PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
PURSUANT TO
S. Con. Res. 27
A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN
INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL
HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND
EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
RELATING THERETO

PART 28
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD

Printed for the use of the
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack
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JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

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JERE COOPER, Representative from Tennessee, Vice Chairman

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HEARINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

Part No. | Pages | Transcript Pages | Hearings
---|---|---|---
1 | 1-399 | 1-1058 | Nov. 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, and 21, 1945.
2 | 401-982 | 1059-2586 | Nov. 23, 24, 26 to 30, Dec. 3 and 4, 1945.
3 | 983-1583 | 2587-4194 | Dec. 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, and 13, 1945.
6 | 2493-2920 | 6647-7888 | Jan. 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 21, 1946.
8 | 3379-3927 | 9108-10517 | Jan. 30, 31, Feb. 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6, 1946.
9 | 3929-4599 | 10518-12277 | Feb. 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, and 14, 1946.
10 | 4001-5151 | 12278-13705 | Feb. 15, 16, 18, 19, and 20, 1946.
11 | 5153-5560 | 13709-14765 | Apr. 9 and 11, and May 23 and 31, 1946.

EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

Part No. | Exhibits Nos.
---|---
12 | 1 through 6.
13 | 7 and 8.
14 | 9 through 43.
15 | 44 through 87.
16 | 88 through 110.
17 | 111 through 128.
18 | 129 through 150.
19 | 157 through 172.
20 | 173 through 179.
21 | 180 through 183, and Exhibits-Illustrations.
22 through 25 | Roberts Commission Proceedings.
26 | Hart Inquiry Proceedings.
27 through 31 | Army Pearl Harbor Board Proceedings.
32 through 33 | Navy Court of Inquiry Proceedings.
34 | Clarke Investigation Proceedings.
35 | Clausen Investigation Proceedings.
36 through 38 | Hewitt Inquiry Proceedings.
39 | Reports of Roberts Commission, Army Pearl Harbor Board, Navy Court of Inquiry and Hewitt Inquiry, with endorsements.

III
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<th>Witness</th>
<th>Joint Committee Exhibit No. 143 (Roberts Commission, Dec. 18, 1941, to Jan. 23, 1942)</th>
<th>Joint Committee Exhibit No. 144 (Hart Inquiry, Feb. 12 to June 15, 1944)</th>
<th>Joint Committee Exhibit No. 145 (Army Pearl Harbor Board, July 20 to Oct. 20, 1944)</th>
<th>Joint Committee Exhibit No. 146 (Navy Court of Inquiry, July 24 to July 19, 1944)</th>
<th>Joint Committee Exhibit No. 147 (Clarke Investigation, Sept. 14 to Aug. 4, 1945)</th>
<th>Joint Committee Exhibit No. 148 (Chauven Investigation, Nov. 23, 1944, to Sept. 12, 1945)</th>
<th>Joint Congressional Committee, Nov. 15, 1945, to May 31, 1946</th>
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<td>Underkoffer, Oliver H., Lt., USNR.</td>
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<td>Utterback, Charles J.</td>
<td>509-517</td>
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<td>Van Deurs, George, Capt., USN</td>
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<td>200-292</td>
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<td>Walker, Eugene B., Col.</td>
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<td>965-972</td>
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<td>Walsh, Roland, Brig. Gen.</td>
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<td>1381-1387</td>
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<td>Waterhouse, George S.</td>
<td>1262-1272</td>
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<td>Waterhouse, Paul B.</td>
<td>1373-1381</td>
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<td>Weddington, Leonard D., Col.</td>
<td>1213-1219</td>
<td>3012-3027</td>
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<td>Welch, George S., Maj.</td>
<td>422-428</td>
<td>2008-2014</td>
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<td>Wellborn, Charles, Jr., Capt., USN</td>
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<td>383-390</td>
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<td>Welles, Sumner</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

1 Pages referred to relate to sworn answers submitted by the witness to written interrogatories.
2 Sworn statement presented to committee.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Witness</th>
<th>Joint Committee Exhibit No. 113 (Roberts Commission, Dec. 18, 1941, to Jan. 23, 1942)</th>
<th>Joint Committee Exhibit No. 144 (Army Pearl Harbor Board, July 20 to Oct. 25, 1944)</th>
<th>Joint Committee Exhibit No. 145 (Navy Court of Inquiry, July 24 to Oct. 19, 1944)</th>
<th>Joint Committee Exhibit No. 147 (Clarke Investigation, Sept. 11 to Sept. 12, 1945; July 13 to Aug. 4, 1945)</th>
<th>Joint Committee Exhibit No. 149 (Chassen Investigation, Nov. 25, 1944, to May 14, 1945)</th>
<th>Joint Congressional Committee, Nov. 15, 1945, to May 31, 1946</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Whaling, William J., Lt. Col.</td>
<td>1830–1842</td>
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<td>White, William R., Brig. Gen.</td>
<td>2456–2478</td>
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<td>Wilke, Wesie T.</td>
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<td>Wilson, Erle M., Col.</td>
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<td>Wimer, Benjamin R., Col.</td>
<td>3663–3683</td>
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<td>Withers, Thomas, Rear Adm.</td>
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<td>Wong, Ahoon H.</td>
<td>3677–3683</td>
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<td>Woodrum, Donald, Jr., Lt., USNR</td>
<td>3750–3773</td>
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<td>Woodward, Farusley C., Lt. (jg), USN</td>
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<td>Woolley, Ralph E.</td>
<td>379–382</td>
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<td>Wright, Wesley A., Comdr.</td>
<td>3357–3586</td>
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<td>Wyman, Theodore, Jr., Col.</td>
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<td>York, Yee Kam.</td>
<td>1525–1538</td>
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<td>Zacharias, Ellis M., Capt., USN</td>
<td>1683–1705</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zucca, Emil Lawrence</td>
<td>2380a–2500</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CONTENTS

WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 23, 1944

Testimony of—

Benjamin L. Stilphen, 109 Jarolemon Street, Brooklyn, New York 1539

Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate pages of original transcript of proceedings.
WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 23, 1944

The Board at 9 a.m., pursuant to recess on yesterday, conducted the hearing of witnesses, Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President of the Board, presiding.


Present also: Major Henry C. Clausen, Assistant Recorder, and Colonel Harry A. Tomlin, Jr., Executive Officer.

General Grunert. The Board will come to order.

TESTIMONY OF BENJAMIN L. STILPHEN, BROOKLYN, NEW YORK

Major Clausen. Sir, the Recorder will not be here for a little while, so I will act as Recorder.

(The witness was sworn by the Assistant Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Major Clausen. Will you state to the Board your name?

Mr. Stilphen. Benjamin L. Stilphen.

2. Major Clausen. And your address?

Mr. Stilphen. My address is 109 Jarolemon Street, Brooklyn, New York.

3. Major Clausen. What is your occupation?

Mr. Stilphen. I am handling industrial relations with the Sinclair Oil Corporation.

4. Major Clausen. In 1941, Mr. Stilphen, were you employed by the United States Engineering Department?

Mr. Stilphen. The Office of the Chief of Engineers; yes, sir.

5. Major Clausen. What were your duties specifically in August 1941?

Mr. Stilphen. My duties were somewhat varied. I was generally sort of a “trouble-shooter” and expediter in handling the labor field. I was classified as a lawyer, but the law had a small part in what I did. I was a liaison labor man; that is what I was. I also did expediting and “trouble-shooting” for them.

6. Major Clausen. Are you admitted to the bar?

Mr. Stilphen. Yes, sir. I am a member of the District Court here in Washington, D.C., and of the Court of Appeals.

7. Major Clausen. Were you acquainted in August 1941 with one Hans Wilhelm Rohl?

Mr. Stilphen. No, sir.
9. Major Clausen. Were you acquainted at that time with Theodore Wyman, Jr.?

Mr. Stilphen. No, sir.

10. Major Clausen. Were you acquainted with a John Martin, [1541] attorney for Mr. Rohl?

Mr. Stilphen. I met Mr. Martin.

11. Major Clausen. When did you meet him?

Mr. Stilphen. It was sometime in the summer of 1941.

12. Major Clausen. Do you recall exactly, with regard to August 28, 1941, when you met Mr. Martin?

Mr. Stilphen. Well, I was sitting at my desk, and Colonel Lorence and Colonel Gesler sent a message out and asked me to come into their office; and Mr. Martin was with them.

13. Major Clausen. He was in the office with Colonel Gesler?

Mr. Stilphen. And Colonel Lorence.

14. Major Clausen. Could you tell me approximately when that was in 1941?

Mr. Stilphen. I have not the slightest idea. It was in the summer-time sometime; that is all I can remember.

15. General Frank. Who was Colonel Lorence?

Mr. Stilphen. Colonel Lorence was Walter E. Lorence; he was the assistant to Colonel Gesler in the Office of the Chief of Engineers. It was the finance section.

16. Major Clausen. Mr. Stilphen, I show you our Exhibit No. 2, which is a photostatic copy of a letter, and ask you whether you have seen the original of that before.

Mr. Stilphen (after examining copy referred to). It sounds suspiciously like something that I might have written.

17. Major Clausen. Do you recognize that as having been prepared by yourself?

Mr. Stilphen. Frankly, I do not, but I have a general idea that I wrote it; yes, sir.

[1542] 18. Major Clausen. Can you tell me whether the talk you had with John Martin was before the letter was prepared?

Mr. Stilphen. Oh, yes.


Mr. Stilphen. I do not know. Several days elapsed, because I had to investigate a case between the time I met Martin and the time this letter was written.

20. General Frank. What was Martin's mission in there?

21. Major Clausen. I was just going to ask that, General.

When you met Mr. Martin you say he was in the office of Colonel Gesler and Colonel Lorence. Tell us what was said by those officers to you and Mr. Martin at that time.

Mr. Stilphen. I was called in and introduced to Mr. Martin and, in substance, they said that a Colonel Wyman, whose name I knew but whom I had never met personally, who was in charge of certain construction for the Corps of Engineers in Hawaii, had written, wired, telephoned, or communicated in some way with the Office of the Chief of Engineers stating that this man Mr. Martin represented—that his services were necessary to completion of these projects out there; that
he was one of the foremost construction engineers of the world, and they had to have him out there.

Mr. Martin was introduced as counsel for this man Rohl, and said he was back here on other business but had been asked by Mr. Rohl, after a consultation in some way or another—I don't know how—that Wyman had been asked to come down to the War Department to see the officers in charge to see if something could be done about getting Rohl's citizenship papers expedited, because at that time there was some sort of a regulation that an alien could not leave the country. So he had to have citizenship papers.

I might add that Mr. Martin, I was told, was back here on other business and stopped in to see what could be done about this thing.

22. Major Clausen. Who told you that, Mr. Stilphen—Colonel Gesler or Colonel Lorence?

Mr. Stilphen. I think it was Colonel Lorence, if I am not mistaken; I would not be too sure about it.

23. Major Clausen. What were your instructions with regard to this?

Mr. Stilphen. To take Mr. Martin out and find out from him his idea of the case, what it was all about, and then to see if I could not do something about it.

24. Major Clausen. What did you do?

Mr. Stilphen. I took Mr. Martin out to my desk and sat him down and got Rohl’s full name, his address, and his background, on paper, and then I called the Department of Justice, the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization. I am very hazy about this business. I will try to recollect it the best I can. If I remember correctly, I could not get hold of anybody at that time. I talked to some girl. So I told Martin that I would take care of it, but I could not get hold of anybody then.

25. Major Clausen. Did you ask Martin why he did not go down to the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization himself and do this?

[1543] Mr. Stilphen. No, sir. My instructions were to do something about it.

26. Major Clausen. Was anything said at this meeting as to why John Martin should not go down himself and take care of getting his client’s citizenship papers expedited if he could?

27. General Frank. Who gave you these instructions—Lorence or Gesler?

Mr. Stilphen. It was one of them, or both. I think it was Lorence, as a matter of fact.

28. Major Clausen. Did Mr. Martin tell you why it was that while the petition for naturalization was filed on January 15, 1941, here it was August 1941, and still it had not been granted?

Mr. Stilphen. I found that out. I found out that that was the usual paper work procedure.

After I did get hold of the proper party at the Department of Justice, I was informed that his papers were in final form, but that the usual red tape—he was in a certain line of precedence. At the time he filed his application here there might be ten other people filing their applications, and fifteen might be before him. His case was completed, but it was a question of taking his papers off the top of the stack and putting them on the bottom of the stack.
29. Major Clausen. But nothing other than that?

Mr. Stilphen. That is correct; that they had completed the investigation and had nothing against him.

30. Major Clausen. Who told you that?

Mr. Stilphen. Somebody in the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization. I have not the slightest recollection of who it was.

31. Major Clausen. Was it the Commissioner?

Mr. Stilphen. I talked to somebody in his office.

32. Major Clausen. Do you recall whether John Martin told you that there was nothing against this Hans Wilhelm Rohl?

Mr. Stilphen. First of all, we had a recommendation as to Rohl's character from Wyman.

33. Major Clausen. What kind of a recommendation was it?

Mr. Stilphen. That he was of excellent character, above reproach, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera.

34. Major Clausen. Was that in writing?

Mr. Stilphen. It was some sort of a communication; I do not know whether it was in writing, telegram, or telephone conversation.

35. Major Clausen. Did you hear that over in the Office of the Chief of Engineers?

Mr. Stilphen. I remember getting that in the Office of the Chief of Engineers.

36. Major Clausen. From whom?

Mr. Stilphen. The impression I have is that I got it from Colonel Lorence. Whether he had the document or whether he had a telephone call from Wyman, or what it was all about, I don't know.

37. Major Clausen. If you got it from Colonel Lorence, was Colonel Gesler there?

Mr. Stilphen. I cannot remember.

38. Major Clausen. Did you have other talks before you went to the telephone to phone the Bureau? Did you have other talks with either Colonel Lorence or Colonel Gesler concerning it?

[1545] Mr. Stilphen. Not outside of my original talk that I have already mentioned.

39. Major Clausen. You must have gotten this information while you were in that office.

Mr. Stilphen. I would say that would be a reasonable inference.

40. Major Clausen. Is that the first case you ever had of getting citizenship papers for somebody?

Mr. Stilphen. Yes; it was the first case of that kind.

41. Major Clausen. It was very unusual for you to ask for citizenship expedition; is that correct?

Mr. Stilphen. I did not consider it unusual. I just thought it was another routine matter at that time. It was in August of 1941, and people were not quite as excited then as they are now.

42. Major Clausen. But you had never had that kind of a routine matter presented to you, had you?

Mr. Stilphen. No, sir.

43. General Grunert. Have you had any since?

Mr. Stilphen. Yes, sir.

44. General Grunert. In your same position?

Mr. Stilphen. No, sir. That was with the Navy Department.
45. Major Clausen. Did Mr. Martin tell you that Hans Wilhelm Rohl had falsely documented some vessels and would have to pay a fine of $25,000 before he could receive favorable consideration?

Mr. Stilphen. No, sir; he did not tell me anything about that.

46. Major Clausen. Did he tell you anything at all about an investigation by the F. B. I.?

Mr. Stilphen. No, sir; he did not.

47. Major Clausen. After you had this first talk with this unknown party down at the Bureau of Immigration, what did you next do?

Mr. Stilphen. I waited to hear from them again. They were going to look up the case, and I subsequently heard from them, and, to the best of my recollection, I was informed that this case was all complete; it was just a matter of routine paper work.

48. Major Clausen. You mean you had, then, only two telephone calls?

Mr. Stilphen. I think I went over there in person once, if I remember correctly.

49. Major Clausen. When you went over in person whom did you see?

Mr. Stilphen. I cannot remember.

50. Major Clausen. Did you go down to the Department of Justice Building?

Mr. Stilphen. I went down to the Department of Justice Building.

51. Major Clausen. Did you report back to your superiors what you had been informed?

Mr. Stilphen. Yes. By the way: Pardon me if I am interrupting you, but the reason for that letter was that I was requested to write that letter by whomever I talked to in the Department of Justice.

52. Major Clausen. When you went down to the Department of Justice were you told substantially the things you have set forth in this letter?

Mr. Stilphen. I would say so, yes. In other words, I brought out that Colonel Wyman had said it was essential to have Mr. Rohl in Hawaii for the completion of these defense projects; and I imagine I went into his background, and so on.

53. Major Clausen. In connection with the letter itself, you knew that this work that was to be done by Mr. Rohl was secret work?

Mr. Stilphen. I knew it was defense work of some sort. I did not know what type it was.

54. Major Clausen. I invite your attention to this sentence of the letter:

It is the understanding of this office that Mr. Rohl's loyalty to the United States is beyond question.

What was the basis for that, Mr. Stilphen?

Mr. Stilphen. The statements by Wyman, and then this investigation that I found out about that had been completed over at the Department of Justice.

55. Major Clausen. It says in the letter that the petition was filed on January 15, 1941. This letter is dated August 28. Do you know whether or not Wyman made more than one request?

Mr. Stilphen. I do not know that, sir.

56. Major Clausen. Do you know when the first request was made by Wyman?
Mr. Stilphen. No, sir.

57. Major Clausen. Did you talk about this with General Robins?

[1549] Mr. Stilphen. No, sir.

58. Major Clausen. Did you talk about it with General Kingman?

Mr. Stilphen. No, sir.

59. Major Clausen. In connection with the sentence which I just read:

It is the understanding of this office that Mr. Rohl's loyalty to the United States is beyond question.

Is it your intent to say that the investigation that was made resulted in that conclusion?

Mr. Stilphen. The investigation and the recommendations of Wyman, and this investigation that I made that I just previously mentioned, about the Department of Justice.

60. General Frank. Did the instructions to you convey the thought that they wanted this matter gotten through in a hurry?

Mr. Stilphen. Yes, sir.

61. General Frank. Was a result of that the lack of thorough investigation of Rohl before this letter was accomplished?

Mr. Stilphen. That is rather a difficult question to answer specifically. I would say that the Corps of Army Engineers would not have adequate facilities, in my opinion, to thoroughly investigate Rohl. It would have to take somebody else's opinion. Those opinions would be of people that knew him personally or had been associated with him, such as Wyman; and then the investigation made by the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization, whose business it is to investigate these people, these aliens.

62. General Frank. Did you realize at that time that this man [1550] was a German alien?

Mr. Stilphen. Oh, yes; I recognized that.

63. Major Clausen. Did you also realize that the letter would be presented to the Court and would have very persuasive power with the Court in granting the petition?

Mr. Stilphen. No. My idea of using the letter, as I previously mentioned, was that I was requested by the Department of Justice, Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization, that they would like to have a letter requesting that these papers be expedited. That was the reason for that letter.

64. General Frank. Were you in this position, that you were called in and told something about this as a "go-getter," and you were then operating under two controls, namely, to get something done about this, if possible, and write that letter, or, rather, first to find out the story about Rohl, and then to write the letter?

Mr. Stilphen. Yes, sir.

65. General Frank. Could you, in the zealously of haste have slighted somewhat the question of the investigation of Rohl before you wrote that letter?

Mr. Stilphen. Generally speaking, that is a fair statement; but when I received my instructions there was no question at that time of writing a letter. The idea was to get this thing fixed up if possible, and the letter came up after I investigated the matter over at the Department of Justice, because they wanted a letter. But I of course would not be competent or qualified and would not have the necessary
facilities to investigate Rohl. I was not in a position to be able to investigate Rohl personally. I would have to rely upon other agencies and other people.

66. General Frank. Did the fact that you in person were not going to sign the letter, but it was somebody else’s onus, lead you to be careless at all about what you put into it?

Mr. Stilphen. No. If I was writing a letter for someone else’s signature it would be the same as writing it for my signature. I would never worry about the onus.

67. General Grunert. While we are on the subject of that particular paragraph of the letter about Rohl’s loyalty, why did you consider it was necessary at all to put that in, if you were just going to write a letter to attempt to expedite the consideration of his case?

Mr. Stilphen. I suspect you would call that a little “window-dressing,” General.

68. General Grunert. A little persuasion or a little influence, in a way?

Mr. Stilphen. Yes, sir.

69. Major Clausen. So that there will not be any mistake about it, up in the upper right-hand corner are the initials “B. L. S.”

Mr. Stilphen. Those are my initials.

70 Major Clausen. You have no question in your mind now that you prepared that letter, have you?

Mr. Stilphen. I am convinced of that.

71. Major Clausen. Let me invite your attention to this sentence:

The qualifications of Mr. Rohl are of vital importance to the expeditious completion of the general construction project because of his peculiar qualifications.

What peculiar qualifications were you informed that Mr. Rohl possessed?

Mr. Stilphen. He was one of the foremost construction engineers in the world, I was told, and it was absolutely necessary that he be sent to Hawaii for the completion of these so-called defense projects.

72. Major Clausen. Who told you that?

Mr. Stilphen. I got that by somebody from Wyman. I don’t know whether I got it from this communication of Colonel Lorence, but from somebody around there somewhere.

73. Major Clausen. Did you get it at the time you had this preliminary meeting with Mr. Martin, Colonel Gesler, and Colonel Lorence?

Mr. Stilphen. Yes.

74. Major Clausen. Is your memory refreshed at all as to when the conversation occurred with respect to the date of this letter, August 28, 1941?

Mr. Stilphen. It might have been perhaps a week before or two weeks. I seem to be able to associate it with the fact that the letter was written—some sort of a period of time elapsed between the meeting and the writing of the letter. It might have been a period of days or a period of a week or two weeks; I just can’t remember. Too many things have happened since that time.

75. Major Clausen. At any rate, on the date when you had this meeting, was Martin there when you phoned the Department?

Mr. Stilphen. Yes; he sat at my desk.
76. Major Clausen. Was it in this telephone conversation that you were asked to go down and see the Immigration Department?

Mr. Stilphen. No, sir. I could not get hold of the proper party; he was not in, or something. I talked to a girl—I remember that—and stated that I wanted to get some information about an immigration case. I think she said that I would have to "come down here." So nothing more was said on the telephone.

77. Major Clausen. When did you go down?

Mr. Stilphen. That day. If I remember correctly, this meeting occurred in the morning. That is when I first met Martin and was called in to Colonel Lorence's office. I don't think he sat any longer at my desk than perhaps five or ten minutes. I got Rohl's full name and his address from him, and tried to develop something from him about his background, as to the kind of work he did, and what projects he had worked on. So I am sure it did not take longer than ten or fifteen minutes.

78. Major Clausen. Then you went down there in the afternoon?

Mr. Stilphen. Yes.

79. Major Clausen. This party that you saw in the afternoon: Do you remember his title?

Mr. Stilphen. I don't remember a thing.

80. Major Clausen. You told General Grumert that you had other cases afterwards. Did you see the same party afterwards?

Mr. Stilphen. I did not have other cases afterwards in Washington, D.C. I had other cases when I was with the Navy at New York.

81. Major Clausen. In any event, inviting your attention again to this letter, it says:

It is therefore requested that the granting of those final citizenship papers be expedited.

Was that the topic of discussion in this conference you had with Colonel Gesler, Colonel Lorence, and Mr. Martin?

Mr. Stilphen. Yes, sir.

82. Major Clausen. In other words, they wanted the application granted?

Mr. Stilphen. Yes, sir. As a matter of fact, they stated it was very important to get it done.

83. Major Clausen. The question of investigating to see whether it should be granted before you wrote the letter was not brought up; is that right?

Mr. Stilphen. I would not say that exactly. If I remember correctly, I was to look up the case to see what it was all about and, if it was possible to get it done, to get it done.

84. Major Clausen. After you had this first talk down at the Department of Justice, did you ever see this party again that you talked with?

Mr. Stilphen. No; it was a telephone conversation.

85. Major Clausen. I thought you said that you went down there after the telephone conversation.

Mr. Stilphen. I did.

86. Major Clausen. The next thing that happened was when you prepared this letter?
Mr. Stilphen. That is right.

87. Major Clausen. How long did you talk with this party, Mr. Stilphen?

Mr. Stilphen. I was down there at the Department of Justice on all kinds of business in those days. I had a tax case in Alaska. They had some school tax law where they could imprison people that did not pay, and they had half of the construction force in jail. I was down there on that, and I was down on all sorts of things.

88. Major Clausen. It sticks in your mind that Mr. Martin was in your office for only five minutes?

Mr. Stilphen. I just happened to remember that?

89. Major Clausen. In any event, did you have any other communications with the Immigration authorities following the telephone conversation, the visit down to see this party, the subsequent telephone conversation, and the writing of this letter?

Mr. Stilphen. I would not say so, sir.

90. Major Clausen. Did it ever come to your knowledge later on that Mr. Rohl had illegally entered the country and had paid a fine of $25,000 for violating a law with regard to immigration matters?

Mr. Stilphen. No, sir; I never heard of him since that time. I was never concerned with him, except when I read about it in the papers here, when Mr. Truman brought it up.

91. Major Clausen. Were you ever asked by your superiors to do any checking up after you had written this letter?

Mr. Stilphen. No, sir.

92. Major Clausen. That is all.

93. Colonel Toulmin. May I ask a question?

94. General Grunert. Yes.

95. Colonel Toulmin. You have stated that the Corps of Engineers had no means of investigating Mr. Rohl; is that correct?

[1556] Mr. Stilphen. I said that in my opinion they had no means. They do not have an investigative agency themselves. I suppose if they wanted to investigate Mr. Rohl they could have gotten Army Intelligence, the F. B. I., or any other such agency. But I meant specifically the Corps of Engineers.

96. Colonel Toulmin. In this case did they make any investigation, to your knowledge, prior to your writing this letter?

Mr. Stilphen. What is very strong in this case, to me, at least, and I assume—

97. Colonel Toulmin. I am asking for the fact now, not for your opinion.

Mr. Stilphen. To answer that question, I wanted to bring out that Colonel Wyman recommended this man—not only recommended him, but he was the particular one that wanted him. Colonel Wyman was the District Engineer, and he certainly had means at his disposal to know about this man. I understood he had worked with him for years and knew all about him. To me, at least—and I am sure the same would apply to Gesler and Lorence—that would be very important.

[1557] 98. Colonel Toulman. Well, did you see yourself the recommendation of Colonel Wyman about Rohl?
Mr. Stilphen. Well, I cannot remember whether I did or not, sir. I heard it. I know I heard it. Whether I saw it afterwards or not, I can't remember.

99. Colonel Toulin. So that the total extent of investigation by the Corps of Engineers was the Wyman recommendation, so far as you know?

Mr. Stilphen. And my inquiries at the Department of Justice.

100. Colonel Toulin. But I am confining it now.

Mr. Stilphen. Yes, sir; as far as the Corps of Engineers go, that policy, that is a correct statement.

101. Colonel Toulin. And the other investigations were made by the Department of Justice and the Bureau of Immigration; is that right?

Mr. Stilphen. Yes, sir.

102. Colonel Toulin. Well, doesn't it strike you as strange that you write a letter of strong recommendation, such as this document of the 28th of August, 1941, on behalf of the Corps of Engineers, certifying as to this matter, when you did not have any means of investigation except Wyman's recommendation, and you were writing the letter to the people who did have the opportunity of making investigation? Isn't that rather the reverse of what is ordinarily done?

Mr. Stilphen. Well, other letters of recommendation had been written, I don't suppose about citizenship papers, but I was asked to write a letter requesting that this case be [1558] expedited by the agency that had cognizance of it; and, as I said before, anybody that makes a recommendation in the Corps of Engineers through the Chief of Engineers out in the field, usually his recommendation, unless it is very, very wrong, would be accepted; I don't care what the matter would be. I mean, if a man is out in the field he knows what he is talking about; unless it is way out of line, obviously, and at that time I do not think anybody thought it was out of line.

103. Colonel Toulin. Well, you have a letter here, Mr. Stilphen, which you wrote on August 28, 1941, in which you give a very extended and positive recommendation of Mr. Rohl to the people who had made the actual investigation, and it is just puzzling. I think, to us why the people who knew the least should be doing the recommending to the people who knew the most.

Mr. Stilphen. Well, that, sir, I am afraid I can't answer; and if Colonel Wyman and my superiors in the Corps of Engineers wanted that man over there, and it had to be done that way, as far as I was concerned it was going to be done that way. They had the perfect liberty to change that letter. As a matter of fact, I have written lots of letters for all the gentlemen involved, and they have no doubt changed a great many of them before they got into the final form.

104. Colonel Toulin. All right. Now that brings me to the next question: Was this letter, which was drafted by you originally, finally signed in this form without change from your original draft, or was it revised by anybody?

Mr. Stilphen. I couldn't answer that. I wouldn't know.

[1559] 105. Colonel Toulin. You don't remember?
Mr. Stilphen. I don’t remember, no, sir.

106. Colonel Toulmin. It was customary to have your letters revised, was it not, when you submitted them for somebody else’s signature?

Mr. Stilphen. It wasn’t customary, but if they didn’t like something they could change it; I had no pride of authorship.

107. Colonel Toulmin. You don’t remember it in this case, whether anybody changed this letter?

Mr. Stilphen. No, sir, I do not.

108. General Frank. Might not your initials up there in the corner indicate that the letter was not changed?

Mr. Stilphen. That didn’t mean anything at all. That didn’t mean anything at all as far as office procedure went. In other words, if I drafted the letter originally and it went through, and say they wanted to change one sentence here or add something, or had anything that should be changed, it would come back again and be typed again, and my initials would still go out on it.

109. Colonel Toulmin. That is all I want.

110. General Russell. So either Gesler or this other Colonel who was out in the outer office that morning, the office into which you went, introduced you to this man Martin as Rohl’s attorney?

Mr. Stilphen. Yes, sir.

111. General Russell. Do you know how long Martin had been out there with these gentlemen?

[1566] Mr. Stilphen. No, sir. I do not.

112. General Russell. At this conference you were directed by one or both of these Colonels, whose names you have given, to follow a certain procedure and accomplish a certain purpose?

Mr. Stilphen. Yes, sir.

113. General Russell. The decision that the Corps of Engineers would expedite, insofar as it could, this application for citizenship by Rohl had been made, therefore, when you were called in?

Mr. Stilphen. Yes, sir.

114. General Russell. Do you know how long Martin had been in conference with these two Colonels before you went into that room?

Mr. Stilphen. No, sir, I do not.

115. General Russell. Was anything said between Martin and those two Colonels after you went into the conference room?

Mr. Stilphen. No, I couldn’t—if I remember, if I can possibly remember, I think that I was introduced to him, and he was identified, and then the statement was made about Wyman and the construction project, and it was necessary to get him over there, and would I see to it, take all steps to see that it was done. Would I take Mr. Martin in tow, as it were, and get what information I needed and then go to work on it.

116. General Russell. The instructions which were conveyed to you by these two Colonels, one or both of these Colonels, at that conference, indicated very definitely that your only job was to expedite those papers?

Mr. Stilphen. Yes, sir.

[1567] General Russell. They, in other words, had adopted whatever had been sent in by this man Wyman or information they
had from other sources, and had decided to go along in getting Rohl these naturalization papers?

Mr. Stilphen. Yes. I was to investigate the case.

118. General Russell. Well, that is what I am getting at. How much investigating were you to do?

Mr. Stilphen. Well, I was to look up and see what the status of the case was. Obviously, if I found out by looking it up that the man was some sort of notorious citizen, I would report that back to them just as a matter of doing my job; but if there was nothing wrong, why, get him out of there.

119. General Russell. Then, your activities were to be along two lines: First, an investigation was to be conducted; and, second, if that investigation was favorable to Rohl, you would press his application?

Mr. Stilphen. Yes, sir.

120. General Russell. Then, you did have a burden of investigating Rohl's desirability as an American citizen?

Mr. Stilphen. No, sir. I wouldn't say that, sir. My part in this was to look up the status of his papers at the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization, which was far from an investigation of whether Rohl would make a desirable citizen or not. The burden of proof was not upon me for the investigation or to determine his desirability. I was merely to determine the status of his citizenship papers at the Department of Justice.

121. General Russell. Now, is that what we are going to stay by? Is that the only thing that you were to investigate, the [1562] status of his papers?

Mr. Stilphen. Yes, sir.

122. General Russell. Therefore, your evidence now is that you were not to make any investigation to determine his desirability as an American citizen?

Mr. Stilphen. Oh, absolutely. I had no instructions as such.

123. General Russell. Did you discuss this situation with General Kingman?

Mr. Stilphen. No, sir.

124. General Russell. You never talked to him about it?

Mr. Stilphen. No, sir.

125. General Russell. I may have asked you this; I am not sure. But do you recall how long you were in conference with these two Colonels and where Martin was present that morning?

Mr. Stilphen. Oh, not more than five minutes, I would say.

126. General Russell. How did it come that this problem was in Washington at all?

Mr. Stilphen. Well, the way I get it, or I got it, was that it came—how it came about, I don't know, but Martin, I was told, was back there on business, some other business.

127. General Russell. Well, let me approach it another way: Is it true or not that this application for the granting of citizenship to this man Rohl was pending in a Federal Court on the West Coast?

Mr. Stilphen. Yes, sir, I think it was.

128. General Russell. It would be in that proceeding, therefore, that all of the evidence would be, and there is where the [1563] judicial conclusions would be reached and the decision made?
Mr. Stilphen. Yes, sir.

129. General Russell. By the Federal Judge out there?

Mr. Stilphen. Yes, sir.

130. General Russell. Now, I am just ignorant on these immigration matters, but there was a file here in Washington relating to this West Coast application?

Mr. Stilphen. Well, now, I don't know that, whether it would be a file here or whether they called or telegraphed out to the Coast. If I am not mistaken, I have a hunch but I certainly wouldn't swear to it; I just can't recollect; I think they wired out there regarding this case, or telephoned.

131. General Russell. When you were over talking with these people in the Department of Justice, did they have a Rohl file there?

Mr. Stilphen. No, sir. As a matter of fact, it took them several days to get the information that they wanted, if I remember correctly.

132. General Russell. Now, you don't remember whether they showed you a telegram or a letter from the West Coast in which this information was set forth?

Mr. Stilphen. They showed me nothing, sir. They showed me nothing.

133. General Russell. I may be confused, but as I remember you said that you had a telephone conversation and then immediately and on—not immediately, but then on the same day you went over to the Department of Justice and talked with them?

Mr. Stilphen. That is right.

134. General Russell. And when you were over there did they have a record or information that Rohl was seeking citizenship in a Court on the West Coast of the United States?

Mr. Stilphen. I think I stated the case to them orally at the time I went over there, and told them what we were after. Then I left there, and they in turn got the information. At no time did I see any papers of the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization on this man.

135. General Russell. What information did the Department of Justice get from the West Coast?

Mr. Stilphen. I suppose the status of his papers out there, along the lines that I have brought out.

136. General Frank. Do you know?

Mr. Stilphen. Do I know? No, sir. I don't.

137. General Russell. Now, when you were in all of your conferences with this Department of Justice group here in Washington, what information did they convey to you about Rohl?

Mr. Stilphen. Well, the nub of it, the way I recollect, was that their investigation of him had been completed.

138. General Russell. Now, "their investigation." What do you means by "their investigation"?

Mr. Stilphen. The Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization.

139. General Russell. That was their Washington office?

Mr. Stilphen. Yes. I speak of that as the office for the country; I don't speak of it just as specifically the Washington office, because I know as well as you know that they operate through field offices and that they would have to, naturally would have to, couldn't all just be down in Washington.
140. General Russell. All right. Go ahead now. Give me the facts if you have them as to what they told you.

[1565] Mr. Stilphen. Well, I don’t have an awful lot of facts, sir. It was a long time ago, and I am trying to do my best to recollect this thing. There has been a lot of water over the dam since that time.

141. General Russell. Well, let me ask you this question: Is it true or not that, had the Office of the Chief of Engineers not intervened in this thing, would the Washington office either of the Department of Justice or the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization have ever known anything at all about Rohl’s application?

Mr. Stilphen. Well, that is a point of procedure I wouldn’t know about. That would be a procedure between the field office of the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization and the Washington office of the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization. Now, whether they clear their papers with the Washington office, I don’t know.

142. General Russell. You are not informed as to whether or not these people in routine procedure here in Washington, whom I have named a moment ago, normally know what is going on in District Courts throughout the United States relating to naturalization?

Mr. Stilphen. I am not informed, sir.

143. General Russell. But it is your impression now that when you contacted the Washington offices of these two Departments it was necessary for them to go to the West Coast to find out what was going on, including the desirability of Rohl to become a citizen?

Mr. Stilphen. Well, I would go so far as to state it was necessary for them to go somewhere and get some information, because, as I recollect it, it took them several days to get the information. In other words, they couldn’t give me an answer right away.

144. General Russell. And they didn’t give you memoranda or other writings in which such information was conveyed to them?

Mr. Stilphen. No, sir.

145. General Russell. Did they give it to you in the office or over the telephone?

Mr. Stilphen. Gave it to me over the telephone.

146. General Russell. Did they tell you in that conversation over the telephone that Rohl’s loyalty to the United States could not be questioned?

Mr. Stilphen. No sir, I don’t think they said that.

147. General Russell. What did they say about his desirability as a citizen, to become a citizen?

Mr. Stilphen. As far as I can recollect, they said that he had filed his papers, that everything was completed about it, and that all that had to happen was that he had to take his turn to get into the District Court to take his oath to become a citizen. That was a question of routine red-tape procedure.

148. General Russell. You are not acquainted with these naturalization proceedings in the Federal District Court?

Mr. Stilphen. I am not. I have a very small knowledge of them. I am certainly no authority on them.

149. General Russell. It did come to pass, as a result of the [1567] Office of the Chief of Engineers intervening, that all this machinery was set in motion in Washington: the Bureau of Immigra-
tion and Naturalization and the Department of Justice, and these three offices cooperating together were responsible for influencing the Western District Court to call up Rohl’s case and dispose of it rather quickly?

Mr. Stilphen. Well, that is the conclusion you are drawing, sir. I assume it is correct.

150. General Russell. Well, you are on the inside to know what the facts are. Is that conclusion correct or not?

Mr. Stilphen. Well, I would say it is a fair statement. In other words, the way the field offices operate, if they get some instructions from Washington they usually do it. See?

151. General Russell. But all of this machinery that was put into action here in Washington, the Office of the Chief of Engineers, the Department of Justice, and the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization——

Mr. Stilphen. May I interrupt you, sir?

152. General Russell. All resulted from the appearance of one Martin in the Office of the Chief of Engineers, and his selling those people down there on the desirability of pressing it along?

Mr. Stilphen. Yes, sir. I just make one statement there. I don’t know whether Martin sold them or not. I don’t know anything about that, but this chain started upon the appearance of Martin. You can put it that way. As far as I am concerned it started with the appearance of Martin.

And there is one thing, just for the record. You are calling it the Department of Justice and the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization. They are one and the same thing. That is, the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization at that time was in the Department of Justice.

153. General Russell. I think that is all.

154. Major Clausen. Who was Colonel Lorence?

Mr. Stilphen. He is colonel Walter E. Lorence, L-o-r-e-n-c-e. He was the assistant to Colonel Gesler.

155. Major Clausen. You say Walter?

Mr. Stilphen. E. Lorence, L-o-r-e-n-c-e.

156. Major Clausen. What was said, Mr. Stilphen, in this talk that you had with Colonel Gesler, Colonel Lorence, and yourself and Mr. Martin concerning the contract that was entered into in December 1940?

Mr. Stilphen. Nothing was said.

157. Major Clausen. Well, you didn’t get this information out of the thin air that is in the first paragraph. You got the contract number and the information that the contractor was doing very important, as you say, defense construction at Honolulu.

Mr. Stilphen. That is right.

158. Major Clausen. Well, from whom did you get that?

Mr. Stilphen. Well, on the statement that he was necessary on this work, I went to the files and got the number of the contract out.

159. Major Clausen. Did you discuss that with anyone?

Mr. Stilphen. No, sir.

160. Major Clausen. You mean you just had a five-minute conversation with Colonel Gesler, Colonel Lorence, and Mr. Martin, and then see these instructions, and undertook all this action?
Mr. Stilphen. Well, my instructions were that way; yes, sir.

161. Major Clausen. Now let me invite your attention to this letter, Exhibit 2. Alongside your initials are some others. What are those initials, Mr. Stilphen?

Mr. Stilphen. There was a man there that was head of the— the Corps of Engineers, the finance section was divided up into a legal section. I was assigned to the legal section, but I didn’t really report to him; I reported directly to Lorence and Gesler on this labor stuff, and I was separate from the labor men on this legal section, but I did do legal work for him too, when I had some spare time, and I think these initials are of the man that was the head of that section. His name is Ralph—I can’t think of his last name, but he would be known; I know that. He was head of that legal section if I am not mistaken. It looks like the last initial is “H” to me, and I think his name begins with an H, but I can’t remember now.

162. Major Clausen. You say, head of the legal section of the labor division?

Mr. Stilphen. No; he was head of the legal section of the finance division of the Corps of Engineers at that time. It was Ralph somebody; I can’t think of his last name.

163. Major Clausen. Let me invite your attention to these initials underneath the date. Do you know whom they represent?

Mr. Stilphen. You mean this mark here (indicating)?

164. Major Clausen. Yes.

Mr. Stilphen. I can’t even decipher it.

[1570] 165. Major Clausen. Now, referring to these initials ending in “H”, was that an officer or a civilian?

Mr. Stilphen. It was a civilian.

166. Major Clausen. Then on the second page there are three sets of initials. Can you tell me whom they represent?

Mr. Stilphen. I think Gesler had a funny little thing; I think that is Gesler’s, but now I wouldn’t swear to it yet. I remember he had a funny little O.K. You see, the way when these letters went out, I will show you; I might give you an idea of the procedure:

I would draft the thing, and then there was a fellow in the section I was in; it would go to him, and he would read it and initial it if it was all right with him. Then from him it would go to the head of this legal section I just mentioned, and he would initial it, and then it would go to Lorence and then to Gesler, and then it would start going up channels to the assistants to the Generals and to the Generals. I mean it would go through nine or ten or fifteen hands.

167. Major Clausen. They didn’t go down that way to you, though, did they?

Mr. Stilphen. You mean the letters?

168. Major Clausen. No. I mean your instructions didn’t come down that way?

Mr. Stilphen. Oh, no.

169. Major Clausen. In this case they went direct to you?

Mr. Stilphen. That is right.

170. Major Clausen. Did you ever see Mr. Martin again after this occasion?

[1577] Mr. Stilphen. No, sir.

171. Major Clausen. Did you ever hear from him again?
Mr. Stilphen. If I remember correctly, I got a letter from him, thanking me.

172. Major Clausen. Thanking you?

Mr. Stilphen. Saying that the papers had been granted, and thanking the Corps of Engineers and me for the assistance, in the letter.

173. Major Clausen. That was about when?

Mr. Stilphen. Oh, golly, at least a month and a half, I guess, or two months.

174. Major Clausen. Addressed to you personally, was it?

Mr. Stilphen. Addressed to me at the United States Corps of Army Engineers, yes.

175. Major Clausen. Personally?

Mr. Stilphen. Personally.

176. Major Clausen. Did you keep that?

Mr. Stilphen. “Benjamin L. Stilphen, Office of the Chief of Engineers, War Department.”

177. Major Clausen. I say, you kept that, did you?

Mr. Stilphen. I think I kept it for a while, but when I sold my house here in Washington I went with the Navy and moved down to New York. I went down there on the Normandie job. I had a lot of files, and I don’t know whether I cleaned them out or destroyed them or not.

178. Major Clausen. Was your action on this letter extracurricular or was it official?

Mr. Stilphen. My action on this letter?

179. Major Clausen. Yes.

[1572] Mr. Stilphen. I would say my action was—wait a minute. I don’t know what exactly you mean, “official.” I signed no correspondence myself.

180. Major Clausen. You say you got a letter from Mr. Martin directed to you, and that you kept it for a while and didn’t put that in the files of the Engineering?

Mr. Stilphen. It was a personal letter.

181. Major Clausen. Was your action in going down to Mr. Schofield a personal matter or was it official, in your mind?

Mr. Stilphen. It was official.

182. Major Clausen. Well, then when you got the letter from Mr. Martin did you take that and show it to anybody there?

Mr. Stilphen. I showed it to Colonel Lorence.

183. Major Clausen. I see. Anybody else? Did Colonel Lorence get one; do you know?

Mr. Stilphen. I don’t think so.

184. Major Clausen. Colonel Gesler?

Mr. Stilphen. I don’t think so. It was, if I remember—I can remember it; it was about one sentence. It said: Mr. Rohl’s papers were granted so-and-so date, and we want to thank you and your associates for your cooperation in this matter, or something on that order.

185. Major Clausen. That is all.

186. General Grunert. I have a few questions. The first one is to get me straightened out on that organization. Was the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization at that time a part of the Department of Justice?
Mr. Stilphen. Yes, sir. It had been recently transferred [1573] from the Department of Labor to the Department of Justice.

187. General Grunert. And the F. B. I. was also a part of the Department of Justice?

Mr. Stilphen. Yes, sir.

188. General Grunert. Now, in your investigation when you went down to the Department of Justice did you in any way know what was in the F.B.I. files about this man Rohl?

Mr. Stilphen. No, sir.

189. General Grunert. From your investigation could you personally vouch for Rohl’s loyalty?

Mr. Stilphen. No, sir.

190. General Grunert. You didn’t, then, have enough information as to be able to vouch for his loyalty?

Mr. Stilphen. I personally, no.

191. General Grunert. Now, who passes on it, or what is the procedure in an alien getting American citizenship? Does the Court grant it?

Mr. Stilphen. The Court grants it. He files—-

192. General Grunert. Where does the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization come in? Do they investigate and recommend to the Court?

Mr. Stilphen. Yes, sir.

193. General Grunert. Now, did it occur to you that the wording of the letter you drafted could have influenced the granting of citizenship because of the fact that the Government appeared to want and need this man badly, and because the Government appeared to vouch for this man’s loyalty?

Mr. Stilphen. I would say that is the tenor of the letter.

[1574] 194. General Grunert. Now, do you know whether this letter itself ever got to the knowledge of the court or whether it just ended at the Bureau of Immigration and had its influence there?

Mr. Stilphen. That I don’t know, whether it got to the Court or not, sir.

195. General Grunert. Are there any other questions?

196. General Frank. You stated to General Russell that your instructions from Colonel Lorence did not obligate you to look up Rohl’s loyalty. Then, why did you put this in here about his loyalty was beyond question?

Mr. Stilphen. My instructions were to investigate the status of Rohl’s case at the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization. After I had determined that there was nothing against him, and on the basis of Wyman’s recommendation, that was put in there, as previously mentioned, to lift the letter up to—-

197. General Frank. Window-dress it?

Mr. Stilphen. Window-dress it.

198. Colonel Toulmin. Selling?

Mr. Stilphen. Selling.

199. General Frank. As a matter of fact, you were the legman in this?

Mr. Stilphen. Yes, sir.
200. General Frank. And you were trying to do everything that you could to carry out the expediting instructions that you had gotten from Colonel Lorence?

Mr. Stilphen. That is right, sir. If it had been Mae West I would have done the same thing, or anyone. The idea was, if [1575] they needed her out there—him or her or anybody out there—to help the war, the idea was to get it done. That is what I tried to do.

201. General Frank. That is all.

202. Major Clausen. What was your employment prior to the time you went to work for the Chief of Engineers?

Mr. Stilphen. I was in the office of the Solicitor of the United States Department of Labor.

203. General Grunert. There appear to be no more questions. Thank you for coming.

Mr. Stilphen. Yes, sir.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

(Thereupon, at 10 a.m., the Board concluded the hearing of witnesses for the day and proceeded to other business.)
CONTENTS

THURSDAY, AUGUST 24, 1944

Testimony of—

Vice Admiral P. N. L. Bellinger, U. S. Navy; Commander, Air Force, Atlantic Fleet, Administrative Office, Norfolk, Virginia----------------- 1575
Commander Joseph J. Rochefort, U. S. N., on duty at Chief, Naval Operations, Washington, D. C----------------------------- 1644
Mrs. Mary B. Kogan, Washington, D. C------------------------------- 1673
Col. Walter E. Lorence, Corps of Engineers, United States Army, Columbus, Ohio--------------------------------------------- 1678
Rear Admiral Walter S. De Lany, United States Navy------------------ 1695

1 Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate pages of original transcript of proceedings.
THURSDAY, AUGUST 24, 1944

MUNITIONS BUILDING, Washington, D. C.

The Board, at 10 a. m., pursuant to recess on yesterday, conducted the hearing of witnesses, Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President of the Board, presiding.


Present also: Colonel Charles W. West, Recorder, Major Henry C. Clausen, Assistant Recorder, and Colonel Harry A. Toulmin, Jr., Executive Officer.

General Grunert. The Board will come to order.

TESTIMONY OF VICE ADMIRAL P. N. L. BELLINGER, U. S. NAVY; COMMANDER, AIR FORCE, ATLANTIC FLEET; ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE, NORFOLK, VA.

(Admiral Bellinger was accompanied by Captain Logan C. Ramsey, U. S. Navy, Chief of Staff to Commander, Fleet Air, Norfolk; Administrative Headquarters, Norfolk, Va.)

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel West. Admiral, will you please state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station.

Admiral BELLINGER. Vice Admiral P. N. L. Bellinger, U. S. Navy; Commander, Air Force, Atlantic Fleet; administrative office at Norfolk, Virginia.

2. General Grunert. Admiral, the Board is after facts as to what happened prior to, leading up to, and during the attack at Pearl Harbor. It is primarily interested in those things that pertained to or could have been connected with the Army. From your assignment during that time, the Board hopes you will be able to give us some light on the facts, and also, possibly, leads to where we can get other facts.

Will you please state to the Board your assignment, and generally your duties thereunder, during the year 1941, giving dates as far as you can remember.

Admiral BELLINGER. On December 6, 1941, and for several months prior thereto, my duties were as follows:

Commander, Hawaiian Based Patrol Wing, and Commander, Patrol Wing 2. Included in the larger command were the patrol squadrons and aircraft tenders attached to Patrol Wings 1 and 2.
Commander, Task Force 9. This comprised Patrol Wings 1 and 2, plus other units, as assigned by Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, for the conduct of specific operations.

Commander, Fleet Air Detachment, Pearl Harbor. The responsibilities of this function included administrative authority in local matters over all fleet aircraft actually based on the Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor.

Liaison with Commandant, 14th Naval District, for aviation development within the District, including Midway, Wake, Palmyra, and Johnston Islands.

Commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force.

In connection with the above duties, I functioned under the following seniors:

Commander, Aircraft Scouting Force, who, as Type Commander for patrol wings, was based at San Diego.

Commander, Scouting Force, the force command of which Patrol Wings 1 and 2 were a part.

Directly under the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, in my capacity as Commander, Task Force 9.

Under Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, in his capacity as Commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force, when performing my duties as Commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force.

Comanders of fleet task forces 1, 2, and 3, for operation of patrol planes assigned to those forces for specific operations.

If I may, and it is the desire of this Board, I would like to continue giving further information.

3. General Grunert. You appear to have some sort of prepared statement, and, if it will enlighten the Board and put its feet on the ground, I think it would be a good thing if you went ahead with your statement, and then we will piece it out with such additional information as we may want. Is that all right with the Board? All right. Proceed.

Admiral Bellinger. On December 6, 1941, and for several months prior thereto, in addition to my basic naval duties as enumerated above, I had the title of Commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force, under the then Commander, Naval Base Defense Force, who was Admiral Bloch, the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District. A change in my status was contemplated in what was then the current Navy War Plan. Under its provisions, the units of my naval command were expected to make an early move to bases in the outlying islands, Midway, Wake, Johnston, and Palmyra. My own headquarters were to be at Midway.

Reverting to my status on Oahu, the most complicated of my duties consisted of those in connection with the air defense of Pearl Harbor. About 1 March 1941, the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, directed me to report to the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, to prepare an air defense plan in conjunction with the Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force. I so reported, and proceeded with the assigned task, working directly with Major General F. L. Martin, U. S. Army, Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, who, incidentally, was senior to me.

The operation plan for the Naval Base Defense Force included several subsidiary plans. The most important of these was the opera-
tion plan of the Naval Base Defense Air Force. In it was outlined the proposed employment of all units made available to the Naval Base Defense Air Force. In so far as Naval and Marine Corps Air Units were concerned, it was an order requiring definite action when applicable.

Orders from Army sources covering the function of air units in the Naval Base Defense Air Force were the guides for these aircraft. Both Army and Navy orders on this subject were based on the estimate of the situation, dated March 31, 1941, and signed by both Generals Martin and myself. That estimate was based on the conditions as they existed at the time it was drafted. Changes in the Naval Air Station between that date and December 7, 1941, were not of sufficient significance to warrant a reestimate, and my information on the Army Air Force \[1579\] indicated an analogous condition. The estimate I believed and still believe to be sound, but the order based on that estimate, like a precept of international law, lacked sanction; and the missing sanction in this case was the absence of unity of command.

Specifically, the organization was designed to function through mutual cooperation between the Army and Navy for the defense of Pearl Harbor against air attack. As such the Naval Base Defense Air Force could function only in the event of an actual emergency or when proper authority so directed. The composition of the Naval Base Defense Air Force varied from day to day with the number of aircraft made available to it by the various air commands, both Army and Navy. The determining factor in this tactical availability was the daily employment schedule of aircraft belonging to the various air units. Aircraft reported as available were subject to the operational control of the commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force, or of the Army Pursuit Commander, in the prevailing category of readiness, only when the Naval Base Defense Air Force was in a functioning status.

The normal procedure used for vitalizing this organization for drills was for the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, in his capacity as Commander, Naval Base Defense Force, to send a dispatch reading:

Drill. Danger of air raid on Pearl Harbor exists. Drill.

This placed the search-and-attack groups in a functioning status. On receipt of this message, I in turn, as Commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force, sent a dispatch to all air units \[1580\] which made planes available to that organization, except Army pursuit units, ordering them to place all available aircraft in the highest degree of readiness. At this point, during such drills, searches were immediately started by planes initially in a high degree of readiness, and their efforts were supplemented by orders to other aircraft as they were reported ready for flight.

The term "Commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force," was actually a misnomer, due to the limited composition of that portion of the Air Forces under my operational control, which included only the aircraft for scouting to locate enemy surface units and to attack them when located. It did not include fighter aircraft, radar detection devices, or antiaircraft guns. The term "Commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force," was even more of a misnomer, as it implied authority
over operating units to a degree which did not exist. This authority was nonexistent until an emergency was apparent, or until appropriate authority placed the Naval Base Defense Air Force in a functioning status; and when so called into existence, was limited in scope, in that it consisted only of operational control over Army units based upon mutual cooperation.

In addition, my authority, limited as it was, extended only over the search-and-attack groups of the Naval Base Defense Air Force, and was non-existent so far as Army pursuit aviation and Navy fighter aviation were concerned, which were to function under the operational control of Brigadier General H. C. Davidson, U. S. Army.

To illustrate the lack of numerical strength of aircraft available to the Naval Base Defense Air Force, attention is [1581] invited to the report of a Joint Army and Navy Board, dated 31 October 1941, convened to prepare recommendations covering the allocation of aircraft operating areas in the Hawaiian area. Paragraph 4 (a) of this report, which was signed by Major General Martin, as Senior Army member, and myself, as senior Navy member, reads as follows:

Paragraph 4. The problem confronting the Board as pertains to Army aviation was summed up by the Army representatives as follows:

a. The mission of the Army on Oahu is to defend the Pearl Harbor Naval Base against all attacks by an enemy. The contribution to be made by the Hawaiian Air Force in carrying out this mission is:

1. To search for and destroy enemy surface craft within radius of action by bombardment aviation.
2. To detect, intercept, and destroy enemy aircraft in the vicinity of Oahu, by pursuit aviation.

It was pointed out that under the Army 54 Group Program, 170 B-17s and two groups of 163 Pursuit planes each, would be assigned to fulfill the above missions.

Naval planes called for 84 patrol planes and 48 VSO planes, to be directly under the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, to supplement or function in lieu of the 98 patrol planes of Patrol Wings 1 and 2, which might be ordered to advance bases on the outlying Islands of Wake, Midway, Johnston, and Palmyra. Further, the planes actually present on Oahu were not free until ordered to concentrate on the naval base Air Defense. Both Army and Navy were in the process of receiving replacements of obsolescent planes. Army B-18s were being replaced by the [1582] more modern B-17s, and Patrol Wings 1 and 2 PBY-1s, -2s, and -3s were being replaced by PBY-5s. The new types were subject to the usual shake-down difficulties and maintenance problems.

The placing of the Naval Base Defense Air Force organization into a functioning status would have necessitated the substantial cessation of training activities in order to concentrate on defense. With the patrol aircraft constantly scouting to a maximum range, and the bomber aircraft standing by for attack missions, a situation would have been soon reached wherein the Navy planes would have been greatly reduced in material readiness and their combat crews approaching an operational fatigue point, while the Army pilots would have been in need of refresher training. Hence, as pointed out in the Martin-Bellinger estimate, the problem resolved itself into one of timing with respect to the current status of our relations with Japan and the necessity
for specific information as to the expectation of an air attack within rather narrow time limits.

The Commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force, did not have the authority to place that organization in a functioning status, except in the case of an actual emergency. The Naval Base Defense Air Force assumed a functioning status immediately after the start of the attack on December 7, 1941, without orders from higher authority. Orders to planes in the air were sent and received by 0805, and a message—

Air raid Pearl Harbor. This is no drill.

was ordered broadcasted at 0758 that morning.

4. General GRUNERT. Did the Naval Base Defense Air Force have anything to do with the outlying islands, Wake, Midway, and so forth?

[1583] Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir.

5. General GRUNERT. That was not part of the responsibility of defense or air action of the Naval Base Defense Air Force?

Admiral BELLINGER. The Naval Base Defense Air Force was based on the joint estimate.

6. General FRANK. The joint air estimate?

Admiral BELLINGER. This joint estimate, prepared by General Martin and myself does not state, "air estimate," but it is based primarily on air, this joint estimate covering joint Army and Navy air action in the event of sudden hostile action against Oahu, or fleet units in the Hawaiian area.

7. General GRUNERT. The Hawaiian area did not include anything outside of the Hawaiian Islands proper, did it?

Admiral BELLINGER. No.

8. General GRUNERT. Now, the Board is interested in the terms used, when the plan is "effective," and when it is "operative." These plans became effective when they were signed, but as I understand, you say they were not to become operative until an emergency arose, and then, I believe, that they could be ordered to become operative by the Army or the Navy Department, or by local commanders, when so agreed upon. Is that your understanding?

Admiral BELLINGER. The question is, who were the "local commanders"—the senior Army and senior Navy officers present?

General GRUNERT. Are you familiar with the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Defense Plan of approximately February 1941, to which this air operational plan was a sort of supplement or appendix? I have here what is known as the "Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan," which was dated as of 11 April 1941, and [1584] in that plan, paragraph 15 (c), (2), it states:

Such parts of this plan as are believed necessary will be put into effect prior to M-Day as ordered by the War and Navy Departments or as mutually agreed upon by local commanders.

Now, just who are referred to, there, as "local commanders," the Board has not yet determined. At least, I do not know who are meant. I would interpret it off-hand to mean that the "local commanders" in Hawaii would be the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, whether or
not it went down below that. But what was your understanding as to when the joint air agreement became effective and operative?

Admiral Bellinger. In this joint estimate signed by General Martin and myself, in paragraph 5 (e), the first sentence reads as follows:

Establish a procedure whereby the condition of readiness to be maintained by each unit is at all times prescribed by the senior officers present of the Army and Navy as a result of all information currently available to them.

10. General Grunert. I thought I understood you to say, in your statement, that this naval air plan functioned only during an emergency?

Admiral Bellinger. Or when set into the functioning status by proper authority. Now, the question is, what is "proper authority"? My understanding of it is that the Commander, Naval Base Defense Force, could issue an order. Whether it would be complied with completely by the Army, lacking an emergency, would depend on the understanding of the Army commander, whether that was a state of emergency which required concentrating on that type of work. That question, as I say, never came up except in connection with drills, and when a drill was held it was arranged by mutual consent prior to the time of the drill, in order to make sure that the forces involved, particularly with the Army, would be available to take part in the drill.

11. General Grunert. Then, for each such drill or maneuver, it required cooperation for that particular period, and did not extend beyond that period? Is that right?

Admiral Bellinger. During the period of the drill, the cooperation existed; yes.

12. General Grunert. That was because the two senior commanders agreed upon having such a drill and maneuver?

Admiral Bellinger. Yes.

13. General Grunert. To your knowledge, did the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District and the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department agree at any time prior to December 7 to make this joint air operation agreement effective as an emergency?

Admiral Bellinger. I remember a situation wherein the Army were having a 3-day period of drills, in which the Navy cooperated in these drills, to get both Army and Navy forces working together. This was subsequent to the plans and directives, and this estimate we have just been discussing, which were in effect.

14. General Grunert. That, again, does not answer the question.

Admiral Bellinger. Excuse me—may I continue?


Admiral Bellinger. The first day, the operations were carried out under the plans of the Naval Base Defense Air Force. That night, I received a dispatch from Army headquarters, stating that the bomber command was no longer "under my command," or "operational control"—I have forgotten the term used in the dispatch. I wondered what caused that dispatch, and what it meant. It arrived late at night. The next morning, there was an air-raid drill in connection with these operations scheduled, and in carrying out the plans for this drill the question, to me, was, was the Army Bomber Command going to function, or not?
About 5 o'clock in the morning, the Wing Commander, Colonel Farthing, called me up and asked if we were going to ask for the Army to assist the Navy. I said, "No; I don't know of any plan to do that," that I was not the one to ask for the Army to assist the Navy; that would be for the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, if they wanted the Navy to ask for the Army to assist the Navy. He said to me that they would like to work in this problem. Well, I said I would like very much to, and that I would keep them informed, and they could carry out their directives, as they might think, acting on the information I gave them, as they saw fit, in accordance with their directives.

In checking later to find out why this dispatch was sent, changing the plan, so to speak, I was informed that it related to the provisions of joint action, which, in my understanding, were superseded, to the extent as indicated, in the plans [1587] embodied in the defense of Pearl Harbor.

After that, I proposed a letter to General Short, for the signature of Admiral Bloch, to endeavor to straighten that situation out, and I believe it was more or less straightened out in so far as I could see from the preliminary phases of it; the idea being that if an emergency did exist and was present, then it would not require authority or sanction of General Short for the Bomber Command to function; and it was in that way and in that echelon that I am speaking about, now.

16. General GRUNERT. Did the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet ever indicate his approval of that joint air agreement as signed by Admiral Bloch and General Short?

Admiral BELLINGER. I assume he did approve it, because Admiral Bloch functioned under the Commander-in-Chief in his capacity, in the defense of Pearl Harbor.

17. General GRUNERT. Now, of course, that was an incident in the case of straightening things out so you could cooperate. What I want to start in with is to get down to the basis. This Joint Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Defense Plan was based on joint action of the Army and Navy, as agreed to in Washington. Under paragraph 9 (b) thereof, is reads:

Operations of Army and Navy forces will be coordinated by exercise of unity of command in the following cases:
1. Where ordered by the President; or,
2. When provided for in joint agreements between the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy; or,
3. When Commanders of Army and Navy forces agree that the situation requires the exercise of unity of command, and further agree as to the service that shall [1588] exercise such command.

Was there at any time, up to December 7, any discussion as to the necessity for agreeing on the exercise of unity of command, under the conditions that then existed?

Admiral BELLINGER. I had mentioned it. In other words, I was not satisfied with the setup under the estimate and directives concerning the Naval Base Defense Air Force. I thought that it was necessary to have a unity of command to make such an operation a success.

18. General FRANK. You mean a unity of command before something happened?
Admiral Bellinger. Yes.

19. General Frank. Rather than when it happened?
Admiral Bellinger. Yes.

20. General Grunert. Up to December 7th was there ever a period that in your mind made it necessary to bring that thing to a head because things were about to happen? In other words, an imminence of possible attack? You apparently in your estimate figured that an air raid or attack was highly possible, if not probable. Now, was there such a period that it seemed to be more necessary than ever to bring that to a head?
Admiral Bellinger. I would like to point out this: that this joint estimate is based on—

21. General Frank. Between you and Martin?
Admiral Bellinger. Yes; the joint estimate signed by General Martin and myself.

22. General Grunert. But approved by the 14th Naval District and by the Admiral of the Fleet?
Admiral Bellinger. This estimate (indicating)? I assume so. I was directed to cooperate with the Army and work out a plan.

23. General Frank. By whom?
Admiral Bellinger. By the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet, [1596] Admiral Kimmel. I was directed to report to the Commandant of the Naval Base to do this, who was Admiral Block; and the most logical procedure was first to make an estimate of the situation, and this was the first step in the effort to bring about a plan of action, but this estimate, as you see, was based on in the event of a sudden hostile action against Oahu and fleet units in the Hawaiian areas. It was not an estimate of Japanese war plans.

24. General Frank. Doesn't that estimate state that a surprise Jap air attack was the most probable action expected?
Admiral Bellinger. "It appears that the most likely and dangerous form of attack on Oahu would be an air attack," is a quotation from the estimate. You asked me, Was this estimate approved. In carrying out my instructions, the estimate and my directive for carrying out the Navy end of the estimate, the decisions of the estimate, were sent to the Commander Naval Base Defense Force, who was my superior in command.

25. General Frank. That was Admiral Bloch?
Admiral Bellinger. Admiral Bloch. I assumed that General Martin sent his copies to General Short, and the agreement between General Martin and myself was that on the basis of this estimate he would get out a directive for his part of the forces involved, and I would get out a directive for my part of the forces involved, and that was done.

26. General Grunert. Presumably it was approved, because it was done?
Admiral Bellinger. Beg pardon?

27. General Grunert. The presumption is that it had the approval of higher headquarters because action was taken in [1597] getting it out?
Admiral Bellinger. I am sure it had the approval. I am sure it had the approval because I was complimented on the cooperation as indicated between Army and Navy.
28. General Grunert. I want to get this fact: But that was not to become operative until an emergency was on your neck, but I want to find out if there wasn't a period of imminence there in which those concerned should have tried to force to a conclusion to make it operative now or to have declared a state of affairs so that unity of command could have been put into effect, and you said you had that in mind but that it was not done?

Admiral Bellinger. No. Pardon me. That could have been done at any time by the Commandant of the 14th Naval District, who was Commander Naval Base Defense Force, if it was approved by and agreed upon by General Short.

29. General Grunert. That is what I want to get at. Why didn't they get together and agree upon it?

Admiral Bellinger. Or it could have been put in effect by General Short if proposed by him and agreed upon by Admiral Bloch.

There was one point I wish to raise, though, in that: that naval planes that were scheduled and which were made available when available to function under this Naval Base Defense Air Force were not separate and distinct from other functions for which they were assigned, which the Commander had a great deal to do with, the Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet.

30. General Grunert. But this is the thing that confuses me: the Naval Defense District and the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department could get together and agree to do this and that, and then suddenly the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet comes in and he may issue orders that are not in consonance with the agreements that General Short and Admiral Bloch had. In other words, he got out an instruction which was late—I don't know—in October, and whether or not that was in consonance with the Hawaiian defense plan and with the air operational agreement, I do not know, but where does the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet come in on these agreements between the District and the Department? Does he have to approve them? If he doesn't approve them, he has most of the means or some of the means that will be involved therein.

Admiral Bellinger. In view of the fact that Admiral Bloch functioned under the Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet, for those purposes I am sure that what was done in preparation of the plan had his approval.

31. General Frank. For what purposes? You said, "for those purposes." I am trying to get what they were.

Admiral Bellinger. For the Pearl Harbor defense force.

32. General Frank. I would like to ask a question here.


34. General Frank. Will you give us a little explanation of your official relationship to Admiral Bloch and to the Commander of the Fleet?

Admiral Bellinger. My direct relation with Admiral Bloch was by a directive from the Commander-in-Chief to report to him for duty in connection with the preparation of a plan coordinated with the Army for the air defense of Pearl Harbor, and as such and in conformity with such I reported, and then as a result of [1593] that I became what was known then as Commander Naval Base Air
Force functioning under Admiral Bloch, the Commandant of the 14th Naval District.

35. General Frank. All right. Now, as that Commander what were your responsibilities to Admiral Block and what were they to Admiral Kimmel?

Admiral Bellinger. Admiral Kimmel had super authority over all the rest of the Navy, and my forces could be removed at any time on any million that he saw fit to assign them; and as an instance, about December 4th there were two squadrons of planes, one at Wake and one at Midway, in connection with an operation which the Commander-in-Chief Pacific had directed. Those planes were subject to being utilized in the Naval Base Defense Air Force when available.

36. General Grunert. When and if they were available. When they are ashore and available, they could be used for that defense, but he, Admiral Kimmel, could pull out anything that pertained to the fleet at any time needed?

Admiral Bellinger. Yes.

37. General Frank. Who was responsible for this Martin-Bellinger agreement, the next higher man? Admiral Bloch or Admiral Kimmel, or both, or you?

Admiral Bellinger. The joint estimate signed by Martin and Bellinger was the result of the initiative taken by Admiral Kimmel. It was signed by General Martin and myself. Therefore we are responsible for the joint estimate.

38. General Frank. We know who was the next man above General Martin, and it was General Short, and there is no question about it; but I still do not know who was the next man above you to [159f] be responsible for this thing.

Admiral Bellinger. Admiral Bloch was the one who was responsible above me in connection with the Naval Base Defense Air Force.

39. General Grunert. But Admiral Kimmel at any time could butt into Admiral Bloch’s business in the defense line and sort of disrupt it by taking out some of his means?

Admiral Bellinger. That is correct. The naval war plans in existence at that time required me to base at Midway and my patrol planes to operate from the four islands, Midway, Wake, Palmyra, and Johnston, and possibly some at Oahu.

40. General Grunert. Here in this case through the direction of the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet he initiated or he told you to get busy on that estimate, and as a result of that estimate there came about this joint air operations agreement which was signed by General Short and by Admiral Bloch, but in that agreement it envisaged using air forces that pertained to the Fleet, and your use of them was only when they were ashore, and they could be taken out from under you at any time as far as the actual defense of Hawaii was concerned?

Admiral Bellinger. Correct.

41. General Frank. They could be taken out from under you as Naval Base Defense Air Force Commander?

Admiral Bellinger. Yes, but not—

42. General Frank. But you still would have them under your command?
Admiral Bellinger. As Commander Patrol Wings, Hawaiian Area. 43. General Frank. In which event you no longer were under [1595] Admiral Bloch?

Admiral Bellinger. No. I was under Commander-in-Chief Pacific in that capacity. That was what I tried to indicate when I answered the first question, and I think you will find that very clearly put as an answer to the question.

44. General Frank. Now I would like to ask this question. Let us assume that somebody did say that, "Here is unity of command." With the forces that you had what would you have done about it?

Admiral Bellinger. As unity of command in connection with the Naval Base Defense Air Force?

45. General Frank. With the whole situation, unity of command; suppose that were on December 1st.

Admiral Bellinger. In that case whoever had unity of command would be responsible for all phases of action which he initiated. Therefore, if he took planes away for one purpose, he is responsible. If he takes, sets the planes for one purpose at another place, he is responsible there. In other words, if he has a certain amount of forces, he would be responsible for the distribution of those forces.

46. General Frank. I know, but what I am trying to get at is this: In view of the lack of equipment, assuming that you had had command of it as a result of the Navy having command under the principle of unity of command, what could you have done?

Admiral Bellinger. I do not know that I could have done anything more unless—that is I.

47. General Frank. Yes.

Admiral Bellinger. The Commander who had unity of command may have done more, yes, because he would be in a position, as [1596] I say, to make distribution of forces, complete distribution, as he saw necessity therefor.

48. General Frank. Were you familiar with the messages that arrived along the 16th of October up through the 27th of November?

Admiral Bellinger. 16th?

49. General Frank. October 16th, and November 24th and 27th.

Admiral Bellinger. 16th of October?

50. General Frank. Yes.

Admiral Bellinger. No. I never saw any of those messages. I do not remember one on the 16th.

51. General Frank. Well, there was one on the 16th.

Admiral Bellinger. That is, I never saw these messages prior to December 7th.

52. General Frank. Well, there was a message on the 16th, a Navy message. In effect it said, "Take due precautions including such preparatory deployments as will not disclose strategic intention nor constitute provocative action against Japan." That was the Navy message as of the 16th of October.

Admiral Bellinger. I do not remember, sir.

53. General Frank. You did not know anything about that?

Admiral Bellinger. No. There was a conference in connection with the reinforcement of Wake and in connection with Midway, and in the first tentative plan it was contemplated that Army pursuit planes might be put out there. Then that was not agreed upon. so
Marine planes were put out there. I attended a conference in the Commander-in-Chief's office. I have forgotten the date. It may have been on the basis of that dispatch. I do not remember ever having seen that dispatch.

54. General Frank. On the 24th of November there was another [1597] message: Caution relative possibility of surprise attack on Guam or Philippine Islands.

Admiral Bellinger. Never saw it. I never saw it prior to December 7. My statement with regard to not having seen these dispatches refers to prior to December 7.

55. General Frank. Did you know that they had arrived?
Admiral Bellinger. Not prior to December 7.

56. General Frank. You did not.

Then there was one of the 27th of November: War warning. Guam Samoa warned re sabotage. Jap action versus Philippines, Thai, or Kra Peninsula, Borneo, expected. You did not know anything about that?

Admiral Bellinger. Not prior to December 7.

57. General Frank. And the Army sent out a message. Since then you have known that those messages had gone out?

Admiral Bellinger. Yes.

58. General Frank. But at that time you knew nothing about it?

Admiral Bellinger. I did not.

59. General Frank. Did you know that there was a tense situation existing?

Admiral Bellinger. The paper indicated quite a tense situation. As a matter of fact, the tense situation had been rising and falling, as you remember yourself, out in that area for some time. It caused me to write considerable letters trying to build up my forces and to get action. I realized thoroughly that it was a tense situation, and as I say the papers indicated a tense situation, but I had no knowledge of [1598] secret dispatches at that time prior to December 7th.

60. General Frank. How many P. B. Y.s did you have then?

Admiral Bellinger. We had a total of 81 P. B. Y.s in the Patrol Wings 1 and 2. And when I say "we had" that included those that were at Midway as well.

61. General Frank. How many did you have right there in Pearl Harbor and Kaneohe?

Admiral Bellinger. On what day?

62. General Frank. December first to seventh.

Admiral Bellinger. On December 5th one squadron that had been away, that is, a squadron of 12 planes that had been away for over a month or so, basing on both Midway and Wake, returned, and one squadron was at Midway on December 6th.

From December 1 to 5 we had 57 P. B. Y. planes.

63. General Frank. On Oahu?

Admiral Bellinger. On Oahu or in the Hawaiian area.

On December 5 to 7 we had 69, with 9 out of commission.

Excuse me. I have to check this a little bit. I have got figures to show all this, and I want to make sure that I am right on this.

64. General Frank. Well, you have the records of the exact number of planes, haven't you?
Admiral Bellinger. On December 7th we had at Kanohe 26 planes, at Pearl 33 planes, and at Midway 12 planes, making a total of 81 planes.

[1599] 65. General Frank. What I am getting around to is this: What kind of reconnaissance or patrolling did you carry out between November 27th and December 7th?

Admiral Bellinger. There was a requirement by a directive from the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, to patrol wings—not Naval Base Air Defense, but patrol wings—to search fleet operating areas in the early morning at sunrise.

66. General Frank. Those are task force operating areas?

Admiral Bellinger. Yes. That was a daily occurrence.

[1600] 67. General Frank. About how many planes did you send out?

Admiral Bellinger. From three to six, depending on the amount of area covered by these assigned operating areas.

68. General Frank. Is that the total number that went out during the day, or did they relieve each other?

Admiral Bellinger. The search was in the early morning, and when that was accomplished, that was the search for that day on that particular job.

69. General Grunert. What was the purpose of the search?

Admiral Bellinger. To guard against submarine attack, primarily, or Japanese ships in the area.

70. General Grunert. And that was primarily done in order to know that in that area a task force could operate with comparative security?

Admiral Bellinger. Yes: from surface or sub-surface craft.

71. General Grunert. It had nothing to do with searching or making reconnaissance for the defense of Oahu?

72. General Frank. Against a surprise attack?

Admiral Bellinger. No. Excuse me. There was patrolling being carried on from Midway.

73. General Frank. What I would like to know is this: Was any patrolling being done as a prevention against a surprise attack?

Admiral Bellinger. Only in the vicinity of Midway. There was a movement in connection with putting these planes that I spoke about, these Marine planes, on Midway and Wake, and in connection with the movement of the carrier task force which was charged with that job we had patrol planes on Midway and Wake that did certain security patrol which was in connection with the security of the task force at sea.

74. General Frank. What instructions did you receive with respect to conducting patrols or reconnaissance for security purposes?

Admiral Bellinger. The ones I spoke about, which required a search of operating areas in the early morning each day.

75. General Frank. You had no instructions from anybody to conduct any search against a force to protect you from a surprise attack?

Admiral Bellinger. We had had on specific occasions, when there was some apparent reason for doing so. That instance had occurred for one or two different periods during the year.
76. General Frank. Was Naval Combat Intelligence information made available to you?
Admiral Bellinger. That depends on the echelon or kind of intelligence.

77. General Frank. During this period?
Admiral Bellinger. Those dispatches were not made available to me.

78. General Frank. Did you have any information about a Japanese task force with carriers in the Marshalls about the first of December?
Admiral Bellinger. No; not to my knowledge.

79. General Frank. Such information would certainly put you on your high horse to get busy, would it not?
Admiral Bellinger. In order for me to get busy I would have to initiate some proposition to higher authority; that is, to get busy lacking some definite actual emergency.

80. General Frank. If you had gotten that information would you not have done some recommending?
Admiral Bellinger. That is something that I would like to say [1602] yes to. I hope I would have done so. But this is post-Pearl Harbor, and then was ante-Pearl Harbor when we were at peace. But I think I would have.

81. General Frank. But at the time you knew nothing about it?
Admiral Bellinger. No.

82. General Grunert. I would like to go back to the subject of what we call distant reconnaissance. You may call it patrol or whatnot. If you had received instructions to do some distant reconnaissance or patrolling with a view to finding out whether there was any air force that might come in to attack Hawaii, in the line of discovering the location of carriers, from whom would you have received that directive for such a reconnaissance?
Admiral Bellinger. Either Admiral Bloch, by his status as Commander, Naval Base Defense Force, in which case I assume he would have conferred with the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific prior to issuing the order, or I might have received it direct from the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific.

83. General Frank. All the planes that you had to perform any missions as Commander of the Naval Base Defense, Air Forces, were sent over there from the fleet, were they not?
Admiral Bellinger. Will you repeat that, please?

84. General Frank. You had a series of six hats that you wore. Among them was Commander of the Naval Base Defense Force, which was under Admiral Bloch; but Admiral Bloch, as the Commander of the Fourteenth Naval District, had no airplanes. Therefore any airplanes that were made available for work as such in the Naval Base Defense Air Force were sent over there from one of these several units?

85. General Frank. Therefore, as long as the commander of the fleet left the planes there, Admiral Bloch and, in turn, you—but principally Admiral Bloch because you belonged to both of them—Admiral Bloch’s plans for carrying out his missions were secure;
but if the Commander-in-Chief of the fleet wanted to pull some of those planes away, that left Admiral Bloch high and dry, so far as carrying out the missions he wanted carried out was concerned. Is that correct?

Admiral Bellinger. That is correct. In other words, the planes comprising the Naval Base Defense Air Force were a "movable feast". In other words, there was no stable organization set aside to form the Naval Base Defense Air Force prior to December 7th. After December 7th, and on December 7th, the main mission became Naval Base Defense Air Force, and all planes functioned on that duty, unless otherwise specifically directed by the Commander-in-Chief, who also took cognizance, and direct cognizance, of the activities of the Naval Base Defense Force.

May I inject one thing on this matter? As I said before, the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, initiated the formation of this Naval Base Defense Force, including the Naval Base Defense Air Force. He did it, so I understand, in order to endeavor, with the forces available, to prepare the best plan, considering all the other factors involved in operation, and to bring about some kind of coordinated effort through mutual cooperation, utilizing what existed or might exist in case the need for it arose.

86. General Frank. One question I would like to ask about this agreement, I asked you who was the one man in the Navy [1604] responsible for the execution of the Martin-Bellinger Agreement. We have three names, Bloch, Bellinger and Kimmel. Under which of the three shells do we find the peanut?

Admiral Bellinger. General Short was——

87. General Frank (interposing). I say, just in the Navy.

Admiral Bellinger. It was not within my authority to start the Air Defense Force unless there was an emergency existing. In other words, it could not be started by me to meet a thought that I might have of danger, unless there was some definite reason to indicate it, in which case I would have had to get some sort of backing from General Martin in order to present this idea to higher authority, because it would have to be a mutual agreement to start it, by General Short and Admiral Bloch.

88. General Frank. That is what I am getting at. We knew to whom Martin would go; there is no question about that. He would go to Short. But to whom would you go? You would go to Bloch or Kimmel?

Admiral Bellinger. With reference to the Naval Base Defense Air Force I would go to Bloch. He was my boss.

89. General Frank. All right. Thank you.

90. General Grunert. I want to exhaust two subjects before we go on with another, in so far as they are exhaustable with the present light.

Let us continue what we might call this command phase. Here we have the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan executed between the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District. Therein, as agreed to and apparently approved all around, it is provided, under [1605] paragraph 18, that

The Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, shall provide for—
and it runs from A to P and paragraph I thereof is "Distant Reconnaissance". It is agreed that the Navy shall provide distant reconnaissance.

As far as the Navy is concerned, in the signatures to that there is the signature of the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District. He is to provide for something; but apparently he has nothing to do that providing with, unless he can get it from his senior, who happens to be the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet. If he is not given the means wherewith to do that, what was the use of having him agree to do it?

Admiral Bellinger. It sounds a little bit worse than it actually might have been, in view of the fact that Admiral Bloch was responsible and functioned under the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, for that purpose. The Commander-in-Chief did have an onus in connection with that also, because Bloch was his man for that purpose.

91. General Grunert. This is my understanding of it. Here is the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet. That is not only Hawaii; it is the Pacific. He has his headquarters at the same place as that of the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District. Therefore, he is in command, and the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District is his subordinate and under him, and he is charged with the defense of the Hawaiian Islands. They make an agreement as between the Army, which is charged with defense, and the Fourteenth Naval District, which is charged with defense, and he agrees to do some distant reconnaissance. [1606] He has no means, apparently, for this distant reconnaissance, or he did not have except such as the Commander-in-Chief of the fleet saw fit to make available to him. In the absence of sufficient aircraft to meet all the demands there necessarily was a sort of pool, and that pool was primarily for the fleet and secondarily for the District. Ordinarily, most of the time the fleet used it and it could not be made available to the District if the fleet was going to use it. So it resulted in what? It resulted in your being put in command of practically all the air forces and the activities of all the air forces, and you had four or five or six different propositions and you had three or four people to go to: You had the Commander-in-Chief of the fleet; you had the District Commander; and you also had some task force commanders, I believe.

Admiral Bellinger. The task force commanders came into the picture when the task forces were operating.

92. General Grunert. So, about the only thing you could do, apparently, was to agree with the Army Air Force commander and say, "We will do what we can with what we have got; and in order to know what we have got, my part of the plan is seaward, and your part of the plan is over the land or nearby." And you agreed on what each other would do, and you agreed that when the time came the fighters of the Navy would be turned over to the Army, and what we may call the reconnaissance of the Army would be turned over to the Navy. That is, generally speaking. So each day, or periodically, you made reports to each other as to what was available?

Admiral Bellinger. Each day.

93. General Grunert. And, therefore, you agreed that

When and [1607] if the time comes that we may have to put this plan into effect, that is our working scheme.

Is that generally a fair statement?
Admiral Bellinger. Generally speaking, I would say that is correct.

94. General Grunert. Without any details.

Now, apparently the inherent weakness in making such plans is the question of their not becoming operative in time to meet an attack? Is that true?

Admiral Bellinger. That is correct. In other words, it is not operative until made operative.

95. General Frank. It depended on a period of strained relations?

Admiral Bellinger. Yes. There was dependence on information that indicated that it was very advisable to put it into operation; and then that required, I would say, mutual consent from Admiral Bloch and General Short in which the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, would have a good deal to do about it with reference to how many planes could be used for that. For instance, he might send planes away. As I say, these two squadrons of planes that went to Midway and Wake were on the direct order of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific.

96. General Frank. It could have been put into effect, that is, this unity of command, by direction from Washington in accordance with joint Army and Navy action?

Admiral Bellinger. Yes.

97. General Grunert. Washington did not direct it.

The only way you had an idea of whether or not this prepared plan would work would be by a number of drills and exercises, which I understand were had?


98. General Grunert. But there was no period of imminence of war that impressed itself upon the minds of those present to decide to get together to make this plan operative and to do it every day until something broke?

Admiral Bellinger. Apparently not.

99. General Grunert. Would it then have been better, and would it have given a better chance to meet an attack on December 7, had that plan been made operative as of the 27th of November, and from that time on you had exercised daily?

Admiral Bellinger. As a result of hindsight and the proper selection of a sector for distant reconnaissance, I would say yes. The question which has to be taken into consideration in looking back now, with our minds built around ante-December 7 days, is this, and I would like to bring this point out: We were in the process of getting new planes; in other words, replacements with new planes, and between 28 October, 1941 and 23 November, 1941, we received 54 new types of planes.

100. General Frank. P. B. Y.-5's?

Admiral Bellinger. P. B. Y.-5's; and those planes were experiencing the usual shake-down difficulties, and we were hampered in maintenance by almost a complete absence of spare parts. We also were not overstocked with personnel. One of our main problems, as I know it was in the Army at that time, was what we termed expansion training, with the idea of endeavoring to develop an additional and adequate number of combat air crews. So that when this was put into effect, in so far as the Navy planes were concerned, that would have to be taken into consideration.
101. General Grunert. Those are what you might call handicaps under any condition?
Admiral Bellinger. That is correct.
102. General Grunert. But if it had been decided that the emergency was such as to go all out in preparedness, then, under existing conditions, would it not have been better to have made that decision before anything happened and not have to implement a plan upon a hostile attack?
Admiral Bellinger. There is no doubt about that, because the whole basis of the plan was to discover the enemy before it could make an attack.
103. General Frank. I would like to ask a question there which is pertinent to that. Had unity of command been in effect and had the whole Army and Navy been in the same frame of mind that they were on the 7th of December with unity of command in effect, what difference would it have made?
Admiral Bellinger. That is rather difficult to answer, because there are so many questions of command relations from the highest echelons, which I am not familiar with, and you would know as much about that as I do. One man who has got the responsibility and the authority to make decisions, instead of trying to influence another man to think as he thinks, is the better plan.
104. General Grunert. If one man had to make the decision and he could get better action, then if two men had to make decisions by cooperation, even with the same means available, do you think you could have gotten better action?
Admiral Bellinger. I think undoubtedly unity of command would have brought better action, starting from the day unity of command was established.
105. General Grunert. Then if any mistake was made in not establishing unity of command, it may have been made by the Powers That Be in Washington or could have been made by joint agreement between the commanders out there. Even unity of command, under the Joint Army and Navy Agreement here in Washington that I read—
106. General Frank. But the frame of mind, the attitude toward the situation, would have been the same in any event, would it not?
Admiral Bellinger. That I am unable to answer, because I do not know what attitude of mind Admiral Kimmel and General Short had.
107. General Frank. Do you think that any information was available in the hands of either of the supreme commanders that would have led to different action had either one of them been supreme?
Admiral Bellinger. If I answered that question it would be entirely supposition on my part; and I do not think that I am competent to really answer it.
108. General Frank. It is just a matter of logic.
Admiral Bellinger. Logically speaking, starting back in August, 1941, I felt that to place something into existence that was then based on mutual cooperation would be much better if they had unity of command; and I still persist in that.
109. General Grunert. We hear considerable about the question of cooperation and the lack of it, and so forth, versus unity of command, and what might have been done thereunder; but this
joint action of Army and Navy, as promulgated here, is part of the “bible” here among the Army and the Navy, from Washington on down, on which this Hawaiian Defense plan is predicated. It says, as I read it, in paragraph 8, B (3):

Operation of Army and Navy forces will be coordinated by the exercise of unity of command in the following cases, 1, 2, and 3.

The third one is:

When the Commanders of Army and Navy forces agree that the situation requires the exercise of unity of command, and further agree as to the service that shall exercise that command.

That unity of command could have been put in force any time those Commanders out there thought the situation demanded it; and apparently they did not think the situation demanded it?

Admiral Bellinger. Maybe one did, and the other didn’t! I don’t know.

110. General Grunert. Have you any more questions on this subject of command? We can go to another subject, now.

111. General Russell. Admiral, as I understand it, Bloch’s function as Base Commander in connection with these islands was limited to the islands and the waters adjacent thereto. The Pacific Fleet, on the contrary, operated over a very immense area, relatively speaking; is that true?

Admiral Bellinger. Yes.

[1612] 112. General Russell. The Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet had all of this area away from the islands, and Bloch had this narrow area about the islands, as his immediate concern: is that true?

Admiral Bellinger. Yes; under the Commander-in-Chief.

113. General Russell. Well, of course, he was in the chain of command. You were immediately concerned with and in command of all the aircraft with the Pacific Fleet, and that which may have been assigned to the Base Commander, with what exceptions?

Admiral Bellinger. In the first place, the fleet planes that I had command of in the Naval Base Air Defense Force consisted of those that were made available to me.

114. General Russell. Well, let us not jump the track. Admiral. That is the trouble we are having.

Admiral Bellinger. Well, but you have to come down to “brass tacks” on this, because it is too confusing.

115. General Russell. Let me state my question, and see if it can be answered.

Admiral Bellinger. All right.

116. General Russell. What aircraft in the Pacific Fleet or in the Fourteenth Naval District did you not have command of?

Admiral Bellinger. The Fourteenth Naval District had under it certain air stations, and there were certain small utility-type planes attached to them, and those planes were directly and specifically under the commanding officer of the air station, and they were directly under the Commandant of the Naval District.

117. General Grunert. That is what you call “housekeeping”? [1613] Admiral Bellinger. That is correct. Now, there was a utility wing. The utility wing was not under me.

118. General Russell. What was that?
Admiral Bellinger. That was a wing composed of various types of planes, to do service to the fleet, such as towing targets, drone control, and various other utility works for the fleet. Also, the carrier planes based ashore were not under me, except when they were made available to me, and when based ashore, and only those, of those based ashore, that were made available to me.

119. General Frank. And the carrier planes available?

Admiral Bellinger. Those carrier planes were attached to aircraft carriers, and while on board the carriers I had nothing to do with them. When they were on shore, those that were made available to the Naval Base Defense Air Force, with the exception of the fighter planes; certain ones of those that were available were made available to the fighter command, General Davidson, in the same method and means as the bomber and scouting planes were made available to me as Commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force. And in addition to that there was a Marine group, which was not under my authority except as the planes were made available to me for the Naval Base Defense Air Force; likewise, the fighter planes of that outfit were made available to General Davison of the fighter command.

Does that answer your question?

120. General Russell. Yes.

Now, we are dealing with four groups, Admiral; certain utility planes that were available to the installation command—ers, and utility planes available to the sea units; the carrier-based planes, when they were on the carriers; and the Marine group. Now, those were the types of planes out in that area, that only on occasions were under your command?

Admiral Bellinger. Right.

121. General Russell. And probably the utility planes were never under your command?

Admiral Bellinger. Yes.

122. General Russell. Because they were “housekeeping”?

Admiral Bellinger. No, they were under my command for that purpose—for this purpose only—Naval Base Defense Air Force purposes.

123. General Russell. Now, let us think about that third group, there, the carrier-based planes. Those were the ones on the two carriers, the LEXINGTON and the ENTERPRISE, operating out of Pearl Harbor?

Admiral Bellinger. Yes.

124. General Russell. About how many carrier-based planes did each of those carriers have?

Admiral Bellinger. Normally, they carried at that time, I believe their complement was 93 planes.

125. General Russell. 93 each?

Admiral Bellinger. Yes.

126. General Russell. That would give them 186?

Admiral Bellinger. Yes.

127. General Russell. Now, let us go to the Marine group. Where were they, and what were they?

Admiral Bellinger. The Marine planes were at the Ewa base and they functioned under the Commander of Carriers of the Pacific Fleet at that time, was his title.
128. General Russell. How many were there?
Admiral Bellinger. I don't remember how many planes they had. It was something about, as I recall, one squadron of bombers, one squadron of scouts, and about two squadrons of fighter planes, perhaps. I am not sure whether that was their full complement or not.

129. General Russell. And where were they, from November 27 to December 7, 1941?
Admiral Bellinger. Some had been moved to Wake. A fighter squadron had been moved to Wake, and I think it was a squadron of dive-bombers that was at Midway.
The remainder of the planes were at Ewa air station.

130. General Russell. Was there any plane arrangement or agreement which regulated the functioning of the planes under your command, the planes with the carriers, and the Marine planes, for reconnaissance purposes?
Admiral Bellinger. Either reconnaissance or for attack purposes?

Admiral Bellinger. When the Air Defense Force was functioning, they automatically came under my command. Those planes were available and received orders as required, either for scouting or for bombing. In other words, standing by for attack. We did not intend using them normally for scouting, because their range was entirely too short.

132. General Russell. Let us go back to realities, from November 27 to December 7. Now, there were these planes with the carriers, there were these planes under your command, and the planes of the Marine people. There was no plan in existence, [1616] then which coordinated the reconnaissance functioning of these three groups of planes out there?
Admiral Bellinger. The plan for reconnaissance was primarily for the patrol planes to carry out reconnaissance. In other words, they were the only ones trained and capable of carrying it out, and these 54 new planes that I am speaking about as having arrived after 28 October were supposedly the best aircraft we had for reconnaissance out in Hawaii.

133. General Russell. Under whose command, then, between November 27 and December 7, were all of the planes in the areas which we have discussed, capable of conducting patrol missions?
Admiral Bellinger. That is a question you have got to elaborate on to get a practical answer. Now, speaking from practical experience, after December 7.

134. General Frank. In the first place, they were all under the Commander of the fleet, at the top side, were they not?
Admiral Bellinger. All fleet planes are subject to the orders of the Commander-in-Chief, as he sees fit, and they each have different commands, but the reconnaissance planes were the PBYs and the 4-engine bombers of the Army.

135. General Russell. We are not talking about the Army, now.
Admiral Bellinger. They were used, and proved the best for reconnaissance work in practice, after December 7.

136. General Russell. We are not talking about that, and I will approach it from another angle. Were there any planes out there
which you have described as "Marine planes," on reconnaissance duty, prior to December 7, 1941?

Admiral Bellinger. You mean, under me, functioning?

137. General Russell. No, sir. I asked you a simple question. [1617] Admiral Bellinger. Well, yes; there were.

138. General Russell. Were those planes on reconnaissance?

Admiral Bellinger. They were going to Midway for that purpose.

139. General Russell. They were functioning, then, on reconnaissance?

Admiral Bellinger. They went to Midway to do jobs at Midway which would require reconnaissance as well as combat.

140. General Russell. All right. Then you did have Marine planes doing reconnaissance from Midway prior to December 7?

Admiral Bellinger. I did not have, no. I just happened to know that they were there.

141. General Russell. Do you know of any of the other Marine-commanded planes that were doing reconnaissance or patrol prior to December 7, 1941, except those at Midway?

Admiral Bellinger. No. Their planes were not actually designed for reconnaissance work, unless perhaps they were operated from a carrier. They at one time used these planes for operating from carriers, and when they were so operated they did carry out reconnaissance duties from the carrier; but from land their range was not satisfactory for that sort of work.

142. General Russell. So, therefore, from land bases their range was not satisfactory for that; then their operations from Midway would not have been satisfactory, because they would have been land-based, there?

Admiral Bellinger. Early information is very desirable. Now, the question is, how early can you get it. If you get information 100 miles away, it is better than having it from 20 miles away. Therefore, they did carry out, I know, [1618] reconnaissance work within their limitations, when they were based on islands; and I don't think any commander who is in charge of an island base would hesitate to use some sort of plane, even a fighter plane, to try to get early information of an attack, or an approaching enemy.

143. General Russell. What would have been the range of those planes based at Midway, that were from the Marine Corps?

Admiral Bellinger. As a matter of fact, those planes flew from Honolulu to Midway with special tanks on them. It was stretching it pretty far, but they did it.

144. General Frank. That is around 1100 miles?

Admiral Bellinger. Midway to Oahu, I think, is 1200 miles, isn't it?

145. General Frank. That is near enough.

Admiral Bellinger. It is 1138 miles.

146. General Russell. Do you know where all of these Marine planes were disposed, or where they were based, on 7 December?

Admiral Bellinger. Those in the Hawaiian area were based at Ewa.

147. General Russell. Do you know about how many there were, there?

Admiral Bellinger. I am not positive.

148. General Russell. Do you know how many were at Midway?
Admiral BELLINGER. I think it was one squadron of 18 planes. I am not positive of that, but I think so.

149. General RUSSELL. Where could we get that information, Admiral, as to where the Marine planes were?

Admiral BELLINGER. That is two years and four months ago, isn't it? I am trying to think where you could get it, now. [1619]

It is only just by luck I have certain papers.

150. General RUSSELL. All right. Now, let us think about the third group.

Admiral BELLINGER. Excuse me. Perhaps you have gotten the wrong impression, when I said that the Marine planes flew from Oahu to Midway. As I say, that was with special gasoline tanks and specially loaded, as lightly as possible, to get the maximum range possible, the normal range combat load—"normal radius of action," you might say, practically, was about 175 miles, the radius of action.

151. General RUSSELL. Then they would be available for reconnaissance from their bases, 175 miles out, and return, or 87 miles out and 87 miles back?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes.

152. General RUSSELL. Which one? They go out 175, and come back, or they go out 87, and come back?

Admiral BELLINGER. If you wanted them for reconnaissance work you would take off some of the load and put more gas on, and get more distance. Normally speaking, I think the plane could search a sector of a radius of 100 miles.

153. General RUSSELL. Then, as a matter of fact, it is a mere generalization to say that the Marine planes were capable of only relatively close-in reconnaissance?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes. As a matter of fact, that was an auxiliary mission.

154. General RUSSELL. Now, let us discuss the planes that were on the carriers at that time, 93 on each carrier. Those planes were available to these two carriers?

Admiral BELLINGER. Available to them.

[1620] 155. General RUSSELL. Yes. I mean, they had been issued. They had them?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes.

156. General FRANK. They were their complements?

Admiral BELLINGER. They were either on the carriers, out at sea, or, when the carriers get in, the planes, the air group, are based ashore.

157. General RUSSELL. Now, the LEXINGTON, that morning of December 7, was about 200 miles westerly of Oahu, isn't that true? One of them was with a task force?

Admiral BELLINGER. One of them was returning. The ENTERPRISE was returning.

158. General RUSSELL. They had with them, or should have had, these 93 planes?

Admiral BELLINGER. I am not familiar with all the details of this operation, because I did not have charge of it.

159. General RUSSELL. You do not know?

Admiral BELLINGER. I don't know for a fact, no. I know from certain information what was going on, and I knew it at the time, but this is two years and some months since then.
160. General Frank. Did you have any authority over or anything to do with the airplanes on the carriers?
Admiral Bellinger. Not on the carriers; no.
161. General Frank. Did you have anything to do with, or any authority over, the Marine planes.
Admiral Bellinger. Only when the Naval Base Defense Air Force functioned, and then I had operational control over those that were made available to me. You must remember that these various commands had commanding officers. They had the job of running them.
162. General Russell. The point I was attempting to illustrate, Admiral, is, that there were certain planes out there that you did not command, and that did not confuse your operation, simply because they were somewhere else, doing something under another command. Those were the utility planes, the marine planes, and the planes that were with the carriers. They did not trouble you, because you had nothing to do with them except when they were attached to your command, isn't that true?
Admiral Bellinger. No, they didn't trouble me.
163. General Russell. With respect to the planes which you had under your command, it did not confuse you a lot, whether you were operating under orders from Kimmel or whether you were operating under orders from Bloch, if you understood your orders?
Admiral Bellinger. No, it didn't confuse me, so long as I got orders.
164. General Russell. But there was no plan set up, and operative, by which you were working with the Army planes, out there, prior to December 7?
Admiral Bellinger. You say there was no plan operating?
Admiral Bellinger. A plan was made operative, at times.
166. General Russell. From November 27 to December 7, was it operative?
Admiral Bellinger. Oh, excuse me. I beg your pardon, was that question from November 27?
167. General Russell. I was going to limit it, so we could not take in so much territory. From November 27 to December 7, were any of those plans operative?
Admiral Bellinger. They were not in a functioning status.
168. General Russell. Is there a great difference between "operative" and "in a functioning status," please, Admiral?
Admiral Bellinger. There is a great misinterpretation of words in the English language, and I want to make sure that it is understood that this plan was not actually functioning at that time.
169. General Russell. Well, I like your language, and we will just adopt it. That will avoid a lot of trouble.
Admiral, on the morning of December 7, 1941, how many Navy planes were available on the Island of Oahu, or in the waters immediately adjacent thereto, to have aided in repelling this Japanese attack?
170. General Frank. That is, for reconnaissance, as well as for fighting purposes?
171. General Russell. For fighting. I am going into the fighting.
Admiral Bellinger. That is a question which is entirely under the
control of the Commander of the fighter group, U. S. Army, as they made their reports to him. They were not under me.

172. General Russell. Then your answer is that you do not know how many naval aircraft were available on the Island of Oahu and the waters adjacent thereto, on the morning of December 7, 1941?

173. General Frank. That is something to get from Davidson.

Admiral Bellinger. In accordance with the estimate of the situation, signed by General Martin and myself, it was [1623] agreed that there would be daily reports of planes that were available to the various commands; and on the afternoon of December 6, I received a dispatch from the Marine Air Corps 21, which stated:

Availability as follows. Eighteen scout bombers, three condition four; fifteen scout bombers, condition five; applicable for December 5, 6, and 7.

I sent this dispatch to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force:

Seven fighters, five condition five; nine scouts, three condition four, six condition five.

Now, those planes were presumably marine planes that were reported to me available, and the scouts were reported because they functioned under the fighter command, the pursuit command, in the normal plan we had drawn up, with the idea that they might be able to track the planes from a hostile air raid back to the carrier, and thereby give the position of the carrier.

[1624] 174. General Russell. Now, were the Marine planes all that were available there at Oahu, or were there some Navy planes in addition thereto available for fighting?

Admiral Bellinger. The regular air groups that were out there were available.

175. General Frank. By that you mean that they were on the carriers?

Admiral Bellinger. Yes. I am practically sure that there were no other planes of that type or of that general size except the Marine planes.

176. General Russell. So there was nothing there available from the Navy aircraft for the defense of the Island that morning, at Pearl Harbor?

Admiral Bellinger. Yes; those that I just spoke to you about and mentioned.

177. General Russell. I though you described those as Marine planes.

Admiral Bellinger. I think they are Marines.

178. General Frank. Those are Navy planes.

Admiral Bellinger. But they are Navy planes. They came in the same category.

179. General Russell. All right. I will ask you if there were any other planes except——

Admiral Bellinger. Excuse me one second. You must remember that the condition of readiness that existed and was in the state of being on the morning of December 7th was Baker 5. Now, that meant, that is for the defense air force setup.

Admiral Bellinger. Now, you understand what Baker 5 is?
181. General Russell. We understood it to mean, Admiral, that condition of readiness.
Admiral Bellinger. So when you speak of readiness, that is the readiness that they were in.
182. General Russell. We are trying to count the planes out there from the Navy that were available to this defense. That was all?
Admiral Bellinger. Yes.
183. General Russell. And those that you have given me are all?
Admiral Bellinger. That is all I know of.
185. General Grunert. I would like to find out what Baker 5 is. Is that four hours' readiness?
Admiral Bellinger. Baker 5 is one-half of aircraft in four hours' readiness. Now, that was a requirement——
186. General Grunert. They could be used in the air?
Admiral Bellinger. Excuse me. That was a requirement by the order by the Commander Naval Base Defense Force. It did not mean necessarily that all planes were only kept in that condition, because planes were not standing by for this [indicating] except within the category that was demanded. In other words, there was a lot of work to be done both by the Army Air Force and myself as well as all the rest of them out there, and that was being done; and if they didn't set this at a lower, a priority which would permit this work to go on, why, it would have been a question of standing by and no work being done.

Admiral Bellinger. If they still were in 5.
188. General Frank. Such other work as was to be done, one of the things would be training?
Admiral Bellinger. Training was one of the big jobs.
189. General Russell. That was what you were discussing, Admiral, some time ago, that maintaining a constant high state of alert out there would produce a weariness of personnel and obstruct other necessary work?
Admiral Bellinger. It was a question of whether we were to improve our conditions out there or take a status quo and never be better than that for some time and rather deteriorate, rather than to improve.
190. General Grunert. Of course, had you known the attack was coming December 7th, it would not have been a long period in which to be on the alert, would it?
Admiral Bellinger. If anyone knew the attack was coming, why, I assume they would have been in a functioning status.
191. General Grunert. Then, if you had received the intelligence that you learned of after December 7th, would that not have given you an idea of the imminence of something coming that would have been greater than attempting to perfect yourselves in training, but to do the best that you could with what you had? I do not mean as to your knowledge about the attack, but I mean as to your knowledge
as to the information that was available to create in your mind a question at least [1627] as to the imminence of an attack.

Admiral Bellinger. In other words, you mean if I had had access to all dispatches, would I have recommended that the Naval Base Defense Air Force be put in a functioning status?


Admiral Bellinger. As I said before, I hope I would have.

193. General Grunert. All right.

Admiral Bellinger. But that is making a statement two years and four months subsequent to December 7, as an aftermath and not as an ante bellum.

194. General Grunert. Admiral, will you tell us the number of planes that were available to you as of December 7th for your, we will say, functioning responsibilities?

Admiral Bellinger. As Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force?


196. General Frank. Did you contemplate using B-18s for any purpose?

Admiral Bellinger. B-18s had a very limited range, so it certainly was not in a good position for reconnaissance. It was hoped that they could make a bombing attack if a carrier came in, in within their radius of action.

197. General Frank. On the other hand, they had very little defensive armament?

Admiral Bellinger. Correct. As a matter of fact, also they were used as well as various other types that were not considered suitable for distant reconnaissance but which we sent out in order to find out anything that we may be able to find out within their radius of action on December 7th.

[1628] Answering the former question by General Grunert, data contained in reports which were sent in accordance with provisions of the joint estimate for the Naval Base Defense Air Force indicate that there were 66 VP planes, 11 utility planes, and from the Army 8 B-17s, 21 B-18s and 6 A-20s. These planes were reported in various conditions ranging from condition of readiness 5 and less.

198. General Grunert. That means what in time?

Admiral Bellinger. Condition 5 means ready in four hours. I would like to bring one point out, though: that the Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, had their conditions in what was termed Easy 5. "Easy" means E-5, and E-5 states that, "All aircraft conducting routine operations, none ready for the purpose of this plan," in Condition of Readiness 5, that is, within four hours.

199. General Grunert. You mean to say any reported number of planes would not be ready within four hours?

Admiral Bellinger. The report means to me that these planes were conducting routine operations, which I assume were carrying out his normal jobs, and they were not ready for the purpose of the Naval Base Defense Air Force plan, but that they could be made ready in four hours.

200. General Grunert. All right. Then they are within four hours? Four hours after they got back?

Admiral Bellinger. Yes.
201. General Grunert. What I am trying to get at is how many were available.

Admiral Bellinger. I am interpreting, because I assume that is what he meant, in other words, because that differs [1629] from the other reports. That is, material readiness Easy or E was different from the others; and, as I say, that “E" means,

All aircraft conducting routine operations, none ready for the purpose of this plan.

202. General Grunert. Meaning, then, that after they got through with the operation they would be made ready in four hours, after they get back? Is that the operation?

Admiral Bellinger. My interpretation was that they were conducting exercises or else were doing something else, but they were not standing by for this plan, but that they could be made ready in four hours.

203. General Grunert. You were not actually able to make the plan function on December 7th, were you? Or did it function?

Admiral Bellinger. The plan began functioning with planes that were available, insofar as scouting was concerned, immediately by radio to the planes that were in the air, and by instructions to get other planes going; and of course the planes that were not in the air were gotten going at various times, some very quickly.

204. General Grunert. Will you tell me how many there were in the air?

Admiral Bellinger. And some, a great many of course, were damaged.

205. General Grunert. Do you know, can you tell me approximately how many were in the air on a scouting mission at the time when the attack first struck or shortly before that, and what their scouting mission was?

I will change that: Were any planes on distant reconnaissance [1630] that morning?

Admiral Bellinger. There were no planes on distant reconnaissance in the true sense of the term “distant reconnaissance." Seven planes were conducting search between 120 to 170 degrees to 450 miles from Midway. Four planes were on the surface at Midway, armed each with two 500-pound bombs and on ten minutes' notice. These four planes took departure at 10:30 and covered a sector from east towards north. Four planes were in the air conducting intertype tactics with submarines.

206. General Frank. At Midway?

Admiral Bellinger. Off Oahu. Captain Ramsey informs me it was off Lanai.

Therefore, considering Midway and Oahu, Patrol Wings 1 and 2 had 14 planes in the air, 7 of which were on search from Midway. 58 were on the surface at Kaneohe or Pearl Harbor ready for flight within four hours or less. 9 planes were undergoing repairs, making a total of 81 planes.

207. General Frank. How many were destroyed in the attack?

Admiral Bellinger. 38 were completely destroyed. 38 were never able to be repaired.

208. General Frank. What about the rest of them?
Admiral Bellinger. 57 planes were put out of commission either temporarily or completely. 38 of those were not able to be put back in commission.

209. General Frank. You then had 24 available after the attack? You said you had 81 and you lost 57. That leaves 24.
Admiral Bellinger. Captain Ramsey says we only had 12 at Midway.

[1631] 210. General Frank. Well, it leaves 12 in commission at Oahu after the attack?
Admiral Bellinger. I am informed by Captain Ramsey that that is correct.

211. General Grunert. Now, a few questions on intelligence. I believe this question was answered. If so, why, we will just say, "answered," but I wanted to make sure that it was understood by you: Did you know of the presence of a Japanese task force in the vicinity of Jaluit between November 27th and 30th?
Admiral Bellinger. No, sir.

212. General Grunert. You did not. Nor were you kept advised as to anything about that force later than that, up to December 7th?
Admiral Bellinger. No, sir.

213. General Grunert. Now, what was the customary procedure insofar as what we would call air intelligence was concerned? Was that a separate intelligence from other intelligence?
Admiral Bellinger. No.

214. General Grunert. It was not?
Admiral Bellinger. No. Naval Intelligence.

215. General Grunert. Do you know whether the air part of the Naval Intelligence was transmitted to the Army Air Forces?
Admiral Bellinger. I do not know. I was not informed.

216. General Grunert. Do you know of any efforts made by the Navy to get intelligence, including intelligence about aircraft or carriers that may have been in or about the mandated islands?
Admiral Bellinger. The Navy is very seriously interested in intelligence, and they have an intelligence branch of the Navy whose job it is to get all intelligence they can get, and undoubtedly everyone in the Navy is interested in getting the maximum amount of intelligence they can get.

217. General Grunert. Your definite interest, though, was primarily, I presume, to know about the possible opposing aircraft and carriers?
Admiral Bellinger. That was something in which I was very much interested.

218. General Grunert. Did you get any such information?
Admiral Bellinger. But, as I said before, my war plans job was to base at Midway. Therefore, with my forces on the various islands including Midway, Wake, Palmyra, and Johnston, I would therefore be very much interested in all information about Japanese air effort.

219. General Frank. But you didn’t have any that morning?
Admiral Bellinger. I beg pardon.

220. General Frank. You didn’t have any on the morning of December 7th?
Admiral Bellinger. December 7th I didn’t have any information about a task force in Jaluit, you say?
221. General Grunert. Yes, or the Marshalls. I will put it both.
222. General Frank. When is the first time since then that you
have heard of that?
Admiral Bellinger. I think it is today.
[1633] 223. General Grunert. If you were based on Midway
then it would be more than that?
Admiral Bellinger. Yes.
224. General Grunert. Anxiety as to information about the man-
dated islands would be greater?
Admiral Bellinger. Yes.
225. General Grunert. Did you ever needle the powers that be to
give you more information than you had? You apparently had not
known about it. Did you ever get after them and say, "Here, in order
do to my work in the future I have got to have information"?
Admiral Bellinger. As to this information about a task force in
Jaluit, I do not remember anything about it. This is my first infor-
mation about that, now, that there was information about this task
force in Jaluit. Certainly I am interested and was interested in every
form of readiness which includes naval intelligence. As a matter of
fact, we were discussing this subject with General Martin and others
some time considerably prior to this, wondering if we would have
intelligence on the movement of a Japanese force.
226. General Grunert. My understanding is that you did not get
any information about the movement of Japanese forces in or about
the mandated islands?
Admiral Bellinger. I remember nothing about it at the present
time, and I do not think I ever got it.
227. General Grunert. Did you take any positive action in at-
temning to get such intelligence from the Navy or from any other
source? Not that intelligence, but any intelligence about the Jap-
anese Navy?
[1634] Admiral Bellinger. We were supposed to be kept in-
formed, as a force commander or commander of an operating out-
fit, and presumably information of that kind would be distributed
as it was known to have been distributed in the past. I do not remem-
ber any special effort or special demand for information that I ever
made to the Navy Department. When it came to demands it was
mainly demands for increasing the material readiness. But I do not
know of any particular definite specific demands for naval intel-
ligence.
228. General Frank. You assumed that if it was available it would
be given to you?
Admiral Bellinger. I assumed that and I expected that.
229. General Grunert. We will go to a different subject now.
Were the submarines of the fleet or of the naval district, if any,
used for reconnaissance purposes? Did they fit into your scheme
of reconnaissance?
Admiral Bellinger. The submarine force was not under me. We
worked that submarine force in various ways. For instance, we had
drills to work out with submarines and we had something to do
with operations connected with reconnaissance duties.
230. General Grunert. Were they ever used in a scheme of distant reconnaissance? While you did not have quite enough planes to cover 360 degrees, there were certain areas that might be covered by subs. Was that ever done?

Admiral Bellinger. They were not put in the scheme of things connected with that, presumably because they would be used offensively rather than on defensive missions.

231. General Grunert. Any intelligence they might furnish would be incidental to other duties?

[1635] Admiral Bellinger. Submarines have been used for intelligence work in war games and in plans. Whether any submarines had been sent out for any specific intelligence work, I do not know. That was not under me.

232. General Grunert. They were not under the air reconnaissance?

Admiral Bellinger. They were not working under me and were not in the picture in connection with the defense of Pearl Harbor.

233. General Grunert. It is the Board's understanding that these task forces that went out from Pearl Harbor had no definite job in distant reconnaissance for the defense of Oahu; that they scour the areas for security purposes and then were used by the task forces for their own purposes, and not for distant reconnaissance purposes for the defense of Oahu. Is that your understanding?

Admiral Bellinger. I do not think that any task force was sent out as a job for the security of Oahu. Some task forces that were operating at that time, that I have spoken about, were in connection with Midway reinforcement and Wake reinforcement. When on those missions, of course they conducted search to the maximum of their capabilities; and in addition to that we had patrol planes that were there for that purpose, too. That is what the squadrons were out there for.

234. General Grunert. The patrol search was intended primarily to safeguard from subs, to look for subs primarily, and any air reconnaissance was incidental as far as protection for Hawaii was concerned?

Admiral Bellinger. Not being the task force commander, I [1636] cannot say; I do not know. Submarines were there on December 7th and for many days after that. Aircraft were there on one day.

235. General Grunert. Let me put it this way: As Navy Defense Air Force commander, you had no assignments made for any air mission so far as the task force was concerned? In other words, they were not given any assignments in so far as your job as the Naval Base Defense Air Force commander was concerned?

Admiral Bellinger. No. In my status as commander of Patrol Wings 1 and 2, in that capacity I furnished planes as directed, or squadrons as directed, by the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, to work with that task force in accordance with the plans of that particular task force commander.

236. General Grunert. How was the so-called cooperation between you and General Martin? Was it satisfactory to you?

Admiral Bellinger. I should say it was very close, friendly cooperation. I have a high opinion of him and I think he is a very fine officer and gentleman.
237. General GRUNET. Outside of his being a fine officer and gentleman, did you get out of him what you needed to carry on your work, and did he get out of you what he needed to carry on his work?

Admiral BELLINGER. I think so, because shortly after he arrived—I had arrived just shortly before he arrived, and we immediately agreed to endeavor to work out exercises together and we conducted many exercises which were entirely arranged between him and me, and then we would have a critique over at the Naval Air Station where several Army officers came over to attend. I think for a while those exercises took place once [1637] a week, and maybe later once every two weeks, and then finally when this Naval Base Defense Air Force came into being the exercises were planned more in accordance with that.

238. General GRUNET. Then the gist of the whole thing is that you got along well together officially and socially. Aside from unity of command, do you think you got about as much as the two of you could get by cooperative action?

Admiral BELLINGER. That can never be attained, because—

239. General GRUNET (interposing). I say, aside from that, did you get as much of cooperation as you think the two of you could have gotten short of unity of command?

Admiral BELLINGER. I do not see how we could have. Cooperation is fine, but there is always the responsibility of one man to one boss and the other man to the other boss.

240. General GRUNET. You did not have that; but did you get as much out of it as you expected, short of that?

Admiral BELLINGER. I was thoroughly satisfied with the cooperation between General Martin and myself.

241. General GRUNET. Did you know what action the Army took, or General Short took, as a result of a message which he received from the Chief of Staff on November 27? The Army went on what they called Alert No. 1, sabotage alert. Were you informed that the Army was on such an alert?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir.

242. General GRUNET. You did not know anything about that?

Admiral BELLINGER. I cannot remember knowing anything about it. One second; excuse me. This was a long time ago. (After a pause:) I do not recall knowing about it; at least, if I knew about it, I did not know about it officially.

[1638] 243. General GRUNET. Would it have affected your responsibility one way or the other had you known?

Admiral BELLINGER. That is, that the Air Force was on an alert?

244. General GRUNET. The entire Hawaiian Defense Command was on Alert No. 1, which is an alert against sabotage. They went on that Alert on November 27th. My question is, did you know about it? You say you did not know about it.

Admiral BELLINGER. I did not know the reasons for it. If I knew they were on their alert, I did not know it officially.

245. General GRUNET. Would it have made any difference whether they were on alert or not as far as your responsibility was concerned?

Admiral BELLINGER. It would depend on for what reason they went on the alert. That I knew nothing about.

246. General GRUNET. And you knew nothing about the message received by the Army from the Chief of Staff, or the message received
by the Navy which started with the words "Consider this a war warning?"

Admiral Bellinger. No.

247. General Grunert. You were not informed of that?

Admiral Bellinger. No, sir.

248. General Grunert. Tell us what you know, if anything, about the Army's Interceptor Command which included its air warning service and its ability to operate December 7. What did you know about it and what was your opinion of it?

Admiral Bellinger. It was my understanding that it was in the process of building up; that they needed more personnel, more equipment, and more experience.

249. General Grunert. Did you have any confidence in its ability to operate?

Admiral Bellinger. I had never had any definite experience that would give me that assurance.

250. General Grunert. Did you have any similar scheme within the Navy itself, such as was contemplated in the Interceptor Command, where one officer, the controller of the information center, controlled the operation of the device in the air or controlled antiaircraft and controlled the radar? Did you have any such thing to control your antiaircraft aboard ship? If not, how were they handled in the Navy? Here was a bunch of antiaircraft on each ship, with quite a bit of fire power, and you had radars. Were they each independent on the ship, or was there some coordinated system of handling all that intelligence and operation while they were together?

Admiral Bellinger. You are speaking about ships at sea, I presume?

251. General Grunert. Yes. In handling your aircraft was it necessary for you to have any such system as the Army established as an Interceptor Command?

Admiral Bellinger. Apparently it was not practical to do that. I have forgotten whether this was subsequent to December 7 or prior to it, but I know that efforts were made to try to see whether radar on ships in harbors, with the interference of the surrounding land, would prevent the radar from being effective.

252. General Grunert. Presumably the radar on ships in the harbor did not operate while in the harbor?

Admiral Bellinger. They did not function very satisfactorily [1640] at that time. I am speaking now about approximately that time. I am not so sure whether this was before December 7 or after December 7, because the radar on ships was something that was just coming into being and every effort was made to try to get them on the carriers first.

253. General Grunert. After the attack occurred on Pearl Harbor of course the Interceptor Command scheme was broadened so as to weave into the antiaircraft defense those guns aboard ship while in the harbor. They supplemented the land-based antiaircraft, and then it was all woven into one whole. Up to that time, as far as you know, those had not been included in the antiaircraft scheme? Is that right?

Admiral Bellinger. The effort to utilize the ships in the harbor with their guns was placed in effect in conjunction with the effort for the air
defense, and came into being under the Naval Base Defense Force commander.

254. General Grunert. Was that prior to December 7?
Admiral Bellinger. Yes.

255. General Grunert. But it had not been woven into the Interceptor Command control?
Admiral Bellinger. No, sir. It was not under the Interceptor Command control; it was under the control of the operating staff of the Naval Base Defense Force. There was a requirement which the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, had in effect at the time, and had for some time, with reference to the manning of gun crews continuously. There was a regular scheme laid out for their control, so far as practicable, by the ships that were in the harbor, by the senior officers in certain sectors of the harbor. That was a different situation, maybe, every day. We [1641] hoped it was a scheme that would work and fit conditions that existed on any day. But the general plans and instructions for manning the guns were in effect.

256. General Russell. After November 27, 1941, did you receive any part of the record which indicated to you, as Commander of the Air Force which you then commanded, that there was a tightening up in the operations in the Navy with respect to reconnaissance or being on the alert for impending attack or trouble with Japan?
Admiral Bellinger. No.

257. General Russell. There were no new instructions, therefore, that reached you on November 27 or thereafter, which you could interpret as meaning that the relations between the two powers were becoming more strained?
Admiral Bellinger. No, not officially; only through newspapers.

258. General Russell. As a result of what you saw in the newspapers did you take any different action from what you would have taken had you not read the newspapers?
Admiral Bellinger. The question is how to interpret the newspapers. As a result of the newspapers, I took no special action. We were in a condition of trying to get ready to such an extent that I was endeavoring to indoctrinate the aircraft in my patrol wings, 1 and 2, that if they were on a flight and they got word that war was on they would be ready in their training point of view, combat crew disciplined and the equipment in the planes to carry out the job that might be assigned. That was the kind of training that were trying to perfect.

259. General Russell. So you did not regard the newspaper in- [1642] formation as changing your operations at all?
Admiral Bellinger. As a matter of fact, I was laid up a few days from December 2nd to the 6th, and I saw newspapers.

260. General Russell. You testified a little while ago that certain planes were operating from Midway to a distance of approximately 450 miles, and you gave the directions of those operations by language with which I am not familiar. I wonder if you could tell me this: Were you operating those planes to the north, the east, the west, or to the south?
Admiral Bellinger. In regard to Midway, the sector covered was to the southeast from Midway. After word was received out there at Midway the four planes that were remaining and ready for flight were on a sector towards the northeast.
261. General Russell. Do you have another copy of that map which is before you?
Admiral Bellinger. No. This is an original and is the only one I have.

262. General Russell. You would not want to give it to us?
Admiral Bellinger. No, sir.

263. General Frank. If one of those planes had met with some Zeros it would have been too bad?
Admiral Bellinger. It would have.

264. General Frank. If all four together met with Zeros it would have been too bad?
Admiral Bellinger. Yes; although patrol planes have “shot it out” with some Jap planes.

265. General Grunert. Is there anything else that occurs to you that you think might be of assistance to this Board in getting at facts or getting leads towards sources of such facts? [1643] If so, if you could add it now to your testimony we would appreciate it. Is there something that sticks in your mind that ought to be considered, outside of what we have covered in our questions and your answers?

266. General Frank. Let me ask this question: The general activities of the Navy operating out of Pearl Harbor were in what direction from Oahu?
Admiral Bellinger. On December 7?

267. General Frank. No; in the period prior to December 7, in November and up to December 7.
Admiral Bellinger. Toward the northwest and west. On the routes toward Midway and Wake there were two task forces of surface craft and aircraft that went out in connection with the reinforcement of those two islands, Midway and Wake, by Marine aircraft. These forces were operating in that area going out and coming back.

268. General Grunert. You do not think of anything else that you think ought to be put before the Board?
Admiral Bellinger. No, sir. I think it has been covered as far as I can see. I know of nothing more to bring out.

269. General Grunert. Thank you very much for giving us of your time and assistance.
(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)
(Thereupon, at 1 p.m., a recess was taken until 2 p.m.)

[1644]  

AFTERNOON SESSION

(The Board, at 2 o’clock p.m., continued the hearing of witnesses.)
General Grunert. The Board will come to order.

TESTIMONY OF COMMANDER JOSEPH J. ROCHEFORT, U. S. N.; ON DUTY AT CHIEF, NAVAL OPERATIONS; WASHINGTON, D. C.

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel West. Commander, will you state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station, please.
Commander Rochefort. Commander Joseph J. Rochefort, U. S. N., on duty at the Chief, Naval Operations; Washington, D. C.

2. General Grunert. Commander, this Board is after the facts, both as to what happened prior to, leading up to, and during the attack at Pearl Harbor. From a study of the Roberts Commission's report, we find that you were in a position, by reason of which I think you can give us some information that will help us.

First, then, will you state to the Board what your assignment was in the latter part of 1941, and then explain what the duties of that assignment were, so that we may get clearly just what your position was and how you fitted into the picture.

Commander Rochefort. About June 1941, I was ordered from duty as intelligence officer of the Scouting Force to combat intelligence at Pearl Harbor. This combat-intelligence assignment was to an office which was a field unit to the home office, which was in Washington; the other field unit being in Cavite, and operating under the Sixteenth Naval District. I was attached to the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, and theoretically had no connections with the Commander-in-Chief[1645] or with any other organization, there.

The duties of the office were extremely technical in nature, and had nothing to do with ordinary intelligence; it was primarily radio intelligence. The method of operating was, we were given assignments by the head office in Washington as to the type of work they wished us to work on.

3. General Grunert. Before you go any further, let me see if I understand that. You were then the combat-intelligence officer, in matters pertaining to the Fourteenth Naval District; at least, you were attached to that district for combat-intelligence work?

Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir.

4. General Grunert. There existed also a fleet-intelligence officer?

Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir.

5. General Grunert. And a district intelligence officer?

Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir.

6. General Grunert. There was also an Army intelligence officer?

Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir.

7. General Grunert. Those were the other echelons of intelligence work going on at that time?

Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir.

8. General Grunert. You had nothing to do with local intelligence, nor with the ordinary intelligence that the fleet needs; you had to do with special intelligence work?

Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir.

9. General Grunert. That was mainly in the line of radio interception?

[1646] Commander Rochefort. Radio interception. I might say, General, that when I first went there it had no name whatever. It was called the "radio unit" of the district, but we changed it after I went there and called it "combat intelligence," and then enlarged it to include such things as providing situation maps for the Commander-in-Chief, and plots of all vessels in the Pacific, and so on, and so forth; and generally we consisted of an intercept station, a radio-direction-finder station, and, in the crypto-analytical units in Pearl Harbor, proper.
10. General Grunert. If there is anything, in answering any of our questions and in explaining anything to us, that may be of future value to the enemy, we had better consider what should be on, and what should be off, the record; so keep that in mind in answering these questions.

Just what is the set-up, so that you could perform the duties that you were required to perform out there?

Commander Rochefort. I don't understand your question, by "set-up," sir.

11. General Grunert. All right. Now, is there radio intercept?

Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir.

12. General Grunert. You spoke of direction finders; and now, what is the physical set-up? How do they do that. Give us an understanding of that.

Commander Rochefort. We had what we termed the "intercept unit," which during 1941 was located at Heeia, at an old naval radio station.

13. General Grunert. That is on an island in the Hawaiian [1647] group?

Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir. That is just beyond Waialua over on the other side.

14. General Grunert. That intercept station works by itself? It doesn't have to have anything farther out, does it?

Commander Rochefort. No, sir. It might be understood a little more clearly, sir, if we called it a monitoring station. I believe that is what the FCC calls it—a monitoring station. In other words, we intercept any traffic that is going, either way.

15. General Grunert. In any direction?

Commander Rochefort. In any direction; yes, sir.

16. General Grunert. All right. Now, I understand it. What are your "direction finders"?

Commander Rochefort. The task of the direction finders was to take bearings on transmissions of vessels or units in which we were interested.

17. General Grunert. That requires more than one station, does it?

Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir; that does require more than one station.

18. General Grunert. Did you have charge of those stations, or were those independent groups, too?

Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir. In addition to the combat intelligence unit at Pearl Harbor, there was established in 1937 what we called the "Mid Pacific strategic direction-finder net," which were all high-frequency direction finders, and those direction finders were physically located at Dutch Harbor, Samoa, and Pearl Harbor, plus one at Guam, which for administrative [1648] purposes came under the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet, but who took bearings for us, so we had four stations which were included in the Mid Pacific net.

19. General Grunert. Was the direction finding primarily for the fleet, or was that incidental in following up your radio-intercept, and so forth?

Commander Rochefort. That was incidental to the radio intelligence job, sir. The function of that, or rather the mission of that
was to tell the Commander-in-Chief and any other interested parties
where certain units of any nation, other than our own—and our own, if so directed—were.
20. General GRUNERT. That is, where they were physically located?
   Commander ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.
21. General GRUNERT. Although you might have picked it out of
the air about their being there, but you located them through the
direction finder?
   Commander ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir. That was the function of the
radio direction finder.
22. General GRUNERT. To whom was this information you got
through the radio intercept and direction finding transmitted?
   Commander ROCHEFORT. That came into the office which was
located in the administration building in Pearl Harbor, and was
evaluated there with other information, and was disseminated to
the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet by means of a daily
bulletin, which included locations of enemy vessels and estimates
and evaluations regarding future operations. Also, if anything
of any importance was determined that was sent by radio to a group
of addresses, a standard group of addresses, which included the
Chief of Naval Operations, the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet,
the Commandant of the [1649] Sixteenth Naval District.
23. General FRANK. That was in Manila?
   Commander ROCHEFORT. That was Cavite; yes, sir; plus the Com-
mandant, Fourteenth Naval District, and the Commander-in-Chief,
Pacific Fleet.
24. General GRUNERT. Did you have any responsibility as to any-
ting sent by direct transmission to the Army in Hawaii?
   Commander ROCHEFORT. No, sir.
25. General GRUNERT. If that was transmitted, it was somebody
else's business?
   Commander ROCHEFORT. Our relations with the Army in Pearl
Harbor were more on the personal basis. We had no directives to
my knowledge, to do such and such, with Colonel Fielder. He hap-
pened to be my opposite number, there. I worked through Colonel
Fielder; but everything that was done was on a personal basis, and
if we determined anything or heard anything, it would be delivered
to Colonel Fielder, personally.
26. General GRUNERT. But it was not your responsibility to keep
him informed?
   Commander ROCHEFORT. I did not consider it was; no, sir.
27. General GRUNERT. Was most of this work that you were doing
considered to be of a high degree of secrecy?
   Commander ROCHEFORT. It was considered to be the very top, sir.
28. General GRUNERT. Therefore, you were probably limited in
the dissemination?
   Commander ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.
29. General GRUNERT. And he was not on your list for dis-
semination?
   [1650] Commander ROCHEFORT. No, sir; we were not permitted
to deal with anybody other than the Commander-in-Chief of the
fleet.
30. General GRUNERT. And the Commandant of the District? All right.
Now, on all diplomatic or consular stuff, could you "pick" or "butt into" that?

Commander ROCHEFORT. No, sir. In this allocation of work that I mentioned before, the diplomatic and consular work was done by the unit in Washington; and, to a certain extent, it was assisted by the unit in Cavite.

31. General GRUNERT. But if it were in the air, could you not pick it out?

Commander ROCHEFORT. We could have, sir, if it was in the air; but—it may sound funny, now—it was not our job, sir.

32. General FRANK. When you refer to "the unit in Washington," do you mean the naval unit in Washington?

Commander ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir; in so far as we were concerned, it was the naval unit. Actually it was both the Army and the Navy here, together, but in so far as we were concerned.

33. General GRUNERT. Was it against the law for you to pick that up?

Commander ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

34. General GRUNERT. And trying to decode it?

Commander ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir; it was.

35. General GRUNERT. Now, we get down to cases. This information that you got was furnished by daily summaries to the fleet and the District?

Commander ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

36. General GRUNERT. And to other people, but not directly to [1651] the Army?

Commander ROCHEFORT. No, sir.

37. General GRUNERT. If you got any special information, I suppose it was furnished to the same people?

Commander ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir. The arrangement we made, General, was again on a personal basis. Anything pertaining to the islands, themselves, in so far as I was concerned, was the function of the district intelligence officer and of the Army; anything pertaining to outside of the islands was my job, and the arrangement I had was that if any information such as—oh, say an unauthorized radio transmitter, perhaps, on the Island of Oahu, if that came up, I would communicate that information to the district intelligence officer and to Colonel Fielder.

38. General GRUNERT. And they would handle the local matters?

Commander ROCHEFORT. They would handle the stuff in the island, proper. In other words, they were interior, and I was not at all interested in anything that went on, on the beach, or within the island. I didn't consider that part of my job.

39. General GRUNERT. But suppose you picked up something a way out to one side, you then could not be the judge as to whether it was Navy, Army, or the district?

Commander ROCHEFORT. Then I dealt only with the Commandant of the District, sir.

40. General GRUNERT. What I am trying to find out is, if it had to be transmitted to the Army, that would be transmitted on his judgment?
Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir; either by the Commandant, the Commander-in-Chief, or by the Chief of Naval Operations, here.

[1652] 41. General Grunert. All right, now; I think I understand the set-up.

Along about the latter part of November, or, I believe, as testified by you before the Roberts Commission, along about the 1st of November, you started picking up some stuff which appeared to be of great interest and probably some question, and then, along about the latter part of November, you picked up some stuff that showed concentration of Japanese vessels. Now, will you give us the story to that, from the beginning to the end, until you lost it, or lost part of it, or whatnot. Give us that story, please.

Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir. Well, in any of this radio intelligence work, sir, by experience, trained men or trained officers can make a very, very good estimate of what the intentions will be of the enemy, by means of just a study of the traffic, itself; and from our experience in Hainan, the movement which had happened about nine months before, and watching the traffic during the late fall of 1941, it became apparent that the Japanese were preparing for a major operation. As time developed, and along about the 20th or 25th of November, things had progressed to the point where our views crystallized, and we accordingly prepared an estimate, which was sent to all the addresses that I mentioned previously.

42. General Grunert. That was in the form of a summary, was it?

Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir; you call it a "summary." We call it a "summary."

43. General Frak. How was that sent—by radio?

Commander Rochefort. That was sent out by radio, sir. [1653] The procedure was that it was sent by radio to a single addressee, which included Chief of Naval Operations, two Commanders-in-Chief, and the two District Commandants involved. That summary indicated to us that the Japanese were engaged in a major operation, which would start in the immediate future, and that it was composed generally of two task forces; and we gave the location and the composition and the general heading. In addition to that, there appeared to be a very strong concentration in the Marshalls; as I recall, we said at least one third of the submarines, and at least one carrier division unit—at least that. We sent that out, as I recall, about the 25th or 26th of November.

44. General Grunert. Would you tell me what a carrier-division unit consists of, how many carriers?

Commander Rochefort. Normally, two, sir, with the Japanese. It could be three, but normally, two.

45. General Grunert. And the submarines, you said about a third?

Commander Rochefort. About one third of the submarines. They were as I recall two squadrons, which would be probably about 15 to 20 submarines.

46. General Grunert. Were there any battleships in that force?

Commander Rochefort. Not that we noted, sir; not that we noted.

47. General Grunert. All right. Go on.

Commander Rochefort. That summary was sent out about the 25th or 26th of November, and the reply was received from the Asiatic unit, the so-called "Cavite unit," in which they agreed with us in prac-
tically all particulars, other than the location of the carriers in the Marshalls.

[1654] Their reaction was that they did not have sufficient evidence that would indicate there were carriers in the Marshalls. Aside from that, they agreed with us.

48. General Grunert. They had a similar unit to yours, in Cavite? Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir, the only difference being the type of work that they were working on, the type of stuff that they were working on.

49. General Grunert. Then, what happened, after the 25th, after that summary?

Commander Rochefort. After the summary, sir, why, things got very quiet, and there was considerable action and traffic and indications in the area generally to the westward of the Empire; that is, between the Empire and Indo-China, which made it very clear that the Japanese were moving in that area. There was some traffic indicating a move down toward the Philippines.

50. General Grunert. Was there anything indicating that this force which you had estimated or figured out to be in about the Marshalls had left the Marshalls?

Commander Rochefort. No, sir; there was not. Aside from those two groups or forces that I have mentioned; that is, going toward the Philippines, and toward Indo-China, there was no information of any sort available from a study of radio traffic that indicated any move to the eastward from the Empire, or any move out of the Marshalls.

51. General Grunert. About when was it that, from all the evidence, this force in the Marshalls dropped out of existence?

Commander Rochefort. About the latter part of November, [1655] I would say, sir; perhaps in the last five days of November.

52. General Grunert. You could not get anything on the carriers, or you could not get anything on any part of the force, or what?

Commander Rochefort. They were not transmitting. That is, if they were transmitting messages, we were not hearing them.

53. General Frank. They were on radio silence, completely?

Commander Rochefort. Apparently so, sir; apparently, they were on radio silence.

54. General Grunert. Was that indicative to you there was something serious in the air?

Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir; there was; but not toward the eastward.

55. General Grunert. Did you enquire of Cavite again to find out whether they got anything more on them?

Commander Rochefort. There was a series of dispatches between Cavite and ourselves and Washington, beginning with our message, about the 25th. I don't recall any specific message though, or what it said, but we had been for months of course in constant communication; but whether any of the messages subsequent to that asked that specific question, sir, I don't recall.

56. General Grunert. You did not have any reaction, though, from Washington, on your summary?

Commander Rochefort. No, sir. There was no reply.
57. General Grunert. There was no reaction, indicating that they believed in it, or disbelieved in it?

Commander Rochefort. No, sir; there was no reply from [1656] Washington, sir.

58. General Frank. Did you get anything from Dutch Harbor or Samoa?

Commander Rochefort. No, sir; I didn't get anything from Dutch Harbor and Samoa, General. They only had either three or four radios, and they were merely a direction-finding unit, that was all, and they were supposed to be trained direction-finder men; but that's about all they were good for.

59. General Grunert. In this radio intercept stuff about the force being in the Marshalls, did you get the names of any of the vessels?

Commander Rochefort. No, sir.

60. General Grunert. Do you know whether this force that you located in the Marshalls was the force that attacked Hawaii?

Commander Rochefort. We believed it was, afterwards, sir.

61. General Grunert. What led you to believe that? What led you to believe that they were the same vessels?

Commander Rochefort. We were reasonably sure, sir, in so far as the submarines were concerned, because we had, of course, numerous submarines off Pearl Harbor, beginning on or about the 7th of December, and the logical place for them to come from was the Marshalls, particularly in view of the fact that the force commander of the submarines was in the Marshalls during November and remained there during December and probably January.

62. General Grunert. Was there any talk in the air by radio, later on, from Japanese sources, that gave you information as to where they had been, or what they had done?

Commander Rochefort. No, sir. We knew, of course, who had come to Pearl Harbor, but where they had come from, we didn't [1657] know.

63. General Grunert. There was something I did not quite understand, in your testimony before the Roberts Commission. The Chairman said something to the effect,

Now, you had information on Wednesday—

I presume that is the 3rd—

that the consul here was burning his papers, did you not?

You replied,

We are the ones who gave that to Washington.

He appeared to be surprised, and said, "Oh!" And then you said:

We talked—we told them he was. They told us that London and Washington were burning papers.

Presumably that was the 3rd of December, Wednesday?

Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir.

64. General Grunert. Now, was that information from Washington that the consulates in London and Washington were burning papers transmitted to your district commander?

Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir.

65. General Grunert. And to the Chief?
Commander Rochefort. It was transmitted to the District Commandant, sir, by me, personally, and it was transmitted to the Commander-in-Chief, by reason of the fact that he was an addressee. In other words, all of those dispatches were automatically addressed to the Commander-in-Chief, but whether or not he personally saw them, of course, I couldn't say.

66. General Grunert. And you do not know whether that information got to the Army, or not?

Commander Rochefort. No, sir; I do not. There were some of those messages, General, which indicated that, "Please show to the Department commander," or, "Please inform the Army authorities of this decision."

67. General Grunert. Those were some messages that came from the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy?

Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir. Some of those dispatches indicated that he was to confer with the Army authorities.

In connection with that diplomatic situation, sir, if I may clear up that one point, the task, as I have indicated, of the diplomatic stuff, was being done in Washington on a joint basis. I think it was Mr. Sarnoff who came out to Honolulu, September, October, or something, and we had been endeavoring to my knowledge since 1925 to get some of this traffic, unsuccessfully. Mr. Arnow indicated we should get it.

68. General Grunert. Mr. Sarnoff was acting in what position?

Commander Rochefort. He was head of the RCA, at the time, sir, President of the RCA. It was suggested we make some sort of effort, and, on a personal basis, with the district intelligence officer, he gave me some of the traffic which he had obtained. It was very recent traffic, and that is how we sent that one dispatch to Washington, indicating that he was burning the stuff, because of some stuff, there.

69. General Grunert. That has covered all the ground I wanted to cover. Have you some questions?

70. General Russell. Did you know anything about the effectiveness of the radar which was in possession of the Navy at Pearl Harbor?

Commander Rochefort. No, sir; I did not.

71. General Russell. You did not know whether they could search out anything with those radar installations?

Commander Rochefort. No, sir; I did not.

72. General Russell. You state that you were not permitted to pick up or evaluate information intercepted from the consular service, is that what you said?

Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir; that is correct.

73. General Russell. You were precluded by law from doing that?

Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir.

74. General Russell. Didn't you have to get some of it, before you knew whether it was consular, or not?

Commander Rochefort. Well, actually, general, it had been obtained, but it was being done by people other than us. That was part, again, of the allocation of work. In other words, we had, say, five jobs to do. Washington, we will say, would handle two, and they would give us two, and they would give Cavite the fifth one, and we would work on them; and if any information was obtained from one of the other jobs, that would be passed on to us; but we were not supposed to work with that type of traffic.
75. **General Russell.** So, as soon as it was distributed by your operators, then they lost interest?

Commander Rochefort. No, sir. We didn’t cover those “printers” on which it would be sent.

76. **General Russell.** I understand.

Commander Rochefort. In other words, we were only interested in one thing, in Pearl Harbor. We were interested in the Japanese Fleet. That’s all we cared about.

77. **General Russell.** You were interested only in what?

Commander Rochefort. In the Japanese Fleet. That’s all we were interested in.

78. **General Russell.** Now, you say there was a summary, about [1660] the 20th of November, in which this task force in the Marshalls was discussed?

Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir.

79. **General Grunert.** You say the 20th?

Commander Rochefort. The 25th, sir.

80. **General Russell.** The 25th?

Commander Rochefort. About the 25th.

81. **General Russell.** Do you know whether or not a copy of that estimate is in existence, in Hawaii?

Commander Rochefort. A copy should be available, sir, in the office of Naval Communications. That would be the normal custodian in the Office of Naval Communications.

82. **General Grunert.** Here, in Washington?

Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir. They should be the custodians of all that traffic.

83. **General Grunert.** Is there any record of it in Hawaii, do you know?

Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir. Yes, there would be a record, there.

84. **General Russell.** Now, about this task force with the carrier unit in it, would it be divulging anything that you should not divulge, if you told us where you first picked that up?

Commander Rochefort. That would be very difficult to answer, General. In estimating these things, it was more by sense than by anything else. I used to explain it by saying that in any major operation started by the Japanese there would be three definite stages. There would be the stage of a large flurry of traffic; that is, messages, and one thing and another; and then there would be a stage of apparent confusion, in which [1661] they would send a message to General Soandso, and Admiral Soandso, and they would say, “He isn’t here, send it somewhere else”; and quite a bit of confusion, which was caused apparently by the regrouping of the ships and the units. That would be the second phase. [1662] The third phase was radio silence, and when radio silence started then you knew something was up. So we could always tell by these various conditions or phases they would go through just about how far advanced they were in this thing. And I think the estimates that were made by both the unit at Pearl Harbor and Cavite were accurate in everything except one respect, that is, that one task force from Pearl Harbor. Everything else was absolutely correct. The make-up of them, the composition, we knew that.
85. General Grunert. There was one other question I wanted to ask you: In that force going down to Hainan, had any of that force ever assembled as far away as the mandated islands in order to go down to the southeast?

Commander Rochefort. No, sir.

86. General Grunert. Then did it seem strange that they should be assembling in the Marshall Islands in order to go southeast?

Commander Rochefort. No. As I recall, General, we said in our summary that that force might possibly be a force that was to cover the flanks. I believe we made such a statement as that, something similar to that. It was our assumption at the time that that group of submarines there, with or without the carrier group, would be used to secure the flanks against any possible move on the part of the United States.

87. General Grunert. Now, at that time was your service rather new?

Commander Rochefort. The service in Pearl Harbor, sir, was relatively new.

[1663] 88. General Grunert. What I am getting at is, did the rest of the Navy believe in what you were doing and what you could do? In other words, how much credence did they give the output of what you did, in your opinion?

Commander Rochefort. The naval officers who had access to the information believed in it very strongly, sir, but those were only a fraction of one percent, possibly, of the naval officers. That is, for reasons of security we were not permitted to discuss the matter with anybody or to show them anything. So that Admiral Kimmel came over very frequently and discussed matters with us, but whether he discussed them with members of his own staff or not, referring to our work, I do not know.

89. General Grunert. Did you consider that force a threat against Hawaii?

Commander Rochefort. Personally, no sir.

90. General Grunert. Although it had aircraft carriers in it that could strike at Hawaii or most any other near-by point?

Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir. The organization that we had identified, General, is not a type of organization you would have for a striking force. In other words, it lacked two elements: it lacked either cruisers or destroyers, and it lacked a supply, that there were no indications of tankers there, no indication of any cruisers or destroyers. For that reason it did not seem that it was coming to the eastward, because they would not move carriers and submarines.

91. General Grunert. Of course, that was none of your business? You picked the information up and gave it to them in a summary, and it was up to them to figure it out?

[1664] Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir, because we had nothing else available, sir, no other information available aside from that we gathered by radio.

92. General Grunert. All right. General Russell, have you finished?

93. General Russell. I am a little bit intrigued about their moving out there to protect the flank, the southern movement of a major portion of the Japanese forces. What was on the flank that they should have been troubled about?
Commander Rochefort. The United States Fleet, sir.
94. General Russell. Where?
Commander Rochefort. Pearl, sir.
95. General Russell. Pearl Harbor?
Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir.
96. General Russell. Where would it have been easier for them to have destroyed that fleet?
Commander Rochefort. Well, if I were Admiral Yamamoto, sir, I would like to have them in the Marshalls somewhere.
97. General Russell. Would it have been better to have attacked them or attempted to have destroyed them when they were in battle formation moving to the west, or when they were not steamed up and lying in the harbor at Honolulu?
Commander Rochefort. Probably when they were out to the Marshalls, I think it would be easier.
98. General Russell. If they had a force out there to have fought it out with these naval forces in the Marshalls?
Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir. I think probably it would have been better from the Japanese point of view to have had us in the Marshalls.

Commander Rochefort. No; all they would need there, sir, would be the air bases.
100. General Russell. Oh, you mean move in with the land-based planes?
Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir.
101. General Russell. As it developed, that was not what they were thinking about.
Commander Rochefort. No, sir, that was not in their mind at all.
102. General Russell. Wasn't it true that this report that you had in the latter part of November indicated the names of the carriers that you had contacted?
Commander Rochefort. I am not sure of that, sir, but I do not believe that it did.
103. General Russell. Is it true or not that the radio stations or the sending sets, if that is the accurate description of what the transmitter is, on the carriers were relatively weak and could not be detected for a long distance?
Commander Rochefort. Oh, no, sir. No, sir; that is not true.
104. General Russell. That is not true?
Commander Rochefort. No, sir, that is not true.
105. General Russell. That when these carriers went into port they changed the type of radio set that they operated with, and you lost sight of them?
Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir.
106. General Russell. So long as the carriers then were in home ports you had very little way of checking on them?
Commander Rochefort. We had what we called collateral, sir. We do the same thing. Everybody does the same thing. When a ship goes into port it usually utilizes the communication facilities of that navy yard or naval base, whatever it is going to be. In other words, he may send his messages by blinker or land-line or telephone or any-
thing else. When he is at sea, of course, then he has to transmit his own.

I might say in passing that at that time, though, we got relatively few dispatches transmitted by a certain vessel as transmitted from that vessel. We got them on the second or third or fourth transmission. In other words, the carrier might send a message to Tokyo. If that carrier were close to Truk he would probably transmit it to the station at Truk, and then Truk would transmit it on up to Saipan or perhaps direct to Tokyo, and we would get it on what we called the second or third or fourth bounce; and then if there was an information addressee in it, possibly Ominato. Tokyo would put that on the air again for Ominato; and by means of that information which we call collateral you could usually determine where a vessel was or where a unit or a commander was.

107. General Russell. Do you know an officer of the Navy by the name of Layton?

Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir.

108. General Russell. What was his function out there at this time?

Commander Rochefort. Layton, Lieutenant Commander Layton at that time, was the fleet intelligence officer for the Commander-in-Chief.

[1667] 109. General Russell. Did he have an independent agency for collecting data on the Japanese fleet? By “independent” I mean different from the agency which you were operating.

Commander Rochefort. I am not sure that I understand, sir. Layton received all radio intelligence pertaining to the Japanese from me, to which he added other types of intelligence that he might have received from other sources, perhaps from documents or letters or something of that nature from someone else. His radio intelligence was received from us.

110. General Russell. Therefore such information as he had about the location of the different elements of the Japanese fleet during the year 1941 probably came from you?

Commander Rochefort. It probably came from us, yes, sir.

111. General Russell. Is it true or not that during the year 1941, or to limit that period a little further, during the six months next preceding December 7, 1941, there were a great many periods of time when you had little or no information on the Japanese Navy?

Commander Rochefort. I think——

112. General Russell. Let me ask you this. Commander: Have you seen the statement which was furished by Lieutenant Commander Layton to the Roberts Commission?

Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir.

113. General Russell. Have you made a study of that table that was there?

Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir.

114. General Russell. I am confining this question purely to the accuracy of the table, and not to any construction that was placed on it. Do you regard the information in that table [1668] as accurate?

Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir; the statements made there are accurate.

115. General Russell. Well, did that table, or not, indicate that there were relatively long periods of time during the six months
preceding Pearl Harbor when there was little information about the Japanese fleet available to you?

Commander Rochefort. The information contained in the table indicated that there were relatively long periods in which we did not have positive information of the location of some specific unit or task force, but from collateral information or other information we did not consider that we had lost those units or forces.

116. General Russell. I want to ask you one thing as a matter of information before I discuss this table in one or two of its details with you. There is an entry which I could not interpret; I do not know what it means. The entry was: Cruisers second fleet less the word c-o-n-d-i-v or -u.

Commander Rochefort. C-o-n-d-i-v?

117. General Russell. C-o-n-d-i-v. What is that?

Commander Rochefort. "Com."

118. General Grunert. C-o-n-d-i-v. What is it? It is a part of the fleet?

Commander Rochefort. It would be a portion—it would be cruisers of the second fleet less the Nachi or Chikumi or Toni or something of that sort, sir.

119. General Russell. Then there is an entry relating to that same word which describes it as "seven, very active on detached service." Nothing positive about that.

[1669] Commander Rochefort. Seven, sir?

120. General Russell. Seven condibs, if that is what it is.

Commander Rochefort. Crudibs.

121. General Russell. Crudibs?

Commander Rochefort. Crudibs is probably what it should be, sir: cruiser divisions.

122. General Russell. Crudiv?

Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir. Crudivs. That would be seven cruiser division. We call it crudiv seven.

123. General Russell. Well, being enlightened, I want to ask you about the carrier situation as reported in this table.

Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir.

124. General Russell. The report was that the carriers with the crudivs out—

Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir.

125. General Russell. That there were 134 days in the last six months when the Navy was uncertain as to the location of the Japanese carriers, that the periods when they were lost during those six months numbered twelve, and that these periods varied from nine to twenty-two days. It seems that the 22-day period was in July 1941. Now, do you have any independent recollection of those carriers being lost all of those days?

Commander Rochefort. No, sir. I believe that the table is correct. The construction to be placed on those remarks I believe is incorrect. In other words, while it is true we did not have any concrete evidence of a unit or units for periods of from nine to twenty-two days, it did not mean that we were uncertain as to their whereabouts. It merely meant that we had not heard them. In other words, we still had not lost them.
126. General Russell. But you were very well satisfied that you knew something about them or knew a great deal about them during these periods when you heard nothing from them?

Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir.

127. General Russell. And the table, then, reflects periods when you just didn't have anything?

Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir, when we did not hear them. Either they had not transmitted or, if they had, it was over circuits that we did not hear.

128. General Russell. Now may I develop briefly, and I will be through, the remark which you made in reply to some of General Grunert's questions about identifying the submarines in the waters near Oahu in the Hawaiian area, that you knew were based out in the Marshalls?

Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir.

129. General Russell. As I recall, your logic there was that you discovered the commander of this submarine group in the Marshalls.

Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir.

130. General Russell. You knew the commander of the group operating in the Hawaiian waters was there. Did your station, intercept station, operate during the attack and immediately thereafter on the morning of December 7th?

Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir.

131. General Russell. Could you tell us briefly what information you picked up that would give you identity as to the vessels operating there, the craft operating in that attack?

Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir. I would say by 1000 we had determined that the officer commanding the striking force was comcardics, Commander Carrier Divisions, what we call Commander Aircraft. We had determined the fact that he had carriers with him, cruisers, and destroyers, and with one bearing that we had obtained we determined his bearing from Pearl Harbor. The submarines did not show up until that evening and the next day, aside from the midget submarines. The regular submarines, the fleet submarines, did not show up until that night. I would say, sir, that by noon of the 7th we had fairly well identified the surface forces.

132. General Russell. How many carriers do you think were in that convoy?

Commander Rochefort. Four, sir.

133. General Russell. Four?

Commander Rochefort. Yes.

134. General Russell. The complement of each was about how many aircraft, or do you know that?

Commander Rochefort. About sixty, sir; sixty to sixty-four.

135. General Russell. Then they could have had a total striking force of aircraft of some 250?

Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir.

136. General Russell. And cruisers or destroyers that appeared in the task force there?

Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir. They had enough—they had one division of cruisers, as I recall it, and approximately one squadron of destroyers.
137. General Russell. What time did you begin operating that day? On the morning of the 7th what time did you begin operating?
Commander Rochefort. We were on a 24-hour basis.
[1672] 138. General Russell. And you picked up nothing in the night preceding the attack?
Commander Rochefort. No, sir.
139. General Russell. So they moved in with radio silence?
Commander Rochefort. Yes, sir. We were on a 24-hour basis then, sir, seven days a week, and had been for about four or five months.
140. General Russell. Of course, you had no means for detecting aircraft in the air?
Commander Rochefort. No, sir.
141. General Russell. By radar operation?
Commander Rochefort. No, sir.
142. General Russell. That was not part of your function?
Commander Rochefort. No, sir, that was not part of our function.
143. General Russell. I think that is all.
144. General Grunert. General Frank?
145. General Frank. No.
146. General Grunert. Colonel Toulmin?
148. General Grunert. Colonel West?
149. Colonel West. No.
150. General Grunert. Major Clausen?
151. Major Clausen. No, sir.
152. General Grunert. That appears to be all. Thank you very much for coming.
We shall take a brief recess.
(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)
[1673] (There was a brief informal recess.)

TESTIMONY OF MRS. MARY B. KOOGAN, WASHINGTON, D. C.

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of her rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel West. Mrs. Kogan, will you state to the Board your name and address, please?
Mrs. Kogan. Mrs. Mary B. Kogan, 1340 Taylor Street, Northwest, Washington.

2. Colonel West. Are you employed now, Mrs. Kogan?
Mrs. Kogan. I was up until two months ago, with the Corps of Engineers here in Washington.

3. General Grunert. Mrs. Kogan, the Board is after facts regarding the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and anything that may have led up to that or what happened at the time. Now, it has come to the knowledge of the Board that you have some information that may assist the Board in its investigation. That is why we asked you to come here.
Now, will you please state to the Board where you were just prior to and during the attack on Pearl Harbor?
Mrs. Kogan. In bed.

4. General Grunert. Where was the bed?
Mrs. Kogan. We lived in Wahiawa, which is about three or four miles from Schofield Barracks. The Barracks was unable to house all of its officers due to the great impetus or influx of new officers.

5. General Grunert. Then you did not live on the post of Schofield itself?

Mrs. Kogan. Not until after the attack.

[1674] 6. General Grunert. Now, information has come to the Board that you, in an article which appears in the Washington Star of March 23, 1942, stated in effect, "that the warning of a Hawaiian newspaper a week earlier than the attack predicted the attack"; also, "that prior to December 7th we hadn't even been told what to do in case of an air raid."

Now, is this substantially true?

Mrs. Kogan. We had never been advised what to do in the event of an air raid.

7. General Grunert. You mean you had never been told, you had never been instructed, as to where to go, where to seek shelter?

Mrs. Kogan. That is right.

8. General Grunert. Where to get food, how to take care of yourselves, or anything of the kind?

Mrs. Kogan. Absolutely.

9. General Grunert. Now, do you know whether those on the post of Schofield itself knew or had been told?

Mrs. Kogan. I feel confident that they did not know.

10. General Grunert. They did not know. How long after the attack were such instructions given to you, if ever?

Mrs. Kogan. To my knowledge, they were never given.

11. General Grunert. They were never given?

Mrs. Kogan. Immediately after the attack we drove—or I might say this: that my husband was in the Dental Corps, of course which was a part of the station hospital, and after hearing all of the commotion he went to the phone and called the hospital to learn what was happening, and the person who answered the phone at the other end said that he didn't know, [1675] but whatever was happening, real ammunition was being used.

That didn't add up, so we called a number of friends, and they didn't know what was happening. The radio was still playing lovely church music, and that didn't help, so we went out in front of the house and saw a lot of planes in the sky that were flying quite low, and they started to machine gun us, and we thought, well, that is a crazy thing for maneuvers to be doing, and we saw the rising sun insignia, dashed back into the house, and the radio became silent for a few minutes, and when it went back on again an announcer advised all military personnel to report to their various stations.

12. General Grunert. To report to what?

Mrs. Kogan. Military stations. Living off of the post, that meant that we were to go to Schofield Barracks. So we dashed over there, and I went to the hospital and helped with surgical dressings while my husband assisted in other ways, and at about two o'clock we were placed—the women and children were placed in different quadrangles of Schofield, and we waited there until about ten o'clock at night not knowing what was going to happen to us and in complete blackout. We were put into busses not knowing where our destination was to be,
and we were driven over the highway past Pearl Harbor. And I might add, at that time there were lots of tracer bullets flying through the sky and lots of people milling around on the highway, and it just seemed like all hell had broken loose again. The bus that I was in turned off about a quarter of a mile from Pearl Harbor, and several hundred of us were put into a little schoolhouse in Kalihi Valley. We just did what we were told to do; we followed the leader, and that was the only instruction. [1676] that was momentary and impulsive, as to what to do in the event of an air raid.

13. General GRUNERT. And had you ever discussed with your husband what should be done in the event of an attack? In other words, did he know what to do if you didn't?

MRS. KOGAN. I don't believe he did.

14. General GRUNERT. Well, let us get back to this article which appeared in the Washington Star in which apparently you had some information that a warning had been given in a Hawaiian newspaper, something about predicting an attack. What was that about?

MRS. KOGAN. Well, I think that time is approximate, and the exact reading of the headline I don't recall. However, a short time before the attack I remember that an extra paper appeared, and the headlines were very startling to us, and I was terribly frightened by them, and we dashed over to friends of ours and sort of went into a huddle, I think, and the essence of it was what I said there. Now, I can't recall the exact words of that headline.

15. General GRUNERT. All right. Who were your friends that you went into a huddle with?

MRS. KOGAN. A Captain and Mrs. Rosen, in the Dental Corps.

16. General GRUNERT. And as a result of that huddle did the alarm spread?

MRS. KOGAN. No.

17. General GRUNERT. Or did everybody else think that there was going to be an attack in a week?

MRS. KOGAN. I don't know that they thought of it that seriously, but we felt that there was something in the air.

[1677] 18. General GRUNERT. You didn't know any of the higher-ups that pooh-poohed it or agreed, or anything, do you?

MRS. KOGAN. No. Of course, an awful lot of rumors ran rampage all over the place, such as General MacArthur having sent a telegram the night before the attack advising something was in the wind, and to go on hundred percent alert. Another rumor had it that the alert that was on was called off at seven o'clock that morning and all the planes were supposedly unloaded, that is, the ammunition, and the guard was slackened up.

19. General GRUNERT. Do you know whether any of these rumors was ever traced down to find out what its origin was?

MRS. KOGAN. No, I can't say that I do. I couldn't substantiate any of them.

20. General GRUNERT. Has the Board any questions?


22. General GRUNERT. General Frank?


24. General GRUNERT. Anybody else? (No response.)

All right; thank you very much for coming down.
Mrs. Kogan. You are welcome.
(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

[1678] TESTIMONY OF COLONEL WALTER E. LORENCE, CORPS OF ENGINEERS, UNITED STATES ARMY

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel West. Colonel, will you state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station?

Colonel Lorence. Colonel Walter E. Lorence, Corps of Engineers, Chief of the Maintenance Division, Military Supply, Office of the Chief of Engineers, stationed at Columbus, Ohio.

2. Major Clausen. Colonel, what were your duties and assignment in August, 1941?

Colonel Lorence. Assistant Chief of the Finance Section, Office of the Chief of Engineers. I believe the reorganization had not gone into effect at that time. I believe I was still under Colonel Gesler, at that time, in 1941.

3. Major Clausen. About that time do you recall having met one Hans Wilhelm Rohl?

Colonel Lorence. I do not remember.

4. Major Clausen. Did you ever meet Hans Wilhelm Rohl?

Colonel Lorence. I don't know whether I have or not, because in those days we processed pretty nearly—well, the peak of our personnel action was 50,000 people a month.

5. Major Clausen. Do you recall having met an attorney by the name of John Martin who had an office in Los Angeles and represented his party, Hans Wilhelm Rohl?

Colonel Lorence. No; I do not. That is, I do not definitely recall, unless I have something in the record of the business I was doing at that time.

6. Major Clausen. I show you our Exhibit 2 and ask you if you recognize that as having been before you or discussed with you at one time?

Colonel Lorence. Yes; I remember it.

7. Major Clausen. Will you explain the circumstances?

Colonel Lorence. May I read the rest of it first?


Colonel Lorence. (after reading Exhibit 2). Yes; I remember this particular communication.

9. Major Clausen. Will you tell the Board how you recall that communication?

Colonel Lorence. I don't know all the details of this particular one, but as near as I can remember—because you have to bear in mind that I was receiving pretty nearly a thousand letters a week past like that from people looking for jobs, and so forth. That was in the midst of very heavy construction. Most of them were before Pearl Harbor, not after Pearl Harbor. We were recruiting. We had recruiting offices throughout the entire country recruiting for our construction program in the United States and for overseas. We handled all recruitments for overseas; and my recollection of this is that Mr.
Rohl, if I am not mistaken, was wanted by the Hawaiian Department for work in Hawaii, and of course all assistance that we could render in the Chief's office, with reference to clearing and moving them overseas, of course we did. I believe there was a question of whether or not he was a citizen at the time.

10. Major Clausen. Do you recall that he was supposed to be a German alien?

Colonel Lorence. I don't know, at that time. Of course I don't know all the details of this, any more than any of the other thousands of items we were handling at that time; but my recollection is that they were anxious to get this man to work on this project; that he had worked with the Hawaiian Construction previously in their activities; that the Hawaiian Constructors was then getting this work overseas, and his ability as an engineer on this work was needed. My recollection is that in New York he had already put in his citizenship papers, his first, second, and so forth, and it was a matter, under present regulations, that if they had been approved or would be approved by the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization, he would comply with the requirements we had at that time for shipment overseas.

11. Major Clausen. Specifically, Colonel, what did you have to do with the preparation of that letter or the sending of it?

Colonel Lorence. I would have to look at the top of it. (After examining letter referred to:) I don't know, to tell the truth, other than this, that looking at the initials on the top, I think this is Mr. Stilphen, who was then my labor relations man.

12. Major Clausen. He was in your department?

Colonel Lorence. Yes.

13. Major Clausen. Do you recall now a Mr. John Martin who appeared before you and requested the action that is set forth in that letter on behalf of Hans Wilhelm Rohl?

Colonel Lorence. I don't recall. I know somebody appeared before me on this case, and that I sent either Mr. Stilphen or somebody to the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization in order to see whether or not the papers had been cleared or to push the clearance of them in order that he could be processed for overseas.

14. Major Clausen. When this party appeared before you who was present at that time?

Colonel Lorence. I have no idea. I had as many as two or three hundred interviews a day at that time.

15. Major Clausen. Is this the first case of your assistance to a party desiring naturalization?

Colonel Lorence. The only case that I know of. It was not assistance to naturalization; it was checking to see whether the papers had been cleared in the Bureau.

16. Major Clausen. Do you recall that after this party appeared before you, you sent somebody, you say, to check over and see the status of the affair?

Colonel Lorence. Yes; to see whether the papers had passed through the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization. As far as I know, there was no assistance.

17. Major Clausen. Have you seen that letter before?

Colonel Lorence. I have not seen this letter; no, sir.
18. Major Clausen. You never saw it before?
Colonel Lorence. I do not think so. I may have.

19. Major Clausen. Are your initials on there any place?
Colonel Lorence. Not on here; I don't believe so. However, it is quite possible that this came through me. I don't know whether it did, or not. I can see Colonel Gesler's initials underneath here, and any matters of personnel under him were my responsibility. Mr. Stilphen did part-time work for me and part-time work for Colonel Gesler, because he was a part-time man on labor relations and a part-time man on contracts. So, whether it went through me at the time or not, I don't know; but the instructions to check up with the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization as a personnel matter, to see whether or not his papers were in order so that he could be processed for overseas, were my instructions on that.

20. Major Clausen. Do you recall now having given those instructions?
Colonel Lorence. Oh, yes. I always did that.

21. Major Clausen. To whom did you give them, Colonel?
Colonel Lorence. That I don't know. You see, complete processing of the papers would have two courses: One through our Procedure Section to see that all the papers were in order for appointment; and if it was for liaison work with another federal agency it could be one of many people; sometimes myself, in order to see whether there was a clearance on it. At the time we were trying to clear men and women for another agency for transfer overseas, and many of those things took place daily.

22. Major Clausen. Are you sure that your only instructions were that the party should investigate the status of the papers?
Colonel Lorence. I think that is all; I don't know.

23. Major Clausen. With respect to the part of this letter, Exhibit 2, which reads as follows:

It is the understanding of this office that Mr. Rohl's loyalty to the United States is beyond question

do you recall what, if any, investigation was made to determine that as a fact?

Colonel Lorence. I think it was, based on the evidence which was submitted. I would not know unless I had all the other papers, if there are any other papers. But we have regular procedure in the checking up. The procedure at that time was prior to the Pearl Harbor procedure, which set up in-

[1683] Investigation through the Provost Marshal General's office. They didn't have that form. The investigation which was made was the character of investigation which was made partially by us and partially by the Civil Service Commission at that time.

24. Major Clausen. Specifically in August, 1941, what was your procedure to check on the loyalty of a prospective contractor with the government?
Colonel Lorence. A contractor or as an individual?

Colonel Lorence. I did not do any checking.

26. General Frank. Let us say, an individual contractor.
Colonel Lorence. An individual person?
27. General Frank. A contractor is an individual person, is he not?

28. Major Clausen. Specifically in August, 1941, what, if anything, was the procedure of the Engineer Corps to which you have referred in your previous testimony that you put into effect with regard to an individual contractor?

Colonel Lorence. I didn't handle contractors; I only handled individuals that moved in on the federal payroll as Civil Service employees or as the equivalent of Civil Service Employees, overseas. I made no investigation of contractors.

29. Major Clausen. When you told the Board about the procedure for checking—

Colonel Lorence. That is on the individual.

30. Major Clausen. What was that procedure?

Colonel Lorence. The procedure prior to the security regulations which came out after Pearl Harbor was the usual character investigation, to see whether or not a man complied with the law and also his statement and affidavit which he came in with, under the oath of office, that he was not contrary to the Hatch Act—that is, communistic activities and things like that—whether or not he was a citizen or that his papers were in sufficient order.

31. Major Clausen. That was conducted with respect to what questions? When did you put that procedure into operation in your division, you, yourself?

Colonel Lorence. That has always been in effect.

32. Major Clausen. With respect to what questions? What question would come before you, Colonel, which would cause you to put that procedure into effect?

Colonel Lorence. That procedure is checked on every individual that comes into the federal service. It is not a question of checking on his loyalty to the government, unless some adverse letter or other matter which was presented in his Civil Service form or on his oath of office, or something of that nature, brought it to our attention. We never questioned, on a security basis, anybody at that time, which was prior to Pearl Harbor, if he was a citizen or the equivalent of a citizen, his last papers having gone in, as to whether or not there was any disloyalty.

33. Major Clausen. This procedure you say you followed in August, 1941—did that apply with respect to persons who wished to be employed by the Engineer Corps?

Colonel Lorence. Yes.

34. General Frank. Under Civil Service?

Colonel Lorence. Yes, sir. Here is the point I want to make: Personnel who were recruited by us for overseas assign- ment on the federal payroll, which was the equivalent of Civil Service—they are not classified Civil Service people; they are federal employees, but not Civil Service.

35. Major Clausen. Was that procedure followed with regard to contractors?

Colonel Lorence. I don't know, sir; I didn't handle that.

36. Major Clausen. Were your functions to deal solely with civilian employees?

Colonel Lorence. Yes, sir.
37. Major Clausen. Do you know how it was, then, that this matter came to you to be directed by you to somebody to perform the function of trying to get this man's citizenship papers through, when it related to a contractor?

Colonel Lorence. Yes; because you see we also handled labor relations, which means—let me put it this way: In recruiting for an overseas job you cannot differentiate between contractors, employees, and federal employees. You have got to set up wage scales for both. Each one has to assist the other in pushing the papers and the procedure through, because you must remember that we were processing on an average of 10,000 people a week for overseas, not only for Hawaii, but for Panama and for the island bases.

38. Major Clausen. Did you check on their citizenship?

Colonel Lorence. We had two methods on that.

39. Major Clausen. What did you do in August, 1941, on that?

Colonel Lorence. This is the way that was handled. Our system was decentralized to the district or division office in the area where the actual recruitment was taking place. Those that were recruited in Washington were handled by my group. The general procedure was the same. For federal employees a check was always made on citizenship, because that was a necessary attribute.

40. Major Clausen. Did that include also an F. B. I. investigation—to see what they had, if anything?

Colonel Lorence. No, sir.

41. Major Clausen. Do you recall having had before you about August, 1941, any recommendations from one Theodore Wyman, a Colonel, or at that time a Lieutenant Colonel?

Colonel Lorence. I think that is how the matter originated; that he was the one that asked us to get the man or to help clearance on that.

42. Major Clausen. Do you recall whether you had a letter or some communication orally or in writing from him?

Colonel Lorence. I don't know whether it was oral or in writing. It may have been in writing, or oral; it may have been a teletype or a cable from Hawaii, because we got communications all three ways in those times.

43. Major Clausen. You have read this Exhibit 2 over, have you not?

Colonel Lorence. Yes.

44. Major Clausen. Just what was the basis for those statements, if you know?

Colonel Lorence. The basis for the statement, as I remember, was that the final papers, through some red tape and so forth, were being tied up in the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization.

45. Major Clausen. Who told you that? Where did you get that information?

[1687] Colonel Lorence. I don't know where the definitive information came from at that time, whether it was from Colonel Wyman or some other source, but it all emanated from the Hawaiian Department.

46. Major Clausen. Do you know of your own knowledge whether Colonel Wyman had any relation to that letter whatsoever?

Colonel Lorence. I think he did, but I don't know definitely.

47. Major Clausen. Your thought in that regard is in what respect?
Colonel Lorence. I think he did, because in every district or division we had an unvariable rule. We never sent anybody to anyone just for dumping them. That was the rule. Only when they wanted certain people. The same thing applies right now. Most people are sent this way, by name, because they know their particular qualifications, either as an engineer or as an administrative man; and it was our job to try to get those people, whether they worked in another department or for a contractor, and see whether or not we could get them. This is another case of the same sort.

48. Major Clausen. After you gave the instructions to whoever you gave them to, did you check up on the instructions to see if they were followed out?

Colonel Lorence. No, sir; I don't think so, because if I did that, then I would have to get myself another checker to recheck, with the number of cases we used to have on that.

49. Major Clausen. Did you ever get any communication from this John Martin?

Colonel Lorence. I don't know, sir. I don't know him at all.

50. Major Clausen. Did you ever get a letter thanking you for your assistance in the matter?

Colonel Lorence. I probably could have. I got thousands of letters. I don't want to be hazy on this thing, Major, but we had a tremendous business in those days. Our average, as you know, at our peak—we had 279,000 federal employees in our construction program which I supervised, and 1,300,000 cost-plus-fixed-fee contract employees, and I would not know individuals in each case.

51. Major Clausen. Did you ever find out that this Hans Wilhelm Rohl was a German alien?

Colonel Lorence. No, sir; not that I know of.

52. General Frank. As far as you were concerned, it was just another case?

Colonel Lorence. Just another case, just like any other case, where they needed a man and needed him badly. A job had to be done, and we sent the people that they asked for.

53. General Frank. Notwithstanding the fact that this man was a German alien, it was just another case?

Colonel Lorence. No; I would not say that, General. I didn't know about that, General.

54. General Frank. You just got through telling me that.

Colonel Lorence. Not quite, sir. You mean, there is something in this letter?

55. General Frank. You said that is the only one you remembered.

Colonel Lorence. On a naturalization case, that is the only one I can remember.

56. General Frank. Yet you just pushed it right out as if you were handling a thousand a day; and he was a German alien?

Colonel Lorence. General, I can remember, for instance, of thousands where we made special exceptions, where they were not citizens. I have in mind now an important case. This brings up recollection of it; a Doctor Casagrande, who is supposed to be one of the greatest soil experts in the United States, from Massachusetts Institute of
Technology. We were requested to take special action so that he could go down to Panama in order to make a report on deep foundation work on the third lock system.

57. Major Clausen. It says in this letter that Hans Wilhelm Rohl has peculiar qualifications. Did you tell that to the party to whom you gave instructions?

Colonel Lorence. No, sir.

58. Major Clausen. If you gave the instructions to this party, whom you say you cannot recall, do you know where he got the information that he would have to have in order to write that letter?

Colonel Lorence. It must have been from the correspondence that he got from the Hawaiian Department.

59. General Frank. Or could it have been from Mr. Martin?

Colonel Lorence. It could have been from Mr. Martin; yes, sir.

60. General Frank. But you do not know?

Colonel Lorence. No, sir; I don't know which it is.

61. Major Clausen. You say you never got the information, so you are sure you did not give it to this party to whom you gave instructions?

Colonel Lorence. I don't know definitely. I don't think I gave the instructions second-handed after listening to Mr. Martin. I think I turned over the matter to Mr. Stilphen in connection with the case in order to process it, because Mr. Stilphen used to be in the Labor Department before I brought him over into the Engineers. He was one of the Bacon-Davis lawyers whom I used to deal with over in that section. He was a good man. He is a crack-jack on labor work. I handled wage rates and so forth under the Bacon-Davis Act among other things.

62. Major Clausen. Do you know what, if anything, Colonel Gesler had to do with the drafting of this letter?

Colonel Lorence. Nothing, other than that he was the boss and it passed through me or Mr. Stilphen as one of the executives along that line, looking it over to see if it was in proper order, and so forth.

63. Major Clausen. At this point do you recall having had a conference with Mr. John Martin and Colonel Gesler concerning the subject matter of this letter?

Colonel Lorence. No, sir; I do not.

64. Major Clausen. All right.

65. Colonel Toulmin. Colonel, what caused you to recognize that letter immediately when you read it, in view of the fact that you just stated that everything was routine to you and you remembered nothing?

Colonel Lorence. There were a lot of outstanding things that came up during the period. The reason for that, more than anything else, was that after the telephone conversation to me at Columbus stating that they wanted me here, I didn't know what they wanted me for. I could think of a dozen things about Hawaii that they might want to know. I went there as Budget Officer when I handled the labor problem over there, when we were trying to get funds and they would not give them to us; and a dozen other things. When I talked to our investigator I asked him whether there was any particular phase that I should bring papers in, or something like that, and he said he did not know, but he thought it was in connection with somebody in connection with citizenship papers, or something like that. So
I cudgelied my brain to find out who that person was in connection with that. It is the same problem, as I say. We have certain things that stand out. It is very unusual for us to check in on citizenship papers, and it was even at that time, and it is very unusual for us to ask for exceptions for people who are not citizens. That is the reason I call it an unusual case.

66. Colonel Toulmin. In view of the fact that it is so unusual and so exceptional, how do you account for the fact that you remembered so immediately about the letter and the circumstances in which it was written?

Colonel Lorence. Because, only the facts of what the action is and what the action should be in order to process the man stand out, and not the detailed facts of the writing of the letter.

67. Colonel Toulmin. Do you want us to understand that you have no independent recollection of this incident other than the fact that that letter was written and you remember having seen it?

Colonel Lorence. I do not even remember whether I saw the letter.

68. Colonel Toulmin. You do not even remember that?

[1692] Colonel Lorence. No, Sir. I may have, because I sign a basketwork 20 times a day.

69. Colonel Toulmin. You have no recollection of it?

Colonel Lorence. Not this particular one.

70. Major Clausen. Do you know Colonel Wyman?

Colonel Lorence. Yes. He used to be the District Engineer when I was in the General Staff School. However, I never served with him or came in contact with him, even out at Fort Leavenworth. Of course, I knew him by reputation.

71. Major Clausen. Before you came here to testify did you ever hear of this letter incident in the press or on the radio?

Colonel Lorence. Yes; I have read of the incident in the papers. Not that letter incident, but I have read the incidents in connection with the tie-up.

72. Major Clausen. Between Rohl and Wyman?

Colonel Lorence. Yes, sir.

73. Major Clausen. Did that refresh your memory?

Colonel Lorence. No, sir.

74. Major Clausen. When you read those incidents did you re-

member then this letter incident?

Colonel Lorence. No.

75. Major Clausen. Who do you think in the Engineering Corps might be able to give us information on that?

Colonel Lorence. I don’t know, sir, unless it is Wyman himself. The reason I say that is that in practically all recruitment, which we did on field recruitment, it was either the District Engineer or the Division Engineer or the Area Engineer or one of the people who were doing the actual recruiting at the time, and our office dealt with that.

[1693] 76. Major Clausen. What you did in August, 1941, was that if an opening appeared for an employee in Hawaii you would check his citizenship?

Colonel Lorence. Yes.

77. Major Clausen. You did that same thing back in December, 1940, did you not?

Colonel Lorence. Yes.
78. Major Clausen. How did you do it?
Colonel Lorence. The check on citizenship, of course, for an ordinary person, is on his Civil Service application, that he is a citizen and so forth. We don't question that. We don't do any checking on that. That was the investigating authority of the Civil Service Commission. The only kind of check we make is where a case comes in where we are told that a man is not a citizen, or that his papers are in, and that he had been trying to check his papers. There may have been other cases like that, but I have no recollection. That is what I am getting at. Normally, there is no check on citizenship papers.

79. Major Clausen. Except by the Civil Service Commission having done it for you?
Colonel Lorence. That is correct. The Civil Service Commission was 9 months to a year behind schedule, and they finally had to turn it over to the War Department.

80. General Grunert. I have a question or two to clear the record. Did I understand you to say that you passed on about 10,000 cases a week for overseas service? That would be over a thousand a day.
Colonel Lorence. That was during our peak.

81. General Grunert. This was in August, 1941. Did they have the amount of construction in the overseas bases at that time? That is over a thousand a day.
Colonel Lorence. That is correct, sir.

82. General Grunert. And for ten weeks it would be 100,000?
Colonel Lorence. General, we had a tremendous attrition rate overseas.

83. General Grunert. All I wanted was to make sure that that was correct—10,000 cases a week for overseas bases.
Colonel Lorence. During the peak.

84. General Grunert. How long was the peak, approximately? I just want to make sure about it.
Colonel Lorence. The peak on that, General, as I remember, lasted about three months.

85. General Grunert. You made a statement to the effect that you received about a thousand telegrams or radiograms or telephone messages from overseas bases a day?
Colonel Lorence. Not from overseas bases; from all over the United States.

86. General Grunert. That is what I wanted to get the record clear on, because it sounded extravagant to me.
Colonel Lorence. It was a big program, sir.

87. General Grunert. As long as you have cleared the record and you are sure of your statement, that is all. Thank you very much for coming.
(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

[1695] TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL WALTER S. De LANY, UNITED STATES NAVY

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel West. Admiral, will you please state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station?
Admiral De Lany. Rear Admiral Walter S. De Lany, Assistant Chief of Staff for Readiness on the staff of the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet. 

2. General Grunert. Admiral, I believe you understand the purposes of this Board and that we are after facts or leads toward facts, and because of your assignment during 1941 and your having testified before the Roberts Commission, we asked you to come in in order that we might delve for facts. Will you tell us of your assignment and, generally, the duties of that assignment in 1941? 

Admiral De Lany. At the beginning of the year 1941 I was Chief of Staff to Commander, Cruisers, Battle Force, and when the Commander. Cruisers, Battle Force became Commander-in-Chief, of the United States Fleet about 1 February, 1941, I then became assistant Chief of Staff for Operations on the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet. 

3. General Grunert. Who was that? 
Admiral De Lany. Admiral Kimmel. 

4. General Grunert. Will you give the Board your idea of the command setup that existed in Hawaii at that time and explain just what the chain of command was? 

Admiral De Lany. So far as the Navy was concerned, the Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet, commanded all United States Navy forces attached to the fleet, and as I consider the [1696] setup, generally saw to it that the responsibilities of the Army and the Commandant of the Naval District were coordinated and matched the requirements of the fleet in the Pearl Harbor area. 

5. General Grunert. Then the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District was a subordinate of the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet? Is that true? 
Admiral De Lany. The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet, did issue directives to the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, but he made him a task force within the fleet organization; but that, as I saw it, pertained only to the relationships that had to exist between the Commandant of the Naval District and the Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet. 

6. General Grunert. You speak of the Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet, and the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet. They are two separate things, but they both were Admiral Kimmel? 
Admiral De Lany. Yes, sir. 

7. General Grunert. Are you familiar with the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan drawn up between the Hawaiian Department and the Fourteenth Naval District? 
Admiral De Lany. I cannot say that I am now, General. I think that if the paper is presented to me I can recognize it. 

8. General Grunert. Not that it is going to make any particular difference, but I would like to see whether we know what we are talking about. (Handing a document to the witness.) 
Admiral De Lany. Yes; I have seen this paper. 

9. General Grunert. Do you know whether or not Admiral Kimmel in his position approved of that joint plan or acted upon it in any way?
Admiral De Lany. No, sir; I cannot answer that now. I cannot hook this specific paper up with any approval that I personally know of, sir.

10. General Grunert. In most of those plans and agreements you, as corresponding to the Operations Officer that we have on our staff, would normally pass and see such papers?

Admiral De Lany. Yes, sir.

11. General Grunert. Are you familiar with what they call the Joint Air Operations Plan, generally, as drawn up?

Admiral De Lany. I think that is the one that was signed by General Short and Admiral Bloch, as I remember it, sir.

12. General Grunert. Yes; drawn up by the respective air commanders, Bellinger and Martin. You are familiar with that?

Admiral De Lany. Yes, sir. I am generally familiar with it.

13. General Grunert. Were you, in your position, kept informed of the Army's defensive measures, those taken by the Army generally?

Admiral De Lany. Generally speaking, yes.

14. General Grunert. Do you recall whether the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, informed Admiral Kimmel of the special measures, if any, that he proposed to take, after November 27, as a result of a message he got from the War Department?

Admiral De Lany. I know that Admiral Kimmel and General Short discussed the general situation, and I am quite sure that Admiral Kimmel knew of the plans that General Short had placed in effect within the Hawaiian area, which, as I understood at the time, were primarily set up as a precautionary measure against sabotage.

15. General Grunert. Were you at this conference to which you refer?

Admiral De Lany. I think I was; yes, sir.

16. General Grunert. Do you recall whether that conference was held in the morning or afternoon of the 27th?

Admiral De Lany. No, sir; I do not recall.

17. General Grunert. Do you recall whether it was held before or after the receipt of the Navy message which began, "Consider this a war warning"? Was that message discussed in that conference?

Admiral De Lany. No, sir; I can't say that, definitely. I cannot answer that question. I know that there were discussions between Admiral Kimmel and General Short, in which this matter of the precautionary measures that were to be taken within the Island on the part of the Army, and the steps that the Navy took in their own operating areas, were discussed.

18. General Grunert. Presumably, then, the conference must have taken place after the receipt of the message.

Admiral De Lany. I think so; yes, sir.

19. General Grunert. Otherwise, they could not have discussed it.

Now, let us go back a little further. Were you on duty with Admiral Kimmel in February 1941?

Admiral De Lany. Yes, sir.

20. General Grunert. It appears from the Roberts Commission's report that Admiral Kimmel inspected the Pearl Harbor defenses in February, and he declared himself astounded at the then existing weaknesses; and that he pointed out the inadequacy of the antiaircraft guns,
the obsolescence of land-based aircraft, and the lack of aircraft detectors. Do you recall that inspection?

Admiral De Lany. Yes, sir; I think I accompanied him on that inspection.

21. General Grunert. Do you know whether he communicated those views on that subject to General Short, or did you communicate them to the Army for him?

Admiral De Lany. I can't answer that, specifically; but as I recall the thing, the letter that the Commander-in-Chief wrote regarding the defenses of Pearl Harbor was either shown to General Short before it was sent, or he was furnished a copy of it.

22. General Grunert. Throughout the year, then, up until the latter part of November, were there any other inspections made? [1700]

Do you know of any progress made toward curing what they thought was wrong?

Admiral De Lany. I know that on at least two other occasions I accompanied Admiral Kimmel, and I believe General Short was in the party, around the Island in connection with joint headquarters. The Army were building quarters up in the cave, up there, and we went there and inspected all the installations. There was also the question of the joint air center, and as I remember it, General Short, Admiral Bellinger, and General Davidson or General Martin, I have forgotten who, were on that party. We drove down towards the area where the location was being proposed at the time.

23. General Grunert. Then, in your mind, you thought that progress was being made toward bettering the conditions, from what had been noted earlier in the year?

Admiral De Lany. So far as material and personnel were being furnished, I believe that the conditions were better, as the year progressed; but it would be my observation that the amount of material that had been originally requested was not forthcoming.

24. General Grunert. Then you think that they were making progress with what they had, but they needed more; is that correct?

Admiral De Lany. Definitely so; yes.

25. General Grunert. Now, on the subject of intelligence, did you know of the presence of a Japanese task force in the vicinity of Jaluit, between November 27 and 30?

Admiral De Lany. As I recall the intelligence, now, as I knew it then, I recall that the information I had was that one [1701] carrier task force was operating in the South China Sea, and the remainder of the Japanese main fleet was in home waters.

26. General Grunert. That leads me to believe that you do not recall that a Japanese task force was in the Marshalls.

Admiral De Lany. That is correct, as I recall it, now. I may have known about it; but I cannot recall.

27. General Grunert. My next question that I wanted to ask was whether, if you had such information, you knew whether or not it had been transmitted to General Short. Generally, do you know what sort of information of that kind was transmitted to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, or have they any policy on that?

Admiral De Lany. I understood that there was an exchange of information between the naval intelligence center in Pearl Harbor and the Army center at Shafter, or wherever it was located, and that
in addition I feel sure that the intelligence as it came in to the Com-
mander-in-Chief was information that normally came through the
district intelligence center, and for that reason I felt that what was
available in the naval intelligence center was also available to the Army
intelligence, because I believe they exchanged information.

28. General Frank. Do you know whether or not that included
combat intelligence?

Admiral De Lany. I cannot answer that. I do not know.

29. General Grunert. We understood from previous testimony that
the combat intelligence, at least certain parts of it, was so highly secret
that it was very carefully guarded and disseminated only to a few, and
I wanted to find out whether or not that dissemination included the
Commanding General of the [1702] Hawaiian Department,
and who decided what to turn over to General Short, and what they
thought was too secret even to turn over to General Short. Could you
answer anything in that line?

Admiral De Lany. No, sir. I cannot answer your question defi-
nitely, General, but it seems to me that I recall instances where General
Short was in the office, there, where Admiral Kimmel had his general
Pacific chart, and that I can recall the intelligence officer of the fleet,
who was then Commander (I think) Leighton, being in there and
pointing out on the wall chart the summary of the information that
we had at the time that the General was in there.

30. General Grunert. And that would include combat intelligence?

Admiral De Lany. Yes, sir; that was the location of Japanese fleets
and forces.

31. General Grunert. You think Admiral Leighton, I believe it is
now, was present?

Admiral De Lany. No, sir; he is a captain, right now.

32. General Grunert. Captain Leighton would be our best source
of information on that?

Admiral De Lany. Yes, sir; I think so, sir.

33. General Grunert. Do you know whether efforts were made by
the Navy to secure information of Japanese naval activities in the
mandated islands?

Admiral De Lany. No, sir.

34. General Grunert. Did the fleet have any particular means of
getting information from the mandated islands?

Admiral De Lany. No, sir.

[1703] 35. General Grunert. Upon what source did they de-
pend for that information?

Admiral De Lany. Our information came primarily from the main
Naval Department from Washington.

36. General Grunert. That was the combat naval intelligence?

Admiral De Lany. Yes, sir.

37. General Grunert. From Washington?

Admiral De Lany. Yes, sir.

38. General Grunert. Do you know whether Washington sent you
anything on this subject of what was in the Marshall Islands, about
November 25 or 26?

Admiral De Lany. There is a naval intelligence bulletin, dated 1
December, which I am of the impression we did not have in our files
on the 7th of December, which states the fact that there was a carrier group, I believe, in the Marshalls.

39. General Grunert. Do you recall where that came from, whether from the District or from Washington?

Admiral De Lany. That was an ONI bulletin from Washington, dated 1 December; but the information that we had prior to the receipt of that bulletin, as I recall it, was based on information that came out of the Sixteenth Naval Department, and, I believe, substantiated in dispatches from Washington.

40. General Grunert. Do you know whether or not General Short, as Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, was kept informed of the movement of the task forces of the fleet, in so far as it pertained to whether they were in or out of the harbor, and, while they were out of the harbor, what areas they covered that might give him protection?

Admiral De Lany. I am sure that that information was [1704] available to Army sources in the Hawaiian area, but whether General Short had it, personally, I cannot answer that.

41. General Grunert. By "available," do you mean, "It's here! Come and get it!" or what?

Admiral De Lany. No, sir; I mean that when the fleet went into an operating area we discussed our operating program with the Army opposites in our staff organization, and so far as I was concerned we always arranged drills for range-finder check, Coast Artillery training. We checked our range finders and submitted our plots against theirs. There was also an arrangement with the Army as to the fact that they knew where we were operating, so that their air forces came out and did whatever searching or bombing or anything else they wanted to do.

42. General Grunert. Did these task forces that were sent out from time to time, especially in the latter part of November and early in December, have any definite "distant reconnaissance" missions, as we call them, in so far as the defense of Hawaii was concerned?

Admiral De Lany. No: not as I interpret your question.

43. General Grunert. The defense of Hawaii was under whom, in the Navy?

Admiral De Lany. Well, the defense of Hawaii was under the Army; and the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District coordinated naval activities with them, as I understand it.

44. General Grunert. The Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District?

Admiral De Lany. Yes, sir.

45. General Grunert. In that joint plan that you recognized, there, the Fourteenth Naval District contracts to have the Navy [1705] provide, among other things, distant reconnaissance?

Admiral De Lany. Yes, sir; and I believe the agreement provided, too, that the Army would assist in it, as I recall the agreement.

46. General Grunert. That afterwards came in the joint air agreement. That is right.

Now, what I am trying to get at is the subject of distant reconnaissance—whether or not it was made; if so, how; and whether it was just made periodically; whether these task forces were woven into
a pattern in making it; or what. Could you enlighten us on that
general subject?
Admiral De Lany. Yes, sir. I say this, that the general mission
of the naval forces in the Hawaiian area had been, and, with the ap-
proval of the Navy Department, continued to be, training. So far as
distant reconnaissance is concerned—and presuming that you mean
by that, aircraft—
47. General Grunert. Primarily, yes.
Admiral De Lany. ——The number of planes, pilots, and spare
parts, and so forth, that were available in the Hawaiian area, and the
fact that the planes in the Hawaiian area required such wartime work
on them as installing bullet-proof cells and other wartime equipment,
there just were not enough planes, pilots, or time available to do the
job of training and preparing the planes for wartime requirements,
and conduct a distant reconnaissance.
I believe I am safe in saying that the same thing that I say about
Navy planes prevailed in the aviation situation so far as the Army
was concerned.
48. General Grunert. Then I gather from your answer to that
question that there was practically no so-called “distant
reconnaissance,” as such.
Admiral De Lany. That is correct, sir.
49. General Grunert. And that was due primarily to the lack of
means?
Admiral De Lany. Yes, sir.
50. General Grunert. When the task forces went out, whatever
patrolling or searching they did was primarily for the task of train-
ing while they were out there, to protect themselves, and was not a
part of a so-called “distant reconnaissance” for the protection of
Hawaii against an air attack?
Admiral De Lany. That is correct. The plane coverage that was
given to naval forces, whether they operated in close proximity to
the islands or whether they operated as we did on certain problems
four or five hundred miles to the northward of the island, our cover-
age was always designed with the idea that we were protecting the
service forces against submarine attack.
51. General Grunert. The reason I am asking these particular
questions is to see whether or not the presence of task forces in cer-
tain areas outside the Island of Hawaii gave the Commanding Gen-
eral of the Hawaiian Department a false sense of security, thinking
that he would be secure from anything coming in that direction, be
it surface or air. If he had been kept informed of their presence,
and of what they did out there, and of what they did not do, he might
then have had a different picture.
That is just an explanation of the line of questioning, so that if
there is anything wrong with that sort of reasoning you might tell me. If there is not, I will assume that it is fairly
correct.
Admiral De Lany. The task forces that operated out of the Hawai-
ian area as surface task forces always operated in assigned areas,
which, in my opinion, were known to the Army and the Commandant
of the Fourteenth Naval District. I believe, too, that the Army was
entirely familiar with all the plane flights that were made by both
Army and Navy planes, and that with that knowledge the Commanding General knew just what the status of surface and air forces in the Hawaiian area was, at all times.

52. General GRUNERT. Do you know whether or not the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District had any air means for long-distance reconnaissance, or did that which existed pertain to the Navy, proper?

Admiral De Lany. They were a part of the U. S. Fleet, but there is no question but what the Commandant knew exactly what the planes were doing.

53. General GRUNERT. In any use of those PBYs that were flying in and about Honolulu daily, they were probably engaged in operations pertaining to a task force going out or coming in, or whatnot?

Admiral De Lany. Plus training; yes, sir.

54. General GRUNERT. Were submarines ever used for this distant surveillance?

Admiral De Lany. There were submarines stationed off Midway and Wake for observation.

55. General GRUNERT. We have been told that because of the lack of means, there could not be a 360° protective distant [1708] reconnaissance, and I wondered whether or not in naval tactics, or whatnot, they often or sometimes used submarines to cover part of a ring around the place.

Admiral De Lany. Yes, sir; I think that is entirely possible.

56. General GRUNERT. But you do not know whether any of that was done?

Admiral De Lany. It was not done.

57. General GRUNERT. Now, I go into the subject of cooperation and coordination. Will you tell me what you thought of the cooperation between the Army and the Navy, as a whole, and particularly that which existed with the fleet, of which you know directly, and that which existed between the Army and the District, if you know about that.

Admiral De Lany. I am more familiar with what existed between the fleet and the Army that I am, between the district and the Army. In so far as the fleet is concerned, I felt that from the top down through my echelon there wasn't any question about amicable understandings and coordination.

58. General GRUNERT. Was there any question about knowing sufficiently of each other's business to be able to carry out your own responsibility, when it came to cooperative action?

Admiral De Lany. So far as I personally am concerned, no, because I was generally familiar with the strength of the Army in the Hawaiian area, what their antiaircraft defense amounted to, the number of planes, type, and so forth, that were available. I felt that the Army knew our general operating schedules, and, as I said before, there wasn't any question about amicable understandings and coordination.

59. General GRUNERT. Who was your opposite number in the Army?

60. General FRANK. Hayes?

Admiral De Lany. Yes; I did business with Hayes.

61. General GRUNERT. Might it have been Donegan?
Admiral DE LANY. Yes, sir; I did business with Donegan, and I also did business with Fleming, who was closer to General Short, out there, than anybody else that I knew of in the Army set-up, sir.

62. General GRUNERT. Did you know the Army system of alerts that was in effect, say in November and the early part of December—not in effect, but which could be put into effect?

Admiral DE LANY. I cannot describe them; no, sir.

63. General GRUNERT. You knew that the one they put into effect was called "No. 1," the so-called sabotage alert?

Admiral DE LANY. Yes, sir.

64. General GRUNERT. You would not know what No. 2 and No. 3 were?

Admiral DE LANY. No, sir; I cannot describe them. I do not know. I cannot recall.

65. General GRUNERT. Was there any question in the mind of the command of the fleet—not the Commander, but the command of the fleet; by that, I mean the commander and his staff—as to the adequacy of that alert for the protection of the fleet in Pearl Harbor, in view of the information or "messages" we will call them, that had been received by the Army and the Navy?

Admiral DE LANY. No, sir; not so far as I am concerned, because I felt that if the island were alerted against sabotage, that was the extent to which the defense of the island should go.

66. General GRUNERT. Then it did not enter your mind, did it, that your fleet would have been better protected had it gone into a more protective alert such as Alert No. 2, which carried a spreading out of their planes and a readiness to get them into the air in a hurry?

Admiral DE LANY. Not on the information we had; no, sir.

67. General GRUNERT. Then the messages received from the Navy Department, particularly the one on November 27, which started out, "Consider this a war warning," together with the message from the Chief of Staff of the same date, did not alarm you or your Commander-in-Chief to the extent of thinking that war was quite imminent?

Admiral DE LANY. Well, we knew that Japan was on the move. We knew that she was headed south. We had no statement as to what the policy of Washington was towards the Japanese, and what would occur in the event that Japan committed an overt act against the United States; and, with no further information than that, the war warning meant just that.

68. General GRUNERT. Then as far as you were concerned, the Army's going on a sabotage alert was O. K. with you?

Admiral DE LANY. Yes, sir.

69. General FRANK. There wasn't an understanding of any kind as to what a warning in that language meant?

Admiral DE LANY. General, we had no M-Day. I do not know what you call it in your war plans, but there had been no mobilization, there had been no mention of anything that indicated anything like that.

70. General GRUNERT. Who had to bring about that designation?

Admiral DE LANY. Sir?

71. General GRUNERT. Who had to bring about the designation of M-day?
Admiral De Lany. It had to come from Washington, sir.
72. General Grunert. Are you sure? I will refresh your memory on the Joint Act of The Army and The Navy, as set forth in Chapter II, paragraph 9b:
(Except from Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, Chapter II, is as follows:)

Operations of Army and Navy forces will be coordinated by the exercise of unity of command in the following cases:
(1) When ordered by the President; or
(2) When provided for in joint agreements between the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy; or
(3) When commanders of Army and Navy forces agree that the situation requires the exercise of unity of command and further agree as to the service that shall exercise such command.

That was not just exactly what I had, what I meant and wanted to bring out then, but I am glad I brought it out now, and I will come back to the other question.

Was the question of the desirability of unity of command ever taken up in conference or discussed with a view to possibly putting it in effect under this that I have just read, in case it became necessary, prior to December 7th?

Admiral De Lany. Not that I recall, no, sir.

73. General Grunert. Did you ever turn the matter over in your mind as to whether you thought unity of command was desirable prior to December 7th, and whether or not it could have accomplished more than cooperation was then accomplishing?

Admiral De Lany. There was never any question in my mind that there should have been unity of command before the 7th of December.

74. General Frank. When did you think that? At that time, or is this back sight?

Admiral De Lany. No, sir. I make that statement as a thought on my part within a month after the—well, by the first of March, 1941.

75. General Frank. But it was not in your mind prior to the attack?

76. General Russell. He said March 1, 1941.

77. General Frank. Oh, March 1, '41. All right.

Admiral De Lany. As a matter of fact, I don't recall the dates, but I know that General Short and Admiral Kimmel, as I mentioned before, had visualized this thing and had actually inspected the places where the Army was putting up their command stations in the mountain out there, with the idea that the whole command setup would move up there and there would be a unity of command.

78. General Grunert. That was provided for when war broke?

Admiral De Lany. Yes, sir.

79. General Grunert. But the unity that I was referring to was unity of command prior to any emergency, so that the preparations could be unified instead of waiting until something broke.

[7/15] Admiral De Lany. General, I think in answer to your previous question I had said there that I don't recall Admiral Kimmel or General Short discussing unity of command either before the 27th or subsequent to the 27th of November. Whether it was discussed, or not, I do not know but I know that, as I said, both the Admiral and the General had visualized this because of their interest in getting a place, a post where the command could be exercised.
80. General Gruner. Now, going back to the former question or discussion of the M-Day, I refer now to a paragraph in this Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, paragraph 15c (2):

(Excerpt from Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Re: M-Day, is as follows:)

(2) M-Day is the first day of mobilization, and is the time origin for the execution of this plan. M-Day may precede a declaration of war. As a precautionary measure, the War and Navy Departments may initiate or put into effect certain features of their respective plans prior to M-Day. Such parts of this plan as are believed necessary will be put into effect prior to M-Day as ordered by the War and Navy Departments or as mutually agreed upon by local commanders.

Admiral De Lany. That is right.

81. General Gruner. So they could have put any or all of this thing into effect by mutual agreement?

Admiral De Lany. That is right.

82. General Gruner. Between local commanders?

Admiral De Lany. Yes, sir.

83. General Gruner. But as far as you know it never came to such mutual agreement?

[1774] Admiral De Lany. It never came to such a mutual agreement because—well, I think I am correct in saying that nobody out there considered that it was essential to do it.

84. General Gruner. Then, it all boils down to the fact that they were sort of sabotage minded but not really war minded at that particular time?

Admiral De Lany. Yes, sir.

85. General Gruner. Is that a broad statement of it?

Admiral De Lany. That is a correct statement, and I think it is based entirely on factual information that we had available to us at that time.

86. General Gruner. Then really, before you got into a different state in which you would actually expect an attack, you expected to have more information of more critical conditions than you actually did get; is that the idea?

Admiral De Lany. Yes, sir.

87. General Frank. You well knew, however, that the Japs were known traditionally to hit and then let that strike be the opening gun in the declaration of war?

Admiral De Lany. Yes, sir.

88. General Frank. You feel, I take it from your comments, that in the face of the information that you had, if the situation were known in Washington to be sufficiently acute to require the announcement of M-Day, that that announcement should have come from him?

Admiral De Lany. Yes, sir, or we should have had more information in order to have us make preliminary deployments or anything else that we would have made prior to receipt of an M-Day dispatch.

[1775] 89. General Gruner. Tell me, Admiral, about what you knew about the Army's interceptor and air warning service, as to its completeness, as to your confidence in it or your lack of such confidence. Just what did you know about it?

Admiral De Lany. I knew that there were, as I recall it, three radar sets on the island. I knew that the Army was drilling personnel on those sets. I knew that there was normal communication between radar
and headquarters that was not reliable but could be used. I personally conducted a conference between the Army and the representative of the Fourteenth Naval District at which, as I recall it, personnel from the telephone people in Hawaii were present when Commander Taylor, who was entirely familiar with the intercepts system as it was installed in U. K., was out there. I saw the outline of the system as it was to be put in, I saw the list of equipment that was required, the number of persons that were required to man it; but beyond the fact that there were, as I said, I believe, three radars on the island, I don’t believe that the intercept system was in effect beyond any stage except where the Army was training on the radar and could get telephone communication back to some place at headquarters.

90. General Frank. And could pick approaching planes up?

Admiral De Lany. Yes, sir. The operators were being trained on their radar sets, sir. I believe the scheme out there, as I recall it, was that the men were sent out on a truck that went out on a morning patrol, and then when the truck came back from that they picked these operators up some place around 7:30 or something like that in the morning and brought them back for their breakfast, and then they went out later on in the after-noon, as I recall the thing.

91. General Grunert. The evidence that you gave before the Roberts Commission appears to be somewhat to the effect that you were pushing the establishment of this service, that you were straining to get it into position and action. Do you know, what was that pushing and what was this straining, and what were the results? Do you recall that?

Admiral De Lany. Yes, sir. As I say here, before the 7th of December, as far as I know the system, the only thing that we had was the radars, and none of the appurtenances and equipment and so forth that go to make an aircraft warning or a fighter director system.

92. General Grunert. Did you ever visit the Information Center?

Admiral De Lany. Yes, sir.

93. General Grunert. Wasn’t that complete?

Admiral De Lany. Partially so, yes, sir.

94. General Grunert. Were not all the connections made, with not three but five radar stations?

Admiral De Lany. Not that I know of, sir. I thought there were three.

95. General Grunert. These that I am speaking of are mobile stations.

Admiral De Lany. That is right; yes, sir.

96. General Grunert. I note that you said there was no direct wire to your headquarters or your office.

Admiral De Lany. That is right, sir.

97. General Grunert. Now, what was there about getting the direct wire to your office? Did that take materials that they had trouble getting?

Admiral De Lany. Well, there just wasn’t any available, sir, or it wasn’t put in, because after the 7th of December we did rig some portable cable down there.

98. General Grunert. That seemed a little bit strange to me, that after the 7th of December everything started popping and getting
done, and prior to that they seemed to have trouble getting started, getting things in. That is why I wondered why you were pushing and straining to get action.

Admiral De Lany. Well, General, I do not think there is any difference between what happened in the Army and what happened in the Navy. We couldn’t get a 20-mm gun out there before the 7th of December, and after the 7th they poured in. The same way with other equipment.

99. General Grunert. That is true in a number of weeks afterwards, but shortly after, practically on the 7th of December and the 8th and from there on that system started working, without waiting for anything to come from the United States?

Admiral De Lany. Not on the 8th, sir, or any time within a week afterward, sir. It was possible to get the information through, yes, sir; and had we known on the first of November that there was going to be an attack any time subsequent or close to that, we could have put the string up then, but the plans were in effect and the material was being shipped to install a permanent installation as it now exists. It would have been possible to have done anything, sir.

100. General Grunert. The whole thing goes back again as to just how deeply they were impressed with the imminence of war. I just have one or two more questions, and then I will turn you [1718] over to the mercies of somebody else here.

Outside of the conferences held between General Short and Admiral Kimmel, what was the nature of the conference held between their respective staffs? Were there any periodic conferences or special conferences, or just individual talks, or what?

Admiral De Lany. I can only speak for my section of the staff and say that they were mostly individual conferences between the gunnery people, the communicators in the Operations Section, sir, and that pertained primarily to joint training exercises that were matching our operating schedule, and then also to the joint base defense drills that were held in the Pearl Harbor area.

101. General Grunert. When did you leave the vicinity of Pearl Harbor permanently for change of station?

Admiral De Lany. I left there in May ’42 and was down in the South Pacific and then came back in November ’42, and that is the last time I have been assigned on anything in Pearl Harbor.

102. General Grunert. The last time you saw Pearl Harbor was November, 1942?

Admiral De Lany. No, sir. The last time I saw Pearl Harbor was the 2nd of July, 1944. I came back through there from Saipan, sir.

103. General Grunert. What I want to get about the Army defenses for Pearl Harbor. Do you know whether they have improved to the extent that you Navy people now think that the Army, with the means it now has available, can give the Navy protection in Pearl Harbor? [1719] Admiral De Lany. I can’t answer that, General. I talked with some people on the staff out there when I came through, and I get the general impression from talking to people on CINCPOR’s staff that generally speaking the requirements of the Army that were asked for starting in April, 1941, have gradually accumulated out there and they do have enough stuff.
104. General GRUNERT. I gather from, I think it was, your testimony I read before the Roberts Commission that at that time you were pretty well convinced that Pearl Harbor was not a good place for the fleet to be, to be protected, to be secure. Is that right or not?

Admiral DE LANY. Yes, sir. I make no hesitancy in saying that on the 7th of December, 1941, Pearl Harbor was not a fleet base as I would visualize a fleet base.

105. General GRUNERT. I think I shall give General Frank a chance now to piece in anything that I may have missed that may be in his mind.

106. General FRANK. Do you know the different responsibilities that the Commander of the Fourteenth Naval District had?

Admiral DE LANY. By Commander-in-Chief's directive he was the base defense officer, sir, and he was also required to maintain liaison with the Army.

107. General FRANK. What I am getting at is this: In the first place, he was Commander of the Fourteenth Naval District?

Admiral DE LANY. Yes, sir.

108. General FRANK. On a basis on which he was the representative of the Chief of Naval Operations?

Admiral DE LANY. Yes, sir.

109. General FRANK. That is one hat?

[1720] Admiral DE LANY. Yes, sir.

110. General FRANK. He was a commander under the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet, was he not?

Admiral DE LANY. Yes, sir. He was commander of Task Force 4, sir.

111. General FRANK. Commander. What was that?

Admiral DE LANY. That was Base Defense Officer and as such included the outlying islands of the Hawaiian Group, but I mean Johnston, Midway, Wake, Palmyra.

112. General FRANK. That is two hats he had?

Admiral DE LANY. Well, that as a task force commander he was the Base Defense commander who was responsible for his sea frontier which included the outlying islands.

113. General FRANK. Yes. But in this other capacity, which I just mentioned, he reported direct to headquarters in Washington. Now, in this capacity he reported to the Commander-in-Chief of the fleet.

Admiral DE LANY. As a base defense officer, yes, sir.

114. General FRANK. Yes. Now, he had another responsibility with respect to the joint Army-Navy coast defense plan, did he not?

Admiral DE LANY. Yes, sir, with the Army.

115. General FRANK. And who was his immediate superior with respect to that? Did he report with respect to that to the Commander-in-Chief of the fleet or to Washington?

Admiral DE LANY. I believe by his original orders he would report to the Chief of Naval Operations in Washington.

116. General GRUNERT. That seemed to be a dual one to me.

117. General FRANK. Another subject: Generally speaking, there actually was not an activity known as distant reconnaissance carried out for the express purpose of providing security of Oahu against a surprise attack?

Admiral DE LANY. Against a surprise air and surface attack, no, sir.
118. General Frank. No. And I gathered that that was because of the state of mind that generally existed as a result of conclusions arrived at from information, messages, and the general situation; is that correct?

Admiral De Lany. Partially, yes, sir.

119. General Frank. Amplify it, will you?

Admiral De Lany. And also, as I said before, that the mission of the fleet activities in the Hawaiian area was at that time primarily training, and in addition to the fact that there were neither planes, pilots, nor equipment available to conduct a continued distant reconnaissance.

120. General Frank. Now, do you feel that the authorities in Washington were conversant with the lack of material and the lack of training necessary for adequate protection of the place?

Admiral De Lany. Yes, sir. I think they were fully cognizant of it, because not only had the Commanding General and the Commander-in-Chief repeatedly outlined the deficiencies of the fleet and the defenses of Pearl Harbor, but in addition to that I am quite certain that all the plans such as you refer to here had copies of them—I speak for the fleet now—had copies of them sent back to the Chief of Naval Operations in Washington. They were entirely familiar with our training and operating schedule, and they knew that we were not conducting distant reconnaissance.

[1722] 121. General Frank. Have you any reason to believe that the state of mind in Washington was different than the state of mind in Honolulu?

Admiral De Lany. No, sir. I have no way of knowing.

122. General Frank. Have you any opinion that you would like to express on it?

Admiral De Lany. Well, my own opinion is that people who sit close to the throne probably hear a whole lot more than those who don’t sit quite so close to the throne, and with that general opinion I believe that the people here must have heard more than we did out in Pearl Harbor.

123. General Frank. With the knowledge, had they had knowledge that led them to believe that you were on a hot seat and needed help to take care of yourself, should that impetus have come from here, you think?

Admiral De Lany. Yes, sir. I believe a commander in the field is entitled to every bit of information that can be furnished him, sir.

124. General Frank. There was a lot of help arrived right after the Pearl Harbor attack?

Admiral De Lany. Yes, sir; some supposed to come in that morning, I believe.

125. General Frank. Even had it been there, the state of mind which led to the conclusions that they had wouldn’t have made any difference under the circumstances, however, would it?

Admiral De Lany. Well. I do not think that that is an entirely fair supposition, because I believe that if the Commander-in-Chief had not had his fleet depleted for months prior to the 7th of December, and had both the Army and the Navy received equipment for which they asked as equipment being required in emergency, that the opinion of the Commanding General and the Commander-in-
Chief would probably have been quite some different because I believe they would have felt that since the material that they needed was forthcoming there would have been some different point of view on the thing.

126. General Frank. You generally remember the messages that arrived from the 16th of October, the 24th of November, and the 27th? I do not mean the exact wording, but generally?

Admiral De Lany. I don't know what you refer to on the 16th of November, sir.

127. General Frank. October.

Admiral De Lany. 16th of —

128. General Frank. October.

Admiral De Lany. Oh, yes, sir; I know.

129. General Frank. Just to refresh your memory a bit, on October 16th:

Take due precautions including preparatory deployments that will not disclose strategic intention.

Navy message of the 24th:

Caution relative probability of surprise attack on Guam or P. I.

Navy, the 27th:

War warning. Guam Samoa warned Jap action versus P. I., Thai or Kra Peninsula, Borneo.

Army message of the 27th:

Hostile action possible. Desire Japan commit first overt act. Do not alarm civil population. In case of trouble carry out Rainbow Five.

Now, what were the reactions from the amount of information that you did get? You knew that there was an acute situation?

Admiral De Lany. Yes, sir. Well, as I said in answer to a little differently phrased question, I felt that Japan was on [1724] the move, as I said, and from the information that we had, the information that appeared in those dispatches mentioning P. I., Guam, and so forth, that the movement was toward the south. There was no question about that. But I certainly never thought that there would be an air or a surface attack on Pearl Harbor.

130. General Frank. What I am trying to get is the statement as to how much the contents of these messages influenced your thinking, you see.

Admiral De Lany. Well, my line of reasoning, my line of thought, was exactly as I expressed here. I thought that the movement was down in that direction. The latest information we had on the employment of the Japanese Fleet, even presuming that I had known that there was a carrier group in the Marshalls, would not have led me to believe that the Japanese carrier force was going to make an air attack on Pearl Harbor. I never would have believed it. I didn't think that Japan would ever choose that as an initial act of war.

[1725] 131. General Russell. As a matter of fact, Admiral, after these messages that General Frank has talked to you about had been received and considered by the naval authorities, no change at all in their plans were made?

Admiral De Lany. Yes, sir; there were.

132. General Russell. In what way?
Admiral De Lany. We did what we thought was against a possible hostile act on the part of Japan, and that is that we increased our protection against submarine activities.

133. General Russell. In what way?

Admiral De Lany. In that the ships in the operating area were required to take their war-time dispositions, with the anti-submarine screens, maintain air patrols, and generally take war-time precautions as they would do in cruising in enemy submarine waters; outside of the fact that, as you know, carriers were sent to put planes on both Midway and Wake.

134. General Russell. I have wondered about those two movements. What was the purpose of those two movements?

Admiral De Lany. That was part of the defensive deployment.

135. General Russell. Those would be land-based planes on those two islands to be used for what purpose?

Admiral De Lany. Probably reconnaissance, but primarily defense.

136. General Russell. It has been mentioned in the testimony heretofore that the situation was influenced in 1941 by the transfer of part of the Pacific Fleet to the Atlantic Ocean. Do you recall when that was done, and about how much of the Navy was affected?

[1726] Admiral De Lany. No, sir; I cannot give the exact dates, but I know there was a carrier and battleship divisions and one or two squadrons of destroyers, plus some transports, both large and small, that we had set up in San Diego to commence amphibious training.

137. General Russell. Do you know about when that occurred?

Admiral De Lany. No; but I would say, offhand, some time around July or August.

138. General Russell. Early in your testimony this afternoon you discussed with General Grunert the inspection that was made by Admiral Kimmel and you in the early part of 1941, as I recall. As a result of that inspection a letter was sent to the Navy Department, and probably a copy furnished to General Short. That is the letter which prompted the correspondence between the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of War touching the subject of the inadequacy of the Army defense on Oahu. Did you know that such a communication was sent?

Admiral De Lany. I cannot answer that; I do not know.

139. General Grunert. The Secretary of the Navy’s letter to the Secretary of War was dated January 24. The Secretary of War’s reply to the Secretary of the Navy was dated February 7. The inspection that was made was not until after the Secretary of War had replied to the Secretary of the Navy; so I do not think there is any connection.

140. General Russell. I think that the record will show that the letter was written from out there on the 25th, and I am trying to find out about it. Admiral Kimmel’s letter is dated the 25th of January and the Secretary of the Navy’s letter is dated the 24th. I am just wondering how many inspections were [1727] made. Do you know whether or not an inspection was made before the 25th of January?

Admiral De Lany. No, sir; I cannot say that, sir; I do not know. I cannot recall the dates.
141. General Russell. So far as you know, there was not an inspection out there until shortly before Admiral Kimmel wrote the letter of January 25?

Admiral de Lany. I believe that Admiral Richardson, as the former Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet, had presented, prior letters about the inadequacy of the defense of Pearl Harbor.

142. General Russell. In the letter of the 24th of January reference was made to the probability of a combined air and submarine attack as being the most probable form of attack by the Japanese Nation. Do you know about that?

Admiral de Lany. Yes, sir; and I think you will find that the Commander-in-Chief's security letters provide for furnishing the facilities of the fleet to the Army and the Base Defense Commander in the event that an air attack occurred while the ships were in Pearl Harbor.

143. General Russell. The interest seems to have been rather acute in the early part of 1941, January and February; that is, the interest in a surprise attack by aircraft and submarines. Is that true?

Admiral de Lany. No, sir; that is not true, because, as I recall it, the last Base Defense air drill was held some time around—well, after the 20th of November.

144. General Russell. At that time there was not such an intense interest in the form of attack out there, was there?

Admiral de Lany. I do not know what you mean by interest.

[1728] 145. General Russell. It was a fact that there was absolutely no protection or screen thrown out on the morning of December 7th or attempt to obtain information about the launching of an attack on Oahu?

Admiral de Lany. That is true not only of the 7th of December, but every other day before that, sir.

146. General Russell. If you people were so intensely interested in the type of attack, why was it that no diligence was exercised at all to discover the force which might have launched that sort of an attack?

Admiral de Lany. Oahu is an island. There are no probable sectors of approach. Therefore, the only way that the Island can be completely protected and an enemy approaching the Island can be discovered is to maintain a 360-degree circle of coverage around the Island. There were neither planes, pilots, nor other facilities available to conduct and maintain such a continuous reconnaissance.

147. General Russell. You realized the danger, but there was simply nothing that you could do about it?

Admiral de Lany. Generally speaking; yes, sir.

148. General Russell. What effect on the damage suffered at that time would the dispersion of the ships have had?

Admiral de Lany. Within the harbor, you mean?

149. General Russell. No. If the ships, instead of being berthed in the harbor, had been at sea.

Admiral de Lany. If the battleships that were eventually salvaged and which are now fighting in the Pacific Campaign had been at sea and had received the same number of torpedo hits that they received in Pearl Harbor I believe they would be sunk.
150. General Russell. It would have been necessary for the task force to have sought these ships out wherever dispersed and attacked them at sea?

Admiral De Lany. Yes.

151. General Russell. Would it have been a considerably larger undertaking than the attack that was made?

Admiral De Lany. Yes; very decidedly so. And I would like to add to that, that had the fleet not been in Pearl Harbor and had the attack changed from fleet ships as their objective to shore installations as their objective, I believe that the ultimate damage and subsequent results would have been very much more far-reaching.

152. General Russell. In answer to one of General Grunert’s questions you stated that you did not regard Pearl Harbor and Honolulu as a desirable Navy base. I attempted to follow the reasons assigned, but, if they were given, I was confused about it. What were your reasons for saying that?

Admiral De Lany. My concept of a naval base is one to which fleet forces may go and obtain the necessary recreation for their crews and overhaul of their matériel during the time that they are in port. Facilities were not available in Pearl Harbor, because the ships were required to maintain a condition of readiness that permitted them to get underway almost immediately, and the crew was required to stand condition watches and live on board a ship that was almost completely bottled up, so far as light and ventilation was concerned. Under those circumstances I believe that the general morale and health of a crew would soon deteriorate if they had to keep that up continuously not only during the time they cruised at sea but also during the time that they were supposed to be in their bases.

153. General Russell. What caused this condition of semi-alertness which prevented the crews from obtaining the necessary recreation?

Admiral De Lany. The condition of readiness that was set after the 7th of December, as I said, required the ships to be ready to get underway.

154. General Russell. We were at war then. Prior to December 7th did this condition obtain?

Admiral De Lany. I am talking about something different, then, General. I am talking about Pearl Harbor as a base after war was declared.

155. General Russell. I meant, prior to the war.

Admiral De Lany. Prior to the war it was a very good operating base. The weather was good; there was plenty of deep water as soon as you left port.

156. General Grunert. What good is a base if you are not going to use it in a war? The whole thing is prepared for the purpose of war. Therefore, a place that is good for a peace base and is not good for a war base is not a good base, is it?

Admiral De Lany. No, sir. I have said it is not a good base. I have said it is not a good base for war operations. The General asked me about peace time. I said, “Yes, it made a very good operating base during peace time,” because you had no restrictions on the security of the bases.
157. General Russell. As a matter of fact, what happened was that the fleet was moved out there before Pearl Harbor had been completed and was ready to receive and to protect the fleet. [1731] Is not that true?

Admiral De Lany. That is correct; and if you see the facilities in Pearl Harbor as pertained to November and that existed to the 7th of December, and those that existed on the 1st of July, 1944, you would appreciate exactly how correct your statement is.

158. General Russell. Admiral, what is your view of the desirability of a base for a large part of our Navy where the surrounding territory is on the Island of Oahu and is inhabited largely or predominantly by people whose nation is hostile to the United States?

Admiral De Lany. I think it is very undesirable.

159. General Russell. That is all I have.

160. General Frank. General Russell brought up the point of your dispersing the elements of the fleet that were in Pearl Harbor as a defense measure against air attack. What is your reaction to the presence of a large number of submarines with the Japanese task force? Did you or did you not know that there was a large submarine force with this attacking force?

Admiral De Lany. I knew after the attack that they had been there; and I can only say that if the air and submarine coordination in the attack on Pearl Harbor was as efficient as it was down in the Coral Sea and in the area where I operated six months afterwards, we would have had a very sad experience had we stood to the northward and run into those submarines.

161. General Grunert. Admiral, there appear to be no more questions, except that I would like to give you an opportunity to add anything to your testimony that you think might be of value to the Board in sizing up the situation, which is mainly [1732] from an Army viewpoint, but not all-inclusively an Army viewpoint. Is there anything that occurs to you?

Admiral De Lany. The only thing that I would like to add to my statement, sir, is that from my personal knowledge and observation I am certain that there were no disagreements or misunderstandings between Admiral Kimmel and General Short, and that any statements that are made to the contrary are not true.

162. General Grunert. We thank you very much for coming here and giving us of your time and helping us.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

(Thereupon, at 5:20 p.m., the Board concluded the hearing of witnesses for the day and proceeded to other business.)
CONTENTS

FRIDAY, AUGUST 25, 1944

Testimony of—

Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, United States Navy, Retired... 1734

DOCUMENTS

The Pacific Fleet in the Command Organization of the Navy as of
December 7, 1941... 1740
Excerpt from Joint Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Defense Plan... 1754
Excerpt of Fortnight Summary of Current International Situations... 1770
Report of United States Ambassador to Japan... 1778

1 Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate
pages of original transcript of proceedings.
FRIDAY, AUGUST 25, 1944.

MUNITIONS BUILDING,
Washington, D. C.

The Board, at 9 a. m., pursuant to recess on yesterday, conducted the hearing of witnesses, Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President of the Board, presiding.


Present also: Colonel Charles W. West, Recorder, Major Henry C. Clausen, Assistant Recorder, and Colonel Harry A. Toulmin, Jr., Executive Officer.

(Leon M. Golding was sworn as a reporter.)

TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL HUSBAND E. KIMMEL, UNITED STATES NAVY, RETIRED. (ACCOMPANIED BY HIS COUNSEL, EDWARD B. HANIFY, LIEUTENANT, JUNIOR GRADE, UNITED STATES NAVY.)

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel West. Admiral, will you state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station?

