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www.w3.org/TR/html4/loose.dtd"> MAGIC: VOLUME III

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND

OF

PEARL HARBOR

VOLUME III
(August 5, 1941—October 17, 1941)

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402 (8-part set; sold in sets only)

Stock No. 008-000-00233-9

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER III

Renewed insistence by the Japanese Government upon its Peaceful Purposes—Resumption of Conversations

Outline of Volume III

Page

PART A—HULL-NOMURA CONVERSATIONS (August 5, 1941-October 17,1941)

1

1. Tokyo Sends New Proposal to Ambassador Nomura (August 5, 1941)

1

2. Hull-Nomura Conversation (August 6, 1941)

2

(a) State Department's Report

2

(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report

3

3. Tokyo Requests an Immediate Report from Ambassador Nomura

4

4. Japan Again Proposes a Konoye-Roosevelt Conference (August 7, 1941)

4

5. Ambassador Nomura Reports on Current American Policy Toward Japan

4

6. Hull-Nomura Conversation (August 8, 1941)

5

(a) State Department Report

5

(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report

6

7. Foreign Minister Toyoda Again Urges a Roosevelt-Konoye Conference

7

8. Colonel Iwakura and Mr. Ikawa Are Recalled to Japan

7

9. Counselor Iguchi Suggests a Propaganda Campaign in Japan

7

10. Prime Minister Toyoda Reprimands Minister Wakasugi

8

11. Ambassador Nomura Confers with an American Cabinet Member (August 13, 1941)

8

12. Hull-Nomura Conversation (August 13, 1941)

9

(a) Secretary Hull's Report

9

(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report

10

13. Japan Discounts the Attempted Assassination of Vice Premier Hiranuma

10

14. Hull-Nomura Conversation (August 16, 1941)

10

(a) Secretary Hull's Report

10

(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report

11

15. Ambassador Nomura Summarizes the Japanese-American Diplomatic Situation (August 16, 1941)

12

16. Roosevelt-Nomura Conversation (August 17, 1941)

13

(a) Secretary Hull's Report

13

(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report

14

17. Ambassador Nomura Discloses His Personal Opinion Regarding the President's Statements

16

18. Mr. Dooman Confers with Mr. Teraski

17

19. Grew-Toyoda Conversation (August 18, 1941)

17

(a) Ambassador Grew's Report

17

(b) Foreign Minister Toyoda's Report

18

20. Ambassador Grew Urges Consideration of Japanese Proposal

18

21. Ambassador Nomura Is Convinced of President Roosevelt's Sincerity

19

22. Ambassador Nomura Suggests a New Proposal

19

23. Rumors of a British-American-Russian Conference Speed Japanese Action

20

24. Hull-Nomura Conversation (First-August 23, 1941)

20

(a) Secretary Hull's Report

20

(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report

21

25. Hull-Nomura Conversation (Second-August 23, 1941)

21

(a) Secretary Hull's Report

21

(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report

21

26. Prime Minister Konoye Replies to President Roosevelt (August 26, 1941)

22

27. Japan Replies to President Roosevelt's Statement of August 17, 1941

22

28. Japan's Reply Contains Its Maximum Concessions

24

(a) Secretary Hull's Report

24

(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report

25

29. Mr. Terasaki Requests Ambassador Grew to Recall American Oil Shipments

26

[i]

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)

 

Page

30. Roosevelt-Nomura Conference (August 28, 1941)

26

(a) Secretary Hull's Report

26

(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report

27

31. Hull-Nomura Conversation (August 28, 1941)

27

(a) State Department's Report

27

(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report

29

32. Secret Interpretation of Japan's Reply to President Roosevelt

29

33. American Newspaperman Seeks Details of Prince Konoye's Message

30

34. The Press Is Informed of Prince Konoye's Message to President Roosevelt

30

35. Tokyo Demands Secrecy Concerning Proposed Conference

31

36. Ambassador Nomura Asks Secretary Hull's Cooperation in Maintaining Secrecy (August 29, 1941)

32

37. Newspaper Article Endangers Japan's Relations with Axis

32

38. Ambassador Grew Confers with Mr. Terasaki (August 29, 1941)

32

39. Ambassador Grew Indicates Responsibility of Ambassador Nomura for Publicity Leaks (August 30, 1941)

33

40 Japan Requests Simultaneous Release of Conference Publicity (September 1, 1941)

33

41. Newspaper Leaks Continue to Concern Japanese Government

33

42. Tokyo Summarizes the Japanese-American Situation for Its Ambassadors in Rome and Berlin

34

43. Ambassador Colonna Calls on Ambassador Nomura (August 30, 1941)

34

44. Hull-Nomura Conversation (September 1, 1941)

35

(a) State Department's Report

35

(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report

35

45. Roosevelt-Nomura Conversation (September 3, 1941)

37

(a) Secretary Hull's Report

37

(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report

38

46. Mr. Terasaki Delivers a Message from Foreign Minister Toyoda to Ambassador Grew (September 3, 1941)

39

47. Ambassador Nomura Advises Tokyo to Reply Briefly to the United States

40

48. Grew-Toyoda Conversation (September 4, 1941)

41

(a) Ambassador Grew's Report

41

(b) Foreign Minister Toyoda's Report

43

49. Hull-Nomura Conversation (September 4, 1941)

44

(a) State Department's Report

44

(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report

44

50. Ambassador Grew Confers with Foreign Minister Toyoda (September 5, 1941)

45

51. Japan Requests Ambassador Nomura to Expedite the Conference Arrangements

46

52. Ambassador Grew Confers with Officials in Tokyo (September 6, 1941)

47

(a) Conversation with Foreign Minister Toyoda

47

(b) Conversation with Prince Konoye

47

53. Hull-Nomura Conversation (September 6, 1941)

48

(a) State Department's Report

48

(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report

49

54. Japanese Embassy Is Warned Concerning Newspaper Leaks (September 6, 1941)

49

55. Japanese Intelligence Discloses America's Desire for Peace in the Pacific

50

56. Minister Wakasugi Prepares Return Trip to United States

50

57. Grew-Terasaki Conversation (September 8, 1941)

51

(a) Ambassador Grew's Report

51

(b) Japanese Foreign Office Report

51

58. American Public Opinion is Hostile to Japan

52

59. Ambassador Grew Delivers American Statement to Foreign Minister Toyoda (September 10, 1941)

52

60. Foreign Minister Toyoda Inquires Concerning Ambassador Nomura's Proposal of September 4, 1941

54

61. Ambassador Nomura Explains Purpose of Proposals of September 4, 1941

54

62. Hull-Nomura Conversation (September 10, 1941)

54

(a) State Department's Report

54

(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report

55

63. Japanese-American Conversation (September 10, 1941)

55

(a) State Department's Report

55

(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report

57

[ii]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)

 

Page

64. Publicity Concerning Mr. Kasai Arouses Japanese Concern

58

65. Ambassador Nomura Appraises American Attitude Toward New Japanese Proposals

58

66. Japan Instructs Ambassador Nomura Not to Change Diplomatic Documents

59

67. Ambassador Nomura Appraises President Roosevelt's Speech

59

68. Chungking and Nanking Governments Opposed to Japanese-American War

60

69. Foreign Minister Toyoda Clarifies Points in Japanese Proposals (September 13, 1941)

61

(a) Ambassador Grew's Report

61

(b) Foreign Minister Toyoda's Report

63

70. Foreign Minister Toyoda Upholds Japanese Proposals

63

71. Ambassador Nomura Stresses the Need for Preliminary Conversations

64

72. Ambassador Grew Confers with Ambassador Shigemitsu (September 17, 1941)

65

73. Mr. Ushiba Calls on Mr. Dooman (September 17, 1941)

65

74. Ambassador Nomura Urges Japan to Make a New Proposal

67

75. Secretary Hull Is Cautious Concerning Proposed Conference

68

76. Japanese Observers in United States Responsible for Publicity Leaks

68

77. French Ambassador Demands Withdrawal of Japanese Troops

68

78. Hull-Nomura Conversation (September 19, 1941)

68

(a) State Department's Report

68

(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report

69

79. Foreign Minister Toyoda Grows Impatient

70

80. Grew-Toyoda Conversation (September 22, 1941)

71

(a) Ambassador Grew's Report

71

(b) Foreign Minister Toyoda's Report

72

81. Ambassador Nomura Forwards a Japanese Report on America's Attitude toward War

73

82. Japan Explains Its Retaining of Troops in China

74

83. Hull-Nomura Conversation (September 23, 1941)

74

(a) State Department's Report

74

(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report

75

84. Ambassador Nomura Asks Tokyo to Clarify Its Proposals

76

85. Japanese Spies Disclose American Attitude Toward Japan

77

86. Foreign Minister Toyoda Urges Increased Diplomatic Efficiency

78

87. Foreign Minister Toyoda Forbids Textual Changes by Ambassador Nomura

78

88. Ambassador Nomura Answers Foreign Minister Toyoda's Message

78

89. Ambassador Nomura Sends Japanese Proposals to Secretary Hull (September 27, 1941)

79

90. Ambassador Nomura Reports Discrepancy in Copies of Japanese Peace Terms

79

91. Grew-Toyoda Conversation (September 27, 1941)

80

(a) Ambassador Grew's Report

80

(b) Foreign Minister Toyoda's Report

81

92. Ambassador Nomura Suggests Changes in the Japanese Proposals (September 27, 1941)

82

93. Ambassador Grew Appraises Conditions in Japan (September 29, 1941)

83

94. Hull-Nomura Conversation (September 29, 1941)

85

(a) State Department's Report

85

(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report

86

95. Foreign Minister Toyoda Submits Official Interpretation of Japanese Proposals

86

96. Ambassador Nomura Converses with Admirals Stark and Turner (September 30, 1941)

87

97. Mr. Iguti Warns Tokyo Against Signs of Over-Anxiety

88

98. Mr. Terasaki Replies to Mr. Iguti

88

99. Tokyo Denies Rumors of Dissension in Konoye Cabinet

89

100. Hull-Nomura Conversation (October 2, 1941)

90

(a) State Department's Report

90

(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report

93

101. Tokyo Reports Receiving America's Reply

93

102. Hull-Nomura Conversation (October 3, 1941)

93

(a) State Department's Report

93

(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report

94

103. Foreign Minister Toyoda Obtains a Copy of British Ambassador Craigie's Report (October 3, 1941)

94

104. Foreign Minister Toyoda Directs Ambassador Nomura to Submit Another Japanese Explanation

95

105. Ambassador Nomura Apologizes for His Hasty Conclusions

95

[iii]

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)

 

Page

106. Foreign Minister Toyoda Requests an Immediate Reply to His Message of October 4, 1941

96

107. Japanese-American Conversation

96

108. Grew-Toyoda Conversation (October 7, 1941)

97

(a) Ambassador Grew's Report

97

(b) Foreign Minister Toyoda's Report

97

109. Mr. Terasaki Interviews Ambassador Grew

98

110. Tokyo Explains Background of Japanese-American Negotiations to Japanese Ambassador in Berlin

99

111. Ambassador Nomura Explains the American Attitude Toward the Japanese Proposals

101

112. Mr. Terasaki Calls on Mr. Dooman (October 9, 1941)

102

113. Mr. Dooman Warns Mr. Terasaki Against New Japanese Troop Landings in French Indo-China

102

114. Hull-Nomura Conversation (October 9, 1941)

103

(a) State Department Report

103

(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report

104

115. Japanese-American Conversation (October 9, 1941)

104

(a) State Department Report

104

(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report

105

116. Foreign Minister Toyoda Is Dissatisfied with Ambassador Nomura's Reports

106

117. Ambassador Nomura Replies to Foreign Minister Toyoda's Complaint

106

118. Grew-Toyoda Conversation (October 10, 1941)

107

(a) Ambassador Grew's Report

107

(b) Foreign Minister Toyoda's Report

107

119. Tokyo Sends Instructions for Welles-Wakasugi Conference

108

120. Welles-Wakasugi Conversation (October 13. 1941)

109

(a) Under Secretary Welles' Report

109

(b) Mr. Wakasugi's Report

110

121. Secret Arrangements Are Made for Terasaki-Wakasugi Telephone Conversation

111

122. Ambassador Nomura Confers with Rear Admiral Turner (October 14, 1941)

112

123. American Sources Reveal Possibility of Early Russo-German Peace

112

124. Ambassador Grew Is Informed of German Pressure (October 15, 1941)

113

125. Rear Admiral Turner Confers with Mr. Terasaki (October 15, 1941)

113

126. Foreign Minister Toyoda Orders Further Welles-Wakasugi Conversations

114

127. Japanese Army Refuses to Evacuate Troops from China

114

128. Japan Reminds the United States of Its Obligation Under the Tripartite Pact

115

129. The Konoye Cabinet Resigns

115

130. Hull-Wakasugi-Welles Conversation (October 16 and October 17, 1941)

116

(a) Secretary Hull's Report

116

(b) Mr. Wakasugi's Report

116

131. Prince Konoye Bids Farewell to Ambassador Grew (October 17, 1941)

118

132. Hull-Wakasugi-Welles Conversation (October 17, 1941)

119

(a) Secretary Hull's Report

119

(b) Mr. Wakasugi's Report

119

PART B JAPANESE INTELLIGENCE IN DIPLOMATIC MESSAGES

122

(a) Reports from the United States

122

133. Japan Learns that American Oil Is Being Transported to Russia

122

134. Japan Learns of Shipment of American Planes to Russia

123

135. American Aid to Russia Is Viewed as Threat to Japan

123

136. Japan Attempts to Expand Its Intelligence Activities

124

137. Japanese Agents Note American Army and Air Group Activities

124

138. Japan Watches the Activities of a Russian Military Commission in the United States

124

139. Japanese Consuls Report on West Coast Shipping.

125

140. Foreign Minister Toyoda Sends New Instructions Concerning Intelligence Reports

126

(b) Reports from the Panama Canal

126

141. Japan Fails to Learn Destination of Planes Departing from Panama

126

142. Japanese Reports on Panama Military Installations

127

(c) Reports from the Philippine Islands

127

143. Japan Attempts to Identify British Vessels Reported at Manila

 127

[iv]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)

 

Page

144. Tokyo Inquires About a Floating Dry Dock Near Mariveles

127

145. Japanese Reports on Manila Anti-Aircraft Preparations

128

146. Japanese Report on American Airport Construction

128

147. Japan Inquires Concerning the U.S.S. Houston

128

148. Japanese Report on American Ship Movements in the Philippines

128

(d) Reports from the Hawaiian Islands

130

149. Japan Notes Activities of French in the Pacific

130

150. Japanese Foreign Minister Requests Special Intelligence Reports Concerning Pearl Harbor

130

151. Japanese Report on American Transportation of English Troops

131

(e) Reports from South America

131

152. Japanese Interest in Brazilian Air Fields

131

153. Minister Ishii Reports American Planes Arriving in Brazil

131

(f) Reports from Capetown, South Africa

131

154. Japanese Agents Report the Transportation of British Soldiers

131

155. Japan Watches British Shipping Near Cape of Good Hope

131

(g) Reports from Vladivostok, Russia

132

156. Departure of Russian Submarines

132

157. Japanese Learn of British Supply Route to Russia

132

[v]

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)

 

Page

PART C JAPANESE DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITIES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD

133

(a) Japanese-American Relations

133

158. Negotiations to Return American Missionaries to the United States Continue

133

159. Japan Fears American and British Alliance with Russia

133

160. Inventory of Secret Funds in Japanese Legations

133

161. New Military Attache Appointed to Japanese Embassy

134

162. Tokyo Reports Chinese Attempt to Draw United States Into War Against Japan

134

163. Mr. Malcolm Lovell Offers to Mediate Between Japan and China - —

135

164. Japanese Foreign Office Asserts Its Authority in Foreign Relations

135

165. Ambassador Nomura Suggests Suspension of Funds Pending Settlement of Financial Agreement

135

166. Freezing Order Curtails Japanese-American Trade

136

167. Ambassador Nomura Reports Indirect Participation of United States in the War Against Germany

136

168. Japan Plans to Evacuate Nationals from the United States

136

169. American Officials Search Japanese Business Offices in Los Angeles

136

170. Evacuation Committee Meets on August 18, 1941 to Discuss Return of Missionaries

137

171. The Japanese Embassy in Washington Reprimands the Tokyo Foreign Office

137

172. Japan Recognizes Russo-German War as Threat to Its Border

137

173. Consul Morishima Suggests Further Precautions to Ensure Secrecy of Dispatches

138

174. Change Predicted in Japanese-American Relations

138

175. Washington Warns Tokyo of Security Violation

138

177. Japanese Authorities Express Concern over United States' Official Inspection

138

178. Japan Reports Anti-Japanese Activities among American Missionaries in China

138

179. Japan Attempts Disposal of Certain Frozen Funds

139

180. Japan Learns Details of Churchill-Roosevelt Agreement

139

181. American Newspapermen in Italy Forecast Axis Defeat

139

182. Minister Sakaya Criticizes American Aid to Russia

140

183. Minister Schoenfield Clarifies American Policy

140

184. Japan Inquires About American Treatment of Japanese Nationals

140

185. Japan Suggests That Reciprocal Permits Facilitate Maintenance of American and Japanese

141

186. Japan Sets Date for Evacuation of American Missionaries

142

187. Japan Opposes American Aid Sent to Russia Via Vladivostok

142

188. Japanese Finance Minister Attempts to Avoid Petroleum Sales Restrictions

142

189. Ambassador Nomura Informs Tokyo of Transfer of Funds

143

190. Mr. Terasaki Plans to Confer with "America First" Committee

143

191. Japan Keeps in Touch with Its Nationals in America

143

192. Arrest of Japanese in Possession of Illegal Passports

143

193. Japanese Officials Leave for Japan (September 9, 1941)

143

194. Japanese Speculations Continue Regarding Myron Taylor's Return to Vatican

143

195. Mr. Myron Taylor Sees Possibility of Russo-German Peace Move

144

196. Japan Changes Military Attaches in United States

144

197. Freezing Order Necessitates Reorganization of Japanese Intelligence Activities

144

198. Freezing Order Curtails Japanese Intelligence Activities in America

145

200. American Isolationists Oppose President Roosevelt's Speech on Greer Incident

145

201. Japanese Intelligence Reports on American Airplane Production

145

202. Japan Denies Interfering with American Rights

146

203. Ambassador Nomura Requests Change in Japanese Broadcasts

146

204. Ambassador Nomura Reports on American Lend-Lease Shipments

146

205. Freezing Order Creates Financial Difficulties for Japanese Diplomats

147

206. Japan Stops Shipping Film to Germany Via America

147

207. German Attache Discounts Probability of Japanese-American War

147

208. Japan Estimates the Number of Potential Evacuees From the United States

148

(a) Report from Los Angeles

148

(b) Report from Portland, Oregon

148

(c) Report from New York

148

209. Foreign Minister Toyoda Explains Evacuation of Russian Embassy Members

148

210. Tokyo Learns that NBC Reception of Far Eastern Broadcasts Is on 24-Hour Basis

148

211. Consul Morishima Deplores Optimism of Japanese Business Firms

149

[vi]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)

 

Page

212. Japan Inquires Concerning the Releasing of Funds for Petroleum

149

213. Ambassador Nomura Asks Tokyo to Allow Americans to Leave Japan

149

214. Ambassador Nomura Requests Permits for Japanese Deposit Banks in America

149

215. Ambassador Nomura Requests That Cultural Institutions Be Exempted from Freezing

150

216. Japan Requests Mutual Agreement in Evacuating Nationals and Returning Goods

150

217. Japanese Foreign Minister Cites Instances of American Discrimination

150

218. Japan Registers Its Nationals in United States for Military Service

151

219. Japan Considers the Supplying of Oil to Russia an "Unfriendly Gesture"

151

220. Tokyo Requests the Addition of Four Japanese to Government List

151

221. Consul Sato Requests the Direct Evacuation of Japanese from Vancouver, Seattle and Portland

151

222. Freezing Order Forces the Evacuation of Many Japanese

152

223. Consul Morishima Reports on an Anti-Axis Pamphlet

152

224. Japan Exhibits Interest in American Military Magazines

153

225. Ambassador Nomura Asks Tokyo to Send American Paper Money

153

226. Ambassador Nomura Defends His Report Concerning Rumors in America

153

227. Major Yano Arranges Anti-American Espionage

154

228. Tokyo Releases the Schedules of Evacuation Vessels To Washington

154

229. Consul Muto Estimates Number of Potential Evacuees

154

230. Japan Requests Permits for Japanese to Reenter the United States

154

231. Japan Refuses to Recognize Yugoslavia

155

232. The United States Requests Fuel Oil for Its Tokyo Embassy and the Yokohama Consulate General

155

234. Japanese Agents Note Shipment of Light Bombers to Russia

155

235. Japan Receives Documents from New York Consulate

156

236. Japanese Secret Agents Procure a Message Sent by Secretary Hull

156

237. The Japanese Ambassador to Turkey Suggests Declaration of War Against the United States

156

(b) Japanese-Panamanian Relations

157

238. Japanese Officials Plan the Removal of Military Charts from Panama

157

239. Japanese Minister Asks Clarification of Duties of Subordinates

157

240. Panama Investigates the Attack on the Sessa

158

241. Panama's Foreign Minister Clarifies Panama's Position in Case of War

158

242. Minister Akiyama Estimates His Espionage and Propaganda Expenditures

158

243. Italian Maps of Panama Canal Shipped to Tokyo Via South America

159

244. Callao Merchants Forced to Secure Permits to Reship Japanese Goods to Panama

159

245. Foreign Minister Toyoda Requests Estimate of Number of Japanese Evacuees

159

246. Panamanian Official Denies Pressure by the United States

159

247. Minister Akiyama Inquires Concerning Japan's Acknowledgment of the New President

159

(c) Japanese-Philippine Relations

161

248. Japanese in Philippine Islands Request Passage to Japan

161

249. Consul Kihara Discusses Plight of Japanese Nationals with President Manuel Quezon

161

250. Consul Kihara Plans to Protect Japanese in Case of War

162

251. Consul Nihro Reports Trend Toward Philippine Independence

162

252. Filipinos Predict Japanese Occupation of Thailand

162

253. Consul Nihro Suggests Japanese Propaganda Against American Business Methods

163

254. Consul Nihro Requests Continuance of Japanese Shipping

163

255. Consul Nihro Urges Protection of Japanese Trade

163

256. Consul Nihro Requests Permits Be Granted to Receive Funds in Japan

164

257. Consul Nihro Plans to Agitate Against the United States

164

258. Foreign Minister Toyoda Restrains Consul Nihro from Disturbing the Diplomatic Situation

164

259. Japanese Plan Broadcast to the Philippines

164

260. Japanese Businessmen Return to Japan

164

261. Japanese Consul Requests Housing Facilities in Shanghai for Japanese Evacuees

165

262. State Department Official Discusses American Policies

165

263. Ambassador Nomura Encounters Difficulty in Handling Japanese-Philippine Problems

165

264. American Officials Apply Freezing Regulations Leniently

165

265. President Quezon's Illness Delays Trade Negotiations

166

266. The Japanese Attempt to Procure Molasses Export Permits

166

267. Japanese Optimism Concerning Trade Permits Is Dispelled

166

[vii]

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)

 

Page

268. Consul Nihro Requests Lenient Handling of Americans Passing Through Customs

167

269. Consul Nihro Requests Suppression by Tokyo of Inflammatory Newspaper Statements

167

270. Japanese Are Denied Molasses Permits

167

271. Lack of Shipping Curtails Japanese Mail to the Philippine Islands

168

272. Mr. Nihro Inquires Concerning Japanese-American Negotiations

168

273. Consul Nihro Rules Against Competition Among Japanese Firms

168

274. Japan Decides Against Subsidizing Philippine Political Candidates

169

275. Consul Nihro Reports Political Strife in the Philippines

169

276. Japanese and Philippine Diplomats Postpone Negotiations

169

277. Consul Nihro Asks That Lumber and Iron Ore Ships Be Dispatched Immediately

170

278. Japan Send the Hakone Maru to Evacuate Nationals

170

279. The Foreign Office Arranges the Sale of a Philippine Vessel

171

280. Japan Arrests Philippine Profiteers

171

281. The Foreign Office Directs That Machine Code Be Used Only for Official Messages

171

(d) Japanese-Mexican Relations

173

282. Japanese Agent Suggests Liquidating Petroleum Company

173

283. Japanese Commercial Representative Leaves Honduras

173

284. Minister Miura Encounters Difficulties in Financial Transactions

173

285. Minister Miura Suggests Waiting Policy in Resisting Trade Restrictions

173

286. Minister Miura Postpones Rayon Price Cutting Scheme

174

287. Minister Miura Opposes Dr. Tsuru's Silk Control Plan

174

288. Tokyo Directs the Pacific Petroleum Company to Close Its Office

175

289. Minister Miura Is Directed to Ship Machinery on the Azuma Maru

175

290. Dr. Tsuru Plans to Aid the Pacific Petroleum Company

175

291. Minister Miura Advises Against Sending the Azuma Maru to Manzanillo

176

292. The Pacific Petroleum Company Summarizes Its Assets

176

293. Japanese Legation Uses Secret Funds

176

294. Minister Miura Rejects Foreign Office's Secret Barter Scheme

176

295. Minister Miura Threatens to Resign

176

296. Minister Miura Withdraws Request for Additional Staff Members

177

297. Japan Lifts Ban on Silk Exports to Mexico

177

298. Japan Objects to Mexican Parcel Post Restrictions

177

299. The Japanese Foreign Office Instructs Minister Miura to Aid German Nationals

178

300. Japanese Officials Prepare for Arrival from Tokyo

178

301. Azuma Maru Leaves Japan on September 14, 1941

178

302. Special Japanese Naval Liaison Officer Is Selected

178

303. Mexico Receives No Japanese News

179

304. Minister Miura Foresees Difficulty in Shipping Machinery to Japan

179

306. Japanese Companies Attempt Barter Despite Mexican Restrictions

179

306. Japan Transports American Money for the German Legation

179

307. Minister Miura Requests Increased Expense Allowances

180

308. Japanese Foreign Minister Attempts to Expedite Barter Negotiations

180

309. Tokyo Accepts Mexican Inspection of Parcel Post

180

310. Japan Considers Evacuating Its Nationals in Mexico

181

311. Mitsui Company Considers Kato Barter Scheme

181

312. Foreign Minister Toyoda Requests Further Information on Kato Proposal

181

313. Japanese Military Officials Plan in Mexico to Leave for Japan

181

314. General Camacho Is Appointed to Cabinet

181

315. Minister Miura Suggests Selling Japanese Silk in Mexico

181

316. The Pacific Petroleum Company Ceases Operations

182

317. Minister Miura Reports on American-Mexican Negotiations (October 2, 1941)

182

318. Japan Releases Silk Shipment for Sale

182

319. Japanese Agents Propose to Smuggle Oil for Germany

183

320. Mexico Discovers Smuggled Mercury at Manzanillo

183

321. Japanese Navy Attache Leads Attempts to Acquire Fuel Oil

183

322. Pacific Petroleum Company Ships Machinery on Azuma Maru

183

323. Mexican Foreign Office Denies Japanese Request for Oil

183

324. Minister Miura Blames Minister Amezcua for Barter Failure

184

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TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)

 

Page

325. Minister Miura Suggests Using Illegal Methods

184

326. Two Japanese Army Officers Sail Aboard the Azuma Maru

184

327. Mexican Newspapers Suggest Recall of Japanese Representatives

184

328. American Embassy Is Responsible for Expose

185

329. Japanese Military Attache Requests Expansion of Intelligence Facilities in the United States

185

330. Japanese Vice Foreign Minister Criticizes Minister Miura for Requesting Information

185

331. Minister Miura Protests the Transfer of Translator Fukushima

185

(e) Japanese-South American Relations

187

332. Naval Attache Atsho Shigehiro Arrives in South America

187

333. Freezing Legislation Adversely Affects Japan

187

334. Japanese Representatives Visit South America

187

335. Minister Yamagato Reports Maru Schedules

187

336. Mr. Shinohara Makes Conflicting Travel Plans

188

337. Secretary Terasaki Establishes Intelligence Net in South America

188

339. Japanese Representatives Visit South American Countries

188

340. Japanese Espionage Network Begins Operations

189

341. Tripartite Powers Agree to Reciprocal Transportation of Diplomatic Material

190

342. Japan Plans to Evacuate Its Nationals

190

343. Japan Considers Using German Funds in South America

190

344. Japan Imposes New Censorship Restrictions

191

345. Foreign Minister Toyoda Explains Japan's Foreign Policy

191

346. Japan Plans to Sabotage American-Bolivian Trade Activities

191

347. Japan Requires Military Registration of Its Nationals

191

(a) Argentina

192

348. Minister Tomii Warns Tokyo of Insecure Telephone Communications

192

349. Japanese Minister Stresses Argentina's Desire for Neutrality

192

350. Japanese Minister Says Argentina Favors the United States

192

351. Minister Tomii Protests the Smuggling of a Radio Transmitter into Argentina

193

352. Argentina Minority Criticizes Anti-Axis Trend

193

353. Joint Japanese-Argentina Trade Conference Is Advocated

194

(b) Brazil

194

354. Tokyo Seeks Evidence in Brazil Against Japanese Journalist

194

355. Colonel Uchinomiya Leaves Japan for Post in Brazil

194

356. United States Officials Advise Brazil on Purchase of Axis Ships

195

357. Japanese Army Negotiates for Purchase of Brazilian Diamonds

195

358. Japan Promotes Propaganda Activities

195

359. Japan Learns of Portugal's Plans to Protect Atlantic Possessions

195

(c) Chile

196

360. Tokyo Seeks American Equipment for Chilean Attache

196

361. Japan Attempts to Raise Money for Chilean Purchases

196

362. Japan Plans to Take Advantage of Anti-American Feeling in Chile

196

363. Secretary Ichiro Kawasaki Is Ordered Home

197

(d) Columbia

197

364. Special Courier to Bring Secret Documents to Bogota

197

365. Minister Iungo Yanai Condemns Lack of Security in Commercial Dispatches

197

366. Minister Yanai Requests Additional Funds

197

(e) Ecuador-Peru

197

367. Messrs. Watanabe and Makizawa Leave Peru for Ecuador

197

368. Peruvian-Ecuadorean Border Dispute Continues

198

369. Ecuador Blames Standard Oil Company for Border Incident

198

370. President Arroyo Del Rio Clears Japanese Commercial Experts

198

371. Peruvian Minister Accuses Ecuador of Creating Border Incident

198

372. Minister Sakamoto Requests Azuma Maru Be Sent to Lima

198

373. Japan Attempts to Bribe Peruvian Officials

199

374. Mr. Kihara Replaces Secretary Matsumoto in Peru

199

375. Japan Continues Trade with Peru

199

(f) Japanese-British Relations

201

[ix]

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)

 

Page

376. British Freezing Order Impels Japanese to Evacuate Hongkong

201

378. Rumors Indicate Japanese Evacuation Near Johore

201

379. Japanese Officials and News Correspondents Prepare to Leave London

201

380. Japan Considers Bartering with British

202

381. Japan Investigates British Military Preparations in Iran

202

382. Japanese Business Firms Charge Singapore Police with Oppression

203

383. Tokyo Continues Negotiations for Barter with British

203

384. Foreign Minister Toyoda Criticizes Editorial Policy of Singapore Herald

203

385. Canada Imposes Restrictions on Foreign Messages

204

386. Canada Plans to Exchange Ministers with Chungking

204

387. Tokyo Permits British Evacuation from Japan

204

388. Tokyo Evacuates Nationals in British Territory

205

389. Britain Guarantees Safe Passage for Hakone Maru

205

390. British and Japanese Banks Negotiate Trade Settlements

205

391. Japanese Embassy in London Discloses Background of Atlantic Charter

205

392. Japanese Embassy Comments on Situations in Iran and Africa

206

393. British-Russian Advance Cuts Off German Escape

206

394. Japanese Intelligence Discloses Possibility of German Attack on Turkey

206

395. Disposition of British Fleet Affects German-French Peace Negotiations

207

396. Canadian Prime Minister Advocates American Aid to Britain

207

397. Japan Fears British-Chinese Collaboration

208

398. Britain Suppresses Japanese Propaganda in China

208

399. Britain Seeks Chinese Translators

208

400. Japan Seeks Funds to Operate Malayan Mines

209

401. British Embassy Burns All Important Documents

209

402. The Fuso Maru, an Evacuation Ship, Schedules a Stop at Singapore

209

403. Japan Intercedes with Britain for Germans in Iran

209

404. Canada Maintains Diplomatic Relations with Vichy

210

405. Foreign Minister Toyoda Anticipates Anglo-Japanese Evacuation Agreement

210

406. Hiye Maru Is Used in Japanese Evacuation

210

407. "Central China Post" Strike Remains Unsettled

210

408. Japan Prohibits Unauthorized Newspaper Articles

211

409. Japan Denies Blockade of Hongkong Waters

211

410. British Authorities Seize Egyptian Steamer

211

411. British Seek to Check Germans in Black Sea Area

211

412. Japan Requests Reciprocity in Evacuation Plans

212

413. British Request License to Export Glycerin

212

414. Japanese Face Financial Difficulties in Canada

212

415. Tokyo Protests Against Canadian Censorship

212

416. British Authorities Delay Loading of Fuso Maru

213

417. Mr. Horiuchi and British Official Confer on Export Difficulties

214

418. Britain Issues Warning to Finland

214

419. Britain Prohibits Code Telegrams in Iran

214

420. Japan Threatens to Rescind Glycerin Permit

214

421. Shanghai Suggests Retaliation Against British

215

422. Churchill Reports on British Position in Russo-German War

215

423. Premier Gailani in Political Exile in Iran

216

424. Japanese Navy Uses Chungking Currency for Secret Purchases

217

425. British and Japanese Authorities Disagree on Shanghai Custom Officials

217

426. Japan Attempts to Adjust Its Currency

218

427. Japan Curtails Allied Propaganda

218

428. Japanese Official to Be Recalled from Singapore

218

429. Japan Fears British Strength in Far East

218

430. Japan Exchanges Merchandise with Spain

219

431. Tokyo Arranges Disposal of Japanese Bonds

219

(g) Japanese-German Relations

221

432. Hitler Stops German-Vichy Conversations

221

433. Foreign Minister Toyoda Reviews Japan's Policies

221

[x]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)

 

Page

434. Ambassador Oshima Correlates German-Russian Battle Reports

222

435. The Foreign Minister Explains That Communication Difficulties Impede the

222

436. Ambassador Oshima Again Urges Active Support of Tripartite Pact

223

437. Ambassador Oshima Reveals German Organization for the Occupation of Russia

223

438. Rumors of Japanese Representations to U.S.S.R. Reach Germany

223

439. Ambassador Oshima's Resignation Is Refused

224

440. The German Army Progresses Against Russia

224

441. Germany Advises Evacuation of Consular Officials From Occupied Territories

224

442. Manchukuoan-German Trade Retarded by War

224

443. Japan Learns of German Undercover Activities in China

225

444. Japan Cultivates the Interest of the German People

225

445. Ambassador Oshima Admonishes Tokyo for Lack of Decisive Attitude

225

446. Ambassador Oshima Objects to Japan's Use of Russian News Releases

226

447. Foreign Minister Toyoda Upholds Japan's Methods

226

448. Ambassador Oshima Confers with Field Marshal Keitel

227

449. Field Marshal Keitel Explains Germany's War Aims

228

450. Nationalistic Chinese in Germany Present a Problem to the Axis

228

451. Japanese-German Trade Continues Despite Difficulties of War

228

452. German Army Plans to Advance Along Leningrad-Sverdlovsk Railroad After Leningrad Falls

229

453. Rumors of Mobilization on Bulgarian-Turkish Border Disproved

230

454. Ambassador Oshima Tours Occupied European Countries

230

455. Ambassador Oshima Again Threatens Resignation

230

456. German National Defense Ministry Estimates Current Situation

231

457. Japan Repudiates Poland

231

458. Germany Explains the Greer Incident

231

459. Ambassador Oshima Learns of German Transactions for South American Money

231

460. New Japanese-German Shipping Problems Arise

232

461. The German Army Reaches Leningrad

232

462. Ambassador Oshima Inspects Bombing at Hamburg

232

463. Respective Treatments of Russian and German Nationals Reviewed

232

464. Ambassador Suma Confers with General Franco

233

465. Axis Powers Develop Communications Intelligence

233

466. Communications Difficulties Noted in Switzerland

234

467. Berlin and Tokyo Negotiate for Improved Communications

234

468. Rumanian Losses Revealed

235

469. Ambassador Oshima Denies Rumors of Russo-German Pre-War Negotiations

235

470. Ambassador Oshima Counteracts British and American Propaganda

236

471. Ambassador Oshima Reports on Russo-German Warfare, October 11, 1941

236

472. Ambassador Oshima Urges Support of Germany's War

238

473. Promiscuous Dissemination of Restricted News Is Condemned by Foreign Minister Toyoda

238

474. Government Control of Press Urged by Ambassador Oshima

238

475. Germany and Turkey Sign Commercial Pact

239

476. Ambassador Oshima Confers with Foreign Minister Von Ribbentrop

239

477. Germany Disapproves of Japan's Attitude Toward Russian-American Trade

239

478. Ambassador Oshima Objects to Pro-American Statements

240

479. Japanese-German Trade Difficulties Recur

240

480. German Manufacturers Aid Japan's War Industries

241

481. Ambassador Oshima Reports on German War Plans, October 16, 1941

242

(h) Japanese-Russian Relations

243

482. Ambassador Smetanin Urges Support of the Japanese-Russian Neutrality Pact

243

483. Japan Tells Germany Its Adherence to Neutrality Pact Is First Step Against Russia

243

484. Mongolian-Manchukuoan Boundary Dispute Settled

243

485. Finland Regains Territory Ceded to Russia

244

486. Japan Notes Stiffening of Russian Resistance

245

487. Leningrad Is Bombed and Kiev Falls

245

488. Japan Protests Against Russian Floating Mines

245

489. Japanese Intelligence Reveals Hitler's Demands on Russia Prior to German-Russian War

246

490. Ambassador Tatekawa Reports Discontent in Russia

246

[xi]

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)

 

Page

491. Japanese Diplomat Supports Neutrality Pact with Russia

246

492. Ambassador Tatekawa Recognizes Russian Strength

247

493. Ambassador Tatekawa Reports on War Progress (October 8, 1941)

247

494. Ambassador Tatekawa and Staff Evacuate Moscow

247

(i) Japanese-Italian Relations

249

495. The Italian Press Urges Japan to Attack Allies

249

496. Ambassador Horikiri Reveals Alleged Plans for Hitler-Mussolini Meeting

249

497. Ambassador Horikiri Suggests Use of Anti-Russian Propaganda

249

498. Ambassador Horikiri Reports on the Italian Occupation of Croatia

249

499. Ambassador Horikiri Again Urges Japan to Attack in the East

250

500. Mr. Filippo Anfuso Reports on Hitler-Mussolini Meeting

250

501. Italy Suspects Japan of Neglecting Tripartite Pact

251

502. Japan Learns of United States Representations to the Vatican

251

503. War Creates Difficulties for Japanese Exchange Students

252

504. Mr. Virginio Gayda Urges Japan to Enter or to Threaten War on the United States

252

505. Ambassador Horikiri Urges Japan to Decorate Outstanding Italians

253

506. Ambassador Horikiri Reports on the Italian Economic Situation

253

507. Italian Envoy Urges Action by Japan

253

508. Ambassador Horikiri Objects to Ending Japanese Trade with Italy

254

(j) Japanese-French Relations

255

509. Japan Requests Increase in Japan-Thailand Plane Service

255

510. France Asks Permission to Exchange Soldiers Between Shanghai and French Indo-China

255

511. Japan Insists That France Recognize the Wang Regime

256

512. Japan Demands Further French "Cooperation"

256

513. Japan Attempts to Limit Its Exchange Agreement with France

256

514. Japan Plans to Send Investigating Committee to French Indo-China

256

515. Marshal Petain Broadcasts to the French People

257

516. Ambassador Kato's Opinions on Conditions in France

257

517. Japan Demands Rubber Supply Allotted to the United States

257

518. Japanese Occupation Expenses Create Difficulty in Currency Exchange

258

519. Japan Vetoes a Proposed German Legation in Indo-China

258

520. Japan Demands French Concurrence in the Establishment of the Japan-Thailand Air Route

259

521. Ambassador Kato Reports on the Attempted Assassination of Mr. Pierre Laval and Mr. Marcel Deat

259

522. Japan Increases Demands for Indo-China Rubber

259

523. Japan Decrees Expulsion of Hostile Chinese in French Indo-China

260

524. French Vice Premier Doubts German Propaganda

261

525. France Resists Japan's Insistent Requests for Recognition of Nanking

261

527. Japanese Official Suggests That Domei News Agency Be Admonished

261

528. Japanese Diplomatic Staff in Vichy Experiences Privations of War

261

529. Germany Agrees to Shipment of French Rubber to Japan

261

530. Occupation Expenses Negotiations Are Transferred to Diplomatic Channels

262

531. Japan Insists That France Pay Supplementary Occupation Expenses

262

532. Ambassador Kato Reports That Germany Favors Franco-German Collaboration

263

533. France Delays Payment of Occupation Expenses

263

534. Vice Premier Darlan Denies Seeking American Intervention

263

535. Japan Seizes a Railroad and Demands Military Installations in French Indo-China

264

536. Vichy Reports on Japanese Experimental Broadcast

264

537. Japanese Army Arrests Annamites in French Indo-China

265

538. German Ambassador Suggests Use of French Annamite in Japanese Sabotage Plans

265

539. Japan Plans Use of Transferable Yen or Gold in Exchange Payment

265

540. Japan Requests Additional 100,000,000 Piasters for Occupation Force

266

541. Japanese Official Carries Secret Documents to Hanoi and Saigon

266

542. Japanese Ambassadors Suggest Decorations for German Diplomats in Vichy

266

543. France Accedes to Japanese Demand for Additional 10,000 Tons of Rubber

267

544. France Protests Against Japanese Demands for Dapuko Barracks

267

545. French Indo-China Fears Collapse of Financial Structure

267

(k) Japanese-Chungking Relations

269

[xii]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)

 

