THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

VOLUME III APPENDIX

PART A—HULL-NOMURA CONVERSATIONS (August 5, 1941-October 17, 1941)

No. 1
August 5, 1941
#447.
FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington 

(In 2 parts—complete).

1. The Imperial Government is trying to give its attention to the all important matter of Japanese-United States relations. This is not an easy task, for there are numerous obstacles involving domestic politics.

According to the various reports you have submitted on the subject, the President and the Secretary of State are displaying considerable understanding in their attitudes toward Japan. You imply that they view the situation cool headedly, regardless of the trend of general public opinion.

On our side, however, there are quite a few persons who vigorously insist that the United States economic pressure on Japan is being daily increased in intensity. For example, the ewspaper Yomiuri carried a dispatch from-----on the 2nd, in which it was reported that the President of the United States had either ordered the complete suspension of, or curtail to the extreme, all exports of petroleum products. As a result of this order, the dispatch continued, even those exports for which permits had already been issued, had to be cancelled.

Regardless of whether there was any truth in the report or not and regardless of the extent of the alleged curtailment, such reports give the antagonists a strong talking point. This is a situation which causes us no end of anxiety.

2. If it is believed by any that our people and country can be threatened into submission by the so-called strengthened encirclement policy or by the application of economic pressure, it is a mistaken notion. As a matter of fact, it is erroneous to the extreme as should be obvious to any who understands our national characteristics.

If such a policy as the above is adopted, we cannot guarantee that the trend will not be in directly the opposite direction from our goal of an improved United States-Japanese relationship. One should be able to see this clearly from the example set forth above.

3. We are convinced that we have reached the most important, and at the same time the most critical, moment of Japanese-United States relations. It was at a time like this that the Imperial Government voluntarily agreed to temporarily cease the bombing of Chungking and its suburban area. This should clearly indicate Japan's sincerity, considerateness, and restraint toward the United States.

If an improvement in the relations between the United States and Japan, as two equal powers on the Pacific, is sincerely desired, the points which will most effectively bring about such improvements must be given unbiased and cool consideration.

For the purpose of preventing the possibility of letting anyone, either within or out of the country, be under the impression that the negotiations were conducted under the threat of economic pressure all measures which may be construed as being economic pressure should be abandoned at once. That we shall reciprocate in kind was made clear in the recent statement issued by the Minister of Finance.

[A-1]

4. Based on the general plan outlined by the last Cabinet, the Imperial Government proposes a plan, set forth in my separate message #448[a], to improve Japanese-United States relations. This last plan was drawn up as a reply to the plan suggested by the President on the 24th, and is being submitted only after the respective positions of the United States and Japan as they affect the other, were given thorough consideration.

Will Your Excellency make an effort to clearly impress this point on the President and the Secretary of State and at the same time draw their attention to the graveness of this matter.

5. In form, the proposal which is being forwarded herewith, is a reply to the President's plan of the 24th. Our real motive, however, is to incorporate its provisions into the final agreement. With this instrument, we hope to resume the Japanese-United States negotiations which were suspended because of the delay in the delivery of our revised proposals of July 14 and because of our occupation of French Indo-China which took place in the meantime. Since that is our intention, please relay the matter contained in my separate message #448[a] without delay.

[a] See III, 2.

Trans. 8-6-41


No. 2
August 5, 1941
#448.
FROM: Tokyo 
TO: Washington 

1. Explanation. (Make this verbally, do not resort to writing.)

The motive and character of the French Indo-China joint defense measure were carefully and fully explained by this Minister and by the Japanese Ambassador in the United States. In brief, the step was taken peacefully, for the purpose of self-defense and in such a manner as to make intervention by a third country unnecessary.

Japanese public opinion had become exceedingly incensed over the trend of the attitude during recent months, of the British, the United States, the Netherlands East Indies, and others.

The French Indo-China measure had to be taken to restrain those who were clamoring for vigorous overseas action and to avert a storm on the peaceful waters of the Pacific.

It is admitted here that the above explanation may not completely wipe away the sense of uneasiness felt by the government of the United States. However, we believe that it will be able to accept it conditionally. On this assumption we make the proposals set forth below.

In view of the times and circumstances, we desire that discussions on the proposals set forth here be conducted in secrecy and entirely off-the-record. Should these discussions culminate in a successful agreement, we desire that the points agreed upon be appropriately incorporated in the plan to promote relations between the United States and Japan which has been under consideration for the past several months.

We are convinced that the government of the United States is as anxious as is the government of Japan to view their respective positions clearly, coolly, and with understanding, in order to determine the fundamental causes which have led to the present critical situation between the two countries. We also firmly believe that the United States is as desirous as we are to remove at the source, or otherwise relieve, any and all military, economic, and political uneasiness which exists between the two nations.

On these assumptions, we propose the following:

[A-2]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

2. Proposal.

(1) The government of Japan definitely promises the following:

(a) So as to remove all military threats to the territories held by the United States, Japan will not occupy any territory in the Southwestern Pacific area, other than French Indo-China. Moreover, the Japanese military forces in French Indo-China will be removed immediately upon the conclusion of the China Incident.

(b) For the purpose of removing all military and political threats to the Philippine Islands, we shall, at an opportune moment, guarantee the neutrality of those Islands. In return we ask that the Imperial Government and its people be treated in the same manner as those of all other countries, including the United States.

(c) In order to remove the cause of the unsettled economic condition between the two countries in East Asia, we will cooperate in the production of and access to the natural resources of this area which are essential to the United States.

(2) The United States definitely promises the following:

(a) For the purpose of removing military threats to the Japanese Empire and to the importing and exporting of goods to and from Japan, the United States will cease military operations in the Southwestern Pacific area. Moreover, upon the effectuating of this agreement, the United States will use its good offices to have the governments of Britain and the Netherlands East Indies to take similar steps.

(b) For the purpose of removing the causes of military, political and economic conflict between the two countries in-----, the United States will cooperate with Japan in the production of and access to natural resources of the southwest Pacific area particularly of the Netherlands East Indies, which are essential to Japan. Moreover, the United States will cooperate with Japan in trying to have all the latter's differences with the Netherlands East Indies settled.

(c) In connection with the above, suitable measures shall be adopted immediately by the two nations to bring about the resumption of the profitable trade relations which used to exist between Japan and the United States.

(d) In view of the promise made by the Government of Japan under (1), (a), of the above, and with a view towards bringing about a settlement of the China Affair, the Government of the United States shall use its good offices to bring about a peace conference between Japan and the Chiang regime. Also, even after the withdrawal of Japanese troops from French Indo- China, Japan's special position there will be given recognition. (Last sentence garbled, gist guessed at.)

3. Public Announcement. (-----will be stressed, verbally.) As was stated above, negotiations of this proposal shall be made in secrecy. Should, however, it become evident that it would be to the interest of both nations if part of all of the points contained were made public, it shall be done at the time and in the manner agreed upon by the two participants.

Trans. 8-6-41

[A-3]


No. 3
August 6, 1941
#660.
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 
TO: Tokyo 

(To be handled in Government Code.)
Secret outside the department. Separate Wire.

1. The Japanese Government undertakes:

(a) That, in order to remove such causes as might constitute a menace of a military character to the United States, it will not further station its troops in the Southwestern Pacific areas except French Indo-China and that the Japanese troops now stationed in French Indo-China will be withdrawn forthwith on the settlement of the China Incident, and

(b) That, in order to remove such causes as might constitute a menace of political and military character to the Philippine Islands, the Japanese Government will guarantee the neutrality of the islands at an opportune time on the condition that Japan and the Japanese subjects will not be placed in any discriminatory position as compared with other countries and their nationals including the United States and its nationals, and,

(c) That, in order to remove such causes as might be responsible for the instability of the economic relations between Japan and the United States (in East Asia), the Japanese Government will cooperate with the Government of the United States in the production and procurement of such natural resources as are required by the United States.

Trans. 8-22-41


No. 4
August 6, 1941
#660.
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 
TO: Tokyo 

(Part 2 of 3.)
(To be handled in Government Code.)
Secret outside the department. Separate Wire.

2. The Government of the United States undertakes:

(a) That, in order to remove such causes as might constitute a direct menace of military character to Japan or to her international communications, the Government of the United States will suspend its military measures in the Southwestern Pacific areas, and also that, upon a successful conclusion of the present conversations, it will advise the Governments of Great Britain and of the Netherlands to take similar steps, and

(b) That, in order to remove such causes as might be responsible for military, political and economic friction between Japan and the United States, the Government of the United States will cooperate with the Japanese Government in the production and procurement of natural resources as are required by Japan in the Southwestern Pacific areas, especially in the Netherlands East Indies, and

\

Trans. 8-22-41

[A-4]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR


No. 5
August 6, 1941
#660.
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 
TO: Tokyo 

(Part 3 of 3.)
(To be handled in Government Code.)

(c) That, in conjunction with the measures as set forth in the above, the Government of the United States will take steps necessary for restoring the normal relations of trade and commerce which have hitherto existed between Japan and the United States, and

(d) That, in view of the undertaking by the Japanese Government as set forth in 1(a) above, the Government of the United States will use its good-offices for the initiation of direct negotiations between the Japanese Government and the CHIANG KAI SHEK Regime for the purpose of a speedy settlement of the China Incident, and that the Government of the United States will recognize a special status of Japan in French Indo-China even after the withdrawal of Japanese troops from that area.

Trans. 8-22-41


No. 6
August 6, 1941
#659.
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 
TO: Tokyo 

(Part 1 of 2.)
Re your #447[a].

On the evening of the 6th, I called on Secretary of State HULL. Bearing in mind the purport of your caption telegram as well as that of your past telegrams, I gave him a detailed explanation of Part 1 of your #448[b] (I handed this to him in writing. Please (refer ?) to (separate ?) telegram #660[c].) HULL said, "After carefully studying your proposal, I shall reply one way or another," and he did not seem to take much interest in it. Stating that he was telling me what he personally thought, he began to express his opinions on the present Japanese-American relations, mentioning not a word about our proposal, but going into great details. What he said was, in short, this:

Setting aside the relations between him and me, he said he was greatly disappointed in the actions Japan has been taking one after another, and that so long as Japan does not give up the policy of force, there was no use talking.

[a] See III, 1,which discusses the criticalness of Japanese-American relations.
[b] See III, 2, which contains explanation and text of the Japanese proposal.
[c] See III, 3-5.

Trans. 8-22-41

[A-5]


No. 7
August 6, 1941
#659.
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 
TO: Tokyo 

(Part 2 of 2)

So long as the Japanese Government authorities say that what the United States is doing is encirclement of Japan, he could not expect anything of Japan ("I can expect nothing from you"). When we wish to live in peace and security, HITLER, saying that he was acting in self- defense, mows down everybody that stands in his way.

He spoke as if Japan was doing likewise. Judging from the impression he gave me, no matter what explanation might be offered, it seems to be impossible to convey Japan's intention to the present leaders in the United States. I felt that the United States Government is determined to deal with any situation.

Trans. 8-22-41


p>No. 8
August 6, 1941
#450.
FROM: Tokyo 
TO: Washington 

(Foreign Office Secret)

1. Concerning the action you were requested to take in paragraph 3 of my #397[a], we have never received any report. In the case of instructions of this nature, you must wire us the results.

2. You have instructions to carry out the procedure recommended in my #447[b] without any delay. This time please be sure to wire the results as soon as possible.

[a] See III, 9—in which Tokyo says they have not determined upon a definite policy and that the occupation of French Indo-China was unavoidable.
[b] See III, 1.

Trans. 8-7-41

[A-6]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR


No. 9
23 July 1941
#397.
FROM: Tokyo 
TO: Washington 

Regarding your message #545[a].

1. You were correct in assuming that I have not as yet determined upon a definite policy because of the fact that I have not been in office very long.

As was pointed out in my message #368[b], our occupation of French Indo-China was unavoidable. This step had been decided upon by the Cabinet even before I assumed office. It is to be carried out peacefully for the purpose of jointly defending French Indo-China. It is my intention to continue to make an effort to decrease the friction between Japan and Britain-United States.

Should the United States, however, take steps at this time which would unduly excite Japan (such as closing of-----for all practical purposes and the freezing of assets), an exceedingly critical situation may be created. Please advise the United States of this fact, and attempt to bring about an improvement in the situation.

2. Please carefully reread messages Nos. 368[c] and 396[c], and make an effort to improve the situation.

3. With regard to your message #536-----(last 13 groups garbled).

[a] Wakasugi reports conversation with Undersecretary Welles.
[b] Tokyo informs Washington of the contemplated negotiations with France for establishment of Jap naval and air bases in French Indo-China.
[c] See II, 160. Tokyo informs Washington of completed negotiations with French government.

Trans. 7-25-41


No. 10
August 6, 1941
#662.
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 
TO: Tokyo 

Re part 1 of your #450[a].

As a result of the occupation of French Indo-China, and accompanying this change in the situation, the attitude of the American authorities with regard to these negotiations is as I told you in my successive wires relative to the conversations[b] conducted on July-----by WAKASUGI with WELLES and HAMILTON to the effect that they saw no course but to end all talks.

[a] See III, 8, in which Tokyo asks for an immediate report. Wakasugi reports conversation with Undersecretary Welles.

Trans. 8-11-41

[A-7]


No. 11
August 5, 1941
#655.
FROM: Washington 
TO: Tokyo 

A friend called and expressed himself in regard to American policies, much along the same line as the Wakasugi-Welles conversation, to the effect that these policies have the support of the people, and will not be changed, and while in the Middle West there are many isolationists who are opposed to participation in the war, these and even Wheeler support the administration's policies in regard to Japan. He also said that he is deeply concerned over Japanese-American relations, that----------who are friendly toward Japan, that he wished articles could be read in Japan too, and that Japan's position is becoming more and more difficult.

Furthermore, he alleged that no one in the world knew that the Soviet had been making so much preparation for war. That Russia is gradually succeeding in her efforts to launch an aggressive pincers operation. The German operations are behind schedule, and the reports from German general headquarters of late are not as reliable as they were formerly, which is -----that the war against the Soviet is, in the final analysis-----(remainder missed).

Trans. 8-8-41


No. 12
August 7, 1941
#542.
FROM: Tokyo 
TO: Washington 

Through my previous messages on the subject, you are perfectly well aware of the fact that the Konoye Cabinets have been sincerely interested in the betterment of Japanese-United States relations. Through misunderstandings and manipulations by third countries, and in spite of our above described desires, Japanese-United States relations are, today, critically tense. We feel that a policy of laissez faire should no longer be pursued.

We are firm in our conviction that the only means by which the situation can be relieved is to have responsible persons representing each country gather together and hold direct conferences. They shall lay their cards on the table, express their true feelings, and attempt to determine a way out of the present situation.

2. In the first proposal made by the United States mention was made of just such a step. If, therefore, the United States is still agreeable to this plan, Prime Minister Konoye himself will be willing to meet and converse in a friendly manner with President Roosevelt.

Will you please make clear to them that we propose this step because we sincerely desire maintaining peace on the Pacific. Please sound out their attitude on this proposal.

3. If, however, they show any signs of hesitation (from the contents of your message #649[a] this possibility cannot be discounted entirely) on the grounds of our occupation of French Indo-China and the reports that we have increased our military strength in the north, put up the following arguments:

(a) That we recognize the exceeding criticalness of the situation and for that reason, the Prime Minister made up his mind to break all precedent to represent his country himself.
(b) That unless every possible effort is made to maintain peace on the Pacific, we would be failing to fulfill our duties to our people.

4. If they are agreeable to holding such a conference, make inquiries as to the time which would best meet the President's convenience. In view of the times and conditions, we are of the opinion that the sooner that such a meeting took place, the better.

[A-8]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

The subjects which will be discussed, undoubtedly will depend greatly on the time it is held. In general, however, the discussion will be conducted along the lines of the negotiations which were being conducted in an attempt to bring about better relations between Japan and the United States. In view of the fact that both the Prime Minister and the President have many uses for their time, arrangements should be made so that the discussions between them will last no longer than a few days. With a view to practicalness it is our hope that the delegations representing Japan and the United States will consist of the minimum number of persons.

5. In view of the extremely important nature of this subject, it is essential that strict secrecy be observed until the holding of the discussions is definitely agreed upon. Therefore, Your Excellency will convey this proposal in person to the President or to the Secretary of State. As soon as you come to an agreement and if the President has no objections, it shall be publicly announced. Therefore, will you confer as to the opportune time, etc. and come to an agreement on those points as well.

For the purpose of security, we are not advising the United States Ambassador in Tokyo regarding this subject for the time being. This is for your information.

[a] Amb. Nomura discusses various angles of Japanese-United States relations with a United States cabinet member; suggests conclusion of an agreement upholding the integrity of territories adjacent to French Indo-China to facilitate supplies of materials.

Trans. 8-8-41


No. 13
August 7, 1941
#456.
FROM: Tokyo 
TO: Washington 

Re my #452[a].

Rumors of Hull's resignation and of the imminence of a general embargo on all shipments of petroleum products to Japan are being circulated in Japan. If there is any truth to these rumores, it would hardly be worth our while to take those measures described in the message referred to above.

Will you please, therefore, make investigations and advise us of your findings. We shall issue further instructions upon receipt of your advice.

[a] See III, 12.

Trans. 8-8-41

[A-9]


No. 14
August 7, 1941
#663.
FROM: Washington 
TO: Tokyo 

(In 2 parts—complete.)

United States-Japanese relations have now reached an extremely critical stage. However, this does not come unexpectedly; undoubtedly it was unavoidable and is the by-product of our government's pursuing other essential policies.

I now wish to describe the recent outlook in the United States. I realize, of course, that I may be too presumptuous, but I do so only because I believe it might be of some interest to one whose time in Office has been as short as yours.

1. Fundamentally speaking, the United States is under the impression that the ties between the Axis partners are closer than appear on paper. It is convinced that the East is working in close cooperation with the West, and vice versa. It assumes that the aims of Germany and Italy in the West and Japan in the East are to conquer the world. Talking with ones who harbor such policies, the United States says, is out of the question.

We, therefore, carefully explained that Japan is guided solely by the principles of HAKKO ITIU (brotherhood of mankind) and that the Axis Pact, like the earlier Anglo-Japanese Pact, is merely an agreement within limitations. This explanation lead eventually to beginning the unofficial discussions.

Then, while the Secretary of State was on leave due to illness, the occupation of French Indo- China took place. The United States, refusing to accept our explanation that that was a peaceful occupation, discontinued the unofficial discussions then and there. Moreover, the United States returned to its original opinion with regard to Japan. Acting Secretary of State Welles made this clear in his statement and it was later confirmed by Secretary Hull himself. Last night, the Secretary expressed his deep disappointment to me. According to the Postmaster General, this disappointment on the part of the Secretary was all the deeper because he had been so very interested in bettering the relations between Japan and the United States. I have already reported that Secretary Hull and his very good friend Walker were put in an exceedingly embarrassing spot in their relations with their Cabinet colleagues.

2. The United States policy toward Japan cannot be termed as one of definite unfriendliness to Japan herself, they explain. The United States has to take some measures, they say, to counteract certain steps taken by Japan. The United States is only taking measures which will counter Japanese southward or northward expansion attempts.

When Japan occupied French Indo-China, the United States retaliated with the "freezing" order and the export embargo; a joint warning by Hull and Eden was issued with regard to any ambitions in the direction of Thailand. There is no doubt whatsoever that the United States is prepared to take drastic action depending on the way Japan moves, and thus closing the door on any possibility of settling the situation.

With regard to a northward move by us, it must be remembered that the United States has suddenly established very close relations with the Soviet Union. In view of this fact, it is highly doubtful that the United States would merely watch from the sidelines if we should make any moves to the north.

It is reported that the President accompanied by high army and navy officials is meeting with Churchill. This indicates that careful preparations are being made to counter our every move without falling back a single time.

3. It must be noted that the government of Germany is exercising the utmost precaution and perseverance in dealing with the United States. It has even gone so far as to issue peace

[A-10]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

terms in an attempt to ease United States public opinion. Therefore, the Pacific, of late, has become the center of public attention and there is a good possibility that, depending on developments in Europe, this trend will be considerably invigorated in the near future.

I have submitted my humble opinions before and they are unchanged today. Our country is at present standing at a most critical crossroads. My only desire is that we choose the right road, for the sake of the future of our country.

Trans. 8-15-41


No. 15
August 8, 1941
#73.
FROM: London 
TO: Washington 

(Message to Tokyo #552)

Re my #546[a].

Further investigation revealed that CHURCHILL was accompanied by British war experts and by HARRY HOPKINS who had come to England for the second time after he had come to discuss the lend-lease question and subsequently had gone to Moscow. From the American side, General MARSHALL and Admirals KING and STARK joined in the conference, although the question of Soviet aid and the Far Eastern question were the chief topics, the fact that the leaders of American war operations had participated as well deserves our attention.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 8-18-41


No. 16
August 8, 1941
#672.
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 
TO: Tokyo 

(Completed translation.)

To be handled in Government code.

Special telegram.

(Part 1 of 3)

Strictly confidential.

The President's proposal was that, if the Japanese Government would refrain from occupying Indo-China or establishing bases there with its military and naval forces, or, in case such steps had already actually been begun, would withdraw such forces, the President would do everything in his power to obtain from the Chinese Government, the British Government and the Netherlands Government, and the Government of the United States would of course give, binding and solemn declaration, provided the Japanese Government would make the same commitment, to regard French Indo-China as a "neutralized" country in the same way in which Switzerland had up to now been regarded by the powers as a neutralized country.

Trans. 8-11-41

[A-11]


No. 17
August 8, 1941
#672.
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 
TO: Tokyo 

(To be handled in Government Code)

(Separate Wire)

(Part 2 of 3)

That such a binding and solemn declaration on the part of each of the governments mentioned would imply that none of these governments would undertake any military act of aggression against French Indo-China and that each of those governments would refrain from the exercise of any military control within or over French Indo-China. The President's proposal contemplated further that the government of the United States would endeavor to obtain from Great Britain and the other interested powers a guarantee that, so long as the present emergency continues, the local French authorities in Indo-China would remain undisturbed in control of the territory of French Indo-China. Subsequently, the President's proposal with regard to French Indo-China was extended to include Thailand as well, and the Japanese Government was informed that, should the Japanese Government accept the proposal of the President and abandon its present course with regard to French Indo-China, the President would request of the other governments which he had mentioned in connection with his proposal concerning French Indo-China the same declaration and guarantee with regard to Thailand.

Trans. 8-11-41


No. 18
August 8, 1941
#672.
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 
TO: Tokyo 

To be handled in government code.

Part 3 of 3.

The Government of the United States feels that its view in regard to a broad understanding which would be calculated to establish and maintain peace in the Pacific area to the benefit of each and every country concerned in that area have been made abundantly clear in various official utterances and acts and in the course of the long series of conversations which the Secretary of State has had during recent months with the Japanese Ambassador. It feels that the Japanese Government is well aware of this attitude, of what it is able and willing to do, and of what it cannot do. It, therefore, feels that the proposals advanced in the document handed to the Secretary by the Japanese Ambassador on August 6 are lacking in responsiveness to the suggestion made by the President, the specifications of which have been for convenience of reference reiterated above.

Trans. 8-9-41

[A-12]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR


No. 19
August 8, 1941
#671.
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 
TO: Tokyo 

(Part 1 of 2)

Re my #659[a?].

On the afternoon of the 8th, I received from the Secretary of State #672[b] which is the reply to our proposal submitted on the 6th. This shows that they have not compromised in the least beyond what the President said. I further communicated to them the purport of your instructions with reference to #452[c] and #456[d] and proposed that the leaders of the two countries meet for a conference in Hawaii. To this the Secretary replied by saying that since, while they were considering transferring the negotiations to Hawaii, they had received a notice to the effect that the Japanese Government was in favor of participating in them, they have ever since been making preparations for that purpose. Then he added that so long as his conversation with me showed that we were in conflict and so long as Japan's policy is not altered, there is no point to-----the conversation. I then sought the opinion of BALLANTINE who was also present at the time, but he gave me a similar reply and said that the use of force cannot go hand in hand with the maintenance of peace in the Pacific.

[a] See III, 6.
[b] See III, 16-18 which give the text of the reply of the United States Government.
[c] See III, 12 in which TOYODA proposes a conference between President ROOSEVELT and KONOYE in an attempt to better United States-Japanese relations.
[d] See III, 13. In which Tokyo asks Washington to investigate rumors of HULL's resignation and of the imminence of a general embargo on all shipments of petroleum products to Japan. Instructions will be issued upon receipt of this advice.

Trans. 8-12-41


No. 20
August 8, 1941
#671.
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 
TO: Tokyo 

(Part 2 of 2)

The Secretary twice repeated the statement that Japan prates about an encirclement policy which is only nonsense, and WELLES muttered some words to the effect that this was Germany's way of talking. Hearing this, I said, "Well, in spite of the fact that the United States is absolutely safe from the point of view of defense, she, too, goes on prating about this danger and that danger, offering the necessity of expanding the national defense as an excuse for prolonging the term of service of the selectees. In the same manner in the face of present dangers, Japan, too, has to prepare the minds of her people".

In sum, they mean to say that they will talk with us if we stop our military operations. They will not yield an inch on that point, so as long as there is no change in the policy of our Government, there is not the slightest chance of parleying with them, so any time you see fit, I would suggest that you might consider having GREW stop.

Trans. 8-9-41

[A-13]


No. 21
August 9, 1941
#464.
FROM: Tokyo 
TO: Washington 

Re your #671[a].

It is essential that the contents of my message #452[b] reach Roosevelt's ears. Your message referred to above does not make this point clear, so please make all necessary arrangements with no loss of time.

[a] See III, 20, (Part 2 of 2). Reports conversation with Hull and Welles.
[b] See III, 12—Ambassador Nomura is directed to feel out the attitude of U.S. officials on arranging a meeting between Pres. Roosevelt and Premier Konoye for a friendly discussion of steps that may be taken for conclusion of an "understanding" to guarantee peace in the Pacific.

Trans. 8-11-41


No. 22
August 9, 1941
#465.
FROM: Tokyo 
TO: Washington 

Re my #464[a].

Immediately upon President Roosevelt's return to Washington, call on him. Explain to him the importance of the discussions referred to and of the advantages that will be derived therefrom. Do everything in your power to bring about a materialization of these conversations.

[a] See III, 21.

Trans. 8-11-41


No. 23
August 9, 1941
#674.
FROM: Washington 
TO: Tokyo 

(In 2 parts—complete)

Re your # 465[a].

Upon the President's return to Washington (when this will be is unknown) I shall make arrangements to call on him and explain to him the subject contained in your message referred to above. I shall do everything in my power to make a favorable impression on the President on that occasion.

As I have pointed out in my various reports on this subject, I am convinced that as long as we proceed along the lines of our present policy, the United States, too, will undoubtedly undeviatingly follow the course whose trend has already been established. The United States assumes that our occupation of South French Indo-China indicates that Japan has definitely set her course. On this point the President and the Secretary of State are in complete agreement and it would be a mistake to try to differentiate between their attitudes. I was made acutely aware of the firm attitude of the United States during my conversations of the 6th and the 8th.

[A-14]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

In view of this situation I greatly fear that even the offer of the Prime Minister to personally come here, would not move the United States to any perceptible degree. For this reason, I regret to have to say that I do not expect too much from the interview I plan to have with the President.

Unless we can draw up some plan by which we can persuade the United States to change its policy toward Japan, I can only feel pessimism for any attempts to break up the present critical situation.

Though I regret that I can report only dark clouds over the world from my distant vantage point, I submit these humble opinions to you for whatever value they may be.

[a] See III, 22—Immediately upon Roosevelt's return to Washington call upon him and do your utmost to bring about a materialization of these conversations (re Jap-American understanding).

Trans. 8-12-41


No. 24
August 11, 1941
Unnumbered.
FROM: Washington 
TO: Tokyo 

Re your message. Am repeating that part of my message #675[a] which was in parenthesis in the first paragraph as follows: (We do not know as to what day that will be).

[a] This message is in reality #674. See III, 23—Ambassador Nomura expresses the belief that the proposed meeting between Pres. Roosevelt and Premier Konoye will have little success in swerving the firm attitude of the U.S. in its Far Eastern policy.

Trans.


No. 25
August 12, 1941
#470.
FROM: Tokyo 
TO: Washington 

Re my #452[a].

Though it would seem that the Americans considered our proposals in reply to the President's suggestions to be our final answer, this is not necessarily the implication we would like to leave. The Prime Minister did not consider our proposals in that light. In order that the United States not labor under this misunderstanding and in order that the stalemate might be broken, he would be willing to have a heart-to-heart talk with the President of the United States along general lines with the view of maintaining world peace.

[a] See III, 12 in which Ambassador Nomura is directed to feel out the attitude of the United States officials on arranging a meeting between President Roosevelt and Premier Konoye for a friendly discussion of steps that may be taken for conclusion of an "understanding" to guarantee peace in the Pacific.

Trans. 8-13-41

[A-15]


No. 26
August 9, 1941
Unnumbered.
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 
TO: Tokyo 

Colonel Iwakuro[a] accompanied by Ikawa sailed for Japan aboard the Tatsuta Maru. Colonel Iwakuro is clear headed and active and continually renders wholehearted assistance. I have requested him to convey my profound gratitude to the Minister of War and to the Chief of the General Staff. Ikawa has the title of non-official employee of the Foreign Office. He has cooperated with Iwakuro and has the confidence of influential people here. He is very useful and has been a great help to me. Since his departure I am greatly inconvenienced, hence I make this special report.

[a] Colonel Hideo Iwakuro, Assistant Military Attache.

Trans. 8-21-41


No. 27
August 11, 1941
#678.
FROM: Washington 
TO: Tokyo 

To (Secretary ?) Tasiro from Iguti[a].

As has been reported in dispatches concerning the attitude of the United States toward Japan, the United States will not turn away from resorting to force of arms should she deem that Japanese actions demand it. I realize, of course, that our government is fully cognizant of the above fact as well as the fact that U.S. preparations for such an eventuality is proceeding uninterruptedly. I also assume that being aware of the above, the Government is setting up all necessary counter measures and precautionary steps.

The reports being carried by Japanese newspapers and magazines, however, indicate that the general public in Japan is still unaware of the recent determined attitude of the United States described above. (Apparently, not even the very clearly and strongly worded statement issued by Welles recently, regarding the attitude of the United States toward Japan, was carried in full in our dailies.) There were indications that our people are viewing the United States attitude with unwarranted lightness and with considerable wishful thinking.

Let us suppose that the day will come when we shall have to face the worst. Under the present circumstances, I fear that we would be unable to guarantee that it wouldn't come as a complete surprise, water being poured into a sleeping man's ears, to our populace in general.

I strongly recommend, though you may have many doubts as to its wisdom, that the Intelligence Section of the Cabinet or some other body, start a campaign to give the general public a clearer picture of the situation, to further enlighten it as to the real attitude of the United States toward Japan at present. I pray that by such means our people will be perfectly prepared if worse comes to worst. They should be given guidance, so that in that unfortunate eventuality, they will be able to knit themselves into a solid unit in the minimum of time.

I realize, of course, my great audacity in suggesting such a thing to you, particularly in view of the fact that you have undoubtedly thought of this very thing on many occasions already.

[A-16]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

We appreciate the fact that the Intelligence Section of our main office is issuing a summary of European and American intelligence for distribution to our various offices. We would appreciate it even more if these reports were issued oftener and if they were to contain more concrete information.

[a] Counselor of Embassy.

Trans. 8-14-41


No. 28
August 12, 1941
#79.
FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) 
TO: Los Angeles 

Secret outside the section.

To be handled in Government Code.

To Minister WAKASUGI.

1. It is hard for you to imagine the critical nature of the current Japan-American question and its effect upon the internal situation here in Japan. The interview which you gave over international telephone, being released for internal consumption, has made the position of this Government extremely difficult. Therefore, I would like to have you make absolutely no comments on your opinions with regard to the Japan-American question to any newspapermen until you have made your statement to me upon your arrival here in Japan.

Furthermore, it is absolutely necessary that your returning home does not give the impression that you are bearing any important proposals from the United States Government.

Trans. 9-18-41


No. 29
August 12, 1941
#450.
FROM: Los Angeles (Nakauchi) 
TO: Tokyo 

Secret outside the section.

To be handled in Government Code.

Re your #79[a].

From Minister WAKASUGI:

I have read Your Excellency's wire. I am amazed at your statement that the interview I gave by phone to Japan has made difficult the position of the Government. Furthermore, I am well aware of the delicacy of Japan-American relations. I would have you believe that I was prompted by no other motives than a desire to make a frank statement which I felt to be most fitting.

[A-17]

In addition, I had no intention of implying such a thing as the lessening of America's responsibility. The statement which I made does not go beyond the suppositions which I explained to American newspapermen prior to my leaving Washington.

[a] See III, 28.

Trans. 9-18-41


No. 30
August 13, 1941
#684.
FROM: Washington 
TO: Tokyo 

(In 2 parts—complete.)

On this the 13th, I had a talk with one of the Cabinet members. During this conversation he said that he was convinced that the occupation of French Indo-China was accomplished with the cooperation of Germany. He said that he would see the application of pressure on the French Government by Hitler who controls it, anyhow.

He went on to say that he was in full accord with the President and Secretary Hull with regard to the desirability of maintaining peace on the Pacific.

I replied that I didn't believe that Japan could now remove her troops from French Indo- China. However, I am sure, I said, that the government of Japan states, when the opportune moment arrives, it shall be done.

Taking this opportunity, I brought up the subject of the meeting of the leading men of the two countries. I pointed out that though a solution which was thoroughly satisfactory to both countries may not be made, some means of surmounting the crisis may be discovered by them.

The Cabinet official did not show much enthusiasm over this proposal but he said that he would take the matter up with Hull.

I then said, in effect: "The press is reporting that the United States Navy, having been assigned all responsibility on the Pacific, will concentrate all of its forces in thos waters; and that Britain and the United States will pool their navies and place necessary power in the Pacific".

"Recently", I continued, "The press is drawing more attention to Japan than it is to Germany. There are more than a mere two or three writers who comment that it is easier to get Congress to agree to be against Japan than it is to have them agree to be against Germany".

The Cabinet official said that he would not deny those statements. "Japan has an excellent navy", he said, "and if she throws in her lot with Germany and works jointly, she will become exceedingly troublesome".

He went on to say that it was not that the United States likes the U.S.S.R. Moreover the United States can foresee some trouble with it in the future. However, joint action with it at the present time is unavoidable from the viewpoint of destroying Hitler.

I said that the application of pressure on Japan was exceedingly harmful. Instead, I said, the matter should be tackled from an entirely different angle. After giving it a thorough consideration from a purely political angle, the United States should take steps which would bring about a reaction in Japan. I said that if the right policy were pursued, the people of Japan would use their common sense and gradually adjust themselves.

I am to see Hull at his request at four o'clock this afternoon.

Trans. 8-18-41

[A-18]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR


No. 31
August 13, 1941
#690.
FROM: Washington 
TO: Tokyo 

(English text)

(In 5 parts—complete)

Recent cases of interference with American rights and interests in Japan and in Japanese occupied areas of China.

Information received by the Department of State from American diplomatic and consular offices in Japan and in Japanese-occupied areas of China indicate that the Japanese authorities and Japanese-sponsored authorities have recently undertaken widespread and expanding activities of arbitrary nature against American official establishments.

American officials, and American rights and interests.

In North China the travel of Americans, including American consular officers, is being stopped, severely restricted, or delayed by a system of travel permits set up by the Japanese military authorities and by refusal of permits or delay in their issuance. At Chingwangtao, Americans embarking for Shanghai are required not only to have a permit for rail travel to Chinwangtao but also a landing permit from the Japanese naval authorities which requires at least one week to obtain. (It is assumed that similar requirements are in force at Tientsin and Tsingtao.)

At Peitaiho, where a large number of Americans and other foreigners pass the summer, transportation of baggage of Americans to the railway station is forbidden and the railway refused to receive baggage for checking. Travel of American citizens in Japan has been restricted so that Americans desiring to proceed to Shanghai to obtain available accommodations for travel to the United States have been unable to proceed.

At Tsingtao the mail of American citizens, including the official mail of the American Consulate, is apparently being held up and censored, American firms are being prohibited from moving their stocks and carrying on business and are not permitted to draw funds from Japanese banks to pay their staff salaries. The premises of the Standard-Vacuum and Texas Oil Companies and of the Universal Leaf Tobacco Company have been occupied by Japanese gendarmes. Protests against the smoking of cigarettes by Japanese sentires in the oil installations of American companies have been without avail. Garages have been forbidden to furnish taxicabs to American citizens, including the American Consul, or to do automotive repair work for American citizens. It is reported on good authority that the restrictions imposed by the Japanese authorities on Americans there include, in addition to some of those listed above, a prohibition of coal deliveries to American citizens and the withholding of American Red Cross famine relief wheat from distribution to refugees by the International Relief Association. Chinese have been intimidated and instructed not to sell food products to or engage in other transactions with Americans if the products exceed in value, or the transactions involve more than, twenty local dollars, and orders have been issued for the cancellation of American insurance policies. At Chefoo mail addressed to Americans is being held up and registered mail received by the American Consulate has shown evidence of having been opened by censors. The stocks of the Standard-Vacuum Oil Company and the Texas Company have been placed under the control of the Japanese special military mission; sales may only be made by permit and the proceeds must be handed over to the Japanese; and American firms cannot withdraw funds from the Yokohama Specie Bank to meet their pay rolls.

At Hwanghsien, Shantung, the Baptist Mission is being picketed, no American is allowed to move his personal effects, the American members of the mission are restricted to the immediate vicinity of the compound and are prohibited from using their automobiles, as well as being prevented from traveling to Chefoo.

[A-19]

At Tientsin, American firms are unable to make rail shipments and the post office in one instance refused to accept a registered letter addressed by an American firm to the United States.

At Foochow, two policemen visited the Consulate stating that they had been instructed by the Japanese authorities to see that "nothing passed in or out" and asking to be given quarters in the Consulate. (The policemen departed upon being asked to do so by the Consul.) Similar activities were undertaken by the police with more success against American firms and missionary institutions.

At Hsinan, a virtual blockade of Cheeloo University (Anglo-America) the Cheeloo Hospital (American) has been established, no foodstuffs or other articles being allowed to enter those two missionary institutions.

At Kobe, the telephone service of the Standard Oil Company was cut off because the Company was unable to draw funds to pay the telephone bill.

At Swatow, unwarranted interference by the Japanese with American firms engaged in the linen drawn work trade has occurred and shipments have been obstructed.

In Japan, by the restrictions on the use of the English language over the telephone, American diplomatic and consular offices are denied a facility which is essential to the proper functioning of these offices.

At Mukden, control over the movements and activities of Americans has been rigid.

American Catholic mission sisters at Fushun were permitted by police to visit the Consulate for passport service only on the condition that they would guarantee to return to Fushun the same day. Long distance telephone calls have been restricted to the Japanese or Chinese languages and when the consulate at Mukden attempted to telephone to the Consul at Dairen, it was informed that it "had better cancel the call".

At Dairen, consular officials are under police surveillance and are followed in all their movements, persons entering and leaving the Consulate are stopped by police and questioned, the Consulate's messengers are stopped by police and the mail and telegrams in their care taken for scrutiny, and in general the conduct of the Dairen authorities toward, and their interference with the legitimates of, the American Consulates seem to show a desire by those authorities to make the position of the Consul untenable.

Trans. 8-18-41


No. 32
August 13, 1941
#689.
FROM: Washington 
TO: Tokyo 

Re my message #684[a].

At four o'clock in the afternoon of the 13th, I had an interview with the Secretary of State. He handed me a note, the text of which is contained in my separate message #690[b], which listed recent instances of interferences and damages to U.S. rights and interests in Japan and in areas taken over by Japan. The Secretary said that these had no connection with the "freezing" order but, in the main, concerned only individuals. He added that he had no intention of releasing the contents of the note for press publication, etc. which would unduly aggravate general public opinion. The Secretary pointed out that whereas there were only a few hundred U.S. citizens in Japan, there were a hundred odd thousand of Japanese in the United States.

I, therefore, replied that Japan was taking action to parallel the "freezing" order enacted by the United States. Moreover, it is true that measures against individuals are being taken there to parallel those here.

Such pin prickings, however, do not particularly affect the general situation but they are annoyances. I expressed my hopes that such practices would be mutually discontinued.

[A-20]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

The Secretary took this opportunity to bring up the subject of the bombing of Chungking, so I explained that we had promised not to bomb any of the suburban areas for a time.

In parting, Hull inquired whether I planned to be in Washington during the latter part of this week. I replied that I did. The way he said it, gave me the impression that he was planning to issue some sort of a statement.

[a] See III, 30.
[b] See III, 31.

Trans. 8-18-41


No. 33
August 15, 1941
#480.
FROM: Tokyo 
TO: Washington 

Regarding my #452[a].

There seem to be those persons who interpret the misfortune which befell Vice Premier Hiranuma as extremist's reaction to any cooperation with Britain and the United States. This is a completely erroneous conclusion.

Public opinion in Japan will approve any fair revision of national relations, regardless of who the other party may be. In spite of the recent unfortunate incident, the government's attitude is unshaken.

Therefore, although we are aware of the matter contained in your message #674[b], will you please relay the matter contained in my message #470[c] to the President immediately, in an attempt to have this proposal accepted. Our aim is the settlement of broad issues and the prevention of a general calamity. We intend to convey our proposal to the U.S. Ambassador in Tokyo at the first opportune moment.

[a] See III, 12—Amb. Nomura is directed to feel out the attitude of U.S. officials on arranging a meeting between Pres. Roosevelt and Premier Konoye for a friendly discussion of steps that my be taken for conclusion of an "understanding" to guarantee peace in the Pacific.
[b] See III, 23—Amb. Nomura expresses the belief that the proposed meeting between Pres. Roosevelt and Premier Konoye will have little success in swerving the firm attitude of the U.S. in its Far Eastern policy.
[c] See III, 25—Our proposals in reply to President's suggestions were not intended to imply a final answer on our part. Please see that there is no misunderstanding on this point.

Trans. 8-19-41


No. 34
August 16, 1941
#705.
FROM: Washington 
TO: Tokyo 

(In 4 parts—complete.)

I received intelligences to the following effect regarding the meeting of leaders of Britain and the United States: Britain's aims at this conference were to draw the United States into the war, and to utilize her to take care of the critical situation in the Far East. The United States aimed at forcing Britain to clarify her war aims and thus to check British ambitions. The joint statement which was announced subsequent to the conference was clear proof that the United States gained her aims with Britain having to assume a disadvantageous position.

Upon receiving the above report, I deemed it essential that we make some preliminary overtures to the government of the United States prior to the return of the President to Washington.

[A-21]

I, therefore, called on the Secretary of State this afternoon and relayed to him your instructions to me, and added that it was of vital importance that the relations between the two countries be revised.

To this, the Secretary repeated his stock replies and added, in effect:

"You and I are striving to come to a peaceful settlement. In the meantime, however, we have been forced to witness military domination."

I pointed out that if matters were permitted to proceed unchecked along the present course, the outcome was only too clear.

"A Pacific war", I continued, in effect, "will not be as simple an undertaking as is apparently imagined by the high officials. It will be mass murder to an unprecedented extent in the history of the world. Do not be mislead into thinking that such a war would be terminated speedily simply because the United States is rich and Japan is poor. It will probably develop into a war of exhaustion, lasting several years. And in the final analysis, neither will have anything to gain by it.

"The politics of our countries should not be swayed by the hot heads which exist in both. Our two countries must, moreover, keep constantly on guard against the enticing counters made by third countries."

The Secretary gave indications of agreeing with this. He agreed that third countries were engaged in considerable activities in Japan and also in the United States.

"There are even those", he said, "who claim that Hitler launched the war knowing far in advance what Stalin's attitude was".

I strongly denied the charges of military domination, pointing out that Japan has an Imperial family whose line has been unbroken for 2600 years. The characteristics of Japan and the Japanese differed from those countries which could change themselves overnight through a simple revolution.

Although we do talk of the Far Eastern Sphere of Co-prosperity, this does not mean military conquests, but merely means living together by defending together. It does not differ much from the Good Neighbor Policy of the United States, I said.

The Secretary pondered over this statement for a while. Then he said, "The United States merely recognizes the equal status of all of the countries involved without resorting to the force of arms".

"The stronger the pressure is on her from the outside," I said, "the stronger Japan will retaliate. On the other hand, if the pressure is taken off of her, Japan will resort to her common senses and will find a peaceful way out".

The Secretary showed an inclination to agree with this.

With regard to the meeting of the leaders of the two countries, I said that as a purely personal opinion of a simple individual, it seemed to me that it should be encouraged rather than discouraged. Many of the points contained in the Eight Point Joint Agreement coincide directly with the Konoye Statement made public some time ago, I said. In view of this fact it seemed logical that two of the authors might be able to find a way, through those instruments, to revise the relations between the two countries. The only reason that Japan is willing to send her leaders to such a conference is because she sincerely wants the meeting to be a successful one, I pointed out.

"In spite of this," I asked, "does the United States still deem that it is an impossibility?"

The Secretary replied that although he had been unable to take the matter up with anyone outside the office as yet, he would take it up with the White House at the earliest opportunity if I sincerely desired it. This was a different attitude from that which he had expressed earlier. (This may have been due to his talking with a Cabinet colleague about which I reported in an earlier message.)

[A-22]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

He then asked me what I thought of the general outlook in the United States today. So I replied that it would be exceedingly dangerous under present conditions in the United States, if we were to leave matters as they are.

I have already been advised of the situation with regard to our southward moves. Recently, much alarming news has been distributed in this area with regard to the Siberian area. I would like to be advised, for my information only, what the true state of affairs there is.

Trans. 8-20-41


No. 35
August 16, 1941
#703.
FROM: Washington 
TO: Tokyo 

(Part 1 of 4)

Re your #480.

