THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

 

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

 

APPENDIX IV

 

(October 18, 1941-December 6, 1941)

 

PART A—HULL-NOMURA CONVERSATIONS

 

No. 1

 

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             October 18, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           No Number.

 

Accept my congratulations on your appointment. Although I was instructed to carry out the policy of the former cabinet and endeavored to do my best, I was not able to do anything useful and naturally I have been keenly conscious of the responsibility. Since my appointment to this post, things have developed contrary to my wishes and, for this reason, I am deeply concerned. It should be fairly clear that I, with my limited ability, shall not be able to accomplish much in the future; I am afraid I shall be leading not only a useless existence but even a harmful one. Grateful for the kind encouragement which the former minister gave me, I would like to think over carefully what I should do; I would like also to return to Japan in the near future so that I may personally report the situation here to you and incidentally receive your instructions in all matters. Will you, therefore, give your approval at once. Inasmuch as both WAKASUGI and IGUCHI are men of ability and efficiency, there should be no objections to leaving matters in their hands after I have left.

 

Trans. 10-22-41

 

No. 2

 

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             October 20, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           No Number.

 

(RETRANSLATION BASED ON COMPLETE INTERCEPT COPY)

 

Will Your Excellency please read this for your own information and then please transmit it to the Minister of the Navy.

My dear Mr. Minister:

Congratulations on your new appointment! When this humble Ambassador was appointed to his present post he asked for the fervent support of the whole Navy Department, but since I came to Washington I am sorry to say that there has been no cooperation between us. Furthermore, the Navy has not cooperated with the Foreign Office. The times do not permit of such lack of coordination. On the one hand the United States is faced by the European war and on the other hand by the Pacific problem, but still she has made no military move. I believe that there is a weak point here. Therefore, I had expected the United States to take a more less conciliatory attitude toward us as soon as the situation was favorable, but, contrary to my surmises, so far all America has done is to stick to her own national policy, and I am beginning to doubt if she can be reformed very much. I think that probably in the last analysis that is due to the fact that the United States has too many interests in China. My own desire has been to leave the China question out of the picture and work out some modus vivendi between our two countries. In my conversations with the Secretary of State I have shown this by my way of talking. However, the Secretary says that the China question is inseparably bound up with the stability of the Pacific. Some days ago I talked for an hour or more with HALIFAX. He said that the

 

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British Empire has a great interest in the Pacific problem and he would like to see some modus vivendi worked out between Japan and the United States to avoid a crisis. He said that he would like to talk with Secretary HULL about this. Since then, however, I have had no chance to talk with him. Well, before I came here I had talked with all the cabinet officials of that time and thought I thoroughly understood the position of the Government; however, since then there have been two administrative changes and now I am left floundering. I cannot tell you how much in the dark I am. I have talked along my own lines with the Secretary of State so often that, if we now explore the situation from a new angle, all my presence would do would be to confuse the situation and cause an unfavorable reaction. There is no doubt about this. That is why I wired the other day that I would like to come home. If you have anything which you want the Foreign Office to transmit to me, please be sure to let them know.

 

Trans. 10-22-41

 

No. 3

 

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             October 22, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           No Number.

 

I have already wired you something about my present psychology. I am sure that I, too, should go out with the former cabinet. I know that for some time the Secretary of State has known how sincere your humble servant is, yet how little influence I have in Japan. I am ashamed to say that it has come to my ears that this is the case. There are some Americans who trust this poor novice and who say that things will get better for me, but, alas, their encouragement is not enough. Among my confreres here in the United States there are also some who feel the same way, but, alas, they are all poor deluded souls. As for Your Excellency's instructions, WAKASUGI can carry them out fully. Nor do I imagine that you all have any objections. I don't want to be the bones of a dead horse. I don't want to continue this hypocritical existence, deceiving other people. No, don't think I am trying to flee from the field of battle, but as a man of honor this is the only way that is open for me to tread. Please send me your permission to return to Japan. Most humbly do I beseech your forgiveness if I have injured your dignity and I prostrate myself before you in the depth of my rudeness.

 

Trans. 10-23-41

 

No. 4

 

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     October 23, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   No Number.

 

From your message(s) I am advised of the various difficulties you are coping with and I wish to express to you that I appreciate the efforts you are making. As you are well aware, the outcome of those negotiations have a great bearing upon the decision as to which road the Imperial Government will pursue. As such, it is an exceedingly important matter. We are placing all of our reliance on Your Excellency's reports for our information on this matter.

For the above reasons, we express our hope that you will see fit to sacrifice all of your own personal wishes, and remain at your post.

 

Trans. 10-23-41

 

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THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

 

No. 5

 

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     October 21, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   # 698.

 

Re your # 966 [a].

 

What you say is well justified. We should, of course, send you instructions immediately, but in view of the fact that the new cabinet was only just formed, they have been unavoidably delayed.

The new cabinet differs in no way from the former one in its sincere desire to adjust Japanese-United States relations on a fair basis. Our country has said practically all she can say in the way of expressing of opinions and setting forth our stands. We feel that we have now reached a point where no further positive action can be taken by us except to urge the United States to reconsider her views.

We urge, therefore, that choosing an opportune moment, either you or Wakasugi let it be known to the United States by indirection that our country is not in a position to spend much more time discussing this matter. Please continue the talks, emphasizing our desire for a formal United States counter-proposal to our proposal of 25 (?) September.

 


[a] See III, 284. Wakasugi-Welles-Hull talk on 17 Oct. in which there is an extensive rehash of arguments and counter arguments that have been repeatedly discussed before. Wakasugi continues to emphasize the impracticability of evacuating China, while Hull emphasizes non-discrimination in trade (i.e., the Open Door up-to-date).

 

Trans. 10-23-41

 

No. 6

 

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             October 20, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 973.

 

Yesterday, the Sabbath day, _____[a] told me the following:

"Through Finland and Bulgaria, Germany is putting out peace feelers and she stands some chance of succeeding. She will probably embark on a peace offensive offering Great Britain generous terms. Now that Great Britain has taken Ethiopia, Syria and Iraq, the LLOYD GEORGE wing may listen to what HITLER has to say. As CHURCHILL's position for some time has been none too safe, ROOSEVELT is upholding the Prime Minister with might and main."

Not long ago the Secretary of State said to me, "Doubtless some 'QUISLINGS' will make their appearance in Great Britain. That's why the United States Government is supporting CHURCHILL so strongly."

Well, the trust of the English people in CHURCHILL seems to me rather real, so I do not put much belief in this story. However, the strange part of it is that _____[a] has always believed in a German defeat. Nevertheless, he came and told me this story, so it may be worth thinking about.

 


[a] DoD comment: Name withheld.

 

Trans. 10-21-41

 

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No. 7

 

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             October 24, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 989.

 

Re your # 698 [a].

Today I am going to have WAKASUGI go and continue his talks with WELLES in a friendly fashion. However, the Chief of Staff has sent the Military Attaché some secret advice. Now, what I want to know is this: Is this the future policy of the Government? I feel sure that I will get some instructions from you today. However, as we have to continue our talks, for my private information let me know something about this immediately.

 


[a] See IV, 5.

 

Trans. 10-27-41

 

No. 8

 

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             October 24, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 995.

 

(Part 1 of 4.)

 

Re your # 698 [a].

 

On the 24th from 2:30 p.m., WAKASUGI conferred with WELLES for an hour, and following the purport of your telegram, explained that our new cabinet was as anxious as the former cabinet for a just readjustment of our relations; that our desires have already been clearly stated; and that since, from what WAKASUGI himself could judge on the basis of what he saw and heard during his recent visit in Japan, circumstances there do not permit prolonging these conversations any longer, he—though not yet in receipt of detailed instructions—would like to see, without a day of further delay, some sort of conclusion reached. He then requested that the United States submit a counter-proposal to our proposal of September 25th. WELLES first expressed his pleasure of learning that the new cabinet intends to continue the discussion of this question and proceeded to say that recently men in responsible positions in Japan—for example, the Naval spokesman—had made such a war-like statement as "the Japanese Navy is 'itching for action' ", and that the ferocious attacks which the Japanese newspapers have been making on the United States had greatly provoked the American people both in and out of the government and are injurious to the continuation of discussions.

 


[a] See IV, 5.

 

Trans. 10-27-41

 

No. 9

 

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             October 24, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 995.

 

(Part 2 of 4.)

 

WAKASUGI replied that there were not a few influential politicians in the United States as, for example, Senator PEPPER, who have severely criticized Japan; that especially the speech

 

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made today by Secretary of Navy KNOX to the effect that Japanese-American war is inevitable and the clash of the two countries is only a few days ahead and other war-like statements are quite provocative to the Japanese government as well as the people; and that in this respect the two countries are very much alike. To this, WELLES came back with the argument that the Naval Secretary's speech was not such a provocative one but the newspapers had played up certain parts of it; that as a man responsible for the United States Navy, which is the most powerful influence in the country, he occasionally indulges in strong words with the intention of encouraging the Navy; and that he would like WAKASUGI to realize that these speeches are nothing other than those made for such purposes. WELLES proceeded, saying, "As to the counter-proposal which you request of the United States, as I have repeated at the time of the previous conversation, the principles as well as the proposal of the American Government are clearly given in the proposal made on June 21. To be sure, one way of approaching a solution would be to adjust the wordings of that proposal to those of the proposal made by Japan.

 

Trans. 10-27-41

 

No. 10

 

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             October 24, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 995.

 

(Part 3 of 4.)

 

"However, in the light of the experience of the informal discussions held during the past several months, to do no more than to consider each paragraph of the past formula would result in repetition of the same old arguments and, therefore, would not be conducive to progress. As I have pointed out during the previous conversation at which Secretary HULL was present, it might be well to try to reach an agreement on such general matters as the three important points which are comparatively easy of settlement; such a new formula may be a short-cut. However, if this is to be done, we had better take up at the beginning the question of equal treatment in commerce, a question which is comparatively easy of agreement by both countries (in reference to this point, WELLES asked if we had transmitted to our government what HULL had so strongly advocated during the previous conversation, and so WAKASUGI replied that he had communicated the matter in detail); and secondly, we should debate the question of Japan's duties to the Three-Power Alliance." He spoke as if there was a possibility of some adjustment also on the part of the United States with regard to this question. WELLES then suggested taking up the China question next. Thus, he made an entirely new proposal.

 

Trans. 10-27-41

 

No. 11

 

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             October 24, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           #995.

 

(Part 4 of 4.)

 

WAKASUGI replied, saying, "Since I have not yet received detailed instructions from my government, I haven't the liberty to add anything today to the proposal of September 25, but I would like to have the United States authorities draw up a definite proposal with reference to the new approach you just suggested and submit it before we will have our next conversation. We, too, shall make a study of this point."

 

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Speaking on the request that frozen funds be released for the dispatching of the two tankers referred to during our previous conversation and the two ships of the NYK line at this time, WELLES said, "We at that time made immediate arrangements, and all procedures have been completed by the Treasury Department with regard to the three NYK ships; but in the matter of tankers, since the United States banking laws require strict investigations for the purpose of protecting bank depositors, once money has been transferred to an account with the Yokohama Specie Bank, it is impossible to release it, regardless of the fact that the money is in the form of cash or of a draft for transference of money to that bank. However, the State Department will offer as much assistance as possible if you wish to have drafts made so that they could be transferred through some American bank."

 

Trans. 10-27-41

 

No. 12

 

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     October 25, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   # 709.

 

Re your # 989[a].

 

We are particularly anxious to get an idea of the extent to which the United States will agree with our final proposal. We are putting much expectation that this point will be clarified during the Wakasugi-Welles talks on the 25th.

With regard to the military general staff office's message, we obtained an explanation from it after we received your message. It seems that that message was an expression of the General Staff's hopes and the government in the meantime is going ahead with its studies to establish a basic national policy, embodying the results of the Japanese-United States negotiations.

My personal intentions are as I outlined in my message # 698[b] (those on which the army and navy concurred). Bearing these facts in mind, will you please urge the United States to voice its intentions. At the same time will you continue to make an effort to definitely ascertain the U. S. attitude with regard to our proposal. I am exceedingly anxious to receive your findings on these points.

 


[a] See IV, 7.

[b] See IV, 5.

 

Trans. 10-25-41

 

No. 13

 

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             October 27, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1004.

 

Chief of Office Routing.

 

On the 25th, I met and talked with Admiral Pratt. The Admiral is one who recognizes the fact that in the final analysis, the aims of economic warfare and actual armed conflict are one and the same. He is of the opinion that as long as Japan stays within the scope of the China Incident, there will be no shooting war between Japan and the United States. He said, however, that if Japan moved either northward or southward, he feared the consequences. He added that the final decision rested in the Emperor and the President.

 

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Knox's speech, he went on, was exceedingly unfortunate. When he (the Admiral) writes for magazines or speaks on the radio, he always takes Japan into his calculations very carefully. After all, the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, as far as the President is concerned, is of course, Stark. The opinions of the two completely coincide. Unfortunately, however, Stark cannot be said to be a "strong" individual, Admiral Pratt said. Hart, on the other hand, although he has enemies within the Department, is a strong character.

He further reported that he had heard from other sources that the President is sincerely desirous of having a peaceful and stabilized Pacific. However, because he is advised by various people to pursue various courses of action, the Admiral could not guarantee that there would be no trouble on those waters.

Admiral Pratt went on to say that Harriman, who was sent to the Soviet Union, is a very capable person in whom every confidence could be placed. This man states that Stalin is not in a position to discuss peace and that without a doubt, Hitler is winning that battle.   Concerning the project to attempt to have Italy enter into a separate peace, Pratt is of the opinion that such a peace would put Italy in the same disastrous position that France now occupies and for this reason he is inclined to doubt that Italy will consider it.

In the final analysis, the Admiral is of the opinion that the war will be a long drawn out affair, and that sooner or later, one side will become more fatigued than the other.

Thus, he expressed what probably is the most optimistic view to come from any authoritative American.

He went on to express his opinion that the Atlantic would be saved for Great Britain.

Japan should do everything to avoid impairing her might on the seas, so that she can take it with her to the eventual peace conference. It will be only with a strong navy to fall back on that Japan will have much say in those peace terms, he said.

 

Trans. 10-30-41

 

No. 14

 

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             October 29, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1008.

 

(In 3 parts complete.)

 

From Minister Wakasugi.

 

U. S.-Japanese relations are now fast approaching a critical crossroad. In view of the fact that the times are indeed grave, I am waiving formality and, though it may seem very presumptuous of me, am reporting to you my views on the general attitude of the United States after coming in contact with its representatives on several occasions.

As you no doubt are well aware through the many other reports pertaining to this matter, the basic U. S. policy is the crushing of the so-called "Hitlerism", (establishing of a new order through the force of arms). Working from this principle, the United States is gradually strengthening its wartime structure. Britain and China have been set up as the first line of national defense. In this way, the United States has succeeded in steamrollering over the isolationist opposition and is forcing the government and the public alike to follow this policy.

The government has determined to gamble on a long term program. It is on those grounds that Hull has said on several occasions that though he yearns for the preservation of peace on the Pacific, on the other hand it will have to be based on agreements covering the entire Pacific area and not upon a patchwork of hit-or-miss local agreements. During my talks with him on the 24th, Welles said that the United States was not in special relations with her colonial holdings. The United States is a firm advocate of absolute non-discrimination and equal

 

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opportunities for all in the entire Pacific area, (including Japan, United States, Britain, China, Australia, Netherlands East Indies, etc.). Every nation will be offered opportunities equal to those existing between the home government and its colonies. For this reason, Welles pointed out on that occasion, this policy should be advantageous to Japan as well.

Judging from these factors, we assume that the United States based their demands for equal opportunities of access to the natural resources of French Indo-China and Thailand, as well as a guarantee that they will remain strictly neutral, upon their principle of non-discrimination. Apparently, they presume that we intend to develop this area under the principle of our military's co-prosperity sphere, in a monopolistic manner, and through the force of arms.

Thus, there has arisen a clash of ideologies.

The United States wants to tackle the China problem as merely one phase of the aforementioned "peace on the Pacific" issue. On the other hand, it should be recalled that Hull once said to the late Ambassador Saito that it was exceedingly doubtful that there should be war between Japan and the United States over merely the China problem. There are indications that the United States is still not anxious to fight Japan over only the China problem. However, it must be borne in mind that China is now relying solely on the United States. (It is said that T. V. Soong and others in the United States are working on the Treasury Department in particular and the United States is doing everything in its power to prevent the bringing about of a truce between Japan and the United States.) Since China is entirely dependent on the United States, the United States cannot turn a cold shoulder to her pleas. It is impossible for the United States to cruelly impose terms on China which would be almost impossible for the United States herself to endure.   Welles used the above described excuse during our talks on the 24th. He went on to say, however, that the United States would not be unreasonable; she would not demand of Japan to carry out that which is immediately impossible. What his implications were when he said that are not clear, but possibly he may have been referring to some such tough problem as that of evacuating our forces (indications are that in spite of our repeated explanations concerning the garrisoning of troops in China, the above ambiguous statement may have been his camouflaged way of pointing out a means of carrying out a program of withdrawal of troops). I got the impression that he wanted to convey to me that the United States would not demand that it be carried out immediately.

In any event, it has become apparent that U. S.-Japanese relations have now become an integral phase of the national policy of the United States. There is every indication that the United States is anxious to adjust the relationship between the two nations as it has much bearing on her national policy. However, she is willing to come to terms only if the conditions suit her. She has set forth her stand in her proposals of 21 June and of 2 October. I am very doubtful that she will make any concessions therefrom.

Her preparations in the event of the worst have been completed. Therefore, I cannot believe that she is stalling for time. On the other hand, I am of the opinion that she is not so anxious to enter into the agreement that she will sacrifice any of her terms. Therefore, I do not believe that we should expect any further counter proposals from them. They have decided on a course of economic pressure plus watchful waiting.

Therefore, if we choose to good naturedly continue these talks, I am of the opinion that all is not hopeless. I feel that such a move will almost automatically open up ways of breaking down differences if we make the best use of world developments. However, if we depend on immediate settlement by settling local differences by insisting upon our freedom of action, we must have our minds made up that not only will these negotiations be terminated, but that our national relations will be severed.

The United States has expressed its interest in continuing with the talks after she has been advised of the attitude and policy of the newly formed Cabinet of Japan. I urge, therefore, that

 

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the new Cabinet establish its basic policy as speedily as possible, so that we may lay our cards on the table for them to see. I sincerely believe that that would be to our best interests.

 

Trans. 11-1-41

 

No. 15

 

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             October 29, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1010.

 

(In 2 parts complete.)

 

Chief of Office routing.

 

I report the following points to you merely as reference material in connection with the adjusting of national relations.

1. Admiral a told Member of Parliament Kasai that the more influential Congressmen from the Middle West (where there are many Americans of German descent) state that the majority of the Middle Westerners are opposed to a war against Germany, but that at the same time, a great number of them favor a U. S.-Japanese war. This is due, in part, he said, to Germany's superior propaganda work. I have heard ______ [a] who is familiar with that area, express similar opinions.

2. Secretary Hull has told Congress that the U. S. Government looks upon the Tripartite Pact as an instrument to be used to intimidate the United States. Its aim is to make impossible the aiding of Great Britain by the United States and thus gradually to force the United States to give up the control of the seas and bring back the first line of U. S. defense to the U. S. shore line. The United States desires peace; however, it is a well established fact that there is a better chance to have peace if strength can be shown. If I (Hull) were to make too many concessions to the Axis powers, there is danger that they would be interpreted as weaknesses on my part and no doubt their demands would be increased. (This is particularly true in Tokyo.) There are indications, Hull continued, that the degree of enthusiasm in Tokyo to proceed on selfish courses, is determined to a considerable extent on how the German-Soviet war is going.

It is said that he went on to say that the situation was "very delicate and very changeable". (Reported in the New York Times, 28th.)

To me, Secretary Hull once said that the people of both Japan and the United States were proud peoples. For this reason, neither would easily succumb to bluffs of the other.

3. It is said that Assistant Secretary of State Breckenridge Long told a certain Japanese who called on him and set forth the many advantages of speedily entering into an understanding with Japan along the lines published in a newspaper as a Tokyo dispatch, that it would be impossible for the United States to get everything in order before 15 November.

4. On two different occasions recently, I met and talked with Lord Halifax. I tried to sound him out as to the British attitude with regard to a Japanese-U. S. understanding. I gather from these that, in accordance with the Churchill speech, Britain would string along with the United States. Lord Halifax said that Britain did not want trouble on the Pacific; that is true of the United States, too, he said, adding that he hoped that Japan would give the matter her thorough study from all angles and exercise the utmost of patience before doing anything.

He refused to enlarge upon the U. S. and British embargo policy in effect at present.

 


[a] Name withheld.

 

Trans. 11-5-41

 

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No. 16

 

FROM:                                                                                                 Tokyo  November 2, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   # 723.

 

(Part 1 of 2.)

 

Day before yesterday when I met the diplomatic corps, during the conversation I had with the American Ambassador, I said, "I am very sorry that Japanese‑American relations have lately been growing worse and worse. If this continues, I fear that unfortunate results will ensue. For six months negotiations have been dragging along and our people are growing impatient. Therefore, I hope that a speedy settlement will be reached. In this connection, I would like to ask your friendly cooperation." I added, "It is necessary for the United States, in order to ar­rive at a frank understanding, to relinquish its theoretical procedure and view the Oriental situation realistically. For example, when we come to the question of evacuation, there are other countries besides Japan who actually have occupation forces in China. Furthermore, although Outer Mongolia is considered a part of Chinese territory, the Soviet has a consider­able force stationed there. The United States must realize these facts and understand our position." The Ambassador nodded to this and promised cooperation. He said that he would like for the parleys between the United States and Japan to proceed amicably.

 

Trans. 11‑8‑41

 

No. 17

 

FROM:                                                                                                 Tokyo  November 2, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   # 723.

 

(Part 2 of 2.)

 

On the 26th the British Ambassador came to see me on other business, and I said to him, "The attitude of the United States is entirely too theoretical, and if this continues there will be scant chance of a settlement. At the present time I am very much concerned over this. If the negotiations turn out to be a failure, I cannot tell but what a lamentable situation will occur. Now you English, who have such important interests in the Far East, would not like this. I think that England ought to endeavor to improve Japanese‑English‑American relations in order to reestablish and maintain the peace of the world." The Ambassador replied that he would transmit what I said immediately to London. I saw him again (yesterday?) and en­deavored to impart to him the impression that the situation is waxing more and more acute and will not permit of procrastination.

Sent also to London.

 

Trans. 11‑3‑41

 

No. 18

 

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     November 1, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   # 721.

 

Please advise this office what actual relationship exists at present between the original con­tents of the U. S. proposal of 21 June and the following points:

The matter pertaining to the exchanging of the official texts which was put into the 21 June proposal as a footnote to Section 2 thereof, (that part concerning the attitude of the respective

 

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THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR  

 

nations to the European war); and the three questions which were submitted concerning the United States' proposal of non‑discrimination in trade, a subject which was put in as a sup­plement to Section 3, (concerning peace between China and Japan), of the 21 June proposal.

According to your message # 424 [a], you told Secretary Hull on 22 June that you could not de­liver the official note to the home government. Moreover, there seem to be indications that the U. S. Government is beginning to understand our viewpoint with regard to the matter of the right of self‑defense.

In view of these facts, may we assume that the matter of exchanging of official notes has been dropped by the United States? We must have this information to discuss this whole mat­ter in a business‑like manner, so please advise us immediately, although it may seem like bringing up old issues.

 


[a] See II, 79. Amb. Nomura wires Tokyo that in an interview with Secy. Hull, Hull made the statement that there seem to be influential people in Japan who do not desire an understanding with the U. S. so, after all, does Japan consider the composure of relations between the two countries so important. Nomura replies that such concessions as the U. S. has so far offered are not worthy of consideration.

 

Trans. 11‑7‑41

 

No. 19

 

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             November 3, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1025.

 

Re your # 721 [a].

 

1. As you mentioned in your message, it is true that I refused to relay the text of the ex­changed notes. They have stuck firmly to their original stand and consequently the two pro­posals have remained at odds with each other.

2. The questions regarding the three items were made with reference to the 21 June proposal. They are still, as before, awaiting our definite reply.

 


[a] See IV, 18.

 

Trans.  11‑7‑41

 

No. 20

 

FROM: Tokyo (Togo)                                                                          November 2, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   # 722.

 

The government has for a number of days since the forming of the new Cabinet been holding meetings with the Imperial Headquarters. We have carefully considered a fundamental policy for improving relations between Japan and America, but we expect to reach a final decision in a meeting on the morning of the 5th and will let you know the result at once. This will be our Government's last effort to improve diplomatic relations. The situation is very grave. When we resume negotiations, the situation makes it urgent that we reach a decision at once. This is at present only for your information. When we take up these negotiations once more, we trust you can handle everything with the greatest of care.

 

Trans.  11‑3‑41

 

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No. 21

 

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             November 3, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1021.

 

I plan to see Hull in two or three days. If possible I would like to be advised of the Cabinet's definite policy before then. If this is impossible while you please advise me of the points I should bear in mind while talking to the Secretary.

 

Trans. 11‑5‑41

 

No. 22

 

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     November 4, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   # 725.

(Urgent.)

(Part 1 of 3.)

 

Concerning my # 722 [a].

 

1. Well, relations between Japan and the United States have reached the edge, and our people are losing confidence in the possibility of ever adjusting them. In order to lucubrate on a fundamental national policy, the Cabinet has been meeting with the Imperial Headquar­ters for some days in succession. Conference has followed conference, and now we are at length able to bring forth a counter proposal for the resumption of Japanese‑American negotiations based upon the unanimous opinion of the government and the military High Command (ensu­ing Nos. 726 [b] and 727 [b]). This and other basic policies of our Empire await the sanction of the conference to be held on the morning of the 5th.

2. Conditions both within and without our Empire are so tense that no longer is procrasti­nation possible, yet in our sincerity to maintain pacific relationships between the Empire of Japan and the United States of America, we have decided, as a result of these deliberations, to gamble once more on the continuance of the parleys, but this is our last effort. Both in name and spirit this counter‑proposal of ours is, indeed, the last. I want you to know that. If through it we do not reach a quick accord, I am sorry to say the talks will certainly be ruptured. Then, indeed, will relations between our two nations be on the brink of chaos. I mean that the success or failure of the pending discussions will have an immense effect on the destiny of the Empire of Japan. In fact, we gambled the fate of our land on the throw of this die.

 


[a] See IV, 20.

[b] See IV, 25 and IV, 29.

 

Trans.  11‑4‑41

 

No. 23

 

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     November 4, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   # 725.

(Urgent.)

(Part 2 of 3.)

 

When the Japanese‑American meetings began who would have ever dreamt that they would drag out so long? Hoping that we could fast come to some understanding, we have already gone

 

A-12

 

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR  

 

far out of our way and yielded and yielded. The United States does not appreciate this, but through thick and thin sticks to the self‑same propositions she made to start with. Those of our people and of our officials who suspect the sincerity of the Americans are far from few. Bearing all kinds of humiliating things, our government has repeatedly stated its sincerity and gone far, yes, too far, in giving in to them. There is just one reason why we do this—to maintain peace in the Pacific. There seem to be some Americans who think we would make a one‑sided deal, but our temperance, I can tell you, has not come from weakness, and naturally there is an end to our long‑suffering. Nay, when it comes to a question of our existence and our honor, when the time comes we will defend them without reckoning the cost. If the United States takes an attitude that overlooks or shuns this position of ours, there is not a whit of use in ever broaching the talks. This time we are showing the limit of our friendship; this time we are making our last possible bargain, and I hope that we can thus settle all our troubles with the United States peaceably.

 

Trans.  11‑4‑41

 

No. 24

 

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     November 4, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   # 725.

 

(Urgent.)

 

(Part 3 of 3.)

 

3. It is to be hoped earnestly that looking forward to what may come at the end—at the last day of Japanese‑American negotiations—the government of the United States will think ever so soberly how much better it would be to make peace with us; how much better this would be for the whole world situation.

4. Your Honor will see from the considerations about how important is your mission. You are at a key post, and we place great hopes in your being able to do something good for our nation's destiny. Will you please think deeply on that and compose yourself and make up your mind to continue to do your best. I hope you will. Now just as soon as the conference is over, I will let you know immediately, and I want you to go and talk to President ROOSEVELT and Secretary HULL. I want you to tell them how determined we are and try to get them to foster a speedy understanding.

5. In view of the gravity of these talks, as you make contacts there, so I will make them here. I will talk to the American Ambassador here in Tokyo, as soon as you have got the consensus of the American officials through talking with them, please wire me. Naturally, as these things develop, in case you take any new steps, I want you to let me know and get in contact with me. In this way we will avoid letting anything go astray. Furthermore, lest anything go awry, I want you to follow my instructions to the letter. In my instructions, I want you to know there will be no room for personal interpretation.

 

Trans.  11‑4‑41

 

A-13

 

No. 25

 

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     November 4, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   # 726.

 

(Urgent.)

 

(Part 1 of 4.)

 

Proposal "A".

 

1. This proposal is our revised final proposal made as a result of our attempts to meet, in so far as possible, the wishes of the Americans, clarified as a result of negotiations based on our proposals of September 25. We have toned down our insistences as follows:

(1) The question of non‑discrimination in trade.

Should they appear not to accede to our proposal of September 25 in this respect, insert the following statement, "The Japanese Government is prepared to carry out this principle in the entire Pacific area; that is to say, China as well, providing the principles of non‑discrimination are applied to the entire world."

(2) The question of our understanding and application of the Tripartite Alliance.

At the same time that you clarify to them that we intend no explanation of our sphere of self defense, make clear, as has been repeatedly explained in the past, that we desire to avoid the expansion of Europe's war into the Pacific.

 

Trans.  11‑4‑41

 

No. 26

 

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     November 4, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   # 726.

 

(Urgent.)

 

(Part 2 of 4.)

 

(3) The question concerning the evacuation of troops.

We are toning down our stipulations in this connection as follows:

(A) The stationing and evacuation of troops in China since the outbreak of the China Inci­dent.

Japanese troops which have been sent to China will be stationed in North China, on the Mongolian border regions, and on the Island of Hainan after the establishment of peace between Japan and China, and will not be evacuated until the elapse of a suitable interval. The evac­uation of other troops will be carried out by Japan and China at the same time that peace is established. In order to maintain peace and order, this will be carried out within a period of two years. (Note: Should the American authorities question you in regard to "the suitable period", answer vaguely that such a period should encompass 25 years.)

(B) The stationing and evacuation of troops in French Indo‑China.

The Japanese Government respects the territorial integrity of the French possession, Indo-China. In the event that a just peace is established, or that the China Incident is brought to a successful conclusion, Japanese troops which have been dispatched to French Indo‑China and are there now shall be evacuated.

(4) As a matter of principle, we are anxious to avoid having this inserted in the draft of the formal proposal reached between Japan and the United States (whether it is called an under­standing proposal or some sort of a statement.)

 

Trans. 11‑4‑41

 

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THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR  

 

No. 27

 

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     November 4, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   # 726.

 

(Urgent.)

 

(Part 3 of 4.)

 

2. Explanation.

 

(1) Of course, there is the question of geographical proximity when we come to consider non­discrimination in commerce. However, we have revised our demands along this line hitherto and put the question of non‑discrimination on a world‑wide basis. In a memorandum of the American Government, they state in effect, however, that it might be feasible for either coun­try within a certain specified area to adopt a given policy and for the other party within an­other specified area to adopt a given policy and for the other party within another specified area to adopt a complementary policy. Judging from this statement, I do not believe they will oppose this term. I think that we can easily reach an understanding on this matter.

(2) As for the question of the Three‑Power Pact, your various messages lead me to believe that the United States is, in general, satisfied with our proposals, so if we make our position even more clear by saying that we will not randomly enlarge upon our interpretation of the right of self‑defense, I feel sure that we will soon be mutually agreed on this point.

 

Trans.  11‑4‑41

 

No. 28

 

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     November 4, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   # 726.

 

(Urgent.)

 

(Part 4 of 4.)

 

(3) I think that in all probability the question of evacuation will be the hardest. However, in view of the fact that the United States is so much opposed to our stationing soldiers in unde­fined areas, our purpose is to shift the regions of occupation and our officials, thus attempting to dispel their suspicions. We will call it evacuation; but although it would please the United States for us to make occupation the exception rather than the rule, in the last analysis this would be out of the question. Furthermore, on the matter of duration of occupation, whenever pressed to give a clear statement we have hitherto couched our answers in vague terms. I want you in as indecisive yet as pleasant language as possible to euphemize and try to impart to them the effect that unlimited occupation does not mean perpetual occupation. Summing this up, Proposal A; accepts completely America's demands on two of the three proposals men­tioned in the other proposal, but when it comes to the last point concerning the stationing and evacuation of forces, we have already made our last possible concession. How hard, indeed, we have fought in China for four years! What tremendous sacrifices we have made! They must know this, so their demands in this connection must have been only "wishful thinking." In any case, our internal situation also makes it impossible for us to make any further compro­mise in this connection. As best you may, please endeavor to have the United States under­stand this, and I earnestly hope and pray that you can quickly bring about an understanding.

 

Trans. 11‑4‑41

 

A-15

 

No. 29

 

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     November 4, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   # 727.

 

(Urgent.)

 

1. Proposal "B".

 

This proposal is based upon proposal "A". If there appears to be a remarkable difference between the Japanese and American views, since the situation does not permit of delays, it will be necessary to put forward some substitute plan. Therefore, our second formula is ad­vanced with the idea of making a last effort to prevent something happening. The substance is as follows:

(1) The Governments of Japan and the United States agree that neither will militarily invade any area in Southeast Asia and the South Seas with the exception of French Indo-China.

(2) The Governments of Japan and the United States will cooperate mutually in guaran­teeing the obtention of the materials they need in the Netherlands Indies.

(3) The Governments of Japan and the United States will mutually return to the situation prior to the freezing of their respective assets and the government of the United States will agree to furnish Japan with the petroleum she needs.

(4) The Government of the United States will engage in no activity which might put an ob­stacle in the way of Japan in her efforts to make peace with China.

Addendum:

(1) If necessary, upon the establishment of this understanding, as soon as peace is estab­lished between Japan and China, or as soon as a just peace is made in the Pacific area, Japan has no objection to promising to evacuate her troops.

(2) If necessary, we will insert an additional stipulation concerning the interpretation and carrying out of the Three‑Power Pact and the question of non‑discrimination in commerce which were referred to in proposal "A" in my # 726 [a].

 


[a] See IV, 25.

 

Trans. 11‑4‑41

 

No. 30

 

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     November 4, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   # 730.

 

Re my # 725 [a]

 

In view of the gravity of the present negotiations and in view of your request on instructions from me, Ambassador KURUSU is leaving ‑‑‑‑‑ on the 7th by clipper to assist you. He will be your right‑hand man in these parleys. He is carrying with him no additional instructions, so in order to prepare him for the talks, will you please tell him all, and I hope that you can, by all means, arrange for an interview between him and President ROOSEVELT.

By the way, will you please be sure to keep Ambassador KURUSU's activities strictly secret.

 


[a] See IV, 22.

 

Trans.  11‑4‑41

 

A-16

 

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR  

 

No. 31

 

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     November 5, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   # 734.

 

Ambassador KURUSU accompanied by Secretary YUKI left the 5th for Shanghai (?).

 

Trans. 11‑5‑41

 

No. 32

 

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     November 6, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   #739.

(Urgent.)

 

Re my # 730 [a].

 

The reason why we are sending Ambassador KURUSU to you so quickly is, in addition to what I have already wired you, to show our Empire's sincerity in the negotiations soon to fol­low. As I wired you before, he brings with him no new instructions in addition to the ones I have already sent you. I wish him, however, to communicate to you at first hand as best he may, the exact situation here in Japan, and now that we are on the last lap of these negotiations, I do hope that he can help you in unraveling this bewildering maze and through cooperation lead to a solution, and that right soon. To make it sound good, we are telling the public that he is coming to help you quickly compose the unhappy relations between the two nations. We have explained all this fully to the British and American Ambassadors here in Tokyo, and Am­bassador KURUSU himself had a heart‑to‑heart talk with the American Ambassador before he left, and both Ambassadors fully understand why he is making the trip.

The officials of both the Army and the Navy are pleased with the special dispatch of the Ambassador and are very grateful for the trouble he is taking. After you read this, please go and tell the American officials concerned and wire me back their reply.

 


[a] See IV, 30.

 

Trans.  11‑6‑41

 

No. 33

 

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     November 4, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   # 731.

(Urgent.)

 

Re my # 725 [a].

 

In these negotiations, Great Britain also is an actively interested party and has vast inter­ests in the Far East. Therefore, in order to carry out this proposal (both Proposal A and Pro­posal B), it would certainly behoove Great Britain and, for that matter, the Netherlands also, as interested parties, to put into effect the terms of the understanding in question. If we should proceed without any definite assurances on this point and reach an accord with Washington alone, it might very well be that it would never work.

 

A-17

 

Consequently, I want you please to impress upon the American officials the importance of this essential measure and have them agree to make Great Britain and the Netherlands both simultaneously sign those terms in which they are concerned. Please wire me the results.

 


[a] See IV, 22‑24.

 

Trans. 11‑4‑41

 

No. 34

 

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             November 5, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1042.

(Strictly confidential, to be handled in government code.)

 

Re your # 731[a].

 

Just what is meant by Britain's and the Dutch East Indies' relation to the above understand­ing? As I understand it they are to sign the document at the same time America does. But just what is meant by this? What items are included?

Again what is meant by joint signature? Will the four countries sign the same document or will separate documents be prepared for the British and the Dutch and the four countries sign these? Or will the several countries exchange official documents? Please wire by return dis­patch for my information.

 


[a] See IV, 33.

 

Trans. 11‑7‑41

 

No. 35

 

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             November 4, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1036.

 

(Extremely Urgent.)

 

Secret.

 

Re your # 725 [a].

 

Naturally I, too, am hurrying to make English translations of Proposals A and B, but remem­ber what you said in paragraph 5. I do not wish any variant words or other discrepancies to occur between the English text you hand Ambassador GREW and the one I make. So please send me yours at the earliest possible moment.

 


[a] See IV, 22‑24.

 

Trans. 11‑6‑41

 

A-18

 

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR  

 

No. 36

 

FROM: Washington                                                                             November 5, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1036.

(Foreign Office Secret.)

 

Re your # 725 [a].

 

We will, of course, make English translations of the texts of both Proposals A and B. How­ever, in view of the contents of paragraph (5) of your message and to avoid our using words and phrases which conflict with the English texts you submit to Ambassador Grew, please send us your English translations immediately.

 


[a] See IV, 22‑24.

 

Trans. 11‑10‑41

 

No. 37

 

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             November 5, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1044.

 

Foreign Office secret.

 

Rushed.

 

(English Text)

 

The Japanese Government recognizes the principles of non‑discrimination in international commercial relations to be applied to all the Pacific areas, inclusive of China, provided that the principle in question is to be applied uniformly to the rest of the entire world as well.

 

Trans. 11‑8‑41

 

No. 38

 

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             November 5, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1045.

 

(Chief of Office routing.)

 

With regard to term "Self‑defense" the Japanese government desires to make it clear that it has no intention of placing too liberal and interpretation on the term that will lead to an abuse of that right.

 

Trans. 11‑10‑41

 

No. 39

 

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             November 5, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1046.

 

(Chief of Office routing.)

 

A. Stationing of Japanese forces in China and the withdrawal thereof:

With regard to the Japanese forces that have been dispatched to China in connection with the China affair, those forces in certain areas in North China and Mongolia (Inner Mongolia) as

 

A-19

 

well as in Hainan-Tao (Hainan Island) will remain to be stationed for a certain necessary period of time after the restoration of peaceful relations between Japan and China. All the rest of such forces will commence withdrawal as soon as peace is restored between Japan and China, and the withdrawal will proceed according to separate arrangements between Japan and China and will be completed within two years after effective maintenance of peace and order is re-established.

Trans. 11-10-41

 

No. 40

 

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     5 November 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   # 732.

 

Re my # 725 [a].

 

If and when an agreement is reached on the basis of our latest proposal we would prefer that it not be written up in the form of a treaty. Ratification of the Senate is required for a treaty, and we fear that too much time would be consumed obtaining this. From the viewpoint of speed and certainty, we would like to avoid having to follow this course. From the gist of the U. S. proposals, we feel that the U. S. Government is also desirous of not having to await Senate ratification.

We have been lead to believe that it is the U. S. Government's intention to use this instrument as a basis for some future treaty, and that it would be classified as one type of an "Executive Agreement" as the President is authorized to do. We have been proceeding in the past on this assumption. (Please refer to page (3 ?) 1, Volume 2, of Hyde's International Law Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied by the United States.) Will you please ascertain the U. S. attitude on this point.

In any event, it is of utmost importance that an agreement be entered into along the lines given in the message referred to in the heading at the earliest possible moment. Under present conditions, speed is an absolutely essential factor.

 


[a] See IV, 22-24.

Trans. 11-5-41

 

No. 41

 

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             5 November 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1041.

 

Re your # 732 [a].

 

From various considerations, the United States also would not care to put the documents confirming these negotiations in the form of a treaty to be submitted to the Senate for the constitutional majority (two-thirds) approval. The reasons for this are, as Hamilton and others have made clear, that in the course of the negotiations thus far, the United States government has left the matter of mutual understandings between the two countries and arrangements concerning statements of policies as being legally within the jurisdiction of the President to handle, by "executive agreement". Article One of the preamble to the U. S. note of 21 June contains the expression "general agreement of understanding as expressed in a joint declar-

 

A-20

 

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR  

 

ation" etc. Also in the latter part of the same note the same intent is set forth in the words "mutual understanding and declaration of policy".

Of course the present situation is different from that involved in past agreements of this kind, and they emphasize that from the standpoint of the U. S. government and domestic politics, it would be difficult to keep the matter secret very long, as I have stated in successive messages.

 


[a] See IV, 40.

 

Trans. 11-12-41


No. 42

 

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     5 November 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   # 735.

 

1. Our counter proposal in the Japanese-U. S. negotiations referred to in my message #725 [a] was taken up at the Imperial Conference on this, the 5th, and was given approval. Therefore, will you please begin the talks along the lines given in my instructions.

2. We assume that it would meet with the U. S. approval, in view of past developments, if, for the time being, the 21 June proposal—25 September's from our point of view—was used as a basis of these new talks. Subsequently, we feel that from the standpoint of the likelihood of reaching an early agreement, our Proposal A (contained in my message #726 [b]) should be submitted for discussion. (As a matter of fact, there are a number of points in the form and in the expressions used in the U. S. proposal which do not meet with our complete approval. However, we feel that for convenience and speed's sake, Proposal A should be submitted first.) Please, therefore, explain these points to the United States and at the same time have them clearly understand the circumstances contained in my message #725 [a]. Thereupon, do your utmost to have them accept that proposal in the shortest possible time.

3. If the United States expresses too many points of disapproval to Proposal A and if it becomes apparent that an agreement cannot be reached, we intend to submit our absolutely final proposal, Proposal B (contained in my message #727 [c]). Please, therefore, ascertain the U. S. attitude to Proposal A as soon as possible, and advise this office. Be sure to advise this office before Proposal B is submitted to the United States.

4. As stated in my previous message, this is the Imperial Government's final step. Time is becoming exceedingly short and the situation very critical. Absolutely no delays can be permitted. Please bear this in mind and do your best. I wish to stress this point over and over.

5. We wish to avoid giving them the impression that there is a time limit or that this proposal is to be taken as an ultimatum. In a friendly manner, show them that we are very anxious to have them accept our proposal.

Although a "1" was placed at the beginning of the body of my message #727 [c], there was no need for it, so please delete it.

 


[a] See IV, 22-24.

[b] See IV, 25.

[c] See IV, 29.

Trans. 11-5-41

 

A-21

 

No. 43

 

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     6 November 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   #740.

 

Re your # 1025 [a].

 

Through Your Honor's continuous efforts, gradually both the Japanese and American insistences centering around the question of self-defense in connection with the Tripartite Treaty have become clear. Now we might say that there exists almost no division between our respective views. At any rate, we have been taking it for granted that this is the case for some time. Our proposal of September 25, which is a counter-proposal to the American Proposal of June 21, makes no reference to any exchange of notes, which means that we are refusing to consider such an exchange. We are taking it for granted that the United States, too, is eliminating this as a matter of course from the negotiations, and we are continuing the negotiations on the assumption that there will be no such exchange of notes. If, by any misadventure, the United States should say that they will not leave out the proposal for exchange of notes, it will be utterly and absolutely impossible for us to agree, so when you negotiate, please be fully aware of this.

 


[a] See IV, 19.

Trans. 11-6-41

 

No. 44

 

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     5 November 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   # 736.

 

(Of utmost secrecy.)

Because of various circumstances, it is absolutely necessary that all arrangements for the signing of-this agreement be completed by the 25th of this month. I realize that this is a difficult order, but under the circumstances it is an unavoidable one. Please understand this thoroughly and tackle the problem of saving the Japanese-U. S. relations from falling into a chaotic condition. Do so with great determination and with unstinted effort, I beg of you.

This information is to be kept strictly to yourself only.

 

Trans. 11-5-41

 

No. 45

 

FROM: Washington                                                                             5 November 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1037.

 

I have received all of your messages of instructions, and after giving the matter my very careful consideration, I have decided to continue to put forth my best efforts, however feeble they may be. I, therefore, made arrangements immediately on this, the 5th, to meet with President Roosevelt through Hull. (I shall advise you the date and time of this interview as soon as it is made definite.) I am of the opinion that it would be to our advantage to keep this meeting as secret as possible. I would appreciate being advised of the Foreign Office's view on

 

A-22

 

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR  

 

this point as soon as possible. If you believe that it would be better if this were made an official interview, please advise me as to the manner in which it should be announced to the public.

 

Trans. 11-10-41

 

No. 46

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     6 November 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   # 741.

 

Re your # 1037 [a].

 

The matter of Your Honor's interviewing the President is delicate in the extreme, and if the newspapers speculate on the import of it, the effect would doubtless be most regrettable. Therefore, if possible, I think we should avoid letting the press get wind of the substance of the interview or even the fact of the interview. If the American officials will agree with this, naturally we, too, will observe the same secrecy.

Carrying this idea still further, in all your subsequent contacts with American officials I would like for you to do your utmost to maintain the same secrecy and avoidance of publicity.

 


[a] See IV, 45.

 

Trans. 11-6-41

 

No. 47

 

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             5 November 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1040.

 

Re your # 735, paragraph 5 [a].

 

On the 5th, reports from Tokyo were played up by the newspapers here to the effect that Domei, the mouthpiece of the Japanese Government and the Times-Advertiser, the mouthpiece of the Foreign Office, were declaring that the 15th had been set as the "deadline" for the negotiations and were giving a list of the Japanese demands, (seven was given as the number).

While I recognize that the above may be considered as well intentioned efforts on our part to lead to a favorable reception of the negotiations still the above reports are directly opposed to the interest of your caption telegram. As you are well aware in view of the present delicate situation such reports will have the effect of alienating American public opinions or causing it to become actively opposed to Japan.

There is danger that America will see through our condition. If we have really made up our minds to a final course of action it would be the part of wisdom to keep still about it. I realize that the internal situation is causing you no end of worry, however I feel that in view of the present grave situation still further guidance should be given to the newspapers.

 


[a] See IV, 42.

 

Trans. 11-7-41

 

A-23

 

No. 48

 

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             6 November 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1051.

 

In the present delicate state of Japan-American relations the local press is becoming more and more excited over the dispatch of KURUSU, etc. From now on all kinds of articles and editorials based on conjecture will continually be appearing. Although I have been very careful in my contacts with the local and foreign press, on account of the rivalry between the different newspapers, spontaneous conjectures and reports are published.

Moreover these articles in English-language newspapers may be sent just as they are to Japan where I fear they would have an unforeseen influence on our already tense population. Considering the seriousness of the situation please prevent the publication of such writings for the time being in the interest of better Japan-American relations, and, keeping a strict control, follow the most prudent policy.

 

Trans. 11-10-41

 

No. 50

 

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             6 November 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1050.

 

(Urgent.)

 

(Secret.)

 

At nine tomorrow morning, (Friday, the 7th), I will go with WAKASUGI for the secret meeting with Secretary HULL, at which time I will ask for an audience with the President. Just this for the present.

 

Trans. 11-10-41

 

No. 51

 

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             7 November 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1052.

 

Re your # 743 [a].

 

We assume that that part which reads "provided....", etc. at the end of paragraph 2 of your message referred to above, refers to the "non-discrimination" matter contained in paragraph one of that message and not to the matter concerning the stationing of troops. Please advise us definitely on this point, together with the text in the form you wish to have it in.

 


[a] Not available.

Trans. 11-12-41

 

A-24

 

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR  

 

No. 52

 

FROM: Washington                                                                             7 November 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1054.

 

Re my #10--.

 

I met and talked with Secretary Hull at 0930 on the 7th, and I explained our new proposal to him in accordance with your instructions. I requested that it be given consideration by the United States and at the same time I expressed my desire to meet with the President at the earliest possible moment. Hull promised to give them his consideration.

With regard to the matter of non-discrimination in trade, Hull showed indications of being satisfied. He did not indicate either approval or disapproval of the matters pertaining to rights of self-defense and of withdrawal of our troops.

The interview lasted approximately one hour.

This message dispatched at 1330.

Trans. 11-10-41

 

No. 53

 

FROM: Washington                                                                             7 November 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1055.

 

(Part 1 of 3.)

 

At 0900 on this, the 7th, I, accompanied by Wakasugi, called on Secretary Hull at his home. (Ballantine was also present.)

I said that I had been instructed by my home government to explain to the President and to the Secretary of State, Japan's attitude and position in the hopes of bringing about immediate settlement of the various problems involved in the relationship between Japan and the United States.

In way of replying to this, Hull said that at present there were two political factions in this world which were at odds with each other and which were, consequently, embroiled in an armed conflict. Neither faction is able to decide the outcome speedily and hence there is a danger that they will be gradually thrown into the chaos of anarchism.

If, at a time like this, the United States and Japan simultaneously hit upon a method of maintaining peace on the Pacific, it is quite possible that the world may be saved from the apparently imminent chaos.

I, therefore, said, in accordance with your various instructions, that:

1. Of the three outstanding problems, agreements have been practically reached on two. With regard to the matter of garrisoning or withdrawing troops, Japan is prepared to make the maximum concessions which can be permitted by the domestic political conditions of Japan.

2. From the viewpoint of U. S.-Japanese friendship in its broad sense, the U. S. Government should take a philosophic attitude concerning present conditions, I said, and I urged that the United States cooperate in bringing about a speedy settlement on that assumption.

Trans. 11-10-41

 

A-25

 

No. 54

 

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             7 November 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1055.

 

(Part 2 of 3.)

 

.... (I pointed out that):

 

3. I have been instructed by my home government to fully explain Japan's determination and Japan's position to the President and the Secretary of State, and through such understandings to reach settlements as soon as possible.

4. After six months of negotiations, the people of Japan are getting a little impatient and that hence the situation there is becoming exceedingly critical. For this reason, we are very anxious that these negotiations are brought to a successful conclusion as soon as possible.

5. In view of the very critical situation parallel negotiations in Tokyo are to be conducted.

Explaining that Japan is now displaying the maximum amount of good will and the utmost of sincerity, I submitted the counter proposal which you sent us, to them. I requested that the United States give it her consideration from the broad aspect, and urged them to accept the terms contained therein.

Hull carefully read this document. He nodded approval of the section concerning the principle of non-discrimination, and commented that that way would prove to be to Japan's interest. With regard to the section of garrisoning troops, he simply asked what would be the proportion of those remaining to those being withdrawn. I replied that such of the greater part would be withdrawn and only a small portion would be kept in China. I went on to explain our position with regard to the "right of self-defense" issue, in accordance with your instruction which I received today.

It was decided that an answer to all of the points would be submitted after this note had been carefully studied by them. They will submit their reply after my interview with the President, at which time I shall endeavor to make a more detailed explanation.

Trans. 11-12-41

 

No. 55

 

FROM: Washington                                                                             7 November 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1055.

 

(Part 3 of 3.)

 

Hull went on to say that as he had said on previous occasions, Britain, China, the Netherlands and other countries had to be consulted regarding Japanese-U. S. talks of maintaining peace on the Pacific. He let it leak out in this connection that China was being consulted with regard to matter pertaining to the China problems.

Hull then said that he had happened to wonder what Japan's attitude would be if there were the following developments: Supposing an influential and reliable representative of China were to join in these talks. Supposing, further, that this representative states that China is desirous of resuming friendly relations with Japan, giving his pledge of true friendship and sincerity. What would Japan's reaction be?

Wakasugi asked whether he could assume first, that China's attitude had been ascertained. Hull replied that the matter hadn't been taken up with China as yet, and that it was just something that he as an individual had happened to think of. If such a thing could be done, however, he continued, peace on the Pacific would be maintained, and no doubt it would set an example for the world and thus have a very favorable effect on it.

 

A-26

 

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR  

 

We got the impression that he may have already discussed this matter with the Chinese and that his plan was a consequence thereof. In either event, Hull requested that this plan be struck upon, be relayed to the government of Japan and its attitude on it be ascertained. I said that I would give it my consideration.

Trans. 11-10-41

 

No. 56

 

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             7 November 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1056.

 

Please make the following corrections to part 3 of 3 of my message # 1055 [a].

 

In the first part, please insert "for the purpose of conducting official negotiations" following that part which reads "negotiations between the United States and Japan".

In the middle part, change the phrase reading "an influential representative" of China, to "the person of highest influence and integrity" and delete reading "participate in these negotiations".

 


[a] See IV, 53.

Trans. 11-12-41

 

No. 57

 

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             8 November 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1061.

 

On the 7th, when I called on Secretary HULL, he handed me the memorandum given in my # 1062 [a] concerning the incident in which American missionaries were imprisoned in Harbin. Calling my attention to the fact that the American authorities had allowed three Japanese Naval officers to return home, the Secretary complained that it was hard for him to understand why American missionaries have been accorded such stern and unreasonable treatment. Therefore, I replied that although this matter is one in which Manchurian officials were involved and is unrelated to Japan, I would transmit the complaint to Tokyo since the question had been brought to my attention. Will you get in touch with the Manchurian authorities and take suitable steps and then wire me the results?

