PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5027

TESTIMONY OF GEORGE E. ELLIOTT, JR., FORMERLY SERGEANT, ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES

(Having been first duly sworn by the Chairman.)

Mr. RICHARDSON. Sergeant Elliott, will you state your name for the record?

Mr. ELLIOTT. George E. Elliott, Jr.

Mr. RICHARDSON. How old are you?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Twenty-eight, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You are not in the service at present?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir; I am lucky enough to have been discharged 4 months ago.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You were on duty in Hawaii at the time of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That is right, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. In what division of the Army?

Mr. ELLIOTT. I was in the Signal Corps, Aircraft Warning.

[13381]

Mr. RICHARDSON. And that brought you in contact with the radar sets that the Army had on Oahu?

5028 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir

Mr. RICHARDSON. You were present at one of those mobile radar sets on the morning of the attack?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Can you indicate on this map, Sergeant, where the mobile station was located, and where you were on the morning of the attack?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Indicate on this map where the station is located where you were on the morning of the attack.

Mr. ELLIOTT. The station was located at the top of the mountain, I believe they call it Opana, at the northernmost point of the island of Oahu, as I indicate here [indicating].

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, coming to this map, Sergeant, this colored chart of what is supposed to be a radar chart of approaching Japanese planes prior to the attack, you were at this point [indicating]?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That is correct.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Will you indicate with the pointer where you saw any indication of approaching planes, where it would be on this map?

[13382] Mr. ELLIOTT. At this point up here [indicating] 3 northeast at the azimuth that they came in on.

We picked them up at the mileage of 136 or 137 miles. That was the very first indication of the flight that we had picked up.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, follow with your pointer, just generally how the planes came down toward your station.

Senator BREWSTER. Will you place the time so it will be identified?

Mr. RICHARDSON. What was the time when you first found any information of planes?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That was 7:02.

Mr. RICHARDSON. All right; now, follow with your pointer the course, as nearly as you can recall it, that the planes followed as you watched them on the radar.

Mr. ELLIOTT. I believe that they came in on a very straight line. I do not recall of their being any differences, as indicated here. It was fairly straight.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, when they approached your station, did they disappear finally from your radar?

Mr. ELLIOTT Yes, sir; they disappeared at approximately 15 to 20 miles away from the island. We lost them due to distortion from a back wave from the mountains, and [13383] it was impossible to follow them further than we had.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Up to the time they disappeared, had there been any diversion of the planes? Were they still all in the main group which you had seen at 7:02?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir; they were all in the same group, so far as I know.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That is the last you saw of them?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir

Mr. RICHARDSON. Who was with you, Sergeant, at the time these planes were sighted?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Another private, Joseph L. Lockard.

PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5029

Mr. RICHARDSON. Who first saw these planes? You or Lockard?

Mr. ELLIOTT. We actually both saw them together.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What discussion was there between you with reference to the matter when you saw them?

Mr. ELLIOTT. At the time I was receiving instructions on the operation of the scope. Lockard looking over my shoulder noticed that there was a target, so he, knowing more about the operation of the scope, actually took over the control there. I went over to the plotting board and we got an azimuth and mileage and figured out a reading as to the location where the flight was, where the target was.

Mr. RICHARDSON. How long did that take you, would you [13384] say?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Well, just a very short time.

Mr. RICHARDSON. A minute or two?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Less than a minute.

Mr. RICHARDSON. All right, go ahead

Mr. ELLIOTT. At that time I suggested to Private Lockard that we send it in to the Information Center. Private Lockard, figuring that our problem was over at 7 o'clock, disagreed as to sending the reading.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What do you mean by your problem was over at 7?

Mr. ELLIOTT. The normal operating period at that time was from 4 in the morning until 7 in the morning.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Was that true on weekdays as well as on Sundays?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir, I believe it was.

Mr. RICHARDSON. For how long a period prior to the morning of the 7th had you been on the 4 to 7 status?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Well, our particular station at that time had only been set up, it was only in operation about 2 weeks before December 7th.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And during that whole 2 weeks, were you on the 4 to 7 schedule?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes. sir, I believe we were.

[13385]

Mr. RICHARDSON. Had there been other men in the station up to 7 o'clock that morning?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir; the only ones present at the station were Private Lockard and myself.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, before that, during the 4 to 7 period that morning, had there been other men on this station?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Oh, yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And what had become of them?

Mr. ELLIOTT. I do not quite understand.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What became of them? How did it happen that only you and Lockhart were left there?

Mr. ELLIOTT. I will have to go back to December 6. It was a standing rule that we would keep two men at the unit at all times.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Twenty-four hours of the day?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. All right.

Mr. ELLIOTT. That was for protection of the unit. They were armed with .45 guns.

5030 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Mr. RICHARDSON. That was to protect the unit? It was not to operate the unit as a radar system?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Well, they were there to protect the unit but they did not operate.

When the men that operated came to the station, the [13386] two men that guarded the unit were there at the same time, although they did not do any operation.

Mr. RICHARDSON. All right; go ahead now.

You got back to the 6th? What were your hours on the morning of the 6th?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Well, we went out to the station at Opana to relieve the two men that had been on the unit, guarding it all the week. We went out there to give them a break, more or less, to come in and get a pass to go to town.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you go out as guards?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir; we went out as guards. The idea was we would stay there all night and be there at 4 o'clock in the morning, to start working on our problem.

Mr. RICHARDSON. This was the night of the 6th?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Go ahead. When did the other men that had been on the station during the night leave?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Well, there had been no other men there since 12 o'clock on December 6, when we relieved them, when Private Lockard and I relieved them.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Then, as a matter of fact, from 4 until 7 on the morning of the 7th you two were the only men at that station?

[13387]

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir. We were the only two at that station from noon of December 6 through 8 o'clock on the morning of December 7.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And that was the station at Opana?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. At the farthest north station?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. The station most immediately adjacent to the whole northwest sector north of Oahu?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. All right.

Now, at 7:02 you two men discovered planes on your target?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes. sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You suggested that you contact the information center?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. At first Lockard did not approve of that?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir. That was after we had figured out the reading from the azimuth and mileage. At that time I spoke to Private Lockard. I even recall saying to him since he did not want to send it in, even if we sent it in and the Army and Navy would work together, they may not [13388] know just whose planes they are, but if we worked out through the information center and had it not on any scheduled problem, that it would be more effective as to actually going out there and intercepting like, say, the Army go out and intercept planes, or vice versa.

PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5031

Finally, after mentioning a few of those things to Private Lockard he finally told me to go ahead and send it in if I liked.

Mr. RICHARDSON. How long from the time you discovered the planes was it until you concluded to phone the information center? How many minutes?

Mr. ELLIOTT. I would say offhand 7 or 8.

Mr. RICHARDSON. During that time, you could still see the target on your charts, these planes coming from the north?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You called up the information center?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir. We had two phones in the mobile unit: One was a direct line, a tactical line, as it was called. That was from the plotting board directly to the information center which was located at Fort Shafter.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Which phone did you use?

Mr. ELLIOTT. I picked up the tactical phone on the plotting board, and I found nobody on the other end at the [13389] information center.

After that, I went to the administrative line and called the information center.

After getting the information center--

Mr. RICHARDSON. Who answered?

Mr. ELLIOTT. A corporal or Private McDonald answered the phone. He was a switchboard operator at the information center.

Mr. RICHARDSON. All right.

What conversation occurred?

Mr. ELLIOTT. At that time, I explained to Private McDonald what we had seen, and he told me that there was nobody around there, and he did not know what to do about it.

I asked him if he would get somebody that would know what to do and pass on the information, and have him take care of it.

Well, a few minutes later--

Mr. RICHARDSON. How many minutes? Just make a guess.

Mr. ELLIOTT. Two or three, I would say.

Mr. RICHARDSON. TWO or three. All right.

Mr. ELLIOTT. Two or three minutes later, this lieutenant that is referred to, or was first referred to in the Roberts report, called back to the station, and Private Lockard [13390] picked up the phone and spoke to the lieutenant.

It was at this time that the lieutenant told us to forget about the flight.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, now, you, of course, did not hear what the lieutenant said over the telephone.

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir; I did not.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What did you hear Lockard say over the telephone, to whomever he was talking?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Well, he only acknowledged that we were to forget it, that we were to forget the flight.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did Lockard say anything to the lieutenant about having discovered planes coming on the chart?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir; I believe he did. He again repeated the distance that we had picked up the planes.

5032 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Mr. RICHARDSON. When Lockard had finished his telephone conversation, what did he tell you the lieutenant on the other end said?

Mr. ELLIOTT. He told me that the lieutenant said to forget it.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did he say anything about the lieutenant mentioning what these planes might be, or from where the planes might be coming? Did he make any statement that the lieutenant had mentioned that subject to him over the telephone?

[13391]

Mr. ELLIOTT. I do not recall whether or not he did.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I am referring to the question of whether the lieutenant mentioned the fact that a flight of B-17's from San Francisco was expected in that morning, and that these planes were probably those planes.

Was there any discussion on that subject by Lockard in reporting the telephone conversation to you?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That is what I do not quite remember. I cannot place it together, whether we received that information then, or whether that came out after the publicity of the Roberts Commission.

I cannot say for sure.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, what did you continue to do after the end of the conversation over the telephone with the lieutenant at the information center? What did you and Lockard continue to do, if anything?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Private Lockard at that time wanted to shut down the unit and just go off the air, and the original intention was that I was to have gotten further training on the unit. I insisted again, and we continued to operate.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You could still see the plane target?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And you followed it in until it got within about 20 miles of your station?

[13392]

Mr. ELLIOTT. That is right, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, then, did you make any chart of the course of those planes?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir. We had an overlaid chart; that is, a transparent paper that is put over the map itself, of the island, with true north on the overlay. That is, the grid lines on the overlay were true north on the map, and in the center is a radius, a mileage radius rule.

From your azimuth and your mileage you can plot exactly where your location is on the map. That is used so that you could have a record of all the flights that you had.

In other words, as you posted your target on this overlay, you could take it off of there and put it on a new sheet of transparent paper and continue on again.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, you did complete a chart following the course of those planes as they approached your station?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you make any readings?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir; we had a running log, a record of reading sheets that covered the time, mileage, azimuth, and coordinate readings.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And you filled that out?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5033

[13393] Mr. RICHARDSON. When did you leave the station that morning?

Mr. ELLIOTT. It was approximately 15 minutes of 8.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Where did you go?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Our station at Opana was 9 miles away to our camp where he billeted and of course coming down the mountain to the highway took some time, and then the 9 miles was from the highway.

Mr. RICHARDSON. How did you go?

Mr. ELLIOTT. At approximately just shortly before 15 minutes of 8, a private--

Mr. RICHARDSON (interposing). How did you go, by shank's mare or in a car?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That is just what I am going to explain.

Mr. RICHARDSON. All right.

Mr. ELLIOTT. Just a few minutes before a quarter of 8, Private Farnback came out in a truck to pick us up, and take our bedding and ourselves back to the camp.

Mr. RICHARDSON. He took you back to the camp?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON What time did you get back to the camp, do you think?

Mr. ELLIOTT. It was very close to 8 o'clock.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you have with you either your chart [13594] or your readings?

Mr. ELLIOTT. We only had the record of readings, the log.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did your record or reading log show the direction from which these planes were coming?

Mr. ELLIOTT. It could have been replotted on the map with the information given to get the exact location of the flight.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What did you do with that log?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That log was turned over to a Lieutenant Upson, the commanding officer of the two platoons that were out in that particular camp.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Was it turned over immediately upon your return to the camp?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir. We were very proud of the reading that we had gotten; that is, the distance out, and we brought it along, not knowing what was taking place, but it was just the fact that the reading was a very good reading.

We brought it back to show it off, so to speak.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, you gave it to your platoon commander?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir

Mr. RICHARDSON. Do you know what he did with it?

[13395]

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir, I do not.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Who was your platoon commander?

Mr. ELLIOTT. A First Lieutenant-at that time Second Lieutenant John Upson.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And he was in the Aircraft Warning Division?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Who was his superior, if you know?

Mr. ELLIOTT. A Captain Tetley.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And where was he stationed?

5034 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Mr. ELLIOTT. He was stationed in Schofield Barracks, at the head quarters. That is where the main body of the company stayed.

We had several headquarters. We had the Fort Shafter, at the Information Center was one headquarters; and also within the same company we had the headquarters at Schofield Barracks, where most of the men stayed; and then, of course, we had the outlying platoons, where we had our individual stations.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Where and to whom would your platoon commander have reported to his superior?

Mr. ELLIOTT. He would have reported directly to Captain Tetley.

Mr. RICHARDSON. At Schofield Barracks?

[13396]

Mr. ELLIOTT. At Schofield Barracks; yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Do you know who was over Tetley?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Offhand, I believe it was Colonel Powell, although I am not sure of the chain of command.

Mr. RICHARDSON. They were all in the aircraft warning section?

Mr. ELLIOTT. I am not sure about Colonel Powell. I believe he was head of the Signal Corps installations.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And the material which you had given to your platoon commander could have been read by any competent person to whom it came, and would indicate where you saw the planes, the direction from which they came, and when they disappeared from your view?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir; very definitely, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. With the times of day involved?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir; an identical chart could have been made, as is indicated up there on the map.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you remain in camp after you arrived there and during the attack?

Mr. ELLIOTT. NO, sir; we stayed in camp only long enough to get up our main belongings that we would need, and we went right back to the unit 9 miles away.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And you stayed at the unit the rest of the day?

[13397]

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir; we stayed there day and night from then on; we did not go back to the camp.

