THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
APPENDIX IV
(October 18, 1941-December 6, 1941)
PART A—HULL-NOMURA CONVERSATIONS
No. 1
FROM: Washington (Nomura) October 18, 1941
TO: Tokyo No Number.
Accept my congratulations on your appointment. Although I was instructed to carry out the policy of the former cabinet and endeavored to do my best, I was not able to do anything useful and naturally I have been keenly conscious of the responsibility. Since my appointment to this post, things have developed contrary to my wishes and, for this reason, I am deeply concerned. It should be fairly clear that I, with my limited ability, shall not be able to accomplish much in the future; I am afraid I shall be leading not only a useless existence but even a harmful one. Grateful for the kind encouragement which the former minister gave me, I would like to think over carefully what I should do; I would like also to return to Japan in the near future so that I may personally report the situation here to you and incidentally receive your instructions in all matters. Will you, therefore, give your approval at once. Inasmuch as both WAKASUGI and IGUCHI are men of ability and efficiency, there should be no objections to leaving matters in their hands after I have left.
Trans. 10-22-41
No. 2
FROM: Washington (Nomura) October 20, 1941
TO: Tokyo No Number.
(RETRANSLATION BASED ON COMPLETE INTERCEPT COPY)
Will Your Excellency please read this for your own information and then please transmit it to the Minister of the Navy.
My dear Mr. Minister:
Congratulations on your new appointment! When this humble Ambassador was appointed to his present post he asked for the fervent support of the whole Navy Department, but since I came to Washington I am sorry to say that there has been no cooperation between us. Furthermore, the Navy has not cooperated with the Foreign Office. The times do not permit of such lack of coordination. On the one hand the United States is faced by the European war and on the other hand by the Pacific problem, but still she has made no military move. I believe that there is a weak point here. Therefore, I had expected the United States to take a more less conciliatory attitude toward us as soon as the situation was favorable, but, contrary to my surmises, so far all America has done is to stick to her own national policy, and I am beginning to doubt if she can be reformed very much. I think that probably in the last analysis that is due to the fact that the United States has too many interests in China. My own desire has been to leave the China question out of the picture and work out some modus vivendi between our two countries. In my conversations with the Secretary of State I have shown this by my way of talking. However, the Secretary says that the China question is inseparably bound up with the stability of the Pacific. Some days ago I talked for an hour or more with HALIFAX. He said that the
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British Empire has a great interest in the Pacific problem and he would like to see some modus vivendi worked out between Japan and the United States to avoid a crisis. He said that he would like to talk with Secretary HULL about this. Since then, however, I have had no chance to talk with him. Well, before I came here I had talked with all the cabinet officials of that time and thought I thoroughly understood the position of the Government; however, since then there have been two administrative changes and now I am left floundering. I cannot tell you how much in the dark I am. I have talked along my own lines with the Secretary of State so often that, if we now explore the situation from a new angle, all my presence would do would be to confuse the situation and cause an unfavorable reaction. There is no doubt about this. That is why I wired the other day that I would like to come home. If you have anything which you want the Foreign Office to transmit to me, please be sure to let them know.
Trans. 10-22-41
No. 3
FROM: Washington (Nomura) October 22, 1941
TO: Tokyo No Number.
I have already wired you something about my present psychology. I am sure that I, too, should go out with the former cabinet. I know that for some time the Secretary of State has known how sincere your humble servant is, yet how little influence I have in Japan. I am ashamed to say that it has come to my ears that this is the case. There are some Americans who trust this poor novice and who say that things will get better for me, but, alas, their encouragement is not enough. Among my confreres here in the United States there are also some who feel the same way, but, alas, they are all poor deluded souls. As for Your Excellency's instructions, WAKASUGI can carry them out fully. Nor do I imagine that you all have any objections. I don't want to be the bones of a dead horse. I don't want to continue this hypocritical existence, deceiving other people. No, don't think I am trying to flee from the field of battle, but as a man of honor this is the only way that is open for me to tread. Please send me your permission to return to Japan. Most humbly do I beseech your forgiveness if I have injured your dignity and I prostrate myself before you in the depth of my rudeness.
Trans. 10-23-41
No. 4
FROM: Tokyo October 23, 1941
TO: Washington No Number.
From your message(s) I am advised of the various difficulties you are coping with and I wish to express to you that I appreciate the efforts you are making. As you are well aware, the outcome of those negotiations have a great bearing upon the decision as to which road the Imperial Government will pursue. As such, it is an exceedingly important matter. We are placing all of our reliance on Your Excellency's reports for our information on this matter.
For the above reasons, we express our hope that you will see fit to sacrifice all of your own personal wishes, and remain at your post.
Trans. 10-23-41
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THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
No. 5
FROM: Tokyo October 21, 1941
TO: Washington # 698.
Re your # 966 [a].
What you say is well justified. We should, of course, send you instructions immediately, but in view of the fact that the new cabinet was only just formed, they have been unavoidably delayed.
The new cabinet differs in no way from the former one in its sincere desire to adjust Japanese-United States relations on a fair basis. Our country has said practically all she can say in the way of expressing of opinions and setting forth our stands. We feel that we have now reached a point where no further positive action can be taken by us except to urge the United States to reconsider her views.
We urge, therefore, that choosing an opportune moment, either you or Wakasugi let it be known to the United States by indirection that our country is not in a position to spend much more time discussing this matter. Please continue the talks, emphasizing our desire for a formal United States counter-proposal to our proposal of 25 (?) September.
[a] See III, 284. Wakasugi-Welles-Hull talk on 17 Oct. in which there is an extensive rehash of arguments and counter arguments that have been repeatedly discussed before. Wakasugi continues to emphasize the impracticability of evacuating China, while Hull emphasizes non-discrimination in trade (i.e., the Open Door up-to-date).
Trans. 10-23-41
No. 6
FROM: Washington (Nomura) October 20, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 973.
Yesterday, the Sabbath day, _____[a] told me the following:
"Through Finland and Bulgaria, Germany is putting out peace feelers and she stands some chance of succeeding. She will probably embark on a peace offensive offering Great Britain generous terms. Now that Great Britain has taken Ethiopia, Syria and Iraq, the LLOYD GEORGE wing may listen to what HITLER has to say. As CHURCHILL's position for some time has been none too safe, ROOSEVELT is upholding the Prime Minister with might and main."
Not long ago the Secretary of State said to me, "Doubtless some 'QUISLINGS' will make their appearance in Great Britain. That's why the United States Government is supporting CHURCHILL so strongly."
Well, the trust of the English people in CHURCHILL seems to me rather real, so I do not put much belief in this story. However, the strange part of it is that _____[a] has always believed in a German defeat. Nevertheless, he came and told me this story, so it may be worth thinking about.
[a] DoD comment: Name withheld.
Trans. 10-21-41
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No. 7
FROM: Washington (Nomura) October 24, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 989.
Re your # 698 [a].
Today I am going to have WAKASUGI go and continue his talks with WELLES in a friendly fashion. However, the Chief of Staff has sent the Military Attaché some secret advice. Now, what I want to know is this: Is this the future policy of the Government? I feel sure that I will get some instructions from you today. However, as we have to continue our talks, for my private information let me know something about this immediately.
[a] See IV, 5.
Trans. 10-27-41
No. 8
FROM: Washington (Nomura) October 24, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 995.
(Part 1 of 4.)
Re your # 698 [a].
On the 24th from 2:30 p.m., WAKASUGI conferred with WELLES for an hour, and following the purport of your telegram, explained that our new cabinet was as anxious as the former cabinet for a just readjustment of our relations; that our desires have already been clearly stated; and that since, from what WAKASUGI himself could judge on the basis of what he saw and heard during his recent visit in Japan, circumstances there do not permit prolonging these conversations any longer, he—though not yet in receipt of detailed instructions—would like to see, without a day of further delay, some sort of conclusion reached. He then requested that the United States submit a counter-proposal to our proposal of September 25th. WELLES first expressed his pleasure of learning that the new cabinet intends to continue the discussion of this question and proceeded to say that recently men in responsible positions in Japan—for example, the Naval spokesman—had made such a war-like statement as "the Japanese Navy is 'itching for action' ", and that the ferocious attacks which the Japanese newspapers have been making on the United States had greatly provoked the American people both in and out of the government and are injurious to the continuation of discussions.
[a] See IV, 5.
Trans. 10-27-41
No. 9
FROM: Washington (Nomura) October 24, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 995.
(Part 2 of 4.)
WAKASUGI replied that there were not a few influential politicians in the United States as, for example, Senator PEPPER, who have severely criticized Japan; that especially the speech
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made today by Secretary of Navy KNOX to the effect that Japanese-American war is inevitable and the clash of the two countries is only a few days ahead and other war-like statements are quite provocative to the Japanese government as well as the people; and that in this respect the two countries are very much alike. To this, WELLES came back with the argument that the Naval Secretary's speech was not such a provocative one but the newspapers had played up certain parts of it; that as a man responsible for the United States Navy, which is the most powerful influence in the country, he occasionally indulges in strong words with the intention of encouraging the Navy; and that he would like WAKASUGI to realize that these speeches are nothing other than those made for such purposes. WELLES proceeded, saying, "As to the counter-proposal which you request of the United States, as I have repeated at the time of the previous conversation, the principles as well as the proposal of the American Government are clearly given in the proposal made on June 21. To be sure, one way of approaching a solution would be to adjust the wordings of that proposal to those of the proposal made by Japan.
Trans. 10-27-41
No. 10
FROM: Washington (Nomura) October 24, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 995.
(Part 3 of 4.)
"However, in the light of the experience of the informal discussions held during the past several months, to do no more than to consider each paragraph of the past formula would result in repetition of the same old arguments and, therefore, would not be conducive to progress. As I have pointed out during the previous conversation at which Secretary HULL was present, it might be well to try to reach an agreement on such general matters as the three important points which are comparatively easy of settlement; such a new formula may be a short-cut. However, if this is to be done, we had better take up at the beginning the question of equal treatment in commerce, a question which is comparatively easy of agreement by both countries (in reference to this point, WELLES asked if we had transmitted to our government what HULL had so strongly advocated during the previous conversation, and so WAKASUGI replied that he had communicated the matter in detail); and secondly, we should debate the question of Japan's duties to the Three-Power Alliance." He spoke as if there was a possibility of some adjustment also on the part of the United States with regard to this question. WELLES then suggested taking up the China question next. Thus, he made an entirely new proposal.
Trans. 10-27-41
No. 11
FROM: Washington (Nomura) October 24, 1941
TO: Tokyo #995.
(Part 4 of 4.)
WAKASUGI replied, saying, "Since I have not yet received detailed instructions from my government, I haven't the liberty to add anything today to the proposal of September 25, but I would like to have the United States authorities draw up a definite proposal with reference to the new approach you just suggested and submit it before we will have our next conversation. We, too, shall make a study of this point."
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Speaking on the request that frozen funds be released for the dispatching of the two tankers referred to during our previous conversation and the two ships of the NYK line at this time, WELLES said, "We at that time made immediate arrangements, and all procedures have been completed by the Treasury Department with regard to the three NYK ships; but in the matter of tankers, since the United States banking laws require strict investigations for the purpose of protecting bank depositors, once money has been transferred to an account with the Yokohama Specie Bank, it is impossible to release it, regardless of the fact that the money is in the form of cash or of a draft for transference of money to that bank. However, the State Department will offer as much assistance as possible if you wish to have drafts made so that they could be transferred through some American bank."
Trans. 10-27-41
No. 12
FROM: Tokyo October 25, 1941
TO: Washington # 709.
Re your # 989[a].
We are particularly anxious to get an idea of the extent to which the United States will agree with our final proposal. We are putting much expectation that this point will be clarified during the Wakasugi-Welles talks on the 25th.
With regard to the military general staff office's message, we obtained an explanation from it after we received your message. It seems that that message was an expression of the General Staff's hopes and the government in the meantime is going ahead with its studies to establish a basic national policy, embodying the results of the Japanese-United States negotiations.
My personal intentions are as I outlined in my message # 698[b] (those on which the army and navy concurred). Bearing these facts in mind, will you please urge the United States to voice its intentions. At the same time will you continue to make an effort to definitely ascertain the U. S. attitude with regard to our proposal. I am exceedingly anxious to receive your findings on these points.
[a] See IV, 7.
[b] See IV, 5.
Trans. 10-25-41
No. 13
FROM: Washington (Nomura) October 27, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1004.
Chief of Office Routing.
On the 25th, I met and talked with Admiral Pratt. The Admiral is one who recognizes the fact that in the final analysis, the aims of economic warfare and actual armed conflict are one and the same. He is of the opinion that as long as Japan stays within the scope of the China Incident, there will be no shooting war between Japan and the United States. He said, however, that if Japan moved either northward or southward, he feared the consequences. He added that the final decision rested in the Emperor and the President.
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Knox's speech, he went on, was exceedingly unfortunate. When he (the Admiral) writes for magazines or speaks on the radio, he always takes Japan into his calculations very carefully. After all, the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, as far as the President is concerned, is of course, Stark. The opinions of the two completely coincide. Unfortunately, however, Stark cannot be said to be a "strong" individual, Admiral Pratt said. Hart, on the other hand, although he has enemies within the Department, is a strong character.
He further reported that he had heard from other sources that the President is sincerely desirous of having a peaceful and stabilized Pacific. However, because he is advised by various people to pursue various courses of action, the Admiral could not guarantee that there would be no trouble on those waters.
Admiral Pratt went on to say that Harriman, who was sent to the Soviet Union, is a very capable person in whom every confidence could be placed. This man states that Stalin is not in a position to discuss peace and that without a doubt, Hitler is winning that battle. Concerning the project to attempt to have Italy enter into a separate peace, Pratt is of the opinion that such a peace would put Italy in the same disastrous position that France now occupies and for this reason he is inclined to doubt that Italy will consider it.
In the final analysis, the Admiral is of the opinion that the war will be a long drawn out affair, and that sooner or later, one side will become more fatigued than the other.
Thus, he expressed what probably is the most optimistic view to come from any authoritative American.
He went on to express his opinion that the Atlantic would be saved for Great Britain.
Japan should do everything to avoid impairing her might on the seas, so that she can take it with her to the eventual peace conference. It will be only with a strong navy to fall back on that Japan will have much say in those peace terms, he said.
Trans. 10-30-41
No. 14
FROM: Washington (Nomura) October 29, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1008.
(In 3 parts complete.)
From Minister Wakasugi.
U. S.-Japanese relations are now fast approaching a critical crossroad. In view of the fact that the times are indeed grave, I am waiving formality and, though it may seem very presumptuous of me, am reporting to you my views on the general attitude of the United States after coming in contact with its representatives on several occasions.
As you no doubt are well aware through the many other reports pertaining to this matter, the basic U. S. policy is the crushing of the so-called "Hitlerism", (establishing of a new order through the force of arms). Working from this principle, the United States is gradually strengthening its wartime structure. Britain and China have been set up as the first line of national defense. In this way, the United States has succeeded in steamrollering over the isolationist opposition and is forcing the government and the public alike to follow this policy.
The government has determined to gamble on a long term program. It is on those grounds that Hull has said on several occasions that though he yearns for the preservation of peace on the Pacific, on the other hand it will have to be based on agreements covering the entire Pacific area and not upon a patchwork of hit-or-miss local agreements. During my talks with him on the 24th, Welles said that the United States was not in special relations with her colonial holdings. The United States is a firm advocate of absolute non-discrimination and equal
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opportunities for all in the entire Pacific area, (including Japan, United States, Britain, China, Australia, Netherlands East Indies, etc.). Every nation will be offered opportunities equal to those existing between the home government and its colonies. For this reason, Welles pointed out on that occasion, this policy should be advantageous to Japan as well.
Judging from these factors, we assume that the United States based their demands for equal opportunities of access to the natural resources of French Indo-China and Thailand, as well as a guarantee that they will remain strictly neutral, upon their principle of non-discrimination. Apparently, they presume that we intend to develop this area under the principle of our military's co-prosperity sphere, in a monopolistic manner, and through the force of arms.
Thus, there has arisen a clash of ideologies.
The United States wants to tackle the China problem as merely one phase of the aforementioned "peace on the Pacific" issue. On the other hand, it should be recalled that Hull once said to the late Ambassador Saito that it was exceedingly doubtful that there should be war between Japan and the United States over merely the China problem. There are indications that the United States is still not anxious to fight Japan over only the China problem. However, it must be borne in mind that China is now relying solely on the United States. (It is said that T. V. Soong and others in the United States are working on the Treasury Department in particular and the United States is doing everything in its power to prevent the bringing about of a truce between Japan and the United States.) Since China is entirely dependent on the United States, the United States cannot turn a cold shoulder to her pleas. It is impossible for the United States to cruelly impose terms on China which would be almost impossible for the United States herself to endure. Welles used the above described excuse during our talks on the 24th. He went on to say, however, that the United States would not be unreasonable; she would not demand of Japan to carry out that which is immediately impossible. What his implications were when he said that are not clear, but possibly he may have been referring to some such tough problem as that of evacuating our forces (indications are that in spite of our repeated explanations concerning the garrisoning of troops in China, the above ambiguous statement may have been his camouflaged way of pointing out a means of carrying out a program of withdrawal of troops). I got the impression that he wanted to convey to me that the United States would not demand that it be carried out immediately.
In any event, it has become apparent that U. S.-Japanese relations have now become an integral phase of the national policy of the United States. There is every indication that the United States is anxious to adjust the relationship between the two nations as it has much bearing on her national policy. However, she is willing to come to terms only if the conditions suit her. She has set forth her stand in her proposals of 21 June and of 2 October. I am very doubtful that she will make any concessions therefrom.
Her preparations in the event of the worst have been completed. Therefore, I cannot believe that she is stalling for time. On the other hand, I am of the opinion that she is not so anxious to enter into the agreement that she will sacrifice any of her terms. Therefore, I do not believe that we should expect any further counter proposals from them. They have decided on a course of economic pressure plus watchful waiting.
Therefore, if we choose to good naturedly continue these talks, I am of the opinion that all is not hopeless. I feel that such a move will almost automatically open up ways of breaking down differences if we make the best use of world developments. However, if we depend on immediate settlement by settling local differences by insisting upon our freedom of action, we must have our minds made up that not only will these negotiations be terminated, but that our national relations will be severed.
The United States has expressed its interest in continuing with the talks after she has been advised of the attitude and policy of the newly formed Cabinet of Japan. I urge, therefore, that
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the new Cabinet establish its basic policy as speedily as possible, so that we may lay our cards on the table for them to see. I sincerely believe that that would be to our best interests.
Trans. 11-1-41
No. 15
FROM: Washington (Nomura) October 29, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1010.
(In 2 parts complete.)
Chief of Office routing.
I report the following points to you merely as reference material in connection with the adjusting of national relations.
1. Admiral a told Member of Parliament Kasai that the more influential Congressmen from the Middle West (where there are many Americans of German descent) state that the majority of the Middle Westerners are opposed to a war against Germany, but that at the same time, a great number of them favor a U. S.-Japanese war. This is due, in part, he said, to Germany's superior propaganda work. I have heard ______ [a] who is familiar with that area, express similar opinions.
2. Secretary Hull has told Congress that the U. S. Government looks upon the Tripartite Pact as an instrument to be used to intimidate the United States. Its aim is to make impossible the aiding of Great Britain by the United States and thus gradually to force the United States to give up the control of the seas and bring back the first line of U. S. defense to the U. S. shore line. The United States desires peace; however, it is a well established fact that there is a better chance to have peace if strength can be shown. If I (Hull) were to make too many concessions to the Axis powers, there is danger that they would be interpreted as weaknesses on my part and no doubt their demands would be increased. (This is particularly true in Tokyo.) There are indications, Hull continued, that the degree of enthusiasm in Tokyo to proceed on selfish courses, is determined to a considerable extent on how the German-Soviet war is going.
It is said that he went on to say that the situation was "very delicate and very changeable". (Reported in the New York Times, 28th.)
To me, Secretary Hull once said that the people of both Japan and the United States were proud peoples. For this reason, neither would easily succumb to bluffs of the other.
3. It is said that Assistant Secretary of State Breckenridge Long told a certain Japanese who called on him and set forth the many advantages of speedily entering into an understanding with Japan along the lines published in a newspaper as a Tokyo dispatch, that it would be impossible for the United States to get everything in order before 15 November.
4. On two different occasions recently, I met and talked with Lord Halifax. I tried to sound him out as to the British attitude with regard to a Japanese-U. S. understanding. I gather from these that, in accordance with the Churchill speech, Britain would string along with the United States. Lord Halifax said that Britain did not want trouble on the Pacific; that is true of the United States, too, he said, adding that he hoped that Japan would give the matter her thorough study from all angles and exercise the utmost of patience before doing anything.
He refused to enlarge upon the U. S. and British embargo policy in effect at present.
[a] Name withheld.
Trans. 11-5-41
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No. 16
FROM: Tokyo November 2, 1941
TO: Washington # 723.
(Part 1 of 2.)
Day before yesterday when I met the diplomatic corps, during the conversation I had with the American Ambassador, I said, "I am very sorry that Japanese‑American relations have lately been growing worse and worse. If this continues, I fear that unfortunate results will ensue. For six months negotiations have been dragging along and our people are growing impatient. Therefore, I hope that a speedy settlement will be reached. In this connection, I would like to ask your friendly cooperation." I added, "It is necessary for the United States, in order to arrive at a frank understanding, to relinquish its theoretical procedure and view the Oriental situation realistically. For example, when we come to the question of evacuation, there are other countries besides Japan who actually have occupation forces in China. Furthermore, although Outer Mongolia is considered a part of Chinese territory, the Soviet has a considerable force stationed there. The United States must realize these facts and understand our position." The Ambassador nodded to this and promised cooperation. He said that he would like for the parleys between the United States and Japan to proceed amicably.
Trans. 11‑8‑41
No. 17
FROM: Tokyo November 2, 1941
TO: Washington # 723.
(Part 2 of 2.)
On the 26th the British Ambassador came to see me on other business, and I said to him, "The attitude of the United States is entirely too theoretical, and if this continues there will be scant chance of a settlement. At the present time I am very much concerned over this. If the negotiations turn out to be a failure, I cannot tell but what a lamentable situation will occur. Now you English, who have such important interests in the Far East, would not like this. I think that England ought to endeavor to improve Japanese‑English‑American relations in order to reestablish and maintain the peace of the world." The Ambassador replied that he would transmit what I said immediately to London. I saw him again (yesterday?) and endeavored to impart to him the impression that the situation is waxing more and more acute and will not permit of procrastination.
Sent also to London.
Trans. 11‑3‑41
No. 18
FROM: Tokyo November 1, 1941
TO: Washington # 721.
Please advise this office what actual relationship exists at present between the original contents of the U. S. proposal of 21 June and the following points:
The matter pertaining to the exchanging of the official texts which was put into the 21 June proposal as a footnote to Section 2 thereof, (that part concerning the attitude of the respective
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THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
nations to the European war); and the three questions which were submitted concerning the United States' proposal of non‑discrimination in trade, a subject which was put in as a supplement to Section 3, (concerning peace between China and Japan), of the 21 June proposal.
According to your message # 424 [a], you told Secretary Hull on 22 June that you could not deliver the official note to the home government. Moreover, there seem to be indications that the U. S. Government is beginning to understand our viewpoint with regard to the matter of the right of self‑defense.
In view of these facts, may we assume that the matter of exchanging of official notes has been dropped by the United States? We must have this information to discuss this whole matter in a business‑like manner, so please advise us immediately, although it may seem like bringing up old issues.
[a] See II, 79. Amb. Nomura wires Tokyo that in an interview with Secy. Hull, Hull made the statement that there seem to be influential people in Japan who do not desire an understanding with the U. S. so, after all, does Japan consider the composure of relations between the two countries so important. Nomura replies that such concessions as the U. S. has so far offered are not worthy of consideration.
Trans. 11‑7‑41
No. 19
FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 3, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1025.
Re your # 721 [a].
1. As you mentioned in your message, it is true that I refused to relay the text of the exchanged notes. They have stuck firmly to their original stand and consequently the two proposals have remained at odds with each other.
2. The questions regarding the three items were made with reference to the 21 June proposal. They are still, as before, awaiting our definite reply.
[a] See IV, 18.
Trans. 11‑7‑41
No. 20
FROM: Tokyo (Togo) November 2, 1941
TO: Washington # 722.
The government has for a number of days since the forming of the new Cabinet been holding meetings with the Imperial Headquarters. We have carefully considered a fundamental policy for improving relations between Japan and America, but we expect to reach a final decision in a meeting on the morning of the 5th and will let you know the result at once. This will be our Government's last effort to improve diplomatic relations. The situation is very grave. When we resume negotiations, the situation makes it urgent that we reach a decision at once. This is at present only for your information. When we take up these negotiations once more, we trust you can handle everything with the greatest of care.
Trans. 11‑3‑41
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No. 21
FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 3, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1021.
I plan to see Hull in two or three days. If possible I would like to be advised of the Cabinet's definite policy before then. If this is impossible while you please advise me of the points I should bear in mind while talking to the Secretary.
Trans. 11‑5‑41
No. 22
FROM: Tokyo November 4, 1941
TO: Washington # 725.
(Urgent.)
(Part 1 of 3.)
Concerning my # 722 [a].
1. Well, relations between Japan and the United States have reached the edge, and our people are losing confidence in the possibility of ever adjusting them. In order to lucubrate on a fundamental national policy, the Cabinet has been meeting with the Imperial Headquarters for some days in succession. Conference has followed conference, and now we are at length able to bring forth a counter proposal for the resumption of Japanese‑American negotiations based upon the unanimous opinion of the government and the military High Command (ensuing Nos. 726 [b] and 727 [b]). This and other basic policies of our Empire await the sanction of the conference to be held on the morning of the 5th.
2. Conditions both within and without our Empire are so tense that no longer is procrastination possible, yet in our sincerity to maintain pacific relationships between the Empire of Japan and the United States of America, we have decided, as a result of these deliberations, to gamble once more on the continuance of the parleys, but this is our last effort. Both in name and spirit this counter‑proposal of ours is, indeed, the last. I want you to know that. If through it we do not reach a quick accord, I am sorry to say the talks will certainly be ruptured. Then, indeed, will relations between our two nations be on the brink of chaos. I mean that the success or failure of the pending discussions will have an immense effect on the destiny of the Empire of Japan. In fact, we gambled the fate of our land on the throw of this die.
[a] See IV, 20.
[b] See IV, 25 and IV, 29.
Trans. 11‑4‑41
No. 23
FROM: Tokyo November 4, 1941
TO: Washington # 725.
(Urgent.)
(Part 2 of 3.)
When the Japanese‑American meetings began who would have ever dreamt that they would drag out so long? Hoping that we could fast come to some understanding, we have already gone
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THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
far out of our way and yielded and yielded. The United States does not appreciate this, but through thick and thin sticks to the self‑same propositions she made to start with. Those of our people and of our officials who suspect the sincerity of the Americans are far from few. Bearing all kinds of humiliating things, our government has repeatedly stated its sincerity and gone far, yes, too far, in giving in to them. There is just one reason why we do this—to maintain peace in the Pacific. There seem to be some Americans who think we would make a one‑sided deal, but our temperance, I can tell you, has not come from weakness, and naturally there is an end to our long‑suffering. Nay, when it comes to a question of our existence and our honor, when the time comes we will defend them without reckoning the cost. If the United States takes an attitude that overlooks or shuns this position of ours, there is not a whit of use in ever broaching the talks. This time we are showing the limit of our friendship; this time we are making our last possible bargain, and I hope that we can thus settle all our troubles with the United States peaceably.
Trans. 11‑4‑41
No. 24
FROM: Tokyo November 4, 1941
TO: Washington # 725.
(Urgent.)
(Part 3 of 3.)
3. It is to be hoped earnestly that looking forward to what may come at the end—at the last day of Japanese‑American negotiations—the government of the United States will think ever so soberly how much better it would be to make peace with us; how much better this would be for the whole world situation.