 


[a] Not available.

 

Trans. 11-12-41

 

No. 58

 

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     8 November 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   # 747.

 

Re your # 1054 [a].

You say you explained our rights of self-defense. I believe I elaborate on this matter in my # 742 [b]. If this message was delayed and did not reach you in time, please be sure to take measures to fit the instructions in my # 742 [b] into your explanations.

 


[a] See IV, 52, in which NOMURA says that he explained the new proposal to Secretary HULL.

[b] Not available.

Trans. 11-12-41

 

A-27

 

No. 59

 

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             8 November 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1060.

 

As the work for the adjustment of Japanese-American relations continues, we may expect frequent exchange in the future of urgent telegraphic messages. I would like to report to you the following for your consideration in arranging business in this connection. We may expect, with the crisis so near at hand, that we shall be facing questions which must be dealt with with no loss of time, and so I would appreciate the Foreign Office fully cooperating with us at this time.

My # 1036 [a], in which I sought your instructions, was sent at 9:56 P.M. on the 5th. I believe it reached you on the afternoon of the 6th, Tokyo time. Your reply to it; namely your # 743 [b], was sent at 7:34 P.M. on the 7th, Tokyo time, and was received here at 8:20 A.M., Washington time. However, since my appointment with Secretary HULL was, as I have previously reported, to have been at 9:00 A.M., there was but forty minutes allowed us for decoding and revising the code with all hands working together, and, consequently, we could get the message read only by considerably postponing the hour of the appointment. I would like to have messages of this nature sent hereafter by you taking into consideration the difference in time as well as the actual limit of efficiency on the part of telegraphic officials here and give us a little more time. When we are expecting instructions of this nature, all officials concerned stay up all night waiting for them. Will you please arrange matters with this in mind.

We have an understanding with the telegraph company to let us know as soon as possible by telephone, even at night, whenever a telegram marked "very urgent" is received. However, since the words "very urgent" had been changed to "kinqu" the telegraph company had found it impossible to distinguish one telegram from another. Therefore, for the sake of convenience, I would like to have telegrams of this nature captioned, as heretofore, with the words, "very urgent."

 


[a] See IV, 35.

[b] Not available.

 

Trans. 11-12-41

 

No. 60

 

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     November 11, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   #759.

 

Re your # 1060a.

 

From the telegraph section to telegraph clerk Horiuchi:

We can see the point of view contained in your message. Please dispose of that matter in accordance with the contents of my Circular # 2(2 ?)81 [b].

All messages which have the words KINQU (you will probably not have much occasion to use this), or DAIQU in the heading, are to be given the same handling as those which were marked "Very urgent" in the past. Please notify the telegraph companies of this fact.

My message # 743 [b] was dispatched from the Foreign Office at 1530 on the 7th. Because of unfavorable atmospheric conditions, however, it could not be dispatched from Tokyo until 1734 of the 7th. (1934 was an error.)

 


[a] See IV, 59.

[b] Not available.

 

Trans. 11-12-41

 

A-28

 

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR  

 

No. 61

 

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     November 9, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   # 752.

 

Re your # 1040 [a] and # 1053 [b].

 

1. This office is in complete agreement with the contents of your messages referred to above. The government is doing everything in its power to give enlightenment to correctly guide public opinion. The censor bureau has evolved a plan whereby there will be no comments on the U. S.-Japanese negotiations. It goes without saying, of course, that the contents of the negotiations will not be published, but furthermore, all utterances which may tend to excite the United States will be censored. (It has been unofficially decided to even suppress information as to the dates on which the representatives of the two nations confer.) We shall prevent the publication of anything that may interfere with the progress. We have issued a particularly vigorous warning to the Times of dire consequences if there are any infractions.

2. We see reports from correspondents in the U. S. area, (for example from the Domei office in your city), which are not in accord with our established policy of maintenance of calm and patience regarding the Japanese-U. S. talks. The situation here is a critical one, so please give correct guidance to all of the correspondents there.

 


[a] See IV, 47.

[b] Not available.

 

Trans. 11-10-41

 

No. 62

 

FROM: Tokyo (Togo)                                                                          November 10, 1941

TO: San Francisco                                                                               #168.

 

To Ambassador KURUSU.

 

The AP issued a dispatch from Manila, said to be from authoritative sources, that Your Excellency had told an old friend there, "I am going to Washington but I have no great hopes for a successful conclusion to the negotiations." This was printed in large headlines of the first page of the "New York Times." Editorial comment gave out that there would be no new compromise by the Japanese which would satisfy the United States.

We have not permitted the publication of this dispatch in papers here in Japan. This is for your information.

 

Trans. 11-18-41

 

No. 63

 

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             November 8, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1065.

 

(Secret.)

 

On the 7th, President ROOSEVELT called for secret consultation the Secretary of Navy KNOX; Admiral STARK, Chief of the Naval Operations, and other leaders of the Navy. I sup-

 

A-29

 

pose they met to discuss our proposal as well as the question of withdrawing the Marines from China.

 

Trans. 11-12-41

 

No. 64

 

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     November 9, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   # 751.

 

Re the last part of your message # 1055 [a].

 

We interpret Secretary Hull's plan to have a Chinese person of the highest integrity give his pledge regarding the China problem, to mean that the Secretary wishes to leave the China problem which has been a stumbling block in the Japanese-U. S. negotiations, up to direct negotiations between Japan and China for settlement. This would lead to having Chiang Kai-shek propose to us that peace negotiations be begun.

We recognize this to be a great contribution toward bringing about friendly relations between Japan and China and for this reason we highly welcome it. We will, of course, follow this message up with another giving this government's opinions. In the meantime please ascertain and advise us what relation this proposal has upon the Japanese-U. S. negotiations. Please make suitable inquiries on this phase to obtain as much information as possible, on whatever concrete plans the United States may have.

 


[a] See IV, 54.

Trans. 11-10-41

 

No. 65

 

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     November 10, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   # 755.

 

(Urgent.)

 

(Part 1 of 2.)

 

Re my # 754 [a].

 

In adjusting Japanese-American relations, the Government of Japan has attached a great deal of importance to the speedy solution of the China Incident. At the same time the United States Government also has maintained the attitude that if peace is to be established in the Pacific, the China question cannot be overlooked. Now, if it is the intention of the United States Government to mediate between Japan and China along the lines proposed by Secretary HULL and also to leave the matter of peace terms to the Japanese and Chinese Governments, this plan harmonizes with what the Japanese Government has been looking forward to since the beginning of -------. It would mean that the question of withdrawing troops from China would, according to HULL's suggestion, be left out for the time being from the negotiations. This would make it possible for us to hasten the settlement by means of negotiations  conducted between Japan and China alone and it would also have the advantage of bringing about peace between Japan and China without American interference.

Should we take advantage of this proposal, it goes without saying that it would be necessary to secure a promise or a definite statement that the settlement of the negotiations between

 

A-30

 

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR  

 

Japan and the United States would not make the establishment of peace between Japan and China its condition and that the United States would not interfere with the peace to be established between Japan and China. (This promise includes cessation of activities for aiding CHIANG.) Furthermore, it is necessary to make it clear that the agreement between Japan and the United States would be immediately signed and put into effect.

 


[a] Not available.

Trans. 11-10-41

 

No. 66

 

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     November 10, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   # 755.

(Part 2 of 2.)

 

As regards the China question, this would mean that the paragraph concerning the China Incident in Proposal "A" of my # 726 [a] (paragraph 3 of the Agreement) should be eliminated from the agenda of the negotiations and paragraph 4 of Proposal "B" given in my # 727 [b] (namely that the United States will refrain from any action detrimental to the efforts made for the purpose of establishing peace between Japan and China) be substituted in its place.

Furthermore, I believe that the United States wishes to see a speedy settlement of an agreement between Japan and the United States and so, for this reason, HULL's proposal is a sincere one and from this standpoint the United States Government proposes to mediate between Japan and China. If the United States is of the intention of postponing the settlement of questions other than the China question until peace is established between Japan and China or of continuing aid to CHIANG, we shall not be able to accept the proposal for it would prevent the establishment of an agreement between Japan and the United States and furthermore, would be apt to put the blame for the failure of the Japanese-American negotiations upon us. I need hardly point out to you but I would like to have you take care so that this would not happen.

 


[a] IV, 25-28.

[b] See IV, 29.

Trans. 11-10-41

 

No. 67

 

FROM: Tokyo (NERNS) Vice Chief General Staff                              November 9, 1941

TO: Circular (Beyoglu) (RIKUGUN)                                                   # 910.

 

Two parts complete.

 

(Part 1.)

 

Ultra Secret.

 

To the Attachés resident abroad.

 

From the Vice Chief of Staff.

 

A-31

 

We would like to have you report any material reflecting the international situation especially anything connected with the following items:

1. The extent of the determination of America and Britain to make war on Japan and Germany.

2. America's reciprocal relations with Japan and Germany.

3. The condition of the military, political and economic union between America, Britain, CHIANG KAI-SHEK, Holland and Russia.

4. The present situation regarding the dispatch of additional military strength by America and Britain, especially of planes, marines and (?infantry?) to the Southern Area and to the Aleutians.

 

(Part 2.)

5. The present situation regarding the non-expansion of bases in the islands scattered in the Pacific. [a]

6. Movements of American and British troops in China.

7. Movements of ships of American and British registry in the Southwestern Pacific and the Sea of Japan.

8. The influence of the Empire's attitude upon America, Britain and the other countries. Also the influence of Japan and America's negotiations.

Please pay attention to the first item in this list before its timeliness is lost.

 


[a] The test appears to refer to the bases which Japan was not to establish in the Mandated Islands. They probably want to know what the world knows about their activities in those islands. Note the date the message was translated.

 

Trans. 2-3-45

 

No. 68

 

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     November 10, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   # 757.

 

(Part 1 of 3.) (To be handled in government code.)

 

On the 10th I went to talk to the American Ambassador, and DOOMAN sat with us. I opened the conversation with a resume of my #725 [a] and reiterated my earnest hope that a decision could be reached in the negotiations on a basis just to our Empire. I explained that I would bend every effort toward the solution of this difficult situation. Then I continued, "Having examined the results of the negotiations thus far, what I feel is that the United States does not have full knowledge of the true situation. I feel that the United States does not have enough understanding and knowledge. Secretary HULL says that he recognizes Japan's stabilizing influence, yet unless he realizes sufficiently present conditions in East Asia and that we Japanese have been occupied over a period of four and a half years with the China incident, even though he calls us a stabilizing influence, he contradicts himself. Our population is ever increasing. Already we have about 100,000,000 people. In order to maintain their existence, we absolutely must obtain the necessary materials. On the other hand, six months have passed since Japanese-American negotiations began, and during that time, although we have given in as much as we could, the United States sticks to her first proposals and will not bend an inch. This is a most regrettable circumstance. It would seem that there are not a few Japanese who doubt the sincerity of the American Government. Consequently, a further delay would do great damage to our popular spirit. Moreover, the cabinet will soon convene, and the situation is becoming exceedingly tense. Without the loss of a day, we should establish these negotiations.

 

A-32

 

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR  

 

I hope that the American Government, too, will fully consider all these points and take the large view, settling the whole thing at once. I do not honestly believe that there is any other way to settle this perplexing situation.

 


[a] See IV, 22-24.

Trans. 11-10-41

 

No. 69

 

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     November 10, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   # 757.

 

(Urgent.)

(Part 2 of 3.) (To be handled in government code.)

 

Next I presented him with the English text of Proposal A contained in my # 726 [a] and said, "As a result of deep thought, this was arrived at by the Government and represents he maximum compromise that we can endure to make. There is absolutely no possibility of our yielding any further.

"1. The attitude of both nations toward the European war is recorded in our proposal of September 25. Therefore, I take it for granted that we are in agreement on this score.

"2. I feel that this proposal fully covers America's desires concerning non-discriminatory treatment in commerce.

"3. Concerning the ever-knotty problem of evacuating troops, the present proposal, in view of the difficulties we face here in Japan, ventures our maximum compromise. I am sure that the United States officials can readily comprehend this. Let me tell you how strongly I hope that we can reach a quick settlement. Now included in this document are many matters in which Great Britain's interests are deeply concerned, so it is necessary that, simultaneously with the establishment of Japanese-American negotiations, Japan and England make preparations to sign." I added, "I hope that the Government of the United States will undertake this."

The American Ambassador answered, "I have had no instructions from my home government, so I would like to reserve my opinion. Only as a hint, let me say that I have wired to Washington the true situation in detail, so the American Government understands the Oriental situation fully. Concerning influence for stability, there are many ways of interpreting that. Concerning the question of the obtention of materials, the present negotiations aim at that very thing, and I think that there will probably be some way for you Japanese to obtain what you need in a peaceful manner."

 


[a] See IV, 25-28.

 

Trans. 11-10-41

 

No. 70

 

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     November 10, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   # 757.

 

(Part 3 of 3.) (To be handled in government code.)

 

I answered, "Though I have all along fully appreciated the efforts of Your Excellency, I do not feel that the Government of the United States has as yet fully appreciated the situation. The

 

A-33

 

feeling in favor of stability and peace is, as a matter of course, the feeling of the majority of the people. Then too, insofar as the question of resources is concerned, if we take the example of the recent situation wherein the supplying of raw materials to Japan was suspended as a result of America's actions in the freezing of assets, such strong-arm measures of economic pressure, in addition to being a threat, indicate the probability of even more severe measures in the future. The people of Japan, though they may feel deeply within themselves that extreme steps for self-defense must be brought to bear, cannot bring themselves to the point of carrying this out.

"On this question there is a definite need for the United States to give the most careful consideration. Furthermore, insofar as the China question is concerned, would you have us ignore the successes gained as a result of sacrifices that we have made over four and a half years? Submission to terms such as these would be suicidal to Japan. For the Government, as well as for the people, I believe that such a course is impossible."

At this point, Counselor DOOMAN interposed the following: "We cannot accept the results of aggression." I refuted him by saying, "The Imperial Government does not consider that it has carried on a war of aggression. Therefore, the question of the results of aggression cannot be raised. We should, therefore, make an exception even in a non-aggression pact insofar as military action in the interests of self-defense is concerned. The fact is, insofar as the interpretation of the right of self-defense is concerned, judging by the examples of recent arguments, I believe that it is the United States which has been exhibiting a tendency to wrongfully magnify this. Therefore, it seems indicated that it is for Japan to call for the exercise of self-control by the Government of the United States. But at any rate, insofar as today is concerned, it behooves us not to become too involved in such arguments as these."

 

Trans. 11-10-41

 

No. 71

 

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     November 11, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   #758.

 

Re my # 757 [a].

 

In these talks, the conferences being conducted in Washington are referred to as being "negotiations". The U. S. Ambassador here states that they should be termed "conversations". I, therefore, replied that I thought they were well within the realm of "negotiations" now. The Ambassador seems to have been satisfied with this.

 


[a] See IV, 68.

 

Trans. 11-12-41

 

No. 72

 

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             November 10, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1066.

 

(Urgent.)

 

(Part 1 of 2.)

 

1. I sent ------ [a] to contact Senator THOMAS of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and HULL. His report reads as follows:

 

A-34

 

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR  

 

"The United States is not bluffing. If Japan invades again, the United States will fight with Japan. Psychologically the American people are ready. The Navy is prepared and ready for action."

2. Yesterday evening, Sunday, a certain Cabinet member, discarding all quibbling, began by saying to me:

"You are indeed a dear friend of mine and I tell this to you alone." Then he continued: "The American Government is receiving a number of reliable reports that Japan will be on the move soon. The American Government does not believe that your visit on Monday to the President or the coming of Mr. KURUSU will have any effect on the general situation."

I took pains to explain in detail how impatient the Japanese have grown since the freezing; how they are eager for a quick understanding; how both the Government and the people do not desire a Japanese-American war; and how we will hope for peace until the end.

He replied, however:

"Well, our boss, the President, believes those reports and so does the Secretary of State."

 


[a] Name withheld.

Trans. 11-12-41

 

No. 73

 

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             November 10, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1066.

 

(Urgent.)

 

(Part 2 of 2.)

 

In the newspapers and magazines, with the exception of the Daily News and the Hearst Papers, it is reported that the Americans are much more eager for a war with Japan than they are for one with Germany. It is said that some of the British are using this inclination for their own advantage and that already parleys have been started for joint Anglo-American action. Suggestions have already been made to the effect that it is necessary for some of the British fleet to be located in the Pacific. Now even if the President and other statesmen do not follow this trend, who can say how it will be? The friend I just spoke to told me that the United States cannot stop now because if Japan moves something will have to be done since it is a question of the United States saving its face.

3. Well, in any case, I am going to see the President today and talk with him on the basis of your instructions. You may be sure that I will do my very best.

Trans. 11-12-41

 

No. 74

 

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             November 7, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1059.

 

The conference with the President has been scheduled for Monday at 11 a.m.

Trans. 11-12-41

 

A-35

 

No. 75

 

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             November 10, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1069.

 

(Extremely Urgent.)

 

Today, the 10th, at 11:30, accompanied by WAKASUGI, I had an hour's conversation with President ROOSEVELT in the presence of Secretary HULL. I told them what you said in your instructions and explained in detail our proposal for the settlement of the three problems. In response the President said that in the present world crisis the American Government has as its objective to contribute to the establishment of peace and order in the Pacific in the spirit of fair play and that he hoped the Japanese-American conversations would be effective.

He continued, "In accordance with the desire of the Japanese Government we will endeavor immediately to continue the parleys and I hope that Japan too will make it evident that she intends to take a friendly attitude. What the United States most desires is (1) to prevent the expansion of the war, and (2) to bring about a lasting peace."

He concluded with the promise that he would carefully study, with Secretary HULL, our proposals as explained by me and after thinking them over make a reply.

I will wire you the details later, however, I am in a hurry to send you this resume.

 

Trans. 11-12-41

 

No. 76

 

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             November 10, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1070.

 

(Extremely Urgent.)

 

(Part 1 of 4.)

 

(To be handled in Government Code. Secret outside the department.)

 

My interview with the President, referred to in my # 1069 [a], was held in a private room in the White House in order to avoid publicity. It was as follows:

Prefacing my remarks with the fact that I was speaking on instructions, I said, "I have had no talks with the Secretary of State for about three weeks: ever since the resignation of the KONOYE cabinet; and since the present situation between Japan and the United States is such that it could not be left as it is, I am very pleased to have this opportunity of speaking with you. The conversations on this question have lasted for more than six months. From their inception, Japan has been wishing to arrive at a quick settlement. The people of Japan also looked forward to these conversations with much hope; however, the conversations have dragged on and in the meantime the relation between the two countries has grown worse. It has become increasingly difficult for the people of my country to be patient. Now, the Government of Japan has in the meantime made many concessions, but the Government of the United States has held to its arguments and has shown no willingness to respond to our compromises. As a result, some people in Japan have begun to doubt if the United States is really sincere in this matter. The Japanese people regard the freezing of funds as a kind of economic blockade, and there seem to be some who say that modern warfare is not limited to shooting alone. No country can exist without the supply of materials indispensable to its industry. From what reports I have received from Japan, the situation seems to be serious and threatening and, therefore, the only way to keep peace is for Japan and the United States to come, without further delay, to some kind of a friendly and satisfactory agreement. It is for no other purpose than

 

A-36

 

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR  

 

that of keeping peace in the Pacific that the Japanese Government is endeavoring so hard to arrive at a satisfactory agreement by continuing our conversations.

 


[a] See IV, 75.

 

Trans. 11-13-41

 

No. 77

 

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             November 10, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1070.

 

(Very Urgent.)

 

(Part 2 of 4.)

 

"As a major effort in attaining this objective, our Government has made the recent proposal. I wish that your Government would make its views clear to us as soon as possible by responding to the views and desires expressed by the Japanese Government."

I incidentally told him that the Japanese Government, realizing the seriousness of the situation, is dispatching Ambassador KURUSU to assist me. Then I continued and said, by way of an explanation of our proposal, that taking together the views expressed on October 2 by the Secretary of State relative to our proposal of September 25, and what both the Secretary and the Assistant Secretary had said subsequent to that date, the whole question could be boiled down to consist of the following three difficult points. I went on to say:

1. "As to the principle of non-discrimination, we have decided to recognize the fact that if this principle is, as your Government wishes, to be applied to the whole world, it is to be applied in the entire Pacific area including China. Since this is something which the Secretary of State has often spoken to me about as being a long-cherished desire of his, I hope that this guarantee which our Government is offering would prove to be satisfactory to you.

2. "Now as to the attitude of the two governments toward the European war, we proposed in our proposal of September 25 that the action on the part of the two governments should be based upon consideration of 'protection and self-defense.'" (The English text used our expression as it stood.)

Regarding this point, I asked whether the United States Government would guarantee that it will not give an unnecessarily broad interpretation to the words "protection" and "self-defense", and I said, "If the Japanese Government could get such a guarantee from the United States Government, the Japanese Government is also willing to give a similar guarantee." I continued, "As to the words 'in case the United States enters the war, etc.,' since our conversations had for their object the maintenance of peace in the Pacific, we are not in a position, under the present circumstances, to make any definite statement outside of what has been given in our proposal of September 25. Unless we have confidence in each other, as you well realize, no guarantee would be a satisfactory one even if backed by a hundred promises and a hundred documents."

Trans. 11-13-41

 

No. 78

 

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             November 10, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1070.

 

(Very Urgent.)

 

A-37

 

(Part 3 of 4.)

 

3. I submitted the new proposal, as it stood, regarding the question of stationing and withdrawing of troops and proceeded to say, "With regard to this question, the Japanese Government has gone a step beyond her past proposals and has, by definitely fixing not only the localities in China where our troops would be stationed but also the period of their occupation, made it clear that the occupation is not a permanent and definite one. No doubt you would like to see the troops withdrawn at once, but I am sure you well understand that it is impossible under the present circumstances to do so. I earnestly wish that you would give favorable consideration to this question from the standpoint of the general situation.

Next, I said, "The Japanese Government is making the following proposal with regard to the Japanese troops in French Indo-China," and so saying, I submitted the proposal contained in your instructions.

In reply to this, the President, remarking that he had already thought on the question before our explanation was given him, spoke as follows from a note which he had been holding in his hand, "As a result of a confusion created by the forces of aggression, the whole world has fallen into a critical state. What seems to me to be common sense is for us to wish earnestly that the world will return to peaceful normalcy and for the United States Government to do its utmost in the spirit of fair play for the establishment of peace, stability, and order in the Pacific. If this object is to be realized, actual results must be effected for the sake of human welfare. It is my earnest wish that the preliminary talks relative to this question would have good results which would serve as a basis of future negotiations. I will, just as the Japanese Government hopes, do my best in order to help carry on these negotiations successfully. I wish that the Japanese Government would clearly set forth its intention of following a peaceful course in its policy and not an opposite course. This is the way to attain the results toward which both you and we are working."

What the United States desires, according to the President, are (1) to prevent the war from spreading; and (2) to establish a permanent peace.

Trans. 11-13-41

 

No. 79

 

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             November 10, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1070.

 

(Very Urgent.)

 

(Part 4 of 4.)

 

The President elaborated on the point that with regard to the question of non-discrimination, he had agreed with CHURCHILL when he had conferred with that statesman to abolish the economic limitations throughout the world; that he had opposed Germany because Germany followed a policy contrary to this idea; and that he wished that the principle of non-discrimination would be applied generally throughout the world. The President then said by way of an incidental remark that in the days of President TAFT when disturbance arose in Cuba, the United States had failed by resorting to a policy of force; however, today under his administration, because the government had adopted a friendly policy, the relations with the Latin-American countries had improved. He then explained how necessary it is to follow a new policy in accordance with new situations. Secretary HULL inserted the remark that the South American countries, who had in the past been fearful of the United States, have come to take an attitude of welcoming the United States. Speaking on the remark I had made to the effect that

 

A-38

 

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR  

 

economic pressure had aroused the ill feelings of the Japanese people and had made them impatient, the President said, "It is necessary to find a modus vivendi if the people are to live," and proceeded to explain that this expression should be translated as "method of living." Although it is not clear to me what it really means, I intend to ascertain whether he refers to, possibly, a provisional agreement.

The President then asked if Ambassador KURUSU was bringing with him a proposal other than that referred to above. I replied that he was not bringing any proposal, but in response to my wishes he was coming to assist me. Then the President said that he is leaving on the 15th and will be away for one week, as he must attend, as is his custom, a children's party at Warm Springs during the Thanksgiving week (the 20th), and that he wondered whether he would have the opportunity of meeting Ambassador KURUSU before he leaves.

Trans. 11-13-41

 

No. 80

 

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     11 November 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   # 762.

 

Re your # 1069 [a].

 

Judging from the progress of the conversations, there seem to be indications that the United States is still not fully aware of the exceedingly criticalness of the situation here. The fact remains that the date set forth in my message # 736 [b] is absolutely immovable under present conditions. It is a definite dead-line and therefore it is essential that a settlement be reached by about that time.

The session of Parliament opens on the 15th (work will start on (the following day ?)) according to the schedule. The government must have a clear picture of things to come, in presenting its case at the session. You can see, therefore, that the situation is nearing a climax, and that time is indeed becoming short.

I appreciate the fact that you are making strenuous efforts, but in view of the above mentioned situation, will you redouble them. When talking to the Secretary of State and others, drive the points home to them. Do everything in your power to get a clear picture of the U. S. attitude in the minimum amount of time. At the same time do everything in your power to have them give their speedy approval to our final proposal.

We would appreciate being advised of your opinions on whether or not they will accept our final proposal A.

 


[a] See IV, 75.

[b] See IV, 44.

Trans. 11-12-41

 

No. 81

 

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     11 November 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   # 763.

 

Re my 671 [a].

 

With regard to our representations to the United States in this matter, we have received two representations from the Germans since then. On 6 November, I advised the German Ambas-

 

A-39

 

sador in Tokyo that in view of the present general-relationship between the United States and Japan, it was essential that this matter be given very careful study. I explained that there is a good chance that it would be more effective under the present circumstances, for us to present a determined attitude rather than to merely make representations to the United States. It is exceedingly doubtful, I pointed out, whether a mere representation would bear any fruit.

 


[a] See III, 277.

Trans. 11-12-41

 

No. 82

 

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     11 November 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   # 764.

 

(In 3 parts complete.)

 

1. On the 11th, the British Ambassador, while calling on me on some other business, brought up the subject of the conversations. He advised me that he reported my talks of the other day (see contents of 2 of my message #723 [a]) to his home government, to which his government replied along the following lines, he said:

"The British Government is not aware of the details of the conversations being conducted in Washington. Since its success would be of interest to Britain and Japan, it is fervently hoping for the success thereof. However, unless the basis of discussion is first settled upon, it would be useless to go ahead and enter into negotiations of the details. The British Government feels that discussions as to the basic principles could safely be left up to the U. S. Government. However, as soon as the real negotiations begin, the United States is to confer with Great Britain according to arrangement. Therefore, when that time arrives, negotiations will be carried on jointly with the United States and Japan."

2. I replied that in the matters being discussed between Japan and the United States there were some phases which greatly affected Great Britain. In the event of an agreement between Japan and the United States, Japan will simultaneously seek Britain's agreement. I wish to arrange matters so that the two agreements may be signed at exactly the same time. In view of the fact that to do the above is necessary, we have already requested the United States to give their approval to the terms, I said to the British Ambassador.

The British Ambassador said that he was not aware as to how much progress had been made between the United States and Japan, but he assumed that they were still in the preliminary stages.

I, therefore, replied that his assumption may have fitted in the past, but that at present they had already entered into the realm of the actual negotiations. Moreover, the Imperial Government has already submitted its final proposal, thus bringing the negotiations to the final phase. We have made this fact absolutely clear to the United States, I added.

I went on to say that I hear that the British Prime Minister made a speech at a luncheon given by the Mayor of London in which he stated that though he did not know the developments in the U. S.-Japanese negotiations, he would issue a warning to Japan. Would it not be more to the point, I challenged, if, instead of making threats without knowing of what he spoke, he were to try to more clearly understand the issues and to cooperate in an effort to clear them up? However, I said, with the U. S.-Japanese talks in the phase they are today, and in view of the fact that I realize that there were certain relationships between the United States and Great Britain, I have no intention of urging or opposing British participation in these talks at this time.

 

A-40

 

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR  

 

The Imperial Government has made the maximum concessions she can in drawing up its final proposal, I explained. We are of the opinion that the United States will find no objectionable points in it. I believe that it will be possible to sign the agreement within a week or ten days, I said. If, unfortunately, the United States refuses to accept those terms, it would be useless to continue the negotiations. Our domestic political situation will permit no further delays in reaching a decision.

I am making superhuman efforts at this time, I pointed out, in the attempt to ride out the crisis in the U. S.-Japanese and the British-Japanese relations. There are factions in the country which insist that there is no need for negotiating and point out the uselessness of doing so. The negotiations are being continued only after these factions were checked.

For these reasons, it is absolutely impossible that there be any further delays.

A speedy settlement can be made depending entirely upon the attitude of Britain and the United States, I said, and suggested that his country give serious consideration to this, and cooperate in bringing about an early agreement.

In the above manner, I pointed out the criticalness of the situation. The Ambassador listened to what I said very attentively, giving indications that he was realizing for the first time how critical the situation was. He advised me that he would send his government a report of the above conversation and that he himself would do his best to bring about a speedy settlement.

3. Thus, there are indications that the United States Government is still under the impression that the negotiations are in the preliminary stages and that we are still merely exchanging opinions. This is further supported by the words of President Roosevelt reported by you in your message # 1070 [b] (that part in which he says that he hopes that these preliminary discussions will lead to the basis of the real negotiations, etc.)

That the United States takes this lazy and easy going attitude in spite of the fact that as far as we are concerned, this is the final phase, is exceedingly unfortunate. Therefore, it is my fervent hope that Your Excellency will do everything in your power to make them realize this fact and bring about an agreement at the earliest possible moment.

 


[a] See IV, 16.

[b] See IV, 76-79.

Trans. 11-12-41

 

No. 83

 

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             11 November 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1072.

 

In paragraph (2) of your message #726 [a], in which you explain our Proposal A, you stated that with regard to the matters involving the Tripartite Pact, the United States was "apparently satisfied in general with our proposal and therefore . . ."

In your message #757 [b], in which you give us the gist of your explanations to the U. S. Ambassador, you say under paragraph (1) concerning the attitudes of the respective countries with reference to the European War that "we assume that this matter has already been settled with their acceptance of this phase of our proposal of 25 September".

I presume that you took this position to press our claims on this particular point. We are proceeding under this assumption. Actually, however, no agreement has been reached as may be seen from the contents of their "oral statement" of 2 October.

The only comment I ever made in this respect was in my message #995 [c] in reporting Wakasugi's conversations with Welles, when it was noted that regarding the Tripartite Pact,

 

A-41

 

"the United States also gave indications that adjustments in this matter may be a possibility".

As we replied in our message #1025 [d] to the question contained in your #721 [e], we are proceeding with the exchange of notes plan without coming to any definite decision on this point.

I merely mention the above, so that no misunderstandings will arise.

 


[a] See IV, 25.

[b] See IV, 68.

[c] See IV, 8.

[d] See IV, 19.

[e] See IV, 18.

Trans. 11-14-41

 

No. 84

 

FROM: Washington                                                                             11 November 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1073.

 

The Chinese Ambassador to the United States had an audience with the President yesterday the 10th and is said to have handed him a document (contents unknown). (It is said the interview lasted two minutes.)

This might be of some information to you.

Trans. 11-13-41

 

No. 85

 

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             12 November 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1076.

 

Re your # 727 [a].

In order that we may have a dependable translation into English of Proposal B, please have it written in English and wire it to me.

The word "provided" in my #1044 [b] (text concerning the principle of non-discrimination in commerce) ought really to be changed to "on the understanding". Please take care of that.

 


[a] See IV, 29.

[b] See IV, 37.

 

Trans. 11-22-41

 

No. 86

 

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             12 November 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1077.

 

(Part 1 of 4.)

 

From the Intelligence Official.

 

A-42

 

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR  

 

1. The ROOSEVELT administration is dashing along the road of military, economic, and industrial reconstruction with the object of defeating the Nazis. So far as war on the sea is concerned, the United States has already entered the conflict. Even if ROOSEVELT should now decide to leave the Nazis be, he is already in too deep. Even though he tried to do a 180° turn, his economic reconstructionists would not let him. Therefore, it can be said that the United States is following the one road to complete war.

2. It is true that the American army is not yet equipped, but even if war were declared against Germany, no more than the present ocean fighting would be necessary and, therefore, such a declaration is possible. The reason why things are not going so well for the administration in this connection, however, is because the people are not completely behind it.

ROOSEVELT has the full support of the government, the military, and the Congress and is tantamount to a dictator (on the 10th, the Times Herald said in an editorial that ROOSEVELT is a dictator in no way less than HITLER or STALIN). The people, however, most certainly do not support ROOSEVELT. During the last two or three weeks this has been particularly evident. Let us look into some concrete examples: Accordingly to reliable reports, the leaders of the America First Committee are secretly endeavoring with all their ingenuity to impeach ROOSEVELT. The stronger government pressure against it becomes, the more belligerent does this committee grow, and it may well be that the time will come when they will resort to force. The pressure of the government against the America First Committee is also becoming fierce. On October 30 in New York, there was a meeting of this committee, but they could not make any radio broadcasts. ROOSEVELT's own life is in grave danger. On that night in Madison Square Garden, the immense crowd totaling 8,000 filled the building to overflowing.

 

Trans. 11-14-41

 

No. 87

 

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             12 November 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1077.

(Part 2 Of 4.)

 

At a mass meeting in Washington, _____ [a] a former Ambassador, made a scathing attack on the ROOSEVELT regime and demanded a referendum against this deliberate drift toward war. On that occasion he said that at this so fateful moment in the nation's history ROOSEVELT might die. These were words of profound meaning and drew great applause from the audience. The Times Herald in an editorial said that the President holds the whip over the Army and Navy and has the full support of the Government. Therefore, it will be impossible for the Congress to impeach him. The editorial said, however, that some believe that he will be impeached, in any case, later on. Now, for papers in their editorials to use the word "impeach" cannot be overlooked as something light. Furthermore, pickets in front of the White House recently carried placards on which were written the words "Impeach the President". Another thing, some days ago in Detroit, Ambassador HALIFAX was pelted with eggs. Again the sinking of the REUBEN JAMES gave the popular spirit of this country a great shock and filled the people with a gloomy foreboding. In his speech on October 27th, ROOSEVELT did not stress foreign questions so much as he did internal matters. This is to be regarded as a declaration of internal warfare whereby ROOSEVELT whipped from its scabbard the sword of an unlimited national emergency.

 


[a] DoD Comment: Name and identifying information withheld.

 

Trans. 11-14-41

 

A-43

No. 88

 

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             12 November 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1077.

 

(Part 3 of 4.)

 

2. The Congress, as I said, is supporting ROOSEVELT. True enough, the Senate approved the entrance of armed merchantmen into the war zones; however, the actual figures were 50 to 37, and this could not, by any means, be called a crushing defeat for the opponents. This also may be regarded as a reflection of public opinion.

Things being as they are in the country, in order to dispel the dilemma and to condition the people for a war against Germany, it may be now that a counter-hand will be played. I mean to say, many people in the United States fear the German war machine frightfully. However, they know how we have fought so hard in China for four years and figure that we are about worn out. They also figure that we are weak in materials. They do not think that we could resist them very much and optimize over how quick we would be to come to our knees.

If we scrutinize this psychology closely, we find that the ROOSEVELT administration, although it does not want a two-ocean war, would probably not do anything to prevent the outbreak of a war with Japan, depending on how we Japanese act. Perhaps a point-blank declaration of war might be made. Then the people's thirst for blood could be stimulated, an unlimited emergency declared, the America First Committee dispersed, and all opposition crushed. Then they figure the popular mind might turn favorable for a war with Germany. In other words, we Japanese would be merely the tool with which the American administration prepares the way for coming to grips with the Reich.

4. What will happen if the United States and Japan come to blows? Well, Germany now has a vast occupied territory and is in the most favorable position to talk peace. England is already complaining that the United States is not sending her enough help. Germany, of course, does not want a long war, and she may suddenly, on unexpectedly generous terms, conclude peace with England. I mean to say that while the United States would be at grips with us, American aid to England would naturally slow down and give Germany a chance to make a separate peace with Great Britain. Germany will certainly do her best to achieve this feat.

 

Trans. 11-15-41

 

No. 89

 

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             12 November 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1077.

 

(Part 4 of 4.)

 

The New Deal failed, and the opposition to ROOSEVELT within the country became unmanageable. Just then the European war took a more lively turn through Germany's invasion of the Netherlands. ROOSEVELT, who is well-versed in international questions, joined the war then and there. It might be said that HITLER's attack on the Netherlands caused ROOSEVELT to enter the struggle immediately. Japanese-American relations are now at identically that same pass. I mean to say that a war with Japan would put the people squarely behind ROOSEVELT and make him a dictator. He knows fully that if he has to fight, there will be a suitable opportunity which would not admit delaying war. Furthermore, in view of Japan's foreign policy, it can be seen that our relations with the United States have reached such a pass that a decision on war is about the only thing that could

 

A-44

 

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR  

 

raise them from the dead. Judging from internal conditions in the United States, for the foregoing reasons there is no hope for a thorough-going pact at the present time. It would be better to devise some relatively easy small-scale makeshift of a temporary nature laying stress on economic matters. Germany will keep sinking American ships, and the President's position will become harder and harder, so as soon as a show-down with Germany is inevitable, then we can get a full-fledged pact. Again, if we do have to fight the United States, we could do this much better after she is at war with Germany.

 

Trans. 11-14-41

 

No. 90

 

From United States Communications Intelligence:

 

Important summaries of Japanese Naval operations.

 

Date of Operations      Serial                                 Date of Issue

Oct. 13-22, 1941               16-41, No. 907-100           Nov. 12, 1941

 

Oct. 17

"Numerous new calls are now appearing in Mandate traffic which indicate a decided increase in the Mandate Force."

 

Oct. 18

"It has been noted with interest during past few days that the Mandate Islands of Truk, Palau, Jaluit, and Saipan have been included in dispatch headings which ordinarily do not concern them".

"The Commander Sixth Base Force originates a dispatch addressed to four unidentified units now at Yokosuka, and information to 6th Base Force. All of the above action addresses are evidently new units scheduled for assignment to the 6th Base Force in Jaluit area."

 

No. 91

 

FROM: Washington                                                                             11 November 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1074.

 

Re your # 762 [a].

 

After my conversation with the President, I told HULL that as the situation is urgent, I would like to meet him the same evening or this morning, and go on with concrete discussion. He replied that they understand fully our need of haste, that, as a matter of fact both yesterday after our conversation and today, although it is the 11th and the Armistice holiday, he would gather those concerned and give study to our proposal, and that it would facilitate the negotiations to have our discussion tomorrow the 12th after hearing their opinions.

As for a conjecture regarding the success or failure of the negotiations, I will ------ after getting their opinions in tomorrow's interview.

 


[a] See IV, 80.

Trans. 11-13-41

 

A-45

 

No. 92

 

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             12 November 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1087.

 

(Part 1 of 4.)

 

(Departmental secret. To be handled in Government code.)

 

On the 12th at 3 p.m. WAKASUGI went with me to talk with Secretary HULL. BALLANTINE sat in and we conversed for about an hour. I asked if they had any answer to our proposal and HULL gave me the oral statements contained in my # 1083 [a] and # 1084 [b]. He said that he wanted me to ascertain if the new cabinet would also approve of oral statement A and stated that oral statement B was presented in the sense of a suggestion concerning peace between Japan and China referred to in our last conversation in accordance with our request. He went on to say that if the same principle were applied to the China question as was applied to all the other problems, a settlement should be possible; that also, such things as the question of non-discrimination in commerce had to be connected with this; and that by day after tomorrow he could let us have a definite proposal. I said that judging from this suggestion and our conversation it looked as though it was implied that unless Japan and China could get together on the question of the stationing of troops there would be no chance for any success at all in the Japanese-American negotiations. I said that if this was what was meant it would be leaving the key to Japanese-American relations in the hands of someone else, which looked rather inappropriate, and I asked him if he meant that Japanese-Chinese relations could be left to Japan and China and that the United States and Japan could agree on the other questions. HULL, however, replied vaguely that if the general principles were applied to China too, an understanding would be possible.

He then continued, "We have not yet privately informed China about these talks, but we are letting England and the Netherlands, who are concerned, know something of their general lines. In case some basis for negotiations is worked out, I believe it possible that they may sign along with the United States. "However," he added, "I cannot guarantee this."

 


[a] See IV, 93.

[b] See IV, 97, 98, 99.

 

Trans. 11-14-41

 

No. 93

 

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             12 November 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1083.

 

(Part 1 of 4.)

 

Strictly secret. To be handled in Government code.

 

A. Oral. Strictly Confidential.

 

It will be recalled that the documents communicated by the Japanese Ambassador to the President of the United States on August 28, 1941 contained a statement of the position of the Japanese Government in regard to its desire and intention to pursue peaceful courses. That position was set forth in excerpts taken from those documents as follows:

 

A-46

 

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR  

 

"Japan is solicitous for the maintenance of the peace of the Pacific and the peace of the world and she desires therefore to improve Japanese-American relations."

"In consequence, the Japanese Government welcomes the invitation by the President of the United States to an exchange of views in regard to basic policies and attitudes as the foundation of an understanding that will condition lasting and extensive peace in the Pacific area. For such peace, the Government of Japan is ready: for such a united effort toward a peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific situation the Government of Japan, like the Government of the United States, would be proud to make sacrifices."

Trans. 11-14-41

 

No. 94

 

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             12 November 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1083.

 

(Part 2 of 4.)

 

(Strictly secret. To be handled in Government code.)

 

With reference to the stationing of Japanese troops in Indo-China, it was stated:

"The Japanese Government has no intention of threatening thereby other countries.

"Therefore, the Japanese Government is prepared to withdraw its troops from Indo-China as soon as the China incident is settled or a just peace is established in East Asia.

"Furthermore, in order to remove all possible doubt in this regard, the Japanese Government reaffirms herewith its repeated declaration that its present action in Indo-China is not a preparatory step for military advance into neighboring territories."

The statement was made specifically applicable to Thailand as follows:

"The Japanese Government believes the above pledge will suffice to clarify also Japan's intentions toward Thailand."

Specific reference was also made to the Soviet Union by the Japanese Government as follows:

"As regard Soviet-Japanese relations, the Japanese Government declares likewise that Japan will take no military action as long as the Soviet Union remains faithful to the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Treaty and does not menace Japan or Manchukuo or take any action contrary to the spirit of the said Treaty."

In a word, the Japanese Government has no intention of using, without provocation, military force against any neighboring nation.

Trans. 11-14-41

 

No. 95

 

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             12 November 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1083.

 

(Part 3 of 4.)

 

With reference to the general program in view, it was stated:

"Such discussions would naturally envisage the working out of a program, obtainable by peaceful methods. The Japanese Government shares fully that view with the Government of the United States.

 

A-47

 

"Regarding the principles and directives set forth in detail by the American Government and envisaged in the informal conversations as constituting a program for the Pacific area, the Japanese Government wishes to state that it considers these principles and the practical application thereof, in the friendliest manner possible, are the prime requisites of a true peace and should be applied not only in the Pacific area but throughout the entire world. Such a program has long been desired and sought by Japan itself."

Inasmuch as subsequent to the giving by the Japanese Government of the foregoing statement of its position a new cabinet has come into office in Japan, the Government believes that it would be helpful, in order to avoid the possibility of any misunderstanding, if the Japanese Government could at this time confirm that the position of the Japanese Government has not changed.

This Government, in its statement to the Japanese Government of October 2, 1941, pointed out that, although we were gratified to receive the statement of the position of the Japanese Government, we found it difficult to understand the need for the qualification by the Japanese Government of its statements of peaceful intent with what would seem to be unnecessary qualifying phrases. We had in mind such phrases as:

Trans. 11-14-41

 

No. 96

 

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             12 November 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1083.

 

(Urgent)

 

(Part 4 of 4.)

 

"As long as the Soviet Union remains faithful to the Soviet-Japanese neutrality treaty and does not menace Japan or Manchukuo or take any action contrary to the spirit of the said treaty."

"Without provocation."

"Without a justifiable reason."

It is believed that it would be helpful if the position of the Japanese Government on this point could be clarified.

The foregoing observations are not directed to ----- proposals put forward by the Japanese Ambassador on November 10, (November 7) but are set forth merely in an effort to make abundantly clear the basis on which we are proceeding in order that there may be avoided any misunderstanding on the part either of the Japanese Government or of this Government. It has not been and is not the purpose of this Government to enter needlessly into a discussion of details. While presenting these preliminary observations toward ensuring a common understanding, this Government will expect to do everything it can to expedite consideration of the latest proposals of the Japanese Government.

 

Trans. 11-14-41

 

No. 97

 

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             12 November 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1084.

 

(Urgent.)

 

A-48

 

(Part 1 of 3.) (Separate Wire.)

 

B. Oral. (Strictly Confidential.)

 

Reference is had to the Japanese Ambassador's request for any further amplification that the Secretary of State might have in mind in connection with the suggestion made by him in informal conversation on November 7th in regard to mutual exchanges of pledges between China and Japan for the establishment of real friendship and collaboration between the two countries.

It will be recalled that suggestion under reference was prompted by the observation of the Japanese Ambassador that should the Japanese Government agree to withdraw its troops within a definite period from all areas of China the Japanese people would feel that they had nothing to show for the four years and more of heavy sacrifice that they had made and that such an agreement would be regarded as having caused Japan a loss of prestige.

 

Trans. 11-14-41

 

No. 98

 

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             12 November 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1084.

 

(English Text) (Urgent)

 

(Part 2 of 3.)

 

(To be handled in Government Code.) Strictly secret.

 

The Secretary, in reply to the Japanese Ambassador's observation, commented that the present world crisis, in which Europe finds itself threatened with anarchy, affords Japan a unique opportunity to enhance its national prestige on a basis of moral force in a way that military might could never accomplish. That, if the Chinese Government were now to say, either as a result of Japanese initiative or on its own initiative, that China desired a real friendship with Japan and would do everything it reasonably could to collaborate with Japan along peaceful and mutually beneficial lines, could not Japan find it possible to reciprocate in a policy of mutual friendship and conciliation with China, would not such a policy enable Japan to make a contribution of inestimable value toward arresting the destructive force which now menaces world civilization and to assume a leadership in the world which every peaceful nation would welcome.

Trans. 11-15-41

 

No. 99

 

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             12 November 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1084.

 

(English Text) (Urgent)

 

(Part 3 of 3.)

 

For what is envisaged would be an implementation of the kind of constructive, liberal and peaceful world program concerning which we have been talking in our exploratory conversations. That program contemplates practical application of basic principles directed

 

A-49

 

toward preservation of order under law, peace with justice, and the social and economic welfare of mankind. It contemplates peaceful collaboration among nations, mutual respect for the rights of all, no aggrandizement, and the adopting of broad-gauge economic policies which would provide liberalization of trade, afford fair access to and development of natural resources and raise living standards to the betterment of all peoples.

Full association by Japan in such a program at this critical moment in world history would give Japan an undoubted position of moral leadership and be a tribute to the far-sighted and enlightened character of its statesmanship.

Trans. 11-15-41

 

No. 100

 

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             November 12, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1087.

 

(Extremely Urgent.)

 

(Part 2 of 4.)

 

(To be handled in government code.)

 

Then BALLANTINE inserted the remark that it is stipulated in the American proposal of June 21st that the United States will not be a party to applying to other countries any condition conflicting with the principles which the United States has been consistently upholding.

WAKASUGI said:

"While we heartily welcome the suggestion offered, I would like to know more definitely how China is to be made to pledge to follow the suggestion. Is it the intention of Secretary HULL to leave this matter up to direct negotiations to be conducted between Japan and China; or is it his intention to have the United States secure the pledge from China and transmit it to Japan; or is it to be accomplished with Japan, the United States, and China meeting in a conference?"

It seems that Secretary HULL had no definite plan in mind regarding this matter, but he spoke as if he was confident that if the Japanese-American negotiations are carried out in accordance with the principle of peace that a stage would in due time be reached at which this suggestion could be carried out.

Whereupon WAKASUGI asked:

"Is it your intention to have China make this pledge when that stage has been reached in the course of the negotiations?"

HULL avoided making a definite reply and instead he brought out an example, stating that when two parties in a dispute wish to come to an agreement they could do so by the mediation of a third party and, so saying, HULL hinted his having the intention of mediating between Japan and China depending, of course, on conditions.

Trans. 11-15-41

 

No. l01

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             November 12, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1087.

 

A-50

 

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR  

 

(Part 3 of 4.) (Departmental Secret.)

 

(To be handled in government code.)

 

Concerning the stationing of troops, I explained to him that in the new proposal we made it clear that we do not mean to keep them there indefinitely. HULL replied that to interfere in the private affairs of other nations contravenes any general peace program and that permanent occupation is impossible. However, he seemed quite satisfied with my explanation.

In connection with a general peace policy, HULL said, "In one breath you say that the three-power pact has a peaceful objective and in the other you confess that Japan is bound by the agreement and is tied up with Germany. Now the officials of our country and our public are at a loss to understand any explanation like this. HITLER has a hard task and to carry it out, he is making the people of the various small nations suffer. Now he cannot hold out forever in such a difficult undertaking, and sooner or later we are going to have to take charge of things after the war. In this we are going to need every resource. Leaders of both Japan and the United States ought to cooperate in a peaceful program. Thus, if some sort of plan can be worked out between Japan and the United States comprising the nations concerned—for example, England and the Netherlands—to bring about complete harmony over the Pacific, Japan would no longer need to worry about the three-power pact, and the three-power pact would die a natural death." I refuted this argument, saying, "The Japanese-British alliance was in effect at the time of the Russo-Japanese war, but after-wards at the time of the Washington conference it was nullified, so you see the situation changes with the times. The existence of the three-power pact presents no obstacle to any peace plan.

 

Trans. 11-15-41

 

No. 102

 

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             November 12, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1087.

 

(Part 4 of 4.) (Departmental secret.)

 

(To be handled in governmental code.)

 

Continuing, he said, "Japan does not like to exercise force—not by any means. If we could get petroleum and other raw materials from the United States and the Netherlands Indies, we would not have to use force, would we? Then, when we come to the question of non-discrimination in commerce, I don't think that the United States will have any objection to our proposal."

HULL answered, "The United States also recognizes that the situation is tense and is considering your proposals concerning the three problems. We are doing this just as fast as we can but questions pending over a period of ten years cannot be settled over night. By day after tomorrow, I will be ready to reply."

WAKASUGI reiterated, "As I told you, the Diet assembles on the 25th and the situation is drawing more and more grave. I want to get a definite reply to our proposal at any time now so by day after tomorrow I will expect a clear concise reply on these various problems."

In a word, during that conversation they sought our recognition of the statement of August 28, number B, and made explanations of their recent suggestion for a Japanese-Chinese peace. They only wished to tell us that the United States is going deeper into the three problems and our proposal of September 25 and that they are making ready for a quick

 

A-51

 

reply. I am not satisfied with their attitude toward taking up negotiations so tomorrow morning I am going to have WAKASUGI again tell HULL please to hurry up with a decision.

Trans.  11-28-41

 

No. 103

 

FROM: Honolulu (Kita)                                                                       November 13, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   # 079.

 

Honolulu to Tokyo # 217.

 

From Kurusu.

 

_____ [a], who was one of the _____ [a] party during its Far Eastern tour, was among the passengers on the Clipper.

During conversation with him he mentioned that he thought it was already too late to try and arrive at a peaceful negotiation between Japan and the United States, and I gathered from the conversation that the _____ [a] party are hoping that negotiations for a peaceful settlement will not be successful.

I am also wondering if the pessimistic outlook on my mission by U. S. radio announcers, etc., of which both Tokyo and Washington cables addressed to me here mention, is not also influenced by this party. Perhaps this will be of some value for you to know.

 


[a] DOD Comment: Name withheld.

Trans.  11-25-41

 

No. 104

 

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     November 13, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   # 768.

 

Re my # 727 [a].

 

Delete that part of note (1) following "HITUYO NI OZI (as required) which reads "HON TORIKIME SEIRITU SEBA" (in the event that the agreement is reached.)

Insert the words "GEN NI FUTURYO INDO SINA NI HAKEN SERARE ORU" (dispatched to French Indo-China at present) following that part which reads "KOSEI NARU HEIWA KAKURITU SURU UE WA" (Upon having a just peace assuredly established).

 


[a] See IV, 29.

Trans.  11-13-41

 

No. 105

 

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     November 13, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   #766.

 

Re your # 1055 [a].

 

A-52

 

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR  

 

1. Through the U. S. Ambassador's courtesy, I was, in confidence, shown the record of your conversations with Secretary Hull of the 7th. According to this record, the Secretary asked you, point blank, in connection with the so-called self-defense rights, for a "concrete statement of Japan's relations with the Axis powers."

You made no mention of this in your message. Will you please give us a detailed report of this.

2. Judging from the tone of these talks, the United States is apparently still assuming that they are of a preliminary nature. We pleaded with the U. S. Ambassador again on the 12th to try and see the seriousness of the situation. Will you, too, do everything in your power to make them realize this in accordance with the lines contained in my various instructions on this subject.

3. Since the record of your conversations with Hull were shown to me only through the personal courtesy of the Ambassador, please maintain strict secrecy regarding it.

 


[a] See IV, 54.

Trans.  11-13-41

 

No. 106

 

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     November 12, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   # 765.

 

(To be handled in Government code.)

 

Please take steps to acquaint Finance Official NISHIYAMA with matters pertaining to the Japan-American negotiations which are the focal point of the recent international situation.

He should receive a confirming wire from the Finance Minister in the near future.

Trans.  11-12-41

 

No. 107

 

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     November 15, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   # 774.

