PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
PURSUANT TO
S. Con. Res. 27
A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN
INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL
HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND
EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
RELATING THERETO

PART 31
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD

Printed for the use of the
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack
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UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1946
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3820 (National Defense)
Re. O. & K. Chapter VII.
Circular Letter (Finance No. 220) (Contracts No. 21)

Rescinded by C/L Fin 41, 1941, file 103 (1941) 41


To: All Contracting Officers and Others Concerned:

The following procedure will govern the making of purchases and the letting of contracts for National Defense purposes by the Corps of Engineers. It includes instructions supplemental to Army Regulations, and, for the convenience of contracting officers, includes the pertinent requirements of Army Regulations, Procurement Circulars and special instructions of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War pertaining to such purchases and contracts. It is issued as a new section to Chapter VII, Orders and Regulations, and will be kept up to date by supplemental Finance Circulars:


772. Statutory provision.—Section 1 (a) of the Act approved July 2, 1940 (Public No. 703, 76th Congress) provides as follows:

That (a) in order to expedite the building up of the national defense, the Secretary of War is authorized, out of the moneys appropriated for the War Department for national-defense purposes for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1941, with or without advertising, (1) to provide for the necessary construction, rehabilitation, conversion, and installation at military posts, depots, stations, or other localities, of plants, buildings, facilities, utilities, and appurtenances there-to (including Government-owned facilities at privately owned plants and the expansion of such plants, and the acquisition of such land, and the purchase or lease of such structures, as may be necessary), for the development, manufacture, maintenance, and storage of military equipment, munitions, and supplies, and for shelter; (2) to provide for the development, purchase, manufacture, shipment, maintenance, and storage of military equipment, munitions, and supplies, and for shelter, at such places and under such conditions as he may deem necessary; and (3) to enter into such contracts (including contracts for educational orders, and for the exchange of deteriorated, unserviceable, obsolescent, or surplus military equipment, munitions, and supplies for other military equipment, munitions, and supplies of which there is a shortage), and to amend or supplement such existing contracts, as he may deem necessary to carry out the purposes specified in this section: Provided, That the limitations contained in sections 1136 and 3734 of the Revised Statutes, as amended, and any statutory limitation with respect to the cost of any individual project of construction, shall be suspended until and including June 30, 1942, with respect to any construction authorized by this Act: Provided further, That no contract entered into pursuant to the provisions of this section which would otherwise be subject to the provisions of the Act entitled 'An Act to provide conditions for the purchase of supplies and the making of contracts by the United States, and for other purposes,' approved June 30, 1936 (49 Stat. 2036; U. S. C. Supp. V, title 41; secs. 35-45), shall be exempt from the provisions of such Act solely because of being entered into without advertising pursuant to the provisions of this section: Provided further, That the cost-plus-a-percentage-of-cost system of contracting shall not be used under this section, but this proviso shall not be construed to prohibit the use of the cost-plus-a-fixed-fee form of contract when such use is deemed necessary by the Secretary of War.

772.1 Applicability of the Act.—Procurements and contracts made without advertising will be referred to as negotiated purchases and contracts. Negotiated contracts may be distinguished as to form as (1) lump-sum contracts, and
(2) cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contracts. They include all construction, supply, service, and rental contracts for the purposes stated in the Act regardless of the actual or estimated amounts involved. The authority does not include procurements and contracts for River and Harbor and Flood Control works.

3. Administrative directions—The Acting Secretary of War on July 2, 1940, determined it to be necessary in the public interest and authorized contracts within the scope of Section 1 (a) of the Act to be entered into without advertising whenever that method of procurement will serve to expedite the accomplishment of the national defense program. By direction of the Assistant Secretary of War the general principles governing the letting of national-defense contracts and the labor policy adopted by the National Defense Advisory Commission (Document No. 590, 76th Congress) will be followed. Such principles and policy are set forth under the following subparagraphs (a) and (b).

(a) General principles governing the letting of defense contracts:
1. The essence of the preparedness program is the getting of an adequate supply of materials of the proper quality in the shortest space of time possible. Considerations of price alone are highly important, but in the emergency are not governing.
2. Speed of delivery of all items on the defense program is essential. This means:
   (a) That orders should be placed in such a manner as to insure the most efficient use of each particular facility from the point of view of the program as a whole;
   (b) That proper consideration should be given to contributory industries, such as the machine tool industry, to avoid creating underlying bottlenecks;
   (c) That once delivery dates are fixed, assurance be given that they will be met by the supplier.
3. Proper quality is also of prime importance. It is therefore necessary to determine first of all whether or not the supplier can meet the quality requirements as specified. There should be a willingness on the part of both the Army and Navy, on the one hand, and of the supplier on the other to adjust specifications on a cooperative basis in order that such specifications may come as near as possible to meeting commercial standards while at the same time fulfilling the military requirements.
4. Price, while not the sole consideration, is of outstanding significance, and every effort must be made to secure a fair price. This must take recognition, among other things, of determination of proper cost factors.
5. The impact of the defense program upon the consumers must be recognized. This relates to such factors as:
   (a) Due regard to the necessity of protecting civilian needs and morale;
   (b) Proper health and housing conditions among employees;
   (c) Consideration to possible off-season production in order to dovetail the military program into production for civilian requirements. Off-season production should also lead to lower overhead and consequently to lower prices for both the consumers and the Government.
6. Adequate consideration must be given to labor. This means compliance with the principles on this subject stated by the Commission in its release of August 31, 1940 (quoted under (b) below).
7. Undue geographic concentration of orders should be avoided, both as to procurement districts and as to industrial sections within any such procurement district. Reasons for such decentralization relate to factors of military strategy, as well as avoiding congestion that will slow down production.
8. Financial responsibility of the supplier should be examined. Ability to post a bond does not necessarily dispose of this problem. The probability should exist that the supplier will be able to continue in business, at least long enough to complete his contract satisfactorily. Further, an ability to finance himself through private sources should take preference over necessity for securing Government aid.
9. The avoidance of congestion of transportation facilities should be sought. The same applies to warehousing facilities.
10. Due consideration should be given to the adequacy of power facilities, particularly where furnished by public utilities.
11. A general preference should be given to firms having experience with so-called educational orders.
12. The moral responsibility of the supplier is important, and in some respects, fundamental. There should be evidence of honest and sincere desire to cooperate.
with the Army and Navy in producing what is called for, and on time, without profiteering; to assume some risks himself rather than attempting to shift all such risks to the Government; and to furnish a correct statement as to his capacity and his experience. The supplier's general standing and reputation among reputable businessmen (as distinct from his financial rating) is one index of such qualifications.

13. The Commission recognizes that competitive bidding is the better procedure in certain types of industry and circumstances. However, it is often impossible to make sure that the principles outlined above are followed when contracts are placed on the basis of price alone and are let to the lowest bidder. Therefore, in cases where competitive bidding will not fulfill the above stated needs of national defense, the Commission recommends that the use of the negotiated contract be authorized where necessary in order that these objectives be obtained in making defense purchases.

(b) Labor policy:
1. Primary among the objectives of the Advisory Commission to the Council of National Defense is the increase in production of materials required by our armed forces and the assurance of adequate future supply of such materials with the least possible disturbance to production of supplies for the civilian population. The scope of our present program entails bringing into production many of our unused resources of agriculture, manufacturing, and manpower. This program can be used in the public interest as a vehicle to reduce unemployment and otherwise strengthen the human fiber of our Nation. In the selection of plant locations for new production, in the interest of national defense, great weight must be given to this factor.

2. In order that surplus and unemployed labor may be absorbed in the defense program, all reasonable efforts should be made to avoid hours in excess of 40 per week. However, in emergencies or where the usefulness of the national defense cannot otherwise be met, exceptions to this standard should be permitted. When the requirements of the defense program make it necessary to work in excess of these hours, or where work is required on Saturdays, Sundays, or holidays, overtime should be paid in accordance with the local recognized practices.

3. All work carried on as part of the defense program should comply with Federal statutory provisions affecting labor wherever such provisions are applicable. This applies to the Walsh-Healey Act, Fair Labor Standards Act, the National Labor Relations Act, etc. There should also be compliance with State and local statutes affecting labor relations, hours of work, wages, workmen's compensation, safety, sanitation, etc.

4. Adequate provision should be made for the health and safety of employees.

5. As far as possible, the local employment or other agencies designated by the United States Employment Service should be utilized.

6. Workers should not be discriminated against because of age, sex, race or color.

7. The Commission reaffirms the principles enunciated by the Chief of Ordnance of the United States Army, during the World War, in his order of November 15, 1917, relative to the relation of labor standards to efficient production: "In view of the urgent necessity for a prompt increase in the volume of production * * * vigilance is demanded of all those in any way associated with industry lest the safeguards with which the people of this country have sought to protect labor should be unwisely and unnecessarily broken down. It is a fair assumption that for the most part these safeguards are the mechanisms of efficiency..." Industrial history proves that reasonable hours, fair working conditions, and a proper wage scale are essential to high production. * * * Every attempt should be made to conserve in every way possible all of our achievements in the way of social betterment. But the pressing argument for maintaining industrial safeguards in the present emergency is that they actually contribute to efficiency."

(c) As to whether or not a prospective contractor is barred from receiving a contract by reason of findings made against him by the National Labor Relations Board, the following guide will be applied:

[6] While the labor policy of an industrial concern has an important bearing on its ability to carry out a proposed contract and the record of a concern in regard to the National Labor Relations Act may be an indication of such labor policy, the award of a War Department contract under the defense program is not to be considered as barred by the single fact that proceedings under the
National Labor Relations Act have been instituted or that findings of violations of the Act have been made by the National Labor Relations Board. In relation to this matter, consideration should be given to the seriousness of the offense charged, the stage which the proceeding has reached, the importance of the plant facilities of the particular concern to the national defense program, and similar factors. Emphasis must necessarily be placed on the prime importance of expeditious accomplishment of the defense program with due regard to efficiency and economy and to the various principles stated by the Advisory Board and approved by the President.

772.3 Authority of contracting officers.—District and division engineers, and other contracting officers specially designated by the Chief of Engineers with authority equivalent to that of a district or division engineer, may issue specifications and negotiate purchases and contracts without the approval of higher authority as provided in paragraphs 706.1 to 706.6, inclusive. Contracting officers specially designated by the Chief of Engineers or by the Chief of Engineers, division engineers under paragraphs 706.1 (c) and (d), will act within the limits of authority contained in their respective letters of appointment. Specifications, awards, and contracts issued and negotiated by contracting officers not under the jurisdiction of a division officer which require the approval of higher authority, unless otherwise specifically directed, will be submitted for the approval of the Chief of Engineers.

[Handwritten in margin:] See C/L Fin 10, 1941.

772.4 Open-market purchases.—Purchases amounting to $2,000 or less may be made in the open market under the same procedure as those set forth in paragraph 725.7, Orders and Regulations, and paragraph 4.0, AR 5-240.

772.5 Forms to be used.—(a) Lump-sum contracts.—Purchases amounting to $2,000 or less may be made by purchase order as set forth in paragraph 725.3, Orders and Regulations, substituting the figure $2,000 for the figure $500 appearing in said paragraph. All negotiated lump-sum contracts and purchases in excess of $2,000 will be entered into on the forms of contract prescribed in paragraphs 750.6, with the exception of (1), “E. D. Form No. 520” for expert services, which is exclusively for River and Harbor and Flood Control works. No standard form has been prescribed for lump-sum architectural and engineering services, and pending the issuance of such a form, they will be executed as provided in paragraph 750.6.

(b) Cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contracts.—All cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contracts will be executed only on standard or special forms approved by the Secretary of War.

To date standard forms have been approved as follows:

1. C. P. F. F. Form No. 1—Cost-plus-a-fixed-fee construction contract.
2. C. P. F. F. Form No. 2—Cost-plus-a-fixed-fee construction subcontract.
3. C. P. F. F. Form No. 3—Cost-plus-a-fixed-fee supply contract. (This form is applicable primarily to Air Corps contracts but may be used as a basis for similar contracts pertaining to purchases in cases where cost-plus-a-fixed-fee form of contract is necessary and authorized.)
4. C. P. F. F. Form No. ______—Cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contract for “Architect-Engineer Services.” (This form has not yet been formally approved but will be generally followed in the preparation of such contracts pending approval.)
(c) Miscellaneous.—For use in connection with (a) or (b) or otherwise as required, forms have been approved as follows:

1. Equipment Rental Agreement.
2. Lump-sum Construction Subcontract.

The standard forms will be followed without change in all possible cases. For construction works outside the continental limits of the United States, or in other cases where it is considered necessary, the form may be altered or redrafted to fit the particular needs of each case, and transmitted to the Chief of Engineers for his consideration and submission for the approval of the Assistant Secretary of War.

772.6 Preparation and distribution.—All negotiated contracts will be prepared and distributed as set forth in paragraphs 750 to 750.6, inclusive, except that:

1. One authenticated copy of all negotiated contracts (contract instrument only, less invitation, specifications, drawings, copy of bid, etc.) of $1,000,000 or more, except those contracts which are classified as secret, confidential or restricted in accordance with AR 830-5, will be transmitted by the contracting officer executing the contract, immediately upon the final approval thereof, direct to the Assistant Secretary of War, Procurement Control Section, Washington, D. C. (AR Par. 15b (4) (a).)
2. When the contract contains terms and conditions relating to reimbursement of the cost of emergency facilities and the protection of the United States with reference to the future use and disposition of such emergency facilities, one additional copy (contract instrument only, but including the terms and conditions indicated), regardless of the amount of the contract, will be forwarded immediately upon final execution, direct to the Assistant Secretary of War, Procurement Control Section, Washington, D. C. (AR 5-200, Par. 15b (4) (b).)

3. The copy of all contracts required to be filed in the Returns Office, as set forth in paragraph 750.9, which are of a secret or confidential nature, shall be prepared for such filing as other contracts but will be transmitted direct to the Office, Chief of Engineers, Contract Unit, by memorandum, stating the secret or confidential nature of the papers which would warrant their not being immediately made available for public examination.

4. The signed ribbon copy of every contract required under paragraph 750.9 (b) to be forwarded to the Office, Chief of Engineers for examination and transmittal to the Audit Division, General Accounting Office, which is of a secret or confidential nature, will be transmitted by registered mail, or other special method of delivery, paid for by the Office, Chief of Engineers, Contract Section, with a memorandum attached that the contract is of a secret or confidential nature. Such contracts will be specially handled and personally delivered to the General Accounting Office where special arrangements have been provided for their safekeeping.

5. Copies of specifications and drawings made a part of negotiated defense contracts, and such contracts themselves, will not be distributed to publishers and others as set forth in paragraphs 735.8 (d), (e), (f), and (g).

772.7 Cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contracts.—(a) Approval of use.—The use of the cost-plus-a-fixed-fee form of contract requires the approval of the Secretary of War in each specific case. If a district engineer or contracting officer considers that the work can be best performed by the cost-plus-a-fixed-fee form of contract, he will submit a letter to the Chief of Engineers stating:

1. The nature of the particular work to be done.
2. The location and the estimated cost thereof.
3. The particular reasons for the use of the cost-plus-a-fixed-fee form of contract.
4. The amount of fixed fee proposed.
5. The name of the contractor proposed for the work with the reasons therefor.

6. The name of one or more alternate contractor or contractors believed to be suitable to perform the work.

7. Whether or not the proposed contractor or any alternate has been awarded any other national defense contract, and if so, the contract number, description of the work, location of the work, estimated cost, and fee for each such contract, if known to the contracting officer.

8. Waiver of bids. (See paragraph 773.)

This application with recommendations of the Chief of Engineers, will clear through the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War and the National Defense Council.

(b) Amount of fee.—The Act of September 9, 1940 (Public No. 781, 76th Congress) provides that the fixed-fee to be paid the contractor as cost of public works contract (cost-plus-a-fixed-fee), hereafter entered into, shall not exceed one percent of the estimated cost of the contract exclusive of the fee as determined by the Secretary of War. The amount of the fees approved in existing construction contracts ranges from the maximum of six percent in smaller contracts of less than $100,000 in almost a straight line to approximately two and one-half percent for contracts approximating $30,000,000. Fixed-fees approximating three-fourths of one percent of the estimated project cost have been accepted as reasonable for architectural, engineering and design contracts.

In addition to the inspections required by AR 5-280, such necessary inspections, audits, and supervision, to make certain that the interests of the Government are fully safeguarded with respect to quantity, quality, cost of labor, materials and services, which are to be charged against such contracts and paid for by the Government, will be made. In view of the many difficulties inherent in contracts of this nature and the necessity for the assurance of rigid honesty in their performance, the careful supervision by contracting officers is enjoined. Care will be exercised in the preparation of all cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contracts that no condition is included which would preclude or abridge the right and duty of the Government to make such inspections and audits. (See Circular Letter Finance No. 225, dated December 9, 1940.)
fully prepared and that all conditions or practices which might operate to delay both procurement and production be eliminated therefrom. It is further important that changes in such specifications or designs, when issued, be limited to cases of absolute necessity. It is, therefore, directed, insofar as practicable, that:

(a) Specifications will be so clear and complete that any competent manufacturer should experience no undue difficulty in preparing bids or estimates.

(b) Unusual or unproven requirements will be avoided wherever possible.

(c) Tolerances and inspection standards will, to the greatest extent possible, conform to commercial practice and be capable of realization by mass production methods.

(d) Except in cases of absolute necessity changes in specifications or designs affecting work in process and affecting contracts to be placed will be avoided during the current emergency situation.

772.10 Approval of contracts.—(a) Lump-sum contracts.—All negotiated lump-sum contracts, both supply and construction, will be subject to the approval of higher authority as provided in paragraph 706.4, except that (1) all such contracts in excess of $100,000 or less than $500,000, will be submitted for the approval of the Chief of Engineers; (2) all such contracts of $500,000 or more will be subject to the favorable recommendation of the Chief of Engineers and the approval of the Assistant Secretary of War and will not be binding until so approved.

(b) Cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contracts.—All cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contracts where the estimated amount is in excess of $50,000 and less than $500,000 will be subject to the approval of the Chief of Engineers, and all such contracts of $500,000 or more will subject to the favorable recommendation of the Chief of Engineers and the approval of the Secretary of War, and will not be binding until so approved.

(c) Letters or endorsements transmitting contracts for approval will state briefly, (1) the necessity for making the procurement without advertising; (2) bidders solicited; (3) comparative cost; (4) whether or not the contractor has been awarded any other negotiated contracts; and (5) any other pertinent data.

772.11 Priorities.—A committee, known as the Priorities Committee of the Army and Navy Munitions Board, has been established and a priorities system has been prescribed by it to insure the procurement of items of Army and Navy equipment and supplies, in the quantity needed, in the order of their military importance, and with the least practicable burden to industry. It is effected by the use, at the discretion of contracting officers, of a specific preference rating to be placed on individual contracts or orders for critical items, as directed by the Committee. They do not apply to contracts for River and Harbor and Flood Control works or procurements. The instructions and procedure prescribed by the Priorities Committee for the use of preference ratings on contracts will be published in a restricted Finance Circular Letter.

772.12 Reports.—Reports of procurements and awards of contracts are required as follows:

(a) Reports of awards of contracts.—(1) Reports of awards of contracts in excess of $2,000 under authority of the Act of July 2, 1940 (Public No. 703, 76th Congress) will be submitted by the district engineer or other contracting officer making the purchase at the time the award is made. In the case of items which have been classified under AR 380-5, the word "classified" will be substituted for the quantity and description of the item. Such reports will be made direct to the Assistant Secretary of War, Procurement Control Section, Washington, D. C. These reports will be made on ordinary letter paper and will conform to the following outline:

Office. Date.
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD

REPORT OF CONTRACT SERIAL NO. -

Under authority of sec 1 (a), act July 2, 1940 (Public No. 703, 70th Cong.)

Project No. Contract or production schedule No. 

Name and address of contractor Location of establishment or plant

where the contract will be performed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Unit Cost</th>
<th>Grand Total</th>
<th>Total Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Quotations requested</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Award made</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Contract executed or notice to proceed issued</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Deliveries to commence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Contract to be completely performed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Number of quotations considered

Competition was not obtained in the negotiation of this contract for the following reasons (when applicable)

The prices obtained in the negotiations of this contract are fair and reasonable.

Signature of Purchasing and Contracting Officer.

(2) (2) Every report submitted in accordance with (a) above will be serially numbered by the station submitting it and the first report submitted by a station will bear the notation "Serial No. 1" immediately below the date in the upper right hand corner. Subsequent reports will be similarly numbered. Such reports as have already been submitted and not so numbered will be assigned serial numbers by the stations submitting them and information as to the numbers assigned furnished by letter to the office indicated in (a) above.

(3) For any item, to which a preference rating has been assigned in accordance with the priorities instructions of the Army and Navy Munitions Board dated August 12, 1940, appearing in the report, a notation substantially as follows will be given:

"ANMB preference (insert rating)"

(2) Purchases in excess of $2,000, made through contracts entered into under authority of the Act referred to in paragraph (a), (1), will not be reported under entry 14 on War Department Form No. 8 as open-market purchases (par. 5, AR-240). The number of such purchases made and the total amount of funds so obligated during each month will be shown by an appropriate notation in the space below entry 9 on page one of that form. The amount reported in the notation will be included in the total shown under entry 10. The number of purchases reported in the notation will be included in the total number of "other" purchases shown under entry 12.

(c) The instructions contained in the preceding paragraphs, (a) and (b), are applicable to all purchases made from War Department funds appropriated for the fiscal year 1941. Reports referred to therein, which have not been furnished covering the obligation of such funds prior to the receipt of these instructions will be prepared accordingly. They do not apply to procurements from River and Harbor and Flood Control funds.

(d) Reports of cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contracts and land acquisitions.

(1) The Act of October 8, 1940 (Public No. 600, 70th Congress) requires the Secretary of War to submit monthly within ten days following the last day of each month, commencing on or about November 10, 1940, to the Chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs and Appropriations of the Senate and House of Representatives, certain information on all cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contracts and all land acquisitions within certain periods. The Act provides that the first report should cover the period from July 1 to October 31, 1940.

(2) Such reports will be submitted by the contracting officer who executed the contract directly to the Assistant Secretary of War, Procurement Control Section, Washington, D. C., and a copy thereof will be transmitted to the Office, Chief of Engineers, Contract Section, Washington, D. C. The report covering contracts executed during the period July 1 to October 31, 1940 should
be submitted not later than November 5, 1940, and subsequent reports will be forwarded at the time the contract is executed in each case.

(3) Reports of cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contracts will contain substantially the following information:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Office</th>
<th>Date of Report</th>
<th>Serial No. of Report</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**REPORT OF CONTRACT**

Cost-plus-a-fixed-fee

Act Oct. 8, 1940

(Public No. 800, 70th Congress)

(a) Object or objects of the contract
(b) Name and place of business of the contractor
(c) Estimated cost of the contract (exclusive of the fee)
(d) Amount of the fee
(e) Date of contract
(f) Location of the project where the contract will be performed

Signature of Purchasing and Contracting Officer.

(4) Reports of land acquisitions will contain substantially the following information:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Office</th>
<th>Date of Report</th>
<th>Serial No. of Report</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**REPORT OF CONTRACT**

Land Acquisition

Act Oct. 8, 1940

(Public No. 800, 70th Congress)

(a) Location
(b) Area
(c) Intended use
(d) Purchase price
(e) Amount appropriated for the purpose
(f) Assessed value
(g) Date acquisition was accomplished

Signature of Purchasing and Contracting Officer.

(e) Press releases.—(1) Semi-monthly reports on the fifteenth and last day of each month of awards of contracts for supplies and Army construction will be submitted by the contracting officer executing the contracts, directly to the Assistant Secretary of War, Procurement Control Section, Room 2315, Munitions Building, Washington, D. C, and a copy thereof will be transmitted to the Office, Chief of Engineers, Contract Section, Washington, D. C. Such reports should be transmitted in time to reach the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War within three days of the period reported. Only contracts of sufficient importance to have news interest should be included. Awards of unusual interest and importance will be reported promptly at the time of award, rather than being held for the regularly semi-monthly release and items so reported need not be included in the semi-monthly report, but some mention should be made of them. Six copies of each semi-monthly and special report is required to be furnished the Office of The Assistant Secretary of War.

(2) Information on awards should include the contracting office, name and address of the contractor, the item or items contracted for, and the amount of each award as to quantity and money value and any other pertinent information. In addition thereto, the report will contain the completion date of deliveries for all contracts in excess of thirty days.
(3) The last release for each quarter of the fiscal year, will, in addition to the usual report of recent awards, include a summary showing the up-to-date status of the procurement program for the year by suitable items or categories, showing the amounts provided for in the annual program, the amounts contracted for to date, the amounts included in outstanding invitations, and other pertinent information.

(4) If the contracting officer considers that certain awards are of a confidential or other nature to make their publication advisable, recommendation to that effect should accompany the release.

The term "contracting officer" as used herein means division and district engineers and other contracting officers specially designated by the Chief of Engineers with similar unlimited authority. The reports of such contracting officers will include all procurements and awards by contracting officers within the authority under their supervision or direction.

773. Bonds.—(a) Lump sum contracts.—Bid bonds will not be required. Performance bonds for all supply contracts, and construction contracts under $2,000, are discretionary with the contracting officer and should be required only in exceptional cases. Performance and payment bonds must be required for negotiated construction contracts in excess of $2,000.

(b) Cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contracts.—The Secretary of War is authorized under the Act of September 9, 1940 (Public No. 751, 76th Congress) to waive the requirements for performance and payment bonds for public works under cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contracts. Pursuant thereto the Secretary of War has determined that the requirements of performance and payment bonds for public works for the military establishment, entered into upon a cost-plus-a-fixed-fee basis, out of funds appropriated for the fiscal year 1941, or authorized to be entered into prior to July 1, 1941, shall be waived except in cases of special circumstances. If the district engineer or other contracting officer considers that the circumstances in any particular case are such that performance and payment bonds should be required, he will include a recommendation to such effect in his letter of application to the Chief of Engineers, (paragraph 722.7) setting forth in detail the facts upon which such recommendation is based.

773.3 Liquidated-damage provisions.—For use in Engineer Corps supply and construction contracts generally, see paragraphs 734.2 (d) and 734.3 (f). The inclusion of liquidated-damage clauses in supply contracts under existing emergency conditions may frequently lead to complications in delivery or performance schedules with deliveries on other contracts under the system of priorities established by the Army and Navy Munitions Board on August 12, 1940. They will accordingly be included in negotiated supply contracts only in exceptional cases.

773.2 Walsh-Healey Act.—All negotiated supply contracts in excess of $10,000 (both lump-sum and cost-plus-a-fixed-fee) will contain the Walsh-Healey Act provisions.

773.3 Bacon-Davis Act.—All negotiated contracts for the construction or repair of public works in excess of $2,000 are subject to the provisions of the Bacon-Davis Act and must contain a schedule of minimum wage rates as determined by the Secretary of Labor.

773.4 Eight-hour Law requirements.—The provisions of the law prohibiting more than eight hours labor in any one day of persons engaged upon work covered by Army, Navy, and Coast Guard contracts were suspended by the Act of June 28, 1940 (Public No. 671, 76th Congress, Section 5 (b)). All contracts for the construction or repair of a public work or for non-personal services in which the stipulation prohibiting work in excess of eight hours a day was theretofore required to be included, are now subject to the provisions of Section 303 (16) of the Act approved September 9, 1940 (Public 751, 76th Congress) permitting employment of laborers and mechanics in excess of eight hours per day upon payment at not less than one and one-half times the basic rate of pay. The following paragraph will be included in all such contracts:

"ARTICLE 11. Eight-hour law—Overtime compensation—Convict labor.—
(a) No laborer or mechanic doing any part of the work contemplated by this contract, in the employ of the contractor or any subcontractor contracting for any part of said work contemplated, shall be required or permitted to work more than eight hours in any one calendar day upon such work at the site thereof, except upon the condition that compensation is paid to such laborer or mechanic in accordance with the provisions of this article. The wages of every laborer and mechanic employed by the contractor or any subcontractor engaged in the performance of this contract shall be con-
puted on a basic day rate of eight hours per day and work in excess of eight
hours per day is permitted only upon the condition that every such laborer
and mechanic shall be compensated for all hours worked in excess of eight
hours per day at not less than one and one-half times the basic rate of
pay. For each violation of the requirements of this article a penalty of five
dollars shall be imposed upon the contractor for each laborer or mechanic
for every calendar day in which such employee is required or permitted to
labor more than eight hours upon said work without receiving compensation
computed in accordance with this article, and all penalties thus imposed shall
be withheld for the use and benefit of the Government: Provided, That this
stipulation shall be subject in all respects to the exceptions and provisions
of U. S. Code, title 40, sections 321, 324, 325, and 326, relating to hours of
labor, as in part modified by the provisions of Section 303 of Public Act No.
781, 76th Congress, approved September 9, 1940, relating to compensation for
overtime."

773.5 Advance payments to contractors.—Section 1 (c) of the Act of July 2,
1940 (Public No. 703, 76th Congress) provides that advanced payments to con-
tractors in amounts not exceeding 30 percent of the contract price, may be made
prior to July 1, 1942, when necessary in the interests of the National Defense upon
such terms and conditions and such adequate security as the Secretary of War
may prescribe. Requests for advance payments by contractors may be made
at any time after negotiations have begun. District engineers and other con-
tracting officers upon receipt of requests from firms or contractors for advance
payments will forward such requests to the Chief of Engineers who will transmit
the request with his recommendation to the Assistant Secretary of War for ap-
propriate action. The following information will be presented with each case:
(a) Amount proposed to be advanced.
(b) Amount and character of contract involved.
(c) Whether award with or without advertising or on a cost-plus-a-fixed-
fee basis.
(17) (d) Terms of the proposed advance (including method and time of
repayment or liquidation).
(e) Necessity for the advance.
(f) Security proposed to protect the Government against loss with the
definite recommendation as to the adequacy thereof.
(g) Financial position and the general character and responsibility of
the contractor.
(h) Any other information pertinent to a proper decision in the case.
(1) Appropriation available.
773.6 Assignment of claims.—The Act of October 9, 1940 (Public No. 811,
76th Congress) provides that Sections 3477 and 3737, Revised Statutes, shall not
apply in any case in which the moneys due or to become due from the United
States, under a contract providing for payments aggregating $1,000 or more,
are assigned to a bank, trust company, or other financing institution, including
any Federal lending agency: provided that:
(a) No claim shall be assigned, in the case of any contract entered into
prior to October 9, 1940, without the consent of the Secretary of War.
District engineers and other contracting officers will forward any requests
for approval under authority of this subparagraph to the Chief of Engineers,
who will transmit the request with his recommendation to the Assistant
Secretary of War for appropriate action. All pertinent information necessary
for action of higher authority will be submitted with the request.
(b) An assignment may be made in the case of any contract entered into
subsequent to October 9, 1940, providing its terms do not prohibit such assign-
ment. Assignments under authority of this subparagraph will be submitted
for the approval of the Chief of Engineers, but they do not require the
approval of the Secretary of War.
(c) Unless the terms of a contract provide otherwise, an assignment of
the contract shall—
(1) Cover all amounts payable and not already paid.
(2) Not be made to more than one party.
(3) Not be subject to further assignment, except that an assignment may
be made to one party as agent or trustee for two or more financing parties.
(d) In case of an assignment, the party to whom the contract was assigned
shall file written notice, and a true copy of the assignment with the—
(1) General Accounting Office.
(2) Contracting Officer.

(3) Surety or sureties upon the bond or bonds, if any, in connection with such contract.

(4) Disbursing officer, if any, designated in such contract to make payment.

Any contract entered into by the War Department after October 9, 1940, may provide that payments to an assignee of any claim arising under such contract shall not be subject to reduction or set off for any indebtedness of the assignor to the United States arising independently of such contract.

Compulsory orders.—(a) Section 9 of the Selective Service and Training Act of 1940 (Public No. 783, 76th Congress) authorizes the President, through the head of the War Department or the Navy Department, in addition to the present authorized methods of purchase or procurement, to place an order with any individual, firm, association, company, corporation, or organized manufacturing industry for such product or material as may be required, and which is of the nature and kind usually produced or capable of being produced by such establishment. Compliance with all such orders for products or material shall be obligatory.

(b) It is the policy of the War Department to continue procurement under the defense program on the basis of voluntary cooperation between industry and the Government wherever possible.

(c) In the event that in any particular case a satisfactory solution cannot be reached on such voluntary basis, a full report of circumstances will be submitted to the Chief of Engineers for submission with his recommendation to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War. Such report of the contracting officer will include his conclusion that action under Section 9 of the Act referred to is necessary, together with the reasons therefor, and a statement that the product or material desired is normally produced or is capable of being produced by the person or corporation involved, that the price of the product or material desired as determined by him is fair and reasonable, and as to the preference over other contracts or orders to which the proposed order should be entitled. All pertinent correspondence or other documents relating to the case should accompany such report.

By order of the Chief of Engineers:

E. E. Gesler,  
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,  
Chief, Finance Section.

ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD EXHIBIT No. 56

[1] AFFIDAVIT OF COLONEL THEODORE WYMAN, JR., SUPPLEMENTING TESTIMONY BEFORE ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD

Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr., a person subject to Military Law, appearing before me in person and being first duly sworn, deposes and says:

The following corrections should be made to the transcript of my testimony given before the Army Pearl Harbor Board on 14 September 1944:

Page 3375, line 8, the word “bridges” should be changed to “barges”.

Page 3478, line 11, the phrase “not of serious occasions” should be changed to “not a series of occasions”.

Page 3478, line 8, the word “light” should be deleted.

Page 3581, line 13, the name “Mr. Epson” should be changed to “Mr. Eppe”.

The answer recorded as given by me on page 3539, line 16, to the effect that I did not see Mr. Rohl at the Palace Hotel is erroneous, either because of a stenographical error or because of my misunderstanding of the question when asked. I did see Mr. Rohl at the Palace Hotel with Mr. Grafe, but did not discuss the questions of whether the contract would be enlarged in scope and amount.

In view of the Board’s questions on my previous appearance covering the point of when I first knew that Mr. H. W. Rohl was not an American citizen, how I discovered this fact and what I did about it, I have reviewed the files on this point to refresh my recollection. My review of these files on this point reveals an inaccuracy in my statement made [2] on page 3504, of the transcript and repeated on pages 3560, 3579, and 3580, to the effect that I “immediately” wrote the Chief of Engineers upon discovering that Mr. Rohl was not an American citizen. At the time I testified it was my recollection that I wrote the
Chief of Engineers immediately, but a review of the file indicates that I did not
write this letter until August 15, 1941. Consequently I would like my answers in
this regard stricken from the record and for the following statement to constitute
my testimony with regard to my discovery of the fact that Mr. Rohl was not an
American citizen and the action taken by me after such discovery.
The first knowledge I had that Mr. H. W. Rohl was not an American citizen
was gained through the following letter dated June 2, 1941 from Hawaiian Con-
structors to me as District Engineer, Honolulu, T. H.:

Contract No. W--41-ENG--602

The District Engineer,
U. S. Engineer Office, Honolulu, T. H.

Dear Sir: Referring to your letter of May 7th—my answer thereto is supple-
mented by the following information:
1. Mr. H. W. Rohl, who owns 25% of the stock of the Rohl Connolly Company,
a member of the joint venture known as Hawaiian Constructors, was born in
Germany and is not a citizen of the United States.
2. Mr. Rohl has an application for United States citizenship pending before
the Naturalization Department of the U. S. Government in Los Angeles.
3. Mr. Rohl desires and intends, if permitted, to aid the United States Gov-
ernment in every way possible in the defense program of the present National
Emergency.

[3] 4. Mr. Rohl is not employed by the Hawaiian Constructors; he is not
now, nor has he been since prior to the execution of the contract, an officer or
director of the Rohl Connolly Company.
5. Mr. Rohl does not have, nor has he ever had, access to the plans or speci-
cifications for the work under this contract, nor has he participated in the contract
trials; in fact, he has purposely refused to do any of these things and intends to
continue to refuse in the future until he either receives U. S. citizenship, or
express permission is granted to him as provided for in the Act.

Very truly yours,

Hawaiian Constructors,

/s/ Paul Grafe,
Paul Grafe.

This letter was written by Mr. Paul Grafe for Hawaiian Constructors in reply to
a letter that I had written to Hawaiian Constructors on May 7, 1941, which
reads as follows:

Hawaiian Constructors

Pier 2-A, Feet of Channel Street, Honolulu, T. H.

Gentlemen: Reference is made to Cost-Plus-A-Fixed-Fee Contract Eng. 602 of
your company.
Your attention is invited to the following information relative to the employment
of aliens on National Defense Contracts.

1. The employment of aliens by contractors on national defense contracts is not prohibited but is restricted as stated by War Department Circular
No. 121, 1940, as follows:

"Protection of classified plans and specifications.—a. No aliens employed by
a contractor in the performance of secret, confidential, or restricted Govern-
ment contracts shall be permitted to have access to the plans or specifications,
or the work under such contracts, or to participate in the contract trials, unless
the written consent of the head of the Government department concerned has
first been obtained, and any person who willfully violates or through negligence
permits the violation of the provisions of this subsection shall be fined not more
than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.

"b. Any alien who obtains employment on secret, confidential, or restricted
Government contracts by willful misrepresentation of his alien status, or who makes
such willful misrepresentation while seeking such employment, shall be fined not
more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.

"c. For the purpose of this section, the term person shall be construed to include
an individual, partnership, association, corporation, or other business enterprise.
Sec. 11, act June 28, 1940 (Pub. 15, W. D., 1940)

"2. Should it become desirable, for any reason, that aliens be employed by
contractors on contracts affected by the foregoing restriction, application should
be made through this office, requesting the written permission of the Secretary of War for such employment and stating fully the reasons therefor.

"By order of the Chief of Engineers:"

Information is requested as to whether or not any aliens are employed by your company who would come under the meaning of Section II, act June 28, 1940.

Very truly yours.

THEODORE WYMAN, JR.,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer

[5] Prior to receiving Mr. Graf's answer of June 2, 1941, I had already received an answer from Hawaiian Constructors, dated May 14, 1941, which reads as follows:

Subject: Cost-Plus-A-Fixed-Fee Contract Eng.--602

THE DISTRICT ENGINEER,
U. S. Engineer Office,
HONOLULU, T. H.

DEAR Sir: Reference is made to your letter of May 7, 1941 relating to employment of aliens by contractor on National Defense Contracts. We wish to report that to our knowledge we have no aliens employed by our company who would come under the meaning of Section II, act of June 28, 1940.

We require each man to sign an application for employment on which he states whether or not he is a citizen of the United States. If he is not a citizen we do not hire him, except that some Filipinos are hired in accordance with District Circular #14 of March 22, 1941.

Yours very truly,

HAWAIIAN CONSTRUCTORS,
/s/ R. A. SCHWIEGER.

R. A. SCHWIEGER.

The occasion for my writing my letter of May 7, 1941 to Hawaiian Constructors was the receipt by me on May 6, 1941 of the following Circular Letter, dated April 21, 1941, from the office of the Chief of Engineers:

[6]

WAR DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF ENGINEERS,
Washington, D. C., April 21, 1941.

3820 (National Defense)
Re: O. & R. Chapter VII.
Circular Letter (Finance No. 104)
(Contracts No. 35)


To: All Divisions and District Engineers.

1. The employment of aliens by contractors on national defense contracts is not prohibited but is restricted as stated by War Department Circular No. 121, 1940, as follows:

"Protection of classified plans and specifications.—a. No aliens employed by a contractor in the performance of secret, confidential, or restricted Government contracts shall be permitted to have access to the plans or specifications, or the work under such contracts, or to participate in the contract trials, unless he written consent of the head of the Government department concerned has first been obtained, and any person who wilfully violates or through negligence permits the violation of the provisions of this subsection shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.

"b. Any alien who obtains employment on secret, confidential, or restricted Government contracts by wilful misrepresentation of his alien status, or who makes such wilful misrepresentation while seeking such employment, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.

"c. For the purpose of this section the term person shall be construed to include an individual, partnership, association, corporation, or other business enterprise. Sec. II, act June 28, 1940 (bull. 15, W. D., 1940)."

2. Should it become desirable, for any reason, that aliens be employed by contractors on contracts affected by the foregoing restriction, application should
be made through this office, requesting the written permission of the Secretary of War for such employment and stating fully the reasons therefor.

By order of the Chief of Engineers:

E. E. Gesler,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
Chief, Finance Section.

41/774

It should be noted that Mr. Grafe advised in his letter of June 2, 1941 that Mr. Rohl was not employed by the Hawaiian Constructors; that he was not at that time, nor had been since prior to the execution of the contract, an officer or director of Rohl-Connolly Company. I knew, of course, that Mr. Rohl had not taken any active part in the supervision or management of the work under Contract No. 602. Therefore, the fact that he was not an American citizen was not important in connection with the administration of Contract No. 602.

Later, as the work on Contract No. 602 expanded, it was felt desirable by Hawaiian Constructors and by me that his services be utilized in connection with this work. On August 15, 1941, I received the following letter from Mr. Grafe of Hawaiian Constructors:

AUGUST 15, 1941.

THE DISTRICT ENGINEER
U. S. Engineer Office
Honolulu, T. H.

Re: PROGRESS OF NATIONAL DEFENSE PROGRAM

Contract No. W-414-Eng-602

[8] Dear Sir: Mr. H. W. Rohl of 8519 Hollywood Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, applied in the U. S. District Court in Los Angeles on January 15, 1941, for his final citizenship papers, which have not yet been issued to him.

Mr. Rohl is one of the principal stockholders of the firm of Rohl-Connolly Company, members of the joint venture known as the Hawaiian Constructors, the contractors on Contract No. W-414-Eng-602.

Mr. Rohl is a man of outstanding ability, with good judgment, resourcefulness, and experience on construction work.

Mr. Rohl's services as an executive on work to be performed under subject contract are urgently needed to expedite the National Defense Program at this time, due to the large amount of work to be done, and the scarcity of supervisory personnel and efficient labor. Mr. Rohl has not taken any part in the performance of the work under subject contract, although anxious to do so, because, since he is not a naturalized citizen, he did not think it good policy to become associated with restricted and secret work.

It is requested that you ask the Department of Justice to give early attention to Mr. Rohl's application for citizenship, so that his valuable services will be available for this work, thus accelerating the progress of this part of the National Defense Program.

Very truly yours,

HAWAIIAN CONSTRUCTORS,

/\ Paul Grafe,
PAUL GRAFE.

On the same date, I wrote the following memorandum to the Chief of Engineers, through the division Engineer, advising that Mr. Rohl's services would prove invaluable in prosecuting the work at hand under Contract No. 602, and requesting that the Attorney General's attention be invited to the facts with the request that action on Mr. Rohl's application for final citizenship papers be expedited.
Request for final citizenship papers of Mr. H. W. Rohl of Rohl-Connolly Company, San Francisco and Los Angeles, California.

THE CHIEF OF ENGINEERS,
U. S. Army,
Washington, D. C.

(Thru: The Division Engineer, South Pacific Division)

1. Mr. Paul Grafo, Attorney-in-fact for the Hawaiian Constructors, a joint venture consisting of the W. E. Callahan Construction Company, Los Angeles, California; Rohl-Connolly Company, San Francisco and Los Angeles, California; Gunther and Shirley Company, Los Angeles, California; and Mr. Ralph E. Woolley, contractor of Honolulu, prosecuting Cost-Plus-A-Fixed-Fee Contract No. W-414-Eng-602, has requested the District Engineer to bring to the attention of the Engineer Department the status of Mr. H. W. Rohl, 8519 Hollywood Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, one of the principal stockholders of the firm of Rohl-Connolly Company. Mr. H. W. Rohl has applied to the U. S. District Court at Los Angeles, California, on January 15, 1941, for his final citizenship papers which, it appears, have not been issued to date.

2. Mr. H. W. Rohl is a very skillful construction supervisor. He has personally supervised several large construction jobs for the Engineer Department under various contracts, also, other agencies of the United States. Some of the outstanding work performed by Mr. Rohl was the construction of the Los Angeles-Long Beach Detached Breakwater, the construction of the Headgate Dam and other heavy construction in the State of California. Mr. Rohl is a man of outstanding ability, and of excellent judgment and resourcefulness for the management of difficult construction work.

3. Due to the fact that part of the work being performed under Contract No. W-414-Eng-602 is of a restricted nature, and because of his alien status, Mr. Rohl has been reluctant to take any active part in the supervision or management of the work under Contract No. W-414-Eng-602; therefore, his valuable services have been lost.

4. While District Engineer at Los Angeles, California, the writer had frequent contacts with Mr. Rohl in connection with the Los Angeles-Long Beach Detached Breakwater construction and the dredging of the Los Angeles Harbor. It is the writer’s opinion that Mr. Rohl’s loyalty to the United States is beyond question.

5. In view of the scarcity of qualified supervisory personnel for construction work in the Hawaiian Islands, it is the District Engineer’s opinion that Mr. Rohl’s services would prove invaluable in prosecuting the work at hand under the above cited contract; therefore, it is recommended that the Attorney General’s attention be invited to the case with a request that action be taken on his application for final citizenship papers be expedited.

THEODORE WYMAN, JR.,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

Inclosure: Ltr 8/15/41 fr
Hawn Constrs.

My recommendation in this memorandum was concurred in by the office of the Division Engineer at San Francisco through the following 1st endorsement:

Subject: Request for Final Citizenship papers of Mr. H. W. Rohl of Rohl-Connolly Company, San Francisco and Los Angeles, California.
To: The Chief of Engineers, U. S. Army, WASHINGTON, D. C.
Concurring in the views and recommendation of the District Engineer.
For and in the absence of the Division Engineer:

F. C. Scheffauer,
Head Engineer.

In response to this recommendation, I am advised that the office of the Chief of Engineers wrote the following letter to the office of the Attorney General on this matter:

"WAR DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF ENGINEERS,
Washington, August 30, 1941.

LEMEUL B. SCHOFIELD,
Special Assistant, Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization,
Office of the Attorney General, Department of Justice,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Schofield: The Hawaiian Constructors, a joint venture consisting of the W. E. Callahan Construction Co., Los Angeles, Calif.; Rohl-Connolly Co., San Francisco and Los Angeles, Calif.; Gunther & Shirley Co., Los Angeles, Calif.; and Ralph E. Woolley, contractor of Honolulu, T. H., are working on very important defense construction at Honolulu, T. H., pursuant to Engineer Corps Contract No. W-144-eng-602.

Mr. H. W. Rohl, 8519 Hollywood Boulevard, Los Angeles, Calif., one of the principal stockholders of the Rohl-Connolly Co., applied to the United States district court at Los Angeles, Calif., on January 15, 1941, for his final citizenship papers which have not, as yet, been issued. Mr. Rohl is possessed of outstanding ability, excellent judgment, and resourcefulness for the management of difficult construction work. Some of the outstanding work performed by Mr. Rohl was the construction of the Los Angeles-Long Beach detached breakwater, the construction of the Headgate Dam at Parker, Ariz., for the Indian Service, and miscellaneous dams, tunnels, and other heavy construction in the State of California. To date, Mr. Rohl’s valuable services have not been available for Government defense projects because of his alien status.

The services of Mr. Rohl are of vital importance to the expeditious completion of the aforementioned defense construction project because of his peculiar qualifications and scarcity of qualified supervisory personnel. It is the understanding of this office that Mr. Rohl’s loyalty to the United States is beyond question. It is therefore requested that the granting of Mr. Rohl’s final citizenship papers be expedited.

Your consideration and cooperation will be very much appreciated.

Very respectfully,

JOHN J. KINGMAN,
Brigadier General,
Acting Chief of Engineers."

I was requested by the Board to determine the date on which Hawaiian Constructors actually initiated construction work under Contract No. 602. The file reveals that this date was February 3, 1941. This is shown in the attached exhibit marked Wyman Affidavit, Exhibit "J."

The Board requested that I determine who had final authority to approve drawings, plans and specifications. My research on this point reveals the following:

1. Plans prepared by the District Engineer were first submitted to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, for approval. Upon receipt of approval from the District Engineer for San Francisco for his approval.

2. For AWS projects certain items of equipment, such as towers, transmitter building, and power plant, were furnished by the using agency. Designs had to be held in abeyance until receipt of drawings from the using agency.

I have searched the files in the Office of the District Engineer in order to determine whether any written answer was received to my letter of January 22,
1941, written to Mr. Rohl requesting him to come to Hawaii in connection with the handling of Contract No. 602. I can find no answer. At the time I wrote this letter I did not realize that Mr. Rohl was not [13] employed by Hawaiian Constructors, nor that he was not at that time nor had been since prior to the execution of the contract, an officer or director of the Rohl-Connolly Company. I was first advised of this situation in the above quoted letter of June 2, 1941 from Mr. Grafe. I did not follow up the request in my letter of January 22, 1941 because the Hawaiian Constructors, shortly thereafter took steps to eliminate the difficulties that were being experienced in the execution of Contract No. 602, the existence of which difficulties were the cause of my writing this letter.

The Board inquired as to who was immediately responsible for the quality and progress of work under Contract No. 602. My answer in this regard was not as complete as it should have been. This responsibility runs through the entire chain of engineering command. It begins with the selection of the contractor. Contractors are first chosen according to experience records as well as the knowledge of them possessed by contracting officer. The latter assures himself that the contractor can perform the work, both as to quality and time requirements, because he possesses finances, management, experience, plant, and personnel. A good contractor realizes his responsibility for progress and pushes the job.

The officer in immediate contact with the work is the Area Engineer. It is the Area Engineer who has the initial responsibility of checking progress and quality of work. An Area Engineer who has more than one job Engineer who is a resident on the Job. The Area Engineer and the Job Engineer are assisted by Inspectors who are chosen because of training and ability.

[14] Field Areas submit semi-monthly reports of progress of all items of work to the District Engineer. These reports showed the estimated percentage of work completed as originally scheduled or planned, and the actual percent of completion attained, with explanation of reasons for delay or of difficulties.

I offer in evidence as Exhibit "K" a sample of the monthly report for a semi-monthly period for the construction program at a station. As part of it is shown the bar diagram of progress of individual features. These reports were prescribed by instructions contained in Orders and Regulations, Corps of Engineers, Paragraphs 236 and 243, supplemented by instructions contained in Finance Circular Letter No. 225, Paragraph 21, December 9, 1940, and Circular Letter, July 24, 1941, Office of the Chief of Engineers.

Area Engineers are in constant contact with the District Office to report difficulties and seek assistance.

District Engineers carefully choose Area Engineers from men whom they know are able and vigorous operators. All District Offices have operations and/or inspection divisions whose tasks are to keep constantly in touch with the work and to inspect it both for progress and quality. Under pressure of war work most districts also had additional transportation divisions, control divisions for coordination, and expediting sections. The Honolulu District had a transportation division and a special coordinator in charge of inspection.

The next higher echelon is the Division Engineer. The Division Engineer normally receive monthly reports of operations which tell what was [15] accomplished during the month on all projects in all districts. During the war period semi-monthly reports were prescribed. (Insert here date when semi-monthly progress reports were initiated.) These reports show breakdowns for every major job into its important features. Reports show the scheduled percent of completion and the actual, with explanations and reasons for delays and difficulties. It also shows the progress expected in the next semi-monthly periods. Division Engineers habitually visit all projects under them or have some of their assistants do so to the extent that the magnitude of their work permits. During the war period Division Engineers generally have so great a number of projects that they must select those projects with the highest priority or those which are suffering the most difficulties to personally inspect, leaving the others to their assistants.

The next echelon of command is the Chief of Engineers. The semi-monthly progress reports described above are transmitted to the Chief of Engineers. There the Control Section examines them minutely to determine which projects are falling behind. Those projects of chief importance which are falling behind would generally be visited at once by a special inspector. For practically every
project having fallen more than 2% behind, a special letter of explanation was required. Many times these were required by radio or telephone.

At a previous hearing I was asked, who was responsible for the "tedious process" in effect with respect to putting construction projects underway during the period from the receipt of approval of the Hawaiian Constructors contract, January 6, 1941, to December 7, 1941.

These time-consuming processes were those required by law, regulations, or long established procedures. The general purposes of these laws, regulations, and long established procedures is to secure control by higher echelons and to protect the Government in expenditures as well as to insure quality of work.

The change from peacetime methods of procedure to wartime was generally accomplished by decentralization of contractual authorities to lower echelons and a reduction in the extent of review by higher echelons. However, some changes had to be made in laws of long standing.

The procedures might be divided into general types, namely: securing technical approval through Engineer channels; and securing approvals by tactical agencies or the using services, responsible for operating, and also securing the coordination required between all responsible agencies.

In order to understand the limitations on the authority of the District Engineer and all the steps that had to be taken by him in cooperation and coordination with other authorities, it is of the utmost importance that the Board keep in mind that at the time of the negotiation of the Hawaiian Constructors' contract, it was about a year before Pearl Harbor. The great sense of urgency was not yet present, although changes from peacetime procedures were being gradually introduced. In order to make this clear I shall discuss the law, regulations, and procedures as they existed under the following general heads:

a. Method of contracting
b. Procedures for technical approvals
c. Limitations on money magnitude for a and b

[17] Under each of these headings I shall compare the situation during:

(1) Peacetime procedures which were in effect through most of 1940, and up to just before the date of approval of the Hawaiian Constructors' contract, January 3, 1941.

(2) Transitional period beginning in 1940 and during the period of the Hawaiian Constructors' contract up to 7 December 1941.

(3) Immediately after Pearl Harbor and during the war period.

I submit in evidence as Wyman Affidavit, Exhibits "A", "B", "C", and "D", tabulations of the contracting authorities for advertised, negotiated lump sum, and negotiated CPFF contracts prescribed for the District Engineer, Division Engineer, and the Office, Chief of Engineers, as these authorities varied in peacetime of 1940, in later 1940, and at the time of negotiating the Hawaiian Constructors contract in December 1940, just after that date and during 1941, and just after Pearl Harbor. These tabulations were extracted from existing orders and regulations. Some orders and regulations were missing from the files of the District Engineer but any inaccuracies will not affect the conclusions from statements made. If any great inaccuracies are found corrections will be submitted after records in Washington have been examined.

The following points are stressed:

a. The low magnitude of the peacetime contractual authorities of the District Engineer and of the Division Engineer, namely $10,000.00 for the District and $50,000.00 for the Division.

b. The low limitation for the District Engineer continued up to February 19, 1941. As far as the approval of specifications was concerned this meant that most plans and specifications had to be submitted to the Division Engineer on the mainland.

[18] c. Under the pressure of preparation for war there was a progressive decentralization of authority as shown by the increased limits of authorities of the District and Divisions on the dates May 1, 1940, December 9, 1940, and February 19, 1941. This decentralization thus began 19 months before Pearl Harbor.

d. That negotiated contracts were not permitted before the latter part of 1940; that up to the war period the authority to negotiate had to first be secured from the Under Secretary of War.

e. That decentralization was progressive from 19 months before up to the date of Pearl Harbor. In no respect was it comparable to the great decentralization that came after Pearl Harbor. For example District Engineers during 1941
can approve lump sum advertised contracts up to $100,000.00. Later in the
war period their authority was increased to $3,000,000.00.

f. Attention is invited to Note 2 in the District Engineers’ Contractual
Authority which states that decentralization up to $3,000,000.00 went even below
District Engineers to Area Engineers.

g. Exhibit “D” shows the relative authorities for the execution of change
orders after contracts were once negotiated. It shows similar trends to those
described above. Decentralization of authorities was begun before Pearl Harbor
and immediately after almost completely decentralized for the war period. In
the special case of the District Engineer in Honolulu, four days after the attack
on Pearl Harbor, the Division Engineer delegated to the District Engineer all
of his contractual authority. This enabled the District Engineer to take action
on contract instruments up to $5,000,000.00.

It will be seen from the above that the District Engineer in Honolulu during the
winter of 1941, which is the period under investigation, had many
limitations under the law and under regulations of the War Department which
required submission of specifications, awards, and contracts to higher authority.
At the same time the War Department and the Engineer Department had started
decentralizing to meet the increasing tempo pressure of war work. As noted in
my narrative, these authorities ascribed to the District Engineer were the same
as those on the continent in spite of its isolated position.

It should be added that all job orders had to be submitted by the District
Engineer, Honolulu, to the Division Engineer for approval. With reference to
the use of negotiated contracts, either lump sum or cost-plus-a-fixed-fee, revised
statutes which had been most rigid on requiring advertising for competitive bids
of contracts for public works had to be modified to permit execution of
construction without advertising and to permit of the use of the cost-plus-a-fixed-
fee form of contract. The Act which afforded this relaxation was Public No.
703, 76th Congress, approved July 2, 1940. This Information was published to
the field in a Circular Letter from the Chief of Engineers, December 9, 1940, and
at first the negotiated contract was merely recommended in cases where
competitive bidding would not fulfill the needs of National Defense. It will be
noted that in the tabulation the field offices had their choice of advertised con-
tracts and negotiated contracts; that later in the war period advertised con-
tracts were prohibited and only the negotiated ones allowed.

From the foregoing it will be seen that the responsibility for many of the
procedures which might have been said to have delayed work because of limitations
of authority was not that of any individual but lay collectively in existing
laws, regulations of the War Department, and of the Engineer Department
which laws and regulations had many fundamental sound reasons for exist-
ence. [20] and that those responsible for such laws and regulations recognized
the need for their alteration in and took proper steps to that end to meet the increased speed of pre-war conditions even though there was no certainty of war.

As stated above some of the time-consuming procedures were those necessary
for coordination with the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and the
Using Service. In my original statement I submitted one example of the
procedure involved in this coordination as Exhibit “N”. I desire to submit a
few additional examples marked Wyman Affidavit Exhibits “E”, “F”, “G”, and
“H”. It will be noted that the time interval to cover the interchange of indorse-
ments in these coordinating staff memoranda ran up in one instance of the four
elements to nine weeks. These are merely additional examples selected at
random. As noted in my original statement there are hundreds of examples of
such coordinating memoranda in the District Engineer files.

Through oversight one page of the schedule attached to Exhibit E, which was
the study on priorities introduced by me in evidence during my testimony was
not included in the exhibit. I submitted this missing page in evidence as Wyman
Affidavit Exhibit “I”.

In connection with my statements on page 28 of my original statement read
before the Board on September 14, I submitted several exhibits illustrating efforts
on my part toward expediting the work under the Hawaiian Constructors’ con-
tract. I would like to submit in evidence, another exhibit bearing on this point
since it is quite pertinent thereto. I am therefore submitting exhibit designed
Wyman Affidavit Exhibit “L”, which is a letter to [21] all contractors
engaged on defense projects within the Honolulu District emphasizing how
imperative the expedition of this work was and urging anticipation of their material and equipment requirements.

I desire to submit a reply to the "Testimony of Mr. Robert Hoffman, Area Superintendent, Hawaiian Constructors, Bellows Field, T. H., taken at Hickam Field on 21 April 1942, by Colonel Lathe B. Row, Inspector General's Department." This report was answered completely and adequately in letter of May 8, 1942 addressed to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and signed by Colonel A. K. B. Lyman, Department Engineer. The latter became my successor, inasmuch as the Hawaiian Department absorbed the District Engineer's activities in February of 1942. I submit in evidence this letter in refutation of the charges made by Mr. Hoffman in said Inspector General's Report as an exhibit marked Wyman Affidavit Exhibit "M".

Theodore Wyman, Jr.,
THEODORE WYMAN, JR.,
Colonel, C.E.

Signed and sworn to before me, the undersigned authorized to administer this oath by the 114th Article of War, on this 16th day of September 1944.

Luc C. Loeber,
Luc C. Loeber,
Major, Commissioned in the Judge Advocate's Department,
Army of the United States.
## Exhibit “A” — District Engineer Contractual Authorities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ADVERTISED CONTRACTS</th>
<th>AUTHORITY TO NEGOTIATE</th>
<th>AUTHORITY TO EXECUTE NEGOTIATED CONTRACTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Approval of Specifi-</td>
<td>Making Awards</td>
<td>Lump Sum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cations</td>
<td></td>
<td>Lump Sum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approval of</td>
<td>Up to $10,000</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contracts</td>
<td>Up to $16,000</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Up to $10,000</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(If no protest.)</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Up to $50,000</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Stan. forms.)</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Up to $50,000</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Stan. forms.)</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Up to $50,000</td>
<td>None USW only (Note 1).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Under $500,000. (If</td>
<td>Up to $50,000.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>regular.)</td>
<td>Up to $100,000. (Stan. forms.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Up to $100,000. (Stan. forms.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Up to $1,000,000.</td>
<td>Up to $1,000,000.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(If no protest.)</td>
<td>Up to $2,000,000. (Stan. forms.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Up to $2,000,000.</td>
<td>Up to $2,000,000. (Stan. forms.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Stan. forms.)</td>
<td>Up to $2,000,000. (Stan. forms.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ADVERTISED CONTRACTS PROHIBITED</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Up to $3,000,000</td>
<td>Up to $3,000,000.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Up to $3,000,000</td>
<td>Up to $3,000,000.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Up to $3,000,000</td>
<td>Up to $3,000,000.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note 1.** Authority must be secured from Under Secretary of War in each specific case.

**Note 2.** The authority to negotiate contracts up to $50,000 was still further decentralized to Area Engineers.
### Exhibit “B” — Division Engineer Contractual Authorities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ADVERTISED CONTRACTS</th>
<th>AUTHORITY TO NEGOTIATE</th>
<th>AUTHORITY TO EXECUTE NEGOTIATED CONTRACTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Approval of Specifi-</td>
<td>Making Awards</td>
<td>Approval of Contracts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1. Peace Time</strong></td>
<td>($10,000 \text{ to } $50,000)</td>
<td>($10,000 \text{ to } $50,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2. May 1, 1940 Changes</strong></td>
<td>($10,000 \text{ to } $50,000)</td>
<td>Over ($50,000) if no protest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3. Dec 9, 1940 Changes</strong></td>
<td>($10,000 \text{ to } $50,000)</td>
<td>Over ($50,000) if no protest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>4. Feb 19, 1941 Changes</strong></td>
<td>All, unless unusual</td>
<td>Under ($500,000) (certain exceptions)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>5. War Period</strong> (After Pearl Harbor published 2/19/42.)</td>
<td>Unusual cases ($100,000) to ($250,000).</td>
<td>Up to ($1,000,000) (certain exceptions)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**LATER IN WAR PERIOD.**

**ADVERTISED CONTRACTS PROHIBITED**

- Up to \(\$5,000,000\)
- Up to \(\$5,000,000\)
- Up to \(\$5,000,000\)
- Up to \(\$5,000,000\)

**Note 1.** Authority must be obtained from Under Secretary of War in each specific case.
## Exhibit C: Office Chief of Engineer Contractual Authorities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Approval of Specifications</th>
<th>Making Awards</th>
<th>Approval of Contracts</th>
<th>Lump Sum</th>
<th>CPFF</th>
<th>Lump Sum</th>
<th>CPFF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Peace Time</td>
<td>Over $50,000</td>
<td>Over $50,000</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. May 1, 1940 Changes</td>
<td>Over $50,000</td>
<td>Over $50,000 if protest or special conditions</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Dec 9, 1940 Changes</td>
<td>Over $50,000</td>
<td>Over $50,000 if protest or special conditions</td>
<td>All contracts not on stan. forms.</td>
<td>$109,000-$500,000 (Note 1)</td>
<td>None (Note 2)</td>
<td>$100,000-$500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Feb 19, 1941 Changes</td>
<td>Unusual cases</td>
<td>Over $500,000</td>
<td>All contracts not on stan. forms.</td>
<td>Over $100,000 (Note 2)</td>
<td>None USW only (Note 2)</td>
<td>Over $500,000 contracts on other than stan. forms. (Note 4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. War Period (After Pearl Harbor; published 2/19/42)</td>
<td>Unusual cases over $250,000</td>
<td>Over $1,000,000</td>
<td>Over $2,000,000 or on non-stan. forms to USW</td>
<td>Over $1,000,000</td>
<td>Over $2,000,000</td>
<td>Over $2,000,000 or on non-stan. forms to USW (or if fee in excess of schedule).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Later in War Period</strong></td>
<td><strong>Advertised Contracts Prohibited</strong></td>
<td><strong>Over $5,000,000 to Under Secretary of War</strong></td>
<td><strong>Under Secretary of War</strong></td>
<td><strong>Over Secretary of War</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**
1. Over—Subject to approval by Asst. Secretary of War.
2. Authority must be obtained from Under Secretary of War in each specific case.
3. Over—Subject to approval by Secretary of War.
4. Over $500,000—Subject to approval by Under Secretary of War.
### Exhibit "D."—Authorities for Approval of Change Orders

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>District Engineer</th>
<th>Division Engineer</th>
<th>Chief of Engineers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 May 1940 Changes</td>
<td>Change orders not in excess of $500 providing for changes in plans and specifications within general scope thereof; extension of time of performance.</td>
<td>Change orders in excess of $500 under contracts not exceeding $50,000 (construction &amp; supply).</td>
<td>Change orders in excess of $500 under contracts in excess of $50,000 (construction &amp; supply); all change orders under contracts executed on other than prescribed stan. forms regardless of amount.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Feb. 1941 Changes</td>
<td>Same as above.</td>
<td>Change orders in excess of $500 not more than $25,000 under lump sum contracts only.</td>
<td>Change orders in excess of $25,000 under lump sum and all change orders CPPF contracts (latter subject to approval of higher authority as required).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War Period. (After Pearl Harbor; published 2/19/42.)</td>
<td>Change orders up to $2,000,000 under stan. form contracts and where the award (authority to bind Government in cases of $1,000,000 or more) has been approved.</td>
<td>Change orders in excess of $2,000,000 and less than $3,000,000 under stan. form contracts and where award of change order (in cases of $1,000,000 or more) has been approved.</td>
<td>Due to changed conditions—where amount less than $5,000,000. (USW—change orders above $5,000,000).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Inter-Staff Routing Slip is for use of the Department Staff including the Department C/A and the B&LDO. It will be used solely for Departmental Staff inter-communication. This slip and accompanying papers, when transferred from one Staff Office to another, will be forwarded to the interested Staff section direct, with the exception that matters concerning personnel will be routed through the Adjutant General unless a policy has been established. The Staff section originating a routing slip will fill in the subject and at the end of the 1st Indorsement list accompanying papers. Notation of enclosures added subsequently will be made by the responsible office at the end of its indorsement. Indorsements herein will be numbered in sequence and initialed by the officer in charge or an officer authorized to sign for him.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. of Ind.</th>
<th>From and Date</th>
<th>To</th>
<th>Subject: Gasoline Storage Tanks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Ind.</td>
<td>17 July 41</td>
<td>Dept Engr</td>
<td>1. Your drawing of the Kaala Station site shows a provision for a gasoline storage tank at the summit. This office has received six of these tanks and after inspection, questions the feasibility of initially installing one of them on Kaala, as well as keeping it filled. These tanks are 4000 gallon capacity and require a tank truck to properly service them. 2. An alternate suggestion is made—install the tank at the base of the cableway, equip it with a pump so as to fill standard drums. These drums can then be accommodated by the cable car and hauled to the top. Tank trucks can readily be driven to the base of the cableway to refill the tank. This will also provide a storage for gasoline to be used by the cable house.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Ind.</td>
<td>8 Aug 41</td>
<td>Sig. O</td>
<td>1. Since receiving your first R/S Indorsement, I have found our that the gasoline for the power plants for these stations must be a special white gasoline. If stored at the base of the cableway, the gasoline there could not be used for the power for the cableway operations. 2. I have discussed this matter with the District Engineer. Both of us believe that these tanks probably can be cut and hauled to the top of Mount Kaala in sections and then welded. If this is done and the tank is installed at the top of Mount Kaala, then it could be filled by gasoline carried up in drums without any great hurry, and having the tank at the top of Mount Kaala would insure that there was a supply of gasoline for the power units. On the other hand, if the tanks were placed at the bottom and gasoline hauled to the top in drums as needed, in actual operations it might be possible for the cableway to be knocked out of action, and this would make the supply of gasoline very difficult. I therefore suggest that we plan on installing the tanks at the top of the mountain. 3. Captain Kelley told me the other day that these tanks were all designed to be located above the ground in concrete cradles. I believe if it is at all possible they should be installed under the ground and I have asked the District Engineer to have a man look at the tanks to see if this can be done.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d Ind.</td>
<td>21 Aug 41</td>
<td>Engr O</td>
<td>1. Concur in cutting the tanks as suggested in par 2. 2nd R/S Ind. 2. The latest information received by this office regarding the installation of these tanks indicates that they may be placed underground after being treated with hot asphalt applications. Attention is invited to Drawing OCSigO Bsd-D-27. 3. The question of white gasoline to be used with the PE 74 has been taken up with the Signal Corps Laboratories. The PE 74 can be modified to use regular issue gasoline. Steps are being taken to effect this modification at the earliest practical date.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

/\ C. A. P.  
C. A. P.  
/\ R. F.  
R. J. F., Jr.  
/\ C. A. P.  
C. A. P.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. of Ind. From and Date</th>
<th>To</th>
<th>Subject: Gasoline Storage Tanks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
                              |          | 2. Return of correspondence is requested.  
                              |          | For the Department Engineer: |
|                          |          | W. F. H. F. W. H. DB.             |
|                          |          | T. W., Jr.                        |

Wyman Affidavit—Exhibit F
HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT
INTER-STAFF ROUTING SLIP

The Inter-Staff Routing Slip is for use of the Department Staff including the Department C/A and the B&LDO. It will be used solely for Departmental Staff inter-communication.

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. of Ind. From and Date</th>
<th>To</th>
<th>Subject: Installation of Gasoline Storage Tanks at Bellows Field. (S-13)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Ind. Air O. 10 May 41</td>
<td>Engr.</td>
<td>With reference to your request of 9 May 1941—attached hereto is a section of the Bellows Field Reservation on which is outlined the area selected for gasoline tank installations. Plans call for an installation of twelve (12) fifty-thousand (50,000) gallon tanks. It is desired that these tanks be bomb-proofed. The area as shown will be covered by the end of the proposed runway and is placed in a section that will need a minimum of excavation.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
|                          |          | 1 Ind. Sketch showing Gas Storage for Bellows Field.  
                              |          | For the Air Officer: |
|                          |          | W. J. F.                                                             |
| 2nd Ind. Engr. 25 May 41 | Afr O.   | 1. This office does not believe that the location selected for the installation of these gasoline tanks at Bellows Field should be accepted.  
                              |          | 2. If these tanks are to be bomb-proofed they must be placed a considerable distance below the level of the ground where the bunker course is located. At the point chosen there will not be sufficient fill above the tanks to provide this distance, and if the tanks are dug into the ground at this point to secure greater overhead cover, there will undoubtedly be difficulties encountered with seepage water as the tanks will be below the ground water level.  
                              |          | 3. When preliminary discussions occurred several months ago regarding the bomb-proofing of these 80,000-tanks, the recommendation that this be done was based upon being able to locate the tanks where they could be dug in or tunneled into the side of a hill in long galleries where several tanks could be placed end to end. I believe that these tanks are fabricated from 1/4" or less steel plate with no supporting ribbing. If the tanks are placed in a long pit end to end, the pit could probably be dug narrow enough so that an undisturbed berm could be left at the edge of the trench and the eventual weight of the bunker course could be supported in large part upon this undisturbed berm. The tanks in this case would only carry the weight of the backfill above them. If, however, the tanks are placed in a trench parallel to each other, the tank would not only have to carry the weight of the backfill but would also have to carry the weight of the bunker slab and there would be some question as to whether the tanks would have sufficient structural strength to do this.  
<pre><code>                          |          | p/ W. J. F.                                                          |
</code></pre>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. of Ind. Frm. and Date</th>
<th>To</th>
<th>Subject: Installation of Gasoline Storage Tanks at Bellows Field (5-15)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2nd Ind. (Corp’t) Engr.</td>
<td>Air O.</td>
<td>4. Based on a very hasty estimate made by this office, the cost of bombproofing these tanks will be about $200,000 more than installing them without this protection. It is believed that locating them rather widely separated in locations away from the runways where the installation can be camouflaged by vegetation should be considered in lieu of bombproofing in view of this increased cost. There is a hill about 400 yards to the south of the existing runway where some of them could be installed and camouflaged and some more high ground to the west of the proposed new runway where possibly some more of the tanks could be installed and camouflaged. 3. It is requested that these comments be given your consideration in order that an acceptable method of installation and location may be reached. For the Department Engineer: 2 Incis: Added Map</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Ind. Air O. Engr.</td>
<td>Engr.</td>
<td>The site as shown in the attached drawing for installation of gasoline tanks at Bellows Field is approved by this office. The matter of bombproofing is considered vital and should be provided for these tanks. Gasoline is obviously one of the most important items of supply for the Air Force. Any failure of this vital item would immobilize our service. For the Air Officer:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Ind. Dist. Engr.</td>
<td>Dist. Engr.</td>
<td>1. The attached file is on the subject of location of the gasoline tanks for Bellows Field. 2. The Air Office originally proposed that these tanks be installed on the western end of the existing runway under the hill necessary for this extension and that the tanks should be bombproofed. This office believes that the tanks installed in this location would have to be below the ground water line in order to get sufficient overhang and raised the question in 2nd R/S Indorsement as to whether the tanks should be bombproofed or given protection by dispersion and camouflage. We made a very hasty estimate based upon the cost of the hurter course that bombproofing would cost about $200,000 additional. 3. The 3rd R/S Indorsement from the Air Office states definitely that they desire the tanks bombproofed and proposes locating them in the small hill to the south of the existing runway. Before the question of installing these tanks and bombproof storage is presented to the Department Commander for decision, I would like your comments on the proposal and on the additional cost required to bombproof the tanks. As stated, my estimate of this additional cost at $200,000 was based upon a very hasty comparison of bombproof costs. Incls: n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th Ind. Dist. Engr.</td>
<td>Dept. Engr.</td>
<td>1. This office concurs in the recommendation of the Department Engineer, that gasoline tanks be not located under the ends of the runway as shown on attached tracing. 2. The location indicated on the blue-line print has the disadvantage of being near the center of the camp and of having too little area to permit dispersion and therefore would require an expensive bombproof protection. 3. A suggested site which is shown on the attached print has the advantage of: (1) Ample room for dispersion. (2) Ease of excavation, as material is sand with no rock in evidence. (3) Ease of access, to large area in which planes may be dispersed for protection, without crossing the runways. (4) Natural camouflage by existing brush and Keawe trees. Incls: 3 Incis Added Map</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th Ind. Dist. Engr.</td>
<td>Dist. Engr.</td>
<td>1. What is your rough estimate of increased cost if these tanks are bombproofed? For the Department Engineer: Inel: No change.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

/s/ R. J. F., 3rd R. J. W.

/s/ W. J. F.

/s/ R. J. W.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. of Ind. From and Date</th>
<th>To</th>
<th>Subject: Installation of Gasoline Storage Tanks at Bellows Field. (8-15)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7th Ind. Engr. 14 July 41</td>
<td>Dist. Engr.</td>
<td>District Engr verbally confirmed our estimate for $300,000 additional.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. I have discussed this question of location of the gasoline tanks at Bellows Field with General Martin. I emphasized to him that bombproofing these tanks would take additional funds, and that these funds have not been included in the estimates submitted for Bellows Field. I also explained to him the status in regard to the $2,000,000 allotment for installation of gasoline tanks at Hickinson Field and at Wheeler Field which you recently received.

2. General Martin agrees with our belief that the first proposed location at the end of the runway is not satisfactory, and also with your statement in the 8th R/S Indorsement above, that the location in the small hill south of the existing runway is not satisfactory. He does not like the location that you suggested, however, because these tanks would then be practically in the bombing range at Bellows Field. I suggested to him then that we consider as an area in the hill south of the proposed runway as indicated in red on your print. He agreed that this location would be satisfactory but before approving it finally would like to leave the question open to your engineering determination.

3. I also passed on to General Martin your suggestion that these tanks now be installed without bombproofing, but in such a manner that a burst in the course could be later added when additional funds are made available. General Martin also concurred in this suggestion.

4. I therefore requested that you give consideration to installing these tanks in the hill indicated on your print. If this site is feasible from Engineering considerations it will be approved by General Martin.

R. J. F.

Wyman Affidavit—Exhibit G

WAR DEPARTMENT,
UNITED STATES ENGINEER OFFICE,
Honolulu, T. H., July 1, 1941.

Refer to File No: 461
X-633 Ammunition Mag.


To: The Commanding General,
Hawaiian Department,
Fort Shafter, T. H.

Attached herewith is a copy of the Definite Project Report for the Installation of War Reserve Aviation Gasoline Storage in the Hawaiian Islands, including necessary drawings.

2. A copy of this report was forwarded to the Office of the Chief of Engineers with recommendations for the adoption of the cut and cover type of gasoline storage at Site "B" and tunnel type of construction to be used for site "A".

