PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE  4829

 

Mr. RICHARDSON. We will call Captain Layton.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Is Captain Layton the next witness, Counsel?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Will Captain Layton please come forward.

 

TESTIMONY OF CAPT. EDWIN THOMAS LAYTON, UNITED STATES NAVY

 

(Having been first duly sworn by the Vice Chairman.)

Mr. RICHARDSON. Will you please state your full name to the committee ?

Captain LAYTON. Edwin Thomas Layton.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You are a captain in the United States [12876] Navy?

Captain LAYTON. Captain, United States Navy; yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. How long have you been in the Navy?

Captain LAYTON. I entered the Naval Academy in 1920. I graduated therefrom in 1924. I have served continuously ever since.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What is your present assignment?

Captain LAYTON. Fleet intelligence officer and combat intelligence officer, United States Pacific Fleet.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What was your assignment at the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor?

Captain LAYTON. Fleet intelligence officer, United States Pacific Fleet.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Will you give to the committee in some detail as to what your duties were at the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor, what duties you were performing in Hawaii?

Captain LAYTON. I will read from the staff instructions to the staff of the commander in chief, United States Pacific Fleet, issued July 14, 1941, and in effect the day of the attack. The instructions I will read are those laid out for the duty of the fleet intelligence officer and his assistants [reading]:

 

Paragraph  214. Intelligence Officer.

[12877]

A: Directs assembly of enemy information and evaluate the same; disseminating to the various members of staff, indicating where action is required.

B. Provides operation officer and war plans officer information essential for current estimates; monograph material.

C. Maintain section 2 sub‑paragraph A, B, C, D, E, F and G of the estimate of situation, enemy forces; maintains location plot of Fleets of possibly enemy or Allies.

D. Directs counter‑espionage and counter‑information.

E. Maintains intelligence records. (See the Naval Intelligence Manual.)

F. Prepares Fleet intelligence bulletins.

G. Evaluates intelligence information received of procedures or processes of other navies, and prepares definite recommendation as to any action to be taken within our own Fleet.

H. In charge of censorship.

I. Internal security of ships.

J. Supervises reconnaissance photographic activities.

215. Assistant Intelligence Officer,

 

who was my subordinate and for whom I am responsible.

 

In addition to assisting 25—

 

4830 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

 

that was my number—

 

In all duties of the Intelligence Section, performs the [12878] following additional assignments

A. maintains Merchant Marine plot and analyses.

B. Prepares silhouettes of own and enemy ships and planes for dissemination to the Fleet.

C. Assembly, evaluation and dissemination of enemy information.

D. Maintenance of current estimates of situation enemy forces and location of plots of fleets of possible enemies or Allies.

 

Mr. RICHARDSON. Who was your assistant?

Captain LAYTON. Commander Robert E. Hudson, U. S. Navy.

Mr. RICHARDSON. From whom or through whom did you get your basic intelligence on which you made your reports?

Captain LAYTON. In accordance with the set‑up, the Chief of Naval Operations subdivision of Naval Intelligence was charged with the furnishing of information of all kinds from all sources to the fleet intelligence officer via official channels.

I also received what we then called combat intelligence, which is now called communications intelligence, and derived via the Fourteenth Naval District Combat Intelligence Unit. This was the unit commanded by the then commander, now Capt. J. J. Rochefort.

[12879]

In addition, from time to time and infrequently; we would receive telegraphic information from other communication intelligence organizations, for instance, Cavite and OPNAV.

Mr. RICHARDSON. When you secured this intelligence did you put it in shape for delivery?

Captain LAYTON. In some cases the actual material was in shape. For instance, reports from OPNAV, various observations. In most cases the communication intelligence as delivered or as received by me was not always in shape desirable for presentation to the commander in chief, and therefore I would work on that, make an evaluation of it and submit it to the commander in chief.

When I speak of it not being in shape, I refer to some of the station logs received from the intercept station at Guam, and the station at Cavite, which was recorded and indeed in accordance with their procedure, but was not in suitable shape for intelligence material requiring a considerable digesting, collating, and the putting together of basic elements of intelligence information for the commander in chief.

[12880]

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did most of your basic material come through Captain Rochefort ?

Captain LAYTON. Most of the basic material received concerning the Japanese ship locations came from Captain Rochefort, although I must say the unit at Cavite was of great assistance, both as a check and because they were nearer and could provide probably more accurate information on certain details.

Mr. RICHARDSON. How would information from Cavite come to you?

Captain LAYTON. Both by mail and by dispatch. In the latter part of October and November most of their information came by dispatch.

Mr. RICHARDSON. To whom did you directly convey your intelligence?

Captain LAYTON. Directly to Admiral Kimmel, sir.

 

PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE  4831

 

Mr. RICHARDSON. In person.

Captain LAYTON. In person.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And in what form?

Captain LAYTON. At 8:15 each morning I would appear at the admiral's office with my intelligence material. It invariably consisted of the communications intelligence summary for that day, plus notations of dispatches received in the recent 24 hours that I thought pertinent materials, that [12881] might bear upon the subject.

This would then be discussed, sometimes briefly, and other times at length, depending upon the state of the material or the nature of the information contained therein.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, were those intelligence reports made directly to Admiral Kimmel during the week prior to the attack on December 7?

Captain LAYTON. They were made daily to Admiral Kimmel during the week prior to the attack on December 7, and for several months theretofore.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And in each of those intelligence reports that you made, did you endeavor to collate all of the intelligence that was available to you for that day?

Captain LAYTON. The written communications intelligence report contained all information noted from observation of enemy naval circuits. Additionally, through conversational explanation, additional enemy reports received during the past 24 hours were discussed, and an attempt made to make them fit, or to key them into materials contained in the radio intelligence report.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Were you the agency through whom dispatches to the commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, would pass?

Captain LAYTON. No, Sir. The dispatches to the commander [12882] in chief, Pacific Fleet, were of generally two categories; regular Navy dispatches, that is, secret, confidential, plain language, which would come through the communications office, and there were the magic dispatches, or dispatches carried in the special channel which has been referred to before, a special radio cryptographic System coming over the same radio channels.

When this went to the communications office, they could not identify the cipher except to know it was a special cipher and held by the fleet security officer, the then Lieutenant Coleman, now deceased, who would ring out the special machinery wheels and would then decrypt this dispatch, would deliver it to me in person, after having shown it to Admiral Kimmel, or the chief of staff, then Captain Smith, the war plans officer, then Captain McMorris, and the fleet communications officer, Commander Curts.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Would they get that information before it came to you or afterward?

Captain LAYTON. There were occasions when I saw it first because I would be in the office when it was being deciphered, and would read it, but the admiral and chief of staff had priority on the receipt of this material, naturally.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Then in the transmission of intelligence to the chief of staff, part of it would be in your communication  [12883]

 

4832 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

 

intelligence summary, and part of it would be oral, and part of it would consist of dispatches?

Captain LAYTON. That is correct, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That had been sent in, where it was your duty to convey that to the commander in chief ?

Captain LAYTON. Plus other normal dispatches, such as sightings, or reports from naval attaches, or naval observers from State Department sources, and others that came in ordinary dispatch form, and was delivered to the admiral as well as the chief of staff and other officers.

Mr. RICHARDSON. After this information had gone to the commander in chief, would it reach other members of his staff?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, it would. May I explain why and how this was done?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Yes.

Captain LAYTON. The radio intelligence organization at that time was a secret. Regulations had been issued as to how it would be handled, who would have access to it, and by whose authority.

When I first assumed this job on December 7, 1940, 1 year before the big day, I made a liaison contact with the Combat Intelligence Unit, Fourteenth Naval District.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That is Admiral Bloch?

[12884]

Captain LAYTON. Directly under Admiral Bloch, for administration.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That is right.

Captain LAYTON. I showed them my credentials, and they showed me these regulations, and had me read one page, and this page is more or less in substance as follows

 

This is very secret. No one shall know about it except the following named officers and offices:

The Commandant of Operations, in which office is placed the Commander in Chief, his Chief of Staff, his Intelligence Officer, and such other officers as designated by him or by the Chief of Naval Operations.

 

This page was signed by the then Chief of Naval Operations.

I was then administered an oath to maintain secrecy and carry out these regulations.

Now, In order that other members of the staff who were not by the admiral's direction on this list who would receive this secret intelligence, or super-secret intelligence might be aware of these facts, I would make up a special intelligence folder in which I would not say where it came from but would give it a rating of A‑1 in case it was communication intelligence, and would lay out the facts as I saw them, as contained in these dispatches. This was shown to the [12885] members of the staff, and their initials appear in blocks at the bottom of the page.

I would like to say parenthetically, by Admiral Kimmel's direction, the war plans officer was added to this list and I received a written directive to that effect.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, I think you told us that it was your custom to include in your communication intelligence summary which you made daily the information which had come to you with reference to fleet and enemy vessel locations.

Captain LAYTON. That is correct, sir:

 

PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE  4833

 

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, I call your attention to your intelligence summary as of November 30, 1941.

Captain LAYTON. I have the original before me.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That appears in our record, Captain as Exhibit 115.

Now, will you explain to the committee what the significance would be of your report of November 30, as you explained it to Admiral Kimmel?

Captain LAYTON. It was my practice to take the communications intelligence summary to Admiral Kimmel at 8:15. He would accept it from my hand and sit and read it. Thereafter he would ask me questions regarding specific points and then a brief discussion would take place regarding its contents.

Thereafter, he would initial it, and in this case it has initials also of the War Plans Officer, then Captain McMorris. I cannot now recall specific words or discussions regarding this specific summary.

[12888]

I would like to say, however, that since the middle of November the tenor of these discussions had been about the apparent change in the Japanese naval tactical organization as reflected by radio intercepts of their own circuits.

It was apparent that the normal volumes of traffic were increasing, that the commanders of certain fleets had decreasing importance. One, for example, the c. in c., Combined Fleet; the big boss, and the c. in c. of the Second Fleet, who correspond roughly to our commander, Scouting Forces, who commanded normally cruisers and de stroyers, had taken a position high and above what he had been in the previous 6 to 8 or 10 months.

Also a fairly newly organized force, the Third Fleet that they sent out, and that we assumed to be an amphibious force, also was far more important in the traffic than he would have been under normal circum stances.

From receiving these from day to day there was no doubt in our minds that a task force was being formed.

This same phenomenon had been noted, only not so strongly, first in February 1941, when the Japanese decided to mediate the French Indochina‑Thailand dispute over a border, and with a show of force went down and mediated.

The task force organization at that time was fairly well reflected in the traffic. The task force organization [12887] at that time was well proven in traffic. When the mediation was over the security measures were reduced and they returned to Tokyo.

This same sort of phenomenon had been noted in about July, 1941, when the Japanese, by ultimatum to Vichy and French Indochina authorities, decided to move in and take over certain Japanese naval bases and air bases in French Indochina.

Then we also received information from magic, from Washington, by the special channel, and were able to fill the picture very nicely.

To return to November 1941, I have spoken of the prominence of two fleet commanders. We had also the commander of the combined air forces, a shore‑based air organization, which also contained air tenders with seaplanes aboard, and so forth.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Speaking now of the Japanese forces?

 

4834 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK.

 

Captain LAYTON. Yes. The Japanese combined air force. They were also quite prominent.

Another point of interest at this time that had been‑noted and talked about was the fact that fleet units belonging to certain fleets apparently no longer had the same mother. For instance, some first fleet destroyers definitely were working for the second fleet.

[12888]

Mr. RICHARDSON. Captain, let me caution you right there, in relating this information as you saw it about the middle of November and from then on, I should like to have you confine yourself to information which was communicated to Admiral Kimmel and to his staff generally.

Captain LAYTON. This information was communicated to Admiral Kimmel.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Go ahead.

Captain LAYTON. And was written up in the summary, which I will produce later, if you wish.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Go ahead. You said something about the ships not having the same mother.

Captain LAYTON. Various units no longer had their normal mothers. In other words, each fleet commander, that we call mother, had certain chickens, and some of these chickens no longer belonged to the mother, but belonged to other mothers of other fleets. This was an unusual procedure, because normally all naval traffic followed an administrative routing, and to have new commanders traced directly as subordinates of another commander was an unusual procedure and indicated he had tactical interest as opposed to an administrative interest.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I see.

Captain LAYTON., The associations of these commanders [12889] were entirely with southern addresses, Formosa, Hainan, and French Indochina. Their direction of movement clearly indicated they were bypassing Formosa, and they were going in that general direction.

It was noted also that certain Cardivs, carrier divisions, were apparently interested or concerned with this movement.

To be specific, the one we called Carrier Division 3, the one we called Carrier Division 4, apparently were concerned somewhat with this movement.

Mr. RICHARDSON. How many carriers in a division?

Captain LAYTON. Two, Sir. As a result of this radio phenomenon, Admiral Kimmel became more interested day by day, and on the 24th told me to contact Rochefort and to see if he was receiving from other units any such phenomena. Rochefort's answer was to the effect that no one had reported this on the circuits. Admiral Kimmel then directed me to order a dispatch, to send a dispatch in a special system to the unit at Cavite and OpNav, making his observations and drawing the conclusions that had been drawn in the summaries which Admiral Kimmel had been reading.

The dispatch that Commander Rochefort originated and was sent to COM14 was the one read here in the testimony the other day. This was replied to by the fleet commander of the Sixteenth Naval Operation at Cavite, in which he agreed [12890] in part and elaborated in part and disagreed to a minor degree.

I have always believed, and I do to this day, that it was the result of these two dispatches to some degree that the war warning came on the 27th.

 

PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE  4835

 

Mr. RICHARDSON. Why?

Captain LAYTON. Speaking now from December 6, 1941, we had this information and no more, we saw this movement growing; we had reports from shore observers in China, assistant naval attaches, merchant skippers, consular authorities, that they had seen these ships loading and going out, that they had been sighted going south, the merchant marine ships stating that they were going south in a convoy, and the entire movement was noted as going south.

That was the radio picture. The visual picture, of course, was not as complete as to detail, or as to destination.

[12891]

When the 27th of November war warning message came, as more than one officer on the staff has explained, that fits the picture, as we see it, and that was what I thought myself.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Coming up to the 30th of November, let me ask you, in the designation of that Intelligence summary under the styling of the Third Fleet you make the recital:

 

No information obtained as to the location of the Commander in Chief Third Fleet, which gives the strong impression that he is under way.

 

Will you explain that statement?

Captain LAYTON. I did not write this summary and I cannot explain that statement other than to say that the operators and the supervisors who sat on these circuits week in, month in, and year in, had the impression, from the type of traffic they were seeing, that he was under way.

I can explain it a little further by this, by going back there in these summaries you will see where the commander in chief, Third Fleet is a very busy originator of traffic. He is talking to the commander of the Second Fleet, he is talking to the commander of the Air Force, he is talking to the resident naval officer of Hainan, he is talking to the resident naval officer in Taihoku, to the present naval officer in Indochina, to the officer in charge at Palao in [12892] the Caroline Islands, he is entirely associated with them and with other high commands, C in C, Second Fleet, indicating he is getting ready to go in those directions. He then shows no longer in the traffic. He is still being addressed in the traffic. He is the addressee of other messages. But no messages originate from him that day. The operator gets the impression he is under way. I think that is what is meant in here.

Like all things, radio intelligence, however, has its limitations. I won't go into the technical details but when you identify one whom you don't know you do it by association, by his activities in the radio circuits, and by his known friends.

In this one, however, is an example of the misleading character of the radio intelligence information. In the general paragraph it states:

 

The only tactical circuit heard today was one with Akagi and several Marus.

 

A tactical circuit is one in which one unit calls another unit on strong enough power for us to hear at Pearl Harbor or Cavite. Normally, units do not communicate that way. Administrative traffic and command traffic is usually handled up a chain of command to its nearest shore station who broadcasts it, and it is then rebroadcast so that   [12893] all addresses receive it on an umbrella.

 

4836 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

 

The fact that Akagi was that day exercising with several marus was brought to my attention and the admiral noted it also. He asked me what I thought, as I recall it, and I said the Akagi was probably talking to some tanker marus, marus being merchant ships and probably going to get oil.

As a matter of fact we now know the Akagi was at sea under radio silence and was not talking to the marus because this same Akagi identified here was identified by Cavite on this day as moving south ward from the Empire.

This, of course, is not to find fault with the time of information. It just has its limitations. It certainly is an inexact science and while the averages are good you cannot follow it on to the last detail and depend upon it without looking it over.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, referring to this language in the fourth paragraph:

 

Also the presence of a unit of plane guard destroyers indicates the presence of at least one carrier in the Mandates although this has not been confirmed.

 

What is there in the presence of destroyers which gives an indication of the presence of carriers?

Captain LAYTON. There again is the technique of reading [12894] the enemy's radio signals without reading his messages and taking who does things as a rule and how he does it as a rule and using that as a thumb rule to find out what he is doing now.

The Japanese naval organization was so set up that originally the carriers or carrier divisions had been assigned to both First and Second and Fleets. Sometime in the middle of 1941 this organization was apparently dissolved. It took us some time to find it out for sure. The carriers were lumped under one organization. But one of the Japanese tendencies had been to keep plane guard destroyers with the same carrier division and when they moved over from the First and Second Fleet into the Carrier Fleet they took their plane guard destroyers with them.

The presence of a plane guard destroyer in the Mandates would be the first and probably the only tip‑off under normal circumstances if they were under radio silence that a carrier might be there, too. It wouldn't prove that the carrier was there, but under normal circumstances it would be logical to assume it. This, unfortunately, was not the case. This plane guard destroyer division, it later turned out, had been detached from the carriers and had gone to the Mandates to reinforce the Mandate Fleet. The deduction was right at the time but incorrect in fact.

[12896]

Mr. RICHARDSON. Turning to the Intelligence summary of December 1 I note the statement:

 

The fact that service calls lasted only one month indicate an additional progressive step in preparing for active operations on a large scale.

 

Will you explain that statement?

Captain LAYTON. Japanese, radio call signs normally lasted about 6 months. It yeas anticipated on November 1 from the type of traffic before that that the call signs would change about November 1. They did so do. To find the radio call signs changing in only 1 month, and when I speak of radio call signs I am speaking of fleet and command call signs, not shore stations, this change was significant and was

 

PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE  4837

 

considered an additional progressive step in preparing for active operations because, first, we saw tactical task forces being formed. We heard of them being formed from eye witnesses who had sighted them on the China coast.

Call signs changing then on December 1 along with the formation of task forces was a logical thought and that they were preparing for operation was also a logical sequence.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, turning to the second page of the Communication Intelligence Summary of December 2, I note there in reference to carriers the statement:

 

[12896]   Almost a complete blank of information on the carriers today.

 

Now, when did this carrier silence, approximately, begin?

Captain LAYTON. There had been very little information on the carrier divisions and commander carriers who was their technical commander with the exception of Carrier Division 3 and sometimes Carrier Division 4 since early in November. There was no definite information throughout November as to their exact location or activity although from time to time a carrier call or carrier activity would be associated with shore stations, air bases.

On November 14 a statement was made:

 

The carriers remain in home waters with most of them in port.

 

The subject of carrier information thereafter was generally fragmentary but it was noted that BatDivThree, the carrier divisions, and two destroyer squadrons have been associated in traffic and addressed letters to the Chief of Naval General Staff, which generally indicated impending operations.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now; for how many days prior to December 7 had there been general carrier silence?

Captain LAYTON. I would have to check the record to be exact. Carrier silence was not commented on as such at any [12897] time. The lack of information on the carriers was commented on after November 27. The November 27 summary indicated the carriers were still located in home waters.

It is to be remarked here, and I believe it to be of extreme importance in judging all these facts, that in this build‑up that I mentioned; since the middle of November the association of forces, the tying together of your task forces, the commander of carriers, or carrier division commander, with the exception of Carrier Division 3, were not addressed, were not associated, and apparently were entirely aloof from the whole proceedings.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, I called your attention a moment ago to your Intelligence summary of December 1 and to the language therein quoted:

 

The fact that service calls lasted only one month indicate an additional progressive step in preparing for active operations on a large scale.

 

Now, it is a fact, is it not, that that opinion was directly presented to Admiral Kimmel?

Captain LAYTON. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And that is the opinion which in your testimony before the Hewitt investigation you referred to as being, that sentence, being underlined in red pencil by Admiral Kimmel at the time?

 

4838 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

 

[12898]

Captain LAYTON. I have the original copy here and it is not underlined in red pencil. It was underlined in lead pencil. L‑e‑a‑d.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Then the reference "in red pencil", was a mistake?

Captain LAYTON. Than was a typographical error on the part of the recorder, I believe.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And the underlining, however, was done by Admiral Kimmel?

Captain LAYTON. At that time; yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, is the—

Captain LAYTON. Mr. Counsel—

Mr. RICHARDSON. Is the absence of information over a considerable period of time of the carriers any evidence of whether those carriers are at sea or in port?

Captain LAYTON. Not necessarily, sir. There have been many times during the course of 1941 and previously when not only carriers but battleships, cruisers and other types were not located by Radio Intelligence traffic. This is because when carriers or other types of vessels go into home waters, home ports, home exercise areas, they use low power radio direct with shore stations. This is then handled normally on telegraphic land lines to prevent our direction finder stations and intercept stations from hearing [12899] their traffic. During such periods as that we have always carried those units as "home waters."

Also when one of these vessels go into a navy yard for overhaul he suspends communications and it is handled by the nearest naval station for him.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, in reporting the fact that these carriers were lost, did you have in your mind at that time any apprehension as to what that might .mean with respect to what the carriers were doing, speaking of your own apprehensions now?

Captain LAYTON. My apprehensions as of that time were briefly these: We have all of these units, all these commands, very well lined up for an operational, an offensive operation. We haven't seen the carriers except Cardiv 3 and sometimes Cardiv 4. Since it was my duty to keep track of the Japanese naval forces, I felt apprehensive as to where they were and therefore conferred with my opposite number daily regarding any evidence that might be able to be pieced out.

[12900]

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, you called Admiral Kimmel's attention to the fact that you didn't know where Carrier Divisions 1 or 2 were?

Captain LAYTON. That was at the time following the December 1, 1941, Communication Intelligence Summary which I have been referring to.

Admiral Kimmel told me to make out for him a location sheet on the Japanese Navy. I proceeded to do so from my current files, derived principally from Radio Intelligence.

I did it at December 1, 1941, that is, it was so typed, but I am positive in my mind that it was actually delivered to Admiral Kimmel on December 2, 1941.

This location sheet showed the location, to the best of our knowledge, of the major portion of the Japanese Fleet and which, with the

 

PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE  4839

 

exception of the Pearl Harbor Task Force was very active. In this location sheet I did not list Carrier Division 1 or Carrier Division 2 because neither one of those commands had appeared in traffic for fully 15 and possibly 25 days. That is, identifiable traffic as an addressee, or as an originator.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Then, Admiral Kimmel at that time called your attention to the fact that you didn't know where those carriers were?

Captain LAYTON. He did, sir.

[12901] 

Mr. RICHARDSON. And that was the occasion of his remark to you, to which you testified, Admiral Kimmel speaking:

 

Do you mean to say they could be rounding Diamond Head and you wouldn't know it? My reply was I hoped they would be sighted before now.

 

Captain LAYTON. Words said to that effect. I believe that Admiral Kimmel said, "What, you do not know where the carriers are?" And my reply was as you read it, or words to that effect.

I must say that his saying "You mean they could be rounding Diamond Head," was to emphasize the fact that I didn't know where they were. I don't believe the admiral meant to say they were off Diamond Head, and I didn't know it, and I answered saying I hoped they would be sighted.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Is there any significance attached to lack of information concerning the whereabouts of the carriers that could be construed by you from your experience as indicating a possibility that they were at sea on a mission?