Mr. RICHARDSON. There were two operating phones to that unit?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did anyone call you up while you were there to inquire concerning what you discovered and the details?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir; they did not call me. They called back, but Private Lockard answered the phone.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Who called him, do you know?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Well, as I said before, it is explained as this lieutenant through the Roberts report. That is the only knowledge I have actually as to who called.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Someone called him?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Well, the information was relayed by Corporal McDonald at the switchboard to the lieutenant.

Mr. RICHARDSON. You do not get what I mean, I don't think, Sergeant.

Mr. ELLIOTT. You mean the lieutenant called--

Mr. RICHARDSON. After you came back from the camp on the morning of the attack, after you came in at 8 o'clock and turned over your reading, you then went back to the station, as I understand it.

PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5035

[13398]

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes.

Mr. RICHARDSON. While you were at the station did anyone contact you to find out what you knew about the incoming planes?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That, sir, I could not answer.

When we went back to the unit, we did not go back to-at least I did not, and I do not recall just what Private Lockard did-we did not go back to the operation. The operation of the unit was being manned by other men in the platoon.

As is I recall, we were busy setting up tents, since we were not going to travel back and forth to our old camp.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, but, Sergeant, did anybody come to you during that day and ask you to tell them what you saw in the radar at 7 o'clock that morning?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir; only the men at our individual camp that were interested to know just what had gone on.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, by the time you had worked around there for awhile, all of the men at that unit knew the story of what had happened to you and your companion after 7 o'clock in that radar station that morning?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir; very definitely. sir

Mr. RICHARDSON. And if anyone had called that unit on the telephone they could have gotten that information from [13399] practically anybody on the job, could not they?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. When you went back from camp to your station, did you have any instructions from your officer in camp as to what you were to do, or anything of that kind?

Mr. ELLIOTT. None at the camp. We were just told to go back to the unit and that we would receive all of our instructions. That is, it was understood as to the working arrangement, what we were going to do, arranging the camp, and so forth, that would have been taken care of out there.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Did you get any instructions after you got back to the camp?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Only as I said before, that we broke up into different groups.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I see.

Mr. ELLIOTT. And did the necessary work.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I see.

When did you first know of the attack?

Mr. ELLIOTT. At the time that we arrived at our camp. However as we were going to the camp, and just, oh, about a quarter way away from the camp, we noticed from our truck all of the men from the camp driving very fast in the opposite direction in which we were going. They were going to the unit.

[13400]

They had their field packs, and helmets, and what not.

We still had no indication as to what had happened until we arrived at the camp, when we were told that we had been attacked by the Japanese.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I have no further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Sergeant, if I understand you, this unit up there on this mountain at the tip of the island, was under guard 24 hours of the day by somebody.

5036 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. What were they guarding against?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Well, the only thing they were guarding against was to see that no one came around to interfere with the equipment we had.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, during 4 hours of that 24, or 3 hours, from 4 to 7 in the morning, the radar station was in operation?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Why was it in operation during those particular hours?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Well, those were the instructions that we had from our company commander, and, as I imagine, they came from--

The CHAIRMAN. Headquarters.

Mr. ELLIOTT. He had taken the orders from higher head- [13401] quarters.

The CHAIRMAN. Did the selection of those 3 hours from 4 to 7 have any relationship, as far as you know? Was it generally understood that those hours were selected because they might have some relationship to a possible air attack?

Mr. ELLIOTT. As a matter of opinion, as I would have looked at it at the time, I would say we were not operating under those conditions. I mean, it was more practice than anything else.

[13402]

The CHAIRMAN. As far as you were concerned, and Private Lockard, you were students, in a sense, you were practicing to become more proficient in the operation of the radar station?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir

The CHAIRMAN. But there must have been some reason why, from 4 to 7 o'clock in the morning was chosen as the hour during which the station was to be in operation. Would you be able to inform the committee, if you have any opinion, as to why those hours were chosen?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir; I could not.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not know about that?

Mr. ELLIOTT. I could not form any opinion.

The CHAIRMAN. Those hours were fixed by higher officers?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know who determined that it should be done from 4 to 7?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Well, only through the information center, down through the chain of command from Captain Tetley, our commanding officer. But that was understood, that we were to work from 4 to 7 in the morning.

The CHAIRMAN. Was there any information passed down to you as to why those hours were selected?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir.

[13403]

The CHAIRMAN. Did you learn anything about that at any time, either before or after the attack, as to why those hours were chosen for the operation of the radar?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir. That angle of the question of 4 to 7 never came up, that I recollect.

The CHAIRMAN. You don't know whether it had any relationship to the general feeling that if an attack occurred there it would be sometime in the early morning, around daylight or sunrise?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You have no information on that?

PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5037

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Now how far were these planes when you first picked them up?

Mr. ELLIOTT. They were actually 137 miles.

The CHAIRMAN. One hundred and thirty-seven miles. And you traced them all the way in until they got within 20 miles?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir; I believe that is what it was, until they got within 20 miles

The CHAIRMAN. How long did that take you, or how long were they in making that flight from 137 miles to 20 miles, within that distance?

Mr. ELLIOTT. I am not particularly sure. I think it was about 20 minutes of 8.

[13404]

The CHAIRMAN. About 20 minutes of 8?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Between 7:35 and 20 minutes of 8.

The CHAIRMAN. So from 2 minutes after 7 until approximately 20 minutes of 8 you were tracing these planes in toward the island?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, did you call, or did Private Lockard, or either one of you, call the central information station while they were being traced in, or after you lost sight of them?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir. We sent it in-I sent it in to the switchboard operator I would say about actually 7:07 or 7:08

The CHAIRMAN. I did not get that.

Mr. ELLIOTT. 7:07 or 7:08. I picked up the flight at 7:02.

The CHAIRMAN. You picked up the flight at 7:02?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. At 7:07 or 7:08, 5 or 6 minutes after that, after you picked up the flight, you phoned in to the central information center?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir. We gave them the reading as of 7:02.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you continue to call them as you got [13405] the reading as the ships came in closer?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You did not?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir

The CHAIRMAN. Just that one call?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That was when we carried on, when he was told to forget.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you recall the name of the lieutenant who told you to forget it?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir, at the time I did not know.

The CHAIRMAN. You did not know at the time?

Mr. ELLIOTT. I think it was Lieutenant Tyler. I mean this information I received later.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Did you know anything about the expectation that some B-17's or P-17's were scheduled to come in from Francisco?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir. I know that I did not know about it before we picked up the target, and as I told Mr. Richardson here, I am not sure just when we actually did find out that those were B-17's.

The CHAIRMAN. You did not know that they were coming in from San Francisco? Would you have known whether they were coming from the north, the direction in which these planes you picked up were coming or would they have come [13406] in more directly from the east?

5038 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir; we would not have known that.

The CHAIRMAN. You would not have known that?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No. That would have been handled in the information center, probably by the liaison officer, and they would not pass that information to us.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, with your knowledge of the island out there, and the directions generally from there toward Japan and toward California, would you be able to say, if you thought they were B-17's, would you have expected them to come in from that direction?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. From the north?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Ordinarily; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Why would they do that?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Well, that would have been the closest route.

The CHAIRMAN. From San Francisco to Oahu would they come in from the north?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir. That would bring them in just about the place where the flight was picked up that morning, at 3 northeast.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all.

Mr. Cooper.

[13407]

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Sergeant, you were then a private?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You and Lockard were both privates?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. How long had you been engaged in this radar work?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Only about 3 months.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Three months?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Not quite three months.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You were still being trained for that type of work?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Was Lockard your instructor?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir; he was.

[13408]

The VICE CHAIRMAN. How long had he been engaged in that radar work?

Mr. ELLIOTT. I am not sure. I believe that it might have been a year or so. I can't say on that.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Then he was considered as an experienced, capable radar man and qualified to give instructions to you?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir; so far as the operation of the unit went he knew the different phases of operation.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And you and he worked together there that Sunday morning in operating the radar?

Mr. ELLIOTT Yes, sir. During the problem he operated the scope and I operated the plotting board. In other words, the targets that he would have picked up from the scope he would have relayed the information and I would have plotted it on the map and followed through on sending it to the information center at Fort Shafter where they would have coordinated with the liaison officers as to whether anybody had a flight in that particular area, and from then on they would have followed through.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. What was the name of that station where you were?

PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5039

Mr. ELLIOTT. Opana.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. O-p-a-n-a?

[13409]

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, you had been on duty there from 12-o'clock noon on Saturday, the day before?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir

The VICE CHAIRMAN. As guards of that station?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And then during the period from 4 o clock on Sunday morning to 7 o'clock on Sunday morning you operated the station?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And you were due then to go off duty in the operation of the station at 7 o'clock ?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir. The original plans were that we would stay there until 12 o'clock noon Sunday, December 7, and at that time the two men that we had relieved the day before would have been back on pass and they would have taken over the guarding of the unit.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. They would have taken over as guards?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir. And then we would have returned to our camp. However, that was changed and it was decided that since they came back from there, on a pass, earlier, they figured they would come out to the unit at 8 o'clock in the morning.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. But you were due to stop operating [13410] the unit at 7 o'clock?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And from 7 o'clock on until you were relieved you were to just serve as guards there?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir; but that also at that time we were to continue on with my instructions, my further instructions as to the operation of the unit.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, it was more or less voluntary on your part as you wanted to get as much training as you could?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And voluntary on Lockard's part to give you that training?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. After 7 o'clock?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. So you were just staying on on a voluntary basis after 7 o'clock?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And you just continued to practice?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. After 7 o'clock?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And then at 7:02, why, you picked [13411] up this flight of planes coming in?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir. I wonder if I could make mention of the fact that at the time that we reported off the air to the information center by our clock at the unit I am very sure that time was 6 minutes of 7 and I can't recall just whether or not we had made a time check with the information center. But I know very definitely that the time

5040 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

on the clock when we actually closed down the unit, that is, went off the air with the information center, was approximately 6 minutes of 7.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Six minutes before 7 o'clock?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You notified the information center?

Mr. ELLIOTT. We were told at that time that the problem was over and that we were to go off the air. In other words, we wouldn't forward then to the information center.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Anything you received after 6 minutes to 7 o'clock you would not send on to the information center?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir. The point I am trying to bring out there is that it was 6 minutes before 7 and I don't recall whether or not we had made a time check to verify the time with the information center.

The CHAIRMAN. That is, your clock showed 6 minutes [13412] to 7 and you don't know whether you synchronized your time with the information center?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That is right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. So that from the time you were told by the information center at 6 minutes before 7 o'clock that you could go off, the remaining time then was just on a voluntary basis by you and Lockhart?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And you picked up this flight of planes coming in at 2 minutes after 7 o'clock?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And within 5 or 6 minutes after you first sighted them, why, you undertook to contact the information center to tell them about it?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir. It was between 6 and 8 minutes, offhand. I can't recall just what it was.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Between 6 and 8 minutes after 7 o'clock?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Somewhere between there.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And when you used the first phone there was nobody that responded at the information center?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir. That was the actual phone that went through to the actual plotting table in the information center.

[13413]

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That was the phone you were supposed to use to give that information?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And there was nobody that responded at the other end?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That is right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Or, at the information center?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That is right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Then you used the other phone which you say was the administration phone?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And Private McDonald answered that switchboard?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And you gave him the information and he told you that there was nobody there to tell him what to do about it?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5041

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And you asked him to please get word as quickly as he could to somebody who would know what to do?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir. I might mention that as I was explaining it to McDonald on the switchboard I spoke in a very nervous voice and from the time that I spoke that way [13414] Lockard seemed to take more note of what I was trying to do in sending in the reading although I didn't know at the time that they were enemy planes. It was just that I did talk over the phone in a very nervous tone of voice.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That was probably your first experience of that type, was it?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir, it was.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I see.

Mr. ELLIOTT. It probably was the idea of getting such a large flight of planes at such a distance, because ordinarily before then we hadn't picked up anything really over 100 to 110 miles, I would say. But this was very big and it was very noticeable and it was just something out of the ordinary.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. It was out of the ordinary to the extent that you were a little bit excited about it?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And also proud of your achievement?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Well, yes, sir. I only wish that it could have been followed through. It could have saved any number of lives.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, you really did do a good job in the work you did there.

Mr. ELLIOTT. I hope I did sir.

[13415]

The VICE CHAIRMAN. How many men were there at that time that operated this radar?

Mr. ELLIOTT. In our platoon we had, I believe it was, 18 men. Out of that 18 men there were three drivers, I believe, truck drivers, and I believe there were two cooks.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That would leave--

Mr. ELLIOTT. That would leave--

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Thirteen.

Mr. ELLIOTT. Thirteen.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Operators.

Mr. ELLIOTT. Operators; yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, although you were still in training and had not had the experience that Lockard had, why, the events of that occasion showed that you had become rather efficient in that line of work.

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Te VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, just how did you conduct this type of work Sergeant? Was there a platoon or squad or definite number of men assigned to each of these radar units?

Mr. ELLIOTT. We had the men assigned; we had what we called the crew chiefs, and I believe with the assigned strength that we had they only had two men under them, and the three men together each operated the unit in shifts of, as I recall it on December 7 especially, very close to that [13416] time, we operated 4 hours on duty on the radar, 4 hours on guard on the unit, and then 4 hours off, and then repeating 4 hours on the unit and so forth; and I believe at that time we had four different crews.