Admiral KIMMEL. Husband E. Kimmel, Rear Admiral, United States Navy, Retired.

2. General GRUNERT. Admiral, you probably know what this Board has been appointed for. It is to find out the facts as to what happened prior to, leading up to, and during the so-called Pearl Harbor attack. By reason of your position and assignment out there we hope that we can get some facts from you or some leads to where we can get facts. That is the main reason for asking you to come over.

I have prepared a number of questions based on the list of subjects I sent over to you. Of course, we will try to stick to those subjects as closely as possible, but when we get to questioning you we will broaden out a bit.

First, will you please state to the Board your assignment and, generally, your duties thereunder, during the year 1941, giving us dates as far as you can recall them?

Admiral KIMMEL. I took over the office of Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, the 1st of February, 1941. I was relieved of that command on December 17th, 1941. During that time I was responsible for the Pacific Fleet.
3. General Grunert. Will you tell the Board generally what your official relationship was to the Commandant of the 14th Naval District and to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department?

4. General Frank. Is there any kind of a chart in existence which shows the relationship of the Commander-in-Chief of the fleet to the Commandant of the 14th Naval District and to Admiral Bellinger?

Admiral Kimmel. The Commandant of the 14th Naval District was a subordinate of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet. The reason I hesitate a moment is that I want to get the thing straight.

5. General Grunert. Use your own time, Admiral.

Admiral Kimmel. The Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District was the subordinate of the Commander-in-Chief, but the [1736] had many duties; he was authorized to perform many duties by direct correspondence with the Navy Department. He, by orders of the Navy Department, War Plans, Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, was charged with and in charge of the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier Defense, and the Commandant of the district, together with the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, made up a Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan. The Commandant of the district was charged most directly with cooperation with the Commanding General in Hawaii. He was responsible for details of Army and Navy cooperation. As my subordinate he kept me informed of what was going on, and I naturally was responsible for what he did.

6. General Grunert. That is what I wanted to get at next. Any plans that were made, although he made them in his capacity under the Navy Department as Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, he kept you informed of; and did you approve such plans?

Admiral Kimmel. Yes. He kept me informed, and I knew what he was doing.

7. General Grunert. You did not actually have to sign those plans, did you?

Admiral Kimmel. No. My recollection is that I did not sign any plans, but I knew the plans and I approved the plans.

8. General Grunert. You were generally familiar, then, with the Joint Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Defense Plan?

Admiral Kimmel. Oh, yes, by all means. I initiated the business of perfecting the cooperation betwixt the Army and Navy air forces in Hawaii and was very much interested in it and thoroughly approved what they did and was informed of it.

[1737] 9. General Grunert. Admiral, see if I am generally correct in what my understanding is of the chain of command, as we might call it, and of action thereunder. For instance, the District Commander was a subordinate of yours?

Admiral Kimmel. I think I have a document here which may tend to clarify the minds of the Board on that point. It is an attempt to simplify the various provisions of the Navy Regulations. General Order No. 142, General Order No. 143, and the orders contained in directives from the Navy Department as provisions in the war plan. I submit that for the consideration of the Board and for their future study. I think it is accurate. It at least will bring you to the place where you can find what is laid down in the documents. I hesitate to testify as to just what the document means. I think you are entitled to get that meaning yourselves from the document.
10. General Frank. The Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District wore one hat—I take that as a phase of responsibility—in which for certain things connected with the Fourteenth Naval District he was responsible directly to the Chief of Naval Operations here in Washington, was he not?

Admiral Kimmel. Oh, yes; matters that had to do with the administration of the district, the expenditure of funds, the expansion of the plant out there—all manner of administrative affairs; and, as a practical matter, he was under me primarily for military reasons.

11. General Frank. That was one phase of his work. The second phase of his work was his responsibility for the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan?

Admiral Kimmel. Yes. His responsibilities were laid down in the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan and were the result of agreement; and, due to the lack of Army equipment in the Islands, in order to utilize everything that we had to the fullest extent, be agreed to supply the deficiencies that did exist there to the best of his ability. The Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan was a realistic plan based on what was available and an attempt to utilize it in the best manner possible without regard to the responsibilities—not without regard—but going beyond the responsibilities as laid down in the Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935. In the Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935, the responsibility for the defense of Oahu lay with the Army; even the long-range reconnaissance was a function of the Army General Headquarters, Air Force. When it came to making plans in Hawaii there was no General Headquarters, Air Force, out there, and we had to rig up a plan to utilize what we had; and at the time that the Commandant agreed to this plan he had been informed that he would eventually have 108 patrol planes assigned to him and that the Army would have something on the order of 200 flying fortresses, and if and when that condition obtained he would have been in very good case to defend Hawaii with other elements that would have been present.

Those are the primary things. However, there being no district patrol planes in existence, there being only—

12. General Frank (interposing). That is, Naval District patrol planes?

Admiral Kimmel. Yes. —and there being only a handful, I think, six flying fortresses suitable for distant reconnaissance and bombing, it was manifestly impossible for the Commanding General and the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, to discharge their responsibilities with this equipment, and it was planned to utilize so many of the patrol planes of the fleet as might be available at any one time, augmented by such planes as the Army could supply to do the distant reconnaissance. The number of patrol planes in the fleet was 81, all told. Of those approximately between 50 and 60 were in the Island of Oahu and suitable for service on the 7th of December. I cannot tell you the exact number, because I do not know which ones were laid up for check and various things like that, but those 81 patrol planes were fleet planes and they had to cover all the Hawaiian Islands and cover all actions of the Pacific Fleet. They could not, and the Commandant knew they could not, be made permanently available for the defense of Oahu, nor was the fleet out there to defend
Oahu; the fleet was there for different purposes. However, we recog-
nized, thoroughly and fully recognized, the conditions as they ob-
tained and endeavored to make the very best use of the equipment
that we had available. I found General Short most cooperative in his
efforts to get things done and, as you have probably heard already,
our relations from the time we first met up to the present day have
been most cordial. I, in my experience, have never seen any locality
where the Army and Navy had closer cooperation or more whole-
hearted desire to make the best of what we had then we had in Hawaii
during the term of my command as Commander-in-Chief, Pacific
Fleet.

I thought I would give you that general picture.

13. General GRUNERT. Admiral, this document which you have
handed me, which shows a chart of the organization as of December
7th, 1941, together with a statement—I believe that if [1740]
we take time out and read this into your testimony it would be well.
It may obviate the necessity of asking some of the more detailed ques-
tions, and we can get down to the point with a definite understanding.
With your permission, I will read it, or your counsel may read it.

Admiral KIMMEL. I have no objection to its being read, and my
counsel may read it or you may read it, just as you please. I want you
to understand, however, that this paper was prepared and is, to the
best of my knowledge and belief, an accurate, although restricted,
presentation of the orders and instructions that governed the actions
of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, and the Commandant of the 14th
Naval District.

14. General GRUNERT. This document starts out by saying [read-
ing]:

(Document "The Pacific Fleet in the Command Organization of the Navy as
of December 7, 1941", is as follows:)

1. Normal command channel.
2. A legal channel rarely used.
3. Navy Regs. 1481—The Commandant is the direct representative of the
   Navy Department, including its Bureaus and Offices, in all matters affecting
district activity.
   a. Art. 1484 (7)—In intercourse with government, state and foreign officials
   and with local authorities in matters of interest to the Navy, the Commandant
   shall himself, or through his subordinate, represent the Navy Department.
   b. General Order 142—The Commandant has dual authority as Commandant
      of the district operating [1741] under orders of the Navy Department.
   c. General Order 143 (7)—Commandants of districts * * * have administra-
      tive responsibility direct to the Navy Department for Naval local defense
      forces.
4. Navy Regs. 1480 (4)—All matters pertaining to military operations in
   Naval districts shall be under the Office of Naval Operations.
   a. Navy Regs. 1485 (5)—All correspondence relative to changes in the assign-
      ment of district craft to CNO via Bureaus concerned.
5. CinC, U. S. Fleet and CinC, Pacific Fleet are identical. The relation of
   CinC to the Commanders-in-Chief of the Atlantic and Asiatic Fleet is ex-
   pressed in General Order No. 143, "Under the CNO the CinC will, through
type Commanders, prescribe standards and methods of training for all the sea-
going forces and air-craft of the Navy. The U. S. Fleet is an administrative
organization for training purposes only, and is a task organization only when
two or more fleets are concentrated or operating in conjunction."
6. General Order No. 142—In his dual capacity, the Commandant of the 14th
   Naval District as an officer of the fleet operates under the orders of the
   Commander-in-Chief thereof.
   a. With duties corresponding to those of a senior officer present afloat.
b. In command of a task group of the fleet when and as directed by its Commander-in-Chief.

The following excerpts from official publications are pertinent to the investigation:

"Navy Regs. 1482—In the administration of affairs in the districts, the Commander will transact necessary business with the officer commanding the group or unit. These groups or units will be coordinated and every effort will be made to develop complete intercommunication and cooperation among several groups and units in regard to all matters requiring joint action.

"Navy Regs. 1484 (5)—The Commandant shall cooperate with Army commanders and Commanders of Fleet Forces within the district, in the preparation of defense plans in time of peace, as well as their execution in time of war.

"Navy Regs. 1484 (5)—He shall be charged with the maintenance of an efficient information and communication service within the district in accordance with instructions issued by ONI and Offices of Naval Communications.

"Navy Regs. 1486 (1)—The mission of a Commandant of a Naval District in coast defense is to control the sea communications within the district. The limits of the Naval districts extend to seaward so far as to include the coastwise sea lanes.

"Navy Regs. 1486 (5)—The Commandants of Naval districts will cooperate with the Army officers commanding corps areas in the preparation of plans in time of peace, determining the more probable situations likely to arise and entering into advance agreements upon plans of joint action for each such situation.

"General Order 142—The duties of the Commandants will include the local Naval Defense Forces.

[1743] "a. The duties of a Commandant as an officer of the fleet will be guided by such instructions as the CinC of the Fleet may consider desirable.

"b. The Commandant of the 14th Naval District will report to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific upon assuming command."

JOINT ACTION ARMY AND NAVY

This publication states under paragraph 19 (d) 3, "Army shall provide, operate and maintain communication and intelligence systems to include air-craft warning service, with provision for prompt exchange with the Navy."

Paragraph 19 (g)—"Navy will provide and operate:

"h. A system of off-shore scouting and patrol to give timely warning of attack."

Paragraph 21 (b) 1—"The Army Air Components will operate over the sea in directing defense of the coast."

Paragraph 31 (d)—"Category 'd' requires long range air reconnaissance plans made for use of GHQ, Air Force." Category "d" is defined as—"Coastal frontier that may be subject to major attack."

Paragraph 31 (g) 2—"In all categories the Army Commander is responsible for AA Defense within the corps area and Naval districts, to include air-craft warning service."

Paragraph 42 (d)—"Strategic freedom of action of the fleet must be assured. THE FLEET MUST HAVE NO ANXIETY IN REGARD TO THE SECURITY OF ITS BASE."

Paragraph 31 (f)—"Regardless of the presence or absence of the fleet, the GHQ, Air Force, retains responsibility for reconnaissance."

[1744] Page 49 (d)—"The Army is responsible for the defense against aerial attack on all Naval facilities ashore in a harbor area." The air-craft warning service is defined on page 150 of this publication.

THE JOINT COASTAL FRONTIER DEFENSE PLAN FOR THE HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER

This plan, signed by General Short and Admiral Bloch, is prepared in accordance with the basic war plan and joint action Army and Navy. The Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier is defined as including Midway, Johnston, Palmyra, Canton and Wake Islands. The defensive sea areas are defined and Hawaii is considered as in category "d". The tasks are:

a. Joint—Hold Oahu as a main outlying Naval base. Control and protect shipping in the coastal zone.

b. Army—Hold Oahu against land, sea and air attack and against hostile sympathizers. Support Naval forces.

c. Navy—Patrol coastal zone and patrol and protect shipping therein, to support the Army forces. In this joint plan the Commanding General of the Army is to provide for;
a. Beach, land, sea, coast and anti-air craft defenses of Oahu, with particular attention to Pearl Harbor, Honolulu, Schofield Barracks, Wheeler Field and Lualualei.

b. AA and gas defense, intelligence and warning service.
f. Establish an in-shore air patrol in cooperation with Naval in-shore patrol, and an aerial observation system in outlying islands. Establish an aircraft warning system for the Hawaiian Islands.

i. In conjunction with the Navy establish a system of land communication (teletype, telegraph loops, radio interceptions, etc.) to insure prompt transmission and interchange of hostile intelligence.

e. Establish a joint intelligence service.

The Commandant of the 14th Naval District shall provide for:

a. In-shore patrol.
b. Off-shore patrol.
c. Escort force.
e. Maintain harbor Control Post for joint defense of Pearl and Honolulu Harbors.
f. Install and operate underwater defense for harbors (Hydro-Acoustic Posts).
g. Plant submarine mines if necessary.
h. Sweep channels.
i. Distant reconnaissance.
j. Local communications (in conjunction with the Army).
k. Operate Naval intelligence for the collection, evaluation and dissemination of hostile information.

[1746] 15. General Frank. I would still like to ask just a couple of questions.


17. General Frank. Prior to this I was asking about the jobs of the Commandant of the 14th Naval District, and we determined that he had a responsibility where he reported direct to the Navy Department. Then it was brought out that he had a responsibility with respect to the joint coastal frontier defense plan. In that capacity was he responsible directly to you or to the Chief of Naval Operations in Washington?

Admiral Kimmel. The Chief of Naval Operations sent out instructions to each District Commandant as to the form, scope, and the contents of a defense plan, and they laid down and prescribed certain parts of the plan. The Commandant, I should say, was responsible directly to the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Chief of Naval Operations approved or disapproved his action on that. Naturally I had a chance to get my ideas into the defense plan or any other plan that the Commandant made. However, it was his job to go ahead and do it, and unless I interfered, why, he did the whole thing.

18. General Frank. All right. Now another thing: I notice in this paper that General Grunert just read into the record that it states in there that the Commandant of the Naval District, being responsible for the local defense forces, was responsible to the Navy Department, and that coincides with what you just said.

Admiral Kimmel. That is right.

19. General Frank. Now, he had a third responsibility, which was that he had command of a task force?

[1747] Admiral Kimmel. That is right.

20. General Frank. And as commander of that task force he was responsible to you?

Admiral Kimmel. That is correct. Now, as commander of the task force that is laid down, if you would like to have that, just what it was.

21. General Frank. Will you state it?
Admiral Kimmel. Yes, I can give it to you.

He was in command of Task Force 4 of the Pacific Fleet. Task Force 4 under the command of the Commandant 14th Naval District, Rear Admiral Claude G. Bloch, U. S. Navy, included that part of the 14th Naval District activities which involved the island bases, primary missions to organize, train, and develop island bases in order to insure their own defense and provide efficient services to fleet units engaged in advance operations. Now, by the provisions of my letter 2 CL-41 of 14 October 1941 the Commandant was also designated as Naval Base Defense Officer, and his duties were laid down in considerable detail in that publication. I think it would be well to present now to this Board a copy of Pacific Fleet confidential letter No. 2 CL-41, revised, of October 14, 1941.

22. General Frank. This, then, constitutes a fourth responsibility for the District Commander?

Admiral Kimmel. That is correct; I should say yes, that is about right. The number I presume is correct.

23. General Frank. Yes.

Admiral Kimmel. At any rate, immediately after I took command of the Fleet I wanted to get an organization for the use of all the naval forces which happened to be in Pearl Harbor at any one time, so that they could be used in the event of any kind of an attack. In the middle of February we issued the first letter on this subject. This letter which I have just quoted was a revision of the original letter.

24. General Gruner. That was in October, was it?

Admiral Kimmel. This is October 14th. This letter tied up some loose ends and tucked them in where they should be, but made no material change in the letter of the 15th of February, 1941.

25. General Gruner. May I ask at this point whether your instructions there were in consonance with this joint coastal frontier defense plan?

Admiral Kimmel. I think there is no question about it. If there had been any conflict we would have discovered it in the course of the numerous drills which we had, and this letter was the subject of considerable thought and effort on the part of the Commandant, 14th Naval District, the forces afloat, and the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department. He knew all about this order; and in this order—I think I can touch on some of the high spots of the order profitably—we disposed the ships of the Fleet in Pearl Harbor as they came in so as to cover all of the various sectors upon which aircraft could approach. It was the duty of the senior officer present afloat, exclusive of the Commander-in-Chief, to so place those ships. We had a sector commander appointed for each sector—that is, of the ships afloat; and the Commandant of the 14th Naval District was placed in charge, as Naval Base Defense Officer, of coordinating the efforts of the Navy, of whatever happened to be ashore, with those of the Army in the defense of the Pearl Harbor base.

[17/49] The other big point that we covered in this and in the joint agreement betwixt the Commanding General and the Commandant of the 14th Naval District was a question of cooperation of the aircraft. I think you should have that presented to you. In general it provided that the bombers and long range planes should be under
the command of the Navy; the fighters should be under the command of the Army, and there were certain other provisions. I won’t go into them because I see you have had it here and it is contained in the papers.

Incidentally, I came to Washington in June of 1941, and I told the Chief of Naval Operations about this agreement which we had arrived at in Pearl Harbor, and he was very much pleased with it, and I undertook to dictate from memory the terms of the agreement, in his office, and tell him about it.

26. General GRUNERT. Were not those agreements forwarded to Washington?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, it was. He hadn’t seen it apparently, and I had tried to bring him up to date on it. At any rate, I think it had already been forwarded, and later on another copy was forwarded; I know that.

Well, he was pleased with it and said that we had gone further in that respect, of getting a coordinated action of the Army and Navy air forces out there, than anywhere else, and he wanted to use it as a model to send to other places, and I think he mentioned the Caribbean as a place where at that time they hadn’t been able to arrive at a definite agreement.

This order, as you will see if you take the trouble to read it, is quite comprehensive. It covers all foreseeable [1750] contingencies and prescribes in general the action to be taken by each element of the Army and Navy in the event of a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor.

Now, this letter is quite long. There are plenty of copies of it.

27. General GRUNERT. We have a photostat copy of what you are referring to.

Admiral KIMMEL. I see. Well, then we don’t need it.

28. General GRUNERT. So I do not think there is any need of putting it in the record. I think that photostatic copy is the one from the Roberts Commission.

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, there is one there, if you have that.

29. General FRANK. Yes.

30. General GRUNERT. There are copies of both your February one and the revised one of October.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct. I think they are both in that testimony.

31. General GRUNERT. All right. You may complete your examination, General Frank.

32. General FRANK. I should like to go back to a statement that you made with respect to airplanes and the responsibilities of the Commandant of the 14th Naval District. I think you stated, no planes in existence. I do not believe you meant that. There were types of planes in existence, but they were not in Honolulu. That is what you meant; wasn’t it?

Admiral KIMMEL. I don’t know what I said, now. I don’t know what you are talking about. I can’t make it out. It is not clear what you are asking, the question you are asking me.

33. General FRANK. Well, you were discussing the [1751] responsibilities of the Commandant of the Naval District with respect to conducting reconnaissance, and you stated there are no planes in existence. There were planes in existence, but they were not in Honolulu and available to him; is that what you mean?
Admiral Kimmel. Well, it is a fact that the Commandant of the 14th Naval District had no planes assigned to him at this time.

34. General Frank. Well, that is what you meant.

Admiral Kimmel. That is a fact. I don’t know what I said. I can’t recall.

35. General Frank. All I was trying to do is to straighten out the record.

Admiral Kimmel. I see.

36. General Frank. So that we don’t come back and find that you made a misstatement.

Admiral Kimmel. Well, I don’t want to make a misstatement if I can help it.

37. General Frank. You see what I am trying to do?

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, certainly. Thank you.

38. General Frank. Now, when you read this—how is that identified [indicating]?

Admiral Kimmel. I might add that, as the Commandant 14th Naval District had no planes assigned to him, the only place that he could get planes was from the Fleet.

39. General Frank. Or from —

Admiral Kimmel. Or from the Army.

40. General Frank. Or from Washington, having the Chief of Naval Operations assign him planes?

[1752] Admiral Kimmel. Well, again I am trying to be realistic, sir.

41. General Frank. Yes.

Admiral Kimmel. He made his best efforts to obtain planes from Washington. He wrote letter after letter to obtain planes from Washington.

42. General Frank. But he didn’t get them?

Admiral Kimmel. And he didn’t get them.

43. General Frank. Now, in this paper that General Grunert just read is the statement:

Regardless of the presence or absence of the fleet, the GHQ Air Force retains responsibility for reconnaissance.

Admiral Kimmel. I didn’t make any such statement as that. That statement is made in Joint Action of the Army and Navy, 1935, as of December 7, 1941, and if you get a copy of Joint Action of the Army and Navy you will find it in there.

44. General Frank. It was just read out of this paper right here [indicating].

Admiral Kimmel. That was taken from this publication here [indicating]. Did he say what page it was? I don’t recall myself.


There would seem to be a little confusion between this statement and the provision in this agreement that was made between the Army and the Navy in which the Navy takes over responsibility for all reconnaissance.

Admiral Kimmel. The agreements arrived at in Hawaii were an honest and energetic effort to use the forces available to [1753] the best advantage, and there weren’t any general headquarters Army aircraft available in Hawaii, and we knew that there weren’t going to be any.
46. General Frank. I am just trying to straighten out the record. Admiral Kimmel. Yes, sir; I understand.

47. General Frank. That is all I am trying to do. Admiral Kimmel. Well, I am too. That is all I am trying to do.

48. General Frank. And this statement that you presented gave this impression that the GHQ Air Force was responsible for reconnaissance irrespective of the presence of the fleet; whereas actually, as a result of this agreement that was made between the Army and the Navy in Hawaii, the Commandant 14th Naval District, under 18 (j) was made responsible for distant reconnaissance.

Admiral Kimmel. Yes; he accepted the responsibility for distant reconnaissance, because he couldn’t do anything else and be sensible.

49. General Frank. All right. I see.

50. General Grunert. Now we go back to a few general principles; we may call them general principles. I am now referring to the joint Hawaiian coastal frontier defense plan. It appears that that plan was made and it became effective when signed, but was not to become operative until something happened. I want to read to you a paragraph from that plan and then ask you a question. Paragraph 15 says “Forces.” Subparagraph “c” says, “Overseas reinforcements.” Subparagraph [1754] (2) to paragraph c is as follows:

(Excerpt from Joint Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Defense Plan is as follows):

M-Day is the first day of mobilization, and is the time origin for the execution of this plan.

In other words, the plan was not to be executed until M-Day had been decided upon.

Then it goes on:

M-Day may precede a declaration of war. As a precautionary measure, the War and Navy Departments may initiate or put into effect certain features of their respective plans prior to M-Day. Such parts of this plan as are believed necessary will be put into effect prior to M-Day as ordered by the War and Navy Departments or as mutually agreed upon by local commanders.

That is the end of that paragraph.

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, I know that.

51. General Grunert. Therefore, parts of this plan could have been put into effect prior to M-Day had the local commanders so agreed. Now, in that, as to local commanders, what is your interpretation of what “local commanders” means? Does that mean to you the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and the Commandant of the District? Or does that mean you and the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, or does it mean both combinations?

Admiral Kimmel. I feel that it does not make much difference what it means.

52. General Grunert. This is my question. My next question [1755] was this:

Admiral Kimmel. I will answer. I am perfectly willing to answer that.

53. General Grunert. All right.

Admiral Kimmel. I think the Commandant of the 14th Naval District and the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, if they felt that they should put into effect the mobilization, they could have recommended it to me. That is, the Commandant, 14th Naval
District, would have recommended such to me; and if he had so recommended it to me, I would have referred it immediately to Washington. We were in communication with Washington. Washington knew much more about this situation than we did. They were the fountain head of the information, and if any action looking towards the execution of this plan were necessary, it appears to me that there is no question but what Washington should have taken the action.

Now, these provisions of what to do on mobilization and what mobilization meant were laid down in the basic plans, and they were laid down in the subsidiary plans which went to the execution of the basic plans; and I venture to say that, had we put into effect mobilization order in the Pacific at any time during the year that I was in command, we would have been most severely criticized by Washington for having done so without prior reference to them, and they would have quite promptly pointed out that you can get an answer in an hour and a half or two hours, and why go ahead and put into effect a plan like this when you are in direct communication?

54. General FRANK. Why? What would that have done?

[1756] Admiral Kimmel. What is that?

55. General FRANK. Why should you not have done it? What would have been the result to which Washington would have objected?

Admiral KIMMEL. It would have alarmed the population. It might have been considered by Japan an overt act. It would have tended to upset the Japanese-American relations, which we had been enjoined to maintain in status quo; and it would have required, so far as the Navy is concerned, certain movements of the fleet and certain action which should not have been taken without reference to the Department.

56. General FRANK. In Washington?

Admiral KIMMEL. In Washington, yes.

57. General GRUNERT. That has answered the next question I had; but now I have one: Was there ever a discussion as to whether or not to make parts of this plan operative, and so recommend to Washington?

Admiral KIMMEL. In this 2 CL-41 letter which deals with the security of the Fleet in Pearl Harbor and in the operating areas outside of Pearl Harbor also, we prescribed certain security measures to be taken, and they were placed in effect; and at the time or prior to the Japanese attack the ships at sea in the operating areas were operating with full security measures. Those in Pearl Harbor had a considerable number of them in effect, but not so much as in the operating area, because in our estimate of the situation (which, incidentally, we revised almost daily; I mean, went over almost daily, in accordance with the intelligence information which we received) we felt that if, as intimated in the dispatches of 27 November, [1757] if the Philippines were attacked or if Guam were attacked, that the principal assault would be there. We felt, too, that it was quite possible that we would have a mass submarine attack on the ships in the operating areas and off the entrance to Pearl Harbor. Against such a contingency we took complete precautions.

58. General GRUNERT. Of course, Admiral, this Board is primarily interested wherever anything touches the Army, and it is not going into the naval phases. So whatever you have to say we will be glad
to hear, but if it isn't exactly pertinent to what we are after we shall save a lot of time and tell you.

Admiral Kimmel. Well, I am sorry. I am very sorry.

59. General Grunert. So these plans as such were really plans to be prepared to do something, but nothing could really be done except by agreement prior to the time M-Day was decided upon or the time something hit. That is why my question here: Was there no time prior to December 7 where things appeared imminent to the respective Commanders over there that caused them to want to implement the plan, even if they had to apply to Washington to do it?

Admiral Kimmel. Well, I think, if I have given the impression which your question implies, I have created a wrong impression. We (I, speaking for myself) would have had no hesitancy in placing into effect any provision of the plan that I thought necessary to put into effect prior to any word from Washington; and had I considered it necessary to place into effect these things, I would have done so. As a matter of fact, [1758] we did actually place into effect some of the provisions of the plan, and not all of them, but I think that the significance of this paragraph and of ordering the full mobilization is different from that, and the full mobilization was something that I would not have ordered without reference to the Navy Department, but any specific provisions which are contained in these plans I would not have hesitated at all to order, and did not hesitate to order, as I considered necessary.

60. General Grunert. Then let me ask this question: At no time up to December 7 did you consider the conditions over there as justifying you in asking the War Department to declare M-Day in existence?

[1759] Admiral Kimmel. No, I did not; and had I considered that I had information which the Navy Department did not have, or had I considered that the information which it supplied to me, or that the information which had been supplied to me from any source demanded that M-Day be proclaimed, I would have so recommended to the Navy Department.

61. General Grunert. Do you recall any particular provisions of this joint plan, that were made operative by agreement, prior to December 7, generally speaking?

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, I think I can give you those. Of course, I am more familiar with what happened in the Fleet, with what I did with the Fleet. My main preoccupation was with the Pacific Fleet and not with the defense of Hawaii.

62. General Grunert. Then what you told me relates primarily to the Fleet?

Admiral Kimmel. Yes.

63. General Grunert. And not between the District and the Department?

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, yes; correct.

64. General Grunert. Then whatever was done under that joint plan, unless it was brought to your attention, you could not tell us very well what was done?

Admiral Kimmel. Well, I think that's true; yes; yes.
65. General Grunert. Let me read to you, or refresh your mind about a paragraph in the joint action of the Army and Navy, chapter 2, paragraph 9 (b), which reads as follows:

Operations of Army and Navy forces will be coordinated by exercise of unity of command in the following cases:

1. When ordered by the President; or,
2. When provided for in joint agreements between the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy; or,
3. When commanders of Army and Navy forces agree that the situation requires the exercise of unity of command, and further agree as to the service which shall exercise such command.

Did that question come up as to the necessity for unity of command prior to anything that might happen in the future? If so, was it discussed and ever contemplated that the commanders over there would agree on unity of command?

Admiral Kimmel. To the best of my recollection, General Short and I never discussed the question of unity of command. We had worked out a formula for cooperation, and we never had any disagreement which we couldn't resolve amicably and to the satisfaction of both of us. I think neither one of us raised a question of unity of command, because, as you know, it has been a touchy subject in the Army and Navy for many years; and I am certain that had either one of us recommended that unity of command be placed in effect in Hawaii prior to the Japanese attack it would not have been done. I think you gentlemen are just as well able to judge that as I am. That is merely my opinion. In any event, we did not discuss it, and made no recommendations. That, I can state.

66. General Grunert. The Board has had testimony to the effect that, had there been unity of command at that time, it would probably have improved matters, including plans and agreements under plans, and a possible decision to take action prior to December 7; so I just wanted to get your reaction as [1761] to that question of unity of command.

Admiral Kimmel. I would like to add one thing to that. Unity of command in the field isn't going to be truly effective as long as the commanders are receiving their orders from different sources. It will help.

67. General Frank. Had you and General Short, prior to December 7, come to an agreement to have installed a unity-of-command basis out there, from whom would that single head have received his orders in Washington?

Admiral Kimmel. The President, I presume. There is no other agency that could give the orders to both of them. I think you gentlemen can answer that just as well as I can.

68. General Grunert. Now, as to deficiency of means to implement the plans that existed, can you generally give the Board an idea of what deficiency in such means there was, as far as the Navy was concerned, that would prevent this plan from having the best results when anything happened? Not in detail, but just generally.

Admiral Kimmel. I think the primary deficiency in Hawaii was in aircraft; and next to aircraft, both Army and Navy, it was in the antiaircraft guns, means for repelling air raids. My recollection is
that we had, on December 7, 1941, 12 B-17 bombers in the islands, and we had 81 patrol planes in the islands, altogether. I may be wrong in detail, but this is a general picture that I think I can give you. Of the 12 B-17s, six of them were in operating condition, six had been stripped and were inoperative.

69. General Frank. Stripped for parts?
Admiral Kimmel. Stripped of parts—and you know why—to send the ones to the Philippines by the ferry. Of the 81 [1762] patrol planes, 12 of them were up at Midway, 12 of them had just returned from an extensive covering operation, escorting the task force which went to Wake. We had had a great many difficulties with new planes—patrol planes, I am talking about—so I think it is fair to say that we had in the neighborhood of 50 planes, between 50 and 60 planes, over-all, Army and Navy, fit for distant reconnaissance or for an attack on a task force. That is, based on Hawaii, now.

70. General Grunert. What should you have had, to be reasonably prepared for such work?
Admiral Kimmel. There was an allowance established of 108 patrol planes for the Navy, for the District, and about 180, as I remember it, for the Fleet. In other words, about 270 planes. Maybe my arithmetic is bad, there—270 or 280 planes, of the 15,000-plane program, and plans were to assign that many patrol planes.

71. General Frank. As a matter of fact, there was a plan worked out which stated that number?
Admiral Kimmel. Yes.

72. General Frank. Or, rather, it stated the number required.
Admiral Kimmel. It stated the number required, and it was in the neighborhood of 270 planes, all told, including the 108 for the District. Also, the Army expected to get, I think it was, 200 B-17 bombers out there. Now, had those planes arrived, they would have been in fairly good shape not only to provide a searching force but to provide a striking force; which is just as important as a searching force; and it is very difficult to accomplish anything from the surface ships against an airplane attack, and that was very well recognized, and has been [1763] proved over and over again in this war. We had three aircraft carriers which could be used for this purpose, supported by the fleet, of course; other elements of the fleet. I am speaking now particularly of what did happen in an aircraft raid against Pearl Harbor. Of these three carriers, one of them was on the coast getting some repairs, and was going to ferry some planes out from San Diego; one of them was returning from Wake, having discharged some Marine fighters at Wake; and one of them was about 400 miles southeast of Midway, ferrying some planes up to Midway. They were not badly placed in case of an attack, as it worked out, provided we had had sufficient planes left on Oahu to do the job of locating the enemy.

There has been some misconception, I think, about the question of distant reconnaissance with surface vessels. I think it is generally accepted that proper reconnaissance against aircraft attack requires that the patrol planes run out to about 800 miles from Oahu, around a 360 degree arc, if you want a full coverage, and this will take about 84 planes, assuming a 15-mile visibility, for one day. Now, the periphery of that 800-mile circle is some 5,000 miles, and to put ships 30 miles apart, you can divide 30 into 5,000 and get the number of ships
that it would be necessary to place out there on that periphery. We didn't have enough ships to do any such stuff as that.

Furthermore, had they been placed on the periphery, it would not have been effective, because all the enemy had to do was to run by them at night and get inside the line; and then you would have nothing to back them up, because we didn't have any more ships. I just wanted to dispose of that as being too absurd to even think of. So we had left, as the only means of locating an enemy, planes, searching planes, and, of course, radar.

And in addition to the shortage in planes—you asked me about that—while I do not carry the figures in my head, my impression is that the Army had about one-third of the anti-aircraft guns that the Commandant of the 14th Naval District, after a study, considered necessary.

73. General Grunert. Of course, we like to have 100 per cent of anything, but we never get to 100 per cent.

Admiral Kimmel. Oh, no; that is true.

74. General Grunert. But that brings up this question: Was that which you had used to its capacity and to its limits, or was it not possible to use what you had for certain protection without getting a 360-degree protection?

Admiral Kimmel. Certainly; it admits of no argument that if you send out one plane to 800 miles, you have covered something, but I have given you, up to the present, only a part of the picture. These were the forces available. That was the question that I was trying to cover.

Now, there are many other considerations. The principal one that arises at once is the question of personnel, the necessity for training personnel, from the fact that certainly the Navy was training personnel and shipping them back to the States, that we were constantly getting new personnel. That intensive training program was essential if we were not to have a fleet that was utterly impotent. I have been informed, and I believe firmly, that the Army had just as many troubles as we had, if not more. They brought pilots out there that needed training, and they were depleting their trained airmen of all ratings. And in the weeks immediately preceding the attack on Pearl Harbor, the primary effort for their Hawaiian Air Force, I think it is fair to say, was in ferrying planes to the Asiatic station, and they very greatly depleted their stuff.

75. General Grunert. To what extent, if you know, was General Short, as Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, familiar with what you are telling us?

Admiral Kimmel. With what?

76. General Grunert. To what extent was he familiar with conditions that existed in the Navy, which would affect his defense? In other words, what did he know about what you are telling us?

Admiral Kimmel. I think he knew it all. I think he knew everything about it; and, as a matter of fact, as a part of our daily work down there, the available aircraft were reported each day to the Army, and the Army reported their available aircraft to the Navy. I mean the ones based on shore at Hawaii. That is, so far as the aircraft was concerned. I think that in our various conversations—and we had many and extended conversations on all phases of the business—we covered practically everything that I can think of.
77. General Grunert. Now, we take the other side of the picture.
Admiral Kimmel. Of course, you know the difficulties, when you assume somebody knows something, and you don't mention it—and we all do that—but I don't think there was much of that, if any.

78. General Grunert. Taking the other side of the picture, how well were you informed as to the Army's deficiencies for a proper defense?
Admiral Kimmel. I think I was very well informed.

79. General Grunert. Was your staff well informed about details?
Admiral Kimmel. Generally speaking, yes; I think they were. It is fair to say that they were well informed. As a matter of fact, I reported in a dispatch to the Navy Department, in the week before Pearl Harbor—I have got it here, somewhere or other—that there were just 6 B-17 bombers that were capable of flying, in Hawaii. I know I was familiar with that, because I reported it. I know, too, that I was quite familiar with the pursuit strength out there; and this proposal from the War and Navy Departments, supplied to General Short by the War Department and to me by the Navy Department, to relieve Marine units with Army units, both aircraft and troops, out on the islands, brought up in considerable detail what we actually did have there at the time; and, incidentally, there was a case where General Short got certain instructions, and I got certain instructions, and we didn't know exactly what they wanted us to do; but we ironed it out, and there was no disagreement betwixt us when we did iron it out.

80. General Grunert. I think the Board is pretty well informed on the actual conditions regarding materiel, personnel, and so forth, that existed at the time.
Admiral Kimmel. All right, sir.

81. General Grunert. I would like next to develop the phase of what I call “intelligence”, or information; and before we go into that, I think it would be well to take about a 5-minute recess.

(Brief recess.)

82. General Grunert. Do you want to add something, Admiral?
Admiral Kimmel. I wanted to say, in regard to the conditions that existed in Hawaii with reference to defense, that in January of 1941, early January, the Commandant of the 14th Naval District submitted to the Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Richardson, a letter pointing out what he considered deficiencies in Army and Navy means for the defense of Oahu. The Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Richardson, sent that in with a forwarding letter. This letter, I believe, was the basis of the letter which the Navy Department drew up and sent to the War Department, pointing out the deficiencies in Hawaii, as to defense, and the Secretary of War wrote an answering letter, to the Navy Department, in which he recognized these deficiencies and stated that the remedying of them was given top priority. All those letters I presume you have.

83. General Grunert. We have them. We have also had testimony on them. But the only new thing, or which appeared to be new, in what you said, is that the letter was based on Richardson's report. We did not know just what it was based on.
Admiral Kimmel. Yes; it was based on Richardson’s report; and I believe that Herron knew all about it and approved what Richardson was doing, and he sent in a parallel recommendation himself.

84. General Grunert. That brings up a point in the Roberts Commission report. You testified as to an inspection you made of the Pearl Harbor defenses in February of 1941, in which you stated that you were astounded at the then existing weaknesses, and that you pointed out the inadequacy of the antiaircraft guns, the obsolescence of land-based aircraft, and the lack of air- craft detectors. As far as that is concerned, did you communicate your views on that subject to General Short?

Admiral Kimmel. I think there is no question about that. If you mean in writing and formally, no. If you mean in conversations, yes; and he thoroughly agreed with me.

85. General Grunert. During the time from that inspection in February, 1941, up to, we will say, the latter part of November, 1941, did you know what corrective action was taken? Did you notice any improvement in what you had found before that?

Admiral Kimmel. Yes. Roughly, at the time I made that statement which you have referred to, the Army had no modern planes in Hawaii at all, none.

86. General Grunert. That was in February of 1941?

Admiral Kimmel. Yes. The antiaircraft guns were even fewer than they were on December 7, 1941. In the spring we made two trips with airplane carriers to bring pursuit planes for the Army to Hawaii. I think it was two trips; it may have been more. I knew by December 7, 1941, that they had approximately 100 effective pursuit planes in the islands. So that was an increase from zero to 100. In that same time they had as high as 27 B-17 bombers out there. I followed this very closely because I was very much interested in it; and as I have previously testified, you know we had just six effective ones on December 7th. They had a number of other planes in the Army at that time, that is, B-18’s and A-20’s, as I recall it. At any rate, I was informed that they were practically useless for offensive work, and they were so short that they could not get anywhere at sea, anyway.

87. General Grunert. Let us go into that. Did you know of the presence of a Japanese task force in the Marshall Islands, in the vicinity of Jaluit, between November 27th and 30th? If so, was this information transmitted to General Short?

Admiral Kimmel. We had radio intelligence, as I recall, of probably one or two Japanese carriers in the Marshalls. Along within this period—I do not remember the exact date, but it was only a few days before the attack—we also had information by which we thought we could place with reasonable accuracy all the Japanese carriers. I do not recall all the details, but I went over this daily with my intelligence officer, with my war plans officer, and with my Chief of Staff, and we made a re-estimate based on the new intelligence and took whatever action we thought was necessary. Practically every time that General Short came to my headquarters, which was on an average of two or three times a week throughout the time I was out there, I called in the intelligence officer. I had a great wall map in my office, and he gave us a little lecture on what the latest intelli-
gence was. That was done during the week of the 27th of November to 7 December, and we had a report from the Navy Department dated 1 December, 1941, which placed the Japanese carriers, the major part of them, in the home waters. I think I can read you from this report, if I may.

88. General GRUNERT. Yes. We would like to hear it.
Admiral KIMMEL. This is the Fortnightly Summary of Current International Situations issued by the Office of the Chief of Naval Relations, Office of Naval Intelligence, Washington, and dated December 1, 1941. It is signed by T. S. Wilkinson, Director of Naval Intelligence. The portion which I am about to read is on page 9, sub-paragraph C, "The Japanese Naval Situation." (Portion of Fortnightly Summary of Current International Situations is as follows:)

Deployment of naval forces to the southward has indicated clearly that extensive preparations are underway for hostilities. At the same time troop transports and freighters are pouring continually down from Japan and northern China coast ports headed south, apparently for French Indo-China and Formosan ports. Present movements to the south appear to be carried out by small individual units, but the organization of an extensive task force, not definitely indicated, will probably take sharper form in the next few days.

To date, this task force, under the Command of the Commander in Chief Second Fleet, appears to be subdivided into two major task groups, one gradually concentrating off the Southeast Asiatic coast, the other in the Mandates. Each constitutes a strong striking force of heavy and light cruisers, units of the Combined Air Force, destroyer and submarine squadrons. Although one division of battleships may also be assigned, the major capital ship strength remains in home waters, as well as the greatest portion of the carriers.

The equipment being carried south is a vast assortment including landing boats in considerable numbers. Activity in the Mandates, under naval control, consists not only of large reinforcements of personnel, aircraft, munitions but also of construction material with yard workmen, engineers, etc.

In addition to that, of course, there was a radio intercept unit to obtain combat intelligence in the 14th Naval District, directly under the command of the Commandant, 14th Naval District, and they reported to me what they obtained. There was another unit, the principal one, out in Manila, in the 16th Naval District, and a unit in the Navy Department.

89. General FRANK. In Washington.
Admiral KIMMEL. Yes. In Washington. These three units with their intercepts and summaries of information exchanged information, and generally the Navy Department made up a summary and sent it out of their estimate, after having received the other two.

During this period the Navy Department directed the Commandant, 16th Naval District, to prepare the summaries, and gave more weight to the 16th District than to the 14th District. We of course got all those and, generally speaking, they confirmed what was in this summary of December 1st. We had no reason to believe, from any intelligence we had, that the Japanese were going to make any air attack on Pearl Harbor, or even that any attack was going to be made on Pearl Harbor. While we had received these messages, all of our information taken together resulted in the action that we took, and there was no disagreement as to what we felt about the situation.

90. General GRUNERT. Do you believe that General Short was kept generally informed of all that you have told us?
Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.
91. General Grunert. Was this stuff all highly secret?
Admiral Kimmel. Oh, yes. This stuff was highly secret; and these secret matters about the enemy—we did not have any secrets from Short himself.

92. General Grunert. Did you judge what to give General Short, [1772] or did you give him practically everything?
Admiral Kimmel. I gave him everything. I did not tell him anything about our plans for operation overseas. I gave him all the information which I thought would help him in the defense of Oahu.

93. General Frank. How did you give him that information?
Admiral Kimmel. Mostly by word of mouth, because that seems to me to be the safest way.

94. General Frank. You gave it to him yourself?
Admiral Kimmel. I gave it to him and, as I have told you, by the lectures in my office; and his staff officers consulted with mine. So far as the fleet plans of what we proposed to do were concerned, following the principle that the fewer people that know about any operations, the better off you are, he was not directly concerned and I did not tell him about those, and he did not inquire.

95. General Grunert. Skipping down to a question that I had in mind to ask, he probably had no definite interest in your plans as far as your responsibilities were concerned, except inasmuch as it might have affected his?
Admiral Kimmel. That is right.

96. General Grunert. When the task forces left Pearl Harbor to go out into areas to either maneuver or for any special task which would probably cover some of the area that would worry him for fear of an attack coming from that particular direction, was he informed generally about these task forces and where they were?
Admiral Kimmel. Yes.

97. General Grunert. But these task forces did not do what we [1773] call distant reconnaissance for the defense of the islands, did they?
Admiral Kimmel. It is a fact that wherever they were and whatever they did covered the areas, and to that extent it was reconnaissance. The ENTERPRISE, under Admiral Halsey, went to Wake and was covered by aircraft all the way out, or patrol squadrons, in addition to scouting of their own, and they cut a swath across there, which was, in effect, a reconnaissance.

98. General Frank. It was incidental to the operation of the task force, however?
Admiral Kimmel. Yes.

99. General Grunert. Primarily reconnaissance for submarines, for their own protection?
Admiral Kimmel. No. When Admiral Halsey went to Wake we did not know what was going to happen to him. Wake was a considerable distance. Patrol planes were not a great deal of protection against submarines, and he did not bother about submarines particularly, because he had an escort of 9 destroyers around his three cruisers and aircraft carrier. He was looking for bigger game than submarines.
100. General Grunert. You evidently had some suspicion, if you sent a task force like that, that was well able to take care of itself. You thought they might run into something?

Admiral Kimmel. Yes; we thought they might run into something. We were taking all precautions, always.

101. General Grunert. But you did not think that that something might come as far as Hawaii, or attempt to?

Admiral Kimmel. Based on the messages we had and our interpretation of the messages and the information we had, we felt [1774] that they would not come to Hawaii. Otherwise we would have done something somewhat different. Wake, you know, is 2,000 miles to the westward.

102. General Frank. You stated that your combat intelligence had told you that there was this force in the Marshalls?

Admiral Kimmel. That is my recollection at the present time. I cannot be sure of that.

103. General Frank. Which would put it in the vicinity of Jaluit. That force, in your estimate of the situation, was supposed to consist of some submarines and aircraft carriers. Did not that disturb you?

Admiral Kimmel. Yes; but we watched that very closely.

104. General Frank. It disappeared, did it not, about December 1st?

Admiral Kimmel. No: I do not think so; not as I recall it.

105. General Frank. I think we have some testimony before the Board that it went on radio silence and disappeared. If you were conversant with that, did not that cause you some concern?

Admiral Kimmel. Oh, yes. But you must realize that in radio intelligence you cannot locate every ship every day. Throughout the year in which I was in command and conversant daily with the situation units would disappear for four or five or six days, and then they would come back again. That was something to be expected.

106. General Frank. What is your explanation, to your own mind, of the reason for the presence of this Jap force at Jaluit?

Admiral Kimmel. I thought they were taking supplies of various kinds down there, planes, all manner of things, and deploying. I thought they were going to make an attack in south-[1775] east Asia and that they were looking to see that they were not going to be interfered with.

107. General Frank. Will you state how you felt with respect to the possibility of a Japanese attack on the Hawaiian Islands at this time?

Admiral Kimmel. Well, after reading all the messages and getting all the information it boiled down to an estimate by the Navy Department that the Japanese were on the move, and they included as possible points of attack the Philippines and Guam. Of course, Guam would have fallen at once.

108. General Frank. This estimate was by the Navy Department in Washington?

Admiral Kimmel. That is the message which came. It mentioned several places. Let me read the message to you.

109. General Grunert. The message of November 27th started out:

Consider this dispatch a war warning.
Admiral Kimmel (reading):

The negotiations with Japan in an effort to stabilize conditions in the Pacific have ended. Japan is expected to make an aggressive move within the next few days. An amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai or Kra Peninsula, or possibly Borneo, is indicated by the number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of their naval task forces. You will execute a defensive deployment in preparation for carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL 46 only. Guam, Samoa, and Continental districts have been directed to take appropriate measures against sabotage. A similar warning is being sent by the War Department. Inform naval district and Army authorities. British to be informed by Spenavo.

[1776] The first sentence is:

This dispatch is to be considered a war warning.

Everything else in this dispatch is a characterization of that first sentence, and it laid down in considerable detail where they expected the attack—that and succeeding messages which told of scouting on the Indo-China coast, the proposal to transfer planes and personnel to relieve troops on the Islands, and numerous other actions by the War and Navy Departments, including the stress on sabotage, guarding against sabotage in Oahu. It all led us to believe that the attack would probably be down in southeast Asia; that if they did attack the United States, it would be in the Philippines; and if such an attack were made in the Philippines it might be accompanied by some submarines in the area.

I have said that some time ago. I have tried to repeat just what I said before.

[1777] 110. General Frank. What I was after was an explanation of how you arrived at a state of mind that led you to believe that you were at that time secure against a Jap attack in Hawaii.

Admiral Kimmel. Well, I have tried to tell you.

111. General Frank. Yes.

Admiral Kimmel. I might add that the decisions I made were my own. They were made after consultation with my staff and with my senior assistants, the senior commanders, those that were present; and that I have no reason to believe that General Short disagreed with any of these decisions or the conclusions.

112. General Frank. The Army was sending planes, B-17s, into Honolulu from time to time?

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, sir.

113. General Frank. What was happening to them?

Admiral Kimmel. I think you ought to get that from the Army, but I can tell you as well as I know. I am perfectly willing to do so.

114. General Frank. They were being sent—

Admiral Kimmel. You are talking now of the B-17s?

115. General Frank. Yes.

Admiral Kimmel. The B-17s were being transported to the Philippines, and they were going to the Philippines by way of Oahu, Midway, Wake, Port Moresby, and Manila.

116. General Frank. Did the fact that those planes were going elsewhere and were not building up the force in Hawaii lead you to any frame of mind?

Admiral Kimmel. The conclusion was inescapable that, if the War Department had had any real belief that Hawaii was going to be attacked, they would not have denuded them of B-17.
117. General GRUNERT. I want to go back to a little background on information which might or might not have influenced the state of mind early in 1941. Were you advised of the report of the United States Ambassador to Japan by telegram to the Secretary of the Navy on January 27, '41 (as contained in "Foreign Relations of the United States; Japan 1931–41," Vol. II, Department of State, Washington) reading as follows:

(Report of United States Ambassador to Japan (Grew) is as follows:)

"The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of Navy

(Paraphrase)

Tokyo January 27, '41—6 p. m.
(Received January 27, '41—6:38 p. m.)

A member of the Embassy was told by [name omitted] colleague that from many quarters, including a Japanese one, he had heard that a surprise mass attack on Pearl Harbor was planned by the Japanese military forces, in case of "trouble" between Japan and the United States; that the attack would involve the use of all the Japanese military facilities. My colleagues said that he was prompted to pass this on because it had come to him from many sources, although the plan seemed fantastic.

(Signed) Grew.

Did you in 1941 know anything about that?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, I had the substance of that sent to [1779] me. It arrived out there in, oh, I imagine somewhere in February of 1941, and it was sent by a subordinate in the Navy Department in a routine manner. There was no stress laid on it, and certainly if the Navy Department and the War Department took that seriously they didn't take the action to meet the attack that they could well have taken.

118. General GRUNERT. I think you have covered the question of cooperation quite well, unless some member of the Board wants to ask questions on the question of cooperation; but I want to bring it down to, say, two primary messages. One was this message you have just referred to which starts out, "Consider this a war warning," and the other was the Army message which apparently was sent as the same information passed to the Army as was passed to the Navy, although the two messages were worded entirely different.

Do you recall whether or not you had a conference on those messages with General Short?

Admiral KIMMEL. I received the message of 27 November from the Navy Department in the afternoon in Hawaii, and I immediately sent that message; gave it to my intelligence officer and departed from the usual routine in order to get it to General Short.

119. General GRUNERT. Who was your intelligence officer?

Admiral KIMMEL. Commander Layton.

120. General GRUNERT. Layton?

Admiral KIMMEL. L-a-y-t-o-n.

And departed from the usual routine in delivering it in order to get it to him promptly. He was in the office, [1780] brought the message into the office to me. And while he was still in there General Short sent me the message which he had received from the War Department on the subject. I read it and gave him back the message. I didn't keep a copy of his message. As I recall it, I got the message from the Navy Department the next day, which repeated, as you say,
the substance of the message which had already been delivered to General Short. I knew that General Short had been directed to make his report to the War Department of the dispositions he had taken, and I knew that he had made such a report.

On succeeding days, the 28th—1 don't get the dates; I have them in here somewhere (indicating papers)—we had a meeting and we discussed everything that had to do with these messages. We did discuss all phases of the situation and the steps that we should take. The discussion of the transfer of Army units to the islands involved in itself a discussion of the Japanese situation and what measures we should take, not only in Hawaii but in the islands.

121. General Frank. You mean the Philippine Islands?
Admiral Kimmel. No, no. We were talking about the outlying islands when I spoke of the islands.

122. General Frank. Yes.
Admiral Kimmel. I might clarify it here. The islands that I referred to were Midway; Wake, Johnston, Palmyra, Canton, and Christmas, and even down in—we were talking about Noumea and New Caledonia and Fiji and also Samoa; and how you can discuss movements of the troops to these islands without discussing the Japanese situation is beyond me. It couldn't be done, and we did discuss that and every phase of it and the [1781] warnings that we had received.

I don't know what else you asked for.

123. General Grunert. That covers it.
Admiral Kimmel. What else?

124. General Grunert. That covers my question as to what conference you had and what was discussed.

Admiral Kimmel. Does that cover the question?

125. General Grunert. Yes.

Now, in that discussion you understood, then, that the Army was going on Alert 1, for sabotage?

Admiral Kimmel. I knew the Army was on a sabotage alert, yes.

126. General Grunert. And under the circumstances did you consider that sufficient so that that would give you the protection that you needed while your ships were in the harbor?

Admiral Kimmel. Well, in the absence of an air raid, yes.

127. General Grunert. And evidently if you and General Short were satisfied with the Army and the measures taken, then there must have been a frame of mind that there would be no air raid?

Admiral Kimmel. Oh, that is right.

128. General Grunert. So everything seems to be predicated on that frame of mind and the reasoning and the conclusions reached as to what might happen.

Admiral Kimmel. That is correct.

129. General Grunert. Now, then, of course we know what did happen; but, had it been in your mind that an air raid might be possible, then that alert would not have been sufficient.

Admiral Kimmel. In addition to what you have just stated, I knew that General Short had reported to the War Department the [1782] measures he had taken. I had every reason to believe that the War Department, who had much more information or was in a position to have more information than we had, was satisfied with what he had
done, and that went to add another reason why we thought that what we had done was all right.

130. General Grunert. Now, in order to make sure about this question of cooperation between the Commanders over there, I want to ask you an impertinent question.

Admiral Kimmel. Well, I shall try to answer it.

131. General Grunert. Is it a fact that you and General Short mutually, whilst maintaining the utmost in cordial personal relationship, felt such a delicacy as to interest in one another's affairs that neither of you really got down to the details of your respective responsibilities and inquired into each other's business, so that there was a lack of true teamwork and cooperation based upon definite factual knowledge of exactly what was happening?

Admiral Kimmel. That's a mouthful. I will answer that this way. I served for a great many years in the Navy. One of the things that I had observed was the lack of cooperation betwixt the Army and the Navy in the various theaters that I had served. I was Chief of Staff with Admiral Tom Craven when he was Commander of the battleships of the battle force, and he made every effort he could at that time to get some joint exercises on the West Coast, to get some joint exercises in the Canal Zone, and to get a joint exercise in Hawaii, and he was unsuccessful at every turn.

We went on a problem into Pearl Harbor, I think it was in '35, spring of '35, winter and early spring of '35, and we arrived off the entrance along in the middle of the night and steamed up and down in front of that harbor awaiting an entrance plan; and during the course of the night the Army turned searchlights on us. They were friendly, you see; we were entering our own port. They exposed us to the enemy.

So Admiral Craven got ahold of the Commanding General and twitted him with this business about how he had turned the searchlights on them. The Commanding General said he didn't know we were coming in, didn't know anything about it; and then he went to our Commander-in-Chief and he spoke to him about it. He said, "It is none of the Army's business when we come in."

I knew all this, and when I took command of the Fleet I decided I was going to cultivate friendly relations with General Short and to exchange information fully and freely with him.

He came to Honolulu a few days ahead of time and lived in a house out in town, and I went out in civilian clothes, and while he was still in civilian clothes, and called on him, and I told him then that I wanted to cooperate and do everything we could together. In that and succeeding conferences I took up the question of cooperation and coordination of our effort in Hawaii.

General Short responded as a man should, and our relations were always cordial, and we discussed all matters that had to do with a defense of Hawaii fully, frankly, and completely. To be sure, he did not inquire as to the organizations that I had in the ships, and I did not inquire as to the organization of his troops on shore. That was his job. He knew more about [1784] than I did, on the one hand, and I thought I knew more about the other than he did, and it was not where our paths crossed.
I feel that I was very well informed as to the condition of the defense of Hawaii as far as the Army was concerned, and I think he was very well informed as to the Navy. It was a question of details that I knew nothing about, and many details in the naval service are left to subordinates. I had to trust them, and did.

I think that constitutes an answer to your question.

Is that an answer to your question?

132. General GRUNERT. That is an answer.

Did that same cordiality of cooperation extend down through the staffs, as far as you know?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, I think it did. I am sure it did.

133. General GRUNERT. Was there ever any discussion or question as to the necessity of getting the staffs physically together with a view toward furthering each other's interests?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think they were physically together, and they were on the ends of telephone lines which they used freely and frequently.

134. General GRUNERT. Then, no such idea existed as, "Well, hell, that's their business. Although it affects my responsibility, that's their business. Therefore I won't inquire into it"?

Admiral KIMMEL. No; I think less than in any place I have ever seen. And there was a certain courtesy which goes with all relations and must be maintained, and I think it was maintained.

[1785] You ask about that. I think it would be of interest to you to have an account of cooperation in training radar crews.

135. General GRUNERT. I was coming to it next.

Admiral KIMMEL. We had radar in four of five ships out there. It was brand-new in the Navy, but we got it a little before the Army got it on shore; and immediately we got it we told the Army about it; and they, knowing that they were going to get radar, wanted to put some men on the ships to send them to sea so that they could see radar operated and learn how to operate it, take lessons in it. For weeks there we had Army personnel on every ship that was equipped with radar, every time they left the harbor, and most of the time while they were in port too, and they learned a great deal about the only equipment of that kind that was available in the Islands.

Subsequently the Army obtained their radar, and along in August of '41 I had a letter from General Short in which he thanked me for the cooperation given him by letting his men go on the ships, and saying that he expected to have his radar in operation very shortly.

About the same time he wrote to me asking that I detail a liaison officer for radar. I replied to his letter and detailed my communication officer, Commander Curts, and told him he would be available for consultation at all times and liaison, and that was the last request I had for any liaison officer to be detailed to General Short.

Subsequently a Lieutenant Taylor—W. E. C. Taylor I think his name is—came to the Fleet, and he was a naval reserve officer and he had been in the Marines, in the British Navy, British Air Force, had quite a career. At any rate, he knew something about the operation of radar, and I think he knew more about the reception in the plane than he did about anything else. At any rate, the Army asked us to let him come over there and advise them. General Martin
requested it, as I remember, and so I sent him over on verbal orders to do anything he could to help. He worked with the Army in an advisory capacity in trying to get their information center—I think that is what they called it—working over there.

Of course I didn't follow his activities in detail, but I have since been informed that he did do considerable to assist the Army, and on 24 November he submitted a report to the responsible Army people, the Colonels in the information center, and I believe he stated that he had given a copy of his report to my operations officer. I had never seen it until just the other day. It was quite a good report. I do not know how sound the recommendations were, but he covered the situation very well, and it was his views on the situation.

I cite those things to show how we tried to work together and how we did exchange information.

Now, of course, any liaison officer required in the information center should have been supplied by the Commandant, 14th Naval District, rather than by the Commander-in-Chief. That was his function, to see that that was done, and my information, which I have no way of checking—at least I haven't checked—was that no specific request had been received for the detail of liaison officers up to December 7.

136. General Grunert. That was insofar as the information center of the air warning service was concerned?

Admiral Kimmel. That is right.

[1787] 137. General Grunert. But I believe that the Commandant of the 14th Naval District did have a Lieutenant Burr as a liaison officer with the operations section of the General Staff, did he not?

Admiral Kimmel. Oh, yes. I was talking merely of the aircraft warning.

138. General Frank A. W. S.

Admiral Kimmel. Now, all of my remarks there should be restricted to the aircraft warning service.

139. General Grunert. All right.

Admiral Kimmel. And I do not know of my own knowledge what the Commandant, 14th Naval District, did, but that is what I have been informed.

140. General Grunert. As to this liaison officer, Lieutenant Burr, with what we call the G-3, which corresponds to your Operations: was he considered both as liaison officer for you and the 14th Naval District, or just for the 14th Naval District?

Admiral Kimmel. I would say that he was the liaison officer for the 14th Naval District primarily.

141. General Grunert. Yes.

Admiral Kimmel. And I think that you should understand that the ordinary and most of the contacts betwixt the Army and Navy in Hawaii were headed up as between General Short and Admiral Bloch: that is, the Commandant of the 14th Naval District and the Commander of the Hawaiian Department. The Commander-in-Chief was, theoretically at least, a bird of passage, and it was a fortuitous circumstance that I went ashore at all. The only reason I went ashore was that I could [1788] not house an adequate staff on board the ships, any ship without practically demobilizing it. My communication was much better when I went on shore than it was on a ship, and
I had much freer communication. Every time I cut loose on the ship it would lay it open to location by the radio direction finders.

That and various other considerations led to my going on shore. It was inevitable that while I was on shore certain of the decisions that had to be made as betwixt the Army and the Navy would necessarily have to be referred to me. At practically every conference that I conducted or that I attended with General Short, Admiral Bloch was present, and Admiral Bloch was primarily concerned with carrying out the decisions made there.

142. General GRUNERT. What prompted that question about Lieutenant Burr as liaison officer was something that came up in some former testimony to the effect that that liaison officer was supposed to transmit everything to the Navy that went on about the Army in which the Navy was interested.

[1789] Admiral KIMMEL. Well, of course, in the set-up, Admiral Bloch was responsible for keeping me informed of all his dealings with the Commander of the Hawaiian Department in which he thought I would have any interest or that it would be necessary for me to know. There were a great many things that he did with the Commander of the Hawaiian Department, that he never told me anything about, quite properly so.

143. General GRUNERT. Let us go forward with the intercepting command; and we included as one of its functions the Air Warning Service. I want to find out from you just what you know about that in the latter part of November and early in December, and what you thought of it as to its status and its ability to operate.

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, at the time, I thought the aircraft warning service of the Army was probably somewhat better than it later proved to be. I knew that in the drills that we had conducted they had been quite successful in following the planes, and I recall that General Short, on one occasion, told me that he thought he could give us a coverage up to 150 miles and probably to 200 miles. This was just conversation. I didn't inquire too closely into it, because that was quite satisfactory to me; and if he could do that, that was, I thought, doing pretty well.

I knew that they were standing watches in the aircraft warning center to the limit of their personnel and equipment; and I knew that, even though I think now I had somewhat overestimated the capacity of it, I knew it was far from perfect and far from a finished product; but it was all we had, and I believed they were doing the very best they could with it.

[1790] 144. General GRUNERT. Did you know they were "standing watch," as you call it, only from 4 a.m. to 7 a.m., and that that was only for practice purposes?

Admiral KIMMEL. In detail, I didn't know just the hours that they were standing watch. The aircraft warning service was manned during most of the day. I had been informed of that.

145. General FRANK. Did you get the impression that it was manned most of the day just for training purposes, or for actual, effective operation?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I thought while it was manned it was effective. Now, so far as effective operation is concerned, the aircraft warn-
ing service, I knew and everybody else knew, was in a state of infancy, and we couldn't expect too much of it.

146. General Frank. You knew that?
Admiral Kimmel. Oh, yes. Why, of course!

147. General Frank. You knew that it had not been formally activated to the point of where they were providing full-hour service?
Admiral Kimmel. Well, I knew that on the many drills that we had had, they had manned this center, and sent out a lot of information and drill messages of various kinds.

148. General Frank. Did you realize that, for them to have been operative, it would have been necessary for several different agencies like the Navy and the Civilian Defense and others to have had people on duty all the time at the information center?
Admiral Kimmel. Well, I was talking about radar; and the information center, while it is a part of the system, it is not radar, but the information center is to use the radar information that is obtained.

149. General Frank. That is right; but it all has to be integrated into a system, for any part of it to be successful?
Admiral Kimmel. Well, it can be partially successful, even when it is only partially integrated. For instance, if a young man on the radar calls up and says he has got planes at such and such a place, that in itself is some information to him. Now, I agree thoroughly that to be fully effective it must be fully and completely manned.

150. General Frank. Yes. You realize that it was not?
Admiral Kimmel. Oh, yes; but the radar was different from the information center.

151. General Frank. Yes, I know. We are fully conversant with that.
Admiral Kimmel. Yes, I know. I just want to clarify my position, that is all.

152. General Frank. When did General Short make the statement that he could give coverage up to 150 miles?
Admiral Kimmel. Oh, I don't know. I couldn't give you that by line and date, to save my life.

153. General Grunert. Knowing what you did about radar and the information center, did you feel that, on December 7, that had let you down?
Admiral Kimmel. Of course, I knew nothing about the receipt of any information at all in the Army radar, until the Tuesday, I think it was, following the attack; and when I found out that they had known where these planes came from and located within rather narrow limits the attacking force—yes, I felt let down, because that was the information we wanted above everything else. I have been informed that the Navy, Admiral Bellinger, and Captain Logan Ramsey, called the Army information center several times each, during this attack of December 7, and asked them if they had been able to locate the direction from which these planes had come, and to which they returned; and each time they were informed they couldn't get anything.

Then, when this information was reconstructed two days later, we felt that it was unfortunate that we had not had that information available.
154. General Grunert. I have one more question, then I will turn you over to one of the other members, to piece out.

It appears that one Raymond Coll, editor of a Hawaiian newspaper, was quoted by a Washington newspaper shortly after the submission of the Roberts Commission's report, on January 24, 1942, as having said, in substance:

General Short and Admiral Kimmel had made clear by their utterances before December 7 the probability and imminence of a Japanese attack at an early date.

Is there any basis of fact for that statement?
Admiral Kimmel. No.

Admiral Grunert. As far as you remember?
Admiral Kimmel. As far as I remember, no newspaperman quoted me to any such effect. In any event, I did not make any such statement. Now, the only possible basis that he could have had for such a statement was a speech which I made at the Chamber of Commerce meeting—that is, as far as I am concerned—at the Royal Hawaiian Hotel, and I indicated certain measures [1793] that they could take in the islands which would improve things considerably, from our standpoint; and I forget the exact term. I think it was along the lines of "You might even have an attack here." That was the sentiment. Other than that, I don't know of anything. And that was made in September, not in November.

156. General Grunert. General Russell, or General Frank?

157. General Russell. I think you have explored most of it, Admiral. There are two or three details. In discussing the aircraft available to the Army and Navy, early in your testimony, I do not recall any mention which you made of the aircraft that were on the carriers. We have had testimony to the effect that the ENTERPRISE and the LEXINGTON had a complement of aircraft consisting of some 83 planes.

Admiral Kimmel. That is correct. They were shy. They were short of torpedo planes, and they were short of fighter planes—every one of our carriers.

158. General Russell. Let us count what we had.

Admiral Kimmel. All right.

159. General Russell. I believe we had 83 planes on each of those carriers?

Admiral Kimmel. Something of that kind.

160. General Russell. What type of planes were they?

Admiral Kimmel. They were fighters and torpedo bombers. I think that is all—and scouts, yes—dive bombers, fighters, and torpedo bombers; that is right, isn't it?

161. General Russell. To what extent were they effective as reconnaissance planes?

Admiral Kimmel. To a very limited extent, probably a [1794] maximum of 300 miles. Halsey told me that he could send his planes out to 300 miles.

162. General Grunert. And have them come back?

Admiral Kimmel. And have them come back. I said, "How far have you sent them?" He said, "I have never sent them out more than 200." That was long prior to Pearl Harbor. As to distant
reconnaissance, there was nothing in those carriers which was capable of distant reconnaissance.

163. General Russell. They could have a maximum total flight; then, of from 400 to 600 miles?
Admiral Kimmel. When they were armed and ready for action.

164. General Russell. Well, were they armed and ready for action on these carriers, prior to December 7?
Admiral Kimmel. Oh, yes; Halsey had them all armed and ready for action.

165. General Russell. So this was a reconnaissance force which we did not mention earlier? This was a reconnaissance means that you did not mention earlier in the testimony?
Admiral Kimmel. No, it wasn't a reconnaissance means. That is just what I have said.

166. General Russell. They could go out 200 miles, and look, and come back?
Admiral Kimmel. Oh, well, yes, sir; that is true; but I mean as bearing on the subject of distant reconnaissance in the Hawaiian Islands. They were practically useless for that.

167. General Russell. What aircraft was being used by these task forces for reconnaissance, for their protection?
Admiral Kimmel. Those. Those were the aircraft that were used for reconnaissance for their protection.

[1795] 168. General Russell. Then that left some 50 aircraft based on Oahu available for reconnaissance from those bases?
Admiral Kimmel. Yes—long-range aircraft; that is right. Now, I think I should make it clear that the aircraft based on the carriers were not in fact available for reconnaissance, and to stick an aircraft carrier out into an area where you were expecting an attack of this kind as a reconnaissance force was just suicidal.

169. General Russell. Let us go back to the question, then that was answered a while ago, and that seems to be departed from, now. What aircraft was used by these task forces that went on to Midway and Wake and those other islands, for the reconnaissance which was conducted by the task forces?
Admiral Kimmel. The aircraft, as you framed the question, were those that were on the carriers; but in addition to the reconnaissance conducted by the aircraft on the carriers, we had the long-range patrol planes operating and covering the areas that they were traversing on the way out and back, and basing on Pearl Harbor, Johnston, Midway, and Wake.

170. General Russell. That clears it up, for the first time.
Now, we had testimony here about some marine planes.
Admiral Kimmel. Yes.

171. General Russell. That is, as distinguished from the categories that you have already described.
Admiral Kimmel. They were the Marine Expeditionary planes.

172. General Russell. What was their reconnaissance capacity?
Admiral Kimmel. They were about equal to the planes that go onto ships—the same thing, the same kind of planes that go onto the ship, the scout dive-bombers.

[1796] 173. General Russell. In answer to a question by General Grunert, or General Frank, you stated that, once having located
the task force in the mandated islands—and I am not sure that you
confined that answer to the Marshall Islands—you watched it rather
closely. What means did you employ to watch it?

Admiral Kimmel. Well, the radio interception; that is all we had.
Well, I said, "radio interception, that is all we had"—I am not now
and never have been familiar with all the means available to the
Navy Department in Washington.

174. General Russell. As a matter of fact, Admiral, if that Jap-
inese task force was in the Marshalls, it was some 400 or 500 miles
south of one of our positions—I believe, Wake Island—was it not?

Admiral Kimmel. About 600 miles, something like that.

175. General Russell. About 600 miles from Wake?

Admiral Kimmel. Well, if you locate the task force at Jaluit, it is
considerably more than 600 miles.

176. General Russell. It would be 100 or 200 miles farther?

Admiral Kimmel. Yes; that is right.

177. General Russell. In other words, the situation was that we
actually discovered carriers at Jaluit, and we had an operating base
600 or 700 miles away from there?

Admiral Kimmel. That is right; that is right.

178. General Russell. And it came to pass that, if this Japanese
task force left Jaluit, it traveled, by this route, or by Wake, for some
2,000 miles, and launched their air attack on Hawaii?

Admiral Kimmel. Yes.

179. General Grunert. I think the upper one of those maps will
you show you the location of Jaluit.

[1797]

Admiral Kimmel. Here is Wake, here is Jaluit, and there
is Hawaii. This is not a scale map, but it gives you the general idea.

180. General Russell. Now, while we are looking at the map, we
had forces on Wake, and we had forces at Midway, and we had forces
at Johnston?

Admiral Kimmel. That is right.

181. General Russell. Let us assume, now, that the Japanese task
force from which the carrier aircraft were launched reached a point
135 miles north of Oahu, and launched their attack on Pearl Harbor.
Then they had to make their way through the open sea, through these
outposts of ours, for a distance of approximately 2200 miles, to reach
that point from which to launch their aircraft?

Admiral Kimmel. More than that, if they were going to the north-
ward—and that's where the Army says they found them—consider-
ably more than that. I have no idea that they came inside of the 800-
mile circle, when they were going up there, until they got ready to
come in.

In other words, General, I cannot prove it, but I believe now that
the carriers that took part in that attack came from Japan, they didn't
come from the Marshalls, at all; and I have felt that the most probable
direction of the attack, after it had taken place, was from the north-
ward; and there are many reasons for that—many reasons for that.
You have given a good many of them, already, yourself—that is, the
outlying islands, and the fear of discovery if they came in from the
south.

182. General Russell. They had to pass through whatever screen
of reconnaissance was set up by our installations?
[1798] Admiral Kimmel. That is right.

183. General Russell. That is, on the islands we have named; and by the barriers of the task forces that moved back and forth to these outlying islands?

Admiral Kimmel. That is right. That is correct.

184. General Russell. And you regard that as one of the principal reasons why they came from some other place?

Admiral Kimmel. That is right. Now, my estimate at the time was, it was northward. I got information that they were to the south, which later I think proved to be wrong. "Bill" Halsey was in the operating area at the time—and he is good; always has been—he thought they would come from the south; but, there you are! I think, though, now, they didn't.

185. General Russell. Let me ask you this: Is it true or not that there was considerable activity of hostile submarines in and around the Hawaiian Islands on the 7th of December, and two or three days thereafter?

Admiral Kimmel. Yes, yes.

186. General Russell. If it were brought to your attention and you were convinced that the commander of that submarine force which operated in that area was located down in the Marshalls, would that influence your thinking as to where the carriers came from?

Admiral Kimmel. No.

187. General Russell. Not at all?

Admiral Kimmel. No, no. Those two forces could assemble in that area, coming from different directions, and could have arrived at specified points, or to be at the specified points at the time of the attack, and then operate from that on; and [1799] there is no particular evidence to show as to where the submarines came from. They could have come from any direction. When I say "any direction," they could have come either from Japan or from the Mandates.

188. General Russell. About what was the speed of these carriers of the Japanese Navy at that time?

Admiral Kimmel. Oh, I think the best of them, about 27 knots.

189. General Russell. That is approximately 30 miles?

Admiral Kimmel. A little over; adding 1/6, 31 or 32 miles, or 1/4.

190. General Russell. Could they average that over a considerable period of time?

Admiral Kimmel. Oh, I think so, long enough to make a 24-hour dash, or something of that kind.

191. General Russell. If they came from Japan, they would have been on the open sea for about a week, would they not?

Admiral Kimmel. Oh, I estimated—and this was all part of it—if they came from Japan, they had to start at least two weeks, maybe longer, because when they made the attack, they had to be full of fuel, and they had to fuel at sea before they made the attack; and fueling at sea at that time of year and in those latitudes was a pretty difficult proposition; and I don't think that they came there and made an attack when they were empty of fuel, as they would have been after coming all the way from Japan; and therefore these fellows must have started, oh, I would say at least two weeks beforehand, considering all the things that I think they had to do.
192. General Russell. If they had come out of the Marshalls, [1800] How long before that would they have had to start, to have made that attack on December 7?

Admiral Kimmel. Well, it is about 3500 miles from Japan to Oahu. From the Marshalls to Oahu approaching Oahu from the north and skirting the 800-mile circle, it would be about 3,000 miles. Those are offhand estimates. You see what I mean by skirting, do you not? They would have to keep out of the Oahu 800-mile circle.

193. General Russell. Admiral, this testimony has been given on this question—and it is a matter of opinion—

Admiral Kimmel. A good many of these things are.

194. General Russell. Yes, sir; we have gotten opinions both from Army and Navy personnel.

If four Japanese carriers, each with a complement of 50 or 60 planes, or a total of 200 to 250 planes, reached a point from which an attack on Honolulu could have been launched, say 125 to 150 miles out; having 150 to 200 aircraft available for that attack; do you believe that, with the defensive means available to the Army and Navy at Pearl Harbor on that day defense could have been set up which would have been completely successful?

Admiral Kimmel. No, I think that every bit of evidence in the war indicates that, once an aircraft attack is launched, it is never stopped. I mean an attack in force, like that.

195. General Frank. A determined attack?

Admiral Kimmel. A determined attack; yes; and the only exceptions to that, that I know of, are the reports that came back from Saipan, where they practically annihilated the Jap force, with no damage to ourselves; but those were against moving targets; and certainly, with the defenses that we had in Hawaii at that time, we were going to be hurt somewhat if they drove in.

[1802] 196. General Russell. Before we go away from the probabilities of Japanese action in early December: You did conclude that there were probabilities of attack against your forces by submarines?

Admiral Kimmel. Yes; if they attacked the Philippines, if they attacked United States possessions, yes.

197. General Russell. If war came you expected submarine attacks?

Admiral Kimmel. Yes. I expected submarines in that area.

198. General Russell. Around Oahu?

Admiral Kimmel. Yes.

199. General Russell. But you did not expect an air force attack?

Admiral Kimmel. No; not at that time.

200. General Russell. I want to ask you one or two questions about your letter. You did not write the letter of January 25, did you? You had not been on duty there?

Admiral Kimmel. I think it was a letter of January 11, was it not? There were two letters.

(Informal discussion off the record.)

201. General Russell. I think your counsel has suggested what I wanted to know. He stated that you collaborated with Admiral Richardson in the letter which motivated the Secretary of the Navy in
writing to the Secretary of War and calling attention to the weaknesses of the defenses at the Pearl Harbor base.

Admiral Kimmel. I did not collaborate in the writing of this letter. Early in January a letter was written by Admiral Richardson, and that letter I knew about, although I did not collaborate in writing it. In the latter part of January an [1803] other letter on the same subject was written, and at the end of the letter it said, "Rear Admiral Kimmel, who is to be my relief, concurs in what I have said."

I think that was on the 25th of January.

202. General Russell. As a part of the estimate of the situation, as stated in that letter, that the most probable form of attack on Oahu or the harbor would be a surprise air attack in conjunction with a submarine attack, the reference to the outstanding weaknesses of the defenses on Oahu related to this surprise air attack. Do you recall that?

Admiral Kimmel. Which letter is that? 25 January?

203. General Russell. I did not see your letters, and have not until now.

Admiral Kimmel. You are talking now about the letter from the Secretary of the Navy?

204. General Russell. Yes.

Admiral Kimmel. No; I did not agree to that. I have stated that I felt that the most probable form of attack out there was a submarine attack. I thought they might drop some mines. The mining was easily taken care of, because there was only a limited area in which they could plant mines effectively.

205. General Russell. Do you have a copy of the Richardson letter here?

Admiral Kimmel. No.

206. General Russell. Do you have a copy of any letter that came to the Secretary of the Navy in which the probabilities of Japanese action out there were described? What I am attempting to say, Admiral, is this: Do you know whether or not the letter of the Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of War set up a [1804] different probability from that contained in other letters?

Admiral Kimmel. I could not state that from memory. At any rate, the probabilities set up in the Secretary of War's letter to the Secretary of the Navy, and of the Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of War, and of the Commander-in-Chief, are somewhat influenced by the needs of the situation, by what was needed to be remedied at the time, and trying to emphasize for all time the things that need to be done now.

207. General Frank. A conclusion reached at any time depends upon the series of circumstances surrounding the situation at that time; is not that true?

Admiral Kimmel. Exactly. The conclusion arrived at, in which I might concur in January, 1941, I would not want to be held to in November of 1941, under different circumstances.

208. General Russell. Were not the probabilities that the Japanese would strike from the air the same in November as they were in January?

Admiral Kimmel. No.

209. General Russell. What was different?
Admiral Kimmel. Not necessarily. It all depends upon what the
Japanese intentions were and what other employment they had for
their aircraft at that time.

210. General Russell. What evidence did you have of changes in
their intentions between January 1st and November which might have
made the probabilities of air attack less?

Admiral Kimmel. We are considering now—at least I am—the prob-
abilities of a specific time under specific circumstances. I have given
you my estimate of that. To ask me what the changes were from the
previous January—I do not remember exactly [1895] what the
conditions were the previous January. If you mean the physical con-
ditions of Pearl Harbor and such things as that, that is one thing.

211. General Russell. Admiral, what occurs to me—and I am at-
tempting to get at a rather big conclusion—is this: You have testified,
and it has been supported by a line of evidence here, that there was not
available to the Army and Navy any means for distant reconnaissance
to ascertain the location of a Japanese task force.

Admiral Kimmel. That is correct.

212. General Russell. Prior to the time that it might reach a point,
from which it could launch aircraft from carriers. That seems to me
a conclusion that the witnesses agree upon. It has also been testified
rather consistently that such a task force having reached the point
from which aircraft could be launched, the attack could not be stopped.
Hence the conclusion seems inevitable that there was not any way for
the American force at Hawaii to prevent a very great danger to our
installations there by aircraft attack from carriers on the 7th of De-

cember, 1941. Is that true?

Admiral Kimmel. In general, I think it is.

213. General Russell. If the success of such an attack was assured
and the Japanese seemed to have known everything about the situation
out there, why would they not have made an attack which had to be
successful?

Admiral Kimmel. Well, of course, there are two or three answers
to that. One is that the Japanese Air Force, I think, without question,
was much more efficient than we had believed it to be. The attack
was a well-planned and well executed at- [1806] tack. An-
other phase is that the greatest damage done there was done by air-
craft torpedoes. We believed prior to the 7th of December that they
could not launch an aerial torpedo in Pearl Harbor. We thought
that the water was not deep enough. Our air service had not been
able to do it; and we had received official information from the Navy
Department which convinced us that it could not be done. We were
wrong. The major part of the damage was done by such torpedoes.

So far as reconnaissance is concerned, we had plans for reconna-
sissance and could run reconnaissance of a sort, but in our estimate
which had been submitted to Washington, and which was on file in
both the War and Navy Departments, it was clearly stated that we
had to know the time of the attack, within rather narrow limits, in
order to have anything like an effective search, because we could not
maintain a search except for a very few days. Then of course we were
hoping to get more planes all the time, and we had been promised
additional planes, patrol planes, and additional Army bombers, all of
which were necessary for the defense of Oahu.
214. General Russell. It occurs to me, Admiral, that we have gone over rather carefully all of those elements.

Admiral Kimmel. I am talking about what we were basing our estimates on. The question of torpedoes is a very vital one, because that is where the major portion of the damage was done. If it had been a pure bombing attack I do not think it would have been anything like the same amount of damage.

215. General Russell. Let me ask you this question: It occurs to me that your answer now as to the incorrectness of your estimate is based on your under-estimate of the capacity of the [1807] Japanese Air Force.

Admiral Kimmel. Yes; a considerable part of it.

216. General Russell. Where did you receive the information from which you made your estimate as to the capabilities of the Japanese Air Force.

Admiral Kimmel. From all sources: The Navy Department, people who had been in Japan. It was all taken together; you might say, a resultant of many opinions.

217. General Russell. Was the estimate made up by you and your staff in your official capacity, or was it sent out to you from the Navy Department?

Admiral Kimmel. We got information from the Navy Department about it; but so far as the efficiency of the Japanese Air Force is concerned I do not think I can at present put my finger on it. I am merely speaking now of a general feeling, and I think that a good many people have testified to that feeling; that they had underestimated the ability of the Japanese Air Force, and that that was not confined to the fleet, by any means.

218. General Russell. I think we are all agreed that we had a bad estimate, and we are trying to find out where it came from. That is largely the purpose of this. Before I go from that: I have asked some questions heretofore about our failure to know anything about what was going on in the Mandated Islands except by the radio intercept, which of course presupposes, to be at all effective, the existence of some elements of the Japanese forces there using radio on their part. What efforts were made, after you came into the command of the fleet out there, up to December 7th, to send people to the Mandated Islands to discover [1808] what the Japanese were doing.

Admiral Kimmel. My recollection is that our orders were not to go anywhere near them.

219. General Russell. From whom did those orders come?

Admiral Kimmel. We wanted to go into the Gilberts to make some surveys down there and find out something about the Gilberts, and the answer was that we should not evince any interest in the Gilberts, because the Japs might find out that we were interested.

220. General Russell. Do you know specifically where the orders came from to stay out the Mandated Islands?

Admiral Kimmel. As far as I am concerned, they came from the Navy Department.

221. General Russell. Do you have any recollection of any such orders?

Admiral Kimmel. Any specific orders, you mean?

Admiral Kimmel. Well, the Navy Department restricted the Commander-in-Chief to a considerable extent. A movement such as that would have had to be approved by the Navy Department. While I cannot put my finger on it, I am convinced that no reconnaissance of the Mandates would have been permitted by the Navy Department at that time. The only time while I was out there that a reconnaissance of the Mandates was authorized was a proposal to send a B-24 over and do some photographing.

223. General Russell. Could you look into that and present the information to the Board?

Admiral Kimmel. I have nothing on it.

224. General Russell. One more question, and then we will go away from the reconnaissance feature. Did you know as a result of your contacts with General Short that the maximum limit of reconnaissance of which any means available to him was capable ended at the extreme range of the radar? Do I make myself clear?

Admiral Kimmel. Yes. I think you mean that having turned over all planes capable of reconnaissance to the Navy, the only thing left to him was the radar. Is that right?


Admiral Kimmel. Yes; I think that is correct.

226. General Russell. So you knew, then, that when the Army's radar range of 130 miles was reached, beyond that the Army could discover nothing about Japanese movements and convey information to you, whatever the range was?

Admiral Kimmel. Yes.

227. General Russell. So that the responsibility for watching the departure of Japanese convoys beyond that limit was the responsibility of the Navy?

Admiral Kimmel. I knew also that even if he had available all of his own planes he could not have gotten the necessary information from reconnaissance.

228. General Russell. Admiral, I have had some curiosity about what was done with your radar as far as the ships in the harbor were concerned.

Admiral Kimmel. I have been informed by experts, and knew at the time, that the radar on ships in port was virtually useless on account of the surrounding hills, and the towers and buildings in the Navy Yard, and we never made any attempt to use it, but depended entirely on the shore for radar information. Furthermore, radar properly mounted on shore, and high up, has much longer range than anything we could get, because one of the elements in the range of the radar is the height above the sea at which it is mounted.

229. General Russell. Did the military people who came down to the ships while they were in the harbor to receive instructions in the operation of the radar receive instructions in the operation while the ships were there in the harbor?

Admiral Kimmel. They went to sea. That is where they got their real instruction, but they played with it in port. While you can play with it in port and learn how to work it, the indications are erratic and unreliable, if you get any. I am not a radar expert, and you can run me up a tree very quickly on that.
230. General Russell. Someone else will have to do that. I am not a radar expert, either.

I believe you stated that General Short on one occasion said that he could cover 150 to 200 miles?

Admiral Kimmel. Yes.

231. General Russell. Did you interpret that as meaning that he was then giving you a coverage of that distance?

Admiral Kimmel. Not at that time; no.

232. General Frank. As a result of the success of the Jap attack you were prevented from employing your planes, were you not?

Admiral Kimmel. To a considerable extent; yes.

233. General Frank. You had some PBY's numbering about 50 that may have been used for reconnaissance had you not felt secure without using them, did you not?

Admiral Kimmel. Something of that kind, but we had a very difficult decision to make. We wanted to maintain our training status. Up to the last minute we had received no orders to mobilize. We had received these which were quite similar to the ones we had received previously, and we felt that we were entitled to further information, and even orders, before we changed our status. We felt that we must conserve what planes we had.

234. General Frank. I have nothing more.

235. General Grunert. Has anyone any other questions? (No response). If not, I have only the following question:

Admiral, is there anything that you want to tell the Board now which may not have been said by you or not brought out by other witnesses in the hearing before the Roberts Commission, as to the Army, your relationship with the Army, or what may have influenced the Army decision?

Admiral Kimmel. You mean, any further statement that I have to make?

236. General Grunert. Any further statement or anything that you want to bring to the Board’s attention that may assist it in getting facts or leads.

Admiral Kimmel. I have a statement that I would like to make to the Board with regard to the information which was supplied to the two responsible commanders in Hawaii. We thoroughly considered all such information and took the action which we deemed appropriate. There was no disagreement between the Army and Navy, and none between me and my personal advisers.

Since Pearl Harbor information has come to my knowledge that vital information in the hands of the War and Navy Departments was not supplied to responsible officers in Hawaii; in particular, that the War and Navy Departments knew that Japan had set a deadline of 25 November, later extended to 29 November for the signing of an agreement, after which they would take hostile steps against the United States; that on 26 November an ultimatum was delivered to Japan by the United States. This was done notwithstanding a joint recommendation to the President by General Marshall and Admiral Stark that no ultimatum of any kind should be made to Japan. I had been advised of this recommendation and had received no qualification of that information. I had no knowledge of the delivery of the ultimatum to Japan on 26 November, 1941.
I am further certain that several days prior to 7 December, 1941, there was information in the War Department and the Navy Department that Japan would attack the United States and, very probably, that the attack would be directed against the fleet at Pearl Harbor, among other places; that there was information in the War and Navy Departments on 6 December, 1941, that the hour of attack was momentarily imminent, and that early on 7 December, 1941, the precise time of the attack was known. It was known at least three or probably four hours before the attack. All this information was denied to General Short and to me. I feel that we were entitled to it. I felt then that if such information was available to the War and Navy Department it would be sent to us. Had we not been denied this, many things would have been different. Had we been furnished this information as little as two or three hours before the attack, which was easily feasible and possible, much could have been done.

237. General GRUNERT. Are there any questions now that you have heard this additional statement? (No response.)

[1813] How about our counsel and recorders? Have you anything to suggest?

238. Major Clausen. I have nothing, sir.

Admiral KIMMEL. May I please have a transcript of my testimony when it is made up? I should like to request that.

239. General GRUNERT. I will take it up with the Department. I do not see any objection to it.

Admiral KIMMEL. Of course you will give me an opportunity to verify my testimony?

240. General GRUNERT. If you so desire. Tomorrow morning we are starting west.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is up to you, if you don’t want me to verify it.

241. General GRUNERT. We are starting west tomorrow, and I do not know how soon the notes will be written up. I will talk to the Board and see whether or not there is a copy that can be sent to you to be verified.

Admiral KIMMEL. Thank you.

242. General RUSSELL. I would like to make this request, Admiral. With reference to the last statement which you made relative to information in the War and Navy Departments which was not sent out to you and General Short, under the division of the work of this Board which was made by General Grunert I have had considerable to do with investigating in the field which you have last discussed. Some of the things to which you have referred may become the subject of further investigation before the Board is through. I was wondering if we could get in touch with you after I have sufficient time to look at your statement as transcribed. It might come to pass that we would [1814] want the source of certain information referred to by you in your statement. Would you be willing to cooperate with us to the extent that we might be furnished the source of the information contained in your statement?

Admiral KIMMEL. I will cooperate to the best of my ability, in conformity with the restrictions which have been imposed upon me.

243. General RUSSELL. I will say, further, that my failure to develop a line of questions or to interrogate you was largely the result
of a feeling that there might be some parts of that about which you would not want to testify freely if I questioned you at this time. I hope you will consider the matter and that we may get in touch with you again.

Admiral Kimmel. All right. Thank you, sir.

244. General Grunert. We thank you for giving us of your time, Admiral.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

(Whereupon, at 12:30 p. m., the Board concluded the hearing of witnesses for the day, and proceeded to other business).
CONTENTS

TUESDAY, AUGUST 29, 1944

Testimony of—

Maj. Gen. F. L. Martin, United States Army, Retired.................. 1816
Colonel Jack W. Howard, Quartermaster Corps, Presidio of San Francisco........................................ 1914
Colonel William J. McCarthy, 260th Coast Artillery Group, Fort Bliss, Texas................................. 1918
Colonel William Donegan, G-3, Fourth Army, Sam Houston, Texas...... 1928

DOCUMENTS

Navy Message of November 27, 1941.................................. 1939
Message to General Short, November 27, 1941......................... 1839, 1942

1 Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate pages of original transcript of proceedings.
The Board, at 9 a.m., pursuant to recess on Friday, August 25, 1944, conducted the hearing of witnesses, Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President of the Board, presiding.


Present also: Colonel Charles W. West, Recorder, Major Henry C. Clausen, Assistant Recorder, and Colonel Harry T. Toulmin, Jr., Executive Officer.

TESTIMONY OF MAJOR GENERAL F. L. MARTIN, UNITED STATES ARMY, RETIRED.

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel West. General, will you please state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station?

General Martin. Major General F. L. Martin, Retired. My present address is 401 North Bolling Green Way, West Los Angeles, California.

2. General Grunert. Now, General, you probably know what the Board has been appointed for. We are after facts and background and viewpoints and leads that will give us facts about the attack on Hawaii. So we hope that in view of your former assignment in Hawaii you will be able to help us.

Now, I am going to skip around and ask a number of questions about a number of things in order to piece out here and there other testimony we have had; and after the Board gets through asking questions, then if you have anything else that you wish to offer we shall be glad to hear it.

Are you familiar with the Joint Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Defense Plan?

General Martin. Well, of course, you understand, General, it has been nearly three years ago since I have seen that.


General Martin. I know all about it, because it was formulated at the time that I was in command of the Hawaiian Air Force, now the 7th Air Force.

4. General Grunert. Do you recall your Joint Air Operations Agreement?

General Martin. I can state as to my memory as to its provisions, that the searching was to be done by the Navy, calling upon the Army
at such time as they needed additional assistance. The coast line, that is, contingent to the Island of Oahu—reconnaissance over that area was to be conducted by the Army.

5. General Grunert. Now let me ask you a few questions, and then if I do not bring anything out you may add anything you want.

   First, was the Army charged with the tactical command of defensive air operations over and in the vicinity of Oahu?

   General Martin. For the defense of Oahu, yes, but if the targets were located at sea the Navy had control of the mission, would assign the mission and call on the Army for such bombardment as they felt was necessary.

   6. General Grunert. Now, under the Joint Air Operations Agreement, were all concerned well aware of this agreement and their respective functions under that?

   General Martin. Yes, sir.

   7. General Grunert. Was the agreement lived up to?

   General Martin. Well, it was not on the morning of this attack on Pearl Harbor, because there was no call made upon us for any assistance whatever.

   8. General Grunert. What tests and exercises did you have that were held under this agreement?

   General Martin. Will you please repeat that?

   9. General Grunert. What tests and exercises did you have under that agreement in practising for it?

   General Martin. We had a number of exercises where targets would be sent out by a small task force, and they would tow what they call a slick sled. The slick sled would be bombed by components of the Hawaiian Air Force under the direction of the Navy. These exercises were never a great distance from our base, not to exceed probably 100 miles.

   10. General Grunert. From the time the agreement was reached up to the time of the attack, about how many exercises had been held under that agreement?

   General Martin. You have reference to the full compliance with the joint agreement between the Army and Navy?

   11. General Grunert. Yes; whenever the Army and the Navy got together in any test or exercise. About how many such exercises had been held?

   General Martin. I would not say that we ever had had a full compliance with the agreement. The only opportunity the Army Air Forces had of entering into a joint exercise with the Navy was these exercises that I have described where they would tow these slick sleds in rear of a cruiser or battleship. They would have out a task force that would have in it destroyers and the cruisers and battleships. We would make an attack upon the slick sled. They would train their gunners on board, but as to actual firing at any targets that we had, we did not, have them, but we would drop practice bombs on the slick sleds.

   12. General Grunert. Now, I understand that for tactical air fighting over the land all fighting aircraft came to the Hawaiian Air Force, whether it was Army, Navy, or Marine; and for work at sea the bombers and long-distance reconnaissance craft went to the Navy.

   General Martin. That is correct; yes, sir.
13. General Grunert. Now, was that practiced? Did they ever call out all you had for practice, so as to get in the habit of doing what the Navy told them, or did any of the Navy and Marine ever come to you for practice?

General Martin. Yes, sir. We had one particular maneuver in which the Navy and Marine fighters joined with the Hawaiian Air Force for the purpose of such an exercise.

14. General Frank. When was that?

General Martin. Oh, that was about May, I think, in '41. I cannot remember the exact dates. Unfortunately, General, I have no record of the files that are in the 7th Air Force, which was formerly the Hawaiian Air Force, or the Hawaiian Department.

15. General Grunert. Are those files on record in Hawaii?

General Martin. They should be, yes, sir, and I just have to trust to memory here as to the statements I am making, which you may find not to be exactly correct, but they are correct so far as my knowledge is concerned.

16. General Grunert. All right. Now, did the Navy conduct distant reconnaissance regularly?

General Martin. Yes, sir, they did. They had task forces out, of which we had no knowledge. They were secret task forces. They were out of communication even with their home station so far as we knew.

17. General Grunert. You say that was distant reconnaissance?

General Martin. Well, by task force, the Navy——

18. General Grunert. You mean just because the task force covered an area you thought they were having distant reconnaissance in the defense of Hawaii?

General Martin. Well, they had some patrol boats that went out on what was called the early morning mission. They left at approximately 5 o'clock in the morning. But there were only two or three of those that went out on patrol duty.

19. General Grunert. What were they supposed to do? Do you know?

General Martin. They made a reconnaissance in that particular area. Of course, you know how much of a reconnaissance two or three ships can make, nothing to amount to much.

20. General Grunert. How about air reconnaissance?

General Martin. That is air reconnaissance I am talking about now.

21. General Grunert. You are talking about that.

General Martin. Now, they had task forces out at various and sundry times, no regular intervals, that went out. As to what they did, I cannot say, because I didn't know anything about it excepting they did have them go.

22. General Grunert. Now, are you sure that these patrol boats that went out were not to just cover the task forces that were going out about that time?

General Martin. I cannot give you any accurate information as to what the Navy did when they had their task forces out.

23. General Grunert. Now, did we have an inshore patrol?

General Martin. Nothing more than the airplanes that were flying in the vicinity of Oahu that were always on the alert for enemy submarine.
24. General Grunert. Were they armed?
   General Martin. No, sir, no more than they would be for the normal performance of a mission. That is, they usually went up, performed gunnery missions at the same time. So they were armed with that: they had their guns and ammunition, but not for a regular combat mission.

25. General Grunert. Then, any reconnoitering they did was incidental to their training; is that right?
   General Martin. It was incident to the training of a day, and not as a well-organized reconnaissaince for the area.

26. General Grunert. They just happened to observe what they could see in their training; is that right?
   General Martin. Well, a little more than that, General: They were instructed to observe that area at all times.

27. General Grunert. They were just looking for subs; is that the idea?
   General Martin. Looking for submarines, yes, sir. There was no other danger from any other source than submarines in the immediate vicinity of the island. That only extended just four [1822] or five miles offshore.

28. General Grunert. So that, as I understand, your understanding is that the task forces went out, and apparently they covered certain areas of the sea; and outside of that, as far as you know, there was no distant reconnaissance by the Navy?
   General Martin. Excepting for the two or three patrol boats that went out each morning.

29. General Grunert. Did you know where they went?
   General Martin. No, sir, I do not.

30. General Grunert. Did you think that in any way covered a defense against an air raid?
   General Martin. No, sir. I complained to Admiral Bellinger about the lack of patrolling that was being done.

31. General Grunert. What did he say?
   General Martin. Well, he said, "This is all that I have. This is all I can put up."

32. General Grunert. But you actually complained about the lack of it?
   General Martin. Yes, sir. I told him that I was not at all satisfied with the amount of patrolling that the Navy was doing in so far as covering the area was concerned.

33. General Grunert. Now, do you recall your air agreement with Admiral Bellinger, that is, of the 31st of March, '41, the Joint Air Operations Agreement?
   General Martin. Very well; yes, sir.

34. General Grunert. Was General Short well aware of that agreement?
   General Martin. Yes, sir.

35. General Grunert. Did he approve it?
   General Martin. Yes, sir.

36. General Grunert. Now, in there there was an estimated possible enemy action, and you stated the "high probability of a surprise dawn attack." Now, that was in the mind of you airmen at the time you drew up the agreement?
General Martin. Yes, sir.

37. General Grunert. Now, what was done to avoid such a surprise attack that you people thought was highly probable?

General Martin. Well, nothing more than what I stated. The search of the area was in the hands of the Navy.

38. General Grunert. Now, there were Addenda 1 and 2 to that plan. Addendum 2 to the Agreement described the various states of readiness by the Interceptor commander using recently-installed equipment and controlling operations from his central board.

General Martin. Yes, sir.

39. General Grunert. That was just a theory at that time, then, was it?

General Martin. Well, it was more than that, because it actually had been used and practiced.

40. General Grunert. Well, that seems to indicate the existence of the Interceptor Command with an installed air warning service and a control board as of September 20th or prior to November 17th. But did you actually try that out during that test?

General Martin. Well, here is what happened with reference to the establishing of this control. The location for the station was temporary. The permanent location was to be underground, and this was being constructed, and there were permanent locations for these five instrument stations, and there were permanent installations to be made, but the engineers had not completed those sites. So the five reporting stations were in temporary locations, and the Department Commander would not turn those over to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Air Forces until he had completed the training under his Department Signal Officer. He refused to turn them over until he considered they were properly trained. So they were still training under those conditions and not been turned over to the Air Force the morning of the attack on December 7th.

41. General Grunert. But you had an exercise somewhere around November?

General Martin. Yes, sir.

42. General Grunert. 17th to 22nd?

General Martin. Yes, sir, about that time; I don't know.

43. General Grunert. Now, at that time the air warning service, such as it was, and the control board operated, did they?

General Martin. Yes, sir.

44. General Grunert. Then they were capable of operating?

General Martin. They were capable of operating. The personnel was being trained for the operation of the equipment. The temporary stations were located, the temporary control station had been located, and the equipment used primarily in the training of personnel to take over the operation of the control area.

45. General Grunert. Now, when was the Interceptor Command actually activated as a part of the Department setup in full control of the Interceptor Command; do you know?

[1825] General Martin. I couldn't give you that date, General; I don't remember.

46. General Grunert. It was not prior to December 7th? It must have been afterward; is that right?
General Martin. It was set up and the men were being trained for, I would say, possibly a month prior to the attack on December 7th. Now, that is just an estimate. The actual time should be a matter of record in the Hawaiian Department.

47. General Grunert. Now, let us consider just prior to the attack, from late in November. Were you in on a conference between General Short and Admiral Kimmel after General Short received the Chief of Staff's message of November 27th?

General Martin. Well, as to the exact date, I do not know, but I was at a conference with Admiral Kimmel and General Short at about that time. This was after General Short and Admiral Kimmel had had a conference with reference to information that they had.

48. General Grunert. What did they discuss at that conference?

General Martin. I do not know as I could tell you definitely, General, just exactly what was discussed.

49. General Grunert. Mollison was with you, wasn't he?

General Martin. Yes, sir, he was.

50. General Grunert. Well, do you know whether they discussed what interpretation to place on these messages received from Washington and what action they should take? Do you know whether that was discussed or not?

General Martin. Well, no doubt it was, but as to the subject matter under discussion at that particular time, it is very hazy in my mind. We were discussing the different possibilities under the instructions that had been received from the War Department by General Short and from the Navy Department by Admiral Kimmel.

51. General Grunert. Do you recall that the message to the Navy started out by saying, "Consider this a war warning"?

General Martin. No. I do not remember that statement being made.

52. General Frank. Did you see the message?

General Martin. The only messages I saw were, as I remember it, two that came to General Short which he showed to me. One was something to the effect that no overt act would be committed by the Army; that is, the first overt act would not be committed by the Army. And the next, the other one, as I remember it, was something in connection with preventing undue publicity with reference to his preparations for the defense of the island becoming known to the public.

53. General Grunert. Were you present at the discussion or was there discussion that you know of concerning what form of alert General Short should take under these warnings?

General Martin. Well, as to whether this occurred at a conference or whether it was just General Short and myself talking, he did discuss with me the type of alert that he felt was appropriate.

54. General Grunert. You say he did or did not?

General Martin. He did, under the circumstances, and his estimate of the situation was that under the conditions and the information that he had his danger lay within the population of the island and that he was going to order Alert No. 1, which is concentration for protection against sabotage and internal uprising. That seemed to be correct and in keeping with the information we had at the time.

55. General Grunert. Did he ask your advice on what alert to take, or did he tell you what he had taken or what he decided to take?
General Martin. I cannot say as to whether he asked my advice. General Short and I usually just discussed these things as man to man. He made the decision. I had an opportunity to present my viewpoint.

56. General Grunert. Then, you concurred in his decision?
General Martin. I didn't see any more danger from attack than General Short did, that is, from a surprise attack with the information we had.

57. General Grunert. Did you concur with him that it would be all right to have your planes concentrated and not dispersed?
General Martin. Of course, I never wanted to concentrate my planes, but we had practiced these different alerts, Alerts No. 1 and Alert No. 2, and they were concentrated under Alert No. 1 for protection against sabotage. We did not have the manpower to effectively protect them in dispersed position. That was the purpose of concentration. Under Alert No. 2 we had them dispersed in dispersal areas at the different airdromes. As to whether it was Alert No. 1 or Alert No. 2 was just a question out of the estimate of the situation. Now, as to how seriously General Short and I discussed the necessity of using Alert No. 1 or Alert No. 2, I am not capable of saying at this time, but I will say that I always had the liberty of discussing these matters with General Short.

58. General Grunert. You tell me you did not like to have [1828] your planes concentrated. Did you object to having them concentrated?
General Martin. I don't think I made any serious objection to him about it, because at the time that the alerts were decided on, as to what they constituted, I explained to him the danger of always pulling your ships in if there was any opportunity of attack from the air, and we weighed all of those things against the possibility of their being defended in a dispersed area, and on account of the large number of men that would be required they were brought into concentrated areas when alert No. 1 was in vogue.

59. General Grunert. You then put it on the question of shortage of personnel. Was there such a shortage of personnel?
General Martin. There was so far as I am concerned, General, I was charged with the defense of the airdromes with the air personnel, and I could not give it.

60. General Grunert. How much more personnel would it have taken if you had dispersed them instead of having them concentrated, approximately, in percentage?
General Martin. As a rough estimate, it would take about four times the men than we had. You see, these were around the perimeter of the field, and both Wheeler and Hickam Fields, which were two large stations, covered considerable area. We discussed the matter of having high fences around the areas. There was a high fence around part of the area at Hickam Field, but not the entire area. This was considered to be too expensive, as we were still having trouble getting funds for some of the things that we considered very essential, and to properly protect the planes in a dispersed area would take a large number [1829] of men.

61. General Grunert. Had there been any evidences of sabotage?
General Martin. No.
62. General GRUNERT. But you were all sabotage-minded; you were all afraid of it?
General MARTIN. Absolutely.

63. General GRUNERT. If they had taken Alert No. 2, wouldn’t that have covered sabotage also?
General MARTIN. No. The greater danger was from the air and not from internal sabotage. The opportunity for sabotage would probably have been prevalent under either type of alert.

64. General GRUNERT. I want to find out what went on in your minds to convince you that defense against sabotage was sufficient to protect you after you had had these warnings?
General MARTIN. A large per cent of the population there was Japanese. As to how loyal those who had been there for the second generation would be, no one knew.

65. General GRUNERT. Suppose you had been on Alert No. 2, couldn’t you have been just as well protected as far as they were concerned?
General MARTIN. General, there is no question if you are going to be attacked from the air that you must not have your planes concentrated. Regardless of what other threats might have been, the controlling factor is the fact that you could not have your planes concentrated at the time they were going to be attacked from the air.

66. General GRUNERT. That is what I want to get at. Here you make an estimate and you almost dope out just exactly what the Japs did, but when the time comes, and you get warning, you apparently forget your estimate and go to sabotage. I cannot understand what went on in the topside here.

General MARTIN. All I can do is to say this: All these things had been considered. They had not been overlooked. You come back to making a final decision. Which is it going to be? They are almost diametrically opposed to each other. And the decision was made by the top commander that his greatest danger lay in the sabotage and the uprising that might take place on the islands themselves. They didn’t have guns. We didn’t know what they had in the way of dynamite and other explosives. It was hoped they had little or none. But in making the decision he was governed largely by the information he had from the War Department as to what he might expect. There was no indication whatever on the part of anyone that he could expect an attack from the surface of the sea or the air on the Hawaiian Islands.

67. General GRUNERT. That is what he was out there for, was it not?
General MARTIN. That controlled his decision to the point where he decided there was no danger from the air, that his only danger was from the ground.

68. General GRUNERT. When Alert No. 1, the sabotage alert, was called, did you then telegraph to the various airports to tell them to carry out sabotage Alert No. 1 and concentrate their planes?
General MARTIN. We had communication with all of our air stations. We had both teletype and telephone and telegraph.

69. General GRUNERT. Now, in discussing the matter with General Short, after which he made his decision to go on Alert No. 1, and you as his air force commander well knowing there was no competent distant reconnaissance that would cover the areas, how do you then justify your agreeing with him that Alert No. 1, sabotage,
would probably be the best thing to do? You knew there was no air reconnaissance to cover you from the outside. Therefore, you had no knowledge of what might come in from the sea, and if you had taken Alert No. 2 you would have covered both your air defense and your sabotage; but still you concurred on the sabotage alert only. It does not seem to make sense, unless you have some arguments back of it. I am just trying to get facts. I am not blaming you or anyone else.

General Martin. Let us cover the reasons. Let us say we had not been attacked from the air and we were under Alert No. 2 and the attack had come from within. We would have had all our ships dispersed in the dispersal areas. Then the embarrassment would have been almost as great as it was before, because you are not prepared to defend them in the dispersal areas. They could have been destroyed by little hand grenades or any sort of a crudely-constructed bomb or fire, or anything of that nature by a few individuals. A few individuals could destroy each one of the areas if properly dispersed, and the whole thing would go up in smoke. We could be just as severely criticized for having them in that position as we were when the attack took place from the air instead of from the ground. So the choice is, which is the greater threat, and as the Department Commander made his decision, which I think was correct, on the information he had, and I subscribed to it, that the defense should be made from sabotage and internal uprising.

70. General Gruenert. You subscribed to it because you thought there was more danger from sabotage if they were dispersed than \[183\] if they were concentrated?

General Martin. Yes, sir.

71. General Gruenert. And in concentrating them, you put them practically wing-to-wing, or overlapped them, where, if a fire started, you could not get them out to save your neck.

General Martin. Well, they are not serviced or are not armed when in that condition. That was one of the conditions of the alert.

72. General Gruenert. Did you have any evidence as to any actual danger from sabotage, outside of your knowing that a great number of Japanese nationals was part of your population?

General Martin. No, sir; and as far as I know there has been none since the islands were attacked.

73. General Gruenert. It was just that bugaboo of a possible chance?

General Martin. That was in the minds of all of us, that we could expect trouble from that source.

74. General Gruenert. Did you know whether or not these sources of explosives had been checked and guarded and one thing and another? What gave you the impression that there might be individuals who would have explosives to make individual bombs for sabotage purposes? Do you know anything about that part of it?

General Martin. No, sir. I do not, because our G-2 activities were under the Department itself.

75. General Gruenert. When I mentioned the message of November 27th from the Chief of Staff you seemed to recall just the things about “Let Japan commit the first overt act; don’t alarm the public; don’t show your intentions.” You recalled those \[183\]
things, but do you recall this part of the message: "If hostilities cannot be avoided, the United States desires Japan to commit the first overt act. This policy should not be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense?"

General Martin. Yes, I knew that that was in there.

76. General Grunert. Evidently at the time that course of action taken to guard against sabotage was not considered as jeopardizing the defense of the island?

General Martin. It was not so considered. General Short informed me that the War Department was thoroughly advised of the action he had taken. He had no criticism from the War Department as to the action he had taken in reference to putting the troops under Alert No. 1. We had had a maneuver just before this and, as I recall, we went directly from the maneuver into the alert and remained on there, but for what period of time I do not recall now. However, we had been on Alert No. 1 for some period of time before the attack took place.

77. General Grunert. After the attack, then they took the extreme alert, No. 3, didn't they?

General Martin. We started to make that disposition without any orders whatever, as soon as the attack took place.

78. General Grunert. How long was that kept up, that No. 3?

General Martin. I cannot tell you.

79. General Grunert. When did you leave?

General Martin. I got my orders on the 8th of January. As I recall, I left the 13th or 14th of January.

80. General Grunert. 1942?

General Martin. 1942; yes, sir.

[1834] 81. General Grunert. Then it was kept up at least from December 8th until January, when you left?

General Martin. I was relieved of duty part of that time; about December 15th, I think.

82. General Grunert. What I am getting at is this: If you could do it afterward and you took the chance against sabotage, you could have done it before. You had personnel enough to do it afterward, didn't you?

General Martin. There is a difference there. It had been actually demonstrated that we could be attacked from the air. Therefore, your greatest menace then was from such an attack.

83. General Grunert. Still you demonstrated to yourself when you made your estimate that you could be attacked from the air.

General Martin. General, when you make an estimate of a situation you consider all things that may happen. Then you come down to your decision and weigh one against the other, and finally your decision is predicated on what is more probable to happen. Your decision is going to be contradictory to some of the other points in the estimate you make.

84. General Grunert. Now, when you make an estimate and say this is the most probable thing that is going to happen, then why not be prepared to meet the most probable thing that is going to happen, instead of taking something way down the scale? It does not look consistent. Here you make an estimate and you seem to hit it right on the nose as to what actually did happen, and then when the time
comes you pay no attention to that. You say, "I am afraid of sabotage."

General Martin. You will have to consider. General, what information was being received. I do not know actually what [1835] the Navy received. I do know a part of what the Army received, because those things that it was essential I know were told to me by General Short, or he let me read the messages. From the information he had, he was not of the impression they were alarmed about an attack on the Hawaiian Islands.

85. General Grunert. Suppose you had no information at all, then what?

General Martin. That is a little bit different.

86. General Grunert. Then what are you out there for? You are there as an outpost, aren't you?

General Martin. Absolutely.

87. General Grunert. Then you ought to be prepared to meet anything that may happen, isn't that right?

General Martin. You can put it that way.

88. General Grunert. And you made an estimate as to what was going to happen and then along came additional information. This message did not say anything about sabotage, the message on which the decision was made, did it?

General Martin. You mean the estimate of the situation says nothing about sabotage?

89. General Grunert. No; this decision that was made on the Chief of Staff's message said nothing about sabotage.

General Martin. No, it did not.

90. General Grunert. And the decision was made, on this Chief of Staff message, to go into a sabotage alert?

General Martin. I cannot recall the chronological order of dates and circumstances in their exactness. All I can say to you is that that decision was based upon what was considered to be the logical thing to do at the time. Now, it happened [1836] that the estimate of the situation as to what was the most probable thing to guard against was exactly correct. It could have been the exact opposite of that and the thing the Department Commander prepared for was exactly what would have been correct. It so happened it was not.

91. General Grunert. If you had had no information from the War Department or from the Navy Department, what would have been the thing to do to protect yourselves?

General Martin. I think that requires a lot of thought before you make that decision.

92. General Grunert. All this requires a lot of thought. That is what we are here for.

General Martin. Why should I have to make that decision now?

93. General Grunert. You don't have to. I am not attacking you. I am trying to develop something so as to get ideas and thoughts as to what was back in your minds while you were in Hawaii in making your decision. Anything I say here, do not take as personal, because I do not mean it that way. I just want to develop the subject to see if we can find out what happened in the minds of the command out there. So we beat all around the bush and occasionally go right through it to try to get some reaction.
General Martin. Let us go back please. Assume that this attack had not taken place and we are making this decision without the information that they could do it. All the best minds out there, including Commander Browning, whom General Frank knows quite well—

94. General Grunert. Of the Navy?

[1837] General Martin. Of the Navy. Had pondered this question; General Street, then a Lieutenant Colonel, and various other individuals, from every conceivable viewpoint before that was written. The probability of that taking place was considered the best opportunity the Japanese had. As to its possibility, it was very, very doubtful that anything so hazardous would occur, because if it failed, it meant such a reduction in their striking power that they would be confined to their own home waters from then on. We felt as though it was just too much of a risk for them to take. These task forces were out. Very little information was coming in from the War and Navy Departments. I am sure, having no knowledge of a possibility of an attack taking place, other than it was probable that it could take place, those things affect you in making a decision. Why should I disperse my aircraft and get prepared for an air attack, when in all probabilities, under existing and present circumstances, my threat is going to come from within the population, the Japanese population of the islands? No, it is very hard for you under those circumstances, this attack having not been demonstrated that it could be accomplished, to say that it will be accomplished and my all-out effort must be to ward that off, when something is right there under your nose that is full of dynamite. I am afraid that is going to have a very marked influence on your decision. It did for us.

95. General Grunert. You did get some information through the Navy and from the Chief of Staff that war was impending. The message that went to the Navy started out with the word, "Consider this a war warning." Then in this message from the Chief of Staff, of the 27th, it also gave intimations of a hostile attack; and you people still thought that sabotage was your biggest immediate danger, is that right?

General Martin. General, I do not believe that you can read into those messages any specific warning that you can expect attack from the surface or the air. The possibilities for those things, of course, are always in our minds, but the average opinion was very vague as to there being an actual attack, as I recall it.

96. General Grunert. Did you expect the War Department to tell you what to do all the time, or just give you certain information on which to use your judgment as to what to do?

General Martin. We wanted information on which to exercise our judgment. The decision had to be made by the Department Commander there as to the defense of the islands.

97. General Grunert. Let me read you the dispatch received by the Navy, which they were instructed to transmit to the Army. This was the dispatch of November 27th from the Navy to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, or a paraphrase of it: "Consider this dispatch a war warning." If you are given a war warning, what do you expect to do?

General Martin. Aren't you reading a Navy dispatch, General?

98. General Grunert. Yes.
General Martin. I have no knowledge of that. As to whether General Short had it, or not, I could not say.

99. General Grunert. That was the next thing I was going to bring up. Outside of the November 27th dispatch from the Chief of Staff, did General Short keep you informed of other messages received through the Navy or otherwise, or is that dispatch of [1839] the 27th from the Chief of Staff the only one you knew of?

General Martin. As to the things received through the Navy, I could not answer it, but as to anything else, he considered I should have knowledge of, he very probably gave me the information, so far as I know.

100. General Grunert. Then you do not know about this dispatch? I will read it to you to make sure of it.

Consider this dispatch a war warning. The negotiations with Japan in an effort to stabilize conditions in the Pacific have ended. Japan is expected to make an aggressive move within the next few days. An amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thailand, or Kra Peninsula, or possibly Borneo, is indicated by the number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of their naval task forces. You will execute a defensive deployment in preparation for carrying out the task assigned in WPL 46 only. Guam, Samoa, and Continental districts have been directed to take appropriate measures against sabotage. A similar warning is being sent by the War Department. Inform naval district and Army authorities. British to be informed by Spennavo.

You do not recall ever having been made acquainted with that? General Martin. General Short got something similar to that. I have some of that information, but not all.

101. General Grunert. General Short got the message of the 27th we have just been talking about and which reads as follows:

Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities [1840] that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot, be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary, but these measures should be carried out so as to not, repeat not, alarm civil population or disclose intent. Report measures taken. Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow Five so far as they pertain to Japan. Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers.

That appears to be the counterpart of the other message.

General Martin. I do not recall the text of the message you read that the Navy received, but from some source I received the information, I believe from General Short himself, that anticipated a move might be made down through the East Indies and French Indo-China or in that direction.

102. General Grunert. In other words, you thought that they would hit far out first and not hit you?

General Martin. We had no idea they were going to make this bold attack from the sea. It was possible. And that possibility had been weighed, but we thought it was too much of a risk for them to take.

103. General Grunert. When you weighed that possibility in your estimate, you concluded it was highly probable, but when it came to actual conditions you concluded it was highly improbable; is [1841] that right?
General Martin. Circumstances cause you to change your mind.

104. General Grunert. Now, what was it that Washington said or did that caused you people to elect sabotage instead of an air attack as your biggest danger? It was not any particular thing that Washington did, was it?

General Martin. No, I would not say it was anything that Washington did that decided us on Alert No. 1. With the number of carriers we thought the Japanese had, we felt they would not risk that number of carriers that we felt they had to bring up.

105. General Grunert. You did not think they had the nerve to attempt such an almost suicidal attack?

General Martin. That is right.

106. General Grunert. And if you had been on Alert No. 2, would it have been successful, in your opinion, or do you think you could have caught them?

General Martin. No, General; we never had enough equipment to stop them. We could have prevented them from being so successful, but not to have stopped them.

107. General Grunert. Could you have knocked out those slow-moving torpedo-bombers?

General Martin. You might knock out some of them, but you are not going to get all of them, because they had too many for the forces we had.

108. General Grunert. Of course, it is like every other situation, you cannot tell what you would have done, but at least you would have been in the air and you could have prevented a lot of what was done?

General Martin. It would not have been so severe; no question about that.

109. General Grunert. About this reconnaissance referred to in that directive of the 27th, it said “take such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary”, or words to that effect. What did that mean to you?

General Martin. The observation and patrolling around the coastal areas, so far as the Army was concerned, were very alert. They were looking for submarines that might be in the shallower waters or taking shelter from the conformation of the islands in different parts of the areas in the islands. That did not extend out to sea to any large extent, although we were sending training missions right along to the small islands south of Oahu and others to the northwest, that is out about five or six hundred miles, for the training of navigators and of the crews for these long missions over water. All of those were always on the alert for anything that might be suspicious.

110. General Grunert. What could this inshore aerial patrol do in the line of or for the defense of Hawaii?

General Martin. It did nothing more than to give information as to any suspicious looking objects under the water in that area or that might be on the surface.

111. General Frank. To whom?

General Martin. For submarine.

112. General Grunert. That was patrolling for submarines, to the Navy?

General Martin. In that area for submarine.

113. General Grunert. But that was for the Navy purposes, wasn’t it?
General Martin. That was for the Army too.

114. General Grunert. What were subs going to do to the Army defenses?

General Martin. Well, we were charged with the defense of Pearl Harbor.

115. General Frank. To whom did you give the information if you got it?

General Martin. Oh, that would come directly to the Air Force headquarters and then on to the Department: go to the Department, the Department would give it to the Navy. They would communicate in that respect.

116. General Grunert. Did you ever find any subs?

General Martin. No, never found any.

117. General Grunert. But what could subs near to the Island do to the Army defenses of Oahu?

General Martin. Well, the joint agreement was that they were to have charge of the reconnaissance of that particular area within the immediate shore line of Oahu for——

118. General Frank. Who was?

General Martin. The Army.

119. General Frank. Yes.

General Martin. Yes, and of course that comes on down to the air forces.

120. General Grunert. You did it under that agreement?

General Martin. Yes, sir.

121. General Grunert. But as far as the actual Army defense of Oahu was concerned, what danger were subs to you?

General Martin. Well, there would be no gain excepting our mission was to defend the Navy Yard; that's all.

122. General Grunert. And they could get within distance to shell the Navy Yard, could they?

General Martin. No, no; it wasn't considered that they might shell the Navy Yard, but they would have been in position to lurk in there to attack ships of the Navy, carrier or capital ship, anything that they wished to consider targets.

123. General Grunert. Then, it was really defense for the Navy?

General Martin. And for such observation as they might make in putting up their periscope; that was all.

124. General Grunert. This message says, "Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary." Now, was any additional reconnaissance ordered, or did the Commanding General not consider any additional reconnaissance necessary?

General Martin. Well, the reconnaissance around the shore line was increased when they went into alert.

125. General Grunert. Increased?

General Martin. That was very definitely increased in the vicinity of the Island.

126. General Grunert. Sabotage alert? Increase it?

General Martin. We did have a very direct concern about the activities of submarines, but we didn't have any feeling that they were going to take the gamble of attacking from the surface.
127. General Grunert. As a matter of fact, the Army was sabotage-minded, and the Navy might be classed as submarine-minded; does that about cover it?

General Martin. Well, I think you are apt to give a wrong impression to others if you use that statement. You might say, from the testimony we have given here, that that is true. I would not say that we were absolutely sabotage-minded and submarine-minded.

128. General Grunert. But at least it was uppermost in your mind?

General Martin. I think it would be dangerous to convey that thought because that isn't quite true. We had considered all these other things. Now, what we actually did would indicate that what you said is true, but it also indicates that we cast aside serious consideration for these other things that actually did take place, which is not true.

129. General Grunert. You were not satisfied with the distant reconnaiss ance being made by the Navy?

General Martin. Oh, no; I knew it was not sufficiently complete.

130. General Grunert. And you complained to Admiral Bellinger, did you?

General Martin. Yes, sir.

[1846] 131. General Grunert. About when was that? Late in the game or early in '41 or late in '41, or several times?

General Martin. No. I did it on two different occasions. I did it shortly after I went over there and then specifically along in August after we had submitted a scheme for the reconnaissance and protection of the Hawaiian Islands from the air that had been worked out by my staff and had resulted from a CPX we had had in the spring of 1941 after I arrived there in November in 1940.

132. General Grunert. Was that orally or in writing?

General Martin. Sir?

133. General Grunert. Were those complaints oral or in writing, or what?

General Martin. Yes, sir. You will find a copy of it in the Army Air Force headquarters and in the War Department.

134. General Grunert. Then, we ought to find in Hawaii, when we go there, at least two letters from you complaining against the inadequacy of the distant reconnaissance?

General Martin. In writing? I thought you were talking about this plan for the defense.


General Martin. I don't know whether you will find them in writing or not. You should, but whether you do or not, I won't be able to say.

136. General Grunert. Rather you think probably, it was oral, do you?

General Martin. Sir?

137. General Grunert. You think probably you just talked to him about it in complaining?

[1847] General Martin. Well, I know I did that.

138. General Grunert. Which might be nothing——

General Martin. It is possible it was in writing too, because it was a subject of considerable moment.
139. General Grunert. But if there are copies of those things they would be in the Hawaiian Air Force record? General Martin. Yes; if it is in writing it should be either in the—it should be in the Air Force files or—

140. General Grunert. Well, now, you say there was a lack of these patrols. You knew they were not covering you outside. Was that discussed when you decided to take the sabotage alert and not go to the air alert?

General Martin. Why, of course.

141. General Grunert. But you discounted that because you didn't think the Japs had the nerve or the equipment to pull anything like that; is that generally the idea?

General Martin. We just felt that it was too much of a gamble in the beginning for him to take.

142. General Grunert. Now, how about your air fields? They do not appear to have been properly protected by taking necessary measures to protect themselves.

143. General Frank. From what point of view?

144. General Grunert. From the idea of protection of personnel, from having air raid shelters designated, from having places where persons could jump into a slit trench, and having machine guns set up against possible air attack. Now, those things, most of them, appear to have been done after December 7, but how much was done prior to December 7?

General Martin. Well, there was quite a bit had been done prior to December 7. The plans were made as to the distribution of the airplanes at the airports. The dispersal positions had been revetted and slit trenches put in at Wheeler Field. The dispersal positions had been selected at Hickam Field. The revetments had not been constructed because it was considered—now, whether I am quoting correctly or not, but it was my understanding that the Department had requested this and the War Department turned it down as being too expensive. Now, it may be—

145. General Grunert. What was that?

General Martin. The revetments for the bombers at Hickam Field. It may be that those revetments were turned down in the Department as being too expensive for the amount of funds that he had. It was one place or the other, but they had been refused after having been requested. The fields that were being constructed on the other islands had provisions for shelter for at least one guard company at each one of these stations.

146. General Frank. What kind of shelter?

General Martin. They were the theater-of-operation type, excepting down at Morse Field; they were a little more permanent there, a part of that construction.

147. General Grunert. None of that is protection from an air attack?

General Martin. No, no, excepting as to concealment. The effort was made to put them in among the algarroba. Any other protection that might be available on the edge of the airport, and also they were staggered in and placed in lines and streets; more to represent a little native town than anything else.

148. General Grunert. Most of them in the line of camouflage?
General Martin. Oh, they weren't strictly camouflage, but an effort was made to make them as inconspicuous as possible without—

149. General Grunert. Which, in a form, is camouflage so as to make it fit in with the scenery: that is camouflage.

General Martin. Yes, sir. That is, at Barking Sands the roofs were green very much like these buildings here, and they were among the algarroba, which were green all the year round.

150. General Grunert. How about setting up machine guns to be prepared in case an air attack came?

General Martin. The machine-gun pits were at various points around Hickam Field and also at Wheeler Field. Remember, General, your Alert No. 1 pulled the antiaircraft in from these positions. The antiaircraft had dispersal points throughout the island. And Alert No. 1 pulled them in from those positions into their home posts, so they were not in those positions the morning the attack took place.

151. General Grunert. That seems to be the trouble: Alert No. 1 did everything that should not have been done.

General Martin. Absolutely.

152. General Grunert. That is, in the light of what we know now.

General Martin. Yes, sir; that is correct. It did exactly the opposite of what the dispersal should have been to meet the attack that took place.

153. General Grunert. But I still do not understand how after December 7th we appear to have had plenty of personnel to do [1850] all this dispersion and take care of that in addition to sabotage, but they seemed to blame the sabotage on the drain on personnel—why you came to that conclusion.

General Martin. General, we had already been stung. We knew it could be done. The improbability of it was a thing of the past. The probability of its happening again was quite dangerous.

154. General Grunert. Now, you made several remarks here to the Roberts Commission that I just want to call your attention to.

General Martin. I want to make one comment with reference to something I said before the Roberts Commission which I mentioned to General McNarney afterward, and he said, Well, he didn't think it was of sufficient importance to come back before the Commission and prove it. Admiral Standley showed me a copy of the Navy order which embodied parts of the estimate of the situation here that I didn't recognize, and I told him that while these things had been discussed, so far as I knew, that I had not seen that paper. Well, I had not seen the paper, but it was an extract from the estimate of the situation which we have been discussing right here, and that is the only thing I know of that is in error with reference to the testimony I gave.


156. General Russell. I have only two or three things.

General, as I understand your testimony there was no complaint of an inadequacy of ships available to the Army to conduct this close-in reconnaissance: aircraft.

General Martin. Now, wait a minute. I am not following [1857] what you are saying.

157. General Russell. The mission of the Army in connection with the defense of Oahu was to conduct this close-in reconnaissance?

General Martin. There was no objection to our doing it?

158. General Russell. No. Was that your mission?
General Martin. It was assigned according to the joint agreement.
159. General Russell. All right. Now, did you have sufficient aircraft to conduct that?
General Martin. Oh, yes, for close reconnaissance. Goodness, you go around the island in just a few minutes.
160. General Grunert. Was there any definite plan for conducting this close-in reconnaissance?
General Martin. As to whether you will find an operation order in the operation files at the 7th Air Force that says how this will be done, I cannot say. It was being done by everyone that went out on a mission. That was a general understanding, that they were always alert for these specific things that might be an indication of the presence of the enemy, particularly under water. We thought he would be spying upon us, because they would send submarines into that area to detect the movements of the Navy, of the Fleet.
161. General Russell. Then this reconnaissance was conducted as a part of some other mission?
General Martin. Normally, yes.
162. General Russell. Do you recall ever having sent out any Army aircraft for the specific and sole purpose of conducting this close-in reconnaissance?
[1852] General Martin. I can’t recall specifically that that was done. We had an observation squadron there, you see, that you will find in their files, I am sure, specifically assigned to some missions for them. Now, as to the making of that, I wouldn’t know.
General Martin. They were given general instructions that this was a part of their duty. It was a part of the duty of the bombers and fighters as well. They all had the same responsibility for observing the area in which they were flying.
164. General Russell. General, your testimony or your evidence as given in reply to General Grunert's questions indicated a rather close relationship between you and the Department Commander, General Short.
General Martin. Yes, sir.
165. General Russell. Were your transactions with him quite frequent or infrequent?
General Martin. No; I would say they were quite frequent. If I had any business to transact on which it was necessary to get his decision, I would ask permission of his Chief of Staff to have an audience with him, which was always granted at as near the time I had requested as was possible for him, and he would call on me quite often to come into headquarters to discuss different matters.
166. General Russell. When did you go out there?
General Martin. I reported for duty there the 2nd of November, 1940.
167. General Russell. Was the Department in a condition of alert when you arrived?
168. General Russell. Were you informed when you arrived that the Department had been on an alert?
General Martin. No, sir.
169. General Russell. That year?
General Martin. Oh, I think there had been some sort of a maneuver or something of that kind. As to being alerted, I didn't have any knowledge of that, don't remember of anything of that kind. I won't say that they were not.

170. General Russell. Were you, or not, conscious of the fact that the relation between the American Government and the Japanese Government grew more tense from the time you arrived until the attack on December 7, '41?

General Martin. Yes, sir; that is right. That is correct. Had full knowledge of that.

171. General Russell. You had full knowledge of that?

General Martin. Yes.

172. General Russell. How did you acquire that knowledge?

General Martin. Well, I acquired it through the press relations and through information that the Department Commander gave me.

173. General Russell. Then, the Department Commander and you were agreed that the relationship between the Japanese and American Governments was growing more tense through the year 1941?

General Martin. Yes, sir.

174. General Russell. Was there anything occurring on the Island itself which would lend color to this growing tenseness between the two Governments?

[1854] General Martin. No, there was none, no indication of anything on the Island that would cause unnecessary suspicion, although the G-2 section of the Department was unusually alert and they were searching for information as such a large percentage of the population were of Japanese descent or native Japanese, natural Japanese, that they felt that it would be almost impossible for them to ferret out all the things that might be taking place. So there was naturally cause for great concern as to what this great mass or large percentage of population could do that would be harmful to us.

175. General Russell. In the fall of 1941 or in November, to limit the period a little more, in middle and late November of 1941, what were the conclusions reached by you and the Department Commander as to the probable imminence of war with Japan?

General Martin. We thought it quite probable.

176. General Russell. When you went on Alert No. 1 as of late November, were you and the Department Commander, insofar as you knew his thoughts, impressed that war might begin at any day or at any hour with Japan?

General Martin. I think that is a little bit further than we considered. The probability of war, yes. And when you say "the probability of war," it is apt to break out at any particular time. The fact that it was going to break out within the next month or two, as far as I am concerned, I will say I did not think that it would. I felt that the Japanese were anxious to accomplish or to gain and hold what they had, rather than to bring additional trouble on their shoulders.

177. General Russell. Yes, sir. Well, do you know, General, whether or not the opinion which you have just expressed as to [1855] the imminence of war at that time was entertained also by the Commanding General of the Department, General Short?

General Martin. All I can say is, he discussed it with me, and the information he had, which indicated that the negotiations were not progressing as they had expected.
178. General Russell. Yes, but you are not able—
General Martin. And they were getting at the critical stage.

179. General Russell. I understand, then, that you are not in a position to give any too clear a picture of General Short's thought about war at that time.

I will ask you this, General: Do you think that in the estimate of the situation, upon which the order for Alert No. 1 was issued, the probability or improbability of immediate war with Japan played any part?

General Martin. You mean to say as to probability of immediate war taking place with Japan being given consideration at the time Alert No. 1 was decided?

180. General Russell. And affecting the order.

General Martin. I don't think there is any doubt but what a war considered.

181. General Russell. General, suppose that a conclusion had been reached by you that war with Japan was likely at any hour; would you have thought then that Alert No. 1 was sufficient?

General Martin. Yes, under the circumstances that I stated to General Granert. You weigh all the information you have available to you. One counters another, and it is up to the Department Commander and his assistants to make a decision as to what he thinks is the greatest set to him. Under the circumstances and the information that was available to him at [1856] that time I felt that his decision was correct.

182. General Russell. Whether war came or not?

General Martin. Yes.

183. General Russell. General, in the discussion by General Granert of the—

General Martin. I would like to add something right there, sir, in addition to the question.


General Martin. I feel that our decision was influenced to a certain extent by the fact that the Navy was patrolling with task forces in waters of which we had no knowledge. Now, as to what areas they were covering, we did not know, but it did affect a decision as to the paramount danger coming from within rather than from without.

185. General Russell. You didn't know where they were? You didn't know where they went to, did you?

General Martin. No.

186. General Russell. Whether north, south, east, or west?

General Martin. No; sir; they didn't tell us.

187. General Frank. Did you have confidence in the effectiveness of these task forces?

General Martin. Well, not complete, no, but——

188. General Frank. But? But what?

General Martin. Well, but what, I don't know what I was intending to say. I was going to say: the task force, not knowing as to where it had gone or not knowing what information it had that would indicate that it should go certain places, I couldn't answer the question.

189. General Frank. But you just said that the fact that the Navy had task forces out influenced your decision.

General Martin. Well, I am sure that it did.

190. General Frank. Well, why did it?
General Martin. Well, if there was anything so large as a task force of proper size to make a successful attack against the Island on the ocean, I just had a feeling that the Navy, in the spreading of their task force to pick up information, would contact it in some way.

191. General Frank. Therefore, you had confidence that the Navy was conducting task force operations that would furnish you a certain protection?

General Martin. That is right.

192. General Frank. And because of that feeling of confidence in the Navy to do it, you felt a certain security?

General Martin. That is perfectly true. Now, as I stated a moment ago, we were not completely satisfied with the way this reconnaissance was being done, because there wasn't enough in the air, and your reconnaissance from the air would extend over a larger territory in the limited amount of time, and that was the thing I was complaining to Admiral Bellinger about. There wasn't sufficient air reconnaissance, but we did have a feeling that the task forces going out were going out with the specific purpose in mind of conducting reconnaissance of the waters in that vicinity. As to where they went, I didn't know.

I am sorry to interrupt, but I just wanted to bring out that point.

193. General Russell. Well, you were not the one that interrupted, General.

I want to talk to you about what General Frank has injected here, this question of confidence in the Navy, not [1858] from a reconnaissance standpoint but from a defensive standpoint. You seem to have some idea, for an air force commander, General, about naval operations, of the task forces necessary to support this air attack, and so forth.

What was your feeling about the ability of the Navy based on Pearl Harbor to destroy such a task force before it could launch the planes from the carriers, assuming that the Japanese task force was discovered in time?

General Martin. I felt the Navy was strong enough and the task forces were strong enough to be such a threat against any concentration excepting the entire Japanese fleet, which I didn't think they would ever contemplate sending, that it would be a very decided deterrent to the Japanese ever sending a task force into that area. They were strong enough to have defeated any except a very unusually strong and well constituted task force with plenty of capital ships in it, because they had capital ships and they had cruisers, a goodly number of destroyers, submarines, and the other lighter ships essential to the protection of the capital ships and carriers. There were four carriers that were in and out at various and sundry times which could have been a part of any task force.

194. General Russell. There were four carriers? Now, I didn't get the full import of that.

General Martin. Yes, sir. I say "in and out." Now, there were the Hornet and the Enterprise and the Yorktown and the—

195. General Russell. Oh, that is out.


General Martin. Yes, Lexington.

[1858A] 197. General Grunert. Four of our own carriers?

General Martin. Yes, sir.
NOW, as far as we knew, the Japanese—all the information we had—
was that the Japanese had about eight fairly good-sized carriers andprobably about the same number of converted carriers, and the naval
forces that were then in the Hawaiian Islands were perfectly com-
petent of taking care of any normal task force that might be sent
against them. It was a question of their finding them.

198. General Russell. Now, General, this final question: Earlier
in your examination you referred to the fact, when asked about means
available to you to have intercepted and destroyed this air attack—
General Martin. Yes, sir.

199. General Russell. You made reference to that and stated that
before you left you wanted to discuss that.

General Martin. Yes, sir.

200. General Russell. And I would like to ask you to discuss it
now.

General Martin. Well, I would like to do two things: I would
like to make just a general statement as to conditions, and then I
would like, if I may, to read extracts from personal letters I have
written to General Arnold on the subject, so you can see the thing was
being discussed at the time. And I'll admit I didn't get any very
definite answers with reference to how it was going to be corrected,
but it had been under discussion for some time.

When I took over from General Frank in the Hawaiian Islands
we had, you might say, no combat equipment. We had some P-26s,
an old obsolete type of fighter which we then \[1859\] called a
pursuit airplane. We had some old observation planes, some B-18
bombers which could never protect themselves in any combat at all.
They could be used for reconnaissance, but you would lose them as
fast as you sent them out, if they went into combat. They were always
recognized as not being a combat ship.

In the spring of 1941 we received possibly 50 P-36s. They were
obsolete at the time they came over. A little later—as I remember
it, about May—we received some P-40 fighters. These ships were
brought in on carriers and flown off to the station after they arrived
in Hawaii. About May we received 21 B-17s that were ferried over
by air. 9 of these, about the 5th or 6th of September, were trans-
ferred to the Philippines by air.

The 12 remaining were ordered to proceed to the Philippines; and
upon our request that they be delayed that we could continue the
training of combat crews for that type of ship, as the two bombard-
ment groups at Hickam Field would be equipped with that type of
airplane, they would go on the tail of some 60-odd airplanes that
were being transferred from the mainland to the Philippines. At
the time this attack took place the preparation of these 12 B-17s for
transfer to the Philippines had progressed to the point where 6 of
them were on the ground with fuel tanks being replaced, in which we
found some deterioration; engines being replaced so that they would
have the requisite amount of lack of time on the engines that they
would be sure to be in a position to function properly in transit.
The types of ships which could have been used in combat, which is
the P-40, B-17, and 10 A-20s, were always possibly 50 percent out
of commission due to spare parts. In the beginning of our production
program \[1860\] all monies, as possible, were placed into the
producing of additional engines, and the spare parts requirements were neglected at the time. Therefore, the new airplanes coming out were deficient to meet the requirements of spare parts.

We had sent cablegrams and letters on the subject of spare parts through proper channels to our supply agencies, and they were not in a position to help us. I knew that, but I did want them to be sure to realize how important it was to improve the spare-part situation as rapidly as possible. If we had an accident in one of our ships, we used what they call cannibalism to rob it of certain spare parts to repair other ships.

Now, that was directly forbidden by regulations, but the situation was such that I knew that I would be always justified in taking such action. They were never destroyed in any way but what the parts if received could be put back in and the ship put back into commis-sion again. But even the taking of a part from any part of the airplane or engine was forbidden as far as our regulations at the time were concerned.

Now, as to information we may have that you may find in the files, I am sure you will find plenty of it explaining this situation, the exact time when these airplanes were received, and the efforts we were making to train combat crews. The type of airplane we had was entirely different from the type we were receiving. Therefore the training program had to be rather extensive for the fighters. We were receiving men just out of the schools, who had not had advanced training at the time: that is, a limited advance training but not on any of the modern equipment. So they were put through a demonstration of their ability to handle the old, obsolescent P-26, then through the P-36 and on to the P-40, and considerable progress was being made in training these men to take over the P-40 equipment.

201. General Frank. How about the bombers?

General Martin. The bombers, as soon as we got B-17s, in I think it was some time in May, we had a few of our pilots that had flown the B-17s. They started training others, and as I remember there were one or two officers remained with the first flight of bombers that came over, and helped train other additional crews. So they had to train the pilots to operate the ship, the co-pilots and all other members of the crew. We had no knowledge of repairing its engines or any of its equipment. We had schools because the schools on the main-land—the technical I am talking about, now—had not progressed to the point where they could meet the requirements. In other words, they had consumed some of their own fat, so to speak, to meet the enlargement of the technical school facility. We were getting but a few technically trained men.

I inherited from my predecessor certain schools which were in being, and others were established afterwards to give radio, engine mechanics, airplane mechanics; and different types of training and repair by the artisans in the handling of this new equipment was given at Wheeler and Hickam Fields. There were possibly 400 men in these schools, as I remember.

My contention, the only dissension of note that I ever had with General Short, was with respect to the Air Corps performing its spe-cific functions and taking care of its own, and the ground forces fur-
nishing protection for the airdrome. The regulations at the time specified that the air force are \[1862\] responsible for the defense of the airdrome, but on account of my intensive training program and the fact that I expected this new equipment to come, the Hawaiian Air Force having just been set up in November of 1940, there was a tremendous amount of loose ends to be picked up, and I complained very bitterly to General Short to have the men relieved that he insisted be trained as infantry for the defenses of the airdromes and for other duty; and his idea was that, when this attack was pressed home to a point that the air forces had been liquidated, then the ground troops would be used as infantry. That part of it was perfectly sound and all right, but my contention was that until I was prepared to meet my primary mission I could not spare the men to be trained for this secondary mission.

Now, I would like to read you some extracts from letters.

202. General Russell. Before you get away from training, General, in order to make the record more or less logical: What effect on this training program would your having gone into Alert 2 or 3 have had?

General Martin. So far as training for the defense of the airdromes is concerned?

203. General Russell. This general training that you are talking about.

General Martin. As soon as you went into one of those alerts then it was assumed by the Department that these men had taken their positions for the final protection of the Island, and parts of them were to report to the military police, and parts of them, a certain number of troops were in defense of the airdromes on the Island. Therefore they would be taken completely away from their essential positions—those that had \[1863\] been trained for other positions—with the air force units. After they had been trained as infantry for this defense and the alert had been called, they had by that time qualified for a classification in the air corps or the ground forces, ground crews for these ships.

\[1864\] 204. General Frank. It is not quite clear to me. Let me ask a question.

General Martin. Perhaps it was not made clear.

205. General Frank. On Alert No. 1 you could continue your Air Corps training; is that right?

General Martin. Now so far as these troops that were performing the duty of infantry was concerned —

206. General Frank. Did you perform infantry duty on all three alerts?

General Martin. Yes, for those troops that had been trained as infantry.

207. General Frank. In all three alerts?

General Martin. Yes.

208. General Frank. Was there any advantage to conducting Air Corps training in any one of the three alerts?

General Martin. Well, as to the training in the alert —

209. General Frank. No, Air Corps training.

General Martin. Yes.
210. General Frank. Technical training. Was there any advantage to conducting Air Corps training in any one of the three alerts?

General Martin. By Air Corps training you mean technical training?

211. General Frank. Yes.

General Martin. Pertaining to the Air Forces?

212. General Frank. Yes.

General Martin. There most certainly was, because we were hard pressed to get the men properly trained to meet our requirements in the new organization.

213. General Frank. Could you do more technical training for the Air Force in No. 3 Alert, No. 2 Alert, or No. 1 Alert, or was there no difference?

General Martin. Of course there was a difference. There would be more under Alert No. 1.

214. General Frank. More technical training?

General Martin. Yes. Under Alert No. 2 your ships are dispersed and your crews are with the ships.

215. General Grunert. Under Alert No. 1 your ships were concentrated. Did you take them out of parking then, to train, or what?

General Martin. The point you have in mind and what I am answering may be different. There is one thing, as to technical training in the schools we had on the ground. If you are talking about the opportunity for training in the crews assigned to the ships, then it is different.

216. General Frank. No, I am talking about the schools.

General Martin. Your Alert No. 1 gave them great opportunity for technical training on the ground.

217. General Russell. What happened with respect to training crews under Alert No. 1?

General Martin. You have no planes at all.

218. General Russell. They are all placed together?

General Martin. Yes. You could not train crews under those conditions.

219. General Russell. After December 7th what happened to your training effort?

General Martin. I should say it started about 8 o'clock on December 7th. The men were moving the ships out of the dispersed areas so far as they could. In fact, considerable of them were caught in getting them to dispersed areas.

220. General Russell. Let us go to December 8th. What sort of training did you carry on on December 8th and thereafter?

General Martin. There was very little training there, or you could not call it training. We went to our established stations.

221. General Russell. That was Alert No. 3?

General Martin. Combat stations.

222. General Russell. That was Alert No. 3?

General Martin. Yes. While it was training, I would not call it training.

223. General Russell. General, I want you to be sure or be accurate on the answer that you made a moment ago about under Alert No. 1. Under Alert No. 1 you assembled all your planes on the aprons and runways close in?
General Martin. That was to protect them against trouble.

224. General Russell. All day long they were kept there?

General Martin. They were kept there, excepting those required for missions and other assignments, which were withdrawn and put back into this concentration upon returning.

225. General Russell. Were any of those missions training missions for which you took those planes out?

General Martin. In a sense, yes. It was flexible to a certain extent when permitted by the Department command. A strict interpretation of the alert would mean you put them there and have them there, but for training they were withdrawn and taken out and continued to be used and put back in their concentrated positions at night, or whenever they came back. They were training at night as well as day time.

[1867] 226. General Russell. I am going to leave the development of your fighting strength, if there is any development, to General Frank; he knows more about it than I do; but I do want to ask you one other question. What help could the Hawaiian Department considered as a whole, Army, Navy and all, have expected in the way of fighters from the Navy?

General Martin. It would have helped to take from the Navy, under our control, such fighters as were flown off the carriers that were within the harbor. That is all.

227. General Russell. Do you know that strength as of December 7th?

General Martin. Let me add: And such Marine Corps fighters as were based on Hawaii.

228. General Russell. Do you know what that effective strength was as of December 7th, 1941?

General Martin. There were no carriers in the harbor, for one thing. I think there were about 25 ships belonging to the Marines out at Ewa Air Base. As to what the Navy may have had on Ford Island, I cannot say. I think you will find those figures of the ships that were actually on the Island at that time in the Operations file of the 7th Air Force, because there was a record being made of the fighting effectiveness of the Hawaiian Air Force from the standpoint of its real defense.

229. General Russell. When these carriers were in the harbor, the aircraft which normally accompanied them to sea were taken off the carriers, were they not?

General Martin. When they came in?


General Martin. They always wanted them to go ashore to [1868] some air field for training. As to whether they were always flown from the carriers to a shore-based station, I cannot say, but it was my understanding they were, because there was great discussion between the Army and the Navy as to the number of air fields that should be made available to the Navy.

231. General Russell. We had some testimony during this hearing about the probable Jap strength in carriers and aircraft. Do you have any independent opinion as to their strength, both in carriers and aircraft, involved in the attack on December 7th?

General Martin. I think I said at the time that we felt we could expect them to have approximately 8 specially designed carriers, and possibly the same number of converted carriers.
232. General Russell. I am talking about those in the task force which made the attack on Pearl Harbor. How many do you think were there?

General Martin. I did not think any such number would ever be in any such task force to leave the Japanese Islands. I would not expect them to have all of their carriers in the task force.

233. General Grunert. How many Japanese planes attacked Hawaii, do you know?

General Martin. No one knows.

234. General Grunert. Your estimate?

General Martin. I would estimate from a hundred to two hundred. It is my opinion they were in the neighborhood of 150. It is further my opinion that a great number of those that made the attack never did return to their carriers. I may be wrong about it, but I believe that is true.

[1869] 235. General Russell. General, you stated that you had some letters that you wanted to discuss. Would you discuss those now?

General Martin. I wish to read extracts of personal letters that I have written to General Arnold. I wrote letters to General Arnold from time to time to keep him apprised of what was going on in the Hawaiian Air Force. I will take them up chronologically.

He had written me a letter on October 16th, 1940, which I received after I reported for duty in the Hawaiian Department. The extract from that letter that I wish to read is as follows:

From the most accurate information available to date, provided further releases of equipment are not made unexpectedly, it is quite probable that new equipment will be available for assignment to Hawaii not later than the first of July, 1941.

From a letter that I had written to him shortly after my arrival in the Hawaiian Department on the 17th of December, 1940, I wish to read the following extract:

In my opinion we have in the past and are still practicing a very faulty policy with reference to providing our foreign possessions with modern equipment. The importance of these stations from the standpoint of national defense dictate that they receive first consideration in the assignment of modern equipment and the full quota of personnel for its operation. We have been satisfied in the past to supply our units in foreign possessions with obsolescent equipment until organizations in the States had been equipped with modern types. This to me is very faulty [1870] and could, in these times of uncertainty, be very detrimental to our scheme of national defense. Our foreign possessions are outposts of great importance and should by all means receive first consideration as to quantity and quality of equipment.

In reference to that, from his reply of the 3rd of February, 1941, I quote the following:

You are correct in that it is of great importance to provide our foreign departments with modern equipment. I am sure that you can appreciate the many conflicts which arise with respect to the assignment of aircraft, based upon tactical needs as determined by the War Plans Division. At this writing, your heavy bombardment groups setup for B-17 airplanes; the 18th Pursuit Group for P-40's, and the 15th Fighter Group for P-38s. It appears that we may be able to send to Hawaii a few of these B-17s around August of this year. Likewise, we expect to send a small number of P-40s late this spring. Indications are that the P-38s are not going to be available until the spring of 1942. We are right in the midst of completing the plans on the assignment of aircraft, pursuant to the 54 group program. As soon as more definite data has been worked out, I will
advise you as to when your unit should be equipped, in accordance with the plans now in progress.

In a letter which I wrote to him on the 25th of July, 1941 I have the following extract that I wish to read:

As a result of an Air Force CPX which I held last winter, a study has been prepared, under the direction of Colonel Farthing assisted by Major Morgan and Captain [1871] Coddington of the 5th Bombardment Group, which gives a clear presentation as to how these islands can be given a positive defense by the operation of long-range bombardment. It also dictates the number of this type of airplane required. This study is going forward within the next few days and I am sending a copy of this study, which is submitted through the Department Commander, directly to you. To me it is the most important study which has ever been prepared for the solution of the problem of the defense of the Hawaiian Islands and should receive most serious consideration. This is particularly important in view of the fact that by a memorandum addressed to the Commanding General, U. S. Air Forces, dated July 17th, 1941, a study was requested to be made of the air situation in Hawaii to include but one heavy bombardment group for this Department. Any other increases to be limited to pursuit and light and medium bombardment and observation types, holding any additional heavy bombardment in readiness on the mainland. Due to the unusual circumstances associated with the proper solution of air defense of these islands, it would be impossible to attain efficient operation from organization reinforcing the Hawaiian Air Force after hostilities begin. The solution of our problem requires special training in the search of water areas and the bombing of precision targets represented by aircraft carriers and other surface vessels. Fortunately the preparation of landing fields on the other islands of this group are underway as a result of the approval of projects which have been submitted some time ago.

[1872] I would like to enlarge on that particular statement that has just been made in that paragraph.

A CPX was conducted, I think it was in January 1941 or early February, with three officers of the Hawaiian Air Force who were capable of operating our estimate of the Japanese air strength in an attack upon the Islands. I myself conducted the defense with the obsolete and obsolescent equipment that was then available to us, using B-18s for bombardment missions because that was all we had. The radius of action of these B-18s with any appreciable bomb load was approximately 300 miles.

This CPX brought out that the enemy could bring his carriers within easy range of the islands before darkness fell, running in at night, and could launch an attack with comparative ease against the islands and get back to safety beyond the range of the existing bombardment type of airplane before we could make an attack against them.

236. General Frank. That is the B-18?

General Martin. The B-18. As a result of this information and knowing that we had been allocated the B-17 type, a study was made as to the total number required for proper reconnaissance and to provide a striking force of that type of airplane. This study was started by Colonel Farthing, as he had full knowledge of the information we had gained from our CPX. His study was in a comparatively crude state and the details of his final form were worked out by my G-3 Section on consultation with myself.

This resolved into an estimate of a requirement for 72 long-range bombardment airplanes on reconnaissance each day flying at an interval of five degrees. In going out, after [1873] passing approximately 600 miles distance from their base, they would not be able to see between the two courses of adjacent ships. Therefore,
when they went to the limit of their radius, which was estimated to be a thousand miles, they would turn to the left, and in doing so, in coming back, they would cover the area in between that was beyond their field of vision on the outward journey.

An additional 72 ships were required for the next day’s reconnaissance mission, with 36 remaining on the ground as the striking force. Those 36 would be augmented, if pilots were found, from the reconnaissance planes which had been on mission the previous day. This brought the total of heavy bombardment to 180.

This plan was completed and forwarded to the Department Commander in Hawaii about the middle of August, sometime before the end of August.

237. General Frank. That made a total equipment of how many B-17s?

General Martin. 180. There were 72 for each day’s reconnaissance, 72 resting on the ground after having completed one day’s reconnaissance—all the daylight hours that were available to us they would be out, so they needed rest—and 36 that were a permanent striking force.

238. General Grunert. And that presumed that the Army Air Force would do all of its distance reconnaissance?

General Martin. I might explain that this was submitted, due to the fact that I had a feeling that the Navy was not properly equipped to conduct a reconnaissance that would be completely satisfactory to me; and on the assumption that if [1874] trouble arose the Navy might be quite distant from Oahu, and we were charged with the responsibility of defending that base so they could always return to it. It was on the assumption that the Navy would be absent from Pearl Harbor while we were charged with its defense.

239. General Grunert. And that the District would not have enough to do that distant reconnaissance?

General Martin. That is right.

240. General Grunert. Outside of the fleet?

General Martin. That is correct.

Another quotation from my letter to General Arnold dated the 25th of July, 1941, reads as follows:

Another problem which is causing very grave concern is the fact that there is in existence such a limited quantity of spare parts for the modern combat airplane, which grounds for long periods of time ships which are sorely needed for combat training. I know how this came about and I know you are aware of this condition and I am sure you are as fully aware as I am of the effects of this condition upon our efforts to make all possible progress in providing combat teams as rapidly as possible.

We are making progress in achieving our goal but it is very irritating that it cannot be more rapid.

Here is a little more accurate information on the date of forwarding that secret plan for the reconnaissance and protection of the Hawaiian defense by air. This is a letter from me to General Arnold on the 15th of August, 1941:

There has been mailed under separate cover a secret study which was being made at the time the memorandum from the [1875] Secretary of the General Staff was received requesting that “a study be made of the air situation in Hawaii.”

This study was originally made by Colonel Farthing as commanding officer of the 5th Bombardment Group (Heavy) assisted by Major Rose and Captain
Coddington. It has been prepared as a staff study and carefully checked as to its contents with certain additions being made by the G-3 Section of the Hawaiian Air Force. It represents to me the complete possibility of the Hawaiian Islands being defended from attack by carrier-based aircraft. It is not making a statement which cannot be fully realized upon to say that "The defense of the Hawaiian Islands can be accomplished with the 180 heavy bombardment airplanes which are set up for the mission by this study." That being true, then, by occupying outlying fields on this island group and with the requisite number of airplanes and of the combat crews as called for by this study, the defense of the Hawaiian Islands has been accomplished and need cause the War Department nor the Army Air Force further concern.

On the 25th of September, 1941, I wrote General Arnold as follows:

Your letter of August 12th, giving information on the augmentation of the Army Air Force and the six charts showing the successive build-up to the 84 Group Program was most valuable information for us. It is strange how quickly you become adjusted to figures in large denominations as to the numbers of aircraft and personnel which but two years ago would have had a staggering effect as to the possibility of accomplishment. We now accept the plans [1876] for the future with the confidence of achievement without a thought of failure.

Since the departure of our nine B-17s we have but 12 of this type left in the Hawaiian Air Force. We have competent crews which can be sent to the mainland at any time to ferry additional B-17s as soon as they can be made available to us. For our preparations for the future and for the carrying out of our defense mission in the Hawaiian Islands, it is extremely important that we get as many of these ships as can be allocated to us as soon as possible.

Further along in this same letter I wrote as follows:

The following progress is being made on the establishment of outlying fields on the other islands. At Barking Sands, on Kauai, one runway is under construction; mobilization housing for two squadrons and one National Guard company for the defense of the airrome has been completed; one bombing target for day and night bombing has been completed. One bombing target for day and night bombing is partially completed; protected gasoline storage is under construction. At Morse Field, on Hawaii, two squadron barracks and mobilization housing for one National Guard company, with utility buildings, have been completed; protected storage for gasoline and runway are under construction. At Hilo mobilization housing has been provided for one National Guard company for the defense of the airrome and work is progressing nicely on one runway construction and mobilization housing for one squadron will be started in the near future. At Homestead Field, on Molokai, the CAA has presented money which has been placed at the disposal of the District Engineer who has started work on the extension of runways, and mobilization housing for one company of National Guard for the defense of the airrome has been completed. On Lanai work has started on the construction of the runways, and mobilization housing is yet to be completed for one squadron. Bellows Field has been designated a permanent station at which barracks, mess hall and utility buildings, for the strength of 1200 men are nearing completion—the construction of runways is underway.

At the end of that same letter I again call attention to the fact that "Our great need for progress at the present time is for our allotment of new equipment.

The underground excavation for the Interceptor Command is nearing completion and we expect to have this in operation within 30 days.

General Frank. What is the date of that letter?
General Martin. The 25th of September, 1941.

Five mobile RDF stations have been established on Oahu but the permanent stations on this and the other islands will not be available to us until March 1942.

From a letter from General Arnold dated the 7th of October, 1941, I wish to read the following extract. In preparation for this, I will say that I had given him a report on the nine B-17s transferred by air
to the Philippines, in which I had called his attention to the limited experience of the great mass of personnel and particularly the excellent work which had been done by Sergeant Griffin as the principal navigator. I stated [1878] that his work was of an outstanding nature and should be so recognized. In his reply he said:

The status of Sergeant Griffin's application for commission is being determined. As you have been informed, your need for equipment has been taken up. So far as the shortage of B-17s is concerned, I know how you must feel when you have set up an efficient heavy bombardment organization only to lose part of it because of the greater need elsewhere. I hope that conditions soon will permit the allocation of new ships to the Hawaiian Air Force.

[1879] I wish to read the following letter from General Arnold dated the 25th of September, 1941:

There has just been brought to my attention the Hawaiian Department Tentative Standing Operating Procedure publication July 14, 1941. I note under Section 2 that the Hawaiian Air Force is charged with being prepared to release a provisional battalion totaling 500 men to assist the auxiliary police force. It is further observed that the Hawaiian Air Force is charged with defending Schofield Barracks against ground and sabotage attacks.

The combat units, together with the auxiliary and service units set up for the Hawaiian Department, have been designed primarily to insure the full effectiveness of air force operations during that critical time indicated under the Hawaiian Department Alert No. 1. It would appear, however, that we have overestimated the requirements for the Hawaiian Air Force. Obviously, it would be impossible for the Hawaiian Air Force to carry out the mission above noted, in addition to its Air Force combat mission, unless there were a surplus of Air Corps and related troops.

As we are so short of trained officers and personnel in the Air Force, it is most undesirable to employ such personnel for other than Air Corps duties, except under most unusual circumstances.

It would seem that the proper step to be taken [1889] would be a request made on the War Department to increase the Hawaiian Department by the number of personnel required to assist the auxiliary police force and to defend Schofield Barracks. Our action would then be to reduce the numbers of Air Corps and auxiliary personnel by that number.

However, before any official steps are taken, I would appreciate your unofficial and informal comment.

Sincerely,

H. H. Arnold,
Major General, U. S. A.,
Chief of the Army Air Forces.

This letter is from me to General Arnold dated 3 November 1941:

In reply to your request for unofficial and informal comment upon the use of Air Corps troops as ordered by "Hawaiian Department Tentative Standing Operating Procedure," dated July 14, 1941, the following information is submitted. During the department maneuvers, which lasted from the 12th to the 24th of May of this year, the Department Commander, General Short, became very much interested in the proper employment of all military personnel in a last stand defense of Oahu. At that time he mentioned the fact that the Air Force had approximately 4,000 enlisted men at Hickam Field and nearly 3,000 at Wheeler Field; he saw no reason why these men should not receive some training as Infantry so that after the Air Force was destroyed [1881] they could assist the ground forces in the defense of the island. I told him it was not possible to give such training at this time as the Air Force's first mission, that of training combat crews, was in a most unsatisfactory state. In order to obtain these combat crews the men must be processed through our technical schools and in addition thereto gain experience in the actual performance of these duties under proper supervision.

As no further comment was made at the time, I thought the matter was a closed issue. Without further warning a letter was received from the Hawaiian Department, dated 5 June 1941 on the subject of training Air Corps personnel for ground defense missions. This letter directed that—
"a. At Hickam Field: The training of two battalions of 500 men each to perform the following missions:

1. One battalion to provide ground close-in defense for Hickam Field.
2. One battalion to be prepared to take over initially under the direction of the Provost Marshal, Hawaiian Department, the anti-sabotage mission within Police District No. 1, City and County of Honolulu, now assigned to the 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry, under the provisions of Field Order No. 1, OHD 38.

b. At Wheeler Field: The training of one [1882] battalion of 500 men to perform the following missions:

1. Provide ground close-in defense of Wheeler Field.
2. Be prepared to take over initially under the direction of the Headquarters Commandant, Hawaiian Division, the protection of the Schofield Area, now assigned to the 2d Battalion, 21st Infantry, under the provisions of Field Order No. 1, OD 40.

The training of these 1500 men was conducted under the supervision of Infantry instructors, after three o’clock in the afternoon, four afternoons per week. The men who were placed in these battalions were the most recent arrivals in the islands, plus a certain number of noncommissioned officers required in the organization. The officers for these battalions were reserve officers regularly assigned to these two stations but from other arms of the service. As the Air Corps training for the enlisted men in these battalions progressed they received assignments with the Air Corps commensurate with their ability and training. The Infantry drill in the afternoon, which usually lasted from 3:00 p.m. to 4:30 p.m. interfered a great deal with the performance of their normal duties and when an alert was called these men were required to take their defense positions which took them away from their Air Corps assignments. This left the organizations to which these men belonged extremely short of the necessary personnel for carrying [1883] on the functions required of the Air Corps organizations. In other words, there was imposed upon these men the performance of a duty assigned to them for the last defense of this island when the Air Force was still carrying on this primary mission in the defense of the island. As soon as sufficient reliable data could be collected as to the inroad this was making on Air Force activities, a letter dated August 25, 1941 was prepared on this subject and taken to the Department Commander, General Short, in person showing that it was inconsistent with the Air Force mission to require its men to train as Infantry and take their Infantry positions when an alert was called, leaving vacant their proper assignment with the Air Force. The only relief from the performance of these duties General Short would give at the time was that those assigned to such duties and properly trained for the performance of these duties need not receive more training than was necessary to insure that they would be properly prepared to assume these duties when called upon.

A new “Standing Operating Procedure” is being prepared but has not yet been published. A copy of this procedure which was submitted to this headquarters for comment made no mention of the assignment of Air Corps troops for Infantry missions, other than Air Corps troops will be trained for the close-in defense of Army airdromes on the Island of Oahu. I have delayed answering your letter awaiting the publication of this “Standing Operating Procedure”. [1884] that I might be sure that the provisions of the existing “Standing Operating Procedure” had been changed as indicated above.

It is my belief that the letter which I mentioned above, pointing out the unnecessary handicaps placed upon the Air Force in training as Infantry at a time when they were unable to conduct sufficient training to meet their primary mission as Air Force troops, has received consideration. In this letter I asked the Department Commander to rescind his instructions requiring Air Corps troops to train as Infantry at least until such time as we had developed sufficient combat and maintenance crews to meet the Manning Tables for the number of airplanes allotted to the Hawaiian Air Force. I am attaching hereto a copy of the letter on the subject of diversion from Air Force training dated August 25, 1941.

It is my firm belief that no attempt would be made by an enemy force to make a hostile landing on these islands until the Hawaiian Air Force has been destroyed or reduced in effectiveness to the point where they could offer little if any resistance. When the present allotment of airplanes has been received and these airplanes are properly manned by competent combat crews, there is no enemy in these waters strong enough to destroy the Hawaiian Air Force or effect a landing on these shores.
I can well understand how one charged with the defense of these islands, assuming that the Hawaiian [1885], Air Force had been destroyed, would wish to utilize to the fullest extent the military manpower available to him in carrying out his mission of the defense of Oahu. For Air Corps troops to be effective under such circumstances they should be properly trained for the parts they are required to play in such defensive action but I just do not wish my Air Force troops to receive training for this “last ditch fight” until they have been properly trained for their primary mission with the Air Force.

General Short is a very reasonable man of keen perception. It is now my belief that he sees more clearly the training problems confronting the Air Force and realizes its enormous proportions. I do expect that the training of Air Force troops as Infantry will not be permitted to seriously interfere with their proper training for their normal mission.

I feel very strongly that a War Department policy should be established or orders issued which will prescribe that troops from the ground forces have the responsibility of the defense of airdromes and performance of interior guard duty. If the interior guard duty is to be performed by Air Force troops, then a special table of organization should be issued for a Military Police Company to be established at each post for the performance of interior guard duty. Due to the importance and value of property on Air Corps stations, troops performing interior guard duty should be especially well trained for this service. These [1886] services can never be efficiently performed except by those who are regularly and permanently assigned to such duty. The duties to be performed by troops for the close-in defense of an airdrome are quite similar and require the same training as that given to all ground troops for a similar mission. As to the number of men required, it makes no difference whatever whether the defense of airdromes and interior guard duty are performed by Air Force troops or troops from other arms. In either case troops performing these duties must have this as their sole responsibility and assignment.

I am happy to say that this problem of training Air Force troops with Infantry, which has caused me such deep concern, seems now on its way to a satisfactory solution. Having given me this opportunity to unofficially and informally bring this matter to your attention I shall, if in the future this burden becomes unbearable, bring it to your personal attention.

I am forwarding under separate cover a study which has been made of our personnel requirements to meet the allocation of airplanes for the Hawaiian Air Force. As you will observe tables of organization for the respective units have been adhered to as far as possible. Our experience indicates the number of men in these organizations barely meet the demands on this personnel for our operations.

Expressing to you my high esteem, I beg to remain,

Most sincerely,

F. M. Martin,
Major General, U. S. Army.

[1887] I would like to read an extract from a letter to General Arnold on the 17th of November, 1941:

With the transfer of the nine B-17s and accompanying spare parts we have practically exhausted all spares for B-17s at Hickam therefore it is important that future flights have distributed among the planes in each flight such spare parts as experience has dictated may be required for these ships while in transit. Tall wheels and inverters are two items for which there has been the greatest demand.

That had reference to the 19th bombardment group, heavy, which passed through Honolulu en route to the Philippine Islands.

241. General Grunert. Are there any other questions as far as those letters read? I have a few if no one else has.

When you in one of your earlier letters referred to units in the United States being equipped prior to those in overseas departments, was there any reply to that as to whether or not that was true that they were equipping units in the United States before they were giving overseas departments their proper equipment?
General Martin. I know that was true before I left the mainland.

242. General Grunert. But there was no reply to that effect verifying it?

General Martin. Nothing more than General Arnold acknowledged the importance of the outpost position of Hawaii.

243. General Grunert. Did he in any reply to you on that subject make any reference to the requirements for aircraft that was going across seas to other nations?

[1888] General Martin. Would you please state the first part of that question? I didn't get it.

244. General Grunert. In his reply to you did he at any time explain to you that possibly there were demands on him for aircraft to be sent to other united nations or allied nations?

General Martin. Oh, he just inferred that.

245. General Grunert. Just inferred it?

General Martin. If you remember, in one of his statements he inferred that; he didn't say that.

246. General Grunert. Now, you referred to the search of water areas by that force of 180 bombers, I believe you asked for. Then, that was really under the joint Army-Navy action arrived at in Washington in which the Air Force was to do such searching; is that right?

General Martin. Now, I don't get all what you have said. I will answer it in this way: this plan was conceived by the Air Force, prepared——

247. General Frank. Where?

General Martin. —immediately, shortly after the CPX in the winter of '41.

248. General Frank. Conceived by the Air Force in Hawaii?

General Martin. Yes, Air Force—oh, I see. By the Hawaiian Air Force?

249. General Frank. Yes.

General Martin. The study was made. It was followed by a staff study. The study was originally made by Colonel Farthing and his assistants, and it was followed by a staff-study of my own G-3 section of the Hawaiian Air Force. The plan was drawn up and submitted to General Short and approved [1889] by him. Then it was submitted through General Short to the War Department, excepting this one copy that had been sent directly to General Arnold.

250. General Grunert. Then, as far as you were concerned, it was based on your own studies and own plan?

General Martin. Yes, sir; no, not—our own study and the experience we had, dictating what was necessary to accomplish the mission.

251. General Frank. As a result of these exercises?

General Martin. As a result of command post exercises, yes.

252. General Grunert. Now, you referred to the construction of air fields. In that construction work were there any appreciable delays and, if so, to what did you attribute the delays?

General Martin. Well, it was a perfectly natural delay that you had to experience from bringing materials; first, getting it approved; sometimes that was difficult. I didn't have so much trouble with General Short, but I had a terrible time with General Herron to convince him of the necessity for outlying airfields. General Short came there receptive as to the need for outlying airfields. Then
the estimate had to be made as to the cost, approved, and sent to the
War Department, approved by them, and the monies made available.
Then and only till then could materials start to move from the main-
land to Hawaii for the purpose of construction, such as were needed
from the mainland.

253. General Frank. With respect to the construction of these air-
dromes, when did you begin to get money for Air Force construction
for airdromes and other projects?


254. General Frank. Well, money was scarce up to a certain point?
General Martin. Yes, up to a certain time.

255. General Frank. And then?
General Martin. Well, it wasn't free until after the attack, or ap-
proximately the time of the attack, was it ever free to the Department.
The things that General Short had been requiring for further de-
defense of the Islands had been given to him very niggardly until the
attack took place, and then he had more.

256. General Frank. Well, did you actually have any money for
the construction of airdromes prior to December 7th?

General Martin. Yes, on the outlying stations, the runways, and
the temporary housing. Now, as to how much of that was taken
from the Department Commander's funds, I could not say. As to
whether he gave the funds prior to the funds being received for the
project that was submitted to the War Department, I do not know.

257. General Frank. Did you feel that there was any delay in any
of your construction, including the aircraft warning service, that was
attributable to the contractors?

General Martin. No, I did not. I had no contact with the contrac-
tors, but I did have contact with Colonel Wyman, who was the Divi-
sion Engineer of that Engineering—District Engineer. He was not
a District Engineer.

258. General Frank. Yes, he was.

General Martin. The district was here. Division Engineer. He
is most cooperative and operated very rapidly within his    [1891]
limitations. Now, he was limited in getting equipment and getting
materials.

259. General Frank. How?

General Martin. Due to the fact that it had to come from the main-
land.

260. General Frank. Well, how did that hold it up?

General Martin. First he had to convince them as to its need.

261. General Frank. Had to convince whom?

General Martin. The War Department.

262. General Frank. Well, if you had the appropriation, the need
was——

General Martin. Oh, after the appropriation had been granted, then
as to how he dealt with the contractors, I do not know. Whether
the Government purchased the supplies and shipped them or whether
the contractors purchased them and shipped them, I do not know, but
I surmise that the contractors made the purchase of the supplies and
shipped them as a part of the contract.

263. General Frank. But so far as you were concerned, did you have
any complaint to make as to the manner in which Wyman functioned?
General Martin. No, I did not.

264. General Frank. Or the manner in which the contractors functioned?

General Martin. No, I did not. I complained with reference to the time that was required to get these permanent stations for the RDF installation; but as I remember, those stations were being constructed under the supervision of [1892] Colonel Wyman rather than Colonel Lyman, who was the Division Engineer. Now, as to who actually had charge of the construction, I will not be positive, but it is my impression at the present time that Colonel Lyman—at least, he was pushing it at the time, trying to unravel the knots that were preventing progress.

265. General Frank. Did you ever have any difficulty with Colonel Wyman?

General Martin. I thought that he was the most aggressive and active engineering officer I ever came in contact with.

266. General Frank. Did you ever come in contact with a man by the name of Rohl, R-o-h-l, the civilian contractor?

General Martin. No, I did not; not to my knowledge. If I met him it was just casually.

267. General Frank. I see. That is all I have along that line.

268. General Grunert. This S. O. P. of November 5th, did that cure the thing of which you complained, requiring Air Corps personnel to do guarding duty for sabotage purposes, or were the provisions of that still in there that required you to turn out Air Corps troops for such purposes?

General Martin. Yes, sir. I was just disappointed. I thought that the thing had been so definitely presented to General Short that there wasn’t any question about his making provision for it in his orders; but after the attack took place and these men were still on guard at these stations I asked that they be relieved, that they could take charge of the salvaging of equipment and getting as much of our equipment back into the air as possible; and he said definitely no, and [1893] they were still on that duty until General Emmons arrived about the middle of December. They were relieved before sundown that night, though.

269. General Grunert. Did the Commanding General of the Department approve your plan for air defense, your 20th of August, 1941, air defense plan that you sent in to your chief?

General Martin. Yes, sir.

270. General Grunert. He approved that?

General Martin. Yes, sir. You have reference to the use of the 180 heavy bombardment planes?

271. General Grunert. Yes, that is right.

General Martin. Yes, sir.

272. General Grunert. Now except having plans for the use of what you thought was the ultimate in protection, did you have plans for the use of what you had?

General Martin. Oh, the plans for the use of what we had? Well, we could not do much planning with what we had, General. You just do the best you can, depending upon the situation that confronted you at the time, knowing full well that you could never fully meet it
until additional equipment and trained personnel were available to you.

273. General GRUNERT. Well, we all like to have everything we think is necessary, but our job requires us to make the best use of what we have. Did you have plans to make the best use of what you had?

General MARTIN. Well, they were not in concrete form, because I cannot see any reason for writing up a plan to guide everyone as to the use of the equipment today when it is going to be different tomorrow. We do have a plan for the equipment [1894] that is promised and which we expect will be available to us in the future: but the thing that I think is important is this, General: that that equipment was never stable; it was always in a state of flux, and you can never lay down that you are going to use so many planes and so many tomorrow because in all probability that particular number is not going to be available to you. So it is from a day-to-day proposition of utilizing, in keeping with the situation, to the best of your judgment, that equipment which is available to you. So you can have no fixed plan for any such operation.

274. General GRUNERT. Not to the detail that you describe; I agree with you there; but you must have plans for the use of what you do have. They must be flexible, and when you get more you can do more; but up to the time you get more you have to use what you have.

General MARTIN. Absolutely.

Now, as to plans. I think you have to use that word advisedly. It is just to make the maximum use of what is available to you on this particular day when it is needed. Now, that is in the minds of everyone there that has anything to do with the operation.

275. General GRUNERT. But if they have no plan by which to use it, how can they use it intelligently or effectively? There is a difference between a complete detailed plan and a plan to operate.

General MARTIN. You have a plan, the master plan that you are going to operate on, but as far as I know there are no troops that go into battle that lay down a hard and fast plan and say, "This is the one we are going to follow," and, if they [1895] only happen to have a small percentage of what they expected to have, still follow this strict plan, because your plans have to conform to what you have available to you.

276. General GRUNERT. But they are plans, aren't they?

General MARTIN. But not from the standpoint of writing them down and putting them away in the secret archives to be referred to when they are needed. They are plans to meet the situation of the moment.

277. General GRUNERT. Well, with what you had available, did all that stuff that you had available know what to do on December 7th?

General MARTIN. They not only did that, but they did it to the maximum of their ability. I was extremely proud of the behavior of all those men because practically without orders they immediately rushed to the positions, grabbed the ships, got them out of the concentration, got them into the dispersion area, and took such steps as were indicated by the conditions existing at the time. Both officers and enlisted men. I am extremely proud of their conduct under those circumstances, which were most unusual and trying. They left noth-
ing to be desired so far as being competent to carry out that which was their assigned or intended mission under the circumstances.

278. General GRUNERT. That finishes my questions so far as that letter was concerned. He was yours before we left and got on this. Go ahead.

279. General RUSSELL. After December 7th did men and matériel for employment by your forces begin to arrive much more rapidly than before December 7th?

General MARTIN. Nothing arrived prior to that excepting [1896] the 21 that I spoke about that were being sent on to the Philippines.

280. General RUSSELL. Well, did any arrive?

General MARTIN. On the morning of December 7th we had nothing but our 12 B-17s coming from the mainland. Those ships arrived during the time the attack was taking place. We warned them in the open, because that is the only way we could warn them, to remain in the air as long as possible; that we had no airdromes at other islands that would accommodate them as yet. They were only partially completed. Four of the eight were lost from the attack of the Japanese. Eight were made available to the Air Force afterwards. Some were damaged in landing. One landed at Bellows Field with the prevailing wind, on a very short runway. The new runway was not yet completed there and it was badly crashed.

281. General RUSSELL. What happened beginning December 8th and thereafter up until you left out there? Did you get a lot of ships or none, or what?

General MARTIN. Oh, I wouldn't say a lot, but they were beginning to come in. As to the exact dates of the arrival of airplanes to supplement the meager force we had there, you can get that from the record.

282. General RUSSELL. Yes.

General MARTIN. I cannot give you the exact dates.

283. General RUSSELL. Well, I will quit there on that, then.

What about troops? Did they send you more troops out there after December 7th?

General MARTIN. They didn't while I was there.

284. General RUSSELL. All right. Was this statement which [1897] you have read from the letters a while ago, General, given to the Roberts Commission?

General MARTIN. No, sir.

285. General RUSSELL. It was not. That is all I have.

General MARTIN. I don't remember that I read any of these to the Roberts Commission.

286. General FRANK. How many B-17s did you have available?

General MARTIN. On the morning of this attack?

287. General FRANK. Yes.

General MARTIN. Six.

288. General FRANK. You had six.

General MARTIN. And three of those were damage in the attack, so it left just three.

289. General FRANK. All right. If you had to have a plan to operate six B-17s when you needed 180, where would you have sent those six?

General MARTIN. Well, that is rather—not a difficult question to answer. You send them where you think they will do the most good, but you don't expect to get them back.
290. General Frank. Well, where would you have sent six airplanes? General Martin. I would have tried to get the carrier if I could; but inasmuch as I couldn't find the locaton of the carrier and I would have estimated they would have been lost anyway in the attempt to get the carrier, I don't think they could have done a particle of good without protection or without great numbers.

291. General Frank. If six airplanes had barged into this Jap force that was making the attack, what would have happened?

[1898] General Martin. They would all have been lost, in my estimation. I don't see how any of them could have come back. And it is probable that they would have been lost before they did very much damage. At least, they would have not stopped the attack.

292. General Frank. Will you give me a little analysis by comparing the probability of a Japanese air attack against the probability of a sabotage attack?

In the first place, I would like to ask you this question: In race track parlance what in your opinion were the odds for and against a Japanese air raid succeeding?

[1899] General Martin. Succeeding?

293. General Frank. Yes.

General Martin. Well, they were very, very large. I do not think it is possible to be very accurate about it, but if I were betting I would have said that it was at least 50 to 1, probably greater.

294. General Frank. What?

General Martin. Of their not succeeding; not being made.

295. General Frank. In other words, you considered it what kind of a venture?

General Martin. Considered that with the improbable attack from carrier-based aviation that far from Japan, would be at an odd of about 50 to 1. Therefore the greater menace to the defenses of the islands was right in our own midst among the Japanese people which, as I remember, in about 400,000 are approximately 165,000 of Japanese descent. Of that number there are possibly 25,000 that are foreigners.

296. General Frank. In other words, you thought that a Japanese raid such as happened was a very daring, unusual risk?

General Martin. It was a terrific gamble. Everything was based on its success; everything to be lost with its failure.

297. General Frank. All right. Now will you give me an analysis by comparing the probability of the air attack versus the probability of the sabotage attack?

General Martin. Well, I think, from the information we had and the terrific gamble that would be entailed in risking a sufficiently large task force of the Japanese Navy with its carriers into those wafer which they knew were frequented by our own Navy, that would indicate that it would be practically a suicide mission to attempt anything of the kind. But within our own population we had a very explosive mixture that could [1900] come to the surface, have a complete understanding and organization as to what they would do, without our being able to know anything about it. There are great areas in the islands that are mountainous and rugged and practically inaccessible, in which the average person never goes. Those are wonderful opportunities for caches of explosives, incendiary equipment, everything of that nature, and it seemed impossible for anyone to be
completely informed, to be assured that there would be no attack from within. That seemed to be the most dangerous source of damage in the defenses of the Hawaiian Department.

298. General Frank. In other words, the sabotage effort was there present, and the Jap air attack you considered a 50-to-1 gamble?

General Martin. I wouldn't say that the sabotage effort was present. I would say the probability of sabotage was extremely great. It could be on you at a moment's notice. The attack from the air, on account of the extreme gamble that was involved, could be highly successful or be a complete failure, and we did not believe that they were going to gamble to that extent in the beginning.

299. General Frank. I see. Now, do you know any place where the Japanese have been as considerate of Americans as the United States was considerate of Japanese in Hawaii?

General Martin. Never.

300. General Frank. What do you think would have been the plight of 160,000 Americans in Japan under similar circumstances?

General Martin. Oh, it is quite definite they would be in concentration, they would be carefully investigated and certain ones would be destroyed. Others would eke out an existence as captives in a foreign country. On the other hand, there were only about 800 of the Japanese that were immediately taken into control by the military authorities after the attack took place, and this was increased somewhat, later. As to how many, I do not know.

301. General Frank. Now, had you been alerted so that your fighters could have taken the air, to what extent do you estimate 80 fighters could have interfered with the attack?

General Martin. Well, they could have done considerable damage. They could not have prevented it. It would have been impossible to have prevented it, but they could have reduced its effectiveness quite materially.

302. General Frank. How many Jap planes actually were shot down over Oahu?

General Martin. I do not know. The Air Forces shot down about 10. The antiaircraft shot down others. As I remember, it was possibly 29 or 30. There is a record of that.

303. General Frank. Yes, I know.

General Martin. I do not remember exactly. I think it was about 29 or 30. But in my opinion, seeing a large number of those ships leaving the area with gasoline streaming out behind them, they never made the carriers, and that was true in many cases that I saw where there would be a white plume of gas—why it didn't catch fire I never knew—leaving the tanks of the airplanes that were making for the sea.

304. General Frank. Well, had the No. 2 or 3 Alert been active and if they got, we will say, 25 Jap planes on the sabotage alert, with the antiaircraft and 80 fighters operating, the chances are that a No. 2 or 3 Alert would have made it most expensive for the Japs.

General Martin. There isn't any question about that. You see, we lost about approximately 50 per cent of our total strength in this attack. 50 per cent was already on the ground out
of commission. After we dispersed them we lost very few ships in the dispersed areas.

305. General Frank. You entered into this agreement with Admiral Bellinger, and when you entered into this agreement you knew that you didn't have any airplanes to give him to make it effective?

General Martin. That is true.

306. General Frank. And you also knew that he didn't have very many air planes to make it effective?

General Martin. That is true. Simply gazing into the future.

307. General Frank. Therefore it was pretty much of a paper defense that you had?

General Martin. At that time it was, and known to us to be in that status.

308. General Frank. Now, did you ever have any knowledge of a Japanese task force with carriers in it in the vicinity of the Marshalls on the 1st of December?

General Martin. Oh, no. No, sir.

309. General Frank. What would have been your reaction to that information?

General Martin. Well, I think I would have been a little more concerned about the possibilities of their getting nearer, if that had been true, if I had known that had been true.

310. General Frank. You doubted the audacity of the Japs to risk carriers, when they had only eight large carriers, in an attack on Hawaii?

General Martin. In the beginning. In the beginning of the [1903] fight I thought that would be too much of a gamble for them to take on the assumption that they would meet with success.

311. General Frank. With that as a background, what would have been your reaction had you been told that there was a division of carriers in the Marshalls on December 1st?

General Martin. Oh, you would have to assume then that they may be going to take that one big chance; at least it is a threat that you hadn't considered, that they would concentrate a large force so far from their home base. Then you would have to consider it as a threat and give it consideration in your estimate of the situation.

312. General Frank. Did you have any information along that line?

General Martin. No, sir, I did not. This is the first I have ever heard of it.

313. General Grunert. What was your opinion of the Japanese air force as such, compared to your own?

General Martin. I thought they were very good, the older members, and their equipment was not the most modern but would be very effective. The number of airplanes that could be carried on their carriers was very much less than that which we could carry on our own large carriers. Therefore it would require more carriers. The number of carriers would indicate a smaller force than would be carried by the same number of our own aircraft carriers.

314. General Grunert. Did you ever have any discussion as to the necessity for unity of command in place of action by cooperation?

General Martin. Well, General, as to that being discussed [1904] between the different officers in Hawaii, I do not remember
having such a discussion; but to my way of thinking that is one of the prime essentials for the success of the military force of any country, particularly this one, to have a central control. It was discussed at the War College, and we were allowed to discuss it very freely there, and did, and we believed that that is one of the prime essentials.

315. General Grunert. But inasmuch as you were only on Alert 1, sabotage, the question of unity of command didn’t show up, whether cooperation proved a handicap or unity of command would have helped things, because they never came to conclusions?

General Martin. I think unity of command would have been a direct help in the solution of the problems in the Hawaiian Islands, and I believe——

316. General Grunert. You didn’t make use of what you had, so where would unity of command have come in to help out?

General Martin. What was that last question?

317. General Grunert. I say, they didn’t use what they had, the Army or the Navy, in the attack, because the attack surprised them, or they were not ready for it or they didn’t anticipate it; hence you don’t know whether unity of command would have helped the situation then or not, do you?

General Martin. I can’t tell you too much about that because it would be between Admiral Kimmel and General Short, quite frequently. I seldom attended those; and the cooperation between the two, as to whether it was a 100 percent or not, I am not in a position to say, but I have always felt that cooperation was one of the weakest possible props for successful operation requiring united effort.

[1905] 318. General Grunert. Now, if you had had unity of command, wherein would your Joint Air Agreement have been changed?

General Martin. It would have been changed in that all the information available to the Army and Navy would come to the central headquarters.

319. General Grunert. Then you realized the lack if information or the dissemination of that information, or what?

General Martin. You mean, would it be received, not only received but disseminated from the central headquarters, which would have made for strength and unity of effort.

320. General Grunert. What I am getting at is, your reply led me to believe you felt there was weakness in getting information and disseminating it. Is that right?

General Martin. Well, it probably is no weaker there, General, than it would be elsewhere where cooperation is depended upon for unity of action.

321. General Grunert. You don’t know of any information that you ought to have that you didn’t have?

General Martin. I don’t know of any specific instance where there was lack of cooperation.

322. General Grunert. Then, you don’t know whether the Navy failed to transmit something to you that you should have used? You don’t know that as a fact, do you?

General Martin. Well, this thing General Frank has just mentioned, that either the Navy or the Department Commander has that,
I think it would have been of value to me in helping me form an opinion as to the advice I should give my Commanding General. General GRUNERT. Well, now, General Short kept you pretty well informed generally, did he?

324. General MARTIN. Yes, sir; I thought he did.

325. General GRUNERT. Rudolph doesn't seem to have known anything about any of these warning messages.

General MARTIN. Rudolph?

326. General GRUNERT. Yes.

General MARTIN. Well, he only knew certain phases of it because they were absolutely secret, and the more people that know a secret the less opportunity there is to keep it from being spread about. Now, he knew that certain conditions were imposed upon operators of an air force. He may, and I am sure he did—I don't know that he had knowledge of the wording of the message, any of those messages. General GRUNERT. Did Davidson know?

327. General MARTIN. My Chief of Staff had knowledge of it.

General GRUNERT. Did Davidson know?

328. General MARTIN. That I could not say, General. I wouldn't say.

I couldn't say, to give you factual information.

329. General GRUNERT. But then you didn't know about the Navy message that started out, "This is a war warning"?

General MARTIN. Not the naval message, but a similar message.

330. General GRUNERT. And you didn't know about the task force that may or may not have been out in the Mandates? So you apparently were not fully informed, anyway?

General MARTIN. Well, I will say this: In any organization if you want unity of effort and the proper evaluation and dissemination of information, you must have central control of that unit.

331. General GRUNERT. Did we have unity within the Army as to spreading of information?

General MARTIN. Well, I can't answer to what others do. I don't know whether they do or not. I think I have suffered from lack of information on many instances.

332. General FRANK. You are highly in favor of unity of command. Let's—

General MARTIN. Oh, now I am speaking of task forces or—well, it is a unit sent out to do a certain thing.

333. General FRANK. Well, I am talking about the situation in Honolulu on December 7th.

General MARTIN. Well, I am answering General Grunert here as to dissemination, receipt and dissemination of information. Had one person been responsible for the defense of Oahu, the information should have come to him and should have been evaluated and distributed by him. Now, you had a dual situation there. There was a commander of the Pacific Fleet present. The local defense commander had nothing to do with the operation of that fleet.

334. General FRANK. What defense commander, Army or Navy?

General MARTIN. The Army defense commander.

335. General FRANK. That is right.
General Martin. He had nothing to do with the orders received or issued to that fleet. Information coming to that CINCUS might not have been properly distributed as to its value to the defense commander of the Hawaiian Department.

336. General Frank. Did you then believe that there should have been unity of command between the Army and the Navy in Honolulu?

General Martin. You are going to cover too much territory there. You can't possibly have unity of command when there is one organization headquarters operating a fleet that is 3,000 miles from that base, and another charged with the defense of particular islands themselves.

337. General Frank. They have it now.

General Martin. Well, I don't agree to it.

338. General Grunert. They have it now.

339. General Frank. They have it now.

General Martin. We had to put something above those fellows.

340. General Grunert. And, as a matter of fact, as soon as war broke they had it right on that day, didn't they, December 7th and 8th?

General Martin. As soon as General Emmons arrived they had it. General Emmons and Admiral Nimitz were given those instructions.

341. General Grunert. Yes.

342. General Frank. Now, the question for which I have been trying to prepare you is this: Assuming that there had been unity of command prior to December 7th, what organization in the War Department or the Navy Department, or both, would have handled it?

General Martin. There is no head to it at all. There is no what you may call national defense headquarters which should control, in my opinion—this is simply my opinion—the military operations of the Army, Navy, and Air, which I feel should be separate and distinct from each other, but controlled by this central planning body: a national defense organization, call it.

343. General Frank. At that time the President of the United States was the only one.

General Martin. That is right. He was the only one who could be acting.

344. General Frank. And we now have the joint Chiefs of Staff.

General Martin. Yes, which is a—

345. General Frank. All right.

346. General Grunert. You don't blame the attack on Pearl Harbor on the lack of such an organization, do you?

General Martin. Oh, no. No, not at all. I did not think that the organization was weak to that extent.

347. General Russell. General Frank asked you some questions a moment ago, General, about what could have been accomplished by 80 fighters on December 7th. I want to ask you: Did you have 80 fighters available on December 7th before the Japanese came in and destroyed a great part of your force?

[1910] General Martin. Now, let me see. We had approximately 100 P-40s.

348. General Russell. And they are fighters?

General Martin. Yes, they are fighters. We had approximately 50 P-36s.
349. General Russell. And they are fighters?

General Martin. They are fighters. At least half of those were always on the ground, on account of lacking spare parts, so I reduced it to 75. Out of the 75 there is always probably ten or fifteen per cent that would be out of commission from day to day. They would be in today and out tomorrow. So it is something less than 75 that would be the maximum that could have been put in the air on that day.

350. General Russell. Do you mean to say when you have 150 planes you have less than 75 you can fight with?

General Martin. That is what I am telling you was true of the Hawaiian Air Force.

351. General Grunert. Due to the peculiar circumstances at that time?

General Martin. I don’t want to be misunderstood. If I had 150 planes I would try to keep 150 planes in the air, but you can’t do it, nor can anyone else. But I was subjected to an additional castigation with that force by having approximately 50 per cent at all times on the ground, simply because I could not get the requisite spare parts from the mainland.

352. General Frank. That was a special situation that existed at that time, which at this time does not exist?

General Martin. You can expect to have 10 to 15 per cent of your ships on the ground.

353. General Grunert. That is normal?

General Martin. That is normal.

354. General Grunert. Then you could have turned out approximately between 50 and 55 fighters to meet the attack?

General Martin. Yes.

355. General Frank. And did the mobile AWS trail back the returning attackers to their carriers? I am speaking of your radar.

General Martin. Oh, no. You could not do that. There was so much confusion in the air. You look at those plots afterwards, and there was just a mass of lines. Of course, the people that saw those could get an indication of a trend, but the operators at the time, regardless of how skilled they might have been, could not have gotten any particular trend from the tracks on the bands. There were too many of them.

356. General Frank. Did you feel there was Japanese radio activity interfering with your radar?

General Martin. We knew it. They started in as soon as the attack began. And these stations which had not been in operation at all were extremely active as soon as the attack began. You were getting spurious messages that parachutes were dropping on certain parts of the island, that there were carriers off shore in every direction except those where we feel now they were. Messages of that nature were coming in over our frequencies at all times. If you asked for landing instructions or anything of that kind, it would be garbled for days afterwards. It was in the neighborhood of ten days or two weeks before those instruments were located and confiscated.

357. General Frank. You did have sabotage then, didn’t you?

358. General Frank. That kind of sabotage.
General Martin. By jamming the air frequencies; yes. It was very much in evidence and there was no indication of it prior to that. We had two monitoring stations in existence there, under whose control I do not know; I think they were F. B. I. They had no indication of these stations being in existence, because they had not been operated. But as soon as this attack took place and got under way, the air was full of Japanese conversation and our own language to the point where it was very difficult to carry on operations using the radio for that purpose.

359. General Grunert. When they located these stations, did they get the personnel that operated them?

General Martin. They had the personnel that had operated them.

360. General Grunert. I mean, did they capture the personnel with the stations when they located these interfering stations?

General Martin. Oh, yes. But they were not always fixed stations. They were mobile stations. In fact, the last one we had had been located out in the direction of Ewa, which had been a Marine Base, but when we got there there was nothing but a thicket, nothing out there at all, no possibility of a station.

361. General Grunert. But they captured the personnel with them?

General Martin. Yes.

362. General Grunert. General, have you anything else you would like to present to the Board which may give us leads or be of evidence as to facts about the Pearl Harbor attack that you can think of now?

[913] General Martin. As far as I can think of the different factors at the present time, I know of nothing but what has been touched upon or covered in the testimony that has been given.

363. General Grunert. Are there any other questions? There being no more, thank you very much.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

(Thereupon, at 12:30 p.m. a recess was taken until 2 p.m.)

[914]

Afternoon Session

(The Board at 1:55 p.m. continued the hearing of witnesses.)

Testimony of Colonel Jack W. Howard, Quartermaster Corps.

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel West. Colonel, will you please state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station?


2. General Grunert. Colonel, this Board is after facts about what happened prior to and leading up to and during the attack on Pearl Harbor, and because of your assignment there during that time we thought we could probably get some facts from you.

What was your assignment in Hawaii during the latter part of 1941, and give us the dates.
Colonel Howard. I was the Supply Officer of the Hawaiian Quartermasters Depot, stationed at Fort Armstrong in 1941 up until after Pearl Harbor.

3. General Grunert. The Adjutant General just had you listed there as commanding officer of that supply depot?

Colonel Howard. I took over the command of the depot in June of 1942.

4. General Grunert. And who then was in command of the Supply Depot during the attack and just prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor?

Colonel Howard. Roland Walsh. I think he is now a Brigadier General of the Quartermaster Corps in command of the Philadelphia Depot. I took over the duties at the time of Pearl Harbor, on the day of Pearl Harbor, the duties of the executive officer. I was the next senior second in command.

5. General Grunert. You testified before the Roberts Commission, did you?

Colonel Howard. I did, sir.

6. General Grunert. What in gist was your testimony there? Why did they call you?

Colonel Howard. Well, I think that General Walsh could probably give you more information as to why I went before the Commission than I could. In fact, he called me in and told me this Roberts Commission was sitting at Shafter and that he wanted me to go up as a representative of the Depot to see and meet the Commission.

7. General Grunert. What did the Board ask you when you were before it?

Colonel Howard. They asked me in effect what I was doing and what I did do on the day of Pearl Harbor.

8. General Grunert. And I will ask you the same question: What did you do?

Colonel Howard. I got to the Depot as soon as—or I would judge around 8:30. I was living at that time out of Fort Armstrong, out in Kahala, and I got to the Depot I would judge about 8:30, and from that time on I was very busy, not only supplying troops but answering and giving all the information I could over the phone.

9. General Grunert. What protection was there for the Depot or the surrounding grounds there as far as you were concerned in that post, the defense measures taken?

[1916] Colonel Howard. Well, of course, there was a small coast artillery setup there on Fort Armstrong. I think they were 3-inch guns.

10. General Grunert. Antiaircraft?

Colonel Howard. No, sir. The antiaircraft guns were right across the entrance to Pearl Harbor.


Colonel Howard. I mean the entrance to Honolulu Harbor, on Sand Island.

12. General Grunert. What protective measures were taken to protect the personnel against air raids and bombing?

13. General Frank. Any slit trenches?

Colonel Howard. Sir?

14. General Frank. Did you have any slit trenches?
Colonel Howard. I was trying to think, General, whether we built those before or after Pearl Harbor. I am of the opinion that they were not built until the day of Pearl Harbor.

15. General Grunert. Did you have any air raid shelters where all women and children and the personnel could run to to get out of bombing range?

Colonel Howard. No, sir, not at the day of Pearl Harbor, time of Pearl Harbor; no sir.

16. General Grunert. Were there any standing orders as to procedure in case of an air attack? In other words, did you know what to do, and the men and officers under you, in case of an air attack?

Colonel Howard. Well, I don’t know how to answer that question. No. I would say no; my duty was as a supply officer, and my men of course were—my employees were mostly civilians, and I would have been operating on the supply standpoint of view entirely. Now, the post of Fort Armstrong was under the command of Roland Walsh, and he in turn had an adjutant operat- [1917] ing up there who had command of the troop, and they did have some kind of a standard, an S. O. P. in which they were to operate under an attack, but I had nothing to do with that.

17. General Grunert. Your men were in warehouses and one thing another?

Colonel Howard. Yes, sir; warehouses and clerks.

18. General Grunert. Did they have any instructions what to do?

Colonel Howard. Nothing except for fire.

19. General Grunert. Evidently you didn’t have much to offer to the Roberts Commission, and have you anything now that you would like to offer that you think would be of assistance to the Board in getting at the facts?

Colonel Howard. I have nothing, sir. As a matter of fact, I have less information of that than several officers that were around the Depot at that time.

20. General Grunert. Any questions?

21. General Frank. Wasn’t there a casemate or something that was a bomb-proof in which they could take shelter?

Colonel Howard. Yes, but that at the time, General, was operated by some coast artillery men from Fort De Russy, and they were quartered in there.

22. General Frank. Did the women and children actually take refuge in there?

Colonel Howard. No, sir. All the women and children that day were moved right off of the post and moved on up into the Nuuanu and Moana canyons.

23. General Frank. All right.

24. General Grunert. That will be all, Colonel. Thank you.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

[1918] TESTIMONY OF COLONEL WILLIAM J. McCARTHY, 260TH COAST ARTILLERY GROUP, FORT BLISS, TEXAS

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel West. Colonel, will you please state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station?
Colonel McCarthy. William J. McCarthy, Colonel, 260th Coast Artillery Group, Fort Bliss, Texas.

2. General Grunert. Colonel, the Board is after facts and leads toward facts; and because of your assignment in Hawaii in the latter part of 1941 and also because you testified before the Roberts Commission we asked that you be sent here to this Board to testify to give us such facts as you may know of your own information, and then I have one particular fact that I wanted to inquire into that I didn't understand in your testimony before the Roberts Commission.

Now, tell me first: What was your assignment in Hawaii, and give me the dates.

Colonel McCarthy. I arrived in Hawaii on October 6th, 1939, and was assigned to Fort Kamehameha.

Does that call for my complete assignments all the time while I was there?

3. General Grunert. Carry it right on through.

Colonel McCarthy. At that time I was a Captain. I was assigned to the 41st Coast Artillery, railway. I remained with the railway artillery until July 1, 1940, when I was assigned as battalion commander of the railway battalion. I remained there in various capacities as battalion commander and artillery engineer of the harbor defense up until July 1, 1941, when I was assigned as battalion commander of the 55th Coast Artillery, which is a 155 tractor-drawn battalion, and I remained in command of that battalion until I left Hawaii. Among [1919] other assignments I was the Group Commander of the so-called Ewa Group, which was a sector of the defense on the west shore of Hawaii that the 155 regiment covered.

4. General Grunert. Where were you during the attack?

Colonel McCarthy. In Fort Kamehameha, sir, right in the fort.

5. General Grunert. And you had a coast artillery assignment with the heavy weapons?

Colonel McCarthy. Yes, sir, with tractor.

6. General Grunert. Didn't you have any antiaircraft?

Colonel McCarthy. No, sir. The only antiaircraft that we had with us were .30-caliber machine guns which were assigned for our own immediate defense, but that was not anti-aircraft.

7. General Grunert. In the report of the Roberts Commission it says that you testified that from November 22, '41, until December 2nd or 3rd, Alert 2 had been in effect. You stated the post commander did this. Now, the post was Kamehameha, was it?

Colonel McCarthy. Yes, sir.

8. General Grunert. And what Alert 2 was in effect up to December 2nd or 3rd, and why was it then called off?

Colonel McCarthy. If I am not—that may be a mistake. I think I said the 27th.

9. General Frank. 27th of what?

Colonel McCarthy. Of November, and not—

10. General Frank. Well, that is immaterial.

Colonel McCarthy. It is immaterial. The 27th. Colonel Walker, who commanded Fort Kamehameha, had instituted a series [1920] of practice alerts. We would black-out the post at certain times, and we would go in the field; sometimes we would never leave the post; to determine how proficient the units were in getting ready to go
into the field. You see, besides the 55th Coast Artillery there was a battalion of railway coast artillery and the 15th, which was the harbor defense regiment, they having command of the fixed guns: The 16s and 12s, that were about Fort Kamehameha. There is Fort Weaver and Fort Barrett.

It so happened that during one of these practice alerts that Colonel Walker had called the thing suddenly went off about 2 o'clock in the afternoon, and battalion commanders were ordered to report to Colonel Walker's office at once. In fact—

[1921] 11. General GRUNERT. What date was this?

Colonel McCARTHY. I am not mistaken, it was about the 27th of November.

12. General FRANK. One of these guns went off?

Colonel McCARTHY. No. I say this practice alert went on in the post. The thing suddenly stopped in the middle of it and the battalion officer suddenly ordered us to report to Colonel Walker's headquarters. When we got there we were told to forget it, everything is over. "I just received a call from the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department that we are now going on an antisabotage alert, and we will guard our own installations in Fort Kamehameha and we will send a sufficient guard to protect the various stations from being damaged by people wandering around."

13. General GRUNERT. Then from that time on, which you estimate to be November 27th, you were on a Department Alert No. 1 or sabotage?

Colonel McCARTHY. Or sabotage; yes, sir.

14. General GRUNERT. What was this No. 2 alert that you were practicing?

Colonel McCARTHY. The No. 2 Alert, as we understood it, was one where we were ready to go into the field, but not actually going out into the field. No. 3 would take us right out into the field. Under No. 2 we were all supposed to go, and that was what we were working on.

15. General GRUNERT. That was just a post practice alert?

Colonel McCARTHY. Yes.

16. General GRUNERT. It was not a Department No. 2 Alert?

Colonel McCARTHY. It was not called by the Department, [1922] not that one that we were working on.

17. General GRUNERT. Did your command have anything to do against an alert called against an air attack?

Colonel McCARTHY. No, sir.

18. General GRUNERT. You would have no function during an air attack alert?

Colonel McCARTHY. No, sir; I would have none.

19. General GRUNERT. Then that explains why you were on Alert No. 2 and it was called off about November 27th, and you went on a Department alert?

Colonel McCARTHY. Yes.

20. General GRUNERT. But the No. 2 Alert that you were on was a post practice alert which got you ready to take the field, but you did not go into the field?

Colonel McCARTHY. Yes, sir.
21. General Grunert. Do you know anything about the protective and defensive measures for the post that were in effect prior to the attack? For instance, what were the measures for the defense of the post itself, what were the protective measures for the care of personnel, the protection of personnel and so forth?

Colonel McCarthy. Under the SOP that we operated under from headquarters of the 7th Coast Artillery Brigade.

22. General Grunert. Who had that brigade?

Colonel McCarthy. At that particular moment General Burgin was in command, but he had relieved General Gardiner. In the event of a No. 3 Alert all organizations had separate sectors, I myself having the so-called inner sector. That consisted of all of the defenses of 155s and some searchlights from a point just north of Barbers Point.

[1923] 23. General Grunert. We will stop right there. I think you mistake what I am after. I want to find out what measures there were to protect the post proper in the line of machine guns to fire upon airplanes, slit trenches to jump into, air raid shelters, and so forth.

Colonel McCarthy. There were no air raid shelters as such. The only air raid shelter that was figured on being used was at Battery Hasbrouck, which was a 12-inch battery, and that was a regroup CP, all underground. Perhaps I better go back a little further. Let me interpolate here that on the 17th of June, 1940, we were suddenly alerted very quickly, and everybody moved out into the field. That is the only time that I know of where we actually took the live ammunition for the guns. I at the moment had the railway battalions on the north shore. I had one railway battalion and one 155 battalion, which was manned by the 11th Field Artillery, and we took live H.E. ammunition and powder out into the field with us.

At that time the Commanding Officer, Colonel Walker, advised that all officers and enlisted men who had families to make some provision to evacuate the post to Fort Kamehameha in the event of an attack.

24. General Grunert. Advised the individuals to make arrangements?

Colonel McCarthy. Yes. The advice took this form: To collect a certain amount of food that you could carry, a certain amount of clothes that the family could carry, and the idea at that moment was to move back into the hills behind the Pali in the event of a landing. I personally had not figured on an air raid attack. I was thinking of a landing by troops.

[1924] 25. General Grunert. Was there ever an S. O. P. issued that told everybody what to do in the case of an air attack or a landing?

Colonel McCarthy. No, sir.

26. General Grunert. Were there measures taken after the attack, protective measures?

Colonel McCarthy. Yes.

27. General Grunert. What happened then?

Colonel McCarthy. After the attack all the women and children on the post were put into Battery Hasbrouck, and they remained there for three days and nights. Some of the women and children were evacuated into civilian homes in Honolulu, but they came back after a couple of days and returned to their quarters on the post.

28. General Russell. After this alert of June 17, 1940, what was the subsequent history? How long did you stay out?
Colonel McCarthy. We stayed out, if my memory does not fail me, until almost the 4th of August.

29. General Grunert. And then did the entire unit move back to the post?

Colonel McCarthy. Yes, sir, when the alert was declared off everybody came back to the post.

30. General Grunert. You were out on it for about six weeks?

Colonel McCarthy. Yes, sir.

31. General Grunert. What effect on your training and morale did this six-week period of training have?

Colonel McCarthy. It did not hurt; it helped, as a matter of fact.

32. General Grunert. You liked it?


33. General Grunert. Then there was no interference with your training or your morale?

Colonel McCarthy. No. We carried out gunnery instructions under drill just the same as we would have had we been back at the post. In addition, we had to stand two alerts, day and night.

34. General Russell. What excitement among the populace prevailed or obtained as a result of this June 17th alert?

Colonel McCarthy. Well, General, I could not answer that. I do not know. You see, I was at Fort Kam and we went right out to the north shore, where I was stationed at the time, and came back to Kam.

35. General Russell. And your testimony is to the effect that in moving in and out you did not come in contact with any of the civilian population?

Colonel McCarthy. No, sir. Of course, we saw a certain amount on the road, but the only contact I had with any civilians whatsoever, in view of this procedure, was with the plantation people, securing rights of way or permission to go on their ground.

36. General Russell. If there had been a great deal of excitement among the civilian population on the island, including those of Japanese descent and Japanese who had not been naturalized, such a state would naturally have reached your ears, wouldn't it?

Colonel McCarthy. Yes, it would. On the Waialua Plantation a great portion of their employees were Japanese. They didn't bother us any, so far as I know. We were right there encamped on their property.

[1926] 37. General Frank. What did you have command of on the north shore?

Colonel McCarthy. A railway battalion. They called it the North Group, General, but it consisted of one railway battery.

38. General Frank. You said the 11th Field Artillery manned it.

Colonel McCarthy. Yes.

39. General Frank. The 11th Field Artillery belonged to Burgin at Schofield, didn't it?

Colonel McCarthy. Yes. Two batteries of the 11th Field Artillery manned 155s which belonged to the Coast Artillery and they were under my control as group commander.

40. General Frank. The Coast Artillery down at Kamahameha commanded some of the 11th Field Artillery that belonged under Burgin at Schofield?
Colonel McCarthy. Yes, that is right. Those batteries were assigned to man the 155s, which were presumably harbor defense guns on the north shore. I don't know why, except that they were.

41. General Grunert. Colonel, have you anything that you know of that you might offer to the Board in the line of testimony that would throw light on any facts that pertain to the attack?

Colonel McCarthy. General, the only thing I could tell you is what happened where I was.

42. General Grunert. What was that, briefly?

Colonel McCarthy. At about a quarter of 8 in the morning of December 7th, I heard airplanes passing over Kamehameha and I heard this firing, machine gun firing. At the moment I thought [1927] it was the Navy practicing. I had seen them flying around a good deal.

43. General Frank. On Sunday?

Colonel McCarthy. This was on Sunday morning, sir.

44. General Frank. Had the Navy been flying on Sunday and shooting?

Colonel McCarthy. No, but we had this alert and I didn't know what was happening. I thought they were practicing. We had blank ammunition for machine guns for ground shooting, but I had never heard of them being in an airplane. I was curious and ran out to see, and just at that time I heard the swish of an explosion. I didn't know what that was. I ran out of my quarters and a Japanese plane was flying overhead with machine guns going. I immediately tried to raise headquarters. The phones were all dead. I got my car and chased the battery out, told them to go out and man their war positions, take over their battle stations.

It so happened that A Battery was in position right at Fort Kamehameha. C Battery guns were in position at Fort Weaver, but the personnel was at camp. B Battery's guns and personnel were at camp. B Battery's position was at Barbers Point.

When I got to the battery area I found B Battery in the middle of a dog fight with some planes right over their heads. They were firing .30 caliber machine guns at them. So far as I know, they shot down two planes. When I got to headquarters Battery they had knocked down one plane, and a plane had caromed off a tree and the pilot was lying on the ground. It was one of those single-seater affairs and was a total wreck. The pilot was dead.

[1923] About the second wave was just starting to come over at that time. I started to move out into Hickam Field. I saw Hickam Field was burning. I didn't know what was causing it, but I could see it burning. But after the battalion was on the road getting ready to move, I reported into headquarters for instructions. Colonel Ryan, who was in the group at headquarters, advised me he had received a report that there were 25 transports 4,000 yards off Kaena Point and for me to get into position as quickly as I could, because I was the biggest thing north of Pearl Harbor at the moment, with 155s, to be ready to repel what he naturally assumed would be a landing in force. Those transports never materialized. Where he got his information, I do not know, except that he gave me that.
I went out in the field and remained in the field until I was relieved on April 12th or 13th and came back to the United States.

45. General GRUNERT. Thank you very much. (The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

TESTIMONY OF COLONEL WILLIAM DONEGAN, G-3, FOURTH ARMY, FORT SAM HOUSTON, TEXAS.

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. Colonel, will you please state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station?

Colonel DONEGAN. William N. Donegan, Colonel, General Staff Corps, O1174, G-3, Fourth Army.

2. Colonel WEST. Where are your headquarters?

Colonel DONEGAN. Fort Sam Houston, Texas.

3. General GRUNERT. Colonel, this Board is attempting to get facts or leads to facts pertaining to the background of the period leading up to and also concerning the attack on Pearl Harbor. [1939] Because of your assignment in the Hawaiian Department in the latter part of 1941 we hope that we can get some such facts from you. I have prepared a number of questions based primarily upon your position at that time, which was what?

Colonel DONEGAN. G-3.

4. General GRUNERT. G-3 of what?

Colonel DONEGAN. G-3 of the Hawaiian Department.

5. General GRUNERT. I will ask you these questions and if you cannot give us the answers, just say so. If you can, naturally we expect the answers, but I understood from an interview with you that I would probably be expecting too much from you. Are you familiar with the provisions of the Joint Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Defense Plan?

Colonel DONEGAN. Could I take about 1 minute, General, just to give my background, and then I think I can be in step?

6. General GRUNERT. Go right ahead.

Colonel DONEGAN. I was in the G-3 Section, Hawaiian Department from September, 1940, until Pearl Harbor. From September 1940 until November 1941 I was Assistant G-3, with a typical G-3 Section on a desk. I was appointed G-3 in November. During most of my time in the G-3 Section, now Brigadier General, then Major Hobart Hewitt was the so-called specialist on the G-3 Section, on Army and Navy agreements and also working with the Air Force. Colonel William Lawton, then Major Lawton, came in and understudied Hewitt for a period of six months, and then he took over Hewitt's task and was the specialist on the Hawaiian Defense Plan, Joint Army and Navy Agreement, and aircraft warning. On these questions he was my adviser at G-3, and I sat in at all principal meetings with the [1930] Navy and Air Force.

7. General GRUNERT. The Board expects to hear Major, now I believe Colonel, Lawton later on. In the meantime I will see what information you can give me on these questions.
9. General Grunert. And you are what?
Colonel Donegan. Infantry.
10. General Grunert. Under that plan was not the Army charged with the tactical command of the defensive air operation over and in the immediate vicinity of Oahu?
Colonel Donegan. That was my understanding.
11. General Grunert. They were providing the antiaircraft defense of Oahu, with particular attention to the Pearl Harbor Naval Base and the naval forces therein?
Colonel Donegan. Honolulu and Pearl Harbor; yes, sir.
12. General Grunert. Do you know whether or not the Commanding General kept himself informed as to the naval forces present in Pearl Harbor?
Colonel Donegan. I cannot answer that, General. There is another point I would like to bring out, based on the Roberts Commission report. We also had in the G-3 Section, now Colonel, then Major, Dingeman, who was the liaison officer between the G-3 Section, Hawaiian Department, and the 14th Naval District. I don't believe he appeared before the Roberts Commission and he is still on duty in Hawaii.
13. General Grunert. What is his name?
[1931] Colonel Donegan. Dingeman, Ray E. Dingeman. He was in the G-3 Section.
14. General Grunert. And he is still in the Hawaiian Islands?
Colonel Donegan. Yes, sir. They also have an Air Corps officer in the G-3 Section who has not been injected into the picture. That is Wilfred Paul. He was there I believe three months before December 7th and at least three months after December 7th. He was one of the advisers on the Air equipment. I don't believe he appeared before the Roberts Commission.
15. General Grunert. What do you suppose he would know that we cannot find out otherwise?
Colonel Donegan. He worked up several of the joint Army and Navy exercises in which the Air participated.
16. General Grunert. He was particularly concerned in working up exercises that General Martin wanted and that were to receive the approval of the Department?
Colonel Donegan. I would say the other way. He was working for General Short and he coordinated our Air Corps and Interceptor Command and Navy in these joint exercises. He was working more or less as general air adviser in the General Staff Section.
17. General Grunert. He would not know anything that General Martin would not know?
Colonel Donegan. He should not, no.
18. General Grunert. General Martin would probably know all that Paul knows?
Colonel Donegan. Yes, sir.
19. General Grunert. Our time is limited and we cannot branch out too much, unless they are leads for facts that we cannot [1932] get otherwise.
Colonel Donegan. Yes, sir.
20. General Grunert. Do you know whether the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department knew what elements of the fleet were in or out of the harbor?

Colonel Donegan. I do not know.

21. General Grunert. Do you know whether such information was ever requested from the Navy through G-3?


22. General Grunert. Would the knowledge whether the fleet was in or out of the harbor make any difference in taking defense measures or applying them or implementing them?

Colonel Donegan. I don't believe it would have at that time. The Navy was constantly in and out. I can recall that distinctly, because at one time they alternated a program so the Navy could be out over the week-end and come back during the week.

23. General Grunert. Did you consider that you had a greater responsibility when the fleet was in than when it was out?

Colonel Donegan. Frankly, I did not think so, as G-3.

24. General Grunert. I understand you had in your office a naval Lieutenant by the name of Burr.

Colonel Donegan. Yes.

25. General Grunert. Who was the naval liaison officer for the 14th Naval District.

Colonel Donegan. Yes.

26. General Grunert. Was he capable?

Colonel Donegan. Well, he was selected by the Navy. He was there. He was not of much value to us.

27. General Grunert. Did he keep you informed of what the Navy was doing?

Colonel Donegan. My recollection of Burr is that when we wanted information we told him what we wanted and he went out and got it for us. But he gave us very little, as I recall, on his own initiative.

28. General Grunert. Did you give him whatever the Navy wanted?

Colonel Donegan. Yes, sir. There was no question about that. Anything we had in our Section was available to him.

29. General Grunert. Did he often ask for it or did he have to ask for it or did you, whenever you had anything new, tell him about it or ask him whether the Navy was interested? I am trying to get at what actual liaison there was there in getting information from one to the other.

Colonel Donegan. It was there for him. I don't believe he asked for much. I think at that time Major Lawton was in daily contact with his corresponding number in the 14th Naval District.

30. General Grunert. His corresponding number would be what?

Colonel Donegan. There was a series. One time Hewitt and I would frequently be contacting a Captain Goode, who was the 14th Naval District, like the Chief of Staff. Then a Captain Munson. Our liaison was back and forth. I had many trips over there and would go with either Lawton or Hewitt. I have also gone to now Admiral, then Captain, McMorris, on board the cruiser Indianapolis. I had been over there frequently to arrange these missions. He had a Scouting Force at that time. Then I know several times a G-3 representative went out to Admiral Halsey's carrier, to
Commander Miles Browning, when the carrier would come in from a "raid", testing out.

31. General GRUNERT. Then you did not depend on this naval Lieutenant, Burr, for your contacts?
Colonel DONEGAN. No, sir.
32. General GRUNERT. In G-3?
Colonel DONEGAN. He was an Intelligence man.
33. General GRUNERT. Intelligence or intelligent?
Colonel DONEGAN. No, Intelligence, Naval Intelligence. He was not like a line, tactical or combat officer. He was a Navy Intelligence reserve officer. We used him very little.
34. General GRUNERT. Would he know anything about the Interceptor Command?
Colonel DONEGAN. Very little.
35. General GRUNERT. And the war warning service?
Colonel DONEGAN. We did not deal with him for anything like that. We discussed the aircraft warning service and dealt with a man in the 14th Naval District who was an expert.
36. General FRANK. He was a sort of a technical liaison man?
Colonel DONEGAN. That is right.
37. General FRANK. Rather than an efficient operating liaison man?
Colonel DONEGAN. He did not have the background. Dingeman, our man, did have the background, particularly on this harbor control post. He spent full time over at the Navy. He came in our office at 8 o'clock in the morning to check up on what we had and then went immediately over to Pearl Harbor, and came back at about 11:30 to have luncheon with us, and would go back to Pearl Harbor at 1 o'clock and spend the rest of the day there. He spent full time at Pearl Harbor.
38. General GRUNERT. That was Dingeman?
[1935] Colonel DONEGAN. Yes, sir.
39. General GRUNERT. Now I am going to read you some extracts here from the Joint Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Defense Plan and ask you a few questions about it.
Paragraph 4 of Section 1 of that plan designates G-3 as the planning representative for the Army, in paragraph 15c (2); Section 3 states in part:

Such parts of this plan as are believed necessary will be put into effect prior to M-Day as ordered by the War and Navy Departments or as mutually agreed upon by local commanders.

Paragraph 21, Section 6, states in part:

This agreement to take effect at once and to remain effective until notice in writing by either party of its renouncement, in part or in whole, or disapproval in part or in whole by either the War or Navy Departments.

Now, do you know whether or not the War and Navy Departments approved that plan?
Colonel DONEGAN. I do not know. Was that not dated some time in April?
40. General GRUNERT. Right.
Colonel DONEGAN. 1941.
41. General GRUNERT. Do you know whether they disapproved all or part of the plan?
Colonel DONEGAN. I do not.
42. General Grunert. Did the War and Navy Departments ever order any part of the plan put into effect prior to M-Day?
Colonel Donegan. Not to my knowledge.
43. General Grunert. Did the local commanders ever mutually agree to put into effect any part of the plan?
Colonel Donegan. I do not recall. If I could talk to General Frank off the record? That comes under something about [1936] plans being put into effect. As to G-3, I do not know.
44. General Grunert. My next question is, if so, would that sort of thing be put on record and be of record in the Hawaiian Department, do you know?
Colonel Donegan. I would not say so; to my knowledge, no.
45. General Grunert. What is M-Day?
Colonel Donegan. Mobilization Day.
46. General Grunert. What does that mean?
Colonel Donegan. That is the day that the Department commanders would be notified by Washington.
47. General Grunert. Could the Department commanders initiate M-Day?
Colonel Donegan. My understanding was that Washington was going to do it.
48. General Grunert. I think the plan provided that M-Day could be put into effect for reasons of the imminence of war of anything like that, by local agreement between the two commanders. Of course, it would have been reported to Washington or probably a request made on Washington to put M-Day into effect.
49. General Frank. What is M-Day?
Colonel Donegan. According to that plan, the War Department was going to stage an M-Day in preparation for war, prior to which we would get a maximum war strength garrison. I may add here that just a week before Pearl Harbor, after a very comprehensive and complete study, we submitted a report which was mailed not later or not earlier than the 1st of December to Washington, stating our requirements for an initial war garrison. It was in the mail on December 7th, I am sure. In that our G-3 Section worked out what we considered the essentials of what the War Department called an initial war garrison, and I believe they gave us the figures. [1937] 50. General Frank. What is the necessity for declaring an M-Day?
Colonel Donegan. In this way, I would say, they would build up the garrison to war strength. That is the only reason I know of. They certainly did not have a sufficient garrison there.
51. General Frank. Suppose the Commander of the Hawaiian Department had declared an M-Day; what would have happened?
Colonel Donegan. I believe my reaction to that would be, if it was necessary for the local commanders to declare an M-Day and they believed the situation was serious enough for that, we would have gone on to a so-called Alert No. 3, instead of the sabotage alert, or No. 1, which we were on at that time. I do not believe that they thought the conditions warranted calling an M-Day. I never thought of M-Day that way before, but the emergency did not exist at that time.
52. General Frank. What I am trying to find out is what happens in a place like Honolulu, when M-Day is declared by anybody? What is the sequence of events?
Colonel Donegan. I don't know. It should be in that plan. They refer to M-Day in that.

53. General Grunert. I will read it for the benefit of the record. It is paragraph 15 C (2) of the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Coastal Frontier.

M-Day is the first day of mobilization and is the time origin for the execution of this plan. M-Day may precede a declaration of war. As a precautionary measure the War and Navy Departments may initiate or put into effect certain features of their respective plan prior to M-Day. Such parts of this plan as are believed necessary will be put into effect prior to M-Day, as ordered by the War and Navy Departments, or as mutually agreed upon by local commanders.