Page

546. Chungking Leaders Open Southwestern Military Conference

269

547. Japanese Intelligence Discerns American-British Aid to China

269

548. Transportation Experts Visit China

269

549. Japanese Demand That Macao Authorities Halt Allied Smuggling

270

550. Chinese Communists Take Advantage of British-American-Russian Conference to Present Demands

270

551. Mao Tse-Tung Promotes Communist-Nationalist Relations

271

552. Chinese Educator Believes Anti-Communist Faction Will Impede Joint Russo-Chinese Military Action

271

553. Chinese Educator Claims Only Anti-Japanese Encirclement Policy Will Save Chungking

271

554. Japan Detects Growing Anti-Communist Sentiment in Nationalist Headquarters

271

555. Chiang Kai-shek Encounters Opposition to Establishment of Southwestern Military Headquarters

272

556. Chicago Times Writer Labels Russian Aid to China Insignificant

272

557. Chinese Pilots Train in American Camps

272

558. Chiang Kai-shek Is Skeptical of Peace Talks

272

559. Japan Considers Possibility of Sabotaging the Socialist Conference With Four Changs

273

560. Japanese Intelligence Locates Chungking Armies in Burma Territory

273

561. Chungking Voids Existing Legal Tender

273

562. Lanchow Agreement Is Concluded—Lattimore Reports to Chiang Kai-shek

273

563. Japan Interprets Communist-Nationalist Truce

274

564. Proposal for Four Power Drive Against Japan Is Rejected by Moscow

275

565. Tokyo Analyzes China's Financial Crisis

275

566. United States Representatives Arrive in Chungking to Solve Economic Problems

276

567. U.S.S. President Coolidge Unloads Troops and Tanks at Unidentified Chinese Port

277

568. Japan Believes American Loan Is Reason for Visit of United States Representatives

277

569. Japan Promotes the Establishment of Independent Mohammedan Area

277

570. Japan Anticipates Peace on China Front

277

(l) Japanese-Nanking Relations

279

571. New Bank Notes Pay Custom Taxes

279

572. Nanking Clarifies Its Duties Toward China Concessions

279

573. Ambassador Honda Asks to Retain His Present Status

279

574. Japanese Offices in Central China Receive New Code

280

575. Nanking Fears Interception of Its Messages by Chungking

280

576. Nanking Army Refuses to Interfere with Problem Concerning Custom Officials

280

577. Japan Negotiates Peace Terms with Shansi Army

280

578. Nanking Requests a Military Allotment from Japan

281

579. Japanese Consul-Generals in China to Meet in Conference

281

580. Japan Freezes Foreign Currency in Chinese Reserve Bank

281

581. Shanghai Restrictions on Gasoline Impede Japanese Military Transportation

282

582. Berlin Appoints German Officials in China

282

583. Shanghai Sets Date for Intelligence Meeting

282

584. Japanese Official Observes Conditions in North China

283

585. Japan Seeks Ratification of Treaty with Shansi Army

283

586. Japan Extends Loan for Central China Operations

284

587. Japanese Official Reviews Chinese Reserve Bank Problem

284

588. Nanking Ambassador to Leave for Post in Germany

284

589. Japan Concerned over Delay in Appointing Nanking Ambassador to Italy

285

590. Berlin Appoints German Officials to Nanking

285

591. Nanking Ambassador Delays Trip to Germany

285

592. President Wang Seeks Information on Japanese-American Relations

286

593. Germany Appoints Pro-Japanese Diplomats in China

286

594. Tokyo Arranges Reception for Nanking Officials Going Abroad

286

595. Chungking Investigates Rumors of Shansi Army Surrender

286

596. President Wang Takes Active Part in Japanese-American Negotiations

287

(m) Japanese-Netherlands East Indies

289

597. Zoku Nomoto Instructs Telegraphic Clerks in New Code Systems

289

598. Japanese Finance Officials Negotiate for Circulation of Japanese Currency

289

[xiii]

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)

 

Page

599. Mr. Imagawa Discusses Japanese Currency Problems with Mr. Hoogstraten (August 7, 1941)

289

600. Second Trade Conference Ends in Disagreement over Japanese-Dutch Contracts (August 8, 1941)

290

601. Dutch Indecision on Petroleum Exports Delays Japanese Tankers

291

602. Japan Publishes Conversations with Finance Authorities

291

603. Native Indonese Leaders Pledge Support to Netherlands Government

291

604. Japan Proposes Reciprocal Financial Guarantees

292

605. Japanese Officials Meet with Mr. Hoogstraten in Fourth Trade Conference (August 12, 1941)

292

606. Thaiese Consul-General Visits Mr. Ishizawa

293

607. Dutch Firms Complain of Japanese Trade Practices

293

608. The Netherlands East Indies Prepares for War

294

609. Japan Seeks Ratification of Mining Agreement

295

610. Mr. Ishizawa Confers with Mr. Hoogstraten on Petroleum Questions (August 16, 1941)

295

611. Mr. Imagawa Emphasizes Importance of Handels Bank Problem

296

612. Dutch Merchants in Kobe are Dissatified

297

613. Netherlands Indies Places Restrictions on Japanese Business

297

(a) Suppression of Japanese Newspapers

297

(b) Java Prohibits Japanese Language Phone Calls

297

(c) Japanese South Seas Company Unable to Pay Telegraph Bill

297

614. Japanese Propaganda Active in East Indies

297

615. Netherlands East Indies Refuses Military Supplies to Japan

298

616. Mr. Ishizawa Asks Permission to Return to Japan

299

617. Mr. Saito Reports Difficulty in Purchasing Military Supplies

300

618. Japan's Reactions to Netherlands Increased Trade Restrictions

300

(a) Japanese Boycott Dutch Firms

300

(b) Japanese Official Leaves Soerabaja with Secret Documents

300

619. Netherlands East Indies Government Supports Chiang Kai-shek

300

620. Mr. Ishizawa Proposes Bank Loans to Japanese Evacuees

301

621. Foreign Minister Toyoda Requests Clarification of Proposals

302

622. Tokyo Disapproves Japanese Evacuation

302

623. Tokyo Sends Funds for Trade Promotion

303

624. Mr. Hoogstraten Calls on Mr. Ishizawa to Refute Japanese Statements (September 5, 1941)

303

625. Japanese Finance Ministry Issues Limited Permits to Dutch Firms

304

626. Japanese Fuel Bureau Reports Shortage of Oil

304

627. Mr. Ishizawa Answers Fuel Bureau's Message

304

628. Mr. Ishizawa Requests Code Names for Japanese Firms

305

629. Tokyo Requests Information on Japanese Fishing Companies

305

630. Batavia Sends Statistics on Fishing Companies

305

631. Mr. Ishizawa Confers with Mr. Hoogstraten on Petroleum Exports (September 8, 1941)

306

632. Japanese Couriers Arouse Suspicion in Indies

306

633. Japanese Minister Decides Polices for Deposit Loans

307

634. Mr. Ishizawa Comments on Deposit Policies

307

635. Mr. Hayasaki Reports Dutch Military Preparations

308

636. Mr. Ishizawa Requests Investigation of Shipping Problems

308

637. Tokyo to Facilitate Release of Confiscated Cargo

309

638. Dutch Government Offices Rumored Moving to Bandong

309

639. Mr. Ishizawa Suggests Reciprocal Shipping Arrangements to Mr. Hoostraten (September 10, 1941)

309

640. Dutch Officials Relax Freezing Order on Japanese Banks.

310

641. Mr. Ishizawa Confers with Mr. Rofinck (September 11, 1941)

310

642. Japanese Official Questions Minister Pabst (September 11, 1941)

310

643. Mr. Ishizawa Continues Arrangements for Evacuees Deposit Loans

311

644. Mr. Ogura Opposed Stipulations of Deposit Loan Plan

311

645. Tokyo Issues Instructions for Use of Codes

312

646. Tokyo Wires Instructions for Mitsui Tankers

312

647. Japan Urges Continued Trade Negotiations with the Dutch

312

648. Japanese Firms Request Exchange of Telegrams Through Consulates

312

649. Batavia Censors Japanese News

313

650. Japanese Ambassador to France Visits Holland

313

651. Finance Ministry Formulates Policies for Conversion of Accounts

313

[xiv]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)

 

Page

652. Japanese Officials to Redeem Guilder Currency

314

653. Japanese Intelligence Locates Indonese Fortifications

314

654. Dutch Officials Investigate Chinese on the Islands

315

655. Batavian Officials Restrict Travel

315

656. Japanese Physician Seeks Admittance to Netherlands Hospital

315

657. Japan Questions Possibility of Continuing Trade Negotiations

316

658. Mr. Ishizawa Plans Return to Japan

316

659. Mr. Ishizawa's Final Conversation with Mr. Hoogstraten (October 8, 1941)

316

660. Japan Decides Policies on Trade with Netherlands East Indies

317

661. Japanese Officials Suggest Trade Through Barter Method

319

662. Batavian Officials Refuse Admission to Japanese Bacteriologist

319

663. Japan to Operate Air Service Between Palao and Timor

319

(n) Japanese-Thaiese Relations

321

664. Japan Opens Further Financial Negotiations in Thailand

321

665. American Assets Are Frozen in Thai Bank

321

666. Japan Negotiates for Needed Thaiese Exports

321

667. Tokyo Answers Inquiry in Regard to Financial Negotiations

321

668. Thailand Issues Warning as Japanese Troops Draw Nearer

322

669. Japan Fears British Influence in Thailand

322

670. Japan Appoints Teiiji Tsubokami as Ambassador to Thailand

322

671. Japan Fears That Other Countries Will Desire Raise in Legation Status

323

672. Thailand Recognizes Manchukuo

323

673. Japan Continues Financial Negotiations

323

674. Japanese Intelligence Discloses British-American Reactions to Japan's Southward Expansion

324

675. Thailand Declares Its Sovereignty

324

676. Japan Proclaims Ambassador's Appointment on August 16, 1941

324

677. Japanese Agents Report That the British-Thaiese Trade Agreements Is Discontinued

325

678. Japanese Minister Futami Learns That Thailand Did Not Disarm

326

679. Japan Decrees That Ambassador Tsubokami Assume Thai Post on September 1, 1941

326

680. Japanese Officials Plan Special Ceremony to Present Japanese Ambassador

326

681. Thaiese Counter Proposal Delays Financial Negotiations

326

682. Japan and Thailand Conclude Their Financial Agreement on August 26, 1941

326

683. Japan Announces Agreement to Press

327

684. Japan Blames British and American Propaganda for Anti-Japanese Feeling in Thailand

327

685. Japan Refuses Crude Oil Supply to Thailand

327

686. Japanese "Theatre Group" Visits Thailand to Film Landscape and Shipping Activities

328

687. Japan Investigates the Reception of Domei News Broadcasts

328

688. Japan Continues Negotiations for Tin and Rubber Products

328

689. Mr. Asada Gives Opinions on Thailand's Reaction to the French Indo-China Occupation

328

690. Adviser Ono to Return to Japan

329

691. Thailand Attempts to Restrict the Entrance of Japanese Nationals

329

692. Japanese Officials Discuss British-Thaiese Trade Agreement

329

693. Ambassador Tsubokami Suggests Methods of Propaganda Improvement

329

694. Japan Plans Joint Japanese-Thailand Shipping Company

330

695. Bangkok Minister Helps to Evacuate Japanese Nationals in East Asia and India

330

696. Japan Plans to Establish and Control Thaiese Hydroelectric Power Station

331

697. Thailand Declares Neutrality Stand

331

698. Japanese Agents Gather Intelligence on British Malaya and Thailand

331

699. Circulars Denounce Mr. Wanitto as Traitor to Thailand

332

700. Japan Plans to Establish a Commercial Drug Concern in Thailand

333

701. The Misuse of Rubber Control Guild Creates Difficulties

333

702. Japanese Navy Purchases Rubber Without Consulting Embassy

333

703. Japan Promises Ambassador to Coordinate Purchases Through its Embassy

333

704. Wanitto's Signature Creates Disturbance in Shipping Plans

334

705. Japan Adds Military Intelligence Men to Thailand Embassy as Non-Career Clerks

334

706. Japanese Evince Interest in Thai Hospitals and Sanitation

334

707. Thai Troops Stage Demonstration Near Japanese Embassy

334

708. Japan Declares its Position in Handling Anticipated Thaiese Problems

335

[xv]

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)

 

Page

709. Thailand Government Becomes Suspicious of Japanese Actions

335

710. Japanese Plan to Establish Commercial Drug Concern Progresses

335

711. Japan Attempts to Have Thailand Waive Medical Examinations for Doctor's License

336

712. Japan Considers Thaiese Ruling a Possible Obstacle to the Establishment of Shipping Concern

336

713. Japan Negotiates for Food with Nai Wanitto

337

714. Ambassador Tsubokami Suggests the Protection of Wanitto in Countering British Propaganda Activities

337

[xvi]

OUTLINE OF VOLUME III

Part A

Hull-Nomura Conversations (August 5, 1941 - October 17, 1941)

(a) Secretary Hull's Reports
(b) Ambassador Nomura's Reports

Part B

Japanese Naval Intelligence in Diplomatic Messages

(a) Reports from the United States
(b) Reports from the Panama Canal
(c) Reports from the Philippine Islands
(d) Reports from the Hawaiian Islands
(e) Reports from South America
(f) Reports from Capetown, South Africa
(g) Reports from Vladivostok, Russia

Part C

Japanese Diplomatic Activities Throughout the World

(a) Japanese-American Relations
(b) Japanese-Panamanian Relations
(c) Japanese-Philippine Relations
(d) Japanese-Mexican Relations
(e) Japanese-South American Relations
(f) Japanese-British Relations
(g) Japanese-German Relations
(h) Japanese-Russian Relations
(i) Japanese-Italian Relations
(j) Japanese-French Relations
(k) Japanese-Chungking Relations
(1) Japanese-Nanking Relations
(m) Japanese-Dutch Relations
(n) Japanese-Thaiese Relations

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

CHAPTER III

Renewed Insistence by the Japanese Government upon Its Peaceful Purposes—Resumption of Conversations[1]

PART A—HULL-NOMURA CONVERSATIONS (August 5, 1941 - October 17, 1941)

1. Tokyo Sends New Proposal to Ambassador Nomura (August 5, 1941)

Despite Japan's efforts to solve the difficulties in Japanese-American relations, domestic issues were frequently an obstacle. Furthermore, on August 5, 1941 Foreign Minister Toyoda advised Ambassador Nomura that though he had reported that President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull, despite the opposition of American public opinion, were displaying considerable understanding in their attitude toward Japan, many Japanese were complaining against the intensified economic pressure being exerted by the United States.[2]

A newspaper report that President Roosevelt either had ordered the complete suspension of petroleum exports, or was about to curtail them, had created a great deal of antagonism in Japan. Warning that the continuance of such economic pressure or the maintenance of an encirclement policy would jeopardize Japanese-American relations, the Japanese Foreign Minister declared that both countries had reached the most important and most critical moment in their relations. To avert the impression that current negotiations had been begun under the threat of economic pressure, he suggested that all measures that might be construed as such should be abandoned at once.

Stating that Japan now proposed a new plan which was based on the one outlined by the last Cabinet, and which had been drawn up as a reply to the proposal of President Roosevelt on July 24, 1941 with the intention of incorporating its provisions into the final agreement, the Japanese Foreign Minister commented:

With this instrument, we hope to resume the Japanese-United States negotiations which were suspended because of the delay in the delivery of our revised proposals of 14 July and because of our occupation of French Indo-China which took place in the meantime.[3]

Ambassador Nomura was also instructed to explain verbally that Japan's action in peacefully occupying French Indo-China was a joint defense measure to make intervention by a third country unnecessary.[4] According to this explanation, Japanese public opinion had become aroused by the attitude of England, the United States and the Netherlands East Indies, and for this reason French Indo-China had to be occupied to restrain those in Japan who were clamoring for vigorous overseas action.

In his instructions to Ambassador Nomura, Foreign Minister Toyoda admitted that this explanation might not completely eliminate the sense of uneasiness felt by the United States, but he believed that at least it would be accepted conditionally. Acting on this assumption, Japan had decided that discussions on the new proposal should be conducted unofficially and in secret.

[1] Chapter title taken from the division arrangement of the State Department documents—Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States-Japan, 1931-1941 in two volumes, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1943, Volume II, 343. Hereafter referred to as S.D., II.
[2] Appendix III, No. 1. Hereafter Appendix III will be referred to as III, 1.
[3] Ibid.
[4] III, 2.

[1]

Stressing the anxiety of both countries to determine the fundamental causes which had led to the present critical condition, and emphasizing the belief that America was as desirous as Japan to remove or otherwise relieve, at its source, any and all military, economic, and political uneasiness existing between the two nations, Japan made the following proposals:

(1) The government of Japan definitely promises the following:

(a) So as to remove all military threats to the territories held by the United States, Japan will not occupy any territory in the Southwestern Pacific area, other than French Indo-China. Moreover, the Japanese military forces in French Indo-China will be removed immediately upon the conclusion of the China Incident.

(b) For the purpose of removing all military and political threats to the Philippine Islands, we shall, at an opportune moment, guarantee the neutrality of those Islands. In return we ask that the Imperial Government and its people be treated in the same manner as those of all other countries, including the United States.

(c) In order to remove the cause of the unsettled economic condition between the two countries in East Asia, we will cooperate in the production of and access to the natural resources of this area which are essential to the United States.

(2) The United States definitely promises the following:

(a) For the purpose of removing military threats to the Japanese Empire and to the importing and exporting of goods to and from Japan, the United States will cease military operations in the Southwestern Pacific area. Moreover, upon the effectuating of this agreement, the United States will use its good offices to have the governments of Britain and the Netherlands East Indies to take similar steps.

(b) For the purpose of removing the causes of military, political, and economic conflict between the two countries in-----, the United States will cooperate with Japan in the production of and access to natural resources of the Southwest Pacific area particularly of the Netherlands East Indies, which are essential to Japan. Moreover, the United States will cooperate with Japan in trying to have all the latter's differences with the Netherlands East Indies settled.

(c) In connection with the above, suitable measures shall be adopted immediately by the two nations to bring about the resumption of the profitable trade relations which used to exist between Japan and the United States.

(d) In view of the promise made by the Government of Japan under (1), (a), of the above, and with a view toward bringing about a settlement of the China Affair, the Government of the United States shall use its good offices to bring about a peace conference between Japan and the Chiang regime. Also, even after the withdrawal of Japanese troops from French Indo-China, Japan's special position there will be given recognition. (Last sentence garbled, gist guessed at.)

(3) Public Announcement. (-----will be stressed verbally) as was stated above, negotiations of this proposal shall be made in secrecy. Should, however, it become evident that it would be to the interest of both nations if part or all of the points contained were made public, it shall be done at the time and in the manner agreed upon by the two participants.5

2. Hull-Nomura Conversation (August 6, 1941)

(a) State Department Report[6]

On August 6, 1941 the Japanese Ambassador called on the Secretary of State to submit his government's reply to President Roosevelt's proposal of July 24, 1941. Explaining that the delay in answering had taken place in Tokyo, and that he had not received instructions until the preceding evening, Ambassador Nomura read an oral statement and then handed a copy of it to Mr. Ballantine.

The document stated that in order to mollify Japanese public opinion by counteracting the successive measures taken by the United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands East Indies against Japan, and to preserve peace in the Pacific, the Japanese government had effected a joint occupation of French Indo-China for the purpose of self-defense.7 To dispel the anxiety which America had manifested over this situation, the Japanese government had in-

[5] III, 2. For English text of this proposal as submitted by Ambassador Nomura to Secretary Hull, see S.D., II, 549. The English text was also sent to Tokyo by Ambassador Nomura, III, 3-5.
[6] "Memorandum of a conversation", initialed by Mr. Joseph W. Ballantine, August 6, 1941, S.D., II, 546-548.
[7] "Oral statement handed by the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) to the Secretary of State on August 6, 1941", S.D., II, 548-549. See III, No. 1 for text as sent by Tokyo on August 5, 1941.

[2]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

structed Ambassador Nomura to enter into negotiations on an "off the record" basis, and to submit a proposal which was intended as a reply to the suggestion made by President Roosevelt on July 24, 1941. This would serve as a fresh basis for a Japanese-American understanding. Any agreements resulting from the negotiations would be then incorporated into the general formula for the adjustment of Japanese-American relations.

Japan believed that both countries realized it was more than ever necessary to examine calmly with mutual understanding the diverse viewpoints of the two nations. In order to remove the causes responsible for military, political, and economic friction between Japan and the United States, the Japanese government would agree not to station troops in the Southwest Pacific, except in French Indo-China, and to withdraw its army even from that area when the China Incident had reached a settlement.

In turn, America was to suspend its military measures in the Southwest Pacific area and was to advise Great Britain and the Netherlands to take similar steps. Japan also guaranteed the neutrality of the Philippine Islands, provided that discriminatory measures would not be taken against Japanese subjects by either the United States or any other nation. By close cooperation between Japan and the United States in the production and procurement of such natural resources as might be required by either country, normal trade relations were to be restored.[8]

Although Ambassador Nomura wished to discuss the contents of the Japanese proposal immediately, Secretary Hull pocketed the copy given him, and suggested that any discussion of it be postponed pending his study of the document. Admitting to the Japanese Ambassador that he was pessimistic regarding the value of the proposal which had been mentioned in the Japanese representative's oral statement, Secretary Hull referred to the arduous but unsuccessful efforts made by both men to improve relations between the United States and Japan.

Pointing to the continuous agitation in the government-controlled Japanese press and to statements of high officials advocating a policy of force and conquest, Secretary Hull drew a parallel between the Japanese contention that theirs was strictly a campaign of precautionary aggression, and German insistence that its action in Europe and its war against Russia was a matter of self-defense. In view of the Japanese belief that the United States was endeavoring to encircle Japan, Secretary Hull felt that future conversations would be valueless. The meeting was then concluded on a defeatist note.[9]

(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report[10]

Ambassador Nomura reported that on the evening of August 6, 1941 he called on Secretary Hull to carry out the instructions received from Tokyo on August 5, 1941. Having made a detailed explanation of Japan's intentions, he then submitted Japan's proposal in English to the Secretary of State.[11] Secretary Hull promised to study the proposal carefully, but, according to Ambassador Nomura, he had not seemed to take much interest in it, and had begun to express his opinions on current Japanese-American relations without further mention of the proposal. Ambassador Nomura summarized the Secretary Hull's statement as follows:

Setting aside the relations between him and me, he said he was greatly disappointed in the actions Japan has been taking one after another, and that so long as Japan does not give up the policy of force, there was no use talking.

So long as the Japanese Government authorities say that what the United States is doing is encirclement of Japan, he could not expect anything of Japan ("I can expect nothing from you"). When we wish to live in peace and security, HITLER, saying that he was acting in self-defense, mows down everything that stands in his way.[12]

[8] "Proposal by the Japanese Government Handed by the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) to the Secretary of State," August 6, 1941, S.D., II 549-550. See II, No. 2 for text as sent by Tokyo on August 5, 1941.
[9] S.D. II, 546-548.
[10] III, 6-7.
[11] II, 3-5,6.
[12] III, 6-7.

[3]

Ambassador Nomura came away from this interview convinced that no matter what explanation was offered, it could not convey Japan's intentions to the leaders of the United States. Moreover, he felt that the United States was determined to deal with any situation.[13]

3. Tokyo Requests an Immediate Report from Ambassador Nomura

On August 6, 1941 Foreign Minister Toyoda complained to Ambassador Nomura that he had not yet received a report concerning the action he had requested the Japanese Ambassador to take on July 23, 1941.[14] Unfortunately, the message indicating the action to be taken was garbled either in transmission or interception, and American cryptanalysts were unable to discover the nature of the request.[15] In view of his previous dilatoriness, Ambassador Nomura was ordered to report immediately the results of his interview with Secretary Hull on August 6, 1941 concerning the New Japanese proposal.[16]

As a result of this reprimand, Ambassador Nomura replied that he had sent several reports relating to discussions between Minister Wakasugi and Messrs. Welles and Hamilton which had indicated that the American authorities saw no course but to end the conversations.[17] Ambassador Nomura also reported that the publisher of the Army-Navy Journal, had called upon him to state that the American people, including even the middle west isolationists, supported the administration's policies toward Japan. According to Ambassador Nomura, he was deeply concerned that only a few Americans of influence were sympathetic toward Japan.[18]

4. Japan Again Proposes a Konoye-Roosevelt Conference (August 7, 1941)

Japanese-American relations were so critical that on August 7, 1941 Foreign Minister Toyoda informed Ambassador Nomura that a policy of "laissez faire" should no longer be pursued. He suggested, therefore, that a conference be held as soon as possible between Prime Minister Konoye and President Roosevelt. Though the subjects to be considered would depend greatly on the time at which the conference was held, in general the discussion would be conducted along the lines of the present negotiations.

To save time, the conference would last no longer than a few days, and it was hoped that the delegation would be restricted to a minimum number of persons. Strict secrecy was to be observed until the calling of the conference was definitely agreed upon, at which time a public announcement could be made, if President Roosevelt had no objection. The Japanese Foreign Minister informed Ambassador Nomura that, to ensure secrecy, the American Ambassador in Tokyo was not being advised of this new proposal.[19]

If there were any truth in the rumors concerning the resignation of Secretary Hull and the imminence of a general embargo on all shipments of petroleum products to Japan, Foreign Minister Toyoda informed Ambassador Nomura, it would hardly be worthwhile for Japan to propose this conference. Therefore, Ambassador Nomura was requested to investigate immediately and report his findings to Tokyo.[20]

5. Ambassador Nomura Reports on Current American Policy Toward Japan

At approximately the same time that Foreign Minister Toyoda was reprimanding Ambassador Nomura for his failure in making prompt replies to his specific questions, Ambassador Nomura

[13] II, 7.
[14] III, 8.
[15] III, 9.
[16] III, 8. [17] III, 10.
[18] II, 11.
[19] III, 12.
[20] III, 13.

[4]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

submitted a report to Tokyo concerning recent modifications in the policy of the United States toward Japan.[21] Although agreeing that Japanese-American relations had reached an extremely critical stage, Ambassador Nomura commented that such a condition was the inevitable result of Japan's own action in following other essential policies.

Remarking that the United States believed the Axis nations to be working hand in hand to conquer the world, Ambassador Nomura reported that his insistence in explaining that Japan was guided solely by the principles of the brotherhood of mankind had led to the beginning of unofficial discussions with the Secretary of State. However, the occupation of French Indo-China by Japan had put an end to those same discussions and, according to recent conversations with Secretary Hull and Acting Secretary Welles, the United States had returned to its original position with regard to Japan. Secretary Hull had been bitterly disappointed because he had been very interested in bettering relations between Japan and the United States, and both he and his very good friend, Postmaster General Walker, had been very much embarrassed by the turn of events.

Although American authorities claimed that the policy of the United States toward Japan was not one of unfriendliness, since it was taking measures only to counteract certain steps taken by Japan, Ambassador Nomura pointed to the freezing order and the export embargo issued by the United States, and the joint warning by Secretary Hull and Foreign Minister Eden with regard to Thailand as indications that there was no doubt that the United States was prepared to take drastic action against Japan. Furthermore, in view of the friendly relations between the United States and Russia, Ambassador Nomura doubted that the United States would remain on the sidelines if Japan attacked to the north. Reports of a conference between high British and American military and naval authorities on aid to Russia and the Far Eastern question had attracted Japanese attention.[22]

Ambassador Nomura reminded Tokyo that its Axis partner, Germany, was exercising the utmost precautions in dealing with the United States and had even gone so far as to issue peace terms in an attempt to influence American public opinion. He also pointed out that the trend which was influencing the United States to center its attention on relations with the Japanese would increase in the near future. Ambassador Nomura concluded as follows: I have submitted my humble opinions before and they are unchanged today. Our country is at present standing at a most critical crossroads. My only desire is that we choose the right road, for the sake of the future of our country.[23]

6. Hull-Nomura Conversation (August 8, 1941)

(a) State Department Report[24]

At a meeting requested by the Secretary of State, Ambassador Nomura was presented with a reply to the August 6, 1941 proposal of the Japanese government. According to this American document, President Roosevelt had proposed that if the Japanese government would withdraw its forces from French Indo-China, and would refrain from the establishment of bases there by means of its military and naval strength, the government of the United States would guarantee for itself, and would also attempt to obtain from China, Great Britain, and the Netherlands, a binding commitment to regard French Indo-China as a neutral country similar to Switzerland.[25] Not only would these governments forego any military act of aggression against

[21] III, 14.
[22] III, 14-15.
[23] III, 14.
[24] "Memorandum of a Conversation", initialled by Mr. J. W. Ballantine, August 8, 1941, S.D., II, 550-551.
[25] "Document handed by the Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura)", August 8, 1941, S.D., II, 552-553. The English text of this document was sent in Japanese code to Tokyo on August 8, 1941. See III, 16-18.

[5]

French Indo-China, but they would also permit local French authorities to remain undisturbed in the administration of their territory. This proposal, in its entirety, had been subsequently extended to include Thailand.

In view of Japan's thorough acquaintance with America's many attempts to found a broad understanding, calculated to establish and maintain a peace in the Pacific which would be beneficial to all the countries concerned, the United States felt that the Japanese proposals of August 6, 1941 were lacking in responsiveness.[26]

After reading the reply of the United States to gain its import, the Japanese representative re-asserted his country's desire to adjust relations with the United States. As a means of attaining this end, he suggested a conference in Honolulu between the heads of the two governments. Mr. Hull replied that if the conversations between the officials of Japan and the United States had produced a basis for mutual understanding, they would now be able to go forward along a policy of peace. However, the loss of control by the peaceful faction in the Japanese government had proven too formidable an obstacle, and Secretary Hull had been forced to notify the Japanese Ambassador that the measures taken by his government had removed the basis for the "understanding" which they had been discussing.

According to Secretary Hull, the Japanese press was being constantly stimulated to stress the alleged encirclement of Japan by the United States. Ambassador Nomura replied that the Japanese press was being inspired only to invigorate his people and it was not attempting to counteract the efforts of the government to improve relations with the United States.

When asked by Ambassador Nomura if this constituted an answer to his suggestion that the heads of the two governments should meet, Secretary Hull replied that the responsibility for shaping suitable policies of peace now rested with the Japanese government.[27]

(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report[28]

Ambassador Nomura informed Tokyo that he had received from the Secretary of State a reply to the proposal he had submitted on August 6, 1941. According to Ambassador Nomura, the document indicated that the United States had not compromised in the least beyond what President Roosevelt had said previously.

To Ambassador Nomura's proposal that the leaders of the two countries meet for a conference in Hawaii, Secretary Hull replied that the United States had been making preparations for that purpose since Japan had agreed to participate in such a conference. Secretary Hull pointed out, however, that since his talks with Ambassador Nomura had demonstrated that the two countries were in conflict and that Japan's policy had not been altered, there was no point in holding such conferences. Mr. Ballantine agreed with this statement and declared that the use of force could not go hand in hand with the maintenance of the peace in the Pacific.

Both Secretary Hull and Mr. Welles commented on Japan's constant prating about an encirclement policy, but Ambassador Nomura replied that though the United States was absolutely safe from the viewpoint of defense, it continued to claim that many dangers were surrounding it in order to have an excuse for expanding its national defense.

Ambassador Nomura was convinced that American authorities would negotiate with Japan only if it stopped further military operations. Believing, in view of this, that there was not the slightest chance of a parley with Japanese officials, Ambassador Nomura suggested that the Japanese Foreign Office have Ambassador Grew in Tokyo stop his activities to bring about the conference of leaders.[29]

[26] S.D., II 552-553. See III, 17-18.
[27] S.D., II, 550-551.
[28] III, 19-20.
[29] Ibid.

[6]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

7. Foreign Minister Toyoda Again Urges a Roosevelt-Konoye Conference

On August 9, 1941 Foreign Minister Toyoda emphasized to Ambassador Nomura the importance of having the proposal for a meeting between the leaders of the two nations submitted to President Roosevelt immediately. The Japanese Ambassador was directed to explain to the American President the advantages that would be derived therefrom.[30]

Ambassador Nomura promptly replied that he would call on President Roosevelt as soon as the latter had returned to Washington, and that he would do everything in his power to make a favorable impression. However, the Japanese Ambassador was convinced that as long as Japan proceeded along the lines of its present policy, the United States would not deviate from its established course. After warning Tokyo that the United States considered Japan's occupation of French Indo-China as a definite indication of an aggression policy, Ambassador Nomura declared that both President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull were in complete agreement, and that it would be a mistake to try to differentiate between their attitudes.

In view of the firm stand expressed by the United States on August 6 and August 8, 1941, Ambassador Nomura felt that even the offer of Prime Minister Konoye to come to the United States would not move American authorities to any perceptible degree. Remarking that he did not expect too much from the interview he planned to have with President Roosevelt, Ambassador Nomura expressed his pessimism concerning the present critical state of affairs. He stressed the need for evolving some plan which would persuade the United States to change its policy toward Japan.[31]

Three days later Foreign Minister Toyoda sent another urgent message explaining that though the Americans apparently considered the Japanese proposals made in reply to President Roosevelt's suggestions to be Japan's final answer, this was not necessarily the impression which Japan intended to convey. Prime Minister Konoye was willing to confer further with the President of the United States along general lines with a view to maintaining world peace.[32]

8. Colonel Iwakura and Mr. Ikawa Are Recalled to Japan

Ambassador Nomura notified Tokyo on August 9, 1941 that Colonel Hideo Iwakura and Mr. Ikawa had returned to Japan aboard the Tatsuta Maru. Expressing his appreciation for the complete cooperation and great help he had received from these officials, Ambassador Nomura asked that certain Japanese authorities be informed of their excellent work.[33]

It will be recalled that Ambassador Nomura had been severely reprimanded by Foreign Minister Matsuoka, when the latter was in office, for having used the term "associates" in describing the status of these assistants.

9. Counselor Iguchi Suggests a Propaganda Campaign in Japan

Counselor Sadao Iguchi of the Japanese Embassy in Washington submitted a report to Secretary Tasiro in Tokyo on August 11, 1941, in which he emphasized the firm attitude of the United States toward Japan, and stressed his belief that the United States would resort to war, if necessary.[34]

Indicating his realization that the Japanese government was fully cognizant of the dangerous situation, Counselor Iguchi commented, however, on the general unawareness of the Japanese public concerning the firm stand being taken by the United States toward Japan. He believed that the Japanese people were guilty of wishful thinking in regard to the United States, and, if the worst came, they would be taken completely by surprise.

[30] III, 21-22.
[31] III, 23-24.
[32] III, 25.
[33] III, 26.
[34] III, 27.

[7]

In view of this, he suggested that the Intelligence Section of the Cabinet or some other group should start a campaign to enlighten the Japanese people concerning the real attitude of the United States, so that they could be prepared for any eventuality. He suggested that the reports, concerning European and American intelligence, issued by the Intelligence Section of the Foreign Office, should contain more concrete information.[35]

10. Prime Minister Toyoda Reprimands Minister Wakasugi

On August 12, 1941, Foreign Minister Toyoda ordered Minister Wakasugi, who was in Los Angeles, to make no further public comments on the Japanese-American question until he had reported to the Foreign Office in Japan. This reprimand was occasioned by an interview which Minister Wakasugi had given over the international telephone to the Japanese press. The newspaper report had heightened the critical nature of the Japanese-American question because of its effect upon various Japanese groups. Mr. Wakasugi was also directed not to give the impression that he was bearing any important proposals from the United States.[36]

Mr. Wakasugi immediately expressed his amazement that his interview could have made difficult the position of his government in regard to the delicate Japanese-American relations, since he had no other motive than the desire to make a frank and fitting statement. In addition, he had no intention of implying any lessening of America's responsibility in the matter.[37]

11. Ambassador Nomura Confers with an American Cabinet Member (August 13, 1941)

On August 13, 1941 Ambassador Nomura conferred with an American Cabinet member whose name was not given in the Japanese Ambassador's report to Tokyo, but who may be presumed to have been Postmaster Frank C. Walker, known to be working behind the scenes with Secretary Hull to effect a peaceful solution to Japanese-American difficulties. Though expressing his conviction that the Japanese occupation of French Indo-China had been assisted by Germany's pressure on the French government, the Cabinet member said that he agreed with President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull with regard to the desirability of maintaining peace in the Pacific.[38]

Ambassador Nomura believed that Japan could not remove its troops from French Indo-China at present, but that when a favorable opportunity arose, they would be evacuated. When he mentioned a conference of the leading men of Japan and the United States as a means of surmounting the present crisis, even though a completely satisfactory solution might not be achieved, the American official did not show much enthusiasm, but promised to discuss the matter with Secretary Hull.

Declaring that the American press was paying more attention to Japan than to Germany, Ambassador Nomura referred to newspaper stories suggesting that the United States Navy concentrate all of its forces in the Pacific, and that Britain and the United States pool their navies to ensure having the necessary power in that area. Several writers had commented that Congress would more likely agree to war against Japan than against Germany.[39]

Stating that he would not deny the statements, the American Cabinet member remarked that Japan's excellent navy would be exceedingly troublesome if combined with that of Germany. Although the United States foresaw future trouble with Russia, it worked jointly with the Soviet Union in order to destroy Hitlerism.

[35] III, Ibid.
[36] III, 28.
[37] III, 29.
[38] III, 30.
[39] Ibid.

[8]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

Ambassador Nomura remarked that pressure against Japan was exceedingly harmful. If the Japanese people were to adjust themselves and act in accordance with the policy desired by the United States, then their problems must be handled from an entirely different viewpoint.[40]

12. Hull-Nomura Conversation (August 13, 1941)

(a) Secretary Hull's Report[41]

Secretary Hull requested that the Japanese Ambassador call on him on August 13, 1941 to receive a statement citing mistreatment of Americans and injury to American rights in places under Japanese jurisdiction.[42] After the Japanese Ambassador had read the document, Secretary Hull said that he could not understand Japan's purpose in allowing these injustices to continue, and, therefore, had felt that a summarization of the incidents should be presented to the government of Japan.

According to Secretary Hull, the Japanese Ambassador agreed wholeheartedly with his views and said that he would be glad to take the matter up with his government. Secretary Hull then informed Ambassador Nomura that he might have other material to present to the Japanese government by Saturday, August 16, 1941, or Sunday, and in answer to a question concerning his availability, the Japanese Ambassador stated that he would be in Washington at that time.

Secretary Hull then introduced a question relating to the alleged promise of Japan not to bomb Chungking after the U.S.S. Tutuila incident.[43] Recounting how the Japanese Ambassador had called on Mr. Welles on July 31, 1941 to express officially to President Roosevelt Japan's deep regret over the bombing of the U.S.S. Tutuila at Chungking, Secretary Hull reminded Ambassador Nomura that he had assured the United States that the bombing had been an accident. In order to prevent similar incidents, Japan had promised to suspend all bombing operations over the city area of Chungking. Japan had requested that this suspension of bombing operations be regarded as strictly confidential and had offered to pay full indemnity for any damage to American properties. At that time, the Japanese Ambassador had informed Mr. Welles that he himself had recommended this procedure to his government.[44]

In view of this action, the American government had considered the incident closed, but on August 8, 10 and 12, 1941 three dispatches had given accounts of new bombings by Japanese planes at Chungking. A telegram dated August 11, 1941, from the American Embassy at Chungking reported that, during the past four days, Chungking had been subjected to unusually heavy and prolonged air raids. Not only had districts outside the city been bombed, but the city area also had been affected, though no bombs had been dropped in the area directly opposite the anchorage of the American gunboat and the United States Chancery. At least one American residence had been demolished, and other residences within the city area had been damaged. In view of these occurrences, the United States requested an explanation and an indication of Japan's attitude and intentions regarding its pledge of July 31, 1941.

The Japanese Ambassador promptly replied that Japan had promised only to cease bombing the city area temporarily and not indefinitely. Although believing that Mr. Welles had understood this stipulation, Ambassador Nomura stated that he might have failed in his efforts to inform the Under Secretary. Nevertheless, he reiterated that this was Japan's position.[45]

[40] Ibid.
[41] "Memorandum by the Secretary of State", August 13, 1941, S.D., I, 907-908.
[42] "The Department of State to the Japanese Embassy", S.D., I, 908-910; III, 31
[43] "Memorandum by the Secretary of State", August 13, 1941, S.D., I, 907-908.
[44] "The Department of State to the Japanese Embassy", August 12, 1941, S.D., I, 723-724.
[45] S.D., I, 908.

[9]

(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report[46]

Ambassador Nomura stated that at four o'clock in the afternoon of August 13, 1941 he had called on the Secretary of State, who had handed him the note mentioned above. Secretary Hull had remarked that he had no intention of releasing the note for publication since it would aggravate unduly public opinion. Though there were only a few hundred United States' citizens in Japan, there were a hundred odd-thousand Japanese in America.

Ambassador Nomura replied that Japan was taking action to parallel the freezing order of the United States, and was also enacting measures against individuals, similar to those in operation against the Japanese in the United States. However, he felt that such pin-prickings were annoyances which did not affect the general situation; therefore, he hoped that they could be mutually discontinued.

Ambassador Nomura declared that when Secretary Hull had introduced the subject of the Chungking bombings, he had explained that Japan had promised to cease bombing the Chungking suburban areas but only for a certain period. Ambassador Nomura also commented that Secretary Hull's inquiry concerning his presence in Washington during the latter part of the week indicated that he was planning to issue some sort of a statement.[47]

13. Japan Discounts the Attempted Assassination of Vice Premier Hiranuma

Japan's eagerness to have Prime Minister Konoye confer with President Roosevelt was evident in a dispatch from Tokyo on August 15, 1941, which denied the erroneous conclusion of some who had interpreted the attempted assassination of Baron Hiranuma, Vice Premier of Tokyo and Minister without Portfolio, as a reaction of Japanese extremists against any cooperation with Britain and the United States.[48]

According to newspaper reports, rumors from diplomatic quarters indicated that an Axis press man had inquired about the Hiranuma shooting some ten hours before it occurred.[49] Emphasizing that his government's attitude was unshaken despite this unfortunate incident, Foreign Minister Toyoda declared that Japanese public opinion would approve any fair revision of national relations regardless of the other party concerned.

Though he was cognizant of Ambassador Nomura's recent messages concerning the obstacles to further Japanese-American negotiations, Foreign Minister Toyoda again urged that the Japanese Ambassador see President Roosevelt in order to expedite the settlement of broad issues and to prevent a general calamity. The American Ambassador in Tokyo would be advised of Japan's proposal at the first opportune moment.[50]

14. Hull-Nomura Conversation (August 16, 1941)

(a) Secretary Hull's Report[51]

Calling on Secretary Hull in regard to President Roosevelt's proposal of August 8, 1941 Ambassador Nomura expressed once more his country's desire to ensure peaceful relations with the United States, and stated that since Japan would make concessions to avoid war, there was a basis for further progress along this line. The Japanese Ambassador also reiterated his suggestion that high Japanese and American officials meet halfway between the two countries for a conference.

[46] III, 32.
[47] Ibid.
[48] III, 33.
[49] New York Times, August 15, 1941, p. 10:2.
[50] III, 33.
[51] "Memorandum by the Secretary of State", August 16, 1941, S.D., II, 553-554.

[10]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

However, when Ambassador Nomura asked whether his conversations with Secretary Hull would be resumed on their former basis, Mr. Hull repeated the circumstances leading up to the cessation of their conversations, but did not pass further on the question or respond favorably. In pointing out that the establishment of bases in and about French Indo-China by the Japanese army, navy, and air forces indicated Japan's intention to effect a serious invasion of the South Seas areas, which would menace British success in Europe and eventually the safety of the Western Hemisphere, Secretary Hull emphasized the fact that the United States could not remain silent in the face of such a threat. To Ambassador Nomura's assertion that Japan desired merely to secure necessary commodities, Mr. Hull replied that under a peaceful agreement Japan would have obtained access to world markets.

Since Ambassador Nomura repeatedly stressed the desire of Japan for an amicable settlement of differences and its willingness to make concessions in order to have the conversations resumed, Secretary Hull expressed some interest in this, but pointed to Japan's continuing policy of conquest by force and to the bitter attacks on the United States by the Japanese government-controlled press. Secretary Hull also suggested that the Japanese Ambassador talk to President Roosevelt and to any other American officials concerning this subject. However, Ambassador Nomura stated that until he had received specific instructions from his own country concerning the concessions it might be willing to make, he could not take such action.[52]

(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report[53]

From the intelligence reports which Ambassador Nomura received concerning the recent conference between the leaders of Great Britain and the United States, it appeared that England desired to draw the United States into war with the purpose of utilizing its resources in the Far East. On the other hand, the United States wished to check Great Britain's ambitions by having it clarify its war aims.

From the joint statement published subsequent to this conference, it was evident, according to the Japanese Ambassador, that the United States had achieved its purpose and that Great Britain had been forced to assume a comparatively disadvantageous position. In view of this report, Ambassador Nomura had considered it essential to confer with Secretary Hull prior to President Roosevelt's return to Washington. Therefore, on the afternoon of August 16, 1941 Ambassador Nomura had met with the American Secretary of State and had discussed the current situation.