 

Re your # 1087 [a].

 

During the conversations with HULL, Wakasugi asked, with regard to the form in which the "B" suggestion should materialize, "or is it your intention to have it conducted by the consular representatives of Japan, the United States, and China?" As you are aware, the Imperial Government is opposed to its taking that course.

Please be aware of the fact that the "B" suggestion was taken up because we thought it might be a short cut to settlement. In other words, we decided to take it up because we thought it would speed up the procedure. We do not wish to give it even a chance to further complicate and prolong matters.

Bearing this in mind, do everything in your power to not only prevent further complications but to simplify matters as much as possible.

 

A-53

 


[a] See IV, 92.

 

Note: The "B" above refers to the "Oral" Statement B handed to Nomura on Wednesday afternoon by Mr. Hull.

 

Trans.  11-15-41

 

No. 108

 

FROM: Washington                                                                             November 13, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1089.

 

Re my # 1087 [a].

 

On this, the 13th, Wakasugi called on Ballantine.

(1) Wakasugi said:

"Yesterday's conversations led to no settlement and moreover, the outcome of it fell far short of Japanese anticipations. The times have become exceedingly critical and the Japanese people have become impatient with regard to the Japanese-U. S. conversations. They are becoming desperate as far as Japanese-U. S. relations are concerned. This being the general condition in Japan, and being confronted with the fact that it is the eve of the convening of the session of the Diet, the government of Japan is anxious to have these U. S.-Japanese talks reach some conclusion without a moment's unnecessary delay.

"The above is as was explained forcefully in yesterday's conversations. In the next conversations, any discussions of general attitudes and comments on the possible outlook should be unnecessary.

"We request that Hull be asked to give a clear reply at our next meeting on the following points: Does the United States intend to accept our proposal of 25 September, including the proposals submitted by us on the 7 and 10th of this month? If not, will the United States submit a counter proposal to the above, clearly indicating the revision desired? Or, on the other hand, is the United States of the attitude that she will stick to her proposal of 21 June and make that instrument her final proposal?

"Many in Japan are of the opinion that the United States is purposely stalling the procedure", Wakasugi said.

Ballantine:

"The United States is also aware of the fact that matters have reached an exceedingly critical stage. In spite of the fact that the 11th was a holiday, it was disregarded and this matter was discussed. There is no truth in the charge that the United States is pursuing a "stalling" policy.

"However, in spite of the fact that we do not wish to appear to be quibbling about details, there are several points which will have to be explained by Japan before the United States can make definite replies.

 

(Part 2.)

 

"For example, Japan has expressed her acceptance of non-discrimination of commerce on the Pacific but on condition that said non-discriminatory treatment be applied to the entire world. Does this sweeping proposal include those nations which are at present embroiled in the war? We cannot help but have some misgivings as to when such an agreement would become effective over the entire Pacific area, if its effectivity there depends on its applicability on the nations at war."

Wakasugi:

 

A-54

 

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR  

 

"Fundamentally speaking, the basic aims of this is to bring about a U. S.-Japanese agreement. The supporters would be Japan and the United States, hence the terms are not intended to be made applicable to every country in the world. It is our intention that the United States and Japan agree upon the basic principle of non-discriminatory treatment throughout the world."

(2) Concerning the matter contained in your messages #758 [b] and #764 [c], it is true that the United States is still assuming that, as it was in the beginning, these talks are as yet in the exploratory stages through which the basis of agreements may be discovered. We, on the other hand, are going on the assumption that these are the actual negotiations. There exists, therefore, a fundamental discordant note.

Wakasugi pointed out this fact, to which Ballantine replied:

"The United States is proceeding along the lines set forth heretofore. Even as late as yesterday, Hull said that if these conversations can be carried to the point of their being made the basis of a negotiation, we could no doubt get Britain and the Netherlands to participate."

 

(Part 3.)

 

Wakasugi:

"Leaving aside the U. S. viewpoint on this particular matter for the time being, if talks between the duly recognized Ambassador of one country and the President and Secretary of State of another, concerning adjustments of relations between the two countries they represent—regardless of the form in which said talks are conducted—are not negotiations, we are indeed hard put to it to figure out what, indeed, does constitute a diplomatic negotiation.

"I request that Hull be clearly advised that we are treating the present proceedings as part of the negotiations."

(3) Regarding your message # 766 [d]:

The main objective of that day's interview was to submit our new proposal and to arrange for a meeting with the President together with Secretary Hull and to advise them that we would make a more detailed explanation at that time. For that reason, as I reported in my message, the only reference I made to the Tripartite Pact was to express my hopes that they would not insist upon enlarging the scope of the right of self-defense. Besides that, we discussed nothing pertaining to the Tripartite Pact. Hull never requested that we make a "concrete statement" concerning our relations with the Axis Powers. Had he done so, I would have been compelled to make some reply.

For the sake of reassuring myself, I had Wakasugi make indirect reference to this matter to Ballantine who was present on the occasion in question. Wakasugi asked Ballantine if he could remember any other points that might have been discussed, stating that he wanted this information for the sake of the records. Ballantine replied that he could recall nothing further.

If any mention was made of the topic you state was in the records of the meeting, it would not be likely that Ballantine, who was the only other person there, knows nothing about it. No doubt there is some mistake there. You are aware, of course, that the United States is trying to get us to assure them on our stand with regard to our duties under the terms of the Pact. You can see that by the contents of their proposal.

 

A-55

 

(Please insert "766-(2)" following that part reading "764" in (2) of this message."

 


[a] See IV, 92.

[b] See IV, 71.

[c] See IV, 82. Note: In connection with this reference see last sentence above.

[d] See IV. 107.

 

Trans.  11-17 41

 

No. 109

 

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     November 14, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   # 771.

 

I finally received your # 1087 [b] at 10:30 P.M. on the 13th. As I told you in my # 745 [a], I want you to wire me quickly brief summaries of such conversations as the one on the 14th. You may wire me the details later at your convenience.

 


[a] See IV, 100-102.

[b] See IV, 92.

Trans.  11-14-41

 

No. 110

 

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             November 14, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1090.

 

(Part 1 of 3.) (Departmental Secret.)

(To be handled in Government Code.)

 

I am telling Your Excellency this for your own information only.

I believe that I will win out in the long run in these negotiations, and I will fight to the end. I will do my very best with infinite patience and then leave the outcome up to God Almighty. However, I must tell you the following:

1. As I told you in a number of messages, the policy of the American Government in the Pacific is to stop any further moves on our part either southward or northward. With every economic weapon at their command, they have attempted to achieve this objective, and now they are contriving by every possible means to prepare for actual warfare.

2. In short, they are making every military and every other kind of preparation to prevent us from a thrust northward or a thrust southward; they are conspiring most actively with the nations concerned and rather than yield on this fundamental political policy of theirs in which they believe so firmly, they would not hesitate, I am sure, to fight us. It is not their intention, I know, to repeat such a thing as the Munich conference which took place several years ago and which turned out to be such a failure. Already I think the apex of German victories has been passed. Soviet resistance persists, and the possibility of a separate peace has receded, and hereafter this trend will be more and more in evidence.

 

A-56

 

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR  

 

3. The United States is sealing ever-friendlier relations with China, and insofar as possible she is assisting CHIANG. For the sake of peace in the Pacific, the United States would not favor us at the sacrifice of China. Therefore, the China problem might become the stumbling block to the pacification of the Pacific and as a result the possibility of the United States and Japan ever making up might vanish.

 

Trans.  11-17-41

 

No. 111

 

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             November 14, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1090.

 

(Urgent)

 

(Part 2 of 3.) (Departmental Secret.)

 

(To be handled in Government Code.)

 

4. There is also the question of whether the officials of the Japanese Government are tying up very intimately with the Axis or not. We are regarded as having a very flexible policy, ready, nevertheless, in any case, to stab the United States right in the back. Lately the newspapers are writing in a manner to show how gradually we are tying up closer and closer with the Axis.

5. If we carry out a venture southward for the sake of our existence and our lives, it naturally follows that we will have to fight England and the United States, and chances are also great that the Soviet will participate. Furthermore, among the neutral nations, those of Central America are already the puppets of the United States, and as for those of South America, whether they like it or not, they are dependent for their economic existence on the United States and must maintain a neutrality partial thereto.

6. It is inevitable that this war will be long, and this little victory or that little victory, or this little defeat or that little defeat do not amount to much, and it is not hard to see that whoever can hold out till the end will be the victor.

7. It is true that the United States is gradually getting in deeper and deeper in the Atlantic, but this is merely a sort of convoy warfare, and as things now stand she might at any moment transfer her main strength to the Pacific.

 

Trans.  11-17-41

 

No. 112

 

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             November 14, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1090.

 

(Part 3 of 3.) (Secret outside the Department.)

 

Great Britain, too, in the light of the present condition of the German and Italian navies, has, without a doubt, moved considerable strength into the area of the Indian Ocean. I had expected in the past that should the United States start war-like activities in the Atlantic, there would be considerable feeling for a compromise in the Pacific, but there has been no evidence of such an inclination as yet. There are even now many arguments against war with Germany as opposed to internal questions, but there is not the slightest opposition to war in the Pacific. It is being thought more than ever that participation will be carried out through the Pacific area.

 

A-57

 

8. Though I cannot be a hundred per cent sure of the present situation in Japan, having read your successive wires I realize that the condition must be very critical. In spite of the fact that it is my understanding that the people and officials, too, are tightening their belts, I am going to pass on to you my opinion, even though I know that I will be harshly criticized for it. I feel that should the situation in Japan permit, I would like to caution patience for one or two months in order to get a clear view of the world situation. This, I believe, would be the best plan.

Furthermore, I would like to call your attention again to my wires Nos. 894 [a] and 901 [b] sent to you on the 3rd and 4th of November, respectively.

 


[a] Message in which NOMURA gives his views on the present world situation.

[b] (See III, 246) Ambassador Nomura apologizes for expressing himself carelessly on the spur of the moment on October 3 and ventures the opinion that Japan will have to drastically reorganize her economy before she is able to become self-sufficient as a result of the establishment of the sphere of co-prosperity. He suggests a profitable foothold from a southward movement within several years.

 

Trans.  11-22-41

 

No. 113

 

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             November 14, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1093.

 

Re my # 1073 [a].

 

According to what _____ [b], told IGUCHI, the document which the Chinese Ambassador submitted to the State Department was a message which CHIANG KAI-SHEK had addressed to the President and contained a plea for intensive American aid to China in the event Japan attacks the Burma Road; but, since the United States Government rejected the plea, T. V. SOONG is now endeavoring to get Secretary HULL and the President interested in it.

Please tell the telegraphic section to cancel the message indicated in the caption of your # 767 [c].

 


[a] (See IV, 84) The Chinese Ambassador to the United States had an audience with the President on the 10th and handed him a document.

[b] Name withheld.

[c] Not available.

 

Trans.  11-18-41

 

No. 114

 

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     November 15, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   # 775.

 

Through my various messages on the subject, you are fully aware of the fact that these talks have gone beyond the preliminary stage and that they are now well within the realm of the "real thing". It is true that at the time the Konoye statement was dispatched, the negotiations were more or less conducted as preliminary to a meeting of "the leaders".

 

A-58

 

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR  

 

However, for all practical purposes, the talks had gone beyond the point where they could be termed as being of a "preliminary" nature. By that time, we had centered all of our efforts toward bringing about a speedy termination of the talks. That has been made perfectly clear. I feel sure that the United States too, regardless of what they may have said, recognized this fact from a realistic point of view.

It is true that the United States may try to say that since we made no particular mention of the changed status of the talks, they were under the impression that they were still of a preliminary nature.

Whatever the case may be, the fact remains that the date set forth in my message #736 [a] is an absolutely immovable one. Please, therefore, make the United States see the light, so as to make possible the signing of the agreement by that date.

 


[a] See IV, 44.

 

Trans.  11-15-41

 

No. 115

 

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             November 15, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1098.

 

(In 2 parts complete.)

 

Let us suppose that the Japanese-U. S. negotiations for the adjustment of relations between the two countries which are being conducted at present, unfortunately break down, and that, as a consequence, we pursue an unrestricted course. The following is my guess as to what would be the relationship between the United States and Japan under such circumstances.

Much, of course, would depend on what move we make and how we make it, but

(a) It is most probable that diplomatic relations between the two countries would be broken off immediately;

(b) Even if they are not, the same situation as now exists between Germany and the United States—that is, the closing of the consulates and recalling of the Ambassador—will probably be effected. (Through the application of the order freezing the assets, economic relations have already been broken off for all practical purposes.) Under such circumstances, only a small staff will remain at the Embassy here. (Please see my separate wire # 1099 [a] for my suggestion as to the personnel of such a reduced staff.)

I presume that the government has given careful consideration as to the disposition of the various offices and our nationals residing here. I would appreciate being advised in confidence of your decision in these matters.

In the event of (b), I presume that the same procedure as was followed in the case of U. S.-Germany will be followed. That is, personnel of the consulates of the respective countries will no doubt be evacuated by mutual consent. We can see that it could be possible for the officials and businessmen who remained here at that time (they would total about 300 or 400) to be evacuated on another vessel. However, we fear that the number of persons desiring passage will undoubtedly skyrocket. The Consuls will, of course, urge our nationals to remain here even if the worst eventually should materialize, but we feel that there will be many who, because of various circumstances, will find it impossible to do so.

It will be practically impossible to make a distinction between them and officials and businessmen. Will you, therefore, give your consideration to sending enough ships to evacuate these people.

 

A-59

 

(Part 2.)

 

In the event of (a)

(1) No doubt some agreement between the United States and Japan will be entered into to guarantee the safe passage of Embassy and Consulate staff members, (agreements will no doubt be entered into with regard to the course of the vessel, markers, and communication methods). (One plan may be to have these officials sent to some half-way point, for example Hawaii, some port in the Aleutian Islands, or, if unavoidable to French Tahiti, on ships belonging to the nation to which they are accredited, and at such prearranged place, have the respective ships exchange passengers.) To the representative of what nation do we plan to entrust our national property and to protect the rights of our nationals remaining here? Is it correct to assume that negotiations with the country which has been selected will be completed in Tokyo with the diplomatic representative of that country and in that country by our ambassador or minister?

(2) Japanese residents here who are of military age, will undoubtedly be held here. Therefore, a plan to exchange our nationals residing here for Americans residing in Japan is conceivable, but in view of the difference in numbers, it is indeed a very slim hope. Dependence on ships of neutral register, too, would be an exceedingly precarious undertaking should war actually be declared. We would appreciate being advised of the government's attitude on these points.

 


[a] See IV, 116.

 

Trans.  11-19-41

 

No. 116

 

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             November 15, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1099.

 

1. Duties are to be limited to only the most pressing matters. Other non-urgent duties, such as auditing of accounts, will be dropped. Accordingly, I desire to have one or two secretaries, two foreign service attaches, and one clerk ordered back to Japan. (There are family considerations involved in the case of Foreign Service Attaches Fujiyama and Inagawa. If possible we would like to have these two returned to Japan.)

2. The intelligence staff will not be returned (to Japan). Instead, we plan to arrange for their transfer to South America; (Secretary Terazaki and Clerk Yamamoto).

3. All overseas students and so-called student attaches will be returned to Japan or transferred elsewhere. (Attaches Ando, Honjo, Nishibori, Arita, Matsui and six 2nd class clerks.)

4. Employees engaged locally will be dismissed as the occasion may demand.

5. Those returning to Japan would go in one of the evacuee ships. Those transferring to South America, or elsewhere, would leave immediately for their posts.

 

Trans.  11-19-41

 

A-60

 

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR  

 

No. 117

 

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     November 15, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   #781.

 

To Ambassador Kurusu.

 

I wish to express my sympathy on the presumption that you must be experiencing considerable fatigue as a consequence of your long trip by air. Not only this Minister, but everyone in government circles, feels deep gratitude that you have agreed to tackle the exceedingly difficult problems which confront us. As I said, I realize that your task is a difficult one, but at the same time it is an important one; success or failure will have a great bearing on the rise or decline of our nation.

Please explain to Ambassador Nomura the conditions which exist here, and at the same time describe our determinations in detail to him. After you have perfect understanding of each other, cooperate with him in an unsparing effort to guide the negotiations to an early settlement. That is my fervent prayer which I hope may be granted.

Even after the presentation of the final proposal by us, the U. S. Government apparently continues to show laxness. There are even those who suspect that the United States is intentionally stalling for time. In view of the fact that the crisis is fast approaching, no subsidiary complications can be countenanced even when considering the time element alone. Such an eventuality would make impossible the surmounting of the crisis.

Please familiarize yourself with my various instructions to Ambassador Nomura on this subject, after which do everything in your power to make the United States come to the realization that it is indeed a critical situation. I beg of you to make every effort to have them cooperate with us in assuring peace on the Pacific.

Because of your expressed desires prior to your departure from here, we have not as yet presented our "B" proposal to the United States. We are of the opinion, however, that we had better submit it to them at an early opportunity.

 

Trans.  11-17-41

 

No. 118

 

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             November 14, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1094.

 

(To be handled in Government code.)

 

My interview of the 14th, with Secretary of State HULL, has been postponed until 9:00 a.m. the 16th, to suit their convenience. Furthermore, I have contacted them and arranged an interview with the President for 11:00 a.m. on the 16th for Ambassador KURUSU and myself. (Prior to this interview we plan to pay our respects to Secretary of State HULL.)

Trans.  11-18-41

 

No. 119

 

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             November 15, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1095.

 

(In 2 parts complete.)

 

On this, the 15th, I, accompanied by Wakasugi, called on Secretary Hull, (Ballantine was also present), for an interview which lasted about one hour and a half. I shall report in detail subsequently, but in the meantime, I am sending you a resume of the meeting as follows:

 

A-61

 

The United States handed us an explanation of their stand on the "non-discriminatory treatment in commerce" matter, which I am forwarding to you as separate wire "A", numbered my message # 1096 [a]; separate wire "B", numbered my message # 1097 [b], contains the text of their proposal involving this matter. (The latter is a proposed joint statement on economic policy and is composed of (1) general policy; (2) Japanese-U. S. relations; and, (3) policies involving the Pacific area.)

We stated that we would give these notes our careful study and after requesting our government's advice, would make a reply. We went on to say that we insist that these talks have now progressed to the negotiations stage.

To this Hull replied that before any settlements can be reached, it is necessary that other countries involved, such as Britain and the Netherlands East Indies, be consulted. This procedure is desired by Japan too, he pointed out. There are reasons, he said, that make it inconvenient for the United States to state that negotiations are being conducted with Japan alone, before they have had a chance to participate therein. He went on to repeat that for those reasons, these talks shall continue to be of an exploratory nature. At the same time, the continuation of these conversations shall not be hampered, he promised.

We then requested that he reply with regard to other matters to which Hull said:

"Japan on the one hand is attempting to enter into a peaceful agreement with the United States, while simultaneously, on the other hand, she is insisting that her military alliance with Germany be maintained. I, personally, can understand Japan's explanations, however, I feel that it would be exceedingly difficult to make the general U. S. public and even of the world, see through the seeming paradox.

 

(Part 2.)

"For this reason, it is essential that we have the definite word of the new Japanese Cabinet on the peaceful policy. In other words, it is essential that this new Cabinet give definite recognition and approval of the statement submitted by the previous government concerning this matter. On 21 June, we made certain proposals which concerned political stabilization of the entire Pacific area. Even if Japan were to favor limiting this area to only the south-western Pacific area, the United States would continue to desire that it be made applicable to the entire Pacific area.

"Therefore, we shall submit our reply on the other two points only after we have received a reply to the proposal we are submitting to you today."

We therefore stated that our government's attitude has already been expressed by the contents of our proposal through which it may be seen that there have been no changes therein. However, for the sake of reassurance, we would ascertain this point, we said.

Hull expressed several doubts concerning our relations to the Tripartite Pact. He pointed out that in spite of the Japanese-U. S. S. R. neutrality pact, it was apparently essential that great armed forces of both countries had to constantly face each other across the Japanese-U. S. S. R. border. The United States wants no peace of that nature. He went on to say that the United States desires that simultaneously with a peace agreement between Japan and the United States, the Tripartite Pact shall become a mere scrap of paper.

We, therefore, repeated that part of our proposal which involved that alliance and again pointed out that there need be no clash between U. S.-Japanese peace and the government would no doubt be very disappointed at the results of today's conversations. We then decided to meet again after I had received my government's further instructions.

Will you, therefore, please rush your instructions concerning the matters contained herein.

 


[a] See IV, 121.

[b] See IV, 127.

 

Trans.  11-18-41

 

A-62

 

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR  

 

No. 120

 

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             November 15, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1106.

 

(In 6 parts, complete.)

Chief of Office routing

 

The following is the conversation I had with Hull on the 15th, the gist of which I reported to you in my message # 1095 [a]:

Hull said that the United States is making sincere efforts too, and through such efforts, he said, he is now able to present a proposal concerning the commerce problem. So saying, he related to me Note "A", which was reported to you as my message # 1096 [b].

Hull: "The United States has entered into trade agreements with 22 nations, all of which are based on the status of a "most-favored nation." Through them trade barriers throughout the world are being removed. There actually are between 1000 and 1200 articles on which tariffs have been substantially reduced. I strongly advocated this policy at the Economic Conference which was held in London some time ago, but because opposition to it was voiced by some, it was not adopted at that time." (He added that Germany was one of the countries which was opposed to it.)

"In this way, the United States desires to apply the non-discriminatory policy over a wide scope. Japan wants that part of the proposal which advocates the application of these terms to the entire Pacific area to be revised so that it will be applicable to the entire world. The United States is unable to guarantee any conditions which are outside of the United States' sphere of influence. Therefore, I hope that Japan will agree to delete her condition, in which she insists that she will agree to applying the non-discriminatory treatment to the Pacific area only if it is applied to the world."

 

(Part 2.)

So saying, he submitted Note "B" which contains the U. S. proposal and which was sent to you as my message # 1097 [c]. Wakasugi asked Hull if this was a counter proposal to that part of our proposal which we submitted the other day concerning the three major problems pertaining to non-discrimination. Hull replied that in its application it covers a wider range, (meaning, apparently, that its contents covers a wider range). I, therefore, advised Hull that we would give it our study and that we would seek our government's opinion thereon after which I would submit our reply.

I said: "Since official proposals have been submitted by me to the President and the Secretary of State, we feel that these talks should be looked upon as negotiations."

Hull: "Your government may consider these talks as being negotiations today. As I said at our previous meeting, however, the subjects being discussed must be taken up with Britain, Netherlands, and others. Moreover, the Foreign Minister himself told Ambassador Grew in Tokyo that it was essential that those countries participate in the negotiations. For these reasons, we feel that it is necessary to hold these preliminary exploratory conversations between Japan and the United States first. It would be inappropriate if we were to consider these talks formal negotiations, because then it would seem as if we were trying to force whatever settlement we reached upon those other nations.

"I feel that we should first find the basic principles on which a suitable agreement could be reached, after which, the United States would reveal its attitude to those other countries, and ask them to participate in the final settlement. Thus until we work things out to a point which would seem to be satisfactory to all parties concerned, I shall consider these talks to be exploratory in nature.

 

A-63

 

(Part 3.)

"From a more practical viewpoint, too, if there were negotiations, the free exchange of opinions between the United States and Japan would be considerably hindered. In Tokyo the Foreign Minister requested to Ambassador Grew that ----- (several lines missing).

"In the United States proposal of 21 June, the United States advocates that that part pertaining to the political stabilization be made applicable to the entire Pacific area. Japan wants to limit it to the southwestern Pacific area only. In view of the fact that my talks with Your Excellency concerns the establishment of peace in the entire Pacific area, I find it difficult to understand Japan's desires to so limit the area. I would like to have this point explained."

He went on to repeat what he has said from time to time before, regarding Japan's peace policies and her connections in the Tripartite Pact.

 

(Part 4.)

Hull, as he did on the previous occasion, requested that the present government of Japan give its definite approval of the spirit of peace contained in our statement of 28 August.

I therefore replied: "The spirit of that statement was contained in our lastest proposal and therefore I am convinced that there has been no change in our government's attitude. We are doing everything in our power to bring about a settlement so that peace may be guaranteed on the Pacific. It is true that the words "southwestern Pacific" appear in the main text of our proposal, but in the preface thereto we made it clear that our aims are to establish and maintain peace on the entire Pacific area."

Hull: "The preface is not a part of the main text and therefore its contents had no binding powers. The only parts which have any binding powers are the contents of the main text."

So saying, he again repeated his doubts as to Japan's expressed peaceful intentions.

He went on to say that Japan is apparently wanting to enter into a peaceful agreement with the United States on the one hand while maintaining a military alliance with Germany on the other.

Hull: "I, myself, can understand Japan's viewpoint and explanations on this matter. The general public, however, are aware only that Japan is allied to Germany and to it—the general public—this has a very militaristic connotation. Should the United States, disregarding what seems to be a paradox, enter into a peace agreement with Japan, the general public and the world in general would probably howl with laughter. We would be in a very difficult position to try to make any explanations.

"If Japan succeeds in coming to an agreement with the United States, she would not find it necessary to hold on to the Tripartite Agreement, would she?

 

(Part 5.)

"While on the one hand Japan is asking that Britain and the Netherlands, which are at war with Germany, participate in a peaceful agreement which is to be established between Japan and the United States, while on the other she negotiates a military alliance with Germany which is the enemy of Britain and the Netherlands. That is incongruous."

I: "We have already explained our position in the Tripartite Pact in our proposal. As I said before, an alliance and a peace agreement need not necessarily be at odds with each other as may be seen by the example of the Japanese-British alliance. Fundamentally speaking, this alliance in question has peace as its main objective. Germany, too, understands that the alliance would not conflict with peace between Japan and the United States."

Hull: "If Japan insists on adhering to the alliance with Germany even after an agreement is reached between Japan and the United States, we could not explain the apparent paradox to other countries. The United States does not desire a situation such as exists between Japan and the U. S. S. R., which in spite of the fact that a Neutrality Pact exists, vast armed forces of each nation must constantly be facing each other across the national boundary.

 

A-64

 

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR  

 

We desire that simultaneously with the establishment of an agreement between Japan and the United States, the Tripartite Pact shall disappear." (He called it a "dead letter".)

Wakasugi: "In other words, do you mean that a U. S.-Japanese agreement is an impossibility as long as Japan does not withdraw from the Triple Alliance?"

Hull: "A peace agreement and a military alliance must be at odds with each other. Therefore, if and when an understanding is reached between Japan and the United States, I desire that the alliance become a dead letter".

Wakasugi: "May we consider that as your reply to our proposal pertaining to the matter of right of self-defense which is a part of the other two subjects?"

 

(Part 6.)

Hull: "Our reply to the other two problems will be issued after we receive: Definite assurance that your present government approves the peace policy expressed in a statement issued by the previous government; clarification of the meaning of changing "the entire Pacific area" in the U. S. proposal, to Japan's proposal's "southwestern Pacific area"; Japan's reply to today's U. S. proposal regarding a joint statement on the economic policy."

I said: "In view of the very critical situation, I am afraid that my government will be very disappointed over your replies."

We agreed to meet again after I had received further instructions from my home government.

Today's talks can be boiled down to the fact that the United States did clarify their attitude on the trade question. On the other two problems, although we agree in principle, we differ on interpretations. They harbor deep doubts as to the sincerity of our peaceful intentions and apparently they view the China situation through those eyes of suspicion.

Since the above seems to have been fairly clearly established, will you please speedily express your definite approval of the government's statement involved, so that we may make a reply to their proposal.

 


[a] See IV, 119.

[b] See IV, 121.

[c] See IV, 127.

 

Trans.  11-21-41

 

No. 121

 

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             November 15, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1096.

 

(Part 1 of 6.)

Chief of Office Routing.

Separate wire A.

Strictly confidential.

Oral.

 

The Japanese Government has stated that it "recognizes the principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations to be applied to all the Pacific areas, inclusive of China, on the understanding that the principle in question is to be applied uniformly to the rest of the entire world as well. " (Italics added)

 

A-65

 

The italicized portion of the statement sets forth a condition the meaning of which is not entirely clear. It is assumed, however, that it is not the intention of the Japanese Government to ask the government of the United States to assume responsibility for discriminatory practices in areas outside of its sovereign jurisdiction, or to propose including in an arrangement with the United States a condition which could be fulfilled only with the consent and cooperation of all other governments.

 

Note: This is Mr. Hull's Note, handed Nomura this date.

 

Trans.  11-18-41

 

No. 122

 

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             November 15, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1096.

 

(Part 2 of 6.)

 

The principle of unconditional most-favored-nation treatment has for many years been the cornerstone of the commercial policy of the United States. Since the first world war this principle has been embodied in virtually every commercial treaty concluded by this government.

Since 1934, when the United States embarked upon an extensive program of commercial agreements for the reduction of trade barriers, it has constantly applied this principle. In twenty-two agreements this government has on its part reduced duties on over a thousand classifications of the American tariff, and it has extended these reductions to Japan (and) all other countries of the world with only two exceptions. These exceptions have been countries whose commercial practices represented a flagrant departure from the principle of non-discriminatory treatment.

Trans.  11-19-41

 

No. 123

 

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             November 15, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1096.

 

(Part 3 of 6.)

 

The withholding of trade-agreement concessions from those countries was itself a step in furtherance of the policy of non-discrimination since the purpose was to create inducement for the abandonment of discriminatory practices. One of the countries from which the benefit of such concessions had been withheld abandoned its flagrant discriminatory measures; and the United States at once extended to that country the benefit of the duty reductions made in its trade agreements.

The government of the United States has not only placed its own trade relations with foreign countries on an unconditional most-favored-nation basis, but has sought consistently to further the application of that policy throughout the world. On every appropriate occasion it has urged upon other countries the adoption of non-discriminatory policies and has sought to bring about the progressive elimination of preferences and discriminations of all kinds.

 

Trans.  11-19-41

 

A-66

 

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR  

 

No. 124

 

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             November 15, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1096.

 

(Part 4 of 6.)

 

In the twenty-two trade agreements above referred to, the government of the United States has obtained from foreign countries commitments respecting the reduction of tariffs and other trade barriers on thousands of products. These concessions affect products which are imported not only from the United States but from other countries as well. The government of the United States has neither sought nor accepted commitments whereby these benefits would be restricted to imports from the United States. On the contrary, it has obtained these reductions in the trade barriers of foreign countries on the assumption and expectation that they would be extended to other supplying countries. Indeed, as part of its general policy of non-discrimination in international trade, it has advocated the extension to all countries of the concessions made in such agreements.

In this way the reduction of trade barriers which results from a program of trade agreements such as that pursued by the United States is given the widest possible effect and makes the maximum contribution to the building up of world trade from which all nations benefit.

Trans.  11-19-41

 

No. 125

 

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             November 15, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1096.

 

(Part 5 of 6.)

 

Chief of Office Routing.

 

It is believed that, if Japan would devote itself to wholehearted cooperation in furthering the policy of non-discrimination as practiced and advocated by the government of the United States and as practiced and advocated for many years by the government of Japan, a long forward step would be taken toward attaining the objective which the Japanese Government's statement under reference has in view.

In the light of the foregoing, the government of the United States raises question whether in the view of the Japanese Government there is need of the proviso under discussion, namely, "on the understanding that the principle in question is to be applied uniformly to the rest of the entire world as well," and whether the proviso might not be omitted.

Trans.  11-18-41

 

No. 126

 

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             November 15, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1096.

 

(Part 6 of 6.)

 

As a practical manifestation of the way in which the government of the United States has applied and is prepared to apply the principle of non-discrimination in international com-

 

A-67

 

mercial relations, there is offered for consideration as a purely tentative suggestion a draft of a possible United States-Japanese declaration on economic policy. It is understood, of course, that agreement as to such a declaration is subject to agreement on the other points involved in a peaceful settlement covering the Pacific area as a whole and that this government would expect, before entering into negotiations on such a possible United States-Japanese declaration on economic policy, to discuss the matter with the British Government and with other specially interested governments.

Trans.  11-19-41

 

No. 127

 

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             November 15, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1097.

 

(Part 1 of 4.)

Separate wire B.

Strictly Confidential Unofficial, Exploratory and Without Commitment.

 

Joint declaration by the United States and Japan on economic policy.

 

1. General policy.

1. The government of the United States and the government of Japan undertake to cooperate fully in urging all nations to reduce trade barriers, to eliminate all forms of discrimination in international  commercial relations, and in general to work toward the creation of conditions of international trade and international investment under which all countries will have a reasonable opportunity to secure, through peaceful trade processes, the means of acquiring those goods and commodities which each country needs for the safe-guarding and development of its economy.

2. The government of the United States and the government of Japan undertake that each of them shall make its appropriate contribution toward the creation of the type of international economic relations envisaged above.

 

Note: This is text of note "B" given Nomura by Mr. Hull.

Trans.  11-18-41

 

No. 128

 

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             November 15, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1097.

 

(Part 2 of 4.)

 

3. As important steps in that direction, the government of the United States and the government of Japan shall establish between themselves and shall seek to establish in the Pacific area the economic relationships indicated below.

 

2. The United States-Japan relationship

1. The United States and Japan undertake to inaugurate, as rapidly as practicable, measures toward restoring the commercial, financial and other economic relationships between them to a normal basis.

 

A-68

 

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR  

 

2. The United States and Japan agree to enter into discussion looking toward the negotiation of a reciprocal trade agreement between the two countries.

3. It is understood that during the present international emergency Japan and the United States each shall permit export to the other of commodities for its own use subject to such restrictions or limitations as may be required by each for its own security and self-defense. It is understood that both governments will apply any such restrictions or limitations in the spirit dominating relations with friendly nations.

 

Trans.  11-19-41

 

No. 129

 

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             November 15, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1097.

 

(Part 3 of 4.)

 

3. Policy in the Pacific area

1. Complete control over its economic, financial and monetary affairs shall be restored to China.

2. The government of the United States and the government of Japan undertake not to seek in China any preferential or monopolistic commercial or other economic rights for them-selves or their nationals, but to use all their influence toward securing in China commercial treatment for themselves no less favorable than that accorded to any third country and full cooperation in the promotion of the general policy stated in the first paragraph of this declaration.

3. The government of the United States and the government of Japan undertake to suggest to the Chinese government that it inaugurate, with foreign assistance where necessary, a comprehensive program of economic development, a full opportunity to participate in which shall be accorded the United States and Japan on terms no less favorable than those accorded any third country.

 

Trans.  11-19-41

 

No. 130

 

FROM: Washington                                                                             November 15, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1097.

 

(Part 4 of 4.)

 

4. The relations which the United States and Japan, respectively, will seek to establish with other countries of the Pacific area shall be governed by the basic principles set forth in this declaration, and the governments of the United States and of Japan agree to urge those countries, wherever possible, to undertake comprehensive programs of economic development with full opportunity to participate in such programs, in so far as foreign assistance may be requested, accorded to the United States and to Japan on terms no less favorable than those accorded any third country.

 

Trans.  12-2-41

 

A-69

 

No. 131

 

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     November 16, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   # 782.

 

(To be handled in government code.)

 

Re your # 1083 [a].

 

1. Please give the following reply to them regarding the question of recognition:

----- the various points in the statement made by the Japanese Government on August 28, which is included in the American oral statement (quote only the points given in the said oral statement) were also included in our proposals of September 6 and 25, and the present cabinet also has no objection to recognizing them as they stand. However, these points have been given on the assumption that the Japanese-American negotiations would reach an agreement. Naturally, therefore, should the negotiations end in a failure, these points would not be binding on Japan alone. We wish to have this clearly understood.

2. Regarding the general question of use of force, the expression "without provocation" was used in the reply of the Japanese Government made on August 28. In the same reply, relative to the Soviet question, we used the words "as long as the Soviet Union remains faithful to the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Treaty" and then in our proposal of September 6, we used the words "without any justifiable reason." Now all these expressions mean fundamentally the same thing. The reason for our having gone somewhat into detail concerning the Soviet Union is that we found it necessary to do so in view of the connection between the existence of the Japan-Soviet Neutrality Treaty and the Russo-German war.

In short, we had stipulated the "qualification" which we as an independent country should necessarily and naturally state. It goes without saying that this qualification by no means either limits nor minimizes our peaceful intentions.

 


[a] See IV, 93-99.

 

Trans.  11-17-41

 

No. 132

 

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     November 17, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   # 783.

 

Re your # 1110 [a].

 

We have no objections to have it apply to the entire Pacific area. Therefore, we shall not object to your deleting the word "southwestern" from Article 6 of our proposal of 25 September.

 


[a] Not available.

 

Trans.  11-17-41

 

No. 133

 

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             November 17, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1118.

 

(Part 1 of 5.)

 

A-70

 

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR  

 

(To be handled in government code.)

 

On the morning of the 17th at half-past ten, I, accompanied by Ambassador KURUSU, called on Secretary HULL. First HULL said, "After the last war there were no able statesmen; therefore, a situation like the present one came about. What we have to think about now is saving the world from this sort of extremity." KURUSU replied, "I am in entire agreement with what you say. Fortunately, the United States and Japan, who have not yet participated in this war, have a grave responsibility on their shoulders for working in this direction. However, before we can talk about that, there are some things which have to be settled between Japan and the United States. Still, if we do not engage in concrete negotiations, we cannot get anywhere." (Then he went on briefly to tell how he had come to the United States at the behest of the Premier and Your Excellency.) Then he continued: "The Premier earnestly hopes for a settlement between Japan and the United States. As a matter of fact, he seems to be rather hopeful beyond expectation. There are at present three problems causing a deadlock between Japan and the United States. They are: Equality in commerce, the Tripartite Agreement, and evacuation. The Premier seems to be very hopeful of a settlement concerning the first two. However, when it comes to the third question—that of evacuation—he seems to entertain great concern.

 

Trans.  11-21-41

 

No. 134

 

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             November 18, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1119.

 

(Strictly secret.)

(Restricted distribution.)

Re my # 1118 [a].

 

I presented the contents of your messages numbered #782 [b] (?) and #783 [c] to the Secretary of State at the time of our interview on the 17th, in the form of a verbal statement.

 


[a] (See IV, 133 and 135-137) Ambassador NOMURA's report of the conference with the President and Secretary HULL on the 17th.

[b] (See IV, 131) Tokyo's reply to the United States' oral statement of November 12, regarding the question of recognition and the general question of use of force.

[c] (See IV, 132) Tokyo wires Washington that it is all right to delete the word "southwestern" from Article 6 of the proposal of the 25th, thus having it apply to the entire Pacific area.

 

Trans.  11-22-41

 

No. 135

 

FROM: Washington                                                                             November 17, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1118.

 

(Extremely Urgent.)

 

(Part 2 of 5.)

 

Since the time had come to meet the President and since HULL has expressed his wish to continue the conversation in the presence of the President, we all left our seats. Together with Secretary HULL, I went to see the President at 11:00 a.m.

 

A-71

 

KURUSU began his conversation by saying, "As I had already told Secretary HULL, the present Cabinet is very much interested in the Japanese-American negotiations. You, Mr. President, as a statesman, no doubt well understand in what frame of mind the Japanese people are after four years of experience in the China incident. While on my way to this country I noticed—though I am not by any means an expert in making such observations—that the situation is militarily strained in Hong Kong, Manila and in other islands. The situation is so tense that we cannot tell when an explosion would occur and, even if it occurred, of what benefit would such a situation be to the United States and Japan? (The President showed that he felt the same way.) To be sure Japan wishes that the Japanese-American negotiations would prove to be a success. However, the time element must be taken into consideration. Delaying the solution avails Japan nothing since in the meantime conditions, both militarily and economically, would become less favorable to her if she is to defend herself. The Premier also seems to be quite hopeful that all of the three questions, namely, that of the Three Power Alliance and Pact and the question of withdrawing troops would be settled. [a] However, he is very much worried over the question of withdrawing troops."

 


[a] Translator's note: Apparently the writer neglected to include in the three questions that of non-discrimination in trade.

 

Trans.  11-18-41

 

No. 136

 

FROM: Washington                                                                             November 17, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1118.

 

(Part 3 of 5.)

 

The President: "A long time ago, Secretary of State Bryan once said, 'There is no last word between friends'."

"There have been many so-called 'non-aggression pacts' in the past, but all of them are now out of date. I believe, however, that by the establishing of some general understanding between the United States and Japan, the situation may be saved."

Kurusu: "That would seem to be very acceptable from my point of view. From my way of looking at it, apparently the main difficulties in the U. S.-Japanese negotiations to date, have been over the problem of what to do about Japan's connections with the Tripartite Pact, and what to do about the various claims that the United States has made with regard to the method in which the China Incident should be settled. In the final analysis, it would seem as if adjusting these two points is the main problem at hand at the present time.

"With regard to the Tripartite problem, Japan is bound by certain duties under the terms of that instrument. Moreover, she must consider her dignity and honor as a great power. Because of these considerations, it is impossible for her to violate the terms of the alliance. Since the United States has been strongly insisting right along that international agreements must be adhered to, I cannot believe that the United States is urging us to do so now. I feel doubly sure of this where the Tripartite Pact is concerned since the basic objectives of that pact are the prevention of the war's spreading and the maintenance of peace.

"Under these circumstances, it seems as though it should be possible to coordinate and adjust the two problems so as to bring about a settlement. Please understand, however, that no proposal, regardless of how good it may sound, can be accepted by Japan if the terms contained therein cannot be put into effect."

 

A-72

 

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR  

 

The President: "With regard to the China problem, I have been advised that Japan finds the withdrawal of troops from China a very difficult undertaking. The United States is not trying to intervene or mediate in the problems of Japan and China. I don't know whether there is such a word in the parlance of diplomats or not, but the United States' only intention is to become an 'introducer'."

 

Trans.  11-22-41

 

No. 137

 

FROM: Washington                                                                             November 17, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1118.

 

(Parts 4 and 5 of 5.)

 

(Part 4.)

Kurusu: "Concerning Japan's duties to go to war under the terms of the Tripartite Pact, Japan has stated that Japan alone will determine this. The United States apparently interprets this to mean that Japan will wait until the United States is deeply involved in the battle on the Atlantic and then stab the United States in the back. This is not the case. There have been indications in the past that there are those in the United States who have been laboring under the erroneous belief that Japan would move at Germany's demands; that Japan was merely Germany's tool. Japan issued the statement that she would act in accordance with Japan's decisions alone, for the purpose of correcting this misapprehension.

"In any event, if at this time a great understanding between the United States and Japan with regard to the Pacific can be reached as described by the President, such an understanding would far out-shine the Tripartite Pact. Under such circumstances, I feel confident that all doubts you may harbor regarding the application of the Tripartite Pact would automatically and completely melt away."

At this point, Hull broke in, and after describing Germany's policy of conquest, said: "Suppose that Germany succeeds in conquering England and then establishes various subservient governments in South America. Suppose after that that Germany attacks the United States with the British fleet. If the United States waits till then, it would be too late regardless of what she tries to do. That is why the United States must prepare her defenses now and this is what the United States calls her rights under defense. There is no reason why Japan cannot see this."

Thus did Hull go over his theory again.

The President: "The map I referred to in my speech the other day, which described German policy in Central and South America, was an authentic map. Its source was the German Government circles."

 

(Part 5.)

Kurusu: "Mr. President, a while ago you made reference to the general relationship between Japan and the United States. As long as we are speaking of peace on the Pacific, and since at least one side of the western hemisphere is on the Pacific, the various countries in Central and South America must be covered when we speak of the Pacific area. It would be impossible for Japan to be a partner in any project aimed at disturbing the peace of the western hemisphere.

"You say that people would give voice to their disapproval should these negotiations lead to a successful settlement between us on the grounds that Japan would be promising the United States peace while on the other hand she would be carrying the spear for Germany. From the beginning, however, the Japanese Government has been saying that should a just peace be established on the Pacific, she would withdraw her troops from French Indo-China. If, therefore, matters progress to that point, this withdrawal should satisfy the general public of the United States as actual proof of Japan's peaceful intentions.

 

A-73

 

"In any event, I am convinced that the immediate objective is to successfully and speedily come to an agreement on the various problems now being discussed at present between Ambassador Nomura and Secretary Hull."

Hull: "I favor the continuation of these talks. Heretofore, I and Ambassador Nomura have met and talked on numerous occasions but we always seem to come to a certain point and then start going around and around the same circle. I would welcome your—Kurusu—attacking this point from a different angle."

The President expressed his approval of this, and said: "I am planning to remain in Washington until this Saturday (the 24th). I shall be glad to discuss matters with you and Secretary Hull at any time before then.

 

Trans.  11-21-41

 

No. 138

 

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             November 17, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1121 (?).

 

Ambassador Kurusu and I expect to confer with the Secretary Hull again at 10 a.m. tomorrow, the 18th.

 

Trans.  11-21-41

 

No. 139

November 18, 1941

 

Communications Intelligence Report:

 

These were the important points:

 

Date of Operations                                               Serial

October 23-29, 1941                                      19-41, No. 907-100

 

Oct. 23

"Shinto Maru # 2 who has been previously serving the South China Fleet will probably move into the Mandates in the near future."

"Comairron 24 and Commander Yokohama Air Group are in Wotje vicinity. Commander Chitose Air Group is at Saipan. Commander Combined Air Force is appearing more frequently in traffic concerning the 24th Airron and with the Fourth Base Force Air Group."

 

Oct. 24

"During the evening two unidentified Marus (air tenders) were heard working KONGO MARU (Tender?). Direction-finder bearings indicate these units are probably enroute to the Mandates." (Marked by asterisk to denote important.)

 

Oct. 25

"The following units originated movement reports today—Commander # 1 Base Force CinC Third Fleet, Commander Northern Blockade Force, Commander Airron 6 and Commander Airrons Combined Fleet. This may be an indication of a large scale movement or possibly only a few ships in each group. Traffic routing and direction-finding bearings indicate no change in general direction."

"Shinto Maru #2 is now enroute to the Mandates apparently having Saipan as a destination."

 

A-74

 

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR  

 

"A new division is now being formed in the 4th Base Force at Truk. The Commander is now aboard an unidentified vessel enroute to Saipan from Truk. Two Maru units are apparently now enroute from the Empire to the Mandates to join this command."

 

Oct. 26

"NAGURA(?) (Salvage vessel) has now departed Yokosuka enroute to the Mandates."

"Considerable confusion now exists on all Mandate circuits, due largely to the extensive use of secret calls. Airron 24 units are continuously active on aircraft frequencies and traffic shows indication of the presence of a part of the Staff of the Combined Air Force command in the Mandates. Air Group Commanders make frequent changes in location, principally between Saipan, Truk, Jaluit and Wotje. Fourth Fleet units are concentrated in Truk area. Traffic indicates an increase in size on the 4th, 5th and 6th Base Force, particularly the 6th. Several additional itinerant marus are now moving toward the Mandates, some of which have previously been active in China waters. Traffic headings have indicated a possible connection between some Third and Fifth Fleet Units with Base Force units in Jaluit area. Occasional dispatches are originated by major units of the First and Second Fleets addressed to Mandate Base Force activities. As a result of the general appearance of traffic the following major units are being watched for a possible move into Mandate area: First Fleet, Second Fleet, Third Fleet, Fifth Fleet, Submarine Force, Combined Air Forces or Air Squadrons, Combined Fleet." (All marked by asterisk to denote important.)

"MATSUEI MARU—Fourth Fleet repair ship is now at Truk having recently arrived there from Palao area."

 

Oct. 28

"Commander Yokohama Air Group is at Wotje (Marshall Islands)."

"Increased radio activity between Mandates Islands and various units of the Combined and Third Fleets have been noted for the past two days possibly indicating movements of additional units to the Mandated area." (Marked by an asterisk to denote important.)

"Commander Third Base Force—Palao Area and a part of the Third Base Force staff is now aboard the KASHIMA, flagship Fourth Fleet in Truk area."

 

Oct. 29

"The KOMOBASHI is now on a course for the Ponape having completed a large irregular circuit around the Marshall Islands."

 

No. 140

 

FROM: Washington                                                                             November 17, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1127.

 

The most emphasis in the talks between Hull, myself, and Ambassador Kurusu on the 18th, (lasting about three hours), was placed on matters pertaining to the Triple Alliance. Hull, in his customary manner, denounced the Hitlerian policy of expansion through armed force. He pointed out that as long as Japan is tied up with such a policy through the Tripartite Pact, it would be difficult to adjust Japanese-U. S. relations.

Kurusu then said that it would be impossible to comply if he was demanding of Japan that she abrogate the Tripartite Pact. He also pointed out that the alliance is not aimed at expansion through the force of arms.

Hull said that he was in no position to tell Japan to abrogate the Pact but that as long as there is no substantiating proof of the real aims of the pact, it serves absolutely no purpose.

 

A-75

 

Then I and Kurusu explained that it was an impossibility to settle such a basic point in any specified time limit. However, to ease the exceedingly critical situation, the first step would be to mutually return to the situation which existed prior to the date on which the freezing of assets order was put into effect, (in other words, Japan would withdraw from south French Indo-China and the United States would rescind her order to freeze the assets). Talks should then be continued in a more congenial atmosphere, we suggested.

He did not seem particularly receptive to this suggestion. He said that if the government of Japan could make it clear that it wants to pursue a course of peace, then the United States would confer with the British on the subject of returning to the conditions which existed prior to the time that the freezing order went into effect. It is essential, however, that under those conditions, Japan continue to pursue a peaceful policy with ever increasing vigor.

There were indications that Hull, because of his usual cautious nature, was somewhat influenced by the exaggerated reports carried in the press regarding the Premier's speech in the Diet in which he expressed the three basic principles of international relations and intention of increasing the troops in French Indo China.

Details will be sent in a subsequent message.

 

Trans.  11-22-41

 

No. 141

 

FROM: Washington                                                                             November 18, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1131.

 

(5 Parts.)

 

(Foreign Office Secret.)

 

(Chief of Office routing.)

 

On the 18th, I, together with Ambassador Kurusu called on Secretary Hull at 10:30 in the morning and we conversed for two hours and forty-five minutes.

Hull (in his customary tone): "I am one who worried about Hitler's activities right from the beginning. However, at that time, no one paid any attention. He is a man who does not know how to stop once he starts. The United States will no doubt become his objective in the near future." (So saying, he repeated his theory which he expounded on the 17th.) "In the event that Hitler continues to be victorious, Japan should be thinking of his coming on to the East Asiatic stage. If Japan doesn't see this for herself, I can't feel sorry for her." (He continued in his usual vein, bringing up again a description of the 'confused era (?)' and the turn about in Germany's attitude toward the Soviet Union.)

"The basis of the national policy of the United States is and will be the maintenance of peace. Therefore, it is impossible for the United States to ever condone the policies of Hitler which depends on expansion through the force of arms.

"As long as Japan is tied to Hitler by means of the Tripartite Pact, there shall be great difficulties in adjusting Japanese-U. S. relations".

Placing emphasis on Japan's part in the Tripartite Pact the Secretary went on to describe his point of view.

Hull: "Even if an agreement is reached between Japan and the United States at this time, it would be impossible at this time to shake the general U. S. public's conviction that, as Germany is pursuing a policy  of expansion by force of arms, Japan is doing likewise in the Far East.

"Of the extremists in the United States, there are those who even say that the United States has become Hitler's partner in his policy of aggression, through her relationship with Japan.

 

A-76

 

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR  

 

(Part 2.)

"Even if some agreement is reached between Japan and the United States under present circumstances, it could mean no more than the existing agreement between Japan and the U. S. S. R., under which, the agreement notwithstanding, enormous forces, which are constantly being increased, have to be facing each other at all times.

"Unless the fundamental trouble is removed, it will be impossible to expect any progress in our talks."

Kurusu: "If something is impossible to do, it simply can't be done, regardless of what fancy words may be used to dress it up.

"Even if you tell us to abrogate, or at least to make ineffective, the Tripartite Pact at this time, that is something that is impossible for us to do."

Hull: "The United States is not in a position to demand that you nullify the effect of the Tripartite Pact. The only thing I say is that although I can comprehend the circumstances making it possible for Japan to maintain the status quo of her relationship to the Tripartite Pact and at the same time seek an agreement with the United States, in view of the nature of the United States, it is impossible to completely disregard the effects of public opinion."

Kurusu: "The alliance in question does not advocate, or even condone, expansion through the force of arms."

Hull: "If that is the case, it is a useless instrument unless some definite proof as to its purposes are presented."

Nomura: "It would be difficult to do so within any limited time. The situation in the southwestern Pacific area is at present very critical. To counter Japan's sending of troops to French Indo-China, Britain is increasing her armed forces in Singapore while the United States is doing likewise in the Philippine Islands.

 


[a] Translator's note: From cryptanalytic study the date is evidently the 18th.

 

Trans.  11-22-41

 

No. 142

 

FROM: Washington                                                                             November 18, 1941

                                                                                                      (Probable date of drafting)

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1129.

 

Re your # 784 [a] and my # 1106 [b].

 

During my talks with Hull on the 18th it became evident that he is thinking about readjusting the economic situation of the world after the conclusion of this war and that he has only a passing interest in the various problems of China. Furthermore, there are indications that the matter prognosticated by Ambassador Kurusu in the separate message, is also being given consideration by Hull.

As a matter of routine, of the three points contained in our Proposal "A", they are apparently desirous of first disposing the matter pertaining to non-discriminatory treatment. In view of this attitude on this subject, unless we delete from our Formula "A" that part which follows after "on the understanding", (as you are aware, Konoye's message contained no such qualification), and give them a more definite agreement, I fear that the progress of our talks may be impeded. This is, of course, not in accordance with our policy of a speedy settlement. Since our formula concerning non-discrimination is also contained in our "B" proposal, unless we reach an agreement on this point now, I fear that our Proposal "B" will not help matters any.

 

A-77

 

I realize thoroughly that there are domestic issues which make it very difficult. Please give your consideration to the deletion of that part which follows "on the understanding", etc.

 


[a] Explanation of phrase: "in the event that the principle of non-discriminatory treatment is applied to the entire world." We mean that it shall apply uniformly throughout the world. China included. Japan desires to apply it to China when world conditions are such that a majority of the nations are in favor of the principle.

[b] See IV, 120.

 

Trans.  11-25-41

 

No. 143

 

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             November 18, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1131.