Captain LAYTON. I believe that everyone who has worked with enemy radio intelligence has always been aware that any force given sealed orders can get under way, go to sea, and as long as they don't use their radio, as long as they are not sighted, can move almost anywhere in the world, provided they are not sighted before they arrive where they [12902] are going.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Then radio silence would, in itself, be one of the evidences from which it might be possible to deduce that certain war ships were under sealed orders proceeding at sea, and not using their radio?

Captain LAYTON. That would be a very difficult deduction to make, but one could make such a deduction, and I might say, in hindsight now, not foresight, that there was no evidence in this of considerations of radio silence.

I would like to point out that had these carriers or carrier‑division commanders or the carrier commander in chief been addressed in any messages of the thousands and thousands that came out from the naval General Staff, regardless of the silence of carriers, then the thought of radio silence would have been paramount, but the fact that they were never addressed, not even once, led to the belief that they were in the same situation as the carrier divisions were in July 1941, when the Japanese had a task force go down with their ultimatum into French Indochina.

At that time the carriers remained in home waters, and not known as to where they were in a covering position, doubtlessly, in case we took counteraction, but where they continued training, returning to the Empire after the conclusion of the French Indochina matter.

[12903] 

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, Admiral Kimmel in his testimony asserted that there had been quite a number of occasions prior

 

4840 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

 

to this period during early 1941 and 1940 when there was a similar absence of call signs from groups of ships and carriers, quite the same in intimation and extent of this absence of signs to which you have just testified.

Captain LAYTON. That is correct, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Is there any difference in your mind between the earlier lack of information and the present lack of information you are referring to here?

Captain LAYTON. No, sir. I believe it to be identical.

In the previous cases they were not addressed, nor did they address messages. In this case they followed the same pattern. I submitted a memorandum to the Roberts commission to that effect prepared by the Intelligence Unit under Commander Rochefort to give a general analysis of periods in which various types of ships were unlocated. Some types of ships were never located by radio intelligence because they didn't appear.

Mr. RICHARDSON. If it were felt that war was imminent and a war warning had been received, the fact that the carrier divisions 1 and 2 were lost, would have some significance in the evaluation of that warning, would it not, from an intelligence standpoint?

[12904]

Captain LAYTON. The valuation of the enemy information was my job. I evaluated it to the best of my ability.

The formulation of the estimate of the enemy situation and its possible courses of action was not a function. of Intelligence, and was laid down in the staff instructions as under Operations and War Plans.

I furnished those sections with my material. I furnished it to Admiral Kimmel. I did not at any time suggest that the Japanese carriers were under radio silence approaching Oahu. I wish I had. I did not so consider at that time.

My own personal opinion, and that is what we work on, when making estimates to ourselves, was that the carriers were remaining in home waters preparing for operations so that they would be in a covering position in case we moved against Japan after she attacked, if she did in southeast Asia.

Mr. RICHARDSON. This information that you were giving, the method that you were following in assembling this information, continued every day up to the attack, did it?

Captain LAYTON. It continued every day up until I left Pearl Harbor on November 29, 1945.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And in conveying that information, you did your very best to acquaint Admiral Kimmel with all of the information at your disposal ?

[12906]

Captain LAYTON. Admiral Kimmel had all of the information at my disposal.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And you are not now conscious of having omitted any method of conveying information to him that you did not use?

Captain LAYTON. I feel confident of that. I also feel confident that Admiral Kimmel feels confident of that.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I have no further questions.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I don't believe I have any questions now.

Senator George.

Senator GEORGE. Just one or two questions, Mr. Chairman.

 

PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE  4841

 

Captain, you say that you transmitted everything that you received to Admiral Kimmel?

Captain LAYTON. That is, in general, true. Certain things came in to the staff that I received that he received also in the course of routine routing of mail, dispatches, et cetera, which I did not have the responsibility for delivering.

Senator GEORGE. So far as you know, did the information which you gave Admiral Kimmel pass on to General Short?

Captain LAYTON. I was rarely present when Admiral Kimmel and General Short conferred. However, from time to time in late 1941, whenever naval task‑force commanders came in to [12906] port, there was a conference in Admiral Kimmel's cabin wherein I outlined the recent strategic and tactical disposition of the Japanese Navy, their rearmament in the Marshall Islands, in the Carolines, and in general went over the entire picture as against Japan. On at least one and possibly more of these occasions, General Short was present and was so briefed by me.

However, when General Short and Admiral Kimmel had conferences between themselves, I was not a party to the conference.

Senator GEORGE. Do you recall any conference in which General Short participated late in November or in the first 6 days of December 1941?

Captain LAYTON. I have no definite recollection of what days they were, but I saw General Short in the admiral's outer office, I saw General Short's aide in the admiral's outer office waiting for General Short, who was inside with the admiral, and I believe it was the middle of November 1941, or around the 20th, perhaps, when I last saw General Short in at a general task‑force briefing where I went over the Japanese situation as to the mandated islands, and the general disposition and tactical deployment of the Japanese Fleet.

Senator GEORGE. You say that was about the middle of November?

[12907] 

Captain LAYTON. About that time, sir.

Senator GEORGE: Now, did you continue to tell Admiral Kimmel, or submit your reports to Admiral Kimmel, indicating the loss of the carriers, or the lack of contact with the carriers, through the means available to you?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir. May I read those to you?

Senator GEORGE. Yes, sir.

Captain LAYTON. December 1, 1941—

Senator GEORGE. Is that the original paper?

Captain LAYTON. This is the original paper made out at that time, and bears Admiral Kimmel's initials.

 

Carriers, no change.

 

December 2, 1941:

 

Carriers, almost a complete blank of information on the carriers, today. Lack of identification has somewhat promoted this lack of information.

 

I would like to say that the call‑sign change had taken place the day before and with some twelve or fifteen thousand call signs being changed the lack of identification would naturally show little information on carriers.

 

However, since over 200 service calls have been partially identified since the change to the first of December, and not one carrier call has been recovered, it is evidence that carrier traffic is at a low ebb.

 

4842 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

 

[12908]

About 200 calls is about 6 percent of the total.

Senator GEORGE. That was the 2d of December?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, Sir. That was the 2d of December.

December 3:

 

No information on submarines or carriers.

 

The 4th of December:

 

Carriers were not mentioned.

 

Fifth of December:

 

Carriers were not mentioned.

 

I beg your pardon. Correction.

 

No traffic from the commander carriers or submarine force has been seen.

 

Sixth of December, the summary was not delivered until after the attack.

Senator GEORGE. Do you have anything on the 6th of December relating to carriers? It wasn't delivered?

Captain LAYTON. No, Sir. It was not delivered until after the attack, and contained no information on the carriers.

Senator GEORGE. Captain, did the message of December 3 relating to the destruction reach you?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, Sir.

Senator GEORGE. That came through you?

[12909]

Captain LAYTON. No, Sir. That came through a special security officer who signed it, delivered to the admiral, Chief of Staff, head of war plans, Chief of Operations, and to myself, and the communications officer.

Senator GEORGE. Admiral Kimmel had that message, did he?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, Sir.

Senator GEORGE. Did he also have as information the message of December 4, 5, or 6—4 or 5—I believe, relating to the code destruction?

Captain LAYTON. Senator, I am not clear on which message you refer to. The message I was referring to was a message stating that purple machines were being destroyed at certain places. Admiral Kimmel sent for me and asked me what a purple machine was.

Senator GEORGE. That was the December 3 message?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, Sir.

Senator GEORGE. That was the information that was sent direct to him, was it?

Captain LAYTON. That was information sent—information to him; yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. Sent as information to him?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir; and he sent for me, wanted to know what the purple machine was, and I told him I did not [12910] know but would find out.

I went to the fleet security officer, late Lieutenant Coleman, and asked him, and he said it was an electric diplomatic coding machine of the Japs, and I so reported it to Admiral Kimmel.

[12911]

Senator GEORGE. Now, subsequent to that there were two other messages that referred to codes. I don't know whether you have them there or not. Did they go to Admiral Kimmel also as information?

 

PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE  4843

 

Captain LAYTON. One on December 3 saying:

 

Highly reliable information has been received that categoric and urgent instructions were sent yesterday to Japanese diplomatic and consular posts at Hongkong Singapore Batavia Manila Washington and London to destroy most of their codes and ciphers at once and to burn all other important confidential and secret documents.

 

That is the one you refer to?

Senator GEORGE. Yes, Sir.

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir; that was received.

Senator GEORGE. That was received also?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, Sir. That was believed to be another version of the one I previously mentioned, Circular 2444, from Tokyo, speaking of purple machines.

Senator GEORGE. I .believe I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Gearhart, of California, will inquire.

Mr. GEARHART. Captain, the answers to these questions of mine may be obvious. They are put for the purpose, of the [12912] record.

Is there any absolutely sure method of preventing a surprise attack?

Captain LAYTON. Mr. Gearhart, I am glad you asked me that question. I was a little curious myself at the end of the war to see what the results had been during the war. If I may have your indulgence for a minute, I will try and find my paper.

To avoid having any personal interest I asked CincPac Analytical Section. They analyzed all reports from all sources and put them together in what they thought was the best narrative of what happened. I told them that I wanted to have a study made of all our carrier task force raids throughout the course of the war, and that I would like to know what degree of surprise they were able to have against the Japs who were supposed to be looking for them.

I told them to go on the cautious side, if anything. And this is what was handed to me by the chief of that section:

There were 72 major raids by carrier‑based planes in the Pacific during World War II in which it might have been expected that the element of surprise would be present. Of these, 21, or 29 2/10 percent achieved compete surprise; 32 or 44 4/10 percent achieved partial surprise; 15 or 20 8/10 percent achieved no element of surprise; and 4 or [12913] 5.5 percent achieved an unknown element of surprise.

In this tabulation raids on the same area within a week's time or on areas under amphibious attack or under bombardment were not included.

Mr. GEARHART. That is very interesting. I don't think I got the third one. Will you repeat it? Captain LAYTON. There were 21, which is 29 2/10 percent; 32, which is 44 4/10 percent; 15, which is 20 8/10 percent; and 4 or 5 5/10 percent.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, that was surprise to the Japs?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, Sir.

Mr. GEARHART. When they were at war with us, when they were on the lookout for us, using all of their methods to prevent surprise?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, Sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Then anything that is done to prevent surprise is merely to reduce the probability of surprise; is that not correct?

 

4844 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

 

Captain LAYTON. In general I think that is true, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, if you were to say anything else you would say there would be a method of preventing surprise absolutely.

Captain LAYTON. There is, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. There is?

[12914]

Captain. LAYTON. Yes, Sir. If you have all the information from the enemy's intercepts and you are reading enough of his systems you can prevent a surprise, and we did it at Midway.

Mr. GEARHART. In other words, what you are saying is that if you achieve perfection then you approach the absolute.

Captain LAYTON. Yes.

Mr. GEARHART. But. that isn't to be expected in human affairs on very, very many occasions, is it?

Captain LAYTON. Perfection is a very rare thing, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, one of the best methods that could have been pursued to have prevented the surprise at Pearl Harbor would have been to have placed in operation adequate and efficient long‑distance patrol; is that correct?

Captain LAYTON. That is one of the ways, sir. I think the Japanese in the early part of the war had an efficient method. The raid that Halsey conducted to take General Doolittle and his brave fliers into Tokyo in April 1942 was prevented not by aerial reconnaissance but by picket boats or fishing boats, thousands of them, spread out there 800 miles to the east of Japan, wherein no task force could penetrate without being seen.

They sank the picket boats but they got their radio message off.

[12915]

Mr. GEARHART. Then if they had sufficient equipment to have carried on an adequate long‑distance aerial reconnaissance for 360° around Hawaii the opportunity of a surprise would have been greatly reduced?

Captain LAYTON. Greatly reduced subject to weather conditions which would allow the search to be effective. Weather conditions prevented a plane from seeing forces, at that time, before the installation of radar.

Mr. GEARHART. Have you any idea how many airplanes of the long-distance reconnaissance type would have been required to keep up a long‑distance reconnaissance around that island that was adequate?

Captain LAYTON. That is a little out of my field. I would rather let the operations people and the aviation people answer those technical questions.

Mr. GEARHART. I think the figures you have given here are very helpful. Thank you.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson, of Michigan, will inquire, Captain.

Senator FERGUSON. Captain Layton, apparently from your answer about this purple machine you were not familiar with the fact that Washington was intercepting the diplomatic messages that the Japanese were using the machine to decipher?

Captain LAYTON. I was not personally familiar with the [12916] machine. I knew that Washington had been, in July 1941, intercepting and decrypting Japanese high diplomatic traffic because they told us what the Japanese were going to demand of Vichy and what they were going to do if Vichy didn't give in, and they also laid out the

 

PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE  4545

 

bases they were going to take and which they did take. So I was aware that our unit in Washington was working and having success as of July with the Japanese, as you call it now, high‑level diplomatic system.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, did you know the name "purple"?

Captain LAYTON. The name "purple" was new to me. I had never heard it.

Senator FERGUSON. So when the word "purple" came in on the message you were not familiar with what they were talking about?

Captain LAYTON. I didn't know what "purple machine" meant. I thought it probably was one of our code, names to cover some device or means of decrypting messages, perhaps.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now you mentioned these messages came to you in July and you knew we were intercepting them here in Washington.

Captain LAYTON. Yes, Sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you get any specific notice that they were not going to give you any more of that kind [12917] of information?

Captain LAYTON. I had noticed, sir. I had written to my opposite number in Washington, Captain McCollum, and had, urged him to send us diplomatic traffic of the very nature of which you speak. He replied in a personal letter and said it was determined that we should not have this sent to us because in fact Washington was the place best qualified both by personnel in number and in experience to evaluate it and to disseminate this information to the fleet and assured me that we would get what we needed at the time we needed it.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, do you have that personal letter?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, Sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you have it with you?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, Sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you produce it?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, Sir. Shall I read it, Sir?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes:

Captain LAYTON (reading)

 

APRIL 22, 1941.

 

DEAR EDDIE: Sorry to be so late in replying to your letter of 11 March but I have just gotten out of the hospital after having them trim me down a trifle. I have taken up the [12918] matter of getting you the Fortnightly Summary by air mail and hope that this matter will be adjusted in the very near future but I cannot be certain as another division handles the mailing and distribution of this report.

 

I would like to add parenthetically that we got it.

 

I thoroughly appreciate that you would probably be much helped in your daily estimates if you had at your disposal the DIP.

 

That is what I asked for, "DIP", standing for diplomatic traffic.

 

This, however, brings up matters of security, et cetera, which would be very difficult to solve. While I appreciate your position fully in the matter, still I cannot agree that this material should be forwarded to you in the way you suggest: It seems reasonable to suppose that the Department should be the origin, for evaluated political situations as its availability of information is greater tan that of any command afloat, however large, its staff is larger and it should be in a position to evaluate the political consequences. Therefore it would seem that the forces afloat must rely on the Department for evaluated views of political situations.

 

4846 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

 

I should think that the forces afloat should, in general, confine themselves to the estimates of the strategic [12919] and tactical situations with which they will be confronted when the time of action arrives. The material you mentioned can necessarily have but passing and transient interest as action in the political sphere is determined by the Government as a whole and not by the forces afloat.

It does not seem to me to be very practical to build up an organization afloat which will merely duplicate the efforts of the Intelligence Division in the Department. I appreciate that all this leaves you in rather a spot as naturally people are interested in current developments. I believe, however, that a sharp line should be drawn and a distinction continuously emphasized between information that is of interest and information that is desirable to have on which to base action.

In other words, while you and the Fleet may be highly interested in politics, there is nothing that you can do about it. Therefore, information of political significance, except as it affects immediate action by the Fleet, is merely a matter of interest to you and not a matter of utility.

 

Senator FERGUSON. Signed?

Captain LAYTON. I have another paragraph.

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

Captain LAYTON (reading):

 

I think your remarks concerning the slate are very [12920] apt and pertinent.

 

The word "slate" means the slate for language officers in case of war.

 

I would, however, ask you to look at this other aspect of the situation. If the officers concerned are to continue to be of use to the Navy in their specialty they must be given a reasonable opportunity for promotion. Certain of the promotion laws are matters of law and are not within the province of the Bureau of Navigation or of any Selection Board to modify.

 

I don't believe reading this letter any further will have any influence on the Pearl Harbor investigation, Senator. It is a long talk about why the officers have to go to sea and cannot remain at their posts.

Senator FERGUSON. I think that is of interest to the committee.

Captain LAYTON [reading]:

 

A case in point—I am advised by the Bureau of Navigation that Birtley—

 

Commander Birtley was then the officer in charge of the Radio Intelligence Unit and who was relieved as officer in charge by Commander Rochefort later on. I was trying to get him kept on in view of his experience. [Reading further:]

 

A case in point—I am advised by the Bureau of [12921] Navigation that Birtley is barely over the line in sea duty in rank for the promotion to the grade of Commander, and they were not quite sure of their computation. In other words, it is desirable from the Bureau's viewpoint and from the point of view of law for Birtley to get to sea for about a year so that there will be no question as to his qualifications for promotion.

Fullinwider, of course, has no sea duty in rank and as he must have two years sea duty in rank before his next grade he cannot afford to stay ashore much more than about another year and we are leaving him there for just that.

 

I had asked for Fullinwider. He had been there for 2 years. Birtley had been there for 2 years. I wanted Commander Rochefort to come there as the most experienced and talented officer in the line. I felt that the Pacific Fleet needed the best talent on the spot.

Senator FERGUSON. You conveyed that to McCollum?

Captain LAYTON. In a personal letter.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. He is telling you why you can't have these valuable men?

 

PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE  4847

 

Captain LAYTON. That is true, sir.

 

This whole subject is tied up with matters of the progress of the work as a whole. I appreciate that the local view frequently looms very big but in assigning personnel [12922] to stations and providing for shifts in personnel I must consider future requirements as well as present needs.

In this connection, we ran on A present need basis for several years with the result that our talent all of a sudden disappeared from certain important billets and I have had a great deal of difficulty in getting all of our stations on a functioning basis again. All of them are just now functioning with some degree of satisfaction and continuity and in order to provide for this desirable continuity, I might even say essential continuity, a definite plan for shifting personnel is essential.

I appreciate that the two boys in Honolulu are doing exceptionally good work and for that reason I would like to see them stay there, but for their own good and more important for the good of the specialized service as a whole, some shift is going to have to be made and Honolulu is the place that a general study of the situation indicates to be the logical place to make the change.

I hope to have the new silhouettes in the mail within the next two weeks. I am ashamed that they have not been sent out before now but I have been forced to accept a reduction in priority of this work as the powers that be have considered other work more urgent. The instruction models I will have to check up on for you although I had [12923] understood that they were already being sent out.

I hope that you will keep in touch with me from time to time as I value your comments very highly.

With best regards,

 

Mac.

 

Over the signature of A. H. McCollum.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, have you any other letters or memoranda?

Captain LAYTON. No other pertaining to Pearl Harbor, Sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, that would indicate, that letter, that you were told at that time that you would not be getting diplomatic matter except that which the Department here wanted you to know for action?

Captain LAYTON. That affected action on the part of the fleet; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And did you believe up until the time of the attack that you were getting all diplomatic intercepted messages that would in any way relate to the action of the fleet?

Captain LAYTON. I thought that the Department had sent us everything they had and when I learned a couple of years later that we had been short‑changed I was outraged and astonished.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, we have in evidence three intercepts of so-called diplomatic messages, the one of the [12924] intrigue in Thailand and the two in relation to the codes. Do you know of any others? One is on the 1st of December and the other two are on the 3d of December. Do you know of any other for action? Those show on their face that they were the so‑called magic or purple, or at least intercepts. You didn't know them by the name of magic. Are those the only three messages that showed on their face that they were intercepted Japanese messages?

Captain LAYTON. Those are the only ones I recall at present. I am sure there weren't many others, if there was even one.

Senator FERGUSON. I didn't understand.

Captain LAYTON. Those are the only ones I recall at present, although the setting up on the winds code may be included in that same category.

 

4848 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

 

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now how can we find out how many other messages there are that on their face indicate that they were intercepts of Japanese diplomatic messages?

Captain LAYTON. I have my file here. If the Senator will give me a little time I will go through it.

Senator FERGUSON. I will be glad to give you time. I think that is important.

Captain LAYTON. I have one dated December 1, 1941.

Senator FERGUSON. That is your file?

[12925]

Captain LAYTON. That is the commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, intelligence file, sir. I have kept it since December 1940, when I first reported for duty.

Senator FERGUSON. What is that message?

Captain LAYTON. It is a duplication of the one you just handed me, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That I gave you?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, Sir.

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

Captain LAYTON. It started out "Ambassador in Bangkok."

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Captain LAYTON. I have one here dated November 28, 1941, from Cincaf to Opnav, Cincpac, Com14, and Com16, which I am sure you have in the record.

Senator FERGUSON. That is the winds?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir; that is the five times winds and the two times winds.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson has to go to the floor, and in the meantime Mr. Richardson has a question or two.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Captain, are you the author of this map of Pearl Harbor that has been set up on this side of the room?

Captain LAYTON. I am not the artist; no, sir. The [12926] map of Pearl Harbor made from existing records in the office of the commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, was constructed by the direction of the commander in chief, Pacific Feet, to show this committee if they wished where the ships were at the time of the attack; also where a couple of them moved during the time of the attack, and to show what has been referred to as Japanese submarine track around Ford Island.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Suppose you take the pointer, Captain, and give us a demonstration on that map of the information it is intended to convey.

Captain LAYTON. This map, with its color for sounding, does not lend itself to being seen, but I will show with this pointer the course laid down on a captured map from the Japanese midget submarine the course he intended to follow. His course has been projected on the map which is a United States naval confidence chart of Pearl Harbor corrected and brought up to date as of December 7, 1941. It is to be remarked when you see me put this submarine on the ground that I am following his track as he laid it down in his chart, which was not a correct chart.

He comes up the channel here to this point; their he starts almost due north.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Does this arrow indicate due north?

[12927]

Captain LAYTON. Yes, Sir.

 

PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE  4849

 

Here he arrives in the vicinity of Hickam Field; this is Hickam Field here; this area here is a naval section base at Bishop Point; this point is Bishop Point.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Will you indicate where the entrance net is?

Captain LAYTON. The entrance net was here, sir.

And the course of this midget submarine as he projected it in his chart places him almost aground on the corner of Bishop Point; he then was going to proceed on this course to this position and then around Ford Island to this position and then to cut across; and notice that he cuts across these ships that were anchored there at the time, across these ships to this position and down here and down here; and he goes then under a position which the Nevada has moved to after she was underway during the attack and ground herself; and then he proceeds on out.

Actually I can prove, and any naval officer will believe me, that he was never inside of Pearl Harbor. That was his intended course.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Then it is your opinion that the chart which has sometimes been interpreted as indicating that he actually entered the harbor and made a circuit of the harbor was not correct, and it was simply a projection of the course?

[12928]

Captain LAYTON. It was a projected course and not an accomplished course. And, furthermore, the prisoner in interrogation never said that he went inside of Pearl Harbor.

As a matter of fact, he still had his torpedoes aboard when picked up.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Where was he picked up?

Captain LAYTON. At Bellows Field, over at Kaneohe Bay.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Show where the different vessels were. What is this channel to the left ?

Captain LAYTON. This is West Loch. It is not used, as a rule, by naval vessels, except ammunition vessels, to unload at the ammunition depot over here.

At the time of the attack the vessel shown here is U. S. S. California.

At the time of the attack the vessel shown here is the oiler Neosho. She got under way and moved about the harbor. She was full of high‑test gasoline and was not touched.