(1) As I have successively reported to you, Japanese-American relations have today reached a state in which anything might happen at any moment, and they are likely to grow worse suddenly as soon as Japan makes her next move. That this sudden change will take place with Japan's occupation of Thailand is a view upon which both Japanese and Americans agree. As I have already informed you, the United States has not yet attained sufficient unity of mind with regard to participation in the European war, and the President himself is hesitant. However, the people are unanimous with regard to taking a strong hand in the Far East. According to those well versed in political affairs, this is what Great Britain approves of and both China and Germany desire.

Trans. 8-19-41


No. 36
August 16, 1941
#703.
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 
TO: Tokyo 

(Part 2 of 4)

I hardly think the President will go to the extreme, inasmuch as he and the naval leaders realize what a tremendous undertaking a Pacific war would be. I understand that the British believe that if they could only have a Japanese-American war started at the back door, there would be a good prospect of getting the United States to participate in the European war. The people here believe that though Germany might eventually defeat Soviet Russia, the war has already passed the stage of being a short, decisive one and has entered the stage of being one of attrition; that inasmuch as the submarine war in the Atlantic is turning in favor of Britain and the United States, these countries will be able in time to attain their original objective; and that the situation resembles closely that which existed in 1917. I understand that confidence in ultimate victory is gaining.

Trans. 8-19-41

[A-23]


No. 37
August 16, 1941
#703.
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 
TO: Tokyo 

(Part 3 of 4)

(2) Since such is the state of affairs in this country, I could not have helped but refer to the State Department the proposal for a conference which you made in your telegram, but as you already know, the Secretary of State gave a negative reply to the proposal. I, therefore, subsequently tried to interest a member of the cabinet who was intimately associated with the Secretary of State, but he also showed little interest in the subject. Besides, it is customary for the Secretary to be present at such conversations. I understand the President at one time had thought of arranging for a conference between the leaders of the two countries, but since Japan's occupation of French Indo-China, he has come to believe that Japan does not want a fundamental re-adjustment of Japanese-American relations but that she is carrying on an appeasement policy toward the United States. I hear that they are beginning to think that I have been fooled by my country and that his having conferred with me was an exceptional thing.

Trans. 8-19-41


No. 38
August 16, 1941
#703.
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 
TO: Tokyo 

(Part 4 of 4)

In the meantime, Japanese newspapers have printed scorching criticism of the statement issued by the American Government. Thus the atmosphere is getting worse. Unless something is done now to eliminate this misunderstanding, I shall not be able to accomplish our object. Furthermore, viewing the problem from the political standpoint, so long as the head of the country remains unfavorable to the proposal, we cannot expect him to do anything about it. I believe the United States is wishing that we would give, at least, some sort of a pledge regarding those three critical points taken up during the past conversations; namely, the question of self-defense, withdrawal of troops from China, and non-discrimination in trade. Today, when the Secretary of State has already rejected our proposal, I cannot help but feel keenly the necessity of careful consideration and a great deal of smoothing out if we are to bring about what you have instructed me in your telegram. I am told that the President will be returning in a few days, so will you please consider the points I have given above, and if you have any further instructions wire them at once.

Trans. 8-19-41

[A-24]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

No. 39
August 17, 1941
#707.
FROM: Washington 
TO: Tokyo 

(English text)

(In 2 parts—complete.)

During past months the Governments of the United States and of Japan, through the Secretary of State and the Japanese Ambassador in Washington, have engaged in protracted conversations directed toward exploring the possibility of reaching a sound basis for negotiations between the two countries relative to the maintenance of peace with order and justice in the Pacific. The principles and policies which were under discussion in these conversations precluded pursuit by either government of objectives of expansion by force or by threat of force.

On July 24 last the President of the United States informed the Japanese Government through the Japanese Ambassador in Washington that he was willing to suggest to the governments of Great Britain, of the Netherlands and of China that they make a binding and solemn declaration that they had no aggressive intentions with regard to Indo-China and that they would agree that the markets and raw materials of Indo-China should be available to all powers on equal terms. The President stated further that he would be willing to suggest to the powers mentioned that they undertake this declaration, in which the United States would be willing to join, upon the understanding that the government of Japan would be disposed to make a similar declaration and would be further disposed to withdraw its military and naval forces from Indo-China. Notwithstanding these efforts, the government of Japan has continued its military activities and its disposal of armed forces at various points in the Far East and has occupied Indo-China with its military, air and naval forces.

The government of the United States is in full sympathy with the desire expressed by the Japanese Government that there be provided a fresh basis for amicable and mutually profitable relations between our two countries.

This government's patience in seeking an acceptable basis for such an understanding has been demonstrated time and again during recent years and especially during recent months. This government feels at the present stage that nothing short of the most complete candor on its part, in the light of evidence and indications which come to it from many sources, will at this moment tend to further the objectives sought.

Such being the case, this government now finds it necessary to say to the government of Japan that if the Japanese Government takes any further steps in pursuance of a policy or program of military domination by force or threat of force of neighboring countries, the government of the United States will be compelled to take immediately any and all steps which it may deem necessary toward safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests of the United States and American nationals and toward insuring the safety and security of the United States.

Trans. 8-20-41

[A-25]


No. 40
August 17, 1941
#706.
FROM: Washington 
TO: Tokyo 

This afternoon, in spite of the fact that it was Sunday, I called, at his personal request, on the President, who had just returned to Washington this morning. (Secretary Hull was also present.) Upon our arrival, he read two papers, the contents of which is being sent to you as my message #707[a] (the gist of which was that if Japan makes further aggression through the use of force of arms, the United States will take any and all necessary steps immediately to protect the interests of the United States and of United States citizens), and my message #708 (the gist of which is that in connection with Japan's proposal to conduct a meeting of leaders of the two countries, the United States would like to be advised of the aims of the Japanese Government).

After reading them, he requested me to relay the contents of my home government. He added that the two papers were not to be considered as oral statements, but were to be given the status of only reference material. As such, he said, he had had the State Department prepare them. I accepted the papers on condition that they would be for only my information.

I am sending you the gist of our talks and the opinions expressed in subsequent messages.

[a] See III, 39.

Trans. 8-20-41


No. 41
August 18, 1941
#709.
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 
TO: Tokyo 

(Part 1 of 5)

At half past four the afternoon of the 18th, I had a private and secret interview with the President (the Secretary of State was present). The President, opening his remarks by saying that he had spent some few days enjoying life at sea, remarked that sailing was fine, and little fog had been encountered to mar the pleasure of the voyage. He went on to say that he sailed on his yacht, transferred to a warship, and then kept a rendezvous at a point off the Maine coast. Then, speaking as though there were many advocates of war, he took up the business of the interview and, holding notes in his hand, he said, "The Secretary of State, you, and I are continuing our efforts to bring about peace in the Pacific, but no one else is." I said, "There are many among the third powers who desire war in the Pacific." He affirmed this, and continued by saying, "The United States, Britain, and probably the Soviet too, hope for peace in the Pacific. But there are not many others who desire it."

Trans. 8-20-41

[A-26]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR


No. 42
August 18, 1941
#709.
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 
TO: Tokyo 

(Part 2 of 5)

After joking about "our German friend" who maintains no warships in the Pacific, the President said, "Neither you, the Secretary of State, nor I have come up through the diplomatic ranks and, therefore, do not observe diplomatic conventions. What we have here is not in the form of a diplomatic document, nor is it in the form of an aide memoire but is merely what we want to say." Having said this, he read in a clear-cut, spirited manner the material which I incorporated into my #707[a] and then said, "I have no desire to put these things in writing." Yet he seemed to be of the opinion that it should be expressed in writing.

Bearing in mind your instructions.

[a] See III, 39.

Trans. 8-20-41


No. 43
August 18, 1941
#709.
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 
TO: Tokyo 

(Part 3 of 5)

I expressed myself on the following points:

ITEM—The Japanese Government is sincere in its desire to bring about an adjustment of Japanese-American diplomatic relations.

ITEM—The Japanese Government would like to be advised as to the possibility of arranging an interview with Prince Konoye.

ITEM—The Japanese Government would like to be advised as to the possibility of informal conversations being realized in the near future along lines of conversations of the past few months.

ITEM—The Japanese Government, having already expressed its various opinions with regard to the French Indo-China question to the Secretary of State, feels that no additional explanations are necessary.

ITEM—The Japanese Government wishes to advise that Prince Konoye is willing for an exchange of opinions along several lines from the viewpoint of world peace.

ITEM—The Japanese Government has every expectation that the finest statesmanship will be exercised by the United States Government. The Japanese Government will reciprocate in like manner.

I went on to say: "We have every confidence in your exemplary statesmanship and your ability to settle matters." The President listened closely to my remarks. Holding the Memoire outline in my #708[a] in his hand, he said "Geographically speaking, it is impossible for me to go to Honolulu. I am not permitted to travel in an airplane."

[a] See III, 52.

Trans. 8-20-41

[A-27]


No. 44
August 18, 1941
#709.
FROM: Washington 
TO: Tokyo 

(Part 4 of 5)

"If it is difficult for the Japanese Premier to come to either S.F. or Seattle, how about Juneau?" (I believe he mentioned Sitka which is in Alaska, too, but I don't clearly recall.)

He also asked about how many days it would take from Japan and I replied about ten days. He then asked what the climate was like around the middle of-----and I replied it would be all right till about then.

Then he continued by saying: "For these reasons I have made a few changes in this paper." He then explained that it is merely for geographical reasons that he had stricken out the word "President" from the original text in which it was stated that the President himself would be present, and he read the paper to me. He added the remark: "It is not that I welcome the 'closed door' such as we have today, but, since we have been forced to it by Japan's actions, there is only one country that can open the door. This time it's Japan's turn." He changed his subject to that of French Indo-China, stating that an official representing the Secretary of State was-----.

Trans. 8-20-41


No. 45
August 18, 1941
#709.
FROM: Washington 
TO: Tokyo 

(Part 5 of 5)

The President from beginning to end maintained an extremely tactful attitude and received me with kindness. (I got the impression that he was undoubtedly thrilled at the reception given by the British people to the joint British-American peace terms which he had succeeded in getting from CHURCHILL in his conversations with him during the past few days. (Unlike the independent declaration by the American Government in Wilson's Fourteen Points, this time, because of the insistence of the United States, joint peace terms by England and America were achieved.) In addition, some 14 or 15 days of life at sea, which he likes so well, have left him in the best of spirits.) Furthermore, the Secretary of State when we parted asked me to call any time that I so desired. The China question, being a separate problem, was not referred to at all in our conversations today.

During the course of our conversations, the President casually mentioned by name Postmaster General WALKER as being ardently endeavoring to bring about Japanese-American good will and, with regard to the early realization of the suggested interview, it seems that he had spoken in its favor.

With regard to our conversations of this day, I shall make a full report of my humble opinions separately.

Trans. 8-20-41

[A-28]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR


No. 46
August 19, 1941
Gogai.
FROM: Washington 
TO: Tokyo 

Re your gogai.[b]

The following is a repeat of that portion of part five or five parts of my message #709[a] as requested by you in the captioned message[b].

"In view of the success of the recent conversations with Churchill (Wilson's fourteen articles was a statement of the U.S. alone. This time, however, the United States had succeeded in drawing England in and in having her accept these peace terms. Being confident that the people of the U.S. would feel jubilant over this victory, and because he was able to put in ten days of life on the seas which he loves so much, the President appeared to be in exceedingly high spirits) and the State-----.

[a] See III, 41—(Incomplete)—Part of a conversation regarding the proposed meeting of President Roosevelt and Premier Konoye in which Juneau is suggested as a possible meeting place.
[b] See III, 47—Tokyo requests repetition of part of Washington's #709.

Trans. 8-22-41


No. 47
August 19, 1941
Unnumbered.
FROM: Tokyo 
TO: Washington 

Please repeat that part of Part 5 of 5 of your message #709[b], between TYU ZYO SAI NAKI TAIDO WO MOTTE OTAIS[a] and KOKUMUTYOKAN WA WAKARE NO TEI[a].

[a] Translation: During which time he received me with frank-----the Secretary of State at his departure.
[b] See III, 41—(Incomplete)—Part of a conversation regarding the proposed meeting of Pres. Roosevelt and Premier Konoye in which Juneau is suggested as a possible meeting place.

Trans. 8-20-41


No. 48
August 19, 1941
#719.
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 
TO: Tokyo 

(In 2 parts—complete)

The fact that upon his return to the capital on Sunday, the President wished to see me before any other person, with the exception of the Secretary of State with whom he talked for several hours, clearly indicates the graveness with which he views Japanese-U.S. relations. It is apparent that the note contained in my message #707[a] was prepared in advance of the President's return. I have already reported that while reading the note, the President interrupted himself on several occasions to make minor and major comments thereon.

The note which I relayed to you as my message #708[a], on the other hand, seemed to contain much that was the President's own attitude and opinion. From that, it seems as if the President was inclined to be in favor of our proposal on certain conditions.

[A-29]

However, when I said that the matter depended entirely on the President's statesmanship, he replied that the United States was not in favor of the "closed door" and that it was Japan's turn to figure out ways and means of opening it.

The impression I got throughout my talks with him was that he harbored other desires. There is no room for doubt, however, that the President hopes that matters will take a turn for the better.

According to recent comments in the newspapers, the President is fearful of the dangers of the United States being drawn into a war in the Far East. Apparently, he believes that there is a 50-50 chance that Japan will attempt further aggression.

It is true that by our proposing that talks be held between the leaders of the two countries, the attitude of the U.S. Government has been considerably eased. However, it is of the utmost importance that this matter be kept strictly secret for if it should once leak out, attempts will be made from every direction to destroy the project. I feel above all else that it is essential that a strict secrecy be maintained in Japan, also.

We, too, are giving this matter our careful attention and study, and should we stumble on to some good ideas, we shall report them to your for whatever value they may have.

[a] See III, 39.
[b] See III, 52.

Trans. 8-22-41


No. 49
August 21, 1941
#(?).
FROM: Tokyo 
TO: Washington 

-----(Preamble and first couple of lines missed.)

-----in view of this request (the said Ambassador notified me, also, on the 15th), I had the various circles concerned make investigations, I said. I went on to say that we are trying to dispose of the matter in accordance with the desires expressed by the United States and that I was certain that I would be able to submit a reply to him at an early opportunity.

Then, on condition that he keep it strictly confidential and "off the record" I talked to him for over two hours concerning the matter contained in my message #452[a]. I pointed out to him, in accordance with the lines contained in my previous messages, the absolute necessity of displaying some real statesmanship if we are to surmount the crisis which now confronts us.

So saying, I strongly urged that the proposed talks take place. I added that since he had worked so tirelessly during the past nine years in behalf of Japanese-U.S. friendship, I was counting on his services in the promotion of these talks.

The above is for your information.

[a] See III, 12—Amb. Nomura is directed to feel out the attitude of U.S. officials on arranging a meeting between Pres. Roosevelt and Premier Prince Konoye for a friendly discussion of steps that may be taken for conclusion of an "understanding" to guarantee peace in the Pacific.

Trans. 8-22-41

[A-30]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR


No. 50
August 20, 1941
#722.
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 
TO: Tokyo 

(Part 1 of 2)

During my conversation with a member of the Cabinet, he remarked, "The President has a broadminded view of the world and is not anti-Japanese. In his past speeches and in his recent statement he had never referred to Japan. As soon as he returned to Washington he had the Secretary of State take up the question of the proposed Japanese-American conference and replied to you. This is an unprecedented thing and it seems that Japan should reciprocate in a like manner." So I replied by saying that it was with a strong resolution that the Japanese Government had come thus far in dealing with this question; whereupon the Cabinet member replied, "It is equally true in the case of the President. Above all, even if there is no real justification for it, the country is replete with anti-Japanese sentiment."

Trans. 8-21-41


No. 51
August 20, 1941
#722.
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 
TO: Tokyo 

(Part 2 of 2)

"And when the atmosphere in Congress is just as bad, if this fact leaks out there is no doubt that a strong opposition will be made, but if the conference succeeds and as a result peace is maintained in the Pacific, the people will for the first time----------. Since I myself had endeavored in the same direction, the success would make me feel that life is worth living. Inasmuch as there is no way of telling whether the President will continue to take such an open-hearted attitude in the future, I earnestly wish that a way could be found to successfully settle this question."

Trans. 8-21-41


No. 52
August 17, 1941
#708.
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin) 

English text.

(Part 1 of 8) (Strictly Confidential)

Reference is made to the question which the Japanese Ambassador raised on 8 August during a conversation with the Secretary of State, whether it might not be possible for the responsible heads of the Japanese Government and the Government of the United States to meet with a view to discussing means whereby an adjustment in relations between the United States and Japan might be brought about. The thought of Prince Konoye and of the Japanese Government in offering this suggestion is appreciated.

[A-31]

Reference is also made to the desire expressed by the Japanese Ambassador during a call on the Secretary of State on 16 August, that there be resumed the informal conversations which had been in progress between the two governments toward ascertaining whether there existed a basis for negotiations relative to a peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific situation.

(Part 2 of 8[a])

(Part 3 of 8)

On two occasions officers of the Department of State, pursuant to instructions from the Secretary of State, called on the Japanese Ambassador to indicate concern over the reports that Japan intended to acquire by force or threat of force military and naval bases in French Indo-China. Subsequently, on July 20 and July 23 the Acting Secretary of State raised with the Japanese Minister and with the Japanese Ambassador the question of Japan's intentions with regard to French Indo-China and pointed out that the government of the United States could only assume that the occupation by Japan of French Indo-China or the acquisition of military and naval bases in that area constituted notice to the United States that Japan had taken by forceful means a step preparatory to embarking on further movements of conquest in the South Pacific area. The Acting Secretary pointed out further that this new move on Japan's part was prejudicial to the procurement by the United States of essential raw materials and to the peace of the Pacific, including the Philippine Islands.

(Part 4 of 8)

The government of the United States accordingly had no alternative but to inform the Japanese Ambassador that, in the opinion of this government, the measures then being taken by the Japanese Government had served to remove the basis for further conversations relative to a peaceful settlement in the Pacific area.

Informal discussions between the Japanese Government and the Government of the United States directed toward ascertaining whether there existed a basis for negotiations relative to a peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific situation would naturally envisage the working out of a program attainable by peaceful methods. It goes without saying that no proposals or suggestions affecting the rights and privileges of either the United States or Japan would be considered except as they might be in conformity with the basic principles to which the United States has long been committed.

(Part 5 of 8[a])

(Part 6 of 8)

If such a program based upon peaceable and constructive principles were to be adopted for the Pacific and if thereafter any of the countries or areas within the Pacific were menaced, the policy of aiding nations resisting aggression would continue to be followed by this government and this government would cooperate with other nations in extending assistance to any country threatened.

Under such a program for the Pacific area Japan would, in the opinion of the government of the United States, attain all the objectives which Japan affirms that it is seeking. This program would not enable any country to extend its military or political control over other peoples or to obtain economic rights of a definitely monopolistic or preferential character.

(Part 7 of 8)

In those areas where the production and distribution of essential commodities are vested in monopolies, the government of the United States would expect to use its influence to see that

[A-32]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

all countries are given a fair share of the distribution of the products of such monopolies and at a fair price.

If the Japanese Government is seeking what it affirms to be its objectives, the Government of the United States feels that the program above outlined is one that can be counted upon to assure Japan satisfaction of its economic needs and legitimate aspirations with much greater certainty than could any other program.

In case the Japanese government feels that Japan desires and is in position to suspend its expansionist activities, to readjust its position, and to embark upon a peaceful program for the Pacific along the lines of the program and principles to which the United States is committed, the government of the United States would be prepared to consider resumption of the informal explanatory discussions which were interrupted in July and would be glad to endeavor to arrange a suitable time and place to exchange views.

(Part 8 of 8)

The government of the United States, however, feels that, in view of the circumstances attending the interruption of the informal conversations between the two governments, it would be helpful to both governments, before entering a resumption of such conversations or proceeding with plans for a meeting, if the Japanese Government would be so good as to furnish a clearer statement than has yet been furnished as to its present attitude and plans, just as this government has repeatedly outlined to the Japanese Government its attitude and plans.

[a] Parts 2 and 5 are attached hereto.

Trans. 8-21-41


No. 53
August 17, 1941
#708.
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 
TO: Tokyo 

(English text.)

(Part 2 of 8)

When the Japanese Ambassador brought up the suggestions, the Secretary of State reminded the Ambassador that the government of the United States had shown great patience and had been prepared to continue in that course of patience so long as the Japanese Government manifested a desire to follow courses of peace. It was pointed out to the Ambassador that while proceeding along this course this government had received reports indicating clearly that the Japanese Government was adopting courses directly the opposite of those on which the recent conversations between the Ambassador and the Secretary of State had been predicated. It was pointed out also that the Japanese press was being constantly stimulated to speak of encirclement of Japan by the United States and was being officially inspired in ways calculated to inflame public opinion. The Secretary of State made it clear that he did not see how conversations between the two governments could usefully be pursued or proposals be discussed while Japanese official spokesmen and the Japanese press contended that the United States was endeavoring to encircle Japan and carried on a campaign against the United States.

(Part 5 of 8)

The program envisaged in such informal discussions would involve the application in the entire Pacific area of the principles of equality of commercial opportunity and treatment. It

[A-33]

would thus make possible access by all countries to raw materials and to all other essential commodities. Such a program would envisage cooperation by all nations of the Pacific, on a voluntary and peaceful basis toward utilizing all available resources of capital, technical skill, and progressive economic leadership for the purpose of building up not only their own economies but also the economies of regions where productive capacity can be improved. The result would be to increase the purchasing power of the nations and peoples concerned, to raise standards of living, and to create conditions conductive to the maintenance of peace.

Trans. 8-22-41


No. 54
August 21, 1941
#725.
FROM: Washington 
TO: Tokyo 

According to reports along the lines of those contained in my #722[a], there are indications that the President himself is becoming seriously interested in participating in the resumption of the negotiations to revise Japanese-U.S. relations. It is even said that the latter half of the note which I sent to you as my message #708[a], was composed by the President himself. I have also heard that he expects to have me hand our reply to that note directly to him. For these reasons, I believe that it would be well if we omitted all of the involved and complicated points in the composition of our reply and instead have it in the most simple and direct phraseology as possible. In my opinion, I think it would be to our interest if we omitted expressions like "continuance of encirclement" as it appears in section three of my message #724[c]. Other corrections which I would make would include the changing of the phrase "of discrimination, of boycott, and barriers, of personal integrities and attack" as it appears in Section 18, to, simply, "circumstances in the recent pact". I also feel that it is essential that we point out the fact that we place much emphasis on the point concerning the guaranteeing of the safety of the Far East.

[a] See III, 50, 51—Nomura reports the gist of a conversation with a Cabinet member in which he is told of President Roosevelt's interest in the proposed conference (with Konoye) and of his (the Cabinet member's) hope for its success.
[b] See III, 52, 53—Text of memorandum handed Amb. Nomura by the President.
[c] See III, 56-62—Text of Amb. Nomura's (proposed) reply to the President's note.

Trans. 8-25-41


No. 55
August 20, 1941
#723.
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 
TO: Tokyo 

(Part 1 of 2)

It seems that the President believes that he could meet with Premier KONOYE depending on the circumstances (my #722[a]). It is not hard to imagine that he is also of the opinion that he would like to take this matter out of the hands of the authorities and settle it himself because of the general situation. It may be said that the President had made this proposal so that he could make his last political stroke at this moment when Japanese-American feelings are at their worst. It is well for Japan to respond in a like generous spirit to this move on the part of the President. It would be well also to leave the decisions of the concrete points until some future date-----and show that there is nothing that would conflict with-----and I think it is imperative that we thus bring about the resumption of the informal negotiations which have been disrupted.

[A-34]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

From this standpoint, I am submitting a proposal we have drawn up (----- 724[b]). There may be points in it that need to be dealt with more in detail. Should I think of any points that should be added I will wire them later. This proposal gives due respect to the policy proposed by the United States Government.

[a] See III, 50, 51.
[b] See III, 56-62.

Trans. 8-25-41


No. 56
August 20, 1941
#724.
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 
TO: Tokyo 

(Part 1 of 7)

To be handled in Government Code. Strictly confidential.

Reference is made to the communication conveyed, on August 17, 1941, to the Japanese Ambassador by the Secretary of State and the President of the United States.

The Government of the United States mentions certain circumstances and measures considered as inimical to a peaceful settlement in the Pacific area. In an atmosphere of world crisis and international cohesion, it is difficult to ascertain whether an event is a cause or a consequence.

Accordingly, not unlike the press in Japan, much news and editorial comment in the United States has forecasted the "encirclement" of Japan as the outcome of American-British policy in the Far East. Elaborate specifications have been made by the press to indicate how, with the assistance of Russia, Japan would be deprived of natural resources and opportunity in the East Asia region. Meanwhile, the United States had taken certain measures which could be interpreted in Japan as indicative of a continuing unfriendly pressure at variance with our then current amicable conversations.

Trans. 8-22-41


No. 57
August 20, 1941
#724.
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 
TO: Tokyo 

(Part 2 of 7)

The Government of the United States considers that certain of its actions vis-a-vis Japan have been only counter-measures to policies and precedures prejudicial to American interests and principles. On the other hand, the Government of Japan considers that its own actions have been dictated by considerations responsive to hazards, circumstancial and political, affecting the national sufficiency and protection of Japan.

It is quite conceivable that both Governments are right.

[A-35]

With admirable modesty of mind, the Government of the United States has seemed, frequently, unaware that the words of policy are weighted with the immense power of America's natural endowment and potential might. The President of the United States, and the Secretary of State, in their own unquestioning adherence to the way of peaceful procedures, might find it difficult to believe that other nationals, anywhere, could consider themselves threatened by the United States.

Yet, so long as they lack that assuagement of possible threat (so convincingly eliminated from South America by the good neighbor policy) there will be some, geographically less well endowed and, by nature, poor in essential resources, who will feel compelled to consider defensively their relations with the United States.

Trans. 8-22-41


No. 58
August 20, 1941
#724.
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 
TO: Tokyo 

(Part 3 of 7)

It is not, therefore, surprising that temporary measures taken by the Government of Japan for the protection of its own equitable and necessary supply of living commodities, should be interpreted, though never so intended nor operated, prejudicial to the procurement by the United States of essential raw materials.

Equally, it is not surprising that, lacking such guarantees as are mentioned in the communication of August 17th, and in default of a consummated understanding with the United States, the Government of Japan felt compelled by current conditions to take certain measures of precautionary defense.

Accordingly, the Government of Japan appreciates that, having indicated difficulties, the Government of the United States now encourages an exchange of basic policies and attitudes as the foundation of an understanding that will condition lasting and extensive peace in the Pacific area.

For such peace, the Government of Japan is ready for such a united effort toward—a peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific situation—the Government of Japan would be proud to make sacrifices.

Trans. 8-22-41


No. 59
August 20, 1941
#724.
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 
TO: Tokyo

(To be handled in government code)

(Part 4 of 7)

The government of Japan, with lively appreciation, endorses as its own, without qualification, the cogent "program attainable by peaceful methods". As outlined in the communication of August 17, 1941, the program is such as has long been desired and sought by Japan.

The government of Japan desires, for itself and all others, the application in the entire Pacific area of the principle of equality of commercial opportunity and treatment. The government of Japan desires to make possible for itself and all countries, access to raw materials and

[A-36]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

to all of her essential commodities. The government of Japan desires cooperation by all nations of the Pacific, on a voluntary and peaceful basis, for the utilization of available resources of capital, technical skillfull, and progressive economic leadership for the purpose of building up not only their own but also the economy of regions where the productive and distributive capacities can be improved, in such manner that for the nations and peoples concerned, pur- chasing power will be increased, living standards raised and conditions conducive to peace will be created.

Trans. 8-22-41


No. 60
August 20, 1941
#724.
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 
TO: Tokyo 

(Part 5 of 7)

(To be handled in Government Code)

If such a program, based upon peaceful and constructive principles, is adopted for the Pacific and if, thereafter, any of the countries or areas in the Pacific are menaced, the Government of Japan will cooperate with the other nations in extending assistance to any nation so threatened. The Government of Japan believes that such a program if faithfully carried out, with the consideration for the relative conditions of the various nations, would preclude the extension, by any one country, of political or military control to attain economic right of a definitely monopolistic or preferential character. In those cases where the production and distribution of essential commodities are vested in monopolies, it is expected that the Government of the United States will use its great influence to see that all countries are given fair and guaranteed share of the distribution of the products of such monopolies, and at a fair price.

Moreover, the Government of Japan rejects any intention of territorial aggrandizement or exploitation of other peoples. It desires the orderly establishment of effective, responsible, independent sovereignty in a united China. It desires the political inviolability of all Pacific nations.

Trans. 8-22-41


No. 61
August 20, 1941
#724.
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 
TO: Tokyo 

To be handled in Government Code.

(Part 6 of 7)

The Government of Japan does not desire, unless forced thereto by political or economic aggression, that the East Asian region should be cut away from a world economy of equitable and peaceful processes, but it does desire that the principle of non-discrimation should be operative and exercised by other nations, no less than by Japan, for both citizenry and commerce. The Government of Japan has sought to express, in its international procedures, the cultural and ethical ideals of peace and harmony which are part of Japanese national culture. Japan participated in the League of Nations and cooperated in various disarmament conferences. But multiple events of world turmoil—of discrimination—of boycott and barriers—of personal indignities and attack, motivated the Governments, responsible for the welfare of

[A-37]

the Japanese people, to take certain counter measures which they would have preferred to avoid Some of those measures, whether faction or alliance, were interpreted as aggressive.

The Government of Japan has no intention and no alliance and no policy of aggression. The Government of Japan conceives its people as members of the family of nations, each of whom ought to live, and let live, under the common bond of brotherhood and just tolerance.

Trans. 8-22-41


No. 62
August 20, 1941
#724.
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 
TO: Tokyo 

(Part 7 of 7)

We consider that the natural position and circumstances of Japan and her people is not incomparable to that of Britain; and the deprivation of economic opportunity by boycott and discrimination are measures against which, not less than against military attack, the prescripts of national security and honor require resistance. It is this policy of resistance, extended to armed conflict, that has been interpreted by some as aggressive.

But, the Government of Japan prefers a policy of cooperation and desires to sincerely respond to the cordial, penetrating proposals of the President of the United States and the Secretary of State by the rapid conclusion of our informally negotiated, and almost completed, understanding. The meeting of the responsible head of our respective Governments would confirm and give such sanction to our purposes that peace in the Pacific would be insisted with the date of that meeting.

It is with great good will that the Government of Japan anticipates the complete resumption of the historic friendship with the United States.

Trans. 8-22-41


No. 63
August 20, 1941
#723.
TO: Tokyo 
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 

(Part 2 of 2)

It explains the immutable policy of our government based on the important statements by Prime Minister KONOYE and Ministers HIRANUMA, ARITA and MATSUOKA and attempts to correct misunderstandings regarding this policy. I believe that since it is limited to those points included in the American proposal, it would be accepted as a sufficient statement and is within the possibility of the United States giving it careful consideration. Of course, it is not wise to refer to those points which the President had not taken up. This is only a convenient method for opening Japanese-American negotiations and is not of a nature that could be proclaimed to the world as Japan's national policy.

I would like to have this proposal considered by the Foreign Office bearing in mind the points I have mentioned above. If the Japanese Government is determined to adjust Japanese-American relations, this is the time. Losing this opportunity, there will be no other that we can take. If the meeting is to take place about the middle of September, as the President has suggested, there is left for preliminary negotiations less than two months, in fact a little more than a

[A-38]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

month. Besides, if the meeting is really to take place, it would be necessary to have a ship ready and to select those who will accompany the party. For these reasons I urge that you decide on this matter quickly.

Trans. 8-25-41


No. 64
August 23, 1941
#495.
FROM: Tokyo 
TO: Washington 

(Strictly Confidential)

According to newspaper reports, it is alleged that a British-U.S.-Soviet conference will be held early in September. This comes at the same time as the reports that the United States is shipping goods to aid the Soviet Union, which in many respects confirms the already existing rumors of "encirclement". Under these circumstances, if the proposed talks between the leaders of Japan and the United States comes subsequent to the above referred to tripartite conference, the general impression would be that Japan had given in in the face of the threat of "encirclement."

We are, therefore, doing everything in our power to rush our reply to the United States and at the same time to bring about the "leaders conference" at an earlier date. Under these circumstances, will you please exert as much effort as possible to accomplish this. At the same time will you please draw the United States' attention again to the matter contained in the last part of my message 487[a].

[a] Tokyo's intentions regarding her northern policy are outlined to Amb. Nomura for his information with the re-quest that should the U.S. question the increase of Jap troops in the North, it should be explained as a precautionary measure taken to offset dangers that might arise from a Soviet defeat and subsequent political confusion in Eastern Russia. Also that should the U.S. ship vital materials to Russia via Japanese coastal waters, it would provoke the feelings of the Japanese people and have an unfavorable effect on the question of readjusting U.S.-Japanese relations.

Trans. 8-25-41


No. 65
August 23, 1941
#739.
FROM: Washington 
TO: Tokyo 

I called on Secretary Hull again at 5 o'clock this (Saturday) afternoon, and in accordance with the contents of your message #495 (?)[a], reported that Japan was prepared to make an early reply and at the same time to hold the "leader's conference" at an earlier date than previously proposed. As you instructed, I requested that the Moscow conference be delayed and the proposed material aid to the Soviet Union be withheld for the time being.

The Secretary made no comment with regard to the first part. With regard to the second portion of my statement, he again—as he did this morning—pointed to the Japanese-U.S.S.R. Neutrality Pact.

[A-39]

He did assure me, however, that my statement would be relayed to the President. According to reports-----the President has made inquiries as to whether Japan's reply had arrived or not. In my opinion, the President is the one who shows the most interest in the "leader's conference".

[a] See III, 64—Tokyo wires Washington that every effort is being made to rush a reply to the President's note, etc., etc.

Trans. 8-26-41


No. 66
FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington

Re your #707[a] and 708[b].

This is a matter of great gravity and the Premier is eager concerning these conversations. Therefore, I am wiring you under this date, message #502 containing a message from the Premier to the President and in #503 the reply of the Imperial Government, (in which connection see also #504).

Will you please go and report them immediately to both the President and the Secretary of State.

[a] For 707 See III, 39 and for #708 See III, 52, 53 which are the texts of two notes handed Ambassador Nomura by President Roosevelt.

Trans. 8-26-41


No. 67
August 26, 1941
#502.

FROM: Tokyo 
TO: Washington 

(Part 1 of 2) (To be handled in Government Code)

I am very much pleased to learn from the document which you handed to Ambassador NOMURA on August 17 that you are in agreement with the idea contained in our proposal regarding holding a meeting between you and me.

Today, when the whole world is in confusion, for the two countries of Japan and the United States, who hold the key to world peace, to drift as we are drifting toward the worst of relations, not only is an unfortunate thing in itself but also means the downfall of world civilization. The reason for Japan being so concerned over the question of peace in the Pacific lies in no other than her desire not only to improve the relations between Japan and the United States, but also to contribute to the realization of world peace through the opportunity which such improved relations would afford.

It seems to me the reason that Japanese-American relations have come to be so bad as they are today is to be found largely in the fact that the governments of the two countries have been lacking in mutual understanding and have repeatedly doubted and misconstrued each other's intentions. It seems also to have been due to machinations on the part of third-power countries. Unless we begin with the elimination of such causes, we cannot by any means hope that the relations between the two countries could be adjusted. Herein lies the reason for my proposing that I meet you face to face for the purpose of frankly exchanging our views.

Trans. 8-26-41

[A-40]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR


No. 68
August 26, 1941
#502.
FROM: Tokyo 
TO: Washington 

(Part 2 of 2)

However, the method upon which we have hitherto been relying; namely, the method of informal negotiations, which was disrupted in July—though it may have been, on the whole, appropriate in consideration of the attitude then taken and of the matters discussed—even if continued from now on with a view of having the leaders of the two governments later giving recognition to the matters discussed, is not a suitable method under the present circumstances in which rapid changes are taking place and the possibility of an unfortunate condition arising is unforseeable. I believe the need of the moment is for the leaders of the two countries to meet face to face and to discuss whether there is any possibility of saving the present situation by studying together with a proper perspective the important questions which affect the whole area of the Pacific Ocean lying between the two countries, and to do this without being bound by the customary method of negotiations. It would be all right to have the details settled by those officials specializing in such matters according as the necessity arises after the leaders have conferred on them.

This is the idea underlying my proposal. It is my earnest wish that you would accept this proposal in an understanding spirit and reciprocate. The situation being such as explained above, I am eagerly waiting for the day of our meeting. As to the place of the meeting, I believe that, in view of various circumstances, it would be best if it were somewhere in the vicinity of Hawaii.

Trans. 8-26-41


No. 69
August 26, 1941
#503.
FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington 

(Part 1 of 7) (To be handled in Government Code)

The Imperial Government has received the communication which was given to the Japanese Ambassador in Washington on August 17, 1941, and sets forth its viewpoint as follows:

1. The Government of the United States, claiming that the actions and measures which Japan took in French Indo-China have deprived it of the basis upon which the conference having to do with settlement by peaceful means of problems affecting the Pacific area should be continued, wishes that the Japanese Government would abandon its expansionist activities, adjust its attitude, and work toward the program of peace in the Pacific, in accordance with the principles embodied in the program which the United States upholds. At the same time, the United States Government wishes that the Japanese Government would submit a clearer statement that those hitherto submitted regarding Japan's present attitude and plans. Furthermore, the United States Government has definitely stated the fact that it will resort at once to every method it deems necessary should Japan take any further steps in line with the policy of militarily dominating Japan's neighboring countries by threat of force or by means which are in the nature of a threat by force.

Note: In deciphering this---------------

Trans. 8-26-41

A-41

No. 70
August 26, 1941
#503.
FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington 

(Part 2 of 7) (To be handled in Government Code)

2. The Government of Japan cannot help but feel deeply regrettable that despite Japan's past pledges and her repeated explanations concerning her activities and measures toward other countries, the United States Government is still harboring misunderstanding and fear. The Government of the United States refers to certain situations and measures which it considers harmful to the peaceful settlement of problems affecting the Pacific area and does so on the bais solely of the fundamental conception to which it has pledged itself. However, in such a world crisis as we face today and in such an atmosphere of international confusion, it is exceedingly difficult to judge whether a certain incident is the cause or the result. It is, furthermore, dangerous to base that judgment one-sidedly upon certain political facts only. The Government of Japan cannot but point out how harmful such a judgment is to lasting peace.

When a country's natural and peaceful progress is interfered with or when its right of existence is threatened from without, for that country to take measures to cope with the threat or to resort to methods for its defense not only is unavoidable, but also must be said to be a most natural thing from the standpoint of maintaining peace. Therefore, before criticizing such counter-measures or defensive measures, to ascertain the cause and to correct the situation must be regarded as the greatest factor for a speedy establishment of peace.

Trans. 8-26-41


No. 71
August 26, 1941
#503.
FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington 

(Part 3 of 7)

We shall not consider at this time those things which have happened in the far past. However, if the matter is regarded in the light of recent incidents, we find that many newspaper articles and editorials in the United States have predicted that a British-American joint policy in the Far East would result in a threat to Japan and have hinted the formation of an anti-Japanese front by Britain, the United States and the Netherlands Indies. In the meantime, in conflict with the friendly conversations that were taking place at the time between Japan and the United States, the United States Government has expressed its intention of applying a continuous and unfriendly policy of pressure and has taken measures which might deprive Japan of the opportunity of obtaining the natural resources necessary to Japan. Although the United States considered some measures as having been taken in opposition to Japan's policy and activities which the United States considered as harmful to her rights to the principles she upholds, on the other hand, the Japanese Government believed that her action was governed by certain measures which she had taken to cope with circumstantial and political obstacles which affected her national requirements of self-sufficiency and defense.

It should not be forgotten that, as pointed out, what the government of one country considers as just proves to be exactly the opposite when regarded by another country, and that it often proves to be a cause for contention as well. Looking back upon past instances, we find among those methods which the United States Government has considered as peaceful, there have

[A-42]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

been some which lead one to think that she has overlooked the fact that they have been a threat to another country because of the established facts relating to the United States, of natural circumstances, and of the United States' monopolistic power.

Trans. 8-26-41


No. 72
August 26, 1941
#503.
FROM: Tokyo 
TO: Washington 

(Part 4 of 7) (To be handled in Government Code)

Because of the fact that the President of the United States and the Secretary of State have a firm attachment to peaceful means, it seems to be difficult for them to believe that the peoples in other countries should feel that they are threatened by the United States. It should be firmly borne in mind that so long as this silent threat is not lightened, the peoples in the countries which are less favorably situated than the United States (especially because of the scarcity of resources) cannot help but regard their relations with the United States in a defensive way. Japan believes that in everything peaceful happiness can be obtained only by really understanding the position and the circumstances which affect the others, rather than by criticizing the individual acts of the others. From this standpoint, the Government of Japan is pleased with the fact that the United States encourages the exchange of opinions regarding the policy and attitude which must form the basis of the understanding which is essential to a lasting and broad peace in the Pacific area.

Trans. 8-26-41


No. 73
August 26, 1941
#503.
FROM: Tokyo 
TO: Washington 

(Part 5 of 7)

3. The steps which Japan has taken for the joint defense of French Indo-China, as stated repeatedly in the past, had for their purpose hastening of the settlement of the China incident which originated from the threat against Japan's right of existence. They constituted also a policy which became, for reason of self-defense, inevitable for the purpose of maintaining peace in the Pacific by coping with various threats which tended to disrupt that peace, and thereby to achieve an equitable supply of materials which are essential to the country. It was not in the nature of merely making a threat. Therefore, should the China incident be settled or should a just peace be established in the Far East, the Government of Japan, as you already know, is willing to withdraw its troops immediately from French Indo-China. In order that every bit of possible doubt may be wiped out, the Government of Japan reiterates here the statement she had repeated in the past—that her steps with regard to the joint defense of French Indo-China were not taken with the intention of making that area a basis from which to advance by force into the neighboring areas. From the statements made above, we believe that Japan's attitude toward Thailand is self-evident. Also, as regards Japanese-Soviet relations, the Japanese Government is to state clearly here that so long as the Soviet Government respects the terms of the Russo-Japanese neutrality agreement and refrains from taking actions which are a threat to Japan and Manchukuo or are in contravention to the spirit of this agreement, Japan will not resort to military action against that country. It is, therefore, an

[A-43]

earnest desire on the part of the Japanese Government that the United States Government refrain from any action that would instill fear in the Japanese, to say nothing of the people in those countries which might fear a threat by the United States and Soviet-Russia acting jointly.

Trans. 8-26-41


No. 74
August 26, 1941
#503.
FROM: Tokyo 
TO: Washington 

(Part 6 of 7) (To be handled in Government Code)

In order that we might do this, the Imperial Government is not inclined to exercise force toward the various countries adjacent to her.

4. The Government of the United States has gone on record as having said that these informal discussions between the Governments of Japan and the United States have for their purpose the discovery of bases for negotiations having to do with bringing about a peaceful settlement in the entire Pacific area as a means of drafting a program which will achieve natural peaceful measures. In this respect the Government of Japan is wholeheartedly in accord. Furthermore, the Government of the United States has made it clear that she will give no consideration to any proposals except those having to do with any of the rights and prerogatives of either Japan or of the United States, or harmonize with the principles which have been observed by the United States in the past. This principle applies equally to the principles which the Government of Japan has embraced in its fundamental national policy.

5. The Imperial Japanese Government believes that the Government of the United States considers that the program coming out of these informal discussions will set forth principles and desires which will be applicable to the whole world and, therefore, to that one part of the world which is the Pacific. In order that this may be achieved, countries enjoying favorable conditions or having advantages over other countries economically, politically, militarily, from the point of view of natural resources or geographically shall assume an attitude of strict impartiality with regard to cooperation and to the distribution of such advantages. It is natural and essential that, first of all satisfying the requirements essential to the existence of a country, in a spirit of reciprocity adjustments should be made in relation to the areas adjacent to it. It is furthermore important in hastening the establishment of peace.

Trans. 8-26-41


No. 75
August 26, 1941
#503.
FROM: Tokyo 
TO: Washington 

(Part 7 of 7) (To be handled in Government Code)

6. I believe that the opinions of the Imperial Government as set forth above are clear and concise. We believe that it is paramount for the maintenance of peace in the Pacific that the governments of Japan and the United States confer dispassionately and constructively together on problems great and small.

From this point of view it is my fervent belief that it would be highly significant for the leaders of both countries to meet together for an immediate conference. However, in order that

[A-44]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

such a conference can be conducted in the most friendly manner, I believe that it is essential to immediately quiet the impression that this step is due to pressure put upon the Japanese Government by the Government of the United States. The Japanese Government is convinced that the Government of the United States is in the main interested in the establishment of world peace and Japan has decided to reciprocate and in the light of the present international situation has decided to endorse the early invocation of this conference.

Trans. 8-26-41


No. 76
August 26, 1941
#504.
FROM: Tokyo 
TO: Washington 

Re my #503.

That message contains the maximum concessions that we can make to the proposal of the President of the United States; however, whether or not you can convince the Americans of this is naturally another matter. Now the international situation as well as our internal situation is strained in the extreme and we have reached the point where we will pin our last hopes on an interview between the Premier and the President.

Please try to convince ROOSEVELT and HULL to this effect and please bear in mind that I do not consider that the interview need necessarily be bound strictly by what is set forth in my caption message.

Trans. 8-26-41


No. 77
August 27, 1941
#748.
FROM: Washington 
TO: Tokyo 

Regarding your message #501[a].

On this day, Wednesday, at noon, I called on the Secretary of State, in accordance with your instructions, and handed him a copy of the message from the Premier. At the same time, I relayed the various points contained in your message #503[b] orally (because the English text had not been completed) and strongly urged him to allow me to see the President today. The Secretary replied that it would be impossible today, but that a reply would be made tomorrow morning.

During this conversation, I mentioned that I thought the Churchill speech was very harmful and the Secretary of State, in reply, referred to his comments to the press. (He refused to make any comments when press representatives pressed him for details.) He went on to say that apparently in Japan the extremist views were holding away in the various publications. I did my best to make appropriate replies.