 

(Part 3 of 5.) [a]

 

(To be handled in government code.)

 

"If we both undertake to increase our military strength at any time, something which we would regret might occur. Therefore, since, even though we keep fighting each other with broad, idealistic arguments there would be no end to them, let us first relax this tension for the time being. To do this we should return to the situation prior to the exercise of the freezing order. I mean Japan should evacuate southern French Indo-China, and in return the United States should rescind the freezing order. If the atmosphere is calm in this manner, there will be no need of sending warships to Singapore or strengthening military facilities in the Philippines. Then we would like to continue these talks." HULL said, "While we are not yet agreed on fundamental questions, it would be futile to do what you say as a temporary stop-gap measure. We hope that as first of the East Asiatic nations, Japan will take the leadership for a policy of peace. However, if a policy of armed conquest is to dominate Japan, we will consider it a danger to world peace, and we will not, by any means, yield. (To this both I and Ambassador KURUSU had something to say.) If the leaders of the Japanese Government will show that they will exert a peaceful policy in any event, why then, in turn, I will not object to getting in touch with Great Britain, the Netherlands, etc., and consider returning to the status prior to the exercise of the freezing order. However, this is so that Japanese politics will turn more and more toward a peaceful trend."

 


[a] Parts 1 and 2 not available.

Trans.  11-21-41

 

No. 144

 

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             November 18, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1131.

 

(Part 4 of 5.)

 

(To be handled in government code.)

 

Concerning the China question, HULL asked a question about the stationing of troops. I explained what you said in Proposal A of your # 726 [a] (of course, I didn't mention the twenty

 

A-78

 

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR  

 

five years you spoke of), and HULL let it go at that. Referring again to the China question, he said that England, the Netherlands and China had all contacted him, and KURUSU wanted to know on what points they were concerned. HULL said that he assumed that Great Britain was mainly interested in the principle of equality of treatment in commerce; that it was the same in the case of the Netherlands; and as for China, she merely spoke in generalities without going into definite matters. Now concerning the principle of equality of treatment, the following conversation took place: HULL: "Have you received any reply from Tokyo on our proposal of the 15th?" (See my # 1095 [b]) KURUSU: "Well, we have a general answer, but further study is necessary. I haven't enough to tell you yet. You seem to mean that the United States can't bear the responsibility of other countries. Well, aren't we pretty much in the same position? Until peace is established between Japan and China, we could say the same thing about the China question, I think. You see, Japan and the United States are in different economic positions. You Americans are in an advantageous position relative to the various nations when it comes to commercial negotiations. We do not have the advantageous bargaining position that you have.

 


[a] See IV, 25-28.

[b] See IV, 119.

 

Trans.  11-21-41

 

No. 145

 

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             November 18, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1131.

 

(Urgent.)

 

(Part 5 of 5.)

 

(To be handled in government code.)

 

"There is a remarkable difference between the extent to which the economy of the United States depends on foreign trade and that to which ours does. You cannot measure them by the same rule. When the economic set-up is suddenly disrupted, great turbulence ensues. Take, for example, the question of controlled exchange in North China. If that were abolished now, the economy of a hundred million Chinese would be thrown into chaos. Now out of consideration of the welfare of the Chinese people alone, we could not do such a thing as that." HULL: "I well understand that. When I was insisting on the principle of equality of treatment in commerce, I had the post-war situation in mind. I rather think that in post-war economic reconstruction, probably the principle of non-discrimination will be an all-encompassing one. What I would like to see is Japan and the United States working together for the principle of nondiscrimination. Now all along I've fought against the preferential system of the British Empire resulting from the Ottawa Conference, and now we are talking it over with England. I don't want you to tell anybody about this, but don't you know, only lately Great Britain is coming around to my point of view." (In this connection, see the newspaper article quoted in separate wire # 1132 [a].)

 


[a] Not available

Trans.  11-21-41

 

A-79

 

No. 146

 

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             November 18, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1134.

 

(Part 1 of 2.)

 

Re my # 1131 [a].

 

In our conversations of today, as a practical means of alleviating the ever worsening front with which we are faced and to quiet the fearful situation, as well as to bring about a return to the situation existing before the application of the freezing legislation, we suggested the evacuation of Japanese troops stationed in the southern part of French Indo-China.

HULL, showing considerable reluctance replied, "After Japan has clearly demonstrated her intentions to be peaceful I will confer with Britain, the Netherlands and other interested powers."

In the past it would seem that the greatest stumbling block for the American authorities was the question of our troops of occupation in China. Recently, however, the United States, what with her internal situation and, especially insofar as it concerns the revision of the Neutrality Agreement, her increasing involvement in the war in the Atlantic, seems to have undergone a change. She is now, rather, exhibiting a tendency to lay more emphasis on Japan's peace plans insofar as they pertain to the Tripartite Alliance. With regard to other questions, too, it seems very clear that they are of a mind to bring about a compromise after making sure of our peaceful intentions. In view of these circumstances, as a result of our deliberations of successive days it would seem that should we present Proposal "B" immediately, an understanding would be more difficult to realize than if we went on with our discussions of Proposal "A". Therefore, looking at it from a practical point of view, we are of the opinion that prior to presenting of Proposal "B" it would be more advisable to reach a practical settlement, principally on the questions of the acquisition of goods and the cancellation of the freezing legislation mentioned in Proposal "B" and then to try to proceed with the solution of other questions on this basis. Unless we follow this course we are convinced that an immediate solution will be extremely difficult.

 


[a] See IV, 141.

Trans.  11-21-41

 

No. 147

 

FROM: Washington                                                                             November 18, 1941

                                                                                                      (Probable date of drafting)

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1134.

 

(Part 2.)

 

It is true that the Konoye government reiterated its approval of the government's statement referred to here. However, that statement carried several supplementary notes, some of which apparently aroused the suspicion of the United States. These supplementary notes were of such character that even if they are not written down in black and white, they would naturally become applicable under the rights of self-defense in the event that to do so becomes necessary.

 

A-80

 

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR  

 

Please therefore issue a statement as that of the new government's, in which there are no provisional notes, and which express our peaceful policies.

The United States, of course, has indicated clearly that she is not interested in mere promises as much as she is in putting said promises in effect. It is necessary, therefore, for us to be prepared to withdraw our troops as soon as the freezing order is rescinded and materials are made available to us.

Please advise us as to your intentions after perusing my message # 1133 [a]. (Hull told me that he would be glad to see me at any time. However, the day after tomorrow, the 20th, is a major holiday here, so if you could make it possible for me to make a reply tomorrow, it would be very convenient for me.)

 


[a] Not available.

Trans.  11-24-41

 

No. 148

 

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     November 19, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   Circular #2353.

 

Regarding the broadcast of a special message in an emergency.

In case of emergency, (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations), and the cutting off of international communications, the following warning will be added in the middle of the daily Japanese language short wave news broadcast.

(1) In case of a Japan-U. S. relations in danger—HIGASHI NO KAZEAME (East Wind rain).

(2) Japan-U. S. S. R. relations—KITANOKAZE KUMORI-(North Wind cloudy).

(3) Japan-British relations: NISHI NO KAZE HARE-(West Wind clear).

This signal will be given in the middle and at the end as a weather forecast and last sentence will be repeated twice. When this is heard please destroy all code papers, etc. This is as yet to be a completely secret arrangement.

 

Trans.  11-28-41

 

No. 149

 

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     November 19, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   Circular #2354.

 

When our diplomatic relations are becoming dangerous, we will add the following at the beginning and end of our general intelligence broadcasts:

(1) If it is Japan-U. S. relations, "HIGASHI".

(2) Japan-Russia relations, "KITA".

(3) Japan-British relations, (including Thai, Malaya and N.E.I.)—"NISHI". The above will be repeated five times and included at beginning and end.

 

Trans.  11-26-41

 

A-81

 

No. 150

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     November 14, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   # 772.

 

(Urgent.)

 

The time of presentation of Proposal B will be according to my instructions of today. We have drawn up this proposal in a formal measure including the addendum. (I mean to say the proposal you are to present to the American officials upon instructions from me.) I am sending to you the English text thereof in ensuing message # 773 [a].

 


[a] See IV, 151.

 

Trans.  11-14-41

 

No. 151

 

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     November 14, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   # 773.

 

(Urgent.)

 

Points 1, 2, 3, and 4 are given in my # 727 [a].

 

5. The Japanese Government agrees to withdraw her army, which is at present stationed in French Indo-China, whenever peace shall have been established between Japan and China or a just peace firmly established in the Pacific area.

6. The Japanese Government (agrees ?) that if the principle of non-discriminatory treatment in trade is to be applied throughout the world the same principle should also be applied to the entire Pacific area, in other words, in China as well.

7. The two governments shall make world peace their common objective and shall cooperate at a suitable time for speedy realization of world peace. However, in dealing with developments prior to the establishment of world peace, the two governments shall act in accordance with the viewpoint of protection and self defense. Furthermore, in the event of the United States' participation in the European war, Japan shall automatically carry out what she understand to be the obligations which befall her as a party to the Three Power Agreement existing between Japan, Germany and Italy. (Point 7 is identical with what is given in paragraph 2 of our proposal of ----- of this month and does not contain the purport given in the first part of (2) of our Proposal "A". This is for your information.)

 


[a] See IV, 29.

 

Trans.  11-14-41

 

No. 152

 

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     November 15, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   # 779.

 

Re my # 727 [a].

 

A-82

 

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR  

 

The English text of (our) Proposal "B" is being forwarded separately as # 780 [b].

 


[a] See IV, 29.

[b] See IV, 153.

Trans.  11-17-41

 

No. 153

 

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     November 15, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   # 780.

 

(Part 2 of 2, Part 1 not yet available.)

 

Chief of Office routing.

 

English text.

 

6. The Japanese Government recognizes the principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations to be applied to all the Pacific areas, inclusive of China, on the understanding that the principle in question is to be applied uniformly to the rest of the entire world as well.

7. Both governments maintain it their common aim to bring about the peace in the world, and, when an opportune time arrives, they will endeavor jointly for the early restoration of the world peace.

With regard to the developments of the situation prior to the restoration of the world peace, the governments of Japan and the United States will be guided in their conducts by considerations of protection and self-defense: and, in case the United States should participate in the European war, Japan would decide entirely independently in the matter of interpretation of the Tripartite Pact between Japan, Germany and Italy, and would likewise determine what actions might be taken by way of fulfilling the obligations in accordance with the said interpretation.

 

Trans.  11-17-41

 

No. 154

 

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             November 20, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           #1144.

 

(Extremely Urgent.)

 

At noon on the 20th I, accompanied by Ambassador KURUSU, called on Secretary HULL at the State Department and we talked for an hour and a half. Today we went into a somewhat lengthy explanation of the various subjects taken up in the instructions in your message #798 [a]. On everything else HULL expressed no noteworthy differences of opinion, however, when we came to the part about the United States doing nothing to obstruct our efforts for a comprehensive peace with China, he showed that he was terribly aroused. He said, "So long as it is not made clear that Japan is turning toward a peaceful policy it will be impossible to stop aiding CHIANG just like it will also be impossible to cut off assistance from Great Britain,"

 

A-83

 

or words to that effect. He said that in any case, after particular study, he would have some views to express.

 


[a] Tokyo says that no further concessions can be made other than the "B" Proposal and if the United States' consent to this cannot be secured negotiations will have to be broken off.

 

Trans.  11-22-41

 

No. 155

 

FROM: Washington                                                                             November 24, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           #1147.

 

(Very Urgent.)

 

Departmental secret.

 

To be handled in Government Code.

 

(Part 1 of 2.)

 

Our conversation with HULL on the 20th may be summarized as follows: (That day is America's biggest holiday. They call it "Thanksgiving." In spite of that, however, Mr. HULL not only agreed to talk with, but seemed glad to see both me and Ambassador KURUSU when we went to call on him.)

First, we explained the various items mentioned in the instructions in your #798 [a]. HULL had only one or two questions about the other parts and expressed hardly any opinions but, when we came to the part where we state that we do not want the United States to do anything to hinder us in bringing about a complete peace over China, he seemed extremely reluctant to consider it. He went on to reiterate what he had always said about the Tri-Partite Alliance. He said that so long as fears emanating from that treaty existed in the heads of the Americans, the United States would find it well-nigh impossible to cease aiding CHIANG KAI-SHEK and that, as we know, the United States is now opposing the German policy of military expansion which knows no bounds; that on the one hand she is helping Great Britain and on the other hand CHIANG KAI-SHEK; that therefore until we Japanese made it perfectly clear that our policy is to be one of peace, it will be impossible to cease aiding China, just like it will be impossible to stop aiding England. He continued that, leading up to the state of affairs we find today, American interests in Japan, including Manchukuo, had undergone terrible embarrassment.

 


[a] Which tells Ambassador NOMURA to present Proposal "B" to the U. S. Government and says that no further concessions will be made.

 

Trans.  11-24-41

 

No. 156

 

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             November 24, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1147.

 

(Part 2 of 2.) (Departmental Secret.)

 

A-84

 

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR  

 

(To be handled in Government Code.)

 

KURUSU said, "When I had an interview with the President the other day, he talked as if he would like to act as an introducer. Now if he wants to take the trouble to do this introducing in order to bring about peace, I cannot reconcile it with continued assistance to CHIANG KAI-SHEK, which actually hinders peace. In other words; it seems quite reasonable to us to ask the President to stop aiding CHIANG if he is going to act as an introducer." HULL replied, "Well, what the President meant when he said that was that he was presupposing that you Japanese would first make it apparent that your fundamental policy was peaceful. Heretofore, influential Japanese statesmen have expressed opinions favorable to HITLER's military expansion policy, and the American people find it very difficult to believe that Japan is turning peaceful." I said, "Well, the plan which I propose today makes no progress whatever on two or three points. However, since the situation is so tense, if the tension between Japan and the United States can be relaxed, be it ever so little, particularly in the southwestern Pacific, and quickly clear the atmosphere, then I think we could go on and settle everything else." HULL said, "Yes, I understand what you mean thoroughly, but that would be very hard to do. In any case, you and I have on our shoulders a heavy responsibility toward both the Japanese and American people. I might say toward the whole human race." Mr. HULL's face assumed a sadly compassionate expression, and he said, "I want to think over this proposal you have brought me fully and sympathetically, and then I want to talk to you again.

 

Trans.  11-22-41

 

No. 157

 

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             November 20, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           #1148.

 

(To be handled in government code.)

 

Secretary of State HULL, in the conversations I detailed in my # 1144 [a], expressed his satisfaction that in the last two or three days Japanese newspaper editorial comment on the United States had become calm. This, doubtless, is due to your great efforts.

Since newspaper editorial comment in this country has become extremely circumspect in conjunction with our conversations, no doubt as a reflection of State Department opinion, I would like to have you continue your efforts in guiding newspaper opinion.

 


[a] See IV, 154.

 

Trans.  11-24-41

 

No. 158

 

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             November 22, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1158.

 

(Government Code.)

 

(Secret outside the Department.)

 

Re your # 817 [a].

 

A-85

 

As you are aware, I have advised them concerning the first part. Insofar as the latter part of that message is concerned, on the occasion of the interview outlined in my # 1147 [b], no reference was made to this matter. However, after they have studied the matter, they will doubtless present some opinions concerning it.

Furthermore, Ambassador KURUSU and myself, at their request, are scheduled to have an interview, as already announced, with Secretary of State HULL at 8:00 P.M. today, the 22nd.

 


[a] Not available.

[b] See IV, 155, 156.

 

Trans.  11-24-41

 

No. 159

 

FROM: Washington                                                                             November 23, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           #1160.

 

(In 2 parts, complete.)

 

Re my # 1159 [a].

 

From Kurusu:

Secretary Hull and I conferred for about a half an hour on the 21st to arrange our talks for the 22nd. At that time Hull said that he thought my idea of attaching so much importance to the agreement that it would outshine the Tripartite Pact, as expressed by me during our talks on the 18th, was wholeheartedly in favor of peace on the Pacific through joint action of the United States and Japan, and through this accomplishment, to contribute to the peace of the world.

He went on to say that he still remembers with pleasure that at the Economic Conference in London, he fought for free commerce shoulder to shoulder with Viscount Isii and (Eigo Fukai?). Hull said that he has looked upon Japan's leadership in the Far East as only a natural phenomenon. It is true that Japan's actions and statements regarding the East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere have been slightly on the unpolished and abrupt side but he is able to be sympathetic with the spirit of it.

 

(Part 2) (Garbled)

As long as Japan strives for this goal without resorting to the force of arms, the United States has nothing against the program and has no intention of interfering with its realization.

"I would like to see the U. S.-Japanese relationship which existed shortly subsequent to the Russo-Japanese war reestablished. At that time Japan and the United States exercised their influence over the Far East and the Western Hemisphere respectively, but at the same time maintained very friendly relations and close cooperation in all matters with each other.

"I hope that we can revive the spirit of those times and reach an agreement to maintain peace on the Pacific. At the same time, I wish that Japan would make it clear that the Tripartite Pact is not an obstacle to attaining that goal".

Under the present critical conditions, the United States acceptance or rejection of our Proposal "B" may have a vital bearing on whether or not the negotiations will break down. However, because of the circumstances outlined in my message referred to in the heading, we may receive some proposal from Hull with regard to an agreement covering the Pacific area on Monday.

 

A-86

 

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR  

 

In the meantime, if you have any suggestions which may lead to a settlement, please advise us immediately.

 


[a] See IV, 161.

 

Trans.  11-27-41

 

No. 160

 

FROM: OPNAV                                                                                   November 21, 1941

TO: CINCPAC, CINCAF                                                                     21175 CR 0151

 

It has been indicated by reliable reports, of the recent establishment by Japan of a combined Air and Surface Craft Patrol, covering shipping routes from the U. S. to Australasia [a]. Daily aircraft patrols have been observed extending to the Gilbert Islands from Base at Jaluit. Surface craft believed to cover area reaching Ellice Islands. Japanese East Indies fishing fleet also reported coordinated in patrol operations. Present indications this fleet divided into three groups now in areas vicinity Bathurst Island, Arnhem and Thursday Island in Torres Strait. They are expected round Dutch New Guinea operating from base in Palau and are equipped with long range radio sets.

 


[a] Australasia—water to east of Australia on South Pacific.

 

(no Trans. date in text.  LWJ)

 

No. 161

 

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             November 23, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           #1169.

 

(In 4 parts complete.)

 

On the 22nd, I, together with Ambassador Kurusu, called on the Secretary of State Hull. (Ballantine was also present.) The resume of their conversation follows:

Hull: "I conferred with the Ambassador and Ministers of Britain, Australia, and the Netherlands on the 22nd." (The press reports that this conference lasted for about two and a half hours.) "I sought their opinion on the Japanese proposals. They all said that if Japan's intentions are assuredly pacific, then they would wholeheartedly favor them. They said that it would be the source of much joy to them to cooperate in the matter of resuming trade relations with Japan under those circumstances.

"However, they said, we are not sure of Japan's real intentions as yet, for while on the one hand she apparently indicates her desire for peace by dispatching a special envoy, the tone of the politicians and press of Japan seems to be in direct opposition.

"The diplomats who called on me also pointed out that just prior to the application of the freezing order, Japanese imports of petroleum took a very sudden upward swing, disproving any contention that it was to be used solely for peaceful undertakings, but that it was being stored away by the navy.

"They further expressed the opinion that the embargo should be lifted only in slow degrees.

"These diplomats, however, said that they would seek their home governments' instructions regarding the Japanese proposals and would submit their replies by the coming Monday. Upon receiving these advices, I shall make a reply to you."

 

A-87

 

(Part 2) [a]

Thus the Secretary seemed to feel considerable concern over the recent trend of Japan's public opinion. He pointed out that a clear statement by the Japanese Government of its desire for peace would have a most important reaction on the public opinion of the United States. (Ballantine said that a clear statement of attitude from the government of Japan to the Japanese people, which would of course be cabled abroad, would bear more fruit than propagandistic reports sent through press channels for foreign consumption only) and in turn would have a most favorable bearing on the chances of a settlement. He even went on to say that was it not the duty of every politician to strive for peace up to the day before war is found to be unavoidable? The President and the Secretary of State, he said ----- (two or three lines too badly garbled).

I then said: "Leaving British, Australian and Dutch opinions aside for the time being, what is the attitude of the United States itself regarding our proposal?"

His subsequent reply, which he made by taking up the proposal paragraph by paragraph, was a complete evasion. However, there were indications that what the United States, Britain, Australia, etc. Actually desire is to dissolve the crisis in the south Pacific, so that the fighting powers they have to maintain in this area to keep things under control, may be transferred for action in other parts.

 

(Part 3)

He pointed out that since that is their main objective, the assurances given Japan in the proposals were insufficient.

I said: "Our troop concentrations in the northern part of French Indo-China are aimed at cutting Chungking's life line. Therefore, they are, for the most part, directed towards Yunnan. As such, they do not and are not intended to form a threat to the south Pacific area."

After I pointed out this fact, Kurusu said that the acceptance of our proposal would naturally lead to the conditions desired not only by the United States, but by the other nations he referred to. To this, Hull replied that what these countries desired was a quick turn-about in the situation.

Hull: "With regard to resumption of trade, a rapid change in the situation can be wrought here, too, once Japan's pacific intentions have been ascertained. This change for the better can be brought about in a mere matter of days."

Regarding aid to China, Hull said:

"We must take into consideration the possibility of a U. S. mediation when considering the possibility of cutting off aid to Chiang. If we promise Japan that we shall cease aiding China, the United States could no longer be considered a fair and neutral party to propose peace between China and Japan.

 

(Part 4)

"Moreover, if it is terminated immediately upon the beginning of the negotiations, the promise would be utterly without value. In any event, the so-called 'aid to Chiang Kai-shek' is not as great as is commonly publicized.

"It is Japan's desire to improve the situation which has reached a critical stage by first settling the outstanding factors involved. Since that is the desire expressed by your proposals, we cannot at this time concur in Japan's demands with regard to stopping aid to Chiang."

He went on to say that he did not believe that the time was as yet ripe for the President to suggest peace to China.

I said "I feel that on Monday the United States will submit some sort of a counter proposal to us. I further feel that this proposal will contain a suggestion that Japan join in some plan to maintain peace on the Pacific and in some kind of a trade agreement. No doubt it will be necessary for the United States and Japan to come to some preliminary agreement, after which it would be submitted to the other countries for their approval."

 

A-88

 

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR  

 

Kurusu: "If it is intended that a sort of a group be formed by those nations and that if they expect to make it appear as if we were 'voted down' by the majority of the voters, we wish to state now that we shall be absolutely unable to accept such a proposal."

 


[a] Part 2 badly garbled; considerable reconstruction work contained.

 

Trans.  11-26-41

 

No. 162

 

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     November 22, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   # 812.

 

To both your Ambassadors.

 

It is awfully hard for us to consider changing the date we set in my # 736 [a]. You should know this, however, I know you are working hard. Stick to your fixed policy and do your very best. Spare no efforts and try to bring about the solution we desire. There are reasons beyond your ability to guess why we wanted to settle Japanese-American relations by the 25th, but if within the next three or four days you can finish your conversations with the Americans; if the signing can be completed by the 29th, (let me write it out for you—twenty-ninth), if the pertinent notes can be exchanged, if we can get an understanding with Great Britain and the Netherlands; and in short if everything can be finished, we have decided to wait until that date. This time we mean it, that the deadline absolutely cannot be changed. After that things are automatically going to happen. Please take this into your careful consideration and work harder than you ever have before. This, for the present, is for the information of you two Ambassadors alone.

 


[a] See IV, 44, Tokyo wires Washington that because of the various circumstances it is absolutely necessary that arrangements for the signing of the agreement be completed by the 25th of this month.

 

Trans.  11-22-41

 

No. 163

 

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     November 24, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   # 823.

 

For both Ambassadors.

 

The time limit set in my message #812 [a] (in which the deadline is extended from the 25th to the 29th) is in Tokyo time.

 


[a] See IV, 162.

 

Trans.  11-24-41

 

A-89

 

No. 164

 

FROM: OPNAV                                                                                   November 24, 1941

TO: CINCAF, CINCPAC, COMS 11 12 13 15                                     242005 CR 0443

 

INFO: SPENAVO LONDON, CINCLAT

 

"Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful x This situation coupled with statements of Japanese Government and movements their naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction including attack on Philippines or Guam is a possibility. Chief of Staff has seen this dispatch concurs and requests action Adees to inform senior Army officers their areas x Utmost secrecy necessary in order not to complicate an already tense situation or precipitate Japanese action x Guam will be informed separately."

 

No. 165

 

Communications Intelligence Report:

 

Japan Mandated Islands

 

Topic                                 Serial                                            Date of Issue

Coast Defenses-

Communications                20-41, No. 603-700                       November 24, 1941

 

"In the past few months it has become known that stations temporarily classified as Coast Batteries, Lookout Stations and Landing Forces, have been active at certain Mandate Islands. During late April the Coast Batteries and Lookout Stations on Saipan were identified. In early July the Coast Batteries, Lookout stations and Landing Forces at Truk were identified."

"Since such defense activities are known to be established at Saipan, Truk and perhaps Ponape, it is reasonable to assume that similar defense preparations are being made at islands in Jaluit and Palao vicinities where bases, supplies, etc., are located."

 

No. 166

 

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             November 25, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1177.

 

Re your # 792 [a]

 

In this office we are withholding all reports regarding the content of the Japanese-American negotiations themselves or any predictions regarding the future. The State Department also is exercising extreme caution in its press conferences. Hence the Japanese correspondents here are transmitting various trends of the negotiations copied from newspaper articles here that are based on pure conjecture. Among these correspondents are those who recognize that the articles are valueless but who are being pressed by the head office for news. I have observed particularly this meaningless competition to get the news among the correspondents who have come to Washington from New York. That this senseless competition to gather

 

A-90

 

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR  

 

inaccurate news will not exert a harmful influence on the course of the negotiations themselves is something that I cannot guarantee. In view of this situation I would greatly appreciate it if the Foreign Office would speak a word of caution to the newspapers concerned regarding this useless competition between their special correspondents in collecting news regarding these negotiations. And it would be particularly helpful if the head offices of the newspapers concerned would issue orders direct to their special correspondents along this line.

 


[a] Not available.

 

Trans.  11-28-41

 

No. 167

 

FROM: Tokyo (Togo)                                                                          November 26, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   # 830.

 

(Urgent)

 

To both Ambassadors.

 

It seems that the American newspapers think that there is a connection between the question of withdrawing our army from French Indo-China and that of the freezing of assets. As I have already indicated in my #798 [a], my proposal made on the 17th, even if submitted by you, would be inadequate to meet the situation. Our final proposal envisages an agreement on the basis of the "B" proposal in toto (it excludes from the "B" proposal paragraphs 6 and 7; namely, the question of non-discrimination in trade and the question of the Three-Power Agreement, and includes, as indicated in my #816 [b], the proposal which the United States Government made on the 12th; that is, the question of mediation by the United States for the purpose of establishing peace between Japan and China as contained in our Proposal "B"), and so the acceptance of this proposal is the most that we can expect. In view of the fact that time is getting short with but few days left this month, I would like to have you at once contact the United States authorities again and do your utmost in getting them to accept our proposal.

I need not suggest the following, for you, no doubt, have already thought of it. I would like to have you make full use of influential Americans about whom you have wired me in the past and put pressure on the United States authorities indirectly as well.

 


[a] Which states that no further concession can be made and if the U. S. does not consent to Proposal B, the negotiations will have to be broken off.

[b] Which states that if the U. S. accepts Proposal B, Japan will have no objection to letting Pres. ROOSEVELT act as mediator between Japan and China.

 

Trans.  No Date

 

No. 168

 

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             November 26, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1183.

 

(Urgent)

 

A-91

 

Re your # 830[a].

 

The evacuation of troops from all of French Indo-China, brought up in your message, is nothing more or less than the speculations of American newspapermen. Here in Washington they haven't mentioned such a thing even in jest. We have driven home our insistences.

Furthermore, in regard to the latter part of your message, we two here have been currently using it sufficiently. Recently, however, Secretary of State HULL, before we had mentioned it, beat us to the punch and turned it to his own advantage.

 


[a] See IV, 167.

 

Trans.  11-28-41

 

No. 169

 

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     November 26, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   # 833.

 

(Priority.)

 

(To be handled in Government Code.)

 

Re my # 798 [a].

 

When you reach a settlement in accordance with our new proposal, it is essential that you secure guarantees for the acquisition of goods in connection with clauses 2 and 3 of that proposal. Of these goods, the  acquisition of petroleum is one of the most pressing and urgent requirements of the Empire. Therefore, in accordance with the course of negotiations, prior to the signing of an understanding, and at as early a date as possible, I would like to have you make our wishes known insofar as petroleum imports are concerned along the following lines:

4,000,000 tons per year from the United States. (This figure is the average amount of imports during the years 1938, '39, and '40 from the United States. The breakdown according to type, aviation gasoline included, corresponds to the actual figures covering imports before the freezing legislation went into effect.) That is to say, roughly, 333,000 tons per month.

In addition, on the basis of past negotiations and roughly in the agreed amounts, we hope to import from the Netherlands Indies 1,000,000 tons per year.

After the establishment of a verbal agreement, I would like to have a definite promise of the above incorporated into an exchange of documents between Your Excellency and the Secretary of State.

Furthermore, these figures are to be taken as the basis for negotiation (however, they can not be called our absolute minimum figures). On the other hand, as far as we are concerned, along with a restoration of trade in the future, we hope for an increase of these figures, over the past. Therefore, after you have read all this, please negotiate along these lines to the best of your abilities.

 


[a] Which states that no further concessions can be made and if the United States does not consent to Proposal B, the negotiations will have to be broken off.

 

Trans.  11-26-41

 

A-92

 

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR  

 

No. 170

 

FROM: Washington                                                                             November 26, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           #1180.

 

(Extremely urgent.)

 

(Part 1 of 2.)

 

From NOMURA and KURUSU.

 

As we have wired you several times, there is hardly any possibility of having them consider our "B" proposal in toto. On the other hand, if we let the situation remain tense as it is now, sorry as we are to say so, the negotiations will inevitably be ruptured, if indeed they may not already be called so. Our failure and humiliation are complete. We might suggest one thing for saving the situation. Although we have grave misgivings, we might propose, first, that President ROOSEVELT wire you that for the sake of posterity he hopes that Japan and the United States will cooperate for the maintenance of peace in the Pacific (just as soon as you wire us what you think of this, we will negotiate for this sort of an arrangement with all we have in us), and that you in return reply with a cordial message, thereby not only clearing the atmosphere, but also gaining a little time. Considering the possibility that England and the United States are scheming to bring the Netherlands Indies under their protection through military occupation, in order to forestall this, I think we should propose the establishment of neutral nations, including French Indo-China, Netherlands India and Thai. (As you know, last September President ROOSEVELT proposed the neutrality of French Indo-China and Thai.)

 

Trans.  11-28-41

 

No. 171

 

FROM: Washington                                                                             November 26, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1180.

 

(Extremely Urgent.)

 

(Part 2 of 2.)

 

We suppose that the rupture of the present negotiations does not necessarily mean war between Japan and the United States, but after we break off, as we said, the military occupation of Netherlands Indies is to be expected of England and the United States. Then we would attack them and a clash with them would be inevitable. Now, the question is whether or not Germany would feel duty bound by the third article of the treaty to help us. We doubt if she would. Again, you must remember that the Sino-Japanese incident would have to wait until the end of this world before it could possibly be settled.

In this telegram we are expressing the last personal opinions we will have to express, so will Your Excellency please be good enough at least to show it to the Minister of the Navy, if only to him; then we hope that you will wire us back instantly.

 

Trans.  11-28-41

 

A-93

 

No. 172

 

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     November 26, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   # 836.

 

To be handled in Government code.

 

The situation is momentarily becoming more tense and telegrams take too long. Therefore, will you cut down the substance of your reports of negotiations to the minimum and, on occasion, call up Chief YAMAMOTO of the American Bureau on the telephone and make your report to him. At that time we will use the following code:

 

Japanese                                                                                       English

Sangoku Joyaku Mondai                                                               Nyuu Yooku

(Three-Power Treaty question)                                                      (New York)

 

Musabetsu Taiguu Mondai                                                             Shikago

(The question of non-discriminatory treatment)                             (Chicago)

 

Shina Mondai                                                                                Sanfuranshisuko

(The China question)                                                                     (San Francisco)

 

Soori                                                                                              Itoo Kun

(Premier)                                                                                        (Mr. Itoo)

 

Gaimudaijin                                                                                   Date Kun

(Foreign Minister)                                                                          (Mr. Date)

 

Rikugun                                                                                         Tokugawa Kun

(The Army)                                                                                    (Mr. Tokugawa)

 

Kaigun                                                                                           Maeda Kun

(The Navy)                                                                                    (Mr. Maeda)

 

Nichi-bei kooshoo                                                                         Endan

(Japan-American negotiations)                                                      (Marriage proposal)

 

Daitooryoo                                                                                    Kimko San

(President)                                                                                     (Miss Kimiko)

 

Haru                                                                                              Fumeko San

(Hull)                                                                                             (Miss Fumeko)

 

Kokunaijoosei                                                                               Shoobai

(Internal situation)                                                                         (Trade)

 

Jooho Suru                                                                                    Yama Wo Uru

(To yield)                                                                                       (To sell the mountain)

 

Jooho Sezu                                                                                    Yama Wo Urenu

(Not to yield)                                                                                 (Not to sell the mountain)

 

Keisei Kyuuten Suru                                                                      Kodomo Gaumareru

(Situation taking critical turn)                                                         (The child is born)

 

For your information, telephone addressees other than our Home Office are as follows:

 

Bureau Chief Yamamoto:                                                                    Setegaya 4617

 

Section Chief, KASE:                                                                          Yotsuya 4793

 

A-94

 

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR  

 

Japanese                                                                                       English

 

The Minister's residence                                                                Ginza 3614

 

The Vice-Minister's residence                                                        Ginza 1022

 

No. 173

 

FROM: Washington                                                                             November 26, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1181.

 

Re your # 836 [a].

 

Even if it is put into effect at once, since the hours for telephone communication between Japan and America are restricted to 7:00 to 10:00 A.M., 11:00 A.M. to 1:00 P.M., 2:00 to 5:00 P.M. (Tokyo time), it is better to wire urgent news rather than phone it.

 


[a] See IV, 172. In which Tokyo says that, due to the fact that the situation is becoming more tense and telegrams take too long, reports should be made by telephone making use of the code words given.

 

Trans.  11-28-41

 

No. 174

 

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             November 25, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1179.

 

Hull has conferred jointly with the diplomatic representatives of Britain, Australia, Netherlands East Indies, and China, on two different occasions recently. In harmony with developments however, he has chosen the British representative as his main conferee. Since this morning, the 25th, he is maintaining communications with the Australian and the N.E.I. representatives through the British Ambassador. He will confer with the Chinese Ambassador tonight, alone, after conferring first with the British Ambassador.

The fact that he has dispensed with the custom of conducting joint conferences and has substituted separate ones is drawing considerable attention from the public in general.

 

Trans.  12-2-41

 

No. 175

 

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             November 24, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1166.

 

Re my #1160 [a].

 

BALLANTINE has informed us on behalf of the Secretary of State that, since the representatives of some of the countries have not yet received instructions from their governments,

 

A-95

 

he would like to postpone until tomorrow (25th) the meeting between Secretary HULL, Ambassador KURUSU, and myself which was scheduled for today (24th).

 

Trans.  11-27-41

 

No. 176

 

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             November 25, 1941

TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin)                                                                    # 1178.

 

We made inquiries as to their conveniences this morning, and were advised that they were in conference, and that some reply would be submitted this afternoon. We pressed them again this afternoon, therefore, and were told that Hull had been conferring on this matter yesterday and today, but that he had been unable to secure a clear reply. They said that they feel certain that it will be ready tomorrow, and for that reason requested that we get in touch with them again tomorrow.

In view of the fact that the bureaus concerned of the State Department were discussing this matter all day yesterday and again today, and in view of the conference between the British Ambassador and Hull which lasted for an hour, apparently they are making an effort to speed up the negotiations, too. We, therefore, decided to postpone our discussions scheduled for today, and take the matter up with them tomorrow morning.

 

Trans.  12-2-41

 

No. 177

 

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             November 26, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1184.

 

(Urgent.)

 

Re my # 1178 [a].

 

At my insistence TERASAKI again called on BALLANTINE this morning and questioned him in regard to the scheduled time for our interview. BALLANTINE stated, "Secretary of State HULL today, from early this morning, has been giving profound study to this matter. The fact is that he has scarcely given any consideration to anything else. I am sure that even now he is reaching a decision as to the time for the scheduled interview." Furthermore, for your information, after communicating with the Secretary of State, though virtually the same reply was received, TERASAKI is understood to have gotten the impression that arrangements for the interview would be made sometime today. This is for your information.

 


[a] See IV, 176.

 

Trans.  11-28-41

 

A-96

 

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR  

 

No. 178

 

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             November 26, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           #1187.

 

(Urgent.)

 

Ambassador KURUSU and I have a meeting scheduled with Secretary HULL today (26th) at 4:45 p.m.

 

Trans.  11-28-41

 

No. 179

 

FROM: Washington                                                                             November 26, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           1745 EST (Telephone code) [a]

 

Trans-Pacific Telephone

 

To Kumaicho Yamamoto [b] from Kurusu:

 

Wakasugi speaking, said:

 

"This is Wakasugi speaking at Kurusu's request. Kurusu and Nomura have at this very moment gone to meet HULL with whom they had an appointment at 4:45."

Yamamoto: "Would they then meet the President?"

Wakasugi: "They would (arrange?) (to) meet the President after seeing Hull, but they had not yet taken steps to see the President. Hull has been conversing with the Chinese for three days past and had seen the Chinese today also. The future of the present talks would be decided during the course of today's conversations."

Yamamoto: "Call me by telephone again upon completion of today's meeting."

Wakasugi: "Have you anything you want me to tell Kurusu?"

Yamamoto: (Reply unintelligible to intercepter and according to him unintelligible to Wakasugi as well.)

After above few unintelligible sentences Wakasugi concluded with a promise to phone later.

Note: A call has been placed for 2100 EST this evening.

 


[a] See IV, 172.

[b] Head of American Division of Japanese Foreign Office.

 

Trans.  11-26-41

 

No. 180

 

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             November 26, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1193.

 

Extremely urgent (Part 1 of 2.)

 

Separate wire.

 

(To be handled in Government code.)

 

A-97

 

Strictly confidential, tentative and without commitment.

 

Outline of proposed basis for agreement between the United States and Japan.

Section 1.

Draft mutual declaration of policy.

The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan both being solicitous for the peace of the Pacific affirm that their national policies are directed toward lasting and extensive peace throughout the Pacific area, that they have no territorial design in that area, that they have no intention of threatening other countries or of using military force aggressively against any neighboring nation, and that, accordingly, in their national policies they will actively support and give practical application to the following fundamental principles upon which their relations with each other and with all other governments are  based:

(1) The principle of inviolability of territorial integrity and sovereignty of each and all nations.

(2) The principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries.

(3) The principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity and treatment.

 

Trans.  11-29-41

 

No. 181

 

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             November 26, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           #1193.

 

(Part 2 of 2.)

 

(4) The principle of reliance upon international cooperation and conciliation for the prevention and pacific settlement of controversies and for improvement of international conditions by peaceful methods and processes; the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States have agreed that toward eliminating chronic political instability, preventing recurrent economic collapse, and providing a basis for peace, they will actively support and practically apply the following principles in their economic relations with each other and with other nations and peoples:

(1) The principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations.

(2) The principle of internal economic cooperation and abolition of extreme nationalism as expressed in excessive trade restrictions.

(3) The principle of non-discriminatory access by all nations to raw material supplies.

(4) The principle of full protection of the interests of consuming countries and populations as regards the operation of international commodity agreements.

(5) The principle of establishment of such institutions and arrangements of international finance as may lend aid to the essential enterprises and the continuous development of all countries and may permit payments through processes of trade consonant with the welfare of all countries.

 

Trans.  11-29-41

 

No. 182

 

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             November 26, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1194.

 

(Extremely urgent.) (Part 1 of 4.)

 

A-98

 

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR  

 

Secret Wire.

 

(To be handled in Government code.)

 

Section 2.

Steps to be taken by the Government of the United States and by the Government of Japan:

The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan propose to take steps as follows:

1. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will endeavor to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact among the British Empire, China, Japan, the Netherlands, the Soviet Union, Thailand and the United States.

2. Both Governments will endeavor to conclude among the American, British, Chinese, Japanese, the Netherland and Thai Governments an agreement whereunder each of the Governments would pledge itself to respect the territorial integrity of French Indo-China and, in the event that there should develop a threat to the territorial integrity of Indo-China, to enter into immediate consultation with a view to taking such measures as may be deemed necessary and advisable to meet the threat in question.

 

Trans.  11-29-41

 

No. 183

 

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             November 26, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1194.

 

(Extremely urgent.) (Part 2 of 4.)

 

Secret outside the Department.

 

(To be handled in Government code.)

 

Such agreement would provide also that each of the Governments party to the agreement would not seek or accept preferential treatment in its trade or economic relations with Indo-China and would use its influence to obtain for each of the signatories equality of treatment in trade and commerce with French Indo-China.

3. The Government of Japan will withdraw all military, naval air and police forces from China and from Indo-China.

4. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will not support—military, politically, economically—any Government or regime in China other than the national government of the republic of China with capital temporarily at Chungking.

Trans.  11-29-41

 

No. 184

 

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             November 26, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1194.

 

(Part 3 of 4.)

 

5. Both Governments will give up all extra-territorial rights in China, including rights and interests in and with regard to international settlements and concessions, and rights under the Boxer Protocol of 1901.

 

A-99

 

Both Governments will endeavor to obtain the agreement of the British and other Governments to give up extraterritorial rights in China, including rights in international settlements and in concessions and under the Boxer Protocol of 1901.

6. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will enter into negotiations for the conclusion between the United States and Japan of a trade agreement, based upon reciprocal most favored-nation treatment and reduction of trade barriers by both countries, including an undertaking by the United States to bind raw silk on the free list.

7. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will, respectively, remove the freezing restrictions on Japanese funds in the United States and on American funds in Japan.

 

Trans.  11-29-41

 

No. 185

 

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             November 26, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1194.

 

(Extremely urgent.) (Part 4 of 4.)

 

Secret outside the department.

 

(To be handled in Government Code.)

 

8. Both Governments will agree upon applying the stabilization of the dollar-yen rate, with the allocation of funds adequate for this purpose, half to be supplied by Japan and half by the United States.

9. Both Governments will agree that no agreement which either has concluded with any third powers shall be interpreted by it in such a way as to conflict with the fundamental purpose of this agreement, the establishment and preservation of peace throughout the Pacific area.

10. Both Governments will use their influence to cause other Governments to adhere to and to give practical application to the basic political and economic principles set forth in this agreement.

 

Trans.  11-29 41

 

No. 186

 

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             November 26, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1192.

 

(Part 1 of 4.)

 

Oral.

 

Strictly confidential.

 

The representatives of the Government of the United States and of the Government of Japan have been carrying on during the past several months informal and exploratory conversations for the purpose of arriving at a settlement if possible of questions relating to the entire Pacific area based upon the principles of peace, law and order and fair dealing among nations. These principles include the principle of inviolability of territorial integrity and

 

A-100

 

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR  

 

sovereignty of each and all nations; the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries; the principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity and treatment; and the principle of reliance upon international cooperation and conciliation for the prevention and pacific settlement of controversies and for improvement of international conditions by peaceful methods and processes.

Trans.  11-29- 41

 

No. 187

 

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             November 26, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1192.

 

(Extremely Urgent)

 

(Part 2 of 4.)

 

It is believed that in our discussions some progress has been made in reference to the general principles which constitute the basis of a peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific area. Recently the Japanese Ambassador has stated that the Japanese Government is desirous of continuing the conversations directed toward a comprehensive and peaceful settlement in the Pacific area; that it would be helpful toward creating an atmosphere favorable to the successful outcome of the conversations if a temporary "modus vivendi" could be agreed upon to be in affect while the conversations, looking to a peaceful settlement in the Pacific were continuing. On November 20 the Japanese Ambassador communicated to the Secretary of State proposals in regard to temporary measures to be taken respectively by the Government of Japan and by the Government of the United States, which measures are understood to have been designed to accomplish the purpose above indicated.

 

Trans.  11-29-41

 

No. 188

 

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             November 26, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1192.

 

(Extremely Urgent.)

 

(Part 3 of 4.)

 

(To be handled in government code.)

 

The Government of the United States most earnestly desires to contribute to the promotion and maintenance of peace and stability in the Pacific area, and to afford every opportunity for the continuance of discussions with the Japanese Government directed toward working out a broad-gauge program of peace throughout the Pacific area. The proposals which were presented by the Japanese Ambassador on November 20 contain some features which, in the opinion of this Government, conflict with the fundamental principles which form a part of the general settlement under consideration and to which each government has declared that it is committed. The Government of the United States believes that the adoption of such proposals would not be likely to contribute to the ultimate objectives of ensuring peace under law, order and justice in the Pacific area, and it suggests that further effort be made to resolve our divergences of views in regard to the practical application of the fundamental principles already mentioned.

 

Trans.  11-29-41

 

A-101

 

No. 189

 

FROM: Washington                                                                             November 26, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1192.

 

(Extremely Urgent.)

 

(Part 4 of 4.)

 

With this object in view the Government of the United States offers for the consideration of the Japanese Government a plan of a broad but simple settlement covering the entire Pacific area as one practical exemplification of a program which this Government envisages as something to be worked out during our future conversations.

The plan herein suggested represents an effort to bridge the gap between our draft of June 21, 1942 [sic] and the Japanese draft of September 25th by making a new approach to the essential problems underlying a comprehensive Pacific settlement. This plan contains provisions dealing with the practical application of the fundamental principles which we have agreed in our conversations constitute the only sound basis for worthwhile international relations. We hope that in this way progress toward reaching a meeting of minds between our two Governments may be expedited.

 

Trans. 11-29-41

 

No. 190

 

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             November 26, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1189.

 

(Extremely Urgent.)

 

(Part 1 of 2.)

 

At 4:45 on the afternoon of the 26th I and Ambassador KURUSU met with Secretary HULL and we talked for about two hours.

HULL said, "For the last several days the American Government has been getting the ideas of various quarters, as well as conferring carefully with the nations concerned, on the provisional treaty proposal presented by Japan on the 20th of this month, and I am sorry to tell you that we cannot agree to it. At length, however, we feel compelled to propose a plan, tentative and without commitment, reconciling the points of difference between our proposal of June 21st and yours of September 25th." So saying, he presented us with the following two proposals:

A. One which seeks our recognition of his so-called "four principles."

B. (1) The conclusion of a mutual non-aggression treaty between Tokyo, Washington, Moscow, the Netherlands, Chungking and Bangkok.

(2) Agreement between Japan, the United States, England, the Netherlands, China and  Thai on the inviolability of French Indo-China and equality of economic treatment in French Indo-China.

(3) The complete evacuation of Japanese forces from China and all French Indo-China.

(4) Japan and the United States both definitely promise to support no regime in China but that of CHIANG KAI-SHEK.

(5) The abolition of extra-territoriality and concessions in China.

 

Trans.  11-28-41

 

A-102

 

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR  

 

No. 191

 

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             November 26, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1189.

 

(Extremely Urgent.)

 

(Part 2 of 2.)

 

(6) The conclusion of a reciprocal trade treaty between Japan and the United States on the basis of most favored nation treatment.

(7) The mutual rescinding of the Japanese and American freezing orders.

(8) Stabilization of yen-dollar exchange.

(9) No matter what sort of treaties either Japan or the United States has contracted with third countries, they both definitely promise that these treaties will not be interpreted as hostile to the objectives of this treaty or to the maintenance of peace in the Pacific. (This is, of course, supposed to emasculate the Three-Power Pact.)

In view of our negotiations all along, we were both dumbfounded and said we could not even cooperate to the extent of reporting this to Tokyo. We argued back furiously, but HULL remained solid as a rock. Why did the United States have to propose such hard terms as these? Well, England, the Netherlands and China doubtless put her up to it. Then, too, we have been urging them to quit helping CHIANG, and lately a number of important Japanese in speeches have been urging that we strike at England and the United States. Moreover, there have been rumors that we are demanding of Thai that she give us complete control over her national defense. All that is reflected in these two hard proposals, or we think so.

 

Trans.  11-28-41

 

No. 192

 

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             November 26, 1941

TO: Tokyo # 1191.

 

(Extremely Urgent.)

 

(Part 1 of 4.)

 

On the 26th at the request of Secretary HULL, KURUSU and I visited him.  First of all, we read over cursorily the documents he handed us, which we sent you in separate messages # 1192 [a], 1193 [b] and 1194 [c], and then engaged in an argument. The gist of it was as follows:

(1) HULL said: "Although we have conferred with the various nations concerned and have studied your proposal of the 20th (B proposal with 6 and 7 left out) for five days, we have decided that we cannot consider it."

(2) I said: "You talk of reconciling the American proposal of June 21st with ours of September 25th, but this is vastly different from either."

HULL retorted: "As for that I want you to read and compare the paragraph I point out with the one immediately preceding it. I said that it was a plan for reconciling both the Japanese and American proposals. Since the opening of conversations, the contents of it have been kept secret and, therefore, in this country where popular opinion counts for so much, various surmises are arising; particularly, rumors are being circulated to the effect that we are leaving China in the lurch. I myself am in the foreground and in spite of what Japan said at

 

A-103

 

the time of our conversation of the 22nd, various important people are still uttering non-pacific statements. There does not seem to be much I can do in the face of that."

 


[a] See IV, 186-189.

[b] See IV, 180-181.

[c] See IV, 182-185.

 

Trans. 11-29-41

 

No. 193

 

FROM: Washington                                                                             November 26, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           #1191.

 

(Extremely Urgent.)

 

(Part 2 of 4.)

 

(To be handled in government code.)

 

(3) Concerning Section 1 of the proposal, I pointed out that of the four principles, the fourth has changed the so-called Stimson Doctrine; but I got no clear reply. I reminded him of their insistences so far concerning the principle of non-discrimination and said that if we applied that immediately to China there would be a sudden darkening of the already cloudy economic situation and that this was improper and impossible.

HULL replied: "I fully understand that and the principle as such does not necessarily have to be put into effect right away."

(4) Concerning 1 of Section 2 of this proposal, I said: "If this plan aims to review a Nine-Power Treaty set-up, we cannot feature it at all because we have fought a four year war in China without a cent of profit."

To this he countered with no strong rebuttal.

 

Trans.  11-29-41

 

No. 194

 

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             November 26, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1191.

 

(Extremely Urgent.)

 

(Part 3 of 4.)

 

(5) I said that paragraphs 3 and 4 of the same section were out of the question and, as for paragraph 4, for a country like the United States, who recognizes the Chungking Government, to say that she cannot desert the Chiang Regime is just like us saying that we certainly cannot desert the Nanking Regime."

In reply HULL said: "The evacuation under 3 would be carried out by negotiations. We are not necessarily asking that it be effected immediately. As for the Nanking Government, according to the best reports available to us, it hasn't much influence over China as a whole any way."

I retorted: "Well, that argument is based on the statement that in the long history of China there have been many rises and falls of governments."

 

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THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR  

 

(6) When we came to the question of the Three Power Treaty, I said: "For the United States to hope on one hand, that she can make us make the last possible concession regarding the Three Power Pact and on the other virtually to say to us concerning the China question "apologize to Chungking" is certainly strange. I do not suppose that that is what the President meant the other day when he spoke of 'introducing'." HULL made no special answer.

 

Trans.  11-29-41

 

No. 195

 

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             November 26, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1191.

 

(Extremely Urgent.)

 

(Part 4 of 4.)

 

I said: "Well, I have read this only cursorily. It is a very difficult plan for us to consider accepting. As far as the China part is concerned, it contains clauses which are entirely out of the question so I, who would like to see an understanding established between Japan and the United States, do not know if I should even report it to Japan as it now stands. I have grave doubts. We will both read it over again and consider it fully. Then we will reply." Finally I said, "I wonder if the United States means that there is no other way but for us to consider this plan. You know the President the other day said that between friends there are no last words. I wonder if you could arrange for an interview." To the former he replied that in a word this was a plan and to the latter he said that, although he did not think that much progress was being made, he would manage the matter.

 

Trans.  11-29-41

 

No. 196

 

FROM: Washington                                                                             November 26, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           1946 to 1953 EST

 

(Telephone Code.) [b]

 

Trans-Pacific Telephone

 

To Kumaicho Yamamoto [a] from Kurusu:

 

Kurusu: "I have made all efforts, but they will not yield. [c] I sent a cable expressing my opinions to the Foreign Minister this morning. The situation is just like that. Otherwise there is no means of accomplishing it. I shall cable you now. Already," he interrupted himself, "you have a general understanding I imagine. Accordingly, I do not know how thing will turn out regarding my meeting with the President. Hull is not making much progress it seems."

Apparently referring to the above mentioned cable he continued: "If that method can be worked out I shall work night and day on it. But there is no other means we can use. It is very regrettable."

Yamamoto: "The situation in Tokyo is extremely critical also." After thanking Kurusu for his efforts he continued: "The proposition sent to the Foreign Minister is extremely difficult."

Kurusu: "I believe it is of no avail."

 

A-105

 

Yamamoto reiterated his opinion regarding its difficulty.

Kurusu: "I rather imagine you had expected this outcome."

Yamamoto: "Yes, I had expected it, but wished to exert every effort up to the final moment in the hope that something might be accomplished."

Kurusu: "I am unable to make any movement (i.e., progress) at all. Something will have to be done to get out of this situation."

 


[a ]Head of American Division of Japanese Foreign Office.

[b] See IV. 1,2.

[c] Interpretation is doubtful as yet. The Intercepter read this as "Sore . . . kesa" (that . . . this morning) and translated this as "it is now . . .", with a distinct pause before and after this phrase. However, the telephone code was not available to him. Verification will follow receipt of record.