4. Your Honor will see from the considerations about how important is your mission. You are at a key post, and we place great hopes in your being able to do something good for our nation's destiny. Will you please think deeply on that and compose yourself and make up your mind to continue to do your best. I hope you will. Now just as soon as the conference is over, I will let you know immediately, and I want you to go and talk to President ROOSEVELT and Secretary HULL. I want you to tell them how determined we are and try to get them to foster a speedy understanding.
5. In view of the gravity of these talks, as you make contacts there, so I will make them here. I will talk to the American Ambassador here in Tokyo, as soon as you have got the consensus of the American officials through talking with them, please wire me. Naturally, as these things develop, in case you take any new steps, I want you to let me know and get in contact with me. In this way we will avoid letting anything go astray. Furthermore, lest anything go awry, I want you to follow my instructions to the letter. In my instructions, I want you to know there will be no room for personal interpretation.
Trans. 11‑4‑41
A-13
No. 25
FROM: Tokyo November 4, 1941
TO: Washington # 726.
(Urgent.)
(Part 1 of 4.)
Proposal "A".
1. This proposal is our revised final proposal made as a result of our attempts to meet, in so far as possible, the wishes of the Americans, clarified as a result of negotiations based on our proposals of September 25. We have toned down our insistences as follows:
(1) The question of non‑discrimination in trade.
Should they appear not to accede to our proposal of September 25 in this respect, insert the following statement, "The Japanese Government is prepared to carry out this principle in the entire Pacific area; that is to say, China as well, providing the principles of non‑discrimination are applied to the entire world."
(2) The question of our understanding and application of the Tripartite Alliance.
At the same time that you clarify to them that we intend no explanation of our sphere of self defense, make clear, as has been repeatedly explained in the past, that we desire to avoid the expansion of Europe's war into the Pacific.
Trans. 11‑4‑41
No. 26
FROM: Tokyo November 4, 1941
TO: Washington # 726.
(Urgent.)
(Part 2 of 4.)
(3) The question concerning the evacuation of troops.
We are toning down our stipulations in this connection as follows:
(A) The stationing and evacuation of troops in China since the outbreak of the China Incident.
Japanese troops which have been sent to China will be stationed in North China, on the Mongolian border regions, and on the Island of Hainan after the establishment of peace between Japan and China, and will not be evacuated until the elapse of a suitable interval. The evacuation of other troops will be carried out by Japan and China at the same time that peace is established. In order to maintain peace and order, this will be carried out within a period of two years. (Note: Should the American authorities question you in regard to "the suitable period", answer vaguely that such a period should encompass 25 years.)
(B) The stationing and evacuation of troops in French Indo‑China.
The Japanese Government respects the territorial integrity of the French possession, Indo-China. In the event that a just peace is established, or that the China Incident is brought to a successful conclusion, Japanese troops which have been dispatched to French Indo‑China and are there now shall be evacuated.
(4) As a matter of principle, we are anxious to avoid having this inserted in the draft of the formal proposal reached between Japan and the United States (whether it is called an understanding proposal or some sort of a statement.)
Trans. 11‑4‑41
A-14
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
No. 27
FROM: Tokyo November 4, 1941
TO: Washington # 726.
(Urgent.)
(Part 3 of 4.)
2. Explanation.
(1) Of course, there is the question of geographical proximity when we come to consider nondiscrimination in commerce. However, we have revised our demands along this line hitherto and put the question of non‑discrimination on a world‑wide basis. In a memorandum of the American Government, they state in effect, however, that it might be feasible for either country within a certain specified area to adopt a given policy and for the other party within another specified area to adopt a given policy and for the other party within another specified area to adopt a complementary policy. Judging from this statement, I do not believe they will oppose this term. I think that we can easily reach an understanding on this matter.
(2) As for the question of the Three‑Power Pact, your various messages lead me to believe that the United States is, in general, satisfied with our proposals, so if we make our position even more clear by saying that we will not randomly enlarge upon our interpretation of the right of self‑defense, I feel sure that we will soon be mutually agreed on this point.
Trans. 11‑4‑41
No. 28
FROM: Tokyo November 4, 1941
TO: Washington # 726.
(Urgent.)
(Part 4 of 4.)
(3) I think that in all probability the question of evacuation will be the hardest. However, in view of the fact that the United States is so much opposed to our stationing soldiers in undefined areas, our purpose is to shift the regions of occupation and our officials, thus attempting to dispel their suspicions. We will call it evacuation; but although it would please the United States for us to make occupation the exception rather than the rule, in the last analysis this would be out of the question. Furthermore, on the matter of duration of occupation, whenever pressed to give a clear statement we have hitherto couched our answers in vague terms. I want you in as indecisive yet as pleasant language as possible to euphemize and try to impart to them the effect that unlimited occupation does not mean perpetual occupation. Summing this up, Proposal A; accepts completely America's demands on two of the three proposals mentioned in the other proposal, but when it comes to the last point concerning the stationing and evacuation of forces, we have already made our last possible concession. How hard, indeed, we have fought in China for four years! What tremendous sacrifices we have made! They must know this, so their demands in this connection must have been only "wishful thinking." In any case, our internal situation also makes it impossible for us to make any further compromise in this connection. As best you may, please endeavor to have the United States understand this, and I earnestly hope and pray that you can quickly bring about an understanding.
Trans. 11‑4‑41
A-15
No. 29
FROM: Tokyo November 4, 1941
TO: Washington # 727.
(Urgent.)
1. Proposal "B".
This proposal is based upon proposal "A". If there appears to be a remarkable difference between the Japanese and American views, since the situation does not permit of delays, it will be necessary to put forward some substitute plan. Therefore, our second formula is advanced with the idea of making a last effort to prevent something happening. The substance is as follows:
(1) The Governments of Japan and the United States agree that neither will militarily invade any area in Southeast Asia and the South Seas with the exception of French Indo-China.
(2) The Governments of Japan and the United States will cooperate mutually in guaranteeing the obtention of the materials they need in the Netherlands Indies.
(3) The Governments of Japan and the United States will mutually return to the situation prior to the freezing of their respective assets and the government of the United States will agree to furnish Japan with the petroleum she needs.
(4) The Government of the United States will engage in no activity which might put an obstacle in the way of Japan in her efforts to make peace with China.
Addendum:
(1) If necessary, upon the establishment of this understanding, as soon as peace is established between Japan and China, or as soon as a just peace is made in the Pacific area, Japan has no objection to promising to evacuate her troops.
(2) If necessary, we will insert an additional stipulation concerning the interpretation and carrying out of the Three‑Power Pact and the question of non‑discrimination in commerce which were referred to in proposal "A" in my # 726 [a].
[a] See IV, 25.
Trans. 11‑4‑41
No. 30
FROM: Tokyo November 4, 1941
TO: Washington # 730.
Re my # 725 [a]
In view of the gravity of the present negotiations and in view of your request on instructions from me, Ambassador KURUSU is leaving ‑‑‑‑‑ on the 7th by clipper to assist you. He will be your right‑hand man in these parleys. He is carrying with him no additional instructions, so in order to prepare him for the talks, will you please tell him all, and I hope that you can, by all means, arrange for an interview between him and President ROOSEVELT.
By the way, will you please be sure to keep Ambassador KURUSU's activities strictly secret.
[a] See IV, 22.
Trans. 11‑4‑41
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THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
No. 31
FROM: Tokyo November 5, 1941
TO: Washington # 734.
Ambassador KURUSU accompanied by Secretary YUKI left the 5th for Shanghai (?).
Trans. 11‑5‑41
No. 32
FROM: Tokyo November 6, 1941
TO: Washington #739.
(Urgent.)
Re my # 730 [a].
The reason why we are sending Ambassador KURUSU to you so quickly is, in addition to what I have already wired you, to show our Empire's sincerity in the negotiations soon to follow. As I wired you before, he brings with him no new instructions in addition to the ones I have already sent you. I wish him, however, to communicate to you at first hand as best he may, the exact situation here in Japan, and now that we are on the last lap of these negotiations, I do hope that he can help you in unraveling this bewildering maze and through cooperation lead to a solution, and that right soon. To make it sound good, we are telling the public that he is coming to help you quickly compose the unhappy relations between the two nations. We have explained all this fully to the British and American Ambassadors here in Tokyo, and Ambassador KURUSU himself had a heart‑to‑heart talk with the American Ambassador before he left, and both Ambassadors fully understand why he is making the trip.
The officials of both the Army and the Navy are pleased with the special dispatch of the Ambassador and are very grateful for the trouble he is taking. After you read this, please go and tell the American officials concerned and wire me back their reply.
[a] See IV, 30.
Trans. 11‑6‑41
No. 33
FROM: Tokyo November 4, 1941
TO: Washington # 731.
(Urgent.)
Re my # 725 [a].
In these negotiations, Great Britain also is an actively interested party and has vast interests in the Far East. Therefore, in order to carry out this proposal (both Proposal A and Proposal B), it would certainly behoove Great Britain and, for that matter, the Netherlands also, as interested parties, to put into effect the terms of the understanding in question. If we should proceed without any definite assurances on this point and reach an accord with Washington alone, it might very well be that it would never work.
A-17
Consequently, I want you please to impress upon the American officials the importance of this essential measure and have them agree to make Great Britain and the Netherlands both simultaneously sign those terms in which they are concerned. Please wire me the results.
[a] See IV, 22‑24.
Trans. 11‑4‑41
No. 34
FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 5, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1042.
(Strictly confidential, to be handled in government code.)
Re your # 731[a].
Just what is meant by Britain's and the Dutch East Indies' relation to the above understanding? As I understand it they are to sign the document at the same time America does. But just what is meant by this? What items are included?
Again what is meant by joint signature? Will the four countries sign the same document or will separate documents be prepared for the British and the Dutch and the four countries sign these? Or will the several countries exchange official documents? Please wire by return dispatch for my information.
[a] See IV, 33.
Trans. 11‑7‑41
No. 35
FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 4, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1036.
(Extremely Urgent.)
Secret.
Re your # 725 [a].
Naturally I, too, am hurrying to make English translations of Proposals A and B, but remember what you said in paragraph 5. I do not wish any variant words or other discrepancies to occur between the English text you hand Ambassador GREW and the one I make. So please send me yours at the earliest possible moment.
[a] See IV, 22‑24.
Trans. 11‑6‑41
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THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
No. 36
FROM: Washington November 5, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1036.
(Foreign Office Secret.)
Re your # 725 [a].
We will, of course, make English translations of the texts of both Proposals A and B. However, in view of the contents of paragraph (5) of your message and to avoid our using words and phrases which conflict with the English texts you submit to Ambassador Grew, please send us your English translations immediately.
[a] See IV, 22‑24.
Trans. 11‑10‑41
No. 37
FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 5, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1044.
Foreign Office secret.
Rushed.
(English Text)
The Japanese Government recognizes the principles of non‑discrimination in international commercial relations to be applied to all the Pacific areas, inclusive of China, provided that the principle in question is to be applied uniformly to the rest of the entire world as well.
Trans. 11‑8‑41
No. 38
FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 5, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1045.
(Chief of Office routing.)
With regard to term "Self‑defense" the Japanese government desires to make it clear that it has no intention of placing too liberal and interpretation on the term that will lead to an abuse of that right.
Trans. 11‑10‑41
No. 39
FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 5, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1046.
(Chief of Office routing.)
A. Stationing of Japanese forces in China and the withdrawal thereof:
With regard to the Japanese forces that have been dispatched to China in connection with the China affair, those forces in certain areas in North China and Mongolia (Inner Mongolia) as
A-19
well as in Hainan-Tao (Hainan Island) will remain to be stationed for a certain necessary period of time after the restoration of peaceful relations between Japan and China. All the rest of such forces will commence withdrawal as soon as peace is restored between Japan and China, and the withdrawal will proceed according to separate arrangements between Japan and China and will be completed within two years after effective maintenance of peace and order is re-established.
Trans. 11-10-41
No. 40
FROM: Tokyo 5 November 1941
TO: Washington # 732.
Re my # 725 [a].
If and when an agreement is reached on the basis of our latest proposal we would prefer that it not be written up in the form of a treaty. Ratification of the Senate is required for a treaty, and we fear that too much time would be consumed obtaining this. From the viewpoint of speed and certainty, we would like to avoid having to follow this course. From the gist of the U. S. proposals, we feel that the U. S. Government is also desirous of not having to await Senate ratification.
We have been lead to believe that it is the U. S. Government's intention to use this instrument as a basis for some future treaty, and that it would be classified as one type of an "Executive Agreement" as the President is authorized to do. We have been proceeding in the past on this assumption. (Please refer to page (3 ?) 1, Volume 2, of Hyde's International Law Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied by the United States.) Will you please ascertain the U. S. attitude on this point.
In any event, it is of utmost importance that an agreement be entered into along the lines given in the message referred to in the heading at the earliest possible moment. Under present conditions, speed is an absolutely essential factor.
[a] See IV, 22-24.
Trans. 11-5-41
No. 41
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 5 November 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1041.
Re your # 732 [a].
From various considerations, the United States also would not care to put the documents confirming these negotiations in the form of a treaty to be submitted to the Senate for the constitutional majority (two-thirds) approval. The reasons for this are, as Hamilton and others have made clear, that in the course of the negotiations thus far, the United States government has left the matter of mutual understandings between the two countries and arrangements concerning statements of policies as being legally within the jurisdiction of the President to handle, by "executive agreement". Article One of the preamble to the U. S. note of 21 June contains the expression "general agreement of understanding as expressed in a joint declar-
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THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
ation" etc. Also in the latter part of the same note the same intent is set forth in the words "mutual understanding and declaration of policy".
Of course the present situation is different from that involved in past agreements of this kind, and they emphasize that from the standpoint of the U. S. government and domestic politics, it would be difficult to keep the matter secret very long, as I have stated in successive messages.
[a] See IV, 40.
Trans. 11-12-41
No. 42
FROM: Tokyo 5 November 1941
TO: Washington # 735.
1. Our counter proposal in the Japanese-U. S. negotiations referred to in my message #725 [a] was taken up at the Imperial Conference on this, the 5th, and was given approval. Therefore, will you please begin the talks along the lines given in my instructions.
2. We assume that it would meet with the U. S. approval, in view of past developments, if, for the time being, the 21 June proposal—25 September's from our point of view—was used as a basis of these new talks. Subsequently, we feel that from the standpoint of the likelihood of reaching an early agreement, our Proposal A (contained in my message #726 [b]) should be submitted for discussion. (As a matter of fact, there are a number of points in the form and in the expressions used in the U. S. proposal which do not meet with our complete approval. However, we feel that for convenience and speed's sake, Proposal A should be submitted first.) Please, therefore, explain these points to the United States and at the same time have them clearly understand the circumstances contained in my message #725 [a]. Thereupon, do your utmost to have them accept that proposal in the shortest possible time.
3. If the United States expresses too many points of disapproval to Proposal A and if it becomes apparent that an agreement cannot be reached, we intend to submit our absolutely final proposal, Proposal B (contained in my message #727 [c]). Please, therefore, ascertain the U. S. attitude to Proposal A as soon as possible, and advise this office. Be sure to advise this office before Proposal B is submitted to the United States.
4. As stated in my previous message, this is the Imperial Government's final step. Time is becoming exceedingly short and the situation very critical. Absolutely no delays can be permitted. Please bear this in mind and do your best. I wish to stress this point over and over.
5. We wish to avoid giving them the impression that there is a time limit or that this proposal is to be taken as an ultimatum. In a friendly manner, show them that we are very anxious to have them accept our proposal.
Although a "1" was placed at the beginning of the body of my message #727 [c], there was no need for it, so please delete it.
[a] See IV, 22-24.
[b] See IV, 25.
[c] See IV, 29.
Trans. 11-5-41
A-21
No. 43
FROM: Tokyo 6 November 1941
TO: Washington #740.
Re your # 1025 [a].
Through Your Honor's continuous efforts, gradually both the Japanese and American insistences centering around the question of self-defense in connection with the Tripartite Treaty have become clear. Now we might say that there exists almost no division between our respective views. At any rate, we have been taking it for granted that this is the case for some time. Our proposal of September 25, which is a counter-proposal to the American Proposal of June 21, makes no reference to any exchange of notes, which means that we are refusing to consider such an exchange. We are taking it for granted that the United States, too, is eliminating this as a matter of course from the negotiations, and we are continuing the negotiations on the assumption that there will be no such exchange of notes. If, by any misadventure, the United States should say that they will not leave out the proposal for exchange of notes, it will be utterly and absolutely impossible for us to agree, so when you negotiate, please be fully aware of this.
[a] See IV, 19.
Trans. 11-6-41
No. 44
FROM: Tokyo 5 November 1941
TO: Washington # 736.
(Of utmost secrecy.)
Because of various circumstances, it is absolutely necessary that all arrangements for the signing of-this agreement be completed by the 25th of this month. I realize that this is a difficult order, but under the circumstances it is an unavoidable one. Please understand this thoroughly and tackle the problem of saving the Japanese-U. S. relations from falling into a chaotic condition. Do so with great determination and with unstinted effort, I beg of you.
This information is to be kept strictly to yourself only.
Trans. 11-5-41
No. 45
FROM: Washington 5 November 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1037.
I have received all of your messages of instructions, and after giving the matter my very careful consideration, I have decided to continue to put forth my best efforts, however feeble they may be. I, therefore, made arrangements immediately on this, the 5th, to meet with President Roosevelt through Hull. (I shall advise you the date and time of this interview as soon as it is made definite.) I am of the opinion that it would be to our advantage to keep this meeting as secret as possible. I would appreciate being advised of the Foreign Office's view on
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THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
this point as soon as possible. If you believe that it would be better if this were made an official interview, please advise me as to the manner in which it should be announced to the public.
Trans. 11-10-41
No. 46
FROM: Tokyo 6 November 1941
TO: Washington # 741.
Re your # 1037 [a].
The matter of Your Honor's interviewing the President is delicate in the extreme, and if the newspapers speculate on the import of it, the effect would doubtless be most regrettable. Therefore, if possible, I think we should avoid letting the press get wind of the substance of the interview or even the fact of the interview. If the American officials will agree with this, naturally we, too, will observe the same secrecy.
Carrying this idea still further, in all your subsequent contacts with American officials I would like for you to do your utmost to maintain the same secrecy and avoidance of publicity.
[a] See IV, 45.
Trans. 11-6-41
No. 47
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 5 November 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1040.
Re your # 735, paragraph 5 [a].
On the 5th, reports from Tokyo were played up by the newspapers here to the effect that Domei, the mouthpiece of the Japanese Government and the Times-Advertiser, the mouthpiece of the Foreign Office, were declaring that the 15th had been set as the "deadline" for the negotiations and were giving a list of the Japanese demands, (seven was given as the number).
While I recognize that the above may be considered as well intentioned efforts on our part to lead to a favorable reception of the negotiations still the above reports are directly opposed to the interest of your caption telegram. As you are well aware in view of the present delicate situation such reports will have the effect of alienating American public opinions or causing it to become actively opposed to Japan.
There is danger that America will see through our condition. If we have really made up our minds to a final course of action it would be the part of wisdom to keep still about it. I realize that the internal situation is causing you no end of worry, however I feel that in view of the present grave situation still further guidance should be given to the newspapers.
[a] See IV, 42.
Trans. 11-7-41
A-23
No. 48
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 6 November 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1051.
In the present delicate state of Japan-American relations the local press is becoming more and more excited over the dispatch of KURUSU, etc. From now on all kinds of articles and editorials based on conjecture will continually be appearing. Although I have been very careful in my contacts with the local and foreign press, on account of the rivalry between the different newspapers, spontaneous conjectures and reports are published.
Moreover these articles in English-language newspapers may be sent just as they are to Japan where I fear they would have an unforeseen influence on our already tense population. Considering the seriousness of the situation please prevent the publication of such writings for the time being in the interest of better Japan-American relations, and, keeping a strict control, follow the most prudent policy.
Trans. 11-10-41
No. 50
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 6 November 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1050.
(Urgent.)
(Secret.)
At nine tomorrow morning, (Friday, the 7th), I will go with WAKASUGI for the secret meeting with Secretary HULL, at which time I will ask for an audience with the President. Just this for the present.
Trans. 11-10-41
No. 51
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 7 November 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1052.
Re your # 743 [a].
We assume that that part which reads "provided....", etc. at the end of paragraph 2 of your message referred to above, refers to the "non-discrimination" matter contained in paragraph one of that message and not to the matter concerning the stationing of troops. Please advise us definitely on this point, together with the text in the form you wish to have it in.
[a] Not available.
Trans. 11-12-41
A-24
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
No. 52
FROM: Washington 7 November 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1054.
Re my #10--.
I met and talked with Secretary Hull at 0930 on the 7th, and I explained our new proposal to him in accordance with your instructions. I requested that it be given consideration by the United States and at the same time I expressed my desire to meet with the President at the earliest possible moment. Hull promised to give them his consideration.
With regard to the matter of non-discrimination in trade, Hull showed indications of being satisfied. He did not indicate either approval or disapproval of the matters pertaining to rights of self-defense and of withdrawal of our troops.
The interview lasted approximately one hour.
This message dispatched at 1330.
Trans. 11-10-41
No. 53
FROM: Washington 7 November 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1055.
(Part 1 of 3.)
At 0900 on this, the 7th, I, accompanied by Wakasugi, called on Secretary Hull at his home. (Ballantine was also present.)
I said that I had been instructed by my home government to explain to the President and to the Secretary of State, Japan's attitude and position in the hopes of bringing about immediate settlement of the various problems involved in the relationship between Japan and the United States.
In way of replying to this, Hull said that at present there were two political factions in this world which were at odds with each other and which were, consequently, embroiled in an armed conflict. Neither faction is able to decide the outcome speedily and hence there is a danger that they will be gradually thrown into the chaos of anarchism.
If, at a time like this, the United States and Japan simultaneously hit upon a method of maintaining peace on the Pacific, it is quite possible that the world may be saved from the apparently imminent chaos.
I, therefore, said, in accordance with your various instructions, that:
1. Of the three outstanding problems, agreements have been practically reached on two. With regard to the matter of garrisoning or withdrawing troops, Japan is prepared to make the maximum concessions which can be permitted by the domestic political conditions of Japan.
2. From the viewpoint of U. S.-Japanese friendship in its broad sense, the U. S. Government should take a philosophic attitude concerning present conditions, I said, and I urged that the United States cooperate in bringing about a speedy settlement on that assumption.
Trans. 11-10-41
A-25
No. 54
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 7 November 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1055.
(Part 2 of 3.)
.... (I pointed out that):
3. I have been instructed by my home government to fully explain Japan's determination and Japan's position to the President and the Secretary of State, and through such understandings to reach settlements as soon as possible.
4. After six months of negotiations, the people of Japan are getting a little impatient and that hence the situation there is becoming exceedingly critical. For this reason, we are very anxious that these negotiations are brought to a successful conclusion as soon as possible.
5. In view of the very critical situation parallel negotiations in Tokyo are to be conducted.
Explaining that Japan is now displaying the maximum amount of good will and the utmost of sincerity, I submitted the counter proposal which you sent us, to them. I requested that the United States give it her consideration from the broad aspect, and urged them to accept the terms contained therein.
Hull carefully read this document. He nodded approval of the section concerning the principle of non-discrimination, and commented that that way would prove to be to Japan's interest. With regard to the section of garrisoning troops, he simply asked what would be the proportion of those remaining to those being withdrawn. I replied that such of the greater part would be withdrawn and only a small portion would be kept in China. I went on to explain our position with regard to the "right of self-defense" issue, in accordance with your instruction which I received today.
It was decided that an answer to all of the points would be submitted after this note had been carefully studied by them. They will submit their reply after my interview with the President, at which time I shall endeavor to make a more detailed explanation.
Trans. 11-12-41
No. 55
FROM: Washington 7 November 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1055.
(Part 3 of 3.)
Hull went on to say that as he had said on previous occasions, Britain, China, the Netherlands and other countries had to be consulted regarding Japanese-U. S. talks of maintaining peace on the Pacific. He let it leak out in this connection that China was being consulted with regard to matter pertaining to the China problems.
Hull then said that he had happened to wonder what Japan's attitude would be if there were the following developments: Supposing an influential and reliable representative of China were to join in these talks. Supposing, further, that this representative states that China is desirous of resuming friendly relations with Japan, giving his pledge of true friendship and sincerity. What would Japan's reaction be?
Wakasugi asked whether he could assume first, that China's attitude had been ascertained. Hull replied that the matter hadn't been taken up with China as yet, and that it was just something that he as an individual had happened to think of. If such a thing could be done, however, he continued, peace on the Pacific would be maintained, and no doubt it would set an example for the world and thus have a very favorable effect on it.
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THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
We got the impression that he may have already discussed this matter with the Chinese and that his plan was a consequence thereof. In either event, Hull requested that this plan be struck upon, be relayed to the government of Japan and its attitude on it be ascertained. I said that I would give it my consideration.
Trans. 11-10-41
No. 56
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 7 November 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1056.
Please make the following corrections to part 3 of 3 of my message # 1055 [a].
In the first part, please insert "for the purpose of conducting official negotiations" following that part which reads "negotiations between the United States and Japan".
In the middle part, change the phrase reading "an influential representative" of China, to "the person of highest influence and integrity" and delete reading "participate in these negotiations".
[a] See IV, 53.
Trans. 11-12-41
No. 57
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 8 November 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1061.
On the 7th, when I called on Secretary HULL, he handed me the memorandum given in my # 1062 [a] concerning the incident in which American missionaries were imprisoned in Harbin. Calling my attention to the fact that the American authorities had allowed three Japanese Naval officers to return home, the Secretary complained that it was hard for him to understand why American missionaries have been accorded such stern and unreasonable treatment. Therefore, I replied that although this matter is one in which Manchurian officials were involved and is unrelated to Japan, I would transmit the complaint to Tokyo since the question had been brought to my attention. Will you get in touch with the Manchurian authorities and take suitable steps and then wire me the results?
[a] Not available.
Trans. 11-12-41
No. 58
FROM: Tokyo 8 November 1941
TO: Washington # 747.
Re your # 1054 [a].
You say you explained our rights of self-defense. I believe I elaborate on this matter in my # 742 [b]. If this message was delayed and did not reach you in time, please be sure to take measures to fit the instructions in my # 742 [b] into your explanations.
[a] See IV, 52, in which NOMURA says that he explained the new proposal to Secretary HULL.
[b] Not available.
Trans. 11-12-41
A-27
No. 59
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 8 November 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1060.
As the work for the adjustment of Japanese-American relations continues, we may expect frequent exchange in the future of urgent telegraphic messages. I would like to report to you the following for your consideration in arranging business in this connection. We may expect, with the crisis so near at hand, that we shall be facing questions which must be dealt with with no loss of time, and so I would appreciate the Foreign Office fully cooperating with us at this time.
My # 1036 [a], in which I sought your instructions, was sent at 9:56 P.M. on the 5th. I believe it reached you on the afternoon of the 6th, Tokyo time. Your reply to it; namely your # 743 [b], was sent at 7:34 P.M. on the 7th, Tokyo time, and was received here at 8:20 A.M., Washington time. However, since my appointment with Secretary HULL was, as I have previously reported, to have been at 9:00 A.M., there was but forty minutes allowed us for decoding and revising the code with all hands working together, and, consequently, we could get the message read only by considerably postponing the hour of the appointment. I would like to have messages of this nature sent hereafter by you taking into consideration the difference in time as well as the actual limit of efficiency on the part of telegraphic officials here and give us a little more time. When we are expecting instructions of this nature, all officials concerned stay up all night waiting for them. Will you please arrange matters with this in mind.
We have an understanding with the telegraph company to let us know as soon as possible by telephone, even at night, whenever a telegram marked "very urgent" is received. However, since the words "very urgent" had been changed to "kinqu" the telegraph company had found it impossible to distinguish one telegram from another. Therefore, for the sake of convenience, I would like to have telegrams of this nature captioned, as heretofore, with the words, "very urgent."