M-Day therefore appears to be when you take steps just as if you expect war in the near future, and in taking those steps mobilization consists of the various steps to be taken, as to the civil population, as to recruitment for the Army, reception of Army personnel, operation of martial law and various other steps that you would take only in case you think war is in the immediate offing. Is that your understanding?

Colonel Donegan. Yes. As G-3 I didn't think war was in the immediate offing, from my knowledge of the situation at that time.

54. General Grunert. What was your position in January, 1941? Assistant G-3?

Colonel Donegan. Assistant G-3 and the section I had. I believe, was that I was in charge of ground troops. I remember particularly tables of organization and so forth.

55. General Grunert. While in G-3 there did you know of a letter written by the Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of War and the Secretary of War's reply to the Navy, a copy of which was sent to the Hawaiian Department, that pertained to the defenses, called attention to certain weaknesses, and especially called attention to the need for preparation to meet air attacks? Do you remember that letter at that time?

Colonel Donegan. No, sir, I don't believe I do.

56. General Grunert. General Short acknowledged receipt of a copy of that letter of February 19, 1941. Do you know what was done between February and December in the line of increasing the defense against air attack, generally speaking?

Colonel Donegan. Well, from a training viewpoint I know we had considerable training. We had exercises with the Navy at least once a month, sometimes twice a month. I think we had it with the Hawaiian Air Force. We had CPX. I recall an Air Force communications officer running CPXs.

57. General Grunert. Do you know that they were building an air warning service?

Colonel Donegan. Yes, sir.

58. General Grunert. Was that considered progress toward air defense?

Colonel Donegan. I would consider it such.

59. General Grunert. What other things were done?

Colonel Donegan. I believe during the year 1941 they built that Information Center at Fort Shafter.

60. General Grunert. Who in G-3 would know more about this line of questions?
Colonel DONEGAN. Lawton.

61. General GRUNERT. Lawton?
Colonel DONEGAN. He was a specialist in G-3.

62. General GRUNERT. Then our best source, outside of General Short, would be whom?
Colonel DONEGAN. The Chief of Staff, General Davidson, who had the Interceptor Command; Colonel Paul, Department Signal Officer, and Lawton, who was the General Staff man.

63. General GRUNERT. Can you, of your own knowledge, give us any information that they cannot?
Colonel DONEGAN. No, sir, and it would not be as accurate.

64. General GRUNERT. Then I will see if I can find something else that you may be able to give us better information about than they may. What was your conception or understanding of the [1940] generally increasing tautness of the international situation as between the United States and Japan during the latter part of the year 1941? What did you know about it and where did you get your impressions, and what were your impressions?
Colonel DONEGAN. Is this personal, official or a combination?

65. General GRUNERT. Combination. Tell me what you know.
Colonel DONEGAN. I think we all felt that there was a tenseness there. We were working every night during the month of November. I think Lawton, Dingeman and I worked every night till 10 or 11 o’clock.

66. General GRUNERT. What did you work at?
Colonel DONEGAN. At that time we were planning to take over from the Navy the occupation and defenses—well, we were going to send task forces to Canton, maybe Christmas. We were going to take over Palmyra.

67. General GRUNERT. Let us stick to Hawaii.
Colonel DONEGAN. This was all under the Joint Hawaiian Department. The tempo had increased, because, as I say, we figured out an initial war garrison if the War Department knew our requirements. It stepped up the garrison to around 60,000. I knew we were flying some ships out to the Far East. We were building an air field down in the South Pacific under the Department’s control. We had a time date. I think the time date the War Department sent was March, 1942, for Christmas and Canton. I don’t know whether it is both, but it sticks in my mind as March. General Short fixed it by a directive for January. He stepped it up about two months.

68. General GRUNERT. Let us get back to your state of mind of [1941] the relationship between Japan and the United States. You say you realized, on account of all this, that the situation was growing more and more tense. What did that indicate to you? Did it alarm you in any way as to the defenses of Hawaii or the possibility of an attack on Hawaii?
Colonel DONEGAN. That, sir, would come from G-2. I have no such information.

69. General GRUNERT. But there was a General Staff. You were all one family and one set of brains. G-2 is not supposed to know everything. What did G-3 know? What did you know?
Colonel DONEGAN. I didn’t know a thing as to an attack coming when it came.
70. General Grunert. Did you know what information was being received, what alarm or what warning as to the danger of that attack? Did it come home to you that it might come or was in the offing or away in the distance, or what?

Colonel Donegan. Frankly, I did not visualize an attack was coming. I did not expect it.

71. General Grunert. Were you acquainted with or did you have knowledge of the Navy message that was received and transmitted to the Army which started out “Consider this a war warning.”?

Colonel Donegan. No, sir, I never saw it.

72. General Grunert. You never saw it, but did you ever hear of it?

Colonel Donegan. I was called up to the Department Commander’s office, I believe, when that message of November 27th was received, when we had a staff conference, or the Chief of Staff had it, and I later went into General Short’s office——

73. General Grunert. That message is the one known as the Chief of Staff message of November 27th?

Colonel Donegan. It might be. That is the last one I recall before Pearl Harbor.

74. General Grunert. That was an Army message, was it?

Colonel Donegan. That was an Army message.

75. General Grunert. That is the Chief of Staff message of November 27th?

Colonel Donegan. That is the one where they mentioned the Rainbow plan?

76. General Grunert. Yes. Tell us what happened then?

Colonel Donegan. We stepped up the tempo of this antisabotage.

77. General Grunert. What do you know about that message?

Colonel Donegan. That is a long time ago, General.

78. General Grunert. Were you called into conference as to its meanings?

Colonel Donegan. Yes, sir. We discussed it, and later I went into General Short, with one or more others of the G–3 Section, and we discussed it.

79. General Grunert. I think it would be well if I read that message and refreshed your memory here, because I want to ask you a few more questions about it. This is the message of November 27th, 1941, from the Chief of Staff to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department:

(War Department message of November 27, 1941, was read as follows:)

Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot, be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as to not, repeat not, alarm civil population or disclose intent. Report measures taken. Should hostilities occur you will carry out tasks assigned in Rainbow Five so far as they pertain to Japan. Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers.

That refreshes your mind?
Colonel Donegan. Yes, sir.

General Grunert. Now, where did you get in on that discussion of that message?

Colonel Donegan. The Chief of Staff called a conference, up in his office. I will go back. I was out in the field, and I returned from the field. The conference had started, and the Chief of Staff was reading that message. Prior to that time, I believe that Major Horner, in the G-3 section—he is now Colonel Horner, G-2, of the Ninth Corps—had gone over the Rainbow plan with General Short, and I further believe that after the Chief of Staff's conference we restudied that telegram in the G-3 section. That is the best I can recall it.

80. General Grunert. Now, where did you come in on it? What advice did you give about it?

Colonel Donegan. As far as the Chief of Staff, the decision had been made, as I say, when I returned from the field, and I believe this directive had been issued about this sabotage or Alert 1.

81. General Grunert. Then the decision had been made?

Colonel Donegan. It had been made.

82. General Grunert. You were not called upon to recommend what was to be done under that, before the decision was made?

Colonel Donegan. No, sir. I was not present at the headquarters. I was, I say, in the field, and when I returned, the conference was in session, and I think the Staff study had been made on it.

83. General Grunert. Do you know who represented G-3 in the discussion before the decision was made?

Colonel Donegan. I am sure that then Major Horner did.

84. General Grunert. Would it have been natural for them to call on G-3 Operations for recommendations as to action to be taken under such a warning, or did the Commanding General make the decision with his Chief of Staff, or what?

Colonel Donegan. Of course, that was the first time we had ever received such a warning, and there was no precedent for the staff procedure in the headquarters.

85. General Grunert. But there had been other decisions made that pertained to operations before that, undoubtedly?

Colonel Donegan. In other decisions pertaining to G-3, invariably I was called up.

86. General Grunert. But in this, you had no say, personally?

Colonel Donegan. I was not available, at the time.

87. General Grunert. Or, the discussion afterwards, after the decision was made? Then you reread this thing?

Colonel Donegan. I think that G-3 went into a conference among ourselves, and we put in effect the directive of the Chief of Staff, and we made no other recommendation.

88. General Grunert. In your discussion was any question raised as to whether or not an antisabotage alert was sufficient to cover what was required and what was intimated in that radiogram?

Colonel Donegan. I do not believe there was, in the G-3 section.

89. General Grunert. In your own mind, did you ever give it a thought as to whether or not the "Old Man" was going far enough?

Colonel Donegan. I will be frank, with you, General, I didn't. I was fooled as much as anybody else—if we were fooled. That is my honest opinion.
90. General Grunert. Do you think that the antisabotage alert covered the requirements of the situation?

Colonel Donegan. I would rather not state, in that there was a decision of the Department Commander. That was his decision, and I would rather not comment on it.

91. General Grunert. Were you free to state your opinion and to hammer it home as long as no decision had been made?

Colonel Donegan. I feel that at headquarters I was always free to say anything I wanted to say.

92. General Grunert. Then you feel that, the decision having been made, from that time on your thoughts were not to be expressed, but the decision was to be carried out?

Colonel Donegan. No, sir; I did not feel that way. The decision was made, and if I had taken exception to it, which I had done several times in the past, I would have gone up and recommended a modification. In this case I didn't. I don't believe anybody in the G-3 section recommended I do it.

93. General Grunert. Since the Chief of Staff had been G-3, was there any inclination on his part to make decisions for G-3 without consulting G-3?

Colonel Donegan. I don't think you can say that he was G-3. If he had been G-3, it was only for about a month. Colonel "Phil" Hayes was the G-3. He was relieved by Colonel Throckmorton; and Colonel Phillips was not G-3, to my knowledge, over six weeks. He was just waiting to step in to take over the Chief of Staff's job. He never was a G-3.

94. General Grunert. How was that staff team, over there? Was it a cohesive team, or were there some disagreements among them, any jealousies, or backbiting, or disappointments, or what?

Colonel Donegan. I don't think there were any disappointments, if you are referring to the appointment of the Chief of Staff—not to my knowledge.

95. General Grunert. Did the staff, or did you, consider Phillips competent to be a Chief of Staff of the Department?

Colonel Donegan. I would rather not answer. We have been warned on this thing. I would rather not discuss this thing. I think that is perfectly all right, isn't it?

96. General Grunert. We will not require you to discuss it. You spoke of Captain McMorris, of the Navy?

Colonel Donegan. Yes, sir.

97. General Grunert. What was his position in the fleet, do you know?

Colonel Donegan. He was the Chief of Staff of the Scouting Force, and I remember I went over there with Hobart Hewitt, and visited him aboard the flagship, and also I think, with Lawton, and we did a lot of our training with him.

98. General Grunert. Did he ever express himself to you as to what he thought about this Japanese situation and the dangers of it, or anything of that kind?

Colonel Donegan. No, sir. I think we worked quite closely with him, because I saw considerable of him when he was Admiral Nimitz' Operations Officer for Pearl Harbor; and he never expressed himself to me.
99. General Grunert. What did you have to do with getting up the SOP of November 5?

Colonel Donegan. I had a chance to go over it and delete anything I didn't like, I think, and that SOP I signed it. I read it before I came to this Board. It is dated November 5, and I think I was appointed Chief of Staff about November 7, and I couldn't have been Chief of Staff 24 hours when I signed that thing; but I helped work on it in the section, as an Assistant G-3.

100. General Grunert. And you became Chief of Staff of the Department?

Colonel Donegan. Not more than a month before Pearl Harbor. I mean, the G-3,

101. General Grunert. Oh; I did not understand that you had been Chief of Staff.

Colonel Donegan. Oh, no. I was G-3, appointed G-3 of the Hawaiian Department in November 1941.

102. General Grunert. But then, you had been in the G-3 section?

Colonel Donegan. The G-3 section. I worked on that SOP.

103. General Grunert. Then you were the next senior in the G-3 section, were you?

[1943] Colonel Donegan. Yes, sir; I was.

104. General Grunert. By the way, how did the staff section work together? Did they work in isolated groups, or in "compartments," you might call them?

Colonel Donegan. No. It was customary in that headquarters to have a staff conference every Saturday morning at 8 o'clock. The Chief of every General and Special Staff section, or the senior or president of the section was present, and it was conducted by the Chief of Staff, and at that conference it was supposed that each General Staff would bring out the principal activity of the week; and G-2 was called in for an orientation, to bring out numbers of things going on. That was customary.

105. General Grunert. Let us ask you a little bit about those orientations. When was the last staff meeting held before December 7?

Colonel Donegan. I would say, on the morning before. It must have been.

106. General Grunert. That was on a Saturday, and your meetings usually took place on Saturday?

Colonel Donegan. Every Saturday morning at 8 o'clock. I don't know whether it was held on Saturday, December 6, or not; if not, it was an exception, because they were held every Saturday morning at 8 o'clock.

107. General Grunert. All right. If it was held December 6, and the Saturday before that, did G-2 come up with anything alarming about the situation?

Colonel Donegan. It did not.

108. General Grunert. Did not? Then you concluded there was nothing, inasmuch as you heard nothing said, and G-2 told you nothing at these conferences? Or do you suppose G-2 did not put out, there, but kept a lot to himself, or between him and his Commanding General, which?

Colonel Donegan. I don't think the G-2 visualized what was [1948] impending.
109. General Frank. Did G-2 ever have any information that was very "hot?"

Colonel Donegan. I never got any of it, as G-3. I don't think there was much "hot." I know he didn't pass it out.

110. General Grunert. Now, were these conferences "hot," or were they just—"Oh, well! we have to get together once a week and tell them something!"

Colonel Donegan. Well, you say about being "compartments." That certainly took us out of the "compartment," and let us know what the other fellow was doing, if we had anything. It was kind of instructive to all the staff. I would tell them, from G-3, what the problems were, what we were doing, and each section would do the same thing.

111. General Grunert. But, in the last two conferences, on the last two Saturdays before Pearl Harbor, there was no particular discussion about what might come; or was there any particular discussion about sabotage?

Colonel Donegan. I cannot recall.

112. General Grunert. That was a "hot" subject then, was it not?

Colonel Donegan. A "hot" subject in G-3. In our section, every officer went out to make visits, for sabotage, went around to see that the guards were on these water plants and power plants, and down by the docks, and the oil fuels, down there; and we thought sabotage was the real thing, and practically every officer in the section was out daily checking on activities.

113. General Grunert. In your section, or in the General Staff meeting, either one, did the question ever come up as to, "Well, the Navy is doing its job of distant reconnaissance, to ward off an attack, or to let us know if there is anything coming?" Did that subject ever come up?

Colonel Donegan. I can't say whether it did or not.

114. General Grunert. It apparently did not impress itself on [1950] you, if it did come up, because, otherwise, you might remember it.

Colonel Donegan. To my knowledge, I think reconnaissance was effective. I personally thought so.

115. General Grunert. You thought distant reconnaissance was effective?

Colonel Donegan. I thought so.

116. General Grunert. What made you think that distant reconnaissance was effective—your confidence in the Navy; or did you know anything in particular about it?

Colonel Donegan. Well, I thought I knew something about it. I tried to keep abreast of it, and my reaction is, I thought it was effective, that they were doing as much as could be expected.

117. General Grunert. Would the Navy liaison officer attend these General Staff meetings?

Colonel Donegan. Only the Chiefs of sections attended.

118. General Grunert. The naval liaison officer was not in on it?

Colonel Donegan. No, sir.

119. General Grunert. So, even if he had had any information on it, he was not there to give it to you?

Colonel Donegan. Well, he would have told me. It was my liaison officer, and I could have told them at the staff section.
120. General Grunert. What did Dingeman ever tell you about the Navy reconnaissance; anything?

Colonel Donegan. Not to my knowledge.

121. General Grunert. Did you ever make any definite inquiries as to what the Navy was doing in the line of distant reconnaissance?

Colonel Donegan. I think we would go direct. I would go over with Lawton, direct, over to the Navy, and ask those questions.

122. General Grunert. All right. Did you go directly?

Colonel Donegan. We visited frequently.

123. General Grunert. Did you ask about the distant reconnaissance?

Colonel Donegan. I don’t recall whether we did or not.

124. General Grunert. But you were interested in it, weren’t you?

Colonel Donegan. Yes, sir. That was going on three years, which is a long time. I don’t know whether we discussed that, or not.

125. General Grunert. Then you thought they had distant reconnaissance, but you really didn’t know. You don’t remember anything about it?

Colonel Donegan. I believe at this time that they were having effective distant reconnaissance. If they didn’t, I didn’t know it.

126. General Grunert. Was that in the line of 360° patrolling?

Colonel Donegan. Well, I would say west of Hawaii.

127. General Grunert. West of Hawaii?

Colonel Donegan. Yes; west.

128. General Grunert. Were you depending on the task forces that went out, or on the planes that were sent out or ordered, or did you just have general confidence that they were doing what you thought they ought to do?

Colonel Donegan. Frankly, I feel that is more G-2 than G-3. You are asking me this, G-3, and I should think that would be a G-2 thing for the Hawaiian Department.

129. General Grunert. Well, the G-3 is operations, and in case anything happens, you have to control the fighting of the defense, do you not?

Colonel Donegan. I understand that, but I get my information from G-2. He goes out and gets it?

130. General Grunert. Well, did you ask G-2 about it?

Colonel Donegan. Yes, sir. He had no information, other than I think he gave me everything he had; so far as I know he did.

131. General Grunert. How was Fielder considered, as to G-2?

Colonel Donegan. I would rather not discuss personalities.

132. General Grunert. Well, discuss officialities, then. Officially, was he considered O. K.?

Colonel Donegan. As far as I know, he was O. K. I would say he was as good a G-2 as I was a G-3. I would just as soon let that go in the record.

133. General Frank. That’s fair enough.

134. General Grunert. Yes; that’s fair enough.

What brought about this system of Alerts 1, 2, and 3? When you first went over there, they only had one kind of alert, didn’t they, and that was an all-out alert?

Colonel Donegan. That is right.
135. General Grunert. Then why 1, 2, or 3? That must have been in your minds, or somebody started it.

Colonel Donegan. That was discussed a great deal, and I think the idea was that in the past when they had an alert they moved everything out, and this way they could continue their training and develop as necessary.

136. General Grunert. You mean, then, it was a step from the less serious to the more serious, to the all-out?

Colonel Donegan. To the all-out.

137. General Grunert. All right.

Now, let us get down to this training. Just what training would be handicapped in Alert No. 2, which was a combination of defense against aircraft and antisabotage? Just how did that interfere seriously with training, and whose training?

Colonel Donegan. Well, I think it spread a considerable number of men all over the island, every vital installation, the [1953] ground forces, and it was principally ground forces. You asked me about the antiaircraft. I will say it did not affect antiaircraft.

138. General Grunert. That was part of the air defense, was it not?

Colonel Donegan. Yes.

139. General Grunert. How did it affect the air training?

Colonel Donegan. I don't believe it did affect the air.

140. General Grunert. It did affect the ground troops, but they had the least to do, and would not have been put out in No. 2, would they?

Colonel Donegan. Fifty percent, in No. 2; and I think SOP, as I recall it—you have it, I think—50% went out on Alert No. 2; as I recall, one battalion, or one something, motorized.

141. General Grunert. But that was primarily for antisabotage?

142. General Frank. No. 2.

143. General Grunert. No. 2 includes, against air and antisabotage?

Colonel Donegan. And sabotage.

144. General Grunert. But what brought the infantry out, the “ground troops,” as we call them? The bringing out of the infantry in full force was No. 3?

Colonel Donegan. 100% in the field.

146. General Grunert. Yes.

Colonel Donegan. Everything.

146. General Grunert. Everything for the fact that they had certain guarding duties against sabotage under No. 2, and so forth, they were not much concerned with No. 2?

Colonel Donegan. Well, you take 50%. All right, now, they [1954] are considerably concerned. Fifty percent were altered under No. 2.

147. General Grunert. Do you know the reason back of calling Alert No. 1 “antisabotage” instead of Alert No. 2, which would have been against air, and antisabotage?

Colonel Donegan. No, sir.

148. General Grunert. You do not know the reason, whether the reason was all training, part training, or what?

Colonel Donegan. I don't; no, sir. I think they thought No. 1 would do the job, otherwise they would have called No. 2.
149. General Grunert. Would do what job?
Colonel Donegan. Whatever job it was, from the information received from Washington.

150. General Grunert. The job that was intimated, appeared to be in the Navy message, which was transmitted to the Army—"this is a war warning"?
Colonel Donegan. Yes.

151. General Grunert. Now, would antisabotage take care of a war in the offing?
Colonel Donegan. I don't recall seeing it, as I stated.

152. General Grunert. Then you referred to the job that the Chief of Staff's message which I read to you called for?
Colonel Donegan. November 27.

153. General Grunert. We will go back to that message. In that message the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department was directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as he might deem necessary. Was any additional reconnaissance made, do you know, or did he not consider any additional reconnaissance necessary?
Colonel Donegan. I don't remember. If it was ordered, it [1955] is certainly a matter of record somewhere. I don't recall.

154. General Grunert. Would such matters have been sent out through you in directives to do such, or not? I am not heckling you; I am just after information.
Colonel Donegan. I think this has been handled direct by the Chief of Staff. It all came so fast, and I say, there was no precedent, this was the first time it was done; so you see normally you can't say whether it would be handled through G-3 or not, because there was no staff precedent or procedure for it.

155. General Grunert. Is there anything now in the line of alerts or the influences or conclusions respecting this information that you had, that you could tell the Board, that might give us further light on this thing, as to the state of mind or the reasons or causes, or anything in that line?
Colonel Donegan. No, sir. I tell you, it all happened so fast, November 27 to December 7, that we were, I will say, on Alert 1. Then, I couldn't get the reactions of other officers, after December 7. It was just a question of our being in the tunnel, we dug in, and it wasn't discussed, even, in fact, in my own section; we didn't have the time.

156. General Grunert. The Hawaiian command was created and put out there as an outpost, and it was their business to be prepared for anything; and, if they were properly warned, if you had notice, why then of course it was the business of the command, your business as G-3, to make whatever plans the "Old Man" called for?
Colonel Donegan. It was.

157. General Grunert. And up to that time you considered the plans had been made and pretty well implemented, is that right?
[1956] Colonel Donegan. From the information that I knew, I think the Department Commander took the steps that were adequate.

158. General Grunert. From what you know of the training and stated training and efficiency of the command, had it been Alert 2, what would have been the results of this attack that did come? Have you ever tried to visualize it that way? Could you have stopped it?
Colonel Donegan. I have tried to visualize it from all angles. I don't know whether it could be stopped or not.

159. General Grunert. Could you minimize the danger, or the amount of damage that was done?

Colonel Donegan. Well, I don't have to answer it, but I will say I don't believe—it would have been negligible, is my opinion.

160. General Grunert. If you do not answer some of these things, it leads me to believe that you have something for which you are afraid you might be hauled up.

Colonel Donegan. Oh, no, sir! Not a thing to worry me, about that!

161. General Grunert. I think I will turn you over to one of the other Members of the Board, here, until I think of something else. General Russell?

162. General Russell. You were out there when General Short came out, were you, Colonel?

Colonel Donegan. Yes, sir.

163. General Russell. You had been out there some time before that?

Colonel Donegan. I arrived in the Department in August 1940.

164. General Russell. How many new officers did General Short bring out there with him?

Colonel Donegan. Very few. From the top down, he brought Phillips, he brought Truman. I don't know of anybody else I can recall right now.

165. General Russell. Phillips became Chief of Staff, and Truman was an aide?

Colonel Donegan. That is right.

166. General Russell. All the other people who were functioning out there on General Short's staff as of December 7 he found when he got out there, if that be true?

Colonel Donegan. I would say, as my memory recalls it, I know of no one else that he brought out.

167. General Russell. It was not a cleaning out of the staff when Short came out there and a moving in of a new staff?

Colonel Donegan. No, sir.

168. General Russell. How did you happen to be sent out there? Was it because it was your turn to go out there?

Colonel Donegan. I went out in the foreign service. I was assigned to the Twenty-first Infantry at Schofield, and I was a Major of Infantry, in the G-3 section, on DS. I had a nervous breakdown and I was placed in the hospital. They let me out, and I asked to go out on DS. I went out there as assistant.

169. General Russell. What I am trying to get at, Colonel, is this: Who sent people out to the Hawaiian Department? Was it the War Department, or the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department?

Colonel Donegan. The War Department, always.

170. General Russell. Did they require the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department to take such people as he had and as the War Department sent him, and do what he could with them?

Colonel Donegan. That is right. He selected his staff usually from the personnel available in the Hawaiian Department.
171. General Russell. These people who were on the staff, there, Fielder, and you, and Throckmorton—and who was this man who was G-4?

Colonel Donegan. Marsden.

172. General Russell. All those people were already on the staff when Short got there, were they not?

Colonel Donegan. Let me get this, now. When Short arrived, "Empy" Potts was G-1. That is Adam E. Potts. Marsden was G-2, Throckmorton was G-3, and Carl Bankfield, I told you, was G-4. Carl Bankfield went back to the mainland, expiration of service, and Marsden was put into G-4. "Empy" Potts dropped out of G-1 and went off with a Coast Artillery outfit.

173. General Russell. As a matter of fact, this staff out there was just a sort of normal staff in the Army as it had operated at that time; they were gradually leaving, and gradually coming in?

Colonel Donegan. That is right.

174. General Russell. General Short had the same problem that anybody else would have had, to make the best he could out of what he had, is that right?

Colonel Donegan. Oh, yes; it is the Commander's prerogative to select his staff.

175. General Russell. He had to select them from within the Department?

Colonel Donegan. I believe he inherited some that were sent out by War Department selection. I think Hobart Hewitt, in the G-3 section, assistant G-3, was sent out by the War Department, the selection of the War Department General Staff. Then there was a transition, when the War Department no longer selected them, and the local commander selected detail on General Staff.

176. General Russell. From where?

Colonel Donegan. From personnel available within the Department.

177. General Russell. From within the Hawaiian Department?

Do you think these people who were selected to be on General Short's staff were selected and sent to him, because they were specially fitted as General Staff officers?

Colonel Donegan. Which people are you talking about, General?

178. General Russell. You and Marsden and Phillips—all of you people. How did you happen to get an assignment on this staff?

Colonel Donegan. It was selected as an assistant G-3 by Throckmorton, on his recommendation, and was then G-3, and I was placed on General Staff on the recommendation of Colonel Hayes, when Hayes was Chief of Staff.

179. General Russell. Some questions were asked you about your not being called upon to express an opinion on this November 27 message. I did not get your testimony any too clearly, but as I recall, you said that if you had disagreed with the Commander's decision, and had you thought that antisabotage was not sufficient, you would have felt perfectly free to go in and discuss it?

Colonel Donegan. Yes, sir.

180. General Russell. With the Chief of Staff, or the Commanding General, or with whom?
Colonel Donegan. My channel would have been to go to the Chief of Staff.

181. General Russell. Were they arbitrary, up there?
Colonel Donegan. No, sir.

182. General Russell. They permitted you to discuss matters with them?

[1960] Colonel Donegan. I always felt free to go in.

183. General Russell. I got the impression from your testimony, Colonel, that in these night jobs that were being carried on, and the work being done in G-3, your thinking was in the terms of Japan and Wake? It was directed toward Japan and Wake?
Colonel Donegan. No, that was based on War Department directives. The War Department told us to make studies of task forces necessary to take over certain islands, and I think Palmyra was one which was then occupied by the Navy, and we figured out a "TO," a table of organization, naturally involving Coast Artillery, Infantry, and Antiaircraft, and we worked those out with the Navy representative, who was Colonel of Marines, and submitted those to Washington.

184. General Russell. But this work that you G-3 people were under pressure to do did not relate to Oahu and the defenses there, but related to islands which lay between you and, generally, the Philippines; is that right?
Colonel Donegan. That was just an additional job. Our defense of Oahu was the primary mission we had, there was no question about it, you can't get away from it. This was just additional work, prior to December 7. I was trying to give you a background of what we were doing, and that was one of the major works going on in the section during the month of November, the latter part of November.

185. General Russell. Did General Short step up the defensive preparations after he got there?
Colonel Donegan. Considerably.

186. General Russell. Pardon?
Colonel Donegan. A great deal.

[1961] 187. General Russell. He was defense-conscious, you feel?
Colonel Donegan. Very much so. In fact, I think a great deal was done, there, on the defense, on bunkers, pill bunkers for the Air Corps, pill boxes, beach defense, being constantly carried on.

188. General Russell. Reference was made to Hawaii as an out-post, it being the area nearest the mainland, which had been fortified and occupied by us; but were there not many other installations between us and Japan and Wake and Midway and the Philippine Islands and Guam, whatever was done on Guam?
Colonel Donegan. That is correct.

189. General Russell. That is all.
Colonel Donegan. What has that got to do with it?

190. General Russell. How?
Colonel Donegan. May I ask a question? What has that got to do with it?

191. General Russell. I don't know what anything has to do with it!

192. General Grunert. Have you any questions, General Frank?
193. General Frank. Had you ever discussed the possibility of an air attack or an air raid on Oahu?

Colonel Donegan. Discussed it many, many times, every time we had a joint Army and Navy exercise, when they came in on Navy carriers, and so forth.

194. General Frank. What was your thought about the possibility of a raid on Oahu by a Jap carrier force?

Colonel Donegan. Well, I believed it was possible; I didn’t think it was probable. I discussed that with staff officers Street and Hagenberg, and they discussed it many times.

[1962] 195. General Frank. Had you ever gone into it in a very detailed manner?

Colonel Donegan. I had gone into it with your man Farthing, in connection with patrolling. He had a patrolling plan, there, and I had gone into it and studied it with him—the number of planes necessary to patrol, and the 360° patrol. All those things were discussed.

196. General Frank. Speaking in race-track parlance, what did you consider the possibility of a Jap air raid?

Colonel Donegan. Frankly, I didn’t expect one or anticipate one. I didn’t think they would attempt it; but I had not made up my mind that way.

197. General Frank. What were the chances, did you think?

Colonel Donegan. I hadn’t even thought it out in chances.

198. General Frank. If you did not think they would do it, why wouldn’t they do it? Let us approach it from the other side. Let us approach it from the Japanese side. That is what I am trying to get at.

Colonel Donegan. Well, you could ask every officer in the Hawaiian Department, over there, the same question, and it’s “second guessing” now, three years later. I think, to ask them, “Why don’t you think they attempted it?” I don’t believe anybody over there, whether it was the Department Staff or the Air Force Staff or Antiaircraft, thought it. That is what we were there, for, but nobody expected it.

199. General Frank. If you thought the Japs would not attempt it, why, from the Jap point of view, wouldn’t they attempt it?

Colonel Donegan. I don’t know why—I will say the same thing—I don’t know why I should answer these questions.

[1963] 200. General Frank. I am trying to get it as a point of view, and we are building up a point of view and a background on this thing. That is the reason I would like to get it. You are a professional soldier, you have been in the Army over a period of time.

Colonel Donegan. That is correct.

201. General Frank. And you must have some sort of professional opinion. From that point of view, then, I would like to have a professional opinion from you on that subject, if you have one.

Colonel Donegan. Well, I can say that with contemporaries there. I discussed it many, many times, and we had our defenses set for it. and we studied and supervised the training in connection with the anti-air defense, antiaircraft, and I personally did not anticipate a raid on Hawaii.

202. General Frank. Well, I have asked you two or three times, why. Was it because it was hazardous, it was a risky thing to do, they
were hazarding too much to attempt it, or what was behind your reason for thinking they would not attempt it?

Colonel Donegan. My reason would be that I thought that their interest lay more in Asia than that they would care to jeopardize the chances, or their limited fleet, in coming to Hawaii. That would be my reaction.

203. General Frank. How much of a risk were the Japs taking in pulling a raid on Honolulu?

Colonel Donegan. The answer is, “Zero,” right now, based on December 7; but I should think it would be a great risk.

204. General Frank. All right. Well, that was the reason? That was one of the reasons that you thought they would not attempt it, was because you thought it was too great a risk?

[1964] 205. General Frank. Had everything not clicked for them, it might have resulted in a disaster? Had both the Navy and the Army been sufficiently alerted to have gone after them, it might have resulted in a disaster?

Colonel Donegan. Well, it could have been a 100% failure, there is no question about it—just as bad a failure as it was a success, if things were 100% the other way.

206. General Frank. Now, did you read the Martin-Bellinger estimate of the situation?

Colonel Donegan. When was it published?

207. General Frank. I refer to the air estimate of the situation that they got out in the spring of 1941.

Colonel Donegan. The spring of 1941?

208. General Frank. Yes.

Colonel Donegan. I don't recall it.

209. General Frank. They made an air estimate on the situation.

Colonel Donegan. Who is Bellinger—the Admiral?


Colonel Donegan. PAT-2? I have sat in conference with him in connection with the use of air.

211. General Frank. Do you remember this air estimate of the situation that was submitted?

Colonel Donegan. No doubt I have read it, if he wrote it.

212. General Frank. To get back to this air attack again, did you ever make any comparison between the probability of damage from an air raid and the probability of damage from sabotage?

Colonel Donegan. No, I didn't.

213. General Frank. Or as to which was more probable?

Colonel Donegan. Let me say this, General. I think, now, [1965] that, after three years, to come here and ask a lot of questions about what we did or what we didn't do three years ago, I think it's rather unfair, whether I am a professional soldier of 27 years' service, or not. Since Pearl Harbor, like many others, we have been trying to win this war, working about 12 to 14 hours a day, and to come in here "cold" and ask me what I thought in December 1941, I think it is unfair for the Board to do it.

214. General Frank. I asked you if you had ever made that comparison.

Colonel Donegan. I never compared the damage that an air-raid would do, and the damage by sabotage. I feel certain I don't recall going through any such mental operations.
215. General Grunert. The witness may think that he is under some compulsion to answer these questions. If you don't know the answer, say so.

Colonel Donegan. I would like to give you the answer, if I can.

216. General Grunert. If you haven't thought it over, say, "I don't remember"; but to the questions asked, give him an answer, or say, "I don't want to answer anything." You are not under compulsion to try to think back three years ago and actually remember details.

Colonel Donegan. I would like to make my stand clear. I would like to assist the Board as much as possible.

217. General Grunert. That is all we want.

Colonel Donegan. But I would like to have the questions within bounds.

218. General Grunert. If they are out of bounds, you need not answer them, if you cannot answer them, as far as you know.

Colonel Donegan. All right.

[1966] 219. General Grunert. But we have to get facts, and we have to dig. We have to do a lot of digging, and this is one of the methods of digging, to see, to get the state of mind, and everything; and so we are going to continue to dig.

Go ahead.

220. General Frank. No, I have no more.

221. General Grunert. Are there any suggestions by the Recorder, the Assistant Recorder, or the Executive Officer?

222. Major Clausen. No, sir.

223. General Grunert. That appears to be all. Thank you for coming up.

(The witness was excused with the usual admonition.)

(Thereupon, the Board, having concluded the hearing of witnesses for the day, took up the consideration of other business.)
CONTENTS

WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 30, 1944

Testimony of—

Colonel John S. Pratt, Retired ........................................ 168
Major George S. Welch, Air Corps, Orlando, Florida .................. 2008
Colonel W. A. Capron; Ordnance Department; Ogden Arsenal, Ogden, Utah ................................................................. 2015
Brig. Gen. Warren T. Hannum, Retired; San Francisco, California .... 2030

DOCUMENTS

War Department Message of November 27, 1941 .......................... 2020
Letter, November 6, 1940, Colonel Hannum to Lt. Col. Wyman ........ 2033
Letter, February 14, 1942, Colonel Lyman to Maj. Gen. Reybold ....... 2038
Letter, February 27, 1942, Colonel Lyman to Maj. Gen. Reybold ....... 2042
Letter, January 22, 1941, Colonel Wyman to Rohl ........................ 2056

1 Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate pages of original transcript of proceedings.
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD

WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 30, 1944

Presidio of San Francisco, Cal.

The Board, at 9 a.m., pursuant to recess on yesterday, conducted the hearing of witnesses, Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President of the Board, presiding.


Present also: Colonel Charles W. West, Recorder, Major Henry C. Clausen, Assistant Recorder, and Colonel Harry A. Houlmin, Jr., Executive Officer.

General GRUNERT. The Board will come to order.

TESTIMONY OF COLONEL JOHN S. PRATT (RETIRED)

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel West. Colonel, will you please state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station.


2. General GRUNERT. Colonel, the Board is after facts. It wants facts and background and viewpoints in order to get leads as to where it can develop facts; that is, both prior to and during the Pearl Harbor attack. Because of your assignment during 1941, particularly, we thought you might give us some facts or lead us to where we might get facts.

Colonel Pratt. I arrived in Hawaii the latter part of June 1937, and left Hawaii April 22, 1942. I was on the Department Staff as Officer in Charge of Civilian Component Affairs, which included the National Guard, the organized Reserve, and the R. O. T. C. My office was in the business section of the city, and not at Fort Shafter.

3. General GRUNERT. Then you had experience in and about Honolulu for nearly five years?

Colonel Pratt. That is true.

4. General GRUNERT. That included the time leading up to the attack of December 7, and during the attack, and after the attack, for several months?

Colonel Pratt. Yes, sir.

5. General GRUNERT. Now, in your position as Officer in Charge of Civilian Affairs, you evidently had an opportunity to know considerable about the civil population, is that right?
Colonel Pratt. I think I probably did have an opportunity to know more than the average civilian out there.

6. General Frank. You had an opportunity to know more than the average officer, too, did you not?

Colonel Pratt. Probably; yes.

7. General Grunert. I will skip around considerably here, but the background of what I am getting after is that your position probably gave you an opportunity to observe, and from that, you may throw some light on the situation; and the Board is after such light.

Now, suppose you go back into 1940. I understand that at [1970] that time there was an alert pulled, in 1940. Will you tell us about that alert, just in general terms.

Colonel Pratt. I believe I understand the particular alert you mean. It happened as I recall approximately four or five months before the arrival of General Short. We were in a conference at Fort Shafter, at which General Herron was presiding, and an orderly came in and handed a message to the Chief of Staff, Colonel Hayes. He in turn handed it to General Herron, but excused himself and said that he would be back after awhile. Later, he returned. The meeting was finished, and I had occasion to go to the Chief of Staff's office upon a matter.

While there, I couldn't help but hear him dictating an order, which in effect was to place the entire command on the alert and at battle stations, with full supply of ammunition; and I asked Hayes what it was all about. I said, "I couldn't help but hear what you were saying." He said that the Navy had lost contact with the high-seas Japanese fleet, and that General Herron was turning the command out.

8. General Grunert. At that time was there just one alert, or were there two or three or four types of alert?

Colonel Pratt. To my knowledge, at least, there was Field Order No. 1. Now, what other alerts there may have been, I don't know of them.

9. General Grunert. What, generally, did that Field Order No. 1 prescribe as to being prepared for action?

[1971] Colonel Pratt. Well, Field Order No. 1 sent all units to their battle stations and their battle jobs, with the necessary supplies, ammunition, and so forth.

10. General Grunert. Later, was that field order superseded by other instructions that required a different gradation of alerts?

Colonel Pratt. I believe it was. I was not acquainted with those gradations of alerts, though I knew they were in effect. I had never seen them.

11. General Grunert. But for this 1940 affair, there was just one getting out and getting ready, is that right?

Colonel Pratt. So far as I know.

12. General Frank. That was a full-out effort?

Colonel Pratt. Yes. Just a moment, please. May I correct that, a little?


Colonel Pratt. They would turn us out on alerts, generally at night, to see how fast the office forces could get to their places of business and ready for business; and that was done quite frequently.

14. General Grunert. When you turned out for this alert in 1940,
and you took your battle position, you were ready for business, you had all the ammunition and everything you needed, is that right?

Colonel Pratt. Yes, sir.

15. General Grunert. Do you know whether or not that alarmed the public, at the time?

Colonel Pratt. I could see no visible effect on the public, because we had had practice alerts before, and I think they were fairly well used to them at that time.

16. General Grunert. Did going on such an alert disclose your intent, except that you were ready to defend yourselves?

Colonel Pratt. Not to my knowledge.

[1972] 17. General Grunert. At the time of that alert, what was your assignment, and how did you participate in that alert?

Colonel Pratt. I was then Officer in Charge of Civilian Component Affairs, and it was my duty to report to my office with my entire force, and stay there, on a 24-hour basis.

18. General Grunert. What opportunity did you have to size up whether or not the public was alarmed by the troops going on the alert?

Colonel Pratt. None other than the newspapers. In other words, the public did not seem to be unduly interested in the thing, any more than they had been in the past.

19. General Grunert. Under how many Commanding Generals did you serve during this period of nearly five years?

Colonel Pratt. General Drum, General Moses, General Herron, General Short, and General Emmons.

20. General Grunert. And under how many Chiefs of Staff?

Colonel Pratt. To the best of my recollection, the original Chief of Staff when I arrived was Colonel Osborne. I am not sure of that.

No, I am wrong about that. There was another man ahead of him, I think. Osborne was G-3 when I arrived, but I can't remember the Chief of Staff's name in 1937; then Osborne, and then Colonel Hayes, who was G-3 prior to his assignment as Chief of Staff. Then, when General Short came out there, Colonel Phillips became the Chief of Staff; and he was there when I left.

21. General Grunert. In your assigned duties, with whom was most of your business done, at headquarters?

Colonel Pratt. With the Commanding General, with the Chief of Staff, with G-3, G-2, and the Department Surgeon, I would say.

22. General Grunert. Was most of it done with the Chief of Staff?

[1972] Colonel Pratt. I would say most of it; yes.

23. General Grunert. What was your connection with G-2? What line of work did you have to do?

Colonel Pratt. Well, if I had any information that I thought might be of value to G-2, I would tell them about it.

24. General Grunert. Were there many such occasions?

Colonel Pratt. Not many.

25. General Grunert. How did you size up the Japanese element of the population—as particularly dangerous, or can you give us an idea on that?

Colonel Pratt. My attitude towards it, from all I could learn and hear and see, was that the great majority of the Japanese population would be loyal, except when the time came when Oahu was just about
to capitulate; then I felt that they would turn on us, the great majority would. I had reason to believe that an espionage organization existed among them, or a military, you might say, espionage organization, and that was confirmed later when I was a member of a Military Commission that tried one Otto Kuhn, a German spy, who had been operating out there and elsewhere for a number of years; and he was found guilty and sentenced to death.

26. General GRUNERT. During the trial of this German, did it indicate where this espionage system headed up?

Colonel Pratt. It appeared from the evidence, as I recall it, as FBI presented it, that he was in close contact with the Japanese consulate there in Honolulu.

27. General GRUNERT. Then you think there were a number of Japanese agents in and about Honolulu?

Colonel Pratt. That is my opinion; yes, sir.

[1974] 28. General GRUNERT. Was there any evidence of this training against the United States during or shortly after the attack on Pearl Harbor, that you intimated, there, that the Japanese elements might turn against the United States?

Colonel Pratt. None that I personally know of, except on the night subsequent to the attack, I listened in on a local police radio net, and there were certain indications then, and I fully, myself, personally, expected an attack at dawn in force on the beaches.

29. General FRANK. On the 8th, you mean?

Colonel Pratt. Yes. I thought an attack might come in on the 8th, the morning of the 8th; and in listening in on this network and hearing the return messages from the "prowl cars," the police patrol cars. Different colored lights would blink, and then be turned out, and rockets would go up; and I believe, if I recall correctly, several cases, of roman candles; and that occurred, as I recall, all along the district from Hawaii to Kahala; that is, from the northwest coast to the east coast.

30. General GRUNERT. That gave the impression it might be the signal for a general attack the next morning?

Colonel Pratt. Well, they were signalling something, and I couldn't imagine what it would be, other than the enemy units at sea, possibly submarines.

31. General GRUNERT. Did you anticipate any organized movement from within, in connection with the possible attack?

Colonel Pratt. I thought it possible that they might engineer such a thing if and when an attack came in.

32. General GRUNERT. Did you inform anyone on the staff as to what your observations were? In other words, was your knowledge [1975] made the knowledge of the General Staff?

Colonel Pratt. Well, I think G-2 was tuned in on the same radio I was. I think he got all of that.

33. General GRUNERT. What staff conferences were held while you were there in 1941, or late in 1941? Did you participate in any staff conferences?

Colonel Pratt. I participated in one, which might be of interest to this Board. I was ordered to attend a conference, at once, at headquarters. I was a little late in getting a car, so I was late, and arrived
late at the conference. In the meantime, the Staff had assembled and I am told that the order or the radio message received from the Chief of Staff in Washington to General Short was read to the assembled staff, though I am not sure of that; and I was handed the copy, in the clear, of that message, and read it at the time; and some instructions were given to certain members of the staff that were more intimately connected with the alert plan than I was.

34. General Grunert. Let me refresh your memory, or let me ask you whether this message that I read is the one that you refer to. This is a message from the Chief of Staff to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, 27 November 1941:

Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibility the Japanese government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat not, be avoided, United States desires Japan commit first overt act. This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that [1976] might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary, but these measures should be carried out so as not, repeat not, to alarm the civil population or disclose intent. Report measures taken. Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow 5, as far as they pertain to Japan. Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to the minimum essential officers.

Is that the message to which you have reference?

Colonel Pratt. To the best of my recollection, that is, sir.

35. General Grunert. Now, will you tell us anything more about that conference—what was discussed, and what impression it created on those conferring; or what impression it created on you, as one of the conferees?

Colonel Pratt. Well, it was a very serious message, to me, and I thought the possibilities of danger quite grave.

36. General Grunert. Had the decision been made as to what action to take upon it, at that time, do you know?

Colonel Pratt. That, I do not know.

37. General Grunert. What action was taken on it, to your knowledge?

Colonel Pratt. Not to my knowledge. I do not know.

38. General Grunert. Do you know whether or not the Commanding General ordered an alert, and what that alert covered?

Colonel Pratt. This is hearsay information. I was told that Alert No. 1 was in effect. As I say, I don’t know what it was.

39. General Grunert. Then what was the conference about? [1977] Colonel Pratt. The reception of this message, and doubtless the Chief of Staff wanted to give some instructions to certain members of the Staff. That was what I gathered, at least.

40. General Grunert. Did you know that the command was alerted against sabotage?

Colonel Pratt. I did not personally notice it, except I believe, as I recall that, I did see some soldiers posted at certain bridges and communications systems.

41. General Grunert. As to the purport of this message, did it occur to you, or did you turn it over in your mind, whether or not the action taken was sufficient under those instructions and warnings?
Colonel Pratt. Well, it occurred to me, in the light of what General Herron had previously done, that Field Order No. 1 might have been put into effect.

42. General Grunert. And Field Order No. 1 provided for an all-out alert?

Colonel Pratt. Yes.

43. General Grunert. Then I gather from the tenor of your testimony that the occasion called for an all-out alert, in your opinion; is that right?

Colonel Pratt. Well, that was my opinion; yes, sir.

44. General Grunert. You spoke of General Herron's taking an all-out alert. Does that lead me to believe that there was a difference in the way Herron and Short looked at the thing?

Colonel Pratt. Apparently.

45. General Grunert. How about the two Chiefs of Staff, Hayes and Phillips; were they different?

[1978] Colonel Pratt. They were different personalities; yes, sir.

46. General Grunert. Which did you consider the stronger personality?

Colonel Pratt. Colonel Hayes.

47. General Grunert. Do you know anything about the cooperation between the Army and Navy, and its effectiveness?

Colonel Pratt. Only by hearsay.

48. General Grunert. From the impression you gathered, were they getting along, were they cooperating, or was there a lack of such cooperation?

Colonel Pratt. I would say that, from what I heard, the cooperation between the Army and Navy was not what it might have been.

49. General Grunert. Was that more evident early in your service over there, or late in your service?

Colonel Pratt. It was evident all the way through, with one exception. There was an Admiral, and I can't remember his name, who was in a subordinate position at Pearl Harbor, who went out of his way to cooperate. His name commenced with an F, as I recall.

50. General Frank. Was it Fitch?

Colonel Pratt. No.

51. General Grunert. Who was the Admiral of the fleet, just prior to Kimmel, do you remember?

Colonel Pratt. Admiral Richardson, I believe.

52. Major Clausen. There was an Admiral Furlong, may I ask?

Colonel Pratt. No, it was not Furlong. It was as I recall something like Friedlander or Fridenthal. I don't remember the admiral's name.

[1979] 53. General Grunert. So Admiral Richardson was in command of the fleet prior to Kimmel?

Colonel Pratt. Yes, sir.

54. General Grunert. During Richardson's regime and during Kimmel's regime, do you know anything about their policy of keeping ships in or out of the Harbor?

Colonel Pratt. Personally, I had never seen what their policy was, except it was noticeable in passing Pearl Harbor on occasions that you would see more ships in there, of different types, during Admiral
Kimmel's régime than you would when Admiral Richardson had the fleet; and that was particularly true of capital ships.
55. General GRUNERT. Have you some questions, General Frank?
56. General FRANK. No. Do you have some questions, Major Clausen?
57. Major CLAUSEN. Yes, sir. May I put the question?
58. General GRUNERT. Yes.
59. Major CLAUSEN. Sir, you mentioned some investigation concerning a German citizen. I wondered if you had met or were acquainted with Hans Wilhelm Rohl?
Colonel PRATT. I was not.
60. Major CLAUSEN. Did you hear any derogatory comments concerning this Hans Wilhelm Rohl in connection with espionage?
Colonel PRATT. Not at that time; no.
61. Major CLAUSEN. Did you, later?
Colonel PRATT. Only as I learned it from the newspapers and other reports.
62. Major CLAUSEN. And when was that, sir?
Colonel PRATT. That was after I got back.
63. Major CLAUSEN. And, with respect to Colonel Theodore Wyman, [1950] Junior, did you know him?
Colonel PRATT. Very casually. He was on the staff when I was out there.
64. Major CLAUSEN. Did you hear rumors as to his inefficiency?
Colonel PRATT. No, I did not. At the time, he was considered to be quite efficient in getting things done, but he gained the antipathy of a number of persons, both in the military service and civil life, by what they termed his "rather high-handed methods," but I never heard any criticism of his efficiency in getting things done.
65. Major CLAUSEN. Did you hear any remarks concerning the relationship which existed in Hawaii between Colonel Wyman and Hans Wilhelm Rohl?
Colonel PRATT. Not until after I got back to the mainland.
66. Major CLAUSEN. In connection with this German that was tried and sentenced to death, did you hear the name of Werner Plack?
Colonel PRATT. I did not. That is my recollection. I do not remember hearing such a name.
67. General GRUNERT. Have you any questions, General Russell?
68. General RUSSELL. Yes.
Colonel, as Officer in Charge of Civilian Component Affairs, you were not about Department headquarters a lot, you were in the field where the various units were, is that true?
Colonel PRATT. My office was in the business district of Honolulu, and the only time I visited headquarters was when I had occasion to do so on official business.
69. General RUSSELL. Of what did these civilian components consist? That is to enable me to know the sphere of your [1951] activities and the people whom you contacted.
Colonel PRATT. They consisted of an Adjutant General and staff of the National Guard, two regiments of infantry. We administered at one time about 1700, as I recall, organized Reserve Officers, some of them from the mainland, and all the R. O. T. C. units there in Hawaii.
70. General Russell. Were there numbers of Japanese people in these units which you have described, or people of Japanese origin?

Colonel Pratt. In the National Guard there were a few American citizens of Japanese extraction, in the enlisted branch. To my knowledge there were I think no American citizens of Japanese extraction in the commissioned ranks. There may have been one or two. But I think that the Adjutant General of the Territory, Colonel Smoot, made an honest and a good endeavor to get rid of as many American citizens of Japanese extraction as possible, and I think he did a pretty good job of it.

71. General Russell. Then it came to pass, Colonel, that the people who were on the ground, who knew the Jap and the American citizen of Jap origin, had so little faith in his loyalty that they were almost entirely excluded from civilian military organizations out there?

[1982] Colonel Pratt. Well, we had some Japanese officers, of Japanese extraction, in the reserves, Organized Reserves. Some of them are doing very well in Italy today.

72. General Grunert. How about R. O. T. C.?

Colonel Pratt. No; they were Organized Reserves people.

73. General Grunert. But your R. O. T. C. units; were they practically all of Japanese extraction?

Colonel Pratt. The University of Hawaii and the McKinley High School R. O. T. C., roughly, were about, I would say, 90 percent of Japanese extraction.

74. General Russell. Well, now let us approach it a little more directly. Were you in frequent or infrequent contacts with Japanese and Americans of Japanese origin?

Colonel Pratt. Well, I knew quite a number of—I knew a few Japanese, officers of Japanese extraction that I had contact with in the Organized Reserves, but I had very little contact with people of Japanese extraction in the R. O. T. C.

75. General Russell. Colonel, was it a fact, or not, that you were more intimately associated with civilians and had much more frequent contact with civilians than the average soldier out there, professional soldier, because of your assignment?

Colonel Pratt. I would say so; yes, sir.

76. General Russell. And by virtue of this contact with civilians who in turn were in contact with the Japanese elements on the Island, you seem to have developed a suspicion of the Japanese elements or a feeling toward them which probably is somewhat different from what we have found elsewhere. Could that be accounted for by virtue of your contact with our own people, our civilian people out there, who in turn were in [1983] touch with these Japs?

Colonel Pratt. As to the question of the loyalty of the Japanese in Hawaii, it depends utterly on whom you contact. If you contact, for instance, the managers of sugar plantations or if you contact the economic leaders of the Territory, you would get one attitude which is very favorable toward the Japanese; but if you contact the lunas of the plantations and the men who became more intimate in actual contact with the people, you get an entirely different estimate.

77. General Frank. A luna is a supervisor or overseer?

Colonel Pratt. Overseer of work.
78. General Russell. Now, you contacted both of these groups, I assume from your testimony, the huger ups, the upper brackets, and the overseer brackets?

Colonel Pratt. In some cases, in some few cases, but I have heard the opinions of certain people also who have contacted these people.

79. General Russell. Now, either because of unloading coal over here or because I didn't hear your evidence very clearly, I did not get the full import of your testimony relating to the radio broadcast that you listened to that night prior to the attack or——

Colonel Pratt. No; it was after the attack.

80. General Russell. Oh, after the attack?

Colonel Pratt. Yes.

81. General Russell. As I recall, General Frank asked if it was on the 8th, and you replied, "Yes," and I became somewhat confused.

Colonel Pratt. Well, it was the night of the 7th-8th.

[1985] 82. General Russell. Yes. It was after the attack on the morning?

Colonel Pratt. That is correct.

83. General Russell. Now, on the evening prior to the attack or any time prior thereto, was there evidence of the possibility of a Jap attack out there, from the sources that you described which gave you information on the 8th?

Colonel Pratt. No, sir.

84. General Russell. There was nothing to indicate an attack on the morning of the 7th?

Colonel Pratt. Not to my knowledge.

85. General Russell. And there were no signals of any sort that were sent up on that night that indicated anything out of the ordinary?

Colonel Pratt. Not to my knowledge.

86. General Russell. Had anything developed on the Islands proper, Colonel, within the two or three months prior to the Japanese attack which indicated growing tension or the possibility of trouble between the Japanese Empire and the American Government?

Colonel Pratt. Nothing to my knowledge, other than what one read generally on the question of relations between the United States and Japan, and we all had the feeling that the situation was becoming tenser and tenser due to that influence alone, but as to local indications I would say no.

87. General Russell. General Grunert in discussing your reaction to the sabotage alert of General Short, on about the 27th of November, elicited from you an opinion that you thought an all-out alert should have been ordered.

[1985] Colonel Pratt. In the light of the message that we received from the Chief of Staff in Washington and the action that General Herron took almost a year before, I was led to believe that it warranted an all-out effort.

88. General Russell. Do you think the fact that General Herron went on an all-out alert a year before played any considerable part in the formulation of that idea?

Colonel Pratt. I think so.
89. General Russell. Do you know upon what order from the War Department the alert of General Herron was directed? 
Colonel Pratt. I do not.
90. General Russell. You do not know, then, that the message to Herron on June 17, '40, directed him or ordered him onto an alert to repel an air attack from overseas? 
Colonel Pratt. I did not know it.
91. General Russell. Colonel, your impression was that the cooperation between the Army and Navy during your entire stay on Oahu left considerable to be desired? 
Colonel Pratt. That was my impression; yes, sir.
92. General Russell. Did you obtain that or did you form that impression from information obtained from official sources or just discussions among officers in a social or private way? 
Colonel Pratt. Discussions among officers.
93. General Russell. At social affairs and other places? 
Colonel Pratt. Well, yes.
94. General Russell. It was based on the talk which went on between and among Army officers as to these relations? 
Colonel Pratt. As far as my knowledge is concerned, yes.
95. General Russell. In your prior testimony, Colonel, you [1986] stated that you were impressed that more ships were in Pearl Harbor after Admiral Kimmel took command? In other words, he had more ships in Pearl Harbor than Richardson ordinarily had in there? 
Colonel Pratt. It seemed to me so; yes, sir.
96. General Russell. Could you make any comparison between the number of ships in the harbor customarily during the week and the number in there on week ends, Saturdays and Sunday? 
Colonel Pratt. I couldn't, no, sir.
97. General Russell. You noticed no difference? 
Colonel Pratt. As far as I am concerned, I didn't.
98. General Russell. I think that is all.
99. General Grunert. Did General Short ever make use of the R. O. T. C. units in the defense of Hawaii? 
Colonel Pratt. Yes, he did.
100. General Grunert. Prior to December 7th or afterward? 
Colonel Pratt. Subsequent to it.
101. General Grunert. Subsequent to it?
Colonel Pratt. Subsequent to December 7th, I would say a day or two, the Territorial Adjutant General came into my office and informed me that the Commanding General and the Governor of the Territory had held a conference in which it was agreed that certain units of the R. O. T. C. should be turned out for guard duty in the city; and if I recall correctly I believe it was either then or later limited to those of 18 years of age and older, though I am not sure of that. Well, it seemed to me to be rather important, because of the high percentage of Americans of Japanese extraction, that I didn't take the word of the Territorial Adjutant General for this. [1987] He requested me to order the units out, but I got General Short in person on the telephone at the command post and told him what the Adjutant General had told me; and he said Yes, there had been a
conference in which it had been agreed that these units would be turned out for guard duty. I called his attention to the fact that there was a high percentage of citizens of Japanese extraction in some of these units, and he said he thought they might prove to be perfectly loyal and thought we should go ahead and direct the PMS&Ts to take ahold and get them out, which I did.

102. General GRUNERT. In this impression you received through conversation that the cooperation between the Army and Navy was not what it might be—was not as it might be desired, we will put it—was there any lack of that cooperation manifested? In what form did it show itself? Can you give us any light on that?

Colonel PRATT. Well, to the best of my recollection—this is three years ago now—there was a request made upon the Navy to do certain things for the Army.

103. General FRANK. Such as?

Colonel PRATT. Well, furnishing boats of certain descriptions, and sometimes participating in certain maneuvers that the Army wanted to engage in there. As I say, as far as I could see there was one Admiral there who went out of his way to cooperate, but he was in a subordinate position and I can't remember his name.

104. General RUSSELL. Any other questions suggested to the Recorder?

Colonel WEST. That German that was tried and sentenced [1988] to death: Do you recall whether that sentence was ever executed, or what was the outcome of that case?

Colonel PRATT. I didn't know it until I met Mr., or Major now, Angus Taylor here in San Francisco quite recently, and he informed me that the sentence had been commuted to a life term and that it was being carried out now, if I recall correctly, at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

105. General GRUNERT. Colonel, can you think of anything now that may assist the Board in getting at facts or leads that might assist the Board in getting witnesses who might have knowledge from which we might adduce some facts?

Colonel PRATT. No, sir.

106. General GRUNERT. Do you know of any witnesses now in Hawaii that can help us get the true story?

Colonel PRATT. Well, there was a gentleman named Mr. Harold Kay, K-a-y, who I believe now is military aide to the present Governor of the Territory, who on the morning of the attack observed the attack from his home at an altitude of 900 feet, which overlooked the whole south seaward coast of Oahu, through binoculars and made notes of what he saw at the time; and I think he might be of some aid to the Board in finding out or corroborating testimony as to what actually did happen so far as he saw it there.

107. General GRUNERT. And you do not think of anything else, that you could of your own knowledge assist the Board with any more evidence?

Colonel PRATT. No, sir.

108. General GRUNERT. There appear to be no more questions. Thank you very much.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)
[1989] TESTIMONY OF BRIG. GEN. WILLIAM R. WHITE, U. S. ARMY; MIRA LOMA QUARTERMASTER DEPOT, MIRA LOMA, CALIFORNIA.

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel West. General, will you please state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station?

General White. William R. White, Brigadier General, U. S. Army, Quartermaster Corps, stationed at Mira Loma Quartermaster Depot, Mira Loma, California.

2. General Grunert. General, the Board is after facts as to background as to events leading up to what happened at Pearl Harbor during the attack of December 7, '41. Because of your long service in the Hawaiian Department and because you were present prior to and during the attack, we called you hoping that we can get some facts or leads toward facts. There is nothing particular except that you were over there a long time and undoubtedly accumulated a lot of information about the situation.

And so, tell us first what your assignment was, how long you were over there, when you came back, and what your assignments were while over there.

General White. I arrived in Honolulu the end of February 1940. My first station was Schofield Barracks, as Quartermaster at that station. In March of 1941 I was ordered to Fort Shafter as the Department Quartermaster, which position I held until February 13, 1944, when I returned to the mainland. Immediately following the attack on December 7th I was appointed Director of Food Control for the entire Territory, which duty was in addition to my work as Department [1990] Quartermaster.

3. General Grunert. Now, the Board is primarily interested as to what happened prior to the attack and during the attack. Can you, first, give us your impression of that cosmopolitan population of Honolulu, especially regarding the Japanese population, both foreign-born and American citizens?

General White. My impression, especially of the Japanese was that what we term the alien was probably a better behaved and more on his guard as to his behavior than the American-born. It was quite apparent that the American-born soon adopted the Western customs, and in their recreation and usual habits they more or less approached the habits of our own people: I mean by that, in their manner of dress, in their consumption of food, their love of entertainment, and their et cetera.


5. General Frank. What was your last word?

General White. Et cetera. Now, that is not a good word. We might stop at that last there, but I am just trying to cover it.

May I have that question again?


General White. I doubt the loyalty of the American-born Japanese citizens just the same as I do the alien-born. In my opinion
their being American citizens is simply a matter of circumstance, of having been born under the American flag, and I have never seen why they should be particularly loyal to this [1991] country, especially in a place as far off as Honolulu where they are not in contact with our people as much as the Japanese on the mainland would be.

7. General GRUNERT. If there was any disloyalty, we will call it, what form did that take, and what were your chances to observe and form an opinion on this class of people?

General WHITE. You couldn’t put your fingers on any particular thing that would stand out as a disloyal act. It was their attitude of superiority, their pushing a white person around, you might say, in the stores that are run by the orientals practically entirely over there. It was quite common for the white person to go in to buy something and find very little for sale in the front part of the store, and a lack of interest in making the sale to the white person, while on the other hand in the rear of the store would probably be a good assortment of merchandise and probably Japanese back there getting the pick of whatever was available. It was this type of attitude, you might say, and the fact that it was difficult to believe that there would be any great loyalty to this country, that caused me to form the opinion that I wouldn’t trust any of them.

8. General GRUNERT. To your knowledge were there any acts of sabotage committed while you were over there?

General WHITE. To the best of my knowledge and belief there were no acts of sabotage committed before or during the attack.

9. General GRUNERT. In your capacity as Department Quartermaster did you have anything to do with the shipping plying between the United States and Hawaii?

[1992] General WHITE. Before the attack, of course, we were interested in getting Quartermaster supplies. We used to requisition 60 days in advance on San Francisco’s Depot, and no difficulty was experienced in getting Quartermaster supplies. As a matter of fact, on December 7, 1941, I had abundance of food and all other types of Quartermaster supplies available to the Army.

[1993] 10. General GRUNERT. Did you have anything to do with the requisitioning or arranging for shipping of construction supplies?

General WHITE. I did not.

11. General GRUNERT. Do you know approximately what time it took for ordinary quartermaster supplies, from date of requisition to date of receipt?

General WHITE. We used to figure 45 days as a turn-around; that is, a ship to leave Honolulu, get to the port, San Francisco, pick up our supplies, and get back to Honolulu. As I stated before, we were required to submit requisitions 60 days in advance of our actual needs. There was no difficulty in transportation problems previous to December 7, 1941.

12. General GRUNERT. Then you did not experience any particular delays on account of shipping; as far as anything you were concerned with?

General WHITE. I did not.

13. General GRUNERT. What knowledge have you of the tenseness of the Japanese-American situation toward the latter part of 1941?
General White. I saw no evidence of any tenseness on the part of any Japanese, previous to the attack of December 7, 1941.

14. General Grunert. Were the newspapers full of stories about what was happening?

General White. Just ordinary accounts. I recall distinctly when Kurusu came through, he was met by our G-2, and the paper carried an account of this interview; and such communications as you might expect in view of the war situation that was going on at the time; but there was nothing that would create a tenseness, that I recall, being published.

15. General Grunert. How about the headlines in the morning paper, say, of November 30, which predicts a war within a week? Did that make any impression on the people over there?

General White. I must truthfully say I don't recall that headline.

16. General Grunert. Were you kept informed of any so-called "warning messages" received by the Navy, transmitted to the Army, or received by the Army directly, from approximately November 24 up to the attack?

General White. Some time just before Thanksgiving, I am not sure of the exact date, I was ordered to report to headquarters at 3:45 one afternoon, and upon arrival, I found the chiefs of all the services had gathered, and we were taken into General Short's private office, and the door was closed, and General Short stated that he had a very serious message to read, from General Marshall. He then proceeded to read a "radio" that was worded approximately like this:

All negotiations have been broken off. Take all measures for defense. Be prepared for any emergency, but do nothing to alarm the populace, Signed "Marshall."

He stated to us that this was secret; that he was ordering Alert No. 1 into effect immediately; that this would not be discussed except insofar as to put Alert No. 1 into effect.

That is the only warning order that was made known to me.

17. General Grunert. Will you listen to this message and see if this is the one to which you refer. This is a message from the Chief of Staff to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, 27 November 1941:

[1995] Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes, with only the barest possibility the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot, be avoided, United States desires Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary, but these measures should be carried out so as not, repeat not, to alarm the civil population or disclose intent. Report measures taken. Should hostilities occur, you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow 5 as far as they pertain to Japan. Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to the minimum essential officers.

General White. That is the first time I have ever heard that complete message.

18. General Grunert. But was that the message to which you referred?

General White. That was not.

19. General Grunert. That was not?
General White. I might say that the message that I refer to was much shorter, and that the only thing that I recognize in that message that was in the one that I spoke of, was the one statement, "Do nothing to alarm the populace." My message started off, as I said, that "All negotiations have broken off." It was very much shorter than that message.

[1996] 20. General Grunert. Did you actually see the message?

General White. I did not. General Short read the message to us.

21. General Grunert. It could have been paraphrased, and it could have been just extracts of the message, or was the whole message read, word for word, do you remember?

General White. It could have been extracted. It was apparent at the time that General Short was reading word for word, but I did not see it.

22. General Grunert. But at that time, had he made a decision to take Alert No. 1?

General White. He had.

23. General Grunert. And what did you understand Alert No. 1 to mean?

General White. Alert No. 1 was to protect all installations against sabotage.

24. General Grunert. Did you turn over in your mind whether or not you considered that alert sufficient under the warning then received?

General White. I don't understand.

25. General Grunert. Did you think to yourself, "Well, is that sufficient protection under this warning?" or anything of that kind? Or didn't you think about it?

General White. I did think about it, and I thought seriously about it; and I immediately called my people, the chiefs of my installations, and gave them this information on the Alert No. 1, and before midnight that night every installation was guarded, and the Alert No. 1 was in full effect; and at that time, I honestly believed that sabotage was the thing that we [1997] had to look for.

26. General Grunert. All right. Now, as far as your installations are concerned, if they had taken Alert 2 or 3, what difference would it have made as to your installations, as to the protective measures taken?

General White. Alert 2 provided for an internal uprising, and had Alert 2 been put in, then it would have been necessary to have placed more guards around the installations to protect them against an attack from the inside. If Alert 3 had been called, which called for an all-out attack of the Japanese against the islands, then guarding my installations would have presented no more problem than Alert 2. It would have required all troops to have taken the field, in field positions, for a defense of the island against a Japanese attack from the outside.

27. General Grunert. What troops did you have that would have had to go out?

General White. Well, we had actually no troops of my own, except that at Fort Armstrong, for instance, we had our own war plan, and we had a battalion of our own troops that had been drilled. We had our own machine guns, and we had our positions for them to go, in case Alert No. 3 or 2 was put into effect.
28. General Grunert. Did you ever hear of a warning that was sent through the Navy, which started out to this effect—

Consider this a war warning?

General White. I did not.

29. General Grunert. Then, so far as you were concerned, you considered an alert against sabotage as of sufficient protection under the instructions received, is that right?


30. General Grunert. I gather from your testimony as to what you understood of the situation prior to the attack, that you were not alarmed about an attack coming, is that right?

General White. That is correct. I would like to add right here that the reason I make that statement is that, in my War College class of '32, we had 10 or 12 very bright naval officers, and I distinctly remember, and have carried it in my mind ever since, that the theory which they spoke openly at all times was that in any war between this country and the Japanese, we would have to take that war to Japan, that Japan would never risk a naval engagement further than a thousand miles from her shore; and throughout the whole year, as I say, the consensus of those men was to the effect that we would take the war to Japan in case of a war.

31. General Grunert. Then you never visualized the ability of the Japanese to bring the war over as far as Hawaii, initially, at least?

General White. I must say I did not.

32. General Grunert. Have you any questions, General Frank?

33. General Frank. Yes.

From your analysis of the feeling that you had against the Japs, I infer that it was a general state of uncertainty and suspicion.

General White. That is correct.

34. General Frank. But the background for this so far as any factual proof of it is concerned, is very nebulous, isn’t it?

General White. That is correct. I might say that altogether I have been in the Hawaiian Islands, to my knowledge, six of the ten past years, and have noticed among the Japanese [1999] this shrewdness, this grinning of theirs, indications all the way along that, “Well, if I could knife you in the back, I would be delighted to do it, if I was sure I wouldn’t be punished.” It is that attitude.

35. General Frank. That is an impression that you got?

General White. That is correct.

36. General Frank. As a matter of fact, their characteristics are very different from the characteristics of an American?

General White. Yes.

37. General Frank. Their cultural background and practices are completely different from the American, is that right?

General White. That is right.

38. General Frank. What about their ethics?

General White. I am not prepared to answer that.

39. General Frank. How do they compare with the ethics of Americans?

General White. I would say they didn’t have any to speak of.

40. General Frank. All right. Now, let us analyze their patriotism a little.
General White. I think their patriotism is purely a veneer. You were speaking of patriotism toward our country!

41. General Frank. I am talking just about patriotism. If you are going to discuss it, discuss it under (a) and (b)—(a), their patriotism for Japan, and (b) their patriotism for the United States.

General White. All right. Then we will discuss it under (a), their patriotism to Japan. That was manifested on all occasions where any celebration such as the emperor's birthday [2000] or any holiday that would be in Japan. They would fly their flags for all kinds of ceremonies, and it was quite evident that their loyalty to Japan was just as one might expect.

42. General Frank. Were you conversant with the Japanese law in their homeland relative to the status of a Jap born of Japanese parents in the United States or in Hawaii?

General White. It is my understanding that the Japanese never gave up that particular person as a citizen of Japan, notwithstanding the fact that he was an American citizen under our law. In other words, there was a dual citizenship, so far as the Japanese were concerned.

43. General Frank. Now, for him to become a full-out citizen of the United States and cease to be claimed as a citizen of Japan, do you remember what was necessary?

General White. As I remember, he had to go to court and sign away his allegiance to the emperor and all connections with his country. I am not in a position to discuss all the details, but I know that something like that had to be done.

44. General Frank. And he had to do that even though he were a native-born Jap?

General White. Yes.

45. General Frank. With respect to this impression that you got from the naval officers at the War College in 1932 about the “1,000 miles,” did it ever occur to you that there has been technical and industrial progress in the meantime which greatly increased the range of aircraft and service craft to an extent such that that 1,000 miles might have been considerably altered?

General White. Yes, sir; and on the other hand, in late years, of course, we taught that you don’t put battleships and [2001] naval craft up against land-based aircraft, and that in thinking this thing over, what thought we gave to it over there was that an armada or a task force sufficient to attack the Hawaiian Islands would be of such size that it certainly would be reported long before it approached the islands, especially as the Navy were carrying on their observations daily, on the lookout for just such an event.

46. General Frank. Did you ever analyze the possibilities of a raid such as that which occurred?

General White. No.

47. General Frank. Did you ever believe that such a thing would happen?

General White. Definitely, I didn’t believe it could happen.

48. General Frank. How risky an undertaking do you consider it was?

General White. I think if that had happened at any time other than Sunday morning it might have been quite disastrous for the
Japanese, and while that doesn't answer your question, I think your question must be answered that it was quite risky, in my opinion.

[2002] 49. General Frank. Do you think it was a very daring unusual venture?

General White. Not necessarily so, under the circumstances. War had not been declared. It was an aerial attack with, as we have been told, two carriers; and for a nation—

50. General Frank. How many carriers?

General White. I understand there were two, may have been more; but for a nation at war to undertake such a mission, it was quite risky.

51 General Frank. I would like to ask one more question: What do you think would have been the attitude of Japan toward the same number of Americans in Japan as there were Japanese in Hawaii?

General White. What do you mean by "attitude"; I mean in that case?

52. General Frank. Do you think they would have been interned, or what would have happened to them?

General White. I am quite sure they would have been interned.

53. General Grunert. Prior to the declaration of war?

General White. Oh, no. No, I didn't understand that was prior to the declaration of war. I might state that I was in Japan on one occasion, in uniform, and at every train that I got off there would be an official at my side asking me my name, my business, where I was going, how long I expected to remain. Now, whether that happened to all other officers in uniform, I don't know, but it was quite apparent from that that they were watching very closely American officers who were in Japan.

[2003] 54. General Frank. Did you ever see a similar scrutiny of Japanese in the United States?

General White. I did not. I have not.

55. General Grunert. Did you ever see any Japanese officers in the United States in uniform?

General White. No, although I have seen them in the Hawaiian Department, which is a territory of the United States.

56. General Russell. Was this flag-flying on national holidays carried on by native-born Japs as well as by those who were born in the Empire?

General White. It is my impression that it was.

57. General Russell. Your impression is that there was a sharp line of demarcation out there between the Japanese and all other groups?

General White. In their patriotism? I mean, their attitude toward their native country?

58. General Russell. Well, in their living together, going together, worshipping the Emperor, and those things, they were a sort of unity in the Hawaiian Department?

General White. That is correct.

59. General Russell. They didn't amalgamate with other races at all?

General White. Let me state it this way: In '35-'37 when I was over there it was unusual to see a Japanese with anyone else but a Japanese. When I returned in 1940 it was not unusual to see a Japanese fraternizing with the American soldiers, going to the picture shows, going to parties and dances with them, and I know of two cases
where Chinese have married Japanese women. That happened on my second tour. During my first tour [2004] I saw none of that and I think but very little of that existed at that time.

60. General Russell. So far as you know, those two cases that you have referred to are the only two cases of intermarriage of Japanese with other nationalities?

General White. So far as I know of the Chinese intermarrying with the Japanese, but I think there have been some American soldiers that have married some of the Japanese.

61. General Russell. Did they dominate the commercial life of Honolulu and other towns out there?


62. General Russell. The larger businesses were American?

General White. The larger businesses were the Americans.

63. General Russell. Did you buy goods from many Japanese in connection with your duties as Quartermaster?

General White. Yes.

64. General Russell. You had an opportunity, then, to deal with the Japanese and get his outlook on life?

General White. Yes; and I might say, in business it was no different from any American concern.

65. General Russell. There was nothing out there just prior to the attack that convinced you that war was imminent, including this message that General Grunert read to you in whole or in part?

General White. No, I would not say that. That message indicated that the relations were right at the breaking point, and I didn't question—I never have questioned—the fact that some day Japan and the United States would fight a war, but [2005] there was nothing in my mind that indicated that such an attack as happened would happen.

66. General Russell. General, you discussed or you made a statement that other than on Sunday morning you do not think that attack would have had any chance at all?

General White. No, not exactly in those words. I stated this: that if the attack had come any other morning but Sunday it would have found our men more prepared. Sunday morning a great many men were off duty that normally during a week day would be at their post and would be on duty, but I think that attack would have had considerably less chance and might have been quite serious for Japan had it happened on a morning other than Sunday.

67. General Russell. And your sole reason for that conclusion is that we would have had more men on duty any other morning?

General White. I think so.

68. General Russell. That is all I have.

69. General Grunert. From part of your testimony I was led to believe that you believe that the Navy was conducting long-distance reconnaissance practically regularly.

General White. That is my understanding.

70. General Grunert. Now, do you have any definite knowledge as to whether they did or not?

General White. Other than that I was told and that the Navy sent their ships out a certain number of miles, and then from there their
planes took off and it is my understanding that it was at least 600 miles out; in other words, that the ships went out a certain distance, and then the planes went out farther than that, and that they covered approximately 600 miles out.

[2006] 71. General GRUNERT. You did not know, then, what these task forces went out for, whether reconnaissance or whether it was maneuvers of their own, or whether they were covering the perimeter around the islands or not, did you?

General WHITE. Now, you must remember that my job was the Department Quartermaster, the Supply Officer, and I was not in on a lot of the conferences, and all, where the tactical—

72. General GRUNERT. Then, it appeared to be just your impression without any definite knowledge on the subject.

General WHITE. Other than having been told in more or less words to that effect, that there was such a mission.

73. General FRANK. By whom?

General WHITE. Well, I can't recall right now any particular person, but it was generally understood.

74. General FRANK. It was just general conversation, however?

General WHITE. That is correct.

75. General FRANK. And impression?

General WHITE. Yes.

76. General GRUNERT. What gave you the impression, then, that the Navy was doing the job of taking care of the outside?

General WHITE. We understood that that was their mission.

77. General GRUNERT. Now, then, from your military education and from what you know of the past tactics and strategy of the Japanese and the Germans, is it not true that the Japanese usually attempted to get in the first blow, which was practically a blow with a declaration of war at the time the blow was given?

General WHITE. I know that happened in the Russia War, Russia-Japanese War; but at the same time there was part of the Russian Fleet very close to the Japanese Islands at the time of that naval engagement.

78. General GRUNERT. And is it not true that the Japanese followed the German tactics and had been instructed by Germans in their military education?

General WHITE. It is my understanding that that is a fact and that their general staff is taken right from the German General Staub, as they call it, or more or less copied from them.

79. General GRUNERT. And also that the Germans usually sought surprise, and particularly on Sunday morning?

General WHITE. That is correct. I think we were all influenced by the great distance between Japan and the Hawaiian Islands as to such a surprise move on the part of Japan.

80. General GRUNERT. Just one more question: Have you anything that you think might be of assistance to the Board in getting at facts, that you can add to your testimony or give the Board any leads as to where they might get at such facts, that has not been brought out during your testimony?

General WHITE. No. I would simply like to add one statement: that I knew a great many people in the Hawaiian Islands; I talked to a great many officers, Army officers, Navy officers; and I have my
doubts that any officer in the Army or Navy at that time over there had any idea that such an attack as happened on December 7th, 1941, was possible. Now, that is my opinion and my impression gained from spending quite a time over there and discussing at various times what might happen.

81. General GRUNERT. Anything further? (No response.)
Thank you very much.
(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

[2008] TESTIMONY OF MAJOR GEORGE S. WELCH, AIR CORPS, ORLANDO, FLORIDA.

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)
1. Colonel WEST. Major, will you please state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station?
Major WELCH. My name is George S. Welch, Major, Air Corps, O398557. I am stationed with the A. A. F. Board, Orlando, Florida. I am now on terminal leave from that organization.

2. General GRUNERT. Major, the Board is after facts as to what happened before and during the attack on Pearl Harbor. Because you were a witness before the Roberts Commission we called on you to appear before this Board, to see what you could give to us. I have but one point as far as your testimony is concerned that I want to look into, but if there is anything else which you can give to the Board which will assist it we shall be glad to get it.

Now, will you tell us what your assignment was, and when, during 1941 in Hawaii?
Major WELCH. You mean, sir, before the war started, up to the war?

3. General GRUNERT. Yes.
Major WELCH. I was a Second Lieutenant, sir, assigned to the 47th Pursuit Squadron, stationed at Wheeler Field in February, 1941, and I arrived in the Islands and was stationed there still at the time that the war started. My squadron was on temporary duty at an auxiliary field, Haleiwa, actually when the war started, the day it started.

4. General FRANK. What were you doing down there?
Major WELCH. Our squadron was out there, sir, for gunnery [2009] camp.

5. General FRANK. That is how you happened to have ammunition?
Major WELCH. Well, we had some ammunition. We had .30 caliber.

6. General FRANK. What kind of planes did you have?
Major WELCH. As nearly as I can remember, sir, we had four or six P-40Bs, about a dozen P-36As, two A-20s, and a B-12 and about five P-26s.

7. General GRUNERT. The one particular question I have here: You testified that the guards at M-a-l-a-i-w-a Field had no instructions as to what to do if the enemy planes came over. Now, what field was that? I haven't heard this name mentioned before.
Major WELCH. Haleiwa, sir. H-a-l.

8. General GRUNERT. That is H-a-l?
Major WELCH. Yes, sir.
9. General Grunert. Now, what was the guarding system at that field and what were the instructions in the event of an attack, if any? Do you know?

Major Welch. Sir, as far as I can remember there were no instructions to cover any possibility of aerial attack. The only possibility of attack that was covered was either sabotage or an enemy landing.

10. General Grunert. What was this field? Just a gunnery range?

Major Welch. No, sir. Haleiwa Field was a very short, sandy field originally used as an emergency landing field, and probably about six months before the war started they had chopped down a few trees and were allowing fighter squadrons to operate out of there as an emergency field to practice shortfield landings; and a month before the war started, the 15th Group, of which the 47th Squadron is a part, was sending each squadron out there for two weeks in rotation to operate off of the field in simulated combat conditions.

11. General Grunert. Who was the commanding officer of that field at that time?

Major Welch. Well, the commanding officer, sir, was the commanding officer of the squadron that happened to be there.

12. General Grunert. Then the commanding officer was changed?

Major Welch. Yes, sir.

13. General Grunert. Was there no permanent post complement there?

Major Welch. Yes, sir. There was a Lieutenant Currie who was Post Quartermaster PX. Really, sir, there was nothing there, no installations. We brought our own tents and everything with us.

14. General Grunert. That is, it was just a question of guarding your own planes, was it?

Major Welch. Yes, sir; just our own personal equipment.

15. General Grunert. What happened to that field when the attack took place?

Major Welch. The Japs passed right over it, apparently didn't notice its existence or didn't know that we were using it; and about the second raid I think one or two planes made a pass at the field, shot up a couple of P-36s.

16. General Grunert. So there was little damage done there?

Major Welch. There was no damage done, sir, except to a few airplanes.

17. General Grunert. And then, as a matter of fact, the lack of such a guard and instructions what to do in case of an attack didn't have much effect as far as the actual attack was concerned, did it?

Major Welch. No, sir. By the time the Japs did make one pass at the field, the men had machine guns out, 30 caliber ground guns, and they shot back at this man, this Jap.

18. General Grunert. Well, now, about how many planes all told were on that field at the time of the attack?

Major Welch. The original attack?


Major Welch. Everything we had. I imagine it was—I just gave you an approximate idea of what we had. I suppose it was about 16, 18.
20. General Grunert. About 16. Were they bunched, all put together, or were they spread or dispersed, or what?

Major Welch. No, sir. They were lined up in a perfect line right down one side of the field.

21. General Grunert. Is that what is always done in peacetime, or is that a special measure against sabotage, or what?

Major Welch. At Wheeler Field, sir, we had revetments, and the airplanes had been called back from the revetments because of sabotage. At Haleiwa we had no revetments, and we just parked them there just to look nice, and also to keep them bunched so we could guard them easier.

22. General Grunert. Then, the concentration of planes was really normal procedure?

Major Welch. Yes, sir.


Major Welch. Except, sir, that they had started thinking about dispersal at Wheeler Field and had built revetments which were unoccupied.

24. General Frank. You took off in a plane and conducted a little attack, didn't you?

Major Welch. Yes, sir.

25. General Frank. What did you take off in?

Major Welch. A P-40B.

26. General Frank. P-40B.

Major Welch. That is the second or third model.

27. General Frank. What happened? Did you shoot any down?

Major Welch. Yes, sir.

28. General Frank. How many?

Major Welch. I claimed four definitely, sir.

29. General Frank. All right. Did anybody else take off from up there?

Major Welch. Yes, sir. Lieutenant Taylor took off with me as my wing man, at first.

30. General Frank. All right.

Major Welch. About half an hour or an hour later three or four other pilots took off from Haleiwa.

31. General Frank. How many did they get?

Major Welch. Between the planes that took off from Schofield and the ones that they finally got off from Wheeler Field, I think we shot down 12 planes definitely.

32. General Frank. All right. Taking that as a background and assuming that you had been on a different kind of an alert at Wheeler, so that they could have taken off in a matter of a few minutes with 60 or 75 planes, and considering the state of gunnery training of the fighters at Wheeler, what do you think they could have done to that Jap attack?

Major Welch. Providing, sir, that the pilots were ready to go, as you said, and had ammunition in their planes, we could have shot every one of them down except the fighters before they got to the Island.

33. General Frank. You think?

Major Welch. I know, sir; I mean from what I have seen with the same type of equipment they used against us there and down in the Pacific. We have fought the same thing. Their dive bombers wouldn't
have gotten through. They might have strafed a bit with their fighters, but there wouldn't have been any bombs in there or torpedoes.

34. General Frank. This boy has a very outstanding reputation as an accurate shot.

35. General Grunert. Then naturally that is why he assumes if all the rest of them were of his caliber they would have gotten quite a number.

36. General Frank. I simply mention that in passing.

Major Welch. No, sir. I have seen—in New Guinea at one time I had a squadron of average pilots and trainee pilots that knocked down the same type of Jap ship, and not a one got through.

37. General Grunert. How about the torpedo bombers? They are pretty slow, aren't they?

Major Welch. Yes, sir.

38. General Grunert. Are they easier to get at than the others as far as shooting is concerned?

[2014] Major Welch. Yes, sir; the Japanese dive bomber and torpedo bomber are sitting ducks.

39. General Frank. That is all I wanted to bring out.

40. General Russell. Sitting ducks for the type of aircraft that you had out on Oahu on December 7, '41?

Major Welch. For our 75 P-40s; not for our other equipment.

41. General Russell. How many of those 75 P-40s did you have out on Oahu available for action that morning?

Major Welch. Well, sir, they were all available. Of course, they didn't have guns in them.

42. General Russell. Well, I know. If they had had the guns and ammunition, how many P-40s were out there ready to go into action; do you know?

43. General Frank. He wouldn't know.

Major Welch. I believe at least 75 or 100, sir. You could find that.

44. General Russell. You are on terminal leave from what?

Major Welch. I am on terminal leave from the air forces boards. I have been donated to North American by the Air Corps to be an engineering test pilot.

45. General Grunert. Any other questions? (No response.) There appear to be none. Thank you very much, Major, for coming.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

(Thereupon, at 12 o'clock noon, a recess was taken until 2 o'clock p.m.)

[2015] Afternoon session

(The Board reconvened at 2 p.m., and continued the hearing of witnesses, as follows:)

TESTIMONY OF COLONEL W. A. CAPRON; ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT OGDEN ARSENAL, OGDEN, UTAH

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel West. Colonel, would you please state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station.

Colonel Capron. Capron, W. A.; Colonel, Ordnance Department. My station is Ogden Arsenal, Ogden, Utah.
2. General Grunert. Colonel, this Board is after facts, and leads that may get other facts; and because of your assignment and position during 1941 we asked you to come here to testify, with the hope that we might get something that would help us. What was your position and assignment in the Hawaiian Department in 1941, and give us the dates.

Colonel Capron. From August 1938 until December 30, 1941, I had the dual function of Department Ordnance Officer of the Hawaiian Department, and as Commanding Officer of the Hawaiian Ordnance Depot.

3. General Grunert. Then, because of that assignment, you had an accurate knowledge of ordnance equipment, did you?

Colonel Capron. Yes, sir.

4. General Grunert. Generally speaking, was the Department well equipped in ordnance items, or was it deficient in some material items?

Colonel Capron. When, sir, may I ask?

5. General Grunert. At the time of the attack.

Colonel Capron. It is very difficult to answer that question with any degree of accuracy, on account of the time period that has elapsed.

6. General Grunert. Give us your general impressions as to the equipment of the department in the ordnance line, as you remember it.

Colonel Capron. As I remember, sir, the seacoast, in both armament and ammunition, was in excellent condition. The mobile ground weapons, I think we lacked 105 howitzers; we had some but not the full complement; and 90-mm. antiaircraft, of which we had none. That was a new weapon, sir, at that period.

7. General Grunert. How about ammunition for antiaircraft weapons?

Colonel Capron. Our ammunition for the weapons which we had, the 3-inch M-1, was good ammunition. We had been using the powder-train fuse. Before the blitz, however, the new fuse centers which handled the mechanical fuse arrived and we had changed over a large portion of the ammunition into mechanical-fuse items.

8. General Grunert. Give us a few facts about the storage of ammunition. What was the status of that at that time?

Colonel Capron. Ammunition storage for what we had was excellent—no, I will say superior. The total reserve was underground in tunnels, the Department reserve.

9. General Grunert. Did you lose any ammunition on account of the attack?

Colonel Capron. Absolutely none of the reserve. One bomb hit in the floor of the Aliamanu crater, which is drilled from the inside, but it had no effect.

10. General Grunert. Now, what can you tell us about the shipment of supplies from the mainland to the islands, as far as you recall? Were there any unusual delays, or was the transportation about what you expected?

Colonel Capron. There are two answers, there, sir, before and after the 7th of December, 1941. Before, it was usual and normal. It was not so much a question of transportation; it was, as I remember, the items were not on hand on the mainland or that the Philippines, hav-
ing a higher priority than we had, a large number of items were going over there which we would have liked to have had, but they just didn't have them.

11. General GRUNERT. Do you recall when the Philippines had a higher priority than you did on ordnance materials?
Colonel CAPRON. No, sir.
12. General GRUNERT. But that was your own understanding and impression?
Colonel CAPRON. That was my impression.
13. General GRUNERT. You don't know, then, when suddenly toward the latter part of 1941 they might have had a higher priority, but before that, they did not have as high a priority?
Colonel CAPRON. I believe, General, all of that is a matter of record on the status report, the ordnance status report for the Hawaiian Department. I wouldn't venture a definite answer; but it was my impression that they were getting things that we would love to have had.
14. General GRUNERT. That was your impression?
Colonel CAPRON. Yes, sir.
15. General GRUNERT. But you have no evidence to that effect?
Colonel CAPRON. No, sir. It is a matter of record, after the 7th—if I may finish that first question, sir—transportation [2018] poured in there. We couldn't have had better service.
16. General GRUNERT. You mean, then, after the attack on December 7, things started pouring in?
Colonel CAPRON. Yes, sir.
17. General GRUNERT. They came at a more rapid rate than they did prior to that time?
Colonel CAPRON. They poured in so fast, sir, we could hardly unload it.
18. General GRUNERT. Now, as to any deficiencies in ordnance material that may have existed, did that in any way affect the taking of appropriate defensive measures with what you had?
Colonel CAPRON. No, sir.
19. General GRUNERT. You told us that you were the Department Ordnance Officer. As such, did you attend conferences of the Department staff?
Colonel CAPRON. All of the conferences.
20. General GRUNERT. Do you recall attending a conference any time about November 27 or thereafter, before the attack—any particular conference?
Colonel CAPRON. There were so many urgent conferences called along in that period that I couldn't pin it down, sir.
21. General GRUNERT. Do you know whether or not General Short ordered the alert which they call the "sabotage alert," about that time?
Colonel CAPRON. We had had alerts, sir, beginning in April, one after the other. They became more frequent and of longer duration, with more confinement of troops to their arms, as December approached.
22. General GRUNERT. Do you recall whether you were at a [2019] conference wherein the Commanding General or the Chief of Staff referred to a message then received from the Chief of Staff concerning the Japanese-American situation, in which they were given directives to do so and so, and cautioned not to do so and so?
Colonel Capron. I remember something about the American-Japanese relations coming up in an urgent conference that had been called. The "radio" was read and discussed, but I am hazy on any indicated action by the War Department.

23. General Grunert. What was your state of mind as to the imminence of a war with Japan toward the latter part of 1941?

Colonel Capron. I felt that it was reasonable to suppose that we would have war; that if we had, it would not come as soon as it actually did, and that if it should, we would have plenty of advance notice.

24. General Grunert. From whom did you expect such notice?

Colonel Capron. From the War Department, sir, who presumably would get the idea from the State Department. We had always counted on a period between the announcement of war and the actual meeting of the enemy. In fact, we had programs which postponed construction, to hold it for this— I have forgotten what we called the period.

25. General Frank. Was it a "period of strained relations"?

Colonel Capron. Yes, sir; that was it, a "period of strained relations."

26. General Grunert. Did this message that was read to you at this conference indicate to you, as you considered it, a period of strained relations?

Colonel Capron. Now, which conference, was that, sir?

[2020] 27. General Grunert. That is the one you just mentioned.

Colonel Capron. The one in November?

28. General Grunert. Approximately November 27. Did you have other conferences in which messages were read or referred to?

Colonel Capron. Yes, quite a number of them, sir.

29. General Grunert. Messages from the United States?

Colonel Capron. Yes, sir.

30. General Grunert. From the Chief of Staff?

Colonel Capron. In my remembrance; yes, sir.

31. General Grunert. Does any one of these conferences stand out in your mind as being of great importance, of more importance than other conferences you had?

Colonel Capron. We had one alert in November. The only way I can fix it, General, is that it was so intense and so sustained that after things eased up, I assembled my ordnance battalion and gave them a talk, made a speech to them, in which I had obtained a verbal commendation from General Short to them. If that is the principal one, I presume it might have indicated strained relations.

32. General Grunert. I will ask the recorder to read to you the Chief of Staff’s message to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, 27 November 1941, to see whether or not that will bring back to your memory whether a particular conference was held on that message.

Colonel West (reading):

Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile [2021] action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot, be avoided, U. S. desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy
should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary, but these measures should be carried out so as not, repeat not, to alarm the civil population or disclose intent. Report measures taken. Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow 5 as far as they pertain to Japan. Limit discussion of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers.

33. General Grunert. Do you recall whether there was a conference on that message?

Colonel Capron. Yes, sir. May I ask what the date of that was?

34. Colonel West. November 27, 1941.

Colonel Capron. I remember the wording, sir, now—"Let Japan commit the first overt act," and that we couldn't do anything that would alarm the population on the island.

35. General Grunert. Those two things seem to stand out in your mind. If they stand out in your mind, why do not these other things stand out in your mind, such as:

This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense.

Then, another thing is, in the message, the part which says:

You are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary.

[2022] Why do certain things stand out in your mind, there, as compared to other things in that message? Were they emphasized, or was it because they went on a sabotage alert, or what? Have you any recollection of why those two things that you mentioned stood out more than any others?

Colonel Capron. No, I have not, sir.

36. General Grunert. If any other measures were adopted, how in your opinion would they alarm the populace, or disclose the intent? Have you thought on that?

Colonel Capron. I don't quite understand, General, what you mean.

37. General Grunert. Now, you picked out two parts of the message, "don't alarm the public," and the "overt act." Now, if other measures had been taken, besides antisabotage measures, how in your opinion would the public have become alarmed? Have you thought of it in that line?

Colonel Capron. I had not; no, sir.

38. General Grunert. Did anything in particular come up at this conference as to discussion of the various parts of this message, or were any reasons expressed why they went into an antisabotage alert instead of an all-out alert?

Colonel Capron. I can't remember any particular conversation or any words in connection with that particular message.

39. General Grunert. Now, you stated in your testimony something to the effect that there was a period which you afterwards identified as "a period of strained relations," in which certain construction should go forward.

Colonel Capron. Yes, sir.

40. General Grunert. That intimates that up to that time [2023] certain construction was not to be prosecuted. What sort of construction was that? Do you recall what was delayed until strained relations came into being?
Colonel Capron. There is a large number of those items, sir. I can't remember one, any detail on it, but that is a matter of record, and I am sure it is on file in the records of the Hawaiian Department.

41. General Grunert. There are a lot of things to be done, later, when you declare M-Day, which is presumably declared when strained relations reach such a point that war is practically imminent, but you think there were some actual construction projects that would go forward in that period?

Colonel Capron. Absolutely, sir; and as I recall, they were engineer's construction. They didn't have any funds to do this, that, or the other. One of the things I cheated and I used Ordnance money to do, a job which the engineers didn't have any funds on, rather than put the thing off until we happened to have a fight.

42. General Grunert. Then it was your understanding that when this period of strained relations came across, there would be funds available and additional authorizations and some additional construction would take place?

Colonel Capron. I always considered that as being—we all sort of looked forward to that as “Christmas Day,” when all of these things that we had been after would suddenly come forth.

43. General Grunert. They started to come forth after the attack, didn't they?

Colonel Capron. Yes, sir; they did.

44. General Grunert. That was along toward Christmas, wasn't it? [2024] Colonel Capron. Yes, sir. I did not mean to be facetious.

45. General Grunert. Now, there is one other item I would like to get some facts or some opinions on. As Department Ordnance Officer, among other things you were particularly interested in antiaircraft and antiaircraft ammunition?

Colonel Capron. Yes, sir.

46. General Grunert. Do you know whether antiaircraft was kept in position, where its ammunition was, for various types of alert?

Colonel Capron. Not off-hand. We had three types of alert. I think we were in a No. 1 on the 7th. We went in, Saturday, I think. I do know, before the morning of the attack, that the antiaircraft regiments—there were three regular-service and one very good National Guard regiment out in the field in position. We had the proper ammunition at all of the fixed AA positions, right at the guns, and in most cases it was out in the field with the mobile AA's.

47. General Grunert. Of course, it was your business to furnish ammunition, but it was not your business to put it at the guns, was it?

Colonel Capron. No, sir. However, it was up to me. General, to have ordnance machinists, ordnance troopers out with these units to look after them, the mechanisms of the weapons, and so on, and also to look after the treatment of the ammunition; and I had those ordnance soldiers who were out there at these places.

48. General Grunert. Do you know whether any of the antiaircraft positions for defense against air attack were in and about the populated parts of the City of Honolulu?

Colonel Capron. Well, the only one I know of, sir, was [2025] the fixed weapons up in Fort Ruger. We had, I think, four guns up there near a hospital. We had never proved or fired them for fear
of the noise. It might frighten people; but those are the only weapons that I remember of, off-hand as being right in Honolulu.

49. General GRUNERT. Do you know where the mobile antiaircraft weapons were to be mobilized in the defense?

Colonel CAPRON. No, sir. That was a variable situation, General.

50. General GRUNERT. Do you know whether or not the actual placing of what we call "live ammunition" near positions would have alarmed the population?

Colonel CAPRON. Well, I doubt it very much. I don't believe it made any difference. We were always having maneuvers, sir. There was ammunition being hauled all over the island. There were truck trains, and so on. We were shipping it on the ONL Railway, and we had a long series of maneuvers up, I think, around October, where the Navy actually flew some planes over to assimilate an attack; so there was so much commotion, so much going on from the Army standpoint, that I doubt if the mere placing of live ammunition, there couldn't have been any particular reaction.

[2026] 51. General GRUNERT. Have you any questions, General Russell?

52. General RUSSELL. What was the state of supply of antiaircraft ammunition on December 7, Colonel?

Colonel CAPRON. I indicated, sir, as I remember, that it was in satisfactory condition; yes, sir.

53. General RUSSELL. How many calibers did you have? How many types of ammunition?

Colonel CAPRON. Three 37s and—I may be wrong on the 37s. I am not sure of the 37s. We had 3-inch Cal. 50, Cal. 30. We had no 40s, of course, nor 20s nor anything of that sort.

54. General RUSSELL. You had your full equipment of antiaircraft weapons except those 90 millimeters?

Colonel CAPRON. Yes, sir; we didn't have any 90s. That was a very new weapon then, sir.

55. General RUSSELL. But everything else, you had a full complement of weapons?

Colonel CAPRON. I am a little hazy on the 37s. We had some of those, but I doubt if we had many.

56. General RUSSELL. I guess that is all.

57. General FRANK. How did you stand on bombs and ammunition?

Colonel CAPRON. The bombs were fine, as I remember, General, but as to the ammunition I am hazy.

58. General FRANK. All right.

Colonel CAPRON. Cal. 50 later became a low point: we gave so much to the Navy that we starved the Army.

59. General GRUNERT. Now, Colonel, we have had many witnesses and we shall have many more, so the Board does not want simply to pile up evidence just to have a fat record, but we would like to find out whether there is anything that stands out in your mind that might assist us, and for us to judge whether or not we have already covered it.

Now, is there any one thing that stands out in your mind, or two or three, that you ought to tell the Board about that might have some bearing on this problem?

Colonel CAPRON. I have two things, sir. I have a lasting impression that when I heard these Jap ships come over I thought, Well,
the gang arrived from the mainland a little ahead of time. They had been ferrying in, and we were looking for some. The reason I knew that: when I heard the shooting; our airplanes had been coming over there, sir, and they had their armament unmounted. It was boxed up somewhere in the shops, and we had sent—or it hadn't come over at all. I had wired, or we had all urged that here—after when ships came over they have the guns not only along with them but also mounted for doing business. Well, when we heard all these airplanes and all the shooting, we thought, Well, at last it percolated and they are arriving here as they should have.

60. General GRUNERT. Did they arrive shooting?
Colonel Capron. It was the Japs, sir. That was the outstanding impression which I had.

Another one was this; it may be irrelevant here: Shortly after the blitz a representative of the White House, a young civilian, came over to the Islands to discuss presumably the subject of handling scrap metal. We had a staff meeting in the headquarters office at Shafter. Well, after this meeting was over and, oh, about two weeks later a nasty report came down from the War Department saying that they had gotten a report from this young civilian, sir, that the ordnance [2028] antiaircraft ammunition had been so foul during the blitz that they had sprayed Honolulu and killed quite a few people.

I want to bring out the fact that on the afternoon of the 7th, because there had been people killed in the city and something, presumably Japanese bombs, had gone through houses—they had functioned; they had hit out in the street; they had killed people—I organized a bomb squad of three, of civilian ammunition technicians. They went around and checked up every incident. We found what these things were. They were not Japanese; they were not Army ammunition. I would like to bring that out too——

61. General GRUNERT. What were they?
Colonel Capron. I made a secret report on that, sir, to General Short in writing on the 9th or the 10th of December, and am I at liberty to say?

62. General GRUNERT. This is all secret and you are at liberty to state anything that you think may assist the Board in getting at the facts, sir.
Colonel Capron. They were antiaircraft ammunition of another service, sir, whose time fuses had failed to function in the air. This particular type of ammunition had a base fuse with a tracer which would function on impact, and it was those items which led to the belief that the Japanese had bombed the city.

63. General GRUNERT. Then, if the Board should consider it desirable or necessary to examine this report of yours, do you know where it is now located?
Colonel Capron. It should be, sir, in the safe of the Hawaiian Department. In fact, I sent—which was wrong—I sent [2029] the original up—it was a secret paper. The original went up to the forward echelon. It was locked in the safe and retained in the files of the Department Ordnance Office. Subsequently some question came up on that thing, and the original had disappeared, and I made a copy of my copy and sent it up to the then Chief of Staff, Colonel——

64. General GRUNERT. Of what?
Colonel Capron. Sir?
65. General GRUNERT. Of what? Chief of Staff of what? The Hawaiian Department?
Colonel CAPRON. Yes, sir. Colonel Phillips.

66. General GRUNERT. Then, the reason or one of the reasons that you bring out now is to show——
Colonel CAPRON. To show that our ammunition, sir, was good.

67. General GRUNERT. Your ammunition was good?
Colonel CAPRON. Yes, sir.

68. General GRUNERT. And somebody else's ammunition was not so good?
Colonel CAPRON. Yes, sir; the other fellow.

69. General GRUNERT. And this ammunition was thrown in the air and didn't explode, and when it came down on the ground some of it did explode and some didn't?
Colonel CAPRON. Yes, sir.

70. General GRUNERT. When you said that the ammunition pertaining to another service, you meant other than the Army?
Colonel CAPRON. Yes, sir.

71. General GRUNERT. All right. Has anyone any other questions?

72. General GRUNERT. Then, that appears to be about all that you can think of that you think might be of value to the Board?
Colonel CAPRON. May I say one more thing, sir? I had heard there was a rumor the Army-Navy relations before the blitz had been not healthful. As far as the Ordnance was concerned, sir, I personally, and my Ordnance agency, had fine relations with the Navy. We were almost hand in glove, and I have frequently gone over to the Chief of Staff over there of the District and gotten anything I wanted; and the Navy Ordnance and the Army Ordnance, who had a lot in common, were fine.

73. General GRUNERT. All right. Thank you very much.
(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

TESTIMONY OF BRIG. GEN. WARREN T. HANNUM, RETIRED; SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. General, will you please state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station?
General HANNUM. Warren T. Hannum, Brigadier General, Retired. I was retired February 1st. On February 4th by appointment of Governor Warren I was made Director of Natural Resources of the State of California, and hold that office at the present time.

2. Colonel WEST. Where is your office, sir?
General HANNUM. My residence address is Apartment 21, 1201 Greenwich Street, San Francisco. Office address is [2031] Department of Natural Resources, State Office Building No. 1, Sacramento.

3. General GRUNERT. Your retirement date was in 1944, was it, or 1942?
General HANNUM. It became effective February 1, 1944.

4. General GRUNERT. You mentioned the date but not the year.
General Hannum. Yes.

5. General Grunert. In our attempts to get at facts and to accomplish the mission charged to the Board, the field is so broad that we divided some of these phases up between the Board members, and General Frank has this particular line of special investigation, so I shall ask him to lead in questioning you, and the other members of the Board will piece out where they think they ought to get more information.

General Hannum. Yes, sir.


7. General Frank. Will you state, please, what position you held in 1941?

General Hannum. I was Division Engineer of the South Pacific Division, under the Chief of Engineers, which included all river and harbor, flood-control, and military construction work in the Pacific Coast States of California, Nevada, Arizona, part of Utah, and also the Hawaiian Islands. There was a district under my supervision in Hawaii, Honolulu, a district in Sacramento, a district in San Francisco, and one in Los Angeles.

8. General Frank. You held the same position in 1942?

General Hannum. Yes, but in that year the South Pacific and North Pacific and Mountain Divisions were abolished and combined into one division known as the Pacific Division, which included practically everything west of the Rocky Mountains except Hawaii, which had by that time been transferred to the control of the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department.

9. General Frank. Was Colonel Wyman in charge of one of your districts?

General Hannum. He was the District Engineer in Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands.

10. General Frank. Had you been Division Engineer when he was previously in Los Angeles?

General Hannum. Yes.

11. Major Clausen. Sir, are you familiar with the negotiations for the contract which was W-414-Eng-602, dated 20 December 1940, with the Hawaiian Constructors, for defense projects in Hawaii?

General Hannum. Yes. I do not know the contract by the number. I know it by the name, under Hawaiian Constructors.

12. Major Clausen. You initiated the contract, didn’t you, sir, by a letter to Colonel Wyman when he was stationed in Hawaii?

General Hannum. No. As District Engineer he was responsible for the initiation.

13. Major Clausen. Well, did you write him, sir, this letter, a copy of which is attached to the I. G. file, report by Colonel Hunt, letter dated November 6, 1940, which I show you?

General Hannum. That is not my signature, but it is probable that I signed it, yes, sir.

[2033] 14. Major Clausen. But do you recall having sent a similar letter to him, if you cannot say that that is it?

General Hannum. That is in conformity with my recollection of the circumstances, yes.

15. Major Clausen. Yes. I would like to introduce this letter in evidence and read it into evidence, so that the Board may understand it. We then do not have to make photostats.
This is a letter dated November 6, 1940, on the letterhead of the Office of the Division Engineer, 351 California Street, San Francisco, California. It is to:

(Letter of November 6, 1940, Colonel Hannum to Lt. Col. Wyman, is as follows:)

Lt. Col. Theodore Wyman, Jr., C. E.,
U. S. Engineer Office,
Honolulu, T. H.

DEAR WYMAN: I inclose herewith a letter received from Colonel Gesler, Office, Chief of Engineers, in reference to negotiated contracts on the basis of fixed price and also cost-plus-fixed-fee. The form for cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts is included.

If you negotiate on the basis of a fixed price, it appears, since you will not have the plans and specifications ready until December 20, that you could not negotiate before that time. After arriving at an agreement, it would take some time to execute it and then an additional month or two before equipment could be placed in Honolulu on the job. On the other hand, if you use a cost-plus-fixed-fee form, negotiations [2934] could be conducted without waiting for the detailed plans. Since the contractors interested are mainly on the mainland, it seems to me it would be well for you to come to the mainland to conduct the negotiations with specified parties on specified dates. We will sit in with you on these negotiations.

Since the Navy contractors over there are on a cost-plus-fixed-fee basis, it occurred to me that a contractor working for you on a fixed price basis would be at a disadvantage since the Navy work is much larger in amount than you would have.

However, I prefer that you examine various methods in the light of existing conditions in Hawaii and come to your own conclusions as to methods and procedure.

Sincerely yours.

W. T. HANNUM,
Colonel, Corps of Engineers,
Division Engineer.

Now, following that letter, sir, did Colonel Wyman come to the mainland and confer with you?

General HANNUM. Yes; he came to the mainland and conferred with me,

1. Major Clausen. And would you state fully the particulars concerning what then happened, sir?

General HANNUM. He went to Los Angeles to confer with possible contractors at Los Angeles. Later I advised him, in view of the fact that neither I nor my office had had any [2035] experience in cost-plus-fixed-fee work, and the contract would have to be approved in Washington. I advised him to proceed to Washington, to the Chief of Engineers Office, and conduct the negotiations there in order to expedite the completion of the contract and get the work started.

2. Major Clausen. Well, now, between the dates that Colonel Wyman arrived and you had this preliminary talk with him, and your instructions that he proceed to Washington, you are aware, are you, that he went to Los Angeles and there discussed this contract with Hans Wilhelm Rohl?

General HANNUM. I do not know that he conducted it with Hans Wilhelm Rohl. I understood, or my impression is, that he conducted it with Callahan Construction Company, Mr. Paul Grafe, and my understanding is that Mr. Paul Grafe went to Washington and was in consultation in Washington.

3. Major Clausen. Well, do I understand from what you say, sir, that when Colonel Wyman reported to you as to his trip to Los Angeles he did not tell you that he had seen Hans Wilhelm Rohl?
General Hannum. I do not recall that he had said anything to that effect.

4. Major Clausen. But you do recall that he did say he had seen Paul Grafe?

General Hannum. Yes. I am sure about that because later on Paul Grafe went with me to Honolulu in May of ’41 to look over the work over there, and all my contacts regarding that contract were with Paul Grafe of the Callahan Construction Company.

5. Major Clausen. Do you recall if Colonel Wyman had discussed this contract with anyone beside Paul Grafe as a possible contractor between the—

General Hannum. I think he did. I think that Mr. Guy Atkinson of the Guy Atkinson Construction Company was in contact with him in Los Angeles, as I recall.

6. Major Clausen. And so far as your memory now serves you, you do not know whether he discussed it with Hans Wilhelm Rohl?

General Hannum. No, I don’t know.

7. Major Clausen. Well, did you know at that time, sir, Hans Wilhelm Rohl?

General Hannum. I had heard of him. I did not know him.

8. Major Clausen. Did you know at that time that he was an alien, a German alien?

General Hannum. No; that didn’t come up until later.

9. Major Clausen. Specifically, General Hannum, whose responsibility in the Corps of Engineers would it be to see that the Government did not make a contract of a secret nature such as this with a German alien?

General Hannum. I don’t know that—Rohl had made—contracts had been made by the Engineer Department with Rohl several years before that in the construction of the breakwater in Los Angeles harbor.

10. Major Clausen. Mr. Reporter, would you read the question please?

General Hannum. And—

11. Major Clausen. Pardon me. I thought you had finished.

General Hannum. I am bringing out the point that no one knew; it wasn’t known that he was not a citizen. He had been in this country for quite a number of years, he was a reputable contractor in Los Angeles, and if there was any idea that he was an alien, and I don’t know; if he was an alien at that time, the rules and regulations and laws forbade the employment of aliens.

[2037] 12. Major Clausen. Well, my question was this: Who in the Corps of Engineers had the responsibility to ascertain?

General Hannum. Initially the District Engineer. Above that, the Division Engineer and the Chief of Engineers office.

13. Major Clausen. So in this case the responsibility primarily or initially would rest upon Colonel Wyman; is that correct, sir?

General Hannum. That would be my correct interpretation of the rules, yes.

14. Major Clausen. Now, as I understand it, Colonel Wyman came to the mainland and he conferred with you in San Francisco here?

General Hannum. Yes.
15. Major Clausen. And then you gave him certain instructions, he went to Los Angeles, and then did he come back here and report to you?

General Hannum. I don't recall whether he came back to San Francisco and went from San Francisco or whether he went to Los Angeles—or went to Washington direct from Los Angeles. I can't recall that.

16. Major Clausen. In any event, he then went to Washington?

General Hannum. Yes.

17. Major Clausen. And were any further conferences had with you, sir, concerning this contract before Colonel Wyman returned to Hawaii?

General Hannum. No. No, because that contract was left in Washington for final execution in Washington, and it was some months later before it was finally executed, as I recall.

18. Major Clausen. Sir, I show you a letter dated 14 February [2038], from Colonel A. K. B. Lyman, Department Engineer in Hawaii, to Major General Reybold, and I am going to introduce this in evidence and I would like to read it. Perhaps I should read it, sir, and then the witness will hear what I am going to say. It is certified as a true copy by Colonel Brown of the Corps of Engineers.

19. Major Clausen. This letter is dated 14 February 1942, on the letterhead of the Headquarters Hawaiian Department, Office of the Department Engineer, Fort Shafter, T. H., too:

(Letter of February 14, 1942, Colonel Lyman to Major General Reybold, is as follows:)

Major General Eugene Reybold,
Chief of Engineers, Washington, D. C.

DEAR General Reybold: We have had an unfortunate and unpleasant situation develop here in the Hawaiian Department. The District Engineer has executed some of his work in a most efficient manner, however, due to an unfortunate personality he has antagonized a great many of the local people as well as some of the new employees and officers who have recently been assigned to his office. Since this atmosphere of antagonism exists whenever any condition arises such as slowness in making payments to dealers or to employees, even if this condition is beyond the control of the District Engineer, the people wrathfully rise up in arms against him.

Prior to December 7 I did not have very many official dealings with the District Engineer and I know little about the efficiency of his administrative and engineering organization, but since December 7, when it was believed that it would be more economical and in the interest of efficiency to continue using his office as the procurement and dispersing agency for the Department Engineer's office, I have had many dealings with him. Some of the work which they were called upon to perform for me has been carried on in a highly satisfactory manner but there are many other items of work, which for some reason or other there was a slowness in getting results. This, I am told by various Post and Station Commanders, obtains generally and as a result many of their assistants carry resentment towards the office of the District Engineer. I shall have to state that there was rather a very abrupt change made when the ZCQM was taken over by the District office and some of the difficulties were undoubtedly created by lack of a suitable transition period.

Even though this area has been officially declared a Theatre of Operations, the District continues to function independently or under the Division Engineer on certain work over which I have no control, and as a result there is a lack of cohesion in our operations, and the whole engineer program is suffering with a consequent loss of prestige by the Engineers in both civilian and military circles. However, this could be overcome by certain corrective measures in the District Engineer's organization and methods, and many of these are now being under-
taken. It is extremely questionable whether a change in sentiment or method of operation by the District Engineer at this time could better the situation in the future due to the intense antagonism that now exists among civilians and worse among military personnel towards the District Engineer. It may be that the present District Engineer has outlived his usefulness in this Department.

The Department Commander discussed this situation with me two days ago and suggested that I warn you that he may conclude that a change is necessary. I know that General Emmons thinks very highly of the present District Engineer in some of the work that he has performed; however, the General feels that possibly an insurmountable condition has developed which is a handicap to efficient operation and he may decide to recommend a change. Before doing this, however, he has directed me to confer with the District Engineer and suggest changes in both his organization and his method of operation in an attempt to improve the existing unsatisfactory service.

Very truly yours,

A. K. B. Lyman,
Colonel, Corps of Engineers,
Department Engineer.

Sir, do you recall having seen that or a copy of it?

General Hannum. No, I don't recall having seen that letter at all. This is the first I have heard of it.

[2041] But it confirms in a way what Colonel Lyman told me when I went out there in May 1942. I went out there in 1942 on the request of the Department Commander. That was after Colonel Lyman had taken over as Department Engineer, taking over the work of district engineer, and the district was abolished, and was no longer under the division engineer.

20. Major Clausen. Sir, with respect to this portion of the letter where it says—

There were many other items of work, on which, for some reason or other, there was a slowness in getting results.

What did Colonel Lyman tell you about that?

General Hannum. He didn't tell me anything about that, specifically. What he mentioned was that he said to me when I was over there that Wyman's administration had not been efficient or effective.

21. Major Clausen. And this was May that you were there, or October, 1942, did you say?

General Hannum. I know it was in May that I went over there. No, I guess it was probably in October. I was over there in October 1941; it may have been that Lyman mentioned something to me about that time. There were differences between Wyman and Lyman at that time when I was over there in October 1941.

22. Major Clausen. This trip that you made in October 1941 was a sort of inspection trip, was it not, sir?

General Hannum. It was. I made one in May 1941—I think it was May 1941—and also in October 1941.

23. Major Clausen. When you were informed by Colonel Lyman of this mess that existed with respect to your district engineer, what did you do about it?

General Hannum. I made inspections with Colonel Wyman, [2042] and also sent over later administrative assistants to assist him in getting his office reorganized.

24. Major Clausen. When were they sent over, sir? It was after Pearl Harbor, wasn't it?
General Hannum. I think it probably was; yes, sir. I do not want to say that I agreed with everything that Colonel Lyman said in that letter. I would like to have that understood, because that's his opinion. While Colonel Wyman had a personality which was irritating when he was under pressure in conferences with others, because he was abrupt at times, he was a very efficient engineer officer and a driver, and got things accomplished.

25. Major Clausen. I am going to ask you if you ever received this letter, or a copy of it. It is dated 27 February 1942, from Colonel Lyman to General Reybold, and I will read it:

DEAR General Reybold: I wrote you on 14 February 1942 in regard to the unsatisfactory situation in the District Engineer office here. Since that time I have personally investigated conditions and find that they are unsatisfactory, particularly in the administrative branches. The administration of his office and his handling of the air field construction program are not altogether pleasing to the Department Commander and the general unpleasant feeling toward him makes it desirable to effect his replacement.

With an organization as large as the present one of the District Engineer, decentralization of authority is essential. Colonel Wyman appears unwilling to grant authority to subordinates and attempts to carry too much [2043] of the load himself. As a result some phases of the work suffer from lack of sufficient attention. In addition three of the officers whom he has selected for important line island projects have had unfavorable reports submitted against them evidencing lack of judgment on the part of the District Engineer in the selection of key personnel.

When I wrote before, the Department Commander had not definitely decided that a change in District Engineers was necessary. He realizes that Colonel Wyman has done an excellent job in many respects and does not want to take official action that would tarnish the record of the officer. General Emmons feels that perhaps Colonel Wyman has been in this semitropical climate too long or that the pace at which the District Engineer has been driving himself has clouded his judgment. On several occasions Colonel Wyman has received important verbal instructions and failed to carry them out, either through forgetfulness or failure to understand. A reconsideration of the entire situation by the Department Commander has resulted in asking me to informally request the replacement of Colonel Wyman as District Engineer.

I sincerely hope that you will see fit to ease Colonel Wyman out of the Hawaiian Department in such a manner as to reflect no discredit on him and replace him with someone who can visualize the high degree of cooperation which is necessary between the various commanders, civilians, and the District Engineer's office in order that the Engineer Service may function to the fullest extent. I, personally, do not believe there is any solution to the [2044] problem short of the relief of the present District Engineer.

In the event that you see fit to make a change I strongly recommend that two experienced administrative assistants, thoroughly familiar with Departmental procedure, be either transferred here or sent on temporary duty to reorganize the administrative branch of the District office to permit it to carry the tremendous mass of detail expeditiously and effectually. The present administrative heads have not had sufficient experience to manage the large organization that is now required to perform the administrative detail. Errors in the preparation of pay rolls and vouchers and delay in making payments have resulted in some hardship and unpleasant feeling among local labor, contractors, except possibly the one large company handling the bulk of his work, and supply firms.

Sincerely,

(8) A. K. B. Lyman,
Colonel, Corps of Engineers,
Department Engineer.

You recall having seen a copy of that, sir?
General Hannum. No, sir; I have never seen it.

26. Major Clausen. Do you recall having been informed of that letter?
General Hannum. No.
27. Major Clausen. Do you recall having discussed some of the things mentioned in this letter, with Colonel Lyman?
   General Hannum. May I see it?
   [2045] General Hannum. Regarding the statement—
   that the pace at which the District Engineer has been driving himself has clouded his judgment.

I do not know that he had clouded his judgment, but I know that he was driving himself very hard, even before Pearl Harbor.

29. Major Clausen. In Los Angeles?
   General Hannum. And particularly so, after Pearl Harbor. No, he was district engineer in Honolulu at the time of Pearl Harbor.

30. Major Clausen. I say, sir, was he driving himself hard in Los Angeles, when he was assigned there?
   General Hannum. He was district engineer. Yes. He was in charge of the Los Angeles District at a time when they had a great deal of flood-control work in Los Angeles, and at one time he had over 20,000 men under his employ, and a great many of them, WPA men. He had them organized and doing the work by force account, and he did a very splendid job.

31. Major Clausen. Wasn’t that Captain, then, now Colonel Fleming, that had that, with General Connolly?
   General Hannum. No, that was WPA work.

32. Major Clausen. In any event, sir, do you care to comment upon the statement in there that Colonel Wyman would not carry out instructions?
   General Hannum. I had not heard of that. I received no information at any time that he was not carrying out instructions, unless it be instructions which Coloney Lyman had given to him as Department Engineer.

33. Major Clausen. Sir, do you know Colonel Row, who was Department IG in the Hawaiian Department?

34. Major Clausen. Do you recall that he made a derogatory report concerning Colonel Wyman?
   General Hannum. No, no; I do not know that. I don’t recall that, now, if he did.

35. Major Clausen. That is, he made several, but one in particular was dated the same date as the first letter from Colonel Lyman to General Reybold, February 14, 1942, which indicated that certain unsatisfactory conditions existed, and among these there were seven specific conditions that were unsatisfactory, which existed, and among them was:

   (e) That the district engineer’s office as a whole has not been organized in such a manner as to operate with efficiency.

   General Hannum. The first time I have heard of that accusation! The first time I have heard of such report by the Inspector General of the Hawaiian Department. It did not come, as I recall, to my office.

36. Major Clausen. I am referring to a report of the FBI investigation, and I am reading from that. On page 58, here, it states:

   It was discovered during the course of inspections of District Engineer activities prior to 7 December that his administrative set-up was improperly coordinated and was so mentioned in these reports of inspection. The District Engi-
ner in his replies has stated that steps had been initiated to correct the irregularities and deficiencies reported. It is now evident that many of these irregularities and deficiencies still existed on 7 December 1941, and have been aggravated by the increased volume of his activities incident to the outbreak of war and the taking over of the functions of the Zone Construction Quartermaster on 16 December 1941.

Colonel Wyman's methods of administration have been such as to antagonize many persons, military and civil, both within and without his organizations. His actions have also been ridiculed and criticized in the community. I believe that this condition is to the great detriment of the Army as a whole and the Engineer Corps in particular.

Did you ever discuss those allegations with any member of the IG in Hawaii?

General Hannum. No.

37. Major Clausen. When you made your inspections, prior to 7 December 1941, did you discuss the District Engineer's functions and office with any member of the IG in Hawaii?

General Hannum. No.

38. Major Clausen. Do you recall, sir, an investigation by another IG, Colonel Hunt?

General Hannum. Yes, because Colonel Hunt stopped by my office to consult with me on his return from that inspection. That was in 1943, I believe it was.

39. Major Clausen. As a matter of fact, you testified at that time before Colonel Hunt?

General Hannum. Yes, sir.

40. Major Clausen. You had been informed by Colonel Lyman of these conditions. I believe you recommended Colonel Wyman for the DSM, is that correct?


41. Major Clausen. Was that your own idea, sir?

General Hannum. It wasn't only by own idea. I discussed it with others. In fact, I discussed it with General Emmons when I was out there in May 1942, and General Emmons admitted that he had done a magnificent job, but the said that no one, up to that time, had been recommended, or had been given a DSM, except General Somervell, and he didn't want to, he didn't feel that it would be a propitious time to submit a recommendation for a DSM; and I think Wyman deserved a DSM at that time for what he had done; and I can say something about that, if you would like to know.

42. Major Clausen. Yes, sir.

General Hannum. In October 1941, I was in Hawaii on one of my inspection trips out there. Wyman and I had gone out to all the other islands on a trip, and when we arrived back, on Sunday morning, we received word that General Short desired to see us that afternoon, Sunday afternoon; and when we reported to General Short, we were informed that he had received a very secret order from Washington to construct an air ferry route from Honolulu to the Philippines by way of Australia, and that all the facilities of the district and division engineer were placed at his disposal. We discussed the matter with General Short that afternoon, the possible locations for the air fields en route to Australia, and the next day I believe it was, there was a conference which I attended with General Short, and Wyman was present at the same time, and the Commandant of Pearl
Hawaiian Harbor, at which arrangements were made for assistance by the [2049] Navy, particularly with the reconnaissance planes, to start parties out. Within 48 hours thereafter, as I recall, Colonel Wyman had reconnaissance parties out, starting out to various places, such as Canton and Christmas, those two islands particularly, and plans were being made for him to start the work at once, using, as I recall, the Hawaiian Constructors' forces.

I remained with him about two days and came back to San Francisco by plane, commercial liner, and after getting things started in San Francisco, a place to procure supplies, and get them over to him, and other things which he needed, I went to Washington; and while in Washington I reported to General Arnold, to describe to him what we were doing, and General Arnold was much interested in it because he had apparently initiated the order to construct the air ferry route.

He asked me. He stated that, naturally, to get to the Philippines by way of Guam and Wake, he would pass through these Japanese possessions, and would have difficulty conducting any air ferry route along that line, and therefore he wanted one by way of Australia, to avoid the Japanese possessions. He asked me when we would have it completed, and I said it would not be completed for some months, but that we would have it available for use with one strip available at each of the four places in three months—by the 15th of January, 1942—and he said to me, "Well, you don't think they can do that, do you?" I said, "Do you know Wyman?" He said he knew him fairly well. "Well," I said, "he hasn't failed me yet, when he was given a mission like that to do." It was completed, ready for use, on December 28, nearly three weeks ahead of time. And [2050] when it was reported to Colonel Fleming, he told me that in a conference with Admiral Nimitz, after Pearl Harbor, at Pearl Harbor, he was present at a conference at which this air ferry route came up, and when Admiral Nimitz learned that it had been constructed, or had been ready for use in less than three months, he said it was one of the miracles of the war.

43. Major Clausen. By the way, sir, was one of the reasons why you recommended a cost-plus contract, such as was afterwards signed, the secret nature of the work?

General Hannum. No, no; it was mainly after discussing it. I was opposed to cost-plus contracts. In the South Pacific Division I didn't make any, I didn't allow any cost-plus contracts to be made, and at the time this came up over there, I didn't want to make them; but after discussing it with Wyman and knowing the situation with regard to the Navy, how the Navy were making nothing but cost-plus contracts over there, I couldn't see any method of accomplishing the work other than by a cost-plus contract.

Since we didn't make any cost-plus contracts in the South Pacific Division, and even at the time that this problem came up, the features of the cost-plus contract were not familiarly known outside of Washington, and they were not particularly well known even in Washington at that time, in the Army.

44. Major Clausen. You recall having written a letter dated 5 June 1944, to the Chairman of the House Committee on Military Affairs?

General Hannum. Yes, I did.

45. Major Clausen. Do you have a copy of that, sir?
General Hannum. I think I retained a copy; yes.

[2051] 46. Major Clausen. Would you make that available to the Board, please, or a copy of your copy?

General Hannum. I would be very glad to, if I can find it. Have you a copy, there?

47. Major Clausen. No, sir; that is the reason I am asking you for the copy, sir. I have not seen the original, and my notes state that you informed the Chairman that you authorized Colonel Wyman to negotiate the basic contract as a cost-plus-fixed-fee contract, because of the urgency of initiating the work, the secret nature of the work, and the indefiniteness. Does that refresh your memory as to whether one of the reasons was the secret nature of the work?

General Hannum. Well, there were some features of the work that were secret, yes.

48. Major Clausen. Why, General, would a cost-plus contract be more desirable from the secret nature aspects of the work?

General Hannum. If you made a fixed contract, you would have to write out your plans and specifications, and, normally, advertise; if you didn't advertise, you would have to call in a number of contractors and negotiate with them, showing them the plans and specifications.

49. Major Clausen. And was that discussed, then, with Colonel Wyman, when he had to come over to the mainland from Hawaii?

General Hannum. Well, he knew in a general way what he was negotiating for, the work at that time, but he also realized, we all realized, that the amount of work would undoubtedly be increased over what was contemplated initially, and it was increased. There was CAA work involved I think at Canton Island—yes.

[2052] 50. Major Clausen. I refer specifically, General, to one of the reasons assigned, the "secret nature of the work," as to whether the secret nature of the work and the desirability therefore of having a cost-plus contract for that reason in part, were discussed with Colonel Wyman?

General Hannum. It was possible to keep any nature of work secret. It was more possible to keep it secret under a cost-plus-fixed-fee contract than it would be under a firm contract, due to procedure.

51. Major Clausen. Did you discuss that with Colonel Wyman, is my question.

General Hannum. No, I don't know that I did discuss that with Colonel Wyman. Colonel Wyman, of course, knew what he had to do; he knew that certain features were secret, and particularly as I recall, the AWS work was involved at that time, the aircraft warning service work.

52. Major Clausen. By the way, had you met Hans Wilhelm Rohl on any occasion up to December 1940?

General Hannum. No; I did not meet him until just before he went over to Hawaii.

53. Major Clausen. Did you ever receive any information, General Hannum, as to the relations which existed in Los Angeles between your district engineer, there, Colonel Wyman, and Hans Wilhelm Rohl, which were apart from business?

General Hannum. No. I have heard some rumors. I heard some rumors.

54. Major Clausen. What were they, sir?
General Hannum. What was published in the newspapers—that he had some drinks with Rohl. Rohl, I think, was a heavy [2053] drinker. Wyman was not a heavy drinker, and he took a social drink with many people, on occasion. I never knew Wyman, if you are leading up to that point of Wyman's sobriety, I would say that I have never known Wyman in my experience to be drunk.

55. Major Clausen. With regard to the other relations that are alleged to have existed between Colonel Wyman and Mr. Rohl during the Los Angeles tour of duty by Colonel Wyman, such as accepting expensive entertainment from Rohl, and then giving Rohl's company important contracts. Did you ever hear of that during the time that Wyman was stationed at Los Angeles?

General Hannum. No, no; I don't think Rohl ever had a contract under Wyman, after—Wyman was district engineer at Los Angeles when I came out here as division engineer, and it was a contract for the breakwater which Rohl had, which had been made before I arrived, and I think the contract was completed before I arrived out here.

56. Major Clausen. When did you arrive out here, General?


[2054] 57. Major Clausen. In any event, I understand, then, that you know nothing of these alleged conditions that existed at Los Angeles?

General Hannum. I have no first-hand information of any discreditable or dishonorable action of Wyman with Mr. Rohl.

58. Major Clausen. And when was it, General, that you heard these rumors that you stated you heard concerning the drinking?

General Hannum. It was only after it came out in the newspapers, the relation between Rohl and Wyman, when it was publicized.

59. Major Clausen. Did you ever hear of this party, Werner Plack?

General Hannum. Beg pardon?

60. Major Clausen. Werner Plack, P-l-a-c-k.

General Hannum. No.

61. Major Clausen. Have you read this House Committee on Military Affairs report (indicating)?

General Hannum. No.

62. Major Clausen. Are you acquainted with the fact that shortly after this December 20, 1940, contract was executed it developed that the contract had been made with the Rohl-Connolly Company, of which Mr. Hans Wilhelm Rohl was a German alien?

General Hannum. The contract was made with The Hawaiian Constructors, and The Hawaiian Constructors was a partnership as—well, of course the records will show what it was. As I recall, it was the Callahan Construction Company represented by Mr. Paul Grafe, Rohl, and Shirley, are the names, as I recall. The contract was dated December 20, 1940. It was later than that before Rohl took out his final papers, citizenship papers.

[2055] 63. Major Clausen. Well, my question is this: When did you know that Rohl would have to take out his papers?

General Hannum. Not until Wyman requested—we got a telegram I think in the Division office from Wyman to the Chief of Engineers, asking that the matter of Rohl's citizenship papers be expedited.
64. Major Clausen. And with reference to December 20, 1940, the
date of the contract, when did you receive that wire?
General Hannum. That was later, some months later, several
months; in the next year, I would say, 1942, because it was 1942 when
I was over there in May of 1942. Mr. Paul Grafe went over by plane
with me. We went together with Wyman to look over the work on
Oahu that was under construction, and that evening Wyman told Mr.
Paul Grafe very forcibly that he would have to remain in Hawaii to
supervise that work; that his superintendent of construction wasn't
accomplishing what should be accomplished, and he insisted that Mr.
Grafe or some member of the firm remain in Hawaii to supervise the
work; that his superintendent of construction was not satisfactory.

65. Major Clausen. When was it that Colonel Wyman sent the wire
requesting that Rohl's application be expedited?
General Hannum. It was after that date, I think, because it was
after that that Mr. Paul Grafe probably suggested Rohl's coming over
because Paul Grafe didn't want to remain over there.

66. Major Clausen. Now, sir, you mentioned that that occurred
in 1942. Aren't you mistaken as to the time when that occurred?
General Hannum. Yes, I am mistaken. I should have said May '41.

67. Major Clausen. Well, now, do you recall, General, that
prior to that, in specifically January of 1941, Colonel
Wyman wrote to Mr. Rohl to come to Hawaii?

General Hannum. January '41?

68. Major Clausen. Yes, sir. I will show you a copy of the letter.
General Hannum. I don't know about that. When did Rohl go?

69. Major Clausen. He went later.
I show you a letter, sir, which is an exhibit in this I. G. report of
Colonel Hunt, dated January 22, 1941, which reads as follows; this is
to Mr. Rohl from Colonel Wyman:

(Letter of January 22, 1941, Colonel Wyman to Mr. Rohl is as
follows:)

Mr. H. W. Rohl, Rohl-Connolly Company,
4551 Alhambra Avenue, Los Angeles, California.

Dear Sir: Reference is made to Secret Contract No. W-414-eng-602 with The
Hawaiian Constructors for work in the Hawaiian Islands.
As you are actively interested in this venture, I desire you to proceed to Honolulu
at your earliest convenience to consult with the District Engineer relative to ways
and means to accomplish the purpose of the contract. You will be allowed trans-
portation either by clipper or steamboat, both ways, and travel allowance not to
exceed $6.00 per day while enroute in accordance with existing laws and
regulations.
You will make application to either the District Engineer at
Los Angeles or the Division Engineer, South Pacific Division, San Francisco,
for transportation.

Do you recall having a copy of that about that time?
General Hannum. No. Now, I don't know whether that is on file
in the Division office, or not. I don't believe it is.

(There was a brief, informal recess.)

70. Major Clausen. I was asking you, General, concerning the
letter that Colonel Wyman sent to Mr. Rohl in January, 1941. I
believe you testified that you did not recall having seen a copy of that.

General Hannum. No: that my present recollection is that this is
the first time I have seen that or known about it.

71. Major Clausen. I see. All right.
With regard to the request from Colonel Wyman for expediting the application for citizenship, do you know whether the wire was supplemented by letters or phone calls from Colonel Wyman directed to that same point?

General HANNUM. I don’t recall at the present time whether there are any wires or not. That would be a matter of record, I think, in the Division Engineer’s office.

72. Major Clausen. Did you take any action in that respect?

General HANNUM. No.

73. Major Clausen. Do you recall, sir, having seen a letter from General Kingman to Mr. Schofield at the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization, dated August 28th, 1941, a copy of which is set forth on page 5 of this House Committee Report [indicating]?  

General HANNUM. I don’t recall having seen that letter, but I do recall now that General Kingman did—I did hear that he had taken steps to assist in expediting the matter.

74. Major Clausen. When did you first hear that, General?

General HANNUM. It was during the time that I would say, just before Rohl—it must have been probably early in ’42, just before— or ’41, just before Rohl went over there.

75. Major Clausen. When was the first time that you learned that Rohl was a German alien?

General HANNUM. Not until the whole matter came up, as is indicated in those papers which you have presented.

76. General Frank. Which was about when?

General HANNUM. I would say in the spring of ’41. I don’t know that it came up before that. I could tell better if I could fix definitely when Rohl went to Honolulu.

77. Major Clausen. We are informed that he went there around about September 15th of 1941.

General HANNUM. Yes. Well, it was in the spring or summer, in ’41, spring or summer, then, before—and I didn’t know that he was an alien until the question came up of his going to Honolulu and we finding out that he had not taken out citizenship papers, final citizenship papers, although he had been in this country for quite a number of years and had been in the contracting business for quite a number of years.

78. Major Clausen. Now, with regard to the delays in the construction program, some of these delays mentioned by Colonel Lyman, what knowledge did you have, sir, that the contracts and job orders were not being completed on time with respect to the air raid warning system?

General HANNUM. The air raid warning system was delayed not only in Hawaii but in this country due to the lack of receipt of instructions from Washington.

79. Major Clausen. Instructions as to what, sir?

General HANNUM. As to just where they were to be placed and the type of installation. We received word about aircraft warning service, I guess it was in ’40. We got instructions suspending action later, and it was nearly a year from the time we received the first word about it before we got final word to go ahead and we got final definite instructions. All that, I think, can be verified, if you wish, by getting copies of records from the Division office.
80. Major Clausen. You mean in Hawaii?
General Hannum. No. The Division office in San Francisco.
81. Major Clausen. Have you seen those records yourself?
General Hannum. Well, the instructions came through the office at various times about the aircraft warning service, and they all were filed in the office there, in the Division office undoubtedly as well as in the District office.
82. Major Clausen. Well, they would be forwarded to Honolulu.
83. General Frank. Do you remember what office in Washington was responsible for the delay?
General Hannum. I don't know. I think perhaps the delay was justified because at that time they didn't know just what form the installation should take nor the locations where they should be placed. For example, they thought initially that a station high up would be the best place for a station, that was unobstructed, and later they found that a plane running, skimming along low, would not be contacted. So in many places where we put stations, where stations were planned high up, they were either moved down or alternate stations placed lower down.
[2060] 84. General Frank. Well, was it the Signal Corps that was—
General Hannum. The Signal Corps were responsible for the design and the installation, and the Engineers were the construction agency. The Engineers were not responsible for the initiation of it.
85. General Frank. The Signal Corps were responsible for the design and for the selection of the sites?
General Hannum. Yes. We did not select the sites.
86. General Frank. All right.
87. Major Clausen. Now, isn't it correct, though, General, that as early as 1939 studies had been made by a board of officers of which then Captain Fleming was a member, and sites determined for fixed A.W.S. stations?
General Hannum. That is probably true.
88. Major Clausen. And isn't it also true—
General Hannum. I don't know. I say it is probably true. I don't recall.
89. Major Clausen. Yes.
90. General Frank. In Honolulu, you mean?
General Hannum. Yes.
91. Major Clausen. I beg your pardon, sir.
General Hannum. In Honolulu?
92. Major Clausen. Yes, sir.
General Hannum. Yes. Captain Fleming was at that time, I believe, Assistant to the Department Engineer.
93. Major Clausen. And in this study by the Board at that time there were certain fixed stations which were later carried over to this contract?
General Hannum. With perhaps modifications, I would say.
[2061] 94. Major Clausen. Yes. Well, in any event, no A.W.S. stations of a permanent type were constructed prior to December 7, were they, sir, 1941?
General Hannum. I don't know, but I recall very definitely that that work in Hawaii was suspended by instructions from Washington.
95. General Frank. All of it?
General Hannum. Yes, on account of the lack of indefiniteness of just what features were to be carried out.

96. General Frank. Lack of definiteness or indefiniteness?
General Hannum. Lack of definiteness, or it was not definitely settled at that time. There were some changes, modifications, which apparently in Washington they discovered would have to be made, from the experience which had been gained presumably abroad. I don’t know. I never understood why the work was delayed or suspended.

97. General Frank. In any event, you think it was technical?
General Hannum. Technical, yes.

98. Major Clausen. And you attribute the delays to the suspension of the work?
General Hannum. Yes.

99. Major Clausen. All right. Well, now, you say these instructions came from Washington to the Division Engineer at San Francisco?
General Hannum. Yes.

100. Major Clausen. And you were the Division Engineer?
General Hannum. I was the Division Engineer. They were transmitted through me to Honolulu, in so far as Honolulu was affected.

[2062] 101. Major Clausen. I see. And when were those instructions received here, sir?
General Hannum. Well, I don’t know. I would have to look up the records to find out.

102. Major Clausen. Will you do that, sir?
General Hannum. Well, of course, my station at Sacramento, I think you could get that by telephoning to the Division office. Colonel Corey is the executive office in the Division office down town.

103. Major Clausen. I perhaps could not describe it, sir, with the particularity that you could, if you jogged your memory on that.
General Hannum. Yes.

104. Major Clausen. I think the Board would appreciate it, since we are working against time, if you could do that.
General Hannum. Very good. I will try to have that assembled. I will have to come down next week some time, then. How long will the Board be in town here?

105. Major Clausen. We shall be in town for a week. And in the event the records could be searched by somebody down there at your request, if the Board has already left we could perhaps review them in Hawaii.
General Hannum. Very good.

106. Major Clausen. Or on our return.
General Hannum. Yes.

107. General Grunert. May I ask a question there: You have reference now to fixed stations as such, as distinguished from mobile stations?
General Hannum. Oh, yes.

108. General Grunert. For air warning?
[2063] General Hannum. Yes. We completed the filter here. We were able to complete the filter stations and the control stations in San Francisco and Los Angeles about a week before Pearl Harbor happened. A week or two weeks, something like that.
109. Major Clausen. Sir, what knowledge do you have concerning delays in the construction of underground gasoline storage tanks?

General Hannum. That was delayed due to lack or difficulty of getting the Navy—I think that was the combined storage you are speaking of, for the Army and Navy; is that right?

110. Major Clausen. All we know is that there were contracts for underground gasoline storage.

General Hannum. Yes.

111. Major Clausen. Including facilities at Bellows Field.

General Hannum. Yes. That was at Bellows Field?

112. Mayor Clausen. Yes, sir.

General Hannum. Or was it up near Wheeler Field?

113. Major Clausen. Bellows Field is one in particular.

General Hannum. I do not recall that one. I recall the one up near Wheeler Field.

114. Major Clausen. Well, in any event—

General Hannum. That was up near Wheeler Field. As I recall, that was the combined underground gasoline storage, combined for Army and Navy, and there were technical difficulties involved in the plans for that, and also difficulties involved in getting coordination between the Army and Navy requirements, particularly as to the unloading point in Pearl Harbor for pumping the gas up to the storage tanks.

115. Major Clausen. Now, with regard to these delays, did you inform higher authority of the fact that there were these delays occurring?

General Hannum. The delays were due to action coming from Washington.

116. Major Clausen. Well, I state: Did you inform the Chief of Engineers of those delays?

General Hannum. The Chief Engineers knew of them because he was the one, or they were issued from his office. The instructions were issued from his office.

117. Major Clausen. I understood you to say that they were issued from the Signal Corps, concerning the A. W. S.

General Hannum. Whatever came from the Signal Corps came through the Chief of Engineers Office to us out here. The Chief Engineers was in contact with the Signal Corps in Washington and received the plans and other details from the Signal Office presumably in Washington, and then transmitted them to the field.

118. Major Clausen. I see. Now, General, what did you do about speeding up the work over there on these things? Did you complain to people of these delays that were occurring in the A. W. S.?

General Hannum. What delays are you speaking about?

119. Major Clausen. Well, I am just referring to the A. W. S., the air raid warning system.

General Hannum. There was nothing to be done. We got instructions to suspend and await further instructions.

120. Major Clausen. Did you have any instructions to Colonel Wyman at any time that this was a matter of prime importance, that these defense installations be constructed as speedily as possible?

General Hannum. Certainly.
121. Major Clausen. Did you tell him that?
General Hannum. Certainly, and he realized that, too. Everybody realized it.

122. Major Clausen. I mean did you specifically tell him that?
General Hannum. Well, I don’t know that I did specifically tell him that. There was plenty of correspondence which might, relating to the matter, probably still in the files.

123. Major Clausen. Now, during 1941 when the construction was going on up to December 7th, did you—or rather, let me ask the question this way: What were your functions with regard to the carrying out of the contract that we have referred to?
General Hannum. Supervision only.

124. Major Clausen. Of whom and of what?
General Hannum. Supervision of the work that was being carried on in the district.

125. Major Clausen. How did the Hawaiian Department Commander, Commanding General, get into that picture?
General Hannum. He didn’t fit into it until after the work was turned over to him in the spring of 1942. Wait a minute. Well, he did fit into it in this way: For instance, when that air ferry route to Australia was constructed we were directed to have the Division Engineer and the District Engineer to report to General Short, the Department Commander, and we did so. In addition to that, when I was out there, I think it was in May of ’41, I directed Colonel Wyman to put the installations in in accordance with General Short’s wishes.

For example, we had money for Wheeler Field and for certain installations at Hickam Field, and General Short did not wish to put those installations in there and crowd and congest those places, and he wanted to open up Bellows Field, and authority was given to open up Bellows Field; and construction that was intended—barracks and things like that which were intended for Hickam Field, Wheeler Field, were put in at Bellows Field and the work was pushed hard, including the preparation of a flight strip, although the flight strip had not been approved as a project in Washington, and that flight strip was not completed on December 7th because it couldn’t be completed with the money and time available, mainly the money available.

126. Major Clausen. Well, did you ever get any request from the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department to speed up this work?
General Hannum. No. When I saw General Short he seemed to be very well satisfied. I went around with him in May of 1941 and also in October of 1941 when I was out there.

127. General Frank. Did you have any functions at this end of procuring, getting priorities on, or expediting delivery of supplies or equipment?
General Hannum. Yes; we were the procurement agency here in the division office for all the supplies and personnel for the district engineer, and particularly after Pearl Harbor and even before Pearl Harbor we had great difficulty in getting transportation to get them out there.

128. General Frank. Did you have any difficulty in getting equipment because of the scarcity?
General Hannum. It took time, but we were able to get them.

129. General Frank. Priorities?
[2067] General Hannum. The critical items under the priority system didn't go into effect, I believe, until some time after Pearl Harbor, but we got numerous pieces of equipment.

130. General Frank. Scarcity of material and lack of shipping; was that it?
General Hannum. No; it was lack of shipping space. Both the Army Transport Service, and particularly the Army Transport Service at that time, and the Navy, however, helped us out on getting over a good deal of supplies and personnel.

131. General Frank. There was no scarcity of shipping?
General Hannum. Scarcity of shipping? There was scarcity of shipping, yes. There was no scarcity of materials. I thought you referred to materials.

132. General Frank. I know, but I am trying to find out what could have delayed construction, if there was a scarcity of shipping.
General Hannum. What delayed construction was mainly a scarcity of qualified labor. If there is any delay in construction, construction could have gone ahead a good deal faster if we could have gotten qualified labor over there promptly, and qualified supervision. That office, the work in the District office increased perhaps ten-fold in December of 1942, and they didn't have the personnel there to handle it, the qualified personnel either in the field or in the office, and it was very difficult to secure qualified personnel at that time.

133. General Grunert. Whose business was it to get that qualified personnel? The contractor?
General Hannum. No. The contractor, yes, for his own work, and the Division office helped him on that. For the office work in the District office, initially the District office itself, which in so far as local sources were concerned, in so far as sources here were concerned, we did endeavor to secure the personnel which was requested, and even after Colonel Lyman took over that office, even for some months after that it still was not operating efficiently administratively.

134. Major Clausen. Sir, with reference to the letters that I read to you from Colonel Lyman to General Reybold, do you recall that Colonel Wyman was relieved shortly after that second letter was written?
General Hannum. He was relieved, as I recall, by an order which placed the work directly under the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, the same as it had been placed under the Commanding General in Alaska.

135. Major Clausen. Did you get a copy of a letter from General Reybold answering the letter of 27 February, 1942, this letter from General Reybold to Colonel Lyman dated March 16th, 1942, stating that the re-assignment of Colonel Wyman was going to be effected?
General Hannum. No.

136. Major Clausen. Well, in any event, did you have anything to do with his relief yourself?
General Hannum. No.

137. Major Clausen. Did you have anything to do with his assignment to the Canol Project?
General Hannum. No, sir.

138. Major Clausen. Or up there to Alaska?
General Hannum. No.
139. Major Clausen. Do you know whether on this Canol Project [2069] he was reprimanded under the 104th Article of War for failing to observe safety precautions, resulting in part in the Dawson Creek explosion?

General Hannum. No. That Canol Project was not under my direction.

140. Major Clausen. I see.

Sir, with regard to this letter from General Kingman to Mr. Schofield dated August 28th, 1941, what did you have to do with that letter yourself?

General Hannum. With this letter?

141. Major Clausen. Yes, sir.

General Hannum. By General Kingman to Schofield?

142. Major Clausen. Yes, sir.

General Hannum. I don't know that I had anything to do with it unless I sent a letter to Kingman about the case. I don't recall that, though.

143. Major Clausen. Well, would you make inquiry in that respect also at the Division Engineer's office here?

I have no further questions.

[2070] 144. General Frank. Did you state that you knew nothing about the association of Wyman and Rohl in Los Angeles?

General Hannum. No; I did not know of any relationship between Wyman and Rohl. I knew that Rohl was a contractor, but I had no knowledge of any particular social relations or other relations, other than official, that Wyman may have had with Rohl.

145. General Frank. When Wyman had the supervision of this contract in which Rohl was involved, in Los Angeles, was he then under your jurisdiction?

General Hannum. No, General Kingman was then Division Engineer, here. I relieved General Kingman, here, in January 1938, and that contract, as I recall, for the breakwater had been made the year or two before that.

146. General Frank. The contract had been made, but Wyman was operating down there, in 1938 and 1939, while you were the division engineer here?

General Hannum. Wyman went out there in 1935, I believe.

147. General Frank. Out where.

General Hannum. To Los Angeles. He was assigned as district engineer in 1935 or 1936, along about that time.

148. General Frank. And when did he go to Honolulu?

General Hannum. He went out there in 1939 or 1940, as I recall.

149. General Frank. Therefore, he was in Los Angeles for over a year under your jurisdiction while you were division engineer here?

General Hannum. Yes, yes; that is correct.

150. General Frank. And you knew nothing of his associations?

[2071] General Hannum. No, no. I don't know that he had any association with Rohl during the period that he was district engineer, after my arrival. It never came to my attention. We had no contracts with Rohl in the Los Angeles district, at that time.

151. General Frank. When did they have the breakwater contract down there?
General Hannum. That breakwater was finished, as I recall, in December 1938.

152. General Frank. What kind of system or arrangement did you have as division engineer to check on your district engineers?

General Hannum. Well, when the engineering papers came in, these plans and specifications were reviewed in the engineering division in my office, and comments submitted to me, and I passed on them, and the contracts at that time had to be approved in Washington. Copies of the contract came to my office. We had copies of the contract, plans and specifications, and I went out and inspected the work with the district engineer, to inspect the progress, and also see whether the work was being carried out, and discussed with him as to whether it was being carried out in accordance with the plans and specifications.

153. General Frank. Did he know when you were coming, generally?

General Hannum. Generally speaking, I think he did; yes. I customarily let him know when I was coming, to make sure that they would be there when I arrived.

154. General Frank. Did you have any organization under which you had an administrative inspector go into a district to find out how the work was being done?

General Hannum. Yes; that is required by the Engineer Department regulations. Administrative auditors and inspectors go out, as I recall now it was at least twice a year—at least once a year, and perhaps twice a year.

155. General Frank. But they are more in the nature of auditors, and their work is not in the nature of making inspections along the line that the War Department inspectors generally make, is that correct?

General Hannum. It is an audit of the accounts, and the records of the district office, yes—an administrative inspection of all the administrative records of the office.

156. General Frank. You did not have any arrangement in your system of finding out what the personal operations of your district engineers were, did you?

General Hannum. I don't know what you mean by "personal operations."


General Hannum. Personal contacts?

158. General Frank. Yes.

General Hannum. No, no; only what would be observed by the division engineer going out and contacting the district engineer and knowing the persons with whom he happened to be associating.

159. General Frank. If he knew you were coming, and he had good sense, he would not disclose anything that was not proper, do you think?

General Hannum. So far as I observed at any time there was no suspicion of any guilt on the part of Wyman in his social [2073] contacts.

160. General Frank. That is, so far as you know; but I am still talking about some sort of set-up in your machinery to find that out. Did you have any sort of arrangement to find that out?
General HANNUM. You would set up such an arrangement as that only if you were suspicious of somebody, wouldn’t you? A brother officer, you wouldn’t suspect that he was carrying on some improper relations with someone.

161. General FRANK. The War Department has a whole Inspector General’s system set up that makes just that kind of inspection arrangement; and the engineers had none of it in their districts and divisions, evidently.

General HANNUM. Nothing—no, no regular set program of anything like that; no.

162. General FRANK. A condition of injudicious, improper association between a district engineer and a contractor could have existed then without your knowing anything about it?

General HANNUM. Oh, you mean in a monetary or a pecuniary way?

163. General FRANK. I mean this: Do you think that it is proper for a district engineer to accept entertainment continuously, to be on parties continuously, to be over a period of time intoxicated with a contractor with whom the district engineer is doing business?

General HANNUM. No, no.

164. General FRANK. That is what I am talking about.

General HANNUM. Yes, yes; but I don’t know that that has been established, in the case between Wyman and Rohl, though.

165. General FRANK. You have heard no reports to that effect?

General HANNUM. I have heard in recent months some allegations to that effect.

166. General FRANK. This happened when he was operating under your jurisdiction.

General HANNUM. Where and when, if I may ask? Well, I don’t know that that is important, sir.

167. General FRANK. I am trying to find out if the organization in the Engineer Corps was based on an absolute trust of the next subordinate, with almost no check on him.

General HANNUM. There are numerous checks, to see that the work is being carried out as planned and as specified, in accordance with the regulations.

168. General FRANK. What was your measure of efficiency and achievement?

General HANNUM. The character of the work, and the progress of the work.

169. General FRANK. Specifically, who finds that out, or who did find that out when you were division engineer?

General HANNUM. Well, I found it out, myself, by the reports that came in. The reports of operations that came in, under the various contracts, and also by personal inspections, and when the work became so heavy that there were so many projects, one man couldn’t cover it. I had additional assistants to go out and check the progress of the work.

170. General FRANK. Did you ever check on Wyman’s sobriety?

General HANNUM. I have been with him on a number of occasions, and have taken a social drink with him. My custom is
to take one or two, and stop, because I never like to lose control of myself mentally. Wyman would take more than that; but I have never seen him, as I say, lose control of himself, or be drunk.

171. General Frank. Are you conversant with the congressional investigation of the Rohl-Wyman association?

General Hannum. No.

172. General Frank. Are you conversant with the California State investigation that involved Rohl and Wyman?

General Hannum. No, only what I saw by way of extracts of what was published in the newspapers.

173. General Frank. I suggest you read them.

Now, in answer to the question that I asked about a type of association between district engineer and contractor, you did not answer that question, if it were proper for a district engineer to continuously do those things.

General Hannum. I think I answered no to your question, General. I think I answered no to that general question that you gave.

174. General Frank. That it was not?

General Hannum. It was not a proper thing, as you say, to accept entertainment from him, and gratuitous gifts.

175. General Frank. No, I didn't say anything about gratuitous gifts, but continuous entertainment, and to establish an intimate personal association.

General Hannum. Well, I don't think that an engineer officer or any contract officer should be denied the privilege of social contact with a contractor just because he happens to be a contractor. That's a personal, social relationship outside [2076] of business; provided he doesn't let that interfere with his business, official status.

176. Major Clausen. When you discussed with Colonel Hunt, his report, if you did, do you know that that report of Colonel Hunt shows, wholly aside from the other aspect, that the intimate social relationship which existed between Rohl and Wyman impaired Wyman's efficiency as an officer?

General Hannum. I don't. I haven't seen Colonel Hunt's report. He did not show that to me.

177. Major Clausen. You wouldn't condone, for example, would you, sir, the entertainment of an Army officer by a contractor, with booze and liquor and women and wild soirees in a hotel?

General Hannum. Well, I wouldn't condone that on the part of an officer with a contractor, nor anyone else that he might associate with.

178. Major Clausen. When you made your answer to General Frank, you did not mean that that is the type of entertainment he should accept?

General Hannum. No.

179. Major Clausen. As a matter of fact, that is wrong, isn't it, sir?

General Hannum. That is not proper conduct; no.

180. General Frank. And when that continues over a period of several months or years, as in Los Angeles, it seems peculiar that it should continue without the next higher authority in some measure knowing something about it, over that length of time, through some kind of reporting or inspection system.
General HANNUM. Well, all I can say is that in all my visits, there, neither he nor anyone in the office, nor anyone else with whom I met down there ever mentioned it to me; and I met quite a few people in Los Angeles, at various times.

181. General Frank. Did you ever get any report on him through General Connolly, who was operating down there in that vicinity?

General HANNUM. As to his conduct? No.

182. General Frank. Do you ever inquire as to the standing of your district engineers in the community?

General HANNUM. Yes, yes; that is quite evident, in many places and cases.

183. General Frank. Did you ever inquire as to his standing in Los Angeles, through other than the contractors, of course?

General HANNUM. Well, I don't know that I specifically made a point of inquiring as to his conduct, but by talking to contractors and others who were associated with the district engineers, personalities or rumors would naturally come up, if there were any. I saw Connolly down there several times, and Connolly's remark about Wyman's work was that he found difficulty in coordinating his work with Wyman, on account of Wyman's insistence on getting specific qualified personnel instead of taking run-of-the-mine, that is to say, the WPA personnel.

184. General Frank. The congressional investigation and the California State investigation have indicated a continuous situation of close personal association, with constantly recurring, rather wild parties, over a period of time.

General HANNUM. Well, I don't see how that could have been true, while Wyman was in Los Angeles and I was division engineer, because he showed no sign of the effects of it, whatever, on my visits.

185. General Frank. Nevertheless, we have these investigations and reports by governmental agencies; and you cannot ignore a congressional investigation, nor a State investigation.

Now, what I am coming to is, this situation existed, and the next higher commander, who was responsible for keeping Wyman in line, was yourself.

General HANNUM. Well, as I say, I don't know who gave the testimony, nor the character of the testimony that was given; and was there anything to indicate that there was any connivance with the contractor in a pecuniary way?

186. General Frank. I suggest you read the official reports that exist. What I was after was trying to determine what kind of system existed in your office, to check on the behavior of your subordinates, and evidently other than your own visits?

General HANNUM. Yes, other than my own visit, or reports; persons who might be sent from my office down there to visit, and what they might have observed; and there were others who went down there, under my orders, administrative officers and engineer personnel; and no such reports of conduct like that ever came to me.

187. General Frank. In other words, the man was out there on his own, and if the reports of such operations came to you, they were incidental rather than through predetermined methods?

General HANNUM. Yes; they were incidental to a visit for other purposes, and not the check on a man's personal conduct.
188. Major Clausen. Sir, do you know Mr. Martin, the attorney for Mr. Rohl, of the Rohl-Connolly Company?
General Hannum. No; I do not know him.
189. Major Clausen. You said that you discussed Wyman’s conduct with Mr. Connolly?
190. Major Clausen. You meant General Connolly?
General Hannum. General Connolly. I did not discuss his conduct. I discussed the relationship between General Connolly, when he was in charge of WPA in Los Angeles, and Wyman, who was district engineer. Wyman was securing WPA personnel from General Connolly, to carry on his work.
General Hannum. His work, which was flood-control work, was being carried on to relieve unemployment.
192. Major Clausen. Did you ever discuss Colonel Wyman with Mr. Rohl at this time, when Colonel Wyman was stationed down at Los Angeles?
General Hannum. No.
193. Major Clausen. Or with any member of Rohl-Connolly Company?
General Hannum. No; and as I say, I don’t think I saw Mr. Rohl but once, in my office.
194. General Frank. After this kind of association that we have just mentioned, do you think it was good judgment on the part of Wyman to ask for Rohl to be sent over, to become intimately associated with him again in Honolulu?
General Hannum. No; if he had that relationship, and he knew of it, I think he was foolish to ask for him to come over there to continue it; but the reason that Rohl was taken into the partnership was because he had floating plant, and he was the only one that had floating plant available, which was needed over there in carrying on the work over there in Hawaii. Floating plant was very difficult to get at that time.
195. Major Clausen. Aren’t you mistaken as to that, sir? [2080] Wasn’t the floating plant desirable with respect to the Canal project?
General Hannum. No. We needed floating plant over there. We had very great difficulty in getting suitable floating plant to do the work on those outlying islands where there was no water, no fresh water, no food, everything had to be imported, had difficulty in getting ships to take it out to the islands.
196. Major Clausen. When was it, sir, that Mr. Rohl was in your office?
General Hannum. As I recall, just before he finally went over to Honolulu. He came in to see if we could assist him in getting transportation over, and he saw me at that time, and I didn’t like his appearance at the time.
197. Major Clausen. What was wrong with it?
General Hannum. Well, he didn’t appear to be absolutely sober.
198. Major Clausen. And what did you do about it?
General Hannum. I assumed that he had been out to the Club, or somewhere, and had just come in to see me, and that it was just a temporary matter.
199. Major Clausen. What did you do about it, sir?
General Hannum. I did nothing further about it.
200. Major Clausen. That is all.
201. General Frank. Were you at all conversant with the deal under which the yacht VEGA, belonging to Mr. Rohl, was taken to Honolulu?
General Hannum. The yacht VEGA was taken to Honolulu on request of Colonel Wyman that it be sent over. He had great difficulty in getting any kind of transportation to carry things between the islands out there, and it was doubtful, in our opinion, whether the VEGA would be suitable; but some work was done on it to try to make it suitable, and it was sent over.
202. General Frank. Do you know anything about the cargo, between California and Honolulu?
General Hannum. No, I do not know about the cargo.
203. General Frank. Do you know whether the VEGA ever was used or not?
General Hannum. No, I don't know whether it was used after it got over there, or not, or to what extent it was used. I think perhaps the records in the office might show that.
204. General Frank. While Colonel Wyman was under your jurisdiction, you know of no incident in which his conduct was not above reproach?
General Hannum. His wife divorced him, and after being divorced he was remarried—if that is to his discredit, why that's about the only thing that I can think of, at the present time.
205. General Frank. You knew nothing whatever about his general conduct?
General Hannum. You are going back to his relations now with Rohl, again?
206. General Frank. Yes.
General Hannum. No, no; I think I have said.
207. General Frank. And you knew nothing about his capacity for consuming liquor?
General Hannum. No.
208. General Frank. Do you know whether he was put on a pledge by Colonel Lyman?
[2082] General Hannum. I did not know that. I do not know what authority Colonel Lyman would have to put him on a pledge.
209. General Frank. When Colonel Lyman first went to Honolulu, Colonel Wyman was then up in the engineer regiment at Schofield; he had not yet been designated as district engineer.
General Hannum. I think that, as I recall it, General, Wyman was ordered from Los Angeles to Honolulu as district engineer.
210. General Frank. I think if you will look up the records, for your own information, now, down in the division engineer's office, you will find that Wyman was sent from the Engineer Regiment to Honolulu as district engineer.
General Hannum. Oh, I recall, now; I believe you are right, General. I think he was temporarily on. Yes, that is right; he was sent over to deal with troops originally. Major Burnell was the district engineer at that time, and then Burnell was relieved and Wyman was put in his place. You are right. I recall that, now.
211. Major Clausen. Do you recall, when you testified before Colonel Hunt, with regard to Colonel Wyman, you said:

On one occasion, not necessarily in serious conversation, I know that he indicated that he could hold his liquor, indicating that he had a capacity to consume a considerable amount, without it very seriously affecting him.

General Hannum. I recall it.

212. Major Clausen. When did you have that discussion with Colonel Wyman?

General Hannum. With Colonel Wyman? I don't recall the exact incident, whether it was on this side, or over in Honolulu.

[2083] 213. General Grunert. Will you give me a little line-up on just the relationship between the division engineer and his district engineers? Are your district engineers under you for administration, for disciplinary action, for control and supervision? Does all that apply as with troops? They were actually under your command, but are there certain limits, or what?

General Hannum. No, the division engineer has supervisory control over the operations personnel in the district.

214. General Grunert. Suppose the district engineer does commit himself as to conduct, is it your business to take action against him?

General Hannum. I would take action against him, yes, or warn him, and consult with him, and advise him.

[2084] 215. General Grunert. In other words, he is under your command for his conduct?

General Hannum. Yes, I think I could say so.

216. General Grunert. For instance, did Wyman have to get your O. K. to give Rohl a contract?

General Hannum. No. That was an arrangement that was made between—Wyman was carrying out the contract. He had, of course, authority to contact the contractors as contractors directly and direct them. He did not have to come to me for authority to secure Rohl's services over there.

217. General Grunert. Because they were the contracting firm with which the District Engineer was doing business; therefore he could get them over there on his own without your O. K.?

General Hannum. Yes. He would issue the necessary instructions to his contractors initially without consulting me.

218. General Grunert. Did you ever get any report about Wyman's conduct from any source, as to his lack of sobriety or his conduct otherwise?

General Hannum. You mean, in Los Angeles or Honolulu?

219. General Grunert. Anywhere while he was under your command.

General Hannum. No, I don't believe so, General. I do not recall hearing any adverse criticism of his conduct except his personality and ability to irritate people. There was brought up one morning the question of his administration and the differences between Wyman and Lyman. When December 7th came the troops on Hawaii needed a lot of supplies and other things, which they did not have, and in taking their positions, their combat positions, they secured materials from the various merchants around the island, and in many cases they did not give [2085] receipts for the materials which they obtained. Then later Wyman, according to his report to me, tried to
have the Department Engineer issue instructions or have them issued by Department Headquarters that in securing these materials the commanding officer, or even a non-commissioned officer, whoever got the materials, should give a receipt to the merchant from whom he received them, merchant or other person. That apparently was not done, according to what I understood.

After things quieted down, the bills were received and turned over to the District Engineer for payment. Wyman had very great difficulty in getting anyone to certify that the materials had been received. He had no authority to make payments of equipment money unless he could get a proper certificate of the receipt of those things. That led to a confusion and a difference between Wyman and Lyman at the time. It also irritated a great many merchants and others who were delayed in receiving payment until there was an opportunity to find out whether the materials had actually been delivered by that merchant to someone in the military service.

220. General Grunert. Then in answer to my question do I understand that you never received any complaint about Wyman that would cause you to take disciplinary action?

General Hannum. No, sir, I did not receive any such complaint.

221. General Grunert. And during the time he was under your jurisdiction, you know nothing about his conduct that would require any such action?

General Hannum. No.

222. General Grunert. Do you know of any delays in construction [2086] that are properly chargeable to the District Engineer through inefficiency or neglect?

General Hannum. No, sir. My experience with Wyman was that he was a driver and he pushed things and pushed them hard, and in doing so he did irritate some of his subordinates and other persons.

223. General Grunert. You know that of your own personal knowledge?

General Hannum. Yes, sir, he was a hard taskmaster.

224. General Grunert. Do you know of your own knowledge whether or not any action of the contractors in Hawaii resulted in delay of construction there?

General Hannum. No, except unless it be inefficient labor. Of course, they had very great difficulty in getting efficient labor and they did not accomplish what might have been accomplished in normal times in this country, on account of the lack of qualified labor.

225. General Grunert. Then I might ask you this question: Do you know whether any such delays were intentional on the part of any contractor?

General Hannum. I would say that they would not have been intentional. I think that they were trying to execute the contract as rapidly as possible and to the best of their ability.

226. General Grunert. With your knowledge of construction, as an engineer officer experienced in construction, had someone else been in Wyman's place under the conditions that existed, do you think they could have done a better job, as good a job, or a job with less success or progress?
General Hannum. I do not believe they could have accomplished more in the way of construction work. I do believe that they could have established better relationships with the public and within their own organization.

227. General Grunert. Any more questions?
228. General Russell. There has been considerable testimony about a man named Lyman. Lyman died out there, didn’t he?

General Hannum. Yes, sir. He went out there. He was on duty as district engineer in Boston along about 1936 or 1937. He was advised by the doctors to retire. He did not want to retire. He thought that by going and taking duty with a regiment out at Honolulu he would not work under such heavy pressure and he would get along all right and when he completed his assignment to the engineer regiment out there, after two years he would retire and live out in Honolulu or in the Hawaiian Islands.

229. General Russell. He was a native Hawaiian?
230. General Hannum. Yes. The family was from the Island of Hawaii.

230. General Russell. You state this man Wyman was rather difficult to get along with and irritated people considerably. What about Lyman?
231. General Hannum. Lyman had a different personality, a pleasing personality. He made friends easily.

232. General Russell. And he did not irritate people?
233. General Hannum. No, I don’t think he did.

234. General Russell. If any friction existed between Wyman and Lyman, it would be your judgment that Wyman would be responsible for the friction?

General Hannum. Not necessarily so. There were differences of opinion. Lyman was a positive character, too, and when he made up his mind he was just as positive as Wyman was, and because they were not, either one, under the other, there would naturally be friction there on that particular matter.

235. General Russell. That is all.

236. General Grunert. Knowing what you did, if you had to do it over again would you choose Wyman to get that sort of a job done, or would you trust it to somebody else?

General Hannum. Under the present conditions and what has developed, I would not want to use Wyman again in the same place, under the same conditions.

237. General Grunert. General, It may happen that as our investigation proceeds we may want to ask you a few more questions when we come back through here. Do you expect to be here off and on for the next month or so?

General Hannum. I will be in the States somewhere.

238. General Grunert. But not necessarily here in San Francisco?

General Hannum. No, but I can be obtained through San Francisco, here.

239. General Grunert. There may be a few points which the Board wants to clear up, of which they may think you have knowledge, and, therefore, although we are through with you now we may want ask you a few more questions if points come up to be cleared up.
General Hannum. Yes, sir. I can leave my office and phone number in Sacramento.

238. General Grunert. From what questions that have been asked and the testimony that has been given, do you know of anything that has not been brought out which might be of assistance to the Board, that you would like to introduce as evidence?

[2089] General Hannum. This relates particularly to Wyman’s relations with Rohl and Wyman’s performance of duty as District Engineer in Honolulu preceding and following Pearl Harbor.

239. General Grunert. Yes, as limited to anything that had to do with the attack on Pearl Harbor, either background or leading up to it, or personalities concerned with, not any ancient history or things that happened afterwards, unless they have some bearing upon what happened then.

General Hannum. And Wyman’s conduct included?

240. General Grunert. And Wyman’s conduct included.

General Hannum. Well, I can tell you something which I heard circumstantially that took place on December 7th in Honolulu, regarding Wyman’s conduct there, but I think that you can get that firsthand possibly better from the personnel in the Honolulu office who were there with regard to that matter.

On December 7th, which was a Sunday, I was coming back from Washington and was on the train this side of Chicago, when the radio recorded Pearl Harbor was being bombed. When I arrived here in San Francisco Colonel Matheson, who was my assistant, reported to me that Wyman had called up by radio phone from Honolulu on early Sunday afternoon, tried to get me, could not get me and finally got Colonel Matheson at his house in Burlingame. Colonel Wyman reported to Colonel Matheson “We are being bombed.” Colonel Matheson asked him whether he could do anything. He said nope, he couldn’t do anything; he just wanted to report they were being bombed. That was all the conversation.

When I went to Honolulu later, which I think was in May of 1942, I learned or it was reported to me that Wyman on the [2090] evening of December 7th, Sunday evening, when the troops were being disposed for defense of the island, happened to be along the waterfront at Honolulu and saw that the little ship harbor there to the east of the main harbor, where a lot of little boats were collected and into which there was an opening from the sea, with a shallow depth of water of 6 or 8 feet over the reef, that that area was not covered, not protected. He proceeded to take measures to get civilians and secured arms from the Ordnance Depot nearby, and had them armed, and within a few hours had taken defense measures and had the place covered, with rifle fire, of course; he had no other means.

I will be very glad, if there is anything more that occurs to me, to report it to you, any circumstances which I think might be of use to you in your investigation in connection with, as I understand, Wyman’s conduct as District Engineer in Honolulu, and the conduct of his work.

241. General Grunert. Yes, as to his conduct, his work, delay in construction, generally about the construction work in Hawaii prior to December 7th.
General HANNUM. Very good, sir.

242. General GRUNERT. That may have a bearing upon delays that may have influenced the defenses against the attack of December 7th.

General HANNUM. Yes, sir.

243. General GRUNERT. Thank you very much.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

(Thereupon at 5 p. m., the Board concluded the hearing of witnesses and proceeded to other business.)
CONTENTS

THURSDAY, AUGUST 31, 1944

Testimony of:

Colonel Lathe B. Row, Temporarily Assistant Inspector General, Western Defense Command, Presidio of San Francisco, California

Major Howard F. Cooper, Air Corps, Army Air Force Base, Unit ATC

Thomas E. Tillman, 1230 Shafter Street, San Mateo, California

Thomas Ernest Connolly, 2100 Fulton Street, San Francisco, California

Walter Wilton Horne, 9125 Wilshire Boulevard, Beverly Hills, California

DOCUMENTS

Memorandum, 14 February, 1942, Department Inspector General to Chief of Staff

Confidential Report to Colonel Row

Excerpts from page 10 of Colonel Hunt's Report

Excerpts from page 11 of Colonel Hunt's Report

Excerpts from page 31 of Colonel Hunt's Report

Excerpts from F. R. I. Report, October 29, 1942

1 Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate pages of original transcript of proceedings.
THURSDAY, AUGUST 31, 1944.

Present of San Francisco, Cal.

The Board, at 9 a. m., pursuant to recess on yesterday, conducted the hearing of witnesses, Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President of the Board, presiding.


Present also: Colonel Charles W. West, Recorder, Major Henry C. Clausen, Assistant Recorder, and Colonel Harry A. Toulmin, Jr., Executive Officer.

General Grunert. The Board will come to order.

TESTIMONY OF COLONEL LATHE B. ROW, 03601: TEMPORARILY ASSISTANT INSPECTOR GENERAL, WESTERN DEFENSE COMMAND; PRESIDIO OF SAN FRANCISCO.

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. General Grunert. Colonel, the Board is after facts concerning the attack on Pearl Harbor, incident to that attack, or connected therewith. It is charged with investigation of certain things that happened in and about Honolulu, connected with Colonel Wyman, and for that purpose you have been called to give the Board some information. General Frank has charge of this particular part of the investigation, and he will lead in questioning, and the Board will fill out where it sees fit. General Frank.

2. General Frank. Will you state any assignment which you had with respect to an investigation that you made concerning the activities of Colonel Wyman.

Colonel Row. I was assigned as Inspector General, Hawaiian Department, some time in May 1941, and continued on that assignment until March 1943. One of the assignments given to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department which I found when taking over the office was inspections of cost-plus-fixed-fee contract operations within the Department. At that time nothing had been done relative to the inspections, and during the summer and fall of 1941 this work was started.

The inspections were turned over to the Inspector General, Hawaiian Department.

3. General Frank. That was yourself?

Colonel Row. That was myself. These inspections and investigations were in the main made by subordinates in a section which was
organized as a Cost-Plus-Fixed-Fee section. A very small part of the work of inspections and investigations were made by me personally, although under my supervision.

4. General Frank. Were you thoroughly familiar with the results and the details?

Colonel Row. I supervised the reports, and interested myself in the progress of them.

5. General Frank. All right.

6. Major Clausen. Sir, did you have occasion to make a report concerning Hawaiian Constructors, Colonel Wyman, et al., about February 1942?

[2094] Colonel Row. I did.

7. Major Clausen. And would you let me have that, please? The record shows the witness handed me a document consisting of three pages, with a fourth page containing a little note, on the top. By the way, in whose handwriting is this, Colonel, “recommending relief of.” on this little note?

Colonel Row. That was mine, personally.

8. Major Clausen. I am going to read this report into the record, if I may, so that the Board may hear. It is dated 14 February 1942, on the stationery of the Headquarters, Hawaiian Department, Office of the Department Inspector General.

Memorandum: To the Chief of Staff.

1. The preliminary portion of the investigation now being made by Lieutenant Colonel Emil W. Leard, I. G. D., of this office regarding the operations of the U. S. District Engineer indicates that the following conditions exist:

a. That the District Engineer has antagonized the business firms of Honolulu and private individuals of the community by his failure to properly meet obligations, peremptory actions, and lack of tact on the part of himself and certain members of his staff.

b. That due to the District Engineer’s failure to coordinate the procuring, auditing, and disbursing sections of his organization payments to dealers for merchandise delivered and services rendered are in some cases long overdue. Some firms are threatening to refuse further sales unless outstanding obligations are paid in full and kept current. Many smaller businesses now are faced with financial difficulties due to their inability [2095] to collect amounts due them from the District Engineer. It has been ascertained that of the larger firms approximately $500,000.00 is due Lewers & Cooke and approximately $60,000.00 is due Mr. Murphy, the owner of Murphy Motors and Aloha Motors. There are indications that similar large amounts are due other firms.

c. That the District Engineer’s delay in paying wages, sometimes for periods of several weeks, is adversely affecting the prosecution of defense projects and the morale of employees engaged on these projects.

d. That the failure on the part of the District Engineer to properly and systematically take over the activities of the Zone Constructing Quartermaster on 16 December has resulted in disruption of administrative functions to a marked degree.

e. That the District Engineer’s office as a whole has not been organized in such a manner as to operate with efficiency.

f. That there is evidence that the District Engineer has harassed the former employees of the Zone Constructing Quartermaster and has subjected them to mental persecution to such an extent that many of the key men have refused to work in his office.

g. There is evidence to indicate that the employees of the former Zone Constructing Quartermaster who have been transferred to the office of the District Engineer are discontented and dissatisfied over conditions existing therein.

2. Mr. Murphy, the owner of the Murphy Motors and Aloha Motors, stated to Lieutenant Colonel Leard yesterday (13 February 1942) that he has been unable to collect past due obligations for trucks and automobiles
purchased by the District Engineer. He further stated that he is going to the mainland by clipper within three days and that he contemplates bringing these matters to the attention of Delegate King and such other authorities in Washington as may be necessary to secure remedial action unless he can be assured his unpaid bills will be settled promptly. He also stated that he contemplates refusing to make delivery on orders now on hand for more motor transportation. Mr. Murphy is extremely bitter over the manner in which he and other automobile dealers have been treated by the District Engineer.

3. In addition to the matters mentioned above, past inspections and recent numerous incidents requiring investigation have disclosed that the administration and operation of the District Engineer activities since 7 December 1941 have been exemplified by extravagance and waste and general maladministration. It was discovered during the course of inspections of District Engineer activities prior to 7 December that his administrative set-up was improperly coordinated and was so mentioned in these reports of inspection. The District Engineer, in his replies, has stated that steps had been initiated to correct the irregularities and deficiencies reported. It is now evident that many of these irregularities and deficiencies still existed on 7 December 1941 and have been aggravated by the increased volume of his activities [2097] incident to the outbreak of war and the taking over of the functions of the Zone Construction Quartermaster on 16 December 1941. Colonel Wyman's methods of administration have been such as to antagonize many persons, military and civil, both within and without his organization. His actions have also been ridiculed and criticized in the community. I believe that this condition is to the great detriment of the Army as a whole and the Engineer Corps in particular.

4. In my opinion Colonel Wyman does not possess the necessary executive and administrative ability or the leadership to cope with the present situation existing in this Department. In addition to the matters set forth in paragraph 1 above, inefficiency of his office has further been demonstrated by:

a. His methods of purchase, assignment and use of motor vehicles.

b. His waste of money in the renting, remodeling and furnishing of offices for himself and his staff.

c. The building of elaborate and expensive ($21,652.46) air-raid shelters at the Punahou School for the use of himself and the executives of the contractor. These shelters have sufficient capacity to protect only a small percentage of the number of employees on the Punahou Campus.

d. Directing his contractor to take over and operate the Pleasanton Hotel at an estimated loss of $2,500.00 per month when a mess is operated and at the rates and room assignments fixed by the District Engineer. [2098] The principal beneficiaries of the use of this hotel to date have been Colonel Wyman and wife, and his staff and their dependents. This hotel was taken over on 16 January 1942 and a mess was established on 26 January 1942.

e. Failing to utilize to best advantage the services of Lieutenant Colonel Harrold, former Zone Constructing Quartermaster, and his highly trained assistants.

f. His failure to stabilize assignments of personnel to positions of responsibility, and his failure to delegate authority to his administrative assistants to act for him.

g. His failure to establish a system of accountability to insure the proper accounting for the receipt and issuance of construction material.

h. His failure to issue directives in necessary detail and to organize his staff to insure compliance with directives issued by him.

i. His disregard for and violation of orders of the Military Governor concerning the curfew law.

5. Although several of the investigations relative to matters mentioned in paragraph 4 have not been completed, the evidence already obtained substantiates the statements made above and indicate that Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr., C. E., does not possess the necessary executive and administrative ability to properly conduct the affairs of his office. The fact that Mr. Murphy contemplates such drastic action and the fact that business firms threaten to refuse delivery on future orders submitted by the District Engineer indicate the seriousness of the situation [2099] and the need for immediate remedial action.

6. I strongly believe that unless a change in the administration of the office of the District Engineer is accomplished within a short time, most serious repercussions will result.

7. CONCLUSION:

That it is to the best interests of the United States and of the Hawaiian Department that Colonel Wyman be relieved at once as District Engineer.
8. RECOMMENDATION:
That Colonel Wyman be relieved as District Engineer at once.

(s) Lathe B. Row,
Colonel, I. G. D.,
Department Inspector General.

I will read the note which is attached to the face of the document:

Informal Memorandum by Dept Inspector General to Dept Commander recommending relief of Col. Wyman as District Engineer.

The words, "recommending relief of" are inserted over the words, which formerly took their place, as follows:

which resulted in relief of

in other words, the pencil notation.

In view of the seriousness of these allegations and the conduct which had gone on for some time, will you tell the Board how it was necessary for you to expose these conditions, rather than the immediate Commander of Colonel Wyman, the Division Engineer?

[2100] Colonel Row. The operations of the District Engineer had increased so rapidly, and in our opinion the organization set-up was so deficient to take care of it, that it seemed to be impossible to get any corrective action taken. These matters were brought to the attention of Colonel Wyman at various times in the form of reports both written and verbal.

9. General Grunert. What did the Department have to do with Wyman? He was a district engineer under a division engineer—how did the Department inject itself into it?

Colonel Row. These inspections were directed by the Secretary of War in a letter of February 1941.

10. Major Clausen. Now, sir, you have stated to me, and I will ask the question of you now, about prior inspections; that is, prior to the one of February 14, 1942. You have stated to me the fact that copies are not available in your office, here.

Colonel Row. That is right.

11. Major Clausen. But that they are available in Honolulu?

Colonel Row. They should be available.

12. Major Clausen. And I have informed you, have I not, that I was not able to locate the copies in Washington, at that time?

Colonel Row. Yes, that is so; a great many. You may have found some, there, but not all of them.

13. Major Clausen. I am sure that, although I requested, I was unable to find any that preceded 7 December 1941, concerning the conduct that is referred to in your report of February 14, 1942; and I was informed that they would be available either through you, or in Honolulu; so I have asked you for them, and you now tell me that they are not available to you here, but that we will get them in Honolulu?

[2101] Colonel Row. I might explain these inspections, the form of the inspections. They were considered of the continuing type, which allows inspections to be made over several months or an entire year, and then a final report made at the end of the year, and for that reason these reports did not in all cases reach Washington.

14. General Grunert. Then as I understand it, the War Department, as a routine matter, charged the local commander with having his Inspector General investigate or keep track of certain things in the District Engineer's administration.
Colonel Row. That is correct.

15. General GRUNERT. And this was just one of the inspections carried on for that purpose?
Colonel Row. Yes, sir.

16. General GRUNERT. And did that, in a way, take some of the responsibility off the division engineer’s shoulders as to administration of the districts?
Colonel Row. In no manner did it relieve the district commander of his responsibilities.

17. General GRUNERT. The division engineer’s responsibility?
Colonel Row. Yes, sir; the division engineer’s responsibility.

18. General FRANK. Were copies of these inspections sent to the division engineer?
Colonel Row. Oh, yes, sir; in all cases, the reports were sent—not to the division, to the district engineer; but not to the division engineer.

19. General FRANK. Do you know the organizational set-up in the Corps of Engineers?

[2102] Colonel Row. In general; yes, sir.

20. General FRANK. You know that the district in Honolulu was under the division engineer here in San Francisco?
Colonel Row. That is correct; yes.

21. General FRANK. He, in turn, was responsible back to the Chief of Engineers, in Washington?
Colonel Row. Yes.

22. General FRANK. Now, do you know what machinery the division engineer here in San Francisco had for checking up on the district engineer in Honolulu?
Colonel Row. I don’t, at the moment; no.

23. General FRANK. While making those inspections, did you run onto any activity on the part of the division engineer to check or inspect his district engineer in Honolulu?
Colonel Row. I don’t recall at this time.

24. General FRANK. Do you know of any systematic arrangement that he had for inspecting his district engineer?
Colonel Row. I do not; no.

25. General FRANK. Do you know the circumstances which prompted the War Department to have that district engineer’s office inspected by the inspector of the Hawaiian Department?
Colonel Row. All of those activities were to be inspected by an Inspector General; that was the general plan. In the continental United States, all of these inspections were conducted from the office of the Inspector General in Washington, but due to the remoteness of the activities in the Pacific, these duties were charged to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department.

26. General FRANK. You say that the copies of the inspections [2103] were not furnished to the division engineer?
Colonel Row. No, sir; it is to the district engineer.

27. General FRANK. Yet the district engineer was operating under the supervision of the division engineer, and if there were some discrepancies that you had determined in your inspection report, the man to require the correction was the next higher commander to the district engineer, who was the division engineer; that is correct?
Colonel Row. That is correct, yes.
28. General Frank. And yet you didn't give it to the division engineer, you gave it to the district engineer?

Colonel Row. That is true. Of course, these inspections were of a local nature.

29. General Frank. Well, but you found things wrong; you reported them to the district engineer, and then you found they were not corrected, and there was no superior of his to whom they were referred?

Colonel Row. These reports went through the office of the Department Commander.

30. General Grunert. In other words, you were responsible to your Department Commander for them, and any distribution he made was up to him; is that the idea?

Colonel Row. Well, I think it would be the duty of the Inspector General to properly advise the Department Commander on those matters.

31. General Grunert. But you did not think it necessary to send it to the division engineer?

Colonel Row. It had not been done before.

32. General Grunert. I think it should have been done, but [2104] it wasn't done, that is all.

33. General Frank. I was following through with a line of questions which ultimately would indicate that the organization and administration both were rather loose.

Colonel Row. In practically every case, Colonel Wyman replied that corrective action would be taken.

34. General Frank. But there was nobody in Honolulu who could require him to take that corrective action. The man who would require him to take the corrective action was the division engineer here in San Francisco; that is correct, is it not?

Colonel Row. That is true.

35. General Frank. I am not getting after you, at all; I am just trying to uncover the strength or the weaknesses of the system.

36. Major Clausen. Sir, along that line, do you know why it was that, coincident with your report of February 14, 1942, which is addressed to the Chief of Staff of the Hawaiian Department, a letter from Colonel Lyman, dated that same day, was sent to the Chief of Engineers, requesting the reassignment of Colonel Wyman?

Colonel Row. I think that letter was the result of the memorandum which you have read.

37. Major Clausen. The point that I inquired about is, why did not that letter go to the division engineer, who was the immediate superior of Colonel Wyman, if you know? Is there any reason that you know of?

Colonel Row. I know of no reason.

38. Major Clausen. You are familiar, sir, with the investigation by Colonel Hunt?

[2105] Colonel Row. All I know is that he made an investigation.

39. Major Clausen. Sir, I assume that your report of February 14, 1942, speaks for itself. I am going to read, some very brief extracts from the report of Colonel Hunt. On page 9 of his report, he states:

The charge relating to Colonel Wyman's questionable association with Mr. Rohl while in Hawaii, his alleged drunkenness, and occupation of rooms adjoining
those of Mr. Rohl, is not wholly sustained by the known facts and the testimony
adduced, although elements of that association strongly suggest a relationship
entirely inconsistent with the relative positions of the two men. If, as implied
by news articles on the Tenney Committee hearings, and by various individuals,
Colonel Wyman was aware that Mr. Rohl was not a United States citizen when
he signed contract W-414-eng-602, these allegations take on a more sinister
aspect.

Do you recall, of your own knowledge, having investigated any of
those allegations, sir?

Colonel Row. As I recall, the fact that Mr. Rohl was not a citizen
or had not been a citizen until a short time before December 7, 1941,
came to light in an investigation that was conducted as to misuse of
gasoline by the engineers, and during the course of that investigation
it was discovered that he had not been an American citizen until a
short time previously.

40. Major Clausen. Now, in connection with that investigation of
Mr. Rohl, did you hand me three pages, which I now show you, repre-
senting some notes on that investigation?

Colonel Row. I did.
41. Major Clausen. And what are those notes, sir?

[2106] Colonel Row. An extract from these notes, is:

During the course of the above referred to investigation—

42. General Frank. Just what is that?
43. Major Clausen. I just asked you what those pages were. You
describe them to me.

Colonel Row. I don’t recall what these notes are, but apparently
they are notes made by one of my assistants for my information.
44. Major Clausen. I think it is advisable, sir, to read these notes,
marked “Confidential.”

In other words, your statement is that these apparently are notes
made by one of your subordinates, of the investigation that you have
already testified to?

Colonel Row. For information of the Department Inspector
General.
45. General Frank. For information of the Department
Inspector General, who was yourself?

Colonel Row. Yes.
46. Major Clausen. Paragraph 1 says:

(Confidential report to Colonel Row is as follows:)

In connection with an investigation directed by the Department Commander
regarding alleged illegal issues of gasoline to military personnel and employees of
the District Engineer and Hawaiian Constructors, the testimony of several
witnesses indicated that Mr. H. W. Rohl, present head of the Hawaiian Con-
structors, had authorized the issuance of USED plates—

That is United States Engineering Department?

Colonel Row. That is right.

Major Clausen (reading):

plates to privately owned vehicles of several of his employees for the purpose of
official identification and to enable them to obtain gasoline from the government
operated gasoline station on Beretania Street. The testimony further indicated
that Mr. Rohl authorized his transportation superintendent, Mr. Box, to issue
gasoline without charge to other employees of the Hawaiian Constructors who
were operating privately owned vehicles for business use.

2. During the course of the above referred to investigation, correspondence
came to the attention of the investigating officer which indicated that [2108]
Mr. Rohl was born in Germany and was, on 15 August 1941, still not a citizen of the United States.

(Exhibit "A")

May I interpose here this question: Do you know where that Exhibit A will be found?

Colonel Row. It should be in the Inspector General's Office in Hawaiian Department.

47. Major Clausen. Do you know what significance the date of 15 August 1941 has?

Colonel Row. I have no knowledge of that.

48. Major Clausen. I shall continue reading. Paragraph 3:

The testimony of Mr. Rohl was deemed essential in the investigation regarding the gasoline, and it appeared desirable to obtain from Mr. Rohl information as to his status in regard to his citizenship.

4. Repeated attempts were made by the investigating officer to obtain an interview with Mr. Rohl. On the first occasion an appointment was made with Mr. Rohl by telephone to meet him in his office at 10:00 AM the following morning, April 4th. At the appointed time the investigating officer was told that Mr. Rohl was not in. Mr. Cades, the attorney for the Hawaiian Constructors appeared and stated that Mr. Rohl desired him to be present when testimony was taken. Mr. Cades was advised that this would not be permitted. After waiting approximately one-half hour for Mr. Rohl, the investigating officer was told by Mr. Middleton, administrator for the Hawaiian Constructors, that Mr. Rohl would not be able to appear as he had an appointment with General Tinker and Colonel Lyman. Two days later, April 6th, the investigating officer contacted Mr. Rohl personally and informed him that the testimony would have to be taken sometime during that day. Mr. Rohl stated that he was just leaving for an appointment with General Tinker and General Emmons, but that he would come to the Office of the Department Inspector General later in the day, or possibly that evening. At 9:30 PM, April 7th, Mr. Middleton called this office and put Mr. Rohl on the phone. Mr. Rohl then agreed to meet the investigating officer at 9:00 AM the following day, April 8th. The inspector visited Mr. Rohl's office promptly on time and waited until 10:15 AM for Mr. Rohl to appear. He then asked Mr. Rohl's secretary if she could locate him. She telephoned the Pleasanton Hotel and then stated that Mr. Rohl was not there and was probably out with General Lyman. In passing the Pleasanton Hotel after leaving Mr. Rohl's office the investigating officer observed Mr. Rohl's car parked in the hotel grounds, whereupon he stopped and asked the hotel clerk the whereabouts of Mr. Rohl. He was informed that Mr. Rohl was asleep in his room and was not to be disturbed, and further, that he had informed Mr. Rohl's secretary of that fact when she had called a few minutes earlier. The clerk was asked to call Mr. Rohl's room by telephone. Mr. Rohl did not answer. Mr. Kina, the manager of the hotel, was then asked to awaken him and advise him that a representative of the Department Inspector General was there to see him. Mr. Kina went to Mr. Rohl's room and then reported that Mr. Rohl would not be in his office until after 1:00 PM, and that he thoroughly disliked being disturbed. No further direct attempt was made to contact Mr. Rohl, as it was believed useless to waste further time in view of his evasive actions. The following morning the Office of the Military Governor was contacted and requested to take necessary action to compel Mr. Rohl to report to the Department Inspector General at a designated time for the purpose of taking his testimony. The following morning the Office of the Military Governor informed this office that Mr. Rohl had left for the mainland several days before, apparently on the afternoon of the day that he was found asleep in the hotel.

5. Neither Mr. Rohl nor any of his representatives informed the Inspector at any time that he intended to leave the Territory, but on the contrary apparently tried to conceal the fact.

6. The matter of irregularities in gasoline distribution is not believed to be sufficiently serious to warrant Mr. Rohl's evasiveness. I am of the opinion that something else, perhaps his citizenship status or other matters, may account for his actions in persistently avoiding being questioned.

7. This matter has been held in abeyance, as this office was informed that Mr. Rohl would return in about two weeks. As he has not yet returned and no definite information can be obtained as to whether he will return,
it is recommended that the Federal Bureau of Investigation be requested to make a thorough inquiry into his citizenship status from the time he first became connected with the organization known as the Hawaiian Constructors (Cost-Plus-A-Fixed-Fee Contractors) up to the present date, with a view of criminal prosecution against all responsible persons if the facts so warrant.

That is the end of that.

Do you recall whether Mr. Rohl was finally interviewed?

Colonel Row. Mr. Condon of the F. B. I., who is now on duty in San Francisco, was on duty in Honolulu at that time. Yesterday, in order to refresh my memory as to what was done, Mr. Condon stated that authority was obtained from the Department Commander to ask for the assistance of the F. B. I. in this matter and that the F. B. I. conducted investigations relative to this matter.

49. General GRUNERT. What were the dates of those notes?

Colonel Row. I don't recall it.

50. General GRUNERT. They refer to April. April what year?

I am in the air as to the date that these notes were made and handed in. Was it April '41, April '42, or what?

51. Major CLAUSEN. Do you remember, sir?

Colonel Row. It would have to be in April '42.

52. General GRUNERT. And at that time there was question about Mr. Rohl's citizenship?

Colonel Row. It would be from—that would be so.

[2112] 53. General GRUNERT. And wasn't it well known that he became a citizen in '41?

54. General FRANK. September.

55. General GRUNERT. September of '41.

Colonel Row. I believe that is correct, according to the reports.

56. General GRUNERT. Then, I wonder why he evades being interrogated on account of citizenship when he became a citizen, as the Board understands, in September of '41. That is why I wondered what that "April" there referred to, whether April of '42 or April of '41. I just wanted to bring that out in the record because it leaves an impression that that was prior to the time that he actually became a citizen.

Colonel Row. No; he became a citizen——

57. General FRANK. I gather from this that he was over there in August of '41 before he got his citizenship papers; is that correct?

Colonel Row. I can't recall when he went over there. I am not familiar with that.

58. General GRUNERT. When was this investigation about gasoline?

When was that conducted? In '42 or '41? Do you recall that?

Colonel Row. Do you have that?

59. Major CLAUSEN. No, sir.

Colonel Row. That would be sometime in 1942.

60. General GRUNERT. Well, then evidently the April date, the month of April referred to therein, must be '42?

Colonel Row. Yes, sir. I am sure.

61. General GRUNERT. Therefore, that still confuses me more, [2113] why they should be thinking that he was evading being investigated because of citizenship.

But carry on. I just wanted to put that in the record.

62. Major CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.
Sir, I am going to read from page 10 of Colonel Hunt's report, as follows:

(Excerpt from page 10 of Colonel Hunt's report is as follows:)

It is difficult, therefore, to escape the conclusion that Colonel Wyman knew of Mr. Rohl's non-citizenship when the contract was entered into, or at latest shortly after writing the unanswered letter summoning him to Hawaii. In such circumstances any close relationship between Colonel Wyman and Mr. Rohl thereafter would have involved the former in dealings with a man of doubtful loyalty to the United States.

Well, my question was much similar to the one put by General Grunert: whether you of your own knowledge know the basis for this conclusion by Colonel Hunt.

Colonel Row. No, I am not familiar with that.

63. Major Clausen. In other words, did you follow up on that aspect, or was that later on followed up by the F. B. I.?

Colonel Row. It was followed up by the F. B. I. It was handled as a civilian matter.

64. Major Clausen. Until Colonel Hunt came out to Hawaii; is that so?

Colonel Row. I think that is right.

65. Major Clausen. Now, from page 11 of Colonel Hunt's report: [2114] (Excerpt from page 11 of Colonel Hunt's report is as follows:)

Various witnesses testified to having seen Colonel Wyman with Mr. Rohl at various semi-public functions,—

This is referring to Hawaii.

—when both men indulged freely in intoxicating beverages. So far as could be ascertained, most of these instances were prior to the attack of 7 December. No witness was found who could testify to drunkenness on Colonel Wyman's part. His own testimony and that of other witnesses in this respect indicates that Colonel Wyman maintained a totally unnecessary, and in the circumstances, an undesirable social familiarity with the active head of an organization whose prime business it was to profit from work under his supervision. If there is reasonable doubt that this relationship was with a man whose non-citizenship at the commencement of the contract was known to him, there is no doubt whatever that it was with a man who at the time of this relationship in Hawaii, had been proven to Colonel Wyman to have concealed the fact of his alien status. The least that can be said of that relationship is that it displayed a callousness on Colonel Wyman's part, not only toward the character of his associate, but toward the possible consequences of its public display.

Do you recall any facts being brought to your knowledge concerning these incidents that are referred to on this page 11?

[2115] Colonel Row. I don't; don't recall.

66. Major Clausen. Do you recall whether any reports in the Hawaiian Department were given to the Department Commander on those aspects?

Colonel Row. No; so far as I know, no reports were rendered nor any investigations made in connection with that phase of the matter.

67. Major Clausen. Now, on page 31 Colonel Hunt says: (Excerpts from Colonel Hunt's report are as follows:)

The flattery of Colonel Wyman personally and professionally, which was bestowed upon him by his wealthy associate, Mr. Rohl, evoked in Colonel Wyman so complete a confidence in the former as to lead him to an unwise acceptance of Mr. Rohl's judgment and advice during their subsequent association in Hawaii. He thereby relinquished to some extent that independence of judgment required of an officer in charge of the Government's interests, as indicated in his too
ready acceptance of Mr. Rohl's recommendations relating to equipment pur-
chases and appraisals.

Then on this page there is this statement concerning one item:

Colonel Wyman did not act in the Government's best interest when in pur-
chasing Rohl-Connolly equipment at a cost of $160,425.17 against the appraised
value of $131,411.03—

And also this statement:

Colonel Wyman did not act in the Government's best interests in the pur-
chase of equipment from the Hawaiian Contracting Company at a cost of $156,000, in that he based that payment upon a prejudiced appraisal—

Sir, do you recall having received information concerning the
matters which Colonel Hunt has disclosed on this page 31 in these
prior investigations?

Colonel Row. I recall that we did make investigations relative to
the purchase of equipment, but the details I don't recall.

68. Major Clausen. Now, Colonel Hunt infers, by reason of the
discovery of these particular instances of acts of Colonel Wyman not
in the best interests of the Government, that there were others. Do
you recall other instances?

Colonel Row. I don't at this time, but the records in the office of
the Department of Inspector General should show them.

69. General Frank. Who is the Inspector General there now; do
you know?

Colonel Row. Colonel Milard Pierson is the Inspector under Gen-
eral Richardson. I don't recall the Inspector of the Service Com-
mand, the Base Command.

70. Major Clausen. Colonel Hunt on page 391 states as follows, in
questioning a certain witness:

Now, I want to talk about the Hawaiian Constructors. Most observers seem
to agree that their work was not efficiently performed.

Did you get reports to that effect, sir?

Colonel Row. We did receive reports to that effect, and we reported
on them.

71. Major Clausen. And what did you do with reports
as to the inefficiencies of the Hawaiian Constructors?

Colonel Row. These reports were rendered to the District Engineer,
and efforts were made to correct the deficiencies when found.

72. Major Clausen. Did he say so, you mean?

Colonel Row. He reported that he was taking steps to correct de-
ficiencies.

73. Major Clausen. And these reports to that effect were rendered
over what period of time, sir?

Colonel Row. It is my estimation that these reports started in the
early fall of 1941.

74. General Frank. What really happened here was that the chain
of command and control did not uncover this unsatisfactory opera-
tion, but that an agency outside the chain of command of the Engi-
neer Corps, namely the Department Commander, uncovered it and
asked for the relief of this man who was not doing satisfactory work;
and that, therefore, the system of the Engineer Corps in administering
Wyman's work was not sufficient to uncover this condition and this
situation?
Colonel Row. That is correct.

75. Major Clausen. Now, sir, do you recall a Robert Hoffman who was an area superintendent of the Hawaiian Constructors?

Colonel Row. I met him one morning.

76. Major Clausen. Do you recall an incident which occurred in the office of General Farthing when Mr. Hoffman had complaints as to delays and inefficiencies of the Hawaiian Constructors?

Colonel Row. I do.

77. Major Clausen. Will you state to the Board what you recall concerning that incident?

Colonel Row. As I recall, at some date about April or May 1942, Brigadier General—Is it Farthing?

78. Major Clausen. Farthing.

Colonel Row. Brigadier General Farthing, Air Corps, telephoned to me and stated that there was a party in his office who desired to make a complaint. General Farthing asked me if I would come to his office and receive this complaint. I did go to Hickam Field and there met a Mr. Hoffman. I have forgotten his name.


Colonel Row. Robert Hoffman. Mr. Hoffman gave me a sworn statement of a number of pages in length. As I recall, his complaints referred to operations at Bellows Field and included inefficiency of the engineer operations and of the USED: United States Engineer Department. As I recall, the complaints included conflicts of authority, dual control, waste, and so forth. These complaints criticized Colonel Wyman and other personnel.

Do you want me to go right ahead with the story?

80. Major Clausen. Yes, I think so.

Colonel Row. Before leaving Mr. Hoffman, General Farthing told me that he had just given Mr. Hoffman a letter of commendation due to the fact that Mr. Hoffman had been closely associated with Colonel Farthing at Bellows Field.

81. General Frank. And had done good work?

Colonel Row. And apparently had done good work, in the estimation of General Farthing.

82. General Grunert. What work?

Colonel Row. Engineering work.

83. General Grunert. What kind of work?

84. Major Clausen. Area superintendent.

Colonel Row. As area superintendent at Bellows Field.

85. General Grunert. Was he working for Farthing or for Wyman?

Colonel Row. For Wyman. But General Farthing was in command of Bellows Field, as I recall.

86. General Russell. Was Hoffman a soldier?

87. Major Clausen. No, sir. He was employed by Hawaiian Constructors.

88. General Russell. Well, that is different.

89. Major Clausen. Yes.

90. General Frank. Nobody said he was a soldier.

91. General Russell. He could not work for the Engineers if he was working for the contractor.

92. Major Clausen. Well, the Engineers on many occasions issued orders directing the employees.
By the way, the statement to which I invited your attention yesterday, which is already an exhibit before this Board as being a statement given in writing, with exhibits, by Mr. Hoffman to General Farthing: do you recall whether you saw that statement on the occasion when you went to the office of General Farthing?

Colonel Row. No, sir, I did not, as I recall.
39. Major Clausen. All right.
Colonel Row. I don't recall of ever seeing that statement.
40. General Grunert. Before we leave this subject of Hoffman, where is that sworn statement he made that you saw? Is it available to the Board?
Colonel Row. This report was typed.
41. General Frank. What report?
Colonel Row. That Mr. Hoffman gave to me in the form of a sworn statement. I transmitted it to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, by memorandum recommending—
42. General Grunert. Then you think it should be on file in the records of the Hawaiian Department?
Colonel Row. It should be, sir.
43. Major Clausen. At this point I would like to show the witness again the sworn statement or the statement that was furnished by Mr. Hoffman.
44. General Grunert. You have it, then, have you?
45. Major Clausen. I have one, sir, and I would rather assume that this that I have is the statement, although he informed me yesterday that he didn't think it was. I would like to get it. It will just take me a moment.
(There was colloquy off the record.)
46. Major Clausen. I show you, Colonel, Exhibit No. 8-B in evidence before this Board. I will ask you to take a look again and see if that is the statement with the supporting documents that you received—rather, a copy of the statement you received from Mr. Robert Hoffman.
47. Colonel Toulmin. Give the date now.
48. Major Clausen. That was in '42.
Colonel Row. I examined this document day before yesterday, and I wouldn't say definitely that this document was never in the office of the Department Inspector General, but I don't believe it was. I don't recognize any feature of it except as to some of the content, which was similar in nature to the sworn statement that was given to me by Mr. Hoffman sometime in the spring of 1942.
49. Major Clausen. On page 16 of this Exhibit 8-B there is a signature of Robert Hoffman and the date April 29, 1942. There are attached to this statement of Robert Hoffman various documents which are dated in 1941.
50. General Frank. What months?
51. Major Clausen. There are July, September, November, December, August and so forth, and they refer to delays and inefficiencies.
52. I first want to ask the question as to whether you had any conversations with General Farthing after this occasion that Mr. Hoffman was in the office?
Colonel Row. I may have, but I do not recall them.
106. Major Clausen. And with regard to the months of 1942, do you know when that was that you had this conversation with Mr. Hoffman and General Farthing?

Colonel Row. It seems to me it was either in March or April of 1942.

107. Major Clausen. And did the statement that Mr. Hoffman make to you refer to items of delays and inefficiencies that occurred in 1941?

Colonel Row. That is my impression at this time.

108. Major Clausen. And did they refer to items of delays and inefficiencies prior to 7 December, 1941?

Colonel Row. It is my impression that that is so.

109. General Russell. What is the date of that statement?

110. Major Clausen. This is dated April, 1942.

Now, for the record and in order that one thing may tie to another, I am going to read from an F. B. I. report that was furnished to this Board by G-2, which is dated October 29, 1942, on page 49, as follows:

(Excerpt from F. B. I. report, October 29, 1942, page 49, was read as follows:)

Confidential informant T-1 related that his division conducted the investigation which precipitated the transfer [2123] of Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr., as District Engineer of the Hawaiian Islands. In connection with that investigation, one Robert Hoffman, Area Superintendent, Hawaiian Constructors, voluntarily furnished information to Confidential Informant T-1 which indicated many inefficiencies in connection with construction work performed by the Hawaiian Constructors and described in detail instances where major work performed by them had cost the government at least 50 per cent more than it should have cost under the circumstances. According to Informant T-1, Hoffman is considered a capable engineer of wide experience and training whose opinions would undoubtedly carry a considerable amount of weight.

This report is by the party you mentioned from the F. B. I., John Condon. Do you recall having a conversation with Mr. Condon concerning this incident?

Colonel Row. I do not recall any such conversation with him.

111. Major Clausen. Do you recall if some other member of your division did?

Colonel Row. It might have been some other member of my division.

112. Major Clausen. I have no further questions.

113. General Frank. Will you state if, as a result of your investigations of this situation, whether or not in your own mind you concluded, as to the efficiency or inefficiency of the contractors' work, as to whether or not there was waste and so forth?

Colonel Row. I was definitely of the opinion that there [2124] was a great deal of waste and unnecessary expenditure of time and funds.

114. General Frank. That was based on what?

Colonel Row. Our inspections and investigations made by our office.

115. General Frank. A series of them?

Colonel Row. A series.

116. General Frank. But those reports were submitted to the District Engineer and not to the Division Engineer?

Colonel Row. That is correct, as I recall it.

117. General Frank. Do you know whether or not copies were sent to Washington?
Colonel Row. I believe that some of them, in certain instances, were sent on. I believe the records in the office of the Inspector General will show that.

118. General Frank. Otherwise the report just passed back and forth between the Department Commander and Wyman, and the Department Commander had no authority in 1941 to put the screws on Wyman direct?

Colonel Row. No, sir. No cooperation between the Commander and the District Engineer.

119. General Russell. Colonel, I want to see if I can tie the evidence, or some of it, up with a few questions. You became the Department Inspector about when?

Colonel Row. May of 1941.

120. General Russell. How soon after you became the Department Inspector was it before you were directed to investigate any phase or phases of the construction which was being done in the Hawaiian Islands?

[2125] Colonel Row. The order for inspections had been received in the Department some time in February or March, as I recall, of 1941, but no inspections had been made until after my arrival.

121. General Russell. Do you recall when this Colonel Emil W. Leard made the inspection, the report of which has been read into the record by Major Clausen?

Colonel Row. I should think some time between January and March, the early part of March, 1942. As I recall, the report was a memorandum to the Chief of Staff, which was made about the 14th of February.

122. General Russell. Is your testimony now that from the time that you took over as Department Inspector, no investigation into that construction work was made until the year 1942?

Colonel Row. Inspections were made more or less continuously from early fall, at least, in 1941, somewhere in the early fall of 1941.

123. General Russell. Then this division in your office that was set up to investigate the type of contract under which the work was done was actually set up in the fall of 1941?

Colonel Row. Yes, sir.

124. General Russell. We have to this time no records of any inspections up until the Leard inspections, is that true?

125. Major Clausen. I have none, sir, except from the witness. The witness says they were made, but I have not seen the inspections.

126. General Russell. Colonel, did you believe, based upon the inspections made after you became the Department Inspector and [2126] down to the completion of the work, that you are in any position to give an opinion as to the efficiency of the work that was being done by the contractors prior to December 7th, 1941?

Colonel Row. Our opinion was that due to the great expansion of work, engineer work, in Hawaii, the organization of the office of the District Engineer was not properly reorganized to handle the great amount of work that came there. While the engineers were having all of these difficulties, the Zone Construction Quartermaster operating in Hawaii on construction work was properly organized and was having little or very little difficulty. Our inspections included inspections of the Construction Quartermaster, and I would say the results of those inspections were excellent.
127. General Frank. Who was the Zone Construction Quartermaster?
Colonel Row. Lieutenant Colonel Clinton Harrold, Quartermaster Corps.

128. General Russell. How did the work being done under the supervision of the Zone Construction Quartermaster and that being done under the supervision of the District Engineer compare as to extensiveness? Or in size or complexity?
Colonel Row. I believe that the work of the District Engineer was greater in volume and more extensive.

129. General Russell. And more complex?
Colonel Row. And possibly more complex.

130. General Russell. Colonel, in your opinion were the waste, inefficiency and other inadequacies inherent in the construction in 1941 attributable solely to the expansion of the work and the failure of the District Engineer's office to keep his administrative work apace with this expansion?


131. General Russell. Then you do not believe that his personal conduct, including drinking, if any, his association with and contacts with Hans Wilhelm Rohl, had anything to do with this ineffectiveness of the work, the inefficiency or the waste?
Colonel Row. I am unable to answer you on that, because I was not familiar with the personal conduct of Colonel Wyman.

132. General Russell. Laying aside familiarity with the personal conduct of Wyman and the conduct of Rohl which might have to come to your attention by virtue of facts, did rumors of such conduct reach your ears, either as Inspector or as an officer resident in Hawaii?
Colonel Row. As I recall this familiarity between Mr. Rohl and other officials with Colonel Wyman came about largely as a result of our inspection of the Pleasanton Hotel matter. That, as I recall, was the first time that it came to my attention that they were very closely associated.

133. General Russell. Can you tell the approximate date of the inspection of the Hotel matter?
Colonel Row. It would be some time in 1942.

134. General Russell. Did that inspection then discover facts relating to improper relations between Rohl and Wyman in the year 1941?
Colonel Row. No, sir, I do not think so.

135. General Grunert. I have some questions.
I am not quite clear as to the character of inspections that were required from your office as to construction matters. Did those inspections actually include any inspection of engineer work in the field, or was it limited to paper work and [2128] administration and management within the office?
Colonel Row. It was largely administrative inspections. We did not at any time go into the technical engineer matters.

136. General Grunert. Would such inspections as were made disclose the causes for any delays in the matter of completion of engineer projects?
Colonel Row. Yes, I believe it would be within the province of the inspection.
137. General Grunert. Did any such inspection show the reason for any particular delays in the completion of such projects?
   Colonel Row. No, sir.

138. General Grunert. Then you will not be able to tell me whether or not such delays as were discovered were intentional on the part of the military or the contractors?
   Colonel Row. No, sir.

139. General Grunert. The waste and extravagance and such delays as were incidental to the faulty administration, as you might call it, do you know whether or not they were limited to what happened prior to December 7th, or continued after December 7th, or increased after December 7th, compared with prior thereto?
   Colonel Row. I think the waste naturally increased after Pearl Harbor, when the urgency for rapid construction was more apparent.

140. General Grunert. Then is there anything through those inspections to indicate to you that there were intentional delays caused prior to the Pearl Harbor attack which might have been of advantage to the attackers?
   Colonel Row. No, sir, that was never brought into it. [2129] Intentional delays were never brought to our attention at any time.

141. General Frank. Do you think the delay and waste was greater than what might be expected in such a large expansion and under the stress of accomplishing work for war purposes?
   Colonel Row. Yes, sir. We felt that correct organization of the District Engineer's setup would have eliminated a great deal of this waste, which was largely a deficiency in organization, as we saw it.

142. Major Clausen. Do you have a copy of the letter from the Secretary of War asking the Hawaiian Department or the Inspector General to conduct these investigations?
   Colonel Row. I do not have, but it should be on file in the office of the Department or the Inspector General.

143. Major Clausen. And you say the date is February, 1941?
   Colonel Row. About that time, February or March, probably March.

144. Major Clausen. And you were Department Inspector when?
   Colonel Row. From May 1941.

145. Major Clausen. When you assumed that position did you see and read that letter?
   Colonel Row. Oh, yes.

146. General Grunert. Colonel, is there anything else that you can think of to add which might throw light on the entire field of our investigation, anything that has not been brought up, that you think you might add?
   Colonel Row. No, sir.

147. General Grunert. All right. Thank you, very much.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

[2130] TESTIMONY OF MAJOR HOWARD F. COOPER, AIR CORPS: 1466 ARMY AIR FORCES BASE UNIT, ATC.

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel West. Will you please state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station.
Major Cooper. Howard F. Cooper; Major, Air Corps; 1466 Army Air Forces Base Unit, ATC; APO 938, care of Postmaster, Minneapolis, Minn.

2. General Grunert. Major, the Board is after facts, and is trying to get a lead to facts, to find out what happened prior to and during the attack on Pearl Harbor. Your name having appeared as a witness before the Roberts Commission, we asked that you be sent to us so that we could find out what facts you know, and how you can help us out.

Now, tell us, first, what was your assignment, at the time the attack took place, December 7, 1941?

Major Cooper. At the time of the attack, I was a First Lieutenant, Command Headquarters, and Headquarters Squadron, Seventeenth Service Group.

3. General Grunert. And where was that organization stationed at that time?

Major Cooper. It was stationed at Hickam Field.

4. General Grunert. What can you tell us, briefly, about the attack, itself, from what you personally know about it?

Major Cooper. On the morning of December 7, 1941, at about 5 to 7, I heard loud explosions, which got me out of bed, immediately, and I raised the shade and looked over Pearl Harbor and saw huge billows of smoke arising. In a few minutes [2131] after that, loud explosions came from the hangar line, and I immediately ran to the bathroom and looked out over the hangar line and saw planes bombing the hangars.

I got into my clothes with my pistol and gas-mask and helmet and ran down to the squadron; got the First Sergeant to disperse all of the members of the organization, armed with rifles, and walked out onto the parade grounds, where there were two 50-calibers set up. They were not in operating condition. I stayed with one gun until it was in operation, and I walked down to the other gun and ordered the fellows to fire, and they said that one part was missing, for which they were waiting, and they assured me that the part was on its way, any efforts to get it faster would be to no avail since there were two fellows dispatched to get this particular part; and at this time, a third formation of bombers came over and dropped bombs on the barracks. The fellows at the gun were all killed.

5. General Grunert. Was it part of your duties to man those guns during a defense against an air attack?

Major Cooper. No, sir.

6. General Grunert. You just took charge of them, did you?

Major Cooper. Yes, sir.

7. General Grunert. How did you know they were down there?

Major Cooper. I walked out onto the parade ground and saw them.

8. General Grunert. And you say there were some machine guns in position, but they were not ready to fire because of missing parts?

Major Cooper. Yes, sir.

9. General Grunert. And were these machine guns part of the [2132] defensive set-up of Hickam Field?

Major Cooper. No, sir.

10. General Grunert. What were they doing out there, do you know?
Major Cooper. As a result of the attack, attack methods were devised to protect the field, on the spot.

11. General GRUNERT. You mean they were suddenly pulled out there?

Major Cooper. Yes, sir; from the ordnance.

12. General GRUNERT. It had not been arranged beforehand?

Major Cooper. They were pulled out from the ordnance.

13. General FRANK. After the first attack?

Major Cooper. Yes, sir; after the first attack.

14. General FRANK. They had not been out there all night?

Major Cooper. No, sir.

15. General GRUNERT. I understood you to say it was about 5 to 7. Was it 5 to 7, or was it 5 to 8?

Major Cooper. Oh, that was 5 to 7. No, that was 5 to 8.

16. General GRUNERT. You are sure it was 5 to 8, not 5 minutes to 7? because I thought you said 5 to 7.

Major Cooper. Yes, sir; I am positive it was 5 to 8 because when I did finally return to my quarters, my electric clock had stopped at 8 o'clock, and it was about five minutes before that, that the attack started.

17. General GRUNERT. In your testimony before the Roberts Commission you stated, at the time of the attack, you were on Alert No. 3 for about two weeks. What were the forms of alert, and what was No. 3?

[2253] Major Cooper. I am not positive as to the number of the alert. We had three forms of the alert, there. One was, alert against external invasion; and the other was, alert against internal sabotage; and the third was a combination of the two, which was the very serious alert.

18. General GRUNERT. Which one were you on?

Major Cooper. We were on the second, the alert against sabotage.

19. General GRUNERT. Then, though you named it “No. 3,” it might have been some other number, but it was the alert against sabotage?

Major Cooper. Yes, sir; it was the alert against sabotage.

20. General GRUNERT. Because No. 3 happens to be the all-out alert.

Major Cooper. We were not on that; no, sir.

21. General GRUNERT. I wanted to clear up that point in the testimony before the Roberts Commission, because it says “Alert No. 3,” and Alert No. 3 is an all-out alert; and you were alerted for sabotage?

Major Cooper. Yes, sir.

22. General GRUNERT. That happens to be No. 1.

Major Cooper. No, sir, I believe.

23. General GRUNERT. In your remembrance, it was No. 2, but it was the sabotage alert?

Major Cooper. Yes, sir.

24. General GRUNERT. That was the only thing I had to bring out.

Have you any questions?

Thank you very much for coming in.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

(Thereupon, at 10:40 a.m., the Board, having concluded the hearing of witnesses for the morning, took up the consideration of other business.)
The Board reconvened at 2 p. m., and continued with the hearing of witnesses, as follows:

TESTIMONY OF THOMAS E. TILLMAN, 1230 SHAFTER STREET, SAN MATEO, CALIFORNIA.

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel West. Mr. Tillman, will you please state to the Board your name and address.

Mr. Tillman. Thomas E. Tillman, 1230 Shafter street, San Mateo.

2. Colonel West. San Mateo, California?

Mr. Tillman. Yes, sir.

3. General Grunert. Mr. Tillman, the Board is after facts concerning certain things that happened in Hawaii prior to the Pearl Harbor attack and during the attack. We have also been charged with making an investigation of certain things that happened in Hawaii, in which Colonel Wyman was concerned. I believe you have information on that phase, and I will ask General Frank and the Assistant Recorder, Major Clausen, to develop whatever you may know.

4. General Frank. Where were you employed, in 1941?

Mr. Tillman. U. S. Engineers, at Honolulu.

5. General Frank. What was your position?

Mr. Tillman. I was in the estimating section.

6. General Frank. In what office?

Mr. Tillman. In the Operations Office, U. S. Engineers.

7. General Frank. Is that the district engineer?

Mr. Tillman. That's right.

8. General Frank. Who was your immediate superior?

[2135] Mr. Tillman. It was first a civilian, that I can't remember his name. It was later Colonel B. L. Robinson.

9. General Frank. Colonel Robinson was Colonel Wyman's assistant, is that right?

Mr. Tillman. Colonel Robinson was Operations Officer for the district engineer.

10. General Frank. What were your duties?

Mr. Tillman. Estimating the cost of various phases of work that the contractor was going to do for the U. S. Engineers.

11. Major Clausen. You recall that, after Colonel Wyman was relieved from the position as district engineer in Hawaii, you did some work on the air-raid warning system stations?

Mr. Tillman. Yes, sir.

12. Major Clausen. And you explained to me, today, the reason for that. What was the reason? Why were you called in to do that, sir?

Mr. Tillman. I think the principal reason was that they didn't seem to get them completed, and the progress wasn't satisfactory, and they called me in as more of a trouble-shooter, to see if something couldn't be done to speed up the completion of it.