 

Trans.  11 26-41

 

No. 197

 

Communications Intelligence Reports

 

Japanese Navy—Organization of Fleets

 

Date of Issue                                                                                  Serial

November 26, 1941                                                                       22-41, No, 901-200

 

"Submitted by the 14th Naval District Communication Intelligence Unit:

Since the latter part of October, the Commander in Chief of the Second Fleet has been forming a task force consisting of:

Second Fleet

Third Fleet (including First and Second Base Forces, and First Defense Division)

Destroyer Squadron Three

Submarine Squadron Five

Combined Air Force

Air Squadron Seven and possibly vessels of the Third Battleship Division in the first fleet.

Third Fleet units are believed to be moving in the direction of Takao and Bako.

It appears that the Seventh Cruiser Division and the Third Destroyer Squadron are an advance unit, and may be enroute South China.

The Combined Air Force has assembled in Takao, and indications are that some of it has already moved on to Hainan Island.

It seems that the Second Base Force is transporting equipment of the Air Force to Taiwan.

Radio calls for the South China Fleet, the French Indo-China Force, and the Naval Stations at Sama, Bako and Takao appear also in headings of dispatches concerning this task force.

The Resident Naval Officer Palao, and the Third Base Force at Palao have communicated extensively with the Commander-in-Chief of the Third Fleet.

It is thought that a strong force of submarines and air groups are in the vicinity of the Marshall Islands. This force includes the 24th Air Squadron, at least one aircraft carrier, and probably one-third of the submarine fleet. (Note: this may mean one-third of the fleet submarines.)

The 14th Naval District Communication Intelligence Unit evaluates the foregoing information to indicate that a strong force may be preparing to operate in Southeastern Asia while component parts of the Task Force may operate from the Marshalls and Palao."

 

A-106

 

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR  

 

Com 14 260110 of November 1941 to OPNAV

Info: CINCPAC, CINCAF, COM 16.

 

No. 198

 

Japanese Navy—Organization of Fleets

 

Date of Issue                                                                                  Serial

November 27, 1941                                                                       23-41, No, 901-200

 

"Following has been submitted by the 16th Naval District Communication Intelligence Unit, referring to and commenting on yesterday's information from the 14th Naval District Communication Intelligence Unit, contained in the above reference.

During the past few days traffic analysis indicates that the Commander-in-Chief, Second Fleet, is directing units of the First, Second, and Third Fleets, and Submarine Force in a loose knit Task Force organization that apparently will be divided into two section. For purposes of clarity the units expected to operate in South China Area will be referred to as First Section and units expected to operate in the Mandates will be referred to as Second Section. The estimated units in First Section are Cruiser Division Seven, Air Squadron Six, Defense Division One, Destroyer Squadron Three, and Submarine Squadron Six. The Second Section consists of Cruiser Division Five, Carrier Division Three (RYUJO and one Maru), Destroyer Squadrons Two and Four, Submarine Squadron Five, Destroyer Division Twenty-three, First Base Force of Third Fleet, Third Base Force at Palao, Fifth Base Force at Saipan, and lesser units unidentified. Cruiser Division Six and Battleship Division Three may be included in First and Second Sections respectively, but status cannot be clarified yet.

There are slight indications today that Destroyer Squadron Three, Cruiser Division Seven, and Submarine Squadron Six are in the Takao Area. The balance of Third Fleet units in doubt but may be assume that these vessels including Destroyer Squadron 5 will take stations in the Straits of Formosa or further south. Combined Air Force units from the Empire proper are at Paidoh.

It is impossible to confirm the supposition of reference report that carriers and submarines are in the Mandates. The best indications are that all known First and Second Fleet Carriers are still in Sasebo-Kure Area.

.....Directives to the above Task Forces, if such, are directed to individual units, and not to complete groups. Special calls usually precede formation of Task Force used in area operations.

Commanders-in-Chief, Second, Third, and Southern Expeditionary Fleet appear to have major roles.

Traffic from the Minister of the Navy and the Chief of Naval General Staff to Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet appears normal.

This evaluation is considered reliable.

 

COM 16 261331, Nov. 1941 to CINCPAC, COM 14, OPNAV, CINCAF."

 

A-107

 

No. 199

 

FROM: Washington                                                                             November 26, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           #1190.

 

(Part 1 of 2.)

 

Judging from the progress of present Japanese-American relations, with which you are well acquainted through successive telegrams, the American proposal on the 26th (message # 11894) showed a great disparity between the demands of both parties. Unfortunately, there are no hopes of acceptance of our demands within the time limit you set.

Although we have requested the agreement of various countries to the numerous demands made, the United States presented this proposal after having conferred with the same countries. Although we cannot allow ourselves to be caught napping by this scheming, we must follow out instructions. Up to the present we have only been able to press them for an early solution. During this time we have not expressed any final intention. Even the President on the 17th said that there would be "no last words." If we do not cause any stop in the present negotiations, in the case of taking independent action after the time set ------.

 


[a] See IV, 190, 191.

 

Trans.  11-28-41

 

No. 200

 

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             November 26, 1941 

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1190.

 

(Extremely Urgent.)

 

(Part 2 of 2.)

 

To be handled in Government Code.

 

The United States is using the excuse that she is at present negotiating with the various competent countries. In view of the fact that she will propagandize that we are continuing these negotiations only with the view of preparing for our expected moves, should we, during the course of these conversations, deliberately enter into our scheduled operations, there is great danger that the responsibility for the rupture of negotiations will be cast upon us. There have been times in the past when she could have considered discontinuing conversations because of our invasion of French Indo-China. Now, should we, without clarifying our intentions, force a rupture in our negotiations and suddenly enter upon independent operations, there is great fear that she may use such a thing as that as counter-propaganda against us. They might consider doing the same thing insofar as our plans for Thai are concerned. Nevertheless, such a thing as the clarification of our intention is a strict military secret; consequently, I think that it might be the better plan, dependent of course on the opinions of the Government, that the current negotiations be clearly and irrevocably concluded either through an announcement to the American Embassy in Tokyo or by a declaration for internal and external consumption. I would like, if such a course is followed, to make representations here at the same time.

 

Trans.  11-28-41

 

A-108

 

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR  

 

No. 201

 

FROM: Washington                                                                             November 27, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1204.

 

Re your # 842 [a].

 

The United States has been conferring with the Netherlands on subjects pertaining to U. S. claims and because we asked them to do so. In the midst of these talks, the White-House suddenly came forth with the announcement on the 24th, that the United States is occupying Dutch Guiana, with the agreement of the government of the Netherlands, for the purpose of protecting it.

As was made plain in the text of this announcement, the main objective of this occupation was to guarantee accessibility to aluminum produced there, which is vital to the national defense of the United States. Ordinarily, the Netherlands Government would dispatch its armed forces stationed in the Netherlands East Indies for this purpose, but she is unable to do so at present because of the present situation in the southwest Pacific area. For this reason, the U. S. Army is being used to protect the aluminum mines in that area. At the same time, at the invitation of the Netherlands Government, Brazil is also taking part in protecting them.

The Netherlands Foreign Minister stopped in the United States en route to visiting the Netherlands East Indies, and conferred with U. S. Government officials. Since then, there has been a considerable increase in the amount of military supplies being shipped to the Netherlands East Indies; the traffic of technicians and experts between the United States and N.E.I., has swung up sharply. From these indications as well as from the history of the Netherlands East Indies, it is believed, that depending upon the atmosphere at the time the Japanese-U. S. negotiations break off, Britain and the United States may occupy the Netherlands East Indies. They will do this, probably, much in the same manner as U. S.-Brazil joint occupation of Netherlands Guiana, in the name of protecting the products of the N.E.I. which are vital to national defense, tin and rubber.

I feel that it is essential that we give careful consideration to this possibility. I made reference to this point in my message # 1180 [b]. The gist of this message does not differ from that contained in that message.

 


[a] Not available.

[b] See IV, 170, 171.

 

Trans.  11-29-41

 

No. 202

 

FROM: OPNAV                                                                                   November 26, 1941

TO: CINCAF                                                                                       # 271442.

 

For the purpose of remedying the unintentional omission of CINCAF, in the forthcoming revision of WPL 46, para 3744 will be amended. If formal war eventuates between U. S. and Japan "Instructions for the Navy of the United States Governing Maritime and Aerial Warfare May 1941" will be placed in effect. This will however be supplemented by additional instructions including authority to CINCAF to conduct unrestricted submarine and aerial warfare against Axis shipping within that part of the Far East area lying south and west of a line joining Lat 30 N Long 122 E and Lat 7 N Long 140 E. You will declare this as a strategical area. You will warn all friendly, enemy and neutral merchant ships and aircraft to refrain from entering this

 

A-109

 

strategical area—except under certain specified conditions—in your proclamation. You will state that this step is necessary to prevent damage to such ships or aircraft from supporting hostile action and to prevent them from obtaining info which if transmitted to the enemy would be seriously detrimental to armed forces of the U. S. The only conditions under which friendly and neutral merchant vessels may enter the strategical area will be through certain prescribed lanes that lead to Naval control stations. You are requested to take up the matter of defining and establishing these lanes and control stations with the Dutch and British Naval authorities, but take care not to disclose for the present these instructions to wage unrestricted submarine and aerial warfare. The situation will be far more complex if hostilities ensue without a formal declaration of war, but it appears probable that very nearly the same procedure will be followed. However, further advice must be received from CNO before this is done.

 

No. 203

 

FROM: OPNAV                                                                                   November 28, 1941

TO: CINCAF                                                                                       # 271912 CR 0863.

 

Request from the Army Chief of Staff that you inform General MacArthur of the contents of my 271442 so that Army air forces may make appropriate plans.

 

No. 204

 

FROM: CNO                                                                                        November 26, 1941

TO: CINCPAC                                                                                     # 270040 CR 0756.

 

If you consider this desirable, Army has offered to make available some units of infantry for re-enforcing defense battalions now on station x For advance bases which you may occupy, Army also proposes to prepare in Hawaii garrison troops but is unable at this time to provide any anti-aircraft units. Take this into consideration in your plans and advise when practicable the recommended armament and number of troops desired x

 

No. 205

 

FROM: CNO                                                                                        November 26, 1941

TO: CINCPAC                                                                                     # 270038 CR 0758.

 

Provided you consider this feasible and desirable and in order to keep the planes of the Second Marine Aircraft Wing available for expeditionary use OPNAV has requested and Army has agreed to station 25 Army pursuit planes at Midway and a similar number at Wake. It will be necessary for you to transport these planes and ground crews from Oahu to these stations on an aircraft carrier x Essential spare parts tools and ammunition will be taken in the carrier or on later trips of regular Navy supply vessels and planes will be flown off at destination and ground personnel landed in boats x Army understands these forces must be quartered in tents x Navy must be responsible for supplying water and subsistence and transporting other Army supplies x Stationing these planes must not be allowed to interfere with planned movements of Army bombers in Philippines x If necessary, additional parking areas should be laid prompt-

 

A-110

 

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR  

 

ly x Can Navy bombs now at outlying positions be carried by Army bombers which may fly to those positions for supporting Navy operations x As soon as practicable, confer with Commanding General and advise x

 

No. 206

 

FROM: CNO                                                                                        November 29, 1941

TO: CINCPAC                                                                                     # 282054 CR 02.

 

The arrangements described in your 280627 appear to be the best that can be done under the circumstances but suggest advisability of transferring VMF 221 from San Diego to Hawaii via SARATOGA. War Department will instruct COMGEN HAWDEPT to cooperate with Navy in plans for use of Army pursuit planes and Army troops in support of Marines. War Dept will endeavor to expedite plans for increase of AA defenses but it is doubtful if much improvement is possible soon. Marine Corps will shortly receive sixteen 37 MM AA guns and receive ammunition in February do you desire these guns for Midway and Wake? Request air mail report on present effective defenses of all outlying bases and increases planned in immediate future.

 

No. 207

 

FROM: Washington                                                                             November 27, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1206.

 

(In 4 parts.)

 

On the 27th, I, together with Ambassador Kurusu, called on the President. (Secretary Hull was also present.) The resume of our talks follows:

The President: "In the last Great War, Japan and the United States were together on the side of the Allies. At that time, both Japan and the United States were given ample proof that Germany failed to comprehend the way the people of other countries think.

"Since these conversations were begun, I am aware of the fact that much effort has been made by the Japanese side, too, by those who cherish peace. I am highly appreciative of this fact. It is clear that the majority of the American people are anxious to maintain peaceful relations with Japan. I am one of those who still harbors much hope that Japanese-U. S. relations will be settled peacefully."

I: "Your recent proposal will no doubt be the cause of painful disappointment to the Japanese Government."

The President: "To tell you the truth, I, too, am very disappointed that the situation has developed in the manner that it has. However, during the several months that these conversations were being conducted, cold water was poured on them when Japan occupied southern French Indo-China. According to recent intelligences, there are fears that a second cold water dousing may become an actuality." (He apparently meant the increase in our troops to French Indo-China and our occupation of Thai.) (See my message # 1205 [a].) "I fully understand that the general public in Japan who have been living in war conditions for the past year, cannot see a parallel with conditions in the United States, which is living under peaceful conditions.

"During all of the time, however, that Your Excellency and Secretary Hull have been conversing, we have never heard of or seen concrete proof of any peaceful intention by the leading elements of Japan. This had made these talks an exceedingly difficult undertaking.

 

A-111

 

(Part 2)

"Even the suggestion that the present situation be overcome by a 'modus vivendi' would be without any value if in the final analysis the basic principles of international relations of Japan and the United States do not agree. If there is a basic difference, no stop gap measure could carry any weighty it seems to me.

"In my conversations with Churchill on the high seas, for example, it was predetermined that our respective basic policies coincided. Moreover, even the subjects which were to be agreed upon had been clearly defined in advance."

Kurusu: "Judging from the records of the developments of our negotiations in the past, the differences of opinions between Japan and the United States were not differences in the basic principles of each. Rather, the differences arose in the practical applications thereof. For a very simple example Japan has no disagreements to the principles of non-discriminatory treatment of commerce, strongly advocated by the United States.

"However, it is when we consider the immediate application of this principle in China, bringing about a radical and sudden change in the economic situation there, it is only natural that Japan insists upon certain special conditions. I feel that this difference may have been the source of some misunderstanding."

Hull: "By your frequent explanations, we thoroughly understand that point. According to advice I have received, however, there are approximately 250,000 Japanese merchants in China at present who followed or accompanied the military. These are engaging in various business enterprises. There have been indications that various incidents have arisen involving the relations between these merchants and nationals of a third country. If you are going to consider the profits of these people, the problem of course will become an exceedingly difficult one."

Kurusu: "Japan's claims are not based on such minor factors, but concern only the various major problems."

 

(Part 3)

We then went on and brought up the subject which has reference to the President's "suggestions."

The President: "I have not abandoned giving consideration to that matter. However, it is first essential that both Japan and China simultaneously desire that that be done."

We pointed out that from a practical standpoint that would be very difficult to accomplish. To this, the President said:

"In domestic issues, I have had several experiences along the same lines. No doubt, some method will be found in this case, too."

I: "We have, as yet, received no instructions from Tokyo regarding your proposal. I, for one, hope that you, Mr. President, whose statesmanship I respect highly after over thirty years of close acquaintance with it, will find some way that will lead to a settlement."

The President: "To tell you the truth, I have since the end of last week, twice postponed a trip which I was going to take for my health, because of a critical domestic issue, and because of the arrival of Ambassador Kurusu to the United States. I am leaving tomorrow afternoon, Friday for the country for a rest." (He looked very tired.) "I plan to return next Wednesday. I would like to talk with you again then. It would be very gratifying, however, if some means of a settlement could be discovered in the meantime.

 


[a] Not available.

 

Trans. 11-29-41

 

A-112

 

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR  

 

No. 208

 

FROM: Washington                                                                             November 27, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1206.

 

(Part 4 of 4.)

 

In the middle of our talks, Hull, with reference to the cause for the failure to agree upon a modus vivendi, said:

"There are other factors other than those pointed out by the President. Japan has sent vast numbers of troops to French Indo-China with which to keep the military powers of other countries checked. With this advantage on her side, Japan carries in one hand, the Tripartite Pact, and in the other, the Anti-Communism Pact. Armed with these, she demands of the United States that petroleum be made available to her.

"It would be absolutely impossible to reconcile the people of the United States to granting such a demand. As I stated during our last conversations, while we here are putting forth our best efforts in attempting to bring about peaceful settlements of Japanese-U. S. differences, your Premier nor your Foreign Minister nor any other influential person utters not a single word nor moves one finger to facilitate these talks of ours. On the contrary, they insist upon promoting the establishment of a New Order through might. This is an exceedingly regrettable state of affairs.

 

Trans.  12-2-41

 

No. 209

 

FROM: Washington                                                                             November 27, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           (2327-2334 EST)

 

(Telephone Code.)

 

Trans-Pacific

Telephone

 

(Conversations between Ambassador Kurusu and Japanese Foreign Office American Division Chief, Yamamoto.)

 

 

Literal Translation

Decode of Voice Code

 

(After connection was completed):

 

KURUSU:

"Hello, hello. This is Kurusu".

 

 

YAMAMOTO:

"This is Yamamoto."

 

 

KURUSU:

"Yes. Hello, hello."
(Unable to get Yamamoto for about six or eight seconds, he said aside, to himself, or to someone near him):

 

 

KURUSU:

"Oh, I see, they're making a record of this, huh?"
(It is believed he meant that the six second interruption was made so that a record could be started in Tokyo. Interceptor's machine had been started several minutes earlier.)

 

 

KURUSU:

"Hello. Sorry to trouble you so often."

 

 

A-113

 

 

Literal Translation

Decode of Voice Code

YAMAMOTO:

"How did the matrimonial question get along today?"

 

"How did the negotiations go today?"

 

"Oh, haven't you got our telegram [a] yet. It was sent—let me see—at about six—no, seven o'clock. Seven o'clock.

About three hours ago.

There wasn't much that was different from what Miss Umeko said yesterday."

 

"There wasn't much that was  different from Hull's talks of yesterday."

YAMAMOTO:

"Oh, there wasn't much difference."

 

 

KURUSU:

"No. There wasn't. As before, that southward matter—that south, SOUTH—southward matter is having considerable effect. You know, southward matter."

 

 

YAMAMOTO:

(Obviously trying to indicate the serious effect that Japanese concentrations, etc. in French Indo-China were having on the conversations in Washington. He tries to do this without getting away from the "Miss Umeko childbirth, marriage" character of the voice code.)

 

 

YAMAMOTO:

"Oh, the south matter? It's effective?"

 

 

KURUSU:

"Yes, and at one time, the matrimonial question seemed as if it would be settled."

"Yes, and at one time it looked as though we could reach an agreement."

 

KURUSU:  

"But—well, of course, there are other matters involved too, but—that was it—that was the monkey wrench. Details are included in the telegram [a] which should arrive very shortly. It is not very long and you'll be able to read it quickly.

 

 

YAMAMOTO:

"Oh, you've dispatched it."

 

 

KURUSU:

"Oh, yes, quite a while ago. At about 7 o'clock."

(Pause)

 

 

KURUSU:

"How do things look there? Does it seem as if a child might be born?"

 

"Does it seem as if a crisis is at hand?"

YAMAMOTO:

(In a very definite tone): "Yes, the birth of the child seems imminent."

 

"Yes, a crisis does appear imminent."

KURUSU:

(In a somewhat surprised tone, repeating Yamamoto's statement): "It does seem as if the birth is going to take place?" (Pause)

 

"A crisis does appear imminent?"

KURUSU:

"In which direction . . ." (Stopped himself very abruptly at

 

 

 

A-114

 

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR  

 

 

Literal Translation

Decode of Voice Code

 

this slip which went outside the character of the voice code character of the talk. The "boy, girl, health" byplay has no other significance):

 

 

YAMAMOTO:

"It seems as if it will be a strong healthy boy."

 

 

KURUSU:

"Oh, it's to be a strong healthy boy?" (Rather long pause.)

 

 

YAMAMOTO:

"Yes.

"Did you make any statement (to the newspapers) regarding your talk with  Miss Kimiko today?"

 

"Did you make any statement regarding your talk with the President today?"

KURUSU:

"No, nothing. Nothing except the mere fact that we met."

 

 

YAMAMOTO:

"Regarding the matter contained in the telegram [b] of the other day, although no definite decision has been made yet., please be advised that effecting it will be difficult."

 

 

KURUSU:

"Oh, it is difficult, huh?"

 

 

YAMAMOTO:

"Yes, it is."

 

 

KURUSU:  

"Well, I guess there's nothing more that can be done then."

 

 

YAMAMOTO:

"Well, yes."

(Pause)

 

 

YAMAMOTO:

"Then, today . . . "

 

 

KURUSU:

"Today?"

 

 

YAMAMOTO:

"The matrimonial question,—that is, the matter pertaining to arranging a marriage—don't break them off."

 

"Regarding negotiations—don't break them off. "

KURUSU:  

"Not break them. You mean the talks."

(Helplessly)

 

 

KURUSU:

"Oh, my."

(Pause, and then with a resigned laugh):

 

 

KURUSU:  

"Well, I'll do what I can."

(Continuing after a pause):

 

 

KURUSU:  

"Please read carefully what Miss Kimiko had to say as contained in today's telegram [a]."

Please read carefully what the President had to say as contained In today's telegram [a]."

 

YAMAMOTO:

"From what time to what time were your talks today?"

 

 

KURUSU:  

"Oh, today's was from 2:30 . ."

(Much repeating of the numeral 2)

 

 

KURUSU:

"Oh, you mean the duration?

"Oh, that was for about an hour."

 

 

A-115

 

 

Literal Translation

Decode of Voice Code

YAMAMOTO:

"Regarding the matrimonial question."

"I shall send you another message. However, please bear in mind that the matter of the other day is a very difficult one."

 

"Regarding the negotiations."

KURUSU:  

"But without anything,—they want to keep carrying on the matrimonial question. They do. In the meantime we're faced with the excitement of having a child born. On top of that Tokugawa is really champing at the bit, isn't he? Tokugawa is, isn't he?"

(Laughter and pause)

 

"But without anything,—they want to keep on negotiating. In the mean time we have a crisis on hand and the army is champing at the bit. You know the army.

KURUSU:

"That's why I doubt if anything can be done."

 

 

YAMAMOTO:

"I don't think it's as bad as that."

 

 

YAMAMOTO:

"Well,—we can't sell a Mountain."

 

"Well,—we can't yield."

KURUSU:

"Oh, sure, I know that. That isn't even a debatable question any more."

 

 

YAMAMOTO:

"Well, then, although we can't yield we'll give you some kind of a reply to that telegram."

 

 

KURUSU:

"In any event, Miss Kimiko is leaving town tomorrow, and will remain in the country until Wednesday."

"In any event, the President is leaving town tomorrow, and will remain In the country until Wednesday."

 

YAMAMOTO:

"Will you please continue to do your best."

 

 

KURUSU:

"Oh, yes. I'll do my best. And Nomura's doing everything too."

 

 

YAMAMOTO:

"Oh, all right. In today's talks, there wasn't anything of special interest then."

 

 

KURUSU:  

"No, nothing of particular interest, except that it is quite clear now that that southward—ah—the south, the south matter is having considerable effect."

 

 

YAMAMOTO:

"I see. Well, then, good bye."

 

 

KURUSU:

"Good bye."

 

 

 


[a] See IV, 207-208.

[b] See IV, 190-191.

 

A-116

 

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR  

 

No. 210

 

FROM: OPNAV                                                                                   November 27, 1941

TO: CINCAF, CINCPAC                                                                     272337 CR 0921.

 

INFO: CINCLANT, SPENAVO

 

This dispatch is to be considered a war warning x Negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased and an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days x The number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of Naval Task Forces indicates an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines Thai or KRA Peninsula or possibly Borneo x Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL 46 x Inform District and Army authorities x A similar warning is being sent by War Department. Spenavo inform British x Continental Districts Guam Samoa directed take appropriate measures against sabotage.

 

No. 211

 

Japanese Navy—Organization of Fleets

 

Date of Issue                                                                                  Serial

November 28, 1941                                                                       26-41, No, 901-200

 

Assistant Naval Attaché, Shanghai, reported the following movements and dispositions:

 

Tuesday, Nov. 25, 1941—An unstated number of transports on a southwesterly course with troops aboard were sighted from a position 21 N 115 E.

 

Wednesday, Nov. 26—Eight Warships believed to be led by the cruiser NAKA proceeding south at a good speed.

Many transports sighted during the week 19-26 November between Hong Kong and Shanghai heading south. A number of these transports had troops on board.

. . . Two senior Construction Officers and 4000 men whose status is not known have been ordered to the Mandated Islands.

CINCPAC and COM 14 have received the information submitted by the 16th Naval District Communication Intelligence Unit.

 

No. 212

 

Japanese Navy—Organization of Fleets

 

Date of Issue                                                                                  Serial

November 29, 1941                                                                       24-41, No, 901-200

 

Submitted by the 16th Naval District Communication Intelligence Unit.

". . . The Commander-in-Chief Second Fleet indicates he will shift communications from the Kure Communication Zone at 0400, 29th; from the Sasebo Communication Zone at 0000, 1st; and later Bako Communication Zone at 0000, 2nd. Thus implying a move from Japan proper to the south."

 

A-117

 

COM16, 291029, November 1941 to CINCPAC

COM14, CINCAF, OPNAV

 

No. 213

 

FROM: Rio de Janeiro                                                                         November 28, 1941[a]

TO: Santiago                                                                                        Circular #326.

 

(Message from Tokyo, Circular # 2416.)

 

(To be handled in Government code.)

 

Concerning Japanese-American negotiations, the counter proposal presented to us by the United States on the 27th, overlooks all we stand for; therefore, of course, we disregard it. There is nothing to do but break off negotiations, and our relations with England and the United States within the next few days will assuredly take a critical turn. The above is for your information only.

 


[a] DoD Comment: Note time of translation.

 

Trans.  12-9-42

 

No. 214

 

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     November 28, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   # 844.

 

Re your # 1189 [a].

 

Well, you two Ambassadors have exerted superhuman efforts but, in spite of this, the United States has gone ahead and presented this humiliating proposal. This was quite unexpected and extremely regrettable. The Imperial Government can by no means use it as a basis for negotiations. Therefore, with a report of the view of the Imperial Government on this American proposal which I will send you in two or three days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured. This is inevitable. However, I do not wish you to give the impression that the negotiations are broken off. Merely say to them that you are awaiting instructions and that, although the opinions of your Government are not yet clear to you, to your own way of thinking the Imperial Government has always made just claims and has borne great sacrifices for the sake of peace in the Pacific. Say that we have always demonstrated a long-suffering and conciliatory attitude, but that, on the other hand, the United States has been unbending, making it impossible for Japan to establish negotiations. Since things have come to this pass, I contacted the man you told me to in your # 1180 [b] and he said that under the present circumstance what you suggest is entirely unsuitable. From now on do the best you can.

 


[a] See IV, 190-191.

[b] See IV, 170-171.

 

Trans.  11-28-41

 

A-118

 

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR  

 

No. 215

 

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             November 28, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           [b]

 

Re my # 1190[a] (in which Nomura expresses the danger of the responsibility for the rupture of negotiations being cast upon Japan should Japan enter into her scheduled operations during the course of the negotiations. He suggests that the negotiations be irrevocably concluded either through an announcement to the American Embassy in Tokyo or by a declaration for internal and external consumption).

So far silence has been maintained here concerning our talks with the United States; however, now the results of our conference of the 26th are out and headlines like this are appearing in the papers. "Hull Hands Peace Plan to Japanese" and "America Scorns a Second Munich." The papers say that it is up to Japan either to accept the American proposal with its four principles, or face war, in which latter case the responsibility would be upon Japan.

This we must carefully note.

 


[a] See IV, 199-200.

[b] Date not provided in original.

 

Trans.  12-1-41

 

No. 216

 

FROM: OPNAV                                                                                   November 29, 1941

TO: COM PNNCF, COM PSNCF                                                         290110 CR 066.

 

INFO: CINCPAC, COM PNCF

 

Refer to my 272338. Army has sent following to Commander Western Defense Command "Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot be avoided the U. S. desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not repeat not to alarm civil population or disclose intent. Report measures taken. A separate message is being sent to G2 Ninth Corps Area re subversive activities in U. S. Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow 5 so far as they pertain to Japan. Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers." WPL 52 is not applicable to Pacific Area and will not be placed in effect in that area except as now in force in Southeast Pacific Sub Area and Panama Naval Coastal Frontier. Undertake no offensive action until Japan has committed on overt act. Be prepared to carry out tasks assigned in WPL 46 so far as they apply to Japan in case hostilities occur.

 

A-119

 

No. 217

 

FROM: OPNAV                                                                                   Nov. 30, 1941

TO: CINCAF                                                                                       300419 CR 0214.

 

INFO: CINCPAC

 

There are indications that Japan is about to attack points on KRA Isthmus by an overseas expedition. In order to ascertain destination of this expedition and for security of our position in the Philippines, desire you to cover by air the line Manila Camranh Bay on 3 days commencing upon receipt this dispatch. Instruct planes to observe only. They must not approach so as to appear to be attacking but must defend themselves if attacked. Understand that the British Air forces will search an arc 180 miles from Tedta Bharu and will move troops to line across KRA Isthmus near Singora. Inform MacArthur if expedition is approaching Thailand. British mission here informed.

 

No. 218

 

FROM: Mexico City (MXMRK)                                                          December 1, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 220.

 

The general opinion in this country is that President ROOSEVELT suddenly terminated his weekend holiday and returned to the capital because the steady advance of our army toward the south and particularly the speeches of Premier TOJO, have brought them [a] to an actual realization of our determination, and a decision on the part of Washington as to whether war or peace can be expected here in a couple days.

According to reports of Americans in political and economic circles in Washington and New York, a survey of well-informed American sources shows that the ratio (? Of those expecting peace or war ?) between Japan and America is one for peace to seven for war.

 


[a] This could refer to the American people or to President Roosevelt. Note date of translation.

 

Trans.  1-13-45

 

No. 219

 

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     December 1, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   # 865.

 

Re my # 857.[a]

 

1. The date set in my message #812 (November 29th for the absolute deadline to complete negotiations) has come and gone, and the situation continues to be increasingly critical. However, to prevent the United States from becoming unduly suspicious we have been advising the press and others that though there are some wide differences between Japan and the United States, the negotiations are continuing. (The above is for your information only.)

2. We have decided to withhold submitting the note to U. S. Ambassador to Tokyo as suggested by you at the end of your message # 1124. [b] Please make the necessary representations at your end only.

 

A-120

 

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR  

 

3. There are reports here that the President's sudden return to the capital is an effect of Premier Tojo's statement. We have an idea that the President did so because of his concern over the critical Far Eastern situation. Please make investigations into this matter.

 


[a] Re new proposals to the U. S.

[b] Not available.

 

Trans. 12-1-41

 

No. 220

 

FROM: Washington                                                                             December 1, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1226.

 

Re my # l 222 [a].

 

Within governmental circles, although decisive comments were withheld, the general opinion seems to be that Tojo's speech indicates the refusal of the Japanese Government to accept the proposals submitted to it by the U. S. on the 26th. These circles also seem to feel that the speech indicates Japan's decision to give up hope for the talks and resort to stronger measures.

The press on the 1st carried a UP dispatch from Tokyo reporting that though Japan was not satisfied with the U. S. reply, Japan is desirous of having the discussions continue for at least two more weeks. In view of the reports of the Premier's speech, this report has an ominous tone about it.

Some of the newspapers comment that since Japan's invasion of Thai has already been definitely mapped out, the above is merely a means of stalling for time so as to give the Japanese a chance to seize the most opportune moment with respect to developments in Europe, to launch this attack.

 


[a] Speaks of unfavorable U. S. reaction to Tojo's speech.

 

Trans.  12-4-41

 

No. 221

 

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     December 1, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   # 858.

 

Kurusu's and Yuki's traveling expenses, $8,000 each, being cabled. Get State Department's unfreezing permit.

 

Trans.  12-1-41

 

No. 222

 

FROM: COM16                                                                                   December 1, 1941

TO: COMINCH, ALL FORCES                                                           011422.

 

JVJ (radio station in Tokyo) announced tonight in closing "All listeners be sure and listen at 0700 and 0730 tomorrow morning, since there may be important news."

 

A-121

 

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR  

 

No. 223

 

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     December 1, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   Circular #2444.

 

The four offices in London, Hong Kong, Singapore and Manila have been instructed to abandon the use of the code machines and to dispose of them. The machine in Batavia has been returned to Japan. Regardless of the contents of my Circular message # 2447[a], the U. S. (office) retains the machines and the machine codes.

 


[a] See IV, 436.

 

Trans.  12-1-41

 

No. 224

 

FROM: OPNAV                                                                                   December 3, 1941

TO: COM16, CINCAF, CINCPAC, COM14                                        031850 CR 0553.

 

Highly reliable info has been received that categoric and urgent instructions were sent yesterday to Jap Diplomatic and Consular posts at Hong Kong, Singapore, Batavia, Manila, Washington and London to destroy most of their codes at once and to burn all other important confidential and secret documents.

 

No. 225

 

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     December 2, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   #867.

 

1. Please destroy by burning all of the codes you have in your office, with the exception of one copy each of the codes being used in conjunction with the machine, the OITE code and the abbreviation code. (This includes other Ministries' codes which you may have in your office.

2. Also in the case of the code machine itself, one set is to be destroyed.

3. Upon completing the above, transmit the one word HARUNA.

4. Use your discretion in disposing of all text of messages to and from your office, as well as other secret papers.

5. Destroy by burning all of the codes brought to your office by telegraphic courier Kosaka. (Consequently, you need not pursue the instructions contained in my message #860,[a] regarding getting in touch with Mexico.

 


[a] See IV, 225A.

 

Trans.  12-3-41

 

A-122

 

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR  

 

No. 225A

 

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     1 December 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   # 860.

 

Have Courier Kosaka, who will arrive there shortly from Brazil, return to Japan on the Tatuta Maru leaving Los Angeles on the 25th.

If this schedule makes it difficult for Kosaka to go to Mexico as planned, have him abandon that trip. Establish communication with Mexico, if this is the case, and make some sort of arrangements with regard to Kosaka's business.

 

Trans.  12-1-41

 

No. 226

 

Japanese Navy—Organization of Fleets

 

Date of Issue                                                                                  Serial

December 1,  1941                                                                              25-41, No. 201-200

 

Submitted by the 16th Naval District Communication Intelligence Unit. Details of ship arrivals in Takao, all under command of Commander-in-Chief, Third Fleet. Commander-in-Chief, Second Fleet, in ATAGO shifted from Kure to Sasebo Communication Zone, apparently enroute South China waters. All Orange service radio calls for units afloat were changed at 0000, December 1, 1941.

 

CINCAF, CINCPAC, COM14 have received the above information.

 

No. 227

 

FROM: COM16                                                                                   December 4, 1941

TO: OPNAV, COM14                                                                          041502.

 

Five numerals intercepts subsequent to 0600 today indicate change of cipher system.

 

No. 228

 

FROM: Washington                                                                             December 2, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1232.

 

(Part 1 of 2.)

 

Re my # 1231[a].

 

Today, the 2nd, Ambassador Kurusu and I had an interview with Under-Secretary of State Welles. At that time, prefacing his statement by saying that it was at the direct instruction of the President of the United States, he turned over to us the substance of my separate wire # 1233[a]. Thereupon we said: "Since we haven't been informed even to the slightest degree concerning the troops in French Indo-China, we will transmit the gist of your representations directly to our Home Government. In all probability they never considered that such a thing

 

A-123

 

as this could possibly be an upshot of their proposals of November 20th." The Under-Secretary then said: "I want you to know that the stand the United States takes is that she opposes aggression in any and all parts of the world." Thereupon we replied: "The United States and other countries have pyramided economic pressure upon economic pressure upon us Japanese. A made the statement that economic warfare was even worse than forceful aggression.) We haven't the time to argue the pros and cons of this question or the rights and wrongs. The people of Japan are faced with economic pressure, and I want you to know that we have but the choice between submission to this pressure or breaking the chains that it invokes. b We want you to realize this as well as the situation in which all Japanese find themselves as the result of the four-year incident in China, the President recently expressed cognizance of the latter situation.

 

(Part 2 of 2.)

Furthermore, I would have you know that in replying to the recent American proposals, the Imperial Government is giving the most profound consideration to this important question which has to do with our national destiny." Under-Secretary of State Welles said: "I am well aware of that." I continued: "We cannot overemphasize the fact that, insofar as Japan is concerned, it is virtually impossible for her to accept the new American proposals as they now stand. Our proposals proffered on the 21st of June and the proposals of September 25th, representing our greatest conciliations based on the previous proposal, still stand. In spite of the fact that the agreement of both sides was in the offing, it has come to naught. At this late juncture to give thoughtful consideration to the new proposals certainly will not make for a smooth and speedy settlement of the negotiations. Recently we promised to evacuate our troops from French Indo-China in the event of a settlement of the Sino-Japanese incident and the establishment of a just peace in the Far East. In anticipating the settlement of fundamental questions, the question of the representations of this date would naturally dissolve". The Under-Secretary assiduously heard us out and then said: "The American proposals of the 26th were brought about by the necessity to clarify the position of the United States because of the internal situation here." Then he continued: "In regard to the opinions that you have expressed, I will make it a point immediately to confer with the Secretary."

I got the impression from the manner in which he spoke that he hoped Japan in her reply to the American proposals of the 26th would leave this much room.

Judging by my interview with Secretary of State Hull on the 1st and my conversations of today, it is clear that the United States, too, is anxious to peacefully conclude the current difficult situation. I am convinced that they would like to bring about a speedy settlement. Therefore, please bear well in mind this fact in your considerations of our reply to the new American proposals and to my separate wire # 1233.

 


[a] Not available.

[b] Original translation incomplete from this point on.

 

 

Trans.  12-3-41

 

No. 229

 

FROM: OPNAV                                                                                   December 2, 1941

TO: CINCAF                                                                                       012356 CR 0313.

 

President directs that the following be done as soon as possible and within two days if possible after receipt this dispatch. Charter 3 small vessels to form a "Defensive Information Patrol" Minimum requirements to establish identity as U. S. Men-of-War are commanded by a

 

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THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR  

 

Naval Officer and to mount a small gun and 1 machine gun would suffice. Filipino crews may be employed with minimum number naval ratings to accomplish purpose which is to observe and report by radio Japanese movements in West China Sea and Gulf of Siam. 1 vessel to be stationed between Hainan and Hue one vessel off the Indo-China coast between Camranh Bay and Cape St. Jaques and one vessel off Pointe de Camau. Use of ISABEL authorized by President as one of the three but not other Naval vessels. Report measures taken to carry out President's views. At same time inform me as to what reconnaissance measures are being regularly performed at sea by both Army and Navy whether by air surface vessels or submarines and your opinion as to the effectiveness of these latter measures.

 

No. 230

 

FROM: CNO                                                                                        December 2, 1941

TO: CINCAF                                                                                       012358 CR 0323.

 

In view of existing situation CNO considers it very important that you exchange full military information with the British and Dutch Naval Commanders-in-Chief except in cases where you consider it definitely inadvisable. These exchanges may appropriately be made through Naval Observers Singapore and Batavia provided ciphers are adequate. Suggest reconsideration of the question of establishing a Dutch Liaison Officer at your headquarters in Manila. Make arrangements direct and advise action.

 

No. 231

 

FROM: Madrid (SPAIN)                                                                      December 3, 1941

TO: Tokyo (SUMMER) (Vice Chief, General Staff)                            # 342.

 

Parts 1 and 2 Complete.

 

Part 1.

 

The Japanese-American conference, once perilously near the breaking point, now is viewed as going on in an easier atmosphere since the resumption of talks made possible by Japanese concessions. The apologies of Ambassador KURUSU and some Japanese newspapers for the phrase about the destruction of the Anglo-American hegemony in the Premier's message, are thought to be somewhat satirical in tone. However, the President's statement, "America will probably be in the war by next year," and that of an important (?American?) Navy man, "we could wipe out the Japanese Navy in no time at all", were blustered out, with no criticism from Japan. (These people) tend to underrate Japan's military strength.

 

Part 2.

The conclusion of an Anglo-American agreement on the establishment of military bases on Christmas, Fiji, Samoa, and other Pacific Islands, has been reported. We are allowing America to grow stronger, while Japan pursues a conservative and hesitant course.

It is our prayer that the Army (?take some?) decisive (?action?).

 


[a] Note date of translation.

Trans.  2-15-46

 

A-125

 

No. 232

 

FROM: OPNAV                                                                                   December 4, 1941

TO: ALUSANA TOKYO, ALUSANA BANGKOK, ASTALUSANA  040330 CR 0640

PEIPING, ASTALUSNA SHANGHAI

 

INFO: CINCAF, ALUSNA CHUNGKING, COM16

 

Destroy this system at discretion and report by word JABBERWOCK. Destroy all registered publications except CSP 1085 and 6 and 1007 and 1008 and this system and report execution by sending in plain language "BOOMBERANG".

 

No. 233

 

FROM: OPNAV                                                                                   December 4, 1941

TO: CO MARDET PEIPING, CO MARDET TIENTSIN                      040343 CR 0641.

 

INFO: CINCAF, COM16

 

Destroy this system at discretion and send word JABBERWOCK when this has been done. All registered publications except this system must be destroyed immediately by MARDETS PEIPING and TIENTSIN and reported by word "BOOMERANG" in plain language. Use discretion on all other confidential papers.

 

No. 234

 

FROM: OPNAV                                                                                   December 4, 1941

TO: NAVSTA GUAM                                                                         042017 CR 0701.

 

INFO: CINCAF, CINCPAC, COMFOURTEEN, COMSIXTEEN

 

Action addressee destroy all secret and confidential publications and other classified matter, with the exception of that which is necessary for current purposes and special intelligence. Retain minimum cryptographic channels necessary for essential communications with OPNAV, CINCAF, CINCPAC, COMS 14 and 16. Report which crypto-channels are retained. Be prepared to destroy instantly all classified matter you retain in event of emergency.

 

No. 235

 

FROM: OPNAV                                                                                   December 4, 1941

TO: ALUSNA TOKYO, ALUSNA BANGKOK, ASTALUSNA PEI-        042019 CR 0703.

PING, ASTALUSNA SHANGHAI

 

INFO: CINCAF

 

Action addressees also destroy all secret and confidential files with the exception of those which are essential for current purposes. Destroy all other papers which in the hands of enemy would be of disadvantage to the U. S. This supplements my 040330.

 

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No. 236

 

FROM: OPNAV                                                                                   December 4, 1941

TO: CINCAF                                                                                       042018 CR 0702.

 

Wake should now be stripped of all secret and confidential publications and papers which in the hands of an enemy would be of disadvantage to the U. S. At your discretion, keep for essential communications a minimum number of cryptographic channels. Advise which ones are retained. Your 120828.

Trans.  00-00-00

 

No. 237

 

FROM: Washington (UAWRK)                                                           December 6, 1941[a]

TO: Tokyo (SUMMER (VICE-CHIEF, GENERAL STAFF))                # 276.

 

(Parts 1-5.)

 

Part 1.

 

1. In the severe criticism which the U. S. Secretary of State has recently directed against Japan (cf. DOMEI wires), there are many points which serve to show the firm resolution of the U. S. Gov't authorities. However, it is felt that these statements are intended as a reprimand in an attempt to bluff Japan into intimidation and check her southward advance.

 

Part 2.

2. We will give you 2 or 3 examples which can be regarded as a basis for the above conjecture.

(A) When relations between Japan and the U. S. were tense at the time of the invasion of Siam, discussions appeared in newspapers and elsewhere. Some were of the vein that there was no need at all to pull Britain's chestnuts out of the fire and thereby risk the danger of a war between the U. S. and Japan which would be very costly and which, it was feared, would drag on for a long time; others said that first of all, a temporary agreement should be made between Japan and the U. S. on the basis of the status quo, and that the impasse could be broken and the problems solved by proceeding slowly and carefully with negotiations.

 

Part 3.

This shows that the U. S. people strongly desire to avoid war between the U. S. and Japan. It is clear that the possibility is very remote that the U. S. Gov't will ignore public opinion and fling the country headlong into a clash with Japan.

(B) Yesterday on the 4th, the Washington TIMES HERALD published an article in which it spoke of a plan drawn up by the President which essentially proposed to increase the army and navy to 10,000,000 and then by sending an expeditionary force of 5,000,000 to completely crush the Axis.

 

A-127

 

Part 4.

It makes one wonder whether it isn't a scheme of some of the government authorities to throw a scare into Japan. The article adds that since neither ROOSEVELT nor HULL has confirmed or denied the authenticity of the plan, it gives the matter a certain degree of credence.

 

Part 5.

(C) At the conference today (the 5th) between HULL and our Ambassador, in view of HULL's attitude, all was calm and harmonious on the surface. The fact that he suggested continuing the conference in the future makes one think that they are not absolutely resigned  to war with Japan and are not thinking of rushing headlong into a struggle.

 


[a] Note date of translation.

 

Trans.  5-23-45

 

No. 238

 

FROM: Washington (UAWRK)                                                           December 6, 1941[a]

TO: Tokyo (SUMMER) (Vice Chief, General Staff)                            #276.

 

3. With circumstances as described above, in the event that the Japanese Army invades Siam we must be prepared from the outset for a war with England and America and we must be in complete readiness for operations to meet this contingency. However, we surmise that England and America will not immediately declare war but may at first close the consulates, increase economic pressure (such as in agreements between Japan and Latin America), and occupy the Netherlands East Indies. But in the event of a Japanese invasion of the Netherlands East Indies and an assault on Singapore, we believe that America will take increasingly severe steps against Japan.

 


[a] Note date of translation.

Trans.  3-31-45

 

No. 239

 

FROM: Peking                                                                                     December 5, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           Circular #625.

 

To be handled in government code.

 

Re my secret military communication # 262 (Not available) of November 30th.

 

1. Concurrent with opening war on Britain and America we have considered Holland as a semi-belligerent and have exercised strict surveillance over her Consulates and prohibited all communications between them and enemy countries.

 

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THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR  

 

2. Coincident with the beginning of the war against Britain and America we have taken steps to prohibit the use of code messages and the use of wireless by the Holland Consulates.

3. In case war breaks out with Holland we will take the same steps toward that country that we have taken in the case of Britain and America.

 

Trans.  12-11-41

 

No. 240

 

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     December 6, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   # 901.

 

Re my #844[a] (in which Tokyo wires Washington the Imperial Government cannot accept the United States proposal, and, therefore, with a report of the views of the Imperial Government which will be sent in two or three days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured. Until then, however, Washington is not to give the impression that negotiations are broken off.)

1. The Government has deliberated deeply on the American proposal of the 26th of November and as a result we have drawn up a memorandum for the United States contained in my separate message #902. [b]

2. This separate message is a very long one. I will send it in fourteen parts and I imagine you will receive it tomorrow. However, I am not sure. The situation is extremely delicate, and when you receive it I want you please to keep it secret for the time being.

3. Concerning the time of presenting this memorandum to the United States, I will wire you in a separate message. However, I want you in the meantime to put it in nicely drafted form and make every preparation to present it to the Americans just as soon as you receive instructions.

 


[a] See IV, 214.

[b] See IV 241A for 14 pt. Message (DoD comment) .

 

Trans.  12-6-41

 

No. 241

 

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     December 7, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   # 907.

 

(Urgent—very important.)

 

Re my # 902[a].

 

Will the Ambassador please submit to the United States Government (if possible to the Secretary of State) our reply to the United States at 1:00 p.m. on the 7th, your time.

 


[a] See IV, 241A.

 

Trans.  12-7-41

 

A-129

 

No. 241A

 

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     December 6, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   # 902.

 

(Part 1 of 14.)

 

Separate telegram.

 

MEMORANDUM

1. The Government of Japan, prompted by a genuine desire to come to an amicable understanding with the Government of the United States in order that the two countries by their  joint efforts may secure the peace of the Pacific area and thereby contribute toward the realization of world peace, has continued negotiations with the utmost sincerity since April last with the Government of the United States regarding the adjustment and advancement of Japanese-American relations and the stabilization of the Pacific area.

The Japanese Government has the honor to state frankly its views concerning the claims the American Government has persistently maintained as well as the measures the United States and Great Britain have taken toward Japan during these eight months.

2. It is the immutable policy of the Japanese Government to insure the stability of East Asia and to promote world peace, and thereby to enable all nations to find each ----- place in the world.

Ever since the China Affair broke out owing to the failure on the part of China to comprehend Japan's true intention, the Japanese Government has striven for the restoration of peace and it has consistently exerted its best efforts to prevent the extension of war-like disturbances. It was also to that end that in September last year Japan concluded the Tri Partite Pact with Germany and Italy.

 

(Part 2 of 14.)

However, both the United States and Great Britain have resorted to every possible measure to assist the Chungking regime so as to obstruct the establishment of a general peace between Japan and China, interfering with Japan's constructive endeavours toward the stabilization of East Asia, exerting pressure on the Netherlands East Indies, or menacing French Indo-China, they have attempted to frustrate Japan's aspiration to realize the ideal of common prosperity in cooperation with these regions. Furthermore, when Japan in accordance with its protocol with France took measures of joint defense of French Indo-China, both American and British governments, willfully misinterpreted it as a threat to their own possession and inducing the Netherlands government to follow suit, they enforced the assets freezing order, thus severing economic relations with Japan. While manifesting thus an obviously hostile attitude, these countries have strengthened their military preparations perfecting an encirclement of Japan, and have brought about a situation which endangers the very existence of the Empire.

 

(Part 3 of 14.)

Nevertheless, to facilitate a speedy settlement, the Premier of Japan proposed, in August last, to meet the President of the United States for a discussion of important problems between the two countries covering the entire Pacific area. However, while accepting in principle the Japanese proposal, insisted that the meeting should take place after an agreement of view had been reached on fundamental—(75 letters garbled)—The Japanese government submitted a proposal based on the formula proposed by the American government, taking fully into consideration past American claims and also incorporating Japanese views. Repeated discussions proved of no avail in producing readily an agreement of view. The present cabinet, therefore, submitted a revised proposal, moderating still further the Japanese claims regarding the principal points of difficulty in the negotiation and endeavoured strenuously to reach a

 

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THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR  

 

settlement. But the American government, adhering steadfastly to its original proposal, failed to display in the slightest degree a spirit of conciliation. The negotiation made no progress.

 

(Part 4 of 14.)

Thereupon, the Japanese Government, with a view to doing its utmost for averting a crisis in Japanese-American relations, submitted on November 20th still another proposal in order to arrive at an equitable solution of the more essential and urgent questions which, simplifying its previous proposal, stipulated the following points:

(1) The Governments of Japan and the United States undertake not to dispatch armed forces into any of the regions, excepting French Indo-China, in the Southeastern Asia and the Southern Pacific area.

(2) Both Governments shall cooperate with a view to securing the acquisition in the Netherlands East Indies of those goods and commodities of which the two countries are in need.

(3) Both Governments mutually undertake to restore commercial relations to those prevailing prior to the freezing of assets.

The Government of the United States shall supply Japan the required quantity of oil.

(4) The Government of the United States undertakes not to resort to measures and actions prejudicial to the endeavours for the restoration of general peace between Japan and China.

(5) The Japanese Government undertakes to withdraw troops now stationed in French Indo-China upon either the restoration of peace between Japan and China or the establishment of an equitable peace in the Pacific area; and it is prepared to remove the Japanese troops in the southern part of French Indo-China to the northern part upon the conclusion of the present agreement.

 

(Part 5 of 14.)

As regards China, the Japanese Government, while expressing its readiness to accept the offer of the President of the United States to act as "Introducer" of peace between Japan and China as was previously suggested, asked for an undertaking on the part of the United States to do nothing prejudicial to the restoration of Sino-Japanese peace when the two parties have commenced direct negotiations.

The American government not only rejected the above-mentioned new proposal, but made known its intention to continue its aid to Chiang Kai-Shek; and in spite of its suggestion mentioned above, withdrew the offer of the President to act as the so-called "Introducer" of peace between Japan and China, pleading that time was not yet ripe for it. Finally, on November 26th, in an attitude to impose upon the Japanese government those principles it has persistently maintained, the American government made a proposal totally ignoring Japanese claims, which is a source of profound regret to the Japanese government.

 

(Page 6 of 14.)

From the beginning of the present negotiation the Japanese Government has always maintained an attitude of fairness and moderation, and did its best to reach a settlement, for which it made all possible concessions often in spite of great difficulties.

As for the China question which constituted an important subject of the negotiation, the Japanese Government showed a most conciliatory attitude.

As for the principle of Non-Discrimination in International Commerce, advocated by the American Government, the Japanese Government expressed its desire to see the said principle applied throughout the world, and declared that along with the actual practice of this principle in the world, the Japanese Government would endeavour to apply the same in the Pacific area, including China, and made it clear that Japan had no intention of excluding from China economic activities of third powers pursued on an equitable basis.

Furthermore, as regard the question of withdrawing troops from French Indo-China, the Japanese government even volunteered, as mentioned above, to carry out an immediate evacuation of troops from Southern French Indo-China as a measure of easing the situation.

 

A-131

 

(Part 7 of 14.)

It is presumed that the spirit of conciliation exhibited to the utmost degree by the Japanese Government in all these matters is fully appreciated by the American government.

On the other hand, the American government, always holding fast to theories in disregard of realities, and refusing to yield an inch on its impractical principles, caused undue delays in the negotiation. It is difficult to understand this attitude of the American government and the Japanese government desires to call the attention of the American government especially to the following points:

1. The American government advocates in the name of world peace those principles favorable to it and urges upon the Japanese government the acceptance thereof. The peace of the world may be brought about only by discovering a mutually acceptable formula through recognition of the reality of the situation and mutual appreciation of one another's position. An attitude such as ignores realities and imposes one's selfish views upon others will scarcely serve the purpose of facilitating the consummation of negotiations.

 

(Part 8 of 14.)

Of the various principles put forward by the American government as a basis of the Japanese-American agreement, there are some which the Japanese government is ready to accept in principle, but in view of the world's actual conditions, it seems only a Utopian ideal, on the part of the American government, to attempt to force their immediate adoption.