Alongside this mooring is the Maryland and Oklahoma. I beg pardon. Oklahoma.

Alongside of this mooring is the Tennessee and West Virginia.

Alongside of this mooring was the Arizona and the repair [12929] ship Vista. The Vista got under way and moved over here.

The Nevada had been in this position, got under way at the time of the attack and moved down here.

These were destroyers.

This was a hospital ship, Solace.

This was a destroyer.

This was the cruiser Phoenix.

Later two destroyers.

Tender and destroyers.

Four destroyers.

There were four destroyers.

Here was a cruiser, Detroit.

 

4850 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

 

Light cruiser Raleigh.

The old training ship Utah.

And there was the Tangier.

Seaplane tender Curtiss was here.

Medusa, a repair ship, was here.

Mine sweeping destroyers were here.

The ships that moved, the principal ships that moved were the vessels from alongside the Arizona, which grounded itself.

The Nevada moved down here.

The cruiser Detroit, these four destroyers, part of these destroyers, the Phoenix, these two destroyers, one [12930] destroyer. The Solace moved over here. And the Nevada, which I mentioned before.

I think that covers the highlights.

Mr., RICHARDSON. Where are the oil supplies?.

Captain LAYTON. These are the oil supply tanks of Pearl Harbor, and here. There.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Where are the beaches where the patrol planes were maintained?

Captain LAYTON. The patrol planes, sir?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Patrol planes.

Captain LAYTON. The patrol planes were operating from this section of Ford Island here.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Where is the airport where the carrier planes were?

Captain LAYTON. They were in this field here.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That is Ford Island?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Nothing further.

Mr. KEEFE. Captain, I understand your testimony to be that you communicated the available intelligence to Admiral Kimmel and his staff each morning?

Captain LAYTON. To Admiral Kimmel each morning; to other members of his staff on every two or three mornings, sometimes every other day, depending on their availability and the amount of material available for them to see. The [12931] Communication Intelligence summaries that I have referred to were mostly always shown to the Chief of Staff and frequently to the Chief of Plans, War Plans, and the operations officer. These officers all saw the evaluated intelligence summaries that I also wrote up for the entire staff.

[12932]

Mr. KEEFE. In your answers to questions before, the Hart investigation you stated in substance facts which I assume is what you mean to tell us today:

 

Q. How often did you communicate the intelligence available, concerning the Japanese naval forces, to Admiral Kimmel?

A. Daily, at about eight‑fifteen in the morning. If subsequent thereto an important dispatch was received, generally from Cavite, or if important developments took place and reported from local communications intelligence unit, I would take it to Admiral Kimmel at the first opportunity he was. free.

Q. Did those daily visits to Commander‑in‑Chief usually bring forth discussions concerning the intelligence?

A. Yes, sir. A discussion concerning the intelligence submitted and as to the Japanese dispositions, intentions, and future operations of the forces concerned, and a general discussion of the situation in general.

 

That is correct?

Captain LAYTON. That is correct, sir.

 

PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE  4851

 

Mr. KEEFE (reading):

 

Q. Was it usual for any other members of the [12933] Staff or any of the Commanders of the Fleet's task forces to be present during those discussions?

A. The Chief of Staff was most always present. On important occasions, the senior War Plans Officer and the senior Operations Officer was called in and a discussion then held. Often during these discussions I was no longer required and was permitted to retire. When Task Force Commanders, who were then operating out two weeks and in one week, approximately, would return to port, the Admiral would send for me and have me review for the benefit of the Task Force Commanders, then in port the situation and developments that had taken place during their absence and a general discussion of Japanese potentialities, capabilities, strength would ensue.

 

Captain LAYTON. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. That is generally the manner that you operated?

Captain LAYTON. That is a better general picture than I have told orally here because I had a chance to put question marks, punctuation, and periods in that testimony.

Mr. KEEFE. And during these discussions you were in the habit of expressing your own opinion and estimate as to the situation that confronted the commander in chief.?

Captain LAYTON. Admiral Kimmel encouraged officers to [12934] express themselves and I took advantage of that opportunity to express my own opinions on several occasions.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, when messages came in which were considered important, there was a general staff discussion as to the meaning and intent of that particular message, was there not?

Captain LAYTON. There were staff discussions almost every day. My participation in the staff discussions was generally of an intelligence nature, such as briefing the staff on the situation as developed and giving them the picture so they would not have to read a lot of material. Then I would be allowed to retire while they discussed specific phases, particularly regarding the war plans.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes. Now, did you have a liaison with the Army through the person of Col. Edwin Raley?

Captain LAYTON. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. He was appointed by the G‑2 of the Hawaiian Department?

Captain LAYTON. I understood that at the time, Mr. Keefe. He came to me in the middle of 1941 and said he wanted to establish a liaison with the fleet.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes.

Captain LAYTON. I told him that I was delighted and thereafter I saw Colonel Raley from time to time. Shortly [12935] thereafter the B‑17's were to be flown to Australia and the Philippines and I furnished him all the information I had available of weather or bases, including some secret information from the Dutch that we had received regarding the air bases in Dutch territory that could be used.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, in any event there was complete, direct, friendly and intimate and almost daily liaison with the Army through the officers that had been appointed by the G‑2 in the presence of Colonel Raley?

Captain LAYTON. Colonel Raley and I saw one another on an average of maybe twice a week in late October and I am sure at least

 

4852 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK.

 

three times a week or more often in late November of 1941. Our liaison was so good—I mean by good, I could get together with his liaison officer. His assistant reported to me, to my desk the morning of the attack and remained there for some 18 hours so that liaison would be intimate and correct.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, I want to get this one fact clear, that so far as the relations in matters of intelligence between the Army and Navy at Pearl Harbor you had an intimate and a direct and a constant relationship.

Captain LAYTON. I did, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And you transferred, as I understand it, to the Army through their liaison officer Colonel Raley the im‑ [12936] portant information that you thought the Army should have.?

Captain LAYTON. I had to dress it down from some of its very secret action. I could not tell him the sources and because I was under oath I went a little further than my oath allowed.

Mr. KEEFE. I see.

Captain LAYTON. But Admiral Kimmel knew I was doing it. I had his permission to make and give Colonel Raley a little more than you could under the oath that I was under obligation to. I would not tell him how it came about we knew these things, but I would inform him of the general details. He knew of this December 1 message—he did not know it was a message—regarding the plot by the Japanese to force the British to invade Thailand so that the Thais could call the British the aggressor and then call on the Japanese to come and help them out. He knew that.

Mr. KEEFE. You did not have this message which has been introduced in evidence here, or discuss that one, the so‑called plotting message, by which the Japs sought to plot Pearl Harbor?

Captain LAYTON. Unfortunately, Mr. Keefe, it was not transmitted to the commander in chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

Mr. KEEFE., And some other things were not communicated [12937] to the commander in chief, Pacific. Fleet.

Captain LAYTON. I think Exhibit 1—

Mr. KEEFE. Which were considered important.

Captain LAYTON. I think Exhibit 1 covers most of those, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, you made a statement a few moments ago in response to Senator Ferguson's question, that about 2 years after Pear Harbor, when you learned that you had been short‑changed, you were very much upset and disturbed.

Captain LAYTON. I was outraged, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. You said you were outraged?

Captain LAYTON. I still am, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, will you explain that just a little more, Captain?

Captain LAYTON. Perhaps my outrage, being 2 years after Pearl Harbor, is hindsight, but throughout this war I have been the fleet intelligence officer and the combat intelligence officer and directly charged with informing our forces at sea with all pertinent information of the Japanese dispositions or intentions or anything else that had to do with our forces and for their own safety, had I been negligent for 1 minute and not informed our forces of things which should be known, I would have been court‑martialed and possibly shot and deserved it. That, of course, was during the war.

 

PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE  4853

 

[12938]

Mr. KEEFE. Yes. Now, I have before me an affidavit of Col. Edward W. Raley, who at the time of making this affidavit was at Langley Field, Va., and who was allegedly sworn by Henry C. Clausen, and in this affidavit Colonel Raley says this:

 

On 7 December 1941 and for about one year preceding I was G‑2, Hawaiian Air Force. Shortly after assuming these duties. I established for purposes of the Hawaiian Air Force, some form of contact with the Navy, through then Commander Layton, U. S. N.

 

I close the quote there and I want to inquire: From this affidavit it would appear that Colonel Raley is drawing a distinction between G‑2 of the Army and G‑2 of the Hawaiian Air Force.

Captain LAYTON. There is a distinction, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Did you understand that that was his capacity when he contacted you?

Captain LAYTON. I knew that he was the G‑2 of the Hawaiian Air Force. When he came to establish his liaison I understood that he was coming as Army liaison, without distinguishing in my mind G‑2, Hawaiian Department, or G‑2, Hawaiian Air Force. He did, however, say, and I agreed with him, to the effect that this liaison was an ideal one insofar as the Navy and the Air Force were offensive weapons while the Hawaiian Depart‑ [12939] ment was a defense garrison, and, therefore, our liaison should be good and intimate, and we thereafter carried on that liaison.

Mr. KEEFE. I am quoting again from his affidavit:

 

I told Commander Layton that my contact was for the Hawaiian Air Force. During this period of about one year I had not more than six conversations with Commander Layton concerning the subject of my contact. These conversations were spread out during this period. As nearly as I can recall the last conversation I had with Commander Layton before 7 December 1941 was about October 1941,

The information given me by Commander Layton was my only Navy source. He stated that if there was any Navy movement by Japan coming to his knowledge, and which might imperil the Hawaiian Islands, he would inform me. The only specific information he gave me in this regard were studies he made of a possible Japanese Malay hostility and of Japanese fleet installations in the Mandates. I believe this was at least two months before 7 December 1941.

Any information I received from Commander Layton I promptly gave to my Commanding General, General Martin

On 1 October 1941 I conferred with Commander Lay‑ [12940] ton and Colonel Bicknell, who was the Assistant G‑2, Hawaiian Department, concerning a conclusion I had reached that hostilities with Japan was possible within a short time or any moment. They apparently shared my view. I reported this to General Martin. Attached are portions of a letter, written by me to my daughter on 2 October 1941, concerning this conference.

 

Now I want to get this straightened out because the colonel's affidavit is here in the record for what it is worth; I have had no chance, or no one on the committee has had any chance to examine Col. Edward Raley, but. I would like to get the exact liaison that existed between you and the Army out; there at Hawaii and if I am to read his affidavit correctly, he states. that he was merely representing the Hawaiian Air Force and that he reported to the commanding general of the Hawaiian Air Force, General Martin.

Now, to a layman this is difficult to understand. It perhaps explains some of the reasons why Pearl Harbor occurred.

Now, I understand your story to be that there was complete friendly relations and almost daily liaison with the Army officer.

 

4854 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

 

He says he did not have over six conversations in a year and the last one was in October 1941, before Pearl Harbor. Now, that raises a question of fact. If I am to consider Colonel Raley's affidavit at all, I have got to [12941] appraise it in connection with the testimony that you have given to the committee. Do you understand the purpose of my questions?

Captain LAYTON. Mr. Keefe, my testimony that I gave you here is the facts and I am sure in my heart that if Col. Edward Raley—I think I called him Edwin before—were to testify here he would say exactly what I have said or words to that effect. Now, I would like to point out one thing. His affidavit was made—

Mr. KEEFE. I will give you the date. It was made the 11th of March 1945.

Captain LAYTON. Perhaps his memory has slipped him on that but he referred to a Japanese attack on Malay, didn't he?

Mr. KEEFE. Yes.

Captain LAYTON. And may I point out that Ambassador Subokimo's dispatch received by CINCPAC on December 1 was the thing that I testified to as having told him and which he in turn refers to as having been told him here.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes.

Captain LAYTON. That would indicate that I saw him some time after November 30, wouldn't it?

Mr. KEEFE. It would indicate that you saw him after October at least, Captain.

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

[12942]

Mr. KEEFE. Well, I want to say to you and I am glad to say so for the purposes of the record—

Captain LAYTON. I would like to continue if I may, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Oh, yes. Pardon me.

Captain LAYTON. I am sure that Colonel Raley in making this affidavit had a bad memory or his recollection was not too good. He has always been a personal friend of mine and I know that if he were to stand here I could recollect things to him.

For example, as I recall the Army‑Navy game was played on Saturday, the 29th of November 1941. He invited myself and my assistant, Commander Hudson, to join him at the Officers' Club at Hickam Field the evening before that game. We had a little conversation and I took him outside the club, out onto the veranda away from ears, to tell him what was the latest developments at that time in my office and again impressed him with what I considered the seriousness of the situation. I am sure that Colonel Raley will remember that and I believe that his attitude at that time was one of not considering the importance of this matter as you have brought it up, or of the recollection of the matters that I have brought up.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, I do not want to be prejudging anyone, but the testimony that you have given here so far as I am [12943] concerned has a ring of complete sincerity and truth in it and it has impressed me just exactly that way. But, of course, this committee has got to try to understand this testimony and reconcile the differences that exist as best we can. That is what I am trying to do.

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. It is going to be a difficult job as we go along and see these differences that crop out in this testimony.

 

PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE  4855

 

Well, now, in your testimony before Admiral Hart you stated:

 

I want to say this: I had all the information of intelligence sources, and I had spent all of my time trying to evaluate these jig‑saw puzzle pieces to make the true picture of events to come, and I think I was as surprised as anyone when the Japanese attacked the following morning.

 

Captain LAYTON. That is correct, sir. However, I was not given a lot of pieces of this jig‑saw puzzle. All the pieces I had made a pretty good picture and when you work as I have in Intelligence I can say it is nothing more than piecing up pieces that do not belong to a jigsaw and pieces that do belong to jigsaw until you form a framework. Then you try to complete the framework of a puzzle until you get [12944] enough to show you what your complete picture is. Unfortunately, there were other sets of jigsaw puzzles that went with this one that were not given us, so all I could do was use what I had and I was surprised.

Mr. KEEFE. In other words, Captain, am I correct in saying this, that to me your testimony means that you had a pretty good mosaic or a jigsaw worked out and put together from what information was available to you and that information indicated that there was going to be war but that it would take place in its initial phases, at least, way off to the southwest, is that right?

Captain LAYTON. That is correct, sir, backed additionally by the past experience of the previous Japanese task force movement to French Indochina, which took place and which was backed up by diplomatic intercept dispatches to us to inform us as to the nature of these ultimatums as to what the Japanese were going to do, which they did.

Here again we have the same build‑up, we have a possibility, we get everything that Washington gives us with that and so our jigsaw puzzle as we make it looked pretty good at that time. As a matter of fact, it looked good in Washington.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, now, you had in that jigsaw puzzle this war warning message of the 27th

Captain LAYTON. That is correct, sir.

Mr.  Mr. KEEFE (continuing). Did you not?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Let me ask you this: Not having ever been an intelligence officer and not too intelligent in any respect connected with this whole business, I would like to have you tell me this because you are one witness that we have had here who talks plainly and frankly and you know what you are talking about, you know your business:

Is it possible in interpreting the actions of men m the armed services charged with responsibility to judge their conduct by any one particular message such as this war warning message of the 27th of November, or must you judge that message in connection with all the other intelligence and all the other information that is available to the commander in the field?

Captain LAYTON. It has been my experience, limited as it may be, that certain commanders write certain messages in certain ways. I believe that certain commanders under them know what their commander means by the way he writes his message. I do not think—other than that, I do not believe I can comment.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, I might say to you that a very high‑ranking officer in the intelligence field and who has not yet been a witness here

 

4856 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

 

but whose affidavit appears in this [12946] so‑called Clausen file, I have had a chance to talk with at some length and the conclusion that I have gotten from that man was that you cannot pick out of intelligence any one single message and say that is the message which determines the responsibility of a commander in the field.

Take a man situated exactly as Kimmel was or as Short was: Kimmel gets this so‑called war warning message and the implications have been that that ought to be sufficient to warn anybody to go out and do certain things, execute a suitable defensive deployment of his ships when he also has an order before him, war plan 46, which required him to attack, spearhead an attack into the Marshalls. .

Now, the point is, can I, as one attempting to evaluate this picture look at that one war warning message of the twenty‑seventh and disregard all the other information and all of the other wires and all the other orders that might affect his decision as to what to do? That is what I am struggling with in my mind, trying to get it straightened out.

Captain LAYTON. Any commander who took only one message and based his course of action on one message would most likely be relieved of his command because his guess most likely would be wrong.

I have a file here and here of probably 50 messages from Chinese sources and diplomatic sources, I mean consuls [12947] and assistant naval attaches, Chiang Kai‑shek's representative, and so forth, saying that the Japanese are positively going to invade Russia next week. I did not take any of this to be factual until something else backs it up. You have to have all these things and intelligence must be backed up by something else. That is what makes the jig‑saw puzzle.

Mr. KEEFE. All right. Having all these messages and finally here is a message comes through which I believe in your statement before the Hart committee, before Admiral Hart, you said was the first message of its kind you had ever seen?

Captain LAYTON. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. A war warning message?

Captain LAYTON. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. It would be striking, it would be called to the attention of anybody, wouldn't it?

Captain LAYTON. It would, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, that message must have been discussed out there, and I believe the evidence here shows that it was discussed in the staff meetings of Admiral Kimmel.

Captain LAYTON. There was a staff meeting that afternoon and evening, yes. I was drafting a paraphrase for delivery to General Short. As a matter of fact, I had a draft—I had to draft three paraphrases before I found one that carried the picture right without destroying it.

[12948]

When I took it to Admiral Kimmel's cabin there were discussions going on at the time. There were about half a dozen of our higher echelon staff in there. At that time the chief of staff of the Fourteenth Naval District brought General Short's message from the War Department over there and gave into Admiral Kimmel.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, then, you found difficulty, as far as the staff was concerned, in determining what to do, all discussing the message that

 

PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE  4857

 

came from Marshall to Short and here is a message from their Chief of Naval Operations to Kimmel.

Now, we are sitting here on this committee judging by hindsight what men should have done. They were faced out there with the situation as it was on the 7th of December and I am trying to put myself in that position.

Now, there were a lot of distinguished men on that staff, were there not?

Captain LAYTON. I thought so, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Very able men ?

Captain LAYTON. I am sure of that, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Did you participate in any of those discussions with respect to this war warning message?

Captain LAYTON. No, I did not, sir. I was busy making this paraphrase and thereafter I was told to get it to General Short. I was not in on the discussions of the war warning   [12949]  message.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, in any event, Captain Layton, so far as you were concerned, with available to you all of the information that had come out there to Admiral Kimmel—you knew of all of it, didn't you?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. You were the one that supplied him with the information?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, Sir.

Mr. KEEFE. You were utterly and completely surprised at this attack the moment that it came?

Captain LAYTON. I was, sir, very.

Mr. KEEFE. But I understand your testimony to be that had you had the information that Washington had, which they did not send out there, then a situation might well have arisen in .your mind?

Captain LAYTON. That is hindsight, sir, but I feel confident that had we had all that material, particularly those main intercepts from the consul and from Foreign Minister Togo to the consul telling him to make reports even when there wasn't anything to report, I think there would have been an entirely different situation there, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, you people out there knew that the Japs were destroying their codes and orders went out from [12950] Washington here to go to our outlying possessions for them to destroy their codes; you knew that, didn't you?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, Sir.

Mr. KEEFE. That simply confirmed the fact that war was going to start; isn't that true?

Captain LAYTON. It did to me, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. But so far as the information which you had of the places where the war was going to start it led you all to believe that it was going to start out in the Far East; is that right?

Captain LAYTON. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And that is why everybody was surprised when it started with an attack on Pearl harbor?

Captain LAYTON. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, when you made the statement that you did a little while ago, if I understand you correctly, you felt outraged and still feel outraged because of the fact that you were not supplied with the information which you now feel had you had it at that time would

 

4858 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

 

have given you people out there an entirely different picture of the situation?

Captain LAYTON. I feel very confident of that, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, the funny part of it is, Captain, from all the witnesses that have been here before this committee in the higher echelons in Washington, everyone of them [12951] were surprised, from the Commander in Chief on down apparently, that there was any attack on Pearl Harbor. Nobody expected an attack on Pearl Harbor apparently, those in Washington here who had all this information. You have read the testimony, I assume, or heard it?

Captain LAYTON, I have heard a good part of it, yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes. You got that impression, did you not?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, Sir.

Mr. KEEFE. There are only two witnesses who differ in that respect and I think I am right in that, I have been trying to follow this thing carefully. One is Admiral Turner and the other is Captain Zacharias; they were the only two witnesses, and Zacharias' testimony was in the form of a sort of prophecy. Admiral Turner seemed to be the only one that had any idea that there might be any possibility of an attack on Pearl Harbor.

Now, was there anybody out there that you knew out at Pearl Harbor that had any idea that there was a likelihood of an attack at that point?

Captain LAYTON. I feel very positive that there was no one there that was not as surprised as I was. I feel confident also that had anyone predicted this attack coming that something would have been done.

[12952]

Mr. KEEFE. Well, Captain, you say that in view of the fact that this book that has been referred to here several times by some Jap, that some Jap wrote predicting the possibility of an attack on Pearl Harbor—you were all familiar with that, were you not?

Captain LAYTON. I translated it, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. You translated it?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, Sir.

Mr. KEEFE. That had all been presented to Kimmel and his staff and evaluated, was it not?

Captain LAYTON. That was a book dealing with the movements or possible actions of the Japanese Fleet after the outbreak of war. It did not predict a surprise attack before war and it was one of many of their courses of action.

Mr. KEEFE. I See.

Captain LAYTON. I do not mean to say for a minute that the Japanese did not have the Pearl Harbor raid as a potentiality, but it was not by itself, in my own mental estimate, made as a capability, capability being differentiated in the military sense as something that they can and will do under the proper circumstances. The Japanese proved that it was a capability.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, in your testimony before Admiral Hart you made this comment, Captain:

 

[12955] I have one matter which I think should be properly included in the record. Admiral Kimmel, as I mentioned before, always consulted with his Task Force Commanders, District Commandant, on the war warning for instance, and had with them, many times in my hearing, a complete, free, and frank dis‑

 

PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE  4859

 

cussion of the situation, and asked and received their opinions regarding it. I frequently took messages of secret, ultra‑secret, and confidential nature to these Commanders on their Flagships on specific occasions as there was on Saturday morning, 6 December, when the report I have mentioned from CinC Asiatic Fleet, giving the sightings of the Japanese naval and auxiliaries units in the Gulf of Siam and Camranh bay by CinCAF forces. I took that to Admiral Pye on his Flagship, the California, and there again a complete and free discussion took place as to what all this meant, not only this message but others they had seen and discussed. That was the only place that I recall as having said positively that the movement into the Gulf of Siam was, I considered, very significant and that the only problem remaining was whether or not they would leave us on their flank as a menace or take us out on the way down.

 

That meant the Philippines and Guam, did it not?

[12954] 

Captain LAYTON. That is right, sir.

Mr. KEEFE (reading):

 

Admiral Pye and his Chief of Staff told me their opinion was that the Japanese would not attack us. When I returned the message to the files, Admiral Kimmel asked me what they said. I repeated their conversations in abbreviated form. On other occasions, other Admirals expressed apprehension as to the status of the Asiatic Fleet and our forces in the Asiatic waters, and were very anxious regarding the situation, indicating that they were not convinced that Japan could by‑pass our Philippine flank.

 

Now, is that a fair statement of the situation, Captain?

Captain LAYTON. That is a very fair statement of the situation as I saw it then and as I see it now.

Mr. KEEFE. You further said:

 

It was my personal opinion that the thought of attack on Pearl Harbor at that time was very far from most people's minds.

 

Captain LAYTON. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And you made that statement before Admiral Hart in the face of the fact that you were the fleet intelligence officer?

