The Munich Agreement and its Application
(September 29-October 4, 1938)
        Munich, September 29
        The agreement concluded at Munich on September 29, 1938, 
        between Germany, the United Kingdom, France and Italy, 
        regulates the conditions for the evacuation by Czecho-
        slovakia and the occupation by Germany of the Sudeten terri-
        tories, entrusts to an international commission the task of
        fixing the frontiers of the Czech State and stipulates, in 
        its Annex I, that an international guarantee of these fron-
        tiers shall be given by the four signatory Powers .........    9

 13  M. DALADIER-Munich, September 30
        M. Daladier asks the French Minister in Prague to make sure
        of President Benes's acceptance ...........................   12

 14  M. GEORGES BONNET-Paris, October 2
        The French Minister for Foreign Affairs sends to  M. Krofta,
        Minister for Foreign Affairs of Czechoslovakia, a personal 
        message of sympathy .......................................   12

 15  M. GEORGES BONNET-Paris, October 3
        M. Georges Bonnet gives an account of the results of the 
        Munich agreement for the guidance of French diplomatic repre-
        sentatives abroad .........................................   13

 16  M. FRANÇOIS-PONCET-Berlin, October 4
        The French Ambassador in Berlin considers that, although,
        for the first time, Herr Hitler has had to compromise to a 
        certain extent, nevertheless the Western Democracies ought,
        above all, to draw from recent events the lesson that it is
        only through their strength and unity of action that they 
        will be able to prevent the repetition of crises similar to
        that solved by the Munich agreement .......................   15


The Munich Agreement and its Application

(September 29-October 4, 1938)

No. 12

Agreement concluded at Munich, September 29, 1938, between Germany, Great Britain, France and Italy

GERMANY, the United Kingdom, France and Italy, taking into consideration the agreement, which has been already reached in principle for the cession to Germany of the Sudeten German territory, have agreed on the following terms and conditions governing the said cession and the measures consequent thereon, and by this agreement they each hold themselves responsible for the steps necessary to secure its fulfillment:

(1) The evacuation will begin on 1st October.

(2) The United Kingdom, France and Italy agree that the evacuation of the territory shall be completed by the 10th October, without any existing installations having been destroyed, and that the Czechoslovak Government will be held responsible for carrying out the evacuation without damage to the said installations.

(3) The conditions governing the evacuation will be laid down in detail by an international commission composed of representatives of Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Italy and Czechoslovakia.

(4) The occupation by stages of the predominantly German territory by German troops will begin on 1st October. The four territories marked on the attached map will be occupied by German troops in the following order:

The territory marked No. I on the 1st and 2nd of October; the territory marked No. II on the 2nd and 3rd of October; the territory marked No. III on the 3rd, 4th and 5th of October; the territory marked No. IV on the 6th and 7th of October. The remaining territory of preponderantly German character will be ascertained by the


aforesaid international commission forthwith and be occupied by German troops by the 10th of October.

(5) The international commission referred to in paragraph 3 will determine the territories in which a plebiscite is to be held. These territories will be occupied by international bodies until the plebiscite has been completed. The same commission will fix the conditions in which the plebiscite is to be held, taking as a basis the conditions of the Saar plebiscite. The commission will also fix a date, not later than the end of November, on which the plebiscite will be held.

(6) The final determination of the frontiers will be carried out by the international commission. The commission will also be entitled to recommend to the four Powers, Germany, the United Kingdom, France and Italy, in certain exceptional cases, minor modifications in the strictly ethnographical determination of the zones which are to be transferred without plebiscite

(7) There will be a right of option into and out of the transferred territories, the option to be exercised within six months from the date of this agreement. A German-Czechoslovak commission shall determine the details of the option, consider ways of facilitating the transfer of population and settle questions of principle arising out of the said transfer.

(8) The Czechoslovak Government will within a period of four weeks from the date of this agreement release from their military and police forces any Sudeten Germans who may wish to be released, and the Czechoslovak Government will within the same period release Sudeten German prisoners who are serving terms of imprisonment for political offences.

      Munich, September 29, 1938.                   ADOLF HITLER,
                                                    NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN,
                                                    EDOUARD DALADIER,
                                                    BENITO MUSSOLINI.

No. 1

Annex to the Agreement

HIS MAJESTY's GOVERNMENT in the United Kingdom and the French Government have entered into the above agreement on the basis that they stand by the offer, contained in paragraph 6 of the Anglo-French proposals of the 19th September, relating to an international guar-


antee of the new boundaries of the Czechoslovak State against unprovoked aggression.