Again, the proposal to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact between Japan, the United States, Great Britain, China, the Soviet Union, the Netherlands, and Thailand, which is patterned after the old concept of collective security, is far removed from the realities of East Asia.

The American proposal contains a stipulation which states: "Both governments will agree that no agreement, which either has concluded with any third powers, shall be interpreted by it in such a way as to conflict with the fundamental purpose of this agreement, the establishment and preservation of peace throughout the Pacific area." It is presumed that the above provision has been proposed with a view to restrain Japan from fulfilling its obligation under the Tripartite Pact when the United States participates in the war in Europe, and, as such, it cannot be accepted by the Japanese Government.

 

(Part 9 of 14.)

The American Government, obsessed with its own views and opinions, may be said to be scheming for the extension of the war. While it seeks, on the one hand, to secure its rear by stabilizing the Pacific area, it is engaged, on the other hand, in aiding Great Britain and preparing to attack, in the name of self-defense, Germany and Italy, two powers that are striving to establish a new order in Europe. Such a policy is totally at variance with the many principles upon which the American Government proposes to found the stability of the Pacific area through peaceful means.

 

(Part 10 of 14.)

3. Where as the American Government, under the principles it rigidly upholds, objects to settling international issues through military pressure, it is exercising in conjunction with Great Britain and other nations pressure by economic power. Recourse to such pressure as a means of dealing with international relations should be condemned as it is at the times more inhuman than military pressure.

4. It is impossible not to reach the conclusion that the American Government desires to maintain and strengthen, in collusion with Great Britain and other powers, its dominant position it has hitherto occupied not only in China but in other areas of East Asia. It is a fact of history that one countr—(45 letters garbled or missing)—been compelled to observe the status quo under the Anglo-American policy of imperialistic exploitation and to sacrifice

 

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THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR  

 

the —es to the prosperity of the two nations. The Japanese Government cannot tolerate the perpetuation of such a situation since it directly runs counter to Japan's fundamental policy to enable all nations to enjoy each its proper place in the world.

 

(Part 11 of 14.)

The stipulation proposed by the American Government relative to French Indo-China is a good examplification of the above-mentioned American policy. That the six countries,—Japan, the United States, Great Britain, the Netherlands, China and Thailand,—excepting France, should undertake among themselves to respect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of French Indo-China and equality of treatment in trade and commerce would be tantamount to placing that territory under the joint guarantee of the governments of those six countries. Apart from the fact that such a proposal totally ignores the position of France, it is unacceptable to the Japanese government in that such an arrangement cannot but be considered as an extension to French Indo-China of a system similar to the av - (50 letters missed) -sible for the present predicament of East Asia.

 

(Part 12 of 14.)

5. All the items demanded of Japan by the American government regarding China such as wholesale evacuation of troops or unconditional application of the principle of Non-Discrimination in International Commerce ignore the actual conditions of China, and are calculated to destroy Japan's position as the stabilizing factor of East Asia. The attitude of the American government in demanding Japan not to support militarily, politically or economically any regime other than the regime at Chungking, disregarding thereby the existence of the Nanking government, shatters the very basis of the present negotiation. This demand of the American government falling, as it does, in line with its above-mentioned refusal to cease from aiding the Chungking regime, demonstrates clearly the intention of the American government to obstruct the restoration of normal relations between Japan and China and the return of peace to East Asia.

 

(Part 13 of 14.)

5. In brief, the American proposal contains certain acceptable items such as those concerning commerce, including the conclusion of a trade agreement, mutual removal of the freezing restrictions, and stabilization of the Yen and Dollar exchange, or the abolition of extra-territorial rights in China. On the other hand, however, the proposal in question ignores Japan's sacrifices in the four years of the China Affair, menaces the empire's existence itself and disparages its honour and prestige. Therefore, viewed in its entirety, the Japanese government regrets that it cannot accept the proposal as a basis of negotiation.

6. The Japanese government, in its desire for an early conclusion of the negotiation, proposed that simultaneously with the conclusion of the Japanese-American negotiation, agreements be signed with Great Britain and other interested countries. The proposal was accepted by the American government. However, since the American government has made the proposal of November 26th as a result of frequent consultations with Great Britain, Australia, the Netherlands and Chungking, ANDND[a] presumably by catering to the wishes of the Chungking regime on the questions of CHTAUL YLAK-[b] be concluded that all these countries are at one with the United States in ignoring Japan's position.

 

Trans.  12-6-41

 

(Part 14 of 14.)

(Note: In the forwarding instructions to the radio station handling this part, appeared the plain English phrase "VERY IMPORTANT")

 

A-133

 

7. Obviously it is the intention of the American Government to conspire with Great Britain and other countries to obstruct Japan's efforts toward the establishment of peace through the creation of a New Order in East Asia, and especially to preserve Anglo-American rights and interests by keeping Japan and China at war. This intention has been revealed clearly during the course of the present negotiations. Thus, the earnest hope of the Japanese Government to adjust Japanese-American relations and to preserve and promote the peace of the Pacific through cooperation with the American Government has finally been lost.

The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify hereby the American Government that in view of the attitude of the American Government it cannot but consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiations.

 


[a] Probably "and as".

[b] Probably "China, can but".

 

Trans.  12-7-41

 

No. 242

 

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     December 6, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   #905.

 

(Urgent.)

 

(---------.)

 

According to AP and UP reports the State Department has announced that the President had wired a personal message to His Majesty the Emperor. Please wire me the fact.

 

Trans.  12-7-41

 

No. 243

 

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     December 7, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   # 908.

 

(Urgent.)

 

(To be handled in Government Code.)

 

All concerned regret very much that due to failure in adjusting Japanese-American relations; matters have come to what they are now, despite all the efforts you two Ambassadors have been making. I wish to take this opportunity to offer my deepest thanks to you both for your endeavors and hard work as well as for what all the members of the Embassy have done.

 

Trans.  12-7-41

 

No. 244

 

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     December 7, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   # 910.

 

(Extremely urgent.)

 

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After deciphering part 14 of my #902[a], and also #907[b], #908[c], and #909[d], please destroy at once the remaining cipher machine and all machine codes. Dispose in like manner all secret documents.

 


[a] See IV, 241A.

[b] See IV, 241.

[c] See IV, 243.

[d] See IV, 467.

 

Trans.  12-7-41

 

No. 245

 

FROM: Washington                                                                             December 7, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1278.

 

Re your #910[a].

 

Your instructions and your #911 (not available) have been duly received and decoded, and as soon as we have composed and dispatched this telegram we will commence the demolition and destruction by fire.

Also, we have destroyed the codes brought by Kosaka.

Furthermore, the key of your #881 (Instructions for disposing of codes) and your Circular #2400 (re new keying method for cipher machine), should have been burned but because the mails to Mexico are not safe it has not yet been sent.

 


[a] See IV, 244.

 

Trans.  12-10-41

 

No. 246

 

FROM: CNO                                                                                        December 7, 1941

TO: CINCPAC, COM PANAMA, CINCAF, PACIFIC                         072252 CR 0102

NORTHERN, PACIFIC SOUTHERN,

HAWAIIAN NAVAL COSTAL FRONTIERS

 

Execute against Japan unrestricted air and submarine warfare. CINCAF inform British and Dutch. Inform Army.

 

No. 247

 

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     December 8, 1941

TO: Circular                                                                                         Circular #2508.

 

(Part 1 of 5.) Rio de Janeiro Circular # 346.

 

Statement by the Imperial Japanese Government December 8, 1941.

 

An Imperial Rescript declaring war having been graciously granted, the Japanese Government hereby makes an announcement to all the world.

 

A-135

 

"It is the immutable policy of Japan to insure the stability of East Asia and to contribute to the cause of world peace, while the guiding principle of its foreign policy has been to carry out the aforesaid national policy by cultivating friendship with all nations.

"Unfortunately, the China affair broke out, owing to the fact that China failed to comprehend Japan's true intentions, and provoked a conflict, but under the august virtue of our sovereign, our Imperial forces proved victorious wherever they went. All important points in China have now fallen into our hands, and farsighted Chinese leaders sharing the same views with us have established a new national government of China with which Japan has forged the ties of neighbourly friendship, and which has already been recognized by as many as eleven friendly powers. Today, the Chungking

(continued in part 2.)

 

Trans.  12-11-41

 

No. 248

 

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     December 8, 1941

TO: Circular                                                                                         Circular #2508.

 

(Part 2 of 5.) Rio de Janeiro Circular # 346.

 

(Continued from Part 1.)

 

Government, surviving in the remote interior, can do no more than continue its futile resistance. However, the United States of America and the British Empire, unwilling to alter their senseless policy of keeping East Asia permanently in a servile position, obstructed by all means the settlement of the China affair.

"Moreover, they instigated the Netherlands East Indies, menaced French Indo-China and resorted to all possible measures for a view alienating Japan ----- natural aspiration to promote with these countries of the south the relationship of common prosperity, that it appeared they were about to open a planned attack upon us. Finally, they went so far to adopt the outrageous measure of severing economic relations with Japan. Between non-belligerent powers the rupture of economic relations constitutes a hostile attack comparable to a challenge by armed force. ----- even with such an impermissible -----, the two powers, by inducing other countries to follow suit, used the increase of armed forces on all sides of Japan."

(Part 3 not available.)

(continued in part 4.)

 

Trans.  12-11-41

 

No. 249

 

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     December 8, 1941

TO: Circular                                                                                         Circular #2508.

 

(Part 4 of 5.)

 

. . . "There exists any hope or formula to maintain the peace of the Pacific in cooperation with the United States and associate powers through the adjustment of our relations with them by peaceful means. The stability of East Asia and the existence of ----- Japan are now in jeopardy. Even today they are directly attacking our armored forces. Such being the situation, an Imperial Rescript declaring war on the United States of America and the British Empire

 

A-136

 

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR  

 

has been issued. The Government is filled with awe on receiving the Imperial injunction. It is time for us, one hundred million subjects of His Majesty to stand up resolutely with a unity of will strong as iron, and devote the nation's total strength to the prosecution of the war in order that we may eliminate forever the sources of evil in East Asia and thereby meet the august wishes of our sovereign.

"There remains, glorious as the sun and stars, the Imperial Rescript on Japan's mission to enable all nations to have each its proper place in the world. All immutable is our policy to realize, prosperity of Japan,

(continued in part 5)

 

Trans.  12-11- 41

 

No. 250

 

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     December 8, 1941

TO: Circular                                                                                         Circular # 2508.

 

(Part 5 of 5.) Rio de Janeiro Circular # 346.

 

. . . "China and Manchoukuo through the cooperation and collaboration of the three countries, and to lay the foundation for the rise and progress of East Asia. And firm and unshakable as ever is our national resolve that, in alliance with Germany and Italy sharing the same aspirations with Japan, we should mark a foundation for world peace and march forward towards the construction of new order. Japan is now obliged newly to take action in the various regions of the south, but it should be stressed that we harbour no hostile intention toward the peoples of those regions. We only desire to do away with the tyranny of America and Britain and to restore East Asia to its proper and undefiled state of existence and share in the enjoyment of common prosperity with them all. We _____[a]

 


[a] Incomplete.

 

Trans.  12-11-41

 

No. 251

 

FROM: Tokyo (NERNS, Vice Chief, Gen. Staff)                                December 8, 1941[a]

TO: Circular (Berlin, La Paz, Lima, Mexico City, Stockholm)             # 693.

 (SIKUGUN)

 

(3 Parts Complete.)

 

(REVISION.)

 

1. Japan has been patient since the spring but the tyrannical attitude of the U. S. has made it impossible to reach any compromise in our negotiations and today Imperial Japanese Army, Navy, and Air Units attacked U. S. and British forces in the south. (We are sending a separate wire on the details of the negotiations.)

We need not emphasize the fact that the fate of our country is at stake in this opening of hostilities.

For the time being, please stress the following points in propaganda against the U. S.:

 

A-137

 

Part 2.

1. Britain and the U. S. had been steadfast in their opposition to Japan's fixed and natural policy of prosecuting the China incident. Moreover, they had increased military preparations, organized an economic blockade, and were completely encircling Japan. Finally, it reached the point where the very existence of the Japanese Empire was threatened.

2. Japan has great faith in the Rome-Berlin-Tokyo Axis and has made clear her determination to cooperate in the establishment of a new world order.

 

Part 3.

2. We would like you to send us (a) detailed report(s) of your opinions on the decisive step taken by Japan and continue sending intelligence reports. It is our earnest hope that even though your daily living conditions may grow more and more restricted, that you shall continue in your work, helping our country now embroiled in a great conflict.

(Wire addressed to all attachés.)

3. For daily reports on the situation, other than special reports, please rely on DOMEI wires and overseas broadcasts.

 


[a] Note date of translation.

 

Trans.  1-13-45

 

No. 252

 

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     December 13, 1941

TO: Hsinking                                                                                       #940.

 

(Ankara to Tokyo # 242.)

 

. . . 1. Foreign Minister SARADOGURU told the German Counselor here on the 8th that he had received word from the Ambassador in Tokyo that we were going to commence the war on the 10th. He received a great shock from the announcement that came at this time

Trans.  12-20-41

 

No. 253

 

FROM: Seattle (Sato)                                                                           October 22, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 147.

 

(Priority.)

 

The following warships entered Bremerton Naval Yard on the 21st: The Warspite (repairs are to be made to her bridge), the Maryland and a vessel which seems to be a cruiser.

Relayed to ----- and Los Angeles.

 

Trans.  11-4-41

 

No. 254

 

FROM: Seattle (Sato)                                                                           October 28, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           #150.

 

A-138

 

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR  

 

(Priority.)

 

In commemoration of Navy Day, the 27th, fifteen Coast Guard vessels sailed through the harbor here in single file. Their names were as follows: The Kane, Giruma[a], the Brooks, the Fox (the above listed vessels have had their four-inch guns replaced by five-inch guns; all of these were brand-new ones), the Frigate Bird, the Crow, the Pintail, the Eagle 57, Batukei[a], the Butternut, the Amber, the YP83, 87, 89, and 90.

 


[a] Kana spelling

 

Trans.  11-19-41

 

No. 255

 

FROM: Washington (UAWRK)                                                           November 7, 1941

TO: Tokyo (SUMMER) (Vice-Chief, General Staff)                            # 226.

 

According to (a) certain important person(s) having connections with the United States War Department, a large number of (?heavy bombers?) as well as fighter planes were freshly dispatched to Alaska as reinforcements during 3, 4, and 5 November. There were 6 companies of bombers and 20 companies of fighters, probably about 150 planes (in all). Because it is such an excessively large number of planes, and even though it may be an underhanded American scheme to force us to compromise by making a show of readiness to go to war against Japan, I am reporting it for your information exactly as I heard it.

 

Trans.  2-15-45

 

No. 256

 

FROM: Seattle (Sato)                                                                           November 10, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 165.

 

(Priority.)

 

(Message to Washington Circular # 80.)

 

Vessels anchored in Bremerton on the 9th: Saratoga, Warspite, Colorado, (I have confirmed that the latter ship is the one which I have reported on successive occasions as the Maryland) and the Charleston.

Relayed to ----- and Los Angeles.

Trans.  11-19-41

 

No. 257

 

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             November 25, 1941

TO: Seattle                                                                                           # 026.

 

Regarding Warspite, a British war ship now under repair at Bremerton.

 

Please investigate progress of repair, also when repair is completed report day and time of its departure and if possible find out its destination and report.

 

Trans.  12-4-41

 

A-139

 

No. 258

 

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     November 29, 1941

TO: San Francisco                                                                               Circular # 2431.

 

Make full report beginning December 1st on the following.

Ship's nationality, ship's name, port from which it departed, (or at which it arrived), and port of destination, (or from where it started), date of departure, etc., in detail, of all foreign commercial and war ships now in the Pacific, Indian Ocean, and South China Sea.

 

Trans. 12-4-41

 

No. 259

 

FROM: Seattle                                                                                     December 6, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 184.

 

Urgent intelligence.

 

1. The ships at anchor in Bremerton on the 5th were the Warspite (came out of the dock and at present is tied up at a pier) and the Colorado.

2. The Saratoga sailed the same day.

 

Trans.  12-8-41

 

No. 260

 

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     October 28, 1941

TO: Mexico                                                                                         # 218.

 

(Strictly Secret.)

 

Have you begun the work of furnishing general information? Please wire me the results.

 

Trans.  10-30-41

 

No. 261

 

FROM: Mexico (Miura)                                                                       October 28, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 427.

 

(Secret.)

 

Re your #218[a].

 

After talking the matter over with the Naval Attaché here, we wired # 57 to the Chief of the Special Service Section of the Naval General Staff, and we are at present waiting for a reply. Since, for reason of the necessity of maintaining the security of the "L" organ, the naval authorities are not in favor of furnishing general information, will you please take the matter up again with the Navy and wire me the reply.

 


[a] See IV, 260.

 

Trans.  10-30-41

 

A-140

 

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR  

 

No. 262

 

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     November 5, 1941

TO: Mexico City                                                                                  # 225.

 

Re your # 427[a].

 

General intelligence in contradistinction to Naval intelligence is used for reference purposes by the Foreign Office. Therefore please reorganize your office immediately along the line of my communication No. 953. [b]

 


[a] See IV, 261.

[b] Not available.

 

Trans.  11-6-41

 

No. 263

 

FROM: Mexico City (Miura)                                                                November 5, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 432.

 

Re your # 225[a].

 

Your communication No. 953 [b] has not arrived. Please wire the gist of it immediately.

 


[a] See IV, 262.

[b] Not available.

 

Trans.  11-7-41

 

No. 264

 

FROM: Panama (Akiyama)                                                                  October 28, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 231.

 

According to intelligences coming from Costa Rica, I have learned the following:

1. It is understood that the American air force has decided to take over bases in the Golfo Dulce off Costa Rica and the Gulf of Fonseca which faces on the territory of (Honduras ?).

2. It is understood that the Government of the United States has admonished the various nations of Central and South America to watch rigorously residents of Axis affiliation.

3. The Government of the United States is now preparing to construct destroyer, submarine, and air bases in the (Gulf/Bay?) of Keyatamu[a] in the southeastern area of the Island of Cocos off the coast of Puntarenas.

 


[a] Kana spelling

 

Trans.  11-19-41

 

A-141

 

No. 265

 

FROM: Panama (Akiyama)                                                                  October 18, 1941

TO: Tokyo (Part 1 of 2.)                                                                      # 220.

 

1. Ship movements from the 14th to the 18th:

Moving toward the Pacific: 4 American, 1 British freighters; 2 American tankers.

Moving toward the Atlantic: 4 American, 2 British, 1 Dutch freighters; 1 American tanker, 1 American passenger steamer. Recently ships have been going through the canal at night.

2. In order to find out the plans of the Canal command, I inspected the military establishment at the Pacific end on the 10th. (Naturally they do not allow us to inspect the forts.) I found that construction is going on at a rapid rate and the whole area is being covered with fortifications. Specifically, at Albrook Field, 3 large hangars, storehouses for airplane parts, underground tanks, and 8 barracks to accommodate 200 men each.

At Corozal, 4 two-hundred-men barracks, 55 two-family officer's quarters and a 500-patient hospital are nearing completion.

 

Trans. 10-23-41

 

No. 266

 

FROM: Panama (Akiyama)                                                                  October 18, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           #220.

 

(Part 2 of 2.)

 

At Fort Clayton there are stationed, as before, the 2nd Field Artillery Battalion, the 1st Engineers, and the 33rd Infantry. Besides barracks for the (signal ?) units attached to these groups, 18 or (48?) barracks large enough to accommodate 250 persons each are approaching completion. In addition to the recently completed hangars at Howard Field, barracks for 26 companies have been roughly completed at Fort Kobbe. Some of these are already in use (details will be sent (by mail ?)). In the Canal Zone there are between the two oceans three cruisers, 8 new type destroyers, 18 submarines, one gunboat, and one submarine tender. The construction work of the submarine base at Balboa is progressing. According to information coming from -----, 16-inch guns have been emplaced on Pearl Islands, and some of the warships of (this country ?) are patrolling the waters around them.

 

Trans.  10-24-41

 

No. 267

 

FROM: Panama (Akiyama)                                                                  October 28, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 232.

 

1. On the 27th, a warship of the Omaha class left this port for the Pacific.

2. On the same day, two single-funnel destroyers, one light cruiser, and one 10,000 ton class transport were anchored in Balboa harbor.

3. On the 26th, one American destroyer and two submarines were anchored in the harbor at Cristobal.

4. From the 22nd until the 27th, four American and four British merchant vessels passed through the Canal bound for the Pacific (one of the British vessels was of the 14,000 ton class).

 

A-142

 

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR  

 

Six American merchant vessels, one American tanker, and one Netherlands cargo ship passed through the Canal in the direction of the Atlantic.

 

Trans.  11-19-41

 

No. 268

 

FROM: Panama (Akiyama)                                                                  November 4, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 241.

 

1. On the 3rd, one American destroyer was seen to pass through the Canal in the direction of the Atlantic. On the same day, an American warship (which did not seem to be the Zane), having two funnels on her fore deck and airplane equipment on her after deck, of 2,000 or 3,000 tons, was seen to pass through the Canal going in the same direction.

2. From the 2nd to the 4th of this month, nine American freighters and one tanker passed through the Canal heading in the direction of the Pacific. Five American freighters and one American passenger vessel as well as one Danish ship were observed passing through the Canal heading in the direction of the Atlantic.

 

Trans.  11-14-41

 

No. 269

 

FROM: Panama (Akiyama)                                                                  November 5, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 246.

 

1. According to news from an Italian source, it is reported as follows: Fifty army air officers of Italian origin who had been training at RIOHATO departed for China during the end of October. It is thought that they were sent to China as they are of Italian blood and would not be suitable for Europe.

2. Report on ships passing through Panama.

November 2nd, an army transport of over 6,000 tons, with capacity load of army men, headed for Pacific.

3. November 4th, two cruisers of Omaha type anchored at Balboa.

4. Ships that passed during 4th and 5th towards Pacific, one U. S. freighter, one British freighter, 1400 tons. From Pacific, three U. S. freighters, one U. S. tanker, one British freighter, 20,000 tons.

 

Trans.  11-24-41

 

No. 270

 

FROM: Panama (Akiyama)                                                                  November 10, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 265.

 

1. The warship mentioned in my # 262[a] is not of the Vanoc class but has been confirmed to be the Diomede. Its destination is the Pacific.

2. On the 10th two American submarines moved through the Canal into the Pacific.

 


[a] Not available.

 

Trans.  11-19-41

 

A-143

 

No. 271

 

FROM: Panama (Akiyama)                                                                  November 11,(?) 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 273.

 

Ships passed through Panama on 11th and 12th.

 

To Pacific: Freighters: 1 American, 2 British, (one 10,000 ton with tower looked like warship). To Atlantic: Freighters: 3 American, 3 British, (one with 2 guns, two with 1 gun).

 

Trans.  11-25-41

 

No. 272

 

FROM: Panama (Akiyama)                                                                  November 12, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 282.

 

1. On the night of the 11th, a British light cruiser went through the Canal in the direction of the Atlantic. This cruiser is understood to have undergone repairs in San Francisco and seems to have been the Liverpool.

2. On the 12th, a British military transport of approximately 27,000 tons, of the Union Castle class, passed through the Canal on its way from the Pacific, filled to capacity with military personnel.

3. Early in November, 12 Douglass two-motored bombers and six Airacobra pursuit planes, flew here to increase the Canal air force.

 

Trans.  12-3-41

 

No. 273

 

FROM: Panama (Akiyama)                                                                  November 13, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 285.

 

Panama shipping report.

 

(1) A commercial ship of Union Castle type passed through towards the Atlantic, with about 1000 of what seemed like evacuees (women and children) and a few wounded, aboard, on the 13th.

(2) The heavy cruiser which passed through on the 11th is believed to be passing through to make up a convoy on the Atlantic, and looks as though it had accompanied # 1 (Union Castle type commercial ship) from the Pacific. The German reports say it is a Liverpool class cruiser, but not the Liverpool.

(3) The Omaha type ship has the bow painted black and the stern painted white and at a glance looks like a destroyer.

 

Trans.  11-24-41

 

A-144

 

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR  

 

No. 274

 

FROM: Panama (Akiyama)                                                                  November 18, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 300.

 

1. On the 18th, one British ship and one Netherlands vessel of approximately 17,000 tons went through the Canal in the direction of the Pacific. One 10,000 ton British vessel and one American ship went through the Canal in the direction of the Atlantic.

2. One destroyer and one submarine are undergoing repairs in Cristobal.

 

Trans.  12-5-41

 

No. 275

 

FROM: Panama (Akiyama)                                                                  November 20, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           #310.

 

1. On the 19th and 20th, four American cargo ships, one British cargo ship and one tanker, and one French ----- passed across to the Pacific.

2. An American cargo ship and one tanker passed across to the Atlantic.

3. (-----message goes off-----.)

 

Trans.  12-10-41

 

No. 276

 

FROM: Panama (Akiyama)                                                                  November 22, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 321.

 

(Part 1 of 4.) (Strictly secret.)

 

I suppose you are already acquainted with these facts but the manner of defending the canal is now as follows:

1. The United States is publishing as though it were utterly true, that a Troy horse has been found not only among the foreigners in Panama but also in government circles. However, this country replies that her principle is Panama for Panamanians. ARIAS stated that though Panama was weak, if certain concessions were made to neighboring countries, the United States might be defied. The United States, however, fixed his regime good and proper. At present, the canal officials are checking over, one by one, 2,000 Germans, 700 Italians, and 400 Japanese.

2. I hear that the United States has set up in Panama air bases (some of which have -----), anti-aircraft gun bases, and airplane detector bases (some of these detectors are said to be able to discover a plane 200 miles away). Thus, we see that in her policy toward South America, the United States is now exerting unprecedented pressure.

 

PART 2

In spite of the fact that it is in violation of the treaty concluded in 1936, the United States is coercing Panama where the canal is. She is expending vast sums of money there, and if necessary will take still more drastic steps. However, the difference in the points of view is forever and eternally a cancer's growth in the relations of the two countries.

3. From the Pacific to the Atlantic coast, between Panama and Colon, there is no thoroughfare. The reason why one has not been constructed, is that the jungle constitutes a natural defense for the canal. As an indication of the United States' policy of defense, lately they have begun to construct a road even of macadam which will probably go as far as Colon. However,

 

A-145

 

it is not yet completed. (This is an exceptional case in preparation for the possible destruction of the canal.) It also seems that when complete the American continental highway will extend as far as the borders of Colombia, but when this will be is uncertain.

 

PART 3

4. The United States government is going on the assumption that the attack on the Canal will be made from both air and sea. Especially, in preparation for a possible attack from the Pacific side, it has reenforced the special fleet recently, as I have already indicated in my telegram. They have mapped out an area 900 (kilometers ?), with the center of the radius at Panama, as a patrol area and are constantly patrolling it. The Army has built fortifications here and there in the territory of Panama in which there are 16" and 14" gun emplacements. (These forts are equipped with hygienic facilities. The soldiers are indulging in pleasures. The distance ----- of the fortifications if ----- exceeds 1500 (kilometers ?).) In addition, they are endeavoring to guard such vital points as locks, spillways, and especially the control tower controlling the spillway on Lake Gatun and the electric plant.

 

PART 4

The anti-air defenses (?) on lock #1, which is now being used, are being improved. (Of course, there are anti-air defenses (?) at lock #3.) The naval defense area, patrolled against possible lightning attacks, extends in the north from Salina Cruz on the Tehuantepec Isthmus to Monepene (on?) the Gulf of Fonseca. The southern limits extend to the air base on the Galapagos Islands.

5. Present army strength is 47,000; naval 10,000; air force, 5,000. In addition, it is estimated that there is approximately twice this general total, made up of the families of laborers (excluding Panamanians).

 

Trans.  12-26-41

 

No. 277

 

FROM: Washington                                                                             December 1, 1941

TO: Panama                                                                                         # 040.

 

Report passage through the Canal of the U. S. S. MISSISSIPPI, NORTH CAROLINA, WASHINGTON, WASP.

 

Trans.  12-10-41

 

No. 278

 

FROM: Rio de Janeiro (Ishii)                                                               November 15, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 460.

 

Reports from our Consul in BEREN (Belem ?) regarding the number and dates of U. S. bomber planes flown from Natal to British Bathurst (on west coast of Africa) are as follows:

 

 

Date

Number of planes

August

30

2

September

4

2

 

30

2 (40 passengers each)

October

16

3 (4 passengers each)

 

19

3 (same as above)

 

—(?)

3 (same as above)

 

 

 

A-146

 

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR  

 

 

—(?)

4 (same as above)

November

5

1 (40 passengers)

 

9

2 (4 passengers)

 

12

3

 

Of the above list, those having large number of passengers are ships carrying technicians to strengthen bases at Bathurst, (refer to my message # 415[a]). Those with few passengers may be thought to be ships being flown to Near East British forces for their use.

 


[a] Not available.

 

Trans.  12-7-41

 

No. 279

 

FROM: Tokyo (Togo)                                                                          November 15, 1941

TO: Honolulu (Riyoji)                                                                         # 111.

 

As relations between Japan and the United States are most critical, make your "ships in harbor report" irregular, but at a rate of twice a week. Although you already are no doubt aware, please take extra care to maintain secrecy.

 

Trans.  12-3-41

 

No. 280

 

FROM: Honolulu (Kita)                                                                       November 18, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 222.

 

1. The warships at anchor in the Harbor on the 15th were as I told you in my # 219[a] on that day.

 

Area A[b]—A battleship of the Oklahoma class entered and one tanker left port.

Area C[c]—3 warships of the heavy cruiser class were at anchor.

 

2. On the 17th, the Saratoga was not in the harbor. The carrier, Enterprise, or some other vessel was in Area C. Two heavy cruisers of the Chicago class, one of the Pensacola class were tied up at docks "KS". 4 merchant vessels were at anchor in area D[d].

3. At 10:00 a.m. on the morning of the 17th, 8 destroyers were observed entering the Harbor. Their course was as follows: In a single file at a distance of 1,000 meters apart at a speed of 3 knots per hour, they moved into Pearl Harbor. From the entrance of the Harbor through Area B to the buoys in Area C, to which they were moored, they changed course 5 times each time roughly 30 degrees. The elapsed time was one hour, however, one of these destroyers entered Area A after passing the water reservoir on the Eastern side.

Relayed to -----.

 


[a] Not deciphered. Dated 14 November 1941.

[b] Waters between Ford Island and the Arsenal.

[c] East Loch.

[d] Middle Loch.

 

Trans.  12-6-41

 

A-147

 

No. 281

 

FROM: Honolulu (Kita)                                                                       November 18, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 224.

 

An advance party of 46 American transport experts and engineers, headed by Captain RICHARD M. JONES arrive in port on the 16th to operate trucks on the Burma Road. It is said that there are now in use on the Burma Road 3,500 new type trucks, mostly of 21/2 ton capacity.

 

Trans.  12-5-41

 

No. 282

 

FROM: Tokyo(Togo)                                                                           November 18, 1941

TO: Honolulu                                                                                      # 113.

 

Please report on the following areas as to vessels anchored therein; Area "N" Pearl Harbor, Manila Bay, and the areas adjacent thereto. (Make your investigation with great secrecy.)

 

Trans.  12-5-41

 

No. 283

 

FROM: Tokyo (Togo)                                                                          November 20, 1941

TO: Honolulu                                                                                      # 111.

 

Strictly secret.

 

Please investigate comprehensively the fleet ----- bases in the neighborhood of the Hawaiian military reservation.

 

Trans. 12-4-41

 

No. 284

 

FROM: Honolulu (Kita)                                                                       November 24, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 234.

 

Part 1 of 2. Strictly secret.

 

Re your #114[a].

 

1. According to normal practice, the fleet leaves Pearl Harbor, conducts maneuvers and forthwith returns.

2. Recently, the fleet has not remained for a long period of time nor conducted maneuvers in the neighborhood of Lahaina Roads. Destroyers and submarines are the only vessels who ride at anchor there.

3. Battleships seldom, if ever, enter the ports of Hilo, Hanalei, or Kaneohe. Virtually no one has observed battleships in maneuver areas

4. The manner in which the fleet moves:

Battleships exercise in groups of three or five, accompanied by lighter craft. They conduct maneuvers for roughly one week at sea, either to the south of Maui or to the southwest. Aircraft carriers maneuver by themselves, whereas sea plane tenders operate in concert with another

 

A-148

 

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR  

 

vessel of the same class. Airplane firing and bombing practice is conducted in the neighborhood of the southern extremity of the island of Kahoolawe.

 


[a] Not available.

 

Trans.  12-16-41

 

No. 285

 

FROM: Honolulu                                                                                 November 24, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 234.

 

Part 2 of 2.

 

The heavy cruisers in groups of six carry on their operations over a period of two to three weeks, doubtless going to Samoa. The length of time that they remain at anchor in Pearl Harbor or tied up at docks is roughly four or five days at a stretch.

The light cruisers in groups of five spend one to two weeks in operations. It would seem that they carry on their maneuvers in the vicinity of Panama.

The submarines go out on 24-hour trips Monday, Wednesdays, and Fridays.

The destroyers, in addition to accompanying the principal units of the fleet, carry on personnel training activities in the waters adjacent to Hawaii.

Mine layers (old-style destroyers) in groups of -----, have been known to spend more than three weeks in operations in the Manila area.

Furthermore, on the night of the 23rd, five mine layers conducted mine laying operations outside Manila harbor.

 

Trans.  12-16-41

 

No. 286

 

FROM: Honolulu                                                                                 November 28, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 238.

 

Military report:

(1) There are eight "B-17" planes at Midway and the altitude range of their anti-aircraft guns is (5,000 feet?).

(2) Our observations at the Sand Island maneuvers are: number of shots—12; interval of flight—13 seconds; interval between shots—2 minutes; direct hits—none.

(3) 12,000 men (mostly marines) are expected to reinforce the troops in Honolulu during December or January.

(4) There has usually been one cruiser in the waters about (15,000 feet?) south of Pearl Harbor and one or two destroyers at the entrance to the harbor.

 

Trans.  12-8-41

 

No. 287

 

FROM: Tokyo (Togo)                                                                          November 28, 1941

TO: Honolulu                                                                                      # 119.

 

A-149

 

Re your message # 243[a].

 

Secret outside the Department.

 

Intelligences of this kind which are of major importance, please transmit to us in the following manner:

1. When battleships move out of the harbor if we report such movement but once a week the vessels, in that interval, could not only be in the vicinity of the Hawaiian Islands, but could also have traveled far. Use your own judgment in deciding on reports covering such movements.

2. Report upon the entrance or departure of capital ships and the length of time they remain at anchor, from the time of entry into the port until the departure.

 


[a] Not available.

 

No. 288

 

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     November 29, 1941

TO: Honolulu                                                                                      #122.

 

Trans.  12-8-41

 

We have been receiving reports from you on ship movements, but in future will you also report even when there are no movements.

 

Trans.  12-5-41

 

No. 289

 

FROM: Tokyo (Togo)                                                                          November 28, 1941

TO: Honolulu                                                                                      # 118.

 

(Priority.)

 

Re your # 232[a].

 

To be handled in government code.

 

Anticipating the possibility of ordinary telegraphic communication being severed when we are about to face the worst of situations, these broadcasts are intended to serve as a means of informing the diplomats in the country concerned of that situation without the use of the usual telegraphic channels. Do not destroy the codes without regard to the actual situation in your locality, but retain them as long as the situation there permits and until the final stage is entered into.

 


[a] Not available.

 

Trans.  12-7-41

 

No. 290

 

FROM: Honolulu (Kita)                                                                       December 1, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 241.

 

A-150

 

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR  

 

(In 2 parts complete.)

 

Re your # 119[a]

 

Report on ship maneuvers in Pearl Harbor:

1. The place where practice maneuvers are held is about 500 nautical miles southeast of here.

Direction based on:

(1) The direction taken when the ships start out is usually southeast by south and ships disappear beyond the horizon in that direction.

(2) Have never seen the fleet go westward or head for the "KAIUI" straits northwards.

(3) The west sea of the Hawaiian Islands has many reefs and islands and is not suitable as an ocean maneuver practice sea.

(4) Direction of practice will avoid all merchant ship routes and official travel routes.

Distance based on:

(1) Fuel is plentiful and long distance high speed is possible.

(2) Guns cannot be heard here.

(3) In one week's time, (actually the maneuvers mentioned in my message #231[b] were for the duration of four full days of 144 hours), a round trip to a distance of 864 nautical miles could be reached (if speed is 12 knots), or 1152 miles (if speed is 16 knots), or 1440 nautical miles (if speed is 20 knots) is possible, however, figuring on 50% of the time being used for maneuver technicalities, a guess that the point at which the maneuvers are held would be a point of about 500 miles from Pearl Harbor.

2. The usual schedule for departure and return of the battleship is: leaving on Tuesday and returning on Friday, or leaving on Friday and returning on Saturday of the following week. All ships stay in port about a period of one week.

 


[a] See IV, 287.

[b] Not available.

Trans.  12-10-41

 

No. 291

 

FROM: Tokyo (Togo)                                                                          December 2, 1941

TO: Honolulu                                                                                      # 123.

 

(Secret outside the department.)

 

In view of the present situation, the presence in port of warships, airplane carriers, and cruisers is of utmost importance. Hereafter, to the utmost of your ability, let me know day by day. Wire me in each case whether or not there are any observation balloons above Pearl Harbor or if there are any indications that they will be sent up. Also advise me whether or not the warships are provided with anti-mine nets.

 

Trans.  12-30-41

 

No. 292

 

FROM: Honolulu (Kita)                                                                       December 3, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 245.

 

(In 2 parts complete.)

 

A-151

 

Military secret.

 

From Ichiro Fujii to the Chief of # 3 Section of Military Staff Headquarters.

 

1. I wish to change my method of communicating by signals to the following:

a. Arrange the eight signals in three columns as follows:

 

Meaning                                                                                                                Signal

Battleship divisions including scouts                                                                     Preparing to sortie  1

and screen units

A number of carriers                        Preparing to sortie                                         2

Battleship divisions                           All departed between 1st and 3rd.                3

Carriers                                             Several departed between 1st and 3rd.          4

Carriers                                             All departed between 1st and 3rd.                5

Battleship divisions                           All departed between 4th and 6th.                6

Carriers                                             Several departed between 4th and 6th.         7

Carriers                                             All departed between 4th and 6th.                 8

 

2. Signals.

a. Lanikai [a] Beach. House will show lights during the night as follows:

                                                                 Signal

One light between 8 and 9 p.m.                1

One light between 9 and 10 p.m.              2

One light between 10 and 11 p.m.            3

One light between 11 and 12 p.m.            4

b.

 

Two lights between 12 and 1 a.m.            5

Two lights between 1 and 2 a.m.              6

Two lights between 2 and 3 a.m.              7

Two lights between 3 and 4 a.m.              8

 

Part 2.

c. Lanikai[a] Bay, during daylight.

If there is a "star" on the head of the sail of the Star Boat it indicates signals 1, 2, 3, or 4. 

If there is a "star" and a Roman numeral III it indicates signal 5, 6, 7, or 8.

D. Lights in the attic window of Kalama House [b] will indicate the following:

 

Times                                 Signal

1900 - 2000                       3

2000 - 2100                       4

2100 - 2200                       5

2200 - 2300                       6

2300 – 2400                      7

0000 – 0100                      8

 

e. K.G.M.B. [c] Want Ads.

A. Chinese rug etc. For sale, apply P.O. box 1476 indicates signal 3 or 6.

B. CHICH..GO farm etc. Apply P.O. box 1476 indicates signal 4 or 7.

C. Beauty operator wanted etc. Apply P.O. box 1476 indicates signal 5 or 8.

3. If the above listed signals and wireless messages cannot be made from Oahu, then on Maui Island, 6 miles to the northward of Kula Sanatorium [d] at a point halfway between Lower Kula Road and Haleakala Road (latitude 20° 40'N, longitude 156° 19'W., visible from seaward to the southeast and southwest of Maui Island) the following signal bonfire will be made daily until your EXEX signal is received:

 

A-152

 

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR  

 

Times                                          Signal

From 7 - 8                                   3 or 6

From 8 - 9                                   4 of 7

From 9 - 10                                 5 or 8

 


[a] Between Waimanalo and Kailua Beaches on east coast of Oahu.

[b] A beach village on east coast of Oahu, 1 mile northwest of Lanikai.

[c] A radio broadcast station in Honolulu.

[d] At latitude 20-42-45 N., longitude 156-20-20 W.

 

Trans.  12-11-41

 

No. 293

 

FROM: Honolulu (Kita)                                                                       December 3, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 247.

 

Ship report.

 

2nd. Military transport (name unknown) sailed out toward mainland.

3rd. RARIN came into port from San Francisco.

 

Trans.  12-10-41

 

No. 294

 

FROM: Honolulu (Kita)                                                                       December 3, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 248.

 

Ship report.

 

December 3rd. Wyoming and 2 seaplane tenders left port. No other movement.

 

Trans.  12-10-41

 

No. 295

 

FROM: Honolulu (Kita)                                                                       December 4, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 249.

 

On the afternoon of the 3rd, one British gunboat entered Honolulu Harbor. She left port early on the morning of the 4th. She was roughly of the 1,100 tons class. She had but one funnel and carried one 4 inch gun fore and aft. ----- -----.

Furthermore, immediately after the vessel entered port, a sailor took some mail to the British Consular Office and received some mail in return.

 

Trans.  12-12-41

 

No. 296

 

FROM: Honolulu (Kita)                                                                       December 5, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 252.

 

A-153

 

 (1) During Friday morning, the 5th, the three battleships mentioned in my message #289[a] arrived here. They had been at sea for eight days.

(2) The Lexington and five heavy cruisers left port on the same day.

(3) The following ships were in port on the afternoon of the 5th:

8 battleships

3 light cruisers

16 destroyers

Four ships of the Honolulu class and ------ were in dock.

 


[a] Not available.

 

Trans.  12-10-41

 

No. 297

 

FROM: Honolulu                                                                                 December 6, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           #253.

 

Re the last part of your # 123[a].

 

1. On the American continent in October the Army began training barrage balloon troops at Camp Davis, North Carolina. Not only have they ordered four or five hundred balloons, but it is understood that they are considering the use of these balloons in the defense of Hawaii and Panama. Insofar as Hawaii is concerned, though investigations have been made in the neighborhood of Pearl Harbor, they have not set up mooring equipment, nor have they selected the troops to man them. Furthermore, there is no indication that any training for the maintenance of balloons is being undertaken. At the present time there are no signs of barrage balloon equipment. In addition, it is difficult to imagine that they have actually any. However, even though they have actually made preparations, because they must control the air over the water and land runways of the airports in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor, Hickam, Ford and Ewa[b], there are limits to the balloon defense of Pearl Harbor. I imagine that in all probability there is considerable opportunity left to take advantage for a surprise attack against these places.

2. In my opinion, the battleships do not have torpedo nets. The details are not known. I will report the results of my investigation.

 


[a]  See IV, 291.

[b] Kana spelling.

 

Trans.  12-8-41

 

No. 298

 

FROM: Honolulu                                                                                 December 6, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 254.

 

1. On the evening of the 5th, among the battleships which entered port were ------ and one submarine tender. The following ships were observed at anchor on the 6th:

9 battleships, 3 light cruisers, 3 submarine tenders, 17 destroyers, and in addition, there were 4 light cruisers, 2 destroyers lying at docks (the heavy cruisers and airplane carriers have all left).

 

A-154

 

2. It appears that no air reconnaissance is being conducted by the fleet air arm.

 

Trans.  12-8-41

 

No. 299

 

FROM: Davao (Kihara)                                                                       October 21, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 156

 

Regarding My # 124[a]

 

As an air base for central Mindanao district, 300 men are being managed by Americans, and the ground is now being leveled.

An underground hangar and underground oil tanks are planned; however, the material for this is delayed so that building on this is not progressing as planned.

Already several times a week planes are flying here, and it seems they are expecting large heavy bomber planes too, very soon.

 


[a] Not available.

 

Trans.  12-1-41

 

No. 300

 

FROM: Manila (Nihro)                                                                        October 22, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 701.

 

The American ship American Leader which arrived in port on the 20th is unloading more than ten tanks, each tank equipped with a gun having a barrel about six feet long.

 

Trans.  10-25-41

 

No. 301

 

FROM: Manila (Nihro)                                                                        October 20, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 693.

 

Primary intelligence. The Houston, the Marblehead, eight destroyers, ten submarines (of the 170 and 190 class) and one mine layer left port on the morning of the 20th. Their destination is unknown.

 

Trans.  10-24-41

 

No. 302

 

FROM: Manila (Nihro)                                                                        October 25, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           #711.

 

1. The REI[a] and one destroyer left during the morning of the 25th. Destination is not known.

2. Ships in port are the following:

 

a. Manila.

TON[a]

 

A-155

 

MADDO[a]

CHESTER

BUKKU[a]

BERU[a]

ROYGXOMU (?)

HON[a]

5 destroyers

11 large submarines

5 small submarines

b. Cavite. PASU[a] (under repair)

2 destroyers

3. There are indications that all of the vessels are to be repainted into an ash color (almost a grey). The TON[a] and one destroyer have already been repainted.

 


[a] Possible equivalents for these abbreviations are:

REI                                 —Langley

TON                               —Houston

MADDO                        —Marblehead

BUKKO                         —Black Hawk

BERU                            —Isabel

HON                               —Heron

PASU                             —Canopus

 

Trans.  10-29-41

 

No. 303

 

FROM: Manila                                                                                     October 24, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 707.

 

1. Two destroyers, the Ton[a] and the Maddo,[a] two submarines and one mine layer touched port on the afternoon of the 23rd.

2. The President Cleveland, which entered the port on the afternoon of the 23rd, landed American soldiers (an unconfirmed report is there were 2,500).

3. The Chester, a Class A Cruiser no doubt convoying the Cleveland, also entered the port on the afternoon of the 23rd.

4. Referring to my #661[b] and 685[c] the Gold Star was a mistake for the Ohotos[a] (or Ohotou[a]) estimated to be a 10,000 ton ship formerly Norwegian and remodeled after the war).

 


[a] Kana spelling.

[b] Not available.

[c] Manila wires Tokyo the ships that are laid up in the harbor at the present time and the ones that left port on the afternoon of the 13th.

 

Trans.  10-24-41

 

No. 304

 

FROM: Manila (Nihro)                                                                        October 27, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 713.

 

A-156

 

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR  

 

1. The PISU entered Cavite on the 26th and the REI entered on the morning of the 27th.

2. On the morning of the 27th, 3 destroyers, 11 submarines of the N type, the HON and 2 minelayers left port, destination unknown.

Trans.  11-3-41

 

No. 305

 

FROM: Manila                                                                                     October 29, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 719 (?).

 

The TON[a] and the MADDO[b] sailed on the afternoon of the 28th and the Chester on the morning of the 29th. Destination unknown.

 


[a] Houston ?.

[b] Marblehead ?.

 

Trans.  11-24-41

 

No. 306

 

FROM: Manila (Nihro)                                                                        November 1, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 722.

 

1. The TON[a], MADDO[a], HON[a], 7 destroyers, 8 submarines and 3 minesweepers entered port on the 31st. But the TON[a] left again on the morning of the 1st, destination unknown.

2. On the morning of the 2st the President Cleveland and President Madison left port loaded with American soldiers whose time was up, (number uncertain).

3. According to reports received from what we believe are reliable sources the number of American military and naval planes in the Philippine Islands is as follows:

(a) Military planes.

Large bombers, 29.

Scout planes, 324.

The same, B type, 62.

Fighters, 317.

The same, B type, 131.

Pursuit planes, 302.

The same, D type, 69.

Training planes, 49.

Total, 1283.

(B) Naval planes.

Large flying boats, 26.

4. Ships in port on the 1st: MADDO[a], BAKKU[a], PISU[a], HON[a], BERU[a], 9 destroyers, 3 submarines, WOHOTOSU, 3 minelayers. In Cavite: REI[a], PASU[a], 2 Z.

5. According to a report from the De La Rama steamship company two of their ships, the Dona Estaban (1616 tons), and the MADBUKARU (191 tons), had been requisitioned by the local American Army.

 


[a] Possible equivalents for these abbreviations are: TON (Houston); MADDO (Marblehead); HON (Heron); BUKKU (Black Hawk); PISU (Canopus); BERU (Isabel); REI (Langley); PASU (Canopus).

 

Trans.  11-8-41

 

A-157

 

No. 307

 

FROM: Manila (Nihro)                                                                        November 1, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           #723.

 

(Re your #318.) [a]

 

Strict guard is being maintained, hence the gathering of information is extremely difficult. We are making secret investigations but I will wire you the following newspaper and foreign office reports for the present.

1. The incorporation of the Philippine Army into the Far Eastern Army is progressing slowly but surely and it is reported that by the end of the year the incorporation of 120,000 will be completed. Additions to the barracks at the various camps are being rushed to completion. It seems that particular emphasis is being placed on the concentration of military strength.

Localities are as follows:

Kabanatuan, San Marcelino  ----- -----  (several groups missing).

Furthermore there is to be a great increase in the number of soldiers stationed in the vicinity Lingayen during the month of November. Army maneuvers are to be carried out during the middle of the month. This may be a temporary measure.

2. In the vicinity of Mariveles more than 3,000 workmen are being used to rush the work on the various projects. However, there are not more than 300 infantry and cavalry troops stationed there.

On the 27th, what I estimated to be between 2,000 and 3,000 infantry troops left Manila by bus headed north. Their destination may have been the above place. It is being investigated at present. It appears that three airports are being built there and the docks are being enlarged.

In the Bataan area the surveillance is particularly strict and it is said that even the entry of Filipinos is prohibited.

3. Work is being rushed on the road between Dingalan and RAARU (Laur ?) and by the middle of October there are less than two kilometers that had not been completed and this will be finished in the near future. The road between Infanta and Manila is being widened to 5 meters. Work is being carried on day and night and the progress is amazing.

4. In Iba there are 30 or 40 fighter planes, 20 or 30 light bombers and several score of altitude planes (?) it is said.

Details by mail.

 


[a] "I want you to make a reconnaissance of the new defense works along the east, west and southern coasts of the island of Luzon, reporting their progress, strength, etc. Also please investigate anything else which may seem of interest."

 

Trans.  11-4-41

 

No. 308

 

FROM: Tokyo (Togo)                                                                          November 5, 1941

TO: Manila                                                                                          # 349.

 

Re your # 722 [a] (reports number of military and naval planes in Philippine Islands).

 

A-158

 

Please wire immediately for our information as to the validity of the reports mentioned in paragraph 3.

 


[a] IV, 306.

Trans.  11-12-41

 

No. 309

 

FROM: Manila (Nihro)                                                                        November 4, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 727.

 

Intelligence.

 

1. Since about a month ago little by little brown soldiers have been arriving at the Stotsenburg Barracks. The number at present is about two or three thousand. In view of the fact that these soldiers speak Spanish, they may be "Iko's." I understand that they are not very friendly with American soldiers. We are now secretly investigating where they have come from.

2. Taraiao[a]. Recently the Migual Air Field has been extended to form a rectangle about 1,000 meters long.

3. All the wooden bridges on the national highway between Taraiao and Lingayen [b] have been replaced with concrete bridges.

4. At the foot of a hill situated to the north of Teraiao (the hill overlooks the Lingayen Gulf) about 200 barracks have been constructed. I understand that new barracks are being built at Ste Ignatia.

5. From what I hear the American soldiers stationed at Stotsenburg maintained an arrogant attitude toward the Filipinos and, since there have been two or three cases of assault on Filipinas, the Filipinos are furious.

 


[a] Tarallo Camarines Province.

[b] Pangasinan Province, Luzon, Philippine Islands on Lingayen Gulf.

 

Trans.  11-12-41

 

No. 310

 

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     November 5, 1941

TO: Manila                                                                                          # 355.

 

For Secretary Yuki.

 

The Naval General Staff has requested that investigation be made on the following items. Please arrange as you think best for the same: These items in regard to each port of call: (1) Conditions at air ports on land. (2) Types of planes at each, and number of planes. (3) Warships; also machinery belonging to land forces. (4) State of progress being made on all equipment and establishments.

 

Trans.  11-13-41

 

A-159

 

No. 311

 

FROM: Tokyo (Togo)                                                                          November 5, 1941

TO: Manila                                                                                          # 349.

 

Re your # 722[a].

 

Please wire immediately for our information as to the validity of the reports mentioned in T! paragraph 3. [a]

 


[a] See IV, 306.

 

Trans.  11-12-41

No. 312

 

FROM: Manila (Nihro)                                                                        November 6, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 735.

 

Of first importance. Re my # 732 [a].

 

The following information has been pieced together from two intelligence reports.

1. 50 American officials and 1200 Philippine soldiers are stationed at Bugallon in Pangasinan [b] province. There are also 8 light tanks and 8 aircraft guns (with fixed mounts). There is a number of American artillery men stationed in the Yashiyama (literally—Coconut (?) mountain) between Sual [c] and Lingayen [c].

2. There are 10 two-motored light bombers, 190 Curtis fighting planes (up to now intelligence reports have given the number to be 60 but recently reenforcements were received) and 400 American air force officers stationed at Iba in Zambales [d] province. A division of Philippine soldiers (15,000) are stationed at San Marcelino. This division is composed of 3 infantry regiments, 3 field artillery companies and 3 self-propelled armored artillery companies and it is expected that a reenforcement of a large number of tanks will soon be received. They have recently started the construction of a new air field there.

Furthermore, 320 Philippine soldiers are stationed at Botolan.

3. They are now constructing barracks at three points (out 4 kilometers, (less than 10) kilometers and 22 kilometers) on the road from Tarlac to Santa Ignacia in Tarlac province which will accommodate 500, 1000, 1500 soldiers respectively, a total of 3,000. Also construction is being started on a new airfield 5 kilometers south of Tarlac (a five year plan) apparently a part of the leveling has already been finished. A military road from Capas through O'Donnell to Botolan in Zambales province is almost completed. (Upon several occasions lately troop camouflaging was observed.)