Captain LAYTON. That is right, sir.

[12956] 

Mr. KEEFE. And had all of the available information that came to Pearl Harbor?

Captain LAYTON. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And were the individual who discussed it with the commander in chief, Admiral Kimmel, and with the commanders of his task forces?

Captain LAYTON. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Who were Admiral Halsey and Admiral Newton, I believe.

Captain LAYTON. Admiral Brown and Admiral Halsey and Admiral Pye were the three task force commanders.

Mr. KEEFE. Oh, yes.

Captain LAYTON. Admiral Newton was a subordinate of Admiral Brown, I believe.

Mr. KEEFE. I think perhaps that is right. My recollection is that Admiral Newton was in command of this task force in which the carrier—

Captain LAYTON. That is correct. On the movement just before December 7 Admiral Newton was put in command of that task unit or group because part of the force went to Johnston Island for landing‑force exercises, so the reference to that as a task force as I have there would be a misnomer.

 

4860 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

 

Mr. KEEFE. Now, you further made this statement. I would like to have this in the record and have you confirm it [12956] to this committee and in this record. This question was asked you:

 

Q. Do you recall your own reaction to the phrase concerning war warning in the Department's dispatch of 27 November?

A. As it was the first dispatch that I had ever seen saying "This is a war warning", I took particular note of it. I thought it over considerably. Meanwhile, its subconscious impression was that it certainly fitted the picture up to date. and that we would be at war shortly if Japan would decide to leave her Philippine flank open and proceed southward, hoping meanwhile to mollify us through a compromise deal with Kurusu‑Nomura negotiations. It made me feel that the picture we had was a good picture, and perhaps complete, and that the times were very critical and perhaps the Department hoped for a last minute compromise in view of their statement that nothing should be done to aggravate an already serious situation. I saw the Army that evening take their condition of readiness, trucks moving, troops moving, and I thought I saw weapons moving in the street and I presumed that they were going into full condition of readiness, including the emplacement of anti‑aircraft and other mobile weapons around Pearl Harbor and other im‑ [12957] portant points on Oahu.

 

Is that a fair statement?

Captain LAYTON. That is a correct statement except one typographical error or else you may have misread it there where it was leaving the Philippines on the flank. I think it would be more properly not leaving the Philippines on the flank. In other words, as it was stated there, as I understood it, if it was leaving them on their flank they wouldn't bother us and go in there but I was apprehensive that if there was they would not leave us on our flank and proceed southward from the Philippines in their southward movement, and that they would attack the Philippines along with the Malay barrier.

Mr. KEEFE. You think that the word "not" should be in there?

Captain LAYTON. I think so. It would make better sense.

Mr. KEEFE. I had better read it again as it does make sense to me:

 

Meanwhile, its subconscious impression was that it certainly fitted the picture up to date, and that we would be at war shortly if Japan would decide to leave her Philippine flank open and proceed southward, hoping meanwhile to mollify us through a compromise deal via Kurusu‑Nomura negotiations.

 

You think it should read, "If Japan would decide not [12958] to leave her Philippine flank open and proceed southward"?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, Sir.

Mr. KEEFE. "Hoping meanwhile to mollify us through a compromise deal via Kurusu‑Nomura negotiations."

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir; that would read better.

Mr. KEEFE. That is the way that that ought to be corrected?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, Sir.

Mr. KEEFE. That is quite important.

Captain, where are you stationed now?

Captain LAYTON. I am still attached to the staff of the commander in chief, Pacific Fleet. Upon the conclusion of this testimony and return to the west coast I hope to be detached for new duty.

Mr. KEEFE. Detached what?

Captain LAYTON. For a reassignment, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. I see.

Captain LAYTON. I have been on one job too long, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, now, that is another thing, Captain, that bothers me. I don't know whether other members of the committee have

 

PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE  4861

 

been bothered or not but I want to ask you because I value your opinion. There seems to be an attitude that a man who is attached to Intelligence, which is to me a highly specialized field of [12959] activity, does not have very much to look forward to in the line of promotion; that in order to meet the attitudes of the examining boards he must leave the field of intelligence and go to sea and get sea duty and all that sort of thing and thus we have the situation where you are writing to McCollum here at Washington asking him to leave out at Honolulu two men who are experts in their field and whom you wanted there for the purpose of building up and maintaining the highest state of efficiency in intelligence and the answer comes back that, "Well, sorry, but they have got other plans. They have got to go to sea in order to meet the tests of sea duty," and all that sort of thing.

Captain LAYTON. That is, true, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, is that a situation that persists in the Navy?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That is the law.

Mr. KEEFE. What?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That is the law.

Captain LAYTON. The law is that you must go to sea and you must perform your duties in an outstanding and highly able manner because, you see, there is selection to promotion.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes.

Captain LAYTON. If you do not have a record that shows what you have been doing and have commanded ships at sea and [12960] have been a sailor you cannot be promoted to higher grade. That is the law. McCollum was only trying to protect his officers because if he had left Birtley, for example, over at Pearl Harbor he wouldn't show the sea service on his record. When he, came up for selection he would be passed over and he would not get his promotion.

Mr. KEEFE. All right, Captain, I will betray my ignorance some bait I want to know about it. You say it is the law, that is a congressional act. Do you understand into be a law of Congress?

Captain LAYTON. Maybe I overstepped—

Mr. KEEFE. Or a rule or regulation of the Navy?

Captain LAYTON. I think that is, you might say, a law by doctrine. I can say only that I am not prepared to give testimony of that sort.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, this committee is bound to make some recommendations to the Congress and if that is the law I would like to know about it. If it is a law passed by the Congress governing the Army axed Navy, that is one thing, but if it is a rule and regulation and practice and tradition of the service, that is another thing.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Will you yield there?

Mr. KEEFE. Yes.

[12961]

The VICE CHAIRMAN. My recollection is Admiral Stark testified here that it is a law passed by Congress.

Captain LAYTON. He is in a much better position to know than I, Sir. I have been doing nothing but intelligence work for a long time and I haven't paid any attention to the regulations other than that pertain to intelligence and I must confess my ignorance on that subject.

Mr. KEEFE. On the other side of the picture we are confronted with a situation where you take a man off a ship who is an outstanding line officer and drag him into Washington to head up the Naval Intelligence Service 1 month before Pearl Harbor.

 

4862 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

 

Captain LAYTON. It is true that—

Mr. KEEFE. A man that never had any previous experience in the field of intelligence. That is the other side of the picture.

 Captain LAYTON. I believe it is true, sir, that intelligence as a line of endeavor with the Navy has not been in the past thoroughly appreciated. I believe as a result of this war, however, there is a very high appreciation among many of the high‑ranking officers and certainly those who were at sea in commanding task forces would value that intelligence during this war, both in the Atlantic and the Pacific.

[12962]

Mr. KEEFE. Well, the reason for my asking those questions is in line with some that have been asked heretofore, that it is quite difficult for me to understand, when we spent the money that has been spent by the United States Government in training people as Japanese language experts—you have been trained as a Japanese language expert; is that correct?

Captain LAYTON. I trained as Japanese‑language expert and was also assistant naval attaché.

Mr. KEEFE. So you would be competent in the field of intelligence, isn't that true, in the Pacific area?

Captain LAYTON. I believe that is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, the evidence here is that they had such limited numbers of people in the Navy to do this sort of work, and yet it is the most outstanding type of work and most necessary work, perhaps, that has to be done, and I came to the impression that the men would sort of shy away from it because when their name comes up for selection they know when they are in intelligence they get passed up.

I don't know whether this committee will do anything about it or riot, but it may desire to make some recommendation to the Congress, or to the Navy with reference to that.

That is why I asked these questions, because I have been impressed with the fact that there is a lot of work that could [12963] have been better coordinated in this field of intelligence prior to Pearl Harbor.

That is all.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Captain, let me ask you a question or two, if I may, please, sir.

You were the fleet intelligence officer at Pearl Harbor on the 1st of December 1941?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, Sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And had been or a year or more?

Captain LAYTON. I reported on December 7, 1940, 1 year to a day before the attack.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And as I understood you to say, you were not present at the staff meetings that were held about the war‑warning message.

Captain LAYTON. I was not an active member. I walked into the admiral's cabin during the process of these meetings to show him the paraphrase of the war‑warning message that I had drawn up to deliver to General Short and to receive his approval of this paraphrase.

I was in there while the chief of staff of the Fourteenth Naval District brought in General Short's warning message that he received from the War Department, and I remained there while there was a discussion among other staff members of this.

 

PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE  4863

 

[12964] 

I was not directly asked to and I did not venture an opinion.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You did not give any opinion?

Captain LAYTON. At that time, I did not feel it was proper, sir.

I do not think I could have added anything to the opinions already being given, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Then you did not attend and participate?

Captain LAYTON. No, Sir, I did not attend and participate. I was an intruder.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You did not participate in the staff meeting with respect to the war‑warning message?

Captain LAYTON. That is right, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, what messages were in Washington that you did not have at Pearl Harbor that would have caused you to anticipate the attack on Pearl Harbor?

Captain LAYTON. I did not want to give the impression that by afterthought and hindsight I could look at a book of these messages and pick out some and show them to you, and state what they would have meant to me. Offhand, I think the bomb plot would have been important. I am sure the messages that were passed in the latter part of November from Kita, the consul in Honolulu, to Tokyo, plus the [12965] request from Togo to Kita for information on our fleet moving in and out, plus a message I have seen about, I believe, balloon barrages were not being used, I think were all important.

I have not gone over Exhibit 1, sir. I have not read it in detail. I merely have heard these things here in this room and have been impressed. I did read some of the messages that are now in Exhibit 1, 2 years after Pearl Harbor, when I first learned that they had them.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Are you familiar with the list of messages listed in Admiral Kimmel's statement to this committee?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, Sir; I read that statement, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You read his statement?

Captain LAYTON. I have read his statement; yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Before he presented it here?

Captain LAYTON. No, Sir; I read the statement about, oh, about a month ago, I think, sir, and again 3 or 4 days ago.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I see.

Now, of those messages listed by him as being important, that he should have had in Hawaii, do you agree with him in his conclusion in that respect?

Captain LAYTON. I agree with the statements that he made there regarding these messages, yes, sir. I think it [12966] would have assisted considerably. I think probably, as I recall it, the one from Berlin outlining the conversations that had been held with Ribbentrop and Hitler, and the one from Rome in which the Japanese Ambassador outlined his conversation with Mussolini, they clearly indicated that the Axis were talking to one another regarding a war with the Anglo‑Saxons, which was then very imminent.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Would any of those messages listed by Admiral Kimmel indicate an attack on Pearl Harbor?

Captain LAYTON. I do not believe any of them would have indicated definitely an attack on Pearl Harbor, unless you take them all

 

4864 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

 

together, and discover that Pearl Harbor is the only geographical location in all the magic intercepts wherein there was increasing interest along toward the latter part of November, keeping in mind the information we had from intercepts of their traffic, which indicated also a naval interest.

It is another one of these things. I cannot say now that I would have been able to say, "Admiral they are going to take Pearl Harbor." I did not mean to give that impression.

I mean to say it was a sort of jigsaw puzzle, that, when fitted together, fell into a common pattern.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It is a fact, Captain, that none of [12967] the messages mentioned by Admiral Kimmel in his statement, except the so‑called bomb‑plot message refers to Pearl Harbor. Is that true?

Captain LAYTON. I would have to review the statement very carefully to make a definite answer.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You do not recall now?

Captain LAYTON. I do not recall now, but I thought there were a couple that referred to the movement of ships in and out., or the anchorage of ships, that referred to area C, and area A, Malama Harbor.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It is my recollection of all the list of messages mentioned by Admiral Kimmel in his statement, none of them referred to Pearl arbor, except the so‑called bomb‑plot message.

Mr. GEARHART. Will the gentleman yield?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. GEARHART. There were five or six messages that had to do with the ships' movements to which the witness just referred. There was one message dividing Pearl Harbor into five areas.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That is the so‑called bomb‑plot message.

Mr. GEARHART. And other messages calling for reports on ship movements, and calling upon Honolulu for reports [12968] even when there were no ship‑movement messages.

Captain LAYTON. Those are the ones I referred to, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The so‑called bomb‑plot message is the one dividing Pearl Harbor into five areas. You are familiar with that?

Captain LAYTON. I recall having seen that here; yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. My recollection is that is the only one that directly refers to Pearl Harbor, and I believe you substantially agree with me in that respect.

Captain LAYTON. Except those that refer to the movements in and out of Pearl Harbor; yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, Captain you say you kept the Army officials in Pearl Harbor completely advised as to all the intelligence you had?

Captain LAYTON. I do not believe I said that, Senator. I said that I kept Colonel Raley of the Hawaiian Air Force, who established Army liaison with me rather fully informed as to the general situation and as to some of the details of the Japanese task force, its movements, and its implications. I did not for a minute intend to say that I had contacts with General Fielder, then Colonel Fielder. I stated in my affidavit to Colonel Clausen that inasmuch as [12969] Colonel Raley was an Army liaison, I saw no reason to establish a liaison with

 

PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE  4865

 

Fielder, and if Fielder for 1 minute was not satisfied with what he was getting from Washington—and I did not know that he was getting anything, or nothing—then, he could certainly establish liaison with me.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Who was your opposite number in the Army in Pearl Harbor?

Captain LAYTON. May I take a minute to explain what the intelligence functions were? I think I can rather straighten out a little doubt in the minds of the committee.

When I joined there, we were afloat. It had been the habitual practice and doctrine in the Navy that when the fleet desires liaison with shore‑based authorities, whether they be public or private services, or the Army or the FBI, we made this liaison through the naval district intelligence officer in the place where we were.

My liaison through the Army official was, therefore, through Captain Mayfield, the district intelligence officer at Honolulu who was attached to Admiral Bloch's organization.

There were meetings between the Army and. FBI and himself every week or more. I attended one of them shortly after I reported, just to let them know I was there, and to say [12970] that I was willing to cooperate in all matters. But for anyone to imply that I had to search out and find an opposite number, or that the G‑2 of the Hawaiian Department should be dependent upon me for sources of information, is rather unusual, for the simple reason the Army and Navy in Washington have close agreement, and have worked in close liaison for years in intelligence, that the Navy passed it down and disclosed it to the Army and the Army disclosed it to the Navy, and in case there was an occasion in which we wanted to consult one another in the field, we consulted then with each other in the field.

Now, it is doctrine in the Army that if you do not know, and the same applies to the Navy, that if you do not know what you have, or that you want more than you already have, then you go and ask somebody else for it.

Had Colonel Fielder come to me and said, "I want some information," I could give him the same amount in a paraphrased form without revealing the source, had I had Admiral Kimmel's permission. He did not do so.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. So you did not give it to him?

Captain LAYTON. Well, he not being there I could not very well give it to him, sir.

Mr. VICE CHAIRMAN. All right.

Was Colonel Fielder your opposite number in the Army?

[12971]

Captain LAYTON. I would not say he was my opposite number in the Army, because the fleet might move from Pearl Harbor, say to San Francisco, for example, and then my opposite over there would be another person.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right; I just want to try to get to the point and not take up too much time.

You were the intelligence officer of the Pacific Fleet?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Who was the intelligence officer of the Hawaiian Department of the Army?

 

4866 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

 

Captain LAYTON. Colonel Field, then Colonel Fielder.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Was he your opposite number?

Captain LAYTON. He was the opposite number of the commandant Fourteenth Naval District intelligence organization.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Did you have an opposite number in the Army?

Captain LAYTON. No, Sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You did not?

Captain LAYTON. I did not.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. There was not anybody in the Army that you were supposed to cooperate with, so far as intelligence is concerned?

Captain LAYTON. I would not want to use the word "cooperate," sir. I would cooperate with him any minute. It [12972] is a question of delineation of the line of command and authority.

Suppose the Army had set up on Oahu an amphibious force to go to sea and land on some island in accordance with the war plan, then the G‑2 of that organization would be my opposite number, and not the G‑2 of a local defense garrison.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. So you did not have any opposite number in the Army?

Captain LAYTON. I did not have any opposite number in the Army in the strict sense of the word, no, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Then you were in the same position as Captain Rochefort when he testified here, that he did not give the information he had to the Army officials, but he sometimes gave it to them in paraphrased form, or changed, sanitized form, I believe he said.

Is that the practice you used?

Captain LAYTON. I gave it to Colonel Raley in the so‑called sanitized form. He never knew the source of information, and he was requested not to ask and promised never to ask.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You gave it sanitized form, as did Captain Rochefort?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

[12973]

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, Captain, you of course saw the message of November 24 from the Chief of Naval Operations to the commander in chief, Pacific Fleet.

Captain LAYTON. Yes; Sir; and Admiral Kimmel ordered me to take that to General Short in person, which I did.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You, of course, were entirely familiar with that message?

Captain LAYTON. I was, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Did not that give you sufficient knowledge about strained relations between the United States and Japan?

Captain LAYTON. It did, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Then you also saw the war warning message of November 27 ?

Captain LAYTON. I did; sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You have testified that that was different in form from any message that you had ever seen.

Captain LAYTON. The, words "This is a war warning" were a shock to me, to see it written down. I never saw anything like it before, and I was impressed by it.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You were impressed by it?

 

PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE  4867

 

Captain LAYTON. Yes, Sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You considered it to be just what it said, a war warning?

[12974] 

Captain LAYTON. It was just exactly that, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, you did not consider that an unusual expression, "This is a war warning"?

Captain LAYTON. I thought that was very unusual. I never saw anything like it before.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It impressed you as such?

Captain LAYTON. Very much so, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. There was not anything following in that message that nullified that impression in your mind, was there?

Captain LAYTON. I would not say there was anything in that message that nullified that impression. It certainly gave me the idea that the Department in Washington had the same concept of the situation that we had, insofar as they said Japan was going to make an amphibious invasion in the future on the same places that we thought, the Philippines.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Guam

Captain LAYTON. No, Sir; Guam was not mentioned in the war warning message, sir. The Philippines, Thailand, Malaya, possibly N. E. I. or possibly Borneo, I believe it was remarked at the time that Guam was left out of the second one, while it was mentioned in the first one. One person facetiously remarked, "I guess they thought Guam was going to fall anyway, so it would not be worth while to put it in."

[12975]

The VICE CHAIRMAN: The Philippines were in the message of the 24th?

Captain LAYTON. Yes; Sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Did you hear Admiral Hart's testimony here today?

Captain LAYTON. I did, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. He thought that meant all the addressees should be watching and on guard, and that the Philippines and Guam should take special note.

Captain LAYTON. I heard the distinguished Admiral's testimony; yes, sir.

 The VICE CHAIRMAN. I see.

Did you agree with the interpretation that he placed on it?

Captain LAYTON. Well, I was not able to agree wholly; judging today from hindsight, I would say "Yes."

At that time I was concerned, as I said, with the picture before me, with what they said, and it was so definitely related to the Far East and it was so easy to put in there, if they had any suspicion of Hawaii, "Hawaii," that the thought of Hawaii did not then occur to me.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I see.

Well, you don't know of anybody in Washington or in Hawaii that actually expected the attack on Pearl Harbor [12976] that Sunday morning, December 7, 1941, did you?

Captain LAYTON. No, sir; and if I did, I would certainly shake his hand, because he would be a good guesser.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You do not know anybody either in Washington or Hawaii that expected that attack?

 

4868 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

 

Captain LAYTON. No, Sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Will the gentleman yield?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. GEARHART. Even the man who wrote it never expected war to come in Hawaii, so he could not convey to you a different impression than he had himself. Would you expect him to?

Captain LAYTON, It is standard naval procedure that when you tell a man something, you tell him what you are thinking and try to project that thought into his mind.

Mr. GEARHART. Then the correct interpretation of such a message is interpreting what he had intended to convey?

Captain LAYTON. Reading the words he put there and trying, without any great mental gymnastics, to put your mind in the same frame his mind was in when he wrote it; had he wanted to put Hawaii in he would have put Hawaii in, I am sure, if he was thinking of it.

Mr. GEARHART. That is correct. And since that time we have had the man on the stand who wrote the message, and [12977] he said that he was surprised that war came to Hawaii, and therefore he could not attempt to convey to you the impression that he was not taken greatly by surprise.

Does not that sound logical?

Captain LAYTON. That sounds logical to me, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator Lucas of Illinois will inquire, Captain.

Senator LUCAS. Captain, one or two questions with respect to the so‑called bomb‑plot message. You said hindsight leads you to believe that the Japs were talking about Pearl Harbor when they sent that message from the standpoint of an attack.

Can you read into that message any other thing that they were talking about, leaving hindsight out?

Captain LAYTON. Leaving hindsight out you can always look into a message and find something that is different from your first impression.

It is typical of the Japanese that they desire to keep meticulous records on everybody, whether he is a friend or an enemy.

Senator LUCAS. In other words, leaving hindsight out of the picture, an individual who was working in the intelligence department, either in Washington or Hawaii, in view of the many messages that they had had of a similar nature, [12978] that you just discussed, could very well have easily reached the conclusion that you just have stated?

Captain LAYTON. Anyone reading that message at the time they did, which I believe was sometime around September, was it not, sir?

Senator LUCAS. I think September 24.

Captain LAYTON (continuing): Around September, at that time, could have made the very logical mistake of seeing it only as a Japanese flair for listing information, and particularly on the United States Pacific Fleet, since we were based there, since April 1940, they wanted to know how many ships were there, when they went in and when they went out.

I think the word "bomb‑plot" message has been applied here.

[12979]

Senator LUCAS, That is correct, it has.

 

PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE  4869

 

Captain LAYTON. I do not intend to insinuate for one minute that had I had it I would have known what their intention was. I only say had we had that, and some other information, there would at least have grown in our minds a suspicion that something was stirring, that was growing right under our feet.

Senator LUCAS. You are correct in saying the term "bomb‑plot" has been applied in this hearing. I think General Mitchell is the one who first used the term.

The situation you have described was especially true, and it became more true as time went on. In other words, from September 23 to December 7 is some two months and a half. Every day that passed after that bomb‑plot message the so‑called bomb‑plot message, without any action on the part of the Japanese might indicate more definitely that they were asking for ship movements and other things that they were used to asking for without thinking about an attack. I mean the longer they put it off the more the chances for Intelligence, as you have suggested. Am I correct in that?

Captain LAYTON. I believe what you said to be correct; yes, sir. I do not think I am capable of commenting on it.

Senator LUCAS. Now, Captain, with respect to magic, you [12980] could translate out there, as I understand it, PA‑K2.

Captain LAYTON. That is out of my field, sir. I had nothing to do with Commander Rochefort's unit, in its mechanics.

Senator LUCAS. I understand. Captain Rochefort testified before the committee that they could translate that code.

Captain LAYTON. Yes, Sir; I heard his testimony, sir.

Senator LUCAS. They could translate messages that were sent in the code known as PA‑K2. Now, in Exhibit 2, on page 22, is a message from Honolulu to Tokyo, dated December 3, 1941, which, as I understand, went out in that code, and which I understand Commander Rochefort could have decoded and translated if he had made an arrangement with the cable office, but did not do that. Can you tell the committee why no arrangement was made with the cable office there in Hawaii so that they would have been able to intercept this message?

Captain LAYTON. I believe Captain Rochefort testified, and from my point of view, as far as I know the side lights of it, it is correct, that his directive from the Chief of Naval Operations, under which he directly worked, was the interception of Japanese naval radio traffic; that he was told to work on certain Japanese naval codes and ciphers; [12981] that he was directed to pass other material to Washington. Now, if Washington were not receiving these intercepts, then it would be up to Washington to tell Rochefort to make these arrangements, or it would be up to Washington to make them themselves.