/s/ THEODORE WYMAN, JR.,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

Incls.:
Report Copy No. 7.
Drawings File Nos. F-26/1 to F-26/10.
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. of Ind.</th>
<th>From and Date</th>
<th>To</th>
<th>Subject: Installation of War Reserve Aviation Gasoline Storage in the Hawaiian Islands</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1st Ind Engr. | 11 July 41 | G-4 | 1. There is attached a letter dated 1 July from the District Engineer which forwards a copy of his report to the Chief of Engineers on the installation of War Reserve Storage for Aviation Gasoline. In brief this report discusses four Items: a. installation of gasoline and tank-type galleries at Site A near Salt Lake. b. Installation of gasoline in tank-type galleries at Site B in the Waikakalana Gulch. c. The installation of gasoline in cut-and-cover bombproofed tanks at Site B. d. The installation of necessary pipelines and appurtenant pumps. 2. The District Engineer finds that 83,000 barrels can be installed in tunnel-type galleries at Site A for $1,020,374.00 or $12.28 per barrel. At Site B storage of 200,000 barrels in cut and cover bombproof constructions would cost $2,991,048.00 or $14.95 cents per barrel. At Site B installation of storage of 200,000 barrels in cut and cover bombproof constructions would cost $2,111,808.00 or $10.56 per barrel; and the pipeline from Pearl Harbor to Sites A & B and distribution lines to Hickam and Wheeler Fields would cost $977,238.00. 3. The District Engineer recommends that projects be adapted for the storage of 83,000 barrels at Site A; for 200,000 barrels at Site B in cut-and-cover bombproof construction, and for the installation of a pipeline. 4. This recommendation follows in general the original recommendations of this headquarters and the Navy when this matter was discussed last spring. At that time it was recommended that the Army storage 20,000 barrels be installed at Site B; 30,000 installed at Site A; that the Navy storage be installed at Site A; and that all tanks be bombproofed. In the event that bombproof protection was not permitted, it was strongly recommended that the storage be installed in the sites selected, but in sufficiently small tanks to permit proper protection by dispersion. Since the project now provides for fully bombproofed protection, dispersal in small tanks is not believed essential. 5. Time for finishing the project is estimated at 8 months. Colonel Wyman has informed me that he is ready to commence operations at Site B; that the construction is included in his cost plans for contract with the Hawaiian Constructors; and that he expects to receive allotment of funds from the Chief of Engineers in the very near future to permit him to initiate construction at Site B. He also informed me that he was receiving funds from the Navy to pay for their share of the project at Site A. 6. The present War Department status of this project is as follows: We have been informed by The Adjutant General that the original
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. of Ind. From and Date</th>
<th>To</th>
<th>Subject: Installation of War Reserve Aviation Gasoline Storage in the Hawaiian Islands</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Ind Eng. 11 July 41</td>
<td>G-4</td>
<td>project for 100,000 barrels of storage has been increased to 250,000 barrels, and that funds in the amount of $2,000,000 will be available, and that additional funds will probably be forthcoming if needed. The Navy has not specified any set amount of storage, but has specified that as much storage be secured as possible with the funds to be made available. Colonel Wyman estimates that this Navy money will be sufficient to provide storage for about 33,000 barrels of gasoline, and therefore the entire project consists of storage for between 273,000 and 283,000 barrels of gasoline, 250,000 of which is the Army share.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7. In a further discussion with Colonel Wyman today we discussed the question of the storage at Site B. As indicated on the drawings, this storage is now planned for four separate tanks of 50,000 barrels each, each with its own burner course. The tanks are separated by 200 feet as this was the original directive from the War Department before the study was made. Colonel Wyman believes that since bombproof protection is to be provided with a reinforced concrete burner course, that the tanks can be placed closer together. This will enable more than one tank to be placed under a burner course and will save concrete which can be utilized to extend the amount of lateral protection.

8. The Department Commander has been informed in general of this study, Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, has been informed. The District Engineer has consulted the Navy. This memorandum is submitted for information only as no action is necessary at this time.

For the Department Engineer:
1 Inc: Ltr. No. 461 x-633 Ammunition Mag.
1 July 41 w/Incls


| 2nd Ind. G-4 15 July 41 | C/S | 1. The Engineer Officer forwards herewith for the information of this Headquarters one copy of the engineering study which was prepared by the District Engineer covering the storage of a war reserve of aviation gasoline. This study was prepared as a result of a directive from the Chief of Engineers direct to the District Engineer.

2. This Headquarters is vitally interested in the manner in which its war reserve of aviation gasoline is stored. While the W. D. has taken no action to indicate whether the instant study will be approved it is probable that its principal features will be used as a guide in designing the installations. It is believed that the Department Commander should be fully informed on the recommendations which have been submitted by the District Engineers. With that object in view, it is recommended that the District Engineer be requested to discuss the details of this study with the Department Commander.

3. In general, this study discusses the following:


b. Installation of gasoline storage in tunnels at Site "P", in gulch near RR Station of Robinson, north of Wheeler Field.

c. Same as b. except storage in cut and cover tanks.

d. Pipe lines, pumps and other appurtenances.

4. It is recommended that:

a. The District Engineer discuss this study with the Department Commander.

1 Inc: n/b.

[Signature] C. C. B.
C. C. B. Rank
Col. G. R. C.
Asst. C. of S.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. of Ind.</th>
<th>From and Date</th>
<th>To</th>
<th>Subject: Installation of War Reserve Aviation Gasoline Storage in the Hawaiian Islands</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3rd Ind.</td>
<td>1383 7/16/41</td>
<td>Lt. Col. Wyman District Engineer</td>
<td>Please present this to the Department commander, in person. Incl: N/C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>H. Philip Hayes, Chief of Staff.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Ind.</td>
<td>C/S 16 July 41</td>
<td>C/S</td>
<td>1. The District Engineer discussed this study with the Department Commander Wednesday, July 16th. 2. The District Engineer discussed the study with Admiral Bloch on Monday, July 14th. Admiral Bloch stated that he concurred in the plans and recommendations of the District Engineer with one exception. In view of the Naval Regulation that gasoline will not be passed over the fuel oil dock located at Pearl Harbor, the loading point should be moved to another location. The Admiral suggested that the loading point be located in the vicinity of the Quartermaster Dock at Hickam Field. The District Engineer has no objection to changing the loading point to Hickam Field. A loading point can be designed in the vicinity of the Quartermaster Dock at Hickam Field which will not interfere with normal traffic at the dock. Admiral Bloch also stated that he would desire a connection from the pipe line to the proposed Navy air facility at Barears Point, the cost to be financed by the Navy Department.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>T. W., Jr. Chief of Staff.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th Ind.</td>
<td>C/S 7/14/41</td>
<td>Engr O</td>
<td>Please present to D. C. Incl: n/c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>H. Philip Hayes, Chief of Staff.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Wyman Affidavit—Exhibit H

(SECRET)

[Paraphrase of Radiogram—Action Copy]

AG 6763 (6-10-41) MC-D
To: CG, Haw. Dept.
From: TAG
JUNE 26, 1941.

Kaala aua station priority contract has been advanced to A-1-C from W-414 Engr 784. Should results under this priority be unsatisfactory Chief of Engineers will instruct Division Engineer on procedure. Above reference your radio No. thirty ninth nine. AGMC.

[Stamped:] Office Chief of Engineers Jun 30 1941. 6763 (AWS—Hwn Dept) 37/1.

6763 (A. W. S.—Haw. Dept.) 37
Subject: Cableway, Kaala Aircraft Warning Station, Hawaii.
Forfs 660 (Honolulu) 54.3

5th Ind.

OFFICE, DIVISION ENGINEER,
SO. PAG. DIV.
San Francisco, July 9, 1941.

To: The District Engineer, U. S. Engineer Office, HONOLULU, T. H.

To note.
For and in the absence of the Division Engineer.

J. R. D. Matheson,
Colonel, Corps of Engineers, Executive Assistant.

Incl.—n/c exc. copy
Sub 1 added.
79716-46—Ex. 145, vol. 5—3
CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

2014.1-8

6th Ind.

Office, District Engineer,
U. S. Engineer Office,
Honolulu, T. H., July 18, 1941.

To: The Division Engineer, So. Pac. Division, SAN FRANCISCO.

Noted.

Theodore Wyman, Jr.,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

Incl.—a/c exc. dup.
Sub 1 w/d

4th Ind.

676.3 (A. W. S.-Haw. Dept.) 37

Office, C. of E., July 1, 1941.

To the Division Engineer, South Pacific Division, San Francisco, Calif.

For your information.

By order of the Chief of Engineers:

Joseph L. D. Misiora,
Lieut., Corps of Engineers,
Assistant Chief, Finance Section.

1 Incl.

[IMMEDIATE ACTION]

War Department

The Adjutant General’s Office

Washington

Subject: Cableway, Kaala Aircraft Warning Station, Hawaii.

AG 676.3 (6-10-41) MC-D

3rd Ind.

EHB/edm-1712 (7-1-41)

War Department, A. G. O., June 27, 1941.

To: Chief of Engineers.

1. Enclosed for your information and guidance is paraphrase copy of radiogram, this office, June 26, 1941, to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

2. It is desired that this correspondence be forwarded to the Division Engineer, San Francisco for further necessary action.

By order of the Secretary of War:

/s/ D. R. Van Sickler,
Adjutant General.

1 Incl. (Added)

Prph Cy of Radio,
AGO, 6-26-41, to
CG, Haw. Dept.

Office Chief of Engineers Jun 30, 1941. Sub 1 accmng
WAR DEPARTMENT
THE AdjUTANT GENERAL’S OFFICE
Washington

[IMMEDIATE ACTION]

On Paraphrase of: Radiogram, No. 3009, June 10, 1941, from Hawaii.
Subject: Cableway, Kaala Aircraft Warning Station.
AG 676.3 (6–10–41) MC 1st Ind. BLW/cdm–1712 (6–14–41)
WAR DEPARTMENT, A. G. O., June 11, 1941.

To: Chief of Engineers.
For remark and recommendation.
By order of the Secretary of War:

/s/ D. R. VAN SICKLER,
Adjutant General.

C. of E. 676.3
(6–10–41) MC
2nd Ind.
6–E

To: The Adjutant General.

1. By telephonic conversation with the Priorities Committee, A. N. M. B., a rating of A–1–G was authorized.
2. The contractor should contact his suppliers to determine if satisfactory delivery can be made with this rating. If not, he should contact other sources for earlier delivery.
3. In the event further assistance is requested, instructions in Circular Letter Finance No. 144 should be followed.

For the Chief of Engineers:

/s/ Joseph L. D. Misiora,
Joseph L. D. Misiora,
1st Lieut., Corps of Engineers,
Assistant Chief, Finance Section.

Office, C. of E., June 17, 1941.

[Stamped:] Jun 19 1941, Received Misc. Div., AGO. W. P. Sub Section.
Rec’d Back Jun 19 1941 66 A G O. Rec’d W. P. D. Jun 23 1941
[Stamped:] In G–4 Jun 23 1941.

[PARAPHRASE OF RADIogram—ACTION COPY]

AG 676.3 (6–10–41) MC
BLW/cdm–1712.

To: TAG
June 11, 1941.
From: Hawaii
8:10 A.M.
No. 3009 June 10

I have been informed by the Division Engineer, San Francisco, that A–1–G is the priority covering contract W–414 Engr 784 with Interstate Equipment Corporation, Elizabeth New Jersey. Materials for cableway to Kaala aircraft warning station covered by this contract. General Electric has subcontract for motor and all electrical equipment. According to division engineer a delay of about fifteen weeks in the delivery of this electrical material to contractor is strongly probable under this priority. As this Kaala station is the most important in aircraft warning system, it is essential that this cableway be completed early. In this department this aircraft service is considered to be the most important single project. War Department assistance to the Chief of Engineers to have priority on this contract changed to A–1–B is strongly recommended.

[Stamped:] Rec’d W. P. D. Jun 23 1941.

[Stamped:] Office, Chief of Engineers Jun 13 1941. 676.3 (A. W. S.–Haw. Dept.)–87
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>File Serial No.</th>
<th>Offices Originating &amp; Receiving Corres.</th>
<th>Substance of Correspondence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14 July 41</td>
<td>(317)</td>
<td>OCE to DE, Hon</td>
<td>TT advising that A-1-c is proper for W-414-eng-608.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 July 41</td>
<td>344</td>
<td>DE, Hon. to OCE</td>
<td>Requests that &quot;rating assigned [be] as high as possible, consistent with current priorities directives&quot;. Cover W-414-eng-670, 668, 672, 705, 697, and 668.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 July 41</td>
<td>345</td>
<td>DE, Hon. to OCE</td>
<td>Requests A-1-c and states that DE, Hon, &quot;has been informed by wire that the (A-1-c) rate will be applicable.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 July 41</td>
<td>346</td>
<td>DE, Hon. to OCE</td>
<td>TT advising of A-1-c ratings on Sers. Nos. 344-349.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 July 41</td>
<td>347</td>
<td>DE, Hon. to OCE</td>
<td>Advises A-1-c approved.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 July 41</td>
<td>348</td>
<td>DE, Hon. to OCE</td>
<td>Contr. 660. Same as Ser. Nos. 344-349 above.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 July 41</td>
<td>349</td>
<td>DE, Hon. to OCE</td>
<td>Notify DE, Hon. of A-1-c on W-414-eng-609.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Aug. 41</td>
<td>1st-344 to 349</td>
<td>OCE to ANMB</td>
<td>Quotes TT from DE, Hon. that steel for W-414-eng-609 for armament bldg. at Hickam with A-1-c is promised for Nov. 41. DE, Hon. advises work will shut down if steel not delivered by 15 Sept. and that it is impossible to secure steel without A-1-c. Desires delivery by 3 Sept. to meet transport at San Francisco.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 Aug. 41</td>
<td>383</td>
<td>So. Pac. Div. to OCE</td>
<td>Advises that OPM is unable to render assistance &amp; that ANMB will not consider higher rating. OPM believes steel can be picked up on West Coast.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 Aug. 41</td>
<td>385</td>
<td>Contractor 666 to OCE</td>
<td>Reports difficulty in obtaining wire and cable.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Sept. 41</td>
<td>396</td>
<td>ANMB to OCE</td>
<td>Requests verification of Ser. 388 and necessary information.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 Sept. 41</td>
<td>2nd, 396</td>
<td>OCE to So. Pac. Div</td>
<td>Indorses letter from contractor 722 requesting information on applicable rating.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Sept. 41</td>
<td>397</td>
<td>OPM to OCE</td>
<td>Transmits information on steel delivery arranged by OUSW on W-414-eng-722 as result of Ser. 396.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 July 41</td>
<td>(317)</td>
<td>OCE to DE, Hon</td>
<td>Transmits Pref. Rating Order No. 18 of A-1-c for Hickam for all materials—critical and non-critical. (Furnished to request submitted to ANMB 27 Aug. 41. See 3820 (Priority Preference Rating) S, herein.)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Wyman Affidavit Exhibit "J"


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Job Order No.</th>
<th>Item of Construction</th>
<th>Date Construction Began</th>
<th>Probable Date of Completion</th>
<th>% of Completion</th>
<th>Work Done During Month</th>
<th>Probable Operations next month</th>
<th>Date last Inspe. by Engr. Off.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>Fire Control Station “M”</td>
<td>Feb. 5, '41</td>
<td>July 25, '41</td>
<td>100 100</td>
<td>Excavation, stringing cable putting up temporary tower to carry equipment to job site.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>Cableway at Mt. Kula</td>
<td>Sept. 8, '41</td>
<td>Apr. 31, '42</td>
<td>20 30</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>Access Road at Mt. Kula</td>
<td>Mar. 11, '41</td>
<td>Dec. 15, '41</td>
<td>99 100</td>
<td>Riprapping and masonry work, laying rock, hot top and rolling.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>A. W. S. Camp and Install Utilities, Mt. Kula</td>
<td>Aug. 27, '41</td>
<td>Dec. 15, '41</td>
<td>96 100</td>
<td>Not started</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mess Hall</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Not started</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3-Man Barracks Building</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Not started</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Power House</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Not started</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coastartek’s Quarters</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Not started</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Radio Communication Bldgs.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Not started</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Remarks:**

- This form shall be fully completed and returned to the Report Section, Civil Engineering Subdivision, U. S. Engineer Office, Honolulu, T. H. on the 1st and 15th day of each month.
- Nov. 10–30.
CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM AT AIR CORPS STATIONS

NO. 1—HICKAM FIELD, T. H.

1. LOCATION AND GENERAL DESCRIPTION:
Hickam Field is an existing military airfield located on the south shore of Oahu, approximately three miles west of the City of Honolulu. The current project consists of construction of the additional buildings, facilities, and miscellaneous works required to house and serve an Air Force Headquarters, a Wing Headquarters, two Bombardment Groups, one Air Base Group, one Transport Squadron, and attached service troops of the Quartermaster Corps, Signal Corps, Ordnance Department, etc.

2. PERTINENT DATA:
   a. Directive:
      (1) 4th Ind., from the Adjutant General, dated January 2, 1941, File No.
           AG 600.12 (12–6–40) M–D, to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.
      (2) Letter from A. G. O. April 2, 1941, to Q. M. C. Subject: Construction of
           Chapels.
      (3) Letter from Chief of Engineers dated May 29, 1941, to Division Engineer,
           S. P. D. Subject: Armament, Instrument Inspection, and Adjustment Building,
           Hickam Field.
   b. Date layout plan approved by Air Corps:
      (1) December 2, 1939.
      (2) Revised layout plan approved February 8, 1941.
   c. Lease of land approved: Construction is on military reservation.
   d. Troop capacity of housing:
      (1) Completed, 327.
      (2) Under construction, 1,386.
   e. Authorized but not under construction, none.
   f. Number of troops occupying stations: 5,473.
   [2] f. Construction begun: Existing works begun in 1936 prior to transfer of
   project to Corps of Engineers.
   Present construction:
      (1) Administration and Housing, November 13, 1939.
      (2) Hospital or Medical Corps installation, May 28, 1940.
      (3) Technical Facilities, November 20, 1939.

3. STATUS OF CONSTRUCTION:
See Table I, progress chart, and map herewith.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage of Completion:</th>
<th>Original program</th>
<th>Additional program</th>
<th>Total program</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Administration &amp; Housing (including utilities)</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospital or Medical Corps Installation</td>
<td>98.8</td>
<td>92.5</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical Facilities</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project as a Whole</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Readiness for Occupancy and Use</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. AUTHORIZED AND ESTIMATED COST OF PROJECT:

- Original program:
- Additional program:
- Total program:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authorized Cost</th>
<th>$12,821,882.00</th>
<th>$3,188,905.19</th>
<th>$16,010,788.19</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Estimated Cost:
   (1) Work constructed or in place (from "Cost to 7/31/41", Form 38A) | 6,554,888.01  | 622,509.17   | 7,177,397.18   |
   (2) Work under way                 | 1,007,127.54   | 1,546,447.18 | 2,553,574.72   |
   (3) Work authorized, but not yet under way | 5,100.00 | 818,820.76   | 823,920.76     |
   (4) Total estimated cost (from "Present working Estimate as of 7/31/41", Form 38A) | 7,362,324.74 | 1,666,968.04 | 9,029,292.78   |
5. STATUS OF PLANS AND SPECIFICATIONS:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Description</th>
<th>Per Cent Complete</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gasoline Storage Tanks</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aqueduct Gasoline Storage from domestic water to salt water</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapel</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Headquarters Building</td>
<td>98%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commissary Warehouse</td>
<td>95%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theatre (800-Man)</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utilities</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pump House</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concrete Reservoir (60,000 gal)</td>
<td>90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alterations to Hangar #1</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6. OPERATIONS DURING THIS HALF-MONTH PERIOD:

- See Table I, progress chart, and map herewith.

7. PROBABLE OPERATIONS NEXT HALF-MONTH:

- See Table I and progress chart.

8. ESTIMATED DATE OF COMPLETION:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Description</th>
<th>Original Program</th>
<th>Additional Program</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Administration &amp; Housing (including utilities)</td>
<td>Nov. 30, 1941</td>
<td>Jan. 31, 1942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Hospital or Medical Corps Installation</td>
<td>Dec. 20, 1941</td>
<td>Nov. 30, 1941</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Project as a Whole</td>
<td>Jan. 12, 1942</td>
<td>Jan. 31, 1942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Readiness for Occupancy and Use</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9. Remarks: None.

[4] Table I.—Hickam Field Semi-Monthly Progress Table

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contract Symbol</th>
<th>Map Item</th>
<th>No. of Units</th>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Date Construction Begun</th>
<th>Per Cent of Completion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Barracks, A. C.—43-Man</td>
<td>Mar. 20, 1941</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>Barracks, Service Troop</td>
<td>Mar. 20, 1941</td>
<td>90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Mess, Enlisted Men</td>
<td>Mar. 20, 1941</td>
<td>90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Mess, Officers—118-Man</td>
<td>May 28, 1941</td>
<td>85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Mess, Officers—179-Man</td>
<td>May 28, 1941</td>
<td>95%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Day Rooms, A. C.—236-Man</td>
<td>May 28, 1941</td>
<td>85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Day Rooms, Service</td>
<td>May 28, 1941</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Quarters, Officers</td>
<td>Mar. 20, 1941</td>
<td>90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Administration Bldgs</td>
<td>May 16, 1941</td>
<td>100%</td>
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<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>Administration Bldgs, Service</td>
<td>May 28, 1941</td>
<td>100%</td>
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<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>Technical Schools, A. C.</td>
<td>May 16, 1941</td>
<td>100%</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>40</td>
<td>Theatre, 800-Man</td>
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<td>43</td>
<td>Post Exchanges, A. C.</td>
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<td>44</td>
<td>Post Exchanges, Blue</td>
<td>Not begun</td>
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<td>46</td>
<td>Post Exchanges, Wine</td>
<td>Not begun</td>
<td>0%</td>
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<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>Post Exchanges, Wine</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>Post Exchanges, Wine</td>
<td>Not begun</td>
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<td>Utilities</td>
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<td>Headquarters Bldg.</td>
<td>Not begun</td>
<td>0%</td>
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<td>56</td>
<td>Regimental Chapel</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>YMCA, A. Bldg.</td>
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<td>0%</td>
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<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>Medical Ward</td>
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<td>0%</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>Medical Ward</td>
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<td>77</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>78</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>Medical Ward</td>
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</tr>
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Additional Program

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<th>Item</th>
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<td>1M Day Rooms, Service</td>
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<td>2 Technological Schools, A. C.</td>
<td>May 16, 1941</td>
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Probable September 15, 1941
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<th>Contract Symbol</th>
<th>Map Item</th>
<th>No. of Units</th>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Date Construction Began</th>
<th>Per Cent of Completion</th>
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<td>15</td>
<td>1 Maintenance Shed, A. C.</td>
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**Entire Additional Project**

| Admin. and Housing | 661  | 79           | 1 Service Club Bldg. | April 1, 1940 | 99  | 100 |
| W-414-Eng-666      | 661  | 79           | 1 Arm. Housing, N. C. O. | Jan 15, 1940 | 100 | 100 |
| W-414-Eng-666      | 666  | 73           | 1 Mess Bldg., Officers' Club | May 20, 1941 | 100 | 100 |
| 688                | 688  | 72           | 1 Apartments, Officers' Club | Nov 8, 1940 | 100 | 100 |
| 698                | 698  | 70           | 12 Quarters, N. C. O. | Nov 13, 1940 | 100 | 100 |
| 630                | 630  | 9            | 100 Quarters, Officers | Jan 12, 1940 | 100 | 100 |
| 698                | 698  | 9            | 100 Street Lighting, etc. | Jan 10, 1940 | 100 | 100 |
| 704                | 704  | 9            | 100 Pavements, Curbs, etc. | Dec 31, 1940 | 100 | 100 |
| 702                | 702  | 9            | 100 Reservation Fence | June 12, 1940 | 100 | 100 |
| W-414-Eng-666      | 698  | 79           | 1 Hospital | Mar 29, 1941 | 98.5 | 99 |

**Medical Corps Installation**

| Medical Corps Installation | 698  | 79           | 1 Hospital | May 29, 1941 | 98.5 | 99 |

**Technical**

| W-414-Eng-669 | 606  | 76           | 7 Supply Bldg., Whse. | Nov 30, 1939 | 100 | 100 |
| 666          | 666  | 73           | 1 Engineering Shop A. C. | Oct 1, 1940 | 65  | 100 |
| 698          | 698  | 73           | 1 Engineering Shop, A. C. | Oct 9, 1940 | 80  | 80 |
| 698          | 698  | 73           | 1 Steam Plant, etc. | Oct 29, 1940 | 96  | 96 |
| 672          | 672  | 83           | 1 Repair Shop Engine | Oct 29, 1940 | 99  | 99 |
| 672          | 672  | 81           | 1 Repair Shop Engine | Oct 29, 1940 | 99  | 99 |
| 677          | 677  | 81           | 1 Double Hangar | Apr 1, 1940 | 71  | 71 |
| 677          | 677  | 81           | 1 Hangar Facilities | Aug 17, 1940 | 91  | 91 |
| 677          | 677  | 81           | 1 Hangar Facilities | Aug 17, 1940 | 91  | 91 |
| 667          | 667  | 83           | 1 Fueling System, Gasoline | June 13, 1940 | 100 | 100 |
| 667          | 667  | 83           | 1 Fueling System, Gasoline | June 13, 1940 | 100 | 100 |
| 698          | 698  | 76           | 1 Motor in Repair Hangar | Oct 11, 1940 | 100 | 100 |
| 698          | 698  | 76           | 1 Motor in Repair Hangar | Oct 11, 1940 | 100 | 100 |
| 670          | 670  | 76           | 1 Bombsight Storage Vault | Not begun | 0  | 0 |

**Entire original project**

1 Previously reported as 3 units, 2 units, and 1 unit each of Service Warehouses, Day Rooms and Recreation Bldgs. respectively. Funds covering construction of 1 unit of each type has been transferred to cover cost of moving a Y. M. C. A. Bldg. and a Y. M. C. A. Secretary's House from Pearl Harbor to Hickam Field.
EXHIBIT L

War Department,
United States Engineer Office,
Honolulu, T. H., July 12, 1941

Subject: Material and Equipment Requirements on Defense Contracts.

To: Contractors engaged on construction of defense projects within the Honolulu District.

Recent experience on construction work has demonstrated that it is becoming increasingly difficult to secure delivery of necessary materials and equipment without undue delay in some phase of the work. It is imperative that construction of defense projects be expedited and completed as soon as practicable with due regard to considerations of economy, sound construction practice, and close adherence to the contract plans and specifications.

In order that construction on defense projects may proceed steadily and without interruption, it is considered highly desirable that all contractors anticipate material and equipment requirements and place all orders at the earliest possible date. Granting of priority ratings has materially aided delivery of certain items, however, the effectiveness of this system has been diminished by the large volume of existing business. Placing of orders at an early date materially advances date of delivery.

Cooperation of all concerned is urgently requested.

Theodore Wyman, Jr.,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

EXHIBIT M

ND 690.114-602
May 9, 1942.


To: The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H.

1. Reference is made to the testimony of Mr. Robert Hoffman, Area Superintendent, Hawaiian Constructors, Bellows Field, T. H., which testimony was taken at Hickam Field, T. H., on the 21st of April, 1942, by Colonel Lathe B. Row, I. G. D., Department Inspector General, and forwarded to this office by Interstaff Routing Slip from the Inspector General to the Department Commander, and thence to this office.

2. From an analysis of the testimony of Mr. Hoffman, it appears to be a highly falsified general criticism of the conduct of the work by this office on the island of Oahu, a criticism of virtually all of the key personnel, and a criticism of his employers, the Hawaiian Constructors. In order to properly present the matter, it is necessary to refute his general allegations; however, these will be touched on but briefly as the actual facts presented demonstrate beyond reasonable doubt that Mr. Hoffman was grossly inefficient, either willfully or through lack of ability and apparently without integrity.

3. It has been deemed desirable, however, to answer in somewhat greater detail, the allegations made relative to the water supply and gasoline storage projects at Bellows Field, due to the importance of these works.

4. Mr. Hoffman's complete lack of integrity is evident from the answer to the fourth question appearing on page one of the testimony, wherein he falsely claims to receive $4,200 per year from the Hawaiian Constructors payable from their funds, in addition to the $7,800 yearly from the funds payable by the United States. His total salary was $7,800 yearly and not $12,000 as claimed. This deliberate and premeditated perversion, under oath, demonstrates the worthlessness of his testimony.
5. By way of introduction, it may be stated that Mr. Robert Hoffman was employed on the mainland by the Hawaiian Constructors (cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contractors—Contract No. W—114-eng-602), for the position of Assistant Building Superintendent at a salary of $400.00 per month ($4,800 per annum). [2] His initial assignment at this field was confined to relatively simple wood mobilization structures. At a later date, work commenced on the runways and the first one was completed (to a usable degree) late in December 1941, with the exception of the fine grading and paving with asphalt. Subsequent promotion to $500.00, to $600.00 and thence to $650.00 per month, with the title of Area Superintendent, were authorized on October 21, 1941, January 24, 1942, and March 14, 1942, respectively. Shortly after the outbreak of war, it was noticed that the progress of work at Bellows Field was conspicuously slow. Efforts were made to speed up construction, but all such efforts failed. Mr. Hoffman either would not or could not, through incompetence, maintain anything like a normal rate. The history of the gasoline storage tanks set forth below conclusively demonstrates this fact. The source of the trouble, having been analyzed, Mr. Hoffman was removed for incompetence shortly after his last promotion (included with fifty-eight other employees) had been approved. The interests of the United States rendered this action mandatory. In no case, where the facts have been known, has this office tolerated hindrance of the defense effort by permitting incompetent personnel to remain in charge of vital projects.

6. Mr. Hoffman’s motives in submitting his testimony wherein he vindictively attacks his superiors and representatives of this office are not understandable. It is noted that he submitted his evidence only after his removal. Obviously his patriotism, if genuine, would have prompted him to speak at an earlier date, as his supposedly pertinent observations were, in some cases, not disclosed for a period of six months.

7. In his testimony, it is noted that he has commented upon many matters on which he is completely uninformed. Investigation reveals that he has distorted facts to suit his peculiar purpose, and finds, to his interest to resort to the truth only upon infrequent occasions. Inquiry from his former associates discloses that his reputation for truth and veracity, based upon their observations over a period of a year, is bad.

8. That his testimony is presented on a biased viewpoint is demonstrated by the fact that no mention is made of the outbreak of war as contributing to the difficulties encountered.

9. Since his removal, conditions have improved. The gasoline storage tanks were completed to a usable condition on May 4, 1942.

10. The discussion herein follows in general the sequence of his testimony. Mr. Hoffman first criticizes the organization of the U. S. E. D., contending that they are attempting to do a field job by remote control with men earning $3000 to $4800 annually and who are without the proper experience. [3] It is a well known fact that work on the mainland prosecuted under the direction of the various Engineer Offices is handled in this manner with great success, thereby demonstrating that a great multiplicity of relatively simple projects (as encountered in the Hawaiian Islands) does not require the presence in the field of government employees in the higher salary brackets. An examination of the projects under construction will result in the conclusion that they are relatively simple construction problems, far less intricate than the lock and dam structures frequently encountered in the mainland, which have been successfully constructed under the direction of the Corps of Engineers for almost the past century with the same type of organization.

11. In one of his initial statements he contends the work was being prosecuted by remote control. Actually the work at Bellows Field was largely under his control as Area Superintendent for the Hawaiian Constructors, with the Area Engineer at Bellows Field in local charge of the functions of this office. The design of work is handled in the Young Building, a forty minute drive from the field, and with direct telephone connection. The Island of Oahu is divided into seven areas. The islands of Kauai, Maui (with Molokai and Lanai) and Hawaii are each separate areas. Southerly Pacific Islands comprise four additional areas. Obviously this is decentralization to a high degree. Mr. Hoffman apparently was either incapable of appreciating this fundamental fact or he chose to intentionally distort even this basic truth. This is typical of the remainder of the observations and is consistent with his general character.

12. Procurement in the Hawaiian Islands for large scale construction is necessarily something of a problem, where, as in this case, funds were not available to permit stocking of needed materials. It is evident that special materials must
be brought from the mainland and that securing such items, even when ordered by radio must take several weeks at the very minimum. Major Shields, who handled procurement and was relieved of this assignment only when it was desired to utilize his services as Area Engineer at Station "Y", is a graduate engineer, well qualified to handle any mass production procurement pertaining to the work in the Hawaiian Islands. Shortly before Major Shields' transfer to his new assignment, the total estimated cost of Contract W-414-eng-602 was less than $15,000,000 and as of July 15, 1941, was less than $6,000,000 at which time procurement on the mainland had already become an acute problem due to shortage and delay in securing materials. Mr. Hoffman chose to ignore entirely the recognized shortages of materials which required the complicated system of priorities which has been in effect for more than one year.

13. The criticism of the prosecution of the work on the gasoline installations may be understood more clearly after a review of the pertinent facts connected therewith. On page 3 of the testimony, it is stated that "the tunnel was driven but not completed for a period of 90 days." Mr. Hoffman's personal animosity to Mr. Cherry, Superintendent of the Hawaiian Constructors, contributed largely to the change in organization by which Mr. Cherry, his crew, and his equipment were withdrawn from the work at Bellows Field to permit the Area Superintendent to handle all tunnel work in the area. When this change was effected, on December 8, 1941 (approximately) the tunnel for gasoline tanks had been driven to its full length for six tanks. However, it was decided to excavate a relatively shallow trench in the floor of the tunnel to contain a concrete pipe duct to house the pipes leading to the tanks. With the inexperienced supervision and methods utilized by the Area Superintendent, work on this project was delayed for approximately three months.

14. On page 3, he states "the U. S. E. D. insisted on having the tanks within 24 hours which was a physical impossibility." This statement is without foundation nor is there any record in this office of such demand.

15. Mr. Hoffman stated (on April 21, 1942) that there was no way to fill the tanks with gasoline and he specifically mentions, "as an accredited engineer" that no plan had been made to pump gasoline into these tanks. Actually, as of May 1, 1942, a pipe line was in existence for this filling the tanks. This line extends from the tanks, up the hillside, along the road to the additional tunnels under construction, (which road is usable and accessible for heavy trucks) terminating in intake pipes providing means whereby the tanks may be filled at this point by utilizing a gravity system, which method is obviously less expensive and has many advantages over any system which Mr. Hoffman deemed necessary. It is apparent from his own statement that the relatively simple expedient of the gravity system did not occur to him. Mr. Tillman, Area Engineer, who succeeded Mr. Lynch, found stored at Bellows Field practically all of the complete pipe fittings for the tanks including the pressure release valves which Mr. Hoffman at one time said had not been shipped from the mainland and which he apparently decided to forget were stored at the site.

16. There is no genuine excuse for the delay in installing the tanks in the tunnel. The 15 pound rail referred to is part of a limited local supply used for tunnel construction. The construction at an inaccessible A. W. S. Station required the use of this light weight rail. The inaccessible location of the storage area required use of a pack train to deliver the rail. It is evident that the 60 pound rail could not be used for this purpose, whereas it was perfectly satisfactory and available for use at Bellows Field. Colonel Robinson directed the Hawaiian Constructors to secure immediately the needed 60 pound rail of which there is a great surplus available in Honolulu. This was for use in skidding the tanks into position. Mr. Hoffman took this incident as an excuse to delay prosecuting the work. It was entirely within his prerogative, and a part of his responsibility as Area Superintendent to expedite the action of his organization in securing the necessary rail. Instead, as in many other instances, he did nothing about the matter.

17. Mr. Cherry finally delivered 1,200 track feet of rail together with the ties to the field on February 1, 1942. The Area Engineer, Mr. Lynch, had assured Colonel Wyman that the tanks could be placed and properly connected in a period of ten days, provided that he was given an RD 8 Caterpillar and other necessary materials. These materials and the tractor were delivered in accordance with his requisition. Mr. Hoffman then installed the rail extending up the hillside from the then location of the tanks and into the tunnels. Then, at this late date, in attempting the excavation of the trench in the floor of the tunnel, he ascertained that the tracks and ties interfered with the work and he decided to remove the tracks and ties from the tunnel and stock them
outside. The necessary excavation for the pipe duct in the floor of the tunnel continued at a slow pace for a period of approximately 60 days, during which time, three of the tank saddles required for one tank were constructed at the remote end of the tunnel.

17. Mr. Hoffman insisted on pouring one set of concrete saddles, moving in one tank for each, building the next set of saddles and moving in another tank, all of which was scheduled to take 48 days. The Area Engineer, Mr. Tillman, however, insisted upon pouring the saddles first and then moving in the tanks, thereby saving a great deal of time.

18. A brief resume shows that work started on the tunnel about September 18 and stopped on December 8, 1941. Nothing further was done until about February 10th, 1942, when the trench was started. The trench was completed on March 20, 1942. The initial attempt to move the first tank on March 25, was a failure as a saddle pulled out of position due to use of improper methods. This schedule demonstrates that from December 8, 1941 to March 25, 1942, a period of 9½ months, little was done on the project except construct the saddles and excavate the trench and place therein the concrete duct for the pipes. The dilatory conduct of the Area Superintendent in this matter is difficult to understand, but may be attributed to his lack of experience in handling projects of this nature.

19. Some further delay in prosecuting the work on this project was occasioned by suspending operations on this project due to the desire of the local Air Corps to use the tunnel for some other purposes. This matter was finally settled and no change was made in the tunnel for that reason.

20. The design of both the water supply and fire protection system for Bellows Field assures adequate facilities for the completed camp. The present system is temporary only for use during construction. The facts relative to the 4" water line are that virtually all materials for this line were delivered by February 10, 1942. At that time, some trenching had been completed. Mr. Hoffman then delayed starting work until he could secure a reducer connection for the transition from 6" to 4" pipe. Upon receiving that item, he then said he needed a 6" x 6" cross fitting. Upon receiving that, he then stated he needed a 22 1/2 degree fitting. Then, having exhausted his ingenuity for concocting excuses, he put off from day to day initiating work on the project. [6] Finally, this office, in an effort to get the work done, assigned the project to Mr. John F. Nichols, a Honolulu contractor who completed the job in less than 6 days under a negotiated contract. Water was in the line on May 4, 1942.

21. On page 3 of the testimony, it is stated “the requisition for the materials for the 6" line was dated February 16 and until the 20th of April, neither the fittings nor the test iron had been delivered.” Actually, the Area Coordinator, Mr. Plummer, located all necessary materials for this line in the base yards, earmarked them for the Bellows Field project, and delivered receipts then in use known as “stug-outs” to the Hawaiian Constructors’ Superintendent of Transportation to effect delivery of this material to the site of work. Any subsequent delay in delivery of this material is evidently a responsibility of the Hawaiian Constructors which the Area Superintendent could have remedied. However, inasmuch as Mr. Hoffman had permitted all the materials for the 4" line to remain at the site of the work without making any effort towards their installation, it is evident that expediting delivery of the material for the 6" line at that time would merely have resulted in materials for two lines, instead of one, lying idle at the site. However, it appears that some materials for the 6" line were delivered and stored on the property of the sugar company nearby, taken from there by the forces of the Hawaiian Constructors and installed in a 6" distribution line inside Bellows Field, but not in connection with the proposed 6" water supply line. It will be noted that Mr. Hoffman already knew the distribution system of Bellows Field was over-taxed and that installing this additional interior distribution line before the needed supply line merely aggravated that condition.

22. Based on his presumably wide experience, Mr. Hoffman has apparently convinced some that he is qualified to handle the extensive construction work in the area, including runways for the airport. Mr. Tillman, who succeeded Mr. Lynch as Area Engineer, became dissatisfied with the operation of the asphalt plant at Bellows Field as the asphalt being placed in the runways was obviously unsatisfactory. Joint investigations made by Mr. Tillman and his associates in the District Office, including one engineer, especially well qualified through many years of broad experience in highway work on the mainland, indicated that Mr. Hoffman knew nothing whatsoever about the operation of this plant and that
it had been set up and assembled in a rather haphazard way. After six weeks' operations, certain vital features of the plant were on the site but not installed in the plant. Mr. Hoffman had refused to make these installations when requested to do so by the Area Engineer. After Mr. Hoffman's removal, this matter was remedied immediately.

23. On page 4 of the testimony, he states the work "is being done as only a group of saboteurs could do it." Before his removal, the dilatory conduct of work under his direction, subsequent to the outbreak of war, was so pronounced that serious thought should be given as to whether this charge as previously mentioned to prosecute the work with even ordinary diligence.

[7] The reference to the appointment of a political group, (mentioning four officers) opposed to Colonel Wyman is obviously nonsense. Colonel Wyman had their whole-hearted support; their every effort was direct toward the program of this office; his appreciation of this fact is evidenced by his recommendations for their promotions. In this connection, it may be pointed out that Lt. Col. Robinson preceded Colonel Wyman to the Honolulu District, so his appointment was evidently not for the fancifully imagined savings of the government.

24. The handling of equipment by this office was an intelligent, honest effort to improve the then existing somewhat unsatisfactory conditions. His reference to the number of orders placed for materials for the mainland and the failure to reduce this number (as previously mentioned) to prosecute the work with even ordinary diligence.

25. His reference to overstaffing is far from authoritative. Cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contracts are an innovation on which he is absolutely uninformed. Existing Government regulations require such as keeping payroll records and timekeeping costs, etc. The timekeeping and payroll records were also handled by this office. For these reasons, the Government Area Office must of necessity utilize a larger office force than the contractor who need not concern himself with this detailed paper work.

26. The yard situation has always been something of a problem due to a definite lack of a source of suitable trained employees available for this work.

27. Withdrawing work from the Hawaiian Constructors to have it accomplished by hired labor forces is the result of an effort to further the interests of the United States by prosecuting work by whatever means seem most effective. This point is illustrated by the case of the 4" water-line at Bellows Field where the failure of Mr. Hoffman to do anything at all resulted in transferring it to Mr. Nichols, who expeditiously completed the work by lump sum contract.

28. The comments upon the contract and the organization of the Hawaiian Constructors are also totally irrelevent. It will be noted (as aforementioned) that he fails to mention the current war contributing anything to the difficult conditions. This is typical of his testimony as it is evident that he is indulging in an attempt to "white-wash" himself for his sorry effort, and to subject to criticism all who failed to tolerate his own brand of inefficiency. He completely fails to mention the organizational problem arising from expanding a contract of this nature from $15,000,000 to $35,000,000 within two months, following a surprise attack on an isolated island and having limited labor supply and a shipping shortage so severe that much badly needed construction equipment remained on the wharves at San Francisco for three months or more during the critical construction stage.

[8] The situation may be further illustrated by the fact that over a period of months, Mr. Hoffman visited projects under his jurisdiction at Ulupal and Kaneohe only two or three times, resulting in the projects coming to a standstill through absolute neglect.

29. While he states Mr. McCullough of the Hawaiian Constructors was removed because of his forceful and energetic nature was undesirable, he actually left because of an almost fatal heart ailment and with the sincere regret of this office. Mr. Ellison, whom he cites as the possible source of more information, was removed, as was Mr. Hoffman, for inefficiency, but in the case of Mr. Ellison, it was noted at an earlier date. His comments upon the conduct of the contract are matters on which it is believed he is entirely uninformed and as such his statements do not merit comment by this office.

30. Mr. Hoffman was thoroughly discredited insofar as this office is concerned and was removed from his post after repeated verbal requests addressed to Mr. Rohl by Colonel Robinson who assembled the facts and acted accordingly. It is sincerely regretted that his removal was not accomplished at an earlier date with the resultant benefit to the progress of the work. Mr. Hoffman was the only employee of the Hawaiian Constructors who refused to submit a written statement of his previous experience when requested repeatedly, giving as his reasons,
therefore, some fanciful excuse. In light of his sorry showing, when confronted with anything more complex than construction of wood mobilization structures, with is doubted that he possesses balanced general construction experience and that his connection with the various projects mentioned in his testimony relative to his qualification would, on cross examination, verify that fact and disclose his shortcomings. It is reported that he attempted to create dissatisfaction among his former employees.

31. By his own admission (page 4 of testimony) he required 23 days to secure rail on an island the size of Oahu where the plentiful supply and high priority carried by the gasoline storage project made the problem relatively simple. As elsewhere, his delay in assigning the responsibility attached to his position is in cause of delay and he now attempts to evade the consequences by making derogatory remarks affecting several individuals including one Colonel, one Lt. Col., four Majors, one Lieutenant, and several civilians, including the executive committee of the contractors, one of whom is Mr. Woolley, whose many successfully completed projects include virtually all the outstanding structures on Oahu, such as the Royal Hawaiian Hotel, both Mormon Temples, the Alexander & Baldwin Building and the Hawaiian Electric office building and power plant. The record of Mr. Woolley as an experienced constructor is absolutely unimpeachable on the visible evidence. Mr. Hoffman's statement that he 'pleaded for the installation of the tanks in temporary position' would imply that the problem was, for him so difficult that even with the tunnel already completed, he could not install the tanks expeditiously. Mr. Lynch anticipated the project could be accomplished in ten days.

32. A typical irresponsible statement appears on page 10 of the testimony as follows: "The bringing of white help from the mainland early in January was a decided mistake." It is clearly evident that additional help was needed and with all island labor employed on defense projects, including more men than the plantations could freely spare, the importation of labor was the only alternative. The Navy contractors also imported labor. Over 500 additional projects, many of them large multiple units, (for example: Over 80 buildings in one evacuation camp constitute one project) were undertaken since December 7, 1941 and the local labor was then already sorely taxed. Many tournapulls were purchased and on the San Francisco docks awaiting shipment to Honolulu, so operators were hired accordingly. Mr. Hoffman's objections to importing labor were not justified by operators not being able to grasp even the most elementary principles of supply, i.e., importing labor when the local supply is exhausted. This must seriously reduce the weight even the most optimistic person could give to his observations (on page 4 of testimony) on mass production or big organization work.

33. On page 10 of his testimony, he again evidences his mental confusion by his statement in one instance mentioning handling and development of his labor crews, "with a certain pride that I look back and see that in 25 years of construction experience I have had a faster concrete or wood framing crew anywhere." Then four sentences later "while the native help wasn't nearly as competent as normal help on the mainland." The inconsistency is too great for possible reconciliation.

34. A year ago this office contemplated stocking-up on basis construction materials by placing large orders on the mainland; however, lack of funds necessitated reducing the quantity of materials actually ordered. Much equipment has been ordered and only since May 1, 1942, has delivery been made in substantial quantities. Mr. Hoffman obviously is unaware that purchases of materials even for large projects cannot be made unless appropriations are available for such purposes.

35. The work at Bellows Field was initially confined to construction of many mobilization buildings. Later, construction of the runways focused attention on that item. The tunnel for the gasoline tanks was under the supervision of Mr. Cherry. Mr. Hoffman apparently was supplied with sufficient, adequate help so that the mobilization buildings and the excavation and placing of base course for the runways was accomplished without difficulty. However, once he was confronted with the problem of installing the tanks in the tunnel, his inability to handle the project became evident. The sequence of work, with the relatively simple projects occupying the spotlight until the last months of 1941 were contributing factors in preventing the knowledge reaching this office, of his inability to properly handle the projects in the Fifth Field Area.

36. The foregoing facts are presented to refute the allegations made. This office does not contend that the ultimate in efficiency has been maintained or that
there has been at all times a steady flow of equipment, men and materials to all projects; shortages of all three items have existed in spite of every effort. [10] Constant effort has been made and will continue to be made to improve the functioning of the organization. Allegations equivalent to sabotage, if from a responsible source, merit serious consideration. This office submits that these allegations are unfounded and are the product of an irresponsible, discredited individual who is evidently motivated by a desire to avenge his fancied wrongs. In conclusion, it is suggested for handling similar cases in the future, it would seem preferable that character investigations of claimants be made by proper authorities before such matters are submitted for consideration. This might eliminate any case where a discredited individual, released from his employment, impeached in the eyes of his associates by his own lack of truth and veracity and possibly suffering from mental aberrations could bring to highest local authorities a rambling account of half truths intermingled with falsehoods and create further interruption to important work by rendering it necessary to prepare a reply.

A. K. B. Lyman,
Colonel, Corps of Engineers,
Department Engineer.

ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD EXHIBIT NO. 57

HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES,
PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS,
OFFICE OF THE SIGNAL OFFICER,
APO 958, 14 September 1944.

Memorandum to: Major General Walter H. Frank,
Army Pearl Harbor Board
Courts Martial Building, 70-B
HUSAFFPOA, APO 958

1. The attached memorandum, prepared in the Office of the Signal Officer, Central Pacific Base Command, contains all the information presently available concerning the arrival of temporary and permanent air warning radar equipment at the Hawaiian Islands prior to 7 December 1941.

2. Search for records to obtain additional information is continuing and will be furnished if, or as soon as, it becomes available.

A. R. Marcy,
A. R. Marcy,
Colonel, Signal Corps.,
Actg. Signal Officer.

1 Incl:
Memo to Engineers dtd 12 Sept 44, subj: AWS Equipment, w/5 Incls.

Memo to: Major Hollensworth, Engineers.
Subject: AWS Equipment.

1. In reference to our informal conversation concerning the receipt of an release of AWS equipment to the Engineers before December 7, 1941, the following information is forwarded:

a. Receipt of AWS Fixed Station Detector Equipment by Signal Corps in Hawaii. (Following information taken from stock record cards of the AWS)

(1) Power Units:
   (a) Five each received 3 June 1941, on DV-3
   (b) Four each received 20 August 1941, on DV-31–42

(2) Detector Stations and Component Parts:
   (a) Two each SCR-271 (Serial #1 & #2) received 3 June 1941, on DV-4.

(5) Tower and Buildings, 96 ft. (for Mt. Kaala and Haleakula)

(a) Two each received, 29 August 1941, on DV-50-42

(b) One each received, 30 August 1941, on DV-50-42

(4) Transmitting Building (for Kokee)

(a) received 29 August 1941, on DV-50-42

(b) Transmitting Building received 29 August 1941, on DV-50-42

(5) Tanks, gasoline or fuel storage and so forth:

(a) Six each received 7 July 1941, on DV-1-42.

(6) Communications:

(a) No definite information available at this time.

b. Receipt of AWS Mobile Equipment by Signal Corps in Hawaii.

(1) Six mobile detector sets were shipped by rail from New Jersey 22 July 1941, and arrived in Hawaii sometime during the first part of August. Temporary locations for these sets on Oahu was proposed the 14 August 1941, and approved on the 15th. (see Inclosure d and e)

c. AWS Equipment Released to Engineers.

(1) Definite information on the release of AWS equipment to the Engineers is not available at this time. The following information which has some bearing on the subject is listed below:

(a) Kokee, Kauai: Tower, gasoline tanks, and building material shipped to Port Allen the 17 September 1941. (see Inclosure #a)

(b) Haleakula, Maui: Necessary metal buildings and towers have been shipped to Haleakula, Maui (This statement was made in a letter dated September 23, 1941). (see Inclosure #b).

(c) Mt Kaala, Oahu: No work could be done on the Kaala Detector Installation until the cableway was completed. On 21 February 1942, the estimated completion time of the Mt. Kaala cableway was five weeks. (see Inclosure #c).

d. Communications equipment was installed by Signal Corps personnel. This was dependent upon the completion of the necessary buildings.

2. Search continues for additional information which will be forwarded when located. Inclosures concerning part 1a will be forwarded 13 September.

ALLEN W. SMITH, Colonel, Signal Corps, Signal Officer.

5 Inclosures:


Inc1 B, Memo dated 21 Feb 1942, To: Col. Powell, From: Mr. Duncan.


Inc1 D, R/8 pages 1, 2, & 3. Subj: Proposed installation of six mobile RDF Units on the Island of Oahu.

Inclosure A

[Telegram—Official Business—Government Rates]

Standard Form No. 14A
Approved by the President
March 10, 1926

From: War Department
Bureau: U. S. Engineer Office, Alexander Young Building, Honolulu, T. H.

GOVT WD
MACCASLAND
U.S. ENGINEERS
WAIMEA, KAUAI

September 17, 1941.

Following items being shipped to Port Allen via I I steamer leaving Honolulu September seventeenth colon for U S E D three boxes stationery one box aildade and one carton tripod for aildade period for AWS Kokee fourteen pieces steel thirty bundles steel one crate hand wihch twelve boxes parts weighing twenty thousand pounds and two each four thousand gallon gasoline tanks.

Certified to be US Govt. official business:
[Hand written:] Phoned to Ft. Shafter 4:45 p. m.—9-17-41.

WM. R.
W. P. McCrane
Capt., Corps of Engineers,
Executive Assistant.

From File: ENGR 6763 Aircraft Warning Service Stations.

Inclosure B

Col. Powell: The construction foreman at Mt. Kaala informed me yesterday that it would be about five weeks before the aerial tramway job will have been completed.

The cable tower at the top has yet to be installed. As it now stands, the top anchorage now consists of a wooden “A” frame and a dead man.

Lt. Bell: To note and file.


[Stamped:] From File: Signal 6763 AWS Station Locations (OaHU).

Inclosure C

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT ENGINEER,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 8 September 1941.

In reply refer to:
Engr. 6763

Memorandum to District Engineer:

1. In accordance with conversation, Colonel Powell-Major Robinson, and Major Fleming, on the Aircraft Warning Service, it is requested that you arrange to obtain from the Signal Officer the necessary metal building and towers for installation at Kokee and Haleakala. As you know, the installation at Kokee will consist of the metal detector building and a 100-foot tower and at Haleakala, will consist of the combined metal building and 35-foot tower.

2. It is my understanding that these metal buildings are now on hand at the Signal Corps yard at Fort Shafter. This site can be verified by having someone check the buildings on hand in the yard. If the buildings are now complete, shipment of them to Haleakala and Kokee and their erection at the site should be expedited.

79716—46—Ex. 145, vol. 5—4
3. It is also requested that erection of the power house at these two stations be expedited. It is understood that your office has designed and is furnishing all materials for these power houses. Their completion should be expedited in order to enable early installation of the equipment.

4. Also, in the discussion referred to, it was decided that the Signal Corps would furnish an employee at Kokee and at Haleakala to assist in the erection of the buildings and to see that they are properly screened and shielded as required. It is also tentatively agreed that the District Engineer would sub枞allot funds to the Department Signal Officer to cover the cost of this employee's transportation and time while engaged on this work. In view of the need of this Signal Corps employee's assistance during the erection of the building, it is requested that you notify this office before the actual erection starts in order that arrangements can be made to send him to the site.

5. The Department Commander is extremely desirous that these stations be placed in operation without delay.

ROBERT J. FLEMING, JR.
Major, G. S. C.

[Stamped:] From File: Signal 676.3 AWS Miscellaneous AWS.
A True Copy:

Address Reply to
DISTRICT ENGINEER
U. S. ENGINEER OFFICE
P. O. Box 2446
Honolulu, T. H.

WASH DEPARTMENT,
UNITED STATES ENGINEER OFFICE,
Honolulu, T. H., September 23, 1941.

Refer to File No.:
ND 676.3 AWS Kokee
X ND 676.3 AWS Haleakala
Subject: Aircraft Warning Service Stations
To: Department Engineer, Headquarters, Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H.

1. In answer to your memorandum of September 8 regarding the installation of the Aircraft Warning Service buildings at Kokee, Kauai and Haleakala, Maui, and the necessary funds for furnishing Signal Corps employees to assist in erection of these buildings, the following information is submitted for your convenience:
   a. The necessary metal buildings and towers have been shipped to Kokee and Haleakala.

2. The necessary steel for the power houses at these stations is now being fabricated and upon completion the erection will be expedited.
   c. Bill for the Signal Corps employees' time and transportation while engaged in this work will be submitted to the District Engineer and payment will be made directly from this office instead of subballotting the necessary funds to the Department Signal Officer as mentioned in memorandum referred to above.
   d. The actual erection of the metal buildings and station towers at these stations will be started as follows: Haleakala, as soon as Signal Corps employees arrive; Kokee, approximately October 1, 1941.

3. You will be notified, as soon as can be determined, the exact date that erection of buildings and tower will be started. Arrangements have been made at these stations for the accommodation of the Signal Corps employees.

5. It is requested that this office be informed the day before the employees are to leave for Maui and Kauai.

THEODORE WYMAN, JR.
THEODORE WYMAN, JR.
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
District Engineer.

[Stamped:] From File: Signal 676.3 AWS Miscellaneous AWS.
WAR DEPARTMENT,
UNITED STATES ENGINEER OFFICE,
Honolulu, T. H., September 23, 1941.

Refer to File No.
ND 676.3 AWS Mobile (9/8/41)
X ND 622
Subject: Mobile Stations, Kauai and Maui
To: Department Engineer,
Headquarters, Hawaiian Department,
Fort Shafter, T. H.
1. Your memorandum of September 8 regarding the mobile stations at Haleakala, Maui and Kokee, Kauai has been received and the following information is submitted for your guidance:
a. The barracks at Haleakala are approximately 90% complete. The garage and truck shelter, one of which is necessary to house the mobile unit, is now being designed.
b. The barracks at Kokee are approximately 10% complete. The garage and truck shelter at this station are also being designed.
2. Work on these islands is being expedited and as soon as it is possible for the mobile units to be sent to these stations you will be notified.

[Stamped:] From File: Signal 676.3 AWS Miscellaneous AWS.

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

INTER-STAFF ROUTING SLIP

The Inter-Staff Routing Slip is for use of the Department Staff including the Department C/A and the B&LDO. It will be used solely for Departmental Staff inter-communication.

This slip and accompanying papers, when transferred from one Staff Office to another, will be forwarded to the interested Staff section direct, with the exception that matters concerning personnel will be routed through the Adjutant General unless a policy has been established. The Staff section originating a routing slip will fill in the subject and at the end of the 1st Indorsement list accompanying papers. Notation of enclosures added subsequently will be made by the responsible office at the end of its indorsement. Indorsements hereon will be numbered in sequence and initialed by the officer in charge or an officer authorized to sign for him.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. of Ind. From and Date</th>
<th>To</th>
<th>Subject: Proposed Installation of Six Mobile RDF Units on Island of Oahu</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1st Ind Sig O 14 Aug 41   | G-S| 1. It is proposed to install the six mobile RDF units recently received by this Department in temporary alert positions until the permanent sites have been completed. This temporary installation is expected to accomplish the following: 
   a. Provide complete RDF coverage around the island of Oahu with multiple coverage south, southwest, and west of Pearl Harbor. 
   b. Provide bona fide RDF intelligence to the Information Center at Fort Shafter in lieu of the "canned" messages now in use. 
   c. Provide facilities for the training of RDF personnel on actual RDF equipment and under simulated War conditions. 
   d. Develop accuracy and speed to reduce the time lag between RDF unit and plotting table. |

2. The following is a list of proposed station sites, together with the reasons prompting their recommendation: 
   a. PUKU PALAILAI—coverage to the west and south—convenient to a suitable road net, C&FC cable, and messing and quartering facilities. 
   b. WAIAIA (KANEILLO PT.)—coverage to the west—convenient to a suitable road net, C and FC cable, and messing and quartering facilities. 
   c. KAWAILOA—coverage to north and northwest—convenient to a suitable road net, C and FC cable, and messing and quartering facilities. 
   d. KAAWA—coverage to the east and northeast—convenient to road net, C and FC—will require field mess, however, site chosen is on a Military Reservation. 
   e. KOLO HEAD—coverage to the east and southeast—convenient to road net, C and FC cable, and messing and quartering facilities. |

[Stamped:] From File: Signal 6763 AWS Station Locations (Oahu).

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

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<th>To</th>
<th>Subject: Proposed Installation of Six Mobile RDF Units on Island of Oahu</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Ind Con Sig O 14 Aug 41</td>
<td>G-3</td>
<td>1. FORT SHAPIER—covers the south and southwest. It is desired to utilise this set to train antenna riggers, van drivers, etc., consequently it will be shifted from its alert position from time to time. The sector covered by this set is also covered by two other stations, consequently it is considered the best set on which to train the rigging personnel thus keeping all other stations at alert status.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3. All sites chosen are on Military Reservations and have been located close to other Army installations. It is proposed to use the existing cable system for communication inasmuch as no AWS communication equipment has been received by this Dept to date.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4. This office is considering the use of a mobile station on the Haleakala Road on the island of Maui. The temporary occupation of the CCC camp on Haleakala will become feasible upon receipt of the AWS communications equipment by this Dept. This station would cover the gap created by the mountains on Molokai and western Maui.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5. The erection of temporary stations on Makapuu Point and Diamond Head have been carefully considered, however, the problem of suitable roads to the station sites precludes their use at this time. The use of these positions would require widening the turns on the Makapuu road and enlarging the tunnel into Diamond Head and improving the road up to the rim. Adequate coverage can be obtained from a position on Koko Head which is conveniently situated with respect to roads, communications, and utilities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3 Incis. #1-Map showing station sites, #2-Map showing area covered, #3-Memo C-8 to Sig O 12 Aug 41.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[Stamped:] From File: Signal 6763 AWS Station Locations (Oahu).

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

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No. of Ind.
From and Date  To  Subject: Proposed installation of six mobile RDF units on Island of Oahu
24 Ind. G-3  Sig O  Installations proposed in 1st R/S endorsement have been approved by Department Commander.
15 Aug 41

[Stamped:] From File: Signal 6763 AWS Station Locations (Oahu).

C/S to Sig O 6/12/41

Confirming all instructions of DC 6 AWS sets to be installed at Makapuu Head, Koko Head and Diamond Head for training at once.

Incl 3

PHILIP HAYES,
Colonel, G. S. C.,
Chief of Staff.

[Stamped:] From File: Signal 6763 AWS, Station Locations (Oahu).

[Copy]

MEMO C/S to Sig O 8/12/41

Confirming all instructions of DC 6 AWS sets to be installed at Makapuu Head, Koko Head and Diamond Head for training at once.

PHILIP HAYES,
Col., G. S. C.

Incl. #3

COPY

INCLOSURE E

[IMMEDIATE ACTION—SECRET]

By Authority of Chief Signal Officer

Date 7/23/41 Initials CF

Address Reply To
DIRECTOR
Signal Corps
Laboratories
Refer to FM (SCL) Proj. 12-8

ADDRESS:
Mail: Red Bank, N. J.
Express and Freight: Little Silver, N. J.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
SIGNAL CORPS LABORATORIES,
Fort Monmouth, July 23, 1941.

Subject: Shipment of Equipment.

To: Commanding Officer, Hawaiian Signal Depot, Fort Shafter, T. H.

1. The following shipment left these laboratories as indicated below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Consignee</th>
<th>Method</th>
<th>Date of Departure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Six (6) Radio Sets SCR-270-B, Serial Nos. 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, and 16.</td>
<td>Commanding Officer, Hawaiian Signal Depot, Port of Embarkation, San Francisco, California</td>
<td>Rail to</td>
<td>July 22, 1941</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. An officer courier and armed enlisted guards accompanied this shipment to Port of Embarkation, San Francisco, California.

3. For your information this shipment consists of the following units:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Dimensions</th>
<th>Weight</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Six (6) Operating Trucks K-30, 21,595 lbs. each | 25' x 10'7" x 8'2" | 25' x 10'7" x 8'2"
| Six (6) Power Trucks K-31, 24,345 lbs. each | 25' x 10'7" x 8'2" | 25' x 10'7" x 8'2"
| Six (6) Stake Body Trucks K-33, 10,125 lbs. each | 26'6" x 8'10" x 8'4" | 26'6" x 8'10" x 8'4"
| Six (6) Antenna Trailers K-22-B, 14,275 lbs. each | 20'4" x 9'10" x 8' | 20'4" x 9'10" x 8'|
| Six (6) Prime Movers K-32, 10,426 lbs. each | 10'2" x 10' x 8' | 10'2" x 10' x 8'|

Total thirty (30) units: 488,560 lbs.
For the Director:
[Stamped:] From File: Signal 676.3 AWS  Unit Equipment SCR 270 Section I.
Leon Fields,
Leon Fields,
Captain, Signal Corps,
Adjutant.

ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD EXHIBIT No. 58
[SECRET]

REPORT ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN AWS IN HAWAII

Prepared by Signal Office Central Pacific Base Command 31 August 1944

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   b. Action in HD.
   a. Negotiations with the D of L.
   b. Negotiations with the WD.
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3. Opana, Oahu.
4. Manawahua, Oahu (Fixed).
5. Makapuu, Oahu (Changed to Ulupau Head Early in 1941).
CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

SECTION V

INSTALLATION AND USE OF FIRST SIX SCR–270–R MOBILE UNITS

1. General.
2. Original Station Locations.
3. Establishments of Temporary Information Center.
4. Tests prior to December 7, 1941.
5. AWS Activities on December 7, 1941.

[1] SECTION I—INITIAL PHASE (15 DECEMBER 1939 TO 28 MAY 1941)

1. Original War Department Directive

The plan of the War Department to establish Aircraft Warning Service in the Hawaiian Islands was first indicated in a letter dated December 15, 1939, by the Secretary of War to the Commanding General Hawaiian Department. This letter outlined the basic principles involved, and suggested the following aircraft detector station locations, based on a map study made by the Office of the Chief Signal Officer:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Station No.</th>
<th>Located on</th>
<th>Geographical Designation</th>
<th>Elevation in feet</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Nishu</td>
<td>Kaio</td>
<td>985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Kauai</td>
<td>Waoшин</td>
<td>852</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Oahu</td>
<td>Pun Kawee</td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Oahu</td>
<td>Taalala</td>
<td>208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Kahalawae</td>
<td>Pun Mowii</td>
<td>1161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Maui</td>
<td>Kailuku</td>
<td>3456</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Hawaii</td>
<td>Pun Oho</td>
<td>3523</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Hawaii</td>
<td>Kane Nui</td>
<td>2932</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The letter further directed that a plan for the establishment of an AWS in the Hawaiian Department be submitted to the War Department not later than 1 May 1940. Inclosure #1 to this report shows the original War Department directive.

2. Appointment of a Board of Officers for AWS Planning

a. On receipt of the above letter from the WD the C/S, Hawaiian Department, directed a board of officers be formed. (See Inclosure #2.) In a letter dated 15 January 1940 Headquarters Hawaiian Department formed the Board of Officers. It consisted of the following members:

Colonel G. L. Van Deusen, Signal Corps, President
Lt. Colonel John H. Linds, OAC Member
Lt. Colonel William E. Lynd, (Major), A. C. 18th Pursuit Group, Member
Capt. R. J. Fleming, Jr., C. E., Asst. Dept Engr. Member
Recruee, without vote, a Signal Corps Officer on duty at Dept. Hq. to be designated by the Dept. Signal Officer

b. The board was directed to prepare a plan for an Aircraft Warning Service for the Hawaiian Department and to be submitted to Headquarters Hawaiian Department not later than 1 April 1940. (See Inclosure #3.)


a. The AWS Board held its first meeting 18 January 1940. Details of the activities of the board between that date and 19 March 1940 are contained in the Preliminary Board Report which was submitted 15 March 1940 by the Signal Officer to the Chief of Staff, Hawaiian Department. (See Inclosure #4.)

b. The final report of the Board of Officers together with the letter of transmittal to the War Department, dated 17 April 1940 is shown in Inclosure #5.
The installation of one fixed and seven mobile stations was recommended to the WD as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group Priority</th>
<th>Priority Within Group</th>
<th>Island</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Oahu</td>
<td>Mt. Kaala</td>
<td>Fixed SCR-271.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Kauai</td>
<td>Vicinity of Kokee</td>
<td>Mobile SCR-270.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Maui</td>
<td>Haleakula</td>
<td>Incl. Ctr.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Oahu</td>
<td>Hickam Field</td>
<td>Mobile SCR-270.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Oahu</td>
<td>Nuuanu Pali</td>
<td>Mobile SCR-270.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Oahu</td>
<td>Manawatu</td>
<td>Mobile SCR-270.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Hawaii</td>
<td>Mauna Loa</td>
<td>Mobile SCR-270.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Kauai</td>
<td>Note: A</td>
<td>Mobile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Maui</td>
<td>Note: A</td>
<td>Mobile</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: A. To be used as an auxiliary station in another location while the Group I station on the same island is operating, and as a substitute in the event of failure of the Group "I" station.

c. The project as outlined in the report mentioned in (b) above was approved by the War Department in the 4th Indorsement dated 27 June 1940 to the above mentioned letter with the following exceptions:

1. Consideration be given to the establishment of the Information Center at Ailamunu rather than Hickam Field.
2. Station at Kokee Kauai approved as a fixed instead of a mobile station.
3. Station at Haleakula, Maui approved as a fixed instead of a mobile station.

The War Department advised that $1,465,975 was included in the FY 1941 appropriation for the establishment of an Aircraft Warning Service in the Hawaiian Department. Approximately $500,000 of this amount was immediately available for expenditure for engineer construction and other purposes in the Hawaiian Islands.

a. The Adjutant General's Office Hawaiian Department notification of War Department approval to the Signal Office, 9 July 1940. The Signal Office notified the C/S, 10 July 1940, that the plan recommended by the Department Commander had been approved by WD with minor changes. The Department Engineer was next notified of the project approval and in an indorsement dated 13 July 1940 be indicated:

1. District Engineer was ready to proceed as soon as the funds were received.
2. Surveys were being initiated on the Kailua cableway and station by troop labor of the Third Engineers.
3. Selection of location of information center is necessary before estimating cost of the center can start.

In a letter dated 13 July 1940, Headquarters Hawaiian Department, Department Engineer informed the Chief of Engineers, Washington, D. C, the action taken on the Aircraft Warning Service, Hawaiian Islands. In the 1st Indorsement to this letter, the Chief of Engineers indicates funds in the amount of $50,000 to initiate construction of Aircraft Warning Service were transmitted to the Hawaiian Department by letter of 24 July 1940.

5. AWS Plan for HD. (Result of Board Report and WD Decision).

The Aircraft Warning Service will consist of a net of eight stations three of which are fixed stations and five mobile. North and west limits on the net are determined by the stations on the island of Kauai and the South and East limits of the net by the stations on Hawaii.
### Congressional Investigation Pearl Harbor Attack

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Station Location</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fixed (271)</td>
<td>Kokee, Kauai</td>
<td>Primary station</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fixed (271)</td>
<td>Mt. Kasa, Oahu</td>
<td>Primary station</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fixed (271)</td>
<td>Haleakala, Maui</td>
<td>Primary station</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobile (270)</td>
<td>Puu Makaawahine, Oahu</td>
<td>Relieve Kasa station of the necessity of continual search.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobile (270)</td>
<td>Nuuanu Pali, Oahu</td>
<td>Coverage of dead space between Kasa and Haleakala stations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobile (270)</td>
<td>Mauna Loa, Hawaii</td>
<td>Extends coverage in the South and East direction.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The remaining two mobile stations have not been assigned a primary location. They will be stationed on Kauai and Mau to relieve the fixed stations on these islands from continually searching in a portion of their fields. The Information Center will be located at Almanu. (See Incl #7.)

[1] Section II—Details of Action Taken in the Initial Phase

The following paragraphs, #1 and #2 list inclosures chronologically while the inclosures in themselves do not form a story, they contain pertinent information closely related to the completion of the HD AWS Program and are listed below as references.

1. AWS Construction
   a. Information received in HD for AWS Construction
      (1) Incl #8. 9 February 1940. Information on fixed detectors, SCR 271.
      (2) Incl #9. 5 August 1940. Information on design and construction of AWS buildings.
      (3) Incl #30. 27 August 1940. Instruction books for SCR 270 & CR 271 & SCR 289 have been forwarded to CG, HD.
      (4) Incl #10. 14 February 1941. Drawings for Oahu, Man, Kauai & Hawaii.
      (5) Incl #11. 17 February 1941. Approved drawings for mobile station shelters.
      (6) Incl #12. 19 August 1941. Instructions for the erection of towers and buildings used in AWS installations.
      (7) Incl #13. 8 September 1941. Instruction of erection of 36 foot tower and transmitter building.
      (8) Incl #14. 4 November 1941. Drawings for fixed detector equipment AWS.
      b. Funds
         (1) Incl #15. 20 July 1940. Funds to be forwarded to District Engr to permit the initiation of Field Surveys for AWS sites.
         (2) Incl #16. 23 July 1940. Estimate of Engr cost for AWS construction.
         (3) Incl #17. 24 July 1940. District Engr receives $50,000.00 to initiate AWS construction.
      c. Construction
         (1) Incl #19. 8 January 1941. Funds in the amount of $20,000.00 be made available to the Engrs. by the QM for the immediate construction of mobile shelters for SCR 270's—no funds at present available for the completion for this project.
         (2) Incl #20. 5 February 1941. Net cost estimate for AWS installations.
         (3) Incl #21. 8 February 1941. Funds for AWS.
         (4) Incl #22. 17 July 1941. Funds in the amount of $40,000.00 are on hand for the construction of mobilization buildings, radio shelters.

2. Equipment
   (1) Incl #23. 24 October 1940. Separation of detector bldg & radio communication bldg.
   (2) Incl #24. 7 November 1940. Construction of Aircraft Warning Station.
   (3) Incl #25. 28 November 1940. Misc. information on AWS construction regarding Col. Wymans trip to mainland.
   (4) Incl #26. 26 February 1941. Housing of 9th Sig Serv Co.
   (5) Incl #27. 11 April 1941. QM construction of AWS shelters.
   (6) Incl #28. 1 May 1941. Change: Engrs to construct AWS shelters.
(7) Incl #29. 23 July 1941. Early completion of AWS Kokee & Haleakala.

(1) Incl #30. 27 August 1940. Estimated arrival of detector equipment: "Much before next June (1941)" by CSO.

(2) Incl #31. 6 February 1941. Informal letter from Col Van Deusen telling Col. Powell that detector sets (both fixed & mobile) probably will arrive the fall of 1941. This is [3] due to the higher priority assigned other defense areas.

(3) Incl #32. 17 February 1941. A letter from the Secretary of War informed the Secretary of Navy that detector equipment would be available in HD by 1 June 1941 and that it could be installed in the various stations immediately.

(4) Incl #33. 20 May 1941. HD receipt of several packages (marked for AWS) containing conduit, radio equipment & accessories.

(5) Incl #34. 2 June 1941. Action has been taken to secure additional long range detectors.

(6) Incl #35. 13 June 1941. Request for information on date portable detectors can be expected—supplies the information: Three fixed units now here. Answered, mobile detectors will be ready for shipment to HD during 19 July 1941. Towers and buildings for two SCR 271 & one SCR 271A have been shipped (19 July 1941).

(7) Incl #36. 21 July 1941. Information received that six fixed and six mobile detector sets will be shipped to HD from mainland by end of July 1941.

(8) Incl #37. 13 August 1941. AWS equipment is ready for shipment from states.

(9) Incl #38. 16 August 1941. 2nd Ind. "Items (fixed detectors) referred to in basic communications were delivered to Signal Property Officer, AWS, Ft. Shafter on 15 June 1941. (Note: This shipment did not include towers and buildings. See Incl #35).

2. Status of AWS Equipment (Monthly Reports)

a. In a radio dated 26 August 1941 the CSO requested monthly radio reports on the status of installation of Signal AWS equipment in the HD. These monthly reports were to cover the percentage completion of the following items: Power, Detector, communication-radio, telephone. The following sheet lists these monthly reports in tabular form:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Project numbers</th>
<th>Overall</th>
<th>Power</th>
<th>Detector</th>
<th>Comm-radio</th>
<th>Telephone</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kokee, Kauai</td>
<td>H-1113</td>
<td>0 0 0 5 5</td>
<td>0 0 10 0</td>
<td>0 0 0 0</td>
<td>0 0 0 10</td>
<td>0 0 0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haleakula, W. Slope</td>
<td>H-1123</td>
<td>0 0 10 10 10</td>
<td>0 10 10 10</td>
<td>0 0 0 0</td>
<td>0 0 0 0</td>
<td>0 0 0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kokee, Road</td>
<td>H-1123</td>
<td>0 0 0 0 0</td>
<td>0 0 0 0</td>
<td>0 0 0 0</td>
<td>0 0 0 0</td>
<td>0 0 0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haleakula, Maui</td>
<td>H-1149</td>
<td>0 0 0 0 0</td>
<td>0 0 0 0</td>
<td>0 0 0 0</td>
<td>0 0 0 0</td>
<td>0 0 0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information Center (Permanent)</td>
<td>H-1149</td>
<td>90 0 0 0 0</td>
<td>0 0 0 0</td>
<td>0 0 0 0</td>
<td>0 0 0 0</td>
<td>0 0 0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information Center (Temporary)</td>
<td></td>
<td>90 0 0 0 0</td>
<td>0 0 0 0</td>
<td>0 0 0 0</td>
<td>0 0 0 0</td>
<td>0 0 0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mt. Kaala, Oahu</td>
<td>H-1155</td>
<td>10 0 0 0 0</td>
<td>0 0 0 0</td>
<td>0 0 0 0</td>
<td>25 25 25 25</td>
<td>0 0 0 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manawalu, Oahu</td>
<td>H-1157</td>
<td>0 0 0 0 0</td>
<td>0 0 0 0</td>
<td>0 0 0 0</td>
<td>0 0 0 0</td>
<td>0 0 0 0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(See Inc. #39 & #40.)
3. Signal Communication Project Submitted to the War Department.

a. Initial discussion regarding signal communications. On 30 July 1940 the Signal Officer, HD advised the Chief Signal Officer of the Signal communication requirements included in the Original Board Report, and raised the question as to whether or not the necessary radio equipment was to be procured locally. The Chief Signal Officer advised on 10 September 1940 that the radio equipment would be procured by that office, but that a complete project should be submitted to insure that all of the equipment would be furnished. (See incl. 41)

b. Project for Signal Communications. On 17 October 1940 the Signal Officer, Hawaiian Department, furnished the Chief Signal Officer with additional details of Radio requirements. (See incl. 42.) In a reply dated 17 January 1941 the Chief Signal Officer indicated that the radio transmitters requested could be furnished, but that funds were not available to procure certain receivers and loud-speakers requested by HD. The detailed requirements at each of the sites were outlined in the 2nd Ind. of the Signal Officer, HD to the Chief Signal Officer on 31 May 1941. (Note: Although dated 31 May, this indorsement was not mailed until about 26 June 1941. (See incl. 42.) Following is a list of items included in this project and an indication of the action taken by the Chief Signal Officer in his reply 3rd Ind. dated 27 September 1941:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM</th>
<th>ACTION BY HD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wire Comm. — Mt. Kaala, Oahu</td>
<td>Approved by separate correspondence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; &quot; Kokee, Kauai</td>
<td>Approved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; &quot; Nuuanu Pali, Oahu</td>
<td>Disapproved (site abandoned)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; &quot; Haleakula, Maui</td>
<td>Approved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; &quot; AWS Info Center, Oahu</td>
<td>Disapproved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; &quot; Teletype</td>
<td>Disapproved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; &quot; Manawaihuia, Oahu</td>
<td>Approved (no requirements)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio Comm.</td>
<td>Approved</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Chief Signal Officer disapproved the AWS Information Center and Teletype requirements because he had not been informed of War Department approval of Information Center. In reply on 17 October 1941 the Signal Officer, HD, informed the Chief Signal Officer that the Information Center was already under construction at Fort Shafter and quoted the correspondence wherein the Adjutant General has been so informed. There was no further exchange of correspondence on this point.

c. Additional information on the subject of Signal Communications is included in inclosures #43, #44 and #45.