13. Major Clausen. And who gave you directions to do that?
Mr. Tillman. Lieutenant Colonel Weimer.
14. Major Clausen. When were those instructions given you?
Mr. Tillman. I would say either the very latter part of April, or the first of June—right in that.
15. General Frank. What year?
Mr. Tillman. 1942.
16. Major Clausen. Now, you also stated to me, when I asked you today, as to the reasons why the work had been lagging, several reasons. Would you tell the Board what you told me.
Mr. Tillman. You want me to explain it in about the same words that I explained it to you?
17. Major Clausen. Yes. This is informal. You told me something about the work lagging, and you said the reasons were such and such and such. Just start in as you did with me and explain to the Board.
Mr. Tillman. Well, the stations were located in various areas around the island of Oahu. That is the one I am speaking of; and the Island of Oahu was divided up into areas. Each area had an area engineer and a superintendent for the contractors. It so happened that I believe every AWS station was situated at a considerable distance from the office or headquarters of the superintendent and area engineer. It was my observation, while I was area engineer, and other times, too, that the superintendent was not paying a great deal of attention to the construction of the AWS stations. By the way, you understand that the AWS stations were a tunnel drilled in the various places, and usually it was on a hill or a "mountain" as you might call it, there. After the tunnel was completed, certain other phases of work had to be done, there, and when those were completed, then the signal corps made their installations. They would not move any equipment there until they were completed, painted, and the civilian crew ready to move out.
18. General Frank. You are talking about the permanent installations?
Mr. Tillman. That is correct.
19. General Frank. Do you remember where they were?
Mr. Tillman. Yes, I do.
20. General Frank. Will you state where they were?
Mr. Tillman. Koko Head, Opana, Ulupau, Kaena Point, Pumana-hu, Mt. Kaala, and Fort Shafter.
21. General Frank. Was there a tunnel to be constructed at each one of these places?
Mr. Tillman. Yes, sir. As a matter of fact, the installations were in a tunnel, and the specifications called for a 48-foot minimum coverage over it.
22. General Frank. You are giving the name "tunnel" to what they called a "bomb-proof," aren't you?
Mr. Tillman. Well, yes.
23. General Frank. All right.
Mr. Tillman. It was a tunnel, by the way.
24. Major Clausen. Now, Mr. Tillman, you said that the superintendent didn't pay much attention to these AWS constructions. The superintendents to which you refer were superintendents of whom?
Mr. Tillman. For the contractor.
25. Major Clausen. In other words, the Hawaiian Constructors' superintendent?
   Mr. Tillman. That is right.
26. Major Clausen. And what is the basis for your statement in that respect?
   Mr. Tillman. The areas in which the superintendent had control of the work were all large areas. He not only had the AWS stations, but in most instances he had a multitude of other work in progress. And I just think that he had too much work to do.
27. Major Clausen. How long had this lagging of this work continued, to your knowledge?
   Mr. Tillman. At the time of the attack—
28. Major Clausen. You mean December 7, 1941?
   Mr. Tillman. December 7—the runways were given, if I [2138] remember right, a No. 1 priority. I believe the AWS stations were given No. 2 priority.
29. Major Clausen. Given by whom?
   Mr. Tillman. The district engineer. The work involved in building the AWS stations at the beginning of course was all tunnel work or excavation. This excavation or tunnel, whichever one you want to call it, was as I say in every instance at the top or near the top of a mountain. Some of those—in fact every one of them with one exception, was inaccessible to anything but foot traffic and mules. Couldn't get a truck or any kind of equipment near them. It was a tremendous job of digging this so-called "tunnel," it was slow work, very slow. Does that answer it?
30. Major Clausen. Well, I just would like to have you tell the Board and tell me what was the basis for your conclusion that the work was lagging; and I suppose you have told, as much as you can.
   Mr. Tillman. At the time I took over the so-called "trouble-shooting" of the stations, there was quite a complaint from the signal corps that we were not making any progress. Colonel Weimer sent me out.
31. Major Clausen. That is not "Wyman"?
   Mr. Tillman. No, that is not "Wyman."
32. Major Clausen. All right. Proceed, please.
   Mr. Tillman. He sent me out to Fort Shafter to interview a Major and a Colonel in charge of the Signal Corps, I can't recall their names, to find out just what they wanted and required. I went out there and interviewed them, and they just put me right on the spot to get them completed to where they could make their [2139] installations.
33. Major Clausen. Now, Mr. Tillman, in connection with your activities, did you as an estimator have some dealings with the Hawaiian Contracting Company, one of the joint adventurers in the Hawaiian Constructors?
   Mr. Tillman. Not while I was in the estimating section; no.
34. Major Clausen. Did you receive instructions from Colonel Robinson to appraise certain equipment belonging to the Hawaiian Contracting Company?
   Mr. Tillman. I did, Major, but that was after I was placed in charge of the Plant Control section.
35. Major Clausen. All right. Let me have the date, please, on that.
   Mr. Tillman. That date was December 9, 1941.
36. **Major Clausen.** And your position at that time was what, Mr. Tillman?

    **Mr. Tillman.** Head of the Plant Control section.

37. **Major Clausen.** Tell the Board exactly what you did.

    **Mr. Tillman.** I rounded up equipment, rented it, bought it.

38. **Major Clausen.** No, I mean you received some instructions from Colonel Robinson?

    **Mr. Tillman.** Yes.

39. **Major Clausen.** Concerning equipment of the Hawaiian Contracting Company? What instructions were they?

    **Mr. Tillman.** I received a typewritten list of equipment owned by the Hawaiian Contracting Company.

40. **Major Clausen.** From whom?

    **Mr. Tillman.** From Colonel B. L. Robinson, priced out, [2140] itemized and priced, with a request that I go out and make an appraisal of it with a view to buying it. I went out to the Hawaiian Contracting Company’s yard, took an equipment expert with me, started to make the appraisal, and was called to the telephone by the superintendent of the yard, and Mr. H. P. Benson, former president of the Hawaiian Contracting Company, and on the board of directors for the Hawaiian Constructors, was on the phone, and asked me what I was doing out there. I told him I was making an appraisal of the equipment. He said, “That equipment has already been appraised, and I am very much concerned with what you are doing, and I wish you would get out of there.” I did. I went back and picked up my man and went back to the office, reported to Colonel Wyman that so far as I could see the equipment was nothing but junk and we wouldn’t be interested in any of it.

41. **Major Clausen.** You say you reported to whom?

    **Mr. Tillman.** I mean to Colonel Robinson.

42. **Major Clausen.** Did you later receive additional instructions from Colonel Robinson concerning the same equipment?

    **Mr. Tillman.** I did. I was ordered to go back there and make an appraisal, and not let anybody stop me.

43. **Major Clausen.** That was how soon after the first time?

    **Mr. Tillman.** I would say that was approximately two weeks later.

44. **Major Clausen.** All right. Then what did you do?

    **Mr. Tillman.** I then took this one appraiser, and also another one, with me, and went out and made an appraisal of it, turned in a report, it was practically junk and we had no use for it, and would be unable to use it. The equipment was out-- [2141] dated and not equipment suitable for our needs at all.

45. **Major Clausen.** You say you turned in a written report to that effect?

    **Mr. Tillman.** Yes, sir.

46. **Major Clausen.** To whom did you give your report?

    **Mr. Tillman.** Colonel Robinson.

47. **Major Clausen.** Have you a copy?

    **Mr. Tillman.** No, I haven’t.

48. **Major Clausen.** Do you know where we can obtain a copy, other than in Hawaii?

    **Mr. Tillman.** No, I don’t.
49. Major Clausen. Do you know, then, what happened, after you had turned in this adverse report, with respect to Colonel Wyman?

Mr. Tillman. I was told, and I don't remember who told me, and I think it's a fact that Colonel Wyman, the week prior to his being relieved over there, ordered that that same equipment be purchased and the deal completed before he left office.

50. Major Clausen. All right.

At this point, I invite the attention of the Board to page 31 of the written report. It is a confidential report.

What is your present position?

Mr. Tillman. Engineer.

51. Major Clausen. By whom are you employed?

Mr. Tillman. Donald R. Warren Company.

52. General Frank. Who was Mr. Benson?

Mr. Tillman. Mr. Benson was on the executive board of the Hawaiian Constructors, and formerly was president of the Hawaiian Contracting Company.

53. General Frank. Well, who was he to give you instructions, when you were working for the district engineer?

Mr. Tillman. Except that I was on his property, he had no authority.

54. General Frank. Was this equipment later purchased by the Government?

Mr. Tillman. It was my understanding that it was.

55. General Frank. Who was the co-adventurer? Who was the contractor who had charge of building the aircraft warning service stations?

Mr. Tillman. The contractor was the Hawaiian Constructors.

56. General Frank. I know, but when those projects came up, were they handled by the Hawaiian Constructors, as a whole, or were they assigned to different contractors?

Mr. Tillman. No, sir; they were handled by the Hawaiian Constructors.

57. General Frank. As a whole?

Mr. Tillman. As a whole.

58. General Frank. In other words, the Rohl-Connolly Company did not handle one series of projects, and the Woolley Company another?

Mr. Tillman. No, sir.

59. General Frank. And the Callahan Company, another group? They all handled them as a single, definite group?

Mr. Tillman. That is right, in so far as I knew. I didn't know anything about the Rohl-Connolly Company, Mr. Woolley, a Ralph Woolley, was also in the same capacity with Mr. Benson, in the Hawaiian Constructors.

60. General Frank. Do you remember how much was paid for this Hawaiian Contractors' equipment?

Mr. Tillman. The price as it was listed to me was $170,000.

61. General Frank. How much was it worth, as a result of your evaluation?

Mr. Tillman. You mean in so far as the engineers were concerned?

62. General Frank. Yes.
Mr. Tillman. Worth nothing.

63. General Frank. Had it been used by the Hawaiian Contracting Company on government projects?

Mr. Tillman. No, sir. You understand this equipment was some of it 30, 35, and even 40 years old. It had laid in their yard until it was overgrown with weeds, rusty, and—well, in other words, equipment that had been discarded many years before.

64. General Frank. Do you know why the engineers wanted to buy it?

Mr. Tillman. No, sir.

65. General Frank. Do you know whether or not it was ever used?

Mr. Tillman. By the engineers?

66. General Frank. Yes.

Mr. Tillman. No; I don’t.

67. General Frank. Or by the contractors?

Mr. Tillman. No; I don’t. I know some of it could not be used.

68. General Frank. Who comprised the rest of the firm with Benson, in the Hawaiian Contracting Company?

Mr. Tillman. Mr. Ralph Woolley, Paul Graef—G-r-a-e-f—

69. General Frank. No, I am talking about the Hawaiian


Mr. Tillman. Oh, I don’t know. I do know who was supposedly the money in back of it, and that was—I can’t recall it right now. It is a very well known one.

70. Major Clausen, Dillingham?

Mr. Tillman. Dillingham—right. He was supposed to own the company, and Benson was the front for it.

71. General Frank. The Hawaiian Contracting Company was a Hawaiian firm, it was not a California firm?

Mr. Tillman. That is right.

72. General Russell. The Hawaiian Constructors were referred to as a “joint group” or “joint adventurers,” who took on all of this work out there; is that true?

Mr. Tillman. Yes, sir.

73. General Russell. Then Hawaiian Contractors was a local corporation?

Mr. Tillman. That is right.

74. General Russell. And was Hawaiian Contractors a member of this group which was going to do all that work?

Mr. Tillman. No. Shortly after the raid, the conditions there were such that no local contractor—or, I won’t say “no”, but hardly any of the local contractors could get any equipment or material to work with. They were left you might say stranded, and it was my understanding that they took in Ralph Woolley and Mr. Benson just as sort of co-partners in the Hawaiian Constructors.

75. General Russell. As additional parties?

Mr. Tillman. I don’t mean that they took in the firm. I mean that they just took in these two men.

[2145] 76. General Russell. Let us go back to the Hawaiian Contractors; the people with the money in that outfit were the Dillingshams?

Mr. Tillman. That was my understanding.
77. General Russell. The Dillingshams are quite big operators out there?
   Mr. Tillman. They are.
78. General Russell. They own a great deal of real-estate?
   Mr. Tillman. Yes, sir.
79. General Russell. They are charged with being rather powerful in that area?
   Mr. Tillman. They are.
80. General Russell. They are powerful? They could go directly to Washington and have some influence?
   Mr. Tillman. I don't know about that.
81. General Russell. Have you ever heard of a Colonel Hunt?
   Mr. Tillman. No, sir.
82. General Russell. Did he approach you at any time and secure from you a statement as to your relation with the work that was carried on out there in the Hawaiian Department?
   Mr. Tillman. I don't recall, if he ever did.
83. General Russell. Have you been called as a witness before anyone, or any body of people, prior to today, for the purpose of giving the testimony which you are giving to this Board?
   Mr. Tillman. The day before I left Hawaii, I was called in by the FBI in Honolulu and asked almost these same questions.
84. General Russell. And what date was that, Mr. Tillman?
   Mr. Tillman. That would be August 5, 1942.
85. General Russell. With the exception of the statement that you made to the FBI, are there any others?
   Mr. Tillman. Well, they also called, when I was on a secret station for the engineers up at Petaluma, and interviewed me again.
86. General Frank. The FBI?
   Mr. Tillman. The FBI.
87. General Russell. Other than to the FBI, you have testified to nobody, or to any Board?
   Mr. Tillman. No.
88. General Russell. Benson represented Hawaiian Contractors, and he told you, when he ordered you off the property, that this equipment had been previously appraised?
   Mr. Tillman. Yes, sir.
89. General Russell. Do you know now what the basis of that statement by Benson was?
   Mr. Tillman. I think so.
810. General Russell. Would you tell us, please.
   Mr. Tillman. I found out later that one of Mr. Benson's employees and a machinery equipment representative and one other man—I can't recall who he was—had made an appraisal of the equipment.
91. General Russell. Do you know of your own knowledge what the appraisal value on this machinery was, as fixed by those three people?
   Mr. Tillman. That was where the $170,000 came from. That was their appraisal.
92. General Russell. Do you know of any appraisal of this machinery which may have been in the neighborhood of $130,000?
   Mr. Tillman. No, sir, I don't.
93. General Russell. You state that you submitted with your appraisal report a list of this equipment?
Mr. Tillman. No. I was given a list by Colonel Robinson.
94. General Russell. Did you turn that list back in to Colonel Robinson?
Mr. Tillman. Yes, sir.
95. General Russell. Did you make any effort upon your second visit to the place where this equipment was located to fix a value on the items of the equipment?
Mr. Tillman. Yes.
96. General Russell. I believe your testimony was to the effect that the Engineers didn't want it at any price, that it would be of no value to them.
Mr. Tillman. I don't believe I made the statement that the Engineers didn't want it. It was my recommendation that we do not purchase it, that we would have no—could not use it.

97. General Russell. Do you recall what the aggregate appraisal value that you placed upon it was?
Mr. Tillman. No, I don't.
98. General Russell. But you did place a value of some sort?
Mr. Tillman. Yes.
99. General Russell. Now, one more question about the air warning service: As a result of your efforts was the work on these air warning service stations accelerated?
Mr. Tillman. Yes, sir.
100. General Russell. Would you please tell the Board what steps you took to accelerate that work?
101. General Frank. May I ask one question: What date was this that you were put on the acceleration of this work?
Mr. Tillman. Probably the last of April or right around the first of June.
102. General Frank. Of what year?
Mr. Tillman. 1942.
103. General Frank. Yes.
104. General Russell. That answer was made a little while ago and seems a bit queer to me; last of April or the first of June. Why was May left out? Do you remember those two——
Mr. Tillman. Wait a minute. I should have said May. Pardon me.
105. General Russell. Now, to go back to my question: the steps that you took to accelerate the work on these air warning stations.
Mr. Tillman. Well, I don't know whether I could just tell you exactly the steps I took.
106. General Grunert. What did you do that wasn't done before?

Mr. Tillman. As a matter of fact, the station that I was ordered to complete first, when I arrived there there was nobody working on it, and I went right down to the area engineer who was in charge of that area and wanted to know why there were no men working there, and he said, Well, they had no equipment, nothing to work with. I went back up there then and made a survey to see just what they had to have, and got in touch with the foreman who had been in
charge of it, and got a list of equipment from him, or material that he had to have, and I went out and rounded up this equipment.

107. General Russell. Well, that is exactly what we are thinking about. On that station nothing was being done, and you got equipment and people and started to work?

Mr. Tillman. That is right.

108. General Russell. Now, do you have any recollection as to what happened at other stations?

Mr. Tillman. The other stations, they were working, but they were not making suitable progress. The tunnels were all completed; that is, the tunnel crew were finished with their work and out of there. It was more or less concrete and carpenter work and electrical work, plenty of electrical work, after the tunnel crew got out of there. They were very short of electrical supplies to complete these stations. In other words, I think I told the Major some of the items that they didn't have and that were practically nonobtainable: for instance, 5000-watt KVA—5000-volt hotheads, varnish cambric tape, 6-inch pipe cover, 60-amp, double-throw switches, in which I went into a shop where I knew the man in charge, and had him make these switches. We had certain stations completed [2150] up to the point where nothing was left to do but a 60-amp, double-throw switch; that was all we had to do to complete them. Well, I went into the shop and had them made and took them out there and handed them to the electrician. I did the same thing with pipe cover. I did the same thing with various other items. I just scouted around until I found them, and took them out there and handed them right to the men. Each station had a hundred-foot steel tower to be erected. They sent inexperienced steel men up there, or men to erect these towers. They couldn't make any progress with them at all. At one station I had three different crews before I got a tower erected.

109. General Russell. What did you say was wrong? Why couldn't they complete them?

Mr. Tillman. The towers?


Mr. Tillman. They didn't know anything about steel erection.

111. General Russell. Lack of skill in that work?

Mr. Tillman. That is right.

112. General Russell. Well, there were various things that you did?

Mr. Tillman. Oh, yes.

113. General Russell. Procurement of the necessary personnel and procurement of materiel, things of that kind?

Mr. Tillman. Yes, sir.

114. General Russell. I think that is all I have to ask.

115. General Grunert. Along this same line: Do you know anything about the status of completion of those air warning service installations as of December 7, '41?

[2157] Mr. Tillman. I really don't.

116. General Grunert. Do you know what caused any delays prior to December 7, '41, on them?

Mr. Tillman. I would say the same reasons that I cited before.

117. General Grunert. I believe you told us that there was a question of an area engineer or supervisor, whatever he is, having a number of engineering projects to process at the same time, and that the air
warning service stuff was, say, Priority 2. Do you know of any reason why they shouldn’t work on both projects simultaneously? Was it a question of lack of material, lack of personnel, or what?

Mr. Tillman. They were working on both projects simultaneously. They were working on all projects simultaneously but preference was given to runways immediately following the raid. They were given first preference.

118. General Grunert. Immediately following December 7?

Mr. Tillman. Yes, sir.

119. General Grunert. But prior thereto do you know whether they were given preference?

Mr. Tillman. I don’t believe we had a priority system set up prior to that.

120. General Frank. As a matter of fact, prior to that they didn’t have any money to build the runways, did they?

Mr. Tillman. Yes, I think so.

121. General Grunert. Do you know of your own knowledge whether or not any of these delays were intentional on the part of anyone?

Mr. Tillman. I have no way of knowing, no, sir. I don’t—

[2153] I can’t believe that they were.

122. General Grunert. Would there be anyone then in the Hawaiian Constructors that would have the power to delay if he had such an intent?

Mr. Tillman. Yes, sir.

123. General Grunert. Who?

Mr. Tillman. I would say that Paul Grafe and Mr. Rohl, either one, could have delayed the progress or completion of work of any kind.

124. General Grunert. In that case would that delay have been with or without the knowledge of the District Engineer?

Mr. Tillman. I think it could have been without his knowledge.

125. General Frank. Do you know or believe that either one of them did delay any work?

Mr. Tillman. No, I don’t know. If you want an opinion I would be glad to express an opinion.

126. General Frank. Let us have the opinion.

Mr. Tillman. It is my opinion that both Mr. Grafe and Mr. Rohl did everything they could to complete any work that they were interested in there. Now, the reason that I say that is that while I was head of the plant control section I sat in with Mr. Rohl at his meetings with his field superintendents at night, and I heard him express his attitude in no uncertain terms too many times to think that, unless he was a lot smoother than I give him credit for, that there was any intent other than to push that work.

127. General Russell. Who were these people to whom Rohl was talking on these occasions?

[2153] Mr. Tillman. Those were the superintendents of the various areas that I have mentioned before.

128. General Russell. All native Americans? Who were they?

Mr. Tillman. I think so. I think so.

129. General Russell. How many would be in those meetings?

Mr. Tillman. Oh, anywhere from eight to twelve or fourteen.
130. General Grunert. Now let me see if I have this straight. The Hawaiian Contractors—
   General Frank. No.
131. General Grunert. Was it a local firm?
   Mr. Tillman. The Hawaiian Contracting Company.
132. General Grunert. The Hawaiian Contracting Company. And the Hawaiian Constructors was the over-all firm that had the contract to start with, consisting of various other firms?
   Mr. Tillman. Yes, sir.
133. General Grunert. Now, as to this equipment that you spoke about that you were sent out to appraise, to whom did that equipment belong?
   Mr. Tillman. The Hawaiian Contracting Company.
134. General Grunert. And not to the Hawaiian Constructors?
   Mr. Tillman. No, sir.
135. General Grunert. Yes.
   Mr. Tillman. It was the Hawaiian Constructors who were supposedly to make the purchase.
136. General Grunert. From the Hawaiian Contracting Company?
   Mr. Tillman. Yes, sir.
137. General Frank. But the Government was going to pay for it?
   [2154] Mr. Tillman. Yes, sir. You understand the purchase arrangement between the contractors and the Government?
138. General Frank. Yes.
   Mr. Tillman. They made the purchase. We paid them a monthly rental of one-twelfth of the cost of the equipment for a year's time in which it became the property of the Government.
139. General Grunert. Then, whose primary interest, whose financial interest was it, to get the Hawaiian Constructors to buy this equipment which the Government would eventually pay for?
   Mr. Tillman. You mean who would benefit by it?
140. General Grunert. Yes.
   Mr. Tillman. The Hawaiian Contracting Company.
141. General Grunert. Would the Hawaiian Constructors benefit by it?
   Mr. Tillman. I do not think so.
142. General Grunert. I do not think of anything else. Does anyone think of any other questions?
143. General Russell. I think we have developed a point there that may best be clarified a little.
144. General Grunert. Go ahead.
145. General Russell. Now, at the time that you were making this appraisal of this equipment of the Hawaiian Contracting Company, they had become one of the associates in the Hawaiian Constructors?
   Mr. Tillman. I do not think so.
146. General Russell. Wasn't it after Pearl Harbor that you were making this appraisal?
   Mr. Tillman. Yes, sir.
   [2155] 147. General Russell. Well, didn't you testify a little while ago that they came in and they began, or they allowed them to work on the common project after December 7th?
   Mr. Tillman. No. No, I didn't say that.
148. General Russell. Well, I was just mistaken about it, then.
Mr. Tillman. No. They had no more work shortly after the
raid.
149. General Russell. Yes.
Mr. Tillman. They did have an organization and they had this
equipment. Mr. Benson, who was president of the Hawaiian Con-
tracting Company, joined the Hawaiian Constructors as one of the
members of the executive board; that is, in an individual capacity.
The company did not join the Hawaiian Constructors.
150. General Russell. They did not take their organization and
their modern equipment and go in and start to work, then, on this?
Mr. Tillman. No, sir.
151. General Russell. All right. But Benson as an individual
went over and gave his services?
Mr. Tillman. Yes, sir.
152. General Russell. Well, that clears that up. I am through.
153. Major Clausen. Sir, you have mentioned several things that
called into play your judgment on engineering matters. Would you,
for the record, tell the Board your engineering schooling background?
Mr. Tillman. Well, I have been in the construction end of the
engineering for 31 years. Prior, at that time, it had been about 28
years. I took a constructional engineering [2156] course from
the I. C. S. School.
154. Major Clausen. Worked on major projects?
Mr. Tillman. Yes, sir.
155. Major Clausen. That is all.
156. General Grunert. Then, you were certain that you knew equip-
ment and what its value was, as to its present shape, and what it could
be used for in the future? You were a good judge of that, were you?
Mr. Tillman. I think so.
157. General Grunert. Whom did you have to assist you in this?
You spoke of the equipment man, did you?
Mr. Tillman. Yes, sir.
158. General Grunert. What was he?
Mr. Tillman. We were buying considerable equipment from the
Allis-Chalmers people. They sent two equipment experts over to the
Islands to assist us in any way possible that they could be of assistance
to us. The Allis-Chalmers were paying all of the expenses; it cost
us nothing. When they reported over there they were ordered to
report and make my office their headquarters. I took them along—
they weren’t working under my direction, you understand. I took
them along as so-called experts.
159. General Grunert. And did you testify that that identical
equipment that you went to appraise and did appraise was actually
sold to the Hawaiian Constructors afterward?
Mr. Tillman. No, I can’t state that it was definitely sold. I think
I stated that it was reported to me that it was sold.
160. General Grunert. That could not have been confused, then,
[2157] with any other batch of equipment that was afterward
purchased?
Mr. Tillman. I do not think so.
161. General Grunert. Anything else?
162. Major Clausen. I would like to know if these two men who went with you, Mr. Tillman, to appraise this equipment concurred in your judgment.

Mr. Tillman. Yes, they did.

163. Major Clausen. That is all.

164. General Russell. What were their names?

Mr. Tillman. I don't remember their names any more. I think I could get their names. I think I have some papers at home that might give me their names, but right now I don't remember.

165. Major Clausen. Will you ascertain and let me know?

Mr. Tillman. I could, yes.

166. General Grunert. Are there any other questions?

(No response.) If not, I thank you very much for coming.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

[2158] TESTIMONY OF THOMAS ERNEST CONNOLLY, 2400 FULTON STREET, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel West. Mr. Connolly, will you please state to the Board your name and address? Full name and address.

Mr. Connolly. Thomas Ernest Connolly. I live at 2400 Fulton Street, San Francisco.

2. General Grunert. Mr. Connolly, the Board has a broad field to cover. In addition to looking into the attack on Pearl Harbor it has been assigned the task to look into certain phases of that attack in which one Colonel Wyman, a District Engineer at Honolulu, was concerned. It is that phase particularly, I believe, in which the testimony from you may help us, and in this broad field that particular special part of it was assigned to General Frank, and to be assisted by Major Clausen, so I shall ask them to start the questioning.

3. General Frank. Mr. Connolly, will you state your position as a contractor during 1940 and '41? Do you remember?

Mr. Connolly. I had work of my own; I had work of or I was associated in work with other contractors. I was the president of the Rohl-Connolly Company, president of T. E. Connolly, Incorporated, and I was sponsoring a joint venture by the W. E. Callahan Construction Company.

4. General Frank. Where?

Mr. Connolly. The Rohl-Connolly Company and the Gunther-Shirley Company at Caddoa, Colorado.

5. General Frank. For whom was this work being done at Caddoa, Colorado?

Mr. Connolly. The Army Engineers.

[2159] 6. General Frank. You stated you were president of the Rohl-Connolly Company?

Mr. Connolly. Yes, I think that is right. I was not president. I was vice president and I was president.

7. General Frank. When?

Mr. Connolly. The latter half of 1940, from 40 on through to the present time.

8. General Frank. What is Mr. Rohl's position?
Mr. Connolly. Now he is in the position of sitting on the board while we distribute the assets of the Rohl-Connolly Company.

9. General Frank. Well, what was his position in 1941?

Mr. Connolly. He was a member of the board and vice president of the company.

10. General Frank. Was he ever president of the company?

Mr. Connolly. Yes.

11. General Frank. When?

Mr. Connolly. Well, we took turns about on that. He was president of that company in early '40, '39 probably. I was probably president in '38.

12. General Frank. What determined who was president and who was vice president?

Mr. Connolly. Just a matter of turnabout, nothing of any consequence. It was really a partnership. It was incorporated.


14. Major Clausen. When did you first meet Mr. Rohl, Mr. Connolly?

Mr. Connolly. Oh, some twenty-odd years ago, I presume.

[2160] 15. Major Clausen. When did you first meet Colonel Wyman?

Mr. Connolly. I first met Colonel Wyman when he was District Engineer in the Los Angeles area, I would say about '34. 1934.

16. Major Clausen. In any event, Mr. Connolly, in the early part of 1940 the Rohl-Connolly Company was a corporation doing business, of which Mr. Hans Wilhelm Rohl was the president; is that correct?

Mr. Connolly. That is right.

17. Major Clausen. All right. Now let's go down to December 1940. Isn't it true that you didn't just take turnabout for no particular reason, but that in December 1940 you specifically telephoned from Washington to Mr. Rohl and advised him that he be not president?

Mr. Connolly. That is correct.

18. Major Clausen. Yes. And because he was a German alien?

Mr. Connolly. That's right.

19. Major Clausen. All right. Now, in connection with the RohlConnolly Company, before this change in status occurred of your assuming the presidency in December 1940, what was the stock ownership?

Mr. Connolly. I owned 50 percent of it, 25 percent of it was owned by Mrs. Rohl, 25 percent by Mr. Rohl.

20. Major Clausen. And the same stock ownership continued, did it, Mr. Connolly, throughout 1940 and throughout 1941?

Mr. Connolly. Yes.

21. Major Clausen. So that when you had this turnabout because Mr. Rohl was a German alien, there was no turnabout or cancellation of any stock ownership, was there?


22. Major Clausen. And he continued as a director, did he?

Mr. Connolly. Yes, sir.

23. Major Clausen. When did you first know about a contract, Mr. Connolly, which later became Contract W-414-Eng-602, which is the one that was later in effect with respect to the Hawaiian defense projects?
Mr. CONNOLLY. When did I first learn about that contract?
24. Major CLAUSEN. Yes, sir.
Mr. CONNOLLY. I was advised from here by telephone to Denver that the contract was to be let in the Hawaiian Islands, but I didn't know whether it was that or not. That was the specific contract I learned about the week prior to Christmas, in Washington, D. C.

25. Major CLAUSEN. Yes. But now when you say you were advised concerning defense projects, as a matter of fact it was Mr. Rohl who telephoned you; isn't that so?
Mr. CONNOLLY. That is right.
26. Major CONNOLLY. And he telephoned you from Los Angeles?
Mr. CONNOLLY. No.
27. Major CLAUSEN. From San Francisco?
Mr. CONNOLLY. Yes.
28. Major CLAUSEN. And he was then here in the office of the Engineers, wasn't he?
Mr. CONNOLLY. Well, I don't know. He was in San Francisco.
29. Major CLAUSEN. Yes. He had talked with Colonel Wyman?
Mr. CONNOLLY. Yes.
30. Major CLAUSEN. With whom else in the Army had he talked?

[2162] Mr. CONNOLLY. Well, that I don't know. I was in Colorado.

31. Major CLAUSEN. And this was December 16, a Monday, was it?
32. General FRANK. What year?
33. Major CLAUSEN. 1940.
Mr. CONNOLLY. Yes, that is about right. Presumably that is correct.
34. Major CLAUSEN. I beg your pardon, sir.
Mr. CONNOLLY. That is probably correct.
35. Major CLAUSEN. Now, at that time you were in Denver, Colorado; is that right?
Mr. CONNOLLY. That is right.
36. Major CLAUSEN. Specifically, what did Mr. Rohl say to you? Just try and tell the Board exactly what he said at that time in this telephone conversation, or the substance.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Well, he said, "Colonel Wyman is here and has some work to offer in the Islands, and he is looking over some contractors to go out to do it." And I asked Rohl what the nature of the work was, and he said that Wyman would tell me, for me to meet Wyman at Cheyenne on his plane and go on to Washington with him; and I couldn't meet him at Cheyenne because I couldn't get on the plane, but I could take a plane from Denver to Chicago and there connect with Wyman's plane, and which I did, and we flew down to Washington together, and I asked Wyman what was the nature of this thing and what was the amount of it, and he told me.

37. Major CLAUSEN. As I understand, then, you met Colonel Wyman in Chicago; is that correct?
Mr. CONNOLLY. At the airport in Chicago.

[2163] 38. Major CLAUSEN. And you then continued in company with him from Chicago down to Washington, D. C.?
Mr. CONNOLLY. Yes, sir.
39. Major CLAUSEN. And didn't you all go to the Carlton Hotel?
Mr. CONNOLLY. Yes, sir.
40. Major Clausen. And stay there?
Mr. Connolly. Yes, sir.
41. Major Clausen. And you were in his company then for how many days?
Mr. Connolly. Well, three or four days; maybe a day or two one way or the other; four days, five days.
42. Major Clausen. And this contract the number of which I have previously given you, was that signed, sir, on December 20, 1940?
Mr. Connolly. I left at that time. Grafe signed it on the 20th.
43. Major Clausen. Yes, sir. When had you left? What was the date?
Mr. Connolly. I left the day before that.
44. Major Clausen. So that you left on the 19th?
Mr. Connolly. I think so.
45. Major Clausen. Now, did you have discussions with Colonel Wyman there concerning the nature of the work and the kind of work that you would do and the kind of work that these other co-adventurers would do?
Mr. Connolly. No. He had one man to do the work. Grafe was to do the work.
46. Major Clausen. I mean the kind of work that your firm, the Rohl-Connolly Company, was to do in connection with the contract.
Mr. Connolly. No. The work was to be handled by Mr. Grafe.
47. Major Clausen. I beg your pardon.
Mr. Connolly. The work was to be handled by one man for the joint—for the co-adventurers.
48. Major Clausen. I don't mean the representation, Mr. Connolly, of the joint venturers by Mr. Grafe. I mean you sat down with somebody there, surely, and discussed the nature of the work that was to be done by these joint ventures, your firm and the Gunther-Shirley Company?
Mr. Connolly. The over-all job, yes.
49. Major Clausen. Callahan Construction Company?
Mr. Connolly. That is right.
50. Major Clausen. And you went into that deeply and fully, did you not, to find out what you would do?
Mr. Connolly. No, not so deeply and not so fully, because, for the very simple reason that it wasn't formulated deeply nor fully. It was very, very sketchy.
51. Major Clausen. Well, the contract itself sets forth that there were to be hangars and runways and defense projects?
Mr. Connolly. No, sir.
52. Major Clausen. Air raid warning systems?
Mr. Connolly. No, sir.
53. Major Clausen. I beg your pardon, sir.
Mr. Connolly. The contract doesn't state that.
54. Major Clausen. Will the Board permit me to go and get the contract, sir? I will be right back.
Mr. Connolly. It is one of the exhibits out there. I couldn't find it.
55. Colonels West. I will find it.
56. Major Clausen. I see. It is one of the exhibits to the—
57. Colonel West. Which one is it?
58. Major Clausen. The contract of December 20, 1940.
59. General Grunert. Suppose you let somebody else do the looking up, and we can go on.
60. Major Clausen. Yes, sir. I will proceed along.
61. Colonel West. I will go out and see if we can find it.
Mr. Connolly. You are speaking now of the contract that I saw in Washington?
62. Major Clausen. I am speaking of the contract that is dated December 20, sir, 1940. It sets forth the general—
Mr. Connolly. Not all those multitudinous supplements?
63. Major Clausen. No, sir. I am speaking of the basic contract.
Mr. Connolly. That is right.
64. Major Clausen. The one that was signed and executed in Washington.
Mr. Connolly. That is right.
65. Major Clausen. And it states general terms, various subdivisions and types of work to be done.
Mr. Connolly. That is right.
66. Major Clausen. And the air raid warning system.
Mr. Connolly. There are five subdivisions stated in that contract.
67. Major Clausen. Well, I mean it did, then, set forth the general character of the work?
Mr. Connolly. That is right. There was no runway in it [2166] and there are no hangars in it.
68. Major Clausen. Well, whatever is set forth in the contract—let me put the question this way—you discussed in Washington, did you not, sir?
Mr. Connolly. Yes.
69. Major Clausen. All right. You also had telephone conversations between yourself in Washington and Mr. Rohl in Los Angeles; isn't that true?
Mr. Connolly. Yes.
70. Major Clausen. Concerning the work of the contract?
Mr. Connolly. Not the work. Concerning the financing of the contract.
71. Major Clausen. The only financing that was to be done concerning the contract was concerning the work to be done under the contract; isn't that so?
Mr. Connolly. Well, that is correct, if that is what it means.
72. Major Clausen. Well, I mean you talked over with Mr. Rohl, your theoretic partner in this corporation, the financing of this particular work; isn't that right?
Mr. Connolly. Sure.
73. Major Clausen. All right. And isn't it true that in addition to being in the company of Colonel Wyman there, you also met John Martin?
Mr. Connolly. Accidentally, yes.
74. Major Clausen. Well, you met him, sir, did you not?
Mr. Connolly. In the lobby of the hotel.
75. Major Clausen. Now, in point of time from when you arrived in Washington, when did you meet John Martin?
[2167] Mr. Connolly. Well, I met John Martin—when I got to the Carlton Hotel there was a note there from John Martin saying
he wanted to see me, but whether I met him that day or the next day I don't know, but I met him just immediately thereafter.

76. General Frank. Just a minute. This is on the trip to Washington around the 20th of December in 1940 that all this occurred?

Mr. Connolly. Yes, sir.

77. General Frank. This was at that same time that John Martin was there present when you met him?

Mr. Connolly. Well, I met him in the hotel, yes, sir, in the lobby of the hotel.

78. General Frank. Who is Mr. Martin?

Mr. Connolly. He is a Los Angeles attorney.

79. General Frank. For whom?

Mr. Connolly. Oh, for various people. For Rohl-Connolly.

80. Major Clausen. Now, when you met Mr. Martin he told you that he was there for the purpose of assisting in acquiring citizenship for Mr. Rohl, didn’t he?

Mr. Connolly. Well, I don’t think he did.

81. Major Clausen. Let me refer to your statement given to the House Military Affairs Committee, as follows:

I met John Martin, Mr. Rohl’s attorney, who told me he was in Washington in the interests of acquiring citizenship or furthering citizenship applications for Mr. H. W. Rohl. When I thought that there was a likelihood that we would acquire the contract I further thought that I should have Mr. Rohl resign as an officer of the Rohl-[2168] Connolly Co. and substitute myself and I so phoned him and it was so done, and he was neither officer nor a director of the Rohl-Connolly Co. until after he obtained his naturalization papers.

Did you make that statement?

Mr. Connolly. Yes.

82. Major Clausen. To Mr. Weiner?

Mr. Connolly. Yes.

83. Major Clausen. I beg your pardon?

Mr. Connolly. I think I did, yes.

84. Major Clausen. All right. Well, now, as a matter of fact, then, Mr. Connolly, Mr. Martin did tell you just exactly what you said here; isn’t that correct?

Mr. Connolly. Yes, but not in the way that you put it.

85. Major Clausen. Well, you put it to me, then, in the correct way.

Mr. Connolly. I asked John Martin what he was doing there—out in the lobby in front of a lot of people,—what he was doing there. He said he was there on business. The next time I see John Martin he advises me that Rohl is not a citizen and I had not ought to sign a contract, that is, I had not ought to sign any contract to take Rohl out of the country. So I knew then that Rohl was not a citizen for the first time, but I didn’t think it made any difference, so I signed the contract.

86. General Frank. How long had you been associated with Mr. Rohl up to this time?

Mr. Connolly. Since 1932.

87. General Frank. Eight years, about?

Mr. Connolly. Yes.

[2169] 88. General Frank. And this was the first time that you knew that he wasn’t a citizen?

Mr. Connolly. Yes.
89. **Major Clausen.** And so you then phoned Mr. Rohl and told him that he should resign?

**Mr. Connolly.** Probably I did.

90. **Major Clausen.** Well, is there any doubt about it, Mr. Connolly? You said in this statement here to the House Military Affairs Committee—

**Mr. Connolly.** He resigned. He resigned; I became president. That's right.

91. **Major Clausen.** Yes, but I say it says here that when you thought "that there was a likelihood that we would acquire the contract I further thought that I should have Mr. Rohl resign as an officer of the Rohl-Connelly Co. and substitute myself and I so phoned him and it was so done."

**Mr. Connolly.** That is right.

92. **Major Clausen.** That is correct, is it?

**Mr. Connolly.** Yes.

93. **Major Clausen.** You telephoned him for that purpose?

**Mr. Connolly.** Yes.

94. **Major Clausen.** All right. Well, now, when did you learn this in point of time of being in Washington? On this first day that you met Mr. Martin?

**Mr. Connolly.** No, I don't think it was the first day. I think it was later on. I think it was a good—after we had been there for two or three days. We were up to the point of signing the contract. I didn't learn that the minute I got in Washington, the minute I saw John Martin.

[2170] 95. **Major Clausen.** All right. Now, whom did you tell that to? You told Mr. Rohl the situation about his not being in the corporation because of the fact that he was an alien. Now, then, what did you say about that to Colonel Wyman?

**Mr. Connolly.** Nothing.

96. **Major Clausen.** What did you say about that to Paul Grafe?

**Mr. Connolly.** I told Grafe that Rohl was not a citizen.

97. **Major Clausen.** Why did you tell it to Grafe and not to Wyman?

**Mr. Connolly.** Because I don't know whether—whether Rohl—whether Grafe and I would agree to sign the contract knowing that Rohl is not a citizen, or not.

98. **Major Clausen.** Whom else did you tell in Washington at that time?

**Mr. Connolly.** No one that I recall.

99. **Major Clausen.** Now, here is a photostatic copy, Mr. Connolly, of articles of agreement dated December 20, 1940. I wish you would look that over and tell me if that is the basic contract to which you have reference?

**Mr. Connolly.** Yes, I think it is, with the exception of these first four leaves which are seemingly an indication of supplements, job orders, dates of transmittal. Of course those were not in existence at that time. And it further states in this contract we were to do five things. First, ammunition storage magazines; second, warning stations; third, railway trackage; fourth, fixed fortification structures; and fifth, in addition to the then existing radio station that was supplemented by an estimate of yardage to be excavated, which amounted
to 380,000 yards, backfill of 150,000 cubic yards, concrete of 36,000 yards, reinforcing steel of 6,000,000, some few culverts and some pavement.

100. Major Clausen. Now, in your telephone talks with Mr. Rohl from Washington—I am referring to December 1940—what did you say in talking to Mr. Rohl concerning the air raid warning stations?

Mr. Connolly. Not a word.

101. Major Clausen. What did you say after that time to Mr. Rohl regarding those air raid warning stations?

Mr. Connolly. Nothing.

102. Major Clausen. Now let me refer to your testimony or statement given to the House Military Affairs Committee, as follows:

Question: Subsequent to receiving the contract for the Hawaiian Islands, did Mr. Rohl discuss with you the nature of the contract, and so forth?

Answer: No. There was no detailed discussion of this contract at all. Personally, I never saw a written description of it or a blueprint on any part of it. Rohl and I discussed the necessary financial arrangements, advancement of monies, because after all we were financing this. We were building certain airfields. We knew what that meant, just simply movement of materials and stabilization of a base without a blueprint at all. When you are told to run a 7,500 runway we knew what it takes.

Question: But it would be most unusual for him to discuss with you the nature and type of contract that you received for the Hawaiian Islands?

Answer: Yes. I don't doubt but what we mentioned building an airport there. I don't think that we ever got into some of these installations out there. I don't think Rohl and I ever discussed anything of that nature. We talked of those warning stations because I was curious as to what they were. That's all that I know that we ever got into any detail about.

Mr. Connolly. That's not our telephone conversation.

103. Major Clausen. I beg your pardon, sir?

Mr. Connolly. That is long after Rohl was out of the islands.

104. Major Clausen. That was after he was out of the islands?

Mr. Connolly. Sure.

105. Major Clausen. Well, with regard to the contract, do you mean? You mean—

Mr. Connolly. I would like to know what an air warning station was. I didn't know what it was. He was out there, and they built them.

106. Major Clausen. All right. You mean you talked with Mr. Rohl concerning these items only after you were out to the islands?

Mr. Connolly. Why, yes. We were not building any airfields here indicating papers.

107. Major Clausen. Well, how many telephone calls, Mr. Connolly, did you put in to Mr. Rohl from Washington or did he put in to you and have with you?

Mr. Connolly. I don't know.

108. Major Clausen. Well, give us an approximation.

Mr. Connolly. Two or three.

109. Major Clausen. And what did you say in these two or three conversations?

Mr. Connolly. I said we have to finance this job. It would be about so much. You have got so much of a fee.

110. Major Clausen. And what else?

Mr. Connolly. That I ought to take over this company or else stay out of it.

111. Major Clausen. What else did you say, Mr. Connolly?
Mr. Connolly. I don't know what I said, but what I am saying now is what I think I said. There was no occasion for us to discuss this, the matter of movement of yards. That doesn't mean anything to a contractor. He knows how to move dirt.

112. Major Clausen. Well, does the fact that you didn't know what an air raid warning station was and the fact that you were curious as to what they were—I mean does the contractor know what an air raid warning station is?

Mr. Connolly. Well, I didn't.

113. Major Clausen. Well, then are you sure, now, Mr. Connolly that you didn't discuss it with your partner?

Mr. Connolly. Of course not.

114. Major Clausen. As to building something that you didn't know what it was?

Mr. Connolly. Yes.

115. Major Clausen. I see.

116. General Frank. You mean to say you were taking on a contract for building something when you didn't know what it consisted of?

Mr. Connolly. No, General. In this contract it sets out you are putting in, doing so many cubic yards of excavation, placing so many cubic yards of concrete and so many thousands of pounds of steel and so much bituminous pavement. Well, that's all right, but putting an air warning station on, I wanted to know what an air warning station was, after this attack, what were the things, and how did they work, and why.

117. Major Clausen. After the attack?

Mr. Connolly. Sure.

118. General Frank. This contract was let long before the attack.

Mr. Connolly. I know it, but there was never a print or a description or anything. There's the whole business: There is nothing in this contract to tell you what it is.

119. Major Clausen. You mean you were to get a fee of fifty thousand for doing something and you didn't know what you were going to do?

Mr. Connolly. No. I mean we were going to get it for moving this much dirt and placing this much concrete, and part of it I presume was going to be an air warning station. It said so much roads and this, that, and the other. The contractor never installed the equipment, you know, in these things; it was never his job to do it.

120. Major Clausen. Now, isn't it true, Mr. Connolly, that even in 1940 Paul Grafe had gone to the Hawaiian Islands with some men and had surveyed the situation and come back and reported to you that the work was to be thus and thus and thus?

Mr. Connolly. No, that's not correct. Mr. Grafe sent two men to the islands way early in the summer.

121. Major Clausen. Of 1940?

Mr. Connolly. Of 1940. And they come back and reported to him, but they did not report to me.

122. Major Clausen. Well, you were there with Mr. Grafe in Washington. Didn't he discuss that with you?

Mr. Connolly. No.

123. Major Clausen. I beg your pardon?
Mr. Connolly. I never saw a report that those men ever made. That was never discussed.

124. Major Clausen. Didn't Mr. Grafe talk to you about the fact that he had gone to the islands or had sent two men to the islands in 1940 and surveyed the situation from the standpoint of this defense project?

Mr. Connolly. Well, he sent two men to the islands, but whether it was that same party or not, I had no means of knowing.

125. Major Clausen. Is your testimony that Mr. Grafe did not discuss it with you in Washington, the fact that he had sent two men to the islands to survey the field for these defense projects?

Mr. Connolly. Well, Grafe never gave me any report on what these men did for him in the islands.

126. Major Clausen. Did you discuss this with him in Washington? is my question.

Mr. Connolly. I don't think I did.

127. General Frank. You are financially interested in this firm, aren't you?

Mr. Connolly. Yes, sir.

128. Major Clausen. Well, now, when you found out in Washington from Mr. Martin that your partner was a—by the way, you knew that was a secret contract, didn't you, Mr. Connolly?

Mr. Connolly. When we were talking about it, I didn't.

129. Major Clausen. I beg your pardon?

Mr. Connolly. When it was first shown me it was, yes. I didn't know it when I went to Washington, though.

130. Major Clausen. Well, when you saw the contract you knew it was a secret contract, didn't you?

Mr. Connolly. That is right.

131. Major Clausen. Now, before you were shown the contract or after, when was it that you knew that Mr. Rohl was an alien?

Mr. Connolly. Before. Before I saw the contract.

132. Major Clausen. All right. And when you saw the contract was it in the form that you see it there (indicating) with the exception of those pages that you say refer to supplements?

Mr. Connolly. Well, it was on white paper, stamped with the SECRET stamp upside down and downside up, as I recall, along all four margins of the front page, as I recall.

133. Major Clausen. Well, you were taken considerable aback, weren't you, by the information that Mr. Rohl was an alien, German alien?

Mr. Connolly. Yes.

134. Major Clausen. I mean that was a big shock to you, wasn't it?

Mr. Connolly. Yes, I was a little surprised.

135. Major Clausen. All right. You had gone on the plane with Colonel Wyman from Denver, or rather, from Chicago to Washington, you had been there with Colonel Wyman, and what did you say about this big shock, if anything, to Colonel Wyman?

Mr. Connolly. Nothing.

136. Major Clausen. What did you say about it to—by the way, did you go over to the office of the Chief of Engineers?

Mr. Connolly. Yes, sir.

137. Major Clausen. And whom did you meet over there?
Mr. Connolly. Well, the man that did most of this work there I think was then Major Newman.
138. Major Clausen. What did you say about this alien status of Mr. Rohl to Major Newman, if anything?
Mr. Connolly. Nothing.
139. Major Clausen. What is that?
Mr. Connolly. Nothing.
[2178] 140. Major Clausen. Whom else did you see in the office of the Chief of Engineers?
Mr. Connolly. Well, I remember meeting General Robins.
141. Major Clausen. What did you say to him about it?
Mr. Connolly. Nothing. Two or three other gentlemen, I think. I don't recall who they were.
142. Major Clausen. When you came back to California, you say you think you left on the 19th of December, is that correct?
Mr. Connolly. I do not know. I have got a diary that will give you the dates, if they are important, but I left and got home prior to Christmas. I left before that was signed.
143. Major Clausen. Do you have a diary that indicates the number of telephone calls you had with Mr. Rohl when you were in Washington?
Mr. Connolly. No, but I will have a diary that indicates when I talked to him.
144. Major Clausen. When you came back, though, from Washington, this deal had been made, had it not?
Mr. Connolly. Yes.
145. Major Clausen. And in order to make that deal you certainly talked over the contract with Mr. Martin, did you not?
Mr. Connolly. Never.
146. Major Clausen. What is that?
Mr. Connolly. No.
147. Major Clausen. You did not talk it over with Mr. Martin, who was the attorney for your firm?
Mr. Connolly. Mr. Martin wasn't there as an attorney for Rohl-Connolly.
148. Major Clausen. In what capacity was Mr. Martin there?
[2179] Mr. Connolly. That, I can't tell you that.
149. Major Clausen. Is it your sworn testimony now to this Board that Mr. Martin had nothing to do with the drafting of that contract?
Mr. Connolly. Yes, sir.
150. Major Clausen. And is it your sworn testimony that he had nothing to do with any of the papers—just for example, the joint-venture agreement that would naturally precede the contract?
Mr. Connolly. I don't think any joint-venture papers did precede this contract.
151. Major Clausen. Well, what is the fact as you state it to the Board, now? What is the fact as to whether Mr. Martin drew any legal papers, or dictated any legal papers, or did anything at all, whatsoever, legally, with regard to that contract?
Mr. Connolly. Nothing.
152. Major Clausen. In point of truth, now, when you came back from Washington to California you sat down and talked to Mr. Rohl, did you not, concerning the contract?
Mr. Connolly. I told Rohl that that contract wasn’t to come into our office down there, nor any papers concerning that contract to come in there; and there was no further discussion on that contract; nor was there, ever; nor was there any plans, papers, nor the contract to be in that Rohl-Connolly office while he was still an alien.

153. Major Clausen. Mr. Connolly, let me show you this contract, signed, in which Rohl-Connolly Company joins with the Hawaiian Constructors, of Honolulu, and I see it is described as consisting of the W. E. Callahan Company, Gunther & Shirley Co., and Rohl-[2180] Connolly Company. Now, the Callahan Company, the Gunther & Shirley Co., and the Rohl-Connolly Company were joint adventurers, were they not?

Mr. Connolly. Yes.

154. Major Clausen. Well, who drew up the papers for that, for the Rohl-Connolly part?

Mr. Connolly. There were no papers drawn prior to the signing and execution of this contract. The Rohl-Connolly Company, the Callahan Company, and the Gunther & Shirley Company were building a joint venture in Colorado, and we were going in on the same percentages as existed on that job, and we had no legal papers drawn up prior to this contract, for this contract, at all.

155. Major Clausen. You are speaking of the Cadoa project?

Mr. Connolly. Yes, sir.

156. Major Clausen. So far as this contract is concerned, is it your statement that you were just to continue on in the same relative percentages?

Mr. Connolly. That is correct.

157. Major Clausen. When you say that no papers came into the Rohl-Connolly Company, isn’t it true now that papers had to be signed and given to the engineers, which showed that Mr. Paul Grafe, here, had authority to sign on behalf of the Rohl-Connolly Company?

Mr. Connolly. Certainly not! Unlimited power of attorney to go to the islands and execute it and carry on this job.

158. Major Clausen. Yes, and who drew that up for the Rohl-Connolly Company?

Mr. Connolly. That, I don’t know; but the Rohl-Connolly [2182] Company did not have it drawn up. I probably executed it to Grafe, had it drawn up, here. probably John Martin—might be some other attorney; I don’t know.

159. Major Clausen. And that was done before this contract was signed?

Mr. Connolly. It was not.

160. Major Clausen. So far as this contract is concerned, Mr. Connolly, is it your testimony, here, to the Board, that you did not discuss it, or anything connected with the deal, with Mr. Rohl, at all, until he became a citizen?

Mr. Connolly. No; I talked to Rohl, as I stated here a while back, about this contract, any arrangement necessary to carry it on.

161. Major Clausen. All right. When did you talk to him?

Mr. Connolly. I talked to him from Washington before we obtained the contract.

162. Major Clausen. And on how many occasions?
Mr. Connolly. Oh, I don't know—two or three. I was only there three or four days.

163. Major Clausen. And then, when you came back to California?

Mr. Connolly. I told him he was to have nothing to do with that contract, until his status changed.

164. Major Clausen. By the way, when was it that you told him that, Mr. Connolly?

Mr. Connolly. Well, when I next saw him.

165. Major Clausen. When was it after you got back?

Mr. Connolly. That, I can't tell you. I don't know. It was shortly after I got back, certainly.

166. Major Clausen. It would be in the neighborhood of Decem-


167. Major Clausen. It would be December or January '41, is that correct?

Mr. Connolly. I think so.

168. Major Clausen. All right. From that time down to the time that Mr. Rohl became a citizen, do you want to say to the Board, or, rather, do you testify that you did not discuss the work or the contract with Mr. Rohl?

Mr. Connolly. Rohl and I never discussed that work, I never saw a plan myself, and I never had a copy of the contract, and there was no scrap of paper with anything pertaining to that contract ever in the Rohl-Connolly Company office in Los Angeles, that I ever knew about; and I think I would have known; and that contract I discussed with Grafe and told him to set it operating. He had an unlimited power of attorney, to go ahead and do it.

169. Major Clausen. Concerning Colonel Wyman, do you recall when he came to Los Angeles as district engineer?

Mr. Connolly. Yes, sir.

170. Major Clausen. You called on him, did you not, Mr. Con-

[2183] nolly, very soon after he arrived, in the company of Mr. Rohl?

Mr. Connolly. I don't think so. The first time I saw Colonel Wyman, as I recall it, was when we were putting in bids on the section of breakwater along the Los Angeles-Long Beach breakwater. That wasn't a call on Colonel Wyman, that was a call on the division engineer. It had been changed within the week.

171. Major Clausen. Did you ever call on Colonel Wyman when he was Captain Wyman or Major Wyman, and accompany him to any parties?

Mr. Connolly. I don't think I was ever in a party with Wyman.

172. Major Clausen. Were you ever on a yacht trip with Colonel, then Captain or Major, Wyman?

Mr. Connolly. No, sir.

173. Major Clausen. Did you ever give him a drink?

Mr. Connolly. Yes, sir.

174. Major Clausen. How many times?

Mr. Connolly. I have had him in my home in this town, and gave him some drinks. How many times? I don't know.

175. Major Clausen. When did you have him in your own home in San Francisco?

Mr. Connolly. I had him in my own home in San Francisco after he returned here from Washington.
176. Major Clausen. You mean, as he got back from Washington, from this December 1940 trip, is that right?
Mr. Connolly. That is right.
177. Major Clausen. How did he come to go to your home?
Mr. Connolly. I invited him. He came out to my home for dinner, the only guest, my wife and me; ate dinner with me and the members of my family. We had dinner, and he left at 10 o'clock.
178. Major Clausen. On this occasion did you tell him this information that had taken you aback in Washington?
Mr. Connolly. No.
179. Major Clausen. Concerning Rohl's alien status?
Mr. Connolly. I have never told that to Wyman, yet.
180. Major Clausen. Did you ever have Colonel Wyman, or Captain or Major Wyman to your home on other occasions?
Mr. Connolly. The only time.
181. Major Clausen. I think I have nothing further.
182. General Russell. What percentage did Rohl-Connolly operate on in this joint-adventure agreement?
Mr. Connolly. To start out, 30%.
183. General Russell. Was that the percentage that you went into the 1940 contract on, Mr. Connolly?
Mr. Connolly. Yes, sir.
184. General Russell. Now, you state that you talked to Mr. Rohl, back in San Francisco, about financing that work. Was all that because it was necessary to put new money into the project, other than that that was available to the Colorado operation?
Mr. Connolly. No. I got this impression: It was my impression that that contract offshore in that amount was not wholly desirable, and Wyman wanted new equipment on that job. Well, new equipment takes new money. The group of us probably had $5,000,000 worth of equivalent equipment with some age on it. Wyman, to do this job, had to put new plant on it. That takes money, and we put in a lot of money and bought the equipment to put on this job.
185. General Russell. Where did this new money come from, Mr. Connolly?
Mr. Connolly. We put it in, in our proportions, from our relative companies, from our companies.
186. General Russell. Do you know how much money Mr. Rohl as an individual had to put in, in order to enable the group to buy new equipment incident to starting the work?
Mr. Connolly. Rohl-Connolly's 40% of the necessary capital was furnished by Rohl-Connolly Company.
187. General Russell. The Corporation, Rohl-Connolly Company, had the necessary money?
Mr. Connolly. Yes.
188. General Russell. Then why did you have to talk to him about the financing, if you were representing the corporation, and the corporation had the money?
Mr. Connolly. Well, if two contractors associated together for years, and you are going to do something, you just as a matter of course discuss those things.
189. General Russell. In the course of arriving at a joint judgment by you and Rohl?
Mr. Connolly. Well, taking a new step, you tell your partner what
you are going to do.

190. General Russell. But the Rohl-Connally Company had money,
already, plenty of money?
Mr. Connolly. Yes, sir.

191. General Russell. That is all.

192. General Grunert. Who was the "spark plug" in getting the
work done in Hawaii for the Hawaiian Constructors? Was there any
one man?
Mr. Connolly. Grafe was supposed to be.

193. General Grunert. Do you know whether or not that work in
Hawaii started to lag, and that that was the reason they got Rohl to
go out there, to put more punch into it, or what?
Mr. Connolly. Well, Rohl was more aggressive than Grafe, and
Wyman wanted Rohl to go out there.

194. General Grunert. In your past contacts, working together and
in combinations, who was the more aggressive man, Rohl [2186]
or Grafe?

Mr. Connolly. Well, Rohl would be the most aggressive, but Rohl
had never had overseas or offshore experience, and Grafe had built the
Madden Dam in Panama, and he had those four or five men with him
who had been key men down there, and we figured we had a "natural."

195. General Grunert. Is that why you co-adventurers chose Grafe
to represent you and get this contract started?

Mr. Connolly. That is right. I thought it was a good nucleus.

196. General Grunert. But if Rohl had been a citizen, would Rohl
have been the man to go out there and put things through, or not?

Mr. Connolly. Well, General, I am not sure on that, because the
key men that Rohl-Connolly had were with me at Cadoa, and they
would have to rob that job, to go offshore. That would be a matter
of discussion, but I thought Grafe with his group was good.

197. General Grunert. Were Rohl and Wyman pretty thick so-
cially?

Mr. Connolly. They were always good friends; yes.

198. General Grunert. Good drinking companions?

Mr. Connolly. Good!

199. General Grunert. Both about the same type, hard-fisted, go-
getters, punchers? Did they naturally click, that way?

Mr. Connolly. General, they are both that way. They are both
tough, and they get it done, and they drive everybody that is about
them.

200. General Grunert. And you think that was a sort of natural
[2187] affinity?

Mr. Connolly. Well, they could fight about the way to do a thing,
and get it done. One was somewhat like the other. As long as it got
done, that's all that counted. To somebody else, less tender-skinned,
that wouldn't suit so well.

201. General Grunert. In the contracting business and other busi-
nesses, is it natural to do a certain amount of entertaining in connec-
tion with obtaining contracts? Do the parties often fraternize and
drink together, or are they afraid that one will influence the other?

Mr. Connolly. Well, they always do that, General.
202. General GRUNERT. They always do that? So you didn't think it unnatural that Rohl should entertain Wyman, and that, Wyman should accept that entertainment from Rohl?

   Mr. CONNOLLY. I thought it was a natural thing to do.

203. General GRUNERT. Do you know whether or not there is any gain on one side or the other through that association?

   Mr. CONNOLLY. I don't think there is any.

204. General GRUNERT. Financial gain, or otherwise?

   Mr. CONNOLLY. I am certain there is no financial gain.

205. General GRUNERT. Did you establish a residence in, or go to Honolulu, while the work was being done over there?

   Mr. CONNOLLY. I did not.

206. General GRUNERT. You never went over?

   Mr. CONNOLLY. No, sir.

207. General GRUNERT. Then you know nothing about the process or the progress of the work over there?

   Mr. CONNOLLY. Oh, yes; I know a lot about the progress of the work.

   [2188] 208. General GRUNERT. Personally, as a matter of personal knowledge?

   Mr. CONNOLLY. From personal inspection, I know nothing.

209. General GRUNERT. You didn't go over there?

   Mr. CONNOLLY. No, sir.

210. General GRUNERT. Then I think the information I am after I cannot get.

211. Major CLAUSEN. That is right, sir. I thought as much.

212. General GRUNERT. All right.

213. Major CLAUSEN. I had a few more questions. Sir, when you discovered that Mr. Rohl was a German alien, you were so taken aback that at first you didn’t wish to sign the contract, isn’t that correct?

   Mr. CONNOLLY. No; that wasn’t it. I was so taken aback that I kept my mouth shut.

214. Major CLAUSEN. And you thought it over and decided that you might not be a proper party to sign, isn’t that true?

   Mr. CONNOLLY. I thought it over, and then I asked Grafe what he thought of it. He didn’t see that it made any difference, and neither did I; so we signed it.

215. Major CLAUSEN. And you debated the advisability of signing the contract?

   Mr. CONNOLLY. With Graef, yes.

216. Major CLAUSEN. All right.

   Mr. CONNOLLY. "What would be the influence of Rohl, an alien, on this contract?" Well, we decided that if Paul runs it, if Grafe runs it and handles it all, it don’t mean anything.

217. Major CLAUSEN. Then you say it did not mean a thing?

   Mr. CONNOLLY. I wouldn’t think so.

   [2189] Major CLAUSEN. All right. When did you then phone Mr. Rohl and tell him to resign? Was it after this decision that you made following your talk with Mr. Grafe?

   Mr. CONNOLLY. I don’t know. I did make a phone call; whether it was before or after, I don’t know.

219. Major CLAUSEN. And specifically, what did you tell Mr. Rohl?
Mr. Connolly. Four years ago, I can’t tell you, but I told him to keep out of it, that I would handle it—about that many words, elaborated.

220. Major Clausen. What did you say about being president?
Mr. Connolly. “I will be president”—just like that, I would say.

221. Major Clausen. And was the change then from Mr. Rohl, as president, to you, as president, effected after that?
Mr. Connolly. After that?

222. Major Clausen. Yes, after your talk from Washington to Mr. Rohl in Los Angeles, in which you told him that you would be president instead of his being president. Was that then accomplished, that change in officers?
Mr. Connolly. Well, we were changed. The minute book will tell you better than I could tell you; but we changed the officers, there, in December.

223. Major Clausen. And was it after this telephone call that you had with Mr. Rohl concerning the change, and concerning his alien status?
Mr. Connolly. Well, I presume it was.

224. Major Clausen. Is there any doubt in your mind?
Mr. Connolly. No, except you must know something I don’t, the way you are questioning me.

225. Major Clausen. Is there any doubt in your mind?
Mr. Connolly. Well, you have created one.

226. Major Clausen. Let me ask you, then, have I created a doubt in your mind as to whether you told anything to Colonel Wyman about this undecisiveness on your part as to whether you should sign the contract?
Mr. Connolly. Not a bit.

227. Major Clausen. You are sure of that?
Mr. Connolly. You bet I am!

228. Major Clausen. Now, what did Mr. Rohl say to you when you told him this, about the fact that since he was an alien, he should not be president? What did he say?
Mr. Connolly. Practically nothing.

229. Major Clausen. That is all.

230. General Grunert. I just want to develop this a little bit more. What does the president of the company do?
Mr. Connolly. He obligates the company.

231. General Grunert. Were you president in name only, and did Rohl continue to run the company as usual?
Mr. Connolly. Not as usual. When that company was formed, I ran it and financed it, not Rohl.

232. General Grunert. This was not just a subterfuge in order to get the contract that you couldn’t have gotten or shouldn’t have gotten because Rohl was an alien?
Mr. Connolly. No, no; there was no subterfuge.

233. General Frank. Who was in this group in Washington discussing this contract?
Mr. Connolly. Just Wyman, Grafe, and myself.

234. General Frank. Where did you stop?
Mr. Connolly. We stayed at the Carlton Hotel.

235. General Frank. All three of you?
Mr. Connolly. Yes, sir.

236. General Frank. And did you get rooms together?

Mr. Connolly. No. I had wired on to the Carlton for rooms, and when I got there with Wyman there were no rooms. We didn't have any place to go, and Grafe had a reservation, and we took Grafe's room. He had a bedroom and a sitting room, and Wyman and I took that, until Grafe showed up, and then Wyman got another room. I stayed with Grafe until I left.

237. General Frank. Who was responsible for getting this group of contractors interested in this Hawaiian venture?

Mr. Connolly. Why, Wyman.

238. General Frank. Wyman was the man who proposed that these three contracting firms take on this job in Honolulu?

Mr. Connolly. Well, my understanding is that Wyman came to the continent to interest contractors, and he interviewed several, that Grafe wanted this thing himself, but Wyman wouldn't give it to him alone, but he would give it to the group that was functioning in Colorado.

239. General Frank. And with that in mind, you and Grafe and Wyman went on to Washington to consummate this contract?

Mr. Connolly. We went on to Washington to negotiate it and determine whether or not we would get it. We didn't have it when we went to Washington.

240. General Frank. Now, how soon after getting to Washington did you find out that Rohl was a German alien?

Mr. Connolly. Why, I think within the next couple or three days.

241. General Frank. That had a very direct bearing on the participation of the Rohl-Connolly Company in the contract, did it not?

Mr. Connolly. What do you mean, "it had a very direct bearing"?

242. General Frank. Well, if Mr. Rohl stayed in there as a German alien, he legally had no right to accept a defense contract?

Mr. Connolly. Well, I don't know.

243. General Frank. That was just plain law, was it not, at that time? So it was not a question of judgment, it was a question of legal responsibility?

Mr. Connolly. You mean Rohl legally could not participate in the contract?

244. General Frank. Not unless he was a citizen; and that, in accordance with the law. That is exactly what I mean. Therefore, the status of the Rohl-Connolly Company in this venture depended upon Rohl's status, did it not?

Mr. Connolly. Well, I don't know. I am a layman, not an attorney.

245. General Frank. You were doing business as the president of the company?

Mr. Connolly. That's right.

246. General Frank. And you certainly had better know something about the law that restricted your operations?

Mr. Connolly. Well, I didn't know there was any law that restricted that, General.

247. General Frank. Didn't this man Martin tell you that?

Mr. Connolly. Well, if I discussed it with him, he probably would have.
248. General Frank. What I am getting around to is this: When you learned that Rohl was a German citizen, you started to "scratch gravel" to eliminate his being an officer in the company, did you not?
Mr. Connolly. Well, that wasn’t what prompted me to do that.
249. General Frank. What was it?
Mr. Connolly. What prompted me was the fact that that thing was secret.
250. General Frank. Did you get any advice whatever from a lawyer on this question?
Mr. Connolly. No, I never developed it with them.
251. General Frank. With Rohl’s status in the company as a German alien being as disturbing as it was, and with Wyman asking that group to come into Honolulu, you want me to believe that you never mentioned it to Wyman?
Mr. Connolly. General, that is the truth; I never mentioned it to Wyman.
252. General Frank. That is what you want? That is what you want?
Mr. Connolly. No, it isn’t a matter of wanting. That is a fact. I never mentioned Rohl’s status to Wyman.
253. General Frank. Why shouldn’t you have mentioned it to him?
Mr. Connolly. Well, I didn’t.
254. General Frank. Why shouldn’t you?
Mr. Connolly. No reason at all, except I am the son of an immigrant, myself; who had his papers, of course. I guess, so were most of us; but Rohl seemed to think that not being a citizen was a terrible thing. I guess it is, after that many years; and I seemed to feel that I was rather a chump, not knowing more about my immediate associate than I did, after all those years, and I probably thought I didn’t like to express it around, about what a damned fool I was. I had more or less pride, I guess, on my part; but that’s it.
255. General Frank. All right.
256. Major Clausen. So, when you learned of this alien status in Washington, you not only learned that he was a German alien, but that he had been an alien since 1913, didn’t you?
Mr. Connolly. No. Well, he had always been an alien.
257. Major Clausen. Yes. Well, you knew though that he had come to the country in 1913?
Mr. Connolly. All his life.
258. Major Clausen. You knew that he had come to this country in 1913, didn’t you, Mr. Connolly?
Mr. Connolly. Well, now, I don’t think I knew when he came to this country.
259. Major Clausen. Maybe you don’t recall your answer. What the General asked you was, “why didn’t you tell Wyman?” And you said, “Well, it was such a terrible thing to have been an alien all those years.”
Mr. Connolly. I had known him 20 years.
Mr. Connolly. That was 20 years he was an alien.
261. Major Clausen. Well, you knew then that he had not only been an alien, but you he had been an alien for at least 20 years, because you had known him for 20 years, didn't you?

Mr. Connolly. Yes—plus the rest of his life.

262. Major Clausen. And you did not discuss that with him?

Mr. Connolly. No.

[2196] 263. Major Clausen. Did Rohl tell you it was a terrible thing to be an alien for those 20 years?

Mr. Connolly. No.

264. Major Clausen. Do you make the assertion to the Board here, as a statement of fact, that you did not discuss the law as to Rohl's participation in this contract with Mr. Martin, in Washington, in December 1940?

Mr. Connolly. Of course, I didn’t. If I did and he had expressed to me what you gentlemen as attorneys now express to me, I would have never executed it.

265. Major Clausen. And that is as true as everything else that you have said, isn't it?

Mr. Connolly. And it's all the truth.

266. Major Clausen. Now, as a matter of fact, you shared a room with Colonel Wyman, did you, in this Carlton Hotel?

Mr. Connolly. Yes.

267. Major Clausen. You not only went to Washington, but, in response to a question by General Frank, you said you slept in the same room with Colonel Wyman?

Mr. Connolly. That's right.

268. Major Clausen. While you were there?

Mr. Connolly. No—till Wyman got a room, when Grafe came in.

269. Major Clausen. And where was Mr. Martin at this time?

He was in the same hotel, wasn't he?

Mr. Connolly. I do not think so. I never saw him in any room in that hotel.

270. Major Clausen. Where was he when you saw him in Washington?

Mr. Connolly. I saw him in the lobby, but I never knew [2196] that he had a room in that hotel. I don't think he did.

271. Major Clausen. Did you just have a casual conversation with Mr. Martin in the lobby? Is that all that you saw of Mr. Martin on that occasion?

Mr. Connolly. No; I saw Martin in the lobby, and of course, I saw him upstairs, too, but I never went into any legal discussions with Martin about this contract.

272. Major Clausen. Did you see Mr. Martin there on more than one day, or was it just the one day?

Mr. Connolly. I say I saw him more than once.

273. Major Clausen. Several days, on several occasions?

Mr. Connolly. I saw him two or three times, there. That's reasonable.

274. Major Clausen. Did Mr. Martin go to dinner with you?

Mr. Connolly. I don't think so, ever; no.

275. Major Clausen. Did you see Mr. Martin when you were with Colonel Wyman?

Mr. Connolly. Yes, I think I did.
276. Major Clausen. Did you have any discussion concerning Mr. Martin with Colonel Wyman?

Mr. Connolly. I don't think so.

277. Major Clausen. Well, as a matter of fact, didn't Colonel Wyman say to you, "Why do you have your lawyer here?" and get "peeved" at the fact that you did have him there?

Mr. Connolly. I didn't have him there. He was there. I didn't have him there.

278. Major Clausen. Well, didn't he say that to you? That is my question. Didn't he remonstrate at the fact that there was a lawyer on the scene representing Rohl-Connolly Company, he thought?

[2197] Mr. Connolly. There was no lawyer on the scene representing the Rohl-Connolly Company.

279. Major Clausen. My question, sir, is this: Did not Colonel Wyman say to you, "Why do you have Mr. Martin here, your lawyer?" or words to that effect?

Mr. Connolly. I don't think so.

280. Major Clausen. Well, are you sure?

Mr. Connolly. Reasonably sure.

281. Major Clausen. All right.

Mr. Connolly. I don't think I discussed Martin with Wyman.

282. Major Clausen. Did Mr. Martin sit around with you when you were discussing the contract?

Mr. Connolly. Certainly not!

283. Major Clausen. Did he go to dinner with the group of you?

Mr. Connolly. Not that I recall.

284. Major Clausen. In these discussions that you had with Mr. Paul Grafe, Colonel Wyman sat in on those, did he?

Mr. Connolly. No.

285. Major Clausen. Just you and Mr. Grafe?

Mr. Connolly. When I remarked about Rohl, yes.

286. Major Clausen. I beg your pardon, sir?

Mr. Connolly. If you mean it was the contract business that Wyman was discussing with me, why, of course, he was there; but if you mean my discussion with Grafe, as far a Rohl was concerned, Wyman wasn't there.

287. Major Clausen. You are sure of that, now?

Mr. Connolly. I know it.

288. Major Clausen. In these discussions that you had with Mr. Grafe concerning the contract—that is, the details of this [2198] contract—was Wyman present?

Mr. Connolly. Why, they were read to us, in the Chief's office.

289. Major Clausen. By whom?

Mr. Connolly. By Wyman and Newman, whoever was around there. There was no contract in anyone's possession around the Carlton Hotel. These papers were in the Chief's office, to stay there. There was no contract in our hands to discuss, ever.

290. Major Clausen. Mr. Grafe was present with you and Colonel Wyman, then, in the Chief's office, is that correct?

Mr. Connolly. Sure.

291. Major Clausen. In other words, Colonel Wyman was there, also?

Mr. Connolly Sure.
292. Major Clausen. Now, who paid for Colonel Wyman’s room at this hotel?

Mr. Connolly. I don’t know, but I suppose he paid for his own. I know Grafe paid for his room, when I took it over. He had the reservations. Wyman and I slept there one night before Grafe showed up. When I left, I left Grafe with the bill; so he paid the bill, for the first night, for the night I stayed there.

293. Major Clausen. I have no further questions.

294. General Grunert. Is there anything else, Mr. Connolly, that you might tell the Board, that might assist us in getting at facts, that you have in mind?

Mr. Connolly. General, anything that I could tell you, that would help you, I would be glad to, if you would just indicate what else you think I might do.

295. General Grunert. I just wondered, possibly there had been something we haven’t brought up, that you might have in mind, and could tell us.

296. General Frank. Have you anything, Colonel Toulmin?


298. General Grunert. Apparently there is nothing else.

Thank you very much for coming.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

TESTIMONY OF WALTER WILTON HORNE, 9425 WILSHIRE BOULEVARD, BEVERLY HILLS, CALIFORNIA

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel West. Mr. Horne, will you please state to the Board your full name and address?


2. General Grunert. Mr. Horne, what the Board needs is help to get at facts that will lead to other facts.

Mr. Horne. Yes, sir.

3. General Grunert. So I am going to ask General Frank and his adviser there to get at some facts that they think you may be able to help us on.


5. Major Clausen. Mr. Horne, what is your present business?

Mr. Horne. I am a realty operator, an insurance broker, have had a great deal of yachting experience in days gone by.

6. Major Clausen. And in your experience previously did you meet a Hans Wilhelm Rohl?

Mr. Horne. I did, sir.

7. Major Clausen. And did you ever have occasion to discuss with him his preference for things Germanic?

Mr. Horne. I did, sir.

8. Major Clausen. Well, just briefly narrate to the Board some of those discussions that you had with him, and when they took place.

Mr. Horne. I had the good fortune to own a German-built yacht, the ARMGAARD, built in Germany for the German Prince Lippe, a 65-ton vessel, racing yacht 106 feet long, one of the outstanding racing yachts of Germany, brought to America, and
we raced it in two races to Honolulu. It was an outstanding, very fast ship, built of German manganese-nickel steel; and Hans Wilhelm Rohl, known to us in the yachting circle as Bill Rohl, was always very interested in that boat, several times tried to buy it, even helped in connection with Honolulu races by supplying masts and gear that came off of his smaller Swedish boat, the PANDORA.

The PANDORA and the ARMGAARD, then renamed yacht CONTENDER, were anchored next door to each other, as neighbors in the Long Beach harbor; and I, as Commodore of the Long Beach Pacific Coast Yacht Club, went down to Spain in 1928 to bring back the trophies from King Alfonso and to take over to Spain the American trophies for the trans-Atlantic Ocean race. I did not consult Rohl as to my going, and when I returned he asked particularly why I went on a British ship, the Cunard Line, why I hadn't consulted him; that I had made a mistake, that he could have helped me, and go on the Hamburg-American Line. He made the direct, positive statement that his uncle, whom he was very close to and who was his financial backer, was the managing director of the Hamburg-American Line and the North German Lloyd Steamship Company, a most influential, high German financially and politically, and that he could have gotten me the very finest of accommodations aboard this trans-Atlantic passage, and he criticized me for going twelfth hour with any accommodations I could get.

9. Major Clausen. Now, with regard to Germany and things German, did you have talks with him in which he boasted of things German?

Mr. Horne. Yes.

10. Major Clausen. By the way, before you answer that question, when was it that you had this talk with him about his uncle being——

Mr. Horne. On my return in the fall of 1928.

11. Major Clausen. All right.

Mr. Horne. I went down to Spain on July 4, 1928.

12. Major Clausen. All right. Did you have other talks with him about the subject of preferences for Germany?

Mr. Horne. I kept my yacht in commission through the winter and took numbers of yachtsmen who owned other yachts that were out of commission, and he went on some of these trips, local trips, where we were practicing navigation, racing crews, and he was always bragging about the yacht CONTENDER being the finest and fastest yacht because she was German-built, and there was no one could build as fine a manganese steel yacht as the Germans could, and his whole boastful braggadocio attitude was entirely German, and things German were by far the best and by far the finest built; and he was very free in those days, in 1926 to 1938, in claiming his relationship with the managing director of the North German Lloyd Line.

13. Major Clausen. Did he ever say anything about the fact that he was a German citizen himself, not a United States citizen?

Mr. Horne. I think he kept that pretty well covered up. We didn't really know at that time that he was a German citizen, until he bought the large American yacht VEGA, and that was in his wife's name, and it was registered in New York, and he bought it for $48,000. That is the ship that he chartered to the Army Engineers for $75,000, reported in the newspapers at one-dollar charter, how-
ever; and we knew, checking into the thing afterwards, that it was because of his alien birth, and he had the yacht registered in his wife’s name, his wife Floy Rohl. She received the charter money.

The PANDORA, the first yacht he owned, which was moored next to me, was under 75 feet in length and therefore could be registered in the name of an alien German, and the PANDORA was really his yacht, registered as his yacht.

14. Major Clausen. Now, did you ever have a talk with Mr. Rohl concerning an acquaintance by him with visiting Germans of high rank, in business and diplomatic service of the German Republic?

Mr. Horne. On my return from this yacht race to Spain bringing back the King Alfonso trophy I had occasion or was called upon as commodore of the yacht club to entertain and did see considerable of Count Von Luckner, who was an outstanding German, known as the sea raider, the skipper of the SEA ADDER that came out of the North Sea at Christmas night and escaped the blockade, in the first war.

He wanted to see this fine German racing yacht because he had sailed on the yacht in Travaminda. He had sailed the same yacht in Kiel and Travaminda, and he wanted to go with me to Honolulu as a navigator on this very fine German yacht.

I did not invite Hans Wilhelm Rohl to these receptions and entertainments of both Count Von Luckner and his Norwegian princess wife, and Rohl became incensed over the fact that I [2204] did not do so, and his friendship or acquaintanceship as a next door neighbor was chilled because of the fact that I had ignored him and had not invited him to these receptions to Count Von Luckner.

I understood that he had made Von Luckner’s acquaintance and had entertained him when he came here, but the outstanding Von Luckner reception, a dinner party aboard his own ship, which was his own birthday party, which was very much of a German—the whole characteristic of the whole thing from beer drinking up and down—Hans Wilhelm Rohl was not invited to that party. Rather strange that he wasn’t, but he was not invited.

There is no question but that Rohl was a true Nazi German: his braggadocio, his drinking, his excessive excesses in every way, bullheadedness and domination, overrunning everybody’s rights in connection with yachting entertainments. On the return from the Honolulu race he made himself very, very obnoxious because of his foreign, German attitude and excessive drinking.

In 1926 when I first met him I was associated politically with three gentlemen who were my partners in the insurance business, and had been the campaign manager that had succeeded in arranging the large bond issues for the Long Beach breakwater, and Rohl came to us wanting to become a preferred, intimate, friendly contractor, to buy a lot of insurance from us and bid and secure the breakwater contracts that he later did actually build in Long Beach, and he offered us all of his insurance, and it was a left-handed way of bribery, and we were very suspicious of his methods and his foreign influencing of contracts, and we withdrew from the thing and have had nothing whatsoever to do with him.

He did not buy or have anything to do with our office [2205] because three of my partners were councilmen and were really sitting
as a board letting the breakwater contracts; and I went to the office of the Pacific Indemnity Company to try to get the back records of Ted Woods, the executive vice president, in reference to his investigation of Rohl’s financial position; and the whole status of his presentation of his qualification for bonds financial, heavy—heavy financial bonds—was not only his own personal resources, which he admitted he brought from Germany some years previous, but that he had a strong financial backing and could command any amount of money or resources if his contracts got involved in trouble, because of the financial backing of his uncle, the managing director of the Hamburg-American Line, who was supposed to be a very wealthy German.

15. Major Clausen. I have no further questions.

Mr. Horne. He tried to buy a German yacht and was unable to do so, finally bought a large American yacht. We as yachtsmen were rather impressed with the publicity, that he had taken that large ocean-going yacht and chartered it to the Government at the beginning of the war for a dollar. It was publicized in the Los Angeles Times, and we found out later that he had actually chartered it to the Engineering Department of the Army Engineers for $75,000 and that the only work and service that that yacht ever performed in the war effort was the hauling of a cargo of liquor from San Pedro harbor to Major Wyman in Honolulu and that the boat never had been put into any useful service in the war effort as a patrol ship, but delivered its cargo of liquor to Honolulu and just was left there.

16. General Frank. How did you find that out?

[2206] Mr. Horne. Well, Commodore Byron McCandless of the United States Navy, San Diego, the pioneer Navy man in charge of San Diego for the last twenty years, of the Destroyer Fleet, was encouraging me and I was offering my services gratis to try to build up a fleet of American-owned yachts for the offshore patrol, because the Navy were all lax—

17. General Frank. Just to get back, there is just a single point I am after.

Mr. Horne. Yes.

18. General Frank. And that is about this,—

Mr. Horne. Well, we were trying to charter all these boats to the Government for a dollar a year, and we were using that as a criterion, and we found out much to our embarrassment that it wasn’t true, that it wasn’t chartered for a dollar a year; it was $75,000.

19. General Frank. Where did you get the information on the $75,000 that you are stating positively here under oath that he got for it?

Mr. Horne. Well, that, where I got it? We checked the charter parties. Donald Douglas, a personal friend of mine, a yachtsman, and vice president of the Douglas Aircraft Company, was interested in putting his yacht in; Keith Spaulding, the owner of the schooner yacht GOOD WILL, a five or six hundred thousand dollar yacht; we made an investigation at the custom house in San Pedro about that charter party. We wanted to make the same charter party, and we found out it was chartered in New York and not here, and out of the checking up of the thing we found out it was really chartered for $150,000, but the Government had finally come down and paid $75,000 as a [2207] modification.
20. General Frank. Where did you get your figures?

Mr. Horne. Well, it was in connection with this custom-house investigation, that we wanted to make the same charters to the Government for a dollar a year, and Keith Spaulding and a number of other large yacht owners had agreed that they would turn their yachts over.

21. General Frank. Did you ever see a document that showed that he got $75,000?

Mr. Horne. No. It was in New York. It was not in this custom house here. And I think as a result of our trying to find what the charter party was, to make duplicates of it, we learned—but I don’t know whether we learned from the custom house or where we learned—that it developed that it wasn’t a dollar-a-year charter. The American boys went on and chartered their boats to the Navy for a dollar a year, turned them over.

22. General Frank. I have nothing further.

Mr. Horne. But I don’t know where we got that information. It was someone of the group that owned these yachts, that turned them over to the Government and—

23. General Frank. As a matter of fact, you are not so sure that that $75,000 is a true statement of the fact, are you?

Mr. Horne. Well, to my best knowledge and belief, that the yachtmen made this investigation and they chartered their boats for a dollar a year and later found out that Rohl had chartered his for a dollar a year plus $75,000. Now, just where that information came from, I am sorry, sir; I can’t tell you, but it came out in our efforts to supply this offshore patrol of these large ocean-going yachts.

[2208] 24. General Frank. So far as you are concerned, then, it is hearsay?

Mr. Horne. I think so, because we didn’t have the records in San Pedro harbor. They were in New York, not here.

25. General Grunert. It may not be true, but you believe it to be true; is that the idea?

Mr. Horne. I really honestly believe it to be true. The yachtmen were very much incensed about it, that they had turned over more powerful Diesel schooners for this offshore patrol on a dollar-a-year basis really inspired by the fact that Bill Rohl had done the thing, and we found out afterward that he had sandbagged the Department for $75,000.

26. General Frank. When your group gave their yachts to the Government for a dollar a year, the Government, however, reconditioned them when they were returned, so that they were as good as when they were originally loaned to the Government, did they not?

Mr. Horne. Well, Walter P. Murphy turned over a 260-foot 3-mast schooner, and he turned it over to the Government just as is: Do with it as you please; and the Government I believe are still using it. Now, they will have to have it reconditioned, I believe.

27. General Frank. That is one conditioned. What about the rest of them? Did the Government recondition them?

Mr. Horne. They have altered them. They took out all of the fine cabins and put for or five times as many—two or three times as many men aboard. I think that the yachtmen understood that the equipment would be put back the way it was.
28. General GRUNERT. Could you have been mistaken as to the [2209] question of its being chartered for $75,000; or putting it back in the condition that they received it cost $75,000?

Mr. Horne. I understood it was charter hire, $75,000 against my friends' putting in their yachts at one dollar.

29. General GRUNERT. All right.

Mr. Horne. The matter of conditioning I don't think was a part of the charter at all.

30. General GRUNERT. Have you succeeded in what you are after in getting or giving a document?

Mr. Horne. I believe that we could get from the New York Custom House a copy of that charter if you would like to have it.

31. General Frank. It is immaterial to us.

32. General GRUNERT. Yes, I think we ought to have evidence on that, and as far as this Board is concerned in its investigation, we limit ourselves to phases which pertain to the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Mr. Horne. I see.

33. General GRUNERT. So whatever evidence there is, if our adviser on this advises us to get that evidence we can do so.

Mr. Horne. Well, I think Mr. Earl Thatcher in Honolulu, who was a yachtsman and who had lots to do with our yacht racing down there, when you arrive in Honolulu, can verify and witness as a qualified witness. He is a member of or in charge of the War Information Bureau in Honolulu, and I believe that that information can be verified, that that yacht made a cargo haul of liquor to Honolulu and was never used otherwise.

34. General GRUNERT. Yes. We have evidence on that also.

Is there anything else you wish to bring out by this witness?


36. General GRUNERT. Have you any questions?


This man Rohl about whom you have testified: prior to the time that he went into work on that breakwater project down there was he a man of considerable resources?

Mr. Horne. Well, I would say that he was a relatively small contractor. His financial resources can be determined accurately by financial statements in the files of the Pacific Indemnity Company, but the source of that money came from Germany, from his uncle, the managing director of the Hamburg-American Line.

38. General Russell. Did he make a lot of money out of his operations with the breakwater contract? Did he become rich in that operation?

Mr. Horne. Well, that would be hearsay. I understood that that was where he became a big, strong financial contractor, from the beginning of the harbor breakwater. I was the chairman of the campaign committee that raised that money, and I believe definitely that it can be shown in the records that that was his financial start as a big major contractor.

39. General Russell. Now, it is true that you went over to this other indemnity company when he was seeking a bond for his breakwater work, and there made an investigation as to his financial condition?
Mr. Horne. Yes, I did, jointly with Mr. Ted Woods, the executive vice president of that insurance company, and the more we got into it and the more there seemed to be a whole influence of his buying—buying influence to get that contract, the further we pulled away from it. But the Pacific Indemnity Company, of course, is entirely neutral; they could supply a bond if they wanted to.

40. General Russell. Well, what did you learn about him? That he was not so strong financially when he went into the breakwater contract?

Mr. Horne. That is it. It was very questionable as to whether the Pacific Indemnity Company would write his bond.

41. General Russell. All right; so much for that.

Now, then, I believe in your earlier evidence you stated that when this ship of his went out to Honolulu, the one that we have had some evidence about—

Mr. Horne. Yes, the VEGA.

42. General Russell. That it took a cargo of liquor for Colonel Wyman; was that your statement?

Mr. Horne. Yes, the statement that we understood that was what was—that was the only work that that boat ever did.

43. General Russell. Now, who made that statement that this was Wyman’s liquor?

Mr. Horne. Well, there is a witness coming tomorrow named Bruce Pine, Los Angeles, Beverly Hills, and I believe that I learned that information from him; and I was in on the Congressional investigation of an attorney from the House Naval Affairs Committee, or I believe it was Naval Affairs Committee, previously, and prepared these affidavits which I will be glad to leave with you, which are signed affidavits; and they questioned me very carefully as to these two yachts, the PANDORA that was registered in Rohl’s name and the VEGA that was not registered in Rohl’s name. I was beyond the age limit, fifty, to get into the Navy, and I volunteered my services to help build up this offshore patrol of these large ocean-going yachts, and that is how I got into this thing and got into the custom house to try to get a copy of the charter party, because these people in a patriotic way had said, “Well, we will do the same thing and get us a copy of the charter party.” And I went down to San Piedro, found that Rohl’s boat was not registered in his name at all. It was registered in his wife’s name, and the custom house said that she was the American and he was not; he was a foreign, an alien citizen, and the boat couldn’t be registered in his name, but he was the one that used the boat exclusively. He was the skipper and owner of the boat as far as the world knew, and he went in and out of port with it.

44. General Grunert. We have that evidence of the House Military Affairs Committee. We have that available to us.

Mr. Horne. Yes, sir. Well, that is how it came out.

45. General Grunert. Yes.

Mr. Horne. Our efforts were very sincere, in a patriotic effort to supply all these yachts to the Navy for a dollar a year, and my friends like Donald Douglas and Keith Spaulding rather laughed at me because I had urged them to put their boats in there at a dollar a year,
and they found out that Rohl had been paid $75,000 a year; not that they wanted $75,000; were perfectly contented to offer their ships. Walter P. Murphy's finest yacht on the Pacific Coast was given for a dollar a year, and it is in service today and has done wonderful yeoman work.

46. Major Clausen. We must get the affidavit, sir, and that is all. Mr. Horne. I would appreciate this one privilege. May I ask the privilege of reading this last page of this affidavit?

47. General Grunert. Go ahead.

Mr. Horne. I am so delighted that you gentlemen are taking the bull by the horns, and a long time ago when this thing [indicating] was written up it was in hopes that just what you gentlemen are doing would come about:

That affiant is informed and believes that said vessel sailing with the said cargo of intoxicating liquor from the harbor of San Pedro was never used for any purpose of national defense or as set forth in the charter thereof.

That affiant believes that the method of registration of said vessel VEGA and the chartering thereof, and the wrongful use of said charter, was and is a fraud upon the United States Government.

That affiant is informed and believes that the said Rohl was at Pearl Harbor, Honolulu, prior to December 7, 1941, and had complete detailed information of all of the offensive and defensive installations of the War Department, and that he knew on said date of the location of American Naval vessels, American planes, fortifications and other vital installations, and that the aforesaid knowledge of the said Rohl at that particular place at that particular time, was too serious to be a mere coincidence, which in affiant's opinion should be thoroughly investigated by officials of the Government high enough not to be biased, prejudiced, or influenced in any manner whatsoever.

[2213] Namely, Rohl's manner of influencing with money and bribery.

Affiant further states that in his opinion, the Government investigators should go deeper than the records disclose upon the surface, so that there may be apprehended all alien spies working under cover against the best American interests, and in league with agents of Germany or Japan, and that all persons so apprehended should lose their citizenship, and all of their worldly goods and ill-gotten gains available should be confiscated, and that they should be deported to the countries from which they originally came.

And that it should not be forgotten that the fathers and mothers who mourn their dead soldiers and sailors who lost their lives in this war, and who have received Awards of Merit and Distinguished Service Medals, would want to return these Awards to the United States Government so long as the said Major Wyman is allowed to retain any merits or the Distinguished Service Medal granted him, and that he should be subjected to an impartial Court Martial, and treated as found guilty, according to his just deserts and the best American tradition.

48. General Grunert. Now, is that evidence sworn to, and so forth?

49. Major Clausen. Yes, sir.

50. General Grunert. All right; take it.

We thank you very much for coming up, Mr. Horne.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

(Thereupon, at 4:45 p.m., the Board concluded the hearing of witnesses for the day and proceeded to other business.)
# CONTENTS

FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 1, 1944.

Testimony of—

Mrs. Gertrude Campbell Brunner, 1210 South Euclid, San Gabriel, California. .................................................. 2216

Hans William Rohl, Rancho Dos Vintos, Camarillo, California. ........... 2222

Paul Grafe, 21 Chester Place, Los Angeles, California. .................. 2288

John M. Martin, Attorney-At-Law, Los Angeles, California. .......... 2321

J. P. Shirley, 501 Belair Road, Los Angeles, California. ............. 2354

1 Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate pages of original transcript of proceedings.
FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 1, 1944.

Presidio of San Francisco, California.

The Board, at 9 a. m., pursuant to recess on yesterday, conducted the hearing of witnesses, Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President of the Board, presiding.


Present also: Colonel Charles W. West, Recorder, Major Henry C. Clausen, Assistant Recorder, and Colonel Harry A. Toulmin, Jr., Executive Officer.

General Grunert. The Board will come to order.

TESTIMONY OF MRS. GERTRUDE CAMPBELL BRUNNER, 1210 SOUTH EUCLID, SAN GABRIEL, CALIFORNIA

(The witness was sworn by the Assistant Recorder.)

1. Major Clausen. Would you state to the Board your name and address?

Mrs. Brunner. Gertrude Campbell Brunner, 1210 South Euclid, San Gabriel, California.

2. Major Clausen. Mrs. Brunner, there is a procedure that we have followed with all witnesses, which consists of warning them of their rights.

Mrs. Brunner. Yes.

3. Major Clausen. In this respect: that you don't have to say anything or testify to anything which might implicate you in any crime; that if you do say anything here it may later be used against you. You understand that, do you?

Mrs. Brunner. Yes.

4. Major Clausen. You formerly were an employee of the United States Engineer Department?

Mrs. Brunner. Yes, sir.

5. Major Clausen. And that employment commenced in the year 1935, did it?

Mrs. Brunner. Yes, it did.

6. Major Clausen. And you were then assigned to Los Angeles?

Mrs. Brunner. That is right.

7. Major Clausen. And at that time your duties consisted of running an addressograph machine?

Mrs. Brunner. I started as secretary to Major Zajieck, Z-a-j-i-e-c-k. He was a Naval—an Army reserve officer. And then I later went into the addressograph department.
8. Major Clausen. This was in Los Angeles?
   Mrs. Brunner. In Los Angeles.
9. Major Clausen. While you were stationed there were you ever the personal representative of Colonel Wyman?
   Mrs. Brunner. Never.
10. Major Clausen. Were you ever his secretary?
    Mrs. Brunner. No, sir.
11. Major Clausen. Were you ever the stenographer assigned to him?
    Mrs. Brunner. No, sir.
12. Major Clausen. And Colonel Wyman later went to Hawaii, did he not?

[2218] Mrs. Brunner. That is right.
13. Major Clausen. About five years later?
   Mrs. Brunner. That is right.
14. Major Clausen. And that was about 1940, '39?
   Mrs. Brunner. Somewhere around there, yes.
15. Major Clausen. And did you then go to Hawaii at about that time?
   Mrs. Brunner. No. I think he was over there quite a while before I went over.
16. Major Clausen. Well, you finally did, though, go to Hawaii; is that correct?
   Mrs. Brunner. That is right.
17. Major Clausen. Still as an employee of the United States Engineer Department?
   Mrs. Brunner. Yes.
18. Major Clausen. Colonel Wyman was relieved from Hawaii about March 1942, returned to the mainland, and was later assigned to the Canol project. Did you return to the mainland in the early part of 1942?
19. Major Clausen. And did you then go to the Alaskan territory, Canadian territory, on this Canol project?
   Mrs. Brunner. Well, it was three months after I returned to the States.
20. Major Clausen. And in going to Alaska or Canada did you fly there with a Ferman K. Pickering, P-i-c-k-e-r-i-n-g?
   Mrs. Brunner. He and his wife were on the plane, yes.
21. Major Clausen. Mrs. Brunner, this morning I showed you

[2219] what purports to be a statement of fact contained on pages 19 and 20 of this report of the House Military Affairs Committee dated June 14, 1940. I am going to read this portion to you:

Gertrude Campbell, who called herself the colonel's personal representative, told me that she had been with the Engineers in Los Angeles; from Los Angeles she had gone to Hawaii, where she worked directly under Colonel Wyman and had gone to Canada from Hawaii. I flew from Edmonton to White Horse in the same plane with Miss Campbell. After staying in White Horse for 2 days, we proceeded to Skagway, Alaska, by train, also accompanied by Miss Campbell, who was the colonel's personal representative on the Canol project No. 2, at Skagway, Alaska. Miss Campbell told me, in the presence of my wife and others, that on the morning of December 7, 1941, in the Hawaiian Islands, Colonel Wyman, who was then district engineer, came to the office after the Japanese attack, in a drunken condition and in civilian clothes, and changed to his
uniform in full view of the girls in the office. Colonel Wyman meantime shouted directions to those in the office and passed out guns to anyone who seemed to be able to operate firearms.

Let me ask you first, Miss Campbell, if you made that statement to which reference is made on this page 20, at that time and place.

MRS. BRUNNER. I don’t remember anything about that at all.

[2220] 22. Major Clausen. Do you recall, though, Miss Campbell, rumors to the effect that on the morning of December 7 Colonel Wyman came to the office in a drunken condition?

MRS. BRUNNER. I have heard that in Honolulu and I have heard it since I have come back to the States, but I couldn’t testify to that because I didn’t see Colonel Wyman on the day of the 7th until in the afternoon.

23. Major Clausen. I have no other questions.

24. General Russell. You had better identify her, as she is testifying as Mrs. Brunner.

MRS. BRUNNER. I was Mrs. Campbell. Mrs. Campbell, not Miss.

25. Major Clausen. You were Mrs. Gertrude Campbell?

MRS. BRUNNER. That is right.

26. General Russell. And what did you say of the time, now?

Major Clausen. That is on this occasion that is referred to by Ferman K. Pickering. You were Mrs. Campbell at that time?

MRS. BRUNNER. That is right.

27. General Grunert. When you saw Colonel Wyman that afternoon what was his condition as to sobriety?

MRS. BRUNNER. Well, I was not close enough to him to tell one way or another.

28. General Grunert. That is all.

29. Major Clausen. That is all.

MRS. BRUNNER. He asked us all to report out there, and we were all assigned jobs to do. I was making sandwiches and was running small errands at Kewalo Basin, and I didn’t get close enough to any of the officers except Captain McCrone, [2221] who was my superior. But I would like to say that I have never worked directly under Colonel Wyman. I have always worked under an officer. Colonel Wyman has never been my superior officer except over the officer that I was reporting to.

30. General Grunert. Is there anything that you would like to tell the Board that occurs to you that might be of assistance to the Board?

MRS. BRUNNER. Well, I don’t know whether it would have any bearing on this case or not, but the party that made this statement here had caused us quite a bit of trouble in Alaska. He and his wife—he was married on his way to Edmonton, and they sent them up to Alaska on the job that I was on. We finally had to send them out. He and his wife got in a fight and they broke her jaw, and they couldn’t fix it in Skagway. They sent them out, and they were going to sue the Government and they were going to do a lot of things. I don’t believe they have done anything since they went back, but Bechtel, Price & Callahan had a terrible time with them. I think that maybe his background, if somebody would look into it, might shed a little light on the subject.


(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)
[2222] TESTIMONY OF HANS WILLIAM ROHL

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel West. Mr. Rohl, will you please state to the Board your name and address?
   Mr. Rohl. Hans William—not Wilhelm—Rohl; Rancho Dos Vientos, Camarillo, California.

2. Colonel West. And your occupation?
   Mr. Rohl. Farmer.

3. General Grunert. Mr. Rohl, this Board is after facts about what happened prior to and during the Pearl Harbor attack, and in the course of this investigation there are phases there that pertain to Colonel Wyman and his connection with construction in Hawaii. Now, this field is so broad that we have divided the field up amongst the Board in making this special investigation, although the Board will act on all phases. So General Frank, assisted by Major Clausen here, will develop this particular field for us. General Frank.


5. Major Clausen. Mr. Rohl, the first question I will ask you: On the night of December 7, 1941, did Colonel Wyman stay at your home?
   Mr. Rohl. On the night of December 7th?

   Mr. Rohl. No, sir.

7. General Frank. December 6?

8. Major Clausen. Or December 6?
   Mr. Rohl. No, sir. Colonel Wyman never stayed at my home overnight.

9. Major Clausen. You mean at no time ever?
   Mr. Rohl. At no time ever.

10. Major Clausen. By the way, you came to this country from Germany on October 23, 1913; is that correct?
    Mr. Rohl. Correct.

11. Major Clausen. And you were born in Germany?
    Mr. Rohl. Yes.

12. Major Clausen. Lubeck?
    Mr. Rohl. Yes.

13. Major Clausen. And you were an alien until September 1941, sir?
    Mr. Rohl. Correct.

14. Major Clausen. You filed a preliminary application for citizenship papers on March 10, 1941; is that correct?
    Mr. Rohl. I believe it is.

15. Major Clausen. Now, in that application you stated that you were married on August 26, 1925; is that correct?
    Mr. Rohl. That is right.

16. Major Clausen. That you had four children born in 1916, 1918, '21, '23; is that correct?
    Mr. Rohl. Yes.

17. Major Clausen. Now, after you filed this application do you recall that you had a request to appear and give some preliminary testimony or preliminary examination, sir?
    Mr. Rohl. Here in— I mean in Los Angeles?
Mr. Rohl. Yes.
19. Major Clausen. And do you recall at that time that you testified that your marriage to your present wife was your [2224] second marriage?
Mr. Rohl. Yes.
20. Major Clausen. That was not true, was it?
Mr. Rohl. No. I corrected it.
21. Major Clausen. I say ——
Mr. Rohl. At the time.
Mr. Rohl. I corrected it at the time.
23. Major Clausen. Well, you corrected it not at that time but at a later time; isn't that true?
Mr. Rohl. Probably it would have been a couple of days.
24. Major Clausen. In other words, after you testified to that, you left the place and then went back later on and made your correction?
Just answer yes or no. Is that correct, sir?
Mr. Rohl. Now, I want to get your question straight.
25. Major Clausen. My question is this, Mr. Rohl: On this preliminary application after you filed your papers for citizenship you appeared and testified that your present marriage was your second marriage; you recall that?
Mr. Rohl. Yes.
26. Major Clausen. And I say that was not true, was it?
Mr. Rohl. No. I was under the ——
27. Major Clausen. All right.
Mr. Rohl. I was under the belief that I had a common-law marriage.
28. Major Clausen. Well, later on, then, you called at the office and you admitted that your testimony in that respect was not true; isn't that correct?
[2225] Mr. Rohl. Yes. I found out that there was no common-law marriage in the State of California.
29. Major Clausen. Yes. But at this preliminary examination you not only said that your present marriage was your second marriage, but you also testified that your first wife had obtained a decree of divorce from you in Sacramento in 1924; isn't that true? That is what you told them?
Mr. Rohl. No. I am not sure about that, because I did sign a settlement agreement with her and filed it with the Petitioner of Immigration or whatever it was.
30. Major Clausen. Now, between the years 1931–1932 you made about ten trips to Mexico, didn't you, Mr. Rohl?
Mr. Rohl. Yes.
31. Major Clausen. In connection with construction work down in Mexico?
Mr. Rohl. Yes.
32. Major Clausen. And on any of these trips did you ever state that you were a German alien, to any immigration officers?
Mr. Rohl. No. I was not asked.
33. Major Clausen. On a certain trip of the VEGA from Jacksonville, Florida, to Honolulu, back to Los Angeles, at which time there was also a stop at Balboa in the Canal Zone, do you remember anything about the ship's manifest?

Mr. Rohl. No.

34. Major Clausen. Listing you as H. Wilhelm—rather, H. William Rohl, born September 29, 1886, at Iola, Kansas?

Mr. Rohl. No.

35. Major Clausen. Did you have anything to do with the fact that the manifest indicated that you were born in this country?

Mr. Rohl. No.

36. Major Clausen. Do you recall that your income tax returns for 1938 and 1939 declared that you were a United States citizen?

Mr. Rohl. I know it now. I didn't know it at the time I signed it, for the simple reason that I don't make out my own income tax. I have a competent auditor who does it.

37. Major Clausen. Do you recall, Mr. Rohl, that in an investigation in 1934 you were asked the question by the Internal Revenue, "Are you a citizen of the United States?" and that you answered, "Yes, I am. I was naturalized in 1921"?

Mr. Rohl. No.

38. General Frank. You didn't say it, or don't you remember?

Mr. Rohl. I don't remember it.

39. Major Clausen. Do you deny that you made that statement to the Internal Revenue agent?

Mr. Rohl. I don't know. I don't see how I could.

40. Major Clausen. Mr. Rohl, do you recall that in connection with your naturalization application that was acted upon in 1941, a letter written by Brigadier General John J. Kingman which stated, among other things, that your services were of vital importance in Hawaii? Do you recall such a letter?

Mr. Rohl. I have never seen the letter. I have heard there was a letter.

41. Major Clausen. You sent your lawyer to Washington, did you not, sir, for the purpose of getting your naturalization application treated differently than anybody else's?

Mr. Rohl. I don't believe that.

42. Major Clausen. Well, did you send a lawyer to Washington?

Mr. Rohl. Yes.

43. Major Clausen. In connection with it?

Mr. Rohl. Yes.

44. Major Clausen. Who, Mr. Rohl?

Mr. Rohl. John M. Martin.

45. Major Clausen. In addition to Mr. Martin you also employed other lawyers in connection with that application, didn't you?

Mr. Rohl. No.

46. Major Clausen. Well, do you recall a Mr. Cannon?

Mr. Rohl. I believe Mr. Martin employed Mr. Cannon. I did not.

47. Major Clausen. Well, Mr. Martin was your lawyer who employed Mr. Cannon to act in your behalf?

Mr. Rohl. Mr. Martin——
48. Major Clausen. Is that correct?
Mr. Rohl. Mr. Martin is my lawyer. He at times employs associate counsel.

49. Major Clausen. But the fact is, Mr. Rohl, that in addition to Mr. Martin there was a lawyer by the name of Cannon who also assisted you in getting your application acted upon; isn’t that correct?
Mr. Rohl. I don’t believe that anybody assisted me to have the application acted upon except perhaps the War Department.

50. Major Clausen. Well, do you remember that you went to Court, Mr. Rohl, to get your citizen application heard?
Mr. Rohl. Yes.

51. Major Clausen. By Judge O’Connor?
Mr. Rohl. Yes.

52. Major Clausen. And they were present in Court at that time as lawyers for you?
Mr. Rohl. Yes.

53. Major Clausen. And who were those lawyers for you present at that time?
Mr. Rohl. There was Mr. Cannon and Frank Martin.

54. Major Clausen. In other words, you had two on that occasion in Court for you; isn’t that correct?
Mr. Rohl. Yes.

55. Major Clausen. And it was September 15, 1941; is that right?
Mr. Rohl. That is right.

56. Major Clausen. Now, do you remember that before that you had not only had John Martin go to Washington, but you had had other lawyers go to Washington in connection with your naturalization application?
Mr. Rohl. I had other lawyers go to Washington?

57. Major Clausen. Yes, sir.
Mr. Rohl. No.

58. Major Clausen. Did Mr. Cannon go to Washington for you?
Mr. Rohl. I don’t think he did.

59. Major Clausen. This Mr. Cannon was David Cannon, wasn’t he, Mr. Rohl?
Mr. Rohl. I believe so.

60. Major Clausen. The firm of lawyers in Los Angeles; isn’t that correct?
Mr. Rohl. Yes.

61. Major Clausen. Acquainted with Mr. Francis Biddle; isn’t that right?
Mr. Rohl. I don’t know.

62. Major Clausen. Acquainted with Mr. J. Edgar Hoover?
Mr. Rohl. I don’t know.

63. Major Clausen. In any event, do you know anything about a letter by this Mr. Cannon, David H. Cannon, 650 South Spring Street, Los Angeles, California, to the Secretary of Commerce, dated August 29, 1941, which states in part as follows: (Paragraph 5)

Theodore Wyman, Jr., Lieutenant Colonel, Corps of Engineers, War Department, in charge of all the above-men tioned defense work in Hawaii, has requested Mr. Rohl and the War Department to have Mr. Rohl give his personal service in connection with the emergency defense work in Hawaii, and as early as January 1941 and at numerous times since that date Colonel Wyman has tendered Mr. Rohl transportation via clipper or boat to the Islands and has
stated to Mr. Rohl over interocean telephone that he will personally obtain special permission, because of Mr. Rohl's alien status, to allow Mr. Rohl to work on this secret contract.

Do you recall having seen that letter?
Mr. Rohl. No.

64. Major Clausen. I beg your pardon.
Mr. Rohl. No.

65. Major Clausen. Well, now, isn't this true, Mr. Rohl: that this lawyer that you had, Martin, was not the one who effected a settlement between you and the Government for falsely documenting your vessels, but that Mr. Cannon, this [2230] David Cannon, was the man who did that?
Mr. Rohl. I don't know. You will have to ask Mr. Martin that question.

66. Major Clausen. I see. You don't know anything about that?
Mr. Rohl. No.

[2231] 67. Major Clausen. Did you pay the $25,000, or did Mr. Martin pay it?
Mr. Rohl. Well, Rohl-Connolly Company paid it.

68. Major Clausen. The Rohl-Connolly Company paid the $25,000?
Mr. Rohl. Yes, sir; that's right.

69. Major Clausen. You knew about it?
Mr. Rohl. Yes, sir.

70. Major Clausen. And you knew about that at the time?
Mr. Rohl. Yes.

71. Major Clausen. Did you O. K. it at the time?
Mr. Rohl. I O. K.'d it.

72. Major Clausen. And you know nothing about Mr. Cannon's having anything to do with it?
Mr. Rohl. I O. K.'d it on the advice of Mr. Martin.

73. Major Clausen. I say, you know nothing about Mr. Cannon's having anything to do with it?
Mr. Rohl. No. I don't even know that Mr. Cannon was in Washington.

74. Major Clausen. You don't know anything about this letter?
Mr. Rohl. No.

75. Major Clausen. Let me refer again to this letter, the statement which was made to the Secretary of Commerce by Mr. Cannon, on your behalf. This was for the attempt to avoid forfeiture of the vessels that had been falsely documented, where he says, here:

As early as January 1941 and at numerous times since that date, Colonel Wyman has tendered Mr. Rohl transportation by clipper or boat to the Islands.

Was that a fact?
[2232] 76. Mr. Rohl. You want me to confirm the letter, or do you want me to—

76. Major Clausen. I am asking whether it is a fact that as early as January 1941, and at numerous times—

Mr. Rohl. Major, may I be excused for a minute? I am asking you, you are quoting out of a letter?

77. Major Clausen. That's right.
Mr. Rohl. Now, what am I to answer? The letter?

78. Major Clausen. The truth.
Mr. Rohl. The truth. I had a letter from Colonel Wyman to proceed to the Hawaiian Islands.
79. Major Clausen. This was January 1941?
Mr. Rohl. That, I don't know, You probably have the letter.
80. Major Clausen. If I show it to you, here, will your memory be refreshed? I am showing the witness exhibit I to the Colonel Hunt report, which is a letter from Colonel Wyman to Mr. Rohl, dated January 22, 1941.
Mr. Rohl. Yes, I received that letter.
81. Major Clausen. What did you tell Colonel Wyman about your going over there? This letter asks that you go over right away, that you have got a secret contract. It has been read to the Board. What did you tell Colonel Wyman? He wrote you the letter. You are the man with the secret contract.
Mr. Rohl. I didn't tell him anything. I didn't go.
82. Major Clausen. You just did nothing? I say, did you just do nothing?
Mr. Rohl. No, I applied for my citizenship.
83. Major Clausen. Well, what did you tell Colonel Wyman, is the question. I say, sir, what did you do with regard to an answer and a response to that letter?
Mr. Rohl. I don't believe I told him anything. I don't believe I answered the letter. I know I didn't answer the letter.
84. Major Clausen. You know you did not answer it?
Mr. Rohl. That's right.
85. Major Clausen. Let me ask this question: When was the first time after January 22, 1941, that you said anything to Colonel Wyman about the subject of his request contained in this letter? Did you understand the question?
Mr. Rohl. I understand the question. I don't know.
86. Major Clausen. What would be your most—
Mr. Rohl. You want the truth, don't you? I am telling you the truth.
87. Major Clausen. Well, was it within a year, or ten years, or two months, or two days, or a week? Could you block it in, at some approximate period?
Mr. Rohl. As a matter of fact, I don't believe I told Colonel Wyman. I believe I told Paul Grafe.
88. Major Clausen. When did you tell anything to Paul Grafe about this letter after January 22, 1941?
Mr. Rohl. Probably on his first trip to the mainland after that.
89. Major Clausen. Which was when?
Mr. Rohl. I don't know.
90. Major Clausen. By the way, you had telephone calls with Colonel Wyman?
Mr. Rohl. That's right.
[2234] 91. Major Clausen. In January 1941?
Mr. Rohl. Yes.
92. Major Clausen. At which time, Colonel Wyman was in Hawaii, and you were in Los Angeles?
Mr. Rohl. Los Angeles.
93. Major Clausen. Isn't that correct?
Mr. Rohl. That's correct.
94. Major Clausen. How many?
Mr. Rohl. That I don't know.
95. Major Clausen. You had telephone calls in February 1941, didn't you, similar calls, between yourself and Colonel Wyman?
Mr. Rohl. Yes.
96. Major Clausen. And in March 1941?
Mr. Rohl. Yes. I am just talking, because I read the same book that you have, where the telephone calls are listed.
97. Major Clausen. What books did I read, Mr. Rohl?
Mr. Rohl. All the House Military Affairs Committee, 60-page book.
98. Major Clausen. In other words, you know that the House Military Affairs Committee actually collected positive proof of the stubs of telephone calls exchanged between yourself and Colonel Wyman?
Mr. Rohl. Yes, I admit.
99. Major Clausen. Yes. In other words, those statements in that report are correct, aren't they?
Mr. Rohl. Yes.
100. Major Clausen. All right. Now, referring again to this letter, January 22, 1941, it says here—Colonel Wyman is saying to you:
I desire you to proceed to Honolulu at your earliest convenience to consult with the District Engineer relative to ways and means to accomplish the purpose of the contract.
Do you want the Board to understand that you just did not answer this letter?
Mr. Rohl. No, I didn't answer the letter.
101. Major Clausen. Let me refer again to the letter of Mr. Cannon:
As early as January 1941, and at numerous times since that date, Colonel Wyman has tendered Mr. Rohl transportation by clipper or boat to the Island, and has stated to Mr. Rohl over Interocean Telephone that he will personally obtain special permission because of Mr. Rohl's alien status to allow Mr. Rohl to work on this secret contract.
Is or is not that a true statement of your lawyer, Mr. Cannon?
Mr. Rohl. I know I never talked to Colonel Wyman over the telephone about my alien status.
102. General Frank. He has not answered this question. Answer the question.
Mr. Rohl. General, may I have that question, again?
Colonel West. Read the previous question from the record.
(Question read.)
103. Major Clausen. The General would like you to answer the question.
Mr. Rohl. Yes, sir. Well, it is a long time, but I have never discussed, to the best of my memory, my alien status with Colonel Wyman over the telephone.
104. General Frank. That was not the question.
Mr. Rohl. Oh, I beg your pardon.
105. General Frank. Let us get this question answered.
Now, you understand that what I have read is an affirmative representation by a lawyer to the Secretary of Commerce for the settling of falsely documented vessels which would be forfeited un-
under the law, which representations are made on your behalf. I would just like to read to you from the third to the end paragraph of the letter:

For the reasons above stated, the petitioner, Mr. Rohl, and I have thought it advisable for me to come to Washington in an endeavor to expedite the closing of this matter. I have already been here 8 days and am quite willing to remain as much longer as may be necessary to obtain official action from your Department and as good business judgment would dictate. In the conference held yesterday it was suggested to me that a decision by your Department might not be forthcoming for several weeks, and for that reason it might not be advisable for me to continue my stay here.

Now, with that in mind, could you answer the General’s question? What about this representation here that Colonel Wyman stated to you over Interocean Telephone that he would personally obtain special permission because of your alien status?

Now, just let me put the question. Did you ever discuss that subject on the Interocean Telephone with Colonel Wyman?

Mr. Rohl. I don't believe I have.

107. Major Clausen. What about the statement beginning with—

As early as January 1941 and at numerous times since that date, Colonel Wyman has tendered Mr. Rohl Transportation by clipper or boat.

Did you ever get a similar letter to this one of January 22, 1941, tendering you such transportation?

Mr. Rohl. No.

108. Major Clausen. Is it your statement then that you never discussed that with Colonel Wyman on the Interocean Telephone, or in any other way?

Mr. Rohl. In my talk to Colonel Wyman, he probably—I am sure he asked me when I was coming over.

109. Major Clausen. I see. And what did you tell him, Mr. Rohl, honestly?

Mr. Rohl. Well, I told him honestly. I told him the truth, that I was still—

110. Major Clausen. Getting your papers?

Mr. Rohl. No.

111. Major Clausen. That you couldn't come?

Mr. Rohl. That I was still trying to get Caddo dam.

112. Major Clausen. Get what, sir?

Mr. Rohl. Caddo dam.

113. Major Clausen. Yes.

Mr. Rohl. United States Army project, in such shape that I could leave. We were building a dam in Colorado at the same time.

114. Major Clausen. Do you recall having a conversation in December 1940 with Mr. Connolly on the telephone when he was in Washington and you were in Los Angeles?

Mr. Rohl. I had a conversation with Mr. Connolly when he was in Washington. I don't know what date that was. I mean, in that, I will take your date for granted, because you probably know that that is the date.

115. Major Clausen. He told you at that time, didn't he, Mr. Rohl, that he had ascertained from Mr. Martin that you were a German alien?

Mr. Rohl. Yes.
[2238] 116. Major Clausen. And that by reason of that fact, you should resign as president, and that he should be appointed president. Do you recall that?

Mr. Rohl. No, because I resigned previous to that.

117. Major Clausen. Is it your testimony, then, that you had no such conversation with Mr. Connolly?

Mr. Rohl. Oh, Mr. Connolly probably brought it up.

118. Major Clausen. Yes; and do you recall then that you actually were told by Mr. Connolly from Washington that you should have nothing to do with this secret contract because it was a restricted matter?

Mr. Rohl. Yes.

119. Major Clausen. All right. Well, when you talked with Colonel Wyman, and he wanted you to come to Hawaii, didn't you tell him that you shouldn't have anything to do with this contract, for the reason that you were a German alien?

Mr. Rohl. I don't believe I did. I know I told Paul Grafe, because Paul Grafe was told by John Martin, in Washington, the same time when John Martin told Mr. Connolly.

120. Major Clausen. Well, is it this, then—is this the reason—that Paul Grafe or Mr. Connolly told you that the whole thing had been explained to Colonel Wyman in Washington, and therefore you didn't have to tell him, later on, that the only reason that was holding you up was the Caddoa, is that the fact?

Mr. Rohl. Yes.

121. Major Clausen. That is the fact? Who told you that? Who told you that—Mr. Grafe, or Mr. Connolly?

Mr. Rohl. That—

122. Major Clausen. The whole thing had been explained to Colonel Wyman in Washington.

Mr. Rohl. Nobody told me that. I took it for granted.

123. Major Clausen. You took that for granted?

Mr. Rohl. Yes.

124. Major Clausen. Why? Upon what did you base that assumption?

Mr. Rohl. May I tell in a few words, of my own words, about that time?

125. Major Clausen. Yes, I have no objection.

126. General Frank. Just while we are on this subject, I would like to ask some questions about these telephone conversations that you had with Colonel Wyman, he in Honolulu, and you in Los Angeles. Do you mean to say that never, in any of those telephone conversations, did you ever bring up the question with him about your alien status?

Mr. Rohl. I don't believe I did, General. I took it for granted that he was told that, in Washington.

127. Major Clausen. What did you base that on?

Mr. Rohl. Well, that's what I would like to explain.

John Martin was back in Washington on other matters, not on my business, or Rohl-Connolly business, Hawaiian Constructors' business. He was back on some other business.

128. General Frank. Having to do with your firm?

Mr. Rohl. No, sir—with other contractors; no one involved in Hawaiian Constructors, and by accident he met Paul Grafe and Tom
Connolly and told them not to sign the contract, until he talked to them further; so John Martin called me, in Los Angeles, from Washington, and told me the nature of the contract, and I gave him permission—not permission, but told him to [2240] Mr. Grafe and Mr. Connolly my alien status; which he did.

129. General Frank. Who was responsible, in trying to get the group of contractors interested in this Hawaiian project? Was it, or was it not, Colonel Wyman?

Mr. Rohl. Yes.

130. General Frank. It was Colonel Wyman?

Mr. Rohl. He was interested in getting a group of contractors.

131. General Frank. Including the Rohl-Connolly Company, the Callahan Company, and the Gunther & Shirley Company?

Mr. Rohl. Yes, sir.

132. General Frank. Now, Colonel Wyman, Mr. Connolly, and Mr. Grafe were in Washington together, in a group, discussing this contract, were they not?

Mr. Rohl. Yes, sir.

133. General Frank. And a hitch that came up in consummating the contract was your alien status, is that correct?

Mr. Rohl. General, by that do you mean—now, I have no knowledge of my own whether Mr.—

134. General Frank. Well, I will put it in different words. Maybe the word "consummating" bothers you. You and they felt that you could not participate in the contract because it was a defense project and you were an alien?

Mr. Rohl. That's right.

135. General Frank. That is correct, isn't it?

Mr. Rohl. That's correct.

136. General Frank. Therefore, there was some question, considerable question, as to whether or not the Rohl-Connolly Company could participate in this project?

Mr. Rohl. No, General.

137. General Frank. There was, until you got out of it?

Mr. Rohl. There was no question about Rohl-Connolly Co.

[2241] 138. General Frank. To whom were these letters being written, and with whom was this conversation by Wyman, in the United States? It was with you, wasn't it?

Mr. Rohl. General, you mean the letter from the Hawaiian Islands?

139. General Frank. Yes. The letter was to you?

Mr. Rohl. Direct.

140. General Frank. Rohl, by name?

Mr. Rohl. Yes, sir.

141. General Frank. And the telephone conversations by Wyman were with you, Rohl, by name?

Mr. Rohl. That's right.

142. General Frank. You were the person that he was interested in getting over there; is that not correct?

Mr. Rohl. That is correct.

143. General Frank. Yes. You were the person that he wanted on the job, as stated in the letter that was written to expedite your naturalization, that is correct, isn't it?
Mr. Rohl. That is correct.

144. General Frank. Therefore, you were the man who was concerned, and whose alien status threw a monkey-wrench into the smooth operation of getting this contract through, in Washington, because, unless you pulled out, the Rohl-Connolly Company could not participate in the project; that is correct, isn't it?

Mr. Rohl. General, by that do you mean, unless I pulled out—

145. General Frank. As an official.

Mr. Rohl. As an active manager?

[2242] 146. General Frank. Yes. That was correct, wasn't it?

Mr. Rohl. That is correct.

147. General Frank. Therefore, there was some complication because of your personal status as an alien, wasn't there?

Mr. Rohl. No, General.

148. General Frank. Well, you just said so.

Mr. Rohl. Well, I never had any intention of going to the Hawaiian Islands and managing that contract.

149. General Frank. Nevertheless, Colonel Wyman in his conversation and in his letters was rather insistent on having you there, wasn't he not?

Mr. Rohl. That's right.

150. General Frank. Now, since your alien status was the one thing that interfered with this thing, since your alien status was the one point that had to be cleared up in Washington, since your alien status was the one thing that blocked your going to Honolulu, and since Wyman, on the other side, was so insistent on having you come there, do you mean to say that Wyman was never told about it?

Mr. Rohl. Oh, Wyman was told about it.

151. General Frank. About your alien status?

Mr. Rohl. Alien status; because, how could Colonel Wyman write that letter? I believe he originated the letter to General Hannum, and I believe the letter went from—

152. General Frank. I am talking now about a time back in December, 1940.

Mr. Rohl. General, you are talking about December? I don't know.

153. General Frank. All right.

154. Major Clausen. I would like to refresh your memory, Mr. [2242] Rohl, by reading some testimony which you gave before the Tenney Committee in hearings held in February 1943, particularly an answer at page 3807:

Q. When you first obtained the contracts for the construction of military installation (construction); did you tell Major Wyman that you were an alien?

A. I did, on the Hawaiian Constructors.

Q. But you didn't on any other projects?

A. We don't have it. There are no restrictions. I mean, on a government contract you are not questioned as to whether you are a citizen or not, but on this particular contract, contract 602, being a secret contract, of course, I told him. I had to tell him.

You remember giving that testimony?

Mr. Rohl. No.

155. Major Clausen. What is that, sir?

Mr. Rohl. No.

156. Major Clausen. Well, what is the fact?

Mr. Rohl. I don't know whether that transcript is right.
157. Major Clausen. You do not know whether it is right?
Mr. Rohl. No; and I will never—I won't take anything for granted in that transcript, because it was a frame-up.
158. Major Clausen. All right, now.
Mr. Rohl. And I will have to stand on that.
159. Major Clausen. Regardless of that?
160. General Frank. Watch your step.
Mr. Rohl. No, no.
161. Major Clausen. What is that?
Mr. Rohl. I am talking about the Tenney Committee.
162. Major Clausen. All right. Now, just tell this Board here—just this Board, the fact as to whether it is not correct that you did tell Colonel Wyman that you were an alien?
Mr. Rohl. Major, I have testified several times that I did not.
163. Major Clausen. Yes. Well, now, just tell me, what is the fact as you now say it to be.
Mr. Rohl. May the reporter read back?
164. Major Clausen. No, you may answer the question if you wish.
Mr. Rohl. No, it is in there.
165. Mayor Clausen. It is in there.
166. General Frank. Answer the question. It is a question of the truth. It is either so, or it isn't.
167. Major Clausen. Let me refresh your memory further. I will come back to the question. You recall, in December 1940, that there were discussions between yourself and Colonel Wyman, regarding this contract, before Colonel Wyman went to Washington?
Mr. Rohl. Yes.
168. Major Clausen. I beg your pardon?
Mr. Rohl. Yes.
169. Major Clausen. There is no question about that in your mind, is there?
Mr. Rohl. No, but—
170. Major Clausen. When did you first know that you were going to have these discussions with him?
Mr. Rohl. I was requested by, I believe, Colonel Kelton, or Colonel Kelton's office, to meet Colonel Wyman in Colonel Kelton's office, who at that time was the district engineer in Los Angeles.
171. Major Clausen. You mean Colonel Kelton was in the District Engineer's office, in Los Angeles?
Mr. Rohl. Yes, sir.
172. Major Clausen. When did you get that instruction or request?
Mr. Rohl. I would say two or three days before Colonel Wyman arrived here.
173. Major Clausen. When was that?
Mr. Rohl. That has to be in December 1940.
174. Major Clausen. All right. Now, isn't it true, also, that in December 1940, you registered under the Alien Registration Act?
Mr. Rohl. Yes.
175. Major Clausen. You know why you had to do it, don't you?
Mr. Rohl. Because I was an alien.
176. Major Clausen. Yes. Who told you to register under the act, or did you just read it in the paper and go down and do it, yourself?
Mr. Rohl. I read it in a paper.
177. Major Clausen. Then did you go down and do it?
Mr. Rohl. Yes.
178. Major Clausen. What is that, sir?
Mr. Rohl. Yes, sir.
179. Major Clausen. In point of time, before or after, was it, that you had these talks with Colonel Wyman?
Mr. Rohl. That, I don’t know, Major. You probably have the dates, there, in your own possession.
180. Major Clausen. Well, you knew, when you had the talk with Colonel Wyman, in December, 1940——
Mr. Rohl. That I was an alien.
181. Major Clausen. —— that you were an alien?
Mr. Rohl. Yes, sir.
182. Major Clausen. And that you couldn’t do any work on this [2246] contract, yourself?
Mr. Rohl. No; I didn’t know that.
183. Major Clausen. Well, let me read you some more from this Tenney manuscript. I beg your pardon?
Mr. Rohl. Go ahead.
184. Major Clausen. I read from this Tenney transcript, page 3808:

Q. Are you familiar with the provisions of the law regarding such contracts?
A. Secret contracts?
Q. Well, secret, confidential, or restricted contracts.
A. Yes.
Q. I will read the law to you and see whether or not this is your understanding of it.

“No aliens employed by a contractor in the performance of secret, confidential, or restricted Government contracts shall be permitted to have access to the plans or specifications, or the work under such contracts, or to participate in the contract trials, unless the written consent of the head of the Government Department concerned has first been obtained.

“Any alien who obtains employment on secret, confidential, or restricted Government contracts by wilful misrepresentation of his alien status, or who makes such wilful misrepresentation while seeking such employment, shall be penalized by a fine of $10,000 or five years in the Federal Penitentiary.

“For the purpose of this section the term ‘person’ shall be construed to include an individual, partnership, association, corporation, or other business enterprise.”

Q. Is that your understanding of the law?
A. Absolutely. Now, as a matter of fact, before we took this contract, the War Department was told.

Did you give that testimony?
Mr. Rohl. At—I was under that impression——
185. Major Clausen. I say, did you give that testimony, sir?
Mr. Rohl. Yes, sir.
186. Major Clausen. What is that, sir?
Mr. Rohl. Yes.
187. Major Clausen. All right. Now, how was the War Department told, before you took the contract?
Mr. Rohl. That, I don’t know. As I have said before, that was my impression. Now, whether Mr. Grafe or Mr. Connolly or Mr. Martin told Colonel Wyman, or anyone in the Engineer Department, that, I don’t know. I simply took that for granted.
188. Major Clausen. In these talks that you had with Colonel Wyman, at Los Angeles, what did you say to him about this situation?
Mr. Rohl. In my talks with Colonel Wyman? First, they were only generalities. I didn’t know what the contract was about.

189. Major Clausen. All right. Will you continue, now, and tell the Board what you told Colonel Wyman, in December 1940, before this contract was signed?

Mr. Rohl. Colonel Wyman arrived in Los Angeles, and interviewed several contractors.

190. General Frank. When?

[2248] Mr. Rohl. In December, 1940. He was talking in generalities. He wasn’t even saying it was a secret or a restricted or a confidential contract. He did mention that there was a third contract over there for a little over a million dollars. That was all the money that had been appropriated, at that time, and he believed the contract would probably run four or five millions of dollars; and he asked us if we would be interested; and that’s about all.

191. Major Clausen. Before you had that talk with him, you had already changed your position as president, with Mr. Connolly—that occurred on December 16, 1940—for the reason that you were an alien, isn’t that true?

Mr. Rohl. I beg your pardon, Major, when did I register? I mean, you can help me, here. You can tell me, probably.

192. Major Clausen. I do not have the date. I have the date when, as I understand it, you changed your positions with Mr. Connolly, for the reason you were an alien, which was December 16, 1940.

Mr. Rohl. I mean, I haven’t got that at the end of my—the records are there. I can furnish you the records.

193. Major Clausen. Do you know that at the time that you went out as president, and Mr. Connolly went in, the reason for it was because you were an alien? You knew that then, did you not?

Mr. Rohl. Yes.

194. Major Clausen. All right. That having occurred before you saw Colonel Wyman, for that reason, I say, what did you say to Colonel Wyman about that, having in mind the testimony that you gave to the Tenney Committee?

[2249] Mr. Rohl. I didn’t say anything to Colonel Wyman about that.

195. Major Clausen. Colonel Wyman expected you to come to Hawaii, as is indicated by his letter of January 22, 1941. Did you represent to him that you would or would not go to Hawaii, when you saw him, in December 1940?

Mr. Rohl. In December, I told him that I would not come to Hawaii.

196. Major Clausen. Where did you say that to him?

Mr. Rohl. Either in Los Angeles or in San Francisco.

197. Major Clausen. All right. Now, what were all the reasons—name them all—that you gave Colonel Wyman, as to why you would not go to Hawaii?

Mr. Rohl. Major, or General, the reason, there was a small contract. The Callahan Construction Company had recently completed the Crado dam, Los Angeles County Flood Control; had an organization, and Paul Grafe was going over, and did go over with the Callahan organization to perform that contract.

198. Major Clausen. Did go over where?

Mr. Rohl. To the Hawaiian Islands.
199. Major Clausen. Yes.
Mr. Rohl. I had no intention of ever going over there.

200. Major Clausen. I say, what did you say to Colonel Wyman, in December 1940, as your reasons for stating to him that you would not go to Hawaii?
Mr. Rohl. The job didn’t warrant it.

201. Major Clausen. You told him that, did you?
Mr. Rohl. Yes.

202. Major Clausen. And what did he say?
Mr. Rohl. “All right.”

203. Major Clausen. And this was December 1940?
Mr. Rohl. Yes, sir.

204. Major Clausen. And what else did you say on that subject to him?
Mr. Rohl. That’s all.

205. Major Clausen. Now, how many talks did you have with Colonel Wyman in December 1940? You remembered very specifically having gone to a conference.
Mr. Rohl. At Colonel Kelton’s office.

206. Major Clausen. At Colonel Kelton’s office. All right. Now, did you have talks with him elsewhere?
Mr. Rohl. I did see Colonel Wyman here in San Francisco, but prior to his departure for Washington.

207. Major Clausen. Yes, that is exactly what I had in mind. Now, between what dates did you have these talks with Colonel Wyman?
Mr. Rohl. I wish I could tell you the exact dates, but here, Major, haven’t you, between the time—let’s put it this way: you can supply the dates. Between the time that Colonel Wyman arrived in Los Angeles, I believe he came from Honolulu to San Francisco, division office, and from the division office to Los Angeles, to interview contractors. Now, between the date that he arrived in Los Angeles and the date that he left for Washington—you are talking about the talks that I might have had.

208. Major Clausen. Those are the dates?
Mr. Rohl. Well, yes.

209. Major Clausen. In other words, before he went to Washington?
Mr. Rohl. Yes, sir.

210. Major Clausen. You are sure of that, as the time that you had these talks in Los Angeles and in San Francisco?
Mr. Rohl. Yes, sir.

211. Major Clausen. All right. Now, what was said in San Francisco concerning this subject?
Mr. Rohl. The same thing. As a matter of fact, Colonel Wyman wasn’t sure; I didn’t know who was going to be the contractor when Colonel Wyman left here, because I believed that was out of Colonel Wyman’s hands, anyway. Colonel Wyman, after all, doesn’t award contracts without being specifically authorized.

212. Major Clausen. Do you recall how it came that you were in San Francisco with Colonel Wyman, before he went to Washington?
Mr. Rohl. No.

213. Major Clausen. I beg your pardon?
Mr. Rohl. No, sir.
214. Major Clausen. Well, did you come up here together, do you remember?
Mr. Rohl. I don't think so.
215. Major Clausen. Did you have talks at any other place than San Francisco or Washington, on this subject, before Colonel Wyman went to Washington?
Mr. Rohl. No, because I stayed in San Francisco, and Colonel Wyman went to Washington.
216. Major Clausen. Well, I mean, was it just yourself and Colonel Wyman that had the talks?
Mr. Rohl. It probably was.
217. Major Clausen. And was that in the division engineer's office?
Mr. Rohl. No.
218. Major Clausen. What is that?
Mr. Rohl. No.
219. Major Clausen. Well, where did you have these talks?
Mr. Rohl. I probably talked to him at the hotel.
220. Major Clausen. That was at what hotel?
Mr. Rohl. Palace Hotel.
221. Major Clausen. What is that, sir?
Mr. Rohl. Palace.
222. Major Clausen. Did you see Colonel Wyman after he got back from Washington, before he went to the Hawaiian Islands?
Mr. Rohl. I don't believe I did. I am pretty sure I didn't. I know Colonel Wyman was waiting for transportation in San Francisco.
223. Major Clausen. Were you here at that time?
Mr. Rohl. No.
224. General Frank. How did you know that?
Mr. Rohl. Because Mr. Connolly, my partner, if I remember right, took him out to Christmas dinner, or right around Christmas time, to his home.
225. Major Clausen. Do you know Werner Plack?
Mr. Rohl. No.
226. Major Clausen. Did you ever meet him?
Mr. Rohl. No.
227. Major Clausen. Did you ever see him, in your life?
Mr. Rohl. No.
228. Major Clausen. Did you ever hear of him, in Los Angeles?
Mr. Rohl. No, only from Bruce Pine's testimony. I read that.
229. Major Clausen. By the way, you read this testimony, then, of the Tenney Committee, over, before you came here today?
Mr. Rohl. No.
230. Major Clausen. Well, where did you see the testimony of Mr. Pine?
Mr. Rohl. After I had them, printed.
231. Major Clausen. You mean to say after the Tenney Committee transcript was printed?
Mr. Rohl. That's right.
232. Major Clausen. You saw the Tenney Committee transcript, then?
Mr. Rohl. Oh, yes.
233. Major Clausen. It included your testimony?
Mr. Rohl. And everybody else’s.

234. Major Clausen. Yes.

Mr. Rohl. I haven’t see it since. I mean, I haven’t had time for it.

235. Major Clausen. Now, when did you first meet Colonel Wyman?

Mr. Rohl. May I refer to your actual record?

236. Major Clausen. It was about 1935, wasn’t it?

Mr. Rohl. Yes, but I can tell you the exact circumstance.

237. Major Clausen. The exact circumstances?

Mr. Rohl. Yes.

238. Major Clausen. Well, it was in 1935, when he first became the district engineer at Los Angeles, wasn’t it?

Mr. Rohl. All right, he became district engineer at Los Angeles.

239. Major Clausen. When he was a Captain, isn’t that so?

Mr. Rohl. I don’t know whether he was captain or major.

240. Major Clausen. You called on him, did you not, with Mr. Connolly?

Mr. Rohl. We put in a bid.

241. Major Clausen. What’s that?

Mr. Rohl. Colonel Wyman’s, or Captain Wyman, whatever it was at that time, his predecessor, Major Stickney, advertised for bids on an extension of the Los Angeles-Long Beach breakwater.

242. Major Clausen. I say, you called on Colonel Wyman after he arrived there?

Mr. Rohl. May I continue? I will stop.

243. Major Clausen. Well, if you have got a statement to make, yes; make your statement. I am waiting.

Mr. Rohl. The bids were postponed. Opening of the bids was postponed for two or three days, or for several days, so Mr. Connolly and I called on the District Engineer, and were told that Major Stickney was not there, that Captain Wyman was in.

244. Major Clausen. Have you completed your statement?

Mr. Rohl. Yes, sir.

245. Major Clausen. All right.

Since the time that you first saw Colonel Wyman, and since the time that he was relieved as district engineer in Los Angeles, you had Colonel Wyman on your yachts, did you not, as a guest of yours?

246. Major Clausen. You entertained him on those yachts?

Mr. Rohl. I wouldn’t say that.

247. Major Clausen. Well, he was on the yachts, and you gave him liquor and food?

Mr. Rohl. Yes.

248. Major Clausen. By the way, you are rather familiar with this House committee report—perhaps we can shorten this. You have seen that statement of the various kinds of entertainment. Are they correct?

Mr. Rohl. No.

249. Major Clausen. All right, now. Why?

Mr. Rohl. Major, if you would only let me explain in my own words, and put that in the record, that will be the true story, and all of the true story.

Mr. **Rohl.** So we are not wasting so much time, that way.

251. Major **Clausen.** Proceed.

Mr. **Rohl.** I have had Colonel Wyman and his officers, meaning the officers of the district, and their wives, on a trip to Catalina and back, lasting one—or, say, leaving Saturday afternoon and returning Sunday—trip No. 1. I had Colonel Wyman on the yacht **RAMONA,** on a trip over to inspect the Catalina Rock Quarries which Rohl-Connolly were operating—that's No. 2.

252. General **Frank.** How long was that trip? **Overnight?**

Mr. **Rohl.** **Overnight.** On the first trip, the officers and their wives stayed ashore. They were in the Catalina Islands. In other words, Colonel Wyman did not stay on the **[2256]** yacht.

253. Major **Clausen.** Have you completed your statement?

Mr. **Rohl.** No; I had one more trip. I took Colonel Wyman and Mrs. Wyman on the **VEGA,** on a trip to Catalina and back. Excuse me, General, these are two different boats. I was talking about one. Now, I am talking about the other. I had Colonel Wyman on the **VEGA,** one trip, leaving again on the Saturday, and returning on Sunday, to Catalina. That is all.

254. Major **Clausen.** Well, now in addition to that, you had him out to your home, and you had him up to the Biltmore Hotel, didn't you, and entertained him?

Mr. **Rohl.** I have had him out to my home for dinner.

255. Major **Clausen.** You have also had him to the Biltmore Hotel, haven't you, sir?

Mr. **Rohl.** I have also had him at the Biltmore Hotel; not, however—not, in both—in all cases, that Colonel Wyman has never been my guest, except the three yacht trips, overnight, either in my home, or in the Biltmore.

256. Major **Clausen.** During the time you had him to the Biltmore Hotel, you had an apartment there, didn't you, sir?

Mr. **Rohl.** I had an apartment there, at times.

257. Major **Clausen.** And you also had a home right there in Los Angeles, too, at the same time, didn't you, sir?

Mr. **Rohl.** Yes. 258. Major **Clausen.** What is that, sir?

Mr. **Rohl.** Yes.

259. Major **Clausen.** Now, I will just summarize this, to shorten the thing. In August 1935, Colonel Wyman awarded the first contract to Rohl-Connolly Company, in the amount of **[2257]** $850,000, and the contract was completed, July 1936.

August 6, 1936, he awarded the second contract to the Rohl-Connolly Company the Long Beach-Los Angeles breakwater job, amounting to $2,145,000, which contract was approved by Colonel John C. Kingman, district engineer, on August 31, 1936.

Mr. **Rohl.** District engineer? Not district engineer.

260. General **Frank.** "Division engineer," isn't it?

261. Major **Clausen.** It says "district." "Division," it should be. All right.

Another contract was awarded to the Rohl-Connolly Company or Rohl for the furnishing of derrick stone, at $15,770, for emergency relief.
Those contracts actually were awarded your firm, were they, Mr. Rohl?

Mr. Rohl. Oh, yes! May I explain that, just to get it in the record? We built the first, or did Mr. Connolly explain that to you, yesterday? If he did, it isn't necessary.

262. General Frank. Built what?

Mr. Rohl. The first section of the breakwater, under Colonel or General Peterson. I would like to get this in the record. It will clear up a lot of things.

263. General Frank. Go ahead.

Mr. Rohl. At that time we were on competitive bids. We were $600,000 below the next bidder, and our bid was $1,520,000, and the engineer's estimate was $1,500,000, but we were still $600,000 below the next bidder, in competitive bids. Mr. Connolly and I, or Rohl-Connolly, built barges, tugs, derrick barges, opened rock quarries to do that one contract.

[2258] Thereafter, we had every extension off the Los Angeles-Long Beach breakwater—Newport, Winnemac, Redondo Beach, Seal Beach—as a matter of fact, all water-borne rock in that area, due to the fact that Rohl-Connolly Company was the only firm properly equipped to do that type of work and could do it cheaper and better for the government than anyone else.

264. Major Clausen. Have you finished?

Mr. Rohl. That's the truth. I mean, I thought I would explain that. There can't be any favors in awarding a low-bidder contract.

265. General Frank. There has been a good deal of conversation about whether or not you told Colonel Wyman about your alien status, and finally, in answer to a question from me, you admitted that you told him about your alien status.

Mr. Rohl. In—today?

266. General Frank. Yes.

Mr. Rohl. General, I might have been confused.

267. General Frank. Now, the question I want to ask is, what is the reason for dodging the point that he was told?

Mr. Rohl. There isn't any, General, that I can see.

268. General Frank. Well, that is what I do not understand.

Mr. Rohl. There was no reason at all for dodging that point. I mean, it was a fact. I didn't keep it a secret.

269. Major Clausen. In line with what the General said, you said that you got this Tenney transcript after the hearings, and that you read it, and you read this portion of it?

Mr. Rohl. Major, may I please say, again—

270. General Frank. Just a minute, now.

Mr. Rohl. That the Tenney transcript, I don't know whether everything in there is the truth, or not.

271. General Frank. But you ought to remember that, it is sworn testimony, and since it is sworn testimony—

Mr. Rohl. General—

272. General Frank. Yes.

Mr. Rohl. General, I didn't mean to interrupt you. I don't know whether that sworn testimony has been transcribed right. Those things can happen.
273. Major Clausen. Well, when you got the transcript and read it over, did you ever write to the Tenney Committee and say it was wrong?

Mr. Rohl. I put it in the waste basket, because that's all it was worth.

274. General Frank. Then it must stand, however, because it is sworn testimony.

Mr. Rohl. But please—please, General.

275. General Frank. Yes.

Mr. Rohl. Let me see that.

276. General Frank. Now, just a minute. I am not talking about this.

Mr. Rohl. No, no. May I turn you to a front page, there, please? I mean, after all, we are talking about something serious, here.

277. General Frank. Yes.

Mr. Rohl. (reading):

Gentlemen (of the press) the committee has ruled for this hearing the public will be excluded but the press may remain. We are asking the press to be very careful in reporting anything of a military nature or that might have any bearing on military objectives or installations or anything of that nature which might be developed in the course of the examination of witnesses. We believe we must be exceedingly careful in reference to that. I believe with that admonition you gentlemen of the press will act accordingly. In other words, we do not want to reveal any military secrets, if any should be developed in the examination.

Then a Mr. Combs comes along and tells the press, because they are excused. I was asked to step outside the room, when Mr. Combs tells the press what to print. That would be in your record. Mr. Combs is the chief investigator for Tenney.

278. General Frank. That is very true, but I am not talking about that testimony.

Mr. Rohl. I know you are not, General, but at the same time——

279. General Frank. I still would like to ask you, what is the point in trying to dodge the admission that Wyman was told about your alien status?

Mr. Rohl. There isn't any point, General.

280. General Frank. That is what I cannot understand.

Mr. Rohl. Neither can I; but, General——

281. General Frank. Because you already have told me, in prior testimony, this morning, that Wyman was told, and in this testimony you testified that Wyman was told. What point was there in not telling him?

Mr. Rohl. There wasn't any point in not telling him. There wasn't. I took it for granted. I made it a point to have Martin explain it to Mr. Grafe and Mr. Connolly, and I took it for granted that they immediately explained it to Colonel Wyman.

282. General Frank. Yes; and then, in this testimony this morning, you stated that you told it to Wyman.

[2261] Mr. Rohl. No. If I made that statement, I want to retract it.

283. General Frank. Now, I come right back to my point—what was the idea of not telling him?

Mr. Rohl. There wasn't any.
284. General Frank. Then why didn’t you tell him?
    Mr. Rohl. I will have to come right back again, I was under the
    impression that he was told in Washington.
285. General Frank. No, that was the main point and difficulty of
    your getting into this contract, when Wyman was trying to induce
    you to come into it. Now, at some time, either now or then, this testi-
    mony is in error that you have been giving.
    Mr. Rohl. Let’s try and get it right.
286. General Frank. Either now or then, the testimony is in error
    that you were giving. Then you testified that you told him; that
    is, in the Tenney Committee. Here, a little while ago, you told me
    that you told him. Now you come back and tell me that you didn’t
    tell him. At the moment, we have two to one against you.
    Mr. Rohl. No, no, General. What dates are we talking about?
287. General Frank. We are talking about some time right after
    December 1940.
    Mr. Rohl. Some time right after December 1940?
288. General Frank. Yes.
    Mr. Rohl. Well, I believe I said that—now, wait a minute. I will
    have to tell it in my own words.
289. General Frank. Now, just a minute. Never mind the words—
    never mind the records.
    [2262] Mr. Rohl. All right.
290. General Frank. Let’s have the truth.
    Mr. Rohl. That’s right.
291. General Frank. Yes. That is what I am after; and there is
    just one truth about this thing.
    Mr. Rohl. That’s correct.
292. General Frank. Yes. Now, let’s have it.
    Mr. Rohl. I don’t believe I told Colonel Wyman, personally.
293. General Frank. This testimony is under oath, just as that was
    under oath, and just as the prior testimony this morning was under
    oath.
    Mr. Rohl. I know, General. If I said that, I am going to retract it
    right now. Can I do that?
294. General Frank. It is too late to retract the Tenney testimony.
    Mr. Rohl. That is right.
295. General Frank. Yes.
    Mr. Rohl. If that is—if the transcript is right.
296. General Frank. Yes. And judicial notice is taken of that,
    now. I still do not understand why Wyman should not have been
told.
    Mr. Rohl. Neither do I.
297. General Frank. And do you mean to tell me you had all these
    conversations with Wyman over the telephone between Los Angeles
    and Hawaii, when he was so insistent about your coming out there, all
    the way from January 1, 1941, and you never told him about your alien
    status?
    Mr. Rohl. Now, wait a minute, General. I told Mr. Grafe.
    [2263] 298. General Frank. I am talking about Wyman. Let’s
    stick to that.
    Mr. Rohl. Yes.
299. General Frank. And you never told Colonel Wyman?
Mr. Rohl. In December 1940? I don’t—
300. General Frank. I didn’t say December.
Mr. Rohl. Oh, I beg your pardon.
301. General Frank. I said shortly after December, in January or February 1941.
Mr. Rohl. I don’t believe I did.
302. General Frank. When did you go to Honolulu?
Mr. Rohl. In September. I left, September 25, 1941.
303. General Frank. Why did you put it off so long?
Mr. Rohl. To get my citizen papers.
304. General Frank. When did you get them?
Mr. Rohl. September 15.
305. General Frank. Why did you go to Honolulu?
Mr. Rohl. Because I was requested to go.
306. General Frank. By whom?
Mr. Rohl. By Colonel Wyman.
307. General Frank. Since you were not interested in the contract, why did you go?
Mr. Rohl. Colonel Wyman wanted more speed.
308. General Frank. But you stated at a prior stage in your testimony that Rohl-Connolly Company was not interested in it.
Mr. Rohl. Right, General. I am talking now about December 1940.
309. General Frank. I am talking about September.
Mr. Rohl. ’41.
310. General Frank. 1941. Since you were not interested in the contract prior to this time, why were you interested in it in September 1941?
Mr. Rohl. I was ordered to go over there.
311. General Frank. You were what?
Mr. Rohl. I was ordered to go over there.
312. General Frank. Who can order you as a civilian? Tell me that.
Mr. Rohl. The contracting officer. He can’t order you; he can request you.
313. General Frank. That is just what he did ever since December 1940.
Mr. Rohl. I wouldn’t say that.
314. General Frank. And you didn’t want to go.
Mr. Rohl. No, General; not since December, I mean.
315. General Frank. Let me see the letter.
316. General Frank. All right. Ever since January 1941, then.
Mr. Rohl. All right. Now let us take it for granted, whether it’s right or wrong or—
317. General Frank. Let’s make it right.
Mr. Rohl. Let’s make it right, is right. Colonel Wyman was dissatisfied with the progress.
318. General Frank. Under whose supervision?
Mr. Rohl. Under Paul Grafe’s supervision.
319. General Frank. Yes?
Mr. Rohl. He was dissatisfied.
320. General Frank. Yes?
Mr. Rohl. He wanted me over there. I refused to go.

321. General Frank. When?

Mr. Rohl. I didn’t—in this letter. I went—

322. General Frank. When? In what month did you refuse to go?

Mr. Rohl. I refused to go until I had my citizenship papers.

323. General Frank. I know, but you said, “this letter.”

Mr. Rohl. Well, the letter of January.

324. General Frank. Yes; you refused to go?

Mr. Rohl. I didn’t refuse to go. I mean I didn’t—I didn’t tell them in so many words.

325. General Frank. Well, go ahead.

Mr. Rohl. But I did go to the Immigration Department and told them that I had—that I was requested to go over there and I didn’t want to go, and they told me it was the right thing to do.

326. General Frank. Who told you that?

Mr. Rohl. Immigration Department in Los Angeles.

327. General Frank. What did you do when you got there?

Mr. Rohl. What did I do? I made a trip around the Island of Oahu with Colonel Wyman and with Grafe and I of course stayed there for about fourteen days and came back; got personnel and equipment to expedite the work, and this time I was ordered to—by General Hannum. I intended to fly back. I was waiting for a plane. I was ordered by General Hannum to get aboard the Lurline on November the 28th.

328. General Frank. You chartered the VEGA or the Government chartered the VEGA from you, didn’t they?

[3266] Mr. Rohl. Yes.

329. General Frank. What was the cargo of the VEGA between Los Angeles and Honolulu?

Mr. Rohl. She had no cargo.

330. General Frank. She had no liquor aboard?

Mr. Rohl. Oh, yes.

331. General Frank. Well, that’s cargo.

Mr. Rohl. No, sir.

332. General Frank. What is it, if it is not cargo?

Mr. Rohl. Supplies.

333. General Frank. For whom?

Mr. Rohl. For the owner.

334. General Frank. Who was the owner?

Mr. Rohl. Mrs. Rohl was.

335. General Frank. Did she go to Honolulu?

Mr. Rohl. No.

336. General Frank. What good did liquor in Honolulu do Mrs. Rohl in Los Angeles?

Mr. Rohl. General, when I told them to outfit the VEGA for six months’ trip, at that time there wasn’t much you could talk over the radiophone, and they outfitted the VEGA for six months’ trip.

337. General Frank. With liquor?

Mr. Rohl. No. With everything. They didn’t even know what kind of a trip—the crew didn’t know what kind of a trip it was.

338. General Frank. Who paid for the liquor that went on the VEGA?

Mr. Rohl. I did.
339. General Frank. How much was on there?

Mr. Rohl. I don't know. I suppose—I think somebody testified
that there was 16 or 17 cases or something on there.

340. General Frank. Who used the liquor when it got to Honolulu?

Mr. Rohl. I took it off.

341. General Frank. And you used it?

Mr. Rohl. Yes.

342. General Frank. Did the Government ever pay for it?

Mr. Rohl. No.

343. General Frank. What reimbursement from the Government
did you get for the use of the VEGA?

Mr. Rohl. One dollar; less—less about five or six thousand dollars
that they didn't pay.

344. General Frank. When you took the liquor off the VEGA in
Honolulu where did you put it?

Mr. Rohl. I locked it up in the Pleasanton Hotel, in the locker.

345. General Frank. You and Colonel Wyman had rooms at the
Pleasanton Hotel, didn't you?

Mr. Rohl. Yes.

346. General Frank. Did Colonel Wyman participate in the con-
sumption of the liquor?

Mr. Rohl. Not much, if any.

If I say anything—General, will it help, I mean, to get at the facts
if I make a statement about the VEGA?

347. General Frank. No. Just a minute now.

Mr. Rohl. Yes.

348. General Frank. Were you conversant with the installation
of the aircraft warning service bases?

Mr. Rohl. In?


Mr. Rohl. At what time?

350. General Frank. When you went over there.

Mr. Rohl. In September?

351. General Frank. Yes.

Mr. Rohl. No.

352. General Frank. You didn't know about them?

Mr. Rohl. Never seen one.

353. General Frank. Have you anything to ask him?


Sir, when you got to Honolulu you inspected various defense installa-
tions that you had previously discussed with Colonel Wyman; is that
correct?

Mr. Rohl. No, I had not previously—I want to correct that. No, I
had not previously discussed them with Colonel Wyman.

355. Major Clausen. Well, Mr. Rohl, here on page 34 are just, it
looks like, about fifteen or twenty telephone calls between yourself
and Colonel Wyman.

Mr. Rohl. May I, please—may I have them and the dates, and then
I can probably answer you better.


Mr. Rohl. I mean let's make it as short and correct as we can.

(A document was handed to the witness.)

Mr. Rohl. Of course, the calls before October the 1st—
357. Major Clausen. What year?

Mr. Rohl. —1941, were social calls.

358. Major Clausen. Well, those before October 1st were socials?

Mr. Rohl. Yes.

359. Major Clausen. There is one, two, three, four, five, six, seven, eight: eight calls, interocean telephone calls, between Los Angeles and Hawaii, you say were social calls?

Mr. Rohl. In a year?

360. Major Clausen. I beg your pardon.

Mr. Rohl. In one year?


Mr. Rohl. No.

362. Major Clausen. What kind of social calls were they? What did you say to him in these calls?

Mr. Rohl. Asked him how he was feeling; how he was getting along.

363. General Frank. Who paid for those calls?

Mr. Rohl. I did.

364. Major Clausen. Did you charge those to the Hawaiian Constructors?

Mr. Rohl. No; I was not charging anything to the Hawaiian Constructors.

365. Major Clausen. Well, did the Hawaiian Constructors charge the Government for them?

Mr. Rohl. Of course not. How could they? I didn’t even charge the Hawaiian Constructors?

366. Major Clausen. Well, now you want this Board to understand your testimony to be that in these telephone calls the only things you discussed were those matters you just now mentioned, and that is your positive testimony?

Mr. Rohl. Yes, sir.

[2270] 367. Major Clausen. All right.

Mr. Rohl. How could I, because I didn’t know anything else?

368. Major Clausen. Do you want to take a recess?

General Grunert. Yes; if you are not near to the point of completion, we shall take a recess for about ten minutes.

(There was a brief informal recess.)

370. Major Clausen. Mr. Rohl, in view of the fact that you got this letter from Colonel Wyman in January 1941 and didn’t answer it—didn’t answer it by phone or letter—what did Colonel Wyman do about not getting an answer? Just nothing?

Mr. Rohl. I believe I told you that I told Paul Grafe shortly after that.

371. Major Clausen. I see.

372. General Frank. That is not answering the question.

Mr. Rohl. What did Colonel Wyman do?

373. Major Clausen. Yes. Was Colonel Wyman the kind of a man that would issue an order to you, “Proceed to Honolulu at your earliest convenience,” and was he the kind of a man that, if you didn’t go, he would just wait until you came, sometime maybe in October?

Mr. Rohl. No, he was not that kind of a man at all.

374. Major Clausen. What is that?

Mr. Rohl. He was not that kind of a man at all.
375. Major Clausen. Well, that is why I ask, what did he do when you didn't go, Mr. Rohl?
Mr. Rohl. I told him it took me some time to clean up my business.
376. Major Clausen. You told him that?
[2271] Mr. Rohl. Yes.
377. Major Clausen. On the phone?
Mr. Rohl. I believe I did.
378. Major Clausen. How soon after you get the letter did you tell him that?
Mr. Rohl. That I don't know.
379. Major Clausen. What is that?
Mr. Rohl. I don't know.
380. Major Clausen. Well, and then what did you tell Paul Grafe?
Mr. Rohl. I told Paul Grafe that, to explain my status to Colonel Wyman, that I couldn't go.
381. Major Clausen. Because you were an alien?
Mr. Rohl. That is right.
382. Major Clausen. And when did you tell him that, bearing in mind that here you had an order, as you now concede, from a man who demanded action?
I say, when?
Mr. Rohl. You mean when and to whom?
383. Major Clausen. I say, bearing in mind this order that you got from Colonel Wyman to go over there, his desire expressed that you go there at once, and he being the type of man that you say he was, and you having not the ability to comply with the order because of your alien status, does that refresh your memory as to how soon after you got the letter that you told Grafe to give him the information?
Mr. Rohl. No, but you—I believe you have Grafe here today.
384. Major Clausen. You know that, do you?
[2272] Mr. Rohl. No; I don't know that. I mean he is waiting for your call, and he should have his travel dates between Honolulu and the mainland.
385. Major Clausen. By the way, you showed familiarity with this House Committee—
386. General Frank. He still does not answer your question.
387. Major Clausen. I know that, sir.
Have you anything further to say on that subject?
Mr. Rohl. General, I can't give you specific date because I haven't got it. I could get it for you.
388. General Frank. He didn't ask you for a date.
When you ask a question, get an answer to the question you ask; don't let him dodge it.
389. Major Clausen. All right. Answer the question.
390. General Frank. Well, repeat the question.
391. Major Clausen. Bearing in mind the kind of a man that Colonel Wyman was, the fact that he had expressed a desire that you go to Honolulu at your earliest convenience to consult with him to accomplish the purpose of the contract, and you say that you told Grafe the status of your alienage which prohibited you—
Mr. Rohl. Well, Grafe already knew it.
392. Major Clausen. What is that, sir?
Mr. ROHL. Grafe knew it.
393. General FRANK. What did Wyman do?
Mr. ROHL. What did Wyman do?
394. General FRANK. Yes.
Mr. ROHL. Wyman didn't do anything.
395. General FRANK. He was the kind——
Mr. ROHL. I mentioned to you——what did I tell Wyman?
396. General FRANK. Yes.
Mr. ROHL. It's there a few minutes ago (indicating). I told
Wyman that it took me——it took me several months to clean up my
business on the mainland so I could devote all of my time to the work
on the Islands, which is the truth. In other words, you can't——I made
no preparations. I was——never intended——I never intended—it was
never contemplated that I would take charge of the work in the Islands,
and you can't——
397. General FRANK. Wyman never came back at you and asked you
anything more about it?
Mr. ROHL. Well, he wrote another letter, not to me. He wrote a
letter to General Hannum, I have heard since.
398. General FRANK. Go ahead.
399. Major CLAUSEN. In which he said what?
Mr. ROHL. To expedite my citizenship.
400. Major CLAUSEN. Precisely. And so when he wrote the letter
to expedite your citizenship,—
Mr. ROHL. Yes, sir.
401. Major CLAUSEN. —to get you to go to Honolulu, do you want
the Board to believe that you said nothing to him about the citizen-
ship?
Mr. ROHL. Major, I told you now that Paul Grafe told Wyman—
if he hadn't told him before, which I don't know——but by this letter
and the second letter that Colonel Wyman wrote to General Hannum,
we know that Colonel Wyman at that time knew from Paul Grafe that
I was an alien.
402. Major CLAUSEN. All right.
[2274] 403. General FRANK. Why didn't you come right out
and tell Wyman before this that you were an alien? Were you
ashamed of it?
Mr. ROHL. Somewhat.
404. General FRANK. You were ashamed of being a German?
Mr. ROHL. No.
405. General FRANK. Well, what were you ashamed of?
Mr. ROHL. I was ashamed of my negligence, living here that long
without becoming a citizen.
406. General FRANK. How much communication did you have with
people in Germany in the meantime?
Mr. ROHL. None.
407. Major CLAUSEN. Haven't you a relative that is in the Hamb-
burg-American Line?
Mr. ROHL. No.
408. General FRANK. You mean to say that you had no communica-
tion between Germany in 1916?
Mr. ROHL. Oh, yes. I had three sisters in Germany, or have; I
don't know which.
410. Major Clausen. Sir, let us get down to the contract and the work that was to be performed under it.
411. General Frank. Let me ask him one question on this contract: What were the delays and the things delayed that you were to remedy by going over there?
   Mr. Rohl. I don't know.
412. Major Clausen. Something had happened, hadn't it? Paul Grafe you said was fighting with somebody else, and things were in a turmoil?
   [2275] 413. General Frank. Let me finish this.
   Mr. Rohl. No. I didn't say that Paul Grafe was fighting with someone.
415. General Frank. Well, now, just a minute. Just answer my questions now.
   Mr. Rohl. Yes.
416. General Frank. You stated that you went over there to speed up the work?
   Mr. Rohl. Right.
417. General Frank. That Wyman was not satisfied with the tempo at which it was being conducted?
   Mr. Rohl. That is right.
418. General Frank. All right. Now, what were the delays and the things delayed that you were supposed to remedy?
   Mr. Rohl. Change organization. Wyman was not satisfied with our project manager.
419. General Frank. Who was he?
   Mr. Rohl. Ashlock, A-s-h-l-o-c-k, I believe.
420. General Frank. And what else did you do then?
   Mr. Rohl. What did I do?
421. General Frank. Yes.
   Mr. Rohl. When I arrived over there?
422. General Frank. I would like to know——
   Mr. Rohl. Yes, sir.
423. General Frank. ——what were the delays and the things delayed.
   Mr. Rohl. There weren't any delays or things delayed.
424. General Frank. Well, then why was it necessary for you [2276] to go over there to speed up the work?
   Mr. Rohl. General, Wyman wanted it done faster than we were doing it.
425. General Frank. Well, then there was something delayed that was not satisfactory to Wyman?
   Mr. Rohl. Well, there wasn't anything satisfactory to Colonel Wyman at that time. He just wanted it done fast.
426. General Frank. Well, what did he want done faster?
   Mr. Rohl. Runways.
427. General Frank. What date was this that he wanted the runways done faster?
   Mr. Rohl. I arrived on September the 25th, I believe, or the 26th, of 1941.
428. General Frank. Yes. What runways were they building at that time?

Mr. Rohl. They were building Bellows.

429. General Frank. September 20, 1941?

Mr. Rohl. Yes, sir, because Bellows was ready for landing on December the 7th, and a B-17 did land.

430. General Frank. They didn't have much money for fixing up Bellows on September 20th?

Mr. Rohl. No, but Hawaiian Constructors furnished the money.

431. General Frank. Out of their own pocket?

Mr. Rohl. That is right.

432. General Frank. What else was done? What else that was delayed did you take steps to expedite?

Mr. Rohl. What I did, I came back here and shipped over a lot of equipment, including equipment for the alternate ferry [2377] command.

433. General Frank. Alternate what?

Mr. Rohl. Alternate ferry command.

434. General Frank. Alternate ferry command.

Mr. Rohl. Now, some of that equipment for Christmas and Canton Island left here in November, I believe November 18th, on the Ludington, was in preparation or process of unloading at Christmas on the morning of December the 7th and returned to Los Angeles. The only way to speed up work at that time was to ship in more equipment, General, and that is what I did.

435. Major Clausen. In other words, Mr. Rohl, before you went to Hawaii you shipped over this equipment for this alternate ferry route?

Mr. Rohl. No, sir.

436. General Frank. Before he went to Hawaii the second time, he did this.

Mr. Rohl. After I returned——

437. Major Clausen. Well, before——

Mr. Rohl. No. This we must get straight: after I returned from Hawaii I purchased and took some of Rohl-Connolly Company equipment and shipped over to Hawaii, and personnel.

438. Major Clausen. Well, you remember that after the basic contract was signed in December 1940, that there had been supplements to that from time to time, don't you?

Mr. Rohl. I knew that when I arrived in Honolulu.

439. Major Clausen. You mean that none of those supplements came into your office?

Mr. Rohl. Nothing ever came into my office.

440. Major Clausen. Until you got to Honolulu?

[2278] Mr. Rohl. I haven't seen the contract yet.

441. Major Clausen. Well, did you know that the contract had been changed in various ways between December to the time that you got in Honolulu?

Mr. Rohl. The contract had been changed?

442. Major Clausen. Yes, increased in scope, work.

Mr. Rohl. Oh, supplements?

443. Major Clausen. Yes.

Mr. Rohl. You mean supplements were issued to the contract?
Mr. Rohl. Yes.

445. Major Clausen. Well, you mean that you didn't know about that before you got over there?

Mr. Rohl. No.

446. Major Clausen. You didn't know that the fee had been increased many times, and the amount of the cost of the work had been increased?

Mr. Rohl. No.

447. Major Clausen. I beg your pardon?

Mr. Rohl. No.

448. Major Clausen. Well, about this alternate air route, when you got over there you were then informed and for the first time you had unfolded to yourself the scope of the work that your firm was doing there?

Mr. Rohl. Yes.

449. Major Clausen. What is that?

Mr. Rohl. Yes.

450. Major Clausen. It could have been $500,000,000 or $500; you didn't know that? What is that?

Mr. Rohl. No.

451. Major Clausen. What about the statement in this House Military Affairs Committee report about delays in the construction of these defense projects, as to the accuracy? Page 39, there are various itemizations of dates when the work was to be started and dates when they were to be completed. Do you know?

Mr. Rohl. Major, I have no information on that, but Mr. Grafe was over there at that time.

452. Major Clausen. Yes.

Mr. Rohl. And I am sure that he can give you the proper answers.

453. Major Clausen. Yes, but you told General Frank about going over there to speed up things.

Mr. Rohl. That is right.

454. Major Clausen. Well, when you got over there in September 1941 did you inquire into why these job orders had not proceeded with the speed that they were supposed to, to be completed in time?

Mr. Rohl. It was lack of material, lack of men. Equipment was arriving slow, beyond our control.

455. Major Clausen. Well, you found out that there were delays, didn't you, Mr. Rohl, when you arrived?

Mr. Rohl. Oh, yes.

456. Major Clausen. By the way, a statement has been made here about your background. 'Where were you during the First World War?'

Mr. Rohl. I was in California.

457. Major Clausen. What is that?

Mr. Rohl. In California.

458. Major Clausen. Remember, you were working up in the Bear River, south bank of the Bear River, at the time?

Mr. Rohl. That's a long time ago.

459. Major Clausen. What is that?

Mr. Rohl. South bank of the Bear River?

Mr. Rohl. I was working near Sacramento on flood-control work.

461. Major Clausen. 1917, thereabouts?

Mr. Rohl. Yes.

462. Major Clausen. Is it true about that time that you went to Mexico?

Mr. Rohl. No.

463. Major Clausen. I beg your pardon.

Mr. Rohl. No.

464. Major Clausen. Well, did you in 1917, 1918, or 1919 go to Mexico?

Mr. Rohl. No.

465. Major Clausen. Now, when you got to Honolulu you made a survey of these various defense projects, didn't you, with Colonel Wyman?

Mr. Rohl. And Mr. Grafe.

466. Major Clausen. And then, as I understand it, you returned to the mainland?

Mr. Rohl. That is right.

467. Major Clausen. And then you went back again?

Mr. Rohl. That is right.

468. Major Clausen. And this time you stayed how long?

Mr. Rohl. I stayed until—I stayed from the forepart of December when I arrived until the latter part of April.

469. Major Clausen. 1942?

Mr. Rohl. 1942, when Colonel Lyman—not Wyman—Colonel Lyman, at that time Colonel Lyman, allowed me ten days on the mainland.

470. Major Clausen. Can you give us specific dates, Mr. Rohl?

Mr. Rohl. Yes.

471. Major Clausen. Let me see. You can refer to a paper. Just go ahead.

Mr. Rohl. I haven't it with me.

472. Major Clausen. What is that?

Mr. Rohl. I haven't got it with me.

473. Major Clausen. Well, tell the General dates that you were in Honolulu.

474. General Frank. About?

Mr. Rohl. I have it down in the office—I have it down in the hotel. I can send it up here this afternoon when I get through, if you wish.

475. Major Clausen. Can you give approximate dates now?

Mr. Rohl. I can give you approximate dates. These are to the best of my knowledge, but I have them in writing: I left Los Angeles on a clipper on or about September the 25th. September the 25th. I returned to Los Angeles about October the 10th to employ personnel and purchase equipment and—

476. General Russell. That is all right. When did you go back?

Mr. Rohl. I went back—this time I was ordered by General Hanneum to take the steamer Larline on November the 28th. Then I stayed until—

Mr. Rohl. April.

477. General Russell. April?

Mr. Rohl. April.

478. General Russell. That is all right. That is what I want. Mr. Rohl. I came back for ten days.
479. General Frank. In April?
    Mr. Rohl. In—promising Colonel Lyman that I would not stay over
ten days. I couldn't get priorities to fly back. In the meantime Colonel
Mollison was in the South Pacific, so I took a convoy, and about an hour
after I was aboard the convoy my priority came in to fly back.

480. Major Clausen. Now, after you—what is that? Did you
    finish?
    481. General Russell. That is all I want to know.
    Mr. Rohl. Well, you want subsequent?
    482. General Russell. I don't. The others might.
    483. Major Clausen. Yes. So far as I am concerned, I just want to
    ask him one question here, or two.
    Let me ask you this, Mr. Rohl: When you finally came back from
Hawaii the last time permanently, so far as the Hawaiian Constructors
were concerned, you continued then your relations with Colonel
Wyman by a meeting with him, and then you went up to Edmonton,
Canada, on the Canol project, didn't you?
    Mr. Rohl. No.
    484. Major Clausen. You mean you never went to Canada on that
    project?
    Mr. Rohl. On the Canol project, no, sir.
    485. Major Clausen. Well, you sent your equipment up there, didn't
    you?
    Mr. Rohl. No, sir.

[2283] 486 Major Clausen. You mean no equipment of the
Rohl-Connolly Company went up there?
    Mr. Rohl. On the Canol project, no, sir, never.
    487. Major Clausen. Did you have any interest at all in any con-
tracts being performed in Canada?
    Mr. Rohl. Foley Brothers and Rohl-Connolly had the military
road called the Haynes Cutoff, from Haynes to Champaigne.

488. Major Clausen. Well, in connection with that you had talks
with Colonel Wyman, did you not, about your participation in that?
    Mr. Rohl. No. Colonel Wyman called Mr. Connolly from Edmon-
ton on the telephone and asked him or both of us to come up to Edmon-
ton along with numerous other contractors.
    489. Major Clausen. Well, did you go to Edmonton?
    Mr. Rohl. Yes.

490. Major Clausen. All right. That is all I have.
    491. General Frank. I haven't anything.
    492. General Russell. How long have you known Bruce Pine?
    Mr. Rohl. Not at all.

493. General Russell. Have you ever had any relations with him of
any sort?
    Mr. Rohl. No, sir.
    494. General Russell. Either directly or indirectly?
    Mr. Rohl. Since his story in there I checked up, and as near as I
can find out I was—attended one party with about 75 or between 75 and
100 people, where I might have met Bruce Pine.
    495. General Russell. But there have never been any relations
[2284] Between you and Bruce Pine which would lead to any
feeling on your part toward him or any feeling on his part toward
you?
Mr. Rohl. General, I didn’t know the man when he was sitting at the table in that Tenney hearing.

496. General Russell. That is all that I have.

497. General Frank. I haven’t anything.

498. General Russell. Did you know Mr. Walter Horne of Los Angeles, an insurance and real estate man of that city?

Mr. Rohl. Of Long Beach, yes.

499. General Russell. How long have you known Mr. Horne? A number of years?

Mr. Rohl. Now wait a minute. May I explain? Mr. Horne had a boat and used to sail, and I met him on sailing trips or races, but I haven’t seen—in about 1928, ’29, or thereabouts; I don’t believe I have seen Mr. Horne for ten or twelve years.

500. General Russell. Did you ever have any business dealings with him, Mr. Rohl?

Mr. Rohl. No.

501. General Russell. You have had no social contacts with him since 1928–1929?

Mr. Rohl. No, sir.

502. General Russell. At any time during your acquaintanceship with Mr. Horne, and whatever relationship may have existed, did anything develop which might cause Mr. Horne to have any enmity toward you or any feeling against you that you know of?

Mr. Rohl. No; I don’t see why.

503. General Russell. Do you have any feeling toward him in any way?

Mr. Rohl. No.

[2285] 504. General Russell. Your feeling toward him is perfectly cordial, so far as any exists?

Mr. Rohl. Oh, yes.

505. General Russell. I think that is all.

506. General Grunert. Any more questions?

507. Major Clausen. Just a general question here: Did your firm or yourself ever do any work in Japan or any Japanese-controlled territory?

Mr. Rohl. No, sir.

508. Major Clausen. Where were you at the time of the Pearl Harbor attack?

Mr. Rohl. At the Pearl Harbor attack I was at home.

509. Major Clausen. In?

Mr. Rohl. On Diamond Head Road. We had a—Mrs. Rohl and I were at home.

510. General Frank. I didn’t get that.

Mr. Rohl. Mrs. Rohl and I were at home.

Now, General, I believe I said so: I might say a question was asked here, Where was Colonel Wyman the night of December the 6th, whether he was at my house. ’I read in there [indicating] that he was at my house drunk.’ It’s false. Colonel Wyman, Colonel Claterbos, and Colonel Robinson and their wives came over Friday after dinner to our house, Friday, December the 5th, stayed for about two hours. The reason was that Colonel Claterbos had arrived in Honolulu on a mission to the Red Sea. I believe, and I didn’t see Colonel Wyman from Friday evening on till Sunday morning when the alarm went out for Hawaiian Constructors to report at Kewalo Basin.
Now, Colonel Claterbos was procurement officer in Honolulu after that time.

[2287] 511. Major Clausen. I have no further questions.
512. General Grunert. Colonel Toulmin?
513. Colonel Toulmin. No, sir; none.
514. General Grunert. Mr. Rohl, have you anything more to tell the Board, anything that you think of that might be of assistance to the Board in getting at facts, that you want to tell the Board of your own volition? Because this is the opportunity to do it.

Mr. Rohl. General, I would say this: the facts are not very hard to get. Facts are facts. I mean you can't ever change the facts. Stories are stories, and I believe that you will get more facts from your own officers than you will from a lot of gossipers.
515. General Grunert. That is not much assistance to the Board because I think the Board understands that of their own accord. Now, have you anything that you can add in the line of testimony, as facts that you think would be of value to the Board?

Mr. Rohl. I can say this: that during Colonel Wyman's regime the work was done.
516. General Grunert. The work was what?

Mr. Rohl. Was done, performed. And it slowed down after that due to the fact that as soon as Colonel Wyman was transferred Colonel Lyman, who unfortunately died, called me in and outlined his program to me and asked me if I would cooperate with him and slowly by stages transfer the Hawaiian Constructors personnel; and his intention was, as much as possible, to form a construction regiment, and the Army absorbing the Hawaiian Constructors personnel in easy stages, which we did during Colonel Lyman's lifetime.

517. General Grunert. There appears to be nothing else. We appreciate your coming in.

Mr. Rohl. Thank you, General.
518. General Grunert. We shall go to other business until 2 o'clock this afternoon.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

(Thereupon, at 11:30 a. m., the Board recessed until 2 o'clock p. m. of the same day.)

[2288]

AFTERNOON SESSION

(The Board at 2 p. m. continued the hearing of witnesses.)

TESTIMONY OF PAUL GRAFE, 21 CHESTER PLACE, LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel West. Mr. Grafe, will you please state to the Board your name and address?

Mr. Grafe. Paul Grafe, 21 Chester Place, Los Angeles.

2. Colonel West. And what is your occupation, Mr. Grafe?

Mr. Grafe. Contractor.

3. General Grunert. Mr. Grafe, General Frank assisted by Major Clausen will develop this particular phase for which we asked you to come as a witness.
4. General Frank. Mr. Grafe, you are a contractor in your own name or associated with someone?
Mr. Grafe. No. I am president of the W. E. Callahan Construction Company.

5. General Frank. How long have you held that position?
Mr. Grafe. Two years.

6. General Frank. Two years?
Mr. Grafe. Yes.

7. General Frank. What position did you have in December of 1940?
Mr. Grafe. I was vice president of the W. E. Callahan Construction Company.

8. General Frank. Who was president?
Mr. Grafe. W. E. Callahan.

9. General Frank. Do you remember a project in which the Callahan Company, Gunther & Shirley, and Rohl & Connolly were engaged, in Colorado, about that time?
Mr. Grafe. Yes, sir.

10. General Frank. What was that?
Mr. Grafe. John Martin dam.

11. General Frank. John Martin dam. The three firms were associated as co-adventurers in that project, were they?
Mr. Grafe. That is correct.

12. General Frank. Do you remember the contract for defense work in the Hawaiian Islands that was considered in December of 1940?
Mr. Grafe. Yes, sir.

13. General Frank. You remember that?
Mr. Grafe. I do.

14. General Frank. You were interested in it from the point of view of the Callahan Construction Company alone?
Mr. Grafe. Yes, sir.

15. General Frank. Who were they?
Mr. Grafe. DeWitt Clinton Wolfe and S. E. McCullough.

16. General Frank. In what capacity did you do that?
Mr. Grafe. As vice president of the W. E. Callahan Construction Company.

17. General Frank. You were interested in it solely as a Callahan project?
Mr. Grafe. That is correct.
21. General Frank. When the thing began to crystallize, when did you hear from Colonel Wyman to the effect that he was interested in having you participate in it?

Mr. Grafe. Well, as a guess, I think in November 1940.

22. General Frank. Do you remember when he came from Honolulu to San Francisco?

Mr. Grafe. Yes, sir.

23. General Frank. On the journey in which he was trying to get that contract approved in Washington?

Mr. Grafe. Yes, sir.

24. General Frank. How were you notified at that time?

Mr. Grafe. By wire or telephone; I am not sure which.

25. General Frank. Where were you?

Mr. Grafe. In Los Angeles.

26. General Frank. Did they request you to do something?

Mr. Grafe. To meet Colonel Wyman in San Francisco.

27. General Frank. In what capacity?

Mr. Grafe. As vice president of the W. E. Callahan Construction Company.

28. General Frank. At that time were the other two firms concerned in this?

Mr. Grafe. No, sir.

29. General Frank. They were not?

Mr. Grafe. No, sir.

30. General Frank. What happened when you met Colonel Wyman in San Francisco?

Mr. Grafe. We went to—I think we met in Colonel Hannum’s office, the Division Engineer’s office.

31. General Frank. And then what developed?

Mr. Grafe. Colonel Wyman stated that I had had some representatives over on the job, they hadn’t yet returned, and that he had this work to do and he wanted us to do it, the W. E. Callahan Company, and he said that we were willing to do it.

32. General Frank. He told that to?

Mr. Grafe. To Colonel Hannum.

33. General Frank. Yes?

Mr. Grafe. Colonel Hannum asked me if that was true, and I said it was. Then Colonel Hannum asked him if he had talked to any other contractors. Colonel Wyman said he had not. Colonel Hannum told him that in accordance with the regulations for and incident to the wording of a cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contract he must talk to at least three other contractors. He quoted the regulations, and he said it would be necessary—

34. General Frank. Who quoted those?

Mr. Grafe. Colonel Hannum.

35. General Frank. Yes?

Mr. Grafe. He said it would be necessary for him to talk to other contractors; and then they, the two of them, discussed other contractors that might possibly be interested, and I was excused. I don’t know what else was said.

36. General Frank. Were you advised of any conclusions that they reached?
Mr. Grafe. Yes.

37. General Frank. What?

Mr. Grafe. They were going to—Colonel Wyman was to go to Los Angeles to meet some contractors down there and discuss this project with them.

38. General Frank. Do you remember what contractors?

Mr. Grafe. No, I don’t. I was told today what they were, but that’s all I heard.

39. General Frank. You didn’t know then?

Mr. Grafe. I didn’t know then, no.

40. General Frank. When did you leave San Francisco to go to Washington?

Mr. Grafe. Well, in a short—in a few days. I first went to Los Angeles and stayed there, as I remember it, a day or two, maybe three or four, and then I was to go to Washington to meet Colonel Wyman.

41. General Frank. You didn’t go to Washington with Colonel Wyman?

Mr. Grafe. No.

42. General Frank. You met him where?

Mr. Grafe. In Washington, at the Carlton Hotel.

43. General Frank. When did the other two firms that originally constituted the Hawaiian Constructors come into the picture?

Mr. Grafe. In the conference at Washington.

44. General Frank. In the conference at Washington, You didn’t know who those other two firms were until you arrived in Washington?

Mr. Grafe. Well, I knew they were being considered.

45. General Frank. Who was being considered?

Mr. Grafe. I thought that the W. E. Callahan—that the Atkinson was being considered, Gunther & Shirley was being considered, and Rohl-Connolly was being considered. Of course, Gunther & Shirley are people that we worked with all the time; I move or less took that for granted.

46. General Frank. What about Rohl and Connolly?

Mr. Grafe. Well, I knew that they were being considered, but we hadn’t—I hadn’t agreed to take them in. Or Atkinson; I thought he was being considered too. I talked to Mr. Callahan about the matter as to whether or not we should take in any more associates or not. It was his opinion, and in which I concurred, that it might be a good idea. Although the contract was not so very much at the time, it looked like it might grow larger, and then in discussing the contract with me Colonel Wyman had insisted that we purchase new equipment, which meant—in rough estimate—it meant between five and six hundred thousand dollars worth of equipment, so he thought we were sticking our neck out a little in buying that much equipment for such a small amount of work.

47. General Frank. Did you have equipment belonging to the Callahan firm to start work on the contract originally?

Mr. Grafe. Oh, yes.

48. General Frank. Now,—

Mr. Grafe. We didn’t—I want to be sure that I understand your question. You mean did we own equipment that could have been used on that?

49. General Frank. Yes.
Mr. Grafe. Yes.
50. General Frank. That is what I meant. Now, did you have arrangements for a meeting in Washington before you left Los Angeles?
Mr. Grafe. Yes.
51. General Frank. With whom?
Mr. Grafe. With Colonel Wyman.
52. General Frank. And who else?
Mr. Grafe. I didn't know of anybody else.
53. General Frank. Did you communicate with anybody else prior to leaving Los Angeles that you would meet in Washington?
Mr. Grafe. I don't think so.
54. General Frank. Where did you stay in Washington?
Mr. Grafe. At the Carlton Hotel.
55. General Frank. You made reservations, or did you get a room after you got there?
Mr. Grafe. No; I made reservations.
56. General Frank. Did you occupy the room for the full time of the reservation?
Mr. Grafe. I think so.
57. General Frank. Did you stay there alone?
Mr. Grafe. No.
58. General Frank. With whom did you stay?
Mr. Grafe. When I arrived Colonel Wyman and Tom Connolly were in the room, and then when I arrived Colonel Wyman got another room and Tom Connolly stayed with me.
59. General Frank. Now, when did you learn about the details [2295] of the contract?
Mr. Grafe. You mean as to what the work consisted of?
60. General Frank. Yes.
Mr. Grafe. At this conference, in part, and some about it in San Francisco.
61. General Frank. And the two men that you sent to Honolulu, they learned something about it, didn't they?
Mr. Grafe. Yes, but their information was rather sketchy.
62. General Frank. All right. After you got to Washington where was the conference held at which you learned about the details of the contract?
Mr. Grafe. By that you mean the terms of the—I saw the contract the first time in the Chief's office.
63. General Frank. I beg pardon.
Mr. Grafe. In the Chief's office.
64. General Frank. What Chief?
Mr. Grafe. Chief of Engineers.
65. General Frank. The contract already had been drawn up?
Mr. Grafe. Yes.
66. General Frank. The first time you saw it?
Mr. Grafe. Yes.
67. General Frank. Were the names of the firms on it that were going to be the co-adventurers?
Mr. Grafe. No.
68. General Frank. Well, how did the co-adventurers get associated?
Mr. Grafe. Well, Colonel Wyman stated that he wanted Rohl and Connolly in it, and Gunther & Shirley, together with us.
Mr. Grafe. And I agreed.

70. General Frank. Where was this stated?
Mr. Grafe. I don't remember. You mean at what exact place?

71. General Frank. Well, was it in this conference in the office of the Chief of Engineers?

Mr. Grafe. I am not sure about that.

72. General Frank. Well, you must have some memory of where you first learned about your associates.

Mr. Grafe. Well, of course, General Frank, I knew that there was something about associates when I saw Tom Connolly in that room.

73. General Frank. Yes?
Mr. Grafe. Now, just when it was first broached, I don't know.

74. General Frank. Well, just give me from your memory how this thing developed. That is what I am trying to work out of you.

Mr. Grafe. Well, as I said before when I saw Tom Connolly in that room why I knew that he must have been up there interested in that contract.

75. General Frank. Who represented Gunther & Shirley?

Mr. Grafe. I did.

76. General Frank. Well, how did you come to represent them if you didn't know they were going to be in it?

Mr. Grafe. Well, I tried to explain that in doing this, after going to San Francisco, after meeting in San Francisco, Mr. Shirley and I had agreed that it would be all right for him to participate with us, and I talked to Mr. Callahan on the phone about it too.

77. General Frank. Well, I asked you a minute ago when you first knew about who your associates were going to be, and you told me that the first that you knew anything about it was in the Chief's office in Washington, and now you tell me you went into Washington as a representative of the Gunther-Shirley Company.

Mr. Grafe. Well, of course we—I look upon the Gunther-Shirley Company as our partners and part of our outfit at times, and that picture just gradually grew.

78. General Frank. Well, then, when I asked you about this, why didn't you tell me that you assumed that the Gunther-Shirley Company were going to be associated with you?

Mr. Grafe. I intended to do that earlier in this questioning. I thought I did that when I told you that we were very closely associated.

79. General Grunert. May I ask a question there?

80. General Frank. Yes.

81. General Grunert. If you had talked to Callahan prior to going to Washington on this, then why the surprise seeing him in the hotel?

Mr. Grafe. Well, I wasn't surprised.

82. General Grunert. Well, I thought you told us you were surprised.

Mr. Grafe. No. I knew that he was interested. It was my thought that we would either—that we would be asked to take in Atkinson or Rohl and Connolly.

83. General Grunert. I mean Connolly, not Callahan. Who was associated with Rohl here?
84. Major Clausen. Connolly, sir.

85. General Grunert. Didn't you tell me you were surprised to see Connolly in the hotel in Washington?

Mr. Grafe. No, I didn't mean to say that I was exactly surprised. I knew that he was interested in that contract when I did see him there. I don't believe that I knew he was—

86. General Russell. He didn't express surprise. He expressed information when he saw Connolly present, that he knew he was there about the contract.

Mr. Grafe. Sir?

87. General Russell. You said when you saw Connolly you knew he was there about the contract.

88. General Frank. Now, how was the decision made as to who were going to be the co-adventurers?

Mr. Grafe. Colonel Wyman told me who they were going to be and asked me if that was O. K., and I said yes.

89. General Frank. How many days were you in Washington before this contract was signed?

Mr. Grafe. I can't answer that exactly.

90. General Frank. About how many days?

Mr. Grafe. I would say—

91. General Frank. Two days, a week, or what?

Mr. Grafe. Oh, no. A week.

92. General Frank. About a week?

Mr. Grafe. Yes.

93. General Frank. You went there; did you have a power of attorney from the Gunther-Shirley Company?

Mr. Grafe. No.

[2299] 94. General Frank. Who signed the contract as binding the Gunther & Shirley Company?

Mr. Grafe. I did.

95. General Frank. What authority did you have to sign it?

Mr. Grafe. Authority from a telephone conversation.

96. General Frank. Is that legally binding, telephone conversation?

Mr. Grafe. No, sir.

97. General Frank. Well, what legal authority did you have to sign it?

Mr. Grafe. I didn't have any except that Major Newman—I told Major Newman that I would have these powers of attorneys in before this contract was approved or signed by the Government. He said that would be satisfactory.

98. General Frank. Now, Mr. Connolly was there, and Mr. Connolly signed it for the Connolly-Rohl Company; is that correct?

Mr. Grafe. No.

99. General Frank. It is not correct?

Mr. Grafe. No.

100. General Frank. Well, who signed it for the Connolly-Rohl Company?

Mr. Grafe. I did.

101. General Frank. Well, how did you get authority to do that?

Mr. Grafe. Verbal.

102. General Frank. On the same basis as that on which you signed it for the Gunther-Shirley Company; is that correct?
Mr. Grafe. Yes, verbal authority.

103. General Frank. Now, this was on or about the 20th of December, 1940, wasn't it?

Mr. Grafe. Yes, sir.

104. General Frank. And you were the representative for this group of co-adventurers including Rohl and Connolly, Gunther & Shirley, and the Callahan Company?

Mr. Grafe. Yes, sir.

105. General Frank. Was there any question, about the participation of any one of those firms?

Mr. Grafe. In what way exactly?

106. General Frank. In any way.

Mr. Grafe. I don't think so.

107. General Frank. It was perfectly clear and in the open, straightforward, that all three of them could participate just as they were in the organization that existed at that time?

Mr. Grafe. Yes, sir.

108. General Frank. No change was made?

Mr. Grafe. I don't know of any. I don't know what changes were made.

109. General Frank. Who was president of the Callahan Company? Mr. Callahan at that time?

Mr. Grafe. That is right.

110. General Frank. Who was president of the Gunther-Shirley Company?

Mr. Grafe. Mr. Shirley.

111. General Frank. Who was president of the Rohl-Connolly Company?

Mr. Grafe. I don't know.

112. General Frank. Well, who gave you authority to act?

Mr. Grafe. Tom Connolly.

113. General Frank. How did you know he had authority?

Mr. Grafe. Well, I assumed that he had it. I didn't have any written evidence that he had it.

114. General Frank. This was a million-dollar contract?

Mr. Grafe. Yes, sir.

115. General Frank. And had promise of running into several million?

Mr. Grafe. Yes, sir.

116. General Frank. And those firms handled authority and responsibility on that nebulous an authority?

Mr. Grafe. Yes, sir. That's our habit.

117. General Frank. What's that?

Mr. Grafe. That's our habit.

118. General Frank. Did any question ever come up about the participation of the Rohl-Connolly Company?

Mr. Grafe. No, sir.

119. General Frank. No question ever came up about it?

Mr. Grafe. From whom? No, sir.

120. General Frank. No. That was a defense contract?

Mr. Grafe. Yes, sir.
121. General Frank. Were you conversant with the existence of a law at that time that any firm participating in a defense contract had to have citizens as its officials?

Mr. Grafe. No, sir.

122. General Frank. You didn’t know that?

Mr. Grafe. No, sir.

123. General Frank. You had better take him.

124. Major Clausen. Sir, when you were in Washington on this occasion you talked with Major Newman?


125. Major Clausen. And did you also discuss the contract with Colonel Gesler?

Mr. Grafe. Very little with Colonel Gesler.

126. Major Clausen. You talked about the contract with General Robins?

Mr. Grafe. Yes, sir.

127. Major Clausen. You talked about the contract with General Schley?

Mr. Grafe. Yes, sir. Very little with those three gentlemen.

128. Major Clausen. You talked about the contract with John Martin?

Mr. Grafe. No.

129. Major Clausen. I beg your pardon, sir.

Mr. Grafe. No.

130. Major Clausen. Well, you met John Martin there, didn’t you?

Mr. Grafe. Yes. In Washington?

131. Major Clausen. Yes.

Mr. Grafe. Yes, sir.

132. Major Clausen. Well, all my questions were directed to Washington.

When you saw John Martin where was he?

Mr. Grafe. He came up to my room.

133. Major Clausen. In the Carlton Hotel?

Mr. Grafe. Right.

134. Major Clausen. And you had a discussion with him at that time?

[2303] Mr. Grafe. Yes, sir.

135. Major Clausen. And what did you talk about?

Mr. Grafe. About a bid that we had placed for the set of locks at Gatun.

136. Major Clausen. As a matter of fact, sometime on this occasion of your visit to Washington you talked with John Martin concerning the alien status of Hans Wilhelm Rohl; correct?

Mr. Grafe. That is possible.

137. Major Clausen. I didn’t ask you whether it was possible. I said, is that correct, sir?

Mr. Grafe. That is possible.

138. Major Clausen. You mean it is possible it is correct?

Mr. Grafe. Answering your question, I said it was possible.

139. Major Clausen. You don’t wish to go further than that?

Mr. Grafe. Further about what? I don’t understand. You get me confused.
140. Major Clausen. Would you read the question to the witness to which he said "possible"?

The Reporter [reading]:

Question. As a matter of fact, sometime on this occasion of your visit to Washington you talked with John Martin concerning the alien status of Hans Wilhelm Rohl; correct?

Mr. Grafe. I don't know. I am not sure.

141. Major Clausen. You knew who Mr. John Martin was at the time, didn't you?

Mr. Grafe. Sure. He was our attorney.

[2304] 142. Major Clausen. Yes. He at that time in Washington on this occasion—whether it was on the day that you first met him or later on—he was informed about the contract and as a matter of fact suggested the terms of the syndicate agreement or the agreement which would represent an understanding of your various interests; isn't that true?

Mr. Grafe. Yes.

143. Major Clausen. Well, now, by the way, you made an affidavit, Mr. Grafe, to a representative of the House Military Affairs Committee; do you recall that?

Mr. Grafe. Yes, sir. To which representative?

144. Major Clausen. I beg your pardon, sir.

Mr. Grafe. What representative?

145. Major Clausen. Well, I have one here. Did you make more than one?

Mr. Grafe. I don't think so.

146. Major Clausen. Well, then it is whatever representative you made it to.

Mr. Grafe. Made it to—

147. Major Clausen. I show you a document consisting of seven pages, and I will ask you to read that and see if that is it.

Mr. Grafe. You want me to read it all?

148. Major Clausen. No, sir. I just want you to look it over from one page to the other page, to see if that is the affidavit that you made on that occasion.

Mr. Grafe. I don't believe it is.

149. Major Clausen. Do you have a copy of the one that you made?

Mr. Grafe. Yes, I do.

[2305] 150. Major Clausen. Where is that copy?

Mr. Grafe. Down at the hotel. I say that because I thought I signed this affidavit.

151. Major Clausen. All right. Will you do this for the Board? Will you send the Board out a copy of the copy that you have in your hotel?

Mr. Grafe. I surely will.

152. Major Clausen. All right, sir.

153. Colonel Toulmin. Major, may I suggest that this gentleman doesn't have anything except his original copy. He would have to go home in order to send you a copy. Why can't he bring it out here and let the reporter copy it, and then we will be sure to have it right away before you get away?

154. Major Clausen. Yes, he may do that when we finish a few more questions.
In any event, on occasion John Martin discussed with you the citizenship status of Hans Wilhelm Rohl; isn't that true?

Mr. Grafe. My mind is confused as to just when Bill Rohl's citizenship status was discussed. Now, John Martin tells me that it was when we were in Washington, and possibly that is true. I didn't attach very much importance to that matter, or I wasn't startled until I learned of this law that you are talking about, which was sometime in April, and then I became keenly alive as to the situation then.

155. General Frank. You didn't know about the law until April?

Mr. Grafe. No.

156. Major Clausen. Now, Mr. Grafe, you just swore that when you learned that Hans Wilhelm Rohl was an alien you did not attach much importance to it. I ask if you gave this testimony to Colonel Hunt of the Inspector General's Department, page 560:

Question. I take it that you were somewhat surprised yourself to learn that Mr. Rohl was not a citizen.

Answer. I was very much surprised. Boy, that was a bombshell.

Did you give that testimony?

Mr. Grafe. I don't remember whether that is the exact wording or not.

157. General Frank. Well, that is official, so there is no question about that.

158. Major Clausen. You testified before Colonel Hunt; you remember that, Mr. Grafe?

Mr. Grafe. Yes, sir.

159. Major Clausen. All right. What did you say to Colonel Wyman in Washington on the subject of the citizenship of Mr. Rohl?

Mr. Grafe. Nothing.

160. Major Clausen. Whenever you learned, whenever it was, that Mr. Rohl was an alien, it was a bombshell, wasn't it?

Mr. Grafe. Well, I am not sure, Major Clausen, whether the fact that I learned that he was not a citizen was a bombshell or whether I learned of that law, that it was a bombshell. You must remember that is several years ago.

161. Major Clausen. When you saw John Martin in Washington you discussed with him various things, and you would go to dinner with him?

Mr. Grafe. No.

[2307] 162. Major Clausen. Were you in his company for several days there?

Mr. Grafe. No.

163. Major Clausen. How long had you known Colonel Wyman?

Mr. Grafe. Since '36 or '37.

164. Major Clausen. By the way, you paid for the hotel bill of Colonel Wyman, didn't you, when he occupied rooms at the Carlton Hotel in December 1940?

Mr. Grafe. No. No; the company paid for the bill. He gave me the money. He left in a big rush and gave me money for the hotel bill, and I had all the bills sent to the company for the company to pay.

165. Major Clausen. To whom did you talk about this case before you came here today?

Mr. Grafe. I talked to Mr. Shirley.

166. Major Clausen. Whom else?

Mr. Grafe. Mr. Connolly.
167. Major Clausen. Mr. Connolly. Whom else?
Mr. Grafe. Mr. Rohl.
168. Major Clausen. Whom else?
Mr. Grafe. Mr. Middleton.
169. Major Clausen. Yes. Mr. Martin?
Mr. Grafe. Mr. Martin.
170. Major Clausen. That is all?
Mr. Grafe. Yes.
171. Major Clausen. The time to which you just referred as having talked to these people—that was on the occasion of your responding to the order to appear before this Board, wasn’t it?
Mr. Grafe. Sir?
172. Major Clausen. I say, the talks that you had with these various people were since you got the order to appear before this Board?
Mr. Grafe. That is a difficult question to ask—or to answer. I don’t understand it.
173. Major Clausen. All right. Put it this way: When did you talk to these people about the case the most recent times?
Mr. Grafe. Today at lunch.
174. Major Clausen. Today at lunch. In other words, you talked to Mr. Connolly after he had testified here; is that correct?
Mr. Grafe. Yes, sir.
175. Major Clausen. He told you he had been here and testified, did he?
Mr. Grafe. Yes, sir.
176. Major Clausen. Did he tell you what he had said?
Mr. Grafe. Yes, sir.
177. Major Clausen. He told you that?
Mr. Grafe. Yes.
178. Major Clausen. And what did he say that he had said?
Mr. Grafe. I don’t remember all he said.
179. Major Clausen. You can’t recall that?
Mr. Grafe. No.
180. General Frank. And you learned this at lunchtime?
By the way, you talked with Mr. Rohl at lunch too? Was he there at lunch with you?
Mr. Grafe. Yes.
182. Major Clausen. He told you he had been here and testified?
Mr. Grafe. Yes, sir.
183. Major Clausen. And he talked over with you what he had testified here this morning?
Mr. Grafe. Some of the things.
184. Major Clausen. Some of the things?
Mr. Grafe. Yes, sir.
185. Major Clausen. Do you recall, Mr. Grafe, that Colonel Wyman at Washington in December 1940, when he learned that Mr. Martin was there, became, to use your words, “sore”?
Mr. Grafe. That is true.
186. General Frank. You seem to remember two and a half years better than you do two hours. Mr. Grafe.
Mr. Grafe. No, if I had been asked to answer something that happened two and a half hours ago that I couldn’t answer.
187. Major Clausen. When, as I understood your testimony, you learned that a contract for some defense projects was to be let in Hawaii—and this was sometime around September 1940; is that correct?

Mr. Grafe. It is just—Major, let me explain that I explained to Colonel Wyman that Mr. Martin was not there in any capacity in connection with this contract.

188. Major Clausen. That is your conclusion?

Mr. Grafe. Well, as far as I knew he was there to—representing—

189. Major Clausen. Well, he was also there helping Rohl get citizenship papers, wasn't he?

Mr. Grafe. That I don't know.

190. General Frank. You don't know that?

Mr. Grafe. I don't know whether—that he was doing that.

191. General Frank. Mr. Grafe, about what was the profit you and your associates made on this Hawaiian contract?

Mr. Grafe. About eight hundred—between eight and nine hundred thousand dollars.

192. General Frank. Now, when you made this contract Mr. Rohl was a German alien and an official of the Rohl-Connolly Company; that is correct, isn't it?

Mr. Grafe. It is correct that he was an alien. I don't know that he was an official of the Rohl-Connolly Company. I have been told that there were some changes made then, and just when they were made I don't know.

193. General Frank. Well, did you take into consideration that this contract might be illegal?

Mr. Grafe. No, sir.

194. General Frank. Have you thought about it since?

Mr. Grafe. No, sir.

195. General Frank. And have you thought that in such an event the Government, even now, could recover from you and your associates?

Mr. Grafe. No, sir. You say have I thought of that?

196. General Frank. Yes.

Mr. Grafe. No, sir.

197. Major Clausen. I would like to invite the attention of the Board to the fact that this witness indicated by his testimony that Mr. Connolly and Mr. Rohl have violated the injunction of secrecy with respect to their testimony before the Board. The Recorder warned the two witnesses that they were not to disclose what went on here, and by this witness it appears that these two men have done so.

Mr. Grafe, you first learned of the contract September 1940, and then, as I understand, you sent two men to Hawaii to review the prospective work?

Mr. Grafe. That is true.

198. Major Clausen. Now, when they were over there Colonel Wyman showed them around, did he not?

Mr. Grafe. I don't know about that. He probably took them to some places, and his representatives took them others. I am not sure about that.
199. Major Clausen. And then when he came to the mainland, when Colonel Wyman came to the mainland in December 1940, you met Colonel Wyman in General Hammun's office here in San Francisco; is that correct?

Mr. Grafe. Yes, sir.

200. Major Clausen. And then did you go to Los Angeles with Colonel Wyman, or was he from Los Angeles?

Mr. Grafe. No, sir.

201. Major Clausen. You said something about Colonel Kelton. Did you meet with Colonel Wyman in Colonel Kelton's office?

Mr. Grafe. I didn't say anything about Colonel Kelton.

202. Major Clausen. When was the next time you saw Colonel Wyman after the San Francisco visit?

Mr. Grafe. In Washington.

203. Major Clausen. All right. Now, between that time did you see Mr. Rohl and discuss with him the prospective participation of his firm in this contract?

Mr. Grafe. No, sir.

204. Major Clausen. I beg your pardon.

Mr. Grafe. No, sir.

[2312] 205. Major Clausen. Mr. Grafe, you did discuss with Colonel Wyman from time to time the citizenship status of Mr. Rohl, did you not?

Mr. Grafe. I discussed it with him the first time in April 1941.

206. Major Clausen. As a matter of fact, you were so interested in the citizenship status that you made a trip to the mainland from Hawaii for the purpose of accelerating the granting of citizenship to Mr. Rohl, isn't that true?

Mr. Grafe. No, sir.

207. Major Clausen. I am going to read you from a letter which was written to the Secretary of Commerce by an attorney, David A. Cannon. First, let me ask you, do you know Mr. Cannon?

Mr. Grafe. No, sir.

208. Major Clausen. This is a representation that he made:

Mr. Paul Grafe, Managing Director for the Hawaiian Constructors, recently flew to and is now in the United States, with the knowledge and consent of Colonel Wyman, in an endeavor to clear the way for Rohl's going to the Hawaiian Islands on this work.

Is that a correct statement?

Mr. Grafe. No.

209. Major Clausen. Did you ever, in the Hawaiian Islands, discuss this subject, at all, about accelerating the citizenship of Mr. Rohl, with Colonel Wyman?

Mr. Grafe. Yes, sir.

210. Major Clausen. As a matter of fact, you signed a letter, yourself, did you not, to Mr. Rohl, on August 15, 1941?

Dear Bill: After considerable discussion with Ted, it was agreed [2313] that this matter would be handled as follows: I would write the attached letter, and Wyman would write one of a similar nature, which he read to me, to the Chief of Engineers, through the regular channels, attaching a copy of my letter. His letter is going out on the clipper today.

Kind personal regards,

Sincerely,

Paul Grafe.
Do you remember writing that?

Mr. Grafe. I don't remember writing it, but it is possible that I did.

211. Major Clausen. I beg your pardon, sir?

Mr. Grafe. It is possible that I did.

212. Major Clausen. Would you care to look at it again, to see it with your eyes? [Major Clausen hands the letter to the witness.]

Mr. Grafe. I don't remember writing it, but it is possible that I did write it. There is nothing there to—

213. Major Clausen. You mean that is not the original letter?

Mr. Grafe. That's right.

214. Major Clausen. Well, that is a Federal Bureau of Investigation report.

Mr. Grafe. Well, I am not denying that I wrote the letter.

215. Major Clausen. Well, all right. Now, concerning the subject matter of the letter, just tell the Board what discussion you had had with "Ted," because you say here—

After considerable discussion with Ted.

I assume you referred, there, to Colonel Wyman, isn't that [2314] true?

Mr. Grafe. That is true.

216. Major Clausen. All right. Tell the Board what "considerable discussion" it was you had with "Ted."

Mr. Grafe. Colonel Wyman wanted Mr. Rohl to come over to Hawaii and help with this work; so did I; and we knew that he couldn't come over, as he was an alien. We understood that he was applying for citizenship papers and that there was no action being taken on it; so we wanted to request the office of the Chief of Engineers to see that prompt action would be taken on his application for citizenship.

217. Major Clausen. When did you have the first of those discussions with Colonel Wyman in Hawaii, Mr. Grafe?

Mr. Grafe. I would say, in August.

218. Major Clausen. Didn't you say here today that you had the first discussion with him somewhere around April?

Mr. Grafe. That was about his citizenship status, but there was no discussion about helping him get his application acted upon.

219. Major Clausen. All right. Tell the Board what discussion you had with Colonel Wyman, in April, concerning Mr. Rohl's citizenship status.

Mr. Grafe. I told Colonel Wyman that he was an alien, and he seemed surprised to know about it. And then he said, as I remember it, he said, "I think there is an order out, or a circular letter out, about that, from the Chief of Engineers' office, as to the status of an alien on work of this character." It was a form letter; and in a day or two he sent me a copy of that letter, and I sent it on to Frank Martin and asked him [2315] what that law meant as to our status on the contract.

220. Major Clausen. The circular letter to which you refer was one which stated that the employment of aliens on defense projects was forbidden by law, isn't that correct?

Mr. Grafe. I don't remember what the law said. I can get that, copy of that, if you want me to put it in my testimony.
221. Major Clausen. I wish you would send that to the Board, also. Now, Mr. Grafe, I refer again to this letter from Mr. Cannon to the Secretary of Commerce, dated August 29, 1941, and to the portion which I read a few moments ago. Did you ever fly to the United States and do anything in connection with getting the citizenship of Mr. Rohl accelerated or expedited or granted, or in any way acted upon?

Mr. Grafe. No, sir.

222. Major Clausen. So, so far as your testimony is concerned, this representation that was made by Mr. Cannon is false, is that correct?

Mr. Grafe. Yes, sir.

223. General Frank. It is? It is false?

224. Major Clausen. Yes, sir: he said, "Yes, sir."

225. General Frank. This official testimony is false?

226. Major Clausen. That is what he says, sir. He says the representation in the letter, of Mr. Cannon, to the Secretary of Commerce, is a false representation.

Mr. Grafe. It—well, now, I don’t—Let me answer your question in a different way. I do not care to answer that, whether that is true or false. I do not understand your question, exactly. What I say is that I never did anything except talk to Colonel Wyman and write him a letter about Bill’s alien status. That is the only thing I ever did in connection therewith.

227. General Frank. Mr. Grafe, where were you born?

Mr. Grafe. In Indiana, Clay City.

228. Major Clausen. Mr. Grafe, you finally ascertained, did you not, in connection with all the citizenship business, in Hawaii—I mean, you learned in Hawaii that the reason that this citizenship was being held up was for certain acts of Mr. Rohl, and included among them was the fact that he had falsely documented certain vessels, which would result in a forfeiture of these vessels to the Government?

Mr. Grafe. No, I didn’t know about that.

229. Major Clausen. Well, this letter from Mr. Cannon is a letter which is in effect a petition of the Rohl-Connolly Company for remission or mitigation with respect to asking to pay a fine for these violations of the law; and following the letter, the petition was granted. I tell you that, to show you the seriousness of the falseness of the statement of Mr. Cannon, if it is false.

I will read you again what he says concerning you. By the way, I will say this, that this remission and the payment of the fine preceded the actual citizenship granting; as a condition, in my opinion. Now, paragraph 6:

Mr. Paul Grafe, Managing Director for the Hawaiian Constructors, recently flew to and is now in the United States with the knowledge and consent of Colonel Wyman, in an endeavor to clear the way for Rohl’s going to the Hawaiian Islands on this work, and is now at the Caddoa Dam, in Colorado, to assist in making arrangements for someone to take over the Caddoa project, if Rohl’s naturalization affairs are so adjusted to permit Mr. Rohl to proceed with the work in Hawaii. Mr. Grafe must return to the Islands at the very earliest possible date.

Now, taking it piece by piece, did you “recently fly to the United States,” with respect to the date of this August 29, 1941 letter?

Mr. Grafe. Did I fly? That is possible.
230. Major Clausen. Were you in the United States in August, 1941? On August 29, 1941, were you in the United States?

Mr. Grafe. I would have to consult my records. I spent most of the time that year in Honolulu.

231. Major Clausen. It says:

with the knowledge and consent of Colonel Wyman, in an endeavor to clear the way for Rohl's going to the Hawaiian Islands on this work.

Did you fly here for that purpose?

Mr. Grafe. No, sir.

232. Major Clausen. Were you at the Caddoa Dam, in Colorado, in August—August 29, 1941?

Mr. Grafe. I was there in July and August. It seems to me that it was in July—July or August.

233. Major Clausen. By the way, do you know anything about a letter written by General Kingman to the Department of Immigration and Naturalization, requesting the granting of Mr. Rohl's application for citizenship?

Mr. Grafe. No, sir.

234. Major Clausen. Now, I show you, Mr. Grafe, what appears to be a copy of a letter dated August 15, 1941, from you to [2318] Colonel Wyman, District Engineer, which accompanies this letter that I have already referred to, that you wrote to Mr. Rohl. This is page 15 of the FBI report. I will ask you to look that over and see if you wrote that letter. I say, do you recall having written that letter, sir?

Mr. Grafe. I assume that I—I know I wrote a letter like that, and I would assume that that is an exact copy of it.

235. Major Clausen. All right.

I have no further questions.

236. General Frank. I have no further questions.

237. General Grunert. Have you any questions, General Russell?

238. General Russell. Yes; two or three.

Mr. Grafe, how long have you been connected with the Callahan Company?

Mr. Grafe. 22 years.

239. General Russell. You are a member of the Callahan family, are you not, by marriage?

Mr. Grafe. No, sir.

240. General Russell. You are now the President of the company?

Mr. Grafe. Yes, sir.

241. General Russell. Now, Mr. Grafe, I want to know something about that operation out there. Who hired all those people that did the work on Oahu? Where did you get your laborers?

Mr. Grafe. We had an employment office in Los Angeles and San Francisco.

242. General Russell. Were any Rohl-Connolly supervisors out there with you, in the beginning?

Mr. Grafe. None.

243. General Russell. What organization did you take out there [2319] with you, as your supervisory organization?

Mr. Grafe. Well, we took the general superintendent, the administrator, several key foremen, warehousemen.

244. General Russell. From what company or companies?
Mr. Grafe. From ours, and Gunther & Shirley's.
245. General Russell. Did you have any of the Rohl-Connolly organization out there, until August 1941?
Mr. Grafe. No, sir.
246. General Russell. When did any of the Rohl-Connolly organization appear out there, to do some of the work, first?
Mr. Grafe. Key employees, you are talking about? I think the first men— the first men were the ones who went over, that started over on the Ludington.
247. General Russell. About when was that?
Mr. Grafe. That must have been about in November 1941, because it was turned back, after the attack.
248. General Russell. Is it your testimony that only Callahan's and Gunther & Shirley's supervisory personnel were in the islands prior to November 1941?
Mr. Grafe. Yes, sir.
249. General Russell. Did Rohl-Connolly Company come into this picture, as one of the adventurers, at your instance, or at the instance of Colonel Wyman?
Mr. Grafe. Colonel Wyman's instance.
250. General Russell. How many times had Callahan Co. been associated with Rohl-Connolly, before this work out in Oahu?
Mr. Grafe. Once.
251. General Russell. Where was that?
Mr. Grafe. John Martin Dam.
[2320] 252. General Russell. Was it essential to have Rohl-Connolly Company in the operation, so that it might be financed?
Mr. Grafe. No, sir; it wasn't essential or necessary. We thought that we should have someone, another partner, in there, to help carry the risk that might be incurred in the purchase of this equipment on such a small contract.
253. General Russell. Did Tom Connolly go to Washington at your instance, or at Wyman's instance?
Mr. Grafe. Well, not at my instance. I assume, at Wyman's instance.
254. General Russell. You have been questioned about a letter written by a man named Cannon. You testified you did not know that man?
Mr. Grafe. Did not know him; that is correct.
255. General Russell. Did you ever see that letter?
Mr. Grafe. No, sir.
256. General Russell. Had you ever heard of that letter prior to your being questioned about it by Major Clausen?
Mr. Grafe. No, sir.
257. General Russell. That is all I want to ask.
258. General Frank. Who sent John Martin to Washington to expedite Rohl's citizenship papers?
Mr. Grafe. I don't know.
259. General Frank. Anything else?
261. General Grunert. That appears to be all.
(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)
[2321] TESTIMONY OF JOHN M. MARTIN, ATTORNEY-AT-LAW; LOS ANGELES, CAL.

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel West. Will you state to the Board your name and address, please, Mr. Martin.

   Mr. Martin. John M. Martin; 714 West Olympic Boulevard, Los Angeles, is my office. My residence is Pasadena.

2. Colonel West. And what is your occupation?

   Mr. Martin. Attorney-at-law.

3. General Grunert. Mr. Martin, this field we are covering is so broad that we are dividing it up for special investigation, and in this particular part of it, General Frank will lead, assisted by Major Clausen; so I will ask General Frank to go ahead.

4. General Frank. Mr. Martin, were you ever employed by Mr. Rohl to represent him as his attorney?

   Mr. Martin. Yes; I have represented Mr. Rohl, oh, off and on, I would say for approximately seventeen years.

5. General Frank. Do you represent him, or have you represented him, individually, or as the counselor for the firm of Rohl-Connolly Company?

   Mr. Martin. Both, whenever called upon to do so; also represent Mrs. Rohl, and the H. W. Rohl Company, and Mr. Connolly, and the Rohl-Connolly Company; and the Rohl-Connolly Partnership, before the Rohl-Connolly Company was incorporated, some twelve years ago.

6. General Frank. Is the Rohl-Connolly Company still a going concern, or is it being liquidated?

   Mr. Martin. Well, my brother, Frank Martin, has handled that matter directly for the Rohl-Connolly Company, and it is my recollection that T. E. Connolly Company, Inc., which is a corporation owned by Fr. T. E. Connolly, acquired the stock in the Rohl-Connolly Company, and that was owned by Mr. and Mrs. Rohl. That was some—oh, eight, ten months ago—maybe a year ago.

7. General Frank. In December 1940, you were in Washington?

   Mr. Martin. Yes.

8. General Frank. At about the time that the Hawaiian contract was being negotiated?

   Mr. Martin. Is there any objection to my referring to a memorandum?


   Mr. Martin. I was in Washington, it was, I believe the greater part of the time from October 18, 1940, until Christmas 1940. I was specifically there on December 17 and December 18, which I believe are two days when the negotiations were going on.

10. General Frank. Have you talked to anybody who has appeared before this Board as a witness?

    Mr. Martin. Yes.

11. General Frank. Have you discussed the testimony that they gave, with them?

    Mr. Martin. Only in substance, principally with Mr. Connolly, who last night asked me three questions. He said, "When did you
go to Washington, D.C., in 1940? How long were you there? and
what did you do while there?" And in response to that, I called
my office to get from my work sheets or time sheets some
identification as to where I was, during the periods mentioned; and
I have such a memo, made by me in conference over the telephone;
which is complete from October 18, 1940, until Christmas 1940; so
that as to that period I can say definitely where I was on any dates.

12. General Frank. We are interested in your being in Washington,
right around the 15th to the 20th of December.

Mr. Martin. Yes.

13. General Frank. On that trip, what were you there for?

Mr. Martin. I was called, from Washington, D.C., by the McNeil-
Zoss Company, in connection with the negotiations for the San Diego
Housing project contract with the Department of Public Works. I
had just returned to my residence, to attend my wife's father's funeral,
and received that call, on November 28, 1940, asking that I meet with
Mr. McNeil and Mr. Zoss, on December 2; so I left—

14. General Frank. Let us confine the activities that you had there
to those associated with the Rohl-Connolly Company, or with Mr. Rohl.

Mr. Martin. Well, I really had none during that period, with one
exception. I had conferences along in December with Mr. Grafe and
Mr. Seabury, of the Callahan Corporation, in connection with the
Callahan Construction Company's bid on the Canal locks; and I had
a conference on December 17 with Mr. Grafe, in Washington, in con-
nection with the brief I was writing for the comptroller general on
that protest; and at that time—

15. General Frank. Now, just a minute. We have some testimony
from commissioned officers of the United States Army about a conference you had with them in Washington, relative to
obtaining citizenship for Mr. Rohl; and that is the activity about which
we would like to learn from you.

Mr. Martin. I don't have those dates here, but they were along
the latter part of August 1941. The conferences were with General
Robins, primarily, the Chief of Engineers, or, by the way, General
King was then Chief; but conferences primarily with General Robins
and with Colonel Lorence.

16. General Frank. L-o-r-e-n-c-e?

Mr. Martin. I believe so, in General Robins' office, and with
Mr. Stilphen, who, as I recall, was a civilian attorney in General
Robins' office.

17. General Frank. Will you tell us just what happened on that
occasion.

Mr. Martin. Yes. I had with me a photostatic copy of an order
or directive or letter from Colonel Wyman, requesting that Mr. Rohl
come to the islands.

18. General Frank. Who gave you that? Did Colonel Wyman
send that to you?

Mr. Martin. I don't know, but I believe that during the summer
of 1941, Mr. Rohl asked me if, when I returned to Washington, D.C.,
in connection with other pending cases, if I would explain to Colonel
Wyman why he, Mr. Rohl, had not reported at the islands in obed-
ience to that instruction; and it is my recollection that at that time,
Miss Dickey, of his office, had made and gave me a photostatic copy.
19. General Frank. Miss Dickey, in whose office?
   Mr. Martin. In the Rohl-Connolly Company office. She is secretary of the company. She gave me a photostatic copy of [2325] this letter from Colonel Wyman, dated along in January 1941, and I presented that letter, or the photostat, to General Robins, in his office, the latter part of August 1941.

20. General Frank. That is right.
   Mr. Martin. And I explained to him that Mr. Rohl couldn't go, because he was not a citizen. General Robins suggested to me that he, as head of the department, could waive that requirement. I told him that I had discussed with Mr. Rohl that possibility and that Mr. Rohl felt that he would be subject to criticism if he went there on a waiver. I told General Robins that Mr. Rohl's petition for citizenship was pending in the federal court for Los Angeles, had been for some six months, and that I felt that the only way that Mr. Rohl could properly go was after that petition for citizenship had been heard by the federal court on its merits.

   I believe at that time General Robins called in Colonel Lawrence and Mr. Stilphen. I am not sure as to General Kingman being called at that conference, but the upshot of the conference was that General Kingman addressed a letter to Mr. Schofield, the head of the Department of Immigration and Naturalization. I believe Mr. Stilphen delivered that letter to Mr. Schofield by hand.

21. General Frank. Who prepared this letter?
   Mr. Martin. I do not know. It wasn't prepared in my presence.

22. General Frank. Did you assist in the preparation of it?
   Mr. Martin. No, sir; I did not.

23. General Frank. Did you offer any suggestion with respect to any phraseology in it?
   Mr. Martin. No, I did not. I never saw it. My only [2326] knowledge of the letter was, I believe, General Robins reading me from a copy of the letter. I never saw the original nor had any part in it.

24. General Frank. And at whose direction did you take steps to expedite this citizenship petition? Did Mr. Rohl send you there for that purpose?
   Mr. Martin. No. Mr. Rohl had asked that while I was in Washington I explain it to General Robins, why he was not reporting to the islands in obedience to that order. I had conferences pending with the Acting Secretary of Commerce, in Washington, and with the Solicitor, General Trimble, and with Commander Fields, in connection with proceedings that were being contemplated with reference to the registration of the Rohl-Connolly Corporation's marine equipment, and at that time the Secretary of Commerce in his report was perfectly willing to mitigate the penalty, to a monetary consideration, under the statute, but insisted upon the vessels being registered; and as I recall, the regulations at that time required that 85% of the stock be owned by American citizens.

   Mr. Rohl, who was then an alien, owned 25% of the stock, so that the vessels either had to be reregistered or sold or transferred, or the entire stock ownership be held to the extent of 85% by American citizens. Therefore, looking to a settlement of those proceedings, the War Department and the Department of Commerce both cooperated
to the extent of asking or rather advising the head of the Immigration Department that it would expedite a clearance of the matter; if the Rohl petition for citizenship could be put on the calendar and heard on its merits; and pursuant to those conferences, which were held direct between General Robins' office and either the Acting Secretary of Commerce or somebody in his office, Mr. Schofield wired Los Angeles to ascertain the status of the Rohl case, and I in turn received word back from General Robins' office that Mr. Schofield had arranged for the case to be set for trial on September 15, 1941; and I so advised my office and Mr. Rohl.

25. General Frank. Did you get a letter? You are conversant with this letter that General Kingman signed?

Mr. Martin. That is the letter, a carbon copy of which, as I recall, General Robins read me, I would say early in September.

26. General Frank. The date of the letter is August 28?

Mr. Martin. That is right.

27. General Frank. Now, did you get a similar letter from the Department of Commerce?

Mr. Martin. No. I talked with the Department of Commerce, and was told by Solicitor General Trimble and the Acting Secretary of Commerce, and by Commander Field, that the matter having been adjusted to their entire satisfaction and the mitigated penalty having been paid, that they would so advise Mr. Schofield, that so far as they were concerned there was no reason why the hearing of the Rohl case should be delayed.

28. General Frank. Do you know whether or not Mr. Schofield was so advised by them?

Mr. Martin. Commander Field personally stated to me in his office at Washington that he had so advised Mr. Schofield.

29. General Frank. How?

Mr. Martin. I don't recall for the moment; but I wrote a letter to my office at Los Angeles, and a copy of it to Mr. [2328] Rohl, at Caddo, in which I outlined those conversations, and that letter would give accurate information, as I dictated it at that time.

