THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
THE MAGIC BACKGROUND
OF
PEARL HARBOR
VOLUME IV
(October 17, 1941-December 7, 1941)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER IV
Advent of the TOJO Cabinet and redoubling of Japanese Government's insistence upon an early acceptance of its proposals.
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Outline of Volume IV |
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PART A Hull-Nomura Conversations (October 17, 1941-November 20, 1941) |
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1. Ambassador Nomura Complains of Lack of Coordination Between Japanese Foreign Office and Navy (October 18, 1941) |
1 |
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2. Tokyo Refuses Ambassador Nomura's Resignation (October 23, 1941) |
2 |
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3. Japanese Government Declares Policies of New Cabinet |
2 |
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4. Ambassador Nomura Reports British-German Peace Rumors |
2 |
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5. Welles-Wakasugi Conversation (October 24, 1941) |
2 |
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(a) Under Secretary Welles' Report |
2 |
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(b) Minister Wakasugi's Report |
4 |
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6. Tokyo Urges American Reply to Japanese Proposals |
5 |
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7. Ambassador Nomura Confers with Admiral Pratt (October 25, 1941) |
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8. Minister Wakasugi Reports on Status of Japanese-American Relations |
6 |
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9. Ambassador Nomura Reveals American Attitude Toward Japan |
7 |
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10. Ambassador Grew's Report (October 25, 1941) |
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11. Grew-Togo Interview (October 30, 1941) |
9 |
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(a) Ambassador Grew's Report |
9 |
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(b) Foreign Minister Togo's Report |
9 |
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12. Tokyo Questions Nomura on American Proposal |
10 |
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13. New Japanese Cabinet Discusses Formulation of Policies |
10 |
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14. Ambassador Grew Learns Japanese Cabinet's Plans |
11 |
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15. Ambassador Grew Reports on Situation in Japan |
11 |
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16. Ambassador Kurusu Appointed Special Aid to Ambassador Nomura |
12 |
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16A. Japan Plans to Attack Hawaii on December 7, 1941 (November 5-7, 1941) |
12 |
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17. Ambassador Grew Receives Japanese Informant |
13 |
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18. Japan's Attitude Toward Present Negotiations Made Known |
13 |
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19. Japan Instructs Ambassador Nomura in Final Proposals |
14 |
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20. Ambassador Kurusu Leaves for Washington |
14 |
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21. Japan Seeks Agreement with Britain and the Netherlands |
15 |
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22. Tokyo Receives English Translation of Proposals |
15 |
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23. Japan to Avoid Ratified Treaty with United States |
15 |
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24. Japanese Diet Accepts Cabinet's Counter Proposals |
16 |
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25. Ambassador Nomura to Guard Secrecy of Conferences |
16 |
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26. Japanese Newspapers Publicize Tokyo's Proposals |
16 |
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27. Japanese and American Newspapers Impair Diplomatic Negotiations |
17 |
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29. Hull-Nomura Conversation (November 7, 1941) |
17 |
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(a) State Department' Report |
17 |
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(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report |
19 |
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30. Tokyo Re-emphasizes Policy of Self-Defense |
20 |
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31. Mr. Horiuchi Arranges for Undelayed Delivery of Telegrams |
20 |
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32. Foreign Ministry Bans Publication of Negotiations |
21 |
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33. President Roosevelt Confers with Naval Leaders (November 7,1941) |
21 |
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34. Japan Interested in Hull's Proposed Settlement of the China Affair. |
22 |
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35. Japan Seeks Facts on American-British Attitude Toward Axis |
22 |
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36. Grew-Togo Conversation (November 10, 1941) |
23 |
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(a) Ambassador Grew's Report |
23 |
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(b) Foreign Minister Togo's Report |
25 |
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TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)
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37. Ambassador Nomura Reveals America's Pessimistic Attitude Toward the Negotiations |
26 |
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38. Roosevelt‑Nomura Conversation (November 10, 1941) |
27 |
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(a) Secretary Hull's Report |
27 |
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(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report |
29 |
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39. Japanese‑American Conversation (November 10, 1941) |
31 |
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40. Japan Doubts America's Awareness of the Critical Situation |
31 |
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41. The German Government Makes Demands on Japan |
31 |
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42. Foreign Minister Togo Confers with Ambassador Craigie (November 11, 1941) |
32 |
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43. Ambassador Nomura Seeks Clarification of Tripartite Pact Issues |
33 |
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44. The Chinese Ambassador Confers with President Roosevelt |
33 |
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45. Mr. Kase Calls on Ambassador Grew (November 12, 1941) |
33 |
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46. Ambassador Nomura Seeks English Translation of Proposal B |
35 |
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47. Japanese Official Analyzes Roosevelt's Domestic and Foreign Strategy |
35 |
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48. Japanese Naval Activity Seen in the Mandates |
36 |
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49. Hull‑Nomura Conversation (November 12, 1941) |
36 |
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(a) State Department's Report |
36 |
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(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report |
39 |
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50. Ambassador Kurusu Reports on American Pessimism |
41 |
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52. Foreign Minister Togo Questions American Interpretation of Proposals |
41 |
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53. Finance Official Nishiyama to Study Japanese‑American Negotiations |
42 |
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54. Japan Seeks Undelayed Chinese Peace Negotiations |
42 |
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55. Japanese‑American Conversations (November 13, 1941) |
42 |
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(a) State Department's Report |
42 |
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(b) Minister Wakasugi's Report |
43 |
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56. Foreign Minister Togo Requests Summaries of the Conversations |
44 |
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57. Ambassador Nomura Warns of America's Preparedness for War |
44 |
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58. China Seeks Increased Aid from the United States |
45 |
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59. Japanese Government Considers Negotiations in Final Stage |
45 |
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60. Ambassador Nomura Speculates on Results of Possible Diplomatic Breach |
46 |
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61. Tokyo Instructs Ambassador Kurusu in New Duties |
47 |
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62. Hull‑Nomura Conversation‑(November 15, 1941) |
47 |
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(a) State Department's Report |
47 |
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(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report |
50 |
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63. Tokyo Instructs Ambassador Nomura in Interpretation of Japanese Proposals |
52 |
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64. Hull‑Nomura Conversation‑(November 17, 1941) |
52 |
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(a) State Department's Report |
52 |
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(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report |
53 |
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65. Roosevelt‑Kurusu Conversation‑(November 17, 1941) |
54 |
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(a) State Department's Report |
54 |
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(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report |
55 |
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66. Ambassador Grew Warns United States of Unexpected Japanese Attack |
57 |
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67. Japanese Air Forces Move to Mandates |
57 |
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68. Hull‑Nomura Conversation‑(November 18, 1941) |
58 |
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(a) State Department's Report |
58 |
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(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report |
61 |
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69. Hull‑Nomura Conversation‑(November 19, 1941) |
63 |
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(a) State Department's Report |
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(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report |
64 |
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70. Japan Prepares for Breakdown of Diplomatic Relations |
64 |
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Japanese efforts to extort an agreement on a narrow and one‑sided proposal
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Hull‑Nomura Conversations (November 20, 1941‑December 1, 1941)
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71. Hull‑Nomura Conversation‑(November 20, 1941) |
65 |
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(a) State Department's Report |
65 |
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(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report |
66 |
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THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
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TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)
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72. Hull‑Kurusu Conversation‑(November 21, 1941) |
67 |
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(a) Secretary Hull's Report |
67 |
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(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report |
67 |
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73. Japanese Air and Surface Patrols Cover Shipping |
68 |
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74. Hull‑Nomura Conversation‑(November 22, 1941) |
68 |
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(a) State Department's Report |
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(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report |
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75. Japan Changes Agreement Deadline to November 29, 1941 |
72 |
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76. Chief of Naval Operations Warns of Japanese Surprise Attack on Philippines |
72 |
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77. Ambassador Grew Discusses Japanese Proposals with Foreign Minister Togo |
73 |
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78. Ambassador Nomura Warns Against Inaccurate News Reporting |
74 |
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79. Foreign Minister Togo Questions Newspaper Interpretation of Proposals |
74 |
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80. Tokyo Wishes Agreement to Include Petroleum Exports |
75 |
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81. Japanese Ambassador Offer to Tokyo Final Suggestion for Peace |
75 |
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82. Tokyo Orders Reports on Negotiations to Be Made by Telephone |
76 |
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83. Secretary Hull Confers with Allied Representatives‑(November 24, 1941) |
76 |
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84. Conference with Japanese Representatives Postponed by Secretary Hull |
76 |
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85. Hull‑Nomura Conversation‑(November 26,1941) |
77 |
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(a) State Department's Report |
77 |
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(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report |
80 |
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86. Ambassador Kurusu Telephones Mr. Yamamoto the Outcome of the Conference |
81 |
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87. Ambassador Nomura Suggests Terminating the Present Negotiations |
81 |
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88. United States Occupies Dutch Guiana |
82 |
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89. American Armed Forces Prepare for War |
82 |
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90. Roosevelt‑Nomura Conversation‑(November 27,1941) |
83 |
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(a) Secretary Hull's Report |
83 |
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(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report |
83 |
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91. Ambassador Kurusu Telephones Yamamoto |
85 |
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92. Chief of Naval Operations Issues War Warning |
86 |
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93. Tokyo Notifies Embassies of Rupture in Japanese‑American Negotiations |
86 |
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94. Ambassador Nomura Urges Open Break in Diplomatic Relations |
86 |
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95. United States Forces Await Japanese Attack |
87 |
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Final Phase.