[a] See III, 66—Tokyo directs Amb. Nomura to immediately report to the President and Secretary of State the contents of two messages (JD-1: 4795 and 4796) being sent separately.
[b] See III, 69-75—Text of Japan's reply to the President's note requesting a clarification of Japan's aims in the Far East.

Trans. 8-30-41

[A-45]


No. 78
August 26, 1941
#505.
FROM: Tokyo 
TO: Washington 

Notwithstanding representations made by us on successive occasions the United States is treading a course which seems to be bent on exciting public opinion within our country. Beginning the first day of September they are exercising stringent limitations on gasoline shipments essential to our civilian population. At this time they are planning to pass through waters adjacent to our shores with cargoes of petroleum products which should be coming to us. The fact that they are transporting these petroleum products to Vladivostok has dealt a severe blow to the sensibilities of our government and people. At the same time that this brings about grave effects upon Japan and American relations, a terrific blow is being dealt by those in Washington to the whole country far more than you can realize.

This being the case, we are forced to cry out our disapproval of the realization of such measures and the Ministry of Interior as well as the War Ministry are very apprehensive. Therefore, because such measures are not in keeping with the neutrality treaty between Japan and Soviet Russia nor in accord with the interpretation of international law, I would like to have you make representations again to the Secretary of State in order that he may reconsider an immediate cessation of these measures from the general view point of the current Japan-American diplomatic relations. Wire me back as soon as you have filed these representations.

In the event the United States assumes the position that it is impossible to cut off shipments of petroleum products to the Soviet, then as it seems advisable to your Excellency make suggestions that they change the transportation route. However, should they not comply with this request, either, I think it would be wise to try to persuade the American authorities that they revive shipments of petroleum products to Japan immediately.

Furthermore, additional representations have been filed with the Soviet too, as of the 26th.

Trans. 8-26-41


No. 79
August 27, 1941
#749.
FROM: Washington 
TO: Tokyo 

Re your #505[a].

When I talked with the Secretary of State on the 27th, he brought out graphs showing the amounts of oil that have been furnished to Japan since the beginning of the year, and in view of the small amount supplied to Russia as compared with the enormous amounts supplied to Japan, he thought it strange that so much should be made of this now in Tokyo. (Previous to his talk with me he had had a talk with the Soviet Ambassador.)

I replied that it is only natural that public opinion should be stirred up over the U.S. Government's action in embargoing oil to Japan, while supplying it to Russia, and that in tankers passing the very throat of Japan.-----the necessity of changing the route. The Secretary -----the reasons,-----discussed normal trade relations with the Soviet on the basis of documents submitted by his subordinates. He further stated that even though export permits were given for Japanese tankers, because of the freezing of funds in the United States this money could not be circulated, and he said he would like the consent of the Japanese Government for payment to be made from moneys in South America and desires an early reply.

[A-46]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

You know about this from the messages I have been sending, and as there is no other way but to use South American moneys, I wish you would take the matter up with the departments involved and advise as to the results by return dispatch.

[a] See III, 78—Amb. Nomura is directed to make representations to the U.S. over the shipment of petroleum supplies to the Soviet via waters adjacent to Japan and request that this practice be discontinued, or the present embargo on oil shipments to Japan be reconsidered and lightened.

Trans. 8-30-41


No. 80
August 29, 1941
#758.
FROM: Washington 
TO: Tokyo 

Re my #749[a].

The Secretary of State also is cognizant of the fact that in consequence of the exceedingly delicate nature of the relations existing between Japan and America at the present time, a single incident may serve as a spark to set off an immediate explosion, and is manifesting great concern over the situation.

Referring to the freedom of the seas he said to a group of newspaper reporters and also to me, that he had no desire to set a precedent in this matter of having any third country interfere in Japanese-American trade or with American trade itself. Besides he said that he had faced great popular disapproval in permitting the export of several millions of barrels of oil to Japan and that there was no reason now for Japan to make a great problem over the shipment of a few hundred thousand barrels of oil to Russia and that if the Japanese Government would fully recognize these facts all would be clear. To this I explained that, entirely apart from the legal aspects of the situation, from the standpoint of national feeling, the shipment of oil that is prohibited to Japan right through Japanese territorial waters to Vladivostok is a major problem. He seemed to see that there was indeed some logic in this, for in today's newspapers there appeared various explanations about routing the oil through the Persian gulf, etc.

I feel very keenly the necessity of doing something to break the deadlock in the situation, and I suggest that as a temporary measure you arrange immediately for the use of those funds that are outside of the area affected by the freezing order for the purchase of petroleum that is being negotiated now.

I make telegraphic request again for the above.

[a] See III, 79—Amb. Nomura reports conversing with the Secy. of State regarding shipments of oil to Russia, whereas, shipments to Japan have been embargoed. The Secy. further requested that as permits have been granted to Jap tankers, arrangements be made for payment from moneys in South America, inasmuch as Jap funds in the U.S. have been frozen.

Trans. 9-4-41

[A-47]



No. 81
September 3, 1941
#771.
FROM: Washington 
TO: Tokyo 

I made English translations of your messages #502[a] (The Premier's message), and #503[b] (the Imperial Government's reply). I am forwarding those translations to you as my messages #772[c] and #773[d] respectively, after making a few changes. Please check and approve.

[a] See III, 68, 69.
[b] See III, 69-75.
[c] See III, 82, 83.
[d] See III, 84-88.

Trans. 9-6-41


No. 82
September 3, 1941
#772.
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 
TO: Tokyo 

(English text)

(Part 1 of 2)

I deeply appreciate the courtesy of Your Excellency in delivering personally to Ambassador Nomura the reply of the United States Government to the proposal of the Japanese Government regarding a meeting between Your Excellency and myself.

In the face of universal war like turmoil Japan and the United States are the last two major powers who hold the key to international peace. That the two nations should fall in the worst of relations at this time would mean not only a disaster in itself, but also the collapse of world civilization. Japan is solicitous for the maintenance of the peace of the Pacific and the peace of the world and she desires therefore to improve Japanese-American relations.

The present deterioration of the Japanese-American relations is largely due, I feel, to a lack of understanding which has led to mutual suspicions and misapprehensions, and also encouraged the machinations and maneuvers of third powers.

Without first eliminating such causes, it is impossible to expect adjustment of Japanese- American relations. This is why I wish to meet Your Excellency personally for a frank exchange of views.

Trans. 9-5-41

[A-48]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR


No. 83
September 3, 1941
#772.
FROM: Washington 
TO: Tokyo 

(English text)

(Part 2 of 2)

Chief of Office Routing

The preliminary informal conversations disrupted July last, were quite appropriate both in spirit and content. But the idea of continuing those conversations and to have their conclusion confirmed by the responsible heads of the two governments does not meet the need of the present situation which is developed swiftly and may produce unforeseen contingencies.

I consider it, therefore, of urgent necessity that the two heads of the governments should meet first to discuss from a broad standpoint all important problems between Japan and America covering the entire Pacific area, and to explore the possibility of saving situation. Adjustment of minor items may, if necessary, be left to negotiations between competent officials of the two countries, following the meeting.

Such is my aim in making the present proposal. I sincerely hope my views in this regard are fully understood and reciprocated by your excellency.

Because of the nature of the meeting as stated above, I would prefer that it will take place as soon as possible.

Trans. 9-5-41


No. 84
September 3, 1941
#773.
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 
TO: Tokyo 

(English text)

(Part 1, 2, and 3 of 8)

Part 1

The Japanese Government has received the communication conveyed by the Secretary of State and the President of the United States to the Japanese Ambassador on August 17, 1941. The Japanese Government desires to state its views as follows:

The Japanese Government profoundly regrets that despite the pledge it has given heretofore as well as its repeated explanations concerning Japan's actions and measures in the foreign field, the United States Government continues to entertain misgiving.

The United States Government mentions certain situations and measures which it regards as inimical to a peaceful settlement in the Pacific area. In an atmosphere of world crisis and international confusion, it is sometimes difficult to ascertain when an event is a cause and when it is a consequence.

[A-49]

Part 2

When a nation is obstructed in the path of natural and peaceful development, or when the means of its existence is threatened, not only is it imperative that that nation should take defensive measures, but it is also required to do so for the maintenance of a just peace. This was the motivating policy of the Japanese Government.

Meanwhile, the United States had taken certain measures which could be interpreted in Japan as indicative of a continuing unfriendly pressure at variance with the current amicable conversations.

The United States Government certainly regards some of those actions as merely counter- measures against Japan's policy and procedures which were considered as conflicting with American interests and principles. On the other hand, to the Japanese Government they were measures determined by considerations of self-protection for meeting national requirements or removing environmental and political obstacles against national security.

Part 3

With admirable modesty of mind, the government of the United States has seemed frequently unaware that its words and policies are automatically weighted with the immense power of America's accomplished facts, natural endowment and potential might. The President of the United States, and the Secretary of State, in their own unquestioning adherence to the ways of peaceful procedures, might find it difficult to believe that other nations, anywhere, could consider themselves threatened by the United States. And yet, as long as there is lacking the assuagement of that possible threat, there will be some less favorably endowed (especially in essential resources) who feel compelled to consider defensively their relations with the United States.

Trans. 9-5-41


No. 85
September 3, 1941
#773.
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 
TO: Tokyo 

(Part 4 of 8)

In consequence, the Japanese Government welcomes the invitation by the government of the United States to an exchange of views in regard to basic policies and attitudes as the foundation of an understanding that will condition lasting and extensive peace in the Pacific area For such peace, the government of Japan is ready; for such a united effort toward a peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific situation the government of Japan like the government of the United States would be proud to make sacrifices.

Japan's measure in Indo-China was intended to accelerate the settlement of the China incident; and at the same time it was calculated to remove all menace to the peace of the Pacific and to secure to Japan an equitable supply of essential materials. It was a measure of self defense the Japanese Government felt obliged to take. But the Japanese Government has no intention of threatening thereby other countries.

Trans. 9-8-41

[A-50]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR


No. 86
September 3, 1941
#773.
FROM: Washington 
TO: Tokyo 

(English text)

(Part 5 of 8)

Therefore, the Japanese Government is prepared to withdraw its troops from Indo-China as soon as the China Incident is settled or a just peace is established in East Asia.

Furthermore, in order to remove all possible doubt in this regard, the Japanese Government reaffirms herewith its repeated declaration that its present action in Indo-China is not a preparatory step for military advance into neighboring territories. The Japanese Government believes the above pledge will suffice to clarify also Japan's intention toward Thailand.

Trans. 9-5-41


No. 87
September 3, 1941
#773.
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 
TO: Tokyo 

(English text)

(Parts 6 and 7 of 8)

Part 6

As regards Soviet-Japanese relations, the Japanese Government declares likewise that Japan will take no military action as long as the Soviet Union remains faithful to the Soviet- Japanese neutrality treaty and does not menace Japan or Manchuoukuo or take any action contrary to the spirit of the said treaty. On the other hand, the Japanese Government sincerely hopes that the United States Government will avoid any action that might give rise to a fear of menace to Japan through collaboration with the Soviet Union.

In a word, the Japanese Government has no intention of using, without provocation, military force against any neighboring nation.

Quite properly discussions between the Japanese Government and the government of the United States directed toward ascertaining if there existed a basis for negotiations for a peaceful settlement covering the entire situation,—such discussions would naturally envisage the working out of a progressive program, obtainable by peaceful methods. The Japanese Government shares fully that view with the government of the United States.

Part 7

It is also stated by the United States Government that no proposals or suggestions affecting the rights and privileges of either the United States or Japan would be considered except as these might be in conformity with the basic principles to which the United States has long been committted. The fundamental national policy long cherished by the Japanese Government is again in full agreement on that point.

Regarding the principles and directives set forth in detail by the American Government and envisaged in the informal conversations as constituting a program for the Pacific area, the Japanese Government wishes to state that it considers these principles and the practical application thereof in the friendliest manner possible, are the prime requisites of a true peace and should be applied not only in the Pacific area but throughout the entire world. Such a program has long been desired and sought by Japan itself.

Trans. 9-8-41

[A-51]


No. 88
September 3, 1941
#773.
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 
TO: Tokyo 

(English text)

(Part 8 of 8)

The Japanese Government now confidently hopes that from the larger viewpoint of a constructive world peace, and in the light of the current international situation, past differences may be merged in an agreement of principles and a cooperative effort based on order and justice. The meeting of the responsible heads of our respective government would confirm and give such sanction to our purposes that peace in the Pacific would be instituted by that meeting.

Trans. 9-5-41


No. 89
August 28, 1941
#752.
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 
TO: Tokyo 

(Part 1 of 2)

Re my #748.

Today, the 28th, at 11:00 a.m. in accordance with your instructions, I had an interview with the President (the Secretary of State was present). I gave him at that time your message as well as the English text of your #503[a]. While the President was reading the message he flatteringly commended it. Having read it thoroughly, in discussing the point having to do with discrimination he smilingly and cynically said, "Though I am looking forward to conversations with Prince KONOYE, I wonder whether invasion of Thailand can be expected during those conversations just as an invasion of French Indo-China occurred during Secretary HULL's conversations with your Excellency." However, I could see that he was well pleased. He continued by saying, "I am looking forward to having approximately three days talk with Prince KONOYE. The main thing that I am interested in is the saving of time. Hawaii is out of the question for according to the constitution the President must sign bills passed through the Houses of Congress within ten days and I cannot have the Vice-President do it for me."

[a] See III, 69-75—English text message containing statement to be made to Roosevelt.

Trans. 8-30-41

[A-52]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR


No. 90
August 28, 1941
#752.
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 
TO: Tokyo 

(Part 2 of 2)

He explained that in this respect it is different with the Japanese Government in that the Japanese Government could appoint an acting minister and added that if it is going to be in Juneau, it would take three days to Seattle, and the round trip from that point on being ten days, if we had fourteen days in all, we would be able to do it, but it would be impossible if it is going to be in Hawaii, since it would take three weeks. I, therefore, told him that insofar as the Japanese Government is concerned, their chief object is to hold a conference, and question of the place of the conference is secondary. I promised that I would communicate the details to the government. I then said that we would like to have the earliest possible date set, whereupon the President replied that he did not object to having an early date set, but he did not give the immediate reply as to when.

The President added also that the recent meeting with CHURCHILL was to have taken place in-----this year but had been postponed on account of the Balkan War and that the meeting was held after the Congress had approved of it. The conversations between the President and me was as given above. These conversations will be continued.

Trans. 8-29-41


No. 91
August 29, 1941
#756.
FROM: Washington 
TO: Tokyo 

(4 part message complete)

Regarding my #732 (?)[a].

The following is the gist of my discussion with Hull, last evening, (28th), regarding the proposed conference, etc.

(a) As the result might be quite unfortunate should either one of the conferring heads of the two governments assume an uncompromising attitude on certain points, it is the expressed desire of Hull to hold preliminary conversations for the purpose of effecting a general agreement prior to the meeting of the two heads, and also to make the decisions of the two principals as final. (Hull used the expression "certification".) (Regarding this point please refer to my #703 (?)[b].)

(b) While it is necessary to bring up to date the various points of past conversations, the United States maintains that the adjustment of Japanese-American relations can be achieved without considering the question of China, which is vital to her.

(c) Despite Japan's insistence that she cannot alter her policy towards China, the United States government is unwilling to seek adjustments in Japanese-American relations at the expense of existing American-Chinese relations. Neither is the United States Government willing to give cause to "explosion" in China by its action. Furthermore, the task of placating China by the United States Government for accepting the basis of Chinese-Japanese negotiations will involve the tremendous effort of winning the approval of Britain and the U.S.S.R. and for this reason it is deemed unfeasible.

[A-53]

(d) Regarding the question of withdrawal of our troops from China and the right of protection, I informed the Secretary that I had nothing to state except what has already been stated on previous occasions. However, when I explained that so long as Prince Konoye remains in the saddle, I am confident that he will make every effort to settle these questions satisfactorily, Hull replied that he hoped that the Imperial Government will see fit to take definite steps toward this end.

Please check over my #540[c] regarding these questions and let me know the government's opinion regarding them. Also please obtain details regarding same from Colonel Iwakuro upon his return.

(e) I wish to make the following suggestions in the event that it has been decided to hold the "Leaders' Conference".

(1) While it is the desire of the Japanese Government to designate Hawaii as the meeting place, we should consent to accept Juneau, if for reasons of constitutional requirements or personal safety, Hawaii is unsatisfactory to the President.

(2) The conference date should be from September 21st (?) to----------.

(3) Five persons each from the Foreign Office, the Ministries of Navy and War, the Embassy and Consulate, that is a total of 20 persons or less, should be present at the conference.

(Part 4 attached.)

[a] #732, Not translated. Corrects the word "insisted" in a previous message to "instituted".
[b] See III, 35-38—Amb. Nomura brings up to date the seriousness of Japanese-American relations; reports that since Secy. Hull has already rejected Japan's proposal (for continued negotiations) and the President is returning shortly, Tokyo should consider giving the U.S. some sort of pledge regarding the three critical points: self-defense, withdrawal of troops, and nondiscrimination in trade.
[c] Amb. Nomura expresses the opinion that, based on the thought and discussions given the proposals for an Understanding Pact, there is a wide gap between the viewpoints of the two countries, and that Tokyo's proposals will lead to a misunderstanding. Comments on several items of the proposal and requests Tokyo's opinion regarding each.

Trans. 9-3-41


No. 92
August 29, 1941
#756.
FROM: Washington 
TO: Tokyo 

(Part 4 of 4—Parts 1, 2, 3 translated 9-3-41)

4. I assume that Prince Konoye will travel by warship and that about ten days will be required en route.

5. The public statement will be made jointly at a time agreed upon by both. I believe that the best time would be shortly after Prince Konoye's departure.

The Secretary of State agreed to discuss these points with the President. In general, it may be said that the Secretary of State is an exceedingly cautious person. There are indications that he is considering this matter from many angles. I feel that unless we are in fairly close agreement the "leaders' conference" will not materialize.

Trans. 9-4-41

[A-54]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR


No. 93
August 28, 1941
#509.
FROM: Tokyo 
TO: Washington 

(Part 1 of 3)

Re my #503[a].

(a) For convenience's sake, in exchanging messages in the future on this question, please insert the paragraph numbers in the order used in the caption telegram.

1. (The section beginning "The Government of the United States" and repeating the content of recently received documents.)

2. (The section beginning "The Government of Japan cannot help but feel deeply regrettable that despite Japan's past pledges, etc.")

3. (The section beginning "The steps which Japan has taken for the joint defense of French Indo-China, etc.")

4. (The section beginning "The Government of the United States has gone on record as having said that, etc.")

5. (The section beginning "The Imperial Japanese Government believes that the Government of the United States considers, etc.")

6. (The section beginning "I believe that the opinions of the Imperial Government as set forth above, etc.")

(b) The following are explanations of the points in the caption telegram which need special attention:

(1) Our opinions regarding this question were set forth briefly in response to those views which the United States Government freely submitted with the request that we do likewise.

We made our views clear, believing that by so doing we might find in due time points upon which the two parties can agree in a friendly spirit and that because of this the meeting of the leaders of the two countries would prove to be effective.

[a] See III, 69-75, which give Japan's viewpoints with regard to American-Japanese negotiations.

Trans. 8-28-41


No. 94
August 28, 1941
#509.
FROM: Tokyo 
TO: Washington 

(Part 2 of 3)

(2) With regard to Para. 3, "should a just peace be established in the Far East." This means, for example, when the CHIANG regime has become merely a local regime as a result of the closing of routes used to aid that regime; when Japanese-Chinese relations have, on the whole, actually returned to normalcy; and when it is possible to secure efficiently and justly materials from French Indo-China, Japan will be willing to consider withdrawing her troops even if a complete settlement of the China incident has not been achieved. In other words, it was a statement made because of the desire to allow as much flexibility as possible when the conversations are to be begun.

[A-55]

(3) With regard to Para 5. (a) ". . . which will be applicable to the whole world, etc." was inserted out of consideration of the fact that if the principles and desires expressed by the other side are applied merely within the Pacific area, we would suffer various restrictions within the East Asia sphere of coprosperity in which we hope to establish a new order, while the United States, on the other hand, would not be bound by any pledge with regard to her relations with her adjacent areas. Since this would result in an arrangement which would be one-sided insofar as it affects Japan, I thought that the principle should be such as may be applied to the entire world.

Trans. (Not dated)


No. 95
August 28, 1941
#509.
FROM: Tokyo 
TO: Washington 

(Part 3 of 3)

(b) With regard to that section in which it is stated that countries enjoying favorable conditions or having advantages over other countries should assume an attitude of strict impartiality with regard to cooperation and to the distribution of such advantages, we wish to point out the logical reasons for cooperation in the application of leadership to the end of bringing about steps for an equitable distribution of resources by those countries who are advantageously situated, and the passage has to do with the proposal by the United States with reference to equality of economic opportunity and treatment. In other words, it hints the idea that it is natural that Japan should assume peaceful economic leadership within the East Asia sphere of Co-prosperity.

(c) As to the words to the effect that it is natural and essential that adjustments should be made in a spirit of reciprocity in relation to the areas adjacent, etc., the passage clarifies the fact that Japan is inevitably, as well as naturally, endeavoring to bring about peace on the basis of the principle of equality in her relations with Manchukuo and China; that is to say, on the basis of the principle of good neighborliness to the end of establishing the East Asia Sphere of Co-prosperity. It also goes to show that the policy of adjacent countries each respecting the conditions peculiar to the other, is not a policy, as the United States alleges it to be, of securing a position superior to the others. This has many points in common with the American Monroe policy.

The passage in which appear the words "first of all satisfying the requirements essential to the existence of a country" came from the idea of so-called (joint defense ?) which the United States Government referred to. This passage was given with the idea also of a joint defense in China in our mind.

In other words, (a), (b) and (c) were brought out as to a precaution against the possibility of our being too narrowly restricted when the discussion takes place concerning the method by which the East Asia Sphere of Co-prosperity should be established.

Trans. 8-28-41

[A-56]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR


No. 96
August 28, 1941
#754.
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 
TO: Tokyo 

Urgent.

A reporter of the New York Herald Tribune called on TERASAKI this afternoon and inquired concerning the contents of the message from the Premier to President Roosevelt. TERASAKI replied that he was not at liberty even to refer to the contents of that message. He then said: "Well, I had an interview with the President two or three days ago and I gathered from lis words that Premier KONOYE would like to have an interview with him in Hawaii."

Trans. 8-30-41


No. 97
August 28, 1941
#753.
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 
TO: Tokyo

Re my #752[a].

Since the time for the interview was announced by the White House, the Secretary of State immediately made public briefly the Pact that I had delivered to him after the conference Premier KONOYE's message to the President, which was discussed by us. It was agreed that 10 reference should be made to the content of the message.

[a] See III, 90.

Trans. 8-29-41


No. 98
August 29, 1941
#510.
FROM: Tokyo 
TO: Washington 

As you have been advised by other messages concerning this matter, no information of the "leaders' conference" should be allowed to leak out until it is definitely settled upon. You should be perfectly well aware that such leaks may make it impossible to get some things done which otherwise would be well within the realm of possibility.

On the 28th, however, the Domei and other press dispatches, report that in an interview to the press you made references to Premier Konoye's message. (We suppressed those dispatches here.) Hereafter will you please refrain from making any mention of this until you have communicated with this office.

Although we were able to suppress the above mentioned dispatches, in view of the channel through which they arrived, we are of the opinion that a fairly large group of people are now aware of the news. We are at present figuring out ways and means of making the best of the situation. In the meantime, will you take every precaution against any leakage of the contents of the message.

Trans. 8-30-41

[-57]


No. 99
August 29, 1941
#511.
FROM: Tokyo 
TO: Washington 

Regarding my message #510[a].

In view of our domestic situation and the delicate international situation, we had intended to keep this matter a strict secret for the time being. However, now that the matter has been made public in your area, we fear that there will be further misunderstanding if we should attempt to suppress or censor the news here. Being of the opinion that it would be best to publicly announce the contents of section 2 of paragraph 5 of the separate message, we did so at 2:30 p.m. on the 29th.

It should be superfluous to mention that because we must take into consideration our relations with Germany and Italy, and in view of the exceedingly complex domestic situation, there is much danger that the project will fail if information is allowed to leak out before a settlement is reached. Bear this in mind and take every precaution to guard against leaks. You should conduct your negotiations, as they were being conducted during your unofficial talks, in such a manner so as to avoid attracting any attention. (We do not feel that the contents of the discussion on the 28th should be made public at this time.) Hereafter, will you please get in touch before you make any public statements. We realize, of course, that you may let an opportunity slip by by this delay, but please look upon such an occurrence as being unavoidable under the present circumstances.

With regard to the location at which the "leaders' conference" should take place, we mentioned Hawaii after giving consideration to our dignity and also because early in the discussions the United States suggested Hawaii.

We do not insist upon Hawaii, but if it is not to take place there, we feel that we should avoid selecting a place which is a part of either nation, but select a spot on the high seas. Please discuss this matter along those lines.

With regard to maintenance of security, in view of the matter contained in your message #754, will you please request the Americans to cooperate fully. (You are aware that our relations with Germany and Italy may be unfavorably affected by announcements made in the United States. It is quite possible that the United States proposed that the announcement be made to estrange Japan from Germany and Italy. We expect to have at least this much cooperation from them.)

With regard to the announcement made by us which was mentioned early in this message, we felt that time was of the utmost importance; we could not consult the U.S. first. Please explain this to them.

[a] See III, 98. [b] See III, 99A.

Trans. 8-30-41

[A-58]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR


No. 100
August 29, 1941
#759.
FROM: Washington 
TO: Tokyo 

(Abstract)

Re your #511[a].

Very difficult to see the President in secrecy as it is the custom of the Press to avail itself of list of callers at White House. However, will take the matter up with Hull and see what can be done.

[a] See III, 99—Amb. Nomura is instructed to make no more public announcements regarding the proposed understanding negotiations and "leaders' conference" without first obtaining permission from Tokyo. Also, that this take place at some place not a part of either country, preferably on the high seas.

Trans. 9-5-41


No. 101
August 30, 1941
#760.
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 
TO: Tokyo 

(Part 1 of 2)

(To be handled in government code)

On the 26th in the New York Herald Tribune KASAI, M.P. who is now in this country, contributed an article in connection with Japan-American relations to the effect that the Tripartite Alliance was Foreign Minister Matsuoka's great blunder. He continued by saying that at the present time these in the know in Japan oppose it for the reason that it blocks-----relationship with the United States. However, Foreign Minister Matsuoka believed that this Alliance would, in the long run, contribute to the improvement of relations between Japan and the United States.

Trans. 9-23-41


No. 102
August 30, 1941
#760.
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 
TO: Tokyo 

(Part 2 of 2)

Such an interview as this is in opposition to our national policy. It cannot help but have a great and terrible effect upon the present situation, therefore, I would like to have you immediately exercise extreme caution. Furthermore, in view of the present situation and insofar as circumstances will permit, I would like to have you arrange it so that (so-called?) authorities will no longer come to the United States until after boats are again dispatched between Japan and the United States.

Trans. 9-23-41

[A-59]


No. 103
September 1, 1941
#538.
FROM: Tokyo 
TO: Washington 

Re your #752 (?)[a].

Please submit to the United States Government my reply to various proposals made by the President in such a manner as to assure absolute secrecy. If they feel it necessary to publish the gist, please see to it that it is done simultaneously with us. (Publication made by us on the 29th was necessitated by the fact that the matter had already been made public at your end. However, hereafter, we wish to have all publications made simultaneously.)

[a]Amb. Nomura reports to Tokyo the results of his interview with the President regarding the time and place for the "leaders' conference."

Trans. 9-3-41


No. 104
September 2, 1941
#765.
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 
TO: Tokyo 

To be handled in Government Code.

Re my #754[a].

Late on the night of the second HIYUUN[b] of the New York Times called TERASAKI and asked him whether there was any truth in the article printed in the New York Herald-Tribune to the effect that Prince KONOYE had requested an interview with President ROOSEVELT. TERASAKI replied that he knew nothing about it. The Herald-Tribune has not reached our hands as yet. In regard to the secrecy of this matter, I strongly urged Secretary HULL's caution on the-----of last month and again yesterday, the 1st, but I plan to call this to his attention once more.

[a] See III, 96, which concerns an interview between a reporter and TERASAKI, in which the former requests information regarding Premier KONOYE's message to the President. Upon TERASAKI's refusal to disclose the contents, the reporter remarked that he had gathered from the President's remarks during an interview "that Premier Konoye would like to have an interview with him in Hawaii."


[b] Kana spelling.

Trans. 9-5-41

[A-60]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR


No. 105
August 30, 1941
#517.
FROM: Tokyo 
TO: Washington 

Message to Berlin as #776.

In connection with the breaking of the stalemate in Japan-American relations, in accordance with the understanding of the previous Cabinet, Ambassador NOMURA carried on an exchange of opinions with Secretary of State HULL, as you are well aware. Early in July the Japanese Army occupied French Indo-China. As a result, the United States made applicable to Japan legislation freezing funds, which resulted in inability by Japan and the United States to carry on economic endeavors. The relations between Japan and the United States within the two countries became extremely tense. In order that the Empire for a number of reasons could calm the tenseness existing between Japan and the United States, Premier Konoye decided to dispatch a message to President ROOSEVELT. Ambassador NOMURA has transmitted this message to him. It has already been publicly announced by Japan and the United States that such a communication has been conveyed.

Here in Tokyo the Vice Minister and I informed the German and Italian Ambassadors of the situation when they called upon us on other business. Therefore, please advise those to whom you are accredited of the above on the authority of these instructions. Please transmit to Rome. I have already transmitted the above to Washington.

Trans. 9-2-41


No. 106
August 30, 1941
#761.
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 
TO: Tokyo 

(Part 1 of 2)

On the-----the Italian Ambassador called on me and asked about Japanese-American relations. I, therefore, limited myself to your #517[a] and to what you have already published and explained that, since the relations have become so extremely critical of late that most influential members of the Congress have begun publicly to declare that the likelihood of a war breaking out is 50-50, we had issued a message for the purpose of lessening the tension. He continued to be very inquisitive and so I said that for the sake of human welfare I would like to see the European war end soon (he expressed a strong agreement to this point); that Japan does not wish to see the United States enter the war; and that it goes without saying that Japan is faithful to the Three-Power Alliance as may be seen from the fact that she is deeply concerned over United States participation. I said also that, if a war breaks out in the Pacific, it will be a long drawn-out affair.

[a] See III, 105 in which Tokyo tells Washington that the German and Italian Ambassadors have been informed of the message which Premier Konoye has dispatched to President ROOSEVELT.

Trans. 9-2-41

[A-61]


No. 107
August 30, 1941
#761.
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 
TO: Tokyo 

(Part 2 of 2)

Then I remarked, "Americans not only harbor no antagonism against Italians but are friendly to them. This may be because there are several million people of Italian extraction in the country." The Ambassador replied, "Athough---------------, socially we experience nothing abnormal but are on good terms."

In view of the fact that you have repeatedly instructed me to maintain secrecy regarding this question and of the fact that I am quite in favor of doing so, I will handle the matter in the best possible way. However, that is not so easy in that you cannot help others making personal surmises on the basis of our action. I have no way of telling what this country will do in the future as a result merely of your having sent your message, but I notice signs of a temporal lessening of tension.

Trans. 9-2-41


No. 108
September 2, 1941
#762.
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 
TO: Tokyo 

(Part 1 of 6)

On the evening of the 1st, I called on the Secretary of State and discussed with him the matter of maintaining secrecy referred to in your #518[a] and also that of simultaneous announcement. It seems that this question is being handled by the President himself. The President left on Friday for Hyde Park and is to have dinner with the Secretary upon his return to Washington on the 4th. I think they will be giving us a reply before long. Both men appeared to be interested in the question of the conference. However, the Secretary seemed to be very cautious because of his position and his nature. He seems to be of the view that if the KONOYE cabinet foregoes its militaristic policy and returns to a peaceful policy in the Pacific, KONOYE would be obliged to resign from the cabinet because of opposition of the public, and it also seems that this fear is being talked about by both foreigners and Americans.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 9-4-41

[A-62]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR


No. 109
September 2, 1941
#762.
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 
TO: Tokyo 

(Part 2 of 6)

I explained to him that such concern was not in the least called for because Prince KONOYE, who is the Premier, as well as one high in political status, is determined to hold this conference unprecedented in so far as Japan is concerned.

It seems that HULL is being posted on Japanese newspaper opinion by GREW. He said that he would like to see the Japanese Government direct, in accordance with (his?) original ideas, public opinion, influential political leaders, and military men, and lead them to approve of a peaceful policy. (If it were not for the fact that such action would lead to the suspicion that the United States Government was trying to interfere with Japan's internal politics, it would facilitate matters in so far as the United States Government is concerned.)

Trans. 9-5-41


No. 110
September 2, 1941
#762.
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 
TO: Tokyo 

(Part 3 of 6)

Then he said that China does not want to make peace and, besides, the Chinese believe that a military cabinet will be established in Japan sooner or later, and so I replied that China is America's spoiled child and asks for everything she wants regardless of others. The Secretary states, as usual, that to bring about friendly relations between Japan and China without offending China is indeed a difficult task and that it would be necessary to win the approval of Great Britain and other countries before this could be done. Then he proceeded by saying that of the three pending questions the question of self-defense is not a difficult one and that there must be some way of settling the question of non-discrimination, which is recognized in the recent statement and included also in the Konoye statement.

Trans. 9-4-41


No. 111
September 2, 1941
#762.
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 
TO: Tokyo 

(Part 4 of 6)

I said that the stationing of Japanese and Manchukuoan troops in North China is not based upon a permanent right of military occupation and so these troops will be withdrawn when the circumstances will permit it, and that I believe that the Japanese Government had some definite plan with regard to this matter. I further stated that from a general political point of view there is no reason for any trouble arising between the United States and Japan and that, as it is evident from repeated commitments, Japan aims to maintain peace in the Far East. I strongly emphasized the fact that there should be no doubt on this point and then urged him to arrange the conference soon.

Trans. 9-3-41

[A-63]


No. 112
September 2, 1941
#762.
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 
TO: Tokyo 

(Part 5 of 6)

The Secretary stated that to definitely establish peace in the Pacific would be a fine thing.

Although our conversation did not go so far as to consider where the conference should be held, I understand that (Hawaii ?) is 3,400 miles away (Juneau 3,800 miles away) and the climate is good even in the autumn. I believe when this matter is to be announced, the place of the meeting should be given as somewhere in the Pacific (midway between Japan and the United States).

If I may, incidentally, state briefly the present situation with regard to this country, I might say that upon entering the third year of the European war, the anti-Axis powers have recovered from a desperate defensive position and have come to be about equal with the Axis powers.

Trans. 9-4-41


No. 113
September 2, 1941
#762.
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 
TO: Tokyo 

(Part 6 of 6)

Generally speaking, the United States herself, seeing that the prospect is bright is building up her defense, planning to supply her allies with more materials (the newspapers have printed the dissatisfaction of the British) and is, on the other hand, warning people against laxity. While she realizes that Germany's fighting power is as magnificent as ever,----------that the war will be carried over into next year because of the tremendous waste of man power and materials on the Eastern front.

Trans. 9-3-41


No. 114
September 3, 1941
#777.
FROM: Washington 
TO: Tokyo 

(In 5 parts—complete)[a]

Oral statement

Strictly confidential

Reference is made to the proposal of the Japanese Government communicated on August 28, 1941, by the Japanese Ambassador to the President of the United States that there be held as soon as possible a meeting between the responsible heads of the government of Japan and of the government of the United States to discuss important problems between Japan and the United States covering the entire Pacific area in an endeavor to save the situation and to the reply of the President of the United States, in which the President assured the Prime Minister of the readiness of the government of the United States to move as rapidly as possible toward the consummation of arrangements for such a meeting and suggested that there be held pre-

[A-64]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

liminary discussions of important questions that would come up for consideration in the meeting. In further explanation of the views of the government of the United States in regard to the suggestion under reference observations are offered, as follows:

Part 2

On April 16, at the outset of the informal and exploratory conversations which were entered into by the Secretary of State with the Japanese Ambassador, the Secretary of State referred to four fundamental principles which this government regards as the foundation upon which all relations between nations should properly rest. These four fundamental principles are as follows:

1. Respect for the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of each and all nations.

2. Support of the principles of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries.

3. Support of the principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity.

4. Non-disturbance of the status quo in the Pacific except as the status quo may be altered by peaceful means.

In the subsequent conversations the Secretary of State endeavored to make it clear that in the opinion of the government of the United States Japan stood to gain more from adherence to courses in harmony with these principles than from any other course, as Japan would thus best be assured access to raw materials and markets which Japan needs and ways would be opened for mutually beneficial cooperation with the United States and other countries, and that only upon the basis of these principles could an agreement be reached which would be effective in establishing stability and peace in the Pacific area.

The government of the United States notes with satisfaction that in the statement marked "Strictly Confidential" which was communicated by the Japanese Ambassador to the President of the United States on August 28 there were given specific assurances of Japan's peaceful intentions and assurances that Japan desires and seeks a program for the Pacific area consistent with the principles to which the government of the United States has long been committed and which were set forth in detail in the informal conversations already referred to. The government of the United States understands that the assurances which the Japanese Government has given in that statement exclude any policy which would seek political expansions or the acquisition of economic rights, advantages or preferences by force.

Part 4

The government of the United States is very desirous of collaborating in efforts to make effective in practice the principles to which the Japanese Government has made reference. The government of the United States believes that it is all-important that preliminary precautions be taken to insure the success of any efforts which the government of Japan and of the United States might make to collaborate toward a peaceful settlement. It will be recalled that in the course of the conversation to which reference has already been made, the Secretary of State on June 21, 1941, handed the Japanese Ambassador a document marked "Oral, Unofficial and without commitment" which contained a redraft of the Japanese Government's proposal of May 10, 1941. It will be recalled further that in oral discussion of this draft it was found that there were certain fundamental questions with respect to which there were divergences of view between the two governments, and which remained unreconciled at the time the conversations were interrupted in July.

Part 5

The government of the United States desires to facilitate progress toward an inclusive discussion, but believes that a community of view and a clear agreement upon the points above mentioned are essential to any satisfactory settlement of Pacific questions. It therefore seeks an indication of the present attitude of the Japanese government with regard to the fundamental questions under reference.

[A-65]

It goes without saying that each government in reaching decisions on policy must take into account the internal situation in its own country and the attitude of public opinion therein. The government of Japan will surely recognize that the government of the United States could not enter into any agreement which would not be in harmony with the principles in which the American people—in fact all nations that prefer peaceful methods to methods of force-----believe.

The government of the United States would be glad to have the reply of the Japanese government on the matters above set forth.

Trans. 9-6-41

[a] Part 3 not indicated.


No. 115
September 3, 1941
#766.
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 
TO: Tokyo 

(In 2 parts—complete)

Foreign Office Secret. Chief of Office Routing.

I have read with appreciation Your Excellency's message of August 27, which was delivered to me by Admiral Nomura.

I have noted with satisfaction the sentiments expressed by you in regard to the solicitude of Japan for the maintenance of the peace of the Pacific and Japan's desire to improve Japanese- American relations.

I fully share the desire expressed by you in these regards, and wish to assure you that the government of the United States, recognizing the swiftly-moving character of world events, is prepared to proceed as rapidly as possible toward the consummation of arrangements for a meeting at which you and I can exchange views and endeavor to bring about an adjustment in the relations between our two countries.

In the statement which accompanied your letter to me reference was made to the principles to which the government of the United States has long been committed and it was declared that the Japanese Government "considers these principles and the practical application thereof, in the friendliest manner possible, are the prime requisites of a true peace and should be applied not only in the Pacific area but throughout the entire world" and that "such a program has long been desired and sought by Japan itself.

Part 2

I am very desirous of collaborating with you in efforts to make these principles effective in practice. Because of my deep interest in this matter I find it necessary that I constantly observe and take account of developments both in my own country and in Japan which have a bearing upon problems of relations between our two countries. At this particular moment I cannot avoid taking cognizance of indications of the existence in some quarters in Japan of concepts which, if widely entertained, would seem capable of raising obstacles to successful collaboration between you and me along the line which I am sure we both earnestly desire to follow. Under these circumstances, I feel constrained to suggest, in the belief that you will share my view, that it would seem highly desirable that we take precaution, toward ensuring that our proposed meeting shall prove a success, by endeavoring to enter immediately upon preliminary discussion of the fundamental and essential questions on which we seek agreement. The questions which I have in mind for such preliminary discussions involve practical application of the principles fundamental to achievement and maintenance of peace which are mentioned with more of specification in the statement accompanying your letter. I hope that you will look favorably upon this suggestion.

Trans. 9-8-41

[A-66]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR


No. 116
September 3, 1941
#768.
FROM: Washington 
TO: Tokyo 

Foreign Office secret.

At his request I am to see the President in secrecy at 5 o'clock this afternoon.

Trans. 9-5-41


No. 117
September 3, 1941
#775.
FROM: Washington 
TO: Tokyo 

Met with the President in secrecy at 5 p.m. today. (Hull was also present.) He read a message from him to Premier Konoye and also the United States' reply. (Being sent to you as my message Nos. 776[a] and 777[b].) Shall report on our conversations subsequently. (7:30 p.m.)

[a] Not available.


[b] See III, 114.

Trans. 9-9-41


No. 118
September 3, 1941
#778.
FROM: Washington 
TO: Tokyo 

(In 3 parts—complete)

At 5 o'clock in the afternoon of the 3rd, I met the President in secrecy. The President read two memos which I am relaying to you as my message Nos. 776[a] and 777[a]. After doing so, the President said that he and Prince Konoye and I and the Secretary of State wish to make every effort to maintain peace on the Pacific. However, there is a matter of public opinion which exists in both Japan and the United States. He frequently receives telegrams urging him not to change the established policy for the purpose of establishing friendly relations with Japan, he said. He added that he was "very, very sincerely sympathetic" toward Prince Konoye.

At this point the Secretary of State requested information of me as to the present outlook in Japan. I replied that the Premier was determined to proceed with his plans.

With regard to the three points contained in my message #777[a], I said that two points have been agreed upon in principle, and as to the third, it is because he believes that an agreement can be reached that the Premier is prepared to set out on the proposed trip.

The Secretary of State said that he did have some questions concerning the wordings in two or three places. He went on to say that after all arrangements had been made, the British, Netherlands East Indies, and the Chinese would have to be prevailed upon.

The President said that he made absolutely no mention of the contents of the conferences to revise Japanese-American relations, on the occasion of his meeting with Churchill. It is the custom in Britain for the Prime Minister to submit all matters to the Cabinet for discussion and its decisions are brought to Parliament for further discussion, the President explained. Under such a system it would be exceedingly difficult to maintain secrecy and that was why he made no mention of this matter to Churchill, he said.

[A-67]

With regard to the date of the proposed meeting, the President said that he has an engagement during the latter part of September, but that any other time would meet with his convenience, as far as he knew at present.

As I was taking leave of the President, I told him that much depends upon the President's high statesmanship if peace on the Pacific is to be preserved. The President shook hands with me. The Secretary of State seemed to be very concerned about the general editorial trend of the press and asked two or three more questions.

I relayed the matter pertaining to our issuing a statement to the public to explain our standpoint, as you instructed at the end of your message #524[c]. The President replied that he had no objections whatsoever. The Secretary of State made no comment, but since I am to see him again tomorrow morning, I shall ascertain his attitude then and submit a report to you.

[a] Not yet available.
[b] See III, 114.
[c] See III, 119.

Trans. 9-6-41


No. 119
September 3, 1941
#524.
FROM: Tokyo 
TO: Washington 

Since the existence of the Premier's message was inadvertently made known to the public, that gang that has been suspecting that unofficial talks were taking place, has really begun to yell and wave the Tripartite Pact banner.

In the midst of this confusion at home the story in the Herald-Tribune relating the rumor of a proposed conference between the Premier and the President broke, which was unfortunate, to say the least, as you can well imagine.

The government is not afraid of the above mentioned confusion; nor does it feel that that condition will destroy the fruits of the said conference. It is only that the government wished to keep the matter a secret until the arrangements had been completed. I am sure that you are aware that such a policy is not limited to just this case.

Because of the circumstances being what they are, we would like to make all arrangements for the meeting around the middle of September, with all possible speed, and issue a very simple statement to that effect as soon as possible. (If the middle of September is not convenient, any early date would meet with our approval.)

Will you please convey this wish of the government to Hull and wire us the results. If an immediate reply is not forthcoming, we plan to issue a public statement describing our position in this matter. We feel that this should be done from the viewpoint of our domestic situation. Please advise the United States of this plan.

Trans. 9-5-41

[A-68]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR


No.120
September 4, 1941
#526.
FROM: Tokyo 
TO: Washington 

Re the last clause in my #524[a].

If it causes misunderstanding of our real intention and results in a failure to arrange the conference in question, this would be contrary to what we wish to see realized. Please, therefore, request-----to rescind this clause. We also will take similar steps.

[a] See III, 119.

Trans. 9-4-41


No. 121
September 3, 1941
#779.
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 
TO: Tokyo 

Regarding my message #775[a].

The "oral statement" which was forwarded to you as my message 777[b] seemed to me to be too lengthy, theoretical, and stilted. The items which the United States is most anxious of having right now is Japan's definite attitude on the matters pertaining to the rights of self- defense, equal trade opportunities, and the conditions of peace between Japan and China. Secretary Hull repeatedly expressed his interest on these points during the unofficial conversations and now he feels that he must be definitely advised so as to assure the success of the "leaders' meeting". Under these circumstances, the United States is not interested in receiving lengthy statements which fail to get to the point, in my opinion.

I shall be able to further ascertain Hull's point of view on the matter when I see him tomorrow, the 4th, but I strongly urge that the above factors be borne in mind in drafting Japan's reply.

[a] See III, 117.
[b] See III, 114.