4. Recently 200 light tanks were (landed ?) at Stotsenburg in Pampanga [e].

 


[a] Not available.

[b] Province north of Manila beyond Tarlac province.

[c] Pangasinan Province.

[d] On the western side of the peninsula across the bay from Manila.

[e] On the northwest shore of Manila Bay between Tarlac and Bataan Province.

 

Trans.  11-15-41

 

A-160

 

No. 313

 

FROM: Manila                                                                                     November 8, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           #738.

 

Re your # 353 [a]

 

Retransmitting that portion of the message following Raichaku.

 

# 732. Re my # 723 [b].

 

1. Since the last part of last month a reenforcement of 4 or 5 thousand soldiers has been received in the province of Bataan. [c] They were stationed along the coast and in the central mountain districts at Saysain, [d] Cobcaben, Lamao, Limay, etc.

2. An excellent military highway has been constructed between Lamao and Mariveles (154 kilometers to 157 kilometers from Manila) along the coast and in the interior. Sentries are posted at the entrance prohibiting the passage of civilians, Philippine military and others not possessing special permits - - - - - (powerful) guns and many defenses seem to have been put in.

Although the road between Bagao and Balanga has already been converted into a military highway, construction of a military road connecting Moron and Olongapo has been suspended. I believe that commercial connections between these places have been by boat for a long time.

 

(MESSAGE INCOMPLETE.) [e]

 


[a] Not available.

[b] See IV, 307.

[c] Philippine province across the bay from Manila.

[d] All places mentioned in this message are in Bataan province.

[e] The last part of the message was not retransmitted.

 

Trans.  11-14-41

 

No. 314

 

FROM: Manila (Nihro)                                                                        November 8, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 742.

 

The warships at anchor in the harbor on the 8th are as follows: The Marblehead, the Black Hawk, eight destroyers, nine submarines, the Heron, the Wohotosua, the Isobel, and the tanker Trinity (the latter arrived on the 8th).

 


[a] Kana spelling.

 

Trans.  11-14-41

 

No. 315

 

FROM: Manila (Nihro)                                                                        November 10, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 745.

 

1. The Houston touched port at Cavite on the 8th.

2. Four destroyers left port on the 10th. Destination unknown.

 

A-161

 

3. Two cargo boats (former President boats of the 10,000 ton class with the names painted over) entered port on the 9th, landing 2,300 soldiers.

 

Trans. 11‑14‑41

 

No. 316

 

FROM: Manila (Nihro)                                                                        November 10, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 746.

 

Re my # 722 [a], first part of part 3‑the number of large attack planes, latest models, 4-motored B‑19's, is 32.

Re my # 727 [b], the black soldiers are American Negroes.

 


[a] See IV, 306.

[a] See IV, 309.

 

Trans. 11‑17‑41

 

No. 317

 

FROM: Manila (Nihro)                                                                        November 12, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 753.

 

On the morning of the 12th, an American cruiser of the Chester class entered port. She is now tied up at dock # 7 and is taking on ‑‑‑‑‑. It is thought likely that this vessel accompanied one of the President line ships into port. This vessel preceded the cruiser into port.

 

Trans.  11‑18‑41

 

No. 318

 

FROM: Manila (Nihro)                                                                        November 12, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 754.

 

According to a report handed on to me by a Japanese who has lived in the Province of Ilocos Norte for some fourteen or fifteen years, the following has been ascertained.

1. At the present time there are approximately 400 Philippine soldiers and seven or eight officers stationed in Laoag [a]. It is being rumored, however, that the Philippine troops will be increased to approximately 1,700. At the present time they are constructing additional bar­racks.

2. There seems to be no indication that they plan the expansion of the present civil airport in Laoag (length, 1,200 metres; width, 850 metres) nor are they stationing any military planes at that field. Aside from a reconnaissance flight nightly (one plane) over the coastal area in the vicinity of the city, no extensive activity is in progress.

 

A-162

 

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR  

 

3. Though it is said that Claveria [b] and Burgos' are being equipped with ‑‑‑‑‑ -‑‑‑‑, the details are unknown. (I am continuing my private investigations in this connection.)

 


[a] Seaport in the Province of Ilocos Norte on the Island of Luzon, P. I.

[b] Towns on the northern shore of the Island of Luzon, P. I.

 

Trans. 11‑21‑41

 

No. 319

 

FROM: Manila (Nihro)                                                                        November 12, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 755.

 

A report given me by a Japanese who resides in Camarines Norte [a] is as follows:

1. In. that area at the present time there does not seem to be many troops stationed. Only about 60 members of the Philippine Patrol organization, with headquarters in Daet [b], are located in that area. Every day five or six of these patrolmen are dispatched as a relief unit to Paracale [c] and Jose Panganiban [d].

2. The Civil Airport at Paracale is not being used at the present time. Insofar as the military air field at Daet is concerned, though one or two military planes landed there during February of this year, from that time to this there has not been a single military plane alight on this field. As this field is located right on the beach, should it be necessary it is said that naval planes could land in the shipping lane just off of the beach as well.

3. On the point of land, San Muricio [e], north of Jose Panganiban it is rumored that they are equipping ‑‑‑‑‑ with ‑‑‑‑‑, but this has not been verified. (I am continuing my secret investi­gations.)

4. Twelve or thirteen coastal reconnaissance planes were seen to have flown over the area within a period of three days. Toward the latter part of last year 13 American freighters are said to have entered the port of Panganiban. Since then, almost on the average of once a week, American freighters sail from Batganas [f] to Hondagua [g].

 


[a] Province near southeastern extremity of Luzon.

[b] City on southeastern extremity of the Island of Luzon.

[c] Seaport in the province of Camarines Norte.

[d] English spelling. Cannot identify.

[e] English spelling. Point of land cannot be identified.

[f] Seaport in southwestern Luzon.

[g] Seaport on Lopez Bay off Lamon Bay.

 

Trans. 11‑24‑41

 

No. 320

 

FROM: Manila                                                                                     November 14, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 757.

 

1. The CA heavy cruiser of my # 753[a] was the Portland.

2. On the morning of the 13th a British destroyer of the Defender type entered port.

 

A-163

 

3. It has been ascertained that 8 (or 4)? of the nine submarines of my #742 [b] are of the 129 class. They have entered port here recently but the exact date is uncertain.

 


[a] See IV, 317.

[b] See IV, 314.

 

Trans. 11-13‑41

 

No. 321

 

FROM: Manila                                                                                     November 15, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 767.

 

The following is from a report of a Japanese resident in Cebu.

1. At present there are about 300 American and 2500 Filipino soldiers stationed there. (There are four barracks each with a capacity of about 500 or 600 soldiers.)

2. The airport has an area of about 196 acres but is being enlarged (by use of convict labor). About 12 planes (of medium size) used by the Philippine Army, have been transported to Java by air, and 12 or 13 American Army planes, (monoplanes—whether they were scout planes or pursuit planes was not clear), are now stationed there. In addition to these there is one large bomber in the hangar (double type, capacity 40 planes).

3. The headquarters of the former patrol force are being used as the commissariat store­house and all sorts of provisions are being stored there.

4. On the 22nd of September, about 20 American warships anchored on the northwest coast of the Sulu Archipelago. Around the middle of October two destroyers and one cruiser entered Cebu Harbor and early this month, one oil supply ship of the 20,000 ton class, and a camou­flaged cruiser of the 10,000 ton class, entered port and anchored for two or three days. It has been recognized that occasionally two or three American ships anchor around the south of Mactan, Bacol, and Panglao.

5. There is an open drydock at MAKUGAA (operated by Chinese) capable of handling ships up to 10,000 tons.

 

Trans. 11‑18‑41

 

No. 322

 

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     November 15, 1941

TO: Manila                                                                                          # 368.

 

Strictly confidential.

 

Re your # 746 [a].

 

Please ascertain by what route the large bombers went to the Philippines, and also please make investigations again as to their number.

 


[a] See IV, 316.

 

Trans. 11‑24‑41

 

A-164

 

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR  

 

 

No. 323

 

FROM: Manila (Nihro)                                                                        November 15, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 767.

 

1. It has been ascertained that the ship of my # 757[a], paragraph 2, was a British transport, the Awatea which entered port at the same time under convoy, (12,000 or 13,000 tons, 700 or 800 soldiers on board). Both ships sailed again on the evening of the 14th, destination unknown.

2. On the afternoon of the 14th, 4 destroyers, 11 submarines, 1 minelayer, entered port.

3. Ships in port on the 15th:

A. Manila:

MADDO

Portland

BUKKU

BERU

BERU [b]

HON

WOHOTOSU

8 destroyers

20 submarines

1 minelayer

B. Cavite:

TON

PASU

 


[a] See IV, 320.

[b] BERU repeated.

 

Trans.  11‑25‑41

 

No. 324

 

FROM: Manila                                                                                     November 17, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 768.

 

An AP dispatch from Hong Kong on the 16th, states that a large number of soldiers from Canada disembarked there on the morning of the 16th. However, I am wondering if these are the same as those reported in my # 767[a], paragraph 1.

 


[a] See IV, 321.

Trans.  11‑18‑41

 

No. 325

 

FROM: Manila (Nihro)                                                                        November 17, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 769.

 

On the morning of the 17th the

MADDO[a]

Portland

 

A-165

J[b] 10 ships

M[c] 1 ship

left port. Destination unknown.


[a] Marblehead (?).

[b] May be garble for "D"‑destroyer.

[c] Minelayer.

Trans.  11‑24‑41

 

No. 326

 

FROM: Manila (Nihro)                                                                        November 17, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 773.

 

On the 17th, the Bulletin published a special dispatch from Lingayen of the 13th, saying that recently light tanks (54 14‑ton tanks), scout cars, provision cars, and baggage cars, and various types of military trucks together with mechanized troops arrived there from Fort Stotsenberg, stayed overnight and then returned again to Fort Stotsenberg. Due to the heat, there were a number of minor troubles, but other than that there were no mishaps. The tanks attained a speed of 60 miles an hour on the sandy beach.

 

Trans.  11‑24‑41

 

No. 327

 

FROM: Tokyo (Togo)                                                                          November 20, 1941

TO: Manila                                                                                          # 372.

 

Strictly secret.

 

Please advise immediately the result of your investigations as to the type of Craft ‑‑‑‑­presumed to be in the water adjacent to Subic Bay[a].

Furthermore, please transmit these details to the Asama Maru as well as to Tokyo.

 


[a] Near Manila, P. I.

 

Trans.  11‑26‑41

 

No. 328

 

FROM: Manila (Nihro)                                                                        November 22, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 785.

 

1. A camouflaged British cruiser (guessed to be 4 or 5 thousand tons; having 8 guns; name unknown) entered port on the morning of the 21st and anchored at Pier # 7, sailing at 5 in the afternoon, destination unknown.

On the 21st, an American transport (rumored to be the President Harrison) entered port and took on soldiers (number unknown) and materiel.

 

A-166

 

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR  

 

 

2. Boats anchored in port on the 22nd were:

Manila-Portland (entered the port on the 21st); Marblehead; Black Hawk; Isabel; Heron; Wohotosu[a]; Pisua; one mine layer; 9 destroyers; 20 submarines.

Cavite‑Houston (?); Canopus.

 


[a] Kana spelling.

 

Trans.  11-29‑41

 

No. 329

 

FROM: Manila (Nihro)                                                                        November 24, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 789.

 

1. Putting together various reports, it appears that a large amount of military stores was removed from the "port area" during the "black‑out" on the night of the 21. Forty or fifty ci­vilian buses (carrying the "mark" of the Manila Electric Company) were seen in the Rizal Province district. Investigations are being made to find out if these were loaded with troops.

2. At about two o'clock in the afternoon of the 22nd, 60 light tanks (carrying one gun, two ‑‑‑‑‑) and 20 ammunition trucks were seen leaving (Quezon Bridge?). These light tanks and ammunition trucks were seen on the 21st grouped near the headquarters of the "port area" military police. It is conjectured that (troops?) arrived on military boats recently entering the Harbor. An English language "bulletin" of the 24th stated that a large number of light tanks and ammunition trucks had left at four and six o'clock on the afternoon of the 22nd in transit for Meycuayan in Bulacan Province and San Fernando in Pampanga Province. I believe that these had been landed sometime around the 21st. The final destination of these tanks and .trucks is now being investigated.

3. At present, it is seen that there are two or three hundred American army trucks near the "port area" which have been imported at short intervals, creating a hurried atmosphere. Also, troops have newly arrived at (certain places in ?) the hills within the city. They are evidently American reinforcements. Feeling among the people, the general, has become tense.

Trans.  12‑1‑41

 

No. 330

 

FROM: Manila (Nihro)                                                                              November 25, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                                 # 790.

 

1. On the 23rd a camouflaged submarine tender, the Hollard[a] (5 or 6 thousand tons, apparently a camouflaged Dutch vessel), entered port.

2. On the 24th, 5 submarines left port, destination unknown.

3. On the 25th, 7 destroyers left port, destination unknown.

 


[a] Probably the U. S. S. HOLLAND of 8,000 tons.

Trans.  12‑4‑41

 

A-167

 

No. 331

 

FROM: Manila (Nihro)                                                                        November 27, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 797.

 

The Portland, BUKKU[a], 2 destroyers, 10 submarines, left port on the 26th (?). Destination unknown.

 


[a] Probably Black Hawk.

 

Trans.  12‑5‑41

 

No. 332

 

November 27, 1941

 

U. S. AIR FORCES IN THE PHILIPPINES

 

NAVY

 

Type                                                                                               Strength

PBY‑4 (Patrol)                                                                               14

PBY‑4 (Patrol)                                                                               14

SOC‑3 (Scout Observation)                                                           4

SOC‑1 (Scout Observation                                                             2

J2F‑4 (Utility)                                                                                3

SOC‑1 (Scout Observation)                                                           2

SOC‑2 (Scout Observation)                                                           2

052U‑2 (Observation)                                                                    2

TOTAL                                                                                          43

 

2 squadrons of OS2U airplanes, 24 in all, are being sent to the Philippines as soon as practi­cable. It is expected that they will be shipped from San Pedro in January, 1942.

 

ARMY

 

B‑18 (Heavy Bomber)                                                                   18

B‑17 C & D (Heavy Bomber)                                                        35

P‑35A (VF)                                                                                    52

P‑40B (VF)                                                                                    30

P‑40E (VF)                                                                                    117

O‑46A (VO)                                                                                  7

0‑49 (VO)                                                                                      3

0‑52 (VO)                                                                                      10

A-27 (Dive Bomber)                                                                      9

C‑39 (Combat)                                                                               1

C‑49 (Combat)                                                                               1

P‑26A (VF)                                                                                    15

TOTAL                                                                                          298

 

In addition to the above 57 type A-24 dive bombers have been shipped to the Philippines this month, and further extensive reinforcements have been approved for complete delivery by February, 1942.

 

A-168

 

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR  

 

SUMMARY

Bombers                                        62

Fighters                                         214     

Combat                                          2

Patrol                                            28

Observation                                   32

Utility                                             3

Total                      341

 

JAPANESE ESTIMATE OF U.S. AIR FORCES IN PHILIPPINES

 

Type                                               Strength

                                                      Military Planes

Large bombers                               29

Scout planes                                  324

The same, B type                           62

Fighters                                          317

The same, B type                           131

Pursuit planes                                302

The same D type                            69

Training planes                              49

TOTAL                  1283

 

                                                      Naval Planes

Large flying boats                          26

 

No. 333

 

FROM: Manila (Nihro)                                                                        November 28, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 799.

 

Recently they have utilized a group of nine planes (one flight of six and another of three planes) in high‑level scouting patrols over the city of Manila from four o'clock in the morning. In addition, three other planes fly over the city independently. Though in the morning and evening the weather is clear and windless squalls come once a day.

 

Trans.  12‑5‑41

 

No. 334

 

FROM: Manila (Nihro)                                                                        November 29, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 805.

 

Ships in port on the 29th.

1. Manila:

Submarine tender WOTOSU and HORAN [a]

Submarines 190 class 5

Submarines 170 class 5

Submarines 170 class 5

(When the 180 class entered port there were 8 but 3 departed, destination unknown)

Submarines 150 class 5

Submarines small size 4

Oilers, 2 (PISU[a] and TRINITY)

Destroyers, 2

Gunboats, 1(BERU[a])

Minelayer, 1

 

A-169

 

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR  

 

2. Cavite: TON [a] PASU[a] (being repaired)

3. It was announced on the 27th that for a time the lights at Langley Point in Cavite, at Manila, Baguio, and on the buoys in the bay would be turned out.

 


[a] Probably HOLLAND, PECOS, ISABEL.

 

Trans.  12‑8‑41

 

No. 335

 

FROM: Manila (Nihro)                                                                        December 1, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 812.

 

Ships in port on the 1st.

A. Manila:

Submarine tender HOLLAND.

Submarines, small 2.

Submarines, large 6.

Oilers, 2 (PISU[a] and TRINITY).

Gunboats, 1 (KASUBERU).

The PASU[a] which was undergoing repairs at Cavite lies at anchor of ‑‑‑‑‑.

Cargo ship, 1 (4,000 tons class), taking on provisions.

The submarine tender, WOTOSU.

14 large submarines and 2 destroyers, left port this morning, destination unknown.

The American Navigation (10,000 ton class) entered port about 3 days ago. From it are being unloaded 12 objects 1 meter in diameter and about 3 meters in length. I think they are boilers. (I am making investigations.)

A former Danish ship, the Manchen Maersk (10,000 ton class), present registry Panama, present name unidentifiable (under investigation) entered port this morning, about half loaded, it appeared.

5 British freighters (6,000 ton class) are at the pier taking on cargo, details not ascertainable.

The Spencer Kellogg (American registry, 6,000 ton class), entered port about 2 days ago, un­loaded crude oil and is scheduled to load castor oil.

The Don Esteban (requisitioned by the American Army) entered port this morning.

B. Cavite:

TON[a]

 


[a] Probably PECOS, CANOPUS, and HOUSTON.

 

Trans.  12‑8‑41

 

No. 336

 

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     October 22, 1941

TO: Singapore                                                                                      # 316.

 

Strictly secret.

 

A-170

 

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR  

 

 

From the Vice‑Chief of General Staff. Through Chancellor Tahira please report the fol­lowing two things concerning the air force now stationed in the Federated Malay States:

1. Their drills and battle maneuvers (aerial formation).

2. Investigate their organization.

 

Trans.  10‑24‑41

 

No. 337

 

FROM: Tokyo (Togo)                                                                          November 18, 1941

TO: Singapore                                                                                      # 353.

 

‑‑‑‑‑ ‑‑‑‑‑ ‑‑‑‑‑ that a squadron consisting of eight ships of the 15,000 ton class and ten other boats set out from port on November 4th, with about 10,000 British troops, including many aviators, heading for the Malay States. Therefore, please pay particular attention to the above.

 

Trans.  11‑25‑41

 

No. 338

 

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     December 5, 1941

TO: Singapore                                                                                      # 377.

 

(Abstract)

 

Wants immediate report on ships in port and movements of capital ships.

 

Trans.  12‑13‑41

 

No. 339

 

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     October 23, 1941

TO: Hsinking                                                                                       # 725.

 

(Vladivostok to Tokyo # 471.)

 

Relaying No. 471 from Vladivostok to Tokyo.

 

On the 20th the American Consul remarked regarding this matter that as yet he had received no official communication regarding the tankers coming here and he did not know why. How­ever, it had been decided at the Moscow conference to continue aid to Russia but due to various considerations the transportation of material to Russia in American ships via Vladivostok would be discontinued after the ships that were already on their way had arrived and a new routing would be used. This would undoubtedly be via Iran. There are at present about 100 American tankers and 100 American freighters in this vicinity[a] now.

 


[a] U.S.‑Near East Route.

 

Trans.  10‑24‑41

 

A-171

 

No. 340

 

FROM: Hsinking                                                                                  November 28, 1941

TO: Peking, Nanking and Shanghai                                                     Cir. # 231.

 

(Message to Tokyo # 779.)

 

Local military intelligences are as follows. For your information.

1. At the military review in celebration of the revolution, 47 airplanes of an unrecognizable type flew over the city of Kuibyshev. They were definitely of American design and construc­tion. It seems that large numbers have recently been arriving.

The above is a report of the Japanese Military Attaché  in the Soviet.

2. Large bodies of anti‑Communist mobile forces are fighting in the vicinity of Mininsk (Bumo[a]) and Barugujin[a] (south of Krasnoyarsk), destroying lines of communication and at­tacking the Kolhoz and Sofhoz. (The above is a spy report.)

3. The 39th Sharpshooters Division (in the neighborhood of Kogaiko[a]) has executed before the firing squad 20 unsuccessful deserters who tried to get into Manchukuo between May and November. To date, 46 Soviet troops have deserted. The Soviet, in order to prevent desertion, has moved certain detachments away from the border or have strung charged barbed wire fences along the border. Another means which they are utilizing is making the regiment re­sponsible for detachments from which there have been deserters.

(The above is intelligence of primary importance.)

4. Recently on the Ude[a] front, the surveillance troops of the Outer Mongolian area have within the last few days deliberately trespassed on Mongolian territory several times, even to the extent of 10 to 20 kilos. They are taking a strong, hostile attitude toward Japanese surveil­lance troops.

(The above is intelligence of primary importance.)

I have transmitted this to Peitai, Shanghai, and Nadal.

 


[a] Kana spelling.

 

Trans.  12‑3‑41

 

No. 341

 

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     November 28, 1941

TO: Hsinking                                                                                       # 880.

 

On the 20th Russian newspapers carried the following story. They said that Domei had re­ported on the 16th that a Russian division had violated the Manchurian border over an extent of forty kilometers in the neighborhood of ‑‑‑‑‑, and that in the fighting ‑‑‑‑‑ soldiers had been killed and ‑‑‑‑‑ taken prisoner. But the Russian paper said this was at variance with the facts, that Russian soldiers had not crossed the border.

The above story disagrees with telegram # 747[a] from our Manchurian Ambassador to the Foreign Minister in regard to the place and time, but since the facts agree with you please let us know the true situation.

 


[a] Not available.

 

Trans.  12‑10‑41

 

A-172

 

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR  

 

PART C‑JAPANESE DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITIES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD

 

No. 342

 

FROM: Seattle (Sato)                                                                           October 18, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 145.

 

1. After a conference between our offices and Vancouver, Portland, and ‑‑‑‑‑ relative to the matter of embarkations on the Hikawa Maru, a plan was drawn up. However, in the event money is not at hand, it has been decided that the three offices will be contacted again.

2. We have made inquiries of the NYK concerning the matter of life belts mentioned in Part 3 of wire # 963[a] from the United States to the Foreign Minister, and it is understood that there are plentiful supplies in stock at San Francisco at the price of $2.36 each.

 


[a] Not available.

 

Trans.  10‑27‑41

 

No. 343

 

FROM: New York (Morishima)                                                           October 18, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 484.

 

Re my message # 482[a].

 

According to further investigations of the cultural society (Bunks‑Kai), the Foreign Missions Conference (the combined organization of all American mission boards) has applied to the government for permission to send over $37,000 to Japan proper and over $7,700 to Korea. (This does not include funds for St. Luke's Hospital and Women's Christian College mentioned in a previous telegram.)

 


[a] Not available.

 

Trans.  10‑23‑41

 

No. 344

 

FROM: San Francisco (Muto)                                                              October 20, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   # 71.

 

(To be handled in Government Code.)

 

It is understood that Member of Parliament KASAI is scheduled to deliver a lecture on the 29th at the Konnyū Kyuuerusu [a] Club on the subject, "Will Japan and the United States Fight?" Right now when we are strengthening our efforts to refute such ideas as "the alienation of Japan and Germany" and "the alienation of the military and the people" brought out in pamphlets distributed among Japanese here by British and American agencies, I believe that this lecture might cause embarrassment to our propaganda work here. Then, too, there is the matter mentioned in the secret letter # 159 from Chicago to the Foreign Minister as well as they request by the Ambassador that we caution him as much as possible (at least as long as he is here in this country). Therefore, it is my earnest wish that you have him cancel his lecture.

Relayed to Tokyo and New York.

 


[a]  Kana spelling.

 

Trans.  10‑31‑41

 

A-173

 

No. 345

 

FROM: Portland                                                                                   October 20, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 28.

(To be handled in government code.)

(Strictly Secret.)

To the Finance Official.

 

Japanese evacuees from the United States are not allowed to take with them more than $210.00, and, as a matter of fact, it is impossible for them to remit money. Consequently, the evacuees here who are planning to leave on board the Hikawa Maru find themselves in quite a predicament. They have sent to me a representative of theirs and secretly asked if it would not be possible for them to pay to this office cash amounts running from $5,000 to $10,000 and receive in Tokyo in exchange for them cash in Japanese currency at the rate of $23.50 per hundred yen. The fact is that this office is so short of funds that it is not in a position to pay the traveling expense of any official transferring to another place. However, if you would pay the representative, when he arrives, the cash from the funds which are earmarked to meet the general expenses as well as salaries of this office, we should be able to tide the evacuees over this difficulty. Please consider this matter and wire me your reply immediately.

 

Trans.  10‑30‑41

No. 346

 

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             October 20, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 974.

 

From TERASAKI to‑YOSHIOKA.

 

Although tentative reservations have been made for official HARADA to sail on board the Hikawa Maru leaving Seattle on November 4, since his stay here would be too short, if he is to carry out the instructions given in your # 545[a], it would be much better if he could leave on board the Terukawa Maru scheduled to sail from Manzanillo early in December. Do you have any objections to this official prolonging his study after ascertaining whether this ship will touch at Mexico?

Please reply by wire.

Relay to Mexico, Seattle.

 


[a] Not available.

 

Trans.  10‑28‑41

 

No. 347

 

FROM: Tokyo (Toyoda)                                                                      October 20, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   # 689.

 

Re my # 687[a].

 

We would have to get the approval of the United States to establish a route through Seattle for money to be sent to Vancouver through the Yokohama Specie Bank.

 


[a] Not available.

Trans.  10‑28‑41

 

A-174

 

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR  

 

No. 348

 

FROM: Tokyo (Togo)                                                                          October 20, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   # 690.

 

Although we had applied for an entrance visa for Secretary MATSUI who is starting for his new post in Washington, in order that he not miss sailing on the Hikawa Maru, we had him leave without waiting for the visa to come through. I want you to go to the State Depart­ment at once and have them send instructions to the American consul in Vancouver about this and the visa.

MATSUI already has a Canadian passport and entry visa.

Trans.  10‑24‑41

 

No. 349

 

FROM: Tokyo (Togo)                                                                          October 20, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   # 691.

 

We are entrusting certain confidential documents to Vice‑Consul KO‑‑SHI who is traveling on the Hikawa Maru. Please negotiate to have these passed through customs without opening. (He is carrying with him ‑‑‑‑‑ (garbled) ‑‑‑‑‑ from the American Embassy in Tokyo.)

Relay to Seattle.

Trans.  10‑27‑41

 

No. 350

 

FROM: Seattle (Sato)                                                                           October 20, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   Circular # 66.

(Message from Tokyo Circular # 2205.)

 

Hikawa Maru, sailing under government orders, left the 20th, 4:00 p.m. from Yokohama with supervisor KENSUKE SATŌ of the Foreign Office and Communications engineer KIICHIRŌ UENO (a qualified maritime official) aboard.

Trans.  10‑27‑41

 

No. 351

 

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     October 21, 1941

TO: Hsinking                                                                                       # 719.

 

(Vladivostok to Tokyo # 477.)

 

(Abstract.)

 

Transmitting Vladivostok's # 477[a] to the Foreign Minister in which the Consul at Vladivostok outlines his views that America is watching the Far Eastern situation closely; that he had observed the progress of the Russo‑Anglo‑American conversations. The present status of the Hull‑Nomura discussions indicates that the Tojo cabinet must not alter Japan's fundamental task of establishing its position in the Far East and that the adjustment of American‑Japanese relations seems hopeless.

 


[a] Not otherwise available.

Trans.  10‑24‑41

A-175

 

No. 352

 

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     October 21, 1941

TO: Berlin                                                                                            # 892.

Re your # 1247[a].

 

In conference with the Vice Minister we have decided to apply these regulations also in the case of a neutral country's carrying on propaganda work for a belligerent nation. The U.S. Embassy thus far has not been distributing "bulletins", but if in the future they should undertake direct propaganda work in Britain's stead in Japan, this would of course have to be taken into control. At the same time the British and American affiliated news corres­pondence over which the Germans and Italians are not a little perturbed is already dis­criminated against to quite some extent. A large number of foreign dispatches received by Domei and other firms are either prohibited from publication, or else withheld voluntarily.

The Germans seem gradually to be coming to understand the real intentions of this and they have discontinued the Japanese bulletins, and also have limited the places of distribution of other material to meet our requests.

 


[a] Not available.

Trans.  10‑25‑41

No. 353

 

FROM: Tokyo (Toga)                                                                          October 21, 1941

TO: Los Angeles (Rioyji)                                                                     # 095.

 

Administration clerk Harada will bring those articles mentioned in my messages No. 53[a] and 60[b]. Please send them to the Consulate General in San Francisco.

 


[a] Dated 14 June 1941, and reading as follows: "I want you to obtain the items listed below and inconspicuously turn them over to the master of some ship going to Japan, wiring me the name of the ship:

1 "Hallicrafter" "Diversity" receiving set. (If this is not manufactured, get one from second‑hand stock.)

1 "Hammarlund" "Super‑pro" short wave receiving set. Spare vacuum tubes for 11 of the above sets divided between the two kinds.

5 each "Spider web" and "Magic Web" antennas and 10 wire cable for 5 sets."

[b] Dated 9 July. Further instructions on obtaining and shipping above equipment.

 

Trans.  l0‑28‑41

 

No. 354

 

FROM: Rome                                                                                      October 22, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 682.

 

A Swiss newspaper of the 20th, the Neue Zuerich Zeitung, publishes a dispatch of the 19th from Washington to the effect that the Japanese Government has expressed to the United States a desire to resume the negotiations and that the United States has accepted. It is alleged that the United States has presented to Japan four sine qua non terms and that the Japanese Government has accepted them in principle.

Trans.  11‑6‑41

 

A-176

 

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR  

 

No. 355

 

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     October 22, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   # 699.

 

In regard to the Shoyo Maru waiting in San Francisco harbor:

1. In order to pay for additional supplies of water and food for this ship, the Nitto Kogyo Company (Japan‑Eastern Mining Company) presented a letter of credit for $900 on the Yokohama Specie Bank on October 5th, but they do not have an American permit to cash it. Their California representative, the Asano Bussan Company, says that the delay in sailing will make an additional $3,000 necessary.

2. The San Francisco branch of Mitsui Bussan Company is applying to the American authorities for permission to load her bunkers with 350 tons of fuel oil, but the permit has not yet been granted.

Considering how long this ship has already had to delay in port, please try to get a permit from the American authorities as soon as possible.

Trans.  10‑23‑41

 

No. 356

 

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             October 22, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 983.

 

Re your # 699[a].

 

They telephoned me from San Francisco about this. So, on the 20th I asked ACHESON about the matter and he replied that he had arranged to have the permit issued immediately.

 


[a] See IV, 355.

 

Trans.  10‑24‑41

 

No. 357

 

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             October 22, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 980.

 

Re your # 692[a] and # 694[a].

 

With regard to the aforementioned, is it not your intention to have our residents who are studying abroad board the Asama Maru at Lisbon?

If so, I would like to have you inform me of the date agreed upon for the boat's touching port at Lisbon.

 


[a] School terms for certain Japanese students in foreign lands are being shortened, and they are to return home earlier than scheduled.

 

Trans.  10‑27‑41

 

A-177

 

No. 358

 

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             October 22, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 981.

 

To Advisor TASHIRO from IGUCHI:

 

Semi‑official OBATA will return to Tokyo on the Tatsuta Maru. Since he is carrying a considerable amount of my luggage, etc., with him, I want a member of the staff to be sent to Yokohama to meet him. Will you please so inform an official.

 

Trans.  10‑27‑41

 

No. 359

 

FROM: Tokyo (Togo)                                                                          October 22, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   # 700.

 

The Miyako newspaper has under contract a man by the name of [a] --‑‑‑ working for the Universal News Feature at a monthly salary of $1,000. Because the American Government has not as yet granted permission for the sending of monthly drafts to cover salary for this man he is understood to be financially embarrassed. Please negotiate immediately so that we may wire him his salary. Furthermore, this has some bearing on future permits to American newspapers by us to cover drafts to Japanese correspondents here in Japan.

 


[a] DoD Comment: Name withheld.

 

Trans.  11‑4‑41

 

No. 360

 

FROM: Tokyo (Togo)                                                                          October 24, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   Circular # 2222.

 

(Strictly secret.)

 

At the end of September we changed the direction, time, and contents of our foreign broadcasts. Will you, therefore, think back in the past and make any suggestions you deem wise concerning technique, contents, priority and so forth.

Relay to San Francisco, Rio, Buenos Aires, Santiago, Panama, Honolulu.

 

Trans.  11‑4‑41

 

No. 361

 

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             October 24, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 988.

 

Re my # 516[a].

 

Please arrange for receipt of (22 boxes?) of records from this office sent by the Norfolk Maru which sailed for Japan from Callao, Peru the 3rd. There is a wooden box in box ( # 2 ?) which is to be handed over to the Navy Ministry.

 


[a] See 361A, in which Ambassador NOMURA wires Tokyo that the materials to be returned to the home office were loaded on board the Norfolk Maru, which left Baltimore on the 12th.

 

Trans.  10‑27‑41

 

A-178

 

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR  

 

 

No. 361A

 

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             July 16, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 516.

 

(Strictly Secret.)

 

In accordance with your instructions, I have been compiling my records, and the materials which should be returned to the home office I have packed into 22 wooden boxes. These have been loaded on board the Kawasaki Steamship Company steamer NORFOLK MARU which left Baltimore on the 12th. I am mailing you the details and ‑‑‑‑‑.

Furthermore, because this steamer will stop at ports of call in South America, it is understood that it will not reach Yokohama until the end of ‑‑‑‑‑ month[a]. Should it be thought that in the light of the international situation that is too late a date, please arrange to have this ship not stop at its ports of call in South America but sail directly to Japan.

 


[a] The two letters giving the number of the month are very badly garbled and could not represent any number; however, it is felt that August is definitely the month meant.

 

Trans.  7‑18‑41

 

No. 362

 

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     October 25, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   # 708.

 

The Fuel Bureau has agreed to supply fuel oil for the U.S. Embassy's heating system in Tokyo.

 

Trans.  10‑27‑41

 

No. 363

 

FROM: Tokyo (Togo)                                                                          October 28, 1941

TO: San Francisco                                                                               # 159.

 

Have you already dispatched the short wave receiving apparatus mentioned in the latter part of wire # 155[a] from Los Angeles to Tokyo, which was to have been sent as part of Minister WAKASUGI's baggage? If not, please send it by the Tatsuta Maru in care of extra­ordinary official KOBATA as part of Ambassador NOMURA's baggage.

 


[a] Not available.

 

Trans.  11-13‑41

 

No. 364

 

FROM: San Francisco (Muto)                                                              October 28, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 261.

 

1. We have already loaded onto the Itsukushima Maru which is tied up in this port the five recording machines and cylinders which are labeled as the personal baggage of Minister WAKASUGI.

 

A-179

 

2. The five # 90 recording machines and parts, the five # 66 recording machines, twenty typewriters and cylinders, cannot be shipped because of the freezing legislation. Please acknowledge.

3. The wireless sets mentioned in my wire to Washington # 693[a] are being sent on the Itsukushima Maru as the hand baggage of Colonel OKA. They have already been loaded. It is believed that it will be impossible to ‑‑‑‑‑ these.

4. I am having extraordinary official KOBATA, who is to embark on the Tatsuta Maru, take the ‑‑‑‑‑ ‑‑‑‑‑ ‑‑‑‑‑.

 


[a] Not available.

 

Trans.  11‑14‑41

 

No. 365

 

FROM: Tokyo (Togo)                                                                          October 29, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   # 711.

 

Re your # 1002[a].

 

We are making preparations to issue orders on November 1st regarding the general permit covering American diplomatic establishments and employees in Japan. However, before issuing it it is necessary to get America's concurrence in the following two points. Please get in touch with the State Department and wire the result before the 31st.

1. Our general permit will cover not only requests for transactions from November on but will also include the months of August, September, and October. America should also make similar arrangements.

2. The method of providing funds for Americans in Japan will be:

A. The National City Bank will purchase the checks on drafts of the American diplomatic establishments and employees resident in Japan.

B. Then the Specie Bank will provide yen for the above to the National City Bank. However, the Specie Bank will not provide the above yen until it has received a telegram from the Branch Office in America stating that an equivalent amount in dollars has been paid there.

Furthermore, only in the event that No. 2 above is carried out will there be no objections to the American proposal of your caption telegram, (that the American government pay into the Specie Bank), or to our proposal contained in my # 639[b], (the proposal that the National City Bank pay into the Specie Bank. At present the National City Bank is negotiating with the American finance department).

 


[a] Dated 27 October. Re unfreezing enough currency from Specie Bank to cover Embassy expenses.

[b] (Not available) Details of negotiations with the U.S. for mutual release of funds for expenses of diplomatic missions

 

Trans.  11‑3‑41

 

No. 366

 

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             October 29, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1009.

 

Re paragraph 2 of your # 711[a].

 

The American Government and the National City Bank say that if they pay dollars to the Specie Bank here in America and then the Specie Bank in Tokyo pays an equivalent amount

 

A-180

 

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR  

 

to the Americans there the exchange transaction will be completed and it will not be nec­essary for checks and drafts to be issued to American diplomatic establishments and employees and then cashed for them by the National City Bank. Please wire about this by return dispatch.

Furthermore, inasmuch as there are no mail ships running at present the buying and selling of checks and exchange is most inconvenient and there is no other way than to remit by telegraph.

This has been taken up with the Financial Attaché.

 


[a] See IV, 365.

                                                                                                      Trans.  11‑3‑41

 

No. 367

 

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             October 29, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1012.

 

Re my # 1009[a].

 

Are there any objections to my conferring with the Secretary of State along the lines of my separate telegram # 1013[b].

 


[a] See IV, 366.

[b] Not available.

 

Trans.  11‑3‑41

 

No. 368

 

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     October 30, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   # 713.

 

(Urgent)

 

Re your # 1009[a].

 

We have asked the American Embassy in Tokyo to have the expense money for their diplomatic staff and employees sent by the American government through the Yokohama Specie Bank, but the Embassy insists that, because of the red tape involved, they prefer to continue their customary method of selling money orders and checks.

Now the staff and employees write checks on their private accounts on banks in the United States, and sometimes they sell these, thus the practice which they wish to follow is the same thing as a reverse money order.

Therefore, we wish:

1. In order to limit the responsibility for this on the National City Bank of New York, decree that only the National City Bank or affiliated banks may buy money orders, and

2. Require that the National City Bank's cash funds in this country be held to insure their fixed deposits, not used to buy money orders. The only money used for buying money orders shall be such money as is received by the Yokohama Specie Bank through the sale of tele­graphic money orders from America.

Since we feel that to make the proposal now which you suggest in your caption telegram would only complicate matters and not help any, please make a proposal to the State

 

A-181

 

Department along the line of our # 711[c] at once and wire the result by 2:00 p.m. on the 31st.

 


[a] IV‑366.

[b] Jyaku kawase‑an arrangement covered by a letter of credit whereby one man can draw funds from another man's account in another city simply by writing a money order on it.

[c] IV, 365.

 

Trans.  11‑1‑41

 

No. 369

 

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             October 30, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1016.

 

Re your # 711[a] and # 713[b].

 

IGUCHI called on ATCHESON, and ATCHESON talked on about financial permits, say­ing that every year in August general instructions go out from the State Department to their foreign diplomatic corps but these are not applicable to countries in which credits are frozen.

Details on this case are sent to GREW by the State Department, but since the American expenses are rarely smaller than the Japanese, the Tokyo branch of the National City Bank of New York has informed its home office in New York that the Yokohama Specie Bank is establishing a yen credit for the necessary amount with them in Tokyo and they want to have the equivalent in dollars paid to the New York branch of the Specie Bank. As they will be sending instructions to this effect to Grew at once, please arrange to have them carried out.

Now, item (1) in your telegram #711[a] referring to immediate payment takes care of your instructions in # 648[c] for the time being. They had asked to have the September diplomatic salaries paid at once but now on the 30th they asked to have the August, September and October salaries paid at once in a lump sum. Please contact the finance ministry at once and wire an answer.

 


[a] See IV, 365.

[b] See IV, 368.

[c] Not available.

 

Trans.  11-3‑41

 

No. 370

 

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             October 31, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1022.

 

Re your # 711[a].

 

Chief of Office routing.

 

In reply to our numerous requests to the Treasury Department regarding this matter, they insist that they have to consider it from all angles. (This morning's New York Times com­mented that the United States would probably refuse to ease its economic pressure on Japan, particularly in the matter of supplying oil, unless Japan completely mends her ways). This stubbornness is probably a means of waiting to see what the developments are in the Japanese‑U. S. negotiations.

 

A-182

 

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR  

 

These conversations have been going on for more than two months. The Treasury insists that first of all an amount equivalent to that withdrawn prior to the "freezing" order and which belonged to the Navy, (as you are aware, this was taken to South America in cash), would have to be refunded. In view of the fact that we did not have this on hand, they brought up the subject of having that much released in South America. At first, we agreed to do this, but chiefly through the Specie Bank's opposition, it fell through.

Then, because the military and the Commerce Ministry wanted it, the releasing in South America proposal was revived.

From the beginning this matter involved much pettiness. We have been doing everything in our power to obtain the petroleum. I have even gone so far as to take this matter up with Hull and, moreover, Wakasugi, on two different occasions, urged Welles to intercede in our behalf. In spite of this, we can see no indications that the Treasury Department has been moved much one way or another. At this rate it is hard to tell when any settlement will be reached. Moreover we do not believe it to be in line with the dignity of this office to have our laundry out drying forever.

We, therefore, have issued orders for them to sail. If the Treasury changes its attitude at some future time, we shall send for the tankers again. (The attitude of the Treasury depends greatly on developments in the Japanese‑U. S. negotiations. In this regard, this matter is very similar to the negotiations involving the trading of silk for petroleum and the joint usage of ship bottoms. In other words, all matters involving relations between the two countries are greatly affected by the adjustment of relations proposal at present under consideration.)

This matter has been discussed with the Financial Attaché  and the Consul General in San Francisco.

 


[a] See IV, 365.

 

Trans.  11‑6‑41

 

No. 371

 

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     October 30, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   # 712.

 

Re your # 946[a].

 

If it appears that these negotiations will go on any longer, please get in touch with San Francisco and our finance officials and arrange to have both the Itsukushima and the Shoyo sent back to Japan.

 


[a] Regarding export permits for gasoline.

 

Trans.  10‑31‑41

 

No. 372

 

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             October 31, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1017.

 

There is no sensitivity and reception is impossible on the new wave length up till the present. We wish that you would change immediately to JAU 2‑7. 327.5 k. c.

Trans.  11‑4‑41

 

A-183

 

No. 373

 

FROM: Washington                                                                             November 1, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1026.

 

Secret.

 

On the 30th of October ‑‑‑‑‑[a] spoke to Terasaki as follows:

1. "At the time I (met with) President Roosevelt on August 26th, Roosevelt said that he had hoped to head for Japan and meet the Japanese leaders and that he desired to do this more than ever now.

"I thought that this was a great scoop and immediately got in touch with the editor in New York, but the editor thought that it was of too grave importance and so the publication was delayed for a time.

"Again I sounded out an official in the State Department (section deleted) [a] and learned from him that Japan had proposed that Konoye and Roosevelt hold a conference on board a Japanese warship.

"In regard to these negotiations the State Department is divided into two factions, the Moderationists and the Strong Policy Advocates, and there is sharp contention between the two.

"The first group is headed by the President and includes Undersecretary Welles, Hamilton and Ballantine. The second group is made up of Secretary of State Hull, Hornbeck, Coville, etc."

 


[a] DoD comment: Name and identifying information withheld.

 

Trans.  11‑6‑41

 

No. 374

 

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             November 1, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1027.

 

Secret outside the Department.

 

As the American First Committee was meeting in New York on the night of 30 October, I rushed Terasaki up to New York on that date. He met with (an associate of officials of the Committees[a]. (As the American First Committee is being watched by the FBI this must be kept strictly secret.) After commenting on the fact that a crisis is right at hand between Japan and the United States he told ‑‑‑‑‑[a] that he would like to have him tell Colonel Lindbergh, who is for America first, that, while the American people do not understand the reason for such a war, it has to do with the China problem, that the United States is about to fight with Germany over her policy of Britain first in the Atlantic, and with Japan over her policy of China first in the Pacific. ‑‑‑‑‑[a] consented and later the same evening he said that he had told him.

On this same occasion Terasaki also strongly asserted that it is a mistake, based on a misunderstanding of the Japanese psychology, to think that Japan will give in if she is driven into a tight corner by the United States, and that even as the United States is adopting a realistic policy in regard to Central and South America, it is also necessary to take a realistic view of the situation in the Orient, and that it is most inconsistent to express fear of a southward push by Japan, while at the same time cutting off petroleum supplies.

Relayed to New York.

 


[a] DoD comment: Name withheld.

 

Trans.  11‑6‑41

 

A-184

 

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR  

 

 

No. 375

 

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             November 1, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1028.

 

Secret outside the Department.

 

Re my # 1027[a].

 

(Abstract)

 

Terasaki met with other persons associated with the America First Committee and repeated the substance of his talk described in No. 374.

 


[a] See IV, 374.

 

Trans.  11‑ 6-41

 

No. 376

 

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             November 1, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1029.

 

(Separate Telegram) (Strictly confidential.)

 

1. From this week on ‑‑‑‑- [a] will keep in touch with this office and devote his efforts toward planning for the organization of the committee which has as its objective the promotion of friendly relations between Japan and America. Terasaki will be the liaison agent. It will be promoted by Americans and will have the appearance of being financed by American money (although a portion of the actual expense will be born by this office). An attempt was made to establish this committee earlier but the invasion of French Indo‑China followed by the freezing order complicated matters. The first meeting was held in New York with ‑‑‑--[a] acting as temporary chairman.

As yet the committee has no influential members, however it is sponsored by Americans and through its establishment and growth it is hoped that American public opinion can be made more friendly toward Japan. (Terasaki is having ‑‑‑‑‑[a] make reports to the State Department relative to the activities of the above committee.)

2. On the 31st of October ‑‑‑‑‑[a] proposed to Terasaki that a second meeting of the com­mittee be held in Washington during September (sic) to discuss Japanese‑American relations. Whereupon Terasaki explained to him the present strained state of Japanese‑American relations explaining that as long as America continued to withhold oil from Japan there was not much hope of progress being made. Terasaki said that as soon as an opportunity presented itself he would have a member of the committee meet with Hull to stage as strongly as possible the objectives of the committee and that the result of this conference would deter­mine whether the committee would be continued or dissolved. It has been arranged for ‑‑‑‑-[a] to come to Washington in the near future to carry out this program.

 


[a] DoD comment: Name withheld.

 

Trans.  11‑7‑41

 

A-185

 

No. 377

 

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     November 1, 1941

TO: New York                                                                                     # 230.

 

Re your # 489[a].

 

The necessity of a "complete survey" of present U.S. economics (under war time) was also realized by this office for some time, while now with new world developments the urgency of carrying this out is felt.

The 1941 budget includes expenditures for this survey, both for (a) expansion of the present financial divisions of the Tokyo, New York, and Washington offices, and (b) the funds for establishing an independent economic survey office in New York.

In view of present conditions, however, after conferring with the Department of Finance, it has been decided to postpone for the present the (b) plan and instead to put all our efforts on the (a) plan of expanding the existing financial divisions. In view of this will you please commence this work, using the Commercial Attaches office and any suitable U.S. surveys already made on this subject.

In reply to the latter part of your plan, you are to be allotted one secretary and two clerks for this work; suitable persons are now being selected.

Relay to Washington.

 


[a] Not available.

 

Trans.  11‑14‑41

 

No. 378

 

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             November 4, 1941

TO: Mexico                                                                                         Circular # 353.

 

(Message to Tokyo # 1034.)

 

(Part 1 of 4. )

 

When we view the present situation in the United States, we can see that regardless of the increase in damages to destroyers and merchantmen, the popular mind is not an iota more incensed against Germany; therefore, it is not likely that the government will sever relations with the Reich and invite war. Germany, too, well knows that a bout with the United States would not be to her advantage and will, insofar as possible, refrain from outright war against America. This country is not yet ready to become involved in Europe. She is content with furnishing the maximum material assistance, patrolling the sea, and affording technical aid.

 

Trans.  11‑15‑41

 

No. 379

 

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             November 4, 1941

TO: Mexico                                                                                         Circular # 353.

 

(Message to Tokyo # 1034.)

 

(Part 2 of 4.)

 

As the danger of war is not in the immediate offing, the people are all worried about their own problems. Instead of war, they are worried about prices, increased taxes, inflation, and

 

A-186

 

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR  

 

other such matters which affect their immediate welfare. By and large, the government officials, too, seem inclined to wish to keep England, of course, and then as many other countries as possible, fighting; and then when the last extremity is reached, to jump in and seize the victory. Therefore, whether it turns out to be a five or a ten‑year war does not seem to make any difference. The United States is aiding Russia today, but that is just because she can use Russia to her own ends; it does not by any means signify that she likes Communism.

 

Trans.  11‑15‑41

 

No. 380

 

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             November 4, 1941

TO: Mexico                                                                                         Circular # 353.

 

(Message to Tokyo # 1034.)

 

(Part 3 of 4. )

 

When it comes to economic pressure on us Japanese, however, the officials have the full backing of the people. They all seem to think that their present strength in the Atlantic is sufficient for national defense and for protection against war. They seem to believe that there is not much to worry about in the southern Pacific, since British, American, and Nether­landish military strength is increasing gradually in that area. In the face of Japan's dauntless attitude, the Americans do not show the slightest fear. Furthermore, it has also been published that conferences already are under way to supply the ABCD nations with war materials, and this process of fortifying universal allies flourishes from day to day.

 

Trans.  11-15‑41

 

No. 381

 

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             November 4, 1941

TO: Mexico                                                                                         Circular # 353.

 

(Message to Tokyo # 1034.)

 

(Part 4 of 4.)

 

Ah, but when it comes to military men, they do not share this optimism; for

 

(1) Well do they know that English morale is not as good as reported. Full well do they know that after the fall of Russia, England may make peace with Germany.

(2) The Mediterranean Sea is in grave peril. The reason why CHURCHILL talked personal­ly with the President was doubtless because he saw that the United States was tending to over‑stress the Pacific Ocean, and he wished the President to know the gravity of the situa­tion in the Atlantic and to warn him that the real danger lies in the Atlantic.

(3) I am sure that the officials know full well what a nuisance a war in the Pacific would be. Lately it has been said in editorials that if it comes to the question of war, the questions of where troops are to be stationed and the moment for striking will be chosen quickly when the whole situation has been taken into consideration.

For your information.

 

Trans.  11‑15‑41

 

A-187

 

No. 382

 

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     November 4, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   # 728.

 

Re messages from San Francisco to the Minister # 71[a] and your # 1030[b].

 

In spite of the fact that arrangements had been made with the United States Government concerning the schedule of ships carrying mail, an undesirable effect was created by the unexpected examination and (sorting ?) of the mail on the night before the sailing of the Tatsuta Maru.

It appears that the American understanding of the arrangements and ours differ, therefore, it is suggested that representations clarifying the situation be made so that the loading of mail may be smoothly carried out in the cases of the Taiyō Maru and the Hikawa Maru.

 


[a] Not available.

[b] Not available.

 

Trans.  11-17‑41

 

No. 383

 

FROM: San Francisco (Muto)                                                              November 5, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   Circular # 277.

 

(San Francisco to Tokyo # 274.)

 

Re my # 263[a].

 

‑‑‑‑‑[b], attached to ‑‑‑‑‑[b], who we have been using for propaganda here, is being investigat­ed regarding his connection with ‑‑‑‑‑[b] and our connection with this matter. He is registered as a foreign correspondent for the ‑‑‑‑‑[b] and we have stated that he is paid for this through us.

 


[a] Not available.

[b] DoD comment: Names and identifying information withheld.

 

Trans.  11‑25‑41

 

No. 384

 

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             November 5, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1039.

 

Re your Circular # 2222[a].

 

Sensitivity of JLG 415.105 kc broadcast to here was fairly good and occasionally we could hear it. However, from 8 p.m. on, interference from other powerful stations was bad and sensitivity was poor. We will check this on successive nights. The sensitivity of other wave lengths was negligible.

The sensitivity of JLG 415.105 kc broadcast to South America was excellent here from 6 to 8 p.m. on successive nights and reception was excellent.

 


[a] See IV, 360.

 

Trans.  11‑7‑41

 

A-188

 

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR  

 

 

No. 385

 

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     November 7, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   # 744.

 

(In 2 parts, complete.)

 

Re your # 1020[a].

 

We are wiring the distribution of the October and November salaries (to the official in charge of accounts) and the second and third period allowances to the various offices as follows: Please wire this to the various offices concerned.

Salaries and expenses of the personnel of the Embassy in Washington. (The unit is in yen.)

 

The Ambassador                                                                        13,200.00

Iguchi                                                                                         6,469.54

Okumura                                                                                     4,185.79

Matsudaira                                                                                  4,924.35

Terazaki                                                                                       5,493.75

Iriki                                                                                              2,053.32

Takagi                                                                                          2,053.32

Hoshida                                                                                      1,906.64

Horiuchi                                                                                     3,211.52

Fujita                                                                                           1,992.66

Yamamoto                                                                                   1,760.00

Fujiyama                                                                                      1,966.58

Inagawa                                                                                       1,966.58

Ando                                                                                          1,966.58

Maeda                                                                                         1,466.64

Okaniwa                                                                                     1,466.64

Nakajima                                                                                     1,466.64

Hori                                                                                             2,216.88

Yamamoto                                                                                  2,125.88

Kajiwara                                                                                      2,198.48

Enseki                                                                                         1,320.00

Honjo                                                                                          1,584.00

Arita                                                                                           1,584.00

Nishihori                                                                                     1,584.00

Total                                                                                          70,062.79

 

Operating expenses, (Unit in dollars).