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HULL‑NOMURA CONVERSATIONS (December 1, 1941‑December 7, 1941)
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96. Tokyo Investigates President Roosevelt's Sudden Return to Washington |
89 |
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97. Ambassador Nomura Reports Unfavorable Reaction to Tojo's Speech |
89 |
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98. Hull‑Nomura Conversation‑(December 1, 1941) |
89 |
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(a) State Department's Report |
89 |
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(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report |
91 |
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99. Tokyo Prepares for Results of Diplomatic Break |
92 |
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100. Japan Safeguards Its Code and Cipher Systems |
92 |
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101. Japanese‑American Conversation‑(December 2, 1941) |
92 |
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(a) State Department's Report |
92 |
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(b) Japanese Embassy Report |
93 |
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102. Welles‑Nomura Conversation‑(December 2, 1941) |
93 |
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(a) State Department's Report |
93 |
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(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report |
94 |
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103. President Roosevelt Orders Reconnaissance of Forces Around Thailand |
95 |
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104. U.S. Navy Exchanges Information with British and Dutch |
95 |
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105. Japanese‑Military Attaché in Spain Reports on Japanese‑American Negotiations |
95 |
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106. American Officers in Far East Destroy Codes |
95 |
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107. Hull‑Nomura Conversation‑(December 5, 1941) |
96 |
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(a) State Department's Report |
96 |
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(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report |
97 |
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TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)
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108. Japanese Military Attaché Discounts Immediate Possibility of War with America |
97 |
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109. Japan Plans to Consider Holland a Semi‑Belligerent Country When at War with the United States |
98 |
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110. Japan to Send Form a Reply to American Proposals |
98 |
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111. Japan Seeks Information on Roosevelt Message |
98 |
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112. President Roosevelt's Message to Emperor Hirohito‑(December 6, 1941) |
98 |
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113. Hull‑Nomura Conversation‑(December 7, 1941) |
99 |
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(a) State Department's Report |
99 |
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(b) Ambassador Nomura's Report |
101 |
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114. Tokyo Extends Appreciation to Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu |
101 |
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115. Japanese Embassy Destroys Codes |
101 |
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116. The Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor‑(December 7, 1941) |
102 |
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(a) Secret Hull's Statement |
102 |
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(b) President Roosevelt's Message |
102 |
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117. The United States Declares War‑(December 8, 1941) |
102 |
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118. American Forces Begin Unrestricted Warfare |
103 |
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119. Japan Spreads Anti‑allied Propaganda in Allied Countries |
103 |
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120. Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor Surprises Turkish Foreign Minister |
103 |
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PART B JAPANESE INTELLIGENCE IN DIPLOMATIC MESSAGES
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105 |
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(a) Reports from the United States
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105 |
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121. Consul Sato Reports United States Navy Day Ceremony |
105 |
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122. Ambassador Nomura Requests Information Concerning the Warspite |
106 |
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123. Tokyo Outlines the Type of Information Needed |
106 |
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124. Consul Identifies Warspite, Colorado and Saratoga at Bremerton |
106 |
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125. Japanese Naval Officials in Mexico Disapprove of Furnishing General Intelligence |
106 |
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(c) Reports from Central America
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106 |
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126. Intelligence Dispatches Outline United States Activities in Central America |
106 |
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(d) Reports from the Panama Canal
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107 |
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127. Minister Akiyama Reports Canal Military and Naval Activity |
107 |
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128. Naval Intelligence Reports Military Construction Work and Navy Patrols |
107 |
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129. Reports Enumerate Vessels Passing Through Canal |
107 |
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130. Japanese Minister Corrects Identification of Vessel |
108 |
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131. Japanese Report Movement of the British Cruiser Liverpool |
108 |
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132. German Agents Correct Japanese Identification of British Cruiser |
108 |
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133. Intelligence Dispatches List Type, Nationality and Number of Ships Crossing Isthmus |
108 |
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134. United States Sets Up Defense Fortifications in Canal Zone |
109 |
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(e) Reports from South America
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109 |
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135. Agents Speculate Concerning Planes Flown to Bathurst |
109 |
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(f) Reports from the Hawaiian Islands
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110 |
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136. Foreign Minister Togo Asks for Semi‑Weekly Ship Movement Reports |
110 |
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137. American Experts, Allegedly en Route to Burma Road, Arrive in Hawaii |
110 |
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138. Foreign Minister Togo Requests Report of Vessels in "N" Area |
110 |
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139. Consul Kita Reports Regular Naval Maneuvers |
110 |
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140. Japanese Agents Observe American Defenses |
111 |
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141. Frequency of Ship Movement Reports Is Left to Discretion of Consul |
111 |
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142. Foreign Minister Togo Wires Instructions Regarding Japanese Communications |
111 |
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143. Japanese Continue to Watch Navy Maneuvers |
111 |
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144. Mr. Fujii Changes American Ship Maneuver Signals |
112 |
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145. Consul Wires Movement Report of Rarin and Wyoming |
112 |
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146. British Vessel Enters Honolulu Harbor on December 4, 1941 |
112 |
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147. USS Lexington Departs Hawaii |
113 |
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148. Consul Kita Notifies Tokyo of Balloon Barrage Defenses |
113 |
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149. Last Intelligence Report Before Pearl Harbor Attack Lists Ships in Port |
113 |
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(g) Reports from the Philippine Islands
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113 |
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150. Consul Nihro Reports Movement of Philippine‑Based Ships |
113 |
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151. Consul Nihro Obtains Information from Newspapers and Foreign Office Reports |
114 |
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THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
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TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)
