W3C
DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional
EN" "http:
www.w3.org/TR/html4/loose.dtd"> MAGIC: VOLUME III

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND

OF

PEARL HARBOR

VOLUME III
(August 5, 1941—October 17, 1941)

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402 (8-part set; sold in sets only)

Stock No. 008-000-00233-9

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER III

Renewed insistence by the Japanese Government upon its Peaceful Purposes—Resumption of Conversations

Outline of Volume III

Page

PART A—HULL-NOMURA CONVERSATIONS (August 5, 1941-October 17,1941)

1

1. Tokyo Sends New Proposal to Ambassador Nomura (August 5, 1941)

1

2. Hull-Nomura Conversation (August 6, 1941)

2

(a) State Department's Report

2

(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report

3

3. Tokyo Requests an Immediate Report from Ambassador Nomura

4

4. Japan Again Proposes a Konoye-Roosevelt Conference (August 7, 1941)

4

5. Ambassador Nomura Reports on Current American Policy Toward Japan

4

6. Hull-Nomura Conversation (August 8, 1941)

5

(a) State Department Report

5

(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report

6

7. Foreign Minister Toyoda Again Urges a Roosevelt-Konoye Conference

7

8. Colonel Iwakura and Mr. Ikawa Are Recalled to Japan

7

9. Counselor Iguchi Suggests a Propaganda Campaign in Japan

7

10. Prime Minister Toyoda Reprimands Minister Wakasugi

8

11. Ambassador Nomura Confers with an American Cabinet Member (August 13, 1941)

8

12. Hull-Nomura Conversation (August 13, 1941)

9

(a) Secretary Hull's Report

9

(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report

10

13. Japan Discounts the Attempted Assassination of Vice Premier Hiranuma

10

14. Hull-Nomura Conversation (August 16, 1941)

10

(a) Secretary Hull's Report

10

(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report

11

15. Ambassador Nomura Summarizes the Japanese-American Diplomatic Situation (August 16, 1941)

12

16. Roosevelt-Nomura Conversation (August 17, 1941)

13

(a) Secretary Hull's Report

13

(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report

14

17. Ambassador Nomura Discloses His Personal Opinion Regarding the President's Statements

16

18. Mr. Dooman Confers with Mr. Teraski

17

19. Grew-Toyoda Conversation (August 18, 1941)

17

(a) Ambassador Grew's Report

17

(b) Foreign Minister Toyoda's Report

18

20. Ambassador Grew Urges Consideration of Japanese Proposal

18

21. Ambassador Nomura Is Convinced of President Roosevelt's Sincerity

19

22. Ambassador Nomura Suggests a New Proposal

19

23. Rumors of a British-American-Russian Conference Speed Japanese Action

20

24. Hull-Nomura Conversation (First-August 23, 1941)

20

(a) Secretary Hull's Report

20

(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report

21

25. Hull-Nomura Conversation (Second-August 23, 1941)

21

(a) Secretary Hull's Report

21

(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report

21

26. Prime Minister Konoye Replies to President Roosevelt (August 26, 1941)

22

27. Japan Replies to President Roosevelt's Statement of August 17, 1941

22

28. Japan's Reply Contains Its Maximum Concessions

24

(a) Secretary Hull's Report

24

(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report

25

29. Mr. Terasaki Requests Ambassador Grew to Recall American Oil Shipments

26

[i]

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)

 

Page

30. Roosevelt-Nomura Conference (August 28, 1941)

26

(a) Secretary Hull's Report

26

(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report

27

31. Hull-Nomura Conversation (August 28, 1941)

27

(a) State Department's Report

27

(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report

29

32. Secret Interpretation of Japan's Reply to President Roosevelt

29

33. American Newspaperman Seeks Details of Prince Konoye's Message

30

34. The Press Is Informed of Prince Konoye's Message to President Roosevelt

30

35. Tokyo Demands Secrecy Concerning Proposed Conference

31

36. Ambassador Nomura Asks Secretary Hull's Cooperation in Maintaining Secrecy (August 29, 1941)

32

37. Newspaper Article Endangers Japan's Relations with Axis

32

38. Ambassador Grew Confers with Mr. Terasaki (August 29, 1941)

32

39. Ambassador Grew Indicates Responsibility of Ambassador Nomura for Publicity Leaks (August 30, 1941)

33

40 Japan Requests Simultaneous Release of Conference Publicity (September 1, 1941)

33

41. Newspaper Leaks Continue to Concern Japanese Government

33

42. Tokyo Summarizes the Japanese-American Situation for Its Ambassadors in Rome and Berlin

34

43. Ambassador Colonna Calls on Ambassador Nomura (August 30, 1941)

34

44. Hull-Nomura Conversation (September 1, 1941)

35

(a) State Department's Report

35

(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report

35

45. Roosevelt-Nomura Conversation (September 3, 1941)

37

(a) Secretary Hull's Report

37

(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report

38

46. Mr. Terasaki Delivers a Message from Foreign Minister Toyoda to Ambassador Grew (September 3, 1941)

39

47. Ambassador Nomura Advises Tokyo to Reply Briefly to the United States

40

48. Grew-Toyoda Conversation (September 4, 1941)

41

(a) Ambassador Grew's Report

41

(b) Foreign Minister Toyoda's Report

43

49. Hull-Nomura Conversation (September 4, 1941)

44

(a) State Department's Report

44

(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report

44

50. Ambassador Grew Confers with Foreign Minister Toyoda (September 5, 1941)

45

51. Japan Requests Ambassador Nomura to Expedite the Conference Arrangements

46

52. Ambassador Grew Confers with Officials in Tokyo (September 6, 1941)

47

(a) Conversation with Foreign Minister Toyoda

47

(b) Conversation with Prince Konoye

47

53. Hull-Nomura Conversation (September 6, 1941)

48

(a) State Department's Report

48

(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report

49

54. Japanese Embassy Is Warned Concerning Newspaper Leaks (September 6, 1941)

49

55. Japanese Intelligence Discloses America's Desire for Peace in the Pacific

50

56. Minister Wakasugi Prepares Return Trip to United States

50

57. Grew-Terasaki Conversation (September 8, 1941)

51

(a) Ambassador Grew's Report

51

(b) Japanese Foreign Office Report

51

58. American Public Opinion is Hostile to Japan

52

59. Ambassador Grew Delivers American Statement to Foreign Minister Toyoda (September 10, 1941)

52

60. Foreign Minister Toyoda Inquires Concerning Ambassador Nomura's Proposal of September 4, 1941

54

61. Ambassador Nomura Explains Purpose of Proposals of September 4, 1941

54

62. Hull-Nomura Conversation (September 10, 1941)

54

(a) State Department's Report

54

(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report

55

63. Japanese-American Conversation (September 10, 1941)

55

(a) State Department's Report

55

(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report

57

[ii]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)

 

Page

64. Publicity Concerning Mr. Kasai Arouses Japanese Concern

58

65. Ambassador Nomura Appraises American Attitude Toward New Japanese Proposals

58

66. Japan Instructs Ambassador Nomura Not to Change Diplomatic Documents

59

67. Ambassador Nomura Appraises President Roosevelt's Speech

59

68. Chungking and Nanking Governments Opposed to Japanese-American War

60

69. Foreign Minister Toyoda Clarifies Points in Japanese Proposals (September 13, 1941)

61

(a) Ambassador Grew's Report

61

(b) Foreign Minister Toyoda's Report

63

70. Foreign Minister Toyoda Upholds Japanese Proposals

63

71. Ambassador Nomura Stresses the Need for Preliminary Conversations

64

72. Ambassador Grew Confers with Ambassador Shigemitsu (September 17, 1941)

65

73. Mr. Ushiba Calls on Mr. Dooman (September 17, 1941)

65

74. Ambassador Nomura Urges Japan to Make a New Proposal

67

75. Secretary Hull Is Cautious Concerning Proposed Conference

68

76. Japanese Observers in United States Responsible for Publicity Leaks

68

77. French Ambassador Demands Withdrawal of Japanese Troops

68

78. Hull-Nomura Conversation (September 19, 1941)

68

(a) State Department's Report

68

(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report

69

79. Foreign Minister Toyoda Grows Impatient

70

80. Grew-Toyoda Conversation (September 22, 1941)

71

(a) Ambassador Grew's Report

71

(b) Foreign Minister Toyoda's Report

72

81. Ambassador Nomura Forwards a Japanese Report on America's Attitude toward War

73

82. Japan Explains Its Retaining of Troops in China

74

83. Hull-Nomura Conversation (September 23, 1941)

74

(a) State Department's Report

74

(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report

75

84. Ambassador Nomura Asks Tokyo to Clarify Its Proposals

76

85. Japanese Spies Disclose American Attitude Toward Japan

77

86. Foreign Minister Toyoda Urges Increased Diplomatic Efficiency

78

87. Foreign Minister Toyoda Forbids Textual Changes by Ambassador Nomura

78

88. Ambassador Nomura Answers Foreign Minister Toyoda's Message

78

89. Ambassador Nomura Sends Japanese Proposals to Secretary Hull (September 27, 1941)

79

90. Ambassador Nomura Reports Discrepancy in Copies of Japanese Peace Terms

79

91. Grew-Toyoda Conversation (September 27, 1941)

80

(a) Ambassador Grew's Report

80

(b) Foreign Minister Toyoda's Report

81

92. Ambassador Nomura Suggests Changes in the Japanese Proposals (September 27, 1941)

82

93. Ambassador Grew Appraises Conditions in Japan (September 29, 1941)

83

94. Hull-Nomura Conversation (September 29, 1941)

85

(a) State Department's Report

85

(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report

86

95. Foreign Minister Toyoda Submits Official Interpretation of Japanese Proposals

86

96. Ambassador Nomura Converses with Admirals Stark and Turner (September 30, 1941)

87

97. Mr. Iguti Warns Tokyo Against Signs of Over-Anxiety

88

98. Mr. Terasaki Replies to Mr. Iguti

88

99. Tokyo Denies Rumors of Dissension in Konoye Cabinet

89

100. Hull-Nomura Conversation (October 2, 1941)

90

(a) State Department's Report

90

(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report

93

101. Tokyo Reports Receiving America's Reply

93

102. Hull-Nomura Conversation (October 3, 1941)

93

(a) State Department's Report

93

(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report

94

103. Foreign Minister Toyoda Obtains a Copy of British Ambassador Craigie's Report (October 3, 1941)

94

104. Foreign Minister Toyoda Directs Ambassador Nomura to Submit Another Japanese Explanation

95

105. Ambassador Nomura Apologizes for His Hasty Conclusions

95

[iii]

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)

 

Page

106. Foreign Minister Toyoda Requests an Immediate Reply to His Message of October 4, 1941

96

107. Japanese-American Conversation

96

108. Grew-Toyoda Conversation (October 7, 1941)

97

(a) Ambassador Grew's Report

97

(b) Foreign Minister Toyoda's Report

97

109. Mr. Terasaki Interviews Ambassador Grew

98

110. Tokyo Explains Background of Japanese-American Negotiations to Japanese Ambassador in Berlin

99

111. Ambassador Nomura Explains the American Attitude Toward the Japanese Proposals

101

112. Mr. Terasaki Calls on Mr. Dooman (October 9, 1941)

102

113. Mr. Dooman Warns Mr. Terasaki Against New Japanese Troop Landings in French Indo-China

102

114. Hull-Nomura Conversation (October 9, 1941)

103

(a) State Department Report

103

(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report

104

115. Japanese-American Conversation (October 9, 1941)

104

(a) State Department Report

104

(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report

105

116. Foreign Minister Toyoda Is Dissatisfied with Ambassador Nomura's Reports

106

117. Ambassador Nomura Replies to Foreign Minister Toyoda's Complaint

106

118. Grew-Toyoda Conversation (October 10, 1941)

107

(a) Ambassador Grew's Report

107

(b) Foreign Minister Toyoda's Report

107

119. Tokyo Sends Instructions for Welles-Wakasugi Conference

108

120. Welles-Wakasugi Conversation (October 13. 1941)

109

(a) Under Secretary Welles' Report

109

(b) Mr. Wakasugi's Report

110

121. Secret Arrangements Are Made for Terasaki-Wakasugi Telephone Conversation

111

122. Ambassador Nomura Confers with Rear Admiral Turner (October 14, 1941)

112

123. American Sources Reveal Possibility of Early Russo-German Peace

112

124. Ambassador Grew Is Informed of German Pressure (October 15, 1941)

113

125. Rear Admiral Turner Confers with Mr. Terasaki (October 15, 1941)

113

126. Foreign Minister Toyoda Orders Further Welles-Wakasugi Conversations

114

127. Japanese Army Refuses to Evacuate Troops from China

114

128. Japan Reminds the United States of Its Obligation Under the Tripartite Pact

115

129. The Konoye Cabinet Resigns

115

130. Hull-Wakasugi-Welles Conversation (October 16 and October 17, 1941)

116

(a) Secretary Hull's Report

116

(b) Mr. Wakasugi's Report

116

131. Prince Konoye Bids Farewell to Ambassador Grew (October 17, 1941)

118

132. Hull-Wakasugi-Welles Conversation (October 17, 1941)

119

(a) Secretary Hull's Report

119

(b) Mr. Wakasugi's Report

119

PART B JAPANESE INTELLIGENCE IN DIPLOMATIC MESSAGES

122

(a) Reports from the United States

122

133. Japan Learns that American Oil Is Being Transported to Russia

122

134. Japan Learns of Shipment of American Planes to Russia

123

135. American Aid to Russia Is Viewed as Threat to Japan

123

136. Japan Attempts to Expand Its Intelligence Activities

124

137. Japanese Agents Note American Army and Air Group Activities

124

138. Japan Watches the Activities of a Russian Military Commission in the United States

124

139. Japanese Consuls Report on West Coast Shipping.

125

140. Foreign Minister Toyoda Sends New Instructions Concerning Intelligence Reports

126

(b) Reports from the Panama Canal

126

141. Japan Fails to Learn Destination of Planes Departing from Panama

126

142. Japanese Reports on Panama Military Installations

127

(c) Reports from the Philippine Islands

127

143. Japan Attempts to Identify British Vessels Reported at Manila

 127

[iv]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)

 

Page

144. Tokyo Inquires About a Floating Dry Dock Near Mariveles

127

145. Japanese Reports on Manila Anti-Aircraft Preparations

128

146. Japanese Report on American Airport Construction

128

147. Japan Inquires Concerning the U.S.S. Houston

128

148. Japanese Report on American Ship Movements in the Philippines

128

(d) Reports from the Hawaiian Islands

130

149. Japan Notes Activities of French in the Pacific

130

150. Japanese Foreign Minister Requests Special Intelligence Reports Concerning Pearl Harbor

130

151. Japanese Report on American Transportation of English Troops

131

(e) Reports from South America

131

152. Japanese Interest in Brazilian Air Fields

131

153. Minister Ishii Reports American Planes Arriving in Brazil

131

(f) Reports from Capetown, South Africa

131

154. Japanese Agents Report the Transportation of British Soldiers

131

155. Japan Watches British Shipping Near Cape of Good Hope

131

(g) Reports from Vladivostok, Russia

132

156. Departure of Russian Submarines

132

157. Japanese Learn of British Supply Route to Russia

132

[v]

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)

 

Page

PART C JAPANESE DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITIES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD

133

(a) Japanese-American Relations

133

158. Negotiations to Return American Missionaries to the United States Continue

133

159. Japan Fears American and British Alliance with Russia

133

160. Inventory of Secret Funds in Japanese Legations

133

161. New Military Attache Appointed to Japanese Embassy

134

162. Tokyo Reports Chinese Attempt to Draw United States Into War Against Japan

134

163. Mr. Malcolm Lovell Offers to Mediate Between Japan and China - —

135

164. Japanese Foreign Office Asserts Its Authority in Foreign Relations

135

165. Ambassador Nomura Suggests Suspension of Funds Pending Settlement of Financial Agreement

135

166. Freezing Order Curtails Japanese-American Trade

136

167. Ambassador Nomura Reports Indirect Participation of United States in the War Against Germany

136

168. Japan Plans to Evacuate Nationals from the United States

136

169. American Officials Search Japanese Business Offices in Los Angeles

136

170. Evacuation Committee Meets on August 18, 1941 to Discuss Return of Missionaries

137

171. The Japanese Embassy in Washington Reprimands the Tokyo Foreign Office

137

172. Japan Recognizes Russo-German War as Threat to Its Border

137

173. Consul Morishima Suggests Further Precautions to Ensure Secrecy of Dispatches

138

174. Change Predicted in Japanese-American Relations

138

175. Washington Warns Tokyo of Security Violation

138

177. Japanese Authorities Express Concern over United States' Official Inspection

138

178. Japan Reports Anti-Japanese Activities among American Missionaries in China

138

179. Japan Attempts Disposal of Certain Frozen Funds

139

180. Japan Learns Details of Churchill-Roosevelt Agreement

139

181. American Newspapermen in Italy Forecast Axis Defeat

139

182. Minister Sakaya Criticizes American Aid to Russia

140

183. Minister Schoenfield Clarifies American Policy

140

184. Japan Inquires About American Treatment of Japanese Nationals

140

185. Japan Suggests That Reciprocal Permits Facilitate Maintenance of American and Japanese

141

186. Japan Sets Date for Evacuation of American Missionaries

142

187. Japan Opposes American Aid Sent to Russia Via Vladivostok

142

188. Japanese Finance Minister Attempts to Avoid Petroleum Sales Restrictions

142

189. Ambassador Nomura Informs Tokyo of Transfer of Funds

143

190. Mr. Terasaki Plans to Confer with "America First" Committee

143

191. Japan Keeps in Touch with Its Nationals in America

143

192. Arrest of Japanese in Possession of Illegal Passports

143

193. Japanese Officials Leave for Japan (September 9, 1941)

143

194. Japanese Speculations Continue Regarding Myron Taylor's Return to Vatican

143

195. Mr. Myron Taylor Sees Possibility of Russo-German Peace Move

144

196. Japan Changes Military Attaches in United States

144

197. Freezing Order Necessitates Reorganization of Japanese Intelligence Activities

144

198. Freezing Order Curtails Japanese Intelligence Activities in America

145

200. American Isolationists Oppose President Roosevelt's Speech on Greer Incident

145

201. Japanese Intelligence Reports on American Airplane Production

145

202. Japan Denies Interfering with American Rights

146

203. Ambassador Nomura Requests Change in Japanese Broadcasts

146

204. Ambassador Nomura Reports on American Lend-Lease Shipments

146

205. Freezing Order Creates Financial Difficulties for Japanese Diplomats

147

206. Japan Stops Shipping Film to Germany Via America

147

207. German Attache Discounts Probability of Japanese-American War

147

208. Japan Estimates the Number of Potential Evacuees From the United States

148

(a) Report from Los Angeles

148

(b) Report from Portland, Oregon

148

(c) Report from New York

148

209. Foreign Minister Toyoda Explains Evacuation of Russian Embassy Members

148

210. Tokyo Learns that NBC Reception of Far Eastern Broadcasts Is on 24-Hour Basis

148

211. Consul Morishima Deplores Optimism of Japanese Business Firms

149

[vi]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)

 

Page

212. Japan Inquires Concerning the Releasing of Funds for Petroleum

149

213. Ambassador Nomura Asks Tokyo to Allow Americans to Leave Japan

149

214. Ambassador Nomura Requests Permits for Japanese Deposit Banks in America

149

215. Ambassador Nomura Requests That Cultural Institutions Be Exempted from Freezing

150

216. Japan Requests Mutual Agreement in Evacuating Nationals and Returning Goods

150

217. Japanese Foreign Minister Cites Instances of American Discrimination

150

218. Japan Registers Its Nationals in United States for Military Service

151

219. Japan Considers the Supplying of Oil to Russia an "Unfriendly Gesture"

151

220. Tokyo Requests the Addition of Four Japanese to Government List

151

221. Consul Sato Requests the Direct Evacuation of Japanese from Vancouver, Seattle and Portland

151

222. Freezing Order Forces the Evacuation of Many Japanese

152

223. Consul Morishima Reports on an Anti-Axis Pamphlet

152

224. Japan Exhibits Interest in American Military Magazines

153

225. Ambassador Nomura Asks Tokyo to Send American Paper Money

153

226. Ambassador Nomura Defends His Report Concerning Rumors in America

153

227. Major Yano Arranges Anti-American Espionage

154

228. Tokyo Releases the Schedules of Evacuation Vessels To Washington

154

229. Consul Muto Estimates Number of Potential Evacuees

154

230. Japan Requests Permits for Japanese to Reenter the United States

154

231. Japan Refuses to Recognize Yugoslavia

155

232. The United States Requests Fuel Oil for Its Tokyo Embassy and the Yokohama Consulate General

155

234. Japanese Agents Note Shipment of Light Bombers to Russia

155

235. Japan Receives Documents from New York Consulate

156

236. Japanese Secret Agents Procure a Message Sent by Secretary Hull

156

237. The Japanese Ambassador to Turkey Suggests Declaration of War Against the United States

156

(b) Japanese-Panamanian Relations

157

238. Japanese Officials Plan the Removal of Military Charts from Panama

157

239. Japanese Minister Asks Clarification of Duties of Subordinates

157

240. Panama Investigates the Attack on the Sessa

158

241. Panama's Foreign Minister Clarifies Panama's Position in Case of War

158

242. Minister Akiyama Estimates His Espionage and Propaganda Expenditures

158

243. Italian Maps of Panama Canal Shipped to Tokyo Via South America

159

244. Callao Merchants Forced to Secure Permits to Reship Japanese Goods to Panama

159

245. Foreign Minister Toyoda Requests Estimate of Number of Japanese Evacuees

159

246. Panamanian Official Denies Pressure by the United States

159

247. Minister Akiyama Inquires Concerning Japan's Acknowledgment of the New President

159

(c) Japanese-Philippine Relations

161

248. Japanese in Philippine Islands Request Passage to Japan

161

249. Consul Kihara Discusses Plight of Japanese Nationals with President Manuel Quezon

161

250. Consul Kihara Plans to Protect Japanese in Case of War

162

251. Consul Nihro Reports Trend Toward Philippine Independence

162

252. Filipinos Predict Japanese Occupation of Thailand

162

253. Consul Nihro Suggests Japanese Propaganda Against American Business Methods

163

254. Consul Nihro Requests Continuance of Japanese Shipping

163

255. Consul Nihro Urges Protection of Japanese Trade

163

256. Consul Nihro Requests Permits Be Granted to Receive Funds in Japan

164

257. Consul Nihro Plans to Agitate Against the United States

164

258. Foreign Minister Toyoda Restrains Consul Nihro from Disturbing the Diplomatic Situation

164

259. Japanese Plan Broadcast to the Philippines

164

260. Japanese Businessmen Return to Japan

164

261. Japanese Consul Requests Housing Facilities in Shanghai for Japanese Evacuees

165

262. State Department Official Discusses American Policies

165

263. Ambassador Nomura Encounters Difficulty in Handling Japanese-Philippine Problems

165

264. American Officials Apply Freezing Regulations Leniently

165

265. President Quezon's Illness Delays Trade Negotiations

166

266. The Japanese Attempt to Procure Molasses Export Permits

166

267. Japanese Optimism Concerning Trade Permits Is Dispelled

166

[vii]

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)

 

Page

268. Consul Nihro Requests Lenient Handling of Americans Passing Through Customs

167

269. Consul Nihro Requests Suppression by Tokyo of Inflammatory Newspaper Statements

167

270. Japanese Are Denied Molasses Permits

167

271. Lack of Shipping Curtails Japanese Mail to the Philippine Islands

168

272. Mr. Nihro Inquires Concerning Japanese-American Negotiations

168

273. Consul Nihro Rules Against Competition Among Japanese Firms

168

274. Japan Decides Against Subsidizing Philippine Political Candidates

169

275. Consul Nihro Reports Political Strife in the Philippines

169

276. Japanese and Philippine Diplomats Postpone Negotiations

169

277. Consul Nihro Asks That Lumber and Iron Ore Ships Be Dispatched Immediately

170

278. Japan Send the Hakone Maru to Evacuate Nationals

170

279. The Foreign Office Arranges the Sale of a Philippine Vessel

171

280. Japan Arrests Philippine Profiteers

171

281. The Foreign Office Directs That Machine Code Be Used Only for Official Messages

171

(d) Japanese-Mexican Relations

173

282. Japanese Agent Suggests Liquidating Petroleum Company

173

283. Japanese Commercial Representative Leaves Honduras

173

284. Minister Miura Encounters Difficulties in Financial Transactions

173

285. Minister Miura Suggests Waiting Policy in Resisting Trade Restrictions

173

286. Minister Miura Postpones Rayon Price Cutting Scheme

174

287. Minister Miura Opposes Dr. Tsuru's Silk Control Plan

174

288. Tokyo Directs the Pacific Petroleum Company to Close Its Office

175

289. Minister Miura Is Directed to Ship Machinery on the Azuma Maru

175

290. Dr. Tsuru Plans to Aid the Pacific Petroleum Company

175

291. Minister Miura Advises Against Sending the Azuma Maru to Manzanillo

176

292. The Pacific Petroleum Company Summarizes Its Assets

176

293. Japanese Legation Uses Secret Funds

176

294. Minister Miura Rejects Foreign Office's Secret Barter Scheme

176

295. Minister Miura Threatens to Resign

176

296. Minister Miura Withdraws Request for Additional Staff Members

177

297. Japan Lifts Ban on Silk Exports to Mexico

177

298. Japan Objects to Mexican Parcel Post Restrictions

177

299. The Japanese Foreign Office Instructs Minister Miura to Aid German Nationals

178

300. Japanese Officials Prepare for Arrival from Tokyo

178

301. Azuma Maru Leaves Japan on September 14, 1941

178

302. Special Japanese Naval Liaison Officer Is Selected

178

303. Mexico Receives No Japanese News

179

304. Minister Miura Foresees Difficulty in Shipping Machinery to Japan

179

306. Japanese Companies Attempt Barter Despite Mexican Restrictions

179

306. Japan Transports American Money for the German Legation

179

307. Minister Miura Requests Increased Expense Allowances

180

308. Japanese Foreign Minister Attempts to Expedite Barter Negotiations

180

309. Tokyo Accepts Mexican Inspection of Parcel Post

180

310. Japan Considers Evacuating Its Nationals in Mexico

181

311. Mitsui Company Considers Kato Barter Scheme

181

312. Foreign Minister Toyoda Requests Further Information on Kato Proposal

181

313. Japanese Military Officials Plan in Mexico to Leave for Japan

181

314. General Camacho Is Appointed to Cabinet

181

315. Minister Miura Suggests Selling Japanese Silk in Mexico

181

316. The Pacific Petroleum Company Ceases Operations

182

317. Minister Miura Reports on American-Mexican Negotiations (October 2, 1941)

182

318. Japan Releases Silk Shipment for Sale

182

319. Japanese Agents Propose to Smuggle Oil for Germany

183

320. Mexico Discovers Smuggled Mercury at Manzanillo

183

321. Japanese Navy Attache Leads Attempts to Acquire Fuel Oil

183

322. Pacific Petroleum Company Ships Machinery on Azuma Maru

183

323. Mexican Foreign Office Denies Japanese Request for Oil

183

324. Minister Miura Blames Minister Amezcua for Barter Failure

184

[viii]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)

 

Page

325. Minister Miura Suggests Using Illegal Methods

184

326. Two Japanese Army Officers Sail Aboard the Azuma Maru

184

327. Mexican Newspapers Suggest Recall of Japanese Representatives

184

328. American Embassy Is Responsible for Expose

185

329. Japanese Military Attache Requests Expansion of Intelligence Facilities in the United States

185

330. Japanese Vice Foreign Minister Criticizes Minister Miura for Requesting Information

185

331. Minister Miura Protests the Transfer of Translator Fukushima

185

(e) Japanese-South American Relations

187

332. Naval Attache Atsho Shigehiro Arrives in South America

187

333. Freezing Legislation Adversely Affects Japan

187

334. Japanese Representatives Visit South America

187

335. Minister Yamagato Reports Maru Schedules

187

336. Mr. Shinohara Makes Conflicting Travel Plans

188

337. Secretary Terasaki Establishes Intelligence Net in South America

188

339. Japanese Representatives Visit South American Countries

188

340. Japanese Espionage Network Begins Operations

189

341. Tripartite Powers Agree to Reciprocal Transportation of Diplomatic Material

190

342. Japan Plans to Evacuate Its Nationals

190

343. Japan Considers Using German Funds in South America

190

344. Japan Imposes New Censorship Restrictions

191

345. Foreign Minister Toyoda Explains Japan's Foreign Policy

191

346. Japan Plans to Sabotage American-Bolivian Trade Activities

191

347. Japan Requires Military Registration of Its Nationals

191

(a) Argentina

192

348. Minister Tomii Warns Tokyo of Insecure Telephone Communications

192

349. Japanese Minister Stresses Argentina's Desire for Neutrality

192

350. Japanese Minister Says Argentina Favors the United States

192

351. Minister Tomii Protests the Smuggling of a Radio Transmitter into Argentina

193

352. Argentina Minority Criticizes Anti-Axis Trend

193

353. Joint Japanese-Argentina Trade Conference Is Advocated

194

(b) Brazil

194

354. Tokyo Seeks Evidence in Brazil Against Japanese Journalist

194

355. Colonel Uchinomiya Leaves Japan for Post in Brazil

194

356. United States Officials Advise Brazil on Purchase of Axis Ships

195

357. Japanese Army Negotiates for Purchase of Brazilian Diamonds

195

358. Japan Promotes Propaganda Activities

195

359. Japan Learns of Portugal's Plans to Protect Atlantic Possessions

195

(c) Chile

196

360. Tokyo Seeks American Equipment for Chilean Attache

196

361. Japan Attempts to Raise Money for Chilean Purchases

196

362. Japan Plans to Take Advantage of Anti-American Feeling in Chile

196

363. Secretary Ichiro Kawasaki Is Ordered Home

197

(d) Columbia

197

364. Special Courier to Bring Secret Documents to Bogota

197

365. Minister Iungo Yanai Condemns Lack of Security in Commercial Dispatches

197

366. Minister Yanai Requests Additional Funds

197

(e) Ecuador-Peru

197

367. Messrs. Watanabe and Makizawa Leave Peru for Ecuador

197

368. Peruvian-Ecuadorean Border Dispute Continues

198

369. Ecuador Blames Standard Oil Company for Border Incident

198

370. President Arroyo Del Rio Clears Japanese Commercial Experts

198

371. Peruvian Minister Accuses Ecuador of Creating Border Incident

198

372. Minister Sakamoto Requests Azuma Maru Be Sent to Lima

198

373. Japan Attempts to Bribe Peruvian Officials

199

374. Mr. Kihara Replaces Secretary Matsumoto in Peru

199

375. Japan Continues Trade with Peru

199

(f) Japanese-British Relations

201

[ix]

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)

 

Page

376. British Freezing Order Impels Japanese to Evacuate Hongkong

201

378. Rumors Indicate Japanese Evacuation Near Johore

201

379. Japanese Officials and News Correspondents Prepare to Leave London

201

380. Japan Considers Bartering with British

202

381. Japan Investigates British Military Preparations in Iran

202

382. Japanese Business Firms Charge Singapore Police with Oppression

203

383. Tokyo Continues Negotiations for Barter with British

203

384. Foreign Minister Toyoda Criticizes Editorial Policy of Singapore Herald

203

385. Canada Imposes Restrictions on Foreign Messages

204

386. Canada Plans to Exchange Ministers with Chungking

204

387. Tokyo Permits British Evacuation from Japan

204

388. Tokyo Evacuates Nationals in British Territory

205

389. Britain Guarantees Safe Passage for Hakone Maru

205

390. British and Japanese Banks Negotiate Trade Settlements

205

391. Japanese Embassy in London Discloses Background of Atlantic Charter

205

392. Japanese Embassy Comments on Situations in Iran and Africa

206

393. British-Russian Advance Cuts Off German Escape

206

394. Japanese Intelligence Discloses Possibility of German Attack on Turkey

206

395. Disposition of British Fleet Affects German-French Peace Negotiations

207

396. Canadian Prime Minister Advocates American Aid to Britain

207

397. Japan Fears British-Chinese Collaboration

208

398. Britain Suppresses Japanese Propaganda in China

208

399. Britain Seeks Chinese Translators

208

400. Japan Seeks Funds to Operate Malayan Mines

209

401. British Embassy Burns All Important Documents

209

402. The Fuso Maru, an Evacuation Ship, Schedules a Stop at Singapore

209

403. Japan Intercedes with Britain for Germans in Iran

209

404. Canada Maintains Diplomatic Relations with Vichy

210

405. Foreign Minister Toyoda Anticipates Anglo-Japanese Evacuation Agreement

210

406. Hiye Maru Is Used in Japanese Evacuation

210

407. "Central China Post" Strike Remains Unsettled

210

408. Japan Prohibits Unauthorized Newspaper Articles

211

409. Japan Denies Blockade of Hongkong Waters

211

410. British Authorities Seize Egyptian Steamer

211

411. British Seek to Check Germans in Black Sea Area

211

412. Japan Requests Reciprocity in Evacuation Plans

212

413. British Request License to Export Glycerin

212

414. Japanese Face Financial Difficulties in Canada

212

415. Tokyo Protests Against Canadian Censorship

212

416. British Authorities Delay Loading of Fuso Maru

213

417. Mr. Horiuchi and British Official Confer on Export Difficulties

214

418. Britain Issues Warning to Finland

214

419. Britain Prohibits Code Telegrams in Iran

214

420. Japan Threatens to Rescind Glycerin Permit

214

421. Shanghai Suggests Retaliation Against British

215

422. Churchill Reports on British Position in Russo-German War

215

423. Premier Gailani in Political Exile in Iran

216

424. Japanese Navy Uses Chungking Currency for Secret Purchases

217

425. British and Japanese Authorities Disagree on Shanghai Custom Officials

217

426. Japan Attempts to Adjust Its Currency

218

427. Japan Curtails Allied Propaganda

218

428. Japanese Official to Be Recalled from Singapore

218

429. Japan Fears British Strength in Far East

218

430. Japan Exchanges Merchandise with Spain

219

431. Tokyo Arranges Disposal of Japanese Bonds

219

(g) Japanese-German Relations

221

432. Hitler Stops German-Vichy Conversations

221

433. Foreign Minister Toyoda Reviews Japan's Policies

221

[x]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)

 

Page

434. Ambassador Oshima Correlates German-Russian Battle Reports

222

435. The Foreign Minister Explains That Communication Difficulties Impede the

222

436. Ambassador Oshima Again Urges Active Support of Tripartite Pact

223

437. Ambassador Oshima Reveals German Organization for the Occupation of Russia

223

438. Rumors of Japanese Representations to U.S.S.R. Reach Germany

223

439. Ambassador Oshima's Resignation Is Refused

224

440. The German Army Progresses Against Russia

224

441. Germany Advises Evacuation of Consular Officials From Occupied Territories

224

442. Manchukuoan-German Trade Retarded by War

224

443. Japan Learns of German Undercover Activities in China

225

444. Japan Cultivates the Interest of the German People

225

445. Ambassador Oshima Admonishes Tokyo for Lack of Decisive Attitude

225

446. Ambassador Oshima Objects to Japan's Use of Russian News Releases

226

447. Foreign Minister Toyoda Upholds Japan's Methods

226

448. Ambassador Oshima Confers with Field Marshal Keitel

227

449. Field Marshal Keitel Explains Germany's War Aims

228

450. Nationalistic Chinese in Germany Present a Problem to the Axis

228

451. Japanese-German Trade Continues Despite Difficulties of War

228

452. German Army Plans to Advance Along Leningrad-Sverdlovsk Railroad After Leningrad Falls

229

453. Rumors of Mobilization on Bulgarian-Turkish Border Disproved

230

454. Ambassador Oshima Tours Occupied European Countries

230

455. Ambassador Oshima Again Threatens Resignation

230

456. German National Defense Ministry Estimates Current Situation

231

457. Japan Repudiates Poland

231

458. Germany Explains the Greer Incident

231

459. Ambassador Oshima Learns of German Transactions for South American Money

231

460. New Japanese-German Shipping Problems Arise

232

461. The German Army Reaches Leningrad

232

462. Ambassador Oshima Inspects Bombing at Hamburg

232

463. Respective Treatments of Russian and German Nationals Reviewed

232

464. Ambassador Suma Confers with General Franco

233

465. Axis Powers Develop Communications Intelligence

233

466. Communications Difficulties Noted in Switzerland

234

467. Berlin and Tokyo Negotiate for Improved Communications

234

468. Rumanian Losses Revealed

235

469. Ambassador Oshima Denies Rumors of Russo-German Pre-War Negotiations

235

470. Ambassador Oshima Counteracts British and American Propaganda

236

471. Ambassador Oshima Reports on Russo-German Warfare, October 11, 1941

236

472. Ambassador Oshima Urges Support of Germany's War

238

473. Promiscuous Dissemination of Restricted News Is Condemned by Foreign Minister Toyoda

238

474. Government Control of Press Urged by Ambassador Oshima

238

475. Germany and Turkey Sign Commercial Pact

239

476. Ambassador Oshima Confers with Foreign Minister Von Ribbentrop

239

477. Germany Disapproves of Japan's Attitude Toward Russian-American Trade

239

478. Ambassador Oshima Objects to Pro-American Statements

240

479. Japanese-German Trade Difficulties Recur

240

480. German Manufacturers Aid Japan's War Industries

241

481. Ambassador Oshima Reports on German War Plans, October 16, 1941

242

(h) Japanese-Russian Relations

243

482. Ambassador Smetanin Urges Support of the Japanese-Russian Neutrality Pact

243

483. Japan Tells Germany Its Adherence to Neutrality Pact Is First Step Against Russia

243

484. Mongolian-Manchukuoan Boundary Dispute Settled

243

485. Finland Regains Territory Ceded to Russia

244

486. Japan Notes Stiffening of Russian Resistance

245

487. Leningrad Is Bombed and Kiev Falls

245

488. Japan Protests Against Russian Floating Mines

245

489. Japanese Intelligence Reveals Hitler's Demands on Russia Prior to German-Russian War

246

490. Ambassador Tatekawa Reports Discontent in Russia

246

[xi]

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)

 

Page

491. Japanese Diplomat Supports Neutrality Pact with Russia

246

492. Ambassador Tatekawa Recognizes Russian Strength

247

493. Ambassador Tatekawa Reports on War Progress (October 8, 1941)

247

494. Ambassador Tatekawa and Staff Evacuate Moscow

247

(i) Japanese-Italian Relations

249

495. The Italian Press Urges Japan to Attack Allies

249

496. Ambassador Horikiri Reveals Alleged Plans for Hitler-Mussolini Meeting

249

497. Ambassador Horikiri Suggests Use of Anti-Russian Propaganda

249

498. Ambassador Horikiri Reports on the Italian Occupation of Croatia

249

499. Ambassador Horikiri Again Urges Japan to Attack in the East

250

500. Mr. Filippo Anfuso Reports on Hitler-Mussolini Meeting

250

501. Italy Suspects Japan of Neglecting Tripartite Pact

251

502. Japan Learns of United States Representations to the Vatican

251

503. War Creates Difficulties for Japanese Exchange Students

252

504. Mr. Virginio Gayda Urges Japan to Enter or to Threaten War on the United States

252

505. Ambassador Horikiri Urges Japan to Decorate Outstanding Italians

253

506. Ambassador Horikiri Reports on the Italian Economic Situation

253

507. Italian Envoy Urges Action by Japan

253

508. Ambassador Horikiri Objects to Ending Japanese Trade with Italy

254

(j) Japanese-French Relations

255

509. Japan Requests Increase in Japan-Thailand Plane Service

255

510. France Asks Permission to Exchange Soldiers Between Shanghai and French Indo-China

255

511. Japan Insists That France Recognize the Wang Regime

256

512. Japan Demands Further French "Cooperation"

256

513. Japan Attempts to Limit Its Exchange Agreement with France

256

514. Japan Plans to Send Investigating Committee to French Indo-China

256

515. Marshal Petain Broadcasts to the French People

257

516. Ambassador Kato's Opinions on Conditions in France

257

517. Japan Demands Rubber Supply Allotted to the United States

257

518. Japanese Occupation Expenses Create Difficulty in Currency Exchange

258

519. Japan Vetoes a Proposed German Legation in Indo-China

258

520. Japan Demands French Concurrence in the Establishment of the Japan-Thailand Air Route

259

521. Ambassador Kato Reports on the Attempted Assassination of Mr. Pierre Laval and Mr. Marcel Deat

259

522. Japan Increases Demands for Indo-China Rubber

259

523. Japan Decrees Expulsion of Hostile Chinese in French Indo-China

260

524. French Vice Premier Doubts German Propaganda

261

525. France Resists Japan's Insistent Requests for Recognition of Nanking

261

527. Japanese Official Suggests That Domei News Agency Be Admonished

261

528. Japanese Diplomatic Staff in Vichy Experiences Privations of War

261

529. Germany Agrees to Shipment of French Rubber to Japan

261

530. Occupation Expenses Negotiations Are Transferred to Diplomatic Channels

262

531. Japan Insists That France Pay Supplementary Occupation Expenses

262

532. Ambassador Kato Reports That Germany Favors Franco-German Collaboration

263

533. France Delays Payment of Occupation Expenses

263

534. Vice Premier Darlan Denies Seeking American Intervention

263

535. Japan Seizes a Railroad and Demands Military Installations in French Indo-China

264

536. Vichy Reports on Japanese Experimental Broadcast

264

537. Japanese Army Arrests Annamites in French Indo-China

265

538. German Ambassador Suggests Use of French Annamite in Japanese Sabotage Plans

265

539. Japan Plans Use of Transferable Yen or Gold in Exchange Payment

265

540. Japan Requests Additional 100,000,000 Piasters for Occupation Force

266

541. Japanese Official Carries Secret Documents to Hanoi and Saigon

266

542. Japanese Ambassadors Suggest Decorations for German Diplomats in Vichy

266

543. France Accedes to Japanese Demand for Additional 10,000 Tons of Rubber

267

544. France Protests Against Japanese Demands for Dapuko Barracks

267

545. French Indo-China Fears Collapse of Financial Structure

267

(k) Japanese-Chungking Relations

269

[xii]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)

 

Page

546. Chungking Leaders Open Southwestern Military Conference

269

547. Japanese Intelligence Discerns American-British Aid to China

269

548. Transportation Experts Visit China

269

549. Japanese Demand That Macao Authorities Halt Allied Smuggling

270

550. Chinese Communists Take Advantage of British-American-Russian Conference to Present Demands

270

551. Mao Tse-Tung Promotes Communist-Nationalist Relations

271

552. Chinese Educator Believes Anti-Communist Faction Will Impede Joint Russo-Chinese Military Action

271

553. Chinese Educator Claims Only Anti-Japanese Encirclement Policy Will Save Chungking

271

554. Japan Detects Growing Anti-Communist Sentiment in Nationalist Headquarters

271

555. Chiang Kai-shek Encounters Opposition to Establishment of Southwestern Military Headquarters

272

556. Chicago Times Writer Labels Russian Aid to China Insignificant

272

557. Chinese Pilots Train in American Camps

272

558. Chiang Kai-shek Is Skeptical of Peace Talks

272

559. Japan Considers Possibility of Sabotaging the Socialist Conference With Four Changs

273

560. Japanese Intelligence Locates Chungking Armies in Burma Territory

273

561. Chungking Voids Existing Legal Tender

273

562. Lanchow Agreement Is Concluded—Lattimore Reports to Chiang Kai-shek

273

563. Japan Interprets Communist-Nationalist Truce

274

564. Proposal for Four Power Drive Against Japan Is Rejected by Moscow

275

565. Tokyo Analyzes China's Financial Crisis

275

566. United States Representatives Arrive in Chungking to Solve Economic Problems

276

567. U.S.S. President Coolidge Unloads Troops and Tanks at Unidentified Chinese Port

277

568. Japan Believes American Loan Is Reason for Visit of United States Representatives

277

569. Japan Promotes the Establishment of Independent Mohammedan Area

277

570. Japan Anticipates Peace on China Front

277

(l) Japanese-Nanking Relations

279

571. New Bank Notes Pay Custom Taxes

279

572. Nanking Clarifies Its Duties Toward China Concessions

279

573. Ambassador Honda Asks to Retain His Present Status

279

574. Japanese Offices in Central China Receive New Code

280

575. Nanking Fears Interception of Its Messages by Chungking

280

576. Nanking Army Refuses to Interfere with Problem Concerning Custom Officials

280

577. Japan Negotiates Peace Terms with Shansi Army

280

578. Nanking Requests a Military Allotment from Japan

281

579. Japanese Consul-Generals in China to Meet in Conference

281

580. Japan Freezes Foreign Currency in Chinese Reserve Bank

281

581. Shanghai Restrictions on Gasoline Impede Japanese Military Transportation

282

582. Berlin Appoints German Officials in China

282

583. Shanghai Sets Date for Intelligence Meeting

282

584. Japanese Official Observes Conditions in North China

283

585. Japan Seeks Ratification of Treaty with Shansi Army

283

586. Japan Extends Loan for Central China Operations

284

587. Japanese Official Reviews Chinese Reserve Bank Problem

284

588. Nanking Ambassador to Leave for Post in Germany

284

589. Japan Concerned over Delay in Appointing Nanking Ambassador to Italy

285

590. Berlin Appoints German Officials to Nanking

285

591. Nanking Ambassador Delays Trip to Germany

285

592. President Wang Seeks Information on Japanese-American Relations

286

593. Germany Appoints Pro-Japanese Diplomats in China

286

594. Tokyo Arranges Reception for Nanking Officials Going Abroad

286

595. Chungking Investigates Rumors of Shansi Army Surrender

286

596. President Wang Takes Active Part in Japanese-American Negotiations

287

(m) Japanese-Netherlands East Indies

289

597. Zoku Nomoto Instructs Telegraphic Clerks in New Code Systems

289

598. Japanese Finance Officials Negotiate for Circulation of Japanese Currency

289

[xiii]

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)

 

Page

599. Mr. Imagawa Discusses Japanese Currency Problems with Mr. Hoogstraten (August 7, 1941)

289

600. Second Trade Conference Ends in Disagreement over Japanese-Dutch Contracts (August 8, 1941)

290

601. Dutch Indecision on Petroleum Exports Delays Japanese Tankers

291

602. Japan Publishes Conversations with Finance Authorities

291

603. Native Indonese Leaders Pledge Support to Netherlands Government

291

604. Japan Proposes Reciprocal Financial Guarantees

292

605. Japanese Officials Meet with Mr. Hoogstraten in Fourth Trade Conference (August 12, 1941)

292

606. Thaiese Consul-General Visits Mr. Ishizawa

293

607. Dutch Firms Complain of Japanese Trade Practices

293

608. The Netherlands East Indies Prepares for War

294

609. Japan Seeks Ratification of Mining Agreement

295

610. Mr. Ishizawa Confers with Mr. Hoogstraten on Petroleum Questions (August 16, 1941)

295

611. Mr. Imagawa Emphasizes Importance of Handels Bank Problem

296

612. Dutch Merchants in Kobe are Dissatified

297

613. Netherlands Indies Places Restrictions on Japanese Business

297

(a) Suppression of Japanese Newspapers

297

(b) Java Prohibits Japanese Language Phone Calls

297

(c) Japanese South Seas Company Unable to Pay Telegraph Bill

297

614. Japanese Propaganda Active in East Indies

297

615. Netherlands East Indies Refuses Military Supplies to Japan

298

616. Mr. Ishizawa Asks Permission to Return to Japan

299

617. Mr. Saito Reports Difficulty in Purchasing Military Supplies

300

618. Japan's Reactions to Netherlands Increased Trade Restrictions

300

(a) Japanese Boycott Dutch Firms

300

(b) Japanese Official Leaves Soerabaja with Secret Documents

300

619. Netherlands East Indies Government Supports Chiang Kai-shek

300

620. Mr. Ishizawa Proposes Bank Loans to Japanese Evacuees

301

621. Foreign Minister Toyoda Requests Clarification of Proposals

302

622. Tokyo Disapproves Japanese Evacuation

302

623. Tokyo Sends Funds for Trade Promotion

303

624. Mr. Hoogstraten Calls on Mr. Ishizawa to Refute Japanese Statements (September 5, 1941)

303

625. Japanese Finance Ministry Issues Limited Permits to Dutch Firms

304

626. Japanese Fuel Bureau Reports Shortage of Oil

304

627. Mr. Ishizawa Answers Fuel Bureau's Message

304

628. Mr. Ishizawa Requests Code Names for Japanese Firms

305

629. Tokyo Requests Information on Japanese Fishing Companies

305

630. Batavia Sends Statistics on Fishing Companies

305

631. Mr. Ishizawa Confers with Mr. Hoogstraten on Petroleum Exports (September 8, 1941)

306

632. Japanese Couriers Arouse Suspicion in Indies

306

633. Japanese Minister Decides Polices for Deposit Loans

307

634. Mr. Ishizawa Comments on Deposit Policies

307

635. Mr. Hayasaki Reports Dutch Military Preparations

308

636. Mr. Ishizawa Requests Investigation of Shipping Problems

308

637. Tokyo to Facilitate Release of Confiscated Cargo

309

638. Dutch Government Offices Rumored Moving to Bandong

309

639. Mr. Ishizawa Suggests Reciprocal Shipping Arrangements to Mr. Hoostraten (September 10, 1941)

309

640. Dutch Officials Relax Freezing Order on Japanese Banks.

310

641. Mr. Ishizawa Confers with Mr. Rofinck (September 11, 1941)

310

642. Japanese Official Questions Minister Pabst (September 11, 1941)

310

643. Mr. Ishizawa Continues Arrangements for Evacuees Deposit Loans

311

644. Mr. Ogura Opposed Stipulations of Deposit Loan Plan

311

645. Tokyo Issues Instructions for Use of Codes

312

646. Tokyo Wires Instructions for Mitsui Tankers

312

647. Japan Urges Continued Trade Negotiations with the Dutch

312

648. Japanese Firms Request Exchange of Telegrams Through Consulates

312

649. Batavia Censors Japanese News

313

650. Japanese Ambassador to France Visits Holland

313

651. Finance Ministry Formulates Policies for Conversion of Accounts

313

[xiv]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)

 

Page

652. Japanese Officials to Redeem Guilder Currency

314

653. Japanese Intelligence Locates Indonese Fortifications

314

654. Dutch Officials Investigate Chinese on the Islands

315

655. Batavian Officials Restrict Travel

315

656. Japanese Physician Seeks Admittance to Netherlands Hospital

315

657. Japan Questions Possibility of Continuing Trade Negotiations

316

658. Mr. Ishizawa Plans Return to Japan

316

659. Mr. Ishizawa's Final Conversation with Mr. Hoogstraten (October 8, 1941)

316

660. Japan Decides Policies on Trade with Netherlands East Indies

317

661. Japanese Officials Suggest Trade Through Barter Method

319

662. Batavian Officials Refuse Admission to Japanese Bacteriologist

319

663. Japan to Operate Air Service Between Palao and Timor

319

(n) Japanese-Thaiese Relations

321

664. Japan Opens Further Financial Negotiations in Thailand

321

665. American Assets Are Frozen in Thai Bank

321

666. Japan Negotiates for Needed Thaiese Exports

321

667. Tokyo Answers Inquiry in Regard to Financial Negotiations

321

668. Thailand Issues Warning as Japanese Troops Draw Nearer

322

669. Japan Fears British Influence in Thailand

322

670. Japan Appoints Teiiji Tsubokami as Ambassador to Thailand

322

671. Japan Fears That Other Countries Will Desire Raise in Legation Status

323

672. Thailand Recognizes Manchukuo

323

673. Japan Continues Financial Negotiations

323

674. Japanese Intelligence Discloses British-American Reactions to Japan's Southward Expansion

324

675. Thailand Declares Its Sovereignty

324

676. Japan Proclaims Ambassador's Appointment on August 16, 1941

324

677. Japanese Agents Report That the British-Thaiese Trade Agreements Is Discontinued

325

678. Japanese Minister Futami Learns That Thailand Did Not Disarm

326

679. Japan Decrees That Ambassador Tsubokami Assume Thai Post on September 1, 1941

326

680. Japanese Officials Plan Special Ceremony to Present Japanese Ambassador

326

681. Thaiese Counter Proposal Delays Financial Negotiations

326

682. Japan and Thailand Conclude Their Financial Agreement on August 26, 1941

326

683. Japan Announces Agreement to Press

327

684. Japan Blames British and American Propaganda for Anti-Japanese Feeling in Thailand

327

685. Japan Refuses Crude Oil Supply to Thailand

327

686. Japanese "Theatre Group" Visits Thailand to Film Landscape and Shipping Activities

328

687. Japan Investigates the Reception of Domei News Broadcasts

328

688. Japan Continues Negotiations for Tin and Rubber Products

328

689. Mr. Asada Gives Opinions on Thailand's Reaction to the French Indo-China Occupation

328

690. Adviser Ono to Return to Japan

329

691. Thailand Attempts to Restrict the Entrance of Japanese Nationals

329

692. Japanese Officials Discuss British-Thaiese Trade Agreement

329

693. Ambassador Tsubokami Suggests Methods of Propaganda Improvement

329

694. Japan Plans Joint Japanese-Thailand Shipping Company

330

695. Bangkok Minister Helps to Evacuate Japanese Nationals in East Asia and India

330

696. Japan Plans to Establish and Control Thaiese Hydroelectric Power Station

331

697. Thailand Declares Neutrality Stand

331

698. Japanese Agents Gather Intelligence on British Malaya and Thailand

331

699. Circulars Denounce Mr. Wanitto as Traitor to Thailand

332

700. Japan Plans to Establish a Commercial Drug Concern in Thailand

333

701. The Misuse of Rubber Control Guild Creates Difficulties

333

702. Japanese Navy Purchases Rubber Without Consulting Embassy

333

703. Japan Promises Ambassador to Coordinate Purchases Through its Embassy

333

704. Wanitto's Signature Creates Disturbance in Shipping Plans

334

705. Japan Adds Military Intelligence Men to Thailand Embassy as Non-Career Clerks

334

706. Japanese Evince Interest in Thai Hospitals and Sanitation

334

707. Thai Troops Stage Demonstration Near Japanese Embassy

334

708. Japan Declares its Position in Handling Anticipated Thaiese Problems

335

[xv]

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)

 

Page

709. Thailand Government Becomes Suspicious of Japanese Actions

335

710. Japanese Plan to Establish Commercial Drug Concern Progresses

335

711. Japan Attempts to Have Thailand Waive Medical Examinations for Doctor's License

336

712. Japan Considers Thaiese Ruling a Possible Obstacle to the Establishment of Shipping Concern

336

713. Japan Negotiates for Food with Nai Wanitto

337

714. Ambassador Tsubokami Suggests the Protection of Wanitto in Countering British Propaganda Activities

337

[xvi]

OUTLINE OF VOLUME III

Part A

Hull-Nomura Conversations (August 5, 1941 - October 17, 1941)

(a) Secretary Hull's Reports
(b) Ambassador Nomura's Reports

Part B

Japanese Naval Intelligence in Diplomatic Messages

(a) Reports from the United States
(b) Reports from the Panama Canal
(c) Reports from the Philippine Islands
(d) Reports from the Hawaiian Islands
(e) Reports from South America
(f) Reports from Capetown, South Africa
(g) Reports from Vladivostok, Russia

Part C

Japanese Diplomatic Activities Throughout the World

(a) Japanese-American Relations
(b) Japanese-Panamanian Relations
(c) Japanese-Philippine Relations
(d) Japanese-Mexican Relations
(e) Japanese-South American Relations
(f) Japanese-British Relations
(g) Japanese-German Relations
(h) Japanese-Russian Relations
(i) Japanese-Italian Relations
(j) Japanese-French Relations
(k) Japanese-Chungking Relations
(1) Japanese-Nanking Relations
(m) Japanese-Dutch Relations
(n) Japanese-Thaiese Relations

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

CHAPTER III

Renewed Insistence by the Japanese Government upon Its Peaceful Purposes—Resumption of Conversations[1]

PART A—HULL-NOMURA CONVERSATIONS (August 5, 1941 - October 17, 1941)

1. Tokyo Sends New Proposal to Ambassador Nomura (August 5, 1941)

Despite Japan's efforts to solve the difficulties in Japanese-American relations, domestic issues were frequently an obstacle. Furthermore, on August 5, 1941 Foreign Minister Toyoda advised Ambassador Nomura that though he had reported that President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull, despite the opposition of American public opinion, were displaying considerable understanding in their attitude toward Japan, many Japanese were complaining against the intensified economic pressure being exerted by the United States.[2]

A newspaper report that President Roosevelt either had ordered the complete suspension of petroleum exports, or was about to curtail them, had created a great deal of antagonism in Japan. Warning that the continuance of such economic pressure or the maintenance of an encirclement policy would jeopardize Japanese-American relations, the Japanese Foreign Minister declared that both countries had reached the most important and most critical moment in their relations. To avert the impression that current negotiations had been begun under the threat of economic pressure, he suggested that all measures that might be construed as such should be abandoned at once.

Stating that Japan now proposed a new plan which was based on the one outlined by the last Cabinet, and which had been drawn up as a reply to the proposal of President Roosevelt on July 24, 1941 with the intention of incorporating its provisions into the final agreement, the Japanese Foreign Minister commented:

With this instrument, we hope to resume the Japanese-United States negotiations which were suspended because of the delay in the delivery of our revised proposals of 14 July and because of our occupation of French Indo-China which took place in the meantime.[3]

Ambassador Nomura was also instructed to explain verbally that Japan's action in peacefully occupying French Indo-China was a joint defense measure to make intervention by a third country unnecessary.[4] According to this explanation, Japanese public opinion had become aroused by the attitude of England, the United States and the Netherlands East Indies, and for this reason French Indo-China had to be occupied to restrain those in Japan who were clamoring for vigorous overseas action.

In his instructions to Ambassador Nomura, Foreign Minister Toyoda admitted that this explanation might not completely eliminate the sense of uneasiness felt by the United States, but he believed that at least it would be accepted conditionally. Acting on this assumption, Japan had decided that discussions on the new proposal should be conducted unofficially and in secret.

[1] Chapter title taken from the division arrangement of the State Department documents—Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States-Japan, 1931-1941 in two volumes, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1943, Volume II, 343. Hereafter referred to as S.D., II.
[2] Appendix III, No. 1. Hereafter Appendix III will be referred to as III, 1.
[3] Ibid.
[4] III, 2.

[1]

Stressing the anxiety of both countries to determine the fundamental causes which had led to the present critical condition, and emphasizing the belief that America was as desirous as Japan to remove or otherwise relieve, at its source, any and all military, economic, and political uneasiness existing between the two nations, Japan made the following proposals:

(1) The government of Japan definitely promises the following:

(a) So as to remove all military threats to the territories held by the United States, Japan will not occupy any territory in the Southwestern Pacific area, other than French Indo-China. Moreover, the Japanese military forces in French Indo-China will be removed immediately upon the conclusion of the China Incident.

(b) For the purpose of removing all military and political threats to the Philippine Islands, we shall, at an opportune moment, guarantee the neutrality of those Islands. In return we ask that the Imperial Government and its people be treated in the same manner as those of all other countries, including the United States.

(c) In order to remove the cause of the unsettled economic condition between the two countries in East Asia, we will cooperate in the production of and access to the natural resources of this area which are essential to the United States.

(2) The United States definitely promises the following:

(a) For the purpose of removing military threats to the Japanese Empire and to the importing and exporting of goods to and from Japan, the United States will cease military operations in the Southwestern Pacific area. Moreover, upon the effectuating of this agreement, the United States will use its good offices to have the governments of Britain and the Netherlands East Indies to take similar steps.

(b) For the purpose of removing the causes of military, political, and economic conflict between the two countries in-----, the United States will cooperate with Japan in the production of and access to natural resources of the Southwest Pacific area particularly of the Netherlands East Indies, which are essential to Japan. Moreover, the United States will cooperate with Japan in trying to have all the latter's differences with the Netherlands East Indies settled.

(c) In connection with the above, suitable measures shall be adopted immediately by the two nations to bring about the resumption of the profitable trade relations which used to exist between Japan and the United States.

(d) In view of the promise made by the Government of Japan under (1), (a), of the above, and with a view toward bringing about a settlement of the China Affair, the Government of the United States shall use its good offices to bring about a peace conference between Japan and the Chiang regime. Also, even after the withdrawal of Japanese troops from French Indo-China, Japan's special position there will be given recognition. (Last sentence garbled, gist guessed at.)

(3) Public Announcement. (-----will be stressed verbally) as was stated above, negotiations of this proposal shall be made in secrecy. Should, however, it become evident that it would be to the interest of both nations if part or all of the points contained were made public, it shall be done at the time and in the manner agreed upon by the two participants.5

2. Hull-Nomura Conversation (August 6, 1941)

(a) State Department Report[6]

On August 6, 1941 the Japanese Ambassador called on the Secretary of State to submit his government's reply to President Roosevelt's proposal of July 24, 1941. Explaining that the delay in answering had taken place in Tokyo, and that he had not received instructions until the preceding evening, Ambassador Nomura read an oral statement and then handed a copy of it to Mr. Ballantine.

The document stated that in order to mollify Japanese public opinion by counteracting the successive measures taken by the United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands East Indies against Japan, and to preserve peace in the Pacific, the Japanese government had effected a joint occupation of French Indo-China for the purpose of self-defense.7 To dispel the anxiety which America had manifested over this situation, the Japanese government had in-

[5] III, 2. For English text of this proposal as submitted by Ambassador Nomura to Secretary Hull, see S.D., II, 549. The English text was also sent to Tokyo by Ambassador Nomura, III, 3-5.
[6] "Memorandum of a conversation", initialed by Mr. Joseph W. Ballantine, August 6, 1941, S.D., II, 546-548.
[7] "Oral statement handed by the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) to the Secretary of State on August 6, 1941", S.D., II, 548-549. See III, No. 1 for text as sent by Tokyo on August 5, 1941.

[2]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

structed Ambassador Nomura to enter into negotiations on an "off the record" basis, and to submit a proposal which was intended as a reply to the suggestion made by President Roosevelt on July 24, 1941. This would serve as a fresh basis for a Japanese-American understanding. Any agreements resulting from the negotiations would be then incorporated into the general formula for the adjustment of Japanese-American relations.

Japan believed that both countries realized it was more than ever necessary to examine calmly with mutual understanding the diverse viewpoints of the two nations. In order to remove the causes responsible for military, political, and economic friction between Japan and the United States, the Japanese government would agree not to station troops in the Southwest Pacific, except in French Indo-China, and to withdraw its army even from that area when the China Incident had reached a settlement.

In turn, America was to suspend its military measures in the Southwest Pacific area and was to advise Great Britain and the Netherlands to take similar steps. Japan also guaranteed the neutrality of the Philippine Islands, provided that discriminatory measures would not be taken against Japanese subjects by either the United States or any other nation. By close cooperation between Japan and the United States in the production and procurement of such natural resources as might be required by either country, normal trade relations were to be restored.[8]

Although Ambassador Nomura wished to discuss the contents of the Japanese proposal immediately, Secretary Hull pocketed the copy given him, and suggested that any discussion of it be postponed pending his study of the document. Admitting to the Japanese Ambassador that he was pessimistic regarding the value of the proposal which had been mentioned in the Japanese representative's oral statement, Secretary Hull referred to the arduous but unsuccessful efforts made by both men to improve relations between the United States and Japan.

Pointing to the continuous agitation in the government-controlled Japanese press and to statements of high officials advocating a policy of force and conquest, Secretary Hull drew a parallel between the Japanese contention that theirs was strictly a campaign of precautionary aggression, and German insistence that its action in Europe and its war against Russia was a matter of self-defense. In view of the Japanese belief that the United States was endeavoring to encircle Japan, Secretary Hull felt that future conversations would be valueless. The meeting was then concluded on a defeatist note.[9]

(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report[10]

Ambassador Nomura reported that on the evening of August 6, 1941 he called on Secretary Hull to carry out the instructions received from Tokyo on August 5, 1941. Having made a detailed explanation of Japan's intentions, he then submitted Japan's proposal in English to the Secretary of State.[11] Secretary Hull promised to study the proposal carefully, but, according to Ambassador Nomura, he had not seemed to take much interest in it, and had begun to express his opinions on current Japanese-American relations without further mention of the proposal. Ambassador Nomura summarized the Secretary Hull's statement as follows:

Setting aside the relations between him and me, he said he was greatly disappointed in the actions Japan has been taking one after another, and that so long as Japan does not give up the policy of force, there was no use talking.

So long as the Japanese Government authorities say that what the United States is doing is encirclement of Japan, he could not expect anything of Japan ("I can expect nothing from you"). When we wish to live in peace and security, HITLER, saying that he was acting in self-defense, mows down everything that stands in his way.[12]

[8] "Proposal by the Japanese Government Handed by the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) to the Secretary of State," August 6, 1941, S.D., II 549-550. See II, No. 2 for text as sent by Tokyo on August 5, 1941.
[9] S.D. II, 546-548.
[10] III, 6-7.
[11] II, 3-5,6.
[12] III, 6-7.

[3]

Ambassador Nomura came away from this interview convinced that no matter what explanation was offered, it could not convey Japan's intentions to the leaders of the United States. Moreover, he felt that the United States was determined to deal with any situation.[13]

3. Tokyo Requests an Immediate Report from Ambassador Nomura

On August 6, 1941 Foreign Minister Toyoda complained to Ambassador Nomura that he had not yet received a report concerning the action he had requested the Japanese Ambassador to take on July 23, 1941.[14] Unfortunately, the message indicating the action to be taken was garbled either in transmission or interception, and American cryptanalysts were unable to discover the nature of the request.[15] In view of his previous dilatoriness, Ambassador Nomura was ordered to report immediately the results of his interview with Secretary Hull on August 6, 1941 concerning the New Japanese proposal.[16]

As a result of this reprimand, Ambassador Nomura replied that he had sent several reports relating to discussions between Minister Wakasugi and Messrs. Welles and Hamilton which had indicated that the American authorities saw no course but to end the conversations.[17] Ambassador Nomura also reported that the publisher of the Army-Navy Journal, had called upon him to state that the American people, including even the middle west isolationists, supported the administration's policies toward Japan. According to Ambassador Nomura, he was deeply concerned that only a few Americans of influence were sympathetic toward Japan.[18]

4. Japan Again Proposes a Konoye-Roosevelt Conference (August 7, 1941)

Japanese-American relations were so critical that on August 7, 1941 Foreign Minister Toyoda informed Ambassador Nomura that a policy of "laissez faire" should no longer be pursued. He suggested, therefore, that a conference be held as soon as possible between Prime Minister Konoye and President Roosevelt. Though the subjects to be considered would depend greatly on the time at which the conference was held, in general the discussion would be conducted along the lines of the present negotiations.

To save time, the conference would last no longer than a few days, and it was hoped that the delegation would be restricted to a minimum number of persons. Strict secrecy was to be observed until the calling of the conference was definitely agreed upon, at which time a public announcement could be made, if President Roosevelt had no objection. The Japanese Foreign Minister informed Ambassador Nomura that, to ensure secrecy, the American Ambassador in Tokyo was not being advised of this new proposal.[19]

If there were any truth in the rumors concerning the resignation of Secretary Hull and the imminence of a general embargo on all shipments of petroleum products to Japan, Foreign Minister Toyoda informed Ambassador Nomura, it would hardly be worthwhile for Japan to propose this conference. Therefore, Ambassador Nomura was requested to investigate immediately and report his findings to Tokyo.[20]

5. Ambassador Nomura Reports on Current American Policy Toward Japan

At approximately the same time that Foreign Minister Toyoda was reprimanding Ambassador Nomura for his failure in making prompt replies to his specific questions, Ambassador Nomura

[13] II, 7.
[14] III, 8.
[15] III, 9.
[16] III, 8. [17] III, 10.
[18] II, 11.
[19] III, 12.
[20] III, 13.

[4]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

submitted a report to Tokyo concerning recent modifications in the policy of the United States toward Japan.[21] Although agreeing that Japanese-American relations had reached an extremely critical stage, Ambassador Nomura commented that such a condition was the inevitable result of Japan's own action in following other essential policies.

Remarking that the United States believed the Axis nations to be working hand in hand to conquer the world, Ambassador Nomura reported that his insistence in explaining that Japan was guided solely by the principles of the brotherhood of mankind had led to the beginning of unofficial discussions with the Secretary of State. However, the occupation of French Indo-China by Japan had put an end to those same discussions and, according to recent conversations with Secretary Hull and Acting Secretary Welles, the United States had returned to its original position with regard to Japan. Secretary Hull had been bitterly disappointed because he had been very interested in bettering relations between Japan and the United States, and both he and his very good friend, Postmaster General Walker, had been very much embarrassed by the turn of events.

Although American authorities claimed that the policy of the United States toward Japan was not one of unfriendliness, since it was taking measures only to counteract certain steps taken by Japan, Ambassador Nomura pointed to the freezing order and the export embargo issued by the United States, and the joint warning by Secretary Hull and Foreign Minister Eden with regard to Thailand as indications that there was no doubt that the United States was prepared to take drastic action against Japan. Furthermore, in view of the friendly relations between the United States and Russia, Ambassador Nomura doubted that the United States would remain on the sidelines if Japan attacked to the north. Reports of a conference between high British and American military and naval authorities on aid to Russia and the Far Eastern question had attracted Japanese attention.[22]

Ambassador Nomura reminded Tokyo that its Axis partner, Germany, was exercising the utmost precautions in dealing with the United States and had even gone so far as to issue peace terms in an attempt to influence American public opinion. He also pointed out that the trend which was influencing the United States to center its attention on relations with the Japanese would increase in the near future. Ambassador Nomura concluded as follows: I have submitted my humble opinions before and they are unchanged today. Our country is at present standing at a most critical crossroads. My only desire is that we choose the right road, for the sake of the future of our country.[23]

6. Hull-Nomura Conversation (August 8, 1941)

(a) State Department Report[24]

At a meeting requested by the Secretary of State, Ambassador Nomura was presented with a reply to the August 6, 1941 proposal of the Japanese government. According to this American document, President Roosevelt had proposed that if the Japanese government would withdraw its forces from French Indo-China, and would refrain from the establishment of bases there by means of its military and naval strength, the government of the United States would guarantee for itself, and would also attempt to obtain from China, Great Britain, and the Netherlands, a binding commitment to regard French Indo-China as a neutral country similar to Switzerland.[25] Not only would these governments forego any military act of aggression against

[21] III, 14.
[22] III, 14-15.
[23] III, 14.
[24] "Memorandum of a Conversation", initialled by Mr. J. W. Ballantine, August 8, 1941, S.D., II, 550-551.
[25] "Document handed by the Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura)", August 8, 1941, S.D., II, 552-553. The English text of this document was sent in Japanese code to Tokyo on August 8, 1941. See III, 16-18.

[5]

French Indo-China, but they would also permit local French authorities to remain undisturbed in the administration of their territory. This proposal, in its entirety, had been subsequently extended to include Thailand.

In view of Japan's thorough acquaintance with America's many attempts to found a broad understanding, calculated to establish and maintain a peace in the Pacific which would be beneficial to all the countries concerned, the United States felt that the Japanese proposals of August 6, 1941 were lacking in responsiveness.[26]

After reading the reply of the United States to gain its import, the Japanese representative re-asserted his country's desire to adjust relations with the United States. As a means of attaining this end, he suggested a conference in Honolulu between the heads of the two governments. Mr. Hull replied that if the conversations between the officials of Japan and the United States had produced a basis for mutual understanding, they would now be able to go forward along a policy of peace. However, the loss of control by the peaceful faction in the Japanese government had proven too formidable an obstacle, and Secretary Hull had been forced to notify the Japanese Ambassador that the measures taken by his government had removed the basis for the "understanding" which they had been discussing.

According to Secretary Hull, the Japanese press was being constantly stimulated to stress the alleged encirclement of Japan by the United States. Ambassador Nomura replied that the Japanese press was being inspired only to invigorate his people and it was not attempting to counteract the efforts of the government to improve relations with the United States.

When asked by Ambassador Nomura if this constituted an answer to his suggestion that the heads of the two governments should meet, Secretary Hull replied that the responsibility for shaping suitable policies of peace now rested with the Japanese government.[27]

(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report[28]

Ambassador Nomura informed Tokyo that he had received from the Secretary of State a reply to the proposal he had submitted on August 6, 1941. According to Ambassador Nomura, the document indicated that the United States had not compromised in the least beyond what President Roosevelt had said previously.

To Ambassador Nomura's proposal that the leaders of the two countries meet for a conference in Hawaii, Secretary Hull replied that the United States had been making preparations for that purpose since Japan had agreed to participate in such a conference. Secretary Hull pointed out, however, that since his talks with Ambassador Nomura had demonstrated that the two countries were in conflict and that Japan's policy had not been altered, there was no point in holding such conferences. Mr. Ballantine agreed with this statement and declared that the use of force could not go hand in hand with the maintenance of the peace in the Pacific.

Both Secretary Hull and Mr. Welles commented on Japan's constant prating about an encirclement policy, but Ambassador Nomura replied that though the United States was absolutely safe from the viewpoint of defense, it continued to claim that many dangers were surrounding it in order to have an excuse for expanding its national defense.

Ambassador Nomura was convinced that American authorities would negotiate with Japan only if it stopped further military operations. Believing, in view of this, that there was not the slightest chance of a parley with Japanese officials, Ambassador Nomura suggested that the Japanese Foreign Office have Ambassador Grew in Tokyo stop his activities to bring about the conference of leaders.[29]

[26] S.D., II 552-553. See III, 17-18.
[27] S.D., II, 550-551.
[28] III, 19-20.
[29] Ibid.

[6]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

7. Foreign Minister Toyoda Again Urges a Roosevelt-Konoye Conference

On August 9, 1941 Foreign Minister Toyoda emphasized to Ambassador Nomura the importance of having the proposal for a meeting between the leaders of the two nations submitted to President Roosevelt immediately. The Japanese Ambassador was directed to explain to the American President the advantages that would be derived therefrom.[30]

Ambassador Nomura promptly replied that he would call on President Roosevelt as soon as the latter had returned to Washington, and that he would do everything in his power to make a favorable impression. However, the Japanese Ambassador was convinced that as long as Japan proceeded along the lines of its present policy, the United States would not deviate from its established course. After warning Tokyo that the United States considered Japan's occupation of French Indo-China as a definite indication of an aggression policy, Ambassador Nomura declared that both President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull were in complete agreement, and that it would be a mistake to try to differentiate between their attitudes.

In view of the firm stand expressed by the United States on August 6 and August 8, 1941, Ambassador Nomura felt that even the offer of Prime Minister Konoye to come to the United States would not move American authorities to any perceptible degree. Remarking that he did not expect too much from the interview he planned to have with President Roosevelt, Ambassador Nomura expressed his pessimism concerning the present critical state of affairs. He stressed the need for evolving some plan which would persuade the United States to change its policy toward Japan.[31]

Three days later Foreign Minister Toyoda sent another urgent message explaining that though the Americans apparently considered the Japanese proposals made in reply to President Roosevelt's suggestions to be Japan's final answer, this was not necessarily the impression which Japan intended to convey. Prime Minister Konoye was willing to confer further with the President of the United States along general lines with a view to maintaining world peace.[32]

8. Colonel Iwakura and Mr. Ikawa Are Recalled to Japan

Ambassador Nomura notified Tokyo on August 9, 1941 that Colonel Hideo Iwakura and Mr. Ikawa had returned to Japan aboard the Tatsuta Maru. Expressing his appreciation for the complete cooperation and great help he had received from these officials, Ambassador Nomura asked that certain Japanese authorities be informed of their excellent work.[33]

It will be recalled that Ambassador Nomura had been severely reprimanded by Foreign Minister Matsuoka, when the latter was in office, for having used the term "associates" in describing the status of these assistants.

9. Counselor Iguchi Suggests a Propaganda Campaign in Japan

Counselor Sadao Iguchi of the Japanese Embassy in Washington submitted a report to Secretary Tasiro in Tokyo on August 11, 1941, in which he emphasized the firm attitude of the United States toward Japan, and stressed his belief that the United States would resort to war, if necessary.[34]

Indicating his realization that the Japanese government was fully cognizant of the dangerous situation, Counselor Iguchi commented, however, on the general unawareness of the Japanese public concerning the firm stand being taken by the United States toward Japan. He believed that the Japanese people were guilty of wishful thinking in regard to the United States, and, if the worst came, they would be taken completely by surprise.

[30] III, 21-22.
[31] III, 23-24.
[32] III, 25.
[33] III, 26.
[34] III, 27.

[7]

In view of this, he suggested that the Intelligence Section of the Cabinet or some other group should start a campaign to enlighten the Japanese people concerning the real attitude of the United States, so that they could be prepared for any eventuality. He suggested that the reports, concerning European and American intelligence, issued by the Intelligence Section of the Foreign Office, should contain more concrete information.[35]

10. Prime Minister Toyoda Reprimands Minister Wakasugi

On August 12, 1941, Foreign Minister Toyoda ordered Minister Wakasugi, who was in Los Angeles, to make no further public comments on the Japanese-American question until he had reported to the Foreign Office in Japan. This reprimand was occasioned by an interview which Minister Wakasugi had given over the international telephone to the Japanese press. The newspaper report had heightened the critical nature of the Japanese-American question because of its effect upon various Japanese groups. Mr. Wakasugi was also directed not to give the impression that he was bearing any important proposals from the United States.[36]

Mr. Wakasugi immediately expressed his amazement that his interview could have made difficult the position of his government in regard to the delicate Japanese-American relations, since he had no other motive than the desire to make a frank and fitting statement. In addition, he had no intention of implying any lessening of America's responsibility in the matter.[37]

11. Ambassador Nomura Confers with an American Cabinet Member (August 13, 1941)

On August 13, 1941 Ambassador Nomura conferred with an American Cabinet member whose name was not given in the Japanese Ambassador's report to Tokyo, but who may be presumed to have been Postmaster Frank C. Walker, known to be working behind the scenes with Secretary Hull to effect a peaceful solution to Japanese-American difficulties. Though expressing his conviction that the Japanese occupation of French Indo-China had been assisted by Germany's pressure on the French government, the Cabinet member said that he agreed with President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull with regard to the desirability of maintaining peace in the Pacific.[38]

Ambassador Nomura believed that Japan could not remove its troops from French Indo-China at present, but that when a favorable opportunity arose, they would be evacuated. When he mentioned a conference of the leading men of Japan and the United States as a means of surmounting the present crisis, even though a completely satisfactory solution might not be achieved, the American official did not show much enthusiasm, but promised to discuss the matter with Secretary Hull.

Declaring that the American press was paying more attention to Japan than to Germany, Ambassador Nomura referred to newspaper stories suggesting that the United States Navy concentrate all of its forces in the Pacific, and that Britain and the United States pool their navies to ensure having the necessary power in that area. Several writers had commented that Congress would more likely agree to war against Japan than against Germany.[39]

Stating that he would not deny the statements, the American Cabinet member remarked that Japan's excellent navy would be exceedingly troublesome if combined with that of Germany. Although the United States foresaw future trouble with Russia, it worked jointly with the Soviet Union in order to destroy Hitlerism.

[35] III, Ibid.
[36] III, 28.
[37] III, 29.
[38] III, 30.
[39] Ibid.

[8]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

Ambassador Nomura remarked that pressure against Japan was exceedingly harmful. If the Japanese people were to adjust themselves and act in accordance with the policy desired by the United States, then their problems must be handled from an entirely different viewpoint.[40]

12. Hull-Nomura Conversation (August 13, 1941)

(a) Secretary Hull's Report[41]

Secretary Hull requested that the Japanese Ambassador call on him on August 13, 1941 to receive a statement citing mistreatment of Americans and injury to American rights in places under Japanese jurisdiction.[42] After the Japanese Ambassador had read the document, Secretary Hull said that he could not understand Japan's purpose in allowing these injustices to continue, and, therefore, had felt that a summarization of the incidents should be presented to the government of Japan.

According to Secretary Hull, the Japanese Ambassador agreed wholeheartedly with his views and said that he would be glad to take the matter up with his government. Secretary Hull then informed Ambassador Nomura that he might have other material to present to the Japanese government by Saturday, August 16, 1941, or Sunday, and in answer to a question concerning his availability, the Japanese Ambassador stated that he would be in Washington at that time.

Secretary Hull then introduced a question relating to the alleged promise of Japan not to bomb Chungking after the U.S.S. Tutuila incident.[43] Recounting how the Japanese Ambassador had called on Mr. Welles on July 31, 1941 to express officially to President Roosevelt Japan's deep regret over the bombing of the U.S.S. Tutuila at Chungking, Secretary Hull reminded Ambassador Nomura that he had assured the United States that the bombing had been an accident. In order to prevent similar incidents, Japan had promised to suspend all bombing operations over the city area of Chungking. Japan had requested that this suspension of bombing operations be regarded as strictly confidential and had offered to pay full indemnity for any damage to American properties. At that time, the Japanese Ambassador had informed Mr. Welles that he himself had recommended this procedure to his government.[44]

In view of this action, the American government had considered the incident closed, but on August 8, 10 and 12, 1941 three dispatches had given accounts of new bombings by Japanese planes at Chungking. A telegram dated August 11, 1941, from the American Embassy at Chungking reported that, during the past four days, Chungking had been subjected to unusually heavy and prolonged air raids. Not only had districts outside the city been bombed, but the city area also had been affected, though no bombs had been dropped in the area directly opposite the anchorage of the American gunboat and the United States Chancery. At least one American residence had been demolished, and other residences within the city area had been damaged. In view of these occurrences, the United States requested an explanation and an indication of Japan's attitude and intentions regarding its pledge of July 31, 1941.

The Japanese Ambassador promptly replied that Japan had promised only to cease bombing the city area temporarily and not indefinitely. Although believing that Mr. Welles had understood this stipulation, Ambassador Nomura stated that he might have failed in his efforts to inform the Under Secretary. Nevertheless, he reiterated that this was Japan's position.[45]

[40] Ibid.
[41] "Memorandum by the Secretary of State", August 13, 1941, S.D., I, 907-908.
[42] "The Department of State to the Japanese Embassy", S.D., I, 908-910; III, 31
[43] "Memorandum by the Secretary of State", August 13, 1941, S.D., I, 907-908.
[44] "The Department of State to the Japanese Embassy", August 12, 1941, S.D., I, 723-724.
[45] S.D., I, 908.

[9]

(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report[46]

Ambassador Nomura stated that at four o'clock in the afternoon of August 13, 1941 he had called on the Secretary of State, who had handed him the note mentioned above. Secretary Hull had remarked that he had no intention of releasing the note for publication since it would aggravate unduly public opinion. Though there were only a few hundred United States' citizens in Japan, there were a hundred odd-thousand Japanese in America.

Ambassador Nomura replied that Japan was taking action to parallel the freezing order of the United States, and was also enacting measures against individuals, similar to those in operation against the Japanese in the United States. However, he felt that such pin-prickings were annoyances which did not affect the general situation; therefore, he hoped that they could be mutually discontinued.

Ambassador Nomura declared that when Secretary Hull had introduced the subject of the Chungking bombings, he had explained that Japan had promised to cease bombing the Chungking suburban areas but only for a certain period. Ambassador Nomura also commented that Secretary Hull's inquiry concerning his presence in Washington during the latter part of the week indicated that he was planning to issue some sort of a statement.[47]

13. Japan Discounts the Attempted Assassination of Vice Premier Hiranuma

Japan's eagerness to have Prime Minister Konoye confer with President Roosevelt was evident in a dispatch from Tokyo on August 15, 1941, which denied the erroneous conclusion of some who had interpreted the attempted assassination of Baron Hiranuma, Vice Premier of Tokyo and Minister without Portfolio, as a reaction of Japanese extremists against any cooperation with Britain and the United States.[48]

According to newspaper reports, rumors from diplomatic quarters indicated that an Axis press man had inquired about the Hiranuma shooting some ten hours before it occurred.[49] Emphasizing that his government's attitude was unshaken despite this unfortunate incident, Foreign Minister Toyoda declared that Japanese public opinion would approve any fair revision of national relations regardless of the other party concerned.

Though he was cognizant of Ambassador Nomura's recent messages concerning the obstacles to further Japanese-American negotiations, Foreign Minister Toyoda again urged that the Japanese Ambassador see President Roosevelt in order to expedite the settlement of broad issues and to prevent a general calamity. The American Ambassador in Tokyo would be advised of Japan's proposal at the first opportune moment.[50]

14. Hull-Nomura Conversation (August 16, 1941)

(a) Secretary Hull's Report[51]

Calling on Secretary Hull in regard to President Roosevelt's proposal of August 8, 1941 Ambassador Nomura expressed once more his country's desire to ensure peaceful relations with the United States, and stated that since Japan would make concessions to avoid war, there was a basis for further progress along this line. The Japanese Ambassador also reiterated his suggestion that high Japanese and American officials meet halfway between the two countries for a conference.

[46] III, 32.
[47] Ibid.
[48] III, 33.
[49] New York Times, August 15, 1941, p. 10:2.
[50] III, 33.
[51] "Memorandum by the Secretary of State", August 16, 1941, S.D., II, 553-554.

[10]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

However, when Ambassador Nomura asked whether his conversations with Secretary Hull would be resumed on their former basis, Mr. Hull repeated the circumstances leading up to the cessation of their conversations, but did not pass further on the question or respond favorably. In pointing out that the establishment of bases in and about French Indo-China by the Japanese army, navy, and air forces indicated Japan's intention to effect a serious invasion of the South Seas areas, which would menace British success in Europe and eventually the safety of the Western Hemisphere, Secretary Hull emphasized the fact that the United States could not remain silent in the face of such a threat. To Ambassador Nomura's assertion that Japan desired merely to secure necessary commodities, Mr. Hull replied that under a peaceful agreement Japan would have obtained access to world markets.

Since Ambassador Nomura repeatedly stressed the desire of Japan for an amicable settlement of differences and its willingness to make concessions in order to have the conversations resumed, Secretary Hull expressed some interest in this, but pointed to Japan's continuing policy of conquest by force and to the bitter attacks on the United States by the Japanese government-controlled press. Secretary Hull also suggested that the Japanese Ambassador talk to President Roosevelt and to any other American officials concerning this subject. However, Ambassador Nomura stated that until he had received specific instructions from his own country concerning the concessions it might be willing to make, he could not take such action.[52]

(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report[53]

From the intelligence reports which Ambassador Nomura received concerning the recent conference between the leaders of Great Britain and the United States, it appeared that England desired to draw the United States into war with the purpose of utilizing its resources in the Far East. On the other hand, the United States wished to check Great Britain's ambitions by having it clarify its war aims.

From the joint statement published subsequent to this conference, it was evident, according to the Japanese Ambassador, that the United States had achieved its purpose and that Great Britain had been forced to assume a comparatively disadvantageous position. In view of this report, Ambassador Nomura had considered it essential to confer with Secretary Hull prior to President Roosevelt's return to Washington. Therefore, on the afternoon of August 16, 1941 Ambassador Nomura had met with the American Secretary of State and had discussed the current situation.

After relaying the instructions which the Japanese government had sent him, Ambassador Nomura stressed the necessity for renewing relations between the two countries, since if the present situation remained unchecked, the outcome would be disastrous. Ambassador Nomura pointed out that a Pacific war would be "mass murder to an unprecedented extent in the history of the world." Such a war would not be terminated quickly because of any difference in the financial status of Japan and the United States, but instead would develop into a war of complete exhaustion, lasting several years, and would be advantageous to neither country. Therefore, not only should Japan and the United States guard against the extremists in both governments, but they must also be on the lookout against enticing offers made by third countries to both Japan and the United States. Secretary Hull remarked that it had been rumored that Chancellor Hitler had begun the war knowing Commissar Stalin's attitude well in advance.

At this point Ambassador Nomura strongly refuted the charges that Japan was under military domination by insisting that the characteristics of its imperial family, its government and its people were opposed to militarization. Although Japan advocated a Far Eastern Sphere of Co-prosperity, such a policy was not to be confused with military conquest, since it meant living together by cooperative defense, and, thus, did not differ greatly from the Good Neighbor Policy of the United States.

[52] Ibid.
[53] III, 34.

[11]

After considering Ambassador Nomura's remark, Secretary Hull stated that the United States recognized the equal status of all countries without the necessity of resorting to the use of arms. Ambassador Nomura replied that external pressure upon Japan had caused it to retaliate, but if this outside pressure were removed, Japan would resort to peaceful measures. Secretary Hull seemed to agree with this statement.

Ambassador Nomura then turned the conversation to the proposed meeting between the leaders of both countries. It was his personal opinion that this meeting should be encouraged rather than discouraged, since many of the measures contained in the Atlantic Charter coincided directly with the statement issued by Prince Konoye, and through both of these documents, an agreement could be reached between the two countries. Indicating that Japan's only reason for suggesting a conference with the United States was to improve the present diplomatic situation, the Japanese Ambassador asked if the United States still deemed such a conference impossible.