30. General Frank. You do not remember whether they did it by letter, verbally, by telegram, or how they did it?

Mr. Martin. It was done verbally, I believe.

31. General Frank. Now, when you went to Washington, did you receive any instructions from Mr. Rohl to start activity on expediting his citizenship?

Mr. Martin. No. When I went to Washington—now we are talking about 1941, when I was there in August?

32. General Frank. I am talking about events during this very time.

Mr. Martin. No.

33. General Frank. Did you ever get a communication or any advice in any form from Mr. Rohl to expedite his citizenship papers, about this time?

Mr. Martin. No.

34. General Frank. Namely, in August 1941.

Mr. Martin. Not to my recollection. I was told by Mr. Rohl when he gave me the copy of Colonel Wyman's request, that he wanted me to explain to General Robins that until that was heard on its merits,
that he couldn't report. Mr. Rohl was anxious of course to have his petition heard, and it was being delayed by the federal court, by numerous departments in Los Angeles who were investigating the registration of these vessels.

35. Major Clausen. Mr. Martin, you are a California lawyer, admitted to practice, for how long?

Mr. Martin. Well, I have been admitted to practice here since 1924.

36. Major Clausen. With your offices in Los Angeles?

Mr. Martin. Yes.

37. Major Clausen. Do you recall a conversation that you had with Mr. Grafe, in Washington, regarding the citizenship status of Mr. Rohl?

Mr. Martin. Yes.

38. Major Clausen. Where did that conversation take place?

Mr. Martin. In the Carlton Hotel.

39. Major Clausen. Who was present?

Mr. Martin. Mr. T. E. Connolly.

40. Major Clausen. And when did that occur?

Mr. Martin. On December 18, 1940.

41. Major Clausen. What was said by yourself and these parties?

Mr. Martin. To make the conversation complete, I would have to go back one day, if you permit me to go to December 17.

42. Major Clausen. Surely.

Mr. Martin. I met Mr. Grafe in connection with this Canal Zone job, and learned from him at that time that he was negotiating for a U. S. E. D. contract in the islands, where he expected to carry on with the same group that were then constructing Caddoa dam. I had been attorney for Callahan Company, I would say, for eight or nine years, and for the Gunther & Shirley Corporation, about the same length of time, both of whom were proposed to be parties to this Pacific island contract; and I knew that Mr. Rohl was not a citizen. I felt that while I was not called upon to give advice, that I should advise Mr. Grafe and Mr. Connolly that Mr. Rohl was not a citizen. It seemed to me that for him to go outside the continental United States might cause trouble, and I asked Mr. Connolly and Mr. Grafe if they would refrain from concluding any negotiations or signing any contract till I obtained permission to give them certain factual information.

The following day, I called from Washington, D. C., and talked to Mr. Rohl, and asked his permission to tell Mr. Connolly and Mr. Grafe that he was not a citizen. He gave me that permission; and it is my recollection that after he had given me that permission, I put Mr. Connolly on the extension, so that Rohl could tell him direct that he wanted the two of us to go tell Mr. Grafe that fact. It is my recollection that call was from my associate's office, Mr. Hermann J. Galloway, of the firm of King & King, Washington, D. C., and that Mr. Galloway was present at that conference. Mr. Connolly and I then left Mr. Galloway's office and went over to the Carlton Hotel, which is two or three blocks from the office of King & King, and I told Mr. Grafe, in Mr. Connolly's presence, that I had just talked with Mr. Rohl, and that I then had the permission which I was seeking to tell him that Rohl was not a citizen. That was in the Carlton Hotel. I can't tell you, other than it was in Mr. Grafe's room.
43. **Major Clausen.** You were aware, were you, Mr. Martin, of the espionage act at that time, which forbade employment of aliens on defense projects?

**Mr. Martin.** In a general way; yes.

44. **Major Clausen.** And you explained that to these men as being one of the reasons why you felt that the work should not be undertaken with Mr. Rohl in the position of an alien and as president, unless some revelation of that were made?

**Mr. Martin.** Well, I only discussed this feature with them. I said, "Are you planning to use Mr. Rohl in any connection, for any purpose in connection with this contract?" and they stated, "None, whatever," that Mr. Grafe would take charge of the work, and that Mr. Rohl would have nothing to do with the work. However, I was not there to advise with them, nor did I advise with them, in connection with their negotiations for this contract, nor did I have any information as to what the contract was, other than that it was for work in the islands of the Pacific.

45. **Major Clausen.** I asked you, Mr. Martin, whether, on the occasion of these talks which you had with Mr. Grafe on that subject, you explained to him the reason why it was necessary that no alien be employed on a defense project in the islands.

**Mr. Martin.** No, I didn't, because I had no information it was a defense project.

46. **Major Clausen.** Well, isn't it a fact, though, Mr. Martin, now, right here in the Board, you telephoned Los Angeles and dictated the joint-venture agreement?

**Mr. Martin.** I telephoned from Mr. Grafe's room and talked to my brother, and dictated to him, or rather, gave him the instructions over the phone for the preparation of the power of attorney and a joint-venture agreement. I did not dictate it in the sense that I formulated the terms. I simply told him to prepare a joint-venture agreement, the same as the one then in existence between the same parties on Caddo dam, with the same participation.

47. **Major Clausen.** In simple English, you told your Los Angeles office to prepare a joint-venture agreement respecting the contract that was being negotiated in Washington at that time?

**Mr. Martin.** I don't know whether I talked to my brother, or whether Mr. Grafe talked to him on the phone; but in any event, such instructions were given to my brother, Mr. Frank Martin, to prepare a joint-venture agreement. As to whether I personally covered it in full, I don't know.

48. **Major Clausen.** Do you recall having been interviewed by the House Military Affairs Committee, on February 19, 1944?

**Mr. Martin.** Yes.

49. **Major Clausen.** Present at that time were Mr. Hermann J. Galloway, yourself, H. Ralph Burton, and Joseph G. Colgan?

**Mr. Martin.** Yes.

50. **Major Clausen.** Do you recall having made this statement to the question:

**Mr. Burton.** You state that there were a number of supplements dated December 20, 1940?

**Mr. Martin.** Yes. I served as attorney for Hawaiian Constructors from the very inception of the contract until the completion of the work about a year ago.
By that I mean I personally dictated from Washington to my Los Angeles office the joint-venture agreement.

Did you make that statement?

Mr. Martin. Well, in substance that. I gave the instructions for its preparation. That statement you are reading from of course is not a complete statement, that is the stenographer's high lights of a conference that I had with Mr. Burton.

[2333] 51. Major Clausen. Now, from whom did you receive the information necessary for the instruction that you conveyed to Los Angeles with respect to the preparation of this joint-venture agreement?

Mr. Martin. Mr. Grafe, at that time, and in his room; it was very brief, to give to me that he wanted a similar agreement to the Caddoa agreement. I didn't have time to prepare it, and instructed my brother to prepare it.

52. Major Clausen. You were not the attorney for Mr. Grafe, were you?

Mr. Martin. Well, I was, from time to time, when employed; that is all; and I am, for any of these clients.

53. Major Clausen. No, I mean on this occasion.

Mr. Martin. I wasn't there representing the Callahan Corporation in this Hawaiian contract, but I was there in conference with Mr. Grafe as attorney for the Callahan Corporation and the Gunther & Shirley Corporation, on the Canal Zone bid.

54. Major Clausen. I am referring specifically, Mr. Martin, to the Hawaiian project.

Mr. Martin. No. I never became attorney for that, until after the contract was executed. I never saw the contract nor read it for many months after it was executed.

55. Major Clausen. Well, isn't it a fact Mr. Martin, that you got information concerning this project from Mr. Grafe, Mr. Connolly, and Colonel Wyman?

Mr. Martin. No; that is not a fact. I never discussed it with Colonel Wyman. I never discussed it with Mr. Connolly. The only information I had was the information that Mr. Grafe gave me, that they wanted to form a joint-venture agreement. [2334] because they were then negotiating for work on the islands in the Pacific Ocean.

56. Major Clausen. By the way, at the time you put in this phone call to Mr. Rohl concerning this matter that you have just testified about, who was president at that time, of Rohl-Connolly Company?

Mr. Martin. I believe T. E. Connolly was.

57. Major Clausen. A change had been effected prior to this conversation; it had been effected on December 16, had it not, at which time Mr. Rohl stepped down as president, and Mr. Connolly stepped in?

Mr. Martin. Well. I have no personal, direct information on that subject, but it is my recollection that I saw at one time a resignation which Mr. Rohl signed as director, dated December 12, 1940. As to when it was accepted or acted upon, I don't know.

58. Major Clausen. Well, isn't it true that you prepared the necessary papers to accomplish that change?
Mr. Martin. No.
59. Major Clausen. I beg your pardon?
Mr. Martin. No.
60. Major Clausen. Who did that?
Mr. Martin. I assume it was done by my brother, but I am not so positive.
61. Major Clausen. Who was your brother, Mr. Martin?
Mr. Martin. Mr. Frank L. Martin, Junior, who is associated with me in the practice of law at Los Angeles. That is merely an assumption.
62. Major Clausen. Is he a Los Angeles lawyer, too?
[2335] Mr. Martin. Yes.
63. Major Clausen. Now, you also telephoned this brother of yours on this day that you telephoned Mr. Rohl, and you told your brother what you had told Mr. Grafe concerning the fact that Mr. Rohl was an alien, and for him to make a note of it, didn't you?
Mr. Martin. Well, in sequence, I talked with Mr. Rohl, first. I then talked with Mr. Connolly and Mr. Grafe at the hotel. I then called, from Mr. Grafe's room at the hotel, to tell my brother that I had informed Mr. Grafe and Mr. Connolly that Mr. Rohl was not a citizen, and that they desired him to prepare a joint-venture agreement on this work.
64. Major Clausen. Now, you answered some questions to General Frank, here, concerning the letter from General Kingman to Mr. Schofield.
I was inviting your attention, Mr. Martin, to this letter from General Kingman to Mr. Schofield, August 28, 1941, a copy of which is set forth on page 5 of this House Military Affairs Committee report. You had been trying to get Mr. Rohl naturalized for quite some time, hadn't you?
Mr. Martin. No.
65. Major Clausen. I beg your pardon?
Mr. Martin. No.
66. Major Clausen. Isn't it true that as early as 1929 you wrote a letter to Mr. Edward F. Colladay, a lawyer in Washington, and asked that he help get Mr. Rohl naturalized?
Mr. Martin. Well, not exactly that. I wrote a letter asking if he knew of any program by which the fact of Mr. Rohl being married to an American citizen would obviate the necessity of him starting all over again. In substance, he wrote me back that he would have to start all over again. I so advised Mr. Rohl, and he did not care to do it, and nothing was done from 1929 until his petition was later filed, I believe, in March 1941.
67. Major Clausen. Now, in addition to Mr. Colladay, and in addition to your brother, you had another lawyer in this attempt to get Mr. Rohl naturalized, or to pave the way—Mr. Cannon; isn't that true?
Mr. Martin. No, not in the exact words you stated.
68. General Frank. Let him state it.
Mr. Martin. Mr. Cannon was an attorney friend of my brother in the same building. I was absent from my office. My brother was ill, and Mr. Cannon did aid in the preparation of those papers, and, I believe, appeared as the attorney for Mr. Rohl, on his petition for citizenship.
69. Major Clausen. Do you recall having seen a letter that Mr. Cannon wrote to the Secretary of Commerce concerning the remission of the penalties for the false documenting of vessels?

Mr. Martin. I don’t recall it at this moment. I do know that those negotiations were personally handled by me direct with the Department, in Washington, D. C., in the absence of Mr. Cannon. Mr. Cannon had gone there for the purpose of submitting certain data, prior to the time that I was in Washington, and took the matter up direct with the Department of Commerce, but he was not in Washington at the time that I had the negotiations and settled this matter with the Department of Commerce.

[2337] 70. Major Clausen. Well, you mean he was not in Washington, in August 1941, is that your statement?

Mr. Martin. No; I think he was there in August 1941. I can’t be positive as to dates, but he was there shortly before the time when I went to Washington and negotiated a settlement with the Department of Commerce.

71. Major Clausen. And that had to be gotten out of the way before Mr. Rohl could be naturalized, isn’t that true?

Mr. Martin. Only in this way: The Department at Los Angeles had declined to place Mr. Rohl’s petition on the calendar for hearing in federal court until they could make a report one way or the other on the documentation of these vessels. As it then stood it would be an adverse report, and after the hearing and determination by the Department of Commerce, it became a favorable report. In other words, they directly notified the Department that they did not longer desire the petition to be delayed on account of any contemplated steps by the Department of Commerce.

72. Major Clausen. Well, in point of truth, the Los Angeles office had recommended on July 10—rather, had recommended, that the Attorney General “issue a warrant for the arrest of this alien, Hans Wilhelm Rohl, male, native and citizen of Germany, who last entered the United States at Honolulu, T. H., ex-yacht VEGA on January 21, 1938,” stating:

He is unlawfully in the United States, in that—
He is in the United States in violation of the Immigration Act * * *.

This is by the inspector in charge of the Los Angeles local office, Judson F. Shaw. You knew that, didn’t you, Mr. [2338] Martin?

Mr. Martin. I had no personal knowledge on that. I was advised by one of my associates in Washington, D. C., Mr. Hermann J. Galloway, that he learned from conference with the deportation officer in Washington, or the head of the Department, that such a recommendation had been made by the Los Angeles office, and that a decision had been rendered by the head of the Department overruling the recommendation, holding it was not a proper case. I only know that from information given me by Mr. Galloway.

73. Major Clausen. Well, that recommendation that he not be deported and not be arrested was based upon the fact that the statute of limitations had run, now, wasn’t it?

Mr. Martin. I have no information.

74. Major Clausen. So that was, sir, a gratuitous ruling?

Mr. Martin. I had no first-hand information on that, at all.
75. Major Clausean. Now, I was going to invite your attention, Mr. Martin, to a letter that Mr. Cannon addressed to the Secretary of Commerce and that it contained on pages 8–11 of this FBI report. I am going to ask you to read that, if you will, and tell me if you have seen that before. It is a copy of a letter.

Mr. Martin. Well, I have at this time no recollection of having seen this letter, or of conveying—I am sure I had no part in its preparation, but I probably have seen a copy of it in the files of my office.

76. Major Clausean. Now, who is this Cannon, this lawyer?

Mr. Martin. At that time he was an attorney having his [2339] office in the same building, the Bank of America building, at 7th and Spring, Los Angeles, an acquaintance of my brother's, rather than mine. My brother was ill and so arranged with Mr. Cannon to help out on a number of different matters.

77. Major Clausean. Now, these questions I am going to ask you are in the line of certain evidence that has been shown to the Board. Is Mr. Cannon a reputable lawyer?

Mr. Martin. Very, to my knowledge.

78. Major Clausean. And do you think that he would put statements in the letter to which your attention was invited, which were inaccurate?

Mr. Martin. Not knowingly; positively!

79. Major Clausean. Well, from where did he get the information for the preparation of that letter?

Mr. Martin. Well, I wasn't in Los Angeles. I would assume that he got this information by direct interview with——

80. Major Clausean. Mr. Rohl, eh?

Mr. Martin. With people who had first-hand knowledge of the facts.

[2340] 81. Major Clausean. Well, for example, the statements in there concerning Mr. Rohl; do you suppose you could get the information concerning them from Mr. Rohl? Do you know anything about that, Mr. Martin?

Mr. Martin. I don't know personally. I had no part in the preparation of this letter, as I recall.

82. Major Clausean. Well, let me ask you this question: I invite your attention to a portion of this letter:

As early as January 1941 and at numerous times since that date Colonel Wyman has tendered Mr. Rohl transportation via clipper or boat to the Islands and has stated to Mr. Rohl over interocean telephone that he will personally obtain special permission, because of Mr. Rohl's alien status, to allow Mr. Rohl to work on this secret contract.

Did you ever have a discussion concerning that matter with Mr. Rohl?

Mr. Martin. I had a discussion with Mr. Rohl as to whether Colonel Wyman, as the authorized representative of the head of the department, could probably waive that citizenship requirement. I told him that I thought that probably he could, but that he might be criticized for going onto a job, by men who were working there who were citizens.

83. Major Clausean. Well, in other words, Mr. Rohl told you that Colonel Wyman had stated to him these things over the interocean telephone?
Mr. Martin. No, he never made any statement of that kind to me.

[2341] 84. Major Clausen. Now, this letter referring to these things—just let me ask the question this way: Did you ever have any discussions concerning this subject matter with Colonel Wyman?

Mr. Martin. No.

85. General Frank. Did you know Colonel Wyman?

Mr. Martin. I had met him on the occasion of the general opening of bids, as District Engineer in Los Angeles.

86. Major Clausen. You met him also in Washington in December 1940, didn't you?

Mr. Martin. Well, I—yes. Well, he asked me if I knew him. I knew him from that fact. I met him and passed the time of day with him for perhaps two minutes in Washington, D. C.

87. Major Clausen. Yes.

Mr. Martin. At no time did I have any conference with him or discuss business in Washington, D. C.

88. Major Clausen. Two minutes in Washington?

Mr. Martin. Not to exceed that: just greeting in the hotel.

89. Major Clausen. By the way, Mr. Martin, were you registered at the Carlton Hotel during that time?

Mr. Martin. A number of these entries show when I was registered [indicating]. I don't believe that I was, but I cannot state positively from the memorandum before me. It is my recollection that I had a room engaged at the Roger Smith Hotel in Washington, D. C., by the month at that time. Usually, I do note where I stay, at what hotel, and in a number of instances I did, and I think I quit making that notation on [2342] my worksheet because I engaged a room at the Roger Smith by the month.

90. Major Clausen. Well, all right. Now, it says here in this letter of Mr. Cannon that Mr. Paul Grafe flew to the United States, was now in the United States with the knowledge and consent of Colonel Wyman and in an endeavor to clear the way for Mr. Rohl's going to the Hawaiian Islands. Do you know anything about that?

Mr. Martin. No. That's the first I ever heard that statement, and for that reason I would now say that I never saw the letter to which you are referring, if it contains such a statement.

91. Major Clausen. At the time, Mr. Martin, that you had this conversation in Washington concerning the letter from General Kingman, did you tell anybody in the War Department, any military men, the information you had received concerning this attempted recommendation toward a deportation of your client?

Mr. Martin. I don't believe that I ever had any first-hand information or ever discussed that matter with anyone outside of Mr. Galloway.

92. Major Clausen. In other words, you were in possession of information that a recommendation had been made by the Los Angeles inspector in charge that your client be deported, arrested for illegal entry. You didn't tell that to anybody there when you went and spoke to them about having this letter sent, referring to the letter on page 5?

Mr. Martin. I don't believe I spoke to them about having that letter sent. I don't believe that letter was [2343] written at my suggestion or instance at all. I don't believe I had any knowledge

79716—46—Ex. 145, vol. 2—28
of that letter being sent until after it had been delivered by Mr. Stilphen and I was read a copy by General Robins. Now, I never discussed with anyone the deportation of Mr. Rohl, nor did I discuss the fact that the head of the department had overruled that and rendered a contrary decision.

93. Major Clausen. Well, you say you didn't discuss it. That is the testimony. You were shown a copy of it, were you not, by Mr. Stilphen?

Mr. Martin. I believe by General Robins.

94. Major Clausen. That was when?

Mr. Martin. Let's see. The date of that letter is?


Mr. Martin. I would say about six days later, about September 4, 1941.

96. Major Clausen. All right.

Mr. Martin. I could give you that exact date if you—

97. Major Clausen. Yes. Have you it there?

Mr. Martin. I don't have it here because I don't have that period here, but I am quite positive that it was in the month of September and not in the month of August 1941.

98. Colonel Toulmin. Do you want to make a note to get it?

Mr. Martin. You want to know what date I first learned of the letter of August 28th?

99. Major Clausen. I want to know the date that you say you saw a copy of this letter. Who showed it to you? You say General Robins did?

Mr. Martin. What date did I see letter of August 28th? [2344] Well, that can stand as September 4, 1941, unless I find differently.

100. General Frank. However, you know that arrangements were being made by the Corps of Engineers to take steps to expedite action on his citizenship?

Mr. Martin. Oh, yes, and by the Department of Commerce also.

101. General Frank. Yes.

Mr. Martin. That is to expedite the setting of the case on the calendar at Los Angeles.

102. General Frank. Yes. And you knew all this, at the same time having this other information in the back of your head?

Mr. Martin. What other information do you refer to now?

103. General Frank. State it.

Mr. Martin. You mean as to the recommendation?

104. Major Clausen. The recommendation of the Los Angeles inspector in charge that your client, Hans Wilhelm Rohl, German alien, was unlawfully in the United States, not in the possession of an unexpired immigration visa.

Mr. Martin. Well, the source of information, as I understand it, was Mr. Schofield's office, the man with whom General Kingman was conferring, and the man with whom Commander Fields and the Secretary of Commerce were conferring. While it is only second-hand information with me from Mr. Galloway, it is my understanding that Mr. Galloway obtained information from the head of the department with whom Commander Fields and General Robins were conferring.
105. Major Clausen. Yes, but the General asked you the question that you had this information in back of your head. [234/5] You knew it when you went there to Washington and had these talks in August 1941: isn't that correct?

Mr. Martin. I knew from Mr. Galloway's report to me that he had learned that the department had received such a recommendation and that the department had overruled it, holding that it was not a proper case.

106. Major Clausen. Now, did you know that on March 1, 1941, the district director of the Los Angeles district, William A. Carmichael, made a recommendation that information had been received "which indicates that Mr. Rohl has been falsely representing himself as an American citizen for a number of years, and a thorough investigation will be necessary prior to the final hearing in order that appropriate recommendation may be made to the Court"?

Mr. Martin. No, I had no such knowledge as that.

107. Major Clausen. Well, now, you were an attorney, as you stated, for all these different companies: Mr. Rohl. He, Mr. Rohl, became the directing head of the Hawaiian Constructors on the Hawaiian contracts on or about the 26th or 27th of September, 1941, at which time he arrived in Hawaii: is that correct?

Mr. Martin. Well, by second-hand information I would say as to at least a substantial portion of the work that would be true. Mr. Grafe was the directing head, as I understand it, until January 1942. I understand that Mr. Rohl, through some arrangement with Mr. Grafe in the Islands, divided the responsibilities from the time that Mr. Rohl arrived there in the fall of '41.

108. Major Clausen. I believe that is all I have right now.


110. General Russell. Mr. Martin, there isn't any confusion or doubt in your mind that after you talked with Rohl in Los Angeles in December of '40 you then went to where this man Paul Grafe was and told him that Rohl was an alien and that you had Rohl's consent to convey that information to Grafe?

Mr. Martin. None whatever. I made that statement to him in the presence of Mr. T. E. Connolly.

111. General Russell. And it is your recollection that Connolly was on the telephone, on an extension of the same telephone, when you were talking with Rohl?

Mr. Martin. That is correct; at District 6196, Washington, D. C.

112. General Russell. When you obtained this information from Rohl and when you conveyed that information to Grafe, did you think or would you consider that you were acting as attorney for those two parties, Rohl and Grafe, during that time?

Mr. Martin. No, not in connection with that matter. I was attorney for the Callahan group on the Canal Zone bid.

113. General Russell. But you were acting more in the capacity of a friend, and the relation of attorney and client did not exist either when you were talking to Rohl or when you were conveying the information to Paul Grafe?

Mr. Martin. Not the relationship of attorney and client, but these—Mr. Rohl and Mr.—or Mr. Grafe and Mr. Connolly were my personal
friends, and I felt that I was in possession of certain factual information which they were entitled to have but which I was not privileged to give without Mr. Rohl's consent.

[2347] 114. General Russell. Yes, I understood that, but I wanted to clear this up.

Mr. Martin. No. It was just giving them factual information, not advising them either legally or as to the matter of policy as to what they should do.

115. General Russell. Now, Mr. Martin, were you present in the District Court on the 15th of September, 1941, or on such date in September '41 as Rohl's application for naturalization was heard by the Judge of the District Court?

Mr. Martin. I was not. It is my recollection I was in the East trying a lawsuit. I was never present at the preparation of any of the Rohl citizenship papers or on any of the hearings or examinations or the Federal Court hearing in Los Angeles.

116. General Russell. Do you know, either by original or primary or hearsay testimony, whether or not this Kingman letter about which testimony has been given was presented to and considered by the District Judge at Los Angeles when he was passing upon this application of Rohl in September of '41 to become an American citizen?

Mr. Martin. By second-hand information, it was not. By that I mean that on the occasion of a trip by Mr. Joseph G. Colgan as an investigator for the House Military Affairs Committee, a trip to Los Angeles where he came and stayed approximately five weeks making investigations, I was present when he interviewed a number of superintendents for the job, and other people, and I recall of asking Mr. Colgan if he had examined the Federal Court files in that citizenship matter. He told me that he had, that he had interviewed Judge J. F. T. O'Connor who heard the case, that he had obtained photostatic copies of the calendar and of the reports of the various departments in that matter, and that he had forwarded them to Mr. Burton at Washington; and I discussed with him a summary of the evidence that was received at that hearing, from apparently the—the evidence by the department to be considered by the Court was reduced to a written summary, and the Government counsel showed that summary to Mr. Cannon, and with joint consent the summary was presented to Federal Court while Mr. Rohl was on the stand. I discussed with Mr. Colgan the contents of that summary, and from that conference I would say that the General Kingman letter was not there. Now, that conference is a comparatively recent conference with Mr. Colgan, so that my recollection is fresh on that.

117. General Russell. That is all I have.

118. Major Clausen. I have one more: While you say the Kingman letter may not have been there, the fact is, is it not, that the Court was informed that the participation of Mr. Rohl in this defense project was necessary and was being held up until he had been naturalized?

Mr. Martin. I don't believe that is correct, but I have no first-hand information. If that is a fact, it is my first knowledge on the subject.

119. Major Clausen. I refer to page 5 of the report of the House Committee on Military Affairs.

120. General Russell. But you haven't straightened out the part that I thought I made absolutely clear. The point I have attempted to
develop is whether or not when this man's application for citizenship was being heard by the District Court there was brought to the attention of the District Court the desire of the Engineering Department or the Chief of Engineers that the application be granted, and I do not know of any way it could have been gotten to the attention of the Court except by this letter or some other testimony.

121. Major Clausen. That is on page 5.

122. General Russell. But that does not show that this letter was before the Court, as I understand it. Our record on that is blank at this time.

123. Major Clausen. At this moment.

Mr. Martin. I am sorry, I have no information on that.

124. General Grunert. Is there anything further that you would like to tell the Board that you think would be not only of interest but of value to the Board in its attempt to get facts about this case?

Mr. Martin. If I could revert from the status of witness to the status of former counsel for Hawaiian Constructors and informally state to you certain things that I think might be of interest to this Board, I would be glad to do so; and if after such a conference you desire to ask me additional questions on the record I will be glad to answer them. I do have certain understandings as to facts which may or may not be within the knowledge of this Board. It is my desire to be helpful. I feel that I have been placed in a very embarrassing situation by some false statements that were made in this report.

For instance, it places me in conference at these negotiations five specific days in Washington, D. C. I was never present at any negotiations, never advised concerning any. On one of those days I was in continuous conference with—for B. Perini & Sons, Boston, and their engineers. On another day I was in continuous conference as attorney for the Arundel Corporation at Baltimore, with Mr. Froelinger, the president of that company, Mr. Warren Black, the vice president of the company, and Mr. James Sanborn, consulting engineer.

On another of the days mentioned I left at 5:15 p. m. from Washington, D. C. on a P. C. A. for Chicago. On one of the days mentioned I was at the Palmer House in Chicago and worked on the Bates and Rogers Blue and Kittatiny tunnel contracts where I represented them.

I left Chicago on one of the days mentioned, by Braniff Lines at 4:30 p. m. and flew to Wichita, Kansas. On one of the days mentioned I arrived at my mother's home in Hutchinson, Kansas, and had turkey dinner there.

So that I simply wasn't doing what that report says. If this Board is interested at all in some way of corroborating my statements, I have with me cards here that will show for every date between October 18, 1940, and Christmas 1940 the name of the client with whom I was in conference, and the name of a disinterested witness who was present at that conference, who can corroborate those duties.

125. General Grunert. Mr. Martin, the ground to be covered by this Board is limited to the phases that pertain to the attack on Pearl Harbor and what leads up to that. Outside of that the Board is not interested.

Mr. Martin. Of course. I have no personal knowledge on that. The only suggestion I could make on that was that there was a written report made by Mr. Joseph G. Colgan, as I understand it, to the Department of Justice, of some forty typewritten pages cover-
ing his five weeks' investigation of the Hawaiian Constructors while he was in Los Angeles. It is my understanding that that report—while I have never seen it, it is my understanding that it would completely discredit the so-called House Military Affairs report which was written, and was written at the instance of the Department of Justice, by Mr. Colgan after he had ceased to serve as an investigator for the House Military Affairs Committee. I have no personal knowledge of the contents of that report, but it seems to me it might be helpful to this Board to have such a report before it if such a report exists.

126. General GRUNERT. Have you any questions?

127. Major CLAUSEN. I have a question here, sir. Page 13 of this report of the Federal Bureau of Investigation is an extract from a memorandum from your office. Would you read that and see if that is an extract [handing document to the witness]?

Mr. MARTIN. I remember of discussing, though I believe it was by telephone, not with Mr. Rohl personally, the advisability of Mr. Rohl ceasing to act as an officer or director of a corporation who was seeking to negotiate for Government work.

128. Major CLAUSEN. I just wanted to know if that was an extract from a memorandum in your files. Do you recognize it as such?

Mr. MARTIN. No, I don't recognize it as such, but the facts there stated I believe to be correct.

[2352] 129. Major CLAUSEN. O. K. Now, a member of the Board has asked that you leave your memorandum from which you have testified, those notes.

Mr. MARTIN. No objection to doing that. I am not sure that they are legible to the average person, but I have no objection to leaving them, and if the reporter has any difficulty in reading them I will be glad to help him. I would like for the record to show that they consist of ten cards in pen and ink memorandum in my own writing. May they be returned to me, or would you rather—

130. Major CLAUSEN. I have no objection at all myself.

131. General FRANK. Yes, return them to him.

132. Colonel WEST. Mr. Martin, one final thing: As these proceedings are confidential, it is required that the testimony given and other proceedings that took place be not revealed outside. Do you fully understand that?

Mr. MARTIN. I didn't understand that, but I do now.

133. Colonel WEST. We usually caution witnesses just before they are excused rather than at the beginning, about that point.

Mr. MARTIN. You mean that I am not to discuss with even people who are my clients what has occurred at this proceeding?

134. Colonel WEST. That is correct.

135. General FRANK. It has already been violated.

Mr. MARTIN. Well, I knew of no such instruction until—

136. Colonel WEST. No, you didn't. It is only the witnesses who have appeared. If some witness who had already appeared previously discussed it with you, you of course didn't know about it.

Mr. MARTIN. Well, the discussion that I had was with [2353] Mr. Connolly asking me three specific questions, and that is the only reason I am able to hand you this memo, is that I called my office and got the data in substance as it appears on these cards.
137. General Grunert. But you understand, what has taken place here has taken place between you and the Board and is not to be discussed with anyone else.

Mr. Martin. Yes, sir.

138. General Grunert. All right. Thank you for coming.

Mr. Martin. Pardon me. May I ask, are you still endeavoring to ascertain from me the date when I first saw this letter of August 28th?

139. Major Clausen. Correct.

Mr. Martin. If I find it to be a different date from the September 4, 1941, I have given you, I will so advise you.

140. Major Clausen. Very well.

Mr. Martin. If I find it to be the same, I will not advise you.

141. Major Clausen. All right.

142. General Grunert. We shall take a recess for ten minutes.

(The witness was excused.)

(There was a brief informal recess.)

[2354] TESTIMONY OF J. P. SHIRLEY, 501 BELAIR ROAD, LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA.

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel West. Will you state to the Board your name and address, please. Mr. Shirley?

Mr. Shirley. J. P. Shirley, at 501 Belair Road in Los Angeles.

2. Colonel West. What is your occupation?

Mr. Shirley. Contractor.

3. General Grunert. Mr. Shirley, I am going to ask General Frank, to be assisted by Major Clausen, to lead off in opening up this subject, and the other members of the Board will ask such questions as they see fit as it develops.

Mr. Shirley. Yes, sir.

4. General Frank. Mr. Shirley, in 1940—well, wait a minute. To go back: You are associated with the Gunther-Shirley Company?

Mr. Shirley. Yes, sir.

5. General Frank. As contractors?

Mr. Shirley. That is right.

6. General Frank. In Los Angeles?

Mr. Shirley. That is right.

7. General Frank. There is a Mr. Gunther in this firm?

Mr. Shirley. No. Mr. Gunther passed away in about eight years ago.

8. General Frank. Who are the officials of the firm?

Mr. Shirley. I am the president, and our secretary is a young woman in the office. My son was a vice president, but he went to work up in Canada, so he resigned when he went to work on a Government job up there, so I am the only official of the company now.

9. General Frank. In 1940 you were associated with the Callahan Company and the Rohl-Connolly Company in a venture in Colorado?

Mr. Shirley. Yes, sir; joint venture at Caddo.
10. General Frank. Then in December 1940 that same group became associated in a Hawaiian contract?
   Mr. Shirley. That is right.
11. General Frank. That contract was consummated in Washington on the 20th of December, 1940?
   Mr. Shirley. Yes, sir.
12. General Frank. Who represented you in that?
   Mr. Shirley. Mr. Grafe.
13. General Frank. What were the circumstances under which he represented you?
   Mr. Shirley. Well, I think the start of that was that I think that I remember meeting Colonel Wyman and some contractors in Los Angeles. I believe Kelton's office, talking about the work in Hawaii, and he was looking for some contractors to do some work in Hawaii, about a million dollar contract, and I remember—I don't remember really the other contractors were there. There were two or three others. I think Mr. Guy Atkinson was one, and Mr. Rohl, and Mr. Grafe had previously sent over two men to Hawaii to look at this work that was contemplated, and they came back, and with not much of a report, as I recollect it. It is a long time ago.
14. General Frank. Yes?
   Mr. Shirley. And I don't remember everything that happened, but as I remember it their report was very indefinite about what there was to be done. So then in about, it seems to me, a couple of weeks after this meeting with Colonel Wyman in Los Angeles Mr. Grafe was going to Washington about this work, and he was acting for me too on that.
15. General Frank. Did he have a power of attorney?
   Mr. Shirley. I don't remember whether he had with him, but he did have a power of attorney on several other jobs, and I don't know whether I gave him one then or whether I gave it to him later.
16. General Frank. I see. In any event——
   Mr. Shirley. But he was acting for our company.
17. General Frank. He did represent the Gunther-Shirley Company in signing the contract in Washington on the 20th of December?
   Mr. Shirley. That's right.
18. General Frank. And the co-adventurers' agreement—that is, the details of participation was the matter of an agreement drawn up among yourselves, I take it?
   Mr. Shirley. That is right; yes, sir.
19. General Frank. Who drew that up?
   Mr. Shirley. I think it was Frank Martin.
20. General Frank. Frank Martin?
   Mr. Shirley. Yes.
21. General Frank. And that was generally along the lines of the agreement that you had in Colorado?
   Mr. Shirley. Just the same, I think.
22. General Frank. Yes.
   Mr. Shirley. Same percentage of interest, any way.
   [2357] 23. General Frank. Were you ever in Honolulu?
   Mr. Shirley. No.
24. General Frank. You didn't go to Honolulu?
   Mr. Shirley. I did not.
25. General Frank. Who represented you in Honolulu? Mr. Grafe?
   Mr. Shirley. Mr. Grafe; yes.
27. Major Clausen. You had talks in Los Angeles with Colonel Wyman, did you, in December 1940?
   Mr. Shirley. Very shortly, yes.
28. Major Clausen. Where did that take place, Mr. Shirley?
   Mr. Shirley. I think it was in the Engineers office in Los Angeles, Colonel Kelton's office.
29. Major Clausen. Do you remember that there present was Mr. Rohl?
   Mr. Shirley. I think Rohl was there and I think Mr. Atkinson was there.
30. Major Clausen. And this was a sort of a gathering together of contractors for the purpose of trying to get—
   Mr. Shirley. Somebody to do this work.
31. Major Clausen. Yes. What did Colonel Wyman state to you gentlemen assembled at that time as to the nature and extent and scope of this work?
   Mr. Shirley. Well, not much about the nature of it, but possibly it cost around a million dollars, and it might increase. As I remember, it was liable to increase to more money.
32. Major Clausen. Specifically what did he say the work was? [2358] What kind of work was it to be?
   Mr. Shirley. I don't remember whether he described the work or not. I don't know. I don't think he did, because we were prepared to do most any kind of work, and really what kind didn't make much difference, but I don't believe he described the work, and from their—
   from my recollection of the report of these two men that Mr. Grafe sent over, they didn't know much about it when they came back, either.
33. Major Clausen. Well, did Mr. Grafe have the report down there? Did you have that report?
   Mr. Shirley. No.
34. Major Clausen. When did you get the report?
   Mr. Shirley. Well, I just don't remember when they come back, but I think before this meeting, and I don't think Mr. Grafe was at this meeting, as I recollect it.
35. Major Clausen. In other words, you had a report which had been obtained by these two men that Mr. Grafe sent over?
   Mr. Shirley. Yes.
36. Major Clausen. And which report you had received before the meeting in Los Angeles with Colonel Wyman?
   Mr. Shirley. That is right.
37. Major Clausen. Well, when you sat around and talked down there about the possibilities of going into this work, did you mention this report and have it with you there?
   Mr. Shirley. No.
38. Major Clausen. Did you have the report?
   Mr. Shirley. I don't know. I never saw the written report, but I talked to these men. I knew them. They had worked for us before, and I knew them both, and I think that [2359] their report is so indefinite, I didn't pay much attention to it.
39. Major Clausen. You talked with Mr. Rohl about the work to be done?

Mr. Shirley. No. We intended to if we—in my talk to Mr. Grafe we intended to do this work ourselves if we could get it alone. I didn’t talk to Mr. Grafe—to Mr. Rohl about it.

40. Major Clausen. Well, the Gunther-Shirley Company and the Callahan Construction Company are in the same building, aren’t they?

Mr. Shirley. Yes, sir.

41. Major Clausen. And the Rohl-Connolly Company, where are they?

Mr. Shirley. Well, they had their office down on a boulevard out of Los Angeles about four or five miles at that time.

42. Major Clausen. Well, you knew about the 20th of December, 1940, that the contract had been awarded?

Mr. Shirley. Yes, I did.

43. Major Clausen. To these three firms?

Mr. Shirley. Yes, I did.

44. Major Clausen. So from that—by the way, you were in Los Angeles during the period, then, say, from December 1940 to December 1941?

Mr. Shirley. Well, was I in Los Angeles all that time, you mean?

45. Major Clausen. Yes. I mean off and on you were there?

Mr. Shirley. Yes, sure.

46. Major Clausen. Did you meet Mr. Rohl at different times?

Mr. Shirley. Very seldom.

47. Major Clausen. Well, you were really partners, in a sense, on this job. What did you discuss with Mr. Rohl in that interim concerning the work?

Mr. Shirley. Well, you mean before we had the contract?

48. Major Clausen. No. I mean—

Mr. Shirley. After?

49. Major Clausen. After the contract and for a period of about a year thereafter.

Mr. Shirley. Well, Mr. Grafe was more or less in charge of this work, and really I didn’t discuss this—I don’t believe I ever discussed it with Mr. Rohl, this project.

50. Major Clausen. I have no further questions.

51. General Gruenert. Is that all you wanted out of this witness?

52. General Frank. That is all.

53. General Gruenert. Have you any questions? (No response.)

None occurs to me, if that is what you wanted. Thank you very much.

Mr. Shirley. Any other information I can give you, I would be very glad to help in any way I can.

54. General Gruenert. Thank you very much. I think they have a program in which to develop their evidence, and whatever they want from you they apparently got. Thank you very much.

Mr. Shirley. All right.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

(Thereupon, at 4:40 p. m., the Board concluded the hearing of witnesses for the day and proceeded to other business.)
[CONTENTS]

SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 2, 1944

Testimony of—

Paul J Lynch, 919 Sutter Street, San Francisco, California. 2362
Willard Bruce Pine, 320 Carolwood Drive, Los Angeles 24, California. 2375
Robert Eugene McKee, General Contractor, El Paso, and Los Angeles, California. 2388

DOCUMENTS

Letter, March 1, 1943, Robert E. McKee to Hon. R. E. Thomason. 2413

1 Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate pages of original transcript of proceedings.
SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 2, 1944

Presidio of San Francisco, California.

The Board, at 9:35 a.m., pursuant to recess on yesterday, conducted the hearing of witnesses, Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President of the Board, presiding.


Present also: Colonel Charles W. West, Recorder, Major Henry C. Clausen, Assistant Recorder, and Colonel Harry A. Toulmin, Jr., Executive Officer.

TESTIMONY OF PAUL J. LYNCH, 919 SUTTER STREET, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF.

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel West. Please state to the Board your name and address.
   Mr. Lynch. Paul J. Lynch, 919 Sutter Street, San Francisco.

2. Colonel West. What is your occupation?
   Mr. Lynch. I am an engineer, civil engineer, consulting engineer.

3. General Grunert. Mr. Lynch, General Frank, assisted by Major Clausen, will cover this particular part of the investigation. I will let them go ahead and then the rest of the Board will ask any questions they see fit.

4. General Frank. Mr. Lynch, on what duty were you in 1941 in Honolulu?
   Mr. Lynch. I was the Area Engineer for the 5th Field Area, under Colonel Wyman of the United States Engineers.

5. General Frank. What was the area covered by the 5th Field Area?
   Mr. Lynch. The 5th Field Area covered approximately the territory between Kaleiwa and Diamond Head.

6. General Frank. That is right straight across the island?
   Mr. Lynch. Right straight across the island.

7. General Frank. That takes in the whole island?
   Mr. Lynch. That takes in that whole shore from Kaleiwa to Diamond Head.

8. General Frank. From the south to the north, around by way of Barbers Point to Makapuu Point?
   Mr. Lynch. Diamond Head, Makapuu Point and Bellows Field.
9. General Frank. Kahuku?
Mr. Lynch. Kahuku.
10. General Frank. Down to Kaleiwa?
Mr. Lynch. That is right. Kaneohe.
11. General Frank. How many Areas do they have there?
Mr. Lynch. That was the 5th Field Area. They had—I have forgotten—11 or 15.
12. General Frank. That takes in half of the island?
Mr. Lynch. Well, I had that half in 1941. Then she was split up after the blitz. Kahuku was assigned to another Area.
13. General Frank. What were your duties?
Mr. Lynch. Area Engineer.
14. General Frank. Specifically, what were your duties?
Mr. Lynch. I was responsible and accountable for all of the construction and material, supplies and equipment, and the payroll in the 5th Field Area, construction of the underground storage, runways, ramps, and so forth.
15. General Frank. When did you get there?
Mr. Lynch. March, 1941. The date I have forgotten.
16. General Frank. There was no permanent aircraft warning site in your area, was there?
Mr. Lynch. There was no aircraft warning operating prior to December 7th, to my knowledge.
17. General Frank. That is, permanent?
Mr. Lynch. Permanent. There may have been one on Diamond Head, but I did not know of it.
18. General Frank. At least, you did not have the construction of any such?
Mr. Lynch. No; not prior to the 7th.
19. General Frank. At any time?
Mr. Lynch. That is right.
20. General Frank. There was none under construction prior to the 7th?
Mr. Lynch. No; that is right.
21. General Frank. Now, let's go over to Bellows Field. There was a runway being constructed over there?
Mr. Lynch. There was an existing runway there, when I got there, General, of 2,700 feet.
22. General Frank. That was the one going straight in from the shore line?
Mr. Lynch. That is right.
23. General Frank. Was there another one, too, going out to the northwest?
24. General Frank. Towards the bathing beach?
Mr. Lynch. I made a survey there.
25. General Frank. In what state of construction was that on December 7th?
Mr. Lynch. I had about 2,000 feet completed; that is, with coral top, ready for the asphalt. I had a plant there. I didn't have it erected, and there was no asphalt on the field. That is, on the new runways, Runways A and B.
26. General Frank. What was the total length of that?
Mr. Lynch. Of the existing, before I got there?
27. General Frank. No, of the new one, when it was finished.
Mr. Lynch. 6,000 feet.
28. General Frank. Do you know the state of funds for construc-
tion of that runway when you started?
Mr. Lynch. Only through hearsay. You mean the finances for
Bellows Field?
29. General Frank. Yes. You were starting there on a shoestring,
weren't you?
Mr. Lynch. Yes, we were. I heard—I don't know this direc-
that we borrowed funds.
30. General Frank. Were you concerned with the construction of
any of the sites for the mobile aircraft warning service stations?
Mr. Lynch. No, sir, at no time.
31. General Frank. You know Colonel Wyman?
Mr. Lynch. I knew him, yes.
32. General Frank. What was the nature of your associations with
him?
[2366] Mr. Lynch. Personally, do you mean?
33. General Frank. And officially; both.
Mr. Lynch. Personally, we had nothing in common. I worked
directly for him in the islands for approximately a year, directly un-
der him. Do you want to know what I think of him as an adminis-
trator and executive?
34. General Frank. Yes.
Mr. Lynch. Well, I think he is one of the best.
35. General Frank. As an administrator?
Mr. Lynch. As an executive and as an engineer and getting work
done, I think he is one of the best Army men I ever came across.
36. General Frank. Do you know anything about the organization
of his office?
Mr. Lynch. Nothing. I did not know Colonel Wyman until I
reached Honolulu. I had never met him.
37. General Frank. All you know then is through your contact
with the field organization, outside of his office?
Mr. Lynch. Well, the Colonel and I—I worked directly under him,
and any orders given he gave to me.
38. General Frank. Your knowledge of the organization was pur-
ely with the field organization?
Mr. Lynch. That is right, my own setup of the 5th Field Area which
I had and was responsible to him for.
39. General Frank. From your point of view were there any delays
in construction?
Mr. Lynch. Oh, General, on every job I have ever been on there
have always been delays. That is a very general question I am going
to answer generally. It is on every job. On any military job where
you don't have a chance to make the surveys that you should, there is bound to be delay. There were delays in equipment, delays in getting men, delay in getting organized.
40. General Frank. How long did it take you to get organized?
Mr. Lynch. I would say about three or four months. The cause
of that I would not know.
41. General Frank. From your point of view what were the causes of the outstanding delays?

Mr. Lynch. Lack of money, I would say, to go ahead. Colonel Wyman always cautioned me to be very careful about every expenditure that I made. He was very conscientious.

42. General Frank. From your point of view, was there any waste, unnecessary waste, manifested anywhere?

Mr. Lynch. Not on my end of it. Unnecessary waste?

43. General Frank. Yes.

Mr. Lynch. There is waste on every job, and I have been in construction for nearly 40 years.

44. General Frank. In that area can you name me the projects with which you were charged from Makapuu Point around to Haleiwa?

Mr. Lynch. Haleiwa was my field of survey, prior to the blitz. Then I had Kahuku, Kaneohe Airfield, Bellows Field, Ulupau, and warning stations on Makapuu, close to Diamond Head, embracing the airfield principally at Bellows Field, which was the one which was under pressure.

45. General Frank. Did you have a project for constructing any underground tanks at Bellows?

Mr. Lynch. Yes. I started them and laid them out.

46. General Frank. When?

Mr. Lynch. I think it was August or September, 1941. We [2368] had no equipment. I had one compressor and two jackhammers and I mucked the stuff by hand and hauled it out by mules.

47. General Frank. Principally because of what?

Mr. Lynch. Lack of money.

48. General Frank. Lack of money?

Mr. Lynch. That is my opinion.

49. Major Clausen. Mr. Lynch, were these underground gasoline storage tunnels at Bellows Field?

Mr. Lynch. One tunnel.

50. Major Clausen. At Bellows Field; was that constructed by December 7, 1941?

Mr. Lynch. No. I had 500 feet on December 7th, approximately, completed.

51. Major Clausen. Can you give an estimate in percentage as to the amount that was completed on that date?

Mr. Lynch. I would say about 40 per cent. I think the tunnel was 1200 feet.

52. General Frank. What is the diameter of that?

Mr. Lynch. Sixteen feet by sixteen, I would say, approximately.

53. Major Clausen. Do you recall a party named Robert Hoffman?

Mr. Lynch. Yes, I do.

54. Major Clausen. What connection did you have with him?

Mr. Lynch. He was the Area Superintendent for the contractor on Bellows Field, Honolulu and Kaneohe, directly under my supervision.

55. Major Clausen. Would you give the Board your opinion as to his business ability and experience?
Mr. Lynch. He was a very good man.

56. Major Clausen. Did you have occasion to make complaints to Colonel Wyman concerning delays, oral complaints?

Mr. Lynch. Yes. I did, and I got results.

57. Major Clausen. Did you have a controversy with Colonel Wyman concerning layouts, designs, construction methods?

Mr. Lynch. Yes, I had a controversy with him and we got together and settled the thing, and that is the last time we had any discussion on such a matter. We differed on the method of design and construction, and we took our hair down, and after that we got along beautifully.

58. Major Clausen. After that was it done in accordance with your ideas?

Mr. Lynch. Not altogether. I was not altogether right in the picture. As I say, we got together. There were a number of differences and we did get together.

59. Major Clausen. You left the islands about March, 1942?

Mr. Lynch. The latter part of March.

60. Major Clausen. Then you were employed on the Canol Project under Colonel Wyman?

Mr. Lynch. Yes.

61. Major Clausen. Do you know of the personal relations which existed on the Hawaiian Islands between Mr. Hans Wilhelm Rohl and Colonel Wyman?

Mr. Lynch. No.

62. Major Clausen. I have no further questions.

63. General Russell. You stated there was nothing in common between you and Wyman, outside of your official relations. Exactly what did you mean by that?

Mr. Lynch. Apparently we did not have the same line of thought. By personal relations, I mean I would not go out with him. I would not want him to sleep with me. He would not want me to sleep with him.

64. General Russell. How do you define those differences?

Mr. Lynch. Well, from a personal view, his background and mine were altogether different. His methods, say, of pleasure are altogether different from mine. But I will say this for him, though; he was on the job; and he knew his stuff.

65. General Russell. Did you think that these personal habits of his away from his work interfered with his efficiency on his work?

Mr. Lynch. Not with me, absolutely not.

66. General Russell. With anyone?

Mr. Lynch. That I would not know.

67. General Russell. Did you think that his personal habits away from the job rendered him at any time incapable?

Mr. Lynch. Oh, no.

68. General Russell. In carrying out his work?

Mr. Lynch. As to my personal feeling that I may have for him, just my personal slant on any man, I may like or dislike. There is no twilight zone with me. But as far as working for him is concerned, I don’t know of a better man I ever worked under.

69. General Russell. His personal habits did not interfere with his efficiency?
Mr. Lynch. Not in my judgment, as far as I was concerned, on either the Canal or the Hawaiian.

70. General Grunert. Do you of your personal knowledge know whether or not any of the delays that occurred were due to the contractors on the job?

[2371] Mr. Lynch. Well, of course, there were delays; no question about that. I cannot recall offhand what those delays were, but there were bound to be delays by the contractors, bound to be delays by the Engineers. I made mistakes.

71. General Grunert. Do you know whether or not any delays that did occur were intentional on the part of the contractors or any other person?

Mr. Lynch. No, sir.

72. General Grunert. Any other questions?

73. General Frank. What is your opinion?

Mr. Lynch. Oh, yes, there were delays.

74. General Frank. I am talking about the intentional part of it?

Mr. Lynch. No, I don't think there was anything intentional. You mean sabotage or anything of that sort?

75. General Frank. Any kind of a delay that was intentional on the part of a contractor?

Mr. Lynch. No. I don't think so. I know in my 5th Field Area that was absolutely none. There could not be. I was responsible. The contractors could not get away with it.

76. General Frank. Was there any tendency on the part of the contractor to try to get away with it?

Mr. Lynch. No, sir, absolutely not.

77. General Frank. They gave complete, 100-percent, whole-hearted cooperation, effort and endeavor?

Mr. Lynch. Well, yes, I would say they did. Hoffman worked directly for me as a representative of the contractors.

78. General Frank. What made you hesitate?

Mr. Lynch. Your question is pretty technical. You say 100 percent. There is no cooperation 100 percent. There is nobody going to work for me and get anything 100 percent. I have got my ideas and the contractor had his.

79. General Frank. Do you suppose the contractors had a good spirit of endeavor?

Mr. Lynch. Yes, very much.

80. General Frank. All of them?

Mr. Lynch. All of the contractors, you mean?

81. General Frank. Yes.

Mr. Lynch. I would have to speak of my own 5th Field Area.

82. General Frank. That is what I mean.

Mr. Lynch. Yes. They would have to, General, or they wouldn't be on the job.

83. General Frank. You say Hoffman was the contractors' supervisor?

Mr. Lynch. Superintendent.

84. General Frank. With whom did you work? The Hawaiian Constructors?

Mr. Lynch. The Hawaiian Constructors. He was on the job, I think, when I made a suggestion to Colonel Wyman, which he ap-
proved, that instead of having a superintendent for the dirt movement and a superintendent for the tunnel, they would throw everything under a general superintendent, so I could hold him responsible. Wyman thought that was an excellent idea and he put it through. Hoffman was made the Area Superintendent, and then we branched out. I will say this: He worked.

85. General Frank. What was the Army building at Kaneohe?

[2373] Mr. Lynch. That was the hospital, the insane hospital. Do you know where that is?

86. General Frank. Yes.

Mr. Lynch. We took half of that over for the Army and then put some additions on it.

87. Major Clausen. You mentioned, in connection with some of the questions of General Frank, Mr. Hoffman being the contractors' representative and your having worked with him. Do you have the approximate dates when Mr. Hoffman was the contractor's Superintendent?

Mr. Lynch. In the 5th Field Area he was the superintendent approximately from the middle of April until I left in the latter part of March, the middle of April, 1941, until the latter part of March, 1942.

88. Major Clausen. Prior to the time that Mr. Hoffman assumed the functions of Superintendent for the contractors had there been other superintendents whom you had caused to be relieved because of their inefficiency?

Mr. Lynch. Yes. The Hawaiian Constructors sent out one man for superintendent and he lasted two days, and they sent out another man, and I think he stayed one day. Hoffman came out and he stayed right on.

89. Major Clausen. Now, concerning the delays concerning which considerable complaints were made, did you have any discussions as to those delays with Mr. Hoffman?

Mr. Lynch. Oh, yes.

90. Major Clausen. And did he agree with you as to the delays or did you have differences with him?

Mr. Lynch. Well, we had differences, no question about it, [2374] as any one will on a job of that kind, but, generally, I will say we agreed.

91. Major Clausen. Did Mr. Hoffman complain himself as to these delays?

Mr. Lynch. Yes, Bob did.

92. Major Clausen. I beg your pardon?

Mr. Lynch. Bob did complain.

93. Major Clausen. Do you know anything of a statement he made concerning these delays in writing to General Farthing?

Mr. Lynch. No, I do not.

94. Major Clausen. Or to the Inspector General of the Hawaiian Islands?

Mr. Lynch. No, I do not.

95. Major Clausen. That is all.

96. General Grunert. There appear to be no more questions, Mr. Lynch. Thank you for coming in.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)
TESTIMONY OF WILLARD BRUCE PINE, 320 CAROLWOOD DRIVE, LOS ANGELES 24, CALIFORNIA.

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel West. Will you state to the Board your name and address?

Mr. Pine. Willard Bruce Pine. My address is 320 Carolwood Drive, Los Angeles 24.

2. Colonel West. What is your occupation?

Mr. Pine. Well, at the present time I am in the shirt business, but for the last four years I have been working for the Tenney Committee of the State Legislature.

3. General Grunert. Mr. Pine, General Frank, assisted by Major Clausen, will develop this particular phase of our investigation. So I shall turn you over to the mercy of General Frank.

Mr. Pine. All right.

4. General Frank. You may proceed, Major Clausen.


Mr. Pine, your connection was with the Tenney Committee, the California State Legislature's joint fact-finding committee on un-American activities?

Mr. Pine. That is correct.

6. Major Clausen. And in connection with that would you give the Board a brief background as to how you became interested in these activities and just what you have done since you first became interested?

Mr. Pine. Well, prior to Pearl Harbor I wanted to get in the Army, and I found I had a heart condition which prevented me, so I knew a great many of the boys—not a great many but a few agents of the Federal Bureau, and I was anxious to make some connection to do something. So I presume that was about the fall of 1941. Then came Pearl Harbor, and right after that in February I met Jack Tenney, and the budget of the State Committee was rather limited, and as a consequence I offered my services, and from then until practically the present time I have participated in the investigations of Mankind United, most of whose leaders, you know, were afterwards arrested and convicted of sedition; and in the various communist investigations; for instance, now we are actively engaged in the Political Action Committee, that is, their ramifications within the State. And the Rohl case—I mean, when I say "Rohl case" I mean the investigation of Rohl—I was very much interested in because I knew the man and knew something of his background. Then, there were lots of local investigations besides Mankind United, various religious organizations who prey upon people in the State.

7. Major Clausen. Mr. Pine, you were present, were you, at the hearing of the California Tenney Committee, which I will refer to as "the Tenney Committee," on February 27, 1943?

Mr. Pine. Yes, I was.

8. Major Clausen. And you recall at that time that certain questions were asked you as to your investigation particularly of the background of Hans Wilhelm Rohl as disclosed by the files and records of the office of the Immigration and Naturalization Commissioner in the Federal Building in Los Angeles, California?
Mr. Pine. Yes.

[2377] 9. Major Clausen. And you were asked at that time, and it is a fact, isn’t it, that you examined those files and those records for the purpose of ascertaining the background of Mr. Rohl?

Mr. Pine. That is correct.

10. Major Clausen. And on one occasion you also were accompanied by the attorney for the Tenney Committee, Mr. R. E. Combs, chief counsel and investigator?

Mr. Pine. Yes, sir.

11. Major Clausen. Now, in that investigation did you see the application of Mr. Rohl for naturalization?

Mr. Pine. Yes, I did.

12. Major Clausen. And did you read the documents in support of that application, consisting of the interrogation of Mr. Rohl by the immigration inspector?

Mr. Pine. Yes.

13. Major Clausen. As a result of that investigation are you able to say of your own knowledge, from having read those papers, what those papers disclosed as to the recommendation with respect to whether citizenship should or should not be granted this party Rohl?

Mr. Pine. I know that there was an application for a warrant, an application for the issuance of a warrant of arrest made by Judson Shore, who was the agent in charge, on the grounds that he was illegally in this country, and the one premise was the fact of the incorrect entry in Honolulu on the yacht VEGA in 1938.

14. Major Clausen. And do you remember when it was that you examined these files and records, over what period of time?

[2378] Mr. Pine. Well, I probably—that’s very hard to say. I was probably there six or seven times, once with Combs, twice I think with an agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and probably two or three times besides that.

15. Major Clausen. Have you read the report of the House Committee on Military Affairs?

Mr. Pine. Yes. I worked with them, with their investigator constantly while he was out here.


Mr. Pine. Yes, I have a copy of it.

17. Major Clausen. And do you recall a letter set forth I believe on page 5 of that report, purportedly sent by General Kingman to Mr. Schofield of the Immigration and Naturalization Bureau at Washington?

Mr. Pine. Yes, sir.

18. Major Clausen. Do you remember if the files in Los Angeles had that letter or a copy of that letter in the files?

Mr. Pine. I am very positive—very, very positive, having gone through that file several times, that there was no copy of that letter, because the first I ever knew of General Kingman’s letter was when I read the House Military Affairs Committee report.

19. Major Clausen. Now, do you recall in the investigation of these records at Los Angeles a letter from F. H. Crockett of the Immigration and Naturalization Service at Laredo, Texas, dated March 7, 1941, to the effect that he had no record there of Mr. Rohl having gone in or out of the United States at that point?
Mr. Pine. Yes.

20. Major Clausen. Do you remember a statement by Mr. Wilcox Cole or some other official of the Immigration and Naturalization Service to the effect that in 1932 it was absolutely impossible for an alien to go in or out of the United States at Laredo without being questioned as to his citizenship status?

Mr. Pine. Yes, I recall that.

21. Major Clausen. Do you recall a statement in the record at Los Angeles that when the yacht RAMONA stopped at Acapulco, Mexico, where it took on gasoline and supplies, that there was no record of Rohl being present on the boat either as a passenger or a member of the crew?

Mr. Pine. Yes, sir.

22. Major Clausen. Do you remember that?

Mr. Pine. Yes, I remember that very well.

23. Major Clausen. The substance of that being in the file.

Do you remember whether in looking over these records at Los Angeles there was any letter from Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr., in general urging that Rohl be made a citizen, that the case be expedited?

Mr. Pine. There was a letter dated, I think it was, January 22nd in 1941, which was an order for Rohl to proceed to the Islands to take his part in—well, I think I can't quote the letter; it's right in there—in the work in which you are interested.

24. Major Clausen. Do you remember the letter in the files there from T. B. Schumacher of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, dated February 4, 1941, asking that the case be made a special case and that the case be expedited?

Mr. Pine. Yes, I do.

25. Major Clausen. And, by the way, when you examined this file you took notes, did you, Mr. Pine?

Mr. Pine. Yes, we did.

26. Major Clausen. Do you remember a letter dated March 13, 1941, from some official of the Immigration and Naturalization Service stating in effect that when the VEGA sailed from the West Coast to Honolulu, Rohl was not revealed on the passenger manifest as a member of the crew or a passenger?

Mr. Pine. No. As I understood it, it sailed from the East Coast but touched at Nassau in the Bahamas on that trip and in Panama and then proceeded to Honolulu.

27. Major Clausen. Do you remember that there were statements to the effect that that manifest showed Mr. Rohl as being born at Iola, Kansas?

Mr. Pine. Yes, which is the birth place of his wife.

28. Major Clausen. And do you remember in the income tax returns, mention of which was made in these files at Los Angeles, that Mr. Rohl had stated under oath that he was a citizen of the United States?

Mr. Pine. Yes, I do.

29. Major Clausen. And do you remember that some document there stated that he had set forth in a return that he had been naturalized in 1921?

Mr. Pine. That is correct.

30. Major Clausen. Mr. Pine, I show you the transcript of the hearing before the Tenney Committee, and certain purported
testimony given by Mr. Rohl, set forth on pages 807, 808, and 809, as bracketed off by me, and I ask you to read that and then tell me if you recall that testimony having been given by Mr. Rohl on that occasion.

Mr. Pine. Did I read particularly this you have marked here?


Mr. Pine. Yes, I was there. That is, as I remember it, exactly what he testified to.

32. Major Clausen. And is that your recollection of the testimony that he gave on that occasion?

Mr. Pine. Yes, sir.

33. General Frank. There is no error in transcription? Generally there is no error in the transcription of the testimony by the reporters?

Mr. Pine. No. Can I make a remark off the record? As a matter of fact, the explanation he gave his friends outside of that hearing was exactly the same thing, that he was too busy traveling, never gave it a thought.

34. Major Clausen. The particular point of the part I have bracketed off was that he, Hans Wilhelm Rohl, had told Colonel Wyman that he, Hans Rohl, was an alien, and that he had told Colonel Wyman this before the contract of December 1940 had been signed.

Mr. Pine. Well, as I remember his testimony, when he was questioned as to whether he had ever told Wyman—that is Colonel Wyman—that he was a German alien, he replied to that by saying that he hadn't before, but in this contract he had to.


Mr. Pine. Because it was a secret contract.

36. General Grunert. He had to, or had told him?

Mr. Pine. No. He said he had to. I think you will find his answer was that, "On this contract I had to tell them."

37. General Grunert. He had to tell him, but did he tell him?

38. Major Clausen. It says here—do you want to read that and see?

39. General Grunert. What does it say there that he did do? A man may have to do things, but he sometimes won't do them anyway.

Mr. Pine. "I did on the Hawaiian Constructors." That was exactly what he testified to, and I know he gave that statement to the Military Affairs Committee, I believe.

40. Major Clausen. Now, concerning that subject, Mr. Pine, is there any information of your own knowledge that you can give the Board as to a verification of the fact that he, Rohl, had told Colonel Wyman that he was an alien before that contract was signed?

Mr. Pine. No. No, not of my own knowledge.

41. Major Clausen. Is there any information that you can give the Board as to any inefficiency of the work of Colonel Wyman in the Hawaiian Islands?

Mr. Pine. Well, it would all be verbal. Now, I believe you have got Mr. Combs coming up here.

42. Major Clausen. Mr. who?

Mr. Pine. Combs, who was the chief investigator for the committee.

Mr. Pine. And he will have all those affidavits. They took a great many which were not even available at the time of the Military Affairs Committee hearing, but the only other people who now have them are the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

44. Major Clausen. I see.

Mr. Pine. And he has them. They are all in affidavit form and sworn to.

45. General Frank. I would like to ask some questions here.

Mr. Pine. Yes, sir.

46. General Frank. How did the California Committee happen to be investigating an Army officer's activity in Honolulu?

Mr. Pine. Well, they didn't start to investigate an Army officer's activity in Honolulu, but they were investigating Hans Wilhelm Rohl in this State, and through the investigation of Hans Wilhelm Rohl, whose life was so bound up with Colonel Wyman's since his arrival here in 1935, why, naturally that came into it, but Wyman came in incidentally; I mean the committee had no jurisdiction over him.

47. General Frank. You have been intimately associated with this committee?

Mr. Pine. Yes, I have, sir.

48. General Frank. The Tenney Committee?

Mr. Pine. Yes, sir.

49. General Frank. Based on the background of testimony that has been received by the Tenney Committee that you feel to be authentic, will you make a general statement to the Board as to the relations between Rohl and Wyman over a period of years?

[2384] Mr. Pine. Yes, I will be perfectly willing to make a statement.

50. General Frank. Go ahead.

Mr. Pine. From numerous witnesses whom I have interviewed and others when I have been present when they were being interviewed—

51. General Frank. Was this testimony under oath?

Mr. Pine. Yes. When they were being interviewed by investigators for the Military Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives and in some instances by agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and by the statements, some of which were not taken under oath because at that time they seemed to be superfluous, that—

52. General Frank. Let's confine this to conclusions reached through authentic information that is taken under oath.

Mr. Pine. That from the day—or correct that, please. Within a month or several months after Colonel Wyman's arrival as District Engineer in Los Angeles, that his association with Hans W. Rohl socially was certainly an inappropriate one for a District Engineer to maintain with a contractor, in that their lives, relationships, and pleasures were so closely welded together—

Now, do you want me to—excuse me. Do you want me to go ahead and explain that, or—

53. General Frank. I should like to have it explained briefly. And have you knowledge as to who paid for all this entertainment?

Mr. Pine. No, I have not.

54. General Frank. Well, explain it briefly so as to show [2385] the nature of this entertainment.
Mr. Pine. Well, it goes back long before there was any thought of Pearl Harbor or anything of that nature. Rohl owned the VEGA, after of course the RAMONA, and we had very many mutual friends who, every time they were invited aboard the VEGA, would say they would never go again if Bill was going to have the drunken major on board. I never knew Wyman's name, never knew who he was at that time, but I knew him by that name, and Mrs. Rohl had told her friends that she had to put up with him because of business reasons, and through the testimony of his servants, members of his crew—and I say "testimony." I mean by that affidavits taken by the Military Affairs Committee and statements taken by the Tenney Committee, that they were very often in residence together at the Biltmore Hotel, that Wyman was a frequent guest at the Rohl home and a partner in Bill's night life.

55. General Frank. Do you think that any reasonable share of the expenses of this entertainment and pleasure could have been paid for out of the salary of an Army officer of Wyman's grade?

Mr. Pine. As I understand it, all the suites in the Biltmore Hotel and everywhere else were taken in the name of Rohl, and I don't see how it would be humanly possible for an Army officer to have maintained the pace that the Colonel seemed to.

Can I speak off the record? Of course, I have seen all his club bills, and so forth. I know about what he was spending on alimony and things of that kind.

56. General Frank. All right. Go ahead.

[2386] 57. Major Clausen. I wonder if you could say, from your examination of these club bills and other evidences of indebtedness, anything further in answer to the question of General Frank as to whether the Colonel would be living beyond his means as a Major and have to have independent resources to maintain this pace.

Mr. Pine. That, sir, is very hard to tell. Those club bills are very deceiving. In some months the Colonel would spend $75, and other months it would be less than $2, and very often—his first wife explained it that, well, when they would have these large bills it would be a group of friends who would go out, and because the Colonel belonged to the club, why, their check would possibly be only $10, but it would reflect a very large amount on the bill. You see what I mean? In other words, the others would pay him their share in cash. You see, he belonged to a great number of clubs, but that was deceptive again because as an Army officer his dues were very small, and many of them he didn't use very frequently.

58. Major Clausen. Now, what you are referring to, Mr. Pine, are club bills of clubs to which Colonel Wyman belonged and which bills were in his name?

Mr. Pine. That is correct, sir.

59. Major Clausen. But what I have in mind are bills that would be normal bills for expensive parties at the Biltmore Hotel, for example.

Mr. Pine. Well, they would be all so far as I know—now, I didn't go through the Biltmore records personally; just one day. But you would really have to be a millionaire to support the expenditures made in that hotel—by Mr. Rohl, [2387] however.
60. Major Clausen. And specifically also, with respect to the yacht trips that were taken by Colonel Wyman and the other forms of entertainment to which you have testified, the question is then posed as to whether, if Colonel Wyman paid his share of all that entertainment, it could have been done out of a Major's salary.

Mr. Pine. I don't think it could be done out of the President's salary, as a matter of fact.

61. Major Clausen. Now, did you in Los Angeles yourself know a Werner Plack, Mr. Pine?

Mr. Pine. Yes, I did, quite well.

62. Major Clausen. Did you have occasion to see Hans Wilhelm Rohl in company with this Werner Plack?

Mr. Pine. Yes, very possibly I saw them together three or four times, but there was only one incident which stands out in my mind when I know definitely they were together.

63. Major Clausen. Would you tell that to the Board, please?

Mr. Pine. Well, it was in the summer of 1938. The reason I place it as 1938 was, a friend of mine who is now dead was out here visiting me, and we had been to the baseball game. We went over to this place called the Swing Club in Hollywood, which was at 1710 North Los Palmas, and I imagine we arrived there—I hesitate to say—probably around midnight. After we had been there a short time there was a floor show, small floor show going on, with a chorus, and the orchestra was playing, and suddenly the master of ceremonies stopped the music and they swung into a new tune, and all the girls and the two men, as I remember it, in the floor show all started [2388] to sing, "Here comes Bill, here comes Bill, here comes Bill Rohl now."

Well, naturally, knowing—having known Bill, I turned to see who was coming in, and it was Bill, Werner Plack, and some white-haired gentleman; I don't know who he was, have never seen him since.

64. Major Clausen. What was your acquaintance with this Werner Plack?

Mr. Pine. Werner Plack I met in 19—this has got to be an approximate date—about 1935. Werner came over here as a guest of Baron Von Gunhardt, who then lived on the corner of Roxbury and Lexington in Beverly Hills.

65. General Frank. Just a minute. Spell that for the reporter.

Mr. Pine. V-o-n G-u-n-h-a-r-d-t, I guess it was. And I met Werner many times during that summer. He seemed to be completely anti-Nazi and against Hitler. Shortly after that he returned to Germany where, from my memory, I believe he remained about one year. On his return to this country he was a thoroughly indoctrinated admirer of the Nazi government. I saw Werner off and on in friends' homes and in my own, at various public places around Beverly Hills, frequently, until his return to Germany—I hesitate—it was before the Russian invasion. It was previous to June 22, 1940.

66. Major Clausen. Do you know whether that return was voluntary?

Mr. Pine. Not of my own knowledge. I know that Harry Flannery of the C. B. S. told me, when he saw Werner in Berlin [2389] when he got back—you see, Werner during this last two years in this country spent most of his time drunk, and for anyone to believe that
he could possibly be an agent of the German Government seemed ridiculous. However, Harry W. Flannery, who was then representing Columbia Broadcasting in Berlin, told me that from the time Werner Plack arrived in Berlin a very few days only transpired before he became an executive of the German Foreign Office.

67. Major Clausex. This Baron Von Gunhardt, who was he?

Mr. Pine. Well, there were four—I never knew them very well. There was Girt Von Gunhardt. They were married to the Anheuser-Busch family. I believe, or the Anheuser-Busch girl married Von Gunhardt, and they lived in Germany, and they moved to this country. There was one brother who was in a great deal of trouble with the Nazi Government over there. The other brothers, as I understand, were intensely loyal.

68. Major Clausex. I was going to ask you, first, if you knew anything about the subsidizing of Werner Plack while in this country by the German Consul in San Francisco, Fritz Weideman, or the German Consul in Los Angeles, that doctor, what was his name?

Mr. Pine. Geisman.


Mr. Pine. I personally know nothing of that except again by hearsay, that Dr. Geisman was the one who was instrumental in sending Werner back to Germany, and from what I understand Werner sold Dr. Geisman a bill of goods, that is, by that, that he understood the American temperament and the American psychology, and if he had a job in the German Foreign Office, why, he could do a good job. You see, Werner was the one who was instrumental in putting P. G. Wodehouse and the Crown Prince on the air.

70. Major Clausex. In Germany?

Mr. Pine. Yes, in Germany when he returned.

71. Major Clausex. Well, can you tell the Board anything as to the connection of Wyman with this Hans Wilhelm Rohl relationship as it is affected by this Werner Plack, in a general way, with leads?

Mr. Pine. I don’t think there was any connection whatever between Colonel Wyman and Werner Plack. So far as I know, they may have never met.

72. General Frank. You know that Rohl knew Plack?

Mr. Pine. Yes, I know that he was with him that night, and they were very friendly. That I unhesitatingly can testify to, that in various parties where they were around in the same group I am sure they must have been together, but I wouldn’t testify to the fact they were, but that night there is no question about it.

73. Major Clausex. I have no further questions.

[2391] 74. General Grunert. Have you any questions, General Russell?

75. General Russell. Yes. I would like to see what this is all about. This Tenney investigation started in 1943, did it not?

Mr. Pine. No, no; not the investigation. The investigation really started when we received the amazing news in Beverly Hills that Rohl had been executed in Hawaii—which turned out of course to be incorrect; and I’ll tell you when that was. That was right after December 17, 1941, right after Pearl Harbor.

76. General Russell. This Tenney Committee that was set up by the California legislature exists for the purpose of investigating un-American activities?
Mr. Pine. That is correct.

77. General Russell. That is its function? Did you begin working with that committee about the time it came into being?

Mr. Pine. No, I didn’t start working with that committee until, I believe it was, January 1942.

78. General Russell. Now, when did this man Rohl become the subject of investigation by that committee?

Mr. Pine. Well, it was when all the rumors began to circulate very freely, we began to check into his background.

79. General Russell. Briefly stated, what was the sum and substance of these rumors which prompted this committee to investigate Rohl?

Mr. Pine. The sum and substance of the first thing that ever came to my attention was when a gentleman by the name of J. Raymond Owens gave the Navy his yacht for the duration. That was about a 150-foot yacht. So Ray Owens and L. B. Askins went down to turn the boat over to the Navy. Ray was taking his personal things off—his liquor off, and taking his crew off. After they returned from Newport Harbor they called me, as well as almost everybody else they knew, that night, to tell that Rohl had been executed; Lieutenant Nivers had told them it had been discovered that Rohl had been receiving money from the German government for years, and that he had never been an American, and was an alien—the story of course was incorrect, as it turned out—was an alien at the time of Pearl Harbor, that he had had access to all the plans, information, and military installations there; and as a result of this, that he had been tried and executed for treason. Of course, that news spread like wild-fire. That was the 17th of December, if my memory serves me rightly, 1941; and so far as we knew for another month—it was at least six weeks after that—we thoroughly believed that Rohl had been executed, until several month, until Floyd Rohl came back on a clipper, and she was asked by a mutual friend, and she said no, that Bill had not only not been executed, but was in full charge of construction work in the islands.

80. General Russell. I have not found anything yet that set the Tenney committee on Rohl, or anything that they found out about him; and that is what I was trying to find out.

Mr. Pine. Mr. Combs is probably much better qualified than I am. He is the counsel and the chief attorney of the committee, and he has the entire files. It is pretty hard for me, out of my head.

81. General Russell. Well, is there anything in the investigation which relates to improper conduct of Rohl in connection with the construction work out in the Hawaiian Department?

Mr. Pine. Yes; there are in the records now, which is not in that transcript.

82. General Russell. Evidence to show improper conduct of Rohl, out in the Hawaiian Department?

Mr. Pine. Oh! I wish you would qualify that.

83. General Russell. Well, you qualify it in your answer.

Mr. Pine. Why, yes, to this extent: There are affidavits from the general superintendent of the Hawaiian Constructors that when he was asked if he had ever seen Mr. Rohl drunk over there, in his affidavit he replied that he had seen him almost every day and he
never had seen him when he would have called him completely sober.

84. General Russell. That is whose affidavit?

Mr. Pine. The name is King—John King, who for four or five months was general superintendent of Constructors.

85. General Russell. That was prior to December 7, 1941, or was it thereafter?

Mr. Pine. Thereafter, because—

86. General Frank. We are going to have Mr. King as a witness.

87. General Russell. All right.

Mr. Pine. A man by the name of Wuckheiser, too.

88. General Russell. Mr. Pine, how long had you known this man Rohl?

Mr. Pine. I would set that about 1932, because I remember asking, at the time of the change in administration, when Hoover went out and President Roosevelt came in, whether it would affect his business, and that is the only reason I say it must have been 1932 or '33.

[2394] 89. General Russell. Had you had social contacts with him, and had you spoken to him over this period of time? Did he know who you were?

Mr. Pine. Yes, although I understood that Floy Rohl told a mutual friend that Bill had said that every time I had ever met him he had been so drunk he only remembered me once, when I sat on the arms of his chairs sometimes for two hours at a time. This was long before the time I had any idea he was a German alien, for that matter.

90. General Russell. Did you ever have any business dealings with Rohl?

Mr. Pine. None whatever.

91. General Russell. You only came into the investigation by virtue of your association with this Tenney Committee?

Mr. Pine. That is correct.

92. General Russell. And do you think that they took after him with this Tenney Committee because they got the report that he had been executed in Hawaii?

Mr. Pine. Yes. I know that was the first thing that interested me, and then when he showed up back here—that is, everything was all right; and then I believe is the time that Mr. Combs started into work to find out how he became a citizen at a time like that.

93. General Russell. That is all.

94. General Frank. I have nothing.

95. General Grunert. I have one or two questions. From your association with the Tenney Committee, and what you know of your own accord, do you know of anything un-American that Wyman has ever done?

[2395] Mr. Pine. That Wyman has ever done? Well, of course, that depends upon your interpretation of "un-American." If you mean in regard to anything subversive—no.

96. General Grunert. Is it un-American to get drunk, if he got drunk?

Mr. Pine. No.

97. General Grunert. Is it un-American to carouse, if he did carouse?

Mr. Pine. No.
98. General Grunert. Mr. Pine, this Board is limited in the scope of its investigation, to such phases as may bear directly or indirectly on the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Mr. Pine. I understand.

99. General Grunert. We are not investigating everything or carrying everything through to conclusions because of leads received in attempting to accomplish our objective. I explain that to most all of the witnesses that have been connected with former investigations, because I do not want anybody to understand that this Board will exhaustively go into phases that are not connected with what we have been charged with doing; and that, of course, is what led up to Pearl Harbor, and what happened at Pearl Harbor.

Mr. Pine. May I ask if you have Rohl's nurse under subpoena, Madeline Ferguson?

100. Major Clausen. No.

101. General Grunert. I think we have testimony, haven't we, such as she gave?

102. Major Clausen. No, sir; we do not have, here.

Mr. Pine. Madeline Ferguson was a trained nurse who [2396] endeavored to enter the Army, and she had sinus trouble. I believe, so she was rejected. However, the American Red Cross accepted her services and sent her to the islands, and shortly after her arrival there, I have forgotten the date on that, she had Rohl as a case, and her affidavit of course Mr. Combs has; but if she speaks the truth, it reveals beyond question that Rohl feared something of which I know nothing about; that is, that when he returned here to the coast she still attended him, at the Palace Hotel. The first thing that "Jim" Gwynn and—well, it was Tom Connolly's brother—I don't know—were in the insurance business; that when he moved into the suite, he used to go behind every picture, beds, and so forth; and when they had to move to another suite, they were positive that the place had been wired and that's why they had moved them; but they accused her, in front of Rohl, of being actively working for the Federal Bureau of Investigation, planted next to him by them, and that that was the first time, that she had attended him at Honolulu for months, and she continued to attend him at various times, in the Biltmore Hotel and the Palace Hotel; that she knew there wasn't anything wrong outside of his drinking. She didn't go to the Federal Bureau of Investigation at that time, because she thought it was such a silly story; but that he lived in constant dread, and particularly, that "Jim" Gwynn and "Pat" Connolly were more worried than Rohl.

103. General Grunert. Had any of these persons that you have mentioned ever been in politics here in California?

Mr. Pine. Who do you mean?

104. General Grunert. There was nothing political about this [2397] Tenney Committee, was there?

Mr. Pine. None whatever. "Jack" Tenney had never heard of "Bill" Rohl or known him, so far as I know.

105. General Grunert. Do you know whether Colonel Wyman, or Major Wyman at that time, dabbled in politics at all?

Mr. Pine. I have never heard such a thing.

106. General Grunert. Now, knowing what I might call our limitation on our field of investigation, can you think of anything else that
you might add that might help the Board or assist the Board in its mission to get at the facts on those phases that pertain directly to the Pearl Harbor attack?

Mr. Pine. Well, you probably have access to wherever she is, Gertrude Campbell, who is now Mrs. Brunner.

107. General Grunert. She has already been a witness.
Mr. Pine. She has? Well, then, there is a Mrs. Cooper, I believe.

108. Major Clausen. We did not call Mrs. Cooper.
Mr. Pine. That's entirely hearsay on my part, from men who were there.

109. Major Clausen. If you think Mrs. Cooper should be called, could you give us——
Mr. Pine. I don't think so. I am just trying. Was she the lady who was with him in Honolulu, and then with him up in Edmonton?

110. Major Clausen. I think so. There is some statement to that effect in the affidavit of a Ferman K. Pickering.
Mr. Pine. Pickering?

111. Major Clausen. Some things have been beyond the scope of the Board's activities.

[2398] Mr. Pine. You see, a lot of this is confused in my mind from what I knew of the Alcan Highway investigation. I think I was thinking of her in that connection.

112. Major Clausen. Do you think Mr. Combs will have an affidavit from this Madeline Ferguson which would bear on this point that you mentioned this morning?
Mr. Pine. Yes; he will have, as I recall it, two long affidavits from her, sworn to.

113. General Grunert. Then you can cover that.

114. Major Clausen. All right. And would he also have any pertinent leads, which would limit it to our mission?
Mr. Pine. You will have the complete file.

115. Major Clausen. Or do you have anything in addition to what he might have?
Mr. Pine. No, I have nothing. He has everything—the entire file.

116. General Grunert. That appears to cover about all we can get from this witness. We thank you for coming over here today.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

(Brief recess.)

TESTIMONY OF ROBERT EUGENE MCKEE, GENERAL CONTRACTOR, EL PASO, TEXAS, AND LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel West. Will you state to the Board your full name and address.
Mr. McKee. Robert Eugene McKee, and my address is El Paso, Texas, and also, Los Angeles.

2. Colonel West. And what is your occupation, Mr. McKee?

[2399] Mr. McKee. I am a general contractor.

3. General Grunert. Mr. McKee, this Board is particularly interested in facts bearing on what happened prior to Pearl Harbor and during the attack, and any phases that bear on that story. That in-
cludes an investigation of what happened in the construction line prior to Pearl Harbor. Now, the field that we cover is so broad that we have parceled out some of these special subjects to members of the Board, and your friend, General Frank, has that particular specialty, and he will be assisted by Major Clausen; so I will ask General Frank to lead in asking the questions.

4. General Frank. Mr. McKee, will you state generally the scope of your operations, to show the size of your firm.

Mr. McKee. Well, we are working, we have offices today in Panama; Dallas, Texas; Santa Fe, New Mexico; Odgen, Utah; and Los Angeles, California, and we have considerable work for the Navy, the Army, the Veterans' Administration, and the Ordnance Department, I think the Santa Fe job is used; as well as for the various railroads. We do a good deal of work for them. We had an office out in Honolulu, as you know, up to the time—well, till about six months after Pearl Harbor. We were there about five or six years.

5. General Frank. In 1941, on what work in Honolulu was your firm engaged?

Mr. McKee. We were working at Hickam Field, Schofield Barracks, and Fort Shafter; and I am not sure whether we were still working at Pearl Harbor. I don't think we were at Pearl Harbor. It might have been, the early part of 1941.

6. General Frank. In the early part of 1941, what as you remember was about the estimated amount of your contracts?

Mr. McKee. Everywhere?


Mr. McKee. Well, I would say we must have had several millions of dollars worth of work.

8. General Frank. Several? Five? Ten?

Mr. McKee. Well, I would say somewhere around from three to four million. That is in Pearl Harbor alone. I mean, in Honolulu, alone.

9. General Frank. In Honolulu alone?

Mr. McKee. Yes. That is just from recollection.

10. General Frank. Now, did you know Colonel Wyman?

Mr. McKee. I never met him. I had had correspondence and conversation with him over the long-distance phone.

11. General Frank. What was the nature of that?

Mr. McKee. Well, the first—when he first came over to Honolulu, as district engineer, the first contacts I had with him was in connection with a building at Wheeler Field. We built a large barracks at Wheeler Field, and on the roof, without going into too much details, constructions and materials, user for insulating material, Vermiculite, and on top of that, put a roofing paper. The Vermiculite unfortunately holds moisture, and it formed bubbles of air or moisture underneath the roofing, and it raised up into blisters; and this occurred after we were through with the building. We hadn't yet received our final payment; and about that time I think Colonel Wyman came over, and we were trying to get him to accept the building; our contention being, and which I believe we were afterwards verified as being correct in, that we had put on the materials, as specified, and it wasn't our difficulties, to get our final payment. Well, Colonel Wyman brought up this question of these blisters on the roof, and he wanted
us to put up a cash bond—the money. I offered to put up—we already had a bond on the job, and the roofer, the Peerless Roofing Company, who did the work for us in Honolulu. We were willing to make good the guarantee, in case the roof went bad. That occurs frequently in Honolulu on account of the moisture; not enough interval between rainfalls to let a roof out there dry up thoroughly; and he wouldn’t accept anything, he said, except cash. Well, we offered to give him Government bonds, and first one thing and another—anything else, but we didn’t want to give him the money, because I thought it was difficult to impound cash; so we had quite a little correspondence about that matter, and finally, through efforts of—in Washington, we had them agree to accept some form of Government bonds, and the matter was closed, and we put up the bonds. I don’t know where they were deposited; but as soon as Colonel Wyman left, why, they returned the bonds to us; and that was our first instance of having, you know, really from myself coming in contact, although our office had other contacts with him.

12. General Frank. Who was supervising your work in Honolulu?

Mr. McKee. Well, there was originally Mr. Jones, and we had a Mr. Hardie, and Mr. Stoker, and Mr. Wylie.

13. General Frank. Who was heading up the organization for you?

Mr. McKee. Well, originally, Mr. Jones, and then he left to come back, and then Mr. Wylie, and Mr. Stoker looked after the office, and Mr. Hardie, on the outside; and of course we had a lot of other men, there, you know—Mr. Clark, and Mr. [2402] Hatchel was over there, and quite a few others.

14. General Frank. Now, do you remember when the Hawaiian Constructors came into being?

Mr. McKee. Well, yes; to some extent. We had been doing considerable work there, and I think the Hawaiian Constructors first started to build some temporary quarters near Hickam Field, as well as I recollect it. We had been in association with another—on other work, under, I think it was Major Harold, for some various work. I think it was a hospital, Tripler hospital, with about six or seven other Honolulu contractors; and, as I say, about this time, I think, when Colonel Wyman came over, why, with Rohl-Connolly and the Callahan concerns, came over. We had figured some air fields on the various islands; sometimes, some of the other local contractors, there; and although we thought that we, and some others, were entitled to the business, why, we didn’t get it. they gave it to, I think, Callahan, or Rohl-Connolly, I don’t know which; and then as I say, about that time they formed this, what I understood was Hawaiian Constructors—wasn’t that the name?

15. General Frank. Yes; that is right.

Mr. McKee. I don’t know just exactly who were the parties to it. I think Mr. Woolley was in on it, as well as Rohl-Connolly.

16. General Frank. Gunther & Shirley?

Mr. McKee. Yes; some other concern.

17. General Frank. And the Callahan Company?

Mr. McKee. Callahan.

18. General Frank. Were you approached to come in on this organization?
Mr. McKee. Not originally, not when they first came over, [2403] not until after Pearl Harbor.

19. General Frank. Did you have a plant and a constructing organization in Honolulu at the time?

Mr. McKee. Yes, we had probably the largest organization over there, I guess, at the time.

20. General Frank. Do you know why you were not approached to become a part of this organization, with the largest construction organization in the islands at the time?

Mr. McKee. Well, only from what was hearsay, and that is that these men were friends of Colonel Wyman, and followed him around from various jobs that he had had in the past, that's all. I understood they were more or less favorites of his, Connolly and ourselves, but I don't think very few other contractors really had very much opportunity.

21. General Frank. Who were the others who had no opportunity?

Mr. McKee. Well, I think, as I say—Mr. Black was one, and there were quite a few others, I don't remember all the names of the fellows over there, now; and although I think the Hawaiian contractors—do you remember the Hawaiian contractors? They went in on it, didn't they, finally?

22. General Frank. Yes.

Mr. McKee. They were not very happy about it, so they told us, and as I say, we were never approached, and I understood the same thing applied to most all of the other contractors. I don't remember all the names right now, and we discussed it more or less informally.

23. General Frank. Do you know why you were not approached?

Mr. McKee. No, I don't know the reason, I suppose, except that perhaps they wanted someone else.

[2404] 24. General Frank. Were you ever approached?

Mr. McKee. After Pearl Harbor, after the bombing of Pearl Harbor, why, we were approached by Colonel Wyman, and he insisted that we go in with the Hawaiian Constructors. Of course, I don't know whether you know it or not, but they kinda call me "the lone wolf," I don't usually go in on any combination of any kind, and I have always been opposed more or less to these joint ventures. I feel that greater efficiency and success can be gained and more responsibility by sending, in one place, and I was somewhat afraid that these joint ventures were leading to too much profit on some of the jobs. Frankly, I didn't think it would stand up, and the original—after the bombing, as I remember it now, after Pearl Harbor, he notified our organization that we would have to go in with the Hawaiian Constructors, as a subcontractor, or go out of business; and they wired me and phoned me, and I believe I wrote them and wired them back, whichever was available at that time, that I was opposed to going in with the Hawaiian Constructors on these general principles, that I was willing to do any work that the Army wanted me to do and I would be glad to do it without any fee whatever, and they could have our entire organization; and as I said, then, the amount of money involved, so far as I was concerned, it didn't make any difference. I didn't care whether we made anything at all or not. That didn't seem to satisfy him, and I think he called me over the long-distance telephone when I was in Los Angeles, and he talked to me and told
Mr. McKee. Not as I recollect, no. They wanted us to work as subcontractors, the way I understood it.

25. General Frank. Were you ever given an opportunity to come into the Hawaiian Constructors on the same level as Gunther-Shirley and Rohl-Connolly?

Mr. McKee. Well, very little. We had contact with some of the men. Then I had contact indirectly through my own men with some of their organization.

26. General Frank. Did you have any opportunity to know anything about the type of organization under which the Hawaiian Constructors operated?

Mr. McKee. I would be probably vain if I told you what the general impression was. Their engineers told us we were the only ones for a while that did any work over there after Pearl Harbor, but apparently the organization wasn't very efficient. I am not—that's about the general understanding, that they were not operating a very efficient organization, which is usually the case with too many cooks in the broth.

27. General Frank. Mr. McKee, do you know of any instances of unnecessary delay that occurred in construction of any projects over there?
Mr. McKee. Well, I don't know of any specific instances without going into it pretty thoroughly. Some of our men—because I wasn't there, but it was the general understanding that the jobs that they had were not going ahead: now, for what reason, I don't know. A lot of jobs that we figured on, I know, that were supposed to be completed in a certain length of time. [2408] many times weren't even started for months and months after the contracts were let. Why that was, I don't know. But, as I say, the general impression in the islands was that they were delayed: I don't know why.

29. General Frank. Do you know of any instances—did you hear of any instances—where there was any deliberate delay?

Mr. McKee. No. I couldn't say that I know of any deliberate delays.

30. General Frank. Have you any information or any knowledge of anything that happened among the contractors or between the contractors and Colonel Wyman that may have contributed to delays?

Mr. McKee. What do you exactly mean by that, General?

31. General Frank. Well, what I am trying to do is to give you an opportunity to state to the Board anything that you may have in the back of your head on the conditions that existed over there.

Mr. McKee. Well, the only thing I would say in some of our instances, without going into other peoples' field which I am not familiar with—shouldn't be—but from the reports of Mr. Wylie and Mr. Stoker and others—

32. General Frank. Who were your representatives?

Mr. McKee. Yes. That many times Colonel Wyman was not in a fit conditions to attend to business. We had lots of times where we couldn't get decisions for reasons which we thought were: wasn't in a condition to attend to business. That was the whole thing.

33. General Frank. That was because of his lack of sobriety?

Mr. McKee. Well, apparently, yes. I have had one report [2409] where we had some papers to be signed where he told me that he wasn't—couldn't sign his name at that time. I don't know how far that went.

34. General Frank. Who gave you that information? Your own representatives?

Mr. McKee. One of our own men, yes. We had a conference up there and supposed to have it agreed, and at that time he was unable to continue for some reason or another. I wouldn't say that he was—how intoxicated, or anything, he was, because I don't know.

35. General Frank. Was this before Pearl Harbor?

Mr. McKee. That was before Pearl Harbor.

36. General Frank. Who was your representative at that time?

Mr. McKee. Well, I say, we had my son over there, John McKee, and Mr. Wylie and Mr. Stoker. We had quite an organization. John Clark, Mr. Hardie, Mr. Jones, and—

37. General Frank. Who would know directly about this?

Mr. McKee. Well, I think probably Mr. Hardie and Mr. Wylie. Mr. Hardy is down at San Bernardino now.

38. General Grunert. Did the lack of that signature at that particular time actually result in delaying any phase of work then going on, or just was it an administrative delay?

Mr. McKee. Well, I really couldn't say, but we had had—I was just using that as an instance, but we had had difficulty in getting decisions
in order that our work proceed. That was one of the things that we were, of course, interested in. I wasn’t so much interested in his habits as I was in getting my job done, because we had times when there was great difficulty in getting decisions for a while there. That was the only thing [2410] that apparently, as far as I am concerned—understand, I have never met Colonel Wyman personally. I wouldn’t know him if I saw him.

39. General Frank. Do you know anything about the association of Colonel Wyman and Mr. Rohl?

Mr. McKee. Only what I had heard from previous talks with other members of the Engineering Department of the government, and just general, you might say—I wouldn’t say whether it was rumors or general understanding of all the contractors and the professional people regarding his past associations.

40. General Frank. What was that?

Mr. McKee. That he was very close to Mr. Rohl, especially, and very intimate with him in many ways, and apparently it was hard for anybody else to get along with him, even officers and the people who worked with him, and such, and also any contractors or anyone.

41. General Frank. Do you feel that that rebounded to the disadvantage of the government?

Mr. McKee. Well, I should say so, yes. I think an officer in charge of work should not be bound too closely with anyone with whom he does business; I would say not only an officer but even my own men. I won’t permit them, for instance, to be with them or get too intimate material men or sub-contractors. I want them to pay their own way. I don’t want them to be obligated. I think the same thing applies to a good officer. I think he should be free to make a decision without any bias to it, feeling. Of course, he can’t be if—of course, understand, I read this report which was sent to me of some congressional board, I guess. A copy was sent to me here about two [2411] months ago. I didn’t know about all of those things that were mentioned in there, but I have heard generally that he was a man of excessive habits and hard to get along with and was very friendly to especially Rohl-Connolly and Callahan.

42. General Frank. Can the statements that you just made cover his reputation among the contracting fraternity?

Mr. McKee. Fraternity, yes.

43. General Frank. But so far as you know there was no detriment rebounded to the government because of that association?

Mr. McKee. Well, I would say I don’t—it’s awfully hard to say anything, specific thing, but I don’t think there is any question about its rebounding to the detriment of the government. I don’t think there is any question about that. How detrimental, well, that’s a matter of comparison.

44. General Frank. Just because that kind of an association is not healthy?

Mr. McKee. Yes, and then, it costs the government money. I don’t think there is any question about that. I know it cost the government money.

45. General Frank. Will you expand on that a little bit?

Mr. McKee. Well, for instance, as I say, we figured some of the airfields on the various islands just about the time before Pearl Harbor.
They could have taken in several reputable contractors and given the work to and had—and actually saved money under the bid that they gave it to Callahan, for instance, and who are very good men. They were—

46. General Frank. Who were they?
Mr. McKee. I am just trying to think. We were low on one [2412] or two projects, and several other contractors involved I don't remember now. It is a matter of record. I could find out. I haven't it with me. But they were all good men. They were all men, I mean, that you would know in Honolulu.

47. General Frank. And do you feel that the work would have been finished as rapidly as it was finished under the contract on which it was done?
Mr. McKee. You mean that specific contract?
Mr. McKee. Well, it probably has developed. I don't think—I don't know that they have ever finished the jobs yet, unless the Army finished them. In fact, they didn't even get started on them. I think they would have been farther along. I don't know whether they would have been finished, or not, but I think they would have been farther along, from what reports I had. I don't know whether they would have finished them, because I think Pearl Harbor came in the interval there, and I am not sure whether the government finished them, or not, exactly. Fortunately it was a good thing for us. It could have been very expensive, and with the conditions like they were, but we would have done our best to get it done anyhow.

49. General Frank. These firms that bid on them and didn't get them had the organization and the plant and equipment with which to do the job?
Mr. McKee. Yes, I am quite sure they did.
50. General Frank. Including your own organization?
Mr. McKee. We had arranged for ours or we wouldn't have figured the job, of course, because it was—

51. General Frank. Have you anything? [2413]
52. Major Clausen. Yes. I would like to ask Mr. McKee, for the record, concerning a letter that he wrote which I think should go in this record, to the Honorable R. E. Thomason, on March 1, 1943. Do you recall writing a letter to Congressman Thomason?
Mr. McKee. I don't remember, unless—I wrote a lot of letters.
53. Major Clausen. I will read it:
(Letter of March 1, 1943, Robert E. McKee to Honorable R. E. Thomason, is as follows:)

Dear Congressman Thomason: You no doubt will recollect (if not you can look up your files) that the writer had quite a controversy with the District Engineer's Office in Hawaii, right after "Pearl Harbor" in connection with the desire of Colonel Wyman to have the writer become a part of the Hawaiian Constructors, which was headed by Hans Wilhelm Rohl, of Rohl-Connolly Company of Los Angeles.

I am enclosing herein a newspaper clipping from the El Paso Times, regarding an investigation of Hans Wilhelm Rohl and his connection with Colonel Theodore Wyman. I am sending this to you as I believe this now, without doubt, justifies the position that I took at the time of the controversy, and no doubt they would have been far better off to have had us, or someone else, do the work, but we are probably better off to have had it end as it did. Nevertheless, from what I have heard, a further investigation of Colonel Wyman would not be amiss, and it seems
to me that the Army should follow this matter up. Such men [24/14] as Chester Clark in Honolulu and others seem to be well posted regarding certain matters connected with Rohr and Colonel Wyman. How in the world anyone like Colonel Wyman could ever receive the Distinguished Service Cross I can't understand. Please note that portion of Mrs. Rohr's testimony wherein she said that they "tolerated Wyman only because of business." The general rumors are that he was inebriated most of the time.

All of this is for your information and for the good of the government. As far as the writer is concerned, it is a dead issue, but I do question the advisability of having a man like Colonel Wyman the head of anything.

Very truly yours,

Robert E. McKee.
General Contractor.

Do you recall that letter?

Mr. McKee. Yes, I do.

54. Maor Clausen. That is all I have.

55. General Russell. You testified that you didn't think that this plan of having a number of contractors associated together, as the Hawaiian Constructors were, was a good plan; and as I remember your evidence, you said something in immediate connection therewith about profits, and I did not get the import of that.

Mr. McKee. Well, the general trend of the so-called joint ventures—that is a new word that they have more or less concocted in the last two or three years. There is no question about it leads to higher prices, costs the government money, because of the fact that you eliminate competition.

56. General Russell. Assuming that the contract entered into [24/15] between the government and the joint adventurers is what they call a cost-plus-fixed-fee contract, would the number of contractors engaged in the completion of work under such a contract result in higher cost to the government?

Mr. McKee. Yes. I think it does, because it is the old adage, you know: Everybody's business is nobody's business; and the general tendency has been—I have had several fixed-fee jobs. Personally, I am not in favor of fixed-fee jobs except under dire necessity. I don't think they are economical.

57. General Russell. Assuming that this group of contractors designates one of its members to carry out the work under that type of contract, wouldn't it be possible to operate with the same efficiency and get the same result as if one individual, one partnership or one corporation was doing the work?

Mr. McKee. It should, but the history of the many such projects is that it has not been.

58. General Russell. Your experience, then, Mr. McKee, in the contracting field, and your observations of that type of operation simply shows that experience indicates that it is more costly to the government?

Mr. McKee. I think so.

59. General Russell. Now, you were out in the Territory of Hawaii doing some work prior to the time that Wyman interested this other group to come out there, as I understood your testimony?

Mr. McKee. Yes, several years.

60. General Russell. That work which you had been doing for the government on the installations, had it been done on a flat contract basis or on a cost-plus-fixed-fee basis?
Mr. McKee. Flat contract basis.

[2416] 61. General Russell. Were you familiar with the type of work which was proposed to have been done under this December '40 contract that went to Rohl and his crew?

Mr. McKee. I don't, of course, know all the work that was embodied in his contract because I have had no opportunity to examine it, but in so far as the original work that he had, I should say we, not only ourselves but many others, were in far better position. He had had no experience in the line of work at all.

62. General Russell. I didn't ask that question. My question was, Were you more or less familiar with the type of work which the government desired to have done when these negotiations with Rohl and his associates were made for the purpose of doing that work?

Mr. McKee. I think so.

63. General Russell. Did you know what they wanted done out there?

Mr. McKee. Well, I couldn't say what they wanted done. I don't know just exactly what someone else would want. If you tell me what kind of work it was——

64. General Russell. Let's see if we can understand each other. Wyman had some work out there for the government that he wanted done?

Mr. McKee. Yes.

65. General Russell. And he went to Rohl and his group to get them to do it; is that right?

Mr. McKee. That is the best of my understanding of it.

66. General Russell. Yes. Now, what was that work that he wanted done?

[2417] Mr. McKee. Well, I couldn't say because I have never had an opportunity of examining the contract or to know what the projects were. I know there was some repair work. He built some temporary buildings and quite a variety of jobs.

67. General Russell. Assuming that that work was the installations of underground petroleum tanks, radar stations, landing fields for aircraft, probably some building, was there any reason why, with conditions as they existed in the Territory of Hawaii at that time, that bids for this work could not have been obtained as the other work had been done out there?

Mr. McKee. When they originally started, the bids could have been obtained, but not after Pearl Harbor.

68. General Russell. In December 1940 was there any good reason that you know as to why the work that was to be done out there for the Army could not have been accomplished on bids?

Mr. McKee. I don't know of any reason. We were doing it all the time.

69. General Russell. Up to that time?

Mr. McKee. Had the work under contract, and more permanent character: We were building engine test buildings and other buildings of a permanent character.

70. General Russell. Do you know of any cost-plus-fixed-fee basis contracts that had been done in the Territory of Hawaii prior to December, 1940?

71. General Frank. Were the Navy doing any; do you know?
Mr. McKee. The Navy was doing some work at Pearl Harbor, I think; had just started, but it was the Pacific Constructors, I think; some such name of an association of private firms.

72. General Russell. Was it a cost-plus-fixed-fee contract; do you know?

Mr. McKee. Well, the first contract—I am sure, General, the first contract was, at the dock, you know; dry-dock. I think they let that by contract. That was the first job that came over. I don’t think they let—I am not sure now, but I don’t think they let any fixed-fee until later, because we bid on that. I am not sure whether we bid, or not, but the first big job, you know, that amounted to anything was that drydock that they asked for bids on.

73. General Frank. Was there any work done by any contractor in Hawaii that your organization was not equipped to do?

Mr. McKee. Yes, there might have been some.

74. General Frank. What was it?

Mr. McKee. Well, I would say tunnel work and probably dredging or something of that character, but there were other concerns there who were equipped who made a specialty of that business.

75. General Russell. You were not approached at all by Colonel Wyman in connection with this other work to be done out there?

Mr. McKee. Never, as far as I know.

76. General Russell. That is all I have.

77. General Grunert. Did you have any what they call floating equipment for construction work available to your firm for such work, for instance, as was afterwards done on the string of islands down toward Australia?

Mr. McKee. Well, we used a lot of floating equipment up here at Benicia. We built those, you know, at the Ordnance, and this big pier. We built all that work. We used floating equipment for that, this pier and dry-dock.

78. General Grunert. I think it appeared in testimony that there was no such equipment available in or about Hawaii or readily procurable for that class of work.

Mr. McKee. There was some available in Hawaii. Whether it was enough or not, I don’t know. The Hawaiian Contracting & Dredging Company had considerable work—had considerable equipment and had been doing considerable work for years there, for Howard Dillingham, isn’t it?

79. General Frank. And you had floating equipment here on the coast?

Mr. McKee. We had them under lease. We had it rented by—but it was available. I don’t know how much was available. In fact, most of the equipment they did use I think they either rented or bought for that purpose. It was available if you wanted to—you know, if you had the work to go out and get it at that time.

80. General Grunert. Now will you just give me a few illustrations of how local contractors could have done a better job than the Hawaiian Constructors did? Was it because of equipment available to them at hand that the Constructors had to get from the mainland? Was it because they had materials or could have access to materials to get them there quicker. Was it because they could have priority on shipment, or what was it that would have improved the situation
had these contracts been made with local contractors as compared to having been made with the Hawaiian Constructors? You see what I am getting at?

Mr. McKee. Better supervision. Just a good General in the Army, the same; they have a good man at the head of it.


Mr. McKee. Better management; that's all.

82. General Grunert. Better—

Mr. McKee. Equipment. As far as equipment, I would say, and the materials, they were practically equally available to anyone with the Army's help. You understand at that time, why, in fact it was congested, traffic congestion to Honolulu, has been congested for many years, even before the war. There always was a shortage of transportation to everybody.

83. General Grunert. How about labor?

Mr. McKee. We never had any trouble ourselves getting labor at the time. Of course, you know the labor situation is like the materials situation: it changes almost from day to day.

84. General Grunert. Now, you yourself were out there a considerable time, were you?

Mr. McKee. I was there three or four times, spent some time.

85. General Grunert. And you and your main superintendents or assistants had a contract under the Quartermaster Corps?

Mr. McKee. A Colonel Harold did. I think it was Harold, H-a-r-o-l-d. But also we had work over there for Colonel Nurse and Colonel Hunt and quite a few other men beside him.

86. General Grunert. What I am getting at, during the time you had that contract did you entertain any of them by social entertainments?

Mr. McKee. General, I have an ulcerated stomach, and even if my inclinations were, Lord preserve me from such embroilments, so I never was able to go very far.

[2421] 87. General Grunert. Well, was it considered a heinous crime to have social relations in the line of entertainment, with somebody you are doing business with, if you don't go to extremes?

Mr. McKee. General, it depends on the extent of it, you know. I have had dinner lots of times with many people that I did business with, and I might have at times—when the Lord permitted, I might have had a cocktail, but I found the men—

88. General Grunert. Well, it is a question of the degree, is it?

Mr. McKee. The degree. I found the men I dealt with were very reluctant to—and I didn't discourage it—to enter into any, you might say, continuous entertainment.

89. General Grunert. Now, as to your ideas on the subject of cost-plus-fixed-fee, if you have something sort of nebulous to do, and you make a large contract on which you may have to have quite a number of changes, or under that let a number of subcontracts or have what they call work orders or what not, doesn't a cost-plus-a-fixed-fee give you much more leeway without the red tape and delays that encumber the other type of contract?

Mr. McKee. General, I don't want to be on a pinnacle differing with everyone else, but for one, we built Brownwood, which cost about $20,000,000, at Brownwood, Texas. That's Camp Bowie. We did
that on a fixed-fee basis, and we had more trouble getting decisions there. And I turned around and built I think it's Camp Shepherd at Wichita Falls on a straight contract basis, which was larger in extent and cost less money. The one we did by fixed-fee—just as an example I can use that \[24\] best, that I think at Brownwood where we had a fixed-fee it looked more difficult apparently to get things settled than it was where we had a straight contract, and the reason of that was that when we were at Wichita Falls, or anywhere else—we built quite a few large contomments—we would insist that these things must be decided, and we wanted to get through and we wanted to get done; while we had nothing to say about it at Brownwood. For instance, we only could do what we were told to do, and that's all. We had no prerogative, practically, of our own. But when we got to our contract, why, we insisted that they make these decisions. See?

90. General GRUNERT. That is what the Board wanted—at least, that is what I wanted to get information on. You being an experienced contractor and I being very much of a dub layman on that subject. I just wanted to see how the thing looked from both sides.

There is only one other question I have, and then if the others have no more questions, why, we shall go to lunch.

Do you know of your own accord or have you reason to believe that either Colonel Wyman or the contractors in Hawaii intentionally delayed work in order to give the Japanese a better opportunity of succeeding in their attack?

Mr. McKee. You ask me my opinion?

91. General GRUNERT. Yes.

Mr. McKee. I would say no. But that isn't the—there are all kinds of rumors that you hear to the contrary. I think it was just a case of Colonel Wyman's bad habits, frankly. I don't think he intentionally, as far as I know, did anything, no. Now, as far as Mr. Rohl, I can't say that, but I say as far \[24\] as Colonel Wyman that I don't know whether he did anything maliciously to help either the Germans or Japanese. I just think he didn't know any better; that's all. I think, frankly, he was ignorant.

General, I want to say one thing. You said you knew of these years of experience I had. I was going to say, in all the years of experience I had, I find each day I know less, so I wouldn't say that—either that, or I am becoming mellowed with age; I don't know which. I used to be a lot more positive about things than I am now.

92. General GRUNERT. Now, Mr. McKee can you think of anything else that you might tell the Board that may help it in its mission?

Mr. McKee. Well, I really don't know what the—

93. General GRUNERT. Anything occur to you?

Mr. McKee. Particularly as far as Colonel Wyman is concerned, you mean, are you talking about?

94. General GRUNERT. Well, concerning the attack on Pearl Harbor, concerning what went on before and what happened during that time, and as far as construction is concerned; as far as Wyman and Rohl are concerned, only such phases as may have had a bearing on the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Mr. McKee. Well, I was just discussing the other day—of course I have talked to a great many people that came back from Honolulu:
Clark and—you know Chester Clark. Of course, he talks a whole lot, and you have to discount a little of that, of course, General, as you know, and he apparently talks very freely and very fluently, so you should get him down when you get over to Honolulu over there, and see if he will tell you as much as he told everybody else. But apparently up to about two weeks before Pearl Harbor, from all I can gather from my own men and others, the Army and the Navy were on quite an alert all the time. They were really rigidly looking after apparently the defenses of the islands. And then for some unknown reason all this stopped. Planes were parked out on the field, and the alert ceased. That happened, I understand, beginning about two or three weeks, I think, prior to that time, apparently; so I say, from all the reports I have, there was a very rigid condition of alert, and then for some unknown reason—of course, you hear lots of things; you read the newspapers, I suppose—this condition ceased and they became lax. That's all. I have heard that.

And you hear all kinds of rumors about Rohl's connection with the Germans, and things of that kind, which of course are purely, I imagine, imagination in a great many cases, which become rumors after passing from one man's mind to another. Of course, a lot of people think there was a definite connection between Pearl Harbor and Mr. Rohl and his activities, but I don't know that. I am just telling you. You know, everybody hears so many things, it is questionable whether they are worthwhile.

95. **Major Clausen.** I have one more thing, sir. Just for the record I would like to show that the letter which I read and which Mr. McKee sent to Congressman Thomason was, through the good offices of Mr. McKee, sent through the Congressman to the War Department and thereafter was the basis of the investigation, in part, of Colonel Hunt, and is annexed to the report of Colonel Hunt, and verified in many respects by the statements of Mr. McKee.

Mr. McKee, I just want you gentlemen to understand I have no animosity as far as Colonel Wyman is concerned. I am just merely a poor country contractor trying to do a job and trying to do it to the best of my ability, and we have a good organization. There are men with us for 25 years, lots of them. We have raised them in the business. Outside of that I have no particular axe to grind.

96. **General Grunert.** We thank you for coming and assisting us. (The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

(Thereupon, at 11:50 a.m., the Board concluded the hearing of witnesses for the day and proceeded to other business.)
CONTENTS

MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 4, 1944

Testimony of—

R. E. Combs, Attorney-At-Law, Visalia, California .................................................. 2427
Rea B. Wickiser, 1522 Rodney Drive, Los Angeles, California ........................................ 2456
Ray Anderson, 1930 Euclid Street, Santa Monica, California ........................................ 2479
George Francis Bartlett, Smartville, California .............................................................. 2492
Harry W. Flannery, 537 North Wilcox, Los Angeles, California .................................... 2516

Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate pages of original transcript of proceedings.
MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 4, 1944.

Presidio of San Francisco, Cal.

The Board, at 9 a.m., pursuant to recess on Saturday, September 2, 1944, conducted the hearing of witnesses, Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President of the Board, presiding.


Present also: Colonel Charles W. West, Recorder, Major Henry C. Clausen, Assistant Recorder, and Colonel Harry A. Toulmin, Jr., Executive Officer.

General Grunert. The Board will come to order.

TESTIMONY OF R. E. COMBS, ATTORNEY-AT-LAW, VISALIA, CALIFORNIA.

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel West. Mr. Combs, will you please state to the Board your full name and address.

Mr. Combs. My name is R. E. Combs, and my address is 415 West Race Street, Visalia, California.

2. Colonel West. And what is your occupation?

Mr. Combs. I am an attorney-at-law.

3. General Grunert. Mr. Combs, General Frank, assisted by Major Clausen, will lead in this particular part of the investigation.

Mr. Combs. Very well, General.

4. Major Clausen. Mr. Combs, did you conduct an investigation concerning the activities of one Colonel Wyman and Hans Wilhelm Rohl, in connection with the activities of the California State Legislature's Joint Fact-Finding Committee on un-American Activities?

Mr. Combs. Yes, sir; I did.

5. Major Clausen. And would you state in a general way how you happened to conduct the investigation, so far as it related to Colonel Wyman.

Mr. Combs. Yes, sir. Mr. W. Bruce Pine, who I understand testified before this Board recently, became a volunteer special investigator for this committee, early in February 1942, following a hearing which the committee held in San Diego. Pine, who had resided in Beverly Hills for a number of years, had a casual social acquaintance with Rohl—that is Hans Wilhelm Rohl—and he related to me early in
1942—I don’t remember the exact date—that he had occasion to go to Newport Harbor Yacht Club, where he overheard a conversation by someone, during which the statement was made in substance that Rohl had become involved in some difficulty concerning some subversive activities in connection with the installation of certain projects for the Army in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor.

Pine conducted a sort of desultory investigation on his own for two or three days, and then he informed me of the results of that investigation; and one of the things that he ascertained was that Rohl did not become a citizen until about two and a half months prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor. Rohl was a resident of southern California, and had been, ever since 1925; and this committee being charged by the Legislature \(^2\) with the investigation of any subversive activity concluded it would investigate Rohl; particularly so, when Pine recalled that he had seen Rohl in company with a man by the name of Werner Plack, who had been an employee of the German vice consulate in Los Angeles under Doctor Gyssling, who went from Los Angeles to Japan and thence to Germany, and was given a rather responsible position in the German foreign office, censoring short-wave radio broadcasts that emanated from Berlin; so I authorized Pine to make a preliminary investigation, which he did.

In the course of the investigation, he inspected the records of the Immigration and Naturalization service in Los Angeles, and I also did, later, several times, made copies of the documents that were contained in the files, some of which later were missing, and as far as I know still are; went to San Pedro and checked the manifests on two of Rohl’s boats, the RAMONA and the VEGA; and our interest in the matter of course was primarily centered on the alleged subversive activities of Hans Wilhelm Rohl, a resident of southern California, rather than on the activities of Colonel Wyman, which we considered, as far as we were concerned, of corollary and secondary interest to us, but which of course were involved.

We worked on the case from some time early in February 1942 until the date of our hearing on February 23, 1943. After that, there was some publicity given to the case, in the press. The hearing was closed to the public, but it was not a privileged hearing, as we were informed by the Legislative Counsel Bureau of the State Legislature, because the hearing was opened to the press, and through the medium of the press, the information \(^3\) concerning the proceedings was available to the public. We anticipated that some appropriate federal action would be forthcoming, by reason of the revelations made in the hearing, because we were convinced that each and every misrepresentation as to citizenship was a separate federal offence, each falsification as to citizenship, on the income-tax returns of Rohl, was a federal offence; his ownership of a boat in excess of 75 feet in length was a federal offence; his illegal entries into the United States were federal offences; and we felt that he had possibly had access to certain secret Army installations, and naval installations, too, for that matter, prior to his becoming a citizen, which was a violation of the statute of the United States Code, annotated, which was quoted during the course of the hearing of February 23, 1943; but nothing was forthcoming, until late in 1943, when Mr. Fulton Lewis arrived in Los Angeles, for the purpose of going into the case and making some broadcasts on the
case, based on the transcript of our hearing, if he found it expedient; which he did; and which whipped the case into considerable prominence. Mr. Weiner, as a result of Mr. Lewis's activity, directly came to Los Angeles. Mr. Pine and I worked with Mr. Weiner for several weeks.

6. Major Clausen. You mean Mr. Weiner, of the House Military Affairs Committee?

Mr. Combs. Yes, sir. And it was then that we began to concentrate a little more on Colonel Wyman's relations with Rohl with reference to their installations, than we had, theretofore. When Weiner returned to Washington, we continued our activities in the case. We interviewed I should say roughly about a hundred additional witnesses, took affidavits from those [2151] who seemed most credible and whose information seemed most applicable. We checked the records of various hotels that Wyman had occupied with Rohl, with the idea in mind of placing them together if possible during the preliminary negotiations for the basic contract of December 20, 1940; and shortly prior to its consummation on that date, in Washington. We checked additional telephone records. We interviewed a great many people who had worked in Pearl Harbor, in addition to those whose names were given to Mr. Weiner when he was out there, and we discontinued our active work on the case on or about the 14th day of June of this year, when the House Military Affairs Committee made public their findings and recommendation.

7. Major Clausen. Mr. Combs, since the House Military Affairs Committee made its report, dated June 14, 1944, has your committee, or have you, yourself, continued the investigation so as to uncover additional evidence?

Mr. Combs. To some extent, Major; yes.

8. Major Clausen. And does that additional evidence to some extent relate to Colonel Wyman?

Mr. Combs. Yes, sir.

9. Major Clausen. Then, specifically, may I ask this: whether you have any additional evidence, other than what might be available to this Board, as furnished by the House Military Affairs Committee, concerning the relationship between Wyman and Rohl, in Los Angeles, before Colonel Wyman was assigned to the Hawaiian Department?

Mr. Combs. Yes, sir; we do have quite a good deal of additional evidence. You see, sir, when Weiner returned to Washington, which was in December of last year, we continued our [2152] investigation up to the 14th of June of this year, and it was during that interval that we developed some additional information concerning the relationship between Rohl and Wyman, that, so far as we know, the House Military Affairs Committee does not have.

10. Major Clausen. Specifically, could you give the Board a very brief statement as to what the findings would be of yourself in that regard, and what leads or affidavits you might have, which could be furnished to the Board?

Mr. Combs. I jotted down some notes, if I may refer to them, from my files, before I came up.


Mr. Combs. It was after Weiner returned to Washington that we obtained two, and I think, three, but I am sure of two affidavits, from
Madeline Ferguson, who was the nurse for Rohl in the Hawaiian Islands and after he came to California, and in her presence, Rohl and his associates expressed apprehension of an FBI investigation of the relationship between Rohl and Wyman, and the manner in which the contract was being handled. This was prior to our hearing on February 23, 1943, and Miss Ferguson was not interviewed by Weiner, and we didn't know about her until after he had left; and as a matter of fact, she was accused point-blank of being an FBI agent; that she had insinuated herself into the confidences of Rohl and his associates, and had attended various of their parties, and so on, and had gotten a good deal of information that they became apprehensive about; so, after she had heard them express apprehension about some sort of federal investigation—and they mentioned the FBI—a few days after that, according to her affidavit, she [2433] was called into Rohl's presence and accused of being an FBI agent.

12. Major Clausen. Would you make those affidavits available to the Board by sending them to me?

Mr. Combs. Yes, sir; I will be glad to. I would like to send you the original and a copy, and have the original returned, if that would meet your purposes.


Mr. Combs. We have to attach the original to the report as an exhibit, that is the reason.


Now, do you have any additional evidence on that same point, as to the relationship which existed between Rohl and Wyman, before Wyman was assigned to the Hawaiian Department, other than the affidavits of Madeline Ferguson?

Mr. Combs. Yes, sir; we do.

There is a witness, whose name I can't recall, off-hand, that we interviewed after Weiner had returned to Washington. He lives in Long Beach. He was a publicity man for William Wrigley in connection with Wrigley's enterprise at Catalina Island, and it was on Catalina Island that Rohl-Connolly Company had some rock quarries. Rock from those quarries was used to cap the breakwater at San Pedro, and according to testimony of engineers who should know, the thing isn't very satisfactory.

15. General Frank. The breakwater is not very satisfactory?

Mr. Combs. The rock that caps it, General. It melts away and has to be constantly replaced, and there was a bid submitted, for another type of rock which had been very highly [2434] recommended, and that bid was rejected by Wyman in favor of the Rohl rock, and the first trip that Wyman made with Rohl, when Wyman was a Captain, and came, I think it was either late in July or early in August, 1935, was over to the islands to inspect that rock with Rohl. The affidavit of Nils Olson, who was the steward aboard the RAMONA at that time, will show that Rohl told his steward, in effect, that he had an extremely important and influential business associate who was to come on board the yacht on that occasion, and who should be treated with every deference and courtesy; and Olson, of course, acceded, and they did go over and inspect the rock, and later went over, a subsequent time, and inspected the rock, and on the second occasion they stayed over the week end, and it was then, I believe, if
my memory is correct on it, or shortly thereafter, that they met this witness that we interviewed. The witness went on several parties with Rohl and Wyman, and related to us in substance some of their conversation, and we considered it as being somewhat significant as a link in the background of what we considered the process by which Wyman was softened up by Rohl.

16. Major Clausen. Do you have any evidence, Mr. Combs, concerning the question as to whether Colonel Wyman exceeded his salary or earnings as an Army officer, in the time that he was at Los Angeles, prior to the time he went to Hawaii?

Mr. Combs. Yes, sir; we do.

17. Major Clausen. And could you give the Board some idea of what that evidence consists?

Mr. Combs. Yes, sir.

18. Major Clausen. And whether or not that can be made available to the Board?

Mr. Combs. Yes, sir. I checked Wyman's bank account, both while Weiner was here and afterwards, because he didn't have time to check it in very much detail. I also went out to the Jantz Realty Company at Westwood and checked their record. Pardon me. First, I went to the recorders' and assessors' and tax collectors' offices in Los Angeles, to check all of the property owned either by Wyman, his present wife, or his ex-wife, and then I went to the Jantz Investment Company and checked the escrow transaction which involved the purchase of the $16,000 home at 221 Woodruff Street in Westwood. I then made a complete check, which information Weiner does not have, of the clubs and fraternal and social organizations that Colonel Wyman affiliated with shortly after he met Rohl, and I checked each and every expenditure at each of those clubs, which of course showed the days that he was there. I do not know whether you have this or not. They included the Los Angeles Athletic Club, the Los Angeles Country Club, the California Club, the University Club, the Bel-Air Bay Club, the Hollywood Athletic Club, the Hollywood Country Club, and the Jonathan Club, in Los Angeles—his expenditures at those clubs. I bore in mind, of course, that being an Army Officer, the initiation fee or dues would be negligible, and we were interested primarily in the actual expenditures that were made, and they were considerable.

The home in Westwood was purchased with funds that were explained by Mrs. Wyman, but the upkeep of the home and the elevated social position that the possession and the operation of such a home entailed, involved a considerable expenditure.

19. Major Clausen. With respect to some of the entertainment of Colonel Wyman by Mr. Rohl, did you check as to the approximate cost of such entertainment in the Biltmore Hotel?

Mr. Combs. Yes, sir. And after Weiner left we also checked some of the affairs in both the St. Francis and Palace Hotels in this city.

20. Major Clausen. You mean affairs similar to the entertainment of Colonel Wyman by Rohl in the Biltmore Hotel at Los Angeles?

Mr. Combs. Yes, sir.

21. Major Clausen. Occurred here in San Francisco?

Mr. Combs. Yes, sir.

22. Major Clausen. That evidence is available in what form, Mr. Combs?
Mr. Combs. Statements and affidavits by employees of the hotel.

23. Major Clausen. Can you give me also some brief idea as to the nature of that evidence and as to the times when that entertainment occurred?

Mr. Combs. I wouldn't—I would hesitate to do that, Major, from my memory, because I don't remember the dates. There were a great many dates. On some occasions Wyman was present and on many others he was not, but the parties continued whether he was there or whether he wasn't. They were just stepped up a bit, apparently, when he was there. But we do know that Rohl's expenditures at the Palace Hotel where he stayed with the greatest regularity were considerable. For example, he registered at the Palace Hotel on December 14, 1940, in suite 8064-6, which was a very luxurious suite, at $35 a day. He got a rate, by the way. And he was also registered there on January 14, 1941, in the same suite, 8064-6, at $41 a day, which indicates that he had guests.

24. Major Clausen. Now, during that particular period, that is, December 1940, have you ascertained whether Colonel Wyman was in the company of Mr. Rohl in Los Angeles?

Mr. Combs. In San Francisco, you mean, Major?

25. Major Clausen. Yes, in Los Angeles, and in San Francisco also.

Mr. Combs. I don't know as to Los Angeles, Major, but we have information that he was present in San Francisco.

26. Major Clausen. With Mr. Rohl?

Mr. Combs. Yes, sir.

27. Major Clausen. And in what form is that evidence?

Mr. Combs. Statement by Mrs. Rohl.

28. Major Clausen. A statement by Mrs. Rohl. Can you give some brief idea as to the nature of that testimony?

Mr. Combs. No, sir. I am sorry I can't. In substance she stated that she knew that her husband left for San Francisco to meet Wyman and with Connolly—that is Thomas E. Connolly—to discuss the preliminary negotiations for the contract of December 20, 1940; that Rohl did leave for San Francisco, and when he came back he told her that he had discussed the contract with Wyman and with Connolly.

And if I may interject a thought of my own there, I prepared a series of questions to be propounded to Thomas Connolly by Weiner, and Weiner took the list of questions and went to San Francisco—came to San Francisco, and was unsuccessful, in his opinion and in mine, in really getting into the meat of the thing to find out the occasions when Connolly and Wyman and Rohl were together discussing the essential matters that were called for by the contract of December 20th, and in my opinion that has never been done. We worked for months and months with the F. B. I. in this case, as we do in all cases, and in my own opinion I don't think that the case has been exhausted by any means, with regard particularly to the question of whether Rohl did or did not have access to the basic information set forth in that—or called for by that contract; and I think the chief telephone operator of the Palace Hotel, who was so intimately acquainted with Rohl that she would on her own initiative call up nurses to come and nurse him through his somewhat frequent hangovers, and who is now residing in San Francisco but no longer in the employ of the hotel, would be a very, very valuable witness, and so far as I know she has never been contacted by anyone.
29. Major Clausen. Would you furnish the Board her name, please? Mr. Combs. Gladly, and her address.
30. Major Clausen. And also the statement by Mrs. Rohl?
   Mr. Combs. Yes, sir.
31. Major Clausen. And also the additional affidavits concerning the San Francisco relationship?
   Mr. Combs. Yes, sir. I have the man's name in Long Beach that I didn't recall a while ago. His name is Norman Kint, K-i-n-t.
32. Major Clausen. And he was a man who had some evidence concerning the rock?
   Mr. Combs. Concerning the rock and the conversations of Rohl and Wyman and their relationship during the summer of 1935.
33. Major Clausen. Now, in addition to the testimony of Mr. Rohl given before your committee on February 27, 1943, do you have any evidence as to whether Colonel Wyman was informed prior to the signing of the basic contract that Mr. Rohl was an alien?
   Mr. Combs. Yes, sir.
34. Major Clausen. In what form is that evidence?
   Mr. Combs. I believe it's in the form of a letter. I am quite sure it's either a letter or two letters or a wire, but we have it available. The file, the material we collected, is quite voluminous over a period of over two years, and I don't recall really just what form it is, but I am positive we have such information.
35. Major Clausen. Will you make that available also to the Board, Mr. Combs?
   Mr. Combs. Yes, sir.
36. Major Clausen. Now, would you inform the Board as to the—
37. General Frank. Just a minute. A little while ago you gave us a list of the clubs that you investigated in Los Angeles.
   Mr. Combs. Yes, sir.
38. General Frank. You didn't make the direct statement, and therefore I would like to ask the direct question: Did you find that Colonel Wyman was a member of each one of those clubs that you enumerated?
   Mr. Combs. He was a member of each of those clubs with the exception of two. One of them was the Jonathan Club, and the other was the University Club, and at those two clubs he lived for periods of time and made considerable expenditures. He was a member of each of the other clubs that I mentioned.
39. General Frank. In this investigation did you get any record of his expenditures there?
   Mr. Combs. Yes, sir; we got a record of his expenditures at each of those clubs.
40. General Frank. Do you have those available?
   Mr. Combs. Yes, sir.
41. General Frank. Will you make those available to the Board?
   Mr. Combs. Yes, sir.
42. General Frank. Such information along that line that you have?
   Mr. Combs. Yes, sir.
43. Major Clausen. Sir, I am going to ask you this question: whether you determined in your own mind, from your investigation, as to whether there was a contrast between the activities of Colonel Wyman after he became associated with Mr. Rohl, as compared to his
previous services in the Army; whether you are able to say anything as to that.

Mr. Combs. Yes, sir; I was very forcibly impressed by it. I mentioned it to both Weiner and Pine about the middle of our investigation when Weiner was out here. It seemed to me that an interesting highlight of the entire investigation, at least as far as I was concerned, was the striking contrast in the tastes and personal characteristics between Wyman and Rohl up to their meeting in the summer of 1935 and immediately afterwards.

[2447] Rohl, on the one hand—of course this is just my own impression of the thing—came into this country in 1913, and he started his career by siring four illegitimate children in Sacramento. He adopted a consistent and very often a stubborn pattern of concealing his alien status; whether deliberately or not, of course, I don't know; I am not able to prove. In my opinion he did it deliberately.

When the Ramona came from Acapulco to Los Angeles in '33, his name was missing from the manifest, although the other members of the crew and the passengers' names appeared. When the Vega sailed through the Panama Canal and docked at Honolulu late in 1937, he was faced with a situation wherein for the first time he was compelled to make a categorical statement whether he was or was not a citizen, so he made a statement that he was born in Iola, Kansas, which was the birthplace of his wife, and although the date of his birth appeared correctly in the manifest, September 29, 1886.

There were many other occasions, of course, with which no doubt you are familiar. The next time he was faced with the necessity of making a categorical statement was in making his federal income tax returns during the period when they required a statement as to citizenship, and year after year he swore, and I have seen these income tax statements myself, that he was an American citizen, and on one occasion he said that he was naturalized on—well, I wouldn't want to give the exact date, but the precise date of his naturalization is set forth. In a preliminary statement to the Immigration and Naturalization officials he stated that he had been naturalized. He later repudiated that statement. So all through his career he [2442] apparently adopted a pattern of concealing that alien status, and one of the intriguing questions corollary to the investigation was why he did that. We have some ideas. Whether or not they are correct, of course, I don't know.

44. Major Clausen. What are your ideas, Mr. Combs?

Mr. Combs. My idea is that Rohl was essentially a stiff-necked, very proud, and somewhat overbearing Prussian, extremely proud of his father, who, as I understand it, was an instructor in a technical school in Hamburg; of his family.

He stated one time when he was drunk that he was a German agent, to a fellow employee up in the vicinity of Bear River in Northern California. He boasted of his acquaintance with officials of the German Government. He associated with Werner Plack, as we know. And there were a lot of other things that he did that I didn't consider important enough to mention to anybody, but they are little things that, when they are all added up, are a pretty good indication, in my opinion, of the man's over-all characteristics, of his basic inclinations; and I think Rohl thought too little of this country and too much of his own to bother to apply for citizenship; and when he was faced
with the necessity of either becoming a citizen or foregoing a lush contract that was dangled before him, it then occurred to him to become a citizen.

There were other things that I thought might possibly be of some significance. There is a footnote on page 31 of a book by Michael Sayre called Sabotage, which relates how a German agent by the name of Von der Osten came to this country from Japan in March 1941; March 16, 1941. Two days later he [243] was hit and killed in Times Square, New York, by a taxicab. The F. B. I. traced his residence to the Taft Hotel in New York, and there they found a sketch of the installations the were called for by the contract of December 20, 1940, with a written notation on the bottom of it, "This will be of interest to our yellow friends." Von der Osten was a known German agent, a very important one. He worked under a man by the name of Ludwig.

In my opinion, Rohl was the type of a person who, if the monetary return would be great enough, wouldn't hesitate for a minute to make the information available. Of course, that again is my own idea, but I can't help but draw that conclusion from some of the other things that existed in the case. Of course, this is only a possibility, and in my opinion it is a rather remote one, but it still is a possibility.

We have a great many witnesses—we have statements from a great many witnesses whom I consider of terrific importance in connection with the manner in which the work was accomplished in the Hawaiian Islands, not King and Wickiser, the man whom Weiner interviewed, but we interviewed I guess about fifty men who worked in the aircraft warning tunnels, men who moved a concrete building six inches after the floor and the walls and ceiling had been poured and had set; B-17 hangars that were all ballixed up, according to the testimony of men who should be in a position to know. We have affidavits from civilian employees of the Engineering Corps who worked not only in Honolulu under Wyman and Rohl but also in Edmonton and some other cantons in Christmas Islands and some of them in Alaska. We have a great number. Some of these [244] men kept guest books and diaries, and so forth, that they made available to us. All of that information has come to us since Weiner left, and I don't believe—I am not so sure that he does not have any of that information.

45. Major Clausen. You have made that distinction several times as to something that you now have which you did not have when Weiner left.

Mr. Combs. Yes, sir.

46. Major Clausen. You say that, do you, because the report of the House Military Affairs Committee dated June 14, 1944, from a reading of it by you, is essentially based on the evidence that was uncovered by Mr. Weiner when he worked in conjunction with you here in California?

Mr. Combs. Yes, sir.

47. Major Clausen. Is that correct?

Mr. Combs. Yes, sir.

48. Major Clausen. And therefore, for example, these affidavits as to delays in the defense projects in Hawaii would be in the nature of additional and new evidence?

Mr. Combs. Yes, sir.
49. Major Clausen. I was going to explore that field a little later. I didn’t interrupt you. Would you now go back to my previous question as to whether you have, from the evidence, seen indications that Colonel Wyman, then Captain or Major Wyman, when he reported to Los Angeles, was theretofore not the same character of individual that he was when he later came under the influence of Mr. Rohl?

Mr. Combs. Yes, sir; I am sorry I got off the point.

50. Major Clausen. Yes.

[2447] Mr. Combs. From our information, prior to the time he met Rohl, Wyman was a very capable and hard-working engineer, devoted to his family. He had been married nearly thirty years in 1935. His family consisted of his wife and his daughter Jane, and he was rather conservative and steady in his tastes.

Rohl, on the other hand, was almost diametrically opposed in his personal tastes. He was a sort of middle-aged man-about-town in Southern California, a lavish entertainer, a lavish spender. He would charter an entire commercial airliner, a 21-passenger plane, to fly from one place to another because he didn’t want to be bothered with anyone else aboard. When he entered the Biltmore Hotel, according to the information that we have from the employees, all the other guests’ luggage would thump to the floor while the bellboys made a dash for Rohl to escort him to the elevator and get one of those fifty-dollar tips. Special songs were composed in his honor when he went to some night clubs that he frequented, and one that we know of, and others that we have heard of, and the entertainment would stop while they would sing this song. He was simply that kind of a man, a lavish spender, drank to excess.

But after Wyman met Rohl, Wyman’s tastes ran peculiarly parallel to Rohl’s, and he drifted away from the wife that he had been married to for thirty years, and she obtained a divorce on the ground of incompatibility, in Nevada. He commenced an affair with the sister of his deceased office secretary. He went on these parties with Rohl, some of which ran into the thousands of dollars. They were constantly getting in fights and brawls at night clubs, led the band, and [2446] tipped the waiters hundred-dollar bills at the time; and among many affidavits of guests who were aboard both the Ramona and the Vega they tell of the almost constant run of parties that the two men went on. An affidavit from Wyman’s driver, which I think Weiner had, would bear that out, as would the testimony of this man Kint in Long Beach that I mentioned.

51. Major Clausen. I just wanted to ask you one question concerning this boast of Rohl that he was a German agent. Do you know to whom that was made?

Mr. Combs. I have the name, yes, sir. I don’t recall it offhand.

52. Major Clausen. Would you furnish that to the Board?

Mr. Combs. Yes, sir.

53. Major Clausen. Now, specifically regarding these delays in the construction work in Hawaii, would you furnish the Board the affidavits or statements that you mentioned in your testimony?

Mr. Combs. Yes, sir.

54. Major Clausen. Does your committee have evidence as to whether after Rohl was awarded this contract he was in communication with his associates concerning the plans before he was naturalized?
Mr. Combs. I don't think so. We have evidence, considerable evidence, that he was in communication with his associates both within two days prior to the signing of the contract and very frequently thereafter, between December 20th and September 15th, 1941; but as to what the substance of the conversations was we have no evidence except, of course, inferential evidence.

[2447] 55. General Frank. Did you ever see this basic contract?
Mr. Combs. No, sir.
56. General Frank. You are not familiar with the fact that the basic contract itself does not contain details?
Mr. Combs. Yes, I am. I understand they are set forth in the supplements.
57. General Frank. They are set forth in the job orders?
Mr. Combs. Yes, sir.
58. General Frank. Therefore, he might have complete knowledge of the basic contract and still not have very information?
Mr. Combs. Yes, I understand. We do have some evidence, I might say, that prior to December 20th, 1941, he did have conversations in which some details of the installations were discussed. What those details were I do not recall, but I would be glad to make that information available to you. We do have the substance of one specific conversation between Wyman and Rohl prior to December 20th, 1940, in which some of the details that were called for in the contract and its supplements were discussed.
59. Major Clausen. You will make that available to the Board?
Mr. Combs. Yes, sir.
60. General Grunert. Wait a minute. You said prior to December 20th, 1941.
Mr. Combs. 1940.
61. General Grunert. How could any settlements prior to that be discussed, when the basic contract had not yet been signed?
Mr. Combs. What I meant to say, General, was this: that the substance of the conversation that occurred prior to [2448] December 20th, 1940 between Wyman in Honolulu and Rohl in Los Angeles concerned some of the installations that were thereafter called for by the contract of December 20th, 1940 and its supplements.
62. General Grunert. Then I understand that possibly Wyman gave to Rohl some information about what was to take place later under the contract?
Mr. Combs. Yes, sir.
63. Major Clausen. Now, specifically with regard to these delays again, is there anything additional that you can tell the Board?
Mr. Combs. No, sir; I think not, with the exception of the statement, which I think I already made, that there are some 50 witnesses, I would say, on hand, all of whose statements I consider are of considerable value in connection with delays, men who were employed in building the project.
64. Major Clausen. Do you have any additional comments on your written statement which bear upon the mission of this Board?
Mr. Combs. I don't think so, sir.
65. Major Clausen. That is all that I have.
66. General Russell: In connection with this investigation, of course, you seem to have developed rather fully Rohl's history and
operations, socially and otherwise, in Los Angeles. Was he regarded in that area as an outstanding contractor?

Mr. Combs. It is a rather difficult question to answer, General. He was regarded as a man who was capable of good engineering work.

67. General Russell. He seemed to have spent a lot of money.

Did that create in your mind an impression that he had been a successful man, making all of this money during this war?

Mr. Combs. No, sir.

68. General Russell. What was the thought about where that money came from?

Mr. Combs. I concluded that he got it when he went to Germany in 1924, or arranged to get it.

69. General Russell. There have been some suggestions or evidence from which the impression could be drawn that he made a lot of money out of that breakwater contract at Los Angeles. Did your investigation develop anything about that?

Mr. Combs. Yes, sir; it did. He made a categorical statement to a man by the name of Staub that he did not make any money out of the Los Angeles breakwater.

70. General Russell. In this investigation where you developed these affidavits did you or your associates attempt to determine the state of feeling of these people who gave the affidavits as to whether or not they were disgruntled or had any personal views which might have influenced their statements?

Mr. Combs. Yes, sir.

71. General Russell. You regard those people as being reliable people, without bias?

Mr. Combs. Those from whom we took affidavits I am satisfied are completely unbiased. There were some of them who were obviously disgruntled for personal reasons and from whom we took no affidavits for that reason.

72. General Russell. I think that is all.

73. Colonel Toulmin. Mr. Combs, as I understand it, you are a member of the bar?

Mr. Combs. Yes, sir.

74. Colonel Toulmin. As a lawyer, we would like to have you prepare a lawyer's statement, in the form of possibly a brief, outlining exactly the information that has now come to you which has not been used heretofore before other investigating committees or boards, as to two things:

First, the relationship of Rohl to the contract for construction in Hawaii, both prior to December 1940 and subsequent to that date, with particular reference to his knowledge of the details of that construction and with particular reference to the changes, alterations, delays and other difficulties with the construction, with which Rohl had some connection or part.

Second, a statement of the relationship between Colonel Wyman and Rohl both before and after that contract, with respect to his operations under the contract or proposed operations under the contract.

Can you do that?

Mr. Combs. Yes, sir; I can do it, but it will take some time, for this reason: We intend to have a hearing or a series of hearings commenc-
ing this month, both here and elsewhere in the State, involving mat-
ters on which we have been working for some time and on which I
came to San Francisco on this trip, incidentally to this hearing, of
course, to prepare. I will be in San Francisco probably ten days or so
working on those things and then I am due in Los Angeles to set up a
series of hearings down there. My files relating to the Rohl Case and
all of the photostats and documents, and so on in connection with it
that have been accumulated since about March, 1942, are at my home
in Visalia. If they were here I could do the things that you ask me to do in a comparatively short time, in connection with other
work.

75. Colonel Toulmin. We want just a summary letter.

Mr. Combs. Yes; I understand. I would not feel that the letter
would be very helpful to you unless I could refer to the sources of proof
on which the statements in the letter would be based and, unfortu-
nately, those sources are not here. They are at my home and locked
up, scattered through a dozen different files pertaining to the Rohl
Case. So in order to prepare such a statement I would have to have access to that material so that the thing would be factual and helpful.

76. General Frank. Could you prepare that statement and have it
available to use by September 22nd?

Mr. Combs. No, sir; I think not; not unless I had the files. I prob-
ably will be in the middle of hearings by that time. We have one on
the Political Action Committee; we have one on the Hindu Gadar
party, and others. I have to write the trial brief and have the wit-
nesses subpoenaed and the hearings prepared.

77. General Frank. It is highly desirable that this Board have
that information.

Mr. Combs. Yes; I understand.

78. General Frank. Because we considered that rather vital testi-
mony.

Mr. Combs. Yes, sir.

79. General Frank. If you could throw some extra effort into mak-
ing that available it would be appreciated.

Mr. Combs. If I could get that file up here, General, I could prepare
such a statement.

[2452] 80. General Frank. Is not the means available to you to get
the file?

Mr. Combs. Yes, but it would take me about two or three days to
get a reservation back and then I have to get another one back here.

81. General Frank. Where is Visalia?

Mr. Combs. It is about 190 miles from here.

82. General Grunert. Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

83. General Russell. You are continuing your association with the
committee that you testified about here this morning?

Mr. Combs. Yes, sir.

84. General Russell. Does that committee plan any further investi-
gation of this man Rohl?

Mr. Combs. Yes, sir.

85. General Russell. Do you expect, if the evidence warrants it, to
take any action, criminal or otherwise, with respect to him?
Mr. Combs. We are unable legally to do so, General, for this reason: Our committee is a fact-finding committee and, as such, we have a great deal of latitude in the ascertainment of facts. We are not bound by the rules of evidence. We can ask leading questions. Witnesses are not permitted the advice of counsel during hearings. We enjoy immunity from either prosecution or suit for slander or libel. But we have no power to do anything except ascertain facts and to make our records available to the appropriate federal or State agencies for such action as may be appropriate. That, we have done.

86. General Russell. Do you mean in the Rohl Case you have [2453] done that already?

Mr. Combs. Yes, sir. We have made our information available, first, to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, to the War Frauds Division of the Department of Justice, through Mr. Harrington's office in Los Angeles; we have made it available to the House Military Affairs Committee, which is also a fact-finding body; but we have made it available to every agency that we thought could do anything about it, and we have also made it available to the United States Attorney's office.

87. General Russell. And nothing has been done yet?

Mr. Combs. Nothing except lapsing of the statutes of limitations which would bar prosecution. They are being chopped off day by day.

88. Colonel Toulmin. What is your explanation of why the Department of Justice does not take action?

Mr. Combs. I don't know, sir. I can only give you my own idea.

89. Major Clausen. I have one more question for the record which is merely a high light. In the investigation which you have made of files of Immigration and Naturalization did you discover that certain letters were missing?

Mr. Combs. Yes, sir.

90. Major Clausen. And what were those letters that you could not find?

Mr. Combs. One of them, I am positive, was a letter or a wire from Wyman to some official in the Immigration and Naturalization stating that Rohl was an alien and asking that his application for citizenship be expedited.

91. Major Clausen. How did you know it was missing?

[2454] Mr. Combs. I read it and copied part of it before it was missing.

92. Major Clausen. That is all.

93. General Grunert. That was missing from the files of the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization?

Mr. Combs. Yes, sir; together with several other documents.

94. Colonel Toulmin. State, first, when you examined the file and found the Wyman communication in it.

Mr. Combs. I can only approximate the date from memory, but it was some time during the summer of 1942.

95. Colonel Toulmin. Now state when you looked at the file again and found it gone.

Mr. Combs. Shortly before the hearing in February of 1943.

96. General Grunert. Are there any further questions?
97. Major Clausen. No, I have none, sir. Mr. Combs, would you be available perhaps for rebuttal testimony in the event it becomes necessary in about two weeks or so?

Mr. Combs. If our hearings have been concluded, Major. I will be.

98. Major Clausen. All right, sir.

99. General Grunert. Mr. Combs, do you think of anything else that might be of assistance to the Board that has not come up, that will not be covered in your statement, plus the evidence that you are going to submit, that you think you should bring to the attention of the Board?

Mr. Combs. No, sir. I would like to make one statement off the record, if I may, General.

100. General Grunert. All right. Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

101. General Grunert. Thank you very much, Mr. Combs.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

[2455]

TESTIMONY OF REA B. WICKISER, LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel West. Mr. Wickiser, will you state to the Board your full name and address, please.

Mr. Wickiser. Rea B. Wickiser. I live at 1522 Rodney Drive, in Los Angeles.

2. Colonel West. What is your occupation?

Mr. Wickiser. My occupation is construction. I am principally a tunnel man.

3. General Grunert. Mr. Wickiser, General Frank assisted by Major Clausen will open up this special investigation that we want as far as you are concerned, and the rest of us will ask questions to fill out if needed, so I will turn you over to General Frank, here.

4. Major Clausen. Mr. Wickiser, would you give the Board some details on your background in construction work, please.

Mr. Wickiser. Well, I came out of school in 1931, and I went to Boulder Dam, worked on the tunnels at Boulder Dam, worked as laborer, and a miner, worked on the concrete work there, and underground, and high-scaling; and I went from there down on the southern California aqueduct and the tunnels there. I worked on several different jobs on the aqueduct, and went down as a shift boss, general foreman at Parker, on the diversion tunnels there, and about that time the Aliamau Crater job in Honolulu came up, and I went to Honolulu under—at that time, it was Captain Hill, the Army Engineers, and drove the storage tunnels there, and I was general tunnel foreman on that job, and I came back from there, and worked at PG&E for a very short time, and I worked on the Pennsylvania turnpike, where I was superintendent of West Portal for Guthrie, Marsh-Peterson, and from there I came back, went down to Parker Dam again and drove the four penstock tunnels for the State of California. The contractor was C. W. Wood; and from there I went to Camp San Luis Obispo, where I was in charge of excavation, quarries. Then I went
to Honolulu for the Territory Airport Constructors; and I think that was in June or in July of 1941.
3. General Frank. Is this a chronological statement?
   Mr. Wickiser. Well, approximately so. I don't remember dates.
4. General Frank. When did you get out of college?
   Mr. Wickiser. 1931.
5. General Frank. What college?
   Mr. Wickiser. Heidelberg College, at Tiffin, Ohio.
6. Major Clausen. In connection with your work in the Hawaiian Islands, did you meet a Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr.?
   Mr. Wickiser. Not personally, no.
7. Major Clausen. Was the work that you were doing at that time work in connection with the contract of the Hawaiian Constructors?
   Mr. Wickiser. When I first went there you mean, sir?
8. Major Clausen. When you first went there, you were working for the Territory Airport Constructors, is that correct?
   Mr. Wickiser. That's right.
9. Major Clausen. You signed that contract for your participation in that, on July 18, 1941?
   Mr. Wickiser. That is right, sir.
10. Major Clausen. At the time war broke out, I was taken over by Hawaiian Constructors, because Territory Airport Constructors had their contract cancelled, and Hawaiian Constructors took over all the personnel of the Territory Airport Constructors.
11. Major Clausen. Now, you are familiar with some of these defense projects in the Hawaiian Islands that were constructed by the Hawaiian Constructors?
   Mr. Wickiser. Yes; I am, sir.
12. Major Clausen. And you then, later, went to work in connection with the Hawaiian Constructors' contract?
   Mr. Wickiser. At the time war broke out, I was taken over by Hawaiian Constructors, because Territory Airport Constructors had their contract cancelled, and Hawaiian Constructors took over all the personnel of the Territory Airport Constructors.
13. Major Clausen. Now, you are familiar with some of these defense projects in the Hawaiian Islands that were constructed by the Hawaiian Constructors?
   Mr. Wickiser. Yes; I am, sir.
14. Major Clausen. And in particular, do you know of the runway on which the grades were changed nine times by the Army engineers?
   Mr. Wickiser. Allow me to make myself very clear. Now, I see that you are reciting or reading here from testimony that was taken by Mr. Weimer or Weiner, I believe it was. That is pertaining to the runways at Hilo, the Hilo airport. Now, there were no changes, up until after the war had come upon us down there, because the company that I was with down there, prior to December 7, had a unit-price contract for that job, and they had plans that they had bid on; and you just don't move in and change work on that type of a contract; but as soon as the contract was taken over by Hawaiian Constructors, which was a cost-plus-fixed-fee contract, then we were operating directly under the engineers; and they were changed nine times, at that time.
   I might draw a picture of that, so that you are familiar with it. They had an idea that they might have to move out of that country in a hurry, and they wanted to wreck the airport, so there were boxes that were placed. Theoretically, the tops of these boxes were even with or at the top of the surface of the runways, and then in these boxes there were supposed to be bombs placed, that they could demolish their runways. Well, these boxes were wooden, and as the runway elevation was changed, your boxes had to be sawed off or raised with the elevations of your runways, and they were changed nine times, because I changed those boxes on those runways nine
different times. As a matter of fact, they got so that I just threw up my hands. I couldn't keep up with them from day to day. I would get half of them changed, then there would be a new program tomorrow morning; and I just got "fed up" on it, and I got on a plane and went to Honolulu; yes, that's true. I think that elaborates a little bit on that, and explains.

15. General Frank. What was the occasion of all these changes, once they had determined the grade?

Mr. Wickiser. Well, sir, you would have to get someone in the engineering department, the U. S. E. D., to find that, because we simply operated upon directives from the engineering department, from the engineers, the Army engineers.

16. General Frank. I am trying to get an opinion from you, as an engineer. After the grade had been once established, was there any necessity for changing it to put these boxes in?

Mr. Wickiser. I am not an airport engineer, to begin with. I am a construction man. I don't know what the "powers to be" down there had in mind.

17. General Frank. Was there anything about the subsoil that required a changing of the grade, to put the boxes in there?

Mr. Wickiser. No. There is a cut-and-fill problem on most of those boxes, but in the area where the boxes were changed, was through the intersection of these runways. Now, had there been a change in plans to balance the cut-and-fill on out at the end of runways, it would have certainly affected the intersection of the runways; if there was a maximum grade or minimum grade that they had to hold to for those runways, it would have; but once it was determined, sir, there would be no reason for it. If they had a plan, a master plan that they were going by, what they wanted, there was no reason in the world for it.

18. General Grunert. But this was all after December 7, 1941?

Mr. Wickiser. Immediately after.

19. General Grunert. Immediately after?

Mr. Wickiser. And not before.


21. Major Clausen. Now, during the time that this changing of the runways was taking place, was that under Colonel Wyman?

Mr. Wickiser. Yes. I believe Colonel Wyman left there in March, didn't he?


Mr. Wickiser. Yes.


Were you ever instructed by Colonel Wyman with respect to a tunnel, not to leave the dirt in the tunnel, and not to take it outside?

Mr. Wickiser. I again want to make myself clear. I am not trying to crucify anyone. No, that statement is not true; and if it is that way, it is an error. We were only instructed by Colonel Wyman's men, the man that was in charge of the Hilo airport for Colonel Wyman.

24. General Frank. Who was that?

Mr. Wickiser. That man was named Fred Henderson. He was a civilian at that time. No, at that time he was a lieutenant. He was commissioned, I believe.
25. Major Clausen. You had one experience, did you not, where you made a 62° turn to the right off an exit, and you found out afterwards that the plan they had given you was incorrect?

Mr. Wickiser. That is correct. I can’t remember the exact dates, but it was shortly after war broke out, that they were in a very big hurry for some radar tunnels, or—not radar; they were AWS stations they called them; was out at Pahoa, in an old cinder cone. It is called East Point. They had plans for one tunnel that was up inside the crater, and there had to be a road leading up to it. You had to get the material up to the top, and we built a road and camouflaged it up part way, and then over the cone, down inside, we just worked off of a foot-path, and inasmuch as the ground was cinders, we could handle it by just hand-mucking it, or hand excavation with wheel-barrows, instead of breaking a big trail and moving a lot of equipment in there, because it would have disturbed the surrounding country, and they wanted to have a perfect camouflage job where no one could find it from the air.

26. General Frank. By “cinders,” you mean volcanic cinders?

Mr. Wickiser. Volcanic cinders—what they call, out in the [2462] islands, Aa. There’s two types of lava out there. One is Lapahoehoe, and the other is Aa. Well, we cut out this job by hand. Now, when I moved in there, the instructions were not to make a dump outside the portal of this AWS tunnel, because it would show from the air. Well, I didn’t know what in the world I was going to do with it. I had to dump it some place, and I couldn’t eat it; so I didn’t know what to do with it, outside of just bringing it out and dumping it. I had no way of carting it off, so we brought it out and dumped it, and camouflaged it. Then, that tunnel was completed, and I had a plan for it; but down below, in back of the Camp at Pahoa, there had to be another tunnel driven, and they were in a very big hurry for that, and I asked for the engineers to come out and stake the job; and no one would show up; so they had an inspector on the job, there, at that time, by the name of Walker, who was not an engineer, but he and I located the tunnel, and we wanted it, to get busy and drive in. We were working on the schedule, but I still had no plans on the second tunnel, so they sent me out a sketch from the engineering office that showed the tunnel going in and making a turn to the left. Well, we drove this tunnel, completed it. After we had completed it, and I had moved off of the job, I got a set of plans on it that showed the tunnel going in and making a dog-leg to the right; so I didn’t know what to do, unless they wanted to drive a new tunnel, I said they could make a turn to the left as well as to the right; so I didn’t do anything more about it, because I went to Honolulu right at that time, and was wanting to go home; but instead of getting away from there, why they prevailed upon me to stay and do some of the work that they had, to be done right away.

[2463] 27. General Grunert. What you have related is all after December 7, 1941, is it?

Mr. Wickiser. I beg your pardon.

28. General Grunert. This driving of the tunnel you are speaking about is all after December 7, 1941?

Mr. Combs. Oh, yes.
29. Major Clausen, Mr. Wickiser, did you have any experience with the engineers under Colonel Wyman before December 7, 1941?
Mr. Wickiser. Only the engineers that were handling the Territory Airport Constructors’ work, representing the Engineers in Hilo.

Mr. Wickiser. And I will say that the Engineers that we worked with there—the boy that we worked with was named Haynes (H-a-y-n-e-s I believe is the way spell that) and he was a very fine boy, and he was a competent engineer.

31. Major Clausen. Mr. Wickiser, in view of your testimony I am going to read a portion from this affidavit contained on page 37 of the House Military Affairs Committee report:

From the experience I had with Wyman’s engineers, when I found he received the Distinguished Service Medal, I thought somebody had slipped up somewhere along the line, and that Washington just didn’t know what had been going on.

Would you comment on that, please, to the Board?
Mr. Wickiser. Yes. Now, again I want to distinguish between the two types of contract that I worked under over there. One with the Territory Airport Constructors was the unit-price contract, and we had bid on that job, or the contractors that I was working for had bid on the job, and they were going to be paid so much for doing a job, a specific job that they had the plans on. We had no interference whatsoever.

But I went to work for Hawaiian Constructors, and immediately the picture changed. There was just such a vast amount of confusion and so many changes from day to day in the orders that we received on how we were to do the work that it was just impossible to get anything done. On top of that, the men were not being paid. They were from two to three months behind in their pay, they were wanting to go home, and it was just tough as hell trying to get any work out of them. And, oh, I could go on and on. But principally there was just a damn bad relationship there right at that time. Now, when I got over to Honolulu I was wanting to go home, and quite a few men that had just arrived from the States——

32. Major Clausen. You found out, Mr. Wickiser, did you, that the conditions which you observed yourself after 7 December 1941 were similar to conditions that had obtained before that time?

Mr. Wickiser. No; they were entirely different, sir.

33. Major Clausen. So far as the Hawaiian Constructors were concerned, were you familiar with those conditions before 7 December 1941 yourself?

Mr. Wickiser. Oh, yes. Hawaiian Constructors also had a job going at South Point down on the Island of Hawaii where Hilo is located, and I came in contact with those men. I might say that prior to December the 7th there seemed to be a minimum of confusion down there, but it wasn’t that way after December the 7th. The reason for it I don’t know. That is, getting orders on what you were going to do, they seemed to be pretty stable, but, you see, this whole—as soon as war hit us down there we were all turned over to the management of Hawaiian Constructors. Now, the airport that we were doing there under the Territory Airport Constructors was immediately taken over by Hawaiian Constructors.
34. **Major Clausen.** And that is when these conditions commenced?
**Mr. Wickiser.** That is when these conditions came in.

35. **Major Clausen.** All right.

36. **General Frank.** Prior to this time you were working on a fixed contractual basis?
**Mr. Wickiser.** That is right, sir.

37. **General Frank.** Now, will you make a statement, please, as to the difference in conditions between the time that the cost-plus-fixed-fee condition came into being and the condition under which you operated under the fixed-price contract basis?
**Mr. Wickiser.** Would you—you want me to make a comparison between the two of them?

38. **General Frank.** Yes.
**Mr. Wickiser.** Well, the first is the pay situation. The men were paid on two days’ notice; in other words, your pay period stopped on Saturday; Tuesday you were paid, with the Territory Airport Constructors.

39. **Major Clausen.** That was the fixed-price contract?
**Mr. Wickiser.** That is right. The contractors handled their own pay. But when the men were transferred to Hawaiian Constructors, the Army was doing the paying, and we had men—[2466] well, I know myself I waited—the first pay check was two months: when I went off the pay roll of Territory Airport Constructors until I got a pay check from the Engineers down there it was two months.

40. **General Frank.** What about changes? What about changes in work?
**Mr. Wickiser.** You mean the orders coming down there, changes?

41. **General Frank.** Yes.
**Mr. Wickiser.** Well, you would have never known the old plans that we had to do the job. They were completely changed.

42. **General Russell.** Were these changes constant and recurring?
**Mr. Wickiser.** From day to day, sir. I might tell you now, that not only existed right at that time but existed right up until the time Hawaiian Constructors’ contract was terminated over there; not only under Colonel Wyman; it existed under General Kramer. The only man that we didn’t have those conditions under was General Lyman. General Lyman did not operate that way, sir.

43. **General Russell.** How many did you have? Wyman, Kramer, and Lyman? Were those the three?
**Mr. Wickiser.** Wyman, Lyman, and Kramer, in that order.

44. **General Russell.** How long did you have Kramer?
**Mr. Wickiser.** Well, Kramer relieved General—took over the duties of General Lyman when he died. Now, it seems that General Lyman died in October. I believe it was, of 1942.

45. **General Russell.** Then how long did you operate until Kramer?[2467] **Mr. Wickiser.** From October 1942 until the time the contract was terminated.

46. **General Russell.** That was when?
**Mr. Wickiser.** I believe it was terminated the first day of February, I believe.

47. **General Frank.** 1942?
**Mr. Wickiser.** Of 1943.

48. **General Frank.** 1943.
I would like to ask one more question here, about the effectiveness of the two methods of accomplishing work: first, through the fixed-price contract, and, next, through the cost-plus-fixed-fee.

Mr. Wickiser. Well, that would, of course, depend whether or not a man could safely bid a job. I don't think a contractor could have operated out there under a unit-price contract after war came on, sir, because you didn't know whether you could get equipment, replacement for your equipment; you didn't know whether you could get personnel; you didn't know whether you could get material to do the job. I think that the Territory Airport Constructors were just tickled to pieces to get their contract taken away from them, because I don't think they could have operated.

49. General Frank. Then, you think there was no other way to do it than under a cost-plus-fixed-fee?

Mr. Wickiser. No, sir. I do not.

50. General Frank. Have you anything else?

51. Major Clausen. Your basic objection was not the cost-plus-fixed-fee contract but the supervision of the cost-plus-fixed-fee contract; is that correct?

[2468] Mr. Wickiser. Yes. I think you gentlemen are aware of a letter that was written outlining the procedure of the duties of the engineers and the contractors under a cost-plus-fixed-fee basis. If those instructions or those procedures were lived up to by both parties, I don't think there would ever be any trouble, but when one side starts to move over into the other man's territory he gets in trouble.

52. Major Clausen. And did that happen?

Mr. Wickiser. Oh, that did happen. For instance, the duty of the Engineers under the cost-plus-fixed-fee is to use the contractors' personnel, to use their experience; and when you have experienced men that are sent out to do a job on that basis, it is to use that experience. But that was not the case there. I took over the tunnel work at Oahu as general tunnel superintendent in June of 1942. At that time General Lyman—or he was Colonel Lyman at that time—Colonel Lyman wanted this tunnel program expanded, and he wanted it done in a hell of a hurry. At that time there was also one job that was going on that they were doing for the Air Corps that was bad. They had had one cave-in at one of the portals getting underground, and, well, they were a little afraid of it.

Well, I went up there and I got ahold of some good men that were available right in Hawaii, and we went to work on that job, and we had just completed it at the time I left. There was practically a mile of 24-foot tunnel in bad ground, mud, and it had to be timbered, every foot of it, and spiked.

At the time I took that job over there was an inspector on the job. I'll get it [examining papers]. It was an inspector on the job; that the fellow who was superintendent of that [2469] particular job for me had no control whatsoever on his job. For instance, this inspector was doing the hiring. He was also making rate changes on men without ever notifying the superintendent of the job. The boy didn't know whether he was running the job or whether this inspector was. And I might tell you that the inspector on that job had never been on a tunnel job in his life up to that time.
53. General GRUNERT. What was he? The contractor's inspector or an Engineer inspector, or what?

Mr. WICKISER. Just an inspector. I think I have a note on that.

54. Major CLAUSEN. Inspector employed by whom?

Mr. WICKISER. Here [indicating]; I think this answers your question here.

55. General FRANK. Just a minute. The inspector represented the—

Mr. WICKISER. Engineers.

56. General FRANK. Corps of Engineers?

Mr. WICKISER. That is right, sir.

Now, here was a job over at Fort Shafter, a job called 208. When I took over I found this job was virtually at a standstill because of overinspection. The inspectors in charge would refuse to allow a concrete pour to begin unless the pour could be completed within the regular working hours of that day. This resulted in hours of wasted labor on the concrete crew because the pour would have to wait until the following day, even though the overtime in question was only one hour. The inspectors in charge would arbitrarily change the water content of the concrete without notifying the foreman. They were using pump crete, and if you do that—[2470] you gentlemen are familiar with pump crete operations—you know that the man that is operating the nozzle and the pump must know how much water is going into there so that he can keep that concrete moving through the pump without a plug.

The inspectors would also give orders to the men and in general assume the position of superintendents rather than inspectors. I might tell you that that was one of the first problems that I had confronting me there, and we rectified it by going to General Lyman or Colonel Lyman as he was at that time. I went directly to him and let my hair down, and it was straightened out.

Now, here was a job called 403-W. It was a bomb storage job, consisted of going up a valley that had high walls on either side, called Kipapa Gulch, and driving these short tunnels every 200 feet. Well, at Job 403-W I went out—this job was in the preliminary stages of building roads. The tunnel equipment was bought and was in Oahu. The battery locomotives had to operate over this road with the main railway laid out in front of these tunnels, see, so that you could get from one to the other with your tunnel equipment. The engineer that was out there, the chief of party surveying that job, had grades laid out as high as 14 percent. 14 percent, and there was a crew that was—jackhammer crew and shovel crew—working behind him taking up these grades of 14 percent that you were going to run light railway equipment over.

Well, you don't have to go into that. You gentlemen know that can't be done. So arbitrarily I moved back and started the crew at 3 percent maximum, which was entirely too much for [2471] railway equipment, but we moved back, and I went right in and got it straightened out with Colonel Lyman at that time; and he said, "Well, if the engineering can't keep up with you," he said, "let's get the job done, and we'll come out afterwards and we'll survey what you have got done. But for Christ's sake," he said, "let's get the work done."
57. Major Clausen. That was Colonel—
Mr. Wickiser. General Lyman.

58. Major Clausen. General Lyman, L-y-m-a-n.
Mr. Wickiser. L-y-m-a-n.

59. General Grunert. This all was after December 7 of '41?
Mr. Wickiser. That is right, sir. And I might tell you, with the exception of a survey party man, the chief of party that was there staking the job, he also had three other jobs that he was covering. There was no one representing the Corps of Engineers on that job, no one there at all, until I insisted on a man being there; and when they finally did place an inspector there, he was a man that had had no previous tunnel experience at all.

Now, if you gentlemen will care to investigate this next statement that I am going to make, I would certainly welcome it. There was a tunnel between 17-B and 17-A at Kipapa Gulch, Job 403-W, that is 60 feet long. Of course, we worked on center line and grade given us by engineers. This tunnel was staked wrong and, if driven to its entire full length, would have intersected the next tunnel to it. I had a hell of a lot of work, and I tell you 60 feet of tunnel could be punched down there in a mighty short time the way that we were stretched out on the tunnel, you know, because we were driving 200 feet of tunnel a day on that one job; and before they had had an underground on the lines that the engineers had given them, the back sights, and when I went up and took a look at this particular hole, and I says, "Fellows, you're wrong. Let's get another engineer out here with a transit and let's have him plot this work again and see if we're headed right."

They brought out another man, and he said, "Well, you're not right."

That tunnel was out there that they had—we gunited it and poured a portal on it, and they could use it for an office or something else that they wanted to have underground. But again, as I say, had they driven this tunnel as they were intending us to do, it would have intersected the other tunnel, but according to the specs on the job they had to be 200 feet apart at all points of parallel tunnels.

I can go on if you care to have me to.

60. Major Clausen. I have no further questions.

61. General Grunert. You see, Mr. Wickiser, we are primarily interested in what happened prior to December 7th; and what information there is after December 7th, we are interested in only so much of it as has a bearing on the phases that pertain to the attack on December 7th.

Mr. Wickiser. I see, sir.

62. General Grunert. So, although we are interested in what you are putting out there, to give us a general line on the efficiency of the management, I think there has been enough evidence of that sort to cover what we need.

I have one question here: Do you know why Colonel Wyman was awarded a decoration?

[2472] Mr. Wickiser. No, sir, I do not. But I can tell you again that as far as the men that were working out there, working on the construction work, they thought it was a joke.

63. General Grunert. Do you know anything about his work on the string of air bases down toward Australia? Did you have anything to do with that?
Mr. Wickiser. No, sir.

61. General Grunert. Then, those who may have known about it and appeared to be surprised that he received a decoration didn't know but what he may have done extraordinary work on something else of which they were not aware?

Mr. Wickiser. That might have been. But I might also say that most of these men also knew of Colonel Wyman in Los Angeles, sir, which goes back a little further than that time.

65. General Grunert. Then, many of these men had been working for Colonel Wyman, then Major or Captain Wyman, in Los Angeles?

Mr. Wickiser. Well, either for him or they were associated with contractors.

66. General Grunert. Then it was a sort of common knowledge or rumored knowledge, at least, of certain existing conditions?

Mr. Wickiser. Common knowledge.

67. General Grunert. Are there any other questions?

68. General Russell. Do you know a man named Rohl?

Mr. Wickiser. Well, I know Bill. I know him not intimately. I might say that the only time that Bill Rohl was ever on any of my work out there in the Islands was along in the fall, latter part of October of 1942, and I was having a little trouble, and my wife was evacuated from Hawaii, and we [247/4] had lost a youngster, and—well, she was here and I was wanting to come home, and I had fulfilled my contract and was staying over at the insistence of Mr. King, who was the general superintendent for Hawaiian Constructors at that time, and I was wanting to come home. Percy Benson and Mr. King and Mr. Rohl met me on the road as I was coming from Job 403-W, and I talked to them on the highway, and they said they wanted to go back and see the job. So I rode back, and we went up onto the job, and I told them at that time—I was talking to Bill and I told him I wanted to go home, and Bill told me this. He said, "Wickie, you can't go home," he said, "because if you go home who in the hell's going to do the work? We haven't got a man that we can turn the work over to, and the Engineers can't do it themselves. If you walk out," he said, "you are just leaving everybody down." And he says, "You can't go home. You got to stay and finish your job."

69. General Russell. Was that the first time you saw Mr. Rohl out there?

Mr. Wickiser. That's the first time I ever saw him out there, sir. That is the truth.

70. General Russell. And that was late in '42?

Mr. Wickiser. '42.

71. General Russell. You did not see him nor did he visit any job that you were doing for the Hawaiian Airport Contractors prior to December 7, '41?

Mr. Wickiser. No, he had no reason to, because he had no connection with that.

72. General Russell. Now, you expressed some familiarity [247/5] in your earlier testimony with the work which was being done by the Hawaiian Constructors prior to December 7, '41, stating that you were impressed that it was running along normally and without confusion.
Mr. Wickiser. Yes. I might state, though, that there were probably four or five million dollars' worth of work involved at that time, and the organization that was there to handle it probable was adequate, but after the attack of December the 7th the work jumped to—well, at the end of the contract, I think 150 million or something like that. There is a hell of a big difference, gentlemen, between an organization that it takes to handle from two to five million dollars' worth of work than one that it takes to handle over a hundred million dollars' worth of work.

73. General Russell. Do you know, by reputation or by common knowledge out there, what if any effect the appearance of Rohl on the Islands had so far as confusion in work or expediting work is concerned?

Mr. Wickiser. No, I don't. No, it wouldn't be fair for me to say one way or the other, I'll be honest with you, because it would be just hearsay.

74. General Russell. Well, what the Board is interested in is whether or not, when Mr. Rohl came out there late in the fall, if he did, of 1941, that he immediately began to expedite the work.

Mr. Wickiser. Well, I will put it this way:—

75. General Russell. Or did he produce confusion?

Mr. Wickiser. Allow me to put it this way: From the time I went over to Honolulu and from the time I went to work [2476] for Hawaiian Constructors there—now, I had worked for them, see, over on Hawaii, down at Hilo, but when I got there I was ready to go home, and in the meantime H. J. King was made superintendent, and when he took over I knew then things would hum, and he asked me to stay there and help him do the job.

76. General Russell. You don't have any knowledge on the question I am asking you?

Mr. Wickiser. Yest, I do. I want to get to that.

77. General Russell. All right.

Mr. Wickiser. Now, at the time King took over I knew that this man King was strong enough that Bill Rohl wouldn't ride him a bit: that is, if he was superintendent, that he would be doing the job, and not Bill Rohl. So that is exactly what happened too, because I think when you fellows get there—when you finally get Mr. King here tomorrow, you will find out that he insisted that Bill Rohl leave the job alone.

78. General Russell. Well, do you think it was better for the job for King to run it?

Mr. Wickiser. I think so.

79. General Russell. Without Rohl's, in other words,—

Mr. Wickiser. That's right, sir.

80. General Russell. —interference?

Mr. Wickiser. That is right, putting it that way.

81. General Russell. So that seems to be a sort of answer to my question.

Mr. Wickiser. That's right, sir.

82. General Russell. All right. Now, you talked a little while ago about the people who were out on this job in Hawaii [2477] having had associations with Wyman back in Los Angeles, and you stated that as a result of those associations they were considerably surprised when he was decorated or received some official recognition?
Mr. Wickiser. Yes, sir.

83. General Russell. Is it a generalization, then, that we may draw, that those people didn't think very much of Wyman as a contractor back in Los Angeles?

Mr. Wickiser. No.

48. General Russell. As an engineer back in Los Angeles?

Mr. Wickiser. No, not as a contractor.

85. General Russell. I mean as an engineer back in Los Angeles?

Mr. Wickiser. That is right.

86. General Russell. Would you mind telling the Board the basis upon which these people predicated their thought that Wyman was not a good engineer officer?

Mr. Wickiser. I won't say that Wyman probably wasn't an able engineer, but the thought was, or the feeling, around Los Angeles among different contractors that Wyman was quite a drinking man and he was domineering. I have heard several legitimate contractors—good, honest men—that have told me of their experience of going in, talking to Wyman, and where they just walked out, walked out of his office, because they felt that they could be treated as men, didn't have to be treated in the domineering, insulting way that he treated them.

87. General Grunert. Do you think of anything else that you might add that might be of interest to the Board, in view of this limited mission that I have stated?

[2478] Mr. Wickiser. There is just one thing that I would like to say, and that is from the standpoint of confusion: I would like to say that there was just as much confusion over there when the contract was terminated as there was right after Pearl Harbor. The only relief that we got there at all, from an operational standpoint, was the time or during the time that Colonel Lyman, who was later General Lyman, was in charge of the Engineering office, and we did have it while he was there. We did have relief, and there was a good, wholesome, friendly relationship that he insisted upon, from both parties; and as soon as General Kramer took over it slipped right back to where it was before.

88. General Grunert. All right, sir. Thank you very much for coming.

Mr. Wickiser. All right, sir.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

(Thereupon at 11:20 a.m. the Board recessed until 2 p.m. of the same day.)

[2479] Afternoon Session

(The Board at 2 p.m. continued the hearing of witnesses.)

Testimony of Ray Anderson, 1930 Euclid Street, Santa Monica, California

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel West. Will you please state to the Board your full name and address?
Mr. Anderson. My name is Robert Arthur Ray Anderson, but I use Ray Anderson as my name.
2. Colonel West. And your address?
Mr. Anderson. 1930 Euclid Street, Santa Monica, California.
3. Colonel West. What is your occupation?
Mr. Anderson. Electrician.
4. General Grunert. Mr. Anderson, on this particular phase of the investigation I am asking General Frank, assisted by Major Clausen, to take the lead.
5. Major Clausen. Mr. Anderson, by whom are you employed at the present time?
Mr. Anderson. In the L. A. shipyards, Todd Shipyards.
6. Major Clausen. You have been a resident of the State of California for how long?
Mr. Anderson. Since 1930.
7. General Frank. By L. A. you mean the Los Angeles shipyards?
Mr. Anderson. Yes, the Los Angeles shipyards.
8. Major Clausen. How long have you been in the electrical business, Mr. Anderson?
Mr. Anderson. All my life.
[2480] 9. Major Clausen. Did you have occasion to be employed on the Hawaiian Islands?
Mr. Anderson. Yes, sir.
10. Major Clausen. In connection with the construction of defense projects for the Hawaiian Constructors, Mr. Anderson?
Mr. Anderson. Yes, sir. I was hired here in San Francisco.
11. General Frank. How old are you, Mr. Anderson?
Mr. Anderson. I will be 63 in December.
12. Major Clausen. During what period of time were you employed by the Hawaiian Constructors?
Mr. Anderson. I was hired by them in January.
13. Major Clausen. What year?
Mr. Anderson. 1942, and I stayed out there until August.
14. Major Clausen. Of 1942?
Mr. Anderson. Yes, sir.
15. Major Clausen. Can you give me some very brief idea as to the projects on which you worked during that period?
Mr. Anderson. I worked in General Emmons headquarters from the time I went there until I left.
16. Major Clausen. To your knowledge was electrical work done by others on these defense projects before you arrived in the Hawaiian Islands?
Mr. Anderson. There had been some pipe put in on the job we were on, but nothing further. Pipe had been put down in the tunnel.
17. Major Clausen. What was that pipe?
Mr. Anderson. Electrical pipe, conduit for the wiring of the tunnel.
[2481] 18. General Frank. What tunnel?
Mr. Anderson. At Aliamanu crater. It was the headquarters of General Emmons. They had moved in there, General Emmons. The Navy had down below there the Navy magazines about three or four miles west of Fort Shafter.
19. Major Clausen. Did you during the period you were in Hawaii meet Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr.?
Mr. Anderson. Yes, sir, I talked to him and saw him frequently.

20. Major Clausen. Do you recall whether Colonel Wyman during that time was ever intoxicated?

Mr. Anderson. Yes, sir.

21. Major Clausen. To what extent?

Mr. Anderson. Well, he could navigate.

22. Major Clausen. I beg your pardon?

Mr. Anderson. He could navigate, but he was intoxicated. I will tell you something about this whole thing while we are on this evidence. I was made a kind of a political football over this deal to start out with.

23. Major Clausen. Over what deal?

Mr. Anderson. This Tenney Committee.

24. Major Clausen. Yes?

Mr. Anderson. And my personal opinion about that whole deal is that it is all over. Rohl has left those construction companies. Wyman has been put out of his job, and I believe General Emmons was possibly relieved over it. I can’t be sure about that. And the whole thing, as far as those Islands are concerned, should be a dead issue. Today it is a political football. I told Jack Tenney last year about it. Fulton Lewis [2482] had broadcast my testimony nationally and it was not the right thing to do. I was going into Douglas on the morning when I was subpoenaed and I told them exactly how I felt about that, and at that time I felt very sore because I actually was afraid that the Japs might come back there. We had fight after fight over the installation of that electrical equipment back there, because I wanted to make the communications separate from the power, because the power might be knocked out. We had quite a fight over it.

And the story about the beds and the food is past and gone. Whether Colonel Wyman through his negligence permitted that condition, I don’t know, but he told me that the food was good enough for us, and he had shut down on it because we were wasting it. We couldn’t get a cup of coffee without paying 35 cents for it, or you could get the whole meal for 35 cents. They had issued Army rations to those men from the day we arrived there until we left. I went to the barracks, the Ordnance barracks at the headquarters around the 1st of April and lived there with the soldiers in the barracks, six of us,— two electricians, two carpenters and two plumbers—lived in the barracks with the soldiers. I was there the morning Colonel Wyman got relieved.

25. Major Clausen. When you testified to the Tenney Committee you told them facts, didn’t you?

Mr. Anderson. Yes, sir.

26. Major Clausen. Regardless of your personal preferences, this Board wants the facts.

Mr. Anderson. I can realize that, too.

27. Major Clausen. Well, tell me this: You said you knew [2483] Colonel Wyman was intoxicated. Just tell me whether you ever had occasion to see Colonel Wyman in an intoxicated condition.

Mr. Anderson. Well, he was what I would call in an intoxicated condition. His breath smelled a little bit and he didn’t seem to be level-headed as a man in that position should be.
28. Major Clausen. And that was during what period of time?
Mr. Anderson. I don't think he went back to his office after the 9th of March. I think the relief was ordered on the 9th of March, and he never went back there. He stayed at that hotel. The guards had to go in one night and jump him about keeping the light on in the room.

29. General Frank. You stated that Colonel Wyman was intoxicated, but we have no dates on that. Can you give us the date?
Mr. Anderson. I do not recall the exact date. The first time I met Colonel Wyman, I want up to his office in the Young Building.

30. General Frank. When?
Mr. Anderson. That was some time in the latter part of February, the last couple of days.

31. General Frank. Of what year?
Mr. Anderson. 1942. We argued all the way down into Bishop Street.

32. General Frank. Was he sober then?
Mr. Anderson. No, he was not. He had been drinking but I never saw Colonel Wyman take a drink. I can tell you that.

33. General Frank. Now, from then on?
Mr. Anderson. Then I saw him the next week.

34. General Frank. Which was still in February?
Mr. Anderson. He had been drinking at that time.

35. General Frank. Still in February of 1942?
Mr. Anderson. That would possibly be around the 1st of March.

36. General Frank. Yes.
Mr. Anderson. And then I talked to him the day before he was relieved, when the order came to him.

37. General Frank. Was he still intoxicated?
Mr. Anderson. He still had whiskey on his breath.

38. General Frank. But as to whether or not his faculties were impaired?
Mr. Anderson. That I could not say, General. That is the hardest thing in the world to say. A man can be drunk and maneuver around and do certain jobs fairly well.

39. General Frank. In your own mind, when do you consider a man drunk?
Mr. Anderson. Well, it is a hard thing to say. Some people think if he is in the gutter he is drunk, but a man who has had more than enough for him, I consider him drunk.

40. General Frank. In other words, you thought on these occasions—
Mr. Anderson. I actually thought he was drunk.

41. General Frank (continuing). That Colonel Wyman was carrying more than he could hold?
Mr. Anderson. Yes.

42. General Frank. That was your interpretation?
Mr. Anderson. That was my interpretation, yes.

43. Major Clausen. Mr. Anderson, you testified to the Tenney Committee that Colonel Wyman was in an intoxicated condition or lay in the hotel drunk all the time for some five days before he [2485] left his job.
Mr. Anderson. He stayed up in that hotel five days before he came out, to the best of my memory.
44. **Major Clausen.** What is the basis of your statement that he lay in the hotel drunk for those five days?

**Mr. Anderson.** Well, he was gone and we saw him down in the lobby once or twice during that time and he wasn’t dressed for the street.

45. **Major Clausen.** When you say “we saw him” you mean that you saw him?

**Mr. Anderson.** I saw him, yes, sir.

46. **Major Clausen.** And could it have been that he was working in the hotel during those five days merely getting his papers ready to get out?

**Mr. Anderson.** That could be possible, sir.

47. **Major Clausen.** I was wondering where you got the basis for your statement, that five days before Colonel Wyman left his job he lay in the hotel drunk all the time. Specifically what is your basis for that, Mr. Anderson?

**Mr. Anderson.** Based on that, I don’t know.

48. **Major Clausen.** In other words, the Board wants facts.

**Mr. Anderson.** That is true.

49. **General Frank.** Do you know anything about the situation in Honolulu prior to December 7th?

**Mr. Anderson.** No, sir, nothing whatever prior to the time I went there.

50. **General Frank.** And you arrived there when?

**Mr. Anderson.** I arrived there at the beginning of February.

51. **Major Clausen.** Do you know anything, Mr. Anderson, about the work that was done on the Islands as an alternate air route down to Australia?

**Mr. Anderson.** Only that the men came back from Christmas Island and told us that General Tinker had ordered them out.

52. **Major Clausen.** In other words, the Hawaiian Constructors had been given certain work to do for an air route down to Australia, is that correct?

**Mr. Anderson.** Yes.

53. **Major Clausen.** And some of the returning men stated something with respect to the Hawaiian Constructors. What did they say, sir?

**Mr. Anderson.** They said that General Tinker came to Christmas Island—Canton Island was still going on—they said that General Tinker came to Christmas Island and ordered all of the construction men to leave there.

54. **Major Clausen.** Do you have the names of some of those men who told you that? Can you give those names to the Board?

**Mr. Anderson.** I doubt whether I can or not, Major.

55. **Major Clausen.** You stated also to the Tenney Committee that you believed that sabotage, in the sense that there was deliberate holding up of the work, had been going on for some time.

**Mr. Anderson.** Well, that is what it appeared to be.

56. **Major Clausen.** And what was the basis for that?

**Mr. Anderson.** On account of not being able to get certain things done, could not get plans and other things of that kind. They were always blaming the men. Middleton and Bazants in
particular blamed the men that the work was not being gotten out and the men would not work.

57. General Frank. Have you talked to anybody about this testimony that you are giving here, in the last few days?

Mr. Anderson. No, sir. I haven't seen anyone, except one boy that came back from Honolulu two or three months ago, and we never discussed anything about the island other than different people we knew.

58. Major Clausen. Over what period time, Mr. Anderson, did this sabotage go on?

Mr. Anderson. We had a great deal of difficulty about getting the job done all the way through.

59. Major Clausen. Do you know if that existed prior to the 7th of December, 1941?

Mr. Anderson. That I could not say. That I would not know.

60. Major Clausen. By whom was this holding up of the work done?

Mr. Anderson. Presumably the superintendents or whoever had charge of the various areas.

61. Major Clausen. When this information came to you, Mr. Anderson, as to these things, did you make reports to anyone?

Mr. Anderson. Not about that, because there was no one but—well, I got a man to speak to Colonel Bathurst.

62. Major Clausen. Who was Colonel Bathurst?

Mr. Anderson. A deputy chief of staff.

63. Major Clausen. Who is this man that you got to speak to him?

Mr. Anderson. A fellow by the name of Glasgow.

64. Major Clausen. You say you got him to speak to the Colonel?

Mr. Anderson. Yes, about straightening this out, and he told Glasgow that the thing would be straightened out shortly and Colonel Wyman was relieved a week later.

65. Major Clausen. Did you ever make reports to G-2 concerning these conditions?

Mr. Anderson. Not about the work. About going into Hickam Field I did. I had a telephone call in the generator room one night from a Japanese woman for an electrician, and I reported that to G-2.

66. General Grunert. Mr. Anderson, I understand from your testimony that you know practically nothing about what happened prior to December 7th, 1941, in Hawaii?

Mr. Anderson. No.

67. General Grunert. And you do not know whether what you considered might be sabotage occurred prior thereto?

Mr. Anderson. That I think, General, would be an expression rather than a direct statement.

68. General Grunert. That was an opinion of your own?

Mr. Anderson. Yes. I see there they have Fort Kam. I never to my knowledge ever heard of it.

69. General Grunert. All these things you know about happened after December 7th, 1941?

Mr. Anderson. Yes, sir. I was here in California when the Japs hit Pearl Harbor.
70. General Grunert. Is there anything that you could tell us about what happened prior to December 7th, 1941, or things that might have led up to the conditions which you found when you got over there?

[2489] Mr. Anderson. Well, General, I will tell you, this whole construction setup, I worked on construction all my life, and in the course of competitive construction we have to work when we have material. We were at one time working there without any wire and there were millions of feet lying there that we knew of, and things of that kind were carried on. It appeared that those people had the intention of always keeping the men disturbed. Now, I cannot say that any Army officer had anything to do with that, because Middleton, as far as the ordinary things went, was the big man there. Mr. Rohl and Mr. Woolley and Mr. Benson had a committee, of which Mr. Woolley was the head. Charlie Winsted told me they had started out there first and put Woolley on that executive committee, supposed to operate it. Then they decided that they should have another contractor from Honolulu and they brought Mr. Benson in. Mr. Benson and Mr. Rohl had nothing to say to any of the men of the Constructors when there were any complaints. They were always handed over to Mr. Woolley. We had no hot water to bathe in. The construction men needed it. They had a little 20-gallon tank and we could not get it. Different things of that kind had gone on. The food was bad. The Army cooks were good. When I lived with the soldiers there I had no complaint to make about the food. The Army ration was sufficient and well cooked.

71. General Grunert. But these were all conditions existing afterwards?

Mr. Anderson. Existing afterwards, yes, sir.

72. General Grunert. You see, this Board is concerned only with phases that had any bearing on the attack on Pearl Harbor and it is limited in its investigation to such phases, so this information which you may have about conditions afterwards, unless it has a bearing on what occurred or what the conditions were prior to the attack, the Board cannot see any great connection with what it has been charged with doing.

Mr. Anderson. I can understand that, General, and I would like to say this much about that whole deal. The best thing that ever happened to us was the Japs hitting us at Pearl Harbor and not at sea. The Japanese have had the full run of those islands for years. The people there are actually friendlier to the Japs than they are to us, from my experience on the island. To my mind, this whole business, the Truman Committee and all included, it is a political football today, for which the Army and Navy will have to suffer. It is something past to us. We have gotten over most of our soreness about the whole thing. We were sore, because men 40 and 50 years old to go into those things don't go in there for the fun of it. I can earn that money here without going out there for the amount of money we were paid. We went there because we thought we could help, and we could not. We just could not help. That is the thing that burned us up. We had this thing of working under Japanese. It is a crime that a man should have to work under a Japanese at a
certain time. They actually had a strike at Bellows Field for a day on that account. George Shaefer—he is in the Army now—he refused to work for 13 days, and they stopped his pay and wouldn’t pay him afterwards, because he wouldn’t work under a Japanese. A Japanese may be a good American citizen, born here, no doubt, but they haven’t shown it. Of course, this whole thing, as I say, now, the politicians are kicking it around. There will never be [2497] anything come of it or done. Rohl got out of his job and the rest of them likewise.

73. General Grunert. That will be all, I believe. Thank you.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

[2492] TESTIMONY OF GEORGE FRANCIS BARTLETT, EMART-VILLE, CALIFORNIA

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel West. Mr. Bartlett, will you please state to the Board your full name and address?

Mr. Bartlett. George Francis Bartlett; postoffice address, Smartville, California.

2. Colonel West. What is your occupation, Mr. Bartlett?

Mr. Bartlett. Engineer.

3. General Grunert. Mr. Bartlett, General Frank here, assisted by Major Clausen, will lead in asking the questions, and the rest of the Board will develop any subject that they think needs development.

Mr. Bartlett. Yes, sir.

4. General Frank. Mr. Bartlett, what is your present occupation?

Mr. Bartlett. I am a principal engineer with the USED on furlough.

5. General Frank. How long is your furlough?

Mr. Bartlett. I am not doing anything at the present time. I am convalescing from an eye ailment.

6. General Frank. Were you employed by the Engineers in Honolulu along about 1940 and ’41?

Mr. Bartlett. Yes, sir.

7. General Frank. What was your job over there?

Mr. Bartlett. In Honolulu I was stationed at Fort Shafter as resident engineer or principal inspector at the underground command post in the radio transmitter tunnels that were being built there by the Hawaiian Constructor [2492] Company.

8. General Frank. At Aliamanu Crater?

Mr. Bartlett. No. At Fort Shafter.

9. General Frank. At Fort Shafter itself?

Mr. Bartlett. Yes, sir. Not in the crater. We put in two tunnels there.

10. General Frank. How long have you been with the Corps of Engineers?

Mr. Bartlett. Off and on since 1937. I was with them in 1937 and ’38, and then I quit and was up on the Shasta Dam for a while. Then I accepted a position that they offered me to go to Honolulu, and this is the time that I went and the time that I went to Fort Shafter.
11. General Frank. What kind of work have you had most of your experience in?

Mr. Bartlett. Mostly underground excavation and general contracting, railroad building, and so forth, roads and highways.

12. General Frank. Will you state again what job you had in 1941?

Mr. Bartlett. I was the associate engineer acting as resident engineer and principal inspector at the Fort Shafter underground radio transmitter tunnel and the command post tunnel.

13. General Frank. From what date until what date, about?

Mr. Bartlett. Some time in late April until December.

14. General Frank. '41?

Mr. Bartlett. '41. At Fort Shafter.

15. General Frank. I see. Who were the contractors on that job?

Mr. Bartlett. Hawaiian Constructors.

16. General Frank. How did the work go?

Mr. Bartlett. At times there was no cause for complaint, but most of the time, why, we were stepping on them pretty hard.

17. General Frank. Why?

Mr. Bartlett. Well, the general lack of procurement and passing the buck, if you know what I mean, back to us. There was a confusion of authority. In other words, we were supposed, as we understood the Engineers, to furnish certain things, and the Constructors would claim that they would furnish those things, and then it was reverse position, and it led to confusion. That was one item in which we had considerable difficulty: procurement, in other words.

18. General Frank. Do you remember any of those items?

Mr. Bartlett. They were all minor items.

19. General Frank. Such as?

Mr. Bartlett. Well, I can give you an example. We were starting a large excavation, a tunnel, there. We had finished one smaller tunnel, and we were putting in this command-post tunnel, which was quite an excavation, and it ran into a long haul, the material of the spoil. So I made a report of the general situation there and what should be done, and the report went through Major Robinson to Colonel Wyman, and Colonel Wyman, as I understand, took it up with the contractors, that they would have to get some other means besides wheelbarrows to move this muck out of there, and they expressed their inability to do it.

20. General Frank. To whom?

Mr. Bartlett. To Major Robinson, then. He was then Major. And that night, why, the contractor went out there and got this equipment, in trucks.
21. General Frank. Who was the contractor?  
Mr. Bartlett. Hawaiian Constructors.

22. General Frank. Do you remember who the particular—
Mr. Bartlett. Their representative at that time was a fellow we named—we called Curly Ellison.

23. General Frank. Were there other instances of delay similar to that?
Mr. Bartlett. Oh, yes. There were delays in procurement, in getting different items, and there was considerable routine involved in getting those items, but that was gradually—

24. General Frank. Were the items available in the Islands?
Mr. Bartlett. They would be, yes, sir.

25. General Frank. Name some of them.
Mr. Bartlett. We had to get some what we called inserts to [2496] put into this radio transmitter tunnel, from the Honolulu Iron Works, and they were available. I called up on the telephone and they were available. So I had a procedure of finding out where these things were and then notifying the procurement department of the USED, who would get busy and get the stuff for us. But if we could give them the leads, why, we found that, their time being taken up with other things, why,—and not knowing exactly what we wanted, and the nomenclature sometimes was indefinite, why, we generally told them where they could get this stuff, and they would go and get it.

So in this particular instance these inserts were needed, and it was holding up the work, and the Honolulu Iron Works had them and would deliver them immediately. So the contractor was supposed to call for them, and a day went by and two days and quite a few days, and they finally stated that they were not down there. I took a representative of the—

26. General Frank. Who told you? The contractor?
Mr. Bartlett. The contractor stated that they were not there. And I took a representative of the contracting company down there, and we found them and got them. Now, that was indicative of the trifling delays which do occur on all construction jobs, but I think it was more pronounced down there than anywhere I have ever been.

27. General Frank. Can you give us another two or three instances?
Mr. Bartlett. They were all just about as trivial as that, General, and I am trying to think of something that was of more magnitude, but I can't recall anything at present.

28. General Frank. Each one of these things, however, was [2497] essential to the complete operation of the project when it was finished?
Mr. Bartlett. Yes, sir.

29. General Frank. Is that right?
Mr. Bartlett. Yes, that is correct.

30. General Frank. Could it have operated without these things?
Mr. Bartlett. Yes, it could have. We could have got along, but the work would have been much slower. It wouldn't have been the general line of construction work as proper procedure.

31. General Frank. Would it have been satisfactory?
Mr. Bartlett. It would have been very unsatisfactory to any construction man, for instance, to see the laborer wheeling out over a
distance of twelve or fourteen hundred feet excavation material from a face of a tunnel that was 12 by 16.

32. General Frank. In your observation of the operation of the contractors did you observe anything that indicated that there was any intent on the part of the contractors to delay the work? Was there anything that showed intent to delay the work?

Mr. Bartlett. Well, that would be an opinion. My opinion is yes, there was an intent, but I couldn't definitely put my finger on anything right now.

33. General Frank. What led you to your opinion that there was intent?

Mr. Bartlett. Well, we would want certain things done at a certain time, and it would be resented on the part of the contractor. If I gave them a definite order that such and such a thing would have to be done at a certain time to make the work proceed in an orderly way, why, they would quite often find some subterfuge for not doing it, apparently, and we did not get along very well. There was considerable bickering on the job, but we made them to a certain extent expedite the work.

34. General Frank. Would anybody take care of them? Was there anybody topside taking care of them? Could they appeal to somebody who would support them?

Mr. Bartlett. The contractors?

35. General Frank. Yes.

Mr. Bartlett. Yes.

36. General Frank. Who would support them?

Mr. Bartlett. Well, as a rule it would go up to Ellison, and he was the general superintendent.

37. General Frank. A civilian?

Mr. Bartlett. A civilian, yes, sir.

38. General Frank. Yes?

Mr. Bartlett. And from Ellison it would go to a chap, a local contractor that entered into that.

39. General Frank. Woolley?

Mr. Bartlett. Woolley. Woolley seemed to carry the load. We saw very little of Paul Grafe of the Callahan Company, although he was out there a few times, and old man Rohl was out there once, and it would be appealed to them and then apparently the thing would be adjusted at headquarters and we would have our way about it, but it would entail delays, and my impression always was that the delays were caused by the contractors and not by the USED, because every man that I knew in the USED was trying very hard to expedite the work.

40. General Frank. Once the information of any of this delay having reached military headquarters, Colonel Wyman's headquarters, what was done about it?

Mr. Bartlett. You would get action right away. If you could reach Colonel Wyman or Colonel Robinson you would get action immediately. If it had to go through a routine and some of their subordinates, it was a little slower. You would get a decision one way or the other from Colonel Wyman or Major Robinson.

41. General Frank. Did you ever run across Mr. Rohl?

Mr. Bartlett. Once.
42. General Frank. What was the circumstance?
Mr. Bartlett. He came out there to the command-post tunnel, and I saw a civilian walking over there, so I went over. It was during the noon hour. The men were not working. And he walked in. I think that either Colonel Robinson or Colonel Wyman was with him, and one or two others, but he was over there by himself, and the Army group was standing off to one side talking with some of the personnel at Fort Shafter. So we all went in the tunnel together, and Rohl made himself known to me and asked me who I was, and I told him, and we walked through the tunnel and he told me who he was, and it was his job.

43. General Frank. Nothing unusual about his being there?
Mr. Bartlett. No. It was the first and last time I ever saw him there.

44. General Frank. I see. There was no incident that caused you to remember it?
[2500] Mr. Bartlett. Yes.

45. General Frank. What was it?
Mr. Bartlett. We had put in a little Denver-Gardner mucking machine, a little sort of a toy arrangement for loading cars, and the contractors had brought that to facilitate loading and it wasn't our idea of just what we should have, but it apparently was all that was available, and Rohl asked me what I thought of that, and I says, "Well, what do you think of it?" I says, "It's yours."

And he laughed and he says, "I don't have to tell you." And that impressed itself on my mind at that time, and that is the way I happen to recall Rohl was in there, because Woolley came out quite often, and I had met Paul Grafe quite a few times. He had been out there several times when we first started the job.

46. General Frank. Colonel Wyman ever come out there?
Mr. Bartlett. Oh, yes, very often.

47. General Frank. What was your impression of him?
Mr. Bartlett. My impression of Coloned Wyman?

Mr. Bartlett. Well, my impression at that time was that he was a good engineer, carrying a very heavy load, difficult to approach, but once you could get his ear long enough to tell him something, why, you would get a decent decision. That seemed to be the impression that we all had of Colonel Wyman at that time.

49. General Frank. Did, at any time while you were there, you ever see him intoxicated?
Mr. Bartlett. No, I haven't.

50. General Frank. What was his reputation among the group that were working for him?
Mr. Bartlett. Why, he was not particularly popular with any of us. He was aloof, but we expected that, and he would come out there and have very, very little to say, but the next day, why, we would get a letter or something of that sort pointing out certain things and ordering certain things done. That was his general procedure. In other words, I would say that the Colonel didn't get close to his employees at all, like other officers that I worked under down there.

51. General Frank. Do you think that the circumstances surrounding these delays could have been helped?
Mr. Bartlett. Yes, I think they could have been helped.

52. General Frank. How?

Mr. Bartlett. I believe that a change in personnel in quite a few respects—

53. General Frank. Of personnel. Personnel representing the Engineer Corps or the contractors?

Mr. Bartlett. Well, both. Both, possibly including myself, because I was more or less cranky down there when things didn't go to suit me, and I presume I was temperamental, and I know some of the others were that took the job more or less seriously, and there were others that didn't take the job quite so seriously. You find that in every outfit, I guess.

54. General Frank. Do you think that these delays prevented the completion of some of that work before December 7th?

Mr. Bartlett. Yes, sir. That work should have been done—going on ordinary construction standards, we should have had our work done in 60 percent of the time that it took for [2502] accomplishment. That's offhand 60 percent.

55. General Frank. Which of those projects, in your opinion, should have been finished prior to Pearl Harbor?

Mr. Bartlett. The radio transmitter station on Kokee should have been finished.

56. General Frank. That is up on Kauai?

Mr. Bartlett. Kauai, yes, sir. And the radio transmitter tunnel should have been finished.

57. General Frank. On Kauai?

Mr. Bartlett. No.

58. General Frank. At Shafter?

Mr. Bartlett. At Shafter. Now, the Engineers had that ready for installation of equipment, but the Signal Corps had difficulty in getting the equipment; and when the equipment came, some of it had been ordered by the Signal Corps, some by the contractor. It was not the proper equipment. It was fouled up some way, and we couldn't set up things as we should, so we improvised and got it going anyway. But it was very unsatisfactory and disconcerting.

59. General Frank. What other projects should have been finished before Pearl Harbor and were not finished because of these delays?

Mr. Bartlett. Well, I can't recall any now.

60. General Frank. Was there any dissention or squabbling among the contractors?

Mr. Bartlett. Among themselves?

61. General Frank. Yes.

Mr. Bartlett. Yes, their personnel used to squabble considerably. They were fighting among themselves. The [2503] weather was hot, and there were the petty jealousies that you find on construction jobs sometimes where there is not a well ordered head to it.

62. General Frank. What about the control of that construction group? Was it well controlled or poorly controlled, the Hawaiian Constructors?

Mr. Bartlett. Well, my impression—my definite impression is, it was very poorly controlled.

63. General Frank. Well, it was under two heads there at different times: it was under Mr. Grafe for a while, and then it was under Mr. Rohl. Was there any difference that you could feel?
Mr. Bartlett. I didn’t notice Rohl entering into the picture much. It seemed to be Grafe, and then after he left, why, Rohl was there for a short time, but Woolley seemed to take over.

64. General Frank. You never thought that there was good positive control?

Mr. Bartlett. No, sir. I didn’t. And there wasn’t good positive cooperation. We didn’t feel that we were all shoving along together at any time. We just couldn’t make them see our point.

65. General Frank. All right.

66. Major Clausen. When was it, Mr. Bartlett, that you saw Mr. Rohl?

Mr. Bartlett. I think it must have been along in the summer months. We were from June until December on the command post, and it was along in probably August.

67. Major Clausen. Of what year, sir?


68. Major Clausen. Do you know anything concerning the relations between Mr. Rohl and Colonel Wyman?

Mr. Bartlett. No, I do not.

69. Major Clausen. I have no further questions.

70. General Russell. You state that when you saw Rohl on one occasion he said, “I don’t have to tell you,” referring to some little appliances for loading cars?

Mr. Bartlett. Yes, sir.

71. General Russell. And you said that impressed you, Mr. Bartlett?

Mr. Bartlett. Yes.

72. General Russell. Now, why did that?

Mr. Bartlett. Well, I thought that the other—his men had tried to sell me the idea that this little mucking machine was quite all right and it was doing effective work, and my impression was that it wasn’t the indicated equipment for a job of that sort. So when Rohl made that remark that he didn’t have to tell me and laughed, why, I just made a mental reservation, “Well, that old fellow is a little more knows a little more about it than some of the men working for him,” or something of that sort. That is the impression I got, but it was his—

[2505] 73. General Russell. Your impression was that Rohl probably had the same idea about it that you did?

Mr. Bartlett. No, sir; I don’t think that. I think that he just figured that they put a mucking machine in there, and it was on the cost-plus basis, and it was in there messing along and jumping off the track and disconcerting the labor, and it didn’t appeal to me, and he know that it wasn’t adequate, but he just said, “I don’t have to tell you,” and laughed about it; and I guess he was correct about it.

74. General Russell. You got the impression he wanted to tell you that was the contractors’ job, not the engineers’ job, and he did not have to?

Mr. Bartlett. Well, General, no, I did not get that impression. I got the impression that he was sort of evading the issue, and it was a rather delicate flattery to me, because he was talking, one construction man to another, and he wasn’t going to tell me anything, but he was just going to laugh it off.
75. General Russell. I do not remember when you stated you left out there, Mr. Bartlett.

Mr. Bartlett. Fort Shafter?

76. General Russell. When you left the islands to come back.

Mr. Bartlett. Oh. I went to Kauai on the 2nd of December to expedite the work.

77. General Russell. 1941, or 1942?

Mr. Bartlett. 1941; to expedite the radar station over there. I was there until August 1942, and the work was pretty well finished up, and then I went over to Honolulu, and I was there until nearly December, and I think I arrived here, the 10th of December.

78. General Russell. Wyman was out there in 1942, when you left, was he?

Mr. Bartlett. No, I think he had left. No, Colonel Wyman was district engineer in May, I think.

79. General Russell. But you were serving with the Department Engineers for the United States Army all that time?

Mr. Bartlett. Yes, sir.

80. General Russell. Well, when you left the islands and came back to this country, did you then close your relations with the engineers? Have you been with them since, or not?

Mr. Bartlett. Yes; I went to Canada, up to Edmonton. Colonel Wyman requested five or six of us up there, and I was dissatisfied with conditions up there, so I resigned, and they wouldn’t accept my resignation, but gave me a furlough.

81. General Russell. Now, if I have gotten your testimony correctly estimated, you were of the very definite opinion that the operation by the Hawaiian Constructors during your association with them in Oahu and in the Hawaiian Department was unsatisfactory.

Mr. Bartlett. Yes, sir.

82. General Russell. Distinctly unsatisfactory?

Mr. Bartlett. Distinctly unsatisfactory.

83. General Russell. And you would attribute that condition to a lack of positive supervision?

Mr. Bartlett. A lack of experienced personnel.

84. General Russell. In what grades? In the supervisory grades?

Mr. Bartlett. In all grades, right down through, skilled labor, and everything but the common labor. The common labor, the Filipino labor, and the Hawaiian labor, when it was good, it was excellent; and what we had was mostly excellent.

85. General Russell. And the inefficiency extended on up to the top?

Mr. Bartlett. Yes, sir; it did.

86. General Russell. And you do not think that Rohl’s appearance on the island influenced the situation which you are now describing?

Mr. Bartlett. No; I am not familiar with anything that he did down there. The only time I ever saw the man was when he came out there, that particular time.

87. General Russell. Did you tell General Frank when that visit was, by Rohl?

Mr. Bartlett. I think it was in August, but I am not sure.

88. General Russell. 1941?

Mr. Bartlett. In 1941; yes, sir.
89. General Russell. It could have been in September or October?
Mr. Bartlett. It might have been.
90. General Russell. Had you known Rohl before?
Mr. Bartlett. No, sir.
91. General Russell. Had you been in the construction work on the west coast for any time before this?
Mr. Bartlett. Yes, sir.
92. General Russell. You knew nothing of the Rohl-Connolly Company?
Mr. Bartlett. Oh, yes; I knew "Tom" Connolly.
93. General Russell. You knew "Tom" Connolly?
Mr. Bartlett. Oh, yes.
94. General Russell. How do you regard Connolly, as a contractor and operator?

[2508] Mr. Bartlett. Well, "Tom" and I were pretty friendly at one time. We were both on the Hetch-Hetchy job, years ago, and he branched out and went into contracting, and our paths crossed a few times, and he seemed to be getting along pretty good, and I figured he was rather a bright, aggressive young man, as a contractor, and was doing all right, and I wished him well; but I have not seen "Tom" Connolly since I was over in Goat Island one time, there, and they were putting in a tunnel, and that is the last time I saw him, the last time I ever had any conversation.
95. General Russell. How about this Callahan Company? How were they regarded in the construction world?
Mr. Bartlett. Well, that calls for my opinion again, and I will say—I am trying to be as cooperative as I can on this, without sticking my neck out too far—but I will say that the Callahan outfit had the best personnel; their lead men were better, than men that they brought over to the islands were better than any of the others.
96. General Russell. Including the Rohl-Connolly Company?
Mr. Bartlett. I didn't see any Rohl-Connolly men that were worth a damn. In fact, I ain't remember any of them, now.
97. General Russell. You do not know when their first supervisory personnel reached the island?
Mr. Bartlett. I think it arrived in February or March 1941, and I arrived there in April 1941. There were some of them there when I got there.
98. General Russell. You are certain of that? There were some Rohl-Connolly?
Mr. Bartlett. Yes; "Shorty" McCoy and "Curly" Ellison [2509]
were there.
99. General Russell. Were they Rohl-Connolly people?
Mr. Bartlett. They were Callahan people.
100. General Russell. I am talking about Rohl-Connolly supervisors.
Mr. Bartlett. I don't know any of their men that were there.
101. General Russell. And you do not know when they first came, or if they came while you were there?
Mr. Bartlett. I don't know of any that came.
102. General Russell. Did you know any of the Rohl-Connolly Company's supervisors that were out there at any time while you were on the island?
Mr. Bartlett. No, sir; I can't recall any.

103. General Russell. So far as you know, then, there were none, or do you mean that you cannot recall them?

Mr. Bartlett. Yes, sir. There was supposed to be a tunnel outfit, and all the tunnel men that we got were from Callahan.

104. General Russell. That is all.

Mr. Bartlett. And Callahan picked some of them up from the Red Hill in the Navy. They were stealing each other's key men all the while down there, and we were trying to stop it.

105. General Grunert. Mr. Bartlett, do you know of your own knowledge, or have you any reason to suspect, that the contractors purposely and intentionally delayed any part of these projects with a view toward sabotaging them, or with a view toward making the situation more favorable to a Japanese [2510] attack?

Mr. Bartlett. No. Of course, we all have our opinions, but I have no substantial basis for my opinion.

106. General Grunert. These minor things that you mentioned—and you called them minor—were they of such nature that they delayed projects that would have been of great value in the defense?

Mr. Bartlett. Yes, sir.

107. General Grunert. For instance, how would your CP have been able, if it had been completed, to have had any effect on what actually happened?

Mr. Bartlett. The CP wouldn't. The CP would—that went the best of any job that we had, and in spite of the fact that the expense was great, and the manner of operation was not good construction methods, still we felt that we were doing the best that we could by moving that spoil out in small quantities. Instead of having a big Conway mucking machine and large cars and so forth and going right through it, why, we had to whittle away with small stuff; but the command post would have been finished by the first of the year if we hadn't had the "blitz," it was that far along; but that didn't affect the general situation down there. It is my personal impression that, had the Kokee radar station been finished, it might have made a big difference.

108. General Grunert. What do you know about that particular situation?

Mr. Bartlett. Well, I finished the job over there. That is where they sent me on the second of December. I went over there as area engineer to speed up the Barking Sand airport, and the Kokee radar station.

109. General Grunert. You went over there on the 2nd of December?


110. General Grunert. What did you find when you got over there?

Mr. Bartlett. Well, I found the Hawaiian Constructors there with three supervisory personnel. They hadn't the tower up. The material had been there for some time.

111. General Frank. How long, about?

Mr. Bartlett. Oh, it had been there for—it was a matter of weeks. I couldn't recall now just how long; but we had it up; in five days, that tower was up.

112. General Grunert. Without getting anything additional?

Mr. Bartlett. Yes, sir.
113. General Grunert. All the materials were there?

Mr. Bartlett. It seems they had difficulty getting the iron workers or something of that sort, and they went over there at the same time I did, and we got that tower up, and then the signal corps moved in, and we had the station going in a few weeks. Then we afterwards did a great deal more work, there, but we had the station operating; but, had that station been operating before December 7, it might have been a different story, probably. Again, it might not.

114. General Grunert. Whether other stations were operating, or not?

Mr. Bartlett. Well, I think that that station, from what I have heard, it might have just emphasized to others that there was a seriousness of an attack.

115. General Grunert. Do you know anything about the information center, or the “control center,” as they call it, of the Air Warning Service, whether that had been completed, so that the outlying stations could use the center, through which to transmit information?

Mr. Bartlett. If you mean the filter center, why, that was—I am afraid I have confused you a little. We call that “command post,” which it was to be—it is a filter center, now, as well as a command post, at Shafter.

116. General Grunert. It was built as a command post?

Mr. Bartlett. It was built as a command post to start with, and we always called it that, and then we enlarged it, and so forth, and we put in the filter center.

117. General Grunert. What I am getting at is whether you know enough of the whole picture to be able to tell us what parts were complete, what not complete, and how it affected the picture of what happened on December 7. As far as I could gather, you were primarily concerned, up to December 2, with your command post, that tunnel at Shafter?

Mr. Bartlett. That is right.

118. General Grunert. You did not get in this other game until December 2?

Mr. Bartlett. That is right.

119. General Grunert. And then you saw this one station, the condition of that?

Mr. Bartlett. Yes, sir.

120. General Grunert. Now, what do you know about the filter center, and what do you know about the other AWS stations, if anything?

Mr. Bartlett. On Oahu?

121. General Grunert. Yes.

Mr. Bartlett. Well, only what I have heard, that there was, over on the other side of the island, a mobile station that was in operation at that time.

122. General Grunert. Are there any other questions?

123. General Frank. Hawaiian Constructors consisted of several firms working together?

Mr. Bartlett. Yes, sir.

124. General Frank. Where did the supervisors and overseers come from, representing the contractors?
Mr. Bartlett. I have been told, I think by some of the men themselves, and by others, that Ellison came from Los Angeles—

125. General Frank. No, what I mean is, how did they determine who supervised the jobs? Were there so many men from Callahan Co., so many men from Gunther & Shirley Company, and so many men from Rohl-Connolly, or how did that work out, do you know?

Mr. Bartlett. Well, I talked with the boys about that, some of them, and it seems that they sent over whatever men they didn't need. Gunther & Shirley sent over some men, and they were mostly clerical men. There were very few construction men in their outfit. And the Callahan people sent over five or six construction men; some of them were all right; some were not.

126. General Frank. In other words, the supervisors and overseers that the contractors sent over there were those that they could spare, and they were not outstanding construction men, is that the idea?

Mr. Bartlett. There were some of them that were good construction men for the jobs they were doing. There were some of them really tried, and some didn't.

127. General Frank. Have you any information, to be more specific along that line?

Mr. Bartlett. Yes. We had a fellow there, on Oahu, this Ellison, that was messing the things up pretty bad, and I didn't consider him efficient.

128. General Frank. For whom was he working?

Mr. Bartlett. He was working for Hawaiian Constructors, and he was a Callahan man; and they picked up a fellow from Red Hill, that had been a Callahan man, a fellow named Cherry; he was a good tunnel man. He made that command post go along pretty good. Then he moved, and we had a fellow named "Shorty" McCoy, from Texas, a Callahan man; and a fellow named Cummings, a Callahan man. They were good average construction men, dirt movers; and then one of them, his year was up. McCoy, he went away, and they sent a man over there that I could never find, he was intoxicated most of the time, and so I had him relieved, finally, but I had a lot of difficulty of getting rid of him. That took me months to get rid of him.

129. General Frank. Who was it?

Mr. Bartlett. I am trying to think of his name. The records will show it. And we finally got rid of him, and the engineers took over the work over there, completely.

130. Major Clausen. Mr. Bartlett, you mentioned previously in your testimony having gone to a certain island and there doing work on a radio transmitter, at which island you arrived on 2 December 1941. Do you recall that, and was that the Island of Kauai?

Mr. Bartlett. Kauai; yes, sir.

131. Major Clausen. You said the work that you did there was on that radio transmitter. Then, later on, you explained that it was a radar station; that is correct, isn't it?

[2515] Mr. Bartlett. It was radar. It was an Air Warning Service station.

132. Major Clausen. So, when you called it a "radio transmitter," you meant it was one of these?

Mr. Bartlett. We put in a radio transmitter station there also, afterwards. The radar was the first one that we put up, the Air Warning Service station.
133. Major Clausen. That was one of the permanent air-raid warning service stations?

Mr. Bartlett. Yes, that was a permanent installation. We stuck it up in the house to start with, and then we went underground afterwards and connected it up.

134. Major Clausen. All right. That is all.

135. General Grunert. Do you think of anything else that might throw light on this subject?

Mr. Bartlett. I would like to be as helpful as I can. I feel that we were taken for a ride over there in lots of ways, and this thing has come up to me so suddenly, and I had a great deal of difficulty in getting down here, and not much sleep, and I haven't been a very good witness, I am afraid; but I have tried to be as cooperative as I could. I can't think of anything else at this time.

136. General Grunert. Thank you very much for coming.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

(Brief recess.)

[HARRY W. FLANNERY, 537 NORTH WILCOX, LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA.

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel West. Mr. Flannery, will you please state to this Board your name and address?

Mr. Flannery. My name is Harry W. Flannery; address 537 North Wilcox, Los Angeles, 4.

2. Colonel West. What is your occupation?

Mr. Flannery. Occupation, radio news analyst. Columbia Broadcasting System.

3. General Grunert. Mr. Flannery, I am asking General Frank, assisted by Major Clausen, to develop this particular lead that we are after.

Mr. Flannery. All right.

4. Major Clausen. Mr. Flannery, you are a radio news analyst for what station?

Mr. Flannery. Columbia Broadcasting System, operating out of KNX, Los Angeles.

5. Major Clausen. And you have been so for what period of time?

Mr. Flannery. Since March 15, 1942 on KNX. I have been with the Columbia Broadcasting System since January 1st, 1935.

6. Major Clausen. You were formerly on duty in Berlin?

Mr. Flannery. Right. I followed William L. Shirer as Columbia correspondent.

7. Major Clausen. And you wrote "Assignment to Berlin" on your return?

Mr. Flannery. Yes.

8. Major Clausen. Do you know a party by the name of Werner Plack?

Mr. Flannery. Yes, sir.

9. Major Clausen. Do you have occasion to know whether he was in Berlin working for the German Foreign Office?

Mr. Flannery. That is right.

10. Major Clausen. That was during what period of time?
Mr. Flannery. That was during the period from some time in the early part of 1941, I think January, up until the time I left, and presumably he is still in Germany.

11. Major Clausen. What date was it that you were sent to Berlin as correspondent for the Columbia Broadcasting System?

Mr. Flannery. I arrived there on November 4th, 1940.

12. Major Clausen. And you were relieved on what date?

Mr. Flannery. And I was relieved on September 29th, that is, I left Berlin September 29, 1941, and arrived back here October 15th, 1941.

13. Major Clausen. When did your acquaintance with Werner Plack originate?

Mr. Flannery. When he arrived in Berlin from the United States. The time was early in 1941, I believe January. My records do not show whether it was January or not, except that I know I met him with Charles Lanius, who was NBC representative, and Lanius, I know, did not arrive in Berlin until January, 1941.

14. Major Clausen. Do you know whether Werner Plack had any connection with Fritz Wiedemann, at one time the German Consul General at San Francisco?

Mr. Flannery. Of my direct knowledge, I do not know, but I understand he was in the Consulate with Fritz Wiedemann in San Francisco.

15. Major Clausen. Do you know whether he had any connection with Doctor Gyssling, the German Consul in Los Angeles?

[2518] Mr. Flannery. No.

16. Major Clausen. By the way, you mention this Werner Plack in your book, do you not, "Assignment to Berlin"?

Mr. Flannery. Yes, sir, that is right.

17. Major Clausen. Could you tell the Board in detail just what duties Mr. Plack performed?

Mr. Flannery. He was in the Radio Department for the German Foreign Office. There were two men principally in the office. The head of the office was George von Lilienfeldt, who was also in the United States previous to assuming his duties there. Plack was his assistant, and during a period of 1941, a period of several months, when Lilienfeldt was in the Baltic States in the Foreign Office, after the Russian War had started, Plack was in charge of the radio department of the Foreign Office. His duties consisted of arranging broadcasts to the United States on the Nazi radio, and being a censor for the American broadcasts or broadcasts by Americans to the United States, and also arranging a sort of an entertainment committee of the Nazis. They had a number of men whose duty it was to try to make the press and radio feel better, that is, arrange dinners and parties and things like that.

18. Major Clausen. Did he indicate to you at any time his propaganda activities in the United States on behalf of the German Reich?

Mr. Flannery. You mean during the time he was here or during the time he was in Berlin?

19. Major Clausen. Well, did he ever boast to you in Berlin that he had been active in the United States as a propaganda agent?

[2519] Mr. Flannery. He did not boast to me about it, but he seemed not disturbed and rather, instead, pleased at some notoriety he had achieved here, in which he was accused of having taken part
in propaganda activities here. There was an article we had—I believe it was in magazine Vogue—we had copies of a number of American magazines and newspapers over there—in which he happened to be mentioned as one of those who were working on Nazi propaganda in the United States, and he showed it to us with great pride. His name was merely mentioned in the article.

20. Major Clausen. Do you remember the issue of Vogue in which that appeared?

Mr. Flannery. I do not, but it usually took us two months or more to get a copy, so I presume it was issued some time in 1941.

21. Major Clausen. Was he accused of espionage in this article written in Vogue?

Mr. Flannery. As I recall it, yes.

22. Major Clausen. Do you know the circumstances under which this party, Werner Plack, left the United States and went to Berlin?

Mr. Flannery. As he told it to me, he left in the last part of 1940, going to Berlin by way of Japan, presumably, therefore, leaving from San Francisco. As he left he told me that he had a lot of trouble with the F. B. I. He claimed that this was due to his having made a number of telephone calls to girls all over the country. He claimed they were innocent calls. The F. B. I. apparently did not think so. The F. B. I. went all through his baggage. According to Plack, he was up all night before getting on the boat. They went all through his baggage his cigarettes and packages and everything else, after he had had them packed. He also had a little fight in Hollywood just previous to that with a man who is now in the United States Army. The man came up to Plack, according to newspaper accounts and told Plack. "You are a dirty Nazi," and Plack apparently did not reply.

23. Major Clausen. Do you know the route taken by Plack back to Germany?

Mr. Flannery. By way of Japan, so I was told.

24. Major Clausen. In other words, he went via Japan?

Mr. Flannery. That is right.

25. Major Clausen. Could you approximate the approximate time he arrived in Germany on this return route from the United States?

Mr. Flannery. No, because I don't know exactly when he left the United States. The records will show.

26. Major Clausen. You did not known this Werner Plack in the United States, did you?

Mr. Flannery. No.

27. Major Clausen. Do you know whether he was the Werner Plack who formerly had lived in Los Angeles? Did he tell you he had lived in Los Angeles?

Mr. Flannery. Yes, he said he had lived in Los Angeles. He told me that, and I have heard since from other people about a Werner Plack who lived there. In every respect in checking on his habits and occupation and so forth, it is the same man. He was a wine salesman in Hollywood.

28. Major Clausen. Do you know what if any connection with Werner Plack this party Hans Wilhelm had?

Mr. Flannery. I do not know, no.

29. General Frank. Did he have anything on the ball?
Mr. Flannery. Plack?

30. General Frank. Yes.

Mr. Flannery. Yes, Plack was pretty clever as a propagandist. He arranged the Wodehouse broadcasts, and he also planned—I don't know whether he planned—those of Count von Luckner. Von Luckner was very well liked here after the other war, and putting him on the air, and Wodehouse, in the American magazines and so forth, and his also planning on putting on von Eckener and the Crown Prince, his idea of putting those on the radio was with the idea that more listeners would listen to it and the propaganda would get over. So he was an able man in that respect. At the same time he was handicapped considerably by his habits of drinking, as a result of which he sometimes could not read my copy, which was supposed to be censored.

31. General Frank. That was going to be the next question; how about the use of alcohol?

Mr. Flannery. He was very fond of liquor.

32. General Frank. To what extent did it incapacitate him?

Mr. Flannery. Well, he couldn't carry out his duties as censor in that particular respect, because he could not see the copy. One night he asked me to read mine to him. Of course, I could read anything, but he couldn't even concentrate upon what I was reading. I remember on this night he felt that as the censor he should put something on the script, so he took out his pencil and started at the front. I had to stop him on [2522] that and erase it, because it would not be decipherable by the time it left the place. I don't know whether this habit incapacitated him in his other duties or not, but I presume it would.