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152. Brown Soldiers Puzzle Japanese Consul |
115 |
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153. Tokyo Directs Secretary Yuki To Investigate Philippine Defenses |
115 |
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154. Foreign Minister Togo Asks Confirmation of Report of November 1, 1941 |
115 |
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155. Consul Nihro Wires Further Information on Military Installations at Manila |
115 |
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156. Twenty‑three Ships Anchored at Manila on November 8, 1941 |
116 |
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157. Japanese Consul Corrects Previous Estimate of Airplanes in Philippines |
116 |
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158. Consul Gathers Information from Japanese Residents |
116 |
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159. Japanese Report Concerning Preparations on Cebu |
117 |
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160. Manila Identifies the British Ship Awatea |
117 |
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161. Consul Nihro Reports Tense Feeling in Manila |
118 |
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162. Submarine Tender Enters Port |
118 |
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163. Inaccuracy of Japanese Intelligence Reports |
118 |
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164. Manila Notifies Tokyo of Scouting Patrols |
119 |
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165. Intelligence Report Lists Ships in Port on December 1, 1941 |
119 |
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(h) Reports from Singapore
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119 |
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166. Japanese Officials in Singapore Learn of Squadron Sailing |
119 |
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167. Tokyo Requests Information on Ships in Port |
119 |
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(i) Reports from Vladivostok and Hsinking
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119 |
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168. American Tankers en Route to Vladivostok |
120 |
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169. Russian Incidents |
120 |
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JAPANESE DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITIES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD
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121 |
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(a) Japanese-American Relations
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121 |
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170. Japanese Consul Considers Means of Evacuating Nationals |
121 |
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171. Consul Morishima Applies for Permit to Transfer American Mission Funds |
121 |
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172. Japanese Fear That Mr. Kasai's Lecture May Cause Embarrassment |
121 |
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173. Consul Originates Plan to Repay Nationals in Tokyo |
121 |
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174. Secretary Terasaki Suggests Delay of Orders for Official Harada |
121 |
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175. Japanese Plan to Route Money to Vancouver Through Seattle |
122 |
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176. Sailing of Kikawa Maru Forces Secretary Matsui to Leave Japan Without Visa |
122 |
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177. Japanese Consul at Vladivostok Views Pessimistically the Adjustment of Japanese‑American Relations |
122 |
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178. Propaganda Regulations Will Apply to Neutral Countries, Japan Decrees |
122 |
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179. Harada to Bring Wireless Apparatus on Hikawa Maru |
122 |
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180. Swiss Newspaper Reports Progress of Japanese‑American Negotiations |
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181. Delay of Sailing Permit Will Cause Financial Loss, Japan Declares |
123 |
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182. Ambassador Inquires Concerning Return of Japanese Students |
123 |
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183. Ambassador Nomura Sends Part of Personal Luggage to Japan |
123 |
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184. Foreign Minister Togo Urges Salary Remittance Exchange for Foreign Correspondents |
123 |
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185. Japan Asks for Foreign Broadcast Suggestions |
124 |
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186. American Embassy in Tokyo to Get Fuel |
124 |
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187. Tokyo Requests Officials to Bring Recording Apparatus |
124 |
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188. Exchange of Diplomatic Expense Funds Gives Rise to Discussion |
124 |
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189. Minister Directs That Cargo Ships Return to Japan |
125 |
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190. Broadcast Wave Length Proves Unsatisfactory |
125 |
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191. Japan Learns of Alleged Source of News Leak |
126 |
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192. Ambassador Nomura Sends Representative to America First Meeting |
126 |
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193. Japanese Officials Plan to Organize and Finance New Committee |
126 |
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194. Tokyo Foresees Need of Survey of United States Economic System |
127 |
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195. Ambassador Nomura Says American People Not Ready to Enter European War |
127 |
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196. Japan Asks Representations in Mail Examination |
128 |
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198. Ambassador Nomura Reports on Broadcast Reception |
128 |
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199. Tokyo Itemizes Diplomatic Expenditures of Officials in United States |
128 |
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200. Japan Reprimands Officials Concerning Dispatch Classification |
128 |
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201. Consul Muto Reports Further Investigation of Japanese Agents |
129 |
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202. Consul Muto Asks Confirmation of Salary as Employee of Japanese Newspaper |
129 |
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203. American Bank in Tokyo Receives no Instructions to Cooperate in Japanese Exchange Plan |
129 |
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204. Manchukuoan Officials Seize Baptist Missionaries in Harbin |
129 |
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TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)
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Page |
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205. Foreign Minister Outlines Policy in China in Event of United States War |
129 |
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206. Lima, Peru, Chosen for Gold Deposits for Emergency Use |
130 |
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207. Tokyo Sends Instructions for Emergency Destruction of Code Machines |
130 |
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208. United States Attempts to Separate Italy from Axis, Ambassador Nomura Reports |
130 |
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209. Japan Plans to Preserve Shanghai Public Peace When American Marines Evacuates |
130 |
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210. Tokyo Decides to Permit Remittances from America to Cultural Institutions |
131 |
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211. Tokyo Advises Ambassador Nomura of Plan of Evacuation |
131 |
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212. Japanese Officials in European Countries Warned of Critical Situation |
131 |
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213. Shanghai United Settlement Council Decides Cooperative Protection Plan |
131 |
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214. Japanese Agents Report American Hospital Staffs To Be Evacuating Peking, China |
132 |
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215. Foreign Minister Directs Havana Consul in Regard to Emergency Fund |
132 |
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216. Foreign Office Considers Scheduling Another Evacuation Vessel |
132 |
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217. Japan Makes Provisions for Financing South American Diplomatic Establishment |
132 |
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218. Consul Morishima Asks That the Tatsuta Maru Dock at New York |
132 |
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220. Japan Wires Washington Schedule of the Tatsuta Maru |
133 |
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221. Japan Decides to Close the Japanese Cultural Association |
133 |
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222. Bank Employees Receive Instructions to Evacuate With the Embassy Staff |
133 |