Trans. 9-8-41

[A-69]


No. 122
September 4, 1941
#529.
FROM: Tokyo (Japanese Foreign Minister) 
TO: Washington 

(Part 1 of 3)

(To be handled in Government Code)

(Separate Wire)

1. Strictly Confidential.

The Government of Japan undertakes:

(a) That Japan is ready to express its concurrence in those matters which were already tentatively agreed upon between Japan and the United States in the course of their preliminary informal conversations:

(b) That Japan will not make any military advancement from French Indo-China against any of its adjoining areas, and likewise will not, without any justifiable reason, resort to military action against any regions lying north (?) to Japan:

(c) That the attitude of Japan and the United States toward the European war will be decided by the concepts of protection and self defense, and, in case the United States should participate in the European war, the interpretation and execution of the Tripartite Pact by Japan shall be independently decided;

Trans. 9-4-41


No. 123
September 4, 1941
#529.
FROM: Tokyo 
TO: Washington 

(Part 2 of 3)

(d) That Japan will endeavor to bring about the rehabilitation of general and normal relationship between Japan and China, upon the realization of which Japan is ready to withdraw its armed forces from China as soon as possible in accordance with the agreements between Japan and China;

(e) That the economic activities of the United States in China will not be restricted so long as pursued on an equitable basis;

(f) That Japan's activities in the Southwestern Pacific area will be carried on by peaceful means and in accordance with the principle of non-discrimination in the international commerce, and that Japan will cooperate in the production and procurement by the United States of natural resources in the said area which it needs;

(g) That Japan will take measures necessary for the resumption of normal trade relations between Japan and the United States, and in connection with above-mentioned, Japan is ready to discontinue immediately the application of the foreigner's transactions control regulations with regard to the United States on the basis of reciprocity.

Trans. 9-4-41

[A-70]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR


No. 124
September 4, 1941
#529.
FROM: Tokyo 
TO: Washington 

(Part 3 of 3)

The Government of the United States undertakes:

(a) That, in response to the Japanese Government's commitment expressed in point (d) referred to above, the United States will abstain from any measures and actions which will be prejudicial to the endeavor by Japan concerning the settlement of the China affairs;

(b) That the United States will reciprocate Japan's commitment expressed in point (f) referred to above;

(c) That the United States will suspend any military measures in the Far East and in the Southwestern Pacific area;

(d) That the United States will immediately reciprocate Japan's commitment expressed in point (g) referred to above by discontinuing the application of the so-called freezing act with regard to Japan and further by removing the prohibition against the passage of Japanese vessels through the Panama Canal.

Trans. 9-4-41


No. 125
September 4, 1941
#528.
FROM: Tokyo 
TO: Washington 

(Part 1 of 2)

Re your #556[a].

1. What the United States Government proposed as a preliminary to the meeting of the leaders of the two countries were the questions of self-defense, occupation of China by the Japanese Army and equal treatment in trade, discussed during the informal negotiations in the past. The fact is that the recent situation in Japan, especially since the leakage of Premier KONOYE's message, has made it urgent to hold the conference as soon as possible and thereby adjust Japanese-American relations. However, if we continue to argue merely the legal angle of the aforementioned three pending questions as we have been doing, we believe that it would be impossible to be ready, as you have suggested, by the latter part of September. Furthermore regarding what was communicated to us by the United States Government on July 24th and (August ?) 17, we have already expressed our views, in addition to our sending the Premier's message. Since we have nothing more to say on the subject, we have decided to express first of all our viewpoint given in #529[a]and, after finding out on what points the leaders of the two countries preliminarily and principally can agree, to hold a conference for the discussion of those points and then issue a joint statement at the end (I will wire you our text as soon as it is ready), and thus help create a more wholesome atmosphere between the two countries.

[a] Not available.
[b] See III, 122-124.

Trans. 9-4-41

[A-71]


No. 126
September 4, 1941
#528.
FROM: Tokyo 
TO: Washington 

(Part 2 of 2)

And so at 4:30 p.m. on the 4th I asked Ambassador GREW to come to see me, and, upon his arrival, I communicated to him what is in the separate telegram. Bearing this in mind, will you also communicate the same to the Secretary of State.

2. The points in the separate telegram which require special explanation are as follows: (This was promised by the leaders of the two countries today during their conference. Whether it should take the form of a secret agreement or an ordinary agreement will be left to the discretion of the conferees).

1. We expect each of the matters upon which Japan has made her pledge, especially Japan's stand with regard to the Three-Power Alliance, will win the approval of the United States Government.

2. As to the withdrawal of the orders for freezing of assets by both countries, you should avoid giving the impression that this freezing measure taken by the United States had proven to be damaging to Japan.

(a) Explain the fact that if the-----of this measure is technical and complicated and, furthermore, a halfway step, it will not be understood by the people at large.

(b) Explain the fact that this step which the United States has taken has given the impression to the Japanese people that it was meant to be a punishment for Japan's occupation of French Indo-China.

(c) Consider its spectacular aspect as secondary and emphatically propose that in view of the importance of the pledges made at this time by Japan, the United States must reciprocate Japan's decision even by overcoming a possible strong opposition within the American Government. By the word "immediately" with reference to the time when these orders are to be withdrawn, the time when an agreement regarding the matter included in the aforementioned (1) has been reached by the leading conferees, is meant.

(3) By ceasing to take military measures we mean, for example, to cease dispatching more submarines and airplanes to the Philippines and cease acquiring military bases in the southwestern Pacific area, in China and in Far Eastern Russia.

Trans. 9-4-41


No. 127
September 4, 1941
#782.
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 
TO: Tokyo 

(Part 1 of 3)

On the morning of the 4th, I tried to sound out HULL's views regarding the so-called preliminary talk which he had with the President. HULL began to deal with the four basic principles included in the caption of the oral statement (dated ?) the 3rd, (please refer to the last part of my #277[a] and reiterated the ideas which he had been cherishing for years, especially his ideas regarding the principle of equal opportunity, I therefore, remarked that it is clear from our reply that the Japanese government has no objection to it in principle and I said

[a] Principles: (1) Guaranteeing the territorial integrity of all countries. (2) Non-intervention in domestic issues. (3) Principle of equal opportunity including commercial. (4) Non-alteration of the status quo in the Pacific effected by force.

Trans. 9-6-41

[A-72]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR


No. 128
September 4, 1941
#782.
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 
TO: Tokyo 

(Part 2 of 3)

that we would like to first of all settle the questions which were left unsettled in the past informal negotiations. HULL replied that it is important to dispose of the basic principles (namely, the aforementioned 4 basic principles) first of all and that the United States Government did not wish to give the impression that by conferring with Japan it was trying to trade off China, Great Britain and other third powers, and also that inasmuch as Japan has made it clear that she stands upon these basic principles, it would be necessary to get the third powers to agree to them.

Trans. 9-6-41


No. 129
September 4, 1941
#782.
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 
TO: Tokyo 

(Part 3 of 3)

I proceeded, referring to the American proposal, and asked if it might not be better to omit the-----clause appearing in the said proposal and referring to the attitude of Soviet Russia and Britain toward the European war. But HULL objected to this.

He objected also to our stationing our troops for the purpose of opposing Communism and appeared to be wishing that we would completely withdraw our troops.

At any rate I got from (todays ?) conversation that the American attitude has very much stiffened.

Trans. 9-6-41


No. 130
September 5, 1941
#533.
FROM: Tokyo 
TO: Washington 

Regarding my message Nos. 528[a] and 529[b].

At 5:30 p.m., by which time the said conference had been concluded, the only message we had received was your message #768[c]. Your messages Nos. 776[d] and 777[e] are as yet unreceived.

We are, therefore, unaware of the attitude of the United States concerning the proposed meeting of the respective leaders. However, for the purpose of speeding up matters and also to clarify the various issues which have been discovered in the past we made the above referred to statements. Please explain this fact to the United States in order to prevent misunderstandings.

The contents of the two messages referred to in the heading are, in essence, Japan's reply requested by the United States in their reply with reference to "an advance (understanding ?)". Paragraphs b and c are so worded as to make it possible for any person to readily understand them. We did this because we felt that they were very important preliminary expressions of intent of the Japanese Government. We feel that they express the maximum point to which Japan will go to meet U.S. requests and feel that the United States can understand our point of view thereby. Please, therefore, try to convince the Americans along those lines.

[A-73]

We are ready and desirous to proceed with the conference of the leaders, so as to bring about a complete settlement through politics and diplomacy, if the United States has no more questions with regard to details. (We shall not attempt to evade such questions, but instead, shall be delighted to give clear cut and concise replies in every case. However, we fear that there is much danger that to do so would mean further delays which in turn may mean losing the present opportunity. For this reason, will you do everything in your power to discourage such questions. We have fully explained this point to the U.S. Ambassador here.)

[a] See III, 125-126.
[b] See III, 122-124.
[c] See III, 116.
[d] Not available.
[e] See III, 114.

Trans. 9-8-41


No. 131
September 6, 1941
#788.
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 
TO: Tokyo 

(Part 1 of 4)

Re your #528[a] and #533[c].

This (?) morning I secretly called on Secretary HULL and-----handing him the purport of your #529[d] in writing I said:

"This contains what the Foreign Minister handed to GREW previous to receipt by the Japanese Government of the President's message of-----and his statement. It was drawn up with a view to clarifying the as yet unclear points so that the conversations which we have been carrying on could be hastened and the meeting of the leaders of the two countries could be realized. It explains the-----of the Japanese Government toward the Presidential message and oral statement on this question.

[a] See III, 125, 126.
[b] See III, 122-124.
[c] See III, 130.

Trans. 9-8-4


No. 132
September 6, 1941
#788.
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 
TO: Tokyo 

(Part 2 of 4)

"The views of our Government are as set forth in our communication of August (?) 6th (my #659[a]) and in the Prime Minister's message and papers appended thereto. I believe that recent communication of our Government, as well as "-----" and "-----", would go a long way

[A-74]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

towards meeting the desires of the United States Government. In my opinion these show the maximum limit to which our Government could go in compromising (?). I would like very much, therefore, that the United States also take into consideration the present situation and display a high degree of statesmanship to the end of endeavoring to bring about very soon the conference of the leaders."

[a] See III, 6.

Trans. 9-8-41


No. 133
September 6, 1941
#788.
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 
TO: Tokyo 

(Part 3 of 4)

In reply, HULL said that he had perused only a part of GREW's report and was not very familiar with it, but that he would study it carefully during the coming weekend.

Furthermore, he appeared to be very much concerned as to the stability of the present cabinet. He stated that since more people in the United States are expressing their opinions in favor of adjusting Japanese-American relations, he would like to have the Japanese Government also influence public opinion in this direction. Then I emphatically pointed out the indispensability of maintaining peace in the Pacific. Although HULL agreed with me in this, he seemed to maintain a very cautious attitude.

Trans. 9-8-41


No. 134
September 6, 1941
#788.
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 
TO: Tokyo 

(Part 4 of 4)

Re your Nos. 524 and 526[a] inclusive (addressed to me ?).

When (on the 5th ?) I conferred with HULL (my #782[b], I asked him for his opinion. He said, "Since-----does not want to give a mistaken impression to the third-power countries, I think it would be all right if no more is said than that we are now studying the basis upon which the Pacific question could be solved." However, if-----should-----also on the part of the Japanese Government, I would like to negotiate on the premises of----------and, therefore, (I believe ?) there is no special need of submitting the matter contained in your #526[a]. (I would appreciate your wiring your instructions at once?.)

[a] See III, 119, 120 in which Tokyo wires Washington that if the last clause in 524 causes a misunderstanding to request that this clause be rescinded.
[b] See III, 127, 128.

Trans. 9-8-41

[A-75]


No. 135
September 6, 1941
#440.
FROM: New York (Morishima) 
TO: Tokyo 

Message to Washington #71.

KASAI, M.P., Now residing in Washington, gave an interview to the Daily News in accordance with special Circular #262[a]. For him to refer to current Japanese-American negotiations for more amicable diplomatic relations not only aggravates the situation but also is inappropriate when the Tripartite alliance is concerned. Previously a contribution was made by him and inserted in the Tribune. We are very anxious of the effect this might have upon Japanese- American negotiations. Therefore, please rigorously caution him.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 9-23-41


No. 136
September 6, 1941
#438.
FROM: New York (Morishima) 
TO: Tokyo 

(Part 1 of 3) Strictly secret.

Report of secondary importance.

One of our private spies,-----[a], told me that his old friend,-----[a], who left by clipper on the 4th as a special envoy to the Pope, informed him to the following effect in strict confidence:

1. a. ROOSEVELT and CHURCHILL in their conference decided definitely on how to carry out measures to assist Great Britain, and they are very anxious, in this connection, to settle the Japanese question harmoniously (according to another report, they agreed that in case such an advantageous agreement could be reached, the American Pacific fleet would be transferred to the Atlantic). The American Government recently sent instructions to Ambassador GREW that he should rally the pro-Anglo-Saxon elements in Japan and foster a tendency toward compromise with the United States among the anti-Axis group.

[a] DoD Comment, Name withheld.

Trans. 10-2-41(?)

[A-76]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR


No. 137
September 6, 1941
#438.
FROM: New York (Morishima) 
TO: Tokyo 

(Part 2 of 3) Strictly Secret

b. Great Britain and the United States have been directing their officials to emphasize that England and the United States will not relax their jointly vigorous attitude, and they have been endeavoring to force Japan to kneel.

2. The attitude of Premier KONOYE and the attitude of the Government toward the sailing of tankers has recently been mollified, which is taken by Washington officials as an indication of the success of this policy of theirs. They figure that as Japan becomes softer and softer, they can become harder and harder, and finally reach an understanding even on the Siberian question.

Trans. 10-2-41


No. 138
September 6, 1941
#438.
FROM: New York (Morishima) 
TO: Tokyo 

(Part 3 of 3) Strictly Secret

Nevertheless, they fear that the situation in Japan may in the future become such that if they make immodest demands and take too stringent steps, they might destroy the possibility of an ultimate composure of relations between Japan and the United States.

3. Therefore, President ROOSEVELT, in order to win our Empire over to the American camp, is very cautious, wishing to avoid taking too stringent steps or going too far in his demands. He wishes particularly to avoid doing anything that would jeopardize the cabinet of Prince KONOYE or its political prestige. The government, hence, is considering various angles of the question of sailing tankers. They are thinking of either giving a guarantee that the aid goods will not be left behind in Siberia or shipping them via the south tip of Kamchatka or by the northern detour around Persia.

Trans. 10-2-41


No. 139
September 6, 1941
#535.
FROM: Tokyo 
TO: Washington 

Secret

I would like to have Minister WAKASUGI return at once. Will you, therefore, request the United States authorities to assist you in making a reservation for him on a Clipper and let me know the results? In case you find it impossible to get this reservation, there is no other ship which he could take except the Terukawa Maru of the Kawasaki line sailing on the 12th. This ship is scheduled to leave Manzanillo on October 1. However, if it is possible to make the aforementioned reservation on an airplane, please bear in mind that we would like to have for use by another party the stateroom reserved for him.

Trans. 9-8-41

[A-77]


No. 140
September 6, 1941
#536(?).
FROM: Tokyo 
TO: Washington 

Message to Canton #155.

Secret.

Please inform me by return wire whether there is a ship leaving your city for Hongkong on or about the 15th. We need this information because Minister WAKASUGI is returning to Japan. Relayed to Washington.

Trans. 9-8-41


No. 141
September 10, 1941
#550.
FROM: Tokyo 
TO: Washington 

To be handled in Government Code.

Re my #535[a].

Please make your reply by noon of the 12th (Japan time).

Furthermore, it seems as though the Terukawa Maru will be one or two days late in leaving.

[a] See III, 139, requesting the immediate return of Minister Wakasugi.

Trans. 9-11-41


No. 142
September 10, 1941
#803.
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 
TO: Tokyo 

Re your #535[a].

Although I requested the State Department for assistance in making reservations, it was without result. They told me that, inasmuch as there were no vacant places for several weeks, it was impossible to make reservations.

[a] See III, 139 in which it is requested that Minister WAKASUGI return to Japan at once.

Trans. 9-13-41

[A-78]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR


No. 143
September 8, 1941
#538.
FROM: Tokyo 
TO: Washington 

1. Shortly the President is going to make a broadcast to the entire United States revolving around the Greer incident. It is not hard for you to imagine the extremely delicate situation within our country insofar as it relates to this incident. There is at present considerable fear that unnecessary and even undesirable results may ensue should any reference be made in this broadcast to Japan-American negotiations. Of course, we have absolutely no intention of interfering in this matter, but in order that there would be no misunderstandings on this point within American Government circles, on the morning of the 8th I had the official in charge of American affairs in the Foreign Office inform the American Ambassador in Tokyo to this effect. However, I would like to have Your Excellency have an informal chat with the Secretary of State about this matter.

2. The Government is deeply grateful for Your Excellency's endeavors during the past several months in connection with the adjustment of Japan-American relations. It is viewed that at long last your efforts are bearing fruit. Now and henceforth too, it is our sincere hope that you will work to the fullest extent of your capabilities.

Trans. 9-8-41


No. 144
September 8, 1941
Unnumbered.
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 
TO: Tokyo 

With the instructions you have been sending me regarding the adjustment of Japanese- American relations fully in mind, I have been working hard day and night in hopes of accomplishing something. Will you please get from IWAKURO WAKASUGI detailed information concerning the situation prevailing in this country. I believe there is no longer a single doubtful point on the part of Japan. Recently when a German submarine attacked an American destroyer, the public opinion here was not stirred up in the least; whereas, as you may see from the Gallup poll (Of course, some people say that there is some question as to how accurate the Gallup poll is.), there has been a sudden increase of opinions in favor of preventing Japan's further advance even at the risk of war. The percentage was 51 % in July, but it now has risen to 70 % and it is apparent that, while the United States Government cannot help but be more concerned than ever over the question of safety of ocean travel in the Atlantic, it is becoming increasingly involved with the Pacific as well. Consequently, it is thought that should an incident occur in the Pacific similar to the aforementioned attack upon the destroyer, the situation would become irreparable. That people do not become incensed over Germany, but over Japan, is in my estimation, attributable largely to the fact that there is a strong sentiment against sending an expeditionary army, whereas there is no need of using the army in case of a Japanese-American war.

The payment for war materials at present exceeds $1,000,000,000 monthly average and production has increased four or five-fold over that for last year.

Trans. 9-10-41

[A-79]


No. 145
September 10, 1941
#806.
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 
TO: Tokyo 

Report B.

With regard to the speech which the President is expected to make on the 11th, speculations are being made. Some say that a shooting patrol will be put into effect in self-defense between the United States and Iceland; others point out the fact that Germany had started the shooting and that the real reason for-----having taken this opportunity shows that her true intention is to seek a showdown with Japan and thereby nip the Japanese-American negotiations in the bud.

Note: Two full lines of text were left out; consequently, the italicized portions are assumptions by the translator.

Trans. 9-11-41


No. 146
September 10, 1941
#800.
FROM: Tokyo 
TO: Berlin 

(Part 2 of 2)[a]

is apt to stiffen the American public opinion more and more and hasten America's military preparations. In the meantime, while every time anything occurred the United States resorted to stronger measures against Germany, Germany has been maintaining a calm attitude toward the United States. Japanese aim should be to persist in an attempt to keep the United States out of war. Rather than to provoke the United States at this time and cause her people to unite, it would be better to quiet her feelings and work toward her internal disintegration. He said that this also is a way of looking at this matter.

3. At the time the above conversation took place, the-----Ambassador asked me (a question?) but I went no further in my explanation but-----.

[a] Part 1 not available.

Trans. 9-15-41


No. 147
September 12, 1941
#556.
FROM: Tokyo 
TO: Washington 

I am sending you for your perusal as separate telegram #557[a], the memorandum which the American Ambassador in Tokyo handed to me the evening of the 10th. (He called my special attention to the fact that it was not a diplomatic note in the strict sense of the word, but he was handing it to me for reference.) We are at present considering how this matter should be disposed of, and so please be informed that there is no need of your taking any steps in regard to it.

[a] See III, 148-153.

Trans. (Not dated).

[A-80]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR


No. 148
September 12, 1941
#557.
FROM: Tokyo 
TO: Washington 

(Separate Wire)

(Part 1 of 6)

The Government of the United States is at present examining the proposals communicated to the American Ambassador by His Excellency, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, on September 4, and also communicated to the Secretary of State by His Excellency, Admiral NOMURA on September 6th.

The American Government has in view an agreement conforming to the principles and methods which it has put forward, an agreement under the terms of which China would receive just and equitable treatment, in which the rights and interests of all Pacific powers would be given due consideration; and which would make a substantial contribution toward the establishment and maintenance of a just, stable and orderly peace. Since the hostilities existing between Japan and China are a basic factor in the problem of reaching a general settlement in the Pacific area, a fair and just settlement of their controversies by China and Japan is an essential condition to any general solution of the Far Eastern problems which might be expected to provide for the future peace and stability of that area.

Trans. 9-12-41


No. 149
September 12, 1941
#557.
FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington 

(Part 2 of 6)

The proposal as originally advanced by the Japanese Government provided for the exercise of good offices by the President of the United States, and the Japanese Government was informed that the Government of the United States was not prepared to suggest to the Chinese Government that it undertake negotiations with the Japanese Government unless the Government of the United States was convinced that the terms which the Government of Japan had in mind were consistent with the principles to which the American Government is committed. A deadlock was reached in the informal discussions between our two governments in regard to these terms as a result of the insistence on the part of the Japanese Government that Japanese troops were to be stationed in Inner Mongolia and North China for an unspecified period, and also because of the fact that the Government of the United States was not able to elicit from the Japanese Government specific assurances that the principles of non-discrimination in commercial relations between nations would be applicable to the program of economic collaboration with China which Japan proposed to adopt.

The Government of the United States has consistently sought an agreement the aim and terms of which shall lead to an all-embracing and durable peace in Eastern Asia and in the area of the Pacific.

Trans. 9-12-41

[A-81]


No. 150
September 12, 1941
#557.
FROM: Tokyo 
TO: Washington 

(Part 3 of 6)

The latest proposals submitted by the Japanese Government, it would appear, seek to break the deadlock, not by responding to the desires of the United States Government on the above points, but by proposing that Japan shall negotiate with China directly, on the premise that, since the good offices of the President are not to be sought, the Government of the United States would not be concerned with the character of the terms of peace which Japan intends to propose to China or with the progress of the conflict between China and Japan. Any such premise as the foregoing passes over or ignores the intention of the United States Government, which has been repeatedly impressed upon the Japanese Ambassador, to confer with the Government of China, Great Britain, the Netherlands, etc., before it could agree to embark on any definitive negotiations with the Japanese Government regarding a settlement involving the Pacific area. This intention of the Government of the United States is based on its view that the peace of the Pacific is not a question which can be decided by the United States and Japan alone but is a question in which other powers having interest in the Pacific have a legitimate concern and unavoidable responsibilities.

Trans. 9-12-41


No. 151
September 12, 1941
#557.
FROM: Tokyo 
TO: Washington 

(Part 4 of 6)

Nor would the Government of the United States be prepared to conclude any agreement which would restrict the degree of assistance that it is now rendering or may in the future wish to render to nations which are engaged in resisting aggression. It is possible to assume that the Government of China, to no less a degree than the Government of Japan, desires to effect a peaceful solution of its controversies with Japan, and that, therefore, provided the Japanese Government is ready to propose equitable and just terms to the Chinese Government, the two nations should find it possible to settle their difficulties. In the event of such an occurrence the need for any provision such as that embodied in point (A) of the commitments which it is proposed that the Government of the United States undertake would appear to be eliminated.

In the light of the considerations set forth above it is clear that some further initiative from the Japanese Government is required in order to effect a solution of the above-mentioned difficulties. It would be of assistance to the Government of the United States if an answer could be obtained from the Japanese Government to the following questions which have arisen as the result of the discussions:

Trans. 9-12-41

[A-82]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR


No. 152
September 12, 1941
#557.
FROM: Tokyo 
TO: Washington 

(Part 5 of 6)

1. In point (A) of the provisional commitments which the Japanese Government is to undertake it is indicated that Japan is prepared to subscribe to the points upon which tentative agreement had already been reached during the informal preliminary conversations held in Washington. Does the Japanese Government have in mind the points whose formulation as set forth in the draft of the Government of the United States of June 21st are identical to those appearing in the draft which was handed to the Secretary of State by the Japanese Ambassador on September 4th or those appearing in some prior draft?

Sould the answer to the first question propounded in paragraph 1 be in the affirmative it would seem that certain of the stipulations contained in the proposals conveyed to the American Ambassador by the Japanese Foreign Minister on September 4th are more limited than are the undertakings provided for in the formulae on which tentative agreement has been previously reached. As an example, in point (F) the Japanese Government undertakes to refrain from discrimination in matters of international commerce in the area of the Southwest Pacific.

Trans. 9-12-41


No. 153
September 12, 1941
#557.
FROM: Tokyo 
TO: Washington 

(Part 6 of 6)

2. With relation to the example above cited affecting point (F), is it the intention of the Japanese Government not to undertake similar commitments in regard to its economic activities in other regions notably in China?

3. In regard to the general question of international commerce, further clarification would be desirable with regard to the meaning of the provisions of point (E) relating to American economic activities in China, namely, the precise meaning of the term "equitable basis" and whether this term is intended to mean that Japan shall be the sole judge in determining what constitutes an equitable basis.

4. Is the Government of the United States to understand that the terms of peace which Japan intends to propose to China will be in conformity with the several points appearing in the, annex to, Section 3 of the draft submitted by the Japanese Ambassador on September 4th which is referred to above? In connection with the formula outlined under point (C) dealing with respective attitudes of the United States and Japan towards the European war, while the American Government considers that this formula does not fully meet the (?) requirements of the situation since it leaves Japan free to interpret independently any commitment on this score, the Government of the United States would like to examine the question further before putting forth any suggestions.

Trans. 9-12-41

[A-83]


No. 154
September 10, 1941
#553.
FROM: Tokyo 
TO: Washington 

Very Urgent.

When Ambassador GREW called on me at 6:00 p.m. on the 10th, he mentioned the fact that you had submitted a proposal to the United States Government on the 4th. This proposal has not been referred to in your #782[a]. Will you wire me and tell me what proposal is meant?

[a] See III, 127-129 which tells of NOMURA's conversation with HULL on the 4th at which time HULL dealt with he four basic principles in the Oral Statement.

Trans. 9-10-41


No. 155
September 10, 1941
#607.
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 
TO: Tokyo 

Re your #553[a].

Prior to receiving the Imperial Government's reply in your #526[a], I, on my own initiative, with the view of continuing conversations, as well as to sound out their opinion, made a number of additional revisions to the (original ?) American proposal and presented these to them as my own suggested proposals. However, because of the receipt of the Imperial Government's reply, I withdrew these.

[a] See III, 154 in which Tokyo wires Nomura that Grew mentioned the fact that he had submitted a proposal to the United States Government on the 4th and asks what proposal is meant.
[b] See III, 120 in which Tokyo wires Washington that if the last clause in #524 III, 119 causes misunderstanding, request—to rescind this clause.

Trans. 9-12-41


No. 156
September 10, 1941
#798.
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 
TO: Tokyo 

(Part 1 of 2[a].)

Re your #538[a].

On the morning of the 10th I called on HULL, and in compliance with the purport of your telegram, I asked that no (reference ?) be made to (questions ?) concerning Japan in the broadcast which the President is to make on the 11th. HULL did not commit himself one way or the other, but said that on the basis of the past-----regarding maintenance of secrecy, he agreed to it.

I then asked him when a reply to Japan's proposal of the other day may be expected. HULL replied that he had had no opportunity since the (cabinet meeting ?) held last Friday to confer personally with the President and that since he expected to confer with the President fol-

[A-84]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

lowing the broadcast on the 11th, he would reply on the basis of that conference. Remarking that the reply of the Japanese Government seems to have very much narrowed down the (scope ?) of the past conversations, he appeared to be dissatisfied.

[a] See III, 157 in which NOMURA states that he has omitted from his reply the points of agreement and made an extract of the points upon which no agreement had been reached; it also discusses the Greer incident.
[b] See III, 143 in which Tokyo expresses fear that undesirable results may ensue should any reference to Japan- American negotiations be made in the President's broadcast.

Trans. 9-12-41


No. 157
September 10, 1941
#798.
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 
TO: Tokyo 

(Part 2 of 2)

I told him that, as I had mentioned in my reply, I had omitted the points upon which we have agreed and made an extract of the points upon which no agreement has yet been reached.

At any rate, it seems that the United States Government is trying to find out what Britain, China and the Netherlands have to say about the question.

In the course of our conversation HULL said in reference to the discrepancy between the American and German announcements on the Greer incident that while the report of the United States Government is consistent with its past reports, HITLER has time and again contradicted himself and for this reason, personally, he considers the United States report entirely reliable. So remarking, he severely criticized the reliability of the German Government.

Trans. 9-11-41


No. 158
September 10, 1941
#606.
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 
TO: Tokyo 

Separate wire.

5. Economic activity of both nations in the Pacific area.

The Japanese Government and the Government of the United States hereby mutually pledge themselves that the Japanese and the American activity in the Pacific area shall be carried on by peaceful means and in conformity with the principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations. In pursuance of this policy, the Japanese Government and the Government of the United States agree to cooperate each with the other toward the creation of conditions of international trade and international investment under which Japan and the United States will have a reasonable opportunity to secure through the trade process the means of acquiring those goods and commodities which each country needs for the safeguarding and the development of its own economy. They, furthermore, agree to cooperate each with the other, especially toward obtaining commercial,-----, on a non-discriminatory basis, by each of them to supplies of such basic commodities as oil, rubber, tin, nickel, and any other commodity the importation of which is essential to each country for the maintenance of its economic life.

Trans. 9-12-41

[A-85]


No. 159
September 10, 1941
#804.
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 
TO: Tokyo 

(Part 1 of 4)

When I conferred with Secretary HULL the afternoon of the 10th, he said there were as many as four different papers which we had submitted regarding the Japanese proposal given in your #529[a], and since he had some question as how these were inter-related, he would like to clarify the matter. However, I discouraged him from doing so. In the afternoon, at the request of the Secretary, HAMILTON (accompanied by BALLANTINE and SCHMIDT) called on me and asked me to explain the points given below contained in our proposal[b]. I gave them an explanation. Incidentally, they explained their desires. Please----------.

[a] See III, 122 which gives the text of the Japanese proposal. [b] See III, 161A.

Trans. 9-12-41


No. 160
September 10, 1941
#804.
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 
TO: Tokyo 

(Part 2 of 4)

1. In (a), in reference to the "undertakings" of Japan specifically what matters are meant by "matters upon which the two countries have agreed during the preliminary informal conversations?" Can the draft of the Japanese-American understanding which formed the basis of the past negotiations be made as it stands the basis of future negotiations? Do the words "without any justifiable reason" in (b) modify the last part of the clause and not the entire clause?

They asked for an explanation of the entire clause (d), but I avoided giving any explanation in view of the-----of the matter. They appeared as if they wanted to ask questions concerning the point dealing with stationing troops for anti-communistic purposes and also concerning the word "agreements".

Trans. 9-12-41

[A-86]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR


No. 161
September 10, 1941
#804.
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 
TO: Tokyo 

(Part 3 of 4)

It appears that Japan in (e), by means of the appendix to the KONOYE message (your #503[a]), had agreed to the principle of equal treatment in the entire Pacific area, including China. As this clause is written it gives the impression that Japan holds a special position in China. This seems as if it is conflict with the above fact.

[a] See III, 69-75 in which the Japanese Government sets forth its viewpoint on the communication given to the Japanese Ambassador in Washington on August 17, 1941 by the United States Government.

Trans. 9-12-41


No. 161A
September 10, 1941
#804.
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 
TO: Tokyo 

(Part 4 of 4)

In the beginning of (f) are the words "Southwestern Pacific Area". Why was it limited to Southwestern Pacific instead of specifying the whole Pacific area?

2. Among the (undertaking/s) in (a), things which the United States have done are mentioned. Specifically what things are meant? Relative to this question, is Japan still thinking that the United States will mediate between Japan and China? If so, this clause seems both unnecessary and out of place. What exactly is meant by it?

Trans. 9-12-41


No. 162
September 10, 1941
#805.
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 
TO: Tokyo 

Re my #804[a].

When HAMILTON called on me he (again ?) made the request that the entire of Section 5 of the American proposal be revised in accordance with my separate wire #606[a].

[a] See III, 159.
[b] See III, 158.

Trans. 9-12-41

[A-87]


No. 163
September 10, 1941
#549.
FROM: Tokyo 
TO: Washington 

I have been informed that lately KASAI, member of Diet, has been expressing, on Japanese- American relations and also on the Three Power Alliance, views which have caused arguments and also that he has been talking as if he had an important part to play in the Japanese-American negotiations.

Now if this report is true, will you strongly warn him against speaking in public and contributing articles to newspapers on the present political situation, for, in view of the present delicate circumstances such action on his part might prove harmful to him not to mention of its having generally an undesirable effect.

Trans. 9-11-41


No. 164
September 11, 1941
#808.
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 
TO: Tokyo 

Re your #549[a].

Yiguti conveyed to Kasai the purport of your message and suggested that in the future he refrain from contributing to newspapers, etc. He agreed to this, but at the same time explained that the efforts he had put forth were with the sincere conviction that they were in the interest of bettering Japanese-American relations; but that it was regrettable that not a few times his opinions had been exaggerated by the newspapermen whom he had met.

[a] See III, 163—If Diet member Kasai is talking out of turn and swinging his weight around, warn him to stop. He may jeopardize the current U.S.-Japanese relations.

Trans. 9-13-41


No. 165
September 11, 1941
#810.
FROM: Washington 
TO: Tokyo 

(Part 1 of 4)

Through my various reports on the progress of the U.S.-Japanese preliminary negotiations, you are aware of the fact that the biggest difficulty being encountered concerns the matter of pertaining to the evacuating of our troops from China, and the garrisoning of our troops for anti-Communism purposes.

The United States insists that it is absolutely impossible for her to recognize the terms of the Tokyo-Nanking agreement because for one thing the domestic public opinion would not tolerate it, and for another, because her obligations to China would not permit it.

In the U.S. note of 21 June, the United States indicated that she desired a new agreement between China and Japan whereby Japanese troops could be removed at the earliest possible moment. Recently, the U.S. attitude along these lines has become stronger. She now indicates that Japan shall complete her evacuation of troops within a two year period subsequent to the resumption of peaceful relations.

[A-88]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

(There are indications that this strengthened attitude on the part of the United States is the result of U.S. talks with China.)

Trans. 9-16-41


No. 166
September 11, 1941
#810.
FROM: Washington 
TO: Tokyo 

(Part 2 of 4)

The United States does not indicate absolute opposition to any of the points contained in our latest proposals. I get the impression that we will have very little difficulty with the United States on the various other points.

However, indications are that they are violently opposed to the matter pertaining to the removal of troops. I feel that there is much danger that the negotiations will break down in the final stages on this matter of troop evacuations.

As a means of handling this obstacle, I would like to trouble you for your opinion on the advisability of accepting the lines of the U.S. suggestion and agree to remove our troops within two years after the restoration of peace.

I pointed out in my message #804[a] that this point was thoroughly explained to the State Department official who called on me yesterday. I am very anxious that we make a definite decision on this point immediately so that I may be better able to continue with these negotiations.

[a] See III, 159 State Department is inquiring further on exactly what our position is. We have given them four notes so far, to their proposals. They are particularly questioning our interpretation of several of the phrases in the notes.

Trans. 9-15-41


No. 167
September 11, 1941
#810.
FROM: Washington 
TO: Tokyo 

(Part 3 of 4)

Fundamentally speaking, the matter of evacuating our troops is purely one to be settled between Japan and China. It is only because of our obligations of using the good offices that it is being considered here at all. Let us assume that the Imperial Government accepts these terms and that as a result the negotiations do take place. Considerable time would necessarily elapse from the time that the "leaders" meet until the details of this meeting are agreed upon and further, until the peace conference is called. It is quite possible that this will require a year or more.

Let us further assume that we do, at this time, agree to evacuate our troops within two years subsequent to the resumption of peaceful relations. Much can happen during that time in world affairs which may make it essential that we enter into a new agreement at a subsequent date to extend the period of garrisoning our troops in China. We may be able to prolong the time limit in the name of protecting our nationals' lives and property, depending on the circumstances at the time.

I cannot believe that this point conflicts with any of the salient points of our established national policy.

Trans. 9-18-41

[A-89]


No. 168
September 11, 1941
#810.
FROM: Washington 
TO: Tokyo 

(Part 4 of 4)

I realize of course that from various domestic problems this is exceedingly difficult, but we would certainly appreciate being advised.

It is true that the phrase "stationing of troops to counter communism" would be deleted. However, it may be possible to station some troops "to act in cooperation with the Chinese to counter acts which imperil the tranquility of the nation (non-militaristic in nature).

Taking this opportunity, I wish to say that I have observed that the Japanese press on one or two occasions, have publicly stated that an understanding between the United States and Japan is at hand. In view of the fact that there are such delicate problems as the matter of evacuating our troops still to be settled, we do not believe that such optimistic views are warranted or are to our interest. At press conferences here, Hull himself has denied that there is room for such optimism. Will you please, therefore, offer suitable editorial guidance to the Fourth Estate.

Trans. 9-27-41


No. 169
September 11, 1941
#554.
FROM: Tokyo 
TO: Washington 

Re your message #771[a].

The text of such notes as were contained in my messages Nos. 502[a] and 503[c] is decided upon after very careful study by all of the various ministries involved. In all of these very important documents we have made it the practice to submit the texts to both the government and the controlling elements of the parties for their approval before they are transmitted. Hence, you can see that we take every possible precautionary measure.

If, however, you note any points in such message, you should make inquiries and suggestions by cable to us before delivering them to the addressees. Much caution will have to be exercised in maintaining liaison with the various departments so please bear that in mind.

[a] See III, 81.
[b] See III, 67, 68.
[c] See III, 69-75.

Trans. 9-13-41


No. 170
September 17, 1941
#822.
FROM: Washington 
TO: Tokyo 

Re your #554[a].

There is sound logic behind everything you say. I feel deeply responsible for the inadvertent omissions which were made in the translation.

[a] See III, 169—Before transmitting such important notes as my reply to the State Department and the reply to the President, various Ministries and organs are fully consulted.

Trans. 9-23-41

[A-90]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR


No. 171
September 12, 1941
#816.
FROM: Washington 
TO: Tokyo 

The speech which ROOSEVELT delivered on the 11th was given in a grave tone of voice and without using any strong expressions; it was, in other words, comparable to a clenched fist clothed in a silk glove. In content it was a strong speech, amounting actually to a challenge to war on the seas (in the air, on and in the water). As to detailed information concerning the relations to this speech, please refer to our special report. Judging from the fact that various newspapers are on the whole in favor of ROOSEVELT, it may be said that he has succeeded in accomplishing what he intended to accomplish.

Furthermore, there are many factors driving the United States straightway into this war. One factor may be said to be the fact that due to circumstances resulting from great expansion of productive and economic organizations undertaken under the pretext of national defense ever since the opening of the war between Great Britain and Germany, these economic and productive organizations must of necessity disintegrate unless the United States joins the war.--------------------------since they do not agree on----------, such an incident as the Geer incident may be regarded as welcome to ROOSEVELT from the standpoint of quickly turning public opinion in his favor.

Trans. 9-16-41


No. 172
September 12, 1941
#811.
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 
TO: Tokyo 

Following ROOSEVELT'S speech on the evening of the 11th LINDBERGH spoke at a meeting of the America First Committee at Des Moines in Iowa saying that England, Jewry and the Roosevelt Administrators composed a three party alliance which was leading the United States into war.

Trans. 9-17-41


No. 173
September 12, 1941
#1983/9.
FROM: Tokyo 
TO: Washington 

(Circular) (Part 1 of 2)

1. Taking together various information which I have recently collected from Chinese sources with regard to recent Japanese-American relations, I have the following:

(1) Chungking is kept in constant anxiety about the United States' policy because it is prosecuted on the basis of the United States' interests alone and because it has had no effect as yet in strengthening Chinese power of resistance, and consequently Chungking cannot be sure whether preparations for the counter-offensive could be built up again. They regard also that the outcome of the current Japanese-American conversations depends upon how the Russo-German war will turn out, and even in case a compromise is arrived at by the United States and Japan, they think that there is little danger of it being made at the expense of

[A-91]

Chiang. However, actually the Chinese authorities are wondering what will happen. It is said that Chiang had Ambassador-----propose to the United States Government that in case the question of Japanese-Chinese peace comes up for discussion, the settlement would be made on the basis of President ROOSEVELT's eight-point principles and that to this proposal HULL had replied that the United States would not sacrifice Chungking.

(2) Among those in Chungking, there are many who say that should a war break out between Japan and the United States, it would be to China's advantage. On the other hand, there are not a few who say that should such a war break out, it would prove unprofitable to Chungking, because the United States will have no time to pay any attention to Chungking, and because of stoppage of material aid, China would suffer a severe blow. Recently this question was debated in a conference held by Chungking leaders, but no definite conclusion resulted because these two different views remained irreconcilable.

Trans. 9-15-41


No. 174
September 12, 1941
#1983/9.
FROM: Tokyo 
TO: Washington 

(Part 2 of 2)

(3) Recently an influential official engaged in special affairs duties for the Chungking Government let out his views to the effect that it would not be difficult for the United States to bring Japan to submission but that if, perchance, the United States should seek temporary stability at the cost of Chungking, Chungking will continue her anti-Japanese resistance unaided. SUN FO[a] entertains an even stronger view. However, such views held by important members of the Chungking regime are expressed in accordance with the propaganda order of that government and so cannot be regarded as being representative of the real psychology of that government.

(4) To be sure, the Nanking Government also is interested in the possible development of Japanese-American relations. According to a report made by Ambassador HONDA, most of the important members of that government are of the opinion that since the United States has no intention of fighting against Japan, a war will not break out. Although, generally speaking, no serious consideration has yet been given to what the attitude of the government would be with regard to this question, the officials, greatly exaggerating the power of the United States, seem to think that in case a war breaks out, Japan's defeat would be inevitable, and should this happen, since Japan will have no time to concern herself with the People's Government, the foundation upon which the new government is being built will begin to shake, and maintenance of peace and order in the jurisdiction will become impossible. Being anxious, they seem to be very eager to see the war averted.

[a] Member of the Central Executive Yuan.

Trans. 9-15-41

[A-92]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR


No. 175
September 13, 1941
#561.
FROM: Tokyo 
TO: Washington 

Re your #804[a].

On the 13th we made explanation to Ambassador Grew as per English text of my #562[a] and you will also give reply accordingly to the United States.

[a] See III, 159-161.
[b] See III, 176.

Trans. 9-15-41


No. 176
September 13, 1941
#562.
FROM: Tokyo 
TO: Washington 

(In 5 parts—complete)[a]
Chief of Office Routing
Separate message

Part 1

1. (a) The proposed draft of an understanding which has been constituting a basis for informal negotiations between Japanese and the United States Governments will continue to be a basis for further discussions. The points upon which we deem a tentative agreement had already been reached during the informal preliminary conversations in Washington comprise the preamble to the proposed understanding, the concepts of the United States and of Japan respecting international relations and the character of nations, and the matter concerning the good offices of the United States to the relations between Japan and China.

Although it seems that there is a misunderstanding on the part of the United States that Japan does not want good offices of the United States in the settlement of China affairs, the Japanese Government has by no means refused the good offices of the President of the United States and is still, as before, wishing for them.

Part 2

(b) The term "without any justifiable reason" applies merely to the latter part of point "B" of the undertaking to which Japan is ready to commit itself.

(c) For the purpose of preventing Communistic and other subversive activities threatening the safety of both Japan and China and also of maintaining the peace and order in China, Japan and China will cooperate in the form of common defense.

The executive of the common defense by Japan and China will contain the stationing of Japanese troops for a certain period in accordance with the agreements between both countries. The Japanese troops which have been sent to China with the object of executing the China affairs will be withdrawn when the said affairs have been settled.

(d) The reason why the Japanese Government inserted point (E) as a matter to---------------(4 lines garbled----------wishes to show her intention of not obstructing any just and equitable economic activities of the United States in China. The government of Japan will not only admit the principle of non-discrimination with regard to commerce in China as well as in southwestern Pacific area, but also it fully respects the established rights and interests of the

[A-93]

United States in China. However, it considers that the especially close economic relations between Japan and China natural from their geographical propinquity are the same kind of relations as those which exist between any other two neighboring countries.

Part 4

Indeed, there will be no reason why the principle of close economic relationship owing to the geographic propinquity shall not be applied to Japan's economic relations with China. Accordingly the close and especial economic cooperation between Japan and China within this limit will not establish so-called monopolistic or preferential rights and interests for Japan. Moreover, it is firmly believed such is a natural phenomenon in our human life, and the observance of this new law of nature is not only a factor of bringing about economic prosperity of the world, but the surest way for the firm establishment of the world peace.

Part 5

(e) Since matters relating to China, as has been stated above, are covered under point (d), the matter concerning Japanese economic activities in the southwestern Pacific area was clarified under point (e) in view of the fact that among other areas of the Pacific the United States is most concerned with the southwestern area of the Pacific.

2. The measures and actions referred to in point (a) among the proposed undertakings by the United States are meant to indicate acts of the United States in aid in various forms for the Chiang Kai-shek regime.

As for the "good offices" of the President of the United States they were referred to above.

[a] Part 3 not noted in original.

Trans. 9-15-41


No. 177
September 13, 1941
#563.
FROM: Tokyo 
TO: Washington 

Re my #557[a].

During my conversation with Grew on the 13th, I explained the meaning of "equitable basis" as per my #564[b].

[a] See III, 148-153.
[b] See III, 178.

Trans. 9-15-41

[A-94]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR


No. 178
September 13, 1941
#564.
FROM: Tokyo 
TO: Washington 

"Equitable basis" means economic activities of a non-discriminatory character which are not monopolistic, exclusive and exploitive, qualified however, by the inevitable natural limitations referred to in e of the reply to questions put by Mr. Hamilton under instructions of Mr. Hull on September 10. Accordingly it goes without saying that Japan is not the sole judge in determining what constitutes "equitable basis".