33. General Frank. How effective in the United States do you think he would have been as an agent?

Mr. Flannery. He might have been—this is just my opinion—fairly successful, because he was that type of person whom the Germans, I understand, had a number of over here, who would give parties and would supply a lot of liquor and otherwise spend money for food and so forth, and after these parties a lot of things could be said in favor of the Nazis. As I came back to Hollywood afterwards the last time here, I understand that largely Plack did that sort of thing. It can be a very insidious sort of thing, because you will not be seeming to have that as your main purpose, but as you do have these parties you can talk about Germany being right in this respect and Germany being right in the other respect, and that was the way he could operate, and I think that was one of the reasons why he had that particular job over there.

34. General Grunert. Do you know Colonel Wyman?

Mr. Flannery. I do not know Colonel Wyman.

35. General Grunert. Do you know of any connection that Plack may have had with Hawaii?

Mr. Flannery. Hawaii, no. All of the other material in regard to Plack with Rohl and Wyman would not be of my knowledge, so I do not know about that.

36. General Grunert. Thank you very much for coming.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition).

Thereupon, at 3:50 p. m., the Board concluded the hearing of witnesses for the day and proceeded to other business.)
CONTENTS

Tuesday, September 5, 1944

Testimony of—

H. J. King, 904 South Oakland Street, Pasadena, California...... 2524
Emma Jane Ballard, Colton, California------------------------ 2567
Emil Lawrence Zueca, Senior Aircraft Service Mechanic, San Ber-
nardino, California------------------------------------------ 2580-A

1 Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate pages of original transcript of proceedings.
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 5, 1944.

Presidio of San Francisco, California.

The Board, at 9:30 a.m., pursuant to recess on yesterday, conducted the hearing of witnesses, Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President of the Board, presiding.


Present also: Colonel Charles W. West, Recorder, Major Henry C. Clausen, Assistant Recorder, and Colonel Harry A. Toulmin, Jr., Executive Officer.

General Grunert. The Board will come to order.

TESTIMONY OF H. J. KING, 904 SOUTH OAKLAND STREET, PASADENA, CALIFORNIA

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel West. Mr. King, will you please state to the Board your name and address?
   Mr. King. My name is H. J. King. My address is 904 South Oakland, in Pasadena.

2. Colonel West. And what is your occupation, Mr. King?
   Mr. King. I am a construction engineer.

3. Major Clausen. Mr. King, you are an engineer?
   Mr. King. Yes.

4. Major Clausen. You are a graduate of Northwestern University?
   Mr. King. Not a graduate of Northwestern, no. I attended Northwestern.

5. Major Clausen. You studied engineering at that university?
   Mr. King. Yes, sir.

6. Major Clausen. You have a son who is now a professor there?
   Mr. King. He is not—he is now at the University of California.

7. Major Clausen. I see.
   Mr. King. He was at that time.

8. Major Clausen. But you have had engineering experience, both civil and military; is that correct?
   Mr. King. Yes, sir.

9. Major Clausen. You were in the United States Army the period of 1917 to 1919 with the rank of Major?
   Mr. King. I was, not during that time; I didn’t hold the rank of Major. I resigned from the reserves in '29 as a Major.
10. Major Clausen. But you have had——
   Mr. King. Yes, I was in the 4th Division during the last war.
11. Major Clausen. Do you recall having met Hans Wilhelm Rohl
    in the Hawaiian Islands in the capacity where you were working
    for the Hawaiian Constructors?
   Mr. King. Yes.
12. Major Clausen. In what condition did you find Mr. Rohl?
   Mr. King. Well, he was playing pretty hard.
13. Major Clausen. He was what, sir?
   Mr. King. Well, that I couldn’t say. He just wasn’t paying very
    much attention to business; I know that.
15. Major Clausen. You mean he was playboying?
   Mr. King. Yes.
16. Major Clausen. He was a playboy?
   Mr. King. Yes, that’s it.
17. Major Clausen. Did you find him drunk?
   Mr. King. I never saw him when he wasn’t, move or less.
18. Major Clausen. And that observation of Mr. Rohl in that
    condition commenced when, Mr. King?
   Mr. King. On the 16th of February in ’42.
19. Major Clausen. And continued for what period of time?
   Mr. King. Until about the middle of June of the same year.
20. Major Clausen. Now, when you reported there——
21. General Frank. Did you know him prior to Pearl Harbor?
   Mr. King. I knew him to speak to, and that’s all. I knew him by
    reputation.
22. General Frank. Did this same condition exist prior to Pearl
    Harbor, that you know?
   Mr. King. I only know that, General, by inference and by hearsay.
23. Major Clausen. The General has brought out that point. Did
    you know prior to Pearl Harbor, from hearsay and general knowledge,
    anything concerning Colonel Wyman?
   Mr. King. Yes, I did.
24. Major Clausen. And what was that concerning his proclivities
    for playboying or drinking?
   [2527] Mr. King. Well, the general impression around Los
    Angeles where Colonel Wyman was stationed was that he was pretty
    much of a playboy too.
25. Major Clausen. And what about his drinking?
   Mr. King. Well, that was generally understood, that he was a pretty
    hard drinker.
26. Major Clausen. Well, later on did you meet Colonel Wyman in
    the Hawaiian Islands?
   Mr. King. Yes, I saw him.
27. Major Clausen. And what was his condition?
   Mr. King. I never did see him drunk.
28. Major Clausen. Did that surprise you?
   Mr. King. It did, yes, because I had previously heard of his being
    a hard drinker.
29. Major Clausen. As a matter of fact, when you reported, there
    was a considerable time in the Hawaiian Islands before you were
actually able to commence work because of the condition of Mr. Rohl; isn't that correct?

Mr. King. Well, I presume that it had a great deal to do with it. He was chairman of the executive board at Hawaiian Constructors, and they just couldn't get him on the spot or get him to work.

30. Major Clausen. In other words, you waited around there some—

Mr. King. Thirty days.

31. Major Clausen. Thirty days before he was sufficiently sober to put you to work?

Mr. King. Well, at any rate he didn't put me to work, and I presume that was the reason.

32. General Frank. When did you go there?

Mr. King. I left San Francisco on the 15th and arrived in Honolulu on the 16th.

33. General Frank. Of what?

Mr. King. February '42.

34. Major Clausen. You commenced work as area superintendent for Area 14, which included the Ewa area, on March 15, 1942; is that correct, Mr. King?

Mr. King. Approximately, that is the date.

35. Major Clausen. And you were area superintendent for the Hawaiian Constructors?

Mr. King. Yes.

36. Major Clausen. And about two weeks later you were appointed general superintendent for the Hawaiian Constructors; is that right?

Mr. King. That is correct.

37. Major Clausen. And you occupied that position until you left the Islands?

Mr. King. Yes.

38. General Frank. On what projects were you engaged over in the Ewa area?

Mr. King. Well, in the Ewa area there was the A. W. S. station.

39. General Frank. Where?

Mr. King. Well, I can't remember the name of the mountain, but it was off to the right of Ewa, back up in the mountains there. There was a number of 5-inch battery positions that were under way at that time. There wasn't much going on in Area 14 at that particular time, and shortly afterwards Area 14 was consolidated with Area 3.

40. Major Clausen. Mr. King, did you have occasion to observe the work that had been done by the Hawaiian Constructors before you arrived?

Mr. King. Well, I saw what had been done prior to the time I arrived, of course, after I arrived there.

41. Major Clausen. Yes. And as an engineer and skilled in building, you were able to form some conclusions as to the character of this work that had been done?

Mr. King. Yes.

42. General Frank. More particularly the conditions under which it had been done, the state or morale of the people that were engaged in the work.

43. Major Clausen. Yes, sir.
44. General Frank. What was that?
Mr. King. Very poor.
45. Major Clausen. Now, I invite your attention, Mr. King, to an affidavit dated December 18, 1943, and especially this part: "Generally speaking, the work that had been accomplished under the supervision of Colonel Wyman prior to December 7, 1941, was pretty lousy." Tell the Board first, Mr. King, what work—
This affidavit, you recall having made that statement?
Mr. King. Yes.
46. Major Clausen. This affidavit that I have in mind is an affidavit that you furnished the House Committee on Military Affairs; is that correct?
Mr. King. That is correct, yes.
47. Major Clausen. And the date on which that was done is this date that I have indicated, December 18, 1943?
Mr. King. It was some time around December 18, during December.
48. Major Clausen. And at that time you gave this affidavit to Mr. John H. Weiner, representative of the House Military Affairs Committee?
Mr. King. That is correct.
49. Major Clausen. Yes. Now, tell the Board just what work it was that you had in mind at the time that you stated in this affidavit that the work accomplished under the supervision of Colonel Wyman prior to Pearl Harbor was pretty lousy. What work was that, Mr. King?
Mr. King. Well, first I want to make it plain that I am not absolutely certain that all this work was under his jurisdiction. I presume it was.
50. Major Clausen. Yes, sir.
Mr. King. He being the Department Engineer, it must have been.
51. General Frank. District Engineer.
Mr. King. Well, District Engineer, if it is; this is different, yes. But generally speaking they are synonymous.
52. Major Clausen. What work was it, Mr. King?
Mr. King. Well, there was an airfield at Bellows Field which was in pretty bad shape.
53. Major Clausen. Yes, sir?
Mr. King. Due largely to lack of equipment, but more specifically to the state of mind, the morale of the people that were working there. There was also another airfield under way at——
54. Major Clausen. Well, let us stay with Bellows, first, and tell the Board what there was about the work that you observed which indicated to you it was pretty lousy.
55. General Frank. May I ask a question first?
56. Major Clausen. Yes.
57. General Frank. How did you, being in charge of Ewa on the west side of the Island, happen to know so much about the work at Bellows, which is on the east side of the Island?
Mr. King. Well, General, I must invite your attention to the fact that I was only in Area 14 for two weeks, and then I became general superintendent and my jurisdiction covered the entire Hawaiian group.
58. General Frank. All right.
59. Major Clausen. Would you read the question?
The Reporter (reading):

Question. Well, let us stay with Bellows, first, and tell the Board what there was about the work that you observed which indicated to you it was pretty lousy.

Mr. King. Well, it was dragging. There wasn't sufficient equipment. The quarry operations in the pit from which the base material for the airfield was procured was only—it was operating at, I would say, 30 percent efficiency.

60. Major Clausen. All right, sir. Now, what other work did you observe in the same condition?

Mr. King. Well, there was another airfield at—at that time, that was referred to as Dillingham. I forget the name that they finally assigned to it. It was a Kanaka name, so I [2533] don't remember it.

61. Major Clausen. And what was there about that work which indicated to you it was pretty lousy?

Mr. King. It was dragging for the same reason.

62. Major Clausen. Now, did you observe any other work?

Mr. King. Yes, the airfield at Kahuku was in the same condition.

63. Major Clausen. Yes, sir. All right.

Mr. King. In fact, all work at that time.

64. Major Clausen. Well, let's see about the air raid warning system. Was that work in that condition?

Mr. King. Generally speaking, yes.

65. Major Clausen. And what work was there of the air raid warning system that was in that condition?

Mr. King. Well, there was one station in Area 14. It is difficult for me to locate this station exactly because the locations were more or less secret. I know where it was; I could go and put my hand on it, but I can't tell you now just exactly where it was.

66. Major Clausen. Is that the one that was on a mountain?

Mr. King. Yes. If I heard the name I would remember it.

67. Major Clausen. All right.

68. General Frank. Was it Kaala?

Mr. King. No. Kaala was another one.

69. General Frank. Where is it? In the vicinity of Kahuku?

Mr. King. Oh, no; it is around on the Ewa side, back up behind the Ewa plantation, in the mountains there.

70. General Frank. Up on the Waianae Range?

Mr. King. Yes, on the Waianae Range.

[2533] 71. General Frank. Well, that identifies it close enough.

72. Major Clausen. All right. And what was there about that work that was pretty lousy, Mr. King?

Mr. King. Well, it was short of equipment, short of men.

73. General Frank. What kind of equipment?

Mr. King. Tunnel equipment.

74. Major Clausen. Short of men?

Mr. King. Short of men. The same status of morale was quite evident.

75. Major Clausen. And did that same condition exist with respect to tunnel work on the Islands?

Mr. King. Yes.

76. Major Clausen. And tunnels for what, Mr. King?
Mr. King. For ordnance stores.

77. Major Clausen. You mean ammunition?

Mr. King. Explosive stores, ammunition, bombs, and that of course was more or less in—the only underground work that was going on at the time that I took over was the A. W. S. stations. The other, the ordnance stores and underground storage for various things like explosives, ordnance stores, and so forth, was more or less in abeyance awaiting equipment from the States, which shortly arrived.

78. Major Clausen. Now, did you know a Colonel Lyman, L-y-m-a-n?

Mr. King. Yes, I knew Colonel Lyman, afterwards General Lyman.

79. Major Clausen. Yes, sir. How did you rate Colonel Lyman, afterwards General Lyman?

Mr. King. In my opinion General Lyman was probably the [2534] ablest man in the Islands.

80. Major Clausen. Now, what value to the work was Mr. Rohl, if any?

Mr. King. I would say that insofar as the work was concerned, rather than his being of value, he was more a detriment.

81. Major Clausen. As a matter of fact, he was so great a detriment that it was through a conference of Colonel, later General, Lyman, with you, that it was finally arranged that he be sent away from the Islands; isn’t that right, Mr. King?

Mr. King. That is true.

82. Major Clausen. Tell the Board about that.

Mr. King. Well, I think it was about the first of June—the date is somewhat—I am not quite certain about, but within a week; it was about the first of June or perhaps the last week in May of 1942, Colonel Lyman called me at the hotel and asked me if I would come to his office in the Young—

83. General Frank. What hotel?

Mr. King. The Pleasanton.

84. General Frank. Yes. Colonel Wyman or Lyman?

Mr. King. Lyman.

85. General Frank. Yes.

Mr. King. Asked me if I would come to his office. He by that time had taken over and had succeeded Colonel Wyman, and asked me if I would come to his office, and he told me to come down after dark, which I did. So I drove down through the blackout and met the Colonel at his office. [2535] And, after some dilatory conversation, he came right out with what he had in mind, what was “on his chest,” as he said: “What are we going to do with Rohl?” And he asked me then if I thought that the other members of the Constructors would have any objection to his putting Mr. Rohl on a plane and sending him back to the States. I told him that, so far as I was concerned, it would be a very happy move and I was quite certain that the other members of the firm would see it the same way; that I was quite happy that he had approached me on the subject rather than them, because of the fact that they probably would not be in a position to talk as frankly to him as I was, because they might feel that they were squeezing Rohl out, whereas I had no interest in the matter; so within a few days after that, Rohl left the islands.

86. Major Clausen. I have no further questions.
87. General Frank. You stated that all the work was dragging. How was that evidenced?

Mr. King. Well, General, it was evidenced by the sad state of the men engaged in the work. Evidently they didn't think it was necessary to pay these men or feed these men or look after these men.

88. General Frank. Who was responsible for that?

Mr. King. Well, it was certainly the Engineer Corps, no one else. They were doing it. They were keeping the time. They were signing the pay checks.

89. General Frank. The man at the top cannot be responsible for all the details.

Mr. King. No, that's certainly true.

90. General Frank. Now, there were some intermediaries between Colonel Wyman and the bottom, where this lack of morale existed, who shared that responsibility?

Mr. King. Who were responsible for that; surely.

91. General Frank. And who were they?

Mr. King. Generally speaking, they were a flock of Reserve Officers he had on duty there.

92. General Frank. Also, the contractors shared that responsibility, because the men were working for the contractors?

Mr. King. That was a rather anomalous condition, there. They were the contractors' men, that's true; but the contractor was not functioning as a fixed-fee contractor, and never did function as a fixed-fee contractor.

93. General Frank. It was functioning as a cost-plus-fixed-fee contractor?

Mr. King. But with the work almost completely out of control of the contractor. For instance, the functions of keeping time, of preparing the pay rolls, and seeing that the men were paid promptly and on time, were not exercised by the contractor but by the Corps of Engineers.

94. General Frank. Was that so, from the beginning, or was it taken over by the engineers because the contractor's organization did not handle it efficiently?

Mr. King. No; I don't believe so. I think it was taken over immediately after Pearl Harbor, for the convenience of the Government, not because the contractor's organization was handling it inefficiently. I have no personal knowledge of that, General, because it was before my time, but I inquired into it, in a large number of cases, and have asked a good many people who had been working for Hawaiian Constructors, prior to Pearl Harbor, whether or not, prior to Pearl Harbor, they had been paid promptly and on time; and the answer invariably was Yes. I wish the Board could have seen what I saw.

95. General Frank. Explain it.

Mr. King. I was there, myself, for, I would say about some six or eight weeks before, and I begun to get to the point where I wanted some money, so I started looking around for my check, and I finally went down in the addressograph room of the Young Hotel, where these checks were written. There were checks on the floor, there were checks in the air, they were on tables, there were pay rolls mixed up. How they ever paid anybody, I can't tell you. It was the most startling thing I ever saw.
96. General Frank. It struck you that there was considerable confusion?

Mr. King. There certainly was.

97. General Frank. That was caused by what—lack of organization?

Mr. King. Lack of organization, lack of knowledge, lack of experience on the part of people that were doing it.

98. General Frank. Lack of supervision?

Mr. King. Yes.

99. General Frank. From the top?

Mr. King. All the way down.

100. General Frank. On the other hand, when a question was put to the top for a decision, evidently it got action, are you conversant with that?

Mr. King. I think a decision was made at the top, but whether or not that decision was transmitted all down through the various grades and translated into action, I don't believe it was. I know we tried and tried and tried, we worked continuously for a year, to pick this morale up, to make these people that were working for us believe that we had some interest in what they were doing, and were trying to build their morale up; and we didn't succeed very greatly, I can tell you. That condition obtained right through until I left.

101. General Frank. Do you think the situation could have been solved by a unit-price contract?

Mr. King. No, it could not, for the simple reason that in order to award a unit-price job you have to have some idea of your quantities and the character of the work. Now, those were indefinite.

102. General Frank. Why were they so indefinite as to preclude a fixed-fee contract?

Mr. King. Well, for instance, if you were going to take a job on the grading for instance and were to be paid a unit price per cubic yard for material moved, you would have to know how many yards of material there were in your job, would you not?

103. General Frank. Yes.

Mr. King. Well, that information wasn't—we built those things without plans.

104. General Frank. It was possible to make plans, was it not?

Mr. King. Well, yes; it was possible, but they were not made.

105. General Frank. Then there evidently existed not only a lack of organization but a lack of planning.

Mr. King. Absolutely, absolutely.

106. General Frank. And it was possible to provide plans, was it not?

Mr. King. Yes, it was—it should have been; but they were not provided.

Perhaps the General will permit me to read an extract from a report that I made to the Hawaiian Constructors on that very subject, just before I left.

107. General Frank. The thing that I would like to emphasize in the record, Mr. King, is the position you held in that organization in Honolulu during this time; and that position was what?
Mr. King. General superintendent in charge of their field operations.

108. General Frank. In that position, you certainly should have been conversant, in a detailed manner, with the general conditions.

Mr. King. Absolutely, sir.

109. General Frank. All right. Read it. Did you, in your position, deal personally with Colonel Wyman?

Mr. King. With Colonel Wyman?

110. General Frank. Wyman; yes.

Mr. King. No.

111. General Frank. With whom did you deal.

Mr. King. With Lyman. You see, at the time Colonel Wyman was there, I was standing by. If you remember, I stated that I was there 30 days before they could make up their mind what they wanted to do with me. Well, at about the end of that 30 days, Colonel Wyman was relieved, and Colonel Lyman succeeded him.

This is rather a long thing, so I am going to confine it to an extract of that part of it that deals with inadequate planning.

112. Major Clausen. It may be you would let us have that when you are free. We will give it back to you.

Mr. King. I would be glad to do that.

113. Major Clausen. Thank you.

Mr. King. (reading):

Much time and money have been lost and many delays have occurred through failure to receive plans. Job Orders of high priority have been issued accompanied by no plans or by partial plans. Work has been started on the basis of partial plans and then held up or temporarily suspended awaiting receipt of further plans. A typical example may be cited: Job Order C-88.0 calls for the construction of an extensive underground Command Post for the Forward Echelon.

That was a combined Navy and Army Command Post.

114. General Frank. Where—in Aliamanu Crater?

Mr. King. That is right. It replaced the old one.

Because of insistence on the part of the Commanding General that work on this project be started, a premature Job Order was received on November 13th calling for the "construction of an underground Command Post in accordance with plans to be furnished."

115. General Frank. Who was responsible for furnishing the plans, at that time?

[2547] Mr. King. General Lyman's office.

116. General Frank. Lyman, or Wyman?

Mr. King. No, I will take that back. It was General Kramer's, then. General Lyman had died before this.

Obviously no work could be started until some sort of plans were received. However, on December 7th, we received a memorandum from the District Engineer to proceed with the construction of the project, but to confine work to the access road and to the central underground corridor. Verbal instructions were received from the District Engineer to have men and equipment on the ground the following day. These men and the necessary equipment, consisting of wagon drills, compressors, a power shovel and trucks were hastily assembled, and were in fact, on the job and ready for work the following day. However, during the following three days, the access road and portal cut were staked in three different locations, and it was not until the fourth day that we were able to even start work, beyond the cutting of grass and the clearing of a few small trees. At this date (January 14, 1943), the access road has been completed,
the portal cut excavated, tracks have been laid, and we are now ready to "go under" with the main corridor tunnel. However, no plans for this tunnel have been received and work will necessarily be halted, in fact, has already been curtailed because of the lack of plans.

117. General Frank. I think that is sufficient, along that line, because you are getting into a regime which is not under investigation by this group. You are now getting into the [2542] Kramer organization, which comes not only after the Wyman regime but after the Lyman regime.

Mr. King. That's right.

I have another one, here, concerning job 104-W, which was started, I am quite certain, under Wyman.

118. General Frank. All right.

Mr. King (reading):

Job 104-W may also be cited as a typical example of inadequate planning. This job consists of a three story concrete shop structure, originally planned to be 263 x 291 feet in size, the entire structure to be below ground level and protected by a heavy concrete burster course.

I do not know whether you gentlemen are familiar with that particular shop. It is out near Wheeler Field.

Excavation to a depth of approximately 60 feet was made to the dimensions shown on the original plans, and the pouring of concrete footings for walls and columns was under way when revised plans increasing the size of the structure by 57 feet on one end and adding several projecting additions to two of the other sides, as well as lowering the grade of the entire structure 16 feet, were received. These revisions necessitated the shutting down of concrete operations, and the resumption of excavation work, the equipment for which had been largely removed from the work. The unit cost of the additional excavation necessarily was several times what it would have been had it been included in the original excavation. Detailed plans for this structure have not been received and delay after delay has occurred through lack of plans. [2543] For instance, work on the second story was delayed some thirty days awaiting plans for an elevator shaft. Plans for imbedded metal work have been lacking, thus holding up the placing of concrete in the structure. This project has, from its inception, been short of materials, particularly concrete aggregates. In my opinion, this project could and would have been long ago completed had it been adequately planned and had materials been made available.

119. General Frank. All right.

Where were you, before you went to the islands?

Mr. King. Where was I working?

120. General Frank. Yes.

Mr. King. I was at Camp San Luis Obispo.

121. General Frank. What were you doing there?

Mr. King. I was general superintendent of the L. A. Dixon Company, the contractors on that job.

122. General Frank. How did you happen to go to the islands?

Mr. King. I went to the islands because I understood they wanted a tunnel man.

123. General Frank. Who was responsible for getting you to go to the islands?

Mr. King. Paul Grafe, who was vice president of the Callahan Company, one of the members of the Hawaiian Constructors.

124. General Frank. When you went to the islands as general superintendent, were you working for the Corps of Engineers, or for Hawaiian Constructors?

Mr. King. Hawaiian Constructors; and I worked for no one but the Hawaiian Constructors, while I was there.
125. General Frank. Who was your immediate boss, or superior?
Mr. King. The executive committee of the Hawaiian Constructors.
126. General Frank. There must have been some one man to whom you looked.
Mr. King. Well, Mr. Rohl originally was the chairman of that committee. Afterwards, Mr. Woolley was.
127. General Frank. You have already testified as to the general effectiveness of Rohl's supervision.
Mr. King. Surely.
128. General Frank. Because of his use of liquor, it was generally ineffective; is that correct?
Mr. King. Surely. That's entirely correct.
129. General Frank. Why was this report written?
Mr. King. This report that I have just read from?
130. General Frank. Yes.
Mr. King. That was written at Mr. Woolley's request, shortly before I left. Mr. Wooley was chairman of the executive committee.
131. General Frank. He was impressed with the fact that the work was lagging, from the point of view of the contractors, because of lack of planning on the part of the engineers, I take it?
Mr. King. Yes. That was one of the reasons he wanted this report.
132. General Frank. And what was another reason?
Mr. King. Well, the lack of control that the contractors had over their work. The whole trouble in the islands, General, came about due to a conflict of opinion as to what the functions of a fixed-fee contractor were. We had one set of [2545] ideas—I say "we," meaning the Hawaiian Constructors—the Corps Engineers had another.

Now, under date of: I think it was November 24, 1941, there was a directive from the Office of Chief Engineers, outlining the duties and functions of a fixed-fee contractor, and that was the basis of our contention, that we as contractors were being emasculated due to this duality of control. We had absolutely no control over our work; and that was the reason I resigned and came home. I have here a copy of my letter of resignation, which very definitely states it. It is dated January 7, 1943, and was addressed to Mr. Woolley, executive manager of the Hawaiian Constructors:

Dear Mr. Wooley: Owing to the apparent unwillingness of the District Engineer to permit the Hawaiian Constructors any semblance of control over the work entrusted to them, I am impelled to advise you that I elect to terminate my connection with your company and to return to the mainland upon completion of my employment contract * * *

Now, that was the reason I left there, because I was absolutely out on a limb. Now, let me explain the reason for that. So long as General Lyman lived, I felt, having known him a long time, having served with him during the last war, I felt that he trusted me. When he left and he was succeeded, I didn't feel that his successor did.
There was some possibility of making a defective system work as long as General Lyman was there, due to his personal characteristics; but the minute General Kramer got there, why, there was absolutely no chance of our doing anything.

[2546] 133. General Frank. Therefore, from your point of view, it generally was unsatisfactory, under Wyman, satisfactory under Lyman, and unsatisfactory again under Kramer?
Mr. King. That is true, from my personal point of view.
134. General Grunert. What did you have to do with Wyman?
Mr. King. I had nothing to do with Wyman.
135. General Grunert. Then how can you say it was unsatisfactory?
Mr. King. On the basis of our preliminary talk, what we said here, to start with, my observation of what had been done under Wyman.
136. General Grunert. But no actual personal experiences?
Mr. King. No; no absolute, personal experience.
137. General Grunert. I just wanted to get that.
138. General Frank. But it was from observing the conditions of his operations, when you arrived there?
Mr. King. That is right; what had been done under him.
139. General Frank. What was the reaction of the executive committee to sending Rohl back to the United States?
Mr. King. The two members of the executive committee who were present in Hawaii at that time—that is, Mr. Benson and Mr. Woolley—were quite pleased, because it relieved them of a very embarrassing situation.
140. General Frank. That is all.
141. Colonel Toulmin. Mr. King, you referred to an order of the Corps of Engineers, defining the relationship between the contractor and the Corps of Engineers, as about November 1941; was I correct in understanding that fact?
Mr. King. November 24, 1941, if I am not mistaken.
142. Colonel Toulmin. Have you a copy of that document?
[2547] Mr. King. No, I have not.
143. Colonel Toulmin. Will you state again what was the purport of that document?
Mr. King. The purport of that document was to establish policy, to make sure that the various department division engineers made use of the contractor's facilities. In other words, it invited attention, that the Government was paying a fee for the services of these contractors, and warned against setting up duplicate organizations; which was exactly what they did in the islands.
144. Colonel Toulmin. Who issued that directive?
Mr. King. I think it was Brigadier General Robins, who at that time was acting Chief Engineer.
145. Colonel Toulmin. Was this Chief of Engineers' directive of November 24, 1941, complied with, so far as you know, or was it not complied with?
Mr. King. It was not complied with.
146. Colonel Toulmin. Who was in charge in the islands for the Corps of Engineers, at the time, November 24, 1941, when this order of General Robins, Chief of Engineers, was issued?
Mr. King. That, I don't know, not being there.
147. Colonel Toulmin. That is all.
148. General Russell. Mr. King, when this work was being done, as you have described, under the system of a duality of control, do you mean to testify, then, that the supervision of the work from a contractual standpoint was done by the engineer officers?
Mr. King. That was their idea of what their function was. Now, perhaps I might explain it further, by [2548] reading another extract from this same report. I will be glad to turn this report over
to the Board, if it wishes it. This extract, I think, will show the point
I am making. That is:

About March 15th, I was appointed Area Superintendent for Field Area No. 14,
relieving Mr. W. J. Nichols, who had suffered a nervous breakdown because of
his inability to accomplish the results that he demanded of himself. Immediately
upon my taking over the area, Major Shields, the Area Engineer, called me to
his office for a conference. Instead of reviewing the scope of the work before
us and outlining the priority of the several jobs, he began issuing orders dealing
with the disposition of men and equipment, stating that this foreman was to be
assigned to that job, etc. I courteously, but firmly, told him that in my opinion
he had a serious misconception of his functions as Area Engineer and that the
prerogatives he was attempting to assume were those of the Contractor's Area
Superintendent. I told him that his true functions as Engineer were:
1. To transmit to me as the representative of the contractor information as
to the relative priority of various jobs.
2. To transmit to me job orders, plans and specifications for such work as was
from time to time authorized by higher authority.
3. To furnish field engineering data and to stake out the work.
4. To perform such necessary inspection as would insure completion of the
work in strict compliance with plans and specifications.
5. To see that an accurate record of time worked by our employees was kept
and that the same was properly transmitted to the U. S. E. D. Payroll Section so
that our men could be promptly and accurately paid.

Then there is another recommendation.

149. General Russell. I think we have developed this position
rather fully, Mr. King. The point I am directing your attention to
now is whether or not these engineer officers took over the contractual
work and attempted to carry it on as contractors rather than as super-
visory engineers.

Mr. King. Yes, that was their attitude.

150. General Russell. And it was your opinion that they were not
capable of doing that job?

Mr. King. Surely.

151. General Russell. And as a result of their invading the field
of the contractors, coupled with the fact that they did not have the
experience and the ability to do the work, the confusion arose, and
delay occurred?

Mr. King. Surely.

152. General Russell. That is the story, as you see it?

Mr. King. Yes.

153. General Russell. You stated there were constant changes in
plans, and one of those that you described indicated rather substantial
changes?

Mr. King. Yes.

154. General Russell. Now, do you know where all these plans
came from?

Mr. King. Where they originated?


Mr. King. Yes. They originated in the design division of the
district engineer's office.

[2550] 156. General Russell. Well, now, those people on the
Islands, though, didn't have the authority to plan the developments?
Didn't they come in there from Washington with those plans for the
development of the Islands?

Mr. King. No. I think the development largely was—
157. General Russell. Have you got that somewhere?
158. Major Clausen. I said, they had the authority over that, to do that, sir?

Mr. King. I think that these plans were developed as time went on. I must say this in extenuation, perhaps, of that planning division. They had a tough job, for the simple reason that it was mighty difficult to get any two or three people to agree on what they wanted.


Mr. King. Well, for instance, one, we will say, speaking of this Job 104 of this shop, for instance, I know from actual experience that one Air Corps colonel would have this idea, another one would have that idea. They would have to get together, and perhaps the man who originally thought the thing out was relieved, and his successor decided they wanted something else, and that all gradually got back to the design division, and that is where these changes apparently originated.

160. General Russell. Then, there was no coordination on top by the Department Commander?

Mr. King. Well, I am not qualified to answer that question.

161. General Russell. All right.

Mr. King. I have a personal opinion, but I don't know whether you want that.

162. General Russell. Now let us go back and talk about those checks that you saw all over the place. Who was the engineer out there then?

Mr. King. Well, General Lyman had taken over about a week before that.

163. General Russell. If I get the picture, you contractors had gotten these laborers together and carried them out there?

Mr. King. Yes.

164. General Russell. You employed them?

Mr. King. We did.

165. General Russell. Procurement of personnel for construction was your job?

Mr. King. That is right.

166. General Russell. How did it come to pass, then, that their quartering and feeding became a function of the Engineers?

Mr. King. Well, their quartering and feeding was not an at that time a function of the Engineers, but by order of the Commanding General we had to feed our men Army rations, and naturally it was a function of the Engineers to provide those rations. We did not operate our camps with locally purchased stuff.

167. General Russell. Who operated the messes? The contractors or the military personnel?

Mr. King. We operated some and they operated some.

168. General Russell. Well, then, the contractors were partly responsible for the poor feeding of the men?

Mr. King. To a certain extent, yes. They perhaps were responsible for the preparation of the food, and the Army was responsible for the furnishing of the food. And I might say, that Army rations are not a very—while they are adapted to the feeding of military units, they are certainly not adapted to feeding construction people, for the simple reason that Army rations are
predicated on feeding three meals a day, at a given time. The components are set up on that basis. But where you have to feed men around the clock, three shifts, they don’t fit in very well.

169. General GRUNERT. Isn’t that just a question of management? Mr. KING. I don’t think so, General. For instance—

170. General GRUNERT. Could you not have had the rationing increased?

Mr. KING. Well, the rations were pretty skimpy all the way through. For instance, the substitution of canned meats for fresh meats: it would be weeks that we would get only a small amount of fresh meat, and would use the—

171. General FRANK. The troops were operating on the same basis, however, weren’t they?

Mr. KING. Yes, surely. I’ll agree to that. That was the argument. The argument was, “If it is good enough for the troops, it is good enough for your men.”

172. General FRANK. Well, isn’t that a pretty solid argument?

Mr. KING. Except that it does not fit, trying to—for instance, I may explain it this way: for instance, if you feed a man three times a day, suppose you have to get out lunches to feed your men underground: your bread component isn’t anywhere near enough to do that. In other words, they eat more bread than the ration would furnish, due to the fact that one of the meals is a cold meal that has to be prepared and shipped out to the—

[2553] 173. General FRANK. That is a question of arrangement, planning and management.

Mr. KING. Also of procurement.

174. General FRANK. Yes.

Mr. KING. If you haven’t got the bread, you can’t—

175. General FRANK. It can be made, though.

Mr. KING. It can be furnished.

176. General FRANK. Yes.

Mr. KING. Yes; if you had sufficient bread, it would work.

177. General FRANK. That is just a question—

178. General GRUNERT. That is the question I am getting at. If you have sufficient quantity, whatever the quality is, it is what you can procure. Now, if you have quantity through proper arrangement, whether you feed three times a day or six times or send a meal out, or whatnot, it is a question of management.

Mr. KING. Yes. Well, there wasn’t sufficient quantity.

179. General GRUNERT. There could have been, because—

Mr. KING. Although I will say that that varies entirely with the people who are handling individual camps.

180. General GRUNERT. Management.

Mr. KING. Some of the camps worked it out better than others; but there was, even in the best of the camps, considerable complaint of the lack of fresh meat.

181. General FRANK. If the boats do not bring it over, there is not fresh meat.

Mr. KING. Yes.

182. General FRANK. And if the soldiers don’t get it and the workmen don’t get it, and the soldiers don’t yell, the workmen should keep quiet.
Mr. King. Yes, that is true; I'll agree with that, although at that same time I went over to the Navy Yard on several occasions and found lots of meat over there.

183. General Frank. That is all right. They had different facilities for bringing it over.

Mr. King. Yes.

184. General Frank. I would like to ask some further questions. Are you through?


186. General Frank. Go ahead.

187. General Russell. As I get it, the Engineers were trying to run the contracting business and didn't know how, and you people were trying to feed your men with Army rations and didn't know how.

Mr. King. Well, I wouldn't say that, General. I think we knew a little about feeding men. I've fed a lot of men in my day.

188. General Russell. Yes, sir. But you couldn't satisfy, or you didn't satisfy, your people out there?

Mr. King. No.

189. General Russell. By giving them the Army rations?

Mr. King. No. I couldn't.

190. General Russell. Irrespective of the logic behind the situation, it didn't take with your employees?

Mr. King. That is right.

191. General Russell. That is the situation, isn't it?

Mr. King. Yes.

192. General Russell. All right.

Now, I do not think that we developed very fully this conference that you had with Lyman when it was agreed that Rohl would have to go. What charges were made by Lyman against Rohl upon which he based his conclusion that Rohl had to leave the Islands.

Mr. King. Well, he stated, in the first place, that he couldn't get ahold of him when he wanted him. That was one of his complaints, that he would run around—he particularly complained of his running around with certain Air Force officers and committed the General—that is, Colonel Lyman—to things that he couldn't—in other words, went out of channels, if you understand what I mean; and he also said that the fact that the old boy was drinking so hard was very embarrassing, and he felt that his presence there was just generally undesirable.

193. General Russell. This final question, now, Mr. King: On December 7 the war came along, and the plans which had been made for the development of the Islands were all abandoned, and the scheme of operation was changed?

Mr. King. Changed many times, absolutely.

194. General Russell. And we stepped all of those operations up out there to a war tempo?

Mr. King. Yes, sir.

195. General Russell. Now, in your opinion, did these things that I have just narrated contribute to the confusion which followed?

Mr. King. Yes.

196. General Russell. Which existed?

Mr. King. Unquestionably, General.
197. General Russell. You were just working under conditions that were new to everybody?

Mr. King. Quite so. But they didn't improve as time went on, some of these fundamental things that were wrong.

198. General Russell. They didn't improve under Lyman, even?

Mr. King. No. As a matter of fact, we never did get to the point—we never did get to the point, during my entire stay in the Islands, where our men were paid promptly and on time and accurately.

199. General Frank. How long were you there?

Mr. King. I was there from—just about a year, just within a day or two of a year.

200. General Russell. I think that is all.

201. General Frank. How long did Lyman have control of this before—

Mr. King. I think the General died in the first days of September 1942. My recollection is that that's—

202. General Frank. And he had it how long?

Mr. King. He had had it since—


Mr. King. It was the first part of March, about the first part of March.

204. General Frank. Now, I would like to ask you, what were the relations among the contractors? There were Rohl-Connolly, Gunther-Shirley?

Mr. King. Yes.

205. General Frank. W. E. Callahan, and Ralph Woolley?

Mr. King. Yes, and the Hawaiian Contracting—

[2557] 206. General Frank. Constructing?

Mr. King. Contracting Company.

207. General Frank. Hawaiian Contracting Company?

Mr. King. Yes, the Dillingham people.

208. General Frank. What were the relations among the contractors themselves with respect to the supervision they were getting under Rohl? Rohl held what position.

Mr. King. Rohl held the position of chairman of the executive committee. In other words, he was the top hand while he was there, or was supposed to be.

209. General Frank. Was Rohl satisfactory to the contractors?

Mr. King. No. To the other members?

210. General Frank. That is what I am talking about.

Mr. King. No, no, certainly not.

211. General Frank. Well, then why was he kept?

Mr. King. Well, largely because of the fact that—I think that these island members of the firm felt that there was a natural cleavage between the mainland members and the island members. The island members were the only people there outside of Rohl.

212. General Frank. Who? What?

Mr. King. How?

213. General Frank. The island members?

Mr. King. Yes. That is, Benson and Woolley and Rohl were the only representatives of the outfit there. See, Callahan and Shirley-Gunther, they didn't have any representative there at all during my tenure.

79716—46—Ex. 145, vol. 2—35
214. General Frank. Mr. Grafe was not there?
Mr. King. No. Grafe left, as I understand, about Christmas, right immediately after Pearl Harbor, and, as far as I know, had practically no communication with the job from that time on.

215. General Frank. Well, was there anything done among the contractors themselves to get rid of Rohl, who the contractors themselves felt was unsatisfactory?
Mr. King. I don’t know. I can’t answer that question, whether there was anything done by them as individual members. I don’t think there was, for the simple reason that they felt that if they did initiate any move to get rid of him they would be accused of trying to take the thing over.

216. General Frank. Well, was there any preference shown for Rohl in the Engineer Corps that you know of?
Mr. King. Certainly not—I am not qualified to say about Wyman’s relations with him. I assume there was as far as Wyman was concerned, although I do not know this of personal knowledge.

217. General Frank. All right.

218. Major Clausen. Sir, you are fairly well satisfied that, while this system of the contract and the supervision by the Engineers was bad, the connection of Rohl with that system aggravated an already bad situation?
Mr. King. Well, it certainly didn’t help it any.

219. Major Clausen. Well, your answer would be yes, wouldn’t it?
Mr. King. Yes.

220. Major Clausen. All right, sir. Now, the situation really was inherited by you?
Mr. King. Yes.

221. Major Clausen. You came there when this system was in operation?
Mr. King. Yes.

222. Major Clausen. And do you know anything of the fact, even before Pearl Harbor when the Hawaiian Constructors had a much smaller job to do, as to the bad situation which resulted in the relief of Colonel Wyman?
Mr. King. I had no personal knowledge of it, not being there.

223. Major Clausen. Do you have any files there which you have been reading, any papers or documents, that might be pertinent to what you might assume the Board is interested in?
Mr. King. Well, I have; I think probably some of these papers are of interest.

224. Major Clausen. May I have it myself afterwards to read over, to return to you, sir?
Mr. King. Surely. I will be glad to have you make copies of anything here, and return the original file to me.

225. Major Clausen. All right, sir.

By the way, who preceded you as general superintendent for the field work of the Hawaiian Constructors?
Mr. King. Well, there was a man by the name of C. G. Clapp who was over there, and he left about three days after I got there.

226. Major Clausen. What is your present position, Mr. King?
Mr. King. I am director of yard operations at Port Hoeneme for the Pacific Naval Airport Contractors.
227. Major Clausen. That is about fifty miles from Los Angeles?

[2560] Mr. King. That is this Seabee base down the coast.

228. Colonel Toulmin. May I ask you a question, Mr. King?

Mr. King. Yes.

229. Colonel Toulmin. It is not clear in my mind as to exactly the sequence of events that took place as far as you are concerned. Now, first, what was the date of your arrival in the Islands?

Mr. King. February 16, '42.

230. Colonel Toulmin. Do I understand that about a week preceding your arrival in the Islands General Lyman, L-y-m-a-n, had taken command?

Mr. King. No. It was—

231. Colonel Toulmin. What is the fact about that?

Mr. King. General Lyman succeeded Colonel Wyman about the first week in March of '42.

232. Colonel Toulmin. And you came when?

Mr. King. I came the 16th of February, some three weeks before the change was made.

233. Colonel Toulmin. So you were there during the period of Colonel Wyman's incumbency in this office of District Engineer?

Mr. King. Yes, the last month, I should say, of his incumbency.

234. Colonel Toulmin. And three weeks after you arrived General Lyman took command in succession to Colonel Wyman?

Mr. King. That is correct.

235. Colonel Toulmin. Now let us go back to this order of the Chief of Engineers of November 24, 1941, which defined the relationship between the Corps of Engineers and the contractors.

Mr. King. That is right.

[2567] 236. Colonel Toulmin. You would regard that as a fundamental order establishing that relationship; is that correct?

Mr. King. Absolutely, sir.

237. Colonel Toulmin. That would be your basic working document between the Corps of Engineers and the contractors?

Mr. King. Yes, and the prime contract itself.

238. Colonel Toulmin. That is right. So you would have two things to look at: first, the order of November 24, 1941, from the Corps of Engineers, defining the relationship between the contractor and the Corps of Engineers, and the contract with the contractor; is that right?

Mr. King. That is right. Those two documents would be your basic documents.

239. Colonel Toulmin. They would be your "bible," wouldn't they?

Mr. King. That is right.

240. Colonel Toulmin. Now, when you got there and had this chance for about thirty days of observing what was going on while you were awaiting assignment and the pleasure of the executive committee to give you the final assignment, to what extent did you observe that this order of November 24, 1941, was being violated?

Mr. King. I had no opportunity to observe, Colonel, for the simple reason that I didn't get out of Honolulu. I was just sitting there waiting assignment.

241. Colonel Toulmin. Well, when you did get out of it, which was about a month after you arrived—
Mr. King. Yes.

242. Colonel Toulmin. What did you observe as to the violation of this order of November 24, 1941?

Mr. King. Well, I immediately—at that time I was not aware of this order. I became aware of it later. But I certainly saw the duality of control which I knew was not contemplated by any fixed-fee contract.

243. Colonel Toulmin. Well, from your observations when you did observe this condition, would you be able to state that these conditions in violation of this order had been in existence for some appreciable period?

Mr. King. Oh, yes.

244. Colonel Toulmin. How long would you say they had been in existence?

Mr. King. Oh, I think they had always been more or less in existence in the Islands, certainly back as far as the 7th of December.

245. Colonel Toulmin. Well, to violate the order of November 24, 1941, would have required a relationship between the District Engineer and the head of the contracting organization that was very acquiescent in making some new arrangement other than that specified by the order; isn't that right?

Mr. King. Yes.

246. Colonel Toulmin. So that, in order to violate this order it would be necessary for Colonel Wyman and Mr. Rohl, if he was the head of the organization, as I understand he was—the contractors—for them to cooperate in violating the order, in order to work out some new arrangement other than that specified by the order; is that right?

Mr. King. I don't think the violation of the—this wasn't an order; it was a directive; a policy directive, as I remember it. I do not believe it was violated in letter by either Colonel Wyman or General Lyman, but it was violated in spirit by their subordinates, and those were the people that we had to do business with, and those were the people that controlled things.

247. Colonel Toulman. So the net effect, then, Mr. King, was that, whoever did, it took the cooperative arrangement between Colonel Wyman and Mr. Rohl, of the subordinates in the Hawaiian Contractors, to change the spirit of this order and do something else other than that directed by the Chief of Engineers?

Mr. King. I don't see that Mr. Rohl would have anything to do with it.

248. Colonel Toulman. Well, the subordinates under Mr. Rohl would have something to do with it, wouldn't they?

Mr. King. No. The attitude of assuming control was arbitrarily assumed by the Corps of Engineers.

249. Colonel Toulmin. All right. Then, the responsibility for changing this order, either in letter or in spirit, was upon the Corps of Engineers?

Mr. King. That is right. That is true.

250. Colonel Toulmin. That is all I have to ask.

251. General Frank. But the contractors were the ones who were suffering as a result of this interpretation?

Mr. King. Absolutely.
252. General Frank. Of violation of it?
Mr. King. Absolutely. That is right. In other words, they could not function.

253. General Frank. And the one man who represented the contractors was Mr. Rohl?
[2564] Mr. King. True enough.

254. General Frank. Therefore it was up to Mr. Rohl to try to alleviate the situation under Colonel Wyman, was it not?
Mr. King. Yes.

255. General Frank. And that was not done by Mr. Rohl?
Mr. King. That I can't say. I do know that there was a continuous record of protest made by the Hawaiian Constructors to the Corps of Engineers, a copy of which I have here: a continuous record of protest starting as early as May 1942 and continuing throughout until the termination of the contract.

256. General Grunert. It appears that from your personal observation and your own knowledge practically all your testimony relates to after Pearl Harbor; is that right?
Mr. King. That is true, General.

257. General Grunert. And that from your observations you found that the morale and certain conditions were inherited probably from before Pearl Harbor?
Mr. King. I would say, rather, as a result of Pearl Harbor.

258. General Grunert. As a result.
Mr. King. As a result of the tremendous confusion engendered by the attack, as part of the reason.

259. General Grunert. Now, you appear to have made quite an indictment of the Corps of Engineers or that part of it that functioned in Hawaii. In that indictment do you know whether or not it concerned their ability as engineers or as administrators?
Mr. King. You have hit the nub of the situation there, [2565] General, exactly. Engineers, generally speaking, are not administrators, they are not managers, and there is where the mistake was made. These reserve officers are picked up. They are engineers, technical engineers. They have little experience in management, and they were attempting to do something that they knew very little about.

260. General Grunert. Now, that report you have there, the papers from which you read extracts, the Board would like to have you leave that with the Board so that we can see what is in it and see whether or not we want to put some of it in the record as an exhibit.
Mr. King. Yes. I will be very glad to turn this over to you with the understanding that it is my personal opinion; it is not necessarily the reflection of the attitude of the opinion of the Hawaiian Constructors. It is my own personal opinion as the result of my observations there.

261. General Grunert. We accept it as such.

Any other questions?
Mr. King. And I feel, in justice to the Hawaiian Constructors, that it should not be used to their prejudice. I will be glad to leave the entire file here, including—

262. General Grunert. Mr. King, do you know of anything else that you might think of that might be of assistance to the Board? You understand that the Board is limited in its investigation to such phases as pertain to the conditions prior to and during the Pearl Har-
Mr. King. Yes. 

263. General Grunert. So that what we have been going after is to see what bearing it has on that phase.

Mr. King. Yes. In other words, then, General, the period of my tenure there is not under investigation?

264. General Grunert. Only insofar as——

Mr. King. As it bears on——

265. General Grunert. So far as we are concerned, insofar as it bears on what might have happened before or during Pearl Harbor or had connection therewith; am I right with the Board?

266. Major Clausen. Inferences which may be drawn.

267. General Grunert. And the inferences drawn; true enough.

Mr. King. Well, I can’t think of any information that I can give the Board that would bear on conditions prior to Pearl Harbor or at the time of Pearl Harbor or immediately thereafter.

268. General Grunert. I didn’t want you to get the impression that this is a thorough investigation of everything in ’42 or ’43 or whatnot, except as it might have a bearing on what happened at Pearl Harbor or leading thereto.

Mr. King. Well, I have nothing along that line.

269. General Grunert. We thank you very much for coming and assisting us.

Mr. King. I am very glad to appear, gentlemen.

270. General Grunert. We shall have a recess.

(There was a brief informal recess.)

[2567] Testimony of Emma Jane Ballard, Colton, California.

(The witness was sworn by the Assistant Recorder and advised of her rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Major Clausen. Mrs. Ballard, would you state your name, residence, and present place of employment.

Mrs. Ballard. Well, my name is Emma Jane Ballard. I live in Colton, California, near San Bernardino. I work at the Army Depot, in parachute repair maintenance.

The way I feel about anything that I know is, that I am not divulging any information that I heard over my switchboard in Honolulu, it is information that I saw and heard outside of my switchboard. I never listened to any information over the switchboard. I was always very much too busy, if I had had the inclination.

2. Major Clausen. You were formerly employed by the United States Engineering Department, in the Hawaiian Islands, is that right?

Mrs. Ballard. That is right.

3. Major Clausen. And that extended over what period of time?

Mrs. Ballard. Well, I am not sure just what date I went to work, but I went to work in November preceding Pearl Harbor for the Procurement Department, the civil section of the Engineers, and until the 8th of December, when I was on duty for 24 hours a day for weeks, I had no contact other than just over the phone with any of the official staff. I was in connection with the civil section of the Engineers.
4. Major Clausen. When did you leave the islands?
Mrs. Ballard. I left there, the 20th of February, and arrived back in San Francisco the 1st day of March, 1942.

5. Major Clausen. Do you recall, during the time that you were on duty, before Pearl Harbor, having observed Colonel Wyman?
Mrs. Ballard. I don't suppose I saw Colonel Wyman more than three or four times at the most, in the time that I worked, before Pearl Harbor.

6. Major Clausen. And did you observe him after Pearl Harbor, and up to the time that you left?
Mrs. Ballard. Well, he wasn't there when I left. I don't know where he was, but I had observed him very closely when I was there on duty.

7. Major Clausen. And can you give the Board some idea as to the number of times that you saw him, from Pearl Harbor up to the time that you left the islands, how frequently you saw him, if you saw him at all?
Mrs. Ballard. Well, several times a day.

8. Major Clausen. Do you know whether, during that time, Colonel Wyman was drunk? If so, just answer, and then explain to the Board how you came to reach that conclusion.
Mrs. Ballard. Well, I had orders to check and verify time and charges, and verify any long-distance calls which were made, and the calls that were made to this Hawaiian Construction Company, and the head, there, Wilhelm Rohl, and Ralph Woolley, and Chadwick. Every call that ever was made, Colonel Wyman went into a rage when I had to verify those calls, and many times came directly to the switchboard and raged and roared around, and everyone was in apparent mortal fear of him—he didn't awe me a bit!—and he continually smelled of liquor. He made the remark to my face one day, or rather to his man secretary, a Mr. Eads, that he didn't know whether he could trust me or not with those calls, and he resented it that I had to check on all of them. And I told him to his face that if he could trust himself as well as he could trust me, he would be doing all right.

9. Major Clausen. When he objected to your checking on calls, were they calls that you were putting in, from himself to this Wilhelm Rohl?
Mrs. Ballard. Yes.

10. Major Clausen. And could you give me some estimate as to the number of those calls that he put in, and the number of times that he made this objection?
Mrs. Ballard. No; I don't believe I could give them, but a great number, though.

11. Major Clausen. Did that extend over the period from the time that you were first on duty there as a telephone operator down to the time that you left?
Mrs. Ballard. Well, after the 7th of December, and up until well, a short while before I left there, he was removed from duty, and a Captain Trik, Carl H., later Major, was placed in command there over that section.

12. General Grunert. Do I understand these calls you referred to were made from approximately the 7th of December up until some time in March?
Mrs. Ballard. I left there in March, but I don't know just how long he had been gone when I left there; but over a period of several weeks, that he made those calls.

13. General Grunert. And they were made to the mainland?
Mrs. Ballard. Some of them. Some of them, this Wilhelm [2570] Rohl seemed to be in Maui and different sections of the island.

14. Major Clausen. Was there a requirement that you check these calls?
Mrs. Ballard. Yes, sir; I had direct orders that I had to check time and verify costs and keep a record of that.

15. Major Clausen. You had that order from whom, Mrs. Ballard?
Mrs. Ballard. Well, I couldn't say. When I first went in on that board at Punahou, the chief operator from down town, at the engineers' office down town, was in charge, and that was her order to me.

16. Major Clausen. On some of these occasions when you saw Colonel Wyman, Mrs. Ballard, was he in your opinion drunk?
Mrs. Ballard. He was very drunk, many times.

17. Major Clausen. Were some of those times before Pearl Harbor?
Mrs. Ballard. No, I don't recall that I was ever close enough to him to notice that, before.

18. Major Clausen. Before Pearl Harbor?
Mrs. Ballard. Before Pearl Harbor.

19. Major Clausen. What was the basis for your assuming that he was drunk?
Mrs. Ballard. Well, I wouldn't consider that a man in his right mind would storm and rage around and have everyone in mortal terror of him, like the man did; and then I knew one of the civilians there that was always bringing liquor in, and very often offered us a drink as he went through.

20. Major Clausen. The civilian would bring liquor to whom?
[2571] Mrs. Ballard. To Colonel Wyman's office. He was his civilian assistant.

21. Major Clausen. What was his name?
Mrs. Ballard. His name was Robert Dikes.

22. Major Clausen. Did you get close enough to Colonel Wyman to smell his breath?
Mrs. Ballard. Oh, many times. He was right at my switchboard.

23. Major Clausen. And did his breath smell of liquor?
Mrs. Ballard. Very badly.

24. Major Clausen. Did you have occasion to observe his walk?
Mrs. Ballard. He staggered when he would walk, many times, and bump the sill.

25. Major Clausen. As a drunken man would?
Mrs. Ballard. Well, as I would imagine he would.

26. General Grunert. Why do you suppose Colonel Wyman was concerned about your keeping proper records of these calls?
Mrs. Ballard. I never could understand that, at the time, until this newspaper article came out about him and Wilhelm Rohl, here several months ago.

27. General Grunert. But, at the time, you could not understand why he should interfere with your records?
Mrs. Ballard. No, sir; I couldn't.
28. General Grunert. Did you imagine it was just because of his condition?
Mrs. Ballard. Yes; I used to think that that was because he was—

29. General Grunert. What did he actually say to you?
Mrs. Ballard. Well, he couldn’t see any sense in me sticking my nose in, and butting in on his business, why I had to check on his calls when they were personal calls, and remarks of that sort.

30. General Frank. What do you mean, “personal calls”? Were they not on official business?
Mrs. Ballard. Well, they were on the Army switchboard, but they were calls—

31. General Frank. Who paid for the calls—the Government?
Mrs. Ballard. I presume that the Government did.

32. General Frank. Were they not carried as official calls?
Mrs. Ballard. Yes, sir.

33. General Frank. When did you start in this position where you had supervision and checking of these calls?
Mrs. Ballard. Right immediately after Pearl Harbor. I lived in the Naval Hospital Reservation, at Aiea, and the Marine guards—I had not worked very long for the engineers, and I had no pass or badge or anything to get in, to show that I was officially employed by the engineers, and to go to Honolulu from where I lived. I had to go right directly through Pearl Harbor, through the bombed area, and the Marine guards refused to even let me out of the Hospital Reservation, the 7th of December, and I finally worked my way out, the morning of the 8th. I got into Honolulu about 20 minutes after 7. I was sent right immediately. I think about 11 o’clock I went to work on the switchboard down in the Alexander Young building, and worked until about 11 o’clock, and relieved the girls there, and then I was sent to Punalou to take over for a day or two—well, maybe a week, there were two other girls that helped me, and then I was left in entire charge of that board.

34. General Frank. What did you do, prior to Pearl Harbor?
Mrs. Ballard. I had worked for the Procurement Department on Aleakea street for the engineers. I hadn’t work very long. I hadn’t been over there but about a year, and my husband had a very good job, and I didn’t consider it necessary to work, but I got very bored doing nothing, so I finally went to work.

35. General Frank. Do you remember any calls back to the mainland between Wyman and Rohl?
Mrs. Ballard. Well, I remember about half a dozen to San Francisco, that I put through.

36. General Frank. Did he ever talk to Los Angeles?
Mrs. Ballard. No, I don’t know that I ever did.

37. General Frank. These were all government calls?
Mrs. Ballard. They were all put through as official calls.

38. General Frank. And they were paid for by the Government?
Mrs. Ballard. Yes, sir.

39. Major Clausen. Do you recall, Mrs. Ballard, ever seeing this German alien, Hans Wilhelm Rohl?
Mrs. Ballard. Yes; I have seen him many times.
40. Major Clausen. Where?

Mrs. Ballard. The engineers had one section, one building of the Punahou School, which was a very large area, and the Hawaiian Construction Company were directly across a narrow street, in another building.

41. Major Clausen. During what period was it that you saw this Rohl?

[2574] Mrs. Ballard. Well, evidently he flew in and out from the mainland to the islands at will, and at the times that he was there, in and out of the engineer's office, there, in Colonel Wyman's office.

42. General Grunert. Was this prior to September 15 1941?

Mrs. Ballard. No, it was after Pearl Harbor that they took over Punahou.

43. General Grunert. Then you did not know whether he was an alien at the time that you knew him.

Mrs. Ballard. No, sir; I didn't know very much about him, at all.

44. General Grunert. The question was asked, as if he were an alien at the time you knew him.

Mrs. Ballard. No; I didn’t know that.

45. Major Clausen. I had reference, sir, to the fact that she had read in the newspapers concerning the German alien. I wanted to make my question specific, that that was the man that I was referring to.

46. General Grunert. All right.

47. Major Clausen. It had no relation to the time of his alienage.

This man that you saw, named Rohl, did you ever see him in company with Colonel Wyman?

Mrs. Ballard. Yes, many times.

48. Major Clausen. When you saw him in company with Colonel Wyman, was Colonel Wyman ever in the condition that you stated, as to drunkenness?

Mrs. Ballard. They were both pretty well drunken, at that time.

[2575] 49. Major Clausen. You say they were both pretty well drunk? I beg your pardon?

Mrs. Ballard. Yes, sir.

50. Major Clausen. Where did this occur that you saw them in that condition?

Mrs. Ballard. Well, I was on specific duty in the library building at that school, and that was where my switchboard was, and the official staff were in through a corridor, and right directly behind our switchboard; and to get into their offices, they went through the entrance right by my switchboard.

51. Major Clausen. Did you get close enough to this party, Rohl, to smell his breath?

Mrs. Ballard. No, I don't know that I ever was as close to him as I had been to Colonel Wyman.

52. Major Clausen. What was there about his actions that indicated to you he was drunk?

Mrs. Ballard. Well, loud talking, and staggering.

53. Major Clausen. Mrs. Ballard, can you tell us anything about the prosecution of the work? I mean the actual work of the engineering department, so far as it relates to the things that they were supposed to be doing, in your opinion?
Mrs. Ballard. No; I don't believe I could tell you much about that. I can tell you about the way the engineers tied up the work for the other agencies.

My husband worked for the Pacific Naval Air Bases, there, for the Navy, and for several weeks, Colonel Wyman had—I don't know just how he worked it with the Navy, but I do know that he had materials tied up in and around Pearl Harbor they [2576] were using for the emergency defense work, until they were stymied, they were helpless to go ahead with their work.

54. General Frank. Who was that?

Mrs. Ballard. Well, the Pacific Naval Air Bases, there. My husband worked for the Turner Construction Company, which built the Navy housing there around Pearl Harbor.

55. General Grunert. Then what you know is hearsay from your husband?

Mrs. Ballard. No; many calls that I had in on the switchboard about that, the different heads of that, from out around Pearl Harbor, "rowing" and "raising Cain" about the materials being tied up.

56. Major Clausen. Mrs. Ballard, was the engineering office in which you were employed one big happy family, or did you have quite a bit of strife and commotion?

Mrs. Ballard. The civil section, there, except for this one Robert Dikes, was a very congenial group.

57. Major Clausen. Did Colonel Wyman ever act towards others, in your presence, as he acted towards you?

Mrs. Ballard. Oh, yes: many times. The different ones that were in contact with him, he would yell at them and bark at them, and they were very much in awe of him. One particular time, he came out of his office, I was off the switchboard right at the minute, and was talking to this Captain, McCrone, whose desk was right directly outside Colonel Wyman's office; and if they didn't all jump just at attention, just the minute that he appeared, why he would yell at them; and this particular time there were about six of those captains and lieutenants after him; just fell in. He yelled at them, and they just [2577] fell in behind him and goose-stepped out of there; and I said, "I thought this was a democracy, and we have the 'little king' with us!" And he turned around and glared at me, but he didn't say anything.

58. Major Clausen. Mrs. Ballard, did any of these exhibitions of that character occur when this Colonel Wyman was acting in this drunken fashion?

Mrs. Ballard. As a rule, I think those occurrences happened when he was drunk.

59. Major Clausen. And you told me something this morning about the townspeople of Honolulu's general impression of the engineering corps, as shown by statements to you, when you would say by whom you were employed. Would you want to elaborate upon that, or tell the Board what you told me?

Mrs. Ballard. Well, in cashing checks or anything, we used to be required by the merchants there to show our badge and pass, and they many times have made the remark to me, "Oh, you work for the engineers!" and then give me the regular horse laugh.

60. Major Clausen. I have no further questions.
61. General Frank. What did that indicate?
Mrs. Ballard. Well, I would say that the engineers were rather the
laughing-stock of the island, the way they destroyed property
there and all, after Pearl Harbor. They cut trees, and this school
that they took over, they were paying an exhorbitant sum for it,
and they had many valuable art objects, and the library, there, that
was of untold value and wealth, and Colonel Wyman, at his order—
I have heard him, one morning, [2578] order a ditch digger
in there, and the library, the books in that library, and the paintings,
and everything in that library were thrown into a ditch eight feet
depth and covered up.

62. General Frank. Did you see this?
Mrs. Ballard. Yes, sir; and the morning of the 8th of December,
this Mr. Nelson, who was president of the faculty of that school,
had tried to retain some of the buildings to store their things in, and
Colonel Wyman ordered me—came out to the switchboard and ordered
me to find the man, and, at a very difficult task, I located him, and he
came up there, and he ordered him to open these other building which
he had locked up with valuable things of the school in, and he said
that in their agreement they had agreed to allow them to retain certain
buildings for storage of their articles, and Colonel Wyman said, "Are
you going to open those buildings, or am I going to get a battering
ram and knock the doors and the walls down?" He said, "You can
take your choice, Nelson!" Nelson opened the buildings for him.

63. General Frank. When was this that you saw these books buried?
Mrs. Ballard. Well, it was in the week following Pearl Harbor;
and going across to the canteen for breakfast one morning, I saw
this ditch digger.

64. General Frank. Where was this ditch?
Mrs. Ballard. It was in the grounds, on the lawn of the school.

Mrs. Ballard. Well, between the library building and [2579]
Bingham Hall.

66. General Frank. Were they ever taken up?
Mrs. Ballard. Not as far as I know, those ditches were never
opened.

67. General Frank. Was there any commotion or remonstrance
about it?
Mrs. Ballard. Oh, there was an awful row about it. They rode
rough-shod over everyone, the people in their beautiful residences
there in Honolulu, the beautiful trees; Colonel Wyman ordered those
trees chopped to the ground, on private grounds; those lawns and
homes were denuded of their trees that were a thousand years old.
They were supposedly used for camouflage. I wouldn't say as to
where that shrubbery and all that was cut there was used.

General Russell. This drunken condition which you have described,
by Wyman, was any of that during the daytime, when he was sup-
posed to have been on duty?
Mrs. Ballard. They were on duty 24 hours a day, there. They had
mattresses there and slept there in that library building.

68. General Russell. Did you see him in that condition during the
daytime?
Mrs. Ballard. Yes, I have; many times.
69. General Russell. That is all.
70. General Grunert. Is there anything else that occurs to you, that you think might be of value to the Board, or that you have, of your own knowledge?

Mrs. Ballard. No, I don’t think so; just the general everyday things that occurred were along that trend.

[2580] 71. General Grunert. Under whose jurisdiction were you employed as the telephone operator, there?

Mrs. Ballard. I was employed by the Civil Service Board, which was in the Engineers Building, the Alexander Young building.

72. General Grunert. Then Colonel Wyman had no authority, and could not have discharged you if he wanted to, could he?

Mrs. Ballard. Well, I suppose if I had given him cause for discharge he could have.

73. General Grunert. Did he ever attempt to get rid of you?

Mrs. Ballard. Not that I know of.

74. General Frank. You were a civil-service employee?

Mrs. Ballard. Yes, sir. The one thing that I have always puzzled about, I didn’t register for evacuation until the 18th of February, and I was out of there in a week, if that was engineered by some one, there, because other people that had registered immediately after the 7th of December were still there in August and September.

75. Major Clausen. August and September of the following year?

Mrs. Ballard. Of 1942.

76. General Grunert. I think that is all, then. Thank you very much.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

[2580-A] TESTIMONY OF EMIL LAWRENCE ZUCCA, SENIOR AIRCRAFT SERVICE MECHANIC; SAN BERNARDINO, CALIFORNIA

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel West. Mr. Zucca, will you please state to the Board your full name and address.

Mr. Zucca. Emil Lawrence Zucca, 1141 Magnolia, San Bernardino, California.

2. Colonel West. What is your occupation, Mr. Zucca?

Mr. Zucca. Senior aircraft service mechanic.

3. Major Clausen. Mr. Zucca, you are employed now by whom?

Mr. Zucca. By the Air Service Command.

4. Major Clausen. And you have been, for what period of time?

Mr. Zucca. Since February 10, 1942.

5. Major Clausen. You formerly were employed by the United States Engineering Department?

Mr. Zucca. Yes, sir.

6. Major Clausen. And in that capacity, did you meet a then Major or Captain Wyman?

Mr. Zucca. I met him as Major Wyman, sir.

7. Major Clausen. Did you meet him in that capacity, in Los Angeles?
Mr. Zucca. Yes, sir.
8. Major Clausen. And that was when, Mr. Zucca?
   Mr. Zucca. In 1936. Let's see; I started there, I believe it was March 10, 1936.

[2580-B] 9. Major Clausen. And what were your relations with Major Wyman at that time?
   Mr. Zucca. I was assigned to the district engineer as chauffeur, sir.

10. Major Clausen. As whose chauffeur?
    Mr. Zucca. I was assigned to drive the district engineer, as the district engineer's chauffeur, and that was Major Wyman, at the time, sir.

11. Major Clausen. And when you drove him, did you use an official car?
    Mr. Zucca. Yes, sir; we did.

12. Major Clausen. And do you know Hans Wilhelm Rohl?
    Mr. Zucca. Yes, sir; I do.

[2581] 13. Major Clausen. When did you first meet Mr. Rohl?
    Mr. Zucca. I don't recall when I first met him. I really don't remember, you know, exactly when I first met him. It was some time during the period of time while I was driving the District Engineer.

14. Major Clausen. How long did you drive for Major Wyman?
    Mr. Zucca. Well, it was approximately four years, around that. I started there in March, just, you know, driving there, and then I was assigned to the District Engineer about four months after I was employed, and I drove him until he was assigned to the Honolulu District.

15. Major Clausen. Now, it was during that time that you met Mr. Rohl also?
    Mr. Zucca. Yes, sir.

16. Major Clausen. Did you ever drive Major Wyman to the Biltmore Hotel in Los Angeles?
    Mr. Zucca. Yes, sir; I did.

17. Major Clausen. Did you ever have occasion on any of these trips to go up with Major Wyman or anyone else to the apartment, in there, of Mr. Rohl?
    Mr. Zucca. I did on a few occasions, I had been up to the rooms there in the hotel, sir.

18. Major Clausen. You saw Mr. Rohl there at that time, did you?
    Mr. Zucca. Well, yes; I had seen him there on, you know—at different times he would be there.

    Mr. Zucca. Sometimes.

[2582] 20. Major Clausen. And on some of these occasions you would see Colonel Wyman and Mr. Rohl drink?
    Mr. Zucca. Well, I never—I wouldn't want to say that I actually saw them drink, sir.

21. Major Clausen. Well, you saw liquor there, though, didn't you?
    Mr. Zucca. Well, yes, sir. I mean that wouldn't indicate, I mean, anyone was—

    Mr. Zucca. That wouldn't indicate I saw them drink, though.

23. Major Clausen. How many times did you drive Major Wyman to the Biltmore Hotel?
Mr. Zucca. I don't know, sir.
24. Major Clausen. Can you give some estimate as to the number of times?

Mr. Zucca. That is rather a difficult question to answer.
25. General Frank. How often did you drive him there, about?

Mr. Zucca. Well, sometimes I might say once a month.
26. General Frank. Well, some other times how often was it?

Mr. Zucca. Well, then again it might be twice a week. It depends—

I mean that wouldn't indicate that Major Wyman was going to see just Mr. Rohl. I mean, after all, there were a lot of people that were connected with the Engineer district who stayed at the Biltmore Hotel when they arrived in the district, and he would go there to meet them, Army officers and other civilian personnel who were there for the district.

27. Major Clausen. You saw, some of these times when you went up to Mr. Rohl's apartment in Los Angeles, Paul Grafe, didn't you, Mr. Zucca?

Mr. Zucca. Yes, sir; I met a Mr. Paul Grafe.
28. Major Clausen. And on some of these occasions when you would drive Major Wyman to the apartment of Mr. Rohl you would wait for him, and wait sometimes from nine o'clock at night to two o'clock the next morning; isn't that right?

Mr. Zucca. I have, yes, sir; I have waited for him.
29. Major Clausen. And you, also during the same period that you drove Major Wyman to the Biltmore, have on occasions driven Major Wyman to the home of Mr. Rohl, which was elsewhere than the Biltmore; isn't that right?

Mr. Zucca. Yes, sir; I drove Major Wyman to Mr. Rohl's home on a few different occasions.
30. Major Clausen. In other words, the home of Mr. Rohl, or it might be another home of Mr. Rohl, was different than the Biltmore Hotel?

Mr. Zucca. Yes, sir; I believe he had a private residence.
31. Major Clausen. In Los Angeles?
Mr. Zucca. In the Hollywood district, sir.
32. Major Clausen. Yes. At Los Angeles?
Mr. Zucca. Yes, sir.
33. Major Clausen. Now, you also had driven Major Wyman at times around to various night club; isn't that correct?

Mr. Zucca. I have on occasions, yes, sir.
34. Major Clausen. All these trips were in the official car; is that correct?

Mr. Zucca. Well, not all of them, sir. I believe that I said that all those trips at one time were in the official car, but that is an incorrect statement. They were not all. I mean there was occasions when they weren't in the official car.
35. Major Clausen. What car would you then use?

Mr. Zucca. Well, Major Wyman had a car of his own, sir.
36. Major Clausen. And you would drive that for him?

Mr. Zucca. Well, I had on very rare occasions driven his own car.
37. Major Clausen. Well, you have driven Major Wyman around to a lot of night clubs? Earl Carroll's? Or let me have the names. You give them to me.

Mr. Zucca. Well, Earl Carroll's is one. I don't recall. The Jane Jones Club.


Mr. Zucca. Yes, sir. And the Cafe La Maze.

39. Major Clausen. Trocadero?

Mr. Zucca. Trocadero, sir.

40. Major Clausen. Ambassador?

Mr. Zucca. Yes, sir.

41. Major Clausen. What other ones, Mr. Zucca?

Mr. Zucca. That is all I recall, sir.

42. Major Clausen. Now, when you would drive him around to these places, who would be in the party with Colonel Wyman? Would Mr. Rohl be there?

Mr. Zucca. Well, occasionally, yes, sir.

43. Major Clausen. And this Paul Grafe sometimes?

Mr. Zucca. Yes, sir.

44. Major Clausen. How about a man by the name of Plack?

Werner Plack. Was he ever along?

[2585] Mr. Zucca. Don't know him, sir.

45. Major Clausen. When you were driving there, you would wait until the party was over and then take them home; is that right?

Mr. Zucca. Sometimes, sir.

46. Major Clausen. That would be around midnight, one o'clock, later on?

Mr. Zucca. Well, yes. You know, the time varied. Sometimes it would be earlier; sometimes it would be a little later.

47. Major Clausen. Now, on some occasions did you just take Major Wyman and Mr. Rohl to these places?

Mr. Zucca. I had, I believe, on a couple of occasions taken them, just the two of them, sir.

48. Major Clausen. And in addition to those night clubs did you sometimes take Major and Mrs. Wyman and Mr. and Mrs. Rohl out to night clubs or country clubs?

Mr. Zucca. Yes, sir, I have.

49. Major Clausen. And what were some of those places?

Mr. Zucca. Well, I think they were the country clubs. The Bel-Air Country Club I believe was one; that was the beach club. I don't recall the names of the others, sir, at the present time.

50. Major Clausen. Well, different hotels?

Mr. Zucca. Yes, sir; I would say, like the Ambassador.

51. General Grunert. Didn't Mr. Rohl have a car of his own?

Mr. Zucca. Yes, sir; he did.

52. General Grunert. Did he use it much, or did he ride a great deal with Major Wyman?

[2586] Mr. Zucca. Well, he usually had his car with him, sir.


54. General Frank. What do you mean by that?

Mr. Zucca. I mean that sometimes that Mr. Rohl might ride in the car with us, but he would have his own car, you know, in the party, sir.

55. General Frank. Trailing along behind?
Mr. ZuccA. Yes, sir.
56. General Frank. What for?
Mr. ZuccA. Why, I really don’t know, sir.
57. General Frank. Did you know his chauffeur?
Mr. ZuccA. I did, sir.
58. General Frank. Would his chauffeur be waiting at these places outside while you were waiting for Major Wyman?
Mr. ZuccA. Occasionally, sir; yes, sir.
60. Major Clausen. I believe you already said that you have driven Major Wyman out to Mr. Rohl’s own home, and I wonder while you were out there if you ever met this party named Plack.
Mr. ZuccA. I don’t recall him, sir.
61. Major Clausen. What is Mr. Rohl’s chauffeur’s name? I mean the man who was the chauffeur at the time that you were the chauffeur for Major Wyman.
Mr. ZuccA. A Mr. Brown.
62. Major Clausen. What is his first name?
Mr. ZuccA. I don’t know.
63. Major Clausen. Do you know where he lives, his address?
Mr. ZuccA. No, I don’t.
[2587] 64. Major Clausen. Do you know where he is working?
Mr. ZuccA. No, I don’t.
65. General Frank. How often would Major Wyman stay all night at Mr. Rohl’s?
Mr. ZuccA. I have never known him to stay all night at Mr. Rohl’s, sir.
66. Major Clausen. I have no further questions.
67. General Russell. When did you first begin working for Captain or Colonel Wyman?
68. General Frank. Major Wyman.
Mr. ZuccA. I was assigned to Major Wyman when I was assigned as the District Engineer’s driver about four months after I was employed with the Army Engineers.
70. General Russell. And that was when?
Mr. ZuccA. Well, I started, I believe the date was—it was either February or March the 10th, 1936: March, April, May, June, or July, some time around there.
71. General Russell. And how long did you drive for Major Wyman?
Mr. ZuccA. I drove until he was transferred from the district at Los Angeles to Honolulu, sir.
72. General Russell. And then it covered a span of three or four years?
Mr. ZuccA. Yes, sir; about three and a half years, roughly.
73. General Russell. Now, were you an enlisted man in the Army and just detailed as Major Wyman’s driver?
Mr. ZuccA. No, sir; I was a civilian.
[2588] 74. General Russell. You were a civilian employee?
Mr. ZuccA. Yes, sir.
75. General Russell. What kind of car did the Major have?
Mr. ZuccA. You mean his own personal car, sir?
76. General Russell. No. The official car. Did he have one assigned to him as his permanent official car?

Mr. Zucca. Yes, sir; there was a car assigned to the District Engineer.

77. General Russell. And you were given the job of driving that particular car?

Mr. Zucca. Yes, sir.

78. General Russell. And did you drive the Major around very much in the daytime?

Mr. Zucca. Yes, sir.

79. General Russell. And then you would drive him some at night?

Mr. Zucca. Yes, sir, occasionally.

80. General Russell. Did he live in more than one place during this period of approximately three and a half years when you acted as his chauffeur?

Mr. Zucca. No, sir, not that I recall, sir. He was——

81. General Russell. Where did he live during that period of time?

Mr. Zucca. In West Los Angeles, sir.

82. General Russell. Do you recall the number and street?

Mr. Zucca. Yes, sir; 221 Woodruff, West Los Angeles.

83. General Russell. A very nice home he had there?

Mr. Zucca. Yes, sir, a very nice home.

84. General Russell. You would pick him up there and take [2589] him downtown to the hotel or out to a club after he had finished his work at night; is that so?

Mr. Zucca. Yes, sir, sometimes.

85. General Russell. Did he and his wife separate during this period of time that you acted as his chauffeur?

Mr. Zucca. Yes, sir.

86. General Russell. Did he continue to live in the home, or did Mrs. Wyman live in the home thereafter?

Mr. Zucca. He continued to live in the home, sir.

87. General Russell. Did she move?

Mr. Zucca. Mrs. Wyman—I believe she was in the East, sir.

88. General Russell. She moved away?

Mr. Zucca. Well, she was in the East. I don’t know whether she moved or not.

89. General Russell. Did Major Wyman marry again before he went out to the Islands.

Mr. Zucca. Yes, sir, he did.

90. General Russell. How long was it between the date of the first Mrs. Wyman’s going to the East until the Major married again?

Mr. Zucca. I don’t know, sir.

91. General Russell. You don’t recall when he married again?

Mr. Zucca. No, sir. I was on thirty days’ leave at the time, and I don’t recall how long it was.

92. General Russell. Do you remember when you went on that leave?

Mr. Zucca. It was in—let’s see. It was August. I think it was in August 1938, I believe.

93. General Russell. Now, do you remember when Mrs. Wyman, [2590] the first Mrs. Wyman, left to go to the East?

Mr. Zucca. No, sir. I had no idea that they were having any difficulty or anything at all. I don’t recall when she left to go
east, and I was rather amazed when I came back, to hear that they had separated, and later on I heard that he was married again.

94. General Russell. Now, aren't we getting a little bit confused? Did he separate and marry again, all during this one period of thirty days' leave that you had?

Mr. Zucca. No, sir.

95. General Russell. Where were you when the first Mrs. Wyman went out east?

Mr. Zucca. I was in the Los Angeles district, sir.

96. General Russell. Weren't you his driver then?

Mr. Zucca. Yes, sir, I was.

97. General Russell. You were taking him home and carrying him back to his office and going out to parties with him all that time?

Mr. Zucca. Well, I was taking him home, yes, sir; but I mean I had no knowledge of Mrs. Wyman's whereabouts, whether she was home or in the East.

98. General Russell. Well, all of the time before she went east, would you go get him and take him down to the hotel and leave the first Mrs. Wyman at home?

Mr. Zucca. I would like to clarify one thing: that when I'd go get Major Wyman, sir, I would usually take him to the district office.

99. General Russell. Well, now, you told Major Clausen a little while ago, you took him down to the Biltmore Hotel.

Mr. Zucca. I did. I have, yes, sir.

[2591] 100. General Russell. You told General Frank you would take him sometimes once a month and sometimes twice a week.

Mr. Zucca. I have, yes, sir. That's right.

101. General Russell. But you left Mrs. Wyman when you would take him down to the hotel?

Mr. Zucca. Well, let's put a time element in here. What time do you mean?

102. General Russell. I don't know. You fix the time.

Mr. Zucca. Well, maybe in the mornings when I'd pick him up I would take him to the district office in Los Angeles.

103. General Russell. We are not troubled about that. We want to know when the period was you were taking him to the hotel. Was that before Mrs. Wyman left and went to the East?

Mr. Zucca. No, sir.

104. General Russell. You never did take him to the Biltmore Hotel while he was living with the first Mrs. Wyman?

Mr. Zucca. Yes, sir, I have.


Mr. Zucca. I have taken him to the hotel and I have taken him to the district office, sir, when Mrs. Wyman was—when he was living with Mrs. Wyman, and I presume that during the time that Mrs. Wyman was away.

106. General Russell. Now, have you ever taken Mr. Rohl and Colonel Wyman out to a night club, just the two of them?

Mr. Zucca. Yes, sir, I have.

107. General Russell. Anybody else in that automobile?

Mr. Zucca. Well, sometimes there would be, yes, sir.

108. General Russell. Who would that be?
Mr. Zucca. Well, sometimes it might be Mrs. Wyman; it might be Mr. Grafie, Mr. Sverdrup.

109. General Russell. Did you have anybody else in there, in those cars?

Mr. Zucca. Well, oh, there was—I—you know, I mean, after all, there was a lot of people connected there with the district office.

110. General Russell. Ever have any other ladies in those cars?

Mr. Zucca. No, sir.

111. General Russell. Mrs. Wyman and Mrs. Rohl are the only two ladies that you ever had in that automobile?

Mr. Zucca. Yes, sir. That's the only ones that I recall, sir.

112. General Russell. Could there have been some others and you have forgotten them before now?

Mr. Zucca. Well, it was a long—long time. Four years is a long time. After all, this is 1944. That was in 1936, '37, '38, and '39.

113. General Russell. But you remember Paul Grafie?

Mr. Zucca. Wel, yes, sir. I remember Paul Grafie.

114. General Russell. His riding in the automobile?

Mr. Zucca. Yes, sir.

115. General Russell. You remember Mrs. Wyman riding in the automobile?

Mr. Zucca. Yes, sir.

116. General Russell. And Mrs. Rohl riding in it?

Mr. Zucca. Yes, sir.

117. General Russell. And these other two gentlemen you have mentioned, and those are the only ones you can remember?

Mr. Zucca. Those are the only ones. I mean I have seen them quite often, naturally, and remember them.

118. General Russell. There might have been other people riding in there?

Mr. Zucca. There was undoubtedly other people, you know, that we had driven at different times, but I don't recall who they were.

119. General Russell. Now, when Brown would come along behind you in Rohl's automobile, who was in there with him?

Mr. Zucca. No one, sir.

120. General Russell. He would be just alone?

Mr. Zucca. Yes, sir.

121. General Russell. Major Clausen asked you about going up to the hotel room where Mr. Rohl and Major Wyman were. Have you ever seen any girls up in those rooms?

Mr. Zucca. No, sir.

122. General Russell. Never saw a one in your life?

Mr. Zucca. No, sir.

123. General Russell. You saw some liquor but didn't see anybody drink any?

Mr. Zucca. I saw some liquor, but I didn't see anybody drinking it.

124. General Russell. In all the times you had ever been in there you never saw one soul take a drink of liquor?

Mr. Zucca. No, sir.

125. General Frank. What did you go up there for?

Mr. Zucca. Well, I took some cigarettes up to Major Wyman a couple of different occasions. One afternoon I took a briefcase up to him, sir.
126. General Russell. What time of day was it that you were going up to this room where Rohl was, where the Major was?

Mr. Zucca. In the afternoon, sir.

127. General Russell. Always in the afternoon?

Mr. Zucca. About four o'clock in the afternoon, yes, sir.

128. General Russell. You never went up there at night at all?

Mr. Zucca. No, sir, I have never been up there at night.

129. General Russell. When have you seen Mr. Rohl?

Mr. Zucca. When?


Mr. Zucca. I haven't see Mr. Rohl since I left the Engineers, sir, 19—let's see. That was 1941 when I left there, and I hadn't seen him quite some time previous to that.

131. General Russell. When did you see Paul Grafe last?

Mr. Zucca. About the same time, sir.

132. General Russell. '41?

Mr. Zucca. Yes, sir.

133. General Russell. Do you know how you came to give this statement that Major Clausen has read sections from to you?

Mr. Zucca. Do I know how I came to give it?


Mr. Zucca. Yes, sir; I was—let's see. Some Weiner—Werner.

135. General Russell. Weiner?

Mr. Zucca. Weiner, I believe—I believe that was his name—contacted to me at the San Bernardino air depot at San Bernardino and questioned me along these same lines, sir.

136. General Russell. Do you know who pointed you out to him or suggested that he go to see you?

[2595]  Mr. Zucca. No, sir, I don't.

137. General Russell. I think that is all.

138. Major Clausen. I have one more question, sir: Some of these times when you went up to the Biltmore Hotel Mr. Rohl would have different apartments, wouldn't he? I mean, change around from time to time?

Mr. Zucca. Well, yes, sir.

139. Major Clausen. Yes. That is all.

140. General Grunert. Any other questions?

141. Major Clausen. No, sir.

142. General Grunert. Can you think of anything else that you may want to tell the Board that hasn't been brought up?

Mr. Zucca. No, sir.

143. General Frank. When you would call for Colonel Wyman and Mr. Rohl at these night clubs and hotels, and so forth, were they always both of them perfectly sober?

Mr. Zucca. To my knowledge, yes, sir.

144. General Frank. Do you know?

Mr. Zucca. Well, I would say that, as far as I knew, they were sober, yes, sir.

145. General Frank. But do you really know?

Mr. Zucca. Pretty near. Well, I think I could tell a sober man. I mean, pretty hard to say that a person is drunk.

146. General Frank. If he is not in the gutter?

Mr. Zucca. No, sir, I wouldn't say that.
147. General Grunert. How did Major Wyman treat you? Was he rough with you abrupt or dictatorial, or was he nice to work for, or what?

148. General Frank. Was he considerate of you? [2596] Mr. Zucca. Yes, sir, I would say that he was.

149. General Frank. That he was what?

Mr. Zucca. Considerate of me, sir.

150. Major Clausen. Well, he gave you extra money, didn't he, Mr. Zucca?

Mr. Zucca. No, sir.

151. Major Clausen. Well, who was it gave you the tips? Mr. Rohl?

Mr. Zucca. I received a tip, I believe, on two different occasions from Mr. Sverdrup.

152. General Grunert. You mean four years and you just received two tips?

Mr. Zucca. Yes, sir.

153. Major Clausen. Mr. Rohl told the Tenney Committee his idea of a man being drunk was one who couldn't stand up any more. Is that your idea of the definition of drunk?

Mr. Zucca. No, sir.

154. Major Clausen. Did he ever tell you that?

Mr. Zucca. No, sir.

155. Major Clausen. That is all.

156. General Grunert. There appear to be no more questions. Thank you for coming.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

(Thereupon, at 11:50 a.m., the Board concluded the hearing of witnesses for the day and proceeded to other business.)
CONTENTS

FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 8, 1944

Testimony of:

Colonel William S. Lawton, General Staff Corps, Headquarters, Pacific Ocean Area, Fort Shafter, T. H.----------------- 2605
Brig. Gen. Edgar King, Medical Department, Fort Shafter, T. H.----------------- 2606
Hon. Lester Petrie, Mayor of the City of Honolulu, T. H.----------------- 2708
Maj. Gen. B. H. Wells, United States Army, Retired, 4551 Kahala Avenue, Honolulu, T. H.----------------- 2722
Walter Francis Dillingham, Carnation Avenue, Honolulu, T. H.----------------- 2745

DOCUMENTS

Radiogram to Commanding General, Hawaiian Department November 27, 1941------------------------------- 2680
Message of December 7, 1941 to Commanding General, Hawaiian Department------------------------------- 2692

1 Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate pages of original transcript of proceedings.
FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 8, 1944.

Fort Shafter, Territory of Hawaii.

The Board, at 9 a. m., pursuant to recess on Tuesday, September 5, 1944, conducted the hearing of witnesses, Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President of the Board, presiding.


Present also: Colonel Charles W. West, Recorder; Major Henry C. Clausen, Assistant Recorder; and Colonel Harry A. Toulmin, Jr., Executive Officer.

General Grunert. The Board will come to order.

TESTIMONY OF MAJOR GENERAL HENRY T. BURGIN, ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel West. General, will you please state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station.


2. General Grunert. General Burgin, the Board is after facts as to what happened prior to and during the attack on December 7.

[2599] Because of your assigned duties at that time, we hope we can get some facts from you, and also probably get leads to others who have such facts. Now, the Board, with the hearings held in the last month or more, has pretty thoroughly developed the subject, so, instead of piling up evidence on facts already substantiated, I will attempt to bolster up some of them by skipping from question to question, much of which is as a background of the Roberts Commission's report. Then, after I get through with that, we can open up any subject that the Board Members desire to have opened up, and also give you an opportunity to introduce anything that may occur to you, as it might have value to the Board.

Now, according to the Roberts Commission testimony, you evidently believed that Short counted on the Navy for warning of a sea approach, through the sources of Navy scouting, and you stated that Short expressed himself forcibly that no enemy ships could get close enough to land a plane. Why this belief, do you know?

General Burgin. It should be “launch a plane.” I did not say “land a plane.”

3. General Grunert. To “launch a plane”? 
General Burgin. Launch a plane from a carrier.

4. General Grunert. Did you concur with Short in that belief, or had you given the matter thought?

General Burgin. I concurred in General Short’s belief, and I got it from conversations with General Short and others. We had no means whatsoever, so far as the Army was concerned, of getting information. We had no surface ships. We did have some planes. It was my understanding that those planes of the Army operated under the Navy so far as scouting purposes went, patrol purposes. Those patrols were seen to go out every morning, come back late afternoon. I was never shown or didn’t attempt to see what routes they took, where they went, or what sectors they covered, but in my mind, and I am sure, in that of General Short’s, was the idea that the Navy was doing the scouting, and that from the Navy we would get our information, should the enemy approach.

5. General Grunert. But you never knew just what scouting the Navy was doing, if any?

General Burgin. I never know positively, no, only I saw these scouting planes go out and some back. It was not my business and I didn’t bother to look into it.

6. General Grunert. What were they—the Navy PBYs?

General Burgin. A great many were Navy PBYs, some of them were Army bombers.

7. General Grunert. Tell me, first, just what did you command at that time?

General Burgin. I commanded what was known at that time as the Coast Artillery Command, consisting of a seacoast artillery plus all the antiaircraft artillery in the Hawaiian Department.

8. General Grunert. What was the Fifty-Third Coast Artillery Brigade? What was that?

General Burgin. That was antiaircraft artillery, composed of the Sixty-Fourth Regiment, the Two Hundred Fifty-First Regiment, and the Ninety-Eighth, which came in just before the attack, two or three months before.

9. General Frank. A National Guard regiment?

[2607] General Burgin. The Two Hundred Fifty-First was the only National Guard regiment.

10. General Grunert. Now, it appears that you had in that brigade a brigade SOP of November 26, 1941, which charged each unit with responsibility for its own security against air and ground forces, and with the maintenance of air guards and dispersion of personnel and matériel, and which provided for alarms for air attack. Now, was this in conformity with the Department SOP of November 5, or was that your own idea, or what?

General Burgin. At this time, I don’t recollect whether it exactly conformed to the Department SOP. I believe it did. In addition to that, the idea behind that particular paragraph is the same old idea that you have with an infantry company marching along the highways. They are cautioned to be ready to shoot, to disperse, and every man shoot at the plane, should they be attacked. The same idea was behind this—each individual unit to look after itself, in so far as strafing planes were concerned, and keep dispersed.

11. General Grunert. Was this both in post and while out?
General Burgin. Everywhere, the idea behind it. That is followed even today in all these units. They are scattered as much as you can, dug into the ground, hidden.

12. General Grunert. How did that work out during the attack?

General Burgin. I did not have a chance to check it, because we were not particularly attacked. They had one target to go after, which was Pearl Harbor, and they went after it. They did it, and did the strafing of airfields, serious strafing, but so far as my AA units, they were not attacked [2602] seriously. There were probably half a dozen men injured from attack during the whole day.

13. General Grunert. Under that SOP, which required each unit to take care of itself, did that include preparing the necessary air-raid shelters and the preparation of slit trenches, and all other requirements to ward off an air attack?

General Burgin. I do not think that would be in that particular paragraph, but that is SOP to do that when you go out into a field position for battle, and the men actually did it without having to be told, when they went out.

14. General Grunert. In the various garrisons in which your troops were stationed, were such precautionary measures taken prior to December 7?

General Burgin. You mean, were slit trenches made, and so forth? No. they were not.

15. General Grunert. Was that done, shortly after December 7?

General Burgin. Immediately after, and during.

16. General Grunert. Now, there is a statement in your testimony, I believe, to the effect that you turned your anti-aircraft over to the Interceptor Command for drills, prior to December 7, and on that date, for action. Was the Interceptor Command then in being?

General Burgin. The Interceptor Command was being organized. It was never in being and functioning, as it should have been. It was only a temporary measure; but that particular feature of Interceptor Command controlling AA fire was jealously guarded by the air people, and we had constant training and maneuvers, practice, where that particular thing [2603] was stressed, and the anti-aircraft was turned over to interceptor command.

17. General Frank. On what date?

General Burgin. A peculiar thing attaches to that. For at least six weeks or two months prior to December 7, we had, every Sunday morning, one of these exercises with the Navy. Our AA would go out in the field and take their field positions. They would know that the Navy was coming in, with carrier-based planes, and they would simulate an attack on the island, and we put our guns out mainly along the roadways, sometimes in position, and practiced simulating fire against this simulated attack made by the Navy. And we were out just one week prior to December 7.

18. General Frank. On Sunday?

General Burgin. On Sunday; but, by some stroke, we did not go out on December 7. The fleet was in the harbor.

The interceptor command never got into being actually as a bona fide interceptor command, for weeks after December 7; but we were practicing as an interceptor command, through General Davidson, all the time.
19. General Grunert. During these practices and exercises, did the thing work?

[2604] General Burgin. It worked, yes, because we would get the information of the planes coming in, and immediately the interceptor command would take over. All that is, so far as turning it over to the interceptor command, is that the interceptor command tells you when to hold fire and when to resume fire. If he doesn't want you firing, he tells antiaircraft to hold fire, and under the orders we have to hold fire.

20. General Grunert. Now, suppose that the interceptor command as had been working during these drills and exercises, was in being on December 7, and had been working as it had been working during the drills and exercises: what difference would it have made in warding off the attack or in minimizing the effect of the attack, in your opinion?

General Burgin. In my opinion, none.

21. General Grunert. Why not?

General Burgin. Because we didn't have ammunition with our mobile antiaircraft. If they had been out in the field without any ammunition, they would have been worse off than they actually were.

22. General Grunert. That brings me to my next line of questioning.

What did you have out with your antiaircraft batteries such as existed on December 7th? Where were they? In what condition were they to go into action?

General Burgin. They were all ready to go into action immediately, with the exception that the mobile batteries did not have the ammunition. The fixed batteries along the seacoast, those batteries bolted down to concrete, had the ammunition [2605] nearby. I had insisted on that with General Short in person and had gotten his permission to take this antiaircraft ammunition, move it into the seacoast gun battery positions, and have it nearby the antiaircraft guns.

It was, however, boxed up in wooden boxes and had to be taken out. The ammunition for the mobile guns and batteries was in Aliamanu Crater, which, you may know or may not, is about a mile from Fort Shafter, up in the old volcano. The mobile batteries had to send there to get ammunition. In addition to that, the mobile batteries had to move out from the various posts to their field positions. They were not in field positions.

23. General Grunert. What proportion of mobile to fixed, approximately? Two to one? Three to one?

General Burgin. I can give you that exact figure from some notes here.

24. General Grunert. I can probably refresh your memory by your saying——

General Burgin. 26.

25. General Grunert. Location of 60 mobile and 26 fixed antiaircraft guns?

General Burgin. Yes. 26 fixed guns and 60 mobile at the time of the attack.

26. General Grunert. And then there were 26 fixed antiaircraft guns which had the ammunition alongside and ready for action?
27. General Frank. In boxes.
28. General Grunert. Was that ammunition for the fixed guns boxed or uncased?
   General Burgin. It was boxed.

[2606] 29. General Grunert. But how long approximately would it take to unbox it and get it into action?
   General Burgin. It depends on the batteries. Some of them had ammunition immediately available; that could be done in a very few minutes, four or five: they get enough ammunition out to begin firing, and continue to unbox. The batteries at Fort Weaver that is across the other side of Pearl Harbor, a little longer, because this ammunition was at Fort Kamehameha, had to be carried across the channel. But for the other fixed batteries I would say they could have been firing within five minutes, as far as the ammunition was concerned. They did begin firing: they went into action, three of those batteries. Three of those batteries got into action promptly.
30. General Grunert. They didn't get into action for the first wave of the attack, did they?
   General Burgin. That I don't know. These waves, I have never found anyone yet who could distinguish the difference in waves and how many waves actually came in here, as a matter of fact.
31. General Grunert. Did you have any information that was gotten out to the batteries in time for them to get into action before the attack actually struck?
   General Burgin. Oh, no; we knew nothing about the attack until the torpedoes dropped.
32. General Grunert. Then, you succeeded, through your own request, in getting boxed ammunition with your fixed antiaircraft batteries, which consisted of approximately 26 guns?
   General Burgin. Right.
33. General Grunert. But you were not successful or did you [2607] attempt to get ammunition to keep with your mobile batteries that could have gone into position with their ammunition without having to wait to draw it?
   General Burgin. Yes, sir, we did. I would like to answer that a little more elaborately. You may recollect yourself the great difficulty in prying loose ammunition from our storehouses and from the ordnance during peacetime. It was almost a matter of impossibility to get your ammunition out because in the minds of everyone who has preservation of ammunition at heart it goes out, gets damaged, comes back in, and has to be renovated. The same was especially true here. It was extremely difficult to get your ammunition out of the magazines. We tried the ordnance people without results. General Max Murray and myself went personally to General Short. General Murray pled for his ammunition for the field artillery. I asked for ammunition for the antiaircraft. We were put off, the idea behind it being that we would get our ammunition in plenty of time, that we would have warning before any attack ever struck.
34. General Frank. Was that putting off made directly by the Commanding General or by a staff department?
   General Burgin. Both; staff departments first, then the Commanding General in person.
35. General Frank. Supported them?

   General Burgin. In his own office, to General Murray and to me.

36. General Frank. Well, what were the staff departments who opposed it?

   General Burgin. The Gs; G-4s, the Ordnance.

[2608] 37. General Frank. And their reasons were?

   General Burgin. Same old reason, that they didn’t want to issue any of the clean ammunition, let it get out and get dirty, have to take it back in later on and renovate it; and, besides, we would get our ammunition in plenty of time should any occasion arise.

38. General Grunert. Then it was just a question of maintenance and preservation. Did the question of possible sabotage come into it; do you know?

   General Burgin. That is quite true; the sabotage was foremost in everybody’s mind. As long as the ammunition could be left locked up in the magazines, it was pretty safely guarded and could not be tampered with to any great extent.

39. General Grunert. Still, you being on an outpost here, with some intimation, at least, of the imminence of an attack, the guns were no good without ammunition?

   General Burgin. Quite true, sir.

40. General Grunert. And, therefore, what warning in the matter of time did you figure you should have in order to get your guns in position and your ammunition there with the guns to fire? Had that been practiced?

   General Burgin. We had many, many practices and tested that out, and it varied from the battery’s position, where it started to where it wound up, and other things, but six hours was considered to be the maximum.

41. General Grunert. Six hours.

   General Burgin. Day and night. We went out daytime and we went out nighttime.

42. General Grunert. You actually took the live ammunition [2609] out there to practice handling it?

   General Burgin. No.

43. General Grunert. And to practice taking it out there?

   General Burgin. No, I never took live ammunition on any practices. That was done once. I can’t say this for a fact, though, because I don’t know. I was only told it was done before I came here, at one time. The ammunition was taken out. There was a flurry and a scare, and the then there was all hell to pay when the ammunition came back in and had to be cleaned up, put back in the ordnance magazine. That, however, is not my personal knowledge.

44. General Grunert. Was there any question in your mind as to the ammunition not being put out there because it might alarm the public or indicate the intent of what was about to happen?

   General Burgin. The idea never occurred to me at the time. Looking back at the message General Short had, not to alarm the public, there is a possibility that was in his mind. I couldn’t alarm the public in this way: to move one of these batteries out to take the position in a private field was practically impossible prior to December 7th. As soon as you got off the highway, the owner, the manager, the topside man, all ran onto General Short’s neck: The Army is trespassing
on their land. Get to hell out of there. You had to do all these maneuvers on Army land or on the highways.

45. General GRUNERT. All right. Now, how many of the mobile positions for the 60 mobile guns were on such private land that you had to trespass to put them in position? Do you recall that?

[2610] General BURGIN. I can look here and refer to this bulletin.

46. General GRUNERT. Go ahead.
The actual number doesn’t make so much difference. I would like to have an idea of what the percentage is, if possible.
General BURGIN. About 40 percent were on private land.

47. General GRUNERT. And the other 60 percent, then, could have been put in position without going on private land?
General BURGIN. Wait a minute. I have included those fixed batteries. Make that higher. That percentage, at least 50 percent of the mobile batteries were on private land.

[2611] 48. General GRUNERT. I believe General Short stated something to the effect that under Alert No. 1 each battery had a skeleton crew with it. Would that refer to the fixed batteries or to the mobile or to both?
General BURGIN. It referred to both as far as sabotage meant only.

49. General GRUNERT. But your mobile batteries had to move out from their location to go into a position, and then none of these mobiles went out in their position, and they had skeleton crews?
General BURGIN. I don’t quite understand your question. I am sorry.

50. General GRUNERT. Here, your fixed batteries are fixed and they undoubtedly had a skeleton crew there to prevent sabotage.
General BURGIN. Right.

51. General GRUNERT. In other words, your skeleton crews to prevent sabotage came in, as far as your mobile batteries are concerned, as if they were at the post and had not moved out into position?
General BURGIN. They were taken more or less as a regiment or a battalion on the post and the sabotage guards did not necessarily go down to the battery itself.

52. General GRUNERT. There was not, then, much of a sabotage problem as far as guards were concerned, within the post itself?
General BURGIN. No, sir.

53. General GRUNERT. You may have answered this, but I will ask it again: What instructions, if any, prevented the antiaircraft command from having ammunition at the guns? Were there any instructions or could you not get the ammunition?
General BURGIN. There were no instructions forbidding the antiaircraft or any other outfit from having the ammunition, but it was just impossible to pry the ammunition loose from the Ordnance, the G-4’s, or from General Short himself.

54. General GRUNERT. Now, in February of 1941, Admiral Kimmel pointed out the critical inadequacy of antiaircraft guns. Were you here at that time, in February of 1941?
General BURGIN. No, sir. I came in August of 1941.

55. General GRUNERT. Since August, 1941, what improvement in the line of antiaircraft gun equipment took place, up to December, 1941?
General Burgin. Up to December 1941?

56. General Grunert. Yes.

General Burgin. No improvement in actual equipment, with the bare exception of about 20 37-mm. guns that arrived. However, there were more in training than were actually in use, because of no ammunition for them up to just a day or two of December 7th.

57. General Grunert. And they were 37s?

General Burgin. 37 mm.

58. General Grunert. How did you consider your command prepared for action with what you had? Was it adequate, satisfactory, or unsatisfactory, and what explanation is there for your answer?

General Burgin. With what we had we were prepared for action, with the one exception that our mobile antiaircraft did not have its ammunition. I have already explained the reason for that. So far as the equipment was concerned, it was [2513] as modern as the U.S. had at the time, with the bare exception, perhaps, that we had 37-mm. automatic weapons, yes, whereas they were using the 40-mm. Bofors and other aerials.

59. General Grunert. Did you have any 90s?

General Burgin. We had no 90s whatever at the time.

60. General Grunert. What was the status of their being supplied to the Army at that time, do you know?

General Burgin. It was reported that there was an automatic supply and we would get them when they had them.

61. General Grunert. Do you know what priority you were on as compared with other commands at that time?

General Burgin. No, I do not. The 90s came along fairly well after December 7th. We are equipped now with 90s and 120s; no 3s whatever. In fact, all the equipment we had on December 7th has been discarded, with the exception of the .50 caliber machine guns.

62. General Grunert. On December 7th, then, did you have practically your full allowance, as per tables, of the weapons that were prescribed for you at that time?

General Burgin. No. We had the full allowance of guns, but did not have the allowance of automatic weapons.

63. General Grunert. Mainly what?

General Burgin. Mainly the 37 mm. or the 40. You might say we had none of them because we had just received a shipment of 20, I think, but no ammunition. We were way short on .50 caliber machine guns. We had only about 40 per cent of our allowance. We had supplemented them with .30 caliber, however.

64. General Grunert. Have you anything else to add to the anti-aircraft situation picture that you think would help the [2614] Board?

General Burgin. I think not, sir. The whole thing sums up in about this: We practiced making a quick get-away from central locations to field positions. We felt that we could get into field positions after the warning which we expected to receive.

65. General Grunert. Had you been alerted in what the SOP of November 5th describes as Alert No. 2, which is an alert to ward off an air attack, plus an alert against sabotage, then what condition would you have been in?

General Burgin. The batteries would all have been in their field positions with the ammunition open ready at the guns.
66. General Grunert. Then it all boils down to your not being in
the alert which required you to be ready for any eventuality, is that
right?

    General Burgin. That is correct.

67. General Grunert. Now, a question as to your distribution of
batteries. Was there an antiaircraft battery assigned to Ford Island
or to cover Ford Island in its fire?

    General Burgin. Yes. Practically all the batteries surrounding
Pearl Harbor were a protection to Ford Island. There was, in addi-
tion, a battery listed for actual position on Ford Island. It was
later put in there.

68. General Grunert. How much of this fixed stuff was in the
scheme of covering Ford Island, how much of a fixed antiaircraft
battery?

    General Burgin. There were only three which you might consider
in that category, unless your attacking planes came \[2615\]
along the shoreline, from Diamond Head; then they could all be in
that category, because they can shoot at the planes before they reach
Ford Island.

69. General Grunert. Then, what you might call the main antiair-
craft protection of Ford Island consisted of your mobile batteries,
which had to take position before they could afford that protection?

    General Burgin. That is correct.

70. General Grunert. Was there ever a scheme made up of having
these people dispersing your mobile batteries so as to get them into
assigned positions more quickly than they could get into them from
their concentrated locations?

    General Burgin. No. They were dispersed pretty well as it was,
with one outfit at Shafter, one at Schofield Barracks, one at Camp
Malekoli; three regiments, three areas. The regiments were assigned
to field positions nearest to their locations.

71. General Grunert. I have one question here that refers to your
testimony before the Roberts Commission, to the effect that you never
knew when the fleet was coming in except when practicing, and you
stated that such knowledge would have helped the defense. Was that
information ever requested, if it was going to be of help to you in
the defense? Was an attempt ever made to find out when the fleet
was coming in?

    General Burgin. I would like you to read that answer to me again,
that I am supposed to have given before the Roberts Commission.

72. General Grunert. This is what this says: "General Burgin
never knew when the fleet was coming in, except when practicing.
\[2616\] He stated such knowledge would have helped defense." Just
what was the exact wording is I do not know. This is a summariza-
tion of such evidence.

    General Burgin. The last line there is what I take exception to,
that it would help defense. I call your attention to the fact that we
were not defending Pearl Harbor prior to Pearl Harbor. We were in
a state of peace, not in a state of war. The practices prior to December
7th were the only instances in which I was personally told that the
fleet was coming in between certain hours and carrier-based planes
would make a simulated attack on us and we would oppose them with
simulated opposition. We had at Pearl Harbor a harbor entrance

79716-46—Ex. 145, vol. 2—37
control post, where one of my officers sat with the Navy, but this officer was given very little information, except when we were maneuvering or practicing tactical situations. In the ordinary course of events, the fleet went in and out without any indication whatsoever to me, at least, and it is my opinion that no information was given to General Short. That I do not know.

73. General GRUNERT. I understood from former testimony that your control officer or the officer at the harbor entrance control post was only there periodically and not on a 24-hour basis, is that right.

General BURGIN. That is true, up to December 7th; he was there on a daylight basis, you might say.

74. General FRANK. What good did it do you to have him there at all?

General BURGIN. Practically none, except practice, tactical situations, so if such things developed we could quickly take care of the harbor entrance control.

[2617] 75. General FRANK. It did not give you any intelligent information as to the location of our own fleet units?

General BURGIN. Absolutely not.

76. General GRUNERT. The testimony before the Roberts Commission also appears to show you stated that you expected Alert No. 2 to follow almost immediately after Alert No. 1. What was the basis of that? What was back in your mind there?

General BURGIN. An actual statement by the Chief of Staff to that effect. When I got the orders to go into Alert No. 1, I put it into effect, checked here and there to see that it had gone into effect, that the guards were out. Then I made a trip to the Commanding General's office, General Short's office. I asked the Chief of Staff if he would mind telling me the reason for Alert No. 1. He showed me the radio that had come from General Marshall and stated "We will go into Alert No. 1; then we will slide immediately to Alert No. 2, and then to No. 3."

77. General GRUNERT. That was on November 27th, then?

General BURGIN. As I recall, it was, it was November 27th.

78. General GRUNERT. But up to December 7th you had not slid into Alert No. 2, had you?

General BURGIN. No, sir, there was no change in the alert. We had done many, many other things guarding against sabotage, sending guns and troops to Canton and Christmas, as I recollect, but we had not changed our alert status.

79. General GRUNERT. Then you actually saw and read the Chief of Staff's message on November 27th, 1941?

General BURGIN. I did.

80. General GRUNERT. Did that give you any idea to suspect [2618] that Alert No. 2 would be called soon, or the necessity for any other alert outside of Alert No. 1? In other words, how did you size up that message?

General BURGIN. It is easy enough from hindsight to say you would have gone into another alert, but it did strike me we were a little backwards; that we should have gone into Alert No. 3, gone all-out, in spite of the fact it would turn the whole town upside down if we had.
81. General Grunert. That is one of the questions I want to ask. In what way was that turning upside down going to affect things, outside of what you have testified to, going on private property?

General Burgin. That is true.

82. General Grunert. In what way would you have turned things upside down, if you had gone into Alert No. 3?

General Burgin. That would have been the main thing, getting your batteries into position, combating the opposition that would have taken place and the excitement we expected to cause among the local Japanese.

83. General Grunert. Before we get off into another trend of thought, there must have been in your mind some question about the adequacy of Alert No. 1, since you went to the Commanding General and questioned him about it; and from your testimony it appears that he had some idea of following it up with Alert No. 2. But what gave you the idea that Alert No. 2 might follow Alert No. 1, unless you considered No. 1 inadequate?

General Burgin. I did consider No. 1 as being inadequate, but I did not voice that idea to General Short or his Chief of Staff. On the other hand, I considered seriously that radio [2619] that had come in to General Short, and wondered what I would do in his position, that he would not unduly excite, or words to that effect, the public.

84. General Frank. Do you remember the wording of that radiogram?

85. General Grunert. General Frank will read you the radiogram, in order that you may refresh your memory on it, and I think the Board would then like to ask you a few questions about it.

General Burgin. All right.

86. General Frank (reading):

Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue.

General Burgin. Now, wait a minute. That is not the radio I saw.

87. General Grunert. Go ahead and finish it and then we will ask you about it.

88. General Frank (continuing):

Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat not, be avoided the United State desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not, repeat not, to alarm civil population or disclose intent. Report measures taken. Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow Five so far as they pertain to Japan. Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers.

[2620] That is signed "Marshall."

89. General Grunert. That was the Chief of Staff's message of November 27th. That apparently does not ring the bell on you?

General Burgin. That does not ring the bell to me. That was not the message I read. It had a great many similar phrases in it.
90. **General Frank.** Are you sure that you saw the original message, that you did not see a digest of it?

**General Burgin.** I could not answer that. I am not sure. It was signed “Marshall” and it was to General Short. It had nothing about the Rainbow plan in it, for example, and while it said “The United States” this message said “The President”.

91. **General Frank.** This is the only message that was so signed “Marshall” on that date.

92. **General Grunert.** And that is the only message that the Board has been able to find of that date. Do you think there is a similar message?

**General Burgin.** I certainly do.

93. **General Grunert.** Could it have been paraphrased and you be given the wrong conception of it?

**General Burgin.** It is possible, but I don’t think so.

94. **General Grunert.** Do you think possibly the last three years may have done something to your memory? You seem to be pretty certain. What cements that idea in your mind?

**General Burgin.** I don’t think so.

95. **General Frank.** What was the substance of the message you saw?

**General Burgin.** All right, I will give it to you just as [2621] my mind recalls it. “Diplomatic relations with Japan have broken down completely. Hostilities may be expected at any time. You will take the necessary action. The President desires that Japan shall commit the first overt act. The President desires that nothing be done to unduly excite the public.” Then I think the rest of it was “Report action taken”, or words to that effect. That is what sticks in my mind as the message that I read.

96. **General Grunert.** Then you do not recall this particular part of any message that you then read, “This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense”?

**General Burgin.** I do not. I have no recollection of any such paragraph in it.

97. **General Grunert.** Had you received a message with that wording in it would you have considered action just for a sabotage alert as restricting your defense?

**General Burgin.** I would, yes, sir.

98. **General Grunert.** We will go back to that subject again, later, when we get some copies of other messages.

**General Frank.** You stated a little while ago that as a result of the message you had received there was some question as to action, in answering the question as to what kind of an alert you in person would have directed. From what you said it leads me to ask you this question: In your mind did the wording of this message put you in a quandary as to just what was expected of you?

**General Burgin.** No, I cannot say that.

99. **General Frank.** Do you think it put General Short in a [2622] quandary?

**General Burgin.** That is hard to say.

100. **General Frank.** If you had received this message what do you think you would have done?
General Burgin. I think I would have gone out into Alert No. 3.

101. General Frank. Why?

General Burgin. Because I believe in doing the maximum rather than doing it by dribs and drabs.

102. General Frank. Would going into Alert No. 3 have handicapped your training, as far as your training is concerned?

General Burgin. No, sir. It would help my training, train right into position.

103. General Grunert. Of course, your viewpoint at the time was that of the Coast Artillery Command, plus the Antiaircraft Command, and not the viewpoint of the top commander?

General Burgin. Absolutely.

104. General Grunert. Let us get down to this series of questions: Were conferences held by the Commanding General or his Chief of Staff with the principal commanders, wherein they were kept informed of the situation, and in turn they would inform the Commanding General of the measures taken by them to meet such situation?

General Burgin. No, sir, there were no conferences, at least while I was there.

105. General Grunert. Did you ever hear of a message received by the Navy on November 27th which started out "Consider this a war warning"?

General Burgin. No, I never did.

106. General Grunert. Just what did you know about the tenseness of the existing situation from late in November until the attack took place?

General Burgin. Nothing officially, only what was in the papers and what you would glean at dinner parties and other places.

107. General Grunert. Then there was never a discussion, as far as you know, between the top commander and his principal commanders—and you were one of them—as to the tenseness of the situation, as to the information received from the Navy concerning that tenseness?

General Burgin. No, sir, there never was.

108. General Grunert. Were you called into discussion on this message received from the Chief of Staff as to what measures should be taken thereunder?

General Burgin. I was not.

109. General Grunert. Then the decision to go into Alert No. 1 was made without your advice or consultation?

General Burgin. Correct, yes, sir.

110. General Grunert. If you did not consider Alert No. 1 as adequate, did you feel that you could go to the Commanding General and say "See here, I don't think this is adequate to give me a chance to do my particular job in defense"? Did that occur to you?

General Burgin. That did occur and that could have been done at any time and might have been done had the attack not come quite so soon. All I was after was to get my ammunition; that was the main point, and I had already been there once on that. However, if we had had our ammunition and been in field position it would not have stopped that attack. It might have deranged it a bit, but the results would have been serious just the same.
111. General Grunert. The Board has had previous testimony as to Saturday conferences held. Were they conferences between commanders or staff commanders, or do you know anything about such conferences?

General Burgin. I do not, no, sir. In my whole four months, August 7th to December 7th, I was called once to a Commanding General's conference, one time. At that conference there were minor subjects discussed; never anything along this line whatsoever.

112. General Frank. Were you here when General Herron was here?

General Burgin. No.

113. General Frank. Were you familiar with the weekly conferences that he held with his people? Did you ever hear about them?

General Burgin. Never did. General Herron had gone some time before I arrived.

114. General Grunert. Who was Chief of Staff while you were here?


115. General Grunert. Colonel Phillips?

General Burgin. His initials I do not know.

116. General Grunert. Did you have a chance to size him up as to his capability or efficiency?

General Burgin. Yes, only casually.

117. General Grunert. What did you think of him as Chief of Staff?

General Burgin. That is a pretty tough question, but I will answer it. Normally he was looked upon as one of General Short's fair-haired boys, and he carried things with a pretty high hand.

118. General Grunert. But he never called, so far as you know, the commanders of the lower echelon in conference to discuss what was in General Short's mind, or to seek advice from them as to decisions to be made?

General Burgin. No, sir, he did not. At least, I was never called, and I was next in command or next in rank to General Short.

119. General Grunert. Do you know anything about conferences held between the Army and the Navy and the cooperation between the Army and the Navy?

General Burgin. No, sir, I do not.

120. General Grunert. Did you ever have occasion for such cooperative action or any reason for cooperation with the Navy?

General Burgin. I went down and made my acquaintance with Admiral Bloch, who at that time was Naval District Commander. Through him we worked up this harbor control idea, where I put an Army officer in there with the Navy to work up the organization and functioning of a bona fide harbor entrance control plan.

121. General Frank. You gave one answer to General Grunert's question on Phillips. What was the concensus on Phillips' efficiency and effectiveness?

General Burgin. It never occurred to me that he was extremely efficient, or otherwise—the average, run-of-the-mine.

122. General Frank. How did he get along with his subordinate commands?
General Burgin. I don't know; got along all right with mine, because I was fairly senior and ran my own command. I didn't know Phillips well and personally. I met him at various dinner parties and other things.

123. General Frank. Would you have selected him as chief of staff?
General Burgin. No, because I didn't know him.

124. General Grunert. Did you make up the plan for antiaircraft defense of Oahu?
General Burgin. Yes; I sat in with my staff and helped work it up.

125. General Grunert. Did that defense include the equipment of the District and of the fleet when in harbor in a concerted whole for antiaircraft defense?

General Burgin. Not prior to December 7.

126. General Grunert. Was it veering toward that, or did you expect to see it remain separate, if an attack had not occurred?

General Burgin. There had been very little planning done along that line prior to December 7, but we soon saw that with various elements of the fleet always in the harbor they should be tied into our antiaircraft command, and the [2627] problem was attacked and worked out, whereas fleet units in the harbor had come under what was then the interceptor commander, now the air defense command. Still, the Navy reserves for each ship the right to decide for themselves whether they shall fire or not, so it is really not worth very much even under its present condition. The captain of the ship is still given the last say, which I think he rightly should have, whether he should shoot or not. It is the preservation of his ship.


128. General Russell. In discussing the factors which should have been considered in going into Alert 2 or Alert 3, you used language, General, about the “opposition which you would have had to combat.” I was wondering just what you meant by that language.

General Burgin. I wonder if you can find that in your notes. Repeat your question to me, will you?

129. General Russell. You were replying to a question from General Grunert, and in that reply you used language about “combatting opposition,” and then I paraphrased the other—opposition which would have been provoked by Alert 2 or Alert 3. All of that language about combatting opposition was quite new.

General Burgin. What I meant by that was the opposition, the annoyance we would have received from owners of land, and other facilities, when we took them over. We would have had to have gone with these batteries and other units, mobile outfits, trucks, tractors, out into the cane fields and other fields, and all the lawyers in town would have been on our [2628] necks in a very short time. We had all that to consider, if we were to comply with the directive as I read it, to not unduly excite the public.

130. General Russell. Is it true, therefore, General, that prior to December 7, 1941, so far as you recall, you had never had all of your mobile batteries in the positions which they were to occupy in the event of hostilities?

General Burgin. That is correct; they had not all been in the actual position they were to go in.
131. General Frank. Was that because of this opposition of the people who owned the land?
General Burgin. Yes, and the fact that we had not yet gotten the leases all fixed up, so that we could move into those positions for practice.

132. General Russell. As a matter of fact, therefore, the action which would have been required under Alert 3 had never been taken on this island?
General Burgin. In so far as the guns going actually in positions, digging their revetments, putting in their bunkers, that had never been done, so far as the mobile, in all their positions; in some, it had.

133. General Russell. Elsewhere in your testimony you referred to "turning the town up-side-down," or language similar its meaning to that.
General Burgin. I see I will have to curb my language.

134. General Russell. No, we are just attempting to get at the thought behind the language. We are not interested in the language. Do you think that going all-out on Alert No. 3 would have resulted in disturbing the people of the City [2629] of Honolulu?
General Burgin. I do.

135. General Russell. Is there in your mind some thought that there would have been developed a considerable opposition among the influential civilian population here on the island toward the results of Alert No. 3?
General Burgin. I think there is no doubt about it, in the world.

136. General Russell. In other words, if General Short had ordered Alert No. 3—and I am asking this question in the interest of clarity—if General Short had ordered Alert No. 3 and thrown all of his people into readiness for immediate combat, including the issuing of ammunition, it might, or, in your opinion, it would have provoked opposition on the part of some of the responsible and influential civilian population here on the island?
General Burgin. I feel positive it would.

137. General Grunert. Even though he might have explained that to the influential citizens, there would still have been opposition?
General Burgin. I don't believe you could have explained it, at that time.

138. General Grunert. Who are some of those influential citizens that you think might have voiced their objection?
General Burgin. Oh, my!

139. General Grunert. Is Dillingham one of them?
General Burgin. Mt. Dillingham, Mr. Walker.

140. General Frank. Which Walker?
General Burgin. I don't know. He is a sugar man. General Wells.

[2630] 141. General Grunert. General Wells is what?
General Burgin. General Wells is with the sugar people, a manager of some kind.

General Burgin. He was instrumental in fighting the sugar people's battles quite strongly prior to the war, and even yet, so far as I know.

143. General Grunert. How about Petrie? Is he one of them?
General Burgin. No, I don't think so. What was the governor's name, at that time?
144. General Grunert. Poindexter?
General Burgin. Poindexter—right. Mr. Spaulding.
145. General Grunert. Who are known here as the “Big Five”? I believe I have heard that term.
General Burgin. I don’t know.
146. General Grunert. These so-called “big, influential people” have mostly land and crop interests, have they, where Alert No. 3 might interfere with or disrupt them?
General Burgin. That was my idea. That’s my idea; yes, sir.
147. General Russell. I want to ask another question in line with this, General. I have gotten the impression from your testimony that the possibility of this opposition might have had a little bit deeper basis than indicated by your answer to General Grunert’s last question, which rather limited this opposition to the land owners because of disturbing their profits, and whatnot. I had gotten the impression that we would have opposition from influential people on the island, because they did not want the community upset, and the relation between the races disturbed and their commercial trends broken into. Was that behind this opposition, too?
General Burgin. It might have been; I don’t know much about that feature of it. I don’t see how it would have any bearing on the races, except perhaps the Japanese, they could see we were doing something, and those who wanted to try to get information back to their own country would have that opportunity. That had nothing to do with it in this case, so far as I can see.
148. General Russell. Going away from that for the minute, you have given considerable testimony about the weapons available to you as antiaircraft commander. We have had testimony to the effect that, first, the weapons available for the protection of Pearl Harbor, of the smaller caliber, were not numerous enough, and were ineffective. What is your opinion on that?
General Burgin. They were certainly not numerous enough. They were, however, about as effective as any weapons we had at that time, except for a few experimental models. For example, we had the 3-inch gun, a pretty good old gun in its day. The 90-mm. had hardly come into play up to that time to any great extent; there were some manufactured, some in use, on the mainland. There had been built 12 experimental model 105-mm. They were all sent to Panama, and were on duty down there. They never panned out well, and were discarded; but so far as our heavy equipment, it was pretty good for its day.
149. General Russell. Did you observe the firing of the batteries in and near Pearl Harbor against the high-altitude Japanese bombers?
General Burgin. Yes.
150. General Russell. What was your impression of that fire?
General Burgin. Those bombers never reached any great altitude. As far as I could tell they were never over 11,000 feet, any of them. Any gun we had would reach that, even the old Navy 5-inch, which isn’t a very good gun, either; at the time; very low muzzle velocity, very slow fire; also defective ammunition. That is the Navy 5-inch, their main weapon.
151. General Russell. The fire against these bombers flying at approximately 10,000 feet has been described in testimony elsewhere as
ineffective, because the bursts were below, and frequently to the rear of the targets. Were you impressed that that was true?

General Burgin. It didn’t occur to me at the time, except that in any antiaircraft fire, you may have observed, yourself, the great percentage of bursts is behind the target, even in practice, even in battle. There are two reasons for that; the first is your deceptive appearance. The burst occurs there, the plane goes ahead, but before that burst is big enough for your eye to see it, the plane has traveled considerably, so your burst is not so far behind as it would appear to be. The other reason is our training; we are always trained on a comparatively slow-moving target. We get out on an actual plane, it is going at least twice as fast as any target you ever shot at, and it takes a few rounds at least to get your bursts up in the lead; but so far as your bursts being late, that wasn’t observable to me to any great extent. It was certainly not due to the fact that the guns would not reach 10,000 feet. Every gun we had would reach that—17,000 feet. The same, with the Navy 5-inch. Just what their maximum height is, I don’t know, but it is certainly beyond 17,000 feet.

[2633]  152. General Frank. The question of shooting ahead or behind is a question of training and practice, is that right?

General Burgin. That’s my idea of it, yes.

153. General Grunert. I would like, before you leave that subject, to ask you about the Navy 5-inch ammunition. You say some of it was defective?

General Burgin. A great deal of it was defective, and “duds.” Unfortunately, the “duds,” detonated on contact with the ground. They were not really “duds,” so far as contact with any material object was concerned. However, they did not burst in the air. They burst all over town. They burst all over De Russy, where I was. I saw them burst two of them up in the crater on Diamond Head, knocking out one of my mortars. That 5-inch ammunition was falling all over the island. A great many people thought they were Japanese bombs, but only one bomb hit the town of Honolulu, and I think that was an accident. All the rest of them were Navy 5-inch shells.

154. General Grunert. How do you know that to be a fact?

General Burgin. I went out and dug up the fragments and looked at the markings on them. I know they were Navy shells; and so does the Navy.

155. General Grunert. Do you know whether or not the Army was blamed for that damage? Do you know whether or not the Army was accused of having poor ammunition, and that they thought it was the Army ammunition that did that?

General Burgin. I never heard of that.

156. General Grunert. All right. Go ahead. I just wanted to get that clear.

157. General Russell. General, I am jumping about, because I just made a note here and there.

General Burgin. Go ahead.

158. General Russell. A great deal has been said about the interceptor command, whether or not it was in operation, and so forth.

General Burgin. Yes, sir.

159. General Russell. As I recall your testimony, it was to the effect that when the interceptor command was organized and operat-
ing, its only effect on you would be to tell you when to shoot and when not to shoot?

General Burgin. That is practically correct.

160. General Russell. There is nothing so very difficult and intricate about the interceptor command?

General Burgin. Not a thing.

161. General Russell. And this man, Davidson, had been designated a considerable time before December 7 as the interceptor commander, or had been named as the man who was going to organize that and exercise the command over it?

General Burgin. Right.

162. General Russell. In the exercises which had been held prior to December 7, 1941, the interceptor command had been in action?

General Burgin. In a minor way.

163. General Russell. As a matter of fact, its operation was essentially minor, any way?

General Burgin. Absolutely, up till well after December 7. I might elaborate on that, to give you my ideas. The whole scheme of things there was in embryo, you might say. These warning radars, you heard a lot about, were just being installed. [2635] They go in as part of the interceptor command. They were not complete in any manner of means. The Signal Corps was putting them in. They had no permanent home for interceptor command, and when I remarked a moment ago it was simple, it is simple enough in operation, but it is complicated as everything, for installation, equipment, and funds. They operated under General Davidson in a temporary shack on the Fort Shafter Reservation down here in the hollow. At the same time, the real interceptor command, which is now the Air Defense Command, was being dug in a hillside up above Fort Shafter, where it is now located—a million dollars' worth of stuff in there; so when I said it is simple, I don't mean simple in equipment and operation, but in control of the antiaircraft—extremely simple; nothing to do except to tell you when you can shoot and when you can't; but the interceptor command in itself is an enormous, complicated machine. You ought to look at it while you are here.

164. General Russell. I hope to. It was new throughout the Army, in 1941?

General Burgin. Incidentally, we do not call it the "interceptor command" any more. It went through several stages, called a "fighter command," and now it is called the Air Defense Command.

165. General Russell. All right. Another disassociated subject: What percentage of your troops were with the fixed batteries on the morning of December 7?

General Burgin. I would say about a third of them. We had a very small number of troops, however, in the fixed defenses, a total of 101 officers and 2,712 men.

166. General Russell. How many were actually out with the [2636] batteries on duty, on that morning of December 7? What percentage?

General Burgin. None of them, except the guard skeleton.

However, they were right at the batteries. They were manned in a very few minutes.
167. General Russell. Some confusion seems to have grown up in my mind about your ammunition, about the status of your ammunition. You had your ammunition, on December 7, you did not have to go to ordnance to get it?

General Burgin. No, you are wrong. I had the ammunition for seacoast artillery at the guns, in the magazine. I had the ammunition for the six fixed antiaircraft. We had that ammunition in the seacoast magazine. I didn't have the ammunition for the mobile antiaircraft's 3-inch guns.

168. General Russell. A moment ago, you referred to the table when you were discussing the personnel available to you on December 7. What percentage of your table strength had been given you on December 7?

General Burgin. We were pretty well below strength. The percentage, I can't give you, but, all in all, we were short 900 or 1,000 men.

169. General Russell. And you had how many—2,700, on this day?

General Burgin. Well, that is seacoast, alone. You have got to remember, I have got two commands—antiaircraft and the seacoast.

170. General Russell. You were short 900 on both commands?

General Burgin. In the two commands combined; yes.

171. General Russell. And in the two commands combined, could [2637] you give us quickly, there, what the table strength was?

General Burgin. No, I haven't got it, I am sorry. I can get it for you very easily.

172. General Grunert. Approximately 20,000?

General Burgin. No, no, no; I didn't have that many—probably about 13,000 or 14,000, total.

173. General Grunert. And that is just about 10 percent short?

General Burgin. Yes.

174. General Russell. General, is it true, or not, that in 1941 the plans for defense against attack by aircraft were in a state of flux or changing constantly?

General Burgin. Quite true; and they are changing, yet.

175. General Russell. As a result of the experiences on December 7, and other experiences, has the Army in its operations here in the island increased to any considerable extent the number of antiaircraft weapons?

General Burgin. That fluctuates extremely, but at one time they increased enormously, they were a way up. Those have gone out in the middle and west Pacific, however. We are back now in the number of guns to about where we were on December 7. However, we have got a much better gun.

176. General Russell. Do you think that the reduction in the number of guns, which has been accomplished in the recent past, results from the fact that there is no great probability of any further Japanese attacks, here?

General Burgin. No, you are wrong. That has been discussed with General Richardson, time and time again. He and I both feel that we are yet subject to attack, that as long as the Japanese have a carrier afloat she can risk one or two or [2638] more, she can get in here; and all the navies in the world won't keep her out, if she wants to get here. That has nothing to do with the number of guns.

177. General Russell. It has been reduced, then, simply because the people who are charged with responsibility for making the decision
believe that the number of guns which you have here now are adequate for the protection of the island?

[2639] General Burgin. That is correct. I have so stated to General Richardson, and he agreed with me. He had established as a minimum the number that we have now.

178. General Russell. Are you on any form of alert now? If so, what is the type?

General Burgin. We are on a five-minute alert. We can get to the battery in five minutes.

179. General Russell. That is neither 1, 2, or 3, the old type of alert, is it?

General Burgin. That has gone out.

180. General Russell. What is it? A cross between 2 and 3, or more nearly 2, or what?

General Burgin. Well, more nearly 3 all the time. We have had since December 7th the men in the camps right at the guns, and they can get there as quick as you can sound an alarm, almost.

181. General Russell. General, I am not sure that the record is clear between you and me on our recent questions you were asked.

General Burgin. I am not either.

182. General Russell. You don’t seem to answer my questions.

General Burgin. I try to.

183. General Russell. And I don’t seem to understand your answers.

General Burgin. I try to.

184. General Russell. Something is wrong.

I am attempting to develop whether or not it is the sense of the commanders here on the Island now that they have adequate weapons for the protection or for the accomplishment [2640] of their mission against aircraft raids.

General Burgin. All right. I will answer you yes. Now, you have got to qualify that when you say “adequate protection.” If you were left here with everything you could get, with all the influences of the world to help, you would probably take more; but when General Marshall tells you that with the manpower shortage and everything else you have got to scrape the bottom from here and there to provide your fighting force out in the Pacific, you have got to balance one against the other and come to a decision. General Richardson has said the minimum antiaircraft which below we shall not go, and he feels and I feel that under the circumstances that is adequate.

185. General Russell. And you have gotten to that number?

General Burgin. And we have not yet quite reached that minimum. We are above it.

186. General Russell. How does that compare now with the number of weapons that you had available on December 7, 1941?

General Burgin. The big guns, as I stated, are approximately the same. The gun is much better and probably ten times as effective as the equipment we had December 7, 1941. The defense around Pearl Harbor is stronger than anything that has ever been put up in Europe anywhere.

187. General Russell. The smaller caliber guns, how does that compare now with December 7, 1941?

General Burgin. Much more. We have got our full complement, 20 batteries.
188. General Russell. In answer to one of General Grunert's questions you said, had you been in position with your ammunition ready to fire on December 7, that you might have affected the Japanese flights in some way. I believe you used the term, you might have broken it up to an extent, or words to that effect, but you would not have been able to have prevented the damage which they did here.

Assuming that the antiaircraft fire had been reinforced by the aircraft, are you in position to know what effect the two operating in conjunction would have had on the Japanese attack?

General Burgin. I think your answer is as good as mine on that. We did have some aircraft that was operative; how many, I don't know. Personally I didn't see any, but there were a few fighters got into the air. The full force of fighters would have no doubt—well, we could have done much more effective operation than they did. The same as our antiaircraft; we probably could have broken up some of their formations, prevented some of the damage; but you never have enough antiaircraft to prevent an air attack. Just can't be done.

189. General Russell. A little while ago you also stated that it was impossible to prevent the Japanese fleet from moving carriers into a point from which aircraft could be launched for an attack on the installation here on Oahu.

General Burgin. I am going to have to ask you to repeat that, what you said.

190. General Russell. Did you or did you not make the statement that it was impossible?

General Burgin. I did not.

191. General Russell. Will you read the General's answer about three questions up?

General Burgin. I said General Short got that from the Navy, that it was the impression of everybody that they could not come here. I have never stated that they could not. I stated a moment ago that even now they could.

192. General Russell. Well, that was what I asked you, if it wasn't true that you stated that it was impossible to prevent Japanese carriers from reaching a point from which they could launch an air attack against the installations here on Oahu.

General Burgin. I think it is impossible right now.


General Burgin. Correct.

194. General Russell. Now, General, you were quite positive in your earlier statements that the message which you saw on the 27th of November used the term, “the President,” at least twice.

General Burgin. That is certainly my impression, sir.

195. General Russell. That is your impression?

General Burgin. I looked at that message handed out of the safe by Colonel Phillips, who held it in his hand while I read it, and it is certainly imprinted on my mind that it said “the President” twice.

196. General Russell. And you recall, as you know, wherein the President’s name was mentioned in connection with the commission of the first overt act?

General Burgin. Not the President's name, but the word, “the President.”
197. General Russell. "The President"?
General Burgin. Correct.

198. General Russell. And you also have a distinct recollection that the term, "the President," was used in [2643] connection with injunction against alarming the public?
General Burgin. That is my impression.

199. General Russell. Yes. And you are yet definite in your impression that the message read to you by General Frank is not the message which Phillips took from the safe and showed you?
General Burgin. I feel positive that is not the message, although it has many of the same terms in it.
(There was colloquy off the record.)

200. General Frank. To clear this up a little: My questions will dodge around here and not follow sequence.
General Burgin. Yes.

201. General Frank. You stated in response to a question by General Grumert, I think, that, "The interceptor command was being organized. It was never in being and functioning as it should have been. It was only a temporary measure; but that particular feature of interceptor command controlling antiaircraft fire was jealously guarded by the air people, and we had constant training and maneuvers, practice, where that particular thing was stressed, and the antiaircraft was turned over to the interceptor command."

I asked you, "On what date?"
I think perhaps I was under the wrong conception there. You didn't mean that the antiaircraft on the afternoon of December 7th was turned over to the interceptor command, but that it was turned over to the interceptor command during these exercises and maneuvers; is that correct?
General Burgin. That is correct, during the exercises and maneuvers, and then it was there for them on December 7. Now, I didn't actually turn it over to them.

General Burgin. But under our practices the control should have been there by the interceptor command. Whether it was or not, I can't answer.

203. General Frank. Well, as a matter of fact, do you know when the interceptor command was organized, formally organized?
General Burgin. There was never any formal opening. I don't know the date.

204. General Frank. When it was announced as the ——
General Burgin. Well, it was a long time, anyhow, before they got actually going.

205. General Frank. December 7th?
General Burgin. In fact, it was more than a month before they got in their permanent home up here and got going properly.

206. General Frank. As a matter of fact, the radar and the interceptor command installation actually was under control of the Signal Corps?
General Burgin. Right.

207. General Frank. And had not yet been turned over to the interceptor command on December 7th; isn't that correct?
General Burgin. That is quite true.
208. General Frank. All right. Now, here is a statement here. "The interceptor command controlling antiaircraft fire was jealously guarded by the air people." Well, was there anything about their jealously guarding that that interfered with its effectiveness?

General Burgin. Oh, no, not a thing in the world. That is an unfortunate remark there, and meant only this: that we [2645] had all these practices and there were many, many times when I, as antiaircraft fire man, thought they ought to be shooting, and as interceptor command he said no, because he had his interceptors coming in from a distance. An example of that we had in target practice down on the beach, and we got an order to hold fire, interceptor command. "Why?" I said. "Why to hold fire?"

"Well, the clipper is coming in."

The clipper wasn't even in sight, way over the horizon then. I said, "For God's sake, I am not going to shoot the clipper down. Go on, let me have my target practice."

It was just those little misunderstandings which made that statement crop out there a moment ago.

209. General Frank. As long as I clear up the point.

General Burgin. It had nothing to do with the December 7th flight.

210. General Frank. Now, you stated that you thought the Navy was conducting reconnaissance.

General Burgin. Yes.

211. General Frank. "They were sending out planes every morning."

General Burgin. Weren't they?

212. General Frank. Did you know what those planes were going out for?

General Burgin. No, I don't know positively. Practice, perhaps. We were told they were patrolling.

213. General Frank. That is a fact. They were patrolling, but they were patrolling not for reconnaissance for defense of Oahu, but patrolling the areas in the vicinity of their task [2646] forces in guarding against submarine attack.

General Burgin. Well, that's news to me.

214. General Frank. Now I would like to get your reaction to this. We have had testified before the Board by a naval officer that it was necessary for the Navy to have intelligence information so that they would know within rather narrow limits of an impending attack, for them, the Navy, to meet it.

General Burgin. I should think that would be a true statement. It certainly needs intelligence just as much as we do.

215. General Frank. Did you have any information along that line? You evidently didn't.

General Burgin. I had no way to get any information as to the enemy's arrival. I am tied down to the Island with nothing to go any farther.

216. General Frank. Evidently there was not a free exchange of information that reached the level that you held.

General Burgin. It didn't reach my level, no.

217. General Frank. All right.

General Burgin. I expected to get my information through General Short.
218. General Frank. All right. Now, was the command generally apprehensive with respect to offending the local Japanese?

General Burgin. I don't think the command as a whole was apprehensive at all. I don't think they cared whether they offended them very much or not.

219. General Frank. Do you remember the wording in this message? Here it is:

You are directed to undertake such reconnaissance [2647] and other measures as you deem necessary, but these measures should not be carried out to alarm the civil population or disclose intent.

General Burgin. That rings a fairly familiar bell.

220. General Frank. Well, the civil population was largely Japanese.

General Burgin. Oh, well. That's quite true; a large percentage of the Island population is Japanese.

221. General Frank. And here was a message not to alarm them. As a matter of fact, there were a series of messages that came in between October 16th and November 28th, seven of them, four of which contained the admonition not to alarm the population.

General Burgin. That's news to me. I only knew of one.

222. General Frank. Well, the question I wanted to ask, following: Was there a leaning over backward in the attitude to keep from offending the Japanese?

General Burgin. I don't know. Looking back in retrospect I would answer yes, it looks that way from this distance.

223. General Frank. What kind of a spirit among the officers and men resulted from this attitude?

General Burgin. There wasn't any noticeable result, in my mind. I knew nothing about the admonition being repeated not to excite the public. It was not noised around as far as I know. It should have reached me if it had been. The only time I saw it was in that one message.

224. General Frank. Did you believe that there would be a Japanese air attack on the Islands?

General Burgin. I did not.

225. General Frank. Why?

[2648] General Burgin. Because I thought they were so far away that we would get some intelligence through our Intelligence Department first, and then I was positive that our Navy was scouting around out there and they would give further information of approach at all in this direction, and our own Navy was out here shooting target practice, maneuvers all the time. It looked like we were perfectly able to take care of ourselves against anything the Japanese should send this way.

226. General Frank. Then, there was generally a state of mind of security?

General Burgin. Yes, with a degree of nervousness underneath it.

227. General Frank. I asked these last two or three questions to give you a little guide as to the trend I am following in the questions that I am asking, you see.

General Burgin. Yes.

228. General Frank. Was there any kind of a war attitude present in the command? Were the officers war-minded?

79716—46—Ex. 145, vol. 2—38
General Burgin. No, not noticeably so. I was impressed when I first arrived here in August that the war spirit was a good deal less than on the mainland.

229. General Frank. Now, you stated in your testimony that people were apprehensive about sabotage from the Japanese. From your observation was there any aggressive attitude toward preventing this much dreaded sabotage, or was it mostly passive?

General Burgin. More or less passive, and they selected the points that should need guarding, like the power plants and the bridges, and they actually went on Alert No. 1, put the guards on the power plants and the bridges, and my searchlights and my \[2649\] big-gun batteries that may have been knocked out with a dynamite charge or something. It was passive, I would say.

230. General Frank. You are an officer of considerable military experience. I would like to get an opinion from you. What do you think would have been the predicament of a similar number of Americans in Japan under similar circumstances?

General Burgin. You mean if the population had been reversed and we had been Americans in Japan?

231. General Frank. Yes.

General Burgin. I think we could have turned the place upside down by sabotage; probably would.

232. General Frank. What do you think the Japanese would have done, however? Do you think they would have allowed Americans to have been at large in Japan?

General Burgin. They certainly would not. We would have been locked up long before war started.

233. General Frank. That is what I am after.

234. General Grunert. All right; go ahead.

235. General Frank. Do you think the nation at large, from the press and your memory of it, was war-minded?

General Burgin. Certainly the opposite, in my opinion.

236. General Frank. You stated that you thought, that you believed, that you were going to get a warning from a system of reconnaissance that you thought existed.

General Burgin. Right.

237. General Frank. But which didn't. How were you going to get that warning?

General Burgin. My idea was, the Navy had its scouts out there, had its carrier-based planes out farther to the west, \[2650\] still, scouting, that they were going out at least 800 miles from Oahu every day. The carrier during the daytime would have to be farther than 800 miles, and we would get as much warning as it would take the carrier to run in from beyond 800 miles and launch the planes. The next thing was, we figured we would have at least 12 hours' warning.

238. General Frank. Did you ever figure that that protection would have to cover 360 degrees?

General Burgin. Quite right.

239. General Frank. Before you had that sense of security, did you ever think of that?

General Burgin. Yes, we thought of it.

240. General Frank. In fact, in a statement in a reply to General Grunert you stated that in your protection of Pearl Harbor against
attacked you were confronted with a state of peace instead of a state of war. However, the dispositions that you made were practice for actual war. Therefore, to all intents and purposes the dispositions were the same, weren't they?

General Burgin. No; the dispositions for peace were far different from those of war.

241. General Frank. Why?

General Burgin. Because the dispositions of peace, the whole 64th Regiment, for an example, were in the barracks here at Fort Shafter, with its field positions out well beyond here but nobody occupying them. The 98th were at Schofield Barracks, 251st at Malekoli. They were not in their field positions for war.

242. General Frank. And you never moved out into all of your field positions?

General Burgin. Never all at one time. no; but every [2651] battery went out didn't have to go into actual position in the cane field and knock down a man's cane. Go in alongside the road. Some more of these simulations that we did in peacetime.

243. General Frank. What facilities, to your knowledge, did our Intelligence Department have to get information?

General Burgin. I don't know.

244. General Frank. You just know that it didn't reach you.

To get back to this question of disturbing the local Japanese, did you ever see any excitement among the local Japanese over any military divisions or operations?

General Burgin. Never have, either before or after December 7.

245. You now know that there was not effective reconnaissance out, in compliance with the defense plan for the protection of the Island of Oahu?

General Burgin. Yes, I know that.

246. General Frank. Did you ever hear of the presence between November 25th and 30th of a Japanese carrier task force with submarines in the Marshalls?

General Burgin. Never.

247. General Frank. What would have been your reaction?

General Burgin. I don't think it would have been any different. We were working under S. O. P. from topside. We would have waited on orders from him.

248. General Frank. You still would have believed in the Navy?

General Burgin. Yes, I certainly would.

249. General Frank. Well, now that you are conversant with the fact that the Navy was not providing this protection in which you believed, had that circumstance been chased in the [2652] open where commanders of your level and above had known it, what do you think would have been your action?

General Burgin. I think I would have gone to General Short and asked him, Let's go all-out and do everything we could here.

250. General Frank. Now, you stated that you had some difficulty in getting into war positions with your equipment. And did you ever want to emplace any of your equipment on Hawaiian Pineapple Company land?

General Burgin. I don't think we did prior to the war. Now, I am not positive. The pineapple go up to the northward and the sugar cane down around Pearl Harbor; there are no pineapples in there.
So I have no recollection of any difficulty with the pineapple people.

251. General Frank. All right. What was the attitude of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters Association?

General Burgin. Like everybody else, they didn’t want the Army to go on their stuff, on their property. The same attitude is growing up right now. We are having terrible difficulty every time we want a piece of property or to use a piece of property. It is the same thing over again; time for the Army to get out. They don’t want the Army around. The same attitude is growing up right now; not bad, because we can do most as we please now, acting carefully.

252. General Frank. Where does that attitude head up?

General Burgin. I don’t know. Just human nature, I think.

253. General Frank. In the Hawaiian Sugar Planters Association?

General Burgin. I don’t know that it is confined to the sugar planters. I have nothing against the Big Five. I know [2653] nothing about them, or any other thing. I can’t place any particular person. It’s everybody. Anybody who owns land or property doesn’t want us around.

254. General Frank. Well, do you think that that is because of commercial interests?

General Burgin. Why, of course.

255. General Frank. Or because of Japanese interests?

General Burgin. Commercial interests, selfish interests, of course.

256. General Frank. In this endeavor to prevent alarming the population, do you think that that had reference to alarming the commercial interests or the Japanese?

General Burgin. I thought, everybody.

257. General Frank. Will you analyze a little bit the difference? What effect would it have had to have alarmed the Japanese, since war was coming anyhow?

General Burgin. You can analyze it as well as I can. I don’t see that it had any effect at all.

258. General Frank. I would like an answer for the record, please.

General Burgin. It is rather a difficult thing to answer. It’s all a man’s opinion anyhow. I don’t think it would disturb the Japanese any more than it would anybody else.

259. General Frank. All right. Now let’s walk over on the side of the commercial interests.

260. Colonel Toulmin. The question is not answered.

261. General Frank. I know. Would you repeat it, please?

The Reporter (reading):

All right. Now let’s walk over on the side of the commercial interests.

[2654] General Burgin. I have no feeling one way or the other. I don’t think there is any distinction between the commercial interest or the Japanese interest or anybody else’s interests. A great deal of the commercial interests were Japanese, incidentally.

262. General Frank. Well, it would have affected the normal conduct of business; it would have affected normal intercourse with the mainland; it would have affected industry?

General Burgin. Yes.

[2655] 263. General Grunert. When you are speaking of that are you speaking of Alert No. 2 or the all-out alert?

General Burgin. I mean the all-out alert.
264. General Grunert. How about Alert No. 2?
   General Burgin. Alert No. 2 is almost as bad, to go out and take
   your field positions.
265. General Grunert. Under No. 2 you get ready to meet an air
   attack and also guard against sabotage?
   General Burgin. That is right. No. 2 would probably have been
   almost as bad as No. 3.
266. General Grunert. And under No. 2 the infantry and artillery
   do not go out?
   General Burgin. I have forgotten what the infantry did under No.
   3, but I think they did not go out under No. 2, or No. 3, those two
   divisions. As far as the antiaircraft is concerned, there is very little
   difference between 2 and 3.
267. General Frank. You stated that had you received this mes-
   sage of November 27th you would have to go Alert No. 3. You also
   stated that you thought that it would have disturbed the population.
   Notwithstanding the cautions in that message not to alarm the popu-
   lation, would you nevertheless have gone to Alert No. 3 and have
   violated that part of it?
268. General Burgin. I think so.
   General Frank. Had the Army and Navy known that the Japs
   were coming, do you think that a determined Japanese air attack in
   force could have been stopped?
   General Burgin. Yes, I do. I think the Navy could have stopped
   it themselves.
269. General Frank. How?
   [2656] General Burgin. Met them carrier for carrier. They
   had at least two carriers here, as I recollect, the ENTERPRISE and
   the SARATOGA, and a whole battleship fleet.
270. General Frank. I know, but they were out on task maneuvers.
   General Burgin. They were out, yes, but they got radio and they
   got information, however. They are supposed to be out if they meet
   the enemy. They are not going to meet him in Pearl Harbor, that is
   sure.
271. General Frank. Considering that they require a 360-degree
   defense, and the only notice that you have of their approach is the
   fact that the Air Force has been launched from the carriers and is
   on its way, 130 miles out, do you think that it can be stopped?
   General Burgin. No. You are limiting it now. Why don't you
   put them 20 miles instead of knowing they were coming? Of course,
   you would have to do something if you knew they were coming, and
   if they had known they were coming down the fleet would have been
   there.
272. General Frank. But the radar——
   General Burgin. The radar would not have helped any, because the
   fleet would have been too close. It would have helped some, but the
   antiaircraft and the fixed defenses could have been further along
   and ready to meet the initial attack, which they were not. The
   initial attack is probably the one that did the most damage, the
   torpedo planes.
273. General Frank. Do you think a sneak attack would succeed
   now?
   General Burgin. Yes.
274. General Frank. Do you consider it reasonable for the American people to believe that the Jap attack on December 7th could have been absolutely prevented?

General Burgin. I think it most unreasonable to even think so, under the conditions we were in, with that fleet. I still go back to that. If you are going to prevent carriers coming here, and battlewagons, you have got to meet them with the same stuff. They are not in Pearl Harbor but out in the Pacific. We had a 360-degrees at Midway, too, but we met them there and licked them.

275. General Frank. But they had intelligence.

General Burgin. Right.

276. General Grunert. What is the use of having a fighter command here if they are not going to be able to lick what comes in the air?

General Burgin. None at all.

277. General Grunert. It is a waste of a fighter command if they are not going to be able to defend themselves here, to a great extent, anyway.

General Burgin. They can defend themselves here. You get that 20-mile warning and you get fighters in the air, because now they are on the alert so they can get in the air.

278. General Grunert. Then why should a sneak attack be successful now, or what extent would you say that it would be successful?

General Burgin. Well, it would not be successful to the extent that the disaster of December 7th was, but it would cause damage. There is no question in my mind if they want to get in here they can get in here, even now, with carrier-based planes.

279. General Grunert. We had a youngster who shot down four, I believe, even without that warning and so forth, and he testified that if they were ready they could have practically eliminated them, especially the torpedo bombers and so forth. So it is just your opinion that there would be a certain amount of success; it could not be absolutely stopped?

General Burgin. Absolutely. They cannot stop them, if they determined to come in.

280. General Grunert. But it would not be another Pearl Harbor, anyway?

General Burgin. It would not be another disaster like December 7th, 1941.

281. General Frank. Could the defense forces be surprised now?

General Burgin. Yes.

282. General Frank. To what extent?

General Burgin. I should say they could be surprised beyond radar surveillance by carrier-based planes.

283. General Frank. Are you familiar with the technical details of radar?

General Burgin. Not too deeply technical, no. I know that the long-range one will reach out to about 120 miles. It is not positive to go off and pick up planes that are down on the surface. We never had a hundred per cent success with it; so they can come in.

284. General Frank. That is all I wanted right there. An attack could come in at about 20 feet?
General Burgin. They have come in undetected, many times, with our practice attacks, undetected until they reach about 20 miles on our 268, when the searchlights pick them up.

285. General Frank. As a matter of fact, even if they come in about 20 feet off the water at 130 miles, the radar does not pick them up until they get in within about 20 miles. Therefore if they come in low enough it is possible even now for a surprise attack; is that correct?

General Burgin. That is correct. We have had it many times in practice. They are still working on radar to get one that will pick up low-flying planes out on the water.

286. General Frank. Do you know anything concerning any delays or tendencies in the construction of the aircraft warning service facilities by the Hawaiian Constructors?

General Burgin. I do not. I know nothing about that.

287. General Frank. Did you ever hear any complaint with respect to this?

General Burgin. Not until it came out in the papers some two or three months ago.

288. General Frank. Did you ever come in contact with or know anything about the relations between a Colonel Wyman, the District Engineer, and a Mr. Rohl, in Hawaii?

General Burgin. No, I know nothing whatever about that, and never did.

289. General Grunert. Did the antiaircraft setup have a triple-A. I. S.?

General Burgin. Oh, yes.

290. General Grunert. How far out is that or to what extent can that give warning of the approach of hostile planes?

General Burgin. As far as you can see.

291. General Grunert. And how much warning in time does that give your information system to get your information disseminated so that you can get ready to fire?

General Burgin. Well, it is an awful short warning. It is only as far as you can put your own men out where they can see and get the message back. Probably two minutes, or something like that.

292. General Grunert. That does give you some warning?

General Burgin. It gives you a little warning.

293. General Grunert. And it supplements the air warning system?

General Burgin. That is right.

294. General Grunert. But only for your own Command?

General Burgin. That is all.

295. General Frank. But you have some radar of your own, do you not?

General Burgin. Oh, yes, now. We had not then. We have got many classes of radar, both for fighter control and picking up planes. The 268 is the main one.

296. General Frank. And this radar you now have is effective how far?

General Burgin. About 20 miles as a maximum.
297. General Grunert. But they can pick up better than the warning system?
General Burgin. No.
298. General Grunert. I understood it could get the beam lower so it can get them coming closer in?
General Burgin. No. We have a separate radar for the sea-coast, for the water.
299. General Grunert. I understand they are working on a combination of 268 and your 574?
General Burgin. I forget the number of it, but we have the latest one at the fort command now, but it is in an experimental stage.
300. General Grunert. This command of Oahu and the Hawaiian Command is an outpost of the United States?
[2661] General Burgin. No doubt about that.
301. General Grunert. And an outpost is intended to be awake and on the alert so the mainland can go to sleep; that is the general idea of an outpost?
General Burgin. That is right, yes.
302. General Grunert. I asked you something about the Big Five. and you gave me a few names, but there is an article in the paper today under Kennedy saying "Big Five Does Not Control Hawaiian Airlines". And it gives their names. Mr. Kennedy named the Big Five as Alexander & Baldwin, Castle & Cooke, C. Brewer & Company, American Factors, and Theodore H. Davies, Limited. Is that just the big five airlines or is that the Big Five in business out there?
General Burgin. I cannot give you any information on the Big Five. It is my impression it is the Big Five in business, not on the airlines. In fact, I am positive of that feature of it.
303. General Grunert. Which one of those is Dillingham connected with, do you know?
General Burgin. I do not know. They are all interlocked one with the other. I don't know a darned thing about the Big Five, to be frank with you, and care less.
304. General Grunert. All right. Any other questions?
305. General Frank. In military procedure, when a tactical and strategic commander is confronted with a situation he makes an estimate of the situation. That is normal, is it not?
General Burgin. Correct.
306. General Frank. And in determining what the enemy will do he tries to find out the action of the enemy along what line, in the extreme?
[2662] General Burgin. Along the line of what he can do to hurt you.
307. General Frank. To what extent?
General Burgin. That is, you try to estimate what the enemy can do to hurt you. I suppose that is what you are getting at.
308. General Frank. Yes.
General Burgin. That is right.
309. General Frank. But to hurt you, he will hurt you in varying degrees in what he does.
General Burgin. You try to find out what he can do to hurt you most.
310. General Frank. And in making your decision on your line of action, what do you do?
General Burgin. Try to protect against that, the most serious threat.

311. General Frank. That is all.

312. General Grunert. Is there anything else that you can think of to inform the Board that has not been brought out, that refers to the subject?

General Burgin. Yes, there is one little thing on my mind.

313. General Grunert. All right.

General Burgin. I think I stated that I attended only one conference where General Short called his senior officers together, and at that conference minor things were discussed, which is quite true, in the way of work projects, unloading lumber, and so forth. At that same conference there was a discussion of the war that arose, to a minor extent, but it was not the purpose of the meeting, however, but General Short did refer to the seriousness of the situation and turned to General Martin, who was his air commander, and said, "Martin, you keep one-third of your fighters on alert at all times."

314. General Grunert. Do you recall when that conference took place?

General Burgin. That was a few days prior to the 27th. It was not that morning. I did not see General Short himself that morning. I saw Colonel Phillips. It was only a day or two prior to that.

315. General Russell. Did you have contacts with General Short, other than at the conference that you are talking about, from August up to December?

General Burgin. Yes, I had contacts in various ways. I will give you one example. I was hunting for a right good command post for my headquarters and decided on the magazine up in Diamond Head crater. General Short went with me to inspect this and to make the decision on the ground. On various things like that I came in contact with General Short.

316. General Russell. Was he accessible and approachable in his headquarters?

General Burgin. Oh, yes.

317. General Russell. Did he come out to see you and have informal talks with you?

General Burgin. No, sir; never. He never called any conferences except that one that I mentioned.

318. General Russell. You say he never did come out to your command post and see you out there and see you in the field and talk with you?

[2664] General Burgin. I have no recollection of his ever coming out at any time.

319. General Russell. And such talks as you had with him were those where you went to his headquarters?

General Burgin. Yes, sir.

320. General Frank. How long were you under his command, the number of months?

General Burgin. Four months, August 7th, until he was relieved about December 17th, or something like that.

321. General Grunert. Thank you very much.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)
[2665] TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM S. LAWTON; COLONEL, GENERAL STAFF CORPS; HEADQUARTERS, PACIFIC OCEAN AREA; FT. SHAFTER, T. H.

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel West. Colonel, will you state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station.

Colonel Lawton. William S. Lawton; Colonel, General Staff Corps; headquarters, Pacific Ocean Area; Ft. Shafter, T. H.

2. General Grunert. Colonel, this Board is after facts, and leads to facts; and because of your assignment in 1941 and during the attack, we hope that we can get some of those facts from you, or leads to others.

Just what was your assignment?

Colonel Lawton. I was an assistant to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, sir.

3. General Grunert. Would you give the approximate dates?

Colonel Lawton. I was in headquarters on March 7, 1941, in that position, and stayed in G-3 until August 1942, sir.

4. General Grunert. Who was G-3, at the time?


5. General Grunert. Colonel Donegan testified before the Board, and in effect stated that he did not know very much about certain G-3 matters, and that you knew it all, or words to that effect, on those certain things. One of them was the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan. Another one was the liaison, I believe, and cooperation with the Navy. Is that approximately correct? Were those your specialties in the G-3?

Colonel Lawton. Yes, I handled those matters in G-3, sir.

6. General Grunert. What other matters in G-3 did you handle, particularly or especially?

Colonel Lawton. For a while I handled Air Force matters, but I was not handling those on the 7th, sir, of December 1941; certain aspects of field fortifications, seacoast and antiaircraft artillery matters, generally.

7. General Grunert. All right. First, let us take up this Joint Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Defense Plan. What do you recall, generally speaking, of the responsibilities of the Army, under that plan?

Colonel Lawton. Could I refer to the plan, sir?


Colonel Lawton. In any particular aspects?

9. General Grunert. What was their mission? What was the Army's mission, with what was it charged?

Colonel Lawton. To hold Oahu against attacks by sea, land, and air forces, and against hostile sympathizers, and support the naval forces. That is stated so in the plans, sir.

10. General Grunert. Under that mission, they were responsible for the land defense?

Colonel Lawton. Yes, sir.

11. General Grunert. And in implementing that plan, what did it include? They had the inshore aerial patrol, did they?
Colonel Lawton. There was none established. That is prescribed as a mission for Army forces. There was none established on the 7th of December, or prior to that time, sir.

12. General Grunert. Did it make any difference as far as the plan was concerned, whether the fleet was in or out of the harbor?

Colonel Lawton. To my recollection, no sir. There was nothing prescribed in the plan, I am quite sure; nothing stated in the plan to that effect.

[2667] 13. General Grunert. Who was charged with distant reconnaissance in that plan?

Colonel Lawton. The Navy, sir.

14. General Grunert. When you say "the Navy," what do you mean—the fleet, or the district, or both?

Colonel Lawton. No, sir; for the Fourteenth Naval District. The Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District was charged with that, sir.

15. General Grunert. Do you know whether or not they lived up to that with which they were charged, in the line of distant reconnaissance?

Colonel Lawton. I can't recall factually at this time, sir. My best recollection is that there was certain distant reconnaissance. It was sketchy, to my belief, if any. I am not sure on that.

16. General Grunert. Whose business was it, in the staff, to follow up whether or not the Navy was following its part of the plan, for the Commanding General? In other words, to whom did he look to see whether or not that plan was implemented?

Colonel Lawton. It would be the General Staff Chiefs. There were certain aspects of the plan that were G-1 functions; others, G-2, -3, and -4, sir.

17. General Grunert. Well, whose function was it to see whether or not the Navy was carrying out its part of the plan of distant reconnaissance?

Colonel Lawton. I think that would be primarily a G-2 function.

18. General Grunert. Just because of the question of intelligence, was that the idea?


19. General Grunert. Just what cooperation was there between G-3 of the Department and operations of the Navy, or what corresponded to a similar position in the district or the fleet, or both?

Colonel Lawton. You are speaking now of liaison, sir, of contact back and forth between the Army and the Navy, sir?


Colonel Lawton. There was an officer in G-3 always who was primarily charged with naval liaison. I took over from Major Hobart Hewitt, in about August.

21. General Grunert. Then you actually performed the duties of liaison officer between the Department and the Navy, in so far as operational matters were concerned?

Colonel Lawton. From the Army, as an Army officer; yes, sir. We also had a naval officer in the G-3 section.

22. General Grunert. And his name was Burr?

Colonel Lawton. Burr; yes, sir; Lieutenant Harold Burr.
23. General Grunert. While we are on that subject, what was he worth to G-3?

Colonel Lawton. His duties were not important, sir.

24. General Grunert. All right. Then you did not get much information from him, did you?

Colonel Lawton. Just as a messenger going back and forth, sir, to get certain specific information, or to bring certain specific information to the Navy.

25. General Grunert. Of course, you do not know, but I wondered what the Navy thought of your being the liaison officer for the Army. Were you any better than he was for the Navy?

Colonel Lawton. I think I was in a position to give them better information.

[2669] 26. General Grunert. All right. Now, what sort of information passed back and forth? What did you do over that period, say, the latter part, from October 1 to December 7? What happened between the two of them? What information was passed back and forth, and what did they jointly get, together? In other words, give us a story of that, of your activities during that time, in so far as the Navy or the fleet and the Naval District were concerned.

Colonel Lawton. Why, I find it a little difficult to remember exact occurrences of matters that came up at that time, sir.

27. General Grunert. Give your memory, as it goes. Just tell us the story, and then we will piece it out by questions.

Colonel Lawton. I would quite frequently go over to see Commander Knowles, who was the operational officer and War Plans officer in the Fourteenth Naval District; occasionally would see Captain Earl, who was the Chief of Staff for Admiral Bloch. Most of my business was done with Commander Knowles. I believe, during that period that you mention, there were one or two joint agreements that were gotten up between the Fourteenth Naval District and the Hawaiian Department, as to which I conferred with Commander Knowles quite frequently. We had a number of meetings, along with other officers. In training matters, coordination of use to training areas, I used to see him quite frequently.

28. General Grunert. Then your conferences were primarily on training matters and joint exercises, were they?

Colonel Lawton. Training matters, joint exercises, and then there were, I think, in connection with the Hawaiian [2670] Coastal Frontier Defense Plan of 1941, several joint agreements made, as annexes.

29. General Grunert. The Board has knowledge of a Joint Air Operations Agreement, and it has knowledge of two addenda to that agreement. That is the only thing that I recall right now that the Board has knowledge of. Do you recall anything else?

Colonel Lawton. There was one agreement, I think, at that time, with relation to harbor entrance control posts, sir.

30. General Grunert. That was a local affair. Was that put in writing?

Colonel Lawton. Yes, sir.

31. General Grunert. And was it made a part of a plan?

Colonel Lawton. It was made part of this plan.

32. General Grunert. Is it in the plan that you have, there?
Colonel Lawton. I believe it is, sir. Yes, sir; it is Inclosure B, Annex No. VII, to HCF-41, joint harbor entrance control post.

33. General Grunert. What annexes have you, there, and what are their topics?


34. General Grunert. Wait. That sounds interesting. Generally, what is that about? What is the date of that?

[2671] Colonel Lawton. That is the 28th of March, 1941, sir.

35. General Grunert. Generally, what is that about?

Colonel Lawton. Conduct of joint air operations in defense of Oahu.

36. General Grunert. That is the Joint Air Operations Agreement, then?

Colonel Lawton. Yes, sir.

37. General Grunert. Well, go ahead. We know about that. Give the dates of those annexa as they go on from this.

Colonel Lawton. The one I just mentioned was Inclosure B to Annex VII, which is a joint harbor entrance control post, approved August 12, 1941, signed by General Short and Admiral Bloch. That is the last one, sir.

38. General Grunert. Now, were you liaison officer for G-3 with both the fleet and the district, or only the district?

Colonel Lawton. I was not designated in writing as either one, to my knowledge, sir. In general, when we had matters to take up with regard to the fleet, the chief of section accompanied the naval liaison, or the officer in G-3 charged with naval duties, when he went there.

39. General Grunert. Were these meetings that you had with the Navy periodic or just when one or the other wanted to have something to talk about?

Colonel Lawton. When matters came up to be discussed.

40. General Grunert. And would you always go over to the Navy, or would the Navy sometimes come to the G-3?

Colonel Lawton. It would come to us as often as we went over there, sir.

41. General Grunert. And when you had something like this to propose as an annex, or something to implement that plan, were those about the only times you got together, or what other subjects brought you together?

Colonel Lawton. There were frequent discussions with regard to training, sir, and allocation of training areas.

42. General Grunert. And that is all local training areas?

Colonel Lawton. Antiaircraft and seacoast artillery; firing areas, and training areas for naval vessels.

43. General Grunert. During any of those discussions, did the question of a long-distance reconnaissance ever come up?
Colonel Lawton. I don't recall any that I was present at, sir.
44. General Grunert. Did they ever inform you what their task forces were doing, while they were out, or where they went, or when they would come back?
Colonel Lawton. They would let us know—that is, we would get a memorandum from the fleet when their forces were going out for exercises, target practice.
45. General Grunert. What did that information usually contain?
Colonel Lawton. It gave the composition of the forces, and I believe the general area in which they were going to conduct their training.
46. General Grunert. And did that information then disclose what amount of reconnaissance they were going to make in that area, and what actions were liable to or could be considered as working in the protective scheme for the islands?
Colonel Lawton. I don't recall anything of that nature in those.
47. General Grunert. You knew they were going out; according to that, you knew the approximate area they were going to work, but then you did not know just what they were going to do when [2673] they got out there, whether they would send planes out to cover a certain wide area, or in, around where they were; whether they were going to look for planes or submarines, or anything of the kind, did you?
48. General Frank. Did you know anything about the details of their operating after they got out?
Colonel Lawton. The only information that I can recall we had in that regard, they would go out and operate with one; they would break it up many times into two task forces out there and operate, one against the other. I went out some time, I would say, in the fall of 1941, on the SAN FRANCISCO, which we broke up into two groups, and we endeavored to locate this group that had gone out the day ahead of us by air search and by other means.
49. General Grunert. Then anything that was done by those task forces while they were out there, in so far as the defense of Hawaii is concerned, was incidental to their own business of going out there and playing with each other in their training?
Colonel Lawton. To the best of my knowledge, sir. As far as I know, every document we got in our section, with regard to these naval exercises, they were purely training exercises.
50. General Frank. And they were not conducted for the defense of Oahu?
Colonel Lawton. To the best of my knowledge they were not, sir.
51. General Frank. Except as their presence there might be incidental to such defense?
[2674] Colonel Lawton. That is right.
52. General Grunert. Now, was G-3, as the operations division for the Department, concerned about having protection all around, about the island, as a defensive measure? Were they concerned to the extent that they wondered whether the sea, north or south, was being covered in the line of reconnaissance?
Colonel Lawton. There was very little attention paid to that matter at that time, sir?
53. General Grunert. Still, the plan and the agreement reached was that the Navy would perform the duty of distant reconnaissance, and that was a protective measure for the Army to do its work; but they never went after the Navy to ask them why they didn't give distant reconnaissance, as far as you know, did they?

Colonel Lawton. I don't recall any specific instance, before the 7th, sir. It is hard to divide, before the 7th and after the 7th.

54. General Grunert. Yes, I know; but you and I make an agreement; I agree to do so and so, which helps you in what you are charged with doing; you agree to do so and so, which helps me: Now, I cannot understand why you do not insist that I live up to my agreement, and know that I am doing it, because it affects your business. Do you see what I am getting at?

Colonel Lawton. Yes, sir. I understand, sir.

55. General Grunert. So far as you know, that was not done prior to December 7?

Colonel Lawton. I believe it was not done at the time, because in the opinion of the commanders there was no need for such reconnaissance.

[2675] 56. General Grunert. Then why put it in the plan?

Colonel Lawton. That was a plan to be implemented at some future time.

57. General Grunert. After they hit you—yes. Implement that protection, after they hit you. That is a poor time to implement anything, after you have been hit!

58. General Frank. Were you waiting for D-day?

Colonel Lawton. No, sir; but this plan was agreed upon, as I recall, back in March or April.

59. General Frank. When the plan was drawn up, was there any arrangement made to itemize the equipment that was available to implement the plan?

Colonel Lawton. I do not know, sir, at the time. I had nothing to do with it, at that particular time, sir.

60. General Grunert. There was in the plan a provision that locally they could implement any part of that plan that they so desired, isn't that true?

Colonel Lawton. I think that is correct, sir.

61. General Grunert. And as far as you know, they did not locally agree to implement any part of that plan except for their training and exercises, is that right?

Colonel Lawton. Well, I couldn't say without going through it, how much of this was implemented. I mean there was nothing that came out to my knowledge that says "This plan, here, will be put in effect in all phases."

62. General Grunert. But in part of the phases, it apparently was put into effect for the time being, for practice and training?

Colonel Lawton. In what regard, sir?

[2676] 63. General Grunert. Whenever you had a joint exercise outside, whenever the Air Corps had a joint exercise with the Navy.

Colonel Lawton. Yes, sir; that is true.

64. General Grunert. That was implementing part of the plan for that particular exercise?
Colonel Lawton. That, as a training element.

65. General Grunert. But, so far as you know, the plan was never implemented for distant reconnaissance?

Colonel Lawton. I believe there was some distant reconnaissance before the 7th of December, sir. The number of planes that the Navy had available were few, and I am not sure right now, but it should be a matter of record.

66. General Grunert. Was the inshore aerial patrol implemented?

Colonel Lawton. The surface patrol I believe was, sir. The air patrol was not.

67. General Frank. Do you know whether or not the commander of the Fourteenth Naval District had in his own command any aircraft with which to conduct this distant reconnaissance that he fought so hard to get?

Colonel Lawton. Yes, sir; he had PBYs and Patrol Wing 2.

68. General Frank. And do you know whether they belonged to the Fourteenth Naval District, or to the fleet?

Colonel Lawton. My recollection, they were under the Fourteenth District, sir.

69. General Frank. It has been stated in naval testimony before the Board that they belonged to the fleet.

Colonel Lawton. If that is the case, then I don't believe Admiral Bloch had any airplanes under him, sir.

70. General Frank. And you did not know that he did not have any planes with which to conduct the reconnaissance that he agreed to conduct, in this joint plan, or did you?

Colonel Lawton. I believe the airplanes, certain planes of Patrol Wing 2, were available to Admiral Bloch for that purpose. I think some of them—I am quite sure that some operated. I know they operated under him in our training exercises, sir.

71. General Frank. But if the fleet commander wanted to pull them away for fleet operations—

Colonel Lawton. I think he could, sir.

72. General Frank. —that left the Fourteenth District commander high and dry?

Colonel Lawton. I believe that is correct, sir.

73. General Frank. Did you know that, at that time?

Colonel Lawton. Yes, sir; I knew that Admiral Kimmel could take those planes away, sir.

74. General Frank. You did know that?

Colonel Lawton. Yes, sir.

75. General Frank. Did you believe that the Navy was furnishing you reconnaissance that provided security? Did you believe that, prior to December 7?

Colonel Lawton. Oh, I was sure they were not furnishing sufficient reconnaissance to provide security. That is, sufficient reconnaissance would have required a 360° search, which they did not have the airplanes to use, and the airplanes were not available for that purpose.

76. General Frank. Did you expect an attack by air?

Colonel Lawton. No, sir.

77. General Frank. Why not, if the Navy were not furnishing complete 360° reconnaissance protection?
Colonel Lawton. I think the general understanding was that no considerable portion of the Japanese fleet could be absent from surveillance by American observers—

78. General Frank. Naval?
Colonel Lawton. —and intelligence personnel, in the Far East, for a long enough period to enable them to come this distance, without our knowing it and being informed of that fact.

79. General Frank. And you trusted to that?
Colonel Lawton. Yes, sir; I think that might be so stated. I have heard numerous naval officers make that statement, as personal friends, from time to time.

80. General Grunert. Prior to Pearl Harbor, or afterward?
Colonel Lawton. Prior to Pearl Harbor, sir.

81. General Grunert. Tell me whether or not you knew anything about a naval message, or a message received by the Navy from the Chief of Naval Operations, on November 27, which began with the words, “Consider this a war warning,” and which wound up by saying, “Transmit this to the Army,” or words to that effect. Did you know of that message?
Colonel Lawton. I have seen it since the 7th. Whether I saw that message before the 7th or not, I am not sure, sir. I saw an Army message of similar character.

82. General Grunert. In view of the liaison between G-3 and the Navy, would it not have been natural for the Navy to have furnished G-3 with a copy of the message, or was that the channel through which the information would be given to the Army?

[2679] Colonel Lawton. That went on a higher level, sir.

83. General Grunert. When it got to its destination, then did it not drop in the slot and come down to G-3 operations?
Colonel Lawton. I don’t believe that particular message did, sir, from the Navy.

84. General Grunert. Do you know whether or not the Commanding General received that message?
Colonel Lawton. No, sir; I don’t, as a fact.

85. General Grunert. What do you know about the message received by the Commanding General from the Chief of Staff of the Army, November 27? Do you recall that message?
Colonel Lawton. Yes, sir; I know they did receive a message, sir, and I saw it, I believe, that day, sir.

86. General Grunert. Tell me generally what you remember about the contents of that message.
Colonel Lawton. The general import was that negotiations were continuing with Japan, and that we should take precautions against sabotage; we were not to commit any acts to arouse the local public. I don’t remember more of the message than that. That was the general trend.

[2680] 87. General Grunert. Those things stuck out in your mind? You were to take measures against sabotage; you were not to alarm the public: those two things?
Colonel Lawton. That is right, sir. And I recall another one, to the best of my recollection within five, six days or a week later, that said—I’ve always thought, from remembrance afterwards, that the wording was used, “Intensify antisabotage protection.”
88. General Grunert. I shall ask the Recorder to read that message to you and see if that is the message of November 27 to which you refer. Listen to it carefully, because I want to ask you a few questions about it.

89. Colonel West. This is the radiogram dated November 27, 1941, addressed to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, signed "Marshall," the body of which reads as follows:

(Radiogram to Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H., signed "Marshall", is as follows:)

Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot, be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not, repeat not, to alarm civilian population or disclose intent. Report measures taken. Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow Five so far as they pertain to Japan. Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers.

90. General Grunert. Do you recall that as being the message to which you refer?

Colonel Lawton. That is the message to which I refer, yes, sir.

91. General Grunert. Yes. Now, it seems to stand out in your mind—the reason I didn't have that message read to you first, I wanted to see what your recollections were of the things that stood out in the message. Now, you said (1) sabotage. Sabotage is not mentioned in that message. (2) Don't alarm the public. Yes, that is mentioned. Now, what I can't quite get is why, "Don't alarm the public," stands out in your mind, where certain things like, for instance, "this policy should not restrict you to use any action which may jeopardize your defense"—why that didn't stand out if the alarming the public does stand out. Is it, do you suppose, because of the action taken, that that fixed that in your mind and the other one didn't, or what?

Colonel Lawton. I believe it was, sir, because in the discussions at the time—I believe I saw that whole message before the—on the 27th of November or possibly the 28th, but I recall the action that was directed in G–3 by the Chief of Section was to the effect that we would go into the anti-sabotage alert. The members of the section, the officers in the section, were detailed, I don't recall exactly the date of the week; I would say that was about a Thursday. We went out Thursday or Friday, and we went out on Saturday afternoon and Sunday and checked the sabotage guards at various public utility installations.

92. General Grunert. Now, that was action taken as a result of a decision made on this message?

Colonel Lawton. That is correct, sir.

93. General Grunert. Were you in on the discussion that the Commanding General held with the staff as to advising him on what action should be taken?

Colonel Lawton. No, sir, I was not.

94. General Grunert. When that action was taken on Alert No. 1, alert against sabotage, and that was transmitted to the G–3 Section,
was there any discussion in the G-3 Section about that alert or about the message itself?

Colonel Lawton. I do not believe there was, sir, and that is what makes me wonder now as to whether I saw that complete message at that time or not.

95. General Grunert. Because it is quite natural, when you get something from the “Old Man,” to sort of discuss it and wonder why he did this and just what he wants us to do.

Colonel Lawton. Yes.

96. General Grunert. And his decision and things of that sort. Don’t those things occur in this new Army as they used to in the old Army?

Colonel Lawton. Yes, sir.

97. General Grunert. I thought so. But you don’t recall any such discussion?

Colonel Lawton. I am sure there wasn’t.

98. General Grunert. All we want you to do is to remember.

Colonel Lawton. I am sure there wasn’t at that time, sir. There was no detailed discussion.

99. General Grunert. But when you heard of it the action had been taken to take No. 1 Alert?

Colonel Lawton. Yes, sir. Any discussion was with respect to what acts of sabotage might be expected.

100. General Grunert. All right. We will drop that and go to the S. O. P. of November 5, ’41, and its provisions. Do you recall that S. O. P., and what did you have to do with getting it up?

Colonel Lawton. I had very little to do with getting it up, sir.

Major Horner got that S. O. P. up, sir.

101. General Grunert. What was Major Horner? Another assistant?

Colonel Lawton. Yes.

102. General Grunert. What did Donegan do? His assistants seemed to be doing everything. What did Donegan do?

Colonel Lawton. He supervised the work of the other members of the section.

103. General Grunert. Do you know what brought about the change from the old system of the department to have one alert which meant all-out alert, to three alerts, three spasms: sabotage, air and sabotage, and all-out? Do you know what brought that about? Were you in there at the time the change was made?

Colonel Lawton. No, sir. I believe that was prior to the early part of ’41.

104. General Russell. Did you see any messages from the Chief of Staff or from the War Department in late November, early December, other than the one that has been read to you by Colonel West?

Colonel Lawton. I believe I did, sir. I thought there was one around the 3rd of December.

105. General Russell. What do you remember about that message?

Colonel Lawton. That was the one that, to my recollection, said, “Intensify antisabotage precautions.”

106. General Russell. Do you recall any message out here in which the Commanding General of the Department was told that the Presi-
dent had certain views about alarming the public and about the first overt act being committed by the Japanese?

Colonel Lawton. In which the President was mentioned, sir?


Colonel Lawton. No, sir, I don’t recall any such message.

108. General Russell. You have no recollection of that. That is all.

109. General Frank. We hear a great deal about the Big Five out here. Do you know what they are?

Colonel Lawton. The heads of some of the big businesses here, sir.

110. General Frank. You heard about it?

Colonel Lawton. I couldn’t name the members of the Big Five.

111. General Frank. You have heard about them?

Colonel Lawton. That is right.

112. General Frank. Do they wield some influence in the Hawaiian Islands?

[2685] Colonel Lawton. I think, a very great deal economically, sir.

113. General Frank. How long have you been here?

Colonel Lawton. Five years next week, sir.

114. General Frank. Has there ever been any feeling or apprehension in the Army about influential civilians remonstrating to Washington relative to military measures they didn’t like?

Colonel Lawton. Well, you asked that whether there has ever been any discussion on that?

115. General Frank. Has there ever been any feeling, any apprehension?

Colonel Lawton. I don’t believe I would call it apprehension, sir. I know it has been discussed among Army personnel that, for instance, the matter of taking cane land, that is, for defense purposes, profitable cane and pineapple lands, that there have been protests made by—whether going to Washington, I have no factual knowledge, but I certain am of the opinion that they did.

116. General Frank. When those questions come up, has the knowledge that those people will be vigorous in their protests ever affected your decisions?

Colonel Lawton. Never affected mine, sir.

117. General Frank. Well, do you think they ever have affected military decisions to prosecute military plans vigorously?

Colonel Lawton. Only to a minor extent, anything that has ever come to my attention, sir.

118. General Frank. They have had some effect on projects, however?

[2686] Colonel Lawton. My belief would be, of a very limited character, sir; I don’t think anything major.

119. General Grunert. Were you ever told to “Lay off so and so. That will excite the Big Five, or one of them, and we’d better not try to put that across, even though it is good for the military end of it”?

Anything like that ever come to you? Did you know of it?

Colonel Lawton. I don’t recall of any such incident.

120. General Grunert. As far as you know, then, as far as G-3 were concerned, they were free to advise the Commanding General as to the best military measures to be taken despite any influence that might be used to delay or offset those measures?
Colonel Lawton. Yes, sir; that is particularly true in the period before the war; I never ran up against that at any time, sir.

121. General Frank. Right after December 7th the whole Territory was very cooperative, were they not?

Colonel Lawton. Very much so, sir.

122. General Frank. What is the situation right this minute?

Colonel Lawton. I think the feeling now is, my personal opinion, many of the business interests feel the war is passing far enough to the west that they can resume some of their—

123. General Frank. Restrictions on the Army?


124. General Frank. And restrictions on the Army?

Colonel Lawton. As far as property is concerned, sir, because of certain agitation to release the curfew and certain elements releasing the internees.

125. General Grunert. Has complacency again set in?

[2687] Colonel Lawton. I don't believe I would call it complacency, sir. I think it is a question of business and profits that are entering the minds of some of the larger business firms, who have been greatly curtailed.

126. General Grunert. Are attempts under way to put conditions back to what they were before December 7th, in the line of business?

Colonel Lawton. I think that is the general trend, yes, sir.

127. General Frank. Is there any plan in the Department to recommend a different attitude toward alien Japanese in the Territory?

Colonel Lawton. Not to my knowledge, sir.

128. General Frank. So, from a military point of view would you consider them a menace, the same as they considered them before the war?

Colonel Lawton. Yes, sir.

129. General Frank. And there is no recommendation, from a military point of view, to clamp down on them?

Colonel Lawton. I thing the situation with respect to the Japanese population, both alien and citizen, from the military point of view, is about the same today as it was a year ago, two years ago, sir.

130. General Frank. There are about how many Japanese on Oahu? About how many?

Colonel Lawton. I think it runs around 40,000, sir.

131. General Frank. If there were 40,000 Americans under similar conditions in Japan, how do you think they would be faring right now?

Colonel Lawton. Not very well, sir.

[2688] 132. General Frank. What do you mean by that?

Colonel Lawton. I think they would be very much restricted, probably not eating very well.

133. General Frank. And interned?

Colonel Lawton. Interned, and working at forced labor.

134. General Frank. Yes. What do you think the Japs would do to them when peace came, a group of Americans under the same conditions that the Japs are in Hawaii?

Colonel Lawton. You mean in case of a Jap victory, sir? They wouldn't have much to say.
135. General Frank. I am just talking of when peace is over, victory or no victory. What I am trying to do is to get a comparison out of you as to whether or not we would proceed reasonably to protect ourselves against that menace or whether we would still allow the menace to remain, and you have stated that the Department—

Colonel Lawton. I don’t believe I understand that question, sir.

136. General Frank. You have stated that the Department has no plan drawn up to recommend to the civil authorities to make any change in the status of the Japs other than to continue to allow them to remain a menace after peace is declared; is that correct?

Colonel Lawton. I don’t—I didn’t intend to make that statement, sir.

137. General Frank. Well, have you any such plan?

Colonel Lawton. I understood your question, General, was to the effect as to whether we had—the military had changed its viewpoint towards the Japanese at the present time.

[2689] 138. General Frank. Yes. Well, has it? Let us proceed along that line. Let us get something that you really understand now.

Colonel Lawton. No, sir; I do not believe the military has changed its attitude toward handling of the Japanese in the Territory today compared to six months, a year, or two years ago, sir.

139. General Frank. And what is that attitude?

Colonel Lawton. I think, a vigilant alera by the part of the Intelligence personnel which is reflected in the fact that hardly a week goes by that certain Japanese are not picked up and interned, having in their possession flags, Japanese flags or objects which should have been turned in, or making anti-American remarks or refusing to be drafted.

140. General Frank. Do you think that that is a reasonable, healthy way to handle them, from a military point of view?

Colonel Lawton. I think, under the circumstances, considering all aspects of the problem, yes.

141. General Frank. Do you think any other nation in the world would do that toward a potential enemy?

Colonel Lawton. No, sir.

142. General Frank. Why do you—

Colonel Lawton. I’ll take that back, sir. I don’t know, sir. I wouldn’t say. No, sir. I think one thing that is involved here is a matter of economics and labor. If that number of Japanese were removed from these islands, were stirred up to the extent that they were improperly taken care of, didn’t receive proper food and clothing, where many of these Japanese are citizens, that we would have aroused a resentment which would cause us more trouble, I believe.

[2690] 143. General Frank. Do you believe that their presence here is a jeopardy to our national defense?

Colonel Lawton. Not at the present time, sir.

144. General Frank. What?

Colonel Lawton. There are certain individuals that are, but the population as a whole, at this stage of the war, I do not believe is a menace.

145. General Grunert. Are there any other questions? General Russell?
146. General Russell. No, sir.
147. General Grunert. Do you think of any, Colonel Toulmin?
148. Colonel Toulmin. Yes, sir. I would like to ask him one question.

Colonel, was the real reason for not wishing to disturb the state of mind of the civil population prior to December 7, 1941,—was it that if that was done it would upset the labor conditions for the commercial interests here in the Island who did not want their Japanese labor in any way stirred up to interfere with their commercial operations?

Colonel Lawton. I don't believe that had anything to do with it, sir.

149. Colonel Toulmin. That is all.
150. General Grunert. Major Clausen?
151. Major Clausen. No, sir.
152. General Grunert. Colonel West?
153. Colonel West. No, sir.
154. General Grunert. Do you think of anything else that you can tell the Board that may be of assistance to it in getting at facts as to what caused Pearl Harbor or what took place during Pearl Harbor, that you want to tell the Board?

[2691] Colonel Lawton. The only thing that stuck in my mind since that time, sir: the radio that came in late on the 7th, and the information that was in back of that.

155. General Grunert. Meaning what?

Colonel Lawton. As to why that information was not positively and rapidly furnished the Commanding General, under the circumstances.

156. General Grunert. What information do you refer to?

Colonel Lawton. The radio that came in, actually delivered, I believe, to General Short in the afternoon of the 7th.

157. General Grunert. You mean the radio from the Chief of Staff of December 7th giving additional information on the situation, which did not reach the Commanding General until early in the afternoon?

Colonel Lawton. Yes, sir; said the Japanese were delivering an ultimatum, I think, at 7:30 local time.

158. General Grunert. Let me have that message, Colonel. Would you read it? December 7th. Will you read it to the witness?

159. Colonel West. Yes. This is the message dated December 7, 1941, which was dispatched to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, signed "Marshall." The body reads as follows:

[2692] (Message of December 7, 1941, to commanding general, Hawaiian Department, signed "Marshall," is as follows:)

Japanese are presenting at one p. m. Eastern Standard time today what amounts to an ultimatum also they are under orders to destroy their Code machine immediately stop. Just what significance the hour set may have we do not know but be on alert accordingly stop Inform naval authorities of this communication.

160. General Grunert. Now, what was it about that message you wanted to put across to the Board?

Colonel Lawton. Well, my thought has been that if the negotiation had reached that stage where an ultimatum was being delivered, code machines being destroyed, that steps would be taken to get that in-
formation rapidly to the Army and Navy Chiefs concerned in the Hawaiian area.

161. General GRUNERT. And, as I understand, you want the Board to consider whether or not the way that message was sent was what it should have been, how it should have been sent?
Colonel LAWTON. That is right, sir.

162. General GRUNERT. Do you know how it was sent?
Colonel LAWTON. Went through RCA, sir.

163. General GRUNERT. RCA. And how could it have been sent, in your opinion?
Colonel LAWTON. Through Signal channels, sir.

164. General GRUNERT. Through Signal channels?
Colonel LAWTON. Yes, Army Signal channels.

165. General GRUNERT. You don't know whether it was sent through Army Signal channels, and the only way to get it here by the Army Signal was to send it through RCA to get it here as quickly as possible?
Colonel LAWTON. No, sir; I do not.

166. General GRUNERT. You don't know that?
Colonel LAWTON. I don't know that, sir. That might be true.

167. General GRUNERT. Do you know whether or not there was oceanic telephone available?
Colonel LAWTON. Yes, sir.

168. General GRUNERT. Do you know whether it was working that day?
Colonel LAWTON. It worked later that day, sir.

169. General GRUNERT. What happened later that day, that you know that?
Colonel LAWTON. I know that Colonel Phillips, Chief of Staff, talked to Washington, sir.

170. General GRUNERT. Talked to Washington?
Colonel LAWTON. I believe General Short did too, but I am not positive of that. I know that Colonel Phillips did, sir.

171. General GRUNERT. Are there any other questions?
Colonel LAWTON. Another thought that I know has been in the minds of the people here: when the message of the 27th of November came in, the action taken here was reported to the War Department, that we had gone on a sabotage alert, and when no further direction was received from the War Department in that regard, I think the Chiefs here considered the precautions taken were what was desired by the War Department.

172. General GRUNERT. Then, as far as you personally are concerned, and what you understand to have been the talk among your fellow officers, it was, "If they didn't like what we did, why didn't they tell us what to do?" Is that the gist of it?
Colonel LAWTON. Yes, sir. I have often wondered why they didn't sir.

173. General GRUNERT. Do you know whether or not, when the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department did not receive any further news after he put in his report, there was ever any attempt made on this end to find out whether what he had put in was O. K.?
Colonel LAWTON. I don't know of any message that went forward in that regard, sir.
174. General Grunert. You don't know whether any inquiry was made. "Well, now, I have just taken the sabotage alert. Does that suit you people?" Or did they just sit back and say, "Well, I put in the report, and if there's nothing about it;"—was there any acknowledgment of that report? Do you know? Colonel Lawton. I don't recall any, sir.

175. General Grunert. Just took it for granted, then, that the report was received and that the report was satisfactory, and nothing else desired? Colonel Lawton. That's to my knowledge, sir. I assume many things went on between General Short and General Marshall that I know nothing about, sir.

176. General Grunert. You just want to bring it to our attention. Colonel Lawton. I know there were matters between General Short and Admiral Kimmel that—conversations that were not transmitted at least to me in G-3. Whether Colonel Donegan knew [2695] it or not, I don't know. But they had, I know, numerous conferences during the period from the 27th on.

177. General Grunert. Is there a file in G-3, or was there a file kept in G-3 of the interchange of information and correspondence between the Navy and the Army that is available to the Board, or is most of this by voice?

Colonel Lawton. All the preliminary discussions were voice. There were letters that went back and forth signed by the Adjutant General or by General Short that would be prepared in G-3.

178. General Grunert. But you don't know of any such particular file that records all, whatever was done and whatever was said? Colonel Lawton. No, sir.

179. General Grunert. If you had to do it over again, would you record these things? Colonel Lawton. Yes, sir.

180. General Grunert. Are you doing it now?

Colonel Lawton. Yes, sir.

181. General Grunert. Any questions? (No response.) All right. Thank you very much, Colonel. (The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

[2696] TESTIMONY OF BRIGADIER GENERAL EDGAR KING, MEDICAL DEPARTMENT, FORT SHAFTER, T. H.

(The witness was sworn by the recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel West. General, will you please state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and present station?

General King. Edgar King, Brigadier General, Medical Department, stationed at Fort Shafter, Headquarters of the United States Army forces in the Pacific Ocean.

2. General Grunert. General, the Board is after facts as to what happened prior to and during the Pearl Harbor attack, any leads that we can get from those who know such facts. The reason we asked you to appear as a witness is because General Short in his testimony before this Board referred to you as having knowledge of conditions in Honolulu and also of the measures taken, as I recall it, to prepare
themselves to meet such an attack. I think where you come in are the medical and sanitary preparations.

General King. Yes, sir.

3. General Grunert. So we have called you to tell us generally what was done, what the conditions were, so we can ask any questions about those when they occur to us. There is nothing special, so far as I am concerned, except that general start. So you will please give us what you remember and the points you think you ought to cover.

General King. I reported for duty in the Hawaiian Department in August of 1939.

4. General Grunert. By the way, what was your assignment?
General King. Surgeon, Hawaiian Department.

5. General Grunert. You were the Department Surgeon?


6. General Grunert. And you were that from when to when?
General King. I reported on the 15th of August, 1939, and except for the change in terminology I am occupying the position now that I filled at that time.

7. General Grunert. All right, go ahead.
General King. It was not long after I reported that it became necessary to consider the possibility of war and the preparations which were necessary to meet it in my department. We took the question of supply, personnel and so forth under consideration and did what we could to get certain increases in the next 12 months, the next 18 months. The principal thing to be mentioned as having been done was the rearrangement of the medical supplies to be readily usable in the expansion of medical facilities.

I think it was February of 1941 when it appeared to be probable that this area might be involved in war, and I made a recommendation to the commanding general covering what I considered certain minimum preparations which should be made to meet a possible attack upon these islands.

The recommendations could be considered in two parts. I am not attempting now to quote literally. I am stating things in general terms. One concerned the question of the organization to meet what had become known as civilian defense—I believe there had been that term used already at that time—and the other was to meet the requirements of the military forces themselves.

The first part, or the part which I mentioned first, the matter of civilian defense, consisted primarily in a recommenda— [2698] tion that I be authorized to consult with the local civilian medical profession and others who were concerned, with a view to organizing the existing facilities and to securing supplies and creating, if we could, a workable organization which could take care of casualties in case the City of Honolulu should be subjected to a bombing attack. That was the thing we primarily had in mind, to make use of what there was available.

The second concerned certain increases in supplies, certain increases in bed capacity of hospitals, and increases in medical department personnel above what was then available.

A third thing was a revision, a careful revision of the plans for the expansion of hospitals in case war action occurred. This expansion program—I think it was called at that time a mobilization plan—is in
existence in all commands, but we found it necessary to give some particular consideration to that phase of preparation.

There were some considerations given to the medical service of the other Hawaiian Islands, but that covered more or less a normal medical service, depending upon the amount of troops placed on those islands, with particular reference to them.

8. General GRUNERT. How did those plans blossom as the time went on? Were you pretty well satisfied that you had a good setup on December 7th, 1941?

General KING. From my memory that I am using now I won’t guarantee that every word is accurate for the record. But the organization of the civilian phase of this proceeded rather satisfactorily. In November of 1941—I think it was the latter half of November—all of this was with the approval of the commanding general, I might say; he was kept fully informed of this and where his approval was necessary it was given. I went to each of 21 aid stations, as we called them, in the City of Honolulu, strategically located as to possible points where casualties might occur, and we had what I thought was a very satisfactory situation, well trained, with the help of medical officers and physicians who volunteered. And the civilian hospitals had some modifications in routine which could be put into effect when necessary.

So far as the military preparations are concerned, we had gotten some increases in our bed capacity; we had gotten some progress toward leasing a building, now the 47th General Hospital; we had completed our plans for an air attack. We had not gotten all the personnel we had hoped for, for which presumably the War Department had their own reasons; and which I do not question. We had organized our existing medical personnel into teams and so on, such as would be required in an emergency; and considering all things we were not badly off for an immediate emergency. We were in a very dangerous position if we had anything like a sustained attack. We did all we could to meet that.

9. General GRUNERT. It functioned pretty well during the attack and immediately after the attack?

General KING. Yes, sir. We had to do a great many things that were of an emergency nature, but I felt, all things considered, that it was a very fine job, and I so stated in an official report concerning those officers and men and the civilian people who assisted us.

10. General GRUNERT. You stated that, in February of 1941, you considered this might be a possible theater of war. Why did that come to you that particular time? Why not in November of 1940 or July of 1941? What particularly brought that to your mind at that time?

General KING. My recollection of my mental processes, General, is this: From the time that I arrived I had in mind getting the medical department in shape for war. Certain things were present which particularly made that necessary for me to get busy on. I studied, as near as I could, the trend of things and I felt at the time that I wrote this particular recommendation that that was as long as I could wait, if I was going to accomplish anything in the way of training these people. That was my design. I kept thinking of it off and on in connection with other things up to that. Those were the processes, as I recall.
11. General GRUNERT. Now, what were your mental processes toward late in November of 1941, according to the information you then had?

General KING. Well, I felt absolutely certain that it would only be a little while till we were occupied with Japan. I had a little knowledge of the Oriental, had served them in the Orient, and I reasoned that we would not be given any warning whatever. Those were my actual mental processes.

12. General GRUNERT. Were you concerned when they just took Alert No. 1 instead of taking a more protective alert?

General KING. I was extraordinarily disappointed, sir.

13. General GRUNERT. You also referred, I believe, in your testimony here that you started to organizing with a view meeting the medical demands for an air attack. Did you consider an air attack as probable or more probable than a surface attack? Do you recall what your mental processes were on that line?

[2701] General KING. Rather clearly, I think, in preparing particularly the civilian population in this area against an air attack, based upon what we had heard of the use of air in Europe it seemed to me that the greatest amount of damage could come from an air attack, and that is why I stressed, in an effort to get the work done, the danger of an air attack over surface because I thought it was the keenest, most dangerous element, as we then saw it. So I talked more about that, and it was more in my mind than a surface or any other attack.

14. General GRUNERT. In your disappointment as to the alert taken, for security purposes, did you figure it was within your province to attempt to point out to the Commanding General or any superior that you did not think that that was sufficient to cover the subject?

General KING. I could not see that it was any of my affair, sir. I knew that they had more information than I did. That was my personal observation.

15. General GRUNERT. Tell me, from your long experience out here, can you give us any highlights as to the population, their degree of loyalty, their possible reactions under situations such as were experienced before and during the so-called blitz, and after it? Can you give the Board the experience of your long service here, so we can get a better insight as to what this population looks like and acts like? I can put some specific questions, if you wish, or you can make a general statement as to that.

General KING. It is very difficult to say anything about that which can be proven. That is about the best way to start my remarks. With the population approximately a third Japanese [2702] or of Japanese origin, personally I regard it as potentially very dangerous. And I believe—this is based upon a concept formed from many little things—that the population as a whole would have become very dangerous if the war had gone against us at Midway, for example, instead of going against the Japanese. That is the reaction that I had formed from my knowledge of the place.

16. General GRUNERT. Has your opinion changed any, or do you think that status still remains?

General KING. I would have no reason to change my opinion whatever about the great majority of these people, that is, the Japanese people. I cannot prove that statement, you understand.
17. General Grunert. Now that it appears that the United Nations are winning this world war, do you think there will be any trouble with the Japanese here in the future, unless Japan appears to be winning?

General King. I could offer no predictions to that, General. The Japanese are a problem here. It is beyond my ability to say what they will be if we win the war. I don't know what it will be. I feel certain that if we were not winning the war there would be quite a different situation than it is now.

18. General Grunert. Were you consulted as to what form of alert the Department should take, or to give advice as to whether or not they should do this or that?

General King. I think I was not at any time at that particular moment. I recall a dispatch which came in which I thought meant the thing would not be but a few days away, and I think that is the same you refer to when Alert No. 1 was [2703] adopted. I was simply told the decision of the Commanding General.

19. General Grunert. You were told of the decision and not asked whether or not you had any opinion about what should be done?

General King. I cannot recall that I was asked, no. I am sure, in fact, that I was not.

20. General Grunert. Was that the message from the Chief of Staff of the Army or the message from the Navy which was transmitted to the Army?

General King. I cannot say, sir. I was called to the office of the Chief of Staff. He handed me a message which I read, which had in it words like this: "It is expected that all necessary precautions will be necessary, but we want to hit the enemy first, if we can, but be ready to hit them." Something like that.

21. General Grunert. Was the President's name or his position used in that message, do you recall?

General King. I do not recall.

22. General Grunert. But that was the only message that started out about the same as that?

General King. That is the only one I recall specifically, and I recall that very specifically.

23. General Frank. You said a little while ago that there was a Japanese problem here.

General King. Yes, sir.

24. General Frank. What is it?

General King. Well, I can best describe it, I think, by the fact that it represents an oriental viewpoint which it will take several generations, at least, to change. If you look along some of the streets here where there are more Japanese than [2704] some of the other races, predominantly Japanese, it looks very like the streets in Tientsin or some of the other north China places. It resembles that more than an American street. It gives one that idea.

25. General Frank. But is it a problem? Is it inimical to our national defense?

General King. In my judgment, the presence of that amount of the population at an outpost like this, unless it is definitely controlled, is inimical to our national defense.
26. General Frank. Is it controlled here?
   General King. It has been during the war, to the best of my knowledge.

27. General Frank. If it is a problem, how would you solve it?
   General King. I doubt that I am capable of giving a solution to that. It is a highly-complicated problem, one which depends on the viewpoint of the nations of the world as to the disposition of the Japanese people after this war. I don't think I can offer a definite solution at this time.

28. General Frank. Does the value of the Jap as a laborer in the Hawaiian Islands have a deterring effect on taking positive action to solve the problem?
   General King. May I qualify that by saying that I understand—it is assumed you could not get other labor—I hear, without being able to definitely state my source of information, that the Japanese people, that is, speaking of them now as Japanese people, are very valuable in many respects as laborers and particularly as artisans and men of that sort, which I think is an economic phase of the political problem and will have to be taken into consideration along with the other things.

29. General Frank. Do the commercial interests control this solution?
   General King. I have no knowledge on which to base an answer to that question.

30. General Frank. What do you think?
   General King. I don't think any commercial interest can control it, if the government wants to take positive action. If you are speaking of the local political situation, I have not enough knowledge to answer that.

31. General Frank. Were you conversant with the official message that General Short had received from Washington relative to the situation existing between the period of November 27th and December 7th, other than this message you saw?
   General King. I recall this: that I was kept informed of everything which affected the medical department, to the best of my knowledge, as to whether I saw all these messages I cannot say, because I do not have any way of knowing.

32. General Frank. Getting back to this commercial situation again, have you any feeling that commercial interests control the government's action as to the solution of this Japanese problem.
   General King. May I ask which government you refer to, sir?

33. General Frank. The local.
   General King. The Territorial Government?

34. General Frank. Yes.
   General King. I do not know, General, whether they do or not. I do not have any knowledge of it. I hear things; I read it in the papers, but I don't know anything about it, to be honest with you; I really don't know anything about it.

35. General Russell. General, I do not know that it is germane to anything we are out here upon, but the subject has been touched upon in the last question or two about this Japanese problem.
   General King. Yes, sir.

36. General Russell. About a third of the population are Japs?
   General King. That is approximately correct.
37. General Russell. The problem, therefore, was created by basing a substantial part of our Navy on a territory where a third of the inhabitants were hostile in a lot of ways toward our government.

General King. I don’t quite follow you, General.

38. General Russell. The problem was created by bringing the Navy in and putting it at Pearl Harbor when all around it a third of the population was Japanese; isn’t that true?

General King. I believe the problem would have existed regardless of who were here, if we had Pearl Harbor Navy Yard and base here, if they had any people, Hawaiians or anything. The problem as far as the Japanese were concerned, the Japanese Navy in its attempt to start this war, would have been the same. The presence of this large number of Japanese sympathizers, in my judgment, made it very easy for them or much easier for them to get all the information they needed with reference to what went on here. But the problem, I think, would have existed regardless of the population if we had this area under our control and had our base here. It would have been more difficult for them.

39. General Russell. It will continue to exist as long as these Japanese are on the islands, isn’t that true?

General King. Well, so long as we have any Japanese any- \[2707\] where, as we have Japanese here, it will not be as easy as if we did not have them. Perhaps that is the only way I can answer your question.

40. General Russell. That was all I wanted.

41. General Grunert. Are there any other questions? General, do you think of anything else that you might tell the Board that may be uppermost in your mind or that may be craving for an outlet, that the Board might consider, concerning this matter.

General King. I have tried to state in a brief form the simple fact that we were not quite ready to meet those fellows at the time. As to why that was, I do not know.

42. General Grunert. If there is not anything else, we will thank the General and excuse him.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

(Thereupon, at 1 p.m. a recess was taken until 2 p.m.)

[2708] afternoon session

(The Board, at 2 o’clock p.m., continued the hearing of witnesses.)

TESTIMONY OF HON. LESTER PETRIE, MAYOR OF THE CITY OF HONOLULU, T. H., CITY HALL, HONOLULU, T. H.

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel West. Mr. Petrie, will you please state to the Board your name and address?

Mr. Petrie. Lester Petrie. My business address or residence?

2. Colonel West. Your business address.

Mr. Petrie. City Hall, Honolulu.

3. Colonel West. And you are, I believe, the Mayor of Honolulu?

Mr. Petrie. I am, sir.
4. General GRUNERT. Now, Mr. Petrie, this Board was appointed to ascertain and report the facts relating to the attack by the Japanese armed forces upon the Territory of Hawaii on the 7th of December, 1941, and, in addition thereto, to consider the phases which related to the Pearl Harbor disaster of the report of the House Military Affairs Committee, which is largely concerned with construction matters. Now, we are after facts or leads to where facts can be found. General Short has furnished the Board with a list of representative citizens living in Hawaii who, he says, may have information of value to the Board. Your name being on that list, we have asked you here with the hope that you may have facts to present to us. General Short did not refer to any particular subject on which you might testify, so it is up to you to open up the subject, which may then give us a line on questions that we would like to ask about the subject. Have you anything in mind?

Mr. Petrie. No, I have not anything in particular that might be pertinent to that. I do not recall. You have not the testimony of the other commission that was here? I was before that commission.

5. General GRUNERT. We have that.

Mr. Petrie. I do not recall just what it was, now.

6. General GRUNERT. But in so far as our mission is concerned, we did not think it necessary to call you on any particular point in that testimony.

Mr. Petrie. No.

7. General GRUNERT. But there may be something that stands out in your mind which you think the Board ought to consider. It was on General Short's request we ask you to come. He did not mention anything in particular.

Mr. Petrie. All I can say, if I can recall now what I testified before, that I know nothing that is pertinent to the subject matter that I understand the investigation is for. I really believe the General was apprehensive of the situation here. As Mayor, I think it was along in the spring of that year, 1941, that I created a Major Disaster Council—there was no other organization here—to prepare for any emergency that might arise. In other words, we felt we were not prepared here as citizens. We invited the Army and Navy to have representatives there and they sat in with us, in an advisory capacity only. I am sure that General Short's representative was there, the Army and Navy. They may not have been at every meeting, but we created this council and we proceeded to supplement our fire equipment and our medical supplies, principally, and organized for personnel emergency assistance that might be needed on any occasion.

8. General GRUNERT. Was that similar to what we now know as—

Mr. Petrie. O. C. D.

9. General GRUNERT. As O. C. D.?

Mr. Petrie. That is right. They took over. When the blitz came in, they took over.

10. General GRUNERT. That is what was known as the Community Services of the O. C. D.?

Mr. Petrie. That is right.

11. General GRUNERT. In that was anything organized in the line of defense measures that the O. C. D. now has, in the line of blackouts, in the line of air raid shelters, air raid warning service, and so forth?
Mr. Petrie. Not at that time. That all came afterward. I think that all came after the blitz that these shelters were constructed.

12. General Grunert. Then at that time there was no consideration given as to the necessity for the protection, immediate protection, of civilians, from an air attack, outside of taking care of themselves after the attack happened?

Mr. Petrie. I don't think so. I don't think we had gone that far.

13. General Grunert. This was all in the embryo stage of working up to what the O. C. D. has done?

Mr. Petrie. That really took place afterwards, after the blitz came.

14. General Frank. Who was the leading spirit in starting [2711] this?

Mr. Petrie. I was in the Disaster Council and a few of the members around the City Hall and my department heads, we got together.

15. General Grunert. That is, in the line of your duties as mayor, you thought that is what you ought to be doing?

Mr. Petrie. Yes, sir.

16. General Grunert. And the military worked in with that scheme whole-heartedly?

Mr. Petrie. Absolutely, yes.

17. General Grunert. And rendered all assistance that you thought was necessary?

Mr. Petrie. Yes, and they were advising the people continually at that time, I think, to lay in food supplies.

18. General Frank. Did General Short cooperate very thoroughly with the city government and the commercial interests?

Mr. Petrie. Yes, he did. I will say that. Yes. We got along very well with General Short, very well.

19. General Frank. Why do you say “we”?

Mr. Petrie. The city; that is as far as I speak. The other branches of government, the Territory. I do not speak for. I speak for the city administration.

20. General Grunert. Do you speak for the prominent citizens in the city or just for the city administration?

Mr. Petrie. I think I could go as far as to speak for the citizens of the city.

21. General Grunert. Do you think of anything else that you might add? Do you wish to express your opinion of General Short or the Army administration, either in preparation for what might happen or in action when it did happen?

[2712] Mr. Petrie. Well, I cannot say anything more than that I honestly believe they did everything that possibly could be done. I know they were apprehensive of the situation, of an emergency, because they were quite active. They had these meetings. We had a meeting at the Royal Hawaiian Hotel and one of the members of the Chamber of Commerce. I think, could speak for that, but I attended one of the meetings when General Short spoke, the Army spoke and the Navy spoke, along these lines of preparedness.

22. General Grunert. Did that give you the impression that they understood or realized the gravity of the immediate future?

Mr. Petrie. I would say so.

23. General Grunert. Did any of you visualize an air attack, or not?

79716—46—Ex. 145, vol. 2—40
Mr. Petrie. No. I know I did not. I did not believe it after I had seen it and I looked at it for an hour, almost, from my front porch.

24. General Grunert. Then apparently the city population was not particularly war-minded, were they?

Mr. Petrie. This was all being worked up. I would not say they were as war-minded then as they were after the blitz, but I don't think they anticipated any such happening as occurred on December 7th.

25. General Grunert. Suppose General Short or Admiral Kimmel or any of their subordinate officers or staff had gotten up at one of these meetings and said "You people are all asleep here; something is liable to happen next week," would you think that was jingoism, would you think he was an alarmist, or what?

Mr. Petrie. My personal observation of that meeting with the Navy, I think Admiral Kimmel kind of insinuated that to the prominent citizen here in Hawaii, the Chamber of Commerce.

[2713] 26. General Grunert. Is it not true that one of your own papers here practically predicted the blitz, within about a week?

Mr. Petrie. I do not recall that.

27. General Grunert. How did you consider the news in the papers; as a little far-fetched, or what?

Mr. Petrie. I do not know. We were not paying too much attention to it at the time. I was quite busy at that time when all this was coming out and I didn't get much chance to read the papers before the day of the blitz. I came down that Sunday morning and I didn't leave the city hall until about 10 or 11 days after that. I stayed right there.

28. General Grunert. Then you do not recall this flare headline in the morning paper of November 30th?

Mr. Petrie. No; I do not recall it.

29. General Grunert. It said that war was very liable to happen within a week or something like that.

Mr. Petrie. I do not definitely recall it.

30. General Grunert. If you had seen it, then what? Would you credit it very much? I don't know how you size up your papers or your editors, or whatnot.

Mr. Petrie. I don't know. Sometimes you think one way and sometimes you think another. To give you an illustration now, you read in the press today that our forces are here, and advancing here, and then tomorrow you pick up the paper and they are still back here. Now, you can take that for what it is worth and maybe that is the same all over. That is my impression of the latest news that we have been getting here. They are a little optimistic.

31. General Grunert. At that time did you think the situation [2714] was sort of tense or imminent or just would not happen to Hawaii?

Mr. Petrie. I don't think they were imminent or tense at that time.

32. General Frank. Had you been getting frequent alarms?

Mr. Petrie. No. I think we may have had an alarm, but not other than a practice alarm.

33. General Frank. What I mean is, had the Japanese situation become tense from time to time? Had you become accustomed to it?
Mr. Petrie. Well, only what we saw in the papers there. That is all we had, and much of that was coming from Washington, from the mainland.

34. General Frank. What I am getting at is—

Mr. Petrie. The Admiral, I know, when he went through here, everything seemed to be all right.

35. General Frank. They called, "Wolf, wolf" so many times that when they finally called it again you did not pay much attention to it?

Mr. Petrie. If they did call it, I know there wasn't too much attention paid to it very seriously. I don't think they were worked up to any high pitch just immediately before that.

36. General Grunert. How about the population of your city at that time? Did you consider, on account of the Japanese element, both American born and alien, that that was a particular menace to the safety of the island?

Mr. Petrie. No; we did not.

37. General Grunert. You say "we did not."

Mr. Petrie. I did not.

[2715] 38. General Grunert. Was there any evidence that they engaged or intended to engage in sabotage?

Mr. Petrie. No, I don't think there was, and even on that day I don't think there was.

39. General Grunert. Just how do you size them up now?

Mr. Petrie. I have lived here with them, I have grown up with them, I have been here practically all my life, except two years of it. I look at them a little bit differently, perhaps. Of course, I believe possibly there are some, as has been demonstrated since, that are not loyal, and there may not be any question in my mind if Japan had succeeded in getting in here that a good many might have followed that way, but the opportunity did not arise, so you cannot say it would happen. I have no reason to say they would or would not.

40. General Frank. How many aliens have you on the island?

Mr. Petrie. I do not recall just now. 30,000, is it? Or approximately?

41. General Frank. 30,000 what?

Mr. Petrie. Aliens, if I am not mistaken. Those figures are off-hand.

42. General Frank. Of what particular advantage are they?

Mr. Petrie. Well, they originally came here as cane workers, workers in the cane fields. Then they gradually graduated into business, and most of the aliens now, I think, are or were in business.

43. General Frank. Are they an asset in the labor situation here now?

Mr. Petrie. Well, to a certain extent those that are in the mechanical field are all right, on account of the shortage of manpower. I think the government has recognized that, because they do practically nothing else but this construction.

44. General Frank. In normal times, with so much unemployment in the United States, how do you reconcile giving employment to 30,000 aliens in Hawaii?
Mr. Petrie. They were residents of Hawaii, I guess, and possibly they were more economical from a wage scale. They were in competition to the white labor. There is no question about that.

45. General Grunert. Was there any effort ever to get labor from the United States, to replace the alien labor, or was there any need for such an attempt?

Mr. Petrie. I don't know. I could not answer that. That could come from someone else. I do not recall any.

46. General Frank. Are they a problem now?

Mr. Petrie. No, I would not say they were. I think the F. B. I. did a pretty job here, and the minute something happened they had them pretty well lined up. They did a very good job. They had them pretty well all located.

47. General Grunert. That was after the attack?

Mr. Petrie. That was after the attack, yes, sir.

48. General Grunert. Do you think of any other subject upon which we might get information from you, that might be of value to us?

Mr. Petrie. No, not that I think would possibly help you in your activities.

49. General Grunert. Any questions?

50. General Russell. How many people are there within the corporate limits of Honolulu of Japanese origin?

[27/17] Mr. Petrie. Of Japanese origin?


Mr. Petrie. In the City of Honolulu?

52. General Russell. Yes.

Mr. Petrie. I cannot say offhand. In the Territory there were about 150,000, if I remember correctly. There may be 60,000 possibly.

53. General Russell. In the City of Honolulu?

Mr. Petrie. Well, the City of Honolulu now is the island.

54. General Frank. City and county?

Mr. Petrie. Yes.

55. General Russell. You just have one political entity?

Mr. Petrie. That is all, yes.

56. General Russell. You are the mayor of the island?

Mr. Petrie. Of the island, that is it.

57. General Russell. Your police jurisdiction extends over the island?

Mr. Petrie. Yes.

58. General Russell. And you of course have a police force of some sort?

Mr. Petrie. Yes.

59. General Russell. And on that police force you have your secret investigators, a detective force as we know it?

Mr. Petrie. Yes, we have a detective force.

60. General Russell. Just how large is your detective force?

Mr. Petrie. Oh, it is not very large. I don't recall now. 15 or 16 men, maybe.

61. General Russell. Did they at any time prior to December 7th direct their attention toward observing these people of foreign origin?

Mr. Petrie. I think they worked with the F. B. I. on that. They were working together on that. I know they took one of our principal
officers up there who was within the detective department. He went in and was assigned to the F. B. I.

62. General Russell. If I interpreted your answer a minute ago correctly, you left the question of the regulation of the Japanese, in relation to the American government, to the federal agents, the F. B. I., principally, is that correct?

Mr. Petrie. I did not get you, General.

63. General Russell. You left the regulation or the investigation of these people of foreign origin to the F. B. I.?

Mr. Petrie. Yes. It was handled all practically by the F. B. I.

64. General Russell. I am interested to know whether or not these people of Japanese origin who are now American citizens participate in your elections?

Mr. Petrie. They do, yes. Some of them are running for office. Some of them are elected. At that time, I think, in 1940, I guess it was, one was elected to the Senate of the Island of Hawaii.

65. General Russell. Do they vote together? Do you consider them a Japanese bloc as a political entity?

Mr. Petrie. That is hard to say. It is hard to prove anything like that. It has often been suspected, but it is awful hard to prove. When you start to analyze it you just get down—

66. General Frank. Are there candidates from the Japanese [2719] bloc in both political parties?

Mr. Petrie. Yes.

67. General Russell. In other words, the Japs out here split up, too?

Mr. Petrie. Oh, yes; they were not all together, the Japanese. They divided up. There was a Japanese member of the House of Representives and there were some Japanese county officers on the other islands. I think the majority of the council on Kauai were Japanese, 3 out of 5, if I remember correctly.

68. General Grunert. I have one or two more questions.

Mr. Petrie. That possibly may be due to complacency, on account of not getting in politics.

69. General Russell. Have you got Democrats and Republicans out here?

Mr. Petrie. That is all, Democrats and Republicans.

70. General Russell. Are there some democratic Japanese and some republican Japanese?

Mr. Petrie. That is right. Oh, yes, they are like you have them on the mainland, in California. It is nothing new down here. There are quite a few of them up north, northwest.

71. General Grunert. Do you know a Mr. Raymond Coll?

Mr. Petrie. I do.

72. General Grunert. Is he still editor of a paper here?

Mr. Petrie. Yes.

73. General Grunert. I have information here that a Hawaiian newspaper editor is quoted by a Washington newspaper; shortly after the submission of the Roberts report on January 24th, 1942, in substance; that General Short and Admiral Kimmel had [2720] made clear through their utterances before December 7th, 1941, of the probability and imminence of a Japanese attack at an early date. Do you recall any utterance of theirs to that effect?
Mr. Petrie. I do not specifically recall it.

74. General Grunert. Suppose there had been an all-out alert instead of a sabotage alert; would that have made a difference as far as the population of Honolulu was concerned? You understand that General Short ordered a sabotage alert?

Mr. Petrie. Yes; I understand.

75. General Grunert. You understand that there are various forms of alert?

Mr. Petrie. A general alert and a sabotage alert. The sabotage alert was practically an invasion, I would say. Is that what you mean?

76. General Grunert. No; a sabotage alert is just against sabotage or subversive efforts.

Mr. Petrie. I don't think we had any of that here at all, a sabotage alert.

77. General Grunert. Suppose you had had an all-out alert in which they had been prepared to meet any attack, would that have alarmed your populace, if they had taken such measures, do you know?

Mr. Petrie. If the Japs had gone that far?

78. General Grunert. No. I mean if the Army had gone all out to meet an attack, would that of itself have alarmed the population here?

Mr. Petrie. I doubt it very much. You mean to any subversive activities?


Mr. Petrie. Particularly with reference to the Japanese?

80. General Grunert. To alarm them.

Mr. Petrie. I doubt it.

81. General Grunert. You don't think if the Army had taken that alert—

Mr. Petrie. I don't think they would have blocked together, no.

82. General Grunert. I want to make sure you understand what I mean. If the Army had prepared itself and had actually gone into all these position to withstand an attack, would the act of their going into a position and so preparing themselves prior to the war have alarmed the population?

Mr. Petrie. It might possibly to a certain extent have put the public upon a general alert itself.

83. General Grunert. But what reaction would such an alarm have had? What could they do, if anything?

Mr. Petrie. I don't think they could have done anything, because the public itself was really in a position—the armed services were here and they were leaving anything of that nature to the armed services.

84. General Grunert. Any other questions? There appear to be no questions, unless you can think of anything else you would like to tell the Board. Otherwise, we thank you very much for coming.

Mr. Petrie. I don't know. I would like to give you whatever information I can.

85. General Grunert. Thank you very much.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)
[2722] TESTIMONY OF MAJOR GENERAL B. H. WELLS, UNITED STATES ARMY, RETIRED, 4551 KAHALA AVENUE, HONOLULU, T. H.

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel West. General, will you please state to the Board your full name, rank and address.

General Wells. My name is Bryant H. Wells. I am Major General, United States Army, Retired. I live at 4551 Kahala Avenue, Honolulu.

2. General GRUNERT. General, this Board was appointed to ascertain and report the facts relating to the attack made by Japanese armed forces upon the Territory of Hawaii on the 7th of December, 1941, and, in addition thereto, to consider the phases which related to the Pearl Harbor disaster of the report of the House Military Affairs Committee which is largely concerned with construction matters. Now we are after facts or leads to where facts can be found. General Short furnished the Board a list of representative citizens living in Hawaii who, he says, may have information of value to the Board. Your name being on that list, we have asked you here with the hope that you may have facts to present to us. General Short did not refer to any particular subject on which you might testify, so it is up to you to open up the subject, which may then give us a lead to questions by which to develop it. He selected you as one of the representative citizens of Hawaii. What is your business among the citizens of Hawaii that you should be selected as a representative citizen? We know you are a representative of the Army, but we ask this of you as a representative citizen over here.

[2723] General Wells. From the date that I retired from the Army, which was in January, 1935. I was employed by the Hawaiian Sugar Planters Association as secretary and treasurer of that organization, until, I have forgotten just when, but after a few years I was made the executive vice president and secretary of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters Association, which position I held up to June 30th of this year, when I retired from that. During that time I participated in the affairs of the community. For 9 years I was a director of the Chamber of Commerce of Honolulu, and I have been identified with the Red Cross and Boy Scouts and China Relief and various things of that kind of a public nature.

3. General GRUNERT. What do you think that Short thought you knew that might be of advantage to the Board in the mission, as I have stated, of the Board? Does any particular thing occur to you? Or just a knowledge of general conditions and so forth?

General Wells. I am kind of sorry I have to answer that question, for this reason: I think that General Short put my name down because, after he had left, a certain prominent citizen in the city here brought to me a letter which he proposed to send, I think, to the Secretary of War, in which it asked for leniency in dealing with General Short. He asked me to sign it. I read it over. I told this gentleman that the first part of the letter I agreed with entirely, and that was that General
Short from the time he got here until the disaster overwhelmed him had entered into the spirit of the community, had cooperated wonderfully with them and shown a broad vision of conditions here and had become quite popular in the community, and people had a good deal of confidence in him.