5042 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Four different crews of two men each?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir. There were three men, actually three men, on each crew.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Three men on each crew and you had four crews?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir. I believe that is the way it was set up; yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And you had four crews?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, of course, then you spent as much time on guard duty as you did in operating the unit?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir. The number of men we had at that time was not a sufficient number to operate 24 hours a day.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, now, if all the operators had been used for operational purposes and ordinary infantry soldiers had been used for guard duty, you could have done that, couldn't you?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Oh, yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And ordinary infantry soldiers could [13417] have been used for guard duty, and were used for guard duty at all other places around the island, weren't they?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir; but there were none assigned to us at that time.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I know, but that could have been done, for the guard duty?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And then that would have left all of you operators to work in shifts just in operational work?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Well, yes, although in the Army they sort of put you to work to the best advantage. In other words, they wouldn't have considered us working 4 hours on the unit and 8 hours' rest, whereas they probably would have fixed it up 8 hours' work and 4 hours' rest.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Yes; that could have been done.

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir. I mean that is the general practice, so to speak.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. What was done in that respect after the attack, after December 7, how did they do it?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Well, at the time I believe we received a few more men from the company. I would say offhand four or five to help out in the operations. We operated under those conditions for approximately 3 weeks.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. After December 7?

[13418]

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir. And at that time our company was enlarged to a regiment and we had some men transferred there from the Infantry to enlarge our company and the infantrymen were to be trained in the operation of the unit.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. They assigned other men there on the island to train in radar work?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That was done after December 7?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir; approximately, I am not sure whether it was 2 or 3 weeks. It was somewhere in between that time.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The forces were greatly enlarged then?

PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5043

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir. Instead of 18 men, as we had on December 7, we had approximately 40 men. That was 2 or 3 weeks after December 7.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I see.

Mr. ELLIOTT. But they had to be trained.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. But those same men had been on the island before December 7?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Now, what hours did you operate the unit after December 7?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Twenty-four hours a day, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Twenty-four hours a day?

[13419]

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. After December 7?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You increased it from 3 hours to 24 hours a day?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, didn't anybody have to go to the hospital as a result of that, did they?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Well, none that I recall, sir. They were probably afraid to go to the hospital.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. I would like to ask one other question.

You say that you called this information center about 7 or 8 minutes after 7?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And talked to Private McDonald at the switchboard. He was the switchboard operator?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. How long was it after that before Tyler came back and talked to Lockard?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Between 1 or 2 or 3 minutes, I don't recall. It was fairly shortly.

The CHAIRMAN. From the time of that conversation between Tyler and Lockard until you went into the information [13420] center did they call back any more to seek any information about these planes?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir. The last time that we talked to the information center during the flight that we had plotted, the plane flight, there was no other conversation about it. Now then, when the flight was finished and we took the record of the reading sheets back to the platoon commander, he passed that on, I imagine, to the company commander.

The CHAIRMAN. That was about a quarter to 8?

Mr. ELLIOTT. At the time that we went.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, the attack was on right away pretty soon after that?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir. As I understand it it was on about 5 minutes of 8.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. There is one question I overlooked.

5044 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

You told us that after December 7, why, the hours of operating the station were increased from 3 hours to a full 24-hour basis.

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. And the men held up all right under that. Did this wear out the sets, radar sets, did they operate all right?

[13421]

Mr. ELLIOTT. Well, our particular set was somewhat of a good set. I mean, we continued operating, I don't know just whether we were lucky or what, but we didn't have very much trouble. Another thing I might mention is that the different units on the islands could overlap each other and where one went off for servicing, and incidentally we did go off an hour a day for servicing and repair, they would cover the particular unit that went out.

But so far as having any serious trouble with the unit I don't recall any.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You don't recall any?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator George.

Senator GEORGE. You say you have been out of service about 4 months?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir; since the 20th of September last year.

Senator GEORGE. When did you enter the service?

Mr. ELLIOTT. On November 12, 1940.

Senator GEORGE. Where did you enter the service, from what State?

Mr. ELLIOTT. I entered in Chicago, sir; Chicago, Ill.

Senator GEORGE. And do I understand that you and Mr. [13422] Lockard were the only two people at this station from midnight, say, of the 6th until the morning of the 7th, when you picked up this flight of planes?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes sir.

Senator GEORGE. There was no one else there?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir, I might make a comment, if I may.

Senator GEORGE. Yes.

Mr. ELLIOTT. On December 8, I believe it was-well, on December 7-Lockard, Private Lockard was called into the company commander, Captain Tetley, and Captain Tetley sent him back to the unit for a statement from Lockard and myself, a signed statement as to what had happened. And at that time Private Lockard told me that he wanted me to incorporate in the statement the name of a man that was not there, the man that ordinarily would have run the motor, the motored generator for the unit. It was put to me that they wanted to keep the records straight.

The C. O. called for no one to operate the unit unless the motorman was present to operate that motor and we were not qualified motormen or mechanics to do that.

However, in that statement that I have given reference to I wouldn't agree to that, to incorporating this other man's name in that statement. The statement itself was just, it was put in the form of "we". Everything that was written [13423] in there was "we" did this and "we" did that. There was no individual "I" did this or "I" did that.

Senator GEORGE. But actually you and Private Lockard were the only two people at the station at this unit?

PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5045

Mr. ELLIOTT. That is correct, sir.

Senator GEORGE. I fix the time arbitrarily from midnight on because that was the important time. And you say at 7:02 you picked up the planes on the radar 3 east of north?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. Could you tell anything about the number of planes in the flight?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir; not definitely. You could just tell that there was a large number.

Senator GEORGE. Now, on that very point, Sergeant, I think the committee would like to have full information. Did you judge it to be a large number of planes?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir; by the size of the echo we judged it to be a fairly large number of planes.

Senator GEORGE. And not merely one or two or three or four planes?

Mr. ELLIOTT. We knew that it was not one or two or three or four since at that distance the echo would have shown up very much smaller. This was very definitely very [13424] big.

Senator GEORGE. And you picked up this flight actually at a distance of about 137 miles?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. Now, you say that when you called to make the report you did not find anyone at the station except Private McDonald as I believe you said his name was?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir; McDonald.

Senator GEORGE. And within a very short time, 2 or 3 minutes, someone did call and Private Lockard did the talking to the officer who called?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir. Private Lockard was the nearest to the phone and picked it up and spoke to the lieutenant.

Senator GEORGE. You have since learned that the officer who called was a Lieutenant Tyler?

Mr. ELLIOTT. I don't believe at that time the name was mentioned, but the only thing that I knew was that it was some officer that had called and told Lockard to forget it.

Senator GEORGE. To forget it; just to forget it?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir. As I recall I never did know the name of the officer until sometime later.

Senator GEORGE. But your best information subsequently secured was that he was Lieutenant Tyler?

[13425]

Mr. ELLIOTT. Not at that time.

Senator GEORGE. Not at that time, but I mean since that time. That is your present information, in other words?

Mr. ELLIOTT Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. Where is he now?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That I don't know, sir

Senator GEORGE. Did he remain in the service on the island after the 7th of December?

Mr. ELLIOTT. I don't know anything about Lieutenant Tyler, with the exception that he has, as I understand, been promoted through the grades to lieutenant colonel. That is all I happen to know.

Senator GEORGE. I wanted to find out if he had been promoted.

Mr. ELLIOTT. That is all that I know of the man in question

5046 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Senator GEORGE. Now, I further understand you were able to follow this flight of planes in until your radar was broken by the projection of the mountains. In other words, you traced them in or followed them in until they were within about 20 miles of the island?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That is right, sir.

[13426]

Senator GEORGE. Were any other radar stations on the island in operation that morning?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir; there were. Offhand, I don't know how many. One that I do know definitely of was on until 7 o'clock.

Senator GEORGE. Until 7 o'clock?

Mr. ELLIOTT. I believe they continued on a little after 7 also, and they had a partial record of the flight that we had picked up. It wasn't quite out as far as the one we had picked up because the station itself was right on the coast-it wasn't up higher in the air.

Senator GEORGE. It didn't have the elevation?

Mr. ELLIOTT. The efficiency wasn't as great, but that is the only station that I know of that actually picked up any portion of the flight that we recorded that morning.

Senator GEORGE. I believe that is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Clark.

Mr. CLARK. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lucas.

Senator LUCAS. Sergeant, what do you mean by the technical term "echo"?

Mr. ELLIOTT. The screen goes about a circle-about a 6-inch circle. On this screen you will see a horizontal line, and that horizontal line was broken up from zero to 150 [13427] miles of scale. At the point that the target is hit by the transmission being sent out and referred back to the unit it will come up and there is a break in that line and there extends a vertical line up. Then, by the mechanism on the scope, we bring the air line over to the echo, and that is where you get your mileage. But the echo looks like a straight line, and at a right angle a vertical line up, which is the particular target that you see.

Senator LUCAS. When you first discovered these planes, did you find more than one?

Mr. ELLIOTT. As I recall it, there were a couple of other flights, but we only followed the main flight because we had all we could do to follow that one.

Senator LUCAS. Would you care to give the committee an estimate of the number of planes you thought, from radar, was in that flight.

Mr. ELLIOTT. Any figure that I would say, or that we did have in mind would be only a guess.

Senator LUCAS. I understand that, but it would be interesting to the committee to get the guess, from your experience out there with this radar.

Mr. ELLIOTT. I really don't recall even guessing that there were any particular number. We knew that there were probably more than 50, but, of course, we didn't know. I [13428] mean, it all enters into the picture just how high the plane is flying and just where you strike it, as to the size of the echo you might get.

Senator LUCAS. Now, do you recall when you talked to Private McDonald over the phone, whether you indicated as to the number of planes you thought might be in this flight?

PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5047

Mr. ELLIOTT. There was no definite number stated. It was just that there were many, very many.

Senator LUCAS. Will you recall, and this may have been given before I came in, will you recall again the substance of the conversation that you had over the phone with McDonald?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir. I called Private McDonald on the administrative line and told him who I was and explained what we had found.

Senator LUCAS. Can you say what language you used? Can you remember the exact language that you used? I don't suppose you do recall.

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir. As I said before, I said it very nervously, and as to the exact wording, I couldn't say.

Senator LUCAS. All right.

Mr. ELLIOTT. I gave him the information that there were a large number of planes coming in, and gave him the location, that is, the reading of those planes.

[13429]

Senator LUCAS. Where was the information center on the island located with reference to Opana?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Well, that was down in Fort Shafter. Fort Shafter itself was about, I believe 8 miles from Honolulu.

Senator LUCAS. And Fort Shafter is where General Short and his staff were located?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir. That was the Hawaiian Department headquarters.

Senator LUCAS. You had a direct communication from the radar station to the information center?

Mr. ELLIOTT. We had two lines. One, a tactical line was connected directly to the information desk where the individuals would place their targets in respect to the map.

Senator LUCAS. What was your understanding as to what the information center was supposed to do with the information that you sent day after day while you were in that training program?

Mr. ELLIOTT. By plotting the different targets that we sent in, the plotters on the end of the information center would plot the targets on the table with the map.

Directly overhead in a balcony would be the liaison officers and signal officers and they would determine as [13430] they saw the target going up in that locality, each unit, each liaison officer would decide whether it was his flight or not, and if nobody could identify that flight, of course, they had prearranged routers that their planes would be taking, and if no one could identify that flight it was considered an enemy flight.

Senator LUCAS. Did you ever learn, Sergeant, whether or not those men who were charged with this responsibility were on duty morning, December 7, 1941?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir. I had no contact with them. I mean, I assume that they were there. That is all I can say. I didn't have direct conversation with any of them, to know.

Senator LUCAS. I understand.

Now, how long had this training program been going on from 4 to 7 in Hawaii?

Mr. ELLIOTT. AS I recall, it was going on all the time that we were n operation which was 2 weeks prior to December 7.

Senator LUCAS. Two weeks-prior to December 7.

5048 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

As to the other units and the time for duty, 4 to 7, I would not be able to state.

Senator LUCAS. Did you get any different information [13431] or orders after November 27, 1941?

Mr. ELLIOTT No, sir; none that I can recall.

Senator LUCAS. Well, now these men in the plotting room, these men in that plotting room, as I understand it, were presumed to take your findings and were supposed to work them out, between the hours of 4 and 7 each morning?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That is correct; yes. sir.

Senator LUCAS. And were they too on duty after 7 o'clock; is that your understanding?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That is my understanding; yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. So could it be possible that the reason Lieutenant Tyler said, "Forget it," was because they had no one there to carry through?

Mr. ELLIOTT. It might be interpreted that way.

Senator LUCAS. But anyhow, if these men in the plotting room had taken this intercepted radar message and plotted it properly, there wouldn't have been any question but what they could have probably determined whether or not this particular flight was enemy planes or otherwise?

Mr. ELLIOTT Yes, sir; they could have, but I think it would have possibly reverted to the same thing that came up, and that was the B-17's coming in. It is just my opinion, but I think the Japs knew every move we made.

Unless they considered that it was not the B-17 flight, [13432] as you say, nothing, probably, would have been done about it.

Senator LUCAS. If these men in this room charged with the responsibility of making that determination were there, they undoubtedly would have known how many B-17's were coming in from the coast?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir; they would have had that information.

Senator LUCAS. And if they had that information and a flight of planes turned up on this radar screen to the extent that you said, possibly 50, then certainly they would have known definitely, under those circumstances, that there was something unusual and probably would have considered it an enemy flight of planes?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. I don't believe there were over 14 B-17s.

Was there anything, when you picked up the planes, was there anything in the way the planes were flying so that you could make a determination as to whether or not they might be fighters, pursuit planes, or bombers, or what not?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir. I don't recall offhand how fast they were going. We could have figured it out by the [13433] time element just how fast they were going, but that would not have been our responsibility. I don't know as though we could determine just whether it was a fighter plane going slow or a bomber going faster. But at that time it was very hard to identify whether it was one plane or a large number of planes.