(2) Mt. Kaala was approved as a fixed station by 4th Ind. of WD 27 June 40 to HD 17 April 1940 (see incl. #5).

a. Negotiation with Commanding General, Schofield Barracks, T. H.

(1) The CG Schofield Barracks was notified in letter, dated 17 July 1940, that the HD was installing, with WD approval, a radio aircraft detection station on Mt. Kaala. Further it would be necessary to install a cableway to the summit of Mt. Kaala. The route of the cableway would start near the firebreak trail making it necessary to permanently withdraw a portion of the artillery range in order to insure the cableway would not be damaged. (See incl. #46)

(2) In a 1st Ind., dated 7 August 1940, the CG Schofield Barracks, pointed out that 90% of the artillery fire is concentrated in the area that is being requested withdrawn. The range, thus reduced for firing, would be of little value as an artillery range. The training value of the range is so great that the CG recommended that every effort be made to find a route for the cableway that would not curtail the range. (See incl. #46).

(3) The HD reply, 2nd Ind. dated 17 August 1940 and a letter dated 20 November 1940, informed CG, Schofield Barracks, that after the study of additional aerial photographs the proposed location of the lower tower terminus of the cableway had been moved west of the firebreak trail. (See incl. #46).

b. Communication. In a letter, dated 7 September 1940, the HD submitted to the CG a signal project for the installation of a 11 pair-19 gauge submarine cable to the AWS Station on Mt. Kaala. (See incl. #47).

c. Action in HD

(1) Preliminary survey of access road completed by 12 December 1941. (See incl. #48).

(2) Work on access road to lower terminus of cableway to start (approx.) 1 February 1941. (See incl. #49).
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(3) Additional information on proposed communication building for Mt. Kaala, 31 January 1941. (See Incl #50).

ALICE ANSLEY, who resides at 938 East Edgemore Road, Los Angeles, Cali-
(4) Proposed plan of buildings for Mt. Kaala are approved, 6 March 1941.
(See Incl #51).

(7) Survey of access road started 4 March 1941. (See Incl #52.)

(6) Cableway equipment awarded to Interstate Equipment Corp., for a two
cableway system for $57,755.00. Completion time is a 100 calendar days. 28
April 1941 (See Incl #54).

(7) Priority of Kauai cableway changed to "I-C." 28 June 1941. (See Incl
(8) 21 February 1942. Aerial Tramway will be finished in about five weeks.
(See Incl #56).

5. Kokee, Kauai

a. Negotiations with T. H.

(1) In a letter, dated 18 July 1940, General Herron, Commanding, informed
the Acting Governor of Hawaii that Congress had authorized the construction of
certain military installations on the Island of Kauai as a part of the nation-
wide defensive program. The CG further pointed out that the site on Kauai was
located in the land section of Honopu, Na Pali Kona Forest Reserve. Permission
was requested to enter this reserve for the purpose of executing the necessary
instrumental surveys. Further cooperation was requested by the HD in trans-
mitting the necessary territorial land to the WD. (See Incl #57).

(2) The Board of Commissioners of Agriculture and Forestry, in a letter
dated 23 July 1940, granted the Army permission to make surveys for the location of
the site. Mr. F. H. Lacey, President of the Board, indicated this question of
"turning over territorial land" to the WD would be taken up at a board meeting
within a week. (See Incl #57).

b. Action In HD

(1) Reconnaissance: 26 September (See Incl #60).

(2) Plot plan station X (Detector Site).
(a) Approved: 20 March 1941. (See Incl #61).

(3) Plot plan Base Camp.
(a) Approved: 20 March 1941 (See Incl #61).

(4) Construction:
(a) 2 July 1941. Due to the shortage of local carpenters, it was necessary
to employ Japanese (American Citizens) carpenters for the construction of
AWS camps at Kokee. (See Incl #62.)

(b) On 30 September 1941, the District Engineer transmitted fabrication
drawings for this AWS Powerhouse building for radio at station X to the
Field Area at Kauai. (See Incl #63).

(c) On 22 November 1941, Signal Corps men were shipped to Kauai to install
the communication cable. This project was completed 11 December 1941 (see Incl #64.)
(d) 2 December 1941. Status of construction. The following is report submitted by Lt. Ralph Caceres on his trip to Kauai 3 December 1941. (See Incl #65).

1. Operating building not complete at station X.
2. Set 2 power units at station X.
3. Set 1 power unit at Base camp. The approved power units to be furnished by the Engineers were 2 diesels units for Radio Communication building at the base camp (not completed).
4. Distribution cable is not present for lighting system. #2 cond. park way needed to make set work.
5. 100 foot tower is up.
6. Heaters are at Honolulu.
7. Water trailer at Maui.

(c) Interview with Captain Ralph Caceres on the status of construction during his trip to Kauai 3 December 1941—Capt. Caceres and Sgt. Richardson went over to Kauai:
1. Buildings are not installed—Concrete floors poured for main operating building but not for the power building.
2. Tower and turntable were up.
3. Mr. Jones in charge. Delay in putting up because of no tower plans.
4. Barracks completion—No windows.
5. The three LeHoi's were there on December 3rd.
6. The Diesels (International Generators) for base camp obtained, sometime after December 19.
7. On December 3, cable crew were installing cable between unit and base camp. M/Sgt Cleary installed cable. Cable installed by 11 December 1941. (See Incl #64).
8. Radio station on air—Mr. Nolts went over at that time—before Radar on air first part of January.
10. February 1, 1942 mess going. Previously mess at CCC Camp.
11. February 19, 1942 Carcuses and two men went over to Kauai.
12. Barracks about 40% complete.
13. Water system, non existent.
15. No heating system.
16. Radar transmitter not up.
17. Power plant not up.
18. Transmitter building erected between 19 December 41, and 22 January 1942 under Lt. Caceres' supervision.

(f) 19 December 1941. Lt. Caceres sent to Kokee for period of 14 days for duty in connection with AWS (See Incl #66).

(g) 20 December 1941. Status of AWS on Kauai. (See Incl #67).
1. Operations bldg. will be completed in one or two days.
2. Radio communications building in three or four days.
3. Area Engineer instructed to equip building.
4. Diesel plants will not be delivered until February 1942. It will be necessary to use local procurement.

(5) Equipment Status: July 1941. Equipment on hand at Signal Corps area for Kokee. (See Incl #68).
(a) 3 ea Power units.
(b) 2 ea Gasoline storage tanks, 4,000 gallons.

[1] (c) 1 ea SCR-271-A less tower, building and control motors.

(d) Tower and building were shipped from Ft. Monmouth during the week of 15 July 1941 (See Incl #40 & #70).

(1) Tower Installations
(a) 20 November 1943. (See Incl #69). Request for tower and details of tower foundation from CSO.
(b) (See Incl #70). Building and towers for two SCR-271 and 1 SCR-271-A will be shipped from Ft. Monmouth, week of 15 July 1941.
(c) 6 August 1941. Construction of AWS tower foundation can commence as soon as plans are received. (See Incl #70).
(d) 17 September 1941. (See Incl #72 & #98). Tower and building material shipped to Port Allen, Kauai.

6. Haleakala. The Haleakala Station was approved by the WD as a fixed detector in the fourth indorsement to the HD letter dated 17 April 1940. (See Incl #5).
a. Negotiations with the National Park Service.

(1) On receiving notification of the WD recommendations the HD sent a letter (see Inc. #73) dated 15 July 1940, to Mr. Edward G. Wingate, Superintendent of the Hawaii National Park, informing him that Congress had authorized the construction of certain military installations on the island of Maui as a part of the nation wide defensive program. Further the site of the installation on Maui was to be located at the highest point of Haleakula in the National Park. The CG pointed out that the HD intended to request:

(a) Transfer to the jurisdiction of the WD of an area at the highest point of Haleakula (probably an additional area farther down the mountain near the existing road).

(b) Transfer of a right of way for a motor road from the end of the existing road to this highest point.

(2) Mr. Wingate in reply (see Inc. #73 to General Herron on 20 July 1940 stated:

(a) Approval for the use of National Park land must come from the Department of Interior rather than Superintendent Hawaii National Park.

(b) The CG’s request is being forwarded to the Director of the National Park Service.

(c) Permission is granted to make the necessary instrumental surveys of the proposed site in Haleakula National Park.

(3) In a letter dated 17 October 1940 Edward G. Wingate, Superintendent of National Park, requested the following information in order to properly evaluate the WD’s request for transfer of National Park land:

(a) Use that the National Park land will be put.

(b) Exact location.

(c) Approximate acreage.

(d) Proposed structures.

(e) Number and location for other sites planned for island of Hawaii and Maui.

Mr. Wingate points out as in the case of the bombing range withdrawal, the Department of Interior feels that there must be available other sites outside of the park which would serve the defense needs equally well. (See Inc. #74).

(4) In a letter dated 12 November 1940, Mr. Wingate, Superintendent HNPS, request that the CG consider another site on Haleakula just outside the park boundary and only 5 or 6 feet lower than the Red Hill site—location of the proposed site. (See Inc. #75).

(5) The CG answer (letter dated 3 January 1941) to Mr. Wingate informed him that the question of sites had been thoroughly studied with his desires in mind. The results of the study, however, indicate that to locate the station on Kokelekole rather than on Red Hill would result in a very greatly decreased field of coverage for this important installation, and therefore it was deemed advisable to use Red Hill. Not only was the site on top of Haleakula Red Hill reconsidered, but also the camp site further down the mountain. After a thorough study of all possible camp sites it was decided that the best location would be one quarter mile inside the park boundary on the east of the road up the mountain. (See Inc. #75).

(6) Therefore, the HD is requesting the WD to open negotiations with the Department of Interior for permission to extend the existing road on Haleakula to Red Hill and for the withdrawal of a small area at Red Hill and an area about 40 acres for a camp site near the point where the road up the mountain crosses the park boundary. (See Inc. #75).

(7) In radio (see Inc. #76) dated 10 March 1941, Mr. Wingate informed the CG that the D of I approved the use of the proposed Haleakula installation and issued a Special Use Permit. The Army would:

(a) Expand the present CCC facilities as required for the accommodation of some 40 men and two officers.

(b) Equipment shed, and Officers quarters to be constructed adjacent to present CCC location.

(c) These buildings were to remain for Park use when the Army purposes have been served.

(d) Preliminary building plans to be prepared by Army with cooperation superintendent Hawaii NP and forwarded through him for approval by Director of National Park Service.
(e) Red Hill installations to be under similar special use permit and plans approvals for building handled similar to that for camp.

(f) Plans accompanying General Herron's letter, dated 3 January 1941, are approved. (See Inc. #75.)

(8) General Short, in letter dated 27 March 1941, submitted the formal request complete with plans, maps, to the Superintendent HNP. This formal request is for permission to install certain military equipment on Red Hill in the Haleakala section of the Hawaii National Park. It is requested that the necessary action with National Park Service and the Department of Interior for the issuance of a Special Use Permit permitting these installations on Red Hill. (See Inc. #77.)

(9) In a radio the Superintendent, HNP notified the CG that the plans were approved and the special use permit covering the Red Hill location will be issued soon. (See Inc. #77.)

(10) The D of I issued a special use permit effective 9 April 1941 for detector site at Red Hill on Haleakala. (See Inc. #78.)

(11) The formal request for the permission to construct and operate a base camp within the Haleakala Section of the HNP was submitted to the Superintendent HNP by the CG HD in letter dated 26 April 1941. This request is for an area of approximately six acres. The request is complete with plans and maps. (See Inc. #80.)

(12) In letter dated 16 May 1941, Mr. Wingate, Superintendent HNP, notified General Short that the CCC camp had been abandoned for the use of the Army. (See Inc. #81.)

(13) In letter dated 27 May 1941, General Short acknowledged Mr. Wingate's permission to use CCC camp and informed him that the WD had notified the HD of the approval of the D of I and the issuance of a "special use permit" would be forthcoming. (See Inc. #81.)

(14) The D of I issued a special use permit effective 17 May 1941 for the use of the camp site specified by CG in Inc. #80. This special use permit specified certain requirements to be satisfied by the Army in compliance thereof. (See Inc. #82.)


(1) On notification that Mr. Wingate was forwarding the HD requests to the Directors of the National Park Service, the HD prepared a letter the 27th July 1940 to TAG informing WD that the Superintendent of Hawaii National Parks was referring the question of securing sites in Haleakala, to the Department of Interior. (See Inc. #84.)

(2) The HD recommended that the WD open negotiations with the Department of Interior for securing the National Park land (at Haleakala, Maui and Mauna Loa, Hawaii to be used as detector sites). The WD in a radiogram dated 14 September 1940, informed the HD that the transfer of land at Haleakala and Maui and Mauna Loa for AWS stations had been discussed with the Department of Interior. (See Inc. #84.)

(3) In a 4th indorsement (See Inc. #84 dated 16 September 1940 to the HD letter 27 July 1940 (mentioned above)) the AG advises that careful consideration must be given the Department of Interior Policy in the study of the site in National Park for these AWS stations, and for the other installations (See Inc. #2 to this letter). In a letter from the Assistant Secretary of the Interior to the Secretary of War, the Interior Department policy is stated:

(a) The Department of Interior desires to cooperate in this matter.

(b) The DI is opposed to the permanent transfer of any additional land from Hawaii National Park for military purposes, unless the exigencies of military strategy make it necessary for national defense.

(c) It is also opposed to granting authority for using any part of the park temporarily therefor, unless it has been determined, after careful studies have been made that suitable land for such purposes cannot be obtained outside of the park boundaries in a manner and time reasonably necessary to meet the problems of national defense.

(d) The temporary use of any part of Hawaii National Park by the WD would be approved by the D. I. only after the submission of plans indicating how much land is to be used and the types of roads, structures, etc., which it is proposed to construct thereon. Such plans would receive prompt consideration.

(e) Should the WD request authority to use any portion of Hawaii National Park temporarily for national defense purposes, the D. I. will...
require that, when it is no longer needed, it will be placed in the same condition as when authority for such use was authorized.

[16] (4) In Par #3 of the 2nd R/S Ind., (See Incl #84) the Engineers pointed out:
(a) The preliminary board took all possible sites into consideration.
(b) Effectiveness of AWS depends upon the height at which the station is located; the summit of Haleakala is the only feasible site in Maui.
(c) The upper terminus of the truck trail on Mauna Loa is the only feasible site on Hawaii.
(d) Protracted negotiations with D. I. for fixed station site will delay the start of construction until fiscal year is over.
(e) The money for the installation of these AWS stations is all fiscal year 1941 money, and it must be spent by June 30, 1941.

(5) Based on the above reasons HD drafted another letter (See Incl #85) dated 9 October 1940 to TAG, Washington D. C. This correspondence pointed out the establishment of a mobile AW station on Haleakala is recommended for the following reasons:
(a) Best site on rim of Haleakala Crater can only be determined by field test.
(b) Limited rainfall makes local water supply impracticable.
(c) Operating personnel should not be quartered at the summit of Haleakala.
(d) The National Park Service road leading to the summit of Haleakala can be improved at reasonable cost.

(6) In the 2nd Indorsement to this letter (See Incl #85) the OCSigO advised that:
(a) Fixed station would be the most satisfactory.
(b) Decision on location of communication building should be delayed until source of water is settled.
(c) No Signal Corps funds are applicable for any additional barracks and quarters for AWS, these barracks and quarters necessary for the detachments meandering the two stations on Maui must be included under the housing project of the HD.
(d) Delivery of first SCR-270 to the HD cannot be expected before middle of May, 1941.
(e) Funds for the AWS, HD expire 30 June 1941. Time does not permit service test of equipment before sites are selected.

(7) In the fourth Indorsement (See Incl. #85) A. G. O. renders WD decision:
(a) Permanent station with quarters for the operating personnel in the communication building.
(b) Requested HD reconsider recommendation and indicate by radio (See Incl #86) whether mobile station is still recommended.

(8) Action taken by HHD on receipt of WD decision for decision:
(a) In a Memo dated 4 December 1940 (See Incl #104) to District Engineer, the Department Engineer submitted the results of a discussion based on the HD Signal Officer's (Colonel C. A. Powell) trip to Maui, General Herron made the following decision:
1. Haleakala station will be fixed type. Building on summit will consist of standard detector building, and antenna tower, standard power house, and the erection of communication buildings.
2. Communications building at summit will have only accommodations for a small caretaking detachment of five men.
3. Installation will be located on Red Hill.
4. Base camp will be located farther down the slopes of Haleakala, possibly outside the park boundaries.
5. Main communications buildings for the fixed station will be located at the Base camp and remotely controlled from detector site.
6. Consideration will be given to locating Base camp outside of National Park so that it would only be necessary to withdraw a “dumbbell shaped” plot from at the summit of Red Hill.

[18] (b) The WD was notified of HD decision by Radio 1977-7th (See Incl #86).

(10) In a 5th Indorsement (See Incl #84) to TAG, dated 3 January 1941, to a HD letter 27 July the CG informs the WD on the status of negotiations with MP's re to Haleakala and Mauna Loa sites.
(a) General Herron, Commanding, points out that the D. I. policy is, "This department is opposed to the permanent transfer of any additional land from Hawaii National Park for military purposes unless the exigencies of military strategy make it necessary for national defense." The General further stated, "In my opinion the particular land described herein is demanded by the exigencies of military strategy for national defense. The early completion of the AWS in this department is a matter of the deepest concern, not only to the Army but to the Navy. In this, Admiral Richardson personally concurred."

(11) As an answer (See Inc. #80) to this 5th indorsement the WD radio dated 3 March 1941, stated that informal discussion with the officials NFS indicates D of I is opposed to permanent transfer of any additional land in Hawaii National Park but will grant special use permit for Red Hill installation as recommended by the HD. Proposed road location appears satisfactory. The proposed telephone line is satisfactory. Park service is opposed to use of forty acre tract for camp site; suggest use of CCC spur camp in same general locality. There are some facilities at CCC camp now and a special use permit would be granted including permit to construct additional buildings and facilities with understanding that such installations will remain for park use when WD need no longer exists. Building on Red Hill to be held to a minimum. All building plans will be submitted to Superintendent Hawaii National Park to be forwarded by him to the D of I.

(12) In radio reply to the WD telegram, General Short's answer contained the following pertinent facts:

(a) Fifth Indorsement (Incl. #84) represented best thought of officers making study.

(b) Your radio, Inclosure #58, AGMO, 3 March 1941 transmitted in the clear does not appear to appreciate the seriousness of the situation.

(c) "I have personally reviewed the Haleakala situation and find that the officers responsible for this project had already thoroughly considered all the questions raised in your radiogram."

(d) AWS detector equipment is expected in June 1941 (see par. 2b).

(e) Haleakala is second most important station in the system and construction should not be delayed any further. If building plans must be submitted to D of I for its detailed examination, the completion of the Haleakala station, which is vital both to the Army and the Navy in the present situation, will be unduly delayed.

(f) "The seriousness of the situation requires that all administrative obstacles be removed; this applies not only to the Haleakala installation but also to the entire project."

(g) It is recommended that this project be decentralized and that CG be authorized to make final decision on design and layouts and such other details as may be required to expedite completion.

(13) In a reply (see Inclosure #80) to the WD radio the WD authorizes the CG to make final decision on design and layout and other details of constructions within the limitations of funds now available for AWS project in the HD and subject to the approval by the D of I for the Haleakala site. The radio further stated that the D of I positively refuses the occupancy of forty acre tract and demands that preliminary building plans be submitted. In letter (see Inclosure #89) dated 31 March 1941 the CG points out the CCC camp is inadequate that it would cost the government more to rebuild it to satisfy the Army's requirements then to build a new camp. Secondly, the D of I mainly objected to the withdrawal from MP jurisdiction of a forty acre tract of land. Thirdly, Mr. Wingate, superintendent HNP, would recommend the use of a forty acre plot by a temporary use permit. With this in mind the HD department recommended that the WD reopen informal negotiations to find out if the Departmnet of Interior would approve the temporary use of a forty acre plot.

(14) In a letter (see Inclosure #90) dated 6 March 1941, to General Marshall, Chief of Staff of the Army, General Short, Commanding for HD, points out the following pertinent facts in regard to AWS situation:

(a) Due to the present international situation the need for AWS is urgent.

(b) The Navy is vitally interested in the AWS project for the HD and are very concerned with the present inadequate warning service.

(c) The Secretary of War advised the Secretary of Navy that the AWS equipment would be received in the HD some time in June and the stations operating shortly afterwards (see Inclosure #32).
(d) Admiral Kimmel has been assured that personnel would be trained and the stations in operation within thirty days after receipt of the equipment.

(e) Due to previous radiograms the WD does not appear aware of the seriousness of the situation.

(f) The fixed station on Haleakala is one of two most important stations in the warning net.

(g) The restrictions imposed by the D of I will delay the final completion of this station.

(h) "I believe that this matter is sufficiently important to be brought to the attention of the Secretary of War to see if permission cannot be obtained from the Secretary of the Interior to construct the Haleakala Installation without the necessity of submitting details plans for consideration by the National Park Service."

(i) Defense of these islands and adequate warning for the United States Fleet is dependent upon the early completion of this Aircraft Warning Service.

(15) General Marshall, Chief of Staff of the Army, answering letter (see Inclosure #90) states:

(a) The War Department appreciates fully the necessity for the early establishment of the Aircraft Warning Service station in the Hawaiian Department. However, it will be necessary to comply with certain fixed regulations in these cases where facilities are to be established in lands pertaining to the Department of the Interior.

(b) "I have given these matters my personal attention and have conferred with officials of the National Park Service. War Department radiogram of March 12, 1941 outlines what appears to be the most practical solution at this time."

(c) Action Taken in HD

(1) Reconnaissance completed:

(a) Camp site: 9 & 10 December 1941 (see Inclosure #93)
(b) Detector Site: 9 & 10 December 1941 (see Inclosure #93)

(2) Type of Building For Detector Site:

(a) HD approval: By the 27 March 1941 (see Inclosure #77)
(b) WD approval: Not required (see Inclosure #89)
(c) D of I approval: 11 April 1941 (see Inclosures #77 & #91)

(3) Type of Buildings for Base Camp:

(a) HD approval: By the 25 April 1941 (see Inclosure #80)
(b) WD approval: Not required (see Inclosure #80)
(c) D of I approval: 17 May 1941 (see Inclosure #82)

(4) Plot Plan for AWS Station Bldg.:

(a) HD approval: 17 March 1941 (see Inclosure #94 and #95)
(b) WD approval: 18 April 1941 (see Inclosure #85)
(c) D of I approval: 8 May 1941 (see Inclosure #78)
(d) Detector Camp Completed: Unknown

(5) Plot Plan for AWS Base Camp:

(a) HD approval: 9 May 1941 (see Inclosure #95)
(b) WD approval: not required (see Inclosure #89)
(c) D of I approval: 17 May 1941 (see Inclosure #80)
(d) Base Camp Completed: Unknown

(6) Equipment Arrives in HD for Red Hill on Haleakala, Maui

(a) Electrical equipment: 15 June 1941 (see Inclosure #35)
(b) Towers and Buildings: Unknown

(7) Equipment Shipped to Maui from Oahu:

(a) Electrical Equipment: Unknown
(b) Towers and Buildings: By the 23 September 1941 (see Incl. #98)

(8) Erection of Equipment (start):

(a) Electrical Equipment: Unknown
(b) Towers and Buildings: Unknown

(9) Erection of Equipment (finish):

(a) Electrical Equipment: 15 January 1942 (approx.)
(b) Towers and Buildings: 6 December 1941 (see Inclosure #106)

(10) Bombproof: Completed: 25 April 1942. (see Inclosure #86)

(11) Station in Operation: 15 January 1942 (approx.) This station operating about middle of January 1942.
(12) Miscellaneous Information on AWS Station Red Hill:
(a) Inclosure #83, #97. Discussion of the Water System for AWS Camp at Haleakula.
(b) Inclosure #60, #99, #105. Lt. Krancus made a trip to Maui in December 1941. The following is believed to be Lt. Krancus's report on the status of AWS at Maui. See Inclosure #105. This inclosure falls in the files just ahead of a letter dated 20 December 1941.
   1. All equipment at the detector site, Red Hill, is set; wiring may start immediately.
   2. The power shelter at the detector is not completed.
   3. The dam (see Inclosure #83 & #97) is built; some of the water storage tanks are up and primed today, but the pipe line is only partially in for the Haleakula water supply. It is necessary for the Engineers to haul the water supply 30 miles at present.
   4. The temperature runs very cold here there is a block of ice on the water barrel. At present there is no heater in use.
   5. The base camp lacks power units; they are not available.
   6. The splinter proof shelters are adequate.
(c) Inclosure #106. Installation of AWS equipment may start on Haleakula station. Status of equipment (25 December 1941): Power house lacks windows, water pipeline requires approximately 10 days for completion.
(d) Inclosure #107. Bombproof at the Base Camp.

7. Information Center
   a. The Selection of the Fort Shafter Site. The original project for an AWS in the Hawaiian Department submitted on 17 April 1940 (see Inclosure #5) called for the establishment of an Information Center on Hickam Field. The War Department did not approve of this location and in their 4th Indorsement, dated 17 June 1940, of the above mentioned letter suggested that the Information Center be placed at the Department Command Post at Alamaunu. A supplementary report of the AWS Board of Officers, dated 25 July 1940, recommended the establishment of the AWS Information Center at Alamaunu, and that the exact location and details of construction be determined by the Anti-bombardment Defense Board. The Department Commander approved of this location on 31 July 1940. (see Inclosure #108). The Anti-bombardment Defense Board, however, objected to the location at Alamaunu. This caused further discussion (see Inclosure #109) with the result that a location at Fort Shafter was agreed upon by all concerned and approved by the Department Commander, 29 October 1940. This decision was not, however, immediately transmitted to the War Department for approval. It is evident from Inclosures #110, #113, #114, relating to the establishment of communications at Alamaunu that the War Department assumed that the AWS Bombproof would be at that location. On 11 January 1941, the War Department was informed of the decision to locate the AWS bombproof at Fort Shafter. (see Inclosure #113). In this connection reference is made to Inclosure #19, in which the Division Engineer at San Francisco advised the District Engineer, Honolulu, that funds in the amount of $70,000 were being withheld, pending War Department approval of the AWS Information Center. Constructional details of the AWS bombproof were discussed by the Signal Officer, Department Engineer & District Engineer (see Inclosures #111, #112, #114). Consideration was given to submitting a formal plan to the War Department covering the AWS bombproof but it was concluded (see Inclosure #115) that in view of the authority given to the Department Commander, in War Department radiogram of 12 March 1941 (see Inclosure #89) that such action would be unnecessary. In this connection reference is made to Section II, par. 4b of this report concerning the disapproval by the Chief Signal Officer on 27 September 1941 of funds for Signal Communications for the AWS bombproof at Fort Shafter for the reason that the installation of the bombproof had not been approved by the War Department.
   b. Agreement Reached on a Combined Air Defense Command Post—Fort Shafter. In accordance with the above mentioned discussion (see Inclosure #111, #112, #114) the District Engineer prepared plans for an AWS Information Center (see Inclosure #116). These plans were not approved by the D. C. in view of the fact that the instructions had been received from the War Department to combine the bombproof structures of the AWS C. P., the Hawaiian Air Force and C. F. of the Antiaircraft Groupment. Details of this entire situation are given in the memorandum shown as Inclosure #118. On 21 June 1941 the Department Commander officially notified the District Engineer to
proceed to prepare plans for a combined Command Post. (See Inclosures #119 & #121). The final plans were submitted to the Department Commander, 14 August 1941 (See 3rd Indorsement, Inclosure #119).

c. Information Center Equipment. Plans for the Information Center were forwarded on 27 August 1941, by the Department Signal Officer to the Chief Signal Officer so that the necessary specialized equipment could be procured. (See Inclosures #122 & #123). On 13 December 1941 the Chief Signal Officer advised that the Mobile Information Center equipment at Drew Field, Florida was being shipped to Hawaii, (See Inclosure #124). Because of shipping difficulties this equipment did not arrive in Hawaii until 28 March 1943 (See Inclosure #127). The voluminous exchange of radiograms on this subject between the Department Signal Officer and the Chief Signal Officer and others is shown in Inclosures #124, #125, #128, & #127). The transfer from the temporary Information Center (Construction described in Section V, par. 3 of this report) to the permanent Information Center was made on April 1, 1942.

8. Nuuanu Pali, Oahu was originally approved by WD as a mobile station in 4th Indorsement to HD letter dated 17 April 1940 (See Inclosure #5). In a later HD decision this site was abandoned and replaced by a mobile set at Makapuu, Oahu (See Inclosures #142 & #144).

9. Manawahana, Oahu. This mobile station was approved by WD in the 4th Indorsement to HD letter dated 17 April 1940 (See Inclosure #5). With the new allotment of detectors to HD (6 Fixed and 6 mobile see Inclosure #134) Manawahana detector station was changed to a fixed station (See Inclosure #142 & #144).

10. Mauna Loa, Hawaii

a. Original plans (See Inclosure #5) called for a mobile detector at the upper terminus of the 'crack trail on the southern slopes of Mauna Loa. Action was instigated by the HD to secure land in the NP. for both Haleakala and Mauna Loa sites (See Inclosures #73, #74, #75, #128, #129, & #130).

b. Additional information is contained in Inclosures #131, #132, & #133.

c. Mauna Loa site was replaced by a mobile detector at Kahuku Ranch Hawaii (See Inclosures #142 & #144).

11. Kauai Mobile Station. The original plan (Inclosure #5) and the subsequent revised plan (Inclosures #142 & #144) called for a mobile stand-by detector to relieve the fixed detector from continually searching in its area. Because of the more urgent need for mobile detectors elsewhere in the Department a set was never installed at this location.

12. Maui Mobile Station. Same as paragraph 11 "Kauai Mobile Station."

[1] SECTION III—SECOND PHASE, 28 MAY 1941 TO DECEMBER 1941

1. Priority & Delivery Schedule of Detectors for the Hawaii Department.

a. In a letter 28 May 1941, received 12 June 1941, the WD indicated the Priority & Delivery Schedule for SCR-270 and SCR-271's for the HD. The schedule indicated that the HD was to receive a total of 6 fixed (271) and 6 mobile (270) Radar Sets. This was different from the previous planned schedule of detector sets. The WD had approved the installation of three fixed (271) and five mobile (270) detector sets for the HD (see Inclosure #5).

b. The letter of 28 May 1941 mentioned above indicated that the HD was scheduled to receive radar equipment in accordance with the following approximate time table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Mobile Sets</th>
<th>Fixed Sets</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total 6 Mobile Sets (270) 6 Fixed Sets (271)

c. The WD further advised that if it had not already been done, a reconnaissance should be conducted to determine detector sites. The necessary land should be acquired and the sites prepared for the detectors schedule for delivery.
so that stations may be established without delay on receipt of equipment. (see Inclosure #134).

2. Board Changes (see Inclosure #136).

In a letter dated 10 June 1941 the Board of Officers was reorganized. The Board then consisted of the following members:
Lt. Col. Carroll A. Powell, (65742), Sig. C., President
Lt. Col. Wm. H. Murphy, (06835), Sig. C., Member
Lt. Col. Albert P. Hegenberger, (01051), Member
Major Isaac H. Ritchie, (01322), C. A. C., Member
Major Robert J. Fleming Jr., (617060), CE, Asst. Dept. Engr., Member
Capt. Kenneth P. Bergquist, (018803), AC, Member
Recorder, without vote, a Sig C Officer on Duty at Dept. Hq. to be designated by Signal Officer.

3. Action Taken in HD on the New Detector Allotment Schedule (see Incl. #157)

a. On receipt of the above letter (Inclosure #134), the Board of Officers' Committee for selecting detector sites prepared a list of sites for the consideration of the Board of Officers at their next meeting.

b. Lt. Col. Powell, President of the Board of Officers, called a meeting of the board for 17 June 1941. This Board Meeting made a map study of the locations and decided on a time for a ground and aerial reconnaissance of the proposed sites.

[2]
c. After completing the reconnaissance the Board decided the following sites were acceptable:

1. The site, 1½ mi. west of Paho Village, Hawaii.
2. The site, at Kilauea Point, Kauai.
3. The site at Puna Triangulation Station, Oahu.
4. The site at Makapuu Point, Oahu.

4. Preliminary Report Submitted to the WD on the Revised AWS Projects for HD

a. In a letter dated 8 July 1941, received in HD 21 July 1941, the WD indicated the basic information that was to be included in the report submitted to WD on the revised AWS project for the 6 fixed and 6 mobile aircraft detector sets (See Inclosure #133).

b. On receipt of this letter the Signal Officer, in a 1st R/S Indorsement dated 19 August 1941, requested the DEO to supply the DSO with the engineer's portion of the information requested by the WD. (See Inclosure #138.)

c. Based on Engineer's and SigO's data, a radiogram dated 13 September 1941, was drafted to the WD submitting, in advance, the sites selected and the cost estimates for the revised AWS project. (See Inclosure #139)

d. The SigO, HD, submitted the cost estimate for the Signal portion of the revised AWS project to the CSO in a radiogram dated 16 September 1941. (See Incl #140). In a radio reply, dated 22 September 1941, the CSO pointed out that the items contained in the radiogram of the 16th must have WD approval before they could be included in budget estimates. The CSO further recommended that the HD submit a letter showing complete justification for the additional detector sites and their cost estimates. (See Incl #141).

e. In a letter dated 16 September 1941. (See Incl #140), the District Engr. HD, submitted the cost estimate for the Engineer portion of the revised AWS project to the C of E. In 1st Ind. to the letter, dated 3 October 1941, the C of E recommended that the sum of $315,200.00 from the funds available to the CSO be allotted to the C of E so that the AWS installation in the HD would proceed without delay. The CSO, in the 2d Ind. recommended that the HD submit a report on the new AWS project for the WD approval. On receipt of such approval the CSO could allot funds to the C of E to the extent available under the current appropriations. TAG in the 3d Ind. authorized the sub-allotment of necessary funds to initiate such action as may be necessary to expedite construction of the additional AWS detector stations.
f. In a letter, dated 29 September 1941, (See Inclosure #141) the Commanding General, HD, submitted the following list of detector sites for the revised AWS project:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fixed (271)</td>
<td>Mount Kaala, Oahu</td>
<td>Unchanged.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fixed (271)</td>
<td>Heleakala, Maui</td>
<td>Unchanged.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fixed (271)</td>
<td>Kokee, Kauai</td>
<td>Additional Set.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fixed (271)</td>
<td>Pahoa, Hawaii</td>
<td>Additional Set.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fixed (271)</td>
<td>Opuna, Oahu</td>
<td>Additional Set.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fixed (271)</td>
<td>Manawaha, Oahu</td>
<td>Additional Set.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobile (270)</td>
<td>Kokee, Kauai *1</td>
<td>Unchanged. To be used to relieve fixed station from continually searching its area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobile (270)</td>
<td>Heleakala, Maui</td>
<td>To replace previously approved location at Nunau Pali, Oahu.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobile (270)</td>
<td>Makapuu, Oahu</td>
<td>To replace previously approved location at Muna Lea, Hawaii.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobile (270)</td>
<td>Kahuku Ranch, Hawaii</td>
<td>To be used as Mobile reserve on the island of Oahu in the event of failure of fixed station.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two Mobile (270)</td>
<td>Oahu</td>
<td>No change.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information Center</td>
<td>Fort Shafter.</td>
<td>No change.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*1 Notes.—The above stations are not located at the fixed detector site but only use the fixed detector's Base Camp.

[4] g. The inclusion of the above listed additional detectors sets in the HD AWS plan necessitates the use of additional funds. The net cost estimates is summarized as follows:

| Engr's Phase | $315,233.00 |
| SigC's Phase | 218,409.00  |

Total Net Cost estimate: 533,633.00

5. Revised HD AWS Project

a. The HD submitted a report, 8 October 1941, to the WD titled, "Survey of the Air Warning requirements for the HD". This report reviewed the complete AWS picture; listed the recommended changes due to additional detectors allotted to HD by the WD; summarized each detector site, touched on the Signal Communications and the Information Center; and listed the additional funds required to complete this revised AWS program. (see Inclosure #142).

b. The “Revised Project Covering Installation Aircraft Warning Equipment” was submitted to WD in a HD letter dated 19 December 1941. This letter, (see Inclosure #144), covered the description of the Signal portion of the revised HD AWS project. In par. 1, 28 Ind, to this letter the OCSigO mentioned that the Aircraft Warning Project for Hawaii had been approved by the Secretary of War, 28 December 1941. See Inclosure #146 for the Secretary of War’s letter approving the HD revised AWS project.

c. Approval of Detector sites.

(1) In a radio (see Inclosure #145) sent 10 November 1941, the HD explained that due to the disposition of personnel and equipment the District Engineer is advantageously situated to commence immediate development of the following sites:

(a) Kilanea Point
(b) Opana, Oahu
(c) Makapuu Point, Oahu
(d) Pahoa Village, Hawaii
(e) Kahuku Ranch, Hawaii

The radio referred the WD to previous HD letters, 29 September 1941 and a 1st Ind. to TAG letter 8 July 1941 (Inclosures #141 & 142 respectively) submitting these sites for approval. The HD requested that the WD radio “Immediate Radio Approval” of these sites. A search of the Signal, Engineers, and AG (HD) has as yet revealed no answer to this radiogram.

(2) In a letter (see Inclosure #146) dated 28 December 1941 the Secretary of War granted authority to OCSO to sub-allot funds and take such other action necessary for the construction and installation of the AWS detector stations, Filter Centers, and Information Centers within the HD as determined by the Commanding General, HD, to be required. This constituted approval of AWS Project (see Inclosure #144) submitted by C. G. to WD.

(3) In radio dated 30 December 1941, the HD requesting additional detectors as “Recent experience demonstrated number AWS detect stations on island of
Oahu inadequate for continuous early warning”. The HD further recommended that these additional radios (3 SCR-271 as indicated by inclosure #12 to this letter, Incl #146) and that the three radio sets, SCR-271, still due the department be expedited. In radio reply dated 9 January 1942, the CSO informed the HD that five more sets of this type would be shipped in January and February 1942. One radio set SCR-271-A was being prepared for immediate shipment to Hawaii result of HD radiogram 1468. The CSO further requested that the HD expedite the preparation of and forward at an early date the projects for other locations of these sets. (see Inclosure #146, see Inclosure #150 for information on shipping these sets).


(a) A memorandum dated 14 December 1941, to Col. Wyman indicated that the C.G. desired to splinterproof all the vital AWS station buildings. This would include the installation of splinterproof protection around the detector house of the fixed stations and also projection of the trucks housing the equipment of the mobile stations (see Inclosure #147 & 148).

(b) On 20 December 1941, the DC directed that immediate action be taken to camouflage all the AWS stations. In the 24 R/S Ind. 30 January 1942, the Engineer indicated to G-4 that AWS were being camouflaged and the dummy stations would be constructed as soon as antennas are completed (See Inclosure #149).

(c) Additional information is listed in inclosure 151 regarding the expediting of the AWS project.

SECTION IV—DETAILS OF ACTION TAKEN IN THE SECOND PHASE

1. Additional correspondence regarding project (second phase)

(a) 30 December 1941, Reconnaissance for the establishment of sites for the additional detectors (see Inclosure #153).

(b) Funds.

(1) Inclosure #154. Funds in the amount of $7,785.00 are required to install commercial power service at Kokee, Kilauea, Point, Haleakala, Pahoa Village, and Kahu Ranch (see Inclosure #154).

(2) Authorization to CG, HD to incur all the necessary obligations to meet the urgent requirements for AWS HD (see Inclosure #155).

(c) Status of Construction on AWS projects (see Inclosure #156 & #158).

(d) Project numbers assigned to the additional AWS sites (see Inclosure #157).

(e) Shipments of equipment for additional AWS sites (see Inclosure #158).

2. Pahoa, Hawaii: was approved by a letter dated 28 December 1941, from the Secretary of War to the CSO as a fixed station (see Inclosures #144 & #146).

(a) Topographical survey: 15 September 1941 (see Inclosure #160 & #161).

3. O'ahu, Oahu: was approved by a letter dated 28 December 1941, from the Secretary of War to the CSO as a fixed station (see Inclosure #145).

(b) During 7 December 1941, there was a mobile detector operating at this site (see Section V, par. 2 for further discussion).

4. Manawatu, Oahu: This station was originally approved as a mobile detector station (see discussion under Section II, par. 30 and #154) with the new allotment of detectors (see Inclosure #154) the HD decided on a fixed station in place of the mobile station. The HD requested early approval of this fixed station (25 November 1941) so that the Engineers could start work on the minimum requirements of the site immediately (see Inclosure #164).

(a) Proposed AWS installation: Approved 27 November 1941, (see Inclosure #163).

5. Mahapuu, Oahu: was approved by a letter from the Secretary of War to the CSO date 28 December 1941 (see Inclosures #144 & #146) as a mobile detector. This was to replace the previously planned mobile site at Nuuam Pali (see Section II, par. 9).
installed at these locations with the exception of Punalu'u. The set scheduled for this location was used at Schofield Barracks for training purposes until the latter part of November 1941, when it was installed at Opana, Oahu. The set was placed at Opana principally as a result of a radiogram, dated 30 October 1941, from Lt. Col. C. A. Powell, who was on temporary duty on the mainland to the acting Dept. Signal Officer Lt. Col. W. H. Murphy advising that tests be made at proposed locations. (See Inclosure #167.) During this early period the sets were used about five hours per day, six days per week. (See Inclosure #168.) A request was submitted by the Signal Officer on 23 August 1941, to the Engineers Officer to expedite the completion of the mobile barracks facilities. (See Inclosure #169.)

3. Establishment of a Temporary Information Center. The desirability of establishing a temporary Information Center for training and possible tactical purposes was realized during the early part of 1941. On May 21, 1941, a request for funds for this purpose was submitted to the Chief Signal Officer. The funds were allotted on 25 May 1941. (See Inclosure #170.) The photographs shown on Incel #171 show the status of the construction of the temporary Information Center at Bldg. #307, Port Shafter during August 1941. In connection with the establishment of this Information Center the Department Commander dispatched a letter on 5 August 1941, to Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet and to the Commandant, 14th Naval District, Pearl Harbor, requesting Navy liaison officer be assigned to the Aircraft Warning Facilities. These appointments were subsequently made by the Navy Officials (see Inclosure #172). The possibility of the use of ground observers in connection with AWS was considered at various times, but was considered impractical. Correspondence pertaining to this subject is shown in Inclosure #173.

4. Test of Mobile Detectors Prior to December 7, 1941

a. On the morning of 27 September 1941, a simulated raid was made on the Island of Oahu by a flight of carrier based Navy planes. This flight was first picked up at their point of orbit, supposedly near their carrier, at an azimuth of 224° and a range of 85 miles. The raid, made up of two separate waves of flights, started at 0656 and 0619 H. The bogey was intercepted by the defending air force at 0616 at the azimuth 223° and a range of 26 miles. The raiding force was theoretically destroyed before an attack on Pearl Harbor could be realized. (2) The returning planes were tracked out to their carrier at 0735 where they disappeared from the radar screen. The reports of this simulated raid were made by the mobile detector at Koko Head and Wai'anae sites. The records of this trial raid are shown in the charts under Inclosure #175.

b. Inclosure #176, 3 November 1941. A discussion of the unusual ranges (greater than 150 miles) being obtained off of various mountains on the other islands by the several of the Mobile detectors on Oahu, was sent to the CSO for his information.

c. Inclosure #177, 4 November 1941. Discussion of the arrival of a transpacific flight of B-17 bombers the morning of 22 October 1941. Comparative plots were obtained from the detector at Kawa (50 ft. elevation) and the detector at Koko Head (675 ft. elevation).

5. AWS Activities on 7 December 1941

a. Operational Order. On 27 November 1941 the acting Dept. Signal Officer received instructions from the Asst. Chief of Staff G-3 to start operating the detector stations from two hours before dawn until one hour after dawn. This order was transmitted immediately to the Commanding Officer Aircraft Warning Company. The detector stations were operating in accordance with the above schedule on 7 December 1941. (See Inclosure #178.)

b. Detector Operation on 7 December 1941. Reference is made to Inclosure #179, which covers the official report of Lt. Col. W. H. Murphy who made a personal investigation concerning the detection of the Japanese attack.

c. Reports to the Chief Signal Officer. Reference is made to Inclosure #181 covering the official report of the Dept. Signal Officer to the Chief Signal Officer concerning the detection of the Japanese attack 7 December 1941.
Memorandum for Major Clasen, Pearl Harbor Board:
Subject: Pearl Harbor Disaster.

Inclosed is the additional material from the files of the Federal Bureau of Investigation on Hans Wilhelm Rohl, requested by telephone today.

L. R. Forney,
L. R. Forney,
Colonel, General Staff Corps,
Chief, Group III, Policy Staff.

4 Incis.
Incl. 1. FBI rpt. 9-8-42
Incl. 2. FBI rpt 12-19-41
Incl. 3. FBI rpt 7-32-41
Incl. 4. Photo copy th 4 to Stephen Early from Enright 7-8-42

SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA
July 8, 1946.

STEPHEN EARLY, ESQ.,
Office of the President, Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. EARLY: I fully realize what a hideous offense it is to make a charge against a person if the charge is false, or, if one would inculcate for personal gain, or, solely, to harass the accused that is why I am writing you, so that an investigation, (should you see fit to make one), can be made with the least danger of causing the accused an injury, if he be innocent. (If a leopard ever change his spots.)

This person that I herewith accuse, is now a rich general contractor in Los Angeles County; twenty-three years ago he and I worked together on the south bank of the Bear River; fifty-five miles north of Sacramento, California. We became very confidential, I knew him, then, to be an under cover agent of the Imperial German Government.

Shortly after our Government (U. S. A.) entered the first World’s War, the accused made a dash for Mexico so full of goose pimples that he looked like a boy with the measles; so wet with cold sweat: as some one held a sprinkling pot over him full of ice water. For years I forgot about the accused.

Now comes a fellow workman who was on the same job twenty-three years ago. This workman went to France: Com. M. 116th Inf.; this veteran knows more about the accused than I do. The veteran comes to me propelled by the fact that the accused now has large contracts in the harbor of our Western Metropolis.

The veteran joins in with me in making this accusation. To get to the man that I knew twenty-three years ago, one would have to have power, to tear off three different veeners: Fraternal, Social and Financial.

May I tell you that I was born in Virginia City, Nevada, fifty-nine years ago. I place my life and my honor at the service of country.

Respectfully and sincerely,

WILLIAM HENRY ENRIGHT.

Postal address.
7232 Amberat St.
San Diego, California.

BILL ROHL
of ROHL & CONNELLY
General Contractors, Los Angeles, Calif.
Memorandum for Army Pearl Harbor Board. Attn. Major Clausen, Room 4743, Munitions Building.

Subject: Rohl, Hans Wilhelm.

Enclosure:
(A) Copy ONI card, 2 Oct 1940, Subject: ROHL, H. W.
(B) Copy 11ND NIS Rept., 17 Oct 1940, Subject: ROHL, H. W.
(C) Copy 11ND NIS Rept., 5 March 1941, same Subject.

1. Enclosures (A), (B), and (C) are forwarded for your information, in accordance with your telephone request.

2. The information forwarded herewith is extremely confidential in character and its security must be preserved, by carefully safeguarding its existence and source, as well as the names of any informants mentioned therein. In no case, if the report covers an investigation of an individual, shall the report be shown to the subject, nor shall copies be made of it, nor shall the Office of Naval Intelligence be mentioned in connection with any action on the basis of such report.

Wallace S. Wharton,
WALLACE S. WHARTON,
Captain, U. S. N. R.

Copy of ONI Card, 2 October 1940:

Rohl, H. W. ONI

Information from Los Angeles, Calif. that subject has obtained all important contracts to construct San Pedro breakwater; that the subject keeps a yacht which was constructed in Germany and maintains a full German crew aboard; that subject and his crew are well informed concerning naval activities; that subject is a "hard-boiled character" and informant believes he and his crew would stop at nothing to accomplish purpose. Conduct appropriate investigation.

ND-11-12
2 October 1940.

[Stamped:] Office of Naval Intelligence. Received in B-3 2:30 pm. Oct. 20, 1940. FGC.

UNITED STATES NAVAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
INVESTIGATION REPORT

Confidential
Subject: ROHL H. W.
Report made at: Los Angeles
Period covered: October 14, 1940 Status of case:
Origin of case: ONI card October 2, 1940
Character of investigation: Personal interview with contacts of subject.
Enclosures: ONI card, October 2, 1940 Copy to O.N.I.; 12ND
Source File No.: #29975 ND11/A8-2/QP ONI File No.:
Synopsis: Careful investigation reveals that subject, and Master of the pleasure yacht "VEGA", Captain Otto MATTHIES are both loyal citizens.
Comment and recommendations:

Reporting officer has known subject and MATTHIES since 1926.
2. The vessel is manned by 9 U. S. Citizens and 1 Norwegian national, a sailor named Harold HARTVIGSEN.
3. Subject and his wife are persons of refinement. At the present time the vessel is only used to carry owner’s family and week-end guests to Santa Catalina Isd.
4. Informant is a dissatisfied ex-employee.

NNI-119
United States Naval Intelligence Service

INVESTIGATION REPORT

B10/NDI/EF30/AS-2
Serial LA/BL/573

Confidential
SUBJECT: ROHL, Hans Wilhelm, President, ROHL & CONNALLY Co., Los Angeles, California.
Report made at: Los Angeles, California. Date: March 5, 1941.
Report made by: Lieut. A. A. Thomas, USNR.
Origin of Case: Originated from C. A. EMERICK, Customs Agent in Charge, Los Angeles, California.
Source File No.: ND11/EF30/AS-5. Copy to: ONI (2) FBI-LA (1)

SYNOPSIS:

Subject, German born and resident of U. S. for 25 years, is part owner in firm known as Hawaiian Constructors engaged in confidential construction work for U. S. Army in Hawaii. Also owner of yacht “VEGA” having radio telephone Station KLVC under FCC license. Part of Subject’s business in wife’s name.

COMMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

Comment: Inspector DUNN believes subject to have been dishonest in his actions and that his actions indicate possible subversive activity.
Recommendation: In view of the fact that three other agencies of the U. S. are investigating subject it is recommended that this office desist from further action.

Approved:

/s/ B. L. CANAGA,
B. L. CANAGA,
Captain, USN, (Ret.)

Confidential

MARCH 5, 1941.

SUBJECT: ROHL, Hans Wilhelm, President, ROHL-CONNALLY Co., business address: 8159 Hollywood Blvd., Los Angeles, California, Residence Address: 4351 Alhambra Ave., Los Angeles, California.

1. This investigation is predicated upon information supplied to this office by C. A. EMERICK, Customs Agent in Charge, to the effect that subject is an alien, and is engaged in National Defense projects in violation of H. R. 9222.
2. Investigating office called on Mr. P. B. DUNN,Immigrant Inspector, Bureau of Immigration, Federal Building, Los Angeles, whose active file disclosed the following:

Subject is not a citizen of the U. S., but filed Form 2214, which is a certificate of arrival, date at present unavailable. Since subject has obtained government work, pressure has been brought to bear to expedite the obtaining of citizenship papers.

Subject is owner of yacht “VEGA”, flagship of the Coast Patrol, which is under the jurisdiction of the Sheriff’s Office, Los Angeles County. Said yacht has a radio telephone, Station KLVC, necessitating an FCC license. FCC license requires a sworn statement to the effect that owner is a U. S. citizen.

Most of subject’s business is in part ownership of wife. As U. S. laws forbid an alien to own more than 25% of stock of a business, it is presumed that subject is using this means to violate law. Subject is 40% owner of firm known as
Hawaiian Constructors, said firm is engaged in very secret construction work for the U.S. Army in construction of antiaircraft bases, underground storage and tunnels, etc., in the defenses of Hawaii.

Subject is 54 years old and has lived in the U.S. for some 25 years.

3. Inspector DUNN advises that investigation of subject is now proceeding and that copies of this investigation will be forwarded to DIO, I1ND, San Diego, California. He also advised that the Bureau of Internal Revenue, U.S. Customs Office, is also conducting an investigation.

4. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:
   Comment: Inspector DUNN, who is conducting investigation for Immigration Department, feels that subject has been dishonest in his actions and that appearances at this stage of the investigation indicate a possibility of subversive activity. He states subject could very easily engage in subversive activities should he so desire, and that subject's deliberate hiding of non-citizenship status is suspicious.
   Recommendation: In view of the fact that three other agencies of the U.S. are investigating subject, it is recommended that this office desist from further action.

5. INVESTIGATION LEADS:
   None.

ARMS PEARL HARBOR BOARD EXHIBIT No. 61

CROSS REFERENCE SHEET

MAIN SUBJECT: Corps of Engineers Operations in Canada (Canal Project)

CLASSIFICATION NUMBER:
MID 611. Canada

Date of Communication: 9-26-42
Date of Basic Document: (2-21-42)

From: M/A Canada, #2026

BEFORE SUMMARY:
Enclosed are copies of letters addressed to American Minister by Dept. of External Affairs, Canada which are more or less self-explanatory and serve to indicate the manner in which the U.S. Army Canal Project in Canada is being conducted by Col. Wyman: Canadian Govt. may see fit to request recall of Col. Wyman; by Disposition Form dated 11-10-42 to Operations Division.

Classified: 26

Routed to: file

Typist: 26

Date of Classifying: 11-21-42

CROSS REFERENCE NUMBERS:

201. Wyman, Theodore (Col)
026.
3219 G-2, Operations Division

No. 2026 JSOG: D

Subject: Corps of Engineers Operations in Canada (Canal Project)

1. Enclosed are copies of letters addressed to the American Minister, Mr. Moffat, by the Department of External Affairs, Canada. These letters are more or less self-explanatory and serve to indicate the manner in which the United States Army Canal Project in Canada is being conducted by its representative, Colonel Theodore Wyman, C.E.

2. Unofficially, Canadian officials have reported more than once of the high-handed manner in which Colonel Wyman has conducted himself in Canada. And, during the visit of Mr. Moffat and the undersigned to the Canadian Northwest different people including high officials of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police spoke disparagingly of this officer. This is indeed unfortunate. Unless something is done to correct this situation it is the opinion of this office that the Canadian Government may see fit to request the recall of Colonel Wyman.

3. The contents of the enclosures were communicated to the State Department by Mr. Moffat.
4. This communication is forwarded in the belief that it is a serious concern of the War Department and of particular interest to your office.

   JOHN S. GULLEY,
   Colonel, G. S. C.,
   Military Attaché.

Encls. (2)
Ltr. 9/22/42
Ltr. 9/17/42

[Stamped:] Record Section Copy [hand written:] without inclosures.

ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD EXHIBIT No. 62

(Exhibit 62 is a book entitled "Ten Years in Japan" by Joseph C. Grew, published by Simon and Schuster, Inc., New York, New York (1944). This book is not being reprinted in these proceedings.)

ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD EXHIBIT No. 63

[1]

SUMMARY OF STATEMENTS MADE
BY
BRIGADIER GENERAL L. T. GEROW,
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, WAR PLANS DIVISION
BEFORE
MILITARY COMMISSION.
DECEMBER 18, 1941

DEVELOPMENT OF CURRENT WAR PLAN

1. Joint Action of the Army and the Navy state the governing policies for joint action of the Army and Navy. These policies serve as basic guides in the preparation of war plans.

2. A war plan is prepared to meet a specific situation requiring the use of all or part of the Army and Navy of the United States. The plan in current use is known as Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 5. Broadly considered, it consists of the following documents:

   c. Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plans—Rainbow No. 5.
   d. Navy War Plan and subordinate plans based thereon.

3. The Joint Board in April, 1941, developed the Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 5 based on a. and b. above. The work incident to the preparation thereof was done by the Joint Planning Committee. The Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 5 was approved by the President, the Secretary of War, and the Secretary of Navy in May, 1941.

4. Based on this joint plan the Army War Plans Division prepared Army Strategic Plan, which consists of Operations Plan—Rainbow No. 5, and Concentration Plan—Rainbow No. 5. A copy of Operations Plan—Rainbow No. 5 was sent to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department on August 21, 1941. Receipt was acknowledged on September 3, 1941. A revision of Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 5 was approved by the Joint Board on November 19, 1941, and a copy of the Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 5, Revision No. 1, was sent to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department on November 28, 1941. Receipt therefor has not as yet been received.

5. The missions assigned the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier under the Army Strategic Plan are as follows:
a. Joint—Hold Oahu as a main outlying naval base and control and protect shipping in the coastal zone.

b. Army—Hold Oahu against attacks by land, sea, and air forces and against hostile sympathizers. Support naval forces in the protection of the sea communications of the Associated Powers and the destruction of Axis sea communication by offensive action against the enemy forces or commerce located within tactical operating radius of occupied air bases.

c. Navy—Patrol the Coastal Zone; control and protect shipping therein; support the Army.

6. For the purpose of indicating the extent of the frontier defense measures to be taken in various categories of defense, the following documents have been established:

a. Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Coastal Frontier.


d. Hawaiian Defense Project.

2. These plans are based on Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan Orange prepared for a situation involving a war in the Pacific between the United States and Japan. The Joint Mission, the Navy Mission, and the Category of Defense under the Orange Plan is the same as that under the Army Strategic Plan—Rainbow No. 5. The Army Mission under the latter plan has been somewhat broadened. Under all plans in existence the War Department's concept of the most probable form of attack which an enemy would adopt against Oahu was a surprise attack consisting of raids and bombardment by ship's fire and air forces and action by local sympathizers.

3. The Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan (prepared by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department and the Commandant 14th Naval District) and the Army Operating Defense Plans were forwarded to the War Department for review at time of issue, and published revisions thereto have been furnished from time to time. Such plans are not formally approved by the War Department and are not commented upon unless it appears that they are not in consonance with the War Department's concept, mission, and means assigned. Plans in force in the Hawaiian Department on December 7 were in process of revision based on the Army Strategic Plan—Rainbow No. 5 and recent changes and additions made in the means provided the Hawaiian Department.

4. Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Department and Fourteenth Naval District, which was revised March 28, 1941, prescribes the joint security measures to be taken for the protection of the Fleet and the Pearl Harbor Base. The following extracts from this plan are quoted in order to indicate the joint agreement in force on December 7, 1941:

I. GENERAL

1. In order to coordinate joint defensive measures for the security of the fleet and for the Pearl Harbor Naval Base for defense against hostile raids or air attacks delivered prior to a declaration of war and before a general mobilization for war, the following agreements, supplementary to the provisions of the HCF-39, (14 ND—JCD—13), are adopted. These agreements are to take effect at once and will remain effective until notice in writing by either party of their renunciation in whole or in part. Frequent revision of these agreements to incorporate lessons determined from joint exercises will probably be both desirable and necessary.

II. JOINT AIR OPERATIONS.

2. When the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and the Naval Base Defense Officer, (the Commandant of the 14th Naval District), agree that the threat of a hostile raid or attack is sufficiently imminent to warrant such action, each commander will take such preliminary steps as are necessary to make available without delay to the other commander such proportion of the air forces at his disposal as the circumstances warrant in order that joint operations may be conducted in accordance with the following plans.
"e. Joint air attacks upon hostile surface vessels will be executed under the tactical command of the Navy. The Department Commander will determine the Army bombardment strength to participate in each mission. With due consideration to the tactical situation existing, the number of bombardment airplanes released to Navy control will be the maximum practicable. This force will remain available to the Navy, for repeated attacks, if required, until completion of the mission, when it will revert to Army control.

"b. Defensive air operations over and in the immediate vicinity of Oahu will be executed under the tactical command of the Army. The Naval Base Defense Officer will determine the Navy fighter strength to participate in these missions. With due consideration to the tactical situation existing, the number of fighter aircraft released to Army control will be the maximum practicable. [5] This force will remain available to the Army for repeated patrols or combat or for maintenance of the required alert status until, due to a change in the tactical situation, it is withdrawn by the naval Base Defense Officer (Commandant, 14th Naval District), and reverts to Navy control.

"c. When naval forces are insufficient for long distance patrol and search operations, and Army aircraft are made available, these aircraft will be under the tactical control of the naval commander directing the search operations.

"d. In the special instance in which Army pursuit protection is requested for the protection of friendly surface ships, the force assigned for this mission will pass to the tactical control of the Navy until completion of the mission."

5. A defense project of an overseas department includes:
First, a statement of the mission to be carried out by the Department Commander as defined by the War Department; second, a brief estimate of the situation outlining the most probable threats against the successful execution of this mission and indicating the course of action and the means necessary to carry out the mission; and, third, a concise statement of the requirements in troops, in defensive installations, construction other than housing, and the supplies and equipment considered necessary to carry out the mission. This summary includes priorities for accomplishment of the requirements enumerated and consolidated estimates of cost. The defense project is revised annually and is submitted to the War Department for approval.

6. The Hawaiian Defense Project, 1940, was approved by the War Department on September 17, 1941. The project contains revisions up to September 29, 1941. The following extracts from this document indicate the mission, the category of defense, and the possible and probable war situations as understood by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department:

"Forms of Hostile Attacks. The basis of the forms of attack listed below is the War Department assignment of Category "D" to this Department.

Possible enemy attacks against the OAHU area in the order of probability are:

"(a) Submarine—torpedo and mine.
"(b) Sabotage.
"(c) Disguised merchant ship attack by blocking channels, by mines, or by air or surface craft.
"(d) Air raids carrier based.
"(e) Surface ship raids.
"(f) Major combined attack in the absence of the U. S. Fleet."

*Basis for Planning.

"Missions and Conditions.

"(a) All defense plans of Oahu will be based upon the following conditions:

"The currently assigned category of defense will be Category D.

"The defense of Oahu will be joint defense by Army and Navy forces under the missions as stated in Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan Orange.

"(b) Possible and Probable War Situations are:

"(1) That sea lanes from continental United States to Hawaii are open and that the garrison of Hawaii will be reinforced from continental United States.
"(2) That the most probable form of attack is a surprise attack consisting of raids, and bombardments by ships' fire and air forces, and action by local sympathizers.
"(3) That the sea lanes from continental United States will be closed and that there may be an attack by a major expeditionary force. From the War Department point of view, this contingency is so remote that it will [7]...
make no additional allowances of either men or reserves to meet it. This is commonly referred to as the 'cut-off from the Mainland situation'.

"(4) The latter contingency forms the basis for our training, as being all inclusive and providing maximum reality for the troops during their training.

"(c) Conclusion.

"To adopt a defense plan adequate initially, to meet an enemy's maximum effort."

ALERTS

1. Following is the chronological record of alerts held by the Army, sometimes in conjunction with the Navy, since July 17, 1940. (Some entries included to indicate awareness of situation.)

June 17, 1940

RadioGram War Department to C. G., Hawaiian Department. "Immediately alert complete defensive organization to deal with trans-Pacific raid to greatest extent possible without creating public hysteria or projecting undue curiosity of newspapers or alien agents. Suggest maneuver basis. Maintain alert until further orders. Instructions for secret communication direct with Chief of Staff will be furnished you shortly. Acknowledge."

June 17, 1940

RadioGram from C. G., Hawaiian Department to War Department answering the above:

"All antiaircraft observation and security detachments in position with live ammunition and orders to fire on foreign planes over restricted areas and in defense of any essential installations. No excitement. Navy in-shore and offshore patrols in operation."

June 24, 1940

[8] Letter General Herron to Chief of Staff: (Reference to alert ordered above)

"I have just come in from seeing the dawn patrols take the air and the antiaircraft standing to their guns at dawn . . . I have been gratified by the precision with which the planes get off each morning at 4:30 a.m. . . ."

June 27, 1940

Letter prepared from Chief of Staff to General Herron, but not sent on account of secrecy. Explain reasons for the above alert, which were:

"Briefly, the combination of information from a number of sources lead to the deduction that recent Japanese-Russian agreement to compose their differences in the Far East was arrived at and so timed as to permit Japan to undertake a trans-Pacific Raid against Oahu following the departure of the United States fleet from Hawaii. . . ."

"Whether the information or discussions were correct, I cannot say. Even if they were, the precautions you have taken may keep us from knowing they were by discouraging any overt act."

"In any event, it would have been foolhardy not to take special precautions. The world is so troubled and changing so rapidly that I think it wise for you to keep the command definitely on its toes until I give you the all clear signal."

July 16, 1940

RadioGram from Chief of Staff to C. G., Hawaiian Department: (Gives authority to relax alert)

"You are authorized at your discretion, to relax alert provisions except that first, precautions against sabotage will be continued on the basis of instant readiness; second, aerial patrol measures can be reduced to a training status, but so arranged as to be reestablished on an alert basis on short notice."

August 28, 1940

Letter Chief of Staff to General Herron, asking reactions as to continued alert:

[9] "As to the alert, I want your frank reaction. Is it imposing too heavy
a tax to continue on the present basis...? It is a very difficult business and I am deeply concerned that we do not exhaust the morale of the command by heavy requirements during what is supposed to be a period of peace, yet a failure would be catastrophic."

September 6, 1940

Reply to General Herron reference burden imposed by alert. "My absolute frank and honest opinion is that the alert as now carried on here does not dull the keen edge, or exhaust morale. I think that our real power accumulates and that the maneuvers being held will build up materially and easily the effectiveness of the alert."

"The presence of the fleet here and its frequent putting to sea with absolute secret destinations and periods naturally eases the situation very much."

July 7, 1941

Radio sent to C. G., Hawaiian Department:

"For your information deduction from important information from numerous sources is that the Japanese government has determined upon its future policy and is supported by all principal Japanese political and military groups. This policy is at present one of watchful waiting involving probably aggressive action against the military provinces of Russia if and when the Siberian garrison has been materially reduced in strength and it becomes evident that Germany will win a decisive victory in European Russia. Opinion is that Jap activity in the south will be for the present confined to seizure and development of naval, Army, and air bases in Indo-China, although an advance against the British and Dutch cannot be entirely ruled out. The neutrality pact with Russia may be abrogated. They have ordered all Jap vessels in United States Atlantic ports to be west of the Panama Canal by first of August. Movement of Jap shipping from Japan has been suspended and additional merchant vessels are being requisitioned."

July 25, 1941

Joint dispatch sent by Chief of Staff and Chief of Naval Operations by naval radio:

"Appropriate addresses please deliver copies to Commanding Generals of Philippines, Hawaiian, and Caribbean Defense Commands and also to General Chaney in London. You are herewith advised that on July 26 the United States will impose economic sanctions against Japan. It is expected that these sanctions will embargo all trade between Japan and the United States subject to modification through the medium of a licensing system for certain material... Japanese funds and assets in the United States will be frozen except that they may be moved if licenses are granted for such movement. It is not expected that Japanese merchant ships in ports of the United States will be seized at this time. United States flag merchant ships will not at present be ordered to depart from or not to enter ports controlled by the Japanese. Chief of Naval Operations and the Army Chief of Staff do not anticipate immediate hostile reaction by Japanese through the use of military means but you are furnished this information in order that you may take appropriate precautionary measures against any possible eventualities. Action is being initiated by the United States Army to call the Philippine Army into active service at an early date. Except from immediate Army and Navy subordinates, the contents of this dispatch are to be kept secret."

October 18, 1941

Radiogram sent by War Department to C. G., Hawaiian Department: "Following War Department estimate of Japanese situation for your information. Tension between the United States and Japan remain strained but no abrupt change in Japanese foreign policy appears imminent."

November 24, 1941

Radiogram from Chief of Naval Operations to Commander-In-Chief, Pacific Fleet: "There are very doubtful chances of a favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan. This situation, coupled with statements of Nippon Government and movements of their naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a
surprise aggressive movement in any direction including an attack on the Philippines or Guam is a possibility. The Chief of Staff has [11] seen this dispatch and concurs and requests action addresses (CINCAF, CINCAP, COMS 11, 12, 13, 15) inform senior Army officers their respective areas. Utmost secrecy is necessary in order not to complicate an already tense situation or precipitate Jap action. Guam will be informed in a separate dispatch.

November 26, 1941

Extract of secret cablegram sent to C. G., Hawaiian Department: "It is desired following instructions be given pilots of two B-24's on special photo mission. Photograph Jaluit Island in the Caroline Group while simultaneously making visual reconnaissance. Information is desired as to location and number of guns, aircraft, airfields, barracks, camps, and naval vessels including submarines X X X before they depart Honolulu insure that both B-24's are fully supplied with ammunition for guns."

November 27, 1941

Secret first priority message to C. G., Hawaiian Department: "Negotiations with Japanese appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities can not, repeat can not, be avoided, the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action, you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not, repeat not, to alarm the civil population or disclose intent. Report measures taken. Should hostilities occur, you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow 5 as far as they pertain to Japan. Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers."

November 28, 1941

Radiogram C. G., Hawaiian Department to Chief of Staff: "Report department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with Navy reurad 472, the 27th."

December 7, 1941

Radio to C. G., Hawaiian Department, from Chief of Staff (left Message Center at 12:17 P. M.): "Japanese are presenting at 1:00 P. M., Eastern Standard Time, today what amounts to an ultimatum also they are under orders to destroy their code machine immediately. Just what significance the hour set may have we do not know but be on alert accordingly. Inform Naval authorities of this communication."

**Means Provided for Defense**

1. **Troops.**
   Units with strength thereof actually present in the Hawaiian Department on December 7, 1941, are shown in Tab "A".

2. **Airplanes.**
   See Tab "B".

3. **Antiaircraft Materiel.**
   The status of antiaircraft materiel in Hawaiian Department on December 7, 1941, was as shown in Tab "C". Existing shortages had not been met because of nonavailability of equipment.

4. **Seacoast Defense.**
   See Tab "D".

5. **Aircraft Warning Service.**
   (a) The approved project provides for 6 mobile detector sets and 6 fixed sets to be located as shown on the attached map. All of these sets have a rated range of 120 miles, but under favorable conditions efficient service has been obtained in excess of the rated range.
   (b) The six (6) mobile sets and three (3) fixed sets were on hand in the Hawaiian Department December 7, 1941. The remaining three fixed sets had not been shipped from the mainland.
(c) The three (3) fixed sets on hand were scheduled for installation at the sites given below. Construction had started, but had not been completed.

Mt. Kaula, Oahu
Kokee, Kauai
Haleakula, Maui

(d) The six (6) mobile sets were scheduled for the locations shown on the attached map. Their actual location on December 7, 1941, is not known to the War Department.

6. Considered broadly, defense projects which have been under construction for some time and for which funds have been provided are as follows:
- Bunkers for dispersed airplanes
- Development of airfields
- Bombproofing of vital installations
- Command and Fire Control Cable System
- Storage for gasoline and oil defense reserves (Splinter-proof)
- Military roads, trails and railroads
- Modernization of seacoast artillery

8" Railway battery positions

7. All reasonable requests by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department for funds and the supply of equipment & materiel have been met within the means available.

**Brief of Chronological Record of Correspondence Between the War Department and the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department on Matters of Importance since December 7, 1941**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Serial No.</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>From</th>
<th>To</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>[4]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>5:00 P. M.</td>
<td>HHD</td>
<td>TAG</td>
<td>Radiogram: Report of Casualties.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>6:30 P. M.</td>
<td>HHD</td>
<td>TAG</td>
<td>Radiogram: Report of Second Attack at 11:00 A. M.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>7:30 P. M.</td>
<td>TAG</td>
<td>HHD</td>
<td>Radiogram: Authority to Incur Necessary Obligations.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**DECEMBER 7, 1941**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>From</th>
<th>To</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>2:38 P. M.</td>
<td>HHD</td>
<td>TAG</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**DECEMBER 8, 1941**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Time</th>
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<th>To</th>
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</table>

**DECEMBER 9, 1941**

**DECEMBER 10, 1941**

<table>
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<th>From</th>
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<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>7:48 P. M.</td>
<td>HHD</td>
<td>TAG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>HHD</td>
<td>TAG</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**DECEMBER 11, 1941**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>From</th>
<th>To</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>10:55 A. M.</td>
<td>TAG</td>
<td>HHD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serial No.</td>
<td>Time</td>
<td>From</td>
<td>To</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1:55 P. M.</td>
<td>TAG</td>
<td>HHD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>5:35 P. M.</td>
<td>HHD</td>
<td>TAG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1:30 P. M.</td>
<td>TAG</td>
<td>HHD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>10:22 P. M.</td>
<td>TAG</td>
<td>HHD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>8:55 P. M.</td>
<td>HHD</td>
<td>TAG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>HHD</td>
<td>TAG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>3:27 P. M.</td>
<td>Pomona</td>
<td>TAO</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

L. T. Genow,  
Brigadier General,  
Assistant Chief of Staff.

5 Incld:
Incl. 1—Troops, Haw Dept 12/7/41 (Tab A).
Incl. 2—Airplanes, Haw Dept 12/7/41 (Tab B).
Incl. 3—AA Org & Equip Haw Dept 12/7/41 (Tab C).
Incl. 4—Seacoast Def Org. Haw Dept (Tab D).
Incl. 5—Map, AWS, Haw Dept.

[16] A Major Units in Hawaii, December 7, 1941
1. Department Headquarters and Headquarters Troops
   34th Engrs. (C)
   804th Engr. Br (How) at Canton
   How Pack Train
   Aircraft Warning Co.
2. Hawaiian Air Force
   5th Bomb Group
   23d Bomb Sq.
   31st Bomb Sq.
   72d Bomb Sq.
   4th Rec. Sq.
   11th Bomb Group
   23th Bomb Sq.
   42d Bomb Sq.
   50th Rec. Sq.
2. Hawaiian Air Force—Continued

58th Bomb Sq. (Lt)
18th Pursuit Group (I)
6th Pursuit Sq. (I)
19th Pursuit Sq. (I)
78th Pursuit Sq. (I)
44th Pursuit Sq. (I)
72d Pursuit Sq. (I)
73d Pursuit Sq. (I)
15th Pursuit Group (F)
45th Pursuit Sq. (F)
16th Pursuit Sq. (F)
47th Pursuit Sq. (F)
88th Observation Squadron

Air Corps Services

3. Harbor Defense Troops

15th CA (HD)
16th CA (HD)
41st CA (Ry)
55th CA (155 mm) (TD)

[17] 4. Antiaircraft Units

64th CA (AA) SM
97th CA (AA) SM
98th CA (AA) SM
251st CA (AA) M

5. Beach and Land Defense

24th Division
25th Division
11th Tank Co (L)

Total Strength—2,149 Officers

48 WO
163 ANC
40,494 EM

42,857 Total

[18] B. Airplanes—Hawaii

Number on December 7, 1941

Modern

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>No.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B-17D</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-20A</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-40B</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-40C</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-47B</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-49</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-39</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OA-4A/OA8/OA9</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BT2R1/2BR/2CR</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AT6</td>
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</table>

Observation
Transportation

Non-modern

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>No.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B12A</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-18</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-12</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-20A</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-28B</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-30A</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium Bomber</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light Bomber</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pursuit</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Antiaircraft

**Organization and armament, Hawaiian Department, Dec. 7, 1941**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authorized</th>
<th>Mobile 20' AA</th>
<th>Fixed 37mm AA</th>
<th>37mm (AA)</th>
<th>Cal. .50 MGs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>64th CA (AA)</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>231st CA (AA)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>97th CA (AA)</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>98th CA (AA)</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harbor Defense Units</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>72</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>1 124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>On Hand</strong></td>
<td>60</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Shortage</strong></td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>2 233</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Figures include cal. .30 MGs in MG batteries and for local protection of AA gun batteries, fixed and mobile.
2. Maintenance allowance not included.
3. + 222 for local defense of S. C. Btry airfields.

### Seacoast

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Caliber</th>
<th>No. Guns</th>
<th>No. Btrys</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>16&quot;</td>
<td>2 (BC)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Weaver,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16&quot;</td>
<td>2 (BC)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Barrette,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14&quot;</td>
<td>2 (BC)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>De Russy,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13&quot;</td>
<td>2 (BC)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Kam.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12&quot;</td>
<td>#2 (DC)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Kam.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12&quot;</td>
<td>#1 (M)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Ruger.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12&quot;</td>
<td>#2 (M)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Ruger.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8&quot;</td>
<td>2 (BC)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Kam.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8&quot;</td>
<td>4 (Rwy)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Kaneohe Bay.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8&quot;</td>
<td>4 (Rwy)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Ewa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8&quot;</td>
<td>4 (Rwy)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Waimanalo.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8&quot;</td>
<td>6 (Kwy)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Alt. Mail.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6&quot;</td>
<td>#2 (DC)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Alt. Malaboa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6&quot;</td>
<td>#2 (DC)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Del Russy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3&quot;</td>
<td>#2 (BC)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Kam. 9.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3&quot;</td>
<td>#2 (BC)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Armstrong.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>155 mm</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Kam.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>155 mm</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Barbers Pt.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>155 mm</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Sand Is.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>155 mm</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Ruger.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>155 mm</td>
<td>#8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Kii.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>155 mm</td>
<td>#6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Kawaiais.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>155 mm</td>
<td>#6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Weaver.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>155 mm</td>
<td>#6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Ewa Beach.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>155 mm</td>
<td>#4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Brewster's Camp.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>155 mm</td>
<td>#6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Kii.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>155 mm</td>
<td>#6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Punch Bowl.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>155 mm</td>
<td>#6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Kanoe Bay.</td>
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<tr>
<td>155 mm</td>
<td>#6</td>
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<td>Kaneohe Bay.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>155 mm</td>
<td>#6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td># not manned initially.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(The remaining portion of Exhibit No. 63 is a map of the Territory of Hawaii relating to "Aircraft Warning Service, Hawaiian Department" and will be reproduced as Item No. 63, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Army Pearl Harbor Board.)