[a] See IV, 35.
[b] Not available.
Trans. 11-12-41
No. 60
FROM: Tokyo November 11, 1941
TO: Washington #759.
Re your # 1060a.
From the telegraph section to telegraph clerk Horiuchi:
We can see the point of view contained in your message. Please dispose of that matter in accordance with the contents of my Circular # 2(2 ?)81 [b].
All messages which have the words KINQU (you will probably not have much occasion to use this), or DAIQU in the heading, are to be given the same handling as those which were marked "Very urgent" in the past. Please notify the telegraph companies of this fact.
My message # 743 [b] was dispatched from the Foreign Office at 1530 on the 7th. Because of unfavorable atmospheric conditions, however, it could not be dispatched from Tokyo until 1734 of the 7th. (1934 was an error.)
[a] See IV, 59.
[b] Not available.
Trans. 11-12-41
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THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
No. 61
FROM: Tokyo November 9, 1941
TO: Washington # 752.
Re your # 1040 [a] and # 1053 [b].
1. This office is in complete agreement with the contents of your messages referred to above. The government is doing everything in its power to give enlightenment to correctly guide public opinion. The censor bureau has evolved a plan whereby there will be no comments on the U. S.-Japanese negotiations. It goes without saying, of course, that the contents of the negotiations will not be published, but furthermore, all utterances which may tend to excite the United States will be censored. (It has been unofficially decided to even suppress information as to the dates on which the representatives of the two nations confer.) We shall prevent the publication of anything that may interfere with the progress. We have issued a particularly vigorous warning to the Times of dire consequences if there are any infractions.
2. We see reports from correspondents in the U. S. area, (for example from the Domei office in your city), which are not in accord with our established policy of maintenance of calm and patience regarding the Japanese-U. S. talks. The situation here is a critical one, so please give correct guidance to all of the correspondents there.
[a] See IV, 47.
[b] Not available.
Trans. 11-10-41
No. 62
FROM: Tokyo (Togo) November 10, 1941
TO: San Francisco #168.
To Ambassador KURUSU.
The AP issued a dispatch from Manila, said to be from authoritative sources, that Your Excellency had told an old friend there, "I am going to Washington but I have no great hopes for a successful conclusion to the negotiations." This was printed in large headlines of the first page of the "New York Times." Editorial comment gave out that there would be no new compromise by the Japanese which would satisfy the United States.
We have not permitted the publication of this dispatch in papers here in Japan. This is for your information.
Trans. 11-18-41
No. 63
FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 8, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1065.
(Secret.)
On the 7th, President ROOSEVELT called for secret consultation the Secretary of Navy KNOX; Admiral STARK, Chief of the Naval Operations, and other leaders of the Navy. I sup-
A-29
pose they met to discuss our proposal as well as the question of withdrawing the Marines from China.
Trans. 11-12-41
No. 64
FROM: Tokyo November 9, 1941
TO: Washington # 751.
Re the last part of your message # 1055 [a].
We interpret Secretary Hull's plan to have a Chinese person of the highest integrity give his pledge regarding the China problem, to mean that the Secretary wishes to leave the China problem which has been a stumbling block in the Japanese-U. S. negotiations, up to direct negotiations between Japan and China for settlement. This would lead to having Chiang Kai-shek propose to us that peace negotiations be begun.
We recognize this to be a great contribution toward bringing about friendly relations between Japan and China and for this reason we highly welcome it. We will, of course, follow this message up with another giving this government's opinions. In the meantime please ascertain and advise us what relation this proposal has upon the Japanese-U. S. negotiations. Please make suitable inquiries on this phase to obtain as much information as possible, on whatever concrete plans the United States may have.
[a] See IV, 54.
Trans. 11-10-41
No. 65
FROM: Tokyo November 10, 1941
TO: Washington # 755.
(Urgent.)
(Part 1 of 2.)
Re my # 754 [a].
In adjusting Japanese-American relations, the Government of Japan has attached a great deal of importance to the speedy solution of the China Incident. At the same time the United States Government also has maintained the attitude that if peace is to be established in the Pacific, the China question cannot be overlooked. Now, if it is the intention of the United States Government to mediate between Japan and China along the lines proposed by Secretary HULL and also to leave the matter of peace terms to the Japanese and Chinese Governments, this plan harmonizes with what the Japanese Government has been looking forward to since the beginning of -------. It would mean that the question of withdrawing troops from China would, according to HULL's suggestion, be left out for the time being from the negotiations. This would make it possible for us to hasten the settlement by means of negotiations conducted between Japan and China alone and it would also have the advantage of bringing about peace between Japan and China without American interference.
Should we take advantage of this proposal, it goes without saying that it would be necessary to secure a promise or a definite statement that the settlement of the negotiations between
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THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
Japan and the United States would not make the establishment of peace between Japan and China its condition and that the United States would not interfere with the peace to be established between Japan and China. (This promise includes cessation of activities for aiding CHIANG.) Furthermore, it is necessary to make it clear that the agreement between Japan and the United States would be immediately signed and put into effect.
[a] Not available.
Trans. 11-10-41
No. 66
FROM: Tokyo November 10, 1941
TO: Washington # 755.
(Part 2 of 2.)
As regards the China question, this would mean that the paragraph concerning the China Incident in Proposal "A" of my # 726 [a] (paragraph 3 of the Agreement) should be eliminated from the agenda of the negotiations and paragraph 4 of Proposal "B" given in my # 727 [b] (namely that the United States will refrain from any action detrimental to the efforts made for the purpose of establishing peace between Japan and China) be substituted in its place.
Furthermore, I believe that the United States wishes to see a speedy settlement of an agreement between Japan and the United States and so, for this reason, HULL's proposal is a sincere one and from this standpoint the United States Government proposes to mediate between Japan and China. If the United States is of the intention of postponing the settlement of questions other than the China question until peace is established between Japan and China or of continuing aid to CHIANG, we shall not be able to accept the proposal for it would prevent the establishment of an agreement between Japan and the United States and furthermore, would be apt to put the blame for the failure of the Japanese-American negotiations upon us. I need hardly point out to you but I would like to have you take care so that this would not happen.
[a] IV, 25-28.
[b] See IV, 29.
Trans. 11-10-41
No. 67
FROM: Tokyo (NERNS) Vice Chief General Staff November 9, 1941
TO: Circular (Beyoglu) (RIKUGUN) # 910.
Two parts complete.
(Part 1.)
Ultra Secret.
To the Attachés resident abroad.
From the Vice Chief of Staff.
A-31
We would like to have you report any material reflecting the international situation especially anything connected with the following items:
1. The extent of the determination of America and Britain to make war on Japan and Germany.
2. America's reciprocal relations with Japan and Germany.
3. The condition of the military, political and economic union between America, Britain, CHIANG KAI-SHEK, Holland and Russia.
4. The present situation regarding the dispatch of additional military strength by America and Britain, especially of planes, marines and (?infantry?) to the Southern Area and to the Aleutians.
(Part 2.)
5. The present situation regarding the non-expansion of bases in the islands scattered in the Pacific. [a]
6. Movements of American and British troops in China.
7. Movements of ships of American and British registry in the Southwestern Pacific and the Sea of Japan.
8. The influence of the Empire's attitude upon America, Britain and the other countries. Also the influence of Japan and America's negotiations.
Please pay attention to the first item in this list before its timeliness is lost.
[a] The test appears to refer to the bases which Japan was not to establish in the Mandated Islands. They probably want to know what the world knows about their activities in those islands. Note the date the message was translated.
Trans. 2-3-45
No. 68
FROM: Tokyo November 10, 1941
TO: Washington # 757.
(Part 1 of 3.) (To be handled in government code.)
On the 10th I went to talk to the American Ambassador, and DOOMAN sat with us. I opened the conversation with a resume of my #725 [a] and reiterated my earnest hope that a decision could be reached in the negotiations on a basis just to our Empire. I explained that I would bend every effort toward the solution of this difficult situation. Then I continued, "Having examined the results of the negotiations thus far, what I feel is that the United States does not have full knowledge of the true situation. I feel that the United States does not have enough understanding and knowledge. Secretary HULL says that he recognizes Japan's stabilizing influence, yet unless he realizes sufficiently present conditions in East Asia and that we Japanese have been occupied over a period of four and a half years with the China incident, even though he calls us a stabilizing influence, he contradicts himself. Our population is ever increasing. Already we have about 100,000,000 people. In order to maintain their existence, we absolutely must obtain the necessary materials. On the other hand, six months have passed since Japanese-American negotiations began, and during that time, although we have given in as much as we could, the United States sticks to her first proposals and will not bend an inch. This is a most regrettable circumstance. It would seem that there are not a few Japanese who doubt the sincerity of the American Government. Consequently, a further delay would do great damage to our popular spirit. Moreover, the cabinet will soon convene, and the situation is becoming exceedingly tense. Without the loss of a day, we should establish these negotiations.
A-32
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
I hope that the American Government, too, will fully consider all these points and take the large view, settling the whole thing at once. I do not honestly believe that there is any other way to settle this perplexing situation.
[a] See IV, 22-24.
Trans. 11-10-41
No. 69
FROM: Tokyo November 10, 1941
TO: Washington # 757.
(Urgent.)
(Part 2 of 3.) (To be handled in government code.)
Next I presented him with the English text of Proposal A contained in my # 726 [a] and said, "As a result of deep thought, this was arrived at by the Government and represents he maximum compromise that we can endure to make. There is absolutely no possibility of our yielding any further.
"1. The attitude of both nations toward the European war is recorded in our proposal of September 25. Therefore, I take it for granted that we are in agreement on this score.
"2. I feel that this proposal fully covers America's desires concerning non-discriminatory treatment in commerce.
"3. Concerning the ever-knotty problem of evacuating troops, the present proposal, in view of the difficulties we face here in Japan, ventures our maximum compromise. I am sure that the United States officials can readily comprehend this. Let me tell you how strongly I hope that we can reach a quick settlement. Now included in this document are many matters in which Great Britain's interests are deeply concerned, so it is necessary that, simultaneously with the establishment of Japanese-American negotiations, Japan and England make preparations to sign." I added, "I hope that the Government of the United States will undertake this."
The American Ambassador answered, "I have had no instructions from my home government, so I would like to reserve my opinion. Only as a hint, let me say that I have wired to Washington the true situation in detail, so the American Government understands the Oriental situation fully. Concerning influence for stability, there are many ways of interpreting that. Concerning the question of the obtention of materials, the present negotiations aim at that very thing, and I think that there will probably be some way for you Japanese to obtain what you need in a peaceful manner."
[a] See IV, 25-28.
Trans. 11-10-41
No. 70
FROM: Tokyo November 10, 1941
TO: Washington # 757.
(Part 3 of 3.) (To be handled in government code.)
I answered, "Though I have all along fully appreciated the efforts of Your Excellency, I do not feel that the Government of the United States has as yet fully appreciated the situation. The
A-33
feeling in favor of stability and peace is, as a matter of course, the feeling of the majority of the people. Then too, insofar as the question of resources is concerned, if we take the example of the recent situation wherein the supplying of raw materials to Japan was suspended as a result of America's actions in the freezing of assets, such strong-arm measures of economic pressure, in addition to being a threat, indicate the probability of even more severe measures in the future. The people of Japan, though they may feel deeply within themselves that extreme steps for self-defense must be brought to bear, cannot bring themselves to the point of carrying this out.
"On this question there is a definite need for the United States to give the most careful consideration. Furthermore, insofar as the China question is concerned, would you have us ignore the successes gained as a result of sacrifices that we have made over four and a half years? Submission to terms such as these would be suicidal to Japan. For the Government, as well as for the people, I believe that such a course is impossible."
At this point, Counselor DOOMAN interposed the following: "We cannot accept the results of aggression." I refuted him by saying, "The Imperial Government does not consider that it has carried on a war of aggression. Therefore, the question of the results of aggression cannot be raised. We should, therefore, make an exception even in a non-aggression pact insofar as military action in the interests of self-defense is concerned. The fact is, insofar as the interpretation of the right of self-defense is concerned, judging by the examples of recent arguments, I believe that it is the United States which has been exhibiting a tendency to wrongfully magnify this. Therefore, it seems indicated that it is for Japan to call for the exercise of self-control by the Government of the United States. But at any rate, insofar as today is concerned, it behooves us not to become too involved in such arguments as these."
Trans. 11-10-41
No. 71
FROM: Tokyo November 11, 1941
TO: Washington #758.
Re my # 757 [a].
In these talks, the conferences being conducted in Washington are referred to as being "negotiations". The U. S. Ambassador here states that they should be termed "conversations". I, therefore, replied that I thought they were well within the realm of "negotiations" now. The Ambassador seems to have been satisfied with this.
[a] See IV, 68.
Trans. 11-12-41
No. 72
FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 10, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1066.
(Urgent.)
(Part 1 of 2.)
1. I sent ------ [a] to contact Senator THOMAS of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and HULL. His report reads as follows:
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THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
"The United States is not bluffing. If Japan invades again, the United States will fight with Japan. Psychologically the American people are ready. The Navy is prepared and ready for action."
2. Yesterday evening, Sunday, a certain Cabinet member, discarding all quibbling, began by saying to me:
"You are indeed a dear friend of mine and I tell this to you alone." Then he continued: "The American Government is receiving a number of reliable reports that Japan will be on the move soon. The American Government does not believe that your visit on Monday to the President or the coming of Mr. KURUSU will have any effect on the general situation."
I took pains to explain in detail how impatient the Japanese have grown since the freezing; how they are eager for a quick understanding; how both the Government and the people do not desire a Japanese-American war; and how we will hope for peace until the end.
He replied, however:
"Well, our boss, the President, believes those reports and so does the Secretary of State."
[a] Name withheld.
Trans. 11-12-41
No. 73
FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 10, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1066.
(Urgent.)
(Part 2 of 2.)
In the newspapers and magazines, with the exception of the Daily News and the Hearst Papers, it is reported that the Americans are much more eager for a war with Japan than they are for one with Germany. It is said that some of the British are using this inclination for their own advantage and that already parleys have been started for joint Anglo-American action. Suggestions have already been made to the effect that it is necessary for some of the British fleet to be located in the Pacific. Now even if the President and other statesmen do not follow this trend, who can say how it will be? The friend I just spoke to told me that the United States cannot stop now because if Japan moves something will have to be done since it is a question of the United States saving its face.
3. Well, in any case, I am going to see the President today and talk with him on the basis of your instructions. You may be sure that I will do my very best.
Trans. 11-12-41
No. 74
FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 7, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1059.
The conference with the President has been scheduled for Monday at 11 a.m.
Trans. 11-12-41
A-35
No. 75
FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 10, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1069.
(Extremely Urgent.)
Today, the 10th, at 11:30, accompanied by WAKASUGI, I had an hour's conversation with President ROOSEVELT in the presence of Secretary HULL. I told them what you said in your instructions and explained in detail our proposal for the settlement of the three problems. In response the President said that in the present world crisis the American Government has as its objective to contribute to the establishment of peace and order in the Pacific in the spirit of fair play and that he hoped the Japanese-American conversations would be effective.
He continued, "In accordance with the desire of the Japanese Government we will endeavor immediately to continue the parleys and I hope that Japan too will make it evident that she intends to take a friendly attitude. What the United States most desires is (1) to prevent the expansion of the war, and (2) to bring about a lasting peace."
He concluded with the promise that he would carefully study, with Secretary HULL, our proposals as explained by me and after thinking them over make a reply.
I will wire you the details later, however, I am in a hurry to send you this resume.
Trans. 11-12-41
No. 76
FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 10, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1070.
(Extremely Urgent.)
(Part 1 of 4.)
(To be handled in Government Code. Secret outside the department.)
My interview with the President, referred to in my # 1069 [a], was held in a private room in the White House in order to avoid publicity. It was as follows:
Prefacing my remarks with the fact that I was speaking on instructions, I said, "I have had no talks with the Secretary of State for about three weeks: ever since the resignation of the KONOYE cabinet; and since the present situation between Japan and the United States is such that it could not be left as it is, I am very pleased to have this opportunity of speaking with you. The conversations on this question have lasted for more than six months. From their inception, Japan has been wishing to arrive at a quick settlement. The people of Japan also looked forward to these conversations with much hope; however, the conversations have dragged on and in the meantime the relation between the two countries has grown worse. It has become increasingly difficult for the people of my country to be patient. Now, the Government of Japan has in the meantime made many concessions, but the Government of the United States has held to its arguments and has shown no willingness to respond to our compromises. As a result, some people in Japan have begun to doubt if the United States is really sincere in this matter. The Japanese people regard the freezing of funds as a kind of economic blockade, and there seem to be some who say that modern warfare is not limited to shooting alone. No country can exist without the supply of materials indispensable to its industry. From what reports I have received from Japan, the situation seems to be serious and threatening and, therefore, the only way to keep peace is for Japan and the United States to come, without further delay, to some kind of a friendly and satisfactory agreement. It is for no other purpose than
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THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
that of keeping peace in the Pacific that the Japanese Government is endeavoring so hard to arrive at a satisfactory agreement by continuing our conversations.
[a] See IV, 75.
Trans. 11-13-41
No. 77
FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 10, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1070.
(Very Urgent.)
(Part 2 of 4.)
"As a major effort in attaining this objective, our Government has made the recent proposal. I wish that your Government would make its views clear to us as soon as possible by responding to the views and desires expressed by the Japanese Government."
I incidentally told him that the Japanese Government, realizing the seriousness of the situation, is dispatching Ambassador KURUSU to assist me. Then I continued and said, by way of an explanation of our proposal, that taking together the views expressed on October 2 by the Secretary of State relative to our proposal of September 25, and what both the Secretary and the Assistant Secretary had said subsequent to that date, the whole question could be boiled down to consist of the following three difficult points. I went on to say:
1. "As to the principle of non-discrimination, we have decided to recognize the fact that if this principle is, as your Government wishes, to be applied to the whole world, it is to be applied in the entire Pacific area including China. Since this is something which the Secretary of State has often spoken to me about as being a long-cherished desire of his, I hope that this guarantee which our Government is offering would prove to be satisfactory to you.
2. "Now as to the attitude of the two governments toward the European war, we proposed in our proposal of September 25 that the action on the part of the two governments should be based upon consideration of 'protection and self-defense.'" (The English text used our expression as it stood.)
Regarding this point, I asked whether the United States Government would guarantee that it will not give an unnecessarily broad interpretation to the words "protection" and "self-defense", and I said, "If the Japanese Government could get such a guarantee from the United States Government, the Japanese Government is also willing to give a similar guarantee." I continued, "As to the words 'in case the United States enters the war, etc.,' since our conversations had for their object the maintenance of peace in the Pacific, we are not in a position, under the present circumstances, to make any definite statement outside of what has been given in our proposal of September 25. Unless we have confidence in each other, as you well realize, no guarantee would be a satisfactory one even if backed by a hundred promises and a hundred documents."
Trans. 11-13-41
No. 78
FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 10, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1070.
(Very Urgent.)
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(Part 3 of 4.)
3. I submitted the new proposal, as it stood, regarding the question of stationing and withdrawing of troops and proceeded to say, "With regard to this question, the Japanese Government has gone a step beyond her past proposals and has, by definitely fixing not only the localities in China where our troops would be stationed but also the period of their occupation, made it clear that the occupation is not a permanent and definite one. No doubt you would like to see the troops withdrawn at once, but I am sure you well understand that it is impossible under the present circumstances to do so. I earnestly wish that you would give favorable consideration to this question from the standpoint of the general situation.
Next, I said, "The Japanese Government is making the following proposal with regard to the Japanese troops in French Indo-China," and so saying, I submitted the proposal contained in your instructions.
In reply to this, the President, remarking that he had already thought on the question before our explanation was given him, spoke as follows from a note which he had been holding in his hand, "As a result of a confusion created by the forces of aggression, the whole world has fallen into a critical state. What seems to me to be common sense is for us to wish earnestly that the world will return to peaceful normalcy and for the United States Government to do its utmost in the spirit of fair play for the establishment of peace, stability, and order in the Pacific. If this object is to be realized, actual results must be effected for the sake of human welfare. It is my earnest wish that the preliminary talks relative to this question would have good results which would serve as a basis of future negotiations. I will, just as the Japanese Government hopes, do my best in order to help carry on these negotiations successfully. I wish that the Japanese Government would clearly set forth its intention of following a peaceful course in its policy and not an opposite course. This is the way to attain the results toward which both you and we are working."
What the United States desires, according to the President, are (1) to prevent the war from spreading; and (2) to establish a permanent peace.
Trans. 11-13-41
No. 79
FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 10, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1070.
(Very Urgent.)
(Part 4 of 4.)
The President elaborated on the point that with regard to the question of non-discrimination, he had agreed with CHURCHILL when he had conferred with that statesman to abolish the economic limitations throughout the world; that he had opposed Germany because Germany followed a policy contrary to this idea; and that he wished that the principle of non-discrimination would be applied generally throughout the world. The President then said by way of an incidental remark that in the days of President TAFT when disturbance arose in Cuba, the United States had failed by resorting to a policy of force; however, today under his administration, because the government had adopted a friendly policy, the relations with the Latin-American countries had improved. He then explained how necessary it is to follow a new policy in accordance with new situations. Secretary HULL inserted the remark that the South American countries, who had in the past been fearful of the United States, have come to take an attitude of welcoming the United States. Speaking on the remark I had made to the effect that
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THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
economic pressure had aroused the ill feelings of the Japanese people and had made them impatient, the President said, "It is necessary to find a modus vivendi if the people are to live," and proceeded to explain that this expression should be translated as "method of living." Although it is not clear to me what it really means, I intend to ascertain whether he refers to, possibly, a provisional agreement.
The President then asked if Ambassador KURUSU was bringing with him a proposal other than that referred to above. I replied that he was not bringing any proposal, but in response to my wishes he was coming to assist me. Then the President said that he is leaving on the 15th and will be away for one week, as he must attend, as is his custom, a children's party at Warm Springs during the Thanksgiving week (the 20th), and that he wondered whether he would have the opportunity of meeting Ambassador KURUSU before he leaves.
Trans. 11-13-41
No. 80
FROM: Tokyo 11 November 1941
TO: Washington # 762.
Re your # 1069 [a].
Judging from the progress of the conversations, there seem to be indications that the United States is still not fully aware of the exceedingly criticalness of the situation here. The fact remains that the date set forth in my message # 736 [b] is absolutely immovable under present conditions. It is a definite dead-line and therefore it is essential that a settlement be reached by about that time.
The session of Parliament opens on the 15th (work will start on (the following day ?)) according to the schedule. The government must have a clear picture of things to come, in presenting its case at the session. You can see, therefore, that the situation is nearing a climax, and that time is indeed becoming short.
I appreciate the fact that you are making strenuous efforts, but in view of the above mentioned situation, will you redouble them. When talking to the Secretary of State and others, drive the points home to them. Do everything in your power to get a clear picture of the U. S. attitude in the minimum amount of time. At the same time do everything in your power to have them give their speedy approval to our final proposal.
We would appreciate being advised of your opinions on whether or not they will accept our final proposal A.
[a] See IV, 75.
[b] See IV, 44.
Trans. 11-12-41
No. 81
FROM: Tokyo 11 November 1941
TO: Washington # 763.
Re my 671 [a].
With regard to our representations to the United States in this matter, we have received two representations from the Germans since then. On 6 November, I advised the German Ambas-
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sador in Tokyo that in view of the present general-relationship between the United States and Japan, it was essential that this matter be given very careful study. I explained that there is a good chance that it would be more effective under the present circumstances, for us to present a determined attitude rather than to merely make representations to the United States. It is exceedingly doubtful, I pointed out, whether a mere representation would bear any fruit.
[a] See III, 277.
Trans. 11-12-41
No. 82
FROM: Tokyo 11 November 1941
TO: Washington # 764.
(In 3 parts complete.)
1. On the 11th, the British Ambassador, while calling on me on some other business, brought up the subject of the conversations. He advised me that he reported my talks of the other day (see contents of 2 of my message #723 [a]) to his home government, to which his government replied along the following lines, he said:
"The British Government is not aware of the details of the conversations being conducted in Washington. Since its success would be of interest to Britain and Japan, it is fervently hoping for the success thereof. However, unless the basis of discussion is first settled upon, it would be useless to go ahead and enter into negotiations of the details. The British Government feels that discussions as to the basic principles could safely be left up to the U. S. Government. However, as soon as the real negotiations begin, the United States is to confer with Great Britain according to arrangement. Therefore, when that time arrives, negotiations will be carried on jointly with the United States and Japan."
2. I replied that in the matters being discussed between Japan and the United States there were some phases which greatly affected Great Britain. In the event of an agreement between Japan and the United States, Japan will simultaneously seek Britain's agreement. I wish to arrange matters so that the two agreements may be signed at exactly the same time. In view of the fact that to do the above is necessary, we have already requested the United States to give their approval to the terms, I said to the British Ambassador.
The British Ambassador said that he was not aware as to how much progress had been made between the United States and Japan, but he assumed that they were still in the preliminary stages.
I, therefore, replied that his assumption may have fitted in the past, but that at present they had already entered into the realm of the actual negotiations. Moreover, the Imperial Government has already submitted its final proposal, thus bringing the negotiations to the final phase. We have made this fact absolutely clear to the United States, I added.
I went on to say that I hear that the British Prime Minister made a speech at a luncheon given by the Mayor of London in which he stated that though he did not know the developments in the U. S.-Japanese negotiations, he would issue a warning to Japan. Would it not be more to the point, I challenged, if, instead of making threats without knowing of what he spoke, he were to try to more clearly understand the issues and to cooperate in an effort to clear them up? However, I said, with the U. S.-Japanese talks in the phase they are today, and in view of the fact that I realize that there were certain relationships between the United States and Great Britain, I have no intention of urging or opposing British participation in these talks at this time.
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THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
The Imperial Government has made the maximum concessions she can in drawing up its final proposal, I explained. We are of the opinion that the United States will find no objectionable points in it. I believe that it will be possible to sign the agreement within a week or ten days, I said. If, unfortunately, the United States refuses to accept those terms, it would be useless to continue the negotiations. Our domestic political situation will permit no further delays in reaching a decision.
I am making superhuman efforts at this time, I pointed out, in the attempt to ride out the crisis in the U. S.-Japanese and the British-Japanese relations. There are factions in the country which insist that there is no need for negotiating and point out the uselessness of doing so. The negotiations are being continued only after these factions were checked.
For these reasons, it is absolutely impossible that there be any further delays.
A speedy settlement can be made depending entirely upon the attitude of Britain and the United States, I said, and suggested that his country give serious consideration to this, and cooperate in bringing about an early agreement.
In the above manner, I pointed out the criticalness of the situation. The Ambassador listened to what I said very attentively, giving indications that he was realizing for the first time how critical the situation was. He advised me that he would send his government a report of the above conversation and that he himself would do his best to bring about a speedy settlement.
3. Thus, there are indications that the United States Government is still under the impression that the negotiations are in the preliminary stages and that we are still merely exchanging opinions. This is further supported by the words of President Roosevelt reported by you in your message # 1070 [b] (that part in which he says that he hopes that these preliminary discussions will lead to the basis of the real negotiations, etc.)
That the United States takes this lazy and easy going attitude in spite of the fact that as far as we are concerned, this is the final phase, is exceedingly unfortunate. Therefore, it is my fervent hope that Your Excellency will do everything in your power to make them realize this fact and bring about an agreement at the earliest possible moment.
[a] See IV, 16.
[b] See IV, 76-79.
Trans. 11-12-41
No. 83
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 11 November 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1072.
In paragraph (2) of your message #726 [a], in which you explain our Proposal A, you stated that with regard to the matters involving the Tripartite Pact, the United States was "apparently satisfied in general with our proposal and therefore . . ."