Trans. 9-15-41


No. 179
September 13, 1941
#560.
FROM: Tokyo 
TO: Washington 

(In 2 parts—complete)
Re my #529[a].

(1) According to your #798[b], the contents of the main message have not yet been considered by the President, but the following points in my message have in reality been "covered" in the -----proposal that was conveyed to the United States from the Imperial Government: (a) Preliminary parleys have been included in our intentions. (b) But we wish to avoid having such parleys get into a discussion of minutiae and become long drawn out. (c) We would speed up the realization of a conference of the two leaders, (to try to go into a repetition of the reasons among the administrative officials would result in nothing taking shape, and we by all means feel the necessity of a statesman-like consultation between the two leaders). We made the one suggestion at that time that Japan and the United States should come to an agreement that would be reached from the standpoint of the whole situation. (In regard to this, the explanation you made to Hull, as given in your #788[c], very satisfactorily serves its purpose.)

We therefore would have the contents of my reference message brought to the attention of the President himself with the request that he give some expression of his intentions.

(2) That we are not-----with the kind of informal talks that Hull suggests, such as we have had thus far is evident from the messages that have been passing and from the whole situation, and it is clear from my reference message that this plan would enlarge the actual scope of the talks thus far held. While we are putting the stress on a settlement from the standpoint of the situation in its entirety, this would necessarily be based upon-----.

We would like to see a conference of the two leaders brought about soon with my reference message as the basis of these conversations, and reducing business and legal discussions to a minimum. Then later the negotiations now being carried on may be resumed as may be necessary.

(3) The United States seem to be asking us to recognize their so-called four principles, but we could not gulp those down as a whole, without having had their reply to the above mentioned reference message.-----would give the impression that it was due to "pressure" from the United States. The attitude of the United States that they must consult Britain, the Netherlands, China, and other nations, might be interpreted to mean the revival of the nine-power treaty policies, which would hardly be appropriate now. It is very important that we keep it in form and fact a parley between Japan and the United States. Please bear in mind the importance of this point. (Even though as a matter of fact the United States should confer with Brit-

[A-95]

ain, the Netherlands, etc. we are not in a position to prevent this, and in fact it could not be prevented, but this is something of which we would not be cognizant; but what we mean is that we would avoid having this lead into a conference or an agreement of many countries.)

(4) This does not mean that we reject such questions as contained in your #814[d] and my #557[e] but the emphasis would be upon the points in my reference message, and our answer to these two messages will be sent shortly.

[a] See III, 122-124.
[b] See III, 157.
[c] See III, 131-134.
[d] Not available.
[e] See III, 148-153.

Trans. 9-15-41


No. 180
September 15, 1941
#819.
FROM: Washington 
TO: Tokyo 

(In 3 parts—complete)
Re your 561 to 563[a].

Points that have occurred to us here:

(1) Whatever we tell to Secretary Hull you should understand will surely be passed on to the President if he is in Washington. It seems that the matter of preliminary conversations has been entrusted by the President to Secretary Hull, in fact he told me that if a matter could not be settled by me and Secretary Hull it would not be settled whoever conducted the conversations. Hull himself told me that during the past eight years he and the President had not differed on foreign policies once, and that they are as "two in one".

(2) The expression "Communistic and other subversive activity" would arouse their caution, and the words "common defense in China" would give rise to questions, while "agreement" would still leave a doubt as to just what it does mean in concrete terms.

(3) The United States has intimated that it wants to be advised of the peace terms between Japan and China and has further indicated that she would refuse to act as intermediary in the peace negotiations unless the terms were fair and just. Under such circumstances, I feel certain that the United States will not agree to promoting the peace conference if we now avoid outlining our terms.

(4) In view of the national characteristics of the United States and of the President's position, it will be next to impossible to leave the interpretation of the Tripartite Pact up to the "leaders" at the conference, for them to settle from a political viewpoint. In other words, if opinions of both sides do not coincide at the preliminary conferences, there will be no "leaders' conference".

(5) The United States has absolutely no objections to making these talks a Japanese-U.S. affair. Moreover, she has never even suggested the addition of a third power to it. The only thing they want to do is to arrange matters with Britain, China, Netherlands, etc. in advance, so that they will not get the impression that the United States is trading them off. However, I shall, of course convey the gist of your instructions to Hull.

[A-96]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

(6) I have been doing everything in my power, however insignificant my efforts may seem, to carry out your various instructions and suggestions concerning the proposed negotiations. I fear, however, that if I were to go ahead and make some disposition of the various points you are discussing in Tokyo, I may find myself going off at a tangent. I should like, therefore, to leave these points alone for the time being and watch developments.

[a] #561 (See III, 175).
#562 (See III, 176).
#563 (See III, 177).

Trans. 9-18-41


No. 181
September 17, 1941
#823.
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin) 

(Parts 1 and 2 of 3)

(1) On 6 August, I said at the White House that of the three main points, both parties were in agreement in principle on two. As for the matter pertaining to our evacuating our troops, I expressed my opinion that it was only because he was confident that an agreement could be reached that the Premier is prepared to attend the meeting. At that time, the Secretary of State said that there were two or three other points that had to be clarified and "brought up to date". When he said that, he was referring to our proposal of 24 June.

Although we are aware of your instructions contained in your message #397 of 24 July,[a] since the negotiations broke down at about that time, we could do nothing about your instructions of 15 July. The break-down continued, and the talks were resumed only after the recent message was sent.

(2) The "understanding" which was put into words and submitted as a proposal on 24 June, was the culmination of over a dozen conferences between the Secretary of State and myself, in accordance with your instructions of 11 May. The Secretary and I conferred almost up to the moment he departed on his trip in behalf of his health. It is natural that the Secretary feels considerably attached to the proposal, since he had worked on it so hard for so many months.

It is my opinion that the U.S. will be more likely to come to terms at the preliminary negotiations if the general lines contained in that proposal were followed. Hull (insists ?) that the negotiations be held here.

[a] See III, 9—You were correct in assuming that I have not as yet determined on a definite policy because of the fact that I have not as yet been in office very long. It is my intention to continue to make an effort to decrease the friction between Japan and Britain-U.S. Should the U.S., however, take steps at this time which would unduly excite Japan (Such as the freezing of assets), an exceedingly critical situation may be created. Please advise the U.S. of this fact, and attempt to bring about an improvement in the situation.

Trans. 9-19-41

[A-97]


No. 182
September 17, 1941
#823.
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin) 

(Part 3 of 3)

In view of the above facts, I believe that it is doubtful whether the preliminary negotiations can be arranged in accordance with only our proposal of 4 September. In any event, our first task is to find terms which are acceptable to both sides concerned, regarding the three points— particularly regarding the matter of garrisoning troops.

According to information from that usual source, the atmosphere of the Cabinet meeting held here last Friday showed considerable signs of anticipation of a Japanese-U.S. conference. There is no mistaking the fact that the President is prepared to attend the meeting if the preliminary arrangements can be made.

Nishiyama (Financial Attache) says that a very good friend of his told him that Hull said to him (the friend) that the President "went too far" during the talks with this Ambassador.

Trans. 9-19-41


No. 183
September 18, 1941
#829.
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 
TO: Tokyo 

The following is what NISHIYAMA[a] heard:

HULL said that Japanese-American negotiations do not look as hopeful as they did two weeks ago; that due to so many conflicting opinions within the Japanese Government, it is hard to say what will happen; that the plan of bartering oil and raw silk cannot as yet be carried out; and that there is nothing to do but wait and see for another two weeks.

I have sent the above in hopes that this information will be of some use in judging the attitude of the United States Government.

[a] Financial Advisor at Washington Embassy.

Trans. 9-22-41


No. 184
September 18, 1941
#830.
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 
TO: Tokyo 

Strictly Secret.
Re your #577[a].

This interview brought out in my #808[a] happened before we met him. Since then, as you are well aware, there are indications that he has been very careful in word and deed. Recently, having been advised of this matter, he is being exceptionally careful.

With regard to KASAI's interview, in reply to questions put to him by newspapermen, he stated that he was, of course, in accord with the statements and arguments of WHEELER and LINDBERGH. These views, he stated, were his own and not the views of this office. Subse-

[A-98]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

quently there have been various criticisms made in regard to the activities of M. P. SHINO-HARA. In accordance with my requests to the Home Office in my #760[c], I would like to have you arrange to discontinue dispatching to the United States so-called observers, for whom there is no great need.

[a] Not available.
[b] See III, 164 in which Diet Member KASAI is warned to refrain from contributing to newspapers.
[c] See III, 101.

Trans. 9-23-41


No. 185
September 20, 1941
#583.
FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) 
TO: Washington 

(Message to Vichy #821)

On the 19th, a short-wave broadcast from San Francisco publicized a Washington report to the effect that the French Ambassador to the United States made representations to Secretary of State HULL that Japan must be made to withdraw her troops from French Indo-China. Please find out from the government to which you are accredited whether or not this is true. If it is true, file strong representations that we cannot help but regard this as a grave matter.

Trans. 10-4-41


No. 186
September 20, 1941 
#838.
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 
TO: Tokyo

(Part 1 of 3)

Yesterday, for the first time in nine days, I called on HULL and asked him for his opinion on our proposal of September (4th ?)[a], but he did not give me much of a reply. He proceeded to say that since he had received a notice from Ambassador GREW that the Japanese Government was of the intention of making, in a day or two, a proposal that would be acceptable to the United States, he had been hoping that I might bring it to him tonight and that he was waiting for Japan's new proposal.

In response to a question I asked, he said that (on account of differences ?)[a] "the suggestion"

with regard to the question of the meeting of the leaders---------------has not yet been made.

[a] Translator's note: Due to garbles the correctness of these words cannot be vouched.

Trans. 9-22-41

[A-99]


No. 187
September 20, 1941
#838.
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo

(Part 2 of 3) Corrected Translation.

I am sending you what I believe to be his views and which I gathered during my conversation.

1. He said that he had no intention of prolonging conversations, and that in so far as the desire for an early consumation of the negotiations is concerned, the United States is as eager as is Japan. This statement of his, however, better be taken as having been made merely for the sake of courtesy.

2. The United States is opposed to a policy which is partly peaceful and partly warlike. While peace reigns over the entire Pacific, Japan will no doubt make great progress and development in pursuit of a peaceful policy. Repeating what he said previously, he remarked that this would be profitable to Japan as well. He once stated that for the sake of peace in the Orient, it is essential that there be a strong Japan; however, he said, it would not be good if a policy is followed which consists of half military aggression and half peace. If a completely peaceful policy could be followed, the Japanese-American question can be settled overnight, and such as the Axis would be----------.

3. He thought Japan's-----is-----than that of the United States. He seems to be receiving -----reports concerning activities in connection with the first anniversary of the-----alliance. He believes that there are more people in Japan who want peace than those who, together with Germany, want war.

Trans. 9-23-41


No. 188
September 20, 1941
#838.
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo

(Part 3 of 3)

4. He understood the point in your #560[a]: That the conversations should be limited to Japan and the United States. However, he pointed out the necessity of keeping in touch with countries whose interest was affected by the Pacific.

In other words, the observation I had given in my Nos. 822[b] and 829[c] was, on the whole, correct.

That the United States is suspicious of Japan is a fact which cannot be denied. Going more to the point, I might say it is the opinion of the United States Government that Japan intends to resort to force while appeasing the United States.

I received this morning your telegram #584 of this date; but please be informed that because of information concerning their attitude and also because of what HULL said, I did not transmit the content of my Nos. 822[b] and 829[c]. It should be noted that the solution of the question depends not on words but on what is actually done.

[a] See III, 179 regarding the proposed conference between the leaders of Japan and the United States. Japan fears that the attitude of the United States, that they must consult Britain, the Netherlands, China and other nations, might be interpreted to mean the revival of the nine-power treaty policies.
[b] Not available.
[c] See III, 183.

Trans. 9-20-41

[A-100]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR


No. 189
September 20, 1941
#584.
FROM: Tokyo (Foreign Minister)
TO: Washington 

Re my #561 to #565 inclusive[a].

With my conversation held on the 13th with the United States Ambassador here, all questions so far asked by the United States have been answered. Despite this fact the United States Government has not made its views known to us. Judging from past developments, I wonder if they are not waiting for a reply from you. If they are waiting, I would like to have you communicate at once to them the contents of the caption telegrams. In doing this, we shall assist you by negotiating parallelly through you. Will you thus try again to get the reply of the United States Government regarding the conference of the leaders and at the same time-----.

For reasons which you may easily surmise, we find it necessary to hasten this matter (of course you should not give them the impression that we are very much in a hurry about it) and since there seem to be various plans being made to celebrate the first anniversary of the Tripartite Agreement on the coming 27th (?), I would like to see something definite accomplished by that date.

[a] #561—See III, 175.
#562—See III, 176.
#563—See III, 177.
#564—See III, 178.
#565—Not available.

Trans. 9-22-41


No. 190
September 22, 1941
#585.
FROM: Tokyo (Foreign Minister)
TO: Washington

While what I gave in my #584[a]-----is true, I would like to have you communicate to them the contents of my caption messages. You mentioned in your message about GREW's having spoken of the proposal that is acceptable to the United States. But what is this proposal? I have not conferred with him since the 10th, when I replied to questions asked by him as well as to those which HAMILTON asked you and explained at the same time that Japan had already said all that needed to be said. The American Ambassador (as well as Counsellor DOOMAN) knows this to be a fact, I, therefore, find it hard to understand why they told you such a thing. Will you please explain this to them and give them the contents of the caption messages at the same time and then wire me the results? I also shall inquire about the matter three or four days later. Depending upon circumstances, I intend to give confidentially to them our terms for disposing of the China Incident. It will not be a new proposal but merely an explanation of what we have already made known.

Please reply by wire at once.

[a] See III, 189.

Trans. 9-22-41

[A-101]


No. 191
September 22, 1941
#589.
FROM: Tokyo (Foreign Minister)
TO: Washington

(Part 1 of 3)

At four o'clock on the afternoon of the-----, I requested a visit by the American Ambassador in Tokyo. During the course of conversation the American Ambassador stated that he would transmit the various opinions expressed to his home government.

1. With regard to conversations to be carried on by Premier KONOYE and leaders of both countries, the message addressed to the American President was clear in itself.

2. Furthermore, in the conversations to be carried out between the leaders of both countries, general principles have been decided. With regard to details, they were to be entrusted to negotiations between diplomatic officials. The attitude of the United States was that they intended to come to an agreement with regard to the various points which are now pending.

3. This I reiterated as I have already conveyed to you, that we have gladly answered all of America's (inquiries ?). We have already said all that need be said in regard to our sincerity and our attitude. Having come to this point we are today able to do nothing but wait for America's reply.

Trans. 9-22-41


No. 194
September 22, 1941
#589.
FROM: Tokyo (Foreign Minister)
TO: Washington

(Part 2 of 3)

4. Our proposals which I have tendered to you embrace all points which are now pending. We have made clear our attitude on a broad scope and we have not attempted to "narrow down" the proposals of the United States.

5. I remember that on the 10th a question was brought up by the American authorities, which you put in the form of a (question ?), having to do with mediation between Japan and China. I, in regard to this matter, have confidentially conveyed to you the terms of a fundamental peace between Japan and China. These confidential remarks of mine were not fresh proposals but should be understood as an explanation of our proposals of the 4th of this month. (I conveyed to him the terms of the fundamental peace outlined in my #590[a].)

6. With regard to the situation in which Japan finds herself, (His or Your ?) Excellency, who is well versed in Japan's affairs, is well aware of the situation. For the past month the situation has steadily grown more critical. (On this point I would like to have you strongly impress the authorities of the United States.)

[a] See III, 191-192.

[A-102]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR


No. 193
September 22, 1941
#590
FROM: Tokyo (Foreign Minister)
TO: Washington

(Part 1 of 2)

To be handled in government code. Separate wire.

Basic terms of peace between Japan and China.

1. Neighborly Friendship.

2. Respect for Sovereignty and Territorial Integrity.

3. Cooperative Defense between Japan and China.

1. Cooperation between Japan and China for the purpose of preventing communistic and other subversive activities which may constitute a menace to the security of both countries and of maintaining the public order in China.

2. Stationing of Japanese troops and naval forces in certain areas in the Chinese territory for a necessary period for the purposes referred to above and in accordance with the existing agreements and usages.

Trans. 9-22-41


No. 192
September 22, 1941
#590.
From: Tokyo (Foreign Minister)
TO: Washington

(Part 2 of 2)

4. Withdrawal of Japanese Armed Forces

The Japanese armed forces which have been dispatched to China for carrying out the China affairs will be withdrawn from China upon the settlement of the said affairs, excepting those troops which come under point 3.

5. Economic Cooperation

(a) There shall be economic cooperation between Japan and China, having the development and utilization of essential materials for national defense of China as its principal objective.

(b) The preceding paragraph does not mean to restrict any economic activities by Third Powers in China so long as they are pursued on an equitable basis.

6. Fusion of the Chiang Kai-shek regime and the Wang Ching-wei Government.

7. No Annexation.

8. No Indemnities.

9. Recognition of Manchukuo.

Trans. 9-22-41

[A-103]


No. 195
September 22, 1941
#589.
FROM: Tokyo (Foreign Minister)
TO: Washington

(Part 3 of 3)

With regard to Japan-American negotiations, from the time that American newspapers began to editorialize on it, they have become a subject of conversation throughout the entire world. In Japan, too, one portion of public opinion well versed in this matter is greatly concerned. On the one hand within four or five days the first anniversary of the conclusion of the Tripartite Alliance is to be celebrated. Though the activities of this day of celebration will be similar to those of last year, the Government here is desirous of conducting these celebrations in as calm a manner as possible. Nevertheless, as far as this Minister is concerned there is a group within the country who with this anniversary as an incentive will take the opportunity to threaten Japan-American negotiations. We are extremely anxious for it is hard to say what incidents might be provoked.

7. This being the case, the situation within Japan herself is extremely critical. Therefore, we would like to have the agreement of the American authorities with regard to the conversations at least in principle at as early a date as possible.

The situation is becoming daily more critical. I would like to have you immediately pass on the details of this conversation of mine to the Secretary of State. Wire me his reactions to the above.

Trans. 9-22-41


No. 196
September 22, 1941
#839.
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo

(Part 1 of 4)

Currently the feeling here is, as ever, to aid the various countries on the side of the United States in carrying out the ultimate destruction of Germany. Though the Soviet, far more than was expected has been able to put up a remarkable fight, there are many who sense an early defeat. England and the United States render such assistance as is possible in order to make impossible a separate peace or surrender. They are hopeful of being able to maintain her fighting strength in the spring, provided she can weather the winter. Opinion has developed to this point. The United States is putting up an estimated $-0,000,000 [sic] worth of assistance. As a result of this, they plan to encourage the Briton's will to fight.

With regard to submarines, their utter annihilation is recognized to be virtually impossible. But then the American Navy could move directly into the Atlantic in order to protect Atlantic shipping. Furthermore, after the anticipated 6,000,000 "dead-weight" tons of increased construction have been completed by the United States alone during the twelve months of next year, a crisis will arise in the Atlantic. No one is unduly alarmed about the submarines.

Trans. 10-3-41

[A-104]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR


No. 197
September 22, 1941
#839.
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo

(Part 2 of 4)

With regard to the question of the policy toward-----, the people, as a general rule, are extremely happy-go-lucky. Should a war develop between Japan and the United States, "why worry, it's inevitable," is their attitude. There is still a great deal of talk on the comparative merits of the navies of both countries, the gist of which can be summed up as follows: A war between Japan and the United States will be one within the scope of the navy alone; Japan's economic strength cannot stand a long war; the United States excels greatly in its ability to replace warships lost in battle; saying these things, they boast of their ability to win out in a short while. There are only a few who are at all conscious of the danger of a war with Japan. In the field of international diplomacy, they still maintain their age-old policy toward-----. There are many who argue that to reach a compromise with Japan at the expense of China is fundamentally wrong. For example, according to the Hyde Park correspondent writing in the New York Times, Sunday edition, at the present time attempts to ameliorate the situation existing between Japan and the United States are deadlocked. Because Japan's demands for the continued occupation of territory held by them in China is not in agreement with HULL's categorical denial of the possibility of such continued occupation, Premier KONOYE has requested a direct conference with the President.

Trans. 10-3-41


No. 198
September 22, 1941
#839.
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo

(Part 3 of 4)

Nevertheless, notwithstanding all that, since the German people's will to fight is stronger than ever before, there are a greater number of people who feel that such a non-aggressive policy as outlined above cannot bring about a successful conclusion.

Many feel that as a result of the discontent of people in occupied lands, Italy will withdraw herself from the line of battle. In addition, many feel that the unrest of people in occupied areas will continue to increase. There are others, too, who pin unfounded hopes that the power of endurance of the German people will crumble within a short space of time.

If the war is to be a short one, one or two years will be required. If it is a long one, it will be protracted from five to ten years. The people generally here are maintaining an extremely happy-go-lucky frame of mind. There are practically none at all who think that as a result of this war the United States will be destroyed. With regard to their will to enter into the war, they feel that naval participation is sufficient. And, aside from the preparations being undertaken by military authorities, there are practically none who anticipate the dispatch of expeditionary forces on a large scale.

However, most recently there has been a sharp decline in the isolationist opinion expressed in the houses of Congress. One group is already going over to the majority group who back up the Government's foreign policy.

Trans. 10-3-41

[A-105]

 


No. 199
September 22, 1941
#839.
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo

(Part 4 of 4)

Nevertheless, the President is a person who unceasingly confers with HULL. Today the greater portion of the American Navy is being kept in the Pacific. Japan, in the event of the Russian downfall, might move either to the south or to the north. In such a case there is some fear that a frontal clash might occur at the same time in the Atlantic and the Pacific as well. The President is giving the utmost consideration to this matter.

As for Japan's peace terms, rumors are being circulated that in addition to Japan demanding the treaty ports and the four southern provinces in China, she might go so far as to demand other points of military importance.

Finally, though the United States Government does not wish to compromise with Japan at the expense of China, should Japan give up forceful aggressions Japanese-American trade relations could be restored, and the United States would even go so far as to render economic assistance to Japan.

The above are the critical observations concerning the trend of opinion in the United States made by KURATUKUHOON,[a] and I think he hit the nail on the head.

[a] Kana spelling.

Trans. 10-3-41


No. 200
September 23, 1941
#591.
FROM: Tokyo (Foreign Minister)
TO: Washington (Koshi)

On the 23rd we had the reasons for keeping troops garrisoned in China placed before the Counselor of the U.S. Embassy, as given below, with the request that this be communicated to the U.S. Ambassador in Tokyo and to the Secretary of State; and you will also please inform Hull of the same at once.

The reasons for which Japan deems it necessary to keep troops in certain specified areas, and for such time as may be required, even after the restoration of peace between Japan and China are: 1. For the purpose of cooperating in the building of a peaceful China, and at the same time 2. To contribute toward the protection of the safety of the international situation.

1. The perpetual lack of peace and order within China is something of which history bears witness, and this has especially been true of the disorder arising between the various provinces. This has not infrequently been taken advantage of by outsiders in making trouble between Japan and other third powers, so that time and again internal disorders have purposely been fomented into international strife. It is well known that the activities of the Communist Party have been most unremitting and destructive to the maintenance of peace and order. Such having been the situation there will be repetitions of it in the future, and it is hardly to be expected that-----to advance the peace and stability of the living conditions of the Chinese people, and therefore it is of prime importance that plans be undertaken for the maintenance of peace and order within China, after the restoration of peace between Japan and China. It is with the desire to see this maintained that Japan would have China bend every energy toward the speedy realization of stable living conditions for the people. While Japan would like to

[A-106]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

see China take up this task in her own strength, at present this is recognized as impossible (for reasons given in (2)) and therefore the Imperial Government will cooperate toward this end by keeping necessary military forces in certain areas for such a length of time as may be necessary.

2. Even from the economic standpoint, it is self-evident that the peace and order of adjacent areas would naturally have an important bearing upon the very existence of the Empire to say nothing of the direct and far reaching effects upon the existence of the Empire, that conditions in China after the conclusion of peace will have now, after such large scale warfare has been carried on for four years. It is only common sense to feel that it will not be easy to prevent the development of a serious situation in China as the scene due to causes both inside and from outside of China, at such a time as this, when nearly the whole world is involved in the ravages of war. For the purpose of preventing such a situation, that is, for the safeguarding of the very existence of the Empire, the keeping of troops there is a matter of sheer necessity. To sum it all up, the Imperial Government, for the above mentioned reasons deems it absolutely necessary to keep troops in China as mentioned above. However, it stands ready to withdraw such troops when the necessity shall no longer exist.-----Japan "vitally" concerned in the maintenance of peace and order in China-----(several groups garbled).

Trans. 9-25-41


No. 201
September 23, 1941
#842.
FROM: Washington
TO: Tokyo

(3 Parts—complete)

On the morning of the 23rd, I called on Hull and handed to him the English texts of your messages #562[a] and #564[b], and our terms of peace between Japan and China as contained in your message #590[c].

I took this opportunity to point out the following points: That with these notes, together with the various other statements made by us, we have said all that we can say; that we have nothing further to say to Ambassador Grew, either; that we shall leave all matters pertaining to the Tripartite Pact, other than the points which have already been brought up and explained, to be decided upon at the meeting of the leaders of the two countries; that the proposals which we now make are not intended to show down the original proposals made by the U.S., but rather are intended to enlarge their scope.

I continued by describing the situation and conditions in Japan in accordance with the contents of your message #589[d]. I added that our government was sincerely interested in having the "Leaders' Conference" materialize at the earliest possible opportunity.

Part 2. In reply to this, Hull said that he was spending much time in promoting the materialization of the "Leaders' Conference". He then said that he had previously expressed his hope that we would guide public opinion to a more favorable one, and inquired if we had been successful in this.

I replied that as I had pointed out on several previous occasions, the government had faced this problem with sincerity, and that it is gradually being improved.

Hull then asked for my own personal opinions on the matter, so I replied that it is the government's opinion that the Tripartite Pact and the improvement of U.S.-Japanese relations can be made parallel to each other. I also said that I was firmly convinced that the meeting between the two leaders would immeasurably strengthen the peace of the Pacific.

Part 3. Hull then advised me that he has received Grew's report of the Minister Toyoda-Grew meeting of the 22nd, and that he is giving it his careful study at the present time. He

[A-107]

said that he is anxious to reply to it at the earliest possible moment. I then tried to have him commit himself to be in favor of the materialization of the "Leaders' Conference", even if in principle only, but I was unable to make him say anything definite.

Hull then went on to say that in view of world conditions, it is not too early even now, for the U.S. and Japan to consider the reconstruction of a peaceful world. He, himself, thinks that Japan and the U.S. are ideally situated right now to lend leadership to the world. At the same time, however, he is not sure whether the caliber of the statesmanship of the two countries is capable of coping with such an undertaking.

I, therefore, said that even from this standpoint, it was essential that the "Leaders' Conference" take place.

With this, out meeting was brought to an end.

[a] See III, 176—Detailed reply of Foreign Minister to Grew's request for interpretation of various phrases and paragraphs in Japan's notes and statements of intentions in the current U.S. negotiations.
[b] See III, 178—"Equitable basis" is not to be judged solely by Japan. (Refers to open door and commerce in China.)
[c] See III, 191—Outline of Japan's terms for peace with China.
[d] See III, 193-195—Grew-Toyoda talk in which Japs again emphasize that all U.S. questions have now been answered and they therefore expect a U.S. reply on the leaders' conference question. The situation during the past month has steadily become more critical and will become more so, due to pro-Axis elements in Japan, if a decision is not reached prior to the first anniversary of the Tripartite Pact on the 28th of this month. Tell the Secretary this and wire his reactions.

Trans. 9-26-41


No. 202
September 24, 1941
#847.
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo

(Part 1 of 2)

I understood most of the ideas you expressed over the telephone just now. However, there are some things about which I am still a little in the dark. As I told you in my #842°, in accordance with your instructions I told the Secretary of State that we have talked ourselves out and that our government has informed Ambassador Grew that we have nothing more at all to say. He said that he would reply just as soon as possible, so now I am just marking time waiting to see what they are going to do.

[a] See III, 201 in which Ambassador NOMURA reports to Tokyo on conference with Secretary HULL on the 23rd.

Trans. 9-26-41

[A-108]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR


No. 203
September 24, 1941
#847.
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo

(Part 2 of 2.)

I received your #591[a] yesterday. Even if I were to communicate this to them, I could not answer their questions as there are some points in it which I, myself, fail sufficiently to grasp. They might take it as a plan whereby troops could be stationed anywhere at all throughout the length and breadth of China. You spoke to me over the telephone about a written explanation. Will you please send this to me immediately for my own information. As you said, this is the last five minutes, and for my own part, I certainly want to carry out your instructions and do my very best to make things come out all right. (10:30 P.M.)

[a] See III, 200 in which the Japanese Foreign Minister gives the reasons for which Japan considers it necessary to keep troops in certain specified areas in China.

Trans. 9-26-41


No. 204
September 26, 1941
#452.
FROM: New York (Morishima)
TO: Tokyo

(Part 1 of 5)

Some days ago, I sent my spies on a secret trip to Washington and had them sound out the American attitude on the question of composing Japanese-American relations. Putting their reports together, I send you the following for your information.

1. Upon the return to power of Premier KONOYE, these negotiations were begun on the initiative of Japan, and seeing Japan's temperate attitude on the navigation of tankers and other matters also, Washington first concluded that this showed that Japan was in a desperate condition and ready to fold up. The officials had an optimistic air. Furthermore, reports of optimistic, though perhaps wishful thinking emanated from Tokyo, and it was estimated that the possibilities were good for binding up the wounds.

Trans. 10-9-41

[A-109]


No. 205
September 26, 1941
#452.
FROM: New York (Morishima)
TO: Tokyo

(Part 2 of 5)

The subsequent delay, however, was occasioned by the following facts:

a. The suspicion grew that the arriere pensee of Japan might be merely playing for time, waiting for Germany to get the upper hand in the land of the Soviets.

b. The feeling grew that under no circumstances should a compromise be reached at the sacrifice of China.

2. So far as Japan is concerned, America's desire to compromise with Japan concerns Japan, England, the Soviet, and the Far East. In so far as the European war is concerned, she wishes to maintain as, at present, her convenient position of strengthening Allied resistance in the European War. If the Axis powers should win, it would hold grave implications for American national defense. If Germany should get the upper hand of Russia, the United States wishes to be sure that the threat we constitute in the Pacific will be completely eliminated.

Trans. 10-9-41


No. 206
September 26, 1941
#452.
FROM: New York (Morishima)
TO: Tokyo

(Part 3 of 5)

As a premise to any attempt to amend relations between the two countries, Japan must give up the principle of invasion. If Japan will revise her intent to seize territory, an understanding will not be impossible, but any understanding must be signed only on those terms. No temporary understanding will be reached for expediency's sake. Such is the temper of the American officials. Secretary HULL, who is taking the lead, asserts with assurance that the basis of the question of adjusting Japanese-American relations is in Japan's abandoning the principle of invasion. Thus, despite all parleys and negotiations, the United States is planning to send a military mission to China. This reflects the attitude of the Secretary and his associates. Furthermore, material is being furnished to China at present under the Lend-Lease Law.

Trans. 10-9-41

[A-110]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

[A-111]


No. 207
September 26, 1941
#452.
FROM: New York (Morishima)
TO: Tokyo

(Part 4 of 5)

At present the United States is laying vast plans for the reconstruction and cultivation of China. When this is considered (on this point, see my #392[a]; please note carefully), it can be easily seen that even in case there were concluded a Japanese-American agreement, such assistance to China would keep up just as ever.

3. The gravest obstacle to undertaking negotiations for the establishment of amity between the two countries is that America's expressed desires do not coincide with Japan's present national policy. In Japan there are, it appears, many who would not approve of negotiations. Similarly, within the American Government there is a strong anti-Japanese wing who scorn making up with Japan and who resolutely say that a Japanese-American rapprochement is out of the question because it would involve necessarily the sacrifice of China. Chungking's propaganda to this effect has a strong appeal.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 10-9-41


No. 208
September 26, 1941
#452.
FROM: New York (Morishima)
TO: Tokyo

(Part 5 of 5)

The opposition of those who support this opinion must be carefully noted (particularly at present, Chungking is in contact with the American society called The Friends of China and has begun to cooperate with it in opposing the composure of relations between Japan and the United States. This point also requires attention. The American Committee for Non-Participation in Japanese Aggression, which has been waging a vigorous campaign for economic sanctions against Japan, has begun a program against the President and the Secretary of State, opposing their efforts to settle the question), so there are two lines of thought in the United States, and all will depend upon whether or not it will be possible to harmonize them. As a matter of fact, the outlook is far from optimistic.

Trans. 10-11-41

[A-111]


No. 109
September 26, 1941
#2077.
FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda)
TO: Washington Circular

(To be handled in Government Code)

As you are well aware, our country is facing the greatest crisis in her history. Since this crisis cannot be overcome except chiefly by diplomacy both the people and the government are placing their hope in the Foreign Office and are greatly concerned with the activity on the part of foreign office officials. Such being the present circumstances, while I shall gladly receive frank expression of opinions from our officials abroad and from all governmental offices, since any act on the part of-------------------------inimical to the solidarity of the entire Foreign Office personnel would not only interfere with the execution of our diplomatic policy but also be inexcusably unjust to. those who are bending every effort to attain the objectives set before us—though it is hardly necessary for me to ask you this—I would like to have you inspire the members of your office more than ever so that those in and outside of the Foreign Office may as one body achieve the maximum diplomatic efficiency.

Trans. 10-1-41


No. 210
September 26, 1941
#597.
FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington 

In solving so difficult a problem as Japanese-American relations, Your Honor's troubles and anxieties have always been deeply appreciated by me. I can easily see that, concerning the negotiations, Your Honor's views are not infrequently at variance with mine; but, as I told you in my #554[a], this is a very serious matter and I am proceeding cautiously and deliberately. Therefore, I wish to caution you again not to add or detract a jot or title on your own without first getting in contact with me. In this connection, please wire me back concerning the following points:

1. Have you communicated to them the contents of my #590[b].

2. In your conversation with the President, did he not mention a promise on our part that we would avoid and cease any further increase in our troops stationed in French Indo-China for the sake of success in the Japanese-American negotiations? When the President stated with smiling cynicism that he expected we might occupy Thailand while the Premier and he were talking, just as we did French Indo-China while you and the Secretary of State were conferring (see you #752.[c]), did he not also refer to such a promise? I think he probably di. In view of the seriousness of matters as they stand, although I know the hour is already late, be-

[A-112]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

cause of the necessity of keeping records, I want you please to go and question them again. Now when Germany (?) is becoming so aroused, we have no intention of rehashing things which have been gone over in the past. Please, also, (tell this to them?). Needless to say, there will be no changes in my #595[d] of today, so will you please communicate it to them.

[a] See III, 169 in which Tokyo tells Ambassador NOMURA that the texts of certain notes are decided upon after very careful study by all of the various ministries involved. If however, he notes any points in such messages, he should make inquiries and suggestions by cable before delivering them to the addresses.
[b] See III, 191 in which Tokyo sends Washington the text of the basic terms of peace between Japan and China.
[c] See III, 89 in which Ambassador NOMURA wires Tokyo of his conference with the President with regard to the meeting between Prince KONOYE and the President.
[d] See III, 213 in which Tokyo wires Washington the text of a proposed agreement between Japan and the United States.

Trans. 9-26-41


No. 211
September 26, 1941
#852.
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo 

Re your #597[a].

1. I have communicated to them all of your #590[b]. (The words "China affairs" in my #842[c] are an example of the usual way of translating all along but I changed it to "China affair".)

2. No, the President did not mention any promise on our part that we would avoid and cease stationing troops in French Indo-China. He did not even question me as to whether we had many or few soldiers there.

3. Today I will tell Secretary HULL the contents of your #591[d] and #595[e].

4. You should understand without my telling you that I don't add or subtract an iota to or from the instructions you send me, so let your fears be at rest on this score. And in the case of your #591[d], however, the English text differs from the original so after you compose the English text you should have it checked well before sending it.

[a] See III, 210. Tokyo tells Ambassador NOMURA to again question the Americans and submit to them the proposal contained in #595 III, 213 as there will be no changes made in it.
[b] See III, 191, 192 in which Tokyo sends Washington the text of the basic terms of peace between Japan and China.
[c] See III, 201 in which Ambassador NOMURA reports to Tokyo on the conference with Secretary HULL on the 23rd.
[d] See III, 200 in which the Japanese Foreign Minister gives the reasons for which Japan considers it necessary to keep troops in certain specified areas in China.
[e] See III, 213 in which Tokyo wires Washington the text of a proposed agreement between Japan and the United States.

Trans. 9-27-41

[A-113]


No. 212
September 25, 1941
No number.
FROM: Washington
TO: Tokyo 

Re your #594[a].

1. Our attitude with regard to this matter at present—that is, while awaiting the reply from the United States—is exactly that which was so completely expressed by the Foreign Minister. I have received no new instructions regarding this matter today. If there has been any word from the U.S. Government, I would appreciate being advised thereof.

2. We would like to take this opportunity to present a paper which contains the proposals made by the U.S. on 21 June, together with our various notes to the U.S.

The above has not been written up in the form of a treaty or anything like that. Neither has it been so worded as to make it inflexible. The various essential points have been arranged so as to facilitate their perusal. It is not, of course, a new proposal. It was merely compiled for the sake of convenience.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 9-26-41


No. 213
September 25, 1941
#595.
FROM: Tokyo 
TO: Washington

(In 7 parts—complete)

The governments of Japan and of the United States accept joint responsibility for the initiation and conclusion of a general agreement of understanding as expressed in a joint declaration for the resumption of traditional friendly relations.

Without reference to specific cause of recent estrangement, it is the sincere desire of both governments that the incidents which led to the deterioration of amicable sentiment between their countries should be prevented from recurrence and corrected in their unforeseen and unfortunate consequences.

It is the earnest hope of both governments that, by a cooperative effort, Japan and the United States may contribute effectively toward the establishment and preservation of peace in the Pacific area; and, by the rapid consummation of an amicable understanding, encourage the world peace and arrest, if not dispel, the tragic confusion that now threatens to engulf civilization.

For such decisive action, protracted negotiations would seem ill-suited and weakening. Both governments, therefore, desire that adequate instrumentalities should be developed for the realization of a general understanding which would bind, meanwhile, both governments in honor and in act.

It is the belief of both governments that such an understanding should comprise only the pivotal issues of urgency and not the accessory concerns which could be deliberated later at a conference.

Both governments presume to anticipate that they could achieve harmonious relations if certain situations and attitudes were clarified or improved, to wit:

1. The concepts of Japan and of the United States respecting international relations and the character of nations.

[A-114]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

2. The attitudes of both governments toward the European war.

3. Action toward a peaceful settlement between Japan and China.

4. Commerce between both nations.

5. Economic problems in the southwestern Pacific area.

6. The policies of both nations affecting political stabilization in the Pacific area. Accordingly, the government of Japan and the government of the United States have come to the following mutual understanding and declaration of policy.

Section 1.—(The concepts of Japan and of the United States respecting international relations and the character of nations.)

Both governments affirm that their national policies are directed toward the foundation of a lasting peace and the inauguration of a new era of reciprocal confidence and cooperation between the peoples of both countries.

Both governments declare that it is their traditional and present concept and conviction that nations and races compose as members of a family one household, living under the ideal of universal concord through justice and equity; each equally enjoying rights and admitting responsibilities with a mutuality of interests regulated by peaceful processes and directed to the pursuit of their moral and physical welfare, which they are bound to defend for themselves as they are bound not to destroy for others; they further admit their responsibilities to oppose the oppression or exploitation of other peoples.

Both governments are firmly determined that their respective traditional concepts on the character of nations and the underlying moral principles of social order and national life will continue to be preserved and never transformed by foreign ideas or ideologies contrary to those moral principles and concepts.

Section 2.—(The attitudes of both governments toward the European war.)

Both governments maintain it their common aim to bring about the peace in the world, and, when an opportune time arrives, they will endeavor jointly for the early restoration of the world peace.

With regard to developments of the situation prior to the restoration of the world peace, both governments will be guided in their conducts by considerations of protection and self-defense; and, in case the United States should participate in the European war, Japan would decide entirely independently in the matter of interpretation of the Tripartite Pact between Japan, Germany and Italy, and would likewise determine what actions might be taken by way of fulfilling the obligations in accordance with the said interpretation.

Section 3.—(Action toward a peaceful settlement between Japan and China.)

Both governments, taking cognizance of the fact that the settlement of the China affairs has a vital bearing upon the peace of the entire Pacific area and consequently upon that of the world, will endeavor to expedite a rapid realization of the settlement of the said affairs.

The government of the United States, recognizing the effort and the sincere desire on the part of the Japanese Government concerning the peaceful settlement of the China Affairs, will, with the intention of facilitating the realization of the settlement, render its good offices in order that the Chungking Government may promptly enter into negotiations with the government of Japan for a termination of hostilities and a resumption of peaceful relations, and will refrain from resorting to any measures and actions which might hamper the measures and effort of the government of Japan directed toward the settlement of the China affair.

The government of Japan maintains that the basic general terms of peace for the settlement of the China affairs will be in harmony with the principles embodied in the Konoye statement, and with those agreements between Japan and China and those matters which have been put into effect in accordance with the said statement; that the economic cooperation between Japan and China will be carried on by peaceful means and in conformity with the principle of nondiscrimination in the international commercial relations and also with the principle of

[A-115]

especially close relationship which is natural between neighboring countries; and that the economic activities of third powers in China will not be excluded so long as they are pursued on an equitable basis.

Note: (There is appended a draft of the basic terms of peace between Japan and China.) Section 4.—(Commerce between Japan and the United States.)

Both governments agree to take without delay measures necessary for resuming normal trade relations between the two countries.

Both governments guarantee each other that they will, as the first of the measures envisaged in the preceding paragraph, discontinue immediately the measures of freezing assets now being enforced, and that they will supply mutually such commodities as are, respectively, available and required by either of them.

Section 5.—(Economic problems in the southwestern Pacific area.)

Both governments mutually pledge themselves that the economic activities of Japan and the United States in the southwestern Pacific area shall be carried on by peaceful means and in conformity with the principle of non-discrimination in the international commercial relations.

In pursuance of the policy stated in the preceding paragraph, both governments agree to cooperate each with the other toward the creation of conditions of international trade and international investment under which both countries will have a reasonable opportunity to secure through the trade process the means of acquiring the goods and commodities which each country needs for the safeguarding and development of its own economy.

Both governments will amicably cooperate for the conclusion and execution of agreements with the powers concerned in regard to the production and supply, on the basis of non-discrimination, of such specific commodities as oil, rubber, nickel, and tin.

Section 6.—(The policies of both nations affecting political stabilization in the Pacific area.)

Both governments taking cognizance of the fact that it is a matter of vital importance to stabilize promptly the situation in the southwestern Pacific area, undertake not to resort to any measures and actions which may jeopardize such stabilization.

The government of Japan will not make any armed advancement, using French Indo-China as a base, to any adjacent areas thereof (excluding China), and, upon the establishment of an equitable peace in the Pacific area, will withdraw its troops which are now stationed in French Indo-China.

The government of the United States will alleviate the military measures in the southwestern Pacific area.

Both governments declare that they respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Thailand and the Netherlands East Indies, and that they are prepared to conclude an agreement concerning the neutralization of the Philippine Islands when its independence will have been achieved. The government of the United States will guarantee the non-discriminatory treatment of the Japanese nationals in the Philippine Islands.

Basic terms of peace between Japan and China.

Since the rest is the same as that contained in my #590[a], we shall not repeat it here. At the beginning of this message please insert "strictly confidential."

[a] See III, 191.

Trans. 9-26-41

[A-116]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR


No. 214
September 27, 1941
#866.
FROM: Washington 
TO: Tokyo

(Foreign Office secret.)

When we presented the English text contained in your message #595[a], Ballantine stated that the peace terms for the China Incident that were relayed to the State Department from Ambassador Grew contained nine articles, whereas that which we handed to him (that which was contained in your message #590[b]) contained only the first five articles of those handed to Ambassador Grew. Thinking that possibly they were inadvertently omitted at the time of transmission I request that this message be checked and this office advised of your findings.

When delivering notes such as these, we usually state that since there is always the possibility of errors in transmission, we would like to have them go by similar instruments delivered to them from Ambassador Grew.

[a] See III, 213. Tokyo sends what appears to be nearly their final effort to get the U.S. to agree to a "leaders' conference."
[b] See III, 191. Outline of Japan's terms for peace with China.

Trans. 10-2-41


No. 215
September 27, 1941
#605.
FROM: Tokyo 
TO: Washington 

(In 4 parts—complete)

Translator's note: This is the gist of the off-the-record statement made by Foreign Minister Toyoda to Ambassador Grew—see Tokyo to Washington #604[a]—and is written in the first person, Toyoda speaking.

(Part 1)

1. Europe has now fallen into a chaotic condition. The flames of war have spread to the Atlantic and they are enveloping the various powers of the world. Fortunately, however, no war has, as yet, broken out in the Pacific. The United States and Japan, alone, hold the key to continued peace or war in the Pacific.

Should the United States and Japan come to blows, the Pacific, too, would be immediately thrown into the chaos that is war. World civilization would then come crashing down. No greater misfortune could befall mankind.

In recent times, there have been numerous and various incidents between Japan and the United States. Relations are at an exceedingly sensitive point, and even the slightest thing must be treated with the utmost precaution.

If, at this time, Japanese-U.S. relations were to be adjusted so as to promote friendship between them, the effects would be felt not only by the United States and Japan, but would indeed contribute greatly to a world peace. The Imperial Government desires the adjustment of Japanese-U.S. relations not only for the sake of Japan and the United States, but hopes that at the same time, such a step would become the opening wedge to bringing about peace throughout the world.

[A-117]

2. Since assuming my post two months ago, I have been working on the matter of readjusting Japanese-U.S. relations even to the extent of almost forgetting to eat and sleep. It is with the same objective that Premier Konoye has expressed his willingness to act as a leader in a conference with President Roosevelt.