As I understand it, these were cabled. Now you can sit in here and you can intercept a Japanese radio transmission and not violate the laws of the United States.

Maybe I am wrong, but that is the way I understand it, but you sit down and tap that cable and you get a $10,000 fine and 10 dears in jail.

Senator LUCAS. Is it not a fact that the Navy were tapping the communication lines or the telephone lines of the Japs for 22 straight months there?

 

4870 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

 

Captain LAYTON. I did not know the district Intelligence officer was tapping the lines. I did not know until I read it here in the committee. I did not want to know, incidentally.

Senator LUCAS. How is that?

Captain LAYTON. I did not want to know. Had I known it it would have been my responsibility to have reported it to Admiral Kimmel, and then he would have had the responsibility of directing that either this be approved by the authorities in Washington or be discontinued. It was against [12982] the law, and that is a Federal statute.

Senator LUCAS. I understand. It is a very strange thing to me that the district Intelligence officer could tap the Japanese telephone lines for 22 straight months and then on December 2, because of some information he received about the FBI doing the same thing, right at that particular time, the Navy, at the height of the crisis, stopped the work of tapping these confidential communications.

Captain LAYTON. I cannot account for Captain Mayfield's action, but had it been I, I might have pulled the tap for fear the FBI would pull it out for me, and give me a $10,000 fine, or 10 years in jail.

They were not caught until the 2d or 3d of December, and then they pulled the tap.

Senator LUCAS. It is very strange to me that the FBI could violate the law.

Captain LAYTON. They may have had clearance from some high authority. I do not know, sir. I cannot comment on that matter.

Senator LUCAS. Captain, do you know Captain Bicknell?

Captain LAYTON. Colonel Bicknell, you meant

Senator LUCAS. Colonel Bicknell.

Captain LAYTON. Yes, Sir; I met him in Pearl Harbor. I think I met him down in Captain Mayfield's office at one [12983] of their weekly meetings.

Senator LUCAS. Are you familiar with the Mori message, so‑called?

Captain LAYTON. My only connection with the Mori message—and I only learned of it here about a year ago—is on the evening of December 6, Captain Mayfield called me in and asked me if I was going to the office the next day.

I told him I expected to. He asked me if I would stop down in his office on the way down. I lived to the east of Honolulu. I asked him if there was anything I could do, and he said:

 

No, there is nothing you can do here because I haven't got the material, and I won't have it until tomorrow morning, but I would like to have you stop in here because I have something that I want your opinion on.

 

That is the last I ever heard of the so‑called Mori message.

Senator LUCAS. What night was that?

Captain LAYTON. The night of December 6, 1941. As you know, the next morning the attack came. Then I next heard about it, as I recall, at the naval court of inquiry, when they asked me about it. I did not know what it was until they quizzed me about it, and then I thought that must be the circumstance.

Senator LUCAS. What happened that you did not see him [12984] on the night of the 6th ?

Captain LAYTON. He told me he did not have the material and would not have it until the next morning, and did not therefore desire that I come down there until the neat morning.

 

PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE  4871

 

Senator LUCAS. Why would he call you if he did not have the material?

Captain LAYTON. He merely wanted to ascertain that I would be coming down the next day. He was informed apparently of the existence of this.

Senator LUCAS. Bicknell, in affidavit before Colonel Clausen, said he called General Fielder on the telephone and he said he had a very important message, and he had to deliver it to him.

Captain LAYTON. That illustrates my point awhile ago regarding the opposite numbers in liaison.

Mine was through Captain Mayfield. He called me in the evening about 6 o'clock and said, as I said before, he wanted to know if I was going to the office the following day, and I said I was, and he asked would I stop by, and I said I would.

I asked could I come down now, was there anything I could do. He said "no," that he did not have the material at that time, and would not have it until the next morning, but would I please stop by tomorrow morning because he had [12985] something he wanted my opinion on.

Senator LUCAS. And you learned after that that this was the Mori message?

Captain LAYTON. I did not learn until the next year that it was actually the Mori message.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What message was it that he was talking about?

Captain LAYTON. He did not say. He just said he had something that he wanted to talk to me about.

Mr. RICHARDSON. When you found out later, what was the message?

Captain LAYTON. I believe the judge advocate before the naval court of inquiry asked me, when I was called, if I knew something about the Mori message, and I said, "No, I never heard of it."

Mr. RICHARDSON. What message?

Captain LAYTON. M‑o‑r‑i, the Mori message.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. What message was Mayfield calling you about? .

Captain LAYTON. That was the same thing. It was only when I talked to the judge advocate and denied knowing anything about it, and he said, "Mayfield called you the night before?"

I said, "Yes," and he said, "Well, that was the Mori [12986] message that you heard on the radiotelephone," or something to that effect.

Senator LUCAS. Captain, one of the things that has puzzled me throughout the hearing is the fact that the Navy did not know that General Short was alerted only to sabotage.

Will you throw, or can you throw, any light on it.

Captain LAYTON. I did not know that either, sir.

I saw these troops move, I saw the trucks moving, I thought I saw weapons, and my first instinct was that they were in an alert the same as we were.

I did not ask my friend, Colonel Raley, either, what kind of an alert they were in.

I knew an alert had gone out, and I presumed it was the highest state of alert.

Senator Lucas. Why did you make that assumption?

 

4872 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

 

Captain LAYTON. The words, "This is a war warning" were pretty well impressed on my mind. When I got home that evening I was still thinking about it, and it impressed me very much.

Senator LUCAS. In other words, when you saw the troops moving—

Captain LAYTON. That was on my way home, sir.

Senator LUCAS (continuing). You did not realize it was a sabotage alert. You thought they were alerted because [12987] of the war warning message that came in on the 27th?

Captain LAYTON. That is correct, sir. I delivered the messages that evening, and I was a little late with the message to General Short. When I went home I saw the trucks and troops, and I saw the weapons moving, and I came to the conclusion, a natural one, too, that they were on the alert.

Senator LUCAS. Can you give this committee any basic reason as to why the Navy and the Army should not have closer liaison upon such an important problem as that?

Captain LAYTON. I do not believe I am qualified to state as to why.

Senator LUCAS. Probably you are not. For instance, Admiral Smith, who was the chief of staff on Admiral Kimmel's force, testified that he did not know that Short's army was on the alert for sabotage. He thought, as you have testified, that they were on a full alert, because he saw them on that same day moving troops here and there.

Now, there is something that seems to be radically wrong.

After all these war warning messages came in, one after another, it seems to me radically wrong that the Navy would not know what the Army was doing, in view of the fact it was the Army's duty to defend the fleet in Pearl Harbor. [12988] , I am riot censuring you at all, sir, but nobody in the Navy has testified here, not even Kimmel himself, that he absolutely knew that the Army was not on a full alert.

Captain LAYTON. I can only offer this, Senator, and this is another Army and Navy custom of long standing.

If you pry into what another man is doing, he naturally resents it. He thinks he is capable of doing his own job.

Senator LUCAS. I can appreciate that.

Captain LAYTON. I think that is the only reason that someone did not go to the Army and ask what kind of alert they were on, and it is just the reason that the Army did not come to the Navy and ask what kind of alert we had on the ships in Pearl Harbor.

Senator LUCAS. I can appreciate that. This fleet was the most precious possession that we had in the Pacific, and under that joint agreement it was the duty of the Army to defend that fleet when it was in Pearl Harbor from a landing attack or an air raid. To me, it is inexcusable, unbelievable, that Short and Kimmel would not have a definite understanding with respect to what the other one was doing.

I have never been able to understand why Kimmel and all his chiefs of staff and other subordinates would not have known that Short was on a sabotage alert, alert No. 1, [12989] in view of the crisis pending.

That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It is now 5 o'clock, so we will suspend until 8 o'clock this evening.

 

PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE  4873

 

(Whereupon, at 5 p. m., the committee recessed, to reconvene at 8 p. m. of the same day.)

[12990]

 

(Captain Layton's testimony resumes on page 4878.  The material here is presented to show that there have been no deletions in the original text.  LWJ.)

 

EVENING SESSION‑8 P. M.

 

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The committee will please be in order.

Does counsel have something at this point?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, I have two certifications both from the War Department.

The first one is a memorandum furnishing to me at my request the number of patrol planes delivered by the United States between February 1 and December 7, 1941, under lend‑lease. Also a memorandum under date of February 14 furnishing to me at my request the lend‑lease figures on antiaircraft guns delivered under lend‑lease from February 1 to December 7.

I would like to have these memoranda extended on the record in the usual and regular way.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It will be so ordered.

Senator GEORGE. Delivered to whom, Mr. Richardson?

Mr. GEARHART. Mr. Chairman, about this—

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Just a moment.

Senator GEORGE. Delivered to whom?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, the exhibit names and identifies the various countries who got the planes and who got the guns.

Senator GEORGE. Oh, it is a general statement then?

Mr. RICHARD. It is a general statement indicating that, for instance—

Senator FERGUSON. What was the total?

[12991]

Mr. RICHARDSON. Between February 1 and December 1 in round figures there were 1,900 planes that went abroad, of which about 1,750 went to the British. Then of guns, interestingly enough, there were about 1,900 antiaircraft guns under lend‑lease, of which some 1,500 went to the British.

Mr. MURPHY. That is from the 1st of the year 1941 to what date?

Mr. RICHARDSON. From the 1st of February to the 1st of December 1941.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It will be so received as requested by counsel.

(The documents referred to follow:)

 

WAR DEPARTMENT

 

WASHINGTON

 

4 D757

 

THE PENTAGON, 12 February 1946.

 

Memorandum for Mr. Richardson

Reference is made to your memorandum of 31 January 1946 asking for the number of patrol planes and antiaircraft guns delivered by the United States between 1 February and 7 December 1941 to countries subsequently allied with the United States.

Enclosed herewith is a table, based on information sup‑ [12992] plied by the Army Air Forces Office of Statistical Control, showing the number of bombers usable as patrol planes which were delivered at the factory to foreign countries (a) between 1 February and 30 November 1941 and (b) in December 1941. Information concerning such deliveries for the period 1 to 7 December 1941 is not

 

4874 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

 

presently available in the War Department and search of field records will be necessary if that information is desired.

A search of War Department records relating to deliveries of antiaircraft guns to foreign countries is still in process; when that search is completed, any pertinent information obtained will be promptly forwarded.

 

(Signed)  HARMON DUNCOMBE,

Lt. Colonel, GSC.

 


 

U. S. Factory Deliveries of Bombers to Foreign Countries, 1 February to 30 November and 1‑31 December 1941

 

 

[12993]

 

 

 

 

Number

Type

Description

Recipient

1 Feb-30

Nov 41

1-31 Dec. 41

B-17

AAF Heavy Bomber 4-eng

British Empire

20

 

B-24

AAF Heavy Bomber 4-eng

British Empire

98

3

B-25

AAF Medium Bomber 2-eng

Latin America

3

3

B-25

 

British Empire

 

14

B-25

 

U.S.S.R.

5

 

PBY

Navy Patrol Bomber 2-eng

British Empire

129

25

PBY

 

Netherlands

36

 

A-20

AAF Light Bomber 2-eng

British Empire

455

 

A-20

 

Netherlands

29

 

A-20

 

U.S.S.R.

79

2

A-28/29

AAF Light Bomber 2-eng

British Empire

800

49

A-28/29

 

China

 

17

A-30

AAF Light Bomber 2-eng

British Empire

78

58

       167

—AAF Light Bomber 2-eng

British Empire

90

 

A-27

AAF Light Bomber 1-eng

Latin America

10

 

V-12

AAF Light Bomber 1-eng

China.

1

 

SA

Navy Light Bomber 1-eng

Norway

2

 

SB2U

Navy Light Bomber 1-eng

British Empire

50

 

N3PB 

Navy Light Bomber 1-eng

Norway

24

 

 

Total

 

1,904

171

 

[12994]

 

WAR DEPARTMENT,

Washington, 14 February 1946.

 

Memorandum for Mr. Richardson:

Your memorandum of 31 January 1846 asked for the number of patrol planes and anti‑aircraft guns delivered by the United States between 1 February and 7 December 1841 to countries subsequently allied with the United States. On 12 February this office forwarded information from the War Department files showing factory deliveries to foreign countries between 1 February and 31‑December 1941 of bombers usable as patrol planes.

In further response to your request, there is transmitted herewith a memorandum signed by the Director of the International Division, Army Service Forces, on transfers of antiaircraft weapons prior to 7 December 1941. This office has been advised by the International Division that the transfers listed in the memorandum were made after 11 March 1941, the effective date of the Lend‑Lease act, and were all a part of lend‑lease except for the transfer to the Netherlands East Indies, which was pursuant to a commercial contract.

(Signed)  HARMON DUNCOMBE,

Lt. Colonel, GSC.

 


 

[12995]

Restricted

 

HEADQUARTERS ARMY SERVICE FORCES,

Washington, 25, D. C., Feb. 11 1946.

 

SPLIX 400.318

 

Memorandum for the Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations Division, W. D. G. S.

Attention: Major John C. Catlin

Subject: Anti‑aircraft Weapons Transferred to Lend‑Lease Countries Prior to December 1841.

1. Reference is made to telephone request of Major John C. Catlin of your office for information regarding anti‑aircraft weapons transferred to Lend‑Lease countries prior to 7 December 2841,

 

PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE  4875

 

2. The records of this office indicate that the following anti‑aircraft weapons were transferred to the countries noted.

 

United Kingdom:

                                                   Quantity

Machine Gun, 50 Cal. w/c A. A. ......................  1520

Gun, 3", AA, Mobile .................................    18

 

Russia:

 

Gun, 90 mm, AA, Mobile ..............................     4

 

China:

 

Machine Gun, 50 Cal. w/c A. A. ......................   285

 

[12996]  Netherlands East Indies:

 

Gun, 3 , A. A. Mobile ...............................    80

(Procured by Netherlands East Indies on their own contract.)

 

For the Commanding General:

 

D. G. SHINGLER,

Brigadier General, G. S. C.

Director, International Division

 

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. If we area going into part of lend‑lease questions in this record and in view of references made by counsel, I ask that a copy of the Lend‑Lease Act be inserted in the record and the date of its passage and a statement as to the organization which was set up by this Government for the purpose of determining what distribution should be made under lend‑lease and what officials were responsible for such distribution.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It will be so ordered.

( The text of the Lend‑Lease Act follows:) [1]

 

[12996‑A].  

 

[PUBLIC LAW 11‑77TH CONGRESS]

 

[CHAPTER 11‑1st SESSION]

 

[H. R. 1778]

 

AN ACT Further to promote the defense of the United Staten, and for other purposes

 

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That this Act may be cited as "An Act to Promote the Defense of the United States".

SEC. 2. As used in this Act—

(a) The term "defense article" means—

(1) Any weapon, munition, aircraft, vessel, or boat;

(2) Any machinery, facility, tool, material, or supply necessary for the manufacture, production, processing, repair, servicing, or operation of any article described in this subsection;

(3) Any component material or part of or equipment for any article described in this subsection;

(4) Any agricultural, industrial or other commodity or article for defense. Such term "defense article" includes any article described in this subsection: Manufactured or procured pursuant to section 3, or to which the United States or any foreign government has or hereafter acquires title, possession, or control.

(b) The term "defense information" means any plan, specification, design, prototype, or information pertaining to any defense article.

SEC. 3. (a) Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law, the President may, from time to time, when he deems it in the interest of national defense, authorize the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, or the head of any other department or agency of the Government—

(1) To manufacture in arsenals, factories, and shipyards under their jurisdiction, or otherwise procure, to the extent to which funds are made available therefor, or contracts are authorized from time to time by the Congress, or both, any defense article for the government of any country whose defense the President deems vital to the defense of the United States.

(2) To sell, transfer title to, exchange, lease, lend, or otherwise dispose


[1] See Hearings, Part 11, p. 5305 et seq. for a letter on the operations of lend‑lease.

 

4876 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

 

of, to any such government any defense article, but no defense article not manufactured or procured under paragraph (1) shall in any way be disposed of under this paragraph, except after consultation with the Chief of Staff of the Army or the Chief of Naval Operations of the Navy, or both. The value of defense articles disposed of in any way under authority of this paragraph, and procured from funds heretofore appropriated, shall not exceed $1,300,000,000. The value of such defense articles [12996-B] shall be determined by the head of the department or agency concerned or such other department, agency or officer as shall be designated in the manner provided in the rules and regulations issued hereunder. Defense articles procured from funds hereafter appropriated to any department or agency of the Government, other than from funds authorized to be appropriated under this Act, shall not be disposed of in any way under authority of this paragraph except to the extent hereafter authorized by the Congress in the Acts appropriating such funds or otherwise.

(3) To test, inspect, prove, repair, outfit, recondition, or otherwise to place in good working order, to the extent to which funds are made available therefor, or contracts are authorized from time to time by the Congress, or both, any defense article for any such government, or to procure any or all such services by private contract.

(4) To communicate to any such government any defense information, pertaining to any defense article furnished to such government under paragraph (2) of this subsection.

(5) To release for export any defense article disposed of in any way under this subsection to any such government.

(b) The terms and conditions upon which any such foreign government receives any aid authorized under subsection (a) shall be those which the President deems satisfactory, and the benefit to the United States may be payment or repayment in kind or property, or any other direct or indirect benefit which the President deems satisfactory.

(c) After June 30, 1943, or after the passage of concurrent resolution by the two Houses before June 30, 1943, which declares that the powers conferred by or pursuant to subsection (a) are no longer necessary to promote the defense of the United States, neither the President nor the head of any department or agency shall exercise any of the powers conferred by or pursuant to subsection (a); except that until July 1, 1946, any of such powers may be exercised to the extent necessary to carry out a contract or agreement with such a foreign government made before July 1, 1943, or before the passage of such concurrent resolution, whichever is the earlier.

(d) Nothing in this Act shall be construed to authorize or to permit the authorization of convoying vessels by naval vessels of the United States.

(e) Nothing in this Act shall be construed to authorize or to permit the authorization of the entry of any American vessel into a combat area in violation of section 3 of the Neutrality Act of 1939.

SEC. 4. All contracts or agreements made for the disposition of any defense article or defense information pursuant to section 2 shall contain a clause by which the foreign government undertakes that it will not, without the consent of the President, transfer title to or possession of such defense article or defense information by gift, sale, or otherwise, or permit its use by anyone not an officer, employee, or agent of such foreign government.

SEC. 5. (a) The Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, or the head of any other department or agency of the Government involved shall, when any such defense article or defense information is exported, immediately inform the department or agency designated [12996‑C] by the President to administer section 6 of the Act of July 2,1940 (54 Stat. 714), of the quantities, character, value, terms of disposition, and destination of the article and information so exported.

(b) The President from time to time, but not less frequently than once every ninety days, shall transmit to the Congress a report of operations under this Act except such information as he deems incompatible with the public interest to disclose. Reports provided for under this subsection shall be transmitted to the Secretary of the Senate or the Clerk of the House of Representatives, as the case may be, if the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, is not in session.

SEC. 6. (a) There is hereby authorized to be appropriated from time to time, out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, such amounts as may be necessary to carry out the provisions and accomplish the purposes of this Act.

 

PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE  4877

 

(b) All money and all property which is converted into money received under section 3 from any government shall, with the approval of the Director of the Budget, revert to the respective appropriation or appropriations out of which funds were expended with respect to the defense article or defense information for which such consideration is received, and shall be available for expenditure for the purpose for which such expended funds were appropriated by law, during the fiscal year in which such funds are received and the ensuing fiscal year; but in no event shall any funds so received be available for expenditure after June 30, 1946.

SEC. 7. The Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, and the head of the department or agency shall in all contracts or agreements for the disposition of any defense article or defense information fully protect the rights of all citizens of the United States who have patent rights in and to any such article or information which is hereby authorized to be disposed of and the payments collected for royalties on such patents shall be paid to the owners and holders of such patents.

SEC. 8. The Secretaries of War and of the Navy are hereby authorized to purchase or otherwise acquire arms, ammunition and implements of war produced within the jurisdiction of any country to which section 3 is applicable, whenever the President deems such purchase or acquisition to be necessary in the interests of the defense of the United States.

SEC. 9. The President may, from time to time, promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary and proper to carry out any of the provisions of this Act; and he may exercise any power or authority conferred on him by this Act through such department, agency, or officer as he shall direct.

SEC. 10. Nothing in this Act shall be construed to change existing law relating to the use of the land and naval forces of the United States, except insofar as such use relates to the manufacture, procurement, and repair of defense articles, the communication of information and other noncombatant purposes enumerated in this Act.

SEC. 11. If any provision of this Act or the application of such provision to any circumstance shall be held invalid, the validity of the remainder of the Act and the applicability of such provision to other circumstances shall not be affected thereby.

Approved, March 11, 1941.

 

[12997] 

 

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Gearhart, do you have some thing?

Mr. GEARHART. Mr. Chairman, the question that I wanted to ask was precisely the one that was propounded by the Senator from Michigan.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right. Does counsel have anything else?

Mr. RICHARDSON. No.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Captain, do you have any statement you desire to make before your examination is resumed?

Captain LAYTON. No, Sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Then Senator Ferguson of Michigan will inquire.

Senator FERGUSON. Do we have on this record, Mr. Richardson, the amount of planes that went to Hawaii and the Philippines during this same period and the amount of antiaircraft guns? Could you get that?

Mr. RICHARDSON. We will inquire and see if we have it and if we have not, I will endeavor to get the figures for you.

Senator FERGUSON. They should be in also.

Mr. MURPHY. I am sorry, Senator, I did not hear what you said.

Senator FERGUSON. I wondered whether the record showed the amount of planes that had been furnished to Hawaii and the Philippines, respectively, and the number of antiaircraft guns during the same period.

[12998]

Mr. MURPHY. And are the dates also given in the break down, Mr. Counsel?

 

4878 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

 

Mr. RICHARDSON. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. So that we may get those later.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right.

 

TESTIMONY OF CAPT. EDWIN T. LAYTON, UNITED STATES NAVY (Resumed)

 

Senator FERGUSON. Captain Layton, you indicated that you had written to Captain McCollum a letter here in Washington. Was that sent through the mail or special pouch?

Captain LAYTON. As I recall it, I wrote the letter in pen myself with no copies and had it sealed, gave it to the flag secretary of the commander in chief, who in turn gave it to an officer courier passing through and going by air to the United States and to Washington, for hand‑to‑hand delivery to Captain McCollum.

Senator FERGUSON. And did you get your answer back which you have read into the record in the same way?

Captain LAYTON. It came back via the locked box on the Clipper, which has previously been described here as a secure means of delivery of highly important and highly secret material.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, when you lost the two important men in July—is that when you lost them?

[12999] 

Captain LAYTON. We only lost one, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What happened to the other one?

Captain LAYTON. He was the one who was allowed to remain all during the year.

Senator FERGUSON. And when did he leave the Intelligence Service?

Captain LAYTON. He did not leave the Intelligence Service. He was transferred after about 2 more years, possibly 3, to Washington where he continued his highly specialized duties and did not leave his duties entirely until after VJ‑day.

Senator FERGUSON. How long have you been a captain?

Captain LAYTON. About 2 years, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You were not a captain, then, at the time that you were—

Captain LAYTON. I was a lieutenant commander on the outbreak of war on the senior part of the numbers.

Senator FERGUSON. Going back to the question that I asked before, you were looking up in your book the amount of purple, or as we call it, of magic here and did you find anything in there?

Captain LAYTON. None other than the winds set—a message that I mentioned previously in testimony before this committee.

[13000]  

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Did the Philippines send you any of their magic that they translated?

Captain LAYTON. The one I referred to specifically was from Com. 16, which was in the Philippines, setting up the five words and the two winds hidden word codes.