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223. Japanese Official List of Agencies Printing Japanese Propaganda |
133 |
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224. Ambassador Nomura Suggests Improvements in Broadcast Service |
134 |
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225. An Emergency Code System Becomes Effective |
134 |
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226. Ambassador Nomura is Asked to Request Permits for Entrance of Japanese from Hawaii |
134 |
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227. Japan Requests Manchukuo to Release American Missionaries |
135 |
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228. Secretary Terasaki Requests Addresses of Foreigners Receiving American Newspapers |
135 |
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229. Difficulties Arise Concerning Evacuation of Dual Nationality Holders |
135 |
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230. Japan Issues Orders Concerning Disposition of Codes and Code Machines |
135 |
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231. Courier Kosaka Ordered Back to Japan |
135 |
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232. Destruction of Code Machines Is Ordered in London, Hongkong, Singapore, and Manila |
135 |
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233. Havana Office Directed to Destroy Codes |
136 |
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234. Officials Directed to Destroy Codes |
136 |
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235. Officials Directed to Retain Emergency Code System Also |
136 |
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236. Provisions Are Made for Evacuation of Diplomats |
136 |
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237. Japan Requests Permission to Change Schedule of Tatsuta Maru |
136 |
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238. Ambassador Nomura Urges Magnanimity in Paying Employees Remaining in United States |
137 |
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239. State Department Approves New Schedule for Tatsuta Maru |
137 |
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240. Ambassador Nomura Is Instructed to Explain Japanese Military Activity in French Indo‑China |
137 |
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241. Manchukuoan Officials Decide to Release Americans |
137 |
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242. Japan Sends Funds for Returning of Families of Japanese Diplomatic Employees |
138 |
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243. American Embassy Requires No Permit for Taking Out Personal Belongings |
138 |
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244. Ambassador Kurusu Suggests United States Investigate Western Transportation Company |
138 |
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246. Mystery Dispatch or Coded Wire Sent to Rio de Janeiro |
138 |
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247. Iguchi Asks Permission to Delay Destruction of One Code Machine |
138 |
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248. Japanese Officials in Washington Learn That American Marines Will Evacuate Shanghai |
138 |
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249. Tokyo Orders Terasaki, Takagi, Ando, and Yamamoto to Return to Japan |
139 |
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250. Consul Morishima Requests Permission for Mr. Hikida to Return Home |
139 |
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251. Ambassador Nomura Requests Additional Expense Money |
139 |
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252. Ambassador Kurusu Asks That Secretary Terasaki Remain in the United States |
139 |
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253. Japan Continues Making Evacuation Plans |
139 |
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254. Tokyo Clarifies Code Machine Reference |
140 |
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255. Japan Issues Its Policy Regarding Allied Diplomatic Officials |
140 |
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256. Consul Nihro Desires Settlement of Akino's Fine |
141 |
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257. Consul Nihro Requests Competent Assistants |
141 |
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258. Tokyo Plans Utilization of Osaka Steamship Company Funds in Manila |
141 |
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259. Consul Nihro Destroys Useless Codes |
141 |
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(b) Japanese‑Panamanian Relations
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143 |
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260. Diplomatic Corps in Panama Acknowledges New Government |
143 |
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261. Latin American Countries Deny "Veiled Intervention" by the United States |
143 |
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THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
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TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)
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Page |
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262. Minister Akiyama Explains New Governments' Foreign Policy |
143 |
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263. Japanese Business Firms Ordered to Clue on October 28, 1941 |
144 |
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264. Uncooperative Course of New Government is Result of Fear, Minister Alleges |
144 |
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265. Panama Restricts Minister Akiyama's Contacts |
145 |
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266. Japanese Minister Says the United States is Urging Panama to Take the Lead |
145 |
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267. Japan Sends Official Complaint to Panama |
146 |
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268. Minister Akiyama Suggests Retaliatory Measures |
146 |
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269. Japan Requests Immediate Reopening of Businesses |
146 |
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270. Radio Broadcast or Domei Service is Suggested to Publicize Panama's Action |
147 |
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271. Tokyo Foreign Office Protests to Panama Minister; Requests Formal Statement From Panama |
147 |
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272. Panama Cabinet Says Japanese Note is Phrased in Insulting Terms |
147 |
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273. Minister Akiyama Says Japanese Will Have Trouble Disposing of Large Stocks |
147 |
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274. Newspaper Article Originating in Japan Charges Panama with Inhuman Acts |
148 |
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275. Japanese Minister Reports Dismissal of Spanish Minister |
148 |
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276. Mexican Minister Incensed at Treatment of Japanese, Returns Home, Akiyama Declares |
148 |
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277. Mr. Izawa Negotiates for Reemployment of Japanese in Panama |
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278. Minister Akiyama Suggests Further Retaliatory Measures |
149 |
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279. Foreign Minister Togo Plans to Aid Nationals |
|
|
280. Japanese Military Men are En Route to Homeland |
149 |
|
281. Minister Suggests that Young Japanese Nationals be Attached to Central and Latin American Legations |
149 |
|
282. Minister Akiyama Stresses Danger of Communication Stoppage |
149 |
|
283. Japanese Nationals Urged to Evacuate to Latin American Countries |
149 |
|
284. Arrangements Made for Tatsuta Maru to Dock at Balboa |
150 |
|
285. Panamanian Minister Reports Arrival of Peruvian Minister in Washington |
150 |
|
286. Japan Proposes Reparation for Treatment of Japan Nationals in Panama |
150 |
|
287. Minister Akiyama Communicates With Buenos Aires and Tokyo Regarding Codes |
151 |
|
288. Minister Akiyama Experiences Financial Annoyances |
151 |
|
(c) Japanese‑Hawaiian Relations
|
153 |
|
289. Consul in Honolulu Requests Funds Before Arrival of Tatsuta Maru |
153 |
|
290. Japanese Official Requested to Bring Money Back to Japan |
153 |
|
291. Foreign Office Asks that ----- be Kept Under Strict Surveillance |
153 |
|
292. Tokyo Suggests Nationals be Assigned to Second Evacuation Vessel |
153 |
|
293. Special Codes to be Retained as Long as Situation Permits |
153 |
|
294. Japan Ponders Recall of Staff |
153 |
|
(d) Japanese‑Philippine Relations
|
155 |
|
295. Consul Nihro Advises Early Evacuation of Useful Nationals |
155 |
|
296. United States Making Preparations for War in Earnest, Consul Says |
155 |
|
297. Payment of Fine for Manila Youth in Japan Creates Problem of Exchange |
155 |
|
298. Consul Protests Opening of Diplomatic Mail Pouch |
156 |
|
299. Japan to Investigate the Seizure of Mail |
156 |
|
300. The Asama Maru Tentatively Scheduled to Arrive November 10, 1941 |
166 |
|
301. Japan Changes Arrival Date of the Asama Maru to November 19, 1941 |
157 |
|
302. Consul Nihro Reiterates Advice that Fares be Reduced |
157 |
|
303. Consul Arranges Permit to Enter Manila as Vessel Sails from Homeland |
157 |
|
304. Passenger and Freight Fees to Buy Supplies for the Asama Maru |
157 |
|
305. Asama Maru to Evacuate Japanese Officials and Business Men |