(Part 2)

3. Japan is connected to Germany and Italy by an alliance. The fact that the Premier of Japan had volunteered to meet the President, in itself has given rise to much misunderstanding regarding her relations with Germany and Italy. Thus, there is proof that Japan is making a supreme sacrifice. Moreover, the history of Japan has no precedence of an instance where the Premier himself has gone abroad in behalf of diplomacy. This fact in itself should clearly show the sincerity of the government of Japan in its expressed desire of adjusting the relationship between Japan and the United States, and through that, of maintaining peace in the Pacific and, indeed for the world.

4. Maintenance of peace is Japan's sole motivating power. Should there be those who believe that Japan was forced to her knees by U.S. pressure, it would indeed be a sad misconception on their part. Japan desires peace; she is not succumbing to outside pressure. Moreover, Japan is not one to yearn for peace at any price.

The Japanese people have a peculiar characteristic of repelling all outside pressures. We have pointed out this fact previously but in view of the general tone of U.S. newspapers in the past, (it is admitted that this has been considerably toned down of late), I feel that it is necessary to repeat this.

(Part 3)

5. Japanese-U.S. relations are exceedingly complicated. Hence, it is quite possible that the entire matter cannot be settled in a day and a night. It is quite possible that not all of the difficult problems can be ironed out by a single meeting between the leaders of the two countries. However, the political aspect of such a meeting would have exceedingly far reaching effects. Moreover, those items which have as yet remained unsettled (we do not believe that any of these exist any longer, but assuming that some do) after all of the goings and comings of cables, they could undoubtedly be settled at the conference. It should be unnecessary to point out the turn for the better in U.S.-Japanese relations that this would have.

We are under the impression that in theory, your side is not opposed to the holding of the "leaders' conference." Should, however, in spite of this, the meeting not materialize for some reason, we doubt if another opportunity such as the present would appear for some time to come. Moreover, it is quite possible that there may be some fearsome reactions from such a failure.

6. Japan has already announced the proposals she will make at the meeting. We have, moreover, already submitted for your convenience a complete resume in accordance with the lines contained in the United States' proposal of 21 June. I feel certain, therefore, that the United States is fully aware of the Japanese viewpoint by this time.

7. We have, of course, already decided upon the vessel which will transport the Premier and his party; the personnel of his party, including the generals and admirals, have also been decided upon. We are in a position to start at any moment now.

(Part 4)

8. Since the situation is as described above, the Imperial Government awaits with expectations the United States' reply at the earliest possible moment. Any further delays would place the government in an exceedingly difficult position from the viewpoint of the Tripartite Pact. Your Excellency is certainly fully aware that there is every possibility of commemorating the first anniversary of the Tripartite Pact, to strengthen the ties of the three powers.

[A-118]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

From the viewpoint of the weather there is considerable danger that it will become unfavorable in the North Pacific and in the Alaska area.

9. From both domestic and external circumstances, time is of paramount importance, as I have pointed out previously. It is essential that the meeting be decided upon at all possible speed and it is with this thought uppermost in my mind that I so strongly insist upon this matter at this time. I would consider it to be of greatest fortune if we were to receive a definite reply at the earliest moment.

From our standpoint if the meeting were scheduled from 10 to 15 October, it would meet with our best convenience.

In conclusion, I would like to say that in a negotiation of this type, it is of the utmost importance that each respect the other's reliability and sincerity. Your Excellency is fully cognizant of Premier Konoye's character and his political position. I hardly feel that I can add anything in this respect at this time. However, as I said before, I doubt if another opportunity to adjust Japanese-U.S. relations will present itself because, at present, the Premier and the entire Cabinet are behind the move. At the same time, it is essential, even under present circumstances, that the leaders meet and confer directly, and at the earliest possible time. I repeat this last point over and over again.

[a] See III, 216.

Trans. 9-30-41


No. 216
September 27, 1941
#604.
FROM: Tokyo 
TO: Washington 

On this the 27th, at 1630, after completing the ceremonies celebrating the first anniversary of the Tripartite Pact, I requested Ambassador Grew to call on me. Off the record, I talked to him along the lines contained in my separate message #605[a]. I urged him to strongly recommend to his home government to have the "leaders' meeting" materialize immediately. Will you too, therefore, carefully read the contents of my separate wire and secretly do everything in your power to prevail upon the President to have this meeting materialize.

The above is not to be construed as being the absolutely final proposal on our part, nor is it absolutely essential that a time limit be put in force. However, in view of internal and external circumstances of our country, we cannot keep postponing matters forever. Please, therefore, put primary emphasis on the importance of holding the meeting immediately. (I mentioned this point to the U.S. Ambassador, too.)

[a] See III, 215.

Trans. 9-30-41

[A-119]


No. 217
September 28, 1941
#606.
FROM: Tokyo (Foreign Minister)
TO: Washington

(Part 1 of 2)

In connection with my off-the-record communication to the American Ambassador in Tokyo last night, in case you have an interview with the President, the following is for your information:

1. As the last paragraph of that communication makes clear, we do not mean at all that all questions and answers are now useless. However, I wished again to emphasize that the first anniversary of the conclusion of the Tripartite Alliance is the turning point and that this occasion is all the more grave. If they have any questions, of course, we will be glad cordially to respond (but as a matter of fact, they have not asked us a single thing since the 10th, and I find this very mysterious).

2. The meaning of the statement that yesterday was the turning point and that the occasion is an important factor is that for the last few days a movement to strengthen the Axis has been afoot, and the popular psychology is being adverted toward this trend. Consequently, the tendency to oppose an adjustment with the United States is naturally increasing. Hence, now is the time, if ever, to concentrate on this accord. This does not mean at all that the power of the present government has dwindled or that the advocates of anti-Americanism have strengthened their position.

Trans. 9-29-41


No. 218
September 28, 1941
#606.
FROM: Tokyo (Foreign Minister)
TO: Washington 

(Part 2 of 2)

It is true, we shall have to get quicker and better results than ever before from our endeavors for an understanding. It may even be necessary for us to publish them. Nevertheless, once the negotiations are decided upon or once the date of an interview is set, the government of this country is sure that the people will stand united and that the opposition's voice will be quickly drowned in a chorus of approval. Of this we have always been sure, nor has our conviction waned for a moment lately. Notwithstanding, the Premier sent in his message more than a month ago. Nothing has happened; it seems as though it were pigeon-holed. The government is very much worried over this, needless to say.

3. It is true that one influential admiral and one general were included in the Premier's entourage. This made the United States suspect that a hostile military was holding the whip hand over us. I took this action, therefore, to dispel any such fear on their part (I seem to recall that HULL asked Your Honor something about this once).

4. I talked with the British Ambassador the other day and he said, "To speak frankly, the trouble is that the United States is uneasy and lacks confidence concerning the attitude of the government of Japan." Well, the integrity of Premier KONOYE and of the present government ought to be a hundred per cent reliable, and the American Ambassador must have sufficiently advised his government on the trustworthiness of Prince KONOYE.

Trans. 9-29-41

[A-120]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR


No. 219
September 27, 1941
#865.
FROM: Washington 
TO: Tokyo 

(In 10 parts—complete)

(Part 1)

On this, the 27th, I had Matudaira call on Ballantine and had him relay the contents of your message and at the same time deliver the English texts contained in your messages 591[a] and 595[b]. He requested that they be delivered to Hull.

I am taking this opportunity to express my humble opinion on various points which happen to draw my attention in regard to your message #595[b]. I pass them on to you for whatever value they may have.

1. As I have pointed out on several previous occasions while reporting on matters pertaining to this issue, the United States insists that it would be inappropriate to hold the "leaders' conference" until the two nations have come to a complete agreement on all the points involved. At present the United States is allegedly investigating our attitude with regard to said various points. Since, as you said, we have already said all that is to be said, we are not committed to await expression of intentions by the United States.

(Part 2)

If we submit further papers to them in advance of receiving some reply from them, there is a danger that matters would become further complicated and less clear. I am of the opinion that this would tend to hamper the progress of the negotiations.

If, by some chance, some apparent inconsistencies appear in our various papers, it may lead to their becoming suspicious of our sincerity.

(Part 3)

Fundamentally speaking, the United States wishes to proceed along the lines she expressed in the U.S. proposals of 21 June. Judging from developments to date we do not feel that the premises outlined in those proposals are too far afield. Moreover, from the viewpoint of practicability we feel that they are the most concrete. I therefore, hope that you will accept the reasonings embodied therein.

2. The deletion of the item reading "no northward advance shall be made without justification" will no doubt be the point which will invite the most suspicion.

(Part 4)

3. The respective attitudes of the two nations to the war in Europe: As I have pointed out in messages pertaining to this phase, (see particularly my message #540[c], it would be exceedingly difficult from the United States' viewpoint to retain paragraph 1 proposing joint mediation. Recent developments (particularly in view of the President's statement subsequent to the sinking of the U.S. vessel) have further stiffened the U.S. attitude. Therefore, it is my opinion that considerable difficulty will be encountered in securing the U.S. agreement to this point.

(Part 5)

Concerning the matter of self defense as contained in paragraph two: Again, as I have previously reported, all U.S. moves pertaining to the European war are allegedly being made from the basic national policy of self defense as the starting point. Even if the United States does become actively involved in the war, she will do so in behalf of self defense and will not, supposedly, be in any sense an aggressive attack, even though she may have an ample provocation to make it so. In this way, they intend to obviate the necessity of our invoking the terms of the Tripartite Pact. Thus, the United States is very anxious to have the term "right to self defense"

[A-121]

as elastic as possible. (Read Secretary Hull's speech, contained in my message 381[d].) For this reason, they may not be tempted to accept the working of our proposal on this point. The fact that we outline our needs for self defense may unduly arouse their suspicion.

(Part 6)

Regarding the matter pertaining to the settlement of the Chinese Incident: As I pointed out in my message #540[c], the United States has fundamentally speaking, insisted that we outline the peace terms we shall propose to China. She maintains that she will enter into the real negotiations only after a complete agreement as to the contents of the "annex". Therefore, we shall undoubtedly be confronted with the difficult task of coming to an agreement on the matters of garrisoning troops and non-discriminatory treatment. I am of the opinion that in the final analysis, we shall have to agree to the terms offered by the United States insofar as they do not conflict with the terms of the Nanking Agreement. We should word our explanations and counter proposals with this in mind.

(Part 7)

Before we are able to have the United States yield, we shall undoubtedly have to conduct several negotiations even after this. The danger of the negotiations breaking down completely as a result of the matter of our stationing troops, is constantly on the increase. The "non-discrimination" phase is not quite as tickling a problem as the former. In our proposal we state that non-discrimination will apply to the conducting of business between China and Japan only. We add that as long as any third nation conducts her economic enterprises on a fair and even basis, she will in no way be discriminated against. I am not at all sure that the United States will be satisfied with these conditions.

(Part 8)

Furthermore, we will probably encounter considerable difficulty in making the United States swallow, from the standpoint of policy, the new "principle of especially close relations."

Aside from these points, paragraph one is so worded as to imply that the United States and Japan were jointly responsible to settle the China incident. I am not at all confident that we shall be able to succeed in this because it may not give a favorable impression at the time this "understanding" is published. (As I have reported in previous messages, the United States is not in favor of keeping this "understanding" a secret.)

----------with regard to the contents of paragraph two referring to having the United States use her good offices-----and the point making the demands, shall necessitate the making of new demands if we are to pursue the lines laid down heretofore, as well as those contained in your instructions of 11 April.

(Part 9)

I also believe that considerable difficulty will be encountered in having them agree to the new matter. In that part referring to peace terms, the following words appear: "Konoye statement and those agreements between Japan and China." I feel that here, too, we shall encounter difficulty in getting their approval. Since President Roosevelt is very interested in taking the mediation actions himself it might be well to insert the word "President" in the sentence.

(Part 10)

5. We have your instructions of 15 July with regard to the matter of trade between the two countries. We would appreciate your basing your proposal on the U.S. proposal of 21 June.

6. With regard to the matter pertaining to the political stabilization of the Pacific, it is said that that part of the U.S. proposal of 21 June referring to it was written by Secretary Hull himself. Since the United States looks upon this phase with the most importance, we would appreciate your allowing that part of their proposal to stand as is. We would particularly appreciate your deleting from the new proposals that part which states that we agree to evacuate our

[A-122]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

troops from French Indo-China only at the termination of the China Incident. We feel that it would be more acceptable to the United States if we were to retain only that part which refers to the condition of a large scale peace in the Pacific.

In other words, we hope to wind up all arrangements of the preliminary conference.

[a] See III, 200—Japan presents a long explanation of the necessity for her maintaining troops in certain parts of China even after peace with Japan is restored.
[b] See III, 213—Tokyo sends what appears to be nearly their final effort to get the U.S. to agree to a "leaders' conference".
[c] Ambassador Nomura expresses the opinion that based on the thought and discussions given the proposals for an Understanding Pact, there is a wide gap between the viewpoints of the two countries, and that Tokyo's proposals will lead to a misunderstanding. Comments on several items of the proposal and requests Tokyo's opinion regarding each.
[d] Not available.

Trans. 10-1-41


No. 220
September 29, 1941
#867.
FROM: Washington 
TO: Tokyo 

During the morning of this, the 29th, (Monday) I called on the Secretary of State, and, in accordance with the instructions contained in your messages from 604 to 606[a], I asked that I be granted a secret interview with the President. The Secretary said that because of death in his family, the President had been in Hyde Park since Thursday. Upon his return to Washington, however, he would see the President, he said and would hand me a memo of the U.S. Government within the next couple of days. He added that he read Ambassador Grew's report yesterday and thus gave evidence of being thoroughly familiar with the situation.

Hull gave indications that he too felt that immediate action was essential. At the same time, however, he seemed to think that it was of primary importance to get public opinion in Japan thoroughly unified in favor of it.

I, therefore, pointed out that though the government, the army, and the navy, were in full accord with the proposals being discussed, considerable time would have to elapse before the entire public could be made to understand them. There are those, for example, who cannot understand why the United States should meddle so deeply in Asiatic affairs when she herself constantly refers to the Monroe Doctrine and who, in actual practice, has seized the leadership of the American continents. Japanese public opinion cannot be made to conform with the every whim of the United States. To wait its doing so would be like watchfully waiting for the century plant to bloom, I said.

[a] 604—See III, 216—Toyoda-Grew talk held 1630 September 27. Japanese again strongly urge early action on the "leaders' conference", and directs Nomura to do everything possible to avoid further postponement.
605—See III, 215—Gist of remarks made by Toyoda to Grew.
606—See III, 217—Toyoda elucidates for Nomura's information various points of his talk with Grew.

Trans. 10-3-41

[A-123]


No. 221
September 30, 1941
#614.
FROM: Tokyo 
TO: Washington 

(Part 1 of 3)

Re your #865[a].

1. As you say, so long as they do not send us any reply we should avoid presenting them with various written suggestions. I am entirely in agreement with you.

2. I, too, in the beginning was in a hurry to draw up a plan and hurry along the negotiations, that is why on the 14th of July I sent you some instructions, but since you never presented the American officials with them, and in the light of subsequent events, in order to finally evolve a comprehensive settlement, on September 4 I brought forth a proposal. I incorporated this proposal in my #595[b] and did my best to harmonize it with the American proposal. There are no changes to be made in the substance of it and if the Americans so desire I think we might negotiate on the basis there of.

3. My views on certain points which you mention in your message are as follows. In case they question you please answer accordingly:

1. The reason why I left out the expression "As there is no real objection we will make no northward invasion", in part 2 of your message is that if we were to insert this into the body of the text it might only give them the suspicion that we have direct designs against the Soviet. This whole matter, after all, concerns the China incident and the South Seas question. There is no particular problem in the north. In the preface to the clause concerning the stability of the Pacific area, this matter is fully included so I am willing to leave it up to the leaders on both sides and if necessary to clarify this in the minutes. In my proposal of the 4th I made it plain that there was no objection to this statement.

[a] See III, 219.
[b] See III, 213 in which Tokyo wires Washington the text of a proposed agreement between Japan and the United States.

Trans. 9-30-41


No. 222
September 30, 1941
#614.
FROM: Tokyo 
TO: Washington 

(Part 2 of 3)

2. The first clause relating to the attitude of both governments toward the European war is all right as it stands so far as I am concerned. Since we say "when the proper time comes" I am sure that this will cover their misgivings.

3. Concerning the second clause of the same article, as you say, they may have something more to say. We will merely wait for them to broach the subject and if necessary not be loathe to consider it again.

4. The part concerning the adjustment of the China incident.

a. We do not mean by the first clause that this is the joint responsibility of the Japanese and the American Governments. All along the United States has insisted that a settlement of the China trouble has a great bearing on the stability of the Pacific. That is why we went so far

[A-124]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

as to say that both Governments "will endeavor to bring about etc." We do not mean to discuss this in detail but if they oppose it as it stands we are ready to change it or leave it out.

b. We have been looking forward with expectancy from the beginning to American mediation and so we are not making any new requests such as you mentioned.

c. The insertion of the phrase "a treaty between Japan and China" is merely in accordance with the three principles layed down by KONOYE and there is no special meaning to it. Please explain this to them.

d. There is no objection to requesting that President ROOSEVELT mediate.

Trans. 9-30-41


No. 223
September 30, 1941
#614.
FROM: Tokyo 
TO: Washington 

(Part 3 of 3)

e. When we come to the question of non-discrimination in economic activities in China, I want you to make it clear to them so that they will not entertain any misgivings that this principle should not apply merely between Japan and China but also to third countries. Advise them, furthermore, that the principle that neighbors naturally have intimate relations is practiced throughout the whole world and is by no means a new theory.

5. The clause concerning commerce between the two countries in my #595[a] coincides in meaning with the American proposal. Only in the meantime the freezing order has taken place and subsequent developments have modified the situation. We only hope that conditions will soon be ameliorated. Once they eliminate this order we will have no objection to their proposal on this subject.

6. a. Concerning the stipulations about the political stability of the Pacific, the stipulations in the American proposal are pet principles of Secretary HULL and the United States sets great store by them. They are merely general stipulations, therefore, we will not be loathe to reconsider them.

b. I transferred the matters concerning the military evacuation of French Indo-China and the settlement of the Chinese incident to the clause concerning the establishment of peace in the Pacific. This will make the clause more harmonious and expand its significance. That is all I meant by this action. If they don't like it, however, we will put it back like it was.

If the Americans present you with an aide memoire today, without any delay wire it on to me. I am ready and eager to make a translation of it. If possible, before you send it, send me a brief summary.

[a] See III, 213 in which Tokyo wires Washington the text of a proposed agreement between Japan and the United States.

Trans. 9-30-41

[A-125]

 


No. 224
September 30, 1941
#881.
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 
TO: Tokyo

(Part 1 of 2)[a].

Last Monday after a long time I went to call on Admiral STARK. In the middle of our conversation Rear Admiral TURNER joined us. The Admiral said that after all the question of troops stationed in China would do most damage to the negotiations and that unless the China Incident is settled an understanding between Tokyo and Washington will be impossible. TURNER said that he doubted if we would agree to evacuate China, but if no agreement were reached in the preparatory talks any conversations between the leaders of the two countries might be dangerous.

While we were talking about the Tripartite Alliance, the Admiral stated that the United States does not intend to go ahead and strike at Japan, adding that if the United States fights a two ocean war after all she will have to defend herself in the Pacific.

[a] Part 2 not available.

Trans. 10-2-41


No. 225
September 29, 1941
#870.
FROM: Washington 
TO: Tokyo 

(In 4 parts—complete)

To Chief of Bureau Terasaki from Iguti.

I realize, of course, that I am being presumptious, but the following are my opinions of the negotiations to adjust U.S.-Japanese relations:

(1) In view of such incidents as were described in our message #866[a], we believe that it would be well if we did not deliver those papers here which have already been delivered in Tokyo to Ambassador Grew. Duplications in this manner are apt to create misunderstandings through, transmission errors and through differences in translations. This is particularly true of some vague passages which cannot be made clear without lengthy explanations. (Please see our message #865[b], and others for points which are in doubt.) Under these circumstances, we are unable to make explanations when we are requested to do so by the United States. The Ambassador himself is placed in an exceedingly awkward position. We, therefore, would prefer to put most of our efforts in trying to sound the U.S. attitude.

(Part 2)

(2) We have already said that we have said all that is to be said. To keep submitting notes after notes, thereafter, which do not always run in sequence with the previous note, is not good, for it causes confusion and further delays.

As a matter of fact we were told in confidence that the United States is of the opinion that the scene of the negotiations was shifted to Tokyo by us so as to bring about delays. They think that we are watching developments of the German-Soviet war, and that we shall launch a northward move if indications seem to favor it.

[A-126]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

(Part 3)

(3)-----advises us that a friend of his in Tokyo reports that Japanese governmental circles feel that there is absolutely no reason why the United States should not accept the most recent proposals. The fact that she has not done so, must be due to interference from some Washington source.

For the past six months, we have been holding talks here during which the attitude and stand of the United States has been set down clearly. We feel confident that you are aware, through our various reports on the subject that is exceedingly unlikely that the United States las any intention of backing down from those established stands.

We feel that there must be a tendency in Tokyo to view the United States statements too optimistically. It is imaginable to us that there are those who approach the Premier with a little too much "wishful thinking".

(Part 4)

(4) It is admittedly true that impatience in this matter must be avoided. We realize, of course, that circumstances have made it unavoidable to a certain extent, but even so, it seems to us that we have been urging the United States to reply quite frequently of late. This apparently is giving the impression to the United States that we are overly anxious.

On the other hand, the United States applied the "freezing" order on us, affecting our entire economic structure. Since then, they have been sitting tight, awaiting and watching subsequent developments. The United States does not suffer greatly from that measure; hence they are in no rush.

Under such circumstances, we do not feel that it is to our advantage to show signs of over-anxiety all by ourselves.

[a] See III, 214—Grew's report of our terms of peace with China differs from what you sent me. Please check.
[b] See III, 219—Long report from Nomura giving his views of current state of U.S.-Jap negotiations.

Trans. 10-4-41


No. 226
October 1, 1941
#618.
FROM: Tokyo 
TO: Washington 

(In 5 parts—complete)

(Part 1)

To Counselor Iguti from Terasaki.

Re your #870[a].

1. Please refer to our message #613[b] with regard to the matter contained in your #866[c].

2. I feel that you are justified to a certain extent when you complain that after we have stated that we have put all of our cards on the table, we continue to send you note after note, etc. Our note of 4 September was so designed to contain our views of the three subjects which have been discussed hitherto in a very broad light. It was not drawn up with any intention of

[A-127]

"slowing down" the procedure in the sense voiced by Hull. We were of the opinion that there were some points of the preliminary talks which needed clearing up. Thinking that it would facilitate matters if we drew up our proposals in the form that the U.S. proposal of 21 June was put in (my message #595[d]). We further sent you message #590[e], dealing with Japanese-Chinese peace terms and my message #59l[f] pertaining to the garrisoning of troops, in the hope that they would supplement and explain our note of 4 September. They were forwarded to your office by the Foreign Minister, as reference material to be used by the Ambassador in explaining our position to the United States. They were sent at the request of the Premier and the military.

Part 2

Putting it bluntly, we were quite unaware of the fact that the Ambassador in the United States had allegedly submitted, for the purpose of further consideration by this office, certain changes in our note of 4 September, (the 1st, 4th—including the supplements—6th and 7th paragraphs were unchanged; paragraph 2 was unchanged with the exception of that part referring to the exchanging of official notes; paragraph 3 was identical to the Japanese note of 15 June; and to paragraph 5 was added the words: "For the production and procurement of national resources" to the U.S. proposal of 21 June), until we were questioned about it by the U.S. Ambassador in Tokyo. This allegation came as a great surprise and the Foreign Minister replied that the note of 14 July must have been the one implied. The Minister added that if the Embassy in Tokyo was in immediate need of the English text of that message, he could no doubt obtain it from the State Department, and that we could supply him with the Japanese text immediately.

It was then that that part which appears in parentheses in the preceding paragraph came to light. At the same time, the fact that the Japanese Ambassador had said that the "draft was not official" to the State Department was also brought to light.

Part 3

These conditions have further complicated the already exceedingly complicated negotiations and for that reason, it is indeed very regrettable.

3. It is regrettable that in spite of the fact that the Ambassador in Washington and yourself are putting forth your best efforts and in spite of the fact that we are facing the problems with the utmost sincerity, the United States does not reciprocate our statesmanship. However, there are none here who are underrating the United States or who are looking upon the developments with undue optimism.

4. We fear that possibly you are not completely familiar with the exceedingly critical situation at home. It is only through the clear thinking of the military and the superhuman work on the part of all those officials concerned with domestic matters that we have been able to avert the breaking out of any unfortunate incident subsequent to the 27th[g]. The utmost caution shall have to be exercised in the future to preserve this condition. Will you please obtain from Minister Wakasugi at first hand a description of the situation in Japan. This is, of course, for your and the Ambassador's information only.

Your explanation to the United States should be made along the following lines: "Apparently there are those in the United States who misunderstand the political situation in Japan. These persons seem to be of the opinion that the Konoye cabinets position is not strong. Therefore, any agreement entered into with that government is in danger of being disregarded by the military or some other strong organization. This is not a correct analysis of the situation in Japan. It is true that there are those who express opposition to the present cabinet but these elements can be easily overruled.

[A-128]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

Part 4

"Of course there have been public utterances such as Colonel Mabuchi's broadcast and Nakano's speech, who expressed, judging from the reports, opinions opposed to those contained in the Premier's message. Anyone, however, who knows the characteristics of the Japanese and who are familiar with conditions in Japan, should be able to understand the true meaning of those speeches. Mabuchi placed the most emphasis on encouraging the people while Nakano, pursuing his usual line, need not be looked upon with any importance.

"Unfortunately, however, foreign newsmen stationed in Japan, attached much importance to these speeches. British and American newspapers which place the most importance on 'journalistic interest' played up minor points in an exaggerated manner.

"Those, of course, are causing misunderstandings. We are confident, however, that the people who have spent any time at all in Japan can see the true picture, etc."

We believe that if the situation were explained to them in that manner, they will more readily understand matters. Moreover, it is the truth.

Not only the Foreign Minister but all concerned are as one in this matter, and are willing to meet any without fear. You can readily see, in view of domestic circumstances and in view of external relations, that we are all eager to have the "leaders' conference" take place. This is but a natural development, and if they insist on construing it to be impatience on our part, I guess it can't be helped.

That we intend Washington to be the central locale of these negotiations is as you stated in your recent message and should have been further clarified by the telephone communication between the Foreign Office and the Embassy. Because of some peculiar circumstances, the occasion may arise where some talks are conducted in Tokyo first. That would be done only under unavoidable circumstances. Any who believe that any idea of stalling was behind such a move, thoroughly misunderstands the Foreign Minister's motives.

Time is now the utmost important element. Whether this matter materializes or not has a direct and important bearing on peace on the Pacific and even of the world. The seriousness of the situation must be thoroughly recognized. Please exercise very bit of power available to bring about a favorable conclusion of this matter.

Paragraph 2 of my message #614[h] was meant to point out that we have no objections to using the contents of my message #595[d] as a basis of negotiations if so desired by the United States.

Although there is that matter contained in my message #617[i], we make the above statement anew.

[a] See III, 225.
[b] Not available.
[c] See III, 214—Grew's report of our terms of peace with China differs from what you sent me. Please check.
[d] See III, 213—Tokyo sends what appears to be nearly their final effort to get the U.S. to agree to a "leader's conference".
[e] See III, 191—Outline of Japan's terms for peace with China.
[f] See III, 200—Japan presents a long explanation of the necessity for her maintaining troops in certain parts of China even after peace with Japan is restored.
[g] First Anniversary of the Tripartite Pact.
[h] See III, 221-223—I agree that we should avoid any more written suggestions to the U.S. until they give us some reply.
[i] Tokyo instructed Washington: "i" as used in "the 'i' of my message #595" in the sentence reading". ... if the U.S. so desires it, it shall be used as the basis", at the end of paragraph 2, is the "i" of "imi".

[A-129]

Trans. 10-4-41

 


No. 227
October 2, 1941
#625.
FROM: Tokyo 
TO: Washington

Special intelligence #330 from New York states that an A. P. dispatch declares that the Japanese-American negotiations warrant a pessimistic outlook and that the KONOYE Cabinet will face a crisis in about two weeks, whereupon it will be inevitable that the Cabinet undergo a revision. It seems that this rumor is going around in Washington, but in any case, it is absolutely false and untrue. The situation here in Japan as described in my #618[a] should be known to you and, whenever necessary, will you please enlighten the Americans. Too, Secretary HULL appears to be gravely concerned over public opinion here in Japan. I think that he has questioned you twice on this subject. Well, let me tell you that public opinion is very calm here and we intend to take advantage of the situation. We are merely awaiting their memorandum, and the Government entertains the view that we had better issue a statement on these Japanese-American negotiations at the earliest opportunity. This opinion is growing.

Naturally the substance of this statement will be confined to our side. We can merely refer briefly to matters on the American side. In any case, we will discuss all this with the Americans.

It seems that there have been a number of rumors concerning a statement by the Government, lately. Among them there are many mistaken ones.

[a] See III, 226.

Trans. 10-2-41


No. 228
October 2, 1941
#890.
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 
TO: Tokyo 

Urgent

(Part 1 of 12)

To be handled in Government code. Separate wire.

Reference is made to the proposals of the Japanese Government communicated on September 6, 1941, by the Japanese Ambassador to the Secretary of State, and to statement relating thereto subsequently communicated to this Government by the Japanese Government. Thoughtful study has been given to the communications to which reference is made, and in connection with that study careful review has been made of other communications previously received from the Japanese Government on the same subject. On the basis of this study observations are offered as follows:

[A-130]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

1. The Government of the United States welcomed, as affording a possible opportunity for furthering the broad-gauge objectives and principles of a program of peace, the Japanese Government's suggestions made through its Ambassador here in the early part of August that there be held a meeting of the responsible heads of the Japanese Government and of the Government of the United States to discuss means for bringing about an adjustment of relations between the United States and Japan and that there be resumed the informal conversations which had been in progress between the two countries to ascertain whether there existed a basis for negotiations relative to a peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific situation.

Trans. 10-6-41


No. 229
October 2, 1941
#890.
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 
TO: Tokyo 

(Part 2 of 12)

To be handled in Government code.

Accordingly, in the reply made by the President on August 17, 1941 to the Japanese Ambassador the view was expressed that such informal conversations would naturally envisage the working out of a progressive program attainable by peaceful means—that sort of program would involve the application in the entire Pacific area of the principle of equality of commercial opportunity and treatment, thus making possible access by all countries to to raw materials and to all other essential commodities, and there were described the advantages which would flow to all countries, including Japan, from the adoption of such a program.

In conclusion, it was stated that if the Japanese Government were in a position to embark upon a peaceful program for the Pacific along the lines of the program and principles to which the United States is committed, this Government would be prepared to consider resumption of the informal exploratory discussion and would be glad to endeavor to arrange a suitable time and place to exchange views.

Trans. 10-6-41


No. 230
October 2, 1941
#890.
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 
TO: Tokyo 

(Part 3 of 12)

To be handled in Government code. Separate wire.

In the light of the broad purposes and fundamental principles which this Government holds, it was gratifying to the President and the Government of the United States to receive the message of the Prime Minister and the statement of the Government of Japan on August 28, 1941, containing statements expressing Japan's desire and intent to pursue courses of peace in harmony with the fundamental principles to which the people and Government of

[A-131]

the United States are committed. In its statement the Japanese Government gave, with some qualifications, broad assurances of its peaceful intent, including a comprehensive assurance that the Japanese Government has no intention of using without provocation military force against any neighboring nation. The Japanese Government declared that it supported the program and principles which had been briefly outlined by the President not only as applicable to the Pacific area but also as a program for the entire world.

Trans. (Not dated)


No. 231
October 2, 1941
#890.
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 
TO: Tokyo 

(Part 4 of 12)

The Government of the United States, while desiring to proceed as rapidly as possible with consideration of arrangements for a meeting between the heads of state, felt it desirable, in order to assure that that meeting would accomplish the objectives in view, to clarify the interpretation of certain principles and the practical.[a] It has not been the purpose of this Government to enter into a discussion of details. This Government has felt, however, that the clarification sought would afford a means of exploiting our effort to arrive at a meeting of minds. On September 3, 1941, the President in giving reply to the Japanese Ambassador expressed the earnest desire of the Government of the United States to collaborate in efforts to make effective in practice the principles to which the Japanese Government made reference.

[a] It is believed that some words were omitted in the original transcription.

Trans. (Not dated)


No. 232
October 2, 1941
#890.
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 
TO: Tokyo 

(Part 5 of 12)

To be handled in Government code.

The President reiterated the four principles regarded by this Government as the foundation upon which relations between nations should properly rest. Those principles are:

1. Respect for the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of each and all nations.

2. Support of the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries.

3. Support of the principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity.

4. Non-disturbance of the status quo in the Pacific except as the status quo may be altered by peaceful means.

The President pointed out that in order to bring about any satisfactory settlement of Pacific questions it was highly important to reach a community of view and a clear agreement upon certain points with respect to which fundamental differences of opinion between our two Governments had developed in the informal conversations; and the President requested an indication of the present attitude of the Japanese Government with regard to those fundamental

[A-132]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

questions. On September 6, the Prime Minister of Japan in a conversation with the American Ambassador at Tokyo stated that he subscribed fully to the four principles above mentioned.

Trans. (Not dated)


No. 233
October 2, 1941
#890.
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 
TO: Tokyo 

(Part 6 of 12)

The foregoing developments and assurances, together with other statements made by the Japanese Government, seemed to justify this Government in concluding that the Japanese Government might be expected to adhere to and to give practical application to a broad progressive program covering the entire Pacific area. It was therefore a source of disappointment to the Government of the United States that the proposal of the Japanese Government presented by the Japanese Ambassador on September 6, 1941, which the Japanese Government apparently intended should constitute a concrete basis for discussion, appeared to disclose divergence in the concepts of the two Governments. That is to say, those proposals and the subsequent explanatory statements made in regard thereto serve, in the opinion of this Government, to narrow and restrict not only the application of the principles upon which our informal conversations already referred to had been based but also the various assurances given by the Japanese Government of its desire to move along with the United States in putting into operation a broad program looking to the establishment and maintenance of peace and stability in the entire Pacific area.

Trans. (Not dated)


No. 234
October 2, 1941
#890.
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 
TO: Tokyo 

(Part 7 of 12)

As has already been said, the various broad assurances given by the Japanese Premier and the Japanese Government are highly gratifying. In putting forward its attitude of peaceful intent toward other nations, the Japanese Government qualified its assurances with certain phrases the need for which is not easily understood. It is difficult to conceive of the developing under present circumstances in any of the territories neighboring French Indo-China, in Thailand or in the Soviet Union in any aggressive threat or provocation to Japan. The inalienable right of self-defense is of course well recognized by all nations and there could arise in some minds a question as to just what the Japanese Government has in view in circumscribing its assurances of peaceful intent with what would seem to be unnecessary qualifying phrases.

Trans. (Not dated)

[A-133]


No. 235
October 2, 1941
#890.
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 
TO: Tokyo 

(Part 8 of 12)

In the formal conversations there was tentatively arrived at a formula in regard to economic policy (section of the draft understanding) which provided that Japanese activity and American activity in the Pacific area shall be carried on by peaceful means and in conformity with the principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations. In the Japanese Government, proposals of September 6 and in subsequent communications from the Japanese Government, the commitments contained in that formula were restricted to the countries of the southwest-Pacific area (or the Pacific area as a whole). In reference to China, the Japanese Government states that it will respect the principle of non-discrimination, but the explanation given in regard to this point would seem to be open to the implication that the Japanese Government has in mind some limitation upon the application of this principle occasioned by reason, geographical propinquity to China.

Trans. (Not dated)


No. 236
October 2, 1941
#890.
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 
TO: Tokyo 

(Part 9 of 12)

Obviously, it would not be likely to serve the purpose affirmed by the Japanese Government or by this government if either the United States or Japan were to pursue one course or policy in certain areas while at the same time pursuing an opposite course or policy in other areas.

This government has noted the views of the Japanese Government in support of its desire to station troops for an indeterminate period in certain areas of China. Entirely apart from the question of the reasons for such a proposal, the inclusion of such a provision in the proposed terms of a peaceful settlement between Japan and China at a time when Japan is in military occupation of large areas in China is open to certain objections. For example, when a country in military occupation of territory of another country proposes to the second country the continued stationing of troops of the first country in certain areas as a condition for a peaceful settlement and thus for the withdrawal of the occupationary forces from other areas, such procedure would seem to be out of keeping with the progressive and enlightened courses and principles which were discussed in the informal conversations and thus would not, in the opinion of this government, make for peace or offer prospects of stability.

Trans. (Not dated)

[A-134]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR


No. 237
October 2, 1941
#890.
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 
TO: Tokyo 

(Part 10 of 12)

It is believed that a clear-cut manifestation of Japan's intention in regard to the withdrawal of Japanese troops from China and French Indo-China would be most helpful in making known—in particular to those who might be inclined to be critical—Japan's peaceful intentions and Japan's desire to follow courses calculated to establish a sound basis for future stability and progress in the Pacific area. With reference to the attitude of each country toward the European war, this Government has noted with appreciation the further step taken by the Japanese Government to meet the difficulties inherent in this aspect of the relations between the two countries. It is believed that it would be helpful if the Japanese Government could give further study to the question of possible additional clarification of its position.

Trans. (Not dated)


No. 238
October 2, 1941
#890.
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 
TO: Tokyo 

(Part 11 of 12)

To be handled in Government Code.

In the exchange of views which have taken place between the two Governments in an effort to reach an agreement in principle upon fundamental questions in order to prepare the ground for the proposed meeting of the responsible chiefs of Government, this government has endeavored to make clear that it envisages a comprehensive program calling for the application uniformly to the entire Pacific area of liberal and progressive principles.

From what the Japanese Government has so far indicated in regard to its purposes this Government derives the impression that the Japanese Government has in mind a program which would be circumscribed by the imposition of qualifications and exceptions to the actual application of those principles.

If this impression is correct, can the Japanese Government feel that a meeting between the responsible heads of Government under such circumstances would be likely to contribute to the advancement of the high purposes which we have mutually had in mind.

Trans. (Not dated)

[A-135]


No. 239
October 2, 1941
#890.
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 
TO: Tokyo 

(Part 12 of 12)

To be handled in government code.

As already stated, this government welcomed the assurances contained in the statement of the Japanese Government which accompanied the Japanese Prime Minister's message to the President of the United States that the Japanese Government subscribed to the principles which have long been advocated by this government as the only sound basis for stable international relations. This government believes that renewed consideration of these fundamental principles may be helpful in our effort to seek a meeting of minds in regard to the essential questions on which we seek agreement and thus lay a firm foundation for a meeting between the responsible heads of the two governments. The subject of the meeting proposed by the Prime Minister and the objectives sought have engaged, and continued to engage, the close and active interest of the President of the United States, and it is the President's earnest hope that discussion of the fundamental questions may be so developed that such a meeting can be held. It is also the President's hope that the Japanese Government shares the conviction of this government that, if the governments of Japan and of the United States are resolved to give those principles practical and comprehensive application, the two governments can work out a fundamental rehabilitation of the relations between the United States and Japan and contribute to the bringing about of a lasting peace with justice, equity and order in the whole Pacific area.

Trans. 10-6-41


No. 240
October 2, 1941
#889.
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 
TO: Tokyo 

At Secretary HULL's invitation, I called on him at nine o'clock this morning. He handed me the reply of the United States Government which I have given in the separate telegram #890[a] and said that it is the opinion of the United States Government that a conference of the leaders of the two governments would be a precarious affair unless a (complete ?) understanding could be arrived at thereby and that if peace is to be maintained all over the Pacific, a "patch-up" understanding would not do, but a "clear-cut" understanding would have to be made. I remarked that the Japanese Government will, no doubt, be very much disappointed in such a reply but that in any case I would transmit it.

[a] See III, 228-239.

Trans. 10-3-41

[A-136]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR


No. 241
October 3, 1941
#626.
FROM: Tokyo 
TO: Washington 

We are in receipt of your messages Nos. 889[b] and 890[a]. The former has been read and the latter is at present being decoded.

The Yomiuri's correspondent sent a dispatch to his home office regarding the U.S.-Japanese negotiations saying that in fact----------.

The view of the domestic situation and the matter contained in paragraph 2 of my message #62(5)(?)[a] it is essential that subjects pertaining to this matter be watched very carefully. Will you please make every effort to do so in behalf of the success of the U.S.-Japanese talks.

[a] See III, 240—Hull-Nomura interview 2 October in which U.S. finally gives Japan a reply on the leaders' conference by turning it down as a "patch work" solution unless basic issues are settled first.
[b] See III, 228-239—Text of U.S. note of 2 October 1941.
[c] See III, 227—Rumors from New York and Washington that the Konoye Cabinet may fall are without foundation.

Trans. 10-6-41


No. 242
October 3, 1941
#898.
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 
TO: Tokyo 

Today, the 3rd, I called on Secretary Hull,

1. and conveyed to him the gist of your Nos. 520[a] and 623[b] and asked for his cooperation in order to effect a speedy settlement. The Secretary said that properly speaking this matter concerned the Treasury Department and the Maritime Commission and that he was not conversant with the details, however he would see that some sort of an answer was forthcoming immediately.

2. I took this occasion to state that the Japanese government might possibly issue some sort of a "statement" regarding the problem of adjustment of Japanese-American diplomatic relations and that if this were done notification would be duly made. The Secretary took it in good part.

[a] (See Japanese Naval Intelligence, Part B). The Navy Ministry wants arrangements for a courier from your office to go to Hawaii.
[b]There is now no other way to get U.S. oil than by transferring our funds (unfrozen) in South America.

Trans. 10-8-41


No. 243
October 3, 1941
#627.
FROM: Tokyo 
TO: Washington 

I described the various problems involving the United States and Japan to British Ambassador Craigie who was scheduled to have gone on a vacation trip to the United States on 28 September. (He had planned to leave from Nagasaki and make connections with the President Coolidge at Shanghai on 4 October. However, in view of illness on the part of the Counselor who

[A-137]

was to have acted as Charge d'affaire in the Ambassador's absence, his trip has been apparently postponed for about three weeks.)

At the same time, we asked Ambassador Grew to also speak to Ambassador Craigie and we understand that they also discussed matters on the same day.

Subsequently, according to absolutely unimpeachable sources, Ambassador Craigie cabled Foreign Secretary Eden and Ambassador Halifax, explaining the importance of having the United States and Japan come to an immediate agreement to hold a conference. The gist of Craigie's opinions contained in those messages is being forwarded to you as my supplementary message #628[a].

In view of the source, will Your Excellency keep the information contained strictly to yourself only.

[a] See III, 244.

Trans. 10-4-41


No. 244
October 3, 1941
#628.
FROM: Tokyo 
TO: Washington 

1. With the resignation of former Foreign Minister Matsuoka the chances of turning away from the Axis policy and toward the Democracies, has been considerably enhanced.

2. Among the difficult points in the materialization of a Japanese-United States conference, is that with Japan speed is required. Moreover, she can enter into nothing more, at the present time, than a temporary understanding. On the other hand, by pursuing a policy of stalling, the United States is arguing about every word and every phrase on the grounds that it is an essential preliminary to any kind of an agreement. It seems apparent that the United States does not comprehend the fact that by the nature of the Japanese and also on account of the domestic conditions in Japan, no delays can be countenanced. It would be very regrettable indeed if the best opportunity for the settlement of the Far Eastern problems since I assumed my post here, were to be lost in such a manner.

3. Prince Konoye is sincerely desirous of avoiding the dangers which Japan may face through her connections in the Tripartite Pact and in the Axis for which the Prince, himself feels responsibility. Opposition within the country to the Prince's reversal of policy is fairly strong. Therefore, unless the Japanese-U.S. conversations are held in the very near future, the opportunity will probably be lost. Moreover, if by some chance, meetings fail to materialize, or if they are unduly delayed, the Konoye cabinet will be placed in a precarious position.

4. We realize, of course, that there are numerous very complicated matters involved in the proposed negotiations. However, both the U.S. Ambassador in Japan and I are firmly of the opinion that it would be a foolish policy if this superb opportunity is permitted to slip by assuming an unduly suspicious attitude.

In conclusion, it must be added that until Japan's reversal of policy is conceretely proven— in other words, until the Konoye principles actually materialize—there should be no let up in the retaliatory economic measures by us.

Note: The above message expresses the views of British Ambassador Craigie in Tokyo, as explained in III, 243.

Trans. 10-4-41

[A-138]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR


No. 245
October 4, 1941
#637.
FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) 
TO: Washington 

Re your #890[a].

Please (make sure ?) immediately and suitably the following points:

1. Since the United States Government wishes to get our explanations regarding the fundamentals before entering upon the Japanese-American negotiations, theoretically speaking, as soon as we have satisfied it with our explanation we should be reaching the stage of actually opening the negotiations. As to the details of these fundamentals, we have already exchanged our view and so they should be clear. Now that only those points which the United States Government has pointed out remain difficult of agreement (namely, economic activity in the Pacific; withdrawal as well as stationing of troops, and the question of the Three-Power agreement,) would it be all right for us to assume that the United States Government has a clear comprehension of the other points?

2. Now, as to the approval the Premier has given to the four basic principles, he has merely approved of them in principle. In other words, although in principle he considers them good, there may be differences of opinion when it comes to actually applying these four principles. The Premier stated that he would like to consider these differences at the time of the negotiations. In fact, it is on the presumption of doing so that we have been managing affairs domestically. Since this matter is of a delicate nature in its bearing upon the internal situation, I would like to have you see to it that the United States Government has no misunderstanding of it.

[a] See III, 228-239—Text of American Government's statement to the Japanese Government.