Although he had not yet taken up the matter with anyone outside of his own office, Secretary Hull promised to confer with President Roosevelt at the earliest opportunity. According to Ambassador Nomura, this attitude was much different from Secretary Hull's earlier position and was probably the result of his having talked with the Cabinet members who had conferred with the Japanese Ambassador. When Secretary Hull inquired concerning Ambassador Nomura's personal opinion on the general outlook, the Japanese Ambassador replied that it would be extremely dangerous to let Japanese-American relations remain in their present condition.[54]

15. Ambassador Nomura Summarizes the Japanese-American Diplomatic Situation (August 16, 1941)

In summarizing the Japanese-American diplomatic situation on August 16, 1941, Ambassador Nomura warned that anything might happen at any moment. As soon as Japan made another move, particularly if it were directed against Thailand, matters would grow suddenly worse. Though he had reported that America was not united in regard to participation in the European war and that President Roosevelt himself was hesitant, the Japanese Ambassador emphasized that the American people were unanimous in regard to taking a strong hand in the Far East. This would meet with the approval of Great Britain, China and Germany.[55]

Expressing his belief that President Roosevelt would not go to extremes inasmuch as both he and American naval authorities were conscious of the tremendous tasks involved in a Pacific war, Ambassador Nomura stated that the British believed that if a Japanese-American war were started, there would be a good prospect of getting the United States to participate in the European war.

The Japanese Ambassador pointed out that Allied confidence in ultimate victory was gaining, for even if Germany eventually defeated Russia, the war would not have been short and decisive, since it had already reached the stage of attrition. Furthermore, since submarine war in the Atlantic was being won by Britain and the United States, the situation closely resembled that of 1917.[56]

With such a state of affairs in the United States, Ambassador Nomura had been very anxious to have the State Department approve Foreign Minister Toyoda's proposal for a conference of Prime Minister Konoye and President Roosevelt, but Secretary Hull had rejected it. Ambassador Nomura's efforts to interest a Cabinet member who was intimately associated with Secretary Hull failed. President Roosevelt at one time had thought of arranging a similar conference, but Japan's occupation of French Indo-China had led him to believe that Japan did

[54] Ibid.
[55] III, 35.
[56] III, 36.

[12]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

not desire a fundamental readjustment of Japanese-American relations, but was only conducting a policy of appeasement towards the United States.

Ambassador Nomura reported that American authorities were beginning to think that he had been misled by his own country.[57]

Since Japanese newspapers had severely criticized a statement recently issued by the American government, the atmosphere had become worse. Ambassador Nomura advised that unless something were done immediately to eliminate this misunderstanding, he would not be able to accomplish his objective. Furthermore, since President Roosevelt was unfavorable to the proposal, Ambassador Nomura did not expect him to do anything about it.

Indicating three critical points concerning which the United States wished Japan to give some sort of a pledge, namely, the question of self-defense, the withdrawal of troops from China, and non-discrimination in trade, Ambassador Nomura requested that the Japanese Foreign Office consider them and send him any further instructions at once. Thus, he would be prepared for an interview with President Roosevelt who was returning to Washington within a few days.[58]

16. Roosevelt-Nomura Conversation (August 17, 1941)

(a) Secretary Hull's Report[59]

In an informal conference between President Roosevelt and the Japanese Ambassador, called at Mr. Roosevelt's request, the strained relations between the two countries were discussed. After President Roosevelt had contrasted the policies and principles of the American government with Japan's course of conquest by force, and had asserted that the next move toward peace now depended upon Japan, Ambassador Nomura produced an instruction which he said was from his government. It emphasized Japan's hopes for a mutual understanding, and expressed Prince Konoye's willingness to attend a conference with President Roosevelt at some point halfway between Japan and the United States.

President Roosevelt then commented that since the relations between the two governments should be brought up-to-date, he had prepared an oral statement clarifying the position of the United States. He regretted the necessity for having to do so, but there was no other recourse. President Roosevelt read the oral statement to the Japanese Ambassador and then handed him the document containing it.[60]

In his oral statement President Roosevelt indicated that in protracted conversations during the past months Secretary Hull and Ambassador Nomura had attempted to formulate a mutual understanding, based on the preclusion of force by either country, in order to maintain peace and justice in the Pacific. On July 24, 1941 President Roosevelt had offered to urge the governments of China, Great Britain, and the Netherlands to join the United States in a solemn declaration that they had no aggressive intentions with regard to Indo-China and would make all markets and materials of Indo-China available to all nations on equal terms, provided that Japan withdrew its forces from this area.

In spite of these efforts, the Japanese government had continued its military activities throughout the Far East and had occupied Indo-China. Although the American government was in full sympathy with Japanese desires for amicable and mutually profitable relations with the United States, it was now deemed necessary to warn Japan that a continuation of its program of military domination of neighboring countries by force or threat of force, would com-

[57] III, 37.
[58] III, 38.
[59] "Memorandum by the Secretary of State", August 17, 1941, S.D., II, 554-555.
[60] Ibid.

[13]

pel the United States to take any and all steps deemed necessary to ensure the legitimate rights and interests, the safety and the security of the United States and its citizens.[61]

After a slight pause, President Roosevelt turned to a discussion of Ambassador Nomura's request for a resumption of the conversations with Secretary Hull. Making further reference to Japan's policy of conquest by force, and to the bitter denunciation of America by the Japanese government-controlled press, President Roosevelt pointed out that under such conditions the reopening of conversations would be fruitless. President Roosevelt then read another document to Ambassador Nomura, which he afterwards handed to him.

In this second statement, President Roosevelt declared in regard to the suggestion of the Japanese Ambassador that responsible officials of Japan and the United States meet to discuss the adjustment of present relations, and with reference to Ambassador Nomura's desire that the previous informal conversations be resumed, that the Secretary of State had already advised Ambassador Nomura that the United States could not see how the conversations could be pursued if Japan continued its present policy of force and supported the bitter press attacks against America.[62]

On two occasions, officers from the Department of State had expressed concern over the impending Japanese offensive in French Indo-China. Subsequently, on July 21 and July 23, 1941, the Acting Secretary of State, Sumner Welles, had informed Ambassador Nomura that the United States believed Japan to be embarking on a program of conquest in the South Pacific area, and since the position of the American government had already been clearly defined, there could be no basis for further conversations.

President Roosevelt pointed out that in order to achieve a peaceful settlement of the entire Pacific situation, a progressive program would have to be evolved from the basic principle of equal commercial opportunity and treatment for all nations. With the cooperation of the countries concerned in this area, all available resources of capital, technical skill, and economic leadership would be utilized not only for building up their own economies, but also for developing regions where productive capacity could be improved which would increase the purchasing power of the nations and peoples concerned, would raise standards of living, and would create conditions conducive to the maintenance of peace. However, any disruption of the peace would find the United States continuing its policy of sending immediate aid to the areas within the Pacific which were resisting aggression.

Since this program would prevent any country from extending its military, political or economic control over other peoples, the United States felt that it assured to Japan satisfaction of its economic needs and legitimate aspirations. If the Japanese government would agree to suspend its expansionist activities and readjust its position along peaceful lines, the American government was prepared to consider resumption of the informal exploratory discussions which had been interrupted in July. However, to clarify the situation for both governments, it would be advantageous if the Japanese government furnished a clearer statement than had yet been presented concerning its present attitude and plans.[63]

(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report[64]

Ambassador Nomura reported to Foreign Minister Toyoda on August 18, 1941 that at half-past four in the afternoon of August 18, 1941[65] he had had a secret interview with President Roosevelt in the presence of Secretary Hull.

[61] "Oral statement handed by President Roosevelt to the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura)", August 17, 1941, S.D., II, 556-557. See III, 39 for English text sent in a Japanese cipher to Tokyo on August 17, 1941.
[62] "Statement handed by President Roosevelt to the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura)", August 17, 1941, S.D., II, 557-559. See III, 39 for English text sent in a Japanese cipher to Tokyo on August 17, 1941.
[63] Ibid.
[64] III, 41-47.
[65] This should be August 17, 1941. See III, 40.

[14]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

President Roosevelt opened his remarks by saying that he had just spent a few days enjoying life at sea, during which he had sailed on his yacht and afterwards transferred to a warship to keep a rendezvous at a point off the Maine coast. Then he began to discuss the current problems, reading from two papers which stated that the United States would immediately take any steps necessary for the protection of its interests and citizens, if Japan were to make further use of force. Furthermore, before Japan's proposal for a meeting of both country's leaders could be realized, the United States must be advised of the aims of the Japanese government. Upon finishing his remarks, President Roosevelt asked that Ambassador Nomura relay the contents of both messages to Japan with the understanding that the documents were not to be considered as oral statements but only as reference material. Ambassador Nomura then accepted the papers on the condition that they would be used solely for his own information.[66]

In the course of the conversation President Roosevelt stated that Secretary Hull, Ambassador Nomura and himself were striving to bring about peace in the Pacific, but no one else was. When Ambassador Nomura remarked that there were many other nations desiring war in the Pacific, President Roosevelt affirmed this and said that the United States, Britain, and probably Russia hoped for peace in the Pacific, but there were not many other nations which desired it.[67]

After joking about "our German friend" who maintained no warships in the Pacific, President Roosevelt stated that because none of the three men present had come up through the diplomatic ranks, they did not feel bound by diplomatic conventions. Therefore, the notes that he held in his hand were not diplomatic documents nor aide-memoires, but were merely expressions of what he wanted to say. The Japanese Ambassador remarked that though President Roosevelt had stated that he had no desire to commit these items to paper, yet the President seemed to feel that they needed to be expressed in writing.[68]

Informing President Roosevelt that the Japanese government was sincere in its desire to adjust Japanese-American diplomatic relations, Ambassador Nomura stated that the Japanese government would like to be advised concerning the possibility of arranging an interview with Prince Konoye, as well as the possibility of the continuation in the near future of the informal conversations which had been carried on during the past months.

Since the Japanese government had already expressed its opinion regarding the French Indo-Chinese question to the American Secretary of State, it felt that no clarifying explanations were necessary. Yet Prime Minister Konoye was still willing to exchange opinions with a view toward achieving world peace.

Asserting his country's confidence in the statesmanship of President Roosevelt and in his ability to settle things, Ambassador Nomura stated that Japan would reciprocate in the fine type of statesmanship the United States would undoubtedly exercise. After listening closely to Ambassador Nomura's summarization of the existing situation, President Roosevelt turned the conversation to the problem of finding a suitable location for the proposed conference. President Roosevelt stated that "Geographically speaking, it is impossible for me to go to Honolulu. I am not permitted to travel in an airplane."[69] He suggested instead that the Japanese Prime Minister meet with him at Juneau, Alaska, as an alternate to either San Francisco or Seattle, Washington. To President Roosevelt's inquiry as to the number of days it would take Prince Konoye to reach the suggested locations, Ambassador Nomura answered that it would take about ten days and that the climate would be favorable until about the middle of September.

[66] III, 40.
[67] III, 41.
[68] III, 42.
[69] III, 43.

[15]

President Roosevelt next pointed out certain revisions that had been made in the documents he held. He had crossed out the word "President" since the original text implied that President Roosevelt himself would attend the conference, and for geographic reasons this might not be possible. Furthermore, he added that while the United States did not welcome the "closed door" policy, which it had been forced to adopt because of Japanese actions, it remained firm in its statement that Japan itself must open the door in the present circumstances. At this point President Roosevelt turned to a discussion of French Indo-China.[70]

Throughout the entire conference Ambassador Nomura was favorably impressed with President Roosevelt's tactful attitude and his high spirits. The Japanese Ambassador believed that President Roosevelt was exceptionally pleased with the responsiveness of the British people to the joint British-American peace terms arrived at in collaboration with Prime Minister Churchill. Unlike the Fourteen Articles issued independently by President Wilson during the last war, this agreement, the Atlantic Charter, had succeeded in drawing up peace terms acceptable to both England and America.

Before drawing the meeting to a close President Roosevelt mentioned Postmaster General Walker as being an ardent supporter of friendly Japanese-American relations. Apparently Mr. Waslker had spoken in behalf of the suggested interview between President Roosevelt and Prince Konoye. As the conversation ended, Secretary Hull asked Ambassador Nomura to call him at any time. Since the Chinese Incident was regarded as a separate problem, it had not been mentioned at all in the day's conversation.[71]

17. Ambassador Nomura Discloses His Personal Opinion Regarding the President's Statements

Since President Roosevelt had asked to see him immediately upon his return to Washington, Ambassador Nomura was certain that the American President viewed Japanese-American relations in a grave light. From the contents of the statement concerning the determination of the United States to protect its interests against any further Japanese aggression and from the manner in which President Roosevelt read it during that meeting, it was evident to the Japanese Ambassador that the note had been prepared in advance of the President's return.[72]

On the other hand, the second statement read by President Roosevelt seemed to contain his own attitude and opinions, and, accordingly, Ambassador Nomura believed that President Roosevelt favored the Japanese proposal under certain conditions. Yet when Ambassador Nomura had suggested that the situation depended largely on President Roosevelt's statesmanship, the President answered that it was Japan's responsibility to open the closed door. Ambassador Nomura was of the opinion, nevertheless, that President Roosevelt had other wishes, for he did not doubt that the American President hoped for a favorable change in Japanese-American relations.

According to recent comments in the newspapers, President Roosevelt was fearful lest the United States be drawn into a Far Eastern war, since he believed that there was an equal chance that Japan would attempt further aggression. Nevertheless, Ambassador Nomura was certain that the proposal for a meeting between the leaders of the two governments had considerably lessened the strain in diplomatic relations. However, it was essential that strict secrecy be maintained regarding this meeting, especially in Japan, for attempts would be begun there to make it impossible, if the news leaked out. Ambassador Nomura assured Tokyo that the matter was under careful study and that a full report would be made of any ideas of value.[73]

[70] III, 44.
[71] III, 45-47.
[72] III, 48.
[73] Ibid.

[16]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

18. Mr. Dooman Confers with Mr. Terasaki

On August 18, 1941 at 3:00 P.M. Mr. Terasaki, Director of the American Bureau of the Japanese Ministry for Foreign Affairs, requested Mr. Eugene H. Dooman, Counselor of the American Embassy in Tokyo, to convey a private message to Ambassador Grew.[74] Stressing the importance of the interview to be held that afternoon at 4:00 P.M., between the Japanese Foreign Minister and Ambassador Grew, Mr. Terasaki's note expressed the hope that the meeting would initiate a series of conversations for the adjustment of Japanese-American relations for he believed that if the Cabinet under Prince Konoye failed in this objective, all hope of reconciliation would be lost. He urged that criticism of the actions and policies of either government be avoided, and warned that though the Japanese government was ready to respond to any proposal of the United States to end the Far Eastern conflict, Japan would under no circumstances give in to American pressure.

Requesting Mr. Dooman to inform Ambassador Grew that there was much optimism in all influential quarters with regard to the outcome of the conversations, Mr. Terasaki hoped that the American Ambassador would do everything possible to achieve the desired results. The conversations were to be "off the record", by which Mr. Terasaki meant that there would be no commitment on either side in regard to any question arising during the conversations.[75]

19. Grew-Toyoda Conversation (August 18, 1941)

(a) Ambassador Grew's Report[76]

Ambassador Grew called on Foreign Minister Toyoda at the latter's request at 4:00 P.M. on August 18, 1941. After first receiving assurance from Ambassador Grew that the matters under discussion would be treated with the greatest secrecy,[77] and that no reports would reach Germany or Italy, Admiral Toyoda began a long oral statement requiring two hours and a half for delivery, regarding the critical situation then existing between Japan and the United States. Declaring that Japan had moved troops into French Indo-China solely for the purpose of settling the China affair, Foreign Minister Toyoda insisted that Japan had been acting under its own initiative and that there was no basis for the drastic economic measures which the United States had taken against his country under the mistaken belief that Japan was acting at the instigation of Germany.

Japanese public opinion had become extremely excited but the government was doing all in its power to repress hostile press comment. Foreign Minister Toyoda stated that the Japanese reply to the President's proposal of July 24, 1941 had been carefully drafted to meet the intentions of the American government, and that it contained proposals which would bind both governments. However, since the President's proposal had dealt exclusively with the joint defense of Indo-China, the Japanese reply was also restricted to that subject and would deal with it independently of the Hull-Nomura conversations.

On August 8, 1941 Ambassador Nomura had received from Secretary Hull the American reply to the Japanese proposal, and the Japanese authorities were disturbed to note in it that the United States had attached little importance to Japan's answer to President Roosevelt's proposal. The American proposal had suggested the withdrawal of Japanese forces from French Indo-China as a prerequisite, although Japan had promised to withdraw after the China Incident was settled.

If the United States wanted peace in the Pacific, Japan suggested that America cooperate in settling the China Incident. Both Japanese and American statesmen were sincerely striving

[74] "Memorandum by the Counselor of Embassy in Japan (Dooman)", initialled by Eugene H. Dooman, August 18, 1941, S.D., II, 559-560.
[75] Ibid.
[76] "Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)", August 18, 1941,
[77] S.D., II, 560-564.

[17]

for peace, according to the Japanese Foreign Minister, and to have a breakdown of peace occur now would be evidence of lack of statesmanship on both sides.

Both countries had a duty to save the world from disaster, and for this reason they must consider their mutual problems in a calm and friendly atmosphere on an equal basis.

Because present relations were extremely strained as a result of misunderstandings on both sides and sinister designs by other countries, it would be most opportune if the leaders of both countries could meet at Honolulu to discuss the situation in person.

Foreign Minister Toyoda said that he intended to have Ambassador Nomura see President Roosevelt in person to make this suggestion, and he requested Ambassador Grew to support this plan, which was unprecedented in Japanese history, since it involved the Premier's going abroad and would be done despite the objections of certain Japanese elements.

The Japanese Foreign Minister assured Ambassador Grew that the Prime Minister, Prince Konoye, would make every effort to save the world from ruin and to maintain peace in the Pacific, and he expressed his conviction that President Roosevelt and Prince Konoye would be able to reach an equitable agreement since Japan was not necessarily bound by the reply made on August 6 by Ambassador Nomura to President Roosevelt's proposal of July 24, 1941. Foreign Minister Toyoda also stressed the necessity for avoiding any impression that Japan had entered into negotiations with the United States because of American pressure. He suggested, therefore, that both countries reciprocate in stopping or moderating various measures of economic pressure.

In his report Ambassador Grew reiterated that he realized the great need for secrecy in this matter, and indicated that he appreciated the reasons for Japan's negotiating through Ambassador Nomura in the United States rather than in Tokyo. However, he informed Foreign Minister Toyoda that in view of Japan's progressive southward advance, the United States could be governed only by Japan's actions and not by its words. He also pointed out that previously Japan had ascribed its move into Indo-China as a reaction against encirclement by other powers but now it was ascribing it to the settling of the China affair. The Japanese Foreign Minister made no comment on the remarks of the American Ambassador.

Ambassador Grew restated Mr. Hull's opinion expressed by Mr. Welles on July 23, 1941 that there appeared to be no basis for continuing the conversations which had been carried on in Washington between Secretary Hull and Ambassador Nomura. He also spoke of Mr. Hull's statement to Ambassador Nomura on August 8, 1941 that the answer of Japan to the proposal of President Roosevelt failed in responsiveness. Though withholding official comment until the American government had time to study the proposal just made by the Japanese Foreign Minister, Ambassador Grew promised to give it his personal support,.[78]

(b) Foreign Minister Toyoda's Report

It is believed that no detailed report of the conversation between Foreign Minister Toyoda and Ambassador Grew was forwarded to the Japanese Embassy at Washington. However, on August 21, 1941 the Japanese Foreign Minister briefly referred to this conversation in a message to Ambassador Nomura.[79]

Pointing out that if Japan and the United States were to surmount the crisis confronting them at present, it would be necessary to display real statesmanship, and reminding Ambassador Grew of his nine years of tireless work to maintain Japanese-American friendship, Foreign Minister Toyoda again strongly urged that the proposed conference of the leaders of the two nations take place.[80]

[78] "Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)", August 18, 1941, S.D., II 560-564.
[79] III, 49.
[80] Ibid.
[81] "The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State", August 18, 1941, S.D., II, 565.

[18]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

20. Ambassador Grew Urges Consideration of Japanese Proposal

In a report to Secretary Hull and Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles, Ambassador Grew urged that the new Japanese proposal be given the utmost consideration, since not only was such a suggestion unprecedented in Japanese history, but it indicated that Japan's intransigence had not completely crystallized. Furthermore, Ambassador Grew believed that a meeting between Prince Konoye and President Roosevelt would be of incalculable value in bringing peace in the Pacific.[81]

21. Ambassador Nomura Is Convinced of President Roosevelt's Sincerity

On August 20, 1941 Ambassador Nomura reported to Tokyo that in a recent conversation Postmaster-General Walker had stressed the fact that President Roosevelt had taken up the question of the proposed Japanese-American conferences immediately upon his return to Washington. Furthermore, by his past speeches and most recent statement, it was evident that President Roosevelt had a broad-minded view of the world situation and was in no way anti-Japanese in his feelings, and, therefore, Japan should reciprocate in a like manner.

When Ambassador Nomura responded that it was with strong resolution that the Japanese government had continued its dealings with the current problem, Mr. Walker emphasized that this was also true of President Roosevelt for even if there were no real justification, there was much anti-Japanese sentiment in the United States. If news of the proposed conference were to leak out, Congress would undoubtedly raise strong opposition to it. On the other hand, there was a great possibility of achieving peace in the Pacific, if the conference succeeded. In view of President Roosevelt's present feeling, Mr. Walker asked that a way be found to settle successfully the Japanese-American question.[82]

On the following day, August 21, 1941, Ambassador Nomura advised Tokyo of further indications of President Roosevelt's serious interest in the resumption of Japanese-American negotiations. According to rumors, the text of the note delivered to Ambassador Nomura on August 17, 1941[83] had been composed by President Roosevelt himself, and the President expected that a Japanese reply would be handed directly to him.

With this in mind, Ambassador Nomura was of the opinion that the Japanese reply should be in simple and direct phraseology. Referring to the text of his proposed reply to President Roosevelt's note, Ambassador Nomura decided to omit such expressions as "continuance of encirclement" and "of discrimination of boycott and barriers of personal integrities and attack." At the same time, however, Ambassador Nomura felt it essential that Japan emphasize the necessity of guaranteeing the safety of the Far East.[84]

22. Ambassador Nomura Suggests A New Proposal

In a message to Tokyo on August 20, 1941 Ambassador Nomura expressed the opinion that President Roosevelt, desirous of settling Japanese-American problems by a conference between the two government heads, had made this proposal as his last political move at the critical moment when Japanese-American relations were at their worst. Urging that Japan respond to the generous spirit exhibited by President Roosevelt, Ambassador Nomura asked Tokyo to leave decisions concerning concrete points in the proposals until some future date, thereby showing the American government that Japan would allow nothing to conflict with the successful resumption of the informal negotiations. On this basis, therefore, Ambassador Nomura submitted a proposal for approval by the Japanese government and subsequent delivery to the United States.[85]

[82] III, 50-51.
[83] III, 52-53.
[84] III, 54.
[85] III, 55.

[19]

By explaining the immutable policy of the Japanese government as seen in important statements issued by Prime Minister Konoye and Ministers Hiranuma, Arita, and Matsuoka, Ambassador Nomura's proposal was designed to correct any misunderstandings arising from his government's proposal. Because his document dealt only with those points included in the proposals of President Roosevelt on August 17, 1941, and did not pretend to be Japan's policy, Ambassador Nomura believed that the United States would give it careful consideration as a means of reopening Japanese-American negotiations.[86]

Emphasizing that this opportunity to readjust the strained diplomatic situation must not be lost, Ambassador Nomura requested that his proposal be given careful consideration. If the proposed meeting between the government heads were to take place in the middle of September 1941, there remained less than two months time for preliminary negotiations. Japan must necessarily select a diplomatic staff and have a ship available before that time. In view of these reasons, Ambassador Nomura urged that the matter be decided upon without delay.[87]

23. Rumors of a British-American-Russian Conference Speed Japanese Action

On August 23, 1941 Tokyo informed Ambassador Nomura of newspaper reports concerning a British-American-Russian conference to be held early in September 1941. Since the United States was also reported to be shipping goods to Russia, Tokyo feared a realization of an Allied encirclement. If Japan were to arrange a conference between its leaders and the United States which would convene after the Allied meeting, the world would receive the impression that Japan had submitted to the threat of encirclement. In order to offset this reaction, Japan decided to submit an early reply to the American proposal and to arrange the conference between President Roosevelt and Prince Konoye for an earlier date. The Japanese Foreign Office also requested Ambassador Nomura to inform the United States that the shipment of materials to Russia by way of Japanese coastal waters would produce an unfavorable effect on Japanese-American relations.[88]

24. Hull-Nomura Conversation (First-August 23, 1941)

(a) Secretary Hull's Report[89]

To thank Mr. Hull for arranging his interview with President Roosevelt, Ambassador Nomura called on the American Secretary of State on August 23, 1941. The Japanese Ambassador said his government was carefully considering the American notes, and would respond in a few days. The two representatives once again stated their mutual desire to better Japanese-American relations.

Reiterating that America's basic principles consisted of peace, law, justice and equality in its dealings throughout the world, Secretary Hull declared that Japan was pursuing the opposite course. During the past months, the government-controlled Japanese press had excited distrust of the United States and had acclaimed a program of unlimited expansion in establishing the "new order" in the Pacific, while war factions headed by Mr. Matsuoka had lauded the benefits of the Tripartite Pact. Considering these facts, Secretary Hull felt that American skepticism concerning Japan's sincerity in seeking a peaceful settlement was justified.

Pointing to America's lack of cooperation in its relations with his country, Ambassador Nomura cited as an example the shipment of oil to Vladivostok through Japanese waters. Faced with large Russian forces in that area, Japan could not be expected to ignore the reinforcement of Russian military supply bases across the border line.

[86] See III, 56-62 for text of this proposal which was not adopted by the Foreign Office.
[87] III, 63.
[88] III, 64. See Japanese-American Relations, Part C, Section 172, Japan Recognizes Russo-German War as Threat to Its Border.
[89] "Memorandum by the Secretary of State", August 23, 1941. S.D., II, 565-567.

[20]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

After mentioning jocularly Japan's non-aggression pact with Russia, which elicited no response but a laugh from Ambassador Nomura, Secretary Hull answered that the United States was concerned only with aiding any resistance to the German armies. Should Japan project itself militarily into the Russo-German situation, or any other situation affecting the United States, the entire situation would be changed.

To Ambassador Nomura's query regarding the future sale of oil to Japan under the freezing system, Secretary Hull replied that his knowledge of the details was incomplete, but he promised to investigate the matter.[90]

(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report

There is no separate message available referring to this conversation with Secretary Hull on August 23, 1941.

25. Hull-Nomura Conversation (Second-August 23, 1941)

(a) Secretary Hull's Report[91]

Later in the day, on August 23, 1941, Ambassador Nomura returned to Secretary Hull's apartment to inform him of a message from Japan concerning the proposed meeting between the heads of the two governments. Because of the reported Allied conferences at Moscow which were scheduled for early in September, the Japanese government was desirous of effecting this meeting earlier than the date, October 15, 1941, suggested by President Roosevelt.

Ambassador Nomura laughed very heartily when Secretary Hull remarked that the Japanese-Russian Neutrality Pact would give Japan all the assurances of Russian peaceful intentions that Japan would desire. Regardless of its non-aggression pact with Russia, Japan feared that some agreements entered into at Moscow might be detrimental to Japanese plans and policies. Secretary Hull, however, made no commitments of any kind in regard to this proposal.

(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report[92]

In compliance with his orders, Ambassador Nomura called on Secretary Hull at 5:00 P.M. Saturday afternoon, August 23, 1941, to report that Japan was prepared to make an early reply to the statement of President Roosevelt. The Japanese Ambassador further suggested that the conference between President Roosevelt and Prince Konoye be held at a date earlier than that previously proposed.

Following Tokyo's other instructions, Ambassador Nomura asked that the United States delay its Moscow conference and withhold shipment of material to Russia for the time being. Although Secretary Hull refrained from making any comment regarding Ambassador Nomura's suggestion for an early Japanese-American conference, he answered Ambassador Nomura's remarks about Russia by pointing to the Neutrality Pact in existence between Japan and Russia. Secretary Hull assured Ambassador Nomura, however, that his statement would be relayed to the President. Ambassador Nomura believed that President Roosevelt, who was anxious to receive Japan's reply, was the one most interested in holding a conference with Prince Konoye.[93]

[90] Ibid.
[91] "Memorandum by the Secretary of State", August 23, 1941, S.D., II, 568.
[92] III, 65.
[93] Ibid.

[21]

26. Prime Minister Konoye Replies to President Roosevelt (August 26, 1941)

On August 26, 1941 the Japanese government sent Ambassador Nomura a reply to be communicated to President Roosevelt as soon as possible.[94] Expressing his satisfaction at President Roosevelt's approval of the proposed leaders' meeting, Prime Minister Konoye stated that since Japan and the United States held the key to world peace, deterioration of their relations would result in the downfall of world civilization. For this reason, Japan desired to improve the Japanese-American situation since the betterment of present conditions would achieve peace not only in the Pacific but throughout the world.

In Prime Minister Konoye's opinion, Japanese-American relations had reached a critical stage because of a lack of mutual understanding intensified by the machinations of third powers. Consequently, both Japan and the United States continually doubted and misconstrued the other's intentions. In order to eliminate these causes at their very source, Prime Minister Konoye desired to meet with President Roosevelt.[95]

Under the present circumstances in which rapid changes were constantly taking place and in which unforeseen conditions might possibly arise at any moment, Prime Minister Konoye did not believe that the previous informal negotiations were adequate any longer. It was necessary now for the two leaders to meet and discuss the possibility of saving the present situation by studying together the important questions affecting the entire Pacific area. Any minor details could then be settled by those officials specializing in such matters.

Eagerly waiting for the day of the meeting, Prime Minister Konoye urged that President Roosevelt accept the proposal in an understanding spirit. In view of various circumstances, the Japanese Prime Minister believed that the meeting should be held somewhere in the vicinity of Hawaii.[96]

27. Japan Replies to President Roosevelt's Statement of August 17, 1941

On August 26, 1941 in a statement sent to Ambassador Nomura, the Japanese government replied to President Roosevelt's note of August 17, 1941.[97] It reviewed the American claim that Japan's actions in French Indo-China had removed the basis upon which the informal conversations concerning Pacific problems had been founded. In accordance with the principles embodied in the peace program which the United States advocated, Japan had been asked to abandon its expansionist activities and change its attitude. Furthermore, in asking that Japan submit a clearer statement of its present plans, the United States had emphatically stated that it would resort to any necessary steps to prevent Japan from dominating its neighboring countries by military power.[98]

In view of its past pledges and repeated explanations of its intentions toward other countries, Japan deeply regretted American mistrust of its actions. Solely on the basis of its own fundamental conception of the Pacific problem, the United States chose to regard certain Japanese measures as harmful to peace in that area. However, in view of the international confusion permeating the entire world, Tokyo felt that it was almost impossible to judge whether a certain incident was the cause or result of the situation.

[94] III, 66.
[95] III, 67. The English translation by Ambassador Nomura was sent to Tokyo on September 3, 1941, see III, 81-83. For the text received by the State Department, see "The Japanese Prime Minister (Prince Konoye) to President Roosevelt", August 27, 1941, S.D., II, 572-573.
[96] III, 68.
[97] III, 69. For English translation by Ambassador Nomura sent to Tokyo on September 3, 1941 see III, 84-88. For text received by the State Department see "Statement by the Japanese government handed by the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) to President Roosevelt, August 28, 1941, S.D., II, 573-575.
[98] Ibid.

[22]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

One-sided judgement of the situation by the United States, based upon only certain political facts, would be harmful to lasting peace. Since Japan thought it necessary to cope with anything that threatened its own peaceful progress and its own defense, the United States, before criticizing such defensive measures, must recognize the cause and correct the situation so that peace could be established.[99]

America considered certain Japanese measures as harmful to the principles which it upheld, but on the other hand Japan felt that the United States had placed certain obstacles in the path of Japan's self-sufficiency and defense. Even during the informal conversations taking place between Japan and the United States, the American government had continuously applied a policy of pressure, thereby depriving Japan of many essential natural resources.

In the meantime many American newspaper articles and editorials predicted that the United States, Britain and the Netherlands East Indies would form an anti-Japanese front in the Far East. Although the United States might have acted in conformity with its own national requirements, this proved conclusively that actions considered to be just by one government might be detrimental to another. The United States apparently overlooked the fact that its natural circumstances and monopolistic power could well present a threat to another nation.[100]

President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull followed the course of peace, and, consequently, it was difficult for them to understand that peoples in other countries felt threatened by the United States. Yet nations less favorably situated, especially with regard to natural resources, were forced to consider their relations with the United States from a defensive viewpoint. In order to maintain peace the United States must refrain from criticizing the individual actions of other nations and instead attempt to understand the circumstances causing those actions. However, Japan was pleased that the United States had encouraged an exchange of opinions relating to the basis for an understanding which would result in lasting peace in the Pacific.[101]

In explaining its actions in the Southwest Pacific, Japan reiterated that its occupation of French Indo-China had not been taken with the intention of advancing by force into neighboring areas, but had been an act of self-defense to cope with threats against Japan's right of existence. Since the China Incident had originated from a threat to Japan's national existence, the ending of the war by the establishment of a just peace with China would find Japan willing to withdraw its troops immediately from French Indo-China. In view of this statement, Japan's attitude toward Thailand was self-evident.

Turning to the problem of Japanese-Russian relations, Tokyo gave assurance that it would refrain from military action against Russia as long as that country observed the Russo-Japanese neutrality agreement by refraining from any threats to Japan and Manchukuo. In return, Japan earnestly requested that the United States refrain from any measures which would stimulate Japan's fear of joint American-Russian action against it.[102]

Japan insisted that it whole-heartedly supported the principles laid down previously by the American government as a basis for conducting informal conversations with Japan, and agreed that their purpose was the conclusion of an understanding that would achieve a natural and peaceful settlement of problems in the Pacific area. By establishing such a peace in the Pacific, Japan joined with the United States in hoping that the principles set forth by both countries would be used towards the establishment of a world-wide peace. To maintain the necessary economical, political and military equality throughout this area, those countries which had superior natural resources and geographical locations must assume an attitude of

[99] III, 70.
[100] III, 71.
[101] III, 72.
[102] III, 73.

[23]

strict impartiality and must cooperate in the distribution of advantages to lesser nations. The spirit of reciprocity should govern any adjustments made in order to satisfy the essential requirements of all countries in that area.[103]

In summing up its reply to President Roosevelt's statement, the Japanese government expressed the opinion that the principles which it had set forth were both clear and concise. Only by conferring together dispassionately and constructively on all problems relating to the interest of both countries could the United States and Japan hope to found a lasting peace; therefore, an immediate conference between President Roosevelt and Prince Konoye was required. First, however, it would be necessary to eliminate the false impression that such a conference was due to pressure exerted on Japan by the United States.[104]

28. Japan's Reply Contains Its Maximum Concessions

In a special message to Ambassador Nomura on August 26, 1941 the Japanese government explained that the reply outlined above contained its maximum concessions. Since both the situation in Japan itself, as well as that throughout the world was strained to the extreme, Tokyo urged Ambassador Nomura to convince the American officials of the necessity for an interview between President Roosevelt and Prince Konoye, on which it was pinning its last hopes. It said that such a conference would not necessarily have to be bound by the statements made in Foreign Minister Toyoda's message.[105]

(a) Secretary Hull's Report[106]

Since Ambassador Nomura had received a reply from his government regarding President Roosevelt's message to the Prime Minister of Japan,[107] Secretary Hull agreed on August 27, 1941 to arrange an interview with President Roosevelt for the next day so that in accordance with his instructions the Japanese Ambassador might present it in person. Meanwhile, both representatives further discussed the relationship between the United States and Japan, with Ambassador Nomura expressing confidence that the new Japanese note offered opportunities for a definite improvement of the situation.

When the Japanese Ambassador mentioned the matter of the two American oil tankers en route to Vladivostok, Secretary Hull immediately forestalled further protests by stating emphatically that the shipments were supported by the Japanese-Russian agreement of Portsmouth, and were as legitimate under all laws of commerce as were the much larger oil exports from this country to Japan. Admitting the strength of Secretary Hull's argument, Ambassador Nomura nevertheless insisted that agitators constantly reminded the Japanese masses that, while they were forced to use coal, American oil shipments were passing Japan en route to Russia. Secretary Hull then declared that this claim was spurious.

As a remedy, Ambassador Nomura suggested that the two Japanese tankers leaving the United States monthly be loaded with oil for his country. In reply, Secretary Hull requested that Ambassador Nomura inquire about the possibility of Japan's using its free money as payment, both in the United States and in South America. The Japanese Ambassador readily agreed to look into this matter.[108]

[103] III, 74.
[104] III, 75.
[105] III, 76. Counselor Dooman of the American Embassy in Japan was warned on August 27, 1941 by a Japanese authority that if there were any premature disclosures of the plans for a meeting of Prince Konoye and President Roosevelt at this time when American tankers were enroute to Vladivostok, attempts might be made on the lives of leading members of the Japanese government, S.D., II, 568-569.
[106] "Memorandum by the Secretary", August 27, 1941, S.D., II, 569-570.
[107] III, 67-75.
[108] "Memorandum by the Secretary", August 27, 1941, S.D., II, 569-570.

[24]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

After giving Secretary Hull a copy of the statement which he was later to present to President Roosevelt, Ambassador Nomura expressed optimism in regard to the reaching of a satisfactory agreement between the two countries should the United States agree to concessions now being asked by the Japanese government.[109]

(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report[110]

Ambassador Nomura reported that he had delivered Prince Konoye's message to Secretary Hull on Wednesday, August 27, 1941. After citing several points orally because the English text had not been completed, Ambassador Nomura requested that he be allowed to see President Roosevelt immediately. Secretary Hull replied that it was impossible on that day, but arrangements would be made for the next morning.

As the conversation progressed, Ambassador Nomura commented on Winston Churchill's recent speech which the Japanese Ambassador considered harmful to the international situation. Remarking that he had refrained from making any comments on the speech to inquiring members of the press, the Secretary of State mentioned the extremist views that were being expressed at present by various Japanese publications.[111]

In accordance with the directions of his government Ambassador Nomura also spoke of the unfavorable effect that United States' petroleum shipments to Russia had had upon the Japanese public.[112] Secretary Hull brought out graphs to show the enormous amount of oil that had been furnished to Japan, and compared it with the comparatively small percentage shipped to Russia. Nevertheless, Ambassador Nomura pointed out that the shipment of this oil to Russia by way of Japanese waters had directly followed the embargo of all American exports to Japan and as a result Japanese public opinion had been disturbed.

Since the freezing of Japanese funds throughout the United States would impede the use of export permits even if they were granted by the United States, Secretary Hull suggested that the Japanese government pay for the desired oil from money invested in South America. Believing that there was no other solution but to use this South American money, the Japanese Ambassador requested that Tokyo discuss the matter thoroughly and advise him of any action to be taken.[113]

Two days later on August 29, 1941 Ambassador Nomura again urged that Tokyo immediately purchase the petroleum needed by Japan with funds which were outside of the area affected by the freezing order.[114] According to Ambassador Nomura, Secretary Hull was cognizant of the delicate nature of Japanese-American relations, and was aware that a single disturbing incident could be disastrous. Yet Secretary Hull felt that Japan was making a great problem over the shipment of a few hundred thousand barrels of oil to Russia when, even in the face of popular disapproval, the American government had already exported several million barrels of oil to Japan.

[109] "Memorandum of a conversation", August 27, 1941, S.D., II, 571.
[110] III, 77.
[111] Ibid. Prime Minister Winston Churchill warns Japan in a world-wide broadcast from London on August 24, 1941 that its aggression in the Far East "has got to stop. Every effort will be made to secure a peaceful settlement. But . . . if these hopes should fail, we shall, of course, range ourselves unhesitatingly at the side of the United States."—Facts on File Yearbook, 1941, Vol. I, 340.
[112] III, 78
[113] III, 79.
[114] III, 80.

[25]

Referring to the freedom of seas, the Secretary of State explained that he had no desire to permit a third country to interfere with Japanese-American trade. However, Ambassador Nomura explained that the shipment of oil, now unavailable to Japan, through Japanese territorial waters to Vladivostok presented a major problem from the standpoint of Japanese national feeling. Apparently Secretary Hull saw the logic of this remark, for a few days later American newspapers mentioned the possible routing of oil through the Persian Gulf.[115]

29. Mr. Terasaki Requests Ambassador Grew to Recall American Oil Shipments

Meanwhile, the problems evolving from the United States' shipping oil to Vladivostok were similarly discussed in Japan.[116] After emphasizing the grave internal situation then existing in Japan, on August 27, 1941, Mr. Terasaki, Director of the American Bureau for Japanese Foreign Affairs, delivered to Counselor Dooman an oral statement for Ambassador Grew, which asked that the American tankers now en route to Russia be recalled. If this were impossible, Mr. Terasaki suggested that the ships be rerouted to avoid their passing through the Straits of Saya and Tsugaru, for, in spite of Japan's non-aggression pact with Russia, the Japanese strongly resented the sending of supplies which might possibly be used against them by Russia.[117]

30. Roosevelt-Nomura Conference (August 28, 1941)

(a) Secretary Hull's Report

On August 28, 1941 Ambassador Nomura called on President Roosevelt to deliver a personal message from the Prime Minister of Japan,[119] and also to submit a reply from the Japanese government regarding President Roosevelt's communication of August 17, 1941.[120] President Roosevelt read Prince Konoye's message with interest and complimented its tone. In speaking of the proposed conference mentioned in Prince Konoye's message, President Roosevelt suggested that, because of the time element involved, Juneau, Alaska might be a better meeting place than Hawaii. The Japanese Ambassador was interested principally in having the conversation held as early as possible.

Turning next to the reply from the Japanese government, which Ambassador Nomura also submitted at this time, the President noted briefly that it did not provide for the discontinuation of Japanese army and naval reinforcements in the Indo-Chinese area while peace conversations were in progress. In addition, Mr. Roosevelt, criticizing Japan's baseless fear of attack by Russia and its unjustified complaints about oil shipments, reminded Ambassador Nomura that Japan was now in a position to load a number of oilers to transport fuel to its home ports whenever it desired.

After concluding his reading of the Japanese note, President Roosevelt advised Ambassador Nomura that he considered it to be a step forward and, thus, was very hopeful. He mentioned again his interest in spending three or four days with Prince Konoye, possibly at Juneau.[121]

[115] Ibid.
[116] "Memorandum by the Counselor of Embassy in Japan (Dooman)", August 27, 1941, S.D., II, 568-569.
[117] Ibid.
[118] "Memorandum by the Secretary of State", August 28, 1941, S.D., II, 571-572.
[119] S.D., II, 572-573. For translation by American cryptanalysts of text sent from Tokyo to Washington on August 26, 1941 see III, 67-68. For English text of this document sent to Tokyo by Ambassador Nomura in code on September 3, 1941 see III, 81-83.
[120] S.D., II, 573-575. For translation by American cryptanalysts of text sent from Tokyo to Washington on August 26, 1941 see III, 69-75. For English text sent to Tokyo by Ambassador Nomura on September 3, 1941 see III, 84-88.
[121] "Memorandum by the Secretary of State", August 28, 1941, S.D., II, 571-572.

[26]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report[122]

In accordance with instructions from Tokyo, on August 28, 1941 at 11:00 A.M. Ambassador Nomura met with President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull to present the English text of the Japanese reply to the President's message of August 17, 1941.[123]

While reading the messages President Roosevelt commended their contents in flattering terms, but in discussing the points pertaining to discrimination, President Roosevelt "cynically" inquired whether an invasion of Thailand would take place during his conference with Prince Konoye just as the invasion of French Indo-China had occurred during Secretary Hull's conversations with Ambassador Nomura. Nevertheless, President Roosevelt assured Ambassador Nomura that he was looking forward to approximately three days of conversation with Prince Konoye.

The main problem stemmed from the choice of a meeting place. Because the American President, unlike the Japanese Prime Minister who could appoint an acting minister to handle such matters, could not designate the Vice President to sign bills from Congress during his absence,[124] a three weeks round trip to Hawaii would take too much time, whereas a trip to Juneau would consume only 14 days.

Ambassador Nomura declared that as far as Japan was concerned the question of a meeting place was secondary, but it was desired to have the conference take place at the earliest possible date. Though he did not object to this request, President Roosevelt did not suggest a definite time.

President Roosevelt added that the recent meeting with Prime Minister Churchill had been postponed on account of the Balkan War, and that the meeting was then held after Congress had approved it.[125]

31. Hull-Nomura Conversation (August 28, 1941)

(a) State Department's Report[126]

Calling at Secretary Hull's apartment after his interview with President Roosevelt earlier in the same day, August 28, 1941, Ambassador Nomura stated that he was much encouraged regarding the attempts to improve relations between the two countries. Since Japan was desirous only that the conference be held at an early date, preferably between September 21 and September 25, 1941, to offset Japanese press attacks against the United States, President Roosevelt's suggestion that the conference be held at Juneau, Alaska would probably be approved by Prime Minister Konoye. Ambassador Nomura pointed out that Prince Konoye would probably be accompanied by a staff of twenty representatives from the Foreign Office, the Army, the Navy, and the Japanese Embassy in Washington. This would be very advantageous in that the Japanese Army and Navy representatives would be equally responsible for any settlement reached. An agreement on publicity concerning the conference would have to be reached by the two governments, especially since the Prime Minister would have to leave Tokyo five days before President Roosevelt left Washington.[127]

[122] III, 89.
[123] Ibid.
[124] Ibid.
[125] III, 90.
[126] "Memorandum of a conversation", initialed by Joseph W. Ballantine, August 28, 1941, S.D., II, 576-579.
[127] Ibid.

[27]

After promising to refer these points to President Roosevelt, Secretary Hull mentioned the questions that would inevitably arise at such a conference. In his opinion the actual conference should serve only to ratify matters of importance already agreed to in principle. Reference was made to certain difficulties encountered in the previous informal conversations which had caused delays and had finally resulted in Japan's acting at variance with the spirit of the conversations. In addition, it would be unwise to have a split in the Japanese Diet over the question of peace.

Recognizing the merits of Secretary Hull's remarks, Ambassador Nomura then summed up the three major difficulties encountered in their conversations: Japan's relations with the Axis; the retention of Japanese troops in North China and Inner Mongolia; and the application of the principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations. Only in regard to the stationing of Japanese forces in North China did the Japanese Ambassador anticipate any trouble. Concerning Japan's relations with the Axis, Ambassador Nomura was confident that as long as America's attitude of self-protection remained reasonable and it did not demand a nullification of the Tripartite Pact by requesting a blanket guarantee from Japan for any action it took against Germany in the name of self-defense, no breach would occur between the two countries.

Secretary Hull commented that Mr. Matsuoka's constant stressing of Japan's alignment with the Axis and the inopportune time chosen for the signing of the Tripartite Pact had already produced an unfavorable effect on America. Unless something were done to counteract the unfavorable impression, it would prove a source of embarrassment to President Roosevelt upon his return from the proposed meeting with Prince Konoye, for as an indication of its current relations with Germany, the United States was already maintaining patrols all the way to Iceland.[128]

At this point, Ambassador Nomura discussed the United States' position in aiding in the settlement of the Chinese situation and commented that Japan preferred to have the United States use its influence to bring Japan and China together to settle their own difficulties rather than have the United States discuss the basic peace terms with Japan. Secretary Hull made it clear, however, that before exercising its good offices between China and Japan, the United States would first consider the basic terms on which Japan proposed to negotiate, since it was necessary to have the friendship and confidence of the Chinese government before and after the negotiations. Both America and Japan, he felt, should consider the potentialities of China as a trading nation.

Ambassador Nomura agreed that the Chinese question was important, but remarked that there were other questions which could be settled at the conference in order to tide over a critical situation. Since the China Incident was one of the major questions calling for settlement, Secretary Hull believed that unless a conciliation were reached in this regard, it would remain the root of future instability. Ambassador Nomura recognized the soundness of this statement, particularly in view of the French Indo-China situation. Mr. Ballantine pointed out that Japan had promised to remove its troops from that area as soon as the China affair was settled.

After recapitulating briefly Secretary Hull's statements to make sure that he understood them, Ambassador Nomura left after commenting that he did not know how far the Japanese government could go in view of internal political difficulties, but Prince Konoye as a man of great courage was willing to assume great risks to improve relations.[129]

[128] Ibid.
[129] Ibid.

[28]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report[130]

Ambassador Nomura reported that on the evening of August 28, 1941 he had exchanged opinions with Secretary Hull on the problems of the proposed conference. If either of the conferring leaders assumed an uncompromising attitude on certain points, the result would greatly endanger Japanese-American relations. For that reason, Secretary Hull desired that preliminary conversations be held for the purpose of effecting a general agreement prior to the major meeting.

While it was necessary to bring up-to-date both the Japanese and American policies, Secretary Hull maintained that the Chinese question would not necessarily stand in the way of an amicable understanding. On the other hand, the United States refused to adjust its relations with Japan at the expense of its friendship with China. Furthermore, even if America accepted a basis for a Japanese-Chinese peace, it would be faced with the tremendous problem of winning the approval of both Great Britain and Soviet Russia.

Ambassador Nomura refrained from clarifying further his government's statements regarding the withdrawal of Japanese troops from China and the right of protection, but he was convinced that as long as Prince Konoye retained his position as Japanese Foreign Minister, every effort would be made to settle Far Eastern problems satisfactorily. Secretary Hull expressed the hope that Japan would take definite steps towards this end.

Ambassador Nomura reminded his government of the wide difference in viewpoint between the two governments which he had noticed during discussions on the proposals for an Understanding Pact. He feared that Tokyo's proposals would only add to the existing misunderstanding. In order that Japan might obtain further details regarding America's viewpoint, Ambassador Nomura asked that Colonel Iwakuro be consulted upon his return to Tokyo.

Ambassador Nomura then offered his government certain suggestions, in the event that Tokyo had agreed upon a meeting between the leaders of the two governments. Ambassador Nomura advised that his government consent to Juneau, Alaska as the conference site, if Constitutional requirements and reasons for personal safety made Hawaii unsatisfactory for President Roosevelt.

The conference date would be set about September 21, 1941 with five persons each from the Foreign Office; the Ministries of Navy and War, the Embassy and the Consulate in attendance.[131] Since it was assumed that Prince Konoye would make the trip by warship, about ten days would be required. Ambassador Nomura believed that the best time to make a public statement regarding the meeting would be shortly after the Prime Minister's departure from Tokyo.

Although Secretary Hull had agreed to discuss these points with President Roosevelt, he was extremely cautious in commenting on the proposed conference. Ambassador Nomura pointed out that Secretary Hull was an exceedingly cautious person, and warned that unless the two governments arrived at a fairly close agreement regarding the terms surrounding this meeting, the conference would never materialize.[132]

32. Secret Interpretation of Japan's Reply to President Roosevelt

On August 28, 1941 the Japanese government advised Ambassador Nomura concerning the interpretation of its recent reply to President Roosevelt.[133] After stressing certain instructions

[130] III, 91.
[131] Ibid.
[132] III, 92.
[133] III, 93.

[29]

regarding the style and form to be used in future messages pertaining to the question of Japanese-American relations, the Foreign Office advised Ambassador Nomura that the phrase "should a just peace be established in the Far East" meant that when the Chiang regime had become merely a local regime as a result of the closing of the routes to Chungking, when Japanese-Chinese relations had returned, on the whole, to normality, and when Japan efficiently and justly could secure the materials it needed from French Indo-China, Japan would consider withdrawing its troops from French Indo-China even before the complete settlement of the China Incident. The statement had been made originally because Japan had desired to allow as much flexibility as possible in the coming conversations.

With regard to the phrase "which will be applicable to the whole world, etc.," Japan wished to ensure that restrictions enforced against Japan within the East Asia area, where it hoped to establish the New Order Sphere of Co-prosperity, would be incumbent upon the United States outside the Pacific area.[134]

The Japanese government also pointed out to Ambassador Nomura that there were logical reasons for Japan's agreeing that all countries enjoying favorable conditions or having advantages over other countries should assume an attitude of strict impartiality in regard to the distribution of necessary materials. Japan felt that it would naturally assume this economic leadership within the East Asia Sphere of Co-prosperity.

Since Japan's proposal had stated that it was natural and essential to make all adjustments in a spirit of equality and reciprocity with adjacent areas, Japan's position toward Manchukuo and China was thereby clarified, for such good neighborliness would ensure the establishment of the East Asia Sphere of Co-prosperity. This policy was not, as the United States alleged it to be, aimed at securing a position superior to other nations in that area, since Japan was following closely the policy set forth in the American Monroe Doctrine. Furthermore, in order to satisfy "the requirements essential to the existence of a country" Japan would naturally take part in a joint defense of China.

Tokyo informed Ambassador Nomura that it had inserted these passages in its reply to President Roosevelt to guard against the possibility of its being too narrowly restricted in any discussions concerning the method by which the East Asia Sphere of Co-prosperity was to be established.[135]

33. American Newspaperman Seeks Details of Prince Konoye's Message

In spite of the efforts of both Japanese and American officials to safeguard the secrecy of their conversations, certain publicity leaks occurred. On August 28, 1941, a reporter of the New York Herald Tribune called on Mr. Terasaki to inquire about the contents of the message from Prime Minister Konoye to President Roosevelt. Although Mr. Terasaki refused to refer to the contents of that message, it was alleged that in a recent interview with President Roosevelt it had been learned that Prime Minister Konoye wished to hold a conference with the American President in Hawaii.[136]

34. The Press Is Informed of Prince Konoye's Message To President Roosevelt

Ambassador Nomura advised Tokyo on August 28, 1941 that since the White House had announced the time for the interview with Ambassador Nomura, Secretary Hull had made public

[134] III, 94.
[135] III, 95.
[136] III, 96.

[30]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

the fact that a message from Prince Konoye had been delivered to President Roosevelt by Ambassador Nomura.[137] However, it was agreed by both the Japanese and American representatives that no reference would be made to the contents of this message.[138]

The Japanese press was notified on August 29, 1941 that Premier Konoye had sent a message to President Roosevelt but no details were given.[139]

35. Tokyo Demands Secrecy Concerning Proposed Conference

Since a disclosure in Japan of any information connected with the proposed conference between President Roosevelt and Prince Konoye would endanger the successful conclusion of such a meeting, on August 29, 1941 Tokyo reiterated its warnings concerning the necessity of secrecy.[140] Ambassador Nomura was informed that on August 28, 1941 the Domei News Service had reported the reference to Prince Konoye's message which he had made in a press conference. Although Tokyo had been able to suppress these dispatches, a fairly large group of people had learned of their contents. In order to prevent similar occurrences in the future, the Japanese Foreign Office requested that Ambassador Nomura refrain from making any mention of Prince Konoye's message until he had first communicated with Tokyo.[141]

Tokyo pointed out that it had intended to keep the matter a strict secret for the time being, but since the news dispatch had been released in Washington, there was danger of further misunderstanding if it attempted to continue suppressing and censoring the news in Japan. Therefore, at 2:30 P.M. on August 29, 1941 certain sections of Prince Konoye's message were announced to the Japanese public.[142] Since the question of time was of the utmost importance, Tokyo requested that Ambassador Nomura explain to American authorities that it had not been able to wait to contact them.

Major reasons for the security measures taken by Japan were in relations with Germany and Italy, and its exceedingly complex domestic situation. Japan felt it quite possible that the United States had deliberately publicized this document in order to estrange Japan from the Axis countries. If information were allowed to leak out before a settlement was reached, there was actual danger that the project would fail. Though Ambassador Nomura's actions might be curtailed somewhat as a result, Japan insisted that he consult with the Foreign Office before making any public statements.

In regard to a suitable location for the "leaders' conference", Japan advised Ambassador Nomura that in case Hawaii were not selected, a place which was part of either nation should not be chosen, for President Roosevelt and Prince Konoye could meet at some spot on the high seas.[143]

In reply, Ambassador Nomura explained to Tokyo the difficulty of seeing President Roosevelt secretly since the American press was furnished with the list of callers at the White House. However, the Japanese Ambassador promised to consult with Secretary Hull to determine measures of avoiding undesirable publicity in the future.[144]

[137] The New York Times, August 29, 1941, 1:5 reported that Ambassador Nomura, at Prince Konoye's request, had begun conferences with President Roosevelt and in Secretary Hull's presence had delivered a note from the Japanese Prime Minister.
[138] III, 97.
[139] "The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State", S.D., II, 579.
[140] III, 98.
[141] Ibid.
[142] III, 99. See Section 39 for Ambassador Grew's report to the State Department which indicates that no details of Prince Konoye's message were released to the Japanese press. See III, 103.
[143] Ibid.
[144] III, 100.

[31]

36. Ambassador Nomura Asks Secretary Hull's Cooperation in Maintaining Secrecy (August 29, 1941)

In order to secure Secretary Hull's assistance in preventing further disclosures, on August 29, 1941 Ambassador Nomura submitted Tokyo's request that the Secretary of State cooperate in safeguarding the secrecy of future conversations.[145] A few days later Secretary Hull, recognizing that security was essential for the success of negotiations, agreed to cooperate with Japan in this matter.[146]

37. Newspaper Article Endangers Japan's Relations with Axis

Ambassador Nomura advised Tokyo on August 30, 1941 that an article appearing in the August 26, 1941 edition of the New York Herald Tribune had greatly disturbed the present situation.[147] Mr. Kasai, a member of the Japanese Parliament, stated that Foreign Minister Matsuoka had made a great blunder in signing the Tripartite Alliance, for although Mr. Matsuoka had believed it would contribute in the end to an improvement of Japanese-American relations, at present it was a stumbling block.[148]

Since such a newspaper article could only serve to aggravate present difficulties and was opposed to Japanese policy, Ambassador Nomura requested that Tokyo prevent other Japanese authorities from coming to the United States until conditions improved considerably.[149]

38. Ambassador Grew Confers with Mr. Terasaki (August 29, 1941)[150]

Since the Japanese press had learned via Washington of Prince Konoye's message to President Roosevelt, Japan requested that Ambassador Grew postpone his scheduled visit with Foreign Minister Toyoda to avoid further publicity. However, in order to convey to Ambassador Grew the text of Prince Konoye's message to President Roosevelt and to discuss the results of the newspaper leaks regarding it, Mr. Terasaki called on Ambassador Grew on August 29, 1941.

Although the newspaper reports had not disclosed the contents of the Japanese message, they nevertheless revealed to the pro-Axis elements in Japan that Prince Konoye had taken the initiative in an obviously conciliatory move. Indignation had been aroused previously by the order freezing Japanese assets in the United States, the shipment of oil to Russia, and America's decision to send a military mission, headed by General Magruder, to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

In view of this latest development, it was feared that serious obstacles would impair Prime Minister Konoye's attempts to reach an understanding with the United States, and there was a greatly increased possibility of an attempt being made on the life of Prince Konoye. To avoid this, Mr. Terasaki, speaking for the Japanese Foreign Minister, proposed that three steps be taken: first, that the meeting between the two government heads take place without delay to offset the rumors that the United States was applying pressure to Japan; that America postpone the routing of tankers to Russia; and lastly, that during the proposed conference, the American, order freezing Japanese assets be suspended. Emphasizing that the Japanese government had given the United States maximum assurances and commitments, particularly in regard to the Chinese situation and the Russian affair, Mr. Terasaki requested that America reciprocate by considering the Japanese proposals not from a legalistic, but rather from a psychological point of view.

[145] "The Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) to the Secretary of State", August 29, 1941, S.D., II, 579.
[146] "Secretary of State (Grew) to the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura)", September 2, 1941, S.D., II, 586.
[147] III, 101.
[148] Ibid.
[149] III, 102.
[150] "Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)", August 29, 1941, S.D., II, 579-582.

[32]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

In reply, Ambassador Grew pointed to the disparity between the very liberal administration of the freezing regulations in the United States and the harsh treatment meted out to Americans and their interests in Japan. Ambassador Grew then expressed to Mr. Terasaki Secretary Hull's views regarding the oil shipments and assured the Japanese official that the United States would consider no request concerning either the shipment of oil or the freezing of assets.

When Ambassador Grew criticized the tenor of American press reports which were being circulated through Japan, Mr. Terasaki replied that certain members of the Cabinet Information Board were pro-Axis in sentiment and the Japanese government was encountering difficulties in handling this question. Mr. Grew gave Mr. Terasaki no encouragement concerning the withdrawing of American tankers from the Russian route or suspending the order freezing Japanese assets.[151]

39. Ambassador Grew Indicates Responsibility of Ambassador Nomura for Publicity Leaks (August 30, 1941)[152]

In answer to Mr. Terasaki's expression of regret over the publicity in Washington concerning the delivery of Prince Konoye's letter to President Roosevelt, Ambassador Grew, on August 30, 1941, presented him with an excerpt from Secretary Hull's press conference held on August 28, 1941.

This revealed that when questioned by a correspondent regarding the nature of President Roosevelt's conversation with Ambassador Nomura, Secretary Hull declared that there had been a general interchange of views related to the affairs of the two countries. As to the nature of Prince Konoye's personal message, the delivery of which Ambassador Nomura had announced as he left the White House, Secretary Hull referred discussion on the matter to the Japanese Ambassador since he had not conferred with him about that point.

To queries regarding the possibility of a written or verbal agreement with Japan, and the theory that the message from the Japanese government had been in the form of a warning, Secretary Hull had merely declined to make any definite statements.

40. Japan Requests Simultaneous Release of Conference Publicity (September 1, 1941)

Aware of the growing dangers resulting from newspaper leaks, Tokyo urged on September 1, 1941 that absolute secrecy surround the Japanese reply to President Roosevelt's proposals. If the United States considered it necessary to publish a summary of this reply, Japan desired that it be notified first, in order that the disclosure might be made to both the Japanese and American peoples at the same time.[153]

41. Newspaper Leaks Continue to Concern Japanese Government

In spite of the efforts of the Japanese government to maintain the strictest secrecy regarding negotiations with the United States, newspaper leaks continued to add to the strain of the diplomatic situation.

Though a reporter had been denied any information when he had called on Mr. Terasaki to confirm the rumor of a proposed meeting between President Roosevelt and Prince Konoye,[154] the New York Herald Tribune had printed a story to the effect that Prince Konoye had requested this interview with President Roosevelt. Consequently, on September 2, 1941 a reporter of

[151] Ibid.
[152] "Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)", August 30, 1941, S.D., II, 582-583.
[153] III, 103.
[154] III, 104.

[33]

the New York Times inquired of Mr. Terasaki concerning the truth of this article, but Mr. Terasaki denied that he knew anything about it.[155]

Ambassador Nomura informed Tokyo on September 2, 1941 that he would again call such breaches of security to Secretary Hull's attention.[156]

42. Tokyo Summarizes the Japanese-American Situation for Its Ambassadors in Rome and Berlin

In a message to Berlin on August 30, 1941 Tokyo summarized the reasons for the new development in Japanese-American relations.[157] In accordance with the principles of Foreign Minister Matsuoka's Cabinet, Ambassador Nomura had carried on informal conversations with Secretary Hull in order to effect a solution to several problems. But when the Japanese army had occupied French Indo-China early in July, the United States froze Japanese assets. As a result, Japan and the United States were unable to carry on normal economic activities with one another, and the tenseness already existing between Japan and the United States became increasingly worse.

In order to alleviate the situation, Prime Minister Konoye had dispatched a message to President Roosevelt which was subsequently announced publicly by both countries. In view of its relations with the Axis countries, Japan had advised the German and Italian Ambassadors in Tokyo of this development and, therefore, the Foreign Office asked that the Japanese Ambassadors in Berlin and in Rome take note of this situation.[158]

43. Ambassador Colonna Calls on Ambassador Nomura (August 30, 1941)

The Italian Ambassador resident in Washington, Don Ascanio dei principi Colonna, called on Ambassador Nomura on August 30, 1941 to discuss certain developments in Japanese-American relations.[159] Ambassador Nomura merely told him that the German and Italian Ambassadors in Tokyo had been informed of President Konoye's message to President Roosevelt.[160] Relations between Japan and the United States were becoming extremely critical, and Ambassador Nomura quoted influential members of Congress as saying that there appeared to be an even chance for war. For that reason, the Japanese Prime Minister had issued a message to President Roosevelt in the hope of lessening the tension.

Since the Italian Ambassador was not content with these replies, Ambassador Nomura expressed the hope, with which Ambassador Colonna agreed, that the European War would soon end. Ambassador Nomura stated that Japan hoped the United States would not enter the war, but it would remain faithful to the Tripartite Pact regardless of America's stand in the European conflict. If war were to break out in the Pacific, it would be a long and drawn-out affair.[161] When reminded by Ambassador Nomura that America had remained extremely friendly toward Italy because of the several million citizens of Italian ancestry now living in the United States, the Italian Ambassador agreed with this view.

After concluding the report of his conference with the Italian Ambassador, Ambassador Nomura assured Tokyo that in accordance with instructions he had maintained strict secrecy. However, the Japanese Ambassador could not prevent the representatives of other countries from drawing their own conclusions as the result of Japan's actions. Though there was no way as yet of telling what the American reaction to the Japanese message would be, Ambassador Nomura had noticed signs of a lessening of the tension between the two governments.[162]

[155] III, 104.
[156] III, Ibid.
[157] III, 105.
[158] Ibid.
[159] III, 106.
[160] III, 105.
[161] III, 106.
[162] III, 107

[34]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

44. Hull-Nomura Conversation (September 1, 1941)

(a) State Department's Report[163]

On September 1, 1941 Ambassador Nomura, accompanied by Mr. Shigeyoshi Obata, a Japanese educated in America, called on Secretary Hull to urge that an early reply be given Prince Konoye's message. After assuring the Japanese Ambassador that he would speak to President Roosevelt upon his return to Washington on the following day, Secretary Hull discussed briefly certain points that would naturally arise should a meeting between the heads of the two nations take place. In response to an inquiry from Secretary Hull, Ambassador Nomura said that he had reported to Tokyo concerning the remarks of Mr. Hull on August 28, 1941.

From Secretary Hull's reports regarding the Chinese situation, it would appear that China was far from a settlement with Japan. Though Ambassador Nomura replied that the discontinuance of American assistance would change China's attitude, Secretary Hull declared that if the good will of China was lost, this method would not result in a stabilized reconciliation.

Though stating that some obstacles to a solution of the fundamental differences might be met, Mr. Obata indicated that some agreement could undoubtedly be reached with regard to the retention of Japanese troops in North China and Inner Mongolia, the proposed Japanese economic cooperation with China, based on international non-discrimination, and the effect of Japan's obligations under the Tripartite Pact upon American self-defense. But Secretary Hull again insisted on the necessity for having an agreement in principle on fundamental questions before the meeting.

When Mr. Obata spoke of the need for simultaneous publication of any reports on such a meeting, Ambassador Nomura pointed out that although the Japanese government had criticized him for mentioning Prime Minister Konoye's personal message to President Roosevelt to the press, the newspapers in Tokyo had responded to the information favorably.

Secretary Hull noted that the attitude of the Japanese press had, to date, only succeeded in widening the breach between the two countries by its support of Japan's co-prosperity sphere in the Far East. Japanese attacks against the United States made it difficult to deal not only with American public opinion, but would repel China, Great Britain and the Dutch East Indies. Furthermore, since any agreement reached in a conference had to receive the backing of Japanese public opinion, Secretary Hull pointed to the present difficulties of the Japanese government in restraining its press from attacking the United States. In view of this, Secretary Hull suggested that Tokyo begin to exercise its influence with the press to emphasize the benefits of a peaceful program in the Pacific. Japan would have nothing to lose in this respect, even though no agreement were reached, since it would have to its credit an effort to achieve peace. Ambassador Nomura promised to submit this suggestion to his government.[164]

(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report

Ambassador Nomura reported on September 1, 1941 that immediately upon receiving instructions he had called on Secretary Hull to discuss the matter of maintaining secrecy in regard to all Japanese-American negotiations and to agree upon a simultaneous announcement of any information that was to be made public.[165] The Japanese Ambassador believed that apparently this problem was being handled by President Roosevelt himself.

President Roosevelt would have dinner with the Secretary of State upon his return to Washington from Hyde Park on September 4, 1941, and since both men were interested in the idea

[163] "Memorandum of a conversation", initialed by Joseph W. Ballantine, September 1, 1941, S.D., II, 583-585.
[164] Ibid.
[165] III, 108.

[35]

of a "leaders' conference", Ambassador Nomura believed that a reply to the Japanese proposals would be forthcoming shortly. Nevertheless, because of Secretary Hull's nature and position in the government, he was extremely cautious, for not only he, but many other Americans apparently were of the opinion that, regardless of Prince Konoye's intentions, the militaristic faction in the Japanese government and Japanese public opinion would not approve the adoption of a peaceful policy in the Pacific.[166] In order to offset such an impression, Ambassador Nomura explained that, as Prime Minister of Japan and a man of great political influence, Prince Konoye was determined to hold the conference.

According to Ambassador Nomura, Ambassador Grew in Tokyo was keeping Secretary Hull well informed on the opinions expressed in Japanese newspapers. Secretary Hull believed that the Japanese government should direct public opinion and influence outstanding political leaders and military men in such a way that they would approve the adoption of a peaceful program. Ambassador Nomura informed Tokyo that this idea would facilitate matters as far as negotiations with the United States were concerned, but pointed out that if such action were taken, it would lead to the suspicion that the United States was trying to interfere with Japan's internal politics.[167]

Secretary Hull then declared that China did not seem too anxious to make peace because it feared that sooner or later a militaristic Cabinet would be established in Japan. Ambassador Nomura replied that "China was America's spoiled child", asking for everything it wanted regardless of others.

To bring about friendly relations between Japan and China without offending China would be difficult said Secretary Hull, who stated that it was necessary to win the approval of Great Britain and other major countries concerned. In regard to the questions of self-defense and of non-discrimination, however, Secretary Hull felt that a satisfactory settlement could be reached.[168]

By way of explaining his government's intentions toward China, Ambassador Nomura assured Secretary Hull that Japan aimed to maintain peace in the Far East. This was evident from the commitments which it had repeatedly made. The stationing of Japanese and Manchukuoan troops in North China was not based on a permanent right of military occupation, and as soon as circumstances permitted, these forces would be withdrawn.[169]

Although Ambassador Nomura discussed with the Secretary of State the proposed "leaders' conference", no decision was made regarding the actual location. However, Ambassador Nomura advised Tokyo that since the climate was favorable even in the autumn, a meeting-place midway between Japan and the United States should be selected.[170]

Summarizing the present international situation, Ambassador Nomura declared that during this third year of the European War, the anti-Axis Powers had recovered from their former desperate defensive position and had built up their strength to equal the Axis Powers.[171] The United States was expanding its own defense and planning to supply the Allies with more materials. Furthermore, in spite of Germany's fighting power, the tremendous waste of manpower and materials on the Eastern Front would undoubtedly cause the war to carry over into next year.[172]

[166] Ibid.
[167] III, 109.
[168] III, 110.
[169] III, 111.
[170] III, 112.
[171] Ibid.
[172] III, 113.

[36]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

45. Roosevelt-Nomura Conversation (September 3, 1941)

(a) Secretary Hull's Report[173]

At President Roosevelt's request, Ambassador Nomura called at the White House on the afternoon of September 3, 1941 to receive an oral statement prepared in reply to the Japanese government's communication. Reading the document aloud, President Roosevelt stressed that since he realized the difficulties of the Japanese internal situation, he had hoped that, in turn, Prince Konoye would appreciate the difficult conditions existing in the United States.

The oral statement referred to the meeting between the respective heads of Japan and the United States, proposed by the Japanese Ambassador in an endeavor to save the situation in the Pacific. Assuring the Japanese Prime Minister that the American government was anxious to consummate the arrangements for such a meeting, President Roosevelt, nevertheless, suggested that preliminary discussions be held concerning problems to be settled at the meeting.

In order to further clarify the stand that the United States would take in the matters under discussion, President Roosevelt reviewed the events leading up to the present conditions.[174] At the outset of the informal and exploratory conversations entered into by Secretary Hull and Ambassador Nomura on April 16, 1941, the American government had set forth four principles as the fundamental basis for its future policy in dealing with all nations: Respect for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of nations; support of the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries; equality in every field, including commercial opportunities; and maintenance of the "status quo" in the Pacific, except where it could be altered by peaceful means.

Not only did the United States believe that peace and stability in the Pacific could be reached only through adherence to these policies, but it was firmly convinced that Japan would profit more by adopting a similar course. The United States noted with satisfaction the statement from Ambassador Nomura to President Roosevelt, on August 28, 1941, which gave specific assurances of Japanese cooperation in the establishment of a peaceful program in the Pacific. America understood by this that any policy involving political expansion or acquisition of economic rights by force was excluded.

During the course of the informal conversations between Ambassador Nomura and Secretary Hull, another proposal, marked "Oral, Unofficial and Without Commitment", had been submitted by the American government as a redraft of the Japanese proposal of May 12, 1941. Certain divergencies of views had been noted in subsequent oral discussions which would have to be clarified at this time in order to facilitate a satisfactory settlement of the Pacific question.

President Roosevelt recognized that no government could reach a decision on policy without taking into account its own internal situation and the strength of public opinion. Japan would realize that the United States could not enter into an agreement that would not be in harmony with the principles of its people. President Roosevelt's statement was concluded with a request for a reply from the Japanese government on the matters set forth above.[175]

After finishing his oral statement, President Roosevelt discussed his recent conversations with Prime Minister Churchill during which both men had agreed that in dealing with certain post war governmental problems, a policy of settlement by plebiscites would be most effective.[176]

[173] "Memorandum by the Secretary of State (Hull)", September 3, 1941, S.D., II, 588-592.
[174] "Oral statement handed by President Roosevelt to the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura)", September 3, 1941, S.D., II, 589-591. For Japanese version of this text sent by Ambassador Nomura to Tokyo, see III, 114.
[175] Ibid.
[176] S.D., II, 588.

[37]

President Roosevelt then read his letter to Prince Konoye. In replying to the Prime Minister's message of August 27, 1941, President Roosevelt expressed his satisfaction over Japanese solicitude for maintaining peace in the Pacific and improving relations with America. Cognizant of the rapidly developing character of world events, President Roosevelt desired to exchange views with the Japanese Prime Minister as soon as possible.[177]

In the statement accompanying Prince Konoye's letter, President Roosevelt had noted that the Japanese government believed the principles of the United States to be the prime requisites for a world peace. In view of the apparently favorable attitude of Japan, President Roosevelt wished to collaborate with it in the practical application of these principles.

Nevertheless, it was evident that certain opposing factions in Japan were strong enough to create obstacles to this proposed collaboration. Under such circumstances, President Roosevelt deemed it advisable that preliminary discussions concerning the basis for achieving and maintaining peace begin immediately, and requested Prince Konoye's assent to this proposal.[178]

When Ambassador Nomura asked his personal opinion regarding the proposed conference, President Roosevelt asserted that the idea was extremely favorable to him. Yet, he insisted that the success of such a conference would rest largely on the settlement of differences prior to the meeting. Once the United States was sufficiently assured that the Japanese principles were favorable to a peaceful settlement in the Pacific, the matter would, of necessity, have to be discussed with the British, Chinese and Dutch, because of their interests in the South Seas. Since difficulties had already been encountered with Tokyo because of its advancement by force into French Indo-China, both President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull emphasized the peaceful stand which Japan must adopt in order to gain the confidence of the nations concerned in the Pacific.

In spite of the opposition in Japan to Prince Konoye's proposal, Ambassador Nomura believed that a meeting between the two government leaders would enable the Japanese to overcome internal friction. Moreover, the questions relating to the complete evacuation of Japanese troops from China, non-discrimination along economic lines, and the interpretation of the Tripartite Pact could be removed as obstacles to Japanese-American friendship if the proposed conference took place.

As the discussion drew to a close, President Roosevelt reiterated his desire that the Japanese government clarify its position and its principles, and that it direct public opinion toward the support of a peaceful course.[179]

(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report

Ambassador Nomura reported that at President Roosevelt's request, he had come to the White House secretly at 5:00 P.M. on the afternoon of September 3, 1941.[180] At that time President Roosevelt read a personal message to be sent to Prime Minister Konoye and also the reply of the United States to the message of the Japanese government, dated August 28, 1941.[181]

After reading these messages, President Roosevelt stated that although Prince Konoye, Ambassador Nomura, Secretary Hull and himself were making every effort to maintain peace

[177] "President Roosevelt's reply to the Japanese Prime Minister (Prince Konoye), handed to the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura)", September 3, 1941, S.D., II, 591-592. For Japanese version of this text sent by Ambassador Nomura to Tokyo, see III, 115.
[178] Ibid.
[179] S.D., II, 588-589.
[180] III, 116-117.
[181] III, 117.

[38]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

in the Pacific, public opinion in both Japan and the United States was an obstacle to friendly diplomatic relations. When President Roosevelt disclosed that he was very sympathetic toward Prince Konoye's position, Ambassador Nomura insisted that regardless of opposition, the Japanese Prime Minister was still determined to proceed with his plans, for of the three points mentioned in the American reply to the Japanese proposal, two points had been agreed upon in principle, and Prince Konoye expected to reach an agreement on the third at the conference.[182]

Pointing out that the British, Netherlands East Indies and Chinese governments would have to be consulted, Secretary Hull inquired concerning certain preliminary arrangements. President Roosevelt assured Ambassador Nomura that during his visit with Prime Minister Churchill he had made no reference to his conferences with Japanese officials. Since according to British custom, the Prime Minister must necessarily submit all matters to the Cabinet and finally to the Parliament, President Roosevelt had recognized that such disclosure would have made it difficult to maintain the secrecy desired by Japan.[183] Ambassador Nomura referred to a message he had received from his government which stated that after the existence of the Prime Minister's message to President Roosevelt had been made known to the public inadvertently, the militaristic faction had vehemently protested against the proposed conference since it feared its effects on the Tripartite Pact.[184]

According to Tokyo, the publication of the story in the Herald Tribune relating the rumor of a proposed conference between Prince Konoye and President Roosevelt had added to the internal confusion,[185] and though the Japanese government did not feel that such actions would destroy the results of a conference between the leaders of both governments, it desired that the matter be kept secret until all arrangements were completed.

Furthermore, the meeting should take place around the middle of September or at an earlier date, with a simple statement to that effect released without delay. The Japanese government advised Ambassador Nomura that if it did not receive an immediate reply concerning these proposals, it planned to issue a public statement describing its position in this matter to safeguard its domestic interests.[186]

However, a day later on September 4, 1941, Tokyo, fearful of causing a misunderstanding which would prevent the conference, requested that Ambassador Nomura rescind this clause.[187]

In regard to the date for the proposed meeting, President Roosevelt stated that the latter part of September would be inconvenient for him but that any other time would be suitable. Though Secretary Hull appeared to be gravely concerned over the general editorial trend of the Japanese press, President Roosevelt agreed to Japan's desire for the simultaneous publishing of any statements concerning these conferences. Ambassador Nomura determined to ascertain Secretary Hull's true attitude during a conversation scheduled for September 4, 1941.[188]

46. Mr. Terasaki Delivers a Message from Foreign Minister Toyoda to Ambassador Grew (September 3, 1941)

Meanwhile, in Tokyo, discussions covering the same general points and emphasizing once more the need for secrecy were taking place between American and Japanese officials. Calling

[182] III, 118.
[183] Ibid.
[184] III, 119.
[185] Ibid. The New York Times, September 3, 1941, 1:6 printed a story of the proposed conference which had to be discounted by the State Department. [186] III, 119.
[187] III, 120.
[188] III, 118.

[39]

by appointment on Ambassador Grew on September 3, 1941, Mr. Terasaki delivered a message from Foreign Minister Toyoda.[189] According to the Japanese Foreign Minister, the Japanese press had obtained information from American newspapers concerning the proposed meeting between the heads of the two governments in spite of all the efforts of Tokyo to prevent such a disclosure.

At this point, Ambassador Grew interposed that the published story had probably resulted from the clever deduction and news sense of the correspondents rather than from any official statement made by the American government. Insisting that the New York Herald Tribune was known to have been in possession of the actual facts, Mr. Terasaki stated that, irrespective of its source, the publicity attending the proposed meeting had increased the suspicion of certain factions in Tokyo that Japan was yielding to American pressure. To halt any mobilization of these pro-Axis elements, it was Mr. Terasaki's opinion that definite results would have to be accomplished by Prince Konoye's proposal.

With this end in mind, Foreign Minister Toyoda deemed it extremely important that an official announcement be released concerning the date and place of meeting between the two government heads. Furthermore, the Japanese government suggested that the conference take place about September 20, 1941 and that the anchorage determined upon be disclosed as "somewhere in the Pacific".

The Director of the American Bureau emphasized Foreign Minister Toyoda's concern over Ambassador Nomura's lack of discretion in speaking to the American press of Prince Konoye's letter to President Roosevelt. Mr. Terasaki assured Ambassador Grew that his government had no intention of delivering an ultimatum to America. Nevertheless, he made it clear that if the projected conference between Prince Konoye and President Roosevelt failed to materialize, Tokyo would be forced to inform the Japanese public, first, of the reasons motivating Prince Konoye's message to President Roosevelt, and second, of the spirit behind the proposed meeting.[190]

On the following day, September 4, 1941, Mr. Terasaki informed Ambassador Grew that both Prince Konoye and Foreign Minister Toyoda wished to retract that portion of the Foreign Minister's message which stated that, should the projected meeting between the two government leaders not be realized, Tokyo would be forced to publish the circumstances surrounding it. The Japanese government feared that such a statement might cause a misunderstanding detrimental to the proposed conference.[191]

47. Ambassador Nomura Advises Tokyo to Reply Briefly to the United States

To clarify the general trend of the informal conferences, Ambassador Nomura sent a message to Tokyo, on September 3, 1941, expressing the opinion that the United States desired mainly to ascertain Japan's definite attitude on questions relating to the rights of self-defense, equal trade opportunities and the terms for peace between Japan and China.[192]

Since he had repeatedly demonstrated his interest in these points during the unofficial conversations, Secretary Hull felt that he must be definitely advised of Japan's attitude in order to insure the success of the "leaders' meeting". According to Ambassador Nomura, the United States did not wish to receive a lengthy statement, which failed to express a definite proposal by the Japanese government.

Ambassador Nomura asked that Tokyo keep these factors in mind in drafting a reply to the American messages. Since Ambassador Nomura was scheduled to converse with Secretary Hull on September 4, 1941, he promised to send a more complete report at that time.[193]

[189] "Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)", September 3, 1941, S.D., II, 586-687.
[190] Ibid.
[191] "Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)", September 4, 1941, S.D., II, 592.
[192] III, 121.
[193] Ibid.

[40]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

48. Grew-Toyoda Conversation (September 4, 1941)

(a) Ambassador Grew's Report[194]

On the afternoon of September 4, 1941 Ambassador Grew called upon Admiral Toyoda and was assured that both Prince Konoye and the Japanese Foreign Minister would make every effort to bring about an early meeting between the Prime Minister and President Roosevelt, since Japan wished to ensure the ultimate success of its peace aims. If this conference were to fail, further efforts to establish friendly relations between the two countries would be useless. In order to achieve these objectives, Japan was prepared to take a definite stand on the matters under discussion, and to make certain provisional commitments. In return, it expected reciprocal commitments from the United States, which would be discussed at the proposed conference.

Stating that he had cabled the proposals to Ambassador Nomura in Washington, Foreign Minister Toyoda then handed Mr. Grew a written copy of the Japanese proposals[195] and requested him to cable them to Washington in his most secret code to obviate any possibility of inaccuracy through misunderstanding of the English language.

In its proposals the Japanese government expressed its willingness to concur in those matters which had already been tentatively agreed upon in the course of the informal conversations. Unless motivated by a justifiable reason, Japan promised that it would not make any military advancement from French Indo-China and the adjoining regions nor would it resort to military action against the territories lying to the north of Japan.

In the case of the United States' entrance into the European War, Japan was to decide independently upon an interpretation and execution of the Tripartite Pact. For the present, the attitude of both Japan and the United States toward the European war was to be determined by the necessary concepts of protection and self-defense.[196]

In regard to its relations with China, the Japanese government would endeavor to bring about general rehabilitation and re-establishment of normal activities. As soon as satisfactory agreements were concluded between Japan and China, the Japanese government was going to withdraw its armed forces.

In regard to the economic activities of the United States, Japan guaranteed that as long as it was pursued on an equitable basis, American trade would not be curtailed in China. Furthermore, Japan would cooperate in the production and procurement of necessary natural resources by the United States in the southwestern Pacific area where the principle of non-discrimination would govern Japan's international commerce. In connection with the resumption of normal trade relations between Japan and the United States, the Japanese government was willing, on the basis of reciprocity, to withdraw its control regulations from American commerce.[197]

In return for these concessions, Japan desired the United States to make similar guarantees. In view of Japan's proposed actions regarding China, the United States was to abstain from any measures which would be prejudicial to Japan's attempts to settle the China affair.

[194] "Memorandum by the Ambassador to Japan (Grew)", September 4, 1941, S.D., II, 593-595, 608-609.
[195] See S.D., II, 608 for text sent to Secretary Hull by Ambassador Grew on September 4, 1941.
[196] See III, 122 for same text sent in Japanese code to Ambassador Nomura on September 4, 1941 and delivered by him to Secretary Hull on September 6, 1941.
[197] S.D., II, 608-609. For Japanese message referring to this specific commitment see III, 123.

[41]

Japan's commitments with regard to trade in the southwest Pacific were naturally to be reciprocated by the United States. Furthermore, any military measures in either the Far East or southwest Pacific areas were to be similarly suspended by the United States, and since Japan wished to resume normal trade relations with the United States, it was desired that America cooperate by discontinuing the freezing of Japanese assets and by removing the prohibition against the passage of Japanese vessels through the Panama Canal.[198]

After stating that Tokyo was prepared to accept the tentative agreement which had been reached in the informal and preliminary conversations carried on at Washington, Foreign Minister Toyoda further declared that points (c), (d) and (e) in the newly submitted Japanese proposals would furnish the basis for an agreement on the chief points that had not been disposed of during previous meetings. Particular emphasis was laid on that section of the proposals which indicated an interpretation of the Tripartite Pact at variance with that of Mr. Matsuoka.

After examining the proposals handed to him, Ambassador Grew remarked that various points were susceptible to broad interpretation. In reply, Foreign Minister Toyoda suggested that they be discussed at the proposed meeting, and that reciprocal commitments and proposals between the two countries be embodied finally into a secret agreement formulated during that meeting. After the conference between President Roosevelt and Prince Konoye had taken place, a general statement could be released to the press. To this suggestion, Ambassador Grew replied that the democratic system of the United States government made it impossible to conceal such meetings from the American public.

At the conclusion of the discussion, Admiral Toyoda revealed that he had not yet received Ambassador Nomura's report on his interview with President Roosevelt on the preceding day. Ambassador Grew also said that he had received no information concerning the conversation which had taken place.[199]

In the comment which Ambassador Grew appended to his report on his conversation with the Japanese Foreign Minister on September 4, 1941, he declared that it appeared to be impossible to work out a detailed agreement concerning each of the points in the Japanese provisional proposals during the short time allotted for the conference between Prime Minister Konoye and President Roosevelt.[200] In regard to any publicity following the meeting of the two government heads, Ambassador Grew believed it wise merely to announce that the government of Japan had subscribed to the principles of international relations enunciated by Secretary Hull, and that in accordance with these principles the reconstruction of problems affecting the Pacific area was under way.

In referring to the efforts of both governments in the establishment of a world peace, the statement should conclude by commenting that it was a source of gratification that both Japan and the United States had advanced toward their goal of peace without the sacrifice of legitimate expansion and aims.

Claiming that there was an obvious difference between Admiral Toyoda's proposals of September 4, 1941 and those transmitted on August 29, 1941, Ambassador Grew believed that the Japanese government was sincerely anxious to achieve a peaceful settlement with the United States.[201]

[198] S.D., II, 608-609. See III, 124.
[199] S.D., II, 593-594.
[200] "Comment by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)", September 4, 1941, S.D., II, 594-595.
[201] Ibid.

[42]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

(b) Foreign Minister Toyoda's Report[202]

In a message to Ambassador Nomura on September 4, 1941 Foreign Minister Toyoda both summarized the conditions existing between Japan and the United States and interpreted the proposals which he had communicated to Ambassador Grew in an interview held on that day.

The Japanese government realized that the United States desired to hold preliminary conferences prior to the major meeting between the leaders of both countries in order to arrive at some agreement on the questions of self-defense, Japanese occupation of China, and equal treatment in trade. But with the disclosure of Prince Konoye's message to President Roosevelt, an internal situation had arisen in Japan which made it extremely urgent to hold the conference without further delay. If representatives of both governments continued to argue these questions merely from a legalistic viewpoint, it would be impossible to be ready for a meeting in the latter part of September.

The Japanese government had already expressed its views on the American proposals issued on July 24 and August 17, 1941, respectively, and could say nothing more on the subject. However, Japan would express its viewpoint in proposals which it was submitting both to Ambassador Grew and Ambassador Nomura for presentation to Secretary Hull. It was felt that the leaders of both countries could hold a conference for the discussion of the points already agreed upon in preliminary discussions, and could then issue a joint statement at the conclusion of their interview. This would create a more wholesome atmosphere between Japan and the United States. The Japanese government promised to send Ambassador Nomura a suggested text of this joint agreement as soon as it could be made ready.[203]

The Japanese Foreign Minister had conversed with Ambassador Grew in the afternoon of September 4, 1941 and had submitted the Japanese proposals concerning which certain points required a special explanation. The two conferees would decide whether the conclusions reached during the conference would be in the form of a secret or ordinary agreement. Japan was confident that its concessions, particularly those made with regard to the interpretation of the Tripartite Pact, would meet the approval of the United States.