158 |
|
306. Japanese Legation Staff Obtains a Loan |
158 |
|
(e) Japanese‑Mexican Relations
|
159 |
|
307. Vice Consul Kobayashi Transports Secret Documents to San Francisco |
159 |
|
308. Minister Miura Sends to Tokyo a Resume of Comments on Mexico's Position in the Event of a Japanese‑American War |
159 |
|
309. Navy Department Retracts Alleged Statement by Secretary Knox of "Imminent Action Within 24 Hours" |
159 |
|
310. Minister Miura Plans to Return to Japan |
159 |
|
311. System of Importing Rayon Undergoes a Change |
160 |
VII
|
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)
|
Page |
|
312. Panama Incident Has No Noticeable Effect in Mexico |
160 |
|
313. Mexican Newspapermen Return from Japan Via Vancouver and Cuba |
161 |
|
314. Courier Inoma Dispatched to San Francisco |
161 |
|
315. Mexican Reporter Returning from Japan Expresses His Gratitude for Hospitality Extended |
161 |
|
316. Mexico Enforces Stricter Passport Policies |
161 |
|
317. Minister Miura Gives His Opinion Regarding Oil Agreement Between United States and Mexico |
162 |
|
318. Agreement Signifies Desire for Mutual Understanding Between United States and Mexico |
162 |
|
319. Minister Miura Request Traveling Expenses and Reservations on the Tatsuta Maru |
163 |
|
320. Japanese Nationals Request Aid in Obtaining Reservations on Tatsuta Maru |
163 |
|
321. Minister Miura Asks that the Tatsuta Maru Load Freight at Manzanillo |
163 |
|
322. Japanese Officials Use Mexico‑Tokyo Diplomatic Channel for Intelligence Routing |
163 |
|
323. Tokyo Sends Instructions by Courier Kosaka Regarding Japanese and Manchurian Daily Broadcasts |
163 |
|
324. Tokyo Wires Formal Authorization for Minister Miura's Return |
164 |
|
325. Minister Miura Reports Impossible Reception of General Broadcast |
164 |
|
326. Foreign Minister Togo Instructs Minister Miura to Arrange for Employment of Japanese from Panama |
164 |
|
327. Tokyo Orders Mexico to Limit Expenses and to Use "S" Code |
164 |
|
328. Minister Miura Discusses with Panama the Employment of a New Staff Member |
164 |
|
329. Tokyo Makes Plans for the Tatsuta Maru to Enter and Leave Port at Manzanillo |
164 |
|
330. The Mexican Government Reopens Its Legation in China |
165 |
|
331. Minister Miura Asks for Confirmation of Schedule of Tatsuta Maru |
165 |
|
332. Tokyo Informs Minister Miura It Approves Taking American and Mexican Money to Japan |
165 |
|
333. Japanese Minister in Mexico Informs Tokyo of Destruction of Ciphers and Code Machines |
165 |
|
(f) Japanese‑South American Relations
|
167 |
|
334. Columbia Refuses United States Overflight Requests |
167 |
|
335. Japanese Naval Authorities Ship Transmitter Despite Protests of South American Foreign Offices |
167 |
|
336. Mitsubishi Unable to Ship Supplies Aboard Toa Maru |
167 |
|
337. German Representatives Reserve Cabins Aboard Toa Maru |
167 |
|
338. Japanese Navy Promises to Stow Radio Transmitter |
168 |
|
339. Brazil Begins Close Inspection of Japanese Exports and Imports |
168 |
|
340. Terukawa Maru to Stop at Callao |
168 |
|
341. South American Countries Change to Code Machine November 7, 1941 |
169 |
|
342. Minister Yanai Advises Instigation of New Radio Code |
169 |
|
343. Tokyo Urges That Maltreated Japanese in Panama Be Taken to South America |
169 |
|
344. Minister Tomii Advises Adjustment of Japanese American Relations to Give Japan More Time |
170 |
|
345. Minister Koseki in Paraguay Burns Codes |
170 |
|
346. New Code Words Issued November 29, 1941 |
170 |
|
347. Tokyo Lists Accomplishments of Pearl Harbor Day |
170 |
|
(a) Argentina
|
170 |
|
348. Japan Attempts to Improve Trade With Argentina |
171 |
|
349. Japan Undecided as to Sympathies of Argentina |
171 |
|
(b) Brazil
|
172 |
|
350. Japan Improves Communications Facilities to Brazil |
172 |
|
351. Courier Kosaka Leaves Rio de Janeiro for Washington |
172 |
|
352. Japan Recognizes Strong United States Sympathies in Brazil |
173 |
|
353. Japan Transfers Bank Funds |
173 |
|
354. Ambassador Ishii Asks for Additional Funds |
173 |
|
355. Ambassador Ishii Has Difficulty in Radio Reception |
173 |
|
356. Japan Prepared for Crisis as Brazilian Army Supports America |
174 |
|
357. Ambassador Ishii Requests Release of Secret Kusano |
174 |
|
358. Japan Sees United States Military Occupation of South America |
174 |
|
359. Japan Issues Instructions for Burning Codes |
175 |
|
(c) Chile
|
175 |
viii
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
|
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)
|
Page |
|
360. Minister Yamagata Suspects United States Machinations in Chile |
175 |
|
361. Japan Limits Tour of Chilean Press |
175 |
|
362. Japanese Watch Development of South American Sympathies in Face of War |
176 |
|
363. Minister Yamagata Asks Chile to Take in Maltreated Japanese from Panama |
176 |
|
(d) Peru
|
178 |
|
364. Minister Sakamoto Asks Permission to Confer with Ambassador Kurusu |
178 |
|
365. Acting Minister Yodokawa Analyzes Peruvian Attitude |
178 |
|
(g) Japanese‑British Relations
|
181 |
|
366. Custom Question Forces Ambassador Tsurumi to Remain in Singapore |
181 |
|
367. Ambassador Tsurumi Receives Permit for the Loading of Raw Cotton |
181 |
|
368. Spanish Ambassador Reports Improvement of Conditions in Britain |
181 |
|
369. Details of Unloading Scrap Iron Remain Unsettled |
182 |
|
370. The Asama Maru Prepares to Evacuate Japanese Nationals from British‑Controlled Ports |
182 |
|
371. The Kito Maru Abandons Trip to Dairen |
182 |
|
372. Japanese Officials in Singapore Continue Negotiations in Regard to the Frozen Accounts |
183 |
|
373. Japanese and Canadian Officials Disagree Concerning the Purchasing Rate of ¥100 |
183 |
|
374. Mr. Wataru Assumes Post as Commercial Attaché in Shanghai |
183 |
|
375. Japan is Concerned Over the Attitude of Great Britain |
183 |
|
376. Spanish Charge d'Affaires in Cairo Comments on the Situation in Egypt |
184 |
|
377. Japanese Naval Reconnaissance Bomber Flies Over Hongkong |
184 |
|
378. Ambassador Craigie and the Foreign Minister Culminate the Honma Incident |
185 |
|
379. Japanese Foreign Minister is Concerned Over Family Remittance Permits |
185 |
|
380. Canadian Army Troops are Sent to the Orient |
185 |
|
381. Makino of the Johol Rubber Plantation is Instructed to Return to Japan |
185 |
|
382. Diplomatic Relations Between Iraq and Japan are Severed |
186 |
|
383. Britain Removes from Office the Chief of Staff and His Assistant |
186 |
|
384. The Boris Arrives in Seattle |
186 |
|
385. Mr. Yoshizawa Seeks Funds for the Ottawa Legation |
186 |
|
386. Mr. Kawakasi Negotiates for Funds for the Nisso Company in Vancouver |
187 |
|
387. Foreign Minister Togo is Concerned Over the Remaining Japanese Residents in Singapore |
187 |
|
388. Tokyo is Concerned Over British Code Material |
188 |
|
389. The Premier of Burma Attempts to Attain an Independent Status for His Country |
188 |
|
390. Hongkong Economic Condition is Becoming Critical |
188 |
|
391. Tokyo is Concerned With Code and Cipher Systems |
189 |
|
392. Japan Prepares for Hostilities |
189 |
|
(h) Japanese‑German Relations
|
191 |
|
393. Ambassador Oshima Asks to Resign |
191 |
|
394. Japan Sees an Increase of British and American Aid to Russia |
191 |
|
395. Exchange Broadcasts Become Acceptable to Japan and Germany |
192 |
|
396. Progress of the Russo‑German War (October, 1941) |
192 |
|
(a) Report from Finland |
192 |
|
(b) Report from Roumania |
193 |
|
397. Tokyo Relays a Summary of Diplomatic Relations as Advanced by Germany |
193 |
|
398. Asama Maru Departure is Delayed Because of Unsuitable Routing |
194 |
|
399. Axis Powers Reacclaim the Anti‑Comintern Pact |
195 |
|
399A. DoD Comment, Also includes Japanese Account of the SORGE |
|
|
400. Halting of American Shipping at Manila Impedes Japanese‑German Trade |
199 |
|
401. Progress of the Russo‑German War (November, 1941) |
199 |
|
402. Fresh Rumors of a Combined Europe Meeting Under Hitler Arise |
202 |
|
403. Progress of the Russo‑German War (November l3‑14, 1941) |
202 |
|
(a) Report from Finland |
202 |
|
(b) Report from Berlin |
203 |
|
(c) Report from Alexandrovsk |
204 |
|
(d) Report from Bulgaria |
204 |
|
404. Japanese Specialists Study German Industries |
204 |
|
405. President Inonu Offers Turkey as a Mediator Between Germany and Russia |
206 |
|
406. Axis Powers Bicker Over Vital Rubber Shipments |
206 |
ix
|
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)
|
Page |
|
407. Ambassador Oshima Says Axis Political Aim of the War is the Dismemberment of Russia |
206 |
|
408. Japanese Officials in Ankara, Helsinki, and Vienna Report German Activities to the Home Office |
207 |
|
409. Germany Proposes Final Draft of the German‑Manchukuoan Economic Relations Pact |
208 |
|
410. Ambassador Oshima Interviews Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop |
208 |
|
411. Axis Powers Arrange for Simultaneous Declarations of War on the United States |
209 |
|
412. Tripartite Powers Strengthen Their Positions in the Near East |
213 |
|
413. Japan Attempts to Pacify Germany in Regard to Japanese‑Russian Relations |
213 |
|
(i) Japanese‑Manchukuoan Relations
|
215 |
|
414. Japan is Concerned with Mongolian Uprisings |
215 |
|
415. Manchukuoan Border Incidents Cause Increasing Concern in Tokyo |
215 |
|
416. Japan is Concerned with Communist Activities in Manchukuo and China |
215 |
|
417. Japan and Russia Equally Unprepared for War Against Each Other, Minister at Hsinking Declares |
216 |
|
418. Russia Thought to be Moving Border Troops to Western Frontier |
216 |
|