After relaying the instructions which the Japanese government had sent him, Ambassador Nomura stressed the necessity for renewing relations between the two countries, since if the present situation remained unchecked, the outcome would be disastrous. Ambassador Nomura pointed out that a Pacific war would be "mass murder to an unprecedented extent in the history of the world." Such a war would not be terminated quickly because of any difference in the financial status of Japan and the United States, but instead would develop into a war of complete exhaustion, lasting several years, and would be advantageous to neither country. Therefore, not only should Japan and the United States guard against the extremists in both governments, but they must also be on the lookout against enticing offers made by third countries to both Japan and the United States. Secretary Hull remarked that it had been rumored that Chancellor Hitler had begun the war knowing Commissar Stalin's attitude well in advance.

At this point Ambassador Nomura strongly refuted the charges that Japan was under military domination by insisting that the characteristics of its imperial family, its government and its people were opposed to militarization. Although Japan advocated a Far Eastern Sphere of Co-prosperity, such a policy was not to be confused with military conquest, since it meant living together by cooperative defense, and, thus, did not differ greatly from the Good Neighbor Policy of the United States.

[52] Ibid.
[53] III, 34.

[11]

After considering Ambassador Nomura's remark, Secretary Hull stated that the United States recognized the equal status of all countries without the necessity of resorting to the use of arms. Ambassador Nomura replied that external pressure upon Japan had caused it to retaliate, but if this outside pressure were removed, Japan would resort to peaceful measures. Secretary Hull seemed to agree with this statement.

Ambassador Nomura then turned the conversation to the proposed meeting between the leaders of both countries. It was his personal opinion that this meeting should be encouraged rather than discouraged, since many of the measures contained in the Atlantic Charter coincided directly with the statement issued by Prince Konoye, and through both of these documents, an agreement could be reached between the two countries. Indicating that Japan's only reason for suggesting a conference with the United States was to improve the present diplomatic situation, the Japanese Ambassador asked if the United States still deemed such a conference impossible.

Although he had not yet taken up the matter with anyone outside of his own office, Secretary Hull promised to confer with President Roosevelt at the earliest opportunity. According to Ambassador Nomura, this attitude was much different from Secretary Hull's earlier position and was probably the result of his having talked with the Cabinet members who had conferred with the Japanese Ambassador. When Secretary Hull inquired concerning Ambassador Nomura's personal opinion on the general outlook, the Japanese Ambassador replied that it would be extremely dangerous to let Japanese-American relations remain in their present condition.[54]

15. Ambassador Nomura Summarizes the Japanese-American Diplomatic Situation (August 16, 1941)

In summarizing the Japanese-American diplomatic situation on August 16, 1941, Ambassador Nomura warned that anything might happen at any moment. As soon as Japan made another move, particularly if it were directed against Thailand, matters would grow suddenly worse. Though he had reported that America was not united in regard to participation in the European war and that President Roosevelt himself was hesitant, the Japanese Ambassador emphasized that the American people were unanimous in regard to taking a strong hand in the Far East. This would meet with the approval of Great Britain, China and Germany.[55]

Expressing his belief that President Roosevelt would not go to extremes inasmuch as both he and American naval authorities were conscious of the tremendous tasks involved in a Pacific war, Ambassador Nomura stated that the British believed that if a Japanese-American war were started, there would be a good prospect of getting the United States to participate in the European war.

The Japanese Ambassador pointed out that Allied confidence in ultimate victory was gaining, for even if Germany eventually defeated Russia, the war would not have been short and decisive, since it had already reached the stage of attrition. Furthermore, since submarine war in the Atlantic was being won by Britain and the United States, the situation closely resembled that of 1917.[56]

With such a state of affairs in the United States, Ambassador Nomura had been very anxious to have the State Department approve Foreign Minister Toyoda's proposal for a conference of Prime Minister Konoye and President Roosevelt, but Secretary Hull had rejected it. Ambassador Nomura's efforts to interest a Cabinet member who was intimately associated with Secretary Hull failed. President Roosevelt at one time had thought of arranging a similar conference, but Japan's occupation of French Indo-China had led him to believe that Japan did

[54] Ibid.
[55] III, 35.
[56] III, 36.

[12]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

not desire a fundamental readjustment of Japanese-American relations, but was only conducting a policy of appeasement towards the United States.

Ambassador Nomura reported that American authorities were beginning to think that he had been misled by his own country.[57]

Since Japanese newspapers had severely criticized a statement recently issued by the American government, the atmosphere had become worse. Ambassador Nomura advised that unless something were done immediately to eliminate this misunderstanding, he would not be able to accomplish his objective. Furthermore, since President Roosevelt was unfavorable to the proposal, Ambassador Nomura did not expect him to do anything about it.

Indicating three critical points concerning which the United States wished Japan to give some sort of a pledge, namely, the question of self-defense, the withdrawal of troops from China, and non-discrimination in trade, Ambassador Nomura requested that the Japanese Foreign Office consider them and send him any further instructions at once. Thus, he would be prepared for an interview with President Roosevelt who was returning to Washington within a few days.[58]

16. Roosevelt-Nomura Conversation (August 17, 1941)

(a) Secretary Hull's Report[59]

In an informal conference between President Roosevelt and the Japanese Ambassador, called at Mr. Roosevelt's request, the strained relations between the two countries were discussed. After President Roosevelt had contrasted the policies and principles of the American government with Japan's course of conquest by force, and had asserted that the next move toward peace now depended upon Japan, Ambassador Nomura produced an instruction which he said was from his government. It emphasized Japan's hopes for a mutual understanding, and expressed Prince Konoye's willingness to attend a conference with President Roosevelt at some point halfway between Japan and the United States.

President Roosevelt then commented that since the relations between the two governments should be brought up-to-date, he had prepared an oral statement clarifying the position of the United States. He regretted the necessity for having to do so, but there was no other recourse. President Roosevelt read the oral statement to the Japanese Ambassador and then handed him the document containing it.[60]

In his oral statement President Roosevelt indicated that in protracted conversations during the past months Secretary Hull and Ambassador Nomura had attempted to formulate a mutual understanding, based on the preclusion of force by either country, in order to maintain peace and justice in the Pacific. On July 24, 1941 President Roosevelt had offered to urge the governments of China, Great Britain, and the Netherlands to join the United States in a solemn declaration that they had no aggressive intentions with regard to Indo-China and would make all markets and materials of Indo-China available to all nations on equal terms, provided that Japan withdrew its forces from this area.

In spite of these efforts, the Japanese government had continued its military activities throughout the Far East and had occupied Indo-China. Although the American government was in full sympathy with Japanese desires for amicable and mutually profitable relations with the United States, it was now deemed necessary to warn Japan that a continuation of its program of military domination of neighboring countries by force or threat of force, would com-

[57] III, 37.
[58] III, 38.
[59] "Memorandum by the Secretary of State", August 17, 1941, S.D., II, 554-555.
[60] Ibid.

[13]

pel the United States to take any and all steps deemed necessary to ensure the legitimate rights and interests, the safety and the security of the United States and its citizens.[61]

After a slight pause, President Roosevelt turned to a discussion of Ambassador Nomura's request for a resumption of the conversations with Secretary Hull. Making further reference to Japan's policy of conquest by force, and to the bitter denunciation of America by the Japanese government-controlled press, President Roosevelt pointed out that under such conditions the reopening of conversations would be fruitless. President Roosevelt then read another document to Ambassador Nomura, which he afterwards handed to him.

In this second statement, President Roosevelt declared in regard to the suggestion of the Japanese Ambassador that responsible officials of Japan and the United States meet to discuss the adjustment of present relations, and with reference to Ambassador Nomura's desire that the previous informal conversations be resumed, that the Secretary of State had already advised Ambassador Nomura that the United States could not see how the conversations could be pursued if Japan continued its present policy of force and supported the bitter press attacks against America.[62]

On two occasions, officers from the Department of State had expressed concern over the impending Japanese offensive in French Indo-China. Subsequently, on July 21 and July 23, 1941, the Acting Secretary of State, Sumner Welles, had informed Ambassador Nomura that the United States believed Japan to be embarking on a program of conquest in the South Pacific area, and since the position of the American government had already been clearly defined, there could be no basis for further conversations.

President Roosevelt pointed out that in order to achieve a peaceful settlement of the entire Pacific situation, a progressive program would have to be evolved from the basic principle of equal commercial opportunity and treatment for all nations. With the cooperation of the countries concerned in this area, all available resources of capital, technical skill, and economic leadership would be utilized not only for building up their own economies, but also for developing regions where productive capacity could be improved which would increase the purchasing power of the nations and peoples concerned, would raise standards of living, and would create conditions conducive to the maintenance of peace. However, any disruption of the peace would find the United States continuing its policy of sending immediate aid to the areas within the Pacific which were resisting aggression.

Since this program would prevent any country from extending its military, political or economic control over other peoples, the United States felt that it assured to Japan satisfaction of its economic needs and legitimate aspirations. If the Japanese government would agree to suspend its expansionist activities and readjust its position along peaceful lines, the American government was prepared to consider resumption of the informal exploratory discussions which had been interrupted in July. However, to clarify the situation for both governments, it would be advantageous if the Japanese government furnished a clearer statement than had yet been presented concerning its present attitude and plans.[63]

(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report[64]

Ambassador Nomura reported to Foreign Minister Toyoda on August 18, 1941 that at half-past four in the afternoon of August 18, 1941[65] he had had a secret interview with President Roosevelt in the presence of Secretary Hull.

[61] "Oral statement handed by President Roosevelt to the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura)", August 17, 1941, S.D., II, 556-557. See III, 39 for English text sent in a Japanese cipher to Tokyo on August 17, 1941.
[62] "Statement handed by President Roosevelt to the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura)", August 17, 1941, S.D., II, 557-559. See III, 39 for English text sent in a Japanese cipher to Tokyo on August 17, 1941.
[63] Ibid.
[64] III, 41-47.
[65] This should be August 17, 1941. See III, 40.

[14]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

President Roosevelt opened his remarks by saying that he had just spent a few days enjoying life at sea, during which he had sailed on his yacht and afterwards transferred to a warship to keep a rendezvous at a point off the Maine coast. Then he began to discuss the current problems, reading from two papers which stated that the United States would immediately take any steps necessary for the protection of its interests and citizens, if Japan were to make further use of force. Furthermore, before Japan's proposal for a meeting of both country's leaders could be realized, the United States must be advised of the aims of the Japanese government. Upon finishing his remarks, President Roosevelt asked that Ambassador Nomura relay the contents of both messages to Japan with the understanding that the documents were not to be considered as oral statements but only as reference material. Ambassador Nomura then accepted the papers on the condition that they would be used solely for his own information.[66]

In the course of the conversation President Roosevelt stated that Secretary Hull, Ambassador Nomura and himself were striving to bring about peace in the Pacific, but no one else was. When Ambassador Nomura remarked that there were many other nations desiring war in the Pacific, President Roosevelt affirmed this and said that the United States, Britain, and probably Russia hoped for peace in the Pacific, but there were not many other nations which desired it.[67]

After joking about "our German friend" who maintained no warships in the Pacific, President Roosevelt stated that because none of the three men present had come up through the diplomatic ranks, they did not feel bound by diplomatic conventions. Therefore, the notes that he held in his hand were not diplomatic documents nor aide-memoires, but were merely expressions of what he wanted to say. The Japanese Ambassador remarked that though President Roosevelt had stated that he had no desire to commit these items to paper, yet the President seemed to feel that they needed to be expressed in writing.[68]

Informing President Roosevelt that the Japanese government was sincere in its desire to adjust Japanese-American diplomatic relations, Ambassador Nomura stated that the Japanese government would like to be advised concerning the possibility of arranging an interview with Prince Konoye, as well as the possibility of the continuation in the near future of the informal conversations which had been carried on during the past months.

Since the Japanese government had already expressed its opinion regarding the French Indo-Chinese question to the American Secretary of State, it felt that no clarifying explanations were necessary. Yet Prime Minister Konoye was still willing to exchange opinions with a view toward achieving world peace.

Asserting his country's confidence in the statesmanship of President Roosevelt and in his ability to settle things, Ambassador Nomura stated that Japan would reciprocate in the fine type of statesmanship the United States would undoubtedly exercise. After listening closely to Ambassador Nomura's summarization of the existing situation, President Roosevelt turned the conversation to the problem of finding a suitable location for the proposed conference. President Roosevelt stated that "Geographically speaking, it is impossible for me to go to Honolulu. I am not permitted to travel in an airplane."[69] He suggested instead that the Japanese Prime Minister meet with him at Juneau, Alaska, as an alternate to either San Francisco or Seattle, Washington. To President Roosevelt's inquiry as to the number of days it would take Prince Konoye to reach the suggested locations, Ambassador Nomura answered that it would take about ten days and that the climate would be favorable until about the middle of September.

[66] III, 40.
[67] III, 41.
[68] III, 42.
[69] III, 43.

[15]

President Roosevelt next pointed out certain revisions that had been made in the documents he held. He had crossed out the word "President" since the original text implied that President Roosevelt himself would attend the conference, and for geographic reasons this might not be possible. Furthermore, he added that while the United States did not welcome the "closed door" policy, which it had been forced to adopt because of Japanese actions, it remained firm in its statement that Japan itself must open the door in the present circumstances. At this point President Roosevelt turned to a discussion of French Indo-China.[70]

Throughout the entire conference Ambassador Nomura was favorably impressed with President Roosevelt's tactful attitude and his high spirits. The Japanese Ambassador believed that President Roosevelt was exceptionally pleased with the responsiveness of the British people to the joint British-American peace terms arrived at in collaboration with Prime Minister Churchill. Unlike the Fourteen Articles issued independently by President Wilson during the last war, this agreement, the Atlantic Charter, had succeeded in drawing up peace terms acceptable to both England and America.

Before drawing the meeting to a close President Roosevelt mentioned Postmaster General Walker as being an ardent supporter of friendly Japanese-American relations. Apparently Mr. Waslker had spoken in behalf of the suggested interview between President Roosevelt and Prince Konoye. As the conversation ended, Secretary Hull asked Ambassador Nomura to call him at any time. Since the Chinese Incident was regarded as a separate problem, it had not been mentioned at all in the day's conversation.[71]

17. Ambassador Nomura Discloses His Personal Opinion Regarding the President's Statements

Since President Roosevelt had asked to see him immediately upon his return to Washington, Ambassador Nomura was certain that the American President viewed Japanese-American relations in a grave light. From the contents of the statement concerning the determination of the United States to protect its interests against any further Japanese aggression and from the manner in which President Roosevelt read it during that meeting, it was evident to the Japanese Ambassador that the note had been prepared in advance of the President's return.[72]

On the other hand, the second statement read by President Roosevelt seemed to contain his own attitude and opinions, and, accordingly, Ambassador Nomura believed that President Roosevelt favored the Japanese proposal under certain conditions. Yet when Ambassador Nomura had suggested that the situation depended largely on President Roosevelt's statesmanship, the President answered that it was Japan's responsibility to open the closed door. Ambassador Nomura was of the opinion, nevertheless, that President Roosevelt had other wishes, for he did not doubt that the American President hoped for a favorable change in Japanese-American relations.

According to recent comments in the newspapers, President Roosevelt was fearful lest the United States be drawn into a Far Eastern war, since he believed that there was an equal chance that Japan would attempt further aggression. Nevertheless, Ambassador Nomura was certain that the proposal for a meeting between the leaders of the two governments had considerably lessened the strain in diplomatic relations. However, it was essential that strict secrecy be maintained regarding this meeting, especially in Japan, for attempts would be begun there to make it impossible, if the news leaked out. Ambassador Nomura assured Tokyo that the matter was under careful study and that a full report would be made of any ideas of value.[73]

[70] III, 44.
[71] III, 45-47.
[72] III, 48.
[73] Ibid.

[16]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

18. Mr. Dooman Confers with Mr. Terasaki

On August 18, 1941 at 3:00 P.M. Mr. Terasaki, Director of the American Bureau of the Japanese Ministry for Foreign Affairs, requested Mr. Eugene H. Dooman, Counselor of the American Embassy in Tokyo, to convey a private message to Ambassador Grew.[74] Stressing the importance of the interview to be held that afternoon at 4:00 P.M., between the Japanese Foreign Minister and Ambassador Grew, Mr. Terasaki's note expressed the hope that the meeting would initiate a series of conversations for the adjustment of Japanese-American relations for he believed that if the Cabinet under Prince Konoye failed in this objective, all hope of reconciliation would be lost. He urged that criticism of the actions and policies of either government be avoided, and warned that though the Japanese government was ready to respond to any proposal of the United States to end the Far Eastern conflict, Japan would under no circumstances give in to American pressure.

Requesting Mr. Dooman to inform Ambassador Grew that there was much optimism in all influential quarters with regard to the outcome of the conversations, Mr. Terasaki hoped that the American Ambassador would do everything possible to achieve the desired results. The conversations were to be "off the record", by which Mr. Terasaki meant that there would be no commitment on either side in regard to any question arising during the conversations.[75]

19. Grew-Toyoda Conversation (August 18, 1941)

(a) Ambassador Grew's Report[76]

Ambassador Grew called on Foreign Minister Toyoda at the latter's request at 4:00 P.M. on August 18, 1941. After first receiving assurance from Ambassador Grew that the matters under discussion would be treated with the greatest secrecy,[77] and that no reports would reach Germany or Italy, Admiral Toyoda began a long oral statement requiring two hours and a half for delivery, regarding the critical situation then existing between Japan and the United States. Declaring that Japan had moved troops into French Indo-China solely for the purpose of settling the China affair, Foreign Minister Toyoda insisted that Japan had been acting under its own initiative and that there was no basis for the drastic economic measures which the United States had taken against his country under the mistaken belief that Japan was acting at the instigation of Germany.

Japanese public opinion had become extremely excited but the government was doing all in its power to repress hostile press comment. Foreign Minister Toyoda stated that the Japanese reply to the President's proposal of July 24, 1941 had been carefully drafted to meet the intentions of the American government, and that it contained proposals which would bind both governments. However, since the President's proposal had dealt exclusively with the joint defense of Indo-China, the Japanese reply was also restricted to that subject and would deal with it independently of the Hull-Nomura conversations.

On August 8, 1941 Ambassador Nomura had received from Secretary Hull the American reply to the Japanese proposal, and the Japanese authorities were disturbed to note in it that the United States had attached little importance to Japan's answer to President Roosevelt's proposal. The American proposal had suggested the withdrawal of Japanese forces from French Indo-China as a prerequisite, although Japan had promised to withdraw after the China Incident was settled.

If the United States wanted peace in the Pacific, Japan suggested that America cooperate in settling the China Incident. Both Japanese and American statesmen were sincerely striving

[74] "Memorandum by the Counselor of Embassy in Japan (Dooman)", initialled by Eugene H. Dooman, August 18, 1941, S.D., II, 559-560.
[75] Ibid.
[76] "Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)", August 18, 1941,
[77] S.D., II, 560-564.

[17]

for peace, according to the Japanese Foreign Minister, and to have a breakdown of peace occur now would be evidence of lack of statesmanship on both sides.

Both countries had a duty to save the world from disaster, and for this reason they must consider their mutual problems in a calm and friendly atmosphere on an equal basis.

Because present relations were extremely strained as a result of misunderstandings on both sides and sinister designs by other countries, it would be most opportune if the leaders of both countries could meet at Honolulu to discuss the situation in person.

Foreign Minister Toyoda said that he intended to have Ambassador Nomura see President Roosevelt in person to make this suggestion, and he requested Ambassador Grew to support this plan, which was unprecedented in Japanese history, since it involved the Premier's going abroad and would be done despite the objections of certain Japanese elements.

The Japanese Foreign Minister assured Ambassador Grew that the Prime Minister, Prince Konoye, would make every effort to save the world from ruin and to maintain peace in the Pacific, and he expressed his conviction that President Roosevelt and Prince Konoye would be able to reach an equitable agreement since Japan was not necessarily bound by the reply made on August 6 by Ambassador Nomura to President Roosevelt's proposal of July 24, 1941. Foreign Minister Toyoda also stressed the necessity for avoiding any impression that Japan had entered into negotiations with the United States because of American pressure. He suggested, therefore, that both countries reciprocate in stopping or moderating various measures of economic pressure.

In his report Ambassador Grew reiterated that he realized the great need for secrecy in this matter, and indicated that he appreciated the reasons for Japan's negotiating through Ambassador Nomura in the United States rather than in Tokyo. However, he informed Foreign Minister Toyoda that in view of Japan's progressive southward advance, the United States could be governed only by Japan's actions and not by its words. He also pointed out that previously Japan had ascribed its move into Indo-China as a reaction against encirclement by other powers but now it was ascribing it to the settling of the China affair. The Japanese Foreign Minister made no comment on the remarks of the American Ambassador.

Ambassador Grew restated Mr. Hull's opinion expressed by Mr. Welles on July 23, 1941 that there appeared to be no basis for continuing the conversations which had been carried on in Washington between Secretary Hull and Ambassador Nomura. He also spoke of Mr. Hull's statement to Ambassador Nomura on August 8, 1941 that the answer of Japan to the proposal of President Roosevelt failed in responsiveness. Though withholding official comment until the American government had time to study the proposal just made by the Japanese Foreign Minister, Ambassador Grew promised to give it his personal support,.[78]

(b) Foreign Minister Toyoda's Report

It is believed that no detailed report of the conversation between Foreign Minister Toyoda and Ambassador Grew was forwarded to the Japanese Embassy at Washington. However, on August 21, 1941 the Japanese Foreign Minister briefly referred to this conversation in a message to Ambassador Nomura.[79]

Pointing out that if Japan and the United States were to surmount the crisis confronting them at present, it would be necessary to display real statesmanship, and reminding Ambassador Grew of his nine years of tireless work to maintain Japanese-American friendship, Foreign Minister Toyoda again strongly urged that the proposed conference of the leaders of the two nations take place.[80]

[78] "Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)", August 18, 1941, S.D., II 560-564.
[79] III, 49.
[80] Ibid.
[81] "The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State", August 18, 1941, S.D., II, 565.

[18]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

20. Ambassador Grew Urges Consideration of Japanese Proposal

In a report to Secretary Hull and Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles, Ambassador Grew urged that the new Japanese proposal be given the utmost consideration, since not only was such a suggestion unprecedented in Japanese history, but it indicated that Japan's intransigence had not completely crystallized. Furthermore, Ambassador Grew believed that a meeting between Prince Konoye and President Roosevelt would be of incalculable value in bringing peace in the Pacific.[81]

21. Ambassador Nomura Is Convinced of President Roosevelt's Sincerity

On August 20, 1941 Ambassador Nomura reported to Tokyo that in a recent conversation Postmaster-General Walker had stressed the fact that President Roosevelt had taken up the question of the proposed Japanese-American conferences immediately upon his return to Washington. Furthermore, by his past speeches and most recent statement, it was evident that President Roosevelt had a broad-minded view of the world situation and was in no way anti-Japanese in his feelings, and, therefore, Japan should reciprocate in a like manner.

When Ambassador Nomura responded that it was with strong resolution that the Japanese government had continued its dealings with the current problem, Mr. Walker emphasized that this was also true of President Roosevelt for even if there were no real justification, there was much anti-Japanese sentiment in the United States. If news of the proposed conference were to leak out, Congress would undoubtedly raise strong opposition to it. On the other hand, there was a great possibility of achieving peace in the Pacific, if the conference succeeded. In view of President Roosevelt's present feeling, Mr. Walker asked that a way be found to settle successfully the Japanese-American question.[82]

On the following day, August 21, 1941, Ambassador Nomura advised Tokyo of further indications of President Roosevelt's serious interest in the resumption of Japanese-American negotiations. According to rumors, the text of the note delivered to Ambassador Nomura on August 17, 1941[83] had been composed by President Roosevelt himself, and the President expected that a Japanese reply would be handed directly to him.

With this in mind, Ambassador Nomura was of the opinion that the Japanese reply should be in simple and direct phraseology. Referring to the text of his proposed reply to President Roosevelt's note, Ambassador Nomura decided to omit such expressions as "continuance of encirclement" and "of discrimination of boycott and barriers of personal integrities and attack." At the same time, however, Ambassador Nomura felt it essential that Japan emphasize the necessity of guaranteeing the safety of the Far East.[84]

22. Ambassador Nomura Suggests A New Proposal

In a message to Tokyo on August 20, 1941 Ambassador Nomura expressed the opinion that President Roosevelt, desirous of settling Japanese-American problems by a conference between the two government heads, had made this proposal as his last political move at the critical moment when Japanese-American relations were at their worst. Urging that Japan respond to the generous spirit exhibited by President Roosevelt, Ambassador Nomura asked Tokyo to leave decisions concerning concrete points in the proposals until some future date, thereby showing the American government that Japan would allow nothing to conflict with the successful resumption of the informal negotiations. On this basis, therefore, Ambassador Nomura submitted a proposal for approval by the Japanese government and subsequent delivery to the United States.[85]

[82] III, 50-51.
[83] III, 52-53.
[84] III, 54.
[85] III, 55.

[19]

By explaining the immutable policy of the Japanese government as seen in important statements issued by Prime Minister Konoye and Ministers Hiranuma, Arita, and Matsuoka, Ambassador Nomura's proposal was designed to correct any misunderstandings arising from his government's proposal. Because his document dealt only with those points included in the proposals of President Roosevelt on August 17, 1941, and did not pretend to be Japan's policy, Ambassador Nomura believed that the United States would give it careful consideration as a means of reopening Japanese-American negotiations.[86]

Emphasizing that this opportunity to readjust the strained diplomatic situation must not be lost, Ambassador Nomura requested that his proposal be given careful consideration. If the proposed meeting between the government heads were to take place in the middle of September 1941, there remained less than two months time for preliminary negotiations. Japan must necessarily select a diplomatic staff and have a ship available before that time. In view of these reasons, Ambassador Nomura urged that the matter be decided upon without delay.[87]

23. Rumors of a British-American-Russian Conference Speed Japanese Action

On August 23, 1941 Tokyo informed Ambassador Nomura of newspaper reports concerning a British-American-Russian conference to be held early in September 1941. Since the United States was also reported to be shipping goods to Russia, Tokyo feared a realization of an Allied encirclement. If Japan were to arrange a conference between its leaders and the United States which would convene after the Allied meeting, the world would receive the impression that Japan had submitted to the threat of encirclement. In order to offset this reaction, Japan decided to submit an early reply to the American proposal and to arrange the conference between President Roosevelt and Prince Konoye for an earlier date. The Japanese Foreign Office also requested Ambassador Nomura to inform the United States that the shipment of materials to Russia by way of Japanese coastal waters would produce an unfavorable effect on Japanese-American relations.[88]

24. Hull-Nomura Conversation (First-August 23, 1941)

(a) Secretary Hull's Report[89]

To thank Mr. Hull for arranging his interview with President Roosevelt, Ambassador Nomura called on the American Secretary of State on August 23, 1941. The Japanese Ambassador said his government was carefully considering the American notes, and would respond in a few days. The two representatives once again stated their mutual desire to better Japanese-American relations.

Reiterating that America's basic principles consisted of peace, law, justice and equality in its dealings throughout the world, Secretary Hull declared that Japan was pursuing the opposite course. During the past months, the government-controlled Japanese press had excited distrust of the United States and had acclaimed a program of unlimited expansion in establishing the "new order" in the Pacific, while war factions headed by Mr. Matsuoka had lauded the benefits of the Tripartite Pact. Considering these facts, Secretary Hull felt that American skepticism concerning Japan's sincerity in seeking a peaceful settlement was justified.

Pointing to America's lack of cooperation in its relations with his country, Ambassador Nomura cited as an example the shipment of oil to Vladivostok through Japanese waters. Faced with large Russian forces in that area, Japan could not be expected to ignore the reinforcement of Russian military supply bases across the border line.

[86] See III, 56-62 for text of this proposal which was not adopted by the Foreign Office.
[87] III, 63.
[88] III, 64. See Japanese-American Relations, Part C, Section 172, Japan Recognizes Russo-German War as Threat to Its Border.
[89] "Memorandum by the Secretary of State", August 23, 1941. S.D., II, 565-567.

[20]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

After mentioning jocularly Japan's non-aggression pact with Russia, which elicited no response but a laugh from Ambassador Nomura, Secretary Hull answered that the United States was concerned only with aiding any resistance to the German armies. Should Japan project itself militarily into the Russo-German situation, or any other situation affecting the United States, the entire situation would be changed.

To Ambassador Nomura's query regarding the future sale of oil to Japan under the freezing system, Secretary Hull replied that his knowledge of the details was incomplete, but he promised to investigate the matter.[90]

(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report

There is no separate message available referring to this conversation with Secretary Hull on August 23, 1941.

25. Hull-Nomura Conversation (Second-August 23, 1941)

(a) Secretary Hull's Report[91]

Later in the day, on August 23, 1941, Ambassador Nomura returned to Secretary Hull's apartment to inform him of a message from Japan concerning the proposed meeting between the heads of the two governments. Because of the reported Allied conferences at Moscow which were scheduled for early in September, the Japanese government was desirous of effecting this meeting earlier than the date, October 15, 1941, suggested by President Roosevelt.

Ambassador Nomura laughed very heartily when Secretary Hull remarked that the Japanese-Russian Neutrality Pact would give Japan all the assurances of Russian peaceful intentions that Japan would desire. Regardless of its non-aggression pact with Russia, Japan feared that some agreements entered into at Moscow might be detrimental to Japanese plans and policies. Secretary Hull, however, made no commitments of any kind in regard to this proposal.

(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report[92]

In compliance with his orders, Ambassador Nomura called on Secretary Hull at 5:00 P.M. Saturday afternoon, August 23, 1941, to report that Japan was prepared to make an early reply to the statement of President Roosevelt. The Japanese Ambassador further suggested that the conference between President Roosevelt and Prince Konoye be held at a date earlier than that previously proposed.

Following Tokyo's other instructions, Ambassador Nomura asked that the United States delay its Moscow conference and withhold shipment of material to Russia for the time being. Although Secretary Hull refrained from making any comment regarding Ambassador Nomura's suggestion for an early Japanese-American conference, he answered Ambassador Nomura's remarks about Russia by pointing to the Neutrality Pact in existence between Japan and Russia. Secretary Hull assured Ambassador Nomura, however, that his statement would be relayed to the President. Ambassador Nomura believed that President Roosevelt, who was anxious to receive Japan's reply, was the one most interested in holding a conference with Prince Konoye.[93]

[90] Ibid.
[91] "Memorandum by the Secretary of State", August 23, 1941, S.D., II, 568.
[92] III, 65.
[93] Ibid.

[21]

26. Prime Minister Konoye Replies to President Roosevelt (August 26, 1941)

On August 26, 1941 the Japanese government sent Ambassador Nomura a reply to be communicated to President Roosevelt as soon as possible.[94] Expressing his satisfaction at President Roosevelt's approval of the proposed leaders' meeting, Prime Minister Konoye stated that since Japan and the United States held the key to world peace, deterioration of their relations would result in the downfall of world civilization. For this reason, Japan desired to improve the Japanese-American situation since the betterment of present conditions would achieve peace not only in the Pacific but throughout the world.

In Prime Minister Konoye's opinion, Japanese-American relations had reached a critical stage because of a lack of mutual understanding intensified by the machinations of third powers. Consequently, both Japan and the United States continually doubted and misconstrued the other's intentions. In order to eliminate these causes at their very source, Prime Minister Konoye desired to meet with President Roosevelt.[95]

Under the present circumstances in which rapid changes were constantly taking place and in which unforeseen conditions might possibly arise at any moment, Prime Minister Konoye did not believe that the previous informal negotiations were adequate any longer. It was necessary now for the two leaders to meet and discuss the possibility of saving the present situation by studying together the important questions affecting the entire Pacific area. Any minor details could then be settled by those officials specializing in such matters.

Eagerly waiting for the day of the meeting, Prime Minister Konoye urged that President Roosevelt accept the proposal in an understanding spirit. In view of various circumstances, the Japanese Prime Minister believed that the meeting should be held somewhere in the vicinity of Hawaii.[96]

27. Japan Replies to President Roosevelt's Statement of August 17, 1941

On August 26, 1941 in a statement sent to Ambassador Nomura, the Japanese government replied to President Roosevelt's note of August 17, 1941.[97] It reviewed the American claim that Japan's actions in French Indo-China had removed the basis upon which the informal conversations concerning Pacific problems had been founded. In accordance with the principles embodied in the peace program which the United States advocated, Japan had been asked to abandon its expansionist activities and change its attitude. Furthermore, in asking that Japan submit a clearer statement of its present plans, the United States had emphatically stated that it would resort to any necessary steps to prevent Japan from dominating its neighboring countries by military power.[98]

In view of its past pledges and repeated explanations of its intentions toward other countries, Japan deeply regretted American mistrust of its actions. Solely on the basis of its own fundamental conception of the Pacific problem, the United States chose to regard certain Japanese measures as harmful to peace in that area. However, in view of the international confusion permeating the entire world, Tokyo felt that it was almost impossible to judge whether a certain incident was the cause or result of the situation.

[94] III, 66.
[95] III, 67. The English translation by Ambassador Nomura was sent to Tokyo on September 3, 1941, see III, 81-83. For the text received by the State Department, see "The Japanese Prime Minister (Prince Konoye) to President Roosevelt", August 27, 1941, S.D., II, 572-573.
[96] III, 68.
[97] III, 69. For English translation by Ambassador Nomura sent to Tokyo on September 3, 1941 see III, 84-88. For text received by the State Department see "Statement by the Japanese government handed by the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) to President Roosevelt, August 28, 1941, S.D., II, 573-575.
[98] Ibid.

[22]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

One-sided judgement of the situation by the United States, based upon only certain political facts, would be harmful to lasting peace. Since Japan thought it necessary to cope with anything that threatened its own peaceful progress and its own defense, the United States, before criticizing such defensive measures, must recognize the cause and correct the situation so that peace could be established.[99]

America considered certain Japanese measures as harmful to the principles which it upheld, but on the other hand Japan felt that the United States had placed certain obstacles in the path of Japan's self-sufficiency and defense. Even during the informal conversations taking place between Japan and the United States, the American government had continuously applied a policy of pressure, thereby depriving Japan of many essential natural resources.

In the meantime many American newspaper articles and editorials predicted that the United States, Britain and the Netherlands East Indies would form an anti-Japanese front in the Far East. Although the United States might have acted in conformity with its own national requirements, this proved conclusively that actions considered to be just by one government might be detrimental to another. The United States apparently overlooked the fact that its natural circumstances and monopolistic power could well present a threat to another nation.[100]

President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull followed the course of peace, and, consequently, it was difficult for them to understand that peoples in other countries felt threatened by the United States. Yet nations less favorably situated, especially with regard to natural resources, were forced to consider their relations with the United States from a defensive viewpoint. In order to maintain peace the United States must refrain from criticizing the individual actions of other nations and instead attempt to understand the circumstances causing those actions. However, Japan was pleased that the United States had encouraged an exchange of opinions relating to the basis for an understanding which would result in lasting peace in the Pacific.[101]

In explaining its actions in the Southwest Pacific, Japan reiterated that its occupation of French Indo-China had not been taken with the intention of advancing by force into neighboring areas, but had been an act of self-defense to cope with threats against Japan's right of existence. Since the China Incident had originated from a threat to Japan's national existence, the ending of the war by the establishment of a just peace with China would find Japan willing to withdraw its troops immediately from French Indo-China. In view of this statement, Japan's attitude toward Thailand was self-evident.

Turning to the problem of Japanese-Russian relations, Tokyo gave assurance that it would refrain from military action against Russia as long as that country observed the Russo-Japanese neutrality agreement by refraining from any threats to Japan and Manchukuo. In return, Japan earnestly requested that the United States refrain from any measures which would stimulate Japan's fear of joint American-Russian action against it.[102]

Japan insisted that it whole-heartedly supported the principles laid down previously by the American government as a basis for conducting informal conversations with Japan, and agreed that their purpose was the conclusion of an understanding that would achieve a natural and peaceful settlement of problems in the Pacific area. By establishing such a peace in the Pacific, Japan joined with the United States in hoping that the principles set forth by both countries would be used towards the establishment of a world-wide peace. To maintain the necessary economical, political and military equality throughout this area, those countries which had superior natural resources and geographical locations must assume an attitude of

[99] III, 70.
[100] III, 71.
[101] III, 72.
[102] III, 73.

[23]

strict impartiality and must cooperate in the distribution of advantages to lesser nations. The spirit of reciprocity should govern any adjustments made in order to satisfy the essential requirements of all countries in that area.[103]

In summing up its reply to President Roosevelt's statement, the Japanese government expressed the opinion that the principles which it had set forth were both clear and concise. Only by conferring together dispassionately and constructively on all problems relating to the interest of both countries could the United States and Japan hope to found a lasting peace; therefore, an immediate conference between President Roosevelt and Prince Konoye was required. First, however, it would be necessary to eliminate the false impression that such a conference was due to pressure exerted on Japan by the United States.[104]

28. Japan's Reply Contains Its Maximum Concessions

In a special message to Ambassador Nomura on August 26, 1941 the Japanese government explained that the reply outlined above contained its maximum concessions. Since both the situation in Japan itself, as well as that throughout the world was strained to the extreme, Tokyo urged Ambassador Nomura to convince the American officials of the necessity for an interview between President Roosevelt and Prince Konoye, on which it was pinning its last hopes. It said that such a conference would not necessarily have to be bound by the statements made in Foreign Minister Toyoda's message.[105]

(a) Secretary Hull's Report[106]

Since Ambassador Nomura had received a reply from his government regarding President Roosevelt's message to the Prime Minister of Japan,[107] Secretary Hull agreed on August 27, 1941 to arrange an interview with President Roosevelt for the next day so that in accordance with his instructions the Japanese Ambassador might present it in person. Meanwhile, both representatives further discussed the relationship between the United States and Japan, with Ambassador Nomura expressing confidence that the new Japanese note offered opportunities for a definite improvement of the situation.

When the Japanese Ambassador mentioned the matter of the two American oil tankers en route to Vladivostok, Secretary Hull immediately forestalled further protests by stating emphatically that the shipments were supported by the Japanese-Russian agreement of Portsmouth, and were as legitimate under all laws of commerce as were the much larger oil exports from this country to Japan. Admitting the strength of Secretary Hull's argument, Ambassador Nomura nevertheless insisted that agitators constantly reminded the Japanese masses that, while they were forced to use coal, American oil shipments were passing Japan en route to Russia. Secretary Hull then declared that this claim was spurious.

As a remedy, Ambassador Nomura suggested that the two Japanese tankers leaving the United States monthly be loaded with oil for his country. In reply, Secretary Hull requested that Ambassador Nomura inquire about the possibility of Japan's using its free money as payment, both in the United States and in South America. The Japanese Ambassador readily agreed to look into this matter.[108]

[103] III, 74.
[104] III, 75.
[105] III, 76. Counselor Dooman of the American Embassy in Japan was warned on August 27, 1941 by a Japanese authority that if there were any premature disclosures of the plans for a meeting of Prince Konoye and President Roosevelt at this time when American tankers were enroute to Vladivostok, attempts might be made on the lives of leading members of the Japanese government, S.D., II, 568-569.
[106] "Memorandum by the Secretary", August 27, 1941, S.D., II, 569-570.
[107] III, 67-75.
[108] "Memorandum by the Secretary", August 27, 1941, S.D., II, 569-570.

[24]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

After giving Secretary Hull a copy of the statement which he was later to present to President Roosevelt, Ambassador Nomura expressed optimism in regard to the reaching of a satisfactory agreement between the two countries should the United States agree to concessions now being asked by the Japanese government.[109]

(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report[110]

Ambassador Nomura reported that he had delivered Prince Konoye's message to Secretary Hull on Wednesday, August 27, 1941. After citing several points orally because the English text had not been completed, Ambassador Nomura requested that he be allowed to see President Roosevelt immediately. Secretary Hull replied that it was impossible on that day, but arrangements would be made for the next morning.

As the conversation progressed, Ambassador Nomura commented on Winston Churchill's recent speech which the Japanese Ambassador considered harmful to the international situation. Remarking that he had refrained from making any comments on the speech to inquiring members of the press, the Secretary of State mentioned the extremist views that were being expressed at present by various Japanese publications.[111]

In accordance with the directions of his government Ambassador Nomura also spoke of the unfavorable effect that United States' petroleum shipments to Russia had had upon the Japanese public.[112] Secretary Hull brought out graphs to show the enormous amount of oil that had been furnished to Japan, and compared it with the comparatively small percentage shipped to Russia. Nevertheless, Ambassador Nomura pointed out that the shipment of this oil to Russia by way of Japanese waters had directly followed the embargo of all American exports to Japan and as a result Japanese public opinion had been disturbed.

Since the freezing of Japanese funds throughout the United States would impede the use of export permits even if they were granted by the United States, Secretary Hull suggested that the Japanese government pay for the desired oil from money invested in South America. Believing that there was no other solution but to use this South American money, the Japanese Ambassador requested that Tokyo discuss the matter thoroughly and advise him of any action to be taken.[113]

Two days later on August 29, 1941 Ambassador Nomura again urged that Tokyo immediately purchase the petroleum needed by Japan with funds which were outside of the area affected by the freezing order.[114] According to Ambassador Nomura, Secretary Hull was cognizant of the delicate nature of Japanese-American relations, and was aware that a single disturbing incident could be disastrous. Yet Secretary Hull felt that Japan was making a great problem over the shipment of a few hundred thousand barrels of oil to Russia when, even in the face of popular disapproval, the American government had already exported several million barrels of oil to Japan.

[109] "Memorandum of a conversation", August 27, 1941, S.D., II, 571.
[110] III, 77.
[111] Ibid. Prime Minister Winston Churchill warns Japan in a world-wide broadcast from London on August 24, 1941 that its aggression in the Far East "has got to stop. Every effort will be made to secure a peaceful settlement. But . . . if these hopes should fail, we shall, of course, range ourselves unhesitatingly at the side of the United States."—Facts on File Yearbook, 1941, Vol. I, 340.
[112] III, 78
[113] III, 79.
[114] III, 80.

[25]

Referring to the freedom of seas, the Secretary of State explained that he had no desire to permit a third country to interfere with Japanese-American trade. However, Ambassador Nomura explained that the shipment of oil, now unavailable to Japan, through Japanese territorial waters to Vladivostok presented a major problem from the standpoint of Japanese national feeling. Apparently Secretary Hull saw the logic of this remark, for a few days later American newspapers mentioned the possible routing of oil through the Persian Gulf.[115]

29. Mr. Terasaki Requests Ambassador Grew to Recall American Oil Shipments

Meanwhile, the problems evolving from the United States' shipping oil to Vladivostok were similarly discussed in Japan.[116] After emphasizing the grave internal situation then existing in Japan, on August 27, 1941, Mr. Terasaki, Director of the American Bureau for Japanese Foreign Affairs, delivered to Counselor Dooman an oral statement for Ambassador Grew, which asked that the American tankers now en route to Russia be recalled. If this were impossible, Mr. Terasaki suggested that the ships be rerouted to avoid their passing through the Straits of Saya and Tsugaru, for, in spite of Japan's non-aggression pact with Russia, the Japanese strongly resented the sending of supplies which might possibly be used against them by Russia.[117]

30. Roosevelt-Nomura Conference (August 28, 1941)

(a) Secretary Hull's Report

On August 28, 1941 Ambassador Nomura called on President Roosevelt to deliver a personal message from the Prime Minister of Japan,[119] and also to submit a reply from the Japanese government regarding President Roosevelt's communication of August 17, 1941.[120] President Roosevelt read Prince Konoye's message with interest and complimented its tone. In speaking of the proposed conference mentioned in Prince Konoye's message, President Roosevelt suggested that, because of the time element involved, Juneau, Alaska might be a better meeting place than Hawaii. The Japanese Ambassador was interested principally in having the conversation held as early as possible.