Referring to the withdrawal of both governments' freezing orders, Japan warned Ambassador Nomura against admitting that the United States' freezing measure had proved damaging to Japan, and directed him to explain that the United States' action in this regard had given the Japanese people the impression that their country was being punished for the occupation of French Indo-China. Therefore, if the order were rescinded by any technical, complicated and halfway measure, it would not be understood by the people at large.

In spite of possible strong opposition within America, the Japanese government believed that the United States should reciprocate the concessions made by Tokyo by withdrawing the freezing order as soon as an agreement was reached by the conferees.

When Japan requested that the United States cease military measures in the Far East, it had in mind the dispatching of submarines and airplanes to the Philippines and the recent acquiring of American military bases in the southwestern Pacific, China and Far Eastern Russia.[204]

[202] III, 125.
[203] Ibid.
[204] III, 126.

[43]

49. Hull-Nomura Conversation (September 4, 1941)

(a) State Department's Report[205]

Accompanied by Mr. Obata, Ambassador Nomura called at Secretary Hull's apartment on September 4, 1941 to express his pleasure over President Roosevelt's reply to Prince Konoye's message. In reply to the request in President Roosevelt's oral statement for a definition of the Japanese government's attitude regarding the three fundamental divergencies of view that had remained unreconciled when the conversations ended in July, Ambassador Nomura stated that those points had been disposed of, in spirit at least, in the Japanese statement of August 28, 1941. In the opinion of the Japanese Ambassador there no longer existed any basic differences between Japan and the United States concerning the principles of peace.

In emphasizing the necessity of consulting with the Chinese, British, and Dutch before entering into final negotiations, Secretary Hull declared that the support of these nations must be enlisted in order to maintain a broad program of peace in the Pacific area. In order to allay any apprehension, particularly on the part of the Chinese, the American and Japanese governments would have to reach a clear understanding beforehand regarding points that would affect China.

Referring to Japanese obligations under the Tripartite Pact, Ambassador Nomura declared that since this alliance was purely defensive there was no question of Japan's attacking the United States should America enter the war. Nevertheless, Secretary Hull insisted that if the United States made an agreement with Japan without first obtaining explicit assurance concerning the interpretation of the Tripartite Pact, difficulties would arise with the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.

In answering Ambassador Nomura's queries regarding discussions prior to the conference between President Roosevelt and Prince Konoye, Secretary Hull raised the question of broadening the proposed trade commitments. In the light of the exigent economic problems which would arise after a peace settlement had been reached, Secretary Hull believed that the existing trade proposals were contrary to Japan's own interest.

After this remark Ambassador Nomura stated that he was awaiting his government's instructions concerning a statement of its present attitude toward the three fundamental points at issue. Ambassador Nomura then handed Secretary Hull a new draft of the Japanese proposals, which he said was a redraft of the American proposals of June 21, 1941. The document was marked "Unofficial, Exploratory, and Without Commitment".[206]

As the meeting drew to a close, Ambassador Nomura referred to the release of a public announcement concerning the meeting of Japanese and American governmental heads. Secretary Hull did not object to an announcement that formal exploratory conversations were in progress, but stated that any publicity regarding the negotiations should be deferred until preliminary discussions had been completed and the other governments concerned in the matter had been approached.[207]

(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report[208]

In order to determine Secretary Hull's views on the preliminary talk which Mr. Hull had with President Roosevelt, Ambassador Nomura called on the Secretary of State on the morning of September 4, 1941.

[205] "Memorandum of a conversation", September 4, 1941, S.D., II, 595-596.
[206] This document was submitted without the approval of the Japanese government and was subsequently withdrawn by the Japanese Ambassador. For complete text see S.D., II, 597-600.
[207] S.D., II, 595-596.
[208] III, 127-129.

[44]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

Secretary Hull again brought up the four basic principles which had been discussed in the previous meeting: guaranteeing the territorial integrity of all countries; non-intervention in domestic issues; equal commercial opportunity for all nations; and the maintenance of the status quo in the Pacific. Ambassador Nomura pointed out that the Japanese government's reply to the American note had made it clear that Japan was in full agreement with these principles.[209] However, Japan wished to settle the problems upon which no agreement had been reached in the past informal negotiations. Secretary Hull replied that it was necessary to dispose of the aforementioned four basic principles. Since the United States had no intention of giving the impression that by negotiating with Japan it intended to trade off China, Great Britain and other interested powers, it would be necessary to get the approval of these third powers.[210]

In discussing the American proposal, Ambassador Nomura was of the opinion that the reference to the attitude of Soviet Russia and Great Britain toward the European war should be omitted, but Secretary Hull objected to this suggestion. Moreover, he desired that Japan completely withdraw its troops from North China instead of stationing them there for the alleged purpose of opposing Communism.

From his conversation with Secretary Hull, Ambassador Nomura received the impression that the American attitude toward Japan was stiffening.[211]

50. Ambassador Grew Confers with Foreign Minister Toyoda (September 5, 1941 )[212]

Although Prince Konoye had invited Ambassador Grew to confer secretly with him at a private home on the evening of September 5, 1941, circumstances forced the postponement of the meeting until the following day. In Ambassador Grew's opinion the Japanese Prime Minister had desired to discuss President Roosevelt's reply to his message, as well as President Roosevelt's oral statement, but had deemed it advisable that Foreign Minister Toyoda discuss the matter first. Consequently, Ambassador Grew called on the Japanese Foreign Minister late in the afternoon of September 5, 1941 and Foreign Minister Toyoda questioned him regarding both those matters.

Since a complete report had not reached Ambassador Grew from the American Department of State, Foreign Minister Toyoda showed Ambassador Grew an English text of both the President's message to Prince Konoye and the oral statement. Furthermore, he requested Ambassador Grew's impression concerning the fundamental differences of view which had not been brought into conformity before the conversations in Washington had been interrupted. However, since Ambassador Grew felt that his own telegram reporting his conversation on the preceding day with the Foreign Minister had not yet been received in Washington and, therefore, the United States government was unaware of Foreign Minister Toyoda's belief that the Japanese proposal, dated August 28, 1941 contained the solution to these differences, he could not discuss the problems further with the Japanese Foreign Minister until he had been informed of his government's reaction to the proposal. At Foreign Minister Toyoda's request, Ambassador Grew promised to convey to Secretary Hull his desire for an early report on the American government's reaction to Foreign Minister Toyoda's proposal.[213]

In commenting on the interview scheduled to be held with Foreign Minister Toyoda on the next day, September 6, 1941, Ambassador Grew in his notes of September 5, 1941 stated that

[209] III, 127.
[210] III, 128.
[211] III, 129.
[212] "Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)", September 5, 1941 S.D., II, 600-603.
[213] Ibid.

[45]

he would avoid discussing any of the questions at issue pending a report from the State Department at Washington.

Foreign Minister Toyoda had expressed the opinion that any necessary conversations called prior to the meeting of Prince Konoye and President Roosevelt should be held at Tokyo in view of the language difficulties that had apparently arisen in Washington. However, Ambassador Grew made it clear that he could make no such recommendation since decisions of this sort were made by the American government.

Having examined carefully the reports of the oral discussions concerning the American redraft of the original Japanese proposals, it seemed apparent to Ambassador Grew that there existed four substantial points upon which no agreement had been reached: (1) the questions of equal opportunity and nondiscrimination in China, (2) the maintenance of Japanese garrisons in China, (3) the respective attitudes of the United States and Japan toward the war in Europe and (4) the question of military bases. At present it was necessary to determine to what degree the new Japanese proposals answered these four points, and to discover whether they afforded an adequate basis for the proposed meeting between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Konoye.

According to Ambassador Grew, no oral or written Japanese promises could completely guarantee the carrying out of their proposals. In order to return to the "status quo ante" in the Far East, and to reestablish satisfactory relations between the countries concerned in the Pacific, Japan would undoubtedly have to cease its progressive acts of aggression. Nevertheless, Ambassador Grew believed that, if implemented, the new Japanese proposals might provide the basis for the establishment of peace.

With this end in view, Ambassador Grew also felt it desirable that American military and economic measures against Japan be relaxed as Japan moved towards implementation of its commitments. Thus, Japan would be provided with inducements to honor its proposals, and the United States would have a lever of compulsion. Ambassador Grew believed that the risk involved in this procedure appeared to be less serious than the risk of armed conflict entailed in the progressive application of economic pressure.[214]

51. Japan Requests Ambassador Nomura to Expedite the Conference Arrangements

On September 5, 1941 Tokyo informed Ambassador Nomura that since it had not yet received the messages from Ambassador Nomura which had been delivered to him by President Roosevelt on September 3, 1941, the Japanese government was unaware of the American attitude toward the suggested meeting of the respective leaders. Nevertheless, in order to facilitate the conclusion of an understanding, the Foreign Minister had given Ambassador Grew a document containing further concessions by Japan toward the adjustment of diplomatic relations. The contents of this document were in essence the Japanese reply to the request of the United States for a preliminary understanding. In order to eliminate the possibility of any misunderstanding the proposals had been worded simply.

Since these latest proposals were the maximum concessions which Japan could make in meeting American demands, Ambassador Nomura was requested to impress the American government with the importance of the proposals as preliminary expressions of Japanese intentions to achieve a complete settlement of all questions through politics and diplomacy. Though Japan was ready to give a clear and concise reply to any questions raised by the United States, it felt that further discussions would serve only to delay the conference between Japanese and American leaders. For this reason, both Ambassador Grew and Ambassador Nomura were requested to exercise their influence in discouraging such questions.[215]

[214] "Comment by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)", September 5, 1941, S.D., II, 601-603.
[215] III, 130.

[46]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

52. Ambassador Grew Confers with Officials in Tokyo (September 6, 1941)

(a) Conversation with Foreign Minister Toyoda

During a conversation with Foreign Minister Toyoda on the morning of September 6, 1941 Ambassador Grew, carrying out instructions received in a State Department telegram, informed the Japanese Foreign Minister that the American government could not suspend the sailing of American tankers to Vladivostok, nor could it withdraw the freezing order pending the proposed meeting of the representative heads of Japan and the United States.[216]

Later on the same day, while conferring with the Director of the American Bureau of the Japanese Foreign Office, Ambassador Grew heard Mr. Terasaki's opinions on the influence of the Axis in Japan. In spite of the publicity leaks which had occurred in regard to Prince Konoye's proposal to President Roosevelt, and the reports circulating at present about the projected meeting between the two government heads, Japan was attempting to keep its negotiations with the United States secret. Nevertheless, through subordinate officials in the Foreign Office and the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, Germany and Italy were endeavoring to secure information concerning the progress of Japanese-American relations.

Though Foreign Minister Toyoda, unlike Mr. Matsuoka, permitted Mr. Terasaki to exercise a certain control over the instructions sent to the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin, there were still large numbers of influential Germans in strategic governmental organizations and positions in Tokyo. On the basis of confidential reports, Mr. Terasaki had also learned that Japanese pro-Axis elements were plotting a coup on September 27, 1941, the anniversary of Japan's adherence to the Axis.

Confronting those opposed to a Japanese-American understanding with a fait accompli would be an efficacious way of forestalling their plans, said Mr. Terasaki. Moreover, the news that concrete agreements had been reached between the two countries would be welcomed by the Japanese public.[217]

(b) Conversation with Prince Konoye

In the evening of September 6, 1941 Ambassador Grew dined at a private home with Prince Konoye, Mr. Ushiba, the Prime Minister's private secretary, and Mr. Eugene Dooman, Councilor at the American Embassy.[218] In a three hours' conversation concerning the fundamental principles advanced by both Japan and the United States, the views of the Japanese government were discussed.

Prince Konoye agreed whole-heartedly that the four principles enumerated by Secretary Hull were a sound basis for the rehabilitation of relations between the United States and Japan. Assuming culpability for the present discord existent between the two countries, the Japanese Prime Minister recognized that it was his responsibility to bring about peace in the Pacific. Since failure now would prevent future Prime Ministers from effecting a peaceful collaboration between Japan and the United States, Prince Konoye was determined to conclude his endeavors successfully in spite of opposing factions.

As a result of the latest Japanese commitments, Prime Minister Konoye hoped that a common basis had been established for a meeting between President Roosevelt and himself. While cognizant that many points needed clarification and more precise formulation, Prince Konoye remained confident that since his proposals were backed by Japanese naval and military leaders, any divergencies in view could be easily reconciled.

From the reports of Ambassador Nomura in Washington, the Japanese Prime Minister had concluded that the American government doubted the strength of the present Japanese Cabi-

[216] "Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)", September 6, 1941, S.D., II, 603-604.
[217] Ibid.
[218] "Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)", September 6, 1941, S.D., II, 604-606.

[47]

net to resist the anti-American factions. Admitting that certain elements within the armed forces did not approve of his policies, Prince Konoye nevertheless was certain that he was fully supported by the responsible chiefs of both the Japanese army and navy. When the proposed conference between the two government heads took place, a full Admiral, possibly Admiral Yoshida, a full General and the Vice-Chiefs of Staff were expected to accompany the Japanese Prime Minister.

At the same time, however, Prince Konoye believed that resentment in Japan over the economic pressure exerted by other countries was mounting, and that unless a settlement between the United States and Japan was effected within the year, the Japanese extremists would be in a position to profit by the situation. When Ambassador Grew had pointed to the failure of the Japanese government to carry out promises made by former Japanese Ministers, Prince Konoye answered that his government wished to bring about a thorough reconstruction of American-Japanese relations. Furthermore, any commitments made by Japan at this time would be strictly observed.

If President Roosevelt desired to communicate secretly with Prince Konoye, the Japanese Prime Minister promised to arrange subsequent confidential meetings with Ambassador Grew. In view of the present internal situation in Japan, however, Prince Konoye hoped that the projected meeting with President Roosevelt would be arranged with the least possible delay since he felt that all problems could be solved to their mutual satisfaction. He was determined to achieve the proposed reconstruction of relations with the United States regardless of cost or personal risk.[219]

53. Hull-Nomura Conversation (September 6, 1941)

(a) State Department's Report[220]

Calling at his own request, Ambassador Nomura with Mr. Obata visited Secretary Hull in his apartment on September 6, 1941. After handing Secretary Hull a document containing Japanese proposals for the adjustment of diplomatic relations, the Japanese Ambassador declared that the statement had been prepared before September 3, 1941, the date of President Roosevelt's reply to Prince Konoye's message.[221] Nevertheless, Tokyo believed that the contents of this communication contained not only the spirit of its previous statement transmitted to President Roosevelt on August 28, 1941, but also a reply to President Roosevelt's message of September 3, 1941.

On the evening of August 28, 1941 Secretary Hull had spoken of the desirability of reaching an agreement on certain fundamental questions before the meeting of the two government heads took place. Ambassador Nomura had referred these views to the Japanese government and they had now been acted upon. In the light of existing circumstances, Ambassador Nomura believed that Japan was now making its maximum concessions. Secretary Hull then assured Ambassador Nomura that he was anxious to proceed as quickly as possible. To Ambassador Nomura's suggestion that the announcement of preliminary discussions be hastened, Secretary Hull replied that he saw no objection to having it known that informal and exploratory conversations were underway.[222]

[219] Ibid.
[220] "Memorandum of a conversation", initialed by Joseph W. Ballantine, September 6, 1941, S.D., II, 606-607.
[221] For the text of the Japanese government's proposals handed to Ambassador Grew on September 4, 1941, see III, 122-124. For the text handed to Secretary Hull on September 6, 1941, see "Draft proposal handed by the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) to the Secretary of State", September 6, 1941, S.D., II, 608-609.
[222] "Memorandum of a conversation", initialed by Joseph W. Ballantine, September 6, 1941, S.D., II, 606-607.

[48]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report[223]

In accordance with the instructions he had received from Tokyo, Ambassador Nomura secretly called on Secretary Hull the morning of September 6, 1941 and handed him a document containing Japanese proposals for the adjustment of American relations. Ambassador Nomura explained that this document was a copy of that handed to Ambassador Grew by Foreign Minister Toyoda.

Although the document had been prepared before the Japanese government received on September 3, 1941 President Roosevelt's reply to the message from Prince Konoye, dated August 28, 1941, it was composed with the purpose of clarifying certain points to remove obstacles to the proposed conference. It expressed the attitude of the Japanese government toward President Roosevelt's personal message and his oral statement.[224]

Moreover, the opinions which the Japanese government had set forth in its August 6, 1941 communication, as well as other messages and papers from Prime Minister Konoye, and the latest Japanese concessions were thought by Japan to meet the desires of the United States. By going to the maximum limits in its concessions to the United States, Japan hoped that it would influence the United States to display a high degree of statesmanship by agreeing without further delay to a conference between the leaders of both governments.[225]

Secretary Hull replied that his hasty perusal of Ambassador Grew's report would prevent him from discussing its contents at this time, but he promised to study it carefully during the coming weekend.[226] It was apparent from Secretary Hull's remarks that he doubted the stability of the Japanese Cabinet.[227] Moreover, since an increasing number of people in the United States were favoring the adjustment of Japanese-American relations, Mr. Hull believed that the Japanese government could influence Japanese public opinion in this same direction.

Ambassador Nomura emphasized the necessity of maintaining peace in the Pacific, but though Secretary Hull agreed, he maintained a very cautious attitude.[228] In order not to give a mistaken impression to other countries, Secretary Hull desired that information released on the negotiations should reveal merely that both Japan and the United States were studying the basis upon which the Pacific question could be solved.[229]

In view of this, Ambassador Nomura believed that there was no reason to rescind the Japanese statement in regard to the necessity of explaining Tokyo's position to the Japanese people.[230]

54. Japanese Embassy Is Warned Concerning Newspaper Leaks (September 6, 1941)

Newspaper leaks continued to be a main source of concern to the Japanese authorities. Mr. Morishima was particularly disturbed over a recent interview with Mr. Kasai which had appeared in the New York Daily News. Although Mr. Kasai apparently had given the interview in accordance with a directive from Japan, Mr. Morishima believed that his reference to the

[223] III, 131-134.
[224] III, 131. [225] III, 132. [226] III, 133.
[227] Rumors of a Cabinet crisis in Japan had already appeared in The New York Times, August 28, 1941, 3:1 and August 29, 1941, 1:8. Finally an emergency session of the Cabinet was called to hear Prince Konoye explain the developments of the talks and his message to President Roosevelt.
[228] III, 133.
[229] III, 134.
[230] III, 120, 134.

[49]

current Japanese-American negotiations not only served to aggravate the existing situation and raise another obstacle to the achievement of amicable diplomatic relations, but was particularly inappropriate because of the existence of the Tripartite Pact.[231]

Mr. Morishima reminded the Japanese Ambassador of a previous article by Mr. Kasai which had appeared in the New York Herald Tribune,[232] and requested him to caution Mr. Kasai against further statements.[233]

55. Japanese Intelligence Discloses America's Desire for Peace in the Pacific

On September 6, 1941 a report from Mr. Morishima of the Japanese office in New York revealed information obtained by a private Japanese spy to the effect that both President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill had agreed that it would be necessary to settle the Japanese question harmoniously, for if an advantageous understanding were reached, the American Pacific Fleet could then be transferred to Atlantic waters.[234] In keeping with this idea, according to the source, the United States had instructed Ambassador Grew in Tokyo to rally the pro-Allied elements in Japan and to foster a tendency toward compromise with the United States among the anti-Axis groups.

On the other hand, Great Britain and the United States had been instructing their officials to strengthen their attitude toward Japan in an endeavor to force Japan to its knees. Washington believed that if it became more demanding as Japan became more conciliatory, an understanding could be reached even on the Siberian question. Apparently American authorities accepted the attitude of Prince Konoye and the recently mollified attitude of the Japanese government toward the sailing of American tankers to Russia as an indication of the success of this policy.[235]

Nevertheless, American officials continued to fear that Japan's internal situation might ultimately prevent the United States from arriving at a peace with Japan. In order not to jeopardize the political prestige of Prince Konoye's Cabinet, President Roosevelt was guarding against taking too stringent steps or making immodest demands.

In regard to the sailing of American tankers to Russia, the United States was even considering its guaranteeing that the materials sent there would not be left in Siberia or that in the future they would be shipped via the southern tip of Kamchatka or the detour around Persia.[236]

56. Minister Wakasugi Prepares Return Trip to United States

Since August 31, 1941 when Minister Wakasugi had arrived in Tokyo for the Cabinet change,[237] the Japanese government had been receiving firsthand information on the Japanese-American informal conversations in Washington. However, on September 6, 1941 Tokyo informed Washington that Minister Wakasugi was returning to the United States[238] and, therefore, the Japanese Embassy was asked to contact American authorities in order to obtain reservations aboard the next China Clipper.

[231] III, 135.
[232] III, 101.
[233] III, 135.
[234] III, 136.
[235] III, 137.
[236] III, 138.
[237] New York Times, August 31, 1941, 1:4, 8.
[238] According to the translation of these dispatches Minister Wakasugi was apparently returning to Japan. However, collateral information obtained from later decoded Japanese messages proved that Minister Wakasugi, in Tokyo since August 31, 1941, was now returning to Washington.

[50]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

If it were impossible to secure this reservation, Minister Wakasugi would sail aboard the Terukawa Maru of the Kawasaki line on September 12, 1941. If a last minute reservation were obtained on the plane the Japanese government still intended to use the stateroom aboard the Terukawa Maru.[239] On the same day Tokyo asked Canton for any information on ships leaving for Hongkong on or about September 15, 1941.[240]

Since the Terukawa Maru would be one or two days late in leaving, Tokyo asked Washington to reply about the request for Clipper reservations before noon of September 12, 1941, Japanese time.[241] But in spite of the fact that Ambassador Nomura himself had promptly requested the State Department's assistance in making reservations, there were no vacant seats aboard the Clipper for several weeks to come.[242]

Although these preparations were unavoidably delayed, the return of Minister Wakasugi to the United States was considered to be a sign of Japanese hope for Pacific peace.[243]

57. Grew-Terasaki Conversation (September 8, 1941)

(a) Ambassador Grew's Report[244]

Because the recent incident involving the American destroyer Greer and a German submarine had become of major concern to the Japanese government, Mr. Terasaki called upon Ambassador Grew to deliver a message from Foreign Minister Toyoda who feared that this incident might involve Japan in an interpretation of the Tripartite Pact, since Germany was asserting that the American ship had committed an unprovoked act of aggression. The Japanese Foreign Minister indicated that this was a further proof of the necessity of expediting the suggested meeting between the leaders of the two nations.

Ambassador Grew declared that he had already sent the Foreign Minister the official statements made by President Roosevelt and the Navy Department regarding the Greer incident. Mr. Terasaki then submitted Foreign Minister Toyoda's request that officials of the United States government guard the secrecy of their conversations with the Japanese, since unwarranted publicity at this critical moment would make it difficult to control the dissident groups in Japan.[245]

(b) Japanese Foreign Office Report[246]

Although the incident under discussion concerned an attack by a German submarine upon the destroyer, the U.S.S. Greer, en route to Iceland with mail, Japanese diplomats recognized that their alliance with Germany might jeopardize Japanese-American negotiations. When President Roosevelt announced his intention to broadcast America's official attitude toward the Greer incident on September 11, 1941, Japanese officials feared that his speech might connect the Japanese government with the incident. In order to guard against the extremely undesirable results which would ensue, Mr. Terasaki, in charge of American affairs in the Foreign Office at Japan, discussed the problem with Ambassador Grew.

To re-emphasize the importance of the situation, Tokyo requested on September 8, 1941 that Ambassador Nomura have an informal conversation along the same lines with Secretary

[239] III, 139.
[240] III, 140.
[241] III, 141.
[242] III, 142.
[243] New York Times, September 15, 1941, 7:2, 4.
[244] "Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)", September 8, 1941, S.D., II, 609.
[245] Ibid.
[246] III, 143.

[51]

Hull. Expressing its gratitude to Ambassador Nomura for his conscientious endeavors to adjust the problems of the Japanese-American situation, Tokyo hoped, since his efforts were nearing realization, that he would continue to employ the full extent of his capabilities in this matter.[247]

58. American Public Opinion Is Hostile to Japan

Although Ambassador Nomura did not discuss the Greer incident with Secretary Hull until September 10, 1941, on September 8, 1941 he sent Tokyo a report on the attitude of the American public toward Japan and the possible effects which the incident in the Atlantic might have upon it. For more detailed information, the Japanese Ambassador asked that Tokyo question Mr. Iwakuro Wakasugi, recently returned to Tokyo from Washington.

From a recent study of the Gallup Poll, Ambassador Nomura observed that American public opinion was much more hostile to Japan than Germany; in fact, since July there had been an increase in the number of people who favored preventing Japan's further advance in the Pacific, even at the risk of war. At present the percentage was approximately 70 % in favor of stopping Japanese aggression.

The attack on the Greer had served not only to increase the concern of the United States over the safety of travel on the Atlantic, but had also raised apprehension regarding shipping in the Pacific. If a similar accident ever occurred in the Pacific, the situation would then become irreparable.

Ambassador Nomura attributed the greater indignation of the American people over Japanese actions as compared with German to the fact that, in case of a war with Germany, it would be necessary to send an expeditionary army, whereas, in the case of a Japanese-American war, an army would not be necessary.[248]

A few days later, on September 10, 1941, Ambassador Nomura reported that there were rumors abroad regarding the speech to be made by President Roosevelt on September 11, 1941. Some declared that a shooting patrol would be established between the United States and Ireland for the defense of those waters, and others insinuated that the German submarine had deliberately attacked the Greer with the intention of forcing Japan to conclude the Japanese-American negotiations.[249]

In a message sent to Berlin reporting the increase in American military preparations, the Japanese government mentioned the stiffening of American public opinion against Japan. Since Germany appeared able to maintain a calm attitude toward the United States in spite of the pressure applied by the American government, Japan felt that its aim should be to keep America out of the European war. Rather than provoking the American people into uniting at this time, Japan recognized the advantages of appeasing the United States and, in the meantime, of working toward its internal disintegration.[250]

59. Ambassador Grew Delivers American Statement to Foreign Minister Toyoda (September 10, 1941)

In compliance with his instructions, Ambassador Grew called upon Foreign Minister Toyoda on the evening of September 10, 1941 to deliver a statement from the State Department. Be-

[247] Ibid.
[248] III, 144. In reporting on American production, Ambassador Nomura pointed out that during 1941 the payment for war materials exceeded an average of $1,000,000 monthly and the production output was four or five times more than that of the preceding year.
[249] III, 145.
[250] III, 146.

[52]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

fore beginning his remarks, Ambassador Grew made it clear to the Japanese Foreign Minister that the inquiries of the United States government in the statement he had presented were merely exploratory and preliminary, and further questions might emerge from an additional study of the Japanese proposals.[251]

The statement declared that although the United States was still examining the Japanese commitments which had been delivered by Foreign Minister Toyoda to Ambassador Grew on September 4, 1941 and by Ambassador Nomura to Secretary Hull on September 6, 1941, the United States had in view an agreement which would provide the basis for an understanding between the two countries by which China would receive just and equitable treatment and the rights of all Pacific powers would be observed.[252]

To ensure future peace and stability throughout the Far East, it was recognized that a fair settlement of the controversies between China and Japan must first be effected. In replying to previous Japanese proposals, the United States had made it clear that it was in no position to assist in the settlement of the China Incident without first receiving definite assurance that Japan's terms were consistent with the principles of the United States. As a result of Tokyo's insistence that Japanese troops should remain in Inner Mongolia and North China for an unspecified period, and because the Japanese government refused to act without discrimination in its commercial relations with China, collaboration between those two countries had not been achieved.

In its latest proposals it appeared that Japan intended to negotiate with China directly, relieving the United States of any responsibility in the matter; and ignoring America's intention, before negotiating with Japan, to confer with the governments of China, Great Britain and the Netherlands in order to evolve a peace beneficial to the legitimate concerns of all powers interested in that area. Since America believed that if the Japanese government were willing to propose equitable and just terms to Chungking, no difficulties would be incurred, the United States intended to continue to render assistance to China in its resistance to aggression.

From the study of these recent Japanese proposals, certain questions had arisen which Japan was requested to answer. Referring to Japan's assertion that it was prepared to subscribe to the points upon which tentative agreement had been reached in Washington, the United States asked whether Japan referred to the points in the American draft of June 21, 1941 which were identical to those in the draft submitted by Ambassador Nomura on September 4, 1941 or some other points. Since certain stipulations in the September 4, 1941 proposals appeared to limit the principles set forth during the informal conversations, the United States requested clarification of certain points.

In regard to the principle of non-discrimination in international commerce, America questioned the extent to which Japan would carry out these liberal economic activities in the Far East. Pointing out that Japan had stated that the economic rights of the United States in China would not be restricted as long as they were pursued on an "equitable basis," the American government asked for the precise meaning of this term and whether Japan would be the sole judge in interpreting it. Although the United States was still carefully examining the Japanese statement of its attitude regarding the European war, it felt that the formula was inadequate in that it permitted Japan to interpret independently any commitment on this score. However, the question would be studied further.[253]

[251] "Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)", September 10, 1941, S.D., II, 610.
[252] "Statement handed by the American Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs (Toyoda)", September 10, 1941, S.D., II, 610-613. Foreign Minister Toyoda sent Ambassador Nomura a copy of this message on September 12, 1941. See III, 147-153.
[253] Ibid.

[53]

After glancing through the American statement both Foreign Minister Toyoda and Mr. Terasaki questioned the American reference to the Japanese proposals delivered to Secretary Hull on September 4, 1941. Foreign Minister Toyoda explained that he did not have in his possession the text of the draft proposal delivered on September 4, 1941 by Ambassador Nomura to Secretary Hull. Nevertheless, the Tokyo officials insisted that the Japanese draft of September 4, 1941 did not cancel any of the terms upon which previous agreements had been reached with the United States during the conversations in Washington. However, Foreign Minister Toyoda and Mr. Terasaki emphasized the fact that their remarks in this connection were unofficial.[254]

60. Foreign Minister Toyoda Inquires Concerning Ambassador Nomura's Proposal of September 4, 1941

Since Foreign Minister Toyoda had not been informed of the contents of the proposal submitted to the United States by Ambassador Nomura on September 4, 1941 and mentioned by Ambassador Grew during the conversation held on September 10, 1941, he asked that information concerning it be sent to him by the Japanese Ambassador in Washington.[255]

61. Ambassador Nomura Explains Purpose of Proposals of September 4, 1941

In his reply Ambassador Nomura stated that, acting upon his own initiative to sound out American opinion, he had submitted a number of additional revisions to the original American proposal, and had presented them to Secretary Hull on September 4, 1941 as his own suggestions. At that time Ambassador Nomura had not received his government's reply to the American proposals, but having since received it, he had withdrawn his own suggestions.[256]

62. Hull-Nomura Conversation (September 10, 1941)

(a) State Department's Report[257]

Complying with the instructions of the Japanese government, Ambassador Nomura and Mr. Obata called at Secretary Hull's apartment on September 10, 1941 to discuss President Roosevelt's forthcoming speech. Since any indiscriminate reference to Japanese-American relations could stimulate pro-Axis activity in Japan, the Japanese Ambassador expressed the wish that discretion be employed in mentioning such incidents as the Greer incident because of its possible effect on the extremist elements in his country. Although refusing to give any indication of the contents of President Roosevelt's speech, which he stated had already been prepared, Secretary Hull assured Ambassador Nomura that he thoroughly understood the desirability for avoiding anything which would be detrimental to Japanese-American relations.

Ambassador Nomura requested Secretary Hull's reaction to the Japanese proposals of September 6, 1941. Commenting that these proposals narrowed the spirit and scope of previous understandings which had related to a broad and liberal agreement covering the entire Pacific area, and that in view of Germany's attempted world conquest, the Tripartite Pact could only be interpreted as a military alliance, Secretary Hull said the new proposals did not meet these difficulties.

Mr. Obata remarked that the recent Japanese proposals did not limit in any way the spirit of previous tentative agreements or the original proposal. In order, therefore, to eliminate any misunderstanding, Secretary Hull suggested that Mr. Hamilton and Mr. Ballantine discuss any disputable points in the proposals with Ambassador Nomura and Mr. Obata.

[254] "Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)", September 10, 1941, S.D., II, 610.
[255] III, 154.
[256] III, 155.
[257] "Memorandum of a conversation", September 10, 1941, S.D., II, 613-614.

[54]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

Agreeing with the Japanese Ambassador who stressed the necessity of proceeding immediately with definite negotiations for peace, Secretary Hull declared nevertheless that conversations for discovering any divergent policies must be conducted in Washington, and not in Tokyo as suggested to Ambassador Grew by Foreign Minister Toyoda. However, Ambassador Grew had been instructed to explain any points which were not clear to the Japanese government and to obtain clarification of the Japanese point of view, if necessary.[258]

(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report[259]

Acting upon the instructions received from Tokyo, Ambassador Nomura called on Secretary Hull on the morning of September 10, 1941 in order to request that President Roosevelt make no reference to the Japanese-American situation in his broadcast regarding the Greer incident. Although Secretary Hull refused to commit himself in any way he agreed to the necessity of maintaining strict secrecy in all Japanese-American negotiations. Secretary Hull remarked that although there was a discrepancy between the American and German accounts of the Greer incident, the consistency of past American reports, and the constantly contradictory statements of Chancellor Hitler made it apparent that the United States' announcement was the more reliable.

To Ambassador Nomura's inquiry concerning the time when an answer to the Japanese government's proposals of September 6, 1941 might be expected, Secretary Hull replied that he had not found the opportunity to discuss the Japanese proposals personally with President Roosevelt since the last Cabinet meeting had been held on the previous Friday. However, he promised to confer with President Roosevelt following the broadcast on September 11, 1941. Secretary Hull indicated his dissatisfaction because the Japanese government had narrowed the scope of the proposed agreement by its latest document.[260]

Ambassador Nomura pointed out that concessions already agreed upon in previous discussions had been omitted from these latest Japanese proposals, and he had discussed only those points upon which no agreement had yet been reached. According to Ambassador Nomura, the United States was attempting to find the stand which Great Britain, China and the Netherlands intended to take on the question.[261]

63. Japanese-American Conversation (September 10, 1941)

(a) State Department's Report[262]

Pursuant to the arrangements made by Secretary Hull and Ambassador Nomura earlier in the day, Mr. Hamilton, Mr. Ballantine, and Mr. Schmidt conferred at the Japanese Embassy about various points contained in the Japanese proposals of September 6, 1941. According to Mr. Obata, both he and Ambassador Nomura had been surprised at the United States' "misapprehension" that the proposals impeded the progress made in the informal conversations. According to both Japanese representatives the Japanese government intended that its latest proposals should supplement the points previously agreed upon during the informal conversations in Washington, and should confirm the commitments made by Prince Konoye through Ambassador Nomura to President Roosevelt.

When asked by Mr. Ballantine if Japan believed that the American statement of June 21, 1941 still represented a basis for a proposed agreement between the two governments, Mr.

[258] Ibid.
[259] III, 156-157.
[260] III, 156.
[261] III, 157.
[262] "Memorandum of a conversation", September 10, 1941, initialed by Max W. Schmidt, S.D., II, 614-619.

[55]

Obata replied in the affirmative. At the same time he added that the document given to Secretary Hull by Ambassador Nomura on September 4, 1941 had not been referred to Tokyo, and, thus, merely represented Ambassador Nomura's personal opinion and not the official views of the Japanese government.

Mr. Ballantine then observed that there still appeared to be certain inconsistencies between the proposals made by the Japanese government on September 6, 1941, and earlier Japanese statements. Referring to portions of the Japanese proposals which were believed to modify previous commitments, Mr. Ballantine discussed Japan's attitude toward aggression in French Indo-China. In conveying broad assurances of the peaceful intentions of the Japanese government, Prince Konoye had previously guaranteed the withdrawal of troops from this territory, but in the document received by Secretary Hull on September 6, 1941 Japan agreed only to refrain from advancing into areas adjoining French Indo-China.

Mr. Obata replied that Prince Konoye's proposals had not in any way been modified, and when Mr. Ballantine commented on the difference in the two Japanese proposals in one of which Japan promised not to attack to the north, and in the other it undertook not to attack to the south of the Empire, Mr. Obata insisted that Japan did not plan to use military force against any nation without any justifiable reasons. However, he agreed to inquire whether "north" or "south" were meant in the proposal, and whether "without any justifiable reason" applied to areas adjoining Indo-China as well as north or south of Japan.

Since the question of Japanese-Chinese cooperation had remained an issue throughout the negotiations, Mr. Ballantine turned to the problems opposing a satisfactory settlement. Although Mr. Obata and Ambassador Nomura were somewhat vague regarding their government's position, both expressed belief that Tokyo still desired the assistance of President Roosevelt in effecting a reconciliation. As had been pointed out in previous conversations, however, the American officials declared that before the United States government could approach Chungking with a Japanese peace proposal, the policies of Japan would have to conform with the fundamental principles to which the governments of both the United States and Japan be committed. Reiterating that peace would be accomplished only by the adoption of a broad, progressive policy in all international relations as well as by avoiding any bitterness on the part of China, Mr. Hamilton insisted that the best interests of Japan lay in this direction.

In the past, the Japanese government had not honored its commitments, Mr. Hamilton stated, and therefore, Japan must now prove the sincerity of its intentions by some definite action such as the withdrawal of troops from occupied territories. Mr. Obata concurred with these statements. Nevertheless, he pointed out that the withdrawal of armed forces from China presented a difficult problem. Therefore, he suggested that the United States make a draft of the commitments which they desired Japan to make relating to the China Incident. But Mr. Ballantine observed that the Japanese government was in a better position to draw up a document embodying its plans.

From the phraseology of clause (e) of the Japanese proposals, which Mr. Obata conceded was bad, it had appeared to the American government that Japan felt that it was entitled to special rights in China. In view of this, Mr. Ballantine questioned the Japanese representatives concerning the future application of nondiscriminatory commercial practices by Japan in China and throughout the entire Pacific area.

At this time Mr. Ballantine handed to Mr. Obata, for the consideration of the Japanese government, a tentative redraft of Section V of the Japanese proposals of September 6, 1941, which American economic experts had prepared to clarify the commercial activities of both nations in the Pacific.[263] It stated that by pledging themselves to conform to the principles of

[263] Ibid.

[56]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

nondiscrimination in international commercial relations, both Japan and the United States agreed to create an international trade and investment situation conducive to the mutual acquisition of essential commodities. Both governments were to co-operate with each other in obtaining such basic supplies, on a nondiscriminatory basis, as oil, rubber, tin, and nickel, as well as other products essential to maintain their economic life.[264]

After completing the discussion of Japan's tentative commitments, the American representatives turned to the reciprocal measures which the Japanese proposals called upon the American government to make. If the Japanese government were to offer China a just and equitable settlement, Mr. Ballantine believed that there would be no difficulties in achieving an acceptable agreement. Therefore, America did not share the Japanese belief that the continuation of United States' aid to China would be detrimental to Japan's conclusion of the China Incident.

As Secretary Hull had previously informed Ambassador Nomura, the United States, before concluding any agreement with Japan regarding the Pacific area, intended to confer with the Chinese government and other nations sharing responsibilities in the Pacific, since the problems involved could not be solved by the United States and Japan alone. Mr. Ballantine said that Ambassador Grew had been fully informed of the attitude of the American government.

As the conference drew to a close, Mr. Obata suggested that the United States prepare a complete statement embodying all the earlier proposals made by both America and Japan. Mr. Hamilton replied that it would be more desirable to have changed the questions which the United States had raised in this meeting before drafting a new agreement. Mr. Obata concurred and promised to have a reply from Tokyo by the next afternoon.

In the opinion of the American representatives, neither Ambassador Nomura nor Mr. Obata knew definitely the intentions of their government. The Japanese representatives were certain only that Tokyo desired that the meeting of the two government heads take place in the immediate future.[265]

(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report

At the request of Secretary Hull the American officials, Mr. Hamilton, Mr. Ballantine and Mr. Schmidt, had called at the Japanese Embassy to raise certain questions regarding the Japanese proposal submitted to the American government on September 6, 1941.[266]

Referring to the "undertakings" of Japan the American representatives had asked for a specific explanation of "matters upon which the two countries have agreed during the preliminary informal conversations". They also questioned whether the draft of the Japanese-American understandings formulated during the past negotiations could now provide the basis for a future agreement. Further inquiries were made concerning the words "without any justifiable reason" which Japan had included in clause (b) of its statement regarding its further expansion in the Far East.

Although Messrs. Hamilton, Ballantine and Schmidt had requested an explanation of the entire clause (d) in relation to the withdrawing of troops from China, Ambassador Nomura avoided making a definite statement, since it would involve a discussion of the stationing of these troops for anti-Communistic purposes.[267]

[264] "Draft statement given to the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura)", September 10, 1941, S.D., II, 619. For the Japanese version of this message, wired to Tokyo on September 10, 1941, see III, 158.
[265] "Memorandum of a conversation", September 10, 1941, initialed by Max W. Schmidt, S.D., II, 614-619.
[266] III, 159.
[267] III, 160.

[57]

Ambassador Nomura stated that the American officials had been given the impression by the latest Japanese proposals that in spite of its guarantee to preserve the principle of equal treatment throughout the entire Pacific area, Japan desired to hold a special position in China.[268]

In view of this and other considerations Mr. Hamilton in his conversation with Ambassador Nomura on September 10, 1941 requested a redraft of the proposals relating to economic activities.[269]

64. Publicity Concerning Mr. Kasai Arouses Japanese Concern

To effect control over information released to newspapers, Tokyo directed Ambassador Nomura to warn Mr. Kasai, a member of the Japanese Diet who had recently arrived in the United States, to refrain from making further comments on Japanese-American negotiations.[270] Through newspaper articles in which he had expressed opinions on the present political situation and, in particular, his views in regard to the Tripartite Pact, Mr. Kasai had already added greatly to the tension existing between the two countries.

Consequently, Mr. Yiguti asked that Mr. Kasai curtail his activities. In defense of his actions, Mr. Kasai explained that he had tried sincerely to better the situation. He regretted, therefore, that his opinions, which had been constantly exaggerated by newspapermen, had jeopardized current Japanese-American relations.[271]

65. Ambassador Nomura Appraises American Attitude Toward New Japanese Proposals

From Ambassador Nomura's report of September 11, 1941, based on preliminary Japanese-American negotiations, it was evident that the major difficulty encountered stemmed from the stationing of Japanese troops in China for allegedly anti-Communistic purposes. Because of its obligations to China and the opposition of domestic public opinion, the United States found it impossible to recognize the terms of the Tokyo-Nanking Agreement.

In the message of June 21, 1941 the American government had expressed its desire that a new agreement be drawn up between China and Japan whereby Japanese troops would be removed from China at the earliest possible moment. Recently, the American attitude had become more forceful, and it now demanded that Japan complete the evacuation of troops from China within a two year period after the resumption of peaceful relations. According to Ambassador Nomura, the strengthened attitude of the United States had resulted from its talks with China.[272]

In regard to various other points included in the Japanese proposals, Ambassador Nomura entertained little doubt that a successful agreement could be reached concerning them. Nevertheless, there was an actual danger that Japanese-American negotiations would fail as a result of the disagreement on troop evacuations. In order to overcome this obstacle, Ambassador Nomura, suggesting that the Japanese government agree to remove its troops within two years after the restoration of peace, declared that an immediate and definite decision on this point would increase the probable success of future negotiations. The State Department had already inquired about Japan's position regarding its troops in China,[273] and in spite of four notes presented by representatives of the Japanese government, Japan's interpretation of several phrases still caused certain doubts about the proposed agreements.[274]

[268] III, 161.
[269] III, 162.
[270] III, 163.
[271] III, 164.
[272] III, 165.
[273] III, 166.
[274] III, 159.

[58]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

Though the matter of evacuating troops from occupied China was actually a problem to be settled only between Japan and China, the question had been introduced into the negotiations with America in view of a possible agreement with the United States to have it use its good offices in ending the China Incident. Therefore, Ambassador Nomura suggested that the Japanese government agree to accept the terms of the United States in order to bring about the desired understanding.

Considerable time would elapse after the leaders' conference and the resulting peace conference, and although Japan would agree to evacuate its troops within two years after the resumption of peaceful relations, world affairs might make it essential that Japan enter into a new agreement which would extend the period of garrisoning Japanese troops in China. Because of circumstances existing in the future, Japan might even prolong the time limit in the name of protecting its nationals' lives and property. Through this method, no conflict would arise with Japan's established national policy.[275]

Because of various domestic problems in Japan, Ambassador Nomura recognized the difficulty in making this concession. The phrase "stationing of troops to counter Communism" would be deleted from the proposals, but, instead a clause would be inserted to permit a certain number of troops to "act in cooperation with the Chinese to counter acts which imperil the tranquillity of the nation (non-militaristic in nature)".

Taking this opportunity to discuss the attitude of the Japanese press regarding the possibility of an understanding between the United States and Japan, Ambassador Nomura assured his Foreign Office that optimistic views were neither warranted nor to the interest of Japan. At press conferences in Washington, Secretary Hull had stated that there were still serious and delicate problems to be settled, and in view of this attitude, Ambassador Nomura asked that Tokyo guide accordingly the editorial policies of Japanese papers.[276]

66. Japan Instructs Ambassador Nomura Not To Change Diplomatic Documents

On September 11, 1941 in answer to Ambassador Nomura's request for approval of certain changes he had made in Prime Minister Konoye's message to President Roosevelt and in the Japanese government's reply,[277] Tokyo informed him that all important documents were submitted to both the government and the controlling factions of the political parties for approval before being transmitted abroad. If Ambassador Nomura had any doubts regarding points in one of these messages, Tokyo requested that he cable all inquiries and suggestions to the Foreign Office before delivering the texts to the American government, since extreme caution had to be exercised in maintaining liaison with the various departments concerned.[278]

Ambassador Nomura replied on September 17, 1941 that such a procedure was very logical. In view of the strict precautions taken by the Tokyo Foreign Office in sending these dispatches Ambassador Nomura felt deeply responsible for the inadvertent omissions made in certain transmissions.[279]

67. Ambassador Nomura Appraises President Roosevelt's Speech

As had been previously announced, on September 11, 1941 President Roosevelt spoke over the radio concerning the official attitude of the United States toward the Greer incident. Be-

[275] III, 167.
[276] III, 168.
[277] III, 81.
[278] III, 169.
[279] III, 170.

[59]

cause Tokyo had believed that the speech might have a significant effect on current Japanese-American relations, Ambassador Nomura submitted his impression of it on the following day.[280]

Ambassador Nomura believed it to be a strong speech actually amounting to a challenge of war, and though delivered in a grave tone of voice, without resorting to strong expressions, it was "comparable to a clenched fist clothed in a silk glove". From various newspaper reports, which appeared to be in favor of President Roosevelt, it was assumed that he had succeeded in accomplishing his purpose.[281]

Nevertheless, a portion of the American people was opposed to President Roosevelt's policies. Expressing the opinion of this minority group at a meeting of the America First Committee at Des Moines, Iowa, Colonel Lindbergh stated that a three-party alliance composed of England, Jewry and the Roosevelt Administration were leading the United States into war.[282]

In Ambassador Nomura's own opinion there were many other factors driving the United States into the war. Because of the great expansion of productive and economic organizations undertaken under the pretext of national defense, the United States was obliged to join the war in order to prevent their disintegration. According to the Japanese Ambassador, the Greer incident had been welcomed by President Roosevelt as a means of turning public opinion in his favor.[283]

68. Chungking and Nanking Governments Opposed to Japanese-American War

By correlating information collected from various Chinese sources, Tokyo was able to notify its Embassy in Washington on September 12, 1941 of Chungking's attitude toward Japanese-American negotiations.[284] Allegedly suffering because of selfish American interests and receiving little support for a counter-offensive against Japan, Chungking was reported as being in constant anxiety over the American policies in the Far East. It was the general belief in Chungking that the outcome of the Japanese-American conversations depended largely upon the Russo-German war. On the other hand, even in the event that a compromise was effected between the United States and Japan, Chungking felt that it would not effect the United States' attitude toward China.

Through the American Ambassador to China, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek had proposed that the settlement of a Japanese-Chinese peace be based on President Roosevelt's eight point principles (Atlantic Charter?). To this suggestion Secretary Hull had answered that China would not be sacrificed by the United States. While there were a few in the Chungking government who believed that war between Japan and the United States would be advantageous to China, the general opinion was that such a war would reduce the material aid from the United States and, therefore, it would prove unprofitable to Chungking. A recent conference held by Chungking leaders had not been able to reconcile these divergent views.[285]

Influential officials of the Chungking government had stated that if the United States sought temporary stability at the cost of Chungking, instead of forcing Japan into submission, the Chinese government would continue to resist Japanese aggression unaided. Mr. Sun Fo, a member of the Central Executive Yuan, desired even stronger action. However, since these views were expressed in accordance with a propaganda order of the Chungking government, Japan did not regard them as representative of the true psychology of the government.

[280] III, 171.
[281] Ibid.
[282] III, 172.
[283] III, 171.
[284] III, 173.
[285] Ibid.

[60]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

Although no serious consideration had as yet been given to the Nanking government's relation to a Japanese-American war, a report made by Ambassador Kumataro Honda indicated that Nanking believed the United States had no intention of fighting against Japan. If war did break out, however, these Nanking officials, impressed with the power of the United States, appeared certain of the inevitability of Japan's defeat. Since the foundation upon which the People's government was built would be gravely imperiled by such a war, Nanking was anxious to have war in the Far East averted.[286]

69. Foreign Minister Toyoda Clarifies Points in Japanese Proposals (September 13, 1941)

(a) Ambassador Grew's Report[287]

To discuss divergencies in view arising from the Japanese proposals, Ambassador Grew attended a meeting, at which Foreign Minister Toyoda, Mr. Terasaki and Mr. Inagaki, of the American Bureau of the Japanese Foreign Office, and Counselor Dooman, of the American Embassy, were present. The Foreign Minister opened the conference by reading instructions which were being telegraphed to Ambassador Nomura as the official Japanese reply to queries made by the United States government on September 10, 1941.[288]

These instructions stipulated that the tentative commitments formulated by the Japanese government on September 6, 1941, together with the points agreed upon during the informal conversations at Washington, were to constitute the basis for an understanding between the United States and Japan. Apparently, the United States had misunderstood Japan's attitude towards American arbitration of the China affair, for Japan still desired the assistance of President Roosevelt in settling this matter.

Referring to the term "without any justifiable reason", the Tokyo government explained that this point related to Japan's promise to refrain from any military advance into regions lying south of Japan. However, in order to prevent Communistic and other subversive activities from threatening the security of both Japan and China, Tokyo proposed that Japanese troops be stationed in China for the execution of common defense, in accordance with an agreement between both countries. Since the United States had exhibited considerable apprehension regarding Japan's violation of American rights and interests in China, the Japanese government had stated in its proposals that American economic activities would not be restricted so long as they were pursued on an equitable basis. Moreover, in spite of the close economic relations that would exist between Japan and China as a result of their geographical positions, the Japanese government had no desire to establish monopolistic or preferential rights for itself in China. Not only in the Southwest Pacific, but throughout the Far East, Japan promised adherence to the principle of commercial nondiscrimination.

After clarifying the terms of its tentative commitments, the Japanese government then proceeded to explain further the reciprocal measures expected of the United States. In asking the United States to refrain from any actions prejudicial to Japanese endeavors toward settling the China Incident, Tokyo requested that aid to the Chiang Kai-shek regime be discontinued.[289]

[286] III, 174.
[287] "Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)", September 13, 1941, S.D., II, 620-622.
[288] "Proposed instructions to the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) handed by the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs (Toyoda) to the American Ambassador in Japan (Grew)", September 13, 1941, S.D., II, 623-624. These instructions were sent to Ambassador Nomura by Foreign Minister Toyoda on September 13, 1941. See III, 175-176.
[289] Ibid.

[61]

At the request of the Japanese Foreign Minister, Mr. Terasaki then read another statement expounding Japan's motives in extending the proposals of September 6, 1941. In order to obviate detailed discussions which would delay the proposed meeting between President Roosevelt and Prince Konoye, the Japanese government had drawn up these latest commitments with the intention of embodying therein all points upon which previous agreement had been made. Rather than curtail former commitments in any way, the Japanese government would even prefer to transcend the scope of the understandings formulated during the informal conferences. Japan would be willing to discuss the details once it had been agreed that a meeting of the heads of the two governments would be held.

In spite of the Japanese desire that the agreements between the United States and Japan be bilateral in nature, Tokyo entertained no objection to the United States' consulting with Holland, Great Britain or other countries which might be affected by the negotiations.

In conclusion Foreign Minister Toyoda expressed the desire that President Roosevelt be informed in detail of these discussions since he understood that his proposals of September 4, 1941 had not yet been seen by the President. To this last remark Ambassador Grew stated that Secretary Hull was constantly in communication with President Roosevelt and was responsible for deciding what data should be brought to President Roosevelt's attention.

After listening to the statement read by Mr. Terasaki, Ambassador Grew replied that the proposals delivered to him by the Foreign Minister on September 4, 1941 and to Secretary Hull by Ambassador Nomura on September 6, 1941 were still being reviewed by the United States' government. However, with the success of the proposed meeting in view, and mindful of the disastrous effects of a failure, America wished to clarify, in preliminary conversations, any divergent points in the proposals.

Foreign Minister Toyoda then delivered oral answers to the questions brought up by Ambassador Grew during a previous meeting. Referring to Ambassador Nomura's statement of September 4, 1941, Foreign Minister Toyoda again pointed out that it had contained only the personal views of the Japanese Ambassador and, consequently, could not be treated officially, especially since it had been withdrawn by Ambassador Nomura.

Insofar as the question on discrimination in commercial matters was concerned, the Japanese Foreign Minister assured Ambassador Grew that his government intended to observe equality in China and throughout the Pacific. The problems pertaining to China were to be discussed more fully in a reply to Mr. Hamilton's remarks made at a Washington conference.[290] Since the significance of the words "equitable basis" had been questioned, Foreign Minister Toyoda asserted that this referred to activities which were non-monopolistic and non-exploitive in nature.

The Japanese explanation of "equitable basis" stated that although qualified somewhat by certain inevitable natural limitations, resulting largely from Japan's geographical situation, this term guaranteed the application of the principle of nondiscrimination in all economic dealings. Japan was not to be the sole judge in interpreting what constituted an "equitable basis".[291]

With reference to the formula relating to the attitudes of Japan and the United States toward the European war, Admiral Toyoda stated that he would refrain from making comment

[290] "Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)", September 13, 1941, S.D., 620-622.
[291] Foreign Minister Toyoda wired the interpretation of "equitable basis" to Ambassador Nomura on September 13, 1941. See III, 177-178.

[62]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

until such time as the United States brought up the question. However, he deemed it advisable that the matter be discussed by President Roosevelt and Prince Konoye at the proposed meeting.

Because of the dangerous internal situation existing in Japan, and because of the efforts of third powers to forestall a Japanese-American alliance, Foreign Minister Toyoda emphasized the urgency of an immediate meeting between President Roosevelt and Prince Konoye. The Japanese Foreign Minister reminded Ambassador Grew again that the anniversary of the Tripartite Pact would be celebrated on September 27, 1941. In view of Foreign Minister Toyoda's great desire for speedy action, Ambassador Grew promised to transmit his views to Secretary Hull again. He also stated that the State Department desired to continue the discussions in Washington rather than in Tokyo.[292]

(b) Foreign Minister Toyoda's Report[293]

Foreign Minister Toyoda informed Ambassador Nomura on September 13, 1941 that he had explained Japan's position to Ambassador Grew in accordance with the instructions he was sending in a separate dispatch.[294] He had also elucidated the meaning of "equitable basis" as used in the text of the Japanese proposal.[295]

70. Foreign Minister Toyoda Upholds Japanese Proposals

In a message to Ambassador Nomura on September 13, 1941 Foreign Minister Toyoda declared that although President Roosevelt had not yet considered the Japanese proposals, several important points had been adequately discussed therein.[296] The preliminary parleys desired by the United States had been included in the statement, despite Japan's objection that such parleys involved discussions of minutiae, and as a result became long drawn out. In a mere repetition of the various steps already discussed, administrative officials could produce no immediate results. Only a statesmanlike consultation between the leaders of the two countries could be successful at this point.

Japan desired to reach some agreement with the United States concerning the whole situation. With this purpose in view, Foreign Minister Toyoda asked that Ambassador Nomura bring the contents of his reference message[297] to the attention of President Roosevelt with a request that the President explain his own intentions.

It was evident that Japan stressed a general settlement, based on the view of the situation in its entirety rather than on individual questions. By reducing the business and legal discussions to a minimum, a conference of the two leaders could be convened without further delay, using Foreign Minister Toyoda's message[298] as the basis for this major conversation. If this general meeting took place, conferences covering specific problems could be resumed as necessary.

For Japan to accept without modification the four principles laid down by the United States would give the general impression that it had submitted to American pressure. If then it were made known that the United States were consulting with Great Britain, the Netherlands, China and other interested nations regarding its dealings with Japan, the world at large would interpret this action as a revival of the nine-power treaty policy.

[292] S.D., II, 622.
[293] III, 175.
[294] See III, 176.
[295] See III, 177-178.
[296] See III, 179.
[297] See III, 122.
[298] Ibid.

[63]

Foreign Minister Toyoda pointed out the importance of keeping the parley, both in form and fact, a negotiation between only Japan and the United States. Although recognizing that the United States would confer with those countries as a matter of form, the Japanese government did not wish the conference to develop into an agreement among many countries.[299]

The Foreign Minister stressed that he did not intend to reject the questions raised in the American reply of September 12, 1941 [300] but wished to emphasize the points contained in his own proposals.[301]

71. Ambassador Nomura Stresses the Need for Preliminary Conversations

In spite of Japan's conviction that its proposals formed a satisfactory and workable basis for peace, Ambassador Nomura nevertheless recognized the urgent need for preliminary conferences to overcome some of the difficulties arising from divergent viewpoints.

In summing up the diplomatic situation on September 15, 1941 for his Foreign Office, Ambassador Nomura noted that President Roosevelt had already stated that if the Pacific problems could not be solved in the preliminary conversations between the Japanese Ambassador and Secretary Hull, they would remain unsettled regardless of who participated in the conference,[302] especially since Secretary Hull had said that he had never disagreed with President Roosevelt on foreign policies.

Referring to the phrases "Communistic and other subversive activity", and "common defense in China", appearing in Foreign Minister Toyoda's last message, Ambassador Nomura expressed the opinion that these terms would create future problems between Japan and the United States. Since the United States wanted to know the prospective peace terms between Japan and China and refused to act as an intermediary in any unjust negotiations, Ambassador Nomura felt that Japan must outline its policies toward China in more concrete terms. Unless the opinions of both Japan and the United States on this and related problems coincided at the preliminary conversations, no meeting could be held between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Konoye.

After viewing the national characteristics of the United States and the position of President Roosevelt, Ambassador Nomura was certain that the interpretation of the Tripartite Pact could not be accomplished from a political standpoint by the "leaders" at the conference. He declared that if an agreement could not be reached at the preliminary meeting there would be no "leaders" conference. Although the United States had expressed the desire to discuss Japanese-American negotiations with the governments of Great Britain, China and the Netherlands, it did not wish to include a third power in the agreement between Japan and the United States. The American motive for revealing its Far Eastern policy to the other countries was to eliminate the fear that the United States was sacrificing them in an effort to effect an understanding with Japan.

In spite of the apparent insignificance of his diplomatic work Ambassador Nomura assured Foreign Minister Toyoda that he would continue to carry out all instructions concerning the proposed negotiations. However, he intended to drop any discussions of the points being dealt with in Tokyo, and to watch merely for any new developments.[303]

[299] See III, 179.
[300] See III, 148.
[301] See III, 122.
[302] III, 180.
[303] Ibid.

[64]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

72. Ambassador Grew Confers with Ambassador Shigemitsu (September 17, 1941)

In Tokyo the Japanese government took the initiative in attempting to reach an agreement on the divergent views mentioned by Ambassador Nomura. Probably with both the knowledge and approval of either Prince Konoye or Foreign Minister Toyoda, Mr. Shigemitsu, the Japanese Ambassador recently recalled from England, met with Ambassador Grew to discuss current issues between Japan and the United States.[304]

In reviewing Japan's attitude toward the informal conversations, Mr. Shigemitsu said that his government was united in its efforts to bring about an adjustment of relations with America. However, in order to prevent the mobilization of anti-American forces in Japan, the discussions must culminate in an agreement without delay, for should Prime Minister Konoye's endeavors fail, the efforts of other Japanese statesmen would also be futile.

In explaining to Mr. Shigemitsu the grave dangers of attempting official negotiations without adequate preliminary understandings, Ambassador Grew pointed out the broad interpretation which could be applied to the Japanese proposals. Moreover, past experience in dealing with the Japanese government had discouraged the United States concerning Japan's ability and sincerity in carrying out commitments.

Since the present Japanese Cabinet was supported by the responsible chiefs of the armed forces, Mr. Shigemitsu believed that no such difficulties would arise after the present negotiations had been completed. Any agreement undertaken with the American government would be faithfully executed in the course of time by the Japanese.

Emphasizing that what he was about to say was in the strictest confidence, Mr. Shigemitsu further stated that even during Mr. Matsuoko's tenure of office and Japan's strict adherence to Axis policies, the Japanese Emperor had desired the establishment of closer relations with both the United States and England. It had been for this reason that Mr. Shigemitsu had been recalled from London.[305]

73. Mr. Ushiba Calls on Mr. Dooman (September 17, 1941)

Anxious to determine whether these conversations in Tokyo were furthering the aims of Japanese-American negotiations, Mr. Ushiba, Prince Konoye's private secretary, visited Counselor Dooman on September 17, 1941 to ask if Washington had made any comments on the secret meeting between Ambassador Grew and the Japanese Prime Minister on September 6, 1941.[306]

According to Mr. Dooman, Secretary Hull had telegraphed his appreciation of the attitude exhibited by Prince Konoye throughout his conversations with Mr. Grew, but the statement handed by Ambassador Nomura to Secretary Hull on September 4, 1941 had so confused the issues at stake that Ambassador Grew had not felt justified in seeking another interview with Prime Minister Konoye.

Assuring Mr. Dooman that the Japanese Cabinet had been disturbed over Ambassador Nomura's actions in this matter, Mr. Ushiba revealed that Prince Konoye had telegraphed Ambassador Nomura a statement in reply to the American draft of June 21, 1941. However, in view of the Cabinet crisis which had arisen in Japan at that time, Ambassador Nomura had withheld that document and had composed instead a brief memorandum which had been of little help. Since in his recent memorandum Ambassador Nomura had neglected to men-

[304] "Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)", September 17, 1941, S.D., II, 624-625.
[305] Ibid.
[306] "Memorandum by the Counselor of Embassy in Japan (Dooman)", September 18, 1941, S.D. II, 626-629.

[65]

tion Japan's desire that President Roosevelt take part in Japanese-Chinese peace plans, another misunderstanding had arisen. Ambassador Grew commented that a week's delay had ensued through no fault of the American government.

Mr. Ushiba did not object to America's desire to understand the aims and objectives of the Japanese before making arrangements for a meeting between the heads of the two governments. Moreover, although his government proposed to maintain the principle of the open door in China, he realized that Japan had failed, despite months of informal conversations in Washington, to indicate any exact plan for accomplishing this. Therefore, Mr. Ushiba suggested that the United States ask Japan to disclose its definite terms for peace with China.

Mr. Dooman reminded Mr. Ushiba that the American government had often indicated its desire to know and, in the June 21, 1941 draft, had specifically asked for Japan's peace terms. It had been assumed, therefore, that Japan had been unwilling to disclose them. Mr. Ushiba was certain that Prince Konoye, as evidence of the good faith of the Japanese government, would communicate Japan's ideas on peace with China to Ambassador Grew. It was agreed that Mr. Ushiba would take the initiative in suggesting that Prince Konoye communicate the terms to Ambassador Grew. On the other hand, Ambassador Grew, if he felt able to do so, would inform Prince Konoye of his desire to learn these terms.

The discussions then turned to the attitude of Japan and the United States toward the European war. Although he felt that Japan could not give a prior guarantee to interpret as defensive any action of the United States against Germany, Mr. Ushiba, nevertheless, believed that Prince Konoye would be able to give assurances concerning Japan's attitude toward the European war which would meet with the approval of President Roosevelt. However, the manner in which the Japanese government would explain to Germany about an understanding reached with the United States was of great concern to Tokyo. Mr. Dooman assured Mr. Ushiba that the United States would not request Japan to betray its treaty commitments.

Continuing in this vein, Mr. Dooman stated that usually in treaties of alliance any policies formulated were designed to serve the common end of those concerned with the agreement. In the Tripartite alliance, therefore, there seemed to be no obligation on Japan's part to conform to principles benefiting Germany exclusively. In view of this attitude, Japan could inform Berlin that it had undertaken an understanding with the United States, although it was still prepared to fulfill its obligations under Article III of the Tripartite Pact.

With regard to former Foreign Minister Matsuoka's interpretation of the treaty with Germany, Mr. Dooman pointed out that, after returning from Moscow, Mr. Matsuoka had expressed the belief that in the event of war between Germany and the United States, Japan would join the war on the side of the Axis powers.

Mr. Ushiba expressed amazement at Mr. Matsuoka's statement, and said that though he was aware that Mr. Matsuoka had differed with Prince Konoye on the interpretation of Article III, he had not been aware that Mr. Matsuoka had disclosed this information to foreign representatives. At the same time, however, he mentioned that during the period of the last Japanese Cabinet change, Mr. Matsuoka had informed the Prime Minister that Ambassador Grew had reported to Washington that the governmental change in Japan was due to American pressure.

Repudiating this idea, Mr. Dooman stated that Ambassador Grew had reported to Washington that the Japanese Cabinet change was due, first, to the German attack on Soviet Russia, which had upset the Japanese theory that peace would be maintained between Germany and Russia; and, second, the conflict between the Prime Minister and Mr. Matsuoka regarding the scope and significance of the Tripartite Pact. Mr. Ushiba then confirmed these assumptions.

[66]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

As the conference drew to a close, Mr. Ushiba again stressed the necessity of America's accepting the Japanese proposal without delay.[307] A day later, September 18, 1941, Mr. Ushiba telephoned to Mr. Dooman to say that within a day or two Prince Konoye would give Ambassador Grew the terms of peace which Japan would offer China.[308]

74. Ambassador Nomura Urges Japan to Make a New Proposal

On September 17, 1941, Ambassador Nomura sent a report to Tokyo summarizing the situation which was preventing the completion of successful Japanese-American negotiations. Of the three main points debated during the informal conversations, both Japan and the United States had agreed in principle on two. At a meeting with President Roosevelt on August 6, 1941, Ambassador Nomura said that Prime Minister Konoye was so confident concerning the reaching of an agreement on the point regarding the evacuation of Japanese troops from China, that he was prepared to attend a meeting with President Roosevelt. However, Secretary Hull, referring to Japan's proposal of June 24, 1941, felt that certain other points needed clarification.[309]

Foreign Minister Toyoda had informed Ambassador Nomura on July 23, 1941 that he had not been in office long enough to decide upon a definite policy regarding the evacuation of troops from China. Because the occupation of French Indo-China had been decided upon before Admiral Toyoda had assumed his position as the new Foreign Minister, there was no way of preventing it. However, motivated by the desire to defend French Indo-China, the Japanese government had carried out this action peacefully, and in order to decrease the existing friction between Japan and the United States as a result of this aggression, Foreign Minister Toyoda had asked Ambassador Nomura to explain to the United States the reasons for this occupation. He was to point out that any pressure exerted by the United States would unduly excite the Japanese public and would only serve to intensify the critical situation.[310] Since negotiations had ceased about this time and had not been reopened until the recent message had been sent, Ambassador Nomura had found it impossible to carry out his instructions of July 15, 1941.

Ambassador Nomura believed that Secretary Hull's concern for the Japanese proposal of June 24, 1941 stemmed from his numerous conferences with Ambassador Nomura in which he had discussed the principal points contained therein in accordance with Foreign Minister Toyoda's instructions of May 11, 1941. Therefore, Ambassador Nomura believed that the United States would prefer that the terms of any preliminary agreement be formulated along the general lines contained in that proposal. Furthermore, Ambassador Nomura advised that in the event that these preliminary discussions take place, Secretary Hull insisted that they be held in Washington.[311]

Because of the attitude expressed by the United States, it seemed doubtful that an understanding could result merely from the Japanese proposal of September 4, 1941. In any event, Ambassador Nomura was convinced that the primary task of the Japanese government was to find terms acceptable to both countries in regard to the three points at issue, particularly to the matter of garrisoning Japanese troops in Chinese territory.

From a secret source of information, Ambassador Nomura learned that President Roosevelt was seriously considering a meeting with Prime Minister Konoye if proper arrangements could be made. In fact, the atmosphere of the recent American Cabinet meeting had been one of anticipation concerning the proposed Japanese-United States conference.[312]

[307] Ibid.
[308] S.D., II, 629, f.n. 12.
[309] III, 181.
[310] III, 9.
[311] III, 181.
[312] III, 182.

[67]

75. Secretary Hull Is Cautious Concerning Proposed Conference

In spite of his report concerning the optimistic attitude of President Roosevelt, on September 17, 1941 Ambassador Nomura commented on the extreme caution observed by Secretary Hull when speaking of the Japanese-American conference.

Mr. Nishiyama, the Japanese Financial Attache in Washington, had learned that Secretary Hull considered that President Roosevelt had gone too far during his discussions with Ambassador Nomura.[313]

Secretary Hull's pessimism regarding the recent progress made in Japanese-American negotiations was based on the conflicting opinions observed within the Japanese government itself.[314]

76. Japanese Observers in United States Responsible For Publicity Leaks

In view of Secretary Hull's cautious attitude Ambassador Nomura recognized the need for observing even closer secrecy with regard to the informal conversations. Because previous breaches of security had resulted chiefly from interviews given to American newspapers by Japanese observers, sent to the United States from Tokyo, Ambassador Nomura requested on September 18, 1941 that Japan discontinue sending officials in this capacity.[315]

Ambassador Nomura reminded Foreign Minister Toyoda of the dangerous effect Mr. Kasai's articles had had on the negotiations. Although Mr. Kasai had curtailed his activities greatly after receiving a reprimand, in a recent public statement he had agreed with certain arguments presented by Senator Wheeler and Colonel Lindbergh. In addition, the activities of Mr. Shinohara had brought criticism upon the Japanese government. Ambassador Nomura urged therefore, that Tokyo prevent a recurrence of these publicity leaks.[316]

77. French Ambassador Demands Withdrawal of Japanese Troops

On September 20, 1941 Foreign Minister Toyoda reported that according to a short wave broadcast from San Francisco on the previous day, the French Ambassador to the United States had demanded that Secretary Hull force Japan to withdraw its troops from French Indo-China. If the Japanese authorities were able to verify this report, Foreign Minister Toyoda instructed them to file a strong protest with the United States.[317]

78. Hull-Nomura Conversation (September 19, 1941)

(a) State Department's Report[318]

Although he had received no reports from his government other than an explanatory statement regarding the Japanese proposals presented by Foreign Minister Toyoda to Ambassador Grew on September 13, 1941.[319] Ambassador Nomura called on Secretary Hull to discuss existing problems. Secretary Hull declared that he had received Mr. Grew's report and had also been notified that the Japanese government planned to communicate to the United States the specific peace terms which Tokyo would extend to China. Since Ambassador Nomura had not yet received any instructions concerning these peace terms, the conversation turned to the explanatory statement issued by Foreign Minister Toyoda.

[313] Ibid.
[314] III, 183.
[315] III, 184.
[316] Ibid.
[317] III, 185.
[318] "Memorandum of a conversation", September 19, 1941, initialed by Mr. Joseph W. Ballentine, S.D., II, 629-631.
[319] S.D., II, 623-624; III, 175-176.

[68]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

In the opinion of Secretary Hull, this statement did not materially clarify any of the points at issue, and, therefore, the United States government still felt that the Japanese proposals of September 6, 1941 narrowed the original program for peace in the Pacific. When asked by Ambassador Nomura if the withdrawal of Japanese troops from China remained the principal difficulty, Secretary Hull replied that the problem of maintaining any agreement formulated on a broad basis covering the entire Pacific area was, at this time, the main reason for divergencies of view.

With reference to the relations of Japan and the United States toward the European war, Secretary Hull declared that the United States had not as yet expressed any views on the formula contained in the Japanese proposals regarding this matter. Assuring Ambassador Nomura that America was desirous of concluding arrangements for a peaceful agreement as soon as possible and was awaiting a Japanese reply, Secretary Hull stated that, meanwhile, his government was continuing to study the proposals.

Ambassador Nomura emphasized that any agreement between Japan and the United States must remain bilateral in nature. Although desirous of conferring with other governments in order to supplement negotiations with Japan, Secretary Hull asserted that the United States had no intention of drawing other countries into the formal agreement with Japan.

In answer to Secretary Hull's inquiry, Ambassador Nomura expressed no apprehension concerning developments that might arise in Japan on September 27, 1941, the anniversary of the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact. Although the Japanese army was influential and many of its members were German-trained, according to Ambassador Nomura, only a very small percentage of the Japanese population would desire to enter war as an ally of Germany.[320]

(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report

Ambassador Nomura reported that for the first time in nine days he had called on Secretary Hull to inquire about the American attitude toward the Japanese proposals submitted on September 4, 1941.[321] Secretary Hull began the conversation by stating that he had received a message from Ambassador Grew indicating that the Japanese government was planning to submit a proposal which would be acceptable to the United States. In view of this information, Secretary Hull had expected that Ambassador Nomura would deliver that message at this conference.

Replying to Ambassador Nomura's question regarding the Japanese proposal, Secretary Hull remarked that a decision on the proposed conference between the leaders of the two governments had not yet been reached.[322] Insofar as an early consummation of the present negotiations was desired, Secretary Hull emphasized that he had no intention of deliberately prolonging the conversations. However, Ambassador Nomura believed that this remark was made merely for the sake of courtesy.

Opposed to a policy which was partly peaceful and partly warlike, Secretary Hull insisted that only by the adoption of completely peaceful policies could Japan hope for greater progress and development in the Orient. While it was essential that Japan remain strong, it was also essential that Japan not follow a policy of military aggression. If a forceful, yet peaceful policy were adopted, Secretary Hull firmly believed that the Japanese-American question could be settled overnight. Apparently, having received reports of celebrations scheduled to be held in connection with the first anniversary of the Tripartite Pact, Secretary Hull expressed the belief that there were more people in Japan who wanted peace than those who, together with Germany, desired war on the United States.[323]

[320] S.D., II, 623-624.
[321] III, 186.
[322] Ibid.
[323] III, 187.

[69]

Ambassador Nomura explained Japan's fear that the United States' action in consulting with the Netherlands, China and other nations on the proposed conference might be interpreted as a revival of the nine-power treaty policies. Although Secretary Hull explained the necessity of keeping in touch with any country whose interests in the Pacific would be affected by an agreement with Japan, he agreed that the conversations should be limited to Japan and the United States. Because of this answer, Ambassador Nomura pointed out in his message to Tokyo that the views he had expressed in other dispatches were accurate.[324]

From a recent conversation the Japanese Ambassador had gathered that the United States did not intend to resort to appeasing Japan. He advised Tokyo that the United States was suspicious of Japan because it was certain that Japan would resort to force while appeasing the United States.

Because of Secretary Hull's attitude, Ambassador Nomura notified his government on September 20, 1941 that he had withheld communicating certain messages to the American Secretary of State, since at this point the conclusion of amicable relations depended not on words but actions.[325]

79. Foreign Minister Toyoda Grows Impatient

Dissatisfied with the lack of progress in these informal conversations and impatient at the United States' delay in answering Japan's proposal for a conference between the leaders of the two countries, Foreign Minister Toyoda instructed Ambassador Nomura on September 20, 1941 to urge American officials to make a definite reply since he believed that all the questions of the United States had been satisfactorily answered during his conversation with Ambassador Grew on September 13, 1941.[326]

Since plans were now underway for the celebration of the first anniversary of the Tripartite Pact on September 27, 1941, the Japanese Foreign Minister foresaw a need for the completion of a definite agreement with America before that date. However, he urged the Japanese Ambassador not to give the impression that Japan was in a hurry about the matter.[327]

Two days later, though Ambassador Grew had informed his government that a new Japanese proposal acceptable to the United States would be forthcoming in the near future,[328] Foreign Minister Toyoda advised Ambassador Nomura on September 22, 1941 that he had no knowledge of any further concessions to be extended by the Japanese government.

When last conferring with Ambassador Grew, ten days before, the Japanese Foreign Minister had answered all questions put to him by United States' officials. But now he made it clear that Japan had explained its policies fully, and had made all possible concessions. Since both Ambassador Grew and Counselor Dooman understood his meaning, Foreign Minister Toyoda did not understand why the American Ambassador should notify the United States' government that Japan was ready to submit a new proposal.

Foreign Minister Toyoda declared that he intended to inquire about this matter when he met Ambassador Grew in three or four days. Depending upon the circumstances, Foreign Minister Toyoda was then going to submit to Ambassador Grew the Japanese terms for peace with China. However, these terms would not be new, but would serve merely as an explanation of what Japan had already made known.[329]

[324] III, 188.
[325] Ibid.
[326] III, 189.
[327] Ibid.
[328] Secretary Hull mentions this proposal in his conversation with Ambassador Nomura, September 19, 1941, See S.D., II, 629-631. [329] III, 190.

[70]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

80. Grew-Toyoda Conversation (September 22, 1941)

(a) Ambassador Grew's Report

When Ambassador Grew called on Foreign Minister Toyoda at the latter's request on the afternoon of September 22, 1941, he listened to an oral statement which further clarified Japan's stand in relation to the United States. In referring to the proposed meeting between Prince Konoye and President Roosevelt, Foreign Minister Toyoda stated that his government had intended that the divergent policies of the two countries should be discussed at the conference, with the details for executing an understanding to be subsequently accomplished through normal diplomatic channels. Contrary to this view, the United States desired that an agreement on policy should be reached during informal conversations held prior to the proposed conference.

In Foreign Minister Toyoda's opinion, the attitude of his government regarding the steps it would take to ensure peace in the Pacific had been broadened by the Japanese proposals issued to Ambassador Grew on September 4, 1941. Furthermore, since Japan was now ready to issue the basic terms of peace which would be offered to China, the good offices of President Roosevelt were still earnestly desired in the settlement of the China Incident.

Foreign Minister Toyoda then presented Ambassador Grew with a copy of the basic Japanese terms of peace with China.[331] They promised the maintenance of neighborly friendship and respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of China. Furthermore, Japan proposed that cooperative defense measures be established by the two countries in order to keep communistic and other subversive activities under control. Therefore, throughout certain Chinese areas, Japanese troops and naval forces would be stationed in accordance with the existing agreements and usages. With the exception of these troops, other Japanese armed forces would be withdrawn from China.

With the development and utilization of material essential to Chinese national defense as its primary object, economic cooperation between the two countries was to be maintained. Nevertheless, the interests of third powers in China were not to be impaired in any way.

In conclusion the Japanese peace terms contained the following provisions: a fusion of the Chiang Kai-shek regime with that of Wang Ching-wei, the recognition of Manchukuo by the Chinese, and a guarantee that no further annexations would be made and no indemnities would be imposed.[332]

Foreign Minister Toyoda stated that although the Japanese government had attempted to maintain secrecy concerning the present problems under discussion, the publicity previously attending the informal conferences, as well as the rumors that had been spread concerning the projected meeting between the two governments, had stimulated the activities of anti-American elements in Japan. Since Japan was attempting to prevent the occurrence of any demonstrations on September 27, 1941, the first anniversary of the signing of the Tripartite Pact, the United States should appreciate Japan's difficulty in controlling factions opposed to an understanding with America due to the delay in achieving any appreciable understanding between the two countries.

After the Japanese Foreign Minister pointed out that Tokyo was still awaiting America's answer to the proposals presented to Secretary Hull on September 6, 1941, Ambassador Grew reported that he had received word from Washington concerning the progress of negotiations,

[330] "Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)", September 22, 1941, S.D., II, 631-633.
[331] Ibid.
[332] "The Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs (Toyoda) to the American Ambassador in Japan (Grew)", September 22, 1941, S.D., II, 633. For English text sent by Foreign Minister Toyoda to Ambassador Nomura on September 22, 1941 see III, 191-192.

[71]

which indicated the United States' desire to hasten matters. Foreign Minister Toyoda again stressed the necessity of eliminating any further delay. When Ambassador Grew indicated that Ambassador Nomura was apparently unconcerned in regard to the danger of a pro-Axis demonstration in Japan on September 27, 1941, Foreign Minister Toyoda explained that Ambassador Nomura was not cognizant enough of the situation in Japan to realize the existing dangers.

At this point Ambassador Grew requested a clarification of the phrase in the peace terms "existing agreements and usages". The Japanese Foreign Minister replied that the phrase must be understood as written, but mentioned the presence of American marines in China as an illustration of its meaning. Although promising to communicate these peace terms to Secretary Hull immediately, Ambassador Grew held out little hope that America would reach a decision on it before September 27, 1941.[333]

(b) Foreign Minister Toyoda's Report

Foreign Minister Toyoda reported that at 4:00 P.M. on September 22, 1941, he had asked Ambassador Grew to visit him in order to discuss further the arrangements for a conference between the leaders of Japan and the United States. During the interview the Japanese Foreign Minister gave Ambassador Grew a copy of the basic Japanese terms of peace with China.

Pointing out that the message to President Roosevelt concerning the conversations to be carried on between him and Prince Konoye, as well as the general principles to be discussed, needed no further clarification, Foreign Minister Toyoda declared that it had been agreed that all minor details would be entrusted to diplomatic officials. Though the United States desired to come to an agreement on various points at once, the Japanese government had satisfactorily answered all American inquiries concerning its sincerity and attitude and, therefore, could do nothing more but await a reply from the United States.[334]

By establishing its attitude toward the negotiations on a broad scope, the Japanese government had, in its proposals, embraced all the existing problems. During a conversation on September 10, 1941 Ambassador Grew had submitted a question concerning mediation between Japan and China. Foreign Minister Toyoda had delivered to him the confidential terms of a fundamental peace between Japan and China, pointing out that they were not new proposals but merely clarification of the proposals submitted to America on September 4, 1941. Since the situation had grown more critical during the past month, the Japanese Foreign Minister urged Ambassador Nomura to impress the authorities of the United States with the necessity of reaching a successful agreement without further delay.[335]

According to Mr. Toyoda, from the time that the American newspapers had begun to editorialize on the Japanese-American negotiations, these negotiations had become a major topic of conversation throughout the entire world. Within four or five days, the first anniversary of the Tripartite Pact would be celebrated. In spite of the fact that the Japanese government desired that the day's activities be conducted in a calm manner, the Japanese Foreign Minister was well aware that an anti-American group within the country would take the opportunity to threaten Japanese-American relations by provoking incidents. Since it was obvious that Japan's internal situation was extremely critical, Foreign Minister Toyoda directed Ambassador Nomura to inform Secretary Hull immediately of the details of his conversation with Ambassador Grew and to request a prompt reply.[336]

[333] "Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)", September 22, 1941, S.D., II, 631-633.
[334] III, 193.
[335] III, 194.
[336] III, 195.

[72]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

81. Ambassador Nomura Forwards a Japanese Report on America's Attitude Toward War

In summarizing a Japanese report on the American attitude toward war in both the Atlantic and the Pacific, Ambassador Nomura, in a message to Tokyo on September 22, 1941,[337] discussed the desire of the United States to adopt any plan which would bring about the ultimate destruction of Germany. In order to prevent Soviet Russia from making a separate peace, England and the United States had rendered all possible assistance, hoping to maintain Russia's fighting strength for an offensive in the spring provided its troops survived the winter months. By contributing millions of dollars for equipment, the United States also hoped to strengthen Britain's will to continue the fight.

Because the strength of the American Navy was increasing constantly, the submarine menace in the Atlantic did not cause as much alarm as formerly, although the United States recognized that utter annihilation of the submarine was impossible.[338] According to the Japanese report, the American attitude toward war as a general rule was extremely casual. If war with Japan did develop the American public would accept it as inevitable.

Because of their economic superiority over Japan, the American people believed that it would be a naval war primarily, and that the United States would be victorious after a very short struggle. Only a few were fully aware of the dangers involved in war with Japan. There still remained those who argued against reaching a peace at the expense of China.[339]

According to an article written in the New York Times, attempts to ameliorate the situation existing between Japan and the United States were dead-locked because Japan's continued occupation of China was against the fundamental principles laid down by the United States. For this reason, Prime Minister Konoye had requested a personal conference with President Roosevelt.[340]

Public opinion in the United States held that in view of Germany's war aims a non-aggressive American policy would result only in failure. Believing that Italy would withdraw from the war, that occupied nations would uprise and, finally, that the endurance of the German people themselves would fail, Americans continued to believe that participation in a war would not be fatal. If they went to war with Japan, the American people felt that naval participation alone was sufficient, and that no expeditionary forces would be dispatched on a large scale.

Nevertheless, certain preparations were being undertaken by military authorities. In Congress, where the majority backed the government's foreign policy, a sharp decline in the strength of the isolationist group was noted.[341]

President Roosevelt had given consideration to the possibility that in case Soviet Russia fell, a Japanese aggression would cause a simultaneous clash in both the Atlantic and Pacific. However, the greater portion of the American Navy still remained in the Pacific.

With regard to Japanese peace terms, it was rumored that Japan was demanding treaty ports in four southern provinces of China. Although the United States did not wish to sacrifice China to Japan, if Japan gave up forceful aggression, the United States would not only restore trade relations with Japan but would even render economic assistance. Ambassador Nomura expressed his opinion of this report by stating that the observer "had hit the nail on the head".[342]

[337] III, 196.
[338] Ibid.
[339] III, 197.
[340] Ibid.
[341] III, 198.
[342] III, 199.

[73]

82. Japan Explains Its Retaining of Troops in China

At Mr. Terasaki's request, Mr. Dooman, Counselor to the American Embassy in Japan, called on the Japanese Foreign Office.[343] A statement, supplementing those made to Ambassador Grew by Foreign Minister Toyoda on the previous day and outlining Japan's reasons for retaining troops in China, had been prepared for communication to Ambassador Grew and for subsequent transmission to the United States government.[344]

In this document the Japanese government stated that in order to aid in the construction of a peaceful China and to ensure the security and defense of Japan itself, it recognized the necessity of stationing Japanese armed forces in certain areas of China. Because the uncertainty of internal stability in China had always proved a source of danger, Japan feared that intrigue, instigated by external sources, might follow the conclusion of the war between these two countries. The activities of the Communistic elements had already been detrimental to the maintenance of peace, and Japan felt that if such conditions were to recur any promotion of China's national life or welfare would be greatly impeded.[345]

From the economic standpoint alone, it was obvious that the activities of any neighboring territories would effect Japan's existence. Moreover, in view of the warlike attitude prevalent throughout the world, the defense of Japan could be endangered by any sudden unfavorable situation in China. Although Japan was prepared to withdraw armed forces wherever their presence was no longer required, it was imperative that a nucleus of Japanese troops be retained in certain areas of China. Any proposal to maintain peace by the stationing of international armed forces was inacceptable because of public opinion in China and because of the direct influence the internal condition of China had upon Japan.[346]

83. Hull-Nomura Conversation (September 23, 1941)

(a) State Department's Report[347]

Upon his own request, Ambassador Nomura called at Secretary Hull's apartment on September 23, 1941. Handing Secretary Hull a copy of the "Basic Terms of Peace between Japan and China"[348] and also a document entitled "A Reply to the American Communication of September 10, 1941",[349] Ambassador Nomura announced that these documents contained a full explanation of Japan's attitude regarding the disputable points in its recent proposals.

Ambassador Nomura said that any further clarification of the Tripartite Pact's effect upon Japan might best be left for discussion at the proposed meeting between the government heads.

Another document delivered to Secretary Hull by Ambassador Nomura on September 23, 1941 defined the phrase "equitable basis" to mean economic activities which were neither monopolistic, exclusive nor exploitative in nature, but which were based on the policy of nondiscrimination insofar as natural limitations permitted. Japan did not intend to be the sole

[343] "Memorandum by the Counselor of Embassy in Japan (Dooman)", September 23, 1941, S.D., II, 634.
[344] Ibid.
[345] "Oral statement made to the Counselor of the American Embassy in Japan (Dooman) by the Director of the American Bureau of the Japanese Foreign Office (Terasaki)", September 23, 1941, S.D., II, 640-641. Foreign Minister Toyoda sent Mr. Koshu a copy of this document on September 23, 1941 with instructions to deliver it to Secretary Hull. See III, 200.
[346] Ibid.
[347] "Memorandum of a conversation", September 23, 1941, initialed by Mr. Joseph W. Ballantine, S.D., II, 634-635.
[348] This document was handed to Ambassador Grew by Foreign Minister Matsuoka on September 22, 1941, S.D., II, 633. For the English text sent to Ambassador Nomura on September 22, 1941, see III, 191-192.
[349] This document was a copy of the one handed to Ambassador Grew by Foreign Minister Toyoda on September 13, 1941, (see S.D., II, 623-624), and wired to Ambassador Nomura on September 13, 1941, see III, 175-176. Ambassador Nomura referred to it in his conversation with Secretary Hull on September 9, 1941, see S.D., II, 629-631 and III, 186-188.

[74]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

interpreter of this term. This document was not mentioned in the State Department's report of this conversation, but its text has been printed in the official documents and Ambassador Nomura referred to it in his report of this interview.[350]

After promising to study these papers as expeditiously as possible, Secretary Hull inquired concerning Ambassador Nomura's impressions regarding the present situation. Stating that he appreciated the position of the United States, Ambassador Nomura pointed to the domestic difficulties in Japan. If the meeting between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Konoye could be effected, Ambassador Nomura was certain that the psychological reaction in Japan would be extremely favorable to the re-establishment of friendly relations with America.