Senator FERGUSON. Was that purple, do you know, or J‑19?

Captain LAYTON. I will check to see what it says. It didn't say which system, sir. It merely said:

 

Following Tokyo to net. Intercept translation received from Singapore X.

 

Senator FERGUSON. I imagine it came to you in English, did it not?

 

PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 4879

 

Captain LAYTON. Oh, yes, Sir. It came to us in or by this special intelligence high security channel for transmitting this so‑called magic purple messages.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, after getting Captain McCollum's letter did you believe up until after the attack that you had received all diplomatic messages in some form or another that they figured that you should have in Hawaii for action?

Captain LAYTON. I thought so until some 2 years later when I found to the contrary. I also so stated on examination before the Roberts Commission that I did not believe that Washington was holding out on us.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, did you know that there was a dead line set on the 25th of November?

[13001] 

Captain LAYTON. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And shifted then to the 29th?

Captain LAYTON. No, Sir.

 Senator FERGUSON. Did you know there was a message delivered on the 26th of November to Japan and a reply to it on the 6th and morning of the 7th of December?

Captain LAYTON. I knew nothing concerning our notes to Japan nor Japan's answers. I may have seen in the paper that we had delivered a note but I do not recall distinctly recalling that it was in the papers or not.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, do you know whether or not after the 26th any Hawaii papers carried evidence that we were still negotiating back and forth from Japan to Washington?

Captain LAYTON. Senator, I do not recall what the papers said at that time, although I might refresh my memory. I have made it a policy, however, not to use newspaper stories in evaluating intelligence unless they back up other known material or other material that was of some real value because a newspaper story can be slanted if they wish. For instance, what was coming out from Tokyo in those days under Domei I would not pay any attention to at all.

Senator FERGUSON. It appears that that wind code was J‑19.

Captain LAYTON. Well, it did not say it in the message. [13002] It merely said, "Following Tokyo net intercept."

Senator FERGUSON. Is that all that you got from the Philippines?

Captain LAYTON. That is all that I recall at the present time; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. I wish you would go to Exhibit 2. Some Of your answers indicated that you were talking about some other messages in Exhibit 2 and I want to go over them with you, if we might.

Page 12 was the one that you have talked about. That is the 24th of September 1941 where they lay it out in areas. Do you have that exhibit before you?

Captain LAYTON. I have it before me; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, you say that standing alone that would not be as clear, as I understood it, as with other evidence. Now, take the one from Tokyo, from Toyoda. Do you know who he was?

Captain LAYTON. Toyoda?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Captain LAYTON. Offhand, no, sir.

 

4880 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

 

Senator FERGUSON. Was he Foreign Minister?

Captain LAYTON. No, Sir; Togo was the Foreign Minister at that time, T‑o‑g‑o.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

[13003]

Captain LAYTON. Toyoda would have been a department chief within the ministry of Foreign Affairs in Tokyo.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, on the neat one, on the 29th September 1941, from Honolulu to Washington, giving certain information in relation to Honolulu. Do you see that message?

Captain LAYTON. What page is that; Senator?

Senator FERGUSON. That is on page 13. They say—

Captain LAYTON. Yes, Sir, I have it.

Senator FERGUSON (reading):

 

Moorings in the vicinity of Ford Island. FV.

Alongside in Ford Island. PG.

Navy dock in the Navy Yard (The Ten Ten Pier) —KT.

 

And then some other items, indicating that they were giving messages in relation to the ships in dock; was that not true?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

[13004]

Senator FERGUSON. Now, the next one from Tokyo (Tojo) to Honolulu, the 15th of November, says:

 

As relations between Japan and United States are most critical, make your ships in harbor report irregular but at the rate of twice a week, although you are already no doubt aware please take extra care to maintain secrecy.

 

Would that have been a significant message, that they wanted the ships in harbor report twice a week at Pearl Harbor?

Captain LAYTON. I think so, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Then we go to the next page, on November 18. If these were regular messages, why would they take the extra care?

They say: "Please take extra care to maintain secrecy."

Captain LAYTON. Senator, the Japanese love secrecy even among themselves.

Senator FERGUSON. And so that, in itself, would not have meant anything?

Captain LAYTON. That, plus the fact that we had caught one of their agents snooping around and had him arrested. He being, a Japanese naval officer, and at the insistence of the Secretary of State, he was released and deported.

The fact that he had been caught before would tend to make these people more suspicious and therefore they would [13005] want to take more secrecy.

Senator FERGUSON. When did you catch the Jap naval officer?

Captain LAYTON. The FBI caught him, sir, but he sent an agent of his out to Honolulu to obtain highly secret and confidential information on the United States Pacific Fleet, to come back to the west coast and report to him. Fortunately this agent that he approached had once been in the Navy and maintained loyalty, and having taken his story to the FBI and having been more or less told to await details, when he called on him again here he was told there was nothing much to do.

He then approached our Naval Intelligence agency in Los Angeles, and told his story.

Senator FERGUSON. When was that?

 

PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE  4881

 

Captain LAYTON. That was in mid‑1941, as I recall, sir. It may have been late spring.

Senator FERGUSON. What finally happened to this Jap naval officer?

Captain LAYTON. Well, after we secured evidence, we waited for him and saw to it that he got it through our own agents. We saw to it that he got to the west coast, and saw to it the FBI could pick him up, and after that followed him to Washington where he had been in audience with the Japanese [13006] naval attaché here in Washington.

After this was over, we got permission of the Secretary of State to arrest him, and then in the interest of amity or other reasons, the prosecution was dropped, and he was deported as an undesirable alien. That was Lieutenant Tachibana.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, go to page 14.

Here is Honolulu again sending a message to Tokyo, and they are using the set‑up that was provided for on page 12.

Captain LAYTON. Yes, Sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And they also give harbor locations.

Look under 3. There is care taken there to show how they come in and how long it takes them from the entrance of the harbor through area B to the buoys in area C—

 

to which they were moored, they changed course five times each time roughly 30 degrees. The elapsed time was one hour, however, one of these destroyers entered area A after passing the water reservoir on the eastern side.

Relayed to (blank).

 

Captain LAYTON. I read it, sir.

[13007] 

Senator FERGUSON. Is that a significant message ?

Captain LAYTON. Senator, I would like to divorce hindsight from foresight on these. But were I reading these on December 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, I am sure they would have struck a responsive chord in my mind.

Senator FERGUSON. Now we have three on the next page, and they are all from Tokyo to Honolulu, seeking evidence.

 

Please report on the following areas as to vessels anchored therein: Area "N", Pearl Harbor.

 

What bay is that? That is not Manila Bay?

Captain LAYTON. I think that is Manila Bay. That is near Honolulu Harbor.

Senator FERGUSON (continuing):

 

and the areas adjacent thereto. (Make your investigation with great secrecy.)

 

That would be translated on the 5th, which would be on Friday the first week of December. The next one is from Tokyo (Togo) to Honolulu again.

 

Please investigate comprehensively the fleet (blank) bases in the neighborhood of the Hawaiian military reservation.

 

Now there has been some testimony here that where the blank line is there was something about air base, fleet air bases, which would make it even more significant, would [13008] it not?

Captain LAYTON., Yes sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Then the next one from Tokyo to Honolulu, November 29, 1941:

 

We have been receiving reports from you on ship movements, but in future will you also report even when there are no movements.

 

4882 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

 

We got that on a Friday.

Captain LAYTON. I think this caps them all by adding considerable significance to their individual messages taken collectively. A report when there are no movements is sometimes more significant than to have reports when there are movements.

Senator FERGUSON. Now there is some evidence in the entire record that the one on page 22 was translated in the rough by 2 o'clock, 1 or 2 o'clock, Saturday, here in the Navy. Would that one be significant?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, Sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now were any of these messages decoded and sent to you, or the substance of them sent to you?

Captain LAYTON. None of them were decoded and sent to me or the commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, I should say, prior to December 7, 1941.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you have specific evidence, or [13009] any evidence that there was going to be an attack in the vicinity of the Kra Peninsula on Sunday?

Captain LAYTON. I would like to answer that in two parts, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. All right, I wish you would.

Captain LAYTON. There was a considerable amount of evidence from reports from various agents, I mean proper agents, consular officials, military observers, and so forth, who predicted an attack on the Kra Peninsula.

The Sunday angle of it can be taken only from an observation of the movement, of those Japanese movements that were actually sighted in the South China Sea, and the time and distance factors lend themselves toward Sunday being a rather critical day.

Senator FERGUSON. Did the radio traffic give it to you?

Captain LAYTON. Not specifically as to the Kra Peninsula, but the radio traffic certainly showed the movement was to the south, south of French Indochina, south of Formosa, south of Hainan, and plus the one purple message we received on the Japanese intrigue in Thailand, which certainly pointed toward either the Thailand border or Malaya.

It was also shown that the Thai airfield at Singora [13010] on the very southern tip of Thailand and only a few miles from the border, being a good beach area, presented an ideal point for amphibious landings. This point was shown to Admiral Kimmel in. the morning conference I had with him on the morning of December 6, 1941.

Senator FERGUSON. Now you were asked as to whether or not the Navy in Hawaii knew that the Army, whose duty it was to protect the base, or the fleet while in the base, knew that the Army was only alerted to sabotage. Did you know that the Navy here in Washington did not know what the Army was alerted to in the Hawaiian Islands, even though General Short had sent back a message on the 28th of November that he was alerted to sabotage, and there was no other mention of any other alert?

Captain LAYTON. I did not know that.

Senator FERGUSON. The Navy did not know what ships were in the harbor, or what alert the Army was on; did you know that?

Captain LAYTON. I did not know that the naval officials here in Washington were unaware that the Army forces in Hawaii were on

 

PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE  4883

 

a sabotage alert. I was not aware that the naval officials in Washington did not know what ships of the Pacific Fleet were in Pearl Harbor, either.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, was it the custom of Pearl Harbor [13011] to report their ships in the harbor?

Captain LAYTON. No sir.

Senator FERGUSON. The location of ships?

Captain LAYTON. It was not customary, as I recall it, for them to report the ships in the harbor, but reports of all movements of all groups or units was reported to Washington. The sailing, for instance, of Admiral Halsey's Task Force, of Admiral Brown's Task Force, of Admiral Newton's Task Unit, I felt confident were a matter of dispatch to Washington, and I think the records will bear me out.

Senator FERGUSON. Now take the two messages on pages 40 and 41 of exhibit 37. As I understand it, these messages were sent about 5 minutes apart. Those on the 3d of December, 31850 and 31855, which would be 5 minutes apart.

Captain LAYTON. Yes, Sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And you gave some evidence this morning, as I recall, that you thought one related to the other, or they were the same message.

Captain LAYTON. When they were received and read it was my interpretation that these two messages originated by two different people in Washington were based on the same information, insofar as they carried basically the same data.

[13012] 

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, the first one names Washington. It says:

 

urgent instructions were sent yesterday to Japanese diplomatic and consular posts at Hongkong, Singapore„Batavia, Manila, Washington, and London to destroy most of their codes and ciphers at once.

 

That would indicate that they were to keep certain ciphers and certain codes, would it not?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, Sir.

Senator FERGUSON (reading):

 

and to burn all other important and confidential secret documents.

 

Now, the next one on the next page was sent 5 minutes later. It is:

 

Ordered London, Hongkong, Singapore, and Manila to destroy machine. Batavia machine already sent to Tokyo. December 2nd Washington also directed destroy all but one copy of other systems and all secret documents. British Admiralty London today reports Embassy London has complied.

 

Captain LAYTON. Yes, Sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did those two messages mean war with the United States, as far as your evaluation was concerned?

Captain LAYTON. They added to my concern at the time I first read the message saying this was a war warning, but it did not necessarily mean war.

[13013]

Let us examine this line of thought which I had at the time, and have previously testified to here. It was a matter of conjecture as to whether the Japanese would leave the Philippines on their flank and proceed further south.

If they were to try to go down into the south China Sea and to further their aggressive acts without treading on Uncle Sam's toes,

 

4884 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

 

and if they thought they could get away with it, then it would not mean war, necessarily; but in case we were to take counteraction such as seizing their embassies, or their consulates, we would seize at that time their code machines, cryptographic material, and their secret documents.

So for the self‑preservation, which everyone is born with, they decided to destroy certain or almost all of these documents which meant considerable to them.

It can be read another way, by saying that they had made a determination that the war warning was emphasized by these but this neither proves nor disproves. They merely add more background and emphasis.

This matter of destroying codes and the purple machine, which I have mentioned previously was very briefly discussed with Admiral Kimmel, and, as I recall it, stress was laid on the fact that the word was "most," meaning most of their codes [13014] and ciphers.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Did you know that the Navy here in Washington had notified the military attaché in Tokyo to destroy his code machine and codes about the 5th?

Captain LAYTON. I believe it was around the 5th that I was aware that the Navy had directed the naval attaché in Tokyo, and also other naval establishments in China, such as at Tientsin to destroy their crypotographic material.

Senator FERGUSON. How did you get that message?

Captain LAYTON. I believe we were an information addressee in the messages sent them, and I know we received their plain language message, one of them which said "Boomerang," which was the code message saying all papers, codes, and ciphers, and so forth, to have destroyed.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know what the policy of this Government was in case there was an attack only by Japan on the British?

Captain LAYTON. No, sir; I was not on that level of high policy.

Senator FERGUSON. You mean that you did not know because you were not on that level? How could you evaluate the evidence, or the intelligence, if ,you, did not know what the policy was?

[13015]

Captain LAYTON. That same question I asked myself in December 1941, prior to the attack. I believe I heard it said no less than four or five times, five or six times, "I wish I knew what we were going to do," or words to that effect, by Admiral Kimmel.

Senator FERGUSON. In case of an attack just on the British?

Captain LAYTON. In case of eventualities in southeast Asia in which the United States was not immediately and directly involved.

Senator FERGUSON. So you did discuss that question with Admiral Kimmel, and it bothered you in evaluating the evidence?

Captain LAYTON. I would not say that Admiral Kimmel had discussed it with me. He had made these remarks in my hearing when the situation was brought to his attention regarding the movements of these ships, their position, their potentialities for attack, and the Japanese propensity for always trying to get something for nothing, if possible, as they had done in French Indochina, and if they were trying to do this again, for instance, in Thailand, hoping we would take no action, and knowing if they got in there and we would not

 

PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE  4885

 

take any action, that would be another base for another move in the future.

[13016]

At that time Admiral Kimmel said, "I wish I knew what we are going to do," or "This is the same thing that was true in relation to the Dutch East Indies." I do not recall if the Dutch East Indies was mentioned specifically by name. Actually it was a general discussion that dealt with the area of the South China Sea and Thailand, I believe was the only specific country mentioned.

Senator FERGUSON. You made a statement that you believed, or you may have had a conversation with Colonel Raley concerning the geographic limit beyond which the British and Netherlands would not permit the Japanese to penetrate.

What was that?

Captain LAYTON. That is one of these rumors you hear, Senator. I had heard a rumor to the effect there was some geographic limit drawn, that only the high authorities knew it; that if the Japanese went beyond that limit, action would be taken by either the British or the Dutch or ourselves, perhaps.

There was no specific paper, or conversation by anyone in authority. It was one of those corridor gossip things that you pick up, but I passed it on to Colonel Raley for what it was worth.

[13017]

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know there were certain documents in Washington, for instance, Exhibit 17 which we have here, indicating that there was a line?

Captain LAYTON. I was not aware of the exact location of a geographic line, nor that there was a line, in fact.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the gentleman yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. That document was also in Hawaii.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, I will ask; did you ever see this document?

Captain LAYTON. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. We will get it.

Captain LAYTON. I didn't see every document that came in. Many documents that had to do with war plans alone were handled; by the War Plans Division, which is a very understandable thing; you don't show everybody on the staff high plans and policies of future operations.

Senator FERGUSON. While they are looking for this document, do you know of anything else, Captain, that you can give us here that could help us in the solution of the problem that we have?

Captain LAYTON. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. As to, how this could happen and we not be alerted in Hawaii?

[13018]

Captain LAYTON. Well, I formed a pretty good idea of how they did it. If you are interested in hearing how I think they did it and were able to come in undetected throughout I will be glad to give it to you in a couple of minutes.

Senator FERGUSON. There is no doubt but they came in and they were not detected.

Captain LAYTON. There is no doubt about that in my mind.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you look at that instrument?

Mr. GEARHART. Will the Senator yield?

 

4886 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

 

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. GEARHART. I would like to hear that if he can tell it in a minute or so.

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

Captain LAYTON. I mentioned this radio intelligence as being an inexact science. I also said that if you go under sealed orders, don't use your radio, and take the precaution that you will receive no radios yourself addressed to you, then you can move freely on the high seas, so long as you are not detected by planes, submarines, picket boats or casual merchant vessels. I have formed a definite conclusion that the Japanese realized that a blow on Pearl Harbor was necessary toward their major plan of operation and that they had carefully studied their own radio traffic and had [13019] made an analysis of it and that therefore they made their plans, gave it to the carrier task force commander, and thereafter never addressed him and, of course, he went under radio silence, and therefore he had no implications, no associations, no mention in traffic, he was just as if, what they wanted me to believe he was, in home ports. That can always be done.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, will you look at that instrument. The bottom of the page.

Captain LAYTON. I see it.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you ever see that before?

Captain LAYTON. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That is Exhibit 17.

Mr. MASTEN. Exhibit 106.

Senator FERGUSON. Exhibit 106. It was originally in Exhibit 17.

Mr. MURPHY. The page, for the record.

Senator FERGUSON. What is the page on that?

Captain LAYTON. This says page 4 here, but this is a very thick volume.

Senator FERGUSON. It is the November 5. Admiral Stark and General Marshall for the President.

Captain LAYTON. I never saw it. I had heard corridor gossip that there was a delineation line.

[13020]

Senator FERGUSON. That is all.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. In other words, you, as the chief of intelligence for the fleet at Hawaii, were obliged to be passing corridor gossip about the question that the Senator asked you but Admiral Kimmel did not show you that recommendation of the Army and the Navy given to the President?

Captain LAYTON. Admiral Kimmel did not see fit to so inform me.

Mr. MURPHY. At any rate, it would have been of help to you, as an intelligence officer, if you had that, since you found it necessary to indulge a in corridor gossip to meet the situation; isn't that correct?

Captain LAYTON. I tried to pass on to my liaison in the Hawaiian Air Force everything that I had that I thought would help him, and if I was passing gossip I told him that it was gossip and he could evaluate it accordingly, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. At any rate, you had to indulge in gossip because the admiral hadn't shown you this particular paper which discussed the idea of the Army and the Navy as to the Japanese at the time; isn't that right?

 

PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE  4887

 

Captain LAYTON. That is true, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, you said that you could give us in a few minutes how the blow was brought about. You said that [13021] they could make plans and give those plans to a carrier task force, have the carriers proceed without traffic, and that that can always be done. You knew that before December ?, 1941, did you not?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. And you also knew that the Japanese had 10 carriers, did you not?

Captain LAYTON. That is correct.

Mr. MURPHY. You knew that you had only accounted for two, did you not?

Captain LAYTON. Not in my sheet of December 2.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, how many had you accounted for? You had accounted for two going south and you thought there were two at the Marshalls; is that not right?

 Captain LAYTON. There were a few more than that. I would like to read them.

Mr. MURPHY. All right: Take it slowly so that I can follow your testimony before the Roberts Commission.

Captain LAYTON. Aye, sir.

On page 3 of my Location Sheet typed on December 1, corrected and submitted on December 2, I put: Cardiv‑4, two carriers and four destroyers; Cardiv‑3, two carriers and three destroyers;. in the Bako-Takao area.

Mr. MURPHY. You also felt, did you not, that they were [13022] part of the second fleet under the commander in chief of the second fleet?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. All right, go ahead.

Captain LAYTON. In the Marshall area I showed the Koryu plus plane guards, being one carrier and four destroyers in the Marshall area.

Mr. MURPHY. How many carriers?

Captain LAYTON. One.

Mr. MURPHY. One in the Marshalls?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir. I showed the Kasuga Maru, a converted carrier, as being also in the Bako‑Takao area.

Mr. MURPHY. How many did you have doing south ?

Captain LAYTON. I had a total of five going south.

Mr. MURPHY. Five?

Captain LAYTON. Five; yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. And one in the Marshalls?

Captain LAYTON. One of those five was a converted carrier.

Mr. MURPHY. Let me review your testimony before the Roberts Commission. Before I do that, Captain, you said that the Secretary of State sent this man back to Japan for amity or other reasons. What would be the other reasons?

Captain LAYTON. Well, I wouldn't be in a position to know.

[13023] 

Mr. MURPHY. I thought there might have been some thing sinister in your "other reasons."

Captain LAYTON. No. I meant rather than have this Naval Japanese officer up for a trial of espionage in our country and the ensuing

 

4888 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

 

row in the Japanese papers, I believed it was deemed, and I am not speaking first‑hand, I am guessing now, better to let him go as an undesirable alien.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, were you familiar with Japanese broadcasts intercepted at Pearl Harbor on December 8, were they called to your attention?

Captain LAYTON. You mean the Japanese broadcasts in plain language, sir?

Mr. MURPHY. The broadcasts in which they told about the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. And you were familiar with the weather broadcasts put in the middle of that message?

Captain LAYTON. I don't recall that there was a weather broadcast in the middle of that message; there may have been.

[13024]

Mr. MURPHY (reading)

 

In the message here a weather forecast was made as far as I can recollect.

 

This is the Naval report.

 

A weather forecast was made, as far as I recollect. No such weather forecast had ever been made before.

 

His exact words were

 

Allow me to especially make a weather forecast at this time. West wind clear. Since these broadcasts are also heard by the Japanese Navy it may be some sort of a code.

 

Captain LAYTON. We heard that late the night of the 7th. It was reported to us that that west wind clear hidden code winds execute did come through late the night of the 7th, but we were not interested in it then.

Mr. MURPHY. West wind clear would refer to—

Captain LAYTON. England.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, you had some discussion with Admiral Kimmel, did you not, between the 1st of December and the 7th of December, about the carriers you could not account for?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir. That was on the 2nd of December.

Mr. MURPHY. And you also had discussion with him of the fact that you were unable to account for battleships?

[13026]

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

I believe that was in the middle of November, or possibly a little later.

Mr. MURPHY. You are sure it wasn't about the same time in December?

Captain LAYTON. No, sir. Battleships were not brought up as a matter of conversation in the carrier conversation.

Mr. MURPHY. I refer you to your testimony on page 1090 before the Roberts board:

 

The CHAIRMAN. Commander, you were at conferences with the Commander in Chief, I presume, between November 27 and December 7, respecting the instant situation?

Commander LAYTON. Yes. I was in conferences daily.

 

In that connection, I would like to ask if there was at any time a conference between Admiral Kimmel and General Short and yourself and some intelligence officer of the Army between those dates?

 

PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE  4889

 

Captain LAYTON. I previously testified that General Short had a conference with Admiral Kimmel and other naval force commanders—

Mr. MURPHY. Do you understand my question?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Was there at any time—

Captain LAYTON. An Army Intelligence officer present.

[13026]

Mr. MURPHY. At any meeting you ever had with General Short?

Captain LAYTON. No, sir, never.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, you also testified that you had liaison with the Air Corps, the Army Air Corps intelligence officer?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you have liaison with the Navy Air Corps intelligence officer?

Captain LAYTON. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Why would you have liaison with the Army Air Corps intelligence officer and not the Navy? What is the difference between the two?

Captain LAYTON. None, as I see it, except that Colonel Raley of the Hawaiian Air Force came to me in mid‑1941 and said, or I understood him to say that he had been directed to establish liaison, which I was glad to do.