Senator LUCAS. That is testimony in the record. It was difficult, according to the testimony, to determine whether it was a hostile plane or a friendly plane that was coming in.

PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5049

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes. As I said, from my knowledge of how the information center worked, the only way they could tell at that time whether it was enemy or a friendly plane, was by checking up on their own flights, and if they didn't have any flight in that particular area, it was considered an enemy plane.

Senator LUCAS. Sergeant, did General Short ever call you to headquarters to talk to you about this?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Did Colonel Phillips ever talk to you about this?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir.

[13434]

Senator LUCAS. Did anybody on General Short's staff ever take enough interest in this radar situation to call you and discuss it with you?

Mr. ELLIOTT. They hadn't called me in at all. Private Lockard was called in to speak to the company commander. Whether he spoke to anybody else after he spoke to the company commander I do not know.

Senator LUCAS. Did your own company commander ever talk to you?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir; he did not. He called private Lockard only, Private Lockard only testified before the Roberts committee.

Senator LUCAS. You did not. Have you testified before any committee heretofore ?

Mr. ELLIOTT. I have testified before the Army and Navy committees only.

Senator LUCAS. Your testimony, I presume there, was about the same as you have given here?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir; only I have had a little more freedom, so to speak, here.

Senator LUCAS. You feel a little freer with Senators than you do with generals, is that it?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Very definitely, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You have got on a different uniform [13435] now.

Senator LUCAS. I want to include the Congressman in that, too.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. He is wearing a different uniform now.

Senator LUCAS. So after the attack on December the 7th no one in the Army ever discussed this question with you at any time in trying to learn any additional or further information about what happened until the Army Board got hold of you. I am talking now about anybody in General Short's command or any officer now. I am not talking about any particular private that you probably discussed it with.

Mr. ELLIOTT. I don't know whether you were in here when I told of the statement.

Senator LUCAS. No, I was not.

Mr. ELLIOTT. Well, anyhow there was a statement prepared by Lockard and myself to the effect as to what was done on that morning.

Senator LUCAS. Who asked you to prepare that statement?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That was relayed to me through Lockard from the commanding officer, Captain Tetley, when he had gone in to see the company commander.

Senator LUCAS. They merely asked you and Lockard to get together and make a joint statement?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

5050 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

[13436] Senator LUCAS. Nobody ever talked to you individually about it at all?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir.

Senator LUCAS. That is all.

Mr. ELLIOTT. The statement was very brief.

Senator LUCAS. Thank you, Sergeant.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Are you through, Senator?

Senator LUCAS. Yes.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Murphy of Pennsylvania will inquire, Sergeant.

Mr. MURPHY. Sergeant, on December 7 it was then Private Lockard and Private Elliott, was it not?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That is right.

Mr. MURPHY. And you got your orders from Sergeant Murphy on Saturday, didn't you?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. There were supposed to be four men out there, weren't there?

Mr. ELLIOTT. The set-up originally I believe was set for three.

Mr. MURPHY. You were supposed to have four or five, weren't you? Weren't you supposed to have a crew chief? Weren't you supposed to have somebody plotting? Weren't you supposed to have somebody on the other part of the instrument [13437] and somebody was there watching after the equipment? Farmbeck was supposed to be out watching the equipment, is that right?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That is right, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. They didn't show up, the other two; did they?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That was not adhered to. I mean the table of organization for the operation of the radar detector unit calls for-I believe it called at that time for five men, one motorman and the other a crew chief and three operators.

Mr. MURPHY. Right. And there were only two there?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir; there were only two.

Mr. MURPHY. How is that? Where were the other three?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Well, that I don't recall, other than just operating short-handed.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, isn't it a fact that you two were only out there to guard the machines with your guns as part of the antisabotage program?

Mr. ELLIOTT. I would not go so far as to say that it was part of the program. It was just a-as we understood it a precaution that the company commander was taking for the equipment that was out at that station.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, did you tell the Army Board that you were there for antisabotage purposes?

Mr. ELLIOTT. I don't recall whether they interpreted it that way or whether I said that or not.

[13438]

Mr. MURPHY. Well, we will get your exact language, and I will get to that in a minute.

Now, I notice in that chart, Sergeant, you and Lockard were the only two at the Opana station, and you were there from Saturday noon until 7:39 on Sunday morning. Who was it that plotted those marks, "6:48, 6:45 and 6:51"? What about those planes?

PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5051

Mr. ELLIOTT. The only thing that I can explain of that, as I can recall, was that there were no targets during the scheduled problem.

Mr. MURPHY. That is right. The evidence is you had no targets, and while the radio interceptor station was working, in all probability there are enemy scouting planes out, and when you have them and think they are identified, call the interceptor station and tell them while the enemy are at a distance.

Is that a fair question then?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Well, if those planes were out there and we had them on our chart--

Mr. MURPHY. You had it on your chart, but you never called and told about it; did you?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. You did not report it?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir; we would have no reason for not [/3439] reporting them.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, the fact is that you had no chart of any kind and you were there on the machine, you and Lockard, and there are planes out there; there is no evidence that they were our planes. We had no planes to the north, this question of the B-17's, because they did not come in there, and the only thing that is left to infer is that there are enemy scouting planes and they are not turned in to the interceptor station by you or Lockard, are they?

Mr. ELLIOTT. I wonder if you could produce the chart so that I could verify it to you in my own mind?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes. Will you produce the chart, please? My only purpose, Sergeant, in asking this question-I don't want to embarrass you. There is some question about that interceptor station working from 4 to 7 and you were only following out the orders you got, weren't you?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. And at that time, that time of the morning was very vital?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Here is planes at 6:30.

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY 6:45 is the first one.

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes.

[13440]

Mr. MURPHY. That is an important schedule. Now, the actual attack does not come until around 7:30 and the fact is that there are no American planes out to the north and that is to the north of the island and in all probability there are enemy scouting planes out in there and I am wondering, if the interceptor command station is working, why Lockard did not have a message reflected to it of an attack coming, especially in view of the fact that there is so much testimony about the Ward sighting a submarine.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What good does it do? This boy saw only one flight.

Mr. MURPHY. The fact is, sir, no one asked him this question and they were both there on the machine. Somebody plotted it and he should know.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Well, nobody asked him about it.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, nobody asked him but I think he should be asked about it. We are coming to the end of this hearing.

5052 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Who was it, sir, if you know, that made that plot as to those planes?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Why, as I.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Is this your plot as you made it?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, we have the plot that he did make. We have a picture made by officer Murphy, certified to by [13441] Murphy.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Let him go ahead and finish; his explanation.

Mr. MURPHY. Yes, sir.

Mr. ELLIOTT. This chart was not taken down after the completion of this schedule-I mean this flight at 7:02. That chart was left on the map and it was used on through, I believe for-I think you will find the times on there.

Mr. MURPHY. In other words, you had there a chart on which plots were made. Did you have a log book?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir; we had the log.

Mr. MURPHY. Did the log book remain there?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That would have been--

Mr. MURPHY. Wouldn't that be the regular procedure, to leave the log book there?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. And wouldn't it be the regular procedure to leave the log sheet there on December the 7th?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, you have told counsel that you took that log sheet down and gave it to Captain Upson.

Mr. ELLIOTT. I took the log sheet down. The sheet that I took was a more or less scrap paper report.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you ever testify--

[13449]

Mr. ELLIOTT. I mean it was not the official four to seven scheduled period that we had. It was just something that you plot in on another form.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you ever testify before any other board that you took that sheet to this captain?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir; I don't believe that I have.

Mr. MURPHY. Did you ever say it to anybody until you came into this room?

Mr. ELLIOTT. I told one of the gentleman off the record last night that was talking to me about that.

Mr. MURPHY. Who was that off the record? Who was it on or off? Whom did you talk to for the first time about taking the log sheet down town? Who was it? Name him, please.

Mr. ELLIOTT. I believe it was you, wasn't it, Mr. Richardson?

Mr. MURPHY. You mean only to counsel, our own counsel?

Mr. RICHARDSON. I had a conversation with him yesterday afternoon.

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. I am just wondering if that is the one. Who was it that you told yesterday about this log sheet?

Mr. ELLIOTT. I have been talking to so many.

Mr. MURPHY. No, you were only talking to one about the log sheet. Who was it? Don't have any hesitancy.

PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5053

[13443]

Mr. ELLIOTT. I believe I talked to Captain Ford also on that.

Mr. MURPHY. Who was it you told about delivering a log sheet to Captain Upson? I am going to go into that.

Mr. ELLIOTT. I believe it was Mr. Richardson.

Mr. MURPHY. That is the only one?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, now, when you called that morning Tyler said, "Forget it," didn't he?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir; well, that is the information that was passed on to me; yes.

Mr. MURPHY. Lieutenant Tyler said, "Forget it"; and the fact is, sir, you thought they were our Navy planes coming in, didn't you?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes; later.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, didn't you say before the other two boards that you thought they were our Navy planes coming in?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Well, yes.

Mr. MURPHY. And you also thought that it would be a fine problem if we could have Army interceptor planes go out to meet our own Navy planes as experience; isn't that true?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir; that was an opinion I expressed at that time.

Mr. MURPHY. All right. Now, you testified here about [13444] nervousness on each occasion. Did you have the intimation at that time of morning that those were enemy planes?

Mr. ELLIOTT. I cannot truthfully say that I did.

Mr. MURPHY. Right. After Lockard said, "Come on, let's go home" you wanted to stay and you did stay until about 7:30, didn't you, after 7:30?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Then the truck came and you went downtown?

Mr. ELLIOTT. To the camp.

Mr. MURPHY. To get breakfast?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. And immediately upon getting there you found out that war was on, didn't you?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Yes. And at that time you did not associate your chart at all with the war starting, did you?

Mr. ELLIOTT. I wonder if you would repeat that last question.

Mr. MURPHY. I say at that time when you heard that war had started did you associate the idea of having charted planes up on the hills and Japanese planes?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir. After we found out what had happened we very definitely knew that the flight that we had plotted was the enemy flight.

[13445]

Mr. MURPHY. You knew it that morning?

Mr. ELLIOTT. We were fairly sure.

Mr. MURPHY. Is that what you told the Army board?

Mr. ELLIOTT. I don't recall telling it to the Army board.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, it may not be of any importance, but you have mentioned a captain and there has been a lot of testimony about the failure of the officials, the top command, in getting this information.

5054 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Now, you have designated a lieutenant. Maybe I shouldn't mention names. You have designated a Captain Upson, about having given that sheet to him, and you never said a single word about it until 2 weeks ago and you testified you even went downtown and got breakfast after the start of the attack.

Now, that puts a burden on Captain Upson that I want to straighten out, because the papers will carry that story all over America. If you did, I would like to know it. If you did not, I would like to know it.

Mr. ELLIOTT. I am sure I did not have the question put to me before of what actually became of the record of reading sheets.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, you never mentioned the sheet before, did you?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Well, I--

Senator LUCAS. Mr. Chairman, I don't want to interpose [13446] an objection, but I can't see how this is pertinent or material.

Mr. MURPHY. The gentleman himself, Mr. Chairman, has asked a great many questions about that, if the Army knew about this thing and this witness has gone into it and I for one am not going to let some little second lieutenant carry the burden of this thing if it is not lying upon his shoulders, and there is not yet a single word of evidence in this case from Pearl Harbor about that little second lieutenant-maybe he is a big second lieutenant, I don't know; maybe he is a general.

Senator LUCAS. He is a lieutenant colonel now, I know that.

Mr. MURPHY. Maybe he is, but the fact is he is entitled to the same protection as anybody else and I think we ought to get the facts.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Proceed, but let us keep to information that you know of your own knowledge, Sergeant.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, Sergeant, that was your plot that morning and there were only you and Lockard there and how did you come to put those designations on that plot, if you know?

Mr. ELLIOTT. You mean the original chart of that flight?

Mr. MURPHY. NO, no; I am going beyond 7:02. Here somebody has charted some planes, apparently, at 6:45, that is a quarter to seven, 6:48, 6:50, 6:51, 6:51 1/2. You two put them on there. There were only two of you there. Who put them on?

[13457]

Mr. ELLIOTT. The writing there shown on the record of reading sheets I believe very definitely is my writing; I am very sure.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, was that that you saw some planes out in there at that time?

Mr. ELLIOTT. The plot would have gone through to the information center. I mean there would be no reason for me and Lockard to hold back any plots.

Mr. RICHARDSON. He is just asking you whether those plots were put on there by you.

Mr. ELLIOTT. Let me see it again.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I have it.

Mr. MASTEN. Mr. Murphy, this is the original signed by Lieutenant Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. Lieutenant Colonel Murphy?

Mr. MASTEN. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. Sergeant, maybe I can help you.

PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5055

Before the Army Board in question 22 General Frank said:

"What I am trying to ascertain is whether on the morning of December 7th there was more activity than usual or whether there was less activity than usual or was it average?

"Sergeant ELLIOTT. well sir during our problem on Sunday there was practically no activity at all.

[13448]

"General FRANK. Prior to this time?

"Sergeant ELLIOTT. Prior to seven o clock yes, sir. We had no plots to send in to our information center and had no targets.

"General FRANK. That is on the morning of December 7th. Now, it may be that at that time the Generals did not know about it, it may be that at that time you did not recall these particular indications on there and I do not want to place the responsibility on you."

All of these experts since Pearl Harbor, so far as I can see, have never gotten clear as to what those indications are, and it is getting on record for posterity, and certainly it is on the Board to show on the record what they are.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What difference does it make to this Board if somebody else found something else?