After referring to a previous American suggestion that the Japanese government assert control over public opinion and in this way attain support for the liberal program to be adopted by Japan and the United States, Secretary Hull asked if Ambassador Nomura believed that a conference between the heads of the two governments would actually be more effective. According to Ambassador Nomura efforts had already been made to influence Japanese public opinion, and favorable results had been achieved. Nevertheless, a meeting between the leaders of the two governments would provide not only support for those elements desiring peaceful negotiations with the United States, but it would also counteract the pro-Axis factions in Japan.

Secretary Hull then reiterated his belief that both Japan and the United States would gain more from peaceful collaboration than by forceful opposition to one another's policies. Pointing to Germany as an example of the difficulties resulting from excessive expenditures for armaments, Secretary Hull remarked that no country could benefit from the staggering cost of an attempted world conquest. Ambassador Nomura agreed fully with his views.[351]

(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report

Ambassador Nomura advised Tokyo on September 23, 1941 that in order to communicate Foreign Minister Toyoda's interpretation of various paragraphs and phrases in the Japanese proposals which had been questioned by the United States, and at the same time to deliver a copy of the Japanese definition of "equitable basis", he had called on the Secretary of State on September 23, 1941.[352]

On presenting the outline of Japan's terms of peace with China, the Japanese Ambassador had pointed out that these latest documents, coupled with previous statements made by the Japanese government, had completely explained all Japanese policies. Therefore, no further explanation would be made to either Secretary Hull in Washington, or Ambassador Grew in Tokyo, and all matters pertaining to the Tripartite Pact would be left for the meeting between the leaders of both countries except those points which had already been discussed at preliminary conferences. Ambassador Nomura stated that these latest Japanese proposals were intended to enlarge rather than narrow the scope of the original American proposals.[353]

Because of certain Axis elements, domestic problems in Japan had become increasingly critical. Therefore, the Japanese government sincerely desired that a decision be reached

[350] "Document handed by the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) to the Secretary of State", September 23, 1941, S.D., II, 636. This term was interpreted during Foreign Minister Toyoda's conversation with Ambassador Grew on September 13, 1941, see S.D., II, 622. It was sent to Ambassador Nomura on September 13, 1941, see III, 177-178.
[351] "Memorandum of a conversation", September 23, 1941, initialed by Mr. Joseph W. Ballantine, S.D., II, 634-635.
[352] III, 201.
[353] Ibid.

[75]

regarding the "leaders conference" before the first anniversary of the Tripartite Pact was celebrated in Japan on September 27, 1941.[354]

Assuring Ambassador Nomura that he was devoting every effort to the materialization of the leaders conference, Secretary Hull stated that it was desirable, however, that the Japanese government first influence Japanese public opinion to adopt an attitude more favorable to the United States. Ambassador Nomura replied that Japan had been able to improve conditions in this regard.

In Ambassador Nomura's personal opinion, conformity with the Tripartite Pact and improvement of American-Japanese relations could be handled along parallel lines by the Japanese government, and a meeting of the leaders would strengthen peace in the Pacific.[355] At this point Secretary Hull informed Ambassador Nomura that he had received Ambassador Grew's report of the conference with Foreign Minister Toyoda on September 22, 1941.[356] Since the points discussed in this conference were now under careful consideration, Secretary Hull hoped to be able to reply in the near future. Ambassador Nomura then attempted to have Secretary Hull express a favorable opinion toward the materialization of the "leaders conference", but the Secretary of State refused to make a definite commitment.

In view of the existing international situation, however, Secretary Hull believed that now was the time for the United States and Japan to work toward the reconstruction of a peaceful world. But although Japan and the United States were ideally situated to lead world affairs, Secretary Hull doubted if the caliber of the statesmanship of both countries was capable of undertaking such a vast problem.

Firmly convinced that the meeting between the two leaders would immeasurably strengthen both governments' stand in the Pacific and would aid world peace, Ambassador Nomura once more urged that Secretary Hull work toward this goal.[357]

84. Ambassador Nomura Asks Tokyo To Clarify Its Proposals

After holding a telephone conversation with Foreign Minister Toyoda on September 24, 1941, Ambassador Nomura requested in a dispatch to the Japanese Foreign Minister on September 24, 1941 that certain points discussed be further clarified.[358] In accordance with instructions from his government, Ambassador Nomura had informed Secretary Hull in a conference on September 23, 1941 that the Japanese government had nothing more to say in regard to the various proposals it had extended to the United States. At present, Ambassador Nomura was marking time while waiting for a reply from Secretary Hull.[359]

In acknowledging receipt of a message from Tokyo on the preceding day, Ambassador Nomura stated that he did not fully understand the reasons offered by Foreign Minister Toyoda in explanation of the necessity for retaining Japanese troops in specified areas of China. The Japanese Ambassador feared that the United States would interpret the statement as a plan to station Japanese troops anywhere at all throughout the length and breadth of China. Anxious to carry out fully the Japanese government's instructions, Ambassador Nomura asked that a written explanation of the proposed peace plans, mentioned by the Japanese Foreign Minister in his telephone conversation, be forwarded to him immediately.[360]

[354] III, 195.
[355] III, 201
[356] "Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)", September 22, 1941, S.D., II, 631-633.
[357] III, 201.
[358] III, 202.
[359] Ibid.
[360] III, 203.

[76]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

85. Japanese Spies Disclose American Attitude Toward Japan

While Japan waited for the United States' answer to its proposals, their espionage agents attempted to determine the American attitude toward the present negotiations. Mr. Morishima, head of Japanese espionage activities in the United States, sent a special report to Tokyo on September 26, 1941.[361]

Mr. Morishima stated that because Prime Minister Konoye had initiated negotiations with the United States, and had taken a temperate stand with regard to the navigation of American tankers, Washington officials concluded that Japan was in a desperate condition. Consequently, at the time of Prince Konoye's return to power, Washington believed that an understanding with Japan could be reached.[362]

The delay in reaching the understanding, however, had been occasioned by the constantly growing suspicion that the present Japanese policy of appeasement was motivated by the desire to gain time, while Germany won a decisive victory in Russia. Gradually, the American officials had begun to feel that no agreement should be reached at the expense of China.

Though desiring to effect a satisfactory compromise with Japan, the United States believed that any agreement concerning Japanese problems also involved England, Soviet Russia, and the Far East. As far as the European war was concerned, America had decided to maintain its present position of strengthening Allied resistance, since an Axis victory would gravely imperil American national defense. In case Germany should win on the Russian front, the United States felt the necessity of eliminating the threat which Japan constituted in the Pacific.[363]

Mr. Morishima declared that America would first try to ensure that Japan would refrain from further invasion before amending its relations with the government at Tokyo. If Japan revised its intention to seize territory an understanding would be possible immediately, but no temporary agreement would be considered, merely for expediency's sake. Despite all negotiations, the United States planned to send a military mission to China and to continue furnishing lend-lease material to China until definite assurance was given that Japan would cease Far Eastern aggression.[364]

According to Mr. Morishima's information, it seemed evident that the United States would carry through its vast plans for the reconstruction and cultivation of China in spite of any agreement concluded with Japan. Since America's expressed desires did not coincide with Japan's national policy, a strong faction in Japan disapproved of the present attempts for establishing amity between the two countries. Similarly, in the United States, an anti-Japanese wing, encouraged by Chungking, spread propaganda to the effect that a Japanese-American rapprochement would involve the sacrifice of China.[365]

By maintaining close contact with the American society called The Friends of China, the Chungking government was opposing a Japanese-American rapprochement. Furthermore, The American Committee for Non-Participation in Japanese Aggression had initiated a campaign for economic pressure against Japan, and was opposing the efforts of both President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull to settle these problems peacefully.[366]

[361] III, 204.
[362] Ibid.
[363] III, 205.
[364] III, 206.
[365] III, 207.
[366] III, 208.

[77]

86. Foreign Minister Toyoda Urges Increased Diplomatic Efficiency

During the period of diplomatic crisis, Foreign Minister Toyoda believed that only exceptional statesmanship on the part of Foreign Office officials would enable the Japanese government to obtain its desired objectives. Therefore, while the frank expression of opinions from Japanese officials abroad were still welcomed, Foreign Minister Toyoda urged that no action be taken which might impair the solidarity of Foreign Office personnel or interfere with the execution of Japanese Foreign Office policy. In a message on September 26, 1941, Foreign Minister Toyoda asked that all Japanese Ambassadors inspire the members of these offices to achieve a maximum diplomatic efficiency.[367]

87. Foreign Minister Toyoda Forbids Textual Changes By Ambassador Nomura

Although realizing the difficulties currently experienced by Ambassador Nomura in the execution of his duties and appreciating fully that Ambassador Nomura had views divergent from his own, Foreign Minister Toyoda, nevertheless, requested on September 26, 1941, that no changes be made in any Japanese communications without first asking permission from the Foreign Office in Tokyo.[368] The Japanese Foreign Minister had previously notified Ambassador Nomura that the texts of the messages from Tokyo were composed only after careful deliberation by the various Japanese ministries involved.[369]

Turning next to the basic terms of peace between Japan and China which had been recently sent from Tokyo, Foreign Minister Toyoda asked whether Ambassador Nomura had found an opportunity to present them to Secretary Hull. Referring to the recent conversation held between President Roosevelt and Ambassador Nomura, the Japanese Foreign Minister asked whether President Roosevelt had mentioned a promise made by Japan that there would be no further increase of troops stationed in French Indo-China in order to ensure the success of Japanese-American negotiations.

Foreign Minister Toyoda believed that the American President had referred to this promise when "with smiling cynicism" he had stated that Japan might occupy Thailand while Prime Minister Konoye and President Roosevelt were holding their peace conference, just as Japanese troops had marched into French Indo-China while Ambassador Nomura and Secretary Hull had conducted informal peace negotiations.

Because of the hostile attitude of Germany toward the proposed understanding between Japan and the United States, and the increasing international tension, Foreign Minister Toyoda requested that Ambassador Nomura interview the American officials to ascertain their views on all problems involved in the negotiations.[370]

88. Ambassador Nomura Answers Foreign Minister Toyoda's Message

Replying to Foreign Minister Toyoda on the same day, September 26, 1941, Ambassador Nomura stated that he had already communicated his government's basic terms for peace between Japan and China to the American authorities. In referring to Foreign Minister Toyoda's questions regarding President Roosevelt's statement, Ambassador Nomura insisted that the American President had made no mention of any Japanese promise to avoid stationing troops in French Indo-China, nor had he inquired concerning the number of troops already stationed there.

[367] III, 209.
[368] III, 210.
[369] Ibid.
[370] Ibid.

[78]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

In the conversation that was to take place between Secretary Hull and Ambassador Nomura later in the day, the Japanese Ambassador promised to convey Foreign Minister Toyoda's reasons for maintaining troops in a certain specified area of China, and also to hand Secretary Hull the text of the proposed agreement between Japan and the United States.

Ambassador Nomura also assured Foreign Minister Toyoda that he neither added nor subtracted from the messages or instructions sent to him by his government. However, the English text of messages sent from Tokyo often differed from the original Japanese text and in view of this, Ambassador Nomura suggested that Foreign Minister Toyoda check the English translations more thoroughly before sending them.[371]

89. Ambassador Nomura Sends Japanese Proposals to Secretary Hull (September 27, 1941)

Under his government's instructions, on September 27, 1941 Ambassador Nomura sent Mr. Matsudaira to give Secretary Hull a copy of the Japanese proposals which had been delivered to Ambassador Grew on September 25, 1941.[372]

In Ambassador Nomura's covering note which was attached to the proposals, he stated that when handing to Ambassador Grew the original set of proposals, Mr. Terasaki had declared that the Japanese government was awaiting a reply from the United States regarding the projected meeting between the two government heads. In order to bring about this conference Japan had formulated a statement along the lines of the American Draft Understanding of June 21, 1941, incorporating all the proposals since communicated to the American government. Prepared solely for the convenience of the United States, these new proposals were not to be interpreted as an inflexible Japanese treaty.[373]

90. Ambassador Nomura Reports Discrepancy in Copies of Japanese Peace Terms

Ambassador Nomura advised Tokyo on September 27, 1941, a few days after delivering a copy of the Japanese government's terms for peace with China to Secretary Hull, that he had been notified by the State Department of certain discrepancies between the proposal handed to Ambassador Grew in Tokyo and that which he had given to the Secretary of State.[374] Mr. Ballantine of the State Department had pointed out that though the Japanese peace terms relayed from Ambassador Grew in Tokyo contained nine articles, the outline received from Ambassador Nomura contained only the first five articles. Since Ambassador Nomura had explained that there was always the possibility of errors in transmission, he requested in his report that Tokyo check the message in question and advise him of its findings.[375]

In reading Ambassador Nomura's report, it should be noted that despite Ambassador Nomura's seemingly honest bewilderment concerning this matter and his request to have Tokyo check on the transmission of the message, a copy of the original Japanese dispatch, sent by Tokyo on September 22, 1941, and now in American communication intelligence files, contains nine articles. It is not certain, therefore, whether the communication clerks in the Japanese Embassy did not receive the complete text, or whether accidentally or deliberately they did not deliver the complete text to Ambassador Nomura. Another possibility, which apparently does not hold in view of Ambassador Nomura's request for further check by Tokyo, is that the Japanese Ambassador deliberately omitted the last four articles for reasons of his own.

[371] III, 211.
[372] "The Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) to the Secretary of State", September 27, 1941, S.D., II, 636. The Japanese translation of the resume in English of Mr. Terasaki's remarks was sent by Ambassador Nomura to Tokyo on September 25, 1941, III, 212.
[373] "Japan's proposals submitted to the American Ambassador in Japan (Grew)", September 25, 1941, S.D., II, 637-640. For complete text sent by Foreign Minister Toyoda to Ambassador Nomura on September 25, 1941, see III, 213.
[374] III, 214.
[375] Ibid.

[79]

91. Grew-Toyoda Conversation (September 27, 1941)

(a) Ambassador Grew's Report[376]

Since Foreign Minister Toyoda received Ambassador Grew on September 27, 1941 immediately after attending various functions celebrating the first anniversary of the Tripartite Pact, Ambassador Grew believed that the Japanese Foreign Minister wished to emphasize that Japan was still anxious to establish amicable negotiations with the United States.

In reiterating Japan's desires to consummate the meeting between Prince Konoye and President Roosevelt, Foreign Minister Toyoda inquired if America had set forth its views regarding the Japanese proposal for a meeting of the two government heads. Ambassador Grew replied that the only information received from Secretary Hull had been the report that, during a discussion on September 23, 1941 Ambassador Nomura had handed the Secretary of State certain written material, which Secretary Hull promised to examine as expeditiously as possible in order to make a prompt reply.

The Japanese Foreign Minister then conveyed orally to Ambassador Grew various considerations regarding the position of the Japanese government in connection with the present informal conversations.[377] Pointing to the critical condition into which Europe had fallen as the result of a war which had involved various powers, Foreign Minister Toyoda stated that if the United States and Japan were to relinquish their hold over the key to peace in the Pacific, then world civilization would be imperiled.

Numerous incidents occurring between Japan and the United States had greatly disturbed peaceful relations, but if the conditions between Japan and the United States could be adjusted in a friendly manner, the effects would be felt throughout the world. It was for this reason that Japan was so determined to adjust any differences with the United States.

Upon assuming the post of Foreign Minister two months before, Admiral Toyoda had begun to work unceasingly toward the re-establishment of friendly relations between the two countries, and with the same objective in mind, Prime Minister Konoye had expressed his willingness to confer with President Roosevelt. Misunderstanding had arisen with Germany and Italy as a result of Prince Konoye's desire to meet with President Roosevelt, but Japan was willing to make sacrifices in order to demonstrate clearly its sincerity in desiring not only to adjust Japanese-American problems but also to maintain peace in the Pacific and to re-establish it in other areas of the world.

Moreover, though there was no precedent in Japanese history for a Prime Minister's going abroad to confer with the head of another government, Prince Konoye was motivated at this time by a sincere desire for peace. Nevertheless, Japan would not succumb to American pressure in reaching an understanding. Because of the allegations to the effect that Japan was being forced to its knees by the United States, which had been made in American newspapers, Foreign Minister Toyoda felt it necessary to repeat this fact.

Since Japanese-American relations were exceedingly complicated, it was quite possible that there would be many problems left unsettled at the conclusion of the meeting between the leaders of the two countries. The political effects of such an epochal meeting would greatly influence the settlement of any divergent views existing at present.

If the meeting did not materialize in spite of the fact that both countries were in accord as to its value and if the United States delayed too long in making a reply, it was doubtful whether

[376] "Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)", September 27, 1941, S.D., II, 641-645.
[377] "For translation of Japanese text of Foreign Minister Toyoda's Oral Statement sent to Ambassador Nomura on September 27, 1941, see III, 215. A resume in English of this conversation was handed to Secretary Hull by Ambassador Nomura on September 29, 1941, S.D., II, 652-654.

[80]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

another favorable opportunity would soon occur. Since Japan had already announced the proposals it would make at the meeting by submitting a complete resume to Ambassador Grew on September 25, 1941, in accordance with the lines contained in the American proposal for June 21, 1941, the United States was fully aware of Japan's position.

All details connected with the transporting of Prime Minister Konoye and his party to the meeting place had been arranged, and Japan was in a position to hold the meeting at any time. Only a reply from the United States was necessary to complete the preparations already underway.

Foreign Minister Toyoda pointed out that any further delay would place the Japanese government in an exceedingly difficult position because the first anniversary of the Tripartite Pact might be used by the pro-Axis elements in Japan to vitiate the efforts of the Japanese Cabinet to improve relations with the United States. Since time was of paramount importance, Japan suggested that the meeting be scheduled for some time between October 10 to October 15, 1941. If held any later, the weather in the north Pacific and along the Alaskan coast would be decidedly unfavorable.

In conducting a conference of this type, it was of the utmost importance that both countries respect the other's reliability and sincerity. Foreign Minister Toyoda felt sure that President Roosevelt fully appreciated Prime Minister Konoye's character and motives in this matter. Stating that the entire Japanese Cabinet was behind Prime Minister Konoye's move, including high army and navy officers who would attend the conference in order to dissipate doubt as to their collaboration with Prince Konoye's plans, Foreign Minister Toyoda urged that the opportunity not be lost to adjust Japanese-American relations by a conference between the leaders of both countries.

In conclusion, the Japanese Foreign Minister expressed the hope that none of his statements would be misinterpreted or considered as setting a time limit upon any reply from the American government.[378]

(b) Foreign Minister Toyoda's Report[379]

Foreign Minister Toyoda advised Ambassador Nomura on September 22, 1941 that after the ceremonies celebrating the first anniversary of the Tripartite Pact on September 27, 1941 had taken place, he had requested Ambassador Grew to call upon him. After talking to the American Ambassador along the lines of his special report to Ambassador Nomura, Foreign Minister Toyoda again strongly urged that Ambassador Grew recommend to the United States that the meeting of the leaders of the two governments take place without further delay.

In view of both internal and external circumstances affecting Japanese policies, it would be impossible to postpone the meeting indefinitely. Foreign Minister Toyoda instructed Ambassador Nomura, when speaking with American officials, to place the primary emphasis on the materialization of this proposed conference.[380]

Foreign Minister Toyoda was particularly anxious to have Ambassador Nomura emphasize the fact that although the Japanese government had made its final statement with regard to the negotiations, it did not consider that all questions and answers were now useless. Foreign Minister Toyoda welcomed any questions and was anxious to respond cordially to them, but since the United States government had not sent a single query since September 10, 1941, Foreign Minister Toyoda was deeply concerned.

[378] Ibid.
[379] III, 216.
[380] Ibid.

[81]

With the celebration of the first anniversary of the Tripartite Pact, the situation had become more critical than ever. Though a movement was underway in Japan to strengthen the Axis faction, and, consequently, opposition toward any adjustment with the United States was increasing, yet the advocates of anti-Americanism had not weakened the power of the present government.[381]

Nevertheless, in order to achieve a successful understanding, it would be necessary to produce quicker and better results and, perhaps, even to publish them. When once the date for an interview between the leaders of the two countries had been established or definite negotiations were underway, Foreign Minister Toyoda was certain that the people would stand united and that all opposition would be quickly overcome. However, at the present time Japan was disturbed concerning the delay in receiving a definite answer from the United States to the proposal submitted by Prince Konoye over a month before.

Because an influential Admiral and one General would be included in Prime Minister Konoye's entourage, the Japanese government feared that the United States might suspect it was controlled by military elements. Foreign Minister Toyoda had attempted to dispel this illusion. In speaking with British Ambassador Craigie in Tokyo, who had stated that the United States "lacks confidence concerning the attitude of the government of Japan", Foreign Minister Toyoda had attempted to eliminate American suspicion by pointing out the trustworthiness of Prime Minister Konoye and the complete reliability of the present Japanese government.[382]

92. Ambassador Nomura Suggests Changes in the Japanese Proposals (September 27, 1941)

On September 27, 1941, Ambassador Nomura informed Foreign Minister Toyoda that he had dispatched Mr. Matsudaira to deliver to Mr. Ballantine the English text of Japan's explanation for maintaining troops in China after the restoration of peace and[383] also the text indicating the Japanese government's final efforts to make arrangements for a conference between the leaders of the governments.

Expressing his opinion on various points of Admiral Toyoda's message, Ambassador Nomura believed that since the United States insisted upon coming to an agreement on all the points involved before considering the proposed leaders' conference, Japan could do no more than await an expression of the intentions of the United States since it had already clarified thoroughly its position.[384]

If further Japanese proposals were submitted before receiving a definite reply from America, matters would only be further complicated and the progress of negotiations possibly hampered because any inconsistencies appearing in the new proposals would cause the United States to doubt Japan's sincerity.

Ambassador Nomura had noted a definite desire on the part of the United States to conduct negotiations along the lines of its proposals submitted on June 21, 1941, which, in the Japanese Ambassador's opinion were concrete and extremely practicable. He suggested therefore, that his government accept the reasonings embodied therein.

Turning to a discussion of phrases contained in the Japanese proposals, Ambassador Nomura remarked that certain of them would cause a setback in the present negotiations. For example, if the item "no northward advance shall be made without justification" were deleted at this time, the American government would become suspicious of Japan's motives.

[381] III, 217.
[382] III, 218.
[383] Mr. Terasaki presented Japan's reasons for maintaining troops in China to Mr. Dooman on September 23, 1941. See S.D., II, 640. Foreign Minister Toyoda in a message to Mr. Koshi on September 23, 1941 ordered that a copy of this document be delivered to Secretary Hull. Ambassador Nomura delayed until September 27, 1941 before complying with this order.
[384] III, 219.

[82]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

With respect to the attitudes of both nations toward the war in Europe, Ambassador Nomura believed the United States would find it exceedingly difficult to conform to Japan's proposal for joint mediation in bringing about world peace. The recent sinking of the American destroyer Greer by a German submarine had affected public opinion greatly. Therefore, it would be exceedingly difficult to secure complete agreement with the United States regarding the European war.

Ambassador Nomura commented that since all moves of America toward aiding the Allies were based on the desire to maintain its own national defense, even if it became actively involved in the conflict and even though provided with ample provocation to do so, America would probably not make any aggressive attack. By making the term "right to self-defense" as elastic as possible, the United States hoped to obviate the necessity of Japan's invoking the terms of the Tripartite Pact. Consequently, the outline of Japan's needs for self-defense, which appeared in the proposals, might easily arouse America's suspicions.

Fearing that no real negotiations could be entered into with the United States unless an agreement had been reached on the matter of garrisoning troops in China and extending a guarantee of nondiscrimination in this area, Ambassador Nomura expressed the opinion that in the final analysis Japan would be forced to accept the terms offered by the United States insofar as they did not conflict with the existing Nanking Agreement.

Though the "nondiscrimination" phrase was not so important as the questions surrounding the stationing of Japanese troops in China, Ambassador Nomura believed that several negotiations would have to be conducted with the United States before America would yield to any proposal. Furthermore, he felt that the United States would not be satisfied with Japan's assurance that no third nation would be discriminated against in China as long as it conducted economic enterprises on a fair and even basis, nor did it seem likely that the United States would permit Japan to exercise such privileges in China as were in conformity with "the principle of especially close relations".

Since the United States desired to publicize any understanding reached, Ambassador Nomura saw little possibility for Japan's success in having the United States and Japan held jointly responsible for the settlement of the China Incident. Since President Roosevelt was very interested in mediating the Japanese-Chinese question Ambassador Nomura thought that the United States would raise some question regarding the term "Konoye's statement and those agreements between Japan and China". In order to offset the possibility of any difficulty arising from this, Ambassador Nomura suggested that the word "President" be inserted in the phrase.

Since it had been rumored that Secretary Hull had written the part of the United States' proposals of June 21, 1941 pertaining to the political stabilization of the Pacific, Ambassador Nomura suggested that his government retain that portion of the proposal as a diplomatic gesture.

Furthermore, since he was certain that the new proposals would be more acceptable to the United States if they dealt solely with a large scale peace in the Pacific, Ambassador Nomura requested a deletion of that part of the agreement which referred to the evacuation of Japanese troops from French Indo-China only upon the termination of the China Incident.[385]

93. Ambassador Grew Appraises Conditions in Japan (September 29, 1941)

In a report to Secretary Hull and Under Secretary Welles, Ambassador Grew attempted to appraise conditions in Japan pertaining to the current diplomatic situation.[386] The

[385] Ibid.
[386] "Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State", September 29, 1941, S.D., II, 645-650.

[83]

American Ambassador believed that since the fall of Admiral Yonai's Cabinet in July 1940, American diplomacy had not been in a better position to effect a Japanese-American rapprochement than it now held under the Konoye-Toyoda regime. Since the time was so propitious the American Ambassador hoped that an enduring foundation for friendly relations between the two countries would be established. Nevertheless, Ambassador Grew was aware that the withdrawal of Japanese troops from China and the prevention of further Japanese advances in the Pacific would be extremely difficult for any Japanese Minister to settle satisfactorily because of domestic opposition.

Since he believed that only respect for America's potential power had deterred Japan from taking more liberties with United States' interests, Ambassador Grew expressed the opinion that Tokyo's program of forceful expansion could be halted only by a threat to use this power, if necessary. By such action, a regeneration of Japanese thought might take place which would allow Japan to resume formal relations with the United States. This American policy had already aided in discrediting former Foreign Minister Matsuoka.

At the present time, Japan was attempting to correct its miscalculation in signing the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy in order to avoid the peril of being caught between Russia and the United States. With the advent of the German-Russian war, however, there was now every chance that the liberal elements in Japan would become more prominent in the attempt to extricate Japan from a dangerous position. By forbearance, patient argumentation and open declaration of the determination of the United States to take positive measures whenever they were called for, Ambassador Grew believed that the anticipated regeneration of Japanese-American relations could be effected.

The opinion was being circulated in certain circles of the United States government that an agreement between Japan and the United States would free the Japanese from the threat of America's aid to China, thereby allowing Japan to strengthen its forces for further aggression in China and throughout the Pacific. In addition, this same group held the opinion that when a deterioration in Japanese domestic economy occurred as a result of commercial restrictions exercised by the United Nations, Japan would be forced to relinquish its aggressive policies.

According to Ambassador Grew, the United States had the choice of two methods in dealing with Japan; one was the use of progressive economic strangulation, the other, constructive conciliation. From the trend of the informal conversations at Washington, it was evident that America had chosen the latter course. Should this method fail, the application of stronger economic restrictions could always be effected. Whatever the trend of Japanese-American relations were in the future, however, the United States would have to remain in a state of preparedness.

Ambassador Grew felt that the principal point at issue was not whether Japan would halt its expansionist program but when. If the United States were to lose the present opportunity to end Japan's program of forceful aggression, the prospect of war was not impossible. Recalling the cases of the Maine and the Panay, Ambassador Grew stated that war could quite possibly result from some incident arousing public opinion.

Ambassador Grew stressed the importance of understanding Japanese psychology since Japan's reactions to any circumstances could not be predicted according to Western standards. Were the United States to wait for the Japanese government to set forth, in concrete detail, commitments which would satisfy the American government, the conversations would be prolonged indefinitely. As a result the Konoye Cabinet and the elements supporting rapprochement with the United States would lose favor, and because of the abnormal sensitiveness of the Japanese and the effects of loss of face, the reaction against America would be serious. Such a situation would be even more serious than a failure to reach a complete agreement at a leaders' conference.

Ambassador Grew had been informed confidentially that the Japanese government found it impossible to clarify further its policies prior to the proposed Roosevelt-Konoye meeting

[84]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

because former Foreign Minister Matsuoka had recounted the complete details of the Washington negotiations to the German Ambassador in Japan, and many of Mr. Matsuoka's supporters who were still in the Tokyo Foreign Office would be in a position to reveal information to German and Japanese extremists who render the present Cabinet's position untenable. However, Prince Konoye had promised to make commitments in his meeting with President Roosevelt that would satisfy the United States, and although unable to determine the exact truth of this statement, Ambassador Grew pointed out that Tokyo had shown a readiness to reduce its alliance with the Axis powers to a dead letter by initiating negotiations with the United States. He suggested, therefore, that the United States place a reasonable amount of confidence in the professed sincere intention and good faith of Prince Konoye and his supporters. As an alternative to discrediting the Japanese military powers through actual military defeat, America should attempt to regenerate Japanese thought by constructive conciliation along the lines of its present efforts.[387]

94. Hull-Nomura Conversation (September 29, 1941)

(a) State Department's Report[388]

To deliver a document containing the gist of the meeting between Foreign Minister Toyoda and Ambassador Grew on September 27, 1941, Ambassador Nomura called at Secretary Hull's apartment on September 29, 1941.[389] The Japanese Ambassador had been instructed to press for a definite answer to the Japanese proposal, but since he was well aware of the American government's opinion regarding this matter and had already passed that information on to his own government, he was somewhat embarrassed. He also explained that he had been requested to obtain an interview with President Roosevelt, but in view of the present situation he would like to discuss the matter with Secretary Hull.

Secretary Hull replied that he had been out of direct touch with the President for the past three or four days, owing to the death of President Roosevelt's brother-in-law. Nevertheless, he expected to be able to give the Japanese Ambassador a memorandum concerning the proposals of the Japanese government in a short time, since he planned to see President Roosevelt that day.

Secretary Hull then declared that some delay had been necessary to permit Japan to educate its people to accept the program advocated by the United States. Ambassador Nomura explained that there were certain groups within the Japanese army which wondered why the United States, asserting leadership on the American continent because of the Monroe Doctrine, was interfering with Japan's assumption of leadership throughout Asia.

When asked if the Japanese public as a whole desired an immediate settlement of the China conflict, Ambassador Nomura replied in the affirmative but remarked that under existing circumstances they had no other alternative but to continue fighting. Ambassador Nomura agreed with Secretary Hull that many of the Japanese occupation forces would not wish to be recalled.

[387] Ibid.
[388] "Memorandum of a conversation", September 29, 1941, initialed by Mr. Joseph W. Ballantine, S.D., II, 651-652.
[389] "Document handed by Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) to Secretary of State (Hull)", September 29, 1941, S.D., II, 652-654. The text to of this same oral statement was conveyed to Ambassador Grew by Foreign Minister Toyoda, see S.D., II, 641-645. For the text wired to Ambassador Nomura by Foreign Minister Toyoda on September 27, 1941, see III, 215.

[85]

Although certain that the Konoye government was in a strong position, Ambassador Nomura believed that if Prime Minister Konoye failed to achieve a meeting between the chiefs of the two governments, he would be succeeded by a less moderate leader.[390]

(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report[391]

Ambassador Nomura reported to Tokyo on September 29, 1941 that in accordance with his instructions he had called on Secretary Hull that morning to speak of Foreign Minister Toyoda's conference with Ambassador Grew, to urge again that early action be taken on the leaders' conference, and to request that he be permitted to see President Roosevelt.

Because of the death of a relative, President Roosevelt had been away for a time, but Secretary Hull assured the Japanese Ambassador that within a few days a memorandum would be issued to him by the United States.

Thoroughly familiar with Ambassador Grew's report on the meeting with Foreign Minister Toyoda in Tokyo, Secretary Hull was convinced that the need for immediate action was evident, but he believed that unity of public opinion in Japan was of primary importance. Stating that Japanese public opinion could never be made to conform to every whim of the United States, Ambassador Nomura pointed out that the Japanese people could not understand why the United States, which always appealed to the Monroe Doctrine after seizing leadership in the American continents, meddled constantly in Asiatic affairs. Nevertheless, Ambassador Nomura was certain that once the negotiations with the United States were underway any understanding resulting from them would receive the full accord of the Japanese government, the army and the navy.[392]

95. Foreign Minister Toyoda Submits Official Interpretation of Japanese Proposals

A few days after Ambassador Nomura had presented Secretary Hull with the latest Japanese proposals, Foreign Minister Toyoda, although anxious to facilitate negotiations, agreed with Ambassador Nomura that the Japanese government should avoid making any further proposals until it had received a reply from the United States.[393]

Stating that on July 14, 1941 he had sent some instructions which Ambassador Nomura had never presented to the American officials, Foreign Minister Toyoda declared that he had issued other proposals on September 4, 1941 and September 25, 1941 in which he had attempted to harmonize both documents with the American proposal of June 21, 1941. He had hoped, therefore, that negotiations might be made on the basis of these proposals.

In the event that American officials questioned certain phrases in these latest Japanese proposals, Foreign Minister Toyoda advised Ambassador Nomura concerning their interpretation. The expression "as there is no real objective, we will make no northward invasion" was omitted from the Japanese proposals of September 25, 1941 because it was feared that the insertion of such a phrase might lead America to suspect that Japan had designs against Soviet Russia.

Since the whole problem evolved from the China Incident and the South Seas' question in the first place, Japan felt that there was no particular problem in the north. With regard to the clause concerning the stability of the Pacific area, Foreign Minister Toyoda believed that the matter had been fully discussed in the proposals and that any further clarification could be taken up at the leaders' meeting. In any event, he had no objection to the statement.[394]

[390] "Memorandum of a conversation", September 29, 1941, initialed by Mr. Joseph W. Ballantine, S.D., ii, 651-652.
[391] III, 220.
[392] Ibid.
[393] III, 221.
[394] Ibid.

[86]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

Since the term "when the proper time comes" had been included in the article discussing the European war, Foreign Minister Toyoda felt that neither country would object to the statement of their respective attitudes. Until the American government broached the subject again, however, the Japanese Foreign Minister desired to postpone discussion of the second clause of the same article.

Concerning the adjustment of the China Incident, the Japanese government was aware of the United States' belief that the settlement of this particular problem was of greatest importance to the stability of the Pacific area. However, if the United States opposed the first clause which indicated that both governments considered it their joint responsibility to bring about peace, Japan was willing to leave it out altogether.

Since Japan, from the beginning of negotiations, had been looking with expectancy to American mediation in the China affair, it had no objection to President Roosevelt's assisting in the settlement. The phrase "a treaty between Japan and China" had been inserted in accordance with the three principles laid down by Prime Minister Konoye, and had no special meaning.[395]

Since the United States might entertain some misgivings about the question of nondiscrimination in Chinese economic activities, Foreign Minister Toyoda offered the assurance that the principle of trade equality would be applied to all other countries. However, in accordance with similar practices existing throughout the world, the geographical situation in the Far East would naturally result in more intimate, neighborly relations between Japan and China. Nevertheless, once the conditions arising from the American freezing order had been ameliorated, commerce between Japan and the United States could be resumed on a normal basis and the Japanese government would be willing to accept the United States' proposals governing trade.

In view of the fact that the stipulations concerning political stability in the Pacific, as set forth in the American proposal, had been strongly supported by Secretary Hull, Foreign Minister Toyoda stressed that Japan would give them full consideration, especially since they were general stipulations. In order to expand the significance of the clause pertaining to the establishment of peace in the Pacific, Foreign Minister Toyoda had embodied therein proposals for the military evacuation of French Indo-China and the settlement of the China Incident. If the United States did not like this arrangement, Foreign Minister Toyoda was willing to change it.[396]

96. Ambassador Nomura Converses with Admirals Stark and Turner (September 30, 1941)

On September 30, 1941 Ambassador Nomura met with Admiral Stark to confer on the Japanese-American situation, and Rear Admiral Turner joined them later. In the opinion of Admiral Stark the stationing of Japanese troops in China was imperiling the present negotiations, and unless the incident was settled without further delay, an understanding between Tokyo and Washington would be impossible.

Although Rear Admiral Turner doubted that Japan would agree to evacuate China completely, he was certain that unless some compromise could be reached in the preparatory discussions, a meeting between the two leaders would be extremely dangerous.

When the discussion turned to the interpretation of the Tripartite Pact, Admiral Stark stated that the United States would not strike at Japan, since if it fought a two ocean war, it would have to defend itself in the Pacific.[397]

[395] III, 222.
[396] III, 223.
[397] III, 224.

[87]

97. Mr. Iguti Warns Tokyo Against Signs of Over-Anxiety

In the message to Mr. Terasaki, Chief of the American Bureau in Japan on September 29, 1941, Counselor Iguti warned his government against showing signs of over-anxiety in dealing with the present negotiations.[398] Furthermore, he believed that it was unwise to deliver statements in Washington which were copies of the original already handed to Ambassador Grew, since transmission errors and discrepancies in translation often created unnecessary misunderstandings. Under these circumstances, Ambassador Nomura found it difficult to explain without lengthy explanations vague passages in the document. Another practice of the Japanese Foreign Office, causing confusion and delay, was the constant submission of proposals which seldom ran in sequence.

Information indicated that the United States believed that the Japanese government was shifting the scene of the negotiations to Tokyo in order to delay proceedings so that Japan could watch the development of the Russian-German war and launch a northward move, if conditions were in its favor.

It was reported to Mr. Iguti that Japanese governmental circles believed that the United States had no reason to refuse the most recent Japanese proposals. They blamed interference in Washington for the inactivity of the United States. However, Mr. Iguti remarked that during the past six months Japanese officials in Washington had clearly indicated the attitude of the United States in their reports to Tokyo. Believing that Tokyo viewed the United States' statements too optimistically, and in fact, with an attitude of almost wishful thinking, Mr. Iguti was certain that the United States had no intention of withdrawing from its position.

By its impatience in urging an immediate reply from the United States, Japan was endangering the situation by giving the impression that the Japanese government was overly anxious to arrive at an understanding. Since the United States had not suffered greatly from any economic measures imposed upon it by Japan, it could afford to delay matters. On the other hand, the American freezing order had affected Japan's entire economic structure. Mr. Iguti believed that under these circumstances, Japan should not show its hand by signs of over-anxiety.[399]

98. Mr. Terasaki Replies to Mr. Iguti

After receiving Mr. Iguti's message concerning Japanese-American relations, and giving it careful consideration, Mr. Terasaki replied that Counselor Iguti's criticisms were justified in regard to the Japanese government's continuing to send proposals after having stated officially that Japan had made its last concession. The Japanese message of September 4, 1941 had been designed to express Japan's views on existing problems in a broad light, and desiring to facilitate negotiations, the Japanese government had sent further messages based upon the United States' proposals of June 21, 1941, which pertained to the garrisoning of troops in China and peace terms for the settlement of the China Incident. Sent at the request of both Prime Minister Konoye and the Japanese military authorities, these supplementary notes were to be used as reference material by the Japanese Ambassador in Washington when explaining Japan's position to the United States government.

[398] III, 225.
[399] Ibid.

[88]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

Officials in Tokyo had been quite unaware that Ambassador Nomura had submitted a statement of his own on September 4, 1941 until certain questions concerning it were raised by Ambassador Grew in Tokyo. Although the Japanese Ambassador had submitted the note only as an unofficial draft, it had complicated negotiations exceedingly. However, Mr. Terasaki realized that Ambassador Nomura and Counselor Iguti were exercising every effort to bring about a satisfactory understanding, and regretted only that the United States did not reciprocate this exhibition of Japanese statesmanship.

Nevertheless, there were more among the Japanese officials who, underestimating the United States, viewed the present condition with undue optimism. In fact, Mr. Terasaki felt that Japanese officials in Washington did not fully appreciate the critical domestic conditions existing in Japan itself. Only by the clear thinking of the military officials in Tokyo had an outbreak been averted following the celebration of the Tripartite Pact on September 27, 1941.[400]

Mr. Terasaki suggested that Counselor Iguti obtain a full description of Japan's internal situation from Minister Wakasugi upon his return to the United States. Furthermore, an explanation should be made to the United States along the lines that certain officials in the United States, misunderstanding the political situation in Japan, did not appreciate the strength of Prime Minister Konoye's Cabinet, and believed consequently that an agreement concluded by the Japanese government would be disregarded by the military organization.

Mr. Terasaki emphasized that though there did exist a faction opposed to the present Cabinet, it would be easily overruled by those in favor of Prime Minister Konoye. It was true that Colonel Mabuchi's broadcast and Mr. Nakano's speech were opposed to Prime Minister Konoye's message, but Mr. Terasaki felt that anyone cognizant of the characteristics of the Japanese people and familiar with conditions in Japan would be able to evaluate those speeches properly. British and American newspapermen, concerned primarily with "journalistic interests", exaggerated minor points in the speech, thereby causing grave misunderstanding.

According to Mr. Terasaki, if the situation were properly explained to American officials, they would understand the real picture. In view of domestic circumstances and external conditions, it was evident that Japan was eager to have a leaders' conference take place. If American officials chose to construe this Japanese attitude as impatience, nothing could be done about it.

Japan agreed that Washington was to be the central locale of any negotiations conducted, though an occasion might arise when conversations would be conducted in Tokyo first. Anyone who construed such action as a delay on the part of the Japanese government misunderstood Foreign Minister Toyoda's intentions.

Time, in Japan's opinion, was now the most important element, for the materialization of the present negotiations would have an important bearing on peace not only in the Pacific but also throughout the world. Thus, the seriousness of the situation was obvious. If the United States so wished, Japan was willing to negotiate further on the basis of its recent message which contained its final efforts to persuade the United States to agree to a leaders' conference.[401]

99. Tokyo Denies Rumors of Dissension in Konoye Cabinet

Special Japanese intelligence reports from New York had revealed that America still regarded the negotiations with Japan from a pessimistic standpoint and that rumors were circulating that Prime Minister Konoye's Cabinet inevitably would be forced to undergo a revision within two weeks.[402] Tokyo denied this rumor and urged that American officials be enlightened with regard to the true situation.

[400] III, 226.
[401] Ibid.
[402] III, 227.

[89]

When answering Secretary Hull's questions on the attitude of Japanese public opinion toward negotiations with America, Foreign Minister Toyoda urged that Ambassador Nomura give full assurance that public opinion was calm. The Japanese government was becoming increasingly conscious of the need to issue a statement on the negotiations at the earliest opportunity.[403]

100. Hull-Nomura Conversation (October 2, 1941)

(a) State Department's Report[404]

On October 2, 1941 when Ambassador Nomura called at Secretary Hull's apartment, he was presented with a confidential statement expressing the views of the United States toward the Japanese proposals.[405]

It declared that after a careful study of the proposals submitted to Secretary Hull by Ambassador Nomura on September 6, 1941 and all statements subsequently communicated to America by Japan, the United States had arrived at certain conclusions.

Welcoming an opportunity to further the broad objectives and principles of peace, the United States had received Japan's suggestion, made through Ambassador Nomura during the early part of August 1941, that a meeting be held by the responsible heads of both governments in order to discuss the adjustment of existing relations. Furthermore, the suggestion had been carefully considered that the informal conversations be resumed in order to ascertain a basis for a peaceful program covering the entire Pacific situation.

As a result, on August 17, 1941, President Roosevelt in a reply to the Japanese Ambassador expressed the view that the United States was prepared to consider the resumption of exploratory discussions provided that they envisaged the conclusion of a progressive program by peaceful means, an equality of commercial opportunity and treatment throughout the entire Pacific area, and the making of raw materials and other essential commodities accessible to all countries. Japan would profit from the adoption of such a program. Provided that the Japanese government agreed to a peaceful program in the Pacific and adhered to the principles to which the United States was committed, the American government would endeavor to arrange a suitable time and place for the exchange of views.

It was gratifying to both President Roosevelt and the United States to receive a message from Prime Minister Konoye and a statement from Japan on August 28, 1941, expressing Japan's intention to pursue a peaceful course in harmony with the broad purpose and fundamental principles to which the United States was committed. Supporting the program outlined by President Roosevelt as applicable not only to the Pacific area but to the entire world, the Japanese government gave further assurance that it would exert no military force against any neighboring nation without provocation.

While anxious not to delay arrangements for the proposed meeting between the two government leaders by a discussion of minor details, the United States, nevertheless, felt it advisable to clarify the interpretation of certain principles in order to ensure the achievement of all objectives. In replying to Ambassador Nomura on September 3, 1941, President Roosevelt agreed to collaborate with the Japanese government in supporting the four principles, previously mentioned by the United States, upon which relations between the two nations must properly rest:-

[403] Ibid.
[404] "Memorandum of a conversation", October 2, 1941, initialed by Mr. Joseph W. Ballantine, S.D., II, 654-656.
[405] Ibid.

[90]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

1. Respect for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of each and all nations.

2. Support of the principle of non-interference in the affairs of other countries.

3. Support of the principle of equality, including the equality of commercial opportunity.

4. Non-disturbance of the status quo in the Pacific except as the status quo may be altered by peaceful means.

Pointing out the necessity of reaching a community of view with respect to the fundamental differences revealed during the informal conversations, President Roosevelt had requested an indication of Japan's attitude toward the fundamental principles and in a conversation with Ambassador Grew at Tokyo, Prime Minister Konoye on September 6, 1941 had subscribed fully to the four principles mentioned above.

In view of the foregoing developments and assurances, coupled with other statements made by the Japanese government, the United States had been assured of Japan's intention to give practical application to the broad progressive program covering the entire Pacific area.

When the proposal extended by Ambassador Nomura on September 6, 1941 had disclosed divergencies in the concepts of the two governments, the United States was gravely disappointed. While they were apparently intended as a concrete basis for discussions, those Japanese proposals and the subsequent explanatory statement narrowed and restricted the application of the basic principles regarding the establishment and maintenance of peaceful stability throughout the entire Pacific area. Because of previous broad assurances given by the Japanese Prime Minister and the Japanese government, the United States did not understand the need for Japan's modifying its former commitments with unnecessary qualifying phrases.

Although recognizing the inalienable right of any nation to defend itself from aggression, the United States found it difficult to conceive of any circumstances developing in the territory of French Indo-China, in Thailand or in Soviet Russia which would constitute a threat or provocation to Japan.

Although a formula of nondiscrimination in international commercial relations had been set down as the fundamental economic policy of the two governments, the proposals of September 6, 1941 and subsequent communications from the Japanese government restricted the commitments contained in that economic agreement to countries of the Southwest Pacific area. In spite of assurances that it would respect the principle of nondiscrimination in China, the explanation given by the Japanese government implied that it intended to limit this principle by reason of geographical propinquity to China.[406]

Peace would not be achieved if either government could pursue one course or policy in a certain area at the same time that it followed an opposing policy in another area. In the views expressed by the Japanese government relating to the question of China, the United States noticed a determination to station Japanese forces in certain areas of China for an indeterminate period. Such a procedure seemed to be out of keeping with the progressive principles discussed in the informal conversations. The United States could not agree with the reasons laid down by Japan for continuing its military occupation of China and it felt that such action would endanger any prospects of stability.

In order to give full assurance of its peaceful intentions and desire to establish a sound basis for future stability and progress in the Pacific area, the United States believed that Japan should exhibit a clear-cut manifestation of its intention to withdraw Japanese troops from China and French Indo-China.

[406] "Oral statement handed by the Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura), October 2, 1941, S.D., II 656-661. For English text wired to Foreign Minister Toyoda by Ambassador Nomura on October 2, 1941, see III, 228-239.

[91]

The United States fully appreciated the steps taken by Japan to meet the difficulties inherent in the different relations of both countries toward the European war and declared that it would be very helpful if the Japanese government would continue to study the question for the purpose of clarifying it still further.

In order to prepare for the proposed meeting of responsible Chiefs of the Japanese and American governments, the United States had endeavored to put into effect a comprehensive program applying liberal and progressive principles uniformly to the entire Pacific area. Apparently, however, the Japanese government desired a program circumscribed by qualifications and exceptions to the actual application of those nondiscriminatory principles. Under these circumstances, a meeting between Prime Minister Konoye and President Roosevelt could never hope to contribute to the advancement of the purposes which the United States desired.

Nevertheless, the United States welcomed Japan's assurances, accompanying Prime Minister Konoye's message to President Roosevelt, that it advocated the principles supported by the United States as the only sound basis for stable international relations. The United States believed that these fundamental principles must be given renewed consideration before a firm foundation could be laid for a meeting between the two governments.

The statement pointed out that President Roosevelt, still interested in the proposed meeting with Prime Minister Konoye, sincerely hoped that a discussion of the fundamental questions would add to the success of such a meeting. The United States was firmly convinced that by collaborating with Japan in the fundamental rehabilitation of mutual relations, the resulting agreement would contribute to lasting peace throughout the Pacific area, based upon justice, equity and order.[407]

After reading the document, Ambassador Nomura stated that his government would be disappointed that the proposed meeting could not take place. Once more, he assured Secretary Hull of Japan's sincerity in first suggesting that such a meeting be held,[408] but said that in view of internal difficulties, he did not believe that Japan could go further at this time.

Although expressing his own confidence in the sincerity of the Japanese Prime Minister and other officials of that government, Secretary Hull nevertheless pointed out that past actions of Japan made it impossible to remove certain doubts concerning the true aims and principles of Tokyo. For this reason, the Secretary of State had insisted that a definite agreement, incorporating the peaceful policies and courses of both governments, be drawn up.

Ambassador Nomura then referred to a press report made by a member of the American Cabinet, which would undoubtedly have a bad effect on Japan's public opinion. Although admitting that certain persons in Japan had made similar statements which were detrimental to Japanese-American peace negotiations, Ambassador Nomura did not believe that they were members of the Japanese Cabinet. Secretary Hull replied that during the informal conversations between Ambassador Nomura and members of the American government, Mr. Matsuoka had made statements inconsistent with the spirit prompting these discussions, but Ambassador Nomura had continued the discussion despite them.

Secretary Hull believed that no proposed meeting could be held before a definite agreement in policy had been established, nor could any patchwork arrangement result in a lasting Pacific peace. It was Ambassador Nomura's opinion that the only source of difficulty was Japan's desire to retain troops in China. No dispute was expected over the question of commercial equality.

[407] Ibid.
[408] "Memorandum of a conversation", initialed by Mr. Joseph W. Ballantine, S.D., II, 654-656.

[92]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

Expressing the belief that Japan would benefit from the universal application of the policy of nondiscrimination, Secretary Hull referred to a report of the Lima conference, containing many economic resolutions concerning South America, which the Japanese government might adopt in the Far East.

According to Ambassador Nomura, Japan's present attitude with respect to regional economic blocs, which destroyed the fundamental principle of nondiscrimination, had resulted from measures similar to those taken at Ottawa, Canada. Since he had been fighting the adoption of such commercial policies, Secretary Hull stated that he would like Japan to join the United States in establishing liberal economic policies. At the conclusion of the conference, Ambassador Nomura again assured Secretary Hull that the Konoye Cabinet was in a comparatively strong position and it desired to reach an agreement with the United States.[409]

(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report

Calling on Secretary Hull at his invitation at 9:00 A.M. on October 2, 1941, Ambassador Nomura received the reply of the United States to the Japanese proposals.[410] Secretary Hull stated that in the opinion of the United States a conference between Prime Minister Konoye and President Roosevelt would be precarious unless a "clear-cut", not a "patch up", understanding regarding the maintenance of peace throughout the whole Pacific could be arrived at beforehand. Although disappointed by the American reply, Ambassador Nomura promised to transmit the message to his government.[411]

101. Tokyo Reports Receiving America's Reply

On October 3, 1941 Tokyo reported the receipt of the United States' reply to Japan's proposal concerning the leaders' conference.

In view of the domestic situation, Foreign Minister Toyoda urged that careful checks be made of newspaper articles dealing with the Japanese-American negotiations, since rumors concerning the fall of the Konoye Cabinet might endanger the success of the negotiations.[412]

102. Hull-Nomura Conversation (October 3, 1941)

(a) State Department's Report[413]

Ambassador Nomura had called on Secretary Hull at his own request on October 3, 1941 to report among other things that on the preceding day he had transmitted the text of the United States' reply to the Japanese proposals. In turn, Tokyo had informed the Japanese Ambassador that it was preparing a statement for public release.[414] Ambassador Nomura hoped to receive an advance copy to submit to Secretary Hull before its publication. Secretary Hull made no comment.[415]

[409] Ibid.
[410] III, 240.
[411] Ibid.
[412] III, 241.
[413] "Memorandum of a conversation", October 3, 1941, initialed by Mr. Joseph W. Ballantine, S.D., II, 661.
[414] There is no record of such a definite statement from Tokyo in American files.
[415] "Memorandum of a conversation", October 3, 1941, initialed by Mr. Joseph W. Ballantine, S.D., II, 661.

[93]

(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report

In order to expedite certain business matters for his government, Ambassador Nomura called upon Secretary Hull on October 3, 1941.[416] The Japanese Naval Ministry desired that arrangements be made to have a courier from Washington go to Hawaii, and the Japanese Foreign Office wished to purchase American oil through the transfer of Japan's unfrozen funds in South America. Although these matters ordinarily came under the cognizance of the Treasury Department and the Maritime Commission, Secretary Hull promised to intercede for the Japanese government.

Ambassador Nomura also mentioned the possibility of Japan's issuing a statement regarding the adjustment of Japanese-American diplomatic relations, and said that if this were done the United States would be notified. Secretary Hull did not object.[417]

103. Foreign Minister Toyoda Obtains a Copy of British Ambassador Craigie's Report (October 3, 1941)

Since British Ambassador Robert Craigie's vacation trip to the United States had been unavoidably delayed by the sickness of his chief assistant, Foreign Minister Toyoda availed himself of the opportunity to discuss various problems involving the Japanese-American situation with him. The Japanese Foreign Minister also asked Ambassador Grew to discuss current diplomatic relations with the British Ambassador.

As a result of both these meetings, Foreign Minister Toyoda reported that Ambassador Craigie had cabled Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden and Ambassador Halifax in support of the proposals for an immediate conference between the United States and Japan. However, in view of the secret source of this information, Ambassador Nomura was asked not to disclose it.[418]

Since Ambassador Nomura was furnished with the gist of Ambassador Craigie's report to the British government, several interesting possibilities exist concerning the method by which the Japanese obtained it. Though Ambassador Craigie might have given the report to the Japanese Foreign Office, this seems improbable in view of Foreign Minister Toyoda's use of the phrase "according to absolutely unimpeachable sources", instead of mentioning the British Ambassador, and his instructions to Ambassador Nomura concerning absolute secrecy in the matter.[419]

The report might have been obtained through espionage activities. Another interesting possibility is that the Japanese were reading the British diplomatic codes at this time, though there is no other evidence to indicate their success in this field. However, in the absence of definite information, no decision can be reached as to the source of this intelligence.

According to Ambassador Craigie's report to London, the resignation of former Foreign Minister Matsuoka had increased the chances for Japan's turning from the Axis powers toward the democracies. The British Ambassador pointed out that if such a change were to benefit Japan it must take place without delay. Since at the present time Japan could enter into nothing more than a temporary understanding, the United States was endangering the ultimate success of the negotiations by arguing over every word and phrase as though it were essential to the conclusion of any preliminary agreement. It was apparent, Ambassador Craigie believed, that the American government did not understand domestic conditions in Japan.[420]

[416] III, 242.
[417] Ibid.
[418] III, 243.
[419] Ibid.
[420] III, 244.

[94]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

In spite of the strong opposition within Japan arising from Prince Konoye's reversal of policy, the Japanese Prime Minister retained his desire to avoid the dangers connected with the Tripartite Pact. If this opportunity for the settlement of Far Eastern problems were lost and the leaders' conference failed to materialize, Ambassador Craigie declared that the Konoye Cabinet would be placed in a precarious position.

Though Ambassador Craigie was aware that many other factors were complicating the consideration of negotiations, both he and the American Ambassador in Japan agreed that this favorable opportunity should not be allowed to slip by because of the unduly suspicious attitude of the United States. However, he agreed that until Prime Minister Konoye's principles actually materialized, retaliatory economic pressure against Japan should be continued.[421]

104. Foreign Minister Toyoda Directs Ambassador Nomura to Submit Another Japanese Explanation

On October 4, 1941 Foreign Minister Toyoda directed Ambassador Nomura to indicate to American authorities that since the Japanese attitude regarding certain fundamental points had been explained theoretically to the satisfaction of the United States, the actual opening of negotiations should now be possible.[422] Although there remained three points upon which divergent views were still held, namely: economic activity in the Pacific, the withdrawal of Japanese troops, and the interpretation of the Tripartite Pact, the Japanese government was certain that the United States had a clear comprehension of the other issues.

Though Prime Minister Konoye approved in principle of the four basic principles underlying the present negotiations, this did not preclude certain differences of opinion regarding their actual application which Prime Minister Konoye desired to consider at the time of the negotiations. The Japanese government had managed its domestic affairs in order to accomplish this, and it wanted Ambassador Nomura to see to it that the United States did not misunderstand the situation.[423]

105. Ambassador Nomura Apologizes for His Hasty Conclusions

During the period of informal negotiations between Japan and the United States, Ambassador Nomura and Foreign Minister Toyoda often disagreed as to policy and principles. On October 4, 1941 Ambassador Nomura, asking that Foreign Minister Toyoda excuse the careless remarks he had sent to Tokyo on the preceding day, explained that his actions had resulted only from the most profound concern for Japan at this critical moment of its history, and that he was deeply impressed with Foreign Minister Toyoda's tremendous efforts since his appointment and throughout the negotiations.[424]

Ambassador Nomura believed that before Japan was able to become self-sufficient as a result of the sphere of co-prosperity, a drastic economic reorganization would have to take place which would be difficult to carry out. Expressing a doubt about a northward advance, the Japanese Ambassador believed that a move to the south might obtain a profitable foothold after several years.[425]

[421] Ibid.
[422] III, 245.
[423] Ibid.
[424] III, 246.
[425] Ibid.

[95]

106. Foreign Minister Toyoda Requests an Immediate Reply to His Message of October 4, 1941

Since Foreign Minister Toyoda had not yet received any information from Ambassador Nomura regarding America's attitude toward the points outlined in his message of October 4, 1941,[426] he informed the Japanese Ambassador on October 17, 1941 that the Japanese government was unable to continue its consideration of the United States' memorandum. Therefore, the Japanese Foreign Minister requested that Ambassador Nomura submit a report with the utmost speed.[427]

On the following day Ambassador Nomura's report had not yet been received in Tokyo. Since the internal situation in Japan would not permit further delay, Foreign Minister Toyoda again stated that until he had received the American reply to his telegram, the Japanese government could not continue its discussions concerning the American memorandum. Therefore, he again urged that Ambassador Nomura reply at once.[428]

107. Japanese-American Conversation

Breakfasting with Mr. Eugene Dooman in Tokyo on the morning of October 7, 1941, Mr. Ushiba discussed the precarious position in which Prince Konoye now found himself because the preliminary conversations with the United States had failed to make progress. Since the latest Japanese proposal for reconciliation between the two countries had not been accepted, the opposition in Japan now had an opportunity to criticize the Konoye Cabinet.[429]

Although in its anxiety to end the China Incident the army had given Prince Konoye unqualified support, he would now have to accept responsibility for the present failure. No one else would take a similar risk or would have the political prestige to gain support of the army in settling the China Incident by negotiation.

Pessimism in the army as well as in the other Japanese official circles had greatly increased because of the failure of the American government to state the precise measures it wished Japan to take. In fact, since the receipt of the memorandum of October 2, 1941 from the United States, many in Japanese governmental circles believed that after America had obtained a definite declaration of Japan's policies and objectives, with no intention of formulating any understanding with Tokyo, America felt justified in maintaining an attitude of quasi-hostility against Japan because its objectives differed from their own. Refuting this conjecture, Mr. Dooman stated that the memorandum of October 2, 1941 had been a direct result of American public opinion which demanded that there be an agreement on certain fundamental points prior to any formal negotiations.

Nevertheless, Mr. Ushiba insisted that the American memorandum was not only extremely argumentative, preceptive and uncompromising, but it also contained no suggestions calculated toward helping the Japanese government to meet the desires of the United States. At the conclusion of the meeting Mr. Ushiba said that the only thing left for Japan to do was to ask the American government to specify exactly the commitments it wished Japan to make, and if a definite reply were not forthcoming, to end the conversations.[430]

[426] III, 245.
[427] III, 247.
[428] III, 248.
[429] "Memorandum by the Counselor of Embassy in Japan (Dooman)", October 7, 1941, S.D., II, 662-663.
[430] Ibid.

[96]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

108. Grew-Toyoda Conversation (October 7, 1941)

(a) Ambassador Grew's Report[431]

Foreign Minister Toyoda requested that Ambassador Grew call on the morning of October 7, 1941 to discuss the American memorandum presented to Ambassador Nomura on October 2, 1941. Because the American Embassy had received only a resume of that document, Ambassador Grew declined to make any comments.

Foreign Minister Toyoda stated that not only had he been informed of Ambassador Grew's private meeting with Prince Konoye on September 6, 1941, but also he knew that Ambassador Grew had communicated Prince Konoye's statements to President Roosevelt through Secretary Hull in "a personal and private message". Since the Prime Minister's statements had been unofficial and merely those of an individual in the Japanese government, it had not been expected that they would be incorporated into a public American document which would be circulated among Japanese officials having no knowledge of Prince Konoye's meetings with Ambassador Grew. However, because Prince Konoye's opinion had been expressed inaccurately in the American memorandum of October 2, 1941, Japan felt it necessary to clarify the record.

In spite of the fact that the American document had maintained that Prince Konoye fully subscribed to the four points contained in the memorandum of October 2, 1941, actually the Prime Minister had accepted the four point program only "in principle", and had indicated that some adjustment would be required in their application to actual conditions. Ambassador Grew interpolated the comment that there was no doubt as to the accuracy of his report concerning the Japanese Prime Minister's statement. Foreign Minister Toyoda then stated that following the complete examination of the memorandum of October 2, 1941, further comments would be forthcoming. In the meantime, the Japanese Foreign Minister, referring to the unofficial draft statement presented to Secretary Hull by Ambassador Nomura on September 4, 1941 as well as Prince Konoye's unofficial statement of September 6, 1941, requested that misunderstandings arising from a discussion of such "technical procedure" should be avoided until some real progress had been made.

Foreign Minister Toyoda commented briefly on the United States' desire to revert to the status quo which had prevailed four years ago in the Pacific. Because Japan had been involved in large scale warfare since that time, a return to the situation previously existing would entail basic adjustments in Japan.

When asked for his own private opinion on the position of the United States according to the memorandum of October 2, 1941, Ambassador Grew replied that America was endeavoring to ensure that Japan would observe those principles designed to achieve lasting peace in the Pacific area.[432]

(b) Foreign Minister Toyoda's Report[433]

On October 7, 1941 Foreign Minister Toyoda advised Ambassador Nomura that he had requested Ambassador Grew to call upon him to discuss the American reply to the Japanese proposals. Assuming that the American Ambassador had also received a copy of the United States' memorandum of October 2, 1941, Foreign Minister Toyoda inquired concerning Mr. Grew's opinions on the document. However, since Ambassador Grew had received only a resume of his government's memorandum, he was loath to express an opinion without having read the full text.

[431] "Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)" October 7, 1941, S.D., II, 663-665.
[432] Ibid.
[433] III, 249.

[97]

Certain that this resume contained the most important points of the American memorandum, and would facilitate the forming of an opinion, Foreign Minister Toyoda urged that Ambassador Grew cooperate in reaching an understanding by voicing his ideas. Although forced to base his statements on an inadequate knowledge of the circumstances, Ambassador Grew replied that the United States was undoubtedly attempting to secure an agreement on the preliminary conditions.

Remarking bluntly that the Japanese government was dissatisfied with the American reply, Foreign Minister Toyoda said that the United States did not understand the domestic and external conditions affecting Japan. Assuring the Japanese Foreign Minister that recently he had submitted a fourteen page report on the various changes seen during his many years in Japan, Ambassador Grew said that he had described fully the sincere efforts made by the Japanese government to effect a compromise with America. However, Ambassador Grew did not continue the discussion of this matter.

Foreign Minister Toyoda then discussed certain phrases used in the United States' memorandum of October 2, 1941 which did not meet the approval of the Japanese government. Although it stated that Prime Minister Konoye had "fully subscribed" to the four principles laid down by the United States, actually the record of the meeting between Ambassador Grew and the Japanese Prime Minister clearly showed that Prince Konoye had agreed to these policies "in principle" only.

When Ambassador Grew insisted that he had reported the discussion accurately to his government because he had been fully aware of the importance of each word spoken, Foreign Minister Toyoda agreed that the matter was important and that his notes clearly recorded an agreement in principle only. In view then of this error the Japanese government took the liberty of changing the term "fully" to "in principle". In order to have the statement coincide with that made in the original discussion, Prime Minister Toyoda ordered that this correction be made in the copies of the American memorandum sent to Ambassador Nomura and other authorized persons for their perusal. Ambassador Grew thanked the Japanese Foreign Minister for reporting this discrepancy to him.

After explaining that he had no desire to become too argumentative, Foreign Minister Toyoda asked by what authority the United States had quoted a passage from Prime Minister Konoye's private message to President Roosevelt in an official American document. Agreeing with Foreign Minister Toyoda wholeheartedly, Ambassador Grew stated that the error must have been due to faulty handling of the papers in the State Department. Returning to the matter concerning the "fully subscribed" quotation, Ambassador Grew seemed to recall that it was Ambassador Nomura who had accepted the four principles unconditionally.

Foreign Minister Toyoda stated that if this misunderstanding had been caused by careless handling of certain papers by Japanese representatives, it would be necessary to make amends at a future date, since any action taken now would involve the danger of needlessly confusing the issue. Since Ambassador Nomura himself had caused a misunderstanding by submitting a personal note on September 4, 1941, Foreign Minister Toyoda believed it advisable to do nothing further at the present time.[434]

109. Mr. Terasaki Interviews Ambassador Grew[435]

On the day following Foreign Minister Toyoda's conversation with the American Ambassador, Mr. Terasaki requested Ambassador Grew to discuss from an entirely personal and unofficial standpoint the American memorandum of October 2, 1941.[436]

[434] Ibid.
[435] "Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)", October 8, 1941, S.D., II, 666-667.
[436] Ibid.

[98]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

The American Ambassador said the memorandum, friendly in tone and helpful in substance, indicated the desire of the United States to make progress in the conversations. When asked by Mr. Terasaki what actions the United States wished Japan to take in order to reach a mutual agreement, Ambassador Grew replied that three major points which had caught his eye were: (1) the withdrawal of Japanese troops from China; (2) the application to the entire Pacific area of certain Japanese assurances which appeared limited to the southwest Pacific; and (3) Japanese claims for special privileges in China as a result of geographical propinquity to that country.

Pointing out that many prominent Japanese officials were comparing the Monroe Doctrine and the United States' relationship to Latin American countries with Japan's position in the Far East, Ambassador Grew emphasized that the two situations were not at all analogous. Since the American Ambassador and Mr. Terasaki could not agree on this point it was not pursued further.

Turning to America's desire for the withdrawal of Japanese troops from both China and French Indo-China, Mr. Terasaki asked if Japan must take action before a meeting between President Roosevelt and Prince Konoye took place. Explaining that he was not in a position to interpret the State Department's phraseology, Ambassador Grew nevertheless expressed his private opinion that in view of previous failures of Japan to live up to its promises his government desired to see concrete evidence of Japan's "manifest intentions" to withdraw its forces from occupied territories.

Ambassador Grew then reminded Mr. Terasaki that Secretary Hull desired that informal discussions relating to both Japanese and American proposals be held in Washington. Though Mr. Terasaki expressed surprise at this, Ambassador Grew said that he had conveyed this information to Foreign Minister Toyoda. If Japan were uncertain regarding any portion of the memorandum of October 2, 1941, Ambassador Grew suggested that Ambassador Nomura seek an interview with Secretary Hull.

Because Mr. Terasaki referred during the conversation to America's suggestion that Japan declare publicly its intention to withdraw its troops from China and French Indo-China, Ambassador Grew was certain that Japan thoroughly understood this point.[437]

110. Tokyo Explains Background of Japanese-American Negotiations to Japanese Ambassador in Berlin

In a message to the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin on October 8, 1941 Foreign Minister Toyoda summarized the background of the current Japanese negotiations with America. The Japanese-American informal conversations had been inaugurated during the administration of the second Konoye Cabinet, but a rupture had occurred when Japan felt it necessary to penetrate into French Indo-China in order to hasten the end of the China Incident, break the Anglo-American encirclement by joint defense, and procure essential materials. Although its action had been motivated solely by self defense, according to Japan, England and the United States had imposed an economic blockade upon Japan with the result that diplomatic relations had deteriorated and the internal situation existing in Japan had become extremely critical.[438]

When the war between Germany and Russia had become a protracted struggle, contrary to German expectations, the United States and England came to Russia's assistance. Commerce between Europe and Asia had been disrupted, and Japanese liaison with Germany and Italy had been severed.[439]

[437] Ibid.
[438] III, 250.
[439] Ibid.

[99]

Meanwhile, England and the United States had tightened their economic net about Japan, preventing the Japanese government from concluding its war with China. As a result Japan had attempted to negotiate with the United States so that hostilities with the Chinese could be terminated under satisfactory conditions and an era of co-prosperity could be established in East Asia during which time Japan's natural resources could be conserved for the future. By means of diplomatic negotiations Japan had intended to open the way for a compromise with the United States to ensure its own economic stability.

After concluding the Tripartite Pact, Japan had attempted to include Russia in the Japanese-German-Italian Pact, and by using German Ambassador Stahmer in negotiations between Tokyo and Moscow, to effect a solution to any problems in the north. Mr. Ott had also promised to work for an understanding between Japan and Soviet Russia.

Japan also had intended to guarantee goods from the South Seas to Germany and Italy in return for certain mechanical and technical assistance. However, unexpected events had occurred recently and at the present time Japan could conclude the China Incident promptly only by maintaining amicable relations with the United States.[440]

Since Germany as well as Japan recognized the need for preventing the United States from entering the European war, during the Matsuoka-Stahmer conversations, it promised to spare no effort to improve relations between the United States and Japan. In fact, the Tripartite Pact had been intended to establish universal peace by preventing the spread of the European war and restraining the United States from participating in it. Now, however, the European war affected all the countries of Europe; only the Pacific remained untouched. In conformity with the original spirit of the Tripartite Pact, therefore, Japan believed it advisable to investigate the causes of any problems existing between Japan and the United States in order to ensure harmony in the Pacific area.[441]

With this objective in view, Mr. Matsuoka's Cabinet had begun negotiations with Washington, and even after a new Cabinet had come into power, Prime Minister Konoye felt the need for continuing them. At the very moment when Tokyo and Washington had been arguing over the Japanese occupation of French Indo-China, Prime Minister Konoye had suggested that a conference between President Roosevelt and himself would establish the foundation for an understanding between the two governments.

Since the time of that proposal, conversations had been held for the purpose of exchanging opinions prior to the major meeting. On October 4, 1941 Japan received the American memorandum concerning the proposal for a leaders' conference which had been forwarded from its Embassy in Washington. The document was now under study by the Japanese Foreign Minister.

Current negotiations diverged in no way from the principles contained in the Tripartite Pact. Japan merely wished to conclude its hostilities with China through a basic treaty by which the United States would coerce the Chiang regime into allowing Japan to establish an area of co-prosperity in greater East Asia. To ensure economic stability and peace in the Pacific area Japan desired to prevent the expansion of the European war, and particularly, the United States' participation in it.[442]

[440] III, 251.
[441] III, 252.
[442] III, 253.

[100]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

111. Ambassador Nomura Explains the American Attitude Toward the Japanese Proposals

On October 8, 1941 Ambassador Nomura advised Foreign Minister Toyoda of his personnel opinion regarding the American attitude toward the Japanese proposals.[443] According to the Japanese Ambassador, the American memorandum of October 2, 1941 made it apparent that the United States intended to base any further negotiations with Japan on the four original principles laid down during the first preliminary discussions. Since the United States believed it necessary, before settling the Pacific question, to achieve unanimity on the fundamental questions, previously explored by both nations in their unofficial talks, Ambassador Nomura was certain that the American government would not agree to a meeting between the leaders of the two countries until it was clearly determined that the four principles would be applied concretely to the problems of the Pacific area. Dissatisfied because Japan would not discuss these policies in detail, the United States demanded further clarification of Japanese views.[444]

Ambassador Nomura agreed with American officials that in Japan's proposals submitted on September 6, 1941 and in its subsequent explanation Japan had limited the scope of the previous informal conversations and had curtailed the guarantees concerning the aforementioned principles. Japan had not only refused to guarantee wholeheartedly that it would stop armed aggression, but it had limited the extent of commercial nondiscrimination. Using geographic propinquity as an excuse, Japan hoped to secure more favorable economic conditions for itself in China. Therefore, the question of garrisoning Japanese troops in China and French Indo-China remained a major obstacle in the negotiations. Moreover, a clearer explanation of Japan's obligations under the Tripartite Pact was requested by American officials.[445]

Since the United States firmly believed that any disagreement on the four basic principles would prevent the success of future discussions, it wished to obtain unanimity regarding their interpretation and then gradually turn to a discussion of matters relating to them. Because it had been made evident in the United States proposals of June 2, 1941 that the United States intended to retain those four principles as a basis for any negotiations, Ambassador Nomura felt that the Japanese proposals of September 25, 1941 were being disregarded. Nevertheless, the Japanese Ambassador advised that further discussions be held concerning the China Incident and the discontinuation of American activities designed to help Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

Other matters in the latest Japanese proposal which needed clarification included the stipulation concerning the Nanking Treaty in the clause relating to the China Incident, joint mediation and the right of self-protection mentioned in the clause concerning the Japanese attitude toward the European war, and the question of eliminating the annex to the clause regarding commerce between the United States and Japan.[446]

Ambassador Nomura drew to Foreign Minister Toyoda's attention the fact that, during the conversations in Tokyo, Ambassador Grew had assumed that an understanding had already been reached by Ambassador Nomura with Secretary Hull on the four basic principles. But on April 16, 1941 when Secretary Hull first presented the four principles to Ambassador Nomura, the Japanese Ambassador had not felt authorized to accept such a proposal before receiving instructions from his government.

[443] III, 254.
[444] III, Ibid.
[445] III, 255.
[446] III, 256.

[101]

Although Ambassador Nomura had been careful not to give the impression that Japan would accept the principles, he nevertheless believed that because of their abstractness they would be applied with some elasticity by the United States. Since discussions of principles in any peace conference were often circumlocutory, Ambassador Nomura did not feel that his government should become particularly troubled over this aspect of the situation.[447]

112. Mr. Terasaki Calls on Mr. Dooman (October 9, 1941)

Although on the preceding day he had received Ambassador Grew's opinion concerning the American memorandum of October 2, 1941, Mr. Terasaki called upon Counselor Dooman to receive his personal observations regarding the same document.[448] Since Ambassador Grew had reported his conversation to the American Embassy, Mr. Dooman did not feel that he was in a position to elaborate further on this matter. Nevertheless, Mr. Terasaki insisted on summarizing his discussion with Ambassador Grew, continually emphasizing the American Ambassador's belief that the American memorandum was friendly in tone and helpful in substance.

Since the withdrawal of Japanese forces from China was a major point in the United States' memorandum, Mr. Terasaki asked whether Japan was expected to execute such a move before President Roosevelt and Prince Konoye conferred. Admitting that such an interpretation might be applied, Mr. Dooman pointed out that the American government hesitated to enter any formal negotiations as long as Japanese troops continued to exercise complete control over French Indo-China as though it were a Japanese colony. When Mr. Terasaki expressed ignorance of such a situation existing in French Indo-China, Mr. Dooman referred to the arrest of French and Chinese nationals, the seizure of private property, airfields and military barracks, and threats to seize the Customs.

Mr. Terasaki then turned the conversation to the Japanese formula for the application of equality throughout the southwest Pacific. Mr. Dooman believed that Japan did not intend to confine its policy of nondiscrimination solely to the southwest Pacific, and he did not feel that this issue should constitute any obstacle to peace negotiations. On the other hand, Mr. Terasaki agreed that Japan's explanations of its proposals were open to the very implications which Japan had desired to avoid.

Returning to the problem of recalling Japanese troops from China, Mr. Terasaki attempted to define his government's position by pointing out that Tokyo could not withdraw its forces until an agreement had been reached between Japan and China. As a demonstration of Japan's desire for peace, Mr. Dooman suggested that the Japanese government furnish a time schedule for the withdrawal of the troops or consider the establishment of a military police force by the Chinese government, with the assistance of foreign military experts, as a substitute for the Japanese troops which Japan proposed to station in Inner Mongolia and North China.[449]

113. Mr. Dooman Warns Mr. Terasaki Against New Japanese Troop Landings in French Indo-China.

Later that same day, learning that Japan was prepared to land 50,000 additional troops in Tonking, French Indo-China on or about October 15, 1941, Mr. Dooman returned Mr. Terasaki's call to warn him of the serious consequences which might follow such a move.[450] Mr. Dooman then reminded Mr. Terasaki that the situation created by the first Japanese landings in July, 1941 had ended the informal conversations then in progress between the two governments.

[447] III, 257.
[448] "Memorandum by the Counselor of Embassy in Japan (Dooman)", October 9, 1941, S.D., II, 667-669.
[449] Ibid.
[450] "Memorandum by the Counselor of Embassy in Japan (Dooman)", October 9, 1941, S.D., II, 669-670.

[102]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

Stating that he was unaware of such a plan of the Japanese military force, Mr. Terasaki assured Mr. Dooman that he would immediately convey this information to Foreign Minister Toyoda.

114. Hull-Nomura Conversation (October 9, 1941)

(a) State Department's Report[451]

After first expressing Japan's appreciation of the American attitude toward the visit of three requisitioned Japanese ships to the United States, Ambassador Nomura referred to the American memorandum of October 2, 1941. Following his recent instructions from Tokyo, Ambassador Nomura requested Secretary Hull to express his reactions to those points entailing a divergence of view between the two governments.

In Ambassador Nomura's opinion there were three main questions to be decided: (1) the relation of Japan and the United States to the European war; (2) the stationing of Japanese troops in certain areas of China; and (3) the application of the principle of commercial nondiscrimination to the entire Pacific area.

At this point in the conversation Secretary Hull declared that America had been disturbed at the modifications and restrictions which the Japanese proposals imposed upon the broad program originally planned to ensure peace and stability throughout the entire Pacific. Although the principle of nondiscrimination in international trade had been intended to pertain to the entire Pacific area, Japan had greatly limited its practical application. Furthermore, because of its propinquity to China, Japan apparently intended to reserve special privileges for itself in that country.

Secretary Hull suggested that Mr. Hamilton and Mr. Ballantine meet with the Japanese Ambassador to clarify the aims of their respective governments. It was then agreed to have this meeting take place later in the afternoon.

Although Prince Konoye had informed Ambassador Grew in Tokyo that he personally subscribed in principle to Secretary Hull's four basic points for peace, Ambassador Nomura pointed out that certain problems, particularly in regard to China, remained to be solved. Since chaos would undoubtedly arise from the conflicting policies of the Kuomingtang and the Communistic parties in China, the withdrawal of Japanese troops would endanger Tokyo's commercial enterprises there and place Japan itself in a dangerous position.

Ambassador Nomura did not respond when Secretary Hull asked if the Chinese government would accept the stationing of Japanese troops in its country. Secretary Hull believed that a sufficient number of Chinese troops might be trained to maintain order in their own country. From the United States' experience in Latin America, Secretary Hull continued, the stationing of any troops in a foreign country perpetuated a feeling of ill will. To stress his point further Secretary Hull referred to the situation existing in the United States after the Civil War when northern troops were retained in the southern states.

Ambassador Nomura answered that Japan was now at a political crossroad. Expressing only his own personal opinion, the Japanese Ambassador believed that the majority of the Japanese people supported the renewal of amicable relations with the United States, in spite of agitators within the government who were attempting to disrupt peaceful negotiations. Because war between Japan and the United States would be such a serious undertaking, Ambassador Nomura desired that everything possible be done to avert the possibility of conflict.

[451] "Memorandum of a conversation", October 9, 1941, initialed by Mr. Joseph W. Ballantine, S.D., II, 670-672.

[103]

In the course of this discussion both Secretary Hull and Ambassador Nomura exchanged compliments concerning their mutual regard for the other's integrity and frankness of expression.[452]

(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report[453]

Ambassador Nomura reported that in accordance with his instructions he had called on Secretary Hull on the morning of October 9, 1941. In the discussion that followed concerning the proposals which had been brought up in the meeting held at the White House on September 3, 1941, Secretary Hull again proposed the extension of a nondiscriminatory policy throughout the entire Pacific area. He also said that geographical proximity could be interpreted in many ways.

Secretary Hull promised that Mr. Ballantine and other American officials would make a detailed report to the Japanese Ambassador that afternoon after the papers submitted by Ambassador Nomura had been carefully perused. Asking that the United States reconsider its attitude toward Japanese troops stationed in China, Ambassador Nomura reminded Secretary Hull of the critical political situation existing in certain parts of China which rendered military protection absolutely essential.

When the Japanese Ambassador turned the conversation to Prime Minister Konoye's adherence "in principle" to the four principles laid down by the American government, Secretary Hull immediately indicated that he was already aware of the Japanese attitude toward this matter.[454]

115. Japanese-American Conversation (October 9, 1941)

(a) State Department's Report[455]

By prearrangement, Mr. Hamilton, Mr. Ballantine and Mr. Schmidt called on the Japanese Ambassador at the Japanese Embassy on October 9, 1941 in an attempt to clarify questions raised by Ambassador Nomura during his conference with Secretary Hull earlier in the day. Although the American officials had expected the discussions to pertain to the United States' memorandum of October 2, 1941, the Japanese officials referred constantly to their government's proposals of September 6 and September 25, 1941.

According to Ambassador Nomura and his staff, which included Mr. Wakasugi, Mr. Okumura, Mr. Matsudaira and Mr. Obata, they desired to learn America's exact objections to their proposals of September 25, 1941. By way of reply, the American diplomats pointed out that the document of October 2, 1941 embodied the policies of the United States, and indicated the commitments it desired Japan to make. The American officials suggested that Japan compare its recently submitted proposals with those fundamental principles for peace clearly set forth by the United States during previous informal conversations and in numerous documents.

At this point in the conversation, Ambassador Nomura declared that the three questions causing a divergence in view between the two governments were: (1) The interpretation of the Tripartite Pact and the inalienable right of self-defense; (2) The application of the principle of commercial nondiscrimination; and (3) The problem of Japanese troops stationed in Chinese territory. In Ambassador Nomura's opinion, the only issue presenting any real difficulty was the removal of Japanese forces from China, and he was still convinced that in a meeting with President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Konoye would be able to present a satisfactory solution.

[452] Ibid.
[453] III, 258.
[454] Ibid.
[455] "Memorandum of a conversation", October 9, 1941, initialed by Mr. Max Schmidt, S.D., II, 672-677.

[104]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

Besides these three basic differences, Ambassador Nomura mentioned, as further complications in the negotiations, certain problems of phraseology and the question of bringing the American draft document of June 21, 1941 up to date. The American representatives interposed that because of the changing situation in the Pacific, Secretary Hull believed that revisions such as those suggested on September 10, 1941 should be incorporated into the existing proposals. However, these revisions would constitute no substantial change in the United States' attitude toward matters which had been tentatively agreed upon in the draft of June 21, 1941.

When Ambassador Nomura asked if his country's action toward Russia and its present activities in French Indo-China had affected Japanese-American relations, the American officials pointed out that the United States was interested in the establishment of peace throughout the entire Pacific. Furthermore, the American government was firmly convinced that the Japanese proposals of September 6, 1941 greatly restricted the broad-gauge principles proposed by the United States.

Ambassador Nomura then declared that his government was willing to interpret independently its obligations under the Tripartite Pact in conformity with the principle of peace in the Pacific. Reiterating Japan's desire to ascertain the exact position of the American government, Ambassador Nomura pointed to the necessity of reaching a workable agreement in the near future. At the same time, however, the Japanese Ambassador reminded the United States that since the Japanese people had suffered the sacrifices of four years of war, Tokyo must conclude an agreement advantageous to its people. In the opinion of the American representatives, Japan's greatest gain would be in following a progressive and constructive program in the Pacific.

While Admiral Nomura's staff appeared disappointed that Mr. Schmidt and his colleagues had avoided a point by point discussion of the Japanese proposals of September 6 and September 25, 1941, they nevertheless asserted that the aims of the American memorandum of October 2, 1941 had now been more clearly expressed. From remarks made by Ambassador Nomura to the other Japanese representatives, it appeared that a report would be sent to Tokyo stating that the Japanese government should either redraft its proposals or prepare a new document on the basis of additional consideration of the fundamental principles discussed by the two countries.[456]

(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report[457]

On the afternoon of October 9, 1941 Mr. Hamilton, accompanied by Mr. Ballantine and Mr. Schmidt, delivered a reply to Ambassador Nomura from Secretary Hull. Ambassador Nomura had received instructions to determine whether the United States was in agreement with Japan upon all the points in the negotiations except the evacuation of Japanese troops from China and Japan's adherence to the Tripartite Pact.[458]

When questioned by the Japanese Ambassador concerning their intentions, the American officials stated that the United States had explained its policies very clearly in the memorandum of October 2, 1941. Since America sought to promote in the Pacific a peace founded on the four basic principles, the Japanese aggression northward and southward, Japan's discriminatory commercial practices in the Pacific, the refusal to withdraw Japanese troops from China and adherence to the Tripartite Pact caused the United States to be disturbed concerning the future. Desirous of applying its four basic principles to the entire Pacific area, the United States saw no reason for using different principles in different areas of the Pacific.

[456] Ibid.
[457] III, 259.
[458] III, 245.

[105]

Turning the discussion to other points in the negotiations, Ambassador Nomura asked if the United States was satisfied with Japan's explanation of its policies other than those divergent views set forth in the American memorandum of October 2, 1941. The American officials answered that the basic attitude of the United States government on all questions was clearly outlined in its reply to the Japanese proposals, therefore nothing more need be added to clarify America's viewpoint. If a "meeting of minds" could be reached with regard to the interpretation of the four basic principles, the United States representatives appeared certain that all other questions would find a natural solution.

Ambassador Nomura reported that the American officials avoided giving any definite replies to his questions. However, they did remark that certain points in the June 21, 1941 American proposal might need revision, in view of subsequent changes in the world situation. However, the larger aspects of the existing problems remained the same. If Japan would reconsider its proposals of September 6, 1941 and submit a new document, the United States was ready to give it careful consideration.[459]

116. Foreign Minister Toyoda Is Dissatisfied with Ambassador Nomura's Reports

On October 10, 1945 Foreign Minister Toyoda informed Ambassador Nomura of his belief that the negotiations had reached a decisive stage and declared that in order to bring about a definite understanding at this time, senseless procrastination must be eliminated from all future dealings. It was with this in mind that Foreign Minister Toyoda had asked Ambassador Nomura to clarify with the United States the points relative to the stationing of Japanese troops in China and the interpretation of the Tripartite Pact.[460]

Yet in spite of instructions sent from Tokyo, the Japanese Ambassador continued to send his own opinions rather than those of the American officials regarding the policies of the United States. Foreign Minister Toyoda stated emphatically that what he desired was the opinions of the American officials and no others.[461] From Ambassador Nomura's report of October 9, 1941,[462] Foreign Minister Toyoda had no way of knowing whether there were any chances for further conversations with Secretary Hull. Therefore, the Japanese Foreign Minister ordered Ambassador Nomura to submit immediately in detail the minutes of all conversations and to indicate the prospect of future negotiations. Furthermore, in any future conversations with Secretary Hull or President Roosevelt, Ambassador Nomura was to be accompanied by Minister Wakasugi or Mr. Iguchi.[463]

117. Ambassador Nomura Replies to Foreign Minister Toyoda's Complaint

In reply to Foreign Minister Toyoda's complaint, Ambassador Nomura reported on October 10, 1941 that the American government demanded the maintenance of peace in the Pacific.[464] In the United States' opinion, Japan's policies were semi-pacific and semi-aggressive. Because the proposals of September 6, 1941, issued by the Japanese government, diverged from agreements reached in preparatory talks, the United States refused to continue negotiations or to clarify its own statements any further.

[459] III, 259.
[460] III, 260.
[461] Ibid.
[462] III, 258.
[463] III, 260.
[464] III, 261.

[106]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

Ambassador Nomura believed that the United States would effect a compromise only in accordance with the lines set down in its memorandum of October 2, 1941. Unless such an agreement were achieved, the proposed conference between the leaders of Japan and the United States would never take place. Although the United States refused to make any further statements, it was willing to accept any future Japanese proposals meeting the specifications defined in the American memorandum of October 2, 1941.[465]

118. Grew-Toyoda Conversation (October 10, 1941)

(a) Ambassador Grew's Report[466]

In order to discuss the American memorandum of October 2, 1941, Ambassador Grew and Foreign Minister Toyoda met on the afternoon of October 10, 1941. Although the Japanese Foreign Minister had encountered difficulty in perceiving the point of the American memorandum, he determined that three main obstacles were impeding Japanese-American relations: (1) the maintenance of Japanese troops in China, (2) the respective attitudes of the United States and Japan to the war in Europe, and (3) equal opportunity in China.