In your message #757 [b], in which you give us the gist of your explanations to the U. S. Ambassador, you say under paragraph (1) concerning the attitudes of the respective countries with reference to the European War that "we assume that this matter has already been settled with their acceptance of this phase of our proposal of 25 September".
I presume that you took this position to press our claims on this particular point. We are proceeding under this assumption. Actually, however, no agreement has been reached as may be seen from the contents of their "oral statement" of 2 October.
The only comment I ever made in this respect was in my message #995 [c] in reporting Wakasugi's conversations with Welles, when it was noted that regarding the Tripartite Pact,
A-41
"the United States also gave indications that adjustments in this matter may be a possibility".
As we replied in our message #1025 [d] to the question contained in your #721 [e], we are proceeding with the exchange of notes plan without coming to any definite decision on this point.
I merely mention the above, so that no misunderstandings will arise.
[a] See IV, 25.
[b] See IV, 68.
[c] See IV, 8.
[d] See IV, 19.
[e] See IV, 18.
Trans. 11-14-41
No. 84
FROM: Washington 11 November 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1073.
The Chinese Ambassador to the United States had an audience with the President yesterday the 10th and is said to have handed him a document (contents unknown). (It is said the interview lasted two minutes.)
This might be of some information to you.
Trans. 11-13-41
No. 85
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 12 November 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1076.
Re your # 727 [a].
In order that we may have a dependable translation into English of Proposal B, please have it written in English and wire it to me.
The word "provided" in my #1044 [b] (text concerning the principle of non-discrimination in commerce) ought really to be changed to "on the understanding". Please take care of that.
[a] See IV, 29.
[b] See IV, 37.
Trans. 11-22-41
No. 86
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 12 November 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1077.
(Part 1 of 4.)
From the Intelligence Official.
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THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
1. The ROOSEVELT administration is dashing along the road of military, economic, and industrial reconstruction with the object of defeating the Nazis. So far as war on the sea is concerned, the United States has already entered the conflict. Even if ROOSEVELT should now decide to leave the Nazis be, he is already in too deep. Even though he tried to do a 180° turn, his economic reconstructionists would not let him. Therefore, it can be said that the United States is following the one road to complete war.
2. It is true that the American army is not yet equipped, but even if war were declared against Germany, no more than the present ocean fighting would be necessary and, therefore, such a declaration is possible. The reason why things are not going so well for the administration in this connection, however, is because the people are not completely behind it.
ROOSEVELT has the full support of the government, the military, and the Congress and is tantamount to a dictator (on the 10th, the Times Herald said in an editorial that ROOSEVELT is a dictator in no way less than HITLER or STALIN). The people, however, most certainly do not support ROOSEVELT. During the last two or three weeks this has been particularly evident. Let us look into some concrete examples: Accordingly to reliable reports, the leaders of the America First Committee are secretly endeavoring with all their ingenuity to impeach ROOSEVELT. The stronger government pressure against it becomes, the more belligerent does this committee grow, and it may well be that the time will come when they will resort to force. The pressure of the government against the America First Committee is also becoming fierce. On October 30 in New York, there was a meeting of this committee, but they could not make any radio broadcasts. ROOSEVELT's own life is in grave danger. On that night in Madison Square Garden, the immense crowd totaling 8,000 filled the building to overflowing.
Trans. 11-14-41
No. 87
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 12 November 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1077.
(Part 2 Of 4.)
At a mass meeting in Washington, _____ [a] a former Ambassador, made a scathing attack on the ROOSEVELT regime and demanded a referendum against this deliberate drift toward war. On that occasion he said that at this so fateful moment in the nation's history ROOSEVELT might die. These were words of profound meaning and drew great applause from the audience. The Times Herald in an editorial said that the President holds the whip over the Army and Navy and has the full support of the Government. Therefore, it will be impossible for the Congress to impeach him. The editorial said, however, that some believe that he will be impeached, in any case, later on. Now, for papers in their editorials to use the word "impeach" cannot be overlooked as something light. Furthermore, pickets in front of the White House recently carried placards on which were written the words "Impeach the President". Another thing, some days ago in Detroit, Ambassador HALIFAX was pelted with eggs. Again the sinking of the REUBEN JAMES gave the popular spirit of this country a great shock and filled the people with a gloomy foreboding. In his speech on October 27th, ROOSEVELT did not stress foreign questions so much as he did internal matters. This is to be regarded as a declaration of internal warfare whereby ROOSEVELT whipped from its scabbard the sword of an unlimited national emergency.
[a] DoD Comment: Name and identifying information withheld.
Trans. 11-14-41
A-43
No. 88
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 12 November 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1077.
(Part 3 of 4.)
2. The Congress, as I said, is supporting ROOSEVELT. True enough, the Senate approved the entrance of armed merchantmen into the war zones; however, the actual figures were 50 to 37, and this could not, by any means, be called a crushing defeat for the opponents. This also may be regarded as a reflection of public opinion.
Things being as they are in the country, in order to dispel the dilemma and to condition the people for a war against Germany, it may be now that a counter-hand will be played. I mean to say, many people in the United States fear the German war machine frightfully. However, they know how we have fought so hard in China for four years and figure that we are about worn out. They also figure that we are weak in materials. They do not think that we could resist them very much and optimize over how quick we would be to come to our knees.
If we scrutinize this psychology closely, we find that the ROOSEVELT administration, although it does not want a two-ocean war, would probably not do anything to prevent the outbreak of a war with Japan, depending on how we Japanese act. Perhaps a point-blank declaration of war might be made. Then the people's thirst for blood could be stimulated, an unlimited emergency declared, the America First Committee dispersed, and all opposition crushed. Then they figure the popular mind might turn favorable for a war with Germany. In other words, we Japanese would be merely the tool with which the American administration prepares the way for coming to grips with the Reich.
4. What will happen if the United States and Japan come to blows? Well, Germany now has a vast occupied territory and is in the most favorable position to talk peace. England is already complaining that the United States is not sending her enough help. Germany, of course, does not want a long war, and she may suddenly, on unexpectedly generous terms, conclude peace with England. I mean to say that while the United States would be at grips with us, American aid to England would naturally slow down and give Germany a chance to make a separate peace with Great Britain. Germany will certainly do her best to achieve this feat.
Trans. 11-15-41
No. 89
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 12 November 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1077.
(Part 4 of 4.)
The New Deal failed, and the opposition to ROOSEVELT within the country became unmanageable. Just then the European war took a more lively turn through Germany's invasion of the Netherlands. ROOSEVELT, who is well-versed in international questions, joined the war then and there. It might be said that HITLER's attack on the Netherlands caused ROOSEVELT to enter the struggle immediately. Japanese-American relations are now at identically that same pass. I mean to say that a war with Japan would put the people squarely behind ROOSEVELT and make him a dictator. He knows fully that if he has to fight, there will be a suitable opportunity which would not admit delaying war. Furthermore, in view of Japan's foreign policy, it can be seen that our relations with the United States have reached such a pass that a decision on war is about the only thing that could
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THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
raise them from the dead. Judging from internal conditions in the United States, for the foregoing reasons there is no hope for a thorough-going pact at the present time. It would be better to devise some relatively easy small-scale makeshift of a temporary nature laying stress on economic matters. Germany will keep sinking American ships, and the President's position will become harder and harder, so as soon as a show-down with Germany is inevitable, then we can get a full-fledged pact. Again, if we do have to fight the United States, we could do this much better after she is at war with Germany.
Trans. 11-14-41
No. 90
From United States Communications Intelligence:
Important summaries of Japanese Naval operations.
Date of Operations Serial Date of Issue
Oct. 13-22, 1941 16-41, No. 907-100 Nov. 12, 1941
Oct. 17
"Numerous new calls are now appearing in Mandate traffic which indicate a decided increase in the Mandate Force."
Oct. 18
"It has been noted with interest during past few days that the Mandate Islands of Truk, Palau, Jaluit, and Saipan have been included in dispatch headings which ordinarily do not concern them".
"The Commander Sixth Base Force originates a dispatch addressed to four unidentified units now at Yokosuka, and information to 6th Base Force. All of the above action addresses are evidently new units scheduled for assignment to the 6th Base Force in Jaluit area."
No. 91
FROM: Washington 11 November 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1074.
Re your # 762 [a].
After my conversation with the President, I told HULL that as the situation is urgent, I would like to meet him the same evening or this morning, and go on with concrete discussion. He replied that they understand fully our need of haste, that, as a matter of fact both yesterday after our conversation and today, although it is the 11th and the Armistice holiday, he would gather those concerned and give study to our proposal, and that it would facilitate the negotiations to have our discussion tomorrow the 12th after hearing their opinions.
As for a conjecture regarding the success or failure of the negotiations, I will ------ after getting their opinions in tomorrow's interview.
[a] See IV, 80.
Trans. 11-13-41
A-45
No. 92
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 12 November 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1087.
(Part 1 of 4.)
(Departmental secret. To be handled in Government code.)
On the 12th at 3 p.m. WAKASUGI went with me to talk with Secretary HULL. BALLANTINE sat in and we conversed for about an hour. I asked if they had any answer to our proposal and HULL gave me the oral statements contained in my # 1083 [a] and # 1084 [b]. He said that he wanted me to ascertain if the new cabinet would also approve of oral statement A and stated that oral statement B was presented in the sense of a suggestion concerning peace between Japan and China referred to in our last conversation in accordance with our request. He went on to say that if the same principle were applied to the China question as was applied to all the other problems, a settlement should be possible; that also, such things as the question of non-discrimination in commerce had to be connected with this; and that by day after tomorrow he could let us have a definite proposal. I said that judging from this suggestion and our conversation it looked as though it was implied that unless Japan and China could get together on the question of the stationing of troops there would be no chance for any success at all in the Japanese-American negotiations. I said that if this was what was meant it would be leaving the key to Japanese-American relations in the hands of someone else, which looked rather inappropriate, and I asked him if he meant that Japanese-Chinese relations could be left to Japan and China and that the United States and Japan could agree on the other questions. HULL, however, replied vaguely that if the general principles were applied to China too, an understanding would be possible.
He then continued, "We have not yet privately informed China about these talks, but we are letting England and the Netherlands, who are concerned, know something of their general lines. In case some basis for negotiations is worked out, I believe it possible that they may sign along with the United States. "However," he added, "I cannot guarantee this."
[a] See IV, 93.
[b] See IV, 97, 98, 99.
Trans. 11-14-41
No. 93
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 12 November 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1083.
(Part 1 of 4.)
Strictly secret. To be handled in Government code.
A. Oral. Strictly Confidential.
It will be recalled that the documents communicated by the Japanese Ambassador to the President of the United States on August 28, 1941 contained a statement of the position of the Japanese Government in regard to its desire and intention to pursue peaceful courses. That position was set forth in excerpts taken from those documents as follows:
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THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
"Japan is solicitous for the maintenance of the peace of the Pacific and the peace of the world and she desires therefore to improve Japanese-American relations."
"In consequence, the Japanese Government welcomes the invitation by the President of the United States to an exchange of views in regard to basic policies and attitudes as the foundation of an understanding that will condition lasting and extensive peace in the Pacific area. For such peace, the Government of Japan is ready: for such a united effort toward a peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific situation the Government of Japan, like the Government of the United States, would be proud to make sacrifices."
Trans. 11-14-41
No. 94
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 12 November 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1083.
(Part 2 of 4.)
(Strictly secret. To be handled in Government code.)
With reference to the stationing of Japanese troops in Indo-China, it was stated:
"The Japanese Government has no intention of threatening thereby other countries.
"Therefore, the Japanese Government is prepared to withdraw its troops from Indo-China as soon as the China incident is settled or a just peace is established in East Asia.
"Furthermore, in order to remove all possible doubt in this regard, the Japanese Government reaffirms herewith its repeated declaration that its present action in Indo-China is not a preparatory step for military advance into neighboring territories."
The statement was made specifically applicable to Thailand as follows:
"The Japanese Government believes the above pledge will suffice to clarify also Japan's intentions toward Thailand."
Specific reference was also made to the Soviet Union by the Japanese Government as follows:
"As regard Soviet-Japanese relations, the Japanese Government declares likewise that Japan will take no military action as long as the Soviet Union remains faithful to the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Treaty and does not menace Japan or Manchukuo or take any action contrary to the spirit of the said Treaty."
In a word, the Japanese Government has no intention of using, without provocation, military force against any neighboring nation.
Trans. 11-14-41
No. 95
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 12 November 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1083.
(Part 3 of 4.)
With reference to the general program in view, it was stated:
"Such discussions would naturally envisage the working out of a program, obtainable by peaceful methods. The Japanese Government shares fully that view with the Government of the United States.
A-47
"Regarding the principles and directives set forth in detail by the American Government and envisaged in the informal conversations as constituting a program for the Pacific area, the Japanese Government wishes to state that it considers these principles and the practical application thereof, in the friendliest manner possible, are the prime requisites of a true peace and should be applied not only in the Pacific area but throughout the entire world. Such a program has long been desired and sought by Japan itself."
Inasmuch as subsequent to the giving by the Japanese Government of the foregoing statement of its position a new cabinet has come into office in Japan, the Government believes that it would be helpful, in order to avoid the possibility of any misunderstanding, if the Japanese Government could at this time confirm that the position of the Japanese Government has not changed.
This Government, in its statement to the Japanese Government of October 2, 1941, pointed out that, although we were gratified to receive the statement of the position of the Japanese Government, we found it difficult to understand the need for the qualification by the Japanese Government of its statements of peaceful intent with what would seem to be unnecessary qualifying phrases. We had in mind such phrases as:
Trans. 11-14-41
No. 96
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 12 November 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1083.
(Urgent)
(Part 4 of 4.)
"As long as the Soviet Union remains faithful to the Soviet-Japanese neutrality treaty and does not menace Japan or Manchukuo or take any action contrary to the spirit of the said treaty."
"Without provocation."
"Without a justifiable reason."
It is believed that it would be helpful if the position of the Japanese Government on this point could be clarified.
The foregoing observations are not directed to ----- proposals put forward by the Japanese Ambassador on November 10, (November 7) but are set forth merely in an effort to make abundantly clear the basis on which we are proceeding in order that there may be avoided any misunderstanding on the part either of the Japanese Government or of this Government. It has not been and is not the purpose of this Government to enter needlessly into a discussion of details. While presenting these preliminary observations toward ensuring a common understanding, this Government will expect to do everything it can to expedite consideration of the latest proposals of the Japanese Government.
Trans. 11-14-41
No. 97
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 12 November 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1084.
(Urgent.)
A-48
(Part 1 of 3.) (Separate Wire.)
B. Oral. (Strictly Confidential.)
Reference is had to the Japanese Ambassador's request for any further amplification that the Secretary of State might have in mind in connection with the suggestion made by him in informal conversation on November 7th in regard to mutual exchanges of pledges between China and Japan for the establishment of real friendship and collaboration between the two countries.
It will be recalled that suggestion under reference was prompted by the observation of the Japanese Ambassador that should the Japanese Government agree to withdraw its troops within a definite period from all areas of China the Japanese people would feel that they had nothing to show for the four years and more of heavy sacrifice that they had made and that such an agreement would be regarded as having caused Japan a loss of prestige.
Trans. 11-14-41
No. 98
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 12 November 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1084.
(English Text) (Urgent)
(Part 2 of 3.)
(To be handled in Government Code.) Strictly secret.
The Secretary, in reply to the Japanese Ambassador's observation, commented that the present world crisis, in which Europe finds itself threatened with anarchy, affords Japan a unique opportunity to enhance its national prestige on a basis of moral force in a way that military might could never accomplish. That, if the Chinese Government were now to say, either as a result of Japanese initiative or on its own initiative, that China desired a real friendship with Japan and would do everything it reasonably could to collaborate with Japan along peaceful and mutually beneficial lines, could not Japan find it possible to reciprocate in a policy of mutual friendship and conciliation with China, would not such a policy enable Japan to make a contribution of inestimable value toward arresting the destructive force which now menaces world civilization and to assume a leadership in the world which every peaceful nation would welcome.
Trans. 11-15-41
No. 99
FROM: Washington (Nomura) 12 November 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1084.
(English Text) (Urgent)
(Part 3 of 3.)
For what is envisaged would be an implementation of the kind of constructive, liberal and peaceful world program concerning which we have been talking in our exploratory conversations. That program contemplates practical application of basic principles directed
A-49
toward preservation of order under law, peace with justice, and the social and economic welfare of mankind. It contemplates peaceful collaboration among nations, mutual respect for the rights of all, no aggrandizement, and the adopting of broad-gauge economic policies which would provide liberalization of trade, afford fair access to and development of natural resources and raise living standards to the betterment of all peoples.
Full association by Japan in such a program at this critical moment in world history would give Japan an undoubted position of moral leadership and be a tribute to the far-sighted and enlightened character of its statesmanship.
Trans. 11-15-41
No. 100
FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 12, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1087.
(Extremely Urgent.)
(Part 2 of 4.)
(To be handled in government code.)
Then BALLANTINE inserted the remark that it is stipulated in the American proposal of June 21st that the United States will not be a party to applying to other countries any condition conflicting with the principles which the United States has been consistently upholding.
WAKASUGI said:
"While we heartily welcome the suggestion offered, I would like to know more definitely how China is to be made to pledge to follow the suggestion. Is it the intention of Secretary HULL to leave this matter up to direct negotiations to be conducted between Japan and China; or is it his intention to have the United States secure the pledge from China and transmit it to Japan; or is it to be accomplished with Japan, the United States, and China meeting in a conference?"
It seems that Secretary HULL had no definite plan in mind regarding this matter, but he spoke as if he was confident that if the Japanese-American negotiations are carried out in accordance with the principle of peace that a stage would in due time be reached at which this suggestion could be carried out.
Whereupon WAKASUGI asked:
"Is it your intention to have China make this pledge when that stage has been reached in the course of the negotiations?"
HULL avoided making a definite reply and instead he brought out an example, stating that when two parties in a dispute wish to come to an agreement they could do so by the mediation of a third party and, so saying, HULL hinted his having the intention of mediating between Japan and China depending, of course, on conditions.
Trans. 11-15-41
No. l01
FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 12, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1087.
A-50
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
(Part 3 of 4.) (Departmental Secret.)
(To be handled in government code.)
Concerning the stationing of troops, I explained to him that in the new proposal we made it clear that we do not mean to keep them there indefinitely. HULL replied that to interfere in the private affairs of other nations contravenes any general peace program and that permanent occupation is impossible. However, he seemed quite satisfied with my explanation.
In connection with a general peace policy, HULL said, "In one breath you say that the three-power pact has a peaceful objective and in the other you confess that Japan is bound by the agreement and is tied up with Germany. Now the officials of our country and our public are at a loss to understand any explanation like this. HITLER has a hard task and to carry it out, he is making the people of the various small nations suffer. Now he cannot hold out forever in such a difficult undertaking, and sooner or later we are going to have to take charge of things after the war. In this we are going to need every resource. Leaders of both Japan and the United States ought to cooperate in a peaceful program. Thus, if some sort of plan can be worked out between Japan and the United States comprising the nations concerned—for example, England and the Netherlands—to bring about complete harmony over the Pacific, Japan would no longer need to worry about the three-power pact, and the three-power pact would die a natural death." I refuted this argument, saying, "The Japanese-British alliance was in effect at the time of the Russo-Japanese war, but after-wards at the time of the Washington conference it was nullified, so you see the situation changes with the times. The existence of the three-power pact presents no obstacle to any peace plan.
Trans. 11-15-41
No. 102
FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 12, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1087.
(Part 4 of 4.) (Departmental secret.)
(To be handled in governmental code.)
Continuing, he said, "Japan does not like to exercise force—not by any means. If we could get petroleum and other raw materials from the United States and the Netherlands Indies, we would not have to use force, would we? Then, when we come to the question of non-discrimination in commerce, I don't think that the United States will have any objection to our proposal."
HULL answered, "The United States also recognizes that the situation is tense and is considering your proposals concerning the three problems. We are doing this just as fast as we can but questions pending over a period of ten years cannot be settled over night. By day after tomorrow, I will be ready to reply."
WAKASUGI reiterated, "As I told you, the Diet assembles on the 25th and the situation is drawing more and more grave. I want to get a definite reply to our proposal at any time now so by day after tomorrow I will expect a clear concise reply on these various problems."
In a word, during that conversation they sought our recognition of the statement of August 28, number B, and made explanations of their recent suggestion for a Japanese-Chinese peace. They only wished to tell us that the United States is going deeper into the three problems and our proposal of September 25 and that they are making ready for a quick
A-51
reply. I am not satisfied with their attitude toward taking up negotiations so tomorrow morning I am going to have WAKASUGI again tell HULL please to hurry up with a decision.
Trans. 11-28-41
No. 103
FROM: Honolulu (Kita) November 13, 1941
TO: Washington # 079.
Honolulu to Tokyo # 217.
From Kurusu.
_____ [a], who was one of the _____ [a] party during its Far Eastern tour, was among the passengers on the Clipper.
During conversation with him he mentioned that he thought it was already too late to try and arrive at a peaceful negotiation between Japan and the United States, and I gathered from the conversation that the _____ [a] party are hoping that negotiations for a peaceful settlement will not be successful.
I am also wondering if the pessimistic outlook on my mission by U. S. radio announcers, etc., of which both Tokyo and Washington cables addressed to me here mention, is not also influenced by this party. Perhaps this will be of some value for you to know.
[a] DOD Comment: Name withheld.
Trans. 11-25-41
No. 104
FROM: Tokyo November 13, 1941
TO: Washington # 768.
Re my # 727 [a].
Delete that part of note (1) following "HITUYO NI OZI (as required) which reads "HON TORIKIME SEIRITU SEBA" (in the event that the agreement is reached.)
Insert the words "GEN NI FUTURYO INDO SINA NI HAKEN SERARE ORU" (dispatched to French Indo-China at present) following that part which reads "KOSEI NARU HEIWA KAKURITU SURU UE WA" (Upon having a just peace assuredly established).
[a] See IV, 29.
Trans. 11-13-41
No. 105
FROM: Tokyo November 13, 1941
TO: Washington #766.
Re your # 1055 [a].
A-52
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
1. Through the U. S. Ambassador's courtesy, I was, in confidence, shown the record of your conversations with Secretary Hull of the 7th. According to this record, the Secretary asked you, point blank, in connection with the so-called self-defense rights, for a "concrete statement of Japan's relations with the Axis powers."
You made no mention of this in your message. Will you please give us a detailed report of this.
2. Judging from the tone of these talks, the United States is apparently still assuming that they are of a preliminary nature. We pleaded with the U. S. Ambassador again on the 12th to try and see the seriousness of the situation. Will you, too, do everything in your power to make them realize this in accordance with the lines contained in my various instructions on this subject.
3. Since the record of your conversations with Hull were shown to me only through the personal courtesy of the Ambassador, please maintain strict secrecy regarding it.
[a] See IV, 54.
Trans. 11-13-41
No. 106
FROM: Tokyo November 12, 1941
TO: Washington # 765.
(To be handled in Government code.)
Please take steps to acquaint Finance Official NISHIYAMA with matters pertaining to the Japan-American negotiations which are the focal point of the recent international situation.
He should receive a confirming wire from the Finance Minister in the near future.
Trans. 11-12-41
No. 107
FROM: Tokyo November 15, 1941
TO: Washington # 774.
Re your # 1087 [a].
During the conversations with HULL, Wakasugi asked, with regard to the form in which the "B" suggestion should materialize, "or is it your intention to have it conducted by the consular representatives of Japan, the United States, and China?" As you are aware, the Imperial Government is opposed to its taking that course.
Please be aware of the fact that the "B" suggestion was taken up because we thought it might be a short cut to settlement. In other words, we decided to take it up because we thought it would speed up the procedure. We do not wish to give it even a chance to further complicate and prolong matters.
Bearing this in mind, do everything in your power to not only prevent further complications but to simplify matters as much as possible.
A-53
[a] See IV, 92.
Note: The "B" above refers to the "Oral" Statement B handed to Nomura on Wednesday afternoon by Mr. Hull.
Trans. 11-15-41
No. 108
FROM: Washington November 13, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1089.
Re my # 1087 [a].
On this, the 13th, Wakasugi called on Ballantine.
(1) Wakasugi said:
"Yesterday's conversations led to no settlement and moreover, the outcome of it fell far short of Japanese anticipations. The times have become exceedingly critical and the Japanese people have become impatient with regard to the Japanese-U. S. conversations. They are becoming desperate as far as Japanese-U. S. relations are concerned. This being the general condition in Japan, and being confronted with the fact that it is the eve of the convening of the session of the Diet, the government of Japan is anxious to have these U. S.-Japanese talks reach some conclusion without a moment's unnecessary delay.
"The above is as was explained forcefully in yesterday's conversations. In the next conversations, any discussions of general attitudes and comments on the possible outlook should be unnecessary.
"We request that Hull be asked to give a clear reply at our next meeting on the following points: Does the United States intend to accept our proposal of 25 September, including the proposals submitted by us on the 7 and 10th of this month? If not, will the United States submit a counter proposal to the above, clearly indicating the revision desired? Or, on the other hand, is the United States of the attitude that she will stick to her proposal of 21 June and make that instrument her final proposal?
"Many in Japan are of the opinion that the United States is purposely stalling the procedure", Wakasugi said.
Ballantine:
"The United States is also aware of the fact that matters have reached an exceedingly critical stage. In spite of the fact that the 11th was a holiday, it was disregarded and this matter was discussed. There is no truth in the charge that the United States is pursuing a "stalling" policy.
"However, in spite of the fact that we do not wish to appear to be quibbling about details, there are several points which will have to be explained by Japan before the United States can make definite replies.
(Part 2.)
"For example, Japan has expressed her acceptance of non-discrimination of commerce on the Pacific but on condition that said non-discriminatory treatment be applied to the entire world. Does this sweeping proposal include those nations which are at present embroiled in the war? We cannot help but have some misgivings as to when such an agreement would become effective over the entire Pacific area, if its effectivity there depends on its applicability on the nations at war."
Wakasugi:
A-54
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
"Fundamentally speaking, the basic aims of this is to bring about a U. S.-Japanese agreement. The supporters would be Japan and the United States, hence the terms are not intended to be made applicable to every country in the world. It is our intention that the United States and Japan agree upon the basic principle of non-discriminatory treatment throughout the world."
(2) Concerning the matter contained in your messages #758 [b] and #764 [c], it is true that the United States is still assuming that, as it was in the beginning, these talks are as yet in the exploratory stages through which the basis of agreements may be discovered. We, on the other hand, are going on the assumption that these are the actual negotiations. There exists, therefore, a fundamental discordant note.
Wakasugi pointed out this fact, to which Ballantine replied:
"The United States is proceeding along the lines set forth heretofore. Even as late as yesterday, Hull said that if these conversations can be carried to the point of their being made the basis of a negotiation, we could no doubt get Britain and the Netherlands to participate."
(Part 3.)
Wakasugi:
"Leaving aside the U. S. viewpoint on this particular matter for the time being, if talks between the duly recognized Ambassador of one country and the President and Secretary of State of another, concerning adjustments of relations between the two countries they represent—regardless of the form in which said talks are conducted—are not negotiations, we are indeed hard put to it to figure out what, indeed, does constitute a diplomatic negotiation.
"I request that Hull be clearly advised that we are treating the present proceedings as part of the negotiations."
(3) Regarding your message # 766 [d]:
The main objective of that day's interview was to submit our new proposal and to arrange for a meeting with the President together with Secretary Hull and to advise them that we would make a more detailed explanation at that time. For that reason, as I reported in my message, the only reference I made to the Tripartite Pact was to express my hopes that they would not insist upon enlarging the scope of the right of self-defense. Besides that, we discussed nothing pertaining to the Tripartite Pact. Hull never requested that we make a "concrete statement" concerning our relations with the Axis Powers. Had he done so, I would have been compelled to make some reply.
For the sake of reassuring myself, I had Wakasugi make indirect reference to this matter to Ballantine who was present on the occasion in question. Wakasugi asked Ballantine if he could remember any other points that might have been discussed, stating that he wanted this information for the sake of the records. Ballantine replied that he could recall nothing further.