Mr. MURPHY. He is the one that charted them on the plots indicating it.

Mr. RICHARDSON. What of it?

Mr. MURPHY. The question is. Did he send them downtown?

Mr. RICHARDSON. He certainly knows that.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, if that had been put on the chart, and he was sure about that, that there were planes out there, and we had no planes out there, and there may have been 20 planes out, he should have sent that information in.

[13539]

Well, I won't press it, Sergeant. You made the plot on there. Do you recall whether you called and reported this information that morning?

Mr. ELLIOTT. The only comment I can make is if those planes were picked up as a target it would have been reported. We would have been defeating our purpose, especially in getting up at 4 o'clock in the morning.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, probably after 7 o'clock you were getting special training. Did you have the earphones on your ear in connection with the interceptor station before 7? Do you remember that?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir, I did not.

Mr. MURPHY. Who was it that had the earphones on, or did anybody?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Private Lockard was the one that had the-that did the visual detecting at that time.

Mr. MURPHY. And then apparently he said something to you and you wrote in these little indications there on the sheet, or was that only practice? Maybe there were no planes, but you plotted it on there. Now, do you remember that?

Senator LUCAS. Will the Congressman yield a minute?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes; sure.

Senator LUCAS. Does that plot show, 6:48 a. m. or 6:48 p. m. up there? As I recall, there was some testimony, [13450] although I am not certain now--

5056 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Mr. MURPHY. Well, if it is his handwriting he was not plotting at night, so it must be morning. He did not go back to plotting.

Senator LUCAS. Well, that may be true.

Mr. ELLIOTT. I think you will find on this record-of-reading sheet I believe the date is put in there and signed by a "Murphy". Will the gentleman take this apart, please?

Mr. MURPHY. May I just say this, Sergeant? The reason I am pursuing this, a witness before the Board here, the very first witness, Admiral Inglis, told us that the Japanese sent out scouting planes. That has not been pursued. It may be that those are the scouting planes; I don't know.

Mr. ELLIOTT. Well, on the 7th of December, as this record-of-reading sheet indicates and as I have admitted in my own handwriting with the exception of the date-I don't believe that I put that in there. You notice the difference in the--

Mr. MURPHY. Is it your judgment, Sergeant, that the times indicated there from 6:45 on were in your handwriting?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. And is it your judgment that you would not put them on there unless they indicated that there was a plane in that vicinity?

[13461]

Mr. ELLIOTT. They would have been on the overlay; yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. They would have been put on the--

Mr. ELLIOTT. If they were put on this chart here as a target.

Mr. MURPHY. But at any rate if you put it there, by you putting it on there it would indicate that on that morning that in their place there was a plane. Do you have any recollection of it?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, do you know how--

Mr. ELLIOTT. I know now we had-you see, during the problem I don't think it was really necessary at that time to have an overlay. That is, it is very possible that I went ahead and took these readings; figuring out where the location was giving me the code names and code letters to forward that information.

Mr. MURPHY. What I mean is you would not put something on that chart that morning if there had not been a plane there to the north of the island at 6:45?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. And you have no recollection now, or do you have a recollection as to whether you reported that through your head phone set via Lockhart to the station downtown?

[13452]

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir. I was under the impression, so far as remembering that, that there were no flights at all. If there were, there were very few, as the few here indicates.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, our information is that there were only a few scouting planes.

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. But you do not have any distinct recollection about reporting that or any conversation in connection with it, do you ?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No; I am afraid I cannot remember back that far.

Mr. MURPHY. And one of the reasons why your memory is dim now, this is the first time you have been asked about it since December 7, 1941; is that right?

PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5057

Mr. ELLIOTT. That is right. The things that happened prior to that time you wouldn't have time to note that, not knowing.

Mr. MURPHY. I want to make it clear, Sergeant. Far be it from me to want to embarrass you. We want to know the facts. And you don't have any recollection. The fact is there is a problem before this committee.

I have no other questions.

Senator LUCAS. Will the Congressman yield?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes, sir. I am through.

[13453]

Senator LUCAS. What was the ordinary practice that was followed by you and Lockard when you did find a plane through radar? What would you do about it?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Regardless of whether it was Lockard and myself or anyone else, the man operating the scope will get a line on the target, lining up the mileage and the antenna to get the azimuth. He will pass that information on to the information, on to the people--

Senator LUCAS. That was done every day that you were out there in the event that you located a plane or more than one plane coming in?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Was that part of your duty?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. To immediately transmit that information on to the information center?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That is right, sir.

Senator LUCAS. And there was no reason why if you did locate these planes at 6:45, 6:48, 6:50, and at 7 that you did not turn that over, that you did not pursue the same course on December 7 that you had pursued at every other time that you had been out there operating this radar equipment?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes; and I might explain what seems to be a mix-up here, too, that ordinarily before December 7 I am [13454] sure we did not plot the actual plots on the overlay unless there was a fairly good-sized flight, because we had the record with the information that the scope operator passed over to the plotter and keeping a record of the plots that are made you could retrace any flight that you wanted to mark on there, but the point I am getting at is this: That the flight that we picked up at 7:02, that we had to follow a different course because it was our duty and we followed on that follow-up all the way in.

Senator LUCAS. The only point I am trying to make here to clear up the situation is that up to 7 o'clock on December the 7th, 1941, you pursued and followed the same course that you had been following day after day out there as far as transmitting information down to the information center.

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Now, after 7 o'clock in the morning, when you knew that everybody was off duty and you sighted this big group of planes, you immediately thought that it was necessary to make a special call on that and get it to the information center and you so did?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir; I might make the comment, too, that so far as reporting to the information center, regardless of whether it

5058 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

was a distinct overlay, as long as it was on those record of reading sheets that would have been [13455] reported to the plotter at the information center. I mean there would be no point in writing these records down and not send it in.

Senator LUCAS. And, of course, you couldn't tell if you did plot these planes at 6:45 whether it was an enemy plane or whether it was one of our planes?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir; we couldn't tell that.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Senator yield?

Senator LUCAS. I took you off before.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, I ask that the paper which the witness has in his hand, which indicates the 6:45 mark and the others that are in his own handwriting, be placed in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection it will be done and spread on the record now as part of the record.

Mr. MURPHY. I ask, Mr. Chairman, that it be a photostatic copy because it is in his own handwriting.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, the counsel will take care of that.

(The document, subsequently introduced as "Exhibit No. 155," is included in this committee's exhibits.)

[13456]

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Gearhart?

Mr. GEARHART. Mr. Elliott, I was called out of the room for a short time.

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Some of the questions that I want to ask you might have been asked heretofore.

First of all I want to know about your tour of duty on this machine on the 6th and on the 7th.

Mr. ELLIOTT. How do you mean that? You mean to explain it to you?

Mr. GEARHART. Well, what I mean is what hours did you go on duty with the machine and what hour did you leave it on the 6th?

Mr. ELLIOTT. I see. On the 6th of December we were sent out there to relieve two men, to so to speak, guard the unit. We were armed with .45 pistols.

Mr. GEARHART. You mean to guard the unit or operate the unit?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir, to guard the unit.

Mr. GEARHART. All right; what time of the day did you arrive there on the 6th?

Mr. ELLIOTT. It was around 12 noon. We relieved the two men and in sending us out there we were to remain there and at 4 o'clock the next morning we were to operate our scheduled [13457] operating period, 4 to 7 a. m.

Mr. GEARHART. Do I understand you correctly, you arrived out there at noon on the 6th with instructions to guard the machines until 4 the next morning and at 4 the next morning you were with Lockard to operate the machine; is that correct?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That is right, sir. I might explain about this guarding the unit. It was no walking guard post; it was not considered as such. That is the impression that we had. The impression that we had was that there were just to be men there in case anything came up, any prowlers around or anything like that and that is the reason

PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5059

we had the gun there, but so far as any walking guard, or patrolling around there was brought up, there was nothing like that. It was just that somebody should be there and we got arms in case any prowler came around.

Mr. GEARHART. And you and Lockard were there from noon on the 6th day of December 1941 until 4 a. m. on the 7th day of December 1941 and during that time the machine was not operated at all?

Mr. ELLIOTT. The machine between 12 noon and 4 a. m.; the machine was not operated; no, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Was it warmed up?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir; not that I recall.

[13458]

Mr. GEARHART. Did you enter the compartment in which the machine was contained between those hours that I have just mentioned?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir; we had trouble with the oil pump on the generator motor in the power plant.

Mr. GEARHART. You spent some of that time repairing those particular items?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes. sir; we repaired the oil pump.

Mr. GEARHART. How long did it take you to repair the oil pump on Saturday?

Mr. ELLIOTT. It took a good part of the afternoon.

Mr. GEARHART. Is that the reason why the machine was not operating for the entire day, or was it because you were not supposed to operate it that day?

Mr. ELLIOTT. I don't believe there were any direct orders not to operate it. It just was not operated.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, there was an officer's tent, war tent, near the mobile instrument, wasn't there, and that is where you slept that night?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That is right sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Lieutenant Lockard slept there that night, too?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Private Lockard at that time, yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Private at that time?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. How were you awakened? By an alarm clock?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. When was that set for?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Off-hand I do not recall. I imagine around a quarter of 4.

Mr. GEARHART. And when you got up did you have to do anything to the radar instrument to prepare it for service beginning at 4 o'clock?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir; as I recall, we had some small work to finish up on the oil pump. I believe we had worked through until it was dark and we stopped work on it, and all there was left was just to make the connections, and we planned to do that in the morning.

Mr. GEARHART. It was still dark at a quarter of 4, wasn't it.

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. As soon as you were awake did you start to work on your oil pump?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

[13460]

Mr. GEARHART. Before 4 o'clock?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

5060 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Mr. GEARHART. Did you have the machine ready to operate at 4 o'clock in the morning?

Mr. ELLIOTT. We went on the air at 4:15, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. You went on the air before you had completed the oil pump repair?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir; we finished our oil pump repair and reported on the air approximately 4:15.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. What time?

Mr. ELLIOTT. 4:15.

Mr. GEARHART. Then these repairs delayed you?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Fifteen minutes?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Then you went on the air?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Now you said you came on duty, in reference to that machine, at noon on the 6th, the day before?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Now had the men you relieved at that time been operating the machine, or had they merely been on guard on the machine?

Mr. ELLIOTT. I am not sure as to whether they operated it. [13461] I believe they did plotting. They knew how to do it, but they had them assigned there and that was their duty, their straight duty, was to remain there 24 hours a day.

Mr. GEARHART. But you don't know whether or not these men that you relieved at noon on the 6th were operating the machine or merely guarding it?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. And under your general orders you could have operated it after 12 o'clock if you wanted to and the instrument had been usable?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir; I am sure we could have.

Mr. GEARHART. You are definite on the point that you put the machine in operation at 4 or 4:15 o'clock in the morning of the day following?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That is right, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. And you kept it in operation until 7 on the morning of the 7th day of December 1941?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Now there is some confusion in my mind in reference to the hours under which you were working. Did you have a different tour of duty on Sundays and holidays from that which you had on week days?

Mr. ELLIOTT. You mean ~ connection with the time for the problem from 4 to 7?

[13462]

Mr. GEARHART. The operation of the machine.

Mr. ELLIOTT. I believe that was the same through the week, 4 to 7 in the morning.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, how many days had you been with Lockard assigned to that machine prior to the 7th day of December?

Mr. ELLIOTT. For actual operation, 2 weeks, and for setting up the unit another 2 weeks. We moved out there just about a month before December 7.

PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5061

Mr. GEARHART. Now you want me to understand now that the hours during all that 2 weeks for the operation of that machine were from 4 in the morning until 7 in the morning?

Mr. ELLIOTT. AS I have testified before, I am not sure just how long we had been working from 4 to 7. I believe that all the time we were out there in those 2 weeks we operated from 4 to 7, but I am not positive.

Mr. GEARHART. Now are you willing to say, as a matter of fact, that on weekdays the operation hours were from 7 in the morning until 5 in the afternoon, and that it was only on Sundays and holidays that you operated from 4 in the morning to 7?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Not as I recall it; no, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, I happen to have the sworn testimony of Lt. Joseph Lockard before me, in which these [13463] questions were propounded and to which he gave these answers:

"Q. They were operating with approximately six men?

"A. That is right. There were approximately six men of our unit. We had six in ours. We operated from 7 to 9 o'clock."

I think that 9 o'clock should have been "5," from the text.

"Q. Nobody operated at night time, so far as you know?

"A. If there was an alert, or if maneuvers were going on, or something of that kind, there was a night operation.

"Q. From 7 to 5, except for lunch periods, you were on daily?

"A. Yes, during the week.

"Q. Sunday was a day off normally?

"A. We had to operate Sundays from 4 in the morning until 7 in the morning. We took turns. That happened to be my Sunday.

"Q. When did you first arrive on the island--"

and so forth.

Now, that is the testimony of Private Lockard at that time, which is very definitely in conflict with that which you tell us now. Could you make a mistake of that wide variation?

Mr. ELLIOTT. I do not think I could have more than he [13464] could have. I make this testimony from what I remember. As I remember it, we worked from 4 to 7 in the morning straight through on a problem, as we had been scheduled throughout the week and also on Sunday. That is from what I remember. I may be wrong, I don't know.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, you have been asked to make statements about this affair on several different occasions, haven't you?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. And the first time you made a statement about it was shortly after the event, wasn't it?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Was there ever an investigation conducted in which you testified or wherein you were not asked what was your tour of duty?