 

Foreign diplomatic establishments.

                  A. Actual expense                                                     3,475.92

(3rd period) B. Transfer expense                                                 5,500.00

(3rd period) C. Entertainment expense                                        1,000.00

                  D. Telegraphic expense                                           10,000.00

                  D. Temporary foreign telegraphic expense                5,000.00

                  E. Miscellaneous                                                        1,200.00

                  B. 3rd period                                                                500.00

                  D. Emergency telegraphic expense                          18,000.00

                  Total                                                                        44,675.92

 

                                                                                                  New York

 

Morishima                                                                                   6,949.20

Inoye                                                                                           4,312.00

Hirazawa                                                                                     3,490.64

 

A-189

 

Kondo                                                                                         3,827.52

Amano                                                                                         2,901.94

Mori                                                                                             2,874.64

Nakazawa                                                                                    1,760.00

Hayashida                                                                                    2,216.88

Watanabe                                                                                     2,198.48

Saiga                                                                                            2,053.28

Total                                                                                          32,584.58

 

Foreign diplomatic establishments.

 

A.                                                                                                4,026.00

B. (3rd period)                                                                             3,650.00

C. (3rd period)                                                                                525.00

F. Rent(1/2 Year)                                                                       11,500.00

D.                                                                                                3,600.00

D. Temporary foreign                                                                  1,500.00

E.                                                                                                 1,200.00

D. Emergency                                                                              4,000.00

Total                                                                                          30,001.00

 

                                                                                                     Chicago

Mori                                                                                            3,107.30

Uchida                                                                                         2,053.28

Ishida                                                                                           2,673.60

Kawabata                                                                                     1,611.84

Total                                                                                            9,446.02

 

                                                            Foreign diplomatic establishments.

A.                                                                                                1,464.00

B. (3rd period)                                                                             1,500.00

C. (3rd period)                                                                                250.00

F. (Last half of year)                                                                    4,329.00

D.                                                                                                1,500.00

D. Temporary foreign                                                                     500.00

D. Emergency                                                                                 500.00

Total                                                                                         10,043.00

 

                                                                                            San Francisco

Muto                                                                                            6,469.54

Inagaki                                                                                         3,581.54

Takahashi (includes Sept. & Oct.)                                               4,478.52

Sata                                                                                              2,279.20

Kurata                                                                                          2,052.64

Hashizume                                                                                   1,837.60

Imai                                                                                             1,837.60

Total                                                                                         22,536.64

 

                                                            Foreign diplomatic establishments.

A.                                                                                                2,922.00

B. (3rd period)                                                                             1,700.00

C. (3rd period)                                                                                325.00

F. (Last half of year)                                                                    3,930.00

D. (2 periods)                                                                              1,000.00

G. Salaries of foreign employees                                                    600.00

D. Temporary foreign                                                                  2,000.00

E.                                                                                                    990.00

 

A-190

 

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR  

 

D. Emergency                                                                              2,000.00

Total                                                                                          15,467.00

 

                                                                                                   Honolulu

 

Kita                                                                                              3,561.58

Okuda                                                                                          2,368.10

Yuge .                                                                                          1,971.20

Tsukikawa                                                                                   1,408.00

Seki                                                                                             1,787.84

Morimura                                                                                     1,026.64

Total                                                                                          12,123.36

 

                                                            Foreign diplomatic establishments.

A.                                                                                                2,386.00

F. (Half period)                                                                               120.00

D.                                                                                                   500.00

G. .                                                                                                 240.00

D. (Temporary foreign)                                                               1,000.00

D. (Emergency)                                                                              500.00

Total .                                                                                         4,746.00

 

                                                                                               Los Angeles

Nakamura                                                                                    2,635.06

Suga                                                                                             1,848.00

Kamata                                                                                       1,848.00

Total                                                                                            6,331.06

 

                                                            Foreign diplomatic establishments.

A.                                                                                                3,051.00

B. (3rd period)                                                                             1,350.00

C. (3rd period)                                                                                200.00

F. (Half year)                                                                               3,720.00

D. (2nd period)                                                                               400.00

D. (Temporary foreign)(3rd period)                                                400.00

D. (Emergency)                                                                              500.00

Total                                                                                            9,642.00

Translator's note: This actually adds up to 9,621‑evidently they made a mistake in their figures as this is the first total that has been off, excepting the first column in the message which is off $1. (or ¥l. )

 

                                                                                                        Seattle

Sato                                                                                             3,490.64

Kaneko                                                                                        1,889.04

Okamura                                                                                      1 300.64

Total                                                                                            6,680.32

 

Foreign diplomatic establishments.

A.                                                                                                1,567.76

B. (3rd period)                                                                             1,000.00

C. (3rd period)                                                                                150.00

F. (Last half of year)                                                                    2,610.00

D. (Temporary foreign)                                                                  795.00

D. (3rd period)                                                                                500.00

(Emergency)                                                                                   250.00

Total                                                                                            6,832.76

 

A-191

                                                                                                                 

                                                                                                     Portland

 

Oka                                                                                              3,412.56

Matsumoto                                                                                   1,401.10

Total                                                                                           4,813.66

 

Foreign diplomatic establishments.

A.                                                                                                2,497.00

B. (3rd period)                                                                                750.00

C. (3rd period)                                                                                100.00

F. (Last half of year)                                                                    1,890.00

D. (2nd period)                                                                               150.00

D. (Foreign diplomatic) (3rd period)                                               150.00

Total                                                                                            5,537.00

 

New Orleans

Ito                                                                                                3,813.86

Sato                                                                                             2,399.60

Total                                                                                            6,213.46

 

Foreign diplomatic establishments.

A.                                                                                                1,290.00

B. (3rd Period)                                                                                800.00

C. (3rd Period)                                                                                  75.00

F.                                                                                                 1,740.00

D. (2nd Period)                                                                               250.00

D. (Temporary foreign) (3rd period)       250.00

Total                                                                                            4,405.00

 

Houston

Sano                                                                                            3,080.00

 

Foreign diplomatic establishments.

A.                                                                                                   580.00

B. (3rd period)                                                                                450.00

C. (3rd period)                                                                                  50.00

F. (Last half of year)                                                                    1,050.00

D. (2nd period)                                                                               150.00

D. (Temporary foreign) (3rd period)       150.00

Total                                                                                            2,430.00

 

Manila (September,. October & November)

Nihiro                                                                                          5,148.00

Fukuda (from October 13th)                                                        1,605.77

Mori                                                                                             2,402.40

Ishida                                                                                           2,001.96

Kijima                                                                                          2,001.96

Nishi                                                                                            2,001.96

Okazaki                                                                                       1,539.96

Nakamura                                                                                    1,539.96

Total .                                                                                        18,241.97

 

Operating expenses

 

Foreign diplomatic establishments.

A.                                                                                     Peso   1,765.87

A.                                                                                      Yen       171.00

B.                                                                                                 2,000.00

 

A-192

 

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR  

 

C.                                                                                                    250.00

F. Aid for refugees actual and

miscellaneous expenses                                                          600.00 yen

 

Davao

 

Kihara                                                                                          3,717.96

Nakamura                                                                                    1,584.00

Kajiya                                                                                          1,143.96

Total                                                                                            6,445.92

 

Foreign diplomatic establishments.

A.                                                                                         Peso   808.83

A.                                                                                        Yen    150.00

B.                                                                                                 1,500.00

C.                                                                                                    125.00

D.                                                                                                   375.00

F.                                                                                                    390.00

D. (Emergency)                                                                              375.00

 

This is the end.

 


[a] Message dated 31 October concerns plans for handling money problems connected with staff salaries for July, August, September, October, November, following methods of remittance used by U.S.

 

Trans.  11‑12‑41

 

No. 386

 

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     November 8, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   Circular # 2281.

 

(Strictly Secret.)

 

Re my circular # 2040[a].

 

From the Chief of the Telegraphic Communications.

 

Recently the number of messages designated "kinqu" has increased by leaps and bounds. Upon examining the material contained in these wires I find they are not of such enormous import that they require dispatching without loss of time or that in the event they are received late at night that they be communicated immediately to the Foreign Minister, Vice‑Minister, or any other of the principal offices for the evaluating of intelligence and certainly not of such vital importance that they need be passed on at that late hour to parties outside the department.

Among these wires there are those which have been designated "kinqu" with utter dis­regard for their contents. (Wires coming from the United States have on very frequent occasions used this most unnecessarily. Furthermore, there certainly is no necessity to put the words "very urgent" in English before the address.) There are so many telegraphic officials who have become so accustomed to marking wires, of little import, extremely urgent (please refer to my mail circular # 8 of 1939) that there is considerable danger of a grave error resulting from this practice.

After you have read and entirely assimilated my wire referred to above, I would like to have you give due consideration to the choice of "kinqu", "daiqu" (which have been used in the past to designate urgency) and "sikyu."

This wire is addressed to the United States, Germany, Thailand and Batavia.

 

A-193

 

Note:

"Kinqu" designation for "extremely urgent."

"Daiqu" designation for "urgent."

"Sikyu" designation for "Priority."

 


[a] Not available.

 

Trans.  11‑12‑41

 

No. 387

 

FROM: San Francisco (Muto)                                                              November 9, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   Circular # 282.

 

San Francisco to Tokyo # 285.

 

The FBI investigation of ‑‑‑‑‑[a] (who was president of the committee concerned last year, at the time when the organization was dissolved) and others connected with the organi­zation is being continued.

The FBI has seven able investigators on this job, so that it would seem as though they considered the case an important one.

Although judging from the type of investigation, it would seem as though they were most interested in gathering evidence to be used against ‑‑‑‑‑[a] and ‑‑‑‑‑, it also is apparent that the Department of Justice feels the necessity of looking into this case, due to the numerous statements being made by the Dies Committee regarding Japanese propaganda in the United States. It also may be that they hope to make this the excuse for demanding recall from the United States of all Japanese Consuls‑General and Consuls to Japan.

2. A rigid investigation of ‑‑‑‑‑[a] is being carried on. As he is officially registered as a foreign correspondent for the ‑‑‑‑‑, there is little danger of his being indicted (prosecuted). During the examination he will no doubt have to prove that he was hired by the ‑‑‑‑‑[a] at $350. per month. Therefore, please arrange matters there so that if ‑‑‑‑‑ should wire to "GO" of the ‑‑‑‑‑[a] for a confirmation of the above, "GO" is to wire back to ‑‑‑‑[a] this effect.

 


[a] DoD comment: Names withheld.

 

Trans.  11‑19‑41

 

No. 388

 

FROM: Tokyo (Togo)                                                                          November 10, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   # 756.

 

(Priority)

 

Re part 2 of my # 716[a].

 

In regard to the purchase of dollars by the Yokohama Specie Bank, through the National City Bank, it is understood that the National City Bank Branch in Tokyo has as yet received no instructions from their home office. Is it possible that the home office of the National City Bank does not fully understand the situation?

 


[a]  Not available, perhaps # 711 meant, See IV, 365.

 

Trans.  11-18‑41

 

A-194

 

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR  

 

No. 389

 

FROM: Hsinking                                                                                  October 27, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 693.

 

Re my # 686[a].

 

The military are at present considering ways and means of disposing the matter involving the arrest of the four U.S. missionaries. If the Foreign Office wishes to express its desires in this matter, please do so at once.

 


[a ] Not available.

Trans.  10‑29‑41

 

No. 390

 

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     October 31, 1941

TO: Hsinking                                                                                       # 754.

 

Re your # 686[a] and # 693[b].

 

With reference to the missionaries concerned, they were involved in Korea in January and February of this year. If they are involved in the Fukei incident, sentence of banishment is suggested. We have as yet received no report from the Army.

 


[a] Not available.

[b] See IV, 389.

 

Trans.  11‑8‑41

 

No. 391

 

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     November 11, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   # 760.

 

Re your # 1061[a].

 

According to information contained in a message from our Ambassador to Manchukuo, the Manchukuoan police officials arrested three missionaries in Harbin on 22 October, on the charge of infraction of the peace preservation laws. These are Baptist missionaries which was the sect of those missionaries in Korea who were deported on the grounds of lesé majesté'. It is said that in Manchukuo these missionaries were telling Koreans in Manchukuo that Japanese and Manchukuoans were treating the Koreans poorly. They were instrumental in organizing secret Korean organizations.

Our Ambassador in Manchukuo requested this office's suggestions on how to dispose of this matter. We, therefore, suggested that they follow the example set by the officials in Korea and order these persons deported. To this, our Ambassador replied that after conferring with the military and the Manchukuoan authorities, it had been decided that our suggested means would be adopted.

This message has been relayed to Manchukuo.

 


[a] See IV, Part A 57.

 

Trans.  11‑12‑41

 

A-195

 

No. 392

 

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     November 11, 1941

TO: Hsinking                                                                                       # 788.

 

Re your # 707[a].

 

The American Embassy in Tokyo requests that, if the Americans concerned have been given a fair trail, before banishment they be permitted to come to Harbin in order to settle their personal affairs. Please wire your suggestions.

 


[a] Not available.

 

Trans.  11-13‑41

 

No. 393

 

FROM: Hsinking                                                                                  November 13, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 728.

 

Re your # 788[a].

 

As a result of conferences with the Manchurian and military authorities it has been decided to comply with your request.

 


[a] See IV, 392.

 

Trans.  11‑14‑41

 

No. 394

 

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     November 14, 1941

TO: Hong Kong                                                                                   # 2319.

 

(Circular) (To be handled in Government Code.)

 

(Strictly secret outside the Department.)

 

Though the Imperial Government hopes for great things from the Japan‑American negotiations, they do not permit optimism for the future. Should the negotiations collapse, the international situation in which the Empire will find herself will be one of tremendous crisis. Accompanying this, the Empire's foreign policy as it has been decided by the cabinet, insofar as it pertains to China, is:

a. We will completely destroy British and American power in China.

b. We will take over all enemy concessions and enemy important rights and interests (customs and minerals, etc.) in China.

c. We will take over all rights and interests owned by enemy powers, even though they might have connections with the new Chinese government, should it become necessary.

In realizing these steps in China, we will avoid, insofar as possible, exhausting our veteran troops. Thus we will cope with a world war on a long‑time scale. Should our reserves for total war and our future military strength wane, we have decided to reinforce them from the whole Far Eastern area. This has become the whole fundamental policy of the Empire. Therefore, in consideration of the desirability to lighten our personal and material, load, we will encourage the activities of important Chinese in their efforts in the occupied territories insofar as is possible. Japan and China, working in cooperation, will take over military bases. Thus, operating wherever possible, we will realize peace throughout the entire Far

 

A-196

 

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR  

 

 

East. At the same time, we place great importance upon the acquisition of materials (especially from unoccupied areas). In order to do this, all in the cabinet have concurred, in view of the necessity, in a reasonable relaxation of the various restrictions now in force (after you have duly realized the critical situation which has brought the above decisions into being you will, of course, wait for instructions from home before carrying them out).

In connection with the above, we have the precedent of the freezing legislation. We are wiring you this particularly for your information alone. Please keep absolutely quiet the existence of these decisions and the fact that they have been transmitted to you.

This message is directed to Nanso[a], Hokudai , Shanghai, Tientsin, Hsinkow, Hankow, Canton, and Hong Kong. Hokudai [a] will transmit to Kalgan and Taiyuan. Tsingtao will transmit to Tsinan. Canton will transmit to Amoy.

 


[a]  Kana spelling.

 

Trans.  11‑26‑41

 

No. 395

 

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             November 14, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1091.

 

From the Finance Official to the Vice‑Minister of Finance.

 

It is at this time impossible to make any forecast as to how, in case of an emergency, diplomats, other government officials as well as some of the other Japanese should evacuate. After considering possible eventualities, I have come to the conclusion that it might be well to have some gold ready in Lima. Will you, therefore, please make suitable arrange­ments with the Yokohama Specie Bank (exchange control is most lenient in Peru). In case the Yokohama Specie Bank branch in that country has not formally been given a letter of attorney for this purpose, please take suitable steps by means of telegram sent through the Peruvian Ministry in Tokyo.

 

Trans.  11‑19‑41

 

No. 396

 

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     November 15, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   # 2330.

 

(Circular.)

 

The following is the order and method of destroying the code machines in the event of an emergency.

 

First of all, the scrambling section shall be destroyed in the following manner: All the screws shall be removed and the machine reduced to the smallest pieces; all wires shall be detached; next, the most vital part of the entire machine, the scrambling nest (HENKŌ­GUN)‑(the revolving arrangement on which wires are attached, and which is located below that part is graduated in A, B, C, D)‑shall be very thoroughly destroyed; wires, insulations, panels, etc. shall be doused with kerosene and burned; gears which have alphabetical graduations and the switch arrangements which are opened and closed with keys shall also be destroyed, and these parts, together with other parts which cannot be destroyed by burn­ing, shall be thrown into the ocean or treated with sulphuric acid and buried in the ground.

 

A-197

 

Next, the printer shall be destroyed in very much the above manner. (The steel rod and bar attached to the lower part of typewriter "A" shall be removed and then the machine dismantled.)

All other markers on the machines and rectifiers shall be removed and burned. All screws which join pieces together shall be removed and disposed of, and all remaining parts shall be pounded with hammers.

Washington relay to Mexico, Rio de Janeiro and Buenos Aires. Berne relay to NSW and NLH (Rome and Ankara (?)). Bangkok (?) relay to Hanoi.

 

Trans.  11‑25‑41

 

No. 397

 

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             November 16, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1108.

 

Departmental Secret. "B" Class report.

 

1. According to DAINERI [c], a secretary attached to the Italian embassy, the United States government is doing everything in its power to get Italy to leave the Axis. It is said that the American Ambassador to Rome, PHILLIPS (under instructions from ROOSEVELT), worked hard about three months ago to arrange a conference between ROOSEVELT and MUSSO­LINI in the Azores, but on account of Italy's fear of German objection, the attempt ended in a failure. (This may sound fantastic, but in view of the fact that the information comes from the Italian embassy and, also, of the fact that the United States was so lacking in common sense as to have demanded that Finland conclude an armistice with Soviet Russia, it cannot be said to be entirely improbable.)

2. The details of the demands which Germany made to Soviet Russia prior to the Russo­German war (referred to in my # 869[a]) were ascertained from MASARIKKU [b] several days ago (when he met the Czech Premier in New York, the latter confirmed them).

3. I understand that the United States' strategy to be employed against Japan in case of a Japanese‑American war is to demolish the manufacturing centers at the outset by means of air raids (I understand that 16 airplane carriers are being either remodeled or camouflaged and that 32 additional ones are in the process of construction) and also to isolate the Japanese forces in China by severing Japanese supply routes in the China Sea by means of submarines.

 


[a] See 397A. Which says that HITLER demanded of STALIN: (1) Access to the oil and grain of the Ukraine; (2) joint operation of the Siberia railroad and establishment of military bases in the Far East; (3) place German representatives in the Soviet military general headquarters.

[b] Kana spelling.

[c] L. DANIELLI.

Trans.  11‑19‑41

 

No. 397A

 

FROM: Washington                                                                             September 29, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 869.

 

B Intelligence. Foreign Office Secret.

 

1. Prior to his war against the Soviet Union, Hitler made the following three demands of Stalin:

 

A-198

 

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR  

 

 

(1) Access to the oil and grain in the Ukraine. (By this was meant the occupation of that area for the duration of the war against England.)

(2) Joint operation of the Siberia Railroad and the right to establish military bases in the Far East, including the Vladivostok areas.

(3) Place German representatives in the Soviet military general headquarters.

Stalin agreed in principle to the first two points but flatly refused to comply with point (3).

2. At this time Ribbentrop told Hitler that according to information he had obtained through his own intelligence organization, should Germany strike at the Soviet from the outside the church faction and the bourgeoisie which had not been thoroughly crushed by the Soviet regime, would immediately rise up. The destruction of the Stalin regime would then be an exceedingly simple matter.

On being advised thusly by Ribbentrop Hitler launched his attack against Russia. Since the Soviet resistance has been surprisingly stubborn Ribbentrop has fallen in Hitler's favor. The intelligence system that Ribbentrop headed has either been disbanded or taken over by the military.

(The above is the gist of what our New York informant ‑‑‑‑‑[a] related to Terasaki in Washington. ‑‑‑‑‑[a] got his information from Hauptman who until recently was in Italy, engaged in the intelligence business, and who is well versed in European matters. ‑‑‑‑- [a] expressed much confidence in the veracity of this information.)

This message was relayed to New York.

 

(Tran. Note: Above message was sent on 1 October from Tokyo to Berlin, verbatim, except that last two paragraphs were omitted.)

 


[a] DoD comment: Name withheld.

 

(No Trans. date in text.  LWJ)

 

No. 398

 

FROM: Shanghai                                                                                 November 17, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 2103.

 

Re my # 2089[a].

 

1. On the 15th, the Commander of the American Marines told the Commander in charge of the Japanese forces here, who is also Chairman of the Joint Defense Committee, that he had received official orders for the withdrawal of the American Marines here in the immediate future.

2. The Japanese army in harmony with previous discussions (see paragraph 2 of my cap­tion telegram) desires to have responsibility for the defense of the "C" area, after the with­drawal of the Marines, divided between the Municipal Council Police and the Shanghai Volunteer squad. Whenever the Japanese army deems it necessary to preserve the public peace, they will participate freely in the policing of this area. An announcement of the above is scheduled to be made to the President of the Municipal Council and the Com­mander of the Italian force by the 20th.

 


[a]  Not available.

 

Trans. 11‑25‑41

 

A-199

 

No. 399

 

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     November 18, 1941

TO: Hsinking                                                                                       # 833.

 

Re your # 720[a].

 

Although Japan, itself, has not frozen funds, but because America has, Japan has not granted permits, generally speaking, for the receiving of remittances. However, we are considering it to the extent of remittances from America to religious organizations in Japan, and from Japan to cultural organizations in America (an estimate of 400,000 yen). Right now we are in the midst of negotiating for this with America.

 


[a] Not available.

 

Trans.  11‑24‑41

 

No. 400

 

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     November 18, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   # 788.

 

Strictly secret. Re your # 1098[a].

 

1. It is hard to prophesy the future course of events, but in the case of "B" if we carry out the first sailing proposal in my # 786[b] for: (a) the remaining officials; (b) such persons as must absolutely not be held back; (c) company employees; and (d) all residents who were unable to board the three ships previously dispatched, the matter can be satisfactorily handled. We will, at this sailing, have the families of our various diplomatic officials as well as mem­bers of their staff who must return to Japan, without an exception, board the ship. However, we do not intend to warn any save those of our residents who must of a certainty return to sail. The number of those who actually embarked at the first sailing was much smaller than the original number of applications. The reason, was, doubtless, nostalgia and a reluctance to part with their property.

2. Will you secretly, therefore, suitably advise the several consuls to take the following steps: (a) to help our citizens who remain behind to work together for the common good; (b) to destroy immediately such secret documents, and so forth, as are in the possession of Japa­nese companies and chambers of commerce.

3. We are now studying ways and means of cooperation between our diplomatic officials and our consulates, as well as responsibility for the interests of our high offices in case of "B". We will negotiate concerning the latter here in Tokyo.

4. I am wiring you next a plan for reducing the members of staffs.

 


[a] See IV, Part A 115.

[b] Not available.

 

Trans.  11‑19‑41

 

A-200

 

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR  

 

 

No. 401

 

FROM: Tokyo (Togo)                                                                          November 20, 1941

TO: Ankara                                                                                          Circular # 2364.

 

Strictly secret.

 

1. Since the formation of the Cabinet, the Government has been in conference for successive days with the Imperial General Headquarters. They have given due consideration to the development of a fundamental national policy which will correspond to the urgent exigencies of the situation. Insofar as this is concerned, in the conference which took place on the morning of the 5th, decisions were reached covering fundamental policies having to do with the adjustment of diplomatic relations with Japan and the United States.

2. Insofar as Japanese‑American negotiations are concerned, in proceeding upon these negotiations for the adjustment of diplomatic relations on a just basis, conferences have been in progress since the 7th. In the light of the trend of past negotiations there is consider­able doubt as to whether a settlement of the negotiations will be reached. Insofar as we are concerned we have lent our maximum efforts in order to bring about a settlement of the negotiations. However, the situations not permitting any further conciliation by us, an optimistic view for the future is not permitted. In the event that negotiations are broken off, we expect that the situation in which Japan will find herself will be extremely critical. The above is for your information alone.

This message is addressed to Switzerland, Turkey and Moscow. Switzerland will transmit to France, Spain, Portugal, Sweden, Finland and South Africa. Turkey will transmit to Roumania, Bulgaria, Hungary.

 

Trans.  11‑28‑41

 

No. 402

 

FROM: Shanghai                                                                                 November 20, 1941

TO: Amoy                                                                                           # 439.

 

Message to Tokyo # 2119.

 

Re my # 2103[a].

 

1. At the meeting of the United International Settlement Council on the 10th, it was decided that the plan suggested by the Administrative General Chief would be followed, of having the Military Training Bureau police assume patrol of the British section after the withdrawal of the (American ?) Marines, the volunteer corps serving as reserves. There were no objections to continuing the present (traffic control system ?). These decisions were then communicated to the Marines.

2. The position to be taken by the Military Training Bureau was decided upon (if a coopera­tive protection plan would be established ?) in which the organization structure would be determined by the various army groups participating. Doubtlessly, there will be com­munications from the marine command section giving today's decision and requesting your opinion.

 


[a] (See IV, 398.)

 

Trans.  11‑26‑41

 

A-201

 

No. 403

 

FROM: Peking

TO: Hsinking                                                                                       November 20, 1941

 

Circular # 599.

 

Message to Tokyo # 740.

 

We have been informed by a reliable source that Missionary University and Rockefeller Hospital have received orders from the American government to evacuate. STEWART and all the other professors and employees are hurrying to leave by way of Shanghai. I will make further investigation and advise you later.

 

Trans.  11‑22‑41

 

No. 404

 

FROM: Tokyo (Togo)                                                                          November 20, 1941

TO: Havana                                                                                         # 27.

 

To be handled in Government code.

Re message # 845[a] from the Ambassador in the United States to the Foreign Minister.

 

Have you kept the $3,000.00 intact without using it for daily expenditures? Please wire me back.

 


[a] Not available.

 

Trans.  12‑5‑41

 

No. 405

 

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     November 20, 1941

TO: New York                                                                                     # 238.

 

From the head of the Trade Bureau to Mogami, Trade Bureau representative. Carry out preparations to close your office. Sell any of the furnishings that you can, and leave the rest with the consulate. It is all right to throw away unimportant things.

 

Trans.  12‑9‑41

 

No. 406

 

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     November 24, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   # 819.

 

Re your # 1152[a].

 

1. At noon on the 14th in the manner explained in my #810[a] the foreign office officials published the statement that an understanding had been established between Japan and the United States regarding the dispatching of a second ship.

2. With regard to the schedule, etc., I shall wire you further at a later date.

3. In connection with the latter part of your caption wire the Home Office, too, is giving consideration to the dispatching of a second ship because of the ever worsening state of affairs. After you have taken note of the contents of this message please impress upon the leaders of Japanese residents in the United States that we are looking out for their safety.

 

A-202

 

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR  

 

Please transmit this wire and my separate wire to all our offices in the United States, Ottawa, Vancouver and Panama.

 


[a] Not available.

[b] See 406A in which Tokyo wires Washington the formal text (Japanese language) of a note for the British and Dutch envoys, as well as the text of an apparently expected reply from them.

 

Trans.  12‑13‑41

 

No. 406A

 

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     November 21, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   #810.

 

(Part 1 of 2.)

 

(Separate wire.)

 

(Chief of Office routing.)

 

Formal note

"I have the honor of addressing this note to you to inform you that my home government has instructed me to forward you a copy of an agreement drawn up between the government of Japan and the government of the United States of America on the ‑‑‑‑‑ (blank) ‑‑‑‑‑ of this month. At the same time I have the honor to transmit to you the following information:

"For the purpose of assuring the maintenance of peace on the Pacific and through that to contribute to the recovery and promotion of peace throughout the world, this agreement was drawn up between Japan and the United States.

"The Imperial Government is firmly convinced that the government of your country, like the governments of Japan and of the United States, is vitally interested in the purposes indicated above. We, therefore, beg permission to draw your government's attention to the contents of this agreement, and particularly to Article One, Article Two, Article Three, Article Four, and Article Six, (Article Six, only if it is included), thereof.

"The various articles enumerated above concern, respectively, the political stabilization in the Pacific area; access to materials produced in the Netherlands Indies; the trade relations between Japan and the United States; the China Incident; and, the non‑discriminatory treatment in international commerce, (this last, only if it is included in the agreement).

"The two governments have made a joint declaration including the above points. We feel that your government and mine could utilize the understandings in the same manner as between Japan and the United States.

"Therefore, in the hopes that the aims thus drawn up in this agreement may more fully be realized, the Imperial Government herewith wishes me to advise you that it is prepared to take suitable steps to come to a formal understanding between your government and mine on the specific points enumerated above. We expectantly await your government's advice that it would be similarly disposed.

"Accept, Sir, these renewed assurances of my highest consideration,"      ‑formal close-

 

                                                                                                            /s/

 

(Part 2 follows)

Trans.  11‑22‑41

 

A-203

 

No. 406A

 

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     November 21, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   #810.

 

(Part 2 of 2.)

 

Formal reply

"I have the honor of addressing you in order that I may respectfully acknowledge the receipt of a copy of the Agreement on a Joint Understanding which has been drawn up between your government and the government of the United States dated the ‑‑‑‑‑ (blank date) ‑‑‑‑‑ of this month and your accompanying explanatory note.

"Your explanation was to the effect that ‑‑‑‑‑.

"I have the honor to inform you that I am in receipt of a reply from my government to the effect that the government of Great Britain (or the Netherlands Government) understands the objectives drawn up in this draft agreement, and in the hope that they may be more fully realized, is disposed to take suitable steps to come to a formal understanding between your country and mine on the points specifically enumerated above.

"Accept, Sir, renewed assurances of my highest consideration."

(Leave some space, and then way down at the bottom place:)"

 

—formal close­—

/s/

 


[a] Japan.

[b] This is Japanese language epistolary style.

 

Trans.  11‑22‑41

 

No. 407

 

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     November 25, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   # 827.

 

In view of the changing times, in order to provide funds for the South American diplomatic establishments, it has become necessary to borrow the unfrozen dollar accounts of our residents there. There is no objection to having repayment made in Japan proper. As soon as you have ascertained the amount collectable by this method please wire the amount.

Please give study to the method of sending the funds so collected to the South American offices by courier mail.

Please transmit this as this Minister's instructions to New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, and San Francisco.

 

Trans.  11‑25‑41

 

No. 408

 

FROM: Washington                                                                             November 25, 1941

TO: San Francisco                                                                               Circular # 378.

 

Outline of message # 827[a] from Foreign Minister to Washington is as follows:

In order to use the unfrozen dollars owned by Japanese in the United States for official funds in South America, please arrange to collect these funds in a very secret way. It could

 

A-204

 

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR  

 

be arranged that payments for these dollars should be made in Japan. As soon as you have some idea of about how much can be collected let us know. After collection please confer on best way of sending this to South America.

 


[a] (See IV, 407.)

 

Trans.  12‑5‑41

 

No. 409

 

FROM: New York (Morishima)                                                           November 26, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 512.

 

It would be very convenient for the people here who expect to sail, because of connections and. other reasons, if the Tatsuta Maru would come to a port here after leaving Balboa. As there are many who have expressed this wish, will you please consider it when approving its schedule?

 

Trans.  12‑1‑41

 

No. 411

 

FROM: Tokyo (Togo)                                                                          November 26, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   # 838.

 

Tatsuta Maru Schedule:

 

Yokohama                            December 2

Los Angeles           arrive      December 14

                              leave       December 16

Balboa                   arrive      December 24

 

Trans.  12‑13‑41

 

No. 412

 

FROM: Panama (Akigawa)                                                                  November 26, 1941

TO: Havana                                                                                         Circular # 34.

 

(Message from Tokyo to Washington # 837.)

 

Re my message # 819[a].

 

The schedule for the TATSUTA MARU, as given in my # 838 (Nov. 26):

 

Yokohama                            December 2

Los Angeles           arrive      December 14

                              leave       December 16

Balboa                   arrive      December 24

 

is to leave Balboa on the 26th arriving in Yokohama January 15th. On the basis of conditions at the time, it may stop at Los Angeles again on the way home, but try to have the passengers from the United States board it on the outward trip. As far as possible, have all those who wish to sail from South America also come on the TATSUTA ‑‑‑‑‑.

 


[a] See IV, 406.

 

Trans.  12‑13‑41

 

A-205

 

No. 413

 

FROM: Tokyo (Togo)                                                                          November 26, 1941

TO: New York                                                                                     # 244.

 

Request Message.

 

As no plans have been set up to dispatch any other vessel than the Tatsuta Maru, please see to it that as many persons desirous of returning to Japan are advised to return by this ship. Wire me immediately the number who can be already to leave.

With regard to their evacuation please make your contacts with these persons in as safe a manner as possible.

 

Trans.  12‑13‑41

 

No. 414

 

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             November 26, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1185.

 

Re your # 788[a].

 

I sent TAKAGI to Chicago and San Francisco to transmit your instructions and he has notified me the result as follows:

1. Japanese residents all over America have already set up a mutual aid system and since in San Francisco they already have a fund of $6,000 there is little need for worry.

However in Chicago and elsewhere the Japanese residents are weaker financially and have practically no funds. I think if it comes to evacuation they will need some aid from the Japa­nese consulate. Please let me know what you think of this.

2. Although the FBI on the west coast already have a practically complete register of names of the members of the Japanese Association and the Industrial Council, etc., there seems to be no stigma attached to the list.

 


[a] See IV, 400.

 

Trans.  11‑28‑41

 

No. 415

 

FROM: New York (Morishima)                                                           November 26, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 511.

 

(Part 1 of 2. )

 

It seems that the proposition sent by the Treasury Department on the 24th to Finance Offi­cial NISHIYAMA, that we would permit remittances to the Sei Ro Ka[a] and the Women's Col­lege in Tokyo if they would loose 30,000 yen for the Cultural Association, was refused so it has come to the point that even such trivial amounts as this cannot be expected.

Judging from # 1117[a] from our Ambassador in Washington to your Excellency, there is no chance of the Cultural Association getting any expense money. (I have confidentially heard that the Secretary of State himself has come to be very suspicious of this organization's activi­ties.) Now, we have no understanding with the United States concerning the continuance of this organization and China is complaining about American relations with Japan so I do not

 

A-206

 

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR  

 

believe that the Cultural Association can function much longer. If and when the worse happens it will be difficult suddenly to close it.

 


[a] Kana spelling.

[b] Not available.

 

Trans.  12‑13‑41

 

No. 416

 

FROM: New York (Morishima)                                                           November 26, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 511.

 

(Part 2 of 2.)

 

I want you, therefore, to immediately decide to close it and send a special ship to carry all its employees home. I think that this will be the best thing to do. It is necessary to hurry so please confer with the Cultural Advancement society and wire me back what they say. I imagine that President MAEDA will agree with me so I want to leave the decision up to Tokyo.

In case this organization closes down (a) I have already gotten an understanding with Columbia University that they will take over our curies and books. (b) This organization's position as an American institution will continue.

 

Trans.  12‑13‑41

 

No. 417

 

FROM: Washington                                                                             November 25, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1168.

 

Regarding your message # 788[a] (1) and # 808[a].

 

According to Nishiyama, Commissioner, the staff of the Bank of Japan in New York have received orders that they are to act in accordance with the Embassy staff regarding evacu­ation from the United States.

This however does not coincide with your orders to us in message # 788[a] and # 808[b].

Will you please get in touch and explain matters to headquarters in Tokyo of all banks and companies with representatives in the United States.

 


[a] See IV, 400.

[b] Re exchange of funds.

 

Trans.  12‑5‑41

 

No. 418

 

FROM: Washington                                                                             November 25, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1176.

 

(In 2 parts complete.)

 

Re your # 1906[a].

 

A-207

 

Our investigations regarding the various agencies are as follows:

1. Names of government organs, news agencies and newspapers which receive broadcasts.

A. Japanese affiliations.

 Los Angeles

The Rafu Shimbun (Los Angeles News).

Kashu Mainichi Shimbun (California Daily News).

Beikoku Sangyo Nippo (American Industrial Daily).

San Francisco

Hokubei Jiji (North American Times).

Taihoku Nippo (North American Daily).

B. Foreign affiliations.

A.P. Globe Press Service and the NBC Broadcasting Company. (Recently a short wave listening station has been established in North Hollywood.)

Also the UP LERTJU wireless, the New York Times, and the Herald Times, etc. have maintained listening stations from time to time, but at present this has been suspended.

2. Desires regarding improvement of broadcasts, etc.

A. For summer I think that 12 to 13 thousand kilocycles and for winter 7 to 12 thousand kilocycles is the best wave length to use. Reception is impossible for 16000 kilocycles and above.

B. Sensitivity.

Washington, 4‑7 a.m.

New York, 6‑10 a.m.

(Eastern Standard Time)

Pacific Coast, 3‑5:30 a.m.

(Western Standard Time)

During the above intervals sensitivity is excellent but during the daytime reception is impossible.

C. Time.

Japanese newspapers, because of economic considerations, employ only one operator so please arrange the schedule so that plain language and English broadcasts do not come during the same hour.

3. Increasing the frequency and word content of broadcasts.

Japanese newspapers, for reasons stated in the preceding paragraph, have their hands full under present arrangements.

4. Opinions regarding content.

A. While there are traces of improvement in broadcasts, opinion in general seems to be that at present the broadcasts are unnecessarily verbose and not sufficiently accurate.

B. More terse, up‑to‑the‑minute broadcasts concerning conditions in Japan are desired.

C. News regarding the China incident.

A summary of the news gathered in the various quarters about once a week is sufficient.

D. Since the Japanese newspapers on the coast rely on Domei it is desired that Domei take the leadership in keeping the Japanese resident here informed regarding the course of Japa­nese‑American relations in case of an emergency.

5. Conditions of use.

Newspapers utilizing the plain language and English. broadcasts are the Japanese papers and also English papers which use their material as background in composing and editing their articles. The Globe offers Domei broadcasts to AP and INS.

AP, UP, and INS make joint use‑of these special correspondents' news or some part of it, however it is very rarely that they give credit to Domei. Of foreign newspapers, the Tribune utilizes these the most.

 


[a] Not available.

 

Trans.  12‑6‑41

 

A-208

 

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR  

 

 

No. 419

 

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     November 27, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   # 843.

 

Broadcast schedule as follows:

 

  6:00 p.m.       To Pacific Coast                            JVJ      12275

  6:30 p.m.       To Western Hemisphere                JUO       9430 and

                                                                              JVJ      12275

  7:00 p.m.       To the Coast                                  JVJ      12275

  8:00 p.m.       To the Coast                                  JHL        5160

  9:00 p.m.       To the Coast                                  JHL        5160

20:00 p.m.       To the Coast                                  JHL        5160

10:30 p.m.       To Europe                                      JHP      11980

 

Trans.  11‑28‑41

 

No. 420

 

FROM: Washington (Nomura)                                                             November 10, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1068.

 

Re my # 1039[a].

 

The sensitivity on the new wave length has been weak for a few days and reception impos­sible. Please change immediately JAU to 27.325.5 kilocycles.

 


[a] See IV, 384.

 

Trans.  11‑14‑41

 

No. 421

 

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     November 13, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   # 776.

 

Secret.

 

Re your # 1068[a].

 

At present, change of Domei's broadcasting wave length is impossible.

As we understand it your caption telegram requested a change in the wave length of the broadcast of the overseas broadcast bureau.

Please wire as to just which broadcast of the general information broadcast bureau you wished the wave length changed.

 


[a] See IV, 420.

 

Trans.  11-17‑41

 

A-209

 

No. 422

 

FROM: Washington                                                                             November 27, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1197.

 

Re your # 798[a] and # 843[b].

 

Due to reception of JUO and JVJ (general intelligence information‑Morse code‑broadcast) being weak, we desire that you change these to JAV (27,327.5 kilocycles) and JUP (13,605 kilocycles), the change to be made immediately.

Reception is also very weak on JHL (Domei news broadcast) so arrange to use above wave length for this, too.

Due to static, the JAP (European broadcast) cannot be heard at all.

 


[a] Instructions concerning talks on withdrawing.

[b] See IV, 419.

 

Trans.  11‑2‑41

 

No. 423

 

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     November 27, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   Circular # 2409.

 

(In 4 parts, complete.)

 

Rio de Janeiro to Santiago as Circular # 324.

 

(Washington send to Ottawa, Mexico City, Bogota, Caracas, Havana, Panama, New York, and New Orleans as unnumbered message.)

 

Part 1. Handle as Chief of Office routing.

With international relations becoming more strained, the following emergency system of dispatches, using INGO DENPO (hidden word, or misleading language telegrams) is placed in effect. Please study this carefully.

Make up a table with the left column containing the code words and the right corresponding plain (decoded) text. Please see that there is no mistake in transcribing this.

EXAMPLE: A message meaning:

"Japan and U. S. S. R. Military have clashed", will read:

"HIJIKATA and KUBOTA, clerks, have both been ordered by your embassy on 15th (begin spell) S T O P (end spell)."

In order to distinguish these cables from others, the English word S T O P will be added at the end as an indicator. (The Japanese word "OWARI" (end) will not be used.)

 

Part 2.

 

Code Word                              Meaning

ARIMURA                              Code Communications Prohibited.

ASAI                                       Communications will be by radio broadcasts.

ASAKURA                              Will communicate by radio broadcast. You are directed to listen carefully.

ASIKAGA                               Reception of overseas broadcast impossible due to interference.

AZUMA                                  Pressure on Japan increasing continually.

EDOGUTI                               Prepare for evacuation.

HANABUSA                           Preparations for evacuation have been completed.

HANAZONA (?)                     Prepare to entrust Embassy property to suitable foreign envoy (or consul) there.

 

A-210

 

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR  

 

Code Word                              Meaning

 

HATAKEYAMA                     Relations between Japan and . . . (blank) . . . have been severed.

HATTORI                                Relations between Japan and . . . (blank) . . . are not in accordance with expectation.

 

Part 3.

 

HIZIKATA                              Japan's and . . . (blank) . . . military forces have clashed.

HOSINO                                  Japan and . . . (blank) . . . are entering a full fledged general war.

IBARAGI                                Communicate to us probable date of breaking off of relations between Japan and the country to which you are accredited.

INAGAKI                                Have you . . ? . . the (blank) matter?

ISHIKAWA                             I have. . ? . . the. . (blank) matter.

KASHIWAGI                          We are commencing military action against . . . (blank) . . .

KOBAYAKAWA                    Stop issuing all entrance and transient visas to Japan to persons of (blank) . . . nationality.

KODAMA                               Japan

KOMIYAMA                           China

KOYANAGI                            England

KUBOTA                                U.S.S.R.

KURIBARA                            France(?)

KUSUNOKI                            Germany

MATUTANI                            Italy

 

Part 4.

 

MINAMI                                  U.S.A.

MIWATA                                Canada

MIYAZAKI                             Mexico

MOROKOSI                            Brazil

MOTIZUKI                              Panama

NAGAMINE                            Argentina

NAKAZATO                           Thailand

NANGO                                  French Indo‑China

NEGI (?)                                  Netherlands East Indies

OGAWA                                  Burma (?)

OKAMOTO                             Malaya

OKUMURA                             Australia

ONIZUKA                               Union of South Africa (?)

ONODERA                              Enemy country

OTANI                                    ?Possibly: (friendly, or allied country?)

ONISI                                      Year

SIMANAKA                            Day (?)

SAKAKIBARA                       Tsuki: Month

SIGENOI                                 (KO) Paragraph

SANZYO                                 (Toki) Time

ITIRO                                      1

NISAKU                                  2

SANTARO                              3

YOITI                                      4

GORO                                     5

MASAROKU                           6

SIMETARO                             7

YASOKITI                              8

 

A-211

 

Code Word                              Meaning

 

HISAMATU                            9

ATUMI                                    0

 

Trans.  12‑2‑41

 

No. 424

 

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     November 28, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   # 849.

 

Re your # 1199[a].

 

There are over ten passengers from Hawaii among those who are going to get passports. Since the next boat will not stop at Honolulu (on the way home), they must either go to Los Angeles by an American boat because only American boats are allowed to carry passengers between Hawaii and the mainland, or they might get special permits as through passengers via the mainland. Please make this request to the State Department and let us know the result. We have taken up the matter with the American Consulate here on the 28th.

 


[a] Not available.

 

Trans.  11-29‑41

 

No. 425

 

FROM: Washington                                                                             December 1, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1223.

 

Re your # 849[a].

 

A reply has been received from the official in charge at the State Department to the effect that there is nothing to hinder their changing from Los Angeles to Honolulu.

 


[a] See IV, 424.

 

Trans.  12‑4‑41

 

No. 426

 

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     November 29, 1941

TO: Hsinking                                                                                       # 887.

 

Re # 1122[a] from Washington to Tokyo.

 

We have had another inquiry from Ambassador Nomura regarding the probable date of the release of the missionaries. Inasmuch as we are interested in making arrangements for the dispatch of the Tatsuta Maru it is necessary for us to maintain good relations with America so please get in touch with the army and then wire immediately the date, of release and pro­spects for release.

 


[a] Not available.

 

Trans.  12‑1‑41

 

A-212

 

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR  

 

 

No. 427

 

FROM: Washington                                                                             November 29, 1941

TO: Rio de Janeiro                                                                               # 11.

 

Strictly confidential.

 

From Terasaki.

 

Please wire immediately the address of two foreigners who are receiving American newspapers and magazines.

 

Trans.  12‑2‑41

 

No. 428

 

FROM: Rio de Janeiro (Ishii)                                                               December 3, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   # 34.

Re your # 11[a].

 

(1) Dr. Borja D'Alumeida, CP 18‑‑, Rio de Janeiro.

(2) Prof. Jose Santana do Carmo ‑‑ (ten letters missing) ‑‑‑ 713, Rio de Janeiro.

 


[a] See IV, 427.

 

Trans.  12‑6‑41

 

No. 429

 

FROM: New Orleans (Ito)                                                                    December 1, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 046.

 

New Orleans to Washington # 032.

 

Two persons employed in our consulate here are both dual nationality holders, but are reported to the State Department as only U.S. citizens. Both do not wish to remain in the United States at the time of closing this office.

According to your message # 2437[a] we are to discharge them and arrange for return passage on Tatsuta.

(1) Will they be able to obtain a departure visa as a Japanese?

(2) Is there any way that they can give up their U.S. citizenship in a day or so's time? (Their draft classification is Class 1‑B and Class 4‑F.)

(3) If the above is not possible, can I report them as part of the staff and have their official standing made into Foreign Office officials? Or can I call them persons in my employ and take them out as they are with their dual citizenship?

 


[a] Not available.

 

Trans.  12‑10‑41

 

No. 430

 

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     December 1, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   Circular # 2436.

 

A-213

 

When you are faced with the necessity of destroying codes, get in touch with the Naval At­tachés office there and make use of chemicals they have on hand for this purpose. The Attaché should have been advised by the Navy Ministry regarding this.

 

Trans.  12‑1‑41

 

No. 431

 

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     December 1, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   # 860.

 

Have Courier Kosaka, who will arrive there shortly from Brazil, return to Japan on the Tatsuta Maru leaving Los Angeles on the 25th.

If this schedule makes it difficult for Kosaka to go to Mexico as planned, have him abandon that trip. Establish communication with Mexico, if this is the case, and make some sort of arrangements with regard to Kosaka's business.

 

Trans.  12‑1‑41

 

No. 432

 

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     December 1, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   Circular # 2444.

 

The four offices in London, Hong Kong, Singapore and Manila have been instructed to aban­don the use of the code machines and to dispose of them. The machine in Batavia has been returned to Japan. Regardless of the contents of my circular message # 2447[a], the U.S. (office) retains the machines and machine codes.

 


[a] See IV, 436.

 

Trans.  12‑1‑41

 

No. 433

 

FROM: Tokyo (Togo)                                                                          December 2, 1941

TO: Havana                                                                                         Circular # 2445.

 

Strictly secret. Take great pains that this does not leak out.

 

You are to take the following measures immediately:

1. With the exception of one copy of the O and L code, you are to burn all telegraph codes (this includes the code books for communication between the three departments and the code books for Army and Navy communication.

2. As soon as you have completed this operation, wire the one word HARUNA.

3. Burn all secret documents and the work sheets on this message.

4. Be especially careful not to arouse the suspicion of those on the outside. Confidential documents are all to be given the same handling.

The above is preparatory to an emergency situation and is for your information alone. Re­main calm ‑‑‑‑‑ ‑‑‑‑‑ ‑‑‑‑‑.

Also sent to Ottawa, Vancouver, Panama, Los Angeles, Honolulu, Seattle and Portland.

 

Trans.  12‑8‑41

 

A-214

 

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR  

 

No. 434

 

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     December 2, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   # 867.

 

REVISED TRANSLATION

 

1. Please destroy by burning all of the codes you have in your office, with the exception of one copy each of the codes being used in conjunction with the machine, the O code and the abbreviation code (L). (This includes other Ministries' codes which you may have in your office.)

2. Also in the case of the code machine itself, one set is to be destroyed[a].

3. Upon completing the above, transmit the one word HARUNA.

4. Use your discretion in disposing of all text of messages to and from your office, as well as other secret papers.

5. Destroy by burning all of the codes brought to your office by telegraphic courier Kosaka. (Consequently, you need not pursue the instructions contained in my message # 860[a], regarding getting in touch with Mexico.)

 


[a] It was not previously known that Washington had more than one code machine. However, the following would indicate they held at least two:

(a) Paragraph 2 directs "one set" (Hitokumi) be destroyed.

(b) Paragraph 1 directs retention of 1 set of machine code keys.

(c) On 3 December, the day after this "destruction" order, there was normal volume both ways in machine traffic.

[b] See IV, 431. See 435 for alternate translation.

 

Trans.  12‑3‑41

 

No. 435

 

FROM: Tokyo (Togo)                                                                          December 2, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   # 867.

 

CORRECTED TRANSLATION

 

Strictly secret.

 

1. Among the telegraphic codes with which your office is equipped burn all but those now used with the machine and one copy each of "O" code and abbreviating code (L). (Burn also the various other codes which you have in your custody.)

2. Stop at once using one code machine and destroy it completely.

3. When you have finished this, wire me back the one word "HARUNA".

4. At the time and in the manner you deem most proper dispose of all files of messages coming and going and all other secret documents.

5. Burn all the codes which Telegraphic Official KOSAKA brought you. (Hence, the neces­sity of getting in contact with Mexico mentioned in my # 860[a] is no longer recognized.)

 


[a] See IV, 431, in which Tokyo wires Washington advising them to have KOSAKA return to Japan on the Tatsuta Maru which sailed on the 28th. If this makes it impossible for KOSAKA to make his trip to Mexico, make some other arrangements with regard to KOSAKA's business in Mexico.

 

Trans.  12‑3‑41

Corrected 12‑4‑41

 

A-215

 

No. 436

 

FROM: Berne (Mitani)                                                                         December 2, 1941

TO: Ankara                                                                                          Tokyo Circular

                                                                                                            # 2447.

 

Orders have been issued to our diplomatic officials in North America (including Manila), Canada, Panama, Cuba, the South Seas (including Timore), Singora, Chienmai, and to all our officials in British (including our embassy in London) and Netherlands territory to inform me immediately upon the burning of all their telegraphic codes except one copy of O and "L".

Relay from Berlin to Lisbon, Helsinki, Budapest and Vienna; Relay from Rome to Bucha­rest, ‑‑‑‑‑; relay from Berne to Vichy, Ankara, Lisbon, Madrid; relay from Rio to Buenos Aires, Lima, Santiago, ‑‑‑‑‑, Mexico, Panama, Bogotá; relay from Bangkok to Hanoi, Saigon; relay from Canton to Haihow, ‑‑‑‑‑.

 

Trans.  12‑6‑41

 

No. 437

 

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     December 3, 1941

TO: ‑‑‑ (Circular)                                                                                 Circular # 2461.

Secret.

 

Please keep the code list (INGO HIKAE)[a] (Including those in connection with broadcasts) until the last moment, and if by any chance you have already destroyed them they will have to be re‑sent to you, so please notify us of this fact immediately.

This message is as a precaution.

 


[a] "Hidden Word" code to be used in plain Japanese language messages.

 

Trans. 12‑6‑41

 

No. 438

 

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     December 3, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   # 879.

 

Re # 1091[a] from Washington to Tokyo.

 

From Vice Finance Minister to Financial Attaché Nishiyama.

 

Handle the matter in the manner you suggest after so instructing the Specie Bank.

 


[a] See IV, 395.

 

                                                                                                      Trans.  12‑3‑41

 

No. 439

 

FROM: Tokyo                                                                                     December 3, 1941

TO: Washington                                                                                   # 874.

 

There are about fifty or sixty persons in Mexico who wish to return to Japan. We would like to have the Tatsuta Maru stop at Manzanillo or Acapulco en route from Los Angeles to

 

A-216

 

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR  

 

Balboa to pick these people up. Will you please request the State Department's permission to change the ship's schedule accordingly.

Even if the ship does stop in Mexico, we do not intend to have it take on any general cargo. This is merely for your information.

Relay this message to Mexico City.

 

Trans. 12‑3‑41

 

No. 440

 

FROM: Washington                                                                             December 3, 1941

TO: Tokyo                                                                                           # 1241.

 

Re your Circular # 2437[a].

 

It is not difficult to imagine that the employees who remain, both foreign and native, (the prospects are that few will return to Japan), will be placed in a difficult position both from the standpoint of the law, and socially, as potential enemies, in case of the unexpected happening. We feel especially sympathetic with those who have served for many years, and who have no prospects of finding other employment. Therefore, I feel that it would be rather too severe to carry out item 6 of your circular # 1347[b], and that it would be far better to treat them with the magnanimity b