If any mention was made of the topic you state was in the records of the meeting, it would not be likely that Ballantine, who was the only other person there, knows nothing about it. No doubt there is some mistake there. You are aware, of course, that the United States is trying to get us to assure them on our stand with regard to our duties under the terms of the Pact. You can see that by the contents of their proposal.
A-55
(Please insert "766-(2)" following that part reading "764" in (2) of this message."
[a] See IV, 92.
[b] See IV, 71.
[c] See IV, 82. Note: In connection with this reference see last sentence above.
[d] See IV. 107.
Trans. 11-17 41
No. 109
FROM: Tokyo November 14, 1941
TO: Washington # 771.
I finally received your # 1087 [b] at 10:30 P.M. on the 13th. As I told you in my # 745 [a], I want you to wire me quickly brief summaries of such conversations as the one on the 14th. You may wire me the details later at your convenience.
[a] See IV, 100-102.
[b] See IV, 92.
Trans. 11-14-41
No. 110
FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 14, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1090.
(Part 1 of 3.) (Departmental Secret.)
(To be handled in Government Code.)
I am telling Your Excellency this for your own information only.
I believe that I will win out in the long run in these negotiations, and I will fight to the end. I will do my very best with infinite patience and then leave the outcome up to God Almighty. However, I must tell you the following:
1. As I told you in a number of messages, the policy of the American Government in the Pacific is to stop any further moves on our part either southward or northward. With every economic weapon at their command, they have attempted to achieve this objective, and now they are contriving by every possible means to prepare for actual warfare.
2. In short, they are making every military and every other kind of preparation to prevent us from a thrust northward or a thrust southward; they are conspiring most actively with the nations concerned and rather than yield on this fundamental political policy of theirs in which they believe so firmly, they would not hesitate, I am sure, to fight us. It is not their intention, I know, to repeat such a thing as the Munich conference which took place several years ago and which turned out to be such a failure. Already I think the apex of German victories has been passed. Soviet resistance persists, and the possibility of a separate peace has receded, and hereafter this trend will be more and more in evidence.
A-56
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
3. The United States is sealing ever-friendlier relations with China, and insofar as possible she is assisting CHIANG. For the sake of peace in the Pacific, the United States would not favor us at the sacrifice of China. Therefore, the China problem might become the stumbling block to the pacification of the Pacific and as a result the possibility of the United States and Japan ever making up might vanish.
Trans. 11-17-41
No. 111
FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 14, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1090.
(Urgent)
(Part 2 of 3.) (Departmental Secret.)
(To be handled in Government Code.)
4. There is also the question of whether the officials of the Japanese Government are tying up very intimately with the Axis or not. We are regarded as having a very flexible policy, ready, nevertheless, in any case, to stab the United States right in the back. Lately the newspapers are writing in a manner to show how gradually we are tying up closer and closer with the Axis.
5. If we carry out a venture southward for the sake of our existence and our lives, it naturally follows that we will have to fight England and the United States, and chances are also great that the Soviet will participate. Furthermore, among the neutral nations, those of Central America are already the puppets of the United States, and as for those of South America, whether they like it or not, they are dependent for their economic existence on the United States and must maintain a neutrality partial thereto.
6. It is inevitable that this war will be long, and this little victory or that little victory, or this little defeat or that little defeat do not amount to much, and it is not hard to see that whoever can hold out till the end will be the victor.
7. It is true that the United States is gradually getting in deeper and deeper in the Atlantic, but this is merely a sort of convoy warfare, and as things now stand she might at any moment transfer her main strength to the Pacific.
Trans. 11-17-41
No. 112
FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 14, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1090.
(Part 3 of 3.) (Secret outside the Department.)
Great Britain, too, in the light of the present condition of the German and Italian navies, has, without a doubt, moved considerable strength into the area of the Indian Ocean. I had expected in the past that should the United States start war-like activities in the Atlantic, there would be considerable feeling for a compromise in the Pacific, but there has been no evidence of such an inclination as yet. There are even now many arguments against war with Germany as opposed to internal questions, but there is not the slightest opposition to war in the Pacific. It is being thought more than ever that participation will be carried out through the Pacific area.
A-57
8. Though I cannot be a hundred per cent sure of the present situation in Japan, having read your successive wires I realize that the condition must be very critical. In spite of the fact that it is my understanding that the people and officials, too, are tightening their belts, I am going to pass on to you my opinion, even though I know that I will be harshly criticized for it. I feel that should the situation in Japan permit, I would like to caution patience for one or two months in order to get a clear view of the world situation. This, I believe, would be the best plan.
Furthermore, I would like to call your attention again to my wires Nos. 894 [a] and 901 [b] sent to you on the 3rd and 4th of November, respectively.
[a] Message in which NOMURA gives his views on the present world situation.
[b] (See III, 246) Ambassador Nomura apologizes for expressing himself carelessly on the spur of the moment on October 3 and ventures the opinion that Japan will have to drastically reorganize her economy before she is able to become self-sufficient as a result of the establishment of the sphere of co-prosperity. He suggests a profitable foothold from a southward movement within several years.
Trans. 11-22-41
No. 113
FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 14, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1093.
Re my # 1073 [a].
According to what _____ [b], told IGUCHI, the document which the Chinese Ambassador submitted to the State Department was a message which CHIANG KAI-SHEK had addressed to the President and contained a plea for intensive American aid to China in the event Japan attacks the Burma Road; but, since the United States Government rejected the plea, T. V. SOONG is now endeavoring to get Secretary HULL and the President interested in it.
Please tell the telegraphic section to cancel the message indicated in the caption of your # 767 [c].
[a] (See IV, 84) The Chinese Ambassador to the United States had an audience with the President on the 10th and handed him a document.
[b] Name withheld.
[c] Not available.
Trans. 11-18-41
No. 114
FROM: Tokyo November 15, 1941
TO: Washington # 775.
Through my various messages on the subject, you are fully aware of the fact that these talks have gone beyond the preliminary stage and that they are now well within the realm of the "real thing". It is true that at the time the Konoye statement was dispatched, the negotiations were more or less conducted as preliminary to a meeting of "the leaders".
A-58
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
However, for all practical purposes, the talks had gone beyond the point where they could be termed as being of a "preliminary" nature. By that time, we had centered all of our efforts toward bringing about a speedy termination of the talks. That has been made perfectly clear. I feel sure that the United States too, regardless of what they may have said, recognized this fact from a realistic point of view.
It is true that the United States may try to say that since we made no particular mention of the changed status of the talks, they were under the impression that they were still of a preliminary nature.
Whatever the case may be, the fact remains that the date set forth in my message #736 [a] is an absolutely immovable one. Please, therefore, make the United States see the light, so as to make possible the signing of the agreement by that date.
[a] See IV, 44.
Trans. 11-15-41
No. 115
FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 15, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1098.
(In 2 parts complete.)
Let us suppose that the Japanese-U. S. negotiations for the adjustment of relations between the two countries which are being conducted at present, unfortunately break down, and that, as a consequence, we pursue an unrestricted course. The following is my guess as to what would be the relationship between the United States and Japan under such circumstances.
Much, of course, would depend on what move we make and how we make it, but
(a) It is most probable that diplomatic relations between the two countries would be broken off immediately;
(b) Even if they are not, the same situation as now exists between Germany and the United States—that is, the closing of the consulates and recalling of the Ambassador—will probably be effected. (Through the application of the order freezing the assets, economic relations have already been broken off for all practical purposes.) Under such circumstances, only a small staff will remain at the Embassy here. (Please see my separate wire # 1099 [a] for my suggestion as to the personnel of such a reduced staff.)
I presume that the government has given careful consideration as to the disposition of the various offices and our nationals residing here. I would appreciate being advised in confidence of your decision in these matters.
In the event of (b), I presume that the same procedure as was followed in the case of U. S.-Germany will be followed. That is, personnel of the consulates of the respective countries will no doubt be evacuated by mutual consent. We can see that it could be possible for the officials and businessmen who remained here at that time (they would total about 300 or 400) to be evacuated on another vessel. However, we fear that the number of persons desiring passage will undoubtedly skyrocket. The Consuls will, of course, urge our nationals to remain here even if the worst eventually should materialize, but we feel that there will be many who, because of various circumstances, will find it impossible to do so.
It will be practically impossible to make a distinction between them and officials and businessmen. Will you, therefore, give your consideration to sending enough ships to evacuate these people.
A-59
(Part 2.)
In the event of (a)
(1) No doubt some agreement between the United States and Japan will be entered into to guarantee the safe passage of Embassy and Consulate staff members, (agreements will no doubt be entered into with regard to the course of the vessel, markers, and communication methods). (One plan may be to have these officials sent to some half-way point, for example Hawaii, some port in the Aleutian Islands, or, if unavoidable to French Tahiti, on ships belonging to the nation to which they are accredited, and at such prearranged place, have the respective ships exchange passengers.) To the representative of what nation do we plan to entrust our national property and to protect the rights of our nationals remaining here? Is it correct to assume that negotiations with the country which has been selected will be completed in Tokyo with the diplomatic representative of that country and in that country by our ambassador or minister?
(2) Japanese residents here who are of military age, will undoubtedly be held here. Therefore, a plan to exchange our nationals residing here for Americans residing in Japan is conceivable, but in view of the difference in numbers, it is indeed a very slim hope. Dependence on ships of neutral register, too, would be an exceedingly precarious undertaking should war actually be declared. We would appreciate being advised of the government's attitude on these points.
[a] See IV, 116.
Trans. 11-19-41
No. 116
FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 15, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1099.
1. Duties are to be limited to only the most pressing matters. Other non-urgent duties, such as auditing of accounts, will be dropped. Accordingly, I desire to have one or two secretaries, two foreign service attaches, and one clerk ordered back to Japan. (There are family considerations involved in the case of Foreign Service Attaches Fujiyama and Inagawa. If possible we would like to have these two returned to Japan.)
2. The intelligence staff will not be returned (to Japan). Instead, we plan to arrange for their transfer to South America; (Secretary Terazaki and Clerk Yamamoto).
3. All overseas students and so-called student attaches will be returned to Japan or transferred elsewhere. (Attaches Ando, Honjo, Nishibori, Arita, Matsui and six 2nd class clerks.)
4. Employees engaged locally will be dismissed as the occasion may demand.
5. Those returning to Japan would go in one of the evacuee ships. Those transferring to South America, or elsewhere, would leave immediately for their posts.
Trans. 11-19-41
A-60
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
No. 117
FROM: Tokyo November 15, 1941
TO: Washington #781.
To Ambassador Kurusu.
I wish to express my sympathy on the presumption that you must be experiencing considerable fatigue as a consequence of your long trip by air. Not only this Minister, but everyone in government circles, feels deep gratitude that you have agreed to tackle the exceedingly difficult problems which confront us. As I said, I realize that your task is a difficult one, but at the same time it is an important one; success or failure will have a great bearing on the rise or decline of our nation.
Please explain to Ambassador Nomura the conditions which exist here, and at the same time describe our determinations in detail to him. After you have perfect understanding of each other, cooperate with him in an unsparing effort to guide the negotiations to an early settlement. That is my fervent prayer which I hope may be granted.
Even after the presentation of the final proposal by us, the U. S. Government apparently continues to show laxness. There are even those who suspect that the United States is intentionally stalling for time. In view of the fact that the crisis is fast approaching, no subsidiary complications can be countenanced even when considering the time element alone. Such an eventuality would make impossible the surmounting of the crisis.
Please familiarize yourself with my various instructions to Ambassador Nomura on this subject, after which do everything in your power to make the United States come to the realization that it is indeed a critical situation. I beg of you to make every effort to have them cooperate with us in assuring peace on the Pacific.
Because of your expressed desires prior to your departure from here, we have not as yet presented our "B" proposal to the United States. We are of the opinion, however, that we had better submit it to them at an early opportunity.
Trans. 11-17-41
No. 118
FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 14, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1094.
(To be handled in Government code.)
My interview of the 14th, with Secretary of State HULL, has been postponed until 9:00 a.m. the 16th, to suit their convenience. Furthermore, I have contacted them and arranged an interview with the President for 11:00 a.m. on the 16th for Ambassador KURUSU and myself. (Prior to this interview we plan to pay our respects to Secretary of State HULL.)
Trans. 11-18-41
No. 119
FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 15, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1095.
(In 2 parts complete.)
On this, the 15th, I, accompanied by Wakasugi, called on Secretary Hull, (Ballantine was also present), for an interview which lasted about one hour and a half. I shall report in detail subsequently, but in the meantime, I am sending you a resume of the meeting as follows:
A-61
The United States handed us an explanation of their stand on the "non-discriminatory treatment in commerce" matter, which I am forwarding to you as separate wire "A", numbered my message # 1096 [a]; separate wire "B", numbered my message # 1097 [b], contains the text of their proposal involving this matter. (The latter is a proposed joint statement on economic policy and is composed of (1) general policy; (2) Japanese-U. S. relations; and, (3) policies involving the Pacific area.)
We stated that we would give these notes our careful study and after requesting our government's advice, would make a reply. We went on to say that we insist that these talks have now progressed to the negotiations stage.
To this Hull replied that before any settlements can be reached, it is necessary that other countries involved, such as Britain and the Netherlands East Indies, be consulted. This procedure is desired by Japan too, he pointed out. There are reasons, he said, that make it inconvenient for the United States to state that negotiations are being conducted with Japan alone, before they have had a chance to participate therein. He went on to repeat that for those reasons, these talks shall continue to be of an exploratory nature. At the same time, the continuation of these conversations shall not be hampered, he promised.
We then requested that he reply with regard to other matters to which Hull said:
"Japan on the one hand is attempting to enter into a peaceful agreement with the United States, while simultaneously, on the other hand, she is insisting that her military alliance with Germany be maintained. I, personally, can understand Japan's explanations, however, I feel that it would be exceedingly difficult to make the general U. S. public and even of the world, see through the seeming paradox.
(Part 2.)
"For this reason, it is essential that we have the definite word of the new Japanese Cabinet on the peaceful policy. In other words, it is essential that this new Cabinet give definite recognition and approval of the statement submitted by the previous government concerning this matter. On 21 June, we made certain proposals which concerned political stabilization of the entire Pacific area. Even if Japan were to favor limiting this area to only the south-western Pacific area, the United States would continue to desire that it be made applicable to the entire Pacific area.
"Therefore, we shall submit our reply on the other two points only after we have received a reply to the proposal we are submitting to you today."
We therefore stated that our government's attitude has already been expressed by the contents of our proposal through which it may be seen that there have been no changes therein. However, for the sake of reassurance, we would ascertain this point, we said.
Hull expressed several doubts concerning our relations to the Tripartite Pact. He pointed out that in spite of the Japanese-U. S. S. R. neutrality pact, it was apparently essential that great armed forces of both countries had to constantly face each other across the Japanese-U. S. S. R. border. The United States wants no peace of that nature. He went on to say that the United States desires that simultaneously with a peace agreement between Japan and the United States, the Tripartite Pact shall become a mere scrap of paper.
We, therefore, repeated that part of our proposal which involved that alliance and again pointed out that there need be no clash between U. S.-Japanese peace and the government would no doubt be very disappointed at the results of today's conversations. We then decided to meet again after I had received my government's further instructions.
Will you, therefore, please rush your instructions concerning the matters contained herein.
[a] See IV, 121.
[b] See IV, 127.
Trans. 11-18-41
A-62
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
No. 120
FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 15, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1106.
(In 6 parts, complete.)
Chief of Office routing
The following is the conversation I had with Hull on the 15th, the gist of which I reported to you in my message # 1095 [a]:
Hull said that the United States is making sincere efforts too, and through such efforts, he said, he is now able to present a proposal concerning the commerce problem. So saying, he related to me Note "A", which was reported to you as my message # 1096 [b].
Hull: "The United States has entered into trade agreements with 22 nations, all of which are based on the status of a "most-favored nation." Through them trade barriers throughout the world are being removed. There actually are between 1000 and 1200 articles on which tariffs have been substantially reduced. I strongly advocated this policy at the Economic Conference which was held in London some time ago, but because opposition to it was voiced by some, it was not adopted at that time." (He added that Germany was one of the countries which was opposed to it.)
"In this way, the United States desires to apply the non-discriminatory policy over a wide scope. Japan wants that part of the proposal which advocates the application of these terms to the entire Pacific area to be revised so that it will be applicable to the entire world. The United States is unable to guarantee any conditions which are outside of the United States' sphere of influence. Therefore, I hope that Japan will agree to delete her condition, in which she insists that she will agree to applying the non-discriminatory treatment to the Pacific area only if it is applied to the world."
(Part 2.)
So saying, he submitted Note "B" which contains the U. S. proposal and which was sent to you as my message # 1097 [c]. Wakasugi asked Hull if this was a counter proposal to that part of our proposal which we submitted the other day concerning the three major problems pertaining to non-discrimination. Hull replied that in its application it covers a wider range, (meaning, apparently, that its contents covers a wider range). I, therefore, advised Hull that we would give it our study and that we would seek our government's opinion thereon after which I would submit our reply.
I said: "Since official proposals have been submitted by me to the President and the Secretary of State, we feel that these talks should be looked upon as negotiations."
Hull: "Your government may consider these talks as being negotiations today. As I said at our previous meeting, however, the subjects being discussed must be taken up with Britain, Netherlands, and others. Moreover, the Foreign Minister himself told Ambassador Grew in Tokyo that it was essential that those countries participate in the negotiations. For these reasons, we feel that it is necessary to hold these preliminary exploratory conversations between Japan and the United States first. It would be inappropriate if we were to consider these talks formal negotiations, because then it would seem as if we were trying to force whatever settlement we reached upon those other nations.
"I feel that we should first find the basic principles on which a suitable agreement could be reached, after which, the United States would reveal its attitude to those other countries, and ask them to participate in the final settlement. Thus until we work things out to a point which would seem to be satisfactory to all parties concerned, I shall consider these talks to be exploratory in nature.
A-63
(Part 3.)
"From a more practical viewpoint, too, if there were negotiations, the free exchange of opinions between the United States and Japan would be considerably hindered. In Tokyo the Foreign Minister requested to Ambassador Grew that ----- (several lines missing).
"In the United States proposal of 21 June, the United States advocates that that part pertaining to the political stabilization be made applicable to the entire Pacific area. Japan wants to limit it to the southwestern Pacific area only. In view of the fact that my talks with Your Excellency concerns the establishment of peace in the entire Pacific area, I find it difficult to understand Japan's desires to so limit the area. I would like to have this point explained."
He went on to repeat what he has said from time to time before, regarding Japan's peace policies and her connections in the Tripartite Pact.
(Part 4.)
Hull, as he did on the previous occasion, requested that the present government of Japan give its definite approval of the spirit of peace contained in our statement of 28 August.
I therefore replied: "The spirit of that statement was contained in our lastest proposal and therefore I am convinced that there has been no change in our government's attitude. We are doing everything in our power to bring about a settlement so that peace may be guaranteed on the Pacific. It is true that the words "southwestern Pacific" appear in the main text of our proposal, but in the preface thereto we made it clear that our aims are to establish and maintain peace on the entire Pacific area."
Hull: "The preface is not a part of the main text and therefore its contents had no binding powers. The only parts which have any binding powers are the contents of the main text."
So saying, he again repeated his doubts as to Japan's expressed peaceful intentions.
He went on to say that Japan is apparently wanting to enter into a peaceful agreement with the United States on the one hand while maintaining a military alliance with Germany on the other.
Hull: "I, myself, can understand Japan's viewpoint and explanations on this matter. The general public, however, are aware only that Japan is allied to Germany and to it—the general public—this has a very militaristic connotation. Should the United States, disregarding what seems to be a paradox, enter into a peace agreement with Japan, the general public and the world in general would probably howl with laughter. We would be in a very difficult position to try to make any explanations.
"If Japan succeeds in coming to an agreement with the United States, she would not find it necessary to hold on to the Tripartite Agreement, would she?
(Part 5.)
"While on the one hand Japan is asking that Britain and the Netherlands, which are at war with Germany, participate in a peaceful agreement which is to be established between Japan and the United States, while on the other she negotiates a military alliance with Germany which is the enemy of Britain and the Netherlands. That is incongruous."
I: "We have already explained our position in the Tripartite Pact in our proposal. As I said before, an alliance and a peace agreement need not necessarily be at odds with each other as may be seen by the example of the Japanese-British alliance. Fundamentally speaking, this alliance in question has peace as its main objective. Germany, too, understands that the alliance would not conflict with peace between Japan and the United States."
Hull: "If Japan insists on adhering to the alliance with Germany even after an agreement is reached between Japan and the United States, we could not explain the apparent paradox to other countries. The United States does not desire a situation such as exists between Japan and the U. S. S. R., which in spite of the fact that a Neutrality Pact exists, vast armed forces of each nation must constantly be facing each other across the national boundary.
A-64
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
We desire that simultaneously with the establishment of an agreement between Japan and the United States, the Tripartite Pact shall disappear." (He called it a "dead letter".)
Wakasugi: "In other words, do you mean that a U. S.-Japanese agreement is an impossibility as long as Japan does not withdraw from the Triple Alliance?"
Hull: "A peace agreement and a military alliance must be at odds with each other. Therefore, if and when an understanding is reached between Japan and the United States, I desire that the alliance become a dead letter".
Wakasugi: "May we consider that as your reply to our proposal pertaining to the matter of right of self-defense which is a part of the other two subjects?"
(Part 6.)
Hull: "Our reply to the other two problems will be issued after we receive: Definite assurance that your present government approves the peace policy expressed in a statement issued by the previous government; clarification of the meaning of changing "the entire Pacific area" in the U. S. proposal, to Japan's proposal's "southwestern Pacific area"; Japan's reply to today's U. S. proposal regarding a joint statement on the economic policy."
I said: "In view of the very critical situation, I am afraid that my government will be very disappointed over your replies."
We agreed to meet again after I had received further instructions from my home government.
Today's talks can be boiled down to the fact that the United States did clarify their attitude on the trade question. On the other two problems, although we agree in principle, we differ on interpretations. They harbor deep doubts as to the sincerity of our peaceful intentions and apparently they view the China situation through those eyes of suspicion.
Since the above seems to have been fairly clearly established, will you please speedily express your definite approval of the government's statement involved, so that we may make a reply to their proposal.
[a] See IV, 119.
[b] See IV, 121.
[c] See IV, 127.
Trans. 11-21-41
No. 121
FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 15, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1096.
(Part 1 of 6.)
Chief of Office Routing.
Separate wire A.
Strictly confidential.
Oral.
The Japanese Government has stated that it "recognizes the principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations to be applied to all the Pacific areas, inclusive of China, on the understanding that the principle in question is to be applied uniformly to the rest of the entire world as well. " (Italics added)
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The italicized portion of the statement sets forth a condition the meaning of which is not entirely clear. It is assumed, however, that it is not the intention of the Japanese Government to ask the government of the United States to assume responsibility for discriminatory practices in areas outside of its sovereign jurisdiction, or to propose including in an arrangement with the United States a condition which could be fulfilled only with the consent and cooperation of all other governments.
Note: This is Mr. Hull's Note, handed Nomura this date.
Trans. 11-18-41
No. 122
FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 15, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1096.
(Part 2 of 6.)
The principle of unconditional most-favored-nation treatment has for many years been the cornerstone of the commercial policy of the United States. Since the first world war this principle has been embodied in virtually every commercial treaty concluded by this government.
Since 1934, when the United States embarked upon an extensive program of commercial agreements for the reduction of trade barriers, it has constantly applied this principle. In twenty-two agreements this government has on its part reduced duties on over a thousand classifications of the American tariff, and it has extended these reductions to Japan (and) all other countries of the world with only two exceptions. These exceptions have been countries whose commercial practices represented a flagrant departure from the principle of non-discriminatory treatment.
Trans. 11-19-41
No. 123
FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 15, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1096.
(Part 3 of 6.)
The withholding of trade-agreement concessions from those countries was itself a step in furtherance of the policy of non-discrimination since the purpose was to create inducement for the abandonment of discriminatory practices. One of the countries from which the benefit of such concessions had been withheld abandoned its flagrant discriminatory measures; and the United States at once extended to that country the benefit of the duty reductions made in its trade agreements.
The government of the United States has not only placed its own trade relations with foreign countries on an unconditional most-favored-nation basis, but has sought consistently to further the application of that policy throughout the world. On every appropriate occasion it has urged upon other countries the adoption of non-discriminatory policies and has sought to bring about the progressive elimination of preferences and discriminations of all kinds.
Trans. 11-19-41
A-66
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
No. 124
FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 15, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1096.
(Part 4 of 6.)
In the twenty-two trade agreements above referred to, the government of the United States has obtained from foreign countries commitments respecting the reduction of tariffs and other trade barriers on thousands of products. These concessions affect products which are imported not only from the United States but from other countries as well. The government of the United States has neither sought nor accepted commitments whereby these benefits would be restricted to imports from the United States. On the contrary, it has obtained these reductions in the trade barriers of foreign countries on the assumption and expectation that they would be extended to other supplying countries. Indeed, as part of its general policy of non-discrimination in international trade, it has advocated the extension to all countries of the concessions made in such agreements.
In this way the reduction of trade barriers which results from a program of trade agreements such as that pursued by the United States is given the widest possible effect and makes the maximum contribution to the building up of world trade from which all nations benefit.
Trans. 11-19-41
No. 125
FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 15, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1096.
(Part 5 of 6.)
Chief of Office Routing.
It is believed that, if Japan would devote itself to wholehearted cooperation in furthering the policy of non-discrimination as practiced and advocated by the government of the United States and as practiced and advocated for many years by the government of Japan, a long forward step would be taken toward attaining the objective which the Japanese Government's statement under reference has in view.
In the light of the foregoing, the government of the United States raises question whether in the view of the Japanese Government there is need of the proviso under discussion, namely, "on the understanding that the principle in question is to be applied uniformly to the rest of the entire world as well," and whether the proviso might not be omitted.
Trans. 11-18-41
No. 126
FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 15, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1096.
(Part 6 of 6.)
As a practical manifestation of the way in which the government of the United States has applied and is prepared to apply the principle of non-discrimination in international com-
A-67
mercial relations, there is offered for consideration as a purely tentative suggestion a draft of a possible United States-Japanese declaration on economic policy. It is understood, of course, that agreement as to such a declaration is subject to agreement on the other points involved in a peaceful settlement covering the Pacific area as a whole and that this government would expect, before entering into negotiations on such a possible United States-Japanese declaration on economic policy, to discuss the matter with the British Government and with other specially interested governments.
Trans. 11-19-41
No. 127
FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 15, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1097.
(Part 1 of 4.)
Separate wire B.
Strictly Confidential Unofficial, Exploratory and Without Commitment.
Joint declaration by the United States and Japan on economic policy.
1. General policy.
1. The government of the United States and the government of Japan undertake to cooperate fully in urging all nations to reduce trade barriers, to eliminate all forms of discrimination in international commercial relations, and in general to work toward the creation of conditions of international trade and international investment under which all countries will have a reasonable opportunity to secure, through peaceful trade processes, the means of acquiring those goods and commodities which each country needs for the safe-guarding and development of its economy.
2. The government of the United States and the government of Japan undertake that each of them shall make its appropriate contribution toward the creation of the type of international economic relations envisaged above.
Note: This is text of note "B" given Nomura by Mr. Hull.
Trans. 11-18-41
No. 128
FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 15, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1097.
(Part 2 of 4.)
3. As important steps in that direction, the government of the United States and the government of Japan shall establish between themselves and shall seek to establish in the Pacific area the economic relationships indicated below.
2. The United States-Japan relationship
1. The United States and Japan undertake to inaugurate, as rapidly as practicable, measures toward restoring the commercial, financial and other economic relationships between them to a normal basis.
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THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
2. The United States and Japan agree to enter into discussion looking toward the negotiation of a reciprocal trade agreement between the two countries.