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**Army Pearl Harbor Board Exhibit No. 64**

**JOHN WINTER, Investigator for House Military Affairs Committee.**

It was expected that at the February 15 hearings of the Committee there would be testimony indicating that during the Spring of 1942 in Hawaii Colonel
Wyman and three other Army officers participated in an evening of drinking in a hotel barroom. Wyman became quite intoxicated and stated:

"There are probably a good many things which I have done during my life that are not exactly right, but there is one thing I have not done and that is to sell out my country the way that s. o. b. Rohl did to his German friends. I should never have trusted him and what I should do now is take this service revolver, go out and shoot him and then blow my own brains out."

It is said that Weiner has an affidavit from a Capt. Guiter who was attached to the General Staff at Washington in July 1943 embodying Wyman's remarks. The day after the carousel Capt. Guiter and the other officers reported the incident to the G-2 office at Honolulu. Nothing was heard for about six weeks when the officers were called in and statements taken. Nothing further was heard of it.

ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD EXHIBIT No. 65

In reply refer to: AGPO—A 210.311 (24 Jun 44)

Via Air Mail
Special Delivery
Subject: Orders.
To: Each officer named.

1. Pursuant to the provisions of Public Law 339, 78th Congress, approved 13 June 1944, a Board of officers is hereby appointed to ascertain and report the facts relating to the attack made by Japanese armed forces upon the Territory of Hawaii on 7 December 1941, and to make such recommendations as it may deem proper, as follows:

Name Station
Lt. Gen. George Grunert, O1534, USA. Hq. 2d Service Command, Governors
Island, New York.
Maj. Gen. Henry D. Russell, O212739, WD Manpower Board, V Section, Co-
Columbus, Ohio.
Maj. Gen. Walter H. Frank, O2871, 4001st AAF Base Unit, Patterson Field, USA. Member.
Col. Charles W. West, O12274, JAGD. USMA, West Point, N. Y.

Recorded, without vote.

2. Such military and civilian personnel may be assigned to assist the Board as the Board shall request.

3. The Board will convene at Washington, D. C., at the call of the senior member and will hold sessions at such time or times and at such place or places as it may deem advisable. The Board is empowered to prescribe its own procedure and is authorized to employ civilian reporter or reporters.

4. The members of the Board assigned to command positions will retain command while performing duties with the Board.

5. During the period of operations of the Board, approximately sixty (60) days, the members are authorized to perform such travel, including repeated travel, within the continental United States as may be directed by the President of the Board. For travel outside the continental United States, the President of the Board will request The Adjutant General to issue such orders as may be required.

6. Military and civilian personnel will render the Board all necessary information and assistance.

7. Travel directed is necessary in the military service. 501-1 P 432-02. 03, 212/50425. The provisions of War Department Circular No. 60, cs, and War Department Circular No. 260, cs, apply.

By order of the Secretary of War:

[Seal]

J. A. Ulio,
J. A. Ulio,
Major General.
The Adjutant General.
In reply
refer to: AGPO-A-A 210.311 (10 Jun 44)

Subject: Amendment of Orders.
To: Lieutenant General George Grunert, United States Army,
Headquarters Eastern Defense Command,
Governors Island, New York.

So much of classified letter orders, this office, AGPO-A-A 210.311 (24 Jun 44),
8 July 1944, subject: "Orders", as pertains to Lieutenant General George Grunert,
O1534, United States Army, and reads: "Hq, 2d Service Command, Governors
Island, New York", is hereby amended to read: "Hq, Eastern Defense Command,
Governors Island, New York".

By order of the Secretary of War:

[SEAL]

J. A. Ullo,
Major General,
The Adjutant General.

Armed Forces Pervasive
No. 67

WCM mers 2401
Officers' Br.
Ph. 78270

WAR DEPARTMENT,
The Adjutant General's Office,
Washington 25, D.C., 22 August 1944.

In reply
refer to: AGPO-A 248.7 (2 Aug 44)

Subject: Amendment of Orders.
To: President, Army Pearl Harbor Board,
Room 4741, Munitions Building,
Washington, D.C.

1944, subject: "Orders", which appointed the Army Pearl Harbor Board, as
11 July 1944, subject: "Amendment of Orders", pertaining to Lieutenant General
George Grunert, O1534, United States Army, is hereby further amended to
authorize the President of the Army Pearl Harbor Board to request The
Adjutant General to issue such invitational orders to civilian witnesses as may
be required, in accordance with paragraph 3 b, Army Regulations 35-4120,
30 July 1943.

2. Announcement is made of the detail of Colonel Harry A. Toulmin, Jr.,
O28520, Air Corps, to the Army Pearl Harbor Board established by above men-
tioned letter orders effective 15 August 1944, and to designate him as Executive
Officer of that Board without vote.
By order of the Secretary of War:

[SEAL.]

J. F. RUTH,
Adjutant General.

Distribution:
5—Col. Harry A. Toulin, Jr., Rm. 4741, Munitions Bldg.
AC of S, G-1, Col. Goodwin, Rm. 2C001, The Pentagon.
C Statistics Br, G8, Rm. 3D685, The Pentagon.
Off Br Rec Sec, Rm. 1055, Munitions Bldg. w/d
AC of S, OPD, WDGS, Rm. 3B869, The Pentagon.
Col. Burger, Rm. 1052, Munitions Bldg. w/d
CG, AAF, Rm. 5D1082, The Pentagon.
Room 2422, Munitions Bldg.

ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD EXHIBIT No. 68

WCM mer 2401
Off Br—WCM—Ph 78270

WAR DEPARTMENT,
The Adjutant General's Office,
Washington 25, D. C., 22 July 1944.

In reply
refer to: AGPO—A—A 210.311 (21 Jul 44)

Subject: Supplemental Orders.
To: Each Officer Mentioned.

1. The Board appointed by letter orders, this office, AGPO—A—A 210.311 (24 Jun 44), 8 July 1944, subject: "Orders", as amended by letter orders, this office, AGPO—A—A 210.311 (10 Jul 44), 11 July 1944, subject: "Amendment of Orders", pertaining to each of the following-named officers, will consider the phases which related to the Pearl Harbor Disaster of the report of the House Military Affairs Committee, as directed by the Acting Secretary of War in his memorandum for the Judge Advocate General, 12 July 1944:

Lt. Gen. George Grunert, O1534, USA,
Maj. Gen. Henry D. Russell, O21273, USA,
Maj. Gen. Walter H. Frank, O2871, USA,
Col. Charles W. West, O12774, JAGD.

2. Major Henry C. Clausen, O907613, JAGD, is appointed as Assistant Recorder without vote on the above referred to Board.

By order of the Secretary of War:

[SEAL.]

W. C. McWilliam,
Adjutant General.

1 Inc.
Memo 12 July 44.

ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD EXHIBIT No. 69

Memorandum for the Judge Advocate General.
Subject: Report of House Military Affairs Committee alleging neglect and misconduct of Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr., and others, concerning Hawaiian and Canadian Defense Projects.

1. The recommendations contained in paragraph 5 of the memorandum dated July 10, 1944, of Major Henry C. Clausen, J. A. G. D., to Mr. Amberg, Special Assistant to the Secretary of War, on the above subject, are approved.

2. Immediately upon the appointment of a board of officers pursuant to Public Law 339, 78th Congress, to investigate the facts surrounding the Pearl Harbor catastrophe, the phases of the present matter relating thereto will be referred to such board for investigation and such other action as may be proper under the directive appointing such board. As it is understood Major Clausen will be
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CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

detailed as assistant recorder of this board, he will continue in that capacity
to coordinate the activities referred to paragraph 1 hereof with the activities
of the Pearl Harbor board in the present case.  
  (Signed) Robert P. Patterson,
  ROBERT P. PATTERSON,
  Acting Secretary of War.

ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD EXHIBIT NO. 70

[1] OFFICE MEMORANDUM—UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT  

Date: August 25, 1944.

To: Lieutenant General George Grunert, U. S. Army,
President, Army Pearl Harbor Board, Munitions Building, Wash-
ington, D. C.

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Subject: Confidential—By Special Messenger.

I will take this means of replying to your letter of August 21, 1944, in which
you request a review of the files of this Bureau for the purpose of furnishing
to you a résumé of the activities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in Hawaii
immediately prior to December 7, 1941. It should be pointed out at the outset
that it was the policy of this Bureau to make available to the War and Navy
Departments all information in its possession bearing upon matters within the
jurisdiction of the War and Navy Departments or reflecting upon the internal
security of Hawaii. It can be safely stated that any information the FBI posses-
sed in these categories was furnished to the War and Navy Departments.

JURISDICTION

On June 20, 1939, the President of the United States issued a confidential
directive to the heads of the various Government departments which stated in
part as follows:

"It is my desire that the investigation of all espionage, counterespionage and
subversion matters be controlled and handled by the Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation of the Department of Justice, the Military Intelligence Division of the War
Department and the Office of Naval Intelligence of the Navy Department. The
directors of these three agencies are to function as a committee to coordinate
their activities. No investigations should be conducted by any investiga-
tive agency of the Government into matters involving actually or potentially any
espionage, counterespionage or sabotage except by the three agencies mentioned
above."

As a result of this Presidential directive, the directors of the three agencies
named by the President in order to coordinate their respective activities sub-
scribed to a "delimitation of jurisdiction agreement". The original agreement
was dated June 5, 1940, and was subsequently revised and reissued on February
9, 1942. The agreement of June 5, 1940, which was, of course, in effect on
December 7, 1941, is quoted as follows:

"I. It is agreed that in conformity with the directive contained in the Presi-
dent's memorandum of June 20, 1939, as augmented by his directive of September
6, 1939, responsibility for investigation of all espionage, counterespionage, sub-
version and subversive activities will be delimited as indicated hereafter. Respon-
sibility assumed by one organization in a given field carries with it the obligation
to provide a pool of all information received in that field but it does not imply
the responsible agency alone is interested in or will work alone in that field.
Close cooperation between the three agencies in all fields is a mutually recognized
necessity."

[2] "II. FBI will assume responsibility for all investigations of cases in
these categories involving civilians in the United States and in its territories
with the exception of the Panama Canal Zone, Guam, Samoa and the Philippine
Islands.

"FBI will keep MID and ONI informed of important developments such as—
  "(a) Developments affecting plants engaged on Army or Navy contracts.
  "(b) Developments affecting vital utilities.
  "(c) Developments affecting critical points of transportation or com-
munication systems."
"(d) Cases of actual or strongly presumptive espionage or sabotage, including the names of individuals definitely known to be connected with subversive activities.

"FBI will act as the coordinating head of all civilian organizations furnishing information relating to subversive movements.

"III. FBI will assume responsibility for investigation of all cases in these categories directed from foreign countries on those occasions and in those situations in which the State, War or Navy Departments specifically request investigation of a designated group or set of circumstances.

"FBI to keep MID and ONI informed of important developments.

"MID will assume responsibility of all cases in these categories in the Military Establishments, including civilians employed on military reservations or under military control. It will also assume responsibility for the investigation of cases in these categories involving civilians in the Canal Zone, the Republic of Panama and the Philippines.

"MID will inform FBI and ONI of important developments.

"V. ONI will assume responsibility for investigation and disposal of all cases in these categories in the Naval Establishment, including civilians under naval control and all civilians in Guam and American Samoa.

"ONI to inform FBI and MID of important developments.

[3] "VI. FBI will assume responsibility for ascertaining the location, leadership, strength and organization of all civilian groups designated to combat 'Fifth Column' activities (overt acts of all sorts in cooperation with the armed forces of an enemy). FBI will transmit to MID, ONI and the State Department information concerning these organizations and any information received concerning their possession of arms.

"On May 15, 1941, Brigadier General Sherman Miles of G-2, Captain Alan G. Kirk, Director of the Office of Naval Intelligence and myself affixed our signatures to a memorandum entitled "Definition of Jurisdiction". This memorandum, in part, is as follows:

"Acting under the authority of a Presidential directive issued on June 26, 1939, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Military Intelligence and the Division of Naval Intelligence have worked closely together in establishing and maintaining a complete coverage of the field of espionage, sabotage, counterespionage, subversive activities and violations of the Neutrality Act. The Military Intelligence Division exercises jurisdiction in this field in matters relating to enlisted and civilian personnel of the War Department and in cases arising on military reservations and complete investigational jurisdiction in the Panama Canal Zone. Naval Intelligence assumes the responsibility for carrying out the investigative operations in all cases involving officers and enlisted men of the Navy, Naval Reserve, Marine Corps, Marine Corps Reserve, and the civilian personnel under the employ or control of the Naval Establishment and the outlying islands of the Sixteenth Naval District, such as Palmyra, Johnston and Wake, and civilian jurisdiction in the Alaskan Peninsula, Aleutian Islands and the Pribilof Islands. The Federal Bureau of Investigation assumes the primary responsibility for all cases within the United States, Puerto Rico, Hawaiian Islands, Virgin Islands and Alaska, not specifically involving personnel of the War and Navy Departments. Naval Intelligence and the Federal Bureau of Investigation exercise joint coverage in the handling of Japanese counterespionage."

In furtherance of the statement contained in this memorandum that the Naval Intelligence and the Federal Bureau of Investigation exercised joint coverage in the handling of Japanese espionage, the minutes of a conference between representatives of the War, Justice, Treasury and Navy Departments on April 2, 1941, as furnished to the Federal Bureau of Investigation by Captain A. G. Kirk, Director of Naval Intelligence, on April 7, 1941, reflect that "it was reaffirmed that the FBI and ONI would carry out as promptly as possible the steps presently being taken to insure complete coverage of the alternate Japanese system".

[4] "In further clarification of the jurisdiction in Hawaii with respect to Japanese matters, permit me to quote in full a memorandum addressed to me by Assistant Director Hugh H. Clegg of the Federal Bureau of Investigation dated July 19, 1940.

"I talked today with Captain Nixon and Captain Phillips, who, it is understood, will later succeed Captain Nixon when he goes to sea, both of ONI. We discussed the handling of Japanese espionage matters and the counterespionage work which should be undertaken. Both Nixon and Phillips indicated they had for years been
focusing their attention on the Japanese problem, since Japan for a number of years appeared the most likely enemy. A war with Japan would be quite largely a Naval problem. Naturally, they were concerned.

"They have developed a number of informants. They have quite a large volume of information. It appears that Anderson has recently told Nixon to send their information to the FBI. At least, he asked if this had been done. Nixon has informed him that it had not. They pointed out the problems involved and the contacts that had already been established. This at least has delayed the information already in the Navy Department's files being sent to the Bureau. Nixon pointed out the difficulties in getting Japanese translators; he pointed out in the Bureau will be working without the vast amount of background knowledge, a great deal of which has not been placed in writing, and the difficulties involved in assimilating the store of information which is a matter of record in the Navy Department. He pointed also to the large increase in work of the Bureau in proportion to the increase in Special Agents.

"I pointed out the difficulties involved, since we were contacting transportation companies, including railroads and airplane travel companies, and finding that they had similar contacts which they had not canceled, and that it would obviously be irritating to various contacts to have to report to two or several governmental agencies; that I felt definitely there should be an understanding in the fixing of responsibility instead of leaving it in a nebulous state as at present. Nixon stated that at present, under the agreement, the work belonged to the FBI except where the Naval establishments were directly affected, but it could be told that Nixon personally and I believe, Phillips, were desirous of retaining a large share of jurisdiction over Japanese espionage.

"They stated they would join in a recommendation as follows:

[5] "(1) The full responsibility for all intelligence work relating to Japan and Japanese in the United States and in the Territory of Hawaii would be assumed by ONI.

"(2) In the event any case investigated by them reached a point where they believed prosecution was desirable, they would submit all facts and information to the FBI, with the request that the information be examined and the investigations as were necessary from a standpoint of getting legal evidence be conducted by the FBI with a view of presenting the facts to the U. S. Attorney for prosecution; that such investigations conducted by the FBI would be made only in cases wherein prosecution was desired and the Bureau will be working without the vast amount of background knowledge, a great deal of which has not been placed in writing, and the difficulties involved in assimilating the store of information which is a matter of record in the Navy Department. He pointed also to the large increase in work of the Bureau in proportion to the increase in Special Agents.

"(3) Any information in possession of the FBI or which the FBI receives in the future concerning Japanese or intelligence work relating to Japan or Japanese would be transmitted to ONI; all information presently in the possession of ONI, with the exception of the names of certain confidential informants of ONI, will be furnished to the FBI; and in the future, information in these categories as it is received will be furnished to ONI to the FBI. The purpose of the FBI receiving any of this information would be, not for investigative purposes, but so that the FBI may be completed and the information assimilated so that, in the future, a time comes when the FBI is to assume jurisdiction over such matters, the proper background and the FBI.

"The above enumerates the gist of the attitude of Captain Nixon and Captain Phillips. They were personally entirely agreeable to it. It was obvious that they could not speak for Admiral Anderson and had no authority to commit ONI to this program."

In a conference in Washington, D. C., in July of 1941, I informed Special Agent in Charge R. L. Shivers of the Honolulu Office that I had advised Admiral Walter Anderson, Director of the Office of Naval Intelligence, and Colonel McCabe, Director of the Military Intelligence Division, that I would not assume the full responsibility for investigation of matters pertaining to Japanese espionage because the Federal Bureau of Investigation was not prepared to take over the full responsibility. I acquainted Mr. Shivers with the fact that I had informed Admiral Anderson and Colonel McCabe that the Naval Intelligence would have to assume and continue primary responsibility for Japanese espionage investigations until the Federal Bureau of Investigation could prepare to take over that phase of the work in full. I also informed Special Agent in Charge Shivers that the Office of Naval Intelligence had specialized in Japanese espionage for many years; that the FBI knew nothing of Japanese espionage and Japanese intelligence matters prior to 1938; that it was not equipped with translators, interpreters and informants and could not undertake the full responsibility for Japanese espionage until it had been able to equip itself to do so. Admiral Walter Anderson also informed Special Agent in Charge Shivers of the Honolulu Office of
substantially the same facts on the battleship West Virginia at Honolulu soon after he took command of the battle force at Pearl Harbor, which was some time previous to July of 1941.

Further evidence of the fact that the Federal Bureau of Investigation did not assume sole and primary responsibility for Japanese espionage activity in the United States and its territories, including the Hawaiian Islands, and did not consider itself so responsible, is to be found in a letter dated December 14, 1940, addressed to the Special Agent in Charge at Honolulu, Hawaii, by me which letter was written in response to an inquiry made of me by the Special Agent in Charge concerning the division of investigative jurisdiction of Japanese matters in Hawaii between the Office of Naval Intelligence and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. This letter, in part, states: "Further, the Bureau does not consider it advisable or desirable at this particular time for your office to assume the responsibility for the supervision of all Japanese espionage investigations in the Territory of Hawaii."

In another letter dated June 24, 1941, addressed to the Special Agent in Charge of the Honolulu Office, the subject of jurisdiction in Japanese espionage cases was further discussed, and he was further informed: "The Bureau is not yet prepared to handle the investigation of Japanese activity exclusively on the mainland, and consequently the Bureau cannot authorize the assumption by your office of exclusive jurisdiction in matters relating to Japanese activities in the Hawaiian Islands."

The delimitation agreement which gave the Office of Naval Intelligence equal and concurrent jurisdiction with the Federal Bureau of Investigation in investigations involving Japanese espionage in the Hawaiian Islands was known to the Office of Naval Intelligence and the Office of Military Intelligence in Honolulu. The Special Agent in Charge at Honolulu has discussed the delimitation agreement with Captain I. H. Mayfield, District Intelligence Officer of the Fourteenth Naval District, Lieutenant Colonel Morrill W. Marston, Colonel Kendall J. Fielder, and Lieutenant Colonel George W. Bicknell, all of whom have been associated with the Office of Military Intelligence since the Federal Bureau of Investigation opened an office there in August, 1939. The Special Agent in Charge informed all of these officers that the Federal Bureau of Investigation was not equipped to take over the exclusive investigation of Japanese espionage matters because of a lack of translators, language students and informants among the Japanese populace. The Special Agent in Charge further informed these gentlemen that the Office of Naval Intelligence had agreed to carry on the Japanese work primarily until such time as the Federal Bureau of Investigation was able to take it over.

[7] These conversations have taken place from time to time at the Weekly Intelligence Conferences which the Special Agent in Charge of the Federal Bureau of Investigation at Honolulu and the above named individuals held.

I am attaching for your information a copy of the delimitation agreement which was finally drafted to incorporate all existing memoranda and understandings. You will note that on page four under the caption "ONI will be responsible for:" is the provision "2. Jointly with FBI, the Bureau will be responsible for:" Similarly, under the caption "FBI will be responsible for:" you will notice that paragraph four provides "Jointly with ONI, the coverage of Japanese activities in these categories. ONI will continue its coverage of Japanese activities as heretofore and FBI will continue to expand its operations in this field." It appears evident from the last quoted sentence that the Office of Naval Intelligence was clearly recognized as having the primary responsibility for Japanese coverage even as of February 9, 1942.

Following the Presidential directive referred to previously, weekly conferences were held at Hawaii between the Special Agent in Charge of the Honolulu Field Office of this Bureau and the officers in charge of the local offices of G-2 and ONI. These conferences, which were quite informal, offered an excellent medium of coordination, and it was the practice of those present to freely discuss all recent developments regardless of whether the matter under discussion might be strictly within the investigative jurisdiction of any particular agency present. In this regard, it should be noted that daily liaison was maintained, particularly with Colonel George W. Bicknell whose offices were located immediately adjacent to the offices occupied by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Special Agent in Charge Shivers and Colonel Bicknell were on intimate personal terms and their contacts throughout the day were frequent. It was in accordance with my instructions that all reports of an Intelligence nature with respect to Hawaii were furnished
to appropriate representatives of the War Department, both at Washington, D. C. and Honolulu. Four times yearly a review was made of all intelligence activities and trends entitled “Quarterly Intelligence Summary”. This was likewise furnished to the War Department at Washington, D. C. The last such report furnished immediately prior to December 7, 1941, was one dated November 15, 1941. I am attaching hereto for your information a copy of a portion of that report (pages 928–942) which I think is pertinent to the matter under consideration.

HONOLULU FIELD OFFICE

The Honolulu Field Division of the Federal Bureau of Investigation was originally opened in April of 1931. This office was closed in May of 1934, and was again reopened in August of 1937. The office was again closed April 30, 1938, due to the insufficiency of funds to continue its operation. [8] Up to this time, the personnel of the Honolulu Office consisted merely of the Agent in Charge and one stenographer. The office was reopened again with Mr. R. L. Shivers as Special Agent in Charge in August of 1939. After this office was opened, three Agents, including Mr. Shivers, and one stenographer were assigned to this Field Division, this force being shortly thereafter augmented with the addition of two stenographers.

In June of 1940, six additional Agents and two additional stenographers were assigned to the Honolulu Office, making a total Agent force of nine, and a stenographic force of five. One Agent was designated as Resident Agent at Hilo, Hawaii. The force was steadily increased so that in June of 1941 the investigative personnel including the Agent in Charge, numbered fourteen.

On December 7, 1941, there was a total of sixteen Special Agents, including the Agent in Charge, and nine clerical employees assigned to the office.

JAPANESE CONSULAR AGENTS

As a result of a survey conducted by the Honolulu Field Office, the results of which were, of course, made available to the War and Navy Departments, both at Hawaii and in Washington, it was ascertained that there were over 200 Japanese Consular Agents present in the Hawaiian Islands at one time, the number of which varied greatly due to immigration, appointments, resignations and deaths. The activities of the Japanese Consular Agents in the Hawaiian Islands were the subject of considerable concern to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Special Agent in Charge of the Honolulu Field Division submitted the following letter dated September 3, 1940:

“...there is being transmitted herewith a list of Japanese acting as consular agents within the Territory of Hawaii for the local Japanese Consul. It is obvious that under the Act governing the registration of agents of foreign principals and of foreign governments that these are exempted from its provisions—

any member of the staff of or person employed by a duty accredited diplomatic or consular officer of a foreign government who is so recognized by the Department of State of the United States, other than a public relations counselor or publicity agent, whose status and the character of whose duties as such member or employee are of record in the Department of State of the United States.

“It is requested that it be ascertained of the Department of State whether or not the names, status, and character of duties of the aforementioned consular agents are of record in the Department of State. If not, it is desired to know whether such consular agents can be considered to fall within the scope of the Act. If it is determined that [9] these consular agents are not subject to the provisions of the Registration Act, as such, would their status be changed in any respect so that they would come within the purview of this Act, provided they are engaged in disseminating propaganda for the Japanese Consul or the Japanese Government?

“It has been learned from a confidential source that one of the consular agents telephoned to the Japanese Consulate in Honolulu and asked a representative of the Consulate if he should register under the terms of the Alien Registration Act. The member of the Consulate staff advised the Consular agent that he was not subject to the terms of this act and should not register because he was a diplomatic officer under the jurisdiction of the Japanese Foreign Office.

“Those consular agents are scattered throughout the Hawaiian Islands and the Bureau can readily see that they constitute a source of information over wide
areas, which if used for espionage purposes would be in a position to furnish the consulate invaluable information on fleet movements, army posts, and all general information that would be of value to the Japanese Government.

"In the event it is determined that any or all of these consular agents are subject to the provisions of the Registration Act, this office desires to conduct an immediate investigation for the purpose of ascertaining their activities looking toward a prosecution of those consular agents who have violated the terms of the Registration Act by not having registered as prescribed.

"While this office is not aware of the full extent of the duties of the consular agents, it is believed that they are required to look after the interests of the Japanese populace in their respective communities, to keep alive the Japanese spirit, and to do the bidding of the Japanese consulate. They are undoubtedly looked upon by the Japanese populace as representatives of the Japanese consulate and the Japanese Government and the Emperor of Japan and for that reason wield considerable influence in determining the actions and molding the thought of the Japanese populace in Hawaii, especially among the alien element."

This matter was taken up with the State Department which advised that unless these consuls were notified pursuant to Section 223, Title 22 United States Code, which requires all agents of foreign governments to be notified to the Secretary of State. A letter was addressed to Honorable Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State, dated September 28, 1940, which read as follows:

[16] There is enclosed a list of Japanese acting as consular agents in the Territory of Hawaii for the Japanese Consul at Honolulu.

"Will you please inform me whether the names, status, and character of the duties of these individuals as consular agents, are of record in your department.

"Can you also advise me whether these consular agents come within the purview of the Registration Act. If it is your opinion that they do not come within the purview of this act, would their status be changed in any respect if they are engaged in the dissemination of propaganda for the Japanese Consul or the Japanese Government?"

"Since these individuals may come to the attention of the Honolulu Field Division of this Bureau from time to time, and that Division may desire to conduct some investigation into their activities, will you also please advise me whether these individuals are subject to diplomatic immunity?"

Under date of October 14, 1940, this Bureau received a letter from Assistant Secretary of State Adolf A. Berle, Jr., which read as follows:

"I acknowledge the receipt of your letter of September 28, 1940 enclosing a list of Japanese acting as consular agents in the Territory of Hawaii for the Japanese Consul at Honolulu.

"In reply to your inquiry, I have to inform you that none of the individuals named is on record in the Department of State as a member of the diplomatic or consular service of a foreign government, nor is any of them registered with the Secretary of State pursuant to the provisions of the Act of June 8, 1938, as amended, requiring the registration of agents of foreign principals.

"If the individuals named are agents of, receive compensation from, or are under the direction of the Japanese Consul, the Japanese Government, or any other foreign principal as that term is defined in the first section of the Act of June 8, 1938, as amended, and are engaged in activities not within the exceptions to the provisions of the Act, they would be considered subject to the requirement of registration.

"The individuals named are not considered entitled to diplomatic immunity, and the Department has no objection to such investigation of their activities as the Federal Bureau of Investigation may desire to make."

[17] After the above fact had been determined with regard to a number of these Consular agents, and it was felt that all Consular agents were acting in similar capacities, the matter of prosecution of them was presented to the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice, first in the case of Yoshio Koike on March 31, 1941. This memorandum is as follows:

"I am in receipt of information from the Honolulu Field Division that it is in possession of a certificate of appointment of Yoshio Koike as a Consular Agent in January of 1936. This individual is not now acting in that capacity.
"There is enclosed a photostatic copy of this certificate. A free translation of this certificate is as follows:

'THE JAPANESE CONSUL GENERAL AT HONOLULU
YOSHIKO KOIKE is authorized to be an agent to receive the various requests and applications of the residents of the Onomea District for the next two years.

JANUARY, 1936.

Imperial Consul General at Honolulu

The seal is said to be that of the Japanese Consul General at Honolulu."

"The Honolulu Office believes that all Consular Agents in Hawaii and the mainland of the United States have similar certificates. These Consular Agents are required to follow certain set of rules which are as follows:

1. Notice to Agents:
   Term of office is two years, starting in January 1938 and ending December, 1939.

2. Any change of residence or leave for Japan:
   The Consulate is to be immediately notified. For failure to do so the appointment will be revoked and another appointed.

3. The scope of the agent's activities is restricted to his residential district and if any agent changes his residence to another district the appointment will be revoked.

4. The agent will cooperate."

"It is the understanding of the Honolulu Field Division that these Agents are not paid any salary by the Japanese Government but are remunerated by fees charged to the person requiring their services.

"I am advised by a representative of the State Department that Yoshi Koike was not notified to the Secretary of State as a Consular Agent or as an agent of Japan at the time he was issued this certificate.

"Since it appears that many of these Japanese Consular Agents may not be notified to the Secretary of State, is it your opinion that those individuals who occupy a position similar to that occupied by Yoshi Koike and engaged in the same activities are violating Section 223, Title 22, U.S Code, requiring agents of foreign governments to be notified to the Secretary of State? Or do these individuals come within the exception to this statute which states that diplomatic or Consular officers or attaches do not have to be notified? If these individuals do not have to be notified under Section 223, Title 22, U.S Code, do they have to register as agents of foreign principals under Section 233 a to g, Title 22, U.S Code, requiring agents of foreign principals to be registered with the Secretary of State?

Would it appear that they do not come within the exceptions of this statute which state that the term 'agent of a foreign principal' does no mean:

'(1) A duly accredited diplomatic or Consular officer of a foreign government who is so recognized by the Department of State of the United States; or

'(2) Any official of a foreign government recognized by the United States as a government, other than a public relations counsel or publicity agent, or a citizen of the United States whose status and the character of whose duties as such official are of record in the Department of State of the United States.'

"This is particularly true since the State Department advises that Yoshi Koike was never notified to the Secretary of State as an agent of Japan, or as a Consular Agent."

The Consular Agents' cases were again presented to the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice on April 7, 1941, in the case Isao Hamada in the following memorandum:

"There is enclosed a copy of the report of Special Agent F. G. Tillman, Honolulu, T. H., dated March 10, 1941.

"I am informed by the Honolulu Field Division that there are approximately 234 individuals in Honolulu who are acting as Consular Agents in a capacity similar to that of Isao Hamada. Will you please advise me whether the information as developed with regard to Isao Hamada will justify the prosecution of this individual for violation of Section 223, Title 22, U.S Code, requiring agents of foreign Governments to be notified to the Secretary of State, or if his activities are such as will justify prosecution of this individual for violation of Section 233 a to g, Title 22, U.S Code, requiring agents of foreign principals to be registered with the Secretary of State."
"A prompt reply to this memorandum will be appreciated inasmuch as it will serve to determine what investigation should be made in the cases of the other 234 Consular Agents in the Hawaiian Islands."

The reports concerning the activities of Itou Hamada and Yoshio Koike, as well as the reports concerning the activities of their fellow consuls, were made available to the War Department in Hawaii and the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice.

On June 2, 1941, the Federal Bureau of Investigation received the following radiogram from the Honolulu Field Division:

"JAPANESE CONSULAR AGENTS TERRITORY OF HAWAII. DEPARTMENT HAS REQUESTED OPINION OF U. S. D. A. HERE REGARDING PROSECUTION UNDER REGISTRATION ACT OF TWO HUNDRED THIRTY FOUR CONSULAR AGENTS. U. S. D. A. WIRING DEPARTMENT RECOMMENDING IMMEDIATE PROSECUTION AND ADVISING THAT THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER OF THE U.S. ARMY HAWAIIAN ISLANDS WAS OPPOSED TO SUCH ACTION AT THIS TIME ON GROUNDS IT MIGHT RESULT IN UNFAVORABLE ACTION ON PART OF JAPANESE COMMUNITIES ALTHOUGH SUCH ACTION WOULD NOT INTERFERE WITH ANY PLANS OF THE HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT FOR THE DEFENSE OF THE ISLANDS."

On June 23, 1941, the Bureau was advised by the Special Agent in Charge of the Honolulu Field Division in a letter as follows:

"Reference is made to the radiogram sent to the Bureau dated June 2, 1941, stating that the Attorney General's Office of the Department had requested an opinion from the United States Attorney at Honolulu regarding prosecution under the Registration Act of the 234 Japanese Consular Agents in Hawaii.

"As stated in the aforementioned wire, Mr. ANGUS M. TAYLOR, Jr., the Acting United States Attorney here, wired the Department recommending immediate prosecution but advised at the same time that Lieutenant General WALTER SHORT, Department Commander of the United States Army in Hawaii, was opposed to such action at this time on the grounds that it might react unfavorably on the Japanese community, although such action would not interfere with any plans of the Hawaiian Department for the defense of the islands.

"The United States Attorney is in receipt of a further communication from the Department requesting to be advised if there has been any change in the opinion of General SHORT concerning this matter and requesting to be advised of the practical effect of his opposition.

"Acting United States Attorney ANGUS TAYLOR has informed me that he has communicated with General SHORT through Lieutenant Colonel H. W. MARSTON, who is in charge of the Military Intelligence Office for the Hawaiian Department, and has been informed that the General has not changed his opinion in this matter and will actively oppose the prosecution of these individuals by recommending to the War Department, if necessary, that the matter be taken up with the Attorney General with a view of preventing the arrest and prosecution of the Japanese Consular Agents at this time.

"As I understand it, the primary objective of General SHORT is that since the Registration Act has been in effect since September, 1933, he does not believe it would be considered fair play if the Government should act at this time against the 234 Japanese Consular Agents who have been acting as such since the enactment of the law, and he feels that it would be regarded by the Japanese community as a hostile act designed to harass the Japanese aliens and American citizens of Japanese ancestry in the Hawaiian Islands.

"I am informed by the United States Attorney that he will present the opinion of General SHORT to the Department and will again reiterate his recommendation that the Department authorize prosecution against the Consular Agents."

On July 1, 1941, the following memorandum was sent to the Department of Justice by me:

"I am in receipt of a communication from the Special Agent in Charge of the Honolulu Field Division in which he advises that although the Acting United States Attorney in Honolulu has approved the prosecution of the Japanese Consular Agents, Lieutenant General Walter Short, Department Commander of the United States Army in Hawaii, has opposed this action on the ground that it might react unfavorably on the Japanese community.

"I am informed that the primary objection of General Short is that since the Registration Act has been in effect since September, 1933, he does not believe it would be considered fair play if the Government should act at this time against the 234 Japanese Consular Agents who have been acting as such since the enactment
of the law, and he feels that it would be regarded by the Japanese community as a hostile act designed to harass the Japanese aliens and American citizens of Japanese ancestry in the Hawaiian Islands.

[15] "This is furnished you for your information. Of course, the investigations to date have been based on the proposition that these individuals are acting as agents of a foreign government who have not been notified to the Secretary of State, which statute is Section 233, Title 22, U. S. Code, this statute being enacted in 1917."

On July 14, 1941, the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice, in response to inquiry previously made of it by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, advised as follows:

"Reference is made to your memorandum dated July 1, 1941, in the above entitled matter.

"For your information, the Department of State has advised the Department that these individuals are not considered to have the status of diplomatic or consular officers or attaches and the Department of State perceives no objection to the contemplated prosecution of these individuals for violation of Section 233 of Title 22 of the United States Code.

"Although the Criminal Division is now prepared to authorize the prosecution of certain of these Japanese Consular Agents, it seems that the objection of Lieutenant General Walter Short, Department Commander of the United States Army in Hawaii, must be given consideration. Accordingly, the Criminal Division has advised the Secretary of War of the facts and its recommendation that prosecution in a certain number of these cases be instituted without further delay."

On August 4, 1941, the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice forwarded copies of a letter dated July 23, 1941, with its enclosure from the Secretary of War concerning these Consular Agents. The Federal Bureau of Investigation was advised that the Criminal Division was not "prepared at this time to authorize the prosecution of these Agents, but still has the matter under consideration." The enclosures forwarded by the Criminal Division are as follows:

"Upon receipt of your letter of July 14, 1941, on the subject of the prosecution of certain unregistered Japanese Consular Agents in the Territory of Hawaii I dispatched a secret radiogram to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, directing him to radio his recommendations stating clearly his reasons and objections if any to the proposed prosecutions.

"A paraphrased copy of his reply is attached hereto.

"I concur in the statements and objections set forth by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and strongly recommend that a warning be issued to these unregistered Japanese Consular Agents, through their accredited Consul General in Honolulu, to register by a certain date, say within a period of thirty days after promulgation of the warning, under penalty of prosecution for violation of our laws.

[15] "I believe that such a warning will effect the desired registration and contribute materially toward the Commanding General's campaign to secure the loyalty of the Japanese population of the Territory."

The paraphrased copy of the radiogram is as follows:

"Paraphrase of Code Radiogram

Received at the War Department

at 9:58, July 22, 1941

"Hawaii, filed July 21, 1941.

\"We are at present engaged in a counter propaganda campaign whose object is to encourage loyalty of the Japanese population of Hawaii on promise of fair treatment. The present outlook of results of this campaign on entire population is very favorable. Success of the campaign would promote unity and greatly reduce proportions of our defense problem. Espionage Act of June 15, 1917 referred to in your radiogram of July 19, 1941 has been in effect here since August 1939 with no attempt at local enforcement. As result of careful survey of situation, considering available facts and opinions FBI and other Federal agencies I believe not over ten per cent of the unregistered consular agents in Hawaii are aware they have violated our laws. I believe further that prosecution at this time would unduly alarm entire population and jeopardize success our current campaign to secure loyalty Japanese population.

"In my opinion fair play demands that warning be given to consular agents to register by a certain date on penalty of prosecution. I believe development of loyalty among Japanese population more important than punishment of a few
individuals. It is impractical to place total Japanese population of one hundred sixty thousand in concentration camps.”

"Snort"

The Federal Bureau of Investigation, from April 7, 1941, by various memoranda had requested the Criminal Division for opinions as to prosecution with regard to various other consular agents. The Criminal Division was followed on numerous occasions in an attempt to prosecute these individuals without success, due primarily to the fact that the War Department had interposed objections to prosecution as set out above.

In August, 1941, the Criminal Division, in nearly all cases of this type, was asked to advise if it was its intention to institute prosecution of these various individuals, and in September replies were received from the Criminal Division that a decision as to the authorization of prosecution was still under consideration by the Department of Justice, the United States Attorney at Honolulu, and other interested agencies.

[17] From the very beginning of the investigation of these individuals of Japanese nationality, it was thought that they might be engaged in activities dangerous to the internal security of the island, for on one occasion, that of Reverend Unji Hirayama, Japanese Consular Agent on the Island of Maui, a confidential informant had advised that this individual had been requested by a member of the Japanese Consulate to keep this member of the consulate informed as to the movements of the United States fleet in the vicinity of Maui. This information was from an unimpeachable source which could not be used in evidence.

On October 3, 1941, the Federal Bureau of Investigation directed a letter to the Special Agent in Charge of the Honolulu Field Division, advising him to conduct immediate, thorough investigations of all of the Japanese Consular agents in the Territory of Hawaii to determine if they were engaged in espionage, subversive, or propaganda activities in an effort to develop information of this character which would overcome the objections of the War Department to prosecution. On receipt of this letter, the Special Agent in Charge immediately assigned five Special Agents exclusively to the further investigation of these Japanese Consular agents for the purpose of carrying out the foregoing instructions. All reports submitted were furnished to ONI and G-2, both in Honolulu and Washington, D. C.

When the United States Attorney at Honolulu informed Special Agent in Charge R. L. Shivers, on or about June 29, 1941, that he had been instructed by the Department of Justice to furnish his opinion as to the prosecution of the Japanese Consular Agents, he conferred with the Special Agent in Charge, who furnished him with the facts and reports developed to that time concerning the activities of these agents. The Special Agent in Charge at that time informed Captain I. H. Mayfield, District Intelligence Officer, Fourteenth Naval District, Honolulu, Lieutenant Colonel Morrill W. Marston, War Department, G-2, and his assistant, Lieutenant Colonel George W. Bicknell, at a conference with these individuals that the United States Attorney had been requested to submit his opinion concerning the prosecution of these agents. The Special Agent in Charge asked these Naval and Military authorities their opinion on prosecution, and, speaking individually for themselves, each person present, including the Special Agent in Charge, was of the opinion that the Consular agents should be prosecuted.

Captain Mayfield of Naval Intelligence and Colonel Marston of Army Intelligence stated that while that was their personal opinions they could not speak for their respective Commanders, who were at that time Admiral Claude C. Bloch, Navy, and General Walter C. Short for the Army. The Special Agent in Charge stated to these representatives that it was a criminal prosecution which should be determined solely by the United States Attorney and he assumed that the Commandant of the Navy Yard and the Commanding General of the Army would regard it as a criminal prosecution with which they would not attempt to interfere.

The day following this conference Captain I. H. Mayfield informed the United States Attorney that Admiral Claude C. Bloch looked upon the matter as purely a criminal proceeding over which he had no jurisdiction and with which he would not attempt to interfere, but that it was his personal opinion the Consular Agents should be prosecuted. Lieutenant Colonel Morrill W. Marston reported to the United States Attorney the following day that Lieutenant General Walter C. Short was opposed to prosecuting the Consular agents for the reasons here-
In order to be properly advised of all attempted espionage activity, this Bureau, deeming that war with Japan and Axis powers was imminent, felt it desirable to monitor all long distance telephone conversations between Hawaii and Japan. Under instructions of the Attorney General, the FBI cannot install telephone taps except with the personal authorization of the Attorney General. In order to accomplish this purpose a memorandum was submitted to the Attorney General on September 2, 1941, for authority to install a technical surveillance which would insure this coverage. This authority was not granted by the Attorney General until October 22, 1941.

It is believed that if an earlier coverage had been effected, much information of value might have been obtained for the results thereof, after this installation, were extremely satisfactory. For instance, the Honolulu Office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, as a result of this surveillance, received information that at about 5:00 p.m. on Friday, December 5, 1941, Motokazi Mori of Honolulu talked by telephone to an unidentified relative in Japan.

A transcript of this telephone call is as follows, and the parentheses including the letters “J” and “H” preceding each recorded conversation indicate “J” for Japan and “H” for Honolulu:

(J) Hello, is this Mori?
(H) Hello, this is Mori.
(J) I am sorry to have troubled you. Thank you very much.
(H) Not at all.
(J) I received your telegram and was able to grasp the essential points. I would like to have your impressions on the conditions you are observing at present. Are airplanes flying daily?
(H) Yes, lots of them fly around.
(J) Are they large planes?
(H) Yes, they are quite big.
(J) Are they flying from morning till night?
(H) Well, not to that extent, but last week they were quite active in the air.
(J) I hear there are many sailors there, is that right?
(H) There aren’t so many now. There were more in the beginning part of [79] this year and the ending part of last year.
(J) Is that so?
(H) I do not know why this is so, but it appears that there are very few sailors here at present.
(J) Are any Japanese people there holding meetings to discuss US-Japanese negotiations being conducted presently?
(H) No, not particularly. The minds of the Japanese here appear calmer than expected. They are getting along harmoniously.
(J) Don’t the American community look with suspicion on the Japanese?
(H) Well, we hardly notice any of them looking on us with suspicion. This fact is rather unexpected. We are not hated or despised. The soldiers here and we get along very well. All races are living in harmony. It appears that the people who come here change to feel like the rest of the people here. There are some who say odd things, but these are limited to newcomers from the mainland, and after staying from three to six months, they too begin to think and feel like the rest of the people in the islands.
(J) That’s fine.
(H) Yes, it’s fine, but we feel a bit amazed.
(J) Has there been any increase in___ of late? That is, as a result of the current tense situation.
(H) There is nothing which stands out, but the city is enjoying a war building boom.
(J) What do you mean by enjoying a war building boom?
(H) Well, a boom in many fields. Although there is no munitions industry here engaged in by the army, civilian workers are building houses for the army personnel. Most of the work here is directed towards building houses of various sorts. There are not enough carpenters, electricians and
plumbers. Students at the high schools and university have quit school and are working on these jobs, regardless of the fact that they are unskilled in this work.

(J) Are there many big factories there?

(H) No, there are no factories, but a lot of small buildings of various kinds are being constructed.

(29) J. Is that so?

(H) It is said that the population of Honolulu has doubled that of last year.

(J) How large is the population?

(H) The population increase is due to the present influx of Army and Navy personnel and workers from the mainland.

(J) What is the population?

(H) About 200,000 to 240,000. Formerly there were about 150,000 people.

(J) What about night time?

(H) There seems to be precautionary measures taken.

(J) What about searchlights?

(H) Well, not much to talk about.

(J) Do they put searchlights on when planes fly about at night?

(H) No.

(J) What about the Honolulu newspapers?

(H) The comments by the papers are pretty bad. They are opposite to the atmosphere prevailing the city. I don’t know whether the newspaper is supposed to lead the community or not, but they carry headlines pertaining to Japan daily. The main articles concern the US-Japanese conferences.

(J) What kind of impression did Mr. Kurusu make in Hawaii?

(H) A very good one. Mr. Kurusu understands the American mind, and he was very adept at answering queries of the press.

(J) Are there any Japanese people there who are planning to evacuate Hawaii?

(H) There are almost none wishing to do that.

(J) What is the climate there now?

(H) These last few days have been very cold with occasional rainfall, a phenomena very rare in Hawaii. Today, the wind is blowing very strongly, a very unusual climate.

(28) J. Is that so?

(H) Here is something interesting. Litvinoff, the Russian Ambassador to the United States, arrived here yesterday. I believe he enplaned for the mainland today. He made no statements on any problems.

(J) Did he make any statements concerning the US-Japan question?

(H) No. Not only did he not say anything regarding the US-Japan question, he also did not mention anything pertaining to the Russo-German war. It appears he was ordered by his government not to make any statement.

(J) Well, that means he was very different from Mr. Kurusu.

(H) Yes.

(J) What kind of impression did Litvinoff make?

(H) A very good one here. He impressed the people as being very quiet and a gentleman.

(J) Did he stop at the same hotel as Mr. Kurusu?

(H) Yes, at the Royal Hawaiian Hotel overnight. He has already enplaned for the mainland.

(J) Do you know anything about the United States fleet?

(H) No, I don’t know anything about the fleet. Since we try to avoid talking about such matters, we do not know much about the fleet. At any rate, the fleet here seems small. I don’t (know if) all of the fleet has done this, but it seems that the fleet has left here.

(J) Is that so? What kind of flowers are in bloom in Hawaii at present?

(H) Presently, the flowers in bloom are fewest out of the whole year. However, the hibiscus and the poinsettia are in bloom now. (J) does not seem to know about poinsettias. He admits he doesn’t know.

(J) Do you feel any inconvenience there due to the suspension of importation of Japanese goods?

(H) Yes, we feel the inconvenience very much. There are no Japanese soy, and many other foodstuffs which come from Japan. Although there are enough foodstuffs (Japanese) left in stock to last until February of next year, at any rate it is a big inconvenience.
[22] (J) What do you lack most?

(H) I believe the soy is what everyone is worried about most. Since the freeze order is in force, the merchants who have been dealing in Japanese goods are having a hard time.

(J) Thanks very much.

(H) By the way, here is something interesting about Hawaii. Liquor sells very fast due to the boom here. The United States, which twenty years ago went under prohibition, is today flooded by liquor. British and French liquors are also being sold. The Japanese merchants, whose business came to a standstill due to the suspension of importation of Japanese goods, engage in liquor manufacture. The rice from the United States is used in brewing Japanese sake here, and the sake is exported back to the mainland.

(H) explains that the Japanese sake brewed in Honolulu is called "Takara-Masanume"; that a person named Takagishi was the technical expert in charge of the brewing; that said Takagishi is a son-in-law of Grand Chamberlain Hyakutake, being married to the latter's daughter; and that said Takagishi returned recently to Japan on the Tuyo Maru. He adds that Japanese here and the Americans also drink sake. He informs (J) that Japanese chrysanthemums are in full bloom here, and that there are no herring-roes for this year's New Year celebration.

(J) How many first generation Japanese are there in Hawaii according to last surveys made?

(H) About fifty thousand.

(J) How about the second generation Japanese?

(H) About 120,000 or 130,000.

(J) How many out of this number of second generation Japanese are in the United States Army?

(H) There aren't so many up to the present. About 1,500 have entered the army, and the majority of those who have been drafted into the army are Japanese.

(J) Any first generation Japanese in the army?

(H) No. They do not draft any first generation Japanese.

(J) Is that right, that there are 1,500 in the army?

[23] (H) Yes, that is true up to the present, but may increase since more will be inducted in January.

(J) Thank you very much.

(H) Not at all. I'm sorry I couldn't be of much use.

(J) Oh no, that was fine. Best regards to your wife.

(H) Wait a moment please?

(J) Off phone.

It is noted that this telephone conversation lasted approximately eighteen minutes and appeared to have some hidden meaning. In view of the language used, the topics discussed, in themselves being of a character which would not ordinarily warrant the expense incurred on this particular occasion.

The Japanese translator of our Honolulu Office completed the translation of this telephone conversation at about 2:00 p.m. on December 6, 1941. Copies of the full text of the conversation, after being translated, were furnished to representatives of the Office of Naval Intelligence and Military Intelligence. These translations were submitted to Captain I. H. Mayfield and Lieutenant Colonel George W. Bicknell of the Military Intelligence Division of the Army, Hawaii. The Special Agent In Charge of the Honolulu Office telephoned the Office of Naval Intelligence at about 2:00 p.m., December 6, for Captain I. H. Mayfield, who was not in. The Special Agent in Charge then talked to Lieutenant Demzel Carr, Japanese expert in the Office of Naval Intelligence, informing him that a call had just been translated which appeared to the Special Agent in Charge to be very important.

Lieutenant Carr was furnished with the substance of the Mori conversation over the telephone and was requested to get in touch with Captain Mayfield immediately as the Special Agent in Charge believed he would want to take up the contents of the call with his superiors. The Special Agent in Charge at Honolulu had been advised several days before December 6 by Captain Mayfield of the Naval Intelligence Office that the Navy was in possession of secret information through which they would be able to know when Japan would move and the direction this move would take. Captain Mayfield informed the Special Agent in Charge, "If I suddenly call you some night and say I am moving to the West,
you will know that Japan is going into the Malaya; and if I say I am moving over on the North side, you will know Japan is going to move against Russia." Captain Mayfield stated that the Navy had secret information as to how this knowledge and information would be furnished by Japan, indicating that it was some code message in Japanese broadcasts. Not knowing the full import of the manner in which Japanese movements would be indicated and not having been furnished with the full information by Captain Mayfield, the Special Agent in Charge at Honolulu felt that strange portions of the Mori conversation might be the key which would indicate Japanese movements.

The Special Agent in Charge also contacted Lieutenant Colonel George W. Bicknell of the Army about 5:00 p.m., at his home in Aiea Heights, informing him that a very important message had been intercepted between Japan and Honolulu, and requesting him to come to the office immediately to get a copy of the message as it was believed he would want to take it up with his superior officers.

The Special Agent in Charge and Special Agent F. G. Tillman of the Honolulu Office, who had been conducting Japanese surveys and investigations in Honolulu, pointed out to Captain Mayfield and Colonel Bicknell on December 6, 1941, what appeared to be significant statements in this conversation, and stated particularly the belief that the references to flowers indicated some purpose of being able to locate the Island, and the fact that it appeared highly unreasonable that anyone in Japan spending the money to talk to Honolulu for eighteen minutes would discuss flowers, the weather and the climate, also pointing out the significance of the inquiry about when and at what times the patrol planes went out and came in.

Captain Mayfield stated he was sure there was some hidden message which would be of value if they could only decode it, but that there was nothing in the message in line with previous information indicating Japanese movements.

It appears, and seems probable now, that the flowers hibiscus and poinsettia, mentioned in the conversation, may have referred to battleships and cruisers, as there were no cruisers in Pearl Harbor at the time of the attack.

CABLE COVERAGE

As far as it is known to this Bureau no governmental agency tapped cable wires in or out of Hawaii. The only cable facilities available were those of the Commercial Pacific Cable Company. This company declined to make available to any of the intelligence agencies the content of any messages sent to or from the Japanese Consulate in Honolulu and Japan. The Federal Bureau of Investigation in Honolulu never received prior to December 7, 1941, copies of any messages sent by cable. The commercial companies by which ordinary wires were connected to and from Japan, such as the RCA Communications Company, the Mackay Radio Company, and the Globe Wireless Company, all transmitted their messages by radio.

The managers of these companies all refused to make available the content of messages to and from Japan, sent or received by the Japanese Consul. They likewise refused to furnish this information to the other intelligence agencies. However, in November of 1941, the Office of Naval Intelligence, through Captain I. H. Mayfield and Admiral Claude C. Bloch, Commandant of the Honolulu Navy Yard, did arrange with Mr. George Sarnoff, President of RCA, while he was in Honolulu, to have the local manager furnish ONI with all telegrams to and from Japan, sent or received by the Japanese Consul, effective as of December 1, 1941. On February 12, 1942, the Honolulu Office first learned that ONI had obtained the messages from December 1 to 4 on December 5, 1941. At no time prior to December 7, 1941, did the FBI receive copies of these messages.

While it is not definitely known, this Bureau received indications at least that the Army Signal Corps was engaging in intercept activity, monitoring short-wave messages going to and from Honolulu, including those sent by RCA, Globe Wireless, and Mackay Radio Company. The FBI's belief is based on conversations held by FBI officials with representatives of the Army and the Navy. Two instances substantiating this belief are as follows:

1. On January 16, 1941, my assistant, Mr. E. A. Tann, submitted a memorandum to me advising that he had been talking to Captain Nixon and Colonel Lester, at which time he referred to the Japanese intercept stations for Japanese messages in the Hawaiian Islands. These individuals had informed him that this Bureau was receiving the results of all matters of interest to the FBI
which were obtained through these intercepts. At that time there was some discussion of adopting some type of code symbols which would indicate whether the information furnished this Bureau was obtained through an intercepted communication or otherwise. No agreement was reached with regard thereto at that time. Mr. Tamm advised that this discussion with Colonel Lester and Captain Nixon dealt with intercepts concerning strictly ship movements and not commercial messages.

[26] 2. The FBI was advised by reliable sources in Hawaii that the Army was intercepting messages, but that this was an Army secret and that intercepted messages were sent to Washington for decoding. Advice was that intercepts were received from a reliable source in the FBI that the Army and Navy were operating intercept stations in the City of Honolulu for the purpose of intercepting radio traffic between the Orient and the United States, particularly Japan. Information was received also indicating that the intercept stations operated by the Navy were primarily for the purpose of intercepting radio messages relating to Japanese fleet movements and that this activity did not include amateur radio bands.

The Federal Communications Commission had operated stations at Honolulu for at least a year prior to December 7, 1941. The scope of their activity was not known to the Special Agent in Charge at Honolulu. At no time prior to December 7, 1941, did the FBI Field Office in Honolulu ever receive any intercepted messages from ONI, G-2, or the Federal Communications Commission.

On April 28, 1941, the Honolulu Field Division in a letter entitled “Weekly Conferences, FBI, ONI and G-2” advised the following:

“The question of Army and Navy jurisdiction in the matter of radio censorship was discussed and the method and manner of monitoring radio broadcasts from Tokyo direct to the Hawaiian Islands was discussed. These programs are being recorded by the Federal Communications Commission Monitoring Station at Honolulu and arrangements will be made through Colonel Bicknell of G-2 to obtain the use of these records for transcription and translation, copies of the translations to be made available to the FBI and ONI.

“Captain Mayfield stated that he has outlined the intended setup in the censorship of radio which will be necessary in the event the United States is embroiled in the present conflict. Captain Mayfield has already requested a large increase in personnel to handle this work and it is particularly noted that at the time of this conference some of the officers requested had already been assigned to the office of ONI at Honolulu for this purpose and it appeared that the Navy is proceeding at this time with the completion of the personnel and the complete censorship of radio.”

[27] A similar letter dated May 5, 1941, contains the following:

“The question of Japanese broadcasts over JZK from Tokyo was brought up and it was brought out that the Federal Communications Commission is monitoring that particular broadcast. The broadcast is for a period of 15 minutes in English and then for about an hour in Japanese. It is a broadcast from Tokyo specifically to the Japanese residing in Hawaii. The FCC makes transcriptions of the English and Japanese broadcasts and furnishes the Japanese transcription to Washington for translation. It was decided that the agencies represented should make an effort to get the FCC to permit us to transcribe and translate these broadcasts. It was agreed that the FBI would transcribe the English broadcasts and that ONI would transcribe and translate the Japanese broadcasts. A sufficient number of copies will be furnished to FCC to forward to its headquarters in Washington, and sufficient copies will be furnished ONI, G-2, and the FBI for the respective offices use and transmission to Washington.”

The above-mentioned monitoring was confined solely to news flashes and news broadcasts directed at the Hawaiian Islands by the radio in Tokyo.

For about a period of two weeks thereafter the FBI in Honolulu did transcribe the English broadcasts by having a stenographer listen to the records furnished by FCC and type up the content. Thereafter the Office of Naval Intelligence took over the whole project in order to release the FBI employee for other more important work.

EVIDENCE OF MATERIAL WHICH COULD HAVE BEEN OBTAINED IF BUREAU HAD ACCESS TO TELEGRAPH COMMUNICATIONS

The telegram file of the Japanese Consul was found at the Consulate when the police guard was established about noon of December 7, 1941. This telegram file was not complete, but it has been translated and decoded.
On December 20, 1941, the Mackay Radio Company at Honolulu, on the direction of the Military Governor of Honolulu, turned over to the Federal [28] Bureau of Investigation all telegrams sent to and received from Japan during the month of November, 1941. Since the attack, all messages sent via Globe Wireless Company to and from Japan for the period from December 1 to December 7, 1941, were furnished to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

From these messages it is apparent that the Consulate at Honolulu was very active in keeping the Japanese Government advised concerning the military, diplomatic and naval activities of the United States. Illustrations of the type of material which was sent and could have been obtained had the proper coverage been afforded are set out below. It will be recalled that Nagao Kita, mentioned in the succeeding messages, is Consul General of the Japanese Government at Honolulu.

NR 66
From: KITA
To: FOREIGN MINISTER TOKIO

According to despatches from Aukland and Sydney the light cruisers Brooklyn and Savannah, the destroyers Case, Shaw, Cuminus, Tucker arrived at Aukland on the 17th; and the heavy cruisers Chicago, Portland and the destroyer Clark, Cassin, Cunninggham, Downs, Reid arrived at Sydney—both groups on a friendly visit X The first group departed from Aukland on the 20th and may return to Pearl Harbor X It is reported that the second group will also go to Brisbane X Today’s newspapers report that the above fleet sailed under sealed orders and that although they entered Pago Pago on the 9th and departed there on the 11th, that the final destination was not known by outsiders (gaihu) until they arrived. The maintenance of secrecy on this trip was a great success it was reported.

NR 96
From: KITA
To: GAIMUDAINJIN TOKIO

President Roosevelt’s eldest son, Captain (USMC) James Roosevelt together with Major General Thomas arrived here on the 20th via Clipper and departed for Manila on the 21st X The local newspapers said that both men said they would not make any statement as to destination or mission until they arrived.

NR 104
From: KITA
To: GAIMUDAINJIN TOKIO

[29] The American Army transport Washington with 2500 troops and 24990 tons of military supplies departed New York the 11th and arrived here early the morning of the 20th via Panama and San Francisco X After unloading 2000 troops 12 student pilots and military stores, 500 troops were embarked and she departed the 27th it is believed this ship will be employed in transporting troops and evacuating Americans from the Far East.

NR 115
From: KITA
To: GAIMUDAINJIN TOKIO

With respect to message No 10 of January 8th for the purpose of reinforcing the local airforce 21 B–17 bombers, under command of Lieut General Emmons departed San Fran at 1550 the 13th in formation and arrived Hickam Field at 0558 the 14th.

NR 134
From: KITA
To: FOREIGN MINISTER TOKIO
Inf: AMBASSADOR WASHINGTON.

1. On the fourth received work from Washington that Admiral Kimmel started conversations with the Secretary of the Navy no extraordinary significance seems to attach to his visit.
2. According to an announcement by Navy Department officials Admiral Kimmel brought plans for sending units of the fleet back to the mainland for recreation of personnel for short periods X The periods and names of vessels to return were not announced.
CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

NR 149
From: KITA.
To: FOREIGN MINISTER TOKIO.
Inf (have forwarded by mail to San Francisco and Manila).
Ref San Francisco Mag #92
SS Pres Pierce with about nine hundred Army men embarked (includes some hundreds of aviation personnel and junior officers) arrived the eleventh and sailed the twelfth.

[39] NO. 147
From: KITA.
To: FOREIGN MINISTER TOKIO.
Chungking Burma Road—Trucks.

NO. 149
From: KITA.
To: FOREIGN MINISTER TOKIO.
Admiral Kimmel and Captain McMorris returned by clipper the 25th.

From: KITA.
To: FM TOKYO. #363.
Wyoming and two seaplane tenders departed third.

# 364
From KITA.
To: FM TOKYO.

Fm/3rd/1 one British warship arrived Honolulu and departed early morning fourth X approximately 1100 tons one stack one four inch gun FWD and AFT X fueled?
Immediately after arrival enlisted rating(s) received mail from British consulate.

#365
From: KITA.
To: FM TOKYO
USS Honolulu arrived 1300/4th.

[31] #368
From: KITA.
To: F M TOKYO
Referring to last paragraph of your No. 123.

1. The Army ordered several hundred balloons for training at Camp Davis NC on the American mainland. They considered (at that time) the practicability of their employment in the defense of Hawaii and Panama. Investigation of the vicinity of Pearl Harbor reveals no locations selected for their use or any preparations for constructing moorings. No evidence of training or personnel preparations were seen. It is concluded that their installation would be difficult. Even if they were actually provided they would interfere with operations at nearby Hickam Field, Ewa Field and Ford Island. The whole matter seems to have been dropped.

2. Am continuing in detail the investigation of the non-use of nets for torpedo defense of battleships and will report further.

No. 369
From: KITA.
To: WASHINGTON-TOKYO.
On the evening of the 5th the BB Wyoming (sic!) and one sweeper entered port.

Ships moored on the sixth are as follows:
BB-9
CL-3
DD-17
am-3
Ships in dock:
Cl-4
DD-2
(CA AND CV ALL ———)
PS-CV CANNOT BE FOUND IN THE FLEET (?).

I have been advised that the symbols used in the quoted messages are those used by the Navy in referring to units of its fleet and are as follows:

CL—Light Cruisers.
DD—Destroyers.
AM—Mine Sweepers.
CA—Heavy Cruisers.
CV—Aircraft Carriers.

I regret that my absence from the city on the dates mentioned in your letter will make it impossible for me to discuss these matters with you personally. However, I hope that the foregoing will adequately serve the needs of your inquiry at this time. In the event you desire any elaboration on any of the points covered in this letter, I will be glad to have Assistant Director D. M. Ladd appear before you to discuss them with you.

Enclosures

[1] STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

FEBRUARY 3, 1942.

Subject: Delimitation of Investigative Duties of the Federal Bureau Investigation, the Office of Naval Intelligence and the Military Intelligence Division.
The Agreement for Coordination of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Office of Naval Intelligence and the Military Intelligence Division.

I. The undersigned have reviewed the directive contained in the President’s Memorandum of June 26, 1939, as augmented by his directive of September 6, 1939, the Delimitation Agreement of June 5, 1940, and the supplemental interpretation and agreements thereon. It is now agreed that responsibility for investigation of all activities coming under the categories of espionage, counterespionage, subversion and sabotage, (hereinafter referred to as “these categories”) will be delimited as indicated hereafter. The responsibility assumed by one organization in a given field carries with it the obligation to provide a pool of all information received in that field but it does not imply the reporting agency alone is interested in or will work alone in that field. Close cooperation between the three agencies in all fields is a mutually recognized necessity.

II. FBI will be responsible for:

1. All investigation of cases in the categories involving civilians in the United States and its territories with the exception of the Republic of Panama, the Panama Canal Zone, Guam, American Samoa, Palmyra, Johnston, Wake and Midway Islands, the Philippine Islands and the Territory of Alaska other than that specifically described in Paragraph III.

2. Investigation of all cases directed from foreign countries on those occasions and in those situations in which the State, War or Navy Departments specifically request investigations of designated group or set of circumstances.

3. The coordination of civilian organizations furnishing information regarding subversive movements.

4. Jointly with ONI, the coverage of Japanese activities in these categories. ONI will continue its coverage of Japanese activities as heretofore and FBI will continue to expand its operations in this field.

5. Keep MID and ONI advised of important developments, such as:
   (a) Developments affecting plants engaged on Army or Navy contracts.
   (b) Cases of actual and strongly presumptive espionage and sabotage, including the names of individuals definitely known to be connected with subversive activities.
   (c) Developments affecting vital utilities.
   (d) Developments affecting critical points of transportation and communication systems.

   (for c and d above, no protective coverage is contemplated)

6. Ascertain the location, leadership, strength and organization of all civilian groups designated to combat Fifth Column Activities (overt acts of all sorts in groups of armed forces of enemies); and transmitting to MID, ONI and
State Department information concerning these organizations and any information received concerning their possession of arms.

III. MID will be responsible for:
1. Investigation and disposal of all cases in these categories in the military establishment including civilian employ, military reserve and military control.
2. The investigation of cases in these categories involving civilians in the Canal Zone, the Republic of Panama, the Philippine Islands and the Alaskan Peninsula and islands adjacent including Kodiak Island, the Aleutian and Pribilof Islands and that part of the Alaskan Peninsula which is separated by a line drawn from Iliamna Bay northwest to the town of old Iliamna and thence following the south shore of Lake Iliamna to the Kvichak River to Kvichak Bay.
3. Informing FBI and ONI of any other important developments.

IV. ONI will be responsible for:
1. Investigation and disposal of all cases in these categories in the Naval establishment, including civilians under Naval employ or control, and all civilians in Guam, American Samoa, Palmyra, Johnston, Wake, and Midway Islands.
2. Jointly with FBI, the coverage of Japanese activities in the categories enumerated in Paragraph I.
ONI will continue its coverage of Japanese activities as heretofore, and FBI will continue to expand its operations in this field.
3. Informing FBI and MID of any important developments.

V. The ultimate and coordination of the Intelligence agencies is the manner in which they function under conditions of national emergency or actual warfare. There should be no doubt as to the identity of the agency or official who is primarily responsible for carrying on Intelligence operations under the broad conditions for which the governing principles are listed hereinafter.

PERIOD OF MARTIAL LAW

VI. It is further agreed that when a state of martial law has been declared by the President, the Military Commander assumes responsibility for Intelligence coverage. He has authority to coordinate intelligence activities of the participating agencies, within the limits of their available personnel and facilities by the assignment of missions, the designation of objectives, and the exercise of such coordinating control as he deems necessary. He is not authorized to control the administration or discipline of the subscribing agencies to which he does not belong, nor to issue instructions to such agencies beyond those necessary for the purposes stated above.

VII. Personnel of the subscribing agencies will still send reports to and be under the continued supervision of their respective headquarters. The subscribing agencies will render such aid and assistance to the Military Commander and his designated representatives as are possible and practicable. All pertinent information, data, and other material that are or may be necessary or desirable to him shall be furnished by the most expeditious means and methods possible consistent with requisite security. The headquarters of the subscribing agencies will promptly be advised of all information and data appropriately identified as having been furnished to the Military Commander.

VIII. It is assumed that the Military Commander will not hesitate to call upon any governmental agency outside the three subscribing agencies to this agreement for any assistance, cooperation, or activity.

PERIODS OF PREDOMINANT MILITARY INTEREST, NOT INVOLVING MARTIAL LAW

IX. In time of war certain areas will come into prominence as potential theatres of operation. When a Military Commander of such a potential theatre is designated, he definitely has interest in, though not control of, the civilian life within the area. In order that the Military Commander may prepare himself for the discharge of the possible responsibility which may affix to him, the following procedure is agreed upon:

1. Agents of the FBI, of ONI, and of MID will continue to function in accordance with the provisions of paragraphs II, III, and IV.
2. In addition thereto the Military Commander may take steps to analyze the facilities existing and to explore the manner in which complete coverage will be obtained if martial law is declared. Adequate liaison with the other two Intelligence services will insure that the Military Commander will have the
benefit of the experience, judgment and knowledge of the representatives of the other services.

3. The Military Commander is authorized to request and receive such information from the three agencies as he may desire and they may be able to furnish.

[7] X. The analysis and exploration referred to above will show the coverage furnished by each of the subscribing agencies and any additional coverage each subscribing agency can undertake. When the Commander feels that more complete coverage is required, it is recognized that his service is authorized to augment the coverage. Prior to any invasion of the spheres normally coming under the cognizance of the other subscribing agency, the Military Commander should obtain the necessary authority from the War Department.

XI. Irrespective of the fact that the preceding recommendations have placed the initiative in the hands of the Military Commander, whenever either of the other two services feel that such a survey to determine adequacy of coverage should be undertaken, it should be so recommended through the director of each service.

XII. The above provisions contemplate that the War Department will be the agency administering martial law. When appropriate, the same principles will govern the Navy Department.

PERIODS OF NORMAL CONDITIONS

XIII. Under these conditions, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Office of Naval Intelligence and the Military Intelligence Division will operate in accord with the provisions of paragraphs II, III and IV.

XIV. From time to time it may be desirable in the light of changing conditions to modify or amend this delimitation agreement. Such amendments or modifications when agreed upon by the heads of the subscribing agencies shall be issued in the form of a revised delimitation agreement and not as separate instructions.

RAYMOND E. LEE
Assistant Chief of Staff G-2, War Department.

T. S. WILKINSON,
Director, Office of Naval Intelligence.

J. EDGAR HOOVER
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation.

JAPANESE ACTIVITIES HAWAIIAN ISLANDS

The information set forth below will supplement the information contained in the Bulletin dated May 15, 1941, pages 891 through 897.

The predominant racial group in the Territory of Hawaii is the Japanese, who constitute 37.3 per cent of the population, or 157,905 persons, to which must be added the residents of the Korean race who are in fact Japanese nationals although usually anti-Japanese in sympathy and action. This group comprises 1.6 per cent of the people in Hawaii, or 6,851 persons. The Japanese races therefore total 164,756 persons or 38.9 per cent of the total population of Hawaii, 425,539 persons. These figures are based on a report compiled from the returns of the Sixteenth Decennial Census of the United States by the Bureau of Census.

Data obtained through the registration of aliens in compliance with the Alien Registration Act of 1940 reveal that there are 41,346 aliens of the Japanese race, or Japanese nationals, residing in Hawaii.

The alien Japanese are disposed to organize almost every conceivable purpose, a psychological characteristic apparently brought with them from Japan, and it can be safely assumed that every Japanese alien resident in Hawaii belongs to one or more purely Japanese organizations. An effort has been made to separate these innocuous groups from organizations which are potentially in a position to engage in acts which might be inimical to the best interests of the United States. A study of these organizations existing in the Territory of Hawaii has brought out that their influence or authority flows in five distinct channels which are interlocked through the duplication of activity, the plurality of positions held by many individual Japanese such as a Buddhist priest being also principal of a Japanese Language School and a Consular Agent or an officer or member of an organization appearing in another category. These five major channels of influence have been previously mentioned in the Bulletin dated May 15, 1941.
It has been determined that each of these channels is at least strongly influenced, if not directly controlled, by groups of similar type and purpose within Japan. The consular organization is obviously controlled by the Japanese Foreign Ministry and the religious sects and organizations supervised by the headquarters of each individual sect in Japan, which is, in turn, under Japanese Governmental supervision. A large number of the groups organized for social purposes are the so-called prefectural societies, comparable to American state societies, which are in direct contact with the home prefecture of their members. The educational organization has, at least, a liaison connection with the Japanese Imperial Educational Association which has seen fit to confer honors upon local Japanese educators. The business houses are tied to Japan by reason of their being branches of Japanese firms in many instances and in all cases importers of Japanese goods. The Honolulu Japanese Chamber of Commerce was until lately a branch of the Japanese Chamber of Commerce and Industry at Tokyo, Japan, and the Hilo, Hawaii, Japanese Chamber an associate but not a member as evidenced by the directory of the organization within Japan. The Overseas Japanese Central Society, as a liaison agency for all Japanese residing in countries foreign to Japan, is connected with all Japanese organizations in the United States, particularly with organizations of a civic type and in their contact with Japan.

CONSULAR ORGANIZATION

The center of the consular organization, as well as alien Japanese activity, in the Territory of Hawaii is believed to be in the Japanese Consul General at Honolulu. This Consul General, Nago Kita, has a staff of nine persons, including a Vice-Consul, Chancellor, two Secretaries and three Clerks. In addition to these the Consul General is in constant contact with six prominent local Japanese who have been termed his "Advisory Council."

It has been learned that the Japanese Consulate when desiring that certain instructions or news be disseminated among the Japanese in Hawaii communicates with the more prominent Japanese societies, they being the United Japanese Society of Honolulu, the Honolulu Japanese Chamber of Commerce, the Hilo Japanese Chamber of Commerce, and the Hilo Japanese Society, as well as the Japanese Press, which follows the directions of the Consulate.

The largest and most ramified group under the direction of the Consul General is that of the "Consular Agents" or "Toritsuginin." There are presently 219 of these agents so situated geographically as to form a comprehensive information system for the Japanese Consulate. These men are in all instances alien Japanese, well educated and above the average in intelligence. Some investigation has been conducted concerning these Consular Agents and it has been determined that one is the holder of the Eight Court Rank, Senior Grade of Imperial Japan, and that at least one other is a Reserve Officer in the Japanese Army. Further, information has been received indicating that many of them are non-quota aliens engaged as Buddhist priests and principals or teachers in the Japanese Language Schools.

These Consular Agents are distributed among the islands according to the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Island</th>
<th>Agents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hawaii</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maui</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kauai</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oahu</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Molokai</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lanai</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>219</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It will be noted from the above that all of the islands are well supplied with Japanese Agents, and it is interesting to note in connection with the denials of many of these Consular Agents that they are under the control of Consul General, that there are none located in the city of Honolulu proper where the Consulate is situated.

RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS

The largest and most far-reaching Japanese organizations are the various religious sects of which the Japanese are adherents. Each community in the Hawaiian Islands, no matter how small, in which there are Japanese residents has one or more Buddhist temples or "Fukyōji" (preaching places).
The immigrant Japanese are primarily agricultural laborers and being simple folk they are readily influenced by the priests because of the respect in which they hold these men. Further, in view of the large total congregations of these churches and the fact that services are held in the Japanese Language and in accordance with Japanese customs, the Buddhist and Shinto sects are in an excellent position to disseminate Japanese propaganda. The Shinto shrines are especially important in this regard as they are primarily concerned with ancestor worship, the worship of the Imperial Family of Japan and the teaching of the Japanese spirit "Kudo." It will be further noted that many of the Buddhist priests, as well as Shinto priests, cannot be considered as aliens who desire permanent residence in the United States for they entered as non-quota aliens usually indicating that they plan to stay approximately five years.

The Honpa Hongwanji is the largest and most influential Buddhist sect in the Territory of Hawaii as well as in Japan where its membership is said to comprise seventy-five percent of the Buddhists due to the fact that the Abbott, or head, is related to the Japanese Imperial Family. This sect in Hawaii is directed by Honpa Hongwanji Betsuin (Branch Temple) at Honolulu, under the leadership of Bishop Bikyo Kuchibe, who was sent to Hawaii to take charge of this organization by the headquarters of the sect in Japan. The sect also has a large number of priests who entered as non-quota aliens and who have lived in the Islands only a short time.

There are 22,300 Japanese following the Buddhist faith who belong to the Honpa Hongwanji sect, which has 38 temples, 57 priests and 25 schools in the Territory of Hawaii.

Information has been received that there are 39 known Shinto shrines in the Territory of Hawaii which follow a variety of Shinto sects. However, many of the Shinto sects have sub-sects or groups within them which meet at regular intervals, utilizing the services of the priest of the main shrine. Therefore, it is possible for one shrine to house many deities and to enshrine many individuals. The congregations of these Shinto sects are not organized as in the case of the Buddhist and Christian sects and it has been impossible to determine the number of adherents to Shintoism in Hawaii. However, it is believed there are at least 40,000 persons visiting Shinto shrines.

PROPAGANDA AGENCIES

The Buddhist and Shinto sects, the Japanese Language Schools and the civic and commercial societies tend to act as Japanese propaganda agencies due to the inherent nature of their work in the Japanese community and the fact that their business is usually carried on in the Japanese Language.