Turning next to the reply from the Japanese government, which Ambassador Nomura also submitted at this time, the President noted briefly that it did not provide for the discontinuation of Japanese army and naval reinforcements in the Indo-Chinese area while peace conversations were in progress. In addition, Mr. Roosevelt, criticizing Japan's baseless fear of attack by Russia and its unjustified complaints about oil shipments, reminded Ambassador Nomura that Japan was now in a position to load a number of oilers to transport fuel to its home ports whenever it desired.

After concluding his reading of the Japanese note, President Roosevelt advised Ambassador Nomura that he considered it to be a step forward and, thus, was very hopeful. He mentioned again his interest in spending three or four days with Prince Konoye, possibly at Juneau.[121]

[115] Ibid.
[116] "Memorandum by the Counselor of Embassy in Japan (Dooman)", August 27, 1941, S.D., II, 568-569.
[117] Ibid.
[118] "Memorandum by the Secretary of State", August 28, 1941, S.D., II, 571-572.
[119] S.D., II, 572-573. For translation by American cryptanalysts of text sent from Tokyo to Washington on August 26, 1941 see III, 67-68. For English text of this document sent to Tokyo by Ambassador Nomura in code on September 3, 1941 see III, 81-83.
[120] S.D., II, 573-575. For translation by American cryptanalysts of text sent from Tokyo to Washington on August 26, 1941 see III, 69-75. For English text sent to Tokyo by Ambassador Nomura on September 3, 1941 see III, 84-88.
[121] "Memorandum by the Secretary of State", August 28, 1941, S.D., II, 571-572.

[26]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report[122]

In accordance with instructions from Tokyo, on August 28, 1941 at 11:00 A.M. Ambassador Nomura met with President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull to present the English text of the Japanese reply to the President's message of August 17, 1941.[123]

While reading the messages President Roosevelt commended their contents in flattering terms, but in discussing the points pertaining to discrimination, President Roosevelt "cynically" inquired whether an invasion of Thailand would take place during his conference with Prince Konoye just as the invasion of French Indo-China had occurred during Secretary Hull's conversations with Ambassador Nomura. Nevertheless, President Roosevelt assured Ambassador Nomura that he was looking forward to approximately three days of conversation with Prince Konoye.

The main problem stemmed from the choice of a meeting place. Because the American President, unlike the Japanese Prime Minister who could appoint an acting minister to handle such matters, could not designate the Vice President to sign bills from Congress during his absence,[124] a three weeks round trip to Hawaii would take too much time, whereas a trip to Juneau would consume only 14 days.

Ambassador Nomura declared that as far as Japan was concerned the question of a meeting place was secondary, but it was desired to have the conference take place at the earliest possible date. Though he did not object to this request, President Roosevelt did not suggest a definite time.

President Roosevelt added that the recent meeting with Prime Minister Churchill had been postponed on account of the Balkan War, and that the meeting was then held after Congress had approved it.[125]

31. Hull-Nomura Conversation (August 28, 1941)

(a) State Department's Report[126]

Calling at Secretary Hull's apartment after his interview with President Roosevelt earlier in the same day, August 28, 1941, Ambassador Nomura stated that he was much encouraged regarding the attempts to improve relations between the two countries. Since Japan was desirous only that the conference be held at an early date, preferably between September 21 and September 25, 1941, to offset Japanese press attacks against the United States, President Roosevelt's suggestion that the conference be held at Juneau, Alaska would probably be approved by Prime Minister Konoye. Ambassador Nomura pointed out that Prince Konoye would probably be accompanied by a staff of twenty representatives from the Foreign Office, the Army, the Navy, and the Japanese Embassy in Washington. This would be very advantageous in that the Japanese Army and Navy representatives would be equally responsible for any settlement reached. An agreement on publicity concerning the conference would have to be reached by the two governments, especially since the Prime Minister would have to leave Tokyo five days before President Roosevelt left Washington.[127]

[122] III, 89.
[123] Ibid.
[124] Ibid.
[125] III, 90.
[126] "Memorandum of a conversation", initialed by Joseph W. Ballantine, August 28, 1941, S.D., II, 576-579.
[127] Ibid.

[27]

After promising to refer these points to President Roosevelt, Secretary Hull mentioned the questions that would inevitably arise at such a conference. In his opinion the actual conference should serve only to ratify matters of importance already agreed to in principle. Reference was made to certain difficulties encountered in the previous informal conversations which had caused delays and had finally resulted in Japan's acting at variance with the spirit of the conversations. In addition, it would be unwise to have a split in the Japanese Diet over the question of peace.

Recognizing the merits of Secretary Hull's remarks, Ambassador Nomura then summed up the three major difficulties encountered in their conversations: Japan's relations with the Axis; the retention of Japanese troops in North China and Inner Mongolia; and the application of the principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations. Only in regard to the stationing of Japanese forces in North China did the Japanese Ambassador anticipate any trouble. Concerning Japan's relations with the Axis, Ambassador Nomura was confident that as long as America's attitude of self-protection remained reasonable and it did not demand a nullification of the Tripartite Pact by requesting a blanket guarantee from Japan for any action it took against Germany in the name of self-defense, no breach would occur between the two countries.

Secretary Hull commented that Mr. Matsuoka's constant stressing of Japan's alignment with the Axis and the inopportune time chosen for the signing of the Tripartite Pact had already produced an unfavorable effect on America. Unless something were done to counteract the unfavorable impression, it would prove a source of embarrassment to President Roosevelt upon his return from the proposed meeting with Prince Konoye, for as an indication of its current relations with Germany, the United States was already maintaining patrols all the way to Iceland.[128]

At this point, Ambassador Nomura discussed the United States' position in aiding in the settlement of the Chinese situation and commented that Japan preferred to have the United States use its influence to bring Japan and China together to settle their own difficulties rather than have the United States discuss the basic peace terms with Japan. Secretary Hull made it clear, however, that before exercising its good offices between China and Japan, the United States would first consider the basic terms on which Japan proposed to negotiate, since it was necessary to have the friendship and confidence of the Chinese government before and after the negotiations. Both America and Japan, he felt, should consider the potentialities of China as a trading nation.

Ambassador Nomura agreed that the Chinese question was important, but remarked that there were other questions which could be settled at the conference in order to tide over a critical situation. Since the China Incident was one of the major questions calling for settlement, Secretary Hull believed that unless a conciliation were reached in this regard, it would remain the root of future instability. Ambassador Nomura recognized the soundness of this statement, particularly in view of the French Indo-China situation. Mr. Ballantine pointed out that Japan had promised to remove its troops from that area as soon as the China affair was settled.

After recapitulating briefly Secretary Hull's statements to make sure that he understood them, Ambassador Nomura left after commenting that he did not know how far the Japanese government could go in view of internal political difficulties, but Prince Konoye as a man of great courage was willing to assume great risks to improve relations.[129]

[128] Ibid.
[129] Ibid.

[28]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report[130]

Ambassador Nomura reported that on the evening of August 28, 1941 he had exchanged opinions with Secretary Hull on the problems of the proposed conference. If either of the conferring leaders assumed an uncompromising attitude on certain points, the result would greatly endanger Japanese-American relations. For that reason, Secretary Hull desired that preliminary conversations be held for the purpose of effecting a general agreement prior to the major meeting.

While it was necessary to bring up-to-date both the Japanese and American policies, Secretary Hull maintained that the Chinese question would not necessarily stand in the way of an amicable understanding. On the other hand, the United States refused to adjust its relations with Japan at the expense of its friendship with China. Furthermore, even if America accepted a basis for a Japanese-Chinese peace, it would be faced with the tremendous problem of winning the approval of both Great Britain and Soviet Russia.

Ambassador Nomura refrained from clarifying further his government's statements regarding the withdrawal of Japanese troops from China and the right of protection, but he was convinced that as long as Prince Konoye retained his position as Japanese Foreign Minister, every effort would be made to settle Far Eastern problems satisfactorily. Secretary Hull expressed the hope that Japan would take definite steps towards this end.

Ambassador Nomura reminded his government of the wide difference in viewpoint between the two governments which he had noticed during discussions on the proposals for an Understanding Pact. He feared that Tokyo's proposals would only add to the existing misunderstanding. In order that Japan might obtain further details regarding America's viewpoint, Ambassador Nomura asked that Colonel Iwakuro be consulted upon his return to Tokyo.

Ambassador Nomura then offered his government certain suggestions, in the event that Tokyo had agreed upon a meeting between the leaders of the two governments. Ambassador Nomura advised that his government consent to Juneau, Alaska as the conference site, if Constitutional requirements and reasons for personal safety made Hawaii unsatisfactory for President Roosevelt.

The conference date would be set about September 21, 1941 with five persons each from the Foreign Office; the Ministries of Navy and War, the Embassy and the Consulate in attendance.[131] Since it was assumed that Prince Konoye would make the trip by warship, about ten days would be required. Ambassador Nomura believed that the best time to make a public statement regarding the meeting would be shortly after the Prime Minister's departure from Tokyo.

Although Secretary Hull had agreed to discuss these points with President Roosevelt, he was extremely cautious in commenting on the proposed conference. Ambassador Nomura pointed out that Secretary Hull was an exceedingly cautious person, and warned that unless the two governments arrived at a fairly close agreement regarding the terms surrounding this meeting, the conference would never materialize.[132]

32. Secret Interpretation of Japan's Reply to President Roosevelt

On August 28, 1941 the Japanese government advised Ambassador Nomura concerning the interpretation of its recent reply to President Roosevelt.[133] After stressing certain instructions

[130] III, 91.
[131] Ibid.
[132] III, 92.
[133] III, 93.

[29]

regarding the style and form to be used in future messages pertaining to the question of Japanese-American relations, the Foreign Office advised Ambassador Nomura that the phrase "should a just peace be established in the Far East" meant that when the Chiang regime had become merely a local regime as a result of the closing of the routes to Chungking, when Japanese-Chinese relations had returned, on the whole, to normality, and when Japan efficiently and justly could secure the materials it needed from French Indo-China, Japan would consider withdrawing its troops from French Indo-China even before the complete settlement of the China Incident. The statement had been made originally because Japan had desired to allow as much flexibility as possible in the coming conversations.

With regard to the phrase "which will be applicable to the whole world, etc.," Japan wished to ensure that restrictions enforced against Japan within the East Asia area, where it hoped to establish the New Order Sphere of Co-prosperity, would be incumbent upon the United States outside the Pacific area.[134]

The Japanese government also pointed out to Ambassador Nomura that there were logical reasons for Japan's agreeing that all countries enjoying favorable conditions or having advantages over other countries should assume an attitude of strict impartiality in regard to the distribution of necessary materials. Japan felt that it would naturally assume this economic leadership within the East Asia Sphere of Co-prosperity.

Since Japan's proposal had stated that it was natural and essential to make all adjustments in a spirit of equality and reciprocity with adjacent areas, Japan's position toward Manchukuo and China was thereby clarified, for such good neighborliness would ensure the establishment of the East Asia Sphere of Co-prosperity. This policy was not, as the United States alleged it to be, aimed at securing a position superior to other nations in that area, since Japan was following closely the policy set forth in the American Monroe Doctrine. Furthermore, in order to satisfy "the requirements essential to the existence of a country" Japan would naturally take part in a joint defense of China.

Tokyo informed Ambassador Nomura that it had inserted these passages in its reply to President Roosevelt to guard against the possibility of its being too narrowly restricted in any discussions concerning the method by which the East Asia Sphere of Co-prosperity was to be established.[135]

33. American Newspaperman Seeks Details of Prince Konoye's Message

In spite of the efforts of both Japanese and American officials to safeguard the secrecy of their conversations, certain publicity leaks occurred. On August 28, 1941, a reporter of the New York Herald Tribune called on Mr. Terasaki to inquire about the contents of the message from Prime Minister Konoye to President Roosevelt. Although Mr. Terasaki refused to refer to the contents of that message, it was alleged that in a recent interview with President Roosevelt it had been learned that Prime Minister Konoye wished to hold a conference with the American President in Hawaii.[136]

34. The Press Is Informed of Prince Konoye's Message To President Roosevelt

Ambassador Nomura advised Tokyo on August 28, 1941 that since the White House had announced the time for the interview with Ambassador Nomura, Secretary Hull had made public

[134] III, 94.
[135] III, 95.
[136] III, 96.

[30]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

the fact that a message from Prince Konoye had been delivered to President Roosevelt by Ambassador Nomura.[137] However, it was agreed by both the Japanese and American representatives that no reference would be made to the contents of this message.[138]

The Japanese press was notified on August 29, 1941 that Premier Konoye had sent a message to President Roosevelt but no details were given.[139]

35. Tokyo Demands Secrecy Concerning Proposed Conference

Since a disclosure in Japan of any information connected with the proposed conference between President Roosevelt and Prince Konoye would endanger the successful conclusion of such a meeting, on August 29, 1941 Tokyo reiterated its warnings concerning the necessity of secrecy.[140] Ambassador Nomura was informed that on August 28, 1941 the Domei News Service had reported the reference to Prince Konoye's message which he had made in a press conference. Although Tokyo had been able to suppress these dispatches, a fairly large group of people had learned of their contents. In order to prevent similar occurrences in the future, the Japanese Foreign Office requested that Ambassador Nomura refrain from making any mention of Prince Konoye's message until he had first communicated with Tokyo.[141]

Tokyo pointed out that it had intended to keep the matter a strict secret for the time being, but since the news dispatch had been released in Washington, there was danger of further misunderstanding if it attempted to continue suppressing and censoring the news in Japan. Therefore, at 2:30 P.M. on August 29, 1941 certain sections of Prince Konoye's message were announced to the Japanese public.[142] Since the question of time was of the utmost importance, Tokyo requested that Ambassador Nomura explain to American authorities that it had not been able to wait to contact them.

Major reasons for the security measures taken by Japan were in relations with Germany and Italy, and its exceedingly complex domestic situation. Japan felt it quite possible that the United States had deliberately publicized this document in order to estrange Japan from the Axis countries. If information were allowed to leak out before a settlement was reached, there was actual danger that the project would fail. Though Ambassador Nomura's actions might be curtailed somewhat as a result, Japan insisted that he consult with the Foreign Office before making any public statements.

In regard to a suitable location for the "leaders' conference", Japan advised Ambassador Nomura that in case Hawaii were not selected, a place which was part of either nation should not be chosen, for President Roosevelt and Prince Konoye could meet at some spot on the high seas.[143]

In reply, Ambassador Nomura explained to Tokyo the difficulty of seeing President Roosevelt secretly since the American press was furnished with the list of callers at the White House. However, the Japanese Ambassador promised to consult with Secretary Hull to determine measures of avoiding undesirable publicity in the future.[144]

[137] The New York Times, August 29, 1941, 1:5 reported that Ambassador Nomura, at Prince Konoye's request, had begun conferences with President Roosevelt and in Secretary Hull's presence had delivered a note from the Japanese Prime Minister.
[138] III, 97.
[139] "The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State", S.D., II, 579.
[140] III, 98.
[141] Ibid.
[142] III, 99. See Section 39 for Ambassador Grew's report to the State Department which indicates that no details of Prince Konoye's message were released to the Japanese press. See III, 103.
[143] Ibid.
[144] III, 100.

[31]

36. Ambassador Nomura Asks Secretary Hull's Cooperation in Maintaining Secrecy (August 29, 1941)

In order to secure Secretary Hull's assistance in preventing further disclosures, on August 29, 1941 Ambassador Nomura submitted Tokyo's request that the Secretary of State cooperate in safeguarding the secrecy of future conversations.[145] A few days later Secretary Hull, recognizing that security was essential for the success of negotiations, agreed to cooperate with Japan in this matter.[146]

37. Newspaper Article Endangers Japan's Relations with Axis

Ambassador Nomura advised Tokyo on August 30, 1941 that an article appearing in the August 26, 1941 edition of the New York Herald Tribune had greatly disturbed the present situation.[147] Mr. Kasai, a member of the Japanese Parliament, stated that Foreign Minister Matsuoka had made a great blunder in signing the Tripartite Alliance, for although Mr. Matsuoka had believed it would contribute in the end to an improvement of Japanese-American relations, at present it was a stumbling block.[148]

Since such a newspaper article could only serve to aggravate present difficulties and was opposed to Japanese policy, Ambassador Nomura requested that Tokyo prevent other Japanese authorities from coming to the United States until conditions improved considerably.[149]

38. Ambassador Grew Confers with Mr. Terasaki (August 29, 1941)[150]

Since the Japanese press had learned via Washington of Prince Konoye's message to President Roosevelt, Japan requested that Ambassador Grew postpone his scheduled visit with Foreign Minister Toyoda to avoid further publicity. However, in order to convey to Ambassador Grew the text of Prince Konoye's message to President Roosevelt and to discuss the results of the newspaper leaks regarding it, Mr. Terasaki called on Ambassador Grew on August 29, 1941.

Although the newspaper reports had not disclosed the contents of the Japanese message, they nevertheless revealed to the pro-Axis elements in Japan that Prince Konoye had taken the initiative in an obviously conciliatory move. Indignation had been aroused previously by the order freezing Japanese assets in the United States, the shipment of oil to Russia, and America's decision to send a military mission, headed by General Magruder, to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

In view of this latest development, it was feared that serious obstacles would impair Prime Minister Konoye's attempts to reach an understanding with the United States, and there was a greatly increased possibility of an attempt being made on the life of Prince Konoye. To avoid this, Mr. Terasaki, speaking for the Japanese Foreign Minister, proposed that three steps be taken: first, that the meeting between the two government heads take place without delay to offset the rumors that the United States was applying pressure to Japan; that America postpone the routing of tankers to Russia; and lastly, that during the proposed conference, the American, order freezing Japanese assets be suspended. Emphasizing that the Japanese government had given the United States maximum assurances and commitments, particularly in regard to the Chinese situation and the Russian affair, Mr. Terasaki requested that America reciprocate by considering the Japanese proposals not from a legalistic, but rather from a psychological point of view.

[145] "The Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) to the Secretary of State", August 29, 1941, S.D., II, 579.
[146] "Secretary of State (Grew) to the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura)", September 2, 1941, S.D., II, 586.
[147] III, 101.
[148] Ibid.
[149] III, 102.
[150] "Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)", August 29, 1941, S.D., II, 579-582.

[32]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

In reply, Ambassador Grew pointed to the disparity between the very liberal administration of the freezing regulations in the United States and the harsh treatment meted out to Americans and their interests in Japan. Ambassador Grew then expressed to Mr. Terasaki Secretary Hull's views regarding the oil shipments and assured the Japanese official that the United States would consider no request concerning either the shipment of oil or the freezing of assets.

When Ambassador Grew criticized the tenor of American press reports which were being circulated through Japan, Mr. Terasaki replied that certain members of the Cabinet Information Board were pro-Axis in sentiment and the Japanese government was encountering difficulties in handling this question. Mr. Grew gave Mr. Terasaki no encouragement concerning the withdrawing of American tankers from the Russian route or suspending the order freezing Japanese assets.[151]

39. Ambassador Grew Indicates Responsibility of Ambassador Nomura for Publicity Leaks (August 30, 1941)[152]

In answer to Mr. Terasaki's expression of regret over the publicity in Washington concerning the delivery of Prince Konoye's letter to President Roosevelt, Ambassador Grew, on August 30, 1941, presented him with an excerpt from Secretary Hull's press conference held on August 28, 1941.

This revealed that when questioned by a correspondent regarding the nature of President Roosevelt's conversation with Ambassador Nomura, Secretary Hull declared that there had been a general interchange of views related to the affairs of the two countries. As to the nature of Prince Konoye's personal message, the delivery of which Ambassador Nomura had announced as he left the White House, Secretary Hull referred discussion on the matter to the Japanese Ambassador since he had not conferred with him about that point.

To queries regarding the possibility of a written or verbal agreement with Japan, and the theory that the message from the Japanese government had been in the form of a warning, Secretary Hull had merely declined to make any definite statements.

40. Japan Requests Simultaneous Release of Conference Publicity (September 1, 1941)

Aware of the growing dangers resulting from newspaper leaks, Tokyo urged on September 1, 1941 that absolute secrecy surround the Japanese reply to President Roosevelt's proposals. If the United States considered it necessary to publish a summary of this reply, Japan desired that it be notified first, in order that the disclosure might be made to both the Japanese and American peoples at the same time.[153]

41. Newspaper Leaks Continue to Concern Japanese Government

In spite of the efforts of the Japanese government to maintain the strictest secrecy regarding negotiations with the United States, newspaper leaks continued to add to the strain of the diplomatic situation.

Though a reporter had been denied any information when he had called on Mr. Terasaki to confirm the rumor of a proposed meeting between President Roosevelt and Prince Konoye,[154] the New York Herald Tribune had printed a story to the effect that Prince Konoye had requested this interview with President Roosevelt. Consequently, on September 2, 1941 a reporter of

[151] Ibid.
[152] "Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)", August 30, 1941, S.D., II, 582-583.
[153] III, 103.
[154] III, 104.

[33]

the New York Times inquired of Mr. Terasaki concerning the truth of this article, but Mr. Terasaki denied that he knew anything about it.[155]

Ambassador Nomura informed Tokyo on September 2, 1941 that he would again call such breaches of security to Secretary Hull's attention.[156]

42. Tokyo Summarizes the Japanese-American Situation for Its Ambassadors in Rome and Berlin

In a message to Berlin on August 30, 1941 Tokyo summarized the reasons for the new development in Japanese-American relations.[157] In accordance with the principles of Foreign Minister Matsuoka's Cabinet, Ambassador Nomura had carried on informal conversations with Secretary Hull in order to effect a solution to several problems. But when the Japanese army had occupied French Indo-China early in July, the United States froze Japanese assets. As a result, Japan and the United States were unable to carry on normal economic activities with one another, and the tenseness already existing between Japan and the United States became increasingly worse.

In order to alleviate the situation, Prime Minister Konoye had dispatched a message to President Roosevelt which was subsequently announced publicly by both countries. In view of its relations with the Axis countries, Japan had advised the German and Italian Ambassadors in Tokyo of this development and, therefore, the Foreign Office asked that the Japanese Ambassadors in Berlin and in Rome take note of this situation.[158]

43. Ambassador Colonna Calls on Ambassador Nomura (August 30, 1941)

The Italian Ambassador resident in Washington, Don Ascanio dei principi Colonna, called on Ambassador Nomura on August 30, 1941 to discuss certain developments in Japanese-American relations.[159] Ambassador Nomura merely told him that the German and Italian Ambassadors in Tokyo had been informed of President Konoye's message to President Roosevelt.[160] Relations between Japan and the United States were becoming extremely critical, and Ambassador Nomura quoted influential members of Congress as saying that there appeared to be an even chance for war. For that reason, the Japanese Prime Minister had issued a message to President Roosevelt in the hope of lessening the tension.

Since the Italian Ambassador was not content with these replies, Ambassador Nomura expressed the hope, with which Ambassador Colonna agreed, that the European War would soon end. Ambassador Nomura stated that Japan hoped the United States would not enter the war, but it would remain faithful to the Tripartite Pact regardless of America's stand in the European conflict. If war were to break out in the Pacific, it would be a long and drawn-out affair.[161] When reminded by Ambassador Nomura that America had remained extremely friendly toward Italy because of the several million citizens of Italian ancestry now living in the United States, the Italian Ambassador agreed with this view.

After concluding the report of his conference with the Italian Ambassador, Ambassador Nomura assured Tokyo that in accordance with instructions he had maintained strict secrecy. However, the Japanese Ambassador could not prevent the representatives of other countries from drawing their own conclusions as the result of Japan's actions. Though there was no way as yet of telling what the American reaction to the Japanese message would be, Ambassador Nomura had noticed signs of a lessening of the tension between the two governments.[162]

[155] III, 104.
[156] III, Ibid.
[157] III, 105.
[158] Ibid.
[159] III, 106.
[160] III, 105.
[161] III, 106.
[162] III, 107

[34]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

44. Hull-Nomura Conversation (September 1, 1941)

(a) State Department's Report[163]

On September 1, 1941 Ambassador Nomura, accompanied by Mr. Shigeyoshi Obata, a Japanese educated in America, called on Secretary Hull to urge that an early reply be given Prince Konoye's message. After assuring the Japanese Ambassador that he would speak to President Roosevelt upon his return to Washington on the following day, Secretary Hull discussed briefly certain points that would naturally arise should a meeting between the heads of the two nations take place. In response to an inquiry from Secretary Hull, Ambassador Nomura said that he had reported to Tokyo concerning the remarks of Mr. Hull on August 28, 1941.

From Secretary Hull's reports regarding the Chinese situation, it would appear that China was far from a settlement with Japan. Though Ambassador Nomura replied that the discontinuance of American assistance would change China's attitude, Secretary Hull declared that if the good will of China was lost, this method would not result in a stabilized reconciliation.

Though stating that some obstacles to a solution of the fundamental differences might be met, Mr. Obata indicated that some agreement could undoubtedly be reached with regard to the retention of Japanese troops in North China and Inner Mongolia, the proposed Japanese economic cooperation with China, based on international non-discrimination, and the effect of Japan's obligations under the Tripartite Pact upon American self-defense. But Secretary Hull again insisted on the necessity for having an agreement in principle on fundamental questions before the meeting.

When Mr. Obata spoke of the need for simultaneous publication of any reports on such a meeting, Ambassador Nomura pointed out that although the Japanese government had criticized him for mentioning Prime Minister Konoye's personal message to President Roosevelt to the press, the newspapers in Tokyo had responded to the information favorably.

Secretary Hull noted that the attitude of the Japanese press had, to date, only succeeded in widening the breach between the two countries by its support of Japan's co-prosperity sphere in the Far East. Japanese attacks against the United States made it difficult to deal not only with American public opinion, but would repel China, Great Britain and the Dutch East Indies. Furthermore, since any agreement reached in a conference had to receive the backing of Japanese public opinion, Secretary Hull pointed to the present difficulties of the Japanese government in restraining its press from attacking the United States. In view of this, Secretary Hull suggested that Tokyo begin to exercise its influence with the press to emphasize the benefits of a peaceful program in the Pacific. Japan would have nothing to lose in this respect, even though no agreement were reached, since it would have to its credit an effort to achieve peace. Ambassador Nomura promised to submit this suggestion to his government.[164]

(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report

Ambassador Nomura reported on September 1, 1941 that immediately upon receiving instructions he had called on Secretary Hull to discuss the matter of maintaining secrecy in regard to all Japanese-American negotiations and to agree upon a simultaneous announcement of any information that was to be made public.[165] The Japanese Ambassador believed that apparently this problem was being handled by President Roosevelt himself.

President Roosevelt would have dinner with the Secretary of State upon his return to Washington from Hyde Park on September 4, 1941, and since both men were interested in the idea

[163] "Memorandum of a conversation", initialed by Joseph W. Ballantine, September 1, 1941, S.D., II, 583-585.
[164] Ibid.
[165] III, 108.

[35]

of a "leaders' conference", Ambassador Nomura believed that a reply to the Japanese proposals would be forthcoming shortly. Nevertheless, because of Secretary Hull's nature and position in the government, he was extremely cautious, for not only he, but many other Americans apparently were of the opinion that, regardless of Prince Konoye's intentions, the militaristic faction in the Japanese government and Japanese public opinion would not approve the adoption of a peaceful policy in the Pacific.[166] In order to offset such an impression, Ambassador Nomura explained that, as Prime Minister of Japan and a man of great political influence, Prince Konoye was determined to hold the conference.

According to Ambassador Nomura, Ambassador Grew in Tokyo was keeping Secretary Hull well informed on the opinions expressed in Japanese newspapers. Secretary Hull believed that the Japanese government should direct public opinion and influence outstanding political leaders and military men in such a way that they would approve the adoption of a peaceful program. Ambassador Nomura informed Tokyo that this idea would facilitate matters as far as negotiations with the United States were concerned, but pointed out that if such action were taken, it would lead to the suspicion that the United States was trying to interfere with Japan's internal politics.[167]

Secretary Hull then declared that China did not seem too anxious to make peace because it feared that sooner or later a militaristic Cabinet would be established in Japan. Ambassador Nomura replied that "China was America's spoiled child", asking for everything it wanted regardless of others.

To bring about friendly relations between Japan and China without offending China would be difficult said Secretary Hull, who stated that it was necessary to win the approval of Great Britain and other major countries concerned. In regard to the questions of self-defense and of non-discrimination, however, Secretary Hull felt that a satisfactory settlement could be reached.[168]

By way of explaining his government's intentions toward China, Ambassador Nomura assured Secretary Hull that Japan aimed to maintain peace in the Far East. This was evident from the commitments which it had repeatedly made. The stationing of Japanese and Manchukuoan troops in North China was not based on a permanent right of military occupation, and as soon as circumstances permitted, these forces would be withdrawn.[169]

Although Ambassador Nomura discussed with the Secretary of State the proposed "leaders' conference", no decision was made regarding the actual location. However, Ambassador Nomura advised Tokyo that since the climate was favorable even in the autumn, a meeting-place midway between Japan and the United States should be selected.[170]

Summarizing the present international situation, Ambassador Nomura declared that during this third year of the European War, the anti-Axis Powers had recovered from their former desperate defensive position and had built up their strength to equal the Axis Powers.[171] The United States was expanding its own defense and planning to supply the Allies with more materials. Furthermore, in spite of Germany's fighting power, the tremendous waste of manpower and materials on the Eastern Front would undoubtedly cause the war to carry over into next year.[172]

[166] Ibid.
[167] III, 109.
[168] III, 110.
[169] III, 111.
[170] III, 112.
[171] Ibid.
[172] III, 113.

[36]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

45. Roosevelt-Nomura Conversation (September 3, 1941)

(a) Secretary Hull's Report[173]

At President Roosevelt's request, Ambassador Nomura called at the White House on the afternoon of September 3, 1941 to receive an oral statement prepared in reply to the Japanese government's communication. Reading the document aloud, President Roosevelt stressed that since he realized the difficulties of the Japanese internal situation, he had hoped that, in turn, Prince Konoye would appreciate the difficult conditions existing in the United States.

The oral statement referred to the meeting between the respective heads of Japan and the United States, proposed by the Japanese Ambassador in an endeavor to save the situation in the Pacific. Assuring the Japanese Prime Minister that the American government was anxious to consummate the arrangements for such a meeting, President Roosevelt, nevertheless, suggested that preliminary discussions be held concerning problems to be settled at the meeting.

In order to further clarify the stand that the United States would take in the matters under discussion, President Roosevelt reviewed the events leading up to the present conditions.[174] At the outset of the informal and exploratory conversations entered into by Secretary Hull and Ambassador Nomura on April 16, 1941, the American government had set forth four principles as the fundamental basis for its future policy in dealing with all nations: Respect for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of nations; support of the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries; equality in every field, including commercial opportunities; and maintenance of the "status quo" in the Pacific, except where it could be altered by peaceful means.

Not only did the United States believe that peace and stability in the Pacific could be reached only through adherence to these policies, but it was firmly convinced that Japan would profit more by adopting a similar course. The United States noted with satisfaction the statement from Ambassador Nomura to President Roosevelt, on August 28, 1941, which gave specific assurances of Japanese cooperation in the establishment of a peaceful program in the Pacific. America understood by this that any policy involving political expansion or acquisition of economic rights by force was excluded.

During the course of the informal conversations between Ambassador Nomura and Secretary Hull, another proposal, marked "Oral, Unofficial and Without Commitment", had been submitted by the American government as a redraft of the Japanese proposal of May 12, 1941. Certain divergencies of views had been noted in subsequent oral discussions which would have to be clarified at this time in order to facilitate a satisfactory settlement of the Pacific question.

President Roosevelt recognized that no government could reach a decision on policy without taking into account its own internal situation and the strength of public opinion. Japan would realize that the United States could not enter into an agreement that would not be in harmony with the principles of its people. President Roosevelt's statement was concluded with a request for a reply from the Japanese government on the matters set forth above.[175]

After finishing his oral statement, President Roosevelt discussed his recent conversations with Prime Minister Churchill during which both men had agreed that in dealing with certain post war governmental problems, a policy of settlement by plebiscites would be most effective.[176]

[173] "Memorandum by the Secretary of State (Hull)", September 3, 1941, S.D., II, 588-592.
[174] "Oral statement handed by President Roosevelt to the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura)", September 3, 1941, S.D., II, 589-591. For Japanese version of this text sent by Ambassador Nomura to Tokyo, see III, 114.
[175] Ibid.
[176] S.D., II, 588.

[37]

President Roosevelt then read his letter to Prince Konoye. In replying to the Prime Minister's message of August 27, 1941, President Roosevelt expressed his satisfaction over Japanese solicitude for maintaining peace in the Pacific and improving relations with America. Cognizant of the rapidly developing character of world events, President Roosevelt desired to exchange views with the Japanese Prime Minister as soon as possible.[177]

In the statement accompanying Prince Konoye's letter, President Roosevelt had noted that the Japanese government believed the principles of the United States to be the prime requisites for a world peace. In view of the apparently favorable attitude of Japan, President Roosevelt wished to collaborate with it in the practical application of these principles.

Nevertheless, it was evident that certain opposing factions in Japan were strong enough to create obstacles to this proposed collaboration. Under such circumstances, President Roosevelt deemed it advisable that preliminary discussions concerning the basis for achieving and maintaining peace begin immediately, and requested Prince Konoye's assent to this proposal.[178]

When Ambassador Nomura asked his personal opinion regarding the proposed conference, President Roosevelt asserted that the idea was extremely favorable to him. Yet, he insisted that the success of such a conference would rest largely on the settlement of differences prior to the meeting. Once the United States was sufficiently assured that the Japanese principles were favorable to a peaceful settlement in the Pacific, the matter would, of necessity, have to be discussed with the British, Chinese and Dutch, because of their interests in the South Seas. Since difficulties had already been encountered with Tokyo because of its advancement by force into French Indo-China, both President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull emphasized the peaceful stand which Japan must adopt in order to gain the confidence of the nations concerned in the Pacific.

In spite of the opposition in Japan to Prince Konoye's proposal, Ambassador Nomura believed that a meeting between the two government leaders would enable the Japanese to overcome internal friction. Moreover, the questions relating to the complete evacuation of Japanese troops from China, non-discrimination along economic lines, and the interpretation of the Tripartite Pact could be removed as obstacles to Japanese-American friendship if the proposed conference took place.

As the discussion drew to a close, President Roosevelt reiterated his desire that the Japanese government clarify its position and its principles, and that it direct public opinion toward the support of a peaceful course.[179]

(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report

Ambassador Nomura reported that at President Roosevelt's request, he had come to the White House secretly at 5:00 P.M. on the afternoon of September 3, 1941.[180] At that time President Roosevelt read a personal message to be sent to Prime Minister Konoye and also the reply of the United States to the message of the Japanese government, dated August 28, 1941.[181]

After reading these messages, President Roosevelt stated that although Prince Konoye, Ambassador Nomura, Secretary Hull and himself were making every effort to maintain peace

[177] "President Roosevelt's reply to the Japanese Prime Minister (Prince Konoye), handed to the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura)", September 3, 1941, S.D., II, 591-592. For Japanese version of this text sent by Ambassador Nomura to Tokyo, see III, 115.
[178] Ibid.
[179] S.D., II, 588-589.
[180] III, 116-117.
[181] III, 117.

[38]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

in the Pacific, public opinion in both Japan and the United States was an obstacle to friendly diplomatic relations. When President Roosevelt disclosed that he was very sympathetic toward Prince Konoye's position, Ambassador Nomura insisted that regardless of opposition, the Japanese Prime Minister was still determined to proceed with his plans, for of the three points mentioned in the American reply to the Japanese proposal, two points had been agreed upon in principle, and Prince Konoye expected to reach an agreement on the third at the conference.[182]

Pointing out that the British, Netherlands East Indies and Chinese governments would have to be consulted, Secretary Hull inquired concerning certain preliminary arrangements. President Roosevelt assured Ambassador Nomura that during his visit with Prime Minister Churchill he had made no reference to his conferences with Japanese officials. Since according to British custom, the Prime Minister must necessarily submit all matters to the Cabinet and finally to the Parliament, President Roosevelt had recognized that such disclosure would have made it difficult to maintain the secrecy desired by Japan.[183] Ambassador Nomura referred to a message he had received from his government which stated that after the existence of the Prime Minister's message to President Roosevelt had been made known to the public inadvertently, the militaristic faction had vehemently protested against the proposed conference since it feared its effects on the Tripartite Pact.[184]

According to Tokyo, the publication of the story in the Herald Tribune relating the rumor of a proposed conference between Prince Konoye and President Roosevelt had added to the internal confusion,[185] and though the Japanese government did not feel that such actions would destroy the results of a conference between the leaders of both governments, it desired that the matter be kept secret until all arrangements were completed.

Furthermore, the meeting should take place around the middle of September or at an earlier date, with a simple statement to that effect released without delay. The Japanese government advised Ambassador Nomura that if it did not receive an immediate reply concerning these proposals, it planned to issue a public statement describing its position in this matter to safeguard its domestic interests.[186]

However, a day later on September 4, 1941, Tokyo, fearful of causing a misunderstanding which would prevent the conference, requested that Ambassador Nomura rescind this clause.[187]

In regard to the date for the proposed meeting, President Roosevelt stated that the latter part of September would be inconvenient for him but that any other time would be suitable. Though Secretary Hull appeared to be gravely concerned over the general editorial trend of the Japanese press, President Roosevelt agreed to Japan's desire for the simultaneous publishing of any statements concerning these conferences. Ambassador Nomura determined to ascertain Secretary Hull's true attitude during a conversation scheduled for September 4, 1941.[188]

46. Mr. Terasaki Delivers a Message from Foreign Minister Toyoda to Ambassador Grew (September 3, 1941)

Meanwhile, in Tokyo, discussions covering the same general points and emphasizing once more the need for secrecy were taking place between American and Japanese officials. Calling

[182] III, 118.
[183] Ibid.
[184] III, 119.
[185] Ibid. The New York Times, September 3, 1941, 1:6 printed a story of the proposed conference which had to be discounted by the State Department. [186] III, 119.
[187] III, 120.
[188] III, 118.

[39]

by appointment on Ambassador Grew on September 3, 1941, Mr. Terasaki delivered a message from Foreign Minister Toyoda.[189] According to the Japanese Foreign Minister, the Japanese press had obtained information from American newspapers concerning the proposed meeting between the heads of the two governments in spite of all the efforts of Tokyo to prevent such a disclosure.

At this point, Ambassador Grew interposed that the published story had probably resulted from the clever deduction and news sense of the correspondents rather than from any official statement made by the American government. Insisting that the New York Herald Tribune was known to have been in possession of the actual facts, Mr. Terasaki stated that, irrespective of its source, the publicity attending the proposed meeting had increased the suspicion of certain factions in Tokyo that Japan was yielding to American pressure. To halt any mobilization of these pro-Axis elements, it was Mr. Terasaki's opinion that definite results would have to be accomplished by Prince Konoye's proposal.

With this end in mind, Foreign Minister Toyoda deemed it extremely important that an official announcement be released concerning the date and place of meeting between the two government heads. Furthermore, the Japanese government suggested that the conference take place about September 20, 1941 and that the anchorage determined upon be disclosed as "somewhere in the Pacific".

The Director of the American Bureau emphasized Foreign Minister Toyoda's concern over Ambassador Nomura's lack of discretion in speaking to the American press of Prince Konoye's letter to President Roosevelt. Mr. Terasaki assured Ambassador Grew that his government had no intention of delivering an ultimatum to America. Nevertheless, he made it clear that if the projected conference between Prince Konoye and President Roosevelt failed to materialize, Tokyo would be forced to inform the Japanese public, first, of the reasons motivating Prince Konoye's message to President Roosevelt, and second, of the spirit behind the proposed meeting.[190]

On the following day, September 4, 1941, Mr. Terasaki informed Ambassador Grew that both Prince Konoye and Foreign Minister Toyoda wished to retract that portion of the Foreign Minister's message which stated that, should the projected meeting between the two government leaders not be realized, Tokyo would be forced to publish the circumstances surrounding it. The Japanese government feared that such a statement might cause a misunderstanding detrimental to the proposed conference.[191]

47. Ambassador Nomura Advises Tokyo to Reply Briefly to the United States

To clarify the general trend of the informal conferences, Ambassador Nomura sent a message to Tokyo, on September 3, 1941, expressing the opinion that the United States desired mainly to ascertain Japan's definite attitude on questions relating to the rights of self-defense, equal trade opportunities and the terms for peace between Japan and China.[192]

Since he had repeatedly demonstrated his interest in these points during the unofficial conversations, Secretary Hull felt that he must be definitely advised of Japan's attitude in order to insure the success of the "leaders' meeting". According to Ambassador Nomura, the United States did not wish to receive a lengthy statement, which failed to express a definite proposal by the Japanese government.

Ambassador Nomura asked that Tokyo keep these factors in mind in drafting a reply to the American messages. Since Ambassador Nomura was scheduled to converse with Secretary Hull on September 4, 1941, he promised to send a more complete report at that time.[193]

[189] "Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)", September 3, 1941, S.D., II, 586-687.
[190] Ibid.
[191] "Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)", September 4, 1941, S.D., II, 592.
[192] III, 121.
[193] Ibid.

[40]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

48. Grew-Toyoda Conversation (September 4, 1941)

(a) Ambassador Grew's Report[194]

On the afternoon of September 4, 1941 Ambassador Grew called upon Admiral Toyoda and was assured that both Prince Konoye and the Japanese Foreign Minister would make every effort to bring about an early meeting between the Prime Minister and President Roosevelt, since Japan wished to ensure the ultimate success of its peace aims. If this conference were to fail, further efforts to establish friendly relations between the two countries would be useless. In order to achieve these objectives, Japan was prepared to take a definite stand on the matters under discussion, and to make certain provisional commitments. In return, it expected reciprocal commitments from the United States, which would be discussed at the proposed conference.

Stating that he had cabled the proposals to Ambassador Nomura in Washington, Foreign Minister Toyoda then handed Mr. Grew a written copy of the Japanese proposals[195] and requested him to cable them to Washington in his most secret code to obviate any possibility of inaccuracy through misunderstanding of the English language.

In its proposals the Japanese government expressed its willingness to concur in those matters which had already been tentatively agreed upon in the course of the informal conversations. Unless motivated by a justifiable reason, Japan promised that it would not make any military advancement from French Indo-China and the adjoining regions nor would it resort to military action against the territories lying to the north of Japan.

In the case of the United States' entrance into the European War, Japan was to decide independently upon an interpretation and execution of the Tripartite Pact. For the present, the attitude of both Japan and the United States toward the European war was to be determined by the necessary concepts of protection and self-defense.[196]

In regard to its relations with China, the Japanese government would endeavor to bring about general rehabilitation and re-establishment of normal activities. As soon as satisfactory agreements were concluded between Japan and China, the Japanese government was going to withdraw its armed forces.

In regard to the economic activities of the United States, Japan guaranteed that as long as it was pursued on an equitable basis, American trade would not be curtailed in China. Furthermore, Japan would cooperate in the production and procurement of necessary natural resources by the United States in the southwestern Pacific area where the principle of non-discrimination would govern Japan's international commerce. In connection with the resumption of normal trade relations between Japan and the United States, the Japanese government was willing, on the basis of reciprocity, to withdraw its control regulations from American commerce.[197]

In return for these concessions, Japan desired the United States to make similar guarantees. In view of Japan's proposed actions regarding China, the United States was to abstain from any measures which would be prejudicial to Japan's attempts to settle the China affair.

[194] "Memorandum by the Ambassador to Japan (Grew)", September 4, 1941, S.D., II, 593-595, 608-609.
[195] See S.D., II, 608 for text sent to Secretary Hull by Ambassador Grew on September 4, 1941.
[196] See III, 122 for same text sent in Japanese code to Ambassador Nomura on September 4, 1941 and delivered by him to Secretary Hull on September 6, 1941.
[197] S.D., II, 608-609. For Japanese message referring to this specific commitment see III, 123.