Trans. 10-6-41


No. 246
October 4, 1941
#901.
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 
TO: Tokyo 

(Part 1 of 2.)[a]

The tremendous efforts you have been making and the profound concern you have had to have since your appointment are beyond my imagination. I am deeply impressed. It is, indeed, regrettable that things do not turn out as we want them to. Yesterday I expressed myself quite carelessly on the spur of the moment. Please be so kind as to understand that it was the result of no other than a profound concern for my country at this critical moment that caused me to do so.

If I may express my views, I believe that before Japan will be able to become self-sufficient as a result of establishment of the sphere of co-prosperity, economic reorganization of an extremely drastic nature would have to be made. I imagine in actuality we shall find this far

[A-139]

from easy. I do not know to what extent we shall be able to solve this-----in case we advance northward, but I suppose that if we advance southward we might be able to gain a profitable foothold after several years.

[a] Part 2 of 2 not available.

Trans. 10-6-41


No. 247
October 7, 1941
#641.
FROM: Tokyo 
TO: Washington 

Re my #637[a]

We are not as yet in receipt of your message. We would appreciate your submitting it to them and advising us of the result at all possible speed.

As you are fully aware, the contents of paragraphs 1 and 2 of the captioned message are of the utmost importance in which every second counts. Without the above information we are unable to continue with our consideration of the U.S. memo. That is the situation here.

[a] See III, 245.

Trans. 10-7-41


No. 248
October 8, 1941
#647.
FROM: Tokyo 
TO: Washington 

Re my #637[a].

Until I receive the explanation to the text of my telegram we cannot go with our discussions on the basis of the American memorandum. Furthermore, the internal situation here is such that it would not permit further delay. Will you therefore reply at once.

[a] See III, 245.

Trans. 10-8-41


No. 249
October 7, 1941
#643.
FROM: Tokyo 
TO: Washington 

(In 3 parts—complete.)

I requested the U.S. Ambassador in Tokyo to call on me on the 7th, and he complied. The following is the gist of our conversation, and I forward it to you for your information only.

[A-140]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

"I am in receipt of the U.S. memorandum of the 2nd, and I (the Foreign Minister) assume that you (the U.S. Ambassador in Tokyo) have also received notification thereof from your home government. I would consider myself exceedingly fortunate if I were permitted to hear your opinions thereon", I said.

To this the Ambassador replied that he had received a resume of that memo from Washington, but that was all for that reason he said he had no way of expressing his opinion. I, therefore, said that since the resume undoubtedly limited itself to the listing of all of the more important points, it should facilitate the forming of an opinion. I added that I was striving to reach an understanding through cooperation, in the same manner as is the Ambassador not so much as a diplomat, but rather as a human being. From that viewpoint, what are the views of the U.S. Ambassador, I asked of him, and also asked him if he had not had some communication from his home government which would tend to explain or express opinions on the above mentioned resume.

The Ambassador said he had been cabled the resume only, and nothing more. Without seeing the entire memo, he said, he could not ascertain the tone thereof. He would be very happy if he could be permitted to read the full text, he said. Should, however, he be forced to express an opinion with his inadequate knowledge of the circumstances, he would be inclined to believe that the United States is trying to secure an agreement on the preliminary conditions.

I, therefore, replied that putting things bluntly, from the viewpoint of the sincere efforts we were making in this matter, we were not completely satisfied with the U.S. note referred to at present.

Part 2

By the above I do not imply that we do not trust the sincerity of the United States, I explained, but say so after taking into consideration the domestic and external circumstances of Japan.

The Ambassador then advised me that even as recently as on the 5th, he wrote up a fourteen page, 3000 word report of the various conditions in Japan based on what he had actually seen and heard himself during his many years of service in Japan. In it, he said that he fully described the real efforts that were being made by us in this matter. However, he did not dwell on this phase of the matter.

2. According to the U.S. memorandum of the 2nd, I continued, the Prime Minister of Japan allegedly stated that he "fully subscribed" to the Four Principles referred to during his conversations with the U.S. Ambassador on the 6th of last month. The record of the meeting, however, shows that the Premier stated that he was in accord with them only in principle. To this the Ambassador replied that being fully aware of the importance of every word of that interview, he had reported it absolutely accurately to his home government. I, therefore, said that it was because I agreed with him as to the importance of the matter that I wished to make this point clear. Our notes of the meeting clearly record that we agreed in principle only. The copies of the U.S. memorandum which were sent to various persons concerned for their perusal and study were corrected from "fully" to "in principle" so as to coincide with the original. We have already requested the Ambassador in the United States, I continued, to notify the United States of this correction. I am reporting this matter to His Excellency, I said, because I felt that he was concerned. The only reason we mentioned this matter to Ambassador Nomura was because this memorandum had been handed to him for delivery. There was absolutely no other motive in doing so, I said.

The U.S. Ambassador seemed to be thoroughly satisfied with my explanation and expressed his thanks for reporting it to him.

Part 3

Continuing, I said that though I had no intention of being too argumentative, there was one item I would like to question the Ambassador about. I pointed out that in doing so, I did not want the friendly relations between himself and myself to be altered in any manner.

[A-141]

After thus prefacing my remarks, I said that fundamentally speaking the Prime Minister's message was a private message addressed to a private party. How, then, I lightly pressed, was it that passages therefrom could be quoted in the memorandum which is an official note?

The Ambassador replied that he could see our point clearly and added that it must have been due to faulty handling of the various papers in the State Department. He said that that was entirely an on-the-spot assumption on his part. He went on to say that he would now be able to definitely state that the Prime Minister was in accord "in principle".

3. Returning to the matter concerning the "fully subscribed" quotation, the Ambassador started to say that he seemed to recall that when that matter was first brought up, Ambassador Nomura had accepted the "Four Principles" unconditionally. I, therefore, said that if there is some misunderstanding on the part of the United States through erroneous handling of some papers by our representative, it may become necessary to correct it at some future date. To attempt to do so now, though, I said involves the danger of needlessly confusing the issue. (I referred to "Ambassador Nomura's draft incident of 4 September as an example) and for this reason, I said that I thought it would be better if nothing were done about it at present.

Trans. 10-11-41


No. 250
October 8, 1941
No number.
FROM: Tokyo (Foreign Minister) 
TO: Washington 

Message to Berlin #873 Part 1 of 4.

Re my #708[a].

1. The Japanese American negotiations began under the conditions described in my afore mentioned message during the Administration of the 2nd Konoye Cabinet. There was, however a rupture caused by the occupation of French Indo-China. We hope by the penetration of French Indo-China to hasten the end of the China trouble; to break the Anglo-American encirclement by joint defense; and to procure raw materials. It is a measure taken in self defense. But England and the United States brought to bear against us measures equivalent to an economic blockade. Japanese-American relations deteriorated extremely and our internal situation was perilously affected. In the meantime, the European War took the trend of a protracted struggle The fight between the Reich and the Soviet Union contrary to the calculations of Berlin reached a deadlock. Now the Soviet is going over to the Anglo Saxon camp and we must make ready to cope with this situation. Moreover commerce is disrupted between Europe and Asia and liaison between our country and Germany and Italy is for the time being severed.

[a] See II, 204 giving the statement of the policy and views of the Imperial Government.

Trans. 10-8-4]

[A-142]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR


No. 251
October 8, 1941
No number.
FROM: Tokyo (Foreign Minister) 
TO: Washington 

Message to Berlin #673. Part 2 of 4.

All the while England and the United States were strengthening their net about us and we could see no means of concluding the Sino-Japanese affair. It was under these conditions that the Imperial Government suddenly decided upon diplomatic negotiations to terminate their struggle with the Chinese; to establish an area of co-prosperity in East Asia; and to conserve our national resources in preparation for the future. We feel that it is necessary to open the way for a compromise in our relations with the United States.

2. When we concluded the Three Power Pact, we hoped while maintaining amicable relations with America, and to tell the truth through this very means, to conclude the Chinese trouble; to win the Soviet over to the Japanese-German-Italian camp; to have Germany use her good offices between Tokyo and Moscow (STAHMER said that Germany would be an honest go-between and would be sure to bring about the solution of our troubles with Kremlin and OTT sent us a letter to the effect that he himself was going to work for an understanding between Japan and the Soviet); to guarantee goods from the South Seas to Germany and Italy who, in turn, were to give us mechanical and technical assistance. But since then times have changed and unexpected events have taken place. All that remains unchanged is Japanese-American relations and that is about the only thing that could be patched up.

Trans. 10-8-41


No. 252
October 8, 1941
No number.
FROM: Tokyo (Foreign Minister) 
TO: Washington 

Message to Berlin #873. Part 3 of 4.

At the time Germany stated that she would not spare any effort to prevent a clash between Japan and the United States and that she would even do all she could to improve relations between the two countries (this was during the MATSUOKA STAHMER talks). Then Japan and Germany felt the need of preventing the United States from entering the war.

3. The objective of the Japan-German-Italian Three Power Pact was to prevent the expansion of the European war, to restrain the United States from participating, and to establish universal peace. Statements exchanged at the time make this perfectly clear but now the war covers the face of Europe. The only placid expanse of water on earth is the Pacific. Under these circumstances, it is felt that it is up to both nations to probe into the causes of the trouble between their respective governments and to assure the harmony of the Pacific. It is further felt that this coincides with the spirit of the Three Power Pact.

Trans. 10-8-41

[A-143]


No. 253
October 8, 1941
No number.
FROM: Tokyo (Foreign Minister) 
TO: Washington 

Message to Berlin #873. Part 4 of 4.

4. It was with this view that the former cabinet began negotiations with Washington and still today we feel the necessity of continuing them. On the very occasion when Tokyo and Washington were arguing over our occupation of French Indo-China, Prince KONOYE was moved to reopen negotiations and messages were exchanged between him and President ROOSEVELT and ever since the respective Governments have been endeavoring to lay the groundwork for the opening of parleys through an exchange of opinions. We got our latest answer from Washington on the 4th of October and we are studying it now. It is not that we are divergent from our relations with the signatories of the Tri-Partite Pact but we are continuing our negotiations hoping to end the China affair. (The three principles of KONOYE envision a conclusion of hostilities with China through a basic treaty and the use of the United States to coerce the CHIANG regime, to establish an area to co-prosperity in greater East Asia, to procure materials, to prevent the expansion of the European war, to seal peace in the Pacific area and to prevent the United States from entering the war. Of course, however, we expect our ups and downs.) This is for your private information.

Relayed to Washington.

Trans. 10-8-41


No. 254
October 8, 1941
#907.
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 
TO: Tokyo 

(Part 1 of 4)

(To be handled in government code. Departmental Secret) Re your #637[a].

I will tell you more about this after I interview the Secretary of State a little later on. However, my views at present are as follows:

(1) According to the American memorandum of the 1st, the Americans realize that there is unanimity on the various principles and fundamentals which they have stuck to. However, they are dissatisfied because you did not express a desire to go into a detailed discussion. The Americans believe in the four principles as the basis on which relations between the two countries must be adjusted. The Americans consider that it is necessary to achieve unanimity on the various questions which have been fundamentally explored by both nations in the unofficial talks held so far in order to settle the Pacific question. They have always felt that if conversations between the leaders of the two countries are to be realized immediately, it must be definitely understood that these principles are to be applied to the concrete problems in the Pacific, and they desire a further clarification of our views.

[a] See III, 245 in which the Foreign Minister, TOYODA, asks Ambassador NOMURA to immediately clarify with the U.S. Government two points.

Trans. 10-10-41

[A-144]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR


No. 255
October 8, 1941
#907.
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 
TO: Tokyo 

(Part 2 of 4)

(To be handled in government code. Departmental Secret)

Thus, they hope that we will make ourselves clearer on these points. In our proposal of the 6th and in the explanation thereof, not only did we limit them and narrow what we had discussed in our informal conversations thus far, but we also curtailed extremely the guarantees we offered concerning the aforementioned principles. We equivocated concerning guarantees that we would not engage in armed aggression. We limited the area to which the principle of non-discriminatory treatment would apply in the Pacific, and on the excuse that China was geographically near to us, we limited the very principle itself. On the question of stationing and evacuating troops in and from China (including French Indo-China), the Americans are making some demands which we in principle have objections to. Moreover, they figure that they must be much surer of our attitude toward the three-power pact. These points you probably already know.

Trans. 10-10-41


No. 256
October 8, 1941
#907.
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 
TO: Tokyo 

(Part 3 of 4)

(To be handled in government code.)

Judging by the impression I got from the above mentioned facts and my contacts with them so far, they figure on first bringing about unanimity on the fundamental questions on which our two countries have so far failed to see eye to eye, and then gradually to turn to the other matters. They evidently feel that so long as there is disagreement on the aforementioned points it would be vain and futile to discuss the various other problems, therefore, up to now the United States has done no more than express her opinions on the other matters in the proposal of June 11. (As I have wired you, some changes were made in the last clause.)

In their proposal of June 21, they made it evident that they were going to stick to this as the basis for negotiations. The latest reply of theirs shows, I am sure, that they are entirely disregarding our own proposal of the 25th. This shows that they are going to stick to their ideas as they stand; however, it will still be necessary for us to talk through certain matters concerning, A. The matter mentioned in the annex of the clause concerning the China incident. B. Discontinuing activities designed to help CHIANG. C. The stipulation concerning Nanking Treaty in the clause concerning the China incident (an agreement between Japan and China): joint mediation and the right of self-protection mentioned in the clause concerning our attitude toward the European war; the question of eliminating the annex to the clause concerning commerce between the two nations.)

Trans. 10-10-41

[A-145]


No. 257
October 8, 1941
#907.
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 
TO: Tokyo 

(Part 4 of 4)

-----------------------------------------------------------------. Concerning the four principles mentioned in (2) during the conversation mentioned in your #634[a], the American Ambassador talked as if I had already reached an understanding with Secretary HULL on this. As I have told you in various messages, they shelved the question in both letter and spirit, but on April 16 when Secretary HULL presented me with these four points (see my #277[b]), I certainly was in no position to accept such a proposal before getting instructions from my home government, nor would I give the impression that we would accept them. Please note that. Nevertheless, these are very abstract principles, and I figured that there would be some elasticity in their application. This country applied them with prudence to other foreign nations; for example, in peace conferences, discussions of principles are extremely circumlocutionary, so I do not think you need to be troubled over this.

[a] The number is apparently wrong, as the subject matter of this message mentioned is unrelated.
[b] See Vol. I, April 16 in which NOMURA gives his views on the attitude and policies of the United States Government, and the four basic points which the United States advocates.

Trans. 10-10-41


No. 258
October 9, 1941
#915.
FROM: Washington 
TO: Tokyo 

Re your #637[a].

This morning, the 9th, I called on Hull and relayed the matter contained in your instructions, and at the same time brought up the points discussed at the White House on 3 September. The Secretary, in reply, merely repeated that non-discriminatory treatment should extend over the entire Pacific area. He added that geographical proximity, etc. could be interpreted in many ways. He said that he would have Ballantine and others make a detailed reply to me later after the papers I submitted were carefully perused and studied. (Hamilton and Ballantine are supposed to call on me this afternoon).

Referring to the matter of evacuating or stationing of troops in China, I carefully and in detail described the political situation in China from the Japanese viewpoint and pointed out that stationing of our troops in certain parts of China was absolutely essential. I requested that this point be given a reconsideration in this light.

I also stated that the Prime Minister had stated that he was in accord with the "Four Principles" in principle only, but Hull indicated that he was already aware of this fact.

[a] See III, 245—Re the U.S. note of 2 October it is assumed there is agreement with the U.S. on all points of the negotiations for an "Understanding Agreement", except evacuation from China, and the Tripartite Pact. Is that true? Konoye approves in principle the Four Principles laid down by the U.S. and expected to iron out their application in conference.

Trans. 10-13-41

[A-146]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR


No. 259
October 9, 1941
#917.
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 
TO: Tokyo 

(In 2 parts—complete)
(For official code handling. Secret outside of department.)
Re my #915[a].

On the 9th, Hamilton (accompanied by Ballantine and Schmidt) called on me on instructions of the Secretary of State, and I tried, on the basis of your #637[b] and along the general lines of your telephone conversation, to ascertain their intentions. They went into minute explanations pointing out that the U.S. Government's attitude is made plain in the memorandum of October 2nd, namely that this government is seeking to promote peace in the Pacific on the basis of the so-called Four Principles, and that the views of the United States in regard to such problems as Japan's forced advances northward and southward, indiscriminatory treatment in the Pacific, withdrawal of troops in China, and the Tripartite Treaty, have their origin in a fundamental concern with regard to the future. They stated that these principles apply to the entire Pacific area, and that there is no reason for applying different principles in the various areas of the Pacific. In reply to my question as to whether or not the United States is satisfied with our explanation in regard to all other points aside from those pointed out in the memorandum of the 2nd, they replied that they would like to have this ascertained from the basic attitude of the U.S. Government which is indicated in the memorandum of the 2nd, that this memorandum was given careful study by the U.S. Government and that this represents all that the U.S. Government has to say and that therefore there is nothing more for them to add. They emphasized the fact that they think that the U.S. Government does not now desire to enter upon any more discussions in regard to details, and that if there is a "meeting of minds" between the two nations in regard to the interpretation of the four basic principles, the other questions will find a natural understanding; but they avoided giving much in the way of definite replies to my questions.

Of course, they did state that there might be points in the proposal of June 21st which would need revision because of subsequent changes in the situation, but that in its larger aspects there has been no change and added further that after having studied these four basic principles, if Japan should reconsider the September 6th proposal and submit a second proposal, the United States stands ready to give it careful consideration.

With the situation as thus stated, I think we might as well proceed on the assumptions mentioned in my #907[a].

[a] See III, 258.
[b] See III, 245—Re the U.S. note of 2 October, it is assumed there is agreement with the U.S. on all points of the negotiations for an "Understanding Agreement", except evacuation from China, and the Tripartite Pact. Is that true? Konoye approves in principle the Four Principles laid down by the U.S. and expected to iron out their application in conference.
[c] See III, 254-257—In reply to Tokyo query whether the U.S. agrees to all points except "evacuation from China", Nomura explains in detail his ideas of the U.S. position and reasons for refusing the leader's meeting. Japan has equivocated and limited her agreement to the Four Principles the U.S. insist must be the basis of an understanding.

Trans. 10-14-41

[A-147]


No. 260
October 10, 1941
#650.
FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) 
TO: Washington 

Re your #915[a].

1. Slowly but surely the question of these negotiations has reached the decisive stage. I am doing my utmost to bring about a decision on them and the situation does not permit of this senseless procrastination. The difficult points must be clarified now. My #637[b] and related messages were sent you for that reason. What I wish of you now is to find out as soon as possible the opinions of the United States concerning the matters mentioned in those messages. (Otherwise, as I have told you two or three times, it will be impossible for me to decide upon our policy.) Yes, I know you have told me your opinions quite sufficiently in a number of messages, but what I want is the opinions of the American officials and none other.

2. In your caption message you do not tell me whether or not we have a chance to proceed with these parleys. You do not tell me how HULL answers. You do not tell me anything else I need to know for my future consideration. You must wire me in detail and immediately the minutes of these conversations, what they say and the prospect for negotiations. Hereafter, when you interview HULL or the President of the United States, please take WAKASUGI or IGUCHI with you and please send me without any delay the complete minutes of what transpires.

[a] See III, 258.
[b] See III, 245 in which Foreign Minister TOYODA asks Ambassador Nomura to clarify immediately with the United States Government two points.

Trans. 10-13-41


No. 261
October 10, 1941
#923.
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 
TO: Tokyo 

I have read your #650[a].

What they want is the maintenance of peace in the Pacific and they claim that our policy is semi-pacific and semi-aggressive. They say that our proposal of September 6 diverged greatly from preceding statements, and that it will be out of the question to agree on any preparatory talks on the basis of such a proposal. In addition, to the three matters mentioned in your message, it seems that there are many other objections. I have repeatedly asked them to clarify what I do not understand, but they won't answer. At any rate, however, I feel safe at least in saying that they are demanding that we compromise in accordance with the lines laid down in their memorandum of October 2. I am sure that there is not the slightest chance on earth of them featuring a conference of leaders so long as we do not make that compromise.

[A-148]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

In other words, they are not budging an inch from the attitude they have always taken; however, they act as if they were ready to consider at any time any plan of ours which would meet the specifications of their answer of the 2nd.

I think that you fully realize the situation I described in my #917[b] yesterday. However, I am sending you this for your information.

[a] See III, 260.
[b] See III, 259.

Trans. 10-11-41


No. 262
October 12, 1941
#654.
FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) 
TO: Washington 

On the afternoon of the 10th I asked Minister GREW to call on me. For your private information I spoke to him as follows, and as I have asked you before, I want you to continue your efforts to lead the United States officials to present us with a clearcut proposal:

1. "On the 3rd we received the American memorandum of the 2nd and have given it most cordial consideration. It is a little difficult for us to grasp the important points of it, but as best we can make out, they are (1) garrisoning and evacuating soldiers; (2) the English, Japanese, American attitude toward the European war; and (3) non-discrimination in commerce in China.

2. "Now we wish to put all our cards on the table and to proceed with negotiations. If the United States has any misgivings on those three points, or on any others, I am sure it will be possible for us to straighten them out. I would like to present to the treaty officials a proposal having some possibilities of adoption. Concerning those three points there is also a question of time. There is no use in exchanging official letters, notes and other documents as we now are. If we would only start out with a conference of leaders, such difficulties as exist may fade away automatically."

3. The American Ambassador said "The United States is a free country and we have to carefully consider public opinion." I retorted "Well, it is none the less so with us. It is true that we are under the thumb of public opinion, but if we can agree with the United States on a conference, public opinion will, of itself, calm down and no such unrest as now exists will continue. If we go on this way, it will be hard to say what the extremists may do."

4. I passed on to the Army Your Honor's communication concerning French Indo-China, but so far I have received no reply. I expect it soon.

Trans. 10-15-41

[A-149]


No. 263
October 11, 1941
#924.
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 
TO: Tokyo 

From Wakasugi to the Foreign Office.

At 5 p.m. the 13th I am scheduled to confer with Under Secretary Welles, during which I plan to ascertain in detail the attitude of their side. Welles also has expressed a desire to have a long chat with me at that time. This much for the time being.

Chief of office routing.

Please convey this to the Foreign Minister also.

Trans. 10-15-41


No. 264
October 13, 1941
#657.
FROM: Tokyo 
TO: Washington 

Re your #924[a].

We shall cable our instructions with regard to the talks referred to, subsequently. Please be so advised.

[a] See III, 263.

Trans. 10-13-41


No. 265
October 13, 1941
#658.
FROM: Tokyo 
TO: Washington 

Re my #657[a].

I presume that your talks with Welles will cover the U.S.-Japanese negotiations in toto. We are particularly anxious to be advised as soon as possible, as I have mentioned in previous messages referring to this subject, on the points listed below. (The situation at home is fast approaching a crisis and it is becoming absolutely essential that the two leaders meet if any adjustment of Japanese-U.S. relations is to be accomplished. I cannot go into details now, but please bear this fact in mind.)

1. May we assume that the United States has no particular disagreements other than the three points which are under consideration at the present time?

2. Submitting by the United States a counter proposal to our proposal of 25 September. (As you are well aware, our proposal of 25 September embodied our claims in the form submitted by the United States as their proposal on 21 June. Should the United States be reluctant to

[A-150]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

submit a clear-cut counter proposal to ours referred to above, we should request that they submit a basically new proposal immediately.)

Of point 1 set forth above, we are particularly interested in being advised of what the United States exactly desires concerning the matter of evacuation or garrisoning of troops.

[a] See III, 264—"We shall cable our instructions with regard to the talks referred to, subsequently. Please be so advised.

Trans. 10-13-41


No. 266
October 13, 1941
#663.
FROM: Tokyo 
TO: Washington 

Re my #658[a].

I pointed out in my message referred to in the heading that circumstances do not permit even an instant's delay. Please, therefore, submit a report on the rough outline and the general tone of the conference between Wakasugi and Welles immediately, and dispatch a cable giving the details, subsequently.

[a] See III, 265.

Trans. 10-14-41


No. 267
October 13, 1941
#939.
FROM: Washington 
TO: Tokyo 

(In 3 parts—complete)

The details of the Wakasugi-Welles conversations will be reported in a subsequent cable[a], but in the meantime, I shall submit this which concerns the two points on which you requested information in your message #658°. In view of the fact that the talks lasted for over two hours, will you please await the subsequent message for the details of the tone, etc. of the talks.

In general, the tone of the talks was friendly and frank. Welles said that there is no change in the President's expressed desire of meeting with the Premier if the three points can be agreed upon. He added that Secretary Hull is in full agreement on this point, too.

(1) As far as he knew, Welles said, there were no obstacles to the materialization of the leaders' conference, other than the three points. Wakasugi said that he got the impression that Secretary Hull was of the opinion that there would be one or two more points which would have to be cleared up when the preliminary arrangements were brought up to date, and asked Welles about that. Welles replied that he had not been advised by Hull of those points but that he would ascertain them and then advise us.

(Part 2)

With regard to the matter of withdrawing or stationing troops in China, Wakasugi said that the U.S. attitude had been made clear in her proposal of 21 June and again in her oral state-

[A-151]

ment of 2 October. We have no intention of arguing about that point any further, Wakasugi continued, but that he would like to ask one question about it. This question was his own personal one as an individual and was not instigated by or put with the knowledge of either the Government or the Ambassador.

So saying, Wakasugi said that when a nation had been sending fighting forces to another over a long period of years, it was exceedingly difficult, from a practical standpoint, to suddenly evacuate them. Even if such a program were to be carried out, years and months would be required before its completion, Wakasugi said, adding that Welles, who has had long years of experience as a diplomat should well understand that.

Moreover, Wakasugi continued, the matter of whether troops were to be removed or not was a matter involving Japan and China. Should, therefore, the United States be assured the withdrawal of troops by Japan, would the United States be willing to leave the details up to Japan and China to decide?

(Part 3)

Welles replied that that would depend entirely upon Japan's sincerity. If Japan is truly sincere in her assurance of troop evacuation there no doubt would be ways of coming to a successful agreement as to ways and means of carrying it out.

1. The United States has no intention of making any counter proposals other than those she has already submitted to Japan on 21 June and the Oral Statement of 2 October. The above two proposals were the result of careful and thorough consideration. However, it is in the realm of possibility that if the objectives contained in those proposals are kept intact the wording may, under certain circumstances, be altered. The United States objections to the Japanese proposals of 6 September and 25 September are based on the fact that they considerably restrict the terms contained in the two U.S. proposals—which incidentally, contained the terms of the earlier Japanese proposals—referred to above.

[a] Available, See III, 269. (A 6 part message, only Part 4 available at present.)
[b] See III, 265—Since the situation at home is fast approaching a crisis, in your talks with Welles cover the entire subject of the U.S.-Japanese negotiations, and in particular, just what the U.S. wants reevacuation or garrisoning of troops in China.

Trans. 10-20-41


No. 268
October 13, 1941
#940.
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 
TO: Tokyo 

Re my #939[a].

The telegram regarding the Wakasugi-Welles conference should be sent as separate telegram #941[b], however, in view of the urgency of the situation, it will not be set up as a Chief of Office Routing telegram, but please handle it as such.

[a] See III, 267.
[b] A 6-part message, only Part 4 available at present, see III, 269.

Trans. 10-20-41

[A-152]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

[A-153]


No. 269
October 13, 1941
#941.
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 
TO: Tokyo 

(In 6 parts—Part 4 only available)

5. Of the three points, please be advised of the matter pertaining to withdrawing or stationing of our troops in China, by my previous report.

6. Wakasugi, therefore, said that in the final analysis, the stumbling block lies in the fact that whereas the United States is interested in agreeing upon basic principles first, Japan is insisting that the matter of primary importance is the clearing up of the outstanding differences first and then to discuss the generalities such as basic principles, etc. The truth of the matter is, Wakasugi continued, it is indeed rarely that a basic principle can be carried as such to any satisfactory degree. Moreover, he pointed out, without agreements or concrete factors, an agreement on principle is without meaning.

To this, the Undersecretary said that the basic principle should first be agreed upon, after which the actual problems can be fitted to it for individual agreements-----(2 lines missed)—(Waskasugi pointed out that) our proposal of 6 September expressed a willingness to sacrifice a practically unanimous desire of the people of Japan for a northward and
or southward military move, for the sake of an adjusted relationship with the United States. This was indeed a bold stroke and probably one which a subsequent cabinet, regardless of its nature, would not dare to duplicate.

In view of this daring step, wouldn't the United States be willing to display some boldness in behalf of great statesmanship, Waskasugi asked.

The Undersecretary said that he fully appreciated our moves and that the United States felt considerable encouragement therefrom. However, the United States has experienced disappointing reverses he said, pointing to the Japanese occupation of French Indo-China, even after matters had progressed to the point of the United States submitting the 21 June proposal.

Wakasugi, therefore, pointed out that the occupation of French Indo-China had a direct bearing on the China incident. He explained that, with a view to our security, we took this step with the agreement of the Government of France.

Trans. 10-21-41


No. 270
October 13, 1941
#662.
FROM: Tokyo 
TO: Washington 

We have made the necessary arrangements for a telephone connection between Chief of the American Bureau of the Foreign Office, Terasaki, and Minister Wakasugi, for noon (Japan time) on the 14th. On this occasion, the following passwords and codes will be used.

U.S. attitude is reasonable

MARIKO

OTAKU NI ASOBI NI KURUYU (Is Mariko coming to pay you a social call?)

U.S. attitude is unreasonable

MARIKO

ASOBI NI KO NU (Mariko is not coming to pay a social call.)

Trans. 10-14-41


No. 271
October 14, 1941
#943.
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 
TO: Tokyo 

(Part 1 of 2.)[a] (To be handled in Government Code.)

I had an interview with Rear Admiral TURNER. If I sum up what he told me, it is this: "What the United States wants is not just a pretense but a definite promise. Should a conference of the leaders of the two governments be held without a definite preliminary agreement, and should, in the meantime, an advance be made into Siberia, the President would be placed in a terrible predicament. Japan speaks of peace in the Pacific and talks as if she can decide matters independently, and so it would seem to me that Japan could set aside most of her obligations toward the Three-Power Alliance. As to the question of withdrawing or stationing troops, since it is impossible to withdraw troops all at once, it would seem that a detailed agreement could be arranged between Japan and China for a gradual withdrawal."

He speculated on the various difficulties which Japan had to face internally. It seems that this opinion of his has also been given to the Secretary of State.

[a] See III, 272.

Trans. 10-16-41

General outlook of the negotiations

SONO-GO NO KOSI NO KENKO (The health of

the Minister since

then).

The Four Principles

SITIFUKUJIN NO KAKE

MONO (Japanese scroll of the Seven Luck Gods).

Will they stick to it?

KI NI IRIMASITA KA

(Did it meet with your approval?)

Is there some way through it?

KI NI IRIMASEN KA (Did it not meet

with your approval?)

[A-154]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR


No. 272
October 14, 1941
#943.
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 
TO: Tokyo 

(Part 2 of 2)

He said that should the Russo-German war suddenly end and should Germany offer Great Britain peace, it would be after all a German peace and England would not now accept it. Now, this man is a responsible fellow in an important position and I take it that this is the view of the Navy. On the other hand, HOOVER and his following consider that should Moscow make a separate peace with Berlin and should Berlin then turn to London with generous peace terms, this whole fray would end with unimaginable quickness. This, however, I take to be a minority view entertained by the Isolationists.

Trans. 10-15-41


No. 273
October 16, 1941
#959.
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 
TO: Tokyo 

(Part 1 of 2)

On the evening of the 15th TERASAKI was invited to the home of Admiral TURNER, who, as you know, is a most trusted friend of Admiral STARK. In the course of their conversation TURNER said:

(a) "If HITLER gains control over Europe, it will constitute a direct threat to Central and South America, and America must certainly fight this. Therefore, it is the present policy of the United States to prevent the enfeeblement of Great Britain's national resources (including the Far East) by assisting her in stopping Germany."

(b) "It is said that the present Japanese cabinet is a strong one; however, it is doubtful whether it has the support of the Army, and if the Military finds itself at variance with the opinion of the cabinet, the cabinet might be overthrown at any time. Therefore, the United States cannot help feeling a little trepidation in broaching any negotiations with the Japanese Government under these circumstances."

(c) "It is urgent that a formula be drawn up on the basis of a fifty-fifty compromise between Tokyo and Washington." (TURNER does not think that we are compromising.)

Trans. 10-20-41


No. 274
October 16, 1941
#959.
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 
TO: Tokyo 

(Part 2 of 2)

TERASAKI explained that some Americans had already questioned him about the permanence of the present cabinet but that this was beside the point because to broach the Japanese-American negotiations while doubting the permanence of the cabinet was putting the cart before the horse. He said that at present when mutual doubts were rife, particularly in the United States, the United States ought certainly to exercise statesmanship, and continued, "The United States is exceedingly idealistic concerning the Far East. Aiding China might be

[A-155]

called a question of principle, but if I may say so, this talk of principles is a sort of hobby among the rich. If it's not a question of principle, all I can conclude is that you all are determined to make us fight with China until we are exhausted. On the other hand, you have followed a very, very realistic policy in Central America. Forgetting the history of Panama for a moment, we can find plenty of present examples proving what I say. Well, China is not an over-simplified question of principle with us Japanese. It is a question of our life. We have already fought there for four years. You went to Japan on the Astoria. I am sure you know something of the temperament of the Japanese. Once a Japanese is in a corner, he will forget all interest in life and death and fight back with fury. I know that we are much poorer than you Americans in material things. I don't know what the result of Japanese-American war might be, but even though we lost, I can tell you we would put up an awful fight. If we do not achieve what we are trying to do, it may come to that. Now if you Americans would only extend your hand in friendship to us a little, you could have our lasting amity; otherwise, we may turn out to be permanent enemies.

Trans. 10-22-41


No. 275
October 15, 1941
#667.
FROM: Tokyo 
TO: Washington 

Regarding your #939[a] and #941[b].

Your message has clarified many points regarding the situation and the matter can be charged up to Welles' state of agitation. However, as I feel that further conversations with Wakasugi might be continued, please maintain contact and also bear the following points in mind:

(1) If we quibble over the argument set forth in paragraph 6 of your message #94l[b] it may give them an opening to insist on having the Four Principles included in the text proper of the agreement.

However, since not only have the so-called basic American stipulations been omitted from the preamble of the American proposal of June 21st, but the reference is made in the final clause to the effect that the principles (stipulations) contained in the proposal of June 21st are also included in the document of October 2nd. We wish to hold to this and should take advantage of the American desire to use the proposal of June 21st as the basis of negotiations and continue our conversations on the basis of the same proposal, without taking up the Four Principles independently.

(2) Our proposal is nothing more than our proposal of September 16th incorporated into the American proposal of June 21st. However, there is no need for us to make any further move until the other side decides that it is impossible to clarify the concrete proposal any further. Therefore please discuss the points of variance between our proposal and that of June 21st and ascertain the United States' intentions regarding the various points involved in the concrete proposal, and reply results.

(3) Due to the nature of this negotiation we wish to have it handled between Wakasugi and Welles, for the time being, and should progress warrant, to transfer the whole negotiation to be handled between you and the Secretary of State.

[a] See III, 267.
[b] See III, 269. A 6 part message, only part 4 available at present.

Trans. 10-20-41

[A-156]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR


No. 276
October 15, 1941
#950.
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 
TO: Tokyo 

Chief of Office routing.
Regarding your #667[a].

Tomorrow afternoon (16th) Wakasugi is expected to confer with Welles. Yesterday (14th) "O" is said to have conferred with the President and also with the heads of the Far Eastern Affairs. (For your information.)

The Military Attache here has been instructed by the headquarters in Tokyo to advise us not to yield an inch in our stand regarding the question of the evacuation of troops. They are apprehensive that we have not emphasized enough our stand regarding it and urge us to lay special stress on this point.

It goes without saying that we fully understand our country's stand regarding this question and both Colonel Iwasa and I have repeatedly informed the other side of this.

However, when Wakasugi conferred with Welles on the 13th, he purposely did not go deeply into the subject of the evacuation of troops because it happens to be one of the three major questions which have been gone over many times before and the purpose of the above conference was to clarify certain points in the United States' proposal in order to ascertain their intentions. You may be assured that we do not intend to minimize the importance of this question nor to effect any compromise.

At tomorrow's conference we intend to bring up this question for discussion once again.

Should you have any inquiry from the Military regarding this matter please explain the above in order to avoid any misunderstanding. I have already explained the situation as stated above to our Military Attache.

[a] See III, 275.

Trans. 10-20-41


No. 277
October 16, 1941
#671.
FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) 
TO: Washington 

Although I have been requested by both the German and Italian Ambassadors in Tokyo to give them confidential information on the Japanese-American negotiations, I have, in consideration of the nature of the negotiations, been declining to do so. However, early this month, following the German attacks on American merchant ships and the consequent (revival?) of the movements for the revision of the Neutrality Act, the German authorities demanded that the Japanese Government submit to the American Government a message to the effect that the Japanese Government observes that if the ROOSEVELT administration continues to attack the Asia Powers increasingly, a belligerent situation would inevitably arise between Germany and Italy on the one hand and the United States on the other, and this would provide the reasons for the convocation of the duties envisioned in the Three Power agreement and might lead Japan to join immediately the war in opposition to the United States. We have not, as yet, submitted this message because, in view of the Japanese-American negotiations, we found it

[A-157]

necessary to consider carefully the proper timing as well as wording of the message. The German authorities have been repeatedly making the same request and there are reasons which do not permit this matter to be postponed.

Trans. 10-17-41


No. 278
October 16, 1941
#672.
FROM: Tokyo 
TO: Washington 

The Imperial Japanese Government has repeatedly affirmed to the American Government that the aim of the Tripartite Pact is to contribute toward the prevention of a further extension of the European war. Should, however, the recent tension in the German-American relations suffer aggravation, there would arise a distinct danger of a war between the two powers, a state of affairs over which Japan, as a signatory to the Tripartite Pact, naturally cannot help entertain a deep concern. Accordingly, in its sincere desire that not only the German-American relations will cease further deterioration but the prevailing tension will also be alleviated as quickly as possible, the Japanese Government is now requesting the earnest consideration of the American Government.

Trans. 10-16-41


No. 279
October 17, 1941
#682.
FROM: Tokyo 
TO: Washington 

The Cabinet has reached a decision to resign as a body. At this time I wish to thank Your Excellency and your entire staff for all the efforts you have made.

The resignation was brought about by a split within the Cabinet. It is true that one of the main items on which opinion differed was on the matter of stationing troops or evacuating them from China. However, regardless of the makeup of the new Cabinet, negotiations with the United States shall be continued along the lines already formulated. There shall be no changes in this respect.

Please, therefore, will you and your staff work in unison and a single purpose, with even more effort, if possible, than before.

Trans. 10-18-41


No. 280
October 16, 1941
#962.
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 
TO: Tokyo 

(Part 1 of 5) (Extremely Urgent)

By previous arrangement WAKASUGI, HULL and WELLES had a conference lasting two hours beginning at 5:00 p.m., on the 16th. The substance of their talk was as follows: (Probably because he had received news of our Cabinet's general resignation, WELLES said that he would like to talk with WAKASUGI in the presence of Secretary HULL. He led WAKASUGI to HULL's room and they talked together.)

[A-158]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

1. HULL asked the circumstances of the Cabinet's general resignation and wished to know what the outlook for the new Cabinet was. WAKASUGI said that all we had received was a public announcement of the general resignation and as yet no detailed news had reached us. WAKASUGI continued, "No matter what sort of Cabinet it is, however, it is impossible to leave Japanese-American relations in their present state. The world being in its present condition, particularly faced by the China problem, our people cannot continue undecided as they now are in the face of American opposition. They demanded a Government that would take a definite stand either to the right or to the left. There is no mistake about that. If no unanimity can be discovered between our two nations, it would be hard to say in which direction the wind will blow. I wanted to talk with the Under Secretary today and see if we could not find some points of agreement between your proposal of June 21st and our proposal of September 25th. That is why I came."

Trans. 10-20-41


No. 281
October 16, 1941
#962.
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 
TO: Tokyo 

(Part 2 of 5)

HULL spent half an hour recounting the substance of his conversation so far and then went on to say, "The United States is certainly not playing along with a policy of procrastination. I earnestly wish to see peaceful and normal political relations reestablished between Japan and the United States. In Europe HITLER is trying to set up a new order by force of arms. Now, if you Japanese also are attempting to set up a new regime in the Far East by force of arms, this world is becoming cramped indeed. We cannot stand by and approve this course of events with equanimity. We stand for non-discrimination in trade and for freedom of the seas and are opposed to all of these militaristic policies. One of the hardest things to reconcile in Japanese-American relations is the fact that, while proclaiming the maintenance of peace, Japan actually carries on a military invasion. There are so many military expansionists now among the Japanese people and among influential people there that I doubt if it would be possible for Japan to cooperate on a new peaceful policy." WAKASUGI then said, "It is true that there are those who advocate expansion northward or southward; however, ever since we have been a naval power foreign nations have lined up our neighbors as colonies of theirs to oppose us. Recent events show how this economic pressure has again brought us to grief. All we have done is to follow the trend necessary for the national security and existence of our people. As a measure for self preservation we had to get necessary materials. Do not think that we deliberately embarked on a military campaign with any joy.

Trans. 10-20-41

[A-159]


No. 282
October 16, 1941
#962.
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 
TO: Tokyo 

(Part 3 of 5)

"The United States seems to have an idea that in order to establish an understanding with Japan on these important questions, she must stop military moves northward and southward, but unless the United States ceases measuring everything by her own yardstick and understands Japan's peculiar position, and unless she shows a friendly attitude in lifting the limitations on the settlement of the China question which faces Japan, as well as commercial limitations, the situation will inevitably continue to grow worse."

3. WELLES urged HULL himself to continue an explanation of the three points he had made, and HULL repeated that the present object of the United States is to defeat Hitlerism; in short, (a) to abolish all militarism, and (b) to bring about equality of treatment and opportunity throughout the whole Pacific area, including China. He showed quite a bit of understanding of Japan's position with respect to the Tripartite Alliance. He seemed, however, loath to go too deeply into the question of peace between Japan and China because he has always been an advocate of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other powers. He asked if there was not some Chinese with whom he (WAKASUGI) could discuss these matters directly. WAKASUGI, however, said that although he knew both AMBASSADOR HU SHIH and SOONG TSE-WEN, he was not able to discuss the relations of the two countries with them. HULL seemed to understand this and said that in any case this would have to be worked out between Japan and China.

Trans. 10-20-41


No. 283
October 16, 1941
#962.
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 
TO: Tokyo 

(Part 4 of 5.)[a]

WAKASUGI then went on to say that it would be very difficult for us to evacuate China. He told them it was very necessary to keep troops there. He went on to explain the activities of the Communist forces in the north as described in your messages and by the Naval Attache. He told them that the Communists were like a cancerous growth on the development of China. He explained that we had to keep forces and to protect the lives, property, and commercial interests of both Japanese and foreigners. HULL then asked, "Well, if you did not take your troops away and left them there for a long time, how would the Chinese take it?" WAKASUGI said, "What the Chinese are most interested in is the safety of their lives and a guaranteed livelihood." He went on to say, "So far as the maintenance of peace is concerned, the Chinese do not care in the hands of what people it is. It is apparently being reported to the President that the Communist Party is engaged merely in educational activities. However, this is a tragic error. What the Communists are trying to do is to destroy Chinese society and industry at the very roots. All the Chinese fear this exceedingly." HULL, however, countered by saying, "In the past we, too, stationed some soldiers in Central America and left them there as long as ten years, but the results were bad, and we brought them out. Since then we have found it more profitable to practice the "Good Neighbor Policy." He did not appear to wish to discuss this matter any further, and seemed to think that this should be thrashed out between our-

[A-160]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

selves and the Chinese. WELLES then asked, "Well, have you any other questions besides those three which you wish to discuss?" and HULL answered, "None in particular."

4. WELLES told HULL the desire of WAKASUGI to look into the differences and points of agreement in the Japanese-American proposals. HULL immediately agreed. He was all in favor of having the officials concerned in this business convene and work out the details immediately, but WAKASUGI said that when the officials concerned on both sides had met before, all they had done was waste their time in arguments without any results. He said that the time would not permit of such procrastination and that he would, for the time being, like to confine lis discussions to important questions only and to discuss them with the Under Secretary alone.

[a] Part 5 not available.

Trans. 10-20-41


No. 284
October 17, 1941
#966.
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 
TO: Tokyo 

Wakasugi met and talked with Hull and Welles for about an hour and a half, from 4:30 p.m. on the 17th. The following is the gist of their talk.

1. Wakasugi stated that he would like to further discuss the three points involved in the U.S.-Japanese negotiations with the understanding that neither side commit itself to what is said here in view of the fact that we were not in receipt of instructions from the new cabinet as yet. Hull expressed his agreement to this proposal and then inquired what the outstanding points were in the respective proposals.

In reply, Wakasugi read those paragraphs pertaining to the right of self-defense under the terms of the Tripartite Pact as contained in our proposal of 25 September, and the U.S. proposal of 21 June. He went on to explain the features in accordance with the various instructions from Tokyo, pointing out that we had made the right of self-defense on which the U.S. placed much emphasis, a mutual right. Did that not satisfy the U.S. demands?, Wakasugi asked.

Hull replied that during the tenure of the former Foreign Minister it was loudly broadcast that the purpose of the Tripartite Pact was to prevent the United States from entering the war. Since the United States may be forced to enter the war for self defense purposes, the United States could not help but have doubts as to Japan's true motives. The United States has no intention of taking military aggression against any nation; her only intention is to consider ways and means of defending herself, he explained repeatedly.

Wakasugi, therefore, pointed out that fundamentally the thing called "right of self-defense" was put in motion in the direction it is intended to be used by the state which invokes its use. Therefore, it is natural that depending on the intentions of another, we should restrain ourselves from fulfilling our duties under the terms of an agreement.

That is why we definitely established the fact in our proposal that our intentions are strictly self-preservation and that application of any phases thereof, would be absolutely on behalf of self-preservation. Self-preservation, as we have used the term, implies that Japan and Japan alone shall determine the means of carrying it out without depending on any foreign country whether it be Britain the United States or Germany, or any other. There are no other implications or interpretations to the phrases from our viewpoint.