(1) Overseas Radio Broadcasts

The Japanese radio stations in Japan continue to direct programs to the United States through the Hawaiian Islands particularly over Station JZK. However, on September 1, 1941, the frequency of this station was changed from 1775 kilocycles to 1700 kilocycles, and the designation of the station was changed from JZK to JLU. Upon the changing of frequency, the Japanese press in the Hawaiian Islands commented that the reception was none too good and that apparently the Japanese were far behind the United States in their radio technique. The press further criticized the programs as being banal and of little interest. The broadcasts of this radio station prior to approximately October 1, 1941, were in general anti-American in their expressions. However, subsequent to that date they appeared to be more friendly to the United States or at least not openly anti-American.

(2) Japanese Consulate General at Honolulu

The Japanese Consulate at Honolulu continued to receive from time to time cases of newspapers and magazines such as the "Tokyo Gassen" until the act freezing the assets of Japan was placed in effect. No information has been received indicating that the Consulate has exhibited any of the motion picture films in its possession produced and distributed by the Kokusai Bunka Shintoshai (Society for International Cultural Relations) of Tokyo, Japan.

(3) Overseas Japanese Central Society

The Overseas Japanese Central Society (Kaigai Doho Tyokai) has not made any headway in organizing branches in the Territory of Hawaii, but it does appear that this society acts for the local Japanese organizations in their corre-
spondence with both the Japanese Government and Japanese business houses or quasi-governmental institutions. According to newspaper comments, the Overseas Japanese Central Society was also active in the evacuation of Hawaiian-born Japanese or Japanese who are residents of Hawaii from Japan following the freezing action.

(4) Tours

Since the order freezing assets of Japanese went into effect, the organization of tours to Japan ceased abruptly. The Japanese press, in commenting on these tours, indicated that a number of Japanese were in effect stranded in Japan and that two tour parties had broken up while in that country.

JAPANESE LANGUAGE PRESS

There are nineteen newspapers and magazines printed in the Japanese language in the territory of Hawaii, of which only two are of any outstanding importance, these being the Nippu Jiji and the Hawaii Hochi, published daily at Honolulu. Nine of these papers are published at Honolulu; these being as follows:

THE HAWAII HOCHI
THE NIPPU JIJI
THE HAWAII SHIMPO
THE JITSUGYO-NO-HAWAII
THE DOBO—a monthly magazine
THE RAKUEN JIHO—a monthly magazine
THE KYODAN JIHO—a monthly magazine
THE SHOGYO JIHO—a monthly commercial magazine
HAWAIIAN JAPANESE CIVIC ASSOCIATION COURIER—a monthly magazine
HAWAII SUNDAY NEWS—a weekly
PLANTATION CHRONICLE—a monthly magazine

On the Island of Hawaii there are three publications. These are as follows:

THE HAWAII MAINICHI and
THE KWAZAN—daily newspapers
THE KONA ECHO—published weekly.

Published on the Island of Maui there are three newspapers, as follows:

THE MAUI SHINBUN and
THE MAUI RECORD—both published bi-weekly
THE SHIN-JI-DAI—published monthly

On the Island of Kauai there are two newspapers, as follows:

THE KAUAI SHIMPO and
YOEN JIHO—both published weekly

All of these newspapers from time to time carry pro-Japanese editorials and news articles and in most instances are bilingual and printed for the Japanese residents of this Territory.

JAPANESE PROPAGANDISTS

AND

AGENCIES

WALKER MATHESON

This will supplement information appearing on page 907 of the book entitled "Subversive Activities in the United States", Quarterly Report, dated November 15, 1940.

Walker Matheson is a native New Yorker. His father was for years connected with the Chicago Tribune of Chicago, Illinois. It is reported that he was at one time editor of the Living Age and that he has a rather unsavory reputation among newspapermen in New York City.
Proceedings of Army Pearl Harbor Board

From a confidential informant information was received that an organization known as World Reviews, Inc. publishes the Living Age and also operates a news service known as the Negro News Syndicate. Irving Harvey Williams, a British subject, who is registered as an alien under the Alien Registration law, is President of World Reviews, Inc.

According to this informant, The Living Age magazine published at 25 West 45th Street, New York City, is controlled, subsidized and operated by and for the benefit of the Japanese government. This magazine formerly was published at 420 Madison Avenue, New York City. It publishes an annual yearbook known as "The World Over", which was started in 1933. There have been three issues to date.

The Negro News Syndicate is a news service which has a mailing list consisting of sixty newspapers in the United States, including one in Washington, D.C. According to informant, it is presently in the process of being incorporated and the papers of incorporation have been prepared, although they have not as yet been filed with the proper state office in New York. This syndicate is likewise controlled and subsidized by the Japanese government for the purpose of playing up the color question.

It is reported that the setup as to both publications originated in the spring of 1938 with Walker Matheson whose father was a newspaperman in Tokyo, Japan, and who at that time was living in New York City with Joseph Hilton Smyth. According to the information received, Matheson approached Smyth and stated that there was a magazine available on Park Row, New York City, which magazine could be operated by them with the financial backing of a party who Matheson knew would be interested in financing the magazine. According to informant, as a result of this approach by Matheson, the magazine was taken over, the deal consummated, and the Japanese government reportedly put up the necessary money. The amount involved was a trifle over $10,000.00. It is reported that the annual loss since 1938 of The Living Age is approximately $10,000.00 which deficit has been underwritten from the same Japanese source.

The publishing name of the Living Age is World Reviews, Incorporated. When the magazine was first taken over, a private tip sheet was distributed weekly entitled "The Foreign Observer", but this has since been discontinued.

Reportedly, the Japanese go-between who handled the financing is K. Fukushima, formerly of New York and now in San Francisco or vicinity. It is believed he is probably connected with the Japanese Consul in San Francisco, and attends the annual meeting in Tokyo in connection with the budget for foreign relief work.

All salaries and expenses of both The Living Age and the Negro News Syndicate are paid in cash which the Bureau's informant is of the opinion is secured from a branch bank in or near Radio Center, New York City.

Since the transfer of Fukushima to San Francisco, his place has been taken by one Honda who holds a position in the Japanese Consulate in Radio City similar to that of a Vice Consul. He is reported that Honda frequents a Japanese restaurant on Fifty-sixth Street just off Fifth Avenue, and also frequents the Nippon Club, Columbus Circle.

Since 1938 Matheson and Smyth have had a disagreement with regard to the editorial policy, which disagreement resulted in Smyth's securing a release from the management of the magazine and is presently only participating to the extent of advising or consulting in a strictly editorial capacity.

Lamar Middleton is the present editor of the Living Age. He is an ex-newspaperman and author. He is apparently strictly an editor and is not connected in any way with the Japanese connection, according to the informant, having only been in charge of the magazine since January of 1941.

According to the informant, the circulation of The Living Age is approximately 3,000, most of this not being a paid circulation. There are no advertisements and no apparent source of revenue.

Joseph Hilton Smyth has published many articles and books and is considered to be one of the best foreign editors in the United States, according to the informant.

According to information received, the losses for the magazine have been paid by Williams and Matheson; at least, that is what the records are apt to show. Williams apparently has borrowed his money to pay these expenses, but it is not known how Matheson gets his money.
HISAOKU K. WATANABE

This will supplement information appearing on pages 9 to 11 of the book entitled "Subversive Activities in the United States", Quarterly Report, dated November 15, 1940.

According to an article appearing in the July 20, 1940, issue of the China Weekly Review, Watanabe gets $325 per month for propagandizing in San Francisco and surrounding areas.

Investigation concerning this individual reflects that he resides at 1792 Post Street, San Francisco, California, and his occupation is given as importer of Japanese liquor. It is stated that he has a reputation for being pro-Japanese and a very heavy drinker. He is 40 years of age and married. It is stated that although he makes remarks favorable to the United States when he is talking in English, whenever he speaks in Japanese he is very pro-Japanese. He is reportedly very active in Japanese government affairs in this country.

ALEXANDER CAIRNS

This will supplement information appearing on page 903 of the book entitled "Subversive Activities in the United States", Quarterly Report, dated November 15, 1940.

Reverend Alexander Cairns is and has been since 1932 the Pastor of the Ampere Parkway Community Church (Presbyterian). Prior to that time he was employed as writer and lecturer for himself. He has delivered numerous addresses in and around Newark, New Jersey on "My Life in Japan" and "The War in China". He reportedly was paid $25 for each address so given by the Japanese Legation in New York City.

He has published a circular on his repertoire of addresses which includes one concerning Japan with a notation which reads, "The American mind is poisoned with hatred of the Japanese people, a hatred which is both unreasonable and regrettable; 90% of the people in Japan can no more be blamed for the war in China than for the earthquakes in Tokyo."

A check of this individual's bank account reflects that he has only a very mediocre income and that there have been no very large deposits or withdrawals. A recent check of his bank account has indicated that the highest balance in the month of April, 1941 and subsequent months was $130.72. His deposits indicate that he apparently has not been receiving a large income from his lecture work, as very few checks from organizations have been deposited.

The 1934-1935 edition of Who's Who in America reflects that Cairns was born in Belfast, Ireland, September 7, 1871, a son of James and Mary Jane Cairns. He was brought to the United States in 1873, has a Ph. D. from Adrian College in Michigan, received in 1897; a B. D. Degree received in 1889 and an M. A. Degree received in 1909, also receiving an L. L. D. Degree in 1929. He married Mary Annie Obee on August 12, 1897. He was ordained as a minister in 1897 and was a teacher from 1897 to 1901 in Japan; a pastor in the United States from 1901 to 1904; a pastor from 1905 to 1906: pastor of the High Street Presbyterian Church, Newark, New Jersey from 1920 to 1925: a lecturer since 1926; a columnist from 1927 to 1929; and pastor of the Presbyterian Church, Bloomfield, New Jersey from 1933 to the present time. Also reflected was the fact that Cairns has lectured in the United States and throughout Canada on the following subjects: "The Man Worth While", "Diplomacy and Destiny", "Washington, the Warrior", "The Golden Age", "Lincoln, the Liberator", "The Martyrs of Intolerance" and "The Goose that Lays the Golden Eggs". Cairns is listed as belonging to the following organizations: Linnaean Society, Sigma Alpha Epilon, Masons and Institute Forum.

On interview Cairns advised that his present occupation is that of lecturer and pastor and that he has been more or less engaged in these two occupations all his life. Due to the fact that he has been a missionary and a teacher in Japan from 1897 to 1901 and has been somewhat interested in missionary work in that country since that time, he feels qualified to speak about the Japanese people and also feels it is an interesting subject to some groups before which he has spoken. Because of his speeches he deemed it advisable to register with the Secretary of State, particularly since he received $25 each for the lectures given him upon Japan from a group of Japanese businessmen in New York City.

He advised that due to the international situation and the fact that it would be improper to continue making speeches at the present time he notified the State Department in July of 1940 that he had ceased making speeches concerning
JAPAN as well as receiving any money from the Japanese. Since that time he has had no connection with any Japanese and has received no money from them.

The State Department records reflect that his registration statement was revoked in July of 1940. Investigation verifies the fact that Cairns has ceased making Japanese propaganda speeches. No further investigation is being conducted concerning this individual.

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EXHIBIT A TO ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD TOP SECRET TRANSCRIPT
[SECRET]

[1]

SUMMARY OF FAR EASTERN DOCUMENTS

By authority A. C. of S., G-2.

Date 20 Aug. 43 (R. S. B.)

Original summary forwarded to the Chief of Staff on 20 August 1943. Returned on 26 August with paper clips attached, pencil notes, and parts crossed out by General Marshall, Chief of Staff.

26 August 1943

Memorandum for the Record:
The attached memorandum from the Secretary, General Staff, and Tab A, the Summary of Far Eastern Documents, were given to me by General Strong at approximately 2:00 P.M., 26 August 1943, with instructions to revise Tab A as directed. Tab B, the Summary of European Documents, although prepared in the same manner as Tab A, that is, containing estimates by G-2, staff studies, memoranda and other entries of evaluated intelligence was not returned to General Strong. It is to be inferred that it will be forwarded to the President as compiled and that Tab A is to contain only raw unevaluated Military Attache reports. The Chief, Far Eastern Unit, was instructed to revise Tab A as quickly as possible as directed in Col. Sexton's memorandum.

At about 2:45 P.M., 20 August 1943, General Strong directed me to include Military Observers' reports with Military Attache reports in Tab A.

R. S. BRATTON,
Colonel, General Staff Corps,
Chief, Intelligence Group.

1 Encl.

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WAR DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF,
Washington, August 26, 1943.

Memorandum for General Strong:
The attached tab does not comply with the directive in that it contains much material other than MA reports. The Chief of Staff desires that it be revised to contain only MA reports.

By direction of the Chief of Staff:

(Signed) W. T. Sexton,
W. T. Sexton,
Colonel, General Staff,
Secretary, General Staff.

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[1] JAPAN'S WAR POTENTIAL AND INTENTIONS

Explanatory Notes

The yearly summaries which follow are based on information contained in intelligence documents consisting of reports, memoranda, estimates, et cetera. The references in the left margin of the summaries are to the Far Eastern file and G-2 file of intelligence documents which accompany these summaries. For example, G-2 13 refers to the document so marked in the G-2 file; FE 1 to the first document in the Far Eastern file. Efforts have been made to show in the summaries the origin of the statements in the text but in some instances this has
not been practicable as the same information may have come from several
sources. It is therefore suggested that when the source is desired, the marginal
references be compared with the tables of contents of the intelligence documents.
Such a procedure will furnish a ready index to the source of the text of the
summaries.

The following abbreviations have sometimes been used:
Chief, FE.——Chief, Far Eastern Section, Intelligence Branch, G–2, War
Department General Staff.
G–2——The Assistant Chief of Staff, G–2 (Military Intelligence Divi-
sion), War Department General Staff (unless some other
G–2 is specified.)
MA——Military Attache or Assistant Military Attaché.
MO——Military Observer.
ONL——Office of Naval Intelligence, Navy Department.
WPD——War Plans Division, War Department General Staff.

When use is made of such expressions as “Tokyo reported,” “Manila re-
ported,” reference is made to reports from the G–2 representative stationed at
such places. In Manila it would be G–2 on the staff of the Commanding
General, Philippine Department; in Singapore or Bangkok, the MO; in Tokyo,
Chungking, Hongkong, or Peking, the MA.

[2] 1937

FE 1 During the first half of 1937, the military leaders of Japan were build-
ing up a war psychology. One of the most formidable instruments
used as an army propaganda agency was the Imperial Reservists Asso-
ciation, with a large well-disciplined membership scattered throughout
Japan. The Army was engaged in a six-year expansion program pro-
viding for (a) Increase of the Air Corps and Anti-aircraft Defenses;
(b) Increase of the Military Force in Manchukuo; (c) Improvement of
Military Training Facilities; (d) Replenishment of War Materials; (e)

FE 4 In the budget debate in the Diet, during the early months of the year,
references were made to the so-called “Continental Policy” and “South-
ward Expansion”. While most of the pronouncements on expansion
came from army leaders, there was indication of concurrence by the
Navy when Rear Admiral Sekine, addressing a private gathering said:
“Even with no naval treaty, we need not worry. Our duty is clearly
to go ahead with our preparations for overseas development.”

FE 17 In early July the so-called China Incident began and what at first
appeared to be a local incident in North China developed into a major
conflict engulfing a large portion of the Chinese Republic. Following
the outbreak of hostilities, Japan began mobilizing the Army and the
movement eventually took on the proportions of a general mobilization.
Four divisions were added to the active army by reconstituting similar
units disbanded in 1925.

FE 32 The Japanese War Office extended the terms of service for members
of mobilized units and units in China until ordered transferred to the
reserves, except such privates as might be ordered discharged. Special
volunteer officers, reservists of all ranks and grades, called into active
service, were to serve until relieved from active service. For members
of non-mobilized units at home stations, including conscript reserve
privates, where the term would normally expire in 1938 the term was
extended to 1939.

FE 31 The Japanese War Office, as of 30 September, estimated that there
were available 4,750,000 trained and partly trained reservists meeting
physical requirements. The Military Attache, in Tokyo, estimated Japan
had 950,000 troops under arms as of 25 October. The Imperial Head-
quarters was established in the Imperial Palace on 20 November. Only
on two previous occasions was this headquarters established, namely,
in 1894, just prior to the Sino—[3] Japanese War, and in 1904 fol-
lowing the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War.

FE 24 Appropriations for the Army during 1937–38 totaled Yen 2,464,978,117,
including supplementary appropriations of Yen 1,422,712,700 or 45 percent
of the expenditures voted for the year, which amounted to Yen 5,488,-
FE 322 364.279. Defense appropriations, both Army and Navy, represented 71.95 percent of the total budget, compared with 47.24 percent during 1936–37.

FE 21 Few thoroughly modern army airplanes were in use in 1937, but prospects of improvement were excellent with an ambitious building program for 1937–38. The new YF (1937) type planes compared favorably with service models of foreign nations. Contracts were let for 500 new YF (1937) type planes for delivery by 1 July 1938. Squadron strength increased from 33 to 59. Trained pilots numbered about 1400 with 288 trained during the year. The number of obsolete planes decreased but the number of available planes increased by only 34 to 1223 planes of all types on 1 July. Several new airplane companies were formed and plans were made for increasing production facilities with the industry, generally, showing fresh growth and new life.

FE 26 Legislation of a war-time character enacted by an extraordinary session of the Diet meeting 3 September, included the “Munitions Industry Mobilization Law” and “Military Secrets Protection Law”. The Cabinet Planning Board was reorganized to plan for complete control of industry, finance and labor, in accordance with the need of the national defense program.

FE 23 An unfriendly attitude toward foreign powers was manifested on several occasions during military operations in China. It was clearly stated by the Senior Aide to the Navy Minister, that peace between China would not be interfered with but should a situation develop like that in Spain, Japan might change her policy. Nevertheless, there were several incidents involving British and American nationals. The attitude toward Great Britain was decidedly unfriendly, although Russia was constantly referred to as the immediate and potential enemy.

FE 33 The reaction to President Roosevelt’s “Quarantine” speech of 5 October was one of shocked disappointment without any demonstration of enmity. Likewise, the sinking of the American gunboat Panay brought an official expression of regret with offer of restitution. The public and the press expressed hope that the United States would be magnanimous in its judgment of the incident.

FE 29 The seriousness of the Far Eastern situation was summarized in a memorandum to the Chief of Staff from the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2; War Department, dated 4 November. The memorandum read in part as follows: “There is a possibility, fantastic as it may seem, that Japan contemplates military action against Great Britain in the Orient at a time when she is involved in Europe, with the idea of seizing Hongkong and Singapore and ultimately acquiring the Dutch oil fields and control of trade routes to the Orient. It is not improbable that this country will be compelled to apply the Neutrality Act and ultimately become involved.”

FE 44 The MA in Tokyo reported on 6 January that the amicable settlement of the Panay Case should not obscure the fact that nationalistic groups in Japan harbor “considerable irritation and ill-feeling” toward the United States because of our “interference in the affairs of East Asia”.

FE 58 Japanese often reiterated that the United States “does not understand Japan”, or “fully recognize the justice of Japan’s stand”, and in so doing made it evident that “understanding Japan” really meant giving her a free hand in East Asia.

FE 59 The Japanese Foreign Minister stated in March that “Japan desires stabilization in the Far East, with herself as the central figure”, and that “there will be no conflict between Japan and the United States as long as they understand each other”.

FE 60 Tokyo reported on 18 March that the Shunso Society, a Japanese nationalist group, stated in newspaper advertisements addressed to the American people that the way for the United States to get “peace in the Orient” was to stop oppressing Japan; “... respect the position of Japan, the greatest power in the Orient; ... make absolutely no political activity or economic operations having political significance without the understanding of Japan; ... guide other Powers to take the same attitude.”
The enactment of the General Mobilization Law on 24 March laid the foundation for totalitarian control and for complete wartime mobilization of Japan's economy and manpower. This law, which was originally passed with the specific assurance that it would not be invoked for the "China Incident", virtually suspended the constitution and enabled the Government, through the issuance of Imperial Ordinances, to mobilize and regulate the human and material resources of the Empire exclusively for war. The Minister of War told the Japanese Army Division Commanders in April that there must be a mobilization of the entire Japanese strength "because the end of the China incident was remote and the changes in the international situation were difficult to predict". Tokyo reported on 12 May that the Japanese War Ministry planned to issue a pamphlet which emphasized that "Japan is facing a crisis in which the fortune of the nation is at stake" and that "only by strengthening this general mobilization system can the ambitions of a third power be restrained". On 15 November the MA in Tokyo outlined the process by which the General Law was gradually being put into full effect through the piecemeal application of the various provisions at times when propaganda or military successes made conditions favorable.

With the enlargement of military operations in China during 1938, the mobilized strength of the Japanese Army steadily increased. On 1 March the MA in China reported that a total of 1,200,000 Japanese troops were under arms. Various measures to strengthen the military conscription system, to increase the efficiency of military training, and to begin to utilize the manpower of Japan's colonies for military purposes were reported during 1938. The MA in Tokyo reported on 18 January that the new law to require two years of military service by all conscripts in the Japanese Infantry, regardless of previous preconscription training, was necessary because of the need for "further training of soldiers in the varied weapons now in use". An Imperial Ordinance, effective 3 April, provided that all Japanese subjects, including Koreans, Formosans, Ainu, and South Sea Islanders, above the age of 17 might volunteer for the Army, subject to selection and physical examination. Under this new program 400 Koreans were selected for training in 1938.

Under the leadership of General Araki, Minister of Education, the Japanese educational system put increased emphasis on Japanese nationalism and military training.

In commenting on the continued strengthening of Japanese home air defenses, the MA in Tokyo reported on 11 April that the Japanese were not greatly worried over the prospects of air raids by Chinese but that they were "drawing plans to combat potential danger from any source" and were "taking advantage of the present emergency to organize and train personnel on a nation-wide basis for coordination with military preparations." Japanese plans for the construction of 28 new airfields near large cities and of double purpose parks-emergency landing fields in Japanese villages, were reported by the MA in Tokyo on 14 May.

Tokyo reported on 19 April that appropriations for the Army during 1938-39 totalled Yen 3,823,994,180 (compared with Yen 2,494,678,117 for the fiscal year 1937-38) of which Yen 2,259,000,000 represented appropriations for the "China Incident" (against supplemental appropriations of Yen 1,422,712,777 during 1937-38). Combined Army and Navy appropriations amounted to Yen 5,543,762,189 or 73.95 per cent of the national budget, compared with 71.95 per cent for the previous fiscal year.

In the spring of 1938 the Japanese Government launched a vigorous "spiritual mobilization" program to secure on the home front the fullest possible support of the war in China. The MA in Tokyo reported on 18 May that "the response of the people appears to be all that could be desired * * * with stoic determination the people have set to fight a serious war". Tokyo reported "as significant" that General Araki, Minister of Education, stated in a speech on 2 July that Japan possessed the perfect social system and therefore had become the center of the world. General Araki emphasized Japan's "mission" to unite the cultures of the Orient and the Occident in accordance with the "Imperial Principle".
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD

Tokyo reported on 1 July that the Japanese Army Air Corps was undergoing a "most widespread modernization program." On 1 July the number of Army planes were estimated to be 1,455 with 305 additional planes ordered but not delivered. The increase in first line army planes from 782 to 1,069 and the decrease in obsolescent planes from 435 to 359 during the preceding 12 months was "due largely to the tremendous Army production program which commenced during the spring of 1937 and continues at present". Japanese aircraft production facilities were unable to meet the increased demands of the Army and Navy, however, and the Army bought 80 Fiat bombers abroad. During the preceding year Japanese army squadron strength increased from 59 to 80, and on 1 July army pilots numbered 1,600, with 150 trained during the preceding 12 months.

Increasing Japanese Irritation over the foreign aid rendered the
Chinese Government by foreign powers was reflected in numerous
reports from the Far East during 1938. France was especially singled
out for allowing the use of French Indo-China railways in transporting
material to the Chinese and for objecting to Japan's apparent intention
of occupying Hainan Island.

The MA in China on 15 July quoted Prince Konoe as saying that "foreign aid alone is prolonging the life of the Chiang Kai-shek regime" and that "Japan would take both economic and diplomatic measures to dissuade the foreign powers from aiding Chiang Kai-shek".

While the Japanese were using discriminatory measures and other
pressure against French, English, and American interests in Japaneseoccupied territories in the hope of stopping foreign aid to China, Ger-
many tried to strengthen its ties with Japan by such acts as the
recognition of "Manchoukuo" on 12 May, the ban on German exports
of arms to China in June, and the withdrawal of German military
advisers from China in July.

Russo-Japanese relations remained strained as a result of
continued delay in renewal of the fishing agreement and recurrent
border incidents, especially the fighting at Changkuufeng during July
and August.

During the European crisis over Czechoslovakia in September, the
MA in China reported by radio that a Japanese-controlled newspaper
in Tientsin and a Japanese military spokesman in Shanghai indicated
that Japan was prepared to support Germany and Italy even to the
point of war.

After the League of Nations authorized the imposition of economic
sanctions upon Japan, but left it up to the individual nations to take
action as they saw fit, the MA in China commented on 12 October that
such decisions meant nothing unless strong nations "are willing to go
to war to back them up". Japan answered this League of Nations
action by severing all relations with that organization on 2 November,
but the Japanese retained their Mandated Islands.

Tokyo reported that the United States note of 6 October relating
to the Nine Power Treaty brought Japanese newspaper comments,
probably government-inspired, to the effect that this treaty was "out-
moded" and could not "be made a cloak for political interference with
Japan's aims."

The Japanese Army continued its advance in China, having over-
rung over 500,000 square miles of territory in China by the end of 1938.

Japan began to consolidate her military and economic gains in North
and Central China, and the semi-official North China Development
Company and the Central China Development Company emphasized
the expansion of communication and transportation facilities, and the
production of iron, steel, coal, and synthetic oil to strengthen the
Japanese military machine.

The territorial expansion of Japan was advanced early in the year
by the occupation of Hainan Island. On 28 February Tokyo interpreted
the significance of recent Japanese pressure upon French Indo-
China and related to this aggression the strategical implications involved: "The occupation of Hainan is so obvious a form of pressure on the French that it is universally assigned a political motive of retaliation, in spite of official denials. Occupation of the island not only gives Japan a potential naval base right in the front-yard of Indo-China, but it also provides a close-in base leading into China from French territory." Concurrently, the Military Attaché evaluated the reaction of the Japanese press to "recent manifestations of U. S. foreign policy": "These developments [i.e., United States sale of war planes to France and proposed fortification of Guam], along with the parallel diplomatic action by the United States, England and France concerning Hainan and previous issues, are widely interpreted as indications of abandonment by the U. S. administration of the isolationist tradition of U. S. foreign policy, and of an alignment of the democratic powers against the authoritarian states including Japan." A subsequent statement from the Military Attaché in China on 7 March reported the Japanese occupation of Hainan as a strategic move directed toward French Indo-China, Hong Kong, Singapore, and the Philippines rather than a military expedient for current operations in China.

On 8 March Tokyo dispatched further evidence of Japanese legislative measures designed to bring the nation closer to a war-footing. Of particular significance was the proposal of a new "Law for the Protection of Secrets Concerning Military Resources," supplementing the provisions of the Military Secrets Protection Law of October 1927.

The rapid expansion of Japanese armaments was reflected in the 1938-39 budget passed by the Diet. On 10 April Tokyo reported that the sum for defense amounted to ¥6,432,155,345, which was 73.93 percent of the total budget. Both the Army and the Navy were being improved and modernized, large sums being allocated to artillery, aviation, motorization, and new ships.

The Combat Estimate of Japan, revised by G-2 as of 31 March, with minor changes in April, May, and July, showed that Japan's armed strength had increased very considerably during the three preceding years. Comparisons of figures from 1936 and 1939 Combat Estimates follow:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items</th>
<th>1936</th>
<th>1939</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Military manpower...</td>
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<td>Navy, active service...</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft carriers...</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Principal combatant ships...</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>251</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The following concluding paragraphs in the 1939 Combat Estimate show the efficiency of Japan's Armed Forces and the strength of her strategical position:

"The Japanese sailors are well trained. The efficiency of the personnel of the Japanese Navy is equal to that of the British or American Navies. The morale is excellent. The Japanese Navy is modern, well balanced, and ready for prompt service. The Combined Fleet works on a schedule of employment that is certain, with the quality of its personnel, to produce a highly efficient organization, and the one which will operate smoothly and effectively in time of war. Naval aviation has developed from fair to good, and is being rapidly expanded with modern planes and equipment."
Geographical

“Prior to July, 1937 Japan was essentially a militarily strong island empire whose principal islands more or less paralleled the east coast of the Asiatic Mainland from Kamchatka to a point opposite Hongkong. To the eastward her mandated islands dotted the Pacific north of the Equator between the Philippines and Hawaii. On the continent of Asia lay the Japanese territory of Korea and the Japanese controlled and dominated state of Manchukuo.

(11) “In March, 1939, after some 20 months of war with China, Japan had extended her territory under her military control over 500,000 square miles of eastern China, including the principal ports, centers of trade and industry, railways and inland waterways, and also the principal Chinese islands southward to include Hainan. Voluntary relinquishment by Japan of the dominant influence so acquired appears highly improbable. In consequence, she now has ready access to important raw materials in China; blocks all sea approaches north of Halphong to the southeastern coast of Asia, flanks all routes from the east to the eastern and northeastern coast of the mainland; and is in a remarkably strong strategical position for defense against any distant naval power.

Conclusions

“The Japanese Army, though the bulk of it is widely extended over eastern China at the ends of long lines of communications, is well organized, trained and equipped. It has been eminently successful during some 20 months of active offensive operations, and its morale is high. By assuming the defensive in China, Japan can concentrate and operate with an effective army of about 1,000,000 men either in the Japanese archipelago or elsewhere in eastern Asia against any new opponent.

“Japan's Navy, standing next in strength to those of Great Britain and the United States, is modern, well balanced, and ready at war strength for active operations. It is relatively strong in battle cruisers, destroyers, and submarines. It would be a formidable opponent to the navy of any power or combination of powers attempting offensive operations in the Western Pacific Area.

“Japan's geographic position is such that her navy on the strategical defensive could from time to time successfully assume the tactical offensive.

“So long as the sea routes between Japan and eastern Asia are under the control of the Japanese Navy it would be extremely difficult for any power or combination of powers to defeat the Japanese Army in Japan or in the eastern part of the Asiatic Mainland.”

FE 102 On 1 April the Military Attache in Tokyo reviewed tactical doctrines of the Japanese Army, as established by new combat regulations of 1939 and by observation of current military operations in China. The report stated that the Japanese were making great efforts to modernize the Army and were spending large sums on aviation, motorization and mechanization, and on increasing the strength of the division artillery. They were at the same time endeavoring to increase the efficiency of organization and tactical operation. Observation of the Japanese Army indicated that it was not a spectacular force but one rugged and capable, and that, “fired with its devotion to duty and patriotism, it would prove a dangerous foe on a battlefield of its own choosing.”

FE 104 (12) Tokyo reported on 12 April further legislation enacted to establish the nation upon a more secure war-footing. Articles 2 and 6 of the National General Mobilization Law were invoked to provide 1) governmental limitation of dividends, and 2) governmental regulations of wages in factories employing more than 50 workers and of a maximum working day of 12 hours.

FE 105 In April, the Military Attache in Japan, reviewing the trend in military aviation toward expansion, stated that since the beginning of the war in China, the personnel and aircraft strength of the Army Air Corps had increased 60 per cent. Production had increased 125 per
cent, and new construction of plants had enlarged production facilities by 40 per cent.

FE 111 Tokyo on 7 June reported a revision of the Military Service Law which extended the term of service in the Conscription Reserve from 12 years and 4 months to 17 years and 4 months and the training period of reservists to include the Second Conscription Reserve.

FE 112 On 9 June the Military Attache in Tokyo reported on the series of disputes occurring toward the end of May and early in June between the Japanese and British over control of the British and French Concessions at Tientsin and the International Settlement at Shanghai. The state of feeling between the Japanese and the British was described as acute, particularly in Tientsin.

FE 115 On 1 July, Tokyo reported the Army Air Corps, during the preceding year, had increased to 106 squadrons from 80; planes numbered 1961 against 1906; and pilot strength increased to 2900 from 1800.

FE 117 The Military Attache in China, reporting on 13 July with reference to the anti-British campaign of the Japanese, pointed out that "the Japanese credo is to drive out all western influence from China"; that the time for an anti-American campaign would come; and that Japanese extremists and conservatives were agreed on the necessity for Japanese dominance in Asia.

FE 123 Tokyo reported on 12 September that the Japanese were taken aback by the announcement of the American abrogation of the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation on 26 July. The press claimed that the United States Government was abandoning the isolationist tradition of foreign policy and was entering the alignment of democratic powers against the authoritarian states, including Japan. The government had adopted a "wait-and-see" course, being deterred, according to the Military Attache, from exploiting an opportunity to push the hard-pressed British because of apprehension of Russia.

FE 125 On the same date the Military Attache in Japan estimated the future course of Japanese foreign policy, particularly with reference to the outbreak of hostilities in Europe, as follows: "Under present conditions, it can safely be said that Japanese foreign policy will be directed toward a settlement of the China incident as rapidly as possible, and an avoidance, if possible, of any entanglements of any sort until a settlement of the China war shall have been realized."

FE 129 The Military Attache in Shanghai dispatched on 1 October to G-2 a memorandum containing estimates of Japanese imperialistic designs in relation to the European war: "In the realm of foreign affairs Japan's immediate policy will be directed toward placating the United States and toward taking advantage of the present European embroilment to secure as many plums as possible. ** * Japan is reported to be watching carefully * * * the Dutch East Indies. It is rumored that Japan is waiting for the propitious moment to take advantage of British and French preoccupation to make a swoop in that direction. * * * Leap frogging Hongkong, French Indo-China and Singapore, the Japanese Navy could bring an irresistible force to bear and easily lop off this rich prize."

FE 132 On 1 November the same source defined the probability of an impending Japanese-American conflict and reported: " * * * [the] Japanese realize that the United States is the greatest potential threat to the attainment of their 'Manifest Destiny' * * * Regardless of the final outcome, we may expect early retaliation for any decisive action we may take against Japan."

FE 133 Tokyo reported on 6 November, subsequent to the speech of Ambassador Grew of 19 October expressing unfavorable American opinion toward Japanese aspirations and activities in China, that attempts on the part of the United States to apply economic pressure upon Japan resulted in a refusal to accept such pressure 'sputinely and a turning toward such more sympathetic nations as may be available.' The imminence of Japanese re-alignment incidental to such economic pressure was thus estimated: "Should the European struggle develop into a world war, participation by the United States, the grouping of Germany, Japan, and possibly Russia and Italy is a combination which under some circumstances could be very embarrassing to the United States as a belligerent in a world war."
FE 134 An impending crisis in Japanese-American relations was reported on 20 November by the Military Attaché in Japan. Included among citations of threatening Japanese policy were the Japanese War Minister's assertions that the Army intended to press the China Incident to a successful conclusion "without much regard for public opinion" and that although abrogation of the Japanese-American commercial treaty would undeniably affect Japan's material mobilization plans, "this situation can be met and our policy toward the United States should be a strong one."

FE 138 [44] The year closed with the Japanese opening the Lower Yangtze River. With reference to this move, the Military Attaché in Japan, in his report of 22 December, estimated that such conciliatory policies might temporarily ease relations but had little long-run significance in view of the ambitious continental policy of the Japanese, from which "they were not likely to be evicted except by force of arms or circumstance."

FE 139 [46] As the year began the serious of the Far Eastern situation was summarized on 8 January by the Chief, Far Eastern Section, Intelligence Branch, G-2, in a confidential lecture delivered to the faculty and students of the Army War College. The concluding remarks were:

"As to ourselves and our interests in the Far East, the future is not a bright one if we cling to the ideal involved in the renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy."

"Regardless of agreements made or to be made between our State Department and the Japanese Foreign Office, the armed forces of Japan have effectively slammed shut the "Open Door." It is unlikely that they can be talked into reopening it.

"Our economic stake in the Orient has gone the way of the whole edifice of diplomatic pretense which, for years, has concealed reality in the Far East.

"This stake, by some standards, such as those of national integrity and prestige, is an important one. By other and possibly more practical or business-like standards it is inconsequential; and may well be written off the books."

"The decision as to whether it is worth fighting over is, of course, not one to be made by the members of our profession."

"To one whose taste it has been to follow the course of events in the Orient, however, it appears that some clear thinking on the part of the American people, leading to a decision on the question is in order."

"If the decision be that the stake is not worth salvaging, then our Government should cease making futile protests and gestures—futile because they are neither addressed to the group controlling Japan's destiny nor conducted in the only language this group understands—that of the sword:

"If the decision be otherwise, we must prepare at once to go the whole way in carrying armed force to Asia in which case our most dangerous frontier today is not in Europe, as many people would have us believe.

"It lies in the Western Pacific."[12]

FE 140 Reporting on 11 January that the imminent fall of the Abe Cabinet was due in part to Japanese concern over the approaching non-treaty status with the United States, the MA in China stated that Japanese political and military leaders "are anxious to appease us only until their 'immutable policy' of a Far Eastern hegemony is well on the road toward accomplishment. Thereafter they feel they can disregard American opinion and pressure with impunity."

FE 142 [16] In commenting to the Far Eastern Section, G-2, on 18 January on the feasibility of establishing an unofficial American air corps in Free China, Major E. C. Whitehead, Air Corps, stated: "Chennault (now Major-General Chennault) has a high opinion of Japan's ability to conduct air war."
Following the expiration of the Japanese-American trade treaty on 26 January, the Japanese felt that relations with the United States were in a "state of delicate balance." Tokyo reported that Japanese abrogation of the trade treaty with the Dutch might be the first step toward an eventual attempt at economic domination of the Netherlands Indies.

The Japanese interpreted the new twenty-million-dollar American loan made to the Chinese Government in March as further evidence of American determination to try to thwart Japan's China program. The Japanese were planning for setting up the Wang Ching-wel regime in Occupied China.

On 30 March the Chief, FE, transmitted to the Chief, Intelligence Branch, a current estimate on the economic position of Japan which emphasized that Japan's economy was geared exclusively for war. Her peacetime industries have been severely curtailed in their operations except so far as they contributed to the acquisition of foreign exchange. The exchange, once acquired, has been expended. The industries as were inessential for military purposes, were blacked out. The severity of these measures materials is the key to Japanese foreign policy. It is directed toward the program of expansion by military conquests.

"The application of an embargo against Japan should be carefully considered, and its possible accomplishments and failures carefully weighed. Clearly, if the United States were to embargo exports to Japan, the possible loss of trade would thereafter no longer be a deterrent to Japanese aggression. Such action would tend to kill off the remaining liberal sentiment in Japan and might force her wholly into the arms of Germany and Russia. Thereafter, the full force of the jingo element in the Army, freed of restraint, would be unleashed in all its fury, regardless of possible consequences, against the Western Powers. The only remaining course then open to the United States would be to bow before the storm and abandon its interests in the Western Pacific, or accept immediate armed conflict."

G-3, in forwarding the above economic survey of Japan to the WPD, stated in part: "As the moment our relations with Japan are deteriorating, the positive economic weapon is only suspended over Japan's head. It is well known that Japan is intensively developing widespread markets and sources of raw materials with the view of avoiding this weapon. It seems that passive diplomacy seems only to effect further deterioration in relations between the two countries. No discernible diplomacy is being exercised successfully to mold Japanese course to American will. Our potential naval and military power is in the background with no definite objective to attain."

The American non-recognition policy toward the Wang Ching-wel regime was interpreted by the Japanese as additional proof of our determination to try to check the Japanese in China, but Tokyo reported on 10 April that the Japanese were hopeful of making a deal with England and France whereby those nations would not oppose Japan's China policy in return for assurances of Japan's neutrality in the European war.

Tokyo reported on 24 April that rumors of an imminent German attack on Holland were current in Japan, and that the Japanese demand for the maintenance of the status quo of the Netherlands Indies "was so presented as to invite the conclusion that it was intended to pave the way for intervention by the Japanese themselves."

The increase in the Japanese Army budget for 1940-41 was accounted for by plans to reorganize the Army Air Corps and to replenish and improve armaments. Tokyo reported. A chart of continuing expenditures for the years following 1940 indicated efforts to bring the equipment of the Japanese Army up-to-date as quickly as possible, but the increase in the "China Incident" budget showed that new large-scale campaigns were not expected in China. In 1940-41, 67.18 percent of the national budget was to be spent by the Japanese Army and Navy.

After the German invasion of Holland, Tokyo reported increasing Japanese concern over the status of the Netherlands Indies, while...

G-3 informed the Chief of Staff on 20 May of the concentration of a Japanese naval force at Palau, north of the Netherlands Indies in the Caroline Islands.
On 21 May, G-2 reported to the Chief of Staff that the Japanese Navy might step forward with its "Southward Advance" as a pannacca for Japan's economic line. Pointing out that the American position with respect to the Pacific area had reached a critical stage, this report stated that American relations with Japan have deteriorated to such an extent that conciliatory gestures made at this time might well be interpreted by Japan as a sign of weakness and fear on our part; whereas threatening notes and gestures, whether or not we are prepared to follow them through to logical conclusions, may push Japan into the camp of the totalitarian aggressors of Europe. No discernable diplomacy has been exercised successfully to mold Japan's course in accordance with our desires. The need appears urgent: therefore, for the formulation and announcement of a national decision as to advantageous and realistic objectives sought by us in the Far East, to the extent that the armed services may proceed intelligently to prepare plans in conformity with these objectives.

This G-2 report of 31 May to the Chief of Staff outlined the Pacific situation in part as follows:

1. The Mandated Islands of Japan form a strategic barrier across Pacific sea lanes which menace American defense and communications lines and cuts the United States off from the rubber and tin supplies of East Asia.

2. The French position in the Far East has deteriorated to such an extent that France has little chance to counter Japanese moves.

3. Japan sees in the present situation a "golden opportunity" to move against England's possessions at Hong Kong and southward.

4. Japanese pressure was being exerted on the Netherlands Indies to gain economic concessions.

5. Thailand's policy is reported to be controlled by Army and Navy officers with pro-Japanese leanings.

Tokyo reported concentrations of Japanese troops on the islands of Formosa and Hainan on 7 June, while a report dated 10 June stated that the impending American embargo on the export of machine tools had created "quite a furor" in Japan and that agitation for "positive action" against the Netherlands Indies was increasing.

The MA in China reported large Japanese military, naval, and air force concentrations on Hainan Island. The present goal is apparently French Indo-China, this report of 12 June added, but the "ultimate objective is of course complete domination of the East Asian seaboard."

On 20 June G-2 forwarded to the Chief of Staff details of a Japanese ultimatum to Great Britain which required that the Hong Kong and Burma borders be closed and that British troops be withdrawn from Shanghai if a Japanese declaration of war was to be averted.

G-2 reported to the Chief of Staff on 26 June that the Japanese attitude toward the United States was stiffening and that the fall of the Yonsei Cabinet is indicated, resulting in an Army-dominated regime or even in a military oligarchy. A concentration of Japanese war vessels was directed toward French Indo-China.

The increasingly stiff Japanese attitude toward the United States was again reported by G-2 to the Chief of Staff on 26 June; mentioning a Japanese public relations official in New York as saying: "Japan [160] will play ball with Germany to the utter disregard of where this may lead as far as America is concerned."

Manila cabled on 26 June that the main Japanese fleet was moving southward, and that landing maneuvers were being held near Palau.

Tokyo estimated that Japan had a minimum of 4,040 Army and Navy airplanes of all types, with 1,510 additional planes contracted for and not delivered, on 1 July. The personnel of the Japanese Army Air Corps and Naval Air Service was estimated to total 4,565 officers, 1,350 cadets, and 63,045 enlisted men on 1 July. Army and Navy pilots numbered 5,950. Further improvement in military aviation was expected with the establishment of the Hokota Army Air School for training in light bombing, as this would release the facilities at the Hamamatsu Army Air School for more extensive training in heavy bombardment and would be conducive to more efficient training in both light and heavy bombardment.
FE 164  On 11 July Tokyo reported that within Japan “the issue is at present sharply drawn between those who favor a closer tie-up with Germany and prompt action against Allied possessions in the Far East, and those who, distrusting Germany or feeling that immediate action is not necessary or desirable, would continue to concentrate on accomplishment of the China venture.” Pending a decision, the Japanese Army concentrated troops, ready for action, opposite both Hongkong and the French Indo-China border.

FE 165  G-2 reported to the Chief of Staff on 30 July that diplomatic relations between Japan and the United States have deteriorated to such an extent that neither threats nor offers of appeasement from Washington would be effective.

11) Resignation of the Yosai Cabinet under Army pressure, and organization of a totalitarian group under Prince Konoe signal a clearing of the track for closer alignment with the Axis powers against Britain.

12) To sum up, it is clear that the day has passed when official statements of disapproval from Washington will deter Japan from further aggressive moves. Neither will the negative restraint inspired by the American fleet at Hawaii halt ardent Japanese nationalism who wish to capitalize upon the present “golden opportunity” to expand the Empire.

13) It is improbable that Japan will take any positive action against Great Britain at Hongkong or at Singapore until she knows the outcome of the present phase of British-German hostilities. It can be predicted with reasonable certainty, however, that, the foreign policy of Japan will from the outset be more aggressive with respect to Thailand, Burma, French Indo-China, and the Dutch East Indies, and with respect to foreign interests and concessions in China.

FE 166  [29] Tokyo reported that Army Districts in Japan were being reorganized, effective 1 August, to increase the efficiency of the Japanese Army for national defense, training, and administration.

FE 172  In the opinion of the MA in Tokyo the shake-up in the Japanese foreign service probably indicated an effort to remove men who were pro-American or pro-Allied. He reported on 4 September that the number of Japanese advocating an alignment with the Rome-Berlin Axis was increasing and that from a military standpoint the Japanese Army would not find it difficult “to take over the northern part of Indo-China.”

FE 174  On 19 September Tokyo reported that the Japanese Army continued to avoid further commitments in China in order to be ready for action. If and when a favorable opportunity presented itself for a new venture elsewhere, if the European war seems to point to a long-drawn-out struggle, the Japanese will eventually decide to seize the desired territories, counting on having time to organize their conquests for defense against the final European victor. The Japanese felt that the United States was certain to object to this expansion, was likely to retaliate by economic means, and might possibly oppose aggression with armed force. The Japanese believed time would be on their side, however, as they felt it would be years before America’s naval and military strength could be built up sufficiently for major operations in the Far East while the German menace still existed. The most radical immediate action, however, would probably be a move across French Indo-China, with or without acquiescence, to hasten the conclusion of the China War.

FE 175  G-2, Manila, reported on 1 October: “It is the opinion of this office that the Japanese are in deadly earnest in all their activities and aspirations.” The United States lacked sufficient “visible evidences” of power in the Far East, and war with Japan would come unless corrective action were taken at once.

FE 177  Tokyo reported on 5 October that the Tripartite Pact was signed after Japan realized that the United States was irreconcilably opposed to Japanese expansion in Asia. Japan has decided to change her traditional policy “at least quiet relations” with the United States and to pursue a course to satisfy her national “ambition.” The statement of Prince Konoe, in which he flatly declared that the question of peace or war in the Pacific “will be decided by whether Japan and the
United States respect and understand the stand of each other” expressed the determination of the Japanese not to be dissuaded from their present ambitions by any half-way measures. Other reports from Japan, China and the Philippine Islands during October emphasized the tense state of Japanese-American relations and the probability of continued Japanese aggression.

On 31 October the MA in China reported that if a non-aggression pact could be signed with Russia, Japan would probably continue her southern expansion regardless of its effect on Japanese-American relations.

Details of a new 10-Year Plan to weld Japan, China, and “Manchukuo” into a close-kind economic unit were transmitted from Tokyo on 13 November, with comment on the great potential strength of Japan’s economic position if such plans were to succeed.

G-2, Manila, reported on 20 November that Japanese troops on the islands of Hainan and Formosa were undergoing landing operations. Stating that Japan would not attack if we were strong enough to afford reasonable chance of failure, Manila recommended that several divisions of the Philippine Army be mobilized at once and that essential war materials be shipped to the Philippines. Large-scale troop reinforcements from the United States were not believed immediately necessary.

Reports from both China and Japan discussed the Japanese Army’s evacuation of Kwangsi Province in November, and indicated that Japan’s next move would probably be into French Indo-China. The MA in China, in commenting on Japan’s plans with regard to the troops being assembled on the islands of Formosa and Hainan, observed that “some even presume an attack on the Philippines via Lingayen Gulf”.

Tokyo reported on 12 December that Ambassador Nomura’s mission to try to improve Japanese-American relations was probably “doomed from the start” because the Japanese Government was “completely in the hands of the more chauvinistic elements” and was not prepared to make concessions in the Japanese program for East Asia which would be acceptable to American opinion.

G-2 13 On 27 December G-2 reported to Mr. John J. McCloy, Special Assistant to the Secretary of War, that by 1 September, 1941 the Japanese Army Air Corps and Naval Air Service would have an estimated 290 combat squadrons, averaging about 12 planes per squadron. These Japanese air combat units would include approximately 50 squadrons of heavy bombers and 80 squadrons of medium and light bombers.

1941
JANUARY

In forwarding the English text of the Japan-Thailand Treaty of Amity, the Tokyo MA called attention to the progress of Japanese designs on French Indo-China and on bases for operations against Malaya and Singapore. G-2 interpreted the concurrent southward movement of part of the Japanese fleet to be a form of pressure on the French in the French-Thai dispute. The Chief, FE, transmitted to the Chief of the Intelligence Branch a report from the American Ambassador at Tokyo that the Japanese were rumored to be planning a mass attack on Pearl Harbor.

A Manila intelligence report of 18 January to G-2 said in part: “Steps should now be taken by the War Department to designate the Department Commander as Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces in the Far East, with appropriate temporary grade. Several divisions of the Philippine Army should be ordered mobilized and mustered into the Federal Service at once, so that they may become integrated in the combat team, and so that their organization, equipment, and training can become perfected prior to the need for their use. This is a front line. The covering force is too small to permit
of a long-range mobilization and training program. The Japanese now have an expeditionary force of 70,000 troops on Hainan Island—7 divisions, 2 brigades, 1 regiment Infantry, 1 regiment cavalry, 1 regiment artillery, 1 regiment A.A. artillery, and about 400 planes of various types. An analysis of the disposition of Japanese troops indicates that Japan is not now mobilized for a major war. However, she is in a position to effect a quick mobilization and descend on the Philippines under favorable conditions. Delay in our preparation might prove fatal."

FE 197 Japan was reported by Manila to be fortifying and reinforcing the Spratly Islands southwest of the Philippines. Fully-trained Japanese parachute troops arrived near the northern border of French Indo-China.

G-2 19 G-2, estimating Alaska’s position for the WPD, made this observation:

G-2 10 "In the first phase of the war and if unopposed, Japan can reasonably be expected to occupy the Aleutian Islands, the Aleutian peninsula and other undefended portions of Alaska with special reference to southeastern Alaska. She may be expected to do this immediately upon the outbreak of the war, with not less than a division reinforced with aviation; antiaircraft artillery; submarines and small craft."

[23] "In any case, in a war with Japan we may expect naval raids and surprise attacks against Pacific ports of the mainland as well as against Alaska."

February

FE 206 Tokyo reported on the extreme character of the National Defense Security Act and said that its immediate effect would be closure of many sources of information. The MA, China, reported that Japan was promoting border trouble in order to profit as a mediator “preserving the peace” between Thailand and French Indo-China. He also commented on Japan’s warnings to the United States that she would tolerate no interference in developing the East Asia economic bloc, her inclusion of the Netherlands Indies in this bloc, and the reports that many Japanese divisions were being trained on Formosa and Hainan, all of which indicated plans to move southward. He believed that under certain conditions Japan would move directly on the Netherlands Indies.

March

FE 215 G-2 transmitted to WPD a Navy memorandum concerning the disposition of the Japanese fleet, commenting that the concentration near Formosa (between 60 and 70 per cent of all combatant naval vessels) could be used to cover landings in French Indo-China; might be an attempt to threaten the United States in the Philippines; or might be preparation for other future movements based on Formosa and Hainan. On 14 March G-2 forwarded copies of a study of Japanese landing operations for widest possible circulation to Alaska, Hawaii, and the Philippines Headquarters. Chungking reported that foreigners generally believed Japan’s move on Singapore and the Netherlands Indies depended upon the outcome of Germany’s offensive against England. Intense military activity in the Mandated Islands was reported by Manila. A test mobilization of the Philippine Army was indicated unpreparedness to meet an enemy attack in force. The Military Observer at Singapore reviewed the disposition of British forces in Malaya with approval, but predicted difficulties in meeting flank attacks and in signal communications. He also reported that the Japanese were reconnoitering the northern border of Malaya.

April

FE 224 Tokyo pointed out that although the newly concluded Japan-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact obviously freed Japan on one front and enabled her to prepare for issues elsewhere, it removed none of the basic differences of opinion between the two countries. Manila recommended “the immediate mobilization and muster into Federal
Service of at least five divisions of the Philippines Army. The Advisability of immediate action cannot be overstressed." The German Ambassador at Tokyo asked that Japanese shipping lines help evacuate German nationals from the Philippine Islands. According to the Singapore MO, [24] the British estimated that the Japanese could move six divisions simultaneously against Malaya, of which two would assail the northern border and the others would land at Kota Bharu, Kuantan and Merlim.

May

FE 229 G-2 informed the Under Secretary of War of the phenomenal increase in Japanese purchases of oil drilling and processing equipment immediately before the Export Control Act went into effect in February. Meanwhile on 2 May Tokyo cabled a warning that the reported increases of Japanese strength in Formosa, Hainan and French Indo-China were greater than normal for the China Incident and "may be there in response to Singapore or East Indies." A report from Chungking on field operations warned that the Japanese would probably attempt an all-out drive to conclude the China Incident in order to have a free hand for southward expansion should the United States become involved in the war in Europe. In transmitting the Japanese Army Budget for the fiscal year 1941–42 the Tokyo MA contrasted it with the budget for the preceding year, and pointed out that the China Incident expenditures alone could not explain its expansion.

Convinced that war with Japan was inevitable, G-2 prepared and issued a Handbook on Japanese Military Forces (TM 30–480, 273 pp., 14 May). A warning not to underrate the fighting ability of the enemy was sounded on page 218 as follows:

"Tactics are without meaning unless studied in relation to the human agent who will apply them in battle. This manual has avoided excursions into the field of Japanese military psychology and national characteristics; however, it should be read with a constant eye to the nature of the Japanese Army for which these tactics are designed. It is an army easily misjudged by the foreign officer who sees first of all its struggling columns, slovenly dress and unmilitary bearing. Just as there is no glitter to its accouterments, there is little theoretical excellence to recommend its tactics; but it is an army which excels in durability and performance. In the same way that its infantry 'straggles' 30 miles a day and arrives at its destination on time with surprisingly few casualties, its command and staff can be counted on to evolve plans and orders which, without being brilliant tactical combinations, are practicable and workable schemes for getting a maximum performance from the Japanese soldier. Furthermore the Japanese Army which fought with bows and arrows in 1870 is thoroughly capable of learning from its mistakes and advancing with the new developments of warfare. While its swaggering self-confidence may receive some rude jolts in a major war, it is a rugged army fired with a devotion to duty and a narrow patriotism which make it a dangerous foe on a field of its own choosing."

On 24 May G-2 prepared for WPD an estimate of the current situation which named the isolation or containing of the Philippines and an attack of Malaya, British Borneo and the Netherlands Indies as possible sources of Japanese action.

FE 235 G-2 prepared an Economic Estimate of Japan (61 pp. 27 May, 1941) which in assessing Japan's economic war potential stated (pp. 50–61): "Japan's present policy is to extend political control over a vast region. Raw materials in this area are to be conscripted and markets opened and held by force. The wider this territory becomes the larger become the requirements for materials to extend such an economy. Germany in Europe is a current example of Japan in Asia. Japan realizes now that only by military occupation can her bloc economy succeed.

"With each success of Germany, Japan widens her sphere and lays more grandiose schemes. Existing world economic spheres belonging
to competing powers such as the United States and England are forced to consolidate their positions. The re-division of bloc economies and their head-on collisions are the order of a new age. Within this order is a growing shift to a barter-economy and a cornering of the basic raw materials by the conquering powers.

"The countries most strategically affected in this collision are forced either to appease or fight. The clearest example today in the fact that the United States and England must continue to sell oil to Japan or run the risk of pushing Japan into an immediate attack upon the Netherlands East Indies which would raise the likelihood of war with Australia, New Zealand, and the British forces in Malaya and Singapore. This in turn would make an American-Japanese clash almost inevitable. Anglo-American activity at the present must be centered in Europe and the Near East.

"All treaties, either economic or political, today have become as oil to grease the wheels of the present emergency in the various spheres of regional hegemony. Japan makes or breaks such treaties with impunity to extend her progress or consolidate her position. With opportunistic designs she rides before the wind and is to be stopped only by a stronger power or combination of powers..."

"The essential fact remains that Japan lacks essential raw materials to support either her manufacturing trade or a major war effort. To procure them she must have foreign exchange. If the present unfavorable trade balance is not radically adjusted it appears that complete exhaustion of all assets capable of being converted into foreign exchange to balance the debit in international payments will occur in the near future (some say by the end of 1941). This will result in the stoppage in the inflow of a considerable part of the raw materials which are vital to the organic well-being of Japan, and her ability to wage war will be seriously curtailed."

FE 238 [26] G-2 Manila was of the opinion that Japan could not strike simultaneously at Manila, North Borneo and Singapore. However, the dangers of a defensive attitude in that region had been emphasized in a memorandum of 23 May:

"Much attention is being given to the importance of Singapore as a naval base; consequently it stands out as a center of resistance to Japanese aggression. Such an idea presumes a defensive attitude, as Singapore is too far from the main Japanese bases to offer good chances of offensive action. It was established to guard the British line of communications.

"The Philippines are in the midst of Japanese southern bases. Their proximity permits offensive action to destroy such bases. They lie across the southern sea lanes, and therefore control them.

"A defensive attitude permits the Japanese to expand their bases to the south and east, and they are so doing. Singapore is too far away for Japan to see it as a threat. An aggressive attitude would force them to look to their home bases first, and to assume a defensive attitude. This attitude idea is important. It is well to have Singapore as an interior base—the advanced base must be the Philippines. It must be armed and equipped to take offensive action. The defensive is the last resort of the weak; it invites attack, and in the end fails. Japan is not halted by Philippines defense, rather by the offensive possibilities of the U. S. Fleet. That fleet is the stabilizing influence in the Far East. If an important part of its strength is moved to the Atlantic, Japan will at once become aggressive.

"If forced to retire to the line Alaska-Hawaii the United States will have to fight a major war to retain its present position in the Far East; meanwhile China will quickly fall and there will be no advanced bases for offensive action. For all of these reasons, this office has urged that this command be placed on a par with Hawaii and Panama, that the Philippine Army be mobilized, and that sufficient arms be provided to reasonably secure the Philippines against air and ground blitzkrieg. Our antiaircraft and antitank arms are meager, and our troop strength not imposing."

FE 237 On 29 May Chungking forwarded Chinese estimates that Japan had 2000 Navy planes and 2500 Army planes.
JUNE

FE 233 Tokyo reported that the Japanese Government was facing great difficulty in preserving restraint vis-a-vis internal public pressure for strong and direct action toward the Netherlands Indies after the failure of trade negotiations at Batavia. On 4 June Tokyo also wrote that in May certain Japanese officers attached to northern units were receiving inoculations against yellow fever.

FE 242 Hongkong reported that on 14 June twenty-seven Japanese transports convoyed by twenty-one destroyers were off the China coast travelling [27] southward, and expected to be off Hongkong on 17 June. Manila on 24 June stated: "The removal of the U.S. Fleet from the Pacific will unleash Japan." Manila also forwarded a British report that 25,000 Japanese troops had received parachute training in China and Japan and that 1,500 of these were stationed near Canton. On 25 June Hongkong further reported that three convoys, totalling about 50 transports, had been seen during the preceding fortnight and were believed to have gone to the Pescadores or Formosa. The MA, Mexico, forwarded a report that the Japanese were preparing small submarines for attacking the American fleet in Pearl Harbor, and that a training program then under way included towing them from Japan to positions off the Hawaiian Islands, where they practiced surfacing and submerging.

FE 255 On 27 June Chungking cabled the opinion that the Japanese would be reluctant to make a major move until results of border incidents revealed the potential of the Russians, and that the sudden German offensive against Russia had caused a temporary lull in the threatening attitude toward the United States.

JULY

FE 256 On 1 July Manila relayed a British Intelligence report that partial mobilization of all forces was under way in Japan.

FE 271 On 12 July Hongkong reported 19 Japanese transports moving southward from Formosa. On the same day Tokyo cabled: "Considerable scale of mobilization and unusual secrecy attending it now beyond question", Tokyo believed the Government, however, was still seeking to avoid positive commitments. Two days later Tokyo cabled that it was now evident that large scale mobilization underway covered by usual secrecy. Some newly mobilized men being sent to Manchoukuo but unable determine number or whether any being sent south.

FE 274 The Chief of Staff was informed by G-2 on 15 July that on 12 July the Japanese delivered a virtual ultimatum to Vichy, with a 20 July deadline, in which they demanded the use of eight air and two naval bases in southern French Indo-China.

FE 273 The Singapore Observer on 16 July summarized the military situation together with notes on naval and air defense potential, and concluded that "The defense of Malaya requires six brigades. . . The question of the defense of Singapore, however, is largely controlled by circumstances in other theaters of the present war. . . ." Singapore also estimated that Japanese strength in French Indo-China was approaching 40,000 men and believed there would be forcible seizure of additional bases. The Chinese G-2 was reported to anticipate an early invasion of French Indo-China, and to believe that areas newly ceded to Thailand were to be used as air bases. Some Japanese ships calling at [28] Manila were commandeered by the Tokyo Government and forced to abandon schedules.

FE 280 London reported belief that the Japanese had completed all preparations for taking over French Indo-China bases. Manila reported the "new Japanese Cabinet, in our opinion, war-minded and capable of taking action." In a strategic estimate for the Chief of Staff on 18 July G-2 reported Japan to have 1,064,000 tons of naval shipping and 6,200,000 tons of merchant shipping, and estimated that Japan had ground strength of 62 infantry divisions, probably to be increased to 64 by 1 July 1943. A summary of aircraft production potential on the
same date indicated "a maximum annual production of 3500 aircraft and 7000 engines. These totals would gradually diminish after the beginning of hostilities with a major power. However, continued adherence to the Axis might alleviate this condition." On the basis of economic intelligence, G-2 recommended to the Chief of Staff on 25 July that a complete embargo be instituted by the U.S.A.

FE 285 

FE 285a 

July Tokyo cabled: "Largest single draft since initial mobilization for China War now under way under conditions extreme secrecy involving restrictions on movements foreigners in all directions." Some Japanese in Tokyo interpreted the 26 July freezing of Japanese credits as the first step toward a final break with America.

FE 286 

FE 276 Additional manpower mobilization was reported. The Japanese ordered their vessels to defer entering any American Pacific port from Alaska to the Canal, any British port on the Indian Ocean from Suez to Singapore, certain ports of East Africa, or any Australian, New Zealand, Netherlands Indies, or Philippine ports.

AUGUST

FE 287 The occupation of southern French Indo-China was being completed.

FE 305 Drastic shipping control measures were instituted by the Japanese Cabinet. Tokyo reported five main forces, composed of ten armies (54 divisions) located overseas. Japan demanded the right to occupy Thai naval and air bases. Bangkok commented: "An immediate Japanese Bangkok Mil. ob. move is anticipated due to Thai indecision."

FE 301 Chungking forwarded British estimates that Japanese tank strength, exclusive of baby tanks and armored machine gun cars, was ten regiments consisting of 150 tanks, with an equal number in reserve. Uncalled reserves were believed to number 210,000. Eleven divisions could be organized from reserves already trained and sixteen from those then in training. These figures include corps, army and service troops. Artillery was believed to be available for only eighteen new divisions.

FE 307 In addition the AM at Chungking forwarded the Russian estimate that the actual strength of the Japanese Army was forty-eight divisions and twenty independent brigades (approximately fifty-eight divisions), with 300,000 men in training, possibly ready in three months. [29] Technical equipment was believed to be insufficient. The total potential strength was estimated by the Russians to be seventy-six divisions.

FE 290 Estimates were forwarded from London that more than 500,000 Japanese were mobilized during June and July, and further British estimates, forwarded from Chungking, placed Japanese strength at 40 divisions, with 54 available by the end of August when mobilization would be complete.

G-2107 The Chief of Staff was informed that G-2 believed that the Japanese Government, with the sanction of the Emperor, had determined on a course of expansion southward for reasons of economic and strategic security, and that the "co-prosperity sphere" would be established "regardless of other developments in the world situation." To implement these policies, it was believed that Japan intended great political military pressure on French Indo-China and Thailand and "preparation for an attack on Siberia, but to be made at her own chosen time". It was believed that Japan would resort to every means available to keep the United States out of the war, but the following warning was sounded: "The great danger in the situation lies in the fact, so often proved, that Japanese military and naval authorities are not under the complete control of their Government. We have seen for the past year an extraordinary example of discipline and self-control of the German military... We can, unfortunately, expect no such self-denial and restraint on the part of the Japanese military. We can only hope that they will at least follow for a time the policies of their Government... "The exercise of increasingly strong 'power diplomacy' by the United States is clearly indicated."

FE-300 Chungking reported Japanese plans to take over international concessions and to capture American marines in Shanghai by surprise.

FE-391 Tokyo estimated on 5 August that the aircraft industry, working
at maximum wartime capacity, could produce annually the equivalent of 4,500 two-place, single-engine military airplanes. Actual production for the period 1 July 1940 to 30 June 1941 was estimated to be 2,700 combat aircraft. It was concluded that since the end of 1939 the aircraft industry had increased production by about one-half, and capacity by about two-thirds, while completion of construction then in sight would give a capacity double that of 1939. The number of employees engaged in the manufacture of airplanes had increased 55 per cent, and employees in engine manufacturing plants had increased in number 57 per cent from 1938-39 to 1940-41.

September

Tokyo MA reported on the organization and high quality of the Japanese military signal communications system, and commented that Japanese radio equipment was “comparable to our own in every respect”.

Japan set up a National Defense General Headquarters in a move to improve arrangements for the defense of Japan Proper.

Invocation of the last drastic measures of the 1938 National Mobilization Law (revised), and a tense political atmosphere were reported by Tokyo to indicate that the day for a final decision on “irremovable” policies was drawing near. Internally the nation was mobilizing for total war. Two hundred and forty Japanese planes were reported in French Indo-China. Economic, diplomatic and military pressure was being brought to bear on Thailand by the Japanese.

The crisis in Japan was described by G-2 on 23 September for the Chief of Staff, with the repeated recommendation that “The exercise of increasingly strong power diplomacy” by the United States is clearly indicated.” The Singapore MO forwarded a British Far Eastern estimate that seasonal weather conditions precluded an attack on Singapore before spring. Manila wrote that Japanese morale was high, almost bordering on fanaticism, and while added emphasis was being placed on military training in schools, older students were being required to abandon some of their classes for industrial work. A

G-2 summary of Japan’s national defense budget showed 63.14 per cent of the total National Budget was to be used for war purposes in the fiscal year 1941-42.

G-2 prepared for the Chief of Staff a Brief Periodic Estimate of the World Situation for 3 September–1 December 1941. Although in summary it was thought that “her most likely, but by no means certain, course is inaction”, the courses of action thought to be open to Japan included an occupation of Thailand in disregard of American opinion, the seizure or isolation of Hongkong and the Philippines and an attack upon Singapore or an attack upon Burma and the Burma Road. As for the most probable action, it was believed that “Japan, beset with uncertainties, will probably buy time by entering into negotiations with the United States. A cabinet upset in Japan, a not unlikely event, will change the whole picture. The present [third Konoe] cabinet, however, will initiate no additional aggression on the part of Japan until all diplomatic means of relieving pressure have been explored and exhausted. This does not preclude independent action on the part of Japan’s armies in the field...”

The following is an extract from the combat estimate of the same document:

“Japan has an active army of about 2,000,000 including an air force of 55,000 and a trained and partially trained reserve of 3,500,000 men.

The active forces are deployed over a wide area from Karafuto and Manchoukuo in the north to the Southern French Indo-China—Thailand border in the south. The estimated number of active divisions or their equivalent is 68, plus 35 depot divisions in Japan Proper. Japan has recently mobilized approximately 500,000 reserves which have been utilized as replacements and in forming new units included in the above estimate.

“Japan has been withdrawing a considerable number of her troops from China and despatching them to Indo-China and Manchuria. Some
of these have been replaced by Manchurian and Wang Ching-wel's puppet troops. Since the outbreak of the Russo-German war, the forces in Manchoukuo have been increased from 8 to 19 divisions with auxiliary troops-including 4 tank regiments and 4 cavalry brigades, totalling about 500,000 officers and men. The Japanese Army is well trained and an efficient fighting force. Officers are well qualified to perform their various duties in peace and war. The staff has functioned well during difficult tactical operations in China. The enlisted men, although somewhat lacking in initiative, are well trained, experienced in combat, well disciplined, courageous and aggressive to the point of recklessness. The Japanese have been consistently successful in China from a tactical point of view and only combat with a modern army can determine Japan's relative efficiency compared to modern occidental armies. Japan's army is physically hardy and psychologically inspired by loyalty to the Emperor, devotion to duty and a fanatical patriotism which make it a dangerous foe on the Asian continent or nearby islands.

The Japanese Army and Navy air forces have made rapid progress since 1937. Personnel strength of Army and Navy air forces is 55,000 officers and men and the two services have combined plane strength of approximately 3,743 combat planes. The Army squadrons number 114 and the Navy has 124 squadrons. Plane design has lagged, but lack of formidable opposition has left them undisputed air superiority. Four years of continuous air operations have increased the efficiency of Japanese aviation in no small degree. Recent acquisition of German planes and technical advisors has contributed to Japanese air proficiency.

"The Japanese Army is the best equipped army in Asia. Its equipment, however, is inferior to that of any of the modern European armies. The shortage of raw materials and production capacity will limit the new divisions which can be organized, even though Japan's partially trained manpower is ample for her anticipated needs. Personal equipment appears to be sufficient and in good condition but there is a shortage of organizational equipment such as tanks, and other mechanized equipment, antiaircraft weapons and modern artillery.

"Japan has a navy consisting of approximately 180,000 men and officers exclusive of about 20,000 in the naval air corps. Naval [32] strength comprises over a million tons already built and nearly 500,000 tons building. The navy is divided into two main divisions: the Combined Fleet and the Japanese Naval Forces in China. The latter consists of the North, Central and South China Fleets. The Combined Fleet is based in home waters.

"The Japanese naval personnel is well trained—a training equal to that of the British and American navies. The Japanese navy is modern, well balanced, and ready for prompt service. It is relatively strong in aircraft carriers and tenders; it would be a formidable opponent to the navy of any power or those of any combination of powers attempting offensive operations in the western Pacific area."

October

G-2 129 On 2 October, G-2 prepared a report for the Chief of Staff covering the crisis in Tokyo, described Konoe's desire to meet the President, and advocated forceful diplomacy vis-a-vis Japan, with the application of increasing military and economic pressure.

FE 327 On 14 October Hongkong reported the presence of 22 transports on the Pearl River.

FE 331 Commenting on heavy troop movements into French Indo-China, Tokyo concluded on 20 October that "if the rumored increase goes above the number originally agreed upon there cannot remain much doubt as to the intention behind it."

FE 332 Tokyo reported that General Tojo, on becoming Premier, retained his status as an officer on the active list, an unprecedented procedure, and concluded that the third Konoe cabinet fell because of inability to meet army criticism of its policy towards French Indo-China, the conversations in Washington, and policy vis-a-vis a weakened Russia.

FE 329 The Chief of Staff was further advised by G-2 that "Any cabinet selected by General Tojo may be expected to have Axis leanings, but will be otherwise anti-foreign and highly nationalistic."
FE 335 Chunching reported the official French Indo-Chinese view to be that the Japanese would attack Thailand about 15 November. London cabled “Japanese troops in Indo-China will be strengthened as follows: 39,000 there now; an estimated 20,000 enroute, and an additional 20,000 included in Japanese plans.” A general southward movement of Japanese shipping in the Western Pacific was reported on 27 October from Singapore, together with intelligence that aircraft carriers and 60 flying boats, fighters and bombers were operating in the Mandated Islands.

FE 336 The China MA cabled that “Increased Nazi activity in Japan plus the cabinet crisis and attacks on U. S. by spokesmen and press considered strong evidence of drastic action in the near future.” [37] By radio on 29 October Manila reported that the “C in C combined naval and air forces” had been ordered to Takao, Formosa, where it was believed an expeditionary force was being organized.

FE 340 On 30 October Chungking radioed that Japanese strength in French Indo-China was then 57,000 troops, and steadily increasing in numbers. He anticipated a possible drive through Yunnan toward the Burma Road. Thailand was reported ready to capitulate in the hope that the country would be saved from the ravages of war.

November

FE 343 The G–2 Estimate of the Far Eastern Situation prepared for WFD on 2 November stated the probabilities of an attack on Thailand, the containing or isolation of the Philippines and Hongkong, the seizure of the Netherlands Indies, and a possible direct attack upon Singapore.

FE 347 G–2 on 10 November, concurred in a British opinion that Japan no longer felt that it must make every effort to avoid war with the United States, and Kurusu’s trip was reported to be for the purpose of determining if America’s stand was a bluff. The Japanese Consul-General at Batavia recommended that on the outbreak of war all Japanese should report promptly to the Netherlands Indies authorities for internment, thus avoiding violence. The Singapore British, however, were reported by the U. S. MO to believe that no attack could be expected before April because of the prevailing northeast monsoon over Malaya. British opinion in Tokyo, relayed by the London MA, was that Japan would find it too difficult to attack Malaya or the Burma Road and hence might be expected to attack the Netherlands Indies.

G–2 147 On 15 November G–2 reported to the Chief of Staff that the Japanese were equipped to carry on chemical warfare, and had done so upon occasion in China and “In the opinion of G–2, they will undoubtedly use gas whenever and wherever it seems necessary or profitable for them to do so.”

FE 352 On 16 November Tokyo estimated production of aircraft at 200 planes per month for the Army. All factories in the aircraft industry had gone on a 3-shift 24-hour day in mid-June. The MA estimated that the current monthly maximum for production was 420 military planes, including trainers.

FE 354 Conclusions reached in a summary of British Intelligence as of 18 November, were that (a) failure of agreement in the Washington talks would require a major Japanese decision whether to risk probable war; (b) Japan would probably not attack Siberia at that time; (c) unless agreement was reached in Washington, the war in China would continue; (d) Japan probably did not intend to attack the Burma Road at that time; (e) the occupation of Thailand, best possibility for the [54] moment, would pave the way for an attack upon Malaya later, yet minimize the risk of a general war.

FE 356a Based on all the information available, including that from the State Department and the most secret sources, and after consultation among G–2, WFD, and the Navy, a message was dispatched on 24 November from the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commanders-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet (Manila) and Pacific Fleet (Pearl Harbor) and the naval commandants at San Diego, San Francisco, Seattle and Balboa with the request that senior army officers in their respective areas also be informed. This message stated, among other
things, that there "are very doubtful chances of a favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan" and warned of a possible "surprise aggressive movement in any direction".

FE 357 G-2 on 25 November reported to the Chief of Staff on the increased Japanese naval air activity throughout Melanesia and southward along the China coast. G-2 expressed to the Chief of Staff the belief that the Japanese were strong enough to meet any American-British-Netherlands Indies opposition to the invasion of Thailand.

G-2 156 G-2 advised the Chief of Staff on 26 November that ONI reported the concentration of units of the Japanese fleet at an unknown point after moving from Japanese home waters southward toward Formosa, and that air and submarine activity was intensified in the Marshall Islands.

G-2 156 On 27 November G-2 included the following intelligence of developments in the Far East in a regular report to the Chief of Staff:

"A Naval Task Force which was reported by the 14th Naval District (Hawaii) as organized and concentrated at Taiwan and Hainan appears, according to a November 27 radio from the 16th Naval District (Manila) to be a loosely organized force on its way to an unknown concentration point. According to the latter dispatch it consists of . . . [383 units including three or four battleships, three carriers, sixteen cruisers and forty-seven destroyers and four converted seaplane carriers].

"The Japanese land forces in the Mandated Islands have been gradually increased in the last 6 months from 5,000 to 15,000 men, and they now have about 100 combat planes of all types, plus the 4th Fleet, a mixed naval force of second class units . . ."

"According to British reports the Japanese have made and will continue to make aerial reconnaissance over British Pacific Islands, especially the Gilbert Group, Nauru and Ocean Islands; also over the northern portion of British Malaya . . ."

"It appears evident that the Japanese have completed plans for further aggressive moves in southeastern Asia. These plans will probably be put into effect soon after the armed services feel that [35] the Kurusu mission is a definite failure. A task force of about five divisions, supported by appropriate air and naval units has been assembled for the execution of these plans."

FE 358a On the same date (27 November) the Chief of the War Plans Division, after consultation with G-2, directed the dispatch of a first priority message to the commanding Generals of the Hawaiian Department and Caribbean Defense Command stating that, among other things, "negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated at all practical purposes" and that "Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment." G-2 in a message to the G-2's, all Corps Areas, Caribbean Defense Command, and Hawaiian Department, instructed them to "advise only the Commanding Officer and the Chief of Staff that it appears that the conference with the Japanese has ended in an apparent deadlock stop Acts of sabotage and espionage probable stop Also possible that hostilities may begin stop".