[41]

Japan's commitments with regard to trade in the southwest Pacific were naturally to be reciprocated by the United States. Furthermore, any military measures in either the Far East or southwest Pacific areas were to be similarly suspended by the United States, and since Japan wished to resume normal trade relations with the United States, it was desired that America cooperate by discontinuing the freezing of Japanese assets and by removing the prohibition against the passage of Japanese vessels through the Panama Canal.[198]

After stating that Tokyo was prepared to accept the tentative agreement which had been reached in the informal and preliminary conversations carried on at Washington, Foreign Minister Toyoda further declared that points (c), (d) and (e) in the newly submitted Japanese proposals would furnish the basis for an agreement on the chief points that had not been disposed of during previous meetings. Particular emphasis was laid on that section of the proposals which indicated an interpretation of the Tripartite Pact at variance with that of Mr. Matsuoka.

After examining the proposals handed to him, Ambassador Grew remarked that various points were susceptible to broad interpretation. In reply, Foreign Minister Toyoda suggested that they be discussed at the proposed meeting, and that reciprocal commitments and proposals between the two countries be embodied finally into a secret agreement formulated during that meeting. After the conference between President Roosevelt and Prince Konoye had taken place, a general statement could be released to the press. To this suggestion, Ambassador Grew replied that the democratic system of the United States government made it impossible to conceal such meetings from the American public.

At the conclusion of the discussion, Admiral Toyoda revealed that he had not yet received Ambassador Nomura's report on his interview with President Roosevelt on the preceding day. Ambassador Grew also said that he had received no information concerning the conversation which had taken place.[199]

In the comment which Ambassador Grew appended to his report on his conversation with the Japanese Foreign Minister on September 4, 1941, he declared that it appeared to be impossible to work out a detailed agreement concerning each of the points in the Japanese provisional proposals during the short time allotted for the conference between Prime Minister Konoye and President Roosevelt.[200] In regard to any publicity following the meeting of the two government heads, Ambassador Grew believed it wise merely to announce that the government of Japan had subscribed to the principles of international relations enunciated by Secretary Hull, and that in accordance with these principles the reconstruction of problems affecting the Pacific area was under way.

In referring to the efforts of both governments in the establishment of a world peace, the statement should conclude by commenting that it was a source of gratification that both Japan and the United States had advanced toward their goal of peace without the sacrifice of legitimate expansion and aims.

Claiming that there was an obvious difference between Admiral Toyoda's proposals of September 4, 1941 and those transmitted on August 29, 1941, Ambassador Grew believed that the Japanese government was sincerely anxious to achieve a peaceful settlement with the United States.[201]

[198] S.D., II, 608-609. See III, 124.
[199] S.D., II, 593-594.
[200] "Comment by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)", September 4, 1941, S.D., II, 594-595.
[201] Ibid.

[42]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

(b) Foreign Minister Toyoda's Report[202]

In a message to Ambassador Nomura on September 4, 1941 Foreign Minister Toyoda both summarized the conditions existing between Japan and the United States and interpreted the proposals which he had communicated to Ambassador Grew in an interview held on that day.

The Japanese government realized that the United States desired to hold preliminary conferences prior to the major meeting between the leaders of both countries in order to arrive at some agreement on the questions of self-defense, Japanese occupation of China, and equal treatment in trade. But with the disclosure of Prince Konoye's message to President Roosevelt, an internal situation had arisen in Japan which made it extremely urgent to hold the conference without further delay. If representatives of both governments continued to argue these questions merely from a legalistic viewpoint, it would be impossible to be ready for a meeting in the latter part of September.

The Japanese government had already expressed its views on the American proposals issued on July 24 and August 17, 1941, respectively, and could say nothing more on the subject. However, Japan would express its viewpoint in proposals which it was submitting both to Ambassador Grew and Ambassador Nomura for presentation to Secretary Hull. It was felt that the leaders of both countries could hold a conference for the discussion of the points already agreed upon in preliminary discussions, and could then issue a joint statement at the conclusion of their interview. This would create a more wholesome atmosphere between Japan and the United States. The Japanese government promised to send Ambassador Nomura a suggested text of this joint agreement as soon as it could be made ready.[203]

The Japanese Foreign Minister had conversed with Ambassador Grew in the afternoon of September 4, 1941 and had submitted the Japanese proposals concerning which certain points required a special explanation. The two conferees would decide whether the conclusions reached during the conference would be in the form of a secret or ordinary agreement. Japan was confident that its concessions, particularly those made with regard to the interpretation of the Tripartite Pact, would meet the approval of the United States.

Referring to the withdrawal of both governments' freezing orders, Japan warned Ambassador Nomura against admitting that the United States' freezing measure had proved damaging to Japan, and directed him to explain that the United States' action in this regard had given the Japanese people the impression that their country was being punished for the occupation of French Indo-China. Therefore, if the order were rescinded by any technical, complicated and halfway measure, it would not be understood by the people at large.

In spite of possible strong opposition within America, the Japanese government believed that the United States should reciprocate the concessions made by Tokyo by withdrawing the freezing order as soon as an agreement was reached by the conferees.

When Japan requested that the United States cease military measures in the Far East, it had in mind the dispatching of submarines and airplanes to the Philippines and the recent acquiring of American military bases in the southwestern Pacific, China and Far Eastern Russia.[204]

[202] III, 125.
[203] Ibid.
[204] III, 126.

[43]

49. Hull-Nomura Conversation (September 4, 1941)

(a) State Department's Report[205]

Accompanied by Mr. Obata, Ambassador Nomura called at Secretary Hull's apartment on September 4, 1941 to express his pleasure over President Roosevelt's reply to Prince Konoye's message. In reply to the request in President Roosevelt's oral statement for a definition of the Japanese government's attitude regarding the three fundamental divergencies of view that had remained unreconciled when the conversations ended in July, Ambassador Nomura stated that those points had been disposed of, in spirit at least, in the Japanese statement of August 28, 1941. In the opinion of the Japanese Ambassador there no longer existed any basic differences between Japan and the United States concerning the principles of peace.

In emphasizing the necessity of consulting with the Chinese, British, and Dutch before entering into final negotiations, Secretary Hull declared that the support of these nations must be enlisted in order to maintain a broad program of peace in the Pacific area. In order to allay any apprehension, particularly on the part of the Chinese, the American and Japanese governments would have to reach a clear understanding beforehand regarding points that would affect China.

Referring to Japanese obligations under the Tripartite Pact, Ambassador Nomura declared that since this alliance was purely defensive there was no question of Japan's attacking the United States should America enter the war. Nevertheless, Secretary Hull insisted that if the United States made an agreement with Japan without first obtaining explicit assurance concerning the interpretation of the Tripartite Pact, difficulties would arise with the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.

In answering Ambassador Nomura's queries regarding discussions prior to the conference between President Roosevelt and Prince Konoye, Secretary Hull raised the question of broadening the proposed trade commitments. In the light of the exigent economic problems which would arise after a peace settlement had been reached, Secretary Hull believed that the existing trade proposals were contrary to Japan's own interest.

After this remark Ambassador Nomura stated that he was awaiting his government's instructions concerning a statement of its present attitude toward the three fundamental points at issue. Ambassador Nomura then handed Secretary Hull a new draft of the Japanese proposals, which he said was a redraft of the American proposals of June 21, 1941. The document was marked "Unofficial, Exploratory, and Without Commitment".[206]

As the meeting drew to a close, Ambassador Nomura referred to the release of a public announcement concerning the meeting of Japanese and American governmental heads. Secretary Hull did not object to an announcement that formal exploratory conversations were in progress, but stated that any publicity regarding the negotiations should be deferred until preliminary discussions had been completed and the other governments concerned in the matter had been approached.[207]

(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report[208]

In order to determine Secretary Hull's views on the preliminary talk which Mr. Hull had with President Roosevelt, Ambassador Nomura called on the Secretary of State on the morning of September 4, 1941.

[205] "Memorandum of a conversation", September 4, 1941, S.D., II, 595-596.
[206] This document was submitted without the approval of the Japanese government and was subsequently withdrawn by the Japanese Ambassador. For complete text see S.D., II, 597-600.
[207] S.D., II, 595-596.
[208] III, 127-129.

[44]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

Secretary Hull again brought up the four basic principles which had been discussed in the previous meeting: guaranteeing the territorial integrity of all countries; non-intervention in domestic issues; equal commercial opportunity for all nations; and the maintenance of the status quo in the Pacific. Ambassador Nomura pointed out that the Japanese government's reply to the American note had made it clear that Japan was in full agreement with these principles.[209] However, Japan wished to settle the problems upon which no agreement had been reached in the past informal negotiations. Secretary Hull replied that it was necessary to dispose of the aforementioned four basic principles. Since the United States had no intention of giving the impression that by negotiating with Japan it intended to trade off China, Great Britain and other interested powers, it would be necessary to get the approval of these third powers.[210]

In discussing the American proposal, Ambassador Nomura was of the opinion that the reference to the attitude of Soviet Russia and Great Britain toward the European war should be omitted, but Secretary Hull objected to this suggestion. Moreover, he desired that Japan completely withdraw its troops from North China instead of stationing them there for the alleged purpose of opposing Communism.

From his conversation with Secretary Hull, Ambassador Nomura received the impression that the American attitude toward Japan was stiffening.[211]

50. Ambassador Grew Confers with Foreign Minister Toyoda (September 5, 1941 )[212]

Although Prince Konoye had invited Ambassador Grew to confer secretly with him at a private home on the evening of September 5, 1941, circumstances forced the postponement of the meeting until the following day. In Ambassador Grew's opinion the Japanese Prime Minister had desired to discuss President Roosevelt's reply to his message, as well as President Roosevelt's oral statement, but had deemed it advisable that Foreign Minister Toyoda discuss the matter first. Consequently, Ambassador Grew called on the Japanese Foreign Minister late in the afternoon of September 5, 1941 and Foreign Minister Toyoda questioned him regarding both those matters.

Since a complete report had not reached Ambassador Grew from the American Department of State, Foreign Minister Toyoda showed Ambassador Grew an English text of both the President's message to Prince Konoye and the oral statement. Furthermore, he requested Ambassador Grew's impression concerning the fundamental differences of view which had not been brought into conformity before the conversations in Washington had been interrupted. However, since Ambassador Grew felt that his own telegram reporting his conversation on the preceding day with the Foreign Minister had not yet been received in Washington and, therefore, the United States government was unaware of Foreign Minister Toyoda's belief that the Japanese proposal, dated August 28, 1941 contained the solution to these differences, he could not discuss the problems further with the Japanese Foreign Minister until he had been informed of his government's reaction to the proposal. At Foreign Minister Toyoda's request, Ambassador Grew promised to convey to Secretary Hull his desire for an early report on the American government's reaction to Foreign Minister Toyoda's proposal.[213]

In commenting on the interview scheduled to be held with Foreign Minister Toyoda on the next day, September 6, 1941, Ambassador Grew in his notes of September 5, 1941 stated that

[209] III, 127.
[210] III, 128.
[211] III, 129.
[212] "Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)", September 5, 1941 S.D., II, 600-603.
[213] Ibid.

[45]

he would avoid discussing any of the questions at issue pending a report from the State Department at Washington.

Foreign Minister Toyoda had expressed the opinion that any necessary conversations called prior to the meeting of Prince Konoye and President Roosevelt should be held at Tokyo in view of the language difficulties that had apparently arisen in Washington. However, Ambassador Grew made it clear that he could make no such recommendation since decisions of this sort were made by the American government.

Having examined carefully the reports of the oral discussions concerning the American redraft of the original Japanese proposals, it seemed apparent to Ambassador Grew that there existed four substantial points upon which no agreement had been reached: (1) the questions of equal opportunity and nondiscrimination in China, (2) the maintenance of Japanese garrisons in China, (3) the respective attitudes of the United States and Japan toward the war in Europe and (4) the question of military bases. At present it was necessary to determine to what degree the new Japanese proposals answered these four points, and to discover whether they afforded an adequate basis for the proposed meeting between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Konoye.

According to Ambassador Grew, no oral or written Japanese promises could completely guarantee the carrying out of their proposals. In order to return to the "status quo ante" in the Far East, and to reestablish satisfactory relations between the countries concerned in the Pacific, Japan would undoubtedly have to cease its progressive acts of aggression. Nevertheless, Ambassador Grew believed that, if implemented, the new Japanese proposals might provide the basis for the establishment of peace.

With this end in view, Ambassador Grew also felt it desirable that American military and economic measures against Japan be relaxed as Japan moved towards implementation of its commitments. Thus, Japan would be provided with inducements to honor its proposals, and the United States would have a lever of compulsion. Ambassador Grew believed that the risk involved in this procedure appeared to be less serious than the risk of armed conflict entailed in the progressive application of economic pressure.[214]

51. Japan Requests Ambassador Nomura to Expedite the Conference Arrangements

On September 5, 1941 Tokyo informed Ambassador Nomura that since it had not yet received the messages from Ambassador Nomura which had been delivered to him by President Roosevelt on September 3, 1941, the Japanese government was unaware of the American attitude toward the suggested meeting of the respective leaders. Nevertheless, in order to facilitate the conclusion of an understanding, the Foreign Minister had given Ambassador Grew a document containing further concessions by Japan toward the adjustment of diplomatic relations. The contents of this document were in essence the Japanese reply to the request of the United States for a preliminary understanding. In order to eliminate the possibility of any misunderstanding the proposals had been worded simply.

Since these latest proposals were the maximum concessions which Japan could make in meeting American demands, Ambassador Nomura was requested to impress the American government with the importance of the proposals as preliminary expressions of Japanese intentions to achieve a complete settlement of all questions through politics and diplomacy. Though Japan was ready to give a clear and concise reply to any questions raised by the United States, it felt that further discussions would serve only to delay the conference between Japanese and American leaders. For this reason, both Ambassador Grew and Ambassador Nomura were requested to exercise their influence in discouraging such questions.[215]

[214] "Comment by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)", September 5, 1941, S.D., II, 601-603.
[215] III, 130.

[46]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

52. Ambassador Grew Confers with Officials in Tokyo (September 6, 1941)

(a) Conversation with Foreign Minister Toyoda

During a conversation with Foreign Minister Toyoda on the morning of September 6, 1941 Ambassador Grew, carrying out instructions received in a State Department telegram, informed the Japanese Foreign Minister that the American government could not suspend the sailing of American tankers to Vladivostok, nor could it withdraw the freezing order pending the proposed meeting of the representative heads of Japan and the United States.[216]

Later on the same day, while conferring with the Director of the American Bureau of the Japanese Foreign Office, Ambassador Grew heard Mr. Terasaki's opinions on the influence of the Axis in Japan. In spite of the publicity leaks which had occurred in regard to Prince Konoye's proposal to President Roosevelt, and the reports circulating at present about the projected meeting between the two government heads, Japan was attempting to keep its negotiations with the United States secret. Nevertheless, through subordinate officials in the Foreign Office and the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, Germany and Italy were endeavoring to secure information concerning the progress of Japanese-American relations.

Though Foreign Minister Toyoda, unlike Mr. Matsuoka, permitted Mr. Terasaki to exercise a certain control over the instructions sent to the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin, there were still large numbers of influential Germans in strategic governmental organizations and positions in Tokyo. On the basis of confidential reports, Mr. Terasaki had also learned that Japanese pro-Axis elements were plotting a coup on September 27, 1941, the anniversary of Japan's adherence to the Axis.

Confronting those opposed to a Japanese-American understanding with a fait accompli would be an efficacious way of forestalling their plans, said Mr. Terasaki. Moreover, the news that concrete agreements had been reached between the two countries would be welcomed by the Japanese public.[217]

(b) Conversation with Prince Konoye

In the evening of September 6, 1941 Ambassador Grew dined at a private home with Prince Konoye, Mr. Ushiba, the Prime Minister's private secretary, and Mr. Eugene Dooman, Councilor at the American Embassy.[218] In a three hours' conversation concerning the fundamental principles advanced by both Japan and the United States, the views of the Japanese government were discussed.

Prince Konoye agreed whole-heartedly that the four principles enumerated by Secretary Hull were a sound basis for the rehabilitation of relations between the United States and Japan. Assuming culpability for the present discord existent between the two countries, the Japanese Prime Minister recognized that it was his responsibility to bring about peace in the Pacific. Since failure now would prevent future Prime Ministers from effecting a peaceful collaboration between Japan and the United States, Prince Konoye was determined to conclude his endeavors successfully in spite of opposing factions.

As a result of the latest Japanese commitments, Prime Minister Konoye hoped that a common basis had been established for a meeting between President Roosevelt and himself. While cognizant that many points needed clarification and more precise formulation, Prince Konoye remained confident that since his proposals were backed by Japanese naval and military leaders, any divergencies in view could be easily reconciled.

From the reports of Ambassador Nomura in Washington, the Japanese Prime Minister had concluded that the American government doubted the strength of the present Japanese Cabi-

[216] "Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)", September 6, 1941, S.D., II, 603-604.
[217] Ibid.
[218] "Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)", September 6, 1941, S.D., II, 604-606.

[47]

net to resist the anti-American factions. Admitting that certain elements within the armed forces did not approve of his policies, Prince Konoye nevertheless was certain that he was fully supported by the responsible chiefs of both the Japanese army and navy. When the proposed conference between the two government heads took place, a full Admiral, possibly Admiral Yoshida, a full General and the Vice-Chiefs of Staff were expected to accompany the Japanese Prime Minister.

At the same time, however, Prince Konoye believed that resentment in Japan over the economic pressure exerted by other countries was mounting, and that unless a settlement between the United States and Japan was effected within the year, the Japanese extremists would be in a position to profit by the situation. When Ambassador Grew had pointed to the failure of the Japanese government to carry out promises made by former Japanese Ministers, Prince Konoye answered that his government wished to bring about a thorough reconstruction of American-Japanese relations. Furthermore, any commitments made by Japan at this time would be strictly observed.

If President Roosevelt desired to communicate secretly with Prince Konoye, the Japanese Prime Minister promised to arrange subsequent confidential meetings with Ambassador Grew. In view of the present internal situation in Japan, however, Prince Konoye hoped that the projected meeting with President Roosevelt would be arranged with the least possible delay since he felt that all problems could be solved to their mutual satisfaction. He was determined to achieve the proposed reconstruction of relations with the United States regardless of cost or personal risk.[219]

53. Hull-Nomura Conversation (September 6, 1941)

(a) State Department's Report[220]

Calling at his own request, Ambassador Nomura with Mr. Obata visited Secretary Hull in his apartment on September 6, 1941. After handing Secretary Hull a document containing Japanese proposals for the adjustment of diplomatic relations, the Japanese Ambassador declared that the statement had been prepared before September 3, 1941, the date of President Roosevelt's reply to Prince Konoye's message.[221] Nevertheless, Tokyo believed that the contents of this communication contained not only the spirit of its previous statement transmitted to President Roosevelt on August 28, 1941, but also a reply to President Roosevelt's message of September 3, 1941.

On the evening of August 28, 1941 Secretary Hull had spoken of the desirability of reaching an agreement on certain fundamental questions before the meeting of the two government heads took place. Ambassador Nomura had referred these views to the Japanese government and they had now been acted upon. In the light of existing circumstances, Ambassador Nomura believed that Japan was now making its maximum concessions. Secretary Hull then assured Ambassador Nomura that he was anxious to proceed as quickly as possible. To Ambassador Nomura's suggestion that the announcement of preliminary discussions be hastened, Secretary Hull replied that he saw no objection to having it known that informal and exploratory conversations were underway.[222]

[219] Ibid.
[220] "Memorandum of a conversation", initialed by Joseph W. Ballantine, September 6, 1941, S.D., II, 606-607.
[221] For the text of the Japanese government's proposals handed to Ambassador Grew on September 4, 1941, see III, 122-124. For the text handed to Secretary Hull on September 6, 1941, see "Draft proposal handed by the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) to the Secretary of State", September 6, 1941, S.D., II, 608-609.
[222] "Memorandum of a conversation", initialed by Joseph W. Ballantine, September 6, 1941, S.D., II, 606-607.

[48]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report[223]

In accordance with the instructions he had received from Tokyo, Ambassador Nomura secretly called on Secretary Hull the morning of September 6, 1941 and handed him a document containing Japanese proposals for the adjustment of American relations. Ambassador Nomura explained that this document was a copy of that handed to Ambassador Grew by Foreign Minister Toyoda.

Although the document had been prepared before the Japanese government received on September 3, 1941 President Roosevelt's reply to the message from Prince Konoye, dated August 28, 1941, it was composed with the purpose of clarifying certain points to remove obstacles to the proposed conference. It expressed the attitude of the Japanese government toward President Roosevelt's personal message and his oral statement.[224]

Moreover, the opinions which the Japanese government had set forth in its August 6, 1941 communication, as well as other messages and papers from Prime Minister Konoye, and the latest Japanese concessions were thought by Japan to meet the desires of the United States. By going to the maximum limits in its concessions to the United States, Japan hoped that it would influence the United States to display a high degree of statesmanship by agreeing without further delay to a conference between the leaders of both governments.[225]

Secretary Hull replied that his hasty perusal of Ambassador Grew's report would prevent him from discussing its contents at this time, but he promised to study it carefully during the coming weekend.[226] It was apparent from Secretary Hull's remarks that he doubted the stability of the Japanese Cabinet.[227] Moreover, since an increasing number of people in the United States were favoring the adjustment of Japanese-American relations, Mr. Hull believed that the Japanese government could influence Japanese public opinion in this same direction.

Ambassador Nomura emphasized the necessity of maintaining peace in the Pacific, but though Secretary Hull agreed, he maintained a very cautious attitude.[228] In order not to give a mistaken impression to other countries, Secretary Hull desired that information released on the negotiations should reveal merely that both Japan and the United States were studying the basis upon which the Pacific question could be solved.[229]

In view of this, Ambassador Nomura believed that there was no reason to rescind the Japanese statement in regard to the necessity of explaining Tokyo's position to the Japanese people.[230]

54. Japanese Embassy Is Warned Concerning Newspaper Leaks (September 6, 1941)

Newspaper leaks continued to be a main source of concern to the Japanese authorities. Mr. Morishima was particularly disturbed over a recent interview with Mr. Kasai which had appeared in the New York Daily News. Although Mr. Kasai apparently had given the interview in accordance with a directive from Japan, Mr. Morishima believed that his reference to the

[223] III, 131-134.
[224] III, 131. [225] III, 132. [226] III, 133.
[227] Rumors of a Cabinet crisis in Japan had already appeared in The New York Times, August 28, 1941, 3:1 and August 29, 1941, 1:8. Finally an emergency session of the Cabinet was called to hear Prince Konoye explain the developments of the talks and his message to President Roosevelt.
[228] III, 133.
[229] III, 134.
[230] III, 120, 134.

[49]

current Japanese-American negotiations not only served to aggravate the existing situation and raise another obstacle to the achievement of amicable diplomatic relations, but was particularly inappropriate because of the existence of the Tripartite Pact.[231]

Mr. Morishima reminded the Japanese Ambassador of a previous article by Mr. Kasai which had appeared in the New York Herald Tribune,[232] and requested him to caution Mr. Kasai against further statements.[233]

55. Japanese Intelligence Discloses America's Desire for Peace in the Pacific

On September 6, 1941 a report from Mr. Morishima of the Japanese office in New York revealed information obtained by a private Japanese spy to the effect that both President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill had agreed that it would be necessary to settle the Japanese question harmoniously, for if an advantageous understanding were reached, the American Pacific Fleet could then be transferred to Atlantic waters.[234] In keeping with this idea, according to the source, the United States had instructed Ambassador Grew in Tokyo to rally the pro-Allied elements in Japan and to foster a tendency toward compromise with the United States among the anti-Axis groups.

On the other hand, Great Britain and the United States had been instructing their officials to strengthen their attitude toward Japan in an endeavor to force Japan to its knees. Washington believed that if it became more demanding as Japan became more conciliatory, an understanding could be reached even on the Siberian question. Apparently American authorities accepted the attitude of Prince Konoye and the recently mollified attitude of the Japanese government toward the sailing of American tankers to Russia as an indication of the success of this policy.[235]

Nevertheless, American officials continued to fear that Japan's internal situation might ultimately prevent the United States from arriving at a peace with Japan. In order not to jeopardize the political prestige of Prince Konoye's Cabinet, President Roosevelt was guarding against taking too stringent steps or making immodest demands.

In regard to the sailing of American tankers to Russia, the United States was even considering its guaranteeing that the materials sent there would not be left in Siberia or that in the future they would be shipped via the southern tip of Kamchatka or the detour around Persia.[236]

56. Minister Wakasugi Prepares Return Trip to United States

Since August 31, 1941 when Minister Wakasugi had arrived in Tokyo for the Cabinet change,[237] the Japanese government had been receiving firsthand information on the Japanese-American informal conversations in Washington. However, on September 6, 1941 Tokyo informed Washington that Minister Wakasugi was returning to the United States[238] and, therefore, the Japanese Embassy was asked to contact American authorities in order to obtain reservations aboard the next China Clipper.

[231] III, 135.
[232] III, 101.
[233] III, 135.
[234] III, 136.
[235] III, 137.
[236] III, 138.
[237] New York Times, August 31, 1941, 1:4, 8.
[238] According to the translation of these dispatches Minister Wakasugi was apparently returning to Japan. However, collateral information obtained from later decoded Japanese messages proved that Minister Wakasugi, in Tokyo since August 31, 1941, was now returning to Washington.

[50]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

If it were impossible to secure this reservation, Minister Wakasugi would sail aboard the Terukawa Maru of the Kawasaki line on September 12, 1941. If a last minute reservation were obtained on the plane the Japanese government still intended to use the stateroom aboard the Terukawa Maru.[239] On the same day Tokyo asked Canton for any information on ships leaving for Hongkong on or about September 15, 1941.[240]

Since the Terukawa Maru would be one or two days late in leaving, Tokyo asked Washington to reply about the request for Clipper reservations before noon of September 12, 1941, Japanese time.[241] But in spite of the fact that Ambassador Nomura himself had promptly requested the State Department's assistance in making reservations, there were no vacant seats aboard the Clipper for several weeks to come.[242]

Although these preparations were unavoidably delayed, the return of Minister Wakasugi to the United States was considered to be a sign of Japanese hope for Pacific peace.[243]

57. Grew-Terasaki Conversation (September 8, 1941)

(a) Ambassador Grew's Report[244]

Because the recent incident involving the American destroyer Greer and a German submarine had become of major concern to the Japanese government, Mr. Terasaki called upon Ambassador Grew to deliver a message from Foreign Minister Toyoda who feared that this incident might involve Japan in an interpretation of the Tripartite Pact, since Germany was asserting that the American ship had committed an unprovoked act of aggression. The Japanese Foreign Minister indicated that this was a further proof of the necessity of expediting the suggested meeting between the leaders of the two nations.

Ambassador Grew declared that he had already sent the Foreign Minister the official statements made by President Roosevelt and the Navy Department regarding the Greer incident. Mr. Terasaki then submitted Foreign Minister Toyoda's request that officials of the United States government guard the secrecy of their conversations with the Japanese, since unwarranted publicity at this critical moment would make it difficult to control the dissident groups in Japan.[245]

(b) Japanese Foreign Office Report[246]

Although the incident under discussion concerned an attack by a German submarine upon the destroyer, the U.S.S. Greer, en route to Iceland with mail, Japanese diplomats recognized that their alliance with Germany might jeopardize Japanese-American negotiations. When President Roosevelt announced his intention to broadcast America's official attitude toward the Greer incident on September 11, 1941, Japanese officials feared that his speech might connect the Japanese government with the incident. In order to guard against the extremely undesirable results which would ensue, Mr. Terasaki, in charge of American affairs in the Foreign Office at Japan, discussed the problem with Ambassador Grew.

To re-emphasize the importance of the situation, Tokyo requested on September 8, 1941 that Ambassador Nomura have an informal conversation along the same lines with Secretary

[239] III, 139.
[240] III, 140.
[241] III, 141.
[242] III, 142.
[243] New York Times, September 15, 1941, 7:2, 4.
[244] "Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)", September 8, 1941, S.D., II, 609.
[245] Ibid.
[246] III, 143.

[51]

Hull. Expressing its gratitude to Ambassador Nomura for his conscientious endeavors to adjust the problems of the Japanese-American situation, Tokyo hoped, since his efforts were nearing realization, that he would continue to employ the full extent of his capabilities in this matter.[247]

58. American Public Opinion Is Hostile to Japan

Although Ambassador Nomura did not discuss the Greer incident with Secretary Hull until September 10, 1941, on September 8, 1941 he sent Tokyo a report on the attitude of the American public toward Japan and the possible effects which the incident in the Atlantic might have upon it. For more detailed information, the Japanese Ambassador asked that Tokyo question Mr. Iwakuro Wakasugi, recently returned to Tokyo from Washington.

From a recent study of the Gallup Poll, Ambassador Nomura observed that American public opinion was much more hostile to Japan than Germany; in fact, since July there had been an increase in the number of people who favored preventing Japan's further advance in the Pacific, even at the risk of war. At present the percentage was approximately 70 % in favor of stopping Japanese aggression.

The attack on the Greer had served not only to increase the concern of the United States over the safety of travel on the Atlantic, but had also raised apprehension regarding shipping in the Pacific. If a similar accident ever occurred in the Pacific, the situation would then become irreparable.

Ambassador Nomura attributed the greater indignation of the American people over Japanese actions as compared with German to the fact that, in case of a war with Germany, it would be necessary to send an expeditionary army, whereas, in the case of a Japanese-American war, an army would not be necessary.[248]

A few days later, on September 10, 1941, Ambassador Nomura reported that there were rumors abroad regarding the speech to be made by President Roosevelt on September 11, 1941. Some declared that a shooting patrol would be established between the United States and Ireland for the defense of those waters, and others insinuated that the German submarine had deliberately attacked the Greer with the intention of forcing Japan to conclude the Japanese-American negotiations.[249]

In a message sent to Berlin reporting the increase in American military preparations, the Japanese government mentioned the stiffening of American public opinion against Japan. Since Germany appeared able to maintain a calm attitude toward the United States in spite of the pressure applied by the American government, Japan felt that its aim should be to keep America out of the European war. Rather than provoking the American people into uniting at this time, Japan recognized the advantages of appeasing the United States and, in the meantime, of working toward its internal disintegration.[250]

59. Ambassador Grew Delivers American Statement to Foreign Minister Toyoda (September 10, 1941)

In compliance with his instructions, Ambassador Grew called upon Foreign Minister Toyoda on the evening of September 10, 1941 to deliver a statement from the State Department. Be-

[247] Ibid.
[248] III, 144. In reporting on American production, Ambassador Nomura pointed out that during 1941 the payment for war materials exceeded an average of $1,000,000 monthly and the production output was four or five times more than that of the preceding year.
[249] III, 145.
[250] III, 146.

[52]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

fore beginning his remarks, Ambassador Grew made it clear to the Japanese Foreign Minister that the inquiries of the United States government in the statement he had presented were merely exploratory and preliminary, and further questions might emerge from an additional study of the Japanese proposals.[251]

The statement declared that although the United States was still examining the Japanese commitments which had been delivered by Foreign Minister Toyoda to Ambassador Grew on September 4, 1941 and by Ambassador Nomura to Secretary Hull on September 6, 1941, the United States had in view an agreement which would provide the basis for an understanding between the two countries by which China would receive just and equitable treatment and the rights of all Pacific powers would be observed.[252]

To ensure future peace and stability throughout the Far East, it was recognized that a fair settlement of the controversies between China and Japan must first be effected. In replying to previous Japanese proposals, the United States had made it clear that it was in no position to assist in the settlement of the China Incident without first receiving definite assurance that Japan's terms were consistent with the principles of the United States. As a result of Tokyo's insistence that Japanese troops should remain in Inner Mongolia and North China for an unspecified period, and because the Japanese government refused to act without discrimination in its commercial relations with China, collaboration between those two countries had not been achieved.

In its latest proposals it appeared that Japan intended to negotiate with China directly, relieving the United States of any responsibility in the matter; and ignoring America's intention, before negotiating with Japan, to confer with the governments of China, Great Britain and the Netherlands in order to evolve a peace beneficial to the legitimate concerns of all powers interested in that area. Since America believed that if the Japanese government were willing to propose equitable and just terms to Chungking, no difficulties would be incurred, the United States intended to continue to render assistance to China in its resistance to aggression.

From the study of these recent Japanese proposals, certain questions had arisen which Japan was requested to answer. Referring to Japan's assertion that it was prepared to subscribe to the points upon which tentative agreement had been reached in Washington, the United States asked whether Japan referred to the points in the American draft of June 21, 1941 which were identical to those in the draft submitted by Ambassador Nomura on September 4, 1941 or some other points. Since certain stipulations in the September 4, 1941 proposals appeared to limit the principles set forth during the informal conversations, the United States requested clarification of certain points.

In regard to the principle of non-discrimination in international commerce, America questioned the extent to which Japan would carry out these liberal economic activities in the Far East. Pointing out that Japan had stated that the economic rights of the United States in China would not be restricted as long as they were pursued on an "equitable basis," the American government asked for the precise meaning of this term and whether Japan would be the sole judge in interpreting it. Although the United States was still carefully examining the Japanese statement of its attitude regarding the European war, it felt that the formula was inadequate in that it permitted Japan to interpret independently any commitment on this score. However, the question would be studied further.[253]

[251] "Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)", September 10, 1941, S.D., II, 610.
[252] "Statement handed by the American Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs (Toyoda)", September 10, 1941, S.D., II, 610-613. Foreign Minister Toyoda sent Ambassador Nomura a copy of this message on September 12, 1941. See III, 147-153.
[253] Ibid.

[53]

After glancing through the American statement both Foreign Minister Toyoda and Mr. Terasaki questioned the American reference to the Japanese proposals delivered to Secretary Hull on September 4, 1941. Foreign Minister Toyoda explained that he did not have in his possession the text of the draft proposal delivered on September 4, 1941 by Ambassador Nomura to Secretary Hull. Nevertheless, the Tokyo officials insisted that the Japanese draft of September 4, 1941 did not cancel any of the terms upon which previous agreements had been reached with the United States during the conversations in Washington. However, Foreign Minister Toyoda and Mr. Terasaki emphasized the fact that their remarks in this connection were unofficial.[254]

60. Foreign Minister Toyoda Inquires Concerning Ambassador Nomura's Proposal of September 4, 1941

Since Foreign Minister Toyoda had not been informed of the contents of the proposal submitted to the United States by Ambassador Nomura on September 4, 1941 and mentioned by Ambassador Grew during the conversation held on September 10, 1941, he asked that information concerning it be sent to him by the Japanese Ambassador in Washington.[255]

61. Ambassador Nomura Explains Purpose of Proposals of September 4, 1941

In his reply Ambassador Nomura stated that, acting upon his own initiative to sound out American opinion, he had submitted a number of additional revisions to the original American proposal, and had presented them to Secretary Hull on September 4, 1941 as his own suggestions. At that time Ambassador Nomura had not received his government's reply to the American proposals, but having since received it, he had withdrawn his own suggestions.[256]

62. Hull-Nomura Conversation (September 10, 1941)

(a) State Department's Report[257]

Complying with the instructions of the Japanese government, Ambassador Nomura and Mr. Obata called at Secretary Hull's apartment on September 10, 1941 to discuss President Roosevelt's forthcoming speech. Since any indiscriminate reference to Japanese-American relations could stimulate pro-Axis activity in Japan, the Japanese Ambassador expressed the wish that discretion be employed in mentioning such incidents as the Greer incident because of its possible effect on the extremist elements in his country. Although refusing to give any indication of the contents of President Roosevelt's speech, which he stated had already been prepared, Secretary Hull assured Ambassador Nomura that he thoroughly understood the desirability for avoiding anything which would be detrimental to Japanese-American relations.

Ambassador Nomura requested Secretary Hull's reaction to the Japanese proposals of September 6, 1941. Commenting that these proposals narrowed the spirit and scope of previous understandings which had related to a broad and liberal agreement covering the entire Pacific area, and that in view of Germany's attempted world conquest, the Tripartite Pact could only be interpreted as a military alliance, Secretary Hull said the new proposals did not meet these difficulties.

Mr. Obata remarked that the recent Japanese proposals did not limit in any way the spirit of previous tentative agreements or the original proposal. In order, therefore, to eliminate any misunderstanding, Secretary Hull suggested that Mr. Hamilton and Mr. Ballantine discuss any disputable points in the proposals with Ambassador Nomura and Mr. Obata.

[254] "Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)", September 10, 1941, S.D., II, 610.
[255] III, 154.
[256] III, 155.
[257] "Memorandum of a conversation", September 10, 1941, S.D., II, 613-614.

[54]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

Agreeing with the Japanese Ambassador who stressed the necessity of proceeding immediately with definite negotiations for peace, Secretary Hull declared nevertheless that conversations for discovering any divergent policies must be conducted in Washington, and not in Tokyo as suggested to Ambassador Grew by Foreign Minister Toyoda. However, Ambassador Grew had been instructed to explain any points which were not clear to the Japanese government and to obtain clarification of the Japanese point of view, if necessary.[258]

(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report[259]

Acting upon the instructions received from Tokyo, Ambassador Nomura called on Secretary Hull on the morning of September 10, 1941 in order to request that President Roosevelt make no reference to the Japanese-American situation in his broadcast regarding the Greer incident. Although Secretary Hull refused to commit himself in any way he agreed to the necessity of maintaining strict secrecy in all Japanese-American negotiations. Secretary Hull remarked that although there was a discrepancy between the American and German accounts of the Greer incident, the consistency of past American reports, and the constantly contradictory statements of Chancellor Hitler made it apparent that the United States' announcement was the more reliable.

To Ambassador Nomura's inquiry concerning the time when an answer to the Japanese government's proposals of September 6, 1941 might be expected, Secretary Hull replied that he had not found the opportunity to discuss the Japanese proposals personally with President Roosevelt since the last Cabinet meeting had been held on the previous Friday. However, he promised to confer with President Roosevelt following the broadcast on September 11, 1941. Secretary Hull indicated his dissatisfaction because the Japanese government had narrowed the scope of the proposed agreement by its latest document.[260]

Ambassador Nomura pointed out that concessions already agreed upon in previous discussions had been omitted from these latest Japanese proposals, and he had discussed only those points upon which no agreement had yet been reached. According to Ambassador Nomura, the United States was attempting to find the stand which Great Britain, China and the Netherlands intended to take on the question.[261]

63. Japanese-American Conversation (September 10, 1941)

(a) State Department's Report[262]

Pursuant to the arrangements made by Secretary Hull and Ambassador Nomura earlier in the day, Mr. Hamilton, Mr. Ballantine, and Mr. Schmidt conferred at the Japanese Embassy about various points contained in the Japanese proposals of September 6, 1941. According to Mr. Obata, both he and Ambassador Nomura had been surprised at the United States' "misapprehension" that the proposals impeded the progress made in the informal conversations. According to both Japanese representatives the Japanese government intended that its latest proposals should supplement the points previously agreed upon during the informal conversations in Washington, and should confirm the commitments made by Prince Konoye through Ambassador Nomura to President Roosevelt.

When asked by Mr. Ballantine if Japan believed that the American statement of June 21, 1941 still represented a basis for a proposed agreement between the two governments, Mr.

[258] Ibid.
[259] III, 156-157.
[260] III, 156.
[261] III, 157.
[262] "Memorandum of a conversation", September 10, 1941, initialed by Max W. Schmidt, S.D., II, 614-619.

[55]

Obata replied in the affirmative. At the same time he added that the document given to Secretary Hull by Ambassador Nomura on September 4, 1941 had not been referred to Tokyo, and, thus, merely represented Ambassador Nomura's personal opinion and not the official views of the Japanese government.

Mr. Ballantine then observed that there still appeared to be certain inconsistencies between the proposals made by the Japanese government on September 6, 1941, and earlier Japanese statements. Referring to portions of the Japanese proposals which were believed to modify previous commitments, Mr. Ballantine discussed Japan's attitude toward aggression in French Indo-China. In conveying broad assurances of the peaceful intentions of the Japanese government, Prince Konoye had previously guaranteed the withdrawal of troops from this territory, but in the document received by Secretary Hull on September 6, 1941 Japan agreed only to refrain from advancing into areas adjoining French Indo-China.

Mr. Obata replied that Prince Konoye's proposals had not in any way been modified, and when Mr. Ballantine commented on the difference in the two Japanese proposals in one of which Japan promised not to attack to the north, and in the other it undertook not to attack to the south of the Empire, Mr. Obata insisted that Japan did not plan to use military force against any nation without any justifiable reasons. However, he agreed to inquire whether "north" or "south" were meant in the proposal, and whether "without any justifiable reason" applied to areas adjoining Indo-China as well as north or south of Japan.

Since the question of Japanese-Chinese cooperation had remained an issue throughout the negotiations, Mr. Ballantine turned to the problems opposing a satisfactory settlement. Although Mr. Obata and Ambassador Nomura were somewhat vague regarding their government's position, both expressed belief that Tokyo still desired the assistance of President Roosevelt in effecting a reconciliation. As had been pointed out in previous conversations, however, the American officials declared that before the United States government could approach Chungking with a Japanese peace proposal, the policies of Japan would have to conform with the fundamental principles to which the governments of both the United States and Japan be committed. Reiterating that peace would be accomplished only by the adoption of a broad, progressive policy in all international relations as well as by avoiding any bitterness on the part of China, Mr. Hamilton insisted that the best interests of Japan lay in this direction.

In the past, the Japanese government had not honored its commitments, Mr. Hamilton stated, and therefore, Japan must now prove the sincerity of its intentions by some definite action such as the withdrawal of troops from occupied territories. Mr. Obata concurred with these statements. Nevertheless, he pointed out that the withdrawal of armed forces from China presented a difficult problem. Therefore, he suggested that the United States make a draft of the commitments which they desired Japan to make relating to the China Incident. But Mr. Ballantine observed that the Japanese government was in a better position to draw up a document embodying its plans.

From the phraseology of clause (e) of the Japanese proposals, which Mr. Obata conceded was bad, it had appeared to the American government that Japan felt that it was entitled to special rights in China. In view of this, Mr. Ballantine questioned the Japanese representatives concerning the future application of nondiscriminatory commercial practices by Japan in China and throughout the entire Pacific area.

At this time Mr. Ballantine handed to Mr. Obata, for the consideration of the Japanese government, a tentative redraft of Section V of the Japanese proposals of September 6, 1941, which American economic experts had prepared to clarify the commercial activities of both nations in the Pacific.[263] It stated that by pledging themselves to conform to the principles of

[263] Ibid.

[56]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

nondiscrimination in international commercial relations, both Japan and the United States agreed to create an international trade and investment situation conducive to the mutual acquisition of essential commodities. Both governments were to co-operate with each other in obtaining such basic supplies, on a nondiscriminatory basis, as oil, rubber, tin, and nickel, as well as other products essential to maintain their economic life.[264]

After completing the discussion of Japan's tentative commitments, the American representatives turned to the reciprocal measures which the Japanese proposals called upon the American government to make. If the Japanese government were to offer China a just and equitable settlement, Mr. Ballantine believed that there would be no difficulties in achieving an acceptable agreement. Therefore, America did not share the Japanese belief that the continuation of United States' aid to China would be detrimental to Japan's conclusion of the China Incident.

As Secretary Hull had previously informed Ambassador Nomura, the United States, before concluding any agreement with Japan regarding the Pacific area, intended to confer with the Chinese government and other nations sharing responsibilities in the Pacific, since the problems involved could not be solved by the United States and Japan alone. Mr. Ballantine said that Ambassador Grew had been fully informed of the attitude of the American government.

As the conference drew to a close, Mr. Obata suggested that the United States prepare a complete statement embodying all the earlier proposals made by both America and Japan. Mr. Hamilton replied that it would be more desirable to have changed the questions which the United States had raised in this meeting before drafting a new agreement. Mr. Obata concurred and promised to have a reply from Tokyo by the next afternoon.