In Foreign Minister Toyoda's opinion, if the United States had answered Ambassador Nomura's requests of October 3, 6 and 9, 1941 by stating definitely the commitment the United States wished Japan to make, the successful conclusion of an agreement would have been accelerated. Therefore, Foreign Minister Toyoda again requested that the United States clarify the commitments which Japan must make in order to actuate a rapprochement between the two countries.

Turning the conversation to the attitude of the Japanese press, Ambassador Grew expressed his disapproval of the criticism expressed in Japan's newspapers because of the apparent failure of the present conversations. After insisting that public opinion would be easy to control once the proposed meeting between Prince Konoye and President Roosevelt had been convened, Foreign Minister Toyoda assured Ambassador Grew that the Japanese government would make far reaching commitments during that meeting, though it could not take more definite action beforehand.

However, Ambassador Grew feared that the arrival of additional Japanese forces in French Indo-China was creating a delicate situation which could adversely affect the negotiations now being attempted. In reply, Foreign Minister Toyoda declared that he had already asked the War Minister to check the activities of the Japanese authorities in French Indo-China and to remedy any aggressive action there.

Because Ambassador Nomura was apparently under considerable strain, Tokyo was considering sending an experienced diplomat to assist the Japanese Ambassador in conducting the informal conversations at Washington. In the event that such an official were chosen, Foreign Minister Toyoda, stressing the necessity for expediting the progress of the conversations, asked if the American government would arrange a plane reservation from Manila to San Francisco. Ambassador Grew offered to transmit this inquiry to the United States.[467]

(b) Foreign Minister Toyoda's Report[468]

Wishing to secure a clear-cut proposal from the United States, Foreign Minister Toyoda asked Ambassador Grew to call on him during the afternoon of October 10, 1941. When giving a resume of this discussion to Ambassador Nomura, two days later, Foreign Minister Toyoda suggested that the Japanese Ambassador in the United States continue his efforts along the same lines.

[465] Ibid.
[466] "Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)", October 10, 1941, S.D., II, 677-679.
[467] Ibid.
[468] III, 262.

[107]

In discussing the American memorandum of October 2, 1941 to Ambassador Grew, Foreign Minister Toyoda explained that the Japanese government had expressed considerable difficulty in grasping its main points. However, Japan decided that the existing problem included the garrisoning of Japanese troops in China; the English, Japanese, and American attitude toward the European war; and finally commercial discrimination in China.

If the United States had any misgivings concerning Japan's attitude towards these three points, Foreign Minister Toyoda was anxious to answer any questions. Although Foreign Minister Toyoda desired to draw up a treaty covering those three points for adoption of both countries, he believed that the question of time excluded the possibility of exchanging further official notes and documents. At this point in the negotiations, only a conference between the leaders of both governments could effect a suitable solution.

When Ambassador Grew remarked that American public opinion must be considered carefully, Foreign Minister Toyoda replied that Japanese public opinion was an equally important factor. However, once the proposed leaders' conference was convened, the present tension of the Japanese people would be greatly relieved.

Foreign Minister Toyoda could not speak about further Japanese aggression in French Indo-China at this conference, because, as yet, the Japanese army had made no reply to the Foreign Office in regard to Ambassador Grew's statement concerning that move.[469]

It will be noted that Foreign Minister Toyoda did not inform Ambassador Nomura of the fact that he had discussed with Ambassador Grew the sending of another Japanese diplomat with the personal rank of Ambassador to assist the Japanese Ambassador in Washington.

119. Tokyo Sends Instructions for Welles-Wakasugi Conference

On October 11, 1941 Minister Wakasugi advised his government that he would confer with Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles at 5:00 P.M. on October 13, 1941.[470] Therefore, on October 13, 1941 the Japanese Foreign Office issued instructions to Minister Wakasugi governing his forthcoming conversation with Mr. Welles.[471]

Pointing out that the situation in Japan was approaching a crisis and any adjustments of Japanese-American relations would have to be accomplished immediately, Foreign Minister Toyoda urged that Minister Wakasugi's conversation with Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles cover all the Japanese-American negotiations to date. First of all, however, the Japanese representative must determine if the United States disagreed with Japan on any other points except the three then under consideration. Japan was particularly interested in the exact demands of the United States in the proposal submitted on June 21, 1941. However, if the United States government refused to deliver a clear-cut counter-proposal, Japan desired that America draw up an entirely new tentative agreement without delay.[472]

Since circumstances would not permit even a moment's delay in the present negotiations, Foreign Minister Toyoda directed Minister Wakasugi to submit a rough outline of his conversation with Mr. Welles immediately after it had taken place, and later to give more complete details by cable.[473]

[469] Ibid.
[470] III, 263.
[471] III, 264-265.
[472] Ibid.
[473] III, 266.

[108]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

120. Welles-Wakasugi Conversation (October 13, 1941)

(a) Under Secretary Welles' Report[474]

Since he had recently returned from an official visit to Japan, Mr. Wakasugi, the Minister-Counselor of the Japanese Embassy, called on Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles on October 13, 1941 to convey his personal impressions concerning Japan's internal situation. During his stay at Tokyo, Mr. Wakasugi had interviews with Prince Takamatsu, the brother and closest adviser of the Emperor; Prince Higashi Kuni; Prince Konoye; Marquis Kido, another close adviser of the Emperor; Foreign Minister Toyoda and high ranking army and navy officials.

Mentioning that there existed among this group a unanimous desire for a Japanese-American rapprochement, Mr. Wakasugi noted that the pro-Axis elements had become powerful, particularly among the younger members of Japan's armed forces. Therefore, although the policies of the Japanese government were supported by the controlling factions in the army and navy and by public opinion, unless the present conversations with the United States culminated in definite action, German propaganda agents at work in Japan would gain in power. Moreover, if the present Japanese Cabinet were to fall, as a result of a coup d'etat, because of assassination or because it could see no hope of reaching an agreement with the United States, it would be replaced by military representatives, responsive solely to German pressure, and hopes for a Japanese-American settlement would vanish.

In order to reach a Japanese-American understanding without delay, Prince Konoye had suggested a meeting with President Roosevelt. The failure of the United States to take a definite stand in the matter had prevented the Japanese government from finding out what in reality were the desires of the United States in regard to an agreement.

Refuting Mr. Wakasugi's last statement, Mr. Welles insisted that, not only throughout innumerable conversations, but more specifically in the documents of June 21, 1941 and October 2, 1941, the United States had clearly established its position. Moreover, in the opinion of the American government, it was the Japanese proposals of September 6, 1941 which had raised an obstacle to a liberal agreement by the very principles upon which the rapprochement was to have been based. Furthermore, Mr. Welles reminded the Japanese Minister that Tokyo had undertaken military action in French Indo-China and to the north of the Empire, which seemed to belie the main purpose for which the reaching of an agreement was being sought.

Mr. Wakasugi revealed that Axis agents in Japan were spreading the rumor that America was delaying negotiations because it had no desire to reach any agreement with Tokyo. According to Under Secretary Welles, there were some in the United States who were attributing the same policy to Japan.

In answering Mr. Welles' criticism of the Japanese aggression in French Indo-China, Mr. Wakasugi stated that the action taken was analogous to the occupation of Iceland by the United States. Continuing his explanation, Mr. Wakasugi stated that the Japanese occupation of French Indo-China had been undertaken through an agreement with a government dominated by Germany, while the American occupation of Iceland had been effected through an agreement with Denmark, a country also dominated by Germany.

In order to rectify the Japanese Minister's erroneous conception of the United States' action in Iceland, Mr. Welles asserted that the United States had not dealt through Denmark, but directly with the free government of Iceland. Furthermore, the United States had been motivated by a justifiable fear of the dangerous results German occupation of that territory would have on American defense. On the other hand, French Indo-China had presented no threat to Tokyo.

[474] "Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Welles)", October 13, 1941, S.D., II, 680-686.

[109]

Returning to the discussion of the Japanese proposals of September 6, 1941, Mr. Wakasugi stated that the misunderstanding of certain terms in these proposals had arisen largely through the use of unfortunate phraseology. In attempting to clarify these terms the Japanese Minister said that Japan would commit itself to undertake no aggressive moves, either north or south of the Empire. However, if the Stalin government were to collapse and some other foreign power were to take over eastern Siberia, Japan would be forced to defend its own interests and those of Manchukuo. Furthermore, in regard to the policy of commercial nondiscrimination, Japan had every intention of applying that principle to China and the entire Pacific area.

Referring to the Tripartite Pact, Mr. Wakasugi asked that the United States agree to leave the interpretation of Japan's obligations to the discretion of Tokyo. Although admitting that any new Cabinet might decide on a different interpretation, at the same time Mr. Wakasugi insisted that only the present Japanese Cabinet would desire to maintain peace with the United States in the event that the United States entered the war against Germany. Mr. Welles promised to refer this question to Secretary Hull.

Through insisting that evacuation of Japanese troops in China could not be completed in a day, Mr. Wakasugi stated that the Japanese government was willing eventually to evacuate all its troops from the China area. Thinking that he misunderstood this statement, Mr. Welles asked Mr. Wakasugi to repeat his remarks. The Japanese representative again said that his country was willing to evacuate its troops from China.

The Japanese Minister then asked if the American government would insist on approving the peace terms proposed by Japan before they were submitted to China. Mr. Welles replied that in the event the United States agreed to mediate between Japan and China, he would not undertake the transmission of peace terms to the Chungking government unless such terms were just and conducive to the maintenance of a stable peace in the Pacific.

In answer to another question from Mr. Wakasugi, Mr. Welles stated that it would not be possible to reach a basis for an understanding on the other major principles without settling the China Incident.

Emphasizing once more the desire of the Japanese government and controlling officials of both the Japanese army and navy to conclude and implement a comprehensive agreement with the United States, Mr. Wakasugi felt that within twenty-four or forty-eight hours, Japan would reach a final decision on the basic questions involved.[475]

(b) Mr. Wakasugi's Report

In accordance with the instructions from Tokyo, a general summarization of the Welles-Wasasugi conversation held on October 13, 1941 was submitted immediately after the interview had taken place. It stated that the conversation had lasted more than two hours with the general tone remaining friendly and frank throughout. Since both President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull still desired the materialization of the proposed meeting between the leaders of the two governments, Under Secretary Welles informed Mr. Wakasugi that if the three major issues were settled, no further obstacles would stand in the way of the meeting.

Though Mr. Wakasugi had received the impression that Secretary Hull believed that one or two points would need clarification when preliminary arrangements were brought up-to-date, Mr. Welles, uncertain of the nature of these points, promised to obtain more information concerning them for the Japanese representative.

[475] Ibid.

[110]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

After first assuring the American Under Secretary of State that his questions of the matter were purely personal and not influenced by either the Japanese government or Ambassador Nomura, Mr. Wakasugi stated that he felt the United States' attitude had been made clear in the proposals of June 21, 1941 and the oral statement of October 2, 1941. However, he wished to point out the difficulty, from a practical standpoint, of evacuating Japanese troops who had been stationed in China for a long period of years. Even if once determined upon, the execution of such a program would require months and even years. Moreover, since the removal of Japanese forces primarily concerned Japan and China, Mr. Wakasugi asked if the United States would be willing to leave the details of this removal to an agreement drawn up between Japan and China.

If Japan were sincere, Mr. Welles felt that the troop evacuation could be accomplished by such an agreement. At the same time, however, the United States had no intention of making further counter-proposals to the Japanese government since the American documents of June 21, 1941 and October 2, 1941 were the result of thorough and careful consideration and embodied all America's objectives. Nevertheless, Mr. Welles seemed confident that if the objectives contained in the American proposals were not changed, the United States would be willing to alter the phraseology of the proposals.

From the conversation, Mr. Wakasugi received the impression that the United States based its disapproval of the Japanese proposals of both September 6 and September 25, 1941 on the fact that they restricted considerably the terms decided upon in preliminary conversations.[476]

In a later message which gave a more complete account of his conversation with Under-Secretary of State Welles, Mr. Wakasugi reported that the main stumbling block in Japanese-American negotiations lay in the fact that the United States' main interest was in an agreement upon basic principles, whereas Japan desired, first of all, to clarify outstanding differences and then discuss basic generalities.[477] Mr. Wakasugi pointed out that before the basic principles could be carried out to any satisfactory degree, they must be applicable to actual circumstance, otherwise they remained meaningless. But Under Secretary of State Welles stated that if basic principles were decided upon, they could be applied later to actual problems and individual agreements.

In requesting that the United States exhibit great statesmanship by overlooking these differences and concluding a peace desired by both countries, Mr. Wakasugi pointed out that in spite of the practically unanimous desire of the Japanese people for a northward or southward move, the Japanese government had been willing to lose public support in order to adjust relations with the United States.

While appreciating the efforts of the Japanese government and encouraged by the statesmanship exhibited, the United States was nevertheless disturbed by Japan's occupation of French Indo-China after the United States had submitted its proposals for peace on June 21, 1941. By way of explanation, Mr. Wakasugi stated that the occupation of French Indo-China, which had a direct bearing on the China Incident, was carried out with the full agreement of the French government because of Japan's need for security.[478]

121. Secret Arrangements Are Made for Terasaki-Wakasugi Telephone Conversation

In order that more complete information of this Welles-Waskasugi conversation might be forwarded without delay to the Japanese government, secret arrangements were made by

[476] III, 267.
[477] III, 268-269.
[478] Ibid.

[111]

Tokyo on October 13, 1941 for a telephone conversation to take place on October 13, 1941 between Mr. Terasaki, Chief of the American Bureau in the Foreign Office at Tokyo, and Mr. Wakasugi.[479] A secret code in the guise of innocuous phrases was to be used to reveal the attitude of the United States and the general outlook of the current negotiations.[480]

122. Ambassador Nomura Confers with Rear Admiral Turner (October 14, 1941)

At an interview with Rear Admiral Richard K. Turner on October 14, 1941, Ambassador Nomura received a more complete picture of the American attitude toward a conference between the leaders of the two governments.[481] Although aware of the various internal difficulties which Japan was facing, Admiral Turner asserted that the United States needed a definite promise from the Japanese government, or at least some definite preliminary agreement settling the major differences, before a conference could be held between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Konoye. If such an understanding were not reached prior to this leaders' conference and, in the meantime, Japan advanced into Siberia, President Roosevelt would be placed in a difficult position.

Since Japan's statements indicated that it could decide matters pertaining to peace in the Pacific independently of any other nation, it seemed logical to Admiral Turner that the Japanese government could put aside its obligations under the Tripartite Pact in order to reach an understanding with the United States. Moreover, since it was impossible to withdraw troops all at once, a treaty could be arranged between Japan and China for a gradual withdrawal of Japanese troops from Chinese territory.[482]

123. American Sources Reveal Possibility of Early Russo-German Peace

During the same conversation with Admiral Turner on October 14, 1941 Ambassador Nomura learned of rumors rife in America concerning the possibility of an early peace between Russia and Germany.[483] Expressing a viewpoint which Ambassador Nomura believed was held by the United States Navy, Admiral Turner said that if Germany should offer Great Britain peace terms at the termination of the Russo-German war, Britain would refuse to accept them.

On the other hand, other American sources revealed different attitudes on this point. In the opinion of Mr. Herbert Hoover, London would quite possibly accept a generous peace agreement offered by Germany in the event that Russia made a separate peace. Since the belief that the European war might soon be terminated was held principally by American isolationists, Ambassador Nomura did not believe that it would have too great an effect on the Japanese-American negotiations.

Mr. Frederick Moore, the legal adviser to the Japanese Embassy in Washington, disclosed that in a conversation with Senator Thomas, Secretary Hull had stated that he hoped the Japanese government would not mistake American patience for weakness. A Washington newspaper correspondent thought that although the cessation of hostilities between Russia and Germany seemed probable, the odds for war between Japan and the United States were still even.[484]

[479] III, 270.
[480] Ibid.
[481] III, 271.
[482] Ibid.
[483] III, 272.
[484] Ibid.

[112]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

124. Ambassador Grew Is Informed of German Pressure (October 15, 1941)

During a private lunch with Mr. Amau, the Japanese Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, on October 15, 1941, Ambassador Grew learned that Germany was urging Japan to issue a statement confirming former Foreign Minister Matsuoka's interpretation of the Tripartite Pact, whereby Japan would declare war against the United States should war occur between Germany and the United States.[485] Though no reply had been sent to Berlin, Tokyo was contemplating a declaration stating that the maintenance of peace in the Pacific had been envisioned in the Tripartite Pact, and with this in mind, Japanese obligations under this pact had been brought to the attention of the United States.

125. Rear Admiral Turner Confers with Mr. Terasaki (October 15, 1941)

Rear Admiral Turner, a trusted friend of Admiral Stark, invited Mr. Terasaki to his home on the evening of October 15, 1941.[486] In discussing the relation of the European war to the Pacific, Admiral Turner said that the United States must prevent Hitler from gaining control over Europe because of the direct threat that German domination could eventually constitute to Central and South America. In order to stop German aggression, therefore, America had adopted the policy of strengthening Great Britain's natural resources, including those in the Far East.

In its negotiations with the Japanese government, the United States felt a certain trepidation because it doubted whether the present Japanese Cabinet had the support of the Japanese army. If an agreement were reached between the two countries under these circumstances, the United States wondered if the Japanese military faction, finding itself at variance with these negotiations, might overthrow the present Japanese Cabinet. Nevertheless, Admiral Turner pointed to the urgency of drawing up a formula on the basis of an equal compromise between Tokyo and Washington. According to Ambassador Nomura, Admiral Turner did not think that the Japanese were ready to compromise.[487]

To broach Japanese-American negotiations while doubting the ability of the Japanese Cabinet to carry out its promises was, in Mr. Terasaki's opinion, putting the cart before the horse. When mutual doubts were rife, he felt the United States should exercise greater statesmanship. Calling the United States' attitude toward the Far East and the China Incident idealistic, Mr. Terasaki remarked that the talk of principles was a hobby among the rich. After stating that the United States appeared determined to force Japan to fight with China until both countries were exhausted, Mr. Terasaki insisted that the China Incident was not an oversimplified question of principle, but was a matter of life or death to Japan. Because of sheer necessity, the Japanese had been forced to adopt an aggressive attitude toward China. Although he did not propose to go into the history of Panamanian-American relations at this time, Mr. Terasaki did compare his country's actions in China to the realistic policy adopted by the United States in its dealings with Central America.

If Admiral Turner were aware of the temperament of the Japanese people, Mr. Terasaki felt sure that he would realize that when cornered the Japanese would lose all interest in life and death and would fight back furiously. Although poorer materially than America, the Japanese government would fight to the finish in a Japanese-American war. On the other hand, if America extended its hand in friendship, Japan and the United States could become lasting friends instead of permanent enemies.[488]

[485] "Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)", October 15, 1941, S.D., II, 686.
[486] III, 273.
[487] Ibid.
[488] III, 274.

[113]

126. Foreign Minister Toyoda Orders Further Welles-Wakasugi Conversations

Since Foreign Minister Toyoda believed that further conversations between Mr. Wakasugi and Under Secretary of State Welles might produce favorable results, on October 15, 1941 he requested the Japanese Minister to maintain close relations with the American Under Secretary of State.[489] During any further conversations, Mr. Wakasugi was instructed not to debate the United States' desire for establishing basic principles and Japan's insistence on clarifying outstanding differences, for if such arguments ensued during these conversations, Japan feared that the United States would insist on including the four basic principles in the text of any agreement.

Since these so-called basic principles were omitted from the preamble of the United States' proposals of June 21, 1941, Japan wished to take advantage of the American desire to use its June 21, 1941 proposals as a basis for definite negotiations, and thereby possibly continue the informal conversations without discussing the four basic principles independently.

According to Foreign Minister Toyoda, the Japanese proposals of September 25, 1941 had merely incorporated the Japanese proposals of September 16, 1941 into the American proposal of June 21, 1941. Since Japan did not feel that it should make any further concessions until America made another move, the Foreign Minister asked that Mr. Wakasugi discuss all the points of variance between the Japanese proposal and the American document of June 21, 1941 and report American intentions in these matters.

Because of the nature of these conversations, Japan further suggested that the matter be handled solely between Mr. Wakasugi and Under Secretary of State Welles. If sufficient progress were made, the matter could then be handled by Ambassador Nomura and Secretary Hull.[490]

127. Japanese Army Refuses To Evacuate Troops from China

In anticipation of Mr. Wakasugi's conference with Under Secretary of States Welles, scheduled for October 16, 1941, instructions had been received by the Japanese Military Attache in Washington from army headquarters in Tokyo, advising the Japanese representatives not to yield an inch in their stand on the need for Japanese troops in China.[491] Apparently, the Japanese army authorities in Tokyo believed that not enough stress had been laid upon the Japanese attitude toward the garrisoning of troops in Chinese territory. In the future, special emphasis was to be placed upon this question.[492]

Replying to these instructions, Ambassador Nomura stated that both he and Colonel Iwasa understood the aims of their government and had repeatedly informed American officials of the Japanese stand regarding this matter. Ambassador Nomura declared that during the conversation with Mr. Welles on October 13, 1941, Minister Wakasugi had deliberately avoided going deeply into the subject since the purpose of the conference had been merely to clarify certain points in the United States' proposals and ascertain America's intentions. However, Ambassador Nomura assured Foreign Minister Toyoda that Mr. Wakasugi would bring up the matter in his discussion with the American Under Secretary on the following day. Ambassador Nomura guaranteed that the importance of this question would not be minimized in an attempt to effect a compromise.[493]

[489] III, 275.
[490] Ibid.
[491] III, 276.
[492] Ibid.
[493] Ibid.

[114]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

The reader will recall that Mr. Welles reported on October 13, 1941 that Mr. Wakasugi had twice emphasized the willingness of his government to evacuate eventually all Japanese troops from China.[494] It is not possible to discover what Mr. Wakasugi reported concerning this aspect of the conversation on October 13, 1941, since only part 4 of his six-part message to Tokyo is available.

128. Japan Reminds the United States of Its Obligations Under the Tripartite Pact

Though both the German and Italian Ambassadors in Tokyo had been urging Foreign Minister Toyoda to inform them confidentially concerning Japanese-American negotiations, the Japanese Foreign Minister, in consideration of the nature of the negotiations, had declined to reveal the details of the conversation to the Axis representatives.[495]

Following German attacks on American merchant ships and the consequent movement for revising the United States' Neutrality Act, the German authorities demanded that the Japanese government inform President Roosevelt that further aggravation of America's relations with the Asiatic powers would inevitably result in a similar aggravation of diplomatic relations between Germany and Italy and the United States. This would provide reasons for Japan's assuming its obligations toward the Tripartite Pact, and, consequently, Japan might be forced to join the European war against the United States.

In view of Japan's negotiations with the United States, Foreign Minister Toyoda had postponed the submission of the message suggested by Berlin because he believed that its proper timing and wording should be carefully considered. Meanwhile, the German authorities were continually requesting that the Japanese government make its views concerning the Tripartite Pact known to the United States.[496]

The official Japanese message stated that Japan had repeatedly affirmed that the aim of the Tripartite Pact was to prevent the further extension of the European war. As a signer of the Tripartite Pact, Japan sincerely desired that German-American relations would not deteriorate further and that the prevailing tension would be alleviated immediately.[497]

129. The Konoye Cabinet Resigns

On October 16, 1941 the Japanese Cabinet headed by Prince Konoye resigned. Two days later a new Cabinet was formed under General Hideki Tojo as Prime Minister with Shigenori Toga as Minister for Foreign Affairs. On October 17, 1941 (October 16, Washington time) Foreign Minister Toyoda advised Ambassador Nomura that the Cabinet had reached a decision to resign as a body because of the differences among the Cabinet members.[498] One of the main divergencies of opinion had resulted from the question of evacuating Japanese troops from China. Nevertheless, negotiations with the United States would be continued by the new Japanese Cabinet along the lines already formulated.

After thanking Ambassador Nomura and his entire staff for their previous efforts, Foreign Minister Toyoda urged that they continue to work in unison and with a single purpose.[499]

[494] S.D., II, 685.
[495] III, 277.
[496] Ibid.
[497] III, 278.
[498] III, 279.
[499] Ibid.

[115]

130. Hull-Wakasugi-Welles Conversation (October 16 And October 17, 1941)

(a) Secretary Hull's Report[500]

By prearrangement Under Secretary of State Welles brought Japanese Minister Wakasugi to confer with Secretary Hull on both October 16 and October 17, 1941. In spite of certain elaborations on the documents which had been exchanged by the two governments during previous informal conversations, no further clarification of any of the proposals was actually accomplished.

Mr. Wakasugi was especially vague about the differences arising from the stationing of Japanese troops in China, nondiscrimination in commerce, and the Japanese interpretation of the Tripartite Pact. By way of emphasizing those Japanese proposals which he felt restricted the application of the peace principles, Secretary Hull expressed the desire of the United States that the policy of commercial nondiscrimination, as well as the limitation of Japanese aggression, be applicable to the entire Pacific area.

Mr. Wakasugi attempted, without success, to explain to Secretary Hull that the Tripartite Pact was an instrument of peace and therefore not aimed at the United States. Secretary Hull reminded the Japanese Minister that since the Tripartite Pact had been openly designed to keep the United States out of war with Germany the American people could hardly be expected to regard it as a harmless document.

Since this issue could not be settled, Mr. Wakasugi discussed next the need for retaining Japanese troops in China. Secretary Hull reminded Minister Wakasugi that as a result of Japanese penetration Tokyo had obtained many monopolies in China which it was obviously unwilling to give up. If the friendship of China were to be acquired, Japan would have to curtail its aggressive policies. Phases affecting the Chinese situation in general which had already been discussed by Ambassador Nomura and Secretary Hull were again reviewed at this time.

In attempting to clarify the American requirements for a broad basic commercial policy in the Pacific, Secretary Hull pointed to the United States' trade agreement with Argentina which had been signed at Buenos Aires on October 14, 1941. Under this pact Japan and all other countries were given equal access to the markets of Argentina. In discussions with England and with the British Dominions, the United States was attempting to eliminate any imperial preferences and other discriminations including the narrow policy of bilateral trade.

Although Secretary Hull did not think the conversation with Mr. Wakasugi had produced any definite results, he felt that the Japanese representative had been given an opportunity to voice his country's opinions on certain matters. The Secretary of State believed that the Japanese government had fallen back from the stand it had once taken just before the occupation of French Indo-China, and that very little could be expected from future conversations.[501]

(b) Mr. Wakasugi's Report[502]

At 5:00 P.M. on October 16, 1941 Minister Wakasugi, Secretary Hull and Under Secretary Welles conferred on the Japanese diplomatic situation. Since the United States had apparently already received the news that Prime Minister Konoye's Cabinet was resigning, Secretary Hull was particularly anxious to make inquiries concerning the attitude of the new Japanese Cabinet toward negotiations with America.

[500] "Memorandum by the Secretary of State", October 16 and 17, 1941, S.D., II, 687-689.
[501] Ibid.
[502] III, 280.

[116]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

Since no detailed news had reached the Japanese Embassy in Washington, Minister Wakasugi was forced to base his remarks on the public announcement made in regard to the Cabinet's resignation. However, he pointed out that, regardless of the type of Cabinet now installed, Japanese-American relations must take a definite stand. In the face of American opposition the Japanese people could not continue on a policy of indecision; public opinion demanded that the Japanese government take a definite stand, whether to the right or to the left.

If no unanimous decision could be reached between the two nations, particularly in regard to the China Incident, Mr. Wakasugi feared for the future. Therefore, the Japanese Minister was most anxious to discover some points of agreement between the American proposal of June 21, 1941 and the Japanese proposal of September 25, 1941.[503]

After recounting the substance of former conversations for half an hour, Secretary Hull insisted that the United States had no intention of following a policy of procrastination. But although anxious to establish peaceful and normal political relations with Japan, the United States could not stand by and approve any attempts of the Japanese to set up a new regime in the Far East similar to the new order established in Europe by Adolf Hitler.

Because of the United States' determination to base its actions upon the policy of nondiscrimination and freedom of the seas, it was opposed to all militaristic policies. Therefore, the United States found it difficult to understand Japan's professed desire to maintain peace while carrying on a military invasion at the same time. In view of the many military expansionists among influential Japanese people, Secretary Hull doubted if it were possible for the Japanese government to cooperate in peaceful measures.

In reply, Mr. Wakasugi agreed that a certain faction in Japan advocated expansion to the north or south. However, the Japanese representative insisted that only because of economic pressure, applied by foreign nations, had Japan been forced to become aggressive in order to maintain its national security and guarantee the very existence of its people. The mere desire for self-preservation demanded that Japan secure necessary materials.[504] Unless the United States attempted to understand Japan's position and exhibited a friendly attitude by lifting the economic restrictions placed upon Japan, the Japanese government would be forced to continue its military moves and the situation would grow continually worse.

In order to make his previous statements clearer to Mr. Wakasugi, Mr. Welles urged Secretary Hull to comment further on the American objectives. Secretary Hull then reiterated that the United States' present actions were motivated by the desire to defeat Hitlerism, abolish all militarism and, finally, bring about an equality of opportunity throughout China and the entire Pacific area. By his remarks, Secretary Hull exhibited full understanding of Japan's position with respect to the Tripartite Pact. However, he declined to discuss fully the problem of establishing peace between Japan and China because he advocated non-intervention in the internal affairs of other nations.

Mr. Hull suggested, instead, that Mr. Wakasugi discuss the Chinese problem directly with Chinese officials. In view of the present situation, however, Mr. Wakasugi did not feel free to discuss the problem with either Ambassador Hu Shih or Mr. Soong Tse-Wen, with whom he was well acquainted.[505]

Continuing the discussion of the Chinese problem, Mr. Wakasugi emphasized the difficulty of evacuating Japanese troops from China because of the dangerous activities of Communist

[503] Ibid.
[504] III, 281.
[505] III, 282.

[117]

forces in the north. Believing it necessary to keep a certain number of Japanese troops stationed in China indefinitely, and describing the Communists as a "cancerous growth on the development of China", Mr. Wakasugi explained that in order to protect the lives, property and commercial interests of both Japanese and foreigners, troops must be garrisoned there. Furthermore, since the Chinese were most interested in the safety of their lives and their livelihood, the retention of Japanese troops served this purpose.

Apparently, misinformation had led President Roosevelt to think that the Chinese Communist Party was engaged merely in educational activities. Actually, the Communist faction was attempting to destroy Chinese society and industry at the very roots. Therefore, the Chinese did not care in whose hands the maintenance of peace remained as long as the lives of the Chinese people were protected. To these remarks Secretary Hull countered that the United States had already found it more profitable to practice the "Good Neighbor Policy" than to garrison troops in another country. However, anxious to end the discussion of this matter, Secretary Hull again suggested that the problem be taken up by the Japanese and Chinese representatives.

Secretary Hull apparently had no desire to discuss any other problems outside of the three already mentioned. Under Secretary of State Welles then explained to Secretary Hull the desire of Minister Wakasugi to discuss both the differences and the points of mutual agreement in the Japanese proposals. To accomplish this end, Secretary Hull suggested that the officials concerned meet and work out the details. But reminding the American Secretary of State of the unproductive meetings held previously by American and Japanese officials, Mr. Wakasugi insisted that the situation did not permit further procrastination. Therefore, at this time the Japanese government wished to confine its discussions to important questions only.[506]

131. Prince Konoye Bids Farewell to Ambassador Grew (October 17, 1941)

Mr. Ushiba, Prince Konoye's private secretary, called at Mr. Dooman's home early on the morning of October 17, 1941 with a private letter from Prince Konoye to Ambassador Grew.[507]

Expressing regret in his message to Mr. Grew for the internal political situation in Japan which had led to his resignation, at the same time Prince Konoye assured the American Ambassador that the new Cabinet would exert every effort to conclude successfully a rapprochement between the two countries. Furthermore, the retiring Japanese Prime Minister promised his own personal assistance to the incoming Japanese government.[508]

After Mr. Dooman had read the message, Mr. Ushiba made an oral statement pertaining largely to the status of the new Japanese government. Because Secretary Hull's memorandum of October 2, 1941 had been so great a disappointment to the Konoye Cabinet, it had been felt that the present conversations could never be concluded successfully. In view, then, of the internal situation in Japan, Prince Konoye had decided to resign.

Although it seemed at first inevitable that the next Cabinet would consist largely of Japanese extremists, Prince Konoye through intensive efforts had succeeded in obtaining a Cabinet which desired to continue the conversations with the United States. However, since no civilian statesman could expect the cooperation of Japanese militarists, the new Japanese Prime Minister was necessarily an army officer and the Cabinet was composed principally of military men.

[506] III, 283
[507] "Memorandum by the Counselor of Embassy in Japan (Dooman)", October 17, 1941, S.D., II 689-691.
[508] "The retiring Japanese Prime Minister (Prince Konoye) to the American Ambassador in Japan (Grew)", October 16, 1941, S.D., II, 691-692.

[118]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

While out of the government, Prince Konoye still intended to direct his influence toward the achievement of Japanese-American friendship. Mr. Dooman then expressed his regret that Prince Konoye had felt it necessary to resign while the conversations were still in progress at Washington.

When the discussion turned to Japanese leadership, Mr. Dooman mentioned Prince Yamagata as a man capable of unifying Japan's army. Agreeing with this, Mr. Ushiba also believed that General Umedzu, Chief of the Kwantung Army, unlike General Sugiyama, would be able to exert great influence when the need for it arose.[509]

In answer to Prince Konoye's personal letter, Ambassador Grew offered his appreciation for the retiring Prime Minister's assurances regarding the aims of the new Japanese Cabinet.[510] After thanking Prince Konoye for his desire to cooperate with the new Japanese government, Ambassador Grew promised to continue his own efforts toward attaining a successful conclusion of the conversations between Japan and the United States.[511]

132. Hull-Wakasugi-Welles Conversation (October 17, 1941)

(a) Secretary Hull's Report

Secretary Hull did not write a separate report of this conversation with Minister Wakasugi, but instead summarized the conversations of October 16 and October 17, 1941 in one report.[512]

(b) Mr. Wakasugi's Report

In keeping with his instructions from Prince Konoye's Cabinet, Mr. Wakasugi conversed with Secretary Hull and Under Secretary of State Welles on October 17, 1941. Although neither side was to be committed officially by the remarks made during this conversation, in view of the fact that the Japanese Embassy in Washington had not yet received instructions from the new Cabinet, Mr. Wakasugi did not wish to delay a discussion of the three points involved in the Japanese-American negotiations.

After agreeing that the conversation was entirely off-the-record, Secretary Hull inquired concerning the outstanding points in the Japanese and American proposals. Mr. Wakasugi read those paragraphs from the Japanese proposal of September 25, 1941 and the United States' proposal of June 21, 1941 pertaining to the definition of self-defense under the terms of the Tripartite Pact. Since the Japanese proposals had made the right of self-defense a mutual one, Mr. Wakasugi did not think there should be any problem involved.

Pointing to the persistent rumors in Japan that the purpose of the Tripartite Pact had been to prevent the United States from entering the war, Mr. Hull remarked that if the United States, which had no intention of military aggression against any nation, should be forced to enter the European war in self-defense, the resulting action of the Japanese government would be of grave concern.

Mr. Wakasugi replied that the "interpretation of the right of self-defense" was governed by the intentions of the country invoking its use. Therefore, Japan would refrain from fulfilling its obligations under the Tripartite Pact depending upon the intentions of the United States government. In line with this reasoning the Japanese government felt that it was obvious that its actions stemmed from its desire for self-preservation and that the application of any phrase in its proposal would be based on this desire. By the term "self-preservation" Japan implied that it alone would determine the means of ensuring self-preservation independently of any

[509] S.D., II, 689-691.
[510] "The American Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the retiring Japanese Prime Minister (Prince Konoye)", October 17, 1941, S.D., II, 692.
[511] Ibid.
[512] See S.D., II, 687-689.

[119]

foreign country whether it be Great Britain, the United States or Germany; consequently, from the Japanese viewpoint no other implications or interpretations could be given to either the phrase "self-defense" or "self-preservation".

In Mr. Terasaki's opinion, it was a self-evident fact that a political agreement could not limit the signers to political commitments against a third country. In view of the Imperial Rescript published when Japan signed the Tripartite Pact, it was obvious that in Japan's opinion the agreement's real mission was a contribution to world peace and not an aid to aggression and aggrandizement.

Although he listened carefully to Mr. Wakasugi's detailed explanation, Secretary Hull apparently suspected that the Tripartite Pact could be interpreted to suit the needs or aims of any Japanese Cabinet in power at the time. Aware of Secretary Hull's fears, Mr. Wakasugi remarked that when viewed through the eyes of suspicion, even the so-called defensive measures of the United States were questionable. In concluding the discussion of this point, both the American and Japanese representatives agreed that careful study of the problem should continue.

Because Secretary Hull was mainly interested in commercial nondiscrimination, the conversation then turned to that problem. Since the assumption of his post many years ago, Secretary Hull had taken great pride in the materialization of the nondiscriminatory policy in trade matters. Particularly proud of the recently signed trade agreement with Argentina and the prevention of the self-interested British appeasement policy in Central and South America, Secretary Hull was certain of the success of such a program in the Pacific. However, unless the principle was applied to the entire Pacific, including China, the contribution it would make toward peace would be negligible.

It was Secretary Hull's sincere belief that world peace could be more easily attained through the adjustment of trade relations than through the settlement of political problems. Because of Japan's geographical position, its race and business ability, Japan would undoubtedly receive concrete and positive advantages from the adoption and application of this basic policy in the Far East.

Admitting that these principles were theoretically advantageous, Mr. Wakasugi stated that each individual nation must apply them in different ways in order to survive. The United States continued to measure the requirements of other countries by its own resources, despite the fact that the position of lesser countries differed greatly from that of the United States. Occupying only a very small corner of the Far East and engrossed for four years with the China Incident, Japan was forced to cope with a number of circumstances peculiar to itself.

For obvious and unavoidable reasons Japan had established various systems in China in order to cope with the temporary conditions of occupation. Therefore, even if Japan agreed to comply with the basic principles advanced by the United States, from a practical and actual standpoint it would be impossible to put them into effect overnight. Although Japan desired to apply the United States' principles at the conclusion of the war, it was not in the realm of practicality even to attempt such an application when the whole world was in a chaotic condition.

Mr. Wakasugi suggested, therefore, that the two countries discuss matters which Japan was capable of carrying out at the present time. The actual problems should be worked out as much as possible in order that joint and cooperative action could be taken at the first opportunity.

Although recognizing Japan's internal position and circumstances, Secretary Hull commented upon the United States' own domestic conditions. American businessmen in China, whose interest had been curtailed because of the monopolistic attitude of Japan in Chinese trade, were voicing complaints which the United States could not neglect. Returning again to a discussion of fundamental issues, Secretary Hull then asked that Japan accept the United States' basic principles.

[120]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

In reply to a question from Secretary Hull, Mr. Wakasugi discussed conditions in Japan. Because of the general public opinion in Japan, Mr. Wakasugi explained that the Japanese government was forced to take immediate and decisive action either to the right or left. Nevertheless, because of the sensitiveness of the Japanese people, even the slightest gesture on the part of the United States toward accepting an understanding would immediately relieve the existing tension. If even minor matters were settled, the situation would improve; then, as time went on an agreement could be reached on the more weighty items.

With this goal in mind, Mr. Wakasugi suggested that the United States release the Itukusima Maru and the Syoyo Maru, which were anchored at San Francisco because the money to pay for fuel had been frozen. Under Secretary of State Welles took down the names of these vessels and other pertinent facts and promised to take the matter up with the bureaus concerned.[513]

[513] III, 284.

[121]

OUTLINE OF PART B*

Japanese Intelligence in Diplomatic Messages

(a) Reports from the United States
(b) Reports from the Panama Canal
(c) Reports from the Philippine Islands
(d) Reports from the Hawaiian Islands
(e) Reports from South America
(f) Reports from Capetown, South Africa
(g) Reports from Vladivostok, Russia

PART B—JAPANESE INTELLIGENCE IN DIPLOMATIC MESSAGES

Continuing to use diplomatic channels for the transmission of intelligence concerning American merchant ships and men-of-war during the period from August 16, 1941 to October 17, 1941, Japanese officials in Tokyo received an increasing number of such dispatches from the United States and South America, the Philippines and Hawaiian Islands.

(a) Reports from the United States

133. Japan Learns that American Oil Is Being Transported to Russia

Consul Kenji Nakauchi in Hollywood, California reported on August 16, 1941 that the St. Claire, after loading 95,000 barrels of aviation gasoline, had sailed from Los Angeles for Vladivostok, and was scheduled to rendezvous at some point in the Pacific with the Fitzsimmons and three other American vessels, all carrying similar cargo. According to rumor, a number of United States destroyers on maneuvers were also bound for Vladivostok,[514] and a Japanese spy in Seattle reported that the English warship, Warspite, had entered the port of Bremerton about August 13 or 14, 1941.[515]

It was disclosed on August 21, 1941 that the Russian ship, Vladimar Mayskovsky, had arrived at Seattle, and after being repaired, would move to California to load freight for Vladivostok. The Minsk was reported to have left Seattle harbor, although its destination was unknown, and the Patrovsuky was still in dry dock.[516]

On the same day Tokyo informed Berlin that though America was apparently transporting oil to Russia, using American, Russian, and neutral ships, and there was a possibility that several hundred planes had already been transported, up to the present time not one American vessel had entered the port of Vladivostok. Although both the Russian Ambassador in Tokyo and the American government, through Ambassador Nomura, had been warned by Japan concerning the extension of a third power's military movements to East Asia, Japan believed that it was impossible to effect any actual restraint through such steps.[517]

*See TABLE OF CONTENTS for a detailed listing of topics discussed in Part B.

[514] III, 285.
[515] III, 286.
[516] III, 287.
[517] III, 288.

[122]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

Consul Yoshio Muto in San Francisco on August 26, 1941 advised Tokyo that the Russian freighter, Yakut, had left port August 24, 1941 loaded with gasoline, shoes, socks, and small arms. Confirming the arrival at San Francisco of the Russian freighter Minsk the report also listed the Russian tanker Dombas as having arrived in port from Los Angeles.[518]

134. Japan Learns of Shipment of American Planes To Russia

Consul Jiseburo Sato, Japanese Intelligence agent at Seattle, reported on August 18, 1941 that a group of large planes was being sent from the United States to Alaska, and planes already in Alaska were probably destined to supply Soviet Russia. Since several two-motored medium sized planes en route to Alaska were marked with the insignia of the United States Army, he surmised that they were probably not intended to be sent to Russia.[519]

135. American Aid to Russia Is Viewed as Threat to Japan

Japan, considerably concerned over these reports of American aid to Russia, learned from Rome that the United States had recently made representations to the Russian government to permit the sending of American naval advisers to Vladivostok. Since American military establishments in Russia would be a threat against Japan, the Japanese Ambassador in Rome advised his government to make a thorough investigation to ensure that they were not established, although the Russian authorities had apparently not yet permitted nor would permit such action.[520]

The Japanese Foreign Minister informed Ambassador Nomura on August 28, 1941 that he had directed the Japanese Ambassador in Moscow to warn Russia that should supplies be exported from the United States to Russia through Japanese waters, Japan's position would become extremely delicate. Foreign Minister Toyoda remarked that, according to recent intelligence, seven American, Russian, and neutral ships were transporting airplane gasoline for the aid of Russia. The Russian government was urged by Japan to consider this development with extreme caution, not only from the legal viewpoint of international law but from the standpoint of the general world situation.[521]

To prevent the spreading of the European war into the Far East, Russia was urged to consider the Japanese-Russian agreement and the maintenance of the excellent relationship between the two countries. In the event that the United States sent its ships through Japanese waters, the effect upon public opinion within Japan, as well as the reactions of Germany and Italy, would "indeed be terrible in the extreme". With regard to the importation of American goods, Japan insisted that Russia give particular attention to the routes over which imports were received.[522]

Meanwhile, Japanese officials on the west coast of the United States continued their intelligence reports on the movements of American shipping. In addition to the departure on September 8, 1941 for Vladivostok of a vessel bearing 80,000 barrels of aviation gasoline, Consul Yoshio Muto in San Francisco also notified Japan that four American tankers of the General Petroleum Company were to be dispatched on the direct shipping route to Vladivostok.[523]

[518] III, 289.
[519] III, 290.
[520] III, 291.
[521] III, 292.
[522] III, 293.
[523] III, 294.

[123]

136. Japan Attempts to Expand Its Naval Intelligence Activities

On September 2, 1941 it became apparent to Tokyo that the expansion of Japanese naval intelligence activities in both North and South America was necessary. Based on a request from naval authorities in Japan, Ambassador Nomura was to insist that a member of his staff go to Hawaii in the capacity of a courier, though in the light of Japanese-American relations the selection of an opportune moment for the presentation of this request to the American government was left to his discretion.[524]

Ambassador Nomura replied that inasmuch as Courier Kuga was returning to Japan by way of the United States, having booked passage on the President Taylor sailing from San Francisco on September 6, 1941, the dispatching of a courier to Hawaii was no longer necessary.[525]

137. Japanese Agents Note American Army and Air Group Activities

Through Consul Sato at Seattle, the statements made by the president of the Boeing Company to a Senate investigating committee were relayed to Tokyo on September 4, 1941. According to the report, the lack of progress was because of the changes in design and the unprecedented expansion of the plant. Although the production of American Army planes was four months behind in schedule, it was expected that this would be caught up by the end of the year.[526]

Furthermore, Lt. General DeWitt, 4th Army Commander, had announced that his army would be increased from 90,000 to 120,000 men. Barracks capable of accommodating 30,000 men were being constructed along the coast, and a mechanized division of 10,000 men was to be located at Santa Maria. The locations of newly organized divisions were listed as Meadow-ford, West Yellowston, Fort Huachuca and Marysville.[527]

Reported also in an intelligence dispatch of September 4, 1941 was the movement on August 23 of the 39th Bombardment Group, the 89th Observation Squadron, and the 310th Signal Company from Spokane to Louisiana to take part in the September maneuvers. The 54th Bombardment Group would receive either Republics or twin-motored Lockheed planes.[528]

138. Japan Watches the Activities of a Russian Military Commission in the United States

Reporting to Japanese intelligence headquarters in Washington, Consul (Lt. Comdr.) Jisaburo Sato at Seattle wired that two Russian planes, arriving at the Naval airfield at Sand Point on September 4, 1941, had brought members of a Russian commission to confer with American authorities concerning aid to Russia.[529] This was apparently the Russian Military Commission which on September 2, 1941 had inspected the B-19 heavy bombers at March Field, and on September 3, 1941 had visited various airplane factories at Los Angeles.[530]

Ambassador Nomura requested Japanese agents in San Francisco, Los Angeles, and Seattle to investigate the possibility of the Russian Military Commission's flying American planes to Russia. He also asked that intelligence be secured concerning the eventual transfer of a considerable American bombing force to the Siberian area.[531]

[524] III, 295.
[525] III, 296.
[526] III, 297.
[527] Ibid.
[528] III, 298.
[529] III, 299.
[530] III, 300.
[531] III, 301.

[124]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

In accordance with Ambassador Nomura's request to report concerning the Russian Military Commission, Consul Sato informed Tokyo on September 22, 1941 that two Russian hydroplanes, bearing ten members of the commission, had left for Moscow on September 19, 1941, but that the remaining thirty-seven members were to stay in the United States to study the production of airplanes.[532] Nineteen of the thirty-seven members remaining in the United States were receiving training in bomber operations at Spokane, Washington, while the others were staying in Washington and Los Angeles.[533]

139. Japanese Consuls Report on West Coast Shipping

Illustrating the close surveillance of American, Russian, and neutral ships by Japanese agents on the American west coast, Consul Muto, on September 8, 1941, informed Tokyo that the Russian freighter, the Minsk, loaded with 8,000 drums of aviation oil, airplane engines, machine guns, ammunition, snow plows and other articles had sailed from San Francisco on September 6, 1941.[534]

On September 6, 1941 Japanese officials in Seattle, attempting to verify the presence of the Vladimar Maykoysky and the Deabrint noted that four vessels were in port.[535] In a dispatch transmitted September 18, 1941 the Japanese Consul reported that the Russian freighter Mijinski, from Vladivostok, had entered San Francisco on September 17, 1941 and that the American tanker, St. Claire, returning from Vladivostok, was expected to arrive on September 19, 1941[536]

Although Consul Muto in San Francisco reported on September 18, 1941 that the Warspite had entered port there from Bremerton,[537] on September 20, 1941 Consul Sato in Seattle informed Tokyo that repair work was continuing on the Warspite at Bremerton. One Saratoga-class aircraft carrier and another vessel which appeared to be a cruiser were also in port, but a ship of the New Mexico class, previously reported there had departed.[538] The arrival of one Oklahoma-class battleship at San Francisco was announced by Consul Muto at San Francisco on October 2, 1941, and a report that the Hunters Point shipyard would be taken over by the United States Navy was sent to Japanese officials in Washington.[539]

On October 16, 1941 Consul Muto declared that the Russian freighter Mijinski was docking, that the Igarka was three days out of New York, that the Nantes was seven days from Vladivostok, and the Michulin was ten or twelve days from Vladivostok. The Nantes was loaded with wheat, 20,000 barrels of fuel oil, and machine guns and tanks.[540] The Russian ship, Kiev, equipped with a 500-watt radio for the reception of orders and war news from Moscow, was reported, on October 12, 1941, to be loading raw materials at Los Angeles before proceeding to Vladivostok.[541]

[532] III, 302.
[533] III, 303.
[534] III, 304-305.
[535] III, 306.
[536] III, 307.
[537] III, 308.
[538] III, 309.
[539] III, 310.
[540] III, 311.
[541] III, 312.

[125]

140. Foreign Minister Toyoda Sends New Instructions Concerning Naval Intelligence Reports

To facilitate the making of reports on the movements of American warships, Foreign Minister Teijiro Toyoda on October 16, 1941 directed the Japanese Consul in Seattle to make routine reports once every ten days, in case there were no great changes in the movements and basing of warships. Special reports were to be made immediately on such occasions as (a) the arrival or departure of American flagships of fleet or scouting force; (b) the arrival or departure of more than ten vessels of any type; (c) the arrival or departure of warships of other countries than the United States; and (d) the inauguration of patrolling by naval planes.[542]

(b) Reports from the Panama Canal

141. Japan Fails to Learn Destination of Planes Departing from Panama

One hundred planes, including Douglas B-18's Martin B-17A bombers, and Boeing 24's which had been stationed at Albrook Field, suddenly departed in early August, 1941 before Japanese observers could learn their destination. A hearsay report was sent to Tokyo on August 18, 1941 that approximately 35 or 45 two-motored bombing planes were stationed at the newly constructed Agua Dulce Air Field in the province of Cocli.[543]

Ships moving through the Panama Canal were the subject of Japanese naval intelligence reports forwarded to Tokyo by Minister Akiyama. Four American submarines, on August 18, 1941, and two freighters, on August 17, 1941, had passed through the Canal toward the Atlantic.

Moving toward the Pacific on August 15, 1941 were a United States freighter and the Triomphant, a DeGaullist destroyer, which left for Tehita on August 17. In addition, five destroyers were reported taking on fuel, rations, and other supplies at Panama.[544] One British and two American freighters were observed on August 19, 1941 to be moving through the Canal toward the Pacific.[545]

Between September 17 and 21, 1941, one American tanker and four American freighters had reportedly passed through the Canal bound for the Pacific, while two American tankers, four American freighters, and one English freighter had gone toward the Atlantic.[546] Informing Tokyo on September 28, 1941 that a Diomede class vessel recently had the upper section of the mast cut off, Minister Akiyama announced that the British operated two ships of this type.[547] On September 30, 1941 it was reported that two warships, possibly French, had left port on August 29, 1941 bound for the Pacific, while another ship of the Omaha class had also departed for an unknown destination.[548]

Minister Akiyama wired on October 2, 1941 that between September 30 and October 2, 1941 three American freighters and one English hospital ship had passed through the Canal to the Pacific, and nine American freighters and one American liner to the Atlantic.[549]

Reporting that one vessel, three American freighters, and one French steamer had moved into the Pacific between October 3 and 4, 1941, Mr. Akiyama wired that seven American freighters, the Union tanker, one destroyer, and two British freighters had gone through the Canal successively in the direction of the Atlantic. Since two cruisers had accompanied these vessels as far as Balboa, indications were that their cargoes were made up of military supplies.[550]

[542] III, 313.
[543] III, 314.
[544] III, 315.
[545] III, 316.
[546] III, 317.
[547] III, 318.
[548] III, 319.
[549] III, 320.
[550] III, 321.

[126]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

142. Japanese Reports on Panama Military Installations

Intelligence transmitted to Tokyo on October 2, 1941 concerned the transfer of the Panama Air Depot from France Field to Curundu Heights, which had been made because of the recent concentration of military aviation in the Pacific area. Tokyo learned of an announcement which had been made on August 1, 1941 by Rear Admiral Sadler, Commander of the 13th Naval District, that a new warehouse on Pier 18, the ammunition unloading pier, and the Balboa dry dock would be taken over for use as naval warehouses.

The acquisition and camouflaging by the United States Navy of petroleum supply tanks at Boca on the Pacific side and at Mt. Hope on the Atlantic side were reported, as well as the construction at Corozal of a storage depot which would contain foodstuffs to supply the Canal Zone for six months should shipping routes between Panama and the United States be severed.[551]

An investigation by the Japanese Minister at Panama disclosed, on October 6, 1941, the sites of five United States' airplane bases in Panama. Panamanian airports, already constructed and scheduled to be converted into military establishments, were identified as the ones at David, in Chiriqui province, and Paidonya outside Panama City. Several other locations had been surveyed but were not used because of the poor condition of the terrain.[552]

(c) Reports from the Philippine Islands

During the period from August 7 to October 17, 1941, Japanese naval intelligence reports from the Philippine Islands increased in number. They were concerned principally with fortifications, the arrival and departure of warships, and the construction of airports.

143. Japan Attempts to Identify British Vessels Reported at Manila

On August 9, 1941 Tokyo directed that secret investigations be made regarding the name of the British battleship reported to have entered port at Manila on August 17, 1941, sailing on the next day for the west coast of North America. According to the Japanese, this ship was reported to be the Warspite, although it was pointed out that the British cruiser Leander resembled the Warspite from a distance.[553]

Consul Katsumi Nihro, in replying to the inquiry, was uncertain as to the ship's identity, and said that he knew only that it was a light cruiser of the Leander class. No British ships, he added, had entered port recently except one which he had mentioned previously.[554]

On August 16, 1941 six ships were reported to have arrived in Manila on the previous day, and it was observed that both United States Army and Navy airplanes were being painted dark blue.[555]

144. Tokyo Inquires About a Floating Dry Dock Near Mariveles

The disappearance of a floating dock previously seen in the vicinity of Mariveles, Luzon was being investigated by the Japanese on August 18, 1941,[556] but subsequent investigations revealed that as late as September 4, 1941 the floating dock was still located one mile southeast of Mariveles in Bataan province. Barracks were being constructed near Mariberosu, and in spite of a previous rumor that they were built for the purpose of imprisoning Japanese nationals, Consul Nihro said that they were intended to house technicians and personnel working on the floating dock.[557]

[551] III, 322.
[552] III, 323.
[553] III, 324.
[554] III, 325.
[555] III, 326.
[556] III, 327-328.
[557] III, 329.

[127]

145. Japanese Reports on Manila Anti-Aircraft Preparations

As to fortifications in Manila proper, the Japanese Consul thought that, since admittance to the upper stories of the city's tall buildings had been forbidden, it was fairly certain that anti-aircraft guns had been placed on the tops of two of Manila's leading hotels, on the Insular Life and Trading Commerce buildings, and on several other public buildings. The transportation of thirty-six anti-aircraft guns to Camp Murphy had also been noted during the latter part of July 1941.[558]

146. Japanese Report on American Airport Construction

Tokyo was informed on August 20, 1941 that work begun in March on an unidentified airplane base in the Philippines, which had been suspended for a time, was now being accelerated.[559] Since too much time would be required to fill in paddy fields for the site of another new air base at Davao. Consul Jitaro Kihara disclosed that plans had been changed, and the airfield would be constructed between the sea and paddy fields where a cocoanut grove stood. Four concrete runways were to be built, and 2,500 recruits from the local populace were to be used in the construction.[560]

147. Japan Inquires Concerning the U.S.S. Houston

Learning from Japanese naval authorities that the Houston had disappeared after passing through the harbor entrance on August 20, 1941, Foreign Minister Toyoda asked on August 30, 1941 that Japanese agents investigate the waters in and around Manila for a trace of this warship.[561] He also directed that weekly intelligence reports be sent to Tokyo. The arrivals and departures of more than five or six destroyers, submarines, or naval ships other than American, were to be subjects of special reports at the time such changes occurred.[562]

On September 1, 1941 Consul Katsumi Nihro informed Japanese officials that the Houston had arrived at Manila on August 5, and that after loading food supplies, it had departed on August 7, 1941. It was surmised that since Admiral Thomas Charles Hart had attended the ceremonies connected with the launching of the "Q" boat for the Philippine army on August 10, the ship must have been in the vicinity until that date. Its course from then on, however, was not known.[563]

The Houston, with two destroyers, re-entered port at Manila on September 7, 1941,[564] and after loading fuel and stores it departed for an unknown destination on September 11, accompanied by two submarines and two destroyers.[565]

148. Japanese Report on American Ship Movements In the Philippines

A number of American destroyers, reported without substantiation to have come from Hawaii, entered the harbor of Jolo during the middle of July. During the last ten days of July, six other American destroyers entered ports in the Philippines and engaged in target practice with live ammunition. One large airplane capable of carrying twenty-six persons had landed on the water in the vicinity of Jolo for a number of hours, and 2,000 drums of airplane gasoline were stored within the military establishment at Jolo.[566]

[558] III, 330.
[559] III, 331.
[560] III, 332.
[561] III, 333.
[562] III, 334.
[563] III, 335.
[564] III, 336.
[565] III, 337.
[566] III, 338.

[128]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

On August 23, 1941 Manila reported that six transports, as well as the Hon and Pisu were in port at Manila, and that one destroyer and the Gorudostna were at Cavite. It was also announced at this time that the oiler Torinircic had departed for Tarakan on August 22, 1941 to take on oil, that several destroyers and submarines were stationed in the vicinity of Mariveles and that Brigadier General Cragette, arriving on August 20 on the Dutch ship, Tibadaeky, had conferred with General Douglas McArthur on August 21, 1941. The Chanto had arrived at Manila on August 20 from Olongapu, where her sister ship, the Kabarunda, was still undergoing repairs. Another ship, possibly the Maddo, and two destroyers had arrived at Cebu on August 16, 1941, and had left the same night.[567]

On August 30, 1941, one destroyer was at Corundusu, and three destroyers, six submarines, and the tanker, Trinity, were at Manila where the arrival of 500 American soldiers on the Cleveland and the entrance of the Migak, a vessel which the Japanese understood was loaded to capacity with military equipment, were noted on the preceding day.[568] The Marblehead returned to its post on August 31, and two destroyers departed September 1, 1944.[569]

A ship, possibly the Black Hawk, the Beru, two destroyers, and one submarine were in port at Manila on September 13, 1941, according to a Japanese intelligence report, and on the same day there arrived an American cruiser of the Brooklyn class, believed to have come from Hawaii.[570] Whether Legaspi Island was being used as a port of call by an American aviation company was the subject of an inquiry directed by Tokyo to Manila on September 15, 1941,[571] Accordingly, Minister Nihro reported the next day that Legaspi was being used as an intermediary station by the Philippine Aerial Taxi Company between Manila and Cebu. It was also noted that the Pan-American Airways were planning to build a landing place at Tacloban in Leyte Province, but as yet had not realized this plan.[572]

The St. Louis, with three other unidentified vessels had left the harbor for Singapore early on September 16, 1941 apparently loaded with food supplies.[573] Since red flags had been hoisted, it was indicated that ammunition was being handled on these ships.[574]

In an intelligence dispatch from Manila on September 20, 1941 Consul Nihro declared that the Phoenix and one other ship were anchored at that port. Another ship, probably the Peters, which entered the harbor on September 18, was reported to have carried 500 soldiers.[575]

On September 26, 1941 Consul Kihara at Davao pointed out that since August, 1941 American destroyer tenders, destroyers, and submarines had entered the port of Davao from the South Seas on every Saturday and had left after about two days. From members of the crews of these warships, he had learned that the warships traversed a route touching Jolo Island, Bataan, Tarao in British North Borneo, and Tarakan, a city in Netherlands Borneo.[576]

[567] III, 339.
[568] III, 340.
[569] III, 341.
[570] III, 342.
[571] III, 343.
[572] III, 344.
[573] III, 345.
[574] III, 346.
[575] III, 347.
[576] III, 348.

[129]

Information concerning the size, tonnage and plane accommodations of the Langley was sent from Davao to Tokyo on September 26, 1941.[577] Consul Nihro advised on October 3, 1941 that he had learned that the American cruisers, the St. Louis and Phoenix, sailing from Manila on September 16 and 22, 1941 respectively, were headed for Singapore. He requested information from Singapore concerning this in order to check on the accuracy of his spy reports.[578] In return it was reported from Shanghai that the United States Army transport, the Henderson, had left that port for Manila carrying 150 Marines.[579]

On October 4, 1941 Foreign Minister Toyoda directed the Japanese Consul at Manila to make a reconnaissance of the new defense works along the east, west and southern coasts of Luzon. The consul was also asked to report on their progress, strength and anything else which might be of interest to Japan.[580]

The Japanese Consul reported that on the afternoon of October 13, 1941 the Houston, Marblehead, and one other vessel, five destroyers, and two minelayers had departed, but that their destinations were unknown. In the harbor on October 14, 1941 were the Black Hawk, four destroyers, ten submarines, the Gold Star, and one other vessel.[581]

A routine intelligence transmission sent to Tokyo on October 17, 1941 reported the Ton, the Maddo, the Hon, four destroyers, five submarines, one minelayer, the Beru and the oiler, Trinity, in port at that time. It was added that large scale barracks were being constructed about 131 kilometers from Manila between Cabanatuan and Laur, and that mechanized maneuvers were taking place between Laur and Aguilla.[582]

(d) Reports from the Hawaiian Islands

149. Japan Notes Activities of French in the Pacific

Consul Nagao Kita reported that taking passage on a destroyer which had left port on September 16, 1941 were Captain C. I. Gargenlieu, high commissioner for Pacific territories under the De Gaulle regime, and Commander G. Cabanier, French Commander of Defense, who were to assume new responsibilities in New Caledonia.[583]

150. Japanese Foreign Minister Requests Special Intelligence Reports Concerning Pearl Harbor

Japanese naval intelligence reports from Honolulu, though few in number, were in the light of the later attack on Pearl Harbor to grow increasingly significant as December 7, 1941 drew nearer. The significance becomes apparent, however, only when reading history backwards.

Concerning Pearl Harbor, Foreign Minister Toyoda on September 24, 1941 directed that in future intelligence reports from Hawaii, Pearl Harbor waters were to be divided roughly into five subareas—

Area A: Waters between Ford Island and the Arsenal.
Area B: Waters adjacent to the Island south and west of Ford Island. (This area is on the opposite side of the Island from Area A.)
Area C: East Loch.
Area D: Middle Loch.
Area E: West Loch and the communicating water routes

[577] III, 349.
[578] III, 350.
[579] III, 351.
[580] III, 352.
[581] III, 353.
[582] III, 354.
[583] III, 355.

[130]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

Furthermore, reports were to be made on warships and aircraft carriers at anchor, and although not so important, those tied up at wharves, buoys, and in docks. The types and classes of vessels were to be designated briefly and special mention was to be made when two or more vessels were alongside the same wharf.[584]

On September 29, 1941 the details of a special code to be used in referring to the location of American warships in Pearl Harbor was sent to Tokyo through diplomatic channels. "KS" meant the repair dock in the Navy yard; "FV" was the moorings in the vicinity of Ford Island; "FG" designated the location alongside Ford Island; and "A" and "B" indicated east and west sides of "FG" respectively.[585]

151. Japanese Report on American Transportation of English Troops

Consul Nagao Kita, on October 2, 1941, reported that an American steamship, possibly the Monterey from Australia, had entered port bearing approximately 600 Australians and New Zealand air corps troops under the command of Wing Commander Axel Richards. English language newspapermen stated that this was the first instance of an American ship being used to transport English troops.[586]

(e) Reports from South America

152. Japanese Interest in Brazilian Air Fields

The Japanese Foreign Minister, in a dispatch to Rio de Janeiro on September 29, 1941, asked that plans for landing fields on islands near Brazil be investigated and the information be sent to Tokyo at once.[587]

153. Minister Ishii Reports American Planes Arriving in Brazil

Japanese Minister Itaro Ishii in Rio de Janeiro informed Ambassador Nomura in Washington that the United States was dispatching weekly two large planes, each capable of carrying 62 persons, to Bathhurst in British Gambia. According to information gathered by Consul Ishii, plans were being made to dispatch by plane several thousand technicians, possibly including military officers.[588]

(f) Reports from Capetown, South Africa

154. Japanese Agents Reports the Transportation of British Soldiers

Two Japanese naval intelligence dispatches from Capetown, South Africa to Tokyo contained information concerning British vessels entering that port, and accordingly were retransmitted to Berlin. Approximately 8,000 British soldiers whose destination appeared to be Iran were embarked on five large transports, accompanied by a 7,000- or 8,000-ton cruiser, which had entered port on September 11, 1941 and sailed again September 14.

155. Japan Watches British Shipping Near Cape of Good Hope

As an aid to Russia, Britain was dispatching airplanes to the Eastern Front, along with aviators, extra machinery parts, gasoline, repair materials and technicians. Some of those were being transported via the White Sea and Murmansk, and part were being sent by the Cape route via Iran.[589]

[584] III, 356.
[585] III, 357.
[586] III, 358.
[587] III, 359.
[588] III, 360.
[589] III, 361.

[131]

Between September 16 and 21, 1941 seven British vessels were reported by Japanese spies to have entered Capetown for two-day stopovers. A camouflaged cruiser, on which a number of soldiers had embarked, and which appeared to be headed for Iran, entered port on September 18, and sailed on September 20, 1941.[590]

(g) Reports from Vladivostok, Russia

156. Departure of Russian Submarines

From Japanese diplomats in Vladivostok, came a ship movement report on September 4, 1941. It revealed that most of the Russian submarines seemed to have gone to sea, though their minesweepers were still engaging in strenuous daily practice. Detailed descriptions of the ships in the harbor and the arrival of a United States tanker on September 3, 1941 were reported.[591]

157. Japanese Learn of British Supply Route to Russia

On October 15, 1941 Japanese intelligence reports revealed that a tremendous amount of British supplies was being shipped to Russia through Capetown, Durban and Lourenco Marques. Aid to Russia via Iran had become difficult owing to a lack of docking facilities in the Persian Gulf, and because of poorly operated railroads in Iran. For this reason Russia and Great Britain had decided to appoint Brigadier General Sir Godfrey Dean Rhodes, then Director of Railways and Harbors in British Kenyauganda, to the position of Director of Transportation in Iran.[592]

[590] III, 362.
[591] III, 363.
[592] III, 364.

[132]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

PART C—JAPANESE DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITIES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD

(a) Japanese-American Relations

158. Negotiations to Return American Missionaries to the United States Continue

In spite of the fact that on July 19, 1941 Ambassador Nomura had suggested the discontinuance of negotiations regarding the thirteen American missionaries in Korea, he wired on August 8, 1941 that, if Japanese government officials would permit, the Missionary Society was ready to return its representatives to the United States on furlough. He asked that this information be conveyed to the office of the Governor-General of Seoul, Capital of Chosen, for appropriate action.[593]

159. Japan Fears American and British Alliance with Russia[594]

Since Great Britain and America had already frozen Japanese funds and effected other retaliatory measures because of Japan's aggression into French Indo-China, the Japanese Military Attache in Washington warned his government, on August 9, 1941, that both these countries would take further action if Tokyo attempted to invade Siam. At the present time there were rumors of a meeting between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill on the Atlantic. It seemed evident by this increased British-American cooperation in Far Eastern affairs that once Japan entered Siam it would face war with the two allies.[595]

By strengthening its defenses in the Alaskan Aleutians the United States had also given clear indication of its growing interest in Russia. If Japan made any move to invade Siberia by force, American aid to Russia would not only increase, but economic and diplomatic relations between the United States and Japan would be completely severed. Even if war did not result, the Japanese Military Attache was certain that at least a severe commercial war would be waged by the United States against Japan.[596]

In view of this situation, the Japanese Military Attache, on August 9, 1941, suggested that Japan delay any northern advance until Russia's defeat by Germany. Once the Russo-German war was concluded, he felt certain that America's hostility toward Japan would lessen. On the other hand, there was always the possibility that the Russo-German war would be long and that as a result Great Britain, America and Russia would attempt to encircle and destroy Japan. In taking this possibility into consideration, the Japanese Military Attache warned that Tokyo should make preparations for dealing with even the most disadvantageous contingencies.[597] He explained that the reason American tankers were being sent to Russia by way of Vladivostok was because America had experienced great difficulty in finding another route by which to send aid. There were some indications that in the future American tankers would detour via Nikolaevsk.[598]

160. Inventory of Secret Funds in Japanese Legations

On August 11, 1941 the Japanese Ambassador in Washington transmitted an itemized account of special secret funds on hand in the Japanese Legations in the United States. Ap-

[593] III, 365.
[594] Information in this section did not become available until May, 1945.
[595] III, 366.
[596] Ibid.
[597] III, 367.
[598] III, 368. These messages were not translated until January and May 1945, respectively.

[133]

proximately $17,425 was contained in a secret fund for propaganda and intelligence purposes, and $20,556 was being held in a special fund in the name of the councilor. In the secret fund in San Francisco was $5,000, while the amounts on deposit in San Francisco and New York were $47,000 and $54,606 respectively.[599]

161. New Military Attache Appointed to Japanese Embassy

Meanwhile, on August 12, 1941 Foreign Minister Teijiro Toyoda in Tokyo informed Ambassador Nomura that Supply Officers Colonel Kenkichi Shinjo, Major Kita Yoshioka and Hinkai Ko had been appointed as assistant military attaches to the Legation in Washington. The United States government was to be informed of these appointments.[600]

162. Tokyo Reports Chinese Attempt to Draw United States into War against Japan

A strange situation was reported on August 13, 1941 in a dispatch retransmitted by Tokyo from Peking to Washington. According to the message, the Chungking faction in the North China area had ordered the assassination of American citizens in the hope that this would provoke the United States into entering the war. Since the Japanese militia in this area, the Harada Corps, had been forewarned, every precaution was now being taken to guard against any such mishap.

In spite of these precautions, threatening notes in the form of handbills had been scattered near the entrances of Christian Churches operated by Americans in Kaifeng, and five persons had broken into the Baptist Church threatening Americans with pistols and making away with cameras, papers and other such articles. Although the Harada Corps was investigating these incidents and was offering protection to all Americans in its jurisdiction, it was feared that in actuality the Americans were making preparations to evacuate the North China area.[601]

Furthermore, many cases of interference with American rights and interests in Japan and Japanese occupied areas of China had been reported. On August 13, 1941 Ambassador Nomura had submitted information to Tokyo from the State Department that Japanese authorities had undertaken widespread arbitrary activities against American official establishments. In North China, the travel of Americans, including American consular officials, was being stopped, restricted, or delayed. At Peitaiho, the transportation of baggage of Americans to the railway station was forbidden and the railway refused to receive baggage for checking. In Japan proper the travel of American citizens had been restricted so that Americans had been unable to obtain accommodations to Shanghai in returning to the United States.[602]

Other infringements upon the rights of American citizens and upon American institutions were reported from Tsingtao, Hwanghsien, Shantung, Tientsin, Foochow, Hsinan and Kobe. Such treatment of American diplomatic and consular officials, as well as American business representatives, at the hands of Japanese authorities or Japanese sponsored organizations was, in each case, seemingly without provocation. Unwarranted interference, rigid restrictions and control over the movements and activities of Americans were also reported at Swatow, Mukden, Fushun and Dairen. In one instance, the American Catholic Mission Sisters were permitted to visit the Consulate for passport services only on the condition that they would guarantee to return to Fushun the same day. Furthermore, when the Consul at Mukden had attempted to telephone to the Consul at Dairen, he was informed that he had "better cancel the call".[603]

[599] III, 369.
[600] III, 370.
[601] III, 371.
[602] III, 372.
[603] III, Ibid.

[134]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

163. Mr. Malcolm Lovell Offers to Mediate between Japan and China

Ambassador Nomura reported on August 13, 1941 that the German Charge d'affaires, Mr. Thomsen, had called on Mr. Sadao Iguchi to request that the latter meet Mr. Malcolm Lovell, a New York banker, who was a close friend of Mr. Kuo Tai Chi, Chief of the Foreign Section of the Chungking government.[604] Mr. Thomsen had become acquainted with Mr. Lovell when the banker, who was interested in the relief work of the Quakers, had come to discuss Quaker activities in occupied France.

At the meeting of Mr. Iguchi and Mr. Lovell on August 13, 1941 Mr. Lovell spoke of his great friendship with Mr. Kuo Tai Chi ever since his college days, and discussed his interest as a Quaker in achieving peace. At the time Mr. Kuo Tai Chi had passed through the United States en route to his home from England, he had informed Mr. Lovell that peace between Japan and China would be welcomed under certain conditions.[605]

According to Mr. Kuo Tai Chi, a previous Japanese peace feeler had not reached the important authorities in the Chungking government. Since Mr. Lovell's Quaker background made him exceedingly anxious to bring about peace, and because of his very close relations with Mr. Kuo Tai Chi, he asked that he be advised as to the Japanese attitude concerning this matter.

When Mr. Iguchi asked when Mr. Lovell expected to get to Chungking, the banker replied that he had many friends in New York newspaper circles and he was confident of his ability to obtain a permit from the State Department as a special correspondent of one of these papers. He would then establish contact with the Japanese at some point, such as Hongkong. Though he was conscious that considerable difficulty would be encountered in finding terms acceptable to both sides, he felt confident that he could convey the respective opinions of the Japanese authorities and Chungking authorities to each other. Furthermore, if he failed, Japan would not be affected, since he was operating entirely on his own and had no intention of accepting any expenses.

Ambassador Nomura requested Foreign Minister Toyoda to decide whether or not the services of Mr. Lovell could be used, stating that Mr. Thomsen believed him to be a thoroughly reliable character.[606]

164. Japanese Foreign Office Asserts Its Authority in Foreign Relations

On August 15, 1941 Foreign Minister Toyoda instructed Ambassador Nomura that all questions regarding the resuming of sending Japanese ships to the United States should be dealt with by the Japanese Ambassador in Washington, or the Consul General in New York. These instructions were occasioned by a message from Financial Attache Tsutumu Nishiyama to the Minister of Finance in Tokyo.

The Foreign Office was concerned not only with the question of jurisdiction in such matters, but also disturbed because a message had not been sent in an Embassy code, which was a violation of their security instructions.[607]

165. Ambassador Nomura Suggests Suspension of Funds Pending Settlement of Financial Agreement

Proposing to pay Legation salaries out of cash on hand, Ambassador Nomura suggested on August 14, 1941 that remittances from Japan be temporarily postponed. Until such time as a general agreement was concluded between the United States and Japan, it would be impos-

[604] III, 373.
[605] Ibid.
[606] Ibid.
[607] III, 374.

[135]

sible to draw from government funds or to pay the salaries which were remitted from Japan. To discuss this financial situation with the Yokohama Specie Bank, Ambassador Nomura sent Mr. Hirome Hoside to New York.[608]

It will be remembered that the United States extended every facility to the Japanese diplomatic and consular organizations, assuring them permission to draw funds for the maintenance of their offices and for the subsistence and traveling expenses of their personnel.[609]

166. Freezing Order Curtails Japanese-American Trade

Foreseeing no way to make payment for the shipments of oil which Japan badly needed at this time, the Japanese Ambassador advised the exchange of raw silk for oil. It would be fine, he said, if Japan could find a way to make the freezing order ineffective, but it could neither expect much in this direction nor hope that the United States would apply frozen funds to pay for the oil.[610]

167. Ambassador Nomura Reports Indirect Participation of United States in the War Against Germany

As further proof that the United States was indirectly, if not directly, participating in the war on the side of the Allies, Mr. Nomura cited the statement made by the New York Times to the effect that if there were any indications that Soviet Russia was being defeated, the aircraft supplied to Russia should be stopped, since such material might fall eventually into German hands, that not even British and American military observers were permitted to watch the war, and as a result, a true picture of the German-Russian war could not be obtained.[611]

168. Japan Plans to Evacuate Nationals from the United States

Discussions were now being carried on between Japanese officials in American cities and in Mexico in regard to the evacuation of Japanese nationals in this area. Consul Yoshio Muto at San Francisco, in a circular dispatch transmitted August 16, 1941, said that first-generation Japanese who had established themselves in America and second-generation Japanese who had registered for military service were anxious to remain in the United States should a break in Japanese-American relations occur.

Consul Muto added that no indications of unrest were apparent even when such persons heard that Japanese ships on regular schedule were no longer to operate to the west coast. Since many first and second-generation Japanese were actually wavering in their intentions, the Japanese consulate at San Francisco was encouraging these persons through subsidized newspapers and organizations.

All Japanese persons connected with banks and companies with home offices in Japan, as well as others who were employed only in completing unfinished business, would be evacuated. It was imagined, Mr. Muto said, that Japanese residents who had become attached to the land would be dealt quite a blow when such evacuation took place. Therefore, all possible means were being taken to soften the blow.[612]

169. American Officials Search Japanese Business Offices in Los Angeles

An inspection of the NYK, Yokohama Specie Bank, the Sumitomo, the Mitsui, and the Mitsubishi branch offices in Los Angeles by four to seven Treasury Department and FBI officials was reported to Tokyo on August 18, 1941. A thorough and detailed inspection had been

[608] III, 375.
[609] III, 376.
[610] III, 377.
[611] III, 378.
[612] III, 379.

[136]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

made in each office. Not only had the inspectors checked letters of private individuals, but photostatic copies had been made of several thousand documents, although the Sumitomo office had forbidden the photostating of its codes.[613]

Consul Kenji Nakauchi believed that the investigation had been conducted to determine the existence of "subversive acts" in spite of the fact that it was theoretically conducted in conjunction with the freezing order. Official employees of the Yokohama Specie office had been forbidden to enter their offices, or to leave, between 6:00 P.M. and 8:30 A.M. in order to prevent the burning of documents. It had been necessary, Consul Nakauchi disclosed, to secure the approval of the inspectors on all telegraphic communications received or dispatched.[614]

170. Evacuation Committee Meets on August 18, 1941 to Discuss Return of Missionaries

In answer to Ambassador Nomura's dispatch of August 8, 1941, Tokyo communicated a message from the Governor-General of Korea on August 19, 1941 to the effect that the evacuation committee of the Mission in Keijo had met on August 18, 1941 to determine whether the missionaries were to return to America. The Governor-General in Korea promised to keep Foreign Minister Toyoda informed as to the results of the meeting of the evacuation committee.[615]

171. The Japanese Embassy in Washington Reprimands the Tokyo Foreign Office

On August 19, 1941 Japanese representatives in Washington complained that during the past several years the Foreign Office had sent general instructions which did not take into consideration the general world situation and, therefore, missed the most essential points. It was suggested, therefore, that diplomatic matters be turned over to the investigation section for proper classification according to their importance so that the Embassy could dispose of the matters in the order of their urgency.[616]

172. Japan Recognizes Russo-German War as Threat to Its Border

On August 20, 1941 Tokyo replied to Ambassador Nomura's request for information concerning Japan's attitude toward the Russo-German war. While Tokyo did not feel able to predict the outcome of the Russo-German war, it took into consideration the possibility that Soviet Russia might lose the war with the result that the Stalin regime would disintegrate and far eastern Russia be thrown into political confusion.[617]

Moreover, it was necessary to consider that since part of Soviet Russia was adjacent to Japan and Manchukuo, Japan felt the necessity of taking precautionary measures to safeguard its national defense and security. There also remained the possibility of Soviet Russia's being influenced by a third power and consequently permitting the establishment of military bases in the maritime provinces of Siberia or in Kanchataka.

As a result, the Japanese government had decided to increase its forces in Manchukuo, and at the same time, to carry on negotiations in Tokyo with Russian officials in order to solve the various questions pertaining to this area. Tokyo was aware, however, that Russian officials had been warned to be cautious in their attitude toward the forces situated in Manchukuo.[618]

If this increase of Japanese troops in northern China should bring from the United States further demands for explanation by Japan, Ambassador Nomura was advised to impress upon

[613] III, 380.
[614] III, 381.
[615] III, 382.
[616] III, 383.
[617] III, 384. See Section 23, Part A, Rumors Of a British-American-Russian Peace Conference Speed Japanese Action.
[618] Ibid.

[137]

the American government that the troop movement was purely a precautionary measure designed to forestall any unforeseen emergency which would disturb peace in the Far East. To an inquiry from the Russian Ambassador in Tokyo regarding this matter the Japanese Foreign Minister had assured the Russian government that Japan would live up to the Neutrality Pact "as long as Russia did". The Soviet Ambassador was satisfied with this reply.[619]

The Tokyo Foreign Office also requested Ambassador Nomura to call the attention of the United States' authorities to the fact that shipping war materials from the United States to Russia by way of Japanese coastal waters would have an unfavorable effect on the already unstable Japanese-American relations. The Japanese Foreign Minister had already explained the situation to Ambassador Joseph C. Grew in Tokyo.[620]

173. Consul Morishima Suggests Further Precautions to Ensure Secrecy of Dispatches

Asking that the Japanese Ambassador in Washington investigate the telegraphic situation, Consul Morito Morishima in New York protested that the Western Union Telegraph Company had returned one of his dispatches which had been sent to Vancouver. Furthermore, since code messages from the Consulate apparently had been prohibited, requests for transmissions must have been received from Japanese Consulates in Canada.[621]

174. Change Predicted in Japanese American Relations

The Japanese finance officer, Mr. Nishiyama, in a confidential interview on August 21, 1941, was told to expect a change in Japanese-American relations within the next ten days. This change would depend upon the attitude that Japan took during this time.[626]

175. Washington Warns Tokyo of Security Violation

Since Tokyo had requested information regarding American treatment of Japanese officials in connection with all branches of communications, asset freezing, travel and surveillance of diplomatic and consular officers, Ambassador Nomura disseminated the instructions of the Foreign Office as directed. However, as a precautionary measure, he first carefully paraphrased and then encoded these instructions. On August 22, 1941 Ambassador Nomura warned Tokyo that a close watch should be maintained in guarding code secrecy.[627]

177. Japanese Authorities Express Concern over United States' Official Inspection

On August 23, 1941 Financial Attache Tsutumu Nishiyama in Tokyo wired his opinion regarding the bank inspection conducted by the Treasury Department officials and F.B.I. men. He believed that the American inspection came closer to being a search for "subversive acts" rather than an inspection connected with the freezing order.

Influential persons in the Specie Bank, greatly concerned, asked that an investigation be conducted to ascertain the real purpose of the inspection of American officials.[629]

178. Japan Reports Anti-Japanese Activities among American Missionaries in China

A supplementary report on American missionaries in China was sent to Washington by Tokyo on August 25, 1941. Upon investigation, the Japanese professed to have learned that the Church had taken in sixteen wounded enemy troops, many enemy spies and Communists, and had hid them on the church premises. It was further alleged that church officials were

[619] III, 385.
[620] Ibid.
[621] III, 386.
[626] III, 391.
[627] III, 392.
[629] III, 394.

[138]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

sending undercover reports to the enemy and were participating in enemy-like activities. As a result of these findings, nine persons, including missionaries, were confined in a house adjoining the church hospital and kept under surveillance.

Deciding, in view of the critical times, to act with special leniency, the Japanese military command asked Mr. James N. Montgomery, who was responsible for the Americans, to sign a pledge that the Americans would not take part in any similar activities in the future. Consequently, the American citizens were released and the watch removed.[630]

In spite of this expression of Japanese friendliness, the church officials were circulating rumors to the effect that a certain Chinese patient who had died of illness in the hospital, had been murdered by the Japanese.[631]

179. Japan Attempts Disposal of Certain Frozen Funds

On August 25, 1941 the Chief of the Financial Bureau in Tokyo replied to Finance Attache Nishiyama's query concerning United States bonds in Japanese banks in the United States. If turned over secretly to the Japanese Financial Attache, Ambassador or Consul, Tokyo believed that those bonds of which the United States was unaware, could be easily disposed of without the owner's loss of title. When such a method was used, the Japanese official to whom they were entrusted was to issue a receipt giving all the information necessary to identify them. A certified list of these bonds was then to be sent to the Finance Minister in Japan who would in turn make yen payments on principal and interest.

In order to prevent the United States' officials from learning of this plan, deliveries of such certified lists were to be made by Foreign Office couriers. On the other hand, those bonds known to United States officials necessarily would be frozen. No other course could be pursued in such a case since any minor incident at this time could considerably endanger any Japanese-American negotiations.[632]

180. Japan Learns Details of Churchill-Roosevelt Agreement

A report of the Russian Peoples Commissar for Foreign Affairs which had been sent to various Russian representatives in the Orient was authorized by the Japanese government on August 25, 1941. It discussed the terms agreed upon during the present Roosevelt-Churchill conference, and said that in order to ensure the support of American public opinion in sending aid to Great Britain, President Roosevelt had stated that British war aims must be clarified. Churchill had cited the exhaustion and the anti-war sentiment prevalent in British dominions and among the laboring classes, and for these reasons had requested positive aid from America.

America had promised aid in the event of a Japanese attack upon Australia, Burma or the Netherlands East Indies and had agreed to an expansion of the economic war against Japan. American aid was also guaranteed in the Near East in case Germany invaded the Caucasus. Furthermore, the United States extended to Great Britain a grant for military aid and promised American participation against German submarine warfare.[633]

181. American Newspapermen in Italy Forecast Axis Defeat

Word came to the Japanese Embassy in Washington on August 25, 1941 that American newspapermen in Rome were highly pleased with developments in the international situation. They believed that American aid to Britain and Russia would gradually strengthen the en-

[630] III, 395.
[631] Ibid.
[632] III, 396.
[633] III, 397.

[139]

circlement of the European continent, and that the German and Italian armies in North Africa would be cut off from their home countries. They also believed that American aid in the future would be sent by way of Dakar, Bathurst, British Gambia, Basra, Singapore and the Suez.[634]

182. Minister Sakaya Criticizes American Aid to Russia

A report to Tokyo from Minister Tadashi Sakaya concerning a conversation with Hans Frederick Schoenfield, the American Minister in Helsinki, Finland was relayed to Ambassador Nomura in Washington. According to the report, Minister Sakaya had argued that the United States' support of Russia, a country diametrically opposed to the democratic principle, was peculiar.[635]

The American Minister replied that, although he had received no detailed reports from Washington, he imagined that his country considered it essential to support Russia against a greater threat. Furthermore, from the standpoint of the United States, Bolshevism could not constitute a very great threat to other nations because of the tribulation which Russia had suffered in the last ten years.[636]

183. Minister Schoenfield Clarifies American Policy

In answer to a remark concerning the absurdity of the United States' meddling in the affairs of Europe and Asia while adhering to the policy of the Monroe Doctrine, Minister Sakaya was informed by Mr. Schoenfield that though foreign countries were not permitted to seize control of any part of the American continents, the United States did not wish to control any country therein. However, should Germany attempt to contravene the principle of self-determination, which would shatter the foundations of peace between the old and new worlds and upset the economic equilibrium, the United States intended to prevent such action.[637]

The American Minister added that the bad relations between the United States and Japan would probably soon improve and that, as long as the leaders of the two countries continued to negotiate, there was a good chance for a composure of relations between the two countries.[638]

184. Japan Inquires About American Treatment of Japanese Nationals

As relations between Japan and the United States grew steadily worse, Tokyo asked Washington for a report on the methods used by the United States in handling Japanese nationals, since it intended to draw up a reply to an American protest against Japan's control of foreign business in Tokyo.

On August 26, 1941, Mr. Kenji Nakauchi, of the Japanese office in Hollywood, replied that printed matter sent from Japan apparently was being censored, although there was no actual proof. Private individuals in the United States often found that newspapers and magazines from Japan had been delayed or confiscated entirely. In one instance photostatic copies had been made of a Japanese official's private letters and diary.

After the Tachibana Incident, Japanese naval officials had been trailed and kept under surveillance, and since that time other Japanese nationals connected with the army and navy also had been watched. In spite of the fact that Captain Yutaka Ishikawa and Commander Sasaki of the Japanese navy had been subjected to an examination by customs officials before boarding the Otowasan Maru to return home, the FBI had also rigorously examined these officers.[639]

[634] III, 398.
[635] III, 399.
[636] Ibid.
[637] III, 400.
[638] III, 401.
[639] III, 402.