When the question of the Polish and Hungarian minorities in Czechoslovakia has been settled, Germany and Italy for their part will give a guarantee to Czechoslovakia.

      Munich, September 29, 1938.                   ADOLF HITLER,
                                                    NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN,
                                                    EDOUARD DALADIER,
                                                    Benito MUSSOLINI.

No. 2


THE HEADS of the Governments of the four Powers declare that the problems of the Polish and Hungarian minorities in Czechoslovakia, if not settled within three months by agreement between the respective Governments, shall form the subject of another meeting of the Heads of the Governments of the four Powers here present.

      Munich, September 29, 1938.                   ADOLF HITLER,
                                                    NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN,
                                                    EDOUARD DALADIER,
                                                    Benito MUSSOLINI.

No. 3

Supplementary Declaration

ALL questions which may arise out of the transfer of the territory shall be considered as coming within the terms of reference to the international commission.

      Munich, September 29, 1938.                   ADOLF HITLER,
                                                    NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN,
                                                    EDOUARD DALADIER,
                                                    Benito MUSSOLINI.

No. 4

Composition of the International Commission

THE four Heads of Governments here present agree that the international commission provided for in the agreement signed by them to-day


shall consist of the Secretary of State in the German Foreign Office, the British, French and Italian Ambassadors accredited in Berlin, and a representative to be nominated by the Government of Czechoslovakia.

      Munich, September 29, 1938.                   ADOLF HITLER,
                                                    NEVILLE CHAMBERLAIN,
                                                    EDOUARD DALADIER,
                                                    Benito MUSSOLINI.

No. 13

M. EDOUARD DALADIER, President of the Council, Minister of National 
   Defence and War, 
     to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
                                    Munich, September 30, 1938, 330 a.m.

PLEASE transmit most urgently to Prague:

The text of the agreement which has been concluded to-night by the four Powers in Munich has been communicated by the British Prime Minister and M. Daladier to M. Mastny. The latter will leave this morning at 6 a.m. by aeroplane for Prague.

M. Ashton Gwatkin, who accompanies M. Mastny, will give you, simultaneously with the French text of this document, the attached map.

You should as a matter of extreme urgency get in touch with M. Benes in order to make sure of his agreement. I request you to express to him my deep emotion at the end of these negotiations-and to assure him that it was not by my choice that no representative of Czechoslovakia was present. I have no doubt, however painful the sacrifices imposed by the present situation, that M. Benes will agree with me that it is of the highest importance, whilst safeguarding for the future the essential conditions enabling his country to retain its faith in its destiny, to save the Czechoslovak nation from the more redoubtable trial of war.

No. 14

M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs,
     to M. V. DE LACROIX, French Minister in Prague.
                                                 Paris, October 2, 1938. 

PLEASE make an immediate communication to M. Krofta to express the sentiments of profound sympathy with which, from hour to hour,


I have followed his noble and courageous personal handling of the situation during so painful a national trial. Please assure him of the admiration felt by myself and by all my countrymen for the strength of character and the incomparable self-control shown by all Czechoslovak leaders, whose clear-sightedness has done so much to protect their country from the horrors of war. Will you assure him of my most loyal personal friendship and of my desire to help him to the best of my ability in the constructive task which now lies before him. The dignity and the self-abnegation shown by the entire Czechoslovak nation afford proof of its reserves of strength and vitality, the best safeguard of her historical patrimony and of her proud and free destiny.

                                                         GEORGES BONNET.

No. 15

M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs,
     to all diplomatic posts.
                                                 Paris, October 3, 1938.

THE answer given on September 27 by Herr Hitler to the personal message from Mr. Neville Chamberlain conveyed to him in Berlin the day before by Sir Horace Wilson was not such as to bring about a relaxation of the general tension. Herr Hitler refused to make any concessions, and maintained his decision to send his troops into the territory inhabited by the Sudeten Germans on the 1st of October. Field-Marshal Goering still further emphasized this attitude by declaring to Sir Nevile Henderson on September 27 that, if the Czechoslovak Government had not accepted the terms of the Godesberg memorandum on the next day, September 28, by 2 p.m., measures of mobilization would immediately be taken and followed by action.

In spite of this German intransigence, the French and British Governments persevered in their efforts to find a basis for a peaceful solution of the Czechoslovak question.

In the evening of September 27, Sir Nevile Henderson presented to the German Government a new plan consisting mainly of the occupation, on October 1, of the territories of Eger and Asch.