Mr. MURPHY. Isn't it rather singular that the Army Air Corps, who knew what was going on, or at least part of what was going on, and Captain Davis and Admiral Bellinger, neither knew anything about these messages?

Captain LAYTON. Admiral Davis was on the staff, sir. He was a subsection officer under Operations.

Mr. MURPHY. He was in charge of Air?

Captain, LAYTON. Under the officer who had all of the [13027] intelligence that I had, and all of my evaluated intelligence reports and who was aware of all of the situation.

Mr. MURPHY. Then, if Captain Davis didn't know about it that would be his superior's responsibility?

Captain LAYTON. That would be his superior. His superior had directed me to show the book to his assistant in Operations.

[13082] 

Mr. MURPHY. Did you show it to Captain Davis?

Captain LAYTON. No, sir. He saw several of the books without initialing because he had not been ordered or told to read the books.

Mr. MURPHY. He has testified under oath that he didn't know about these war warning messages and I wondered if you knew whether he had or not.

Captain LAYTON. I couldn't state positively here under oath that I know positively that he did. It would be my assumption that he was present when the war warning message was being discussed in the admiral's cabin.

Mr. MURPHY. Do you know whether he was or not?

Captain LAYTON. I do not know positively.

Mr. MURPHY. What do you know about Admiral Bellinger. He was also an air officer. He has testified that he knew nothing about them.

Captain LAYTON. I do not know, sir.

 

4890 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

 

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, you also testified this afternoon that you felt that the Army was on an all‑out alert. Was that your testimony?

Captain LAYTON. That was my conception at the time.

Mr. MURPHY. You presumed the Army was on the highest state of alert?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

[13029]

Mr. MURPHY. Why would you presume that when the fleet wasn't on the highest state of alert, they were only in the third condition.

Captain LAYTON. I didn't know there was a difference in the Army states of alert at that time. I thought they only had one.

Mr. MURPHY. Weren't the Navy ships themselves on the lowest state of alert, with only one‑fourth of the antiaircraft guns manned?

Captain LAYTON. They went into the one customarily in while in port.

Mr. MURPHY. They didn't take any special precautions after the war warning, than they had for months previous; isn't that true?

Captain LAYTON. I believe that is correct, although I don't know that first hand.

Mr. MURPHY. The Navy was in the normal ordinary routine alert and yet you thought that the Army was in the highest state of alert; the first hand.

Captain LAYTON. I thought the Army had only one state of alert. When I say "highest" I mean that they were on the alert.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, you said you did not expect war in Hawaii.

[13030]

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Is that so?

Captain LAYTON. That is true.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you expect an attack on the fleet?

Captain LAYTON. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Admiral Kimmel has testified before us that he did expect a submarine attack. Why would you differ with him?

Captain LAYTON. My words were loose. I meant air attack, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Then you are restricting it to an air attack. If you were to have a submarine attack that would be war in Hawaii, would it not?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir. We had had submarine contacts off Hawaii many, many times, but you couldn't prove that they were submarines. We suspected that there were Japanese submarines lurking about trying to scout for information. We also had a report from the naval attaché in Tokyo that the crew of one submarine had returned and were bragging about having been in Pearl Harbor.

Mr. MURPHY. You knew that there was a considerable submarine movement moving east?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. You know they were sighted at Saipan?

[13031]

Captain LAYTON. They weren't sighted.

Mr. MURPHY. I mean the sound—they were detected.

Captain LAYTON. Definitely, passing down to the Marshalls.

Mr. MURPHY. Captain Rochefort did tell you in his daily intelligence summary that there was a submarine movement eastward?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir; eastward toward the Marshalls.

 

PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE  4891

 

Mr. MURPHY. Well, the Marshalls are much closer to Hawaii than home waters, are they not?

Captain LAYTON. It would be a logical place to go for refueling and standing by for further exercises or operations.

Mr. MURPHY. How do you account for the fact that if the submarines were going to the Marshalls and you felt there were aircraft carriers at the Marshalls that the Army didn't know anything about it? General Short says that he never heard of it.

Captain LAYTON. I can only say that Washington had all the information that we had. Washington had close liaison with the Army. The Army in Washington knew who they were sending their information to. The Washington authorities had full right to send out their information. And it is my conception and belief, and it is sound, that if they didn't want to send it out to the authorities in [13032] Hawaii, that was a responsibility of the War Department.

Mr. MURPHY. Sir, did you have any responsibility? What were you doing out there?

Captain LAYTON. My responsibility was as laid down by the staff instructions which I read this afternoon. They clearly outline the full scope.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, as the fleet intelligence officer you were to advise the fleet generally as to conditions wherever the fleet was; isn't that right?

Captain LAYTON. I was to see about the fleet.

Mr. MURPHY. And while the fleet was in the harbor the fleet was your responsibility, wasn't it?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir. That is, my responsibility as far as intelligence went.

Mr. MURPHY. That is right. It was up to you to know everything there was in the way of intelligence to protect that fleet wherever it was?

Captain LAYTON. That is correct, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, the fact is, you did expect hostile Japanese action in the first week of December, did you not?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. You had that information from various sources, Naval Intelligence, reports of naval attachés, naval observers, [13033] the commander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet and the intelligence unit at Manila, did you not?

Captain LAYTON. And Pearl Harbor.

Mr. MURPHY. Yes. And the Intelligence Unit, Fourteenth Naval District?

Captain LAYTON. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, about the middle of November you knew that the normal organization of the Japanese Feet was disrupted?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. You also knew that the commander in chief of the Second Fleet was placed in a position far more important than his normal administrative job?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. You also knew and had been informed that that fleet was apparently getting together for an offensive action?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

 

4892 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

 

Mr. MURPHY. You also had a report as to what ships were seen going south didn't you?

Captain LAYTON. Some reports; yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. You had detailed reports to some extent of warships, did you not?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

[13034] 

Mr. MURPHY, And there were a number of carriers not accounted for in that report, were there not?

Captain LAYTON. Yes; sir. As a matter of fact, no carriers were reported by citation at any time.

Mr. MURPHY. You also knew that it appeared as if instead of protective operations by the fleet there was to be an operation by task forces or a task force, and the commander in chief of the Second Fleet was to be, put in supreme command?

Captain LAYTON. We expected it, and he was.

Mr. MURPHY. You also knew by radio intelligence that you had no contact as to the commander in chief of the Second Fleet in connection with the southward movement?

Captain LAYTON. I don't believe that is correct. Would you repeat that?

Mr. MURPHY. I say, did you also know that there was no radio intelligence placing the commander in chief of the Second Fleet in the southward movement?

Captain LAYTON. Oh, yes, there was.

Mr. MURPHY. There was?

Captain LAYTON. Considerable.

Mr. MURPHY. To make you believe he was in charge?

Captain LAYTON. He was commander in chief of the Second Fleet and was taking supreme command of the task forces moving [13035] south?

Mr. MURPHY. Was he in charge of the one coming to Hawaii?

Captain LAYTON. No, sir. The commander in chief of that force was called the commander in chief of the First Air Fleet.

Mr. MURPHY. You felt from radio intelligence that the movement would be south and that it would be amphibious in nature?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. And you felt that it would be to the Malay Barrier or against Singapore or to the Netherlands Indies or the Philippines, did you not?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. In other words, you agreed. entirely with what Washington had said to you in the dispatch they sent to you?

Captain LAYTON. Exactly. I considered their dispatches as dotting the i's and crossing the t's.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, you also knew that there had been no positive indications of the location of the Japanese carriers with the exception of Carrier Division 3, did you not?

Captain LAYTON. Well, I had positive location of Carrier Division 3. There was no positive location of Carrier [13036] Division 4 or these other units. I put one in the Marshalls and one in the south Formosa area. However, the extra carrier division had been in the past previously associated, even in a light way, with the com‑

 

PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE  4893

 

mander, Second Fleet, and commander, Third Fleet, and on the basis of that I placed that carrier division there.

Mr. MURPHY. I ask you whether or not before the Roberts Commission you gave this testimony:

 

Commander LAYTON. There had been no positive indications of the location of the Japanese carriers with the exception of Carrier Division 3, which was associated with the southern movement for some time.

The CHAIRMAN. What was Carrier Division 3? Two carriers?

Commander LAYTON. Two carriers, sir; the Ryuio and the Hosho.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, did your command have knowledge of the number of Japanese carriers in their Navy?

 Commander LAYTON. Yes, sir.

 The CHAIRMAN. How many were there?

 Commander LAYTON. Ten, sir.

 The CHAIRMAN. So you have accounted for two?

 Commander LAYTON. Yes, sir.

 The CHAIRMAN. Of the other eight I understand you to [13036A] say there were no definite indications as to their location.

Commander LAYTON. No positive indications of their location.

 

Captain LAYTON. That is correct. No positive. I have tried to indicate, sir, that when you make a location sheet you have to use some of the very small evidence rather than the preponderance of the evidence to locate your forces because if you wait for all positive evidence you would only put down two or three ships.

Mr. MURPHY. On the information you received from Commander Rochefort, the daily intelligence summaries, there was carried as to the carriers "no information."

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, the first time you heard from the commander in chief of the carrier fleet was on December 8?

Captain LAYTON. December 7, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. December 7.

Captain LAYTON. He opened up after the attack.

Mr. MURPHY. You hadn't heard from him for some days and that morning you told Admiral Kimmel that you had heard from him for the first time in some time; isn't that right?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, there was also a change in radio calls, was there not, in November?

[13037] 

Captain LAYTON. November 1; yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. And there was also a change the first of December?

Captain LAYTON. December 1; yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. That was extraordinary, wasn't it?

Captain LAYTON. Rather extraordinary. I would like to point out that the Japanese at that time were showing all the symptoms of taking increased radio security. I won't go into the technicalities but they were using multiple addresses and blanket coverage and what we call addressed to nobody from nobody, which everybody copied, and when they do that nobody is being talked to that you can identify, and therefore the forces are pretty hard to identify in traffic.

Mr. MURPHY. You did have a report from the commander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet and a report from the American observer in Singapore and the commander in chief of the British Far East Naval Forces that gave you some idea as to the initial distribution of the task force in the south, did you not?

 

4894 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

 

Captain LAYTON. A part of it; yes.

Mr. MURPHY. That left the carriers unaccounted for except two?

Captain LAYTON. Not precisely; no. That left a good [13038] part of that force unaccounted for by sighting, but they were definitely headed south. It left my distribution of carriers good in my mind. However, on that location sheet I did not list Cardivs 1 or 2 because they had not shown in traffic, had not been addressed, were in no way in the traffic headings, and had all the usual appearances of being in home ports or possibly standing by for a covering force in connection with the southern movement, remaining in home waters, I thought.

Mr. MURPHY. You say that the answer you made as to the inquiry as to the battleships not being accounted for was prior to November 27 ?

Captain LAYTON. It is my recollection. I have not read the Roberts report. I never saw a copy of it. It might have been after.

Mr. MURPHY. Before the Roberts Board, on page 1090, you were questioned about the conferences between November 27 and December 7, and it was then that you said in answer to this question:

 

The CHAIRMAN. Commander, you were at conferences with the Commander in Chief, I presume, between November 27 and December 7, respecting the instant situation?

 Commander LAYTON. Yes. I was in conference daily.

 The CHAIRMAN. Had you the slightest suspicion of a  [13039] possible air attack upon Pearl Harbor?

 Commander LAYTON. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Why not, when you had the warning and from what you knew about the situation that Japan would strike and probably strike hard and even before war was declared?

Commander LAYTON. Yes. That had all been considered.

The CHAIRMAN. That had all been considered?

Commander LAYTON. Yes, that had all been considered and discussed. The Admiral, in fact, said one day, "Where are the battleships". I said "I don't know. Their location had not been known for more than a week." He said, "Do you think they could be off here or out at sea without our knowing it?" I said, "Yes, if they have maintained radio silence." He said "Do you think they are?" and I said, "No." He said, "Where do you think they are?" and I said, "I estimate they are in port, having completed two weeks operations and they are having overhaul for new operations."

General MCNARNEY. Was there some discussion held with reference to the carriers?

Commander LAYTON. Yes, only not so specific. The Admiral knew of the carriers down there, I am sure.

 

You told us here tonight that they could maintain radio silence. Did you take that into consideration?

[13040] 

Captain LAYTON. That is always taken into consideration to a degree; yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you also take into consideration, since you expected a submarine attack, in the plans you had in effect at Hawaii, that if there was a submarine attack it would in all probability be accompanied by an air attack?

Captain LAYTON. I don't believe I recall having grouped those two together in my mind. I know that was one of the feasibilities and capabilities of the enemy as laid down. I knew that was in our standard operating procedure letter. I won't say definitely I had those two coupled in my mind during that time.

 

PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE  4895

 

As I recall it, and my memory may be bad, that conference regarding the battleships was previously, because on this location sheet dated December 1, 1941, I showed battle division 1 and battle division 2 in the Kure‑Sasebo area. Now, they were fairly well indicated as being there and they hadn't been showing the radio silence but had shown it previously. They had no traffic on them and the admiral asked where they were. This was not the only location sheet that I submitted. I also carried BatDiv 3 in this location sheet as in the southern task force and of course only two were there. The other two came to Hawaii. But all the battleship divisions were accounted for, so I think that [13041] perhaps is the conversation prior to the period mentioned there as it being a general question referring to conferences regarding the surprise attack. The conference regarding surprise attack was some time before Pearl Harbor.

Mr. MURPHY. Do you mean you indicated any such date before the Roberts board?

Captain LAYTON. I don't think I did.

Mr. MURPHY. Before the Roberts board did you make this answer:

 

that Carrier Division 3 was enroute or in the China Sea, and one of the carrier divisions was reported to be in or near the Mandates, and others were getting their bases all set, but their location was not known.

 

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, is it true that the strength of our two task forces that we had at Hawaii was superior in strength to the task force that attacked Hawaii?

Captain LAYTON. Superior, sir?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes.

Captain LAYTON. I believe the task force that attacked Hawaii infinitely superior than a combination of our task forces, let alone any individual one.

Mr. MURPHY. Were you asked this question—of course, we may have more information since that time:

 

[13042]   Admiral Reeves—

 

This is page 1093. You were discussing then before the Roberts board the strength of the Japanese Fleet:

 

Admiral REEVES. And that is the striking force.

Commander LAYTON. Yes. As I obtained that from the radio call sheet out of the plane.

Admiral REEVES. Then in strength, that is hardly equal to the strength of our task force, three of which we had out, except in carriers. That is, a carrier in each one, three heavy cruisers—

Commander LAYTON. Yes.

Admiral REEVES. And 12 destroyers?

Commander LAYTON. Yes.

Admiral REEVES. And that was 12. They did have more carriers in this one group?

Commander LAYTON. Yes.

 

Now, was that to indicate our strength was greater than theirs?

Captain LAYTON. I don't follow the line of that questioning. I have never had a chance to proofread it. I know they struck a lot from the record. It is my firm belief that the Japanese carrier task force, with 6 carriers fully trained, armed, ready to go, with 2 battleships, 2 battle cruisers, 2 heavy cruisers, 1   [13043] light cruiser

 

4896 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

 

and 12 destroyers, was a powerful offensive force. They had weaknesses. If they were caught at night or in poor visibility, then they had a weakness because somebody could make slashing attack upon them without them being able to use their air.

[13044]

Mr. MURPHY. I won't press it because it is a matter of certainty in the record as to what each force consisted of. We have that in the record without indulging in speculation or recollection.

Were you aware of the message that was sent from Hawaii on the night of December 6 as to the destruction of the codes at Hawaii?

Captain LAYTON. I was informed by then Commander Rochefort that he had very good pipe‑line information to the effect that the Japanese consulate was destroying codes and official papers by burning.

Mr. MURPHY. Why didn't Admiral Kimmel know about that?

Captain LAYTON. I don't know that he didn't know about it, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. My recollection is that he said he didn't. That was Com‑14. Com‑14 advised Washington on December 6:

 

Believe local consul has destroyed all but one system although presumably not including your eighteen double five of third.

 

Did you know about that?

Captain LAYTON. I did not see that message, although Commander Rochefort informed me of the purport.

Mr. MURPHY. You feel you certainly notified your commander in chief ?

[13045]

Captain LAYTON. I wouldn't be too positive., I may have been notified when Admiral Kimmel was not in or at some time when I didn't get the message to him immediately, but I have no definite recollection.

Mr. MURPHY. If you heard they were destroying their system, you would report it?

Captain LAYTON. Then I would report it.

Mr. MURPHY. If they were destroying all but one system, you would feel that was important enough to get it to the commander in chief as quickly as possible?

Captain LAYTON. I would think so, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. What is the significance to you of the destruction of codes? That is pretty important information, isn't it?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Would you consider that a matter of vital importance?

Captain LAYTON. If we had not had previous information that the Japanese were destroying codes, I would say it would be very vital. The previous information was well known and this would merely be added evidence.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, you also testified that you delivered the message of the 24th direct to General Short.

Captain LAYTON. In person.

[13046]

Mr. MURPHY. Now, Admiral Kimmel criticized you about one message, didn't he?

Captain LAYTON. That was the 27th, sir.

I believe he withdrew that criticism when he discovered that General Short had in fact received it.

Mr. MURPHY. I know just what I read in the record, and I believe there was some qualification of it. I don't want to say that is true either. I mean his characterization. Far from it.

 

PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE  4897

 

Now you also said that you heard it said by Admiral Kimmel as to what we would do if there was an attack on the British.

You knew at Hawaii that we were a democracy, and that Congress had the right to declare war?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir. I believe his statement was "I wish we knew what we were going to do."

Mr. MURPHY. You meant "What would we do when"?

Captain LAYTON. What would we do and when.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, as to knowledge of ships being in Pearl Harbor, did you know as the intelligence officer what reports were being made to Washington as to the ships? You did testify that they would not, in your judgment be the task forces?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

[13047]

Mr. MURPHY. Is it not a fact that your reports to Washington were only as to the ships in the Harbor or that they were in the Hawaiian area

Captain LAYTON. Very likely so. That was the province of Operations.

Mr. MURPHY. We had testimony before us and we have a map here showing some ship to the north of the island of Oahu on December 6. Did you know anything about that ship?

Captain LAYTON. My guess would be that it was a merchant ship that was torpedoed there on the morning of December 7.

Mr. MURPHY. But it wasn't there on the 7th. At least the map doesn't show it.

Captain LAYTON. It wasn't on my plot and I couldn't say.

Mr. MURPHY. The map shows it on the 6th and not on the 7th. In fact, it seems to trace it going; into Pearl Harbor on the week end.

Captain LAYTON. It was customary for the ships to go in for the week end to give the crews needed rest and relaxation, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. This is my last question.

So far as liaison with the Army was concerned, you never received a single order from the commander in chief as to any liaison whatever with any particular Army intelli‑ [13048] gence ?

Captain LAYTON. That is correct, sir. Nor did I have any requests from Army sources for liaison.

Mr. MURPHY. That is all.

Senator LUCAS. I would like to ask a few questions.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator Lucas.

Senator LUCAS. Captain, shortly after the Pearl Harbor disaster, we had unity of command in Hawaii?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Is that still in existence?

Captain LAYTON. I don't believe I am competent to answer that question because I am not real sure. I left Pearl Harbor on the 29th of November to come before this committee, sir, and I am a little bit rusty on what is going on out there.

[13049]

Senator LUCAS. When you left on the 29th of November was unity of command still in operation at that time?

Captain LAYTON. To a limited degree, sir. The commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet still commanded the Pacific Ocean areas and the Army forces in that area came directly under General MacArthur. Under the unity of command principle that was in effect

 

4898 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

 

prior to VJ‑day or about that time the Army forces in the Pacific Ocean areas were under the direct military command of Admiral Nimitz through General Richardson, commanding general of the Central Pacific Forces.

Senator LUCAS. Captain, from what you know about the Pearl Harbor disaster and the events leading up to this disaster, did you feel that there was proper liaison between the Army and the Navy at that time?

Captain LAYTON. I believe the liaison at that time could be improved on in the light of war experience.

Senator LUCAS. Well, in light of what happened at Pearl Harbor and the war following you believe the liaison could be improved upon?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, Sir; but it must be done on a chain of command principle and not on parallel ladders, so to speak.

Senator LUCAS. I am not sure that I follow you on that last statement.

[13050]

Captain LAYTON. For example, sir, under the principle of unity command in effect in the Pacific Ocean areas during the war, intelligence that funneled to the Pacific Ocean areas was a responsibility of the commander in chief of that area to get it to all forces in his area for their use. Before the setting up of that principle of that unity of command no single person was responsible for the intelligence for everybody else, so you had two parallel intelligence systems and as it turns out—and I did not know until afterward—the Army in Hawaii was receiving very little intelligence from Washington. The Navy was developing combat intelligence regarding the Japanese fleet but we received no Japanese troop movements or dispositions from the Army, and I don't believe the Army in Hawaii received them either.

If those funnels had been only funneled to one man whose responsibility it was, who in turn gives it to all the forces no matter what kind of a uniform they wear and is responsible for that, then you have a principle of single purpose, single responsibility, and a proper functioning organization. You cannot have two presidents of a corporation.

Senator LUCAS. I think that you have expressed it better than I would know how and it more or less coincides with what I believe should be done as a result of the testimony that has been adduced before this hearing.

[13051]

In other words, do you agree with me that, either in peace or in war, if you are going to have a successful intelligence department either in Washington, Hawaii, the Philippines, or in any other outpost, you are going to have someone upon whom rests the sole responsibility for the proper evaluation and the dissemination of that information to every branch of the service, whether it is the Navy, the Army, or the Marine Corps?

Captain LAYTON. I quite agree with you whole‑heartedly, Senator, and I believe the present new set‑up that I have read about in the papers, wherein the State Department, Army, and Navy will form one central intelligence agency or whatever it is, will function to the benefit of this country in the future.

Senator LUCAS. You fellows in the Navy had some of the finest men that the Naval Academy ever turned out in the Pacific area during

 

PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE  4899

 

that time, according to the testimony that has been given to this committee and Admiral Kimmel was in charge of the Pacific Fleet at that time as well as the Atlantic Fleet.

Captain LAYTON. No, Sir.

Senator LUCAS. On December the 7th?

Captain LAYTON. No, Sir.

Senator LUCAS. Wasn't he commander in chief of the entire fleet?

[13052]

Captain LAYTON. No, Sir. He was commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet.

Senator LUCAS. Of the Pacific Fleet?

Captain LAYTON. And also the doctrines that he evolved, the techniques or matters of policy or standard operating procedure that he thought were good enough and having consulted with the commander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet and the commander in chief of the Atlantic Fleet, were in fact issued by the commander in chief under the directive which he had to this United States Fleet.

Senator Lucas. Well, at one time he was commander in chief of the United States Fleet

Captain LAYTON. That was just a title, that was a hat he could wear, but it was not a tactical or administrative office.

Senator LUCAS. Well, the fact that this was a title or hat that he could wear, did that add anything to his importance out there as the commander of the Pacific Fleet?

Captain LAYTON. No, Sir. I don't think you can find anything higher than the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet in the Pacific.

Senator LUCAS. Well, now, it is a fact that General Short was out there and his was just a small part of the United States Army although he held a very responsible position.

Captain LAYTON. That is correct, sir.

[13053]

Senator Laces. I have obtained this sort of an idea and if I am wrong I want you to disabuse it from my mind. You fellows in the Navy are a pretty powerful group, and you had charge of the Pacific Fleet out there, and Short was more or less in charge of just an outpost, and, as far as the Army was concerned, was pretty small. I have gained sort of an impression that you fellows did not pay much attention to Short and his crowd; and I am wondering if I am wrong.