[140]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

185. Japan Suggests That Reciprocal Permits Facilitate Maintenance of American and Japanese Embassies

The Japanese government asked that the United States guarantee, under the principle of reciprocity, that Japanese diplomatic and consulate organizations in the United States be permitted to draw funds for the maintenance of offices and the expenses of personnel.[640]

On August 27, 1941 the Japanese Foreign Minister handed Ambassador Grew in Tokyo a document containing Japan's opinions on this subject, and on the same day a similar document was transmitted to Ambassador Nomura with instructions that he contact the American State Department concerning it. Japan pointed out that by the present reciprocal arrangement effective between Japan, England, Australia, Canada and Holland, it was possible to exclude the Ambassador, Consul, and employees of government offices from the investigations following transactions of foreigners. This agreement did not include public funds, but exempted only personal accounts of consular officials from investigation.

Since the United States did not permit the practice which Japan had accorded to American officials in Tokyo, the Japanese government felt obliged to make certain revisions in the American proposals concerning Japanese funds. Japan desired that the investigation of the actual expenses connected with telegraphic matters, salaries of employees, rents and entertainment expenses be omitted.[641] Furthermore, a permit should not be required for the receipt of money transferred to another official account.

On the other hand, America should grant a permit when Embassy and Consulates and other government offices wished to pay into the Japanese national treasury any balance on hand of current operating expenses and funds arising from the disposal of assets. Moreover, the income received by the consulate and the salaries of the consulate employees should be allowed to be sent to Japan. In regard to the personal living and traveling expenses, the standard set was to be 1500 yen a month in Japan and $500.00 a month in America. Permits for established salaries were to be issued reciprocally for the payment of both the Japanese and American Ambassadors, their Financial Attaches, Military and Naval Attaches, and Embassy secretaries.[642]

If any circumstances rendered necessary a greater amount than that already agreed upon, either the American or Japanese Ambassador, as the case might be, was to apply for a separate permit upon each occasion. After a list of the Japanese employees above the rank of clerk was furnished to the State Department by the Japanese Embassy in Washington, the American government was to grant the Yokohama Specie Bank a general permit covering the payment of salaries to these employees by the Japanese Foreign Office. If the expenses remitted through the Yokohama Specie Bank exceeded the $500.00 per month limit, the United States government was to grant a permit for the additional funds immediately upon the request of the Japanese Embassy.[643]

When Ambassador Nomura presented this memorandum from his government, he expressed the opinion that although the present arrangement would be effective only in the Japanese Empire and the United States respectively, it should be extended even further. If America facilitated the clearing of dollar remittances to Japanese offices and employees in South America and Europe as well, the Japanese Ambassador promised to recommend that the Manchurian and Nanking governments accord similar privileges to American offices in that area.[644]

[640] III, 376.
[641] III, 403.
[642] Ibid.
[643] Ibid.
[644] Ibid.

[141]

186. Japan Sets Date for Evacuation of American Missionaries

On September 2, 1941 the Governor-General's Office in Korea announced that in view of the fact that all thirteen of the American missionaries had consented to evacuate, all pending litigation would be dismissed and the missionaries would sail to Shanghai on Japanese vessels. Departing from Japan on ships leaving on August 26 and September 16, 1941, they would transfer at Shanghai to American vessels for the trip to the United States.[645]

187. Japan Opposes American Aid Sent to Russia Via Vladivostok[646]

On September 4, 1941 the Japanese Military Attache made another report on American aid being sent to Russia via Vladivostok. In his opinion the American public did not support aid to Russia so wholeheartedly as that to China. Therefore, he believed that Tokyo could openly oppose the routing of American tankers to Russia.[647]

If it were emphasized that the Japanese Navy held maneuvers in that area, and if at the same time the sinking of the Terukuni Maru in those mined waters was recalled, the Japanese Military Attache believed that American supplies to Russia would be rerouted in the future. At the same time, however, he emphasized that the Japanese government should not put too much pressure upon American officials, otherwise a commercial war might commence which would result finally in the complete economic destruction of the Japanese Empire.[648]

188. Japanese Finance Minister Attempts to Avoid Petroleum Sales Restrictions

On September 4, 1941 a Japanese official in Washington reported to the Minister of Finance in Tokyo concerning the problem of obtaining funds with which to purchase petroleum from the United States. According to this official's opinion, diplomatic relations between Japan and the United States must inevitably become more favorable, for if the situation were allowed to become worse, trade between Japan and South America would greatly suffer and any attempts of the Japanese to preserve their deposits there would be thwarted. On the other hand, if the situation improved, Japanese officials could send money from the United States to South America. To secure the necessary petroleum, therefore, it would be advantageous if the Japanese government heeded America's current demands so that means of paying for any petroleum purchases could be devised by Japan.[649]

The finance officer promised to discuss the problem with the American State and Treasury Departments and the Foreign Fund Control Board. After the United States had put into effect the freezing measures against Japan, the Japanese government had sent funds to South America for the purchase of certain goods. In view of this the finance officer suggested that in the future a portion of these funds should be used to pay for United States exports and, particularly, in the purchase of petroleum. Any other money in gold accumulated in other countries was also to be used for this purpose, though it would be necessary to secure permits beforehand from the Exchange Control Organization in each country.[650]

The Japanese official pointed out that the United States could effect a freezing of funds in related banks in order to impair Japan's South American policy, though such action had been delayed by the United States because of the Japanese-American negotiations. In order, therefore, to lessen the ill effects which the South American countries would suffer if the United States froze Japanese funds in their banks, the Japanese finance officer again urged Tokyo to make certain concessions to America's demands.[651]

[645] III, 404.
[646] Information in this section did not become available until January 1945.
[647] III, 405.
[648] Ibid.
[649] III, 406.
[650] Ibid.
[651] III, 407.

[142]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

189. Ambassador Nomura Informs Tokyo of Transfer of Funds

Referring to his previous message to Tokyo regarding funds on hand in Washington, Ambassador Nomura declared on September 4, 1941 that the $20,606.47 which he had been holding for the New York Consulate would be transferred to that office.[652]

On September 5, 1941 the Japanese Ambassador was asked to send $5000 from the special secret funds held by the Counselor to a Japanese resident in Cuba for emergency use. The actual disbursement of these funds, however, was to be made only upon orders from Foreign Minister Toyoda.[653]

190. Mr. Terasaki Plans to Confer with "America First" Committee

For the purpose of making secret contacts with members of the "America First" Committee, Ambassador Nomura asked Tokyo on September 6, 1941 to authorize Secretary Hidenari Terasaki to make an official visit to Chicago. Since Mr. Terasaki had been unable to make an official tour to Los Angeles and San Francisco, it was requested also that he be permitted at this time to stop off at San Francisco, Seattle and Los Angeles.[654]

191. Japan Keeps in Touch with Its Nationals in America

Arrangements were made on September 6, 1941 to have Mr. Ryukichi Watanabe attend memorial services in honor of his son, Mr. Junichi Watanabe and others, which was to be held from October 15 to 21 inclusive at the Yasukuni Shrine in New York. Since the name of the deceased was not to be made public until the end of September, Mr. Watanabe's invitation to the memorial services was to be extended to him confidentially.[655]

192. Arrest of Japanese in Possession of Illegal Passports

Tokyo learned on September 6, 1941 from Consul Nakauchi in Hollywood that local immigration officers had arrested Japanese who were in possession of illegal passports. Approximately 100 persons had been taken into custody in California. Since it appeared that "this sort of round-up" would be carried on in the future as well, Mr. Nakauchi declared that when boats became available approximately half of these persons would be given the opportunity to return home.[656]

193. Japanese Officials Leave for Japan (September 9, 1941)

Other Japanese returning to Tokyo at this time included Couriers Kuga, Watanabe and Tachi; Mr. Zozo Nishina, an engineer; Mr. Nakajima, former Manchurian Railroad Director; Mr. Hase, Diet Member; Mr. Kiyohara, Secretary of the Ministry of Justice; Messrs. Kuge and Ito, officials of the Home Ministry; Professors Hamada and Tanabe; Mr. Satsuma, Chief Editor of the Kokumin newspaper, and two others. This group had left San Francisco on the President Taylor on September 9, 1941 en route to Shanghai whence reservations to Japan had been requested.[657]

194. Japanese Speculations Continue Regarding Myron Taylor's Return to Vatican

After a year's absence, Mr. Myron Taylor, President Roosevelt's personal emissary to the Vatican, returned to his post on September 9, 1941. Various rumors arose concerning his mis-

[652] III, 408.
[653] III, 409.
[654] III, 410.
[635] III, 411.
[656] III, 412.
[657] III, 413.

[143]

sion. According to one representative, Mr. Taylor had been ordered to request that the Vatican mediate the settlement of the Far Eastern question between Japan and the United States. Another report indicated that, in view of the new alliance between Great Britain, the United States and Soviet Russia, Mr. Taylor was to discuss the anti-Bolshevik propaganda instigated by Catholics.

Other speculations included the discussion by Mr. Taylor of problems affecting Catholics and Catholic missions throughout the territories of the Far East under the control of the United States and Great Britain, as well as the theory that Mr. Taylor had brought a peace proposal for the Pope's opinion. In the opinion of Japanese officials stationed in Rome, however, Mr. Taylor had not been entrusted with any particular mission. In view of the present delicate international situation they believed Mr. Taylor's assignment to be a gesture designated by President Roosevelt for the purpose of spreading good-will among the Catholics in the United States, Central and South America and in Europe.[658]

195. Mr. Myron Taylor Sees Possibility of Russo-German Peace Move

On September 10, 1941, the conversation of Mr. Taylor with the American Ambassador to France, Admiral William Leahy, and the American Ambassador to Spain, Alexander Weddell was reported from Barcelona by Japanese Consul Suma. Mr. Taylor believed that America's participation in the war at the present time was unlikely unless a major incident developed, or it became necessary to combat German-Russian peace moves. While Stalin questioned the motivation of British and American aid to Russia, he greatly feared the collapse of the Russian regime and at times it was thought that he planned to make peace with Germany. Depending upon the terms offered, Stalin might accede.[659] As far as the United States was concerned, it was anxious to avoid waging a war in the Pacific and the Atlantic at the same time. Although the United States would make no clear commitment in view of the consequences if Japan remained in the Axis, the American authorities would ensure that conversations between the two countries were not discontinued. If Japan broke with the Axis, the United States was ready to make "sizable concessions."[660]

Although the moving of English troops to Malay pointed to the opening of a joint British-American campaign, it was believed that the United States was unlikely to go as far as rendering "military assistance" until its relationship with Japan was more clearly defined.[661]

196. Japan Changes Military Attaches in United States

Foreign Minister Toyoda, on September 10, 1941 informed Ambassador Nomura that Major Hotsue Ishikawa who was already in the United States, had been appointed Assistant Military Attache, replacing Lt. Col. Toshkizu Suzuki.[662]

197. Freezing Order Necessitates Reorganization of Japanese Intelligence Activities

Japanese espionage and intelligence organizations in the United States were affected by the freezing of Japanese assets. Consul Morishima in New York advised Tokyo on September 12, 1941 that even before the freezing legislation it had been decided to dismiss all persons of little value and to transfer to the Cultural Institute the most effective persons or groups in their employment. The most capable persons were to be diverted from the dissemination of propaganda to the collecting of intelligence and to espionage activities.

[658] III, 414.
[659] III, 415.
[660] III, 416.
[661] III, 417.
[662] III, 418.

[144]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

After this reorganization had taken place, the freezing order had been set in motion by the United States and Japanese authorities, finding it impossible to maintain their elaborate plans, had decided to make temporary reduction in expense funds and salaries.[663] In readjusting their plans, Japanese officials at the New York Consulate had decided to discontinue publication of the Living Age, the Foreign Observer, and the Far Eastern Trade and the Culture on Wheels Library.[664]

They also planned to suspend distribution of films through the YMCA office and other agencies as soon as the Japanese contracts had expired, and to discontinue publication of books for propaganda purposes in connection with the World Over Printing Enterprise. The publications, the Orient and the Japanese American, were to be suspended because of the scarcity of funds for employees. Many Japanese employees would be kept on the payrolls although their monthly salaries would be greatly reduced after September.

198. Freezing Order Curtails Japanese Intelligence Activities in America

Readjustments in the Japanese civilian intelligence organizations continued to be the subject of dispatches from Consul Morishima in New York to Tokyo. On September 22, 1941 he said that the following of a more aggressive policy in connection with the Cultural Institute had been impossible because of the freezing of funds. Activities of the Institute had even been curtailed. The Library on Wheels, which had maintained a route hardly worth mentioning would be transferred to the Cultural Institute, and its driver would be dismissed from employment.[666]

200. American Isolationists Oppose President Roosevelt's Speech on Greer Incident[668]

In a press conference on September 5, 1941 President Roosevelt said that the German submarine attack on the U.S.S. Destroyer Greer, on the previous day, was deliberate and that United States warships would eliminate the U-boat once it was tracked down. President Roosevelt said that the attack took place on the American side of the Atlantic while the ship was enroute to Iceland with mail and that the attack occurred in broad daylight. The fact that the destroyer escaped did not minimize the seriousness of the incident.[669]

A report on this speech sent to Tokyo by the Japanese Military Attache in Washington, believed to be Mr. Isoda, disclosed that such staunch isolationists as Colonel Lindbergh and Senators Nye, Gilette and Clark were strongly opposed to the President's attitude. German-American relations, in the future, Japanese officials felt, would depend largely upon Germany's actions, particularly in the Atlantic. Nevertheless, it could not be doubted that this latest incident had increased the chances of American participation in the European war.[670]

On September 11, 1941 President Roosevelt delivered a scathing attack on the methods of Germany and promised that the U.S. Navy would shoot aggressors on sight in the Atlantic.[671]

201. Japanese Intelligence Reports on American Airplane Production

On September 16, 1941 Consul Nakauchi in Los Angeles transmitted to Tokyo a detailed intelligence report concerning American airplane production. Not only were each of the airplane plants named specifically, but the size of orders filled by each plant, the number of

[663] III, 419.
[664] III, 420.
[666] III, 424, 425.
[668] Information in this section did not become available until February 1945. [669] New York Times, September 1941.
[670] III, 426.
[671] III, 427, Facts on File, September 11, 1941.

[145]

employees and the total amount of monthly salaries paid were enumerated as well. The type of craft on order at various plants for the British and American armies was listed. It was estimated by Consul Nakauchi that at least forty per cent of the total orders had been placed in the Los Angeles area, while ten per cent was concentrated in the vicinity of San Diego.[672]

202. Japan Denies Interfering with American Rights

On September 17, 1941 more than a month after Ambassador Nomura had submitted to Tokyo a document from the State Department listing injustices to American citizens in Japanese occupied territory, the Foreign Minister replied that the items in question had been investigated by the departments concerned. Subsequently, such reports of interference or injustices could be clarified as (1) items of misunderstanding for which there was no basis of fact, (2) conditions which, for a time, due to certain circumstances, did exist, but which were now restored to normal and, (3) conditions which, because of the present state of things, still existed, but which Japan was considering restoring to normal as soon as their continuance was no longer necessary.

In referring to the infraction of the right of the Standard Oil Company to draw funds with which to pay its telephone bill, the Foreign Minister said that officials who had administered the freezing order were unaccustomed to the procedure and some inconvenience was experienced in the drawing out of funds. The conditions, however, were gradually being eliminated. In the case of individuals, restrictions had been eased up to make it possible for foreigners to withdraw funds deposited in their own names to the amount of 1,000 yen per month for living and other expenses consistent with this. Ambassador Nomura was to bear these facts in mind when he replied to the United States government.[673]

203. Ambassador Nomura Requests Change in Japanese Broadcasts

Because the 4:30 A.M. Japanese broadcast, as well as the 4:00 to 7:00 A.M. Domei broadcasts could hardly be heard, Ambassador Nomura asked that Tokyo consider changing the wave length. Although the Domei broadcasts had been excellent, by September 18, 1941, they had faded out completely. Furthermore, static had increased on the 8:30 A.M. broadcasts to the point where they could not be understood.[674]

204. Ambassador Nomura Reports on American Lend-Lease Shipments

Meanwhile Ambassador Nomura in Washington had been able to obtain from intelligence sources facts pertaining to the American Lend-Lease Act, which were transmitted by circular to Japanese representatives in London, Rio de Janeiro, Buenos Aires, Berlin and Tokyo. The Ambassador pointed out that out of the original $7,000,000,000, which had been authorized, only $6,200,000,000 had been allotted and as of September 18, 1941 the actual payment had not exceeded $390,000,000.

According to the Japanese Ambassador, some progress had been made in the actual aid given, but what had been accomplished had not measured up to expectations especially for planes, tanks, machine tools, arms and ammunition. Of the amount of defense materials exported, which included arms and ammunition, airplanes and tanks, ships and agricultural products, the greater part had been shipped to England, Central Asia, Africa and the American countries. The reasons advanced by the Japanese Ambassador as to why progress had not come up to expectations was that the production process was still in the stage of development, and there was a shortage of shipping.[675]

[672] III, 428, 429.
[673] III, 430.
[674] III, 431.
[675] III, 432.

[146]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

205. Freezing Order Creates Financial Difficulties for Japanese Diplomats

Financial difficulties were being experienced by the Japanese Legation staff in the United States as a result of the freezing order. On September 18, 1941 the Japanese Consul in San Francisco informed Ambassador Nomura in Washington of the salaries of himself, of Consul Kazuyoshi Inagaki, Vice-Consul Takahasi, Secretary Kensuke Sato, Secretary Shigero Imai, Secretary Kurata and Interpreter Hasizume. He advised Ambassador Nomura that the San Francisco branch of the Yokohama Specie Bank was handling each of the accounts listed as a separate checking account.[676]

206. Japan Stops Shipping Film to Germany Via America

On September 18, 1941 Consul Morishima in New York advised Tokyo to stop the shipment of Japanese film to Germany via San Francisco and Buenos Aires. Since certain documents which had been discovered by American customs officials in previous shipments had been played up greatly in American movie magazines, it was supposed that American officials would continue to "spite" Japan in this manner.[677]

207. German Attache Discounts Probability of Japanese-American War

The Japanese Military Attache replied to Tokyo on September 20, 1941 that the German Attache in Washington believed that Great Britain would benefit from a Japanese attack on Russia, since it would lessen the danger to British interests further south. Nevertheless, he emphasized that both Great Britain and the United States would feel obligated to continue aid to Russia.[678]

Even though the Japanese Army were to invade the Netherlands East Indies and Singapore, the German Attache said, the United States might be willing to overlook this aggression provided the Japanese military forces did not attack the Philippines nor block America's supply of tin and rubber from Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies. In the event that Japan did control tin and rubber by virtue of its conquests in the southwest Pacific, the German Attache did not support the theory that the United States would immediately begin a devastating commercial war against Japan. He believed that the United States would delay further economic restrictions against Japan so long that they would be ineffective, for in the meantime Japan would have gained control of all the necessary materials of war.[679]

However, in evaluating these opinions of the German Attache, the Japanese Military Attache reminded his superiors that German and Italian officials were noted for being over-optimistic with regard to the Japanese-American situation. Therefore, it would be an unwise military policy for the Japanese government to order a further advance into the south Pacific on the basis of unfounded optimism, which he suspected was deliberately planned to impel Japan into a northern or southern drive. The Japanese official pointed out that in order to ensure a complete supply of war materials from Australia and India, the United States would be forced to augment its power in the Far East. Therefore, any further southward move by the Japanese forces would force the United States to enact some counter-measures. Although the United States might not actually enter in actual warfare with Japan, it was highly probable that the two countries would engage in severe economic warfare.[680]

[676] III, 433.
[677] III, 434.
[678] III, 435.
[679] Ibid.
[680] Ibid.

[147]

208. Japan Estimates the Number of Potential Evacuees from the United States

(a) Report from Los Angeles

On September 22, 1941, in answer to a special dispatch from Tokyo to its Consul in the United States regarding the dispatching of a special vessel to evacuate Japanese nationals. Consul Nakauchi transmitted an estimate of the number of persons who would have to be evacuated from Los Angeles. In this group were four government employees, 300 persons who were unable to finance transportation for themselves, and possibly 40 merchants.[681]

(b) Report from Portland, Oregon

Japanese Consul Oka in Portland, Oregon informed the Japanese Embassy on September 22, 1941 in answer to the questionnaire regarding the evacuation of Japanese nationals, that none under his jurisdiction came under the category of those to be evacuated. Four or five, however, had no objection to being evacuated.[682]

(c) Report from New York

Consul Morishima, in accordance with instructions concerning evacuees and Japanese Nationals, informed Consul Muto in San Francisco on September 24, 1941 that three or four students, a member of the Cultural Institute Director's family, two newspapermen and six railway and Tourist Bureau officials constituted the only group in the New York vicinity who had decided to leave the country at present. When conditions become more critical, however, approximately 160 to 180 businessmen and 30 students hoped to return home. It appeared that evacuation by American steamers was out of the question.[683]

209. Foreign Minister Toyoda Explains Evacuation of Russian Embassy Members

On September 22, 1941 Foreign Minister Toyoda informed Ambassador Nomura in Washington that the Domei report of the evacuation of some fifty members of the Russian Embassy in Tokyo had given the United States the false impression that relations between Moscow and Tokyo were in a critical stage and that a wholesale evacuation was imminent. As a matter of fact, Mr. Toyoda said, all the Russians that had left Tokyo were the Ambassador's wife and children together with several members of the staff. There was nothing extraordinary in these few people quitting the Embassy in Tokyo at this time.[684]

210. Tokyo Learns that NBC Reception of Far Eastern Broadcasts Is on 24-Hour Basis

The establishment of an NBC listening post in North Hollywood for the purpose of listening in on Far Eastern broadcasts was reported by Consul Nakauchi in Los Angeles on September 24, 1941. Six or seven RCA receiving units recorded broadcasts from Japan, China, the Netherlands East Indies, Malay, Thailand and possibly French Indo-China. The receiving station had been established in the private residence of an NBC technician in North Hollywood where five persons, technicians and translators, conducted a continuous listening service. Together with the personnel of the New York receiving station in Bellmore, Long Island, a staff of 22 persons were receiving Far Eastern Broadcasts 24 hours a day.[685]

Listening in on uncensored broadcasts, the Hollywood staff transmitted the information to New York by teletype when it believed the information to be of military value. The reception of

[681] III, 436, 437.
[682] III, 438.
[683] III, 439.
[684] III, 440.
[685] III, 441.

[148]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

Japanese broadcasts, especially Japanese short wave broadcasts to the South Seas and to various Asiatic coast stations, as well as Manchurian, Chinese, and Palau broadcasts to Japan, were receiving concentrated attention.[686]

211. Consul Morishima Deplores Optimism of Japanese Business Firms.

A word of warning to Japanese firms which were inclined to regard Japanese-American relations with too much optimism was advised by Consul Morishima in a dispatch to Tokyo on September 26, 1941. He pointed out that the Yokohama Specie Bank was using the upward price trend of Japanese securities as indicative of a favorable turn in Japanese-American relations, while the Osaka Steamship Company had advised its branch officials to go ahead and meet their expenses and if they found themselves short, supplementary funds would be sent. The Japanese Consul believed that commercial firms and banks should be advised to await the actual turn of events before proceeding in this manner.[687]

212. Japan Inquires Concerning the Releasing of Funds for Petroleum

Although negotiating with the Chief of Bureau in Charge of Foreign Funds in Washington on September 20, 1941 Japanese officials received no encouragement in solving their problem of getting funds with which to purchase petroleum. To their suggestion that payment be made by money brought in via South America some consideration during the following week was promised, but payment in Japanese money was refused.[688]

An inquiry regarding the question of payment for petroleum was sent from the Chief of the Exchange Bureau to Finance Official Nishiyama in Washington on September 26, 1941. Since Japan found it necessary to hasten this matter it requested that the Finance Official learn the attitude of the United States.[689]

Four days later Finance Attache Nobuo Yamada telegraphed that he was able to learn nothing at all from American officials concerning the matter of money with which to purchase petroleum. It would appear, he said, that the committee was arguing this matter and could reach no decision, although upon his subsequent inquiries, their attitude had appeared more and more unfavorable. The proposal that Japan transfer funds from South America had been made at the committee's suggestion, but when Mr. Yamada had accepted it, they had merely cancelled the plan and proposed another in its place. This, he said, gave them an excuse for further delay and refusals.[690]

213. Ambassador Nomura Asks Tokyo to Allow Americans to Leave Japan

On September 30, 1941 Ambassador Nomura advised that in spite of the fact that it would be impossible to get accommodations for all Japanese and Nisei in the United States to return to Japan, the 140 or 150 Americans in Japan should be given permission to leave. He pointed out that the United States attached a great deal of importance to allowing Americans to leave Japan.[691]

214. Ambassador Nomura Requests Permits for Japanese Deposit Banks in America

An inquiry concerning the procurement of funds was sent to Tokyo by Ambassador Nomura on September 30, 1941. He stated that the deposit banks of the Yokohama Specie Bank should be granted permits rather than the Yokohama Specie Bank itself, and inquired

[686] III, 442.
[687] III, 443.
[688] III, 444.
[689] III, 445.
[690] III, 446-447.
[691] III, 448.

[149]

whether the financial agreement covered these banks. The Yokohama Specie Bank carried accounts in branches which were located at San Francisco, Los Angeles, Honolulu, and Manila.[692]

215. Ambassador Nomura Requests that Cultural Institutions be Exempted from Freezing

Learning that $6,500 in American money, which had been sent by the Philadelphia Christian College to a girl's school in Tokyo had been frozen, Ambassador Nomura suggested to Tokyo on September 30, 1941 that cultural institutions should be allowed to send money freely. If the Japanese Foreign Office could discuss this matter with American representatives in Tokyo, it might be possible to permit remittances between cultural institutions without freezing.[693]

216. Japan Requests Mutual Agreement in Evacuating Nationals and Returning Goods

Ambassador Nomura learned on October 2, 1941 that the sending of ships to evacuate Japanese nationals would be difficult as long as there was no promise by the United States not to detain these vessels by legal claims. Although the commandeering of passenger ships was being considered, Japan wished to avoid this step since such ships would be called evacuation ships. Promising to consider the possibility of sailing permits for Americans, if space permitted, the Foreign Office directed Ambassador Nomura to visit the State Department to make further arrangements.[694]

In case left-over goods were to be shipped from Japan, the United States should arrange for their export and at the same time grant permits to release goods which were to be sent to Japan. If special ships were sent from Japan, they would have to be completely excluded from all legal claims by an arrangement between the two governments.[695] Foreign Minister Toyoda declared that he was exerting every effort to settle this matter and expected Ambassador Nomura also to do his best.[696]

217. Japanese Foreign Minister Cites Instances of American Discrimination

Giving details of instances of alleged discrimination suffered by Japanese in the United States as well as Central and South America,[697] Foreign Minister Toyoda circularized a message to Peking, Tsingtao, Nanking, Shanghai, and Tientsin on October 2, 1941 which was designed to present Japan's viewpoint concerning the treatment of Americans.

During a trip made by Japan's Minister to Mexico, Mr. Yoshioki Miura, and Interpreter Shintaro Fukushima on September 15, 1941 their baggage had been examined by Pan-American Airway officials. Although no sealed documents had been molested, the Japanese officials had been refused permission to board the plane unless they would consent to the examination. Furthermore, Minister Yamagata, returning from Chile, had been informed by Pan American Airways officials of these same rules. When Secretary Terasaki had left Washington for a visit to Port of Spain, Trinidad, the Pan American Airways officials, saying that regulations required the search, had examined his luggage.[698]

Furthermore, when the Heian Maru had left Seattle in August, Japanese passengers had been submitted to physical examination during which both men and women were stripped to their underwear. When the Asama Maru left Los Angeles, also in August, Japanese passengers

[692] III, 449.
[693] III, 450.

[694] III, 451.
[695] III, 452.
[696] III, 453.

[697] See III, Part A, Section 12.
[698] III, 454.

[150]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

had been stripped of their clothing and submitted to physical examination. However, when Japanese had embarked on the President Taylor at San Francisco and the French liner, the Marshal Joffre, no special physical examination had been given.[699]

The physical examinations, Foreign Minister Toyoda said, might have been made through a misunderstanding of the freezing order and through the fact that there had been a rumor that Japanese ships were carrying away cash in United States dollars. Since an agreement had been made recently between Japan and the United States not to examine the baggage of evacuating diplomats or to require them to submit a list of contents, it was thought unwise to subject Americans withdrawing from South China to physical examinations.[700]

218. Japan Registers Its Nationals in United States for Military Service

Because of the uncertainty of the mails, Consul Nakauchi in Hollywood doubted that all of the Japanese in his jurisdiction who would reach draft age in 1942 would be able to get their registrations in to Tokyo by the established deadline, November 30, 1941. Since these circumstances were beyond his control, he asked on October 2, 1941 that he be advised in this matter.[701]

219. Japan Considers the Supplying of Oil to Russia an "Unfriendly Gesture"

The question of America's supplying petroleum to Russia was the subject of a discussion between the American Consul and a Japanese official in Vladivostok, who asked if America did not consider the supplying of Russia with large quantities of petroleum, which Japan needed, an unfriendly course of action, disregarding the recent petroleum embargo issued by the United States against Japan. The American Consul replied that aid to Russia was the firm and fixed national policy of both England and the United States. Furthermore, only three American tankers, the Fitzsimmons, the Associated and the St. Claire, had arrived at Vladivostok, and the date of arrival of others was uncertain. If the United States should enter the war, American aid to Britain and to Russia would necessarily be diverted to Siberia.[702]

220. Tokyo Requests the Addition of Four Japanese to Government List

Ambassador Nomura was directed by Tokyo to list as government officials, Mr. Goroo Fukuyama, Assistant Professor at the University of Hokkaido, Mr. Shigeru Mishio, Assistant Professor at the Tokyo Imperial University, Mr. Kentaro Shimizu, Assistant Professor of Medicine at Tokyo University, and Mr. Shizuo Kakutani, Assistant Professor at the Osaka Imperial University. The names of Mr. Kuniaichi Yamamoto and Dr. Hayakawa were not listed since they could not be called government officials.[703]

In preparing for the return to Japan of the Chiefs of the Tourist Bureaus and their staffs in New York and Los Angeles, Foreign Minister Toyoda directed that Ambassador Nomura request permits for their living and travel expenses.[704]

221. Consul Sato Requests the Direct Evacuation of Japanese from Vancouver, Seattle and Portland

On October 6, 1941 Consul Sato in Seattle informed Tokyo that the number of Japanese in Seattle, Vancouver and Portland who desired to return to Japan had increased by approximately 400 persons since the evacuation of Japanese businessmen from that area. If an evacuation ship touched port at San Francisco, a difficult situation would be created since territory

[699] III, 455.
[700] III, 456.
[701] III, 457.
[702] III, 458.
[703] III, 459.
[704] Ibid.

[151]

transit permits would have to be secured from American authorities in order that Japanese in Canada might come to San Francisco. Furthermore, they could come into the United States only in a closely guarded train which might be publicized jingoistically by the American press. Consul Sato suggested that not only the Heian Maru but also the Kikawa Maru be dispatched to that port, since the evacuees would probably increase in number and their baggage would exceed the capacity of one ship.[705]

With the plans for sending evacuation ships to the United States still uncertain, the Foreign Office requested that Ambassador Nomura secure a guarantee from the American government regarding the first ship, the Tatsuta Maru, as well as those to follow. Until such a guarantee were obtained, it would be impossible to arrange a fixed schedule. In view of the scarcity of vessels, it seemed improbable that a new schedule could be arranged upon short notice.[706]

Nevertheless, the Japanese discussed the matter again on October 10, 1941 with State Department officials who declared that until the fundamental problem of national relations was adjusted, there was no use trying to reach a settlement of such subsidiary problems.[707]

222. Freezing Order Forces the Evacuation of Many Japanese

Ambassador Nomura was notified by Tokyo on October 6, 1941 that the Yokohama Specie Bank's frozen accounts included all funds held by its deposit banks. Therefore, when appropriate monthly transfers were made from the frozen funds to diplomatic office funds, permits should be granted also to the Yokohama Specie Bank's deposit banks. Since the local National City Bank in Tokyo had virtually exhausted its funds, the Yokohama Specie Bank was considering presenting a proposal through its branch offices in the United States covering the transfer and circulation of Japanese funds in consideration of the transfer of a like sum to the National City Bank in Tokyo. Should the American authorities not agree, Ambassador Nomura was instructed to request of the State Department that definite revisions be made in the regulations then in force.[708]

Although Ambassador Nomura had expected that permits for the office expenses and allowances of Embassies and Consulates would be granted automatically, it appeared that difficulties had arisen. In the future even should there be a basic agreement in regard to reciprocal exemptions from the freezing order, its application would not be a simple affair. Consequently, there appeared to be no other way than to make application for permit for each separate occasion as it arose. It would be necessary to revise the amounts for the so-called government organs and since it would be inexpedient for a delay to occur in the permit for foreign diplomatic establishments and consulates, there was no other way than to have all those whose business had ceased to return to Japan at once. Since it would be impossible to say that members of the Tourist Bureau and students studying in the United States under the Department of Education were government officials, it would be necessary that they be returned to Japan.[709]

223. Consul Morishima Reports on an Anti-Axis Pamphlet

A pamphlet entitled "Hitler Intends To Destroy Japan", written by Alton Pettenkofer under the pseudonym of Else Weil, was the subject of a report from Consul Morishima on October 8, 1941. The pamphlet which was expected to appear in the November issue of the magazine,

[705] III, 460.
[706] III, 461.
[707] III, 462.
[708] III, 463.
[709] III, 464.

[152]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

Asia, was, according to Consul Morishima, part of the propaganda published by the Committee to Defend America for the purpose of alienating Japan from Germany.[710]

224. Japan Exhibits Interest in American Military Magazines[711]

The General Affairs Section of the Japanese Army exhibited great interest in the organization of America's military forces. On October 8, 1941 the Japanese Embassy in Washington was asked to forward the March, 1941 issue of the Army Directory and also the August issue of the Infantry Journal.[712]

225. Ambassador Nomura Asks Tokyo to Send American Paper Money

On October 9, 1941 Ambassador Nomura notified Tokyo that the money order covering staff salaries for August as well as a notice that September's allotment had been sent by cable had been received, but that permission to cash them had not yet been granted. Having been forced to advance salaries out of secret funds on hand, the Japanese Ambassador estimated that he would need approximately $60,000 to pay salaries and expenses in October, 1941. Although he believed the negotiation involving release of expense money would be successful eventually, he was certain that the difficulties involved in transferring this amount of cash would cause delay. For this reason, Ambassador Nomura asked that the director of the accounting section send by courier, possibly on the Tatsuta Maru, enough American paper money to cover expenses.[713]

On October 16, 1941 Foreign Minister Toyoda directed the Japanese Ambassador in Washington to arrange that the returning Japanese bring as much United States paper money as possible instead of sending their money by means of drafts, since recently there had been an increased demand for United States paper currency.[714]

226. Ambassador Nomura Defends His Report Concerning Rumors in America

In answer to a dispatch from Ambassador Oshima, branding reports of negotiations between Germany and Russia before June, 1941 as false, which Tokyo had forwarded for the information of Japanese representatives in Washington, Ambassador Nomura declared on October 10, 1941 that he had not believed the intelligence concerning the negotiations and for this reason had sent it as a report of secondary importance.

Ambassador Nomura believed that at a time when such events as Hess's flight to England could occur, any report should be investigated from every possible angle. Likewise, he said, it would not seem logical for Germany brazenly to attack Russia without previous negotiations. In the future, should the contents of a spy report have a bearing on Japan or should the facts of a report have to be checked, Ambassador Nomura declared that he would continue to submit this type of intelligence report.[715]

While making arrangements for the remittances to pay for shipments of petroleum, the Japanese Financial Official in Washington learned that the export licenses of the Japanese firms exporting the petroleum had been cancelled. Upon investigation he found that these had actually been cancelled at the time the freezing order was issued, because the American authorities thought that the permits had been issued after the freezing order as a result of an oversight.[716]

[710] III, 465.
[711] Information in this section was not made available until June 1945.
[712] III, 466.
[713] III, 467.
[714] III, 468.
[715] III, 469.
[716] III, 470

[153]

Tokyo was informed on October 16, 1941 that the Secretary of State was advising temporary postponement of activities in regard to the matter of payment for petroleum because the United States was giving due consideration to the changes taking place in the Japanese government. As soon as Japan's political situation had crystallized the United States would decide immediately upon a course of action.[717]

227. Major Yano Arranges Anti-American Espionage

The Japanese officials stationed in the United States were planning an increase in anti-American espionage activities. After receiving instructions from the General Staff Headquarters in Tokyo, Major Yano, on October 10, 1941, was preparing to leave Washington with Japanese code books for an official trip to Mexico.[718]

228. Tokyo Releases the Schedules of Evacuation Vessels to Washington

On October 12, 1941 Foreign Minister Toyoda sent Ambassador Nomura the schedule of the evacuation ships. The Tatsuta Maru would arrive at Honolulu on October 24, 1941 and at San Francisco on October 30, 1941 leaving there on November 2, 1941.

The Nitsuta Maru would arrive at Vancouver on October 31, 1941 and at Seattle on November 1, 1941 leaving Seattle on November 3; while the Taiyo Maru would dock at Honolulu from November 1 to 4.[719]

229. Consul Muto Estimates Number of Potential Evacuees

Consul Muto in San Francisco, who appeared to be in charge of the evacuation, informed Tokyo on October 14, 1941 that approximately 130 first class passengers and 64 second class passengers from New York and Chicago were to be evacuated on the Hikawa Maru and on the Tatsuta Maru. He advised that the other 127 persons resident in Chicago who wished to return home should advise the New York Consular office. Under the jurisdiction of the Los Angeles office were 38 first class passengers, 25 second class passengers and 200 third class passengers who wished to return home. The number of those taken on at Los Angeles could, should the situation warrant, be increased by approximately 250.[720] After the evacuation had been made, the Consul hoped that others who remained and who might be anxious to return to Japan would inform the Consular Office.[721]

230. Japan Requests Permits for Japanese to Re-enter the United States

At this time Tokyo was requesting that Japanese who re-entry permits had expired or who had left wives and children in the United States and wished to return be granted re-entry permits. On October 13, 1941 the Foreign Minister requested that the State Department's reply in regard to this matter be sent by noon of October 14, 1941, and that in case the American answer should be further delayed Ambassador Nomura's opinion concerning the matter be sent.[722]

When Ambassador Nomura referred this question to the State Department he was informed that the matter had considerable bearing upon the question of permitting American citizens in Japan to leave the country. Telephone reports had revealed that American persons had found it necessary to secure nine different permits before they were allowed to leave Japan.

[717] III, 471.
[718] III, 472.
[719] III, 473.
[720] III, 474.
[721] III, 475.
[722] III, 476-477.

[154]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

Consequently, there were many who were not able to board steamers for home. The State Department declared that until this matter had been discussed with competent authorities, it would have to postpone further reply. Ambassador Nomura at this point inquired of Tokyo as to whether any restrictions were being placed on American citizens who were endeavoring to leave the country. He asked that the departing Americans be delayed as little as possible so that their arrangements to board steamers for home could be facilitated.[723]

In regard to the evacuation of American citizens from Japan, Foreign Minister Toyoda on October 15, 1941 replied that Japanese regulations regarding the evacuation of foreigners applied to all non-Japanese and not to Americans only. At the suggestion of Ambassador Nomura, Japanese authorities were considering the elimination of as much red tape as possible at this time when Americans were desirous of returning home. Many Americans would, however, require two or three weeks to make preparations for leaving and, for this reason, would not be ready in time to sail on the ship scheduled to leave soon. This problem had nothing to do with the issuance of permits to leave the country, Foreign Minister Toyoda said, and furthermore, the American Ambassador in Tokyo should be fully cognizant of the situation.[724]

231. Japan Refuses to Recognize Yugoslavia

Japan's recognition of Croatia rather than Yugoslavia was stressed in instructions from Tokyo to Ambassador Nomura on October 13, 1941. Although the interests of Yugoslavia in Japan had been taken care of by France since 1919, recently when England had presented a note that this care would devolve on the British Embassy, Japan replied that having already recognized Croatia, it did not recognize Yugoslavia, and such a representation could not be acknowledged.[725]

232. The United States Requests Fuel Oil For Its Tokyo Embassy and the Yokohama Consulate General

On October 14, 1941 the State Department requested that a permit for fuel oil for heat and hot water for its Embassy in Tokyo and the Consulate General in Yokohama be granted, since the request of the Embassy and the Consulate General had been refused. Inasmuch as the efficiency of the work of the two offices was involved, the State Department had requested Ambassador Nomura to make a telegraphic request to the Japanese government for a permit for the immediate transportation of the fuel oil. Although Ambassador Nomura realized that it was difficult to accord American diplomatic establishments special treatment, there was also the problem of the supply of bunker oil for the Tatsuta, Hikawa and Taiyo Marus to consider. Ambassador Nomura recommended that the necessary permission be granted.[726]

234. Japanese Agents Note Shipment of Light Bombers to Russia

An announcement by the United States War Department concerning the shipment of light bombers to Russia was reported to Tokyo on October 15, 1941. The planes, which appeared to be eighteen Douglas light bombers, had been purchased by the Peruvian government in Canada, but the United States had later withdrawn permit for shipment. Whether the planes would be shipped directly to Russia or would be sent by way of England was not known.[728]

[723] III, 478.
[724] III, 479.
[725] III, 480.
[726] III, 481.
[728] III, 483.

[155]

235. Japan Received Documents from New York Consulate

With Mr. Aoyagi, a Japanese Consulate official from New York, who was planning to return to Japan for family reasons and was scheduled to embark on the Tatsuta Maru on October 16, 1941, Consul Morishima planned to send the ashes of Mr. Hyukichi Watanabe and one suitcase of Watanabe's personal effects.[729] He pointed out that documents from the New York Consulate had already been sent to Japan with Courier Koga, who had sailed from San Francisco on September 9, 1941.[730]

236. Japanese Secret Agents Procure a Message Sent by Secretary Hull

Tokyo was notified by its representative in Shanghai on October 16, 1941 that a Japanese secret agent had obtained a copy of Secretary Hull's reply of October 11, 1941 to the Consul General in Shanghai. The American Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai had appealed to Secretary Hull concerning the relaxing of the export license system and the control over exchange.[731]

237. The Japanese Ambassador to Turkey Suggests Declaration of War Against the United States On October 17, 1941 the Japanese Ambassador to Turkey, Mr. Sho Kurihara, in "submitting

his humble opinion without reflecting on the presumptiousness of it", advised that Japan should adhere to the spirit of the Tripartite Pact and terminate the Japanese-American negotiations. It was his most ardent wish that Japan devote itself wholeheartedly to the establishment of the New Order in East Asia in harmony with its fixed national policy.

It was clear to the Ambassador that the Foreign Office was attempting to prevent, through Japanese-American negotiations, America's entry into the war and to effect a solution of the China Incident. Though realizing the necessity of solving the present crisis, he pointed out that little progress had been shown. Unless Japan changed its passive attitude of allowing English and American concessions and extraterritoriality, there was no hope of settling the problem. To negotiate further with America, which had oppressed Japan through the freezing order and other injustices, would result inevitably in the further encirclement of Japan, in which policy America was the ringleader.

Since America understood the absolute necessity of aiding England in order to overthrow Germany, the Japanese Ambassador declared that American participation in the war would be conditioned more by the future trend of the European war rather than by the surrender of Japanese rights in Japanese-American negotiations. Ambassador Kurihara was also disturbed because he had frequently heard remarks in Germany and Italy that Japan's attitude was that of an enemy. If Japan really had determined to fight, he believed that it would be best to end these negotiations immediately and to manifest a resolute attitude. The continuation of negotiations would not only jeopardize the settlement of the China Incident but would also permit the United States to participate in the European war.[732]

[729] III, 484.
[730] III, 485.

[731] III. 486. The Japanese dispatch containing Secretary Hull's message is not available.
[732] III, 487.

[156]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

PART C—JAPANESE DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITIES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD

(b) Japanese-Panamanian Relations

238. Japanese Officials Plan the Removal of Military Charts from Panama

Early in the summer of 1941 arrangements had been made by the Japanese Minister in Panama to have copies made of secret charts showing the locations of equipment, guns and other military establishments in Panama. On June 27, 1941 it had been decided not to remove the charts from Panama until such time as a safe opportunity presented itself.[733]

On August 21, however, Minister Akiyama wired that he was still encountering considerable difficulty in finding a person to whom he could entrust the diagrams for delivery, although Colonel Yamamoto, Assistant Attache to the Embassy in Washington, had taken explanatory notes of the fortification maps with him when he had passed through Panama en route to Japan during the middle of July, 1941. In spite of the fact that no definite plans had been formulated, Minister Akiyama declared that the maps would probably be moved from Panama by the end of August.[734]

Inspecting military defenses, new equipment and establishments in the Canal Zone, six members of the House of Representatives Military Committee had arrived in Panama on August 23, 1941. Minister Akiyama reported to Tokyo on August 26, 1941 that the Congressmen had inspected defenses in Bermuda, Puerto Rico, Antigua, Trinidad and Georgetown.[735]

239. Japanese Minister Asks Clarification of Duties of Subordinates

Minister Akiyama presented his credentials to the authorities of Panama on August 28, 1941 and on September 10, 1941 Foreign Minister Toyoda informed him that his present duty was to include that of Minister to Costa Rica.[736] A few weeks after his arrival in Panama, Minister Akiyama found it necessary to clarify the positions of his subordinates at that post. He proposed that Mr. Izawa be appointed as Consul since at the present time this gentleman was responsible for collecting intelligences in the Canal Zone and for making contacts with outsiders. In order to clarify matters for the Panamanian officials who did not grant diplomatic privileges to anyone below the rank of consul, and at the same time to bring about order within the office, the Japanese Minister suggested that this promotion be considered. Since Vice-Consul Hara had been engaged chiefly in Commercial dealings, Minister Akiyama suggested that he be charged only with this responsibility.[737]

Six days later on September 18, 1941 having received no reply to his proposal, Minister Akiyama again asked concerning the reassignment of duties in his office. He pointed out that to remove Mr. Jusoku Ogawa from the office at the Foreign Minister's whim would do serious harm at this critical time, since it would cause confusion in the Legation and in the intelligence organization which was running smoothly at the moment. He asked that the personnel at the Ministry remain unchanged until he had received a reply to his request.[738]

[733] See Volume II, Part B.
[734] III, 488.
[735] III, 489.
[736] III, 490-491.
[737] III, 492.
[738] III, 493.

[157]

240. Panama Investigates the Attack on the Sessa

On September 9, 1941 the American State Department announced that the 1,700 ton United States-owned former Danish steamship, Sessa, carrying food and non-military supplies to the Icelandic government at Reykjavik, had been torpedoed and sunk on August 17. The ship, which had been taken over by the United States Maritime Commission in July, was under Panama registry.[739]

Whether the attack on the ship was made in belligerent waters or not would determine the attitude of the Panama government in regard to this affair, Minister Akiyama pointed out in a dispatch to Tokyo on September 12, 1941. According to a Presidential Order that had been issued on February 19, 1941 Panama had declared itself not responsible for any risk taken by a ship of Panama registry sailing in belligerent waters of any part of the world. The shipping companies would be responsible for the damage suffered in consequence of such action.[740]

Minister Akiyama further informed Tokyo that in August the German government had demanded the withdrawal of Panamanian consuls from European nations under German occupation, and Panama, in turn, had withdrawn its consuls not only from the German occupied countries but from Germany as well.[741]

Panama had not, however, withdrawn its Minister to Germany, Francisco Villalaz Castillo, and on September 16, 1941 it had instructed Minister Castillo to protect against the torpedoing of the Montana, also under Panama registry, and the Sessa, and to demand indemnities.[742]

241. Panama's Foreign Minister Clarifies Panama's Position in Case of War

In a talk with the Panamanian Foreign Minister on September 15, 1941 the Japanese Minister learned that Panama was obliged to cooperate with the United States in the defense of the Canal and that, furthermore, it was duty bound to join the war in case the Canal were attacked. However, in case the United States entered the war, Panama was not obliged automatically to do likewise. The Japanese Minister pointed out that Japan need have no concern as to whether or not shipments to Panama, and from Panama to Japan, would be held up in the Canal Zone since the United States had promised that no shipments would be stopped.[743]

On September 20, 1941 the Japanese Minister to Panama learned that he was also accredited as Japanese Minister to Nicaragua.[744]

242. Minister Akiyama Estimates His Espionage and Propaganda Expenditures

After having made a special study of the attitude of the United States, of the nature of the Panamanian people, and of the topography of Panama, Mr. Akiyama, in a dispatch to Tokyo on September 20, 1941 made an estimate of the money needed for enlightenment, propaganda and intelligence purposes. With a forewarning that the expenditure summary would be "hard to take", he begged that these per month expenses be considered carefully.

The estimate included bonuses for officials or spies assigned to observe the movements of warships or give warning about other matters; running expenses for the Japanese broadcasting office; money for special spies; funds to pay those who tried to obtain information as well as those who achieved results; and a separate fund to maintain contact with newspaper reporters and other agents. In addition, he listed a special fund for spying in the other countries

[739] Facts on File, 1941, 354H.
[740] III, 494, 495.
[741] III, 494.

[742] Facts on File, 1941, 366-G.
[743] III, 496-497.
[744] III, 498.

[158]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

to which he was accredited. The total estimate amounted to an expenditure of $730.00 per month.[745]

243. Italian Maps of Panama Canal Shipped to Tokyo Via South America

Meanwhile, it was learned that the maps of the military fortifications at Panama were being delivered to Japan by devious methods. Having been taken to Chile by Minister Yamagata, the maps had been carried by Assistant Attache Usui from Chile to the Italian Ambassador in Buenos Aires, where the Assistant Attaches Kameda and Usui were present to ascertain that they were exact copies of the originals. The maps had been then sent to Tokyo by a Japanese Naval Courier, Mr. Tatuma, who was returning home on the Buenos Aires Maru. The Japanese Minister in Argentina requested on September 23, 1941 that the Italian government be notified at the time of the arrival of these papers in Tokyo.[746]

244. Callao Merchants Forced to Secure Permits to Reship Japanese Goods to Panama Reporting that Callao shipping firms were reluctant to forward Japanese shipments,

Minister Akiyama informed Tokyo on September 30, 1941 that these firms had been told that they must first secure permits from the United States for all Japanese shipments to Panama. Japanese merchants had been unloading their merchandise at Callao, since the right of Japanese vessels to enter the port of Panama had been abolished.[747]

245. Foreign Minister Toyoda Requests Estimate of Number of Japanese Evacuees

Foreign Minister Toyoda inquired on October 4, 1941 as to the number of Japanese nationals living in Panama, and where these persons could best be transferred. In case commercial and industrial restrictions went into effect, some of the Japanese people would be able to shift for themselves, others could get along through cooperation, some could turn to agriculture, but others would have to go to other countries. Foreign Minister Toyoda was interested in the number of Japanese nationals who would have to be removed from Panama.[748]

Answering the Foreign Minister's dispatch on the same day that it was transmitted, Minister Akiyama replied that although negotiations were going on, the prospects were gloomy and many frightened persons would seize upon the present situation as an excuse to return to Japan. He promised to cable a more detailed answer promptly.[749]

246. Panamanian Official Denies Pressure by the United States

Mr. Akiyama reported on October 8, 1941 that a certain high Panamanian official, in answering an article which had been published in the official newspaper, La Tribune, said that the present step taken by the Panamanian government in regard to protecting its ships had not been made in cooperation with any country and especially not with a certain friendly neighboring country. According to the official, ships sailing under the Panamanian flag had been the object of repeated attacks and were compelled to adopt a firm attitude to protect the honor of the Panamanian flag.[750]

247. Minister Akiyama Inquires Concerning Japan's Acknowledgment of the New President and Cabinet

In a message to Tokyo on October 10, 1941 the Japanese Minister asked permission to acknowledge the new President of Panama in the name of Japan. According to a statement

[745] III, 499.
[747] III, 500.
[748] III, 501.

[748] III, 502.
[749] III, 503.
[750] III, 504.

[159]

made by a Panamanian official at the Foreign Office, there would be no formal inauguration ceremony for the President and the new Cabinet; instead, the departmental corps merely would be advised of this action. As to the policy of the new Cabinet, it was opposed to the Nationalist principles which had governed previous Cabinets and had issued a statement that it would place primary emphasis on democratic plans and personal freedom. Since it would, at the same time, work in close cooperation with the United States, the Foreign Minister believed that it was virtually a puppet in the hands of this government.[751]

[751] III, 505.

[160]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

PART C—JAPANESE DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITIES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD

(c) Japanese-Philippine Relations

248. Japanese in Philippine Islands Request Passage to Japan

Mr. Katsumi Nihro, Consul to the Philippine Islands, reported to Tokyo on August 6, 1941 that approximately 1700 Japanese had requested accommodations to Japan. The unrest in the Philippines which had quieted down after the freezing order had been instituted, was now being revived since Japanese ships were gradually ceasing to come to the Philippines. Although the Consul was doing everything in his power to discourage the departure of Japanese nationals, he nevertheless advised that the Foreign Minister dispatch evacuation ships immediately to the Philippine Islands.

Of the evacuees, the greater part were women and children who would require third class accommodations. In case only one or two ships were available, it might be possible to ferry passengers between the Philippine Islands and Formosa. It was possible that American and French vessels could be used between Manila and Shanghai, but only a small portion of the Japanese nationals were able to purchase first and second class passage on these vessels. Because there were many in the Philippine Islands who "in their innermost hearts would like to return to Japan because of the present situation and the poor business conditions", and who had not yet applied for passage home, he felt that those who had applied should be dispatched as soon as possible.[752]

The Japanese Consul in Manila again reported on August 8, 1941 that in comparison to the Filipinos, Japanese who had come to Manila from outlying districts had, on the whole, maintained a calm which was astonishing to Americans and Filipinos alike. The Japanese women and children who had solemnly expressed their desire to be evacuated, felt that it was the responsibility of Japan to effect the evacuation even though it might cause inconvenience. The forbidding of Japanese passenger ships to enter the port of Manila had greatly increased the unrest. For this reason, the Japanese Consul asked that the Foreign Minister consider carefully this request.[753]

After learning of the suspension of overseas shipping by Japan on August 9, 1941 the Consul General continued to be very much concerned about the safety of the Japanese in the Philippine Islands in view of the inadequacies of the police system. Because of the possibility of war with the United States, he urged that ships be kept available for prompt evacuation.[754]

249. Consul Kihara Discusses Plight of Japanese Nationals with President Manuel Quezon

To present the problem of obtaining protection for Japanese residents in the event of war between the United States and Japan, the Japanese Consul to Manila, Mr. Jitaro Kihara, called on Mr. Manuel Quezon, President of the Philippine government. When the Japanese Consul said that he would appreciate being advised of any plans which had been drawn up in this respect, President Quezon replied that Japanese residents might be forced to experience considerable hardships, depending upon the character of the person selected as the Commander-in-Chief of the Far Eastern forces. Although he had experienced many anxious moments concerning the situation, the appointment of General Douglas MacArthur had dispelled his worries, President Quezon said, for he felt that they could work together in harmony. He had not been able to get along with High Commissioner Francis B. Sayre.

[752] III, 506.
[753] III, 507.
[754] III, 508.

[161]

President Quezon pointed out, however, that if war did actually come, he and his Cabinet would be subordinated to the United States. In a recent conference with General MacArthur, he had stated that he was particularly interested in giving foreign residents every possible protection. President Quezon believed that it was quite possible that the United States would deem it necessary to place those persons in concentration camps. Jitaro Kihara then declared that as long as the Japanese nationals were not subjected to undue pressure, they would cause no trouble for they had been urged to remain calm and patient. Because of American propaganda and the anti-Japanese attitude of the general public, however, he could not guarantee that the Japanese residents would not take some measures to defend themselves, if war should break out.[755]

250. Consul Kihara Plans to Protect Japanese in Case of War

According to a tentative plan advanced by Consul Kihara, Japanese residents should be congregated in school, business and club buildings to facilitate their protection by the Philippine officers. President Quezon agreed with Mr. Kihara that such a plan would be mutually beneficial and added, that until the termination of the hypothetical war, or until the Japanese forces took the area over, there was need to store about six months supply of food for these people. President Quezon said that he would again confer with General MacArthur on this subject.[756]

251. Consul Nihro Reports Trend Toward Philippine Independence

In an intelligence dispatch sent on August 6, 1941 the Japanese Consul reported that the question of Philippine independence had been raised again in the American Congress. In spite of the fact that General Aquinaldo had openly supported the proposal, the American government and influential politicians in the Philippine Islands had not commented on it.[757]

The Philippine government and Congress had already approved the policy of granting Philippine independence in 1946, and according to a newspaper comment, political independence was already a "closed" question. By the time actual independence had been reached, it was felt that conditions would somehow have adjusted themselves in spite of the critical conditions in the Far East.

The Consul felt assured of the coming of Philippine independence in spite of Mr. Paul V. McNutt's opposition to it in his speech of July 7, 1941. In addition, a United States Congressman had said that Mr. Elisalde, a Philippine official in the United States, had been in favor of a resurvey of the movement for Philippine independence and that this movement was gradually becoming stronger in the United States Congress and in the American government. It was possible that this question would be reviewed in the American-Philippine conference, scheduled to be held in 1944, which was stipulated by the Tydings-McDuffie Act. For this reason, the Japanese Consul felt that it was necessary in the future to pay full attention to the attitude of the United States.[758]

252. Filipinos Predict Japanese Occupation of Thailand

On August 7, 1941 an intelligence report of the Philippine reaction to the occupation of French Indo-China was made to Tokyo. In general, Consul Nihro said, the people took it for granted that the Japanese occupation of Thailand could not be prevented. This move, the Filipinos felt, would probably take place after about two months, since that amount of time would be required for Japan to solidify her occupation of French Indo-China.

[755] III, 509
[756] Ibid.

[757] III, 510.
[758] Ibid.

[162]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

Although people were watching the British military fortifications and construction work in the Far East and though much was being made of Britain's stiffened policy, it was generally believed in the Philippines that the attitude of the United States was not strong. For the substantiation of this belief, the people pointed to the speedy settlement of the Tutuila incident. Local newspapermen in the Philippines believed that war between Japan and the United States was a possibility but that it could be avoided if the French Indo-China and Thailand incidents were settled by an agreement.[759]

253. Consul Nihro Suggests Japanese Propaganda Against American Business Methods

According to Consul Nihro, many unfortunate problems were arising in regard to goods purchased in the Philippine Islands, and important people were gradually being aroused. In case licenses for iron ore were denied and Japanese ships detained, Japanese officials could use such action in their propaganda to convince the Filipinos that the United States had caused Japan to stop business dealings with them. This would anger the Filipinos and would harm the United States.

On the other hand, if Japan obtained permits, ships must be made available to transport the materials. In this event, the yearly amount of Japanese exports would total 900,000 tons, which could be brought in by monthly installments.[760] In the matter of the purchase of hemp, although permits were being withheld at the present time, the Japanese Consul believed that Japan could eventually procure as much of it as America did not consume.

As to the purchase of molasses, it was doubted that the United States would include this product among quota goods since Japan had been the chief molasses consumer. Considering the fact that there was an annual exportable amount of 50,000 tons of molasses, Japan could continue its purchases for the time being. The Japanese Consul suggested, however, that these dealings take place as inconspicuously as possible.[761]

254. Consul Nihro Requests Continuance of Japanese Shipping

That Japan endeavor by every means possible to maintain trade with the Philippine Islands was suggested by Consul Nihro in a summary of the Japanese-Philippine trade situation on August 12, 1941. If the lack of Japanese shipping to Manila and Davao persisted, the Philippines might become antipathetic so that if Japan wished to resume its purchase of such items as iron ore, it would be unable to do so. For this reason, Consul Nihro urged that ships should be dispatched immediately to the Philippine Islands to get the iron ore and other quota goods, and at the same time permits should be procured to bring in a corresponding amount of Japanese goods.[762]

255. Consul Nihro Urges Protection of Japanese Trade

That American ships plying between Japan and the Philippine Islands be exempt from the application of trade restrictions was suggested to Tokyo by Consul Nihro on August 12, 1941. Not only did the regulations apply to Japanese companies making their headquarters in the Philippine Islands, but also to foreign companies with offices in Japan. Therefore, in order that all trade between these two points not be discontinued entirely, he felt that the American companies should be exempted.[763]

Emphasizing the fact that it might become necessary for all trade between Japan and the Philippine Islands to be shut off, the Japanese Consul pointed out that in spite of the regu-

[759] III, 511.
[760] III, 512.
[761] Ibid.
[762] Ibid.

[763] III, 513.

[163]

lations for the freezing of funds, comprehensive permits were yet obtainable. He disapproved any plan for stopping the export of Japanese goods, since it would result only in the closing down of approximately 600 Japanese retail companies in the Islands. Furthermore, since the textile industry looked to Japan for raw materials, any order calling for the stoppage of this supply would endanger the existence of many Japanese factories.

Other factors which he felt should be considered in any decision in this matter were: "there was little danger that Japanese ships would be seized; the stoppage of Philippine export quota goods would have a bad effect on the attitude of the Filipinos toward Japan; permits could still be secured for the exporting of iron ore and hemp; and Japan was only a few days distant by sea from the Philippine Islands".[764]

256. Consul Nihro Request Permits Be Granted to Receive Funds in Japan

Another suggestion forthcoming from Japanese Consul Nihro on August 12, 1941 was that the requiring of permits for relatives in Japan to receive money from Japanese residents in the Philippines be abolished. It was possible for Japanese nationals to secure permits to send between 200 and 400 pesos to their families in Japan, but since persons in Japan receiving these drafts must first secure permits to receive the money, the Japanese in the Islands were afraid that their families would be unable to obtain the necessary permits.[765]

257. Consul Nihro Plans to Agitate Against the United States

Consul Kihara was advised by two confidential sources on August 8 and 10, 1941 that the time was ripe for agitation in the Philippines against the "landlords". Following out previous instructions which had been sent by Tokyo, Mr. Kihara had made arrangements to begin the agitation. Consul Nihro declared that in view of the current changes in the Philippine government and the great concern which was felt in the Philippines over the international situation, Japan should now take a firm position.[766]

258. Foreign Minister Toyoda Restrains Consul Nihro from Disturbing the Diplomatic Situation

On August 15, 1941 Foreign Minister Toyoda directed Consul Nihro to drop all plans to make the Filipinos antagonistic towards the United States. The Japanese Consul was told to endeavor to maintain the status quo until such time as a solution could be reached on the main problem.[767]

259. Japanese Plan Broadcast to the Philippines

On the occasion of President Quezon's birthday a discussion of Japanese-Philippine relations was to be the subject of a radio address in Spanish by General Rikarute, a political refugee residing in Japan. Consul Nihro was directed to make arrangements for publicizing the 10 minute broadcast, which was to be heard at 10:50 P.M. on August 19, 1941.[768]

260. Japanese Businessmen Return to Japan

In reassuring Foreign Minister Toyoda on August 16, 1941 that there was little need for concern in regard to Mr. Nagao and Mr. Uyeno, members of the "Kinyo Kai", a Japanese association, Consul Nihro said that both would return to Japan aboard the French Steamship Marshal Joffre, sailing on August 18, 1941. They were returning home, partly for the purpose

[764] III, 514.
[765] III, 515.
[766] III, 516.
[767] III, 517.
[768] III, 518.

164

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

of making a report, and would leave again when the political situation had become more stable and future prospects more certain. Many Japanese businessmen had already returned to Japan, the Consul reported, since it had become impossible for them to engage in their work.[769]

261. Japanese Consul Requests Housing Facilities in Shanghai for Japanese Evacuees

On August 19, 1941 the Japanese Consul in Manila requested temporary housing in Shanghai for transient Japanese enroute from Manila to Japan. Owing to recent developments in international relations and the resulting unrest, as many as 370 Japanese had applied for passage on the French steamer, Marshal Joffre. Since approximately 200 of these had no connections in Shanghai, Japanese groups in Shanghai were asked to provide lodging facilities for these passengers in primary schools and other buildings. Furthermore, it was requested that staterooms be reserved on ships sailing from Shanghai to Japan.[770]

262. State Department Official Discusses American Policies

In reporting a conversation between Mr. L. E. Salisbury, State Department aide to the High Commissioner, and a Japanese official in Manila, Consul Nihro advised Tokyo on August 21, 1941 that America seemed to have no intention of altering its policy toward the Orient. According to the Japanese Consul, America's attitude as expressed by Mr. Salisbury conveyed the impression that there was nothing to do but await the impoverishment of Japan which was expending all its strength in French Indo-China and Thailand. Since America's objective was the destruction of "Nazism", it was necessary to extend aid to Russia. However, after the overthrow of Germany there would immediately be a change in American-Russian relations.

The Japanese official learned from Mr. Salisbury that there was great dissatisfaction in the United States regarding the aid to Russia program, but in the Philippines attention was focused on the steps Japan would take in regard to American shipment of materials to Russia.[771]

263. Ambassador Nomura Encounters Difficulty in Handling Japanese-Philippine Problems

On August 22, 1941 Ambassador Nomura in Washington notified the Japanese Minister in Manila that at present Japanese-American relations were being handled as political problems, which was not a simple procedure. He requested, therefore, that the matter be taken care of in Manila as the Japanese Minister thought best. In the present situation, Ambassador Nomura found it impossible to negotiate for such things as Filipino cotton goods agreements even though this matter was handled by leading American businessmen.[772]

264. American Officials Apply Freezing Regulations Leniently

Extreme leniency in the application of the freezing order in the Philippine Islands was reported by Consul Nihro to Tokyo on August 22, 1941. Although the authorities had demanded that the banks submit statements of balance as of August 11, 1941, they had evinced interest only in business amounting to more than 2,000 pesos. Furthermore, they had been extremely cautious in the investigation, fearing that they might interfere with the banking business. Frozen accounts of small amounts had been ignored, though particular attention had been paid to banking businesses in which 5,000 or more pesos were involved.

Even in case of frozen funds the authorities had permitted the issuance of comprehensive licenses for remittances necessary for paying family expenses. Leniency had been shown in classifying Japanese nationals, and the practice of carrying on trade without remittances or

[769] III, 519.
[770] III, 520.
[771] III, 521.
[772] III, 522.

[165]

application for license had been permitted when commercial evidence was submitted. No objection had been offered to the furnishing of money to Japanese associations for the next month, and remittances to Japanese newspapermen were allowed.

In addition, as a temporary measure after August 22, 1941, it had been decided to allow Japanese travellers to carry as much as 400 pesos when leaving the country. Consul Nihro reported that he had endeavored to be as efficient as possible in applying for licenses and he had requested that the same exemption from submitting reports be accorded Japanese businessmen as was accorded Chinese businessmen. He believed that these requests would receive favorable consideration.[773]

265. President Quezon's Illness Delays Trade Negotiations

On September 1, 1941 Japanese officials at Manila were attempting to negotiate a trade agreement whereby it would be possible to procure needed goods from the Philippines. It was reported, however, that negotiations were being held up owing to President Quezon's illness. The date fixed for putting this agreement into effect would depend upon the convenience of the firms concerned and the availability of steamers.[774]

Instructions that Consul Nihro establish contact with President Quezon and the new Secretary of the Interior, Mr. Rafael R. Alunan, were sent by Foreign Minister Toyoda on September 6, 1941. He pointed out that while the commercial negotiations were being carried on, it would be necessary for the Japanese Consul to participate often in regard to current questions.[775]

266. The Japanese Attempt to Procure Molasses Export Permits

Since September 1, 1941 (Labor Day) was an American holiday, Consul Nihro reported that it was impossible to talk with the High Commissioner concerning a new export permit for the first ship which would arrive in the Philippines to load molasses. The merchants, however, were optimistic regarding the permit. The Japanese Consul added that he would investigate the possibility of securing lumber and wire.[776]

267. Japanese Optimism Concerning Trade Permits Is Dispelled

Japanese optimism concerning normal trade relations was dispelled by a rumor reported to Tokyo on September 2, 1941. Philippine dealers had learned from a source considered to be reliable that under discussion was a proposal which was designed to prevent exporting by applying the export license system to all goods to be shipped to Japan and French Indo-China. Mr. Noble, the chief export control official, had informed Japanese lumber dealers that he believed the exporting license system would apply to logs and to all kinds of soft woods.

The export official had given no definite reply when questioned concerning the exporting of molasses, saying that the matter was now being referred to Washington. Under the circumstances, Consul Nihro suggested that the dispatching of the Kaisoku Maru be delayed for a time.[777]

Upon further investigation, the Japanese Consul learned that no cancellation would be ordered for items already permitted, barring, of course, that no unforeseen incident broke out in the meantime. The official in charge had been unwilling to speak definitely on the matter since he had not yet received instructions from Washington as to how the export

[773] III, 523.
[774] III, 524.
[775] III, 525.
[776] III, 526.
[777] III, 527.

[166]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

license system would be applied. Upon Consul Nihro's request for a permit for the Kaisoku Maru, the official had given no definite reply but had asked merely that the dealers file an application.[778]

On September 4, 1941, the Japanese Consul to the Philippines reported extreme leniency in the physical examination of Japanese who were entering the country. The leniency of examining authorities had been particularly marked in the investigation of venereal diseases.[779]

268. Consul Nihro Requests Lenient Handling of Americans Passing Through Customs

Consul Nihro declared on September 4, 1941 that as a result of legislation freezing funds and regulating exports, Japanese nationals in the Philippine Islands greatly feared ill-treatment upon their leaving the country. Adding to this fear was a statement in a local English language newspaper that the officials in Japan and Shanghai had been extremely rigorous in their examinations of students sent out by the Philippine government, who had recently returned from the United States to their homes in the Islands.

Since many more Japanese were coming and going in these islands than were Americans and Filipinos passing through Japan and Shanghai, Consul Nihro asked that all possible arrangements be made to ensure lenient handling of American nationals.[780]

269. Consul Nihro Requests Suppression by Tokyo of Inflammatory Newspaper Statements

Believing that certain newspaper reports made in a Shanghai newspaper were inciting dissension, Mr. Nihro asked on September 4, 1941 that they be suppressed by Tokyo. Far from the truth, he declared, was the statement which had appeared in the Mainichi newspaper in Shanghai that Japanese residents in the Philippine Islands were resisting as best they could the pressure of American and Filipino authorities. An editorial comment in the same paper to the effect that Japanese fishing boats were barred from the Islands because of the antipathy of the Filipinos, as well as other false statements, had greatly embarrassed the Japanese attempting to do business in the Islands. Authorities in Japan were asked, therefore, to exert their best efforts so that such uncalled for statements would not be made in the future and that such editorial comments would not be printed in the papers in Shanghai.[781]

270. Japanese Are Denied Molasses Permits

Having been notified that Washington would not permit the loading of molasses, Japanese Consul Nihro demanded on September 4, 1941 that this matter be reconsidered. However, since delay would be created by a second appeal to Washington, he thought it best to direct the Kaisoku Maru to return to Japan. He added, for the information of the Japanese Foreign Office, that molasses was not a permit item.[782]

Although Mr. Wuyirobii had the authority to cancel export permits for iron ore, he had given the Japanese Consul his word that such cancellation would not be made. For this reason, Foreign Minister Toyoda was asked to dispatch a ship as quickly as possible.

A few days later a plan was evolved by Consul Nihro to have interested Filipinos apply for permission to export molasses and other goods. He believed, however, that the possibility of loading products successfully was very small since most Filipinos would "pull in their necks" when the necessity of American-Philippine cooperation was explained to them or when they were asked if they intended to revise the policy of the United States. In case this

[778] III, 528.
[779] III, 529.
[780] III, 530.
[781 III, 531.
[782] III, 532.

[167]

attempt should fail, the Japanese intended to use the restriction of Japanese-Philippine trade for propaganda purposes.[783]

Consul Nihro declared on September 9, 1941 that the British Consul General had been watching the recent increase of exports to Japan and had called the attention of the Americans to the shortage of fuel. In view of this fact, Consul Nihro believed it to be unwise to ask for a reconsideration of the American refusal to grant permits. Since it appeared that arrangements were being made for the resale of goods previously designed for Japan, and as there was a considerable demand within the Islands for fuel, the Japanese Consul suggested that the matter be abandoned.[784]

271. Lack of Shipping Curtails Japanese Mail to the Philippine Islands

Consul Nihro suggested to Tokyo on September 5, 1941 that the East Asia Bureau have mail routed to the Philippine Islands via Shanghai, since many of the Japanese residents in the Islands were concerned because they had received no mail from home. Since the mail would be transported from Shanghai to the Islands on foreign ships, he advised that the contents be examined before sending mail from Japan.[785]

Foreign Minister Toyoda replied on September 9, 1941 that the Bureau of Communications was giving study to this matter of transportation of mail. Since the French ships sailing between Shanghai and Saigon were routed by way of Hongkong, where they were inspected, this route was not a desirable one for Japan to use. However, if Consul Nihro could discover whether French ships were sailing directly from Shanghai to Manila, he was asked to inform the Foreign Office of this fact. At the present time, the Bureau was considering the use of Japanese ships from Shanghai to Saigon and of French ships from Saigon to Manila.[786]

272. Mr. Nihro Inquires Concerning Japanese-American Negotiations

In view of the lack of funds to carry on the work of the Consul General, Mr. Nihro requested on September 11, 1941 that the Japanese Foreign Office advise him of the present status of Japanese-American negotiations. He had believed that the work could be carried on for perhaps two months with the funds on hand, but since it now appeared that negotiations would continue for a much longer period than was previously anticipated, the Japanese Consul was disturbed about the future. Since he had also learned that the New York branch office of the Tourist Bureau was soon to be closed, he asked that instructions be sent from the Tourist Bureau's home office.[787]

273. Consul Nihro Rules Against Competition Among Japanese Firms

To avoid difficulties which might result from American authorities noticing competitive activities among Japanese firms, Consul Nihro informed the Foreign Office on September 12, 1941 that he had forbidden certain firms to wire Japan. Asking the Foreign Office to form a pool for the firms in order to keep them from competing, he suggested that one company should be appointed to handle all the business of a certain type, as in the case of importing hemp or lumber, and this company alone should send telegrams.

In a recent conference with Mr. Yuirobyii, the Japanese Consul found that lumber exportations would be governed by a general license since this was a non-remittance export. How this system would apply to logs was not certain, and in case the matter was not clarified soon, it was agreed that an inquiry should be wired to the High Commissioner's Office.[788]

[783] III, 533.
[784] III, 534.
[785] III, 535.

[786] III, 536.
[787] III, 537.
[788] III, 538.

[168]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

274. Japan Decides Against Subsidizing Philippine Political Candidates

Although in the Philippine Islands the Japanese had been following the policy of subsidizing political candidates who, if elected, would cooperate with Japanese officials, it had been previously decided (See Volume II—Japanese-American Relations) to investigate the characters of candidates very carefully, as well as to discover their chances for election. On September 4, 1941, Consul Nihro notified Tokyo of the details of a particularly turbulent political race being held in the "Jyu" election district. The Governor, belonging to the opposition party, had suspended the chairman of the "Jyu" faction and as a result President Quezon had suspended the Governor. Consequently, the election district was declared open to free political candidates.

Believing, however, that open support of this pro-Japanese candidate would be dangerous, even if the district were limited to officially recognized candidates, the Japanese Consul asked permission to report the impossibility of raising the necessary funds though Mr. Enoshima in Japan, would somehow try to raise the necessary 5,000 pesos by the time of the election.[789]

On September 13, 1941 Foreign Minister Toyoda advised Consul Nihro that Mr. Enoshima had informed Mr. Kakiage that he was experiencing difficulty in raising funds at the present time, furthermore, there was no way of making remittances. In view of the fact that the candidate did not comply with Japan's wishes and there would be various other candidates whom Japan might wish to assist, no further aid could be extended at this time. The Japanese Consul was directed to make a reply along this line. [790]

275. Consul Nihro Reports Political Strife in the Philippines

Local altercations between members of rival political parties were creating a critical situation, the Japanese Consul at Manila reported on September 16, 1941. A Filipino had attempted to kidnap the secretary of the Ko Mon Kai in retaliation for an attempt by staff members of the local branch of the Nationalist party to murder a member of the Simpoto faction. Since officers of the Toa Simpoto as well as 50 members of the Nationalist party had been placed on the black list, the Simpoto party was attempting to retaliate by force. The Chinese Consul claimed, Mr. Nihro reported, that he was not familiar with the details of the incident.[791]

Foreign Minister Toyoda commented that the problem of the conflict between the Ko Mon Kai Society and the Nationalist Party was of greater importance to Japan than the differences in the negotiations at Manila. He directed the Vice Consul at Saigon, therefore, to get in touch with Manila to aid the Ko Mon Kai Society and to limit the disturbances as soon as possible since the main objective of the negotiations was to get control of the Ko Mon Kai and to allow its members to work out their own ideas.[792]

276. Japanese and Philippine Diplomats Postpone Negotiations

Consul Nihro reported the details of an interview he had with Mr. Rafael R. Alunan, Secretary of the Interior on September 17, 1941.

Accompanied by Mr. Kihara and Mr. Morokumo, Consul Nihro was informed that the status quo in regard to trade between Japan and the Philippine Islands would be maintained until 1946 at which time, because of the newly acquired independence of the Philippines, open negotiations in regard to the land problem could begin. Mr. Kihara had then presented a memorandum regarding the preservation of the status quo, and Secretary Alunan had promised to deliver it to President Quezon on the following day.

[789] III, 539
[790] III, 540.
[791] III, 541.
[792] III, 542

[169]

After meeting with President Quezon on September 18, 1941, Secretary Alunan had left on urgent business for a trip into the country. As a result, though he had telephoned Mr. Morokumo that there was no reason why Mr. Kihara should not return to his post, he had reported very little of his interview with President Quezon. However, President Quezon in his last discussion with Mr. Kihara and Mr. Morokumo, had avoided setting a definite date for future discussions, and since Consul Nihro believed that it was probably better for Japan not to specify a date, mention of 1946 had been purposely avoided.[793]

Following Mr. Alunan's return on September 22, 1941 from his short business trip, Consul Nihro was able to report that President Quezon had confirmed the memorandum presented to Mr. Alunan on September 17, 1941.[794]

Foreign Minister Toyoda pointed out that the mutual agreement between the Japanese and Philippine representatives was nothing more than a verbal promise since no written recognition of the Japanese memorandum had been demanded of the Philippine officials. Not from a lack of faith in Secretary Alunan or President Quezon's word but in view of the important nature of the question, the Japanese Foreign Minister felt that some secret paper outlining the agreement or the secretary's signature on the copy of the memorandum should be obtained despite the delicate relations existing between the Philippine authorities and the High Commissioners. In case the Philippine authorities should violate this understanding and no written agreement had been obtained, Japan would find itself powerless to take any action.[795]

277. Consul Nihro Asks That Lumber and Iron Ore Ships Be Dispatched Immediately

Advising that ships be dispatched immediately, although separately, to the Philippines, the Japanese Consul declared on September 16, 1941 that lumber was not to be included in the recently enlarged list of items affected by the export license system. Since the length of time during which this exemption would be in effect was by no means certain, he pointed out the necessity of sending ships immediately, and of notifying the traders in the Philippines of the names of the ships and the date of their arrival as soon as possible.[796]

According to Consul Nihro on September 22, 1941 logs and lumber were on the list, published on September 20, 1941, of material not covered by the export control order. He further declared that no permits had been granted for hemp exports, although there had been no change in permits which had already been issued.[797]

Consul Nihro also asked that Japanese ships be dispatched immediately in order that the loading of iron ore could be continued. If ships were not sent soon to the Islands, there was danger of discouraging further Japanese efforts. Furthermore, it was necessary that funds resulting from previous exports to the Philippines be utilized since they would only increase the frozen funds.[798]

278. Japan Sends the Hakone Maru to Evacuate Nationals

The Foreign Minister advised the Japanese Consul at Manila on September 26, 1941 that the Hakone Maru would soon call at Manila and Davao. The Foreign Office was to be advised of the number of Japanese withdrawing from that district as well as other details of the evacuation.[799]

[793] III, 543.
[794] III, 544.
[795] III, 545.

[796] III, 546.
[797] III, 547.
[798] III, 548.
[799] III, 549.

[170]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

279. The Foreign Office Arranges the Sale of a Philippine Vessel

Apparently to complete the sale of the Fuyo No. 1, the Foreign Office asked the Japanese Consul at Manila on September 29, 1941 for permission of the owners in the Philippines to dispose of the vessel at approximately ¥29,000. In case the sale were made, two-thirds of the sale price would go to the owners remaining in the Philippines while one-third would be paid to those who brought the ship to Japan. He also inquired if he should send 6,000 pesos of the latter sums to the owners in the Philippines immediately following the sale.[800]

280. Japan Arrests Philippine Profiteers

In answer to a dispatch, Foreign Minister Toyoda in Japan sent the names of individuals who had been punished for violation of the Exchange Control Act. Among those who had been charged with collecting dollars in Japan to sell for yen in Shanghai were Raphael Aquino, who was a nephew of the former Director Aquino in Manila, Juan Aquino, and Riserio Kasutoro.[801]

According to the Japanese Foreign Office, Raphael Aquino had requested on October 3, 1941 that his father, Ganzalo Aquino send him Y3,000 with which to pay his fine. Since no remittance had been received, as of October 10, 1941, Consul Nihro was requested to talk with the elder Aquino to find out his character and to have the father advise his son to return home.[802]

281. The Foreign Office Directs that Machine Code Be Used Only for Official Messages

The day before the new code system was to go into effect, the Japanese Foreign Office informed Manila on October 13, 1941 that the system was to be used entirely for secret messages and not for personal ones.[803]

[800] III, 550.
[801] III, 551.
[802] III, 552.
[803] III, 553.

[171]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

PART C—JAPANESE DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITIES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD

(d) Japanese-Mexican Relations

282. Japanese Agent Suggests Liquidating Petroleum Company

In view of the strained commercial relations existing between Japan and Mexico, Mr. Okumura, a representative of the Japanese Pacific Petroleum Company in Mexico, advised his Tokyo office that since difficulty was being encountered in obtaining manufacturing permits, Japanese officials and machinery of the company should be evacuated. At the same time he submitted to the company president, Mr. Kubota, an estimate of the company funds on hand in Mexico as of August 6, 1941.[804]

283. Japanese Commercial Representative Leaves Honduras

After Minister Yoshiaki Miura had been consulted by officials in Tokyo in regard to the evacuation of Mr. Megurigami, a Japanese commercial agent in Honduras, he inquired on August 8, 1941 whether the Foreign Office had been consulted. Mr. Megurigami had asked permission to return home since the freezing regulations had badly affected Japanese-Honduras trade. Although his return had already been authorized by his home office, his superiors had asked for the opinion of Minister Miura.[805]

On August 14, 1941 Minister Miura was advised by the Foreign Office that the Japanese company, after consulting with the Foreign Office, had made arrangements for the official's return to Tokyo.[806]

284. Minister Miura Encounters Difficulties in Financial Transactions

Still experiencing difficulty in collecting exchange certificates, the Japanese Minister in Mexico inquired of the Foreign Office on August 8, 1941 concerning the best method of securing permits from the American authorities for commercial transactions. He advised that his funds on hand were diminishing, and asked that instructions be sent to him immediately.[807]

285. Minister Miura Suggests Waiting Policy in Resisting Trade Restrictions

The Japanese Minister reported to Foreign Minister Toyoda on August 11, 1941 concerning the restrictions placed on exports in Mexico. The Mexican government, he said, would hardly dare ease up on trade restrictions which had been dictated by the United States, especially since the enforcement of the Presidential order was being carefully watched at the present time.

Although previous secret efforts made by the various Japanese commercial firms to exchange Japanese rayon for Mexican mercury had ended in failure, Mexican companies were now beginning to work openly to obtain permission for this exchange. Consequently, newspaper articles relating to the subject were appearing almost daily in Mexican newspapers. Furthermore, the rayon textile dealers planned to send manufacturing representatives directly to the Mexican President, at the same time sending telegrams to senators.

Pointing out that the Japanese could instigate a propaganda campaign, Minister Miura, however, advised against this since the scheme might react upon Japan.

[804] III, 554.
[805] III, 555.
[806] III, 556.

[807] III, 557.

[173]

Since it was necessary that the situation be thoroughly understood before taking part in it, a policy of waiting was advised by Minister Miura. According to him, the present pertinent question appeared to be: When will the United States sacrifice civilian or even military necessities in order to supply Mexico's needs? Although the United States had, he said, formerly promised to give this matter consideration, no expression of its intentions had yet been seen. When at last it became apparent that the United States did not intend to supply Mexico with rayon, and the existing stock in Mexico had been completely exhausted, the Japanese Minister felt that the reaction in Mexico would ultimately favor trade with Japan.[808]

On August 11, 1941 the Japanese Minister further reported that he had learned a great deal concerning the existing situation in his talk with a Mexican official on August 2, 1941. Although the plans for "barter" of rayon and mercury had begun to show hopeful developments, America's announcement of its intentions had caused them to be abandoned. Since, in the opinion of the Mexican official, it would be absolutely impossible for America to furnish rayon to Mexico, it would be opportune, following the meeting of the assembly on September 1, 1941, to get in touch with influential senators for the purpose of bringing about a change.

To win the support of Mexican people, the Mexican official advised that the Japanese Minister secure export permits for the shipments which had been contracted for before the issuance of the Presidential order. Several days later Senor Enrique Osornia, a Mexican senator, made a similar suggestion. Although Japan formerly had decided to withhold all shipments of rayon to Mexico, the Japanese Minister replied that the 3,000 boxes on the Heiyo Maru would suffice in the way of a friendly "gesture" by Japan, although an increase in the stock of rayon in Mexico at this time might possibly have adverse results. Furthermore, unless this gesture aided in the solution of the whole problem it would be difficult to change the attitude of the Japanese government.[809]

286. Minister Miura Postpones Rayon Prince Cutting Scheme

In answer to Foreign Minister Toyoda's suggestion that Japan counter American plans by furnishing Japanese rayon to Mexico at half price, Minister Miura advised on August 12, 1941 that the lowering of price could be used as a forceful tool in future trade treaties, but that Japan's wiser course would be to await a better opportunity.[810] He reiterated that no question of price or barter existed at the moment, but that Japan's problem was to overcome Mexican trade restrictions.[811]

Dr. Kiso Tsuru, a well known leader in Japanese oil, mining, construction, and other enterprises in Mexico, reporting on August 5, 1941 indicated the attitude of the Mexican President and Economic Minister as revealed by a person close to the President. This confirmed the advice of the Japanese Minister that any action by Japan at this time would be futile.[812]

287. Minister Miura Opposes Mr. Tsuru's Silk Control Plan

As to the possibility of future trade between Mexico and Japan, Mr. Miura disapproved of a plan concerning artificial silk which had been evolved by Mr. Tsuru. In view of the fact that artificial silk was the only instrument which might guarantee to Japan the acquisition of Mexican materials, Minister Miura advised Tokyo on August 12, 1941 that he opposed any breakdown of the present control as suggested by Dr. Tsuru.[813]

[808] III, 558.
[809] III, 559.
[810] III, 560.

[811] III, 561.
[812] Ibid.
[813] III, 562.

[174]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

288. Tokyo Directs the Pacific Petroleum Company to Close Its Office

In answer to a request from his home office in Tokyo, Mr. Okumura informed officials of the Pacific Petroleum Company on August 12, 1941 that it would be impossible to evacuate machinery and company personnel for some time to come since no Japanese ships were being assigned to that route.[814]

Mr. Okumura was advised via Foreign Office dispatches that the decision of the three Japanese officials in Mexico in regard to closing the Mexican Office had been confirmed. The company official was to carry out certain instructions in shipping company personnel and machinery out of Mexico, and was to comply with stated priorities.[815]

289. Minister Miura Is Directed to Ship Machinery on the Azuma Maru

On August 15, 1941 Minister Miura learned that the Azuma Maru would leave Yokohama on September 5, 1941 and arrive in Manzanillo on September 24, 1941. In order to comply with a request from the Chief of the Japanese Fuel Bureau, Minister Miura was to have ready for loading at Manzanillo a drilling machine, a tractor, a caterpillar, and powder for a gun perforator. Several parts to be used in a Diesel engine were to be purchased and loaded on the Azuma Maru,[816] as well as the machinery which was being sent to Japan by the Pacific Petroleum Company. The Japanese Foreign Minister added that, although other countries considered the Azuma Maru as an ordinary commercial vessel, the Japanese government considered the ship to be in official use.[817]

290. Dr. Tsuru Plans to Aid the Pacific Petroleum Company

Minister Miura advised Foreign Minister Toyoda on August 21, 1941 that his instructions regarding the evacuation of company officials and machinery had been received.[818]

When Dr. Tsuru was informed of the purport, he submitted a counter proposal by which the Pacific Company's main office would continue its actual prospecting on the principle of "Live and let live", with drilling being carried on as soon as drilling permits could be obtained. The Mexican firms would carry the expenses of operations and maintenance, and in the event of a crisis the Pacific Petroleum Company would retain the funds on hand.[819]

After this counter proposal had been made, however, the Foreign Minister's dispatch of August 21, 1941, concerning the schedule of the Azuma Maru, had been received, and the Mexican firms returned to their original plan. They agreed to carry the expenses of the company's maintenance and to protect Pacific Company funds from confiscation. Since the machinery was to be sent to Japan, the operations of the company would be limited, but for the time being, according to Mr. Tsuru's plan, the Pacific Company was to continue prospecting with the Mexican companies attempting to secure operating permits and to collect guarantee funds for the purchase of petroleum.[820]

On August 30, 1941 the Japanese Foreign Office informed Minister Miura that there was no room for reconsideration of any counter proposal made by Dr. Tsuru or the Mexican firms. As far as the Foreign Office was concerned, the Pacific Petroleum Company had temporarily stopped operations.[821]

[814] III, 563.
[815] III, 564-656.
[816] III, 566.
[817] III, 567.
[818] III, 568.