3. It is understood that during the present international emergency Japan and the United States each shall permit export to the other of commodities for its own use subject to such restrictions or limitations as may be required by each for its own security and self-defense. It is understood that both governments will apply any such restrictions or limitations in the spirit dominating relations with friendly nations.
Trans. 11-19-41
No. 129
FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 15, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1097.
(Part 3 of 4.)
3. Policy in the Pacific area
1. Complete control over its economic, financial and monetary affairs shall be restored to China.
2. The government of the United States and the government of Japan undertake not to seek in China any preferential or monopolistic commercial or other economic rights for them-selves or their nationals, but to use all their influence toward securing in China commercial treatment for themselves no less favorable than that accorded to any third country and full cooperation in the promotion of the general policy stated in the first paragraph of this declaration.
3. The government of the United States and the government of Japan undertake to suggest to the Chinese government that it inaugurate, with foreign assistance where necessary, a comprehensive program of economic development, a full opportunity to participate in which shall be accorded the United States and Japan on terms no less favorable than those accorded any third country.
Trans. 11-19-41
No. 130
FROM: Washington November 15, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1097.
(Part 4 of 4.)
4. The relations which the United States and Japan, respectively, will seek to establish with other countries of the Pacific area shall be governed by the basic principles set forth in this declaration, and the governments of the United States and of Japan agree to urge those countries, wherever possible, to undertake comprehensive programs of economic development with full opportunity to participate in such programs, in so far as foreign assistance may be requested, accorded to the United States and to Japan on terms no less favorable than those accorded any third country.
Trans. 12-2-41
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No. 131
FROM: Tokyo November 16, 1941
TO: Washington # 782.
(To be handled in government code.)
Re your # 1083 [a].
1. Please give the following reply to them regarding the question of recognition:
----- the various points in the statement made by the Japanese Government on August 28, which is included in the American oral statement (quote only the points given in the said oral statement) were also included in our proposals of September 6 and 25, and the present cabinet also has no objection to recognizing them as they stand. However, these points have been given on the assumption that the Japanese-American negotiations would reach an agreement. Naturally, therefore, should the negotiations end in a failure, these points would not be binding on Japan alone. We wish to have this clearly understood.
2. Regarding the general question of use of force, the expression "without provocation" was used in the reply of the Japanese Government made on August 28. In the same reply, relative to the Soviet question, we used the words "as long as the Soviet Union remains faithful to the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Treaty" and then in our proposal of September 6, we used the words "without any justifiable reason." Now all these expressions mean fundamentally the same thing. The reason for our having gone somewhat into detail concerning the Soviet Union is that we found it necessary to do so in view of the connection between the existence of the Japan-Soviet Neutrality Treaty and the Russo-German war.
In short, we had stipulated the "qualification" which we as an independent country should necessarily and naturally state. It goes without saying that this qualification by no means either limits nor minimizes our peaceful intentions.
[a] See IV, 93-99.
Trans. 11-17-41
No. 132
FROM: Tokyo November 17, 1941
TO: Washington # 783.
Re your # 1110 [a].
We have no objections to have it apply to the entire Pacific area. Therefore, we shall not object to your deleting the word "southwestern" from Article 6 of our proposal of 25 September.
[a] Not available.
Trans. 11-17-41
No. 133
FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 17, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1118.
(Part 1 of 5.)
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THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
(To be handled in government code.)
On the morning of the 17th at half-past ten, I, accompanied by Ambassador KURUSU, called on Secretary HULL. First HULL said, "After the last war there were no able statesmen; therefore, a situation like the present one came about. What we have to think about now is saving the world from this sort of extremity." KURUSU replied, "I am in entire agreement with what you say. Fortunately, the United States and Japan, who have not yet participated in this war, have a grave responsibility on their shoulders for working in this direction. However, before we can talk about that, there are some things which have to be settled between Japan and the United States. Still, if we do not engage in concrete negotiations, we cannot get anywhere." (Then he went on briefly to tell how he had come to the United States at the behest of the Premier and Your Excellency.) Then he continued: "The Premier earnestly hopes for a settlement between Japan and the United States. As a matter of fact, he seems to be rather hopeful beyond expectation. There are at present three problems causing a deadlock between Japan and the United States. They are: Equality in commerce, the Tripartite Agreement, and evacuation. The Premier seems to be very hopeful of a settlement concerning the first two. However, when it comes to the third question—that of evacuation—he seems to entertain great concern.
Trans. 11-21-41
No. 134
FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 18, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1119.
(Strictly secret.)
(Restricted distribution.)
Re my # 1118 [a].
I presented the contents of your messages numbered #782 [b] (?) and #783 [c] to the Secretary of State at the time of our interview on the 17th, in the form of a verbal statement.
[a] (See IV, 133 and 135-137) Ambassador NOMURA's report of the conference with the President and Secretary HULL on the 17th.
[b] (See IV, 131) Tokyo's reply to the United States' oral statement of November 12, regarding the question of recognition and the general question of use of force.
[c] (See IV, 132) Tokyo wires Washington that it is all right to delete the word "southwestern" from Article 6 of the proposal of the 25th, thus having it apply to the entire Pacific area.
Trans. 11-22-41
No. 135
FROM: Washington November 17, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1118.
(Extremely Urgent.)
(Part 2 of 5.)
Since the time had come to meet the President and since HULL has expressed his wish to continue the conversation in the presence of the President, we all left our seats. Together with Secretary HULL, I went to see the President at 11:00 a.m.
A-71
KURUSU began his conversation by saying, "As I had already told Secretary HULL, the present Cabinet is very much interested in the Japanese-American negotiations. You, Mr. President, as a statesman, no doubt well understand in what frame of mind the Japanese people are after four years of experience in the China incident. While on my way to this country I noticed—though I am not by any means an expert in making such observations—that the situation is militarily strained in Hong Kong, Manila and in other islands. The situation is so tense that we cannot tell when an explosion would occur and, even if it occurred, of what benefit would such a situation be to the United States and Japan? (The President showed that he felt the same way.) To be sure Japan wishes that the Japanese-American negotiations would prove to be a success. However, the time element must be taken into consideration. Delaying the solution avails Japan nothing since in the meantime conditions, both militarily and economically, would become less favorable to her if she is to defend herself. The Premier also seems to be quite hopeful that all of the three questions, namely, that of the Three Power Alliance and Pact and the question of withdrawing troops would be settled. [a] However, he is very much worried over the question of withdrawing troops."
[a] Translator's note: Apparently the writer neglected to include in the three questions that of non-discrimination in trade.
Trans. 11-18-41
No. 136
FROM: Washington November 17, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1118.
(Part 3 of 5.)
The President: "A long time ago, Secretary of State Bryan once said, 'There is no last word between friends'."
"There have been many so-called 'non-aggression pacts' in the past, but all of them are now out of date. I believe, however, that by the establishing of some general understanding between the United States and Japan, the situation may be saved."
Kurusu: "That would seem to be very acceptable from my point of view. From my way of looking at it, apparently the main difficulties in the U. S.-Japanese negotiations to date, have been over the problem of what to do about Japan's connections with the Tripartite Pact, and what to do about the various claims that the United States has made with regard to the method in which the China Incident should be settled. In the final analysis, it would seem as if adjusting these two points is the main problem at hand at the present time.
"With regard to the Tripartite problem, Japan is bound by certain duties under the terms of that instrument. Moreover, she must consider her dignity and honor as a great power. Because of these considerations, it is impossible for her to violate the terms of the alliance. Since the United States has been strongly insisting right along that international agreements must be adhered to, I cannot believe that the United States is urging us to do so now. I feel doubly sure of this where the Tripartite Pact is concerned since the basic objectives of that pact are the prevention of the war's spreading and the maintenance of peace.
"Under these circumstances, it seems as though it should be possible to coordinate and adjust the two problems so as to bring about a settlement. Please understand, however, that no proposal, regardless of how good it may sound, can be accepted by Japan if the terms contained therein cannot be put into effect."
A-72
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
The President: "With regard to the China problem, I have been advised that Japan finds the withdrawal of troops from China a very difficult undertaking. The United States is not trying to intervene or mediate in the problems of Japan and China. I don't know whether there is such a word in the parlance of diplomats or not, but the United States' only intention is to become an 'introducer'."
Trans. 11-22-41
No. 137
FROM: Washington November 17, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1118.
(Parts 4 and 5 of 5.)
(Part 4.)
Kurusu: "Concerning Japan's duties to go to war under the terms of the Tripartite Pact, Japan has stated that Japan alone will determine this. The United States apparently interprets this to mean that Japan will wait until the United States is deeply involved in the battle on the Atlantic and then stab the United States in the back. This is not the case. There have been indications in the past that there are those in the United States who have been laboring under the erroneous belief that Japan would move at Germany's demands; that Japan was merely Germany's tool. Japan issued the statement that she would act in accordance with Japan's decisions alone, for the purpose of correcting this misapprehension.
"In any event, if at this time a great understanding between the United States and Japan with regard to the Pacific can be reached as described by the President, such an understanding would far out-shine the Tripartite Pact. Under such circumstances, I feel confident that all doubts you may harbor regarding the application of the Tripartite Pact would automatically and completely melt away."
At this point, Hull broke in, and after describing Germany's policy of conquest, said: "Suppose that Germany succeeds in conquering England and then establishes various subservient governments in South America. Suppose after that that Germany attacks the United States with the British fleet. If the United States waits till then, it would be too late regardless of what she tries to do. That is why the United States must prepare her defenses now and this is what the United States calls her rights under defense. There is no reason why Japan cannot see this."
Thus did Hull go over his theory again.
The President: "The map I referred to in my speech the other day, which described German policy in Central and South America, was an authentic map. Its source was the German Government circles."
(Part 5.)
Kurusu: "Mr. President, a while ago you made reference to the general relationship between Japan and the United States. As long as we are speaking of peace on the Pacific, and since at least one side of the western hemisphere is on the Pacific, the various countries in Central and South America must be covered when we speak of the Pacific area. It would be impossible for Japan to be a partner in any project aimed at disturbing the peace of the western hemisphere.
"You say that people would give voice to their disapproval should these negotiations lead to a successful settlement between us on the grounds that Japan would be promising the United States peace while on the other hand she would be carrying the spear for Germany. From the beginning, however, the Japanese Government has been saying that should a just peace be established on the Pacific, she would withdraw her troops from French Indo-China. If, therefore, matters progress to that point, this withdrawal should satisfy the general public of the United States as actual proof of Japan's peaceful intentions.
A-73
"In any event, I am convinced that the immediate objective is to successfully and speedily come to an agreement on the various problems now being discussed at present between Ambassador Nomura and Secretary Hull."
Hull: "I favor the continuation of these talks. Heretofore, I and Ambassador Nomura have met and talked on numerous occasions but we always seem to come to a certain point and then start going around and around the same circle. I would welcome your—Kurusu—attacking this point from a different angle."
The President expressed his approval of this, and said: "I am planning to remain in Washington until this Saturday (the 24th). I shall be glad to discuss matters with you and Secretary Hull at any time before then.
Trans. 11-21-41
No. 138
FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 17, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1121 (?).
Ambassador Kurusu and I expect to confer with the Secretary Hull again at 10 a.m. tomorrow, the 18th.
Trans. 11-21-41
No. 139
November 18, 1941
Communications Intelligence Report:
These were the important points:
Date of Operations Serial
October 23-29, 1941 19-41, No. 907-100
Oct. 23
"Shinto Maru # 2 who has been previously serving the South China Fleet will probably move into the Mandates in the near future."
"Comairron 24 and Commander Yokohama Air Group are in Wotje vicinity. Commander Chitose Air Group is at Saipan. Commander Combined Air Force is appearing more frequently in traffic concerning the 24th Airron and with the Fourth Base Force Air Group."
Oct. 24
"During the evening two unidentified Marus (air tenders) were heard working KONGO MARU (Tender?). Direction-finder bearings indicate these units are probably enroute to the Mandates." (Marked by asterisk to denote important.)
Oct. 25
"The following units originated movement reports today—Commander # 1 Base Force CinC Third Fleet, Commander Northern Blockade Force, Commander Airron 6 and Commander Airrons Combined Fleet. This may be an indication of a large scale movement or possibly only a few ships in each group. Traffic routing and direction-finding bearings indicate no change in general direction."
"Shinto Maru #2 is now enroute to the Mandates apparently having Saipan as a destination."
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THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
"A new division is now being formed in the 4th Base Force at Truk. The Commander is now aboard an unidentified vessel enroute to Saipan from Truk. Two Maru units are apparently now enroute from the Empire to the Mandates to join this command."
Oct. 26
"NAGURA(?) (Salvage vessel) has now departed Yokosuka enroute to the Mandates."
"Considerable confusion now exists on all Mandate circuits, due largely to the extensive use of secret calls. Airron 24 units are continuously active on aircraft frequencies and traffic shows indication of the presence of a part of the Staff of the Combined Air Force command in the Mandates. Air Group Commanders make frequent changes in location, principally between Saipan, Truk, Jaluit and Wotje. Fourth Fleet units are concentrated in Truk area. Traffic indicates an increase in size on the 4th, 5th and 6th Base Force, particularly the 6th. Several additional itinerant marus are now moving toward the Mandates, some of which have previously been active in China waters. Traffic headings have indicated a possible connection between some Third and Fifth Fleet Units with Base Force units in Jaluit area. Occasional dispatches are originated by major units of the First and Second Fleets addressed to Mandate Base Force activities. As a result of the general appearance of traffic the following major units are being watched for a possible move into Mandate area: First Fleet, Second Fleet, Third Fleet, Fifth Fleet, Submarine Force, Combined Air Forces or Air Squadrons, Combined Fleet." (All marked by asterisk to denote important.)
"MATSUEI MARU—Fourth Fleet repair ship is now at Truk having recently arrived there from Palao area."
Oct. 28
"Commander Yokohama Air Group is at Wotje (Marshall Islands)."
"Increased radio activity between Mandates Islands and various units of the Combined and Third Fleets have been noted for the past two days possibly indicating movements of additional units to the Mandated area." (Marked by an asterisk to denote important.)
"Commander Third Base Force—Palao Area and a part of the Third Base Force staff is now aboard the KASHIMA, flagship Fourth Fleet in Truk area."
Oct. 29
"The KOMOBASHI is now on a course for the Ponape having completed a large irregular circuit around the Marshall Islands."
No. 140
FROM: Washington November 17, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1127.
The most emphasis in the talks between Hull, myself, and Ambassador Kurusu on the 18th, (lasting about three hours), was placed on matters pertaining to the Triple Alliance. Hull, in his customary manner, denounced the Hitlerian policy of expansion through armed force. He pointed out that as long as Japan is tied up with such a policy through the Tripartite Pact, it would be difficult to adjust Japanese-U. S. relations.
Kurusu then said that it would be impossible to comply if he was demanding of Japan that she abrogate the Tripartite Pact. He also pointed out that the alliance is not aimed at expansion through the force of arms.
Hull said that he was in no position to tell Japan to abrogate the Pact but that as long as there is no substantiating proof of the real aims of the pact, it serves absolutely no purpose.
A-75
Then I and Kurusu explained that it was an impossibility to settle such a basic point in any specified time limit. However, to ease the exceedingly critical situation, the first step would be to mutually return to the situation which existed prior to the date on which the freezing of assets order was put into effect, (in other words, Japan would withdraw from south French Indo-China and the United States would rescind her order to freeze the assets). Talks should then be continued in a more congenial atmosphere, we suggested.
He did not seem particularly receptive to this suggestion. He said that if the government of Japan could make it clear that it wants to pursue a course of peace, then the United States would confer with the British on the subject of returning to the conditions which existed prior to the time that the freezing order went into effect. It is essential, however, that under those conditions, Japan continue to pursue a peaceful policy with ever increasing vigor.
There were indications that Hull, because of his usual cautious nature, was somewhat influenced by the exaggerated reports carried in the press regarding the Premier's speech in the Diet in which he expressed the three basic principles of international relations and intention of increasing the troops in French Indo China.
Details will be sent in a subsequent message.
Trans. 11-22-41
No. 141
FROM: Washington November 18, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1131.
(5 Parts.)
(Foreign Office Secret.)
(Chief of Office routing.)
On the 18th, I, together with Ambassador Kurusu called on Secretary Hull at 10:30 in the morning and we conversed for two hours and forty-five minutes.
Hull (in his customary tone): "I am one who worried about Hitler's activities right from the beginning. However, at that time, no one paid any attention. He is a man who does not know how to stop once he starts. The United States will no doubt become his objective in the near future." (So saying, he repeated his theory which he expounded on the 17th.) "In the event that Hitler continues to be victorious, Japan should be thinking of his coming on to the East Asiatic stage. If Japan doesn't see this for herself, I can't feel sorry for her." (He continued in his usual vein, bringing up again a description of the 'confused era (?)' and the turn about in Germany's attitude toward the Soviet Union.)
"The basis of the national policy of the United States is and will be the maintenance of peace. Therefore, it is impossible for the United States to ever condone the policies of Hitler which depends on expansion through the force of arms.
"As long as Japan is tied to Hitler by means of the Tripartite Pact, there shall be great difficulties in adjusting Japanese-U. S. relations".
Placing emphasis on Japan's part in the Tripartite Pact the Secretary went on to describe his point of view.
Hull: "Even if an agreement is reached between Japan and the United States at this time, it would be impossible at this time to shake the general U. S. public's conviction that, as Germany is pursuing a policy of expansion by force of arms, Japan is doing likewise in the Far East.
"Of the extremists in the United States, there are those who even say that the United States has become Hitler's partner in his policy of aggression, through her relationship with Japan.
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THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
(Part 2.)
"Even if some agreement is reached between Japan and the United States under present circumstances, it could mean no more than the existing agreement between Japan and the U. S. S. R., under which, the agreement notwithstanding, enormous forces, which are constantly being increased, have to be facing each other at all times.
"Unless the fundamental trouble is removed, it will be impossible to expect any progress in our talks."
Kurusu: "If something is impossible to do, it simply can't be done, regardless of what fancy words may be used to dress it up.
"Even if you tell us to abrogate, or at least to make ineffective, the Tripartite Pact at this time, that is something that is impossible for us to do."
Hull: "The United States is not in a position to demand that you nullify the effect of the Tripartite Pact. The only thing I say is that although I can comprehend the circumstances making it possible for Japan to maintain the status quo of her relationship to the Tripartite Pact and at the same time seek an agreement with the United States, in view of the nature of the United States, it is impossible to completely disregard the effects of public opinion."
Kurusu: "The alliance in question does not advocate, or even condone, expansion through the force of arms."
Hull: "If that is the case, it is a useless instrument unless some definite proof as to its purposes are presented."
Nomura: "It would be difficult to do so within any limited time. The situation in the southwestern Pacific area is at present very critical. To counter Japan's sending of troops to French Indo-China, Britain is increasing her armed forces in Singapore while the United States is doing likewise in the Philippine Islands.
[a] Translator's note: From cryptanalytic study the date is evidently the 18th.
Trans. 11-22-41
No. 142
FROM: Washington November 18, 1941
(Probable date of drafting)
TO: Tokyo # 1129.
Re your # 784 [a] and my # 1106 [b].
During my talks with Hull on the 18th it became evident that he is thinking about readjusting the economic situation of the world after the conclusion of this war and that he has only a passing interest in the various problems of China. Furthermore, there are indications that the matter prognosticated by Ambassador Kurusu in the separate message, is also being given consideration by Hull.
As a matter of routine, of the three points contained in our Proposal "A", they are apparently desirous of first disposing the matter pertaining to non-discriminatory treatment. In view of this attitude on this subject, unless we delete from our Formula "A" that part which follows after "on the understanding", (as you are aware, Konoye's message contained no such qualification), and give them a more definite agreement, I fear that the progress of our talks may be impeded. This is, of course, not in accordance with our policy of a speedy settlement. Since our formula concerning non-discrimination is also contained in our "B" proposal, unless we reach an agreement on this point now, I fear that our Proposal "B" will not help matters any.
A-77
I realize thoroughly that there are domestic issues which make it very difficult. Please give your consideration to the deletion of that part which follows "on the understanding", etc.
[a] Explanation of phrase: "in the event that the principle of non-discriminatory treatment is applied to the entire world." We mean that it shall apply uniformly throughout the world. China included. Japan desires to apply it to China when world conditions are such that a majority of the nations are in favor of the principle.
[b] See IV, 120.
Trans. 11-25-41
No. 143
FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 18, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1131.
(Part 3 of 5.) [a]
(To be handled in government code.)
"If we both undertake to increase our military strength at any time, something which we would regret might occur. Therefore, since, even though we keep fighting each other with broad, idealistic arguments there would be no end to them, let us first relax this tension for the time being. To do this we should return to the situation prior to the exercise of the freezing order. I mean Japan should evacuate southern French Indo-China, and in return the United States should rescind the freezing order. If the atmosphere is calm in this manner, there will be no need of sending warships to Singapore or strengthening military facilities in the Philippines. Then we would like to continue these talks." HULL said, "While we are not yet agreed on fundamental questions, it would be futile to do what you say as a temporary stop-gap measure. We hope that as first of the East Asiatic nations, Japan will take the leadership for a policy of peace. However, if a policy of armed conquest is to dominate Japan, we will consider it a danger to world peace, and we will not, by any means, yield. (To this both I and Ambassador KURUSU had something to say.) If the leaders of the Japanese Government will show that they will exert a peaceful policy in any event, why then, in turn, I will not object to getting in touch with Great Britain, the Netherlands, etc., and consider returning to the status prior to the exercise of the freezing order. However, this is so that Japanese politics will turn more and more toward a peaceful trend."
[a] Parts 1 and 2 not available.
Trans. 11-21-41
No. 144
FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 18, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1131.
(Part 4 of 5.)
(To be handled in government code.)
Concerning the China question, HULL asked a question about the stationing of troops. I explained what you said in Proposal A of your # 726 [a] (of course, I didn't mention the twenty
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THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
five years you spoke of), and HULL let it go at that. Referring again to the China question, he said that England, the Netherlands and China had all contacted him, and KURUSU wanted to know on what points they were concerned. HULL said that he assumed that Great Britain was mainly interested in the principle of equality of treatment in commerce; that it was the same in the case of the Netherlands; and as for China, she merely spoke in generalities without going into definite matters. Now concerning the principle of equality of treatment, the following conversation took place: HULL: "Have you received any reply from Tokyo on our proposal of the 15th?" (See my # 1095 [b]) KURUSU: "Well, we have a general answer, but further study is necessary. I haven't enough to tell you yet. You seem to mean that the United States can't bear the responsibility of other countries. Well, aren't we pretty much in the same position? Until peace is established between Japan and China, we could say the same thing about the China question, I think. You see, Japan and the United States are in different economic positions. You Americans are in an advantageous position relative to the various nations when it comes to commercial negotiations. We do not have the advantageous bargaining position that you have.
[a] See IV, 25-28.
[b] See IV, 119.
Trans. 11-21-41
No. 145
FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 18, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1131.
(Urgent.)
(Part 5 of 5.)
(To be handled in government code.)
"There is a remarkable difference between the extent to which the economy of the United States depends on foreign trade and that to which ours does. You cannot measure them by the same rule. When the economic set-up is suddenly disrupted, great turbulence ensues. Take, for example, the question of controlled exchange in North China. If that were abolished now, the economy of a hundred million Chinese would be thrown into chaos. Now out of consideration of the welfare of the Chinese people alone, we could not do such a thing as that." HULL: "I well understand that. When I was insisting on the principle of equality of treatment in commerce, I had the post-war situation in mind. I rather think that in post-war economic reconstruction, probably the principle of non-discrimination will be an all-encompassing one. What I would like to see is Japan and the United States working together for the principle of nondiscrimination. Now all along I've fought against the preferential system of the British Empire resulting from the Ottawa Conference, and now we are talking it over with England. I don't want you to tell anybody about this, but don't you know, only lately Great Britain is coming around to my point of view." (In this connection, see the newspaper article quoted in separate wire # 1132 [a].)
[a] Not available
Trans. 11-21-41
A-79
No. 146
FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 18, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1134.
(Part 1 of 2.)
Re my # 1131 [a].
In our conversations of today, as a practical means of alleviating the ever worsening front with which we are faced and to quiet the fearful situation, as well as to bring about a return to the situation existing before the application of the freezing legislation, we suggested the evacuation of Japanese troops stationed in the southern part of French Indo-China.
HULL, showing considerable reluctance replied, "After Japan has clearly demonstrated her intentions to be peaceful I will confer with Britain, the Netherlands and other interested powers."
In the past it would seem that the greatest stumbling block for the American authorities was the question of our troops of occupation in China. Recently, however, the United States, what with her internal situation and, especially insofar as it concerns the revision of the Neutrality Agreement, her increasing involvement in the war in the Atlantic, seems to have undergone a change. She is now, rather, exhibiting a tendency to lay more emphasis on Japan's peace plans insofar as they pertain to the Tripartite Alliance. With regard to other questions, too, it seems very clear that they are of a mind to bring about a compromise after making sure of our peaceful intentions. In view of these circumstances, as a result of our deliberations of successive days it would seem that should we present Proposal "B" immediately, an understanding would be more difficult to realize than if we went on with our discussions of Proposal "A". Therefore, looking at it from a practical point of view, we are of the opinion that prior to presenting of Proposal "B" it would be more advisable to reach a practical settlement, principally on the questions of the acquisition of goods and the cancellation of the freezing legislation mentioned in Proposal "B" and then to try to proceed with the solution of other questions on this basis. Unless we follow this course we are convinced that an immediate solution will be extremely difficult.
[a] See IV, 141.
Trans. 11-21-41
No. 147
FROM: Washington November 18, 1941
(Probable date of drafting)
TO: Tokyo # 1134.
(Part 2.)
It is true that the Konoye government reiterated its approval of the government's statement referred to here. However, that statement carried several supplementary notes, some of which apparently aroused the suspicion of the United States. These supplementary notes were of such character that even if they are not written down in black and white, they would naturally become applicable under the rights of self-defense in the event that to do so becomes necessary.
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THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
Please therefore issue a statement as that of the new government's, in which there are no provisional notes, and which express our peaceful policies.
The United States, of course, has indicated clearly that she is not interested in mere promises as much as she is in putting said promises in effect. It is necessary, therefore, for us to be prepared to withdraw our troops as soon as the freezing order is rescinded and materials are made available to us.
Please advise us as to your intentions after perusing my message # 1133 [a]. (Hull told me that he would be glad to see me at any time. However, the day after tomorrow, the 20th, is a major holiday here, so if you could make it possible for me to make a reply tomorrow, it would be very convenient for me.)
[a] Not available.
Trans. 11-24-41
No. 148
FROM: Tokyo November 19, 1941
TO: Washington Circular #2353.
Regarding the broadcast of a special message in an emergency.
In case of emergency, (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations), and the cutting off of international communications, the following warning will be added in the middle of the daily Japanese language short wave news broadcast.
(1) In case of a Japan-U. S. relations in danger—HIGASHI NO KAZEAME (East Wind rain).
(2) Japan-U. S. S. R. relations—KITANOKAZE KUMORI-(North Wind cloudy).
(3) Japan-British relations: NISHI NO KAZE HARE-(West Wind clear).
This signal will be given in the middle and at the end as a weather forecast and last sentence will be repeated twice. When this is heard please destroy all code papers, etc. This is as yet to be a completely secret arrangement.
Trans. 11-28-41
No. 149
FROM: Tokyo November 19, 1941
TO: Washington Circular #2354.
When our diplomatic relations are becoming dangerous, we will add the following at the beginning and end of our general intelligence broadcasts:
(1) If it is Japan-U. S. relations, "HIGASHI".
(2) Japan-Russia relations, "KITA".
(3) Japan-British relations, (including Thai, Malaya and N.E.I.)—"NISHI". The above will be repeated five times and included at beginning and end.
Trans. 11-26-41
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No. 150
FROM: Tokyo November 14, 1941
TO: Washington # 772.
(Urgent.)