Mr. ELLIOTT. In explaining my tour of duty, I do not recall whether I was asked about the other days of the week or not.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, are you willing to say that Lieutenant Lockard was entirely wrong when he said it was only on Sundays and holidays that they started the machine in operation at 4 in the morning?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Well, I would not know what to say on that, sir. The only thing I can say again is, as I remember it, we operated from

5062 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

4 to 7 every day, and that that was our scheduled operating period for our problem. That is as I remember it.

[13465] Mr. GEARHART. You remember now that you were on this assignment from the first clay of December 1941, at least. You first said about 2 weeks, but you are certain you were on for 1 week prior to December 7, aren't you?

Mr. ELLIOTT. You mean as to operating myself?

Mr. GEARHART. No; that you were on this particular assignment with Private Lockard.

Mr. ELLIOTT. That may have varied at any time. I mean they could have assigned Lockard and someone else. We did not work as a particular team. Any man in the unit could work with Lockard.

Mr. GEARHART. All right.

How many of the days of the first week of December did you work with Private Lockard?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That I cannot recall either.

Mr. GEARHART. How many nights during the first week of December 1941 did you sleep in this officer's tent at Opana?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Only the 1 night, sir, the Saturday night before Sunday, December 7.

Mr. GEARHART. Then do you want to tell me that you did not work on that instrument from 4 o'clock to 7 o'clock every day on the first week of December, including the morning of the 7th?

[13466]

Mr. ELLIOTT. I cannot recall that either, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. As a matter of fact you do not know what the tour of duty was on those instruments on Sundays and holidays, do you; it might be just as the then Private Lockard pointed out; is that correct?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That could be correct; yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, when I returned to the room, I heard you testify when 7 o'clock arrived there that morning--

The CHAIRMAN. You are going into another phase of it. It is now 12:30.

Mr. GEARHART. I am perfectly willing to suspend here.

However, it is only 12:20.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, go ahead.

Mr. GEARHART. As I came In you were testifying when 7 o'clock arrived, Lieutenant Lockard, then Private Lockard, was about to turn the machine off, and you said, "No, let it go on for a while."

Mr. ELLIOTT. That is right, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. How is that?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That is right.

Mr. GEARHART. Why did you want it to go on a while?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Because I was there for instruction purposes. I was there to learn more about the unit, and since [13467] we had had the unit on from 4 until 7, disregarding the 15 minutes late, I figured on continuing operating, that he could give me the instruction that I desired.

Mr. GEARHART. DO you want this committee to understand that the only reason why the machine was continued in operation after 7 o'clock on the morning of the 7th was because you asked Private Lockard for an opportunity for a little extra training on the instrument?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir. That was prearranged. Permission was obtained from Sergeant Murphy, our platoon sergeant, and that was

PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5063

the understanding, that I was to get further training after the problem, that we were to continue on the air.

Mr. GEARHART. But you had been on that instrument from 4 o'clock in the morning, clear down to 7?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That is right, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Did not you consider that training enough in one period?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That was training in one field, sir. There was more than one type of training on the job. I was very familiar with plotting. The training I was to get was the operation of the scope where you actually detect the planes.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, has not this idea of additional training, your continuing on the instrument after the hour [13468] of 7, been suggested to you by a number of other people as something you might say to explain for having stayed on the instrument? Has anybody suggested to you that that would be a good explanation that you might give?

Mr. ELLIOTT. For picking up planes, you mean, on December 7?

Mr. RICHARDSON. No. He is asking you whether somebody told you what to say.

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, as a matter of fact, did not you stay on that instrument, and, as a matter of fact, is it not true that it was not turned off for the sole and only reason that the truck that was to take you to breakfast had not arrived?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Will you read that question to him?

Mr. GEARHART. It is a little complicated. I will ask it in a simpler form.

As a matter of fact, did not that instrument continue in operation simply because the truck that was going to take you to breakfast had not yet arrived?

Mr. ELLIOTT. There also is some discrepancy-not discrepancy, but I do not recall exactly what the set-up was in this truck coming back. Originally, it was intended that we were to stay there until 12 o'clock. I believe when [13469] we called-when I called through the administration line, we had to call to our platoon, and they put us on through to the information center, and it was at that time, I believe that we were told instead of working until 12 noon, as was previously stated, we would only work until 8.

Then, after 7, why, we continued the operation.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, haven't you testified here before that the reason the instrument stayed in operation, the reason why you did not turn it off was simply because the truck that was supposed to take you to breakfast had not yet arrived?

Mr. ELLIOTT. I do not recall making that statement; no. sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, reading further the testimony of now Lieutenant Lockard, then Private Lockard--

Mr. ELLIOTT. (interposing). Pardon me, sir. What testimony is that of Private Lockard? To which board or committee?

Mr. GEARHART. Testimony by Private Lockard given to the Office of the Chief Signal Officer in the Pentagon Building, Washington, D. C., on October 30, 1944.

Mr. ELLIOTT. I see, sir.

5064 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Mr. GEARHART (reading):

"Q. As you were operating this thing, [13470] you did not see anything at all until about two minutes after 7. When 7 o'clock came what did you say to Elliott?

"A. We mentioned the fact that the truck had not arrived, and there was no particular point in closing up and sitting out in the grass when we could be comfortable inside."

Is that correct, or is that incorrect?

Mr. ELLIOTT. I do not know how much my word is against his, but in my opinion, if he made that statement, he lied, because at 7 o'clock he had already started to shut down the unit, and it was put on again through my efforts. The unit was already being turned off at 7 o'clock when we were told by the information center that the problem was over.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, will you say that his statement here, plain as day, is a lie?

"Answer. We mentioned the fact that the truck had not arrived, and there was no particular point in closing up and sitting out in the grass when we could be comfortable inside."

Mr. ELLIOTT. I personally think it would have been more comfortable laying in the grass than working inside.

Mr. GEARHART. All right. Then you are saying that that is a lie?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Just a minute, Mr. Chairman. I do not think the witness ought to be required to say that any [1347l] testimony that has been taken is a lie.

Mr. GEARHART. Mr. Chairman, the witness has injected that word. I haven't.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; the witness did.

Mr. GEARHART. He said Lieutenant Lockard lied, and I am asking if this is one of those lies, since he has used a shortening of the word. Is it?

Mr. ELLIOTT. I was not following you sir.

Mr. GEARHART. I guess you were not following very much of anything, even then.

The CHAIRMAN. Is the member of the committee disputing the fact that this radar instrument was in operation?

Mr. GEARHART. I will not ask you again to pass upon the veracity of Lieutenant Lockard, since I think you have already done so.

"Q. Then, you tracked it to about 22 miles. By that time the truck had arrived?

"A. No. By that time we had lost it in the permanent distortion.

"Q. You cut off the machine?

"A. We looked around a little further for somebody else and did not see anything, so we closed down the machine.

"Q. Had the truck arrived by that time?

"A. Yes."

[13472]

Is that a correct statement of what occurred at that time?

Mr. ELLIOTT. The unit was closed, and off the air before the truck arrived. We were taking our bedding along to the officer's tent that you referred to, and were preparing to get on the truck when it arrived, but the unit was definitely shut down between 20 minutes of 8 and a quarter of 8. That was the time that we went off the air.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, I just want to ask you this question in conclusion.

PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5065

You had no regular written order telling you when you should be operating the machine and when you should be just there guarding the machine; is that correct?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir; that was just a verbal order.

Mr. GEARHART. Who gave you those verbal orders?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That was passed on to us by Sergeant Murphy, the sergeant in charge of the platoon.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, where did you work on the 5th, 4th, and 3d of December?

Mr. ELLIOTT. There again, I don't recall.

Mr. GEARHART. Were you assigned to operate other machines besides the one which was at Opana?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir; I was not.

[13473]

Mr. GEARHART. During the last week of November and the first week of December, your only connection with a radar instrument was the portable machine which was stationed at Opana?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That is correct, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. And you are not able to tell us whether or not your tour of duty was different on weekdays from the Sundays and holidays which occurred in that 2 weeks' period?

Mr. ELLIOTT. I have made my statement from my memory. If my memory isn't right, why I don't know just what else I can say.

As I recall it we worked from 4 o'clock in the morning until 7. That is, on the problem.

Mr. GEARHART. Then you went on duty on the afternoon of Saturday, or noontime Saturday?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. And did not do anything but repair the instrument until the following morning at 4. Who told you to put it on at 4 the following morning?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Those were our instructions from Sergeant Murphy, to go on the air at 4 o'clock. That was understood that we were to work from 4 to 7.

Mr. GEARHART. How long had you been under training [13474] for this kind of work?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Approximately a month and a half.

Mr. GEARHART. Where were you trained? At Schofield Barracks?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Partially, yes, sir. Partially there and partially in the field, after the unit was set up.

Mr. GEARHART. Was Lieutenant Lockard or Private Lockard, in those days, under training with you at the same places?

Mr. ELLIOTT. I would not say he was under training. I do not recall that he was.

Mr. GEARHART. As a matter of fact, he had been under training way back the previous June, had he not?

Mr. ELLIOTT. I imagine he had.

Mr. GEARHART. As a matter of fact, you regarded him as an expert in radar operation, did you not?

Mr. ELLIOTT. In the operation I might have; yes, sir. He knew how to do it. I don't know how much of an expert I would call him.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, he did the operational work, did he not, and you did the plotting and recording?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That is right, sir.

5066 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Mr. GEARHART And he had supervision of your work as well, did he not?

[13475]

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes.

Mr. GEARHART. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will recess until 1:30 o'clock.

You be back then, Sergeant.

(Whereupon, at 12:35 p. m., the committee recessed to 1:30 p. m. of the same day.)

[13476]

AFTERNOON SESSION-1:30 P. M.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Sergeant Elliott.

TESTIMONY OF GEORGE B. ELLIOTT, JR. (Resumed)

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. Sergeant, you had a sheet of paper there this morning. Would you let me know what that is? You said you had some figures on it.

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir. That is a record-of-readings sheet. It has on it the log of all the plots that you make of the targets at the time that you make them.

Senator FERGUSON. And was that sheet made daily by the people who operated the machine?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir. That was made daily by the plotter.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, would it show what time the machine was operating, what time you started to work, and what time you quit?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir, I don't believe that is covered on the log. The only indication that you would have there is the time of the plots.

In other words, the first plot to the last plot would give you, the interceding plots, would give you the time.

[13477]

Senator FERGUSON. But it wouldn't indicate when you were working on the machine?

Mr. ELLIOTT. NO, sir; it wouldn't.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, we have heard a lot about decorations from various witnesses. Were you decorated during the war in any way?

Mr. ELLIOTT. I have received a letter of commendation from Lieutenant General Emmons, Major Tinker, and Brigadier General Davidson, of the Hawaiian Department.

Senator FERGUSON. Was that for the part you took in the events on the morning of Pearl Harbor?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir; it was.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, your fellow private who was there, what decorations did he get for what he did at that time?

Mr. ELLIOTT. The only one that I know of that he has is the Distinguished Service Medal.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether he got it for his conduct that morning?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. The Distinguished Service Medal.

Do you know whether Lieutenant Tyler, the officer that was called on the telephone, received also the Distinguished Service Medal for his part?

PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5067

[13478]

Mr. ELLIOTT. That I don't know, whether he did or not.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, you told us something about a statement that you made. Did you sign that statement?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir; I did.

Senator FERGUSON. Can you give us the substance of what was in that statement outside of what you told us this morning that they wanted you to certify that there were three men there and in fact there were only two?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir. The statement, in substance, was that. As I mentioned this morning it was very brief. We didn't break it up actually into things that were done.

In other words, such as him doing the scoping and I doing the plotting. We just put down "we" picked up this flight and "we" gave the time, and so forth. It was very brief.

Senator FERGUSON. How many pages?

Mr. ELLIOTT. It only covered one page. I believe it was double-spaced type.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you sworn to it or not?

Mr. ELLIOTT. I believe I was, by the officer that I signed it before.

Senator FERGUSON. Did it purport to state what had taken place that morning as far as you seeing this flight was concerned?

[13479]

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir. Are you speaking of myself individually?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. What was in the statement

Mr. ELLIOTT. No. Everything was "we."

Senator FERGUSON. It was a joint statement?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir; it was a joint statement.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, I am not quite clear on this record as to when you went back to where the machine was at Opana.

Mr. ELLIOTT. We arrived around 8 o'clock. The attack had been going on for about 5 minutes or so. The time element there was only the length of time enough to get our belongings or equipment and to get back on the truck and get back out to the unit which I imagine did not take more than a half-hour, to get back there.

Senator FERGUSON. You would say that around 8:30 to 9 o'clock you were back to the radar station?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Were you in a position at that time to ascertain if it was then being operated by some other men?

Mr. ELLIOTT. It was being operated by other men; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, were you near the station; did you see any plotting then?

[13480]

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir; I didn't. You see, having our camp 9 miles away, we didn't have any living facilities at the unit itself. We went out there and started clearing off some ground to put up the tents.

Senator FERGUSON. So that you didn't pay attention to what they were doing on the machine?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir; not until my next tour of duty, which was much later in the day.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, as I understand this machine that you had, this radar, you couldn't tell the number of planes but by the sound wave you could tell there were a great number of planes, or more than two or three planes, is that right?

5068 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Mr. ELLIOTT. Not by the sound wave. By the visual electrical impulse which you see.

Senator FERGUSON. By the impulse?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir. We could tell that there was probably more than ordinarily by the size of the echo.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, "ordinary" doesn't mean much to the committee at the present moment. More than how many?

Mr. ELLIOTT. AS I testified this morning it may have been 50 to 100, but I couldn't say.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, did you indicate when you telephoned [13481] in any way that your machine showed 50 or 100?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Not by number, but just explaining that there were a large number of planes. I mean, we knew there were a larger number of planes than ordinarily.