419. Japan Questions Manchukuo's Motives in Canceling Visas |
216 |
|
420. Government Authorities Agree on Manchukuo's Policy in the Event of War |
217 |
|
421. Japan Ponders Disposition of Its Manchukuoan Army |
217 |
|
422. Japan Asks Renewal of Five‑Year Rights to Northern Sakhalin Coal and Oil |
217 |
|
(j) Japanese‑Italian Relations
|
219 |
|
423. Italy Urges Japan to Restrain United States from Participation in the War |
219 |
|
424. Italy Disapproves Japan's Dissemination of British Propaganda |
219 |
|
425. Ambassador Horikiri Finds Count Ciano Uninformed on Japanese‑American Negotiations |
219 |
|
426. Ambassador Horikiri Urges Japan to Publish More Italian Propaganda |
219 |
|
427. Japan Desires Italian Reciprocity in Air Transportation to South America |
220 |
|
428. Japanese Officials Discuss Trade Relations With Italy |
220 |
|
429. Ando Rebukes Gayda for Attempting to Utilize Japan in Axis Machinations |
220 |
|
430. Ambassador Horikiri Explains Italian Censorship of Japanese Mail |
221 |
|
431. The Japanese Ambassador Reveals Revolutionary Plot in India |
221 |
|
432. The Catholic Church at Rome Seeks to Forestall Breach in Japanese‑American Relations |
222 |
|
433. The Catholic Church Is Unmoved by Arabic Situation |
222 |
|
434. Ambassador Horikiri Complains of Weaknesses in Japanese Radio Transmission to Rome |
223 |
|
435. Ambassador Horikiri Obtains Information Concerning Italian Relations with Croatia, France, and Russia |
223 |
|
436. Ambassador Horikiri and Secretary Ando Confer with Mussolini and Count Ciano |
224 |
|
437. Ambassador Horikiri Learns of Italian Position in Regard to the War with the United States |
224 |
|
(k) Japanese‑French Relations
|
225 |
|
438. Mr. Arnald Refuses to Make Military Expense Payment in Piastres |
225 |
|
439. Japan Instructs Ambassador to Procure Export Permit by October 24, 1941 |
225 |
|
440. Japan Protests Movement of Troops into Unfortified Zone |
225 |
|
441. Tokyo Plans to Land Planes in Indo‑Chinese Waters |
225 |
|
442. Foreign Minister Togo Applies Pressure in Shanghai by Limiting Exportations |
225 |
|
443. Japan Threatens Action Unless French Agree to Payment of Military Expenses |
226 |
|
444. Tokyo Decrees Further Export Restrictions to Combat Freezing of Assets |
226 |
|
445. Consul Hayashi Investigates Pro‑Japanese Party Members |
226 |
|
446. Special Committee Receives Codes |
227 |
|
447. Tokyo Instructs Kato To Request Only Plane Landing Space |
227 |
|
448. Hanoi Consul to Negotiate for Plane Landings Independently |
227 |
|
449. Government Officials are Listed as Dangerous to Franco‑Japanese Cooperation |
227 |
|
450. Frenchman Intercedes in Behalf of Japan |
228 |
|
451. Togo Plans to Send Emissary Group Despite Visa Procurement Difficulty |
228 |
|
452. Japan Reiterates Threat to Secure Military Expenses |
228 |
|
453. French Authorities Agree to Issue Visas for Entire Yoshizawa Group |
229 |
|
454. France Accedes to Japan's Military Expense Payment Demand |
229 |
|
455. French Indo‑China Remits Occupation Expenses |
229 |
|
456. Japanese Officials Arrive at Hanoi |
230 |
x
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
|
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)
|
Page |
|
457. Japan Demands Payment in Full from French Indo‑China |
230 |
|
458. Tokyo Forwards New Code Machines for the Hanoi and Saigon Offices |
230 |
|
459. French Indo‑China Makes Payment in Philippine Dollars |
230 |
|
460. Investigation Discredits Aid of Pro‑Japanese Frenchman |
230 |
|
461. Foreign Minister Togo Outlines Duties of Ambassador Yoshizawa |
231 |
|
462. Ambassador Kato Asks for Schedules of Yoshizawa Party Members |
231 |
|
463. Tokyo Officials Demand Release of Shipment |
232 |
|
464. Consul Ogawa to Sail on Chicago Maru |
232 |
|
465. French Government Approves Rubber Shipment |
232 |
|
466. Expansion of Japanese Army in French Indo‑China Creates Difficulties |
232 |
|
467. France Agrees to Provide Additional Supplies to Japan |
233 |
|
468. Tokyo Releases New Broadcast Schedule for Far East |
233 |
|
469. Vice‑Minister Roshier Considers Movement of Japanese Troops |
233 |
|
470. Secret Messages Withheld from Staff Members are to be Headed by "Gaisin" |
233 |
|
471. Japan Vests Negotiating Authority in Ambassador Yoshizawa in French Indo‑China |
234 |
|
472. Japan Agrees to Transport Rubber for Germany as Far as Japan |
234 |
|
473. German Official Says Germany and Japan Must Agree on Division of Indo‑Chinese Rubber |
234 |
|
474. Planning Committee Draws up Bill to Export Materials |
234 |
|
475. Japan Obtains Visas for Members of Yoshizawa Party |
235 |
|
476. Japanese Suspect Decoux of Collaboration With Americans and English |
235 |
|
477. Resignation of General Weygand is Considered to be German Victory |
235 |
|
478. Japanese Insist on French Indo‑China as Site for Negotiations |
235 |
|
479. Tokyo Arranges Contract for Additional Rubber |
236 |
|
480. Specialists are En Route to Bangkok Office |
236 |
|
481. Minister Iwaturo Uchiyama Complains of Lack of Information Concerning Japanese‑United States Negotiations |
236 |
|
482. Japanese Officials Told to Disregard French Attitude |
236 |
|
483. Japan Encounters Difficulty in Securing Round‑About Visas |
237 |
|
484. French Accede to Japanese Demands Concerning Rubber Negotiations |
237 |
|
485. Mr. Ogawa Suggested as Liaison Officer |
237 |
|
486. Japan Promises Not to Increase Her Troops in Indo‑China |
237 |
|
487. Mr. Yokoyamu in Hanoi Negotiates for Supplies |
237 |
|
488. Japan Prepares to Invade French Concession in Shanghai |
238 |
|
489. Tokyo Orders French to Cooperate in Efforts Against Sabotage |
238 |
|
490. Japan Decrees Removal of British and American Consuls |
238 |
|
491. Joint‑Defense of French Indo‑China Proclaimed |
239 |
|
492. Japan Denies Change in Troop Disposition in French Indo‑China |
239 |
|
493. Darlan Declares that France will take a Neutral Stand |
241 |
|
(1) Japanese‑Chungking Relations
|
241 |
|
494. Tokyo is Informed of a British‑American‑Chinese Financial Conference |
241 |
|
495. Rumors Reach Tokyo of Secret Chungking‑Communist Agreement |
242 |
|
496. Japanese Authorities Increasingly Suspicious of Chungking‑American Activities |
242 |
|
497. Hongkong Is Informed of Measures to be Taken in China in the Event of a Japanese‑American War |
243 |
|
(m) Japanese‑Nanking Relations
|
243 |
|
498. Nanking Appoints Minister Li Fang Commercial Attaché to Berlin |
243 |
|
499. German Diplomats Depart for Nanking |
243 |
|
500. Nanking Refuses to Comment on Tojo Cabinet |
244 |
|
501. Occupied China Attempts to Stabilize Its Currency. |
244 |
|
502. Japan Distributes Newspapers to the Chinese |
244 |
|
503. Ambassador Honda Plans Trip to Tokyo |
244 |
|
504. The Vatican Reportedly Favors the Nanking Government |
245 |
|
505. Administration Difficulties Arise in Shanghai |
245 |
|
506. Japan Concludes Agreement with the Shansi Army |
246 |
|
507. President Wang Desires Collaboration with Chungking |
246 |
|
508. Japan Initiates New System for the China Affairs Board |
246 |
|
509. Japan Proposes Methods of Controlling Chinese Nationals Aboard |
247 |
|
510. Japanese Apprehend Blue Shirt Terrorists |
247 |
xi
|
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)
|
Page |
|
511. Ambassador Oshima Urges Mr. Li Sheng‑wu to Report to Berlin Immediately |
247 |
|
512. Japan, Manchuria, and China Plan Exchange Broadcasts |
247 |
|
513. Japan Plans to Confiscate Third Country Concessions in China |
247 |
|
514. Japan Extends Its Control Over the Chinese |
248 |
|
515. Japanese Leaders Outline Their War Policy in China |
248 |
|
516. Japan Fights Espionage in Northern China |
249 |
|
517. Nanking Outlines Method of Handling Enemy Nationals and Property |
249 |
|
518. Japan Directs Nanking Not to Participate in the War |
250 |
|
519. Tripartite Powers Secure Shortwave Broadcasting Unit in Shanghai |
250 |
|
(n) Japanese‑Netherlands East Indies Relations
|
251 |
|
520. Consul General Ishizawa Arranges To Leave Batavia |
251 |
|
521. Dutch Officials Become Suspicious of Japanese in the Indies |
251 |
|
522. Japanese Trade and Shipping Problems (October 18‑30, 1941) |
252 |
|
523. Japanese Agents Secure Military Information Concerning the Indies |
253 |
|
524. Dutch Governor‑General Evinces No Alarm Over Impending Crisis |
254 |
|
525. Tokyo Plans the Evacuation of Japanese Nationals |
254 |
|
526. Mr. Ishizawa Requests Subsidy for Japanese Newspaper in Batavia |
255 |
|
527. Communication Difficulties Arise in Batavia |
255 |
|
528. Major Kuriya is Ordered to Return to Japan |
255 |
|
529. Dutch Authorities in Netherlands East Indies Prepare for War |
256 |
|
530. Supittai Denounces Japanese Foreign Policy |
256 |
|
531. Japan Orders Remaining Nationals to Return Immediately |
256 |
|
532. Japanese Trade and Shipping Problems (November, 1941) |
256 |
|
533. Netherlanders' Attitude Remains Anti‑Japanese |
258 |
|
534. Japanese Businesses Close in Preparation for Evacuation |
258 |
|
535. Consul General Ishizawa Complains of Minor Problems |
259 |
|
536. Netherlands East Indies Government Suppresses Japanese Agents |
259 |
|
537. Germany Requests That Its Nationals Be Evacuated by the Fuji Maru |
260 |
|
538. Japan Prepares to Invade the East Indies |
260 |
|
539. Consul Ishizawa Orders Consulate Classified Material Burned |
260 |
|
540. Japanese Foreign Office Declares the Netherlands a Quasi‑Enemy Nation |
261 |
|
(o) Japanese‑Thaiese Relations
|
263 |
|
541. Japanese Plan Invasion of Southern Thailand |
263 |
|
542. Intelligence Agent Reports Thaiese Troop Movement to Border |