In the opinion of the American representatives, neither Ambassador Nomura nor Mr. Obata knew definitely the intentions of their government. The Japanese representatives were certain only that Tokyo desired that the meeting of the two government heads take place in the immediate future.[265]

(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report

At the request of Secretary Hull the American officials, Mr. Hamilton, Mr. Ballantine and Mr. Schmidt, had called at the Japanese Embassy to raise certain questions regarding the Japanese proposal submitted to the American government on September 6, 1941.[266]

Referring to the "undertakings" of Japan the American representatives had asked for a specific explanation of "matters upon which the two countries have agreed during the preliminary informal conversations". They also questioned whether the draft of the Japanese-American understandings formulated during the past negotiations could now provide the basis for a future agreement. Further inquiries were made concerning the words "without any justifiable reason" which Japan had included in clause (b) of its statement regarding its further expansion in the Far East.

Although Messrs. Hamilton, Ballantine and Schmidt had requested an explanation of the entire clause (d) in relation to the withdrawing of troops from China, Ambassador Nomura avoided making a definite statement, since it would involve a discussion of the stationing of these troops for anti-Communistic purposes.[267]

[264] "Draft statement given to the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura)", September 10, 1941, S.D., II, 619. For the Japanese version of this message, wired to Tokyo on September 10, 1941, see III, 158.
[265] "Memorandum of a conversation", September 10, 1941, initialed by Max W. Schmidt, S.D., II, 614-619.
[266] III, 159.
[267] III, 160.

[57]

Ambassador Nomura stated that the American officials had been given the impression by the latest Japanese proposals that in spite of its guarantee to preserve the principle of equal treatment throughout the entire Pacific area, Japan desired to hold a special position in China.[268]

In view of this and other considerations Mr. Hamilton in his conversation with Ambassador Nomura on September 10, 1941 requested a redraft of the proposals relating to economic activities.[269]

64. Publicity Concerning Mr. Kasai Arouses Japanese Concern

To effect control over information released to newspapers, Tokyo directed Ambassador Nomura to warn Mr. Kasai, a member of the Japanese Diet who had recently arrived in the United States, to refrain from making further comments on Japanese-American negotiations.[270] Through newspaper articles in which he had expressed opinions on the present political situation and, in particular, his views in regard to the Tripartite Pact, Mr. Kasai had already added greatly to the tension existing between the two countries.

Consequently, Mr. Yiguti asked that Mr. Kasai curtail his activities. In defense of his actions, Mr. Kasai explained that he had tried sincerely to better the situation. He regretted, therefore, that his opinions, which had been constantly exaggerated by newspapermen, had jeopardized current Japanese-American relations.[271]

65. Ambassador Nomura Appraises American Attitude Toward New Japanese Proposals

From Ambassador Nomura's report of September 11, 1941, based on preliminary Japanese-American negotiations, it was evident that the major difficulty encountered stemmed from the stationing of Japanese troops in China for allegedly anti-Communistic purposes. Because of its obligations to China and the opposition of domestic public opinion, the United States found it impossible to recognize the terms of the Tokyo-Nanking Agreement.

In the message of June 21, 1941 the American government had expressed its desire that a new agreement be drawn up between China and Japan whereby Japanese troops would be removed from China at the earliest possible moment. Recently, the American attitude had become more forceful, and it now demanded that Japan complete the evacuation of troops from China within a two year period after the resumption of peaceful relations. According to Ambassador Nomura, the strengthened attitude of the United States had resulted from its talks with China.[272]

In regard to various other points included in the Japanese proposals, Ambassador Nomura entertained little doubt that a successful agreement could be reached concerning them. Nevertheless, there was an actual danger that Japanese-American negotiations would fail as a result of the disagreement on troop evacuations. In order to overcome this obstacle, Ambassador Nomura, suggesting that the Japanese government agree to remove its troops within two years after the restoration of peace, declared that an immediate and definite decision on this point would increase the probable success of future negotiations. The State Department had already inquired about Japan's position regarding its troops in China,[273] and in spite of four notes presented by representatives of the Japanese government, Japan's interpretation of several phrases still caused certain doubts about the proposed agreements.[274]

[268] III, 161.
[269] III, 162.
[270] III, 163.
[271] III, 164.
[272] III, 165.
[273] III, 166.
[274] III, 159.

[58]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

Though the matter of evacuating troops from occupied China was actually a problem to be settled only between Japan and China, the question had been introduced into the negotiations with America in view of a possible agreement with the United States to have it use its good offices in ending the China Incident. Therefore, Ambassador Nomura suggested that the Japanese government agree to accept the terms of the United States in order to bring about the desired understanding.

Considerable time would elapse after the leaders' conference and the resulting peace conference, and although Japan would agree to evacuate its troops within two years after the resumption of peaceful relations, world affairs might make it essential that Japan enter into a new agreement which would extend the period of garrisoning Japanese troops in China. Because of circumstances existing in the future, Japan might even prolong the time limit in the name of protecting its nationals' lives and property. Through this method, no conflict would arise with Japan's established national policy.[275]

Because of various domestic problems in Japan, Ambassador Nomura recognized the difficulty in making this concession. The phrase "stationing of troops to counter Communism" would be deleted from the proposals, but, instead a clause would be inserted to permit a certain number of troops to "act in cooperation with the Chinese to counter acts which imperil the tranquillity of the nation (non-militaristic in nature)".

Taking this opportunity to discuss the attitude of the Japanese press regarding the possibility of an understanding between the United States and Japan, Ambassador Nomura assured his Foreign Office that optimistic views were neither warranted nor to the interest of Japan. At press conferences in Washington, Secretary Hull had stated that there were still serious and delicate problems to be settled, and in view of this attitude, Ambassador Nomura asked that Tokyo guide accordingly the editorial policies of Japanese papers.[276]

66. Japan Instructs Ambassador Nomura Not To Change Diplomatic Documents

On September 11, 1941 in answer to Ambassador Nomura's request for approval of certain changes he had made in Prime Minister Konoye's message to President Roosevelt and in the Japanese government's reply,[277] Tokyo informed him that all important documents were submitted to both the government and the controlling factions of the political parties for approval before being transmitted abroad. If Ambassador Nomura had any doubts regarding points in one of these messages, Tokyo requested that he cable all inquiries and suggestions to the Foreign Office before delivering the texts to the American government, since extreme caution had to be exercised in maintaining liaison with the various departments concerned.[278]

Ambassador Nomura replied on September 17, 1941 that such a procedure was very logical. In view of the strict precautions taken by the Tokyo Foreign Office in sending these dispatches Ambassador Nomura felt deeply responsible for the inadvertent omissions made in certain transmissions.[279]

67. Ambassador Nomura Appraises President Roosevelt's Speech

As had been previously announced, on September 11, 1941 President Roosevelt spoke over the radio concerning the official attitude of the United States toward the Greer incident. Be-

[275] III, 167.
[276] III, 168.
[277] III, 81.
[278] III, 169.
[279] III, 170.

[59]

cause Tokyo had believed that the speech might have a significant effect on current Japanese-American relations, Ambassador Nomura submitted his impression of it on the following day.[280]

Ambassador Nomura believed it to be a strong speech actually amounting to a challenge of war, and though delivered in a grave tone of voice, without resorting to strong expressions, it was "comparable to a clenched fist clothed in a silk glove". From various newspaper reports, which appeared to be in favor of President Roosevelt, it was assumed that he had succeeded in accomplishing his purpose.[281]

Nevertheless, a portion of the American people was opposed to President Roosevelt's policies. Expressing the opinion of this minority group at a meeting of the America First Committee at Des Moines, Iowa, Colonel Lindbergh stated that a three-party alliance composed of England, Jewry and the Roosevelt Administration were leading the United States into war.[282]

In Ambassador Nomura's own opinion there were many other factors driving the United States into the war. Because of the great expansion of productive and economic organizations undertaken under the pretext of national defense, the United States was obliged to join the war in order to prevent their disintegration. According to the Japanese Ambassador, the Greer incident had been welcomed by President Roosevelt as a means of turning public opinion in his favor.[283]

68. Chungking and Nanking Governments Opposed to Japanese-American War

By correlating information collected from various Chinese sources, Tokyo was able to notify its Embassy in Washington on September 12, 1941 of Chungking's attitude toward Japanese-American negotiations.[284] Allegedly suffering because of selfish American interests and receiving little support for a counter-offensive against Japan, Chungking was reported as being in constant anxiety over the American policies in the Far East. It was the general belief in Chungking that the outcome of the Japanese-American conversations depended largely upon the Russo-German war. On the other hand, even in the event that a compromise was effected between the United States and Japan, Chungking felt that it would not effect the United States' attitude toward China.

Through the American Ambassador to China, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek had proposed that the settlement of a Japanese-Chinese peace be based on President Roosevelt's eight point principles (Atlantic Charter?). To this suggestion Secretary Hull had answered that China would not be sacrificed by the United States. While there were a few in the Chungking government who believed that war between Japan and the United States would be advantageous to China, the general opinion was that such a war would reduce the material aid from the United States and, therefore, it would prove unprofitable to Chungking. A recent conference held by Chungking leaders had not been able to reconcile these divergent views.[285]

Influential officials of the Chungking government had stated that if the United States sought temporary stability at the cost of Chungking, instead of forcing Japan into submission, the Chinese government would continue to resist Japanese aggression unaided. Mr. Sun Fo, a member of the Central Executive Yuan, desired even stronger action. However, since these views were expressed in accordance with a propaganda order of the Chungking government, Japan did not regard them as representative of the true psychology of the government.

[280] III, 171.
[281] Ibid.
[282] III, 172.
[283] III, 171.
[284] III, 173.
[285] Ibid.

[60]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

Although no serious consideration had as yet been given to the Nanking government's relation to a Japanese-American war, a report made by Ambassador Kumataro Honda indicated that Nanking believed the United States had no intention of fighting against Japan. If war did break out, however, these Nanking officials, impressed with the power of the United States, appeared certain of the inevitability of Japan's defeat. Since the foundation upon which the People's government was built would be gravely imperiled by such a war, Nanking was anxious to have war in the Far East averted.[286]

69. Foreign Minister Toyoda Clarifies Points in Japanese Proposals (September 13, 1941)

(a) Ambassador Grew's Report[287]

To discuss divergencies in view arising from the Japanese proposals, Ambassador Grew attended a meeting, at which Foreign Minister Toyoda, Mr. Terasaki and Mr. Inagaki, of the American Bureau of the Japanese Foreign Office, and Counselor Dooman, of the American Embassy, were present. The Foreign Minister opened the conference by reading instructions which were being telegraphed to Ambassador Nomura as the official Japanese reply to queries made by the United States government on September 10, 1941.[288]

These instructions stipulated that the tentative commitments formulated by the Japanese government on September 6, 1941, together with the points agreed upon during the informal conversations at Washington, were to constitute the basis for an understanding between the United States and Japan. Apparently, the United States had misunderstood Japan's attitude towards American arbitration of the China affair, for Japan still desired the assistance of President Roosevelt in settling this matter.

Referring to the term "without any justifiable reason", the Tokyo government explained that this point related to Japan's promise to refrain from any military advance into regions lying south of Japan. However, in order to prevent Communistic and other subversive activities from threatening the security of both Japan and China, Tokyo proposed that Japanese troops be stationed in China for the execution of common defense, in accordance with an agreement between both countries. Since the United States had exhibited considerable apprehension regarding Japan's violation of American rights and interests in China, the Japanese government had stated in its proposals that American economic activities would not be restricted so long as they were pursued on an equitable basis. Moreover, in spite of the close economic relations that would exist between Japan and China as a result of their geographical positions, the Japanese government had no desire to establish monopolistic or preferential rights for itself in China. Not only in the Southwest Pacific, but throughout the Far East, Japan promised adherence to the principle of commercial nondiscrimination.

After clarifying the terms of its tentative commitments, the Japanese government then proceeded to explain further the reciprocal measures expected of the United States. In asking the United States to refrain from any actions prejudicial to Japanese endeavors toward settling the China Incident, Tokyo requested that aid to the Chiang Kai-shek regime be discontinued.[289]

[286] III, 174.
[287] "Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)", September 13, 1941, S.D., II, 620-622.
[288] "Proposed instructions to the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) handed by the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs (Toyoda) to the American Ambassador in Japan (Grew)", September 13, 1941, S.D., II, 623-624. These instructions were sent to Ambassador Nomura by Foreign Minister Toyoda on September 13, 1941. See III, 175-176.
[289] Ibid.

[61]

At the request of the Japanese Foreign Minister, Mr. Terasaki then read another statement expounding Japan's motives in extending the proposals of September 6, 1941. In order to obviate detailed discussions which would delay the proposed meeting between President Roosevelt and Prince Konoye, the Japanese government had drawn up these latest commitments with the intention of embodying therein all points upon which previous agreement had been made. Rather than curtail former commitments in any way, the Japanese government would even prefer to transcend the scope of the understandings formulated during the informal conferences. Japan would be willing to discuss the details once it had been agreed that a meeting of the heads of the two governments would be held.

In spite of the Japanese desire that the agreements between the United States and Japan be bilateral in nature, Tokyo entertained no objection to the United States' consulting with Holland, Great Britain or other countries which might be affected by the negotiations.

In conclusion Foreign Minister Toyoda expressed the desire that President Roosevelt be informed in detail of these discussions since he understood that his proposals of September 4, 1941 had not yet been seen by the President. To this last remark Ambassador Grew stated that Secretary Hull was constantly in communication with President Roosevelt and was responsible for deciding what data should be brought to President Roosevelt's attention.

After listening to the statement read by Mr. Terasaki, Ambassador Grew replied that the proposals delivered to him by the Foreign Minister on September 4, 1941 and to Secretary Hull by Ambassador Nomura on September 6, 1941 were still being reviewed by the United States' government. However, with the success of the proposed meeting in view, and mindful of the disastrous effects of a failure, America wished to clarify, in preliminary conversations, any divergent points in the proposals.

Foreign Minister Toyoda then delivered oral answers to the questions brought up by Ambassador Grew during a previous meeting. Referring to Ambassador Nomura's statement of September 4, 1941, Foreign Minister Toyoda again pointed out that it had contained only the personal views of the Japanese Ambassador and, consequently, could not be treated officially, especially since it had been withdrawn by Ambassador Nomura.

Insofar as the question on discrimination in commercial matters was concerned, the Japanese Foreign Minister assured Ambassador Grew that his government intended to observe equality in China and throughout the Pacific. The problems pertaining to China were to be discussed more fully in a reply to Mr. Hamilton's remarks made at a Washington conference.[290] Since the significance of the words "equitable basis" had been questioned, Foreign Minister Toyoda asserted that this referred to activities which were non-monopolistic and non-exploitive in nature.

The Japanese explanation of "equitable basis" stated that although qualified somewhat by certain inevitable natural limitations, resulting largely from Japan's geographical situation, this term guaranteed the application of the principle of nondiscrimination in all economic dealings. Japan was not to be the sole judge in interpreting what constituted an "equitable basis".[291]

With reference to the formula relating to the attitudes of Japan and the United States toward the European war, Admiral Toyoda stated that he would refrain from making comment

[290] "Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)", September 13, 1941, S.D., 620-622.
[291] Foreign Minister Toyoda wired the interpretation of "equitable basis" to Ambassador Nomura on September 13, 1941. See III, 177-178.

[62]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

until such time as the United States brought up the question. However, he deemed it advisable that the matter be discussed by President Roosevelt and Prince Konoye at the proposed meeting.

Because of the dangerous internal situation existing in Japan, and because of the efforts of third powers to forestall a Japanese-American alliance, Foreign Minister Toyoda emphasized the urgency of an immediate meeting between President Roosevelt and Prince Konoye. The Japanese Foreign Minister reminded Ambassador Grew again that the anniversary of the Tripartite Pact would be celebrated on September 27, 1941. In view of Foreign Minister Toyoda's great desire for speedy action, Ambassador Grew promised to transmit his views to Secretary Hull again. He also stated that the State Department desired to continue the discussions in Washington rather than in Tokyo.[292]

(b) Foreign Minister Toyoda's Report[293]

Foreign Minister Toyoda informed Ambassador Nomura on September 13, 1941 that he had explained Japan's position to Ambassador Grew in accordance with the instructions he was sending in a separate dispatch.[294] He had also elucidated the meaning of "equitable basis" as used in the text of the Japanese proposal.[295]

70. Foreign Minister Toyoda Upholds Japanese Proposals

In a message to Ambassador Nomura on September 13, 1941 Foreign Minister Toyoda declared that although President Roosevelt had not yet considered the Japanese proposals, several important points had been adequately discussed therein.[296] The preliminary parleys desired by the United States had been included in the statement, despite Japan's objection that such parleys involved discussions of minutiae, and as a result became long drawn out. In a mere repetition of the various steps already discussed, administrative officials could produce no immediate results. Only a statesmanlike consultation between the leaders of the two countries could be successful at this point.

Japan desired to reach some agreement with the United States concerning the whole situation. With this purpose in view, Foreign Minister Toyoda asked that Ambassador Nomura bring the contents of his reference message[297] to the attention of President Roosevelt with a request that the President explain his own intentions.

It was evident that Japan stressed a general settlement, based on the view of the situation in its entirety rather than on individual questions. By reducing the business and legal discussions to a minimum, a conference of the two leaders could be convened without further delay, using Foreign Minister Toyoda's message[298] as the basis for this major conversation. If this general meeting took place, conferences covering specific problems could be resumed as necessary.

For Japan to accept without modification the four principles laid down by the United States would give the general impression that it had submitted to American pressure. If then it were made known that the United States were consulting with Great Britain, the Netherlands, China and other interested nations regarding its dealings with Japan, the world at large would interpret this action as a revival of the nine-power treaty policy.

[292] S.D., II, 622.
[293] III, 175.
[294] See III, 176.
[295] See III, 177-178.
[296] See III, 179.
[297] See III, 122.
[298] Ibid.

[63]

Foreign Minister Toyoda pointed out the importance of keeping the parley, both in form and fact, a negotiation between only Japan and the United States. Although recognizing that the United States would confer with those countries as a matter of form, the Japanese government did not wish the conference to develop into an agreement among many countries.[299]

The Foreign Minister stressed that he did not intend to reject the questions raised in the American reply of September 12, 1941 [300] but wished to emphasize the points contained in his own proposals.[301]

71. Ambassador Nomura Stresses the Need for Preliminary Conversations

In spite of Japan's conviction that its proposals formed a satisfactory and workable basis for peace, Ambassador Nomura nevertheless recognized the urgent need for preliminary conferences to overcome some of the difficulties arising from divergent viewpoints.

In summing up the diplomatic situation on September 15, 1941 for his Foreign Office, Ambassador Nomura noted that President Roosevelt had already stated that if the Pacific problems could not be solved in the preliminary conversations between the Japanese Ambassador and Secretary Hull, they would remain unsettled regardless of who participated in the conference,[302] especially since Secretary Hull had said that he had never disagreed with President Roosevelt on foreign policies.

Referring to the phrases "Communistic and other subversive activity", and "common defense in China", appearing in Foreign Minister Toyoda's last message, Ambassador Nomura expressed the opinion that these terms would create future problems between Japan and the United States. Since the United States wanted to know the prospective peace terms between Japan and China and refused to act as an intermediary in any unjust negotiations, Ambassador Nomura felt that Japan must outline its policies toward China in more concrete terms. Unless the opinions of both Japan and the United States on this and related problems coincided at the preliminary conversations, no meeting could be held between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Konoye.

After viewing the national characteristics of the United States and the position of President Roosevelt, Ambassador Nomura was certain that the interpretation of the Tripartite Pact could not be accomplished from a political standpoint by the "leaders" at the conference. He declared that if an agreement could not be reached at the preliminary meeting there would be no "leaders" conference. Although the United States had expressed the desire to discuss Japanese-American negotiations with the governments of Great Britain, China and the Netherlands, it did not wish to include a third power in the agreement between Japan and the United States. The American motive for revealing its Far Eastern policy to the other countries was to eliminate the fear that the United States was sacrificing them in an effort to effect an understanding with Japan.

In spite of the apparent insignificance of his diplomatic work Ambassador Nomura assured Foreign Minister Toyoda that he would continue to carry out all instructions concerning the proposed negotiations. However, he intended to drop any discussions of the points being dealt with in Tokyo, and to watch merely for any new developments.[303]

[299] See III, 179.
[300] See III, 148.
[301] See III, 122.
[302] III, 180.
[303] Ibid.

[64]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

72. Ambassador Grew Confers with Ambassador Shigemitsu (September 17, 1941)

In Tokyo the Japanese government took the initiative in attempting to reach an agreement on the divergent views mentioned by Ambassador Nomura. Probably with both the knowledge and approval of either Prince Konoye or Foreign Minister Toyoda, Mr. Shigemitsu, the Japanese Ambassador recently recalled from England, met with Ambassador Grew to discuss current issues between Japan and the United States.[304]

In reviewing Japan's attitude toward the informal conversations, Mr. Shigemitsu said that his government was united in its efforts to bring about an adjustment of relations with America. However, in order to prevent the mobilization of anti-American forces in Japan, the discussions must culminate in an agreement without delay, for should Prime Minister Konoye's endeavors fail, the efforts of other Japanese statesmen would also be futile.

In explaining to Mr. Shigemitsu the grave dangers of attempting official negotiations without adequate preliminary understandings, Ambassador Grew pointed out the broad interpretation which could be applied to the Japanese proposals. Moreover, past experience in dealing with the Japanese government had discouraged the United States concerning Japan's ability and sincerity in carrying out commitments.

Since the present Japanese Cabinet was supported by the responsible chiefs of the armed forces, Mr. Shigemitsu believed that no such difficulties would arise after the present negotiations had been completed. Any agreement undertaken with the American government would be faithfully executed in the course of time by the Japanese.

Emphasizing that what he was about to say was in the strictest confidence, Mr. Shigemitsu further stated that even during Mr. Matsuoko's tenure of office and Japan's strict adherence to Axis policies, the Japanese Emperor had desired the establishment of closer relations with both the United States and England. It had been for this reason that Mr. Shigemitsu had been recalled from London.[305]

73. Mr. Ushiba Calls on Mr. Dooman (September 17, 1941)

Anxious to determine whether these conversations in Tokyo were furthering the aims of Japanese-American negotiations, Mr. Ushiba, Prince Konoye's private secretary, visited Counselor Dooman on September 17, 1941 to ask if Washington had made any comments on the secret meeting between Ambassador Grew and the Japanese Prime Minister on September 6, 1941.[306]

According to Mr. Dooman, Secretary Hull had telegraphed his appreciation of the attitude exhibited by Prince Konoye throughout his conversations with Mr. Grew, but the statement handed by Ambassador Nomura to Secretary Hull on September 4, 1941 had so confused the issues at stake that Ambassador Grew had not felt justified in seeking another interview with Prime Minister Konoye.

Assuring Mr. Dooman that the Japanese Cabinet had been disturbed over Ambassador Nomura's actions in this matter, Mr. Ushiba revealed that Prince Konoye had telegraphed Ambassador Nomura a statement in reply to the American draft of June 21, 1941. However, in view of the Cabinet crisis which had arisen in Japan at that time, Ambassador Nomura had withheld that document and had composed instead a brief memorandum which had been of little help. Since in his recent memorandum Ambassador Nomura had neglected to men-

[304] "Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)", September 17, 1941, S.D., II, 624-625.
[305] Ibid.
[306] "Memorandum by the Counselor of Embassy in Japan (Dooman)", September 18, 1941, S.D. II, 626-629.

[65]

tion Japan's desire that President Roosevelt take part in Japanese-Chinese peace plans, another misunderstanding had arisen. Ambassador Grew commented that a week's delay had ensued through no fault of the American government.

Mr. Ushiba did not object to America's desire to understand the aims and objectives of the Japanese before making arrangements for a meeting between the heads of the two governments. Moreover, although his government proposed to maintain the principle of the open door in China, he realized that Japan had failed, despite months of informal conversations in Washington, to indicate any exact plan for accomplishing this. Therefore, Mr. Ushiba suggested that the United States ask Japan to disclose its definite terms for peace with China.

Mr. Dooman reminded Mr. Ushiba that the American government had often indicated its desire to know and, in the June 21, 1941 draft, had specifically asked for Japan's peace terms. It had been assumed, therefore, that Japan had been unwilling to disclose them. Mr. Ushiba was certain that Prince Konoye, as evidence of the good faith of the Japanese government, would communicate Japan's ideas on peace with China to Ambassador Grew. It was agreed that Mr. Ushiba would take the initiative in suggesting that Prince Konoye communicate the terms to Ambassador Grew. On the other hand, Ambassador Grew, if he felt able to do so, would inform Prince Konoye of his desire to learn these terms.

The discussions then turned to the attitude of Japan and the United States toward the European war. Although he felt that Japan could not give a prior guarantee to interpret as defensive any action of the United States against Germany, Mr. Ushiba, nevertheless, believed that Prince Konoye would be able to give assurances concerning Japan's attitude toward the European war which would meet with the approval of President Roosevelt. However, the manner in which the Japanese government would explain to Germany about an understanding reached with the United States was of great concern to Tokyo. Mr. Dooman assured Mr. Ushiba that the United States would not request Japan to betray its treaty commitments.

Continuing in this vein, Mr. Dooman stated that usually in treaties of alliance any policies formulated were designed to serve the common end of those concerned with the agreement. In the Tripartite alliance, therefore, there seemed to be no obligation on Japan's part to conform to principles benefiting Germany exclusively. In view of this attitude, Japan could inform Berlin that it had undertaken an understanding with the United States, although it was still prepared to fulfill its obligations under Article III of the Tripartite Pact.

With regard to former Foreign Minister Matsuoka's interpretation of the treaty with Germany, Mr. Dooman pointed out that, after returning from Moscow, Mr. Matsuoka had expressed the belief that in the event of war between Germany and the United States, Japan would join the war on the side of the Axis powers.

Mr. Ushiba expressed amazement at Mr. Matsuoka's statement, and said that though he was aware that Mr. Matsuoka had differed with Prince Konoye on the interpretation of Article III, he had not been aware that Mr. Matsuoka had disclosed this information to foreign representatives. At the same time, however, he mentioned that during the period of the last Japanese Cabinet change, Mr. Matsuoka had informed the Prime Minister that Ambassador Grew had reported to Washington that the governmental change in Japan was due to American pressure.

Repudiating this idea, Mr. Dooman stated that Ambassador Grew had reported to Washington that the Japanese Cabinet change was due, first, to the German attack on Soviet Russia, which had upset the Japanese theory that peace would be maintained between Germany and Russia; and, second, the conflict between the Prime Minister and Mr. Matsuoka regarding the scope and significance of the Tripartite Pact. Mr. Ushiba then confirmed these assumptions.

[66]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

As the conference drew to a close, Mr. Ushiba again stressed the necessity of America's accepting the Japanese proposal without delay.[307] A day later, September 18, 1941, Mr. Ushiba telephoned to Mr. Dooman to say that within a day or two Prince Konoye would give Ambassador Grew the terms of peace which Japan would offer China.[308]

74. Ambassador Nomura Urges Japan to Make a New Proposal

On September 17, 1941, Ambassador Nomura sent a report to Tokyo summarizing the situation which was preventing the completion of successful Japanese-American negotiations. Of the three main points debated during the informal conversations, both Japan and the United States had agreed in principle on two. At a meeting with President Roosevelt on August 6, 1941, Ambassador Nomura said that Prime Minister Konoye was so confident concerning the reaching of an agreement on the point regarding the evacuation of Japanese troops from China, that he was prepared to attend a meeting with President Roosevelt. However, Secretary Hull, referring to Japan's proposal of June 24, 1941, felt that certain other points needed clarification.[309]

Foreign Minister Toyoda had informed Ambassador Nomura on July 23, 1941 that he had not been in office long enough to decide upon a definite policy regarding the evacuation of troops from China. Because the occupation of French Indo-China had been decided upon before Admiral Toyoda had assumed his position as the new Foreign Minister, there was no way of preventing it. However, motivated by the desire to defend French Indo-China, the Japanese government had carried out this action peacefully, and in order to decrease the existing friction between Japan and the United States as a result of this aggression, Foreign Minister Toyoda had asked Ambassador Nomura to explain to the United States the reasons for this occupation. He was to point out that any pressure exerted by the United States would unduly excite the Japanese public and would only serve to intensify the critical situation.[310] Since negotiations had ceased about this time and had not been reopened until the recent message had been sent, Ambassador Nomura had found it impossible to carry out his instructions of July 15, 1941.

Ambassador Nomura believed that Secretary Hull's concern for the Japanese proposal of June 24, 1941 stemmed from his numerous conferences with Ambassador Nomura in which he had discussed the principal points contained therein in accordance with Foreign Minister Toyoda's instructions of May 11, 1941. Therefore, Ambassador Nomura believed that the United States would prefer that the terms of any preliminary agreement be formulated along the general lines contained in that proposal. Furthermore, Ambassador Nomura advised that in the event that these preliminary discussions take place, Secretary Hull insisted that they be held in Washington.[311]

Because of the attitude expressed by the United States, it seemed doubtful that an understanding could result merely from the Japanese proposal of September 4, 1941. In any event, Ambassador Nomura was convinced that the primary task of the Japanese government was to find terms acceptable to both countries in regard to the three points at issue, particularly to the matter of garrisoning Japanese troops in Chinese territory.

From a secret source of information, Ambassador Nomura learned that President Roosevelt was seriously considering a meeting with Prime Minister Konoye if proper arrangements could be made. In fact, the atmosphere of the recent American Cabinet meeting had been one of anticipation concerning the proposed Japanese-United States conference.[312]

[307] Ibid.
[308] S.D., II, 629, f.n. 12.
[309] III, 181.
[310] III, 9.
[311] III, 181.
[312] III, 182.

[67]

75. Secretary Hull Is Cautious Concerning Proposed Conference

In spite of his report concerning the optimistic attitude of President Roosevelt, on September 17, 1941 Ambassador Nomura commented on the extreme caution observed by Secretary Hull when speaking of the Japanese-American conference.

Mr. Nishiyama, the Japanese Financial Attache in Washington, had learned that Secretary Hull considered that President Roosevelt had gone too far during his discussions with Ambassador Nomura.[313]

Secretary Hull's pessimism regarding the recent progress made in Japanese-American negotiations was based on the conflicting opinions observed within the Japanese government itself.[314]

76. Japanese Observers in United States Responsible For Publicity Leaks

In view of Secretary Hull's cautious attitude Ambassador Nomura recognized the need for observing even closer secrecy with regard to the informal conversations. Because previous breaches of security had resulted chiefly from interviews given to American newspapers by Japanese observers, sent to the United States from Tokyo, Ambassador Nomura requested on September 18, 1941 that Japan discontinue sending officials in this capacity.[315]

Ambassador Nomura reminded Foreign Minister Toyoda of the dangerous effect Mr. Kasai's articles had had on the negotiations. Although Mr. Kasai had curtailed his activities greatly after receiving a reprimand, in a recent public statement he had agreed with certain arguments presented by Senator Wheeler and Colonel Lindbergh. In addition, the activities of Mr. Shinohara had brought criticism upon the Japanese government. Ambassador Nomura urged therefore, that Tokyo prevent a recurrence of these publicity leaks.[316]

77. French Ambassador Demands Withdrawal of Japanese Troops

On September 20, 1941 Foreign Minister Toyoda reported that according to a short wave broadcast from San Francisco on the previous day, the French Ambassador to the United States had demanded that Secretary Hull force Japan to withdraw its troops from French Indo-China. If the Japanese authorities were able to verify this report, Foreign Minister Toyoda instructed them to file a strong protest with the United States.[317]

78. Hull-Nomura Conversation (September 19, 1941)

(a) State Department's Report[318]

Although he had received no reports from his government other than an explanatory statement regarding the Japanese proposals presented by Foreign Minister Toyoda to Ambassador Grew on September 13, 1941.[319] Ambassador Nomura called on Secretary Hull to discuss existing problems. Secretary Hull declared that he had received Mr. Grew's report and had also been notified that the Japanese government planned to communicate to the United States the specific peace terms which Tokyo would extend to China. Since Ambassador Nomura had not yet received any instructions concerning these peace terms, the conversation turned to the explanatory statement issued by Foreign Minister Toyoda.

[313] Ibid.
[314] III, 183.
[315] III, 184.
[316] Ibid.
[317] III, 185.
[318] "Memorandum of a conversation", September 19, 1941, initialed by Mr. Joseph W. Ballentine, S.D., II, 629-631.
[319] S.D., II, 623-624; III, 175-176.

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THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

In the opinion of Secretary Hull, this statement did not materially clarify any of the points at issue, and, therefore, the United States government still felt that the Japanese proposals of September 6, 1941 narrowed the original program for peace in the Pacific. When asked by Ambassador Nomura if the withdrawal of Japanese troops from China remained the principal difficulty, Secretary Hull replied that the problem of maintaining any agreement formulated on a broad basis covering the entire Pacific area was, at this time, the main reason for divergencies of view.

With reference to the relations of Japan and the United States toward the European war, Secretary Hull declared that the United States had not as yet expressed any views on the formula contained in the Japanese proposals regarding this matter. Assuring Ambassador Nomura that America was desirous of concluding arrangements for a peaceful agreement as soon as possible and was awaiting a Japanese reply, Secretary Hull stated that, meanwhile, his government was continuing to study the proposals.

Ambassador Nomura emphasized that any agreement between Japan and the United States must remain bilateral in nature. Although desirous of conferring with other governments in order to supplement negotiations with Japan, Secretary Hull asserted that the United States had no intention of drawing other countries into the formal agreement with Japan.

In answer to Secretary Hull's inquiry, Ambassador Nomura expressed no apprehension concerning developments that might arise in Japan on September 27, 1941, the anniversary of the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact. Although the Japanese army was influential and many of its members were German-trained, according to Ambassador Nomura, only a very small percentage of the Japanese population would desire to enter war as an ally of Germany.[320]

(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report

Ambassador Nomura reported that for the first time in nine days he had called on Secretary Hull to inquire about the American attitude toward the Japanese proposals submitted on September 4, 1941.[321] Secretary Hull began the conversation by stating that he had received a message from Ambassador Grew indicating that the Japanese government was planning to submit a proposal which would be acceptable to the United States. In view of this information, Secretary Hull had expected that Ambassador Nomura would deliver that message at this conference.

Replying to Ambassador Nomura's question regarding the Japanese proposal, Secretary Hull remarked that a decision on the proposed conference between the leaders of the two governments had not yet been reached.[322] Insofar as an early consummation of the present negotiations was desired, Secretary Hull emphasized that he had no intention of deliberately prolonging the conversations. However, Ambassador Nomura believed that this remark was made merely for the sake of courtesy.

Opposed to a policy which was partly peaceful and partly warlike, Secretary Hull insisted that only by the adoption of completely peaceful policies could Japan hope for greater progress and development in the Orient. While it was essential that Japan remain strong, it was also essential that Japan not follow a policy of military aggression. If a forceful, yet peaceful policy were adopted, Secretary Hull firmly believed that the Japanese-American question could be settled overnight. Apparently, having received reports of celebrations scheduled to be held in connection with the first anniversary of the Tripartite Pact, Secretary Hull expressed the belief that there were more people in Japan who wanted peace than those who, together with Germany, desired war on the United States.[323]

[320] S.D., II, 623-624.
[321] III, 186.
[322] Ibid.
[323] III, 187.

[69]

Ambassador Nomura explained Japan's fear that the United States' action in consulting with the Netherlands, China and other nations on the proposed conference might be interpreted as a revival of the nine-power treaty policies. Although Secretary Hull explained the necessity of keeping in touch with any country whose interests in the Pacific would be affected by an agreement with Japan, he agreed that the conversations should be limited to Japan and the United States. Because of this answer, Ambassador Nomura pointed out in his message to Tokyo that the views he had expressed in other dispatches were accurate.[324]

From a recent conversation the Japanese Ambassador had gathered that the United States did not intend to resort to appeasing Japan. He advised Tokyo that the United States was suspicious of Japan because it was certain that Japan would resort to force while appeasing the United States.

Because of Secretary Hull's attitude, Ambassador Nomura notified his government on September 20, 1941 that he had withheld communicating certain messages to the American Secretary of State, since at this point the conclusion of amicable relations depended not on words but actions.[325]

79. Foreign Minister Toyoda Grows Impatient

Dissatisfied with the lack of progress in these informal conversations and impatient at the United States' delay in answering Japan's proposal for a conference between the leaders of the two countries, Foreign Minister Toyoda instructed Ambassador Nomura on September 20, 1941 to urge American officials to make a definite reply since he believed that all the questions of the United States had been satisfactorily answered during his conversation with Ambassador Grew on September 13, 1941.[326]

Since plans were now underway for the celebration of the first anniversary of the Tripartite Pact on September 27, 1941, the Japanese Foreign Minister foresaw a need for the completion of a definite agreement with America before that date. However, he urged the Japanese Ambassador not to give the impression that Japan was in a hurry about the matter.[327]

Two days later, though Ambassador Grew had informed his government that a new Japanese proposal acceptable to the United States would be forthcoming in the near future,[328] Foreign Minister Toyoda advised Ambassador Nomura on September 22, 1941 that he had no knowledge of any further concessions to be extended by the Japanese government.

When last conferring with Ambassador Grew, ten days before, the Japanese Foreign Minister had answered all questions put to him by United States' officials. But now he made it clear that Japan had explained its policies fully, and had made all possible concessions. Since both Ambassador Grew and Counselor Dooman understood his meaning, Foreign Minister Toyoda did not understand why the American Ambassador should notify the United States' government that Japan was ready to submit a new proposal.

Foreign Minister Toyoda declared that he intended to inquire about this matter when he met Ambassador Grew in three or four days. Depending upon the circumstances, Foreign Minister Toyoda was then going to submit to Ambassador Grew the Japanese terms for peace with China. However, these terms would not be new, but would serve merely as an explanation of what Japan had already made known.[329]

[324] III, 188.
[325] Ibid.
[326] III, 189.
[327] Ibid.
[328] Secretary Hull mentions this proposal in his conversation with Ambassador Nomura, September 19, 1941, See S.D., II, 629-631. [329] III, 190.

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THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

80. Grew-Toyoda Conversation (September 22, 1941)

(a) Ambassador Grew's Report

When Ambassador Grew called on Foreign Minister Toyoda at the latter's request on the afternoon of September 22, 1941, he listened to an oral statement which further clarified Japan's stand in relation to the United States. In referring to the proposed meeting between Prince Konoye and President Roosevelt, Foreign Minister Toyoda stated that his government had intended that the divergent policies of the two countries should be discussed at the conference, with the details for executing an understanding to be subsequently accomplished through normal diplomatic channels. Contrary to this view, the United States desired that an agreement on policy should be reached during informal conversations held prior to the proposed conference.

In Foreign Minister Toyoda's opinion, the attitude of his government regarding the steps it would take to ensure peace in the Pacific had been broadened by the Japanese proposals issued to Ambassador Grew on September 4, 1941. Furthermore, since Japan was now ready to issue the basic terms of peace which would be offered to China, the good offices of President Roosevelt were still earnestly desired in the settlement of the China Incident.

Foreign Minister Toyoda then presented Ambassador Grew with a copy of the basic Japanese terms of peace with China.[331] They promised the maintenance of neighborly friendship and respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of China. Furthermore, Japan proposed that cooperative defense measures be established by the two countries in order to keep communistic and other subversive activities under control. Therefore, throughout certain Chinese areas, Japanese troops and naval forces would be stationed in accordance with the existing agreements and usages. With the exception of these troops, other Japanese armed forces would be withdrawn from China.

With the development and utilization of material essential to Chinese national defense as its primary object, economic cooperation between the two countries was to be maintained. Nevertheless, the interests of third powers in China were not to be impaired in any way.

In conclusion the Japanese peace terms contained the following provisions: a fusion of the Chiang Kai-shek regime with that of Wang Ching-wei, the recognition of Manchukuo by the Chinese, and a guarantee that no further annexations would be made and no indemnities would be imposed.[332]

Foreign Minister Toyoda stated that although the Japanese government had attempted to maintain secrecy concerning the present problems under discussion, the publicity previously attending the informal conferences, as well as the rumors that had been spread concerning the projected meeting between the two governments, had stimulated the activities of anti-American elements in Japan. Since Japan was attempting to prevent the occurrence of any demonstrations on September 27, 1941, the first anniversary of the signing of the Tripartite Pact, the United States should appreciate Japan's difficulty in controlling factions opposed to an understanding with America due to the delay in achieving any appreciable understanding between the two countries.

After the Japanese Foreign Minister pointed out that Tokyo was still awaiting America's answer to the proposals presented to Secretary Hull on September 6, 1941, Ambassador Grew reported that he had received word from Washington concerning the progress of negotiations,

[330] "Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)", September 22, 1941, S.D., II, 631-633.
[331] Ibid.
[332] "The Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs (Toyoda) to the American Ambassador in Japan (Grew)", September 22, 1941, S.D., II, 633. For English text sent by Foreign Minister Toyoda to Ambassador Nomura on September 22, 1941 see III, 191-192.

[71]

which indicated the United States' desire to hasten matters. Foreign Minister Toyoda again stressed the necessity of eliminating any further delay. When Ambassador Grew indicated that Ambassador Nomura was apparently unconcerned in regard to the danger of a pro-Axis demonstration in Japan on September 27, 1941, Foreign Minister Toyoda explained that Ambassador Nomura was not cognizant enough of the situation in Japan to realize the existing dangers.

At this point Ambassador Grew requested a clarification of the phrase in the peace terms "existing agreements and usages". The Japanese Foreign Minister replied that the phrase must be understood as written, but mentioned the presence of American marines in China as an illustration of its meaning. Although promising to communicate these peace terms to Secretary Hull immediately, Ambassador Grew held out little hope that America would reach a decision on it before September 27, 1941.[333]

(b) Foreign Minister Toyoda's Report

Foreign Minister Toyoda reported that at 4:00 P.M. on September 22, 1941, he had asked Ambassador Grew to visit him in order to discuss further the arrangements for a conference between the leaders of Japan and the United States. During the interview the Japanese Foreign Minister gave Ambassador Grew a copy of the basic Japanese terms of peace with China.

Pointing out that the message to President Roosevelt concerning the conversations to be carried on between him and Prince Konoye, as well as the general principles to be discussed, needed no further clarification, Foreign Minister Toyoda declared that it had been agreed that all minor details would be entrusted to diplomatic officials. Though the United States desired to come to an agreement on various points at once, the Japanese government had satisfactorily answered all American inquiries concerning its sincerity and attitude and, therefore, could do nothing more but await a reply from the United States.[334]

By establishing its attitude toward the negotiations on a broad scope, the Japanese government had, in its proposals, embraced all the existing problems. During a conversation on September 10, 1941 Ambassador Grew had submitted a question concerning mediation between Japan and China. Foreign Minister Toyoda had delivered to him the confidential terms of a fundamental peace between Japan and China, pointing out that they were not new proposals but merely clarification of the proposals submitted to America on September 4, 1941. Since the situation had grown more critical during the past month, the Japanese Foreign Minister urged Ambassador Nomura to impress the authorities of the United States with the necessity of reaching a successful agreement without further delay.[335]

According to Mr. Toyoda, from the time that the American newspapers had begun to editorialize on the Japanese-American negotiations, these negotiations had become a major topic of conversation throughout the entire world. Within four or five days, the first anniversary of the Tripartite Pact would be celebrated. In spite of the fact that the Japanese government desired that the day's activities be conducted in a calm manner, the Japanese Foreign Minister was well aware that an anti-American group within the country would take the opportunity to threaten Japanese-American relations by provoking incidents. Since it was obvious that Japan's internal situation was extremely critical, Foreign Minister Toyoda directed Ambassador Nomura to inform Secretary Hull immediately of the details of his conversation with Ambassador Grew and to request a prompt reply.[336]

[333] "Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)", September 22, 1941, S.D., II, 631-633.
[334] III, 193.
[335] III, 194.
[336] III, 195.