FE 358c On 28 November G-2 directed that a radio be sent first priority warning Corps Areas and Overseas Department Commanders that because of the critical situation, all precautions should be taken immediately to guard against sabotage, subversion and espionage within their commands.

December

FE 360 The Singapore MO advised G-2 on 2 December that the alert in Malaya had been advanced from the third to the second degree on the previous day. Japanese reconnaissance activities over Malaya were reported.

FE 361 On 2 December Manila cabled that six divisions (100,000 men), 359 fighter planes, 150 medium bombers, 50 medium tanks, 450 light tanks and 200 75-mm guns had been unloaded at Haiphong, French Indochina, and that six full divisions were on Formosa.

FE 361a On 3 December, G-2 informed Tokyo and Peking that an early FE 391b rupture of diplomatic relations with Japan had been indicated and
FE 361c instructed them to memorize a prescribed emergency key word. They were further instructed to destroy all codes and ciphers except three cipher systems which could be readily destroyed and, when it became necessary to destroy these, to rely solely upon the memorized key. A copy of the message to Peiping was sent to the American Military Observer in Hongkong for his information.

G-2 159 A supplementary estimate by G-2 of the military situation on 5 December raised the Japanese active army air force figure to 65,000. The trained and partially trained army reserves were estimated increased to 4,750,000. Personnel figures for the naval air forces were raised to 35,000 men. Figures for combined army and navy (46) plane strength were raised to 5,933 combat planes, of which the Army had 2,362 (136 squadrons) and the Navy 2,591 (159 squadrons). This estimate concluded that:

"Japan, because of her geographic location including her bases on Formosa and Hainan, flanks all sea approaches to the southeastern coast of Asia north of Saigon; lies athwart all routes from the east to the eastern and northeastern coast of the mainland; and is in a remarkably strong strategic position for defense against any distant naval power. The Formosa base is the key to this position; neutralization of Formosa would imperil all her troops and installations south of Japan proper. However, Japan's geographic position is such that her navy on the strategical defensive could from time to time assume the tactical offensive. Japan's greatest weakness lies in the vital necessity of keeping open the water lines of communication to her forces in central and south China and Indo-China over routes that are vulnerable to underwater and air attack from hostile bases in the Philippines, Malaya, Burma and China."

FE 361d On 5 December G-2 instructed G-2, Hawaiian Department, to confer immediately with a naval officer on duty at Pearl Harbor, who had learned from most secret sources that weather broadcasts from Tokyo would include information regarding Japan's intention to break diplomatic relations with certain designated powers including the United States.

FE 362 On 6 December G-2 reported to the Chief of Staff that the Japanese had 125,000 troops and 450 planes in French Indo-China, 59,000 troops, and 200 planes on Hainan and 40,000 troops and 400 planes on Formosa.

FE 363 On the day before the attack on Pearl Harbor a Japanese convoy with naval escort appeared off Cambodia Point in the Gulf of Siam.

FE 366 Melbourne radioed that on 6 December the Netherlands Far East Command had ordered the execution of mobilization Plan A-2 upon learning of Japanese naval movements out of Palau.

FE 366a On the morning of 7 December, G-2 learned that the Japanese Ambassador had received instructions to deliver to the Secretary of State at 1 o'clock in the afternoon a statement which rejected an American proposal of 28 November and which asserted that it was impossible to reach any agreement through further negotiations. Based on this information the Chief of Staff after consultation with G-2 and WPD, wrote a first priority radiogram which was dispatched about 12:17 p.m. to the Commanding General of the United States Army Forces in the Far East, Caribbean Defense Command, Hawaiian Department, and Fourth Army. The message read as follows:

[37] "Japanese are presenting at one p.m. Eastern Standard time today what amounts to an ultimatum also they are under orders to destroy their Code machine immediately stop Just what significance the hour set may have we do not know but be on the alert accordingly stop Inform naval authorities of this communication stop"
**Congressional Investigation Pearl Harbor Attack**

**Far Eastern Documents**

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<td>Singapore, Secret Message (Brink) No. 102, 8 Dec 41.</td>
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1 Bound in sixteen volumes of Far Eastern Documents File.

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**TOP SECRET**

**EXHIBIT B TO ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD**

**TOP SECRET TRANSCRIPT**

From: Tokyo (Toyoda).
To: Honolulu.
September 24, 1941.
J-19.
#83.

Strictly secret.

Henceforth, we would like to have you make reports concerning vessels along the following lines insofar as possible.

1. The waters (of Pearl Harbor) are to be divided roughly into five sub-areas.
   (We have no objection to your abbreviating as much as you like.)
   Area A. Waters between Ford Island and the Arsenal.
   Area B. Waters adjacent to the Island south and west of Ford Island. (This area is on the opposite side of the Island from Area A.)
   Area C. East Loch.
   Area D. Middle Loch.
   Area E. West Loch and the communicating water routes.

2. With regard to warships and aircraft carriers, we would like to have you report on those at anchor, (these are not so important) tied up at wharves, buoys and in docks. (Designate types and classes briefly. If possible we would like to have you make mention of the fact when there are two or more vessels along side the same wharf.)

222090 Trans. 10-9-41 (S)
From: Washington (Nomura).
To: Tokyo.
October 14, 1941.
Purple.

#948 (Part 1 of 2) *(To be handled in Government Code).
I had an interview with Rear Admiral TURNER. If I sum up what he told me, it is this:

"What the United States wants is not just a pretense but a definite promise. Should a conference of the leaders of the two governments be held without a defined preliminary agreement, and should, in the meantime, an advance be made into Siberia, the President would be placed in a terrible predicament. Japan speaks of peace in the Pacific and talks as if she can decide matters independently, and so it would seem to me that Japan could set aside most of her obligations toward the Three-Power Alliance. As to the question of withdrawing or stationing troops, since it is impossible to withdraw troops all at once, it would seem that a detailed agreement could be arranged between Japan and China for a gradual withdrawal."

He speculated on the various difficulties which Japan had to face internally. It seems that this opinion of his has also been given to the Secretary of State.

ARMS 5544 23570 SECRET Trans 10/16/41 (2)

* For part 2 see S. I. S. 223516.

From: Washington (Nomura).
To: Tokyo.
October 14, 1941.
Purple.

#948 (Part 2 of 2).

He said that should the Russo-German war suddenly end and should Germany offer Great Britain peace, it would be after all a German peace and England would not now accept it. Now, this man is a responsible fellow in an important position and I take it that this is the view of the Navy. On the other hand, HOOVER and his following consider that should Moscow make a separate peace with Berlin and should Berlin then turn to London with generous peace terms, this whole frame would end with unimaginable quickness.

CASTLE* told me that HUGH GIBSON feels the same way and that Japan, too, should be on the alert for this possibility. Thus, however, I take to be a minority view entertained by the isolationists. MOORE* reports that Secretary HULL told Senator THOMAS that he is proceeding patiently with the Japanese-American negotiations, but he hopes that Japan will not mistake this for a sign of weakness on America's part, and that no answer had arrived to the memo of October 2nd.

KIPLINGER* reports that there is a very good basis for rumors of a cessation of hostilities between Russia and Germany and that the chances for war between Japan and the United States are fifty-fifty.

ARMY 5544 23570 SECRET Trans 10-15-41 (7)

* Part 1 of 2 not available.
* Former U. S. Ambassador to Japan.
* American legal advisor to Japanese Embassy in Washington.
* A Washington newspaper correspondent.

From: Tokyo (Toyoda).
To: Washington.
October 16, 1941.
Purple (CA).

#97.

Although I have been requested by both the German and Italian Ambassadors in Tokyo to give them confidential information on the Japanese-American negotiations, I have, in consideration of the nature of the negotiations, been declining to do so. However, early this month, following the German attacks on American merchant ships and the consequent (revival?) of the movement for the revision of the Neutrality Act, the German authorities demanded that the Japanese Government submit to the American Government a message to the effect that the Japanese Government observes that if the ROOSEVELT Administration continues to attack the Axis Powers increasingly, a belligerent situation would inevitably arise between Germany and Italy on the one hand and the United
States on the other, and this would provide the reasons for the convocation of
the duties envisioned in the Three Power agreement and might lead Japan to
join immediately the war in opposition to the United States. We have not, as
yet, submitted this message because, in view of the Japanese-American negotia-
tions, we found it necessary to consider carefully the proper timing as well as
wording of the message. The German authorities have been repeatedly making
the same request and there are reasons which do not permit this matter to be
postponed any longer. While Japan on the one hand finds it necessary to do
something in the way of carrying out the duties placed upon her by the Three
Power Alliance she had concluded with Germany, on the other hand, she is
desirous of making a success of the Japanese-American negotiations. Under
the circumstances, we can do no other than to warn the United States at an ap-
propriate moment in such words as are given in my separate wire and as would not
affect the Japanese-American negotiations in one way or another. This message
is a secret between me and you.

(Separate wire)

The Imperial Japanese Government has repeatedly affirmed to the American
Government that the aim of the Tripartite Pact is to contribute toward the pre-
vention of a further extension of the European war. Should, however, the recent
tension in the German-American relations suffer aggravation, there would arise
a distinct danger of a war between the two powers, a state of affairs over which
Japan, as a signatory to the Tripartite Pact, naturally cannot help entertain a
depth concern. Accordingly, in its sincere desire that not only the German-
American relations will cease further deterioration but the prevailing tension
will also be alleviated as quickly as possible, the Japanese Government is now
requesting the earnest consideration of the American Government.

ARMY 5901 238611 SECRET

From: Washington (Nemura).
To: Tokyo.
October 22, 1941.
Purple. (CA).

I have already wired you something about my present psychology. I am sure
that I, too, should go out with the former cabinet; I know that for some time
the Secretary of State has known how sincere your humble servant is, yet how
little influence I have in Japan. I am ashamed to say that it has come to my
ears that this is the case. There are some Americans who trust this poor novice
and who say that things will get better for me, but alas, their encouragement is
not enough. Among confreres here in the United States there are also some
who feel the same way, but, alas, they are all poor deluded souls. As for Your
Excellency's instructions, WAKASUGI can carry them out fully. Nor do I
imagine that you all have any objections. I don't want to be the bones of a
dead horse. I don't want to continue this hypocritical existence, deceiving other
people. No, don't think I am trying to flee from the field of battle, but as a man
of honor this is the only way that is open for me to tread. Please send me your
permission to return to Japan. Most humbly do I beseech your forgiveness if I
have injured your dignity and I prostrate myself before you in the depth of my
rudeness.

ARMY 6917 23859 SECRET Trans. 10-23-41 (T)

From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
5 November 1941.
(Purple—CA).
#736.

(Of utmost secrecy)

Because of various circumstances, it is absolutely necessary that all arrange-
ments for the signing of this agreement be completed by the 25th of this month.
I realize that this is a difficult order, but under the circumstances it is an un-
avoidable one. Please understand this thoroughly and tackle the problem of
saving the Japanese-U.S. relations from falling into a chaotic condition. Do so
with great determination and with unstinted effort, I beseech you.

This information is to be kept strictly to yourself only.

JD-1:6254 SECRET (D) Navy Trans. 11-5-41 (S—TT)
CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

From: Tokyo.
To: Hongkong.
November 14, 1941.
Purple.
Clr. #2319 (To be handled in Government Code).

(Strictly secret outside the Department)

Though the Imperial Government hopes for great things from the Japan-American negotiations, they do not permit optimism for the future. Should the negotiations collapse, the international situation in which the Empire will find itself will be one of tremendous crisis. Accompanying this, the Empire's foreign policy as it has been decided by the cabinet, insofar as it pertains to China, is:

a. We will completely destroy British and American power in China.
b. We will take over all enemy concessions and enemy important rights and interests (customs and minerals, etc.) in China.
c. We will take over all rights and interests owned by enemy powers, even though they might have connections with the new Chinese government, should it become necessary.

In realizing these steps in China, we will avoid, insofar as possible, exhausting our veteran troops. Thus we will cope with a world war on a long-time scale. Should our reserves for total war and our future military strength wane, we have decided to reinforce them from the whole Far Eastern area. This has become the whole fundamental policy of the Empire. Therefore, in consideration of the desirability to lighten our personal and material load, we will encourage the activities of important Chinese in their efforts in the occupied territories insofar as it is possible. Japan and China, working in cooperation, will take over military bases. Thus, operating wherever possible, we will realize peace throughout the entire Far East. At the same time, we place great importance upon the acquisition of materials (especially from unoccupied areas). In order to do this, all in the cabinet have concurred, in view of the necessity, in a reasonable relaxation of the various restrictions now in force (after you have duly realized the critical situation which has brought the above decisions into being you will, of course, wait for instructions from home before carrying them out).

In connection with the above, we have the precedent of the freezing legislation. We are wiring you this particularly for your information alone. Please keep absolutely quiet the existence of these decisions and the fact that they have been transmitted to you.

This message is direct to Nanso,* Hokudai,* Shanghai, Tientsin, Hankow, Hankow, Canton, and Hongkong. Hokudai will transmit to Kalguan and Taiyuan. Tsingtao will transmit to Tsinan. Canton will transmit to Amoy.

25232
JD 6801 Trans. 11/26/41 (NR)

* Kana spelling.

From: Tokyo (Togo)
To: Honolulu (Biyoji)
15 November 1941
(J-1B)

#111

As relations between Japan and the United States are most critical, make your "ships in harbor report" irregular, but at a rate of twice a week. Although you already are no doubt aware, please take extra care to maintain secrecy.

SIS 25644
JD-1: 6901 SECRET (Y) Navy Trans. 12-3-41 (S)

From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
November 16, 1941.
Purple (Ca) (Urgent).

#

For your Honor's own information

1. I have read your #1000,* and you may be sure that you have all my gratitude for the efforts you have put forth, but the fate of our Empire hangs by the slender thread of a few days, so please fight harder than you ever did before.

2. What you say in the last paragraph of your message is, of course, so and I have given it already the fullest consideration, but I have only to refer you to
the fundamental policy laid down in my #725. Will you please try to realize what that means. In your opinion we ought to wait and see what turn the war takes and remain patient. However, I am awfully sorry to say that the situation renders this out of the question. I set the deadline for the solution of these negotiations in my #736, and there will be no change. Please try to understand that. You see how short the time is; therefore, do not allow the United States to sidetrack us and delay the negotiations any further. Press them for a solution on the basis of our proposals, and do your best to bring about an immediate solution.

* See JD-6553 in which NOMURA gives his views on the general situation. Part 3 not available.
* S. I. S. #24430 in which TOGO says that conditions both within and without the Japanese Empire will not permit any further delay in reaching a settlement with the United States.
* S. I. S. #24373 in which TOGO says that it is absolutely necessary that all arrangements for the signing of this agreement be completed by the 25th of this month.

From: Tokyo (Togo).
To: Honolulu.
November 18, 1941.
J-19.
#113.
Please report on the following areas as to vessels anchored therein: Area "N", Pearl Harbor, Manila Bay, and the areas adjacent thereto. (Make your investigation with great secrecy.)

ARMY 25773 7063 SECRET Trans. 12/5/41 (S)

* Probably means Mamoa Bay.

From: Honolulu (Kita).
To: Tokyo.
November 18, 1941.
J-19.
#222.
1. The warships at anchor in the Harbor on the 15th were as I told you in my #219* on that day.
Area A 3A-A battleship of the Oklahoma class entered and one tanker left port.
Area C—3 warships of the heavy cruiser class were at anchor.
2. On the 17th the Saratoga was not in the harbor. The carrier, Enterprise, or some other vessel was in Area C. Two heavy cruisers of the Chicago class, one of the Pensacola class were tied up at docks "KS". 4 merchant vessels were at anchor in Area D.
3. At 10:00 a.m. on the morning of the 17th, 8 destroyers were observed entering the Harbor. Their course was as follows: In a single file at a distance of 1,000 meters apart at a speed of 3 knots per hour, they moved into Pearl Harbor. From the entrance of the Harbor through Area B to the buoys in Area C, to which they were moored, they changed course 5 times each time roughly 30 degrees. The elapsed time was one hour, however, one of these destroyers entered Area A after passing the water reservoir on the Eastern side.

ARMY 25817 7111 SECRET Trans. 12/6/41 (2)

* Waters between Ford Island and the Arsenal.
* East Loch.
* Middle Loch.

From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
19 November 1941.
J19.
Circular #2333.

Regarding the broadcast of a special message in an emergency.

In case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations) and the cutting off of international communications, the following warning will be added in the middle of the daily Japanese language short wave news broadcast:

(1) In case of a Japan-U. S. relations in danger:

HIGASHI NO KAIZAMU (EAST WIND RAIN)
(2) Japan-U. S. S. R. relations:
KITANOKAZE KUMORI (NORTH WIND CLOUDY)
(3) Japan-British relations:
NISHI NO KAZE HARE (WEST WIND CLEAR)
This signal will be given in the middle and at the end as a weather forecast
and each sentence will be repeated twice. When this is heard, please destroy
all code papers, etc. This is as yet to be a completely secret arrangement.
Forward as urgent intelligence.
(Voice broadcasts.)
SIS 22492
JD-1:3875 SECRET Navy Trans. 11-28-41

From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
19 November 1941.
(J19).
Circular #2354.

When diplomatic relations are becoming dangerous we will add the following
at the beginning and end of our general intelligence broadcasts:
(1) If it is Japan-U. S. relations "HIGASHI"
(2) Japan Russia relations "KITAG".
(3) Japan-British relations (including Thai, Malay, and NEI) "NISHI"
The above will be repeated five times and repeated five times at beginning
and end.
Relay to Rio de Janeiro, B. A., Mexico City, and San Francisco.
SIS 25362
JD-1:6850 SECRET Navy Trans. 11-26-41

From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
19 November 1941.
(Purple-CA).
#768.

Re my #797*
The condition outlined by them namely "After the peaceful policies of Japan
have been made more definite" we imagine would naturally have reference to
the question of the three-power treaty. It does not mean merely that Japan
will withdraw her troops from Southern Indo-China, and that then the U. S.
will go back to conditions prior to the freezing act. It leaves the way open
for the U. S. to bring up rather complicated terms.

On the other hand, the internal situation in our country is such that it would
be difficult for us to handle it if we withdraw from Southern French Indo-China,
merely on assurances that conditions prior to this freezing act will be restored.
It would be necessary to have a proposed solution that would come up to the
B** proposal. With the situation as urgent as it is now, it is of utmost importance
that you play your hand for the amelioration of the situation, to the extent
of the proposal in your message, then to push on for an understanding.
The Ambassador did not arrange this with us beforehand, but made the pro-
posal contained in your message for the purpose of meeting the tense situation
existing within the nation, but this can only result in delay and failure in the
negotiations. The Ambassador, therefore, having received our revised instruc-
tions, (after reading our #797*, #800,*** and #801*****) will please present
our B** proposal of the Imperial Government, and no further concessions can
be made.
If the U. S. consent to this cannot be secured, the negotiations will have to
be broken off; therefore, with the above well in mind put forth your very best
efforts.
We note what you say in your #1133**** and #1124*****, but in these nego-
tiations consent can be given only within the scope of the instructions of this
office. We would emphasize this.
From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
November 22, 1941.
Purple CA (Urgent).

#812.
To both you Ambassadors.
It is awfully hard for us to consider changing the date we set in my #736*. You should know this, however. I know you are working hard. Stick to our fixed policy and do your very best. Spare no efforts and try to bring about the solution we desire. There are reasons beyond your ability to guess why we wanted to settle Japanese-American relations by the 26th, but it within the next three or four days you can finish your conversations with the Americans; if the signing can be completed by the 26th, (let me write it out for you—twenty ninth); if the pertinent notes can be exchanged; if we can get an understanding with Great Britain and the Netherlands; and in short if everything can be finished, we have decided to wait until that date. This time we mean it, that the deadline absolutely cannot be changed. After that things are automatically going to happen. Please take this into your careful consideration and work harder than you ever have before. This, for the present, is for the information of you two Ambassadors alone.

ARMY 6710 25138 SECRET Trans 11/22/41 (S)

* See J. D. #6254. Tokyo wires Washington that because of the various circumstances it is absolutely necessary that arrangements for the signing of the agreement be completed by the 25th of this month.

From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
November 26, 1941.
Purple.

#836. To be handled in Government Code.
The situation is momentarily becoming more tense and telegrams take too long. Therefore, will you cut down the substance of your reports of negotiations to the minimum and, on occasion, call up Chief YAMAMOTO of the American Bureau on the telephone and make your report to him. At that time we will use the following code:

**Japanese**

Sangoku Joyaku Mondai (Three-Power Treaty question)
Musabetsu Taigun Mondai (The question of non-discriminatory treatment)
Shina Mondai (The China question)
Soori (Premier)
Gaimundajin (Foreign Minister)
Rikgun (The Army)
Kaijun (The Navy)
Nichi-betsu kōshōhō (Japan-American negotiations)
Daitōryūo (President)
Hara (Hull)
Kokunaijo (Internal situation)
Jooho Suru (To yield)
Jooho Senzu (Not to yield)
Keisal Kyunten Suru (Situation taking critical turn)

**English**

Shikago (Chicago)
Sanfuranshisuko (San Francisco)
Itoo Kun (Mr. Itoo)
Date Kun (Mr. Date)
Tokugawa Kun (Mr. Tokugawa)
Maeda Kun (Mr. Maeda)
Endan (Marriage proposal)
Kimiko San (Miss Kimiko)
Fumeko San (Miss Fumeko)
Shoobai (Trade)
Yama Wo Uru (To sell the mountain)
Yama Wo Ureu (Not to sell the mountain)
For your information, telephone addresses other than our Home Office are as follows:

Bureau Chief YAMAMOTO: Setagaya 4617.
Section Chief KASE: Yotsuya 4763.
The Minister's residence: Ginza 3614.
The Vice-Minister's residence: Ginza 1022.

ARMY 6841 25344 SECRET Trans. 11-28-41 (S)

From: Washington.
To: Tokyo.
November 20, 1941.
Purple. (Extremely urgent).

#1180 (Part 1 of 2).

From NOMURA and KURUSU.

As we have wired you several times, there is hardly any possibility of having them consider our "B" proposal in toto. On the other hand, if we let the situation remain tense as it is now, sorry as we are to say so, the negotiations will inevitably be ruptured, if indeed they may not already be called so. Our failure and humiliation are complete. We might suggest one thing for saving the situation. Although we have grave misgivings, we might propose, first, that President ROOSEVELT wire you that for the sake of posterity he hopes that Japan and the United States will continue for the maintenance of peace in the Pacific (just as soon as you wire us what you think of this, we will negotiate for this sort of arrangement with all we have in us), and that you in return reply with a cordial message, thereby not only clearing the atmosphere, but also gaining a little time. Considering the possibility that England and the United States are scheming to bring the Netherlands Indies under their protection through military occupation, in order to forestall this, I think we should propose the establishment of neutral nations, including French Indo-China, Netherlands India and Thai. (As you know, last September President ROOSEVELT proposed the neutrality of French Indo-China and Thai.)

ARMY 6891 25435 SECRET Trans. 11-28-41 (1)

From: Washington.
To: Tokyo.
November 20, 1941.
Purple. (Extremely urgent).

#1180 (Part 2 of 2).

We suppose that the rupture of the present negotiations does not necessarily mean war between Japan and the United States, but after we break off, as we said, the military occupation of Netherlands India is to be expected of England and the United States. Then we would attack them and a clash with them would be inevitable. Now, the question is whether or not Germany would feel duty bound by the third article of the treaty to help us. We doubt if she would. Again, you must remember that the Sino-Japanese incident would have to wait until the end of this world war before it could possibly be settled.

In this telegram we are expressing the last personal opinions we will have to express, so will Your Excellency please be good enough at least to show it to the Minister of the Navy, if only to him; then we hope that you will wire us back instantly.

ARMY 25436 SECRET Trans. 11-28-41 (1)

From: Washington (Nomura).
To: Tokyo.
November 20, 1941.
Purple. (Extremely urgent).

#1190 (Part 2 of 2)."}

To be handled in Government Code.
The United States is using the excuse that she is at present negotiating with the various competent countries. In view of the fact that she will propagate that we are continuing these negotiations only with the view of preparing for our expected moves, should we, during the course of these conversations, deliberately enter into our scheduled operations, there is great danger that the responsibility
for the rupture of negotiations will be cast upon us. There have been times in the past when she could have considered discontinuing conversations because of our invasion of French Indo-China. Now, should we, without clarifying our intentions, force a rupture in our negotiations and suddenly enter upon independent operations, there is great fear that she may use such a thing as that as counter-propaganda against us. They might consider doing the same thing insofar as our plans for Timi are concerned. Nevertheless, such a thing as the clarification of our intention is a strict military secret; consequently, I think that it might be the better plan, dependent of course on the opinions of the Government, that the current negotiations be clearly and irrevocably concluded either through an announcement to the American Embassy in Tokyo or by a declaration for internal and external consumption. I would like, if such a course is followed, to make representations here at the same time.

Furthermore, in view of the fact that there are considerations of convenience having to do with my interview with the President, should there be anything that you would want me to say at that time, please wire me back at once.

25489 Trans. 11-29-41 (1)

S. I. S. #25444. (Part 1 of 3.)

From: Washington.
To: Tokyo.
26 November 1941 (1946 to 1953 EST). (Telephone Code) **
Trans-Pacific Telephone.

To Kumaichiro Yamamoto* from Kurusu:

Kurusu: “I have made all efforts, but they will not yield.*** I sent a cable expressing my opinions to the Foreign Minister this morning. The situation is just like that. Otherwise there is no means of accomplishing it. I shall cable you now. Already,” he interrupted himself, “you have a general understanding I imagine. Accordingly, I do not know how things will turn out regarding my meeting with the President. Hull is not making much progress it seems.”

Apparent referring to the above mentioned cable he continued: “If that method can be worked out I shall work night and day on it. But there is no other means we can use. It is very regrettable.”

Yamamoto: “The situation in Tokyo is extremely critical also.” After thanking Kurusu for his efforts he continued: “The proposition sent to the Foreign Minister is extremely difficult.”

Kurusu: “I believe it is of no avail.”

Yamamoto reiterated his opinion regarding its difficulty.

Kurusu: “I rather imagine you had expected this outcome.”

Yamamoto: “Yes, I had expected it, but wished to exert every effort up to the final moment in the hope that something might be accomplished.”

Kurusu: “I am unable to make any movement (i.e. progress?) at all. Something will have to be done to get out of this situation.”

JD-1: 6843 (M) Navy Trans. 11-26-41 (12-TT)

*Head of American Division of Japanese Foreign Office.
**See Jd-1: 6841 (S. I. S. #25344), of this date.
***Interpretation is doubtful as yet. The intercept read this as “Sore... less” (that... this morning) and translated this as “It is now... .” with a distinct pause before and after this phrase. However, the telephone code was not available to him.
Verfication will follow receipt of record.

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From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
November 28, 1941.
Purple. (CA).

#844.
Re your #1180.*

Well, you two Ambassadors have exerted superhuman efforts but, in spite of this, the United States has gone ahead and presented this humiliating proposal. This was quite unexpected and extremely regrettable. The Imperial Government can by no means use it as a basis for negotiations. Therefore, with a report of the views of the Imperial Government on this American proposal which I will send you in two or three days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured. This
is inevitable. However, I do not wish you to give the impression that the negotiations are broken off. Merely say to them that you are awaiting instructions and that, although the opinions of your Government are not yet clear to you, to your own way of thinking the Imperial Government has always made just claims and has borne great sacrifices for the sake of peace in the Pacific. Say that we have always demonstrated a long-suffering and conciliatory attitude, but that, on the other hand, the United States has been unbending, making it impossible for Japan to establish negotiations. Since things have come to this pass, I contacted the man you told me to in your #1180 and he said that under the present circumstances what you suggest is entirely unsuitable. From now on do the best you can.

ARMY 6808 25446 SECRET Trans. 11-28-41 (S)

* S. I. 8. #25441, #25442.
* S. I. 8. #25435, #25436. The man is the Navy Minister.

From: Tokyo.
To: Honolulu.
29 November 1941.
(J31).
#122.

We have been receiving reports from you on ship movements, but in future you will also report even when there are no movements.
SIS 25823
JD-1: 7086 SECRET (Y) Navy Trans. 12-5-41 (2)

From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
29 November 1941.
(Purple—CA).
#857.

Re my #844*

We wish you would make one more attempt verbally along the following lines:
The United States government has (always?) taken a fair and judicial position and has formulated its policies after full consideration of the claims of both sides.
However, the Imperial Government is at a loss to understand why it has now taken the attitude that the new proposals we have made cannot be made the basis of discussion, but instead has made new proposals which ignore actual conditions in East Asia and would greatly injure the prestige of the Imperial Government.
With such a change of front in their attitude toward the China problem, what has become of the basic objectives that the U. S. government has made the basis of our negotiations during these seven months? On these points we would request careful self-reflection on the part of the United States government.

(In carrying out this instruction, please be careful that this does not lead to anything like a breaking off of negotiations.)

SIS 25490
JD-1: 6821 SECRET (F) Navy Trans. 30 Nov. 1941 (S—TT)

*JD-1: 6821 (SIS 25490) dated 28 Nov., in which Tokyo's first reaction to the new U. S. proposals castigates them as humiliating. When Japan sends a reply in 2 or 3 days giving its views on them the negotiations will be "de facto" ruptured. However, do not give the impression that negotiations are broken off.

From: Washington.
To: Tokyo.
30 November 1941 (2230 to 2238 EST).

Telephone Code.

Transpecific Radio Telephone (Note.—Following is a preliminary, condensed version of conversation between Ambassador Kurusu and the Japanese Foreign Office American Division Chief Yamamoto on Sunday night).

KURUSU: "It is all arranged for us to meet Hull tomorrow. We received a short one from you, didn’t we? Well, we will meet him in regard to that. There is a longer one coming isn’t there? In any case we are going to see him about
the short one." (i.e. telegram. The longer one is probably Tokyos reply to Mr. Hull's proposals.)

YAMAMOTO. "Yes. I see."

KURUSU. "The President is returning tomorrow. He is hurrying home."

Y. "Is there any special significance to this?"

K. "The newspapers have made much of the Premier's speech, and it is having strong repercussions here."

Y. "Is that so?"

K. "Yes. It was a drastic statement he made. The newspapers carried large headlines over it; and the President seems to be returning because of it. There no doubt are other reasons, but this is the reason the newspapers are giving."

(Pause.)

"Unless greater caution is exercised in speeches by the Premier and others, it puts us in a very difficult position. All of you over there must watch out about these ill-advised statements. Please tell Mr. Tani."

Y. "We are being careful."

K. "We here are doing our best, but these reports are seized upon by the correspondents and the worst features enlarged upon. Please caution the Premier, the Foreign Minister, and others. Tell the Foreign Minister that we had expected to hear something different, some good word, but instead we get this."

(i.e. Premier's speech.)

(After a pause, Kuru continues, using voice code.)

K. "What about the internal situation?" (In Japan)

Y. "No particular—(one or two words faded out)"

K. "Are the Japanese-American negotiations to continue?"

Y. "Yes."

K. "You were very urgent about them before, weren't you; but now you want them to stretch out. We will need your help. Both the Premier and the Foreign Minister will need to change the tone of their speeches! ! ! Do you understand? Please all use more discretion."

Y. "When will you see them. The 2nd?"

K. "Let's see . . . , this is Sunday midnight here. Tomorrow morning at ten. That will be Monday morning here."

(Pause.)

"Actually the real problem we are up against is the effects of the happenings in the South. You understand don't you?"

Y. "Yes. Yes. How long will it be before the President gets back?"

K. "I don't know exactly. According to news reports he started at 4: 00 this afternoon. He should be here tomorrow morning sometime."

Y. "Well then——Goodbye."

JD-1-6922 (M) Navy trans. 30 Nov. 1941 (R-5)
25697

From: Tokyo.
To: Berlin.
November 30, 1941.

Purple. (CA) a
#985 (Part 1 of 3). b
Re my Circular #2287. c

The conversations began between Tokyo and Washington last April during the administration of the former cabinet, in spite of the sincere efforts of the Imperial Government, now stand ruptured—broken. (I am sending you an outline of developments in separate message #986. d) In the face of this, our Empire faces a grave situation and must act with determination. Will Your Honor, therefore, immediately interview Chancellor HITLER and Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP and confidentially communicate to them a summary of the developments. Say to them that lately England and the United States have taken a provocative attitude, both of them. Say that they are planning to move military forces into various places in East Asia and that we will inevitably have to counter by also moving troops. Say very secretly to them that there is extreme danger that war may suddenly break out between the Anglo-Saxon nations and Japan through some clash of arms and add that the time of the breaking out of this war may come quicker than anyone dreams.
From: Tokyo.
To: Berlin.
November 30, 1941.
Purple. (CA).
#985 (Part 3 of 3).

4. If, when you tell them this, the Germans and Italians question you about our attitude toward the Soviet, say that we have already clarified our attitude toward the Russians in our statement of last July. Say that by our present moves southward we do not mean to relax our pressure against the Soviet, but if Russia joins us we shall go in for full-scale war with Germany and the United States, and really up in the north, we are ready to turn upon her with all our might; however, right now, it is to our advantage to stress the south and for the time being we would prefer to refrain from any direct moves in the north.

This message is important from a strategic point of view and must under all circumstances be held in the most absolute secrecy. This goes without saying. Therefore, will you please impress upon the Germans and Italians how important secrecy is.

6. As for Italy, after our Ambassador in Berlin has communicated this to the Germans, he will transmit a suitable translation to Premier MUSSOLINI and Foreign Minister CIANO. As soon as a date is set for a conference with the Germans and Italians, please let me know.

Will you please send this message also to Rome, together with the separate message.

25553 Trans. 12-1-41 (NR)

From: Tokyo.
To: Berlin.
November 30, 1941.
Purple.
#986 (Strictly Secret) (To be handled in Government Code (Part 1 of 2) (Secret outside the Department).

1. Japan-American negotiations were commenced the middle of April of this year. Over a period of half a year they have been continued. Within that period the Imperial Government adamantly stuck to the Tri-Partite Alliance as the cornerstone of its national policy regardless of the vicissitudes of the international situation. In the adjustment of diplomatic relations between Japan and the United States, she has based her hopes for a solution definitely within the scope of that alliance. With the intent of restraining the United States from participating in the war, she boldly assumed the attitude of carrying through these negotiations.

2. Therefore, the present cabinet, in line with your message, with the view of defending the Empire's existence and integrity on a just and equitable basis, has continued the negotiations carried on in the past. However, their views and ours on the question of the evacuation of troops, upon which the negotiations rested, (they demanded the evacuation of Imperial troops from China and French Indo-China), were completely in opposition to each other.

Judging from the course of the negotiations that have been going on, we first came to loggerheads when the United States, in keeping with its traditional ideological tendency of managing international relations, re-emphasized her fundamental insistence upon this traditional policy in the conversations carried on between the United States and England in the Atlantic Ocean. The motive of the United States in all this was brought out by her desire to prevent the establishment of a new order by Japan, Germany, and Italy in Europe and in the Far East, that is, to say, the aims of the Tri-Partite Alliance. As long as the Empire of Japan was in alliance with Germany and Italy, there could be no maintenance of friendly relations between Japan and the United States was the stand they took. From this point of view, they began to demonstrate a tendency to demand the divorce of the Imperial Government from the Tri-Partite Alliance. This was brought out at the last meeting. That is to say that it has only been in the negotiations of the last few days that it has become gradually more and more clear that the Imperial Government could no longer continue negotiations with the United States. It became clear, too, that a continuation of negotiations would inevitably be detrimental to our cause.

ARMY 6944 25554 SECRET Trans. 12/1/41 (NR)
3. The proposal presented by the United States on the 26th made this attitude of theirs clearer than ever. In it there is one insulting clause which says that no matter what treaty either party enters into with a third power it will not be interpreted as having any bearing upon the basic object of this treaty, namely the maintenance of peace in the Pacific. This means specifically the Three-Power Pact. It means that in case the United States enters the European war at any time the Japanese Empire will not be allowed to give assistance to Germany and Italy. It is clearly a trick. This clause alone, let alone others, makes it impossible to find any basis in the American proposal for negotiations. What is more, before the United States brought forth this plan, they conferred with England, Australia, the Netherlands, and China—they do so repeatedly. Therefore, it is clear that the United States is now in collusion with those nations and has decided to regard Japan, along with Germany and Italy, an enemy.

From: Tokyo.
To: Berlin.
November 30, 1941.
Purple.
#186 (Part 2 of 2).

ARMY 6944 25555 SECRET Trans. 12-1-41 (NR)

______________________________________________________________

From: Washington.
To: Tokyo.
1 December 1941.
(Purple).
#1227.

Indications are that the United States desires to continue the negotiations even if it is necessary to go beyond their stands on the so-called basic principles. However, if we keep quibbling on the critical points, and continue to get stuck in the middle as we have been in the past, it is impossible to expect any further developments. If it is impossible from the broad political viewpoint, to conduct a leaders' meeting at this time, would it not be possible to arrange a conference between persons in whom the leaders have complete confidence (for example, Vice President Wallace or Hopkins from the United States and the former Premier Konoye, who is on friendly terms with the President, or Adviser to the Imperial Privy Council Ishii). The meeting could be arranged for some midway point, such as Honolulu. High army and navy officers should accompany these representatives. Have them make one final effort to reach some agreement, using as the basis of their discussions the latest proposals submitted by each.

We feel that this last effort may facilitate the final decision as to war or peace.

We realize of course that an attempt to have President Roosevelt and former Premier Konoye meet, failed. Bearing in mind the reaction to that in our nation, it may be to our interest to first ascertain the U. S. attitude on this possibility. Moreover, since we have no guarantee either of success or failure of the objectives even if the meeting is held, careful consideration should first be given this matter.

We feel, however, that to surmount the crisis with which we are face to face, it is not wasting our efforts to pursue every path open to us. It is our opinion that it would be most effective to feel out and ascertain the U. S. attitude regarding this matter, in the name of the Japanese Government. However, if this procedure does not seem practical to you in view of some internal condition, then how would it be if I were to bring up the subject as purely of my own origin and in that manner feel out their attitude. Then, if they seem receptive to it the government could make the official proposal.

Please advise me of your opinions on this matter.

23727
JD-1: 7055 SECRET (D) Navy Trans. 12-4-41 (1)
CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
1 December 1941.
(Purple).
Circular #2430.

When you are faced with the necessity of destroying codes, get in touch with the Naval Attaché’s office there and make use of chemicals they have on hand for this purpose. The attaché should have been advised by the Navy Ministry regarding this.

25545
JD-1: 6039 (D) Navy Trans. 12-1-41 (S-TT)

From: Tokyo.
To: London.
1 December 1941.
(Purple).
Circular #2443.

Please discontinue the use of your code machine and dispose of it immediately.

In regard to the disposition of the machine please be very careful to carry out the instructions you have received regarding this. Pay particular attention to taking apart and breaking up the important parts of the machine.

As soon as you have received this telegram wire the one word SETUJU in plain language and as soon as you have carried out the instructions wire the one word HASSSO in plain language.

Also at this time you will of course burn the machine codes and the YÜ GÖ No. 29 of my telegram. (The rules for the use of the machine between the head office and the Ambassador resident in England.)

25787
JD-1: 7001 (H) Navy Trans. 12-5-41 (L)

From: Tokyo.
To: Helsinki.
1 December 1941.
(Purple).

#858.

In the event that Manchuria participates in the war, in view of various circumstances it is our policy to cause Manchuria to participate in the war in which event Manchuria will take the same steps toward England and America that this country will take in case war breaks out.

A summary follows:

1. American and British consular officials and offices will not be recognized as having special rights. Their business will be stopped (the sending of code telegrams and the use of short wave radio will be forbidden). However it is desired that the treatment accorded them after the suspension of business be comparable to that which Japan accords to consular officials of enemy countries resident in Japan.

2. The treatment accorded to British and American public property, private property, and to the citizens themselves shall be comparable to that accorded by Japan.

3. British and American requests to third powers to look after their consular offices and interests will not be recognized.

However the legal administrative steps taken by Manchoukuo shall be equitable and shall correspond to the measures taken by Japan.

4. The treatment accorded Russians resident in Manchoukuo shall conform to the provisions of the Japanese-Soviet neutrality pact. Great care shall be exercised not to antagonize Russia.

JD-1: 7052 SECRET (H) Navy Trans. 12-4-41 (S-AR)
SIS 2055
From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
1 December 1941.
(Purple-CA).

#865.
Re my #857*.
1. The date set in my message #812** has come and gone, and the situation continues to be increasingly critical. However, to prevent the United States from becoming unduly suspicious we have been advising the press and others that though there are some wide differences between Japan and the United States, the negotiations are continuing. (The above is for only your information.)
2. We have decided to withhold submitting the note to the U. S. Ambassador to Tokyo as suggested by you at the end of your message #1124***. Please make the necessary representations at your end only.
3. There are reports here that the President's sudden return to the capital is an effect of Premier Tojo's statement. We have an idea that the President did so because of his concern over the critical Far Eastern situation. Please make investigations into this matter.

SIS-25905
JD-1: 1 6663 SECRET (D) NAVY TRANS. 12-1-41 (S-TT)

*JPD-1: 6921.
**JPD-1: 6710.
***Not available.

From: Washington.
To: Tokyo.
December 2, 1941.
Purple.

#1232 (Part 1 of 2).
Re my #1231.

Today the 2nd Ambassador KURUSU and I had an interview with Under-Secretary of State WELLES. At that time, prefacing his statement by saying that it was at the direct instructions of the President of the United States, he turned over to us the substance of his separate wire #1236**. Thereupon we said: "Since haven't been informed even to the slightest degree concerning the troops in French Indo-China, we will transmit the gist of your representations directly to our Home Government. In all probability they never considered that such a thing as this could possibly be an upshot of their proposals of November 20th. The Under-Secretary then said: "I want you to know that the stand the United States takes is that she opposes aggression in any and all parts of the world." Thereupon we replied: "The United States and other countries have pyramided economic pressure upon economic pressure upon us Japanese. (I made the statement that economic warfare was even worse than forced aggression.) We haven't the time to argue the pros and cons of this question or the rights and wrongs. The people of Japan are faced with economic pressure, and I want you to know that we have but the choice between submission to this pressure or breaking the chains that it invokes. *We want you to realize this as well as the situation in which all Japanese find themselves as the result of the four-year incident in China; the President recently expressed cognizance of the latter situation.

25693-B

* Not available.
* Original translation incomplete from this point on. Trans 12/3/41

To: Tokyo.
December 2, 1941.
Purple.

#1232 (Part 2 of 2).

Furthermore, I would have you know that in replying to the recent American proposals, the Imperial Government is giving the most profound consideration to this important question which has to do with our national destiny." Under-Secretary of State WELLES said: "I am well aware of that." I continued:
3250 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

"We cannot overemphasize the fact that, insofar as Japan is concerned, it is virtually impossible for her to accept the new American proposals as they now stand. Our proposals, proffered on the 21st of June and the proposals of September 23rd, representing our greatest conciliations based on the previous proposal, still stand. In spite of the fact that the agreement of both sides was in the offing, it has come to naught. At this late juncture to give thoughtful consideration to the new proposals certainly will not make for a smooth and speedy settlement of the negotiations. Recently, we promised to evacuate our troops from French Indo-China in the event of a settlement of the Sino-Japanese incident and the establishment of a just peace in the Far East. In anticipating the settlement of fundamental questions, the question of the representations of this date would naturally dissolve." The Under-Secretary assiduously heard us out and then said: "The American proposals of the 26th were brought about by the necessity to clarify the position of the United States because of the internal situation here."

Then he continued: "In regard to the opinions that you have expressed, I will make it a point immediately to confer with the Secretary."

I got the impression from the manner in which he spoke that he hoped Japan in her reply to the American proposals of the 26th would leave this much room. Judging by my interview with Secretary of State HULL on the 1st and my conversations of today, it is clear that the United States, too, is anxious to peacefully conclude the current difficult situation. I am convinced that they would like to bring about a speedy settlement. Therefore, please bear well in mind this fact in your considerations of our reply to the new American proposals and to my separate wire #1244.*

25990 Trans. 12-3-41 (7)

ARMY

* Not available.

(CORRECTED TRANSLATIONS)

From: Tokyo (Togo).
To: Washington.
December 2, 1941.

Purple.
#867. (Strictly Secret).

1. Among the telegraphic codes with which your office is equipped burn all but those now used with the machine and one copy each of "O" code (Oite) and abbreviating code (L). (Burn also the various other codes which you have in your custody.)

2. Stop at once using one code machine unit and destroy it completely.

3. When you have finished this, wire me back the one word "haruna".

4. At the time and in the manner you deem most proper dispose of all files of messages coming and going and all other secret documents.

5. Burn all the codes which Telegraphic official KOSAKA brought you. (Hence, the necessity of getting in contact with Mexico mentioned in my #860 * is no longer recognized.)

#25640 Translated 12-3-41 (X) Corrected 12-4-41.

* S. I. 8. #22550 in which Tokyo wires Washington advising them to have KOSAKA return to Japan on the Tatsuta Maru which sails on the 28th. If this makes it impossible for KOSAKA to make his trip to Mexico, make some other arrangements with regard to KOSAKA's business in Mexico.

From: Tokyo (Togo).
To: Honolulu.
December 2, 1941.

J-19. #123 (Secret outside the department).

In view of the present situation, the presence in port of warships, airplane carriers, and cruisers is of utmost importance. Hereafter, to the utmost of your ability, let me know day by day. Wire me in each case whether or not there are any observation balloons above Pearl Harbor or if there are any indications that they will be sent up. Also advise me whether or not the warships are provided with anti-mine nets.

Note.—This message was received here on December 23.

ARMY 8007 27065 SECRET (Japanese) Trans. 12/30/41 (5)
From: Washington.
To: Tokyo.
3 December 1941.
(Purple).
#1223.

Judging from all indications, we feel that some joint military action between Great Britain and the United States, with or without a declaration of war, is a definite certainty in the event of an occupation of Thailand.

25789
JD-1: 7068 (D) Navy Trans. 12-5-41 (7)

From: Berlin.
To: Tokyo.
December 4, 1941.
Purple. (CA).
#1410.

In case of evacuation by the members of our Embassy in London, I would like to arrange to have Secretary MATSUI of that office and three others (URABE and KOJIMA and one other) from among the higher officials and two other officials (UEHARA and YUWASAKI) stay here. Please do your best to this end.

ARMY 25807 JD-7134 Trans. 12-5-41 (W)

From: Washington.
To: Tokyo.
5 December 1941.
(Purple).
#1208.

Re your #867*
From Councillor of Embassy Iguchi to the Chief of the Communication Section:
We have completed destruction of codes, but since the U. S.-Japanese negotiations are still continuing I request your approval of our desire to delay for a while yet the destruction of the one code machine.

25936
JD-1: 7136 (M) Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S-TT)

*(Dated 2 December) JD-1: 7017 (SIS #25640): Directs Washington to destroy all copies of codes except one copy of certain ones, and also destroy one code machine.

From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
December 6, 1941.
Purple
#901
Re my #544.*

1. The Government has deliberated deeply on the American proposal of the 26th of November and as a result we have drawn up a memorandum for the United States contained in my separate message #902 (in English).

2. This separate message is a very long one. I will send it in fourteen parts and I imagine you will receive it tomorrow. However, I am not sure. The situation is extremely delicate, and when you receive it I want you please to keep it secret for the time being.

3. Concerning the time of presenting this memorandum to the United States, I will wire you in a separate message. However, I want you in the meantime to put it in nicely drafted form and make every preparation to present it to the Americans just as soon as you receive instructions.

ARMY 7149 25838 SECRET Trans 12/6/41 (S)

* See S. I. 8. #25445 In which Tokyo wires Washington the Imperial Government cannot accept the United States proposal and, therefore, with a report of the views of the Imperial Government which will be sent in two or three days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured. Until then, however, Washington is not to give the impression that negotiations are broken off.
From: Washington.
To: Tokyo.
December 6, 1941.
Purple (Urgent).
#1272.

In addition to carrying on frontal negotiations with the President and HULL, we also worked directly and indirectly through Cabinet members having close relations with the President and through individuals equally influential because of its delicate bearing upon the State Department, please keep this point strictly secret. Up until this moment we have the following to report:

(1) On the 4th those engaged in Plan "A" dined with the President and advised him against a Japanese-American war and urged him to do the "introducing" at once between Japan and China. However, the President did not make known what he had in mind. According to these men, this attitude of the President in his usual attitude. Recently, when the President discussed matters with LEWIS and settled the strike question, I understand that he did so on the advice of these individuals.

(2) Those carrying on Plan "B" included all of our proposal of November 20th into that of September 25th and after incorporating those sections in the United States' proposal of November 20th which are either innocuous or advantageous to us—(MESSAGE INCOMPLETE)—

ARMY 25846 1776 SECRET Trans. 12/7/41 (2T)

From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
December 6, 1941.
Purple
#902 (Part 1 of 14)
Separate telegram MEMORANDUM

1. The Government of Japan, prompted by a genuine desire to come to an amicable understanding with the Government of the United States in order that the two countries by their joint efforts may secure the peace of the Pacific area and thereby contribute toward the realization of world peace, has continued negotiations with the utmost sincerity since April last with the Government of the United States regarding the adjustment and advancement of Japano-American relations and the stabilization of the Pacific area.

The Japanese Government has the honor to state frankly its views concerning the claims the American Government has persistently maintained as well as the measures the United States and Great Britain have taken toward Japan during these eight months.

2. It is the immutable policy of the Japanese Government to insure the stability of East Asia and to promote world peace, and thereby to enable all nations to find each BOAMPYQEB place in the world.

Ever since the China Affair broke out owing to the failure on the part of China to comprehend Japan's true intentions, the Japanese Government has striven for the restoration of peace and it has consistently exerted its best efforts to prevent the extension of war-like disturbances. It was also to that end that in September last year Japan concluded the Tri Partite Pact with Germany and Italy.

JD-1:7148 SECRET Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (8)

From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
December 6, 1941.
Purple
#902 (Part 2 of 14).

However, both the United States and Great Britain have resorted to every possible measure to assist the Chungking regime so as to obstruct the establishment of a general peace between Japan and China, interfering with Japan's constructive endeavours towards the stabilization of East Asia, exerting pressure on The Netherlands East Indies, or menacing French Indo-China, they have attempted to frustrate Japan's aspiration to realize the ideal of common prosperity in cooperation with these regions. Furthermore, when Japan in accordance with its protocol with France took measures of joint defense of
French Indo-China, both American and British governments, wilfully misinterpreted it as a threat to their own possession and inducing the Netherlands government to follow suit, they enforced the assets freezing order, thus severing economic relations with Japan. While manifesting thus an obviously hostile attitude, these countries have strengthened their military preparations perfecting an encirclement of Japan, and have brought about a situation which endangers the very existence of the empire.

JD–1: 7143 SECRET Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)

From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
December 6, 1941.
Purple
#902 (Part 3 of 14).

Nevertheless, facilitate a speedy settlement, the Premier of Japan proposed, in August last, to meet the President of the United States for a discussion of important problems between the two countries covering the entire Pacific area. However, while accepting in principle the Japanese proposal, insisted that the meeting should take place after an agreement of view had been reached on fundamental—(75 letters garbled)—The Japanese government submitted a proposal based on the formula proposed by the American government, taking fully into consideration past American claims and also incorporating Japanese views. Repeated discussions proved of no avail in producing readily an agreement of view. The present cabinet, therefore, submitted a revised proposal, moderating still further the Japanese claims regarding the principal points of difficulty in the negotiation and endeavoured strenuously to reach a settlement. But the American government, adhering steadfastly to its original proposal, failed to display in the slightest degree a spirit of conciliation. The negotiation made no progress.

JD–1: 7143 SECRET Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)

From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
December 6, 1941.
Purple
#902 (Part 4 of 14).

Thereupon, the Japanese Government, with a view to doing its utmost for averting a crisis in Japanese-American relations, submitted on November 20th still another proposal in order to arrive at an equitable solution of the more essential and urgent questions which, simplifying its previous proposal, stipulated the following points:

1. The Governments of Japan and the United States undertake not to dispatch armed forces into any of the regions, excepting French Indo-China, in the Southeastern Asia and the Southern Pacific area.

2. Both Governments shall cooperate with a view to securing the acquisition in the Netherlands East Indies of these goods and commodities of which the two countries are in need.

3. Both Governments mutually undertake to restore commercial relations to those prevailing prior to the freezing of assets.

The Government of the United States shall supply Japan the required quantity of oil.

4. The Government of the United States undertakes not to resort to measures and actions prejudicial to the endeavours for the restoration of general peace between Japan and China.

5. The Japanese Government undertakes to withdraw troops now stationed in French Indo-China upon either the restoration of peace between Japan and China or the establishment of an equitable peace in the Pacific area; and it is prepared to remove the Japanese troops in the southern part of French Indo-China to the northern part upon the conclusion of the present agreement.

JD–1: 7143 SECRET Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)
From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
December 6, 1941.
Purple.
#92 (Part 5 of 14).

As regards China, the Japanese Government, while expressing its readiness to accept the offer of the President of the United States to act as "Introducer" of peace between Japan and China as was previously suggested, asked for an undertaking on the part of the United States to do nothing prejudicial to the restoration of Sino-Japanese peace when the two parties have commenced direct negotiations.

The American Government not only rejected the above-mentioned new proposal, but made known its intention to continue its aid to Chiang Kai-Shek; and in spite of its suggestion mentioned above, withdrew the offer of the President to act as the so-called "Introducer" of peace between Japan and China, pleading that time was not yet ripe for it. Finally, on November 26th, in an attitude to impose upon the Japanese government those principles it has persistently maintained, the American government made a proposal totally ignoring Japanese claims, which is a source of profound regret to the Japanese Government.

JD: 1 T143 SECRET Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (8)

From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
December 6, 1941.
Purple.
#92 (Part 6 of 14).

4. From the beginning of the present negotiation the Japanese Government has always maintained an attitude of fairness and moderation, and did its best to reach a settlement, for which it made all possible concessions often in spite of great difficulties.

As for the China question which constituted an important subject of the negotiation, the Japanese Government showed a most conciliatory attitude.

As for the principle of Non-Discrimination in International Commerce, advocated by the American Government, the Japanese Government expressed its desire to see the said principle applied throughout the world, and declared that along with the actual practice of this principle in the world, the Japanese Government would endeavour to apply the same in the Pacific area, including China, and made it clear that Japan had no intention of excluding from China economic activities of third powers pursued on an equitable basis.

Furthermore, as regards the question of withdrawing troops from French Indo-China, the Japanese government even volunteered, as mentioned above, to carry out an immediate evacuation of troops from Southern French Indo-China as a measure of easing the situation.

JD: 1 T143 SECRET Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (8)

From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
December 4, 1941.
Purple.
#92 (Part 7 of 14).

It is presumed that the spirit of conciliation exhibited to the utmost degree by the Japanese Government in all these matters is fully appreciated by the American government.

On the other hand, the American government, always holding fast to theories in disregard of realities, and refusing to yield an inch on its impractical principles, caused undue delays in the negotiation. It is difficult to understand this attitude of the American government and the Japanese government desires to call the attention of the American government especially to the following points:

1. The American government advocates in the name of world peace those principles favorable to it and urges upon the Japanese government the acceptance thereof. The peace of the world may be brought about only by discovering a mutually acceptable formula through recognition of the reality of the situation and mutual appreciation of one another's position. An attitude such as ignores realities and imposes one's selfish views upon others will scarcely serve the purpose of facilitating the consummation of negotiations.

T143 SECRET
From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
December 6, 1941.
Purple.
#902 (Part 9 of 14).

The American Government, obsessed with its own views and opinions, may be said to be scheming for the extension of the war. While it seeks, on the one hand, to secure its rear by stabilizing the Pacific area, it is engaged, on the other hand, in aiding Great Britain and preparing to attack, in the name of self-defense, Germany and Italy, two powers that are striving to establish a new order in Europe. Such a policy is totally at variance with the many principles upon which the American Government proposes to found the stability of the Pacific area through peaceful means.

3. Whereas the American Government, under the principles it rigidly upholds, objects to settling international issues through military pressure, it is exercising in conjunction with Great Britain and other nations pressure by economic power. Recourse to such pressure as a means of dealing with international relations should be condemned as it is at times more inhuman than military pressure.

JD-1: 7143 Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)

From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
December 6, 1941.
Purple.
#902 (Part 10 of 14).

4. It is impossible not to reach the conclusion that the American Government desires to maintain and strengthen, in collusion with Great Britain and other powers, its dominant position it has hitherto occupied not only in China but in other areas of East Asia. It is a fact of history that one country — (45 letters garbled or missing) — has been compelled to observe the status quo under the Anglo-American policy of imperialistic exploitation and to sacrifice the — es to the prosperity of the two nations. The Japanese Government cannot tolerate the perpetuation of such a situation since it directly runs counter to Japan’s fundamental policy to enable all nations to enjoy each its proper place in the world.

JD-1: 7143 Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)
From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
December 6, 1941.
Purple.

#902 (Part 11 of 14).

The stipulation proposed by the American Government relative to French Indo-China is a good exemplification of the above-mentioned American policy. That the six countries,—Japan, the United States, Great Britain, The Netherlands, China and Thailand,—excepting France, should undertake among themselves to respect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of French Indo-China and equality of treatment in trade and commerce would be tantamount to placing that territory under the joint guarantee of the governments of those six countries. Apart from the fact that such a proposal totally ignores the position of France, it is unacceptable to the Japanese government in that such an arrangement cannot but be considered as an extension to French Indo-China of a system similar to the n—(50 letters missed)—sible for the present predicament of East Asia.

JD: 1 7143 SECRET Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)

From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
December 6, 1941.
Purple.

#902 (Part 12 of 14).

5. All the items demanded of Japan by the American government regarding China such as wholesale evacuation of troops or unconditional application of the principle of Non-Discrimination in International Commerce ignore the actual conditions of China, and are calculated to destroy Japan's position as the stabilizing factor of East Asia. The attitude of the American government in demanding Japan not to support militarily, politically or economically any regime other than the regime at Chungking, disregarding thereby the existence of the Nanking government, shatters the very basis of the present negotiation. This demand of the American government falling, as it does, in line with its above-mentioned refusal to cease from aiding the Chungking regime, demonstrates clearly the intention of the American government to obstruct the restoration of normal relations between Japan and China and the return of peace to East Asia.

JD: 1 7143 SECRET Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)

From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
December 6, 1941.
Purple.

#902 (Part 13 of 14).

5. In brief, the American proposal contains certain acceptable items such as those concerning commerce, including the conclusion of a trade agreement, mutual removal of the freezing restrictions, and stabilization of the Yen and Dollar exchange, or the abolition of extra-territorial rights in China. On the other hand, however, the proposal in question ignores Japan's sacrifices in the four years of the China Affair, menaces the empire's existence itself and disparages its honour and prestige. Therefore, viewed in its entirety, the Japanese government regrets that it cannot accept the proposal as a basis of negotiation.

6. The Japanese government, in its desire for an early conclusion of the negotiation, proposed that simultaneously with the conclusion of the Japanese-American negotiation, agreements be signed with Great Britain and other interested countries. The proposal was accepted by the American government. However, since the American government has made the proposal of November 20th as a result of frequent consultations with Great Britain, Australia, The Netherlands and Chungking, ANDND* presumably by catering to the wishes of the Chungking regime on the questions of CHUTAL YLOKMMRT** be concluded that all these countries are at one with the United States in ignoring Japan's position.

JD: 1 7143 SECRET Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)

*Probably "and as."
**Probably "China, can but."
From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
7 December 1941.
(Purple-Eng).
#902 Part 14 of 14.

(Note: In the forwarding instructions to the radio station handling this part, appeared the plain English phrase "VERY IMPORTANT")

7. Obviously it is the intention of the American Government to conspire with Great Britain and other countries to obstruct Japan's efforts toward the establishment of peace through the creation of a New Order in East Asia, and especially to preserve Anglo-American rights and interests by keeping Japan and China at war. This intention has been revealed clearly during the course of the present negotiations. Thus, the earnest hope of the Japanese Government to adjust Japanese-American relations and to preserve and promote the peace of the Pacific through cooperation with the American Government has finally been lost.

The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify hereby the American Government that in view of the attitude of the American Government it cannot but consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiations.

JD-1: 7148 SECRET (M) Navy trans. 7 Dec. 1941 (S-TT)

From: Tokyo (Togo).
To: Honolulu.
December 6, 1941.
PA-K2.
#128.

Please wire immediately re the latter part of my #123 a the movements of the fleet subsequent to the fourth.

(Japanese)

ARMY 7381 26150 SECRET Trans. 12/12/41 (S)

* Not available.

From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
December 7, 1941.
Purple (Urgent—Very Important).
#907. To be handled in government code.

Re my #902 a

Will the Ambassador please submit to the United States Government (if possible to the Secretary of State) our reply to the United States at 1:00 p.m. on the 7th, your time.

ARMY 7145 25350 SECRET Trans. 12/7/41 (S)

* JD-1: 7148—text of Japanese reply.

From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
December 7, 1941.
Purple (Extremely Urgent).
#910.

After deciphering part 14 of my #902 a and also #907 b, #908 c and #909 d, please destroy at once the remaining cipher machine and all machine codes. Dispose in like manner all secret documents.

25554 Trans. 12/7/41 (S)

* S. I. S. #25542—text of reply.
* S. I. S. #23550.
* S. I. S. #23553.
* S. I. S. #23588.
From: Budapest.
To: Tokyo.
December 7, 1941.
LA.
#104.
Re my #103 *.
On the 6th, the American Minister presented to the Government of this country a
British Government communiqué to the effect that a state of war would break out
on the 7th.

* Relayed to Berlin.

Note.—The Report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board is printed as a part of
Joint Committee Exhibit No. 157. Appendix No. 1 is printed following the
Report.)
Appendix No. 2

War Department, Army Pearl Harbor Board

Cross-reference Index to Testimony Before Army Pearl Harbor Board

This Cross-Reference Index has the following features:
1. Titles and sub-titles are listed alphabetically.
2. Main titles are shown in full capital type; sub-titles are preceded by a hyphen and are in regular type; secondary sub-titles are preceded by two hyphens; a few sub-titles are preceded by a triple hyphen; e.g.,

**MARSHALL**
- Communications with Short
  -- Message 7 December
  -- Washington Signal Office handling

3. The references to the record are by name of witness and page number, thus STIMSON 4072, means the testimony of Secretary of War Stimson on page 4072 of the transcript of the testimony.
4. The Index proper is paged with arabic numerals. The cross-reference key to this Index is paged with Roman numerals, and appears on pages i to xii. The cross-reference key is designed to give the arabic page numbers of the Index on which the titles and sub-titles will be found.
5. Related subject matter is frequently found listed under two or more titles or sub-titles. For example, references concerning aircraft available in Hawaii on 7 December 1941, will be found under the following headings:

**ARMY-NAVY EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION**
- Planes available, daily reports p. 23
**ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR**
- Only 2 U. S. ships got in air p. 26
**HAWAIIAN DEFENSE**
- Army planes available p. 31
**HAWAIIAN DEFENSE**
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**RECONNAISSANCE**
- By Army
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6. In using the Index, the following steps are suggested:
(a) Select all relevant main titles on page iv which could possibly cover the subject sought; for example, take the subject of the 27 November message from the War Department to General Short. Relevant main titles, found in the list on page iv, are:

**ALERTS IN HAWAII**
**ALERT NO. 1**
ARMY-NAVY COOPERATION
ARMY-NAVY EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION
MARSHALL
NAVY
RECONNAISSANCE
SHORT

(b) Select all relevant sub-titles on pages v through vii; e.g., in the example suggested in (a) above, if it is desired to find out all matters bearing on the 27 November message and its results, each of the main titles listed will be found to have several relevant sub-titles, like

ALERTS IN HAWAII
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-Decision by Short p. 13
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(c) Turn to the appropriate arabic numbered page or pages of the Index, given after each relevant title and sub-title. Then refer to the Record page number or numbers listed under the main titles and sub-titles of this cross-reference Index for the testimony thereon.

Page 90 at the end of this volume contains a TABLE FOR FINDING VOLUMES FROM PAGE REFERENCES.

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  -Kimmel 1745
  -Short 367-368
  -Davidson 4150
  -Fleming 1271
  -Fleming 1330-1331
  -Short 503
  -Wyman 3420
  -Wyman 3536
  -Wyman 3576
  -Davidson 4142
  -Phillips 1246
  -Perlitter 3713
  -Wyman 3574
  -Hannum 2064-2065
  -Kimmel 1768
  -McMorris 2880
  -Short 326
  -Stimson 4065
  -Fleming 1330-1331
  -Powell 3911
  -Phillips 1244
  -Short 500-501
  -Wyman 3572
  -Belling 1638
  -Blee 1503
  -Short 484
  -Hayes 273
  -Burton 883
  -Loekard 1030
  -Marston 3129
  -Rafter 787-789
  -Reybold 587-589
  -Reybold 624-625
  -Robins 709-710
  -Tillman 2149-2151
  -Wong 3680
  -Wyman 3438
  -Wyman 3440-3441
  -AFF-Wyman 3867
  -AFF-Wyman 3871
  -AAF-Wyman 3873
  -Bartlett 2510
  -Bergquist 1190
  -Bergquist 1218
  -Burton 884
  -Colton 678
  -DeLany 1716-1717
  -Fleming 1261-1262
  -Fleming 1268-1270
  -Fleming 1273-1274
  -Fleming 1275-1276
  -Hayes 270-271
  -Marston 3128
  -Marston 3130
  -Marston 3133

[2] Delays, causes of
AIRCRAFT WARNING SERVICE—Continued

-Delays, causes of—Continued
  Marston 3143
  Phillips 1144
  Powell 3886
  Powell 3893
  Powell 3901
  Powell 3905
  Reybold 571–573
  Reybold 623
  Robins 711
  Robins 728
  Schley 654
  Short 497
  Short 509
  Tillman 2130–2137
  Tillman 2151–2152
  Wyman 3431–3432
  Wyman 3440
  Wyman 5973
  Davidson 4127
  Short 485
  Colton 679
  Colton 682–685
  Fleming 1341
  Powell 3892
  Hannum 2058–2059
  Marston 3132
  Marston 3135
  Perlite 3703
  Short 4433
  Wyman 3436–3437
  Wyman 3441–3443
  Wyman 3519
  Martin 1890
  Phillips 1153
  Wyman 3446
  Davidson 4142
  Fleming 1317–1318
  Elliott 1011
  Marston 3130
  Hunt 774
  Kestly 3699
  Perlite 3711
  Wyman 3415–3417
  Bergquist 1194
  Bergquist 1220
  Fleming 1257
  Fleming 1260–1261
  Fleming 1266–1267
  Marston 3155
  Molison 813
  Powell 3887
  Reybold 582
  Reybold 605
  Reybold 619
  Short 297
  Short 498
  Tillman 2136
  Bergquist 1192–1193
  Bergquist 1195–1196
  Bergquist 1198
  Bergquist 1201
  Bergquist 1204
  Davidson 4153

[3]  —Not contractors—

—Not lack of personnel—

—Contra—

—Personnel difficulties—

—Difficulties of permanent erection and location—

—Effort to get functioning—
AIRCRAFT WARNING SERVICE—Continued

- Equipment present, except cables

- Fixed, equipment delivered October 1941
- Funds allotted
- Haleskaia Job Order 41.0
- Higher command, not AWS-minded

- Highest priority
  — Contra

- Information Center
  — In general

— Communications with stations, not good
— Development of
— Functioning

[5] — Naval liaison requested

DeLany 1716
Reybold 502
Reybold 603
Short 256
Stimson 4064
Stimson 4073
Taylor 1076
Tillman 2149
Wyman 3428
Wyman 3431
Wyman 3444
Short 497-498
Short 511
Wyman 3439
Fleming 1259
Short 464
Rafter 782
Belling 1640
Bergquist 1193
Taylor 1084
Tindal 4498
Tindal 4590
Short 505
Tillman 2137-2138
Wyman 3427
Wyman 3426-3429
Wyman 3567
Bergquist 1191
Colton 685-689
DeLany 1716
Kimmel 1790-1791
Lockard 1025
Lockard 1026-1028
Martin 1824
McDonald 4156
Perffiti 3714
Rudolph 1235
Taylor 1073-1075
Taylor 1077-1079
Taylor 1084
Tindal 1093
Tyler 1095-1098
Bergquist 1201
Bergquist 1210-1214
Davidson 4127
McDonald 4153
Tindal 4491
Wyman 3433
Colton 693
McDonald 4158-4159
Powell 3900
Short 401
Tindal 4497
Bergquist 1192-1193
Bergquist 1213-1214
Davidson 4131
Powell 3906
Short 493
Taylor 1089
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-Navy notified of delay after 5 August. Short 507
-Bellinger 1638
-Bergquist 1192
-Bergquist 1197
-Colton 696
-Davidson 4126
-Davidson 4132
-Elliott 996
-Lockard 1016
-Phillips 1154
-Powell 3998
-Pye 1078
-Short 487
-Short 508
-Taylor 1082
-Taylor 1088
-Taylor 1091
-Tindal 4498

-No training scheduled, 7 December.
-Not dependent on height.

--Contra.

-Not increased after 27 November.
-Number of stations, changed.
-Only on Oahu.

-Operating 7 December.


Colton 694-695
-Davidson 4130-4131
-Elliott 1001-1006
-Lockard 1024
-Lockard 1026
-McDonald 4154
-McDonald 4162
-Powell 3903
-Short 439-440
-Taylor 1085
AIRCRAFT WARNING SERVICE—Continued
-Operating 7 December—Continued
--Detected planes—Continued
---Disputed
Mollison 815
Mollison 826
Bergquist 1190–1200
Davidson 4145
Lockard 1025
McDonald 4154–4156
McDonald 4157
Short 312
Short 518
Tyler 1096
Tyler 1099–1102
--Merely training
Davidson 4130–4131
Kimmel 1790
Martin 1824
Phillips 1152
Phillips 1154
Short 516
Short 4442
--Purpose, Anti-sabotage
Davidson 4134
Elliott 1008
Colton 688
Davidson 4128
Davidson 4146
Kimmel 1789–1790
Lynch 2364
McDonald 4169
McDonald 4163
Powell 3885
Powell 3896
Powell 3908
Short 516
Short 4443
Stimson 4066–4067
Tindal 4492
West 3123
--Contra
[8]
--Operation, in general
Phillips 1143
Bellinger 1639
Bergquist 1187
DeLany 1715
Elliott 1006–1007
Elliott 1009
Elliott 1012–1014
Lockard 1017–1021
Lockard 1031–1032
Marston 3151
McDonald 4161
Powell 3889
Powell 3904
Stimson 4068
Tindal 4500
West 3123
Powell 3886
Short 509–510
Range, effective
Burgin 2660
Layton 3065–3066
Marston 3151
Powell 3888
Short 440
--200 miles, permanent stations
--75 miles, for mobile stations
--130 miles
Bergquist 1190
QM received for shipment in July
Short 440
Powell 316
AIRCRAFT WARNING SERVICE—Continued

-Range, effective—Continued
  --150–200 miles
     -----------------------------
     Kimmel 1789
     Kimmel 1791
     Kimmel 1810
     Powell 3889
     Powell 3905
     Burgin 2658
     Fleming 1258

  --120–140 miles
  -----------------------------
  Short 368

  -Refer to letter, S/N to S/W, 24 January
  Davidson 4137
  Kimmel 1786

  -Report, 24 November
  Bergquist 1187
  Bergquist 1202–1203
  Burgin 2644
  Davidson 4127
  Martin 1824
  Phillips 1245–1249
  Powell 3885
  Powell 3908
  Short 492
  Short 516–518
  Wyman 3436
  Wyman 3572
  Wyman 3577

  -Signal Corps, technical responsibility
  Bergquist 1187
  Colton 672–677
  Powell 3895
  Powell 3915
  Wyman 3436
  Reymold 622–624
  Short 508
  Short 514
  Short 4442

  -Stations contemplated
  Bergquist 1187
  Colton 672–677
  Powell 3895
  Powell 3915
  Wyman 3436
  Reymold 622–624
  Short 508
  Short 514
  Short 4442

  -Tactical plan
  Bergquist 1192–1193
  Bergquist 1198
  Bergquist 1204
  Powell 3912–3913
  Davidson 4129
  Davidson 4133
  Kimmel 1790–1790
  McDonald 4161
  Short 297
  Bergquist 1198–1199
  Davidson 4150
  Gerow 4274
  Lockard 1031
  Phillips 1154–1155
  Powell 3910
  Short 469–470
  Short 514–515
  Short 4442
  Taylor 1085
  Hayes 257
  Hayes 274

  -Twenty-four hour use not required by situation
  Wyman not responsible for material. See also,
  WYMAN, COL. THEODORE

  -Contra
  Bergquist 1102
  Bergquist 1198
  Bergquist 1204
  Powell 3912–3913
  Davidson 4129
  Davidson 4133
  Kimmel 1790–1790
  McDonald 4161
  Short 297
  Bergquist 1198–1199
  Davidson 4150
  Gerow 4274
  Lockard 1031
  Phillips 1154–1155
  Powell 3910
  Short 469–470
  Short 514–515
  Short 4442
  Taylor 1085
  Hayes 257
  Hayes 274

  -Use ordered by Short
  --4 to 7 A. M.
  Davidson 4150
  Gerow 4274
  Lockard 1031
  Phillips 1154–1155
  Powell 3910
  Short 469–470
  Short 514–515
  Short 4442
  Taylor 1085
  Hayes 257
  Hayes 274

  -WD interest in

  -Short 488
  Wyman 3419
  Wyman 3428–3429
[14] ALERTS IN HAWAII (See also ALERT NO. 1 and HAWAIIAN DEFENSE—SOP, 5 NOVEMBER and WAR DEPARTMENT.)

- In general ............................................ Brooks 982
                     Brooks 989
                     Burgin 2662-2663
                     Farthing 841-842
                     Farthing 845
                     Gerow 4304
                     Hain 3222
                     Hayes 251-255
                     Herrin 216
                     Herrin 219
                     McCarthy 1924
                     Mollison 891-802
                     Mollison 822
                     Murray 3099
                     Murray 3101
                     Pratt 1968
                     Pratt 1970-1972
                     Pratt 1985
                     Rudolph 1222
                     Rudolph 1226
                     Wells 2729-2930
                     Wilson 925-930
                     Herron 225
                     J. Midkiff 2840
                     Capron 2025
                     Dillingham 2772
                     Dingeman 3195
                     Murray 3096-3097
                     Petrce 2720
                     Throckmorton 1398
                     Wells 2723
                     Burgin 2609
                     Dingeman 3195
                     Hain 3318
                     Herron 225
                     Murray 3100
                     Short 409
                     McKee 2424
                     Marshall 53
                     McCarthy 1924
                     Wilson 1366-1367
                     Hain 3321-3322
                     Murray 3101
                     Short 435
                     Gerow 4238
                     Short 408
                     Hain 3317
                     Hain 3319
                     Herron 217
                     Farthing 842
                     Dingeman 3198
                     Hain 3317
                     Marshall 52
                     J. Midkiff 2835
                     Murray 3100
                     Short 283

- Alarmed public .....................................

-- Contra .............................................

- Ammunition issued ..................................

-- Contra .............................................

- By Army, no effect on Navy ...........
-- Laxity alleged in late November ......
-- Morale, affected .............................

-- Contra .............................................

- Never ordered by WD ......................

[19] -- Contra ..........................................

-- Contra; when Navy "lost" Jap ships ....

-- Number of ........................................
ALERT NO. 1. (See also HAWAIIAN DEFENSE—SOP 5 Nov.; JAPANESE IN HAWAII; JAPAN—Caution not to provoke and related titles.)