[A-161]

Fundamentally, Wakasugi continued, wasn't it a self-evident fact that political agreements such as the Tripartite Pact cannot limit the signatories to any political commitments against a third country?

In the light of the Imperial Rescript published at the time of the signing of the Tripartite Pact, the spirit and the aims of said Pact should be evident. In the final analysis, that Pact's real mission is the contribution to world peace and does not support any intent of aggression and aggrandizement.

Hull listened carefully to Wakasugi's detailed explanations. Apparently the Secretary suspects that, basically, the nature of the Pact could be twisted at will to suit the needs of either a Japanese cabinet favoring military aggression or a cabinet favoring peace. Wakasugi, therefore, asked whether it was not true that unless suspicions were allayed, it would be impossible to come to agreements with any country. Was it not true, he continued, that when viewed through eyes of suspicion there would be much that could be questioned even in the so-called defense measures of the United States?

In any event, it was agreed that both of the proposals in question shall be given careful study after which a reply would be submitted.

2. Hull places the most emphasis on matters pertaining to non-discrimination in trade. He urged that we listen carefully to Welles' explanation of how Japan would actually profit by such a system. Hull then went on to point out that materialization of the non-discrimination in trade matters has been his main objective since his assumption of the post many years ago and described the progress he has made in various quarters. As an example, of the success of his program, he pointed to the recently signed trade agreement with Argentina. He seemed particularly proud of this accomplishment and added that even the self-interested British appeasement policy had been prevented in Central and South America. (What was meant exactly by this was not made clear.)

Hull went on to say that if this policy were limited merely to the southwest Pacific area, it would not be of much value. Unless this principle is applied to the entire Pacific area (including China) the contribution it would make toward peace would be negligible. There is more probability that world peace, under present world conditions, can be attained through adjustments in trade relations than through adjustments of political relations between nations, he claimed.

It cannot be doubted for a moment, he continued, that if Japan adopts this basic policy and applies it in the Far East, that she will have the advantage over all countries in her area because of her geographical position, her race, and because of her business acumen. He urged repeatedly that the concrete and positive advantages be pointed out to our government.

Will you please therefore, he thoroughly advised of this phase and let us know your opinions thereof.

Wakasugi then said that he would admit that the various principles set forth by the United States were indeed fine and as guiding principles no one could possibly find fault with them. The cold facts are, however, that different means have to be used by each individual nation in order to survive. In spite of this fact it is the United States' custom to measure the others needs by a ruler which measures the needs of her own country, which is the most blessed from the standpoint of nature, of any nation in the world. The fact that the position and circumstances of other countries differ from those of the United States apparently is not taken into consideration by the United States, Wakasugi said.

Japan occupies only a small corner of what is known as the Far East; moreover, she has been occupied for over four years with the China incident. She has, therefore, a number of circumstances which are peculiar to herself. So though she may want to comply with all of what the United States suggests, it is impossible for her to immediately do so. For example, for obvious and unavoidable reasons, Japan has established various organs and put into effect various systems in China to cope with temporary conditions and circumstances. Even if we tried to

[A-162]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

comply with the basic principles advanced by the United States, we could not do so overnight where these are concerned. It would be an absolute impossibility from a practical and actual standpoint.

If the United States' principles are to be applied to the world at the end of the war, it is indeed a worthy undertaking and merits serious consideration. However, it is not in the realm of practicality to attempt to apply these principles at a time when the whole world is in a chaotic condition. It is asking too much of Japan to expect her to accept these principles under such world conditions, and to expect her, in turn, to apply them immediately to the Far East area which has been undergoing particularly unfavorable conditions.

Therefore, Wakasugi continued, the immediate need is to discuss matters which Japan is capable at the present time of carrying out. These actual problems should be worked out to the maximum point of possibility under present circumstances and in this manner, the first opening to the road of joint and cooperative action should be found.

Hull replied that he well understood Japan's position and the circumstances in which she was involved. However, he continued, the United States also has to cope with the domestic problems. For example, there are complaints from U.S. business men in China who have been squeezed out or whose activities have been curtailed because of the monopolistic attitude Japan has assumed in the China trade. When these complaints are voiced, because of the make-up of the United States, they cannot be left unnoticed.

Returning again to fundamentals, it is an unalterable fact, the Secretary continued, that the United States' basic principle is advantageous to Japan. For this reason he desired acceptance of it by Japan, the Secretary repeated.

He agreed to compare the two proposals on this point, too, and to submit a reply after so doing.

In conclusion Hull asked what the conditions were in Japan. Wakasugi replied that the general public were very strained. The government is being forced to take an immediate and decisive turn to either the right or the left. The people are apparently ready to jump at a chance for an understanding with the United States and because of the sensitiveness of the Japanese people, the tension will no doubt be immediately relieved if there is the slightest gesture on the part of the United States to warrant it.

Although it may be true that more time will be required before an agreement can be reached on the weighty items, however, there would be made favorable reactions if even minor matters, such as the following, were cleared up: releasing of the Itukusima Maru and the Syoyo Maru which have been tied up in San Francisco for over a month because the money with which to pay for their fuel has been frozen; releasing of funds with which to pay for fuel for those ships which are coming over here at present. (There is some interference from the Treasury Department in this instance.)

As Wakasugi mentioned these items, Welles took down the names of the vessels and other pertinent facts and promised to take the matter up with bureaus concerned.

Trans. 10-21-41

[A-163]


No. 285
August 16, 1941
#156.
FROM: Hollywood (Nakuchi) 
TO: Tokyo 

Re my message #151[a].

1. The St. Claire took on a cargo of 95,000 barrels of aviation gasoline and left port for Vladivostok on the afternoon of (date). The Fitzsimmons is in the process of taking on a similar cargo of 75,000 barrels at Erusegundo[b]. Aside from these two, three other ships are scheduled to leave port carrying similar cargoes. All of them, it is understood, are under charter with the Maritime Commission.

2. All of the above mentioned ships are to rendezvous at some point in the Pacific. It is understood that a number of United States destroyers are on maneuvers at the present time. Rumor has it that they are bound for Vladivostok.

3. The crew of the St. Claire, mentioned above,---------------.

Relayed to Washington and San Francisco.

[a] Not available.
[b] Kana spelling.

Trans. 8-22-41


No. 286
August 16, 1941
#91.
FROM: Seattle (Sato) 
TO: Tokyo 

(Secret outside the office)

According to a spy report, the English warship Warspite entered Bremerton two or three days ago.

Trans. 10-4-41


No. 287
August 21, 1941
#93.
FROM: Seattle (Sato) 
TO: Tokyo 

The Russian ship Vladimar Mayskovsky arrived one or two days ago and entered dry dock for repairs which will require a week or more. The present movements of the ship are----------, but as soon as it is repaired, it is going to California to load on freight for Vladivostok.

The Minsk has left harbor as previously stated. The Patrovsuky is still in dry dock.

Trans. 8-25-41

[A-164]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR


No. 288
August 21, 1941
#749.
FROM: Tokyo 
TO: Berlin 

Re your #1045[a].

1. America appears to have begun the transportation of oil to Russia using American, Russian and neutral ships. There are also reports to the effect that perhaps several hundred airplanes have been transported. In spite of the fact that we are keeping everything under strict surveillance up to the present not one American vessel has entered Vladivostok.

2. I have warned the Soviet Ambassador in Tokyo in line with my #739[b] and I have conveyed a similar warning to the American government through Ambassador Nomura. However, it is very difficult to effect any actual restraint through such steps.

The above is for your information.

[a] Not available.
[b] See Japanese-Russian Section, Volume III. Report of conversation between Japanese Foreign Minister and the Soviet Ambassador in Tokyo, in which both insist the Neutrality Pact is being strictly observed; Japan warns against third power's acquiring Russian territory in East Asia; extension of third power's military movements to East Asia; and shipment of U.S. munitions to Vladivostok.

Trans. 8-26-41


No. 289
August 26, 1941
#183.
FROM: San Francisco (Muto) 
TO: Tokyo 

The Russian freighter Yakut (1500 tons) which had been undergoing repairs here left on the 24th° for Vladivostok loaded with gasoline, shoes, socks and small arms. On the 20th[b] the Russian freighter Minsk arrived here from (?) and on the 23rd[a] the Russian tanker Dombas(?) arrived here from Los Angeles.

Relayed to Washington, Los Angeles, Seattle, &-----.

[a] Approximate dates.

Trans. 9-4-41


No. 290
August 18, 1941
#92.
FROM: Seattle (Sato) 
TO: Tokyo 

Re your circular #1788[a].

The large planes to be sent into Alaska may be flown from Spokane, McChord or, after being transported to Portland by rail, from the latter city. The planes now in Alaska may be used to supply Soviet Russia. In order to ascertain this, I sent a member of the office to Tacoma, but gathering of information of this nature is an extremely difficult thing. According to what the member reported,-----Field is about 60% completed, and already the troops had arrived; there were also two large four-motored planes there; at-----Field also, considerable number

[A-165]

of troops are tenting; although there are several two-motored medium sized planes, judging from the fact that each has an insignia of the United States Army on it, they are probably not intended to be used for aiding Russia.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 9-27-41


No. 291
August 26, 1941
#547.
FROM: Rome 
TO: Tokyo 

On the 6th all of the local newspapers printed a dispatch dated the 25th from Shanghai to the effect that the United States Government had recently made representations to the Soviet Government to permit the sending of American Naval advisors to Vladivostok. The Soviet authorities apparently at this date have not permitted the setting up of military establishments within their realm. This dispatch continued by saying that, should such military establishments be set up, it would be a threat against Japan. However, until American demands become much more stringent, there is little fear of these establishments being permitted by the Russian authorities, and the Japanese Government should make thoroughgoing and secret investigations on the spot to see that such a thing was not carried out.

Trans. 8-30-41


No. 292
August 28, 1941
#1899.
FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) 
TO: Washington 

(Part 1 of 2) (Message to Moscow, Part 1 of 2, #835)

In the event that supplies for the assistance of the Soviet, exported from the United States, are imported by the Soviet through Japanese waters and from Vladivostok to the Soviet, the position of Japanese diplomacy, which is based on the Tripartite Alliance, will become extremely delicate. I believe that Your Excellency has already advised the government to which you are accredited of this on the basis of representations to you by former Minister MATSUOKA and myself. According to recent intelligences which have come to hand, seven American, Russian, and neutral ships are already undertaking the transportation of material aid for the Soviet in the form of airplane gasoline. Already they are on the high seas bound for Vladivostok. I believe that you are aware of the gravity of the problem which this provokes and of the arguments to be invoked. The Imperial Government at this time believes that it must strongly insist upon the caution of the Soviet Government not only from the point of view of the legal arguments of international law, but also from the viewpoint of the general world situation.

[A-166]

Trans. 9-15-41

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR


No. 293
August 28, 1941
#1899 (Circular).
FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) 
TO: Washington 

(Part 2 of 2) (Message to Moscow #835, Part 2 of 2)

In the spirit of the neutrality agreement, the Imperial Government is interested in the maintenance of excellent relationships between the two countries. The Imperial Government feels that the Government of the Soviet is already sufficiently aware of the fact that Japan greatly hopes that the European war will not mushroom into the Far East, and to this end she will bend every effort. In the event that the Government of the United States in her program of material aid to the Soviet sends her ships through Imperial waters, the effect upon the general opinion within our country, as well as the reaction of Germany and Italy to this, will be, indeed, terrible in the extreme. It has become of the utmost importance that the Soviet Government give due consideration to the increasing difficulty that it is for us to condone the development of such a situation as I have mentioned above. Therefore, we would like to have you make representations to the Government of the Soviet to acquaint them sufficiently with these developments. Furthermore, with regard to the importation of American goods, it is necessary that we insist upon their government giving most particular consideration to the routes over which these imports are received and the routes by which they are secured. As soon as you have communicated the above to the government to which you are accredited, I would like to have you make such reply as you deem fitting.

Trans. 9-15-41


No. 294
August 30, 1941
#191.
FROM: San Francisco (Muto) 
TO: Tokyo 

1. The Donbasu[a] took on a load of 80,000 barrels of aviation gasoline September 8[b] and left immediately for Vladivostok.

2. According to various newspaper reports in addition to the four American tankers bound for Vladivostok, tankers of the General Petroleum Company too are to be dispatched on the direct shipping route to Vladivostok.

Relayed to Washington,-----,-----,-----New York.

[a] Kana spelling.
[b]Apparently an error in the date of loading, made either by the Japanese encoding the dispatch, or by operators in transmitting it.

Trans. 9-19-41


No. 295
September 2, 1941
#520.
FROM: Tokyo (Japanese Foreign Minister) 
TO: Washington 

The Naval authorities have made the following request of us. They would like to have you insist at this time upon a member of your staff going to Hawaii in the capacity of a courier. Now

[A-167]

as to the most opportune moment, in the light of Japan-American relations, they would like to have this matter left up to your Excellency's discretion.

According to what the Naval authorities have to say on the matter, your Embassy staff is well aware of this situation. If this is indeed the case, direct application should be made from Washington rather than from the Home Office. Based on a similar request by the Naval authorities, a courier is being sent to South America. This is for your information.

Trans. 9-4-41


No. 296
September 2, 1941
#762.
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 
TO: Tokyo 

Re your #520[a].

Naval authorities here have filed still another request. Inasmuch as courier KUGA is returning to Japan by way of the United States and has booked passage on the President Taylor sailing from San Francisco on the 6th, the matter to which you refer is no longer necessary.

Please advise-----.

[a] See III, 295.

Trans. 9-4-41


No. 297
September 4, 1941
#105.
FROM: Seattle (Sato) 
TO: Tokyo 

(Part 1 of 2)

1. According to a statement by the President of the Boeing Company to the Senate Committee inspecting military industries, the lack of progress in the production of his Company was not due to lack of material but to changes in design and also to the unprecedented large expansion of the plant. The Company has stopped the manufacture of planes for England (?) and although it is four months behind in the manufacture of planes for the American Army, it will catch up by the end of the year. The number of employees of the Company is 16,500.

2. According to an announcement by the 4th Army Commander, Lieut-Gen. DeWitt, the 90,000 men of his army will be increased to 120,000 (?) men. There is at present being built along the coast five barracks, which will be ready by the end of September, capable of accommodating 30,000 men. One mechanized division, about 10,000 is to be (?) located at Meadowford, West Yellowston, (?), Fort Huachuca and Marysville.

Trans. 9-10-41

[A-168]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR


No. 298
September 4, 1941
#105.
FROM: Seattle (Sato) 
TO: Tokyo 

(Part 2 of 2)

3. The 39th Bombardment Group (44 planes), the 89th Observation Squadron (15 planes), and the 310th Signal Company, all of Spokane, left August 23 (?) to take part in the September maneuvers in Louisiana.

4. The planes (number unknown) which the 54th Bombardment Group at (?) near Everett are to get are Republics (?) or twin-motored Lockheeds (?).

5. The Naval Air Base at Dutch Harbor was opened on the 2nd. W. N. Updegraff has been named Commandant as has been previously reported (?). The Naval supply base at Port Andrews (?) was opened on the 4th, according to reports.

6. The steering apparatus (?) (diameter 8 inches, double cylinders (?), gear ratio 410 to 1 (?) for the 312 10,000 ton freighters to be leased to England are to be manufactured in two factories, one in Everett and one in New York (?).

Trans. 9-10-41


No. 299
September 4, 1941
#38 (Circular).
FROM: Seattle (Sato) 
TO: Washington 

Message to Tokyo #104.
Re my #10.

Two Soviet planes arrived at the Navy air field, Sand Point, at 5 P.M. on the 4th. The party is putting up at a hotel in the city. It is reported that their mission is to confer with the American authorities concerning the degree of aid the Soviet may be able to obtain from the United States.

Trans. 9-8-41


No. 300
September 6, 1941
#170.
FROM: Hollywood (Nakauchi) 
TO: Tokyo 

The Russian Air Mission inspected the B-19 heavy bomber at March Field on the 2nd, and on the 3rd came to Los Angeles where they are inspecting various airplane factories. Relayed to Washington, San Francisco and Seattle.

Trans. 9-11-41

[A-169]


No. 301
September 4, 1941
#263.
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 
TO: San Francisco, Los Angeles, Seattle 

Message to Tokyo #780.
Strictly secret.

Possibly the United States is preparing now for the eventuality when a considerable bombing force will have to be transferred to the (Siberian ?) area. Please secure intelligences on this matter.

1. Please investigate the state of affairs and the possibility of the Russian Military Commission, now in the United States, flying American planes via Alaska when they return home. (They have given their greatest consideration to large size Consolidated military planes and amphibions.)

Trans. 9-29-41


No. 302
September 20, 1941
#121.
FROM: Seattle (Sato) 
TO: Tokyo 

Re my message #107[a].

The two Russian hydroplanes left Sand Point on the 19th (?) for Moscow via the same route on which they came. Of the forty-seven members of the mission, ten of them returned with the hydroplanes (five on each ship). The remaining thirty-seven members are staying in the United States to study the production of airplanes.

Returned to-----and Los Angeles.

[a] See II, 452.

Trans. 9-25-41


No. 303
September 22, 1941
#124.
FROM: Seattle (Sato) 
TO: Tokyo 

Re the latter part of my #121[a].

Of the Russians remaining behind, 19 (?) of them are receiving training in bomber operation (?) at Spokane. The others (number unknown) seem to be staying in Washington and Los Angeles.

Relayed to-----and Los Angeles.

[a] See III, 302.

Trans. 9-25-41

[A-170]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR


No. 304
September 8, 1941
#198.
FROM: San Francisco (Muto) 
TO: Tokyo 

The Minsk, having completed its repairs, left here on the 6th loaded with 8,000 drums of aviation oil, airplane engines, machine guns, ammunition, snow plows, etc.

Trans. 9-13-41


No. 305
September 11, 1941
Cir. 1983.
FROM: Tokyo 
TO: Hsingking 

Message from San Francisco #1-6 on the 8th.

Ship (Minsk ?) which----------, left port on the 6th destined for-----. She is said to be carrying 18,000 drums of aviation gasoline besides airplane motors, machine guns, ammunition, ----c etc.

Relayed to Washington, Los Angeles, Seattle and Portland.

Trans. 9-22-41


No. 306
September 9, 1941
#569.
FROM: Tokyo 
TO: Hsingking 

Message from Seattle #109 on the 6th.

Since it is not customary to publish information concerning entrance and exit of (ships ?), there is no way but for us to watch, and sometimes when it is raining we lose track of them. In order to make sure of the presence of Vladimar Maykovsky and Deabrist, we approached the docks, pretending that we were fishing. We found four ships in port, but they all had their names obliterated. Of these, we were able to identify three by their flags. They flew the flags of the United States, Great Britain, and-----. Judging from the appearance of the ship hands, one seemed to be V., but we were not able to find D. It may be that the latter, finding no cargo, had proceeded to San Francisco.

Trans. 9-22-41


No. 307
September 18, 1941
#217.
FROM: San Francisco (Muto) 
TO: Tokyo 

The Russian freighter Mejinski entered port here from Vladivostok on the 17th (?). The American tanker L. P. St. Clair, which is en route returning from Vladivostok, is expected to arrive on the 19th (?), according to reports.

Relayed to Washington, Los Angeles, and Seattle.

Trans. 9-25-41

[A-171]


No. 308
September 18,1941
#218.
FROM: San Francisco (Muto)
TO: Tokyo 

According to a spy report, the English warship Warspite arrived here from Bremerton on the -----and is at present moored near the (naval arsenal at Mare Island?). It has been determined that it requires two more months for repairs at Liverpool (my message # 187[a]).

Relayed to-----, Los Angeles and Seattle.

[a] See II, 771.

Trans. 9-25-41


No. 309
September 20, 1941
# 123.
FROM: Seattle (Sato)
TO: Tokyo 

1. The following warships are now at Bremerton:

The Warspite (repair work continuing. The upper part of the bridge and the port side of the bow spotted here and there with red paint).

Maryland class—one ship (the bridge, turrets and other main armaments have been painted red. Also, they seem to be constructing mountings on the foreward main deck for ten anti-aircraft guns).

Saratoga class air-craft carrier, 1 ship (tied up alongside the pier).

One ship which appears to be a cruiser (it has two smoke stacks but we were unable to distinguish anything else).

One other ship just arrived for repair.

2. The New Mexico class ship mentioned in message #101[a] has departed.

[a] See II, 855.

Trans. 9-27-41


No. 310
October 2, 1941
#222.
FROM: San Francisco (Muto)
TO: Washington

Message to Tokyo as #230.

1. One Oklahoma class battleship has arrived in port and is moored in front of the Bethlehem ship-building yard. No reconstruction work is going on on the outside but a great deal of repair work appears to be in progress within the ship.

A-172

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

2. It has been announced by the local headquarters of Naval District #(?) that the Hunters Point shipyard, which was bought last year and which has been undergoing repairs, will be taken over formally in the near future in advance of expectations. (Refer to confidential letter #216[a] of last year.)

Relayed to Washington, Los Angeles, Seattle and Honolulu.

[a] See II, 745.

Trans. 10-17-41


No. 311
October 16, 1941
#243.
FROM: San Francisco 
TO: Tokyo 

Re my #217[a].

The Russian freighter, MEJINSKI, is now in the process of docking. The IGARKA is three days out of New York, the NANTES 7 days from Vladivostok, and the MICHULIN 10 or 12 days from Vladivostok.

The NANTES is loaded with a large quantity of wheat, 20,000 barrels of fuel oil, and also some machine guns, tanks, etc.

Relayed to Washington, Los Angeles, Seattle, Portland.

[a] See II, 29.

Trans. 10-23-41


No. 312
October 12, 1941
#48.
FROM: Hollywood (Nakauchi) 
TO: Washington 

Message to Tokyo #202.
Re my #185[a].

The Russian ship, Kiev, now in port here, will take on its load of war materials as soon as repairs are completed and proceed to Vladivostok when orders are received. For this purpose, it is equipped with a 500 watt radio for the reception of orders and war news from Moscow.

Relayed to-----, Seattle.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 10-22-41

[A-173]


No. 313
October 16, 1941
#2187 (Circular).
FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) 
TO: Seattle 

Henceforth, I would like to have you refer in your reports to the movement of warships as follows.

1. As long as there are no great changes in the movement and basing of warships, report on them at least once every ten days. In the event of priority intelligence, report such on each occasion.

a. The arrival or departure of American flagships of the fleet or scouting force.

b. Should more than ten vessels of any type arrive or depart from port at one time.

c. The arrival or departure of warships of countries other than the United States (give as detailed a report as possible on the class of-----).

2. Should patrolling be inaugurated by naval planes, report it at once.

Trans. 10-29-41


No. 314
August 18, 1941
#121.
FROM: Panama (Akiyama) 
TO: Tokyo 

1. The Douglas B-18, the Martin B-17A bombers, totaling 100 planes, as well as a number of heavy Boeing 24's which have been stationed at Albrook Field in the past, completely disappeared about two weeks ago. I am attempting to find out where they went.

2. I have heard that approximately (35 or 45?) two-motored bombing planes are stationed at the newly constructed Agua Dulce Air Field in the province of Cocli.

Trans. 9-30-41


No. 315
August 18, 1941
#120.
FROM: Panama (Akiyama) 
TO: Tokyo 

Report on observations:

1. Ships moving through the Panama Canal toward the Atlantic:
August 15th Four U.S. submarines (number-----)
August 16th Two U.S. freighters
August 17th One U.S. freighter

2. Moving toward Pacific:
August 15th One U.S. freighter
One DeGaullist Government destroyer (Triomphant) (now anchored at Balboa)

[A-174]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

3.

August 17th
One U.S. destroyer anchored at Balboa.
One warship which appeared to be a cruiser was seen to arrive.

Recently five large-size destroyers have been in port (taking on fuel, rations and other supplies).

Trans. 9-29-41


No. 316
August 20, 1941
#123.
FROM: Panama (Akiyama) 
TO: Tokyo 

1. Please refer to (?) of my message #120[a]. The Triomphant left Balboa for Tohita on the 17th according to report.

2. On the 19th two United States freighters and 1 British freighter were observed to transit the Canal toward the Pacific.

[a] See II, 1036—Panama reports movements through the Panama Canal.

Trans. 10-11-41


No. 317

September 22, 1941#173.
FROM: Panama (Akiyama) 
TO: Tokyo 

Ships passing through the Canal between the 17th and 21st are as follows:

1. Pacific bound:
1 American Tanker
4 American Freighters

2. Atlantic bound:
2 American Tankers
4 American Freighters
1 English Freighter

Trans. 10-2-41

[A-175]


No. 318
September 28, 1941
#49.
FROM: Panama (Akiyama) 
TO: Washington 

Message to Tokyo #184.
Re my #183[a].

Recently the Diomede Class is understood to have had the upper section of the mast cut off. The British operate two vessels of this type as well.

[a] See III, 289.

Trans. 11-4-41


No. 319
September 30, 1941
Circular #51.
FROM: Panama (Akiyama) 
TO: Washington 

Message to Tokyo #188.

On the (29th ?) two (French ?) warships left port bound for the Pacific. One vessel of the Omaha class left port on the night of-----for an unknown destination. In spite of the rumor that the raider is in the neighborhood of the Galapagos, rumors are circulating that it is in water adjacent to the Canal.

Trans. 10-10-41


No. 320
October 2, 1941
#191.
FROM: Panama (Akiyama) 
TO: Tokyo 

Between the 30th and the 2nd, three American freighters and one English hospital ship transited the canal to the Pacific, and nine American freighters and one American liner transited the canal to the Atlantic.

Trans. 10-18-41


No. 321
October 4, 1941
#194.
FROM: Panama (Akiyama) 
TO: Tokyo 

Re my message #193[a].

One vessel left for the Pacific at 11:00 A.M. on the 3rd.

From the 3rd until the morning of the 4th, three American freighters and one French steamer moved out into the Pacific. During the same interval, seven American freighters, the "Union tanker", one destroyer and two British freighters went through the Canal in the direction of the Atlantic (one of the two British freighters was of the 10,000 ton class). All of the vessels bound

[A-176]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

for the Atlantic went through the Canal successively. The two cruisers, which I mentioned in my caption message, accompanied these vessels as far as Balboa. Therefore, it would seem indicated that their entire cargoes were made up of military supplies. Relayed to Washington.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 10-18-41


No. 322
October 2, 1941
#190.
FROM: Panama (Akiyama) 
TO: Tokyo 

(2 parts—complete)

1. Since the recent shift in military aviation efforts to the Pacific Area the "Panama Air Depot" located at France Field was transferred to Curundu Heights (immediately adjacent to Albrook Field).

2. Rear Admiral SADLER, Commander of the 15th Naval District, since the extensive activities on the Pacific end of the Canal, made public on the 1st a statement to the effect that because of the increase of naval supplies a four-story warehouse built on pier 18 (it will be completed the middle of November), the ammunition unloading pier (west of pier 18) consisting of 32 buildings, and the existing buildings in the neighborhood of the Balboa dry dock would all be taken over as warehouses. Furthermore, the petroleum supply tanks at Boca on the Pacific side and at Mt. Hope (the railroad junction from which the line branches to Colon and Ft. Randolph) on the Atlantic side (recently it is believed that these tanks have been camouflaged) have been taken over.

3. There are intelligences at hand concerning the construction of a good storage depot at Corozal which would contain sufficient foodstuffs to supply the Canal Zone for a six-month period, even though shipping routes between this point and the United States are severed.

Trans. 10-20-41


No. 323
October 6, 1941
#194.
FROM: Panama (Akiyama) 
TO: Tokyo 

The result of my investigations, as I reported in my secret letter #142[a], are as follows:

1. The airplane bases which the United States is constructing are located at La Chorrera in Panama province, (please refer to part 4 of my #149[a]) Chitre in Herrera province, Mensabe[b] in Los Santos province and at Remidios and Las Ra-Hasu in Chiriqui province.

2. The Panamanian airports already constructed which will be converted into military establishment are the ones at David in Chiriqui province and Paidonya[b] outside the limits of Panama City.

[

A-177]

3. Airports which have been surveyed but because of the poor condition of the terrain have not been constructed, are the airports at Guarare in Los Santos province and at eight other projected points.

[a] Not available.
[b] Kana spelling.

Trans. 11-7-41


No. 324
August 9, 1941
#254.
FROM: Tokyo 
TO: Manila 

Re your #415[a] and #451(?)[b].

Please make secret investigations regarding the name of the ship and-----and subsequent conditions and wire. According to reports from doubtful sources the British battleship Warspite entered Manila on the 17th and sailed on the 18th for the west coast of America for repair of damages sustained. Please make secret investigations regarding the truth of this and wire result.

By the way the British cruiser Leander of the 7000 ton class resembles the Warspite from a distance.

[a] Not available.
[b] Dated July 28, 1941. Reports departure of British cruiser from Cavite.

Trans. 9-16-41


No. 325
August 12, 1941
#507.
FROM: Manila (Nihro) 
TO: Tokyo 

Re your #254[a].

(1) At the time a non-commissioned officer of the American Navy told me confidentially that the ship mentioned in my #414[b](8?)[b] was the Warspite and I took this to be reliable information. This British ship, however, had its name painted over. Some spies who viewed the ship when it docked report that it was something like a 7,000-ton vessel. It was further reported that this ship moored at Cavite pier on the___th. Now, considering the shallowness of the water there, I do not see how it could have been the Warspite. (When the Cincinnati approaches that dock, it gradually lets out water ballast.) Judging from its shape, I would say that it was a light cruiser of the Leander class. (According to another report it was an 8,000-ton craft. This seems rather accurate.) (2) Among the members of the crew who came on shore there were some with such names as YORK, GEORGE, etc., on their hatbands and we also have a spy report to report to the effect that some forty-eight soldiers wounded in the Mediterranean were being accommodated. (3) I know nothing of the movement of this ship after my #451[c]

[A-178]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

Lately no British ships save this has entered port here (that is aside from the Taggubwno(?) mentioned in my #494[a].

[a] See III, 324.
[b] Not available.
[c] British cruiser which was anchored at Cavite for several days departed for_on the 27th.

Trans. 8-16-41


No. 326
August 16, 1941
#517.
FROM: Manila (Nihro) 
TO: Tokyo 

1. Ships now in port are six pasu (3 of type 190 and 3 of type 170) and-----(all these came in on the 15th).

Those of type 170 each had on deck a rectangular box-like thing four metres long and two metres high.

2. Both the army and navy airplanes have come increasingly to be painted in dark blue.

Trans. 8-20-41


No. 327
August 19, 1941
#527.
FROM: Manila (Nihro) 
TO: Tokyo 

Re my #523[a].

The floating dock was not seen in the vicinity of Mariveles on the 18th. We are investigating its destination.

[a] See III, 328—Re sighting some vessel (or dock) off Mariveles.

Trans. 9-16-41


No. 328
August 18, 1941
#523.
FROM: Manila 
TO: Tokyo 

Re your #262[a].

Since I have----------that it was cited off Mariberu[b] on August 6th, (however, it is not certain whether this (deck?) is that of Crongapo[b]), I told the First Engineer of the Nitian Maru (a ship chartered by the Mitsui and scheduled to arrive at Kobe on the 17th) to report the matter to the Naval authorities upon arriving at Kobe. Please, therefore, get the details from him. We have made arrangements to investigate this matter further. I am reporting this much at this time.

[A-179]

The address to which your caption telegram should have been transmitted was given as Batavia, but should it not have been Davao?

[a] Not available.
[b] Kana.

Trans. 8-22-41


No. 329
September 4, 1941
#575.
FROM: Manila (Nihro) 
TO: Tokyo 

Re my #527[a].

Subsequent investigations revealed the following:

1. What was given in my caption telegram was an error on the part of the witness. We have ascertained the fact that the floating dock is still located at a point about one mile southeast of Mariberesu.[b]

2. This floating dock had been moved early in July from Olongapo[c]. Together with it, the technicians and the workers were moved. I understand that there have been of late hardly any ship movements in or out of Olongapo.

3. For some time, it was reported that barracks were being constructed near Mariberesu to imprison the Japanese. It seems that these barracks were being constructed to house the technicians and workers employed on the floating dock. I understand, however, that these people are experiencing considerable difficulty because of enormous swells in the neighborhood of Mariberesu. We have witnessed near the floating dock ten cylinders (about 30 meters in length) which seem to be ship building materials.

[a] See III, 327—Floating Dry dock not seen at Mariveles the 18th. We are investigating further.
[b]Kana spelling for Mariveles which is in Bataan Prov., Luzon, P.I.
[c] In Luzon, P.I.

Trans. 9-17-41


No. 330
August 20, 1941
#532.
FROM: Manila 
TO: Tokyo 

Re your Circular #1793[a].

I am reporting to you below information which I have been able to get, though it may be somewhat incoherent.

1. There are many tall buildings in the city, to the upper stories of which admittance is forbidden. It is thought, therefore, that anti-aircraft guns have been placed in them. It is fairly certain that guns have been placed on the Great Eastern Hotel (some have actually seen ten disguised machine guns on top of it.) the (Hitchcock ?) Avenue Hotel (this is the former Marco Polo Hotel), and on the Insular Life and the Trading Commerce. Besides these, I presume guns have been placed on top of the Capitol, the Municipal Building, the post office,

[A-180]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

etc. (I believe that the army and the navy both have in their possession a map giving the locations of the tall buildings in the city.)

2. A person has seen during the evenings in the latter part of July, 36 anti-aircraft guns being transported to Camp Murphy.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 8-26-41


No. 331
August 20, 1941
#533.
FROM: Manila 
TO: Tokyo 

(Report of Primary Importance)

Last March work was begun on the reparation of the airplane base south of Darurakku[a] on the way to San Miguel. For a time, however, the work was stopped. Lately it seems that the undertaking has been resumed.

Eye witnesses say that they are using about 300 employees and are hurrying the work along. I understand that at present the gliding ground is being prepared.

[a] Kana spelling.

Trans. 8-28-41


No. 332
August 22, 1941
#104.
FROM: Davao (Kihara) 
TO: Tokyo 

(Intelligence of Primary Importance)

Because too much time would be required to fill in the paddy fields as orginally planned in the construction of a new air base, it is rumored that these plans have been changed. Construction is to begin on an air base which will be laid down between the sea and the paddy fields where now stands a cocoanut grove. In order that bombing planes can use this air field, four concrete runways are to be constructed. It is understood that some 2,500 recruits from among the local populace will be used in this construction enterprise. Four or five hundred wheelbarrows which will be used in this construction work have already been unloaded onto the pier. When I last visited this area and made an investigation of the land they planned to use, it seemed to me that they would have to use more than three feet of dirt to fill in these paddy fields. A great deal of work will be entailed, I observe, in the cutting down and removal of the cocoanut trees in the grove.

[A-181]

Trans. 10-28-41


No. 333
September 1, 1941
#277.
FROM: Tokyo 
TO: Manila

According to intelligences obtained by naval authorities, the Houston was observed on the 20th or there about to pass through the harbor entrance but since that time they have not been able to learn where it went. Please investigate the waters in and around Manila for some trace of this warship and then make your report.

Trans. 11-8-41


No. 334
August 30, 1941
#279(?).
FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) 
TO: Manila

Strictly confidential.

In regard to the points you were to note, from now on in case there is no special change, report once a week, but report each change of the following as they occur:

1. Arrival and departure of Houston.

2. Arrival and departure of more than 5 or 6 destroyers or submarines.

3. Arrival and departure of naval ships other than American; (report in detail the particulars and relationships involved).

Trans. 9-11-41


No. 335
September 1, 1941
#564.
FROM: Manila (Nihro) 
TO: Tokyo 

Re your #277[a].

The Houston arrived the 5th of last month, and took on a large amount of food supplies at the naval pier and left on the 7th, I observed, (my #484[a] and #501[b]).

However, judging from the fact that Admiral Hart attended the ceremonies of the launching of the Q boat attached to the Philippine Army on the 10th, it must have been in the vicinity till the 10th at least. Its course from then on is not clear but we will investigate.

[a] See III, 333.
[b] Available, not translated. Dated 11 August. Reported departure of Houston for Zamboanga.

Trans. 9-16-41

[A-182]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR


No. 336
September 8, 1941
#590.
FROM: Manila (Nihro) 
TO: Tokyo 

On the 7th, the Houston, and two destroyers entered port.

Trans. 9-11-41


No. 337
September 11, 1941
#595.
FROM: Manila (Nihro) 
TO: Tokyo 

The Houston, which we reported having entered on the 7th, has been alongside the pier loading fuel and stores until today when it left for unknown destination accompanied by two submarines and two destroyers.

Trans. 9-15-41


No. 338
August 22, 1941
#107.
FROM: Davao (Kihara) 
TO: Tokyo 

1. During the middle of July a number of American destroyers entered the harbor of Jolo. We have intelligence to the effect that they came to this port from Hawaii, but we have no evidence to substantiate it.

2. During the last ten days of July, 6 American destroyers entered the ports of Jolo[a], Kabunko[b]. (Please refer to part 3 of my #32[c].) While in the area of these three ports, they engaged in target practice with live ammunition.

3. During the middle of August, one large airplane capable of carrying 26 persons landed on the water in the vicinity of Jolo and was tied up there for a number of hours.

4. It is understood that there are approximately 2,000 drums of airplane gasoline stores within the military establishment at Jolo.

Furthermore, reports on the movements of war vessels in and out of the port of Jolo are prone to be delayed because of the existing conditions. Do you want me to wire this sort of delayed information by urgent wire? Please wire.

[a] Town on the island of the same name, one of the southernmost islands of the Philippine Island group.
[b] Kana spelling.
[c] Not available.

Trans. 10-24-41

[A-183]


No. 339
August 23, 1941
#543.
FROM: Manila (Nihro) 
TO: Tokyo 

1. Ships in port on the 23rd.

A. Manila.
Transports 6.
HON
PISU (Arrived the morning of the 23rd.)

B. Cavite.

Destroyers 1. (Arrived from Manila on the 21st.)
Transports (GORUDOSTNA (entered port about a month ago and is now under repairs.)

2. The oiler TORINIRCIC left harbor on the 22nd headed for Tarakan in order to take on oil.

3. Recently several destroyers and submarines have been stationed in the vicinity of Mariveles. We are investigating the number stationed at present.

4. Brig. General Cragette arrived here on the 20th apparently on the Dutch ship TIBADAFKY and had a conference with McArthur on the 21st.

5. According to newspaper reports the CHANTO (formerly the Hilda Maersk) arrived here the 20th after having been repaired at Olongapo and her sister ship the KABARUNDO (formerly the Gertrude Maersk) is at present being repaired there. Hence the floating dry dock must have been there formerly, however we will continue investigations.

6. On the 16th a ship which appeared to be the MADDO and two destroyers arrived in Cebu and all left that same night.

Trans. 8-27-41


No. 340
August 30, 1941
#559.
FROM: Manila 
TO: Tokyo 

(Primary Intelligence)

1. Warships at anchor in this harbor on the 30th:

(1) In Manila, 3 destroyers of the Bell class; 6 submarines (submarines left port on the 27th but have returned). Furthermore, the tanker Trinity came to this port on the 27th and dropped anchor here (please refer to Part 2 of my #543[a]).

(2) One destroyer (undergoing repairs) Corundusu.

2. A large portion of the submarines, according to intelligences, which have come to me, are now in the Ringaon area.

3. 500 American soldiers arrived here on the Cleveland the 29th. Furthermore, on the same day the Migak entered this harbor. (Though details of this ship could not be ascertained, it is understood that she is loaded to capacity with military equipment.

[a] See III, 339 regarding boats in harbor at Manila.
[b] Lingayan on the west coast of the Island of Luzon.

Trans. 9-2-41

[A-184]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR


NO. 341
September 1, 1941
#562(?).
FROM: Manila (Nihro) 
TO: Tokyo 

The MARBLEHEAD returned to port on the 31st. Two destroyers left port on the 1st.

Trans. 9-16-41


No. 342
September 13, 1941
#601.
FROM: Manila 
TO: Tokyo 

1. Ships in port on the 13th:
BUKKU (Black Hawk?)
2 destroyers
BERU
1 submarine

2. On the 13th an American cruiser of the Brooklyn class entered port and is taking on supplies. It is said to have come from Hawaii. I am investigating names of ships and other details but am sending this much on for the present.

Trans. 9-17-41


No. 343
September 15, 1941
#296.
FROM: Tokyo 
TO: Manila 

It is reported that an American aviation company is using Legaspi on the island of Luzon as a port of call. Please ascertain the facts and advise by return dispatch.

Trans. 9-18-41


No. 344
September 16, 1941
#606.
FROM: Manila (Nihro) 
TO: Tokyo

 

Re your #296[a].

The recently inaugurated service of the Philippine Aerial Taxi Company between this city and Adbu[b] uses Nequasupyi[c] as an intermediary station. There has also been a report (dated the 16th of last month; please refer to my report #764) that the Pan-American Airways are planning to build a landing place at Takuroban[d] in the state of Reite,[c] but it does not appear that they have as yet realized this plan.

[a] See III, 343.
[b] Probably Cebu.
[c] Probably Legaspi, city on Luzon Island.
[d] Tacloban.
[e] Leyte Province.

Trans. 9-19-41

[A-185]


No. 345
September 16, 1941
#605.
FROM: Manila (Nihro) 
TO: Tokyo

Re my #604[a].

They left the harbor early on the 16th loaded with food supplies. On the stern three seaplanes (single wing) were observed. Designation is as stated in my previous message. It is also reported that they (arrived here?) by way of Australia but whether this is true or not I don't know.

[a] See III, 346—I have secret information that the ST. LOUIS and three other ships are leaving for Singapore and that they apparently have ammunition on board.

Trans. 9-25-41


No. 346
September 15, 1941
#604.
FROM: Manila 
TO: Tokyo 

Re my #601[a].

According to secret information received, it is the ST. LOUIS, with three other vessels (names unknown), said to be starting for Singapore. Bow waves of indicating speeds of 24 to 25 knots were observed. Also, apparently ammunition is being handled (red flags are hoisted).

[a] See III, 342.

Trans. 9-18-41


No. 347
September 20, 1941
#618.
FROM: Manila (Nihro) 
TO: Tokyo

The boats anchored here the 20th, are:
PHOENIX
BUKKO[a]

-------------------------------------------------------a chartered boat (12,000 to 13,000 tons, number of crew unknown) carrying (?) approximately 200 sailors.

The PITASU[a] (Peters?), which entered the harbor on the 18th, is reported to have carried 500 soldiers.

[a] Kana spelling.

[A-186]

Trans. 9-27-41

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR


No. 348
September 26, 1941
#135.
FROM: Davao (Kihara) 
TO: Tokyo 

Upon my arrival to take up my post here, I heard the following report concerning Zamboanga:[a]

Since last August American destroyer tenders, destroyers and submarines enter that port from the South Seas every Saturday. After they have lain at anchor for one or two days they leave again for the South. In summing up the statements of members of the crews of these boats, it appears that these warships ply the waters from Jolo[b] to Tawao[c] on the island of Borneo.

[a] A city on the island of Mindanao.
[b] Name of the island connecting the main Philippine group to Borneo.
[c] Town in British North Borneo.

Trans. 11-7-41


No. 349
September 26, 1941
#136.
FROM: Davao (Kihara) 
TO: Tokyo 

Re your #60[a].

The LANGLEY, 11,500 tons, 540 feet, has accommodations for 33 flying boats. These airplanes carry from five to seven persons and have a cruising range of 30 hours. They are two-motored "PBY's" long-range flying boats.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 11-7-41


No. 350
October 3, 1941
#654.
FROM: Manila (Nihro) 
TO: Tokyo 

Message to Singapore #8 on the 2nd.

The American Cruisers, ST. LOUIS and PHOENIX recently docked here and sailed on the 16th and 22nd respectively. Now, I have received a spy report that their destination was Singapore. What I want to know for sure is if they have arrived there or not, also I am very much interested in checking on the accuracy of this spy report. Please investigate and wire me back immediately.

[A-187]

Trans. 10-7-41


No. 351
October 2, 1941
#860.
FROM: Shanghai 
TO: Net Circular

Message to Tokyo #1804.

The newspapers here reported the fact that the United States Army transport HENDERSON left this port on the 20th for Manila carrying 50 Marines from Tientsin and about 100 Marines of the 4th Marine (Corps?) stationed here. According to an explanation given by the naval authorities, 30 of those who have come from Tientsin are retained here, making the maximum number here 70 persons.

Relayed to-----, Peking, and Tientsin.

Trans. 10-9-41


No. 352
October 4, 1941
#318.
FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda) 
TO: Manila 

I want you to make a reconnaissance of the new defense works along the east, west and southern coasts of the Island of Luzon, reporting on their progress, strength, etc. Also, please investigate anything else which may seem of interest.

Trans. 10-8-41


No. 353
October 14, 1941
#685.
FROM: Manila (Nihro) 
TO: Tokyo 

On the afternoon of the 13th, the HOUSTON, the MARBLEHEAD, the HOH[a], five destroyers, and two mine layers left port. Their destination is unknown.

The following ships are tied up in this harbor at the present time: The BLACK HAWK, the PAS[a], four destroyers, 10 submarines (the submarines are of classes 170 and 190), and the GOLD STAR (all of the above-mentioned submarines are tied up on either side of the GOLD STAR and are taking on supplies).

[a] Kana spelling.

Trans. 10-21-41


No. 354
October 17, 1941
#691.
FROM: Manila 
TO: Tokyo 

Reports of reliability A.

On the afternoon of the 17th the
TON
MADDO

[A-188]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

HON
4 destroyers
5 submarines (140 class)
BERU
1 minelayer and
oiler TRINITY entered harbor.

In addition to the above ships in port at present on the 18th are as follows:

A. Manila.
The same as my #685[a].

B. Cavite.
REI
2 minelayers
-----(4 groups missing)

3. Large scale barracks are being constructed at NUEBA ESIHA between Cabanatuan and Laur (about 131 kilometers from Manila).

4. It is said that mecha