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THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

81. Ambassador Nomura Forwards a Japanese Report on America's Attitude Toward War

In summarizing a Japanese report on the American attitude toward war in both the Atlantic and the Pacific, Ambassador Nomura, in a message to Tokyo on September 22, 1941,[337] discussed the desire of the United States to adopt any plan which would bring about the ultimate destruction of Germany. In order to prevent Soviet Russia from making a separate peace, England and the United States had rendered all possible assistance, hoping to maintain Russia's fighting strength for an offensive in the spring provided its troops survived the winter months. By contributing millions of dollars for equipment, the United States also hoped to strengthen Britain's will to continue the fight.

Because the strength of the American Navy was increasing constantly, the submarine menace in the Atlantic did not cause as much alarm as formerly, although the United States recognized that utter annihilation of the submarine was impossible.[338] According to the Japanese report, the American attitude toward war as a general rule was extremely casual. If war with Japan did develop the American public would accept it as inevitable.

Because of their economic superiority over Japan, the American people believed that it would be a naval war primarily, and that the United States would be victorious after a very short struggle. Only a few were fully aware of the dangers involved in war with Japan. There still remained those who argued against reaching a peace at the expense of China.[339]

According to an article written in the New York Times, attempts to ameliorate the situation existing between Japan and the United States were dead-locked because Japan's continued occupation of China was against the fundamental principles laid down by the United States. For this reason, Prime Minister Konoye had requested a personal conference with President Roosevelt.[340]

Public opinion in the United States held that in view of Germany's war aims a non-aggressive American policy would result only in failure. Believing that Italy would withdraw from the war, that occupied nations would uprise and, finally, that the endurance of the German people themselves would fail, Americans continued to believe that participation in a war would not be fatal. If they went to war with Japan, the American people felt that naval participation alone was sufficient, and that no expeditionary forces would be dispatched on a large scale.

Nevertheless, certain preparations were being undertaken by military authorities. In Congress, where the majority backed the government's foreign policy, a sharp decline in the strength of the isolationist group was noted.[341]

President Roosevelt had given consideration to the possibility that in case Soviet Russia fell, a Japanese aggression would cause a simultaneous clash in both the Atlantic and Pacific. However, the greater portion of the American Navy still remained in the Pacific.

With regard to Japanese peace terms, it was rumored that Japan was demanding treaty ports in four southern provinces of China. Although the United States did not wish to sacrifice China to Japan, if Japan gave up forceful aggression, the United States would not only restore trade relations with Japan but would even render economic assistance. Ambassador Nomura expressed his opinion of this report by stating that the observer "had hit the nail on the head".[342]

[337] III, 196.
[338] Ibid.
[339] III, 197.
[340] Ibid.
[341] III, 198.
[342] III, 199.

[73]

82. Japan Explains Its Retaining of Troops in China

At Mr. Terasaki's request, Mr. Dooman, Counselor to the American Embassy in Japan, called on the Japanese Foreign Office.[343] A statement, supplementing those made to Ambassador Grew by Foreign Minister Toyoda on the previous day and outlining Japan's reasons for retaining troops in China, had been prepared for communication to Ambassador Grew and for subsequent transmission to the United States government.[344]

In this document the Japanese government stated that in order to aid in the construction of a peaceful China and to ensure the security and defense of Japan itself, it recognized the necessity of stationing Japanese armed forces in certain areas of China. Because the uncertainty of internal stability in China had always proved a source of danger, Japan feared that intrigue, instigated by external sources, might follow the conclusion of the war between these two countries. The activities of the Communistic elements had already been detrimental to the maintenance of peace, and Japan felt that if such conditions were to recur any promotion of China's national life or welfare would be greatly impeded.[345]

From the economic standpoint alone, it was obvious that the activities of any neighboring territories would effect Japan's existence. Moreover, in view of the warlike attitude prevalent throughout the world, the defense of Japan could be endangered by any sudden unfavorable situation in China. Although Japan was prepared to withdraw armed forces wherever their presence was no longer required, it was imperative that a nucleus of Japanese troops be retained in certain areas of China. Any proposal to maintain peace by the stationing of international armed forces was inacceptable because of public opinion in China and because of the direct influence the internal condition of China had upon Japan.[346]

83. Hull-Nomura Conversation (September 23, 1941)

(a) State Department's Report[347]

Upon his own request, Ambassador Nomura called at Secretary Hull's apartment on September 23, 1941. Handing Secretary Hull a copy of the "Basic Terms of Peace between Japan and China"[348] and also a document entitled "A Reply to the American Communication of September 10, 1941",[349] Ambassador Nomura announced that these documents contained a full explanation of Japan's attitude regarding the disputable points in its recent proposals.

Ambassador Nomura said that any further clarification of the Tripartite Pact's effect upon Japan might best be left for discussion at the proposed meeting between the government heads.

Another document delivered to Secretary Hull by Ambassador Nomura on September 23, 1941 defined the phrase "equitable basis" to mean economic activities which were neither monopolistic, exclusive nor exploitative in nature, but which were based on the policy of nondiscrimination insofar as natural limitations permitted. Japan did not intend to be the sole

[343] "Memorandum by the Counselor of Embassy in Japan (Dooman)", September 23, 1941, S.D., II, 634.
[344] Ibid.
[345] "Oral statement made to the Counselor of the American Embassy in Japan (Dooman) by the Director of the American Bureau of the Japanese Foreign Office (Terasaki)", September 23, 1941, S.D., II, 640-641. Foreign Minister Toyoda sent Mr. Koshu a copy of this document on September 23, 1941 with instructions to deliver it to Secretary Hull. See III, 200.
[346] Ibid.
[347] "Memorandum of a conversation", September 23, 1941, initialed by Mr. Joseph W. Ballantine, S.D., II, 634-635.
[348] This document was handed to Ambassador Grew by Foreign Minister Matsuoka on September 22, 1941, S.D., II, 633. For the English text sent to Ambassador Nomura on September 22, 1941, see III, 191-192.
[349] This document was a copy of the one handed to Ambassador Grew by Foreign Minister Toyoda on September 13, 1941, (see S.D., II, 623-624), and wired to Ambassador Nomura on September 13, 1941, see III, 175-176. Ambassador Nomura referred to it in his conversation with Secretary Hull on September 9, 1941, see S.D., II, 629-631 and III, 186-188.

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THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

interpreter of this term. This document was not mentioned in the State Department's report of this conversation, but its text has been printed in the official documents and Ambassador Nomura referred to it in his report of this interview.[350]

After promising to study these papers as expeditiously as possible, Secretary Hull inquired concerning Ambassador Nomura's impressions regarding the present situation. Stating that he appreciated the position of the United States, Ambassador Nomura pointed to the domestic difficulties in Japan. If the meeting between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Konoye could be effected, Ambassador Nomura was certain that the psychological reaction in Japan would be extremely favorable to the re-establishment of friendly relations with America.

After referring to a previous American suggestion that the Japanese government assert control over public opinion and in this way attain support for the liberal program to be adopted by Japan and the United States, Secretary Hull asked if Ambassador Nomura believed that a conference between the heads of the two governments would actually be more effective. According to Ambassador Nomura efforts had already been made to influence Japanese public opinion, and favorable results had been achieved. Nevertheless, a meeting between the leaders of the two governments would provide not only support for those elements desiring peaceful negotiations with the United States, but it would also counteract the pro-Axis factions in Japan.

Secretary Hull then reiterated his belief that both Japan and the United States would gain more from peaceful collaboration than by forceful opposition to one another's policies. Pointing to Germany as an example of the difficulties resulting from excessive expenditures for armaments, Secretary Hull remarked that no country could benefit from the staggering cost of an attempted world conquest. Ambassador Nomura agreed fully with his views.[351]

(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report

Ambassador Nomura advised Tokyo on September 23, 1941 that in order to communicate Foreign Minister Toyoda's interpretation of various paragraphs and phrases in the Japanese proposals which had been questioned by the United States, and at the same time to deliver a copy of the Japanese definition of "equitable basis", he had called on the Secretary of State on September 23, 1941.[352]

On presenting the outline of Japan's terms of peace with China, the Japanese Ambassador had pointed out that these latest documents, coupled with previous statements made by the Japanese government, had completely explained all Japanese policies. Therefore, no further explanation would be made to either Secretary Hull in Washington, or Ambassador Grew in Tokyo, and all matters pertaining to the Tripartite Pact would be left for the meeting between the leaders of both countries except those points which had already been discussed at preliminary conferences. Ambassador Nomura stated that these latest Japanese proposals were intended to enlarge rather than narrow the scope of the original American proposals.[353]

Because of certain Axis elements, domestic problems in Japan had become increasingly critical. Therefore, the Japanese government sincerely desired that a decision be reached

[350] "Document handed by the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) to the Secretary of State", September 23, 1941, S.D., II, 636. This term was interpreted during Foreign Minister Toyoda's conversation with Ambassador Grew on September 13, 1941, see S.D., II, 622. It was sent to Ambassador Nomura on September 13, 1941, see III, 177-178.
[351] "Memorandum of a conversation", September 23, 1941, initialed by Mr. Joseph W. Ballantine, S.D., II, 634-635.
[352] III, 201.
[353] Ibid.

[75]

regarding the "leaders conference" before the first anniversary of the Tripartite Pact was celebrated in Japan on September 27, 1941.[354]

Assuring Ambassador Nomura that he was devoting every effort to the materialization of the leaders conference, Secretary Hull stated that it was desirable, however, that the Japanese government first influence Japanese public opinion to adopt an attitude more favorable to the United States. Ambassador Nomura replied that Japan had been able to improve conditions in this regard.

In Ambassador Nomura's personal opinion, conformity with the Tripartite Pact and improvement of American-Japanese relations could be handled along parallel lines by the Japanese government, and a meeting of the leaders would strengthen peace in the Pacific.[355] At this point Secretary Hull informed Ambassador Nomura that he had received Ambassador Grew's report of the conference with Foreign Minister Toyoda on September 22, 1941.[356] Since the points discussed in this conference were now under careful consideration, Secretary Hull hoped to be able to reply in the near future. Ambassador Nomura then attempted to have Secretary Hull express a favorable opinion toward the materialization of the "leaders conference", but the Secretary of State refused to make a definite commitment.

In view of the existing international situation, however, Secretary Hull believed that now was the time for the United States and Japan to work toward the reconstruction of a peaceful world. But although Japan and the United States were ideally situated to lead world affairs, Secretary Hull doubted if the caliber of the statesmanship of both countries was capable of undertaking such a vast problem.

Firmly convinced that the meeting between the two leaders would immeasurably strengthen both governments' stand in the Pacific and would aid world peace, Ambassador Nomura once more urged that Secretary Hull work toward this goal.[357]

84. Ambassador Nomura Asks Tokyo To Clarify Its Proposals

After holding a telephone conversation with Foreign Minister Toyoda on September 24, 1941, Ambassador Nomura requested in a dispatch to the Japanese Foreign Minister on September 24, 1941 that certain points discussed be further clarified.[358] In accordance with instructions from his government, Ambassador Nomura had informed Secretary Hull in a conference on September 23, 1941 that the Japanese government had nothing more to say in regard to the various proposals it had extended to the United States. At present, Ambassador Nomura was marking time while waiting for a reply from Secretary Hull.[359]

In acknowledging receipt of a message from Tokyo on the preceding day, Ambassador Nomura stated that he did not fully understand the reasons offered by Foreign Minister Toyoda in explanation of the necessity for retaining Japanese troops in specified areas of China. The Japanese Ambassador feared that the United States would interpret the statement as a plan to station Japanese troops anywhere at all throughout the length and breadth of China. Anxious to carry out fully the Japanese government's instructions, Ambassador Nomura asked that a written explanation of the proposed peace plans, mentioned by the Japanese Foreign Minister in his telephone conversation, be forwarded to him immediately.[360]

[354] III, 195.
[355] III, 201
[356] "Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)", September 22, 1941, S.D., II, 631-633.
[357] III, 201.
[358] III, 202.
[359] Ibid.
[360] III, 203.

[76]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

85. Japanese Spies Disclose American Attitude Toward Japan

While Japan waited for the United States' answer to its proposals, their espionage agents attempted to determine the American attitude toward the present negotiations. Mr. Morishima, head of Japanese espionage activities in the United States, sent a special report to Tokyo on September 26, 1941.[361]

Mr. Morishima stated that because Prime Minister Konoye had initiated negotiations with the United States, and had taken a temperate stand with regard to the navigation of American tankers, Washington officials concluded that Japan was in a desperate condition. Consequently, at the time of Prince Konoye's return to power, Washington believed that an understanding with Japan could be reached.[362]

The delay in reaching the understanding, however, had been occasioned by the constantly growing suspicion that the present Japanese policy of appeasement was motivated by the desire to gain time, while Germany won a decisive victory in Russia. Gradually, the American officials had begun to feel that no agreement should be reached at the expense of China.

Though desiring to effect a satisfactory compromise with Japan, the United States believed that any agreement concerning Japanese problems also involved England, Soviet Russia, and the Far East. As far as the European war was concerned, America had decided to maintain its present position of strengthening Allied resistance, since an Axis victory would gravely imperil American national defense. In case Germany should win on the Russian front, the United States felt the necessity of eliminating the threat which Japan constituted in the Pacific.[363]

Mr. Morishima declared that America would first try to ensure that Japan would refrain from further invasion before amending its relations with the government at Tokyo. If Japan revised its intention to seize territory an understanding would be possible immediately, but no temporary agreement would be considered, merely for expediency's sake. Despite all negotiations, the United States planned to send a military mission to China and to continue furnishing lend-lease material to China until definite assurance was given that Japan would cease Far Eastern aggression.[364]

According to Mr. Morishima's information, it seemed evident that the United States would carry through its vast plans for the reconstruction and cultivation of China in spite of any agreement concluded with Japan. Since America's expressed desires did not coincide with Japan's national policy, a strong faction in Japan disapproved of the present attempts for establishing amity between the two countries. Similarly, in the United States, an anti-Japanese wing, encouraged by Chungking, spread propaganda to the effect that a Japanese-American rapprochement would involve the sacrifice of China.[365]

By maintaining close contact with the American society called The Friends of China, the Chungking government was opposing a Japanese-American rapprochement. Furthermore, The American Committee for Non-Participation in Japanese Aggression had initiated a campaign for economic pressure against Japan, and was opposing the efforts of both President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull to settle these problems peacefully.[366]

[361] III, 204.
[362] Ibid.
[363] III, 205.
[364] III, 206.
[365] III, 207.
[366] III, 208.

[77]

86. Foreign Minister Toyoda Urges Increased Diplomatic Efficiency

During the period of diplomatic crisis, Foreign Minister Toyoda believed that only exceptional statesmanship on the part of Foreign Office officials would enable the Japanese government to obtain its desired objectives. Therefore, while the frank expression of opinions from Japanese officials abroad were still welcomed, Foreign Minister Toyoda urged that no action be taken which might impair the solidarity of Foreign Office personnel or interfere with the execution of Japanese Foreign Office policy. In a message on September 26, 1941, Foreign Minister Toyoda asked that all Japanese Ambassadors inspire the members of these offices to achieve a maximum diplomatic efficiency.[367]

87. Foreign Minister Toyoda Forbids Textual Changes By Ambassador Nomura

Although realizing the difficulties currently experienced by Ambassador Nomura in the execution of his duties and appreciating fully that Ambassador Nomura had views divergent from his own, Foreign Minister Toyoda, nevertheless, requested on September 26, 1941, that no changes be made in any Japanese communications without first asking permission from the Foreign Office in Tokyo.[368] The Japanese Foreign Minister had previously notified Ambassador Nomura that the texts of the messages from Tokyo were composed only after careful deliberation by the various Japanese ministries involved.[369]

Turning next to the basic terms of peace between Japan and China which had been recently sent from Tokyo, Foreign Minister Toyoda asked whether Ambassador Nomura had found an opportunity to present them to Secretary Hull. Referring to the recent conversation held between President Roosevelt and Ambassador Nomura, the Japanese Foreign Minister asked whether President Roosevelt had mentioned a promise made by Japan that there would be no further increase of troops stationed in French Indo-China in order to ensure the success of Japanese-American negotiations.

Foreign Minister Toyoda believed that the American President had referred to this promise when "with smiling cynicism" he had stated that Japan might occupy Thailand while Prime Minister Konoye and President Roosevelt were holding their peace conference, just as Japanese troops had marched into French Indo-China while Ambassador Nomura and Secretary Hull had conducted informal peace negotiations.

Because of the hostile attitude of Germany toward the proposed understanding between Japan and the United States, and the increasing international tension, Foreign Minister Toyoda requested that Ambassador Nomura interview the American officials to ascertain their views on all problems involved in the negotiations.[370]

88. Ambassador Nomura Answers Foreign Minister Toyoda's Message

Replying to Foreign Minister Toyoda on the same day, September 26, 1941, Ambassador Nomura stated that he had already communicated his government's basic terms for peace between Japan and China to the American authorities. In referring to Foreign Minister Toyoda's questions regarding President Roosevelt's statement, Ambassador Nomura insisted that the American President had made no mention of any Japanese promise to avoid stationing troops in French Indo-China, nor had he inquired concerning the number of troops already stationed there.

[367] III, 209.
[368] III, 210.
[369] Ibid.
[370] Ibid.

[78]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

In the conversation that was to take place between Secretary Hull and Ambassador Nomura later in the day, the Japanese Ambassador promised to convey Foreign Minister Toyoda's reasons for maintaining troops in a certain specified area of China, and also to hand Secretary Hull the text of the proposed agreement between Japan and the United States.

Ambassador Nomura also assured Foreign Minister Toyoda that he neither added nor subtracted from the messages or instructions sent to him by his government. However, the English text of messages sent from Tokyo often differed from the original Japanese text and in view of this, Ambassador Nomura suggested that Foreign Minister Toyoda check the English translations more thoroughly before sending them.[371]

89. Ambassador Nomura Sends Japanese Proposals to Secretary Hull (September 27, 1941)

Under his government's instructions, on September 27, 1941 Ambassador Nomura sent Mr. Matsudaira to give Secretary Hull a copy of the Japanese proposals which had been delivered to Ambassador Grew on September 25, 1941.[372]

In Ambassador Nomura's covering note which was attached to the proposals, he stated that when handing to Ambassador Grew the original set of proposals, Mr. Terasaki had declared that the Japanese government was awaiting a reply from the United States regarding the projected meeting between the two government heads. In order to bring about this conference Japan had formulated a statement along the lines of the American Draft Understanding of June 21, 1941, incorporating all the proposals since communicated to the American government. Prepared solely for the convenience of the United States, these new proposals were not to be interpreted as an inflexible Japanese treaty.[373]

90. Ambassador Nomura Reports Discrepancy in Copies of Japanese Peace Terms

Ambassador Nomura advised Tokyo on September 27, 1941, a few days after delivering a copy of the Japanese government's terms for peace with China to Secretary Hull, that he had been notified by the State Department of certain discrepancies between the proposal handed to Ambassador Grew in Tokyo and that which he had given to the Secretary of State.[374] Mr. Ballantine of the State Department had pointed out that though the Japanese peace terms relayed from Ambassador Grew in Tokyo contained nine articles, the outline received from Ambassador Nomura contained only the first five articles. Since Ambassador Nomura had explained that there was always the possibility of errors in transmission, he requested in his report that Tokyo check the message in question and advise him of its findings.[375]

In reading Ambassador Nomura's report, it should be noted that despite Ambassador Nomura's seemingly honest bewilderment concerning this matter and his request to have Tokyo check on the transmission of the message, a copy of the original Japanese dispatch, sent by Tokyo on September 22, 1941, and now in American communication intelligence files, contains nine articles. It is not certain, therefore, whether the communication clerks in the Japanese Embassy did not receive the complete text, or whether accidentally or deliberately they did not deliver the complete text to Ambassador Nomura. Another possibility, which apparently does not hold in view of Ambassador Nomura's request for further check by Tokyo, is that the Japanese Ambassador deliberately omitted the last four articles for reasons of his own.

[371] III, 211.
[372] "The Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) to the Secretary of State", September 27, 1941, S.D., II, 636. The Japanese translation of the resume in English of Mr. Terasaki's remarks was sent by Ambassador Nomura to Tokyo on September 25, 1941, III, 212.
[373] "Japan's proposals submitted to the American Ambassador in Japan (Grew)", September 25, 1941, S.D., II, 637-640. For complete text sent by Foreign Minister Toyoda to Ambassador Nomura on September 25, 1941, see III, 213.
[374] III, 214.
[375] Ibid.

[79]

91. Grew-Toyoda Conversation (September 27, 1941)

(a) Ambassador Grew's Report[376]

Since Foreign Minister Toyoda received Ambassador Grew on September 27, 1941 immediately after attending various functions celebrating the first anniversary of the Tripartite Pact, Ambassador Grew believed that the Japanese Foreign Minister wished to emphasize that Japan was still anxious to establish amicable negotiations with the United States.

In reiterating Japan's desires to consummate the meeting between Prince Konoye and President Roosevelt, Foreign Minister Toyoda inquired if America had set forth its views regarding the Japanese proposal for a meeting of the two government heads. Ambassador Grew replied that the only information received from Secretary Hull had been the report that, during a discussion on September 23, 1941 Ambassador Nomura had handed the Secretary of State certain written material, which Secretary Hull promised to examine as expeditiously as possible in order to make a prompt reply.

The Japanese Foreign Minister then conveyed orally to Ambassador Grew various considerations regarding the position of the Japanese government in connection with the present informal conversations.[377] Pointing to the critical condition into which Europe had fallen as the result of a war which had involved various powers, Foreign Minister Toyoda stated that if the United States and Japan were to relinquish their hold over the key to peace in the Pacific, then world civilization would be imperiled.

Numerous incidents occurring between Japan and the United States had greatly disturbed peaceful relations, but if the conditions between Japan and the United States could be adjusted in a friendly manner, the effects would be felt throughout the world. It was for this reason that Japan was so determined to adjust any differences with the United States.

Upon assuming the post of Foreign Minister two months before, Admiral Toyoda had begun to work unceasingly toward the re-establishment of friendly relations between the two countries, and with the same objective in mind, Prime Minister Konoye had expressed his willingness to confer with President Roosevelt. Misunderstanding had arisen with Germany and Italy as a result of Prince Konoye's desire to meet with President Roosevelt, but Japan was willing to make sacrifices in order to demonstrate clearly its sincerity in desiring not only to adjust Japanese-American problems but also to maintain peace in the Pacific and to re-establish it in other areas of the world.

Moreover, though there was no precedent in Japanese history for a Prime Minister's going abroad to confer with the head of another government, Prince Konoye was motivated at this time by a sincere desire for peace. Nevertheless, Japan would not succumb to American pressure in reaching an understanding. Because of the allegations to the effect that Japan was being forced to its knees by the United States, which had been made in American newspapers, Foreign Minister Toyoda felt it necessary to repeat this fact.

Since Japanese-American relations were exceedingly complicated, it was quite possible that there would be many problems left unsettled at the conclusion of the meeting between the leaders of the two countries. The political effects of such an epochal meeting would greatly influence the settlement of any divergent views existing at present.

If the meeting did not materialize in spite of the fact that both countries were in accord as to its value and if the United States delayed too long in making a reply, it was doubtful whether

[376] "Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)", September 27, 1941, S.D., II, 641-645.
[377] "For translation of Japanese text of Foreign Minister Toyoda's Oral Statement sent to Ambassador Nomura on September 27, 1941, see III, 215. A resume in English of this conversation was handed to Secretary Hull by Ambassador Nomura on September 29, 1941, S.D., II, 652-654.

[80]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

another favorable opportunity would soon occur. Since Japan had already announced the proposals it would make at the meeting by submitting a complete resume to Ambassador Grew on September 25, 1941, in accordance with the lines contained in the American proposal for June 21, 1941, the United States was fully aware of Japan's position.

All details connected with the transporting of Prime Minister Konoye and his party to the meeting place had been arranged, and Japan was in a position to hold the meeting at any time. Only a reply from the United States was necessary to complete the preparations already underway.

Foreign Minister Toyoda pointed out that any further delay would place the Japanese government in an exceedingly difficult position because the first anniversary of the Tripartite Pact might be used by the pro-Axis elements in Japan to vitiate the efforts of the Japanese Cabinet to improve relations with the United States. Since time was of paramount importance, Japan suggested that the meeting be scheduled for some time between October 10 to October 15, 1941. If held any later, the weather in the north Pacific and along the Alaskan coast would be decidedly unfavorable.

In conducting a conference of this type, it was of the utmost importance that both countries respect the other's reliability and sincerity. Foreign Minister Toyoda felt sure that President Roosevelt fully appreciated Prime Minister Konoye's character and motives in this matter. Stating that the entire Japanese Cabinet was behind Prime Minister Konoye's move, including high army and navy officers who would attend the conference in order to dissipate doubt as to their collaboration with Prince Konoye's plans, Foreign Minister Toyoda urged that the opportunity not be lost to adjust Japanese-American relations by a conference between the leaders of both countries.

In conclusion, the Japanese Foreign Minister expressed the hope that none of his statements would be misinterpreted or considered as setting a time limit upon any reply from the American government.[378]

(b) Foreign Minister Toyoda's Report[379]

Foreign Minister Toyoda advised Ambassador Nomura on September 22, 1941 that after the ceremonies celebrating the first anniversary of the Tripartite Pact on September 27, 1941 had taken place, he had requested Ambassador Grew to call upon him. After talking to the American Ambassador along the lines of his special report to Ambassador Nomura, Foreign Minister Toyoda again strongly urged that Ambassador Grew recommend to the United States that the meeting of the leaders of the two governments take place without further delay.

In view of both internal and external circumstances affecting Japanese policies, it would be impossible to postpone the meeting indefinitely. Foreign Minister Toyoda instructed Ambassador Nomura, when speaking with American officials, to place the primary emphasis on the materialization of this proposed conference.[380]

Foreign Minister Toyoda was particularly anxious to have Ambassador Nomura emphasize the fact that although the Japanese government had made its final statement with regard to the negotiations, it did not consider that all questions and answers were now useless. Foreign Minister Toyoda welcomed any questions and was anxious to respond cordially to them, but since the United States government had not sent a single query since September 10, 1941, Foreign Minister Toyoda was deeply concerned.

[378] Ibid.
[379] III, 216.
[380] Ibid.

[81]

With the celebration of the first anniversary of the Tripartite Pact, the situation had become more critical than ever. Though a movement was underway in Japan to strengthen the Axis faction, and, consequently, opposition toward any adjustment with the United States was increasing, yet the advocates of anti-Americanism had not weakened the power of the present government.[381]

Nevertheless, in order to achieve a successful understanding, it would be necessary to produce quicker and better results and, perhaps, even to publish them. When once the date for an interview between the leaders of the two countries had been established or definite negotiations were underway, Foreign Minister Toyoda was certain that the people would stand united and that all opposition would be quickly overcome. However, at the present time Japan was disturbed concerning the delay in receiving a definite answer from the United States to the proposal submitted by Prince Konoye over a month before.

Because an influential Admiral and one General would be included in Prime Minister Konoye's entourage, the Japanese government feared that the United States might suspect it was controlled by military elements. Foreign Minister Toyoda had attempted to dispel this illusion. In speaking with British Ambassador Craigie in Tokyo, who had stated that the United States "lacks confidence concerning the attitude of the government of Japan", Foreign Minister Toyoda had attempted to eliminate American suspicion by pointing out the trustworthiness of Prime Minister Konoye and the complete reliability of the present Japanese government.[382]

92. Ambassador Nomura Suggests Changes in the Japanese Proposals (September 27, 1941)

On September 27, 1941, Ambassador Nomura informed Foreign Minister Toyoda that he had dispatched Mr. Matsudaira to deliver to Mr. Ballantine the English text of Japan's explanation for maintaining troops in China after the restoration of peace and[383] also the text indicating the Japanese government's final efforts to make arrangements for a conference between the leaders of the governments.

Expressing his opinion on various points of Admiral Toyoda's message, Ambassador Nomura believed that since the United States insisted upon coming to an agreement on all the points involved before considering the proposed leaders' conference, Japan could do no more than await an expression of the intentions of the United States since it had already clarified thoroughly its position.[384]

If further Japanese proposals were submitted before receiving a definite reply from America, matters would only be further complicated and the progress of negotiations possibly hampered because any inconsistencies appearing in the new proposals would cause the United States to doubt Japan's sincerity.

Ambassador Nomura had noted a definite desire on the part of the United States to conduct negotiations along the lines of its proposals submitted on June 21, 1941, which, in the Japanese Ambassador's opinion were concrete and extremely practicable. He suggested therefore, that his government accept the reasonings embodied therein.

Turning to a discussion of phrases contained in the Japanese proposals, Ambassador Nomura remarked that certain of them would cause a setback in the present negotiations. For example, if the item "no northward advance shall be made without justification" were deleted at this time, the American government would become suspicious of Japan's motives.

[381] III, 217.
[382] III, 218.
[383] Mr. Terasaki presented Japan's reasons for maintaining troops in China to Mr. Dooman on September 23, 1941. See S.D., II, 640. Foreign Minister Toyoda in a message to Mr. Koshi on September 23, 1941 ordered that a copy of this document be delivered to Secretary Hull. Ambassador Nomura delayed until September 27, 1941 before complying with this order.
[384] III, 219.

[82]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

With respect to the attitudes of both nations toward the war in Europe, Ambassador Nomura believed the United States would find it exceedingly difficult to conform to Japan's proposal for joint mediation in bringing about world peace. The recent sinking of the American destroyer Greer by a German submarine had affected public opinion greatly. Therefore, it would be exceedingly difficult to secure complete agreement with the United States regarding the European war.

Ambassador Nomura commented that since all moves of America toward aiding the Allies were based on the desire to maintain its own national defense, even if it became actively involved in the conflict and even though provided with ample provocation to do so, America would probably not make any aggressive attack. By making the term "right to self-defense" as elastic as possible, the United States hoped to obviate the necessity of Japan's invoking the terms of the Tripartite Pact. Consequently, the outline of Japan's needs for self-defense, which appeared in the proposals, might easily arouse America's suspicions.

Fearing that no real negotiations could be entered into with the United States unless an agreement had been reached on the matter of garrisoning troops in China and extending a guarantee of nondiscrimination in this area, Ambassador Nomura expressed the opinion that in the final analysis Japan would be forced to accept the terms offered by the United States insofar as they did not conflict with the existing Nanking Agreement.

Though the "nondiscrimination" phrase was not so important as the questions surrounding the stationing of Japanese troops in China, Ambassador Nomura believed that several negotiations would have to be conducted with the United States before America would yield to any proposal. Furthermore, he felt that the United States would not be satisfied with Japan's assurance that no third nation would be discriminated against in China as long as it conducted economic enterprises on a fair and even basis, nor did it seem likely that the United States would permit Japan to exercise such privileges in China as were in conformity with "the principle of especially close relations".

Since the United States desired to publicize any understanding reached, Ambassador Nomura saw little possibility for Japan's success in having the United States and Japan held jointly responsible for the settlement of the China Incident. Since President Roosevelt was very interested in mediating the Japanese-Chinese question Ambassador Nomura thought that the United States would raise some question regarding the term "Konoye's statement and those agreements between Japan and China". In order to offset the possibility of any difficulty arising from this, Ambassador Nomura suggested that the word "President" be inserted in the phrase.

Since it had been rumored that Secretary Hull had written the part of the United States' proposals of June 21, 1941 pertaining to the political stabilization of the Pacific, Ambassador Nomura suggested that his government retain that portion of the proposal as a diplomatic gesture.

Furthermore, since he was certain that the new proposals would be more acceptable to the United States if they dealt solely with a large scale peace in the Pacific, Ambassador Nomura requested a deletion of that part of the agreement which referred to the evacuation of Japanese troops from French Indo-China only upon the termination of the China Incident.[385]

93. Ambassador Grew Appraises Conditions in Japan (September 29, 1941)

In a report to Secretary Hull and Under Secretary Welles, Ambassador Grew attempted to appraise conditions in Japan pertaining to the current diplomatic situation.[386] The

[385] Ibid.
[386] "Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State", September 29, 1941, S.D., II, 645-650.

[83]

American Ambassador believed that since the fall of Admiral Yonai's Cabinet in July 1940, American diplomacy had not been in a better position to effect a Japanese-American rapprochement than it now held under the Konoye-Toyoda regime. Since the time was so propitious the American Ambassador hoped that an enduring foundation for friendly relations between the two countries would be established. Nevertheless, Ambassador Grew was aware that the withdrawal of Japanese troops from China and the prevention of further Japanese advances in the Pacific would be extremely difficult for any Japanese Minister to settle satisfactorily because of domestic opposition.

Since he believed that only respect for America's potential power had deterred Japan from taking more liberties with United States' interests, Ambassador Grew expressed the opinion that Tokyo's program of forceful expansion could be halted only by a threat to use this power, if necessary. By such action, a regeneration of Japanese thought might take place which would allow Japan to resume formal relations with the United States. This American policy had already aided in discrediting former Foreign Minister Matsuoka.

At the present time, Japan was attempting to correct its miscalculation in signing the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy in order to avoid the peril of being caught between Russia and the United States. With the advent of the German-Russian war, however, there was now every chance that the liberal elements in Japan would become more prominent in the attempt to extricate Japan from a dangerous position. By forbearance, patient argumentation and open declaration of the determination of the United States to take positive measures whenever they were called for, Ambassador Grew believed that the anticipated regeneration of Japanese-American relations could be effected.

The opinion was being circulated in certain circles of the United States government that an agreement between Japan and the United States would free the Japanese from the threat of America's aid to China, thereby allowing Japan to strengthen its forces for further aggression in China and throughout the Pacific. In addition, this same group held the opinion that when a deterioration in Japanese domestic economy occurred as a result of commercial restrictions exercised by the United Nations, Japan would be forced to relinquish its aggressive policies.

According to Ambassador Grew, the United States had the choice of two methods in dealing with Japan; one was the use of progressive economic strangulation, the other, constructive conciliation. From the trend of the informal conversations at Washington, it was evident that America had chosen the latter course. Should this method fail, the application of stronger economic restrictions could always be effected. Whatever the trend of Japanese-American relations were in the future, however, the United States would have to remain in a state of preparedness.

Ambassador Grew felt that the principal point at issue was not whether Japan would halt its expansionist program but when. If the United States were to lose the present opportunity to end Japan's program of forceful aggression, the prospect of war was not impossible. Recalling the cases of the Maine and the Panay, Ambassador Grew stated that war could quite possibly result from some incident arousing public opinion.

Ambassador Grew stressed the importance of understanding Japanese psychology since Japan's reactions to any circumstances could not be predicted according to Western standards. Were the United States to wait for the Japanese government to set forth, in concrete detail, commitments which would satisfy the American government, the conversations would be prolonged indefinitely. As a result the Konoye Cabinet and the elements supporting rapprochement with the United States would lose favor, and because of the abnormal sensitiveness of the Japanese and the effects of loss of face, the reaction against America would be serious. Such a situation would be even more serious than a failure to reach a complete agreement at a leaders' conference.

Ambassador Grew had been informed confidentially that the Japanese government found it impossible to clarify further its policies prior to the proposed Roosevelt-Konoye meeting

[84]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

because former Foreign Minister Matsuoka had recounted the complete details of the Washington negotiations to the German Ambassador in Japan, and many of Mr. Matsuoka's supporters who were still in the Tokyo Foreign Office would be in a position to reveal information to German and Japanese extremists who render the present Cabinet's position untenable. However, Prince Konoye had promised to make commitments in his meeting with President Roosevelt that would satisfy the United States, and although unable to determine the exact truth of this statement, Ambassador Grew pointed out that Tokyo had shown a readiness to reduce its alliance with the Axis powers to a dead letter by initiating negotiations with the United States. He suggested, therefore, that the United States place a reasonable amount of confidence in the professed sincere intention and good faith of Prince Konoye and his supporters. As an alternative to discrediting the Japanese military powers through actual military defeat, America should attempt to regenerate Japanese thought by constructive conciliation along the lines of its present efforts.[387]

94. Hull-Nomura Conversation (September 29, 1941)

(a) State Department's Report[388]

To deliver a document containing the gist of the meeting between Foreign Minister Toyoda and Ambassador Grew on September 27, 1941, Ambassador Nomura called at Secretary Hull's apartment on September 29, 1941.[389] The Japanese Ambassador had been instructed to press for a definite answer to the Japanese proposal, but since he was well aware of the American government's opinion regarding this matter and had already passed that information on to his own government, he was somewhat embarrassed. He also explained that he had been requested to obtain an interview with President Roosevelt, but in view of the present situation he would like to discuss the matter with Secretary Hull.

Secretary Hull replied that he had been out of direct touch with the President for the past three or four days, owing to the death of President Roosevelt's brother-in-law. Nevertheless, he expected to be able to give the Japanese Ambassador a memorandum concerning the proposals of the Japanese government in a short time, since he planned to see President Roosevelt that day.

Secretary Hull then declared that some delay had been necessary to permit Japan to educate its people to accept the program advocated by the United States. Ambassador Nomura explained that there were certain groups within the Japanese army which wondered why the United States, asserting leadership on the American continent because of the Monroe Doctrine, was interfering with Japan's assumption of leadership throughout Asia.

When asked if the Japanese public as a whole desired an immediate settlement of the China conflict, Ambassador Nomura replied in the affirmative but remarked that under existing circumstances they had no other alternative but to continue fighting. Ambassador Nomura agreed with Secretary Hull that many of the Japanese occupation forces would not wish to be recalled.

[387] Ibid.
[388] "Memorandum of a conversation", September 29, 1941, initialed by Mr. Joseph W. Ballantine, S.D., II, 651-652.
[389] "Document handed by Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) to Secretary of State (Hull)", September 29, 1941, S.D., II, 652-654. The text to of this same oral statement was conveyed to Ambassador Grew by Foreign Minister Toyoda, see S.D., II, 641-645. For the text wired to Ambassador Nomura by Foreign Minister Toyoda on September 27, 1941, see III, 215.

[85]

Although certain that the Konoye government was in a strong position, Ambassador Nomura believed that if Prime Minister Konoye failed to achieve a meeting between the chiefs of the two governments, he would be succeeded by a less moderate leader.[390]

(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report[391]

Ambassador Nomura reported to Tokyo on September 29, 1941 that in accordance with his instructions he had called on Secretary Hull that morning to speak of Foreign Minister Toyoda's conference with Ambassador Grew, to urge again that early action be taken on the leaders' conference, and to request that he be permitted to see President Roosevelt.

Because of the death of a relative, President Roosevelt had been away for a time, but Secretary Hull assured the Japanese Ambassador that within a few days a memorandum would be issued to him by the United States.

Thoroughly familiar with Ambassador Grew's report on the meeting with Foreign Minister Toyoda in Tokyo, Secretary Hull was convinced that the need for immediate action was evident, but he believed that unity of public opinion in Japan was of primary importance. Stating that Japanese public opinion could never be made to conform to every whim of the United States, Ambassador Nomura pointed out that the Japanese people could not understand why the United States, which always appealed to the Monroe Doctrine after seizing leadership in the American continents, meddled constantly in Asiatic affairs. Nevertheless, Ambassador Nomura was certain that once the negotiations with the United States were underway any understanding resulting from them would receive the full accord of the Japanese government, the army and the navy.[392]

95. Foreign Minister Toyoda Submits Official Interpretation of Japanese Proposals

A few days after Ambassador Nomura had presented Secretary Hull with the latest Japanese proposals, Foreign Minister Toyoda, although anxious to facilitate negotiations, agreed with Ambassador Nomura that the Japanese government should avoid making any further proposals until it had received a reply from the United States.[393]

Stating that on July 14, 1941 he had sent some instructions which Ambassador Nomura had never presented to the American officials, Foreign Minister Toyoda declared that he had issued other proposals on September 4, 1941 and September 25, 1941 in which he had attempted to harmonize both documents with the American proposal of June 21, 1941. He had hoped, therefore, that negotiations might be made on the basis of these proposals.

In the event that American officials questioned certain phrases in these latest Japanese proposals, Foreign Minister Toyoda advised Ambassador Nomura concerning their interpretation. The expression "as there is no real objective, we will make no northward invasion" was omitted from the Japanese proposals of September 25, 1941 because it was feared that the insertion of such a phrase might lead America to suspect that Japan had designs against Soviet Russia.

Since the whole problem evolved from the China Incident and the South Seas' question in the first place, Japan felt that there was no particular problem in the north. With regard to the clause concerning the stability of the Pacific area, Foreign Minister Toyoda believed that the matter had been fully discussed in the proposals and that any further clarification could be taken up at the leaders' meeting. In any event, he had no objection to the statement.[394]

[390] "Memorandum of a conversation", September 29, 1941, initialed by Mr. Joseph W. Ballantine, S.D., ii, 651-652.
[391] III, 220.
[392] Ibid.
[393] III, 221.
[394] Ibid.

[86]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

Since the term "when the proper time comes" had been included in the article discussing the European war, Foreign Minister Toyoda felt that neither country would object to the statement of their respective attitudes. Until the American government broached the subject again, however, the Japanese Foreign Minister desired to postpone discussion of the second clause of the same article.

Concerning the adjustment of the China Incident, the Japanese government was aware of the United States' belief that the settlement of this particular problem was of greatest importance to the stability of the Pacific area. However, if the United States opposed the first clause which indicated that both governments considered it their joint responsibility to bring about peace, Japan was willing to leave it out altogether.

Since Japan, from the beginning of negotiations, had been looking with expectancy to American mediation in the China affair, it had no objection to President Roosevelt's assisting in the settlement. The phrase "a treaty between Japan and China" had been inserted in accordance with the three principles laid down by Prime Minister Konoye, and had no special meaning.[395]

Since the United States might entertain some misgivings about the question of nondiscrimination in Chinese economic activities, Foreign Minister Toyoda offered the assurance that the principle of trade equality would be applied to all other countries. However, in accordance with similar practices existing throughout the world, the geographical situation in the Far East would naturally result in more intimate, neighborly relations between Japan and China. Nevertheless, once the conditions arising from the American freezing order had been ameliorated, commerce between Japan and the United States could be resumed on a normal basis and the Japanese government would be willing to accept the United States' proposals governing trade.

In view of the fact that the stipulations concerning political stability in the Pacific, as set forth in the American proposal, had been strongly supported by Secretary Hull, Foreign Minister Toyoda stressed that Japan would give them full consideration, especially since they were general stipulations. In order to expand the significance of the clause pertaining to the establishment of peace in the Pacific, Foreign Minister Toyoda had embodied therein proposals for the military evacuation of French Indo-China and the settlement of the China Incident. If the United States did not like this arrangement, Foreign Minister Toyoda was willing to change it.[396]

96. Ambassador Nomura Converses with Admirals Stark and Turner (September 30, 1941)

On September 30, 1941 Ambassador Nomura met with Admiral Stark to confer on the Japanese-American situation, and Rear Admiral Turner joined them later. In the opinion of Admiral Stark the stationing of Japanese troops in China was imperiling the present negotiations, and unless the incident was settled without further delay, an understanding between Tokyo and Washington would be impossible.

Although Rear Admiral Turner doubted that Japan would agree to evacuate China completely, he was certain that unless some compromise could be reached in the preparatory discussions, a meeting between the two leaders would be extremely dangerous.

When the discussion turned to the interpretation of the Tripartite Pact, Admiral Stark stated that the United States would not strike at Japan, since if it fought a two ocean war, it would have to defend itself in the Pacific.[397]

[395] III, 222.
[396] III, 223.
[397] III, 224.