Captain LAYTON. If I answer that, you put me in an embarrassing position if I either agree with you and am not telling the truth.

Senator LUCAS. I won't press it if it is going to embarrass you, and I probably should have asked Admiral Kimmel that question when he was here.

Captain LAYTON. I say I think it is an embarrassing question, because I, for one, never thought of the Army as any small potato. In fact, I worked with the Army at our Army post all during this war, sand they are a fine bunch of people, and if you really want to see how the services get together go out where they don't wear a collar and tie when they put them in the South Pacific. You can't tell the Army from the Navy.

Senator LUCAS. I am sure you always worked faithfully under any conditions, and that was the attitude in the Navy and Army, and I know that you worked faithfully since Pearl [13054] Harbor; there isn't any question about that; but the only thing I am talking about is previous to Pearl Harbor, when there was a sort of a nonchalant, lackadaisical attitude with the American people, and it seemed

 

4900 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

 

to me that went right on into the Army and the Navy about that particular time. I may be wrong about that.

Captain LAYTON. I recall our attitude toward the impending crisis was anything but lackadaisical, Senator. As a matter of fact, there were some gray hairs sprouted out at that time.

Senator LUCAS. Some what?

Captain LAYTON. Gray hairs.

Senator LUCAS. There may have been some after Pearl Harbor, but do you think there were many before Pearl Harbor?

Captain LAYTON. I can only speak for myself, sir.

Senator LUCAS. How far did you. think that the carrier and the two destroyers and what number aircraft they might have had was from Pearl Harbor when you made an estimate to the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet?

Captain LAYTON. I think that was really December 2.

Senator LUCAS. December 2.

Captain LAYTON. I considered them in the Marshalls themselves, and I was delighted when the Army proposed a distance long‑range, overwater reconnaissance of the Marshalls [13055] and the central Carolines to spot this task force down there.

Senator LUCAS. Yes; well, how far did you think that these carriers were from Pearl Harbor at the time you made the estimate?

Captain LAYTON. I thought they were in the Marshalls themselves, and most likely at anchor in one of the atolls‑Jaluit, possibly Wotje, and possibly Maloelap.

Senator LUCAS. How far in miles would that be, the nearest one, I mean, that the carrier might be based in?

Captain LAYTON. I would like to give you the exact distance if I can, sir.

Senator LUCAS. All right, sir, I would like to have it.

Captain LAYTON. From Jaluit to Pearl Harbor is 2,096 nautical miles.

Senator LUCAS. Yes. Is that the nearest port they might be located in?

Captain LAYTON. I believe that Wotje is a little closer. It is 1,970 miles. I believe that is about the nearest that has a good harbor and base facility.

Senator LUCAS. Well, now, should that fact alone, Captain, have given the commander of the Pacific Fleet some concern and some warning, if there was an aircraft carrier that close on December the 3d?

Captain LAYTON. The attack that came did not come from [13056] the Marshalls.

Senator LUCAS. I understand that.

Captain LAYTON. There had been aircraft carriers in the Marshall Islands before. The situation, of course, was not as tense.

Senator LUCAS. That is right.

Captain LAYTON. Now, one of the basic axioms of intelligence is to always think if you were the enemy what would you do and being in intelligence you say, "Now, this fellow has got a carrier out here. I am a Jap. What did I put him down there for?" My answer to that one was he was there to ferry down some planes for other divisions. I mean they were expanding and enlarging the movement

 

PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE  4901

 

in preparation for what you would think then would be our most logical point of attack, an attack on the Marshalls.

Senator LUCAS. In other words, it never occurred at that time, and I can understand it from the evidence, that this carrier might be there for the purpose of making a final attack upon Oahu ?

Captain LAYTON. I did not think so, sir. The Senator will recall that there was a difference of opinion between the combat intelligence unit at Pearl Harbor and the one at Cavite as to the presence or absence of carriers in the Marshalls.

[13057]

Senator LUCAS. That is right, I know there was a difference of opinion.

Captain LAYTON. And I had to evaluate this. One said none and the other one said two divisions, so I straddled the fence by putting one down there.

Now, there had been two and good evidence of two. They might be down there as a covering force and a scouting force to detect with their carrier planes the advance of our raiding force, which they could anticipate well by looking at the geography just along there where they stretched and thereby allow their land‑based planes to make an attack in force without having to do scouting.

Senator LUCAS. Did you ever learn thereafter whether your evaluation of that carrier was correct?

Captain LAYTON. No, sir; I don't believe there has been anything found, any evidence found anywhere that one carrier was in the Marshalls. There was evidence of two carriers in the Palau area and they attacked the Philippines on the morning of December 8 Philippine time, December 7 our time.

Senator LUCAS. The fact is that the evidence before this committee shows that the Japs expected to lose one‑third of their task force.

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. You are familiar with that?

[13058]

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. Do you know upon what basis they might have figured that in view of the complete surprise?

Captain LAYTON. That figuring was done before they had the complete surprise, Senator.

Senator LUCAS. Yes.

Captain LAYTON. They sat down and worked this out on a game board. They moved their forces and they had members of their general staff act as Americans, while the members of their task force who worked this out acted as their own selves, Japanese, and in working this out they did not, so I am told, anticipate getting off scot free and the umpires which you always have in a game of this nature assessed them one‑third carrier damage. Based on that they anticipated one‑third carrier loss.

Senator LUCAS. Well, in other words, regardless of how they finally reached the conclusion, they did not expect to be as successful in this surprise raid as they were.

Captain LAYTON. I believe their success surpassed their fondest dreams.

Senator LUCAS. In other words, they expected the Army and the Navy in Hawaii to be on the alert and give them some battle instead of finding them the way they were?

 

4902 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

 

Captain LAYTON. That is true. They also gave the Army and [13059] Navy in Hawaii credit for far more planes than we had, in their war‑college game board they worked out in advance.

Senator LUCAS. That is probably true. I am glad that we did not have more planes there the way it turned out. Of course, it may be that if we had had more planes they might not have struck, too; that is another angle. If we had had enough there to have had long‑range reconnaissance around the perimeter, they probably may not have taken a chance.

Now, one other question. I think that is bordering along the line of a question I previously asked. I quote from Colonel Clausen's testimony. Senator Ferguson said this [reading]:

 

Did you find that that same thing took place in Washington?

Colonel CLAUSEN. In Washington, Sir, I think there was far more cordial and freer exchange, but the same thing applies, Senator.

For the sake of the country it should be known that there was evidently some jealousy between the services, and this thing existed prior to Pearl Harbor.

Senator FERGUSON. And it existed in Washington, Hawaii and the Philippines?

Colonel CLAUSEN. That is what I understand. In other words, what a ludicrous situation is presented if you have [13060] a fleet intelligence officer, Captain Layton, saying he gave information to Colonel Raley but would not tell Colonel Raley where it came from. How would Colonel Raley know to evaluate it?

Senator FERGUSON. That is what I was going to get at for many days in this hearing here in Washington.

Colonel CLAUSEN. If I can make one simple contribution to this case, and if anything comes out of this hearing, it would be that you pursue the idea of having one agency and let that thing be coordinated on a business basis, so you do not have monopolistic agencies trying to hide the information for themselves.

 

And that is practically what you agreed to a little while ago in the question I propounded to you.

Captain LAYTON. That is basically what I said without the adjectives.

Senator LUCAS. Yes, sir. I think that is all.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, may I ask one question?

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. Was there a separate Coast Guard set‑up at Hawaii?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir; I believe the Coast Guard set‑up was separate but I am not positive.

Mr. MURPHY. Do you know whether they had a separate in- [13061] telligence service?

Captain LAYTON. Their radio intelligence personnel worked with and side by side with the Navy.

Mr. MURPHY. But they had a separate intelligence man; did they?

Captain LAYTON. If they did, I never saw him; I never heard of him. I do not believe that they did, sir. The Coast Guard was concerned with the coastal waters alone there.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, they were firing on the morning of the 7th; weren't they?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir. I was not saying anything to detract from the Coast Guard's fine record.

Mr. MURPHY. No.

Captain LAYTON. I meant that their service was entirely limited and as such they came under the commander of the Fourteenth Naval District, and as a fleet intelligence officer I would not have cognizance over matters pertaining to the Coast Guard.

 

PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE  4903

 

Mr. MURPHY. I have been asked the question as to whether or not the Coast Guard were fully alerted on the morning of December 7 and ready to meet the attacks coming in there. Do you know anything about that?

Captain LAYTON. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. That is all.

Mr. GEARHART. Mr. Chairman.

[13062]

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Gearhart.

Mr. GEARHART. Captain, if I understood your testimony, you attributed great importance in the achieving of the success the Japanese carrier obtained to their ability to maintain radio silence over their ship movement.

Captain LAYTON. More than that, Mr. Gearhart.. Radio silence alone would be a give‑off if they had been in the traffic, but they were not in the traffic at all throughout the month. When the build‑up came, they were not addressed. They had all the rest of these commanders addressed, but they were not. It was not unusual, but the fact they were not addressed and the fact that they were apparently unconcerned with this entire matter and operating no radio, whether as originators or as addressees, led us to the belief, erroneous as it was, that they were unconcerned and were remaining in home waters, probably preparing for future operations.

Mr. GEARHART. Wouldn't you have described that as a complete radio silence? They were just simply not involved in radio at all.

Captain LAYTON. It is more than radio silence, sir. Radio silence involves a ship or unit or series of units not using their radio but being addressed.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, if you are being addressed and there is no directional radio broadcasting, how can that help you?

[13063] 

Captain LAYTON. I mean if they are addressed in the traffic, their future activity may be forecast.

Mr. GEARHART. I would like to have you define something that I have been hearing over and over again. What do you mean by "traffic"?

Captain LAYTON. Well, sir, traffic is a broad term for all the radio messages that pass on the many, many circuits that a Navy has. I imagine the Japanese had somewhere around 200 different circuits as of December 7 or before, and they have a peculiarity, maybe I should explain, that is different from that in ordinary usage.

For instance, if a ship is at Kure in southwest Japan, and it is going to Ominata in the Hanshus, under normal circumstances he would send a movement report in which he would address the chief of the main reporting division in Tokyo, the commandant in Kure, where he was leaving, and to the naval station in Ominata, telling him he was coming. That would then be placed on the Kure broadcast. It would then go to the Tokyo broadcast, it would be picked up and broadcast on the Ominata broadcast, and by putting these together and watching their sequence you could forecast that this ship was going to go from Kure to Ominata. That is the way we forecast the task force that was going to the south.

Mr. GEARHART. I understand that all right, but I cannot [13064] understand what you mean when you say it is not the equivalent of radio silence when a ship is simply not mentioned on the radio at all,

 

4904 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

 

no messages go from the ship and no messages are addressed to the ship. Now, isn't that absolute radio silence?

Captain LAYTON. It is more than radio silence, sir. If the ship itself merely remained silent and does not use its radio, that is generally called radio silence.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, it is a complete condition of no sending.

Captain LAYTON. It is a blank condition obtaining.

Mr. GEARHART. That is what it is, yes.

Captain LAYTON. Yes.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, you attributed great importance to the Japanese attack—in their attack on Pearl Harbor—to the fact that they were able to achieve their super two‑way silence.

Captain LAYTON. Yes, Sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, what I would like to know is, is your attachment of importance to that condition which was produced, is that a hindsight matter or was that a principle that you had in mind before Pearl Harbor?

Captain LAYTON. I think I stated, sir, that it was a hindsight observation that I would like to give in 2 minutes. The fact that ships could go under radio silence was well known but never in the history of the Japanese naval communication that I had observed over a period of years had such a phenomena ever occurred.

[13065]

Mr. GEARHART. Well, an order for radio silence of some degree—I do not want to argue over terms, but an order for radio silence of some degree was imposed on American ships issued from the Pacific Fleet Command, was it not?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, Sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, an examination of logs of ships has disclosed, at least one of them, the Boise, that enemy ships were sighted in American waters adjacent to Guam on the last couple of days of November of 1941.

Captain LAYTON. I believe that is true.

Mr. GEARHART: You have learned that?

Captain LAYTON. I have read of that; yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. The fact that the Boise sighted enemy ships in American waters, adjacent to Guam, was never reported to you?

Captain LAYTON. That is true, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. That is because of the order of radio silence; is that it?

Captain LAYTON. That, I believe, was the result of the interpretation of the captain on radio silence.

Radio silence as ordered is general in terms. You will maintain radio silence and will only break it in case of emergency.

This being a peacetime mission that the Boise [13066] was on, he maintained a radio silence. Whether he had an alternate in his directive or not, I do not know.

As a matter of fact had the Boise reported sighting the ship near Guam, it would have added nothing to our store of knowledge as we had already suspected some of the ships in the southern Pacific force were going down to Palau.

Mr. GEARHART. It would have been important to know because it would have been a confirmation or proof of a fact which you merely suspected?

 

PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE  4905

 

Captain LAYTON. That is true, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Also, an examination of the log of the U. S. S. Wright in Hawaiian waters discloses that they sighted enemy ships on the 6th day of December 1941. Was that reported to you or to the fleet?

Captain LAYTON. No, Sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Would that have been important information for you to have received?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, Sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Under the orders for radio silence, do you think the commander of that ship or the captain of that ship was under an obligation not to report it, or did he exercise bad judgment?

Captain LAYTON. By no means, Sir. I would say that was [13067] a case of bad judgment.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, can you tell me of any other instances where the order of radio silence prevented Admiral Kimmel's command from obtaining information they should have had until after the 7th day of December 1941?

Captain LAYTON. I do not recall any at first‑hand; no, sir. I do not recall any rumors either.

Mr. GEARHART. How is that?

Captain LAYTON. I do not recall any; no sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, does anything occur to you along that line that you should report to us?

Captain LAYTON. No, Sir. I am being honest when I say I do not recall any such instance being brought to my attention at any time.

Mr. GEARHART. Did you have anything to do with the issuing of that order for radio silence shortly before Pearl Harbor?

Captain LAYTON. No, Sir. That would be the communications officer.

Mr. GEARHART. Was it not inspired or suggested by reason of your belief that the control of radio use was so important?

Captain LAYTON. No, sir; none whatsoever.

Mr. GEARHART. I think that is all.

[13068]

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Are you through?

Mr. GEARHART. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. When Mr. Shivers was before the Roberts Board he spoke of a message of December 6, you spoke of one of December 5, and one of December 4, another of December 4, and one of December 3.

I do not know of any place in the record as to whether or not they were known in Hawaii before December 7.

Do we, counsel?

Mr. MASTEN. They were messages from whom?

Mr. MURPHY. They were messages from Kita. I will ask it this way:

Captain, on December 6, 1941, from Togo, Foreign Minister, to the consul at Honolulu:

 

Please inform us immediately of any rumors of movements of warships after the 4th.

 

Signed, "Togo." Did you know about that before the 7th?

Captain LAYTON. No, Sir. I believe Mr. Shivers got that after the 7th, sir.

 

4906 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

 

Mr. MURPHY. That series of messages?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. He did not make it clear to the Roberts [13069] Board.

Captain LAYTON. Those are the ones Captain Rochefort referred to, that they worked on some after the 3d and were not able to break down until I believe it was the 10th, he said, at which time I know they were given to the district intelligence officer to use, and Mr. Shivers was shown those.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Is that all?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I just want to inquire if the Japanese ships were up in the "vacant sea," and without receiving radio messages, would the throwing of the beam to those ships, as I understand you can do, and being intercepted by your station, would that indicate that they were reaching ships in the "vacant sea"?

Captain LAYTON. The which sea?

Senator FERGUSON. It has been referred to as the "vacant sea," from Japan over north 2 or 3 hundred miles, north of Oahu.

Captain LAYTON. Well, if they were using a beamed antenna, shooting its beams only in a directional way, and they were not heard in Hawaii, and they were not, heard in Cavite, there was still a chance that the radio direction finder unit as Dutch Harbor in the Aleutians would have heard [13070] them, and being a part of Captain Rochefort's mid‑Pacific direction‑finder net, they would so have reported it, and that would have been given considerable weight.

Senator FERGUSON. Then if the Japanese information indicates that on the 6th they sent out the message Climb Mount Niitaka," if that was broadcast to the fleet to the Jap Fleet, that should have been picked up by the Dutch Harbor unit?

Captain LAYTON. I read that Japanese report with considerable interest.

Senator FERGUSON. Have you an opinion on it?

Captain LAYTON. I am of the opinion that "Climb Mount Niitaka or any other such code phrase, was never transmitted.

Senator FERGUSON. You believe they went in there under radio silence both ways?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. In and out?

Captain LAYTON. No, sir; they broke radio silence right after the attack.

Senator FERGUSON. I mean until the attack took place?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir.

The fact is that the minute the attack was commenced, the direction-finder bearings were placed immediately on, [13071] think, the Akagi and Kaga and they were immediately identified.

Senator FERGUSON. You mean by our radio station?

Captain LAYTON. At Hawaii.

Senator FERGUSON. Then why did not we send some planes up there?

Captain LAYTON. Unfortunately, Senator, the direction‑finder bearing is bilateral; it runs two ways. They did have one direction finder which could take a unilateral bearing, or a one‑direction bearing.

 

PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE  4907

 

The communications in that station were completely out all the forenoon, until late afternoon. They sent their information in by sidecar, or bicycle, or some such slow transportation.

Our direction finder at Haeia on the north part of Oahu was sending, and was giving what had come to that set what was called bilateral bearings.

As an example, the first information I received was 10:40 local time, Oahu, bearing bilateral 357°, or 178° true from Haeia.

Senator FERGUSON. Then do I understand you went south to find these ships instead of going north?

Captain LAYTON. It was not a case of misleading at all, sir. The radio direction finder gives you two bearings; [13072] this way and that way [indicating]. It is the nature of the instrument and it cannot be helped.

Additionally, at that same time, they had reports, vague as they were, of carriers to the south, and that gave cause for thinking that the carriers were to the south, plus the report previously by Com 16 intelligence unit that there had been carrier divisions in the Marshalls, and that also influenced their thought that they, might have come from the Marshalls.

Therefore, the preponderance of evidence indicated a southerly direction, while actually that was not true.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, the radar man found these planes coming in from the north.

Captain LAYTON. So I have heard, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did not anyone think of calling up the radar man to find out whether some radar did find them coming in?

Captain LAYTON. I do not know at first‑hand, but I was informed that several efforts had been made to obtain that information from Fort Shafter that morning, without results.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the gentleman yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. Are you familiar with Captain Rochefort's testimony before the Roberts commission, about him charting [13073] the planes to the north?

Captain LAYTON. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Haven't you known that Captain Rochefort did have some charts that pointed to the north, and he got it by cross‑bearings?

Captain LAYTON. Those bearings I believe you referred to are the ones of the following day, when we had the direction finder fixed to the northeast of Midway and northwest of Oahu, but at that time they were seven‑hundred‑and‑sixty‑odd miles from Oahu and we had no planes available to carry bombs out that far and have a chance of getting back.

Mr. MURPHY. Are you clear on the fact that Captain Rochefort was speaking of the next day?

Captain LAYTON. I do not know whether Captain Rochefort was speaking of the next day. I know that the only fix we had—and I would be the person who got the fixes—was the following day.

Mr. MURPHY. Are you through, Senator?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. I would like to ask one question

The Japanese have supplied information to the effect that they sent out the message "Climb Mount Niitaka" and the Navy, 3 months

 

4908 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL IIAR13OR ATTACK

 

ago or 4 months ago presented us with evidence to that effect. Have you ever expressed [13074] your doubt to anyone in the Navy before this occasion as to the authenticity of that testimony?

Captain LAYTON. No, sir; only to my assistants in Pearl Harbor when I first read that report from the strategic bombing survey.

Mr. MURPHY. If you have been able to break the Japanese naval code—I don't want to press the thing

Mr. RICHARDSON. Which one? There are two.

Mr. MURPHY. I am talking about the fact we have been given evidence here, and I don't want to indulge in any arguments on it. I would like to have you, sir, since you made a flat assertion, state on this record why you disbelieve the testimony that is in the record.

Captain LAYTON. Had they transmitted that message, whether in code or plain language—and it is my understanding that in that code, or hidden‑word message "Climb Mount Niitaka," they used plain language

Mr. MURPHY (interposing). Have you read the testimony in this record?

Captain LAYTON. Not nearly all of it, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. What is that.

Captain LAYTON. Not nearly all of it, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. I am talking about this specific incident. Have you read the testimony on that in this record?

[13075]

Captain LAYTON. No, Sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Have you read the reports from Japan?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, Sir.

Mr. MURPHY. You have read the report as to how they did it?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, Sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, what do you differ about in that report?

Captain. LAYTON. Had they broadcast that, I think we would have heard it, if it were broadcast "Climb Mount Niitaka".

Mr. MURPHY. Yes.

Captain LAYTON. Had they encoded it and addressed it to Commander, Carrier Division, who was the commander concerned, we would have the address that day, but we did not have. it.

Mr. MURPHY. You feel then if there was one message some time during the night that you would be most certain to catch it?

Captain LAYTON. There was an intense watch kept from about the 25th to the 26th of November to try to find carrier frequencies. You see, every once in a while the Japanese would change frequencies, and then you would have to search to find them. It is a very difficult problem, but [13076] it can be solved.

Mr. MURPHY. In other words, everybody was looking for carrier frequencies right up to December 7?

Captain LAYTON. Yes, sir; and they came up on regular frequencies that morning.

Mr. MURPHY. The only way you could find them, if you could not find them by radio, was by reconnaissance, was that right?

Captain LAYTON. By reconnaissance, or by some merchant ship, or by picket boats, or submarines.

Mr. MURPHY. Even though you were working intently to find them by radio and could not find them, there was no substitute other than by way of ships or planes to do it, was there?

 

PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE  4909

 

Captain LAYTON. None that I am aware of.

Mr. MURPHY. You base your statement on this message not being broadcast, or on your failure to hear it at Hawaii?

Captain LAYTON. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. That is all.

Senator FERGUSON. Just one question.

Did you ever have any war games of an air attack upon Hawaii that came from any other direction than out of the north from the "vacant sea"?

[13077]

Captain LAYTON. I do not recall any, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That is all.

Senator LUCAS. Just one more.

Captain, do you care to express an opinion on whether or not our national defense and our security has been benefited or hurt as the result of this investigation?

Captain LAYTON. Do you want the truth, sir?

Senator LUCAS. Yes, Sir.

Captain LAYTON. I believe that the investigation has hurt our national security to an incalculable degree by so much publicity being given to the decryption activities.

While it may serve a very fine purpose for the future, that is my personal belief. I have the conviction that any potential enemy we ever have now or in the future will be watching his code books and cipher machines, and call signs, and our information, that we have obtained with some success against Japan in the past, will not be in that fine shape that it was, mediocre as it was, on December 7.

After all, if you recall, there was a book once written by a man named Yardley, called "The Black Chamber," and he exposed the reading of the Japanese diplomatic notes to the Washington conference at the time of the 5‑5‑3 ratio in 1922.

Senator, you would hardly believe it, but the‑Japanese [13078] naval ciphers in those days were pretty simple. Their call signs were even more simple. They were abbreviations of the full name, like "Kag" for Kagani. After they read that book they treated us language students with suspicion and rightly so, and they changed their codes and ciphers very fast, and the information we were able to have in the past, which was a prop to national security was knocked out from under us.

I believe the investigation here will have the same effect in the future, and I say it with no disrespect to any member present.

Senator LUCAS. Of course, it is unbelievable that a hearing of this kind could be held during the war.

Captain LAYTON. The war would still be going on if you had, Sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. We thank you, Captain, for your appearance and the information you have given the committee, and your apparent desire to be helpful to us in this inquiry.

You may be excused, sir.

(The witness was excused.)