[819] III, 569.
[820] III, 570-571.
[821] III, 572.

[175]

291. Minister Miura Advises Against Sending the Azuma Maru to Manzanillo

On August 22, 1941 the Japanese Minister in Mexico advised that the Azuma Maru was scheduled to stop at Manzanillo on September 13, 1941. Since the ship had left this port on July 17, 1941 after the imposition of the Mexican embargo, he advised against its returning to Mexico. An unfortunate situation would be created if a dispute should arise because of the Mexican government's forbidding, on some pretext, the unloading or sailing of the ship.[822]

292. The Pacific Petroleum Company Summarizes Its Assets

On September 1, 1941 officials of the Pacific Petroleum Company sent to Tokyo through diplomatic channels a statement of their funds in Mexico. The greater portion of their capital, over a million pesos,[823] had been deposited with the Mexican Legation, 1,000 piastras had been deposited in the bank, and a considerable sum was being held by the Japanese consulate. Total assets in August, 1941 amounted to 1,201,639.76 pesos and $5,072 American dollars.[824]

293. Japanese Legation Uses Secret Funds

Prospective difficulties in making payment to the Legation staff and other Japanese officials in Mexico caused Minister Miura to ask in July, 1941 that the Foreign Office work out some method of remitting funds. (See Volume II, #423). Foreign Minister Toyoda replied on September 2, 1941 that although there would be a delay in the remittance of salaries, the Foreign Office was studying methods of making remittances in spite of the freezing order of the United States. Until such payment became possible, the Japanese Minister was instructed to make use of the secret fund or other funds kept at the Legation.[825]

294. Minister Miura Rejects Foreign Office's Secret Barter Scheme

On September 3, 1941 eleven days after Minister Miura had advised the Japanese government to order the Azuma Maru not to touch port at Manzanillo,[826] he expressed his indignation to the Foreign Office concerning the Japanese Navy's scheme of disguising the exchanging of artificial silk for Mexican mercury as a commercial deal undertaken by civilian business firms without the cognizance of either government. In view of Japan's strict control of rayon exports, the adoption of such a plan was merely, he said, to harbor a hallucination born of ignorance. If such a scheme were worth taking a chance on the danger involved, it should be done in such a way that the Japanese government could say that it knew nothing of it, thereby avoiding any responsibility. The Japanese navy had stated, however, that any results arising from future dealings would have to be handled by Foreign Office officials. One mistake in such a plan might well give rise to international complications which would seriously affect the prestige of the Empire, Minister Miura declared, and for this reason the Foreign Office should not carry out cooperation with the military authorities to such an extent that it would accept the unwise plan.[827]

295. Minister Miura Threatens to Resign

Continuing his remarks on the Japanese Navy's scheme to acquire mercury, the Japanese Minister protested against having to take action upon a situation which had been explained only to his Naval Attache. Furthermore, Minister Miura could not understand why no previous inquiry had been made concerning actual conditions in Mexico, or why no information had been given to him as the Minister responsible for the actions of his government in Mexico.

[822] III, 573.
[823] A peso was worth 20.5 cents in American money at this time.
[824] III, 574.
[825] III, 575.

[826] III, 573.
[827] III, 576.

[176]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

Requesting an explanation from the Foreign Minister in this regard, he declared that if, in the face of his sincere counsel, the original plans were insisted upon and carried out, he would resign and request that he be ordered home immediately.[828]

296. Minister Miura Withdraws Request for Additional Staff Members

Despite his previous request for the establishment of a Japanese consulate at Manzanillo, the Japanese Minister now explained to Tokyo on September 5, 1941 that it was unwise to send additional officials at this time when Mexico was keeping Japanese affairs under close observation. Since making necessary arrangements for the arrival of the Japanese officials might arouse the suspicion of the Mexican government, which was carefully scrutinizing all Japanese movements, he advised that any action on this matter be postponed pending a more favorable opportunity.[829]

297. Japan Lifts Ban on Silk Exports to Mexico

On September 6, 1941 Japan informed the Japanese Minister in Mexico that the ban on exports of artificial silk was being lifted, and that Mexico would be guaranteed a minimum supply of 10,000 boxes of artificial silk for the next six months. In exchange Mexico was allowing accommodations for Japanese ships at the ports of Manzanillo, Acapulco, and Salina Cruz, and providing the ships with 30,000 tons of fuel oil during the next six months. Continuation of this agreement would be discussed at the end of six months.[830]

In explaining this decision Foreign Minister Toyoda informed Minister Miura that General Jose Luis Amezcua, the Mexican Minister in Tokyo, had called on the Chief of the Japanese Trade Bureau to propose that Japan ship rayon in Japanese ships as far as Manzanillo, with Mexico supplying, by way of exchange, fuel oil for the ships. Since Japan was controlling trade to counter Mexico's anti-Japanese position, the export of Japanese rayon silk to Mexico was forbidden. However, in spite of this fact, Japan desired to discuss the Mexican Minister's plan, since it needed oil for its ships assigned to Central and South America, and since such negotiations would contribute toward the lessening of Mexico's pressure against Japan. After Japan made its proposal the Mexican Minister sought instructions from home. He declared that because of Mexico's relations with the United States it would be best to agree on this matter before any transfers of materials were made.[831]

Minister Miura then advised Tokyo that it was in the interests of Japan that any rayon shipments from Japan should be made after the signing of the pending agreement.[832]

298. Japan Objects to Mexican Parcel Post Restrictions

An unforeseen development in Japanese-Mexican relations occurred when the Japanese Foreign Minister learned on September 9, 1941 that diplomatic parcel post would be opened in the presence of customs officials whenever the Mexican government deemed it necessary. Mexico had explained, however, that such action was not intended to be a means of applying pressure on Axis nations.[833]

The Japanese Foreign Office replied on September 13, 1941 that such action was considered objectionable from the standpoint of its international relations.[834]

[828] Ibid.
[829] III, 577.
[830] III, 578.

[831] III, 579.
[832] III, 580.
[833] III, 581.
[834] III, 582.

[177]

299. The Japanese Foreign Office Instructs Minister Miura to Aid German Nationals

Without previous reference to the subject on September 10, 1941 Foreign Minister Toyoda gave Minister Miura the names of five German citizens with the explanation that there were no objections to granting them visas to enter Japan. The Germans, the Foreign Minister said, wished to leave Manzanillo September 16, 1941 on the Heiyo Maru.[835]

Minister Miura notified Tokyo on September 13, 1941 that on the previous day he has been asked to cooperate with Mexico in securing passage to Japan for five Germans whom Mexico wished to deport but whose names it would not divulge.

Since it would be necessary to ensure against propaganda being made of the fact that Japan had assisted in the banishment of these persons, the Japanese Minister had replied that he must first ask instructions from his government, and that it would be necessary to be advised of the names of the persons to be deported as well as the reasons therefor. Although Mexican officials had agreed to give Japan this information in strict confidence, on the morning of September 13, 1941 there had been no further word from the Mexican Foreign Office.

Since the Heiyo Maru was scheduled to sail from Manzanillo on September 16, 1941 Minister Miura asked the Foreign Office for immediate instructions. Minister Miura had secretly conferred with members of the German Legation in Mexico, and had been informed that they were at a loss to know the meaning of this action unless it referred to the five persons mentioned previously by Tokyo.[836]

300. Japanese Officials Prepare for Arrival from Tokyo

On September 10, 1941 Tokyo requested the Japanese Legation to assist Couriers Harada Masayuki and Morino Maysayoshi, who would enter Mexico toward the end of September at Manzanillo on the Terukawa Maru. All assistance was to be given them in their passage through Mexico to Washington.[837]

From the Japanese Embassy in Washington on September 15, 1941 came the request that the schedule of Couriers Harada and Morino be forwarded as soon as they had arrived in Mexico.[838] Japanese officials in Mexico were also asked to assist in making reservations for Minister Wakasugi, who sailing from Yokohama, would arrive on the Terukawa Maru at Manzanillo about October 4, 1941 and would proceed to Washington by plane.[839]

301. Azuma Maru Leaves Japan on September 14, 1941

In accordance with Minister Miura's request that he be informed of developments in regard to the "barter" of rayon for bunker oil, the Japanese Foreign Office indicated on September 13, 1941 that the Azuma Maru would leave Japan on September 14, 1941. Since the rayon had already been loaded, and it would have been difficult to unload it again, it had been shipped with its disposal at Manzanillo left to the judgment of Minister Miura. However, if the barter arrangements had not been effected by the time the Azuma Maru reached the Mexican port, the Japanese Minister was given permission to send the vessel back to Japan.[840]

302. Special Japanese Naval Liaison Officer is Selected

The name of Mr. Shoichi Kaihara, a Japanese Legation staff member, was sent to Tokyo for approval on September 18, 1941. The official had been selected to act as a special liaison man for the Japanese navy, and in that capacity would make an official trip to Colombia.[841]

[835] III, 583.
[836] III, 584.
[837] III, 585.
[838] III, 586.
[839] III, 587.
[840] III, 588.
[841] III, 589.

[178]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

303. Mexico Receives No Japanese News

In answer to a circular requesting information as to the reception and dissemination of Domei news reports, Minister Miura replied on September 18, 1941 that no government organization, news agency or newspaper in Mexico was receiving Japanese dispatches. He also reported that the transmission of Domei news items by way of San Francisco had been discontinued since early in September.[842]

304. Minister Miura Foresees Difficulty in Shipping Machinery to Japan

Reporting that since the Presidential order had been issued in Mexico "nerves had become sharpened" regarding export smuggling, the Japanese Minister on September 18, 1941 advised that the transportation of the machinery of the Pacific Petroleum Company to Japan would arouse suspicion and perturb the employees. A shipment of all the machinery at one time would be conspicuous and difficult since the machinery was scattered widely.

Although applications for export permits were being made, it was evident that it would be difficult to obtain them. However, since the machinery would pass customs without inspection as Legation property, there seemed to be no other solution than to have holders of diplomatic passports take a part of the bulky machinery with them as personal luggage whenever they left Mexico.[843]

After investigating the possibilities of obtaining some special machinery which Tokyo had requested, Mr. Miura reported that there would be many difficulties in buying and transporting the equipment, especially, if it became known that it was to be sent to Japan. This stemmed from the reluctance of Mexican businessmen to offend the United States. Furthermore, the Pacific Petroleum Company insisted that it would pay only after the machinery had been put aboard, and refused to take responsibility for putting it on board.[844]

305. Japanese Companies Attempt Barter Despite Mexican Restrictions

Tokyo learned on September 18, 1941 that the Mitsui Company in Mexico, before July 15, 1941, had been attempting to contract for 580 bottles of mercury in anticipation of the possible executive embargo. As a result of working through certain Mexican officials and a fee of 15,000 pesos for Mr. Maximin Camacho, on September 7, 1941 the Mexican Foreign Minister had approved the export of mercury. Another Japanese agent, Mr. Fugio Kata, believed that he would obtain the consent of General Maximin Camacho, a brother of the Mexican President, to barter 20,000 boxes of artificial silk for 10,000 bottles of mercury. Since Foreign Minister Padilla had given no indication that he would approve this transaction and General Camacho could be reached only through intermediaries, the Japanese officials in Mexico suggested that they be permitted to move slowly, especially in view of Mexican reluctance to offend the United States.[845]

The Mitsui representative had been instructed to work with the Legation in securing mercury, but since he was acting without consulting Legation officials, Minister Miura asked that the Mitsui Office be ordered to instruct its representative that such negotiations were a matter of national policy and were not to be handled by Mitsui as a company or as individuals. He asked that Japanese naval officials also be advised to this effect.[846]

306. Japan Transports American Money for the German Legation

On September 18, 1941 the Heiyo Maru left Manzanillo with three trunks filled with Japanese diplomatic documents. One contained $100,000 in American currency belonging to the

[842] III, 590.
[843] III, 591.
[844] III, 592.
[845] III, 593, 594.
[846] III, 595.

[179]

German Legation. Minister Miura advised Tokyo on September 20, 1941 that the trunks had been securely sealed and entrusted to the Captain of the ship.[847]

307. Minister Miura Requests Increased Expense Allowances

In an attempt to persuade the Japanese Foreign Office to increase the expense allowances of its Legation staff in Mexico, the Japanese Minister pointed out on September 23, 1941 that the standard of living in Mexico had risen sharply. Contributing factors to an advance in Mexican prices were a previous rise in the United States and the scarcity of materials caused by the American armament program. According to the Japanese Minister, Mexico had become more dependent on American economy since the Mexican-American treaty of July. The advance in prices, amounting to 40 or 50 per cent, had made it difficult for the Legation staff to keep up appearances and maintain its prestige. It was necessary, therefore, that the staff's allowance be increased until it reached the level of other Japanese diplomatic establishments.[848]

308. Japanese Foreign Minister Attempts to Expedite Barter Negotiations

Since the Azuma Maru in Tokyo was about to sail, Foreign Minister Toyoda asked on September 24, 1941 that the Japanese Minister in Mexico request the Mexican Foreign Office to instruct the Mexican Minister in Tokyo as to its wishes in this respect. Minister Miura also was asked for any suggestions he might have.[849]

In accordance with this request, Minister Miura paid a visit to the Under Secretary of the Mexican Foreign Office on September 21, 1941 to inform him that the Mexican Minister in Tokyo had made representations to the Japanese government regarding the bartering of fuel oil for silk. Japan had approved the plan, and in return had submitted a concrete proposal, which had not yet been answered. The Mexican Minister replied that no decision concerning general principles could be reached until a technical study of the amount, price, and method of payment had been completed.[850]

Minister Miura then stated that a misunderstanding must exist, since Japan had already accepted Mexico's proposal. Furthermore, a boat, already loaded with silk, would arrive at Manzanillo during the first part of October, and Japan desired a settlement of the commercial agreement before the ship reached port. The Under Secretary agreed to accelerate the study of problems concerned, but said that the Foreign Office did not have time to arrange the matter on such short notice.[851]

309. Tokyo Accepts Mexican Inspection of Parcel Post

Although Minister Miura had been informed that the policy of opening diplomatic parcel post in the presence of Mexican customs officials would be objectionable to the Japanese government, the Japanese Minister had by September 25, 1941 made no representations concerning his government's reaction. He explained that other diplomatic establishments had considered it as a simple routine matter and reported it to their governments.

Since neither the German nor Italian staffs in Mexico had protested, Minister Miura felt that it would be unwise for Japan alone to protest, especially since the measure applied only to packages addressed to diplomats as individuals and not to those sent to their offices. Other nations had taken this same emergency step. For this reason Minister Miura had replied to the Mexican government only that he had reported the measure to his Foreign Office.[852] Two days later, Tokyo notified him that it had no objections to his action.[853]

[847] III, 596.
[848] III, 597.
[849] III, 598.
[850] III, 599.
[851] Ibid.
[852] III, 600.
[853] III, 601.

180

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

310. Japan Considers Evacuating Its Nationals in Mexico

In reply to a request from Tokyo it was announced on September 27, 1941 that no Japanese were awaiting evacuation in Mexico. However, seven persons connected with the Pacific Petroleum Company would have to return to Japan in the near future. If the situation grew worse, the staff, its employees and families, totaling fifty-three, as well as employees of the commercial companies of Assenjo, Mitsui, Mitsubishi and 20 other persons would have to be evacuated.[854]

311. Mitsui Company Considers Kato Barter Scheme

Since the Kato firm had devised a scheme to trade 10,000 flasks of mercury for 20,000 cases of rayon thread, with 10 per cent of the rayon price to be paid to high ranking Mexican government officials, the Mitsui Company, on September 29, 1941, asked its representative to promote competition among other Japanese firms since the price appeared to be exorbitant. Furthermore, it appeared to be impossible to secure 10,000 flasks of mercury in Mexico. Since Japanese officials had urged that the firms cooperate in this venture which was to be handled in the name of one firm, the Kato and Mitsui firms would soon confer. The Mitsui agent was advised to spare no effort in improving the situation.[855]

312. Foreign Minister Toyoda Requests Further Information on Kato Proposal

On the same day, September 29, 1941, the Japanese Foreign Minister asked Minister Miura's opinion regarding the Mitsui-Kato proposal. Though Japan desired to complete a trade agreement before the Azuma Maru's arrival at Manzanillo, the Mexican government's telegram to its Minister in Tokyo, received on September 27, 1941, had given no hope for a speedy settlement.[856]

313. Japanese Military Officials Plan in Mexico to Leave for Japan

On September 29, 1941 the Military Service Bureau, Air Service Headquarters and the Army Technical Headquarters in Japan were informed by the Japanese Military Attache in Washington that Lt. Colonel Nakano and Major Omori would leave Manzanillo, Mexico on October 7, 1941 aboard the Azuma Maru. By following a direct route from the southwest coast of the United States, the Azuma Maru would probably arrive in Japan about November 21, 1941. Another Japanese Army officer, Colonel Oka, was in San Francisco awaiting to depart aboard a Japanese tanker.[857]

314. General Camacho is Appointed to Cabinet

The appointment on September 29, 1941 of General Maximino Avila Camacho, brother of the Mexican President, to the post of Minister of Communications was reported to Tokyo on September 30, 1941. This action could be considered as a step toward solidifying the government, Minister Miura said. The appointment was probably of great importance in view of the appearance of an anti-Cabinet feeling on the part of labor.[858]

315. Minister Miura Suggests Selling Japanese Silk in Mexico

Replying on September 30, 1941 to the Foreign Minister's dispatch informing him that the Azuma Maru would sail for Mexico and the disposal of its shipment of silk would be left to his

[854] III, 602-603.
[855] III, 604.
[856] III, 605.
[857] III, 606. This message was not translated until March 10, 1945.
[858] III, 607.

[181]

judgment, Minister Miura declared that no explanation had ever been given him as to the reason for shipping the silk. Since the negotiations being conducted by the Kato and Mitsui firms had aroused Mexico's hope of procuring rayon, and since Mexico knew that Japan realized how desperate was its need, the sending of the unloaded ship back to Japan would have a disastrous effect upon Japanese-Mexican relations.[859] The Japanese Minister suggested, therefore, that the rayon be distributed in equitable amounts to various Mexican concerns in order to improve relations between the two countries. He asked the Japanese Foreign Office to instruct the Captain of the Azuma Maru to unload at Manzanillo.[860]

Since Minister Miura felt that this was a blunder which had occurred as the result of some scheme of the Japanese Navy he stated that if the Foreign Office, knowing the trade situation with Mexico, had issued orders at the instigation of the Japanese Navy, it had acted unwisely. If the orders had been issued in ignorance, he felt that those entrusted with Mexican trade matters had better examine themselves.[861]

Advising Tokyo that the Mexican Minister would soon call at the Japanese Foreign Office,[862] Minister Miura said that he had called on the Mexican Vice Foreign Minister on October 1, 1941. He had been informed that there was little prospect of any agreement being reached concerning the proposed barter of silk for oil. However, since the rayon had already been shipped, Mexico proposed to purchase it for cash. Minister Miura replied that though the rayon should be shipped back, and he had had nothing to do with the shipment nor the barter discussions, he would dislike seeing the rayon returned.[863]Consequently, despite the profits which could be made from selling at the current market price, he suggested that the rayon be sold at the price stipulated in the contract made before the Presidential embargo was imposed.[864]

316. The Pacific Petroleum Company Ceases Operations

On October 2, 1941 Tokyo was informed by the Japanese Minister that the Pacific Petroleum Company in Mexico had ceased operations as of September 30, 1941.[865]

317. Minister Miura Reports on American-Mexican Negotiations (October 2, 1941)

The Japanese Minister reported on October 2, 1941 that Foreign Minister Ezequiel Padilla had revealed in a newspaper interview that Mexico was negotiating with the United States' State Department though Mexico's Ambassador to Washington, and that the Minister of Finance, Mr. Eduardo Suarez, had departed for Washington to discuss pending problems between America and Mexico. The Mexican Foreign Minister had declared that he would inform his people in the near future of the united friendship that existed between the two countries of America and Mexico. According to an American dispatch, the United States had approved a loan of eight to thirty million American dollars to stabilize Mexican money.[866]

318. Japan Releases Silk Shipment for Sale

Forewarned by Minister Miura of the nature of the Mexican Minister's instructions in regard to Mexico's rejection of the barter proposal, the Japanese Foreign Office replied to the Mexican Minister on October 2, 1941 that it would delay in answering formally until the opinion of several officials had been received.[867]

[859] III, 608.
[860] Ibid.
[861] Ibid.
[862] III, 609.
[863] III, 609-610.

[864] III, 610.
[865] III, 611.
[866] III, 612.
[867] III, 613.

[182]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

On October 3, 1941 the Mexican Minister, Mr. Amezcua, had been informed by Foreign Minister Toyoda that in view of Japanese-Mexican relations, the shipment of silk would be released for sale in Mexico. He was asked to notify the Mexican Foreign Office, since it was necessary that fuel oil be made available to the Azuma Maru. Minister Miura was instructed to press the oil matter because negotiations with Argentina and Peru might be delayed.[868]

319. Japanese Agents Propose to Smuggle Oil for Germany

By October 4, 1941 Japanese Military Attache Commander Kyoho Hamanakia had arranged, at the request of the German Naval Attache in Tokyo, to load petroleum products as bunker oil on Japanese ships which touched Manzanillo. After arriving in Japan, the unused portion of petroleum would be turned over to the German Naval Attache in Tokyo for disposal. Officials of Japanese companies were exerting efforts to obtain fuel oil so that the secret plan would not fail.[869]

320. Mexico Discovers Smuggled Mercury at Manzanillo

On October 6, 1941 Minister Miura reported to Tokyo that Mexican custom officials at Manzanillo had discovered smuggled exports of mercury and other materials which were to be shipped on the Azuma Maru. Minister Miura had learned of this when a special Associated Press correspondent had telephoned the Minister for his opinion in the matter.[870]

Articles in Mexican newspapers, the Excelsior, the Universal and Nobedades, were transmitted to Tokyo on the same day. The Excelsior declared that the discovery of a large amount of mercury and lead which was to be smuggled out in the Azuma Maru made it apparent that customs officials had been deceived and international agreements had been violated. According to officials making an investigation at Manzanillo, the mercury contained in bottles weighing 76 pounds each had been camouflaged in all sorts of commercial shipments. The Nobedades reported that certain elements were continuously working to establish Manzanillo as a supply base for the Axis countries.[871]

321. Japanese Navy Attache Leads Attempts to Acquire Fuel Oil

Tokyo had learned that difficulty was being encountered in getting fuel oil for the Terukawa Maru. On October 8, 1941 a company representative in Mexico was directed to keep in close touch with the Japanese Naval Attache in such matters.[872]

322. Pacific Petroleum Company Ships Machinery on Azuma Maru

The precision machinery of the Pacific Petroleum Company had been transported to Japan on the Terukawa Maru, which left Acapulco on October 6, 1941. The head of the company, Mr. Kubota, was asked to arrange with the Foreign Office and Naval Ministry to unload the shipment after its arrival in Yokohama, and to have the machinery insured for a value of $17,300.[873]

323. Mexican Foreign Office Denies Japanese Request for Oil

Keeping Tokyo informed of subsequent developments in regard to the Azuma Maru and having called on the Foreign Office Under Secretary on October 7, 1941, Minister Miura re-

[868] Ibid.
[869] III, 614.

[870] III, 615.
[871] III, 616.
[872] III, 617.
[873] III, 618.

[183]

ported that the Under Secretary had reiterated his thanks for Japan's decision to sell the shipment of artificial silk in view of the general trend of Japanese-Mexican relations. Although the Under Secretary was in favor of supplying fuel oil to ships sailing from Manzanillo to Yokohama, he refused fuel for either one-way or round trips to Valparaiso on the grounds that such an understanding was precluded by certain agreements. Voicing his opinion with reluctance when questioned by Minister Miura as to how the Mexican government could supply fuel oil, he answered that the Mexican Petroleum Bureau should be questioned in that respect.[874]

324. Minister Miura Blames Minister Amezcua for Barter Failure

Investigating the reason for the failure of the barter negotiations, Minister Miura discovered through the Under Secretary of the Mexican Foreign Office that the Mexican Minister to Tokyo, Mr. Amezcua, had given his home government no reports concerning the attitude of Japan.

Since it was his opinion that a grave mistake had been made by Minister Amezcua in regard to details of the barter, Minister Miura advised that the Japanese Foreign Office use the utmost discretion in future dealings with him.[875]

325. Minister Miura Suggests Using Illegal Methods

On October 8, 1941 Minister Miura suggested that Japan should not follow open diplomatic means in obtaining Mexican petroleum, but should effect a settlement of this practical problem by other methods. He had received the impression that even though the United States had or had not instituted a practical embargo of petroleum products to Japan, Mexico would not dare to contract or pledge supplies to Japan.

Pointing out that there had been no lack of oil for Japanese ships when the purchases had been made by the ships themselves, Minister Miura said that he and the Japanese Naval Attache agreed that it would be well not to be too fastidious about the matter of procuring petroleum, and it should be left in the hands of Japanese representatives.[876]

326. Two Japanese Army Officers Sail Aboard the Azuma Maru

On October 9, 1941 the Japanese Ministry in Mexico City notified the Embassy in Washington that Lt. Colonel Nakano and Major Omori had sailed aboard the Azuma Maru as scheduled. On the same day, October 7, 1941, Messrs. Waki, Uchida, Yoshioka, Kaneko and Morimura had arrived in Mexico City to await further orders.[877]

327. Mexican Newspapers Suggest Recall of Japanese Representatives

Reporting again on October 14, 1941 concerning the unfortunate discovery of mercury and lead smuggled aboard the Azuma Maru, the Japanese Minister summarized recent editorials which had appeared in various Mexican newspapers. Each paper had published vindictive articles saying that the true character of the Military and Naval Attaches of a certain Eastern country had finally become apparent. On October 12, and 14, 1941 the Excelsior had suggested that the Foreign Office should request the withdrawal of foreign diplomats if they were responsible for this incident.[878]

[874] III, 619.
[875] III, 620.
[876] III, 621.
[877] III, 622-623.
[878] III, 624.

[184]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

328. American Embassy is Responsible for Expose

Minister Miura also reported on October 14, 1941 that according to a Japanese Naval investigation the recent expose had resulted from guidance offered by the American Embassy, which appeared to be well informed in this matter.[879] In a press conference on October 13, 1941 Foreign Minister Padilla had stated that either the Military or Naval Attaches of a certain Far Eastern country, or the Commercial Secretary, had participated in the affair. Although the rank of the persons concerned was regrettable, the case would now come under the jurisdiction of the Foreign Office and the guilty parties would be punished severely since the Mexican government would take a firm stand in this matter.[880]

329. Japanese Military Attache Requests Expansion of Intelligence Facilities in the United States Since it seemed evident to Japanese representatives in Mexico that war between Japan

and the United States would break out at any time, they advised the establishment of additional facilities to acquire military intelligence in the United States. In the future it would probably be extremely difficult for Japanese agents, either in the United States or in South America, to carry on espionage as formerly planned. In view of the fact that after and even before the outbreak of war Japanese agents would be unable to get intelligence concerning the details of military operations, the Japanese Military Attache in Mexico advised that additional advisors, particularly with air and technical backgrounds, he sent immediately to the attache's office in the United States to increase facilities for gathering intelligence.[881]

330. Japanese Vice Foreign Minister Criticizes Minister Miura for Requesting Information Concerning Japanese Negotiations

A dispatch evidently created a misunderstanding in the Japanese Foreign Office, for on October 16, 1941 Minister Miura defended himself by saying that the message in question emanated purely from his interest in his country's welfare, and if the message were not read from that point of view it would not make sense. He resented being considered forward though admitting that he might have been reckless in his choice of words.[882]

Minister Miura pointed out that the Imperial Portraits had already been sent home in preparation for war, and requested that officials in the field be given permission to make their final preparations.

According to a circular which had been sent to Foreign Office representatives, Foreign Minister Toyoda had declared that: (1) the Foreign Office was carrying on negotiations with the United States, and (2) that these negotiations had been approached on the theory that they could be reconciled with the Tripartite Alliance. Urging that Japanese diplomats be advised of the facts by some government code, since not to do so would be to deceive them, their staffs, and resident nationals, Minister Miura said that everyone knew the negotiations had failed.[883]

331. Minister Miura Protests the Transfer of Translator Fukushima

To a suggestion of the Japanese Foreign Office that Mr. Mokichi Fukushima, official interpreter of the Japanese Legation in Mexico be transferred, Minister Miura voiced his opposition. Considering Mr. Fukushima's wide acquaintance with persons of high rank in Mexico, and his invaluable services as an interpreter in important conversations, Minister Miura considered him indispensable in making contacts and in the smooth and prompt handling of business. With Japanese-American relations now reaching a very tense stage, business in the

[879] Ibid.
[880] III, 625.

[881] III, 626. This message was not translated until May 3, 1945.
[882] III, 627-628.
[883] III, 629.

[185]

Japanese Legation would become more and more complicated and delicate. For these reasons, Minister Miura asked that Mr. Fukushima's transfer be postponed for the time being at least.[884]

[884] III, 630.

[186]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

PART C—JAPANESE DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITIES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD

(e) Japanese-South American Relations

332. Naval Attache Atsho Shigehiro Arrives in South America

During the period from August 6 to October 17, 1941 Japan became increasingly interested in South American countries, not only to keep informed of the trends of public opinion there, but also to derive intelligence regarding the United States. In pursuit of this information, Japanese representatives regularly visited their colleagues in South American capitals.

Naval Attache Atsho Shigehiro, accredited to the ABC powers left Miami, Florida on August 9, 1941 for Cali, Colombia via Balboa; when he would arrive in Santiago, Chile on August 11, 1941.[885]

333. Freezing Legislation Adversely Affects Japan

Japanese officials were much concerned over the freezing legislation put into effect by certain South American countries. Since several marus were ready to depart from Japan to pick up various products from South American trading posts, Tokyo urged on August 12, 1941 that Japanese representatives in South America confer with authorities of the Yokohama Specie Bank in order to obtain products critically needed in Japan.

The Noto Maru which would not sail until the completion of these conferences between the Japanese Ministers and bank and company representatives was scheduled to transport silk, cotton and woolen goods, porcelain wear and staple fibre totaling approximately 15,460,000 yen, to the South American ports.[886]

334. Japanese Representatives Visit South America

On August 18, 1941 Ambassador Nomura advised Japanese representatives in Panama, Colombia, Peru, Brazil and Argentina that Secretary Hiroichi Takagi, a diplomatic courier, would arrive in their countries by Sanagra plane between August 23 and 26, 1941.[887]

Two Japanese Army officers, Lt. Colonel Suzuki and Lt. Colonel Ito were to sail aboard the Argentina on August 20, 1941 and were expected to arrive in Tokyo by September 10, 1941. The Japanese Military Attache in Washington stated that a certain item would probably not be dispatched in Lt. Colonel Suzuki's care, since it had been loaned out to the San Francisco Military Affairs Society. Lt. Colonel Suzuki would, however, have information concerning the reservations aboard a certain ship.[888]

335. Minister Yamagata Reports Maru Schedules

On August 20, 1941 Minister Kiyoshi Yamagata at Santiago, in a message to Rio de Janeiro, reported that the Sakido Maru was leaving the port of Coquimbo on August 25, 1941, the Asuka Maru would depart from Valparaiso about August 30, 1941 and the Norfolk Maru was to leave Valparaiso on September 15, 1941. All of these were freighters with limited accommodations for passengers.[889]

[885] III, 631-632.
[886] III, 633.

[887] III, 634.
[888] III, 635.
[889] III, 636.

[187]

336. Mr. Shinohara Makes Conflicting Travel Plans

Mr. Hidenari Terasaki, Second Secretary of the Japanese Embassy in Washington and secretly in charge of Japanese espionage in the United States, accompanied by Diet Member Rikour Shinohara was scheduled to arrive in Buenos Aires on August 9, 1941 via the Pan American Airways. From Buenos Aires the two officials would depart from Santiago on August 17, 1941 arriving in Lima on August 18, 1941.[890]

Mr. Shinohara, who had previously visited the United States, was planning a trip to Germany. Arriving at Santiago on August 18, 1941 he enlisted the aid of the Japanese diplomats in that city to secure his passage to Germany via Lisbon. If it were possible to go to Germany, he desired to obtain permission from the State Department to reenter the United States.

In the meantime, the Japanese staff at Santiago was trying to persuade Mr. Shinohara to return to Japan on the Heiyo Maru, sailing on August 23, 1941, rather than to complete his proposed trip to Germany. Both plans awaited the State Department's decision.[891]

Replying on August 20, 1941 that it was almost impossible to obtain seats on the Lisbon plane, Ambassador Nomura recommended that Mr. Shinohara be advised to return to Japan on the Heiyo Maru. In spite of the fact that his application for entry to the United States had been referred immediately to the State Department, no response had been forthcoming as yet.[892]

It would appear that Mr. Shinohara was having difficulty in making up his mind for a dispatch from Panama to Washington on August 30, 1941 intimated that Mr. Shinohara had decided to return to Japan aboard the Heiyo Maru, leaving Manzanillo on September 20, 1941, and desired to visit Washington beforehand. Since his application to the American Embassy in Peru for entry into the United States had not been approved as yet, Minister Masatoshi Akiyama asked that the permit be sent to Panama.[893] However, on this same day, another dispatch from Minister Akiyama in Panama to Ambassador Ishii in Rio de Janeiro requested that space be obtained for Mr. Shinohara aboard the Italian plane leaving Brazil for Rome on September 15, 1941.[894] On September 10, 1941 Ambassador Ishii replied that both on September 15 and 16, 1941 seats were available aboard a Lati plane leaving Recife, and requested that Mr. Shinohara indicate his choice.[895]

337. Secretary Terasaki Establishes Intelligence Net in South America

As a result of the conference of Mr. Terasaki with the Japanese Ministers of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, Tokyo was informed on August 22, 1941 that the establishment of an intelligence network in Latin America had been proposed to secure information in the United States. Spies would be placed within the United States, American propaganda as revealed in printed matter and radio broadcasts would be analyzed and intelligence secured from sources in Latin America would be collected and evaluated.[896]

339. Japanese Representatives Visit South American Countries

On September 2, 1941 Naval Attache Shigehiro in Buenos Aires informed the Lima Consulate that the Naval inspection party which had been scheduled to leave Argentina on the Heiyo Maru was unable to make connections, and was cancelling its reservations.[898] On Sep-

[890] III, 637.
[891] III, 638.
[892] III, 639.
[893] III, 640.
[894] III, 641.
[895] III, 642.
[896] III, 643.
[898] III, 645.

[188]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

tember 6, 1941 Ambassador Itaro Ishii in Rio de Janeiro informed the Japanese representative in Lima that Secretary Kudo, who wished to make an observation trip, would arrive in La Paz on September 12 and Lima on September 16, 1941.[899]

On September 6, 1941 Foreign Minister Teijiro Toyoda instructed his representative in Buenos Aires that Mr. Mizukawa and Mr. Samurai Kosaki, telegraphic officials carrying secret papers and probably a cipher machine, would arrive there on October 15, 1941 aboard the Toa Maru. A safe for the office in Buenos Aires had also been entrusted to the captain of the Toa Maru.[900]

Another message from Mr. Toyoda informed Japanese representatives in Santiago that Mr. Kosaka would arrive in Valparaiso on the Toa Maru on October 6, 1941 carrying secret documents. The Foreign Minister urged that prompt dissemination be made of the information which Courier Kosaka was bringing to Santiago.[901]

When the Toa Maru sailed from Buenos Aires, it was expected that Mr. Ebizuka, who had been engaged in intelligence activities, would be aboard, bound for his new post.[902]

Aboard the Toa Maru, as assistant to Mr. Kosaka, the Telegraphic Secretary, was a Mr. Kusano, carrying the passport of a diplomatic courier. Although he was not to be placed on the diplomatic list, Foreign Minister Toyoda requested that the Brazilian government be requested to approve his employment in the office at Rio de Janeiro.[903]

Since Mr. Kosaka, who was scheduled to arrive on the Toa Maru in Rio de Janeiro around October 13, 1941, planned to continue to North America, the Foreign Minister asked that steamship reservations be made for him, and that an American passport be procured.[904]

340. Japanese Espionage Network Begins Operations

In line with the establishment of an efficient Japanese spy organization in South America on August 22, 1941 by Mr. Terasaki, the Japanese intelligence coordinator for the Americas, all Japanese offices in North America were ordered to give their immediate attention to the selection of qualified espionage agents. Among the spies was a seaman who was to be placed with some prominent steamship company servicing North American ports.

Foreseeing difficulties in selecting reliable individuals and in checking information derived from foreign countries, Mr. Terasaki emphasized the necessity of Japan's spending vast sums to procure men and administer the whole intelligence network. Combating American counterespionage activities presented a problem since F.B.I. agents were known to be attempting to gain the confidence of those employed in the office of the Axis nations. He urged, therefore, that all Japanese agents be selected with care.

Each Japanese office in South America was to be equipped with radio sets capable of receiving United States' domestic broadcasts. Moreover, a central listening post would be located possibly in Brazil, where a secretary proficient in English shorthand would be on duty at all times.[905] It was learned later that American broadcasts would not reach beyond 1,000 miles. This made it impossible to establish a post either at Buenos Aires or Rio de Janeiro to listen to broadcasts made in the United States.[906]

Subscriptions to American papers and magazines were to be procured in the name of a South American for analysis by trained Japanese agents. Important spy centers were to be located in Brazil, Argentina, Chile and Colombia, the latter country was of importance be-

[899] III, 646.
[900] III, 647.
[901] III, 648.
[902] III, 649.
[903] III, 650.
[904] III, 651.
[905] III, 652.
[906] III, 653.

[189]

cause of its nearness to the Panama Canal. It would be necessary, therefore, to enlarge the telegraphic sections of all the Japanese offices and to use the intelligence sources supplied by the local Domei news agency, special correspondents and Spanish and Portugese language correspondents. Japanese merchants would be employed to keep the organization informed of economic conditions in the United States. If the Axis diplomatic staffs were ordered out of the country before the Japanese, their German and Italian informants would be hired. Not only were Latin American spies to be used, but also those who lived in Spain and Portugal, since it would be possible, should Mexico enter the war, to relay information from Mexico to Spain where it could be retransmitted to Japan.[907]

341. Tripartite Powers Agree to Reciprocal Transportation of Diplomatic Material

By September 18, 1941 Japan, Germany and Italy had entered into a reciprocal agreement in regard to transporting diplomatic material and documents to and from American ports. Responsibility for transporting the documents varied according to the route.[908]

All contacts between Japan and Chile would be made by Japanese steamers and couriers and diplomatic pouch mail would be sent from Chile to Brazil. Permission had been secured to dispatch one courier a month between Brazil, Argentina and Chile.[909]

342. Japan Plans to Evacuate Its Nationals

Japan was preparing for the evacuation of Japanese nationals from all South American capitals. On September 20, 1941 Tokyo directed that Japanese residents, who were capable of maintaining themselves after economic relations had been severed, should not be evacuated. In addition, those whose incomes and livelihood were purely local in origin were to remain. Only Japanese residents of official status, those who had relations with Japanese industrial concerns, and those who were destitute, would be evacuated.[910]

Minister Goscoe Ohgimi in Caracas, Venezuela informed Tokyo on September 22, 1941 that all Japanese in Venezuela desired to remain, and that there were no destitute persons among them.[911] In Brazil, however, there were thirty-eight persons returning to Japan, including two officials, twenty-one destitute nationals and fifteen teachers,[912] who had been affected by Minister Anibal Hara's announcement on August 30, 1941 that subsidies for teachers and indigent Japanese nationals in Brazil were to be abolished owing to lack of funds.[913] If the diplomatic situation became more critical it was expected that approximately 180 officials and leaders would return to Japan.[914]

343. Japan Considers Using German Funds in South America

On September 22, 1941 Tokyo advised its representatives in South America concerning German funds in South America. Although its trade balance with South America had been unfavorable before the war, Germany planned to secure funds in South American branches of the Reichsbank to use in defraying expenses of its officials.

Germany also had decided to requisition the accounts of private German citizens, borrow on interest, exchange secretly the currency of various South American countries and send it abroad,[915] and, finally, sell German-owned bullion in South America. Since Ambassador Ishii

[907] III, 652.
[908] III, 654.
[909] III, 655.
[910] III, 656.
[911] III, 657.
[912] III, 658.
[913] III, 659.
[914] III, 658.
[915] III, 660.

[190]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

believed that this would produce a considerable sum, he suggested that Germany's permission be obtained to use these funds in paying Japanese officials in South America.[916]

344. Japan Imposes New Censorship Restrictions

On October 4, 1941 Japan issued two new orders, one a temporary order for postal control and the other a Communications Department order. The first order announced the powers of the Minister of Communications in time of war or emergency to issue an order for the (a) prohibition or restriction of mailing (b) censorship of mail and (c) prohibition of delivery of mail.

The second order provided for the prohibition of the use of codes and ciphers, secret ink, Braille, and other methods of secret communications, as well as the mailing of private post cards and double sealed envelopes destined for foreign countries.

In addition, it required that the sender's address be indicated. Mail destined for foreign countries was not to be stamped, previously, but was to have the postage attached so that the matter could be mailed at the post office. Mail to and from foreign diplomatic offices in Japan would be excepted from this order by the various countries concerned unless a Japanese request for reciprocity relaxing in their censorship rule was denied.[917]

345. Foreign Minister Toyoda Explains Japan's Foreign Policy

In a message to Japanese representatives in South America, Foreign Minister Toyoda on October 9, 1941 discussed Japan's foreign policy in respect to the international situation. He confirmed the principles of the Tripartite Pact which he said had been founded with one purpose—that of preventing the spread of the European war and establishing world peace.

However, since the war had already spread throughout Europe it was now Japan's primary purpose to remove the causes for war between Japan and America by negotiating with America. However, as far as Japan was concerned, there was no change in its attitude to the Tripartite Pact; it was still attempting to settle the China incident, establish a co-prosperity sphere in Asia, prevent the spread of the war, ensure peace in the Pacific area, and, at the same time, prevent American participation in the war.[918]

346. Japan Plans to Sabotage American-Bolivian Trade Activities

On October 10, 1941 Tokyo announced that it had learned from an interested commercial concern that Bolivia was now considering an agreement to supply the United States exclusively with all kinds of metals. Foreign Minister Toyoda suggested to Minister Tatsuki Sakamoto in Lima that it should not be impossible for Japan to forestall the American-Bolivian agreement and its supply of materials by encouraging the Mitsui Company to negotiate with the Bolivian government for a "barter" agreement. Foreign Minister Toyoda asked that he be informed of the outcome of the American-Bolivian conferences so that Japan could decide its future action.[919]

347. Japan Requires Military Registration of its Nationals

Japanese military authorities had issued regulations requiring the registration of all nationals becoming eligible for military service during 1942. These persons were to register before November 30, 1941 with local authorities at whatever place their respective families maintained a residence.

[916] III, 661.
[917] III, 662.
[918] III, 663.
[919] III, 664.

[191]

On October 16, 1941 Tokyo expressed the belief that many Japanese nationals in South America, who were subject to military duty, were concerned over the question of reporting in time, owing to the uncertainty of the mails. Advice was asked as to the proper position to take in this regard, but Tokyo warned that this registration could not be postponed.[920]

(a) Argentina

348. Minister Tomii Warns Tokyo of Insecure Telephone Communications

In a message to Tokyo on August 16, 1941 Minister Tomii warned the Foreign Office against permitting Japanese commercial firms to transmit confidential information over the telephone, since it was well known that the local telephone company in Buenos Aires was making transcriptions of all conversations transmitted between Japan and Argentina. He felt that certain matters which an unnamed business concern in Japan was telephoning to Argentina could prove very embarrassing if disclosed to the public. Since it was more difficult to control telephone conversations than telegraphic communications, Minister Tomii urged that both private and governmental conversations be supervised so that leakage of secret information could be avoided. Representatives of the Axis nations were quite disturbed at the time because of an Argentinian investigation into Nazi activities.[921]

349. Japanese Minister Stresses Argentina's Desire for Neutrality

In a message on August 20, 1941 Minister Tomii advised Tokyo concerning the trend of public opinion in Argentina. During a speech made by Argentina's President, Ramon S. Castillo, to the graduating class of the University of Jurisprudence at Buenos Aires, the President cautioned that Argentina must be on its guard against those of its nationals who were in close touch with the German Embassy. On the other hand, he warned the pro-British and pro-American factions must not use force against Axis sympathizers.

The newspapers with British and American backing, primarily the Prensa and the Nacione, had opposed President Castillo's speech as arousing confusion in the minds of Argentinians and creating a diversity of opinion among the people. The Japanese Minister then revealed that the Argentina House Committee investigating Nazi activities had authorized the confiscation of 83 boxes containing Axis printed propaganda which had arrived on the Hana Maru on August 8, 1941.[922]

350. Japanese Minister Says Argentina Favors the United States

On September 18, 1941 Minister Tomii informed Japan concerning the persistent efforts of the United States to win over Argentina to the Anglo-American side. Referring to a mass meeting which had been held under the auspices of Argentina labor groups, and also to a bill which had been presented in the Lower House requesting the government of Argentina to support the Roosevelt-Churchill program, Minister Tomii said that the American Congress had invited the Argentina Lower House to send a group of representatives to the United States.

In view of the fact that the time was approaching for an Argentina election, Minister Tomii believed that the minority party was bringing up the question of international policy in an attempt to attack American "pressure" upon those in power. Furthermore, the minority group asserted that the Fascist Party as well as Argentina leaders in economic and military affairs were being softened by United States' "dollar diplomacy".

[920] III, 665.
[921] III, 666.
[922] III, 667.

[192]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

According to Minister Tomii, the Argentina government wished to obtain military supplies from the United States and was anxious to increase its exports to that country; consequently, it would be in favor of maintaining great amity toward the United States.[923]

Minister Tomii pointed out that the situation had become delicate for although acting President Castillo had resolutely upheld a neutrality policy, the Argentina Minister of War, who had recently attended an international celebration at Brazil, was currently attending a similar celebration in Chile, apparently for the purpose of exchanging opinions with the A.B.C. powers regarding a unified international policy.

Although the policy was still not known on September 18, 1941, Minister Tomii surmised that the A.B.C. powers would attempt to maintain peace in southern South America by cooperation with the United States. This theory was also held by those close to President Castillo.[924] In view of this situation the daily operations of the investigating committee against Nazi activities were expected to increase. However, Mr. Tomii did not expect that Italy or Japan would be effected.[925]

351. Minister Tomii Protests the Smuggling of a Radio Transmitter into Argentina

Learning that a radio transmitter was being brought to Buenos Aires by a Japanese Naval Attache, who was aboard the Toa Maru, Minister Tomii immediately warned Tokyo concerning the inadvisability of such a move. He stated than when informed of this plan he had conferred with the Naval Attache in Buenos Aires as to the Navy's motive, and had been told that it was hoped to use the transmitter once or twice subsequent to, and in the event of, severing diplomatic relations between the two countries.

The Japanese warned Tokyo that the use of radio transmitters might cause considerable difficulties should war between the United States and Japan break out, if Argentina remained neutral. In that case, it was clear that Argentina as well as all other South American countries would be more dependent upon Great Britain and the United States than ever before.[926]

Minister Tomii emphasized that in view of recent scientific developments it would be simple for Argentina, Britain or the United States to discover the use of a Japanese transmitter. A grave diplomatic scandal would result from a belligerent country using a neutral nation as a base for military operations. Critical relations between Japan and Argentina would become unavoidable.

In mentioning the foiled Nazi plot to take over the Argentina government, Minister Tomii stated that Argentina customs officials had become very strict. Therefore, it would be difficult to transport the transmitter into the country, and it would be equally dangerous to maintain it there.[927] The conspiracy to which the Japanese Minister referred had taken place on September 23, 1941. It involved certain air force officials stationed at Cordova and Paruna. In advising Japan of the plot, Minister Tomii explained that although little had come of the seditious activities and national accord had been restored, increased measures had been undertaken to ensure the safety of the Argentina government.[928]

352. Argentina Minority Criticizes Anti-Axis Trend

The minority party in Argentina had become strongly antagonistic toward what it termed "government dictatorship", and was greatly aroused over the question of renouncing the German Ambassador. It also resented the existence of Anglo-American influence in administrative circles, and planned to stop the building in Argentina of military bases for the joint defense

[923] III, 668.
[924] III, 669.
[925] III, 670.
[926] III, 671.
[927] Ibid.
[928] III, 672.

[193]

of the western hemisphere.[929] The administration replied that diplomatic prerogatives belonged to the government alone, and influential circles in the Assembly supported this statement. According to the Japanese Minister this was but one aspect of the increased bitter political strife in the country.[930]

On October 6, 1941 President Castillo, while attending a religious ceremony in Rosairo, re-emphasized that the Argentina people must remain distinctly neutral. President Castillo assured the people that various external and internal problems would be settled in compliance with Argentina's needs and interests, and definite steps were being developed in support of neutrality. In keeping with the new plan, foreign residents in Argentina, although maintaining connections with belligerent countries, would not be questioned as long as they respected Argentina traditions.[931]

353. Joint Japanese-Argentina Trade Conference Is Advocated

On September 28, 1941 Minister Tomii who had reported previously concerning the attitude of Argentina authorities regarding Japanese ships, warned Tokyo that the Tokai Maru, anchored in the Buenos Aires harbor, was experiencing difficulty in obtaining enough fuel for the return trip.[932]

Conferring with the Argentina Trade Bureau Director in Buenos Aires, Minister Tomii learned on October 8, 1941 that Argentina had not decided on a definite policy for import and export trade. Argentina was finding it difficult to obtain supplies of tin, tin plate, aluminum, antimony, iron plate, jute, silk thread, rayon, and especially fuel oil, and because of the shortage of power some factories had been forced to close. Therefore, the Argentina Trade Bureau Chief suggested that if Japan were having similar difficulties in obtaining raw materials, a conference for the exchange of necessary goods should be called.

Since the trade of both countries was suffering from the present shortage of ships, it was suggested that Japan continue its shipping schedules in order to induce Argentina to share its supply of fuel oil with Japan.[933] The combination of American freezing laws and Argentina currency control was causing Japanese businessmen much concern.[934]

(b) Brazil

354. Tokyo Seeks Evidence in Brazil Against Japanese Journalist

Mr. Tadao Mitsuura of the Asahi newspaper was arrested in Japan because of suspicious actions, and Tokyo desired to obtain a letter he had written to a person in Sao Paulo. Foreign Minister Toyoda in his message to Sao Paulo requested that the Japanese Minister obtain this evidence. If the Japanese Minister expected that the recipient of the letter would refuse to hand it over on the basis that it might compromise Mr. Mitsuura, he was instructed on August 12, 1941 to request competent Brazilian authorities to intercept the letter and release it to him.[935]

355. Colonel Uchinomiya Leaves Japan for Post in Brazil

On August 26, 1941 Tokyo announced that Colonel Naokata Uchinomiya was departing on the Toa Maru for his new post as Military Attache at the Japanese Embassy in Brazil.[936]

[929] III, 673.
[930] III, 674.
[931] III, 675.
[932] III, 676.
[933] III, 677-678.

[934] III, 679.
[935] III, 680.
[936] III, 681.

[194]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

356. United States Official Advise Brazil on Purchase of Axis Ships

In regard to the sale of Axis ships interned in Brazilian harbors, Ambassador Ishii reported in a message to Tokyo on August 28, 1941 that Germany appeared to be holding out for payment in foreign money. He added that the presidents of the Moore-McCormack Import Bank had recently arrived in Rio de Janeiro to confer with Brazilian officials in connection with the sale of the Nazi vessels.[937]

357. Japanese Army Negotiates for Purchase of Brazilian Diamonds

On September 16, 1941 the General Affairs Department of the Japanese government informed its representatives in Rio de Janeiro that the Japanese War Ministry was sending 150,000 yen for the purchase of diamonds. The Japanese War Ministry also wished information concerning the possibility of acquiring high grade mica and quartz.[938]

358. Japan Promotes Propaganda Activities

In regard to the dissemination of Japanese propaganda in Brazil, Ambassador Ishii reported on September 12, 1941 that an agreement had been reached between Domei officials and the Director of the South American Newspaper Bureau to permit Domei news broadcasts. There had been no objections to the wave length but Domei had been requested to use more power.

Since Japanese language reports had little appeal in Brazil, Ambassador Ishii requested the appointment of a special commentator to discuss current world events in Portuguese.[939]

Although he had stated that propaganda in the Japanese language was of little value in Brazil, Ambassador Ishii reported that he had disseminated this material through official channels to Japanese nationals living in the interior who were under the jurisdiction of this office. Translation of this same propaganda was being published on the Sao Paulo Correo Paulistano and the Brazil Asahi. Until arrangements could be made for permission to use a special correspondent for English text propaganda, the Japanese were supplying various newspapers with Stefani dispatches which up to this time had not been used to any great extent.[940]

359. Japan Learns of Portugal's Plans to Protect Atlantic Possessions

On October 10, 1941 Ambassador Ishii advised Tokyo of secret reports regarding the Portuguese situation. According to the German Ambassador to Brazil, the Portuguese government, a few months before, had requested that Brazil assume protection of Portuguese possessions in the Atlantic in the event that Germany or the United States threatened to occupy them, or should Portugal itself be invaded by Germany and its government find it necessary to flee to Brazil.

However, since the Brazilian government had close relations with the United States, it said that it could not accept this responsibility, if the United States were to take over the islands. On the other hand, in the event that Portugal were invaded by any other power, Brazil said that protection of the islands would be undertaken through Pan-American cooperation, with Brazil assigned the role of "symbolic protection".[941] No response had been received as yet from the Portuguese government, and though it was still a matter of conjecture as to what Brazil meant by "symbolic protection", the German Ambassador believed that the flags of both Portugal and Brazil would be flown side by side.[942]

[937] III, 682.
[938] III, 683. This message was not translated until March 21, 1945.
[939] III, 684.

[940] III, 685.
[941] III, 686.
[942] III, 687.

[195]

(c) Chile

360. Tokyo Seeks American Equipment for Chilean Attache

On October 16, 1941 the Chief of the General Affairs Section in Tokyo directed the Japanese Embassy in Washington to send a shortwave radio set and a car to Chile by steamship, if possible. The General Affairs Section was to be advised of the cost of the freight charges and the time required for the trip. If the purchases could be made, Colonel Wake would bring the necessary money to the United States.[943]

361. Japan Attempts to Raise Money for Chilean Purchases

The problem of obtaining sufficient currency to purchase materials desired by Japan was acute in Chile. On August 20, 1941 Minister Yamagata advised Tokyo that Chilean firms had begun to demand advance payment on all exports of copper ore. Through the efforts of the Argentina government and German banks, Mr. Yamagata reported that he had been able to obtain enough money to conclude one contract, but the possibility of raising $250,000 for the purchase of other ores and wool seemed slight at the present time. Permission was requested to begin negotiations to obtain $100,000 from a German bank with the Yokohama Specie Bank furnishing a guarantee.

According to the Japanese Minister, all important persons in Chile, including the Minister of Foreign Affairs, had assumed a friendly attitude toward Japan but none was willing to lend money at Chile's risk.[944]

362. Japan Plans to Take Advantage of Anti-American Feeling in Chile

Unlike other South American countries, Chile, according to Minister Yamagata, had not instituted anti-Japanese restrictions. Since Chile was the chief exporter of copper, tin and nitrates to the United States, Minister Yamagata felt that its pro-Japanese feeling and undercurrent of anti-Americanism should be used to advantage in maintaining the neutrality of Chile, and strengthen opposition to the United States.[945]

To obtain the greatest results at the least cost, Minister Yamagata suggested that the following plan for the carrying out of this policy via newspaper, radio, motion pictures, lectures, and printed matter be instituted in September. An increased allotment of 15,5000 yen would be required for a seven months period, and should be sent along with the second installment. The plan included:

1. The increase of 500 yen a month for the transfer of daily broadcasts from the old station to a new broadcasting unit, said to be the highest powered station in South America.

2. The increase of 900 yen a month for reprinting Domei news in El Chileno, the morning newspaper with an anti-American editorial policy.[946]

Since Minister Yamagata also considered the possibility of interesting Diario Illustrado and El Chileno in reprinting a series of impressions from Japan, Tokyo was requested to have Domei send dispatches once a week and to inform the Santiago office beforehand regarding the time and wave length of the broadcasts.[947]

On October 10, 1941 Minister Yamagata, referring to a statement by United States correspondents in the local papers which announced that friendly talks had been initiated between Japan and Chile, requested permission to release full details of the conversations.[948]

[943] III, 688.
[944] III, 689.
[945] III, 690.
[946] III, 691.
[947] III, 692.
[948] III, 693.

[196]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

363. Secretary Ichiro Kawasaki is Ordered Home

On September 6, 1941 Foreign Minister Toyoda ordered that Secretary Kawasaki in Santiago return to Japan.[949]

(d) Colombia

364. Special Courier to Bring Secret Documents to Bogota

According to a dispatch on October 14, 1941 a special courier from Santiago was departing for Bogota with secret documents.[950]

365. Minister Iungo Yanai Condemns Lack of Security in Commercial Dispatches

The insecure communications of Japanese business firms had been of great concern to Minister Tomii in Argentina. In addition, on August 16, 1941, Japan's Minister to Colombia, Mr. Jungo Yanai, who had just returned from Ecuador,[951] expressed anxiety over a plain text telegram regarding the purchase of platinum, which an undisclosed Tokyo commercial firm had sent to its representative. The same message had been handled in Japanese diplomatic code some days before. The Japanese Minister advised that if this practice were to continue, it would not only damage Japan's import trade, but it would jeopardize the reputations of both himself and Naval Attache Shigehiro. If such secret information leaked out, Japan would not be able to make any further purchases of platinum, and Minister Yanai urged that more caution be taken in the future.[952]

On October 1, 1941 Minister Yanai again warned against laxity in transmitting commercial messages. Referring to a cable received by a businessman of Bogota from a Mitsui official in New York, which included not only detailed explanations of some secret plan, but had also transmitted the wrong instructions, Minister Yanai warned that he did not believe it safe to send messages between New York, Tokyo and Colombia on this matter. He asked that the Japanese Navy Department issue orders to the Mitsui Company to this effect.

The fact that the local press was calling the attention of the public to the large amounts of valuable materials secretly being exported to Japan and Germany caused Minister Yanai to reiterate his pleas for caution at this time. He revealed that the government of Colombia, in an attempt to check these exports, was sending secret investigators throughout the country.[953]

366. Minister Yanai Requests Additional Funds

On October 7, 1941 Minister Yanai, indicating that he had been successful in obtaining some desired items, requested additional funds from the Naval Attache in Mexico City.[954]

(e) Ecuador-Peru

367. Messrs. Watanabe and Makizawa Leave Peru for Ecuador

Messrs. Noboru Watanabe and Makizawa, two Japanese officials, were scheduled to leave Callao, Peru on the Santa Luisa on September 11, 1941. After making a landing at Quayaquil, they would travel to Quito by train.[955]

[949] III, 694.
[950] III, 695.
[951] III, 696.
[952] III, 697.

[953] III, 698.
[954] III, 699.
[955] III, 700.

[197]

368. Peruvian-Ecuadorean Border Dispute Continues

A border dispute between Peru and Ecuador continued through August and October, 1941 with armed conflicts taking place sporadically throughout the period. Little traffic concerning Ecuador was intercepted during this period, but Minister Yanai accredited to Bogota, Colombia kept the Japanese government informed of current events.

369. Ecuador Blames Standard Oil Company for Border Incident

The President of Ecuador believed that Peru's aggression had been incited by the Standard Oil Company, which he said, possessed vested interests in the southern part of Peru, and was attempting to encroach upon the rights of the Shell Oil Company in the Cuenca and adjacent area of Ecuador.

The United States had sold fifteen bombers to Peru, but had refused to send five planes or any military supplies to Ecuador. Because of this Ecuador could not subscribe to the United States' plan for Pan-American solidarity. The Japanese Minister believed that Ecuador would not send a representative to the approaching Good Neighbor conference unless the border question was settled.[956]

370. President Arroyo Del Rio Clears Japanese Commercial Experts

On September 18, 1941 Minister Yanai reported that Mr. Juan Martinez, an intimate friend of the Provisional President of Ecuador, Dr. Carlos A. Arroyo Del Rio, had made a special report which had resulted in a complete transformation of the President's attitude toward Japanese commercial experts who had been forced to leave the country. The President stated that all suspicions formerly directed against the Japanese experts had been dispelled, but owing to the unstable internal and foreign conditions of the country, he felt that their return at this time would be a bit premature. However, by the end of the month he might ask them to return.[957]

371. Peruvian Minister Accuses Ecuador of Creating Border Incident

According to a confidential report given to Minister Hisashi Nanjo at Havana by the Peruvian Minister, negotiations were being carried on between the United States and Ecuador for a ninety-nine year lease of the Galapagos, off the west coast of Ecuador. Since Ecuador was not able to withstand American pressure, its government was attempting to obtain as much as possible under the circumstances. The Peruvian Minister stated that Ecuador had deliberately instigated a border dispute in order to benefit from an advantageous solution by the United States, which would be asked to mediate in the name of hemispheric cooperation. Ecuador even hoped to obtain lend-lease materials from the United States.

According to the Peruvian Minister, this maneuver had not been successful for although the Acting Secretary of State, Mr. Sumner Welles, had summoned the Peruvian Ambassador in Washington and had made a veiled threat by announcing that the United States had decided to give two destroyers to Ecuador, Brazil had withdrawn from the mediation and the situation was disadvantageous to Ecuador.[958]

372. Minister Sakamoto Requests Azuma Maru Be Sent to Lima

On October 8, 1941 Minister Sakamoto in Lima requested that the Japanese Navy Department order the Azuma Maru to stop at a Peruvian post on its return voyage to Tokyo to take on materials accumulated there. It was expected that possibly 2,000 tons of cargo in excess of the previous estimate could be loaded. Minister Sakamoto requested an immediate reply.[959]

[956] III, 701.
[957] III, 702.
[958] III, 703.
[959] III, 704.

[198]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

373. Japan Attempts to Bribe Peruvian Officials

Foreign Minister Toyoda informed Minister Sakamoto in Lima that he was shipping to the Peruvian Finance Minister a set of European style dishes specially manufactured by the Nagoya China Company, and five Cloisonne flower vases to the Chief Assistant to the Finance Minister. These gifts were to be presented to the Peruvian officials with the compliments of Japan, and with the secret hope that Japan would get what it wanted from them more easily.[960] However, on October 14, 1941 Minister Sakamoto advised Tokyo that there was no hope of negotiating with the Peruvian government.[961]

374. Mr. Kihara Replaces Secretary Matsumoto in Peru

Minister Sakamoto in Lima advised the Japanese office in Panama that Secretary Bunazburo Matsumoto planned to leave Lima with secret documents and was scheduled to arrive in Cristobal, Venezuela on the Imperia on October 12, 1941.[962 ]When Tokyo requested that the Lima office reserve passage on the Terukawa Maru for Mr. Matsumoto, who desired to sail on that ship,[963] Mr. Sakamoto responded on October 14, 1941 that the new successor to Secretary Matsumoto, Secretary Jitaro Kihara, was encountering difficulty in obtaining travel expenses. He urged that Tokyo investigate this matter immediately.[964]

375. Japan Continues Trade with Peru

On October 14, 1941 the Terukawa Maru, according to Foreign Minister Toyoda had space available for 135 tons of cargo, which Japanese officials in Lima were to fill with materials necessary to Japan. Although the proper procedure was to have the Japanese Minister obtain these materials from the Peruvian government, the Japanese Foreign Office had decided that the respective private firms would import the materials and issue their own letters of credit. The Foreign Minister advised that every precaution be taken to avoid misunderstanding in the settlement of price between the Peruvian government and the sellers on the one hand and the Japanese firms on the other.

Since there were no prospects at present for assigning a ship to transport salt, the Foreign Minister asked that the Japanese representatives bargain with the Peruvian government for 250,000 sol of salt by telling them that a ship would soon be assigned by Japan to export it. Japan desired to remit the price each time an importation of salt was effected. Foreign Minister Toyoda also advised that a supply of sugar be obtained so that Japanese dealers could sell it in Peru.[965]

Upon learning that the Terukawa Maru might take aboard freight at Callao, Minister Yanai at Bogota, Colombia urged that the Japanese Embassy in Argentina be informed when the ship put into port.[966] Foreign Minister Toyoda replied that the Terukawa Maru would not be able to stop at Bogota and asked that Minister Yanai confer with the Argentina Ambassador to urge that he board this ship at Callao.[967]

[960] III, 705.
[961] III, 706.
[962] III, 707.
[963] III, 708.
[964] III, 709.
[965] III, 710.
[966] III, 711.
[967] III, 712.

[199]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

PART C—JAPANESE DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITIES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD

(f) Japanese-British Relations

376. British Freezing Order Impels Japanese to Evacuate Hongkong

Suspecting that an order freezing Japanese assets would be put into effect throughout the British Empire, Japanese representatives in Hongkong reported to their Foreign Minister in August, 1941 that considerable unrest was apparent among the Japanese residents who feared that Japanese ships would be denied entrance to the harbor.[968] When disclosing this situation to its representative in Canton on August 6, 1941, Tokyo inquired about the possibility of evacuating Japanese nationals by way of Canton.

In the meantime, an attempt was made to secure guarantees from English officials that Japanese ships would be permitted to leave Hongkong.[969] On August 8, 1941 Hongkong reported that since the Shirogane Maru was leaving Canton unimpeded and that since British authorities were not impeding the Takuun Maru then docked at Hongkong, no interference with Japanese shipping was anticipated, though the British had not as yet given any guarantee.

Nevertheless, preparations continued for the evacuation of approximately 110 subjects, the majority of whom were families of the Japanese staff and residents in Hongkong. With all mail steamers filled to capacity, it was suggested that the Kamo Maru, after leaving Kakao on August 20, 1941, take aboard some of these people at Hongkong. At the same time Japanese vessels were warned to prepare for detailed inspection of all cargoes by the British civil administration.[970]

Realizing that an official order to evacuate Hongkong would heighten the already critical situation, the Chief of the East Asia Bureau advised on August 10, 1941 that the withdrawal of Japanese subjects should give the appearance of being carried out under their own initiative.[971]

378. Rumors Indicate Japanese Evacuation Near Johore

In other sections of the Near East Japanese subjects were also preparing to return to their home land. Learning from a Singapore news dispatch of August 16, 1941 that Japanese near Johore in the Malay States had been ordered to evacuate, Tokyo, on August 23, 1941, requested verification of the report and complete details.[973]

379. Japanese Officials and News Correspondents Prepare to Leave London

At this time high ranking officials, including Lieutenant Colonel Yoshii and Commander Nakano, the assistant military and naval attaches at the Japanese Embassy in London, as well as Mr. Hasegawa and Mr. Nakamura, special news correspondents representing the Domei and Asahi syndicates respectively, prepared to leave London. The Japanese Ambassador in London inquired on August 20, 1941 concerning the advisability of these men returning to Japan via Panama in view of their military status and the existing international situation.[974]

[968] III, 713.
[969] III, 714.
[970] III, 715.
[971] III, 716.
[973] III, 718.
[974] III, 719.

[201] [200 blank]

380. Japanese Considers Bartering with British

Although evacuation plans were of major importance during the months of August and September, 1941, the problem of stabilizing trade relations between Japan and Great Britain was of equal concern. Since, according to Tokyo, by freezing Japanese funds and by abrogating treaties Great Britain had greatly curtailed Japanese commerce, Japan was willing to give careful consideration to a British proposal for the use of barter in trade between the two countries. Japan decided that the agreement would facilitate the settlement of its banks' financial problems, yet was anxious lest too prompt acceptance of the British proposal expose Japan's position. However, on August 15, 1941 Tokyo instructed its Embassy in London to order Mr. Kitaro Kato to arrange negotiations with the British and Netherlands East Indies banks.[975]

At the same time Japan continued to study the terms of the proposed agreement pertaining to the type of British commodities which would be supplied under it, and also the areas in which the agreement would be carried out. In Japan's opinion the new trade relationship should be put into effect throughout Great Britain's colonies, and not be limited to England itself.[976]

381. Japan Investigates British Military Preparations in Iran

In view of its alliances under the Tripartite Pact, Japan believes that it had to fear not only British economic pressure in the Far East but also the effects of British military preparations in other parts of the world on its ally, Germany. Since the European War had allied Great Britain with Russia, Tokyo was concerned with the trend of events in Iran where unforeseen developments might easily turn the tide of the Russo-German war.

For information gathered by the head of the Mitsubishi Branch in Iran, Tokyo learned of an increase in British shipping at ports on the Persian Gulf. By docking an average of five ships daily, Great Britain had brought the number of British and Australian troops in the area up to 200,000. In addition, trucks, speedboats equipped with depth bombs, machine guns and other military supplies were being unloaded rapidly. Yet in spite of the twenty-eight cranes used in these unloading operations, many ships were still anchored in the outer harbor at Basra waiting to put their cargoes ashore.[977]

In view of the fact that the British army had commandeered in Basra between 350 and 400 lighters, and had equipped them with plank covers, it seemed probable that the British were preparing to land their men and supplies in frontal assault on German lines. This theory was further substantiated by British use of the newly-completed railroad from the Basra harbor to Kuweit and by indications of a new connection with Bahrein Island.

Apparently, the Iranian government feared British preparations for war on its territory. On August 5, 1941 at the commemoration of the promulgation of the Constitution, Mr. Mobangaru, an influential member of the Iranian Parliament, warned his fellow members that Iran must prepare against joint British and Russian pressure. Mr. Mobangaru had been attacked by the Director of the British Imperial Bank in Iran because of the pro-German attitude in the country.[978]

After receiving this information concerning British military activities in Iran, the Japanese representative there went to the German Minister. In spite of the fact that the source of Japanese information was supposedly authentic, the German Minister refused to believe that either British troops or supplies were as numerous as reported; he considered the information to be English propaganda. Nevertheless, the Japanese representative in his message to the

[975] III, 720.
[976] Ibid.
[977] III, 721.
[978] Ibid.

[202]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

Foreign Minister on August 18, 1941 warned his government that the situation in Iran had grown extremely critical since the onset of the Russo-German war.[979]

Although the Iranian Foreign Office denied the rumor, there seemed to be some truth in the statement that Great Britain had requested permission to transport its troops through the country. It was rumored, too, that on August 5, 1941 the American Legation had secretly advised the evacuation of Americans from Iran.

Once the Russo-German war had been concluded, Japanese sources warned, the dangerous situation existing in Iran would be brought to a head, for then German troops would encroach upon the northern border of Iran and Great Britain would use Iran as a buffer state for the protection of India.

The statement by Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Anthony Eden, that Britain only wished to protect Iran from German Fifth Columnists was regarded merely as a British excuse. In fact, because the German Minister in Iran realized that the British government might make the first move to protect British oil companies, he was attempting to align the Iranians with the Axis by a policy of not irritating them in any manner.[980]

382. Japanese Business Firms Charge Singapore Police with Oppression

The Kobayashi firm, which for the past three years had been granted permits to carry on its business activities in Singapore, reported in August 1941 that oppressive measures were being taken against it. In order not to aggravate the situation, on August 25, 1941 Tokyo advised that the books of this concern be put in order to meet the control measures of the British authorities in Singapore. However, in retaliation not only was a strong protest to be made to Ambassador Robert Craigie, but British propaganda in Japan was to be curtailed.[981]

383. Tokyo Continues Negotiations for Barter with British

A Japanese Cabinet meeting on August 26, 1941 decided to continue negotiations for reciprocal trade with the British.[982] Since the proposed use of a barter system was designed to adjust the existing trade balances between British and Japanese banks, Tokyo believed that the terms should be drawn up by the Yokohama Specie Bank and by the British Dutch Bank, without any public announcement before or after a final plan was evolved.[983] Therefore, on August 27, 1941 Mr. Hisaakira Kano, branch manager of the Specie Bank in London, was notified of the arrangement.[984]

Although the original British proposal was acceptable almost as submitted, certain revisions in the articles and phraseology were still under discussion. Because the transportation of the material would be effected largely by Japanese ships, the Japanese government believed that England should furnish the necessary fuel and should extend certain facilities to Japan's cargo vessels. On August 27, 1941 Tokyo requested its London Embassy to present this stipulation in writing to the British.[985]

384. Foreign Minister Toyoda Criticizes Editorial Policy of Singapore Herald

Foreign Minister Toyoda warned the Japanese representatives in Singapore on August 28, 1941 to see to it that the Herald did not publish more editorials which were anti-Axis in tone.[986] Japanese authorities in Singapore replied that, whereas it was impossible for them to

[979] III, 722.
[980] Ibid.
[981] III, 723.
[982] III, 724.
[983] III, 725.
[984] III, 726.
[985] III, 725.
[986] III, 727.

[203]

direct the writing of each article, they had informed the paper of what its editorial policy should be: namely, to avoid provoking the British and to give the impression that Japan's aims, interfering in no way with the rights and interests of the English, were directed toward a Far Eastern peace.

A month before, in July 1941, British authorities in Singapore, through Mr. Scott, the former chief of the Far Eastern Section, had warned Mr. Jones, the Herald's editorial writer, that it was particularly inadvisable for an Englishman to write such analytical and critical editorials for a Japanese newspaper. Nevertheless, Mr. Jones had chosen to remain on the staff. According to the Japanese report, it was clear that the Herald's editorial, which had aroused much comment, had not been written under Japanese direction, but it was regrettable that Japan had permitted the publication of material suitable for use in British propaganda.[987]

385. Canada Imposes Restrictions on Foreign Messages

Because of Canada's proximity to the United States and England, its reactions to international diplomatic situations were carefully noted by the Japanese Embassy in Ottawa as an indication of trends common among the Allied nations. It was reported from Ottawa on August 26, 1941 that because of its entrance into the European war, Canada was prohibiting even the clearance of official foreign code and clear text telegrams when addressed to or sent by a private individual.

Although conscious that inconveniences would naturally arise, the Canadian government was resolute in allowing the transmission of only those official messages between Japanese consular offices in Canada and the United States which were clearly marked "Japanese Consul" or "Japanese Consul General."[988]

386. Canada Plans to Exchange Ministers with Chungking

Only a few days later Japan received evidence of Canada's tendency toward pro-Chinese and anti-Japanese policies. From Ambassador Seijiro Yoshizawa in Ottawa came a report on August 30, 1941 of a rumor that Canada was planning to exchange ministers with the Chungking government. To determine the truth of the story appearing in local Canadian newspapers, the Japanese Ambassador in Ottawa questioned Prime Minister MacKensie King. He learned that diplomatic negotiations to effect such an exchange had been underway for some time, aided by the British Ambassador in Chungking.[989]

In view of the establishment of the Japanese-sponsored regime at Nanking,[990] Ambassador Yoshizawa impressed the Canadian Prime Minister with the advisability of notifying Japan prior to any official decision.[991]

387. Tokyo Permits British Evacuation from Japan

Although diplomatic relations were still not severed, both Japan and England continued arrangements for evacuating their nationals from the other's territory.

At the request of the British Ambassador in Tokyo, the Japanese government issued an oral statement granting the same facilities for the arrival and departure of British evacuation ships at Japanese ports, as had been guaranteed to Ambassador Mamoru Shigamitsu in London, when the Fushimi Maru removed Japanese subjects from Great Britain.[992]

[987] III, 728.
[988] III, 729.
[989] II, 730.

[990] Japan has set up a puppet government in Nanking. See II, Japanese-Nanking Relation.
[991] III, 730.
[992] III, 731.

[204]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

In return for the safe passage of British ships, Japan instructed its Ambassador in London, on August 28, 1941, to obtain further assurance that nothing would hinder its vessels from taking Japanese nationals aboard at Karachi, British India.[993]

388. Tokyo Evacuates Nationals in British Territory

As preparations for the evacuation of Japanese nationals from all British territories progressed, Tokyo, on August 29, 1941, ordered its Ambassador in London to explain to the British authorities that the Matsumoto Maru at Calcutta and another ship at Durban had no accommodations for the evacuees from Mombasa in Kenya, South Africa. Since it would be necessary to dispatch two other Japanese ships for that purpose, a guarantee of safe passage was requested by the Japanese government.[994]

389. Britain Guarantees Safe Passage for Hakone Maru

Negotiations were continued in order to obtain further guarantees on the part of both the Japanese and British governments that no obstacle would be placed in the way of the evacuation ships.

According to an agreement with Ambassador Robert Craigie in Tokyo, safe transit for the Hakone Maru, sailing through the Persian Gulf en route to Bombay, was assured. In exchange, English ships, sent to Japan and China for the evacuation of British and Allied nationals, were granted similar facilities.[995]

390. British and Japanese Banks Negotiate Trade Settlements

The beginning of September 1941 found Japanese and British banking concerns negotiating for further trade between the two countries. Tokyo revealed that authorities of the British Netherlands Bank had approached the London branch of the Yokohama Specie Bank about the possibility of establishing a settlement account to facilitate commercial payments.

The Yokohama Specie Bank proposed that before arranging such a system, a list of materials for export by both the British and Japanese governments be drawn up for discussion. The Japanese government was anxious to carry on trade with British territories and colonies in cotton goods and other miscellaneous materials known to be lacking in these areas. Tokyo felt that such a measure would alleviate some of the trade problems which had resulted from the British freezing order.[996]

391. Japanese Embassy in London Discloses Background of Atlantic Charter

On September 2, 1941 the Japanese government sent to Berlin a report received from the Japanese Embassy in London concerning the background of the Atlantic Charter signed by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill on August 14, 1941.[997]

From the information received it was learned that the eight points of the Atlantic Charter were originated by President Roosevelt. Because these points touched upon the question of the distribution of territories throughout Europe, Prime Minister Churchill hesitated to sign the document at first, fearing that diplomatic problems might arise in consequence. President Roosevelt then pointed out that the American public had assumed an extremely heavy burden of taxation in order to give necessary aid to Britain. If the American public came to feel that it was involved in a war merely for the benefit of Great Britain, great dissatisfaction would result. When President Roosevelt stressed that therefore a statement must be issued precisely

[993 Ibid.
[994] III, 732.
[995] III, 733.
[996] III, 734.
[997] III, 735.

[205]

because the European war was so serious a problem involving not only Great Britain but the entire world, Prime Minister Churchill agreed to adopt the Atlantic Charter.

As had been expected, the question of the distribution of territories caused friction between the allied European countries. Soviet Russia, in particular, had many questions to pose regarding this problem.

With regard to the problems in the Far East, the Japanese Embassy in London stated that Great Britain believed America's attitude toward Japan to be more lenient than its own, since the United States was continuing its informal conversations with Japan.[998]

392. Japanese Embassy Comments on Situations in Iran and Africa

This same report from the Japanese Embassy in London commented on the situations in both Iran and Africa. With regard to its invasion of Iran, Great Britain realized the difficulty of preserving peace in neighboring countries if she resorted to conquest by force. Therefore, Great Britain hoped to carry out only a minor aggression in Iran and to attain its major objectives by negotiations with the Iranian government.

Although developments in Iran at first gave hope to these expectations, the British government faced the fact that the Russian troops showed no signs of stopping their advance into Iran from the north. Only after the Soviet forces had secured the northern end of the railroad and the area adjoining the Caucasus did they intend to cease operations. The British troops had already secured the oil fields in the southern part of the trans-Iran railroad, however, and since neither army had sent troops to Teheran, efforts were still underway for peaceful negotiations with the Iranian government.

Meanwhile, in Africa, the Vichy government was attempting to forestall a move for independence on the part of the French African colonies by putting General Huntziger in command of all African forces. Because of his great popularity, the Vichy government could not risk dismissing General Weygand; therefore, it had been necessary to make him second in command.

The British government had refrained from aiding the pending struggle for independence among the French African colonies since it was felt that once this independence was secured, Berlin would take advantage of the situation by sending German troops into Spain.[999]

393. British-Russian Advance Cuts Off German Escape

By the first part of September 1941 the situation in Iran had become so critical that the German Legation burned its general documents and prepared to flee Teheran. Because of the rapidly advancing British and Russian troops, however, escape was cut off. The German nationals in Teheran were faced either with becoming captives of the Allies, or with taking cover and carrying on anti-British and anti-Russian activities until aid from the German army reached them. Whatever their choice, it was now obvious that once Iran capitulated, British-Russian occupation would leave the Caucasus open to Allied aid and German forces, fighting in Russia, would be placed in a precarious position.[1000]

394. Japanese Intelligence Discloses Possibility of German Attack on Turkey

On September 5, 1941 the Japanese Embassy in London sent Tokyo reliable information concerning the possible occupation of Near-East territories by British, Soviet, and German troops. The Japanese Embassy disclosed that when the British and Russian governments had first demanded the expulsion of Germans from Iran, Turkey and Egypt had been sympathetic with the Iranian government. However, both Iran and Turkey asked that, in case Russia should

[998] Ibid.
[999] Ibid.
[1000] III, 736.

[206]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

invade Iran, Britain then enter the country presumably to prevent Russian occupation of Teheran and possible outrages against the populace and king. If Great Britain should fail to make this move, the Turkish militarists, pro-German in their sentiments, would find it an excuse to collaborate with the Axis nations.

Although the German Ambassador to Turkey, Mr. Papen, had made no special demands on that government, his return to Berlin was considered an indication of a future German invasion of Turkey. On the other hand, Japanese intelligence reports pointed out that Germany recognized the difficulty of breaking through the plains of Anatolia and, rather than risk failure, the Berlin government might refrain from an attack at the present time.

Though Admiral Raeder had recently visited Bulgaria, a well-informed person disclosed that the purpose of his visit was to negotiate for the use of Bulgaria's harbors in the event of a war on the Black Sea. While an Italian squadron might be able to assist Germany by invading the Black Sea, Japanese intelligence reports pointed out that the Dardanelles Straits would still have to be controlled before this move could prove of any real value.[1001]

395. Disposition of British Fleet Affects German-French Peace Negotiations

Information from the Japanese Embassy in London on September 5, 1941 also disclosed certain problems connected with the establishment of final peace negotiations between Vichy France and Germany. The disposition of the British fleet, threatening the German and Italian supply route to Libya, had been largely responsible for the resignation of Admiral La Rocque, Vichy's director of naval strategy, and the demotion of General Weygand. Because German and Italian ships feared attack by the British, a route to Libya through the harbor of Bizerte in French-held Tunis had been contemplated. Since General Weygand and Admiral La Rocque had opposed this move, there had been a shake-up in the French military and naval high command which had had a telling affect upon French politics.

Furthermore, Italy's claims on the French colonies in Africa, Corsica, Nice, and Savoy and the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine by Germany had such a bad affect upon French public opinion that Vichy could not afford to ratify peace negotiations with Germany at the present time.[1002]

396. Canadian Prime Minister Advocates American Aid to Britain

On September 5, 1941 Tokyo also received information concerning a speech made by Canada's Prime Minister, Mr. MacKenzie King, at an informal dinner-party given by the Mayor of London.

Since his arrival in Great Britain, Prime Minister King had openly advocated all-out aid to Britain by the United States as a means of attaining a common objective. With the backing of Prime Minister Churchill, King made a speech emphasizing that a new world order, based on freedom, could only be achieved by complete British-American cooperation.

The attitude of other British leaders toward the European war was causing a political rift in Great Britain. Recently, Mr. Moore-Brabazon, the Minister of Aircraft Production, had openly declared that Great Britain could take advantage of the war-exhaustion of Germany and Russia to advance its own production of war materials. As a result of this statement, Mr. Tanner, the head of the Amalgamated Engineers' Union, had attacked Minister Moore-Brabazon at a meeting at which Air Minister Attlee and Economic Warfare Administrator Dalton were present. At the coming session of Parliament, careful attention was to be given to the problems which had arisen from the differing views of the two men.[1003]

[1001] III, 737.
[1002] Ibid.
[1003] Ibid.

[207]

397. Japan Fears British-Chinese Collaboration

Since British relations with Far Eastern territories had a definite bearing on their attitude toward Japan, Tokyo watched with growing concern the obvious tendencies toward increased British-Chinese collaboration. Although both British and Chinese authorities were avoiding any definite statement concerning the extent of cooperation between their countries, and while no actual treaty was believed to exist, Mr. Tateki Horiuchi, in Shanghai, quoted a Reuters dispatch from Chungking in the early part of September 1941, which stated that British and Chinese military leaders constantly coordinated their activities.

A United Press news report quoted the British Naval Attache to the United States as saying that if America entered the war, Britain would permit it to use Singapore. Furthermore, Ambassador Archibald Kerr had admitted that relations between England and China were closer than imagined by the world at large.[1004]

A little over a week later confirmation of British-Chinese military cooperation was found in a Japanese intelligence report. After investigating the distribution and quartering of troops around Lashio, a Japanese spy revealed that military conferences between the British and Chinese leaders had been held twice monthly since July, 1941. On September 6, 1941 Lashio was filled with Chinese soldiers, who were holding maneuvers with British troops.[1005]

By September 10, 1941 Chinese forces had been strengthened by 1000 men ready to move southwards from Lashio in trucks. Other detachments arriving from Kunming in the latter part of September 1941 were apparently to be stationed near Wanten and Shaho, where military barracks were under construction and underground ammunition dumps, invisible from the sky, were nearly completed.[1006]

Later in September 1941 another spy report disclosed that thousands of trucks carrying gasoline, arms, ammunition, cotton and miscellaneous equipment had been arriving at Yunan during August, and arms and ammunition had been sent to reinforce the Chinese at Fushan.[1007]

398. Britain Suppresses Japanese Propaganda in China

In order to protect its interest in China, Great Britain found it necessary to suppress Japanese propaganda there. Disturbed by Japan's varied activities in China, the British authorities curtailed travel and placed restrictions on newspaper articles and radio talks. Furthermore, all mail from Chinese nationals in occupied territories was opened and censored, and all Chinese working with Japan were watched by the police. Members of the Chinese Communist party, who had been merely feigning anti-Japanese sentiments, found their activities suppressed by British officials.[1008]

In an attempt to counteract the effects of this British surveillance, Japanese authorities at Singapore suggested to Tokyo on September 9, 1941 that the National government of China establish a radio station to broadcast pro-Japanese propaganda, which would emphasize the futility of China's continuing its resistance to Japan. It would also stress that the present National government, established in the occupied areas of China, was actually the legitimate successor to the Nationalist party established by Mr. Sun Yat-sen.[1009]

399. Britain Seeks Chinese Translators

British preparations for war in the Far East were reported by the Japanese, who stated that British authorities were making a survey of Englishmen in North China, Hongkong and Shang-

[1004] III, 738.
[1005] III, 739.
[1006] III, 740.
[1007] III, 741.
[1008] III, 742.
[1009] Ibid .

[208]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

hai who understood the Chinese language and could work with the British forces in Burma. Reporting the results of Britain's search, Mr. Horiuchi informed Tokyo that by September 10, 1941 ten linguists had been appointed in Shanghai.[1010]

400. Japan Seeks Funds to Operate Malayan Mines

Though the ties between Great Britain and China were being constantly strengthened by economic and military measures, relations between Great Britain and Japan were weakened by the same means, for the British freezing of funds was effective in upsetting Japan's economic stability.

Unless a direct payment could be made to Japanese who were operating mines in Malay, Foreign Minister Toyoda believed that negotiations would have to be begun with England for the appropriation of the funds necessary to keep these mines open. In order to be completely informed on the situation, Foreign Minister Toyoda, in the early part of September 1941, instructed his representative at Singapore to collect data on the number of Japanese employed in the mining industry, their monthly salaries in Shanghai dollars, the cost of maintaining the equipment to keep these mines in operation, and the amount of cash in possession of the mines.[1011]

401. British Embassy Burns All Important Documents

A Japanese diplomat in Nanking reported to Tokyo on September 5, 1941 that the British Embassy, feeling the strain of existing relations with Japan, had apparently burned all important documents.[1012]

402. The Fuso Maru, an Evacuation Ship, Schedules a Stop at Singapore

Since there seemed to be little hope remaining for the reestablishment of normal relations between the two countries, detailed plans were being made in September 1941 to evacuate British and Japanese subjects to London and Tokyo respectively. These plans became more significant as time passed.

Notifying Singapore on September 10, 1941 that The Fuso Maru was scheduled to arrive there late in September, 1941, Foreign Minister Toyoda suggested that arrangements be made to fill the 700 accommodations available for passage to Tokyo aboard this ship.[1013]

403. Japan Intercedes with Britain for Germans in Iran

On September 8, 1941 Mr. Ichikawa in Teheran notified Tokyo that British and Russian forces had reached that city. Although there was still much discussion regarding the treatment of German nationals residing in Kazavin and other cities in Iran, the German authorities were opposed to being held as prisoners of the British. Therefore, German residents in Teheran were appealing to Persia to arrange their immediate transfer to Turkey. If this could not be done, the German authorities intended to retire to the Ministry compound.[1014]

Mr. Ichikawa called on the Iranian Foreign Minister to enlist his assistance in the transfer of German nationals to Turkey, but because of British pressure, the Iranian Foreign Minister was pessimistic regarding this plan. Mr. Ichikawa then visited British and Turkish authorities to obtain their help, and the American Minister in Iran agreed to speak to the British authorities there. However, at the present time, Mr. Ichikawa stated, there was great anxiety among the German residents over the prospect of being forced to return to the Ministry compound since they would have to remain there until the conclusion of the war.

