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Press Releases, vol. XIV, p. 486
Statement by the Honorable
Norman H. Davis, Chairman of the United States Delegation, London Naval
Conference, May 13, 1936 [29]
[Extracts]
A full report of the recent Naval Conference
in London and of the treaty which was signed on March 25 last has been made to
the President, who in turn has transmitted this to the Senate. I should like,
however, to make certain additional observations with regard to the treaty that
is now before you for ratification.
At the outset, I must state that there are
two regrettable but unavoidable omissions in this treaty. One is that two of
the Washington Treaty powers, Japan and Italy, have not yet signed it; the
other is that this treaty does not provide for any reduction in total tonnage
or for a continuance of the principle of quantitative limitation established by
the two previous treaties. The facts are, however, that it was not possible to
secure agreement to that effect because all of the naval powers represented at
the Conference, with the exception of Great Britain and the United States,
refused to enter into a new treaty which continued the limitations and the
ratios established by the present treaties. In fact, Japan left the Conference
a
[29] Before the committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Hearings on the London Naval Treaty.
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few weeks after it began because the other powers were unable to accept
as a basis for negotiation the Japanese proposal for a so-called common upper
limit which, in effect, was to scrap the present system of naval limitation
and, without regard to relative needs and security, to change the present ratio
of 5-5-3 to 3-3-3 or 5-5-5. While recognizing Japan's right to equal security,
which we believe was achieved under the Washington and London Treaties, it was
obviously impossible to accept the Japanese proposal because, owing to the
difference in relative needs and vulnerability, naval parity would give to
Japan naval superiority.
As it was impossible to agree to continue
existing treaties beyond the end of this year, it was necessary, after the
Japanese withdrawal from the Conference, for the remaining powers to decide
whether to throw up their hands and quit or whether to proceed to the
negotiation of such a treaty as might be possible, in order to prevent if
possible the chaotic situation that would develop upon the termination of the
existing treaties in case there should be nothing to take their place.
Notwithstanding the difficulties that were
inherent in this situation, it was decided to continue in conference, with the
result that after considerable time and patient effort we succeeded in
negotiating a treaty which, while preserving in a modified but practical way
the principle of naval limitation, contains new and important provisions which
largely offset the omissions.
Although some things which we wanted are not
in this treaty, there is nothing in it to which we object. There is, in fact,
no single provision of the treaty which is objectionable or unfair to any
participating state or to any of the other naval powers, but there is much that
should prove to be mutually beneficial. It can thus be hoped that those states
who have not yet signed the treaty will readily adhere to its provisions.
When one considers the difficulties which
stood in the way of negotiating any treaty whatsoever, and what the situation
would be without any treaty at all, it is indeed a source of real satisfaction
that we were able to achieve as much as we did. We were indeed fortunate in
being able to negotiate a treaty which not only preserves a structure of naval
limitation but which establishes a basis for further progress toward naval
reduction under more favorable conditions than now exist.
While the new naval treaty is less rigid and
less far-reaching than the previous treaties, it has many advantages, and its
lack of rigidity may well be one of them. The fact is that the Washington
Treaty has been denounced because of its rigidity, and for the same reason
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the London Treaty could not be renewed, whereas the new treaty, which is
more flexible, may be more enduring and prove in the long run to be more
practical. At any rate, we have nothing to lose in trying it out, and possibly
much to gain.