This plan not having been accepted, the French Ambassador immediately approached Herr Hitler himself, during the morning of September 28, with another proposal which, while conforming with the procedure contemplated in the British plan, considerably enlarged the zone of territory to be occupied by the Germans from the 1st of October.


As a result of this conversation, which lasted a whole hour and during the course of which the Chancellor had behaved in a calm and almost friendly manner, our Ambassador had the impression that it might not be impossible to reach an agreement. Without rejecting the French proposal, Herr Hitler reserved his reply with a view to a written communication.

It was in these circumstances that, as a result of a suggestion made by Mr. Neville Chamberlain in agreement with the French Government after President Roosevelt's appeal, and supported in Berlin by Signor Mussolini, Herr Hitler, in the afternoon of the 28th September, invited the Heads of the French, British and Italian Governments to meet on the 29th September at Munich.

After laborious negotiations, which began at midday on September 29, an agreement was signed during the night of the 29th-30th of September.

There is no need to summarize here the text of that agreement, which was published on the 30th of September; nevertheless, it seems useful to compare the principal points of the agreement with the demands formulated by Herr Hitler at Godesberg on the 23rd September.

(1) At Godesberg, the whole of the zone inhabited by the Sudeten Germans was to have been ceded to Germany on the 1st October. At Munich it was agreed that this occupation would take place by stages, being spread over a period of ten days.

(2) At Godesberg, the new frontier was to be determined by a unilateral decision of Germany alone. At Munich, an international commission was to determine it finally.

(3) At Munich, Germany gave up the idea of the plebiscite which had been insisted upon at Godesberg in the zone inhabited by a strong majority of Sudeten Germans, no doubt with the intention of creating a precedent which Germany might invoke in other cases.

(4) At Godesberg, Herr Hitler had demanded the organization of plebiscites in certain regions with a strong Czech majority, but with German minorities. At Munich, he abandoned this claim, leaving it to the international commission to decide upon the advisability, and to determine the territorial limits, of any plebiscites.

(5) At Munich, Germany conceded to the population the right of option "to be included in the transferred territories or to be excluded from them."

(6) Whilst, in the Godesberg plan, the German Government would accept only one plenipotentiary representing the Czechoslovak Govern-


ment and Army as agent de liaison with the German General Staff, it has now agreed to the presence within the international commission of a Czechoslovak representative on an equal footing with the German representative.

(7) The German plan at Godesberg did not mention any project of international guarantee. At Munich, Britain and France have undertaken unconditionally and without delay to participate in an international guarantee of the new Czechoslovak frontiers against any unprovoked aggression; Germany and Italy have undertaken to give their guarantee as soon as the question of the Polish and Hungarian minorities shall be settled.

(8) Taken as a whole, the Godesberg plan resembled in many respects a veritable armistice convention concluded after victorious military operations on the part of Germany; the Munich agreement as the character of a settlement, concluded under the guarantee of the four Powers, the execution of which is essentially under the control and even, in many cases, subject to the decision of an international commission.

The Czechoslovak Government, with the highest self-abnegation, and in a spirit to which we must pay tribute, has accepted the agreement of the 29th September. All the measures provided for in this agreement are now in course of execution.

                                                         GEORGES BONNET.

No. 16

FRANÇOIS-PONCET, French Ambassador in Berlin,
     to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
                                                Berlin, October 4, 1938.

THE agreement reached on September 29 at Munich has been received with no less relief in Germany than in France and Great Britain.

The Chancellor's speech delivered on September 26 and the news of the military measures taken by France and Great Britain had brought the prevailing anxiety to a high pitch. The Chancellor had burnt his boats. It was felt to be unthinkable that he could retreat. Contrary to general expectations, the Western Powers appeared resolved to fight. During the days of the 27th and 28th September, one could sense the hourly approach of the catastrophe. This state of mind was clearly visible in the expressions of the Berliners who had been urged, during the evening of the 28th September, to listen to a speech


by Dr. Goebbels, the general opinion was that he was to announce general mobilization.

It was in this atmosphere that on Wednesday, towards 10 p.m., the news began to spread that the Four-Power Conference was to open the next day at Munich. It immediately aroused a feeling of immense satisfaction. Nobody doubted for a moment that the imminent danger of war had been averted. The miracle that all had ceased to hope for had occurred.