263 |
|
543. Ambassador Tsubokami Requests Funds, Supplies to Open Drug Concern |
263 |
|
544. Japanese Officials Plan the Use of Indian Troops in Malaya |
263 |
|
545. Foreign Minister Togo Proposes Set‑Up of Short Wave Radio in Bangkok |
264 |
|
546. Ambassador Tsubokami Asks Permission to Remain at Post Because of Difficult Situation |
264 |
|
547. Tokyo Adds Army Man to Bangkok Legation Staff |
264 |
|
548. Japanese Plan Establishment of Air Wireless Section |
265 |
|
549. British Cabinet Member Submits Proposals to Thailand |
265 |
|
550. Major Aoyama Reports on Code, Espionage Work |
265 |
|
551. Tokyo Forwards Instructions for Operation of Beacon Radio Set |
265 |
|
552. Japan Continues Plans to Establish a Navy‑Controlled Steamship Company |
266 |
|
553. Japanese Ambassador Requests Ten Large Radios For Use in Thailand |
266 |
|
554. Japanese Ambassador Asks for Restriction on Number of Japanese Merchants Entering Thailand |
266 |
|
555. Rumor Discloses That Britain Asks Exclusion of German Fifth Columnists |
266 |
|
556. Japanese Government Has Difficulty in Securing Export Permit |
266 |
|
557. Japan to Sell Gold to Thailand |
267 |
|
558. Tokyo Attempts to Purchase Thaiese Rice |
267 |
|
559. Foreign Minister Plans to Send Money for Purchase of Radio Sets |
267 |
|
560. Thaiese Official Considers Re‑exportation of Armaments to British Possessions |
267 |
|
561. Two Japanese Officials Receive Ill‑Treatment |
267 |
|
562. Tokyo Informed Concerning British Forces in Malaya |
268 |
|
563. Foreign Minister Togo Dispatches Official to Shanghai to Speed Plans for Bangkok Drug Dispensary |
268 |
xii
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
|
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)
|
Page |
|
564. Japan Enlarges Bangkok Staff |
268 |
|
565. Ambassador to Ask Nationals to Secure Rubber, Tin |
269 |
|
566. Japanese Ambassador Establishes Name, Stock Holders for Shipping Concern |
269 |
|
567. Japanese Officials are Disappointed in Advancement of Proposal to Establish a Commission |
269 |
|
568. Bangkok Papers Print Reports of Japanese Army Campaign in Burma |
269 |
|
569. Disguised Army Experts to Be Sent to Thailand |
270 |
|
570. Intelligence Agents Report Discussion Between Mr. Duff Cooper and Premier Pibul |
270 |
|
571. Tokyo Sends 3,300 Yen to Purchase Radios |
271 |
|
572. Japan Approves Plan to Purchase Rice Unobtrusively in Small Amounts |
271 |
|
573. Japan Will Have Controlling Interest in New Shipping Concern |
271 |
|
574. Japan Fears that Chinese and British Interests Are Buying Rubber |
272 |
|
575. Japan Asks Investigation of Report that Prime Minister Pibul Desires to Resign |
272 |
|
576. Gold Negotiations Do Not Permit Optimistic Outlook, Ambassador Says |
272 |
|
577. Tokyo Cautions Regarding Operational Plans |
272 |
|
578. Japanese Return Imperial Portrait to Homeland |
272 |
|
579. Intelligence Report Informs Tokyo of Planned Chinese‑Thaiese Cooperation |
272 |
|
580. Prime Minister Pibul Assures Ambassador That Thailand Desires to Cooperate Despite Difficulties |
273 |
|
581. Japan Learns of Alleged British Proposal to Supply Thailand with Arms |
273 |
|
582. British Minister Points to Thailand's Danger |
273 |
|
583. Japan to Receive Less Rubber Due to Production Decrease |
274 |
|
584. Supplies for Japanese‑Owned Drug Dispensary are Sent From Shanghai |
274 |
|
585. Ambassador Tsubokami Requests Assistance for Five Newspapermen |
274 |
|
586. Thailand Consortium Makes Written Proposal Regarding Liquidation of Japanese Gold |
274 |
|
587. Foreign Minister Togo Sends Secret Fund to Bangkok Foreign Office |
274 |
|
588. Bangkok Office Returns Code Machines to Japan |
275 |
|
589. Ambassador Tsubokami Believes that Thailand Should be Led to Cooperate Voluntarily |
275 |
|
590. New Pro‑Japanese Party Advocates Collaboration with Japan |
275 |
|
591. Prime Minister Pibul, Defense Minister Puromu Differ Concerning Thailand's Policy |
275 |
|
592. Ambassador Requests Funds for Machinations |
276 |
|
593. Ambassador Recommends that Crew of Fishing Vessel Escape to Saigon District |
276 |
|
594. Japan Agrees to 25,000,000 Baht Exchange of Gold |
276 |
|
595. Japan Discovers Discrimination in Thaiese Censorship |
276 |
|
596. Ambassador Advises that Railway he Completed Quickly |
276 |
|
597. Foreign Minister Togo Asks that Additional Rubber be Secured |
276 |
|
598. Japan Plans to Investigate Raw Opium Market |
277 |
|
599. Consul General Asada Carries Important Papers to Thailand |
277 |
|
600. High Ranking Official Says Thailand Friendly to Japanese Army |
277 |
|
601. Agreement Stipulates Continuance of Gold Exchange to March, 1942 |
277 |
|
602. Ambassador Requests Additional Secret Fund |
277 |
|
603. Ambassador Tsubokami Explains Objectives of Prime Minister Pibul's Speech |
278 |
|
604. Ambassador Tsubokami Suggests that Thailand be Persuaded to Cooperate |
278 |
|
605. Thaiese Government Officials Still Vote for Neutrality |
278 |
|
606. Officials Originate Plan to Force Mr. Pibul to Declare His Position |
279 |
|
607. Ambassador Sends List of Codes to be Destroyed |
279 |
|
608. Japanese Ambassador Suggests Counter‑Propaganda Tactics |
279 |
|
609. Foreign Minister Togo Remits Funds for Propaganda Purposes |
279 |
|
610. Japanese Officials Set Up Secret Wireless Communication Facilities |
279 |
|
611. Nai Wanitto Believes Thailand Will Cooperate with Japan in Two or Three Days |
279 |
|
612. Thailand Sends Official Reply to Financial Proposal |
280 |
|
613. Propaganda, to be Disseminated in Thailand, is Sent to Japan |
280 |
|
614. British and American Residents Evacuate Bangkok |
280 |
|
615. Ambassador Informs Tokyo of Schedule of Batavia Maru |
280 |
|
616. Japan to Issue Proclamation on December 8, 1941 |
280 |
|
617. Invasion of Thailand to be Announced by Separate Wire |
281 |
|
618. Foreign Office Provides Ambassador with Varying Explanations in Case Occupation is Peaceful or by Force |
281 |
xiii
|
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)
|
Page |
|
619. Thailand Gives Right of Passage Through Territory to Japanese Army |
281 |
|
620. Tokyo Announces Armies' Advance and Occupation of Bataan |
281 |
|
Concluding page |
|
xiv
OUTLINE OF VOLUME IV
Part A
Hull‑Nomura Conversations (October 17, 1941‑December 7, 1941)
(a) Secretary Hull's Reports
(b) Ambassador Nomura's Reports
Part B
Japanese Intelligence in Diplomatic Messages
(a) Reports from the United States
(b) Reports from Mexico
(c) Reports from Central America
(d) Reports from the Panama Canal
(e) Reports from South America
(f) Reports from the Hawaiian Islands
(g) Reports from the Philippine Islands
(h) Reports from Singapore
(i) Reports from Vladivostok and Hsinking
Part C
Japanese Diplomatic Activities Throughout the World
(a) Japanese‑American Relations
(b) Japanese‑Panamanian Relations
(c) Japanese‑Hawaiian Islands Relations
(d) Japanese‑Philippine Islands Relations
(e) Japanese‑Mexican Relations
(f) Japanese‑South American Relations
(g) Japanese‑British Relations
(h) Japanese‑German Relations
(i) Japanese‑Manchukuoan Relations
(j) Japanese‑Italian Relations
(k) Japanese‑French Relations
(1) Japanese‑Chungking Relations
(m) Japanese‑Nanking Relations
(n) Japanese‑Dutch Relations
(o) Japanese‑Thaiese Relations
xv
xvi (blank)
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
CHAPTER IV
PART A‑HULL‑NOMURA CONVERSATIONS
(October 17, 1941‑ November 20, 1941)
Advent of the Tojo Cabinet and Redoubling of Japanese Government's Insistence Upon an Early Acceptance of Its Proposals. [1]
1. Ambassador Nomura Complains of Lack of Coordination Between Japanese Foreign Office and Navy (October 18, 1941)
Following the change of government in Japan, Ambassador Nomura on October 18, 1941, offered his congratulations to the new Cabinet. At the same time, however, he pointed out that throughout the term of the former Japanese Cabinet he had been unable to accomplish anything through Japanese‑American conversations. According to Ambassador Nomura, certain things which had taken place in spite of his personal recommendations had forced him to question his own value to a future Japanese government.
Since Minister Wakasugi and Mr. Iguchi were capable of handling negotiations, Ambassador Nomura requested that he be allowed to return to Japan in order to report personally on the existing Japanese‑American situation and to receive instructions regarding future policies. [1a]
Two days later, on October 20, 1941, Ambassador Nomura stated that, since his appointment to the post in the United States, there had existed a complete lack of coordination between the Japanese Navy Department and the Japanese Foreign Office. [2]
Referring again to Japanese‑American problems, Ambassador Nomura emphasized that, although the United States might desire to avoid military action in the Pacific because it was already faced with war on the Atlantic front, America would still refuse to renounce its national policies even to effect a conciliation. In Ambassador Nomura's opinion, China was primarily responsible for the present attitude of the United States toward Japan. For that reason, Ambassador Nomura had attempted to bring about a "modus vivendi" between the two countries, leaving out the China question entirely. But Secretary Hull had insisted that China was inseparably concerned with the stability of the Pacific. However, from a conversation with Lord Halifax, Ambassador Nomura learned that Great Britain agreed with Japan that a "modus vivendi" should be worked out in order to avoid a crisis in the Far East.