[87]

97. Mr. Iguti Warns Tokyo Against Signs of Over-Anxiety

In the message to Mr. Terasaki, Chief of the American Bureau in Japan on September 29, 1941, Counselor Iguti warned his government against showing signs of over-anxiety in dealing with the present negotiations.[398] Furthermore, he believed that it was unwise to deliver statements in Washington which were copies of the original already handed to Ambassador Grew, since transmission errors and discrepancies in translation often created unnecessary misunderstandings. Under these circumstances, Ambassador Nomura found it difficult to explain without lengthy explanations vague passages in the document. Another practice of the Japanese Foreign Office, causing confusion and delay, was the constant submission of proposals which seldom ran in sequence.

Information indicated that the United States believed that the Japanese government was shifting the scene of the negotiations to Tokyo in order to delay proceedings so that Japan could watch the development of the Russian-German war and launch a northward move, if conditions were in its favor.

It was reported to Mr. Iguti that Japanese governmental circles believed that the United States had no reason to refuse the most recent Japanese proposals. They blamed interference in Washington for the inactivity of the United States. However, Mr. Iguti remarked that during the past six months Japanese officials in Washington had clearly indicated the attitude of the United States in their reports to Tokyo. Believing that Tokyo viewed the United States' statements too optimistically, and in fact, with an attitude of almost wishful thinking, Mr. Iguti was certain that the United States had no intention of withdrawing from its position.

By its impatience in urging an immediate reply from the United States, Japan was endangering the situation by giving the impression that the Japanese government was overly anxious to arrive at an understanding. Since the United States had not suffered greatly from any economic measures imposed upon it by Japan, it could afford to delay matters. On the other hand, the American freezing order had affected Japan's entire economic structure. Mr. Iguti believed that under these circumstances, Japan should not show its hand by signs of over-anxiety.[399]

98. Mr. Terasaki Replies to Mr. Iguti

After receiving Mr. Iguti's message concerning Japanese-American relations, and giving it careful consideration, Mr. Terasaki replied that Counselor Iguti's criticisms were justified in regard to the Japanese government's continuing to send proposals after having stated officially that Japan had made its last concession. The Japanese message of September 4, 1941 had been designed to express Japan's views on existing problems in a broad light, and desiring to facilitate negotiations, the Japanese government had sent further messages based upon the United States' proposals of June 21, 1941, which pertained to the garrisoning of troops in China and peace terms for the settlement of the China Incident. Sent at the request of both Prime Minister Konoye and the Japanese military authorities, these supplementary notes were to be used as reference material by the Japanese Ambassador in Washington when explaining Japan's position to the United States government.

[398] III, 225.
[399] Ibid.

[88]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

Officials in Tokyo had been quite unaware that Ambassador Nomura had submitted a statement of his own on September 4, 1941 until certain questions concerning it were raised by Ambassador Grew in Tokyo. Although the Japanese Ambassador had submitted the note only as an unofficial draft, it had complicated negotiations exceedingly. However, Mr. Terasaki realized that Ambassador Nomura and Counselor Iguti were exercising every effort to bring about a satisfactory understanding, and regretted only that the United States did not reciprocate this exhibition of Japanese statesmanship.

Nevertheless, there were more among the Japanese officials who, underestimating the United States, viewed the present condition with undue optimism. In fact, Mr. Terasaki felt that Japanese officials in Washington did not fully appreciate the critical domestic conditions existing in Japan itself. Only by the clear thinking of the military officials in Tokyo had an outbreak been averted following the celebration of the Tripartite Pact on September 27, 1941.[400]

Mr. Terasaki suggested that Counselor Iguti obtain a full description of Japan's internal situation from Minister Wakasugi upon his return to the United States. Furthermore, an explanation should be made to the United States along the lines that certain officials in the United States, misunderstanding the political situation in Japan, did not appreciate the strength of Prime Minister Konoye's Cabinet, and believed consequently that an agreement concluded by the Japanese government would be disregarded by the military organization.

Mr. Terasaki emphasized that though there did exist a faction opposed to the present Cabinet, it would be easily overruled by those in favor of Prime Minister Konoye. It was true that Colonel Mabuchi's broadcast and Mr. Nakano's speech were opposed to Prime Minister Konoye's message, but Mr. Terasaki felt that anyone cognizant of the characteristics of the Japanese people and familiar with conditions in Japan would be able to evaluate those speeches properly. British and American newspapermen, concerned primarily with "journalistic interests", exaggerated minor points in the speech, thereby causing grave misunderstanding.

According to Mr. Terasaki, if the situation were properly explained to American officials, they would understand the real picture. In view of domestic circumstances and external conditions, it was evident that Japan was eager to have a leaders' conference take place. If American officials chose to construe this Japanese attitude as impatience, nothing could be done about it.

Japan agreed that Washington was to be the central locale of any negotiations conducted, though an occasion might arise when conversations would be conducted in Tokyo first. Anyone who construed such action as a delay on the part of the Japanese government misunderstood Foreign Minister Toyoda's intentions.

Time, in Japan's opinion, was now the most important element, for the materialization of the present negotiations would have an important bearing on peace not only in the Pacific but also throughout the world. Thus, the seriousness of the situation was obvious. If the United States so wished, Japan was willing to negotiate further on the basis of its recent message which contained its final efforts to persuade the United States to agree to a leaders' conference.[401]

99. Tokyo Denies Rumors of Dissension in Konoye Cabinet

Special Japanese intelligence reports from New York had revealed that America still regarded the negotiations with Japan from a pessimistic standpoint and that rumors were circulating that Prime Minister Konoye's Cabinet inevitably would be forced to undergo a revision within two weeks.[402] Tokyo denied this rumor and urged that American officials be enlightened with regard to the true situation.

[400] III, 226.
[401] Ibid.
[402] III, 227.

[89]

When answering Secretary Hull's questions on the attitude of Japanese public opinion toward negotiations with America, Foreign Minister Toyoda urged that Ambassador Nomura give full assurance that public opinion was calm. The Japanese government was becoming increasingly conscious of the need to issue a statement on the negotiations at the earliest opportunity.[403]

100. Hull-Nomura Conversation (October 2, 1941)

(a) State Department's Report[404]

On October 2, 1941 when Ambassador Nomura called at Secretary Hull's apartment, he was presented with a confidential statement expressing the views of the United States toward the Japanese proposals.[405]

It declared that after a careful study of the proposals submitted to Secretary Hull by Ambassador Nomura on September 6, 1941 and all statements subsequently communicated to America by Japan, the United States had arrived at certain conclusions.

Welcoming an opportunity to further the broad objectives and principles of peace, the United States had received Japan's suggestion, made through Ambassador Nomura during the early part of August 1941, that a meeting be held by the responsible heads of both governments in order to discuss the adjustment of existing relations. Furthermore, the suggestion had been carefully considered that the informal conversations be resumed in order to ascertain a basis for a peaceful program covering the entire Pacific situation.

As a result, on August 17, 1941, President Roosevelt in a reply to the Japanese Ambassador expressed the view that the United States was prepared to consider the resumption of exploratory discussions provided that they envisaged the conclusion of a progressive program by peaceful means, an equality of commercial opportunity and treatment throughout the entire Pacific area, and the making of raw materials and other essential commodities accessible to all countries. Japan would profit from the adoption of such a program. Provided that the Japanese government agreed to a peaceful program in the Pacific and adhered to the principles to which the United States was committed, the American government would endeavor to arrange a suitable time and place for the exchange of views.

It was gratifying to both President Roosevelt and the United States to receive a message from Prime Minister Konoye and a statement from Japan on August 28, 1941, expressing Japan's intention to pursue a peaceful course in harmony with the broad purpose and fundamental principles to which the United States was committed. Supporting the program outlined by President Roosevelt as applicable not only to the Pacific area but to the entire world, the Japanese government gave further assurance that it would exert no military force against any neighboring nation without provocation.

While anxious not to delay arrangements for the proposed meeting between the two government leaders by a discussion of minor details, the United States, nevertheless, felt it advisable to clarify the interpretation of certain principles in order to ensure the achievement of all objectives. In replying to Ambassador Nomura on September 3, 1941, President Roosevelt agreed to collaborate with the Japanese government in supporting the four principles, previously mentioned by the United States, upon which relations between the two nations must properly rest:-

[403] Ibid.
[404] "Memorandum of a conversation", October 2, 1941, initialed by Mr. Joseph W. Ballantine, S.D., II, 654-656.
[405] Ibid.

[90]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

1. Respect for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of each and all nations.

2. Support of the principle of non-interference in the affairs of other countries.

3. Support of the principle of equality, including the equality of commercial opportunity.

4. Non-disturbance of the status quo in the Pacific except as the status quo may be altered by peaceful means.

Pointing out the necessity of reaching a community of view with respect to the fundamental differences revealed during the informal conversations, President Roosevelt had requested an indication of Japan's attitude toward the fundamental principles and in a conversation with Ambassador Grew at Tokyo, Prime Minister Konoye on September 6, 1941 had subscribed fully to the four principles mentioned above.

In view of the foregoing developments and assurances, coupled with other statements made by the Japanese government, the United States had been assured of Japan's intention to give practical application to the broad progressive program covering the entire Pacific area.

When the proposal extended by Ambassador Nomura on September 6, 1941 had disclosed divergencies in the concepts of the two governments, the United States was gravely disappointed. While they were apparently intended as a concrete basis for discussions, those Japanese proposals and the subsequent explanatory statement narrowed and restricted the application of the basic principles regarding the establishment and maintenance of peaceful stability throughout the entire Pacific area. Because of previous broad assurances given by the Japanese Prime Minister and the Japanese government, the United States did not understand the need for Japan's modifying its former commitments with unnecessary qualifying phrases.

Although recognizing the inalienable right of any nation to defend itself from aggression, the United States found it difficult to conceive of any circumstances developing in the territory of French Indo-China, in Thailand or in Soviet Russia which would constitute a threat or provocation to Japan.

Although a formula of nondiscrimination in international commercial relations had been set down as the fundamental economic policy of the two governments, the proposals of September 6, 1941 and subsequent communications from the Japanese government restricted the commitments contained in that economic agreement to countries of the Southwest Pacific area. In spite of assurances that it would respect the principle of nondiscrimination in China, the explanation given by the Japanese government implied that it intended to limit this principle by reason of geographical propinquity to China.[406]

Peace would not be achieved if either government could pursue one course or policy in a certain area at the same time that it followed an opposing policy in another area. In the views expressed by the Japanese government relating to the question of China, the United States noticed a determination to station Japanese forces in certain areas of China for an indeterminate period. Such a procedure seemed to be out of keeping with the progressive principles discussed in the informal conversations. The United States could not agree with the reasons laid down by Japan for continuing its military occupation of China and it felt that such action would endanger any prospects of stability.

In order to give full assurance of its peaceful intentions and desire to establish a sound basis for future stability and progress in the Pacific area, the United States believed that Japan should exhibit a clear-cut manifestation of its intention to withdraw Japanese troops from China and French Indo-China.

[406] "Oral statement handed by the Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura), October 2, 1941, S.D., II 656-661. For English text wired to Foreign Minister Toyoda by Ambassador Nomura on October 2, 1941, see III, 228-239.

[91]

The United States fully appreciated the steps taken by Japan to meet the difficulties inherent in the different relations of both countries toward the European war and declared that it would be very helpful if the Japanese government would continue to study the question for the purpose of clarifying it still further.

In order to prepare for the proposed meeting of responsible Chiefs of the Japanese and American governments, the United States had endeavored to put into effect a comprehensive program applying liberal and progressive principles uniformly to the entire Pacific area. Apparently, however, the Japanese government desired a program circumscribed by qualifications and exceptions to the actual application of those nondiscriminatory principles. Under these circumstances, a meeting between Prime Minister Konoye and President Roosevelt could never hope to contribute to the advancement of the purposes which the United States desired.

Nevertheless, the United States welcomed Japan's assurances, accompanying Prime Minister Konoye's message to President Roosevelt, that it advocated the principles supported by the United States as the only sound basis for stable international relations. The United States believed that these fundamental principles must be given renewed consideration before a firm foundation could be laid for a meeting between the two governments.

The statement pointed out that President Roosevelt, still interested in the proposed meeting with Prime Minister Konoye, sincerely hoped that a discussion of the fundamental questions would add to the success of such a meeting. The United States was firmly convinced that by collaborating with Japan in the fundamental rehabilitation of mutual relations, the resulting agreement would contribute to lasting peace throughout the Pacific area, based upon justice, equity and order.[407]

After reading the document, Ambassador Nomura stated that his government would be disappointed that the proposed meeting could not take place. Once more, he assured Secretary Hull of Japan's sincerity in first suggesting that such a meeting be held,[408] but said that in view of internal difficulties, he did not believe that Japan could go further at this time.

Although expressing his own confidence in the sincerity of the Japanese Prime Minister and other officials of that government, Secretary Hull nevertheless pointed out that past actions of Japan made it impossible to remove certain doubts concerning the true aims and principles of Tokyo. For this reason, the Secretary of State had insisted that a definite agreement, incorporating the peaceful policies and courses of both governments, be drawn up.

Ambassador Nomura then referred to a press report made by a member of the American Cabinet, which would undoubtedly have a bad effect on Japan's public opinion. Although admitting that certain persons in Japan had made similar statements which were detrimental to Japanese-American peace negotiations, Ambassador Nomura did not believe that they were members of the Japanese Cabinet. Secretary Hull replied that during the informal conversations between Ambassador Nomura and members of the American government, Mr. Matsuoka had made statements inconsistent with the spirit prompting these discussions, but Ambassador Nomura had continued the discussion despite them.

Secretary Hull believed that no proposed meeting could be held before a definite agreement in policy had been established, nor could any patchwork arrangement result in a lasting Pacific peace. It was Ambassador Nomura's opinion that the only source of difficulty was Japan's desire to retain troops in China. No dispute was expected over the question of commercial equality.

[407] Ibid.
[408] "Memorandum of a conversation", initialed by Mr. Joseph W. Ballantine, S.D., II, 654-656.

[92]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

Expressing the belief that Japan would benefit from the universal application of the policy of nondiscrimination, Secretary Hull referred to a report of the Lima conference, containing many economic resolutions concerning South America, which the Japanese government might adopt in the Far East.

According to Ambassador Nomura, Japan's present attitude with respect to regional economic blocs, which destroyed the fundamental principle of nondiscrimination, had resulted from measures similar to those taken at Ottawa, Canada. Since he had been fighting the adoption of such commercial policies, Secretary Hull stated that he would like Japan to join the United States in establishing liberal economic policies. At the conclusion of the conference, Ambassador Nomura again assured Secretary Hull that the Konoye Cabinet was in a comparatively strong position and it desired to reach an agreement with the United States.[409]

(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report

Calling on Secretary Hull at his invitation at 9:00 A.M. on October 2, 1941, Ambassador Nomura received the reply of the United States to the Japanese proposals.[410] Secretary Hull stated that in the opinion of the United States a conference between Prime Minister Konoye and President Roosevelt would be precarious unless a "clear-cut", not a "patch up", understanding regarding the maintenance of peace throughout the whole Pacific could be arrived at beforehand. Although disappointed by the American reply, Ambassador Nomura promised to transmit the message to his government.[411]

101. Tokyo Reports Receiving America's Reply

On October 3, 1941 Tokyo reported the receipt of the United States' reply to Japan's proposal concerning the leaders' conference.

In view of the domestic situation, Foreign Minister Toyoda urged that careful checks be made of newspaper articles dealing with the Japanese-American negotiations, since rumors concerning the fall of the Konoye Cabinet might endanger the success of the negotiations.[412]

102. Hull-Nomura Conversation (October 3, 1941)

(a) State Department's Report[413]

Ambassador Nomura had called on Secretary Hull at his own request on October 3, 1941 to report among other things that on the preceding day he had transmitted the text of the United States' reply to the Japanese proposals. In turn, Tokyo had informed the Japanese Ambassador that it was preparing a statement for public release.[414] Ambassador Nomura hoped to receive an advance copy to submit to Secretary Hull before its publication. Secretary Hull made no comment.[415]

[409] Ibid.
[410] III, 240.
[411] Ibid.
[412] III, 241.
[413] "Memorandum of a conversation", October 3, 1941, initialed by Mr. Joseph W. Ballantine, S.D., II, 661.
[414] There is no record of such a definite statement from Tokyo in American files.
[415] "Memorandum of a conversation", October 3, 1941, initialed by Mr. Joseph W. Ballantine, S.D., II, 661.

[93]

(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report

In order to expedite certain business matters for his government, Ambassador Nomura called upon Secretary Hull on October 3, 1941.[416] The Japanese Naval Ministry desired that arrangements be made to have a courier from Washington go to Hawaii, and the Japanese Foreign Office wished to purchase American oil through the transfer of Japan's unfrozen funds in South America. Although these matters ordinarily came under the cognizance of the Treasury Department and the Maritime Commission, Secretary Hull promised to intercede for the Japanese government.

Ambassador Nomura also mentioned the possibility of Japan's issuing a statement regarding the adjustment of Japanese-American diplomatic relations, and said that if this were done the United States would be notified. Secretary Hull did not object.[417]

103. Foreign Minister Toyoda Obtains a Copy of British Ambassador Craigie's Report (October 3, 1941)

Since British Ambassador Robert Craigie's vacation trip to the United States had been unavoidably delayed by the sickness of his chief assistant, Foreign Minister Toyoda availed himself of the opportunity to discuss various problems involving the Japanese-American situation with him. The Japanese Foreign Minister also asked Ambassador Grew to discuss current diplomatic relations with the British Ambassador.

As a result of both these meetings, Foreign Minister Toyoda reported that Ambassador Craigie had cabled Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden and Ambassador Halifax in support of the proposals for an immediate conference between the United States and Japan. However, in view of the secret source of this information, Ambassador Nomura was asked not to disclose it.[418]

Since Ambassador Nomura was furnished with the gist of Ambassador Craigie's report to the British government, several interesting possibilities exist concerning the method by which the Japanese obtained it. Though Ambassador Craigie might have given the report to the Japanese Foreign Office, this seems improbable in view of Foreign Minister Toyoda's use of the phrase "according to absolutely unimpeachable sources", instead of mentioning the British Ambassador, and his instructions to Ambassador Nomura concerning absolute secrecy in the matter.[419]

The report might have been obtained through espionage activities. Another interesting possibility is that the Japanese were reading the British diplomatic codes at this time, though there is no other evidence to indicate their success in this field. However, in the absence of definite information, no decision can be reached as to the source of this intelligence.

According to Ambassador Craigie's report to London, the resignation of former Foreign Minister Matsuoka had increased the chances for Japan's turning from the Axis powers toward the democracies. The British Ambassador pointed out that if such a change were to benefit Japan it must take place without delay. Since at the present time Japan could enter into nothing more than a temporary understanding, the United States was endangering the ultimate success of the negotiations by arguing over every word and phrase as though it were essential to the conclusion of any preliminary agreement. It was apparent, Ambassador Craigie believed, that the American government did not understand domestic conditions in Japan.[420]

[416] III, 242.
[417] Ibid.
[418] III, 243.
[419] Ibid.
[420] III, 244.

[94]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

In spite of the strong opposition within Japan arising from Prince Konoye's reversal of policy, the Japanese Prime Minister retained his desire to avoid the dangers connected with the Tripartite Pact. If this opportunity for the settlement of Far Eastern problems were lost and the leaders' conference failed to materialize, Ambassador Craigie declared that the Konoye Cabinet would be placed in a precarious position.

Though Ambassador Craigie was aware that many other factors were complicating the consideration of negotiations, both he and the American Ambassador in Japan agreed that this favorable opportunity should not be allowed to slip by because of the unduly suspicious attitude of the United States. However, he agreed that until Prime Minister Konoye's principles actually materialized, retaliatory economic pressure against Japan should be continued.[421]

104. Foreign Minister Toyoda Directs Ambassador Nomura to Submit Another Japanese Explanation

On October 4, 1941 Foreign Minister Toyoda directed Ambassador Nomura to indicate to American authorities that since the Japanese attitude regarding certain fundamental points had been explained theoretically to the satisfaction of the United States, the actual opening of negotiations should now be possible.[422] Although there remained three points upon which divergent views were still held, namely: economic activity in the Pacific, the withdrawal of Japanese troops, and the interpretation of the Tripartite Pact, the Japanese government was certain that the United States had a clear comprehension of the other issues.

Though Prime Minister Konoye approved in principle of the four basic principles underlying the present negotiations, this did not preclude certain differences of opinion regarding their actual application which Prime Minister Konoye desired to consider at the time of the negotiations. The Japanese government had managed its domestic affairs in order to accomplish this, and it wanted Ambassador Nomura to see to it that the United States did not misunderstand the situation.[423]

105. Ambassador Nomura Apologizes for His Hasty Conclusions

During the period of informal negotiations between Japan and the United States, Ambassador Nomura and Foreign Minister Toyoda often disagreed as to policy and principles. On October 4, 1941 Ambassador Nomura, asking that Foreign Minister Toyoda excuse the careless remarks he had sent to Tokyo on the preceding day, explained that his actions had resulted only from the most profound concern for Japan at this critical moment of its history, and that he was deeply impressed with Foreign Minister Toyoda's tremendous efforts since his appointment and throughout the negotiations.[424]

Ambassador Nomura believed that before Japan was able to become self-sufficient as a result of the sphere of co-prosperity, a drastic economic reorganization would have to take place which would be difficult to carry out. Expressing a doubt about a northward advance, the Japanese Ambassador believed that a move to the south might obtain a profitable foothold after several years.[425]

[421] Ibid.
[422] III, 245.
[423] Ibid.
[424] III, 246.
[425] Ibid.

[95]

106. Foreign Minister Toyoda Requests an Immediate Reply to His Message of October 4, 1941

Since Foreign Minister Toyoda had not yet received any information from Ambassador Nomura regarding America's attitude toward the points outlined in his message of October 4, 1941,[426] he informed the Japanese Ambassador on October 17, 1941 that the Japanese government was unable to continue its consideration of the United States' memorandum. Therefore, the Japanese Foreign Minister requested that Ambassador Nomura submit a report with the utmost speed.[427]

On the following day Ambassador Nomura's report had not yet been received in Tokyo. Since the internal situation in Japan would not permit further delay, Foreign Minister Toyoda again stated that until he had received the American reply to his telegram, the Japanese government could not continue its discussions concerning the American memorandum. Therefore, he again urged that Ambassador Nomura reply at once.[428]

107. Japanese-American Conversation

Breakfasting with Mr. Eugene Dooman in Tokyo on the morning of October 7, 1941, Mr. Ushiba discussed the precarious position in which Prince Konoye now found himself because the preliminary conversations with the United States had failed to make progress. Since the latest Japanese proposal for reconciliation between the two countries had not been accepted, the opposition in Japan now had an opportunity to criticize the Konoye Cabinet.[429]

Although in its anxiety to end the China Incident the army had given Prince Konoye unqualified support, he would now have to accept responsibility for the present failure. No one else would take a similar risk or would have the political prestige to gain support of the army in settling the China Incident by negotiation.

Pessimism in the army as well as in the other Japanese official circles had greatly increased because of the failure of the American government to state the precise measures it wished Japan to take. In fact, since the receipt of the memorandum of October 2, 1941 from the United States, many in Japanese governmental circles believed that after America had obtained a definite declaration of Japan's policies and objectives, with no intention of formulating any understanding with Tokyo, America felt justified in maintaining an attitude of quasi-hostility against Japan because its objectives differed from their own. Refuting this conjecture, Mr. Dooman stated that the memorandum of October 2, 1941 had been a direct result of American public opinion which demanded that there be an agreement on certain fundamental points prior to any formal negotiations.

Nevertheless, Mr. Ushiba insisted that the American memorandum was not only extremely argumentative, preceptive and uncompromising, but it also contained no suggestions calculated toward helping the Japanese government to meet the desires of the United States. At the conclusion of the meeting Mr. Ushiba said that the only thing left for Japan to do was to ask the American government to specify exactly the commitments it wished Japan to make, and if a definite reply were not forthcoming, to end the conversations.[430]

[426] III, 245.
[427] III, 247.
[428] III, 248.
[429] "Memorandum by the Counselor of Embassy in Japan (Dooman)", October 7, 1941, S.D., II, 662-663.
[430] Ibid.

[96]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

108. Grew-Toyoda Conversation (October 7, 1941)

(a) Ambassador Grew's Report[431]

Foreign Minister Toyoda requested that Ambassador Grew call on the morning of October 7, 1941 to discuss the American memorandum presented to Ambassador Nomura on October 2, 1941. Because the American Embassy had received only a resume of that document, Ambassador Grew declined to make any comments.

Foreign Minister Toyoda stated that not only had he been informed of Ambassador Grew's private meeting with Prince Konoye on September 6, 1941, but also he knew that Ambassador Grew had communicated Prince Konoye's statements to President Roosevelt through Secretary Hull in "a personal and private message". Since the Prime Minister's statements had been unofficial and merely those of an individual in the Japanese government, it had not been expected that they would be incorporated into a public American document which would be circulated among Japanese officials having no knowledge of Prince Konoye's meetings with Ambassador Grew. However, because Prince Konoye's opinion had been expressed inaccurately in the American memorandum of October 2, 1941, Japan felt it necessary to clarify the record.

In spite of the fact that the American document had maintained that Prince Konoye fully subscribed to the four points contained in the memorandum of October 2, 1941, actually the Prime Minister had accepted the four point program only "in principle", and had indicated that some adjustment would be required in their application to actual conditions. Ambassador Grew interpolated the comment that there was no doubt as to the accuracy of his report concerning the Japanese Prime Minister's statement. Foreign Minister Toyoda then stated that following the complete examination of the memorandum of October 2, 1941, further comments would be forthcoming. In the meantime, the Japanese Foreign Minister, referring to the unofficial draft statement presented to Secretary Hull by Ambassador Nomura on September 4, 1941 as well as Prince Konoye's unofficial statement of September 6, 1941, requested that misunderstandings arising from a discussion of such "technical procedure" should be avoided until some real progress had been made.

Foreign Minister Toyoda commented briefly on the United States' desire to revert to the status quo which had prevailed four years ago in the Pacific. Because Japan had been involved in large scale warfare since that time, a return to the situation previously existing would entail basic adjustments in Japan.

When asked for his own private opinion on the position of the United States according to the memorandum of October 2, 1941, Ambassador Grew replied that America was endeavoring to ensure that Japan would observe those principles designed to achieve lasting peace in the Pacific area.[432]

(b) Foreign Minister Toyoda's Report[433]

On October 7, 1941 Foreign Minister Toyoda advised Ambassador Nomura that he had requested Ambassador Grew to call upon him to discuss the American reply to the Japanese proposals. Assuming that the American Ambassador had also received a copy of the United States' memorandum of October 2, 1941, Foreign Minister Toyoda inquired concerning Mr. Grew's opinions on the document. However, since Ambassador Grew had received only a resume of his government's memorandum, he was loath to express an opinion without having read the full text.

[431] "Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)" October 7, 1941, S.D., II, 663-665.
[432] Ibid.
[433] III, 249.

[97]

Certain that this resume contained the most important points of the American memorandum, and would facilitate the forming of an opinion, Foreign Minister Toyoda urged that Ambassador Grew cooperate in reaching an understanding by voicing his ideas. Although forced to base his statements on an inadequate knowledge of the circumstances, Ambassador Grew replied that the United States was undoubtedly attempting to secure an agreement on the preliminary conditions.

Remarking bluntly that the Japanese government was dissatisfied with the American reply, Foreign Minister Toyoda said that the United States did not understand the domestic and external conditions affecting Japan. Assuring the Japanese Foreign Minister that recently he had submitted a fourteen page report on the various changes seen during his many years in Japan, Ambassador Grew said that he had described fully the sincere efforts made by the Japanese government to effect a compromise with America. However, Ambassador Grew did not continue the discussion of this matter.

Foreign Minister Toyoda then discussed certain phrases used in the United States' memorandum of October 2, 1941 which did not meet the approval of the Japanese government. Although it stated that Prime Minister Konoye had "fully subscribed" to the four principles laid down by the United States, actually the record of the meeting between Ambassador Grew and the Japanese Prime Minister clearly showed that Prince Konoye had agreed to these policies "in principle" only.

When Ambassador Grew insisted that he had reported the discussion accurately to his government because he had been fully aware of the importance of each word spoken, Foreign Minister Toyoda agreed that the matter was important and that his notes clearly recorded an agreement in principle only. In view then of this error the Japanese government took the liberty of changing the term "fully" to "in principle". In order to have the statement coincide with that made in the original discussion, Prime Minister Toyoda ordered that this correction be made in the copies of the American memorandum sent to Ambassador Nomura and other authorized persons for their perusal. Ambassador Grew thanked the Japanese Foreign Minister for reporting this discrepancy to him.

After explaining that he had no desire to become too argumentative, Foreign Minister Toyoda asked by what authority the United States had quoted a passage from Prime Minister Konoye's private message to President Roosevelt in an official American document. Agreeing with Foreign Minister Toyoda wholeheartedly, Ambassador Grew stated that the error must have been due to faulty handling of the papers in the State Department. Returning to the matter concerning the "fully subscribed" quotation, Ambassador Grew seemed to recall that it was Ambassador Nomura who had accepted the four principles unconditionally.

Foreign Minister Toyoda stated that if this misunderstanding had been caused by careless handling of certain papers by Japanese representatives, it would be necessary to make amends at a future date, since any action taken now would involve the danger of needlessly confusing the issue. Since Ambassador Nomura himself had caused a misunderstanding by submitting a personal note on September 4, 1941, Foreign Minister Toyoda believed it advisable to do nothing further at the present time.[434]

109. Mr. Terasaki Interviews Ambassador Grew[435]

On the day following Foreign Minister Toyoda's conversation with the American Ambassador, Mr. Terasaki requested Ambassador Grew to discuss from an entirely personal and unofficial standpoint the American memorandum of October 2, 1941.[436]

[434] Ibid.
[435] "Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)", October 8, 1941, S.D., II, 666-667.
[436] Ibid.

[98]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

The American Ambassador said the memorandum, friendly in tone and helpful in substance, indicated the desire of the United States to make progress in the conversations. When asked by Mr. Terasaki what actions the United States wished Japan to take in order to reach a mutual agreement, Ambassador Grew replied that three major points which had caught his eye were: (1) the withdrawal of Japanese troops from China; (2) the application to the entire Pacific area of certain Japanese assurances which appeared limited to the southwest Pacific; and (3) Japanese claims for special privileges in China as a result of geographical propinquity to that country.

Pointing out that many prominent Japanese officials were comparing the Monroe Doctrine and the United States' relationship to Latin American countries with Japan's position in the Far East, Ambassador Grew emphasized that the two situations were not at all analogous. Since the American Ambassador and Mr. Terasaki could not agree on this point it was not pursued further.

Turning to America's desire for the withdrawal of Japanese troops from both China and French Indo-China, Mr. Terasaki asked if Japan must take action before a meeting between President Roosevelt and Prince Konoye took place. Explaining that he was not in a position to interpret the State Department's phraseology, Ambassador Grew nevertheless expressed his private opinion that in view of previous failures of Japan to live up to its promises his government desired to see concrete evidence of Japan's "manifest intentions" to withdraw its forces from occupied territories.

Ambassador Grew then reminded Mr. Terasaki that Secretary Hull desired that informal discussions relating to both Japanese and American proposals be held in Washington. Though Mr. Terasaki expressed surprise at this, Ambassador Grew said that he had conveyed this information to Foreign Minister Toyoda. If Japan were uncertain regarding any portion of the memorandum of October 2, 1941, Ambassador Grew suggested that Ambassador Nomura seek an interview with Secretary Hull.

Because Mr. Terasaki referred during the conversation to America's suggestion that Japan declare publicly its intention to withdraw its troops from China and French Indo-China, Ambassador Grew was certain that Japan thoroughly understood this point.[437]

110. Tokyo Explains Background of Japanese-American Negotiations to Japanese Ambassador in Berlin

In a message to the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin on October 8, 1941 Foreign Minister Toyoda summarized the background of the current Japanese negotiations with America. The Japanese-American informal conversations had been inaugurated during the administration of the second Konoye Cabinet, but a rupture had occurred when Japan felt it necessary to penetrate into French Indo-China in order to hasten the end of the China Incident, break the Anglo-American encirclement by joint defense, and procure essential materials. Although its action had been motivated solely by self defense, according to Japan, England and the United States had imposed an economic blockade upon Japan with the result that diplomatic relations had deteriorated and the internal situation existing in Japan had become extremely critical.[438]

When the war between Germany and Russia had become a protracted struggle, contrary to German expectations, the United States and England came to Russia's assistance. Commerce between Europe and Asia had been disrupted, and Japanese liaison with Germany and Italy had been severed.[439]

[437] Ibid.
[438] III, 250.
[439] Ibid.

[99]

Meanwhile, England and the United States had tightened their economic net about Japan, preventing the Japanese government from concluding its war with China. As a result Japan had attempted to negotiate with the United States so that hostilities with the Chinese could be terminated under satisfactory conditions and an era of co-prosperity could be established in East Asia during which time Japan's natural resources could be conserved for the future. By means of diplomatic negotiations Japan had intended to open the way for a compromise with the United States to ensure its own economic stability.

After concluding the Tripartite Pact, Japan had attempted to include Russia in the Japanese-German-Italian Pact, and by using German Ambassador Stahmer in negotiations between Tokyo and Moscow, to effect a solution to any problems in the north. Mr. Ott had also promised to work for an understanding between Japan and Soviet Russia.

Japan also had intended to guarantee goods from the South Seas to Germany and Italy in return for certain mechanical and technical assistance. However, unexpected events had occurred recently and at the present time Japan could conclude the China Incident promptly only by maintaining amicable relations with the United States.[440]

Since Germany as well as Japan recognized the need for preventing the United States from entering the European war, during the Matsuoka-Stahmer conversations, it promised to spare no effort to improve relations between the United States and Japan. In fact, the Tripartite Pact had been intended to establish universal peace by preventing the spread of the European war and restraining the United States from participating in it. Now, however, the European war affected all the countries of Europe; only the Pacific remained untouched. In conformity with the original spirit of the Tripartite Pact, therefore, Japan believed it advisable to investigate the causes of any problems existing between Japan and the United States in order to ensure harmony in the Pacific area.[441]

With this objective in view, Mr. Matsuoka's Cabinet had begun negotiations with Washington, and even after a new Cabinet had come into power, Prime Minister Konoye felt the need for continuing them. At the very moment when Tokyo and Washington had been arguing over the Japanese occupation of French Indo-China, Prime Minister Konoye had suggested that a conference between President Roosevelt and himself would establish the foundation for an understanding between the two governments.

Since the time of that proposal, conversations had been held for the purpose of exchanging opinions prior to the major meeting. On October 4, 1941 Japan received the American memorandum concerning the proposal for a leaders' conference which had been forwarded from its Embassy in Washington. The document was now under study by the Japanese Foreign Minister.

Current negotiations diverged in no way from the principles contained in the Tripartite Pact. Japan merely wished to conclude its hostilities with China through a basic treaty by which the United States would coerce the Chiang regime into allowing Japan to establish an area of co-prosperity in greater East Asia. To ensure economic stability and peace in the Pacific area Japan desired to prevent the expansion of the European war, and particularly, the United States' participation in it.[442]

[440] III, 251.
[441] III, 252.
[442] III, 253.

[100]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

111. Ambassador Nomura Explains the American Attitude Toward the Japanese Proposals

On October 8, 1941 Ambassador Nomura advised Foreign Minister Toyoda of his personnel opinion regarding the American attitude toward the Japanese proposals.[443] According to the Japanese Ambassador, the American memorandum of October 2, 1941 made it apparent that the United States intended to base any further negotiations with Japan on the four original principles laid down during the first preliminary discussions. Since the United States believed it necessary, before settling the Pacific question, to achieve unanimity on the fundamental questions, previously explored by both nations in their unofficial talks, Ambassador Nomura was certain that the American government would not agree to a meeting between the leaders of the two countries until it was clearly determined that the four principles would be applied concretely to the problems of the Pacific area. Dissatisfied because Japan would not discuss these policies in detail, the United States demanded further clarification of Japanese views.[444]

Ambassador Nomura agreed with American officials that in Japan's proposals submitted on September 6, 1941 and in its subsequent explanation Japan had limited the scope of the previous informal conversations and had curtailed the guarantees concerning the aforementioned principles. Japan had not only refused to guarantee wholeheartedly that it would stop armed aggression, but it had limited the extent of commercial nondiscrimination. Using geographic propinquity as an excuse, Japan hoped to secure more favorable economic conditions for itself in China. Therefore, the question of garrisoning Japanese troops in China and French Indo-China remained a major obstacle in the negotiations. Moreover, a clearer explanation of Japan's obligations under the Tripartite Pact was requested by American officials.[445]

Since the United States firmly believed that any disagreement on the four basic principles would prevent the success of future discussions, it wished to obtain unanimity regarding their interpretation and then gradually turn to a discussion of matters relating to them. Because it had been made evident in the United States proposals of June 2, 1941 that the United States intended to retain those four principles as a basis for any negotiations, Ambassador Nomura felt that the Japanese proposals of September 25, 1941 were being disregarded. Nevertheless, the Japanese Ambassador advised that further discussions be held concerning the China Incident and the discontinuation of American activities designed to help Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

Other matters in the latest Japanese proposal which needed clarification included the stipulation concerning the Nanking Treaty in the clause relating to the China Incident, joint mediation and the right of self-protection mentioned in the clause concerning the Japanese attitude toward the European war, and the question of eliminating the annex to the clause regarding commerce between the United States and Japan.[446]

Ambassador Nomura drew to Foreign Minister Toyoda's attention the fact that, during the conversations in Tokyo, Ambassador Grew had assumed that an understanding had already been reached by Ambassador Nomura with Secretary Hull on the four basic principles. But on April 16, 1941 when Secretary Hull first presented the four principles to Ambassador Nomura, the Japanese Ambassador had not felt authorized to accept such a proposal before receiving instructions from his government.

[443] III, 254.
[444] III, Ibid.
[445] III, 255.
[446] III, 256.

[101]

Although Ambassador Nomura had been careful not to give the impression that Japan would accept the principles, he nevertheless believed that because of their abstractness they would be applied with some elasticity by the United States. Since discussions of principles in any peace conference were often circumlocutory, Ambassador Nomura did not feel that his government should become particularly troubled over this aspect of the situation.[447]

112. Mr. Terasaki Calls on Mr. Dooman (October 9, 1941)

Although on the preceding day he had received Ambassador Grew's opinion concerning the American memorandum of October 2, 1941, Mr. Terasaki called upon Counselor Dooman to receive his personal observations regarding the same document.[448] Since Ambassador Grew had reported his conversation to the American Embassy, Mr. Dooman did not feel that he was in a position to elaborate further on this matter. Nevertheless, Mr. Terasaki insisted on summarizing his discussion with Ambassador Grew, continually emphasizing the American Ambassador's belief that the American memorandum was friendly in tone and helpful in substance.

Since the withdrawal of Japanese forces from China was a major point in the United States' memorandum, Mr. Terasaki asked whether Japan was expected to execute such a move before President Roosevelt and Prince Konoye conferred. Admitting that such an interpretation might be applied, Mr. Dooman pointed out that the American government hesitated to enter any formal negotiations as long as Japanese troops continued to exercise complete control over French Indo-China as though it were a Japanese colony. When Mr. Terasaki expressed ignorance of such a situation existing in French Indo-China, Mr. Dooman referred to the arrest of French and Chinese nationals, the seizure of private property, airfields and military barracks, and threats to seize the Customs.

Mr. Terasaki then turned the conversation to the Japanese formula for the application of equality throughout the southwest Pacific. Mr. Dooman believed that Japan did not intend to confine its policy of nondiscrimination solely to the southwest Pacific, and he did not feel that this issue should constitute any obstacle to peace negotiations. On the other hand, Mr. Terasaki agreed that Japan's explanations of its proposals were open to the very implications which Japan had desired to avoid.

Returning to the problem of recalling Japanese troops from China, Mr. Terasaki attempted to define his government's position by pointing out that Tokyo could not withdraw its forces until an agreement had been reached between Japan and China. As a demonstration of Japan's desire for peace, Mr. Dooman suggested that the Japanese government furnish a time schedule for the withdrawal of the troops or consider the establishment of a military police force by the Chinese government, with the assistance of foreign military experts, as a substitute for the Japanese troops which Japan proposed to station in Inner Mongolia and North China.[449]

113. Mr. Dooman Warns Mr. Terasaki Against New Japanese Troop Landings in French Indo-China.

Later that same day, learning that Japan was prepared to land 50,000 additional troops in Tonking, French Indo-China on or about October 15, 1941, Mr. Dooman returned Mr. Terasaki's call to warn him of the serious consequences which might follow such a move.[450] Mr. Dooman then reminded Mr. Terasaki that the situation created by the first Japanese landings in July, 1941 had ended the informal conversations then in progress between the two governments.

[447] III, 257.
[448] "Memorandum by the Counselor of Embassy in Japan (Dooman)", October 9, 1941, S.D., II, 667-669.
[449] Ibid.
[450] "Memorandum by the Counselor of Embassy in Japan (Dooman)", October 9, 1941, S.D., II, 669-670.

[102]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

Stating that he was unaware of such a plan of the Japanese military force, Mr. Terasaki assured Mr. Dooman that he would immediately convey this information to Foreign Minister Toyoda.

114. Hull-Nomura Conversation (October 9, 1941)

(a) State Department's Report[451]

After first expressing Japan's appreciation of the American attitude toward the visit of three requisitioned Japanese ships to the United States, Ambassador Nomura referred to the American memorandum of October 2, 1941. Following his recent instructions from Tokyo, Ambassador Nomura requested Secretary Hull to express his reactions to those points entailing a divergence of view between the two governments.

In Ambassador Nomura's opinion there were three main questions to be decided: (1) the relation of Japan and the United States to the European war; (2) the stationing of Japanese troops in certain areas of China; and (3) the application of the principle of commercial nondiscrimination to the entire Pacific area.

At this point in the conversation Secretary Hull declared that America had been disturbed at the modifications and restrictions which the Japanese proposals imposed upon the broad program originally planned to ensure peace and stability throughout the entire Pacific. Although the principle of nondiscrimination in international trade had been intended to pertain to the entire Pacific area, Japan had greatly limited its practical application. Furthermore, because of its propinquity to China, Japan apparently intended to reserve special privileges for itself in that country.

Secretary Hull suggested that Mr. Hamilton and Mr. Ballantine meet with the Japanese Ambassador to clarify the aims of their respective governments. It was then agreed to have this meeting take place later in the afternoon.

Although Prince Konoye had informed Ambassador Grew in Tokyo that he personally subscribed in principle to Secretary Hull's four basic points for peace, Ambassador Nomura pointed out that certain problems, particularly in regard to China, remained to be solved. Since chaos would undoubtedly arise from the conflicting policies of the Kuomingtang and the Communistic parties in China, the withdrawal of Japanese troops would endanger Tokyo's commercial enterprises there and place Japan itself in a dangerous position.

Ambassador Nomura did not respond when Secretary Hull asked if the Chinese government would accept the stationing of Japanese troops in its country. Secretary Hull believed that a sufficient number of Chinese troops might be trained to maintain order in their own country. From the United States' experience in Latin America, Secretary Hull continued, the stationing of any troops in a foreign country perpetuated a feeling of ill will. To stress his point further Secretary Hull referred to the situation existing in the United States after the Civil War when northern troops were retained in the southern states.

Ambassador Nomura answered that Japan was now at a political crossroad. Expressing only his own personal opinion, the Japanese Ambassador believed that the majority of the Japanese people supported the renewal of amicable relations with the United States, in spite of agitators within the government who were attempting to disrupt peaceful negotiations. Because war between Japan and the Unit