With the exception of a few fanatics, very few Germans thought that the Sudetens were worth the risk of a European war. The great masses of the people knew nothing of the Sudeten: they were in no way conscious that the Sudeten had ever belonged to the Reich; they were hardly more interested in their fate than in that of the Germans in Rumania. They would have been quite pleased with a punitive expedition against Czechoslovakia, but they certainly would have abandoned the Sudeten rather than see the entire world in arms against Germany.

At the moment when the German-Czech conflict threatened to turn into a European conflagration, the atmosphere in Germany was very different from the feverish and aggressive atmosphere of August 1914. It is certainly without any feeling of enthusiasm that the German people would have followed their Führer into a general war

Though these are the general reactions brought about in the country by the events of the last few days, it does not appear that unanimity reigns in the leading circles of the Reich as to the lesson to be learnt from them. In that respect one can discern two separate schools of thought.

The more reasonable circles have been very much struck by the resistance that the Führer's will has encountered for the first time In the face of the attitude adopted by Great Britain and France, and; at the last moment, even by Italy, Adolf Hitler was not able to maintain in its entirety the position he had assumed at Godesberg, and which was formulated in his memorandum of September 23. He was preparing to dictate terms to Czechoslovakia as to a vanquished country. He had, with a unilateral gesture, determined on a map the zone which German troops were to occupy from the 1st of October The time allowed for evacuation was so short that the Czechs could not have retired in an orderly fashion. The Führer had to compromise on all these points. Even though he has obtained satisfaction on the main issues, he was obliged to accept an international procedure as


regards the mode of execution, in spite of his repeatedly expressed dislike of such methods. He was not able to go as far as he wished. He recognized that he had reached the limit beyond which foreign opposition threatened to become armed intervention.

In German high political circles, and even among the most convinced and influential Nazis, there is no lack of counsels of moderation to the effect that the Germans should be satisfied, for the time being at least, with the results obtained, that they should allow themselves a respite, relax the economic and financial tension, and seek to reach some arrangement with the Western Powers. These are the circles which, during the crisis of the 28th September, influenced Field-Marshal Goering and whose counsels prevailed over Herr von Ribbentrop's.

Yet there are many who proclaim that one must continue to go ahead and to take the utmost advantage of the military superiority which the Reich believes itself to possess at present. Their influence is felt within the International Commission itself, where they assume the attitude of victors who have the right to formulate imperative demands. It has been necessary more than once to remind them that the agreement of September 29 was not a German "Diktat," but an international arrangement. The annexation of the Sudeten, following the Anschluss of Austria after an interval of seven months, has not satisfied their appetites. At the very moment when the German army is occupying the mountains which have hitherto been the historic frontiers of Bohemia, they are scanning the horizon in search of new demands to formulate, new battles to fight out, new prizes to conquer.

Clearly anxious to spare the feelings of France and Great Britain, to allay mistrust and awaken hopes, the German Press has not ceased during these days to affirm that the Munich Agreement might become the keystone for building a new Europe released from prejudices and mutual hatreds, ruled by respect for the vital rights of all peoples and orientated towards a harmonious cooperation between the nations. The newspapers of the Reich are prodigal in expressions meant to please France. They have repeatedly stated that no subject of contention now exists between France and Germany. They have been at pains to pay tribute to the role played by M. Daladier at the Munich conference; they have praised him as an ax-serviceman whose chief concern is to spare his country and Europe the horrors of a new war. Quoting a remark of Field-Marshal Goering's, they have written: "With a man like M. Daladier, politics become a practical proposition."


Commenting on the declaration issued by the Führer and the British Premier after the Munich conference-a declaration which has been represented here as a non-aggression pact-they have let it be understood that, in their opinion, there is no reason why France and Germany should not come to a similar arrangement. Evidently the primary condition would be that France, adopting a realistic policy, should draw certain conclusions from the events which had so profoundly shaken the whole of Europe.

In that respect, the Munich conference should serve us as a warning. In order that the agreement which assigns to Czechoslovakia new frontiers and a new place in Europe should become the starting-point of a reorganization of the Continent on an equitable basis, it is indispensable that the Western Democracies should draw a lesson from the dramatic events of last week. It is necessary that while continuing to affirm their will to peace and neglecting no means of reaching an understanding with the totalitarian States, they should nevertheless eliminate all causes of internal weakness, that they should fill up as quickly as possible any gaps in their armaments, and that they should give to the outside world tangible proof of industry, cohesion and strength. This is the price we must be prepared to pay if Europe is not to undergo again, after a respite of uncertain duration, crises similar to the last one just settled at the Munich conference after threatening for several days to degenerate into general pandemonium.



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