At the conclusion of his report, Ambassador Nomura re‑emphasized his ineffective position as Ambassador from Japan possibly because of his lack of understanding of the principles of the present Japanese government. [3] In fact, Ambassador Nomura frankly stated that he should have been asked to resign along with the members of the former Japanese Cabinet. In spite of the encouragement of Secretary Hull and other American statesmen who trusted his sincerity, Ambassador Nomura recognized that his lack of actual influence in Japan forced him to lead a hypocritical existence as Japanese Ambassador to the United States. Although not anxious "to flee from the field of battle", Ambassador Nomura urged his government to order his recall. [4]
[1] Chapter title taken from the division arrangement of the State Department documents‑Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States‑Japan, 1931‑1941 in two volumes, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1943, Volume II, 343. Hereafter referred to as S.D., II.
[1a] Appendix IV, No. 1. Hereafter Appendix IV will be referred to as IV, 1.
[2] IV, 2.
[3] Ibid.
[4] IV, 3.
1
2. Tokyo Refuses Ambassador Nomura's Resignation (October 23, 1941)
After considering Ambassador Nomura's report of the Japanese‑American situation and his request for a transfer of duty, on October 23, 1941 Tokyo asked that Ambassador Nomura sacrifice his personal wishes and remain at his post. Assuring Ambassador Nomura that the Japanese government was relying completely upon his judgment, Tokyo stated that the policies of the Japanese government, determined by the outcome of these negotiations, would be based upon the information which Ambassador Nomura forwarded. [5]
3. Japanese Government Declares Policies of New Cabinet
Agreeing with Ambassador Nomura that the Japanese Embassy in Washington must be kept well informed on any changes of policy made in Tokyo, the Foreign Office assured the Japanese Ambassador that instructions had been unavoidably delayed because of the formation of a new Cabinet. [6] Tokyo assured Ambassador Nomura, however, that the new Cabinet still retained the desire of the former Japanese government to adjust relations with the United States on an equitable basis. Yet, Ambassador Nomura was told that the Japanese government, having set forth its principles completely, could take no further action.
In order to emphasize Japan's desire that a formal United States counter proposal to the Japanese document of September 25, 1941 be submitted, the Japanese government urged Ambassador Nomura to discuss this matter discreetly with American representatives. [7]
4. Ambassador Nomura Reports British‑German Peace Rumors [8]
Realizing that the trend of events in Europe would affect the situation in the Pacific, Ambassador Nomura kept his government informed on developments in the war between Britain and Germany.
In the latter part of October, 1941 Ambassador Nomura was told that Germany was preparing to offer Great Britain generous peace terms. Since the British public was apparently satisfied with taking Ethiopia, Syria and Iraq, and since Lloyd George appeared to be gaining in popularity over Prime Minister Churchill, it was thought that Hitler's offer of peace might be accepted. On the other hand, Ambassador Nomura believed that the English people would continue to place their trust in Prime Minister Churchill and that President Roosevelt, representing the United States government as a whole, would assist the British in withstanding German movements.
Yet, Ambassador Nomura felt it necessary to point out that up until this time his informant had believed in a German defeat while now he was convinced that Germany and Great Britain were ready to arrive at a satisfactory peace. [9]
5. Welles‑Wakasugi Conversation (October 24, 1941)
a. Under Secretary Welles' Report [10]
At his own request Mr. Wakasugi called upon Under Secretary of State Summer Welles on October 24, 1941 to inform the United States government that the new Japanese Cabinet desired to continue the informal conversations with a view to resuming friendly diplomatic and economic relations.
Mr. Wakasugi then inquired whether the United States had any counter proposals to make to those offered by Tokyo on September 25, 1941. In reply, Mr. Welles pointed out that during
[5] IV, 4.
[6] IV, 5.
[7] Ibid.
[8] IV, 6.
[9] Ibid.
[10] "Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State Welles", October 24, 1941, S.D. II, 692‑697.
2
THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
the past seven or eight months the United States government had earnestly endeavored to establish the basis for an equitable agreement between the two governments. However, recent statements made by prominent authorities of the Japanese army and navy and other parts of that government had created an atmosphere detrimental to the conclusion of such an agreement. [11] The recent public statement made by an officer of the Japanese navy declaring that the Japanese navy was "itching to fight [12]" had had an undesirable effect upon the American navy. Furthermore, Mr. Welles continued, the tone of articles and editorials appearing in Japanese newspapers created a serious obstacle to any satisfactory agreement which might be arrived at during the informal conversations.
In an attempt to show that the attitude of the United States government was not wholly conducive to peace, Minister Wakasugi stated that he had seen a statement by Secretary Knox indicating that because war between Japan and the United States was inevitable [13], the United States navy was forced to remain on twenty‑four hour duty. In correcting this interpretation, Mr. Welles insisted that the statement attributed to Secretary Knox merely implies that. the situation was such that some incident might possibly occur and consequently the United States navy must be prepared for an emergency. If the Japanese navy was willing to announce that "it was itching to fight" with the United States, Mr. Welles pointed out, the United States navy had to adopt precautionary measures. Although anxious to find a successful outcome to the present conversations, Under Secretary Welles said, the United States government must seriously consider the attitude of the Japanese press and public as a whole.
In answering Minister Wakasugi's questions regarding American counter proposals to those offered by Japan on September 25, 1941, Mr. Welles stated that both he and Secretary Hull in previous conversations with Mr. Wakasugi had emphasized that the views of the United States government had been completely clarified in the communication handed to the Japanese government on June 21, 1941. Since another United States document was delivered to the Japanese Embassy on October 2, 1941, Mr. Welles did not feel that any further counter proposals would be forthcoming from his government. In fact, during the last conversation between Mr. Hull and Minister Wakasugi, the American Secretary of State had impressed upon the Japanese representative the benefits which Japan would derive from following those economic principles already laid down by the American government in the documents mentioned. Minister Wakasugi stated that he had transmitted the details of that conversation to his government but had received no opinions upon it from Tokyo.
As far back as April 1941, Minister Wakasugi declared, he had urged Ambassador Nomura to find a practical, concrete basis for an agreement with the United States on any phase of the situation affecting the Pacific. However, the interference of both American and Japanese gentlemen, introducing certain peace formulas without any authority from either government, had succeeded in complicating the situation. Since these unofficial, unauthorized documents had created misunderstandings, Minister Wakasugi suggested that a fresh approach to the situation be made by having both governments submit entirely new formulas, setting forth basic principles upon which to formulate peace. Mr. Welles stated that all the officials of the United States government would be willing to contribute any time and effort necessary to arrive at a satisfactory agreement.
[11] Ibid.
[12] Captain Hideo Hiraide, Director of the Naval Intelligence Section of Imperial Headquarters, Stated‑"the Imperial Navy is itching for action when needed." It is important to note here that the promotion of Premier Tojo to full General (New York Times, October 19, 1:6), and the statement of Naval Minister Shimada that the Japanese navy was ready for any situation, added to the existing martial atmosphere. (New York Times, October 20, 1941, 3:1, 3, 4.)
[13] The New York Times reported that Secretary Knox's statement that a Japanese‑American war was inevitable and the clash of the two countries only a few days ahead, was viewed in Japan as unfortunate. (October 25, 1941, 1:8).
3
From the standpoint of expediency, Mr. Welles felt it advisable to reach an agreement on the economic principles first. Therefore he was anxious to illustrate to the new Japanese Cabinet the practical advantages Japan would experience if Secretary Hull's economic policies were adopted. Mr. Welles pointed out that the abolition of such trade barriers as British Imperial preferences, Japan would be able to trade with Canada, Australia and New Zealand without danger of discrimination.
Mr. Wakasugi agreed wholeheartedly, but he insisted that a lack of natural resources made Japan the victim of economic aggression and encirclement. Under Secretary Welles returned that Japan's modern history up to the year 1930, a time when its relationship with Both Great Britain and the United States was most friendly, showed Japan capable of becoming one of the great powers of the world. Mr. Welles continued that only Hitler's propaganda about the "have and have not nations" had caused Japan to adopt its aggressive policies. Disagreeing with Mr. Welles' conclusions, Minister Wakasugi asserted that Japan had pursued its own national determinations of policy regardless of Germany or Italy, and in spite of the liberal tendencies of Japan's younger generation. Nevertheless, Mr. Welles replied, Japan had allied itself officially and publicly with the Axis policies. Mr. Wakasugi made no comment, but turned the conversation to the Japanese‑Chinese situation. In order that every approach be undertaken to settle this conflict, Minister Wakasugi suggested that Mr. Welles meet with the Chinese Ambassador and any other Chinese officials to discuss the problems in a purely unofficial manner. If President Roosevelt intended to mediate in the peace between Japan and China, Minister Wakasugi believed it advantageous to ascertain the attitude of the Chiang Kai‑shek government. Since Under Secretary of State Welles did not feel authorized to give even a personal and unofficial response without careful consideration, he promised to discuss the suggestion in a future conversation with Mr. Wakasugi.
Although Minister Wakasugi made no reference to any