-In general—
Bloch 1497
Bloch 1511
Bloch 1530
Brooks 990
Davidson 4149
DeLany 1709–1710
Kogan 1677
Mollison 818–821
Murray 3085
Murray 3089
Murray 3092
Phillips 1110
Phillips 1111
Phillips 1112
Phillips 1113
Phillips 1114
Phillips 1123
Walsh 1384–1385
Wilson 929
Wilson 1350
Wilson 1356
Wilson 1357

-Decision by Short—
Burgin 2623
Coll 3173
Donegan 1944
Fielder 2909
Marin 1827
Mollison 793–794
Pratt 1976–1977
Short 262
Short 520
Throckmorton 1393
Throckmorton 1403
Truman 1450
Walker 971
White 1994
Wilson 1357
Dingeman 3194A

-Navy not consulted—

---Plan to "slide" to No. 3---

-Burgin 2617
-Flood 2854
-Hayes 297
-Lawton 2081
-Martin 1830
-Martin 1835
-Martin 1847
-Martin 1855
-Phillips 1114
-Phillips 1117
-Phillips 1122
-Phillips 1123
-Phillips 1133
-Phillips 1138
-Phillips 1148
-Short 286
-Short 297
ALERT NO. 1—Continued
-Decision by Short—Continued
---Reasons for---

Short 304
Short 307
Short 434-435
Short 437
Short 431-432
Short 446
Short 450
Short 461
Short 470-471
Short 479
Short 483
Short 520-521
Short 527-528
Throckmorton 1394
Throckmorton 1398
White 1996

-Differences from Alerts 2 and 3- 

Burgin 2614
Burgin 2855
Dillingham 2772
Donegan 1952-1954
J. Middkiff 2841
Mollison 818-821
Powell 3912-3913
Tindal 4489
Weddington 3015
Donegan 1956
Martin 1831
Martin 1833
Martin 1836
Martin 1856
F. Middkiff 3819
Murray 3090
Phillips 1117-1118
Phillips 1126
Allen 3113
Allen 3119
Bergquist 1205
Burkin 2618
Burkin 2621
Burkin 2652
Burkin 2655
Farthing 839
Fielder 2987
Hayes 250
Hayes 268
Hayes 263
Herron 226
King 2700
Martin 1827-1828
Martin 1849
Mollison 707
Mollison 805-806
Murray 3096
Murray 3097
Phillips 1127
Phillips 1128
Phillips 1148
Phillips 1152
Powell 3912-3913
Pratt 1977
Pye 1046-1048
Rudolph 1221-1230
ALERT NO. 1—Continued
-Not a mistake—Continued
---Contra---
  Rudolph 1226
  Rudolph 1229
  Rudolph 1239
  Short 4440
  Short 479
  Throckmorton 1395
  Throckmorton 1399
  Throckmorton 1402
  Wells 2731
  West 3121
  Wilson 926–928
  Wilson 1361
  Wilson 1363
  Wilson 1881
  Mollison 796–797
  Phillips 1127
  Short 459
  Short 515
  Tindal 4489

-Planes ready in 4 hours, under
  Allen 3119
  Burgin 2649
  Burr 3072
  Davidson 4134–4135
  Davidson 4143
  DeLany 1714
  Dingeman 3195
  Fielder 2907
  Flood 2849
  Kimmel 1776
  Loevy 2797
  Martin 1829
  Martin 1845
  Moody 3199
  Poinsette 3161
  Coal 3173
  Hill 2938
  Kimmel 1782
  Lawton 2693
  Martin 1833
  Murray 3099
  Short 437
  Short 453–455
  Short 471
  Short 533
  Stimson 4062
  McKee 81
  Bellinger 1581
  Burgin 2616
  Donegan 1960
  Gerow 4227
  Hain 3225
  Herron 207
  Kimmel 1744
  Lawton 2666
  Marshall 17
  Marshall 18
  Martin 1843
  McKee 64
  McKee 72
  Murray 3078–3079
  Phillips 1110
  Phillips 1149
  Short 322
  Wilson 1361

-"Sabotage-minded"

[16]

-War Department never objected

-WPD not informed of

[17] ARMY MISSION IN HAWAII. (See also NAVY MISSION IN HAWAII; HAWAIIAN DEFENSE; RECONNAISSANCE; and related subtitles.)
ARMS MISSION IN HAWAII—Continued
-Air fields defense ........................................ Flood 2854
-CG free from WD control ................................. McKee 71
-WPD not concerned with ................................... Herron 222

[18] ARMY-NAVY AGREEMENTS (See also
ARMY-NAVY COOPERATION; ARMY-NAVY
EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION; and related
titles.)
-Joint Air Operations Agreement, 21 March ..........  Arnold 161–162
Arnold 163
Bellinger 1578–1579
Bellinger 1587
Bellinger 1607
Bloch 1474
Gerow 4233
Gerow 4324
Lawton 2670
Martin 1817
Martin 1822–1823
Martin 1902
Short 371–373
Short 4436–4437
Short 4441
Throckmorton 1391

--No call for Army help 7 December ..................... Martin 1818
Lawton 2676
Martin 1818

--Never fully complied with ............................... Bellinger 1605
Bloch 1473
Bloch 1478–1479
DeLany 1696–1697
DeLany 1713
DeLany 1720
Donegan 1935
Gerow 4318
Hain 3325
Hayes 245
Kimmel 1736
Kimmel 1738
Kimmel 1744
Kimmel 1746
Kimmel 1748
Lawton 2665–2666
Marshall 26
Martin 1817
McKee 58
McMorris 2891
Short 365–366
Short 382–383
Short 387
Throckmorton 1392

--Washington consent needed to put in effect ............ Kimmel 1755–1756
Kimmel 1759
Gerow 4283
Kimmel 1757–1759
Short 4439

[19] ARMY-NAVY COOPERATION (See also
ARMY-NAVY AGREEMENTS; ARMY-NAVY
EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION; and related
titles.)
-In general ................................................. Lawton 2695
McKee 83
Short 355
Short 363
Short 391–392
ARMY-NAVY COOPERATION—Continued

-Anti-aircraft defense not perfectly coordinated
  (See also HAWAIIAN DEFENSE—Anti-aircraft.)
-Army-Navy Maneuvers

-Before Short

-Conferences between Short and Kimmel

-Conference 27 November, Kingman, Martin, Mol-llison, Bloch

-Confidence in Navy

--Not justified

-Defense projects, liaison

-Directed by letter, WD, 7 February

-Joint headquarters

-Joint headquarters construction

-Navy confidence in Army

-Navy jealous

-Navy never cheeked on

-No joint staff meetings

-Not on alerts

-Operations office liaison, complete

--Contra

Short 366
Short 393-394
Bellinger 1585
Davison 4137
Dingeman 3192
Donegan 1899
Martin 1818-1819
Short 292
Herron 207-211
Bloch 1510
Bloch 1513
DeLany 1698
DeLany 1702
Dillingham 2782
Hayes 259
Hayes 260-262
Herron 235
Hill 2942
Kimmel 1765
Kimmel 1766
Kimmel 1768
Kimmel 1769-1771
Kimmel 1780
Kimmel 1783
Lawton 2944-2945
Layton 3058
McMorris 2872
Mollison 790-794
Short 298
Short 301
Short 359-360
Short 394-395
Truman 1446
Truman 1446-1448
Truman 1451
Wells 2732
Bloch 1507
Bloch 1509
Martin 1825
McMorris 2872
Brooks 902
Moody 3200
Phillips 1132
Short 362-363
Short 406
McMorris 2887
Short 390
Short 409
Dingeman 3194
Fleming 1257
Short 368
Phillips 1242
DeLany 1700
Bloch 1482
Kimmel 1783-1784
Herron 212
Bloch 1481
Phillips 1240
Herron 217
Thruckmorton 1409-1410
Lawton 2668
ARMS-NAVY EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION (See also ARMY-NAVY AGREEMENTS; ARMY-Navy COOPERATION; and related titles.)

- In general ____________________________ Gerow 42035
  Marshall 36
  Phillips 1132
  Arnold 184
  Mollison 805
  Bellinger 1636
  Kimmel 1765–1766
  Phillips 1241
  Burr 3069
  Murray 3095
  Truman 1449
  DeLany 1698–1699
  Short 399
  Bellinger 1636
  Herron 221–222
  Kimmel 1771–1772
  Kimmel 1783–1784
  Bloch 1502
  Bloch 1619
  Burgin 2616–2617
  Martin 1907
  Rochefort 1649–1657
  Short 299
  Short 358
  Mollison 796
  Short 406
  Short 410
  Biecknoll 1438–1439
  Fielder 2945
  Fielder 2956
  Shivers 3203
  Shivers 3219
  Taylor 3252
  Taylor 3253
  DeLany 1701
  DeLany 1704
  Mollison 805
  Rochefort 1652–1655
  Rochefort 1661
  Rochefort 1665–1672
  Short 451
  Short 474–475

ARMS-NAVY COOPERATION—Continued

- Very good ____________________________ Capron 2030
  DeLany 1708
  DeLany 1732
  Hayes 244
  Hayes 260
  Herron 210
  Kimmel 1739
  Kimmel 1783
  Kimmel 1811
  Marshall 27
  Taylor 3257
  Burgin 2625
  Martin 1904–1905
  Pratt 1985

-- Contra ____________________________

Fleet activities 27 November–7 December (See also NAVY—Naval Intelligence.)

[22]
ARMY-NAVY EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION—Continued

-G-2-ONI (See also NAVY MISSION IN HAWAII—Naval Intelligence.

---A-2-ONI (See also NAVY—Naval Intelligence, Activities Limited.)

-Information re Jap ships

-Naval aircraft identification course

-Naval information failed to reach field commanders

-Navy, little confidence in Army

-Navy message 24 November not given Short

-Navy notified AWS delay

[23] -Navy not specific re reconnaissance

-Navy, 3 December message re burning codes (See also NAVY.)

-5 December message, G-2

-No information to Short re task force in Marshall Islands

-Planes available, daily reports

-Procedure

---None established

Allen 3111

Bicknell 1438
Dingesman 3193
DeLany 1701
Fielder 2945
Fielder 3000
Layton 3028–3029
Layton 3063
Short 474
Bellinger 1631
Farthing 846
Layton 3030
Mollison 796
Mollison 804
Bloch 1497–1499
DeLany 1710
Farthing 844–845
Pye 1047–1058
Short 291
Short 407–408
Short 452–455
Rudolph 1236
Burgin 2616
Burgin 2646
Wilson 1352
Herron 220
DeLany 1723
Short 414
Bloch 1503
Short 507
Fielder 2990
Hayes 247
Herron 218
Lawton 2685
Lawton 2672
Short 377
Short 379
Short 384
Lawton 2684
Short 424
Rochefort 1657
Short 525
Short 361
Bellinger 1607
Herron 222
Kimmel 1765
Bloch 1500
Burr 3069
DeLany 1718
Donegan 1933
Gerow 4263
Layton 3030
Layton 3037
Layton 3057
Phillips 1248–1249
Short 415
Burgin 2616
Dingesman 3192
Gerow 4323
Lawton 2671–2672
Phillips 1248
ARMY-NAVY EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION—
Continued
- Re Interceptor Command: Bellinger 1596
- “War Warning” message, 27 November: Bellinger 1638
- Bellinger 1597
- Bloch 1503C–1505
- Burr 3070–3071
- DeLany 1698
- DeLany 1723
- Gerow 4262
- Gerow 4301
- Kimmel 1775–1776
- Kimmel 1779
- Layton 3041–3042
- Layton 3058–3059
- Martin 1826
- Martin 1838–1840
- Martin 1906
- McMorris 2886
- Mollison 795
- Murray 3087
- Phillips 1115
- Pye 1040–1041
- Pye 1049
- Pye 1067
- Throckmorton 1393
- Short 416
- Short 469
- Stimson 4074
- Wilson 1349
- White 1997

[24] “War Warning” message, 27 November
(Continued)

[25] ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR (See also:
JAPAN—Attack a surprise; HAWAIIAN DEFENSE; JAPAN—Attacking force origin; and related
titles.)

- In general: Allen 3112
- Allen 3114
- Burgin 2610
- Burgin 2633
- Burgin 2656
- Flood 2852
- Kay 3931–3937
- Looey 3707
- McCarthy 1926–1928
- F. Midkiff 2821
- F. Midkiff 2828
- Murray 3193
- Powell 3997
- Pye 1045
- Tindal 4490
- Weddington 3016
- Weddington 3019
- Burgin 2606
- Brooks 987
- Collie 3172
- Murray 3083
- Short 316–317
- Weddington 3013
- West 3121

- Arrival of new B-17s: Martin 1896
- Weddington 3017–3018
- Bloch 1494–1496
- Capron 2027–2028
- Cooper 2130–2133
- Farthing 837
- Farthing 848

- Description by Bloch: Capron 2027–2028
- Description by Capron: Cooper 2130–2133
- Description by Cooper: Farthing 837
- Description by Farthing: Klatt 1460–1467
- Description by Klatt:
ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR—Continued

- Description by Kogan
  - Mollison 283-831
- Description by Phillips
  - Pye 1045
  - Short 313-314
  - Short 456-457
  - Short 482
  - Short 536-538
  - Short 540
- Description by Walker
  - Welch 909-970
- Description by Welch
  - Wilson 914-922
- Description of Jap planes by Martin
  - Martin 1911
  - Flood 2853
  - Martin 1901
  - McMorris 2884
  - Short 317-318
  - Welch 2012
  - Kay 3092
  - Martin 1568
  - Short 318
  - Short 453-455
  - Arnold 150
  - Mollison 800-801
  - Mollison 816
  - Waddington 3023
  - Kimmel 1800
  - Martin 1841
  - McMorris 2877
  - McMorris 2878
  - McMorris 2883
  - McMorris 2872
  - Pye 1968-1069
  - Burgin 2531
  - Burgin 2555
  - Burgin 2556
  - Fielder 2988
  - Kimmel 1800
  - Kimmel 1805
  - Mollison 829
  - Murray 3090
  - Welch 2013
  - Pye 1059-1060
  - Davidson 4144
  - Flood 2864
  - Herron 223
  - Martin 1837
  - Mollison 797
  - Mollison 807
  - Phillips 1118
  - Short 481
  - Waddington 3014-3015
- Psychological blunder.
  - Result, if planes dispersed
- Result same if during 1940 alert
- Salvage operations
- Statistics on repair work after 7 December
- Sunday best for
- W. D. and N. D. knew precise hour of attack

[38] CANOL PROJECT (See also WYMAN, COL. THEODORE.)
CANOL PROJECT—Continued

- Wyman, administration improper

- Wyman, treatment of personnel

- Wyman, wife as employee

[29] G-2 KNOWLEDGE OF JAPAN (See also JAPAN; ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR; ARMY-NAVY EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION; and related titles.

- In general

- Aircraft carriers about 1 December

- Aircraft carriers on 27 October

- Attack force composition

- Channeled through Chief of Staff

- Coordinated with ONI

- Dissemination procedure

- Embassy chief source

- Interpretation supplied

- Jaluit task force, no notice to HD (See also JAPAN-Jaluit Task Force)

- Jap papers burned, 5 December

- Reported in staff meeting

- Short didn’t know

- Limited

- Limited personnel

- Mandated Island knowledge

- No situation estimate received

- Personnel untrained

- Supplied to H. D.

[30] HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER DEFENSE PLAN (See ARMY-NAVY AGREEMENTS.)

HAWAIIAN DEFENSE (See also AIRCRAFT WARNING SERVICE; ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR; JAPAN; SHORT; MARSHALL; and related titles.)

- Air Corps, infantry training

- Aircraft, B-17, total U. S.

- Air Defense Plan, 20 August

- Sent to WD, 20 August

- Antiaircraft
HAWAIIAN DEFENSE—Continued

- Anti-aircraft

Burgin 2015
Burgin 2626
Burgin 2632
Burgin 2635–2636
Davidson 414
DeLany 1699
DeLany 1708
Farthing 834
Farthing 841
Hayes 266
Kimmel 1764
Kimmel 1768
Klett 1455–1459
Marston 3127
Marston 3152
McMorris 2879
Midkiff, J. 2884
Short 366
West 3122
Burgin 2604
Burgin 2924
Short 456
Burgin 2604
Burgin 2605
Burgin 2908
Burgin 2613
Burgin 2633
Burgin 2638
Dillingham 2784
Murray 3075
Murray 3080
Murray 3082
Murray 3091
Short 313
Weddington 3026–3027
Wilson 1353–1354

[37] - Ammunition supply, 7 December

-Army planes available (See also RECONNAISSANCE—By Army—Insufficient planes).

Arnold 155
Arnold 175
Burgin 2662–2663
Davidson 4138
DeLany 1708
Martin 1859
Martin 1897–1898
Martin 1910
Short 314
Short 455
Weddington 3014
Weddington 3023
Welch 2099
Welch 2014
Martin 1860
Mollison 806
Arnold 184
Bloch 1519
Hayes 257
Martin 1873
Martin 1869–1887
Marston 3152
Murray 3081
Poindexter 3164
Short 369
Arnold 178

-Would have been ineffective
HAWAIIAN DEFENSE—Continued
[52] -Difficulty protecting planes. ------------ Fielder 2959
                                             Martin 1827-1829
                                             Short 290
                                             Short 457
                                             Short 477
                                             Short 480-481
                                             Weddington 3014-3015
                                             Burgin 2605
                                             Burgin 2913
                                             Burgin 2931
                                             Kay 3940
                                             Lawton 2675
                                             Murray 3077
                                             Phillips 1149
                                             Short 354
                                             Short 478
                                             West 3121
                                             Marshall 8
                                             Burgin 2662
                                             Fielder 2988
                                             Fielder 2996-2997
                                             Phillips 1121-1125
                                             Phillips 1127-1128
                                             Hain 3324-3339
                                             Pratt 1970
                                             Throckmorton 1404-1407
                                             Richards 731
                                             Richards 733
                                             Richards 738
                                             Richards 736
                                             Martin 1874-1875
                                             McMorris 2884
                                             McMorris 2884
                                             Midkiff, F. 2804
                                             Midkiff, F. 2818
                                             Midkiff, J. 2841
                                             Midkiff, J. 2843
                                             Walker 966
                                             Phillips 1134

-G-2 funds available. .................................................... Richards 731
                                             Richards 733
                                             Richards 738
                                             Richards 736
                                             Martin 1874-1875
                                             McMorris 2884
                                             McMorris 2884
                                             Midkiff, F. 2804
                                             Midkiff, F. 2818
                                             Midkiff, J. 2841
                                             Midkiff, J. 2843
                                             Walker 966
                                             Phillips 1134

-Greatest danger, Jap population (See also JAPA-
NESE IN HAWAII.) .......................................................... Arnold 179
                                             Arnold 183
                                             Marshall 14
                                             Marston 3128
                                             McKee 87
                                             DeLany 1730
                                             Capron 2016
                                             Short 389
                                             Herron 207-208
                                             Bieknell 1437-1438
                                             Fielder 2982
                                             Layton 3091
                                             Short 458
                                             Coll 3182
                                             Farthing 848
                                             Fielder 2970
                                             Fielder 2977
                                             Grew 4221
                                             Herron 233
                                             King 2706
                                             McMorris 2880
                                             McMorris 2882
                                             Mollison 831
                                             Shivers 3211
                                             Shivers 3214

-Field Order No. 1. ......................................................

-Violated. ...........................................................................

-Good  (See also—Weakness of, infra, this title.)

-Known to Japan. ..............................................................
HAWAIIAN DEFENSE—Continued

-Local Joint Planning Committee.

-Phillips 1250

-Short 396–397

-Bloch 1479

-Capron 2023

-Coll 3188

-DeLany 1713–1714

-Donegan 1936

-Kay 3041

-Kay 950

-Kimmel 1758–1859

-McKiff, F. 2505

-Wells 2726

-Bellinger 1622

-Martin 1867

-Fielder 2989

-Martin 1858

-Burgin 2603

-Flood 2851

-Leech 2791

-McCarthy 1923

-Burgin 2603

-Farthing 833

-Farthing 841

-Howard 1916

-Short 530

-Short 4417

-Arnold 161

-Arnold 185

-Bellinger 1607

-Bellinger 1609–1611

-Bloch 1496

-Delany 1711–1713

-Gerow 4318

-Kimmel 1759–1760

-Martin 1908–1909

-McKee 82

-Pye 1056

-Rudolph 1222

-Short 302

-Short 372

-Short 453

-Dillingham 2783

-Marshall 27

-Martin 1904–1905

-Short 534

-Kimmel 1806

-Bloch 1519

-Burgin 2636

-Donegan 1937

-Hain 3353

-Marshall 23–24

-Martin 1827–1828

-Martin 1861

-Short 354

-Short 481

-Short 4415

-Throckmorton 1404

-Walker 966

-Weddington 3023

-Short 489

-Burgin 2626

-Farthing 833–836

-Fielder 2987

-Hayes 293
HAWAIIAN DEFENSE—Continued
-Report prepared by Bergquist

-SOP 5 November (See also RAINBOW PLAN)

- Artillery, alternate missions
- Criticized

-Navy informed

-Preparation of

-Sent to War Department

-Staff conferences weekly

-Staff officers fully informed

-Supervision by War Department

Bergquist 1209
Bergquist 1219
Bergquist 1216
Bloch 1503-A
Brooks 977-978
Brooks 979-980
Brooks 984
Burgin 2601
Davidson 4139
Donegan 1947
Earle 3642
Marshall 29
Marshall 31
Marshall 47
Marshall 53
Martin 1879
Mollison 797
Mollison 820
Powell 3910
Short 252
Short 333
Short 400
Short 431
Short 460
Short 489
Short 507
Short 520
Short 526
Short 529
Throckmorton 1398
Walker 967-968
Walsh 1383
Wilson 913
Wilson 1357
Murray 3078-3079
Walker 966-967
Burgin 2639
Davidson 4136
Flood 2556-2557
Gerow 4278
Herron 226-229
Lawton 2683
Martin 1892
Phillips 1242
Mollison 800
Phillips 1110
Phillips 1146-1147
Short 421
Hain 3316
Short 519
Short 524
Short 522
See also, infra—WD did not supervise HD closely

Gerow 4278
Gerow 4281
Herron 222-223
Hill 2938
Hill 2939
Gerow 4304
HAWAIIAN DEFENSE—Continued

- Weakness of (see also—Good, supra, this title; see also under JAPAN–S/N ltr to S/W 24 Jan.)… Arnold 159
  Bellingr 1607
  Bergin 2638
  Bergin 2640
  Coll 3174
  DeLany 1699
  DeLany 1727
  Dillingham 2778
  Donegan 1938
  Gerow 4364
  Hill 2935
  Hill 2936
  Kay 3040
  Kay 3042–3046
  Kimmel 1765
  Kimmel 1768
  Lawton 2673
  Marston 3128
  Midkiff, F. 2829
  Murray 3076
  Murray 3090
  Murray 3092
  Poindexter 3158
  Poindexter 3164
  Short 463
  Weddington 3026
  Wilson 1357
  Wilson 1358–1359
  Wilson 1373
  Bloch 1486
  Bloch 1491
  Burgin 2603
  Burgin 2656
  Burgin 2657
  King 2707
  Petrie 2710
  Short 4444
  Walker 968
  Weddington 3013
  Gerow 4254–4256
  Gerow 4281–4282
  Gerow 4285–4286
  Gerow 4288
  Gerow 4325
  Gerow 4333
  Hayes 249
  Herron 222
  Short 458
  Short 4432
  Short 4436–4437
  Stimson 4074
  Stimson 4085
  Herron 223
  Herron 258

[37]—No preparation for air attack………………

- WD did not supervise HD closely………………

— Inspection by Marshall………………

- WD “ideas,” lack of confidence in………………

[38]— HAWAIIAN DEFENSE PROJECTS (See also AIRCRAFT WARNING SERVICE; WYMAN, COL. THEODORE; SHORT; and related titles.)

- In general………………

- Airfields, built without WD approval…………
HAWAIIAN DEFENSE PROJECTS—Continued

- Airfield delays

- Airfield protection, WD denied

- Airfields progress as of 7 December (See also: Ferrying routes, infra, this title.)

- Ammunition storage magazines

- Assistance requested by Short

- Not from Chief of Engineers

- Considered unnecessary

- Construction spurt after 7 December

- Contract, District Engineer can abrogate

- Contract negotiation

- Contract, 20 December 1940
HAWAIIAN DEFENSE PROJECTS—Continued

-Contract, 20 December 1940

Rafter 780
Reybold 582–583
Robins 698
Robins 713
Robins 722
Robinson 3807
Robinson 3815
Rohl 2277–2280
Schley 630
Schley 655
Shirley 2355
Woodley 3765–3767
Wyman 3482
Wyman 3489

[40]  --Inefficiency of contractors

Clarke 3629
Hunt 751
Hunt 761
King 2531–2533
Sisson 3269
Sisson 3275
Sisson 3280
Wyman 3423
Benson 3734
Hunt 747
Hunt 751
Sisson 3281
Marston 3148
Lynch 2371–2372
Reybold 600
Reybold 606
Wyman 3375
Lumsden 3246
Wyman 3581–3582

--"Profit" plus fixed fee

--Contractors, no complaints against

Marston 3148
Lumsden 3247
Reybold 576
Reybold 579–581
Reybold 599–600
Reybold 602
Robins 700
Robins 705
Robins 713
Robins 715

--Contractors, responsibility for checking

Bragdon 3834–3835
Gesler 651
Kingman 560
Lorence 1682–1687
Lorence 1693
Lumsden 3247
Reybold 576
Reybold 579–581
Reybold 599–600
Reybold 602
Robins 700
Robins 705
Robins 713
Robins 715
Row 2093
Schley 646–650
Schley 657
Schley 664
Schley 667
Wyman 3397
Wyman 3579
AFF Wyman 3868
AFF Wyman 3855
Reybold 577–578
Schley 650
Wyman 3507
Wyman 3597

--Espionage Act

--Letter, TAG, 12 December

[41]  --Contractors sent "scrub" team

Clarke 3626
Kingman 557–558
Sisson 3260–3270
Sisson 3279
Sisson 3280
Woodley 3768
Wyman 3549
HAWAIIAN DEFENSE PROJECTS—Continued

-Contractor, social contact with Army officers

- Delays, reasons for

[44]

--- Fixed-fee contract not cause.

--- Lack of money.

--- Not intentional.

--- Contro...

--- Priorities.

Claterbos 4103
Reybold 597–598
Wyman 3360
Wyman 3365
Wyman 3383
Wyman 3398
Anderson 2482
Anderson 2486–2487
Anderson 2489–2490
Ballard 2577
Bartlett 2494–2499
Bartlett 2511–2515
Bragdon 3837–3839
Bragdon 3845
Capron 2023
Fleming 1337
Hannum 2061–2064
Hunt 770–771
King 2527–2529
King 2539–2543
King 2547–2554
King 2556
King 2564–2565
Lumsden 3228–3229
Lumsden 3236
Lyne 2388
Marston 3138
Marston 3141
Marston 3146
Marston 3149
Moody 3186
Perlitter 3700
Perlitter 3709
Perlitter 2718
Robinson 3621
Rohl 2280
Row 2123–2124
Row 2126–2129
Skeley 651
Short 326–327
Short 512–513
Sisson 3271
Weddington 3024–3025
Wickiser 2458–2565
Wickiser 2471–2472
Wyman 3460
Wyman 3500
Wyman 3568
Wyman 3571
Hunt 769
Perlitter 3706
Wickiser 2469
Haines 3651–3660
Lyne 2366–2367
Lyne 2371
McKee 2422
Willman 2152
Wyman 3425
Bartlett 2406–2408
Bragdon 3847–3848
Colton 678
Colton 681
Fleming 1336
Hunt 772
Marston 3135
Marston 3136
## HAWAIIAN DEFENSE PROJECTS—Continued

- Delays, reasons for—Continued

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- Weather conditions

- Wyman

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- District Engineer responsibility

- Engineers, funds used

- Engineers, chain of command

- Equipment available in Hawaii

- Extensions granted

- Ferrying routes

- Flat contract basis possible
HAWAIIAN DEFENSE PROJECTS—Continued

[44]  -Hawaiian Contractors

AFF-Wyman 3866
Clarke 3625
Connolly 2180
Connolly 2181-2185
Connolly 2191
Dillingham 2751-2752
Dillingham 2757-2758
Fleming 1304
King 2536-2540
Lumsden 3237
Lumsden 3239
Lumsden 3243
McKee 2403-2407
Wyman 3388
Wyman 3494
Wyman 3501
Fleming 1340
King 2557-2558
King 2561-2565
Lorenz 1694
Wyman 3499
Wyman 3513-3514
Wyman 3557
Fleming 1340
Wong 3671
Wyman 3543-3544
Wyman 3425
Fleming 1314
Rafter 781
Fleming 1257
Hunt 773
Clarke 3626
Hunt 762
Benson 3722-3723
Cletterbox 4098
McKee 2418
Schley 642
Wyman 3481
Marston 3150
Short 502
Wyman 3577
Clarke 3628
Gesler 942
Gesler 955
Kestly 3668
Kestly 3670
Robins 728
Robinson 3590
Robinson 3602
Short 505
Sisson 3267
Weddington 3018
Weddington 3023
Wyman 3557
Wyman 3570
Wyman 3473
Wyman 3490-3492
Wyman 3518
Fleming 1330-13333
Hayes 269
Marston 3150
Short 324

--Difficulties dealing with

--Not cause of delay

-Inspection, none from Washington
-Job Order 21
-Navy liaison on
-Navy projects
-Open to all contractors, claimed Wyman

---Contra

-Progress reports to Short

[45]  -Progress unsatisfactory

-Short, attempt to expedite
HAWAIIAN DEFENSE PROJECTS—Continued

- Underground gasoline tanks

AFF—Wyman 3881
Burton 884
Fleming 1342
Hayes 270
Hannum 2063
Lynch 2398–2399
Marston 3135
Marston 3140
Marston 3141
Marston 3149
J. Midkiff 2844
Mollison 816
Perlitter 3699
Perlitter 3703
Perlitter 3708
Rafter 779
Rafter 784
Reybold 591
Schley 654
Weddington 3018
Weddington 3024
Wyman 3449–3454
Wyman 3551
Wyman 3455
Wyman 3458
Wyman 3459

[46] HOFFMAN, ROBERT (See also WYMAN, COL. THEODORE; HAWAIIAN DEFENSE PROJECTS; and related titles.)

- Allegations answered

- Knowledge of Wyman

- Reliability of

[47] INFORMATION CENTER (See AWS.)

INTERCEPTOR COMMAND (See AWS.)

JAPAN (See also ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR; G–2 KNOWLEDGE OF JAPAN; and related titles.)

- Air force considered good

- Attack a surprise

Kimmel 1805–1807
Martin 1903
Arnold 185
Bergquist 1203
Bisch 1518
Bryden 908
DeLany 1724
Dillingham 2771
Dillingham 2774
Donegan 1941
Fielder 2960
Fielder 2989
Hayes 268
Kimmel 1771
Lawton 2677
Marshall 9
Martin 1827
Martin 1830
Martin 1837
McMorris 2870
Midkiff, F. 2808
Midkiff, F. 2924
JAPAN—Continued

- Attack a surprise
  ・Pye 1069–1070
  ・Rudolph 1233–1234
  ・Short 462
  ・Short 288
  ・Short 536
  ・Short 538
  ・Walker 970
  ・Walsh 1386
  ・Wilson 922
  ・Wilson 1355
  ・Wilson 1390
  ・Stimson 4072
  ・Pye 1070
  ・Short 4417
  ・Bellinger 1631
  ・DeLany 1701
  ・Ferguson 4392
  ・Kimmel 1796–1797
  ・Layton 3033–3036
  ・Layton 3043–3052
  ・McMorris 2874
  ・McMorris 2875
  ・McMorris 2889
  ・Miles 123
  ・Miles 129
  ・O’Dell 4514
  ・Rochefort 1656
  ・Gerow 4316–4317
  ・Layton 3060
  ・Stimson 4081
  ・Short 449
  ・Marshall 10–12
  ・Bloch 1513
  ・Murray 3097
  ・Rochefort 1657
  ・Shivers 3203
  ・Bicknell 1413–1418
  ・Fielder 2986
  ・Phillips 1242–1243
  ・Bellinger 1596
  ・Bloch 1503–B
  ・Capron 2021
  ・Coll 3179
  ・Coll 3180
  ・Fielder 2996
  ・Gerow 4320
  ・Grew 4300
  ・Hill 2937
  ・Kimmel 1756
  ・Marshall 54
  ・Pointecker 3163
  ・Short 270
  ・Short 263–294
  ・Short 421
  ・Short 428
  ・Short 449
  ・Short 472
  ・Wilson 920
  ・Wilson 1347
  ・Burgin 2642
  ・Capron 2021–2022
  ・DeLany 1723
  ・Gerow 4247
  ・Gerow 4253

- Attack, joint U. S.-British-Dutch action in event
  of.

- Burning papers.
  ・Staff announcement.

- Caution not to provoke.

- Commission of first overt act by.
JAPAN—Continued
Commission of first overt act by

[49] -Crisis with

Gerow 4318
Hull 4474
McMorris 2869
Mollison 702
Phillips 1111
Phillips 1150
Short 280–281
Marshall 37
Arnold 151
Arnold 156
Arnold 172
Bellingham 1597
Bergquist 1204
Brooks 979–981
Davidson 4143
Dillingham 2771
Dillingham 2784
Donegan 1940
Gerow 4206
Gerow 4294–4296
Gerow 4326
Grew 4190
Grew 4210
Grew 4215
Grew 4222
G–2 Est. 3884
G–2 Est. 3689
Hayes 248
Hayes 256
Loewy 2708
Lockard 1033
Marshall 7–8
Marshall 9–13
J. Midkiff 2843
Martin 1853
Mollison 702
Phillips 1111
Pratt 1084
Rudolph 1226
Rudolph 1232
Stimson 4045
Stimson 4049–4050
Throckmorton 1394
Walsh 1386
Welch 2049
White 1903
Wilson 919–923
Wilson 1347
Wilson 1363
Wilson 1369
Fleming 1330–1331
Short 4114
Allen 3106
Allen 3110
Bellingham 1641–1642
Brooks 983
Burgin 2623
Coll 3168
Coll 3173
Fielder 2975
Fielder 2990
Kogan 1674
Murray 3097
Robson 4364
Short 467
Stimson 4059
Throckmorton 1399

--Known to Short

--Newspapers

[50] --Newspapers

--Newspapers
JAPAN—Continued
-Crisis with—Continued
--Newspapers

White 1994
Wilson 1371
Wilson 1373
Wilson 1379
Bellinger 1631
DeLany 1701
DeLany 1724
Farthing 844
Short 4400
Fielder 3000
Herron 230
Kimmel 1769
Kimmel 1796-1797
Kimmel 1774
Layton 3032-3033
McMorris 2871
McMorris 2885
Miles 111
Miles 123
Miles 129
Rochefort 1654-1656
Rochefort 1660
Stimson 4053-4072
Stimson 4086-4087
Col 3178
Earle 3643
Fielder 2979
Fielder 2984
Layton 3037-3039
Layton 3053
Shivers 3210
Shivers 3212
Shivers 3215
Shivers 3216
Shivers 3224
Short 310
Short 536-537

-G-2 alert for disloyalty
-Mandated Islands closed to U. S.

Martin 1854
Bloch 1503
Bloch 1528-1529
DeLany 1702
Hull 4469-4474
Kimmel 1808
Layton 3054-3055
Miles 102
Miles 104
Pye 1064
R-4466

-Mandated Islands photographic mission—November 1941.

Arnold 152
Gerow 4259
Kimmel 1808
Miles 112
Stimson 4053
Stimson 4086-4087
Truman 1446
Bicknell 1422
Bicknell 1427
Fielder 2967-2971
Fielder 3007
Robison 4363

-Messages intercepted

--Phone call, Dr. Mori to Tokyo

Bicknell 1417-1420
Exhibit 21
Fielder 2960
Knatt 1468
Shivers 3204-3207

--Short informed of

Bicknell 1420
Fielder 2993-2995
JAPAN—Continued

-Naval concentrations

DeLany 1724
Ferguson 4398
Graves 4348
Kimmel 1769–1770
Layton 3039–3040
Layton 3061
Miles 111
Miles 123
Miles 129
Miles 132
O’Dell 4505
Rochefort 1652–1654
Rochefort 1660–1666
Short 451–452
Stimson 4053
Stimson 4080
Stimson 4072
Martin 1858A
Martin 1903
DeLany 1714
DeLany 1724
Kay 3951
McMorris 2869
Short 457
Stimson 4051
White 2006
Wilson 922
Herron 237
Fielder 2989
McMorris 2880
White 1998
Wilson 1365
Fielder 2974
G–2 Est. 3685–3686
G–2 Est. 3694
Gerow 4230
Short 279
Gerow 4204
Allen 3108
Arnold 154
Arnold 157
Arnold 166
Arnold 175
Arnold 181
Bellingham 1590–1591
Bloch 1486
Bloch 1503–B
Bloch 1517
Brooks 979–981
Bryden 908
Burgin 2590
Burgin 2614
Burgin 2638
Burgin 2647
Burgin 2650
Burgin 2656
Cell 3166
Davidson 4150
DeLany 1724
Dillingham 2780–2781
Dillingham 2785
Donegan 1962–1963
Elliott 1004
Farthing 841
Fielder 2983

-Navy strength

-No declaration of war expected (See exhibit "Joint Air Operations Agreement"). [58]

-Contra...

-Not considered strong enough for attack

-Probable attack on Russia

-Probability of attack by
JAPAN—Continued

- Probability of attack by

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-Probability of attack by
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  Short 4440
  Stimson 4051
  Stimson 4082
  Taylor 1076
  Walker 970
  White 1998
  White 2011
  White 2007
  Wilson 1355
  Wilson 1361
  Bergquist 1203–1204
  Delany 1727–1728
  Hayes 265
  Hill 2935
  King 2701
  Marshall 17
  Martin 1837
  Midkiff, F. 2824
  Miles 103
  Miles 105
  Murray 3083
  Murray 3091
  Stimson 4066
  Stimson 4072
  O’Dell 4513
  Donegan 1061
  Ferguson 4396
  Grew 4203
  Kimmel 1778
  Short 451
  Kimmel 1779
  Martin 1823
  McMorris 2890–2891
  Short 4444
  Welch 2009
  Short 389
  Biecknell 1413–1418
  Kimmel 1778
  Short 451
  Arnold 182
  Bellinger 1579
  Martin 1823
  Martin 1830
  Short 4441
  Ferguson 4389–4391
  Kogan 1677
  Delany 1726
  Donegan 1938
  Hayes 269
  Kimmel 1767
  Kimmel 1803–1804
  McMorris 2879
  Short 368
  Short 369
  Short 461–462
  Stimson 4064
  Stimson 4066
  Short 368–369
  Kimmel 1757
  Kimmel 1802
  Layton 3041
  McMorris 2870
  Pye 1040–1043

--Air attack probable

--Australian intelligence report
--Discussed often
--Grew memo
--Nothing done to avoid surprise attack

--Plan, in case of surprise
--Predicted by G-2
--Predicted by Grew, 27 January 1941

[55] --Predicted in Joint Air Operations Agreement

--Rumors
--S/N ltr, 24 January
---Copy to Short
--Submarine danger
JAPAN—Continued

- Probability of attack by—Continued
  -- Surprise invasion impossible —
    Marshall 17
    Midkiff, F. 2825
    Wilson 1351
    Wilson 1354
    Walsh 1387

- Ships ceased use of ports 2 months before
  Fielder 2974
  Walsh 1387

- Ultimatum, 26 November
  Ferguson 4396
  Gerow 4320
  Gerow 4330
  Grew 4207—4208
  Grew 4215
  Hull 4479–4480
  Kimmel 1812
  Short 4427
  Stimson 4079

[56] - War considered imminent
  Coll 3168
  Fielder 2986
  Fielder 2988
  Ferguson 4388
  Gerow 4229
  Gerow 4237
  Gerow 4329
  Graves 4348
  G–2 Est. 3684
  Hull 4483
  Kay 3940
  Martin 1854
  McMorris 2868
  McMorris 2886
  Midkiff J. 2836
  Murray 3091
  O’Dell 4514
  Short 467–468
  Short 531
  Short 4413
  Short 4418
  Short 4427
  Stimson 4050
  Stimson 4053
  Stimson 4061
  Davidson 4143–4144
  Davidson 4150–4151
  Donegan 1938
  Layton 3062
  Midkiff, F. 2807
  Petrie 2714
  Midkiff, F. 2810
  Midkiff, F. 2813
  Petrie 2718
  Wells 2736
  Wells 2742
  White 2004–2005
  Fielder 2991
  Short 401–405
  Taylor 3254
  Fielder 2966
  Fielder 2978
  Fielder 2986
  Fielder 3008
  Kay 3941
  King 2706
  McMorris 2884
  Pratt 1973
  Shivers 3206–3207
  Shivers 3209

-- Contro --

[57] JAPANESE IN HAWAII (See also ALERT NO. 1; JAPAN—caution not to provoke; and related titles.)

- Alien registration

- Espionage

JAPANESE IN HAWAII—Continued

- Espionage
  Shivers 3218
  Shivers 3223
  Short 4420
  Taylor 3151
  Wells 2739

  -- None before 7 December
  Pratt 1974-1976
  Fielder 2952
  Fielder 2980
  Martin 1854
  Fielder 3006-3007
  Martin 1911-1912
  Powell 3001
  Allen 3118
  Dillingham 2769
  Dillingham 2770
  Dillingham 2775
  Fielder 2948
  Hayes 262
  Herron 224
  Meurlott 3921
  Pratt 1987
  Wells 2733
  Wells 2735
  Wilson 1364
  Farthing 838
  Hayes 255
  Hill 2940
  King 2702
  Locsey 2793-2794
  Martin 1829
  Midkiff F. 2809
  Moody 3200
  Pratt 1973
  Pratt 1981-1983
  Wells 2741
  White 1990
  White 1999-2000
  Dingeman 3196
  Fielder 2949
  Fielder 2953
  Fielder 2987
  Martin 1834
  Martin 1836-1837
  McMorris 2890
  Midkiff F. 2812
  Phillips 1134

- "Most Probable Danger"

- Not arrogant, merely uneasy
- Number of

  Short 433
  Short 457
  Burgin 2647
  Fielder 2947
  King 2704
  Lawton 2687
  Marshall 50
  Meurlott 3920
  Petrie 2715
  Petrie 2717
  Phillips 1111
  Phillips 1133
  Poindexter 3162
  Short 299
  Wells 2727
JAPANESE IN HAWAII—Continued

-Sabotage by, none before 7 December

- Contra

[59] -Sabotage by, not expected

- Contra

--- Anderson 2488
    Dillingham 2771
    Herron 225
    Kay 3941
    Lynch 2371
    Martin 1829, 1832
    Wells 2740, 91
    White 19

    Wilson 926
    Herron 225
    Hill 2937
    Meurillot 3922
    Mclliff F. 3826
    Mclliff J. 2839
    Petrie 2730

    Burgin 2611
    Burgin 2648
    Fielder 2952
    Fielder 2956
    Fielder 2958
    Fielder 2962-2904
    Fielder 3009
    Flood 2855
    Hain 3315
    Hain 3340
    Hain 3342
    Kay 3949
    Lawton 2682
    Lawton 2684
    Lawton 2688
    Loeve 2799
    Marshall 50
    Martin 1930
    Martin 1990
    McMorris 2870
    Mollison 809
    Poindexter 3159
    Poindexter 3161
    Poindexter 3162
    Pratt 1974
    Scanlon 4166
    Scanlon 4181
    Short 289
    Short 527
    Welch 2009
    White 1999

--- KIMMEL

-CINCPAC, 1 February '41 (See also ARMY-Navy Cooperation—Conferences Short and Kimmel.)

-Duties

--- Kimmel 1735
    Kimmel 1736-1738
    Kimmel 1739-1745
    Kimmel 1747
    Kimmel 1789
    Bicknell 1422-1423
    Fielder 2964
    Pratt 1973
    Shivers 3206-3207
    Shivers 3218
LOCAL JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE (See HAWAIIAN DEFENSE.)

[61] MARSHALL, GENERAL GEORGE C. (See also AIRCRAFT WARNING SERVICE; ALERT NO. 1; JAPAN, Attack a surprise; JAPAN, Probability of Attack; and related titles.)

Authority to sign "Marshall" ...........................................
Bryden 905
Marshall 40
Gerow 4333
Marshall 39
Stimson 4001
Gerow 4243

-Away on 27 November ......................................................

-Chief of Staff
-Initials on document .......................................................
Bryden 904
Marshall 39

-Communications with Short (See also SHORT, -Msgs, WD and TAG.)

--All in WD files .........................................................
Marshall 19

--Ltr 5 March ..............................................................
Marshall 19-20

--Ltr 15 March ............................................................
Marshall 21-25

--Ltr 14 April .............................................................
Marshall 26-27

--Ltr 6 May .................................................................
Marshall 27-28

--Message 7 December (See also SHORT, -Msg WD, 7 Dec.)

---Washington Signal Office handling ..................................
French 187-206

--Message to AWS "eyes alone" May 1941 ..............................
Fleming 1271

--Personal letters .......................................................  
Marshall 20

--Letters not "specific directives" .................................  
Marshall 33

--Ltr 7 February ........................................................
Marshall 13

--Ltr 19 February .......................................................  
Short 321-323

--Letter received 29 May ...............................................  
Marshall 28

--Letter 10 October ....................................................  
Marshall 29

--Letter, 14 October ..................................................  
Marshall 31-32

[62] --Letter 28 October ..................................................
Bryden 900-905

--Message, WD, 27 November (See also under SHORT, -Msg WD, 27 Nov.)

---Participation in .....................................................  
Scanlon 4183
Short 417
Bryden 903
Marshall 40-42
Stimson 4069
Gerow 4280
Gerow 4289-4291
Gerow 4287-4288
Marshall 38
Short 286-287
Short 380
Short 419-420
Short 4452
Short 4458
Stimson 4061-4062
Stimson 4084
Dillingham 2777
Taylor 3254
Fielder 2946
Short 318-320

MARTIAL LAW ..............................................................

-Delayed 8 December ......................................................

-
NAvy (See also ARMY-NAVY AGREEMENTS; ARMY-NAVY COOPERATION; ARMY-NAVY EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION; Kimmel; NAVY MISSION IN HAWAII; RECONNAISSANCE; and related titles.)

-Agreements with Army (See ARMY-NAVY AGREEMENTS.)

-Base Defense Air Force

Bellinger 1576-1585
Bellinger 1589
Bellinger 1590-1591
Bellinger 1593-1596
Bellinger 1603-1604
Bellinger 1625-1628
Bellinger 1640
Bloch 1476
Bloch 1621-1623

-CINCPAC not restricted on Fleet use

McMorris 2881
Bloch 1497
Bloch 1530
Pye 1066-1067
Bellinger 1607
Herron 222
Kimmel 1765

-Condition No. 1

Bloch 1512
DeLany 1725

-Daily reports by

Kimmel 1802-1803

-Defensive deployments, not Navy term

-Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan (See ARMY-NAVY AGREEMENTS.)

-Ltr, S/N to S/W, 24 January 1941. (See under JAPAN.)

-Ltr, January 25, Richardson to S/N (See under JAPAN, -Probability of attack by.)

-Ltr, 14 October, 2-CL-41

Kimmel 1747
Kimmel 1749-1750
Kimmel 1802-1803
Bello 1596
Bloch 1603-A
DeLany 1723

-Message 16 October, new Jap cabinet *(See also SHORT, -Mag WD 16 October.)

-Message 27 November (See ARMY-NAVY EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION, -War Warning Message 27 Nov.)

-Message, ONI, 1 December, Jap carriers

-Kimmel 1769

-Messages, 3, 4 and 6 December (See also under ARMY-NAVY EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION.)

-Messages to CINCPAC

McKee 80

-Naval Intelligence (See also ARMY-NAVY EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION, -G-2-ONI.)

-Activities limited (See also JAPAN, -Fleet Movement; ARMY-NAVY EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION, -G-2-ONI.)

Fielder 2066
DeLany 1701-1703
Layton 3061
Layton 3063
Rochefort 1651
Rochefort 1655-1660
Rochefort 1664
Shivers 3214

Fielder 3000
Layton 3081-3032
Layton 3051
McMorris 2885
Rochefort 1650-1652
Rochefort 1655-1656
Rochefort 1658-1664
NAVY—Continued
-Naval plane program, 1940
Bellinger 1581
Bloh 1536
Bellinger 1597
Bloh 1503–B and –C
DeLany 1723
Fielder 2996
Gerow 4258
Herron 235–240
McKee 80
Short 414
Bloh 1513–1515
Herron 235–240
McKee 64
McKee 72
McMorris 2385
McKee 70
Bloh 1470–1473
McKee 60
Bloh 1474
Bloh 1479–1480
Bloh 1512
Gerow 4325
McKee 58–59
McKee 61–63
McKee 67–68
McKee 76
McKee 84
Mollison 792
O’Dell 4512
Phillips 1158
Short 280–281

[67] NAVY MISSION IN HAWAII
-Hawaiian Defense SOP
-Kimmel and Bloh, relations between
ORANGE PLAN—obsolete
RAINBOW PLAN (See also HAWAIIAN DEFENSE—SOP 9 November.)

[67] RECONNAISSANCE (See also AIRCRAFT WARNING SERVICE; ALERTS IN HAWAII; ALERT NO. 1; HAWAIIAN DEFENSE; NAVY; SHORT; and related titles.)
-Army never asked Navy
-By Army
Phillips 1241
Burgin 2600
Hain 3331
Hayes 246
Kimmel 1744–1745
Kimmel 1809
Marshall 47
Marshall 48–49
Martin 1817
Martin 1844
Mollison 812
Pye 1054
Pye 1067
Short 280–281
Short 307–308
Short 374
Short 375–376
Short 460
Short 486
Herron 213–214
Martin 1821
Martin 1842
Martin 1851–1852
Rudolph 1224
Short 486
Burgin 2599
Herron 212
Herron 233
Lawton 2906
Lawton 2674
Mollison 823

--Incidental to training

--Insignificant
[68] --Not ordered by Short.

[69] --Contra...
RECONNAISSANCE—Continued

-Distant by Navy—

-Complaints by Martin—
---G-3 never asked Navy—
---Lack of confidence in—
---Navy never requested Army planes for—
---Navy patrols—

---Patrols best reconnaissance—
---Reconnaissance merely incidental—

[70]---Navy, planes available—

---Insufficient—

---None, 7 December—
---Not cover vs. air raids—
---Route used unknown—

Pye 1062
Pye 1067
Rudolph 1232
Rudolph 1233-1234
Short 281-282
Short 373
Short 378-379
Short 380
Short 383
Short 393-394
Stimson 4071
White 2005
Wilson 1352
Martin 1846-1847
Donegan 1851
Lawton 2674
Lawton 2678
Martin 1856
Midkiff F. 7831
Rudolph 1222
Short 303
Bellingher 1509-1600
Bellingher 1602-1603
Bellingher 1612-1619
Kimmel 1761
Kimmel 1794-1795
Kimmel 1810-1811
Lawton 2676
Short 450
Bellingher 1630-1631
Lawton 2673
Lawton 2677
Martin 1822
Burgin 2600
Burgin 2672
Martin 1822
Martin 1850-1857
Mollison 811
Short 375
Short 475
Lawton 2672
RECONNAISSANCE—Continued

- Distant by Navy—Continued
  
  Short 359–360
  Short 375–376
  Short 475
  Bloch 1489–1490
  Martin 1847
  Short 4483
  Kimmel 1772
  Burgin 2600
  Donegan 1950
  Fielder 2989–2990
  Moody 3199
  Short 356–360
  White 2001
  Short 375
  Brooks 993
  Molisson 811
  Short 384
  Short 4438
  Lawton 2674
  Short 4439
  Bellinger 1582
  Gerow 4321
  Short 387–389
  Herron 214

  - None 7 December
  - Not discussed by Short and Kimmel 27 November conference.
  - Not well coordinated.

- Joint Air Operations Agreement (See also ARMY-NAVY AGREEMENTS).

- Did not delay defense work.
  
  - Contra

- False rumor of death.
- Furnished equipment for Canal Project.
- Hawaiian Contractors, dominant figure in.

- Investigation of.

- Knew nothing about AWS.
- Block, Werner, friendship with.

[71] --Sunday, day off.

[72] ROHL, HANS WILHELM (See also WYMAN, COL. THEODORE).
ROHL, HANS WILHELM—Continued
-Reliability of

Combs 2448
Connolly 2185-2186
Fleming 1325
Geisler 944
Horne 2507
Reybold 577
Reybold 607
Robins 704
Robins 714
Row 2152
Siliphon 1557-1558
Siliphon 1561
Wyman 3511
Wyman 3527
Wyman 3561
Anstey 4023
Bicknell 1433-1434
Burton 860-870
Clarke 3655
Claterbos 4101
Fielder 3002
Fleming 1296
Harrington 3959
Harrington 3964
Harrington 3970
Hunt 767
King 2526
King 2544
King 2555
Marston 3145
Mourlott 3925
Pine 2333-2384
Robinson 3592
Schlesinger 3288-3289
Schlesinger 3297
Shors, A. T. 3948
Wyman 3532
Zucia 2595
Bartlett 2500-2508
Combs 2442
Combs 2446
Combs 2449
Dillingham 2760-2761
F. B. I. 4028-4030
Hunt 749
Hunt 771
King 2525-2528
Lewis 1184
Pine 3992
Pratt 1979
Robinson 3594

-Questionable

-Rohl and Wyman (See under WYMAN.)

-Barber 3972-3974
Barber 3983
Bicknell 1433
Butterfield 4104-4115
Butterfield 4119
Burton 855-860
Burton 879
Carmichael 4017-4018
Claterbos 4098
Combs 2412
Combs 2439-2442
ROHL, HANS WILHELM—Continued

- Rohl, citizenship.
SHORT (See AIRCRAFT WARNING SERVICE; ARMY-NAVY AGREEMENTS, CO-OPERATION, and EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION; ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR; HAWAIIAN DEFENSE PROJECTS; JAPAN; KIMMEL; MARSHALL; and related titles and subtitles.)

-Caution not to alarm public-----------------

Allen 3109
Burgin 2609
Burgin 2621
Burgin 2627-2628
Burgin 2629-2630
Burgin 2642
Burgin 2647
Burgin 2653
Dingeman 3195-3196
Gerow 4276
Gerow 4321
Kimmel 1756
Lawton 2681
Phillips 1111
Scanlon 4169
Short 427-428
Short 532-533
Throckmorton 1394
Throckmorton 1396-1397
Wilson 1370
Wilson 1375
Loeey 2789
Poindexter 3156
Burgin 2651
Throckmorton 1398
Burgin 2625
Burgin 2626
Donegan 1946
Hayes 265
Pratt 1978
Throckmorton 1408-1409

-Contrario-----------------------------------

-Prior maneuvers did not alarm (See also ALERTS IN HAWAII, -Alarmed Public.)

-Chief of Staff, Col. Phillips, criticized-----------------

-Communications with Marshall (See MARSHALL, -Communications with Short.)

[77] -Conferences with subordinates-----------------

Burgin 2624
Burgin 2662
Burgin 2663
Hayes 264
Murray 3084
Murray 3087
Murray 3097
Rudolph 1227-1228
Coll 3178
Dillingham 2784
Gerow 4274
Herron 238
Dillingham 2746-2747
Gerow 4327
Hill 2937
Loeey 2789
Loeey 2802
Midkiff F. 2804
Midkiff F. 2830
Midkiff J. 2842
Midkiff J. 2846
Poindexter 3154
Allen 3115
Allen 3119
Burgin 2607
Burgin 2613
Dillingham 2780

-Considered guilty-------------------------------

-Considered O. K---------------------------------

-Criticized (See also ALERT NO. 1, -Not a mistake, -Contrario.)
SHORT—Continued

- Differences with Kimmel (See also ARMY-NAVY COOPERATION)
  -- Question of joint command
    DeLaney 1732
    Kimmel 1760
    Short 302
    Kimmel 1777
  -- Contra (See also ARMY-NAVY COOPERATION, Conferences, Short and Kimmel).
- District engineer not under
  [78] Failed to order reconnaissance, 27 November
    Short 500
    Gerow 4274
    Phillips 1141
    Short 378
    Short 4436-4437
    Stimson 4063
    Wilson 1849

- Failure to revise defense plan
  McKee 75
- Herron fully informed, 5-7 February
  Herron 223-224
- Knew of Wyman-Lyman feud
  Bloch 1509
  Fleming 1281-1282
  Fleming 1322

- Letter from Arnold about air routes
  Marshall 21
- Letter, 15 March 1941, air attack vulnerability
- Letter to War Department, 10 June
  Short 360
- Letter to Kimmel, 5 August re AWS
  Short 485
- Letter, civilians, to President, 22 December, complimenting Short
  Midkiff F. 2803-2805
  Short 342-343
  Wells 2728
- Letter from Governor, 23 December, complimenting work

- Messages, WD changes military situation
  Short 449
  McKee 76
- Message, no WD, that war inevitable
  Short 451
  Short 451
  Kimmel 1812

- Message to AG, 10 June
  Short 488
  Short 503
  Short 512
  Short 327

- Message from AG, 26 June
  Marshall 33-35
  Short 448
  Stimson 4055

- Message, TAG, 7 July
  Short 327
  Marshall 33-35
  Short 448
  Short 485

[79] Messages from WD, none from July-16 October
- Message, WD, 16 October (See also NAVY, 16 Oct. new Jap cabinet)
  Short 447
  Bloch 1503-A
  Hain 3305
  Short 279
  Short 447
  Short 447
  Stimson 4055
  Short 412-413
  Hain 3307
  Gerow 4257
  Stimson 4055
  Gerow 4264
  Arnold 154
  Arnold 199
  Burkin 2620
  DeLany 1698
  Dingleman 3197
  Donegan 1942-1943
  Gerow 4233
  Gerow 4268-4272
  Fielder 2990
  Hain 3307
  Hain 3309
  Hayes 267
  King 2763
  Lawton 2678
| Message, WD, 27 November                           | Lawton 2650  |
|                                                  | Lawton 2690  |
|                                                  | Layton 3041  |
|                                                  | Marshall 35-40 |
|                                                  | Martin 1826  |
|                                                  | Martin 1835  |
|                                                  | Martin 1842  |
|                                                  | Miles 115    |
|                                                  | Mollison 792 |
|                                                  | Murray 3086  |
|                                                  | Murray 3094  |
|                                                  | Murray 3095  |
|                                                  | Phillips 111 |
|                                                  | Pratt 1975-1976 |
|                                                  | Pye 1048     |
|                                                  | Scanlon 4183 |
|                                                  | Short 280-282 |
|                                                  | Short 286    |
|                                                  | Short 447    |
|                                                  | Stimson 4056 |
|                                                  | Stimson 4083 |
|                                                  | Throckmorton 1390 |
|                                                  | Welch 2021   |
|                                                  | White 1994-1995 |
|                                                  | Wilson 1347-1348 |
|                                                  | Bloch 1508   |
| --Bloch not informed of                        | Gerow 4250-4253 |
| --Interpretation                                | Gerow 4256   |
|                                                  | Gerow 4277   |
|                                                  | Gerow 4284   |
|                                                  | Gerow 4293   |
|                                                  | Gerow 4300   |
|                                                  | Gerow 4321   |
|                                                  | Gerow 4328   |
|                                                  | Marshall 43  |
|                                                  | Short 4436-4437 |
|                                                  | Stimson 4071-4076 |
|                                                  | Throckmorton 1402 |
|                                                  | Wilson 1376-1378 |
|                                                  | Gerow 4303   |
|                                                  | Miles 118    |
|                                                  | Phillips 1121 |
| --Miles objections to Arnold about               | Short 416    |
| --Staff sections notified of                    | Short 469    |
|                                                  | Burr 3070    |
|                                                  | Kimmel 1779  |
|                                                  | Layton 3058  |
|                                                  | Arnold 173   |
|                                                  | Fielder 2962 |
|                                                  | Fielder 2998 |
|                                                  | Gerow 4237   |
|                                                  | Gerow 4260   |
|                                                  | Gerow 4298   |
|                                                  | Halsey 3315  |
|                                                  | Lawton 2679  |
|                                                  | Marshall 35  |
|                                                  | Miles 116-117 |
|                                                  | Phillips 1128 |
|                                                  | Phillips 1131 |
|                                                  | Phillips 1142 |
|                                                  | Scanlon 4182 |
|                                                  | Stimson 4093 |
SHORT—Continued
[81] - Message, TAG, No. 482, 28 November.... Arnold 170–171
Arnold 174–177
Bryden 907
Hain 3310
Marshall 41
Miles 117
Sealion 4164–4165
Sealion 4168
Sealion 4174–4178
Short 263–294
Stimson 4083
---Considered reply to 27 Nov. message.---
---Reply to--------
Arnold 178
Gerow 4287–4288
Hain 3311
Short 294–296
Gerow 4305
Short 308
Short 447
Stimson 4059
Short 464–466
---Messages, from WD, none after 28 November---
---Message, 6 December from Intelligence Officer---
---Message, WD, 7 Dec. (See also MARSHALL,
-COMMUNICATIONS WITH SHORT, -MSG
WD 7 December.)---
---Not surprised Japan failed to declare war. (See
also JAPAN, - No declaration of war expected.)---
[82] ---Read newspapers re Japan and U. S.
(See also JAPAN, - Crisis with, ---
Newspapers.)---
---Scrambler Phone---
Fielder 2999
French 189
French 205
Gerow 4309
Middkiff F. 2831
Short 310
Bicknell 1414
Burgin 2624
Donegan 1938
Fielder 2088
Short 519
Throckmorton 1389
---Staff conference weekly---
---Took command 7 February---
---At Marshall's request---
---Use of ROTC after 7 December---
---War Department assigned HD Personnel---
---Worked with Wyman, directly---
[83] TENNEY COMMITTEE, California State
Legislature.

WAR COUNCIL

Arno...
[54] WYMAN, COL. THEODORE (See also CANOL PROJECT; HAWAIIAN DEFENSE PROJECTS; ROHL, HANS WILHELM; AIRCRAFT WARNING SERVICE; and related titles.)

- AW 104 used on
  - Nannum 2069
  - Wyman 3520
  - Fleming 1279
  - Fleming 1301
  - Fleming 1308
  - Hannum 2038–2044
  - Hannum 2068
  - King 2532–2555
  - Lumsden 2323–2324
  - Lumsden 2350
  - Marton 3147
  - Reynold 609
  - Robbins 717
  - Row 2094–2099
  - Row 2104–2105
  - Row 2122–2123
  - Wyman 3516
  - Hannum 2089–2090
  - Lynch 2369
  - Braden 3851
  - Flood 2863
  - Hannum 2085
  - Lynch 2370
  - Martin 1891–1892
  - Marton 3134
  - McKee 2422
  - Reynold 608
  - Reynold 716
  - Schley 655
  - Ballard 2575–2576
  - Benson 3748
  - Reynold 596
  - Dillingham 2779–2780
  - Reynold 630
  - Wyman 3374
  - Hunt 762

- Complaints to, about delays
  - Hannum 2091
  - Lynch 2369
  - Braden 3851
  - Flood 2863
  - Hannum 2085
  - Lynch 2370
  - Martin 1891–1892
  - Marton 3134
  - McKee 2422
  - Reynold 608
  - Reynold 716
  - Schley 655
  - Ballard 2575–2576
  - Benson 3748
  - Reynold 596
  - Dillingham 2779–2780
  - Reynold 630
  - Wyman 3374
  - Hunt 762

[55] - Defense projects open to other contractors (See also HAWAIIAN DEFENSE PROJECTS, -Open to all contractors.)

- Difficulties with McKee

- Drunkenness, alleged

- Contra

- Contracting officer

- Decorated with DSM

- Dillingham 2750
- Kingman 549
- Kingman 555
- Marshall 52
- Short 488
- Nannum 2069
- Wyman 3520
- Fleming 1279
- Fleming 1301
- Fleming 1308
- Hannum 2038–2044
- Hannum 2068
- King 2532–2555
- Lumsden 2323–2324
- Lumsden 2350
- Marton 3147
- Reynold 609
- Robbins 717
- Row 2094–2099
- Row 2104–2105
- Row 2122–2123
- Wyman 3516
- Hannum 2089–2090
- Lynch 2369
- Braden 3851
- Flood 2863
- Hannum 2085
- Lynch 2370
- Martin 1891–1892
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<td>Witness was C of 8, HD from 5 Nov., 1941 after serving as G-3 from July of that year. Had related through various staff sections as another of C of 8 appointment. Alert No. 3 was ordered immediately upon attack. Witness as senior Army member of Local Joint Planning Committee did not function actively and did not deem it necessary to modify the joint plan after the messages of Nov. 27 and 28 were received. No consultation with Navy took place between 27 Nov. and 7 Dec.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Witness</td>
<td>Identifying or similar subject matter</td>
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<td>Maj. Gen. Maxwell Murray (Vol. 27 APHB; Vol. 3 RC)</td>
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<td>Vol. 27; 3075; 3076-3077</td>
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<td>Maj. Gen. Henry T. Burgin (Vol. 24 APHB; Vol. 3 RC)</td>
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<td>Vol. 12; 1348; 1351; 1355-1357</td>
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<tr>
<td>Witness</td>
<td>Identical or similar subject matter</td>
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<td>APHB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col. George W. Rockwell (Vol. 12 APHB; Vol. 9 RC)</td>
<td>Identifying data, Jap consulate burned papers. Was assistant G-2 in charge of counter intelligence, H I D, October 1940 to April 1943. At about 1700, Friday, 4 Dec witness was informed by FBI that Japanese Consul was burning official documents. This intelligence was communicated by witness to the staff conference at 1900, Tuesday, 5 Dec. The conference made comment.</td>
<td>Vol. 15: 1709.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Witness</td>
<td>Identical or similar subject matter</td>
<td>(Cross references)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Duties and identifying information.</td>
<td>Vol. 27; 3120-3121.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Preparations for defense.</td>
<td>Vol. 27; 3013-3014; 3017-3024; 3024-3027.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Occurrences 7 December 1941.</td>
<td>Vol. 27; 3013-3020; 3022-3027.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Aircraft.</td>
<td>Vol. 27; 3014-3017; 3019; 3023-3024.</td>
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APPENDIX No. 5

This appendix consists of comparisons of the Records of the Roberts Commission and the Army Pearl Harbor Board as to any conflicts between the two Records.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Witness</th>
<th>Statements RC</th>
<th>Statements APHB</th>
<th>Conflicts and discrepancies</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Major General Walter Campbell Short (Vol. 2 and 4, RC; Vols. 4 and 5, APHB)</td>
<td>In response to question &quot;The only thing that the Joint Agreement between you seems to cover is distant reconnaissance?&quot; General Short responded, &quot;Yes. That was very definitely placed upon the Army even to the point of controlling the planes, which is the only logical way because otherwise if two people are made responsible they may be making reconnaissance in the same sector and another sector may be forgotten.&quot; (Vol. 2, 46.)</td>
<td>&quot;* * * long-distance reconnaissance was definitely a function of the Navy * * *&quot; (Vol. 4, 91)</td>
<td>Conflict in responsibility for reconnaissance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;Up to time of attack, small amount of this wire (for flying air fields against sabotage or uprisings) * * * had been received * * *&quot; (Vol. 2, 46.)</td>
<td>* * * by 8:50 all of the pursuit that was serviceable were in the air. * * * By 11:40 all the bombers that were still serviceable were in the air—and sent out on distance reconnaissance.&quot; (Vol. 2, 81)</td>
<td>Slight discrepancy in whether fencing received.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;They made a search * * * starting * * * at 1127 they sent—first at 1140, at 1300, and 1330, and then the first search they made under Navy control was at 1325 * * *&quot; (Vol. 14; 1530)</td>
<td>* * * by 7:50 all the pursuit that was in condition to get into the air was put into the air.&quot; (Vol. 4, 317).</td>
<td>Slight discrepancy in time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;* * * the 24th Division * * * were out firing on enemy planes as early as 8:11. They moved to battle positions about 8:30, and at 8 o'clock in the afternoon all troops in this group were in battle positions and had one day firing. * * * the 25th Division also started moving into its battle position at 8:30 and by 4 in the afternoon was in its battle position with one day of firing.&quot; (Vol. 2, 88)</td>
<td>&quot;The 34th Division turned out at 8:10 and returned the fire of the enemy planes and at 8:30 they were moving out to their battle positions. The 26th Division was also moving out to their battle positions by 8:30. By 4 o'clock the 26th Division were all in battle positions and the 35th by 5 o'clock.&quot; (Vol. 4, 316).</td>
<td>Some slight discrepancy in time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;My reconnaissance under the plan with the Navy is limited to just the immediate offshore of the island, ordinarily limited to 15 miles. The Navy had assumed full responsibility for the distant reconnaissance.&quot; (Vol. 2; 107)</td>
<td>Distant reconnaissance meant &quot;anything beyond the 20 mile zone&quot;. (Vol. 4; 372)</td>
<td>Discrepancy in extent of inshore patrol.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Witness</th>
<th>Statements RC</th>
<th>Statements APHB</th>
<th>Conflicts and discrepancies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Major General Walter Campbell Short—Continued</td>
<td>&quot;So we made a comprehensive study and had asked to have probably 187 B-17s so that we could make a 360-degree patrol for a thousand miles.&quot; (Vol. 2: 147.)</td>
<td>&quot;We had asked * * * we made a study and showed them it was necessary to have 187 B-17s for a proper reconnaissance in case the Navy was ever pulled out * * *.&quot; (Vol. 5: 230.)</td>
<td>Slight discrepancy in number of B-17s requested.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Didn't see Navy message of 27 Nov. &quot;this is a war warning&quot;. (Vol. 5: 163.)</td>
<td>&quot;If I feel sure that I have seen that message, although we couldn't find a copy of it in our headquarters, when we looked for it, for the Roberts Commission Report. That was during the period when I was down there at Kimmel's headquarters every day for three or four days in all probability he either read it to me or I read it right there, because it is familiar to me, but we couldn't find a copy.&quot; (Vol. 4: 415-416.)</td>
<td>Confusion as to whether had or had not seen Navy message of 27 Nov.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Naval Officers at AWS at the interceptor command station on morning of 7 Dec 1941. &quot;There had been on previous days, and as a matter of fact the Navy had felt that it would be a good idea to have a little more of that * * * Total of 30 officers at interceptor command station including the normal quota of three Naval Officers. (Vol. 2: 69-70)</td>
<td>Whether a Naval man was actually detailed as part of the Information Center witness could not say definitely. &quot;I know the request had been made, that it was contemplated, and I thought it had been carried out.&quot; (Vol. 5: 492)</td>
<td>Confusion as to whether or not Navy man detailed to interceptor command post by Navy.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major George S. Welch (Tm 1 LT.) (Vol. 4 R.C., Vol. 18 APHB)</td>
<td>In testifying as to the enemy planes brought down witness declared &quot;I was given credit for 5, but I did not see the other one.&quot; (Vol. 4: 430.)</td>
<td>In speaking of the number of Jap planes shot down by the flats declared &quot;I claimed the planes definitely.&quot; (Vol. 18: 2012.)</td>
<td>Some confusion in testimony concerning the number of planes brought down by witness.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In response to the question whether there were any machine guns, witness responded &quot;No, sir,&quot; and later in response to the question &quot;Was there any installation of antiaircraft guns ready for action then?&quot; witness responded &quot;No, sir, there were none ready. There were pistols, but no guns in them.&quot; (Vol. 4: 427.)</td>
<td>&quot;** * the men had machine guns out, 10 Caliber ground guns and they shot back at this man, this Jap.&quot; (Vol. 18: 2011.)</td>
<td>The question as to whether there were or were not machine guns.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Sgt Lowell V. Klat (Vol. 4, BC—Vol. 13, APHB)</td>
<td>** we would see them cut loose with their machine guns and numerous planes there was splinters flying and things like that. And at that, why, I figured it was something important, so I told my detail to get their packs, got the trucks down, and be ready to take off. And while I was doing that Lt. Saltzman gave the word that we were on the alert, to go to our battalion command post and set up communications.&quot; (Vol. 4: 455)</td>
<td>Witness testified that Lt. Saltzman notified witness before the bombing to &quot;get my stuff and hit the field.&quot; (Vol. 13: 1460)</td>
<td>Slight discrepancy as to time witness received order.</td>
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1st. Sgt. Lowell V. Klatz—Continued

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<tr>
<th>Witness</th>
<th>Statements RC</th>
<th>Statements APHB</th>
<th>Conflicts and discrepancies</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st. Sgt. Lowell V. Klatz</td>
<td>In response to question, did both planes crash or just one, witness replied &quot;No, Sir; only the second one, the one that swung to the left. We didn't get a chance to fire at the first one to amount to anything because he pulled away from us pretty fast, but the other one pulled—swung right around broadside to us.&quot; (Vol. 4: 407)</td>
<td>&quot;The communications officer, Lt. Salzman, and I were fortunate enough to knock both of the down with BAR fire.&quot; (Vol. 15: 146)</td>
<td>Slight discrepancy in number of planes brought down by witness.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonel Walter G. Phillips, (Vol. 2 R C V 16 APHB)</td>
<td>Witness states he did not believe the Navy furnished him a copy of telegram sent by Navy operations on 27 Nov. (Vol. 3: 212)</td>
<td>&quot;That message was received by the General, and I believe it was read to us all. I am not positive about that though&quot;. (Vol. 10: 1115)</td>
<td>Witness evasive. C of S normally gets communications before CG. Did he know contents or not? Flat contradiction. Did he expect attack or not?</td>
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<td></td>
<td>&quot;** hostility or attack from without, any such thing wasn't visualized by us at that time. ** we didn't visualize anything from without at that time, Sir&quot;. (Vol. 3: 213; cf. 290)</td>
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<td>Witness stated that Alert No. 1 was sufficient to carry out the directive of 27 Nov. (Vol. 3: 221)</td>
<td>Witness stated that all higher commanders and staff were &quot;all thoroughly alert and fully conscious of the possibility&quot; or immensity of war, &quot;the Navy as well as the Army&quot;. (Vol. 10: 1116)</td>
<td>Conflict as to witness’ belief in sufficiency of Alert No. 1.</td>
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<td>Witness testified in the event of sabotage or attack the question of fire is a greater hazard, consequently, the more dispersed the planes are the less chance there is of fire spreading.</td>
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### PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD

#### APPENDIX No. 6

**Table of Important Dates**

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<tr>
<th>Date</th>
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<td>11 February 1922</td>
<td>Washington Treaty with Japan</td>
<td>4469</td>
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<td>20 February 1922</td>
<td>Hoh married Mrs. Hibbert</td>
<td>3995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 January 1924</td>
<td>Hoh bought yacht PANDORA</td>
<td>3995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 January 1928</td>
<td>Hoh-Connelly firm formed</td>
<td>3845</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 February 1940</td>
<td>Vega arrived in Honolulu from Balboa.</td>
<td>4115, 4119, 4120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 February 1940</td>
<td>Vega arrived in Honolulu from Balboa.</td>
<td>4111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 April 1940</td>
<td>Admiral Bloch arrived in Pearl Harbor</td>
<td>1470, 1529</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 May 1940</td>
<td>Army alerted, Navy not alerted</td>
<td>212</td>
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<tr>
<td>1 May 1940</td>
<td>Tabulations deconcentration began</td>
<td>3845</td>
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<tr>
<td>1 May 1940</td>
<td>Increases in limit of authority of Dist. &amp; Div. Engrs</td>
<td>3873</td>
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<td>1 May 1940</td>
<td>General Miles entered upon assignment as Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department.</td>
<td>391</td>
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<td>1 June 1940</td>
<td>Message Herron C S re conditions due to alert.</td>
<td>3211</td>
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<td>15 June 1940</td>
<td>Military Appropriations Act $125,000 for Military Intelligence was signed.</td>
<td>732</td>
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<tr>
<td>17 June 1940</td>
<td>Army went on all-out alert for six weeks</td>
<td>214</td>
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<tr>
<td>17 June 1940</td>
<td>Message from Washington directing all-out alert</td>
<td>213</td>
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<td>17 June 1940</td>
<td>Alert</td>
<td>1,295</td>
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<td>17 June 1940</td>
<td>Message from W. D. (Adams) to go to Alert.</td>
<td>3,317</td>
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<td>17 June 1940</td>
<td>Herron's message &quot;W-17th, Secret.&quot;</td>
<td>3,318</td>
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<td>17 June 1940</td>
<td>WD order for HD Alert</td>
<td>4304</td>
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<td>19 June 1940</td>
<td>Wire from WD to base up on alert</td>
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<td>19 June 1940</td>
<td>Message CQ, HD from WD (Adams)</td>
<td>3118, 3319</td>
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<td>19 June 1940</td>
<td>Message to C Q of S from Herron</td>
<td>3319</td>
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<td>20 June 1940</td>
<td>Herron replied to wire of 19 June from WD</td>
<td>315</td>
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<tr>
<td>21 June 1940</td>
<td>Herron wired C of S re alert</td>
<td>3211</td>
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<td>22 June 1940</td>
<td>Message from Herron to C of S that Navy not on Alert</td>
<td>216</td>
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<tr>
<td>22 June 1940</td>
<td>Strong signed message that Marshall to Herron to keep on alert</td>
<td>3216, 3320</td>
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<td>27 June 1940</td>
<td>Appropriation of $135,000 for Military Intelligence by Second ID by Chief of Staff.</td>
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<td>27 June 1940</td>
<td>WD approved sites for radar at Kaali, Kokee and Haleakula</td>
<td>3885</td>
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<tr>
<td>27 June 1940</td>
<td>Act of Congress</td>
<td>4109-4110</td>
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<td>27 June 1940</td>
<td>Appropriation of $5,000,000 for Military Intelligence by Second ID by Chief of Staff.</td>
<td>733</td>
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<tr>
<td>8 July 1940</td>
<td>Message Herron to C of S re conditions due to alert</td>
<td>3321, 3322</td>
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<tr>
<td>8 July 1940</td>
<td>Ltr Enright to Stephen Early wherein suggestion made that</td>
<td>3906</td>
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<tr>
<td>10 July 1940</td>
<td>Message C of S to Herron re wear and tear on equipment de to</td>
<td>3906</td>
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<tr>
<td>10 July 1940</td>
<td>Item available for construction of permanent radar installa</td>
<td>3906</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 July 1940</td>
<td>Message Herron to C of S re alert</td>
<td>3322</td>
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<tr>
<td>24 July 1940</td>
<td>Message C of S to CQ, HD, re alert</td>
<td>3322</td>
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<tr>
<td>25 July 1940</td>
<td>Chief of Engrs gave Dist. Engr. $50,000 toward construction cost of permanent radar installations.</td>
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<tr>
<td>25 July 1940</td>
<td>$6,000 allotted to Hawaiian Department for Military Intelligence.</td>
<td>3906</td>
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<td>1 August 1940</td>
<td>Mobile SCR-270 arrived</td>
<td>3907-3908</td>
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<tr>
<td>2 August 1940</td>
<td>Alert of 17 June 1940 ended</td>
<td>1924</td>
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<tr>
<td>5 August 1940</td>
<td>Ltr Chief of Engrs to Chief, Signal Office, re furnishing designs of AWS structures at earliest possible date.</td>
<td>3414</td>
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<tr>
<td>5 September 1940</td>
<td>Joint Board 214 contemplated storage tanks for 220,000 barrels for the Army and 100,000 for the Navy, (on basis of estimated cost of $2.40 per barrel in commercial tanks of 25,000 barrel capacity).</td>
<td>3414</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 October 1940</td>
<td>Appropriations Act for $100,000 for Military Intelligence</td>
<td>3906</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 October 1940</td>
<td>Memo or message from CNO</td>
<td>3905</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 October 1940</td>
<td>Ltr. Arnold to Martin re new equipment being sent to Hawaiian Islands, not later than 1 July 1941.</td>
<td>3409</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 October 1940</td>
<td>Ltr. Stein to Marshall re DEP - Naval patrol</td>
<td>3409</td>
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<tr>
<td>16 October 1940</td>
<td>Field Order No. 1 (Mission Order); Operations Orders HDO</td>
<td>3229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 October 1940</td>
<td>Ltr. to Pabanne from Gist re cost-plus-fixed fee contract</td>
<td>3333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 October 1940</td>
<td>Letter to Wyman from Pabanne re W-414-ENG-102</td>
<td>3333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 November 1940</td>
<td>Letter to Wyman from Pabanne re W-414-ENG-102</td>
<td>3333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 November 1940</td>
<td>Letter to Wyman from Pabanne re cost-plus-fixed fee contract</td>
<td>3333</td>
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<tr>
<td>20 November 1940</td>
<td>Air Corps stations work assigned to Corps of Engrs</td>
<td>661</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1940</td>
<td>Jap naval vessels first appeared in Marshalls, Caroline and Marianas, Layton informed Richardson and Kimmel.</td>
<td>3040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1940-1941</td>
<td>Engineers took over work for Air Corps.</td>
<td>3844</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1940-1941</td>
<td>Engrs. did Air Corps construction only &amp; QMC did rest of military construction.</td>
<td>3844</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 December 1940-15 February 1941</td>
<td>Grew's tour as (Acting) Ast O of S, War Plans Division</td>
<td>4223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 December 1940</td>
<td>Finance Itr 230 from Office Chief Engrs. Authorizing Sec'y War to expend for national defense with or without advertising. (Kehoe file.)</td>
<td>3848, 3849, 3846, 3850, 3869, 3875</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 December 1940</td>
<td>Increases in limit of authority of Dist. &amp; Dlv. Engrs.</td>
<td>3973</td>
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<tr>
<td>12 December 1940</td>
<td>Date of resignation as director signed by Rohr.</td>
<td>2334</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 December 1940</td>
<td>Wyman signed at $33.00 a day Palace Hotel suite.</td>
<td>2693</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 December 1940</td>
<td>Approval of cost-plus-fixed-fee form of construction contract submitted by Wyman.</td>
<td>2694</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 December 1940</td>
<td>Wyman went to California to conduct interview for contract</td>
<td>3373</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 December 1940</td>
<td>First knowledge Connolly had of Hawaiian construction by telephone call from Rohr.</td>
<td>878</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 December 1940</td>
<td>Letter from Martin to Arnold requesting modern equipment.</td>
<td>1669</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 December 1940</td>
<td>Ltr. to Asst. Sec'y from Grew, Office Chief of Engrs. requesting authority for cost-plus-fixed-fee form of contract.</td>
<td>641</td>
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<tr>
<td>19 December 1940</td>
<td>W-12-ENGR-002 with Hawaiian Constructors for defense projects in Hawaii; Graf signed above contract; contract approved by Under Sec'y War.</td>
<td>2163, 581, 610, 642, 688-69, 263, 725, 2855</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 December 1940</td>
<td>Connolly left Washington.</td>
<td>2365</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 December 1940</td>
<td>Articles of Agreement. Basic contract entered into between Hawaiian Constructors consisting of Rohr-Connolly Co., Gunther &amp; Shirley Co., W. E. Callahan Co., and W. D. Contract recommended and negotiated by Wyman.</td>
<td>584, 585</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 December 1940</td>
<td>Grew sent memo to Hickey, Chief of Engrs. and copy of contract dated December 20 between U.S. and the Hawaiian Constructors.</td>
<td>642</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 December 1940</td>
<td>Grew sent memorandum to Commissioner Kundson requesting clearance for award of contract M-414-602.</td>
<td>642</td>
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<tr>
<td>26 December 1940</td>
<td>Approved by Chief of Engrs. placed on contract.</td>
<td>932</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 December 1940</td>
<td>Directive raising the estimate of cost of barrels from $2.00 to $4.00 reduced the galleys (Army) for Hawaii to 100,000 barrels and authorized preliminary surveys to be made.</td>
<td>3458</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 December 1940</td>
<td>Commissioner Kundson cleared contract M-414-602.</td>
<td>642</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 January 1941</td>
<td>5th Ind., Subject: Transfer to WD of Halsehaka &amp; Maunalua sites, T.H. to TAG.</td>
<td>2469, 2472</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 January 1941</td>
<td>Contract W-12-ENGR-002 approved Under Sec'y War.</td>
<td>262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 January 1941</td>
<td>Contract M-414-602 approved by Under Sec'y War.</td>
<td>262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 January 1941</td>
<td>Approval of contract.</td>
<td>3145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 January 1941</td>
<td>Approval of general project by Sec'y War.</td>
<td>3145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 January 1941</td>
<td>Approval of Hawaiian Constructors' contract.</td>
<td>3145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early 1941</td>
<td>Semi-monthly engineer reports required on military projects.</td>
<td>3146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 January 1941</td>
<td>Final approval of Hawaiian Constructors Contract No. 602.</td>
<td>3145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 January 1941</td>
<td>Letter to Hawaiian Constructors from Div Engr granting authority to Hawaiian Constructors to purchase equipment needed for this project.</td>
<td>3145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 January 1941</td>
<td>Report on Pinnaman Hotel addressed to CG, ND.</td>
<td>2369</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 January 1941</td>
<td>Letter of Admiral Richardson to Sec'y Navy regarding deficiencies of Pearl Harbor.</td>
<td>1802</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 January 1941</td>
<td>Suite at Palace Hotel rented by Wyman at $1 per day.</td>
<td>2477</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 January 1941</td>
<td>Rohr made application for final citizenship papers.</td>
<td>447</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17-18 January 1941</td>
<td>Connolly appeared before the Navy Board regarding building of naval bases and ordnance installations.</td>
<td>877</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 January 1941</td>
<td>Ltr. to Rohr from Wyman advising Rohr to proceed to Hawaii.</td>
<td>2006-2007, 2232, 2237, 3270, 3280, 4107, 4108, 4114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 January 1941</td>
<td>Connolly appeared before Naval Board again</td>
<td>2006-2007, 2232, 2237, 3270, 3280, 4107, 4108, 4114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 January 1941</td>
<td>Wyman ltr to Rohr naturalization.</td>
<td>4390</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 January 1941</td>
<td>Wyman ltr to Hawaiian Constructors re initiating work under Contract No. 602.</td>
<td>3067</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 January 1941</td>
<td>Ltr. from Sec'y Navy to Sec'y War re cooperative defensive measures.</td>
<td>298, 299, 4064-4066, 4092, 4091</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 January 1941</td>
<td>Probability of combined air and submarine attack.</td>
<td>298, 299, 4064-4066, 4092, 4091</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 January 1941</td>
<td>Letter of Richardson to Sec'y Navy in which Kimmel concerned re efficiencies of Pearl Harbor.</td>
<td>1803</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 January 1941</td>
<td>Report of Ambassador Grew by telegram to Sec'y of Navy re planned jap attack on Pearl Harbor.</td>
<td>1788, 4293</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 January 1941</td>
<td>Vice-Admiral Fye appointed Commander Battle Force U.S. Pacific Fleet.</td>
<td>1065</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 February 1941</td>
<td>Admiral Kimmel took over office of CINCAC.</td>
<td>1735</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 February 1941</td>
<td>Shoemaker memo re Rohr citizenship and Wyman.</td>
<td>4370</td>
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<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Record Page Reference</th>
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<tr>
<td>5 February 1941</td>
<td>Letter from Arnold to Martin promising modern equipment as soon as possible.</td>
<td>1870</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 February 1941</td>
<td>Letter from T. H. Schumacher of Immigration &amp; Naturalization Service asking Rohl naturalization be expedited.</td>
<td>2379</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 February 1941</td>
<td>Hawaiian Constructors initiated construction under Contract No. 602.</td>
<td>3886</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 February 1941</td>
<td>Butterfield memo on Rohl.</td>
<td>4106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 February 1941</td>
<td>General Short arrived in Pearl Harbor.</td>
<td>221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 February 1941</td>
<td>General Short took command.</td>
<td>3409</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 February 1941</td>
<td>Ltr Sec'y War to Sec'y Navy, constr. of Mt. Kasa cabbyway.</td>
<td>4054, 4062, 4092</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 February 1941</td>
<td>Ltr. from Marshall to Short re duties and army deficiencies.</td>
<td>1317, 289, 354</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 February 1941</td>
<td>Ltr. Sec'y War in reply to letter of 24 January 1941 from Sec'y Navy.</td>
<td>308</td>
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<tr>
<td>7 February 1941</td>
<td>General Harron left Pearl Harbor.</td>
<td>221</td>
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<tr>
<td>14 February 1941</td>
<td>Memo by Wyman to Dept. Engrs. requesting approval of certain preliminary sketches and plans.</td>
<td>2223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 February 1941</td>
<td>Report of C of S from Col. Lath B. Row, IGD.</td>
<td>4064</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 February 1941</td>
<td>Interview Sec'y War, Chief of Signal Corps, &amp; Asst. Sec'y War for Air (Mr. Lovett) re types of radar &amp; radio equipment to be manufactured.</td>
<td>3873</td>
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<tr>
<td>17 February 1941</td>
<td>Wilson left Schoidt Barracks.</td>
<td>2323</td>
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<tr>
<td>18 February 1941</td>
<td>$10,000 limitation on Dist. Engrs. contractural authority discontinued.</td>
<td>3873</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 February 1941</td>
<td>Increases in limit of authority of Dist. &amp; Div. Engrs.</td>
<td>3873</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 February 1941</td>
<td>Report of Inspection of Station X dated 19 Feb 1941 from the files of Pt. Shafter, IGD.</td>
<td>2223</td>
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<tr>
<td>19 February 1941</td>
<td>Short wrote letter to C of S outlining the things he thought should be done.</td>
<td>3974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 February 1941</td>
<td>Wyman interviewed by Naturalization official re Rohl citizenry.</td>
<td>3816-3819, 4021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 February 1941</td>
<td>P. 9, FBI report dated 28 Apr 1943 read wherein it is noted that Wyman was interviewed 20 Feb 1941 at which time Wyman declared he first became acquainted with Rohl in Calif. and that his relations with him were purely business.</td>
<td>4187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 February 1941</td>
<td>Letter District Director (Naturalization Service), Los Angeles District, to Dist. Director, Honolulu, re Rohl.</td>
<td>2323</td>
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<tr>
<td>22 February 1941</td>
<td>Tyee arrived in Hawaii.</td>
<td>3974</td>
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<tr>
<td>22 February 1941</td>
<td>Layton gave his opinion at that time of the defenses and aviation stationed in the Marshalls.</td>
<td>3974</td>
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<tr>
<td>24 February 1941</td>
<td>W. B. Order on Wheeler Field.</td>
<td>992</td>
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<td>24 February 1941</td>
<td>Meeting of District Engineer's Advisory Control Board.</td>
<td>3432</td>
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<tr>
<td>28 February 1941</td>
<td>Trumpman arrived in Hawaii.</td>
<td>3429</td>
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<tr>
<td>Feb or Mar 1941</td>
<td>Wyman relieved and Layton became District Engineer.</td>
<td>3974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 1941</td>
<td>Wyman relieved and Lyman became District Engineer.</td>
<td>3974</td>
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<tr>
<td>March 1941</td>
<td>$1,000,000 made available to Dist. Engrs. for survey re 160,000 barrel fuel storage for Army and survey made.</td>
<td>3429</td>
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<tr>
<td>1 March 1941</td>
<td>CINCPOAC Direction to prepare an air defense plan in conjunction with CG, Hawaiian Air Force.</td>
<td>1957</td>
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<tr>
<td>1 March 1941</td>
<td>Trumpman assigned as Aide to Short.</td>
<td>2345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 March 1941</td>
<td>Trumpman assigned as Aide to Short.</td>
<td>2345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 March 1941</td>
<td>Trumpman arrived in charge Los Angeles to Inspector in charge San Pedro, Calif. re Rohl's naturalization.</td>
<td>1811</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 March 1941</td>
<td>Ltr U. S. Naturalization Examiner, Immigration &amp; Naturalization Service, Honolulu, to District Director.</td>
<td>4112-4114, 4193-4194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 March 1941</td>
<td>Wire WD to CG, HD showing objection of the Dept. of the Interior to the transfer of land for AWS project.</td>
<td>4194</td>
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<tr>
<td>4 March 1941</td>
<td>Wire from CG, HD to TAG pointing decision of Dept. of the Interior.</td>
<td>4194</td>
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<tr>
<td>5 March 1941</td>
<td>Letter from Marshall to Short re situation Hawaiian Department defense against air attack and contemplated West Coast exercise in spring.</td>
<td>19-20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 March 1941</td>
<td>Approval of AWS station Mt. Kaala.</td>
<td>3434</td>
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<tr>
<td>6 March 1941</td>
<td>Kaala job layout plan approved by CG.</td>
<td>3554</td>
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<tr>
<td>6 March 1941</td>
<td>Letter from Short to Marshall re AWS.</td>
<td>23</td>
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<tr>
<td>6 March 1941</td>
<td>Construction of Mt. Kaala cabbyway started.</td>
<td>3969</td>
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<tr>
<td>7 March 1941</td>
<td>Letter from F. H. Crockett of Immigration &amp; Naturalization Service, Laredo, Texas.</td>
<td>2313</td>
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<tr>
<td>7 March 1941</td>
<td>Notice of short time by Wyman to the Div. Engrs. urging completion of work on Mt. Kaala.</td>
<td>3439</td>
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<tr>
<td>10 March 1941</td>
<td>WD priority set for delivery of SCR 279, 271, and 271-A.</td>
<td>672</td>
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<tr>
<td>10 March 1941</td>
<td>Rohr field naturalization petition in U. S. District Court for Southern District of Calif.</td>
<td>2233</td>
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<tr>
<td>11 March 1941</td>
<td>Butterfield notes re Rohl.</td>
<td>4111-4112</td>
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<tr>
<td>13 March 1941</td>
<td>Construction started on access road five days after approval.</td>
<td>3554</td>
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<td>12 March 41</td>
<td>Wire to CG, HD from WD authorizing final decision on design, layout and details of construction for AWS project in Hawaii.</td>
<td>3430</td>
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<tr>
<td>15 March 41</td>
<td>Lt. from Marshall to CG, HD re approval for use of desired land.</td>
<td>3430</td>
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<tr>
<td>15 March 41</td>
<td>Short lr. to Marshall in reply to Marshall 5 March lr.</td>
<td>21-25</td>
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<tr>
<td>16 March 41</td>
<td>Von der Osten came to this country with complete plans of 20 December 1940 contract.</td>
<td>2442-2443</td>
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<tr>
<td>17 March 41</td>
<td>Approval of AWS station Haleiwa on Maui.</td>
<td>3434</td>
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<tr>
<td>17 March 41</td>
<td>Meeting of District Engineer's Advisory Control Board.</td>
<td>3421</td>
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<tr>
<td>18 March 41</td>
<td>Von der Osten killed in New York City.</td>
<td>3800</td>
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<tr>
<td>20 March 41</td>
<td>Approval of AWS station Kokee on Kauai.</td>
<td>3434</td>
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<tr>
<td>20 March 41</td>
<td>Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan.</td>
<td>1473</td>
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<tr>
<td>20 March 41</td>
<td>Layout for station at Kokee, Kauai approved.</td>
<td>3440</td>
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<tr>
<td>21 March 41</td>
<td>Plans between Short &amp; Bloch approved by C of S.</td>
<td>283-292</td>
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<tr>
<td>21 March 41</td>
<td>Cooperation plan between Army &amp; Navy consummated.</td>
<td>322, 1474, 371, 1442</td>
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<td>22 March 41</td>
<td>Supplemental agreement to contract of 3 Jan. 1941.</td>
<td>3458-3454</td>
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<tr>
<td>28 March 41</td>
<td>Lt. Marshall to Short relieving commission by construction of additional fields and dispersal of aircraft.</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 March 41</td>
<td>Joint Air Operations Agreement.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>31 March 41</td>
<td>Div. Engr. advertises cable work on Mt. Kaala.</td>
<td>3439</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 March 41</td>
<td>A'dendum No. 1 to Joint Air Operations Agreement signed by Martin and Bellinger.</td>
<td>387, 1578, 1822, 1582</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 April 41</td>
<td>Project for defense of Kaneohe Bay area approved by Joint Board.</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 April 41</td>
<td>Major Murrill called to active duty.</td>
<td>3918</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 April 41</td>
<td>Visit of representative of Office of Chief of Air Corps to select the site for underground fuel storage.</td>
<td>3337</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 April 41</td>
<td>CO notified to TAG recommendation for locations at 2 sites.</td>
<td>3459</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 April 41</td>
<td>Dist. Engr. was advised that negotiations had been opened for steel priorities.</td>
<td>3137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 April 41</td>
<td>Chief of Engrs. notified the Dist. Engr. by lr. that priority for steel for tanks could not be obtained until the contract for tanks had been let.</td>
<td>3459</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 April 41</td>
<td>Short talked before the Chamber of Commerce on Army Day re civilian defense.</td>
<td>335 &amp; 498</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 April 41</td>
<td>Location of A/W station at Fort Shafter fixed.</td>
<td>3433</td>
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<tr>
<td>9 April 41</td>
<td>Chief of Engrs directed the Dist. Engr. to prepare a site project report for total storage capacity of between 125,000 and 150,000 barrels.</td>
<td>3459</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 April 41</td>
<td>Hawaiian Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan.</td>
<td>1583</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 April 41</td>
<td>Lt. Short to Marshall re agreements Army and Navy etc.</td>
<td>26-27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 April 41</td>
<td>Memo from Wynn to CO, HD submitting general plan and sections for AWS Information Center.</td>
<td>3423</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 April 41</td>
<td>Memorandum from Wynn to Hawaiian Constructors re AWS.</td>
<td>3419-3420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 April 41</td>
<td>Meeting of District Engineer's Advisory Control Board.</td>
<td>3421</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 April 41</td>
<td>Dist. Engr. submitted revised detail cost estimates increasing costs from $900,000 to $950,000 in connection with W-414-eng-302.</td>
<td>553</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 April 41</td>
<td>Letter from Chief of Engrs. to Dist. Engr. to submit recommendations regarding protection at both sites.</td>
<td>3459</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 April 41</td>
<td>Circular Ltr Chief of Engrs. to Div. &amp; Dist. Engrs. re employment of aliens on defense projects.</td>
<td>3558-3569</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 April 41</td>
<td>Authority to proceed with leasing land parcels radioced to Hawaii.</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 April 41</td>
<td>Contract for cableway signed with Interstate Equipment Company.</td>
<td>3421</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 April 41</td>
<td>Approval for access road to Kokee, Kauai.</td>
<td>3340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 April 41</td>
<td>Wodley paid $50,000 for 20% interest in Hawaiian Constructors.</td>
<td>2731, 3789, 3769</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 May 41</td>
<td>Lt. from Marshall to Short replying to Short 24 April lr.</td>
<td>27-28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 May 41</td>
<td>Meeting of District Engineer's Advisory Control Board.</td>
<td>3422</td>
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<tr>
<td>5 May 41</td>
<td>Supplemental agreement to the basic contract.</td>
<td>3444-3456</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 May 41</td>
<td>Wynnman received Circular Ltr dated 21 Apr 1941 from Chief of Engrs. re employment of aliens on defense projects.</td>
<td>3357</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 May 41</td>
<td>Wynnman lr to Hawaiian Constructors re aliens employed on national defense projects.</td>
<td>3355-3565, 3739</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 May 41</td>
<td>Meeting of District Engineer's Advisory Control Board.</td>
<td>3422</td>
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<tr>
<td>13 May 41</td>
<td>Received foundation plans for metal buildings and detector for AFS installations.</td>
<td>3442</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 May 41</td>
<td>HD maneuvers referred to in letter of 3 November 1941 from Martin to Arnold.</td>
<td>1880</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 May 41</td>
<td>Bids opened on island airports.</td>
<td>3627</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 May 41</td>
<td>Office of Chief of Engrs, South Pacific Division received A/4-4 rating in contract M-414-eng-784.</td>
<td>3427</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 May 41</td>
<td>Message No. 115 from Kita, bomb consul to Tokyo, to Guam.</td>
<td>2668</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 May 41</td>
<td>Hawaiian Constructors lr to Dist. Engrs. re aliens employed on defense projects.</td>
<td>3657, 3567</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 May 41</td>
<td>Request made for $40,000 for airfield fencing etc. (See 11 July 1941 and 12 August 1941).</td>
<td>290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 May 41</td>
<td>Directions received to increase storage capacity from 100,000 barrels to 250,000 barrels.</td>
<td>3137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 May 41</td>
<td>Priorities and Delivery Schedule re SCR-279-A and 271 sacs approved.</td>
<td>652, 679</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table of Important Dates—Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>22 May 1941</td>
<td>Started HD maneuvers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 May 1941</td>
<td>Supplemental Agreement No. 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 May 1941</td>
<td>Exemption of Rohl by Immigration Inspector Ellis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 May 1941</td>
<td>Allotment of $85,600 additional funds requested for W-414-eng-662.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 May 1941</td>
<td>All components for SCR 271 turned over by Signal Corps to QMC for shipment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 May 1941</td>
<td>Added #2 to Job Order Wheeler Field</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 May 1941</td>
<td>Components on one 271-A turned over by Signal Corps to QMC for shipment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 May 1941</td>
<td>Close of Rohl citizenship investigation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 May 1941</td>
<td>Three additional fixed stations for Hawaii authorized by War Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 May 1941</td>
<td>Ltr. to Chief Signal Officer subject “Air Mail Service for the United States Overseas Department and Bases”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 May 1941</td>
<td>Ltr. U.S. Dept. Justice, Immigration &amp; Naturalization Section, Los Angeles, to District Director, Los Angeles.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 May 1941</td>
<td>Marshall received letter from Short re certain maneuvers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 May 1941</td>
<td>Letter from Short to Bloch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 May 1941</td>
<td>Letter AG to CG, HD stating that the National Park Service had approved building designs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1941</td>
<td>Rockefeller ordered to combat intelligence at Pearl Harbor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1941</td>
<td>Authorization for use of land belonging to the National Park Service for AWS given.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1941</td>
<td>Wyman first learned that Rohl an alien</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1941</td>
<td>Kimmel came to Washington</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 June 1941</td>
<td>Hawaiian Constructors letter to Dist. Engr. to Reel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 June 1941</td>
<td>Meeting of District Engineer’s Advisory Control Board.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 June 1941</td>
<td>SCR 271 requisites received</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 June 1941</td>
<td>Letter CO, HD, to TAG re difficulties in procurement and transport from the mainland.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 June 1941</td>
<td>Letter from HD re training air corps personnel for ground defense mission.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 June 1941</td>
<td>Sign 1st hr. to Marshall</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 June 1941</td>
<td>WD directed that the 1st Aircraft Warring Company be prepared to furnish long range warning service and embark for overseas point by this date.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 June 1941</td>
<td>Chief Signal Officer requested additional data regarding costs from the Dist. Engr. which were submitted 8 July 1941.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 June 1941</td>
<td>Telegram received from HD re TAG re a special “A” for 41 to 72,ccs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 June 1941</td>
<td>Message Short to TAG re AWS materials of received</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 June 1941</td>
<td>1st Ind. from Wyman to CG, HD, re construction work to commence at early date.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 June 1941</td>
<td>Priority rating received for underground storage tanks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 June 1941</td>
<td>Job Order No. 41 to proceed on Mt. Haleakula Maui.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 June 1941</td>
<td>AWS materials designated to arrive in Hawaii.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 June 1941</td>
<td>Chief of Engs. replied to TAG re priorities by 2nd endorsement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 June 1941</td>
<td>Office of Chief of Engrs., obtained priority rating of A-1 from the Army &amp; Navy Munitions Board.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 June 1941</td>
<td>Dist. Engr. notified that a special material order was to be authorized before 1 July.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 June 1941</td>
<td>Date of Job Order 23.1 was to begin.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 June 1941</td>
<td>Supplemental Agreement No. 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 June 1941</td>
<td>Ltr. Short to Bloch re AWS operation in near future.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 June 1941</td>
<td>Letter to Kimmel re AWS mentioned by Grunert</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 June 1941</td>
<td>Dist. Engr. received notice that proposed Army storage increased from 100,000 to 50,000 barrels.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 June 1941</td>
<td>Date that work on AWS, utilities, and Honolulu Koke Road under Job Order 23.1 was to begin.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 June 1941</td>
<td>WD forwarded detailed project report on war reserve aviation gas storage.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 June 1941</td>
<td>Construction on access road to Kokee, Kaui started.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 June 1941</td>
<td>WD Order indicated this as commencement date of Haleakula road.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 June 1941</td>
<td>TAG reply to Short message of 10 June 1941 re AWS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 June 1941</td>
<td>Components of 2 SCR 272's turned over to QMC for shipment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 June 1941</td>
<td>WD originally agreed to furnish materials for AWS so that it could be completed by this date.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1941</td>
<td>McKee, assigned War Plans Division, handled matters pertaining to Hawaiian Defense Project.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 July 1941</td>
<td>Funds had to be utilized for underground storage.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 July 1941</td>
<td>Addendum #2 to Job Order Wheeler Field.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 July 1941</td>
<td>Memo Medley to Brown re Rohl reseat ship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 July 1941</td>
<td>Dist. CO, H.O. to TAG about difficulties in procurement and transportation from the mainland.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 July 1941</td>
<td>Marshall ordered that civilian evacuation seem not a necessary project.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 July 1941</td>
<td>Message to CG, H.O. requesting Japanese situation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 July 1941</td>
<td>Message C of 8 to CG, H.O. re Japanese situation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 July 1941</td>
<td>Work on Haleakula road started.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 July 1941</td>
<td>WD message warning of attack</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table of important dates—Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8 July 1941</td>
<td>WD authorized general changes in program, &amp; addition of 2 fixed stations Pahoa, Hawaii; Opaeka'a, Oahu; Manawatu, Oahu</td>
<td>584</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 July 1941</td>
<td>Dist. Engr. submitted additional data re costs requested by Signal Officer</td>
<td>583</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 July 1941</td>
<td>Message TAG to CG, HD</td>
<td>2673-2674</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 July 1941</td>
<td>Message from FAA to foreign ministers in Tokyo</td>
<td>2960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 July 1941</td>
<td>Report by Col. H. S. Burwell, Air Corps, Special Inspector, re sabotage</td>
<td>3340-3342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 July 1941</td>
<td>$150,000 authorized of May 15 request for $240,000 for fence around airfields</td>
<td>290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 July 1941</td>
<td>Preference rating for aircraft detector equipment changed from A-1 to A-2</td>
<td>678</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 July 1941</td>
<td>Short's let re civilian defense</td>
<td>4418</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 July 1941</td>
<td>SOP, HD</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 July 1941</td>
<td>HD tentative SOP referred to in letter of 25 Sept 1944 from Arnold to Martin.</td>
<td>1879</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 July 1941</td>
<td>Job No. 46, Mobile AWS station Mauna Loa cancelled by HQ, HD.</td>
<td>3480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 July 1941</td>
<td>$325 allotted HD for Military Intelligence</td>
<td>737</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 July 1941</td>
<td>Letter to CG, AAF, from the Secretary GS, requesting study air situation in Hawaii.</td>
<td>3344</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 July 1941</td>
<td>Letter from George A. Simon dated Honolulu, T. H., re Wyman</td>
<td>557-558</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 July 1941</td>
<td>Wickiser signed his contract for participation with the Territory Airport Constructors.</td>
<td>2457</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22 July 1941</td>
<td>Five SCR 270s delivered to QMC for shipment.</td>
<td>319</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 July 1941</td>
<td>Letter Wyman to Hawaiian Constructors re expediting AWS</td>
<td>3420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 July 1941</td>
<td>Div. Engr. relayed to Chief of Engrs. request of Dist. Engrs. to be permitted to proceed with evacuation work.</td>
<td>3137, 3459</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 July 1941</td>
<td>Letter Martin to Arnold regarding operation of long range bombardment, etc.</td>
<td>1874-1877</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 July 1941</td>
<td>WD message warning of attack</td>
<td>4055</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 July 1941</td>
<td>Dist. Engr. was instructed not to start work on storage tanks as the plans were being materially changed.</td>
<td>3490</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 July 1941</td>
<td>About this time notice came out re freezing Japanese assets so alert must have been about this date and not in September.</td>
<td>233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 July 1941</td>
<td>Representative from Div. Engr. in San Francisco to Dist. Engr. stating that the Chief of Engrs. advises evacuation should not be started until proposed installation approved by the Territory Airport Constructors.</td>
<td>3137-3138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 July 1941</td>
<td>Letter CG, HD, to TAG about difficulties in procurement and transportation from the mainland.</td>
<td>3429</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 July 1941</td>
<td>Ltr. from Short to TAG re fortification and camouflage projects.</td>
<td>3561-3562</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 1941</td>
<td>Mobile sets received on Islands for AWS</td>
<td>3445</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 August 1941</td>
<td>Gen. Burgis arrived in Hawaii</td>
<td>2604</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 August 1941</td>
<td>CG, HD, approved request for 180 B-37s.</td>
<td>123-124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 August 1941</td>
<td>Ltr. George Pain to the President re sabotage.</td>
<td>2903</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 August 1941</td>
<td>Ltr. Short to Kimmel aircraft warning service facilities rapidly approaching completion.</td>
<td>561-756</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 August 1941</td>
<td>Radio received from the Div. Engr. advising that work was not to be started since plans are being materially changed. (Oil storage tanks.)</td>
<td>3138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 August 1941</td>
<td>$9,000 of request of May 15 for $240,000 authorized for fencing airfields.</td>
<td>290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 August 1941</td>
<td>Lt. Arnold to Martin (Information on Army air force and six charts showing the successive build-up to the 84 group program).</td>
<td>1878</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 August 1941</td>
<td>Radiogram TAG to Short, reply to the 26th of July.</td>
<td>3553</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 August 1941</td>
<td>Lt. TAG to Chief of Bureau of Yards &amp; Docks of Navy requesting that the plans be reviewed and concurrence of funding recommendations be given by the Bureau of Yards &amp; Docks of the Navy.</td>
<td>3138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 August 1941</td>
<td>Inclosure H to Annex VII, HECU</td>
<td>2671</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 August 1941</td>
<td>Ltr from TAG to Short in reply to 22 July 1941.</td>
<td>3562-3564</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 August 1941</td>
<td>Addendum #6 to Job Order Wheeler Field.</td>
<td>660</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 August 1941</td>
<td>Ltr. George A. Simon to Honolulu, T. H., re Wyman.</td>
<td>3660</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 August 1941</td>
<td>Ltr. Short to Kimmel aircraft warning service facilities rapidly approaching completion.</td>
<td>561-765</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 August 1941</td>
<td>Ltr. Wyman to Chief of Engrs. re expediting Kimmel's repositioning.</td>
<td>3562-3564, 3560</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 August 1941</td>
<td>Ltr. Martin to Arnold re secret plan for reconnaissance and protection of the Hawaiian defense by air.</td>
<td>1874-1875</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 August 1941</td>
<td>Lt. Graf to Kohl re Kohl's citizenship.</td>
<td>2313-2313</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 August 1941</td>
<td>Ltr. Graf to Kohl re Kohl's citizenship letter.</td>
<td>2313-2313</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 August 1941</td>
<td>Concurrence rec'd through TAG, re storage tanks.</td>
<td>3138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 August 1941</td>
<td>Martin report to CG, HD under the title of &quot;Study of the Air Situation in Hawaii&quot;.</td>
<td>3344-3345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 August 1941</td>
<td>Directive published containing 1 Aug 41 authorization that all Hawaiian contracts could be A-1-e.</td>
<td>3428</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 August 1941</td>
<td>Plan for Air Defense of Oahu submitted to WD by CG, Hawaiian Air Force, Gen. Martin, through CG, Hawaiian Dept.</td>
<td>411</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 August 1941</td>
<td>Copy Operations Plan Rainbow No. 5 sent CG, HD.</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
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<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Record page reference</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>25 August 1941</td>
<td>Lt prepared re Infantry training of Air Force personnel</td>
<td>1883</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 August 1941</td>
<td>Lt Kingman to Schofield (Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization)</td>
<td>3865–3866</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 August 1941</td>
<td>Lt from Gen. Kingman and Mr. Schofield</td>
<td>2057</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 August 1941</td>
<td>N. Y. Kingman signed letter requesting action on Rohl’s citizenship papers</td>
<td>545–546, 556–557</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 August 1941</td>
<td>Lt from David H. Cannon to Secretary of Commerce</td>
<td>8220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 August 1941</td>
<td>Job order called for completion of AWS on 30 Aug. In lieu of 30 June</td>
<td>270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 December 1941</td>
<td>First possible date that Army would have been prepared for the Japanese according to Marshall’s statement to Secretary of State.</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 1941</td>
<td>State Department with six-hour advance notice told Hayes that they were going to freeze assets of Japan - Went on Alert</td>
<td>252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 September 1941</td>
<td>Message from Kita to foreign minister, Tokyo, transmitting American intelligence.</td>
<td>2969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 September 1941</td>
<td>Report of IG covering organization of office of District Engineer in Honolulu.</td>
<td>3415-3417</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 September 1941</td>
<td>Receipt of Operations Plan Rainbow No. 5, which was sent 21 August 1941, acknowledged.</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 September 1941</td>
<td>TAO requested the Chief of Engineers to revise the plans for storage tanks</td>
<td>3400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 September 1941</td>
<td>Stilp to Eff of 28 August read to Martin by Gen. Robins</td>
<td>2345-2344</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 September 1941</td>
<td>Chief of Eng. requested plans for storage tanks be revised to conform to established policy worked out by the Chief of Eng. for other locations with reference to the proposed concomitant &amp; dispersion</td>
<td>3128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 September 1941</td>
<td>Memo to Stilp sent to expedite Rohlen citizenship</td>
<td>4372</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 September 1941</td>
<td>Construction of cableway actually began.</td>
<td>3430</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 September 1941</td>
<td>Memo to Stilp: hearing set 15 Sept, re Rohlen citizenship.</td>
<td>4373</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 September 1941</td>
<td>Lt from HD to Dist. Eng. advising that the necessary metal buildings and towers for installation at Haleska were on hand at Signal Corps yard at Fort Shafter.</td>
<td>3437</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 September 1941</td>
<td>Complete plans submitted for putting aircraft maintenance underground.</td>
<td>323</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 September 1941</td>
<td>Received some small details for transmitter buildings for AWS installations.</td>
<td>3440</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 September 1941</td>
<td>Rohlen naturalized.</td>
<td>3073, 4374</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 September 1941</td>
<td>Rohlen’s knowledge of contracts for Hawaiian installations prior thereto.</td>
<td>4090</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 September 1941</td>
<td>Rohlen received citizenship papers.</td>
<td>707, 2263</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 September 1941</td>
<td>Hearing of Rohlen’s case.</td>
<td>885</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 September 1941</td>
<td>Requested AWS estimates of cost and report were forwarded by Dist. Eng. to Gen. Robins, Chief of Eng.</td>
<td>564</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 September 1941</td>
<td>Final decision as to location and method of construction of small tanks along the edge of Bellows Field.</td>
<td>3430, 3432-3434</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 September 1941</td>
<td>Estimated date of completion of Koko Road, etc., under Job Order 23-1.</td>
<td>570</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 September 1941</td>
<td>Dist. Eng. was directed to proceed with construction at Site B, but not to start work at Site A pending arrival in Honolulu of the Eng. Advisory Committee.</td>
<td>3460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 September 1941</td>
<td>Report of District Eng. to HQ HD, advising that bldgs. and towers had been shipped to the site and that erection would soon begin.</td>
<td>3467</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 September 1941</td>
<td>Lt from Arnold to Martin re Hawaiian Dept. SOP 14 Jul 41</td>
<td>1879-1880</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 September 1941</td>
<td>Lt to Arnold replying to Arnold’s letter of 12 Aug. 1941</td>
<td>1877-1878</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 September 1941</td>
<td>Rohlen left for Honolulu.</td>
<td>2203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 September 1941</td>
<td>Radiogram to TAO &amp; HD #63, requesting $125,000 for field fortifications materials.</td>
<td>3565-3657</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 September 1941</td>
<td>WD AGO 2nd inst. to CG HD, re denial of application for $125,000. for field fortifications materials.</td>
<td>3658</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 September 1941</td>
<td>Dist. Eng. notified that installation of eight 40,000 barrel storage tanks had been approved and that negotiations for procuring these eight tanks had begun.</td>
<td>3400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 September 1941</td>
<td>Radiogram #73 from TAO to CG HD, re application for $125,000 for field fortifications materials denied.</td>
<td>3537</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 September 1941</td>
<td>Date of completion of AWS changed from this date to 30 August.</td>
<td>270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 1941</td>
<td>Jap ships stopped coming into Hawaii.</td>
<td>1380-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 1941</td>
<td>Memo from Operations Department, General Staff, discussing Japanese probabilities.</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 1941</td>
<td>15 day maneuver.</td>
<td>3090</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 1941</td>
<td>26th Inf. Div. organised, Gen. Wilson taking command at Schofield Barracks.</td>
<td>1340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 1941</td>
<td>Reynolds appointed Chief of Eng.</td>
<td>589</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 1941</td>
<td>Requested estimates of cost and report sent by Dist. Eng. 18 Sep 41, forwarded by Chief of Eng., Chief Signal Officer to TAO.</td>
<td>584</td>
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<td>October 1941</td>
<td>AWS structure finally approved by CG, HD.</td>
<td>3433</td>
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<td>October 1941</td>
<td>Meeting Stimson &amp; Hull.</td>
<td>4047</td>
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<tr>
<td>October 1941</td>
<td>Series of conferences re Japan.</td>
<td>4328</td>
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<tr>
<td>7 October 1941</td>
<td>Lt. Arnold to Martin saying need for equipment had been taken up.</td>
<td>1877-1878</td>
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<td>7 October 1941</td>
<td>Meeting Stimson and Knox.</td>
<td>4047</td>
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<tr>
<td>9 October 1941</td>
<td>Report of Board of Petroleum Consultants under which work was authorized for construction of storage tanks.</td>
<td>3140</td>
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<tr>
<td>9 October 1941</td>
<td>Dist. Eng. forwarded report of the Advisory Committee and concurred in its recommendations.</td>
<td>3460</td>
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<td>10 October 1941</td>
<td>Lt. Marshall to Short re SOP, HD, dtd. 14 July 41.</td>
<td>28-29</td>
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<td>10 October 1941</td>
<td>Rohl returned to Los Angeles</td>
<td>2241</td>
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<td>10 October 1941</td>
<td>Lt. Schofield to Stilphen</td>
<td>4373</td>
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<td>14 October 1941</td>
<td>Lt. Short to Marshall replying to Marshall’s of October 10 regarding air units in SOP.</td>
<td>21-22</td>
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<tr>
<td>14 or 15 October 1941</td>
<td>Chess letter 27-L-41 revised.</td>
<td>1486</td>
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<td>Middle or 10 October 1941</td>
<td>Hayes ceased as C of S.</td>
<td>242</td>
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<td>16 October 1941</td>
<td>W/D message warning of attack</td>
<td>4073</td>
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<td>16 October 1941</td>
<td>Navy message</td>
<td>4260</td>
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<td>16 October 1941</td>
<td>Message from W/D to Short relative to Japanese</td>
<td>4260</td>
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<td>16 October 1941</td>
<td>Navy message regarding fall of Malanaka Cabinet</td>
<td>1500-1502</td>
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<td>16 October 1941</td>
<td>W/D message through CINCPAC</td>
<td>344</td>
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<td>17 October 1941</td>
<td>O-2 HD estimate of international (Jap) situation</td>
<td>3097-3098</td>
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<td>17 October 1941</td>
<td>O-2 HD estimate of international situation</td>
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<td>18 October 1941</td>
<td>Radiogram 286 from TAG to Short mentioned by Russell</td>
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<td>18 October 1941</td>
<td>Msg W/D to Short, estimate</td>
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<td>20 October 1941</td>
<td>18 October message (290) sent to Short</td>
<td>4257-4258</td>
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<td>20 October 1941</td>
<td>WD Radiogram signed Adams to CG, HD, re estimate of Jap situation.</td>
<td>3307</td>
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<td>20 October 1941</td>
<td>W/D message warning of attack</td>
<td>4055</td>
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<td>20 October 1941</td>
<td>Grow message to Hawaiian Dept.</td>
<td>4231</td>
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<td>21 October 1941</td>
<td>Meeting Stimson and Knox</td>
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<td>23 October 1941</td>
<td>Communication from the Office of the Chief of Eng. to Div. Engr. at San Francisco entitled A&amp;W foundation drawings.</td>
<td>3441-3442</td>
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<td>23 October 1941</td>
<td>Meeting Stimson and Knox</td>
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<td>24 October 1941</td>
<td>Meeting Stimson and Knox</td>
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<td>24 October 1941</td>
<td>Navy message to Kimmel</td>
<td>4258</td>
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<td>27 October 1941</td>
<td>Brink reported to O-2, W/D, 2 aircraft carriers operating in Mandated Islands of which Kaga was one.</td>
<td>111</td>
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<td>27 October 1941</td>
<td>Plans for putting aircraft underground, returned, disappeared.</td>
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<td>28 October 1941</td>
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<td>30 October 1941</td>
<td>Radio from Short to TAL requesting funds for field fortifications and camouflage</td>
<td>3509</td>
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<td>30 October 1941</td>
<td>Lt. Marshall to Short replying to Short’s of 14 October</td>
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<td>30 October 1941</td>
<td>Approval to go ahead on war reserve aviation gasoline storage construction.</td>
<td>3709</td>
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<td>30 October 1941</td>
<td>Communication from Div. Eng. at San Francisco to Dist. Engr. Honolulu transmitting aircraft warning service foundation drawings.</td>
<td>3442</td>
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<td>31 October 1941</td>
<td>Report of Joint Army and Navy Board covering the allocation of aircraft operating areas in the Hawaiian area.</td>
<td>1581</td>
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<td>31 October 1941</td>
<td>Exonarvation on A&amp;W project finished</td>
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<td>31 October 1941</td>
<td>Authority received to start construction on underground storage tanks</td>
<td>3140</td>
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<td>31 October 1941</td>
<td>Dist. Eng. directed to proceed with work on underground tanks in accordance with recommend of Advisory Committee.</td>
<td>3460</td>
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<td>28 November 1941</td>
<td>Summary in regard to task force in the Marshall. Latter part of November Jap Force dropped out of Marshalls.</td>
<td>1000, 1053, 1054</td>
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<td>1 November 1941</td>
<td>Photographic mission to Mandated Islands</td>
<td>172</td>
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<td>1 November 1941</td>
<td>Material arrived which was scheduled to arrive 30 June for aircraft warning service.</td>
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<td>3 November 1941</td>
<td>Message from Secretary of State to Stimson</td>
<td>3083-3091</td>
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<td>3 November 1941</td>
<td>Mr. Martin to Arnold regarding training of air corps troops.</td>
<td>1850-1856</td>
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<td>5 November 1941</td>
<td>Grow telegram to Secy of State regarding against Japs, #37.</td>
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<td>Reply from WD (Adams) to CG HD.</td>
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<td>4 November 1941</td>
<td>Telephone call Stimson and Hull</td>
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<td>5 November 1941</td>
<td>Col. Phillips became Chief of Staff for Short</td>
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<td>On Hayes officially left Hawaii</td>
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<td>283, 489, 507, 1145, 1242, 1503, 1503, 3042, 3643, 3646, 4152, 4156, 4456, 4659, 5095, 5135, 4110</td>
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<td>8 November 1941</td>
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<td>7 November 1941</td>
<td>Stimson diary entry</td>
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<td>9 November 1941</td>
<td>5 November SOP published by AG HD.</td>
<td>3216</td>
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<td>10 November 1941</td>
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<td>11 November 1941</td>
<td>Telephone call Stimson and Hull</td>
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<td>11 November 1941</td>
<td>Authority from WD received to go ahead on clearing northern ferrying route</td>
<td>330</td>
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<td>Memo, Powell to Colton re operation of radio sets, WO-2.</td>
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<td>Message Field to WD.</td>
<td>2972-2073</td>
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<td>Memo to Colton, Chief Materiel Branch, from Powell, Dept. Signal Officer, re test SCH-278.</td>
<td>3896</td>
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<td>Signal Corps memo to Secy of War re performance of SCH-272.</td>
<td>4007</td>
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<td>16-28 November 1941</td>
<td>Six messages sent to Short—four told him not to disturb Japanese and three censored about sabotage.</td>
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<td>16 November 1941</td>
<td>Navy message from CNO.</td>
<td>2065</td>
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<td>Memo, George to Arnold re vulnerability of Wake and Midway.</td>
<td>152</td>
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<td>17 November 1941</td>
<td>Message Grew re planned Jap attack on Pearl Harbor.</td>
<td>98-101, 4265</td>
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<td>18 November 1941</td>
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<td>18 November 1941</td>
<td>IG prepared first draft of criticism of District Engineer Office.</td>
<td>4457, 4457</td>
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<td>18 November 1941</td>
<td>Ltr to Dist. Engr. from Hawaiian Constructors re &quot;Vega&quot;.</td>
<td>3460-3461</td>
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<td>18 November 1941</td>
<td>&quot;Report of Investigation Allegations charging slow-down on defense construction work performed by USEID&quot; addressed to CG, HD, made by O'Rourke, IG.</td>
<td>3256</td>
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<td>19 November 1941</td>
<td>Further revision of Joint Army and Navy basic war plan Rainbow No. 3 approved Joint Board.</td>
<td>59</td>
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<td>19 November 1941</td>
<td>Construction of storage tanks and pipe line began, with completion date of 1 June 1942.</td>
<td>3490</td>
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<td>21 November 1941</td>
<td>Last shipment of subway component left factory of Interstate Equipment Company, Elizabeth, N. J.</td>
<td>3410</td>
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<td>21 November 1941</td>
<td>Stimson diary entry</td>
<td>4050</td>
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<td>21 November 1941</td>
<td>Dist. Eng. wired Div. Eng. requesting immediate shipment of the channel anchors and bars.</td>
<td>3440</td>
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<td>24 November 1941</td>
<td>Conference consisting of Col. Murphy (Acting Signal Officer, Hawaiian Dept.), Lt. Commod. Coe (Pac Wing 2), Maj. Tindal (18th Bombardment Wing), Capt. Bergquist (14th Pursuit Wing), Lt. White (Signal Corps), Lt. Harville (3rd Coast Artillery), Lt. Thomas (6th Observation Squadron), Commod. Taylor and Col. Tetley.</td>
<td>1074, 1129</td>
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<td>24 November 1941</td>
<td>Message from CNO to Cinac.</td>
<td>2900, 3041, 3070</td>
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<td>24 November 1941</td>
<td>Ltr. Chief of Eng. subject &quot;Conduct of Work under CFF contract.&quot;</td>
<td>3524, 5883</td>
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<td>24 November 1941</td>
<td>Communication of 30 October 1941 from Division Engr. (San Francisco) to District Engineer (Honolulu), received by Wyman.</td>
<td>3412</td>
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<td>24 November 1941</td>
<td>Wyman received final plan for transmitter building with sketch of 100-foot tower and relative position of detector and transmitter building.</td>
<td>3442</td>
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<td>24 November 1941</td>
<td>Lt. Taylor submitted report to the responsible Army Chief in connection with radar.</td>
<td>1796</td>
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<td>24 November 1941</td>
<td>Directive from Chief of Eng. outlining relationship between contractors and US.</td>
<td>2545, 2561</td>
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<td>24 November 1941</td>
<td>Message re surprise movement on Philippines and Guam possible.</td>
<td>230, 1723, 414, 1868</td>
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<td>24 November 1941</td>
<td>Short re'd. 24 Nov. Navy Maj.</td>
<td>4392</td>
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<td>24 November 1941</td>
<td>WD message warning of attack</td>
<td>4051, 4066</td>
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<td>24 November 1941</td>
<td>Stimson diary entry.</td>
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<td>24 November 1941</td>
<td>Telephone call Stimson and Hull</td>
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<td>27 November 1941</td>
<td>Capt. Layton delivered Navy message by direction of Kimmel to Short.</td>
<td>3061</td>
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<td>25 November 1941</td>
<td>Meeting President, Stimson, Hull, Knox, Stark and Marshall.</td>
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<td>25 November 1941</td>
<td>Telephone call Stimson and Hull</td>
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<td>25 November 1941</td>
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<td>Secy of State's statements re J. S. Jap relations.</td>
<td>4032, 4091</td>
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<td>25 November 1941</td>
<td>Jap deadline to U. S.</td>
<td>4427</td>
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<td>25 November 1941</td>
<td>War and Navy Department knew that Jap had set a deadline which was later extended to 25 November for the signing of an agreement after which they would take hostile steps against the U. S.</td>
<td>1813</td>
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<td>25 November 1941</td>
<td>Ltr. to Hawaiian Constructors from Wyman re charter of &quot;Vega&quot;.</td>
<td>3491, 3492</td>
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<td>26 November 1941</td>
<td>Ltr of Div Eng forwarding to Dist Eng copy of an endorsement for the Chief of Eng to the Navy stating that four tanks would be shipped by 30 November and steel for other five by 15 January 1942.</td>
<td>3460-1</td>
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<td>22-20 November 1941</td>
<td>Japanese force in Jaluita.</td>
<td>129, 1608</td>
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<td>Jap task force in Marshall.</td>
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<td>Maj. WD to Short re photo relion.</td>
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<td>Secy of State delivered statement of policy to Jap Ambassador.</td>
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<td>23 November 1941</td>
<td>Memo Secy of State to Jap Ambassador.</td>
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<td>23 November 1941</td>
<td>Marshall went to North Carolina for maneuvers.</td>
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<td>State Department handed to Jap memo which G-2 WD considered ultimatum to Jap.</td>
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<td>23 November 1941</td>
<td>Brigade SOP charging each unit with responsibility for its own security against air and ground forces.</td>
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<td>26 November 1941</td>
<td>Hull ultimatum to Japan.</td>
<td>4320, 4396, 4427</td>
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<td>27 November 1941</td>
<td>Memo to President signed by Stark and Marshall re Far Eastern Situation.</td>
<td>9-12</td>
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<td>27 November 1941</td>
<td>Marshall returned that evening from North Carolina.</td>
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<td>Gen. Farthing took command as Base Commander at Hickam Field.</td>
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<td>G-2 W.D message, #673, to G-2 HD</td>
<td>25,115,117,111, 2962, 3115, 4182, 4160, 4282</td>
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<td>1964, 2727-8</td>
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<td>Message #472 from Marshall to Short</td>
<td>26-7, 3059</td>
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<td>27 November 1941</td>
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<td>416, 469, 795, 1114-15, 1430, 1585-1586, 2029-2031</td>
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<td>Army conference at which Navy dispatch of 27 Nov. was discussed.</td>
<td>1941</td>
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<td>28 November 1941</td>
<td>Short-Kimmel-Bloch conference. Martin and Mollison also present.</td>
<td>394, 790, 1507, 1698, 1773, 2029-2031, 1941</td>
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<td>Message G-2, WD (Adams) to CG, HD (#482)</td>
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<td>Copy of Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan Rainbow No. 5 sent to CO, HD</td>
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<td>28 November 1941</td>
<td>Rhod returned to Honolulu</td>
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<td>District Engineer was notified that channel anchors and bars shipped 26 November.</td>
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<td>Message signed by T.A.G. apparently prepared in the Office of the Air Force dealing with protection against sabotage of planes.</td>
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<td>Message #482 signed by T.A.G. to CO, HD</td>
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<td>Marshall left Washington again, going back to North Carolina</td>
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<td>29 November 1941</td>
<td>Telegram to T&amp;G from Short in reply to #492.</td>
<td>4136-4138</td>
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<td>29 November 1941</td>
<td>Short sent Officer Courier to Schofield Barracks who orally delivered</td>
<td>1347</td>
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<td></td>
<td>message that information had been received from WD that negotiations</td>
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<td>with Japs had reached a deadlock and were awaiting Japanese action.</td>
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<td>30 November 1941</td>
<td>Meeting Shinnon and Knox.</td>
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<td>30 November 1941</td>
<td>Information Center 725 completed.</td>
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<td>30 November 1941</td>
<td>Date of completion of Job Order 23.1 changed to 31 Dec. 1941.</td>
<td>3275</td>
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<td>30 November 1941</td>
<td>Road to Halesika completed.</td>
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<td>Early December 1941</td>
<td>Brit., U. &amp; Dutch conferences at Melbourne.</td>
<td>4504</td>
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<td>December 1941</td>
<td>Rohi asked Benson to buy 25% interest in Hawaiian Contractors.</td>
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<td>3-4 December 1941</td>
<td>Jap failure to suggest settlement.</td>
<td>4039</td>
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<td>1 December 1941</td>
<td>Navy Intelligence Bulletin stating carrier group in Marshalls but not</td>
<td>1703</td>
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<td>in DeLany's file on 7 Dec.</td>
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<td>Kimmel received report from Navy Dept. placing Jap carriers for the</td>
<td>1762</td>
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<td>major part in home waters.</td>
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<td>1 December 1941</td>
<td>Forthright Summary of Current International Situation by the Office</td>
<td>301</td>
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<td></td>
<td>of the Chief of Naval Relations, signed by T. W. Wilkins, Director of</td>
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<td>Naval Intelligence.</td>
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<td>1 December 1941</td>
<td>Short and Kimmel received radiograms from WD and Navy Department</td>
<td>301</td>
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<td></td>
<td>respectively re relief of Marines on Wake Island and Midway.</td>
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<td>Conference between Kimmel and Short; re WD &amp; CNO message of.</td>
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<td>(Continued) same date.</td>
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<td>1 December 1941</td>
<td>Tentative date of Japanese Far Eastern attack.</td>
<td>3058</td>
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<td>Meeting Shinnon, Welles, Knox and President.</td>
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<td>2 December 1941</td>
<td>Stimson diary entry.</td>
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<td>2 December 1941</td>
<td>Kimmel to Short's Hq. with proposed eight-page ltr. to Navy Department</td>
<td>301, 394, 1313</td>
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<td>setting forth his views on relief of Marines.</td>
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<td>2 December 1941</td>
<td>Molison says attack expected by Japa against Malaya.</td>
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<td>Short sent radio to WD relative to relief of outlying garrisons.</td>
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<td>Dutch Admiral knew of Jap carriers in Marshall Islands.</td>
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<td>Powell and Davidson returned from mainland.</td>
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<td>Gen. Davidson returned to Honolulu.</td>
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<td>Rohi returned to Pearl Harbor.</td>
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<td>Transcripts of intercepted telephone messages with notations.</td>
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<td>Marines on Wake and Midway.</td>
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<td>Navy Dept. message to CNO for Japanese officials instructed to burn</td>
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<td>ciphers, codes, etc.</td>
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<td>Messages from Kita to foreign minister, Tokyo, Nov. 363, 364.</td>
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<td>Mr. Shivers intercepted phone of Jap Consul saying that the Japs had</td>
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<td>been instructed to burn papers.</td>
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<td>Message from WD &quot;Intensively antibasque precautions&quot;.</td>
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<td>Message from Navy Dept. to CINCPAC that Japanese Consulates were</td>
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<td>destroying ciphers and burning documents.</td>
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<td>Expanded &quot;A&quot; W program approved.</td>
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<td>Message, RCA No. 365, Kita to Foreign Minister, Tokyo.</td>
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<td>Secy of War approved revised &quot;A&quot; W.</td>
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<td>Navy Dept. message to CINCPAC re destruction of their confidential</td>
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<td>Col. Chiferis arrived in Honolulu by clipper.</td>
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<td>British Admiral believed war imminent.</td>
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<td>Cable to Short by U. S. Military Attaché in Melbourne.</td>
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<td>Lt. Col. Richert informed staff at meeting 6 Dec that Japs were</td>
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<td>burning papers on 3 Dec.</td>
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<td>B-34's arrived from mainland no ammunition. Message in regard to plan</td>
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<td>for photographic mission of B-34's.</td>
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<td>Telephone conversation to Dr. and Mrs. Mori intercepted.</td>
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<td>Order to photograph Tree.</td>
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<td>U. S. Brit. Dutch Joint Action Agreement known to U. S. Military</td>
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<td>Attaché in Melbourne.</td>
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<td>Message No. 368 to Foreign Minister, Tokyo.</td>
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<td>Transmitter detector on Halesika was completed.</td>
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<td>6 December 1941</td>
<td>Belliner received message from Marine Air Corps re 21 airplanes</td>
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<td>available in this Command.</td>
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<td>6 December 1941</td>
<td>Col. Fielder saw intercepted telephone message of Dr. Mori.</td>
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<td>6 December 1941</td>
<td>Navy Dept. sent message to CINCPAC out there authorizing them to</td>
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<td>destroy confidential papers under conditions of emergency.</td>
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<td>6 December 1941</td>
<td>Two groups of planes left Hamilton Field no ammunition, guns</td>
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<td>not boresighted.</td>
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<td>Intercepted phone message between Jap at Oahu and Japanese official</td>
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<td>Stimson Diary entry</td>
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<td>Attack on Pearl Harbor, Yes, A McDonald in Information Center.</td>
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<td>WD knew precise hour of Japa attack</td>
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<td>7 December 1941</td>
<td>2 squadrons of fighter planes, one at Haleiwa and one at Bellows Field loaded with ammunition on morning of Dec. 7.</td>
<td>4490</td>
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<td>7 December 1941</td>
<td>Intercepter Center operated immediately both before and after attack.</td>
<td>4491-4492</td>
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<td>7 December 1941</td>
<td>Col. Tindal at Information Center</td>
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<td>7 December 1941</td>
<td>Fighter airplanes went &quot;up as individuals&quot;</td>
<td>4496</td>
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<td>7 December 1941</td>
<td>No Navy representative, but one bomber representative at Information Center.</td>
<td>4497</td>
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<td>7 December 1941</td>
<td>Information Center not functioning at is best efficiency due to lack of knowledge.</td>
<td>4487-4498</td>
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<td>7 December 1941</td>
<td>USED took over Hawaiian Contractors plant</td>
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<td>7 December 1941</td>
<td>Telegraph from TAG to CG HD authorizing expenditure of funds.</td>
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<td>Two main submarines in Pearl Harbor 6:45 PM</td>
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<td>7 December 1941</td>
<td>Document the Pacific Fleet in Command organization of Navy as of 7 Dec.</td>
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<td>Conference between Short and Governor of Pearl Harbor</td>
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<td>529</td>
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<td>7 December 1941</td>
<td>Radio from Chief of Staff</td>
<td>3691-3692</td>
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<td>7 December 1941</td>
<td>About 9 or 9:30 on the morning of the 7th and the 71st Inf. had moved into the back yard of John Middill.</td>
<td>2540</td>
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<td>7 December 1941</td>
<td>Regarding defense prior to 7 Dec. 1941</td>
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<td>7 December 1941</td>
<td>After attack, No. 2 Alert immediately followed by directive to go on No. 3 Alert.</td>
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<td>8 December 1941</td>
<td>Martial law declared</td>
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<td>8 December 1941</td>
<td>Ordered District Engineer to take over all engineering supplies and ordered all contractors to work under him and take over all labor.</td>
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<td>8 December 1941</td>
<td>M-Day bill put into effect</td>
<td>335-319</td>
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<td>8 December 1941</td>
<td>Meeting held by General Short about 40 people there including Mr. Loevy on food situation.</td>
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<td>CG, HD, signed Colson Acting in regard to receipt of message of 7 Dec.</td>
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<td>Reply of Short to 9 Dec, message from Chief Signal Officer, Washington.</td>
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<td>Mr. Tillman placed in charge of Plant Control Section</td>
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<td>Actions and orders issued pertaining to chemical air attack.</td>
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<td>Distribution of Chans horns for air raid warning system.</td>
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<td>9 or 10 December 1941</td>
<td>Practiced air raid for Honolulu. Exchange of old gas masks for new.</td>
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<td>Report Capron to Short re ammunition</td>
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<td>10 December 1941</td>
<td>Orders for practice air raid issued</td>
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<td>10 December 1941</td>
<td>Secy. Knot arrived in Hawaii</td>
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<td>3442</td>
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<td>Communication to Division Engr, San Francisco from the Office of the Chief of Engr. forwarding additional drawings and erection diagrams for aircraft warning service construction.</td>
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<td>Vim, Dept. issued 2 hrs re property accountability</td>
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<td>Vim, P. F. took over command of Pacific Fleet</td>
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<td>Supplementary Appropriation Act signed, increasing by $220,000</td>
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<td>18 December 1941</td>
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<td>Hawaiian Constructors contract became effective</td>
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<td>Plans and specifications for the 40,000 barrel tanks were received</td>
<td>1246</td>
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<td>for proceeding with the erection of the detector and transmiss</td>
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<td>Air Ferry Route completed by Wyman which was to be completed</td>
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<td>Contract W-44-3270 for rental of 16 yr old tractor from Woolsey,</td>
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<td>Wyman telegram</td>
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<td>Martin received orders to leave Hawaii</td>
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<td>Lt. Rodl to District Engineer stating amount desired for equipmen</td>
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<td>3818, 3829</td>
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<td>January 1942</td>
<td>Martin left Hawaii</td>
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<td>Dist. Engr. took the Honolulu Hotel and</td>
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<td>Scheduled date of completion of air ferry route which was com</td>
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<td>February 1942</td>
<td>Rohn transported cases of whiskey Los Angeles to Honolulu</td>
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<td>February 1942</td>
<td>Newspaper clipping, Honolulu Advertiser “Fraudulent Pay Claim Charged.”</td>
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<td>Lt. Wyman to Raybould; Hansen had not seen it regarding</td>
<td>2030-40</td>
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<tr>
<td>February 1942</td>
<td>situation in District Engineer’s office</td>
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<tr>
<td>February 1942</td>
<td>Report of Colonel Row</td>
<td>2030-40</td>
</tr>
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<td>February 1942</td>
<td>Report from Army Office to Commanding General that Wyman should be</td>
<td>4036, 2030-3069</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 1942</td>
<td>relieved as District Engineer for inefficiency</td>
<td>4036, 2030-3069</td>
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<tr>
<td>February 1942</td>
<td>Kingston arrived in Hawaii</td>
<td>4036, 2030-3069</td>
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<tr>
<td>February 1942</td>
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<tr>
<td>February 1942</td>
<td>Emmons took over all construction</td>
<td>3808</td>
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<td>4533</td>
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<td>February 1942</td>
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<td>2129</td>
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<tr>
<td>February or March</td>
<td>Lt. Seig. of War, asking HD or IG to conduct investigations in</td>
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<td>1942</td>
<td>the delays of construction</td>
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<tr>
<td>March 1942</td>
<td>Lt. Lyman took over construction</td>
<td>4460</td>
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<tr>
<td>March 1942</td>
<td>Inspection property accounting</td>
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<td>March 1942</td>
<td>Wyman left Hawaii</td>
<td>2560, 3512, 3563</td>
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<td>March 1942</td>
<td>&quot;Vega&quot; arrived in Hawaii</td>
<td>3560</td>
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<td>March 1942</td>
<td>Lt. Rohl on behalf of Hawaiian Constructors requesting District</td>
<td>727, 3414</td>
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<td>March 1942</td>
<td>Engineer to purchase certain equipment from Rohl-Connolly Company</td>
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<td>March 1942</td>
<td>Mr. Parker, who had appraised equipment at $151,411.63 was asked to</td>
<td>757-758</td>
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<td>March 1942</td>
<td>report to Wyman’s Operations Office</td>
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<td>March 1942</td>
<td>Approval of equipment by Mr. Parker</td>
<td>3509-9a</td>
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<td>March 1942</td>
<td>End of use of Rohl-Connolly equipment</td>
<td>3510, 3504, 3505</td>
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<td>March 1942</td>
<td>Wyman directed Hawaiian Contractors to purchase equipment for</td>
<td>750, 3516</td>
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<td>March 1942</td>
<td>government at prices named by Rohl</td>
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<tr>
<td>March 1942</td>
<td>Approval of purchase based on Gentry and Robie estimates, by Wyman</td>
<td>3505, 3505, 3505</td>
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<tr>
<td>March 1942</td>
<td>Report of Inspection of 4 March</td>
<td>4460</td>
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<tr>
<td>March 1942</td>
<td>Wyman $147,511 equipment purchase from Hawaiian Contracting Company</td>
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<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
<td>Record page reference</td>
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<tr>
<td>15 March 1942</td>
<td>Wyman relieved                                                                 traction</td>
<td>3826,3815</td>
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<td>15 March 1942</td>
<td>Wyman left Hawaii</td>
<td>4465</td>
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<tr>
<td>16 March 1942</td>
<td>Lt. Reaybold to Lyman in reply to ltr. 27 Feb. 42 re-assignment of Wyman</td>
<td>2068</td>
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<tr>
<td>2 April 1942</td>
<td>Lt. Col. Nurse, CEB re Rohr citizenship status</td>
<td>3238</td>
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<tr>
<td>4 April 1942</td>
<td>Lt. Lyman to Hawaiian Constructors informing them the &quot;Vega&quot; no longer needed.</td>
<td>3406</td>
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<tr>
<td>13 April 1942</td>
<td>Lt. Dillingham to Wyman in which acknowledgment made of latter's letter of 17 March.</td>
<td>3409</td>
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<tr>
<td>14 April 1942</td>
<td>Conference Marine with representatives of Air Force, Engineers and Navy settling final installation plan for storage tanks.</td>
<td>3149</td>
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<tr>
<td>21 April 1942</td>
<td>Testimony of Robert Hoffman taken by Col. Row, IGDA</td>
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<td>26 April 1942</td>
<td>Lt. re Inspector's report 14 March</td>
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<td>28 April 1942</td>
<td>Appropriations Act of $1,433,000 signed</td>
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<td>20 April 1942</td>
<td>Statement of Robert Hoffman</td>
<td>2121</td>
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<td>1 May 1942</td>
<td>Formal cancellation of Job #46 (Mobile A&amp;W Station at Mauna Loa) which was actually cancelled 14 July 1941.</td>
<td>3518</td>
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<tr>
<td>May 1942</td>
<td>Col. Robinson left Hawaii</td>
<td>3822</td>
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<tr>
<td>May 1942</td>
<td>Benson paid for 20% Interest in Hawaiian Contractors.</td>
<td>3741,3742</td>
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<tr>
<td>May 1942</td>
<td>Report of investigation re irregularities in office of 14th Field Area USEO Pearl City, T.H.</td>
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<td>May or June 1942</td>
<td>Rolbi left Hawaii</td>
<td>3737</td>
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<tr>
<td>Spring 1942</td>
<td>Rolbi made trip to continent, Rolbi complained of having had heart</td>
<td>3737,3735</td>
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<tr>
<td>Summer 1942</td>
<td>Rolbi returned to the continent permanently.</td>
<td>3739</td>
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<tr>
<td>1 July 1942</td>
<td>Other Rolbi-Connolly equipment accepted by District Engineer valued at $20,001 subsequent to this date.</td>
<td>3829</td>
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<td>9 July 1942</td>
<td>&quot;Vega&quot; accepted by Coast Guard for duty, ltr. 28 July 1942.</td>
<td>3406</td>
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<td>22 July 1942</td>
<td>Meurk's memo re Rolbi</td>
<td>3225, 3001-2</td>
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<tr>
<td>2 August 1942</td>
<td>Alleged improper conduct of a government employee by misappropriation of meal tickets to CG HD conducted by Lt. Col. O'Rourke, TID.</td>
<td>3243</td>
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<tr>
<td>22 September 1942</td>
<td>Lt. to Chief Military Intelligence Service WD from John A. Gullitt marked Exhibit 61 concerning Col. Wyman and U.S. Army Canal project with two inclosures 22 Sep 1942 and 17 Sep 1942.</td>
<td>4005-4035</td>
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<td>October 1942</td>
<td>Report of FBI re Wyman.</td>
<td>2129-2133</td>
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<td>November 1942</td>
<td>Rolbi got German passport.</td>
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<td>November 1942</td>
<td>Rolbi went back to continent.</td>
<td>3736</td>
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<tr>
<td>January 1943</td>
<td>Wooley came out of Hawaiian Constructors contract.</td>
<td>3705</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 January 1943</td>
<td>Report on the Pleasanton Hotel matter.</td>
<td>3240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 January 1943</td>
<td>Col. Nurse's report to Gen. Kranner.</td>
<td>3769</td>
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<tr>
<td>31 January 1943</td>
<td>Hawaiian Constructors' contract terminated.</td>
<td>3765, 3705</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 March 1943</td>
<td>Lt. Robert McKee, El Paso, Texas, to Hon. E. E. Thompson, M. C., enclosing newspaper clipping regarding Wyman and Rolbi.</td>
<td>748</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 March 1943</td>
<td>FBI report re Capt. Ulrich Von Der Osten.</td>
<td>3903</td>
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<tr>
<td>28 April 1943</td>
<td>Report of Edw. A. Furlough re Rohr citizenship status.</td>
<td>3923</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 May 1943</td>
<td>Lt. to the CG, 6th Service Command, signed by Gen. Madison Pearsen, O. S. C.</td>
<td>3924</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 July 1943</td>
<td>Lt. to Col. Millard Pearsen, Dept. IG, from J. E. Thornton of FBI.</td>
<td>3239</td>
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<tr>
<td>15 September 1943</td>
<td>Japs apprehended and dual citizens born.</td>
<td>3921-3922</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 September 1943</td>
<td>Affidavit of R.F. Wichner, Hawaiian Contractors Company, Ltd., suspended dividend of 15% monthly paid 1942-1943.</td>
<td>3904</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 January 1944</td>
<td>Lease land at Mokuleia Airfield from Dillingham (Mokuleia Ranch &amp; Land Co., Ltd.).</td>
<td>3881</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 March 1944</td>
<td>Don C. Bird, FBI agent, investigated Col. Clatterbuck's information re Wyman.</td>
<td>4006</td>
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<tr>
<td>13 June 1944</td>
<td>Public Law 330, 76th Congress, directing investigation.</td>
<td>4036-4039, 4050</td>
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<tr>
<td>2 August 1944</td>
<td>Lt. Gen. Grummet to Congressman Robinson.</td>
<td>4031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 August 1944</td>
<td>Orders for Gen. Bragdon in connection with Army Pearl Harbor Board.</td>
<td>2064-2055</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 August 1944</td>
<td>Army Pearl Harbor Board memo to Sec. of War.</td>
<td>4014</td>
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<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
<td>Record page reference</td>
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<td>-----------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 August 1944</td>
<td>Ltr to Major Clausen by Col. R. L. Forney, Gen. Staff Corps, Military Intelligence, Washington, with enclosures marked Exhibit 59 and received in evidence. Exhibit 59 indicates that as of Dec 1940 there was a file in FBI to the effect that Hans Wilhelm Rohl was possibly an agent of the German Gov't. and guilty of subversive activities, which information could have been obtained by any one desiring to investigate the loyalty of Rohl. Also a suspicion directed against Hans Wilhelm Rohl of subversive activities as early as July 1940.</td>
<td>4027-4028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 August 1944</td>
<td>List of MID Personnel &amp; expenses, 1921-1942</td>
<td>4355-4361</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 August 1944</td>
<td>Report Signal Office, Central Pacific Base Command, on establishement of AWS (Exhibit 58)</td>
<td>3915</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 September 1944</td>
<td>Maj. Powell's orders in connection with Army Pearl Harbor Board.</td>
<td>2923</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 September 1944</td>
<td>Ltr Robert Hoffman to Army Pearl Harbor Board.</td>
<td>4121-4123</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Exhibit 51—summary of information concerning Jap task force.</td>
<td>3912</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 September 1944</td>
<td>1st Ind. to ltr of 7 September 1944, from Gen. Grumert</td>
<td>3643</td>
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<tr>
<td>14 September 1944</td>
<td>Memo Col. Marcy to Gen Frank, (Exhibit 57)</td>
<td>3914</td>
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<tr>
<td>14 September 1944</td>
<td>Memo, Maj. Loder to Maj. Clausen final estimate cost $97,866,981. Fee rec'd by Hawaiian Constructors $1,060,000.</td>
<td>3797</td>
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<tr>
<td>16 September 1944</td>
<td>Affidavit by Wymon, (Exhibit 86)</td>
<td>3852-3878</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 September 1944</td>
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<td>3881-3882</td>
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<tr>
<td>18 September 1944</td>
<td>Ltr H. P. Benson to Army Pearl Harbor Board.</td>
<td>3916, 3917</td>
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<tr>
<td>21 September 1944</td>
<td>Affidavit of Graves that Australia knew Japs headed for U. S. possession.</td>
<td>4404, 4413</td>
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<td>28 September 1944</td>
<td>Gen. Grumert phone call to Sen. Ferguson</td>
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INDEX TO EXHIBITS—ILLUSTRATIONS  
ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD

(The original Exhibit to which each illustration relates is indicated in parentheses following the description)

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<td>Map of the Island of Oahu, T. H., showing Communications Installations as of 7 July 1941. (Exhibit No. 1.)</td>
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<td>2.</td>
<td>Map of the Island of Oahu, T. H., showing Police Districts, Railroad Stations, and Highway Bridges. (Exhibit No. 1.)</td>
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<td>3.</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Photostat of a captured Japanese map taken from the chart board of a Japanese dive bomber. (Exhibit No. 23.)</td>
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<td>60–61.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Lt. Col. Theodore Hyman Jr.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Street</td>
<td>Honolulu</td>
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<tr>
<td>City</td>
<td>Hawaii</td>
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Money, jewelry, and other valuable packages must be placed in the safe in the office and receipt obtained. Otherwise, the management will not be responsible for any loss.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WEIGHT</th>
<th>DEPARTED</th>
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<th>ORDER</th>
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<td>8/6/50</td>
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<td>70423</td>
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<td>Memo</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Explanation</td>
<td>Amt. Charged</td>
<td>Amt. Credited</td>
<td>Balance Due</td>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>DEC17-40</td>
<td>Room ...</td>
<td>* 2.00</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>DEC18-40</td>
<td>Valet</td>
<td>* 1.00</td>
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<td>3.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>DEC18-40</td>
<td>Room ...</td>
<td>* 4.50</td>
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<td>7.50</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>DEC19-40</td>
<td>Room ...</td>
<td>* 4.50</td>
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<td>12.00</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>DEC20-40</td>
<td>Room ...</td>
<td>* 4.50</td>
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**Memo:**

- DEC17-40: Room ...
- DEC18-40: Valet
- DEC18-40: Room ...
- DEC19-40: Room ...
- DEC20-40: Room ...

**Balance Due:**

- 2.00 (DEC17-40)
- 3.00 (DEC18-40)
- 7.50 (DEC18-40)
- 12.00 (DEC19-40)
- 16.50 (DEC20-40)

**Room No.:**

- 914
- 016
- 020
- 020
- 020
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<tr>
<th>Description</th>
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<td>INV. RENDERED #69664</td>
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<td>CASH ADV 6/26</td>
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Please ensure that all payments are completed in ten days to avoid any interest charges.

Signed: [Signature]

79716 0-46
SCHOFIELD BARRACKS TERRITORY OF HAWAII

The undersigned depositor agrees with the Bank of America, National Association, that this account is to be carried by said bank as a COMMERCIAL ACCOUNT and all funds which the undersigned depositor has or may have on deposit therein with said bank shall be governed by its By-Laws, all future amendments thereof, and all regulations passed or hereafter to be passed by its Board of Directors pursuant to said By-Laws relating thereto including interest, service charges, etc.

Sign: Theodore Wyman

Address: 798 O'ahu Ave. St

Business or Occupation: U.S. Army

Birthday: Somerville, N. J.

Father's Name: Theodore Wyman

Mother's Maiden Name: Ella Shelvin

Refer to Capt. Change U.S. Engineers Office

Opened by: 1st

Date: 8-17-35

Amount: $0.00

Closed: 11-30-39

Account Number: 141-14

Balance: C.C. for balance
M. Theodore Jr.

Camp Claiborne, Louisiana

The undersigned depositor agrees with Bank of America that this account is to be carried

by said bank as a COMMERCIAL ACCOUNT and all funds which the undersigned depositor has or may have
on deposit therein with said bank shall be governed by its By Laws, all future amendments thereof, all
regulations passed or hereafter to be passed by its Board of Directors pursuant to said By-Laws, and by all
rules and practices of said bank relating thereto including interest, service charges, etc.

Sign
Here

Theodore Hyman Jr.
U. S. Engineers Office

Address

Business or
Occupation

Birthplace

Father's Name

Mother's Maiden Name

Introduce by

Opened by


Close.

TEL: 100 1:40 SIGNATURE CARD: INDIVIDUAL, OR INDIVIDUAL TRUSTEE

Amount 1743 67
## THE BILTMORE HOTEL

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H. W. R. L.
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Hiram M. Oake, Th.

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in 75 from (3861).

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District Engineer:

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R.2.26 to 55
Exhibit No. 23
In evidence
### Chart for Period Aug. 31, 1941

#### Original Program

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**PERCENT COMPLETED**

**ORIGINAL PROGRAM**

**PERCENT OF READINESS FOR OCCUPANCY AND USE**

**ORIGINAL PROGRAM**

*TYPE OF CONSTRUCTION IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH SPECIFICATIONS ISSUED BY Q.M.C.*