[1010] III, 743.
[1011] III, 744.
[1012] III, 745.
[1013] III, 746.
[1014] III, 747.

[209]

Fighting was still going on in many areas of Iran, with the Russian army moving in the west to the Mashhad area and to the south of this territory.[1015]

404. Canada Maintains Diplomatic Relations with Vichy

Mr. Yoshizawa, the Japanese representative in Ottawa, notified his government on September 8, 1941 that Prime Minister MacKenzie King had returned home by plane on the previous day. In keeping with the stand of the British government, Prime Minister MacKenzie King had stated at a press conference that Canada intended to maintain diplomatic relations with

Vichy.[1016]

405. Foreign Minister Toyoda Anticipates Anglo-Japanese Evacuation Agreement

According to a message transmitted to Teheran on September 10, 1941 Foreign Minister Toyoda expected that an Anglo-Japanese understanding on the evacuation facilities to be provided by both countries would be reached very shortly.

To expedite the evacuation of Japanese and British subjects, the two governments were expected not to withhold any necessary permits more than a fortnight from the time when they were submitted unless a suitable explanation was given. In the matter of traveling expenses, some standard method of settling problems that might arise would be arranged between the British Embassy in Tokyo and the Japanese Finance Ministry.[1017]

Not only was Great Britain to cooperate with Japanese leaving the United Kingdom, India, Burma or British colonial territory, but it was also to place no obstacle in the way of those wishing to leave British dominions or territories under either British or Allied occupation. In return, Tokyo gave assurance of the safe passage of British subjects from Japan, Manchukuo or occupied China.[1018]

406. Hiye Maru Is Used in Japanese Evacuation

Leaving Kobe on September 22, 1941 the Hiye Maru was to pick up evacuees at Bombay, India, Bandarshapur on the Persian Gulf and Mombasa, Kenya, before returning to Yokohama. Because the schedule was not to be altered, Foreign Minister Toyoda, in a message to Teheran, Iran, on September 12, 1941, warned that all passengers should be ready to board when the ship docked, and that Iraq be informed immediately to ensure the evacuation of Japanese residents from Bagdad.

Since suitable accommodations for all were impossible to obtain, the Japanese Foreign Minister ordered that preference be given the sick, aged, women and small children.[1019]

407. "Central China Post" Strike Remains Unsettled

While these evacuation negotiations were underway it was particularly important that no incident, no matter how insignificant, be allowed to upset the Japanese-British diplomatic situation. In July 1941 a strike had broken out in the office of the Central China Post, an English language newspaper published in Hankow. The British Ambassador in Chungking, because he believed the strike had been instigated by the Japanese, the Municipal government, and the Nanking regime, demanded that immediate settlement be effected by Japanese authorities.[1020]

A message from Hankow on September 12, 1941 revealed that the incident was not yet closed. Settling in the office of the Central China Post, one group of strikers had refused to surrender,

[1015] III, 748.
[1016] III, 749.
[1017] III, 750.
[1018] Ibid .

[1019] III, 751.
[1020] III, 752.

[210]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

whereupon the British Consul-General in Hankow filed a protest with the Japanese authorities there. However, since Japanese officials insisted that the movement was directed by Chinese attempting to impede the establishment of the New China and, consequently aiming to suppress the Central China Post, they said that any interference by Japan would be useless. They desired to let the strike run its natural course without intervention by local authorities.[1021]

408. Japan Prohibits Unauthorized Newspaper Articles

To prevent further trouble with newspapers, the printing of any articles regarding the creation of the "National Policy Cooperation", with the exception of those authorized by the proper authorities, was prohibited in Shanghai.[1022] On September 13, 1941 Japanese authorities in Shanghai requested that similar action be taken at Hankow.[1023]

409. Japan Denies Blockade of Hongkong Waters

In spite of strict precautions differences between the Japanese and the British arose over trade and shipping policies. On September 15, 1941 Japanese authorities in Canton, in answer to a British complaint, insisted that the Japanese blockading squadron had always respected Hongkong's territorial waters.[1024]

410. British Authorities Seize Egyptian Steamer

A British seizure of an Egyptian steamer, Star of Egypt, carrying a cargo of cotton and glycerin, caused Tokyo to instruct its officials at Shanghai to investigate the reason for this action and to negotiate for the release of the vessel.[1025]

Japanese authorities in Shanghai reported to Tokyo that on one occasion Japan had refused the China Trading Company a permit to send fifteen tons of glycerin to Hongkong. Since Japan stood to profit in trade negotiations by granting such permits, it was suggested that they not be withheld in the future.[1026]

411. British Seek to Check Germans in Black Sea Area

From an authentic intelligence report, the Japanese Embassy in London learned that British military authorities intended to extend the war with Germany into the Black Sea area since the German army had already planned to cross over into the Caucasus from the Bulgarian and Rumanian shores. In an effort to move its fleet into the Black Sea and forestall this German aggression, the British government was trying to persuade Turkey, Iran and Iraq of the danger of their position once German troops were in possession of the Caucasus. However, the Japanese intelligence report stated that Berlin realized the intentions of the British and therefore would delay any attack on Turkey. Nevertheless, the German army in Bulgaria was making preparations for invading the Caucasus.

The Japanese believed that Great Britain did not want to deal harshly with Persia since British troops were not scheduled originally to enter the city of Teheran. However, when the Russian government had declared its intentions to march on Teheran and dispossess the ruler, Great Britain had been placed in a difficult position.

From an American source, Japanese intelligence learned that assistance to Moscow would be included in the Lend-Lease law at some time in the future. In order to ensure British vic-

[1021] III, 753.
[1022] III, 754.
[1023] III, 755.
[1024] III, 756.

[1025] III, 757.
[1026] III, 758.

[211]

tory over Germany, the United States was determined to give Russia the maximum amount of assistance.[1027]

412. Japan Requests Reciprocity in Evacuation Plans

Tokyo was concerned with the safe passage of the Fuso Maru due to arrive in Singapore late in September, 1941 although no agreement had been achieved by September 17, 1941, the Japanese expected the British to accord the Fuso Maru the same privileges which would be granted to the English ship Anhui. The Japanese government planned to extend every convenience to the Anhui, even to supplying it with fuel and water.[1028]

Since the Fuso Maru was preparing to transport Japanese nationals from British territory, Tokyo sent a report to Singapore stating the cost of passage aboard this ship. Japanese officials in Singapore were directed to collect the fares and pay all fuel, customs, and docking expenses.

Questions regarding the remittance of funds by the evacuees and the issuance of departure and exchange permits were to be settled by the British Ambassador and the Japanese Minister of Finance. Furthermore, both Japanese and British customs officials were to begin checking baggage three days before the ship's entry into port in order to reduce any delay in disembarking.[1029]

413. British Request License to Export Glycerin

On September 18, 1941 the British Commercial Attache in Tokyo notified the Chief of the Japanese Trade Bureau that Ambassador Craigie, upon instructions from London, had asked the Governor-General in Singapore to release cotton and machinery which the British had confiscated there, in return for a license to export glycerin from Japanese-held Shanghai. It was not revealed to Ambassador Craigie at this time that officials in Singapore had previously agreed to turn over the material without any conditions and that licenses for the export of glycerin to the British had already been issued at Shanghai.[1030]

Later the same day Tokyo informed Japanese officials in Shanghai that the British Consul-General had been directed to ask them for the license, which Tokyo directed should be issued immediately.[1031]

Tokyo suggested to Singapore that the cotton and machinery, which the British were expected to release in return for this license, be loaded onto the Fuso Maru.[1032]

414. Japanese Face Financial Difficulties in Canada

On September 24, 1941, Mr. Kawasaki in Vancouver sent a plea to Tokyo requesting amelioration of the situation which had resulted in Canada from the British order freezing Japanese funds. Not only had officials been unable to arrange passage home for Japanese subjects residing in Canada but since the sending of money to and from Japan was also curtailed, families in Tokyo dependent upon relatives in Canada, and Japanese students in need of remittance from their home in Japan, were in financial straits.[1033]

415. Tokyo Protests Against Canadian Censorship

Ambassador Yoshizawa in Ottawa, acting under orders from Tokyo, officially protested to the Canadian government against its prohibition of all code and clear text telegrams between

[1027] III, 759.
[1028] III, 760.
[1029] III, 761.

[1030] III, 762.
[1031] III, 762.
[1032] III, 762.
[1033] III, 764.

[212]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

the Canadian and American consulate offices which were not marked "Japanese Consul". Although Mr. Yoshizawa explained the difficulty in transmitting all Japanese messages through the Embassy network, Canadian officials firmly refused to rescind their previous order. In his report to Tokyo on September 24, 1941 the Japanese Ambassador expressed the opinion that Canada was particularly anxious to prevent the exchange of code messages between Vancouver and San Francisco.[1034]

416. British Authorities Delay Loading of Fuso Maru

On September 25, 1941 Tokyo was informed by the Japanese Consul-General in Singapore that the ship Fuso Maru was being delayed in that port by cargo loading problems. Basing their refusal on the fact that the Fuso Maru did not have enough cargo space to load all the cotton and machinery, local authorities in Singapore had withheld the necessary export permit. However, a discussion between the director of the Japanese Commercial Affairs Bureau and the British Commercial Counselor revealed that the delay in issuing this permit had been caused by a previous refusal of the Japanese maritime customs to allow a China soap company in Shanghai to export glycerin.

Attempting to offset further delay in loading the Fuso Maru, the Japanese Consul-General agreed to permit the Chinese firm to export fifty tons of the glycerin contracted for, and at the same time to secure a guarantee regarding the remaining seventy tons. In return, arrangements were to be made whereby the British Consul-General and the British Governor General in Singapore would be informed by their Ambassador in Tokyo that permission to load the Fuso Maru had been granted. Furthermore, a second Japanese ship was to take part of the Maru's cotton cargo.[1035]

Despite these arrangements, on September 27, 1941 the Fuso Maru was still in port. Though Tokyo accused Singapore authorities of scheming to delay the sailing of this vessel,[1036] Foreign Minister Toyoda told Mr. Riyoji in Singapore that there was no objection to delaying the departure of the Fuso Maru, and that all arrangements should be made to have it remain at anchor until the loading schedule was completed. The loading was to continue as planned, but no freight charges were to be paid at Singapore, since this matter would still have to be taken up with the British Embassy. Furthermore, Consul-General Horiuchi in Shanghai was instructed to proceed with issuance of the permit for the export of glycerin desired by the British.[1037]

As a result Foreign Minister Toyoda informed Singapore on September 30, 1941 that Ambassador Craigie in Tokyo had sent a message regarding the cargo of the Fuso Maru directly to the Governor General in that city.[1038] A few days later on October 2, 1941 Tokyo informed Shanghai that it was believed the British Consul-General in Shanghai had sent a telegram to the British Governor-General. Therefore, it was requested that the sailing of the Fuso Maru be further postponed to await the outcome of these latest developments.[1039]

Although the Japanese believed that the British Consul-General in Shanghai must have received Ambassador Craigie's telegram, no answer had been received by them on October 2, 1941. Consequently, finding it impossible to come to any agreement regarding permission for loading cotton and machinery, the Japanese ordered the Fuso Maru to sail. In one last attempt, however, Tokyo ordered its officials in Shanghai to remind the British Consul-General of his request for a glycerin permit.[1040]

[1034] III, 765.
[1035] III, 766.
[1036] III, 767.
[1037] III, 768.
[1038] III, 769.
[1039] III, 770.
[1040] III, 771.

[213]

417. Mr. Horiuchi and British Official Confer on Export Difficulties

On October 3, 1941 Consul Horiuchi, the Japanese representative in Shanghai, meeting with the British Consul-General, learned that the British official, since he had not received an export permit, did not regard the Japanese Consul's note as sufficient guarantee that the export of glycerin would be granted. Consul-General Horiuchi replied that he did not have the authority to interfere directly with the maritime custom's formal issuance of export permits, but, at the same time, he was certain that Japan would not hinder the shipment of 120 tons of glycerin. As proof of this statement, Consul Horiuchi pointed out that permits for 50 tons had already been granted on October 3, 1941 and a permit for 10 tons on the following day.

Although the Japanese believed these agreements had effected a satisfactory solution to the trade problem, England also desired permission for the safe passage of British naval tugs and motor launches bound for both the Suez and Singapore, insisting that this was relative to the original question. Since Shanghai reported on October 4, 1941 that this last request was handled through the Customs Investigation Committee and was just recently given to the British, Mr. Horiuchi accused British authorities of deliberately creating a delay in the negotiations.

Willing to continue attempts at compromise regarding trade, Consul-General Horiuchi in another conference with the British Consul-General insisted that not only would ships carrying glycerin be allowed to leave port safely but that permits for the British tug boats would also be issued. However, he warned that Japan would retaliate if the restrictions obstructing Japanese shipping continued.[1041]

418. Britain Issues Warning to Finland

The Japanese Minister in Helsinki notified Foreign Minister-----on September 30, 1941

that the British government, through the Norwegian Minister in Helsinki, had issued a warning to Finland on September 24, 1941 regarding its war with Russia. Unless Finland agreed to settle its border question with Russia, London would regard Finland as a belligerent and hostile nation.

In an effort to determine Finland's reply to Great Britain's demands, the Japanese Minister in Helsinki called on the Finnish Foreign Minister on September 25, 1941. From the Conversation the Japanese Minister drew the conclusion that Finland would find it impossible to make definite promises to Great Britain's demands. The Japanese Minister in Helsinki questioned the Finnish Foreign Minister on the reasons surrounding Britain's presentation of its demands to Finland through the Norwegian Minister instead of through the American Minister. The Finnish Foreign Minister could not answer this question. However, he offered the theory that the United States might possibly have refused to submit Britain's demands to Finland.[1042]

419. Britain Prohibits Code Telegrams in Iran

By September 30, 1941, Mr. Ichikawa in Teheran reported to Tokyo that British domination of Iran was so complete that they were able to carry out an order prohibiting the sending and receiving of code telegrams. Apparently this edict included the French Legation as well as the German Legation.[1043]

420. Japan Threatens to Rescind Glycerin Permit

After receiving Mr. Horiuchi's version of his conference with the British Consul-General in Shanghai, Tokyo wired Shanghai on October 6, 1941 asking why the British official had not then already wired the English Governor General in Singapore and Ambassador Craigie in Tokyo

[1041] III, 772.
[1042] III, 773.
[1043] III, 774.

[214]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

admitting that Japan had issued export permits for the glycerin. Tokyo made it clear in this message that though permits for the two shipments of fifty and seventy tons of glycerin had been granted, actually neither of these shipments would be exported until Japan received guarantees from the British that the raw cotton and machinery could be loaded.[1044]

421. Shanghai Suggests Retaliation Against British

Apparently British and Japanese representatives had reached a satisfactory understanding in Tokyo regarding these differences. Yet Shanghai officials reported on October 6, 1941 that they had been unable to put such an agreement into effect because of the attitude of the British Consul-General. Therefore it was believed that appropriate counter-measures should be taken by the Japanese.

While cutting off all future export permits to the British would undoubtedly be effective, Shanghai realized that it would also result in a complete rupture of business relations between the two countries. As an alternate measure then, Japanese officials suggested that demands be made of the British Consul-General in Shanghai, for a guarantee that no obstacles would further delay the loading of cotton aboard Japanese ships at Singapore.[1045]

The following day October 7, 1941 Shanghai passed on to Singapore the information that the British Consul-General had apparently sent the necessary requisite telegram. But, since nothing more had come of it, the British having as yet failed to release the goods confiscated in Singapore, Shanghai suggested that Japan should, in retaliation, revoke the glycerin export permit issued by the customs inspector, or, if necessary call on the Japanese navy or gendarmerie to stop actual exportation of the glycerin. Nevertheless Mr. Horiuchi hesitated to take these steps since at the conference on October 4, 1941 he had definitely assured the British Consul-General no obstacles would be placed in the way of the export of glycerin.[1046]

In consideration of these circumstances Tokyo agreed on October 8, 1941 that, instead of forbidding the glycerin export, the British Consul-General in Shanghai should wire both the Singapore Governor-General and Ambassador Craigie that Japan was permitting the shipment of 50 and 70 tons of glycerin respectively. In return Britain was expected to accord certain facilities to the Japanese ships taking the cargo of raw cotton and machinery aboard.[1047]

When Shanghai officials inquired about the telegrams on October 9, 1941, the British Consul General stated that they had been sent on October 6, 1941 to Ambassador Craigie and the Singapore Governor-General. But since Mr. Horiuchi wished to transmit them, the British official promised to turn over the text of the telegram to the Japanese Consul-General.[1048]

On October 13, 1941 Tokyo requested the complete text of the British Consul-General's official communication to Ambassador Craigie and to the British official in Singapore.[1049]

422. Churchill Reports on British Position in Russo-German War

On October 2, 1941, the Japanese Ambassador in London informed the Embassy in Washington of Churchill's report made before Parliament on September 30, 1941 concerning the British part in the Russo-German war. Since the outbreak of war between Germany and Russia, Prime Minister Churchill warned, there had been an increased feeling of optimism on the part of the British government and people. However, while Germany's preoccupation with Russia was allowing Great Britain time to deliberate upon its own situation and build up its own resistance, Prime Minister Churchill stated, Great Britain must not relax its war efforts.

[1044] III, 775.
[1045] III, 776.
[1046] III, 777.

[1047] III, 778.
[1048] III, 779.
[1049] III, 780.

[215]

Russian resistance to German forces had been greater than at first expected. Even though Leningrad might possibly fall, there was the hope that Moscow and the Caucasus would hold out through the winter and that Germany's occupation of the Ukraine could be stopped.

With Germany's attention drawn to its eastern flank, shipping on the Atlantic during the past three months had become safer. Therefore, aid from the United States was able to reach Great Britain. Furthermore, Britain's coastal defenses and the disposition of its home troops had been improved to such an extent that even though Germany might start additional invasion attempts, the British government was confident that they could be repelled.[1050]

However, the British authorities claimed that Germany, once it had defeated Soviet Russia, would not be interested in the invasion of the British Isles but instead would continue moving toward the Near East. For this reason Great Britain desired to enlist the aid of Turkey and to consolidate its position in Syria, Iraq and Iran. Not wishing to put too much economic pressure on Turkey, the British Isles had resorted to dispatching divisions of troops to that territory amounting to approximately 750,000 men. In this way Great Britain evidently hoped to impress Turkey with the number of troops it would be able to maintain behind the line of battle.

In preparation for a possible engagement with the German forces in this area, General Wavell had made a recent trip to London besides holding conferences in Baghdad and Teheran. The preparations for a defensive warfare in that area were carried to such an extent that General Wavell was lining up British forces from the Far East and India for joint British-Soviet action in the Caucasus area and possibly within the borders of Russia itself.[1051]

In order to carry on this concerted warfare against Germany, however, Russia required continued aid from Great Britain. Because of the number of German troops and planes lost in the war with Russia Prime Minister Churchill believed that Great Britain was now on an equal footing with its enemy. In comparison with 1940, particularly the period following the evacuation of Dunkirk, Great Britain now possessed eighty divisions of armed forces of which thirty-seven were armored divisions. Recently Great Britain had even been able to carry on daily and nightly bombing attacks over Germany. Great Britain expressed great admiration for the occupied countries of Europe and put strong confidence in their ability to aid England in bringing about ultimate victory.

Japanese intelligence sources reported that Churchill's dynamic political leadership was holding the British government together and enabling it to carry on a unified projection of the war against Germany. With regard to the British attitude toward Japan, it could be seen both from newspaper accounts and general public opinion that Great Britain was dissatisfied with the trend of the present Japanese-American conversations and had little hope for reaching any rapprochement with the Japanese government. Although the British government had been making some attempts to turn the tide of anti-Japanese feeling in order to watch for the outcome of the Japanese-American conversations, it refused to negotiate with Japan even on minor points of the freezing legislation. In fact, England refused to take any direct steps toward improving relations with Japan.[1052]

423. Premier Gailani in Political Exile in Iraq

On October 6, 1941 Rome received the information that former Premier Gailani had been held in political exile in Iraq since the last part of July. Since the Turkish government had assured him that it would overlook his leaving the country, Premier Gailani hoped to return to Rome by way of Baghdad with the assistance of the German government.

In reporting on the conditions in Iraq, Premier Gailani stated that the country's political stability would be very hard to maintain in the future. The politicians who would eventually

[1050] III, 781.
[1051] III, 782.
[1052] III, 783.

[216]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

return to Iraq through Germany's assistance would not be in an enviable position, Premier Gailani stated.

In commenting on the British strength in the Near East, Premier Gailani insisted that in spite of the gross exaggeration of the British propagandists of the forces in Syria, Iraq and Iran, there were not more than a total of fourteen divisions in these countries. Furthermore, Premier Gailani did not believe that General Wavell's forces were in any position to defend the Caucasus.[1053]

424. Japan Navy Uses Chungking Currency for Secret Purchase

In the meantime, while settlements of trade negotiations were pending, Japan continued to obtain necessary materials by various devices. A dispatch from Tokyo to Shanghai on October 9, 1941 revealed the Japanese navy making purchases secretly by using Chungking currency. In order to prevent any disclosure of this activity Tokyo warned that complete contact be maintained with the Foreign Office. Any sudden fluctuations in market prices as a result of these purchases were to be avoided so that investigations would not occur.[1054]

425. British and Japanese Authorities Disagree on Shanghai Customs Officials

At the same time that negotiations were underway to remove export differences in Shanghai, the friction between the British and Japanese officials here was increased by a dispute over the appointment of customs officials in Shanghai. In September, 1941, Mr. Hirokichi Kishimoto, the chief secretary of the Inspector General of Chinese Maritime Customs in Shanghai, had informed Sir Frederick W. Maze, the British Inspector-General of Shanghai customs, that certain changes would have to be effected regarding trade conditions, before Japan would pay its customs expenses dating back as far as June 1941.

During the discussions held for the purpose of settling British-Japanese customs problems, Tokyo proposed against United States opposition that a Japanese official be appointed to head the customs in Shanghai. Then, in a visit with Mr. Horiuchi, Sir Frederick W. Maze suggested that someone from a neutral country officiate over the customs, at least for the time being. The Japanese official refused to agree to such a proposition but then urged that Sir Maze take the responsibility of deciding the matter himself.[1055]

From a dispatch to Tsingtao, on October 14, 1941, it appeared that a suggestion had been offered whereby Japanese customs inspectors would send in reports on the character and standing of the present customs officials. But, Nanking doubted the wisdom of such a move, fearing that it might lead to chaos in the southern China customs. However if the existing policy, under which both the Peoples' Government and the Japanese army sent reports concerning the effectiveness of customs measures to Shanghai, proved unsuccessful, it seemed evident that the Japanese would take over complete control of the Shanghai customs.[1056]

By October 15, 1941, Mr. Horiuchi appeared hopeful that the protests already submitted by the American Ambassador in Tokyo would be retracted because of the present Japanese-American negotiations. It was felt, therefore, that this was the opportune moment to press Japan's demands in Shanghai. In so doing Japanese officials were to emphasize that Japan was anxious to comply with the needs of the present situation with regard to the Chinese customs in Shanghai, and to remove any causes for the friction which had been evident in the past.[1057]

[1053] III, 784-785.
[1054] III, 786.
[1055] III, 787.
[1056] III, 788.
[1057] III, 789.

[217]

426. Japan Attempts to Adjust Its Currency

As equally important as the curtailing of Japanese trade and commerce was the effect of the British freezing order on Japanese currency. Since Japanese assets abroad were frozen, a permit was even required to import a one yen bill into Japan. Therefore Japanese subjects being evacuated from Singapore were ordered by Tokyo, in late September, 1941, to change all their funds into remittance drafts. Meanwhile, the Finance Minister was checking every possible means of getting currency through into Japan.[1058]

With regard to trade, Singapore was also notified in October, 1941 that in those transactions concerning the liquidation of accounts between Japan and Great Britain exchange drafts were to be substituted for yen notes.[1059]

Application had been made by Singapore for current expenditures,[1060] with the result that on October 8, 1941 Foreign Minister Toyoda in a secret dispatch announced that approximately 600,000 yen would be sent from Tokyo, exclusive of travel expenses.[1061] Furthermore, it was intimated that Singapore was, by its own methods, securing secret funds with the approval of the Japanese government.[1062]

427. Japan Curtails Allied Propaganda

While Great Britain was imposing restrictive measures on Japan, Tokyo, in turn, was effecting certain methods of retaliation. Although apparently rendering equal treatment to all belligerent countries, Tokyo revealed in a message to London on October 4, 1941 that its Bureau of Information gave only the Axis powers ample facilities for the dissemination of propaganda.[1063]

428. Japanese Official to be Recalled from Singapore

Moreover in view of the situation existing in Singapore, Tokyo was withholding the official recall of a Japanese official in that city. But he expected to return to Tokyo sometime after October 9, 1941.[1064]

429. Japan Fears British Strength in Far East

By comparing the situation existing on October 13, 1941 with that of February 1941 Tokyo in a message to Hsingking revealed certain outstanding changes in Far Eastern conditions.[1065] First of all because the British government had come to regard Japan as an enemy nation, increasing economic pressure had been applied, with the result that Japanese interests in mining and other business enterprises had been practically destroyed. More recently the freezing order issued by the United States subsequent to Japan's occupation of French Indo-China had halted southward expansion.[1066]

As economic measures weakened Japanese strength, Great Britain seized every opportunity to build up its own economic and military holds on the East. Singapore by October 9, 1941 had already given Tokyo a full report of the activities there. During the last part of November, 1941, Sir Robert Brooke-Popham had become Commander-in-chief of the army, navy and air forces east of India. Later as the German-Soviet war and United States aid created a more favorable situation in Europe for the allies, England set up a defense base in the East using

[1058] III, 790.
[1059] III, 791.
[1060] III, 792.
[1061] III, 793.
[1062] III, 792.

[1063] III, 794.
[1064] III, 795.
[1065] III, 796.
[1066] Ibid.

[218]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

Singapore as the focal point. Australian troops and modern airplanes were being sent. Branches of the Ministry of Economic War and Propaganda were established in Singapore, while health corps and transportation groups were organized from the British resident in the city, to serve behind the lines in the event of war. Yet, though British defense measures appeared to be approaching fulfillment, the available sea power in that area was still inadequate and provided the British with a source of constant concern.[1067]

However, with the arrival of Sir Alfred Duff-Cooper in October 1941 it was expected that the British defense organization would coordinate its activities.[1068] Since he was accompanied by a large staff, including Colonel Edmund Leo Hall-Patch, Sir David John Montague Douglas, Scott, Chambers, and Lieutenant Commander Neville, the British official's mission seemed to be associated with the administration of foreign affairs in the Far East. In a conference with United States and British officials including Major General Francis Stewart Gilderoy Piggott, British Military Attache in Tokyo, and Mr. Becker, a lawyer, the effectiveness of allied propaganda upon the Japanese and the Nanking governments was to be discussed with the aim of divorcing Japan from the Axis powers.[1069]

430. Japan Exchanges Merchandise with Spain

Toward the end of October as the need for maintaining the proper balance of trade became acute, Japan extended the rise of barter in its transactions, to Spain and Portugal. On October 15, 1941 Tokyo informed London that arrangement had been made for using the Asama Maru in the barter exchange of Japanese merchandise for Spanish quicksilver. Although the business transactions with both Spain and Portugal were concluded primarily between the Mitsui Trading Company and the Spanish Department of Commerce, since they concerned neutral countries within the British sphere of influence, the plans dealing with the transportation of this cargo by the Asama Maru were communicated to the British Ambassador Craigie in Tokyo.[1070]

431. Tokyo Arranges Disposal of Japanese Bonds

Next, in order to dispose of those Japanese bonds backed by foreign money and owned by Japanese residents in England, the Japanese Finance Ministry ordered that a list be drawn up and approved to facilitate either the redeeming or cancellation of those bonds. To deal with those bonds which were not disposed of in this manner Tokyo ordered its Embassy in England on October 16, 1941 to have the London Branch of the Yokohama Specie Bank cancel them. For the cancellation of other bonds in the future, Tokyo further suggested that a list be drawn up regarding the bonds on hand, that it be checked, and finally that one copy be submitted to the Finance Ministry in Japan.[1071]

[1067] Ibid.
[1068] III, 797.
[1069] Ibid.
[1070] III, 798.
[1071] III, 799.

[219] [220 blank]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

PART C—JAPANESE DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITIES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD

(g) Japanese-German Relations

432. Hitler Stops German-Vichy Conversations

In a wire to Ambassador Oshima dated August 6, 1941 Foreign Minister Toyoda attempted to clarify rumors resulting from statements made by Ambassador Fernand de Brinon in Paris the previous day. The Foreign Minister relayed remarks accredited to Ambassador Brinon by the Spanish ambassador to Japan who had had confidential conversations with Mr. Brinon.

Germany, in exchange for granting Tripoli to France, had demanded the leasing of the Bizerte harbor, according to the reported remarks of the French Ambassador. France refused to grant them. In conversations between Chancellor Adolf Hitler and Vice-Premier Jean Francois Darlan conducted at Berchtesgaden as a prelude to a separate German-French peace, Hitler had shown disappointment and had ordered Ambassador Otto Heinrich Abetz in Paris to discontinue conversations with the Vichy government.[1072]

A meeting between Hitler and Vice-Premier Darlan had occurred on May 11, 1941, at which time Hitler declared that the time had come for France and Germany to draw more closely together. As a token of his good will, the Fuehrer offered, in exchange for certain concessions, the repatriation of 100,000 French war prisoners, officers and non-coms, who had also served in World War I.

In deference to French military pride, Hitler offered Darlan the right to organize a skeleton air force; in deference to prostrate French finances, he agreed to review the arrangement whereby Vichy paid $8,000,000 a day for the upkeep of the army of occupation. In practice, Hitler did send home the veteran prisoners; a few French army planes were reconditioned and placed in service, but the sum extracted for the army in France remained unchanged. For his part Hitler demanded access to military supplies in the colonies, assistance to Nazi bases, and employment of the fleet by the French for convoying food ships and other patrol duties. The last condition was, of course, designed to bring the French Fleet into conflict with the British. The Nazi demands, it will be seen, corresponded closely to, and exceeded somewhat, those accepted by Pierre Laval at Montoire. Should the Vichy government refuse these reasonable terms, Vice-Premier Darlan was warned, Hitler could not answer for the consequences.[1073]

433. Foreign Minister Toyoda Reviews Japan's Policies

After a conference with the military leaders of Japan, Foreign Minister Teijiro Toyoda on July 31, 1941 dispatched the Imperial government's policy regarding the Russo-German war to the Japanese Ambassadors in Berlin, Rome, and Washington. The broad outlines of Japan's future policy were decided in a Cabinet meeting on July 2, the Foreign Minister wired, and every effort was now being expended to bring about its materialization.[1074]

Despite the fact that German diplomatic officials in Tokyo understood Japan's position, the Nazi government had not been sufficiently informed, Foreign Minister Toyoda continued. After having devoted the greater part of its energies for four years to bring a conclusion to the China incident, Japan found itself with large forces still fighting on the China mainland and new difficulties arising in the north and south. Commercial and economic relations between Japan and third countries, led by the United States and England, had become so strained that Japan was forced to secure the raw materials from the South Seas. This situation had resulted

[1072] III, 800.
[1073] "How War Came," by Forrest Davis and Earnst K. Lindley, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1942; pp. 222-223.
[1074] III, 801.

[221]

in the decision to obtain military bases in French Indo-China. Meanwhile the Russo-German war offered an opportunity to settle the northern question after preparations had been completed.

The Foreign Minister pointed out that Japanese advances to the south obviously had given England, Russia, and the United States a set-back in the Pacific, thus helping Germany.

German annoyance at Japan's negotiations with the United States was realized in the Home Office; however, two of the primary objectives of Japan were to prevent the United States from entering the war "at any cost" and to settle the Chinese incident. Having assumed that there was complete trust between Germany and Japan, Foreign Minister Toyoda said that the discussions with the United States were begun at a time which seemed opportune to Japan. He referred to the fact that Germany initiated the war with the Soviet Union at an undesirable moment for Japan.

Pointing to the promulgation of an Imperial rescript as proof of Japan's determination to effect the success of the objectives of the Tripartite Pact, Foreign Minister Toyoda reiterated that each country must have a certain flexibility in its conduct if these aims were to be accomplished. He explained that real cooperation did not necessarily mean complete symmetry of action but rather a trust in each other, thereby enabling both Japan and Germany to strive toward the common goal, each using its own discretion within the bounds of good judgment.[1075]

434. Ambassador Oshima Correlates German-Russian Battle Reports

Rumors that the German army was not succeeding in its drive against Russia prompted Ambassador Hiroshi Oshima on August 6, 1941 to correlate public statements from both belligerents in an attempt to clarify the situation. From these reports he surmised that Russian forces had been irreparably damaged with casualties mounting to 3,500,000. Transfers of troops from Siberia and other sections of the U.S.S.R. to revitalize the Red Army were deemed ineffective.

Only Russia's southern Ukrainian forces retained any degree of striking power, according to Ambassador Oshima; Germany was now attacking in this sector as well as cleaning up the area south of Kiev. He commended the excellent strategy of the German army in cautiously encircling the stubborn Soviet troops with minimum losses.[1076]

435. The Foreign Minister Explains That Communication Difficulties Impede the Expression of Tokyo's War Aims

Recently-appointed Foreign Minister Admiral Teijiro Toyoda replied on August 7, 1941 to Ambassador Oshima's request for clarification of Japanese policy particularly in regard to the Russo-German conflict.[1077] He pointed out that the Foreign Office in Tokyo was experiencing unusual communications difficulties in disseminating European and American intelligence. Therefore, the Home Office was finding it increasingly burdensome to keep its field units informed of the national policy at all times.

The Foreign Minister attempted to convey the beliefs of his office regarding future German plans. He acknowledged the possibilities of a German invasion of England and recognized the fact that, although the Axis seemed bent on an early termination of the war, Germany was preparing for a prolonged conflict. In the light of current British defense preparations and morale, the eventuality of a long war seemed probable.

Concerning the Russo-German war, the Japanese Foreign Office expressed the belief that the Russian people were convinced that Germany was waging a racial war against them. In view of the Russians' deep rooted communistic conviction and traditional affinity for the soil, they

[1075] III, 802-804.
[1076] III, 805.

[1077] II, 600.

[222]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

would meet the invading armies with unyielding resistance. Japan could not overlook the difficulties of administering such territories when conquered, territories vast in their geography, intense and severe in their climate, and poorly supplied with transportation facilities.

In addition, with the German army progressing at its present slow pace, Tokyo also realized that Commissar Joseph Stalin would be able to retreat to the Ural Mountains, thereby temporarily frustrating the German plan to bring chaos to the Red Regime. Therefore, according to Tokyo, unless the German army were to exhibit a more "blitzlike" advance, the Stalin power would continue to be a dominating influence in the Far East and a menace to Japan.[1078]

436. Ambassador Oshima Again Urges Active Support of Tripartite Pact

Ambassador Oshima on August 9, 1941 directed a dispatch to the Foreign Minister, reiterating his former pleas for active support for the Tripartite Pact. He explained that despite Tokyo's numerous statements advising Germany that the Japanese were conducting their policies in accord with the aims and spirit of the Pact, unless the plans, by which this support was to materialize were forcefully executed in the near future, Japan might give an impression of disinterest. The full fruits of cooperation would not be garnered through individual efforts. Stressing that it was not his intention that Japan should court Germany and Italy, he continued that they should cooperate with a view toward future benefits for the Empire.[1079] Ambassador Oshima explained that Hitler had already offered his support to Japan should a clash occur between that country and the United States.[1080]

437. Ambassador Oshima Reveals German Organization for the Occupation of Russia

On the same day Ambassador Oshima acknowledged that Germany had not devised a course of action beyond the annihilation of the Russian field forces. Germany, however, had set up a governing organization under the head of Dr. Alfred Rosenburg to administer the conquered territories. The proposed policy of destroying Communism at its source coincided unalterably with the intention of the Japanese government, Ambassador Oshima pointed out; and it was only fair, in fact essential, that Japan now cooperate closely and unconditionally with the Axis to insure harmony in the future. As soon as the Japanese Empire had determined its aims and policies, Ambassador Oshima suggested that Japan and Germany negotiate for the settlement of jurisdictional disputes which might arise upon the partitioning of Russian territory.[1081] Ambassador Oshima had previously revealed that Germany planned to take direct control of affairs in conquered Russia for a ten-year period after the occupation, occupying all the area up to the Ural Mountains. Dr. Rosenberg, German-appointed Minister of State for the occupied territory, would establish his office in Moscow.

According to Germany's postwar plan the three Baltic countries and a part of White Russia were to be united to form a Baltic district, and an enlarged Ukraine and the Caucasus would form two other political areas. Finland would receive the Kola peninsula and the Karelian area, while Rumania would recover Bessarabia and Bukovina. Hungary would receive a small area in exchange for the cession of a portion to Slovakia. No change in the former German policy toward Poland was expected.[1082]

438. Rumors of Japanese Representations to U.S.S.R. Reach Germany

A few days later the German Minister at Hsinking was reportedly under the impression that Japan had made representations to the Soviet Union. Although it appeared that Japanese

[1078] III, 806.
[1079] III, 807.
[1080] III, 808.
[1081] III, 809.
[1082] III, 810.

[223]

Home Affairs Department had revealed such information to the Nichi-Nichi main office, but had killed the story immediately, the German official still had had time to intercept it.

439. Ambassador Oshima's Resignation Is Refused

Despite Ambassador Oshima's persistent requests to return to Japan, the Home Office insisted that he remain in Berlin. In a secret dispatch on August 12, 1941 Foreign Minister Toyoda re-emphasized the fact that although the Ambassador's point of view was understood, his presence in Berlin remained a necessity.[1084]

440. The German Army Progresses Against Russia

Ambassador Heinrich D. Stahmer informed the Japanese Ambassador that the German army by August 14 had completely encircled Leningrad and had occupied the northeast area. In the south, Odessa had been invested. The Dnepropetrovsk power plant, largest in Soviet Russia, was to be the next objective of the advancing forces. Ambassador Stahmer divulged the encouraging information to Ambassador Oshima that German losses in the six weeks of war had been unbelievably small with a total dead of only 30,000. Since the Japanese Ambassador had recently concluded a tour of the battlefield, he was convinced that these figures were reasonably accurate.

Russian and British air attacks on Berlin, Ambassador Stahmer declared, were attempting to prove that Germany did not have aerial supremacy. This was only a political move, unrelated to actual conditions. He cautioned Japan to be wary of Russian-British propaganda.[1085]

441. Germany Advises Evacuation of Consular Officials From Occupied Territories

On instruction from the German government all Consular officials in the occupied areas of France, Belgium, Holland, Luxemburg, and Norway were to close their offices by September 1, 1941 and to evacuate the areas. Ambassador Oshima notified the Home Office on August 12 that Minister Paul Schmidt, German Chief of Protocol, had confided to him that this order was not to be applied to Japan.[1086]

On August 16, 1941 Ambassador Oshima reported to Tokyo that he had recently dispatched Consul Shigero Imai to Brussels to bring the Imperial portraits, then in possession of the Antwerp Consulate, to the Berlin office.[1087]

Further arrangements were made on August 23, 1941 for the evacuation of Japanese officials from occupied areas.[1088]

That Japan had instigated a license system applying to foreigners leaving that country was wired to Ambassador Oshima. He was instructed to determine the extent of such restrictions in Germany and other countries to which he was accredited. Since Japan's license system would not effect members of Foreign Embassies, Ministries, Consulates and their families unless such a system were manifested against Japan in other countries, the Ambassador was directed to discover the extent and application of the restrictions.[1089]

442. Manchukuoan-German Trade Retarded by War

As the Russo-German war progressed, increased restrictions upon Japanese-German trade were being felt, but it was difficult for Japanese officials to explain the seriousness of the situation to their Axis partners. One instance of restricted trade to Germany was the forced discontinuance of the Manchukuoan supply of soy beans. It was feared that the mere excuse of a Russo-

[1084] III, 812.
[1085] III, 813.
[1086] III, 814.
[1087] III, 815.

[1088] III, 816.
[1089] III, 817.

[224]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

German war would seem a feeble pretext to German authorities considering the fact that Germany would probably counter with the argument that Manchukuo need not be concerned with the problem of overland transportation. By August 12, 1941 Japanese spokesman had agreed that they should attempt to convince Germany that since Japan was adopting emergency measures in the North in order to assist Germany, and since there was a limited supply of soy beans for domestic consumption in Manchukuo already, it would be impossible to live up to the May agreement in regard to shipments to Germany.[1090]

By October 8, 1941 considerable Manchurian merchandise amounting to $215,000 which was en route to Germany through Russia had been confiscated. Since Germany would probably never receive the shipments and could not be expected to pay for them, Japan found itself in the position of settling the deal with Manchuria. In an attempt to avoid paying the retail price for the shipments which it had transhipped to Germany, Japan consulted with Ambassador Oshima and Minister Umetsu.[1091]

443. Japan Learns of German Undercover Activities in China

On the other hand, German progress in China did not seem to be suffering since, with the freezing of assets in Tientsin, German firms were reported to be secretly purchasing United States and British real estate. This was distressing Japanese authorities, and it was advised that Japan seek the German government's cooperation either through the German Ambassador or through Dr. Helmut Wohlthat.[1092] Thus, Consul Makoto Okuma on August 18, 1941,[1093] inquired of German authorities regarding the rumored encroachment on Japanese rights in the Tientsin area. In response, German spokesmen declared that they had been giving ample support to Japan's policy of freezing British and American assets. Stating that they had no specific knowledge of any German-Allied dealings, they agreed that should the Japanese submit concrete evidence, such practice would be dealt with properly. In the instance of the German firm of Meruchaasu which was under suspicion, it was revealed that they had already issued a warning.

When Consul Okuma inquired about German-Jewish activities he was reassured that not one of the German firms in this area was Jewish, even though the Jews in that area were socially respected.[1094]

444. Japan Cultivates the Interest of the German People

Despite these somewhat strained relations between merchants in China, the general attitude toward Japan in Germany gradually became one of increasing interest. According to Ambassador Oshima the sudden surge of interest in Japan was giving rise to a demand for materials in the form of German language publications propagandizing Japan. He reported that distribution of effective information concerning Japan was being disseminated through libraries, universities, publishers, government offices, and through the party and picked individuals. The material was nonetheless proving insufficient, and he urged the publication of new and supplementary volumes. Currently popular editions were Nippon, Contemporary Japan, The East Asia Economic and the Japan Trade Monthly.[1095]

445. Ambassador Oshima Admonishes Tokyo for Lack of Decisive Attitude

Ambassador Oshima was becoming increasingly aroused that no definite instructions in regard to Japan's policy in the Russo-German conflict had been forthcoming from Tokyo. On

[1090] III, 818.
[1091] III, 819.
[1092] III, 820.
[1093] III, 821.
[1094] Ibid.
[1096] III, 822.

[225]

August 20, 1941 he transmitted a caustic reminder that no word except an account of Foreign Minister Toyoda's conferences with Ambassadors Constantin Smetanin and Eugene Ott on July 9 had been forthcoming and that it was impossible to know the real intention of the Home Office merely on the basis of such conversations. He also took this opportunity to request immediate information on Japanese-American relations, revealing that the government had become quite perturbed over the existing circumstances.[1096]

In a severe rebuke for the government's failure to inform its field representatives of the current situation, Ambassador Oshima telegraphed that he could not conclude that Foreign Minister Toyoda either feared that secrecy would not be maintained or that the government had not as yet decided upon a definite policy. Should Tokyo be withholding information for security reasons, Ambassador Oshima declared that every Japanese representative at the risk of his life would maintain secrecy. Should the second reason prevail, Ambassador Oshima urged that, regardless of the inconclusiveness of the information, he be told even what Mr. Toyoda himself was considering.[1097]

446. Ambassador Oshima Objects to Japan's Use of Russian News Releases

Ambassador Oshima also complained bitterly of Japan's objective broadcasts of Russo-German frontline activities, stating that Tokyo, on two occasions, August 9 and 10, 1941, had broadcast Tass reports to the effect that Russian planes had raided Berlin on August 7 and 8. Ambassador Oshima pointed out that actually only an air raid alarm had been sounded and that no great damage, such as was reported, had been inflicted.

Stressing the fact that Japan would certainly be equally outraged should Germany deign to broadcast as facts the Chungking government reports, he suggested that Japan attempt to control future broadcasts. He further pointed out that since the German Foreign Office was constructing a large receiving station by which it would be able to listen minutely to broadcasts from the whole world, it would now be most important that Japan exercise caution in her transmissions.[1098]

The Ambassador continued to emphasize the ill will and confused feelings which such a policy of broadcasting would invoke throughout the Empire. This kind of reporting not only would cause misunderstanding among German officials and among Japanese living outside of Berlin, but there was a danger that it would injure the veracity of Japanese overseas broadcasts. Therefore, he urged that the Foreign Office consult with the broadcasting department and take suitable steps regarding the regulating of broadcasting reports originating in Russia.[1099]

447. Foreign Minister Toyoda Upholds Japan's Methods

In rebuke, on August 22, 1941, Foreign Minister Toyoda reminded Mr. Oshima that the Japanese government had been following a policy of handling worldwide broadcasts objectively and impartially in the hope of fostering confidence. He stressed the point that from the very fact that German broadcasts had been so severely regulated, their China and South Seas propaganda power had become worthless.

He also countered that such examples as the Ambassador had pointed out were extremely rare and challenged him to listen over a period of several days to verify this. Substantiating evidence for the report of a Russian raid on Berlin had been garnered from Domei dispatches and had originated in London and Vichy, the Foreign Minister revealed. Again he emphasized

[1096] III, 823.
[1097] III, 824.
[1098] III, 825.
[1099] III, 826.

[226]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

the fact that the Japanese broadcasting companies, working in unison with all government branches, were completely supporting their Foreign Office policy of upholding the Tripartite agreement.[1100]

448. Ambassador Oshima Confers with Field Marshal Keitel

By August 25, 1941, according to Ambassador Oshima who had been gathering battle reports from various sources[1101] including the German Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel, with whom he talked on August 23 at General Headquarters,[1102] German strategy was meeting with unprecedented success. In a lengthy six part dispatch transmitted on August 25, 1941, Ambassador Oshima attempted to convey to his Home Office the current trend of Russo-German hostilities, as related to him by the Field Marshal. Accordingly, he revealed that Russian casualties were estimated to be about five million, with a definitely known total of 1,250,000 prisoners and twice that many dead. Only the equivalent of about 60 divisions of the 260 which had appeared on battlefields remained, and these seemed to be haphazardly slapped together, resulting in low military efficiency. It had been estimated that the armed strength of the Soviet Union had fallen to one third of its original strength. The shortage of equipment and officer material was apparent. In some cases sergeants commanded battalions and in others a lieutenant would be in charge of a regiment.

Judging from the population it would be possible to organize about 20 more divisions, but in so doing they would practically exhaust the source of supply. Female battalions had already made an appearance. Although the Russian forces were still rich in manpower, they no longer were equipped or trained to fight with any degree of efficiency.[1103]

On the other hand, in regard to German losses, the Field Marshal stated that casualties were less than 160,000, the dead to date reaching 40,000. War reports from the southern front showed Odessa completely encircled while Dnepropetrovsk, located in a field warfare area and very strongly fortified, was being subjected to artillery fire before German forces would make any direct in-fighting attempt.

It was pointed out that in order to avoid the damage resulting from suburban warfare, Kiev was being subjected to destruction by artillery fire, to be followed up by infantry attacks.

Sudden and rapid developments in the Ukraine sector had enabled the German army to annihilate the greater part of Marshal Semyon Mikhailovich Budenny's forces, Field Marshal Keitel revealed. Because of the speed with which this advance had been conducted, all grains and other goods were left intact. From this point the German forces were scheduled to push on across the Dnieper River to Harikohu and Donbasu.[1104]

Along the northern front the Leningrad-Moscow railroad had already been cut at Chudovo and the German army had laid siege to the outlying districts of Leningrad from which is was reported that Marshall Kliment Voroshilov had fled. In Estonia, Revel remained the only unconquered area. Here again the German forces were avoiding rushing tactics and were concentrating on heavy artillery fire, the Field Marshal explained. The Finnish forces in cooperation with the Germans had advanced to the area between Lake Ladoga and Lake Onega. For the purpose of seizing the Murmansk area, General Eduard Dietl, famed for his defense of Narvik, was reportedly arriving from Norway with his forces via the sea.[1105]

German divisions on the central front had been diverted to both the southern and northern theaters, the latter group reaching a point southeast of Leningrad, and joining forces with the troops in that area.

[1100] III, 827.
[1101] III, 828.
[1102] III, 829.
[1103] III, 830.

[1104] III, 831. (The Kana word Harikohu is believed by United States translators to be Kharkov; and the Kana word Donbasu, to be Rostov.)
[1105] Ibid.

[227]

449. Field Marshal Keitel Explains German's War Aims

Explaining the aims of the German forces, Field Marshal Keitel told Ambassador Oshima that they were preparing to launch the second phase of the war soon. The goal of this phase included the capture of the entire region from Rostov to Moscow and the industrial area around Leningrad. These campaigns should be concluded by early November at which time the Russian field forces would have been destroyed. The Caucasus area was to be seized, but this action might not be initiated until December. No prediction about forces to be sent to the Urals could be made until the completion of the second phase. The Field Marshal blamed any delays on weather conditions and the stubborn resistance of the Russian masses.[1106]

450. Nationalist Chinese in Germany Present a Problem to the Axis

On September 2, 1941, Ambassador Oshima reported that a problem had arisen in connection with Chinese Nationalists in Berlin. Although Li Sheng-Wei had been appointed as Nanking Ambassador to Germany, he was experiencing transportation difficulties and would not be on hand to control the situation in Germany for some time. As a means of meeting the existing emergency Ambassador Oshima suggested that Nanking appoint an honorary consul in Berlin, which appointment would be approved by Tokyo, to deal with these "depraved anti-Japanese rascals".

Ambassador Oshima declared that the plan to establish an honorary consul had been thoroughly approved by the German government. If Nanking wished, Berlin had offered to select several "New Order" advocates to collaborate with Nanking representatives for the improvement of Japanese-Chinese-German relations. Ambassador Oshima requested the Foreign Minister's approval.[1107]

451. Japanese-German Trade Continues Despite Difficulties of War

Japan and Germany continued to rely upon each other for transportation facilities as, according to a September 1 dispatch, German and Italian Ambassadors in Tokyo requested that Japanese ships be made available for transporting Axis documents from Tokyo to South America. Japan had been in agreement provided that Italian airplanes flying between Italy and Rio de Janeiro and Santiago be made available for the transportation of Japanese documents which were secret or confidential in nature.[1108]

Tokyo wired that Ambassador Oshima urge the German Ministry of Finance in Berlin to approve Japan's request to draw from German peso funds in Argentina the equivalent of 7,000,000 yen to apply against Japanese purchases of cowhide. As compensation, Foreign Minister Toyoda explained, Japan was offering petroleum and other goods as well as foreign money. Although the details of the negotiations had been communicated to the German government via its representatives in Tokyo, by September 2, 1941, no action had been forthcoming and two of Japan's ships were already in South American waters prepared to load the cargo.[1109]

In the meantime, the Japanese embassy in Berlin was experiencing difficulties in distinguishing between official and civilian, urgent and non-urgent goods. Twenty-seven thousand tons of freight which was destined for Japan had accumulated, and although instructions from Tokyo stipulated that the goods be divided into four categories with the number of tons in each, Ambassador Oshima was at loss to cope with the matter and requested that hereafter more explicit arrangements be completed in Tokyo.[1110]

[1106] Ibid.
[1107] III, 832.
[1108] III, 833.
[1109] III, 834.
[1110] III, 835.

[228]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

On September 6, 1941 Ambassador Oshima made a report concerning Germany's growing economic control over the Balkan States with the exception of Turkey. He declared that since Germany's imports were in excess of its exports especially in its trade with Rumania, it had resorted to changing the exchange rate in its own favor. In addition to this Germany had exported large quantities of arms to these countries, thus strengthening itself militarily as well as adjusting its trade balance.

Ambassador Oshima also revealed that an optimistic view prevailed in the Balkan states in regard to the new period plans[1111] which were designed to increase production since at the present time agriculture appeared to be in an extremely primitive state. However, by supplying implements and fertilizers, the German government hoped to prevent a decline in agricultural production and, depending upon such endeavor, might eventually be able to increase by 50,000 tons such oil bearing crops as soy beans. However, no general radical increase in agricultural production could be expected within the next two or three years.[1112]

According to Ambassador Oshima, by strict control, Germany was assuring itself of the Balkan supply which was larger than in previous years. The commercial and economic implications of Germany's plan to develop the River Danube water route connecting it with the Rhine to facilitate uninterrupted shipment of petroleum, grains, lumber, etc., were emphasized in regards to the future prosperity of Europe.[1113]

According to Minister Sikao Matashima the German army's activities had only slightly affected agricultural production in the Balkans, and harvest appeared even better than in previous years. There was a resulting tendency toward collaboration of additional Balkan countries with the Reich. These nations were operating under a produce pact with Germany in accordance with which they were supplying raw materials in exchange for German war materials, farm tools, medicines, etc. The mark became the unit of exchange in all trade transactions between Germany and the Balkans. Trade between the Balkan nations themselves was to be regulated in the Berlin Exchange Control Bureau with all loans to Germany being repaid by manufactured articles. This, it will be seen, established a virtual Balkan trade block in which Germany controlled an export market and would be economically sovereign. Germany now was getting more arms from the Balkans and transporting them over safer routes. Although currency exchange rates were unstable at present, Minister Matashima was confident that after Germany had won the Russian war, the situation would improve.[1114]

452. German Army Plans to Advance Along Leningrad-Sverdlovsk Railroad After Leningrad Falls

On September 3, 1941, a message transmitted from Moscow to Tokyo on the progress of Russo-German hostilities was re-broadcast to Hsinking despite the previous warning of Ambassador Oshima in Berlin that Japan should be more cautious of Russian reports. In this case, however, it was predicted that, after the capture of Leningrad, one part of the German army would advance along the line of the Leningrad-Sverdlovsk railroad and other part, the main force, would advance with the central army toward Moscow.

Should the Germans be successful in dealing Russia a knockout blow in Leningrad, Moscow, and Kharkov, it would be but a brief step to the oil fields of Grozny. With the withdrawal from these three important cities Russia would lose four-fifths of its war industries.

The same report revealed that the Soviet Republics' government outwardly appeared calm. As yet there were no signs of collapse in the Red army which stubbornly resisted the Germans

[1111] III, 836. Five or ten year plan worked out or put into effect in the Balkan States.
[1112] III, 836.
[1113] III, 837.
[1114] III, 838.

[229]

in its attempt to carry on a long war. But it was predicted that soon the army would deteriorate, and such possibilities, it was believed, were causing much concern in America and England.[1115]

On September 4, 1941, Ambassador Oshima reported activities at the front as they had been explained by a reliable German source. In this statement the encirclement of Leningrad had been completed with the occupation of Slusselburg. Among the prisoners captured during the fighting in this neighborhood were armed citizens as well as workers operating tanks. The strategy involved in taking the city was to rely principally upon shelling and bombing and to avoid street fighting.

With regard to activities in the Kiev area it was believed that since Soviet forces to the east could no longer retreat, mopping-up activities would be completed in the following week.

German forces had crossed the Dnieper River all along the line from Dnepropetrovsk south and were gaining steadily.[1116]

453. Rumors of Mobilization on Bulgarian-Turkish Border Disproved

From Turkey came rumblings of massive troop concentrations on the Bulgarian-Turkish border. In order to obtain first-hand information Japanese representatives there made an official trip to Bulgaria, where it was discovered that not more than eleven Bulgarian divisions and not more than five German regiments were located. Hence, although at first it had been thought that Field Marshal Sigmund Liszt's army was stationed there, later data seemed to disprove this theory.

With regard to Turkish-German relations, it was believed that Germany would not be inclined to hurry her negotiations until the eastern front had been brought under control even though trade negotiations had been scheduled to begin on September 2, 1941.[1117]

454. Ambassador Oshima Tours Occupied European Countries

On September 8, 1941 Ambassador Oshima advised Foreign Minister Toyoda that he would leave the following day for a tour of German occupied territories in Belgium, the Netherlands and northern France at the invitation of the German government.[1118]

455. Ambassador Oshima Again Threatens Resignation

Again on September 20, 1941, Ambassador Oshima threatened Tokyo with his resignation if Japan did not clarify its intentions with regard to the Japanese-American negotiations. Complaining that such an explanation as the Foreign Minister had transmitted on September 10, 1941,[1119] was little more than routine diplomatic material, Ambassador Oshima stated that it was impossible for him to know the truth regarding his own government. The pro-Axis Ambassador continued that although outwardly the Japanese government claimed that the Japanese-American negotiations would not violate the spirit of the Three Power Agreement, he was doubtful.

Asserting that he had been "in a fog" since July 2, 1941 when the national policy was decided, Ambassador Oshima stated that he felt incapable of performing his duties satisfactorily.[1120]

[1115] III, 839.
[1116] III, 840.
[1117] III, 841.
[1118] III, 842.
[1119] III, 843.
[1120] III, 844.

[230]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

456. German National Defense Ministry Estimates Current Situation

The Vice Chief of the General Staff in Tokyo forwarded to the Washington delegation an estimate of the current situation on September 20, 1941. This estimate, reportedly originating from the German attache in the United States, had been sent to the Japanese representatives in Berlin by the German National Defense Ministry; and Tokyo requested that its authenticity be investigated in Washington.

The German attache was credited with stating that if Japan attacked Russia, England would aid the Soviet Union; but that unless Japan attacked the Philippines or seriously menaced the American transport routes, the United States would not declare war against Japan. This reluctance on the part of America would greatly decrease its prestige in the Pacific area. He stressed that it was of vital importance to the Axis Powers that the United States be kept in "some dilemma" concerning Far Eastern problems.

Employing a policy of delay because its fleet was divided between two oceans and because its air force and army were lacking in strength, the United States was attempting to use economic pressure to conceal its weaknesses. The German attache pointed out that if Japan procrastinated, the British and Americans would have had time to combine their naval strength and Japan would have "lost an excellent prize by chasing the sun".[1121]

457. Japan Repudiates Poland

Although Ambassador Oshima had failed in his efforts to persuade former Foreign Minister Yosuke Matsuoka that Japan should accede in Germany's demand that Poland be repudiated, it appeared by August 15, 1941, that under the new Cabinet, final steps in this direction would be taken. The Japanese Ambassador was notified that after talking with Ambassador Ott, Foreign Minister Toyoda had agreed to call a special meeting of the Privy Council in September at which time the Japanese Embassy in Poland would be abolished and the Polish Embassy in Japan would be repudiated.[1122] However, circumstances prohibited the presentation of this request to the Privy Council before October and the Council was not expected to give its approval until October 3, 1941, at which time the Polish Ambassador would be notified.[1123]

458. Germany Explains the Greer Incident

Meanwhile, on September 8, Germany's Vice Minister Ernst Von Weizsacker accounted to Tokyo via Ambassador Oshima for the Greer incident which involved a German submarine attack on a United States warship. He explained that the submarine upon approaching the vessel for identification purposes had been fired upon. However, he said, although attacked, the submarine dove and waited two hours during which the attack continued; and then it surfaced, sighted the warship, and released two torpedoes in self-defense.

At Ambassador Oshima's query as to Germany's intention in the matter, the Vice Minister replied that he did not know Hitler's intentions but personally he did not believe that too much ado should be made about it. According to Ambassador Oshima, President Roosevelt appeared to be using the incident to stir up a war spirit in the United States. Nevertheless, Ambassador Oshima believed that since no diplomatic steps had been taken, nothing more would come of the affair.[1124]

459. Ambassador Oshima Learns of German Transactions for South American Money

On September 11, 1941, Ambassador Oshima divulged that Germany was holding large sums of money in South American branch banks which it was attempting to obtain before the

[1121] III, 845-846.
[1122] III, 847.
[1123] III, 848.
[1124] III, 849.

[231]

American freezing order went into effect. These assets Berlin hoped to obtain primarily by selling gold, but also by affixing the funds held by Germans in South America, purchasing raw materials, and by "bootlegging" South American currencies.[1125]

Only four days later the Ambassador revealed that transactions were being made at 10 per cent under the market price by German representatives in Lisbon with Argentina, Uruguay, and Brazil.[1126]

460. New Japanese-German Shipping Problems Arise

Meanwhile some new questions were arising regarding neutral shipping. Ambassador Oshima wired his home government on September 17, 1941 to explain its decisions on several points. Items under discussion by the army and navy and Japanese merchants in Berlin involved the transporting of freight. Such problems involved an interpretation of the word "neutral", a decision as to type of freight, and the necessity for obtaining navicerts.

Ambassador Oshima also explained that the Berlin contingent desired that all freight be collected at Marseilles and then shipped by water to Lisbon thereby eliminating the use of the inefficient Spanish railroads. In this regard he wanted to know whether or not there would be an official British inspection and if so how thorough such a search would be.[1127]

461. The German Army Reaches Leningrad

By September 15, 1941 Ambassador Oshima reported that the German army had completely surrounded Kiev's east side, resulting in the encirclement of nearly 1,000,000 Russian soldiers. To the north other divisions had reached the Leningrad suburbs. The sudden invasion of the Crimea had already proved successful although during operations the German General Eugen Ritter von Schobert had been killed.[1128]

In defensive tactics, Ambassador Oshima emphasized the superiority of the German military, comparing the extent of the damage by bombing done to Hamburg to that of London. According to his report, little damage to communication organization had been inflicted and anti-aircraft guns and camouflage maneuvers had been most effective. Apparently, the English were not risking large numbers of men in group bombings.[1129]

462. Ambassador Oshima Inspects Bombing at Hamburg

While inspecting the harbor at Hamburg immediately after its pounding, Ambassador Oshima on September 10, 1941 reaffirmed the German statement that little damage had been accomplished. He noted that four submarines were then under construction while German sources revealed that one ship a week was being completed.

Although German industrial and munitions factories were being hit, little damage in general had been accomplished. However, it was admitted that the Mannheim Castle had sustained heavy losses.[1130]

463. Respective Treatments of Russian and German Nationals Reviewed

At this point, confusing stories regarding the respective treatments of stranded nationals and people of occupied areas were being disseminated by Germans and Russians alike. According to Ambassador Yoshitsugu Tatekawa in Moscow, the Soviet government had been ban-

[1125] III, 850.
[1126] III, 851.
[1127] III, 852.
[1128] III, 853.
[1129] III, 854.
[1130] III, 855.

[232]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

ishing German nationals to Siberia and Turkestan upon 48 hours notice and already had ordered the compulsory removal of 600,000 Germans from the Volga area.

On the other hand, the Germans through refugee spokesman were spreading counter propaganda, apparently advancing their own generosity to all peoples of the occupied areas. Stressing the fact that they had been supplying food and places of shelter, the Nazis had succeeded in influencing even greater numbers of peoples so that still fewer persons believed Soviet stories of German atrocities. Accordingly, Ambassador Tatekawa stated that the numerous Soviet propaganda articles were becoming conspicuous. To him, such stories seemed to be only an outlet for Russian impatience with the unfavorable war conditions.[1131]

464. Ambassador Suma Confers with General Franco

On September 30, 1941 Ambassador Yakichiro Suma in Madrid expressed opinions resulting from a conversation with General Franco at the Parudo[1132] Palace on the previous day. According to this report, the Axis had succeeded in destroying more than half of the Soviet army, and within a month's time the military phase of the Russo-German conflict would be ended.

However, it was recognized that because of the policy of scorched earth being carried out by a strongly united Communistic people, it was possible that they would withdraw into the Turkestan region to continue resistance. Therefore, Ambassador Suma recognized that an Axis compromise with Stalin could not be considered. Germany would have to annihilate the Soviet Army completely.[1133]

Ambassador Suma continued with General Franco's views, divulging that the Axis need have no fear of American or British troop landings on Gibraltar, which was obviously too narrow, or in Portugal, which would be swallowed up by Spain should she afford any opportunity of an invasion to the enemy. However, care should be taken against the United States' occupying Dakar and Cape Verde preparatory to its entrance into the war.[1134]

465. Axis Powers Develop Communications Intelligence

Colonel Senjuro Hayashi in a dispatch to the Head of the General Affairs Section in Tokyo dated September 22, 1941 requested an outline of the procedure to be used in sending British messages. Insomuch as he had asked Major Nishi to deliver this material to the Germans during his absence, he felt that he must know immediately how his country planned to handle these wires. Colonel Hayashi remarked that the Germans had expressed their appreciation for the material they had received and conveyed his congratulations to Lt. Colonel Kawamura and to Mr. Sueyoshi on the success of their cryptanalytic work.[1135]

On the same day another message from Berlin to Tokyo suggested that Lt. Colonel Scholz of the German OKW ABWEHR[1136] be awarded the Order of the Sacred Treasure, third class, at the same time that Mr. Kemp would receive his commendation. The reason for further bestowing an award on Lt. Colonel Scholz who had received the Order of the Rising Sun, fourth class, was that as head of the communications of the attache office, he had given meritorious service, particularly in regard to German-Japanese joint cryptanalytic work.[1137]

From Bangkok to the Vice Chief of the General Staff in Tokyo came a list of steps which should precede air operations in British Malaya. It was suggested on September 26 that if these operations were being considered, there should be a thorough-going reenforcement of the

[1131] III, 856.
[1132] Kana spelling.
[1133] III, 857.
[1134] III, 858.
[1135] III, 859.
[1136] Kana spelling.
[1137] III, 860.

[233]

air units in Saigon. An accurate utilization of the detailed intelligence already collected and the establishment of spy networks would be necessary as well as the execution of wind-speed observation with balloons having radio-sounding equipment, twice daily, in at least five places. These were to include Saigon, Hanoi, and Heito.[1138]

466. Communications Difficulties Noted in Switzerland

Ambassador Oshima's plea for clearer coverage of his government's policies were echoed from Bern, Switzerland, on September 1, 1941, by Consul Takanobu Mitani who suggested that as a result of the difficulty in maintaining communications between Japan and its various outlying stations, some steps should be taken to rectify the situation. In this regard, he proposed that in view of the increase of news of the day and the necessity for its immediate distribution one broadcast a day would last too long if it covered all the news. Henceforth over the Switzerland station two separate periods lasting from 40 to 60 minutes each would be inaugurated, to be scheduled approximately as 6:00 p.m. and 11:00 p.m.

In harmony with this new plan for reducing the time of an individual broadcast but increasing the over-all coverage of the news, Consul Mitani explained that the content of each broadcast from Bern would be increased while a more careful selection of the news to avoid repetition would be practised. The plan was to give explanations of new place names and personal names. To this end it was decided to arrange for an immediate change in wave length and to distribute reference material.[1139]

467. Berlin and Tokyo Negotiate for Improved Communications

It will be remembered that negotiations had been initiated between Berlin and Tokyo to determine a more efficient and satisfactory method for settling the communication difficulties between Japan and Germany prevalent at this point. An agreement, submitted by Ambassador Oshima, was approved on August 20, 1941 by authorities in Tokyo. This placed the authority for concluding the technical arrangements in the hands of officials of the German and Japanese Broadcasting Companies. Another plan gave ultimate authority to the German and Japanese governments. Of the two plans submitted, Foreign Minister Toyoda approved of the one sanctioning the least possible "meddling" of foreign officials with the private broadcasting companies. However, he stated that in case the German authorities requested it, he had no objections to entering the statement that liaison officers would attend to the business of contracting the broadcasting company according to Foreign Office instructions from the respective countries.[1140]

After conferring with the German government, Ambassador Oshima replied to the Foreign Minister on September 1, that he had been informed by German authorities, that with the growing importance of radio in the world situation they had already established a diplomatic post of radio attache in Tokyo and in other of the important capitols throughout the world. In addition Germany placed much importance upon radio as being an integral part of the functions of a state, and as for leaving anything but the program details up to direct negotiations between the broadcasting companies, it was made clear to Tokyo that Germany was not in accord, furthermore that it expected to retain the right to have the final say in all matters having political implications.

Ambassador Oshima hurried to make it clear to the Foreign Minister that Germany had no intention of interfering with the organizations of foreign countries which had been specifically established to conduct informative and propaganda work, but believed that the matter would have to be arranged and settled in its entirety through governmental negotiations or have the

[1138] III, 861.
[1139] III, 862.
[1140] III, 863.

[234]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

governments enter into agreements covering the general points and leaving the details up to the private broadcasting associations.[1141]

In rejoinder on September 12, the Foreign Minister pointed to the previously established exchange radio agreement between Japan and Italy, which had been based on a sincere understanding between the radio bureaus of both countries. However, if the German authorities, as a matter of government policy, pressed for an understanding regarding this agreement, the Japanese on their part would like to request that an exchange of notes confirm the agreement. The Foreign Minister urged that Ambassador Oshima keep this in mind while once more negotiating with the German authorities.[1142]

After meeting with German officials again according to his instructions, Ambassador Oshima explained to Foreign Minister Toyoda on September 20, 1941 that Germany had decided that an agreement between the two broadcasting associations would be concluded and that the governments of the two countries concerned should have recognition to the agreement by an exchange of memoranda. With regard to clause V, which Germany had previously desired to delete anyhow, they proposed that, "those engaged in the work of broadcasting should reserve to the Government the ultimate right of censorship in matters of political importance and a clause should be included to the effect that officials engaged in exchanging broadcasts should follow instructions given by the Ambassador."

Since a great deal of time had already been spent in discussing the matter, Ambassador Oshima urged that his government compromise on the point of government negotiations and put the plan into practice immediately.[1143]

Foreign Minister Toyoda then notified Ambassador Oshima that the authorities in Tokyo had decided to conclude the agreement between the broadcasting associations of the two countries based on the Japanese proposals regarding the exchange of broadcasts between Japan and Germany and to exchange a memorandum patterned after the official Japanese-German Medical Science agreement of 1939, between the governments of the two countries in order to validify the above. Japan would agree to eliminate Clause V of the proposals.

Expressing the desire of Tokyo broadcasting authorities to have the signing of the agreement take place in Tokyo, Foreign Minister Toyoda proposed that Mr. Shichiro Komori be made Japanese director of this broadcasting association and asked that the Germans select their representative and notify Tokyo.[1144]

468. Rumanian Losses Revealed

By October 6, 1941, reports from Bucharest transmitted salient points from a Rumanian official announcement which located the Rumanian alpine and cavalry forces with the Germans between the Dnieper River and the sea of Azov. Since the beginning of hostilities Rumanian forces reportedly had captured 60,000, killed 70,000, and wounded 100,000, while Rumanian loses were counted at 20,000 dead and 15,000 missing. This bulletin reported that the fire caused by the bombing of the Ploesti Petroleum Works had amounted to no more than 300,000,000 lei.[1145]

469. Ambassador Oshima Denies Rumors of Russo-German Pre-War Negotiations

Declaring that intelligence which had been sent to him by the Foreign Office to the effect that Germany was now reaping the mistake of turning against Russia in June, 1941 was a "ridiculous fabrication", Ambassador Oshima on October 2, 1941 gave what he believed to be

[1141] III, 864.
[1142] III, 865.
[1143] III, 866.
[1144] III, 867.
[1145] III, 868.

[235]

the true motives for Germany's entrance into the war against Russia. Since it was Germany's purpose to consolidate the eastern front for the war against England, it had been necessary to annihilate the Russian field troops and to overthrow the Communist regime. With these objectives, it was clear, according to Ambassador Oshima, that no demands had been filed with Russia nor had Germany's objectives been discussed over a conference table. It was true, the Japanese Ambassador conceded, that Russia was putting up a far more obstinate fight than Germany had imagined possible.

Furthermore, the rumors that Herr Von Ribbentrop was operating his own spy agency in Germany were false since the German Foreign Minister, helping and advising daily at Supreme Headquarter in Berlin, was in the closest confidence of Chancellor Hitler. Such rumors were branded as pure nonsense by Ambassador Oshima who stated that they had been circulated in the United States only to drive a wedge between Japan and Germany. Ambassador Oshima suggested that Foreign Minister Toyoda allow competent Japanese authorities to peruse the telegrams he had written before and during the outbreak of Russo-German hostilities.[1146]

470. Ambassador Oshima Counteracts British and American Propaganda

In order to counteract what Ambassador Oshima termed British and American propaganda relative to the strength of the Soviet Army in the Far East, he communicated on October 6, 1941 a list of the Russian Far Eastern divisions which had been destroyed since the middle of September. According to the German High Command, these divisions had already ceased to exist as organized divisions since the middle of August.[1147]

On October 8, Ambassador Oshima related pertinent points of a recent conversation with Germany army and naval attaches who had just returned from a tour of observation of the eastern front. From this meeting, he learned that should the German army continue at its current rate of advance disposing of the Russian troops in Moscow, and its surrounded neighborhood, it would not be long before the eastern front could be consolidated.

Commenting upon the British and United States "propaganda" regarding Germany's plan to offer peace to the Soviet immediately after the fall of Moscow, he stated that this would never happen. In explaining his opinion he remarked that although Germany would in the future direct her principal strength against England, she would not weaken her aggressive attack on the Soviet Union until the Communist regime had been overthrown.

He cautioned Tokyo against believing British and American reports that the war between Germany and the Soviet Union had been stalemated; for it was self-evident that the fall of Moscow would be a tremendous blow to the Stalin regime.[1148]

471. Ambassador Oshima Report on Russo-German Warfare, October 11, 1941

Despite Ambassador Oshima's warning to Tokyo against placing too much confidence in British-American propaganda, he could not deny that the German advance had slowed considerably. In order to explain this event, he announced on October 11, 1941 that the Soviet army had been found to possess a far greater supply of weapons than was expected and that the entire nation had been aroused to stubborn resistance. Therefore, the German army had not attempted the impossible by attacking them outright but had deliberately plotted for their annihilation by means of slow methodical warfare. He repeated that Soviet losses had been extremely heavy in comparison to German army casualties.

In this message the Ambassador also announced the beginning of the large-scale siege of Moscow and predicted that the remainder of Marshal Samyou Timoshenko's troops would suffer severe treatment at the hand of the invading German army. This devastating blow, in line

[1146] III, 869.
[1147] III, 870.
[1148] III, 871.

[236]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

with German strategy, had been dealt the Soviet forces before the severe winter had set in. Germany had seized the larger part of Soviet raw materials, so that soon the invaded country would be reduced to servitude.[1149]

Although Ambassador Oshima had from time to time expressed the belief that the extinction of Communism was the primary purpose of Germany's war aims, he now pointed out with assurance that Germany's principal objective in this war was the overthrow of Great Britain. This would have to be done by an increase of air attacks and submarine warfare followed by landing operations. Such operations, Ambassador Oshima believed, would not take place before spring. Although he acknowledged that Great Britain believed such landing operations would end in failure, he assured his Home Office that the preparations of Germany had assumed large proportions backed by the cooperation of all the war industries of Europe, and by the excellence of the German supreme command and the quality of its soldiers. He then pointed to the example set by the German army in the Norway operations and in breaking the Maginot line.

Ambassador Oshima continued stating that Germany itself was awaiting the invasion hour with the greatest of confidence. In the meantime, it planned to complete operations in the Caucasus, the Near East and Egypt. With regard to British strength in the Far East, Ambassador Oshima explained that Germany considered such claims of 750,000 British troops a great "bluff" and did not believe it necessary to move large opposing forces there. Thus, it would keep its main forces for a concentration of the landing operations in England.[1150]

He again repeated that Germany expected to bring Britain to its knees by force of arms if it did not surrender unconditionally. In this event, although the British royal family, the government and the navy would flee to overseas possessions and continue resistance with American cooperation, still the spiritual effect of successful landing operations on British soil would strike the world a resounding blow.

Should the government flee England, there would be no hope of British victory, since it was not believed that resistance could be continued without immediate leadership and 40,000,000 subjects would be left to die. The Ambassador then commented upon the fact that Germany had repeatedly made the statement that it assumed no responsibility for feeding peoples of occupied areas.

Personally, however, Ambassador Oshima did not believe in the possibility of British leaders' fleeing to overseas areas. He recognized that much would depend upon the United States' attitude in the near future, but he did not expect that America would be in a position to formally declare war on Germany early in 1942. Then, if after having subjugated Britain, Europe, Russia, North Africa and the Near East, Germany proceeded with her plans for a new order in Europe, even the United States would not be able to do anything about it.

Ambassador Oshima also considered the possibility of Germany's not being able to attack the United States even though at war with it, and submitted that he believed some way would be found for Germany and the United States to reach an agreement. In his opinion, even though the two countries should continue to oppose each other, a state of war between them would not last long.

Then Ambassador Oshima dealt briefly on the hope of Britain and United States that internal disturbances would interrupt German progress, stating that at present the occupied areas were of no concern and that Germany was not in the least worried about the situation following the conquest of England.[1151]

[1149] III, 872.
[1150] III, 873.
[1151] III, 874.

[237]

472. Ambassador Oshima Urges Support of Germany's War

Finally, Ambassador Oshima approached the point he had been attempting to emphasize. In his opinion should Germany be forced to accept merely the occupation of the British Isles, abandoning its plan for complete overthrow of the British Empire throughout the world, Japan in the future would still face the combined interests of the United States and Great Britain in the Far East. Therefore, Japan must assist in the complete conquest of the British Empire. Along this line the speedy settlement of the China incident was mandatory and Ambassador Oshima pointed to the need for the resources and markets of the south. The great objective in concluding the Tripartite Pact had been this very thing. Said Ambassador Oshima,

"The realization of our objectives, and destiny of the Empire for a thousand years now hangs upon the success of

Germany and Italy in Europe."

He again warned against being taken in by British propaganda and reiterated his belief that it would be more difficult for Japan in the future should Germany and Italy gain a victory only in Europe.[1152]

To insure the future of the East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere, Ambassador Oshima urged that Japan reinstate the true aims of the Tripartite Pact by establishing a definite course with regard to the war in Europe. As one means to this end, he reaffirmed his desire that Tokyo make plans to eliminate the Soviet threat at this opportune time. Then simultaneously with Germany's invasion of England in the spring of 1942, the government should launch its southward penetration. He asked that the German high command be kept informed of Japan's efforts along these lines.[1153]

473. Promiscuous Dissemination of Restricted News is Condemned by Foreign Minister Toyoda

With the continuation of damaging British and Russian propaganda, it soon developed that Ambassador Oshima was not the only one concerned about general dissemination of restricted news in Japan; for on October 11, Foreign Minister Toyoda issued a reprimand to Berlin in which he suggested that since popular dissemination of short-wave wireless news of a certain classification was not permitted in Japan, any privilege accorded to foreign diplomatic establishments should not be abused by allowing promiscuous publication. Foreign Minister Toyoda explained that the policy in Japan had been to restrict all material which was used in publication "Bulletin" to the general public, but to allow it some distribution among foreign officials. In view of the current situation it would also be quite impossible to allow Germany or Italy popular use of the releases.

The Foreign Minister explained that the Vice Minister had already approached Ambassador Ott on the proposition of strengthening cooperation between Axis and Domei reporters, at the same time arranging for an interview between Ambassador Ott and Chief of the Intelligence Bureau Ito, on the 10th of October. At this meeting, it was decided that publication of all pamphlets other than the "Bulletin" would be suppressed. The exhibition of all British propaganda films were to be ruled out and the publication and exhibition of German and Italian films in Japan would be increased.[1154]

474. Government Control of Press Urged by Ambassador Oshima

On October 13, 1941 Ambassador Oshima took his turn in rebuking the home government for releasing an editorial by the Domei press to the effect that Germany should end Russo-German hostilities and concentrate on an invasion of England insomuch as a long war would be disadvantageous to the Axis countries. He also took this opportunity to rebuke the Foreign

[1152] III, 875.
[1153] III, 876.
[1154] III, 877.

[238]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

Office for the release of the Domei dispatch from Ankara revealing that Hungary had lost forty per cent of her total army in the current Soviet campaign. Then releases, Ambassador Oshima pointed out, had been used by Boston and other foreign broadcasting stations in propaganda activities, and, besides, they served to arouse the displeasure of the Axis powers. He demanded that strict representations to the proper authorities be made so that future reports and editorials of this type would be completely eliminated.[1155]

475. Germany and Turkey Sign Commercial Pact

On October 9, 1941 Japanese-Ankara spokesmen revealed that the commercial treaty which had been under negotiation between Germany and Turkey had been signed, effective for one and one half years. The total amount of exports and imports were set at 200,000,000 marks each, with Germany trading manufactured goods for Turkey's raw materials. Although this figure was computed on a basis of 50 per cent of Turkey's output, Germany planned to take over the complete 1943 supply of chrome to bring the total Turkish exports to Germany up the scale.[1156]

476. Ambassador Oshima Confers with Foreign Minister Von Ribbentrop

Foreign Minister Joachim Von Ribbentrop made the first anniversary of the Tripartite Pact[1157] on October 1, 1941 an occasion for expression Germany's dissatisfaction with the Japanese negotiations with the United States. During several visits with him Ambassador Oshima learned that Germany was thoroughly disgusted with Japan, having received proof that although Japan would not confide the secret Japanese-United States negotiations with its Tripartite partner, America was continually revealing Japanese-American secrets to the British. Ambassador Oshima explained that he was attempting to convince the press that German high officials were also informed of the negotiations, but the whole hoax was proving increasingly difficult.

Ambassador Oshima was ever conscious of third power impressions which seemed now to picture Japan as avoiding the conflict because of impoverishment resulting from the China incident, and because she lacked faith in the outcome of the European war.

Now, even though Germany might overlook inevitable attempts of third powers to divide the Axis partners and would keep up a pretense of smooth relations, still there was a general bad feeling among leaders which might precipitate malicious acts on the part of Germany.[1158]

477. Germany Disapproves of Japan's Attitude Toward Russian-American Trade

Foreign Minister Von Ribbentrop the following day called to the attention of Ambassador Oshima the receipt of a report revealing that Japan had approved the sailing of American ships through to Vladivostok.[1159]

In answer to Ambassador Oshima's demand that he be told the true situation, Tokyo divulged that Japan had stood firmly against Russian-American trade on the basis of the current political situation. America, when questioned by Japan, had replied that it felt that such trade was a political matter between America and Russia and should cause Japan no uneasiness. To Japan's charge that this was an unfriendly act, America had invoked the freedom of the seas doctrine and had said that it could not tolerate interference with its foreign trade.

Tokyo then explained that five United States tankers carrying between 60,000 and 95,000 barrels of oil each, had entered Vladivostok from the middle of August until October 9th. In

[1155] III, 878.
[1156] III, 879.
[1157] III, 880.

[1158] III, 881.
[1159] III, 882.

[239]

addition, the number of Russian ships which had operated between American and the Soviet Union was nine, with an estimated total of 300,000 barrels of oil and aeroplane parts transported.[1160]

Conductor Hidemuro Konoye, younger brother of the Premier, who had been on tour in Europe at the outbreak of hostilities, joined Ambassador Oshima in an appeal to Prince Fuminaro Konoye for an elimination of existing Axis ill-will resulting from American shipping to Vladivostok and the American-Japanese negotiations.

Hidemaro Konoye explained that as long as the Tripartite Pact was still in active existence, Germany would be much perturbed at Japanese philandering with the Americans and would object strenuously to announcements by the Tokyo Information Bureau that intimate progress was being made in Russian-American negotiations. Mr. Konoye suggested that Tokyo explain to Germany that any negotiations with the United States that were not in harmony with the spirit of the Tripartite Treaty would be merely a political scheme and that actually there would be no change in Japan's policy.[1161]

478. Ambassador Oshima Objects to Pro-American Statements

Meanwhile Diet Member Juiji Kasai in the United States had been making anti-German, pro-American statements;[1162] but Ambassador Oshima was assured by Tokyo that Kasai had been warned vigorously and that close tab was being kept on him.[1163] However, by October 13 Ambassador Oshima, still convinced that Kasai would not reform, requested that Foreign Minister Toyoda return the offender to Japan.

The Ambassador also reported on American broadcasts which contended that Foreign Minister Matusoka had entered into the undesirable Tripartite Pact without the majority consent of the people; and that if the United States and Germany went to war, Germany would be to blame.[1164]

Foreign Minister Toyoda in a reply on October 14, 1941 admitted that he feared that British and United States attempts to separate Japan and Germany would precipitate a difficult situation where he himself was concerned, and he requested that Ambassador Oshima explain Japan's good intentions regarding the Tripartite Pact.[1165]

479. Japanese-German Trade Difficulties Recur

Recurrences of trade difficulties between Germany and Japan continued to cause Ambassador Oshima much concern in view of the insufficient funds available in the exchange allotment for Japanese government purchases. Up until October 13, 1941 there had been no difficulties making payment for government orders out of the fixed allotment; but since then civilian purchases had become so large that even the government was being forced to forego placing new orders. Ambassador Oshima suggested, in order to alleviate the situation, that Germany be requested to make credit available for Japan's use.[1166]

On October 16, 1941 Foreign Minister Toyoda revealed that Japan's payment to Germany which had to be made by March 1943, exceeded 80,000,000 yen or 14,810,000 marks, according to German authorities. Although it was expected that by cancellations of contracts due to the war this figure would be considerably lessened, still the problem of meeting the debt was imminent. The Foreign Minister was of the opinion, however, that the German government would

[1160] III, 883.
[1161] III, 884.
[1162] III, 885.
[1163] III, 886.
[1164] III, 887.
[1165] III, 888.
[1166] III, 889.

[240]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

agree to purchasing goods from Japan in that amount and negotiations for a provisional agreement to cover the purchases and payment of both sides were under way. The goods with which Japan bargained to supply Germany and which were to be applied on the deficit included whale oil, raw silk, and cotton thread.[1167]

480. German Manufacturers Aid Japan's War Industries

That Japan looked to Germany for assistance in developing manufacturing techniques was shown in a series of commercial messages sent through diplomatic channels from August 8 to October 10, 1941. The necessity of Japan's producing its own steel castings caused the navy to decide to have a civilian company in Japan study the matter or to send Japanese technicians to Germany for factory training, depending upon the relative costs.[1168]

An explanation by the Junkers Company of Germany enabled the Japanese by August 8 to complete their investigation of the SV-11 type propeller.[1169] However, as late as October 6 negotiations regarding the propeller-purchase by the Hamamatsu Musical Instrument Company remained unsettled. The transfer of the manufacturing rights had been forced upon the Junkers Company by the Japanese, and the Germans insisted upon a higher price.[1170]

Meanwhile the Tokyo Aircraft Gauge Company had purchased patent rights for the Askania-manufactured automatic pilot. Despite the recognized urgency in learning the techniques, the War Office of the Senior Adjutant in Tokyo wired Berlin on August 30 that it was impossible to send personnel from Japan at that time; however, at least one technician from the Tokyo Aircraft Gauge Company and Engineer Yoshinari would join the Askania laboratory.[1171] By October 6, 1941 discussions concerning the automatic pilot compasses and the Siemens electric gauges had not been completed because of exchange currency and transportation difficulties. In regard to the automatic pilot Berlin informed the Japanese government that this apparatus was not then being manufactured and thus purchases had become impossible.[1172]

The Japanese Vice Minister of War on August 29 requested that Dr. Helmut Wohlthat, German commercial attache in Tokyo, assist Japan in acquiring the "IG" patent rights from Germany. He wired the Japanese delegation in Berlin on September 5 Dr. Wohlthat's reply, that although Germany was in accord in regard to the "IG" transfer, there remained the fact that, just as Japan felt about America, Germany did not wish to goad that country at the moment.[1173]

Market disturbances were created in Bangkok during September because of German buying of rubber and tin. A German agent, Schmidt, had employed 100,000 bahts, sent from Shanghai via the Yokohama Specie Bank to camouflaged Chinese companies, to make these purchases.[1174]

Definite arrangements for paying for special universal drills from the Swiss Rumer Company through Germany were requested by Berlin authorities in a dispatch to the Japanese Vice Minister of War on September 13, 1941.[1175] Other Swiss manufacturing equipment was contracted by Japan through these channels.[1176]

[1167] III, 890.
[1168] III, 891.
[1169] III, 892.
[1170] III, 893.
[1171] III, 894.
[1172] III, 895.
[1173] III, 896-897.
[1174] III, 898.
[1175] III, 899.
[1176] III, 900-901.

[241]

481. Ambassador Oshima Reports on German War Plans, October 16, 1941

On October 16, 1941 Ambassador Oshima reported that German army plans called for leaving a small observation force at Leningrad while part of the Reebuk forces advanced toward the encirclement of Moscow. Ambassador Oshima stated that nothing but annihilation faced the Russian forces in Leningrad. Meanwhile the mechanized forces having already reached Kalinin, north of Moscow, had proceeded as far as Yaroslav, approximately 250 kilometers northwest of Moscow, where the ground was already frozen thereby facilitating troop movements.

Ambassador Oshima also pointed out how ignorant the Russian army was of the true war situation in that, unaware that Germans had taken Kalinin the week before, they proceeded to transport troops for 48 hours after the city had fallen. This blunder resulted in Germany's taking many prisoners.

To the south of Moscow, infantry regiments had already arrived in Tula and mechanized troops were extending in an encircling wing eastward of Moscow. However, thawing snow and complicated forests and swamps were naturally slowing the advance of the German forces. With regard to the Karkov area, Ambassador Oshima revealed that little resistance was being met from Russian forces.[1177]

[1177] III, 902.

[242]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

PART C—JAPANESE DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITIES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD

(h) Japanese-Russian Relations

482. Ambassador Smetanin Urges Support of the Japanese-Russian Neutrality Pact

While Ambassador Hiroshi Osh