[2724] The last part of the letter, I don't remember just what it said, but it was rather effusive. It didn't make so very much difference, but I told this gentleman I didn't want to sign it. It was on the second page. I said that I liked General Short, that "I think General Short has got a lot of ability; I think his relief from here is all that could be expected; he could not continue here after what has happened, and I hope he will be given some job elsewhere where he will have training, but I think you put down here a lot of things or are giving him credit for having done a lot of things that he did not do. Not that it makes so much difference, but I don't want to sign it."

He said, "Oh, do you think so?" And he asked me to explain. And I did, and he said, "I guess that is right." He said, "I will change it. It is all right if I change the last sheet, is it?" I said, "Yes, I will sign the first sheet", which was to the effect of what I said.

I learned afterward that he did not make any change in the letter at all, so my signature stands on that letter, and a copy of it was sent to General Short, and General Short wrote me a letter and thanked me for it.

Now, I like to be perfectly clear with the Board here on that. I meant what I said, that I was willing to sign it. I don't know why this gentleman did what he did. The reason I found it out is because later he brought one for me to sign in the case of Admiral Kimmel, which I told him I would not sign, and I upbraided him for having sent the other one in without having corrected it as he promised to do.

That is all I know.

4. General Grunert. In your position did you keep up your [2725] connections with Army matters in any way, or are you in position to testify as to the measures taken or the improvement in conditions as far as the military defense is concerned?

General Wells. No; I would not be an expert witness on that. You mean, during his incumbency?

5. General Grunert. Yes.

General Wells. All I can say is that things were rather lively from the time he got here. There had been a good many changes in the defense system of the island. For instance, as early as 1939, as I recall it, in the fall of 1939, Admiral Adolphus Andrews came down here with a Scouting Fleet; I think they called it the Hawaiian Detachment of the fleet or some such thing as that; which was a lot of ships and a lot of officers and men. And shortly after that the rest of the fleet came down under command of Admiral Richardson, who was then the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet.

6. General Grunert. Would you know that letter you referred to if you saw it?

General Wells. I think I would, yes.

7. General Grunert. Is Frank E. Midkiff the fellow who composed the letter?

General Wells. That is him. A very nice fellow, by the way, and very enthusiastic about the Army and Navy, and has been president of the Chamber of Commerce and always likes to help people.
8. General GRUNERT. I show you this letter, which is in the record, in the testimony of General Short at pages 338 and 339, and see if you recognize that letter.

General WELLS. It would take me a little while to read this. My eyesight is not particularly good.

9. General GRUNERT. We can read it to you if you wish.

General WELLS. If you could have the Recorder read it to me I would be very happy and it would save your time.

10. Colonel WEST. The letter is dated in Honolulu, December 22, 1941, and is addressed to The President, The White House, Washington, D. C.

SIR: We, the undersigned representing substantial business and social organizations in Hawaii, and having had for many years in many ways a vital interest in the armed forces stationed in Hawaii, do hereby wish to express our sincere appreciation of the services rendered to this territory and to our Nation by Lieutenant General Walter C. Short.

We have found him, at all times to be most cooperative and furthermore he has exercised a vigorous leadership in causing this community to prepare for an emergency such as exists at present. Almost a year ago he laid out a plan for this purpose and has taken all steps practicable toward carrying out such a plan.

General Short’s thorough foresight and his forceful presentation of his ideas to our Territorial Legislature, to our local officials, and to our community in general have been very largely responsible for (a) the enactment of a sound “M-Day” Bill;—

General WELLS. I don’t know about that; I doubt if I had very much to do with the passage of the M-Day Bill, but that is the letter, if that is the question you ask. You are beginning now to get into the things I would not subscribe to. Up to that point I was willing to.

11. General GRUNERT. Let us branch off to a few other subjects on which you may have some knowledge and may be able to give us some light. During your service here you have got to know these people pretty well, haven’t you?

General WELLS. Yes, some of them.

12. General GRUNERT. How about the Japanese element? You employed a lot of them in the sugar business, didn’t you?

General WELLS. Yes.

13. General GRUNERT. What is your opinion? Are they a dangerous element to the safety of this outpost here, or not?

General WELLS. They are not.

14. General GRUNERT. They are not?

General WELLS. In my opinion.

15. General GRUNERT. This is your opinion?

General WELLS. That has been demonstrated.

16. General GRUNERT. Do you know of any evidence of sabotage that occurred since you have been here to show their inclination?

General WELLS. On the contrary, I have made inquiries into quite a number of cases where sabotage was alleged to have been committed, and in every case when followed down it proved to be a false alarm.

17. General GRUNERT. Do you know that General Short decided on November 27th to take up an alert called a sabotage alert and decided not at that time to take up any more protective alert and one of the reasons given for that is that he did not wish to alarm the public. Now, had they gone to an all-out alert, gone on
into position, ready for anything, air attack, surface attack, or what-not, do you know what reflection it would have had on the public or how it might have disturbed the public?

General Wells. I don't think it would have disturbed the public in any way adversely. I think there might have been some people in the public that were so much interested in it they would have liked to have gone out and seen what was happening. But the people of this island have seen alerts and have seen the command turned out to their war positions so many times that it is an old story. There would have been no excitement, in my opinion, had he gone to the war positions.

18. General Grunert. Would there have been any protest on the part of business interests or others because of possible disturbance of crops or their taking places in sugar fields, and so forth, that would have deterred anyone from taking that alert unless he had to?

General Wells. I think not.

19. General Grunert. Taking the people in the sugar interests, would there have been a protest from the sugar people, if he had taken an all-out alert, because of disturbance to their labor, to their fields, to their cane and so forth?

[2720] General Wells. The best answer I can give to that is to make it a little lengthy, rather than just yes or no.

At the time I came here in 1930, before I came here, while still in Washington, I had heard—I was in the War Plans Division there—that it was difficult to train on this island because of the high development of agriculture and the few places where troops might maneuver off the reservations, and of the reluctance of the people who owned property to let the Army have access to their property for that purpose.

I found it just the reverse. From somewhat close to thirty years of experience before that in many places on the mainland those conditions did exist. We had to keep on the road. If we went into fields or anything of the kind or into roads across fields we usually had to get not only the owner's permission but had to pay for it and frequently it was denied us. I found it just the reverse here. I never had any trouble, in the four years that I was in command, of getting permission. You had, of course, to ask. Only decency would indicate that you should ask permission and not just move onto people's property.

Of course, that doesn't mean that we could take trucks or wagons or horses or men through cultivated fields. We didn't need to. We had property of our own that we could maneuver on in rather a large way, and over in the Waianae pocket where there is very little cultivation there is land for that kind of work. But to cross fields, to go through their roads, to go through their valleys and over their hills, and so forth, to camp on their ground, to use their water, and all of those things, we had no difficulty whatsoever in getting permission to do it, and I never paid a cent for it. That is my [2730] recollection. If there was any money ever paid for any camp ground or for water or for firewood or anything like that, why, I never knew about it.

Now, coming to the answer now, in building a plan for the defense of the Island, where you had to use land of that kind, it was necessary, of course, to get permission of the owners or managers of various plantations. In my plan of defense of the Island I sent my G-3 all around the Island. We did a great deal of hiking ourselves, so we knew people
personally, and we had permission—we would show them what part of their lands might be used in case of an emergency, and we asked if we might include it in our defense plan and if, when we wanted to have practice or maneuvers, would it be all right for us, just by notifying them that we were going to pull off a maneuver, to go into those places without further ado. We never had any trouble of getting permission.

Now, during the time that you mentioned I have no doubt that the plan—whatever it was or whatever changes were made in it, since I hadfooled with it, it had several Department Commanders since that time. What General Short had done to it I don't know in detail. I have no doubt that he had procured authority to include certain lands that might be needed, that they had been surveyed, and that he had received permission, and that it wouldn't have been anything unusual at all for the troops of his command to have gone to those places whenever he wanted to sound an alert for them to go. As a matter of fact, they did it time and time and time again.

20. General Grunert. Then, I gather from what you have told us that, as far as you know, there was no influence out here which might have caused the Commanding General to take some action that he didn't think was adequate for the occasion: in other words, that he took a sabotage alert and not a more protective alert, that was of his own volition and not influenced by the criticism and the influence of the prominent property owners? Is that generally the idea?

General Wells. I feel very sure that it was not through any influence of a civilian character.

21. General Grunert. That was just one of the things we are looking into.

General Wells. Well, I want to say this: that, in answer to your question, I've heard—don't know how true it is, but it was published. It has been published; I can't say where now. You probably would know. I think it is in the Roberts report that was published, or that part of it, that a message was sent from the War Department to General Short telling him that he should expect sabotage, asking him not to commit any overt act, and to report what action he had taken.

Well, I have always thought that naturally, when General Short got those instructions from the War Department that he should expect sabotage, maybe not having been here long enough to know the situation and to cast out of his mind the fear that there would be any, and fearful that if he didn't take steps against sabotage that he might bring criticism upon himself, that that was the reason that he sounded what was afterwards known as Alert No. 1. But that is only my opinion. That, I thought, was an error on his part because he was taking steps against his friends, when the danger was outside.

22. General Grunert. Do you know anything about whether there was any friction between the Army and the Navy in the line of cooperative action?

General Wells. At that time, you mean?

23. General Grunert. Just prior to December 7th or at that time.

General Wells. No, I don't know of any. I have heard it stated, seen it in papers, and so forth, that Admiral Kimmel and General Short didn't speak to each other. I don't believe a word of it. In fact, I have seen them together, been with them together. How ex-
tensively they cooperated by going to see each other when these messages began to come in, of course, I don't know anything about it, but I know that they were friendly or, if they were not, they made a pretty good bluff at it, because I have seen them together many times and they seemed to be cordial.


General Wells. Oh, I don't know. I think about 20,000, but that is just a guess. You can get those figures accurately. That would be the best way to get them, instead of taking them from me.

25. General Frank. I am just after a representative bloc. That is as far as I want.

Is there any question about the loyalty of the alien Japs?

General Wells. Well, General Frank, I want to say, from the time I came here—and I came here with a view which I got by reading papers, in the War Department, in talking to people who had served over here, in which they had conceived at one time that they would put all of the Japanese here in a stockade or send them to another island because if they had any trouble [2733] here they were all treacherous and they would pounce down upon us and sabotage, and so forth. Naturally, there wasn't any question that was more important to a commanding officer, so that during my four years I made a particular study of that for the purpose of deciding what was the truth of the matter, if I could get at it.

I came to the conclusion that there had been a lot written and a lot said for which there was no foundation. I concluded that we didn't know, and we never would know until the emergency came, just what the situation was. But there was nothing in the conduct of these people here in their daily lives and their conduct as citizens that justified me in believing that they were any different from any other hyphenated Americans, so far as those that were citizens, or that the aliens were any different from a lot that we were familiar with in other parts of the United States. As a matter of fact, they were law-abiding and quiet and industrious and provident and thrifty and not quarrelsome.

It is true they are not very pretty to look at. I wasn't struck with that. They are rather secretive, they are gregarious, and so on. But I figured that the great majority of them, aliens and citizens, would be loyal. There would be skunks, the same as there are in many other sections, that are hyphenated Americans, but there wasn't anything that the great United States couldn't handle with respect to them, and it would be a great deal easier to handle them and take care of them by treating them and giving them the rights that the Bill of Rights provides for citizens and that the proclamation of the President of the United States in the last war guaranteed to aliens.

[2734] As early as 1932 they had an organization here—well, earlier than that—they had an organization known as the New Americans, which were gotten together by a very prominent Japanese here named Okamura, who was a Christian minister. He cannot become a citizen, for reasons that I don't need to go into, although he would like very much to, but he has a home down there, and he brings in a lot of these boys, young fellows from all over the Islands, every year, or did up to the time of the blitz, to the number of about 75 or 100, in between there somewhere, representatives from the various Islands,
that he calls the conference of the New Americans, which lasts for a week, and he has prominent citizens talk to these boys about Americanism and things of that kind. He always has a theme in advance.

I think it was in '32 that I—I talked to him several years, but in '32 I brought up this question, my point of view. Admiral Stirling brought it up from the Navy point of view, and I told him that they were suspected, the thing that they already knew, but so far as I was concerned I believed that they were conducting themselves with propriety, and that I regarded them, in the plan of defense of this Island that I was building, as an asset.

I am glad you asked the question, because I have banked my reputation more or less. I have been one of the people who has shown faith and confidence in them, and I did that because of my regard for the Constitution of the United States. I didn't bring these people here, I wasn't responsible for it, but they are here, and they were here properly under the laws of the United States and under the Constitution, and they were entitled to whatever protection it fell within my jurisdiction to give them.

I say I am glad I did it because subsequent events that have happened since that time has convinced me, if it doesn't anybody else, but I can't see how anyone can—now the time has come, and I said at that time, "We can't tell now, but when the emergency comes we can tell in a very few weeks. We will know where you stand." And now it has been more than a couple of years, and aside from remarkably few who have been taken under our wing—and they are only suspected; it isn't because of anything they did particularly, the great majority of them—the rest of them have performed as well as or equally as well as a lot of our own, you might say, our own Caucasian people.

26. General Frank. About how many Japs did the Hawaiian sugar planters employ totally?

General Wells. The last time I looked at the list I think it was about 12,000.

27. General Frank. I would like to ask you a question about the status of Japs in Hawaii as considered by the Japanese government. They consider all persons of Japanese ancestry as citizens of Japan, do they not?

General Wells. I think that they did for a while. Most all nations do that, consider the children of subjects or citizens to be citizens of their country. I think we fought the War of 1812 on that question somewhat, as far as Great Britain was concerned, and they claimed the right to take our citizens off our ships. And that is one of the features. But Japan, I think, if my recollection is correct, is about the only nation I know of that has made provision—

28. General Frank. That is what I am getting to.

General Wells. —have made provision for those who want to give up or to alienate themselves from that tie; they have provided a way for doing it.

29. General Frank. Yes.

General Wells. And I don't know of any other nation that has, although I am not an expert on that.

30. General Frank. Do you know who is an expert? What I am after is to have that explained a little bit. What do they call this legal process by which these Japanese renounce their allegiance to Japan?
General Wells. You mean those that they call dual citizens?


General Wells. Now let me see if I get that correctly. Up to a certain time, which I think was about 1925, a child born here—of course, any of them born here from any time are regarded by our government as citizens of the United States. Now, up to this year, which I think was 1925, the Japanese people regarded them as subjects of Japan; and then, on account of various questions concerning Japanese here and in California, and so on, they issued a decree or passed a law, or whatever it is they do over there, that any child born here whose parents wanted him or her to retain Japanese citizenship had to register that child three weeks after it was born with the Japanese consul here; and if they didn't so register the child, that Japan would lay no claim to it.

With respect to those that were born before '35 and who were American citizens, and they were then dual citizens and wanted to release themselves from that dual status, they provided \( \text{2737} \) a manner of doing it, which, as I recall it, was quite complicated, but it meant you went up to the Japanese consul here and you filed an application, and he did something with it and sent it on to the prefect or district or the home of the parents of this party in Japan, and then there was some rigmarole there, and then he came back, and usually maybe it will be approved, but oftentimes—and I have talked to some of these young fellows as to why they didn't do it. They said it took so long to go through it that they didn't want to bother to do it. They had always regarded themselves as American citizens; they had been told that they were, having been born here; and why should they go to the trouble and expense? It costs them a little. I think that \$3 was the fee for it, but there was a manner in which they could divest themselves of the dual citizenship.

32. General Frank. From your point of view, then, you never considered this dual-citizenship group a liability to the United States?

General Wells. Well, General, I have always considered it just the same as the millions of citizens that live on the mainland right now that are in that same status. I have made talks before these people and told them that, but I have also said that, “You are in a little different status here because you are under suspicion, and I advise you to do away with your dual citizenship.” I have done that time and time again. I always had an idea that they should do that if they could. I have sent quite a number of them, individuals that I happen to know who have asked me what to do and how to do it, up to the Japanese consul to get it done.

33. General Frank. Was there any differential in pay between Americans and Japanese doing the same work in the cane industry?

General Wells. Not doing the same work.

34. General Frank. How did prices paid the Japs in Hawaii compare with prices paid in Louisiana, for instance?

General Wells. You mean on the sugar plantations?

35. General Frank. Yes.

General Wells. Well, in recent years, since 1934 when they passed the sugar legislation, things have changed so that I can't tell that exactly, but our wages here have always been higher and are higher now, very much higher now, but those wages since—
36. General Frank. Higher than what?
   General Wells. Higher than they are paid in Louisiana.
37. General Frank. Oh.
   General Wells. Higher in cash, and no comparison with respect to
the superiority of the perquisites that are furnished the men here
as compared with those they have down there.
38. General Grunert. Have you any questions?
39. General Russell. General, your discussion of the Japanese on
the islands has suggested a question or two to me.
   You were more or less familiar with these people as they were em-
ployed on the sugar plantations and, I assume, the other agricultural
pursuits here on the islands?
   General Wells. A little louder, please.
40. General Russell. I say, you were familiar with the Japanese
as they were employees on the sugar plantations and the other agri-
cultural pursuits on the islands? You knew of them, saw them?
41. General Russell. And in your experience did you have reports
about the activities of the Japanese consular agents?
   General Wells. Well, from the time when I was in command I
always considered that the consul was some fellow whom we had to
keep track of and watch.
42. General Russell. No. The information which we have of
Japanese activities is to the effect that in the islands just prior to De-
cember 7th, '41, there were 219 agents of the Japanese consul here,
that they circulated among the Japanese populations on these farms,
and their mission seemed to be to keep the relationship between the
Japanese on the island and the homeland established, work out this
principal of dual citizenship, and so forth; and the question I am ask-
ing is as to whether or not you in your connection with the sugar
growers got any reports of these activities.
   General Wells. No. I did while I was Commanding General. My
G-2 told me about them. We didn't pay much attention to them. I
always considered that they were, I thought—in fact, I thought I
knew, and I believe now, that one of the duties of the Japanese consul
here, that are laid down to him by his own government, was to keep
track of the Japanese here in the best way he could, and I think that
he—usually a new one would come here most—after being here a little
while and getting himself located in his house and office and joining
the Chamber of Commerce and meeting a few people and trying to
ingratiate himself that way, he would go and make a trip around the
islands, I suppose to make contacts with the prominent Japanese on the
various islands.
43. General Russell. But in all of your connections here—I am not
talking about the Japanese consul; I am talking about these 219 people
who were working out from his office.
   General Wells. Yes.
44. General Russell. In all of your contacts with your association you never heard any report at all on their activities among the people on the plantations, the Japanese people?

General Wells. I am saying that when I was in command my G-2 told me that there were people on the islands at that time who were reporting to the consul. Just what the nature of those reports was we never could find out exactly. I didn't consider it very serious, but from the time I have been associated with the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association I don't recall a single instance where I ever heard or the managers ever told me that they were a menace or that they were doing anything contrary to what they ought to do. In that connection—and it might be in that connection—when the F. B. I. came down here, quit a time before the blitz, the officer in charge there, Mr. Shivers, came over to see me. He said a large part of the Japanese were around on our plantations, and he thought it would be helpful to him in getting a line on things if I could give him some information about the reliability of those Japanese aliens and citizens who were on plantations. And I said, "Well, it is a kind of a ticklish thing, maybe. Only the reason I think about it is that I hate to be suspecting these people all the time, but," I said, "if you want it I'll do anything you want me to. I'll send out to the managers and ask them to send in lists of the names of every Japanese that is working on the plantation, and also to state what in his opinion the character of these men would be; particularly, if he feels that there are some that should not be trusted, to say so; and, if he feels absolutely sure that certain individuals can unquestionably be trusted, to say that."

I did that. I got in the list. Some of the managers thought, "Well, I don't know of anybody whom I have any reason to suspect." I recall one plantation manager who put down three men,—he's on a plantation that employed, as I recall it, something like 2,000 employees; they weren't all Japs—who stated that, of all the Japanese he did have, that there were three men that he thought ought to be watched, that he wouldn't trust them. On the contrary, he put down, I don't remember how many, but more than that, of men that he would trust with his own life. The rest of them he had no reason to suspect.

In general, I think that one plantation out of the 35, as I recall it now, was the only one where a manager was willing to put his name down on a list and say that he wouldn't trust anybody, and that man had three fellows.

45. General Russell. That is all.

General Wells. Does that answer your question?

46. General Russell. Yes. The only thing I wanted to know was whether or not these consular agents made trouble for you, the people out on the plantations.

General Wells. Yes.

47. General Russell. And you say no?

General Wells. I know they didn't make any trouble on the plantations. The only trouble we had, I think, on the plantations in handling Japs that amounted to anything was, occasionally,—of course, they had a strike here back a great many years ago. But they had some questions sometimes over religion, as a rule. There would be something. One sect like the Okinawas, which they have, put up the money to build a church, and another group of Japanese
who didn't like the Okinawas and looked down upon them, and they wanted a church. The manager said he was not going to have his plantation all covered with churches; they would have to get together. So they got together. One sect put up a monument to one of its reverend saints in front of it, and the other came and knocked it down. Things like that you might have in the plantations, but that is the only case I speak of.

48. General GRUNERT. General, suppose what would happen to the sugar interests if the 12,000 Japanese now employed were withdrawn. It would sort of upset things, wouldn't it?

General WELLS. It surely would put a—give them a headache. The best answer to that is that we had here before things started to hum over here, which was a year and a half or two years before the blitz, with these big contractors coming down and the Army and Navy having so much money to spend, what they called the Pacific Naval Air Base Contractors. There were five of them, with Walter Dillingham here associated with them, and then afterwards what they called the Hawaiian Constructors, which were some people who came down, too. We lost between then and now, on the plantations, as far as I can recall it, something in the neighborhood of 15,000 men, Filipinos and others, all told. They went because they got better pay, and they went because there was no one else to go. They were [2743] practically shanghaied in many places. But anyhow, it was unreasonable that either the sugar or pineapple could pay the wages that the government paid; and particularly, when the government put a ceiling price on the sugar we couldn't change the price of sugar. We couldn't increase the amount we got for it. So we had to get along. at the same time the government sent out requests that sugar was absolutely essential to the prosecution of the war, in the manufacture of industrial alcohol, wanted us to—they took off the ban that they had had on there with respect to the quota that we could have and asked us to produce our maximum. At the same time we were losing all these men.

Well, we have done remarkably well by going to mechanism very largely, in introducing grab harvesting as distinguished from hand harvesting, and many other of the operations in cultivation, harvesting, and milling the cane are now done in more economical ways. Those ways, of course, have produced headaches in another way and require more machinery when again we are handicapped by having to get priorities for the machinery that we needed, which has not been easy to do. In fact, new machinery we were prohibited from having. We have had to buy second-hand at enormous prices, but we have gotten along.

Now, you ask, if you took 12,000 more away from us. I don't know what would happen. All I can say is that this industry has survived in spite of hell and high water, through the industry and activity of the people who run it, but I think many of the plantations would go flat if you took those men away.

49. General GRUNERT. Is there anything else you think of that [2744] might be of value to the Board in its mission, that has not been brought up?

General WELLS. No, I don't think so. I doubt if what I have said will be of much value to you.
50. General Grunert. You would be surprised at the many leads we get and the many opinions we get which dovetail at times.

General Wells. Yes.

51. General Grunert. All right. Thank you very much for coming up.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

General Grunert. We shall take a five-minute recess.

(There was a brief, informal recess.)

[2475] TESTIMONY OF WALTER FRANCIS DILLINGHAM, CARNA- NTION AVENUE, HONOLULU, T. H.

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel West. Mr. Dillingham, will you please state to the Board your name and address?

Mr. Dillingham. Walter Francis Dillingham, Carnation Avenue, Honolulu.

2. Colonel West. What is your occupation?

Mr. Dillingham. I am president of the Oahu Railway and Land Company.

3. General Grunert. Mr. Dillingham, this Board was appointed to ascertain and report the facts relating to the attack made by the Japanese armed forces upon the Territory of Hawaii on the 7th of December, 1941, and, in addition thereto, to consider the phases which related to the Pearl Harbor disaster of the report of the House Military Affairs Committee, which are largely concerned with construction, that took place since 1941. Now, we are after facts or leads to where such facts can be found. General Short has furnished the Board a list of representative citizens living in Hawaii who, he says, may have information of value to the Board. Your name being on that list, we have asked you here, with the hope that you may have facts that you can present to us. General Short did not refer to any particular subject on which you might testify, so it is up to you to open the subject which may give us leads as to questions we may want to ask you to develop that subject. That is rather a nebulous beginning, but that is the situation. Your name was presented in a list of names that General Short sent to the Board, so we hope that you have something in mind with which to lead us to other things about which we may question you. Have you any such?

Mr. Dillingham. I would not know where to start, General.

4. General Grunert. Have you any idea why General Short put your name down, except as a prominent citizen who may have known something about what he did over here? That is the main lead I can give you. You knew General Short, did you?

Mr. Dillingham. I knew General Short practically the whole time of his tour of duty here.

5. General Grunert. Did you know anything about his association with the citizens or his knowledge of the people or anything along that line that might give a lead?

Mr. Dillingham. Yes, sir. I became very well acquainted with General Short through business dealings and also through social contacts. I might say this: that it has been my privilege and somewhat
my duty, in connection with my business activities, to become acquainted with all of the Commanding Generals who have been here since the first armed forces came to Hawaii in 1898, I think it was, at the time of the Spanish War. General Short was one of those with whom I came in contact.

6. General Grunert. Do you know anything about his accomplishments in attempting to better or perfect the defenses of the island?

Mr. Dillingham. From my observation—and I think I was in a favored position to know what was going on in construction work, because I have been active in construction work for many years—I formed the opinion and stated it a good many times, that I considered him one of the ablest Commanding Generals we have [2747] had here. He was a driver; he wanted to see things done; he accomplished a great deal, a great deal, and was able to do that because he was a very satisfactory man to do business with. I may say I did not always agree with him, but that is possible. I have learned, in business, to disagree with those one deals with.

During the time he was here he acquired or started to acquire lands on the water front, and very successfully upset plans that I had had in mind in connection with the development of the Honolulu harbor extension, Kapalama Basin, by condemning some 70 to 75 acres across the water front property. The matter was so serious that I took it up with General Somervell in Washington.

7. General Grunert. And General Somervell at that time was what?

Mr. Dillingham. This was before he was—I don't know just what his particular activity was, but he had control over situations such as was presented to me. He was interested in transportation, I think. In any event, I was told to see him. I did see him. I explained that in this over-all condemnation suit which was being instituted, they were taking away all of the water front property that was vitally necessary to the Hawaiian Dredging Company, of which I was the organizer and president, that if all this water front property was taken away from us our shops, repair shops, ways on which we build scows and dredges, and so forth, would fold up, as this company had developed all the harbors on the islands of the Territory that started with opening Pearl Harbor in 1909, with dredging the original channel there, and a good many million dollars for the Army and for the Territory. It would put us out of business [2748] unless we had a home port. It did not seem to me necessary, nor to the interests of the government as well as to us, if we were denied any place to work.

As a result of that conversation I thought and had reason to believe that word was sent out here, because upon my return from that trip I took up the question with General Short of rearranging the plans which the Army had so as to give us a part of this frontage of several thousand feet which we had on the water front.

8. General Grunert. What did he want it for, do you know?

Mr. Dillingham. Yes, sir. It was for the development of warehouses in connection with terminal wharves which were to be built to serve the Army Transport. I made trips over the ground with him, and as a result of that it was decided that they could leave us the 12 acres which we were using, but it would be necessary for the
Army grabbed that hard-hitting man on repaired great effort. Scows have emphasized of area, for $1.00.

In the plan for this development the railroad, which, as I have stated, I was interested, because some years ago I arranged with the Territory to secure a right of way for a belt line road right around this probable some-day harbor extension, Kapa-lama, to have this railroad hook in with the warehouses and serve the wharves and so forth. Discussions were held [2740] with the United States Engineers and others to perfect a working arrangement on paper.

I have taken some time, very little time, to explain what took a great many meetings and discussions, but a very considerable amount of money was involved. You will appreciate that when you know the limited area of water frontage in this harbor, and the taking away of what we had definite plans for on locations which I bought, I think, in 1913, took a long shot ahead, looking for a final permanent location for a home base for our dredging enterprise.

All that came out of those discussions and plans was that a small area, much smaller than we required and planned for, was left to us, and it is occupied and operated by us today.

9. General Grunert. You might call that a handicap to his desire for a full plan. Do you know of any other handicaps under which he may have suffered in attempting to build up a 100 percent defense?

Mr. Dillingham. If I gave you the impression that it was a handi-cap, I think I have not stated the position correctly, General. It was a rearrangement which, as it turned out, was directly in the interests of both the Army and the Navy, for we have built scows, we have repaired equipment, we have been continuously at work 24 hours a day on that piece of property in connection with the war effort.

10. General Grunert. Still you considered him a very satisfactory man to deal with?

Mr. Dillingham. Yes; I think he is a clean-cut, straight-forward, hard-hitting man to get what he wants, and I am inclined to believe that if some word had not come from Washington [2750] to emphasize the importance of our place in the picture he would have grabbed it all off. As it turned out, had that taken place, it would have been a serious handicap to the defense operations of both the Army and the Navy, for we have built a very great many barges and scows and dredges and whatnot that have been actively used in this effort.

11. General Grunert. As it turned out?

Mr. Dillingham. Yes.

12. General Grunert. Suppose that Washington had not interfered, would you still have considered him a very satisfactory man to deal with?

Mr. Dillingham. I considered him very satisfactory, if you like, in driving home what he wants.
13. General Grunert. With what construction company were you associated? Any particular firm?

Mr. Dillingham. With the Hawaiian Dredging Company.

14. General Grunert. Did that company have any construction contracts for the government?

Mr. Dillingham. We have done construction work, dredging work, wharf building, dry-dock building, and so on, for the Navy; we have done dredging work for the U. S. Engineers, so that we have practically been continuously employed for 35 or 40 years in government work.

15. General Grunert. As to your dealings with the Army Engineers, who was the District Engineer with whom you did business, do you recall?

Mr. Dillingham. Oh, yes; I have done business with a good many. The last one I did business with was Colonel Wyman.

16. General Grunert. Wyman or Lyman?

[2751] Mr. Dillingham. Both. Lyman followed Wyman. I have done business with Albert Lyman. Albert Lyman was the last engineer that I had any considerable amount to do with, and he followed Colonel Wyman.

17. General Grunert. Since we are on that subject and before I open any new ones, I think I will ask General Frank and Major Clausen to develop a certain specialty that they have assumed in this investigation, while we are on this subject. You go ahead with that line, and develop it, General.

18. General Frank. Did you have any interest in any contracting company or construction company that was associated with the Hawaiian Constructors?

Mr. Dillingham. Yes, sir. I organized in 1919 the Hawaiian Contracting Company. The reason for organizing it was that I wanted to give—this is important I think—some of my associates who had gone along with us in the dredging company an interest in construction work of a wider field than we had in the dredging business. So this company was organized and the stock was offered to the young men who had been associated with me in the dredging business. The idea was, so there would be no competition between the two companies, because they were closely affiliated, that the contracting company would do the land work and the dredging company would do the water front work. That made a line of cleavage so that if it were wharves the dredging company handled it; if it were filling, reclamation, salvage work, dredging, any work of that character, the dredging company handled it. If it were bridges, roads, buildings, sewers, work of that character, the contracting company handled it.

I agreed with my principal associate in the dredging business[2752] that we would take whatever stock the boys were not able to take. So, as it turned out, while not getting the control, I had a substantial interest, but had no interest, nor was I a director, nor have I ever been, in the contracting company.

These companies were affiliated, used the same group of engineers, occupied the same building, under two separate managements. As to the contracting company, Colonel Wyman asked me, after he had been here some time, and I met him, if I would be interested in coming in and taking an interest in the Hawaiian Constructors. Is that the name of it?
19. General Frank. That is right.
Mr. Dillingham. I said no, I would not. He wanted to know why not. And we had quite a talk. I said that all my time and all my efforts were dedicated to the work which we had in hand, that I was not interested in getting into anything more than what I had on hand.

20. General Grunert. About when was this, Mr. Dillingham, when he approached you as to this?

Mr. Dillingham. I think I can tell you pretty close to it. That was, I think, perhaps in May or June of 1941, along in there some time.

Colonel Wyman explained to me that the Navy had put one over on the Army in getting—I am repeating now; I am not vouching for facts—the Navy had put one over by giving my organization, my assistants, property work which the Navy was doing, that he came down here without any idea that there was any outfit, local outfit, that could handle the work which was in sight for the engineers to do, and because of my long residence in this place and connections which I had, to use his exact words, [2753] "you can get anything that is necessary to push your job along, and I have got this outfit I brought with me, that have got to find their way around," and he said "I would like to have your outfit come in and take a hand in this, so as to help push our jobs along."

21. General Gunert. But this was after the contract had been awarded to the Constructors and they were on the job?

Mr. Dillingham. Oh, yes, they had been here and they were doing quite a lot of work. I don't know when they came here, but I know it was about the middle of the year of 1941, because—and this may interest you,—I turned it down flat, but I said this, "If at any time there is anything you think I can do to help out in the situation, you can call on me just as if I had the controlling interest in this contract of yours. I don't want anything for it, but I do want to help wherever I can. So if a situation arises where you think, as you seem to think, that I could be helpful, just let me know what to do."

Well, along in October of that year, one Sunday noon, Colonel Wyman and Colonel Weimer came down to this ranch that I have, where I spend my week-ends. They arrived about noon and had a bit of lunch and then he said: "General Short has sent me down here to tell you we have got to have a 35-ton crane, and the only crane that is not now being used in war work is the one that you have down in your shops, the dredging shops."

I said, "Well, Colonel, you can't have it."
He said, "By God, we will buy it."
I said, "You can't have it. We are outfitting right at the moment a dredge which has come from California and that they want to put to work as soon as possible. Without that [2754] crane it is impossible to lift the spuds or move any of the heavy pipe, and it will tie us up so we will have to shut down. We cannot do it. We have another one which has already gone and we can't allow this one to go."

We was a very persistent man and a very forceful man. He and I did not always get along. But we locked horns on this one. He said "Short says you must let us have it." I said "I can't help it; you can't have it." He said "Well, you telephone some of your outfit." I said "I won't telephone. It won't do any good. The answer is no."
Well, he stuck to it for an hour and a half, or more, and then I said, "I will see you tomorrow, Colonel. In the meantime I will try and think up some way out of your fix here."

So the next morning I took up the question of whether or not there was a crane available, and to satisfy Colonel Wyman I took the shop foreman up to the Colonel's office, and I said "Now, I tried to explain to you how important this crane is to us. Here is the shop foreman, Manuel Costa. He will tell you what our situation is, and the answer is no."

Then he said "This is so important that nothing is comparable in importance to the getting of this crane. By God, you are going to let me have it." I said, "No, I am not."

Suddenly it struck me and I turned to this man, and I said "Listen, Manuel, what has become of that gantry crane that we had at Hilo when we finished the Hilo breakwater?" He said "I think it is up there." So I took the telephone and called up the superintendent.

"Am I making this too long for you gentlemen?"

22. General Grunert. Go ahead; it is very interesting.

[2755] Mr. Dillingham. I called up the superintendent of the Hilo Railroad and said "Where is that crane you used on the outer end of that breakwater?" He said, "It is boxed up behind the round house." I said, "Tear it down, so it can be inspected. It is a 30 to 35 ton crane, is it not?" He said, "Yes."

So I said, "Colonel, have you got a man that can go up and inspect this rig?" He said, "Yes, I have, but," he said, "I haven't got any money to pay for sending him to Hilo." I said, "All right, I will pay for it, and you can pay me some time. I will send one of our engineers, mechanical engineers with your man, and they can go up tomorrow morning."

So I telephoned and arranged the transportation by air, and we then discussed how we could get it down, and Wyman said, "I have got a load going up on a scow that ought to be in Hilo tomorrow." I said, "You hold that scow in Hilo until we can find out whether this crane will answer the purpose or not?" That was arranged.

Manuel Costa said everything was set to go. Then Wyman said, "I am going to tell you what a jam I am in." I may say, until the calendar ran against me, that I have for over 20 years been a reserve officer in good standing and have discussed the defense plans for this island with many commanding officers, and for several reasons, and one was because of the part which the railroad here would play in any attack that would be made upon the island.

He pulled down a chart and for the first time I learned where the Japanese were. I was shown these islands to the south and southwest of us and how they were placed there and how easily they could cut our line of communications between [2756] here and Australia. He said, "The Ludington is loading in San Diego. I have got orders to get equipment down to Canton to be used at Canton and/or Christmas, unload the Ludington when she gets there. We have got to get out of here in so many days with this equipment. I haven't a scow; I haven't a crane; I haven't a towboat; I haven't got a damned thing, and I have got to get this equipment together and get it off down there."
Well, Golly, I said to myself, if there is anything in God's world I can do to help this situation, this is a situation that should take priority over anything else. Word came back from Hilo that the crane was worth moving, but the boiler was shot. I got it down here and I put it in the shop. I had a battle royal with my son, the manager of the dredging company, because he said, "You can't, you just can't tie us up this way." I couldn't tell them why, but I said, "This has got to have priority. I don't care if you shut down right now, but we have got to have this thing ready to go. Take my word for it. You will have to take my word for it." We got it ready a day ahead of scheduled time and off, and it was down there to meet the Ludington. We got the scow, we got the tow boat, strapped this crane in the center so she could lift the stuff out and put it on one end and on the other end and then go ashore and lift it off again, guns and very necessary heavy equipment that had to be put ashore.

Subsequent events satisfied me that that was a contribution that was of the very greatest value to the war effort, because we hadn't been set up there. If the island was attacked or defended, we maintained the line of communications for our planes through to Australia; and I have said many times, I don't know [2757] of any job that was more important to the war effort than what was put over by Colonel Wyman.

I hold no brief for him, but I can tell you gentlemen that in over 50 years of business experience nobody I have ever known would have put that over unless he had had the drive that Colonel Wyman had, who wouldn't take no for an answer. He stuck to it until he solved the problem, and I couldn't discourage him, and until the thing was really put up in such shape that it had to be done, a way had to be found to do it. I am glad to bear testimony to this, because I read the papers.

23. General Frank. Did the Hawaiian Contracting Company finally become a member of the Hawaiian Constructors?

Mr. Dillingham. Subsequently they were. They were taken in. They were—I'll tell you. Let me tell you that story.

Colonel Wyman and Rohl called me to a meeting and tried to get me associated in this group, and I said that I wouldn't be interested, as I said before, and I wouldn't go along. So that was that.

Some days after that Mr. H. P. Benson, who was president of the Hawaiian Contracting Company, asked me if I would go with him to the engineer's office to discuss a proposition which they wanted to make to get the Contracting Company in to help on this construction work of the U. S. E. D. I agreed to go, and went. The Contracting Company had the contract to build the two wharves in Kapalama, and when the war came on they cancelled the contract; and under a clause of the contract, a recapture clause, they took all of the equipment, all of our men except the office force and the management, and took them over—Wyman did—into his group. He took the equipment, the men [2758] served, and I don't know just how they were handled, but we were left without any men, without any equipment, and we were just the shell of a company with some money which they eventually paid for some equipment.

24. General Frank. Are you conversant with the manner in which that organization functioned over in the Hawaiian Constructors?
Mr. Dillingham. No; I know very little about the details of what went on, but my advice to Benson was not to go in on it; and at that meeting which I started to tell you about, after ten or fifteen minutes I got up and said, "Well, I am not running this company, and I have no managerial interest in it, but any arrangement you make with Mr. Benson is your affair," and I left. He came to me and said, "We are flat. We have nothing to do unless we can go in there."

I said, "What I have heard, they need some assistance such as you can give in straightening out some of the tangles and snarls which result from driving ahead to grab materials and men and freeze this and freeze that and freeze the other thing so as to have something to work with." The result was, it had gotten awfully jammed up, and there was a lot of howling about it from the business community because they couldn't get their bills approved, and so forth and so on. I said, "There is a big job for you, Percy, in there, but I wouldn't touch it."

25. General Frank. You said that to Benson?

Mr. Dillingham. Yes, I wouldn't touch it. It's an awful mess, I think.

26. General Frank. Were you familiar at all with those matters?

Mr. Dillingham. Only by hearsay and the difficulties that [2759] people were having in dealing with them. I wasn't connected with any deal of that sort, and so I wasn't affected.

27. General Frank. Who were the people who were affected? Can you tell us that?


28. General Frank. What were the reasons they needed help?

Mr. Dillingham. Well, I told Colonel Wyman one day, I said, "Colonel, the trouble with your outfit is that you haven't set up an organization big enough to do the tremendous job that is on you. You need a top executive, chief-clerk type of man to run the office. You need a man that's conversant with the pay and the checking up of orders and bills and so on. You are trying to do it all yourself, and there isn't any man living can handle the job the size that this has suddenly developed into without having properly trained and able men to handle the different jobs so that when it comes on your desk you can put your O.K. on and it's on the way. You are trying to do all that detail yourself, and no man can do that."

29. General Frank. Do you know of any delays in defense construction because of that situation?

Mr. Dillingham. Oh, I couldn't. If I said I did, I would have to tell you where and when, and I don't know.

30. General Frank. You said a moment ago, in talking to Mr. Benson, for him to do what he wanted to, but you wouldn't touch it. Why wouldn't you touch it?

Mr. Dillingham. Well, I had about all that I could handle, and policy matters, and details connected with business that I [2760] was trying to operate; and to take this on in addition was out of the question, plus the fact that I knew they weren't set up as any business of that magnitude would have to be set up to function perfectly. But it was war, and the jobs had to be done, and the drive
was to do them. The hours of work that those men spent were just beyond anything that I have ever known, because I have been called 9—one call I got 10 o'clock one night from Colonel Wyman, a rumpus about unloading some ship in the harbor. He drove these men, according to Mr. Benson, up to 12 and 1 o'clock, and he would be down in the morning at 5 or 6. He was a thief for work if ever a man was, and he drove everybody with him that way.

31. General Frank. Are you sufficiently familiar with the details to tell us whether or not when the Hawaiian Contracting organization went in there, that they were allowed to use their organizational and directive ability in the Hawaiian Constructors, or were they directed by the Engineer Corps?

Mr. Dillingham. If I may make the suggestion, the man that can tell you all of this and give you the detail and the straight of it is Mr. Benson, and anything that I might say would be what I remember of discussions or talks that I had with him; but he would have first-hand information about all of that I am sure.

32. General Frank. That is what I want to get. Now, did you ever meet this man Rohl?

Mr. Dillingham. Yes.

33. General Frank. Do you know anything about him?

Mr. Dillingham. Well, personally I didn't want him for a partner. In that perhaps I do him a great injustice when I say [2761] that, but I didn't like the cut of his jib, to be perfectly frank.

34. General Frank. Would you ever hire him?

Mr. Dillingham. No, sir.

35. General Frank. Why?

Mr. Dillingham. I don't know why. I didn't like him.

36. General Frank. How many times, ever, did you see him?

Mr. Dillingham. I think only three times.

37. General Frank. Was he always sober?

Mr. Dillingham. I don't know.

38. General Frank. Did you have any suspicion?

Mr. Dillingham. Yes.

39. General Frank. Now, how long did you know Wyman?

Mr. Dillingham. I think I met him fairly shortly after his tour of duty started. I don't remember just when it was, but I didn't see much of him until it came pretty close to the attack here, the months before that, I think, four or five or six months prior to that when I first had discussions with him. I think that's right.

40. General Frank. If Wyman were available would you hire him?

Mr. Dillingham. Yes, for certain type of jobs I would consider him a very valuable man.

41. General Frank. Are there any qualifications on that?

Mr. Dillingham. Yes.

42. General Frank. Will you state them?

Mr. Dillingham. I would want to follow along with him. It's a very hard question to answer, but he was such a driver that he was not one that would get along with men in civilian life. In all probability, in civilian activities he would have [2762] trouble with his organization because of his domineering, driving character. But if there was a tough job somewhere to be done, and regardless of everything else it just had to be done, I would feel that in his hands it would be accomplished somehow.
43. General Frank. Do you know whether or not he had any habits that affected his dependability?

Mr. Dillingham. I never saw him, in any meeting I ever had with him, when I thought he wasn’t alert, on the job. I had practically no social contacts with him. I think he only was in our house once, and that was for a very short time when he came to inquire about something.

44. General Frank. Would you say he was a man who called for close supervision?

Mr. Dillingham. Well, in what connection, General? “Close supervision?” Close supervision implies a check on his integrity or honesty, or so on.

45. General Frank. Well, I am talking about his work. If you had been Division Engineer in San Francisco and responsible for him as District Engineer in Hawaii, what degree of supervision would you have felt were necessary? That is in the light of statements you have just finished.

Mr. Dillingham. Well, if it was a rush job that had to be done I would turn him loose on it. If it was a job that was a developing plan, and so on, I would want someone of entirely different nature, training, and ability to go over his setup and see how in balance he had his work planned out.

46. General Frank. If his operations extended over a period of eight months, or any period, how often would you feel it necessary to check on him?

[2763] Mr. Dillingham. Well, that would depend somewhat on the form of reports that came in, the progress reports, the labor reports, and costs of the operation. If those were full and complete, if those reports were satisfactory, I wouldn’t consider that he needed very close supervision.

47. General Grunert. May I butt in there?


49. General Grunert. Suppose you had him in the job which he did here in Hawaii, in which apparently the office was pretty well balled up due to a lack either of key personnel to administer the office; how then would you have known through these reports in what shape that office was unless you came and looked at it and knew conditions? Would those reports have reflected the conditions that actually existed here?

Mr. Dillingham. I wouldn’t think so. I know nothing about it, but I don’t believe that they were taking the time to write out reports and all the rest of it. I don’t think the man is a good organizer. I think he is a driver.

50. General Grunert. Then, if he is not a good organizer, wouldn’t you necessarily have had to provide him with such organizational brains to help him or at least come to see how his organization was getting along?

Mr. Dillingham. I would think so.


52. General Frank. In his selection of men he was instrumental in bringing Rohl over here to help him. Do you think Rohl was of any help to him?

Mr. Dillingham. Well, I can repeat what he said to me. He said that, “These people have done good work for me on the mainland,
and I brought them over here because”—repeating what [2764] I have already said—"because I didn’t think there was anybody here that was in a class to do the job that I knew they could do."

53. General Grunert. Well, had he investigated to find out whether there was anybody here to do the job before he went to the mainland to get them; do you know?

Mr. Dillingham. No, I don’t know.

54. General Grunert. Did he ever approach you prior to that contract being awarded?

Mr. Dillingham. No, sir.

55. General Grunert. In December?

Mr. Dillingham. No, sir.

56. General Grunert. Were there others beside yourself who had capable organizations to do a great deal of that work?

Mr. Dillingham. Why, there are other organizations here that do construction work of different kinds successfully.

57. General Frank. Do you think Benson would have been big enough to have created the right type organization to have met that requirement, or Woolley?

Mr. Dillingham. Given the opportunity at the start, I think that Woolley and Benson could have put in an organization in the office, and that would have been of great value.

58. General Frank. Are you conversant with the McKee Constructing Company?

Mr. Dillingham. No, sir.

59. General Frank. Mr. McKee who built Hickam Field?

Mr. Dillingham. I knew when they were here working on the field, but I didn’t have any contacts with them.

60. General Frank. Was this tour of Wyman’s here his first [2765] tour in the islands, to your knowledge?

Mr. Dillingham. I think it was. I don’t recall of ever knowing of his being here before.

61. General Frank. You were here during the period prior to Pearl Harbor and afterwards and knew generally the reputation of this pair, Rohl and Wyman. Will you tell what it was?

Mr. Dillingham. I don’t think they were very well known, frankly, in the community. It was, it seemed to me, a very involved setup that they had: I couldn’t answer that question. I don’t know. Rohl was, I think, here only a small part of the time, and there was a fellow named Paul Grafe who I think had the dealings with Wyman and with Benson and Woolley.

62. General Grunert. What is your opinion of Grafe?

Mr. Dillingham. Well, I wouldn’t employ him. It is pretty hard to answer questions like that, what my opinion is. I had so little to do with him, practically nothing to do with him. The same with Rohl. I think we form our likes and dislikes and our impressions—oftentimes I do—in ten or fifteen minutes’ talk; and what feeling I had was that this California outfit do business in a different way from what we do business. But that doesn’t condemn them.

63. General Frank. You knew that this Hawaiian Constructors was operating on a cost-plus-fixed-fee contract?

Mr. Dillingham. Yes, sir.
64. General Frank. Will you state your opinion of the relative advantage and disadvantage of a cost-plus-fixed-fee contract as compared to a fixed-fee contract?

Mr. Dillingham. No interests of mine that I know of have worked on a cost-plus-fixed-fee except the interest that I have through the contracting company on this U. S. E. D. contract. The Hawaiian Dredging Company was one of the first three companies to work on a cost-plus-fixed-fee contract for the Navy. That was on the Pacific Naval Air Base contract. That contract grew from an estimated expenditure of money of between 12 and 14 million dollars to over 500 million. If the old method of advertising for contracts had been followed, the time it would have taken to get up the drawings, to write the specifications for the work in these far-flung locations such as Midway, Wake, Johnston, Palmyra, Canton, as well as the tremendous amount of construction work that was done on this island, I don’t believe it would have been possible, because of the time element consumed in getting together these facts, calling for bids, securing the bonds, having the contract signed, and so on—I don’t think it would have been possible to have accomplished half which was accomplished under the cost-plus-fixed-fee, in the work which we were connected with.

65. General Frank. In that work, however, you had an opportunity to use the organizing and directive ability that already existed in your dredging company?

Mr. Dillingham. Very definitely.

66. General Frank. And you had control of directing the work of procurement and in planning operations?

Mr. Dillingham. Yes, subject to review and such control as the Bureau of Yards and Docks exercised over each job.

67. General Frank. And the government did not take over supervision of your work?

Mr. Dillingham. No, sir.

68. General Frank. You supervised that yourself?

[2767] Mr. Dillingham. Yes, sir.

69. General Frank. They gave you the plans on which to proceed?

Mr. Dillingham. Yes, sir. And when you say “you” you mean the group where we in turn formed a directive group centralizing the direction and control of ourselves within ourselves?

70. General Frank. Yes.

Mr. Dillingham. Yes, sir.

71. Major Clausen. Concerning, Mr. Dillingham, some of the other contractors who have been available here to have done this work that was later done by the Hawaiian Constructors, can you tell the Board some of the group that might be here? You mentioned Mr. Woolley and Mr. Benson. Now, in addition to those two are there others?

Mr. Dillingham. Mr. E. E. Black.

72. Major Clausen. Does he have an organization here, sir?

Mr. Dillingham. Yes, sir.

73. General Frank. Yes.

Mr. Dillingham. And Glover, Jimmie Glover, both of whom were constructors, do construction work in wood and concrete and underground and roads and buildings, and so on.
74. Major Clausen. Now, is there a Mr. Wiley, W-i-l-e-y, who is a contractor, local contractor, with whom you are acquainted?

Mr. Dillingham. I don't believe so. Mr. Wiley?

75. Major Clausen. Is there a Mr. Clarke of the Clarke-Halawa Rock Company?

Mr. Dillingham. Yes, I know Mr. Clarke.

76. Major Clausen. And will you state to the Board your opinion as to his organizing and directing ability, sir?

Mr. Dillingham. I wouldn't employ Mr. Clarke.

77. Major Clausen. Just when was it, Mr. Dillingham, when you became a part of the Hawaiian Constructors?

Mr. Dillingham. I never became a part of the Constructors.

78. Major Clausen. You never were?

Mr. Dillingham. No, sir.

79. Major Clausen. I understood that you were.

Mr. Dillingham. No, sir.

80. Major Clausen. You have made a statement that this California outfit operated differently than the Hawaiian groups.

Mr. Dillingham. Yes, sir.

81. Major Clausen. You had reference to the Hawaiian Constructors?

Mr. Dillingham. I had reference to Paul Grafe, and under Rohl's direction or management or whatever the relationship was.

82. Major Clausen. Mr. Paul Grafe represented, did he not, W. E. Callahan Construction Company and the Gunther-Shirley Company?

Mr. Dillingham. I think so.

83. Major Clausen. Both those organizations, Mr. Dillingham, are Nebraska corporations.

Mr. Dillingham. Oh, are they?

84. Major Clausen. And Mr. Rohl represented Rohl-Connolly Corporation, and that also was a Nebraska corporation.

Mr. Dillingham. Well, I didn't mean to say anything about California corporations. I should have said mainland corporations.

85. General Grunert. Have you finished your line of inquiry, General Frank, or have you something else?

86. General Frank. Are you through, Major?

87. Major Clausen. This Mr. Wylie I refer to is an employee of the McKee organization. Were you acquainted with the McKee Contractors when they were here and built the Hickam Field and other permanent installations?

Mr. Dillingham. Yes, I know of them. I was not connected with them in any way.

88. Major Clausen. That is all I have.

89. General Grunert. Mr. Dillingham, from your long residence in the island and your wide acquaintanceship, could you give the Board just a little talk of what you know of the people, especially the Japanese element of the population, as to their—I won't call it loyalty to the United States, but as to their danger to this outpost of the United States?

Mr. Dillingham. Of course, that has been a question. I think three presidents of the United States asked me over a period of years what I could tell of what I thought of the loyalty of the Japanese-Americans here. My answer to that was this: No one really knows. The acid
test would be where they will stand if we ever mix it with Japan. If the thing can be staved off for another generation, the wish is father to the thought, but I believe that the roots of the third generation will be in the ground sufficiently deep so that it will be fully to their interests to be loyal and support the government as against any outsider.

90. General Grunert. Was there any indication because of the raid, the blitz, or whatever they call it, of any particular \[2770\] element showing their desire to turn against the United States or to perpetrate deeds or acts of sabotage that confirmed your belief that they showed an inclination of what the present-day generation out here was inclined to do?

Mr. Dillingham. I do not know of a single case where a Japanese agent or a Japanese-American showed anything out of line with support to this country. In our own experience, we had 45 Japanese-American brakemen, and on the morning of the 7th we had on our docks, which are served by rail and truck, a great many thousand tons of dynamite and high explosives. We used, because we had no other labor, our regular train crews, worked them around the clock, and they picked up and moved away from the docks in Honolulu enough dynamite and high explosives to flatten the whole city of Honolulu.

These boys worked on these trains, carrying train loads of ammunition, dynamite and high explosives, from the water front in Honolulu and the Pearl Harbor naval station and other restricted areas, now restricted areas, towed by locomotives without headlights, without any lights of any sort, and they had to give up using fog torches, electric torches, because when they were used it frequently happened that somebody on guard on the way took a shot at the fellow that was between the engine and the highball. We have had our men shot at, machine gunned as the train pulled out at the foot of Waianae Mountain, when we had Marine guards on the train, and guards along the side, and moving trainloads of ammunition; they would open fire and shoot back and forth. Of course, it made a job for me to do.

But never once was there an employee of the road, Japanese or otherwise, I may say, who failed to carry on or who showed any inclination to do other than his job and do it well and faithfully \[2771\] fully and stay on it 17, and 18, and 19 hours out of the 24, as many of them did. I do not know of a single case in Honolulu where there was sabotage. All the hooey that went out in the papers, everything that was published, every report suggesting something of that sort was run down, and not one particle of evidence was developed to support any of those yarns.

I think it was a marvelous record. What they were wishing or thinking, many of them, no one knows. But so far as any acts are concerned, I must say that they certainly delivered a square job to the United States.

91. General Grunert. Did you expect an air raid when it came?

Mr. Dillingham. No, sir.

92. General Grunert. Had you any reason to believe that the international condition between the United States and Japan was such as to result in explosion about that time?

Mr. Dillingham. No, sir.

93. General Grunert. Did you form an opinion as to the tense-ness between the two nations about that time?
Mr. Dillingham. Naturally we were interested in what the press carried about the negotiations in Washington. I think there was a feeling—I felt they were not getting anywhere with those negotiations.

94. General Grunert. Your sources of information were the press and radio only, were they?

Mr. Dillingham. Yes, sir.

95. General Grunert. Do you know the types of alert that were prescribed by the Army?

Mr. Dillingham. I am not sure that I know them all. I know there was a sabotage alert, there was the top alert, and I did know the week before the 7th that there was a form of alert which was described and discussed at that time as being the sabotage alert.

96. General Grunert. You had no occasion to ask yourself whether or not that was sufficient security under the circumstances as you knew them?

Mr. Dillingham. Well, it was considered a drill from that point of view, one of many drills that were being held.

97. General Grunert. Did you have any experience under the drill in an all-out alert, where they took their positions as if to meet an attack, be it from the air or sea or whatnot? Have you ever noticed any of those drills?

Mr. Dillingham. I do not recall a drill of that sort. There may have been, however.

98. General Grunert. Do you know whether not any of the precautions that were taken by the Army at any time alarmed the public?

Mr. Dillingham. I don't think so.

99. General Grunert. Suppose every defensive move that could have been taken to meet any possible condition had been taken, of occupying the positions, of placing live ammunition at guns and the location in position of antiaircraft guns, together with protection of various points against sabotage; would that have caused any particular alarm amongst the public that you know of?

Mr. Dillingham. I think it would cause considerable discussion, if that had been put into effect. The question very naturally would be why?

100. General Frank. There would have been no upset?

Mr. Dillingham. Oh, I don't think so.

101. General Grunert. Have you, outside of your interests in the railroad and your construction, any other interests that employ considerable labor?

Mr. Dillingham. Well, I have been interested for some 10 years in this cane fibreboard factory in Hilo. I have been vice-president of the Oahu Sugar Company employing some 500 men.

102. General Grunert. The Board does not want to know your interests. It just wants to get an idea of the amount of labor over which you have some control and of which you may have some knowledge, with a view to finding out what the conditions were as to their loyalty, as to their possibility of being a danger to the United States, and as to whether such business interests or commercial interests would lead the commercial people to interfere with anything the Army wanted to do in the line of taking defensive measures. Do you know of any such?

Mr. Dillingham. No.
1443

103. General Grunert. You do not know of any protest that business or commercial firms or managers of labor would make if the Army took an all-out alert at any time?

Mr. Dillingham. No, sir.

104. General Grunert. Have you any questions?

105. General Russell. Were you down in this vicinity of Pearl Harbor on this day of December 7th, 1941?

Mr. Dillingham. I was at the ranch, which is on the other side of the Waianae Mountains. Two planes engaged in a dog fight and we thought it was a target practice. I was at breakfast on the veranda, and after disposing of the family down there I came right down to Pearl Harbor and spent the day at Pearl Harbor, until about 4 in the afternoon. My son was in charge of dredging operations there. He came in ahead of me. [2774] I followed him in as quickly as I could, in time to see the planes come over that did the photographing, and I stayed out and watched them.

106. General Russell. What I had in mind particularly was your testimony of a moment ago, in which you related that the operation of the trains indicated a lot of indiscriminate shooting by the troops, one shooting at the other. It indicated quite a bit of confusion among the American troops here; is that true?

Mr. Dillingham. No, sir. To everybody that was just as much of a shock as there would be if this thing happened in Washington, D. C. The reaction was somewhat in the nature of paralysis. I would say, rather than excitement. Unbelievable. It was not on that day that any of this shooting went on, but when night came on, planes were coming in and being shot at, not far from my home, and fires in the cane field from a shot-down plane, and fire from the ships which was still burning, and the uncertainty as to whether that night the morning attack would be followed by a landing, all caused a pretty serious state of mind in the people here. It was not then so much as the following nights, that we were trying to reorganize, that we were moving, as we did every night, trains in and out.

107. General Russell. But the night that you were describing about the planes coming in and getting shot at, was that the night following the attack on the morning of the 7th?

Mr. Dillingham. Yes, that was the night of the 7th.

108. General Russell. They were friendly planes?

Mr. Dillingham. Yes.

109. General Russell. And our people were shooting at them?

Mr. Dillingham. Yes.

[2775] 110. General Grunert. What is the state of mind as of today?

Mr. Dillingham. What is the state of mind today?

111. General Grunert. As compared to the state of mind as of December 7th, before the blitz. Are they growing complacent again? Don't they expect an attack now, or have you any index to that state of mind?

Mr. Dillingham. I think there is this difference. General: Before the 7th there was uncertainty as to what the reaction would be in the Japanese population here. I think the officials of the Army and Navy, from statements made by them—and I discussed it with a great many over a period of several years—the attitude of the public di-
vided somewhat as to how we could depend on the Japanese, or whether we could not, which led to the feeling that the most serious thing that could happen to us in the event of war would be what the Japanese would do. whether we would be knifed in bed, and hysterical people saying they wouldn't have them in the house if they didn't have to, because if there came along D-Day, or whatever they call it, they might pin you all in bed. There was a lot of loose talk of that kind. I don't think anyone today is afraid of any such reaction on the part of the Japanese. That is quite different from what the feeling was before the 7th.

112. General RUSSELL. That feeling was rather real and would enter into any decision made by a commander here, wouldn't it?

Mr. DILLINGHAM. I think, in fact I know, that that was borne in upon them from some distance away, that they have got to be prepared to handle a situation that might develop locally in the event of trouble. If I had to die for it, I never met an officer of the Army or Navy with any idea that we would be [2776] bombed from the air. No one that I ever talked to ever intimated that such a thing was a possibility.

113. General GRUNERT. Is there any indication at present that business or employers of labor would be inclined to not cooperate with the military in what the military thinks ought to be done, because they now think that there can be no more raids, and, on account of the present war situation, a great many of these restrictions should be removed, because they interfere with business or pleasure?

Mr. DILLINGHAM. I do not think the business men have raised that point even in their own minds. I think that this little community was solidly behind whatever was necessary in the judgment of our military leaders to be done, just as if they were all in uniform and drilled to support them. I have never known this community—I have seen them in trouble before; we had the plague, cholera and other scares here, yellow fever and one thing another, and they were pretty badly frightened and got together to do something about it, but I have never known this community so of one mind to get in and do whatever was necessary or give whatever was wanted as they have been since the 7th of December.

The exception to the rule was when politics entered into the thing and there was a feeling amongst some of our legal fraternity and colleges that we ought to say, "By God, we ought to maintain the rights of American citizens," and all that sort of hooey that nobody gave a damn about.

We were perfectly willing to go to bed at 10 o'clock and 8 o'clock and go without lights and all the rest of it, and nobody wanted any change. Irrespective of what was said, that was the truth. They didn't want to be moved into a different position. [2777] for one very good reason: They felt that if there was anything lurking in the minds of the Japanese or any tendency for any Japs to get together or any desire to do a thing like that, they were denied that opportunity under the curfew and were a damned sight safer as American citizens under that kind of military control, when the fear of immediate punishment was facing a violator of military law, as against cases dragged along in the courts, and the minute they lifted the thing up our troubles began with the police and the police department. The minute that was done they began having trouble.
114. General Grunert. Wouldn't that be good government on the part of the city or the county to have put that in of their own accord, then?

Mr. Dillingham. To do what?

115. General Grunert. To have a curfew of their own.

Mr. Dillingham. No, it is the fear of punishment, General. It was the teeth in the military control that made people feel comfortable here.

116. General Frank. As you know, Mr. Dillingham, this Alert No. 1 that was in vogue as a defense against sabotage?

Mr. Dillingham. Yes, sir.

117. General Frank. And they decided upon that because they were so ultra-allergic to sabotage and that feeling, that state of mind had been built up. Now, from what you say I assume that that same feeling existed among the civilian population.

Mr. Dillingham. The uncertainty as to whether or not—

118. General Frank. Yes.

Mr. Dillingham. That is right.

119. General Frank. And there was a feeling among the civilian population of the necessity of taking measures against sabotage as a protection just in case?

Mr. Dillingham. Right.

120. General Frank. That is right?

Mr. Dillingham. That is correct.

121. General Frank. I am bringing that up so as to indicate that notwithstanding there were some messages from outside the Department that came in that told them to beware of sabotage, there was a feeling right here in the community that prompted that same action?

Mr. Dillingham. Yes. I would not say that it was a unanimous opinion or anything like that. Except in time of great stress, you would find a variety of ideas on the thing. Some people felt there was danger from it, and others said "Oh, pshaw," or something, but as a precautionary measure I think those who believe in a conservative position felt we should not take any chances; would rather be ready than sorry.

122. Major Clausen. Sir, are you acquainted with the reasons why Colonel Wyman was relieved as District Engineer for the Hawaiian Department?

Mr. Dillingham. No, I am not. I happen to know that he and Colonel Albert Lyman did not see eye to eye on many things. I think there was a good deal of friction between those two officers.

123. Major Clausen. Do you know, sir, why notwithstanding whatever reasons may have existed for the relief of Colonel Wyman, he was later awarded a D. S. M.?

Mr. Dillingham. Wyman or Lyman?


[2779] Mr. Dillingham. Wyman?

125. Major Clausen. Yes.

Mr. Dillingham. Do I know why?

126. Major Clausen. Yes.

Mr. Dillingham. I have always understood that it was in recognition of what he did in opening and keeping the door open between here and Australia.
127. **Major Clausen.** Did you have anything to do with that D.S.M.?

**Mr. Dillingham.** I haven't anything to do with making awards of that sort, naturally, but I made the statement a great many times, as I made it here, that I think it was a contribution to the war service. Everything else aside, he darned near did the impossible to make possible the keeping open of communications lying between here and Australia. To my mind that is one of the most important things that could have been done at that time, but he surmounted the difficulties and did it.

128. **Major Clausen.** Did you have anything to do with the recommendation for that? Did you ever so recommend to his superiors?

**Mr. Dillingham.** No, sir.

129. **Major Clausen.** Or did anyone else that you know of?

**Mr. Dillingham.** I talked at large on the subject, and I think I wrote Lee Warren, to be sure about that, that this Wyman was deserving of recognition for the accomplishment of that job that I knew so much about.

130. **Major Clausen.** Just for the sake of the record, would you state who Lee Warren is, Mr. Dillingham?

**Mr. Dillingham.** Yes. Lee Warren is an attorney in Washington that has represented me by power of attorney for 20 years. He was in the Navy, retired more than 20 years ago, studied law, and has represented business interests there.

131. **Major Clausen.** This D. S. M. passed through a chain of origination in the office of the Division Engineer at San Francisco, then through the office of the Chief of Engineers in Washington and to the Commanding General of the Army Service Forces, General Somervell, for the usual routine handling.

**Mr. Dillingham.** Yes.

132. **Major Clausen.** Did you talk or write to any of those?

**Mr. Dillingham.** No, sir.

133. **General Frank.** Just for purposes of the record, I would like to get in there that the Rohl-Connolly Company and the Shirley-Gunther Company and the W. E. Callahan Company have offices in and do business in California, notwithstanding where they are incorporated.

134. **General Grunert.** Have you any further questions?

135. **General Russell.** No.

136. **General Grunert.** Was there much if any damage to property and loss of life in Honolulu aside from Army and Navy installations and personnel?

**Mr. Dillingham.** There was some. There were a number killed. There were some houses hit by falling shells and shrapnel, but in proportion it was very light.

137. **General Grunert.** Is there any feeling existent or extant in the islands here as to what General Short and Admiral Kimmel [2781] did or did not do, as to whether or not they did their duty or did not do their duty?

**Mr. Dillingham.** Would you read that question again, please?

(The pending question, as above recorded, was read by the reporter.)

**Mr. Dillingham.** I judge, from letters received from the mainland and further away, that feeling was much more keenly critical of their failure to do their duty than here in the islands.
138. General Frank. Had you been at the other end of this attack, Mr. Dillingham, would you not have been feeling that you were participating in a very courageous task of jeopardy?

139. General Grunert. Do you mean on the Japanese end?

140. General Frank. Yes.

141. General Grunert. Oh.

Mr. Dillingham. Yes, I would have felt so if I believed all that I read in the papers about the impregnable Hawaii, that I was going up against a buzz-saw.

142. General Frank. It, therefore, was a courageous undertaking that could have been disastrous, just as disastrous in defeat as it was successful in victory?

Mr. Dillingham. Well, I wouldn't say that, because the loss of life and property if we had bagged the whole lot would have been very little compared to the odds in personnel and matériel; we stood to lose a great deal more than they could have lost if we had knocked them all out.

143. General Frank. But, had they lost the carriers that participated in this,—

Mr. Dillingham. Ah, yes.

144. General Frank. —it would have had a great effect upon future Japanese naval operations?

[2782] Mr. Dillingham. That is very true.

145. General Frank. Therefore, they made a gamble?

Mr. Dillingham. No question about that.

146. General Grunert. Although we have gone quite far afield from our original start here, and we didn't know why General Short wanted you to appear before the Board, except that you knew something the Board might be able to use, I think we have covered considerable ground, but now is there any ground left that you can think of, any facts that you can give the Board that have not yet been covered, or subjects that have not been touched upon, that you would like to tell the Board?

Mr. Dillingham. I have read so much hooey about the relations between General Short and Admiral Kimmel that I feel that I would like to go on record, having known both these gentlemen, having known them, General Short in a business and social way, and Admiral Kimmel only in a limited social way. I am perfectly positive that there was a speaking and pleasant relationship between Admiral Kimmel and General Short. I never heard that there was any friction or any lack of get-together between those two men until after the fracas was over. I would like to say this: that prior to the 7th there was no one ranking officer here recognized by both branches of the service. The question of whether the top Admiral or the top General had authority over the other branch of the service, as far as I know, was never determined. In other words, there was sort of a dual control. Under those conditions, from my point of view as a citizen, I think that is a very difficult situation. If after the 7th the thing was set up, Admiral Nimitz was put in supreme command and the Commanding General here made military governor, there there — [2783] was a sort of a question as to whether this controlled that or this individual controlled the other, and it got down to details. But with the individuals who represented those two tops the relationship was good, as I know of my own knowledge; and I thought, and still think and believe, that it is abso-
lutey necessary that there be one control in a locality when there is a job for both to do; and I think that that situation not only applies here but it applies in the islands to the south and elsewhere.

147. General GRUNERT. At that time had you that same thought through to conclusion, how would that have been in Washington, one head here receiving instructions from two heads in Washington? Wouldn't that unity of command or of control be necessary from top to bottom?

Mr. DILLINGHAM. I would think so. I am a believer, in business, of having a boss that has the final say in the direction of policies, and so forth and so on.

148. General GRUNERT. But that has come about now through our system of joint Chiefs of Staff which made unity of command possible. Prior to that, had they had unity of command without a joint chief of staff in Washington, they would probably have received conflicting instructions from two heads.

Mr. DILLINGHAM. Yes.

149. General GRUNERT. So the system as a whole would have to be adjusted to meet the conditions extant at that time.

Mr. DILLINGHAM. I have just finished reading Ten Years In Japan, by Ambassador Joseph Grew. When I read of that year leading up to December 7th, to say nothing of what came before, and read that on January 27th, because of the amount of conversation there was about a sneak attack on Pearl Harbor, that that was sent to the State Department, and then followed along up to the time of these conversations, and no progress, and the military and the civilians' controls in Japan shifting from one foot to the other, and so on, and a growing antagonism against the United States, and on the third of November Ambassador Grew sent a long cablegram to Mr. Hull outlining the situation; and the fact, the deduction, the only deduction I can make, was that war would inevitably follow if they didn't fix the situation promptly, and there didn't seem to be any prospect of that, and so forth and so on; and the next day in his journal he said, "I think that my telegram of the 3rd will become history." One month and four days before the attack on Pearl Harbor this information is sent to the State Department in Washington; and if, as I assume, a message was sent out to be alerted for any emergency, and Admiral Kimmel and General Short knew of this background or had those instructions from the Secretary of War and the Secretary of Navy, and the captains of warships who were in town with their families on Saturday night, and the Army didn't have ammunition at the guns and the men placed, I think they were very derelict in their duty. So if that would be information that they had, that would be the warning that they had, and nothing more was done about it than to look out for the possible sabotage here, and so forth and so on, they certainly didn't do their job.

150. General FRANK. Have you read the Roberts report?

Mr. DILLINGHAM. No, I have not read the Roberts report.

151. General RUSSELL. This dereliction of duty that you have pictured just a moment ago—in outlining the factual basis there—[2785] for you spent some considerable time in talking about the details of what the ambassador who wrote the book knew, and its transmittal to the State Department.
Mr. Dillingham. Yes, sir.

152. General Russell. I was not clear as to whether you thought that the dereliction was more apparent and real if the commanders here knew what the ambassador in Japan knew. Do you think that that would affect their dereliction whether they knew what was going on in Japan or not?

Mr. Dillingham. Yes, I'd think so, for the reason that I don't believe—in fact, I feel positive that there wasn't an Army or a Navy officer stationed here in Hawaii, and maybe elsewhere, who believed that it was likely or possible that we would be bombed by Japan. I don't believe they were. And unfortunately I can't tell you the opinion of a man high in office in this country who believes just as I do and included himself in the statement that that couldn't be, that that situation couldn't arise.

Much of the work that was being done here for the defense of these islands I think was considered on the part of a great many officers as being a hell of a good opportunity for some contractors to make some money, but that it was wholly unnecessary. And certainly I was on the wrong end of that one.

153. General Grunert. Any further questions?

154. General Frank. No.

155. General Grunert. We seem to have exhausted what has occurred to us. So we thank you very much for your presence and taking your time and giving us of your testimony.

Mr. Dillingham. Very well, sir.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

(Thereupon, at 5:34 p. m., the Board concluded the hearing of witnesses for the day and proceeded to other business.)
CONTENTS

SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 9, 1944

Testimony of—

Frank H. Locey, Waialae Ranch, Honolulu, T. H. 2787
Frank E. Midkiff, 406 Castle & Cooke Bldg., Honolulu, T. H. 2803
John H. Midkiff, Waialua, Honolulu 2833

1 Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate pages of original transcript of proceedings.
[2787] PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD

SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 9, 1944.

Fort Shafter, Territory of Hawaii.

The Board, at 9 a.m., pursuant to recess on yesterday, conducted the hearing of witnesses. Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President of the Board, presiding.


Present also: Colonel Charles W. West, Recorder; Major Henry C. Clausen, Assistant Recorder; and Colonel Harry A. Toulmin, Jr., Executive Officer.

General Grunert. The Board will come to order.

TESTIMONY OF FRANK H. LOCEY, WAIALAE RANCH, HONOLULU, TERRITORY OF HAWAII

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel West. Mr. Locey, will you please state to the Board your name and address?

Mr. Locey. Frank H. Locey, Waialae Ranch, Honolulu.

2. Colonel West. And what is your occupation, Mr. Locey? You operate that ranch?

Mr. Locey. I operate the ranch. Oh, I do several other things. I am an importer of livestock.

3. General Grunert. Mr. Locey, this Board was appointed to ascertain and report the facts relating to the attack made by the Japanese armed forces upon the Territory of Hawaii on December 7th, 1941, and, in addition thereto, to consider the phases which related to the Pearl Harbor disaster of the report of the House Military Affairs Committee, which was largely concerned with construction activities prior to that attack. Now, we are after facts or leads to where facts can be found. General Short has furnished the Board a list of representative citizens living in Hawaii who, he says, may have information of value to the Board. Your name being on that list, we have asked you here with the hope that you may have facts to present to us. General Short did not refer to any particular subject on which you might testify, so it is up to you to open the subject, which may then give us leads on which we can ask questions.

Do you think of any particular reason why he should have suggested your name as possibly having information that may be of value to the Board?

Mr. Locey. Well, as far as Pearl Harbor on December 7th is concerned, I was not that close to the military situation, although at the
time I was president of the Board of Forestry and Agriculture, for 10 years, and I came in contact over land deals with General Short. I sat on the Governor's Food Commission, which General Short was very much interested in. General Short several times sent for me prior to December 7th to discuss issues that I was familiar with.

4. General GRUNERT. Then you can possibly give us some sidelights on his attempts to build up his defense of Hawaii and his cooperation with the civilian governmental officials.

Mr. LOCY. I was president of the Department of Agriculture for 10 years, and I saw in General Short's time a marked stepup in preparing. I could see the hookup in my business with him. He was continually—I have charge of all the forestry in the Territory which was Territory property—he was continually working on roads, trails, getting permits to get into different water setups and studying the water conditions. He was greatly interested in the food situation of our people. He quite a few times—I would not say quite a few times, but he was continually harping at the civilian population here to right themselves in case of a war.

Several months prior to December 7th, he had put guards on all the bridges and installations here. There was not a day or night that you would go out—I might go a little further than that, which would be hearsay, and say that his fear and Washington's fear was of sabotage here, not an attack. He did his utmost. He put out guards on all of our utilities, on all of our bridges, day and night. He put them all through our forests, all over our water setups. They had a continuous guard over them. There was hardly a day that there were not letters coming in on the forestry situation from General Short, most of them personally signed by General Short.

5. General GRUNERT. Then the way I size it up, as far as you can see, he did his utmost to be physically prepared for anything that might happen; at the same time he paid a great deal of attention to antisabotage measures. Does that about size it up?

Mr. LOCY. He did the utmost. I saw him prior to December 7th several times, on the food situation. On December 7th I was with him for a while; on December 8th I was at quite a lengthy meeting with him. I think that General Short was a savior to this country on December 7th. As I say about 10 or 11 o'clock I was with him, and saw the way the man held himself.

On December 8th he called a meeting at headquarters of about 40 of us, and he outlined what he wanted us civilians to do. He outlined the food situation. He talked probably for two hours.

Soon after he left I took over the civilian defense, and it was a big problem for me. We had about 11,000 people on our staff to organize and put on the staff. We had construction and hospitals and bomb shelters, which was piled on me in directives that were written in General Short's time. We revolutionized the whole hospital setup. We went into all phases of civilian life, that were prepared under his administration.

He sat and talked on December 8th to us boys for probably two hours, and for a year after that, when I got out of the civilian defense—I was not a war man and what I was doing I never did before, and problems and directives were coming at me en masse. There
wasn't a day or many times a day that questions would come up to me that were a mystery. I did not know how to decide them. I could pretty near always go back to General Short's speech that he made on that day, the 8th, and get an answer.

6. General GRUNERT. This was all after December 7th?
   Mr. LOCHEY. That was December the 8th, this meeting.

7. General GRUNERT. Was any of this preparatory work done prior to December 7th?
   Mr. LOCHEY. Well, there was a marked stepup here with the engineers, through their branch.

8. General GRUNERT. Did you have any air raid shelters, any black-out drills, any slit trenches dug, and so forth, prior to December 7th?
   [2791] Mr. LOCHEY. We did not on the civilian setup. The civilian setup here was like you might say it was in the United States. It had to be sold to the public.

9. General GRUNERT. In other words, the public had to be convinced of the necessity for it?
   Mr. LOCHEY. There had to something happen. The public was not sold on the food setup. General Short made a lot of public statements on the food setup. General Short feared a blockade here.

10. General GRUNERT. The former commanders had also feared that, hadn't they?
   Mr. LOCHEY. Well, yes, but they were so far ahead of war that we did not notice it, probably.

11. General GRUNERT. You did not pay any attention to it?
   Mr. LOCHEY. We didn't pay any attention. General Short was a very calm and convincing man.

   [2792] 12. General GRUNERT. How long have you been in the Islands?
   Mr. LOCHEY. I have been here thirty years, thirty-four years.

13. General GRUNERT. Then possibly you can assist the Board in some general observation. Do you mind if we question you along general lines?
   Mr. LOCHEY. No, sir.

14. General GRUNERT. How about the population you have over here, particularly the Japanese element, both aliens and American citizens? How do you size them up as to their being a menace or a danger to the United States and the Islands? Would you like to express yourself on that?
   Mr. LOCHEY. I would.

Our community talks of statehood here. I think it is the most asinine thing I ever heard. I think we have the finest form of government here that there is in the United States today. I have been through the mainland. I have seen more or less things that weren't right, that couldn't be changed. We have a form of government that you can put your finger on and clamp down at any time. Our judges here are appointed by and go up as high as the President. We have got a better staff of judges in the territory, and have had for thirty years, than this territory could ever have or any state has ever had, because they are appointed, they are fearless, they don't have to look forward to election when a case is decided. They are clean and above-board, and there is no election mixed up with it.

You speak of the Japanese here. General Short, General—oh——
15. General Grunert. Heron?

Mr. Locey. No. He was a Colonel at the time: Green was General Short's executive officer that was put in military governor. He was quite concerned, and I was on his advisory staff on civilian affairs. He kept asking me about these Japs. I constantly said that these Japs were—we were amazed at the way they did behave, but there isn't anything else they could do at the time. But I kept a-telling the General that when he would bring this subject up, that if this Island ever had an invasion and it got to a point where we had 60 percent of the advantage and the Japs had 40, look out; Goddamit, they would all go against us. I don't say all of them. I'll take that back. There are some good Japanese boys here. But we are just a-kidding ourselves. Our population: go to our schools here and look at the masses just filling the high schools, just the statistics of the graduates of the high schools in two or three years. They are voters. See what our vote, estimate what our vote will be here in four years. Why, hell, the population is 40 percent Japs now, and there is always a sway in vote that you can't depend on.

16. General Grunert. Are most of them Democrats or Republicans, or both?

Mr. Locey. Well, they are mostly youngsters; they don't know what they are.

17. General Grunert. But there are some on each side?


18. General Grunert. Then, you think they would be a definite menace in case the Japanese attacked and appeared to be winning?

Mr. Locey. Oh, definitely. I wouldn't say all of them; there's a lot of the boys that would rally to our side. But there's a lot of them here.

19. General Grunert. There is no indication of that now in the present state of the war, is there?

Mr. Locey. Oh, not the slightest. On December the 7th there wasn't a thing hardly went wrong here.

20. General Grunert. Do these Japanese all cling together, vote together, and vote as a bloc, or are they separated into parties, or what?

Mr. Locey. They will bloc some, and then they kind of fear to bloc, and they waited to gain more strength. You can take in our House, compare. I will go back a little further on the question you asked me of the setup here. Go a little further back. I spoke of the appointments of the people that were appointed here. I didn't make any mention of the elected setup. If you would take and get before a bunch of elected officers here and a bunch of appointed officers, why, there is the difference of day and night. Now the Japs started to crawl into our House of Representatives. A few of them got elected. They kept a-crawling until they got one—prior to December the 7th, a couple of years before that, they got one Japanese member in the Senate. But there was a marked climb-up of Japanese getting elected to our House. Then one crawled into the Senate. But it's nothing now to what it would be, in my mind, in ten years from now. Why, Goddamit, if we got statehood, some day we would
have a Japanese governor and a couple of Japanese delegates in Washington. That's my opinion; hope [2795] this is not for——

21. General GRUNERT. All this is secret, but whoever digs out the secret record has to have the authority to do so. But it is not for publication.

Mr. LOCY. I am interested here. It's not becoming of me, really, to talk this way against the community and this territory.

22. General GRUNERT. You use your own judgment on that, and if you think there is anything that you might say that is liable to rebound on you that way——

Mr. LOCY. I don't ask to have it stricken out. It is my feeling; Goddamit, I can stand up under it. The bigger percent of the population here is for statehood. Everybody laughed at it when they started it. A couple of politicians began to talk about it to get more votes amongst that class, until it has grown and grown; Goddamit, they have all got to believing it. I think it is most ridiculous, and I am way in the minority on that thought; there are very few people that's got to thinking as I do.

23. General FRANK. What advantage would statehood be to industry?

Mr. LOCY. I can't see it. I just—I can't see. They had a congressional meeting over here years ago on statehood, and they harped and harped on statehood. The only advantage that it would have, we don't get proper representation in Washington. We have one delegate that sits in the House. He has a voice but no vote, and his voice is not any good if he has not got a vote to trade, and these representatives kept a-asking what we wanted. The answer was very easily answered: [2796] We want representation in Washington that will have a value. But I think that we are asking for a lot of trouble to get that representation. We sure need representation in Congress and in the House. We have a House member, but he has no vote, and they pay no attention to him. He's a—Republicans, now they don't pay any attention to them, even if they do have a vote, because they are in the minority; but just think of a man that hasn't got a vote; they just pay no attention to him.

24. General GRUNERT. Do you have any questions?

25. General FRANK. No.

26. Major CLAUSEN. No.

Mr. LOCY. I might go a little further on December the 7th, and speaking of preparedness, I left out the Navy. You didn't ask me. I was also Fish Commissioner for ten years, and we have a deep sea fishing industry here that depends on what they call nelsu. It is a small fish for bait, and about 90 percent of those are in Pearl Harbor, and quite a while prior to December they just shut us down; we couldn't get a fisherman in Pearl Harbor to get bait.

That wasn't my business, but I appealed and represented them. We couldn't get them in, and it got to a point where we couldn't get our own game wardens to police Pearl Harbor, which is a great fish reservoir. It got to a point where we couldn't get a one of our officers in there to police the shore for fishing violations. Pearl Harbor was just as tight as could be. That went on for, oh, probably a year prior to Pearl Harbor.
27. General Grunert. Their fear of sabotage or fear of the signaling, or what?

Mr. Locey. I think fear of sabotage. My understanding of this whole situation before December the 7th, it was a great fear of sabotage. Plenty of Army officers here told me that this place was impregnable; they just waved aside the thought of attack, but that was just hearsay, but I know of General Short's feeling, and I knew that it was the feeling in Washington, through hearsay which comes so straight to me, that it was sabotage that we had to look after.

28. General Grunert. Well, they are sent out here for defense purposes.

Mr. Locey. Yes, sir.

29. General Grunert. Sabotage is just one element of defense.

Mr. Locey. That is right.

30. General Grunert. Now, do you people out here feel that the Army and Navy have let you down through not being able to do more to resist that attack?

Mr. Locey. No. No, we don't.

31. General Grunert. You didn't have very much damage or loss of life among your civilians in this thing?

Mr. Locey. No; we only had—well, there was at Pearl Harbor. I don't think there was hardly any loss in the military reservations, of individuals?

32. General Grunert. I mean among your civilian population.

Mr. Locey. Civilian. Well, there was some civilian population at Pearl Harbor, but in the town——

33. General Grunert. Those were employees, were they?

Mr. Locey. Yes, employees. In town there were only a very few, and those came from shells of our own guns that were popped at the Japs.

34. General Grunert. And you people, you civilians, you business-men, and so forth, did you anticipate any such attack?

[2798] Mr. Locey. No.

35. General Grunert. Were you complacent? Were you satisfied that this place was impregnable, and therefore——

Mr. Locey. No. Well, to a civilian, the war—we don't understand it; and if a man is a businessman he takes the advice of a man that is in that business.

36. General Grunert. That is, you look to the constituted authorities to take care of you, naturally?

Mr. Locey. Yes, that is right.

37. General Grunert. Well, now, were you conscious or war-minded, conscious that war was in the immediate offing? Did you realize the tense situation?

Mr. Locey. Yes, we did.

38. General Grunert. Where did you get that information?

Mr. Locey. Well, you just couldn't help from the attitude of Japan; you couldn't help from the attitude of our own nation of beginning to clamp down on Japan. Something had to happen. It had to break.

39. General Grunert. Then, as I gather it, you thought there was going to be war but it wasn't going to hit here, first, at least?

Mr. Locey. It wasn't going to hit here. The attitude, it seemed we got a lot of our attitude from Washington, because we read the
papers, and it was my experience with papers that they are a menace; they don't tell 10 percent of the truth in a lot of cases. They will switch things around. They always have in my business.

40. General Grunert. But you still think that the Army and Navy did what they should do here, under the circumstances?

Mr. Locey. I don't know a great deal about the Navy; [2799] I wasn't in touch with them, never have been, but I have been more or less close to the Army and the Generals that have been here prior to Short, and I think that the Army was very much on the job. Their construction efficiency was high. Their officers are a high type of men. We had criticism here in the press on this Colonel Wyman.

[2800] 1. General Grunert. What do you know about Wyman?

Mr. Locey. Well, Wyman was a very funny man, but everything these papers said about Wyman was utterly false, in my mind. I have never seen a man that came into a community, that made more enemies. He was ruthless and hard and cold and tough, and if he worked an hour, he worked 20 hours a day; and if there was ever a driver that ever came to Hawaii it was Wyman, and we would have been so far back in our work, or the Army would—why, they couldn't have got a man that would have driven work through as Wyman did. He was just like a "bull in a china shop." He didn't make friends. He wasn't a personal friend of mine, but I believe in justice, and the papers, the items they printed on Wyman, all letting down, was just all bosh.

42. General Grunert. Did you know this man Rohl?

Mr. Locey. No.

43. General Frank. Did you know Wyman?

Mr. Locey. I knew him personally. I had business contacts with him. General Short appointed me on December 8 to make an inventory of farming machinery that was necessary to produce more food here, and turn it over to Wyman. I contacted Wyman on that, and anything after December 7 that pertained to food or agriculture, I was Wyman's contact man. Of course it mostly came through an agent, but hell! you could get Wyman at 12 o'clock, or 2 o'clock, in his office, at night; and I have been out on the jobs. On agricultural problems and vegetables he had called me in a few times to consult me and take me out and show me the jobs, get my advice on them; but I think everything that I have seen in the paper about Wyman was false, in my mind.

44. General Grunert. Did you see any reports about his [2801] imbibing of liquor to excess? If so, would you say they were false, also?

Mr. Locey. Well, I am not a social man. I knew Short very well. I was never in his house. I never met him socially. It was always in a business way. The same applied to Wyman. I guess Wyman took a drink. A few Army men do take drinks, don't they?

45. General Grunert. We have you as a witness, and we are not on the stand.

Some of those "hard-boiled guys" who get things done are sometimes, not always, hard drinkers.

Mr. Locey. Well, they have got to have "an out." That has always been my experience and observation; that if you see a man who is a "driver," and a man who accomplished something, he had some "out." Maybe he drank, I don't know; I guess he did; but I don't know, why should I say he drank? I never saw him drinking.

79716—46—Ex. 145, vol. 2—43
46. General Grunert. In your associations with or in your knowledge of Wyman, did you ever know whether his taking a drink or his having liquor interfered with his work?

Mr. Locey. I never have seen anybody that liquor did any good. I am a teetotaler. I keep liquor in my house. My friends come there, sometimes, and get too much. I have never seen liquor do anybody any good. There are lots of them that drink it, but as far as General Wyman’s work, here and “driving;” we would have lost, without General Wyman.

47. General Grunert. You mean Colonel Wyman?

Mr. Locey. Or Colonel Wyman; yes.

48. General Grunert. The other one was General Lyman.

Mr. Locey. Yes. I knew General Lyman very well.

49. General Grunert. But you mean Colonel Wyman?

Mr. Locey. I mean Colonel Wyman. He was a man that probably couldn’t stay too long in one place. He was such a [2802] “driver” and so ruthless that in time they build up a sort of barrier around him, that they don’t get through things as well as the man that goes a little calmer; but if there was ever a “driver” it was Colonel Wyman. If there was ever a man worked hard, or worker long hours, it was Colonel Wyman.

50. General Grunert. Do you think of anything else that you would like to tell the Board, that has not been brought up, that might be of value to us?

Mr. Locey. No.

51. General Grunert. Anything leading up to Pearl Harbor, or during Pearl Harbor?

Mr. Locey. Well, I don’t know anything. I have always had my opinions.

52. General Grunert. Sometimes people have something in the back of their mind they would like to turn loose. Now, this is the opportunity.

Mr. Locey. No, I haven’t anything. I don’t think I have anything else.

53. General Grunert. Are there any other questions?

Mr. Locey. I have always felt in this case that there were records here that would show, and clear General Short. I feel that General Short has been crucified. I think he was our savior on December 7. I worked so close with him. He was so calm and so broad, and I think it has been a crime the way he has been treated. I think he has been a savior to this country, a savior on December 7. That’s not as a personal friend, because, just a business associate of mine. He wasn’t a personal friend, at all.

54. General Grunert. All right, sir; thank you for coming over and giving us your time.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

[2803] TESTIMONY OF FRANK E. MIDKIFF, 406 CASTLE

& COOKE BUILDING, HONOLULU, T. H.

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel West, Mr. Midkiff, will you please state to the Board your name and address.
Mr. Frank Midkiff. Frank E. Midkiff, 406 Castle & Cooke Building, Honolulu.

2. General Grunert. Mr. Midkiff, this Board was appointed to ascertain and report the facts relating to the attack made by the Japanese armed forces upon the Territory of Hawaii on December 7, 1941, and, in addition thereto, to consider the phases which related to the Pearl Harbor disaster, of the report of the House Military Affairs Military Committee. This report largely concerns construction prior to the attack. Now, we are after facts, or leads to where facts can be found. General Short has furnished the Board a list of representative citizens living in Hawaii, who, he says, may have information of value to the Board. Your name being on that list, we have asked you here, with the hope that you may have facts to present to us. General Short did not refer to any particular subject on which you might testify, so it is up to you to open the subject, which may then give us leads to questions by which to develop it.

I think possibly his suggesting that you be asked to appear was because, as I understand, you prepared a letter, or at least signed a letter that went to the President, the date of the letter being December 22, 1941. That is probably the reason: so you may start by telling us about that letter and its contents, and what you people thought of General Short, and the reasons, and so forth.

Mr. Frank Midkiff. I tried to find a copy of that letter, General, last night, and was unable to put my hand on it.

3. General Grunert. I have it here, if you wish to refresh your memory.

Mr. Frank Midkiff. Well, I am only glad that you have it, because that is my chief concern, that you have it.

4. General Grunert. That was the letter, as it is contained in the files of the Roberts Commission's report, and we have the Roberts Commission's report to consider.

Mr. Frank Midkiff (reading):

We have found him at all times to be most cooperative, and, furthermore, he has exercised a vigorous leadership in causing this community to prepare for an emergency such as exists at present. Almost a year ago he laid out a plan for this purpose, and has taken all steps practicable toward carrying out such plan.

That is our opinion. A number of us were under the general impression that General Short was certainly one of the most active Army officers in making preparations for an attack by Japan.

Along in April, or March possibly, of 1941, he caused one of his staff officers, then Colonel Albert Lyman, to meet with a group of men down town—these men represented, I believe, the Mayor's Defense Committee—to discuss a plan for protective measures for the civil population of Oahu, in case of bombardment. Colonel Lyman left with the members, certain of them, copies of that plan, with the exception of Part II, which Part II was omitted from the plan, because it was a description of a possible attack by airplane. That was omitted. All the rest was there, containing the measures to be adopted by the civilians, how to organize the city for the emergency, to provide air-raid protection, take care of evacuation, and utilize the workers, and so on. It went into great detail.
Furthermore, at about the same time, there was the annual meeting of the Chamber of Commerce of Honolulu, at which General Short spoke, very eloquently urging the people to be prepared, to lay in stocks of supplies, to avoid panic, and giving them instructions in case of emergency that might arise. At the special session of the legislature, the General appeared in person, and it was I think due to his straightforward presentation that the legislature enacted the M-Day Bill, which they had failed to enact at the regular session of the legislature, earlier.

5. General Grunert. Then I gather from your testimony that General Short was an asset in preparing this command for defense; particularly, within your own knowledge, an asset in preparing the civilian end to defend themselves?

Mr. Frank Midkiff. Yes, sir.

6. General Grunert. What do you know about how those measures that were planned for were actually put into effect when the attack came?

Mr. Frank Midkiff. By the civilians?


Mr. Frank Midkiff. I was not a member of the Mayor's Defense Committee until after December 7. On about December 8, I was asked to come over and assist in the civilian defense set-up, then, and take charge of the evacuation procedures. To my general observation, not being a member of the organization, I note that the personnel were selected and appropriations were made by the legislature for the use of civilians, and unusual powers were given to the Governor, and training that personnel in the civilian defense corps was being carried out regularly. The Civilian Defense Corps, to what exact extent I am not certain, did cooperate with the Army in the Army's maneuvers and problems.

[2807] 8. General Grunert. Was this prior to December 7th?

Mr. Frank Midkiff. Yes, sir. A man who is now, I believe, Major Dopy, was in charge of that civilian defense corps. He is now in the Army.

9. General Grunert. Then you believe that General Short did everything, as far as you can see, that should have been done in preparing his command to defend the island?

Mr. Frank Midkiff. I think so. The plan that he laid out, General, was supposed to have cost the civilians about a million dollars, and Colonel Lyman made that plain, that it would be quite an expensive thing for them, and I well recall the cold chills that the business men had at the prospect of having to spend that much money. Nevertheless, General Short placed it before them, as to what they should be doing.

10. General Frank. Was anything ever done with it?

Mr. Frank Midkiff. Only that the business firms loosened up with their personnel to assist in the civilian defense corps. I do not believe that the Territory really began spending money to any considerable extent until after December 7th.

11. General Grunert. Were your people war conscious? Did you think this thing was coming, or what?

Mr. Frank Midkiff. I think it was our general feeling that General Short was stressing this thing more than necessary; because
of the fact we had the fleet here and because we could see these fortresses going out in all directions and planes going out in all directions on reconnaissance, and they having submarines and destroyers out, we felt that we were quite well protected. But I think, even more than that, we were of the impression, the most of us, that there was no great imminency of war.

12. General GRUNERT. But when they struck is when the money started pouring out?

Mr. FRANK MIDKIFF. That is right.

13. General GRUNERT. When the necessity showed itself?

Mr. FRANK MIDKIFF. Yes, sir.

14. General GRUNERT. So, as I gather it, your state of mind was one in which, yes, war was in the offing, but it would not come here because of the protective measures you thought were in existence?

Mr. FRANK MIDKIFF. That is right, sir, and I believe we also had the feeling that Japan would be plumb foolish to attack the United States, absolutely asinine.

15. General GRUNERT. Maybe she would have been plumb foolish, but she took that chance.

Mr. FRANK MIDKIFF. Yes, sir.

16. General GRUNERT. You thought it was a desperate chance to take?

Mr. FRANK MIDKIFF. Yes, sir. I think we didn’t even think they would be that rash and that crazy.

17. General GRUNERT. That brings me to the subject of the Japanese population here. Are they of that same foolish disposition, that they will take chances? In other words, what do you think of the Japanese part of the population of the island, both alien and American?

Mr. FRANK MIDKIFF. There is a wide range, as I see it. I have often been asked that question, General, because I helped form a company of American citizens of Japanese ancestry before the first world war, and took them in, and had their training and so forth, until I was put in charge of an officers training school. I have always felt there is a wide range in the attitude of the Japanese we have here toward the United States Government and in the kind of Japanese that we have here. Some are highly intelligent, well educated. A great many of them are not very well informed. Most of them are literate. They read the Japanese papers, but they are not very well informed. They go to church and are what you might call well disciplined, but they have been taught to love Japan and adore the Emperor and so forth, the old-timers. So we have the American citizens that are educated here, the American citizens that have been sent to Japan for their education, and then we have the old-time aliens here who are rapidly dying out.
These old-time aliens, for the most part, are simple, harmless people, not well enough informed or astute enough to be trusted with any kind of military intelligence, but just plodding away. I don't think they would be capable of being organized into planned resistance. The Kibei, the ones born here but sent to Japan, I have always felt were not trustworthy. I have always felt they have really been indoctrinated with the love of the Emperor and the feeling of the superiority of Japan and so forth, very much like the Germans.

[2810] 19. General GRUNERT. Are there many such?

Mr. FRANK MIDKIFF. I do not know the number, but there may be some hundreds. They are not too common, but enough of those so that we resented their sending their children to Japan, did not think it was a good thing. I would say it was a small number, comparatively, but in the hundreds.

20. General GRUNERT. When they return here do they attempt to spread propaganda as to what they find out about Japan when over there?

Mr. FRANK MIDKIFF. I have never heard of their doing that actively, but they impress on their children or try to impress on their children, more than the ones born and educated here, the superiority of Japanese culture, love of the Emperor and so forth. They do that in their own children, in their houses.

21. General Frank. Does not the Japanese family head have a more positive control over the family than the Americans?

Mr. FRANK MIDKIFF. Very much more, yes, sir. It is what you might call a well disciplined family, indeed. The young people are brought up according to the customs of Japan, rather carefully. They get that in the Japanese language schools as well as at home. The old people openly loudly deplored the tendency of the young Americans, born here and educated here, to pull away from them. They were getting too fresh and too uppity. They were not controlled. They objected to that.

On the whole, the Japanese have been a more or less docile group here, hard workers, good citizens, law-abiding, as the records will show, on the whole, no serious crimes, a few serious crimes. The people here trusted them.

To my knowledge, having been here for 31 years, there has [2811] never been a case, for example, of a yard man or a house man stealing any property, money or anything like that, to which they had access at all times in the residences; nor have they let the employers down by neglecting their duties or permitting trespass, if they can avoid it. They have always been helpful as employees in that respect, and trustworthy.

22. General GRUNERT. On and after December 7th, 1941, did you have occasions to observe the actions of the Japanese as to whether or not stuck to their jobs or they let their employers down, or attempted to organize, or anything of that sort?

Mr. FRANK MIDKIFF. I have had occasion to observe the actions of the Japanese and the people here generally, and to my knowledge there was no evidence of anything like that.

23. General GRUNERT. Do you think that most of them were ignorant of the attack that came?

Mr. FRANK MIDKIFF. I think so, yes. I think the most of them were sort of stupid, people that were not really astute enough to
be trusted with any serious intelligence of that sort, and they were
confused, many of them were crying and running around distractedly
and could not understand what it was all about.

24. General Frank. You believe that had there been a landing or
the Japanese invading force had been partially successful, that there
would have been a large support of that Japanese invading force
by the native Japs?

Mr. Frank Midkiff. I think that is quite probable, that a great
many of the aliens, practically all of the Kibei, and a number even
of the American citizens educated here might have attempted to
cooperate with a landing party, and if the Japanese [2812] had
been successful in an area and not all over the entire island there
might have been many who would have joined them and operated
with them. I think that is quite probable.

25. General Frank. You think, then, that they were a problem,
from a military point of view?

Mr. Frank Midkiff. I think that under the circumstances you
mention many of them would be a problem, yes, sir.

26. General Frank. What is the solution of that problem?

Mr. Frank Midkiff. For the future, after the war?

27. General Frank. Yes.

Mr. Frank Midkiff. Most of them now, I think, after Japan is
defeated, will not need any further attention. The old timers, their
curve is dropping off very fast here, the old aliens. The Kibei, I
should say it would be a good thing to send them all back to Japan
and to send any alien that did not wish to show loyalty to the United
States or was disturbed over defeat of Japan, send him back. Give a
chance to the American citizens born and educated here to state
whether or not they wish to be thoroughly loyal to the United States,
assuming that as American citizens they will be loyal, but give them
a chance to state, and if they do not wish to declare their loyalty view
there would be no harm in sending them all back.

28. General Grunert. What do you think the reaction to that
would be? How many would you lose, do you think? Have you
ever tried to analyze it that way?

Mr. Frank Midkiff. I think that from a practical standpoint
those few American citizens educated here would want to go back.
I think very few of the old timers, with their children and grand-
children here, would consider going back. Some [2813] would
prefer to go back there, join the remainder of their families, and die
there, but on the whole I think it would be possibly 5 per cent of the
population that would be deported under the terms I suggested.

29. General Grunert. Do you think the defeat of Japan would
influence those who are on the fence to become citizens?

Mr. Frank Midkiff. Of the United States?


Mr. Frank Midkiff. Of course, the opportunity is not available
to them, unless they were born here, but I think the defeat of Japan
in many cases would cause them, those that have been inclined to favor
Japan, to think twice and to show their loyalty toward the victorious
nation.

31. General Grunert. Suppose that 80 per cent of those did not
want to remain or 80 per cent of your Japanese would be taken out
from here, how would it affect your economic interests?
Mr. Frank Midkiff. It would be very serious.
32. General Grunert. Which industry would be hit the hardest?
Mr. Frank Midkiff. The two industrialized agricultural industries, sugar and pineapples.
33. General Grunert. Sugar and pineapples?
Mr. Frank Midkiff. Those two. They would be very hard hit.
34. General Frank. From your point of view, then, as pertaining to the Japanese situation, you would like to put it on a stable, clean-cut basis, and eliminate the uncertainty with respect to the Japanese?
Mr. Frank Midkiff. I should. I advised, at the beginning of the war, when time made it impracticable to adopt my recom- [2814] mendation, that everybody here be processed and to find out the loyalty of the people here, because had there been an invasion, of course, our duty was to confine all of the Japanese, and all like the Japanese, all the Orientals, and our work would have been seriously affected. I thought it would be advisable for us to go through and process them all and put a big identification mark on the ones that we decided would be trustworthy, and, if we had to use the others, in case of an invasion to lock them up.
35. General Frank. Has anything like that been done?
Mr. Frank Midkiff. No, sir.
36. General Grunert. I was going to say, it sounds very sensible. Why don't you people do it?
Mr. Frank Midkiff. It has been done for those people who have to be used on the water front and in strategic places.
37. General Grunert. Are the business interests against such action?
Mr. Frank Midkiff. I don't think they would be. There was a time when it was thought of, but the time seemed so short, it could not be passed to get around to it.
38. General Grunert. Is it being thought of now seriously?
Mr. Frank Midkiff. Yes.
39. General Grunert. Whose business do you think it is to get that thing started? The Territorial Legislature or what?
Mr. Frank Midkiff. An idea like that, I think, probably should originate in the Territory or with the department entrusted with the security, the F. B. I. I am sure Mr. Shivers of the F. B. I. thought the plan was a good one at the time.
40. General Grunert. Certainly, if a thing like that should be [2815] done in the future, it would look like now is a good time for the people to strike, when they have definite impressions of their danger and what happened in the past and what may happen in the future.
Mr. Frank Midkiff. Yes. May I, before I leave—
41. General Grunert. We don't want you to leave for some time, unless it is on the same subject; otherwise I will give you an opportunity later to line up anything you want.
Mr. Frank Midkiff. Yes, thank you.
42. Colonel Toulmin. I would like to ask a question there, if I might.
You mentioned the Japanese language schools. Will you describe briefly what they are and why you continue to allow them to be taught Japanese and segregate themselves under their own language?
Mr. Frank Midkiff. The language schools were all closed by order of the military government on December 7th or 8th and they have not been reopened. No assemblages have been permitted of the Japanese.

43. Colonel Toulin. What did you have before that time?

Mr. Frank Midkiff. We did have the language schools right up to December 7th.

44. Colonel Toulin. Who ran them?

Mr. Frank Midkiff. They were run by groups of Japanese, people who organized and brought teachers over from Japan. Quite often they were Buddhist priests. They were decidedly sectarian on the whole. Some of them were Buddhist schools, some Shinto schools. A few were non-sectarian. But they taught the Japanese language. They thought it was a necessary thing, [2816] that they needed it in their business, but they also thought that certain items of ethics had to be taught in these schools that were neglected in the public schools, such as filial piety and loyalty and disinterestness and things like that. They justified the need for those language schools in order to teach the children to speak with their elders and to respect their elders properly.

45. Colonel Toulin. May I interrupt you there? Do you recommend that those schools should not be reopened?

Mr. Frank Midkiff. I do. I think those schools should not be reopened, any language schools.

46. Colonel Toulin. What about Japanese newspapers, are they still being published in Japanese?

Mr. Frank Midkiff. There are two papers, the Hawaii Herald and the Hawaii Times, which formerly were the Hawaii Nippu Jiji and Hawaii Hochi, that are published in English and Japanese. It was the feeling of the military government that in order to get announcements and probably propaganda over it was necessary to use those papers.

47. Colonel Toulin. Do you recommend their continuance after the war is over, in Japanese?

Mr. Frank Midkiff. If they are duly interpreted, they might be useful for a while, until these old timers die off. I think they will die a natural death. I should be very glad when the time arrives that they are unnecessary. If they are really necessary from the standpoint of giving some of these old fellows who cannot talk information and if they are duly checked and interpreted and the interpretation is filed and so on, I think they would be all right.

[2817] 48. General Frank. What kind of a problem do you run into in putting a restriction like on the freedom of the press?

Mr. Frank Midkiff. For example, after the First World War, in this organization that I was the head of, in the American Legion, we took the initiative in doing away with the language schools. A case went from Oregon to the Supreme Court of the United States which knocked that out. We legislated against it in this territory. We had to restore the language schools then, because of that Supreme Court decision. We might be up against it on that account, too.

49. Major Clausen. I have one question on the same point. Sir, what proportion of the Japanese attended these Japanese language schools?

Mr. Frank Midkiff. I think 90 per cent of them.
50. Major Clausen. 90 per cent?
Mr. Frank Midkiff. A very large per cent. They attended an hour a day after the public schools.

51. General Frank. They attended the regular English public schools?
Mr. Frank Midkiff. That is right. That is required.

52. General Frank. And after that was over they then went to the Japanese language schools?
Mr. Frank Midkiff. Yes, sir.

53. General Grunert. Is it not a question of reciprocity? What is done in Japan? They are allowing freedom of worship or religion; they allow certain churches. I do not suppose there are enough Americans grouped over there to have a school of their own. I think that must be taken into consideration. Were not there agreements made between fellow nations as to what to allow their nationals to do. When it comes to your own nationals, if you can define them as nationals, those that are not held to a dual citizenship, it is a question of arrangement between the nations.

54. General Frank. It is not a question of reciprocity, unless the laws and customs of the two countries coincide with the question of reciprocity.

55. General Grunert. I think this is very interesting, but I want to get down to our task here.

Summing up your testimony regarding General Short, I gather that you sized him up as being a great asset to this command over here in preparing it to carry out its mission of defending these islands?

Mr. Frank Midkiff. Yes, sir.

56. General Grunert. That he cooperated well with the civil authorities and made considerable progress in preparing the civil population to take care of itself in the case of an emergency?

Mr. Frank Midkiff. Yes, sir.

57. General Grunert. Now, then, when the time came and the surprise attack struck, do you people over here feel that the military authorities let you down by not taking the proper alert to use the means that had been perfected for that defense?

Mr. Frank Midkiff. There is, I think, on the part of a great many people just that feeling. I think that on the part of many more thoughtful people there is a feeling that the Army was doing everything humanly possible, practically, to maintain the security of the Territory, to prepare the people and the troops.

58. General Grunert. Then you say everything was being done to prepare the troops, the civilian population. However, we assume that all proper measures that were necessary were taken, but when the time came they were not applied. Did the people feel they were not applied? You understand that the alert adopted was the alert against sabotage?

Mr. Frank Midkiff. Yes, sir.

59. General Grunert. It was not an all-out alert against anything else but sabotage?

Mr. Frank Midkiff. Yes, sir.

60. General Grunert. In that respect has there been any feeling here that the Army should have taken the all-out alert in order to fulfill their mission, for proper protection?
Mr. Frank Midkiff. That has been expressed. I have heard it expressed. I think, however, that there are a number of people who are better informed—think they are better informed on this subject—that feel that if the general public knew the details the general public would not blame the local commander here.

61. General Grunert. And by the details that you referred to, just what have you in mind?

Mr. Frank Midkiff. I have a feeling that it has been impossible, for many reasons, for General Short to tell anyone, much, any of the details as he knows them, and I have a reference to details of what he was doing in the way of work here to prepare airfields, what he was requesting in the way of supplies and material, troops, and equipment, and, from the other end, what his instructions had been as to his conduct in these tense and touch-and-go times. All of that, it is my belief, had a very definite bearing on this whole situation, but the general public knows nothing of that.

62. General Grunert. Then, you appear, from what I gather, to think that, if the public knew what General Short knows, it might put a different complexion on it.

Mr. Frank Midkiff. I really believe so, yes, sir.

63. General Grunert. Now I am going to ask the members of the Board whether they have any other questions, and then I will give you an opportunity to add anything that you can think of that might help the Board.

General Russell?

64. General Russell. Did you visit in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor on the day of the 7th, the night of the 7th or 8th of December, '41?

Mr. Frank Midkiff. I did not visit there, but I was up on the hills back at the Kamehameha Schools from 8:05 a.m. December 7th until about 12 noon December 8th, where I could see a great deal of what went on.

65. General Russell. Could you give us your impressions briefly of what you saw and what you think about it?

Mr. Frank Midkiff. I heard these tremendous explosions shortly before 8 o'clock. I was to speak at the Kamehameha Schools that morning up on the hills there, and I went up just as fast as I could get up there, and arrived to see great smoke clouds and fire at Pearl Harbor, hear these tremendous explosions, seeing the Japanese planes flying around the place, flying back up over the hills and circling around over town, and so forth; and my first duty as the trustee of the Kamehameha Schools was to quiet the students and teachers and tell them to have no fear, that in a very short time our planes would be up and the fleet would be out and this would be all settled, and that comforted them.

And so we waited for that to happen. But to our amazement these Japanese planes continued to fly around. They didn't seem to be very fast planes either, flying low around here, cracking away at everything, and the explosions continued. I was not close enough to see any plane drop any bombs, but I could see the—like, for instance, a little later time I saw some destroyers go out of the channel, and I saw Japanese planes following those and bombs straddling ships [indicating]. The ships kept on going. We began then to get—we had gotten reports over the radio of what was going on. They tried to explain what we were seeing there. Then the radio
was silenced, [2822] and we just had to wait until the refugees began to flee from Hickam and Pearl Harbor and come up to the Kamehameha Schools to tell us what they had been through.

66. General Russell. When did you see the first evidence of defensive measures or response by American forces?

Mr. Frank Midkiff. About—well, I could see our Army trucks moving along the highways at great speed, in different directions, but chiefly toward Pearl Harbor and Hickam, and I could—about ten o'clock or ten-thirty, I am not certain of the time now, I saw two B-17's take off and start out over the town and go out toward Molokai. I am informed that there were other planes active, able to get off the ground, but I didn't happen to see any of those out toward Schofield or Barbers Point or Kahuku where I am told they were active. After 8:05 the only planes of ours that I noticed were those two B-17's. I was also told that some of our B-17's came in at about eight o'clock right in the midst of this thing. I didn't see those.

67. General Russell. But from what you saw there was very little opposition offered to the Japanese invading force at any time that day?

Mr. Frank Midkiff. I saw a great deal of antiaircraft. A great deal of antiaircraft. And there were other small-caliber machine guns, and so forth; and the antiaircraft, on the whole, was far higher, exploded far higher than the planes. I noticed that. Way up high.

68. General Russell. After the Japanese were all gone home that day, during the afternoon and night did this shooting continue by the American troops?

Mr. Frank Midkiff. It did. In the evening I saw a B-17 [2823] come back almost over the same course, and it came out and circled and made ready to land at Hickam, apparently, and for some reason or other then it did not land but leveled off and went on over across Pearl Harbor, with everything in the book opened up at it, tracer bullets and everything else going way up into the sky. And a little later that other, second B-17, or one—the second B-17 came back and had the same experience, and the next morning—

69. General Russell. Go back to that night. Was there shooting going on in our troop areas almost constantly through that night of December 7th? Could you hear firing almost constantly throughout that night?

Mr. Frank Midkiff. There were probably both civilian and Army troops scouring the heights and scouring the valleys and active on the coasts all around, very active; and, for instance, in the valley alongside the Kamehameha Schools, Kapalama Valley, there was shooting all night from time to time. I didn't know whether it was civilians in these parties or whether it was Army troops making this, searching around to see if there were any Japanese activities up there, but there were shots being fired all through the night.

70. General Russell. All right. Now, I am sorry to have disturbed you.

Mr. Frank Midkiff. The next morning about four o'clock or four twenty-five I heard over the radio, "Unidentified planes coming in from the northeast, approximately 60 miles from Kauai. That is all." And I went down to the dining hall of the Kamehameha Schools where I had a good view. A little later I saw planes coming in, and again
everything was opened [2324] up at them, antiaircraft, and so forth. Those planes then, they were up so high that there was a little sun on them by that time, and they went out over the sea and later came back, settled down some place.

71. General Russell. That is all I have.

72. General Frank. You stated that you did not believe that there would be a Japanese attack on Oahu; you believed this prior to December 7th?

Mr. Frank Midkiff. Yes, sir.

73. General Frank. Did that general feeling in the community result in the conclusion that local sabotage was a much greater menace than an air attack.

Mr. Frank Midkiff. I think the people here did not fear sabotage. I think they had no fear of the maids. There were people who immediately circulated stories that the maids had tried to poison the ranking Army officers. and so forth. There were all kinds of rumors of that sort. None of us believed that, and so far as I know nothing of that sort occurred. We had no fear of the local Japanese, nor did we believe that there was any substantial organization outside of the consul’s clique and his associates.

74. General Frank. Yet you yourself have stated that you didn’t trust the—

Mr. Frank Midkiff. Kibeis?

75. General Frank. Yes.

Mr. Frank Midkiff. Kibeis.

76. General Frank. Yes.

Mr. Frank Midkiff. That is right. I think they are Japanese, but I don’t feel that they—unless they were attached [2325] to the consul and serving him. I don’t believe that they are part of an organization or ever were a part of an organization that amounted to anything, or were entrusted with plans.

77. General Frank. And also you stated that, had the Japanese landed, you thought that a large portion of the Japanese would have gone over to them?

Mr. Frank Midkiff. I think that is probably true.

78. General Frank. Now let us get back to the question I just asked.

Mr. Frank Midkiff. Yes. Then do we—did we fear sabotage?

79. General Frank. Yes.

Mr. Frank Midkiff. I think we did not fear sabotage. We thought these Japanese were more or less docile, with the exception of those uppity, those Kibeis who we felt were Japanese, but we didn’t feel that there was any likelihood or probability of the Japanese landing here and of their being a chance for the local Japanese to be able to do anything. It would be nothing but suicide, and I might have thought that would have been easy less advisable than for Japan to attack the Islands. I think that was the feeling locally.

Excuse me, General. Let me say this: that there are people here who have always distrusted the Japanese and have said for years that the only good Jap is a dead Jap, and there are many people like that. They haven’t been here very long, I think, on the whole, but I can give you an outstanding example of one for your consideration, if you will
not put it on the record right now as coming from me. Just let me give it to you informally, if I may.

80. General Grunert. Off the record.

(There was colloquy off the record.)

[2826] 81. General Frank. There had been built up a very decided consciousness about the probability of sabotage?

Mr. Frank Midkiff. Yes, that is right.

82. General Frank. And on the part of General Short?

Mr. Frank Midkiff. Yes, sir.

83. General Frank. That was supported to a certain degree by a certain number of the local populace, was it not?

Mr. Frank Midkiff. I think it was, yes, sir. We were anxious to do everything that he would recommend. For example, he wanted the civilians to be well organized and trained so that in the civilian defense corps there would be men available to guard the waterworks and the electric plant, and so forth.

84. General Frank. The point on which I am about to crystallize is this: Generally in the community there was a greater apprehension against sabotage than there was against an air attack?

Mr. Frank Midkiff. I believe that there may have been, as I try to think of it myself, my own attitude and those with whom I was in closest touch, the attitude that both were preposterous but that we had, nevertheless, in these times, to take the advice of those responsible for our security and get ready, to train our civilian defense corps and train against sabotage, and so forth, and that the Army and Navy should be on the alert, as we thought they were.

85. General Frank. As a matter of fact, if sabotage were going to take place, it might then and there was upon them because the people to do it were here present.

Mr. Frank Midkiff. Yes, sir.

86. General Frank. Whereas the raid was yet to come.

[2827] Mr. Frank Midkiff. That is right.

87. General Frank. You think that that was an influencing point of view?

Mr. Frank Midkiff. With the people here?

88. General Frank. With the people, yes.

Mr. Frank Midkiff. Most people themselves, I think, would not have been afraid of the Japanese. Most people felt that they should do everything possible to cooperate with the conservative stand of the Army. I think most people would have felt that the first thing that would have hit us, if anything would hit us, after the air attack, would be some sabotage and not a landing party immediately.

89. General Frank. Do you believe a Jap raid now possible?

Mr. Frank Midkiff. I think it might be possible. I don't know what these fast carriers could do. They might elude our submarines and our reconnaissance, come in fast enough to take a poke at us, about as they did on December 7th. I think it might be possible, a raid; yes, sir.

90. General Frank. As a matter of fact, air bombardment attacks in force are being pressed through to varying degrees of success on targets all over the world, and in the face of determined opposition.

Mr. Frank Midkiff. Yes, sir.

91. General Frank. Right today.
Mr. Frank Midkiff. I am quite impressed with that. I have this feeling; and I don't wish to be unjust, but I have the feeling that our Navy, prior to December 7, did not have a due appreciation of the danger of air; and I think, if our fleet hadn't been sunk, that there was a good chance that it might have sailed out into the deep water against the Japanese out here and been sunk in deep blue water. That is what I have always felt about it, indicating, I believe, the reaction I have had at that time that up until that time there was not the appreciation of the danger of the air force to ships.

92. General Frank. As a matter of fact, that Japanese air attack was a very courageous, daring, hazardous, spectacular project?

Mr. Frank Midkiff. I feel that it was one of the most remarkable, well planned, coordinated, and lucky things that ever happened in warfare. There was a good deal of luck about it, it seems to me, too.

93. General Grunert. I hear much about this sabotage. Just because they have personnel here, why should there be so much danger of sabotage? What have they got to sabotage with? Is it dynamite or weapons available to them? Are explosives available to them? Are the authorities here so careless in taking care of the dangerous things that this public could get at such weapons with which to sabotage? Have they anything from which they can make bombs and things of that sort? I don't quite get, just because there is a lot of personnel available, that the danger of sabotage is necessarily there unless they have something to sabotage with. Do you care to express yourself along that line?

Mr. Frank Midkiff. In the days before Pearl Harbor a great many of our expert powder men in the quarries and on the plantations, and so forth, were Japanese; old powder men. Many of them were Japanese. They had access to the explosives. We don't know how much material and supplies the consul may have had or what distribution he may have made of the material and supplies that may have come to him from Japan. There is somewhat of a customs immunity. But if he had not had a good organization, well distributed, even though he had brought in explosives, and so forth, from Japan, he couldn't have used those things to any great extent. I think that General Short was more apprehensive of sabotage than the people here were, I might say. He hadn't been here so long, and at any rate I don't think he would have taken any chances. He was apprehensive, I am sure, about sabotage, and more than we were.

94. General Grunert. Now, the other point, the other question I have, is this, more or less bringing up a topic to get a reaction. I think everybody respects the air forces that can do a lot of damage, but if you are properly prepared against an air attack you can minimize that damage. Now, since December 8th or 7th haven't you people been preparing yourselves to minimize whatever damage could be done by a return air raid, in the line of discipline, in the line of O. C. D. organization, in the line of air raid shelters? And at the same time the Army and the Navy have undoubtedly taken measures to have all their weapons of defense in position, which was not done in December 7th; so that even though an air attack is possible the damage it could do is not so great if you are prepared for it. Is that right?

Mr. Frank Midkiff. That is right, yes, sir.
95. General Grunert. Of course it is going to do damage, and I do not think an air raid, as such, a determined raid, can be stopped, but the effect of it can be greatly minimized. Is that your way of looking at it?

[2830] Mr. Frank Midkiff. Yes, sir.

96. General Grunert. I just didn’t want to leave the impression that an air force could come over and do as it pleases.

Are there any other questions? (No response.)

Is there anything else that you think of that you would like to tell the Board about, for its consideration, that may be of assistance to it in accomplishing its mission?

Mr. Frank Midkiff. After I joined the O. C. D. and had charge of evacuation, I had a great deal of contact with the Army.

97. General Grunert. This was after December 7th?

Mr. Frank Midkiff. December 7th, yes, sir; after December 8th. And I am not able to tell whether many of my impressions and many of the things I have learned came before or after December the 8th, but I have a decided belief and I have been informed that General Short was making earnest efforts to increase the protection here, was asking for supplies, personnel, and equipment from the War Department, and that things were not coming as fast as he would have liked, but were coming much faster than they had been coming in years past. There had been a change in the tempo. It wasn’t nearly what General Short was expecting and hoping for, and it is that feature that I think would be productive of investigation also, that one point right there, whether the War Department really was supporting General Short.

98. General Frank. But he didn’t use what he had.

99. General Grunert. That is the big question: Did he use what he had?

[2831] Mr. Frank Midkiff. Yes. Well, he had—the question would be, how much did he have in the way of radar, and how much did he have in the way of personnel to man it, and so forth.

100. General Grunert. We know what he did have. Did he use what he had? All those questions must be considered, and the Board is glad to get all these leads with a view to coming to conclusions.

Mr. Frank Midkiff. Yes, sir. There was also the feeling among some of us that the reconnaissance over the sea was entrusted to the Navy and that there was a definite division of responsibility.

101. General Grunert. Might you rather not say “charged to the Navy” instead of “entrusted”?

Mr. Frank Midkiff. Yes, sir.

102. General Grunert. Does that about cover everything you can think of? Because we would like to have everything that is in the back of your mind.

Mr. Frank Midkiff. The one thing that has been referred to in the press and that we were concerned with at the time was the fact that a telephone might have been used instead of a coded message arriving here so that it became intelligible to General Short at 11:30 a.m. instead of at an earlier hour.

103. General Grunert. You are referring to the so-called December 7th message?

Mr. Frank Midkiff. Yes, sir.
104. General Grunert. Was the oceanic telephone in operation and had it been used that morning, do you know, by anyone?

Mr. Frank Midkiff. I don't know that, but I have no reason—

105. General Grunert. Well, it is a point that you think ought [2832] to be considered?

Mr. Frank Midkiff. Yes, sir.

106. General Grunert. I see.

Mr. Frank Midkiff. I have no reason to believe that it was out of commission. I am most thankful that the investigation has finally come around, because I am sure justice will be done. I have in my own mind felt that it was necessary on December the 7th, and after that incident, for us to have someone to blame, and shortly afterwards it was advisable to have someone to make a hero of, because I have felt, from what I have understood to be the situations, that conditions were not so dissimilar out in the Philippines from what they were here.

That is about all I have to say.

107. General Grunert. All right. Thank you very much for coming. We appreciate it.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

108. General Grunert. We shall have a recess for ten minutes. We have sat now for two hours.

(There was a brief informal recess.)

[2833] TESTIMONY OF JOHN H. MIDKIFF, WAIALUA, HONOLULU

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel West. Mr. Midkiff, will you please state to the Board your name and address?

Mr. John Midkiff. John H. Midkiff; address, Waialua, Honolulu.

2. Colonel West. And what is your occupation, Mr. Midkiff?

Mr. John Midkiff. I am the manager of the Waialua Agricultural Company, Limited.

3. General Grunert. Mr. Midkiff, I always explain to most of the witnesses what this Board is attempting to do, and it was appointed to ascertain and report the facts relating to the attack made by Japanese armed forces upon the Territory of Hawaii on the 7th of December 1941, and in addition thereto, to consider the phases which related to the Pearl Harbor disaster, of the report of the House Military Affairs Committee, largely concerned with construction matters prior to Pearl Harbor.

Now, we are after facts or leads to where we can get facts. General Short has furnished the Board a list of representative citizens living in Hawaii who he says may have information of value to the Board. Your name being on that list, we have asked you to come here, with the hope that you may be able to have facts to present to us.

General Short did not give us any particular leads as to what facts we might find, or what these various witnesses might be able to tell us, so we depend on you to open up the subject, and then we will ask some questions. Now, just what your connections with General Short were, what you know about him, at [2834] about, prior to, or during the attack, we leave that to you; so, if you wish to make a statement, we would be glad to have it as an opener.
Mr. John Midkiff. Well, that's a little bit difficult, nothing too definite on that.

4. General Grunert. If you would rather, I will open it up with a question.

Mr. John Midkiff. I will try to cover it a little.

5. General Grunert. All right.

Mr. John Midkiff. I have been fairly well acquainted with most of the Department Commanders, for a good many years, here, and I was impressed, and our engineering department on the plantation has mentioned a number of times the very large amount of new things that were being done on our plantation, and I am referring to the northern part, Waialua, Haleiwa, and around in that direction, that would make it a safer place in case of attack—oh, for instance, such things as a north shore railroad, that came through from Wahiawa, that came down and branched, both ways on the plantation, that could not be cut off as readily as the Oahu Railway that went around to the beach line.

There was a great deal, a tremendous amount of rights of entry asked of the plantation for maneuvers, probably more than there ever had been; and a great deal of training going on.

6. General Grunert. This, I assume, was when?

Mr. John Midkiff. Well, a couple of years before the Pearl Harbor attack; and a very large number of large gun positions that had rights of entry to put them on various strategic places on the plantation, especially high up on the hills, overlooking the ocean, where they could cross-fire; and those, in the main way, would be the things that impressed me.

7. General Grunert. And this was under General Short, from when to when, do you recall? He came here in February 1941 and left in December 1941. It was during that period, that you noticed this progress, also?

Mr. John Midkiff. That is true. Under General Herron, a great deal of this type of work had been started, and I suppose the fact that apparently we were coming nearer to war, at least the civilian population seemed to think so, it seemed to be speeded up under General Short.

8. General Grunert. Do you know of any handicaps that he may have had in preparing for the defense of the Island of Oahu, such as not being able to get positions that he wanted? Were there any positions on your plantation that he wanted, that he could not get?

Mr. John Midkiff. I think not. I don't recall any, at this time.

9. General Grunert. Did they have a number of so-called "alerts," in which they practiced going into position?

Mr. John Midkiff. Many.

10. General Grunert. They had no trouble in going into such positions as they selected, because they got your permission to go there?

Mr. John Midkiff. That is right.

11. General Grunert. Did that apply generally in other places, do you know?

Mr. John Midkiff. I think that it did. I believe that most people in my position realized that we needed to cooperate with the Army.

[2836] 12. General Grunert. Now, you spoke of being near war. Just what did you mean by "being near war," prior to the attack?
Mr. John Midkiff. Well, there was a general feeling that we were going to have war with Japan.

13. General Grunert. What caused that state of mind on your part? What were the reasons back of it? Where did you get your information?

Mr. John Midkiff. Some of them, from the preparedness speeches of the President of the United States. He had very evidently been attempting to prepare the Nation, at least it seemed so to me, mentally, for the war, and to get a great deal more war equipment built.

14. General Grunert. That came from newspapers and radio, primarily?

Mr. John Midkiff. That was true.

15. General Grunert. Did you have any private sources of information?

Mr. John Midkiff. No.

16. General Grunert. Did you have any conversations with the Commanding General of the Department as to the possible imminence of war?

Mr. John Midkiff. I have had conversations with practically all the preceding commanding officers, but in a general way, I think, when you talked with the Army or the Navy—and I think even more so with the Navy—for years before, you had a sort of feeling that "Well, some day we are going to fight Japan"; nothing more with General Short than with any other Commander.

17. General Grunert. Did you anticipate an air attack as of December 7, or about that time?

Mr. John Midkiff. I did not; no. It was a great surprise to me.

18. General Grunert. Did you think we were going to war with Japan within six months of that time, approximately?

Mr. John Midkiff. I did.

19. General Grunert. Then, why did you not think it might hit here, instead of elsewhere?

Mr. John Midkiff. Well, I am not a military man. I couldn't answer that. General. I could only say, of my own reactions in March of 1941, I had a meeting of all the Japanese on our plantation.

20. General Grunert. How many such Japanese were there approximately?

Mr. John Midkiff. Well, we have about 500, but we had this meeting of representatives of the various groups, and I told them that I felt we were going to have war with Japan, and the things that I felt they should do to put themselves in the right position if we did—the things that I thought would be expected of them.

21. General Grunert. What were those things?

Mr. John Midkiff. Well, in the first place, I felt that it was a very good thing, there were bond drives at that time, for them to invest in our bonds; never, by word or deed, to say or do anything that anybody could interpret as being disloyal to the United States; to remember that their children were here, and that if we did have war, they would undoubtedly be fighting for the United States; not to put themselves, as aliens, in a position where they were on one side and their children on another—just general things of that kind.

22. General Grunert. Were most of these Japanese the older generation, or youngsters, or was it a combination?
Mr. John Midkiff. They were both. They were representatives of both the older and the younger.

23. General Grunert. Had you occasion between that time and December to note what they did with your advice?

Mr. John Midkiff. I felt that our people followed it very closely. I think probably the best proof of that is that we haven't had a single one of our men picked up and interned. I think that's very unusual.

24. General Grunert. Did they buy bonds?

Mr. John Midkiff. Oh, yes! Many of them!

25. General Grunert. Can you give us your general impression of your employees, as to their feeling toward Japan and toward the United States?

Mr. John Midkiff. In some months back, the Army gave young Japanese people a chance to volunteer for active combat, and over 97 percent of our people did volunteer for that active combat; and I think that would probably be about as good an answer as I could give to that.

26. General Grunert. That sounds quite unusual; or was it unusual, compared with other plantations, or do you know?

Mr. John Midkiff. It is considerably higher than the Territory, as I remember it. I am not sure about the Territorial figures. It was somewhere around 22 percent for the Territory, that volunteered; I am not sure about that. I think that's about that.

[2839] 27. General Grunert. How did you feel on this subject of sabotage by Japanese aliens, or Japanese Americans?

Mr. John Midkiff. I felt that if there were any sabotage it would not be committed by the mill run of the Japanese people here; that if there were going to be sabotage, it would be definitely directed by the Japanese consul or his staff; that the people who have lived here on the plantations, and particularly, most of the parents have been here all the way from, oh, 30 to 50 years; and their children are born and brought up here, and are to make their homes here; they have no intention of going back. I didn't feel that we had much to worry about from the ordinary run of the population; that they would not be entrusted with military information by Japan.

28. General Grunert. Now, suppose Japan had followed its air raid with a surface attack and been reasonably successful; what then do you think the attitude of the Hawaiian Japanese would have been?

Mr. John Midkiff. Well, undoubtedly there would have been some of them that would have sided in with the invader. I think a large percentage of the local-born would not have. Of course, my views undoubtedly are colored by the knowledge of my own people that I have lived and worked with out there for over 20 years, at Waialua; and, as I say, I don't believe that 97 percent of them would volunteer to fight for the United States if before that they were going to side in with an invader.

29. General Grunert. What form of agriculture was it that was followed on this plantation?

Mr. John Midkiff. Sugar.

30. General Grunert. How about the pineapple people, were they in about the same category?

Mr. John Midkiff. I should think mostly; the production men in the fields, at least. I couldn't answer for the people in the canneries, in town; I don't know enough about that.
31. General Grunert. We are trying to get away from this word "surprise," but were you surprised by the attack on December 7?

Mr. John Midkiff. Yes, I was surprised. We had had a party. We have an annual sugar planters' meeting here early in December, each year, and had a number of friends from outside, managers from the other islands; they spent the night with us, and we had had a party, that was a little too much of a party, probably. They certainly surprised me. Got me out of bed. I heard a great deal of commotion over at our place, and I had a hard time believing that it was Japanese.

32. General Grunert. Do you know what forms of alert the Army had to take care of the various contingencies?

Mr. John Midkiff. There were many. I couldn't say exactly what forms of alert they had; no. I know that prior to that, there had apparently been a feeling that something unusual was about to happen, because there had been more alerts by the Army staff.

33. General Grunert. That is, more turning out of troops, more occupation of positions, or what?

Mr. John Midkiff. That was my impression, yes. My house is a house with large grounds, there, and about 9 o'clock in the morning, I think it was 9 or 9:30, on the morning of the 7th, the Twenty-First Infantry had moved into my back yard and had the battalion headquarters set up there. They were certainly prepared to move rather fast, to have that all down there at [2847] that time.

34. General Grunert. Where did they come from?

Mr. John Midkiff. Schofield.

35. General Grunert. How far is your place from Schofield?

Mr. John Midkiff. About 10 miles.

36. General Grunert. But they were not out there on the 6th?

Mr. John Midkiff. They were not in position at my place, no. They had been, formerly, many times, down there, but they were not, on the 6th.

37. General Grunert. It appears the Army was on what they called the "Alert No. 1," about November 27, and continued on that alert until the attack. That alert calls for protection against sabotage only; it does not call for protection against air attack, nor against surface attack. They had two more forms of alert. The second form was that which was protection or readiness to meet an air attack, plus sabotage; and the third form was an all-out alert to meet everything. They took this first alert, an alert against sabotage, and that is the alert they were on when the attack struck. Was that generally known to the public, or was it known to you?

Mr. John Midkiff. No, it was not known to me. It was simply that things that we saw gave us that impression; but it was not known.

38. General Grunert. Now, my next question: Did the general public, as you know it, feel let down by what the Army failed to do, or by the inadequate measures they took to meet this attack?

Mr. John Midkiff. I don't think so.

39. General Grunert. You don't think so?

Mr. John Midkiff. Not in Hawaii.

[2847]

40. General Grunert. How do you feel about it?

Mr. John Midkiff. Well, for publication, I rather sort of hate to have this thing down in these notes, if I could, in some of our meetings, discuss it off the record.
41. General Grunert. It won’t do us any good unless we have it on the record, because we must come to our conclusions from the record; so if you have something you do not want to say, why, don’t say it; but if you have something you can tell us, we would be glad to hear it.

Mr. John Midkiff. Well, all right—you asked what I thought of it. I thought that the Army in Hawaii, compared to the Army leaders in the Philippines, got a very bad deal, frankly.

42. General Grunert. You mean they got a bad deal in what way?

Mr. John Midkiff. Well, in the very fact that, at the time—and as I say, I am not military; I know very little about it—but the impression was that here, practically the same thing happened in Hawaii that had happened in the Philippine Islands, and the commanders here were certainly relieved, and, apparently to me, held up to a good deal of shame, while under rather similar conditions in the Philippines they were quite heroes.

43. General Grunert. You didn’t know, of your own accord or knowledge, whether both of them were, so-called, “guilty,” or were innocent, both of them?

Mr. John Midkiff. No, I didn’t. I couldn’t say that I did. You ask my impression. I am giving you my impression.

44. General Grunert. Then your impression was made up from what you have heard and read about what happened in the Philippines, and what you know happened here?

[2843] Mr. John Midkiff. That’s right.

45. General Grunert. Well, what I was really getting at is, did the people here think that the Army let them down by not using all that they had to meet the attack?

Mr. John Midkiff. I think that the people of Hawaii, as a whole, under the conditions, knowing that the ambassadors were talking over the situation in Washington, felt that it was a thing that would have happened under most any circumstances, with any commanding officers, and that they did not feel “let down.”

46. General Grunert. Still, you looked to your Army and your Navy to protect you, did you not?

Mr. John Midkiff. Yes, sir; definitely.

47. General Grunert. And that they must have more knowledge than is ordinarily available to you, to come to a judgment as to what to do?

Mr. John Midkiff. That is true. In that, I might repeat, I am giving my impressions.

48. General Grunert. Naturally; that is what we want.

Now, is there any other thing that you think of, any subject you might want to open up on, that will give us a lead on which to develop it?

Mr. John Midkiff. I don’t think of anything more. As I say, it was just a feeling that we had that a very great deal had been done for some months prior to the attack at Pearl Harbor, and that about everything was being done, from the civilian point of view, that could be done.

49. General Grunert. Suppose we admit that the 100% preparedness measures had been taken; they would not have been of avail if [2844] they had not been used, would they?
Mr. John Midkiff. That is true.

50. General Grunert. But, from what I gather through your testimony, you noticed progress was being made, and the Commanding General and his staff, and his troops, were interested and working toward preparing themselves to defend the island?

Mr. John Midkiff. That is right.

51. General Grunert. Do you know anything about the construction that took place, here? Did you have any connection with it?

Mr. John Midkiff. Which construction?

52. General Grunert. Mostly in the line of tunneling, building emplacements, and building air warning stations, and so forth.

Mr. John Midkiff. Well, of course, I know of the construction work that took place out on my own plantations—railroads and gun emplacements, and things of that kind. The fact of the underground storage of oil, and things of that kind, for the Navy, it is more or less public knowledge; but just exactly what it was, I did not know.

53. General Grunert. Were you acquainted with, or did you know about Colonel Wyman, who was a district engineer in Hawaii?

Mr. John Midkiff. I had met him.

54. General Grunert. What do you know about him?

Mr. John Midkiff. Well, he called the plantation managers, some time before the war, I believe; I am not exactly sure about the time, but anyway, it was felt that they would need the help of our Filipinos for war work, construction, and also some of our Japanese; and there was formed in Hawaii what they called, in this island, the Oahu Volunteers, and, on the Island of Hawaii, the Hawaiian Rifles, and so on; and we were supposed to be able to help in any way with construction work, if necessary, or fighting, if necessary, whatever we were called upon to do; and Colonel Wyman called us in one Sunday morning shortly after the war to talk about, oh, the building of airfields and things of that kind, where we were helping, the use of our men. We turned practically all of our men and all of our equipment over to Colonel Wyman and his staff for some time; had several hundred of our men regularly, and all of our equipment, building airfields and things of that kind.

55. General Grunert. Do you know anything about Colonel Wyman’s deficiency or his ability in his job as district engineer?

Mr. John Midkiff. Again, impressions. He impressed me as rather “hard boiled go-getter” that I would sort of like to have in charge of a job, but didn’t like personally. I didn’t care much about him personally, but I did think he was moving things along pretty well.

56. General Grunert. Did you know a man by the name of Rohl?

Mr. John Midkiff. I did not. I have heard of him.

57. General Grunert. Did you know a man by the name of Grafe?

Mr. John Midkiff. I did not.

58. General Grunert. Can you think of anything else that you would like to tell us about? General Short evidently depended on you to give us some leads. You have been trying to give us some. Are there any others that are in the back of your mind that may be of help to us in coming to conclusions or ferreting out other things?
Mr. John Midkiff. I really don't think of any other leads, General. I feel that most all my testimony has been very intangible, just simply impressions. I have no very definite knowledge. I knew General Short and talked to him on a good many occasions, as I had with General Herron before him, and other commanding officers.

59. General Grunert. You liked him and respected him, did you not?

Mr. John Midkiff. Very much. The community as a whole I am sure liked and respected him.

60. General Grunert. But you knew nothing definite about his military ability or capacity or judgment?

Mr. John Midkiff. No, except the impression that he was doing a very good job in preparing the place.

61. General Grunert. Thank you very much for coming. It is a pleasure to have met you, and thank you for helping us out.

Mr. John Midkiff. Thank you. If I do think of anything more, if I may volunteer, I will do that.

62. General Grunert. All right.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

(Whereupon, at 11:35 a.m., having concluded the hearing of witnesses for the day, the Board took up the consideration of other matters.)
CONTENTS

MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 11, 1944

Testimony of—

Brig. Gen. William J. Flood, U. S. Army, Chief of Staff, 7th Air Force, Hickam Field, Oahu........................................... 2848
Rear Admiral Charles H. McMorris, United States Navy, Chief of Joint Staff, Pacific Fleet in Pacific Ocean Area............... 2866
Major Bolling R. Powell, Junior, General Staff Corps, Legislative and Liaison Division, War Department, General Staff, Washington, D. C......................................................... 2923
Senator William Hardy Hill, 77 Keokeo Road, Honolulu, T. H........ 2934
Colonel Kendall J. Fielder, General Staff Corps, Headquarters, POA, Fort Shafter, T. H.............................................. 2943

DOCUMENTS

Priority dated August 2, 1944.................................................. 2904
Excerpts from folder marked "Confidential, 336.92, Japanese Consulate and Consular Agents".............................. 2907
Message to War Department, November 14, 1944......................... 2972
Message to Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, dated July 8, 1941.............................................................. 2974

EXHIBITS

No. 22, Photostat of Japanese Map........................................ 3000

1 Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate pages of original transcript of proceedings.
[2848] PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD

MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 11, 1944

Fort Shafter, Territory of Hawaii.

The Board, at 9 a. m., pursuant to recess on Saturday, September 9, 1944, conducted the hearings of witnesses, Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President of the Board, presiding.


Present also: Colonel Charles W. West, Recorder; Major Henry C. Clausen, Assistant Recorder; and Colonel Harry A. Toulmin, Jr., Executive Officer.

General Grunert. The Board will come to order.

TESTIMONY OF BRIG. GEN. WILLIAM J. FLOOD, U. S. A., CHIEF OF STAFF, 7TH AIR FORCE, HICKAM FIELD, OAHU

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel West, General, will you please state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station?

General Flood. William J. Flood, Brigadier General, U. S. Army; Chief of Staff, 7th Air Force, Hickam Field, Oahu.

2. General Grunert. General, the Board is after facts and after leads to where we can get facts. The reason we requested you to come here was that the Board understood that you had command of Wheeler Field during the attack, and so we hope we [2849] can get some facts from you to fill out the story that is gradually taking shape.

What was your command in 1941 over here, and during the attack?

General Flood. I was in command of Wheeler Field, sir. Wheeler Field at that time consisted of our fighter airplanes. Practically all of them were at Wheeler. I was not in command of any fighter units; merely the field.

3. General Frank. Base commander?

General Flood. Base commander, yes, sir.

4. General Grunert. Suppose you tell us about what defense measures were taken prior to and after the attack, at Wheeler Field. In defense measures I mean what preparatory work was done, what was the system of defending the field itself against an air attack, and what was done after the air attack took place that had not been done prior thereto?

General Flood. Prior to the attack, sometime in November, we were called—all base and tactical commanders were called to General Martin's office, who was then in command of the Hawaiian Air Force (that was a forerunner of the 7th Air Force) and we were told that Head-
quarters Hawaiian Department was in receipt of a message outlining the strained relations between the Japanese and the United States, and that we were to be particularly on alert for sabotage. At that time I think the sabotage readiness phase was 1. We increased our guards around the field. We pulled all our airplanes in groupments on the ramps, and so forth, in order to save manpower, and felt that we could probably better take care of sabotage that way, and we increased our guards around the [2850] perimeter of the field. We also put more stress on training of the rifle. We were short of men, and, of course, as you know, in the Air Force all our men are mechanics and we don't have time to train them how to shoot a gun so much, but we did then. We drew some of them out and tried to make marksmen out of them, to know how to handle rifles, and so forth.

5. General Grunert. What was the defense of Wheeler Field, the ground defense, as planned?

General Flood. Well, sir, at that time we had some machine gun positions on our big hangar, and we had a perimeter guard, is all, at that time. That was before we had the fence.

6. General Grunert. Perimeter guard armed with rifles?

General Flood. Yes, sir.

7. General Grunert. And some machine guns on the hangars?

General Flood. Yes, sir; and on top of the hangars, on top of the big barracks.

8. General Grunert. On top of the barracks?

General Flood. Yes, sir.

9. General Grunert. To protect the hangars?

General Flood. Yes, sir.

10. General Grunert. Had the men been instructed with the machine gun?

General Flood. Yes, sir.

11. General Grunert. So you had a perimeter guard of riflemen partly instructed, and how many machine guns?

General Flood. Well, sir, I don't think we had more than about five.

12. General Grunert. Five machine guns?

General Flood. Yes, sir.

13. General Grunert. Was there an S. O. P. on just what everybody would do in case of an attack by air?

General Flood. Yes, sir, there was an S. O. P. I am sure that the Hawaiian Department had an S. O. P.

14. General Grunert. Were there any women and children on the post?

General Flood. Yes, sir; we had all the families here.

15. General Grunert. What were the instructions, what were the plans as to taking care of them in case of attack?

General Flood. Well, we were to evacuate, if we had any notice; the local Red Cross, and so forth, here, under the Office of Civilian Defense—I am pretty sure that that was the agency that had made arrangements to take families into the homes away from the stations and into, you might say, the suburbs or the hill areas of Honolulu if such became necessary.

16. General Grunert. Then, I understand your scheme was evacuation rather than protection in or about Wheeler Field?

General Flood. Yes, sir; we had no protection right there at Wheeler Field. We had no trenches or anything.
17. General Grunert. You had no air raid shelters?
General Flood. No, sir.
18. General Grunert. Or any place for immediate protection?
General Flood. No, sir.
19. General Grunert. In case you were caught by surprise?
General Flood. No, sir.
20. General Grunert. Yes. Now, tell me briefly what happened when the attack came.
General Flood. Well, the attack, as I remember it, hit us [2852] about 7:55 Sunday morning on the 7th. It struck me at first—the first we knew about it, I just happened to be out in front of the quarters talking to some people, and there was a bomb hit down near the Wheeler Depot area, and my first reaction was that it was an accidental bomb due to someone having been out on maneuvers, or something like that. Then immediately following that these low-flying airplanes came in, I would say around 25 of them, about 50 to 75 feet in the air. You could almost hit them with a rock if you had it. And then, of course, we saw the insignia of the Japanese rising sun on it, and then right away we knew what had happened, and we all hurried to the line. Well, we started to the line when the bomb hit, and they dropped I think not more than five bombs on Wheeler Field, two of which hit one of the barracks and, say, maybe three hit the shop area. Then they machine-gunned the whole post. I mean they went up and down the line and in the residential area strafing. They went up and down the line strafing, I presume incendiaries, at our airplanes, because they burned most of them. They were all loaded with gas, and so forth, and of course they went up right away; and unfortunately that morning there wasn’t any wind, and the black smoke and all, we couldn’t see down there. We were trying to get airplanes out, tow those out that were not burning, but you could hardly see anything around the hangar area, just this black smoke with no wind to amount to anything. We found afterwards that they had practically got all our planes. I think we probably had, oh, maybe 45 or 50 left out of an original about 150.
21. General Grunert. In what shape were those that were left?
General Flood. Well, those that were left were not bad, sir. [2853] Fortunately we had gunnery exercise on Saturday, and we had some few airplanes over at Haleiwa, which is a field a few miles from Wheeler, that the Japs didn’t hit. So we rushed some boys over there right away, and they had some ammunition and everything ready to go, there, because they had been practicing gunnery; and we got approximately 14 ships in the air that morning, and I think we approximately got 14 Japs down. As far as I know, those were the only airplanes in the air.
22. General Grunert. What was the scheme of antiaircraft protection for Wheeler Field?
General Flood. Well, there wasn’t any scheme. We didn’t have any antiaircraft other than machine guns.
23. General Grunert. I know, but it was covered by antiaircraft fire of the Department, wasn’t it?
General Flood. I presume it was, sir.
24. General Grunert. Do you know of any antiaircraft that went into position before the blitz was over, that went into action before the blitz was over, as far as you know, as far as you were concerned?
General Flood. Not at Wheeler, but they were firing from Schofield Barracks. I don't know where, but I could see them, I am pretty sure.
25. General Grunert. Well, after the thing was over, what additional measures were then taken for anything that might come in the future?
General Flood. Well, I made a survey right away that morning, and, figuring that most of our airplanes were destroyed, I got aboard of four officers who had been in the Infantry, Air Force, and I immediately formed four infantry companies with my air force people. We put them around the field, particularly near Kuuia Gulley there, to watch for anybody that might come in; and then I called on the Department for some troops to guard the airfield. We thought we might be able to get some planes up. Of course we didn't know what was coming. They sent me a battalion of infantry from Schofield. We started the battalion around, and their guns, and so forth. Major Nave I believe at that time was in command, and I turned all that ground personnel over to him, including the four companies that we formed with air force troops.
26. General Grunert. This was on your request and not according to a plan for the protection of the field?
General Flood. It was on my request I got the battalion; yes, sir. Colonel Collins, who is now General Collins, was then, as I remember it, the Chief of Staff, and I got in touch with him.
27. General Frank. Chief of Staff where?
General Flood. Of the Hawaiian Department. I believe he was. No; it was Phillips, I believe was, according—no; Phillips I believe was Chief of Staff. Yes, that's right. It was not Collins.
28. General Grunert. Now, you said as soon as they went on the sabotage alert you had to pull in all the planes from wherever they were, to concentrate them so it would take less guards. Where were these planes before you concentrated them?
General Flood. Well, we had them around the field, sir, spotted in different positions around the field, and we pulled them all into the apron.
29. General Grunert. Well, weren't they being guarded while they were all around the field, prior to your pulling them in?
General Flood. Well, they were guarded, yes, sir, by the guards on the field, but no particular guard on the individual airplanes as we do now have.
30. General Grunert. The day before you got the sabotage alert they were all spotted around, and they were being taken care of?
General Flood. Yes, sir.
31. General Grunert. And the day you got the sabotage alert you pulled them in?
General Flood. We pulled them in.
32. General Grunert. Into a group, to take care of them?
General Flood. Yes, sir.
33. General Grunert. Weren't they being taken care of?
General Flood. Well, sir, we thought they were. We asked—as a matter of fact, I asked General Martin if we could continue to disperse,
and he said, "Well, Flood," he said, "no. The orders are to concentrate your planes." Well, then I got a wire from the Commanding General of the Department that we would not disperse the airplanes, or a tele-type. I haven't got a copy of it, but I am sure there is a record of it here.

34. General GRUNERT. Then, it just looked as though they expected something to happen the day after, that might not have happened the day before, as far as sabotage is concerned?

General Flood. Well, it appeared to me, sir, that they might have thought there might have been some kind of organized sabotage in this area, which I don't know about.

35. General GRUNERT. But you just carried out your orders?

General Flood. That's all; yes, sir.

36. General GRUNERT. If you hadn't received those definite orders, what would have been your disposition on your own?

General Flood. Sir, I believe I would have left them dispersed. I asked for that permission.

37. General GRUNERT. How would you have taken care of them dispersed? How much more personnel would it have taken, in your opinion, to take care of them dispersed, as compared to concentrated?

General Flood. Well, there were men working on the airplanes all day, and I don't think it would take any more, except at night you would probably increase your guard, say, as we do now. We have a guard per airplane now, or try to. We did up until recently. We don't right now.

38. General GRUNERT. Do you know what department orders required the concentration of airplanes under Alert No. 1? Was that the SOP of November 5, do you know?

General Flood. Yes, sir; there was a condition of readiness No. 1; yes, sir; that is what we were under, at the time.

39. General GRUNERT. That was an SOP of November 5? General Russell, have you any questions?

40. General RUSSELL. I do not think that is particularly clear. General. Were you acting under an SOP in concentrating your planes, or did you have an order from the Hawaiian Department explicitly directing a concentration of the planes?

General Flood. We had a directive from General Martin, at this meeting, that we would pull our planes in and group them up for guarding against sabotage. That is where I got my instructions, from General Martin.

41. General RUSSELL. What did your testimony mean, a moment ago, to the effect that you had a teletype or some form of recorded order?

General Flood. No, sir; I did not mean a teletype, that way. I say that after this meeting, I asked General Martin if we couldn't disperse the airplanes, and he said, "No, Flood, that is not the orders, but," he said, "I will investigate it." I then later, I think the next day, got a teletype saying that I would not disperse the airplanes. That tele-type as I remember it was not signed "Martin," it was signed "Short."

42. General RUSSELL. Would it be possible for you to get that tele-type and let us have it, at this date?

General Flood. Well, I presume, sir, that Wheeler Field has that in the files. I will try to locate it for you.
45. General Russell. We will appreciate that.
44. General Frank. Will you locate it and furnish the Board an official copy of it?

General Flood. Yes, sir. If they haven't got it, I am sure the Department here has it.

45. General Frank. You will dig it up?

General Flood. I will take steps to try to locate it; yes, sir.

46. General Russell. There has been evidence at one time or another about a third of the airplanes being required to be on the alert constantly, by a department order; do you know anything about that?

General Flood. No, sir; I don't anything about that.

47. General Russell. It is true, however, that none of the planes at Wheeler Field were on the alert 7 December 1941? Wheeler Field was where you were?

General Flood. Yes, sir; Wheeler Field. On December 7, sir?

48. General Russell. Yes. Do you know whether any airplanes were on the alert on the morning of December 7, 1941, or not?

General Flood. No, sir; I don't. That would be General Davidson, the Fighter Command.

49. General Russell. You saw the planes, and where they were when the attack came?

General Flood. Yes, sir.

50. General Russell. You saw none of them make an effort to get off the ground and into the air?

General Flood. Oh, yes; yes, sir. In addition to my job as Base Commander, I was Acting Executive of the Fighter [2859] Command, and General Davidson had given me permission to aid him in running the set-up out there; and two or three airplanes did get off the ground. They were not on the alert, however, as far as I know; they might have been put on by the Fighter Command; but they got up, because the pilots went down there and saw what was going on, and the mechanics and the pilots loaded their ships and took off from Wheeler. There were not more than two or three that got in the air from Wheeler. The airplanes I mentioned being in the air, about 14, were practically all from Halesiwa, which is a station where we have planes for gunnery. We send them over there for maneuvers in gunnery. It is right on the water.

51. General Russell. On previous Sunday mornings, say the Sunday mornings in November 1941, had your fighter planes participated in any exercises or maneuvers held here in the Hawaiian Department?

General Flood. We had maneuvers, sir, periodically. I cannot tell you whether there was any in November. General Davidson's records would show that, I think.

52. General Russell. You do not recall any early Sunday morning maneuvers just prior to the Pearl Harbor attack, in which your fighter aircraft participated?

General Flood. No, sir; I don't know of any, myself.

53. General Russell. That is all I have.

54. General Frank. You just stated that you were Base Commander, but you were also Executive of the Fighter Command?

General Flood. Yes, sir; that was an agreement that General Davidson and I had, because at that time we were building this Air
Defense Command Post, which is your present set-up, right here at Shafter.

55. General Frank. The information center?
   General Flood. Yes, sir; and he was dividing his time between Wheeler and that point.

56. General Frank. What tactical authority did you have over the Fighter Command?
   General Flood. I had not tactical authority. I didn't order any airplanes out, or any maneuvers of any kind.

57. General Frank. What were your duties, then as Executive?
   General Flood. Just to take care of the set-up at Wheeler Field, help the groups along.

58. General Frank. In what way?
   General Flood. Well, in an advisory capacity. We had a lot of young fellows up there that, when General was away, he felt an old officer ought to be around to whom they could turn and ask questions, and that was the type of work I was doing for him. I had no tactical responsibility.

59. General Frank. When did you become Base Commander at Wheeler Field?
   General Flood. I became Base Commander, there, in about November, sir.

60. General Frank. 1941?
   General Flood. Yes, sir. Prior to that, I was A-4 of the Hawaiian Air Force—since that the time you put me in that job, in March 1940.

61. General Frank. As A-4 of the Hawaiian Air Force, did you have contacts with the district engineer?
   General Flood. Yes, sir; quite often.

62. General Frank. What was the nature of those contacts?
   General Flood. They were all construction projects, the development of the Hilo Airport, the Homestead Airport, Bellows Field, Barking Sands, and Wheeler.

63. General Frank. Was there any money appropriated to develop those fields prior to December 7?
   General Flood. There was money appropriated to him, sir, not to us, as I remember it. He got the money. I know that he set up the estimated costs, and so forth, and I presume he got the money, himself. We didn't handle any money ourselves in the Air Force—that is, the Air-4 office.

64. General Frank. Did the construction proceed satisfactorily?
   General Flood. Excellent, under Wyman—faster, under Wyman, I believe, than it did under the Department Engineer, who at one time was in on a lot of the stuff.

65. General Frank. Who was the Department engineer, do you remember?
   General Flood. Yes, sir; that was Brigadier General Lyman, "Queen" Lyman. I do not know whether that is his regular name, or not. He was of Hawaiian descent, and they called him "Queen."

66. General Frank. How well did you know Wyman?
   General Flood. I only know him, sir, in an official capacity. I had never been out with him socially. I saw him though at least two or three times a week during the course of his construction period.
67. General Frank. Were you always able to find him and to do business with him?

General Flood. Yes, sir; he had an office down-town. Of course, at some times we would call him up and he would not be there, but he would always be out to see us on any big [2863] project.

68. General Frank. Was he cooperative?

General Flood. Exceedingly so, with the Air Force. I don't know whether he was an advocate of air or not, but we never had any trouble with him. We would tell him what we wanted. Well, naturally, of course, we would have the usual arguments about runways and so forth, and the way he wanted to build them and the way we wanted, so we took his word, as being an engineer.

69. General Frank. Was the runway at Bellows Field under construction when you were A-4 of the Hawaiian Department?

General Flood. Yes sir; we started on Bellows Field, the whole Bellows Field project, when I was A-4. Colonel Wyman undertook that project, himself, and at the time, we were asking for money, and I remember—I don't know whether this has anything to do with any interest in this case, but I asked him about starting on it. I said, "You are starting it pretty fast. Did you get the money for it?" He said, "Well, we'll get the money. We will go ahead. We need this"; so he put that project over in no time at all; and it is a good thing he did, because we needed it.

70. General Frank. The work proceeded satisfactorily, then?

General Flood. Yes, sir.

71. General Frank. Were there any construction projects that, from your point of view as A-4 of the Hawaiian Air Force, lagged, that were under his jurisdiction?

General Flood. No, sir; I would say they went faster under Wyman's jurisdiction.

72. Major Clausen. Sir, are you familiar with the exact [2863] times that this work was required to be done by the contract and the job orders?

General Flood. No; we had nothing to do with that. That was Wyman's.

73. Major Clausen. So, in answering General Frank's questions as to whether it was satisfactory, you would not know whether the contract and job orders had been lived up to?

General Flood. I meant it was satisfactory from an Air Force standpoint of having the facilities, getting it ready for us. Now, as to whether or not it came up to specifications that the engineers laid down or not, I can't answer that, because that wasn't our responsibility.

74. Major Clausen. With respect to Bellows Field, the runway there would not take a heavy ship, would it, on 7 December 1941?

General Flood. Well, I don't think it was a question of the runway, there. I can't answer that. I would say it could take a heavy ship, but in fact, we never put any heavy stuff in there, because of the nature of the field, because it is a bad field. It was never designed to put heavy stuff over there.

75. Major Clausen. You said something about concentrating the airplanes, the airplanes having been pulled in before the 7th of December. Were they put wing to wing?

General Flood. Yes, they were pulled in on the apron in front of the hangars and practically wing-tip to wing-tip.
76. Major Clauseen. Did you empty the gasoline tanks on some of them?

General Flood. No, sir; we kept them so we could fly. We did not drain them. It takes quite a while to fill an airplane, if you ever need it.

77. Major Clauseen. You also said something about the practice now being to guard each plane with one man, and having in mind that you have more planes now than you had before the 7th of December 1941; you had sufficient personnel before 7 December 1941 to do that same thing, did you not?

General Flood. Not one man per airplane; no, sir.

78. Major Clauseen. How many planes were there on Wheeler Field?

General Flood. Right on Wheeler Field? Oh, I would say maybe 110.

79. Major Clauseen. Did you have 110 men?

General Flood. We had more than 110 men, but we could not spare 110 men for guards for each individual airplane, because at that time our service units were short, and these people were all mechanics. You had no real set-up for guarding, except what we call "basics." Of course, now we have; we have MP companies that are sent out, assigned to the air force for the purpose of guarding. We do not use trained men in guarding, unless in emergency.

80. Major Clauseen. Suppose you had dispersed the planes instead of concentrating them, before 7 December 1941, would it have been possible to have assigned one man to each plane?

General Flood. I think it would, in emergency. It would skin us down.

81. Major Clauseen. But you could have done it?

General Flood. I think we could have done it.

82. Major Clauseen. How many men did you have?

General Flood. I do not know the strength off-hand of the men at Wheeler Field, but we could skin down and have done that if it had been necessary to put one man per airplane.

83. Major Clauseen. I have no further questions.

84. General Frank. Colonel Toulmin, have you anything?


86. General Gruentert. Have you anything that occurs to you that you would like to bring to the attention of the Board that has not been brought up? The Board has pretty thoroughly covered the ground with other witnesses, and there is no need of just building up testimony, just to pad the record.

General Flood. No, sir.

87. General Gruentert. But if you know of anything that is in the back of your mind that may be of assistance to the Board, let us have it.

General Flood. No, sir; I haven't anything, at all.

88. General Frank. Did you ever know a Hans Wilhelm Rohl?

General Flood. No, sir; I never knew him.

89. General Frank. Did you ever hear of him?

General Flood. I have read in the papers. Isn't he the man that Wyman has entered into contracts with, or supposed to have contracts over here?

90. General Frank. Yes.
General Flood. I have read of him. I never knew him, and I never knew he was here until after the stories broke in the papers.

91. General Frank. Did you ever know a Paul Grafe?

General Flood. No, sir; I never knew him. We had no contacts, at all, as you remember, General, with any of the contractors. Ours are with the Department and the district engineer. They were the ones that let the contracts out, and we didn’t even know who had them, except we heard the names.

92. General Grunert. Thank you very much for coming in.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

[2866] TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL CHARLES H. McMorris, UNITED STATES NAVY, CHIEF OF JOINT STAFF, PACIFIC FLEET IN PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel West. Admiral, will you please state to the Board your name, rank, organization and station?

Admiral McMorris. Charles H. McMorris, Rear Admiral, United States Navy, Chief of Joint Staff, Pacific Fleet in Pacific Ocean Areas.

2. General Grunert. Admiral, this Board is after facts and leads to where it can get such facts, if it cannot get them from the witnesses present. The Board asked you to come here because you had testified before the Roberts Commission, and from that testimony and your assignment in 1941 we hope we can get some facts from you. The field which we have to cover is so broad that we have parcelled out some of the phases of this investigation. General Russell here has charge of this particular phase of it, so he will lead in questioning you, and the other members of the Board will fill in. So I turn you over to the tender mercies of General Russell.

3. General Russell. Admiral, what was your assignment in November and December of 1941?

Admiral McMorris. Head of the War Plans Division of the staff of the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet.

4. General Russell. How long had you been on that assignment prior to December 7th, 1941?

Admiral McMorris. Since 1 February, 1941.

5. General Russell. That was about the time that General Short came out and became Commanding General of the Hawaiian [2867] Department?

Admiral McMorris. Almost exactly the same time.

6. General Russell. During that period, Admiral, from February 1, 1941, to December 7, 1941, were there frequent or infrequent conferences between the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and the Admiral of the Pacific Fleet?

Admiral McMorris. There were a very considerable number of conferences between those two officers. They were generally held in the office of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, and I attended most if not all of them.

7. General Russell. Briefly stated, what subjects were discussed at those meetings?
Admiral McMorris. The defenses of the Hawaiian Area and the operations in case of war of the Pacific Fleet and, among other things, the possibilities of moving some of the units of the Army under the command of the Commander, Hawaiian Department, to Midway and Wake, and the building up of certain defenses at Canton and other outlying islands.

8. General Russell. Were those conferences more frequent or less frequent in the latter part of the year 1941, or were there any changes in the frequency of holding those conferences?

Admiral McMorris. As I recall now, they were more frequent, but a certain degree of tenseness in the international situation obtained throughout 1941 and I cannot say with definiteness that the frequency had markedly increased.

9. General Russell. Was this subject of the tenseness in the relationship between the Japanese Empire and the American Government discussed at any of these conferences?

Admiral McMorris. Yes, more frequently than not that situation was discussed.

10. General Russell. Is it your opinion or impression that there was a realization on the part of those participating in those conferences that the situation between the Japanese Empire and the American Government was becoming more tense in the year 1941 as the year progressed?

Admiral McMorris. Yes.

11. General Russell. Is it your opinion that there was a realization on the part of these officers, both naval and Army, that a war with the Japanese Empire was inevitable?

Admiral McMorris. I would say highly probable.

12. General Russell. Highly probable?

Admiral McMorris. Rather than inevitable.

13. General Russell. Were speculations indulged in at these conferences as to the imminence of war with Japan, its likelihood of breaking out in the immediate future?

Admiral McMorris. Yes.

14. General Russell. What, in your opinion, was the consensus of judgment of those officers attending these meetings as to the imminence of war with Japan in late November, 1941?

Admiral McMorris. It is my opinion that those officers believed that war with the Japanese Empire might occur in an extremely short time, although there may have been expressed some uncertainty as to whether a war between the Japanese and British Empires might not precede the involvement of the United States by a short time. I do not believe, however, that there was serious doubt but that we would actually be involved on very short notice.

15. General Russell. You have introduced the subject of war occurring between the British and Japanese Empires a short time before we became involved. Was it the opinion of the assembled officers in these conferences that we would go to the rescue of Britain if she became involved in war with Japan?

Admiral McMorris. It was felt that if Great Britain became involved that some overt act, real or fancied, would almost surely occur and that it would not be so much of going to the rescue of the British Empire as to defend American interests.
16. General Russell. Was this opinion or conception based on facts, or was there some factual information which had been received, or was it mere speculation on the part of these officers?

Admiral McMorris. Largely speculation, and a general acquaintance with movements of certain Japanese forces in the southeast Asia area, and the feeling that Japan might be unwilling to expose her line of communications to a threat from the Philippines.

17. General Frank. You felt that the United States would be forced in by an overt act by Japan rather than by a determined decision by the United States?

Admiral McMorris. Yes.

18. General Russell. But your reasoning was that our entry into the war would probably be preceded by an outbreak of hostilities between the British and Japanese Empires, which would give our forces some notice of the coming events?

Admiral McMorris. I would not say that I believed that, but in discussions it was certainly regarded as a distinct possibility or even probability.

19. General Russell. Now, Admiral, if high naval officers had reached the conclusion that war with Japan was highly probable and that its imminence was a very great possibility, what conclusions, if any, were reached about the probability or the possibility of an attack on Pearl Harbor and the Army installations on the Island of Oahu?

Admiral McMorris. Certainly I personally regarded such an attack by saboteurs or by submarines as extremely probable. I did not at any time envisage such an attack as actually occurred.

20. General Russell. You now refer to a surprise air attack from carrier-based airplanes?

Admiral McMorris. Yes, sir. I did regard it as a possibility that a small raiding force might at some time undertake it and run efforts along our lines of communication in this vicinity and that such a raiding force might include some carrier strength.

21. General Russell. Admiral, did you know of the presence of a carrier force or a task force, Japanese task force, in the Marshall Islands in which carriers had been discovered late in November of 1941?

Admiral McMorris. I believe I recall some intelligence data that indicated the possible presence of carriers in the Marshalls area. Parenthetically, I might add that it has since become well established that no such force was in the Marshalls, but, of course, this added information was not available to us at that time. The intelligence that we actually had was of a speculative nature.

22. General Russell. What is the information which you have received since that time that establishes clearly that no such task force with carriers was in the Marshalls late in November, 1941?

Admiral McMorris. Interrogation of prisoners or reports of interrogations of prisoners and captured documents that seemed to quite clearly indicate the movements of the Japanese carrier force in late November and early December.

23. General Russell. Where are the documents that you now refer to?

Admiral McMorris. I believe that our intelligence organization in the Pacific Ocean Areas has that information available.
24. General Russell. Would that be in files here on the Island of Oahu?

Admiral McMorris. I should say very probably, but I would have to consult our Intelligence Officer to give a positive statement in that connection.

25. General Russell. Would you be willing to undertake that for us and let us know whether or not you find those documents and if they could be made available to us?

Admiral McMorris. Yes, sir.

26. General Russell. Are there reports, Admiral, of the questioning of the witnesses upon whom you base your opinion that the carriers were not in the Marshalls in late November and early December available in records any place?

Admiral McMorris. I would expect to find that information at the same source.

27. General Russell. Will you attempt to ascertain that for us and let us know, please, sir?

28. General Russell. Prior to the morning of December 7th, 1941, possibly on the date of November 27th, 1941, do you recall specifically a conference attended by you, General Short, possibly Admiral Kimmel, and others, in which the possibility of an attack on Pearl Harbor was discussed?

Admiral McMorris. I recall that about that time, certainly in very late November, a number of dispatches concerning the existing military situation had been received, and that conference did take place in Admiral Kimmel's office at which the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and various other officers were present. I particularly remember a discussion with regard to the movement or the possible movement of certain pursuit planes from Oahu to Midway and Wake and that certainly the possibility of an air attack on Pearl Harbor was mentioned, and I recall that the merits or demerits of sending certain particular units to Midway were inquired about. I had advocated sending the less efficient group to Midway, and Admiral Kimmel inquired when I felt an air attack on Pearl Harbor might occur, and I replied that I felt such an attack would never occur.

29. General Russell. Admiral, we have discussed the fringes of it, possibly, without going to the heart of it. Would you state to the Board the reasons upon which you based this conclusion, that an air attack on Pearl Harbor would never occur?

Admiral McMorris. Again, I am expressing my own views, but they are the views which colored such recommendations as I made from time to time to the Commander-in-Chief. I felt that the Japanese interests lay in the Asiatic area and that they could more effectively utilize their full power in that area. I doubted that an attack on the Pearl Harbor area would inflict great damage and felt that the Japanese would have a similar conclusion. I felt that if we were contemplating a similar attack on the Japanese homeland that the damage we might inflict would not be commensurate with the risk and probable losses involved, and that, similarly, the Japanese would reach such a conclusion as regards an attack on Hawaii. Subsequent events, of course, proved my conclusions very unsound.

30. General Russell. Earlier you stated, Admiral, that you had come to the conclusion that the event of war against the United States,
assuming it was brought on by an offensive action on the part of Japan, would result from threat to the Japanese line of communication in its progress to the south. Did it occur to you that possibly the main instrument which the American people had to attack that line of communication was the fleet here at Pearl Harbor?

Admiral McMorris. I knew that such was not the case, that our logistic capabilities at that time would not have permitted any considerable portion of the fleet in the Pearl Harbor area operating in that portion of the Pacific. I did know, however, that there had been considerable augmentation of the air strength in the Philippine area as would endanger such lines of communication, and that submarines based on Manila would be highly effective against such a line.

[2874] General Russell. But you did not regard our surface fleet at Pearl Harbor as a threat to the Japanese line of communications to the south, from the Japanese Empire?

Admiral McMorris. I did not. I did not so regard it until we were able to establish ourselves much further west and have facilities for logistic support that could not be developed for a very considerable period.

32. General Russell. Admiral, to go back to a question which has been suggested to me in relation to the attack made here on Pearl Harbor: You state that subsequent investigation has been made, and you have now come to the conclusion that the task force which made the attack did not assemble in the Marshall Islands; is that true?

Admiral McMorris. That is correct, sir.

33. General Russell. What is your opinion now as to where this task force came from?

Admiral McMorris. That they departed from ports in southern Honshu, made a rendezvous in the southern Kuriles, and steamed almost directly eastward on a line that approximates the latitude midway between Pearl Harbor and the Aleutians, and then almost directly south.

34. General Russell. For the purposes of the record: the first port from which this task force sailed, is it, or not, located on the mainland of the Japanese Empire, the home island?

Admiral McMorris. The initial port of departure was from the main base of Japan, but that their assembly point from which they finally sailed was an isolated harbor to the northward of the main islands of Japan, that is, to the northward of Hokkaido.

[2875] 35. General Russell. And from that point they traveled in which direction?

Admiral McMorris. East.

36. General Russell. Almost directly east?

Admiral McMorris. Almost directly east.

37. General Russell. And thence almost directly south?

Admiral McMorris. Almost directly south.

38. General Russell. Do you know of any refueling point between the point that you have described as their assembly point after leaving the homeland and the point from which they launched their attack on Oahu?

Admiral McMorris. From their point of departure I believe they proceeded in one force, did fuel enroute, but I do not now recall just the location of the refueling point or points.
39. General Russell. How long, in the opinion of the Navy, was it from the time this task force left the mainland of Japan, or its initial assembly port and point of departure as you have described it, until it reached Pearl Harbor?

Admiral McMorris. It has been some time since I have reviewed that information, but it was in the neighborhood of two weeks from the time of departure from their main bases.

40. General Russell. Have you any factual basis from which deductions have been made by the Navy as to the constitution of this task force?

Admiral McMorris. There were six cruisers and attendant light craft in this task force, but the aircraft from only four of the carriers actually participated in the Pearl Harbor attack.

41. General Russell. Could you tell us roughly how many surface ships, including carriers of various categories, would have been in this task force?

Admiral McMorris. Without refreshing my memory, I believe an answer to that might be misleading.

42. General Russell. Admiral, the thing I am attempting to learn, if possible, is whether or not this was a considerable convoy, this task force, and if you can estimate roughly the number of surface craft that might have been in it.

Admiral McMorris. The force in question was a fast striking force that did not include the heavy battleships but was in general comparable in strength to two of the carrier task forces which the United States now operates. Let us say there were in the neighborhood of 15 combatant vessels, including the 6 carriers.

43. General Russell. Does the Navy have conclusions as to the distance that these forces were from Pearl Harbor when they launched their aircraft which participated in the attack on Pearl Harbor?

Admiral McMorris. In the neighborhood of 300 miles. I might add that the distance was considerably greater than we felt that it was feasible to launch an attack on the part of our own carriers at that time. The special fittings of belly tanks, and the willingness to sacrifice planes that might run out of gas, permitted the operation to take place from that distance.

44. General Russell. At the time of this attack on December 7th, as we recall, there were two or three task forces from the Pacific Fleet based on Pearl Harbor operating away from Pearl Harbor, American vessels: is that true?

Admiral McMorris. That is correct. There were at that time three American carriers in the Pacific. One was completing or had just completed overhaul at Puget Sound and was enroute to San Diego to obtain her air group. One carrier with attendant cruisers and destroyers had just delivered certain marine fighters to Wake and was expected to arrive at Pearl Harbor on 7 or 8 December. The remaining carrier, also with attendant cruisers and destroyers, was returning to the Pearl Harbor area after delivering fighters to Midway.

45. General Russell. Admiral, to shorten the examination, and without describing the elements of the Navy present in Pearl Harbor, was the fighting strength of those elements at Pearl Harbor on the morning of December 5th, 6th, and 7th, we will say, of sufficient
capacity to have destroyed the Jap task force had the Jap task force from which these aircraft were launched been located and intercepted?

Admiral McMorris. It would have been impossible for that force to have brought the Japanese task force within gun range of the heavy ships unless by some fortuitous circumstance which I do not envisage; and unless they could have been brought within gun range they could not have been destroyed.

46. General Russell. Well, let me state that question another way. Let's assume that on the 4th or 5th of December this approaching Japanese task force had been discovered, by reconnaissance or accidentally or otherwise. Was there here in Pearl Harbor a force which could have gone out and prevented this task force from reaching a point from which the aircraft could have been launched for the attack?

Admiral McMorris. If the force in question had been discovered on the 5th of December, there is no question in my mind that the forces present would have been moved to intercept the Japanese forces, and that it is highly probable that if such interception had taken place the Japanese force would have been deterred from making an attack on Pearl Harbor. On the other hand, and we are now in the field of speculation, I suspect that a fight would have occurred in which our losses might have been even greater than actually occurred.

I'd like to amplify that a moment, if I may.

47. General Russell. Yes. Would you?

Admiral McMorris. The antiaircraft defenses of our ships at that time were by no manner of means as effective as they have since become. We would have had but two carriers present as against the Japanese six; and, while I believe that we would have inflicted damage on the Japanese, I believe that our own losses would have been extremely heavy and might well have included the loss of both our carriers.

48. General Russell. Well, to state it a little bit crudely, they were going to get you whether you stayed at home or whether you went out and fought them; is that it?

Admiral McMorris. I regret to say I think that is probably true.

49. General Russell. Now, Admiral, the documents which this Board has seen relating to the plans for the joint operations of the Army and Navy, in estimating the situation, have, as I recall, without exception, stressed the probability of a submarine-air attack on Pearl Harbor as being very, very probable. These documents, as I recall, were prepared in the spring of '41. As a matter of fact, the Secretary of the Navy [2879] sent a letter to the Secretary of War in which the attention of the Secretary of War was called to the possibility or probability of that form of attack, and there was stressed in this letter the weakness of defenses here against such an attack. Are you familiar with those documents and those estimates?

Admiral McMorris. Without having any detailed recollection of the matter, I feel quite sure that at the time I knew of them, and certainly the matter of AA defenses of this area had been a matter of very grave concern, and representations were made to the Secretary of the Navy to increase the AA gun power, radar, and so forth, to insure more effective protection of ships in Pearl Harbor.
50. General Russell. Do you recall making an inspection of the antiaircraft defenses here on Pearl Harbor as they were maintained by the Army?

Admiral McMorris. I at one time did make a tour of the defenses of Oahu with General Gardner, who gave a presentation of his antiaircraft setup; and then I rode around the Island, saw a number of the installations, and attended several antiaircraft practices. I do not now recall whether that was when General Herron was here or after General Short had taken over. I did know that Army authorities felt that the AA gun power immediately around Pearl Harbor needed improvement, and they were particularly concerned over the possibility that aircraft coming in from the south might be able to drop bombs before they had been under very serious AA fire. I did not, however, have detailed familiarity with the AA defenses here, nor would I be a competent judge to pass on many of the technicalities. What I now have outlined is rather a general impression.

51. General Russell. Do you know of any reports made by the Navy here to the Navy Department in Washington or to Army authorities here or elsewhere in which these deficiencies or inadequacies of the antiaircraft defenses were pointed out? I will confine that question to the period after February 1, '41, if I did not in the original question.

Admiral McMorris. I do not now recall very clearly. Such matters could have occurred within the staff without my recollecting it, but I do recall, when on a trip in the summer of '41 to the Navy Department with Admiral Kimmel, representation to naval authorities that the AA gun power and radar defenses of Pearl Harbor should be improved; that I do recall that the matter of acquiring radars was one very frequently discussed, and that during 1941 very marked improvement was made in that connection.

52. General Russell. Admiral, do you know any reason why the thinking of the Navy might have changed from February 1941 to November 1941 as to the probability of a surprise air raid on Pearl Harbor?

Admiral McMorris. Perhaps I had better express my own views in that connection, that to my mind as the defenses here were strengthened I thought that the Japanese would be very promptly aware of it; and I thought that as the year wore on the Japanese were becoming more fully committed to an all-out effort in another direction. I did not discount the possibility of air raid here, but I did doubt that it would be highly effective. I did believe that any raiding group would suffer disproportionately to damage that they might inflict upon us.

53. General Russell. This last question so far as I am concerned, Admiral: Do you know of any directive or order which may have been restrictions or limitations upon the freedom of the Admiral of the Pacific Fleet in the disposition of the elements of that fleet; from higher authority?

Admiral McMorris. I am sure there were none.

54. General Russell. And you base that assurance on the fact that you knew of none, and would have known of such if they had existed?
Admiral McMorris. That is correct.

55. General Frank. Do you know how Jap intelligence revealed to the Jap navy the conditions here, so favorable to this attack?

Admiral McMorris. I do not.

56. General Frank. Is there any thought about that in the Navy? There must have been some discussion of it.

Admiral McMorris. I never entertained any doubt, any time during 1941, that the Japanese were fully informed of all military activities in this area.

57. General Frank. Do you feel that there was sufficient effort made in the islands, and that could have been made, to protect against Jap intelligence?

Admiral McMorris. You are getting out of my bailiwick, General.

58. General Frank. You are Chief of Staff; you must have had some thought on it.

Admiral McMorris. I was War Plans Officer at that time, and my concern was very largely with the plans for offensive operations in the Marshall area.

59. General Frank. From a general point of view, is there any feeling about that, in the Navy?

Admiral McMorris. I would say in general that there was a feeling that intelligence efforts on the part of the United States in time of peace, toward restricting information reaching the enemy, are weak, and that it takes stress of war to obtain popular support for restrictive measures.

60. General Frank. You have already commented on this. I would like to approach it from a little different point of view, with respect to this question: Had the Japanese attack been anticipated and met by the Navy, could aircraft from the carriers have been successful, do you feel, in an attack on the Jap carriers?

Admiral McMorris. Will you read that question?

(Question read.)

61. General Frank. I will tell you what I am after, just to clear this up a little bit. I am going to follow this with a question as to what would have been the effect on subsequent operations of the Jap fleet, had they not lost those carriers. Do you see my approach?

Admiral McMorris. Had the Japanese lost their carriers, undoubt- edly they would have been handicapped in some of their subsequent operations, but it is improbable that all of their carriers would have been lost. In fact, at one time or another, those carriers have been under attack; and I believe that one of the six carriers that came to Pearl Harbor on the 7th of December 1941 is still operative.

62. General Frank. Then would you say that this Japanese attack was not so hazardous, so courageous, and such a decided gamble?

Admiral McMorris. I would say that I felt that it was a considerable gamble at the time, and that had the Japanese continued in, with all the defenses fully manned and alerted, there would have been suffered very severe damage, and, in so far as locally is concerned, would not have inflicted great damage. I do think however that we would surely have suffered damage within our fleet.

63. General Frank. Do you feel that there was a certain complacency here which led the command, both Army and Navy, to feel secure against such an attack?
Admiral McMorris. No, I would not say that in quite those words.

64. General Frank. How would you state it?
Admiral McMorris. I would say that they felt an attack of that particular nature was improbable, but that their capabilities for withstanding such an attack, with the measures at hand, would be quite effective.

65. General Frank. That is, the capabilities of the Jap attack would be effective?
Admiral McMorris. No, that the capabilities of defense would be effective.

66. General Frank. But there seems to have been an effective Japanese intelligence system.
Admiral McMorris. I am quite sure of it.

67. General Frank. Therefore, in the face of that intelligence system, which kept them advised of the attitude and measures taken here, do you feel under those circumstances that this Jap attack was hazardous, courageous, and a gamble?
Admiral McMorris. I so felt at the time. I still feel that there was great risk involved, even though they escaped undamaged.

68. General Frank. But you have already stated that at that time there was not a sufficient naval force here to have met them successfully.
Admiral McMorris. That's correct.

69. General Frank. Do you consider this was a suicidal attack in that it was made so as to sacrifice the airplanes and crews but save the carriers?
Admiral McMorris. I believe that that was in their minds to a large extent. I do not believe that they expected to lose all of their crews, but that they were prepared to lose all or a great portion of them. I believe for that matter that they were prepared to accept some losses within their carriers, themselves.

70. General Frank. Had all or any part of this analysis through which we have just gone taken place prior to the attack?
Admiral McMorris. Certainly not, as it has been outlined, here, subsequently. There had been consideration given to the question, and to the effectiveness of these carriers.

71. General Frank. What I don't quite understand is how, if you felt fears that six carriers could come in that could not be handled by the United States fleet, here, how you felt that Oahu was so secure against attack.
Admiral McMorris. Let me say, here, that the fleet is not primarily to defend Oahu, but rather, that Oahu was a place of refuge for the fleet. It was not expected that in time of war the fleet would be present in Oahu, except the units here for rest and replenishment; just as, today, the fleet is not present in Oahu, but rather is operating for the most part far afield.

72. General Frank. So far as you know, did this Jap attacking task force completely evade all United States naval intelligence detection?
Admiral McMorris. As far as I know, no intelligence, on the part of any portion of the United States authorities, was developed.

73. General Frank. Intelligence indicated a Jap task force in the Marshalls, with carriers and submarines. Do you know whether or
not the radio intercept was successful in picking the force, but wrong in the location?

Admiral McMorris. I feel quite sure that that did not obtain.

74. General Frank. Is it a difficult task to make a rendezvous with supply ships at sea without the use of radio?

Admiral McMorris. No; it should be very simple.

75. General Grunert. Admiral, do you recall whether or not you were present or knew anything about a conference that was held as a result of two messages received, November 27, 1941, one coming to the Admiral of the fleet, and one, to General Short; the one to the Admiral of the fleet starting out by saying, “Consider this a war warning”?

Admiral McMorris. I remember such a message, and I remember that, subsequent to that, there was a conference; but whether or not it was entirely on the basis of that dispatch or on proposals of other dispatches that came in about the same time, I do not recall. Minutes of those meetings were never made.

76. General Grunert. Is it common practice in the Navy to receive a message starting out, “Consider this a war warning,” or what did that mean to you navy people, when they said, “Consider this a war warning”? Was that discussed?

Admiral McMorris. It was certainly considered to mean that the internal situation was continuing to deteriorate, and that we might find ourselves engaged in war, in very short order. This was not particularly disturbing or unexpected, but rather confirmatory of the general thoughts at the time.

77. General Grunert. Then you presume it was sent just as a routine matter?

[2887] Admiral McMorris. No, sir; by no manner of means.

78. General Grunert. Then it would seem that if you had that thought in mind, there was no use in sending you such a message. That is just an observation on my part. As to your estimate, wherein, at one of the conferences, you expressed yourself as estimating or feeling that the Japs would never so attack, and there was no probability of such an attack, or words to that effect; now, at such conference, an expression on your part, in your position, is not an expression of your own opinion, it is the expression of an official opinion which possibly a commanding general of the Department could take as reflecting the Navy estimate of the situation, and possibly, on which he could base action that he took, because of your understanding; is that a correct expression? If not, will you correct me in its incorrectness?

Admiral McMorris. I would not pass an opinion or conclusion as to the merits or demerits of the conclusion which you have just given.

79. General Grunert. But is true, is it not, that when you express yourself at any official conference, that is an official opinion, at least?

Admiral McMorris. That certainly was an expression of the opinion of the War Plans officer of the fleet commander. I should be highly surprised, however, if the individual who is charged with defenses should govern his actions or preparations for defense or offense entirely on an opinion so expressed.

80. General Grunert. During any conference subsequent to November 27, do you recall whether or not the Commanding [2888] General of the Hawaiian Department informed the Navy as to the
measures he was taking in view of what we will call the "warning messages" received?
Admiral McMorris. I do not recall.
81. General Grunert. Do you know what measures the Commanding General took about that time?
Admiral McMorris. No.
82. General Grunert. Then you do not know whether or not he informed the Navy of the measures that he did take?
Admiral McMorris. I do not know. That, however, does not imply that such action did not take place.
83. General Grunert. Were you not interested in the measures he took, or was going to take, in order to protect your fleet?
Admiral McMorris. My own concern and my duties were with the implementation of the plans for offensive action. The commander of the Hawaiian sea frontier, and, to a lesser degree, the operations section of our staff, would have had those matters of their immediate concern.
84. General Grunert. Then as I understand it, you were concerned practically with operation of the fleet after it was out of the harbor, and not particularly in the harbor?
Admiral McMorris. My concern was with the future rather than the immediate present.
85. General Russell. Admiral, the course which you have described as being the one that the Navy thinks now the Jap task forces took in order to launch their aircraft, is about how many miles in length? Do you recall how far that is?
Admiral McMorris. You mean from the port that they last departed, until they arrived?
86. General Russell. Until they arrived at the point at which they launched their attack.
87. General Frank. Did they have to refuel before they got back home?
Admiral McMorris. I don't know that they have got information on that, that they tried to estimate that distance. I mean, without a chart at hand, it is certainly several thousand miles; but with a quick reference to the chart, which I suppose is not obtainable here, I could give it with a considerable degree of accuracy.
88. General Russell. I am not sure that we can, from the record, determine, but we were attempting to relate that back of December 7 to the date of November 26, which would have given them approximately 11 days' traveling time. We were wondering if they could have followed the course which you have described and have completed it within eleven days.
89. General Russell. Have you any information which you could give us from which we could deduce the distance travelled by the task force, assuming that it followed the course which you now think it did?
Admiral McMorris. I believe that we have certain intelligence data that might furnish very closely the dates and courses.
90. General Russell. Would you make that data available to us?
Admiral McMorris. Yes, sir.
91. General Grunert. Admiral, on several occasions you referred, in addressing this body, to it as a court. It is not a court. It is a Board.
Admiral McMorris. Very good, sir.

92. General Frank. Admiral, you seem to adhere to the sincere belief that this Jap attack was possible and at the same time have the sincere belief that it was not probable.

Admiral McMorris. Those were certainly the views that I entertained at that time.

93. General Frank. Also the Japs had rather complete intelligence information of the conditions here. That has been indicated by captured orders of the attack?

Admiral McMorris. Yes, sir.

94. General Frank. Also that the Army here took measures against sabotage only. Was that satisfactory to the Navy?

Admiral McMorris. I do not know that I can answer that question in that way. Certainly, the chief concern that we felt at the time was that saboteurs or a submarine attack constituted the chief hazard.

95. General Frank. What defense measures against air attack did the Navy have on December 7th?

[2897] Admiral McMorris. The details I do not know.

96. General Frank. They had certain guns aboard the ships?

Admiral McMorris. A plan had been drawn up and signed by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and the Commander, Hawaiian Sea Frontier—

97. General Frank. Who was Admiral Bloch?

Admiral McMorris. Yes. —that included provisions for ships and aircraft in port participating in the local defense, but exactly what those provisions were or what conditions were prescribed I cannot say.

98. General Frank. In analyzing the testimony, the Jap attacking force had a relative degree of security against attack by our fleet, did it not?

Admiral McMorris. Probably, unless there was chance encounter.

99. General Frank. But you stated that had our fleet known of its existence, it would probably have suffered defeat had they met.

Admiral McMorris. I think that is quite possible.

100. General Frank. Then about the only threat the Jap air attack had was from local defenses, after the attack had been launched; is that correct?

Admiral McMorris. Not quite, because the things that the Jap fleet would have to contend with would have included both elements of the fleet, which even had our fleet been defeated would probably have inflicted some damage, so that no one element or consideration can be taken as a thing apart.

101. General Frank. According to your own testimony, it would not have been a paying venture for the United States Fleet have gone out after this attacking Jap force; that is correct, [2892] is it not?

Admiral McMorris. No, sir, I did not say it would not be a paying venture. I did say and feel that our own losses might well have been heavier than those actually experienced, but that I would have expected some damage to have been inflicted on the Japanese Fleet, whereas they actually escaped scot-free.

102. General Frank. Except for the loss of their—

Admiral McMorris. Except for the loss of some aircraft.
103. General Frank. What in your opinion would have been the result of a conflict at sea between the available naval craft here, with two carriers, and the Jap force that came in?

Admiral McMorris. I believe that our fleet would have suffered quite severely and that it would largely have been a contest by air forces, and that it is improbable that we would have succeeded in bringing the Japanese carriers under gunfire. That, however, is necessarily highly speculative.

104. General Frank. That is very true, but in the face of this analysis it would seem that this attack would show up to have been much more probable than with the existing conditions at the time then estimated?

Admiral McMorris. It might be considered very doubtful if the Japanese Fleet had been discovered, with our forces at sea, as to whether or not they would have continued the attack.

105. Major Clausen. Admiral, was the reason that no counter-attack was launched because of the lack of available means, or because you did not know where the attackers were?

Admiral McMorris. We did not know where the attackers were.

106. Major Clausen. Would the present radar installations on the higher mountains as presently operated, had they been operated before or on 7 December, 1941, have permitted you to have found the attackers?

Admiral McMorris. It might have materially assisted.

107. Major Clausen. That is all I have.

108. General Grunert. Any other questions?

Admiral, is there anything else that you think of that you would like to advance or tell the Board that may be of assistance to it in coming to a conclusion about these matters?

Admiral McMorris. No, sir.

109. General Grunert. Thank you very much for coming up. We appreciate your giving us your time.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

[2894] TESTIMONY OF BRIG. GEN. JOHN STEWART BRAGDON, CHIEF OF CONSTRUCTION DIVISION, OFFICE OF CHIEF OF ENGINEERS, WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C.

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel West. General, will you please state to the Board your name, grade, and organization and station?

General Bragdon. John Stewart Bragdon, Brigadier General, Chief of Construction Division in the Office of Chief of Engineers.

2. Colonel West. In the War Department?

General Bragdon. In the War Department, yes.

3. Colonel West. Washington, D. C.?


4. General Frank. Will you state, General Bragdon, how you happen to be here?

General Bragdon. Yes, sir. I am here under orders, of which I have copies, issued by the Adjutant General, dated the—(the witness examines paper) I think it's the 2nd of September; and these orders

79716—46—Ex. 145, vol. 2—46
instruct me to proceed and report to the Commanding General, Pacific Ocean Area, on temporary duty in connection with the activities of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, which meets 17 September 1944.

I was called on the telephone by General Styer, I think about two weeks ago, and told that this investigation was going on and that I should—they wanted somebody to appear before the Board who was conversant with the procedures and policies of the Engineer Department, to appear before the Board, and that I was the person that [2895] should do it, and—

5. General Frank. You were to appear as a witness before the Board?

General Bragdon. They told me, they stated—stated that Colonel Wyman was coming back from France, and they wanted somebody as counsel and adviser to him, but they also indicated that I should also make sure that any facts concerning construction and the Engineer Department or the War Department's methods along that line should be—I should inform the Board of anything which they wanted to know in that line.

6. General Grunert. Was this at the instigation of the Chief of Engineers or the Commanding General of the Army Service Forces?

General Bragdon. No, sir.

7. General Grunert. Or what?

General Bragdon. General Styer told me that General Somervell wanted me to do that, and I think at the same day or possibly a day later I got a call from the Under Secretary's office, from General Reber, and General Reber stated that he had been present when that discussion had been going on and that the Under Secretary's office felt that I should have the assistance of a lawyer, and suggested Major Powell, and of course I said I was very glad to have that assistance and would be very glad to have Major Powell accompany me, and he is here, and he has orders just similar to mine.

8. General Grunert. The Board has no information about your coming, as far as I know. Is that true, Mr. Recorder?

9. Colonel West. Yes, sir. The only information that the Board possibly had regarding General Bragdon was that little [2896] memorandum that came through the other day, forwarded from our Washington headquarters, over Colonel Hughes' signature, advising us that General Bragdon had been designated as Colonel Wyman's counsel and had made request of our headquarters in Washington for certain information. That came second-hand from the Washington headquarters through Colonel Hughes, and we have no copies of orders such as that which General Bragdon has in his possession, or no other official information.

10. General Grunert. You go ahead, finish; then I will begin.

11. General Frank. Why is this lawyer with you?

General Bragdon. I take it, to assist me, sir. I mean that is the—

12. General Frank. In what capacity?

General Bragdon. I would say, the same reasons that I am here. He has his orders to be here with me, sir.

Now, what we had hoped that the Board would do, sir, was allow us to submit statements concerning each of the phases—all phases of the matter. We have particularly read the interim report of the Congressional Committee, and I rather felt that probably that put this
particular phase of the matter somewhat different from other phases, because in that were a lot of conclusions affecting primarily Colonel Wyman's actions in connection with certain of the work under his charge.

That committee—that report has been published, and of course the newspapers carried these criticisms all over the United States, and it was thought desirable that every effort be expended to see that all data were submitted to the Board. In the Office of the Chief of Engineers Major Lozier has been studying exhaustively all the files bearing on it, and particularly the A. W. S. files and the War Gas Reserve files and the circumstances surrounding the awarding of the Hawaiian Constructors' contracts. Those three phases were the three things chiefly touched on by the Congressional Committee, and so we have been studying the files to see if we can get out all the data that it was possible to get and pin down the various circumstances, connecting them up with the dates chronologically so as to show a true picture, and that turns out to be a prodigious task, because the ramifications of all of these things, if pursued, are almost inexhaustible. Major Lozier has done a lot of work like that, on that line; and ever since Major Powell was told that he would come, he similarly has made exhaustive studies, and we are now working, have been working, started working on the files yesterday when we came here.

This wire that I have here—

13. General Frank. Now, just a minute. Specifically in what capacity are you here?

General Bragdon. Well, I take it I am here for two things: in the first place, to—this order says, "in connection with the activities of the Army Pearl Harbor Board"; in other words, to get any data that the Board may want, particularly in connection with the Engineer Department activities; and the next thing: and then as counsel for Colonel Wyman, to help him work up data which bear on his connection with the work, and also in connection with the charges made in the interim report.

14. General Frank. You are out here, from your point of view, to act as counsel for Wyman, as a counsel for the Corps of Engineers, or whom?

[2898] General Bragdon. Counsel for Colonel Wyman, in helping him produce data for the Board, more or less in defense of his actions; but I didn't—don't conceive it, General, to be solely that; I also conceive it to be my duty to present everything I can that affects those particular activities, namely, the—

15. General Frank. Do you feel that you were sent out here as a sort of special investigator for this Board?

General Bragdon. No, sir; not at all, sir.

16. General Frank. Do you feel that you are sent out here as a sort of counsel for the Engineers?

General Bragdon. Yes, sir; I would say partially that.

17. General Frank. From whom did you get your instructions?

General Bragdon. From General Styer.

18. General Frank. What were those instructions?

General Bragdon. Those instructions were about like this, sir—

19. General Frank. Have you anything written?
General Bragdon. No, sir. I had a telephone conversation, but I don't know whether that's along with me or not. I can tell you just about the way the conversation went. The Chief of Engineers and the Deputy Chief happened to be out of the office, and General Styer stated—

20. General Frank. Who is the Deputy Chief?
General Bragdon. General Robins.

21. General Frank. Yes?
General Bragdon. —were out of the, office, and General Styles got me and stated that Colonel Wyman was back from France and going through Washington, was in fact over there, had just been in General Somervell's office, and that he was [2399] coming out to appear before this Board; and they stated that they wanted somebody to appear before the Board who understood the Engineer Department's construction procedures and policies, who was well acquainted with those and could present those as it might affect this case before the Board, and he ended up by saying, "You are it."

I said, "I am it, am I?"

And that was about all there was to it. He said that Colonel Wyman was proceeding on out to San Francisco to have a few days' rest. They had pulled Colonel Wyman, who was in command of the base at Cherbourg, out from there, from his activities. He was all tired out, and he should get a few days' rest. I should contact him in San Francisco.

22. General Frank. In San Francisco?
General Bragdon. Yes, sir; which is exactly what transpired. I contacted him about two days before I came out, and we went through some of the files there, that we thought some of the data might be there that might not be here.

23. General Frank. Did you get any instructions from General Somervell?
General Bragdon. Not personally, no, sir; nothing other than just what I told you, from General Styer.

24. General Frank. Did you get any instruction from Mr. Patterson's office?
General Bragdon. No, sir, not directly from him himself. I talked to General Reber, and General Reber's sole discussions with me were with reference to having a legal man along with me.

25. General Frank. For what purpose?
General Bragdon. To assist me.

[2900]

26. General Frank. Well, why is the Assistant Secretary's office interested in having a special lawyer out here as an assistant to Wyman's counsel?

General Bragdon. I don't know, sir. I know that except—well, I would say any office would be interested in having as much data presented by—well, I guess I might consider myself as a specialist, because I have specialized in construction so much.

27. General Frank. Well, we have an officer who is an Assistant Recorder on the Board.
General Bragdon. Yes.

28. General Frank. Major Clausen, who has been put on the Board, at the instance of the office of the Under Secretary, Mr. Patterson, to assist the Board in this very matter.
General Bragdon. Yes.
29. General Frank. Now, he, I understand, is here for the purpose of representing the War Department and the Under Secretary's office: and now, as I understand it, the same Under Secretary's office is placing another lawyer here to take care of Colonel Wyman's interests.

General Bragdon. Well, I would say he was here primarily to assist me, sir, and I have found in—I have asked—

30. General Frank. And you are here as counsel for Colonel Wyman?

General Bragdon. Yes, sir. I have found, though, in looking through these files that it is a terrific task, and I have been using Major Powell on that. He has been searching—since he has been on this work what he has been doing has been searching files, the A. W.—

31. General Frank. When he came back—Colonel Wyman—to whom did he report in Washington? To General Somervell?

General Bragdon. Yes, sir.

32. General Frank. Or to the Chief of Engineers, or to whom?

General Bragdon. To General Somervell, sir. You see, he over in France—over in—yes, in France, he wasn't under the jurisdiction of the Chief of Engineers. He reported to General Somervell. I haven't got a copy of Colonel Wyman's orders, but he has. He is here, sir. He is now in Hawaii.

33. General Frank. Can you state what you are here to prove?

General Bragdon. No, sir; I am not here to prove any particular thing. I am simply here to—I take—conceive that I am here to see that all data that can possibly bear on construction and the activities here are brought before the Board.

I wonder if I can give you an example of how I figure I might be helpful? I think I can, sir. Before Pearl Harbor, when peace-time regulations were in effect, the procedures were very cumbersome. We had very small limitations on awards of contracts. For instance, a District Engineer had a $10,000 limitation, a Division Engineer a $50,000 limitation. Everything above that had to travel out all the way back to Washington, and there was all that complicated procedure, which was proper procedure to protect the United States. But after Pearl Harbor things changed, and there was a transition, too, along that line! and after Pearl Harbor even an Area Engineer, a subordinate of a District Engineer, had a $3,000,000 limitation.

I think general policies like that do make clear quite a number of things.

34. General Frank. Are you on full time status as a counsel now for Colonel Wyman?

General Bragdon. Well, I am not doing anything else, sir; I mean—

35. General Frank. It seems sort of peculiar, because General Short has been given a counsel to act in addition to his other duties.

General Bragdon. Yes, sir. Well, of course.—

36. General Frank. And here Colonel Wyman comes along and has you, a Brigadier General, and a Major out of the Assistant Secretary's office to take care of him.

General Bragdon. I think, sir, the reason I was designated was simply because I am head of the construction division and supposed to be well acquainted with our construction procedures.

37. General Frank. Do you know anything about the operations at Pearl Harbor around December 7, 1941?
General Bragdon. Except as revealed from a study—I have been studying this up, naturally, since I was assigned to the job—no, sir. I had—

38. General Frank. Yes. But you had no experience with the contractors' nor with the District Engineer's operations in 1941 in Hawaii?

General Bragdon. No, sir, I did not.

39. General Frank. All right. Now, who is Major Lozier?

General Bragdon. Major Lozier is an officer who has been on duty in the Chief of Engineer's legal—

40. General Frank. Is he a service officer?

[2903] General Bragdon. No, sir. The Judge Advocate General's Office. He has been on duty in the Chief of Engineer's office, and he has been sent out here on permanent change of station.

41. General Frank. Did he come out here with you?

General Bragdon. No, sir; he preceded me. His permanent change of station orders I think have been in existence about six weeks. I don't know why they didn't get clearance. And when the Board in Washington called Generals Reybold and Robins before it, he was assigned to work on this case, to get up data for them, so those two Generals could answer you gentlemen's questions before the Board. He has worked intensively on that ever since—well, I think for about five weeks. He worked on the files in Washington, the A. W. S. files and the War Reserve Gasoline Storage files.

42. General Grunert. Still working on that, is he?

General Bragdon. Yes, sir.

43. General Grunert. Then was he sent out here also to help somebody else?

General Bragdon. You see, General, he was out here—his orders out here, I think, about six weeks ago.

44. General Grunert. Then, why is he still on this work? Has he been instructed to be still on this work out here?

General Bragdon. I don't know whether such instructions were given him or not, sir, but we did send a wire out here in connection with my coming, asking them to please arrange these files out here in the chronological order and to segregate them according to what we conceive to be the three main branches of investigation, that is, to segregate the Air Warning Service files from the Reserve Gasoline Storage files [2904] and the Rohl-Connolly contract so that they can be examined here. I found, in the little questioning I have done of various people connected with this, that very few of them can give answers that are specific. They just give you leads, and you have to go to the files to find out anything that is really anyways conclusive.

45. General Frank. To whom were you to report when you got here?

General Bragdon. General Richardson, sir. I just got here yesterday, and I came over, and General Richardson was not here. General Ruffner was out when I got here, too.

46. General Frank. You have an official copy of the telegram to General Richardson?

General Bragdon. Yes, sir, I do.

47. General Frank. Will you read it into the record, please?
A WAR 300004Z WTJ

W-88682 30TH Orders are being requested for Brigadier General J. S. Bragdon to proceed to Hawaii in connection with the Army Pearl Harbor Board hearings there. General Bragdon will act as counsel for Colonel Wyman who will appear before the Board. It is desired that [2905] these officers reach Hawaii on or about twelve September. (To Richardson from Somervell signed Marshall) It is requested that you have the Department Engineer have the records pertaining to the construction of aircraft warning stations, the war reserve gasoline project and all work pertaining to both, also the records pertaining to the Rohl Connolly contract and any other contracts for work or materials relating to the above projects, reviewed and a chronological analysis made thereof so that it will be available for the officers above. It is particularly desirable that there be a chronological record of the actual work done and of all delays in connection therewith, with reasons therefor. Also that local priorities and changes therein be listed according to their occurrence. It is further suggested that the analysis be developed under the three general headings of:

(a) the project for the aircraft warning stations;
(b) the war reserve gasoline storage project; and
(c) the Rohl Connolly contract—
That should have been “Hawaiian Constructors,”
in its relation to those projects and any other work or materials for which that contract was used. Major Lue C. Lozier who is being transferred to the Office of the District Engineer on permanent change of station—

Apparently the second page of it is not here, sir. I will have to get that. It was very brief on the second page, [2906] to the effect that he also was coming. I will have to get that, sir.

[2905-A] Addenda

(A corrected and complete copy of the above-mentioned radiogram which was furnished the Recorder of the Board by Headquarters, United States Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas, (Through Lt. Col. R. W. Hain, G. S. C.) reads as follows:)

This is a re-decipherment of the message dated 30 August and contains corrections.

12 Sept 44 (Date of re-decipherment)

A WAR 300004Z WTJ

W-88682 30TH Orders are being requested for Brigadier General J Pd S Pd Bragdon to proceed to Hawaii in connection with the Army Pearl Harbor Board hearings there Pd. General Bragdon will act as counsel for Colonel Wyman who will appear before Board Pd. It is desired that these officers reach Hawaii on or about twelve September Pd. It is requested that you have the Department Engineer have the records pertaining to the construction of aircraft warning stations cma the war reserve gasoline project and all work pertaining to both cma also the records pertaining to the Rohl Connolly contract and any other contracts for work or materials relating to the above projects cma reviewed and a chronological analysis made thereof so that it will be available for the officers above Pd. It is particularly desirable that there be a chronological record of the actual work done and of all delays in connection therewith cma with reasons therefor Pd. Also that local priorities and changes therein be listed according to their occur-
rence Pd. It is further suggested that the analysis be developed under the three general headings of colon paren a paren the project for the aircraft warning stations semi paren b paren the war reserve gasoline storage [2905-B] project semi and paren c paren the Rehobo Connolly Contract in its relation to those projects and any other work of materials for which that contract was used Pd. Major Lu C Pd Lozier who is being transferred to the Office of the Diver Engineer on permanent change of station is being sent out immediately Pd. Major Lozier also has studied this case.

[2906—continued] 49. General Frank. Have you received any other instructions—any other instructions from anybody—other than those you have mentioned?

General Bragdon. No, sir. I talked it over with General Robins, and General Robins said, "Just give the Board all the facts you can find." That was almost exactly his words. And General Reybold got back about an hour before I left—no, a few hours before I left, the same morning. He had no instructions to give me.

50. General Frank. To whom are you directed to report in Washington after you complete your duty here?

General Bragdon. I wasn't directed to report to anybody, sir. I suppose that I should inform my superiors of what happened.

51. General Frank. Who directed you to come here?

General Bragdon. These orders, sir [indicating].

52. General Frank. I know, but I am getting to the authority that originated these orders.

General Bragdon. I take that to have been General Somervell, because General Styer so told me.

53. General Frank. Yes.

General Bragdon. General Styer first called my Chief and Deputy, but they were both absent.

54. General Frank. I think that is all.

General Bragdon. General, could I say—I think I did say it before, but I did feel, sir, that this particular phase of it was somewhat different from other phases because [2907] there had already been an investigation, and printed report of investigation which actually states certain things were not efficiently done, and that's been in the press all over the country. That's known, and I don't think there is any other phase that has been that way, and I think that undoubtedly is why our superiors felt that somebody who was supposed to know our procedure, both then and now, should be here to make sure the Board could get all those phases and aspects before it. I think that was all there was behind that, sir.

(There was colloquy off the record.)

General Bragdon. Maybe I had better correct that, sir. General Reber is with the—you mentioned it, Colonel.

55. Colonel West. Well, I understood he was with the Legislative and Liaison Division of the War Department.

General Bragdon. With Colonel Persons.

56. Colonel West. General Persons.

General Bragdon. General Persons. Yes, I think he is. Maybe I am mistaken on that. I know he went over to be with the Under Secretary, and I am not just sure, sir, of the relationship between that Legislative Liaison Section and the Under Secretary's office. I know that General Reber—I thought he was right with the Under Secretary's office. I have only been in Washington about two and a half months, and I am not quite sure of all the relationships between those officers.
57. General GRUNERT. What conversation did you have with Reber? General BRAGDON. It was solely to—as I said before, sir, he thought I should have a—he stated that he had been in General Somervell's office when the conversation had taken place there, and he stated he thought I should have a legal man [2908] to help me.

58. General GRUNERT. Then, do you know whether he represented the Under Secretary of War or whom he represented when he made that statement?

General BRAGDON. No, sir. I don't know exactly that. I can't answer that, sir.

59. General GRUNERT. Let me see if I understand the situation correctly. You came over here under orders to act as a counsel for one Colonel Wyman. That's one thing.

General BRAGDON. Yes, sir.

60. General GRUNERT. You came over here also to provide the Board with data from the War Department files and from the Hawaiian Department files if the Board wants such data; is that right?

General BRAGDON. Yes, sir.

61. General GRUNERT. Then, you are in a dual capacity of representing one Colonel Wyman and of being an agent on behalf of the War Department; is that right?

General BRAGDON. I would say, on behalf of the Engineer Department of the War Department. Yes, sir, I would say that was correct.

62. General GRUNERT. Now, as far as the Board knows, Colonel Wyman has not yet been accused of anything except by a Congressional Committee report: and therefore, as far as the Board is concerned, why, we do not admit that there is a counsel required by any witnesses who have appeared before this Board, although any witness may have the advice of counsel in that respect, and not counsel as distinguished from somebody charged with something as far as the Board is concerned.


63. General GRUNERT. You understand that?

General BRAGDON. Yes, sir.

64. General GRUNERT. Now, the Board will be very glad to get any evidence that is available or any explanation of evidence which has not already been advanced and is not already thoroughly understood by the Board. Do you understand that the Board is limited in its investigation to phases that led up to and are directly connected with the Pearl Harbor disaster, and nothing after that unless it relates to that attack?

General BRAGDON. Yes, sir. I understand that, sir.

65. General GRUNERT. And these records that you have been investigating, most of them are after Pearl Harbor or prior thereto, or what?

General BRAGDON. All prior thereto, sir, and the fact is, we have been concentrating on the records of the time between the Hawaiian Constructors' contract and December 7th, the date of Pearl Harbor, and of course we had to go back somewhat prior to that in order to understand that part of it.

66. General GRUNERT. Now, from your investigation have you made up a running story or statement that you would like to submit to the Board or testify to before the Board?
General Bragdon. Not at this time, sir.

67. General Grunert. How long will it take you to do that?

General Bragdon. I would like as much time as I could get.

68. General Grunert. This Board is very limited as to its time, and it is going to leave here probably on the 19th and go back to Washington.

[2910] General Bragdon. I had understood from our orders that you were going to call Colonel Wyman on the 17th, so we had been aiming our studies that we have been making to have our data ready on the 17th.

69. General Grunert. Wyman has been scheduled to appear here on the 14th. It may originally have been intimated the 17th, but it is actually scheduled now as the 14th.

General Bragdon. The 14th?

70. General Grunert. We have to move up in order to accommodate or take care of everything we are charged with doing within the limited time we have to do it. Now, whether or not we could postpone his hearing until a little later, that would be up to General Frank, who has that particular part of the investigation. But there is no use in rehashing a lot of this stuff if the Board already has the evidence that you desire to present on behalf of the Chief of Engineers and on behalf of Wyman. Therefore, it would be very necessary for us to hear what you have to make in the line of a statement before we determine whether or not it is just piling evidence up. In other words, you don’t know what the Board knows.

General Bragdon. No, sir, I don’t.

71. General Grunert. And we don’t know what you may have found out that the Board doesn’t know.

General Bragdon. Could I present the statement of that on the 15th, sir?

72. General Grunert. I think you ought to present your statement as early as possible, to Major Clausen, with a view to seeing whether or not it is new evidence to the Board; the earlier the date, the better. Then we can determine what in [2911] your statement the Board hasn’t had and doesn’t understand or hasn’t had in the evidence so far.

General Bragdon. Could I——

73. General Grunert. This is as if you were coming new into the case. You are coming into the case, newly into the case but probably with old evidence as far as we are concerned, and we have not time to bother with rehashing all this stuff.

General Bragdon. No. I see that.

Could I have the privilege, sir, of reading any of the evidence that pertains to those particular phases?

74. General Grunert. I do not see the necessity of your reading the evidence that the Board has taken.

General Bragdon. My whole point was to see if—in many cases I have found things——

75. General Grunert. You may consult Major Clausen as to whether or not such evidence exists on any point you wish.

General Bragdon. Yes.

76. General Grunert. But to turn over the evidence of the Board to any particular witness or anyone who is interested in another wit-
ness would be giving one witness the benefit of knowing what all the other witnesses had said, and in case of any future action therein it wouldn't be "turkey."

General Bragdon. Of course, my idea would be just to do it in his presence, in his office.

77. General Grunert. But you are in the capacity here—that is why I wanted to bring out that dual capacity. You are in the capacity here of a counsel, to counsel some particular witness. Therefore I do not see where it is pertinent that you should read all the evidence, nor should the witness know [2912] what the others testified to.

General Bragdon. Yes.

78. General Grunert. If, as an aftermath of whatever may happen, anyone is particularly charged with anything, then the law and the regulations give him ample opportunity to prepare whatever case may be against him.

It seems that most people have an idea that this is a court of inquiry or something or a court to investigate some particular man or some particular person. We are here to find facts about those things charged to us.

General Bragdon. Yes.

79. General Grunert. And as far as you people are concerned, now that you have shown yourself as counsel for Wyman, as far as you are concerned, those phases that pertain to the Pearl Harbor disaster, it may or may not have a bearing on the Pearl Harbor disaster, and that will include Colonel Wyman.

General Bragdon. Yes.

80. General Grunert. So we want to get all the evidence we can, but we can't include you as a member of the Board to know everything that has gone on, and so forth.

General Bragdon. That is right.

81. General Grunert. There is nothing to be hidden except through our instruction of holding this in closed session.

Do you sort of get an understanding of that, I mean?

General Bragdon. Yes, sir. Of course, it is a fact that those—we had then an awful lot of data which bore on those matters which were in that Congressional report. Of course, we had naturally addressed ourselves to that, because that was pretty definite—rather, an awful lot of things were said there, [2913] and that was why we thought it was important that these things that we had found which answered a lot of those things should be most certainly placed before you.

82. General Frank. Well, you understand that the Board has a regular procedure, and we have developed a requirement for things that we want, and we have established the routine of getting it.

General Bragdon. Yes, sir. I only want to fit in with that procedure, sir. I say, I only wanted to fit in with that. I wasn't—

83. General Grunert. You might ask the Assistant Recorder whether certain evidence has been brought out, introduced or not, with a view to finding out what has been done, so that if you have anything new the Board would be glad to get it.

General Bragdon. Yes.

84. General Grunert. Is that about right?

85. General Frank. Yes.
General Bragdon. I can submit all the statements I want, can't I, with reference to these—
86. General Frank. Yes.
87. General Grunert. Yes, but we don't want to pile up evidence. If we are satisfied that we have evidence on a point, there is no use piling up records of it. We would be glad to get anything you want to submit for consideration.

General Bragdon. General, would there be any objection, with reference to particular witnesses that have to do with Wyman's case, to either myself or Major Powell being present, just for those particular witnesses that had to do with Wyman and the air warning service?

[2914] 88. General Grunert. You mean, to sit in with those witnesses when they give their testimony?

General Bragdon. Just to be present.
89. General Frank. No.
90. General Grunert. No; we cannot consider that anybody at present needs a counsel for that, except where it is authorized by the War Department directly, as was done for General Short, and that was just to sit in during the time General Short was giving his testimony, and for no other witnesses.

General Bragdon. Not while others affecting him were there? My whole point would be just to make sure you got everything bearing on those individual points.
91. General Frank. You seem to have come out here to have joined the Board.

General Bragdon. No, sir, I don't believe that—I mean, I have no such intention.
92. General Grunert. Well, the Board is a little bit confused as to the necessity of the War Department's sending two or three people out here when the War Department is already represented by an Assistant Recorder who was specially detailed for that purpose by the Under Secretary of War.

General Bragdon. Yes, sir.
93. General Grunert. So that this coming of this avalanche of talent, or rank and talent, is not understood by the Board; but if this avalanche has anything to contribute to the Board, we shall be very glad to get it.

94. General Frank. Have you some questions, Colonel Toulmin?
95. Colonel Toulmin. I would like to ask him one or two questions, if it is agreeable, General.

General, I am confused and I think the record is not entirely clear as to just whom you are representing, or defending, rather, other than Colonel Wyman. Whom else are you acting either as counsel for or defending here besides Colonel Wyman?

General Bragdon. I wouldn't say I was defending any individual. I do feel that I should bring to the attention of the Board any procedures which might explain to the Board any charges of wrong policies or inefficiencies on the part of our methods of doing things.

Do I make myself clear on that?
In other words, if it is asserted that due to certain methods of the Engineer Department certain things might have been delayed, and I can explain them, then I would conceive it to be my duty to do that.
96. Colonel Toullmin. Then you would be acting as a witness; is that it?

General Bragdon. I would say that that was it, too, yes.

97. Colonel Toullmin. And you would also be acting as counsel?

General Bragdon. Yes, because, General, of course, you see, the two things are intermingled. Colonel Wyman was the officer who was in direct charge. Of course, he was under the Commanding General here, but he was in direct charge. But there are a lot of things to be explained by existing procedures at that time, which were peacetime procedures, and there is a legitimate line of demarcation, although there was a transition between them, and that transition had to do with things—for example, CPFF contracts were not in existence in time of peace, and they came in before Pearl Harbor, but just before it.

98. Colonel Toullmin. But it is a little unusual to have a man appointed both as counsel and as witness. Under any sort of procedure before a board or a court that is a bit unusual, so I am puzzled in asking the question.

Now let me ask one more question: What was the reason for the conference between such high authority as General Somervell, General Styer, and General Reber in connection with this matter? That is, what is the objective sought to be accomplished?

General Bragdon. I don't know that, sir, because I wasn't present. The only thing I knew about when I received a telephone call and I received those instructions which I have already mentioned.

99. Colonel Toullmin. You are not counsel for those people, are you?

General Bragdon. No, sir.

100. General Grunert. Well, then, have you finished?

101. Colonel Toullmin. That is all.

102. Colonel West. I have one question, General.

103. General Grunert. Yes.

104. Colonel West. Suppose, General, in the course of your research for certain documents or data which this Board desired, you should run across some information which might be inimical to the interests of Colonel Wyman: what would you do in a case of that sort?

General Bragdon. I would give it to the Board.

105. Colonel West. Even though you have been designated as his counsel, you feel under a duty to see that a full, free, and frank disclosure of all the facts is made?

[2917] General Bragdon. Of course, you ask a very difficult question, but I asked General Robins—

106. Colonel West. I think you are in a very difficult position, and I am wondering if you gave any thought to the matter before you left Washington.

General Bragdon. Well, I did to this extent: I said to General Robins—I didn't ask him that question, as such, but General Robins said, "You should give the Board all the facts you can find, but our point is to give them all the facts." And that is what I conceive it to be my job to do, to give you all the facts, because I thought there was a great paucity of facts.

I would like to reiterate, too, with every one of those I questioned—I believe it was about four or five people who had to do with the
air warning service in Washington: a Colonel Smith, a Mr. Richardson, a Colonel Letts, who had been in that job for about 35 years; Colonel Mayo, now with the Air Force; and when I talked to those people all I got was generalities; I couldn't get specific things. But they would give leads, and the only way I could get anything I could pin down was when I went to these files, and then I would get something that was specific. That was one thing that worried me. Just questionings didn't get it, but when you went to the files and commenced to pin things down, then the story commenced to be clear.

107. Colonel Toulmin. General, I would like to ask one question: Is Colonel Wyman aware, General, of the fact that your position will be such as that indicated in your answer to Colonel West, that as his counsel you feel that you are also going to produce any information that may lead to his [2918] conviction?

General Bragdon. Well, he isn't on trial, sir. I mean you say—

108. Colonel Toulmin. Well, have you told him that you are going to produce all of this evidence no matter whom it hurts?

General Bragdon. No, we did not discuss that point at all.

109. Colonel Toulmin. I see.

General Bragdon. I mean, I don't think "conviction" is a word that should be used, because—

110. Colonel Toulmin. Well, omit the word "conviction." Have you told him that you are in this unique capacity of both his counsel and as an investigator to get all the facts?

General Bragdon. No, sir. I am willing to tell him that I will conceive it to be my job to produce anything before the Board that I find the Board could——

111. General Frank. Who appointed you as counsel for Wyman?

General Bragdon. Well, I would say that, as far as the appointment is concerned, there was no written designation.

112. General Frank. Well, who designated you?

General Bragdon. Well, that was the time, of course, when General Styer talked to me on the phone, General.

113. General Frank. What I am trying to get is who designated you as that, as counsel.

General Bragdon. Nobody gave me an official designation. Those were the terms used by General Styer when he called me up.

114. General Frank. It is, then, General Somervell's office that has designated you as counsel for Wyman?

General Bragdon. Yes.

115. General Frank. All right. Now, who gave you the [2919] instruction to provide all this information to the Board? General Somervell’s office?

General Bragdon. No, sir.

116. General Frank. Or the Office, Corps of Engineers?

General Bragdon. No, sir. General, you are making it more formal than it was. I simply talked with General Robins about coming out here. I asked, "Have you anything to tell me to do, General, when I get there before the Board?"

And he said, "No. Just tell them the whole straightforward facts, anything you find."