The time of presentation of Proposal B will be according to my instructions of today. We have drawn up this proposal in a formal measure including the addendum. (I mean to say the proposal you are to present to the American officials upon instructions from me.) I am sending to you the English text thereof in ensuing message # 773 [a].
[a] See IV, 151.
Trans. 11-14-41
No. 151
FROM: Tokyo November 14, 1941
TO: Washington # 773.
(Urgent.)
Points 1, 2, 3, and 4 are given in my # 727 [a].
5. The Japanese Government agrees to withdraw her army, which is at present stationed in French Indo-China, whenever peace shall have been established between Japan and China or a just peace firmly established in the Pacific area.
6. The Japanese Government (agrees ?) that if the principle of non-discriminatory treatment in trade is to be applied throughout the world the same principle should also be applied to the entire Pacific area, in other words, in China as well.
7. The two governments shall make world peace their common objective and shall cooperate at a suitable time for speedy realization of world peace. However, in dealing with developments prior to the establishment of world peace, the two governments shall act in accordance with the viewpoint of protection and self defense. Furthermore, in the event of the United States' participation in the European war, Japan shall automatically carry out what she understand to be the obligations which befall her as a party to the Three Power Agreement existing between Japan, Germany and Italy. (Point 7 is identical with what is given in paragraph 2 of our proposal of ----- of this month and does not contain the purport given in the first part of (2) of our Proposal "A". This is for your information.)
[a] See IV, 29.
Trans. 11-14-41
No. 152
FROM: Tokyo November 15, 1941
TO: Washington # 779.
Re my # 727 [a].
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THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
The English text of (our) Proposal "B" is being forwarded separately as # 780 [b].
[a] See IV, 29.
[b] See IV, 153.
Trans. 11-17-41
No. 153
FROM: Tokyo November 15, 1941
TO: Washington # 780.
(Part 2 of 2, Part 1 not yet available.)
Chief of Office routing.
English text.
6. The Japanese Government recognizes the principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations to be applied to all the Pacific areas, inclusive of China, on the understanding that the principle in question is to be applied uniformly to the rest of the entire world as well.
7. Both governments maintain it their common aim to bring about the peace in the world, and, when an opportune time arrives, they will endeavor jointly for the early restoration of the world peace.
With regard to the developments of the situation prior to the restoration of the world peace, the governments of Japan and the United States will be guided in their conducts by considerations of protection and self-defense: and, in case the United States should participate in the European war, Japan would decide entirely independently in the matter of interpretation of the Tripartite Pact between Japan, Germany and Italy, and would likewise determine what actions might be taken by way of fulfilling the obligations in accordance with the said interpretation.
Trans. 11-17-41
No. 154
FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 20, 1941
TO: Tokyo #1144.
(Extremely Urgent.)
At noon on the 20th I, accompanied by Ambassador KURUSU, called on Secretary HULL at the State Department and we talked for an hour and a half. Today we went into a somewhat lengthy explanation of the various subjects taken up in the instructions in your message #798 [a]. On everything else HULL expressed no noteworthy differences of opinion, however, when we came to the part about the United States doing nothing to obstruct our efforts for a comprehensive peace with China, he showed that he was terribly aroused. He said, "So long as it is not made clear that Japan is turning toward a peaceful policy it will be impossible to stop aiding CHIANG just like it will also be impossible to cut off assistance from Great Britain,"
A-83
or words to that effect. He said that in any case, after particular study, he would have some views to express.
[a] Tokyo says that no further concessions can be made other than the "B" Proposal and if the United States' consent to this cannot be secured negotiations will have to be broken off.
Trans. 11-22-41
No. 155
FROM: Washington November 24, 1941
TO: Tokyo #1147.
(Very Urgent.)
Departmental secret.
To be handled in Government Code.
(Part 1 of 2.)
Our conversation with HULL on the 20th may be summarized as follows: (That day is America's biggest holiday. They call it "Thanksgiving." In spite of that, however, Mr. HULL not only agreed to talk with, but seemed glad to see both me and Ambassador KURUSU when we went to call on him.)
First, we explained the various items mentioned in the instructions in your #798 [a]. HULL had only one or two questions about the other parts and expressed hardly any opinions but, when we came to the part where we state that we do not want the United States to do anything to hinder us in bringing about a complete peace over China, he seemed extremely reluctant to consider it. He went on to reiterate what he had always said about the Tri-Partite Alliance. He said that so long as fears emanating from that treaty existed in the heads of the Americans, the United States would find it well-nigh impossible to cease aiding CHIANG KAI-SHEK and that, as we know, the United States is now opposing the German policy of military expansion which knows no bounds; that on the one hand she is helping Great Britain and on the other hand CHIANG KAI-SHEK; that therefore until we Japanese made it perfectly clear that our policy is to be one of peace, it will be impossible to cease aiding China, just like it will be impossible to stop aiding England. He continued that, leading up to the state of affairs we find today, American interests in Japan, including Manchukuo, had undergone terrible embarrassment.
[a] Which tells Ambassador NOMURA to present Proposal "B" to the U. S. Government and says that no further concessions will be made.
Trans. 11-24-41
No. 156
FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 24, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1147.
(Part 2 of 2.) (Departmental Secret.)
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THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
(To be handled in Government Code.)
KURUSU said, "When I had an interview with the President the other day, he talked as if he would like to act as an introducer. Now if he wants to take the trouble to do this introducing in order to bring about peace, I cannot reconcile it with continued assistance to CHIANG KAI-SHEK, which actually hinders peace. In other words; it seems quite reasonable to us to ask the President to stop aiding CHIANG if he is going to act as an introducer." HULL replied, "Well, what the President meant when he said that was that he was presupposing that you Japanese would first make it apparent that your fundamental policy was peaceful. Heretofore, influential Japanese statesmen have expressed opinions favorable to HITLER's military expansion policy, and the American people find it very difficult to believe that Japan is turning peaceful." I said, "Well, the plan which I propose today makes no progress whatever on two or three points. However, since the situation is so tense, if the tension between Japan and the United States can be relaxed, be it ever so little, particularly in the southwestern Pacific, and quickly clear the atmosphere, then I think we could go on and settle everything else." HULL said, "Yes, I understand what you mean thoroughly, but that would be very hard to do. In any case, you and I have on our shoulders a heavy responsibility toward both the Japanese and American people. I might say toward the whole human race." Mr. HULL's face assumed a sadly compassionate expression, and he said, "I want to think over this proposal you have brought me fully and sympathetically, and then I want to talk to you again.
Trans. 11-22-41
No. 157
FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 20, 1941
TO: Tokyo #1148.
(To be handled in government code.)
Secretary of State HULL, in the conversations I detailed in my # 1144 [a], expressed his satisfaction that in the last two or three days Japanese newspaper editorial comment on the United States had become calm. This, doubtless, is due to your great efforts.
Since newspaper editorial comment in this country has become extremely circumspect in conjunction with our conversations, no doubt as a reflection of State Department opinion, I would like to have you continue your efforts in guiding newspaper opinion.
[a] See IV, 154.
Trans. 11-24-41
No. 158
FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 22, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1158.
(Government Code.)
(Secret outside the Department.)
Re your # 817 [a].
A-85
As you are aware, I have advised them concerning the first part. Insofar as the latter part of that message is concerned, on the occasion of the interview outlined in my # 1147 [b], no reference was made to this matter. However, after they have studied the matter, they will doubtless present some opinions concerning it.
Furthermore, Ambassador KURUSU and myself, at their request, are scheduled to have an interview, as already announced, with Secretary of State HULL at 8:00 P.M. today, the 22nd.
[a] Not available.
[b] See IV, 155, 156.
Trans. 11-24-41
No. 159
FROM: Washington November 23, 1941
TO: Tokyo #1160.
(In 2 parts, complete.)
Re my # 1159 [a].
From Kurusu:
Secretary Hull and I conferred for about a half an hour on the 21st to arrange our talks for the 22nd. At that time Hull said that he thought my idea of attaching so much importance to the agreement that it would outshine the Tripartite Pact, as expressed by me during our talks on the 18th, was wholeheartedly in favor of peace on the Pacific through joint action of the United States and Japan, and through this accomplishment, to contribute to the peace of the world.
He went on to say that he still remembers with pleasure that at the Economic Conference in London, he fought for free commerce shoulder to shoulder with Viscount Isii and (Eigo Fukai?). Hull said that he has looked upon Japan's leadership in the Far East as only a natural phenomenon. It is true that Japan's actions and statements regarding the East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere have been slightly on the unpolished and abrupt side but he is able to be sympathetic with the spirit of it.
(Part 2) (Garbled)
As long as Japan strives for this goal without resorting to the force of arms, the United States has nothing against the program and has no intention of interfering with its realization.
"I would like to see the U. S.-Japanese relationship which existed shortly subsequent to the Russo-Japanese war reestablished. At that time Japan and the United States exercised their influence over the Far East and the Western Hemisphere respectively, but at the same time maintained very friendly relations and close cooperation in all matters with each other.
"I hope that we can revive the spirit of those times and reach an agreement to maintain peace on the Pacific. At the same time, I wish that Japan would make it clear that the Tripartite Pact is not an obstacle to attaining that goal".
Under the present critical conditions, the United States acceptance or rejection of our Proposal "B" may have a vital bearing on whether or not the negotiations will break down. However, because of the circumstances outlined in my message referred to in the heading, we may receive some proposal from Hull with regard to an agreement covering the Pacific area on Monday.
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THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
In the meantime, if you have any suggestions which may lead to a settlement, please advise us immediately.
[a] See IV, 161.
Trans. 11-27-41
No. 160
FROM: OPNAV November 21, 1941
TO: CINCPAC, CINCAF 21175 CR 0151
It has been indicated by reliable reports, of the recent establishment by Japan of a combined Air and Surface Craft Patrol, covering shipping routes from the U. S. to Australasia [a]. Daily aircraft patrols have been observed extending to the Gilbert Islands from Base at Jaluit. Surface craft believed to cover area reaching Ellice Islands. Japanese East Indies fishing fleet also reported coordinated in patrol operations. Present indications this fleet divided into three groups now in areas vicinity Bathurst Island, Arnhem and Thursday Island in Torres Strait. They are expected round Dutch New Guinea operating from base in Palau and are equipped with long range radio sets.
[a] Australasia—water to east of Australia on South Pacific.
(no Trans. date in text. LWJ)
No. 161
FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 23, 1941
TO: Tokyo #1169.
(In 4 parts complete.)
On the 22nd, I, together with Ambassador Kurusu, called on the Secretary of State Hull. (Ballantine was also present.) The resume of their conversation follows:
Hull: "I conferred with the Ambassador and Ministers of Britain, Australia, and the Netherlands on the 22nd." (The press reports that this conference lasted for about two and a half hours.) "I sought their opinion on the Japanese proposals. They all said that if Japan's intentions are assuredly pacific, then they would wholeheartedly favor them. They said that it would be the source of much joy to them to cooperate in the matter of resuming trade relations with Japan under those circumstances.
"However, they said, we are not sure of Japan's real intentions as yet, for while on the one hand she apparently indicates her desire for peace by dispatching a special envoy, the tone of the politicians and press of Japan seems to be in direct opposition.
"The diplomats who called on me also pointed out that just prior to the application of the freezing order, Japanese imports of petroleum took a very sudden upward swing, disproving any contention that it was to be used solely for peaceful undertakings, but that it was being stored away by the navy.
"They further expressed the opinion that the embargo should be lifted only in slow degrees.
"These diplomats, however, said that they would seek their home governments' instructions regarding the Japanese proposals and would submit their replies by the coming Monday. Upon receiving these advices, I shall make a reply to you."
A-87
(Part 2) [a]
Thus the Secretary seemed to feel considerable concern over the recent trend of Japan's public opinion. He pointed out that a clear statement by the Japanese Government of its desire for peace would have a most important reaction on the public opinion of the United States. (Ballantine said that a clear statement of attitude from the government of Japan to the Japanese people, which would of course be cabled abroad, would bear more fruit than propagandistic reports sent through press channels for foreign consumption only) and in turn would have a most favorable bearing on the chances of a settlement. He even went on to say that was it not the duty of every politician to strive for peace up to the day before war is found to be unavoidable? The President and the Secretary of State, he said ----- (two or three lines too badly garbled).
I then said: "Leaving British, Australian and Dutch opinions aside for the time being, what is the attitude of the United States itself regarding our proposal?"
His subsequent reply, which he made by taking up the proposal paragraph by paragraph, was a complete evasion. However, there were indications that what the United States, Britain, Australia, etc. Actually desire is to dissolve the crisis in the south Pacific, so that the fighting powers they have to maintain in this area to keep things under control, may be transferred for action in other parts.
(Part 3)
He pointed out that since that is their main objective, the assurances given Japan in the proposals were insufficient.
I said: "Our troop concentrations in the northern part of French Indo-China are aimed at cutting Chungking's life line. Therefore, they are, for the most part, directed towards Yunnan. As such, they do not and are not intended to form a threat to the south Pacific area."
After I pointed out this fact, Kurusu said that the acceptance of our proposal would naturally lead to the conditions desired not only by the United States, but by the other nations he referred to. To this, Hull replied that what these countries desired was a quick turn-about in the situation.
Hull: "With regard to resumption of trade, a rapid change in the situation can be wrought here, too, once Japan's pacific intentions have been ascertained. This change for the better can be brought about in a mere matter of days."
Regarding aid to China, Hull said:
"We must take into consideration the possibility of a U. S. mediation when considering the possibility of cutting off aid to Chiang. If we promise Japan that we shall cease aiding China, the United States could no longer be considered a fair and neutral party to propose peace between China and Japan.
(Part 4)
"Moreover, if it is terminated immediately upon the beginning of the negotiations, the promise would be utterly without value. In any event, the so-called 'aid to Chiang Kai-shek' is not as great as is commonly publicized.
"It is Japan's desire to improve the situation which has reached a critical stage by first settling the outstanding factors involved. Since that is the desire expressed by your proposals, we cannot at this time concur in Japan's demands with regard to stopping aid to Chiang."
He went on to say that he did not believe that the time was as yet ripe for the President to suggest peace to China.
I said "I feel that on Monday the United States will submit some sort of a counter proposal to us. I further feel that this proposal will contain a suggestion that Japan join in some plan to maintain peace on the Pacific and in some kind of a trade agreement. No doubt it will be necessary for the United States and Japan to come to some preliminary agreement, after which it would be submitted to the other countries for their approval."
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THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
Kurusu: "If it is intended that a sort of a group be formed by those nations and that if they expect to make it appear as if we were 'voted down' by the majority of the voters, we wish to state now that we shall be absolutely unable to accept such a proposal."
[a] Part 2 badly garbled; considerable reconstruction work contained.
Trans. 11-26-41
No. 162
FROM: Tokyo November 22, 1941
TO: Washington # 812.
To both your Ambassadors.
It is awfully hard for us to consider changing the date we set in my # 736 [a]. You should know this, however, I know you are working hard. Stick to your fixed policy and do your very best. Spare no efforts and try to bring about the solution we desire. There are reasons beyond your ability to guess why we wanted to settle Japanese-American relations by the 25th, but if within the next three or four days you can finish your conversations with the Americans; if the signing can be completed by the 29th, (let me write it out for you—twenty-ninth), if the pertinent notes can be exchanged, if we can get an understanding with Great Britain and the Netherlands; and in short if everything can be finished, we have decided to wait until that date. This time we mean it, that the deadline absolutely cannot be changed. After that things are automatically going to happen. Please take this into your careful consideration and work harder than you ever have before. This, for the present, is for the information of you two Ambassadors alone.
[a] See IV, 44, Tokyo wires Washington that because of the various circumstances it is absolutely necessary that arrangements for the signing of the agreement be completed by the 25th of this month.
Trans. 11-22-41
No. 163
FROM: Tokyo November 24, 1941
TO: Washington # 823.
For both Ambassadors.
The time limit set in my message #812 [a] (in which the deadline is extended from the 25th to the 29th) is in Tokyo time.
[a] See IV, 162.
Trans. 11-24-41
A-89
No. 164
FROM: OPNAV November 24, 1941
TO: CINCAF, CINCPAC, COMS 11 12 13 15 242005 CR 0443
INFO: SPENAVO LONDON, CINCLAT
"Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful x This situation coupled with statements of Japanese Government and movements their naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction including attack on Philippines or Guam is a possibility. Chief of Staff has seen this dispatch concurs and requests action Adees to inform senior Army officers their areas x Utmost secrecy necessary in order not to complicate an already tense situation or precipitate Japanese action x Guam will be informed separately."
No. 165
Communications Intelligence Report:
Japan Mandated Islands
Topic Serial Date of Issue
Coast Defenses-
Communications 20-41, No. 603-700 November 24, 1941
"In the past few months it has become known that stations temporarily classified as Coast Batteries, Lookout Stations and Landing Forces, have been active at certain Mandate Islands. During late April the Coast Batteries and Lookout Stations on Saipan were identified. In early July the Coast Batteries, Lookout stations and Landing Forces at Truk were identified."
"Since such defense activities are known to be established at Saipan, Truk and perhaps Ponape, it is reasonable to assume that similar defense preparations are being made at islands in Jaluit and Palao vicinities where bases, supplies, etc., are located."
No. 166
FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 25, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1177.
Re your # 792 [a]
In this office we are withholding all reports regarding the content of the Japanese-American negotiations themselves or any predictions regarding the future. The State Department also is exercising extreme caution in its press conferences. Hence the Japanese correspondents here are transmitting various trends of the negotiations copied from newspaper articles here that are based on pure conjecture. Among these correspondents are those who recognize that the articles are valueless but who are being pressed by the head office for news. I have observed particularly this meaningless competition to get the news among the correspondents who have come to Washington from New York. That this senseless competition to gather
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THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
inaccurate news will not exert a harmful influence on the course of the negotiations themselves is something that I cannot guarantee. In view of this situation I would greatly appreciate it if the Foreign Office would speak a word of caution to the newspapers concerned regarding this useless competition between their special correspondents in collecting news regarding these negotiations. And it would be particularly helpful if the head offices of the newspapers concerned would issue orders direct to their special correspondents along this line.
[a] Not available.
Trans. 11-28-41
No. 167
FROM: Tokyo (Togo) November 26, 1941
TO: Washington # 830.
(Urgent)
To both Ambassadors.
It seems that the American newspapers think that there is a connection between the question of withdrawing our army from French Indo-China and that of the freezing of assets. As I have already indicated in my #798 [a], my proposal made on the 17th, even if submitted by you, would be inadequate to meet the situation. Our final proposal envisages an agreement on the basis of the "B" proposal in toto (it excludes from the "B" proposal paragraphs 6 and 7; namely, the question of non-discrimination in trade and the question of the Three-Power Agreement, and includes, as indicated in my #816 [b], the proposal which the United States Government made on the 12th; that is, the question of mediation by the United States for the purpose of establishing peace between Japan and China as contained in our Proposal "B"), and so the acceptance of this proposal is the most that we can expect. In view of the fact that time is getting short with but few days left this month, I would like to have you at once contact the United States authorities again and do your utmost in getting them to accept our proposal.
I need not suggest the following, for you, no doubt, have already thought of it. I would like to have you make full use of influential Americans about whom you have wired me in the past and put pressure on the United States authorities indirectly as well.
[a] Which states that no further concession can be made and if the U. S. does not consent to Proposal B, the negotiations will have to be broken off.
[b] Which states that if the U. S. accepts Proposal B, Japan will have no objection to letting Pres. ROOSEVELT act as mediator between Japan and China.
Trans. No Date
No. 168
FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 26, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1183.
(Urgent)
A-91
Re your # 830[a].
The evacuation of troops from all of French Indo-China, brought up in your message, is nothing more or less than the speculations of American newspapermen. Here in Washington they haven't mentioned such a thing even in jest. We have driven home our insistences.
Furthermore, in regard to the latter part of your message, we two here have been currently using it sufficiently. Recently, however, Secretary of State HULL, before we had mentioned it, beat us to the punch and turned it to his own advantage.
[a] See IV, 167.
Trans. 11-28-41
No. 169
FROM: Tokyo November 26, 1941
TO: Washington # 833.
(Priority.)
(To be handled in Government Code.)
Re my # 798 [a].
When you reach a settlement in accordance with our new proposal, it is essential that you secure guarantees for the acquisition of goods in connection with clauses 2 and 3 of that proposal. Of these goods, the acquisition of petroleum is one of the most pressing and urgent requirements of the Empire. Therefore, in accordance with the course of negotiations, prior to the signing of an understanding, and at as early a date as possible, I would like to have you make our wishes known insofar as petroleum imports are concerned along the following lines:
4,000,000 tons per year from the United States. (This figure is the average amount of imports during the years 1938, '39, and '40 from the United States. The breakdown according to type, aviation gasoline included, corresponds to the actual figures covering imports before the freezing legislation went into effect.) That is to say, roughly, 333,000 tons per month.
In addition, on the basis of past negotiations and roughly in the agreed amounts, we hope to import from the Netherlands Indies 1,000,000 tons per year.
After the establishment of a verbal agreement, I would like to have a definite promise of the above incorporated into an exchange of documents between Your Excellency and the Secretary of State.
Furthermore, these figures are to be taken as the basis for negotiation (however, they can not be called our absolute minimum figures). On the other hand, as far as we are concerned, along with a restoration of trade in the future, we hope for an increase of these figures, over the past. Therefore, after you have read all this, please negotiate along these lines to the best of your abilities.
[a] Which states that no further concessions can be made and if the United States does not consent to Proposal B, the negotiations will have to be broken off.
Trans. 11-26-41
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THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
No. 170
FROM: Washington November 26, 1941
TO: Tokyo #1180.
(Extremely urgent.)
(Part 1 of 2.)
From NOMURA and KURUSU.
As we have wired you several times, there is hardly any possibility of having them consider our "B" proposal in toto. On the other hand, if we let the situation remain tense as it is now, sorry as we are to say so, the negotiations will inevitably be ruptured, if indeed they may not already be called so. Our failure and humiliation are complete. We might suggest one thing for saving the situation. Although we have grave misgivings, we might propose, first, that President ROOSEVELT wire you that for the sake of posterity he hopes that Japan and the United States will cooperate for the maintenance of peace in the Pacific (just as soon as you wire us what you think of this, we will negotiate for this sort of an arrangement with all we have in us), and that you in return reply with a cordial message, thereby not only clearing the atmosphere, but also gaining a little time. Considering the possibility that England and the United States are scheming to bring the Netherlands Indies under their protection through military occupation, in order to forestall this, I think we should propose the establishment of neutral nations, including French Indo-China, Netherlands India and Thai. (As you know, last September President ROOSEVELT proposed the neutrality of French Indo-China and Thai.)
Trans. 11-28-41
No. 171
FROM: Washington November 26, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1180.
(Extremely Urgent.)
(Part 2 of 2.)
We suppose that the rupture of the present negotiations does not necessarily mean war between Japan and the United States, but after we break off, as we said, the military occupation of Netherlands Indies is to be expected of England and the United States. Then we would attack them and a clash with them would be inevitable. Now, the question is whether or not Germany would feel duty bound by the third article of the treaty to help us. We doubt if she would. Again, you must remember that the Sino-Japanese incident would have to wait until the end of this world before it could possibly be settled.
In this telegram we are expressing the last personal opinions we will have to express, so will Your Excellency please be good enough at least to show it to the Minister of the Navy, if only to him; then we hope that you will wire us back instantly.
Trans. 11-28-41
A-93
No. 172
FROM: Tokyo November 26, 1941
TO: Washington # 836.
To be handled in Government code.
The situation is momentarily becoming more tense and telegrams take too long. Therefore, will you cut down the substance of your reports of negotiations to the minimum and, on occasion, call up Chief YAMAMOTO of the American Bureau on the telephone and make your report to him. At that time we will use the following code:
Japanese English
Sangoku Joyaku Mondai Nyuu Yooku
(Three-Power Treaty question) (New York)
Musabetsu Taiguu Mondai Shikago
(The question of non-discriminatory treatment) (Chicago)
Shina Mondai Sanfuranshisuko
(The China question) (San Francisco)
Soori Itoo Kun
(Premier) (Mr. Itoo)
Gaimudaijin Date Kun
(Foreign Minister) (Mr. Date)
Rikugun Tokugawa Kun
(The Army) (Mr. Tokugawa)
Kaigun Maeda Kun
(The Navy) (Mr. Maeda)
Nichi-bei kooshoo Endan
(Japan-American negotiations) (Marriage proposal)
Daitooryoo Kimko San
(President) (Miss Kimiko)
Haru Fumeko San
(Hull) (Miss Fumeko)
Kokunaijoosei Shoobai
(Internal situation) (Trade)
Jooho Suru Yama Wo Uru
(To yield) (To sell the mountain)
Jooho Sezu Yama Wo Urenu
(Not to yield) (Not to sell the mountain)
Keisei Kyuuten Suru Kodomo Gaumareru
(Situation taking critical turn) (The child is born)
For your information, telephone addressees other than our Home Office are as follows:
Bureau Chief Yamamoto: Setegaya 4617
Section Chief, KASE: Yotsuya 4793
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THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
Japanese English
The Minister's residence Ginza 3614
The Vice-Minister's residence Ginza 1022
No. 173
FROM: Washington November 26, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1181.
Re your # 836 [a].
Even if it is put into effect at once, since the hours for telephone communication between Japan and America are restricted to 7:00 to 10:00 A.M., 11:00 A.M. to 1:00 P.M., 2:00 to 5:00 P.M. (Tokyo time), it is better to wire urgent news rather than phone it.
[a] See IV, 172. In which Tokyo says that, due to the fact that the situation is becoming more tense and telegrams take too long, reports should be made by telephone making use of the code words given.
Trans. 11-28-41
No. 174
FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 25, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1179.
Hull has conferred jointly with the diplomatic representatives of Britain, Australia, Netherlands East Indies, and China, on two different occasions recently. In harmony with developments however, he has chosen the British representative as his main conferee. Since this morning, the 25th, he is maintaining communications with the Australian and the N.E.I. representatives through the British Ambassador. He will confer with the Chinese Ambassador tonight, alone, after conferring first with the British Ambassador.
The fact that he has dispensed with the custom of conducting joint conferences and has substituted separate ones is drawing considerable attention from the public in general.
Trans. 12-2-41
No. 175
FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 24, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1166.
Re my #1160 [a].
BALLANTINE has informed us on behalf of the Secretary of State that, since the representatives of some of the countries have not yet received instructions from their governments,
A-95
he would like to postpone until tomorrow (25th) the meeting between Secretary HULL, Ambassador KURUSU, and myself which was scheduled for today (24th).
Trans. 11-27-41
No. 176
FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 25, 1941
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin) # 1178.
We made inquiries as to their conveniences this morning, and were advised that they were in conference, and that some reply would be submitted this afternoon. We pressed them again this afternoon, therefore, and were told that Hull had been conferring on this matter yesterday and today, but that he had been unable to secure a clear reply. They said that they feel certain that it will be ready tomorrow, and for that reason requested that we get in touch with them again tomorrow.
In view of the fact that the bureaus concerned of the State Department were discussing this matter all day yesterday and again today, and in view of the conference between the British Ambassador and Hull which lasted for an hour, apparently they are making an effort to speed up the negotiations, too. We, therefore, decided to postpone our discussions scheduled for today, and take the matter up with them tomorrow morning.
Trans. 12-2-41
No. 177
FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 26, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1184.
(Urgent.)
Re my # 1178 [a].
At my insistence TERASAKI again called on BALLANTINE this morning and questioned him in regard to the scheduled time for our interview. BALLANTINE stated, "Secretary of State HULL today, from early this morning, has been giving profound study to this matter. The fact is that he has scarcely given any consideration to anything else. I am sure that even now he is reaching a decision as to the time for the scheduled interview." Furthermore, for your information, after communicating with the Secretary of State, though virtually the same reply was received, TERASAKI is understood to have gotten the impression that arrangements for the interview would be made sometime today. This is for your information.