Senator FERGUSON. So instead of the number being used the word "large" was used, the adjective "large"?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Or "many." Which was it? Was it "large" or "many"?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Large.

Senator FERGUSON. Large?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, there was a plat shown you this morning, a tissue plat. Do you recall that?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir. I have it.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, is that the original paper that you made or used on the morning of the 7th of December, 1941?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir; it is.

Senator FERGUSON. Your own handwriting or markings are on there; is that true?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, I notice that the line of flight was not as regular as this one on this chart that was [13482] made for us. Would you put those dots on that paper that is now before you.

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. So that would be an accurate chart of everything that happened up until 7:40 as far as you were concerned that morning.

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And after that, of course, you allowed the paper to remain on the machine so that some other private or some officer would use it from that time on?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And you were only speaking of it as of the time that you left there, which was about a quarter to 8?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, I now ask that this original paper be made an exhibit in this case.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there any reason, Sergeant, why you wish to keep that as your personal property? This is the original.

Mr. RICHARDSON. This is a part of the files. It doesn't belong to this witness.

The CHAIRMAN. Let the original be filed as an exhibit.

Mr. MASTEN. 155.

PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5069

[13483]

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 155.")

Senator FERGUSON. Sergeant, I have only a few other questions. On these markings, that is, 6:48 and 6:45, and the one that hasn't a number, could they be more than one plane, do you know? That doesn't designate one plane or more than one, does it?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir; that is one of the flights that I referred to, it was less or out of the ordinary-I mean it was ordinary.

Senator FERGUSON. It was an ordinary flight?

Mr. ELLIOTT. It was an ordinary flight. I mean there was no exceptional echo on the scope.

Senator FERGUSON. Does this map show how far out the plane to our left on this map, 6:48, would be from your station?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. How many miles?

Mr. ELLIOTT. It doesn't show on the map. I mean, on the overlay. You would have to have the map in the radius room that this chart was made from. You see, the overlay is marked with two of the grids of the particular map that was used.

Senator FERGUSON. With a scale on it, is that what it is? [13484] The overlay has a scale on it?

Mr. ELLIOTT. The scale has been put in later. That was not on on December 7. We didn't put any scale rule on there. The scale that we used on the plotting table was just the radius rod, which is calibrated in miles.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Will you estimate the distance from this 6:48 to your Opana station here?

Mr. MURPHY. There are two 6:48's on there.

[13485]

Senator FERGUSON. I mean the one to our left as we are looking at this map.

Mr. ELLIOTT. I would judge about 95 miles.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you hear any conversation there on the day after you went back that they had used this machine to follow out the Japanese planes as they were leaving the island going back?

Mr. ELLIOTT. I believe they tracked some of the planes.

However, it was pretty much of a mixed-up affair. I mean they were dispersed. I mean, they didn't come-they didn't go out in the same formation that they came in. And I think that what happened was that they had plots here and there, and it was just almost impossible to keep up with all of the targets as they left the island of Oahu.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, after they got out, looking at the plot before you, there are some planes at 10:39, 10:27-you see them on that plat before you, going north? Are they on your original map?

Mr. ELLIOTT. I am just wondering whether you are under the impression that the two targets you point out there are at that mileage away from the island. There is no indication up here. It would be very-I retract that. I see it.

Senator FERGUSON. Look on your original map. Do you [13586] see those chartings?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. There is a way on the machine to know whether a plane is coming in to the machine or going out, is there not?

5070 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir; very definitely, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Very definitely.

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. So that the people operating the machine would be able to determine if there were planes leaving, as shown by this plat, that they were going north?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That is right, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. That machine only had two methods of reaching the center, and they were both by telephone, there were no other means of communication. No teletype?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Just by telephone?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Just by the two telephone lines; yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And you knew of no bombing in the vicinity of where you were working with this machine, so as to interrupt the telephones, so far as the center was concerned?

Mr. ELLIOTT. You are speaking of after the attack?

[13487]

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Where was the communications center?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Down at Fort Shafter.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether it was bombed?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir, I don't. I really couldn't say.

Senator FERGUSON. There was communication by road between Opana and Fort Shafter?

Mr. ELLIOTT. I understand that there was.

Senator FERGUSON. About how many miles; do you know?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Offhand, about 50 miles away from Fort Shafter.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, is there anything that you could tell us here today that we haven't asked you about that may be of benefit to us on this question?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir; there is one point.

In reading the Roberts report, it states in there in substance that a noncommissioned officer was instructing a private and at that time there was no noncommissioned officer involved. Private Lockard and myself, both privates, were there only.

However, when Private Lockard was called into the Roberts committee, a staff sergeant went along with Private [13488] Lockard, although I don't know whether he went before the committee.

Now, this staff sergeant was put in charge of the unit sometime during the day of December 7, over the Sergeant Murphy that had been in charge.

And, as I stated before, I don t know whether he testified before the Roberts committee, although I do know that he went in with Private Lockard, together, the day that he testified.

Senator FERGUSON. I have the language now before me, and I wonder whether this is the language you are talking about.

On page 11 of the Roberts report:

"A non-commissioned officer who had been receiving training requested that he be allowed to remain at one of the stations and was granted leave to do so. At about 7:02, he discovered what he thought was a large fight of planes slightly east of north of Oahu at a distance of about 130 miles."

PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5071

Was that the sentence that you had in mind?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir; it was.

Senator FERGUSON. You wanted to state that there were no commissioned officers, two privates were all that were there?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That is correct, sir.

[13489]

Senator FERGUSON. That is all I have.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Keefe?

Mr. KEEFE. I shall be very brief.

I gather from your testimony, Mr. Elliott, that you were operating this radar equipment fundamentally for training purposes, is that right?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, when you went out to this particular task did you get instructions from any superior officer as to what you were to do and what reports you were to make, if any?

Mr. ELLIOTT. None other, sir, than just the reporting of any targets that we had found.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, who gave you those instructions?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Well, that came down through the chain of command from the commanding officer.

Mr. KEEFE. In other words, you were directed to report any targets which you found in the operation of this machine?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And when were you to make the reports-immediately?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir; as soon as possible.

Mr. KEEFE. And that is why that phone on the chart board was there on the machine?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes; sir. That was the main purpose of our [13490] training, was getting that information as soon as could be possible to the information center.

Mr. KEEFE. So that it was considered to be part of your training to be able to spot a plane or a target, as you say, and to immediately report that, with the necessary directions and distances, and so on to the information center?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. So that if the occasion came when it was necessary to utilize that information in that field you would be trained to perform properly; is that true?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, You had no ideas that there were any Jap planes liable to come in on Oahu that day; did you?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. You hadn't any idea as a private in the United States Army that there was any thought of an attack on Oahu imminent or liable to take place?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. So that as far as your charting these targets on your report, it was merely routine?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir. It was more or less of a theoretical problem.

Mr. KEEFE. And you would have made your report whether those were Jap planes or American planes just the same?

5072 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

[13491]

Mr. ELLIOTT. That is correct.

Mr. KEEFE. But I understood your testimony to be that you were concerned because of the large number of targets that showed up; is that right?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And that caused you some concern and some nervousness, as you said, when you reported it?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, if there had only been an ordinary number of targets, three or four or five, you would have reported that exactly the same way; would you not?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That is definitely right.

Mr. KEEFE. HOW soon after you observed the planes or targets, as you have described, would you normally report to the information center?

Mr. ELLIOTT. I would judge offhand 30 to 45 seconds.

Mr. KEEFE. So that I assume that when you found out later that the planes that you had noticed on your machine turned out to be Jap planes you were as much surprised as anybody else?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. That is all.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman.

[11492]

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Murphy.

Mr. MURPHY. Sergeant Elliott, I notice on the chart there there are two 6:48's, so that would indicate that at least at that moment you sighted on your machine at least one plane in each of those locations; isn't that right?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That is correct, sir, if the times are both the same day.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, I understand that that shows December 7. I will just show you what I mean.

Mr. ELLIOTT. I believe that this overlay here will show a little more than December 7.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, there is a plane there, or at least a pip in there at 6:48, there is another 6:48. Would that mean that you found a plane here, at least one plane here and another plane here at the same time?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That is possible; yes, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. And would you know whether or not there was one plane or several planes in each of those places?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Depending on the size of the echo.

Mr. MURPHY. Well, assuming there was only two or three, you couldn't tell the difference from whether it was one there, could you?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir; not at all.

Mr. MURPHY. Then I notice on this 6:58 and 6:59 there [13493] are red stars instead of white. Do you know what that would indicate?

Mr. ELLIOTT. I wonder if I may examine the chart?

Mr. MURPHY. Yes; I wish you would, take your time. 6:58 and 6:59, as well as these three over here, 7:40, 7:43, and 7:53, are indicated by red stars, whereas the others are indicated by white blocks. Was there any set procedure as to one having a red star and the other having a white block that you know of?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir; none that I know of.

PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5073

Mr. MURPHY. I have one other thing. In answer to the Senator from Michigan you said that those at 6:48 were ordinary. By that you mean ordinary in size; is that it?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That is correct, sir.

Mr. MURPHY. No other questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Just one question, Sergeant. You were asked this morning about the testimony of Private Lockard in regard to the truck being late arriving at the station and also about some suggestion that it would have been more comfortable out on the grass than on the inside of the station.

Regardless of that, whether it would have been more comfortable or not on the grass, or whether the truck was late, the station was in operation at the time you have testified and it was taking these readings that you have described here [13494] to the committee?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. No matter what the cause of your delay in getting away from the station, whether you had prearranged to stay until 8 o'clock or whether the truck was late or whether it would have been more comfortable somewhere else, you were at the station and at the machine taking these readings as these planes came in?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That is correct, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And Private Lockard was there with you?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. There was one other question, but I have forgotten what it was.

Mr. RICHARDSON. May I ask a question, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Counsel wishes to ask a question.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Sergeant, you did put the information which came in over your radar station on this plot that you have been examining here all morning and at the time you saw these ships coming in from the north?

Mr. ELLIOTT. You are referring to the 7:02 plot?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Yes.

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, did you take off at the same time a log which would be a station record showing the progress of [13495] those planes?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, what was the paper, if any, that you took in with you that you gave to your platoon commander when you came to camp at 8 o'clock?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That was a copy of the record of reading sheets with the recorded plots on them.

Mr. RICHARDSON. But the log that you took remained in the station?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That I do not know.

Mr. RICHARDSON. The one that you took in and gave to the company commander showing that was not the official record?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir; there was no official record.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Was there any other record of the progress of the planes by way of a log, except the one you gave to your platoon commander?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir.

5074 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Mr. RICHARDSON. You are sure you gave that paper to him when you came to your camp at 8 o'clock?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir; we gave it to him.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That it all.

The CHAIRMAN. Any further questions?

Mr. KEEFE. May I ask a question just to be sure?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

[13496]

Mr. KEEFE. I don't know a great deal about radar.

Would your scope-I believe you referred to it?

Mr. GEARHART. Oscilloscope.

Mr. KEEFE. Oscilloscope, would that show a ship that came on the surface of the water?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir; it would. Ordinarily you cannot pick up a ship at sea I would say over 30 some miles out because the ship is over the horizon and it is an impossibility to do that.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, if there was in fact a ship within that 30 mile visibility limit that you have expressed, it would show on your oscilloscope; would it not?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. It might even be a whale surfacing; might it not?

Mr. ELLIOTT. It could; yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Or a submarine if it came to the surface.

Mr. ELLIOTT. I don't want to be quoted on that. I believe it would; yes. sir.

Mr. KEEFE. But as to planes, they would show on the oscilloscope at a greater distance because of the visibility above the horizon; is that right?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Not necessarily. I mean if you had a plane 30 miles out, the size of the echo would probably be much [13497] larger than an ordinary ship at sea at the same distance.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, I am thinking of these pips or targets or whatever it is that shows on this oscilloscope that you can see visually.

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. You also hear; do you not?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir; you do not hear.

Mr. KEEFE. You do not?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, then, these pips would be large or small, depending upon the distance away?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Depending upon distance and the size of the object.

Mr. KEEFE. I see. That is all.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Now, sergeant, the lower the approaching object gets, the closer it goes to the surface of the sea or the land that you are looking over, the harder it is to pick it up with your radar; is it not?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That is correct as to the training that we had.

Mr. RICHARDSON. And the fact that you could see these planes first 137 miles away showed they had a pretty good elevation in the air; did it not?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes sir.

[13498]

Mr. RICHARDSON. Can you estimate what that elevation was?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir; I could not.

PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5075

Mr. RICHARDSON. All right.

The CHAIRMAN. You speak of the echo throughout your testimony here. You referred to the echo. That is not a sound that you yourself heard. It is the registration on this instrument of the sound made by the planes at the distance?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You would not hear that at all but you would see it as it is recorded on this chart?

Mr. ELLIOTT. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. ELLIOTT. We call it an electrical impulse or an echo.

The CHAIRMAN. It is not an echo as we--

Mr. ELLIOTT. Or it is commonly called a pip.

The CHAIRMAN. It is not an echo as we understand an echo that we hear?

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir. I am sorry I have thrown you off.

The CHAIRMAN. I wanted that explained. Thank you very much, Sergeant. We appreciate your willingness to come here and give your testimony and you are now excused.

Senator BREWSTER. Perhaps one question. I haven't been here much of the day. There has been a round robin questioning and maybe this has been asked before. Is there anything [13499] further that you know, that you have not been queried about, that you think would be helpful?

The CHAIRMAN. He was asked that by Senator Ferguson.