Now, that is the only basis I have for this other reply to Colonel West. I didn’t get a lot of specific instructions.
117. General Grunert. Then, it is the Engineers that want the Board to hear you as a witness?
General Bragdon. Well, they had—they never initiated that, sir. They never initiated that.
118. General Grunert. Well, we didn’t initiate it. Did Wyman ask for you? Why are you out here? Somebody initiated it.
General Bragdon. Well, all I know is, I was called by one of my superiors in General Somervell’s office.
119. General Grunert. Well, then, it was initiated in General Somervell’s office?
General Bragdon. It was initiated in General Somervell’s office, yes, sir.
120. General Grunert. That is, as far as your coming out here as counsel for Wyman is concerned?
General Bragdon. Yes, sir.
121. General Grunert. Well, now, who initiated your coming out here to give the Board additional information the Board hasn’t
already received or called for?
General Bragdon. Well, nobody told me that I would be a witness before the Board—that is, and defined it as formally as you gentlemen have formulated it.
122. General Grunert. We only accept evidence here through witnesses.
General Bragdon. Yes, sir.
123. General Grunert. And official documents.
124. General Frank. After all, there has to be some sort of formal-ity about the operations of this Board.
General Bragdon. Yes. On the other hand, sir, I would say if we should chase that down technically, it is simply a fact that this ordered me here to report to General Richardson in connection with the ac-
tivities of the Army Pearl Harbor Board.
125. General Frank. But the Board calls the witnesses it wants, not those that are imposed upon it.
General Bragdon. Yes, sir. Well, I would like to appear before the Board if you will all give me the authority to do it, sir. If you simply say I can’t do it—
126. General Grunert. That is what I am getting at. The Board will then consider you as an officer desired by Colonel Wyman to counsel him. I say “counsel him”; not as his counsel, but to counsel him, because he hasn’t been charged with anything that I know of.
General Bragdon. Yes, sir.
127. General Grunert. And also as a witness.
128. General Frank. For the Board.
129. General Grunert. Yes, as a witness, we will call you; as a witness for the Board.
General Bragdon. I appreciate that very much, sir.
130. General Grunert. So that you can find anything you have in mind, make up your statement, and I would advise you to consult with the Assistant Recorder so as to avoid wasting your time and our

time on what is not necessary.
General Bragdon. Yes, sir.
131. Colonel Toulmin. May I ask one question?
132. Colonel West. I have one.
133. Colonel Toulmin. General Grunert, may I ask just one question, please?
134. General Grunert. Yes.
135. Colonel Toulmin. General, may I ask you this?
General Bragdon. Yes.
136. Colonel Toulmin. Did Colonel Wyman's visit to General Somervell precede the instructions that came to you from General Somervell's office? Did they tell you anything? Or General Styer?
General Bragdon. Yes, sir.
137. Colonel Toulmin. That is all.
138. Colonel West. May I ask another question, General?
139. General Grunert. Yes.
140. Colonel West. Did Colonel Wyman ask for you by name, as counsel?
General Bragdon. I don't know, sir. I have wondered that. I just don't know.
141. Colonel West. Do you know whether or not he asked General Somervell's office to designate someone as counsel?
General Bragdon. No, sir; I do not know that.
142. Colonel West. Did I understand you to say that you had [2922] talked with Colonel Wyman in San Francisco?
General Bragdon. Yes.
143. Colonel West. On the way over here?
General Bragdon. Yes, that is right.
144. Colonel West. Did you inquire of him whether or not your designation as his counsel was satisfactory to him?
General Bragdon. No, I didn't ask him that at all.
145. General Grunert. Well, we will ask him that.
146. Colonel West. I have no further questions, sir.
147. General Grunert. Thank you very much. And get busy now, so that you will be prepared to help the Board when the time comes for you to be called.
General Bragdon. Thank you, sir.
(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

[2923] TESTIMONY OF MAJOR BOLLING R. POWELL, JUNIOR; GENERAL STAFF CORPS, LEGISLATIVE AND LIAISON DIVISION, WAR DEPARTMENT, GENERAL STAFF, WASHINGTON, D. C.

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)
1. Colonel West. Major, will you please state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station.
Major Powell. Bolling R. Powell, Junior; Major, General Staff Corps, Legislative and Liaison Division; War Department, General Staff. Washington, D. C., is my station.
2. General Grunert. Major, we really do not know what you are a witness for, or to, or against, or whatnot; but it appears that you have come out here on something connected with this Board, so I am going to have General Frank try to find out what you are here for, and what we are going to do with you.
Major Powell. All right, sir.
4. General Frank. Will you state how you happen to be here.

Major Powell. I am here pursuant to orders of the Adjutant General dated 4 September 1944, which direct me to—

Proceed, not later than 13 September 1944, to the Commanding General, Pacific Ocean area, on further temporary duty for approximately 31 days, in connection with the activities of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, which meets September 1944, and upon completion of this temporary duty, will return to proper station.

That is a quotation from these orders of mine. I was instructed.

5. General Frank. By whom?

Major Powell. By General Miles Reber, of the Legislative and Liaison Division, War Department, General Staff.

6. General Frank. In whose office does he function?

Major Powell. He functions under the War Department General Staff. General Persons is the head of that particular division of the War Department General Staff, and I was directed by General Reber to report to General Bragdon for instructions, and to serve General Bragdon in any capacity I could, in connection with the consideration of the interim report of the House Military Affairs Committee, involving the Wyman-Rohl relationships and the charges contained in that interim report, with which you are familiar; and that was my instruction.

7. General Frank. In what manner are you serving with respect to the Assistant Secretary's office?

Major Powell. Well, I have no directions or instructions from either the Assistant Secretary or the Under Secretary. My only instructions came from General Reber.

8. General Frank. You have no instructions from Judge Patterson's office.

Major Powell. No, sir; the only instructions I have are from General Reber, and he, as I said, directed me to report to General Bragdon.

9. General Frank. Do you know whether or not your coming out here was coordinated with Judge Patterson's office?

Major Powell. I don't know, of my own personal knowledge; no, sir.

10. General Frank. When you came out here, did you know that there already was an officer on the Board who was designated by the War Department?

Major Powell. Yes, sir; I had secured a copy of the order appointing the Board, and the order referring to the Board this consideration of the interim report; and I knew that Colonel West had been designated Recorder of the Board, and Major Clausen, Assistant Recorder; but I was not directed of course to work with the Board, or become any part of the personnel attached to the Board. I was told that I was to work with General Bragdon and assist him in preparing evidence to be presented to the Board in connection with the charges contained in this congressional committee, report—in other words, in the nature of counsel or advisor.

11. General Frank. Did you receive instructions from anybody else besides General Reber on this thing?

Major Powell. No, sir.

12. General Frank. None?
Major Powell. None whatever—other than General Bragdon, after I reported to him, of course.

13. General Frank. What instructions did you receive from him?

Major Powell. Well, General Bragdon has used me in assisting him in preparing the evidence involving the charges contained in this House report, the interim report, assisting him in getting that together and trying to develop it in orderly and coherent fashion so that we could present it to the Board and be of assistance to the Board in that respect.

14. General Frank. That is, the evidence concerning what?

Major Powell. The charges leveled against Colonel Theodore Wyman and—

[2926] 15. General Frank. That he did what?

Major Powell. Well, the charges in this report of the House committee. There are a number of charges and accusations and imputations and everything else contained through there; and we have been trying to develop evidence and get the facts, all the facts that have anything to do with that, in the files of the office of the Chief Engineer, and in the files of the office of the division engineer in San Francisco, and in the files of the engineer office here at Honolulu; and my only purpose was to get that together and present it in an orderly and coherent way so the Board will have the whole picture.

We are not attempting in any way to present a biased or just one side of the picture; we want the Board to have the whole thing, of course; but that is the nature of our activities.

16. General Frank. Was there some question about the ability of the Board to get at the facts?

Major Powell. None whatever, to my knowledge; certainly no one ever told me of anything, or made any such accusation; but this Board, I was told, was charged, of course, with the investigation of the whole Pearl Harbor matter, and the engineer, the Chief of Engineers and his officers have been accused of irregularities and inefficiencies, through this House report, and no other branch of the service has a House report such as this one facing it, and I was advised that it was because of the charges contained in that House report that it was desired that we prepare evidence and aid the Board in answering the charges contained in the House report; not the general Pearl Harbor investigation as such, if you get the [2927] distinction, there.

17. General Grunert. What are your investigations? Had you any instructions in the nature of preparing a defense against such charges?

Major Powell. Not a defense, other than presenting the facts, the whole facts, and presenting them in a coherent manner that would be easily understood.

18. General Grunert. Wherein is the Legislative Division, as such, interested in this matter? Why should they have selected someone from the Legislative Division—why not some one from the Adjutant General's Office, or from the Judge Advocate General’s Office, or what? Why were you selected to do this, do you know?

Major Powell. No, sir; I don't know.

19. General Grunert. You do not know why Reber was called upon to produce somebody, do you?
Major Powell. No, sir; I don't.

20. General Grunert. Are you an ex-engineer, or an engineer?
Major Powell. No, sir; I am a lawyer in civil life.

21. General Grunert. But have you been connected with the engineers?
Major Powell. No, sir.

22. General Grunert. This just came out of the clear sky to you?
Major Powell. Yes, sir.

23. General Grunert. And apparently they are just using you to advise with and help General Bragdon, because of your legal experience?
Major Powell. Legal background; I think so; yes, sir.

[2928] 24. General Grunert. And they thought it was necessary to have someone with legal experience to dig up these facts, is that it?
Major Powell. I can't say what they thought, sir, that they thought it was necessary, or not. I think they thought it would be helpful to have a man with legal background prepare this evidence.

25. General Grunert. And what progress have you made?
Major Powell. Well, as I say, we have gone, and gone through the records in the Chief of Engineers' office, in Washington; we have gone through the records in the division engineer's, in San Francisco, and are now in process of going through the records here; and we are preparing exhibits and maps, and we are preparing documents and things of that nature that we are finding, to present.

26. General Grunert. Are you preparing these things just as if the ones to whom you were going to submit them do not know anything about the case?
Major Powell. No, sir; but we are preparing them from the point of view of giving the Board, being absolutely sure that the Board has everything that has a material bearing on the case, and trying to present it to the Board in a manner that will save the Board a lot of time and assist them in understanding the real significance of it.

27. General Grunert. The Board will appreciate anything you can do in that line that is not redundant, that is not already contained in the record; and then you will be prepared to be called as a witness by the Board, will you, as soon as you have obtained this evidence and put it in form?

[2929] Major Powell. It had not been anticipated that I would be called as a witness. As I say, it was anticipated that I would aid in preparing witnesses to appear before the Board, more than being called as a witness, because I have no personal knowledge of this matter, as General Frank brought out.

28. General Grunert. Now, when you prepare a witness, what do you prepare that witness for, except to produce certain evidence or certain lines of thought or lines of action? Now, why should you prepare witnesses?

29. General Frank. Evidence is "fact."
Major Powell. Well, when I say "preparing a witness," I mean seeing that the witness will present to this Board, the witnesses that have been called by this Board will present to it, everything that is of record, and is pertinent, here.
30. General Frank. You think that needs a lawyer—an expert lawyer to do that for the Board?

Major Powell. Well, I can't say, of course, would not be presumptuous enough to say the Board needs me, but I received these orders to come and help in any way that I could.

31. General Grunert. Then I understand that you simply have been detailed to assist General Bragdon in whatever he has been ordered to do?

Major Powell. That is correct; yes, sir.

32. General Grunert. Well, I think that settles it, right there.

33. Colonel Toulmin. I would like to ask him just one question.

34. General Grunert. Go ahead, ask him a question.

35. Colonel Toulmin. You are from the Legislative Division, as I understand it. You have read this committee interim report of Congress, is that right?


36. Colonel Toulmin. Is it your purpose to show that the committee's statements were wrong, in whole or in part?

Major Powell. Well, it is our purpose to show all facts that have anything to do with the statements of the committee.

37. Colonel Toulmin. You do not answer me.

Major Powell. And whether its statements are wrong or not, or whether they are half truths, will just depend on the facts.

38. Colonel Toulmin. Is it your position that Congress did not either have the ability to get at the facts, or did not put all the facts in the record?

Major Powell. It is my own personal opinion from the facts that I have uncovered in the files of the engineers' offices that there are a great many inaccuracies in that report of Congress, and I think the facts that we present to you gentlemen will definitely show that.

39. Colonel Toulmin. What firm were you connected with in civil life, Major?

Major Powell. Well, I was first connected with the law firm of Martin, Turner, & McWhorter, in Birmingham, Alabama. I served for a year on the law faculty at the University of Virginia, and immediately before coming in the Army, I was associated in legal work with the American Telephone & Telegraph, as a house counsel.

40. Colonel Toulmin. That is all.

Colonel West. May I ask a question?

41. General Grunert. Yes.

Colonel West. What was General Reber's assignment prior [2931] to his going on this Legislative and Liaison Division?

Major Powell. I don't know, sir. I didn't know him before that. I don't know just what it was.

42. Colonel West. Has he just recently gone on that assignment?

Major Powell. He has been there for some time, to my knowledge. Now, he has been acting as head of that division, in General Persons' absence.

43. Colonel West. Is that division under the Under Secretary of War's office in any way?

Major Powell. Well, I know it is a division of the War Department General Staff, and I cannot say just how the War Department General Staff fits into the picture, but it was my impression that, in
effect, that was General Marshall's staff, and that the line of command would go right on up through General Marshall to the Secretary of War.

44. Colonel West. Just one other question: Is it your understanding that you are functioning as a sort of assistant counsel for Colonel Wyman?

Major Powell. That's my understanding—to assist him.

45. Colonel West. In other words, you are General Bragdon's assistant, and he is designated as counsel?

Major Powell. As counsel.

46. Colonel West. So you are really in the nature of assistant counsel for Colonel Wyman?

Major Powell. That is right, sir; I was assigned to assist Colonel Wyman in any way possible, and our approach to this thing has been, as I have said—I would like to emphasize—not from the point of view of the over-all investigation of this Board, into the Pearl Harbor disaster, but this House interim report. We have studied that very carefully and analyzed all the charges contained in there, and have been endeavoring to develop the evidence on those charges.

47. General Frank. I would like to ask a question. You stated that you considered it one of your duties, to prepare the witnesses. We simply are after facts, and if the witness has the facts, that is all we are after—the simple facts.

Major Powell. That is right.

48. General Frank. How do you expect to prepare a witness to give us simple facts, other than the normal way in which he would do it?

Major Powell. Well, we have been endeavoring; when I say "prepare the witness." I mean, to see that the witness knows all of the facts that he is supposed to know, that are in the files, there, that are contained there, and have them organized in some orderly way to come down here and present them to you gentlemen.

49. General Frank. After all, is it not the Board's option to get its facts and its witnesses, without having the witnesses tampered with?

Major Powell. Well, I wouldn't want my statement with reference to the preparation of a witness to be interpreted for one moment as tampering with the witness, or advising the witness to say anything less than the whole truth, and everything that is material; but it is of some assistance, I think, for a witness to go over all the facts and come prepared, rather than just walk in "green," not knowing what he is going to be faced with.

[2932] 50. General Frank. Do I understand that you are about to ask the Board for a list of the witnesses that it is going to call, so that you can have an opportunity to deal with them?

Major Powell. Well, no, sir; I am not about to ask the Board for any list of witnesses.

51. General Frank. All right.

52. Colonel Toulmin. I would like to ask you one question, Major. Do you regard it as proper for a lawyer to appear as counsel for a man, and also appear as a witness in disclosing all of the records and other data and facts, which may be adverse to the man whom he represents?

Major Powell. I say it would be highly irregular, sir, and as I have stated before, I have no instructions to appear as a witness, and
I would be of no aid as a witness, because anything I said would be second-hand.

53. General Grunert. See if this statement of mine is correct: As far as you know, then, the War Department and the Chief of Engineers' Office have sent you people out here to be sure that the Board gets a chance to get all the facts?
Major Powell. Correct.
54. General Grunert. Pro or con?
Major Powell. Right, sir.
55. General Grunert. That is all.
Major Powell. And to withhold nothing.
56. General Grunert. Thank you very much for coming in. We wanted to get your status settled, because we did not know where you stood.
Major Powell. All right, sir; fine!
(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)
(Thereupon, having concluded the hearing of witnesses, the Board took up the consideration of other business until 2 p.m.)

[2934]

AFTERNOON SESSION

(The Board, at 2 o'clock p.m., continued the hearing of witnesses.)
General Grunert. The Board will please come to order.

TESTIMONY OF SENATOR WILLIAM HARDY HILL, 72 KEÖKEO ROAD, HONOLULU, T. H.

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)
1. Colonel West. Senator, will you state to the Board your full name and address, please?
   Senator Hill. William Hardy Hill, 77 Keokeo Road, Honolulu.
2. General Grunert. Senator, this Board was appointed to ascertain and report the facts relating to the attack made by Japanese armed forces upon the Territory of Hawaii on the 7th of December, 1941, and, in addition thereto, to consider the phases which related to the Pearl Harbor disaster of the report of the House Military Affairs Committee. This latter report is largely concerned with construction. We are after facts and leads to where facts can be found.
   General Short has furnished the Board a list of representative citizens living in Hawaii who he says may have information of value to the Board. Your name being on that list, we have asked you here with the hope that you may have facts to present to us.
   Now, General Short did not refer to any particular subject on which you might testify, so it is up to you to open the subject, which we may then develop by our questions. Do you know of any particular thing that General Short might wish you to [2935] tell the Board?
   Senator Hill. I do not, and as far as facts are concerned regarding the attack I do not have any. I knew General Short very well, had many talks with him. We have discussed briefly, as much as a military man would care to discuss with a civilian, the situation over here, but I have no definite facts that I can give this Board.
3. General Grunert. Possibly he might have wanted you to tell us what you thought of him, together with what you may know of your own accord as to his endeavors here to build up a defense. Is there anything in that line that you might tell us?

Senator Hill. Well, I have never known a man who I thought more highly of. I think he was a very fine man. He was a serious and conscientious man and very high idealized. I felt and he led me to believe, at least I gathered from what he said at different times, that he was not being given support in the way of men and ammunition from Washington that he should. I believe that he felt that he should have had more men and more ammunition and better equipment.

The General was not afraid of an attack from Japan. In fact, nobody in Hawaii gave any thought to that. We thought we were safe and Japan would attack possibly the Philippines or possibly Panama. There was no thought in my mind and I am sure there was no thought in General Short's mind that Hawaii would be attacked.

On one occasion, when General Short returned from Washington, I said to him "Well, how did you get along?" And his answer was that he did not feel that he was being given the support that he should.

[2936] 4. General Grunert. You did not know what he expected, did you?

Senator Hill. I believe—and all of this is belief—that he wanted more planes, that he wanted more men, and I am not sure that he told me, but somebody told me, some military people, that some of the guns had not been fired for some 15 or 20 years, until he came here, and I gathered that he was back there to try to get larger appropriations in order to better fortify the Islands of Hawaii, the Territory.

5. General Grunert. Although these things that you tell us may not be facts, this Board, although it wants facts, is also obtaining some impressions. It wants to size up the conditions. Can you give us something in the line of the condition or the state of mind of the population here?

Senator Hill. Yes. The population had a tremendous amount of confidence in the armed forces. They felt they were absolutely protected against any attack that could ever be made. As an example, about two months before the attack I made a little speech up in Spokane, Washington to the Rotary Club, and I told them that I thought they were in just as much danger of attack as we were; we had high-powered guns and we had the radars, we had planes, and that we were absolutely safe, and that was the feeling of all of the civilian population.

6. General Grunert. Having that impression when the attack came did you feel let down by the military?

Senator Hill. Frankly, we did. We felt that we were let down to a certain extent, but the feeling here, and almost all of the people feel, that the let down was not here but in Washington.

[2937] General Grunert. Have you any basis for that feeling?

Senator Hill. We feel that in Washington the powers that be were being hoodwinked by the Japs and that they were afraid to do very much for fear that they would offend the Japanese. I know we read in the papers where they refused some 30 or 40 thousand dollars to do some work on Guam, for fear that it would offend the Japanese.
The general feeling, I think, is that Washington did not give us the protection and the men and equipment and so forth that we were entitled to. We feel and have felt since the war that Cordell Hull and others in Washington knew a great deal more about the situation than we were told. There was no feeling that I know of that General Short had let us down or had sort of gone to sleep on the job. He was recognized, I think, throughout the Territory as a very serious-minded and an efficient and a good man, doing the best that he could. He was not out on parties at night, not a drinking man, but he was all business. There is a kindly feeling toward General Short throughout the Territory.

8. General Grunert. Now, you said that it was general belief that he did the best he could. The Board has had testimony to the effect that he took an alert, called No. 1, the sabotage alert, where he could have taken an all-out alert. What the consequences were or what happened is well known. What might have happened had he taken a greater alert that would have provided greater security, one does not know. But I cannot well ask you what was in General Short’s mind when he took the lowest form of alert, but can you tell us anything about the public mind as to the danger from sabotage of your population?

Senator Hill. We were not afraid of sabotage and there was very little of it here. The different races, we feel differently toward them from what they do on the mainland, and still feel that a great many or nearly all the Japs were loyal citizens or, at least, loyal enough not to do any harm.

I think that the armed forces—I think that General Short was not too much afraid of sabotage and work of that kind. We have heard that at that time they were on a sabotage alert. We have also been led to believe that these alert orders came from Washington. They were on the alert so much for a year or two before the war—I talked with some of the officers—“My God, we have been on the alert so much off and on and off and on” that it got to be a sort of a tiresome thing. I did not know that the General had it within his power to name the type of alert. We were under the impression—at least I was, and most of us were—that these orders came from Washington.

We have also heard that orders were cabled from Washington on December the 7th regarding this attack and the possibility of it, and the message did not reach General Short until sometime in the afternoon. General Short did not tell me that. Some of my information, I am very glad to tell you where I got it so you can follow it up, was from a man named Dick Hale—, a newspaper man who was very friendly with General Short also. I think that he can give you possibly some information that you want.

9. General Grunert. Is he located here in the city?

Senator Hill. He lives here in the city. I think at the Pacific Club.

10. General Grunert. And at that time he was a newspaper man?

Senator Hill. He was.

11. General Grunert. And he gave you an impression? Just what impression did he give you?

Senator Hill. He gave me the impression—some of the impressions I have given you here—that General Short was doing the best that he
could and that he was being let down a little by Washington, they were not giving him the equipment and men that he should have and that he had asked for repeatedly.

12. General Grunert. Did he tell you that this sabotage alert was ordered from Washington?

Senator Hill. I cannot say whether Haller told me that or not. We heard it at the time. I cannot say, I do not recall whether Haller was the man who told me that, but it was general information.

13. General Grunert. What do you suppose his source of information was?

Senator Hill. I have an idea it was General Short direct. He was very close to General Short.

14. General Grunert. Was there any influence that you know of by citizens or groups of citizens that would have prevented or would have influenced General Short in refraining from going on the all-out alert because of the disruption it might cause in plantations as far as the sugar-cane crop or the pineapple crop or this and that were concerned?

Senator Hill. Since the war, since the outbreak, it has been shown that the actions of the Commanding General here are influenced somewhat by the civilian population. Now, I mean this: General Emmons had in mind moving a great many of the Japanese from the Territory. He discussed this with me. I also discussed with his Deputy Chief of Staff, Phillips. He wanted to move many, many thousands out of here. It was his idea that the Japanese, the intelligent or semi-intelligent, semi-educated Japanese was the more dangerous; that the old alien out of the cane field was not as dangerous. But the sugar planters, the so-called Big Five in the Territory, immediately got busy, contacted Washington, contacted General Emmons, contacted everybody that they could and put it up to them in this way: "We put out a million tons of sugar per year. If you take our Japs out you get no sugar." They were very badly frightened that something of that kind would happen and they used all the pressure that they could, and apparently they were successful in getting what they wanted, because General Emmons definitely did want to ship out many, many thousands of Japanese.

15. General Grunert. Where was he going to ship them, do you know?

Senator Hill. Anywhere on the mainland, but get them out of here.

16. General Grunert. You knowing the Japanese and Filipino elements of the population, how do you size them up as regards their being a menace to the defense of the group of islands?

Senator Hill. At the present time? You mean whether they are a menace now?

17. General Grunert. Then or now.

Senator Hill. I cannot see that they are in any way a menace to the war effort. The Filipino is definitely a good worker and a loyal man. The Japanese, I believe, are loyal to us, most of them, because we are in charge. I do believe that as soon as a Japanese soldier is put on Hawaiian soil, the majority of the people will be loyal Japanese. I think they are just riding—
18. General Frank. The bandwagon?

Senator Hill. Riding on the fence. I have many of them working for me and with me. I have lived with them here for 33 years. I know that even in the third and fourth generation the Jap is just as much a Jap as he was a thousand years ago. As you know, their religion, their State, their politics, are all in one,—the family. Recently there was a third generation Japanese married. His mother was born here. He was married in the old Japanese style, just exactly as they did in Japan 2,000 years ago. They are not becoming Americanized.

19. General Grunert. But they do have two political parties, don’t they?

Senator Hill. Yes. We have two political parties, the Democrat and the Republican parties here, and up until a few years ago, when their numbers were small, they voted en bloc. As they got larger, as the group became larger, a few others aspired for a little power or leadership, and with the help of some of the rest of them we got them sort of divided and fighting among themselves, so they are not now voting in a solid bloc, although they have been able to elect many Japanese to public office, in the Legislature and in the different boards of supervisors.

20. General Grunert. Do any of you think of any other avenue of approach, anything else to ask the Senator? If not, I will ask the Senator to bring up anything that he thinks might be of value to the Board, realizing that we are looking at the attack on Pearl Harbor, what led up to it, what happened there, and only those things afterwards as are related to the attack.

Senator Hill. I am sorry I have not been of more help to you. I realize I have not been of much help. There are two or three things, though, that I would like to mention. One is that the Roberts report stated that there was no cooperation between the Army and Navy. Again, I do not know the facts, but we never heard before the war of any lack of cooperation. We knew there was a certain rivalry in the football games, and so forth, but we felt and knew, or thought we knew, that they were conferring and cooperating. Now, that is the general impression in the Territory.

21. General Grunert. You do not know how effective that cooperation was, do you?

Senator Hill. I do not.

22. General Grunert. You knew they were getting together, but you do not know what happened when they got together?

Senator Hill. No. I do know that Admiral Kimmel and General Short both were holding conferences every day for many, many months; not together; I mean with their various men. I know that they were getting together; to what extent or how far they went, I do not know; but nobody thought of the Army and the Navy working at odds. They all felt they were cooperating with each other and doing it properly. I think that is about the only thing that I could bring up that might be of interest.

23. General Grunert. We thank you very much for coming and appreciate your coming all the way up here.

Senator Hill. I am very glad to come, but I am sorry I cannot be of more help.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)
[2943] TESTIMONY OF COLONEL KENDALL J. FIELDER, GENERAL STAFF CORPS, HEADQUARTERS POA, FORT SHAFTER, T. H.

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel West. Colonel, will you please state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station?
Colonel Fielder. Kendall J. Fielder, Colonel, General Staff Corps, Headquarters POA, APO 958, c/o Postmaster, San Francisco.

2. General Grunert. Colonel, I am going to turn you over to General Russell as being the Board member who will go into this particular phase specially. The rest of us will piece out by questions.
Colonel Fielder. Yes, sir.

3. General Russell. When did you become G–2 on the staff of the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department?
Colonel Fielder. In the late summer of 1941. I think I reported on the 22nd of July.

4. General Russell. From January 1, '41, until you became G–2 of the Hawaiian Department, what was your assignment?
Colonel Fielder. I was with the 22nd Brigade at Schofield Barracks on this Island, as executive officer.

5. General Russell. You came down as a member of the staff and immediately became the G–2 of the Commanding General of the Department?
Colonel Fielder. That is correct, yes.

6. General Russell. Colonel, would you tell the Board what personnel you had in the G–2 organization as of November and December 1941, in the G–2 division?

[2944] Colonel Fielder. The G–2 section at that time was engaged in counter-intelligence as well as so-called combat-intelligence, of which there was none because there was no combat, but we did have a small combat section. We had the public relations section and the censorship. It was subdivided into two general subdivisions, one of which took in combat-intelligence, public relations, and plans for censorship. That comprised one lieutenant colonel, three captains, two first lieutenants, and six clerks. Then, we had the counter-intelligence division which was engaged in planning, preparing for anything subversive. That was composed of one lieutenant colonel, one captain, seven first lieutenants, two second lieutenants, and nineteen counter-intelligence corps agents, plainclothesmen. That was the G–2 section at that time.

7. General Russell. Total personnel in the G–2 section, therefore, was some fifty?
Colonel Fielder. Commissioned, I can tell you exactly: eighteen, and nineteen agents. They are enlisted men, but they are plainclothes.

8. General Russell. Thirty-seven. And then your clerical force?
Colonel Fielder. We had about nine clerks: six with the public relations section and three with the counter-intelligence.

9. General Russell. Colonel, sometime prior to December 7 a subdivision of work had been made on the Island between the Office of Naval Intelligence, the F. B. I., and the G–2 section of the Department. You are familiar, of course, with that delineation of duties, and so forth?
Colonel Fielder. Yes, I am.

[2945] 10. General Russell. As a result of the agreements reached between those three agencies, would you tell the Board the limitation on the operations of the G-2 section of the Hawaiian Department, or the fields in which they could operate pursuant to the terms of that agreement?

Colonel Fielder. We were limited to operating among military personnel and among civilians employed by the military establishment.

11. General Russell. Did you, or not, in 1941, irrespective of the limitations of this agreement, operate among the Japanese people on the Island? And by “Japanese people” I mean all of those who were aliens and those of alien origin, Japanese origin.

Colonel Fielder. We did to a limited extent. The F. B. I. and the O. N. I. and the Military Intelligence Division were very closely associated even then, and we had meetings once each week of the heads of these three organizations, and we did assist them with our translators and with our agents, but we had no authority to open new cases or to prosecute, or anything like that.

12. General Russell. You repeat, therefore, that your jurisdiction over civilians was limited to those employed by the military establishment?

Colonel Fielder. That is correct.

13. General Russell. Colonel, I am going to ask you some questions in a minute, probably, about the sabotage and the threat of sabotage as existing because of the presence of so many Japanese people on the Island. It may be necessary, however, to lay a little broader groundwork than I have done [2946] already.

On and after December 7, 1941, military law was declared on the Island; is that true?

Colonel Fielder. That is correct. About noon on December 7th martial law was declared.

14. General Russell. Will you tell the Board what effect on the jurisdiction of the G-2 section over Japanese people this declaration of martial law had?

Colonel Fielder. It had the effect of placing all the responsibility for control of the alien population or the subversively inclined population in the hands of the military. That was by joint agreement. The War Department and the Navy Department and the Federal Bureau of Investigation in Washington had agreed that in the event of martial law in Hawaii the senior military commander would be responsible, and it was what we call the limitation agreement, and it does delineate the duties of the various investigative organizations.

Now, when we got a copy of that over here, we had our own little local agreement signed by General Emmons at that time and Admiral Bloch, the Commandant of the 14th Naval District, and Mr. Shivers of the F. B. I.; and that merely elaborated a little bit on the central agreement, the main agreement.

15. General Russell. Have you been in touch with the Japanese population since that time, in a more detailed way than prior to December 7th?

Colonel Fielder. Yes, I have, very much more so.
16. General Russell. You have continued in your assignment as G-2 until this time?

Colonel Fielder. Although the commands have changed, I am still the G-2 for the Senior Commander.

18. General Russell. Now, Colonel Fielder, there has been considerable discussion by various people as to the threat to our national security and the probability of sabotage because of the presence here of so many Japanese people on the Island. I want to break this down and go through it hurriedly to get G-2's reactions to that situation, and possibly it would be better to do that with it under certain heads.

The Japanese as individuals, how many—what is the percentage of Japanese population in the territory?
Colonel Fielder. It is almost 40 percent, about 160,000.

19. General Frank. On this Island or in all the Islands?
Colonel Fielder. All the Islands. About 90,000 on this Island.

20. General Russell. The total population of the Islands, then, there is approximately 400,000?
Colonel Fielder. That is right; 450,000, about.

21. General Russell. How does the Japanese population on all of the Islands compare with what we commonly refer to as the white population?
Colonel Fielder. Just about the same. Roughly the population is divided into three thirds: one-third white, one-third Japanese, and one-third mixtures: Chinese and Hawaiians, and part Hawaiians, and Filipinos, and so forth.

22. General Russell. What is the predominant pursuit of the Japanese population on the Island?
[2948] Colonel Fielder. I suppose you would call the predominant pursuit agriculture, but they also control many other things. Practically 80 percent of all the artisans, carpenters, plumbers, electricians, and so forth, were of Japanese extraction, and then of course many businessmen, many professional men: lawyers, doctors, even bankers. They were engaged in almost every pursuit.

23. General Russell. Based on your work among these people, the data which your section has accumulated, and the data which have been furnished you by F. B. I. and O. N. L., have you reached any conclusions as to the percentage of loyalty or disloyalty to the American Government—I will put it another way: have you reached any conclusion as to the percentage of Japanese who, in a contest between the American Government and the Japanese Government, would be loyal to the American Government?

Colonel Fielder. It is almost impossible to arrive at any definite percentage. There is no question but what a great number of them would be completely loyal to the United States. There is no question but what a large number would be pro-Japanese because they are aliens; you couldn't expect them to be otherwise. The queer thing about the Japanese is that you cannot differentiate between those who are potentially loyal and those who are potentially disloyal. But we just don't think the way they do; we can't solve their minds; and unless they commit some overt act or unless we have evidence against them.
such as knowing that they have large financial holdings in Japan or that their nearest relatives are there, or that they have contributed toward the Japanese war effort in the war [2949] against China, and things like that, there is no way of telling whether they are loyal or not.

24. General Russell. I was going to ask you if any conclusions as to loyalty and disloyalty could be drawn because of the place of birth or the time spent on the Island.

Colonel Fielder. You can't draw a definite conclusion. But there is one class of Japanese called Kibei, those who are born here and then received much of their education in Japan; they are dual citizens. We consider them the most dangerous group because they are young, they are active, they are smart, and they have been indoctrinated with this fanatical worship of the Emperor and willingness to die for the Emperor, and all that stuff.

25. General Russell. It is from that group that you might expect the leaders of the Japanese people to come, if at all?

Colonel Fielder. Yes; at the present time. Now, prior to the war, of course, they had many alien Japanese leaders, people engaged in shipping, the NYK Line officials in this town, the bankers, the editors of the local papers, and the Shinto priests, the language school teachers, and several other categories, they were the potentially dangerous ones at that time. Many of these, of course, were picked up promptly on December 7th.

26. General Russell. Now, those people were aliens and had come to the Island from Japan after having attained their maturity in Japan?

Colonel Fielder. Not necessarily. They might have been born there. If they are born in Japan and come right away, they are still aliens.

27. General Russell. Yes.

Colonel Fielder. Many of them are—or most of them are 40 years old or over, but some of them are not that old.

28. General Russell. Well, now, Colonel, to hurry along: You have in the Islands a great group of Japanese people who are poorly educated, work with their hands, the laboring class; that is true, isn't it?

Colonel Fielder. That is true, definitely.

29. General Russell. And then you have the upper crust, the people that you are talking about, the Kibei's and the merchants and the bankers and the shipping interests and the professional people. They are the educated Japanese people. Now, from the standpoint of loyalty to the American Government, where would you expect to find the greatest degree of loyalty, among the uneducated group or among that educated group?

Colonel Fielder. You would expect the greatest degree of loyalty not among any of those that I have mentioned, but among the citizens who were born here, educated here, and who have never been away from these Islands, which is still another group. None of the groups that you mention.

30. General Russell. Well, they are potential leaders, aren't they?

Colonel Fielder. Many of them are.

31. General Russell. All right.
Colonel Fielder. We have hundreds of them here who have gone through our colleges and universities on the mainland, have gone through the college here, who have never been away from the American soil.

32. General Russell. Now, you think those people, all those [2951] that belong to what we will roughly call the intellectual class, are loyal Americans?

Colonel Fielder. I think 95 percent of them are.

33. General Russell. And they would go down the line in a contest with Japan?

Colonel Fielder. Right. That is borne out by the fact that about 6,000 of them are in our Army and have given a splendid account of themselves in Italy with the Hundredth Battalion.

34. General Russell. Therefore your conclusions are that among the intellectual group some part of them would be disloyal, and then there would be a large element of them that would be loyal?

Colonel Fielder. That is correct, yes, sir.

35. General Russell. And among the uneducated or laboring group they would probably follow the leaders?

Colonel Fielder. They would probably follow the leaders. Many of the old aliens have been here so long, they are more or less harmless in a group because most of their interests are here. They have raised their families here. They have severed many of their ties with Japan. Consequently, as a group you couldn’t consider them necessarily dangerous, but as individuals any one of them might be dangerous.

36. General Russell. Now, Colonel, prior to the outbreak of—I will come back to this sabotage thing in a minute. Prior to the outbreak of hostilities in December of 1941, December 7, 1941, you had lists of Japanese people here, “A” and “B” lists?

Colonel Fielder. Yes, we did.

37. General Russell. Now, what did the “A” list mean?

[2952] Colonel Fielder. “A” list?

38. General Russell. Yes.

Colonel Fielder. Meant those that would be picked up immediately in the event of any hostilities, even against the Philippines, we will say, or against Malaya, anywhere between the United States and Japan, even though notwithstanding——

39. General Russell. How many people did you have on your “A” list as of December 7, ’41?

Colonel Fielder. I have forgotten now. I could get those figures, but I don’t recall.

40. General Russell. Did it run into thousands?

Colonel Fielder. No.

41. General Russell. Or into hundreds?

Colonel Fielder. I would say three or four hundred. But I can get those figures if it makes any difference.

42. General Russell. Well, three or four hundred is enough for us.

“B” list?

Colonel Fielder. The “B” list is those that were also considered potentially dangerous but who would not be picked up immediately, in the event they sank one of our transports on the way to the Philip-
pines, or diplomatic relations were severed, or something like that. But they would be picked up in the event of an attack on this place or war in this part of the Pacific Ocean. Otherwise they would just be watched.

43. General Russell. Now, on this subject of percentage of loyalty and disloyalty, do you think they would be affected materially by the success of Japan arms in the Territory, assuming that they might have been successful here?

[2953] Colonel Fielder. Yes; many of them would. Many of them who would be neutral otherwise would turn to the winning side.

44. General Frank. Or the invading side?
Colonel Fielder. Of the invading side.

45. General Russell. Now, Colonel, what about the Japanese organizations on the Island, very briefly?
Colonel Fielder. They are great on organizations. They organize for every form of sport, every form of religion, and everything else. There are literally hundreds of Japanese organizations, but those that were considered dangerous, most dangerous, were the Shinto religious sects, and of course the Black Dragon Society, which everybody is familiar with, was one of their very rabid imperialistic organizations.

46. General Frank. What characterized the two of them?
Colonel Fielder. Intense loyalty to Japan, I think, more than anything else, and desire to better Japan's position in the world of nations.

47. General Russell. Now you are discussing with General Frank this Shinto group?
Colonel Fielder. That is the Shinto; yes, they are. When you get into religion I am just not familiar enough with it to go into much detail, but in the Shinto religion it is tied in pretty close with the federal government, the Japanese Empire, the worship of the Empire.

48. General Russell. Go to heaven if you die for them.
Colonel Fielder. Well, that's right.

49. General Russell. Well, do you think that that sort of thing is taught here in your Shinto temples?
Colonel Fielder. It certainly is taught; there is no question about it. It isn't any more because we don't let—we have closed up all the Shinto temples, but it was taught prior to December 7.

50. General Russell. How many Shinto temples did you have prior to December 7, 1941?
Colonel Fielder. I have no idea, but it ran into hundreds.

51. General Russell. Didn't you have some conception of the number of followers of Shintoism here in the Territory?
Colonel Fielder. I would say probably the F. B. I. did have. We didn't have, except what they turned over to us.

52. General Russell. Well, they hadn't been here very long, had they, Colonel?
Colonel Fielder. The Shintos?

Colonel Fielder. I think they came about probably ten years ago.

54. General Russell. Well, don't you think as G-2 it would have been a part of your function to have learned how many of these Shinto people there were among the Japanese, if they believed in that sort of a thing?
Colonel Fielder. Well, I am not sure but what my own counterintelligence people did know, but I as head of it didn't know exactly how many they had. We undoubtedly had access to the records of how many; otherwise we couldn't have arrested those that were considered dangerous.

55. General Russell. No, but how many Shinto temples were there that you closed up after December 7, 1941?

Colonel Fielder. I will have to get that from the records.

56. General Russell. Will you get that and give it to us?

Colonel Fielder. I will do that. As a matter of fact, the office—if you are going to call Major Meurlott, who is my assistant,—

57. General Russell. He is supposed to come in later.

Colonel Fielder. He can give you all of the details of that.

58. General Russell. What kind of reaction did you get from closing up these Shinto temples?

Colonel Fielder. Strangely enough, it wasn't bad. They didn't seem to mind it so much. They seemed to expect it more or less, many of the Shinto priests, or at least a few, and a few of the other leaders. When we went around to pick them up on the morning of December 7, we had a plan. It was just a regular dragnet affair. Some of them even had their suitcases packed, so they knew what was coming.

59. General Russell. All right. I would like to have the background on this Shinto organization.

Colonel Fielder. I'll see that Major Meurlott has this when he comes up before the Board.

60. General Russell. Now, the consular activities, including the consular agents. The reports we have indicate that there were 219 of these agents operating in the Islands on the 7th of December or shortly theretofore. Were you at all familiar with the activity of these people?

Colonel Fielder. Yes. We knew that they were in the employ of the Japanese consulate, but we didn't know in what capacity. Many of them were very minor clerks and probably informants.

61. General Russell. Were you furnished reports on these consular agents and Shinto priests by the F. B. I., Colonel?

Colonel Fielder. As individuals, yes, we exchanged files, and we had at that time—we still have—many filing cabinets full of reports of investigations of individuals. We had on December 7 access to practically all the information that the F. B. I. had on individuals. That is how we got the "A" and "B" lists. We had a map as big as the side of that wall (indicating), of the city of Honolulu and of this entire Island. Every house for one of these people that we were suspicious of, we had a pin there, and it was a comparatively simple matter to put out our dragnet and pick them up when hostilities started, but we couldn't touch them prior to that.

62. General Russell. Well, did it come to pass that as of December 7, or November 27, based on the information which you had and which has been referred to in these previous questions, that you felt that there might be an element of Japanese on this Island or on these Islands that would engage in sabotage efforts against the Government in event of war?

Colonel Fielder. Very definitely.

63. General Russell. In the event of hostilities or war?
Colonel Fielder. Very definitely. Everything pointed in that direction. You couldn't—you can't conceive of that many people of a different race not engaging in some subversive activity in the event of hostilities. I can't conceive of 160,000 Americans being in Japan, when war is declared, without them doing something against Japan. And the same way here; we couldn't think otherwise.

64. General Russell. In other words, you had the feeling [2957] that if relations became more tense and war should intervene, or war was immediately imminent, that you might expect activity of some sort in the nature of sabotage by some elements of the Japanese on the Islands?

Colonel Fielder. Yes, everything pointed to that. In analyzing the big picture of the war, we knew that Japan's ambition was to the south where they could get resources. We knew that they needed tin, they needed rubber, they needed oil; and we also knew that this was their one stumbling block.

65. General Russell. What was their one stumbling block?

Colonel Fielder. Pearl Harbor.

66. General Russell. You mean the Navy?

Colonel Fielder. The Navy. Our Navy, Pearl Harbor. Consequently it looked as if the easiest thing for them to do would be to inflict great damage on our military and naval installations here any way they could. Well, with 160,000 potential saboteurs scattered throughout the Islands it is perfectly reasonable to assume——

67. General Russell. How were they going to get their hands on their equipment, the explosives and whatnot, to commit acts of sabotage?

Colonel Fielder. About all they would need would be a box of matches.

68. General Russell. Explain that; will you please, Colonel?

Colonel Fielder. Well, for instance, the oil tanks over here near Pearl Harbor, dozens of them, right out in the open, not underground at all; the docks, the waterfront. Any waterfront can be—— [2958]

69. General Russell. You can't set them afire with a match, can you?

Colonel Fielder. You certainly can if you spread a little gasoline on it, and right within 500 yards of the docking facilities, all of the commercial aviation that's stored on the Island was there.

70. General Frank. You mean aviation gas?

Colonel Fielder. No. Aviation gas, yes. That's it. As a matter of fact, every other kind of gas, automobile gas; and under those docks, for instance, are a very intricate series of pipe lines where they bunker the ships, and so forth. It would be a very simple matter to open one of those valves and flood a little oil, a little gasoline on the water, and set it on fire.

71. General Russell. Well, what about blowing up utilities and destruction of aircraft that was parked back there? What was your fear there?

[2979] Colonel Fielder. The fear, there, was that you could more easily protect aircraft when they were concentrated than if they were dispersed.

72. General Russell. How were they going to get the thing to blow them up with?
Colonel Fielder. Well, dynamite, for instance, was very plentiful here at that time, because of the nature of this particular island, for instance. Every time you build a home up there on one of these hills, you usually have a blast away a lot of rock, consequently all of the constructions companies, almost every gang of builders had cases of dynamite which might have been used. That is one way they could do it.

73. General Russell. Do you recall a message which came out to General Short on the 27th of November?
Colonel Fielder. Yes, sir; I do.

74. General Russell. Did you see that message?
Colonel Fielder. I saw it.

75. General Russell. Did you know of a message which arrived for the Navy, on or about that same date, which began with the words, "This is a war warning"?
Colonel Fielder. No, sir; I didn't see that; never heard of it, until after this thing was all over.

76. General Russell. When General Short received that message on the 27th that we are discussing, and which began with the statement that "negotiations with the Japanese government are practically over, to all intents and purposes," did he have a staff meeting and discuss what to do about that?
Colonel Fielder. As I remember it, he called the staff officers in, the Chief of Staff did, one or two at a time, but it was called to my attention. We read the thing, and we actually discussed the message, and intensified our inspections of the sabotage plans. I personally was detailed by General Short to go to Wheeler Field, go to Fort De Russy, go to Fort Kamehameha, and check on the interior guard systems, check on the plans for repelling enemy action, subversive acts.

77. General Russell. Did you agree with the decision made by the Commanding General, to go on a sabotage alert and not to take a more effective form of alert?
Colonel Fielder. I don't consider that my prerogative, to agree or disagree with the Commanding General.

78. General Russell. He did not ask you for your opinion about it?
Colonel Fielder. He did not ask me for my opinion.

79. General Russell. Colonel, you are about the only man we have found here who was not willing to express an opinion about whether he though the sabotage alert was good or bad.
Colonel Fielder. I have indicated that I thought—I very definitely thought it was sound. I didn't expect anything else, if that is the answer you want.

80. General Russell. I do not care what the answer is, I just want the question answered.
Colonel Fielder. I did not mean it just facetiously, or anything like that, but I want to make it perfectly clear that I did expect sabotage, very definitely.

81. General Frank. Did you expect an air attack?
Colonel Fielder. No, sir; I did not.

82. General Russell. Colonel, there has been shown us a telephone call from Doctor Mori on the Island of Oahu to someone in Japan. Have you ever heard of that telephone call?
Colonel Fielder. Yes, sir; I am familiar with that.

83. General Russell. When did you first see it, and under what conditions?

Colonel Fielder. I first saw it on the late afternoon of December 6, 1941. It was brought to me by Lieutenant Colonel Bicknell, who was my assistant at that time. I read it, and went over to General Short's quarters and discussed it for about an hour with him, and Bicknell was there at the same time. We couldn't solve it, we couldn't make heads nor tails out of it. We considered it very suspicious, very fishy, but the person doing the talking on this end was a newspaper woman, and it appeared from the conversation that someone in Tokyo, some newspaper was trying to get material to advise the Japanese public of conditions in Hawaii, and there were a lot of things they talked about—flowers, for instance, poinsettias and hibiscus, which didn't seem to make sense, and till this day that message has not been solved, so far as I know.

84. General Russell. Who did you say brought that message to you?


85. General Russell. Did he remain with you, so long as you and General Short were considering the message?

Colonel Fielder. He remained at least an hour. General Short and I considered it for perhaps another hour, because we were going to Schofield Barracks together. We were an hour late getting there as a result of that message, and, riding out in the car, we discussed it; and then on the way back, about 9:30, we discussed it still further; and arrived at no conclusion as to its significance.

[2962] 86. General Russell. To go back to the November period, you received a message on November 27 from G-2, the War Department, is that true?

Colonel Fielder. That is true.

87. General Russell. Have you got the original of that message, which was in the file, here?

Colonel Fielder. I believe that has been turned over to the Board. I have a copy of it.

88. General Russell. I hand you a message, No. 473, dated 27 November 1941, which reads:

"Japanese negotiations have come to practical stalemate STOP Hostilities may ensue STOP Subversive activities may be expected STOP Information Commanding General and Chief of Staff only."

Do you remember what time of day you got that message?

Colonel Fielder. I do not remember. I could find out from the original, perhaps.

89. General Russell. Was it before you were in the conference with the Chief of Staff about the sabotage order, or not?

Colonel Fielder. I am not sure of that, but I think it was subsequent, I think this came after the other message, but I am not sure. It has been so long, now, that some of the details have slipped my mind.

90. General Russell. Colonel, on this subject of sabotage, and of how broadly prevalent the sentiment about it was, do you recall my calling your attention on Saturday to a letter of August 3, 1941, which was signed by a man named George Paisn, written to the President of
the United States, from Blue Ridge, New York? Do you remember that?

[2963] Colonel Fielder. Yes, I remember that:

91. General Russell. Was that letter, or a copy of that letter, forwarded from Washington out to the Hawaiian Department, and is it now in the files of the Hawaiian Department?

Colonel Fielder. It is.

92. General Russell. Do you recall my asking you to check on this man, George Paisin, to determine who he was, and why he was writing the President about the danger of sabotage here on the island?

Colonel Fielder. I checked so far as our files; we had nothing on him, at all. That letter came out in September 1941, as I remember it.

93. General Russell. This is a letter written by a man named George Paisin to the President and sent out here to the Hawaiian Department, and I will read one sentence from it:

I possess information that cannot be questioned of the existence of some kind of understanding between the large number of Japanese who live in Hawaii, the Japanese government and the native Hawaiians. I cannot give the source of this information in a letter, but shall be happy to do so to anyone who can be trusted not to reveal it to anyone but yourself. The danger of sabotage of these reserves of ammunition and of stores cannot therefore be overlooked and demand the most stringent precautions on the part both of the American naval and of the military authorities in Hawaii.

Colonel, do you mean to testify that when you got a letter with that sort of information in it, coming from the President, you did not check on the man who wrote it, to see whether or [2964] not it was worthy of serious attention?

Colonel Fielder. That's exactly what I mean to say. A copy of that letter was sent out here for our information by General Miles, who was then the G-2 of the War Department. We immediately checked here as best we could to find out whether any ring of saboteurs or potential saboteurs existed. We immediately discussed it, as I remember it, but we got nowhere. This was probably one of, I would say, eight or ten letters that I have seen which predicted sabotage and other subversive acts by local Japanese.

The fact that it is addressed to the President does not make it any more impressive. I presume that this letter was turned over to the FBI, and I presume that the FBI on the mainland investigated this fellow, but our files do not show a result of that investigation. Now, I would be very glad to go to the FBI files and perhaps we could find out whether this was run down, but we didn't do it in my section.


Colonel, it is true that you had a great number of these people whom you detained after December 8, 1941. Did you ever try any of those people on any criminal charges?

Colonel Fielder. One man was tried, a German named Kuhn, for espionage, and he was sentenced by a military commission to be shot, or hanged.

95. General Russell. Those records I have been looking for, and I ask you now. They told me today they thought they would have them for me. You did not find them in your records?

Colonel Fielder. Yes; we have them. I thought they had been delivered to the Board, by Colonel Hayne.
96. General Russell. Hayne told me today he would check.

Colonel Fielder. He has them.

97. General Russell. Now, so far as you know, however, of all the Japanese people that you interned after December 8, not a one of them has ever been tried?

Colonel Fielder. I do not know of any that have been tried.

98. General Russell. Since December 8, 1941, or immediately prior thereto, has any Japanese from this island been tried for disloyalty to the American Government, or for acts of sabotage?

Colonel Fielder. Not to my knowledge.

99. General Frank. Would you know?

Colonel Fielder. Not necessarily. That would come under the Military Governor's office, and they could have a military commission sitting on one of the other islands and I might not ever know.

100. General Frank. Would you know if it were on this island?

Colonel Fielder. Not necessarily. I could very quickly find out, though, by a telephone call.

101. General Russell. Do you not believe, being in as close touch as you are with the Japanese Hawaiians on this land, that if such thing had occurred, you would know something about it?

Colonel Fielder. I think if it were an outstanding case, there is no question but I would know something about it. The chances are I would know, yes; but you can see that some of the consular agents might have been tried before a military commission on Japanese of gathering information of our fleet, he might have been acquitted, or might have been sentenced to a penitentiary sentence; I don't know.

[2966] 102. General Russell. All right.

Turning now from sabotage, Colonel, what are the sources of information available to you as G-2 on this island, from which you might make deductions as to possible Japanese activity by the armed forces, either naval or military?

Colonel Fielder. You are speaking at the present, or prior to December 7?


Colonel Fielder. The only source of information we had was through the Navy. That's locally. Now, of course we had access to War Department information, Navy Department information; that would come to us; but locally, our only source of information was through the Navy.

104. General Russell. Do you believe that the information was being sent from these islands to the homeland of the Japanese government by their Japanese consul or his agents?

Colonel Fielder. Yes, I do.

105. General Russell. Was it possible for you to have intercepted any of that information and have made deductions therefrom which might have been of benefit to our armed forces here on the island?

Colonel Fielder. It was not possible under the conditions; no.

106. General Russell. What were those conditions, Colonel?

Colonel Fielder. The first thing I think of is that we were not authorized to do anything in connection with the local population. The consular agents had diplomatic immunity; and even the FBI I understand were not permitted to intercept the commercial cables.
107. General Russell. What were the means of communication available to the Japanese consul, if he desired to communicate with the homeland?

Colonel Fielder. Probably the safest thing would be by courier. The boats ran regularly, and the diplomatic mail is not subject to examination. I would say the safest method would be physical transmission of messages, not by radio or telephone. Then of course they had the commercial cables, they had telephone connections, and they had the Mackay radio and the RCA, all of which had circuits to and including Tokyo.

108. General Russell. Were you permitted to intercept messages from these other means of communications?

Colonel Fielder. We were not.

109. General Russell. Are you permitted to do that now?

Colonel Fielder. We are not. It is illegal.

110. General Russell. On the 7th of December, did the military people raid the Japanese consulate here on the island?

Colonel Fielder. Yes; they did.

111. General Russell. Did they discover any messages which had not been destroyed, in that consulate?

Colonel Fielder. Yes; they did.

112. General Russell. Is this folder which I have in my hand, marked "Confidential, 336.92, Japanese Consulate and Consular Agents," a folder or file containing all of the messages delivered to you by the FBI as taken from the Japanese consulate on the day of the raid?

Colonel Fielder. It contains all that have been pieced together and decoded and translated. We had probably several waste-paper baskets fulls of scraps which were never solved. We worked on this, oh, some six or eight months, piecing the various little scraps together, and we finally did solve some of them. This is the complete file of messages that have been solved.

113. General Russell. Now, Colonel, did I ask you, on Saturday, last, to go through that file and to select any message or messages which might have been helpful to you as G-2 in predicting Japanese future actions, had they been in your hands prior to December 7, 1941?

Colonel Fielder. Yes; you did.

114. General Russell. And did you select any such messages?

Colonel Fielder. I selected several messages here which would have been very much of interest to me. They might not have given us any definite warning of an attack.

115. General Russell. Would you read into the record two, three, or four that you would consider more material, so that the Board might hear them, and so they may become a matter of record. Will you identify them by date, Colonel, so that we might know?

Colonel Fielder. Yes. Here is a message, No. 115, 14 May, 1941, from Kita, who was the local consul to Tokyo. It says:

With respect to message No. 10 of January 8th for the purpose of reinforcing the local air force 21 B-17 bombers, under command of Lieut. General Emmons, departed San Francisco at 1539 the 13th flying in formation and arrived Hickam Field at 0558 the 14th.

116. General Russell. That went to whom?

Colonel Fielder. To Gainmadaijin, Tokyo.
117. General Russell. Did you know then, Colonel, or do you know now, who that addressee was? [2969] Colonel Fielder. I do not.

Here is one that might have been of interest to us. It indicated that they knew that some of our fliers were joining the Chinese forces. It is from Kita on 8 July 1941, to the foreign minister, Tokyo:

A report regarding the Washington report of the Latin Pact of May that American pilots are joining the China air force. The local Chinese consul general on 10 June enrolled 100 men at his consulate (largely from local air groups) Newspaper reports indicate that the Chinese military attache in Washington (makes arrangements?) Furthermore according to English (language) newspapers or the 5th—

that must be a misprint.

—200 men have already (Toppa Senn) gone (?). The Chinese consul general avoids a statement regarding his orders.

End of message.

On September 2, 1941, from Kita to foreign minister, Tokyo, a similar message, one sentence of which is pertinent:

A ship left port en route for the Orient carrying about 50 American aviators and mechanics. Although the group declined to reveal their destination they are an advance party already assigned to patrol the Burma border and the Burma Road, and they have obtained permission to resign from their military duties.

Here is one of December 3, 1941, from Kita to foreign minister, Tokyo, No. 363:

Wyoming and two seaplane tenders departed third.

December 4, 1941, RCA message No. 364, from Kita to foreign minister, Tokyo:

One British warship arrived Honolulu and departed early morning fourth, approximately 100 tons, one stack, one four-inch gun forward and aft. Fueled. Immediately after arrival enlisted ratings, received mail from British consulate.

On December 4, 1941, RCA message 365, from Kita to foreign minister, Tokyo.

USS HONOLULU arrived 1300 4th.

December 6, 1941, from Kita to foreign minister, Tokyo, message No. 368:

1. The Army ordered several hundred balloons for training at Camp Davis North Carolina on the American mainland. They considered (at that time) the practicability of their employment in the defense of Hawaii and Panama. Investigation of the vicinity of Pearl Harbor reveals no locations selected for their use or any preparations for constructing moorings. No evidence of training or personnel preparations were seen. It is concluded that their installation would be difficult. Even if they were actually provided they would interfere with operations at nearby Hickam Field, Ewa Field, and Ford Island. The whole matter seems to have been dropped.

2. Am continuing in detail the investigation of the non-use of nets for torpedo defense of battleships and will report further.

That, to me, is a rather significant message. That left here on December 6, 1941.


Here is a message, 3:20 a.m., December 7, 1941, from the Japanese consul, Honolulu. No, it is received by him from Togo:

Relations strained between Japan and the United States and Britain.
That is dated 3:20 a.m., on the morning of the 7th.

Outside of those, there are no messages in there, that might have been particularly helpful.

119. General Russell. Is it your testimony, or not, Colonel, that with the messages which are contained in the file recently identified, and the telephone message which we have discussed already, and which is known as the Mori message, that those include all of the messages which reached you, as G-2, from FBI, prior to December 8, 1941?

Colonel Fielder. Well, these messages did not reach me for weeks after December.

120. General Russell. But they were seized by the FBI from the consulate and turned over to you, weeks after December 8?

Colonel Fielder. Yes, sir; that is correct.

121. General Russell. Therefore, the number of messages which you have produced in response to the Board's notice to produce, as coming from the FBI, consists of this one telephone transcript about which you have testified?

Colonel Fielder. Yes, sir; that is correct, so far as the armed forces of Japan are concerned.

[2973] 122. General Russell. Now, Colonel, did you read the local papers along about the first of December, 1941, to see what the relationship between the Japanese Empire and our government was?

Colonel Fielder. Yes, I naturally read the papers.

123. General Russell. What was your conclusion at that time as to the inevitability of war with Japan?

Colonel Fielder. It appeared inevitable to me.

124. General Russell. You thought it was coming some time?

Colonel Fielder. Yes, sir. I had no idea when, but it seemed inevitable.

125. General Russell. You did not have the impression that it was imminent?

Colonel Fielder. No, I did not.

126. General Russell. I asked you or the Board asked you to produce all the messages which you might have received from G-2 or the War Department indicating to you the imminence or the inevitability of war. As I recall, you have produced only this one message of November 27th. We had some other messages which we might want to identify. Here is a message which might be interesting for the record. Will you identify and read that message and tell the Board where it came from and what the basis of information therein contained is?

Colonel Fielder. Yes, sir. This is a message that we sent to the War Department on the 14th of November, 1941. I authenticated the message. It reads:

(Message to War Department authenticated by Colonel Fielder, dated November 14, 1941, is as follows:)

The Adjutant General,
Washington, D. C.

For G-two interviewed W. G. Keswick, British courier from [2973] Singapore now enroute San Francisco comma Washington and London in same plane with Saburo Kurusu comma Keswick states quote mission of ambassador is primarily to confirm Nomura reports that United States Government is not bluffing stop If he sees any indication of weakness in attitude of United States comma then Japan may move toward other hostilities stop Should he observe only attitude of strength and determination great possibility no such hostile
acts would take place unquote stop. Keswick information and opinions hitherto fairly accurate period

127. General Russell. As I get it, you people here interviewed this man named Keswick, who was travelling with Kurusu, and Keswick’s opinion was that he was going to the States to see whether or not we were bluffing in our attitude toward Japanese aggression in the Pacific?

Colonel Fielder. Yes, sir, that is true.

128. General Russell. And you made that sort of reply?

Colonel Fielder. Yes, sir. We interviewed many people that passed through here. That was one of our sources of information. Honolulu has always been somewhat the crossroads and many Britishers, Dutchmen and Filipinos and whatnot travel through here. We interviewed a great many of them prior to December 7th, 1941.

129. General Russell. That message went from you to the War Department?

Colonel Fielder. Yes, sir, that is right.

130. General Russell. Here is a message of July 8th, 1941, from the Adjutant General to you, in which he discusses the international situation. I believe that message is in the record [2974] from other sources. But you did receive this message of July 8th, 1941, which discusses the War Department’s idea as to what the Japs were going to do?

Colonel Fielder. Yes, sir, that is correct.

131. General Russell. Will you read into the record that part of that message which deals with the War Department’s prophesy about the Japanese future action?

Colonel Fielder. The date of this message is July 8th, 1941; the number is 94–War–BC–207, to the CG, Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter:

(Message to commanding general, Hawaiian Department, from War Department, dated July 8, 1941. is as follows:) For your information deduction from information from numerous sources is that Japanese Government has determined upon its future policy which is supported by all principal Japanese political and military groups. This policy is at present one of watchful waiting involving possible aggressive action against maritime provinces of Russia if and when Siberian garrison has been materially reduced in strength and it becomes evident that Germany will win a decisive victory in European Russia. Opinion is that Jap activity in the south will be for the present confined to seizure and development of naval, Army and air bases in Indo-China, although an advance against the British and Dutch cannot be entirely ruled out. Neutrality pact with Russia may be abrogated. They have ordered all Jap vessels in U. S. Atlantic ports to be west of Panama Canal by first August. Movement of Jap shipping from Japan has been suspended and additional merchant vessels are being requisitioned.

That is the end of the message.

General Russell. Do your files have any other messages [2975] from the War Department touching the Japanese situation until the message of November 27, 1941, from this date in July?

Colonel Fielder. No, sir. That is all that appears in the G–2 files.

132. General Russell. There is another source of information we want to deal with briefly, and that is this newspaper situation. You say you were reading the newspapers out here in early December and late November?

Colonel Fielder. Yes, sir.
133. General Russell. Do you remember the headline of Sunday, November 30, 1941, to the effect that the Japanese might strike over the week-end?

Colonel Fielder. I do not remember that in particular. It probably impressed me at the time.

134. General Russell. I will ask you this: Did you during that critical period in November and early December, 1941, prior to the attack, as a result of seeing any headlines in the local papers go down to their offices and contact them to determine from where they were getting the information on which these headlines were based?

Colonel Fielder. No, I did not, because that never would occur to me. Unless it was something very outstanding and did not represent opinion. I don't think I would ever query them on it.

135. General Russell. Was not that a source of information which you people did not have out here, as to the imminence of war?

Colonel Fielder. I do not consider it such. I do not consider a daily newspaper a source of official information, because I think everything that they would have access to would be available to the War Department.

136. General Russell. Your mental attitude, then, excluded all sources of information coming to you except official information?

Colonel Fielder. Not at all. I just cited a couple of cases where we interviewed people passing through. We were seeking information from all sides. But it never occurred to me to query a daily paper because it had a headline that war was imminent. We knew war was imminent.

137. General Russell. Colonel, we have been discussing the things that we did not know about the Japanese. I now want to ask you a few questions about the maps which you took off the Japanese or which were taken from the Japanese after or during the attack of December 7th, 1941. You have before you now a map. Will you tell the Board what that map is?

Colonel Fielder. It is a chart, an American chart, a very old one, showing the depth of the water of Oahu. It shows the outline of Pearl Harbor. It shows Hickam Field. It shows Fort Kamehameha. It shows several military installations. At this particular point in Japanese is written "4 6-inch tractor-drawn guns." It shows around the perimeter of Pearl Harbor where certain ships are berthed. It does not mention them by name, but it has a fairly accurate outline of the installations inside of Pearl Harbor.

138. General Frank. On what date?

Colonel Fielder. The date is not shown. They had this map in their possession a number of years, because there is one entry on there dated 1933 in Japanese, but it is a coastal Geodetic Survey map which anyone could buy before the war at any map store. Apparently, they have gathered information from time to time and overprinted it in Japanese on this particular chart. In addition to that, there are modern entries apparently made by the aviator himself. He has got certain magnetic bearings to certain targets in Pearl Harbor.

To my mind the significance of it is that they were very meticulous in briefing their pilots prior to this attack. To me it indicates they had practiced a great deal. They probably rehearsed this thing many
times before it came off, because they had very detailed information and instructions for the pilots.

139. General GRUNERT. Tell us some more things about the maps, Colonel.

Colonel FIELDER. It shows the drydocks at Pearl Harbor. It shows the fuel—the tank farm of oil, Navy oil, which did not exist at the time this chart was printed originally.

140. General GRUNERT. What is shown about Hickam Field?

Colonel FIELDER. It shows the number of hangars, a total of 8 hangars, and one headquarters building, all apparently sketched in in ink over the original chart.

141. General GRUNERT. How many hangars actually existed there on December 7th?

Colonel FIELDER. Five.

142. General GRUNERT. How do you account for eight being shown?

Colonel FIELDER. The plans for Hickam Field called for eight hangars, although those plans are more or less standard, and there is in existence a drawing or a sketch of Hickam Field which dates back to about 1936, at least, which shows in outline five hangars constructed and three outlined in broken lines or dotted lines.

[2978] 143. General FRANK. The original plans called for that number of hangars and they had not gotten the money to date by way of appropriations to construct them.

144. General GRUNERT. What impressed me was that it appears on this old map to have been a lot of modern installations put on there, but when they get to Hickam Field they apparently do not know that five are constructed and they put eight on there. It just doesn't make sense. If they had recent information about this and that, why didn't they have recent information about the large hangars on Hickam Field? Do you suppose they got ahold of some plans and took that for the granted as the number there?

Colonel FIELDER. Probably did.

145. General RUSSELL. It is the first time he said anything to me about the plans being in existence in 1936. The story he told me was that they had plans that they were working on Hickam Field then at the time of the attack, calling for eight, and that only five of them had been put in, which indicated to my mind very clearly that they had the current plans under which the field was being constructed. Now he comes up and says it was in 1936. I know nothing about that.

Colonel FIELDER. I beg your pardon. I did not mean to mislead. I don't understand now what you are after.

146. General RUSSELL. It is perfectly obvious that if they were working on current plans calling for eight hangars and only five had been put up and that map showed eight, then that map was made from the plans and not from an observation of the field.

Colonel FIELDER. Oh, yes, that is granted.

147. General RUSSELL. But if the plan was made in 1936, they may have had it for three years. That is the first time I knew it was a 1936 plan.

Colonel FIELDER. That is the first time I knew it, today. You asked me to look it up Saturday and I went to Hickam Field and got their files.
148. General Russell. Do you have the map on which you showed me Pearl Harbor with the number of ships there by name, the WYOMING and some others, on Saturday?

Colonel Fielder. I think that is it right there.

149. General Russell. Could you identify what you are referring to?

Colonel Fielder. This is a translation and photostat of an overlay made from a chart taken from the body of a Japanese submarine operator. A two-man submarine ran on the reef off this island. One of the operators was captured and the other one drowned, and this was on the body of the one that was drowned.

150. General Russell. What does it show about Pearl Harbor?

Colonel Fielder. It shows the ARIZONA and the PENNSYLVANIA by name as being—it shows their place of berth. It shows the TENNESSEE, the CALIFORNIA, the SARATOGA, the WYOMING, the SAN FRANCISCO, the OMAHA, the TRENTO.

151. General Frank. Was the SARATOGA at Ford Island?

Colonel Fielder. It was not. Very few of these cruisers were in port.

152. General Russell. Are those the places where they were habitually berthed when they came in there, Colonel?

Colonel Fielder. I am not sure. I am quite sure that it is correct for the—the location is correct. Whether or not the ships berthed in those places, I do not know. I know where they were on that date. I know where the CALIFORNIA, and the WEST VIRGINIA and the ARIZONA and the UTAH were, and this does not quite correspond, but it is sufficiently accurate to indicate that they had pretty good knowledge of where our ships tied up.

153. General Russell. That is all.

154. General Frank. Give us a short statement on the industry of the Japanese workers as compared to others on the islands.

Colonel Fielder. In my opinion, they are much better. They lose less time, they work harder, they are more law-abiding.

155. General Frank. Do they work much faster?

Colonel Fielder. Much faster.

156. General Frank. You get a lot more labor out of eight hours of Japanese labor than you get out of any other labor on the island?

Colonel Fielder. That is correct. This particular building is an outstanding example. Most of the labor on this building was Japanese, and they put it up in. I think it was, five weeks from the time they broke ground, these two buildings.

157. General Frank. Did you render G-2 estimates periodically prior to December 7th?

Colonel Fielder. We did not.

158. General Frank. Why not?

Colonel Fielder. I better modify that. I was thinking of periodic reports which are based on combat. We submitted periodically reports of the local situation which covered economy and communism, racial disorders and things like that.

159. General Frank. How periodically?

Colonel Fielder. I believe it was once each month.
[2981]  160. General Frank. How often did you submit strategic estimates?
Colonel Fielder. I did not submit one that I remember, a strategic estimate, prior to December 7th, from the time I became G-2.
161. General Frank. Do you submit them now?
Colonel Fielder. We submit a weekly report and a monthly report.
162. General Frank. What is in it?
Colonel Fielder. That is based on operations. We have a periodic report that goes in every week and then we have one that goes in bi-weekly now, every other week.
163. General Frank. You stated that there were few, if any, messages that you received prior to December 7th.
Colonel Fielder. Yes, sir, that is correct.
164. General Frank. As G-2 of the Hawaiian Department?
Colonel Fielder. Yes.
165. General Frank. You did not get much information from the War Department as a G-2, then?
Colonel Fielder. Very little in the messages. Now, they would send us out studies, of various islands, for instance, maybe the Philippine Islands. We had a lot of terrain studies; we had a lot of economic studies, strategic studies.
166. General Frank. Did they give you any information on the political situation?
Colonel Fielder. The local political situation?
167. General Frank. No, the international political situation.
Colonel Fielder. I do not remember any report on the international situation at all.

[2982]  168. General Frank. Well, was the Department Commander expected to get it? Is not G-2 the normal source for that?
Colonel Fielder. That is the normal source for it and we normally get those things. I just don't happen to remember. I could very easily look in the files. But we got nothing, to my knowledge, that had any particular bearing on the imminence of war.
169. General Frank. Did you get any intelligence messages from the Navy?
Colonel Fielder. No, we did not.
170. General Frank. The Navy had an intelligence message which reported a Japanese task force in the Marshall Islands. Did you know anything about that?
Colonel Fielder. I did not.
171. General Frank. Do you get any messages now?
Colonel Fielder. Yes, we do.
172. General Frank. From the Navy?
Colonel Fielder. From many different sources. We get very detailed valuable information.
173. General Frank. Do you get any messages on the international situation?
Colonel Fielder. Yes, we do.
174. General Frank. Do you feel that you now are kept fully abreast of the situation?
Colonel Fielder. I do, definitely.
175. General Frank. Do you feel that a Japanese air raid is probable or possible now?
Colonel Fielder. I feel it is definitely possible, but not probable.

Colonel Fielder. Yes, I have.

176. General Frank. Have you any means of watching for it now?

Colonel Fielder. Yes, I am, very definitely.

Colonel Fielder. I don’t think it could be surprised to that extent, but I think it is entirely possible to raid this place again from the air and do a lot of damage.

Colonel Fielder. I think it would be reported, but possibly too late to repel them.

180. General Frank. Without being reported?

181. General Frank. It would be reported from about only 20 miles?

Colonel Fielder. Twenty miles, line of sight; further than that from the higher installations.

182. General Grunert. Only 20 miles out?

183. General Frank. That is all.

184. General Grunert. They could only get them from the time they got within 20 miles?

185. General Frank. Right today the facilities are such that if they came in at about 20 feet over the water they can get within about 20 miles before they can be detected, unless they are seen visually.

186. General Grunert. Low flying?

Colonel Fielder. That is right. I thought it was a little further than that. I thought it was at the height of the line of sight.

188. General Frank. They have to be seen, by vision. Did the Navy know of that Poinsettia-Hibiscus message?

Colonel Fielder. Yes, they did. I don’t know just when they got it, but a copy of that was sent to the Navy and Army by the F. B. I.

189. General Frank. Was there ever any discussion that Poinsettia and Hibiscus might apply to types of naval ships like carriers and battleships?

Colonel Fielder. Very definitely, except it did not make sense, because they said they were both in blossom and there were no carriers in Pearl Harbor. There were battleships and one or two cruisers.

190. General Frank. Might “blossom” have meant that they were at sea?

Colonel Fielder. It could have contained a code, there is no question about that, but we tried to solve it, and so far as I know it has not been solved.

191. General Frank. I have nothing further.

192. General Grunert. Do you remember one Captain McMorris of the Navy making statements to the effect that in his opinion the Japs would never so attack, meaning by air, and also there is no possibility of such an attack? Do you remember that being discussed or that opinion being stated?
Colonel Fielder. No, sir. I do not.

193. General Grunert. Was the Army informed of the sinking of [2985] a Jap sub about 6:45 a.m. December 7th?

Colonel Fielder. It was not.

194. General Grunert. Now, in your testimony before the Roberts Commission it appears that you reported at a staff meeting that the Japs were burning papers at the consulate on December 6th, that the information came from the F. B. I. and that no one paid any attention to it.

Colonel Fielder. That is incorrect. I did not. I did not report that to the Roberts Commission.

195. General Grunert. Do you know anything about that?

Colonel Fielder. Yes, I do.

196. General Grunert. What was that about?

[2986] Colonel Fielder. The information came to us that the consulate was burning papers, and if I am not mistaken that came from sources other than the F. B. I. I think it came from the War Department, but it also came from F. B. I. sources. And that was reported at the staff meeting, and it was discussed, but that in itself, while significant, was not in any way conclusive, because there is not a day goes by that we don't burn secret papers right out here. For instance, and it was quite possible that the Japs had been directed to burn up certain codes. In fact, we know now, from the material that was captured at the consulate, that they were destroying their codes and a lot of their files of messages at that time.

That was not ignored at the staff conference, but no particular action was indicated, and it merely indicated that war was more nearly upon us, but not of an impending air attack.

197. General Grunert. You definitely understood that the consulate was the head of the espionage system in the islands?

Colonel Fielder. Yes, sir.

198. General Grunert. Had you any way of getting information as to what was happening at that consulate?

Colonel Fielder. None whatever.

199. General Grunert. Did you ever make an attempt to get it?

Colonel Fielder. We discussed it at great length with the F. B. I. as to how—what we should do, and I am of the—

200. General Grunert. You never went beyond the letter of the law or the letter of the instructions by easing operators in there to find out what they were doing?

Colonel Fielder. We did not.

201. General Grunert. Now, it is also in the digest of this Roberts report: it says, "Fielder discussed possibility with Commanding General in a purely academic way." Why, what is discussing the possibility of an attack in an academic way? [2987] We have our academic ways at our schools and colleges. When you discuss whether or not you are going to have an attack, what can you discuss in an academic way?

Colonel Fielder. I don't know whose testimony that refers to.

202. General Grunert. Well, did you discuss the possibility of such an attack with the Commanding General? And, if so, what was done about it?

Colonel Fielder. That was discussed innumerable times, not only with the Commanding General, but with all the staff officers. We
didn't necessarily discuss an air attack as such, but we planned how the troops would be disposed; where would the defenses be installed, what regiments would be dispersed on certain beaches, where the main line of defense would be in the event of invasion. All those things were discussed.

203. General Gruxert. All those things were discussed, and a lot of them practiced, were they?

Colonel Fielder. A lot of them practiced.

204. General Gruxert. But when it came down to the actual time, they found the command in Alert No. 1, which was sabotage, and therefore the implements that had been prepared could not possibly be used? Is that so?

Colonel Fielder. That is so.

205. General Gruxert. Then, it appeared that if Alert No. 2 had been in force there would have been a much better chance, if not of stopping the attack, of minimizing the loss; is that right?

Colonel Fielder. Undoubtedly losses would have been smaller. They could not have stopped the attack.

[2988]

206. General Gruxert. If an error was made or a mistake in judgment, it was a lack of comprehension of just was about to come about, or a question of adopting the proper alert?

Colonel Fielder. That enters into it. There is no assurance at all that Alert No. 2 or Alert No. 3 would have repelled the air attack. In my opinion it would not. It might have—it undoubtedly would have reduced the losses.

207. General Gruxert. Now let me ask you a little about these staff conferences. How many staff conferences did they have? They had periodic staff conferences between the Chief of Staff and the heads?

Colonel Fielder. Every Saturday morning we had a staff conference.

208. General Gruxert. Was it a routine matter?

Colonel Fielder. That was a routine matter, but they—

209. General Gruxert. What did it amount to?

Colonel Fielder. Well, for instance, my part of it consisted of bringing the staff officers up to date on world conditions.

210. General Gruxert. Did you give them a little talk every Saturday?

Colonel Fielder. Yes, every Saturday morning.

211. General Gruxert. Then, in a way that was sort of an estimate of the situation?

Colonel Fielder. That is exactly what it was.

212. General Gruxert. How did you estimate the situation along about November 27 to December 6th, say?

Colonel Fielder. I considered it serious, I considered war imminent, but frankly I didn't think it would be precipitated in that manner. I expected the Japs to expand towards the south. [2989] About that time we had knowledge of a large number of ships going down the China coast to the south, which looked as if an invasion force was taking off for Indo-China or the Malay States, or the Philippines or some other place. I felt that there was great danger of war, but I couldn't—I didn't anticipate that it would be inflicted on us so suddenly. I thought perhaps there might be a sinking
of a transport, one of our transports, maybe on overt act against
the Philippine Islands, maybe a severing of diplomatic relations;
but we had pacified the Japs so many times, had had this critical
situation for weeks and weeks, and then we would give them maybe
a little oil or something, and I didn't—I definitely did not antici-
pate war as being imminent.

213. General GRUNERT. But you considered the Hawaiian com-
mand as in an outpost, didn't you?

Colonel FIELDER. More as an outpost, more as a base from which
the Navy could operate. I had great confidence in the presence of
our Navy here, and we had most of our Navy here at that time, and
I couldn't—I just didn't know enough to visualize the approach of
an enemy task force as long as our Navy was present.

214. General GRUNERT. Then, you had what we might call a sort
of blind confidence in the Navy; is that right?

Colonel FIELDER. Well, it must have been.

215. General GRUNERT. Did you know that the Navy was not
making distant reconnaissance for the protection of the islands?

Colonel FIELDER. I knew that under the joint agreement they were
charged with it.

216. General GRUNERT. Right.

[2990] Colonel FIELDER. And I thought they were making
reconnaissance.

217. General GRUNERT. Do you know whether any steps were ever
taken to ascertain just what they were or weren't doing in the line
of distant reconnaissance?

Colonel FIELDER. I made none personally. I don't know whether
the other—whether the Commanding General made any or not.

218. General GRUNERT. Did you know what the task forces were
going out for or what they were doing out there and in what way
it would have helped to protect the island from an approach?

Colonel FIELDER. I merely assumed that they were going out for
battle practice, maneuvers. We could hear firing in the distance
occasionally when they were out.

219. General GRUNERT. I want to clear up a few points and then
I will go to the gist of what I really want to find out.

Now, did I understand you to tell General Russell that you did
not see an article or a flare headline across your morning paper
of November the 30th predicting war within a week?

Colonel FIELDER. I didn't say I didn't see it. I said that I didn't
remember it at this time as having impressed me particularly.

220. General GRUNERT. Then, you didn't place much credence in
what the papers put out?

Colonel FIELDER. I apparently didn't, and I still do not—some of
their headlines.

221. General GRUNERT. Now, tell us about the statement that ap-
ppears in the Roberts report record to the effect that Mr. Shivers stated
that Mr. Angus Taylor, District Attorney, wanted to prosecute some
Japanese agents for failure to register under the alien registration act,
but General Short was opposed to this without giving them notice so
to do, claiming that it would [2991] react unfavorably to his
plan of trying to make friends and create good relations amongst them.

Now, what did you have to do with that, and what advice did you
give General Short on the subject?
Colonel Fielder. That happened before I took over as G-2, but I am familiar with it and I know the background for it. Still in the backs of everyone’s mind was the old sabotage bugaboo, and with so many Japanese here the Army authorities felt that any way—any steps, almost, should be taken to control the local element of—the local Japanese population; and also they had been told not to disturb the population, not to bring on racial disorders, not to commit any overt act. And very definitely, if these agents so-called had been prosecuted it would have thrown the community into a tailspin, and I still think it was wise not to do it. General Short’s policy has proven sound, in that they have had no trouble from the Japanese population.

222. General Grunert. How do you know it was proven sound if they never attempted it?

Colonel Fielder. His policy was to treat them fairly and not antagonize them or stir them up, but to handle them fairly, and I say it is sound because it has had no overt acts.

223. General Grunert. Isn’t it the characteristic of the Japanese to be told what to do in no uncertain terms? Won’t they respect you more?

Colonel Fielder. They do respect authority. They also respect fair treatment.

224. General Grunert. Or is it possible that they have a contempt for those who they appear to think are weaklings—following the German and the Japanese custom?

[2992] Colonel Fielder. If they construe it as weakness, I think that is correct; they have a contempt.

225. General Grunert. Well, weren’t they laughing up their sleeves that they could have these agents trotting all around against our laws and nobody lay a finger on them?

I don’t expect you to answer all these unless you want to.

Colonel Fielder. I am delighted to answer them, because I think that the stand that General Short took was absolutely sound.

226. General Grunert. Then, at that time, at least, you thought appeasement was the best policy?

Colonel Fielder. I did. I don’t call it appeasement, exactly. I call it fair play. These people had not been advised of their rights; they had not been told that it was illegal to act. Many of them were just as ignorant of their offense as anything in the world.

Now, here is—he didn’t decline to prosecute. He wanted to give them warning and tell them that if they didn’t register before a certain date they would be prosecuted.

227. General Grunert. Well, why hadn’t this warning been given all this time?

Colonel Fielder. That I don’t now.

228. General Grunert. Since the law was in existence.

Colonel Fielder. That I don’t know. That is not within the—

229. General Grunert. Yes. All right; we will drop that subject.

Now, it is recorded here that in your testimony before the Roberts Commission you denied that Washington had advised you [2993] of three code words that would signal attack. Was there ever any understanding with Washington as to signals or messages of this kind to denote imminence of actuality of attack?

Colonel Fielder. Absolutely none.
General Grunert. That's all out of clear sky?

Colonel Fielder. That's out of the—that's a figment of someone's imagination.

230. General Grunert. Now tell me a little more about the time that Bicknell came up—according to the testimony we have, he got this message, this message this woman is supposed to have telephoned to Japan, and he goes, according to his story, takes it up to the Commanding General's house where you and the Commanding General were about to start out for some other place, and he has a short discussion with you, and that's all that came of that case as far as he knows; but he expressed himself as feeling that that was a most important thing and that it meant a great deal.

Will you tell us more about just what happened there? As I remember it, he said he had a very short conversation and intimated that you discussed that thing for about an hour.

Colonel Fielder. Yes, I did; for longer than that.

231. General Grunert. Was he there all the time?

Colonel Fielder. Bicknell was there the whole time. He had called me up first, I don't remember the exact hour; I imagine around 6 o'clock in the afternoon, and he came—I said, "Well, come right on out".

He came out to my quarters, we read it over, and I said, "This is—we had better go over and see General Short," who lived next door, and we, the two of us, went over, sat out on [2994] his porch for I don't know how long, but I would say 45 minutes to an hour at least, because we were over an hour late leaving for where we were going; and we all considered it extremely interesting, possibly important, but we couldn't make heads or tails of it.

232. General Grunert. It didn't induce General Short in any way to go to his next step in another alert, did it?

Colonel Fielder. No, because, if you will analyze the conversation, the simplest thing is to read it, and all it is, it is getting information. It ask about the searchlights and whether there are many sailors on the streets, whether there is—how the military reacts toward the—

233. General Grunert. But didn't all these things add up into something? All these indications should have added up into—of course it is hindsight.

Colonel Fielder. It is hindsight.

234. General Grunert. But it might then at that time have been foresight to have all these things add up into meaning something more than mere sabotage.

Colonel Fielder. It didn't. It is easy enough, when an act has been committed, to look back and see a lot of indications of that act, but hindsight is so much better than foresight. We studied it at great length; we really did.

235. General Grunert. Tell me, in the same connection: I believe in the hearings before the Congress on whether or not to demand that so-and-so be done, one congressman testified or at least announced that when Bicknell got up to the Commanding General's quarters the Commanding General cussed him out and practically kicked him out. Will you tell us whether that is [2995] true or not, sir?

Colonel Fielder. That is untrue.

236. General Grunert. All right; that is all on that.
Now let us go over a few messages here and see what you know about these things.

Here is a message or a paraphrased dispatch of the 16th of October, '41, from the C. N. O., which warned all concerned of the existing grave situation and which directed the Navy to take due precautions which would not constitute provocative action against Japan. Did you know anything about that October 16th message? That was the gist of it.

[2996] Colonel Fielder. I don't remember it in particular. It might have been discussed at a staff meeting, but I don't remember it, no, sir.

237. General Grunert. Here is a message from the same source to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, November 24, 1941, in which it is stated as an opinion, "A surprise aggressive movement in any direction is a possibility," and in which it was directed not to "precipitate Jap action." Do you know anything about that message?

Colonel Fielder. I do not.

238. General Grunert. You have already told us you know nothing about this message of November 27th to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, which is paraphrased and includes the following: "Consider this dispatch a war warning."

Colonel Fielder. I was not familiar with that, either.

239. General Grunert. You were familiar with the Chief of Staff's message to the Commanding General November 27, '41, which brought on Alert No. 1?

Colonel Fielder. Yes, sir. I was familiar with that.

240. General Grunert. Were you at the discussion prior to the decision as to what was to be done then?

Colonel Fielder. I discussed that with the Chief of Staff and I think with the Commanding General prior to the decision, but I don't remember those details. The message was called to my attention, and we did discuss it.

241. General Grunert. Prior to or after the decision?

Colonel Fielder. I am not sure.

242. General Grunert. Did he ask you for an estimate of the situation, in view of what was known then?

[2997] Colonel Fielder. No, he did not.

243. General Grunert. Was there any discussion, as far as you remember, as to whether or not you should go to No. 2 or No. 3 alert?

Colonel Fielder. There was no discussion as to whether we should go to No. 2 or No. 3, that I remember. I do remember discussing with the Commanding General what might be expected of the local population, and that was discussed any number of times. Sabotage was more or less foremost in our minds; there is no question about that.

244. General Grunert. Foremost in your minds why?

Colonel Fielder. Because of the imminent danger from so many——

245. General Grunert. Did you have any experience to back that up with?

Colonel Fielder. Nothing except the experience that the Germans had given us, and we knew that the Japs were collaborating with the Germans. We knew that there were Germans in Japan training the Japs.

246. General Grunert. In that experience you read about the Germans did you also run across the fact that they usually hit on
Sunday morning? I think that was part of that same series of stuff they put out.

Colonel Fielder. Yes, that is true. And it was well known, of course, that the Japs liked to surprise-attack. That's what they did at Port Arthur.

247. General Grunert. Now, you got this G-2 message from the War Department November 27, to you, G-2, in which it states that acts of sabotage and espionage were probable, and also [2998] possible that hostilities may begin. That was a straight G-2 message to G-2, and it was just inter-office, really?

Colonel Fielder. It was inter-office.


Colonel Fielder. I was directed to bring that to the attention of the Commanding General and the Chief of Staff only, which I did.

249. General Grunert. Now, on November 28th you also got a message which pertained more to protection against sabotage and airfields?

Colonel Fielder. Yes, sir.

250. General Grunert. That was an Adjutant General's message?

Colonel Fielder. That was an Adjutant General's message.

251. General Grunert. But those of these G-2 messages that referred to sabotage were received after the decision was made to go on an Alert No. 1, sabotage?

Colonel Fielder. I am not sure of the time, General. That is probably correct. We could check the hour of receipt very easily.

252. General Grunert. Now, there is a naval dispatch of December 3rd to the effect that information disclosed that instructions were sent to various Japanese diplomatic and consular posts to destroy certain codes and ciphers and to burn secret documents. Was this information transmitted to you? Do you remember that?

Colonel Fielder. I don't remember it from that source.

253. General Grunert. Now, there is one on December 4th and one on December 6th somewhat along the same line. Do you recall any additional information you got from the Navy after [2999] November 27th?

Colonel Fielder. I do not.

254. General Grunert. Do you know anything about the actual time of receipt of the Chief of Staff's message of December 7th?

Colonel Fielder. Only that it was after the attack. I don't remember what hour; I think it was around noontime.

255. General Grunert. Had you had occasion to use the oceanic telephone for anything with Washington? Was that used as a means of communication?

Colonel Fielder. I never used it until after the attack. I used it twice on the morning of December 7th.

256. General Grunert. And prior to that?

Colonel Fielder. Prior to that I had never used it.

257. General Grunert. Now, do you know how long it took you to make connections and get messages through by using that means?

Colonel Fielder. It took approximately an hour to get a message through.

258. General Grunert. From the time you put in your call until the connections were made?
Colonel Fielder. From the time I put it in until I talked to General Miles in Washington. And he called me back later. I talked to him twice on that day.

259. General Grunert. After December 7th you actually got in contact with General Miles, and then he called you back?

Colonel Fielder. Yes, sir.

260. General Grunert. Now give us a little more to wind up with. Give us a little bit of information about just what [3000] your contacts with the district and the fleet were, in the line of getting information and giving information.

Colonel Fielder. It was very, very close insofar as counter-intelligence was concerned. The investigations and the suspect list and those things were discussed regularly every week. But insofar as combat-intelligence and my associations and relationships with the fleet-intelligence officer, they were not very close because we had practically nothing in common. There was no combat at that time.

261. General Grunert. And you say the district never transmitted to you the fact that they had picked up a task force in the Marshall Islands?

Colonel Fielder. They did not.

262. General Grunert. Any other questions?

263. General Frank. Do you get that kind of information now?

Colonel Fielder. Oh, yes, very definitely.

264. Major Clausen. Yes, we have some on the Rohl-Wyman matter.

Colonel Fielder, are you acquainted with a Hans Wilhelm Rohl?

Colonel Fielder. I am not.

265. Major Clausen. You, while in charge of the G-2 of this Headquarters, though, have conducted investigations concerning this individual, have you?

Colonel Fielder. I think the F. B. I. did.

266. Major Clausen. Well, you did hand me a G-2 file which indicated an investigation of Hans Wilhelm Rohl by your section here, sir.

Colonel Fielder. I thought that was a—it's a series— [3001] we do have a file on him which includes a report of an investigation by the F. B. I., and we have in that file also a series of newspaper clippings, and so forth, but we did not make a full investigation of this man.

267. Major Clausen. Well, I didn't ask you whether you had made a full investigation. You have, or had, in July 1942, a Captain Meurlott?

Colonel Fielder. Meurlott.

268. Major Clausen. Who was he?

Colonel Fielder. He was in—what was the date of it?


Colonel Fielder. He was in the counter-intelligence section of the G-2 office at that time.

270. Major Clausen. And did he conduct an investigation concerning Hans Wilhelm Rohl, any type of investigation whatsoever?

Colonel Fielder. Well, I don't think he did. He might have perused the files, and so forth, but I wouldn't call that an investigation.
271. Major Clausen. Well, I show you a report titled, "Memo for files," dated July 22, 1942, and ask you if you recognize that as being in the handwriting of Captain Meurlott.

Colonel Fielder. Yes, that is his handwriting all right.

272. Major Clausen. And that is a photostatic copy, is it, Colonel, from the files to which you just referred?

Colonel Fielder. That is right.

273. Major Clausen. Was that report made under your supervision?

Colonel Fielder. Yes, it was.

274. Major Clausen. You were acquainted with it at the time?

Colonel Fielder. No, I was not.

275. Major Clausen. I see.

Well, I will offer in evidence this memorandum dated July 22, 1942, and read it to the Board at this time. This is entitled:

(Memorandum dated 7/22/42, by Captain Meurlott, is as follows:)

Memo for files:

Decision made to bring this case to a close without the formality of a C1-R1 report. Subject is claimed by Colonel Mollison to be a confirmed drunkard, and, inferentially, to be incompetent as a subversive influence for that reason. Irresponsibility rather than subversion appears to characterize the irregularities in his activities, as brought to the attention of this office.

Case closed.

Signed "R. M. Meurlott, Capt. M. I."

To whom is that subject applicable? It says, "subject is claimed."

Who was the subject?

Colonel Fielder. Oh, that is Hans Wilhelm Rohl.

276. Major Clausen. I see. Now, are you acquainted with Captain Ulrich von der Osten, who was a German spy? Are you acquainted with that case?

Colonel Fielder. No. I am not.

277. Major Clausen. Let me read you this from the F. B. I. report dated March 11, 1943:

[3003] (Excerpt from F. B. I. report of March 11, 1943, in re Captain Ulrich von der Osten, is as follows:)

Captain Ulrich von der Osten was in fact one of the chiefs of the German intelligence service among whose duties it was to establish contact with individual agents operating throughout the world. En route to the United States from Shanghai he had reported detailed information concerning national defense preparations of the United States at Pearl Harbor and other vital points in the Hawaiian Islands. In his report on the Hawaiian Islands he mentioned that this information would be of particular interest to "our yellow Allies." This report of von der Osten, fortunately, failed to reach its destination and was ultimately turned over to the FBI.

Are you acquainted with that case?

Colonel Fielder. I am not.

278. Major Clausen. Did you maintain liaison with the F. B. I. concerning matters of that kind, sir?

Colonel Fielder. That could very easily be in the hands of my section without my knowledge. I say that I personally was not familiar with it.

279. Major Clausen. This report was made in 1941 and resulted in conviction and sentences to terms of imprisonment of five to twenty years, of a ring of spies.
Colonel Fielder. I am not familiar with that.

280. Major Clausen. March 1942 the court convicted these people. I wondered, in connection with that report from which [3004] I have just read, if you ever gave any consideration to the possibility of a coincidence between the construction of national defense preparations in the Hawaiian Islands and the actual bomb pattern of the attackers on 7 December 1941.

Colonel Fielder. No, I haven’t.

281. Major Clausen. You don’t know? Well, if you have never given any consideration to it, you would not know.

Colonel Fielder. I have considered the pattern, but not in connection with the construction plans.

282. Major Clausen. Did you know, Colonel, about the alternate air route to the Philippines that was constructed or under construction about October?

Colonel Fielder. Yes, I knew about that. In the fall of ’41.

283. Major Clausen. And that was commenced about October 1941?

Colonel Fielder. ’41.

284. Major Clausen. Did your office ever receive any information concerning the fact that the plans for that alternate air route may have come to the attention of the Japanese Government prior to 7 December 1941 and thus have indicated to Japan the fact that this nation, that is the United States, was going to wage war with Japan?

Colonel Fielder. No, that never came to my attention.

285. Major Clausen. Did your office ever receive information that Colonel Wyman, in the spring of 1942, at a drinking party with three other Army officers,— or I will ask this first: You know Colonel Theodore Wyman, Junior, sir?

Colonel Fielder. Yes, I know him.

286. Major Clausen. Did you ever receive information to the effect that Colonel Wyman, in the spring of 1942, in connection with several other Army officers, participated in an evening of drinking and made this statement, Colonel:

There are probably a good many things which I have done during my life that are not exactly right, but there is one thing I have not done and that is to sell out my country the way that s. o. b. Rohl did to his German friends. I should never have trusted him and what I should do now is take this service revolver, go out and shoot him and then blow my own brains out.

Colonel Fielder. That never came to my personal attention.

287. Major Clausen. Well, now, you indicated a few minutes ago that such an important thing as a case of a spy might well be in your section here and not come to your personal knowledge. Will you search your files and see whether there is, any place in this Department or under your jurisdiction or command, any place, information concerning this statement that I have just read?

288. Major Clausen. Colonel Fielder. That could very readily be in the files of the Inspector General. Unless an Army officer is suspected of espionage or some disloyal act, he would not come to the attention of the G-2 section. If he went out on a drinking party, or if he gambled, or if he went in debt, or something like that, he would probably be investigated by an inspector; but unless it was subversive, we probably wouldn’t investigate him at all.
288. Major Clausen. The incident to which I refer is reported to us to have been referred to the G-2 office at Honolulu; so would you conduct that investigation and advise the Board, sir?

Colonel Fielder. I will have the officer who can answer that, and who has charge of the files, as a subsequent witness. It would be much more appropriate to have him identify the files, and search his files.

289. General Grunert. Will you coach him to look that up so he can testify on it?

Colonel Fielder. I will. I have already done that, and he reported to me that this was the only thing he had in his files.

290. Major Clausen. I am going to read you a paragraph, here, from a lead, and ask you if you have ever heard of this:

Check assertion that Rohl was close to the owner of a barn near Schofield base. This man is said to have been operating an illegal short-wave radio on December 7, 1941, and was shot by military police. There should be some data in the Honolulu FBI office about this matter, since we are informed that an inquiry was made by the FBI office in Los Angeles. This man's name was given to us as Bert Hasby, and his friendship with Rohl was said to have been intimate.

Do you know anything about that, Colonel?

Colonel Fielder. Yes; I know about that.

[3007] 291. Major Clausen. What are the facts?

Colonel Fielder. The facts are that Hasby was a Japanese alien, and he ran a beer garden adjacent to Schofield base. He was not even picked up after December 7. We subsequently investigated him some year or year and a half after the war started, and he was interned for a while on the mainland and was subsequently paroled. He is now out, though; he was not shot.

292. Major Clausen. Did Colonel Wyman ever talk with you regarding the immigration application of Hans Wilhelm Rohl?

Colonel Fielder. Never mentioned it, never talked to me about anything about Rohl.

293. Major Clausen. Do you know anything of any letters or oral conversations that Wyman had with respect to that application of Rohl?

Colonel Fielder. No; no; he never talked to me about it.

294. Major Clausen. I have just one question on this other matter of Doctor Mori. Was this Doctor Mori a woman dentist?

Colonel Fielder. Doctor Mori was a man, but the woman that did the talking was a newspaper woman, and I think a daughter-in-law; I am not sure; but Mori was a professional man. I don't know whether he was a surgeon or a physician or a dentist.

295. Major Clausen. Well, this "hibiscus and poinsettias" conversation was by a woman from this end, and not this Doctor Mori, a dentist?

Colonel Fielder. Yes, except the call was placed for Mori, and she did the talking after the connection was completed. That is my recollection of it.

[3008] 296. General Grunert. Did you ever "G-2" her afterwards?

Colonel Fielder. Oh, yes; she was picked up.

297. General Grunert. What was done?
Colonel Fielder. She was interned. She was interned, and so was he; and I have forgotten what became of him, he may still be interned; but they did not get enough on any of them to proceed before a military commission, but they did get enough to intern them.

298. General Grunert. Are there any questions?


300. Colonel Toulmin. Is this photostat in evidence?

301. General Grunert. No; they were not put in evidence, they were just explained.

302. Colonel Toulmin. Do you not think it ought to be put in evidence, General?

303. General Grunert. It would be very interesting to have it in there, if the Board wants it in.

304. General Frank. Is this on the record?

305. Colonel Toulmin. I was talking on the record.

306. General Grunert. Does the Board want this in the record?

307. General Frank. It may not be of interest, because it is an old photograph. It is obsolete. It has several hangars on there that never were built, but it does not have on there either the big engineering docks nor the supply warehouses at the other end of the line.

Colonel Fielder. Nor the Aqua system.

308. General Frank. Yes—nor the Aqua system.

309. General Russell. It had on there enough for the Japs to blow hell out of us down there with, and that is what they were [3009] using it for.

310. Colonel Toulmin. My thought is that some question might be raised at some time why the record was not complete. It is a very simple thing to put it in and then nobody could be critical of our not having it in the record.

311. General Grunert. Identify it, and we will put it in.

312. Colonel Toulmin. This photostat of the Japanese map found on a Japanese aviator, December 7, 1941, is offered in evidence with the next number.

(The photostat referred to was marked as Exhibit No. 22, and was received in evidence.)

313. General Grunert. Colonel Fielder, do you know of anything else, on any subject that relates to what we are after, that has not been brought up here, that you would like to introduce in evidence?

Colonel Fielder. I have one other very short statement I would like to make.


Colonel Fielder. That is to the effect that, while everyone in the Army here was materially concerned about sabotage, certain other steps were taken to prepare the group of islands for defense; and I did mention the fact that we held maneuvers, and that we fortified the beaches, and things like that; but as far as my testimony is concerned, I don’t want it to appear that all we did was prepare for sabotage, because we went a great deal further than that.

315. General Grunert. You prepared for a number of things, but what was actually put into effect on December 7 when the attack struck? You were actually in alert No. 1?
[3010] Colonel Fielder. We were in Alert No. 1 at that time; that is correct.

316. General Grunert. Are there any other questions? There appear to be none. Thank you very much.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

(Whereupon, at 4:55 p.m., having concluded the hearing of witnesses for the day, the Board took up the consideration of other matters.)
CONTENTS

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 12, 1944

Testimony of—

Colonel Leonard D. Weddington, Air Corps, Sixth Air Service Area Command........................................ 3012


Commander Harold S. Burr, U. S. N. R., 14th Naval District.................. 3067

Major General Maxwell Murray, United States Army, Commanding Guadalcanal........................................ 3075

Riley H. Allen, Editor, Honolulu Star-Bulletin, Business Address 125

Captain St., Honolulu, T. H........................................ 3105

Lt. Colonel Melbourne H. West, Headquarters 7th Fighter Wing.......... 3120

DOCUMENTS

Message of November 27, 1941, to Commanding General, Hawaiian Department........................................ 3094

Newspaper Articles......................................................................................................................... 3110

EXHIBITS

No. 23. Photostat of a captured Japanese chart taken from the chart-board of a Japanese dive bomber................................. 3035

24, 25. Two captured Japanese maps............................................................................................... 3074

26. Captured map with translation of Japanese endorsements............... 3074

1 Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate pages of original transcript of proceedings.
The Board, at 8:30 a.m., pursuant to recess on yesterday, conducted the hearing of witnesses, Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President of the Board, presiding.


Present also: Colonel Charles W. West, Recorder; Major Henry C. Clausen, Assistant Recorder; and Colonel Harry A. Toulmin, Jr., Executive Officer.

General Grunert. The Board will come to order.

TESTIMONY OF COLONEL LEONARD D. WEDDINGTON, AIR CORPS, SIXTH AIR SERVICE AREA COMMAND

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel West. Colonel, will you please state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station.

Colonel Weddington. Leonard D. Weddington, Colonel, Air Corps, Sixth Air Service Area Command; APO 959.

2. General Grunert. Colonel, this Board is after facts, and leads to where we can get facts; that is, concerning what led up to, and what happened during, the attack at Pearl Harbor. We asked that you attend because you are listed here, at the time of the attack, as commanding Bellows Field; is that right?

Colonel Weddington. Yes, sir.

3. General Grunert. Now, I wish you would tell the Board the conditions at Bellows Field at the time of the attack, as to its preparation for defense and what it did to defend itself that day.

Colonel Weddington. Do you desire, on the preparation, our defense as to the type of alert, orders that we had received, or something like that?

4. General Grunert. What were the physical means of defending the field? What measures were taken to defend the field, to ward off an air attack?

Colonel Weddington. Prior to December 7, there were practically no means of warding off an air attack available at Bellows Field.

5. General Grunert. Did you have machine guns in position?

Colonel Weddington. No, sir.

6. General Grunert. Did you not have any-no emplacements of any kind for weapons, or any protection for the personnel, in the line of slit trenches or air-raid shelters—anything of that sort?
Colonel Weddington. No, sir; natural ditches and ravines were the only thing.

7. General Grunert. In the line of protective measures, what took place after December 7?

Colonel Weddington. Our preparation was hurried, and we accomplished some, from the time of the warning until the attack, because at Bellows Field we had one plane make one pass, firing his forward guns through a tent area, approximately an hour before we at that field came under any attack other than that.

[3014] 8. General Grunert. What protective measures have you there, now? Do you know what there is, now?

Colonel Weddington. I know approximately. I do not know the numbers of organizations, because they have changed a number of times since I have read over the station list at that place; but I do know that they have numbers of emplacements for automatic weapons and have sites in the vicinity for antiaircraft gun positions. They have placed them in there several times. We placed them within a few days after the attack, and kept them there for many months.

9. General Grunert. What aircraft was at Bellows Field on the morning of the attack?

Colonel Weddington. The O-47s, I believe there were 7 there at the time belonging to the Eighty-Sixth Observation Squadron. They also had on the line two O-49s. There was one squadron of fighters at Bellows Field engaged for a month's aerial gunnery practice. I am not certain of the number of P-40s that they had, but they had in the vicinity of 12 on the field that morning.

10. General Grunert. Making a total of about how many airplanes?

Colonel Weddington. 21, approximately.

11. General Grunert. These were all concentrated practically wing-to-wing, were they?

Colonel Weddington. Yes, sir; at the time the first airplane came over the field. Before the next attack, they were dispersed as much as possible on the field at that time, which, with the number that we had, the maximum distance between airplanes was approximately 50 to 75 feet.

[3015] 12. General Grunert. Was this of your own volition that the airplanes were so placed, or were you required to so place them?

Colonel Weddington. It was the volition of the indoctrination on the field. I personally arrived, it had been done.

13. General Grunert. In other words, it was done according to orders from higher up, is that right?

Colonel Weddington. I believe our indoctrination certainly came from there; yes, sir.

14. General Grunert. Have you any questions, General Russell?

15. General Russell. You state that when you arrived these planes were all in, wing-to-wing, is that what you testified?

Colonel Weddington. When I arrived?


Colonel Weddington. No, sir.

17. General Russell. When were they placed wing-to-wing?

Colonel Weddington. From the time the first airplane came down and fired into our tent gap and went away, we had about an hour.
18. General Russell. We do not understand each other. When did you place your airplanes wing-to-wing, or close together?
   Colonel Weddington. The night before, when the flying for the day was over.
19. General Russell. How long had you been doing that prior to December 7, 1941?
   Colonel Weddington. All the time except when we were placed under some kind of special order.
20. General Russell. In October 1941, were you doing that?
   Colonel Weddington. Yes, sir.
21. General Russell. You had been doing it always?
   Colonel Weddington. Yes, sir.

23. General Frank. At that time, were there any pilots on the field?
   Colonel Weddington. Yes, sir.
24. General Frank. How many airplanes were destroyed?
   Colonel Weddington. Actual destruction?
25. General Frank. Well, how many airplanes were made incapable of flight?
   Colonel Weddington. I believe, four.
26. General Frank. Did any of them try to take off?
   Colonel Weddington. Yes, sir.
27. General Frank. What happened?
   Colonel Weddington. They were shot down immediately, with the Japs right behind them. They couldn't hit the airplane while taxiing down. I personally watched, wondering what would happen if the pilot was hit while taxiing, whether the airplane would just go on off, over the island, or whether he would die there, or whether he would groundloop, or what would happen; and I was watching particularly, because I saw them make at one of them taxiing down six passes. Six different airplanes made passes at him and seemingly never hit him, but when he got on the runway and started to take off, they got right square behind him, and just as he got off, shot him down in flames; and he was turning, trying to give them a bad target, and crashed into the beach and burned there.

   The other one that they shot down taking off, I did not see take off, because there were some of them making passes at the position I was in at that time, and I ducked. I had seen him taxiing down, however. They shot him down in the same [3017] manner, except that he was not so badly shot up, landed in the water about three quarters of a mile to a mile down the beach, and swam ashore. He was not killed.
28. General Frank. That morning, did any of the B-17s that had been flown over from the mainland land at Bellows?
   Colonel Weddington. Yes, sir.
29. General Frank. How many?
   Colonel Weddington. One.
30. General Frank. Did you examine it?
   Colonel Weddington. Yes, sir.
31. General Frank. What armament did it have?
   Colonel Weddington. Six 50-caliber machine guns, I believe, is the total.
32. General Frank. Were they mounted?
Colonel Weddington. Yes, sir; I believe so. I am certain they were, because we used the two on the top turret that were capable of being manned. We left them in position, and manned them for a number of days, because we had no other mounts. We took the others out and tried to improvise mounts at other parts of the field, and obtained ammunition for them. That was the next day or two before we got it. They had no ammunition aboard. They were mounted, but no ammunition aboard.

33. General Frank. Do you know the direction from which they came in?

Colonel Weddington. You mean to that field, or to these islands?

34. General Frank. I mean the B-17s.

Colonel Weddington. To that field, or to these islands?

35. General Frank. No, to these islands.


36. General Grunert. Has anyone else any questions?

37. Major Clausen. I have some, here.

Sir, what facilities did you have for gasoline for these planes?

Colonel Weddington. We had a small storage tank. They were in the process of putting in more, but at that time there was a storage tank I believe of only 20,000. I am not positive of that number.

38. Major Clausen. And so, on the 7 December 1941, they were then constructing the underground gasoline storage tanks, is that correct, sir?

Colonel Weddington. Yes, sir.

39. Major Clausen. Do you know roughly what percentage of completion that underground work had reached on 7 December 1941?

Colonel Weddington. Approximately 50 percent of the tunneling. I believe the total figure of the depth was 417 feet into the hill.

40. Major Clausen. And was it usual, Colonel, for the truck with gasoline to come over the mountains every day about 10 o'clock?

Colonel Weddington. I don't recall any specific time they didn't come over. They came around.

41. Major Clausen. From what point did the truck with the gasoline have to come—how far away?

Colonel Weddington. The gasoline had to come from Honolulu.

42. Major Clausen. That was about 30 miles?

Colonel Weddington. Approximately; a little more; a little more than 30, I believe.

43. Major Clausen. Now, were any of the aircraft on the field drained of gasoline on this morning, for security reasons, or otherwise?

Colonel Weddington. Not drained for security reasons. They had been flown the day before, and it had been the practice when the squadron was on its month of aerial gunnery practice not to refuel the airplanes when they got through on Saturday afternoon, but to refuel them during Sunday; and other days, they normally simply cleaned the guns, and armed the next morning when they were ready to go; but on Saturday afternoons it was the practice to get a better job of cleaning, to actually take the barrels or whatever portion of the gun necessary at that time to take off and to give them a better cleaning. The guns were actually dismounted from most of the P-40s.

44. Major Clausen. Specifically, with reference to the gasoline, could you give me some idea as to what percentage of gasoline these planes that were on the field had in their tanks?
Colonel Weddington. No, sir; I have not heard what percentage. I know some of them were not fueled, and some of them might have been.

45. Major Clausen. So, in addition to being wing-to-wing, they also needed to be fueled?

Colonel Weddington. Yes, sir.

46. Major Clausen. Can you tell me something about the runways, Colonel? Were the runways being constructed at that time, also?


47. Major Clausen. Just tell the Board roughly what had been done and what needed to be done to these runways as of 7 December 1941.

Colonel Weddington. The plan was for a 2-runway field, and they had been working over a month taking out sand hills and coral hills and working the coral into a depth to give them a good base on one of the runways. The other runway had very little work done on it, because it was going to be built directly over the existing runway, so, to keep the field operative, they were not doing anything on that runway until the other runway was capable of handling aircraft.

48. Major Clausen. And with reference to what you called “the other runway,” can you give the Board some idea as to the percentage of completion on 7 December 1941?

Colonel Weddington. No, not definitely a percent, because so much work had entered into it, and they worked 24 hours a day and in 7 days had it so they could take any sized bomber that we had, by Thursday.

49. Major Clausen. By Thursday?

Colonel Weddington. They worked night and day.

50. Major Clausen. The following Thursday?

Colonel Weddington. The following Thursday, by working night and day; and we reported on Wednesday that we could take anything over there by Thursday. We hesitated to tell anybody we were working night and day. However, we were afraid that we would get stopped working at night, so we worked night and day to get that thing ready, and then told them on Wednesday that we could take any bomber that they had the next day. We had [3021] been informed that Hickam Field was out, and for several days we got no other information as far as operation.

51. Major Clausen. Colonel, the Wednesday and the Thursday to which you have just referred were the Wednesday and Thursday following?

Colonel Weddington. Immediately following December 7.

52. Major Clausen. Now, as of December 7, you had no runway there which was capable of taking the bombers, is that correct, sir?

Colonel Weddington. They landed very light on it. It was 75 feet wide and I believe 3,800 feet long.

53. Major Clausen. And this one B-17 that landed, in fact was wrecked, isn’t that correct?

Colonel Weddington. Yes, sir. He was wrecked, however, because he landed down a very strong wind, and not up-wind.

54. Major Clausen. Now, getting back to this gasoline storage, do you know the amount of gasoline that was in the tank that you had at Bellows just before the attack on 7 December 1941?
Colonel Weddington. I don't recall if it was full or not. I believe it was kept fairly right up to the top of it. I never heard, one way or the other, so it must have been full.

[3022] 55. Major Clausen. Do you know where I could get that information, sir?

Colonel Weddington. Possibly the records, but I am not sure.

56. Major Clausen. Was there any construction taking place at Bellows Field in addition to the gasoline storage facilities and the runways?

Colonel Weddington. Yes, sir, there were buildings for a complete permanent camp or permanent post.

57. Major Clausen. Had they been completed?

Colonel Weddington. No, sir.

58. Major Clausen. Can you give the Board some idea of the percentage of completion of these additional facilities?

Colonel Weddington. There were 16—I have forgotten the exact number in the oval of the so-called 63-man barracks. The buildings themselves were supposedly completed. There were no sewage facilities. The sewage had not been started, even, and half of these buildings were so low that without the sewage they could not even put in temporary latrines or cesspools. On the higher half they dug and connected up temporary cesspools and were using about six of these, six or eight. The one office building—we called it No. 1 item, I think it was—approximately of the standard cantonment type construction, 26 by 108 feet—I believe that is the size of the building, I am not positive of that size, but it was a standard cantonment type construction. Two of those had been completed. However, the U. S. E. D., Area Engineer, was still occupying one of them.

59. Major Clausen. Now, you said you understood that Hickam Field was out on December 7th?

[3023] Colonel Weddington. Yes.

60. Major Clausen. Was Bellows the only field available that could be used?

Colonel Weddington. No, sir. Our information was that the runways at Hickam were not usable. We had not heard one way or the other about Wheeler. However, Wheeler, not being a field with runways at that time, had no runways on it. We felt that it could be used, but we did not know the extent of the damage to Wheeler Field. We had not been informed of that.

61. Major Clausen. Did you later learn the extent of the damage, as to whether Bellows was the only available field?

Colonel Weddington. Yes, sir.

62. Major Clausen. What was that?

Colonel Weddington. That they could be used. They swept the runways and repaired what little damage had been done. It was mainly debris and not damage to the runways actually at Hickam, and since they were expecting more airplanes to arrive, and we were trying to relieve the congestion, they decided to send all available B-18's that were left to Bellows, and we informed them that we could use them on Thursday.

63. General Grunert. At Bellows Field was the lack of gasoline any handicap to what took place that day?
Colonel WEDDINGTON. I believe we could have gotten, if the airplanes had been armed and refueled, more of them into the air.

64. General GRUNERT. Could you have gotten all of them in the air with the fuel you had?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. I do not believe that that many pilots were available.

65. General GRUNERT. I mean, as to gasoline. Did you have enough gasoline to put all the planes in the air, if necessary?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. Yes, there was enough gasoline there to take care of the planes.

66. Major CLAUSEN. In regard to the construction of this gasoline storage facility, the runways and other items you mentioned, do you know the dates on which they were supposed to have been completed?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. No, sir. I do not recall if we heard an estimated date of completion.

67. General FRANK. Were you satisfied with the progress of the construction?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. Yes, sir.

68. General FRANK. Was it being prosecuted vigorously?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. I believe so. There were other projects going on on the island and they were continually pulling equipment from the job there and taking it somewhere else, until finally the Area Engineer was very disturbed about it, because it interfered with his program, and we would find out that equipment would leave and he did not know about it and I did not know about it. We had very little to say about it. I instructed the guards at the gate that no equipment left that field without the personal O. K. of the Area Engineer.

69. General FRANK. Who was the Area Engineer?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. Mr. Paul—

70. General FRANK. Lynch?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. Lynch, Paul Lynch.

71. General FRANK. Were there any delays in construction that were brought to your attention?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. I do not recall any specific delay, except, as I mentioned, the equipment being pulled off, and then a little project being held up and the location of a certain building. We would argue with them. They tried to locate buildings once in a while from down town by an incorrect contour map, and they would hold the Area Engineer to placing it the way it was shown on their drawing, and we would say "It can't go there that way," and so we would have to call up and get them to come out and show them it would not go that way.

The District Engineer continually did things like that. In one area, particularly, that was completely smoothed off to be the shoulder of one of the runways later, they wanted to put buildings around the contour, on the hill. We said that was entirely out, that no buildings go in that area. Finally we got a fairly open authority to place the buildings where we wanted to. If it was too much out the Area Engineer would—we got along very well with the Area Engineer.
72. General Frank. Did you have any difficulty with the District Engineer's office, other than this confusion with respect to location?

Colonel Weddington. No. Outside of a little confusion like that we had no real trouble, because when it got to a problem larger than that, we knew we were without authority and would pass it on up to the Air Force.

73. General Frank. Did you feel you were getting full support from the District Engineer's office?

Colonel Weddington. Of course, we didn't know all the problems that they were up against.

74. General Frank. There was some confusion?

[3026] Colonel Weddington. We felt like we could direct for our own benefit out there better than they were doing. That is a natural feeling on the part of the lower echelons, I believe. I would not say that we were not getting cooperation.

75. General Grunert. Have you anything else that is on your mind that you would like to tell the Board that you think would be of benefit to the Board?

Colonel Weddington. No one has asked about the availability of ammunition to the personnel we had there.

76. General Grunert. All right, suppose you tell us about that.

Colonel Weddington. We had no ammunition, except the belted war reserve ammunition belonging to the 86th Observation Squadron, 32,000 rounds, I believe.

77. General Grunert. What did you want to have; what did you think you ought to have?

Colonel Weddington. We should have had some for the rifles we had there, that had been given to us for training recruits. We thought we should have had some ammunition for them. The 86th Observation Squadron also had a few .30 caliber machine guns which we could not obtain the belts for.

78. General Grunert. Did you ask for what you needed or did you just wait to be served?

Colonel Weddington. No, sir. We asked for it several times.

79. General Grunert. What was the answer?

Colonel Weddington. It was not available and it was not authorized for any purpose that we were over there for.

80. General Grunert. As to December 7th, were you handicapped by not having it then? Were you in a position to fire and use it, if you had it?

Colonel Weddington. We could have fired the machine guns if we had had belts. We did have them in the hour over there between the first airplane and the attack of the 9 fighters that finally attacked the field; we did unbelt war reserve ammunition belonging to the 86th and issued it to all the people, all the men there that we had issued rifles to. Many of them had never fired a rifle, but we at least armed them.

81. General Grunert. Thank you very much for coming.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)
TESTIMONY OF CAPTAIN EDWIN T. LAYTON, U. S. NAVY

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel West. Captain, will you please state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station?


2. General Grunert. Captain, the Board is after facts or leads to facts. We have developed quite a bit of background and also quite a bit of the story, so we are piecing out as much as possible.

First, will you tell us what was your assignment and position just prior to the attack and during the attack?

Captain Layton. I was fleet intelligence officer, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

3. General Grunert. Did you have anything to do with the Naval District?

Captain Layton. No, sir. The Naval District is a separate command, and the operations of the intelligence organization there are directly under the Commandant and the Chief of Naval Operations. However, the district intelligence officer keeps the fleet intelligence officer apprised of any information ashore that would have any effect upon the morale of the fleet, or subversive elements, or activities towards sabotage, or anything that might disturb the activities of the fleet from its base.

4. General Grunert. Now, will you please give the Board a [3029] brief general summarization of your duties as fleet intelligence officer, and wind up by telling us just what connection you had with the department headquarters ashore, the Army?

Captain Layton. The duties of the fleet intelligence officer were to assemble, collate, to evaluate and disseminate information to the fleet, also to the Commander-in-Chief and to sub task force commanders, of all matters that were concerned with the operations of the fleet, whether it was a matter of matériel or a matter of tactics, or matters of cognizance of junior commanders. My collation and evaluation and dissemination of intelligence to the Commander-in-Chief itself generally concerned itself with the broader picture of the situation in the Pacific.

I do not recall the exact date, but somewhere mid-1941 Colonel Raley—Colonel Edwin Raley of the Air Corps, who was G–2, Hawaiian Air Force—called on me and suggested that we establish immediate and intimate relationship of liaison, telling me that he had been so directed by the Department G–2. His selection, he explained, was because the Air Corps and the Navy based here would operate closely in case any operations of the fleet in these waters would be expected, and that the function of the ground force here was largely of a defensive garrison category. From that time on Colonel Raley or one of his assistants and I were in almost daily conferences. As the time grew closer the end of November, and principally the middle of November on, there was never a day but which I saw Colonel Raley in person at least once and sometimes two and three times. That was also particularly [3030] marked toward the end of November when considerable intelligence was received from various sources.
regarding the Japanese intentions in the Far East. He informed me that he was keeping his General informed of all these matters.

5. General Grunert. By "his General" he meant whom? Do you know?

Captain Layton. I believe it was General Martin. I am not real—


Captain Layton. It is so long, I have forgotten the name of the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Air Force at that time. I believe it was General Martin.

7. General Grunert. What connection did Raley have with G-2, if any?

Captain Layton. As a subordinate under G-2, as I understand the setup, he was told to contact me as a liaison between the G-2 and the fleet.

8. General Grunert. And then the information that passed between the two of you passed for the Department and not just between the Air Force of the Department and you?

Captain Layton. I cannot say that at first hand. I do not know what he did or what action he took with regard to this material. It was my assumption, however, that, rather than he talking to the G-2, that the Commanding General of the Air Forces was to confer or have conversations regarding the situation with the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department. That is not first-hand evidence.

9. General Grunert. Just what took place at these conferences? What type of information did you pass to him?

[3037] Captain Layton. Starting about the early part of November, somewhere between the 10th and 12th, we started to receive a series of reports from naval observers in China, naval attaché in Tokyo, naval attaché in Chungking, from the British and other sources, regarding the movements of Japanese troops, vessels, naval vessels, transports, and so forth, south along the China coast. There was also information of the highest secrecy from the British sources and from other sources which indicated invasion of the Kra Isthmus was impending. The intelligence from all sources, added up, indicated a southern movement on the part of the Japanese amphibious forces, and as the days grew on more confirmatory intelligence was received to strengthen this picture.

10. General Grunert. What was the source of your information?

Captain Layton. I would have to ask the Board now as to what degree of security I am given on my testimony.

11. General Grunert. I don't want you to divulge anything that may be used by—I will put the question a little differently: Did you get information from the District radio intercept?

Captain Layton. Yes, we received information from many sources. The principal source of information, of course, is Office of Naval Intelligence under Chief of Naval Operations.

12. General Grunert. But the principal source came from Washington?

Captain Layton. That would be—all sources from Washington would be channeled through that source.


Captain Layton. That is, we will say that I presume the military attaché at Chungking, if he received some information, he
would pass it in turn to G–2, who in turn would pass it to O. N. I., who in turn would pass it to us. Most of our dispatches coming from China direct or from Japan direct or from the Philippines or from French Indo-China or from the Singapore area would be passed through the naval observers there, but it wasn’t necessarily their original information; it may have come from some other source.

14. General Grunert. All right. Let us get nearer home. During the latter part of November do you recall having received information of the presence of a task force in the Marshall Islands?

Captain Layton. There was a statement to the effect that it was believed that some carriers and a majority of the submarines were estimated to be in the Marshall Islands.

15. General Grunert. That came from what source?

Captain Layton. That came from, what the source is called, combat intelligence, 14th Naval District.

16. General Grunert. Who evaluates that sort of information as to its credibility, or who checks it up?

Captain Layton. I did.

17. General Grunert. How did you evaluate it?

Captain Layton. Since that information was not checked from other combat intelligence sources having available to them the same material, it was not possible to add it or to evaluate it as “A–1.” It is after all, an assumption rather than a definite statement of fact. It was, however, believed that the submarine situation was more clearly identified than the carrier situation insofar as no carriers themselves were [3032] identified. This, I may say now, has been proven erroneous. Captured documents and interrogation of prisoners have proven beyond a shadow of a doubt that no carriers were in the Marshalls at that time.

18. General Grunert. Was this information not confirmed, or was this information confirmed, by the intercept at Cavite?

Captain Layton. It was not confirmed at Cavite.

19. General Grunert. It was not. Are you at liberty to tell us what is your source of information as to what you actually think happened now, instead of what was then at that time supposed to be the origin or the source from which the task group that attacked Hawaii came?

Captain Layton. I am at liberty, and I would be glad to tell the Board. Based on the interrogation of several prisoners, both locally and in the Southwest Pacific area, based upon documents that have been captured, it is established beyond shadow of doubt, as far as I am concerned, that the task force allocated toward the attack on Pearl Harbor departed Empire ports and bases about 22 November and proceeded direct to Tankan Bay on Etorofu Island where they assembled, fueled, and departed on 27 November, proceeding on easterly courses until on or about 4 or 5 December (I say that because one prisoner says 4 and one says 5; these dates are all east longitude dates) at which time they turned south. The course taken was to avoid all shipping and avoid being sighted.

On the night of the 7th, east longitude date again, they increased speed to 26 knots and proceeded on to the attack. The fly-off was at about 6:30 Honolulu time, although one captured document shows at least an intended fly-off slightly later than that.

[3034] 20. General Grunert. How far out, approximately?
Captain Layton. The document which showed the intended fly-off point was about 250 miles. This was based—off the record a minute, would the Board care for a photostat of that document?


Captain Layton. I have it here if you would like it.

(There was colloquy off the record.)

[3035] Captain Layton. I would like to introduce a photostat made in my office of a captured Japanese chart taken from the chartboard of a dive bomber two days after the attack, when it was raised in Pearl Harbor. I, myself, took this from the plane, and saw that it was photostated in my office unchanged.

(The photostat referred to was marked Exhibit No. 23, and was received in evidence.)

I have marked on there, in English, our interpretation of these markings. There is a point with a circle around it, timed 0300. All these times are Japanese times minus 9, which they maintain at all times, as well as the Japanese date, without changing it going across the date-line as we do. There is a line running slightly to the west of south, headed for the north point Oahu, on which space to part our positions with times 0320, 0340, and 0400 hours. These correspond, starting off with the assumed fly-off point of Honolulu times of 0730, 0750, 0810, and 0830. Their spacing is about 156 to 160 nautical miles per hour, which obviously must be a plane speed, and which is evaluated as being a plane speed, with lean mixture, to make the longest distance with the most amount of bombs and the most amount of "gas" they could carry and take off.

22. General Frank. With the least amount of consumption of "gas"?

Captain Layton. The least amount of consumption of "gas."

I would like to invite your attention to several points on this, one of which, translated in English, says:

No. 1 Assembly Point, 30 degrees 20 miles from Kahuku Point.
No. 2 Assembly Point, 30 degrees 20 miles from Kaneohe Bay.

On various points Oahu, such as Barber's Point, points on Hawaii, points on Maui, are reference points. These are merely like reference points on a map, A, B, C, D, and E. Those will [3036] probably be used in connection with sightings. It is to be noted this chart is gridded in Japanese fashion, A, B, C, D, and so forth.

There is another line running due north, the southern position of it being slightly to the south of the fly-off point, which would represent a fly-off on a southerly course, and then the carriers being south of the fly-off point at the end of the fly-off proceeding north. These positions are marked as follows: 0350. It is to be noted that this is 50 minutes after fly-off time. The next northerly point is 0450, the next northerly point is 0550, the next northerly point is 0650, the next northerly point is 0750. These times are again Tokyo time. Placed in English, they are Honolulu time: 8:20, 9:20, 10:20, 11:20, and 12:20.

The spacing of these on the chart indicates a speed of about 26 knots and indicates the carrier retirement course. There are three positions in the left-hand corner, rather indistinct, representing three submarines, I-19, I-21, and I-23. One prisoner-of-war interrogation states that three submarines accompanied this task force from Tankan Bay
and proceeded with this force, deploying to protect the force prior to the run-in at high speed.

Here is one that is not translated, marked up, so that you can see what it looked like in the original.

23. General GRUNERT. Make a proper notation, identify it, and put it in the record, please.

Colonel WEST. This document will be received in evidence and marked Exhibit 23.

24. General GRUNERT. Now, let us go back to the radio intercept, which indicated some Japanese vessels in the Marshalls. [3037] Was this information transmitted to the Army, do you know?

Captain LAYTON. I do not recall off-hand. I believe I told Colonel Raley about it, but I don't remember, now, positively, whether I did or not.

25. General GRUNERT. At that time, without the knowledge you have now, it indicated that there was something in the Marshalls, because of which it might have been well to suspect something might come from the Marshalls. Have you ascertained where the two-man "subs" came from?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir. With slightly less positive identification than the previous testimony I gave regarding the task force, the 2-men "subs" were carried "piggyback" on submarines specially designed to carry them, and were released in the vicinity of Oahu. Their mission was to proceed inside Pearl Harbor and to destroy American naval vessels there.

I may offer, if I may, another chart showing the positions of five submarine numbers inside the Pearl Harbor channel entrance, which it is assumed are the submarine positions. It also shows the course and time element of a submarine passing around Ford Island, inside Pearl Harbor, and is the predicted track of the submarine, from which this chart was taken. This chart was taken from the "midget" submarine captured off Bellows Field.

I would like to invite the attention of the Board that three submarines, marked here "I-16," "I-20," and "I-22," are on the left-hand side of the channel, entering Pearl. The I-18 and the I-24 are on the right-hand side of the channel, entering Pearl. The captured submarine was either the I-16 or the I-18, I have forgotten which. They apparently took their names from their parent submarine, which was the real I-18 or I-16 or I-20.

26. General GRUNERT. How many of these submarines were destroyed, do you know?

[3038] Captain LAYTON. All of them, sir. The reason I say "all of them" was, the Japanese announced nine officers and petty officers had all been raised in rank, and had lost their life on their suicide mission against Pearl Harbor. The Japanese press subsequently was forced to announce that one of the members of these crews had been taken prisoner, because many Japanese knew these were 2-man submarines, and nine men could not be divided in two.

I also have photographs of these people, now.

27. General GRUNERT. At what time were any of these submarines destroyed in Pearl Harbor?

Captain LAYTON. One was destroyed by gun fire and ramming on the morning of December 7, during the attack.

28. General GRUNERT. Do you know approximately what time?
Captain Layton. I couldn't testify that, first-hand; it would be hearsay.

29. General Grunert. Was one destroyed before the attack?
Captain Layton. One was destroyed outside of Pearl Harbor by the USS WARD.

30. General Grunert. Do you know what time that was?
Captain Layton. I don't know at first-hand evidence; no, sir.

31. General Grunert. But it was well before, about two hours before the attack?
Captain Layton. It was somewhere around two hours before the attack. I can get the records to find out the exact time.

32. General Grunert. Do you know whether that information was transmitted to the Army?
Captain Layton. I do not know, sir.

33. General Grunert. Whose business would it be to transmit such information to interested agencies?
Captain Layton. At that time it would be the mission of the duty-officer who had the staff duty.

34. General Grunert. Do you know what time that information was received, where it could have been transmitted to the Army?
Captain Layton. It was received in the Fourteenth Naval District, first. What action they took, I do not know.

35. General Grunert. Then through ordinary channels it would have been up to the Fourteenth Naval District to transmit the information to the Army, if such transmission were to be made?
Captain Layton. Yes, sir.

36. General Grunert. And it would be in their judgment as to where to transmit, and whether or not to transmit, and what dissemination to give it?
Captain Layton. Yes, sir; being an event within their naval sea frontier.

37. General Grunert. I have one more question on the pick-up in the Marshalls. Although you could not verify it at the time, and you did not give it an "A-1" priority, as I might call it, at the same time there was evidence of some Japanese naval vessels in the Marshalls?
Captain Layton. Yes, sir.

38. General Grunert. Wouldn't that, in your opinion, have been sufficient news in order to at least check up on whether or not measures had been taken, to be sure that your defense was all it should be?
Captain Layton. Checking up the measures of defense was not my function as a fleet intelligence officer. I would like [3040] to invite the attention of the Board to the fact that there had been naval officers in the Marshalls since early December 1940.

39. General Grunert. Naval officers?
Captain Layton. Naval vessels, in the Marshalls.

40. General Frank. You mean Jap naval vessels?
Captain Layton. Yes, sir; Jap naval vessels in the Marshalls, since December 1940. May I refresh my memory? As a result of which, I made a personal study of the Japanese movements into the Marshalls and Carolines and Mariñtas, as we were in possession of intelligence that they were then actually fortifying and building air bases on various strategic atolls. I informed Admiral Richardson of this in late December 1940, and informed Admiral Kimmel of this activity when he took command in February 1941.
As of February 1941, I laid out what was my opinion at that time of the defenses and aviation stationed in the Marshalls, and noted that as of that time some 30 auxiliaries were engaged in transport of supplies, material, and personnel, and at least five men-of-war were in the general Mandates area. Subsequently, this number of ships, naval and auxiliary naval, in the Mandates, and including the Marshalls, rose to the total of some eighty per month, en route, at, and returning.

The fact that one unit of the communication intelligence net assumed that carriers were in the Marshalls was based on their tentative identification of destroyers, which had previously worked with carriers, being in the Marshalls. The submarine concentration in the Marshalls was accepted as almost A-1, and submarine activity was anticipated. We had had, from [3041] time to time, innumerable submarine contacts off Oahu. They had been followed up, and eventually lost. Admiral Kimmel’s decision to treat all submarines in the Hawaiian area as enemy was based upon the information which we have mentioned, and also the thought that submarine action was most likely in case of hostilities.

41. General GRUNERT. Do you recall a message received by Admiral Kimmel from the Chief of Naval Operations on the 27th of November, which, as paraphrased, started out by saying, “Consider this dispatch a war warning”?

Captain LAYTON. I do.

42. General GRUNERT. Did you have any connection with transmitting that to General Short?

Captain LAYTON. I did.

43. General GRUNERT. Do you know whether or not it was transmitted to General Short?

Captain LAYTON. I do. It was.

44. General GRUNERT. By whom?

Captain LAYTON. Admiral Kimmel directed me to make a paraphrase and insure its delivery to General Short. Prior to that, he told me to show him the paraphrase, to be sure it met with his approval, and that it paralleled closely the original message. I typed the paraphrase, after several revisions, and took it into his cabin for his approval. At that time, the Chief of Staff of the Fourteenth Naval District, Captain Earl, arrived with a message from General Short, which the Admiral read, and, said, or words, “This is almost like ours.” He said, “All right. Get this to General Short,” and returned the message to the Chief of Staff of the Fourteenth Naval District, Captain Earl.

We walked out of the cabin together, and Captain Earl said, “Lieutenant Burr, the Navy liaison officer with the headquarters, Hawaiian Department, is returning General Short’s message to General Short, and it is appropriate that he also deliver this message, as he is the official liaison officer.” He then asked Burr to read the message, which I had in my hand, for General Short, to be sure that he understood it. I handed them to Lieutenant Burr, and he delivered them, that evening. It was done about 5:30, or maybe a little later.

45. General GRUNERT. Of the 27th?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

46. General GRUNERT. Then, as far as you know, you understand that Burr delivered the message?
Captain Layton. Yes, sir.

47. General Grunert. Have you any questions?

48. General Frank. Was that a matter of assumption, or a matter of fact?

Captain Layton. He has told me he delivered the message.

49. General Frank. To whom?

Captain Layton. When he arrived at the headquarters, General Short and his Chief of Staff were absent, inspecting the condition of alert that had been put in, and he delivered it to the senior staff officer, who was head of G-3. I believe, and I believe his name was Colonel Donegan, or Donovan—Donegan, I believe, sir; I am not real sure—for delivery to General Short.

50. General Russell. With the possible exception of some reference which you made to the evidence or the statement of [3043] the captured Japanese, you have given the Board none of the factual bases for your conclusions as to the course which the carrier task force followed in reaching the point from which the planes were launched in the attack of December 7. How extensive is this information upon which you have based your conclusions as to that course?

Captain Layton. I did not say from one prisoner: I said, from several prisoners, from independent sources. We have one other prisoner who is at present under interrogation, who was secret secretary on the staff of Admiral Yamamoto, then CINC, combined fleet, who was present when the original operation order was drawn up, and he also, without knowledge that we knew, wrote a rough draft of the order, as he remembered it, in which it said:

On X minus—

that was 18 days.

the striking force composed of the first air fleet would sortie home waters and proceed via Tankan Bay and carry out a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, taking courses such as to avoid shipping, and to arrive undetected on X-Ray Day.

Of interest is that they prescribed that if any third power's vessels, including Russia and Japan, were found within 600 miles of its destination, that vessel was to be destroyed; that if any third power's vessels, including Soviet Russia and Japan, were found outside of 600 miles of the force's destination, the vessel was to be seized, and to be prevented from making any radio transmissions; if suspicion was existent that it had made transmissions, the vessel was to be destroyed.

[3044] 51. General Russell. That document is in your possession?

Captain Layton. That document has not yet been fully translated. This prisoner is still under interrogation. I give you that as a first-hand evidence of having talked to the prisoner and having read his initial draft. That document will be translated, with others that this man is doing, within two or three weeks, and will be published as an official intelligence bulletin from the Pacific Ocean Areas Command.

52. General Russell. How many witnesses who have given evidence bearing on the course of that task force have been examined by ONI, by your agency, and by all naval agencies of which you know?

Captain Layton. I think three have been examined by Pacific Ocean Area agencies, and two have been examined by General MacArthur's agencies.
53. General Russell. And these five were personnel of this task force?

Captain Layton. That is right, sir. Additionally, I might add, we also have a facsimile of a captured Japanese map, which shows the courses of the carriers between November 1941 and June 1942, when they met their end at Midway. That was captured in the South Pacific area and translated by that combat intelligence center at Noumea. It also shows a course due east of Tankan Bay, and then a course southeast to north Oahu.

[30/5] 54. General Russell. What was the strength of this task force that we are discussing, the Japanese task force?

Captain Layton. From a captured official Japanese document taken from the plane from which the charts, the photostats I have produced before the Board were obtained, a small call sign list was extracted that showed the following carriers there, and other documents that bear this out:

Six aircraft carriers, including the AKAGI, KAGA, HIRYU, SORYU, SHOKAKU, ZUIKAKU; two battleships, two fast battleships, the HIJYU and the KIRISHIMA; two heavy cruisers, the TONE and the CHIKUMA; one light cruiser, the ABUKUMA; Desron 1.

55. General Russell. That is what?

Captain Layton. Destroyer Squadron 1. It should be pointed out that Destroyer Squadron 1 is a command and the ABUKUMA is its flagship. The number of destroyers present cannot be positively determined, because they were not given by name on the call sign list.

56. General Russell. Estimated, how many surface craft were in this task force?

Captain Layton. Six aircraft carriers, two fast battleships, two heavy cruisers, one light cruiser, and some destroyers.

57. General Russell. More than 11?

Captain Layton. More than 11.

58. General Russell. You have enumerated 11, and there were a number of destroyers also?

Captain Layton. There should have been a number of destroyers, although the prisoners of war said there were destroyers in Tankan Bay, plus 3 submarines, which were not on the [30/5] call sign.

59. General Russell. You gave the maximum speed that this task force maintained after it turned south, southeast, in the direction of Oahu. Was that 26 knots?

Captain Layton. 26 knots is what the prisoners said.

60. General Russell. Approximately 30 miles an hour?

Captain Layton. Very close to it, yes.

61. General Russell. What is your estimate of the relative combat strength of this task force and the elements of our Navy which was based at Pearl Harbor?

Captain Layton. This task force was a very powerful organization in air and was the same organization that in one raid on Port Darwin made the force at Darwin, Australia, to be no longer used as an advance naval and air force. Part of this force hit Ceylon and Trincomalee in the Indian Ocean, and destroyed the aircraft carrier HERMES and the cruisers DORSET and CORNWALL.

It might be added that part of this force returning to Japan stopped by Wake and supported the final assaults on Wake. This force was
the cream of the Japanese Navy. Four of these aircraft carriers came to Midway and were sunk there. It is to be recalled that several reports on Japanese naval air activity have stressed the fact that the character of the pilots and their aggressiveness and their tactics have never returned to a par since the disruption of the carrier forces at Midway.

I would like to speculate for a minute on the tactical disposition of this force. It is to be recalled that on the night of the 7th of December, 1941, our date. Midway was bombarded by two cruisers and four destroyers, and the shell holes [3047] indicated 8-inch shells. It is my conviction that the two heavy cruisers of this force, the TONE and the CHIKUMA and some destroyers, broke away from this task force prior to their last run in for Oahu and made a run to arrive off Midway in the late evening for a bombardment. I say this because every other 8-inch cruiser of the Japanese Navy was well accounted for and has been subsequently checked by captured documents from prisoners.

62. General Russell. Assuming that the elements of the American Navy based on Pearl Harbor, with two of its carriers present, had discovered this task force at a time which would have enabled it, the American elements, the fleet at Pearl Harbor, to have gone out to sea and engaged in combat, what is your opinion as to the outcome of such an engagement?

Captain Layton. This is my personal opinion.

63. General Russell. Yes.

Captain Layton. I think the American forces here would have taken the licking of their life, first, because the American people were not psychologically prepared for war.

64. General Russell. How would the psychology of the American people influence a naval engagement off of Oahu?

Captain Layton. I am referring to the American Navy as a part of the American people, and I use this example: During the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor a portion of a squadron of American carrier planes were then flying in from a carrier to Ford Island. They were attacked by Japanese fighters, and it is to be observed that these planes were armed with machine gun ammunition and machine guns ready to fire, and I can find no record of any of these carrier planes firing one single [3048] shot at any Japanese plane.

65. General Russell. Well, let us analyze that a little further. Would this terrific licking which you think we would have taken in a naval engagement have resulted from the psychology of our fighters or from the lack of equipment to compete with the Japanese task force?

Captain Layton. I do not mean that the psychology would lick them, at all. Lack of equipment would certainly have been very disastrous; lack of cruisers, because the battleships would never catch that force of the Japanese. But the Japanese aviators at that time were all charged up to go fight. Our people were not charged up to go fight, until after Pearl Harbor was hit.

66. General Russell. Would not they have gotten pretty tensely charged if they had an order to proceed and meet and engage a Japanese task force which was seeking to invade the Island of Oahu?

Captain Layton. I do not belittle their fighting spirit. I do not
mean it that way at all. I merely mean the shock of Pearl Harbor, which I saw at first hand, caused a reaction among certain people that I think the initiative being in the hands of the other fellow, regardless of his great superiority in planes and numbers would have made him, fresh from an attack, fresh from the exhilaration of having delivered his attack, a psychological foe worthy of consideration.

67. General Russell. How many aircraft do you estimate were present in the Japanese task force?

Captain Layton. 424 aircraft on the carriers.

68. General Russell. Could the naval elements at Pearl Harbor [3049] have mustered any aircraft fleet in strength to compare with and engage the Japanese aircraft in battle?

Captain Layton. If both our carriers had been present—and only one was—their total planes would have been a maximum of somewhere around 180.

69. General Russell. Each had a capacity of around 90?

Captain Layton. At a maximum, and as you know, there were no combat flyable aircraft after the Japanese hit the Hawaiian Islands.

70. General Russell. I was attempting to draw a picture of what would have happened had we discovered the approaching Japanese task force in time to have intercepted it and engaged it in the open sea.

Captain Layton. That then brings this point of psychology: If they were sent out to intercept a Japanese task force, they would undoubtedly have done a good job. I believe that they would have been completely smashed.

71. General Russell. Because of the superiority of equipment of the Japanese task force?

Captain Layton. And the Japanese task force had the initiative in so far as long training of the air units is concerned, preparation for war, constant training on the dive bombers. We know from a few documents here and there that this was worked out in advance, rehearsed.

72. General Grunert. May I interpose a question there? Suppose, now, the Japanese had used the same reasoning that you did, that you are putting forth now, would it not have been to their advantage to entice the United States Fleet out of Pearl Harbor, if they were going to do so much damage to it, than [3050] take the chance of coming within reach of land-based aviation? Why did they do what they did, if they were reasoning as you are reasoning now?

Captain Layton. The Japanese mission was to destroy as much as possible of the Pacific Fleet. The Japanese also realized that were they to be caught at night or under conditions of bad visibility, whereby their carriers would be of no value, they would have been wiped out by gunfire, with no power. They had no power in gunfire. I would like to repeat that. I said before they were very powerful in the air. They were very weak in defensive gunpower. A handful of cruisers under fog, rain or bad visibility opposing them would have destroyed them completely by destroying their planes on deck with gunfire, and fire resulting. Cruisers and destroyers would have been able to put in killing blows. My statement they were powerful, I want to emphasize, was from the air. Therefore the Japanese decided to make their fast run in to be able to use their air against the naval ships in the harbor.

79716—46—Ex. 145, vol. 2—51
We know their priority was: 1, aircraft carriers; 2, battleships; 3, cruisers; 4, naval installations at Pearl Harbor and, of course, the overall priority covering the action was to destroy planes on the ground on the way in. In other words, their fighters would destroy planes on the ground; their dive bombers and speedy planes would destroy, in order, aircraft carriers, battleships and cruisers, and, thereafter, shore side installations.

73. General Russell. What facilities or means were available to you to detect or discover such a task force you have described, a hostile task force?

[3051] Captain Layton. We would have to be informed through our normal channels of information. The Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet possessed no independent intelligence organization. The Commander-in-Chief was kept apprised through the intelligence organizations of the formation, composition and almost destination of the Japanese task force that invaded Malaya or invaded the Philippines. That was all brought out in the message referred to prior to the 27th of November, where some aircraft carriers were estimated to be in the Marshalls. Those task forces followed the picture presented, moved to the areas indicated and carried out the missions presumed.

74. General Russell. Let us go back to the task force that invaded us at Pearl Harbor. Your report assumes they were assembled off the mainland of Japan, where the task force gathered before starting its eastward journey.

Captain Layton. General, that position is in the north Kuriles. They moved from the Japanese home waters up there where it is an uninhabited location for their departure east. That force was under the strictest injunction, according to a prisoner I have referred to previously, who is now under interrogation, to use their radio under no circumstances whatever. Also, he has stated that one of the outlines of this plan was that the communication unit belonging to the combined fleet would initiate deception tactics, to give the impression that the major force of the combined fleet was remaining in inland seas waters. They said that the TATSUTA MARU was to sail to the West Coast as scheduled; and some days prior to this X-Ray Day of execution she would be turned around and return to America. They thought of everything.

75. General Russell. Then there was nothing on this rendezvous part of the northern islands——

Captain Layton. There was absolutely no evidence from the radio intercepts.

76. General Russell. I mean, nobody lived there?

Captain Layton. No.

77. General Russell. At this rendezvous?

Captain Layton. This is a very desolate island. It has a few fishermen on it, who are, of course, Japanese. Two prisoners of war stated they were absolutely forbidden to go ashore. The only shore party, of which he was one member, went in to burn trash. They were forbidden to throw overboard garbage or trash in any form.

78. General Russell. The only place we could have had spies to observe the formation of the task force would have been on the mainland of Japan?

Captain Layton. Spies even on the mainland of Japan would have merely noted their departure. Their departure we know almost cer-
tainly was through the Bungo Channel between the Islands of Kyushu and Shikoku, which forms the outer rim of the island there, and that is the channel they go out of when they go to the Kuriles.

79. General Russell. The point is that the elements of the task force that left the home island went in isolated units, and met at a distance from there and proceeded en masse on this assignment?

Captain Layton. That is the best information we have.

80. General Russell. That is all I have.

81. General Grunert. Are there any other questions?

82. Major Clausen. I wondered, sir, if you wanted the name of [3053] the duty officer whose responsibility it was to communicate the information to the Army of the sinking of this Jap sub?

83. General Grunerts. Yes, ask that question.

84. Major Clausen. Sir, will you give me the name of the duty officer whose responsibility it was to have informed the Army of the sinking of this submarine?

Captain Layton. The name of the duty officer of the 14th Naval District I do not know. First, it is too far past and, second, I would not make it my business to find out who was the duty officer in the 14th Naval District. The duty officer on the Commander in Chief’s staff was then Commander Murphy. He was informed, as I recall it, about 7:30.

85. Major Clausen. You stated there were 420 aircraft on the carriers. Do you have an estimate of the number that was used in the attack?

Captain Layton. I have tried to make that estimate but, unfortunately, our observers vary so much; but at least 300 came to Oahu.

86. Major Clausen. That is all I have, sir.

87. Colonel Toulmin. May I ask one question?

How long before the attack on Pearl Harbor did the Japanese rehearsals probably start?

Captain Layton. The best indication was that the rehearsals were held somewhere in July or August at Nanseiishoto.

88. Colonel Toulmin. You are referring, of course, to 1941?

Captain Layton. 1941. There were maneuvers held in that area. May I check my memory? I better check as to what date that was. I think that is correct.

[3054] 89. Colonel Toulmin. And when did you acquire the information about these rehearsals?

Captain Layton. About a year ago.

90. Colonel Toulmin. And to what extent, if any, were you able to get any information out of the Marshall Islands as to the activities of the Japanese force of two or three years prior to December, 1941?

Captain Layton. There was no information from any source out of the Marshall or Mandated Islands, due to the Japanese regulations, which would permit no foreigners and very few Japanese to enter that area, particularly after they commenced the militarization in late 1940.

91. Colonel Toulmin. Did you have any instructions from the State Department not to intervene in that situation without its approval?

Captain Layton. There had been long existing differences between the Navy Department and the State Department as to American
naval vessels calling in the Marshall Islands, that is, the open ports of the Marshall Islands.

Having served in Tokyo myself and seen some of this material handled, it will be interesting, perhaps, to the court to hear.

The Japanese Navy would say, of course, there are open ports and we would be glad to have you call in at Jaluit or Truk, of course. And we would approach the State Department, that is, the Ambassador or Secretary would. And they would say "We cannot see any reason at all why you should not stop in at Yap or Palau or Truk; they are open ports."

Then when you would press them for a [3055] date or written approval, either they would say "The home office is very bad. They can't get along with the Ministry of Colonies, and they are not willing at this time." or they would give the excuse that there are no pilots to take you in, very bad reefs and very treacherous. At other times they would say they had no one there of suitable rank to greet this vessel, and therefore it was disapproved. It always ended with the word "disapproved."

92. General Russell. Let us go back to one thing more on this task force. The elements of this task force when they left the homeland proceeded in a northerly direction?

Captain Layton. Yes, sir.

93. General Russell. The movement of other elements of the Japanese Navy was in a southerly direction, at that time?

Captain Layton. Yes.

94. General Russell. Therefore, had the movement of these elements to the north been discovered, it would have indicated missions other than those of the elements which were moving to the south?

Captain Layton. That is correct, sir.

95. General Russell. That is all.

96. General Grunert. I wish you would give the Board—by the way, this is a Board and not a court.

Captain Layton. Excuse me, sir. In the Navy it is a court. I am sorry. Please change that to "Board" when I said "court."

97. General Grunert. Would you inform the Board or give the Board an idea of how much of what you got in the line of information of all of these situations was eventually transmitted to the Army, and the system of so doing? For instance, the information that you received, was that transmitted to the District or did it come from the District, and did you in your position transmit anything to the Army or did you consider that the District's business to transmit such information to the Army?

Captain Layton. The information received from the Office of Naval Intelligence, Chief of Naval Operations, was, I presume, passed to the Army by Washington, where they were the fountain-head of intelligence, both military and naval.

Now, I think I should clarify the matter of the combat intelligence, or communications intelligence, as it is now known. The naval communications intelligence channel is run by Washington, supervised by Washington, over which the Commander-in-Chief has no direct responsibility, nor concern, except he is informed by the adjacent unit nearest him, and his intelligence officer has access to their files and to their intelligence as a matter of speed and ascertaining the accuracy of certain views or statements.
98. General Frank. What do you mean by adjacent unit?
Captain Layton. For instance, if the Commander-in-Chief was here in the Hawaiian Islands, he would have liaison or entree to the communications intelligence unit of the 14th Naval District. If he were in Guam, then he would have liaison or access to the intercept unit. It was not a communications or intelligence unit. It was an intercept unit at Guam. If he were in Cavite, he would do likewise. The units at Cavite and in Pearl Harbor, 14th Naval District, and one in Washington, were on one separate circuit. The Commander-in-Chief held the cryptoby which that circuit was controlled.

[3057] 99. General Frank. Commander of which fleet?
Captain Layton. Pacific Fleet, and the Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic Fleet. So that they could be informed directly regarding any matter of high security, but they did not fit on the circuit as an intercept unit, it being an automatic land line or high-speed transmitter which no receiver wire would take. It was the responsibility of the Chief of Naval Operations, under whom the Director of Naval Communications is subordinate, and to whom this communications intelligence organization is responsible and operating. It is the Chief of Naval Operations or his subordinate whose responsibility is it to pass appropriate matters of that intelligence to appropriate government agencies, and not the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet.
As a matter of fact, he is not authorized to do it. When I was passing information that came from those sources to Colonel Raley I was doing it on my own responsibility and I so explained to Colonel Raley that I was so doing.

100. General Frank. The amount of material that you could pass to Colonel Raley, compared to the total that you received, had to be limited?
Captain Layton. I passed him only the highlights and most important spots.

101. General Gruentert. And those things that you thought the Army had an interest in, is that it?
Captain Layton. All of these had to do with the situations in the Far East, the intrigues, how the British reported to us that spies, for example, were going to put a false report out that the Japanese had landed at Singora on the east coast, and had a false report to go to the British in Malaya across the [3058] border that they needed assistance, and to entice them across the border from Padang Bessa, across the border from Alor Star. The British having been enticed across the border, they were then to be declared by Thailand as an aggressor, and Thailand was to call on Japan for assistance, and the Japanese entry into Thailand was then to be as an ally and a joint attack be made on Malaya on the basis of sovereignty. The date was tentatively scheduled for 1 December.

102. General Frank. 1941?
Captain Layton. 1941. The movement of troops south, the movement of amphibious craft, warships, all these things all added into a picture, which I told Colonel Raley.

General Gruentert. You do not know what conferences or conversations the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet had with the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department in which he may have passed information to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department?
Captain Layton. I do not know, sir. I do know, however, that I delivered one message—may I refresh my memory? I delivered one message on the direction of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, to General Short in person, on either the 24th or 25th of November, where it said that the chances of a favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan was very doubtful and that the situation, coupled with the statements of the Japanese Government and the movements of their naval and military forces indicated, in the opinion of naval operations, a surprise aggressive movement in any direction, including an attack on the Philippines or Guam as a possibility. It stated that the Chief of Staff of the Army had seen the dispatch and concurs and re-quested that the people addressed in the dispatch inform the senior Army officers in their area. It also had an injunction that the utmost security was necessary in order not to complicate an already tense situation or to precipitate Japanese action.

General Short asked me what I thought of it at which time I told him that we had considerable intelligence from various sources of the movements of Japanese units to the south, that troops, amphibious craft, warships, movements of planes, had all been detected. He asked me if the Navy had an airfield in Guam. I told him we did not, that an airfield on Guam had been allowed to go into disuse, and that Guam had its guns removed, and that Japan was so informed, in the year before Pearl Harbor, to make the Japanese realize our very peaceful intentions.

[3059] 103. General Grunert. Have you anything?
104. General Russell. Yes.
Did you know in November of 1941 of the existence of any agreements between the British, the Dutch, and the Americans as to taking action in concert in event the Japanese armed forces should do certain things, such as attack British, Dutch, or American possessions or go into the Gulf of Siam, for example?

Captain Layton. No, sir.
105. General Russell. Do you know now whether any such agreement as that existed?
Captain Layton. Not of first-hand knowledge. I have heard that there was such an existing agreement, but I have never seen it nor heard of it officially.
106. General Russell. Assuming that such agreements did exist in the fall of 1941 from October on, and you had known of those agreements, would they have influenced you in your estimate of the situation as to the probability of war with Japan and its inevitability?

Captain Layton. General, it is pretty hard to go back now, with all the things that have happened, and remember what I would have thought then, but, doing the best I can, it would depend upon the type and nature of the agreement, the locality concerned; and, in other words, all the circumstances would have to be taken into their proper position and their proper weight.

I would like to mention that we had in accordance with this a message from the Dutch who said that they had these secret sources which told them the Japanese were going to move in on Dutch Timor and possibly even Portuguese Timor, and asked us [3061] if we had any information of that move. We told them we had nothing whatsoever, but there was some indication that some Japanese
forces would soon proceed to the Palau area, but whether or not they had aggressive intentions against Timor we could not confirm.

107. General Frank. As a matter of fact, from the information that you did have, did you anticipate, did you think war was imminent with Japan?

Captain Layton. We had a war warning. The Department had ordered a reconnaissance made by flying boats over the French Indo-China coast, the approach of the Gulf of Siam. Japanese submarines, vessels, a whole convoy, transports and aircraft, were seen in the area on the 6th of December. A dispatch from the C-in-C Asiatic Fleet reported two transport convoys en route into the Gulf of Siam.

The discussion then, as previously, that I heard in the Commander-in-Chief's office was: Would the Japanese attack, or was this a further movement into the west coast of French Indo-China to establish an advance base to use in the future on occasion of other moves? Or, if the Japanese decided to pull this Thailand induced invasion, would they leave the Philippines on their flank? The possibility of war was fully debated. I did not personally think that the Philippines would be left on the flank in case the Japanese decided to make an all-out southerly push with military force.

You must remember at this time, although the negotiations had broken down and there was very little evidence that they might be renewed, these negotiations had been going on in Washington since somewhere around April 1941, intermittently, but they had broken down once before and suddenly Kurusu was given the right of way of a clipper being held for him in Hongkong, and there was nothing that would indicate that perhaps they couldn't find some other way. After all, the Japanese is essentially an oriental, and bargaining is one of their fortes. If they can't get their way one way, they will go around another way to bargain, and they never ask first what they really want: they ask for about twice as much so they can meet you in the midway of compromise.

So with that in mind there was also the situation of: Was this a military move or was this a show of force, or did they think that they could put a little more pressure on French Indo-China and that we would not do anything?

Those are questions we all know the answer to now, but at that time, lacking all the pictures in this jigsaw puzzle which included naval operations and diplomacy, national policy, we couldn't form a complete picture from which you could guess the entire puzzle, because you will never have all the jigsaw pieces, but we had insufficient pieces to see the whole picture clearly.

108. General Frank. You still haven't answered my question.

Captain Layton. I beg your pardon, sir.

109. General Frank. As an intelligence officer you make intelligence estimates for the Commander-in-Chief, don't you?

Captain Layton. Yes, sir.

110. General Frank. Did you consider at that time, in view of the information that was available, that war was imminent?

Captain Layton. I did not think that war was imminent, although war was an entire possibility.

[3063] 111. General Frank. All right.
112. General Grunert. Are there any other questions? (No response.)

Captain, have you anything that you think of that we haven’t touched on that you think might be of value to the Board in coming to conclusions, that you haven’t brought up or that we haven’t brought up?

Captain Layton. I would like to state that I have good information that there is, or that there was, intelligence of value in the Office of Naval Intelligence and also in G-2 in Washington which bears on the case in question, and, while it was not the decisive pieces of evidence, they were just some more pieces of jigsaw puzzle that might have assisted considerably in arriving at a proper estimate of the situation.

113. General Grunert. In other words, what was the gist of such information? You must have some idea of what it amounted to.

Captain Layton. The gist of the information was the most highly secret sources and had to do with the presence or absence of naval vessels from Pearl Harbor, reports concerning them, also concerning international relations, particularly ourselves versus Japan, Japan versus and concerning her allies, Germany and Italy.

114. General Grunert. You mean, that you think should have been transmitted to the Admiral and the General here? Is that the idea?

Captain Layton. I do, sir.

115. General Grunert. And having had those, from what you now know—or I don’t know what you do know on that subject, but [3604] had you had additional information it would have given you a different idea, a different outlook, or a different viewpoint, or what?

Captain Layton. I think it would have assisted General Short and Admiral Kimmel into seeing a broader picture of the situation as it existed then than without their being able to see the other parts of this jigsaw puzzle of which many pieces were missing, but these pieces were ones that we possessed in our Government and we did not have out here.

116. General Grunert. That, of course, is hindsight, like most everything else we get before this Board.

Captain Layton. Of course.

117. General Grunert. However, someone must judge as to where to draw the line as to how much they give. Otherwise we would have a state, or a chief of naval operations or a chief of staff headquarters at each one of the lower commands, with everything they get.

Is there anything else that you think of?

Captain Layton. Nothing further, sir.

118. General Frank. I would like to ask him a question.

119. General Grunert. All right.

120. General Frank. Does your estimate of the situation indicate that a surprise air raid is possible right now?

Captain Layton. It is always within the Japanese potentialities to place aboard their carriers the planes from the shore bases, for instance, to assign to them by land line telegram from Japan certain escorts, to give them explicit instructions that they shall not break radio silence, to sail them and take advantage of weather fronts that form, as they [3605] know they periodically do form, and they can strike Hawaii, Oahu, tomorrow.

121. General Frank. Do you know how close they can get to Oahu right now, even in good weather, if they are not under visual observation, without detection?
Captain Layton. Not first-hand evidence, but I would guess somewhere within radar range, if they are not visually detected by a plane.
122. General Frank. To what distance do you believe radar range to be a protection, positive?
Captain Layton. Positive protection, sir?
123. General Frank. Yes.
Captain Layton. Against low-flying planes, about 20 miles.
124. General Frank. That is right.
Captain Layton. Unless you have got a very high mountain where you can get your radar way up in the air, and then you can extend it out to about 28 miles, and from there on you have to have too high a mountain for a horizon.
125. General Grunert. In order that the record shall not be misconstrued or misread, if it is read by someone, I think a little item of explanation ought to be entered therein, because the layman has the idea that they can detect up to about 120 or 130 miles, and many of them cannot understand that a low-flying craft cannot be detected until it gets very close in. That is the idea, is it?
Captain Layton. Yes, sir. The radar wave we could call, in other words, human sight going out from the eye, hitting something, coming back, and reflecting on the eyeball its vision, its impression. Now, if you stand on a high mountain, you may only see then to the horizon due to the curvature of the earth. If you stand on the seashore you may not see out very far due to the fact that your height of eye is the actual height of your eye above the sand you stand upon; and based on the triangle, one leg of which is the height of your eye, and the hypotenuse is to the horizon, and the base is from the base of your feet to the point where your eye touched the horizon, the higher you go the longer the leg of the right angle triangle.
126. General Frank. No.
Captain Layton. Excuse me.
Captain Layton. Well, up to a degree.
The higher you go the greater becomes the upright, and therefore the hypotenuse must be increased also. That is the distance you see the plane.
128. General Frank. That is all right in theory, but it doesn’t always work in practice. For instance, right here on this island it didn’t work.
Captain Layton. I am only speaking of theory now, to explain what radar does.
129. General Frank. Yes.
Captain Layton. Therefore, a low-flying plane two or three feet off of the waves—
130. General Frank. Or twenty.
Captain Layton. —cannot be detected as soon as one who is flying way high because he is the same as visual observation then.
131. General Grunert. I think that gives enough explanation for the record, anyway.
If there is nothing else, Captain, we thank you very much for coming.
(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)
TESTIMONY OF COMMANDER HAROLD S. BURR, U. S. N. R.

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel West. Commander Burr, will you please state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and present station?
Commander Burr. My name is Harold S. Burr, Commander, U. S. N. R., and I am at present assistant district intelligence officer, 14th Naval District.

2. General Grunert. Commander, we are after facts and leads to facts. Now, we have developed a great deal in the testimony we have heard, so there are just a few things that we would like to check up with you.
Will you tell the Board just what duty you were on in the latter part of 1941 and during the attack on Pearl Harbor?
Commander Burr. Immediately preceding the attack and following it I was naval liaison officer representing the 14th Naval District at the headquarters of the Commanding General.

3. General Grunert. Then, you represented the 14th Naval District. How about the fleet? Did you represent the fleet?
Commander Burr. No, sir.

4. General Grunert. And with whom did you do most of your business in the department headquarters?

[3068] Commander Burr. My desk was located in G-3, and most of my work was with the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3.

5. General Grunert. Who was that at that time?
Commander Burr. Colonel Donegan.

6. General Grunert. Donegan?
Commander Burr. Yes, sir.

7. General Grunert. Will you tell the Board what that liaison consisted of? What did you do there, and why were you there?
Commander Burr. While I am an intelligence officer, sir, most of my work was of a general utility nature, assisting the Army in its contacts with the 14th Naval District.

8. General Grunert. So all the business that the 14th Naval District did, was that transmitted through you?
Commander Burr. I wouldn't say all of it, sir, but——

9. General Grunert. What classes of business that was conducted, or cooperation between the Department and the District, passed through you? What sort of things did you handle?
Commander Burr. Well, it was a wide variety of things, sir. There were no specific instructions, but I was the only naval officer at the time in the headquarters of the Commanding General; and as matters came up with headquarters within the Army that involved contact with the 14th Naval District (it might be on matters of finding the right ordnance man or the right public works man or the right operations man for the Army to contact) that was my job.

10. General Grunert. Were you a sort of leg man for the District?

[3069] Commander Burr. Yes, sir, I would say that.

11. General Grunert. Then, you did a great deal of contacting of other staff officers who transacted business between themselves; is that right?
Commander Burr. Yes, sir.
12. General Grunert. Was it your duty to keep the Army informed of what the District was doing or what intelligence it received?

Commander Burr. Not on operational intelligence matters as a rule, sir.

13. General Grunert. But occasionally they would use you for that purpose?

Commander Burr. But occasionally on things, yes, sir. As the Commandant of the District issued directives which I thought would be of interest to the Army, I did my best to bring them to the attention of those Army officers who I thought would be concerned.

14. General Grunert. All right. Let's have the other side of the picture. Did the Army give the District all the information the District wanted? And, if so, was it transmitted through you, or did the same thing apply, that they used you in finding out with whom to do business, and then they did business sometimes with your knowledge and sometimes without?

Commander Burr. That is it, sir; sometimes with my knowledge and sometimes without.

15. General Grunert. Let us think of this special case on which the Board would like to have information. This was a message from the Chief of Naval Operations in Washington to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, dated November 27, 1941, which, paraphrased, started out, "Consider this a war warning." Do you remember that message?

Commander Burr. I remember a secret message that came in at that time. I wouldn't be able to say definitely that that was the message, but it sounds very much like it.

16. General Grunert. At that time were you used, in your capacity as liaison officer, to deliver this message from the fleet or from Admiral Kimmel to General Short?

Commander Burr. Yes, sir, I was used for that.

17. General Grunert. How did you receive the message, and what did you do with it?

Commander Burr. Well, it was in connection with a similar message which General Short had received from the War Department, in which he showed it to me, asked me to read it; and, as I remember, there was an instruction in there for General Short to inform the Commandant of the District, and I took it over to the District. The Commandant was not present, and so I showed it to the Chief of Staff, who promptly took me to Admiral Kimmel's office where the message was shown to him also, and it was at that time that—

18. General Grunert. This that you are talking about is the Army message?

Commander Burr. That is the Army message. But that is how I happened to be over in Admiral Kimmel's office when he gave me the message that the Navy had received, to show to General Short.

19. General Grunert. Did you show it to General Short?

Commander Burr. No, sir. When I returned to Fort Shafter, General Short was not present and could not be located. And similarly with the Chief of Staff: the senior officer present was Colonel Donegan, as I remember, in G-3, and he said that he would assume the responsibility for seeing to it that the message was delivered to General Short as soon as he could be located.
20. General GRUNERT. Do you know whether or not that message actually reached General Short?
   Commander Burr. It is a long time ago, sir, but I am under the impression that I did ask Colonel Donegan afterwards if that message had reached General Short, and he said that it had. That is my impression.

21. General GRUNERT. Was that message a secret message, as far as you know?
   Commander Burr. Yes, sir.

22. General GRUNERT. What is the standing operating procedure of handling secret documents? Was a receipt demanded or given?
   Commander Burr. A receipt was not demanded on that, sir.

23. General GRUNERT. So as far as you know there is nothing in writing to show delivery or receipt?
   Commander Burr. No, sir. There is, I believe, an officer present here in the Islands who was present at the time I handed the message to Colonel Donegan, and he might be able to confirm my statement.

24. General GRUNERT. Who is that officer?

25. General GRUNERT. Do you know whether G-2 of the Department knew anything about this message? Was he concerned in any way as to the transmission?
   Commander Burr. I don't think so.

26. General GRUNERT. Or was he included in the know?
   Commander Burr. I don't think so, sir. It appeared to be a G-3 pigeon as it was handled.

27. General GRUNERT. All right. That covers the points that I wanted to use this witness for. If you want to ask any other questions of him, you may. General Russell?

28. General Russell. No, not I.

29. General GRUNERT. Now, before you go, tell us what is in the back of your mind that you would like to have the Board know. Is there anything that occurs to you that might be of value to the Board, any other subject you think of bringing up? Somebody usually has a little something they want to say.
   Commander Burr. Yes, sir.

30. General GRUNERT. We want to give you the opportunity if there is anything that occurs to you.
   Commander Burr. Well, I was a very young reserve officer, only being on duty a short time, and tremendously impressed with the importance of that message, although it was very confusing to me.

31. General GRUNERT. You read both the Army message and the Navy message?
   Commander Burr. Yes, sir. I couldn't distinguish one from the other at present, although they impressed me as being essentially the same, but the import of it as I read it seemed to focus attention on the Philippines and the Far East and apply to this area only as a security precaution, an antisabotage precaution, as I remember.

32. General GRUNERT. Do you remember whether there was anything in either message that refers to sabotage?
   Commander Burr. That word sticks in my head, sir, but I only had a quick glance at it, and that was some years ago, and I wouldn't—couldn't swear to it.
33. General Grunert. But it did impress you as one that required something to be done in order to insure your own security here in the Islands?
   Commander Burr. Yes, sir.
34. General Grunert. Anything else?
   Commander Burr. I was very much upset that I couldn’t deliver the message directly to General Short, but there seemed to be nothing more I could do about it; and, knowing its urgency and the fact that probably prompt action was indicated, and knowing that messages of that sort usually went pretty directly to G-3, I felt that G-3 was the proper place to deliver it.
   Commander Burr. Yes, sir.
   (The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)
36. General Russell. Let me put these in evidence, unless somebody has some objection to it.
37. General Grunert. I have no objection to putting them in evidence. I said we did not want them, but if you want them, far be it from me to keep you from putting them in.
38. General Russell. I want these to be marked exhibits next in number: two captured Japanese maps which were identified [3074] before the Board by Captain Layton; and also another exhibit which is a copy of a captured map with translation in English of the Japanese endorsements; and those three will be marked next in order.
   (Captured Japanese maps identified, by Captain Layton were marked Exhibits Nos. 24 and 25 and received in evidence.)
   (Copy of captured map with translation of Japanese endorsements was marked Exhibit No. 26 and received in evidence.)
39. Colonel Toulmin. Are there any more witnesses?
40. General Grunert. No more witnesses this morning.
   (Whereupon, at 11 a.m., the Board, having concluded the hearing of witnesses for the morning, took up the consideration of other business.)

[3075]

AFTERNOON SESSION

(At 2 p.m., the Board met and continued with the hearing of witnesses, as follows:)
   General Grunert. The Board will come to order.

TESTIMONY OF MAJOR GENERAL MAXWELL MURRAY, UNITED STATES ARMY

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel West. General, will you please state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station.
   General Murray. General Maxwell Murray, O2216; Major General, United States Army; commanding Guadalcanal Base.
2. General Grunert. General, this Board is after facts, and leads to where we can get facts, as to what led up to Pearl Harbor, and also
the attack. Because of your assignment during the latter part of 1941, and because you testified before the Roberts Commission, we put you on the list, here, as a witness.

Now, the Board has developed a great deal of the story, and there is no use piling evidence on evidence, so we will skip around here and try to piece out some of this story, and then open up any subjects that any Members of the Board want to open up, as well as give you an opportunity to open up anything we may not touch on.

First, I would like to talk to you about artillery ammunition, and ask you this question: Why was not sufficient ammunition at hand for the artillery, on December 7?

General Murray. There was sufficient artillery ammunition on hand, but it had not been issued to troops.

3. General Grunert. I mean "at hand," not "on hand."

[3076] General Murray. I was not authorized to draw the artillery ammunition from the magazines. I requested authority from General Short to draw artillery ammunition and stack it; I suggested either in the gun parks or on the division review field, in small stacks. The division review field, as you know, is a large area immediately adjacent to the old artillery park, and had been planned as the dispersal area for the artillery.

4. General Grunert. Tell us, first, what your assignment was.

General Murray. I was in command of the 25th division, at that time.

5. General Grunert. And that was stationed where?

General Murray. That was stationed at Schofield Barracks. I was a senior divisional commander and had been in command at Schofield Barracks until, I can't be certain of the date, but I believe that the organization of the post command under Colonel Earl M. Wilson had been established shortly before Pearl Harbor, before the attack on December 7.

6. General Grunert. That was a station command?

General Murray. It was a station command; yes. As I recall it, that had just been organized, and I had moved into a divisional headquarters which was separate from the post headquarters.

7. General Grunert. Then you had the tactical division, and had nothing to do primarily with the post?

General Murray. Nothing with the post.

8. General Grunert. And in your division you had what artillery?

General Murray. I had the Eighth, Eleventh, and Thirteenth Field Artillery, but it is not generally known that we had [3077] practically doubled the gun strength of the brigade before the 75-mm. gun batteries; the Eighth and the Thirteenth were 75-mm. gun regiments, and each of those batteries had eight guns to the battery instead of four. The Eleventh was the 155-howitzer regiment, but they were in addition adding two batteries of 155 guns, and some 240-mm. howitzers. The 75 regiments both had 240-mm. howitzers assigned to them, too.

We had a total of six 240-mm. howitzer batteries organized, and two howitzer batteries—"two-gun batteries" we called them; and those had all been equipped and furnished, and we had as I recall it a total of 136 guns mounted in the single brigade, which made a very heavy artillery deployment.
9. General GRUNERT. Under the new plans for defense, what was
the assignment as to mission, as to your division, and as to the use of
that artillery?

General MURRAY. The division was assigned to the south sector.

10. General GRUNERT. Will you describe that sector.

General MURRAY. The south sector extended from a point north of
Waianae pocket—I have forgotten the name of the exact point—
stretched around through the southern half of the island, and up to
just beyond the northern edge of the Kanohe Bay side, the eastern
side of the island, at a little island off the coast, Lae-Ka-Ohio.

11. General GRUNERT. Did that sector include the City of Honolulu?

General MURRAY. It included the City of Honolulu, yes.

You asked for the mission of the artillery?

12. General GRUNERT. Yes.

[3078] General MURRAY. The artillery was charged with the
establishment of the immediate support of the beaches by approxi-
mately half of the 75-mm. guns in the brigade. They were emplaced
on the beaches to provide close-in enfilading fire as support of the
machine-gun positions, which also covered the beaches. In addition
to the immediate beach defense, the infantry defense of the beach was
supported from fixed artillery positions, dug-in positions, running
from 1500 to 2500 yards in rear of the beaches, the 75-gun batteries;
and in rear of those, or about on the line, were the 155 howitzer batteries;
observation for all batteries being set up on the beach for a close
defense.

In addition to those organic guns, the 75 guns and the 155 howitzers,
the 240 howitzers were in position, so that practically the entire beach
that was assigned to the division was under fire of at least one 240-mm.
howitzer battery, and in many cases, the batteries; the important areas
of the beach were covered by two batteries. I would like to correct one
statement that I made earlier. I said that the brigade manned 155
guns. I recall now that we had turned those over to the Twenty-
Fourth Division just before December 7, because they were in the
northern sector. They had been assigned to the Eleventh Field, but
we had turned them over. I had forgotten that when I made the state-
ment.

I might add, I have not prepared myself for this discussion, but it
comes from memory.

13. General GRUNERT. All right.

General MURRAY. So we had additional 240s.

14. General GRUNERT. Then your mission was primarily against a
surface attack?

[3079] General MURRAY. Entirely, except for individual small
arms and automatic weapons, which were organic in the division.

15. General GRUNERT. Primarily, for your own protection?

General MURRAY. Primarily; yes.

16. General GRUNERT. Do you recall the types of alert that were
prescribed at that time?

General MURRAY. Yes. We were ordered to go on No. 1 Alert, on
November 27, and on December 7, immediately after the initiation of
the attack, we had a message to go on No. 2 Alert, and that was immedi-
ately followed by a directive to go on No. 3 alert.

17. General GRUNERT. See if I am correct in this: No. 1 Alert is the
so-called "sabotage alert"?
General Murray. Primarily.
18. General Grunert. No. 2 is the alert against an air attack, plus sabotage; No. 3 is the all-out alert, including everything; is that right?
General Murray. I am not certain. I would have to look up the division order, which is not available to me; at least, the order that we had. As I recall it, the Department alert probably included the anti-aircraft, but the division alert, in so far as I can recall it, the No. 2 Alert, involved a movement of certain infantry troops and certain light weapons to position, but did not call for the installation of the heavy artillery units, the 240s.
19. General Grunert. I see, then, you had a division alert, under the prescribed Department alert?
General Murray. Yes.
20. General Grunert. It may have been different in nomenclature?
General Murray. In minor details. The nomenclature was [3080] the same, but the details were not.
21. General Grunert. Then really when you turned out it was the all-out alert, in which you used your infantry and your artillery?
General Murray. Yes, sir; we jumped from the No. 1 Alert to the No. 3 Alert.
22. General Grunert. Now, we get back to the ammunition. You say that there was no ammunition immediately available to you for quick action, is that right?
General Murray. So far as I can recall, we did not have a round of ammunition in the gun parks.
23. General Grunert. And, in case you were turned out, to go on an alert which required ammunition, you would then have to draw it from somewhere?
General Murray. We had to draw it.
24. General Grunert. Where did it come from?
General Murray. We drew it directly; the majority of it was drawn at Schofield Barracks, although the artillery units of the Eighth Field Artillery, which came directly to the positions in Honolulu and Hickam Field, immediately adjacent to it, were to draw ammunition at the Aliamanu Crater, which was down here near Pearl Harbor.
25. General Grunert. What additional time, outside of turning out from where you were to get to positions, would it take to get ammunition to your positions, approximately?
General Murray. I would say that there had been set up for the regiment two separate entrances, made so as to expedite the issuing of ammunition, so that my estimate would be that it took not over an hour to issue the unit of fire which we took to the beach with us on December 7.
[3081] 26. General Grunert. And did I understand you to say that you had requested that you be given authority to stack some ammunition here and there so as to expedite it?
General Murray. Yes.
27. General Grunert. And to whom did you apply, and what was the result?
General Murray. To General Short. I should go into it a little further. I was not satisfied, myself, with the status of our ammunition for either the infantry or the artillery. We were authorized by the Department, an old order had limited us to 6,000 rounds of small-
arms ammunition per company in the parks. It was held there primarily for antisabotage purposes. That made a limited amount of machine-gun ammunition and a limited amount of rifle ammunition. Our infantry companies were all equipped with extra machine guns. We had, I think, at least 15 machine guns in each rifle company; the average may have been nearly 20. It was obviously impossible—most of our ammunition was not belted—it was obviously impossible to get out the ammunition and belt it without a serious delay. We were ordered to have 10,000 rounds at each machine-gun position, which was a very heavy allowance, a little over three units of fire, so that when I brought that point up to General Short that it had taken, on experiment, three days, with only two. We had two belt loading machines for a heavy-weapon company, and it took us three days to load up our belted ammunition on a previous trial, so that he had authorized us to draw and belt machine-gun ammunition, draw the necessary rifle ammunition, and store that in the parks. As I recall it, the only limitation that he made on infantry ammunition was [3082] that we could not have mortar ammunition or high-explosive grenades inside the barracks. That was left us in the ordnance depot, in the infantry warehouses, as was the artillery ammunition. However, the fact that we were able to get all of the infantry, rifle, and machine-gun ammunition at all ordnance magazines cleared the congestion in the ordnance area to such an extent that we could draw artillery ammunition very rapidly, and as I said before, the artillery ammunition was prepared for prompt issue in stacks of a unit, so that the trucks of the Eighth could go directly to the doors that were assigned to them with the ammunition crews on board and load very promptly. That is what made for the expedited delivery of ammunition.

As a matter of fact, while I said there was an hour possibly delay, that is merely guesswork because I am certain that the artillery was loaded and had the ammunition, ready to go, and that the first unit of fire, which was 300 rounds per gun for 75s, and 150 rounds for the 155 howitzer, that was loaded and ready by the time the artillery was ready to move from the post. I don't think that the actual movement of the guns to their positions was delayed on December 7.

[3083] 28. General GRUNERT. Then on December 7th you got in position by 4 p.m. Was that normal?

General MURRAY. I would say it was a little before that. It was an exceedingly rapid move, especially when you consider we had that much ammunition. As a matter of fact, Colonel Kelliher, who checked the movement of the post for me, came back and reported that the movement out was the best he had ever seen the division execute.

29. General GRUNERT. Now, it appears from the Roberts Commission report, or, at least, I gather the impression that you had drawn some ammunition in violation of standing orders. What regulation did you violate in drawing ammunition for emplacement in battery position?

General MURRAY. I do not recall that, sir. The only question that came up, so far as I can recall, was the drawing of infantry ammunition, which was authorized. It is possible that certain batteries may have had some at the gun positions on the beach, but I say that as a possibility and not of my knowledge. So far as I can recall, all ammu-
nition was drawn for the field artillery units on the day of December 7th; that is all the ammunition that was taken to the positions, that went to the guns in their initial movement to position.

30. General GRUNERT. The evidence, as I recall, also states that you drew this ammunition really in violation of standing orders, because you anticipated a surprise raid. Is that true?

General MURRAY. I do not recall that, sir. I would like to check it up, but I do not recall it.

31. General GRUNERT. Let us see that testimony here. Or let us see what the digest of that is. I then had the question, \[3034\] What caused you to anticipate a surprise raid, but if you do not recall that you did——

General MURRAY. No, sir. As I say, I have not discussed it with anyone since that date. I may have made that statement. I may have known of some that was in the hands of the artillery at that time, but I do not recall it at this time.

32. General GRUNERT. In the meantime, we can go to another subject.

General MURRAY. I would like to suggest that Colonel Kelliher, who was the executive of the artillery brigade at that time, is in charge of the Planning Section of the Department Headquarters, and he would know.

33. General GRUNERT. We will get him if it is of any material moment. Were the commanders of major units—and by major units I mean such a unit as you had, such as Wilson and Burgin had, and Martin and so forth—kept informed of the War and Navy Department warning messages?

General MURRAY. So far as I know, we received every message. I received only one personally.

34. General GRUNERT. So far as you know, you received only one?

General MURRAY. Yes, sir, with reference to the preparation or the immediate preparation for possible attack. We had a number of informal conferences. We had a number of informal conferences with General Short as to the status of our troops, and the equipment at hand.

35. General GRUNERT. Do you recall ever having seen a message of November 27th from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, which started out "Consider \[3035\] this is a war warning"?

General MURRAY. It did not arrive in that exact wording. I have a true copy of the message that was given to me orally, which I would like to present.

36. General GRUNERT. All right, read it. Then we won't have to have so many appendices to our record.

General MURRAY. May I describe this document?

37. General GRUNERT. Yes.

General MURRAY. At the time the order for the alert was received on November the 27th, as I recall it, it was approximately 3 o'clock, possibly 3:30 p.m. I was in the dentist chair. My aide came to me and said Alert No. 1 had been ordered, and I asked whether the necessary steps had been taken to put it in operation. He said the initial units were loading out at that time. I asked as to whether the liaison officer had gone down to the Department Headquarters, which was
routine. He advised me that he had gone, and I told him that I would report to headquarters as soon as the dentist could complete the temporary work he was doing.

Shortly after I arrived at my divisional headquarters, the liaison officer returned with an oral message which he told me he was to deliver to me in person and with the utmost secrecy. He repeated his message to me and I asked for his notes. He said that he had no notes, that he was not authorized to take notes, that the message had been read to them twice by the Chief of Staff, but they were not allowed to take any notes. So I asked him to repeat it, and I was certain that I had the gist of the message, so I then directed him to write out the message as he had given it to me and file it as secret in the divisional G-2 safe.

[3086] The copy that I have at hand now is a copy of the original message which I was fortunate enough to find with the 25th Division on Noumea the other day and they still had the original one in headquarters. It reads:

Negotiations have come to a standstill at this time. No diplomatic breaking of relations and we will let them make the first overt act. You will take such precautions as you deem necessary to carry out the Rainbow plan. Do not excite the civilian population. This will be held to minimum people. Note.—1 I was told to tell General Murray, General Wilson, and Colonel Wilson only.

That is initialed by Colonel Haynes; message from Colonel Philips, November 27, 1941.

That was the only message as a direct message that I received prior to the order to move out on No. 3 Alert on December 7. As I say, there were a number of conferences and discussions. detailed instructions, given, of which I have no record, from General Short at that time.

38. General Grunert. Were you ever called into conference on this message to discuss what might be the best thing to do under its terms?

General Murray. I feel certain that we were. I recall one discussion particularly. The question came up as to whether any further procedure was necessary on the completeness of our sabotage and patrol cover. The sabotage order required not only standing guards but heavy patrols and the readiness of one battalion to move at short notice as a reserve unit. And the discussion included the fact that the report had been made to the War Department of our antisabotage status.

[3087] 39. General Grunert. But that was after the decision had been made to go on Alert No. 1?

General Murray. Yes, sir.

40. General Grunert. And you were discussing how best to carry out that alert?

General Murray. Yes, sir.

41. General Grunert. But you did not discuss prior to going on Alert No. 1 or your advice was not sought as to whether you should go on No. 1, No. 2 or No. 3?

General Murray. I do not recall any further discussion in that detail.

42. General Grunert. And you do not recall on that same day knowing anything about a message received by the Navy which started out "Consider this a war warning"?

General Murray. I have never seen or have never heard directly of that message.
43. General Grunert. Did you hear anything about any other messages after or around November 27th which related to the international situation, the burning of papers at the consulate and so forth?
44. General Grunert. How often or how frequently were your conferences with the Commanding General? Were their periodic, were they when something came up, or what?
   General Murray. That is a rather difficult question to answer. I should say that I saw General Short at his office possibly five times between November the 27th and December the 7th.
45. General Grunert. Do you recall generally what you discussed [3083] with him at those meetings?
   General Murray. We discussed the general situation as we saw it in Washington, the discussions of the daily reports of the conference in Washington, and General Short maintained a very close personal interest in the activities of the division.
46. General Grunert. In those discussions do you recall the source of General Short's information about the situation in Washington and the situation in the diplomatic field and so forth?
   General Murray. No, sir. I cannot be certain as to that. I know that General Short was in communication with Washington by telephone from time to time.
47. General Grunert. Before December 7th?
   General Murray. That is my impression, sir. I know that he had one of these scramblers, as we call them, and my impression was that he talked with Washington, and I considered or I know that part of the discussions were based on the newspaper reports.
48. General Frank. Is that an inference by you or a fact?
   General Murray. That is an inference. I say that we discussed it. I know there was a discussion of the newspaper reports.
49. General Grunert. In that discussion what was the state of mind? What did you conclude from your discussions? Were you in accord with what you concluded or was there difference of opinion? In other words, what did you discuss?
   General Murray. I recall no differences of opinion, General. My reaction was that we were on the verge of war, that we were ready for it, the ground troops were ready for it, [3089] and it took merely a move to position to meet them. We all anticipated, I am certain, something further than the message that was received on November 27th.
50. General Grunert. But you were on a sabotage alert and you took no other alert until the blow struck?
   General Murray. No other alert.
51. General Grunert. Then if the concensus of these discussions was that war was imminent, why do you suppose no other form of alert was taken? Was that discussed?
   General Murray. I do not think that any one of us considered it as imminent as it was.
52. General Grunert. Imminent for somebody else but not immediately imminent for you?
   General Murray. I would say not immediately imminent. I might elaborate. You asked whether we did anything besides the antisabotage. Of course, there was continuous work by all troops in
establishing their gun positions and digging machine gun installations and completing the installations and checking the installations, improving the telephone lines, improving the trails to the infantry positions, putting wire in the critical areas. That was being carried by troop details, but the troops were carrying it out not from positions on the beach but by details from Schofield. Those were part of the discussions we were carrying on with General Short as to the progress that was being made.

[3000] 53. General GRUNERT. All excellent preparatory measures.

General MURRAY. Preparatory altogether.

54. General GRUNERT. But not implemented unless the proper alert had been adopted?

General MURRAY. That was correct, sir.

55. General GRUNERT. Now, so far as you were concerned, as the attack took place and what happened, even if you had been on Alert No. 3, would you have had any influence on the attack one way or another?

General MURRAY. So far as the ground troops are concerned, I do not think it would have made a particle of difference insofar as the events that occurred on December the 7th were concerned.

56. General GRUNERT. Your mission was primarily concerned with sabotage and with all-out position?

General MURRAY. Our mission was primarily sabotage and defense against ground or close-in naval attack, and we were not equipped or prepared to execute an active defense against an air attack.

57. General GRUNERT. Now come back to testimony before the Roberts Commission, in order to help your memory as to what was said then. In a statement to a question from General McCoy it says here that a part of the statement was as follows:

Several days before the alert I violated the usual regulation regarding ammunition by moving all infantry ammunition except high explosives into the company barracks, the barrack room, and that meant that most of them had as much as thirty rounds of ammunition in the belts, so they were ready for immediate action.

[3001] That was an evident violation of something, but—

General MURRAY. Well, it is a statement of a violation of the old regulation, but that was—I would like to correct that as to the statement that I made before this Board. That movement of ammunition into the barracks was in violation of the standing orders of the post, but I made that movement of the ammunition on the authorization of General Short.

58. General GRUNERT. Yes.

General MURRAY. Is that clear, General?

59. General GRUNERT. That is clear to me.

General MURRAY. The standing regulations of the post permitted us to have only 6,000 rounds of small-arms ammunition in the barracks, and that confirms my recollection to the effect that he did not permit me to bring the high explosive ammunition into the barracks. That was the mortar ammunition and grenades.

60. General GRUNERT. Then, in reply to a question from the chairman, you said,

I was just looking after the alert. I thought there might be a surprise raid.
That is where that digest got this,
I thought there might be a surprise raid.

Now, do you recall what caused you to think there might be a surprise raid?
General Murray. That is in line with what I stated or meant to convey in my statement that I considered an attack might be imminent. We all considered the possibility of a surprise raid, an attempt to raid either some of our installations by a small landing—I think that the general impression, certainly among the ground troops, was that the most possible attack would be what would correspond to a [3092] commando raid.

61. General Grunert. Yes.

General Murray. That was my own impression.

62. General Grunert. But if a commando raid was in the offing, do you think you, being on Alert No. 1, would have been prepared for it?
General Murray. No, sir. As an afterthought, it looks—I say there is no question but what as far as protection against commando raids or any small raid, any sort of a surface raid, we would have been in a better position had the troops been in the defense position.

63. General Grunert. I wanted to keep away from this afterthought, this hindsight.

General Murray. Yes, sir.

64. General Grunert. That is why I dug up that remark of yours that you expected a surprise raid. That was not really afterthought; that was practically at the time that you thought that. That is why I wanted to develop the thing a little more. If you expect a surprise raid, it isn't afterthought, now, that you think there ought to have been a better alert than Alert No. 1?

General Murray. I think that I expressed myself fully. I would have made a better statement of my position had I said that I would have been certain we would be better prepared for a surprise raid had we the ammunition in the hands of troops. It was a prevention that I thought should be taken; prevention [3093] of a disaster in case of surprise was to have ammunition in the hands of troops; and, as I say, it is better—I think I made clear that I would have preferred to have had the artillery ammunition in the hands of the troops.

65. General Grunert. Another remark, another part of the testimony, is to the effect that when General Murray got Alert No. 1 he was not informed as to the seriousness of the existing situation; no intimation, nothing, although he talked to the Commanding General and Headquarters several times between November 27 and December 7. Is that still your impression?

General Murray. That is approximately the—the only direct inference—the only direct information that I had had with reference to the war status was in this message which I read of November the 27th.

66. General Grunert. I will ask the Recorder to read you the Chief of Staff's entire message from which evidently that part was transmitted to you, this with a view so that you will understand what was in the entire message, and that you only got a part of that message, evidently. Have you seen the entire message since?

General Murray. No, sir. I have never seen it.
67. General Grunert. You have never seen it.
I will ask the Recorder to read it to you, to see whether or not that would have made any difference had you heard the entire message.
Colonel West. Shall I read it now, General?
68. General Grunert. Yes.
[3094] Colonel West. This is the message dated November 27, 1941, addressed to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H., signed "Marshall," the body of which reads as follows:
(Message of November 27, 1941, to commanding general, Hawaiian Department, signed "Marshall," is as follows:)
Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot, be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not, repeat not, to alarm civil population or disclose intent. Report measures taken. Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow Five so far as they pertain to Japan. Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers.

69. General Grunert. Evidently, then, they just picked out such parts of that message as they thought you needed?
General Murray. There is another possibility: that it [3095] was read twice to the staff officer whom I sent down there and who told me definitely that he took no notes, was not permitted to take notes, probably because of the obvious secrecy of this message, and his notes omitted two or three important sentences in that message.
70. General Grunert. He may have forgotten them.
General Murray. He may have forgotten them.
71. General Grunert. Or they may not have been impressed upon his mind.
General Murray. That was it; yes, sir.
72. General Grunert. Now, that sentence in there that in effect says:
No matter what you have to do, don't you jeopardize your own defense.
General Murray. Yes, sir.
73. General Grunert. That is rather serious: No matter what is required otherwise, he must not jeopardize his own defense. Now, that in a way might have caused——
General Murray. May I—one sentence—ask the second sentence there, with reference to the inimicence of hostilities? I think it is about the second or third sentence.
74. General Grunert. All right. Reread that.
General Murray. This need not be on the record, General. It is merely for my own information. I would like to hear it read.
75. General Grunert. Read it in the record. Put it in the record again.
Colonel West. I had better read it all again. It begins:
Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest [3096] possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue.
Now, the second sentence is:

Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot, be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act.

That is the end of the third sentence, and the fourth sentence is:

This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense.

76. General GRUNET. I think that covers as much as he wants.

General MURRAY. That covers it, yes, sir.

77. General GRUNET. Now, that sentence in there about alarming the civil population: Do you know of anything that would have alarmed the civil population had you gone on an all-out alert, as far as you were concerned?

General MURRAY. No, sir, I don't think it would have alarmed them. It was the question that the act—the fact that we were taking over all of the important installations: the water, lights, gas and oil utilities, patrols all over, all important bridges guarded.

78. General GRUNET. That's Alert No. 1?

General MURRAY. That's Alert No. 1, yes, sir.

79. General GRUNET. Do you think that would have been more of an alarm than if you had gone into position?

General MURRAY. I think that is just as much of an alarm [3097] to the people that we were anticipating something as if they had gone to the beaches.

80. General GRUNET. How about if you had gone into Alert No. 3? How much would it have interfered with your training? What sort of training was going on at the time?

General MURRAY. At that time our training was, I would say, complete and right up to the handles.

81. General GRUNET. Then that would have been just a question of going into the field and continuing such training as you were able to do?

General MURRAY. Yes, sir.

82. General GRUNET. It would not have made much difference to your command at that time?

General MURRAY. I don't think it would have made any difference as far as training. Possibly the training would have been a little more active, actual. We were rather limited in our training during that period due to the fact that we were on defense construction work.

83. General GRUNET. General Russell?

84. General RUSSELL. You state that you had numerous talks with General Short between November 27 and December 7, four or five; is that true?

General MURRAY. Four or five, I should say.

85. General RUSSELL. During those conversations the international situation was discussed?

General MURRAY. Yes, sir.

86. General RUSSELL. You were keeping up with developments by the local press, what you read in the papers?

General MURRAY. That is my impression, General.

[3098] 87. General RUSSELL. Do you recall General Short telling you anything about other information that had been coming in from Washington?
General Murray. My impression is that he mentioned—I have quite a definite impression that about the first of December, two or three days after the report of the action that had been taken, and under the message that has just been read, that he mentioned a reply from the War Department acknowledging the receipt of the information. That is memory of nearly two years, and I cannot be certain, but I am strongly of that impression.

[3099] 88. General Russell. Then General Short had reported the alert status which was in existence here, to Washington?

General Murray. That is my impression; yes, sir.

89. General Russell. And it was his impression that it had been approved in Washington—that is, the alert status had been approved by Washington?

General Murray. That was the impression that I have carried for nearly two years.

90. General Russell. General, there has been some testimony about Sunday morning exercises for several weeks prior to the Sunday morning of December 7. Did your command participate in any such exercises as those?

General Murray. None that I can recall. We had completed a maneuver. As I recall it, it ended about the end of October. We had had a 15-day maneuver of both divisions and the artillery, the Department artillery troops; antiaircraft and coast artillery had been involved to a certain extent, but that was the completion of the training period, and so far as I can recall those were the only exercises that were held on Sunday morning. Those, of course, included Sunday.

91. General Russell. How long had you been in command of the unit on the island prior to December 7, 1941?

General Murray. I had command of the artillery brigade from about the 1st of July 1940 until about the middle of June 1941, approximately, and I took command of the Twenty-Fifth Division—of the Hawaiian Division, first, and I believe the separation of the Hawaiian Division, which was a Sixth Regiment organization at that time, into two triangular divisions, was completed approximately the 1st of October. I would have to [3100] check the records on that, but my recollection is it was taken the 1st of October.

92. General Russell. And you were on the island only from the middle of the year, from July until the attack?

General Murray. Yes, sir.

93. General Russell. There seems to be some confusion in the record about the number of alerts, practices of going into position, and so forth, which had taken place during the period that you just described. What is your recollection of whether or not numerous alerts were staged and practices of going into defensive positions?

General Murray. During the entire period?

94. General Russell. Yes.

General Murray. I could give no estimate of the number. General, but it was a routine. A great many occupations of position were made as part of regimental exercises. A regiment sent a battalion down.

95. General Russell. Were these occupations of positions confined to the units of your division, or were they a part of general all-out alerts by the Hawaiian Department?
General Murray. There were cases of a general all-out alert, but in no case that I can recalled did we take the complete ammunition component with us. Just before I joined the division, a complete move, including the fire allowances, had been made in June 1940, just before I came to the department, but so far as I can recall, we made—

I will have to change my statement. I believe we made one which moved the ammunition to the positions. We had after General Short arrived a loading problem, to check the time involved in distribution of ammunition, our ability [3101] to transport it; and my impression is that the troops went to the positions at the same time. I cannot give the exact date, but I believe that was shortly before the Hawaiian Division was broken up.

96. General Frank. Was that under Short or Herron?

General Murray. The last one was under General Short. The first one was under General Herron, on a War Department order.

97. General Russell. In these conferences with the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, or elsewhere, was consideration given to the effect on the morale of the troops of constant or continued alert during peacetime—in other words, the effect on the troops of being out in peacetime, looking for Japanese who never came?

General Murray. Crying "wolf"? No, sir; because I believe that in practically all cases we knew that they were training alerts. I do not recall of any one that we moved in while I was in command of troops on the island, where the troops felt that it was anything other than drill, to determine our ability and the time it would take us to set our positions and be ready.

98. General Russell. That is all.

99. General Frank. Really, how much intelligence information did you get over a period of time? Did you get any?

General Murray. That is a very difficult question, General, because that would be a G–2 record, which I am not sufficiently familiar with to know.

100. General Frank. I am not after the fine points of the record, I am just after your impression as to whether there was an official distribution of information.

General Murray. I cannot answer that question definitely.

[3102] My impression is that we did. I know that G–2 of the division was in constant contact with Colonel Fielder of the Department, but I cannot recall at this time exactly what the contents of the G–2 reports were.

101. General Frank. Do you remember of ever getting anything "hot"?

General Murray. I do not recall definitely of having received anything that I considered what you call "hot"; that is, active information bearing on the possible initiation of hostilities.

102. General Frank. Have you, since that critical period between the 25th of November and December 7, become conversant with information that did exist at that time?

General Murray. No, I do not recall it.

103. General Frank. Well, what I was about to lead up to was this question—if in your opinion you though the caution with which vital information was handled hindered full-out defense measures?
General Murray. I do not feel that it did; because I was so convinced of General Short's immediate interest and his full knowledge of what steps were being taken: and his directives were so definite that I did not feel there was anything that he had that was not being applied to the position in hand. I felt that I was in possession of the information that he had. Is that a clear answer to your question, General? I am not certain whether I have covered exactly what you want or not, sir.

104. General Frank. It would be necessary that you knew that something went on of which you were not informed, in order to be able to answer the question; therefore, the lack of preparation for the question made it impossible for you to answer it.

General Murray. I might say that this report, here, is much more definite as to conditions than the abbreviated report that was given to me directly, which was from my G-2.

105. General Frank. I have nothing further.

106. General Grunert. Are there any other questions by any of the advisors or counsel?

If not, can you think of anything that you feel that you know, that you could tell the Board, to assist us in arriving at conclusions as to this matter in hand? Usually, witnesses have something in the back of their head which, if it is not brought out by questions, they wish to bring it out.

General Murray. Well, I have no hesitation. It is merely a question as to what I can offer that will clear the picture. The only point that occurs to me at this instant is, you asked as to the next information that I had had with reference to a dispatch from Washington. The only positive information that I have as to a dispatch which succeeded the one received on November 27 was on the afternoon of December 7. General Brush and I—General Brush was my assistant division commander—reported to General Short's command post, at, I would estimate, approximately 3:30 p. m. on the afternoon of December 7, to inform him that the division was completely in position and had the first unit of fire at the guns, for all weapons; and while we were discussing the details, that he wished carried out, the Chief of Staff brought in a telegram, which he presented to General Short, a radio message, which I have never seen, but which apparently was a great shock to General Short, and he made some explanation, and as I recall it, said, "Well, this is a lot of news that would have made a great difference in the situation," or words to that effect. I have never seen the message.

107. General Frank. Have we located that?

108. General Grunert. That was the December 7 message; yes. It arrived early in the afternoon of December 7. That is the one to which the witness evidently refers.

General Murray. I presume that is the message.

109. General Grunert. You have never heard it, so you would not know that.

General Murray. I never heard the message, and that is the only thing; that is the next direct contact that I can be sure of, of having been received from the War Department.

110. General Grunert. Then you never heard of any messages received through the Navy, concerning this situation?
General Murray. No, sir.
111. General Grunert. Are there any questions?
Thank you very much. We appreciate your coming.
(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

[3105] TESTIMONY OF RILEY H. ALLEN, EDITOR, HONOLULU STAR-BULLETIN, BUSINESS ADDRESS 125 MERCHANT STREET HONOLULU, T. H.

1. Colonel West. Mr. Allen, will you please state your name and address?
Mr. Allen. My name is Riley H. Allen; business address, 125 Merchant Street; home address, 3275 Pacific Heights, Honolulu, T. H.

2. Colonel West. And you are, I believe, editor of the Honolulu Star-Bulletin?
Mr. Allen. I am, sir.

3. General Grunert. Mr. Allen, this Board was appointed to ascertain and report the facts relating to the attack made by the Japanese armed forces upon the Territory of Hawaii on December the 7th, 1941, and, in addition thereto, to consider the phases which related to the Pearl Harbor disaster of the report of the House Military Affairs Committee, the latter of which was largely concerned with the construction that took place here prior to December 7th.

Now, we are after facts or leads to where facts can be found. I requested that you come before the Board in view of your position as an editor of one of the prominent papers here, with the hope that you might be able to give the Board some facts, or at least impressions and background, and possibly some opinions, if they are well based.

I do not know just what line to proceed along, except to ask you what your impression was, together with that which you transmitted to the public during the latter part of November and early in December, as to the status of the international [3106] situation, particularly between the United States and Japan, including your impression of the possible imminence of war and whether or not the impression was that war would hit here and, if so, how soon.

Would you give us a little story on that, just a little rambling talk to give us an idea of what the editors thought and what impressions they gave the people through their papers?

Mr. Allen. I will be glad to, General.

I think it is fair to say that an examination of the columns of our paper throughout a good part of 1941 will show that we were aware of the increasing tensity of the situation on the Pacific and the increasing possibility that friendly relations between the United States and the Empire of Japan would be severed and that this severance might lead to combat.

As early as the forepart of 1941 we were urging preparation by the civil community to meet such an eventuality, and we were instrumental and I in some of my activities, outside of editing a newspaper, was in some degree instrumental in endeavoring to build up agencies of preparedness in the community.
If I may go back a little further, sir. I was a member of the executive committee of the Hawaii Chapter of the American Red Cross, as I am now, and early in 1941 we were considering the possibility that this island might become a scene of defense, or at least that we might be called upon to defend ourselves, and that such defense might result in civilian casualties, and we began aiding other agencies, including the Preparedness Committee of the Medical Association in their first aid stations. In mid-summer of that year, I recall we appropriated a considerable sum to aid that agency, the Preparedness Committee of the Medical Association.

We urged very strongly the increase of island food production. We urged particularly that steps be taken by the Territorial executive to cooperate in the bringing in and storing of surplus commodities.

Our editorial columns called attention to the increasing tensity of the situation, and we interpreted particularly the negotiations, or the diplomatic exchanges in progress at Washington, first with Ambassador Nomura and the Secretary of State, and later with Special Envoy Kurusu and the Secretary of State, we interpreted the lack of successful conclusion of those negotiations as a very ominous sign.

I think that is a fair statement of the text of the tone of our editorials.

We urged the passage of what is called the M-Day Legislation. We did criticize the Territorial executive for what we felt to be a lack of realistic action to carry out the provisions of an M-Day Bill as it was passed by the Territorial Legislature.

I mention that not to bring up an old criticism so much as to answer your question, sir, as to what we attempted to do.

4. General GRUNERT. Mr. Allen, can you tell the Board the sources of your information for your editorials and for your write-ups concerning the international situation? In other words, did you have some authentic sources from which to get information to publish to your people?

Mr. Allen. Most of our information, General, was derived from a reading of the dispatches.

5. General GRUNERT. What dispatches?

[3108] Mr. Allen. Which came to us by the Associated Press, United Press and our own Washington bureau, together with what I felt to be an increasingly grave atmosphere locally. It was impossible to escape the feeling, I think, that there was an increasing apprehension here locally that this tense situation on the Pacific might involve the Territory of Hawaii.

I do not recall any particularly confidential information, General, that I received. I do recall at various times the officers with whom I was acquainted here spoke to me about the possibility of such eventualities, and civilians, too.

I spoke about the principal source of information being the dispatches and information from Washington. A search of our paper, I am sure, would show that the headlines and the news stories told of this situation. I recall we carried headlines on the imminence of trouble at Singapore, based on dispatches. We carried headlines on preparations for eventualities at Manila. We carried statements by Secretary of State Hull in which he indicated that the conversations proceeding between his office and that of the Ambassador of Japan and the Special
Emissary from Japan were not resolving themselves into friendly accommodations or friendly solutions.

We interpreted the vary sharp warning of our administration to Japan that the Japanese must, in order to retain the confidence of the United States, treat with China. We interpreted that as a very serious warning and a very serious note, and also, if I recall correctly, we stated our own conclusions that Japan was quite unlikely to yield to that demand or to that insistence.

We interpreted some of the moves which were made, the possibilities, such as were obvious to a layman and a citizen [3109] such as myself. We interpreted those moves as signs of increasing tension; the requisitioning of some of our great passenger ships for transport use, the warnings to our nationals to leave the Far East.

That, General, was our chief source of information on which we based our conclusions, rather than any confidential or off-the-record information that we had as to the actual imminence of a break with Japan.

6. General GRUNERT. Were you as the editor of a paper free to interpret these things to your own satisfaction, without coercion from any source?

Mr. Allen. Yes, sir.

7. General GRUNERT. Did you in any way have to cater to your local population, particularly since a great deal of it may have been Japanese? Do they read your paper?

Mr. Allen. They do, sir.

8. General GRUNERT. And did you have to tone down anything you wanted to say because of their reading the paper, or anything of that sort?

Mr. Allen. Not in the slightest.

9. General GRUNERT. You did not think that anything you put in there, or did you have to consider whether that would alarm them or possibly make the situation worse locally by predicting a break or calling attention to the strained relations, or anything of that sort?

Mr. Allen. We had to consider, General, the possibility that we might misinterpret the news too seriously and needlessly alarm and disturb not only our readers of the affected nation, but the citizenry as a whole. So far as I can recall, I never [3110] held back on calling the facts as I saw them.

10. General GRUNERT. Were you conservative in such interpretation?

Mr. Allen. I felt that I had to be at least conservative to a degree that I should not be jingoistic.

11. General GRUNERT. Did you just prior to the— I don't know what you call it over here, whether disaster or blitz or what-not, but prior to December 7th did things appear tense to you, so that you had to put out a big headline on anything? Did any particular point stand out during that week prior to the attack that you figured something was quite imminent?

Mr. Allen. That, sir, I do not recall. I do not recall exactly what it was.

12. General GRUNERT. Does an editor pass on anything except the editorials, or does he pass on the scareheads, as I call them?

Mr. Allen. In our organization I am responsible and I do pass, especially in time of tension and time of special delicacy or respon-
sibility, upon headlines as well as upon the text of articles, although I do not always see all the headlines before they are written or before they are published. I do keep pretty closely in touch with them.

13. General Grunert. I have before me a few of the headlines of the Honolulu Star-Bulletin, and I will just read them in the record to see what the general trend was.

The 29th of November, 1941:

U. S. Waits Japan Reply.
First of December:
U. S. Army Alerted in Manila, Singapore Mobilizing As War Tension Grows.

Again, December 1:
Japan Envos Resume Talks Amid Tension.

[3111] Another one on the 1st of December:
War Fears Grow In Philippines.
The 4th of December:
Japan Spurns U. S. Program.
The 6th of December:
Singapore on War Footing.
Again on the 6th:
New Peace Effort Urged In Tokyo.

Another one on the 6th of December:
Civilians Urged To Leave Manila.

Of all those the one of the 4th of December seems to indicate to me more than any other,

Japan Spurns U. S. Program.

There is an excerpt here:

Domei Japanese News Agency reported tonight that it is “utterly impossible for Japan to accept American proposals” for settlement of the Far Eastern Situation as Premier Hideki Tojo and Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo explained current diplomatic issues to the privy council.

There is no answer to that; only I just wanted to read this into the record.

During all this work here what connection did you have with the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department on the work of building up the civilian end of the defense?

Mr. Allen. I knew the Commanding General fairly well. I talked with him occasionally. Our chief contact, General, with both of the services was through, at that time, the Naval Intelligence or the Army G-2 Intelligence, now Public Relations or Public Relations Branch.

14. General Grunert. Do you feel that they played the game with you?

Mr. Allen. I have no criticism upon that point at all. I should add that there may have been matters which they knew about which I knew nothing, but I have no criticism of our contacts with them.

15. General Grunert. Did you depend on them as sources of information for articles, or did they refuse any such information, if asked
for? In other words, did you ask for anything and, if you asked for it, did you get it.

Mr. Allen. We were under a voluntary censorship, which has been in effect for a considerable time. I at times have differed with some of the aspects of that voluntary censorship and have expressed myself in an entirely friendly way. I should say that with the exception of those matters which were represented to us as being of secret in the interest of military secrecy, we received adequate cooperation. I do not recall any instance in which we were denied access to information, except on the ground of necessity for military secrecy. May I add just this: that our relations were never hostile; always, so far as I know, friendly and cooperative.

16. General Grunert. How were the people over here generally; war-minded or peace-minded, or complacent, or what?

Mr. Allen. I think that there were large sections or considerable sections that were acutely apprehensive. That would be elements in all races, perhaps. I think there were other sections who relied completely on the believed ability of the defense forces to detect an attack in case one should be made. I think the atmosphere, rather than one of complacency—I don't think you can call it complacency—I think the atmosphere was rather one of reliance upon the military and naval leadership and military and naval installations and forces to give warning, first, of a possible attack and to repel that attack if it was made.

I think in general the people of the territory were extremely cooperative in providing such support and such aid as was requested by the military and naval commanders, such as might by done by civilians.

17. General Grunert. You have answered my next question in a way, but I will put it anyway: Did you have confidence in the military? By military I mean both Army and Navy?

Mr. Allen. Personally, sir, I had great confidence in them.

18. General Grunert. Do you or does your public, as I will call it, consider that the Army let you down, because of what happened at Pearl Harbor?

Mr. Allen. If you will just pardon me, General, I want to phrase my answer precisely.


Mr. Allen. I think we feel that we had a right to expect of the Army command a greater degree of alertness than was manifested on December 7th, 1941.

20. General Grunert. By that you mean another degree of alertness which gave more security than that degree of alertness they call sabotage?

Mr. Allen. Yes, sir.

21. General Grunert. That is an answer to my question. Anything else?

22. General Russell. Did you come out here on the day of December 7th, the night of December 7th?

Mr. Allen. I came out along—I did not come to Fort Shafter. I came along the roadway. I did not come out until late in the afternoon. I was busily engaged all morning in newspaper duties, as we were issuing extras. I came out late in the afternoon. I drove out along the roadway. I did not go to Pearl Harbor. I drove part way and then drove back again along the roads.
23. General Russell. Did you come out that night?
  Mr. Allen. No, sir.
24. General Russell. Was there a lot of confusion that afternoon?
  Mr. Allen. Not a great deal. I came out about 4 o’clock. There was a great deal of traffic. There had been impressed into service a great variety of miscellaneous vehicles. I did not detect what I would call more confusion than one would expect after such an attack. It is rather hard to answer your question exactly.

   I have heard—and this is hearsay, because I did not see it—I heard in the morning there was not so much confusion as a tremendous jam of vehicles because of the tremendous pressure to get people from Pearl Harbor and other installations. I thought when I came out that things were moving pretty well. My observation early in the day downtown had been that the movement of troops through the city was proceeding expeditiously, so far as I could judge.

25. General Russell. Did you and the people here in general have the feeling that there was a possibility of sabotage or subversive activities on the part of the Japanese people on the island in the event of war with Japan or the imminence of war with Japan?
  Mr. Allen. You are speaking of the people as civilians, sir?

   [3115] Mr. Allen. For myself I will speak perfectly frankly. I have had for many years a great deal of faith and confidence in the Americans of Japanese ancestry, American citizens. I have repeatedly said and written that I thought they would stand the test as American citizens, realizing that there might be exceptions to that general statement. I know that there were a great many others who were of the same mind as myself, particularly the people who deal with the young Japanese, not merely as servants and employees, but deal with them in a more intimate way, are better acquainted with them.

   I think it also fair to say that there are other citizens who had in their minds a doubt as to the conduct of Americans of Japanese ancestry under such a task or in the case of war between the United States and Japan.

27. General Russell. This latter group regarded the Japanese population here as furnishing a potential source of fifth column activity?
  Mr. Allen. I think so.
28. General Frank. Did you ever know the District Engineer who was out here at that time, Colonel Wyman?
  Mr. Allen. I knew him very slightly.
29. General Frank. Did you ever have any business with him?
  Mr. Allen. No, sir, not directly with him. On matters of information I have talked briefly with him and on matters of information have talked briefly with his subordinates, but I had relatively little contact with him.
30. General Frank. Did anything ever arise in your association with him or your dealings with him about which you would like to comment to the Board?

   [3116] Mr. Allen. Not with him personally, General. This is second-hand information. I give it as nothing else. I heard instances given of his what might be called ruthlessness, about which I am personally not familiar. Therefore, I hesitate to answer your question in the way it was put.

79716—46—Ex. 145, vol. 2—53
31. General Frank. That is the full extent to which you are conversant with his activities?
Mr. Allen. You mean his official activities?
32. General Frank. Yes.
Mr. Allen. Yes, sir.
33. General Frank. Do you know of any personal characteristics, in your opinion, that adversely affected his efficiency?
Mr. Allen. I do not personally, no.
34. General Frank. By reputation?
Mr. Allen. Do you want me to give hearsay? This is only hearsay. I will give it, if you wish.
35. General Frank. I would like to know, to establish that information on the basis of reputation in the community.
Mr. Allen. I heard that at times he was a heavy drinker.
36. General Frank. Which affected his official capacity?
Mr. Allen. No, sir, I did not hear that.
37. General Frank. Did you ever know of Hans Wilhelm Rohl?
Mr. Allen. No, sir.
38. General Frank. Do you know anything about him?
Mr. Allen. Only what I have read. I am familiar with the reports that have come in.
39. Major Clausen. What information, Mr. Allen, did you receive as to the characteristics of Hans Wilhelm Rohl, either from original source or by hearsay?

[3117] Mr. Allen. Frankly, until the case became of public notoriety some months ago, I cannot recall that I had more than heard that there was such a man. It was not until the news came out of the investigating committee in Washington that it had made any impression on my mind about him. I just do not recall that I more than heard of him as one of the interested contractors.

Major Clausen. With respect to the information you received from Colonel Wyman that you have related to General Frank, was that information received by you during the time that he was on duty here?
Mr. Allen. Yes, sir.
40. Major Clausen. I believe that is all the questions I have.
41. General Grunert. Colonel Toulmin?
42. Colonel Toulmin. Nothing, sir.
43. General Grunert. Colonel West?
44. Colonel West. No, sir.
45. General Grunert. Do you employ Japanese on your paper?
Mr. Allen. Yes, sir.
46. General Grunert. How do they size up? What kind of Japanese are they? Young men, old men? How do they size up?

Mr. Allen. We have, I think, only one Japanese alien, part time. We have a number of Americans of Japanese ancestry. We select them as carefully as we can, and we endeavor to extend to them—if we feel that they are people who can be trusted—we extend to them our confidence and support.

I might add that on the morning of December 7th one of our Americans of Japanese ancestry employed on our news staff begged to be able to be allowed to go out on the street and cover the news. I was apprehensive that I might be mistaken, on that [3118] tumultuous
morning, that he might be shot or locked up. I finally decided that we would send him out to the Japanese consul and bring back what news he might find there. He came back and related with every evidence of satisfaction that the Japanese consul just had been taken over and he was glad to see that the Japs were locked up at this time.

I might say that he himself on previous occasions had been sent by us to cover the news and he felt that he was being, as he expressed, pushed around by the Japs of the consulate. He himself is of Japanese ancestry, a graduate of St. Louis College, which is a Catholic institution, and a young man we felt to be of fine character and integrity. We have a number of others. We feel that they are loyal citizens and good workers.

[3119] 47. General Grunert. This one that went to the Japanese consulate that morning—outside of that general news item he didn't get anything else, did he?

Mr. Allen. I don't recall, frankly. I can find out, if it is material, but so far as I know, why, he wasn't on the street very much. We had to be careful lest if he were too active, as a newsman would be, he might get himself into difficulties and have difficulty explaining what he was doing.

48. General Grunert. Now, Mr. Allen, do you think of anything else that you want to tell the Board that might be of value to them in reaching conclusions as to the mission charged to the Board?

Mr. Allen. Just one thing, and perhaps that may have been completely or sufficiently touched on for your purposes: I have always felt that the preoccupation or, let me say, the concern of the military and naval commands with the fancied or feared situation from within, the sabotage situation, was such that it took their concern away from the possibility of attack from without. I felt that they had, or some of them had, a very strong belief that there would be uprising or wide-scale, wholesale sabotage within, at any slightest opportunity, and did not sufficiently take into account what has been done in the territory over a period of a great many years to mold our young citizens of Japanese ancestry in the same beliefs and the same devotions that American citizens of other ancestries have. It seemed to me that that was a fundamental and a tragic error in their conception of the situation in the territory.

49. General Grunert. These were your thoughts prior to [3120] December 7, or have they been formed in your mind since December 7?

Mr. Allen. Prior to December 7. I expressed them to a considerable degree editorially at a time when there was pending in Washington a so-called martial-law bill, which, whatever its merits, did seem to be based at least partly on an acute distrust of the Americans of Japanese ancestry in the territory.

50. General Grunert. Anything else? (No response.)

We thank you very much for coming up, and we appreciate it.

Mr. Allen. Yes, sir. Thank you.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

General Grunert. A five-minute recess, and then we have one witness after that; we shall take but a short time with him.

(There was a brief informal recess.)
TESTIMONY OF LT. COL. MELBOURNE H. WEST, HEADQUARTERS 7TH AIR FIGHTER WING

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel West. Colonel, will you please state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station?

Lt. Col. West. Melbourne H. West, Lieutenant Colonel, Headquar-
ters 7th Fighter Wing, APO 958.

2. General Grunert. Colonel West, this Board is after facts or leads to facts pertaining to the Pearl Harbor attack. We called you because you had testified before the Roberts [3121] Commission. Now, this Board has covered a lot of ground and has developed most of the main subjects, so we are just filling out by checking up on various points.

Will you tell me what your assignment was the latter part of 1941, including at the time of the attack?

Lt. Col. West. I was battery commander of a searchlight battery.

3. General Grunert. Stationed where?

Lt. Col. West. At Camp Malekoli.

4. General Grunert. Malekoli. That was the home station, or what you might call the home station. Was that also the position of the battery when and if you were alerted?

Lt. Col. West. That was the home station of the battery, but it was not the field position of the battery when we were alerted.

5. General Grunert. I notice in the Roberts Commission testimony that you are alleged to have said that at Malekoli the antiaircraft had to be gotten out of storage and set up; no equipment in place nor any ready to fire. Is that correct?

Lt. Col. West. It is correct.

6. General Grunert. Will you explain that to us? We don't know just how to interpret that: "The antiaircraft had to be gotten out of storage and set up." What does that mean? If your position was not at Malekoli and you had to take it out, does that mean that all this equipment was placed in dead storage and you had to dig it out, oil it up, put it together and take it out, or what? Explain it to us.

Lt. Col. West. The equipment was not in dead storage. The guns were on wheels, ready to be connected with their prime [3122] movers and moved to their battery positions. They were stored at Camp Malekoli for the purpose of protection during the alert, the type of alert that we were in.

7. General Grunert. Then, it simply meant that you took it from there to your position?

Lt. Col. West. That is right, sir.

8. General Grunert. And got it in position ready to fire?

Lt. Col. West. That is correct.

9. General Grunert. Well, that is what misled me when I read it. I just asked you to come down here to clear up that point.

As far as Alert No. 1 was concerned, the sabotage alert, there was no call for your mobile battery to be in position for action, was there?

Lt. Col. West. That is correct.

10. General Frank. May I ask him a question?
12. General Frank. Would you mind showing on that map where your field position was and where Malekoli is?
Lt. Col. West. Malekoli is about two miles north of Barbers Point, southwestward tip of the Island. The field position of my battery, which was a searchlight battery, was in the Ewa plain area adjacent to Pearl Harbor and including the Wainae pocket.
13. General Grunert. How many searchlights in your battery that you had to put out in position?
Lt. Col. West. 15 searchlights.
14. General Grunert. And they were all concentrated at Malekoli; is that right?
[3123] Lt. Col. West. All the searchlights were, sir. There were three radars which were in field positions.
15. General Grunert. And you didn't have your searchlights out in position with small detachments to take care of them and operate them in those positions?
Lt. Col. West. We did not. That's not customary even now, sir. The searchlights go out to the position, they operate at night, they come into the central position in the daytime, up until just recently.
16. General Grunert. Well, you take them out just before dark?
17. General Grunert. And operate in the position?
Lt. Col. West. That is right, sir.
18. General Grunert. About how far does the farthest searchlight have to travel?
19. General Grunert. Then there is no need of keeping searchlights out there in the daytime, is there?
Lt. Col. West. No, sir.
20. General Grunert. Except to save wear and tear on rubber and use of gas and oil?
Lt. Col. West. And the guards which may be necessary to guard the position. The radars were in their field positions.
21. General Grunert. And, as I understand, the searchlight and the radar act in combination; did they?
Lt. Col. West. That is correct, sir.
22. General Grunert. Is there anything that you have in mind that you would like to bring to the attention of the Board, to see whether or not we may or may not have gotten information [3124] on it, that you think is pertinent to the issue, knowing what took place and probably some of the reasons why the things happened? Sometimes the witnesses have something in the back of their heads that they might like to have somebody else know about. Have you any such information? If so, this is the time to let us know.
Lt. Col. West. I have none, of my personal experience. I don't know what has been brought up before the Board. The things I have in my mind or have expressed have probably already been brought up before them.
23. General Grunert. Then, there is nothing that is particularly itching to come out, is there?
Lt. Col. West. No, sir.
24. General Grunert. Have you any questions?
26. General Grunert. Any questions by the Board? (No response.)
Thank you for coming.
(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)
(Thereupon, at 4:45 p. m., the Board concluded the hearing of
witnesses for the day and proceeded to other business.)
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