[a] See IV, 176.
Trans. 11-28-41
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THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
No. 178
FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 26, 1941
TO: Tokyo #1187.
(Urgent.)
Ambassador KURUSU and I have a meeting scheduled with Secretary HULL today (26th) at 4:45 p.m.
Trans. 11-28-41
No. 179
FROM: Washington November 26, 1941
TO: Tokyo 1745 EST (Telephone code) [a]
Trans-Pacific Telephone
To Kumaicho Yamamoto [b] from Kurusu:
Wakasugi speaking, said:
"This is Wakasugi speaking at Kurusu's request. Kurusu and Nomura have at this very moment gone to meet HULL with whom they had an appointment at 4:45."
Yamamoto: "Would they then meet the President?"
Wakasugi: "They would (arrange?) (to) meet the President after seeing Hull, but they had not yet taken steps to see the President. Hull has been conversing with the Chinese for three days past and had seen the Chinese today also. The future of the present talks would be decided during the course of today's conversations."
Yamamoto: "Call me by telephone again upon completion of today's meeting."
Wakasugi: "Have you anything you want me to tell Kurusu?"
Yamamoto: (Reply unintelligible to intercepter and according to him unintelligible to Wakasugi as well.)
After above few unintelligible sentences Wakasugi concluded with a promise to phone later.
Note: A call has been placed for 2100 EST this evening.
[a] See IV, 172.
[b] Head of American Division of Japanese Foreign Office.
Trans. 11-26-41
No. 180
FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 26, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1193.
Extremely urgent (Part 1 of 2.)
Separate wire.
(To be handled in Government code.)
A-97
Strictly confidential, tentative and without commitment.
Outline of proposed basis for agreement between the United States and Japan.
Section 1.
Draft mutual declaration of policy.
The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan both being solicitous for the peace of the Pacific affirm that their national policies are directed toward lasting and extensive peace throughout the Pacific area, that they have no territorial design in that area, that they have no intention of threatening other countries or of using military force aggressively against any neighboring nation, and that, accordingly, in their national policies they will actively support and give practical application to the following fundamental principles upon which their relations with each other and with all other governments are based:
(1) The principle of inviolability of territorial integrity and sovereignty of each and all nations.
(2) The principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries.
(3) The principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity and treatment.
Trans. 11-29-41
No. 181
FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 26, 1941
TO: Tokyo #1193.
(Part 2 of 2.)
(4) The principle of reliance upon international cooperation and conciliation for the prevention and pacific settlement of controversies and for improvement of international conditions by peaceful methods and processes; the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States have agreed that toward eliminating chronic political instability, preventing recurrent economic collapse, and providing a basis for peace, they will actively support and practically apply the following principles in their economic relations with each other and with other nations and peoples:
(1) The principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations.
(2) The principle of internal economic cooperation and abolition of extreme nationalism as expressed in excessive trade restrictions.
(3) The principle of non-discriminatory access by all nations to raw material supplies.
(4) The principle of full protection of the interests of consuming countries and populations as regards the operation of international commodity agreements.
(5) The principle of establishment of such institutions and arrangements of international finance as may lend aid to the essential enterprises and the continuous development of all countries and may permit payments through processes of trade consonant with the welfare of all countries.
Trans. 11-29-41
No. 182
FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 26, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1194.
(Extremely urgent.) (Part 1 of 4.)
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THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
Secret Wire.
(To be handled in Government code.)
Section 2.
Steps to be taken by the Government of the United States and by the Government of Japan:
The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan propose to take steps as follows:
1. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will endeavor to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact among the British Empire, China, Japan, the Netherlands, the Soviet Union, Thailand and the United States.
2. Both Governments will endeavor to conclude among the American, British, Chinese, Japanese, the Netherland and Thai Governments an agreement whereunder each of the Governments would pledge itself to respect the territorial integrity of French Indo-China and, in the event that there should develop a threat to the territorial integrity of Indo-China, to enter into immediate consultation with a view to taking such measures as may be deemed necessary and advisable to meet the threat in question.
Trans. 11-29-41
No. 183
FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 26, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1194.
(Extremely urgent.) (Part 2 of 4.)
Secret outside the Department.
(To be handled in Government code.)
Such agreement would provide also that each of the Governments party to the agreement would not seek or accept preferential treatment in its trade or economic relations with Indo-China and would use its influence to obtain for each of the signatories equality of treatment in trade and commerce with French Indo-China.
3. The Government of Japan will withdraw all military, naval air and police forces from China and from Indo-China.
4. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will not support—military, politically, economically—any Government or regime in China other than the national government of the republic of China with capital temporarily at Chungking.
Trans. 11-29-41
No. 184
FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 26, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1194.
(Part 3 of 4.)
5. Both Governments will give up all extra-territorial rights in China, including rights and interests in and with regard to international settlements and concessions, and rights under the Boxer Protocol of 1901.
A-99
Both Governments will endeavor to obtain the agreement of the British and other Governments to give up extraterritorial rights in China, including rights in international settlements and in concessions and under the Boxer Protocol of 1901.
6. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will enter into negotiations for the conclusion between the United States and Japan of a trade agreement, based upon reciprocal most favored-nation treatment and reduction of trade barriers by both countries, including an undertaking by the United States to bind raw silk on the free list.
7. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will, respectively, remove the freezing restrictions on Japanese funds in the United States and on American funds in Japan.
Trans. 11-29-41
No. 185
FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 26, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1194.
(Extremely urgent.) (Part 4 of 4.)
Secret outside the department.
(To be handled in Government Code.)
8. Both Governments will agree upon applying the stabilization of the dollar-yen rate, with the allocation of funds adequate for this purpose, half to be supplied by Japan and half by the United States.
9. Both Governments will agree that no agreement which either has concluded with any third powers shall be interpreted by it in such a way as to conflict with the fundamental purpose of this agreement, the establishment and preservation of peace throughout the Pacific area.
10. Both Governments will use their influence to cause other Governments to adhere to and to give practical application to the basic political and economic principles set forth in this agreement.
Trans. 11-29 41
No. 186
FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 26, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1192.
(Part 1 of 4.)
Oral.
Strictly confidential.
The representatives of the Government of the United States and of the Government of Japan have been carrying on during the past several months informal and exploratory conversations for the purpose of arriving at a settlement if possible of questions relating to the entire Pacific area based upon the principles of peace, law and order and fair dealing among nations. These principles include the principle of inviolability of territorial integrity and
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THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
sovereignty of each and all nations; the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries; the principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity and treatment; and the principle of reliance upon international cooperation and conciliation for the prevention and pacific settlement of controversies and for improvement of international conditions by peaceful methods and processes.
Trans. 11-29- 41
No. 187
FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 26, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1192.
(Extremely Urgent)
(Part 2 of 4.)
It is believed that in our discussions some progress has been made in reference to the general principles which constitute the basis of a peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific area. Recently the Japanese Ambassador has stated that the Japanese Government is desirous of continuing the conversations directed toward a comprehensive and peaceful settlement in the Pacific area; that it would be helpful toward creating an atmosphere favorable to the successful outcome of the conversations if a temporary "modus vivendi" could be agreed upon to be in affect while the conversations, looking to a peaceful settlement in the Pacific were continuing. On November 20 the Japanese Ambassador communicated to the Secretary of State proposals in regard to temporary measures to be taken respectively by the Government of Japan and by the Government of the United States, which measures are understood to have been designed to accomplish the purpose above indicated.
Trans. 11-29-41
No. 188
FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 26, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1192.
(Extremely Urgent.)
(Part 3 of 4.)
(To be handled in government code.)
The Government of the United States most earnestly desires to contribute to the promotion and maintenance of peace and stability in the Pacific area, and to afford every opportunity for the continuance of discussions with the Japanese Government directed toward working out a broad-gauge program of peace throughout the Pacific area. The proposals which were presented by the Japanese Ambassador on November 20 contain some features which, in the opinion of this Government, conflict with the fundamental principles which form a part of the general settlement under consideration and to which each government has declared that it is committed. The Government of the United States believes that the adoption of such proposals would not be likely to contribute to the ultimate objectives of ensuring peace under law, order and justice in the Pacific area, and it suggests that further effort be made to resolve our divergences of views in regard to the practical application of the fundamental principles already mentioned.
Trans. 11-29-41
A-101
No. 189
FROM: Washington November 26, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1192.
(Extremely Urgent.)
(Part 4 of 4.)
With this object in view the Government of the United States offers for the consideration of the Japanese Government a plan of a broad but simple settlement covering the entire Pacific area as one practical exemplification of a program which this Government envisages as something to be worked out during our future conversations.
The plan herein suggested represents an effort to bridge the gap between our draft of June 21, 1942 [sic] and the Japanese draft of September 25th by making a new approach to the essential problems underlying a comprehensive Pacific settlement. This plan contains provisions dealing with the practical application of the fundamental principles which we have agreed in our conversations constitute the only sound basis for worthwhile international relations. We hope that in this way progress toward reaching a meeting of minds between our two Governments may be expedited.
Trans. 11-29-41
No. 190
FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 26, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1189.
(Extremely Urgent.)
(Part 1 of 2.)
At 4:45 on the afternoon of the 26th I and Ambassador KURUSU met with Secretary HULL and we talked for about two hours.
HULL said, "For the last several days the American Government has been getting the ideas of various quarters, as well as conferring carefully with the nations concerned, on the provisional treaty proposal presented by Japan on the 20th of this month, and I am sorry to tell you that we cannot agree to it. At length, however, we feel compelled to propose a plan, tentative and without commitment, reconciling the points of difference between our proposal of June 21st and yours of September 25th." So saying, he presented us with the following two proposals:
A. One which seeks our recognition of his so-called "four principles."
B. (1) The conclusion of a mutual non-aggression treaty between Tokyo, Washington, Moscow, the Netherlands, Chungking and Bangkok.
(2) Agreement between Japan, the United States, England, the Netherlands, China and Thai on the inviolability of French Indo-China and equality of economic treatment in French Indo-China.
(3) The complete evacuation of Japanese forces from China and all French Indo-China.
(4) Japan and the United States both definitely promise to support no regime in China but that of CHIANG KAI-SHEK.
(5) The abolition of extra-territoriality and concessions in China.
Trans. 11-28-41
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THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
No. 191
FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 26, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1189.
(Extremely Urgent.)
(Part 2 of 2.)
(6) The conclusion of a reciprocal trade treaty between Japan and the United States on the basis of most favored nation treatment.
(7) The mutual rescinding of the Japanese and American freezing orders.
(8) Stabilization of yen-dollar exchange.
(9) No matter what sort of treaties either Japan or the United States has contracted with third countries, they both definitely promise that these treaties will not be interpreted as hostile to the objectives of this treaty or to the maintenance of peace in the Pacific. (This is, of course, supposed to emasculate the Three-Power Pact.)
In view of our negotiations all along, we were both dumbfounded and said we could not even cooperate to the extent of reporting this to Tokyo. We argued back furiously, but HULL remained solid as a rock. Why did the United States have to propose such hard terms as these? Well, England, the Netherlands and China doubtless put her up to it. Then, too, we have been urging them to quit helping CHIANG, and lately a number of important Japanese in speeches have been urging that we strike at England and the United States. Moreover, there have been rumors that we are demanding of Thai that she give us complete control over her national defense. All that is reflected in these two hard proposals, or we think so.
Trans. 11-28-41
No. 192
FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 26, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1191.
(Extremely Urgent.)
(Part 1 of 4.)
On the 26th at the request of Secretary HULL, KURUSU and I visited him. First of all, we read over cursorily the documents he handed us, which we sent you in separate messages # 1192 [a], 1193 [b] and 1194 [c], and then engaged in an argument. The gist of it was as follows:
(1) HULL said: "Although we have conferred with the various nations concerned and have studied your proposal of the 20th (B proposal with 6 and 7 left out) for five days, we have decided that we cannot consider it."
(2) I said: "You talk of reconciling the American proposal of June 21st with ours of September 25th, but this is vastly different from either."
HULL retorted: "As for that I want you to read and compare the paragraph I point out with the one immediately preceding it. I said that it was a plan for reconciling both the Japanese and American proposals. Since the opening of conversations, the contents of it have been kept secret and, therefore, in this country where popular opinion counts for so much, various surmises are arising; particularly, rumors are being circulated to the effect that we are leaving China in the lurch. I myself am in the foreground and in spite of what Japan said at
A-103
the time of our conversation of the 22nd, various important people are still uttering non-pacific statements. There does not seem to be much I can do in the face of that."
[a] See IV, 186-189.
[b] See IV, 180-181.
[c] See IV, 182-185.
Trans. 11-29-41
No. 193
FROM: Washington November 26, 1941
TO: Tokyo #1191.
(Extremely Urgent.)
(Part 2 of 4.)
(To be handled in government code.)
(3) Concerning Section 1 of the proposal, I pointed out that of the four principles, the fourth has changed the so-called Stimson Doctrine; but I got no clear reply. I reminded him of their insistences so far concerning the principle of non-discrimination and said that if we applied that immediately to China there would be a sudden darkening of the already cloudy economic situation and that this was improper and impossible.
HULL replied: "I fully understand that and the principle as such does not necessarily have to be put into effect right away."
(4) Concerning 1 of Section 2 of this proposal, I said: "If this plan aims to review a Nine-Power Treaty set-up, we cannot feature it at all because we have fought a four year war in China without a cent of profit."
To this he countered with no strong rebuttal.
Trans. 11-29-41
No. 194
FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 26, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1191.
(Extremely Urgent.)
(Part 3 of 4.)
(5) I said that paragraphs 3 and 4 of the same section were out of the question and, as for paragraph 4, for a country like the United States, who recognizes the Chungking Government, to say that she cannot desert the Chiang Regime is just like us saying that we certainly cannot desert the Nanking Regime."
In reply HULL said: "The evacuation under 3 would be carried out by negotiations. We are not necessarily asking that it be effected immediately. As for the Nanking Government, according to the best reports available to us, it hasn't much influence over China as a whole any way."
I retorted: "Well, that argument is based on the statement that in the long history of China there have been many rises and falls of governments."
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THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
(6) When we came to the question of the Three Power Treaty, I said: "For the United States to hope on one hand, that she can make us make the last possible concession regarding the Three Power Pact and on the other virtually to say to us concerning the China question "apologize to Chungking" is certainly strange. I do not suppose that that is what the President meant the other day when he spoke of 'introducing'." HULL made no special answer.
Trans. 11-29-41
No. 195
FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 26, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1191.
(Extremely Urgent.)
(Part 4 of 4.)
I said: "Well, I have read this only cursorily. It is a very difficult plan for us to consider accepting. As far as the China part is concerned, it contains clauses which are entirely out of the question so I, who would like to see an understanding established between Japan and the United States, do not know if I should even report it to Japan as it now stands. I have grave doubts. We will both read it over again and consider it fully. Then we will reply." Finally I said, "I wonder if the United States means that there is no other way but for us to consider this plan. You know the President the other day said that between friends there are no last words. I wonder if you could arrange for an interview." To the former he replied that in a word this was a plan and to the latter he said that, although he did not think that much progress was being made, he would manage the matter.
Trans. 11-29-41
No. 196
FROM: Washington November 26, 1941
TO: Tokyo 1946 to 1953 EST
(Telephone Code.) [b]
Trans-Pacific Telephone
To Kumaicho Yamamoto [a] from Kurusu:
Kurusu: "I have made all efforts, but they will not yield. [c] I sent a cable expressing my opinions to the Foreign Minister this morning. The situation is just like that. Otherwise there is no means of accomplishing it. I shall cable you now. Already," he interrupted himself, "you have a general understanding I imagine. Accordingly, I do not know how thing will turn out regarding my meeting with the President. Hull is not making much progress it seems."
Apparently referring to the above mentioned cable he continued: "If that method can be worked out I shall work night and day on it. But there is no other means we can use. It is very regrettable."
Yamamoto: "The situation in Tokyo is extremely critical also." After thanking Kurusu for his efforts he continued: "The proposition sent to the Foreign Minister is extremely difficult."
Kurusu: "I believe it is of no avail."
A-105
Yamamoto reiterated his opinion regarding its difficulty.
Kurusu: "I rather imagine you had expected this outcome."
Yamamoto: "Yes, I had expected it, but wished to exert every effort up to the final moment in the hope that something might be accomplished."
Kurusu: "I am unable to make any movement (i.e., progress) at all. Something will have to be done to get out of this situation."
[a ]Head of American Division of Japanese Foreign Office.
[b] See IV. 1,2.
[c] Interpretation is doubtful as yet. The Intercepter read this as "Sore . . . kesa" (that . . . this morning) and translated this as "it is now . . .", with a distinct pause before and after this phrase. However, the telephone code was not available to him. Verification will follow receipt of record.
Trans. 11 26-41
No. 197
Communications Intelligence Reports
Japanese Navy—Organization of Fleets
Date of Issue Serial
November 26, 1941 22-41, No, 901-200
"Submitted by the 14th Naval District Communication Intelligence Unit:
Since the latter part of October, the Commander in Chief of the Second Fleet has been forming a task force consisting of:
Second Fleet
Third Fleet (including First and Second Base Forces, and First Defense Division)
Destroyer Squadron Three
Submarine Squadron Five
Combined Air Force
Air Squadron Seven and possibly vessels of the Third Battleship Division in the first fleet.
Third Fleet units are believed to be moving in the direction of Takao and Bako.
It appears that the Seventh Cruiser Division and the Third Destroyer Squadron are an advance unit, and may be enroute South China.
The Combined Air Force has assembled in Takao, and indications are that some of it has already moved on to Hainan Island.
It seems that the Second Base Force is transporting equipment of the Air Force to Taiwan.
Radio calls for the South China Fleet, the French Indo-China Force, and the Naval Stations at Sama, Bako and Takao appear also in headings of dispatches concerning this task force.
The Resident Naval Officer Palao, and the Third Base Force at Palao have communicated extensively with the Commander-in-Chief of the Third Fleet.
It is thought that a strong force of submarines and air groups are in the vicinity of the Marshall Islands. This force includes the 24th Air Squadron, at least one aircraft carrier, and probably one-third of the submarine fleet. (Note: this may mean one-third of the fleet submarines.)
The 14th Naval District Communication Intelligence Unit evaluates the foregoing information to indicate that a strong force may be preparing to operate in Southeastern Asia while component parts of the Task Force may operate from the Marshalls and Palao."
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THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
Com 14 260110 of November 1941 to OPNAV
Info: CINCPAC, CINCAF, COM 16.
No. 198
Japanese Navy—Organization of Fleets
Date of Issue Serial
November 27, 1941 23-41, No, 901-200
"Following has been submitted by the 16th Naval District Communication Intelligence Unit, referring to and commenting on yesterday's information from the 14th Naval District Communication Intelligence Unit, contained in the above reference.
During the past few days traffic analysis indicates that the Commander-in-Chief, Second Fleet, is directing units of the First, Second, and Third Fleets, and Submarine Force in a loose knit Task Force organization that apparently will be divided into two section. For purposes of clarity the units expected to operate in South China Area will be referred to as First Section and units expected to operate in the Mandates will be referred to as Second Section. The estimated units in First Section are Cruiser Division Seven, Air Squadron Six, Defense Division One, Destroyer Squadron Three, and Submarine Squadron Six. The Second Section consists of Cruiser Division Five, Carrier Division Three (RYUJO and one Maru), Destroyer Squadrons Two and Four, Submarine Squadron Five, Destroyer Division Twenty-three, First Base Force of Third Fleet, Third Base Force at Palao, Fifth Base Force at Saipan, and lesser units unidentified. Cruiser Division Six and Battleship Division Three may be included in First and Second Sections respectively, but status cannot be clarified yet.
There are slight indications today that Destroyer Squadron Three, Cruiser Division Seven, and Submarine Squadron Six are in the Takao Area. The balance of Third Fleet units in doubt but may be assume that these vessels including Destroyer Squadron 5 will take stations in the Straits of Formosa or further south. Combined Air Force units from the Empire proper are at Paidoh.
It is impossible to confirm the supposition of reference report that carriers and submarines are in the Mandates. The best indications are that all known First and Second Fleet Carriers are still in Sasebo-Kure Area.
.....Directives to the above Task Forces, if such, are directed to individual units, and not to complete groups. Special calls usually precede formation of Task Force used in area operations.
Commanders-in-Chief, Second, Third, and Southern Expeditionary Fleet appear to have major roles.
Traffic from the Minister of the Navy and the Chief of Naval General Staff to Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet appears normal.
This evaluation is considered reliable.
COM 16 261331, Nov. 1941 to CINCPAC, COM 14, OPNAV, CINCAF."
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No. 199
FROM: Washington November 26, 1941
TO: Tokyo #1190.
(Part 1 of 2.)
Judging from the progress of present Japanese-American relations, with which you are well acquainted through successive telegrams, the American proposal on the 26th (message # 11894) showed a great disparity between the demands of both parties. Unfortunately, there are no hopes of acceptance of our demands within the time limit you set.
Although we have requested the agreement of various countries to the numerous demands made, the United States presented this proposal after having conferred with the same countries. Although we cannot allow ourselves to be caught napping by this scheming, we must follow out instructions. Up to the present we have only been able to press them for an early solution. During this time we have not expressed any final intention. Even the President on the 17th said that there would be "no last words." If we do not cause any stop in the present negotiations, in the case of taking independent action after the time set ------.
[a] See IV, 190, 191.
Trans. 11-28-41
No. 200
FROM: Washington (Nomura) November 26, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1190.
(Extremely Urgent.)
(Part 2 of 2.)
To be handled in Government Code.
The United States is using the excuse that she is at present negotiating with the various competent countries. In view of the fact that she will propagandize that we are continuing these negotiations only with the view of preparing for our expected moves, should we, during the course of these conversations, deliberately enter into our scheduled operations, there is great danger that the responsibility for the rupture of negotiations will be cast upon us. There have been times in the past when she could have considered discontinuing conversations because of our invasion of French Indo-China. Now, should we, without clarifying our intentions, force a rupture in our negotiations and suddenly enter upon independent operations, there is great fear that she may use such a thing as that as counter-propaganda against us. They might consider doing the same thing insofar as our plans for Thai are concerned. Nevertheless, such a thing as the clarification of our intention is a strict military secret; consequently, I think that it might be the better plan, dependent of course on the opinions of the Government, that the current negotiations be clearly and irrevocably concluded either through an announcement to the American Embassy in Tokyo or by a declaration for internal and external consumption. I would like, if such a course is followed, to make representations here at the same time.
Trans. 11-28-41
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THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
No. 201
FROM: Washington November 27, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 1204.
Re your # 842 [a].
The United States has been conferring with the Netherlands on subjects pertaining to U. S. claims and because we asked them to do so. In the midst of these talks, the White-House suddenly came forth with the announcement on the 24th, that the United States is occupying Dutch Guiana, with the agreement of the government of the Netherlands, for the purpose of protecting it.
As was made plain in the text of this announcement, the main objective of this occupation was to guarantee accessibility to aluminum produced there, which is vital to the national defense of the United States. Ordinarily, the Netherlands Government would dispatch its armed forces stationed in the Netherlands East Indies for this purpose, but she is unable to do so at present because of the present situation in the southwest Pacific area. For this reason, the U. S. Army is being used to protect the aluminum mines in that area. At the same time, at the invitation of the Netherlands Government, Brazil is also taking part in protecting them.
The Netherlands Foreign Minister stopped in the United States en route to visiting the Netherlands East Indies, and conferred with U. S. Government officials. Since then, there has been a considerable increase in the amount of military supplies being shipped to the Netherlands East Indies; the traffic of technicians and experts between the United States and N.E.I., has swung up sharply. From these indications as well as from the history of the Netherlands East Indies, it is believed, that depending upon the atmosphere at the time the Japanese-U. S. negotiations break off, Britain and the United States may occupy the Netherlands East Indies. They will do this, probably, much in the same manner as U. S.-Brazil joint occupation of Netherlands Guiana, in the name of protecting the products of the N.E.I. which are vital to national defense, tin and rubber.
I feel that it is essential that we give careful consideration to this possibility. I made reference to this point in my message # 1180 [b]. The gist of this message does not differ from that contained in that message.
[a] Not available.
[b] See IV, 170, 171.
Trans. 11-29-41
No. 202
FROM: OPNAV November 26, 1941
TO: CINCAF # 271442.
For the purpose of remedying the unintentional omission of CINCAF, in the forthcoming revision of WPL 46, para 3744 will be amended. If formal war eventuates between U. S. and Japan "Instructions for the Navy of the United States Governing Maritime and Aerial Warfare May 1941" will be placed in effect. This will however be supplemented by additional instructions including authority to CINCAF to conduct unrestricted submarine and aerial warfare against Axis shipping within that part of the Far East area lying south and west of a line joining Lat 30 N Long 122 E and Lat 7 N Long 140 E. You will declare this as a strategical area. You will warn all friendly, enemy and neutral merchant ships and aircraft to refrain from entering this
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strategical area—except under certain specified conditions—in your proclamation. You will state that this step is necessary to prevent damage to such ships or aircraft from supporting hostile action and to prevent them from obtaining info which if transmitted to the enemy would be seriously detrimental to armed forces of the U. S. The only conditions under which friendly and neutral merchant vessels may enter the strategical area will be through certain prescribed lanes that lead to Naval control stations. You are requested to take up the matter of defining and establishing these lanes and control stations with the Dutch and British Naval authorities, but take care not to disclose for the present these instructions to wage unrestricted submarine and aerial warfare. The situation will be far more complex if hostilities ensue without a formal declaration of war, but it appears probable that very nearly the same procedure will be followed. However, further advice must be received from CNO before this is done.
No. 203
FROM: OPNAV November 28, 1941
TO: CINCAF # 271912 CR 0863.
Request from the Army Chief of Staff that you inform General MacArthur of the contents of my 271442 so that Army air forces may make appropriate plans.
No. 204
FROM: CNO November 26, 1941
TO: CINCPAC # 270040 CR 0756.
If you consider this desirable, Army has offered to make available some units of infantry for re-enforcing defense battalions now on station x For advance bases which you may occupy, Army also proposes to prepare in Hawaii garrison troops but is unable at this time to provide any anti-aircraft units. Take this into consideration in your plans and advise when practicable the recommended armament and number of troops desired x
No. 205
FROM: CNO November 26, 1941
TO: CINCPAC # 270038 CR 0758.
Provided you consider this feasible and desirable and in order to keep the planes of the Second Marine Aircraft Wing available for expeditionary use OPNAV has requested and Army has agreed to station 25 Army pursuit planes at Midway and a similar number at Wake. It will be necessary for you to transport these planes and ground crews from Oahu to these stations on an aircraft carrier x Essential spare parts tools and ammunition will be taken in the carrier or on later trips of regular Navy supply vessels and planes will be flown off at destination and ground personnel landed in boats x Army understands these forces must be quartered in tents x Navy must be responsible for supplying water and subsistence and transporting other Army supplies x Stationing these planes must not be allowed to interfere with planned movements of Army bombers in Philippines x If necessary, additional parking areas should be laid prompt-
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THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
ly x Can Navy bombs now at outlying positions be carried by Army bombers which may fly to those positions for supporting Navy operations x As soon as practicable, confer with Commanding General and advise x
No. 206
FROM: CNO November 29, 1941
TO: CINCPAC # 282054 CR 02.
The arrangements described in your 280627 appear to be the best that can be done under the circumstances but suggest advisability of transferring VMF 221 from San Diego to Hawaii via SARATOGA. War Department will instruct COMGEN HAWDEPT to cooperate with Navy in plans for use of Army pursuit planes and Army troops in support of Marines. War Dept will endeavor to expedite plans for increase of AA defenses but it is doubtful if much improvement is possible soon. Marine Corps will shortly receive sixteen 37 MM AA guns and receive ammunition in February do you desire these guns for Midway and Wake? Request air mail report on present effective defenses of all outlying bases and increases planned in immediate future.
No. 207
FROM: Washington