Mr. ELLIOTT. No, sir; I believe that I do not have any more. I appreciate gratefully being called here. I just came down as an observer yesterday and I certainly did not intend to be here today and neither did my boss.

The CHAIRMAN. Where is your home now?

Mr. ELLIOTT. Long Branch, N. J., sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What is your occupation?

Mr. ELLIOTT. I am with the New Jersey Bell Telephone Co.

The CHAIRMAN. In what capacity?

Mr. ELLIOTT. As a construction clerk.

The CHAIRMAN. I see, all right. Thank you very much.

Mr. ELLIOTT. Thank you again, sir.

(The witness was excused.)

The CHAIRMAN. Who is the next witness?

Mr. RICHARDSON. I would like to call Captain Creighton.

The CHAIRMAN. Captain Creighton, please come forward.

Mr. GEARHART. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Gearhart.

Mr. GEARHART. We discussed the probability of Lieutenant Lockard being called as a witness in this case and I have [13600] ascertained that he has business that will consume the entire day. In view of this situation and the conflicts on some of the points in the testimony of the witness who has just left the chair, I think we should include the testimony of Lieutenant Lockard at this point in the record.

I have a copy of the transcript of his testimony given on October 30, 1994, in my hand. I ask that it be included in the record.

5076 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Mr. RICHARDSON. Was that given in any of our reports, Congressman?

Mr. GEARHART. No; it is in addition. This is a special investigation conducted by the Signal Corps in preparation for the writing of a history of that part of the Army.

Mr. RICHARDSON. It would seem to me, Mr. Chairman, that it at least is of the grade of the Clausen affidavits, to say the least. I do not see any objection.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I see no objection to making it part of the record at this point.

(The testimony of Lieutenant Lockard referred to follows:)

[13501]

CONFIDENTIAL

TRANSCRIPT OF CROSS EXAMINATION OF LT. JOSEPH LOCKARD (SIGNAL CORPS SCAWH), WHO, ON THE MORNING OF DECEMBER 7, 1941, DETECTED THE APPROACH OF JAPANESE PLANES TO PEARL HARBOR

Place of examination: Conference room: Office of the Chief Signal Officer, Pentagon Building, Washington, D. C., October 30, 1944.

[13502]

INTERVIEW WITH LIEUTENANT LOCKARD

FRASER. When you were in the islands, there were six 270-B's; were installed?

LOCKARD. There were no 270-A's. The 270-A was a unit that was initially designed. We never had any of them. There were only six units on the island.

F: That was the latest machine available?

L: It was the latest available to us. They may have had other equipment in the laboratories, but it was not yet available to us.

F: They were operating with approximately six men?

L: That is right. There were approximately six men per unit. We have six in ours. We operated from 7 to 5 o'clock.

F: Nobody operated at nighttime so far as you know.

L: If there was an alert or if maneuvers were going on or something of that kind, there was night operation.

F: From 7 to 5, except for lunch periods, you were on daily?

L: Yes, during the week.

F: Sunday was a day off normally?

L: We had to operate Sundays from 4 in the morning until 7 in the morning. We took turns. That happened to be my Sunday.

F: When did you first arrive on the islands.

[13503]

L: I landed on December 10, 1940

F: You were really there only three days under a year.

L: That is right.

F: Did George Elliott come there at that time.

L: I don't know. He was an Air Corps man.

F: How old was he?

L: About 21 or 22.

F: What was the first job assigned to you when you arrived in 1940?

L: At that time, I went directly to this particular outfit that I was with all the time I was here. At that time we had no equipment and were carrying on training and a program similar to Signal line-up.

F: Was there instruction in the use of the 270-B's.

L: No, because we had no equipment.

F: Did your instruction cover any sort of machine at all or was it all of a general nature?

L: We were at that time conducting a company school in radio theory. Most of our operation was as a radio Signal company. We had the old 171 and 131's, a small field transmitter.

F: What is the maximum range of these equipments?

L: The 171 is good for ten miles. We are lucky if we get two or three miles out of the 131. Those are actually World War I sets.

PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5077

[13504]

F: When did the first radars arrive?

L: They came in July and there were six of them, all 270-B's.

F: You went right to work learning how to use them?

L: No. One of these units was set up adjacent to the company area. No one seemed to know too much about them. We had the manuals which came with them. We proceeded to learn the functioning and operation of the equipment. The entire company was trained in the operation.

F: Was there somebody there who really knew how to operate the equipment from the beginning?

L: I don't know. There didn't seem to be too much information available. Shortly thereafter, Lieut. Bell came over. He was very familiar with the equipment.

F: Did he train the men in the operation of the equipment?

L: No. He was more interested in the maintenance and logging and the operational abilities of the equipment.

F: Was there a school or course which trained the men?

L: There was no established school. The company was running the training program.

F: Is Col. Murphy whom you speak of the Colonel William H. Murphy who was killed in an automobile accident in Florida last winter?

L: I don't know if it was he or someone else.

F: Is it very difficult to learn to operate a 270-B?

[13505]

L: No. The biggest problem in the operational function is that of being able to distinguish and interpret the pictures which appear upon the screen.

F: I suppose to set down the log and track would take some mechanical knowledge.

L: No.

F: Do you recall if any of these machines were out of order while you were there?

L: Certainly. No machine is mechanically perfect. We had to do most of our own maintenance at first.

F: Do you recall when you first started using the particular machine that you were using on December 7?

L: It was about the middle of November. The unit was set up at Schofield Barracks and we dismounted it and moved it to Opana and set it up there.

F: Was there any particular reason why they moved the equipment?

L: It had been set up at Schofield for purposes of training. We were living in the old Chemical Warfare Barracks in Opana. It was set up right in that vicinity. It wasn't sent to Schofield for operational purposes. It was used merely for training. After we moved the equipment to Opana, we were doing our training on the job. As new individuals came into the outfit who hadn't had the training, they were allocated for training.

[13506]

F: Did you train Elliott?

L: I helped.

F: You had been working on that machine since about Thanksgiving Day?

L: I guess so. Yes.

F: When you speak of a truck that was supposed to come, was it a regular army truck?

L: It was what is called a four by four.

F: It came every Sunday or holiday morning to pick up whoever was operating the machine and carry them back to wherever they were living?

L: We hadn't been under that set-up for too long a time prior to that date. We didn't usually operate on Sunday. We had been doing it for only three or four weeks.

F: Did you have any written instructions as to whom to report to, if you saw anything extraordinary on the scope?

L: No.

F: On that particular Sunday morning, you were sleeping in a small tent a most next to the machine. Was it any particular type of tent?

L: It was an officer's war tent.

F: Then you had to walk only a few feet to the 270-B?

L: Yes.

[13507]

F: How was the equipment housed?

L: It was a mobile unit, mounted on two trucks. The trucks are van-type.

F: The antenna is the same antenna they have on all 270-B's?

5078 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

F: In order to operate the machine, you had to mount the truck?

L: We had to unlock the vans and open them.

F: There was nothing in this van except the machine itself?

L: That is right.

F: Was Elliott doing the actual computation or were you?

L: I was doing the computation. Elliott was doing the plotting and keeping the log.

F: What do you mean by "operating the equipment"?

L: Operations consist of controlling the movement of the antenna and reading the information from the oscilloscope, both on the screen and on its mileage scale.

F: As you were operating this thing, you didn't see anything at all until about two minutes after seven. When seven o'clock came, what did you say to Elliott?

L: We mentioned the feet that the truck hadn't arrived and there was no particular point in closing up and sitting out in the grass when we could be comfortable inside.

F: At about two minutes after seven, you were the first [13508] to notice anything on the scope?

L: Yes.

F: You noticed it as a big thing coming up?

L: Yes.

F: What did you say to Elliott when you first saw that thing?

L: I don't know offhand. I asked him to look at it. I thought at first there was something wrong with the equipment.

F: That was at a range of 136 miles?

L: Approximately.

F: You kept observing it to 132 miles and at 132 miles you decided to call?

L: We reported it in at 132 miles. We had accomplished all the preliminaries to a telephone conversation. It takes a relatively short amount of time to check the equipment.

[l3509]

F: Can you estimate the time elapsed between 136 miles and 132 miles?

L: An average airplane travels three miles a minute. It was about one minute and a half.

F: Then you called the main switchboard operator. When you told this fellow you had something you wanted to report--

L: Yes, I called the switchboard operator and told him I wanted to report. I asked if there was anyone around the Information Center. He said they had all left. I asked him to find somebody.

F: Do you recall his name?

L: Yes. Joe McDonald.

F: He left the switchboard or did he call up somebody?

L: No. He left the board and relayed the information.

F: Couldn't he plug in and ring somebody at their quarters?

L: No. Not with that switchboard; it merely connected the various radar stations on the island with the I. C.

F: You couldn't have plugged in if you wanted any commanding officer?

L: I don't know really how the exchange was set up.

F: He left his post and found somebody?

L: Yes. McDonald relayed the information I had given him. The officer he spoke to didn't appear interested and I asked to talk to him.

F: Then when you spoke to him, can you recall what you said?

[13510]

L: I merely mentioned the fact that there was something unusual on the scope both in size and direction. They were expecting a flight of B-17's that morning from California. He probably assumed that was what it was.

F: The B-17's did come in?

L: Yes and they got a hot welcome too.

F: Didn't you also say that "I have never seen anything like this in my experience"?

L: That is right. I said it was the largest formation I had ever seen.

F: You said that it was coming in due north and what did he answer?

L: I don't recall exactly. He said it was all right, that that was all he wanted to know.

F: Then you went back to your scope. How had the situation changed?

L: The formation appeared a little closer.

PROCEEDINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 5079

F: Did Elliott make any comment and did you try anything else?

L: There was nothing else we could do.

F: Did Elliott seem to be alarmed?

L: No, we were just interested.

F: Then you tracked it in to about 22 miles, by that time the truck had arrived.

L: No. By that time, we had lost it in the permanent distortion.

[13511]

F: You cut off the machine?

L: We looked around a little further for somebody else and didn't see anything so we closed down the machine.

F: Had the truck arrived by that time?

L: Yes.

F: Then you got in with Elliott. He was in back of the truck and you were up front with the driver.

L: That was about right.

F: Did you mention to the driver what had been puzzling you?

L: No.

F: Then you went back to Kawailoa. About halfway back, you met a similar truck carrying some of your colleagues.

L: Yes. They were going very fast back toward the unit.

F: They simply waved?

L: We blew the horn and slowed down. We wanted to ask why they were going back but they simply blew their horn and went on very fast.

F: Would you say that was at approximately a quarter to eight or about seven thirty?

L: It would have to have been about 7:55. That is supposedly when the first bomb fell.

F: How long did it take you to go from your radar unit to your base?

L: It would take about 20 minutes or 25 minutes. It was about a mile and a half or two miles over a very bad dirt road. [13512] We had to go down this dirt road to get to the highway.

F: Was it during that mile and a half that the Japanese planes actually struck?

L: I don't know. It shouldn't have taken very long. After I lost them at 22 miles, it shouldn't have taken them very long to get those last miles.

F: Can you tell how many minutes elapsed between losing them in the distortion and the arrival of the truck?

L: As I recall it, not over five minutes.

F: When you got back to your base and the truck drove up, what did it carry besides you and Elliott?

L: Nothing. It came up for the purpose of bringing us back.

F: When you reached your base the first thing you saw was a group of men looking at the sky?

L: That is right. Lt. Carcarus was there.

F: They all had the information that Pearl Harbor had been attacked and as soon as you got the information, you turned to Elliott and said: "I bet that is what we saw."

L: Something like that.

F: Then you joined the crowd and they questioned you as to what you had seen?

L: Yes. We told them what had happened.

F: What did you do next?

L: After a hurried breakfast, we put a few things together and went right back to the unit. The other crew had it [13513] in operation when we got there and we started taking shifts.

F: Each unit had six men?

L: Well, six or more.

F: It could be operated with only two men?

L: It wasn't comfortable. Twenty-four hour operation with six men means that you pull a four-hour shift and at the same time you had to do guard duty. We had to conduct the operation, the maintenance, and guard the equipment 24 hours a day.

F: Normally you didn't have to have any guard,

L: No.

F: Was it difficult to operate with only six men when you didn't have to have a guard?

5080 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

L: No. That was all right; It gave everyone something to do.

F: On the way home to your base, you noticed these heavy oil clouds?

L: We noticed this black oil smoke in the sky. The island on two sides is mountainous. Down the center is a plateau which starts from the sea level area and runs up gradually between these two ranges of mountains to the plateau where the palms grow. On the other side, it goes down approximately 200 feet to the sea again.

F: These clouds were so heavy that, by the time you got [13514] half way to your base, they were visible?

L: They were visible to us and we knew they were coming from the harbor.

F: When you saw these oil clouds, they didn't have any particular meaning to you?

L: We thought there might have been some sort of an accident or a fire.

F: After you got back to your base, did you get any official request from anybody to report your own findings on the scope?

L: No, the story wasn't accredited yet.

F: When was it first taken notice of officially?

L: It must have been about a week.

F: Can you recall how Colonel Murphy looked?

L: He was rather short, heavy set, with graying hair and a florid complexion.

(At this point Mr. Fraser referred Lt. Lockard to the large detailed map of Pearl Harbor, supplied by the War Department, and traced his (Lt. Lockard's) movements thereon from Kawailoa base to Opana and return. Lt. Lockard also noted position-as of December 7,1941-of the five other radar (271-B's) installations on the map.)

Mr. FRASER. Thank you, Lieutenant, you have been very helpful.

LOCKARD. I am glad to have been of any help.

(Termination of interview.)


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