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Chapter II
Background
1. INTRODUCTION: Confusion of Thinking, Organization, Conflict of
Opinions and Diversity of Views; Nation Not Geared to War.
2. PUBLIC OPINION: Psychological Conditions and Their Effect; Army
Dependent on Public Opinion and State of Public Mind and Its Readiness
for War; American Public Reluctant to Consider a War; Japan Ready for
War.
3. U.S. POLICY: (1922-1939) Study of Long-Term Treatment of Japan
Important; the Mandated Islands and Exclusion of the United States and
Fortification of the Islands by Japan; the Navy's Efforts to Get Into
the Islands and Its Relationship to the State Department; Diplomatic
Status of Consular Agents of Japan in Hawaii and Their Spying
Activities; Strong National Policy for the Protection of American Rights
Lacking Effect Upon the Army and Navy; the Effect of This Policy on the
Japanese Oriental Trading Mind.
4. U.S. POLICY: (1939-1941) Avoidance of a Conflict with Japan 1939-1941
by Avoiding Open Breach; Necessity for Delay to Prepare for War;
Negotiations Based Upon Lack of Incidents.
5. MORAL EMBARGOES VERSUS JAPANESE EXPANSION: Moral Embargoes; Economic
Sanctions by Direct Embargoes; Coincident Forming of Public Opinion
Against Japan; Japanese Making No Concessions and Proceeding with
Aggressions; Threatening Hostile Action; Lack of Public Understanding of
Importance of Hawaii; War and Navy Departments Making
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Great Effort to Prepare for War with Grave Deficiencies; Diversion of
Resources to Assist England and France Retarding Our Own Rearming;
Coordination of Action by the Government Through Conference in War
Council, Etc.; Lack of Appreciation of Where Japan Would Attack and
Miscalculation of Time of Attack; Japanese Full Understanding of Our
Dilemma.
6. PUBLIC DEMANDS ACTION AGAINST JAPANESE: National Policy Against War;
Attempt to Negotiate and Apply Economic Sanctions Put Government in
Difficult Contrary Positions; Conflicting Elements of Policy
Communicated to Field Commanders to Both Prepare for War and Not
Precipitate an Incident Causing War; Public Opinion in 1941 More
Belligerent Than the Preparations for War Justified Complicating
Government Position.
7. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST JAPAN: The Economic Effect on Japan of
Progressive Sanctions Considered in Detail; the Rising Tempo of Economic
Disaster to Japan and the Decreasing Success of Negotiations; Inevitable
Showdown Between Japanese Economic Strangulation and Military Action
Approaching; the Impasse Reached on November 26, 1941; the State
Department Passes Responsibility for the Nation to the War and Navy
Departments.
8. THE HAWAIIAN POPULATION PROBLEM: Sabotage Complex; the Japanese
Population Conditions Analyzed in Hawaii; the Rising Dominance
Economically and Politically of the Japanese Group; Sabotage of War
Action Possible by the Hawaiian Japanese Group; the Difficulty of Alerts
Without Disturbing the Civilian Japanese Population To An Overt Act;
Effect of Japanese Atmosphere in Hawaii and Government Policy Against
Overt Acts Upon the Responsible Commanders in Hawaii; the Local
Opposition of Commercial Interests to
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Putting Japanese Under Control; Official Reluctance to Put Local
Japanese Population under Civilian Surveillance; Free Japanese
Propaganda and Intelligence Operations in Hawaii.
9. HAWAIIAN PRESS: Constant Reiteration of Progressively Increasing
Difficulties with Japan and Threats of War Accentuated the State of Mind
of Local Commanders as to Difficulties with Local Population.
10. SUMMARY: Preparatory Period Immense Effect Upon State of Mind of
Public Officials and Commanders; Our Complacency Our Weakness; Our
National Pride and Vanity Our Weakness; the Result was Lack of Action,
Coordination, Cooperation, Teamwork, and War Spirit; United States Was
Unprepared Mentally, Physically, or as an Organization for War.
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1. Introduction: The purpose of this explanation of the background of
public and private events as they existed in 1940 and 1941 is this.
There existed during this critical period much confusion of thinking and
of organization, of conflict of opinion and diversity of views. The
nation was not geared to war, either mentally or as an organization. It
was a period of conflicting plans and purposes. The winds of public
opinion were blowing in all directions; isolationists and nationalists
were struggling for predominance; public opinion was both against war
and clamoring for reprisal against Japan; we were negotiating for peace
with Japan, and simultaneously applying economic sanctions that led only
to war; we were arming our forces for war and at the same time giving
away much of such armament. The Administration, State, War and Navy
Departments in their policies, plans and operations were likewise being
pushed here and there by the ebb and flow of war events, public
reactions, diplomatic negotiations and newspaper attacks.
The War Department by its actions and its organization was still on a
peacetime basis; neither its management nor its general staff had
perfected its organization for war or for the conduct of a large
enterprise. The whole machinery of government was geared to a different
purpose and tempo than war. Valiant and brilliant men were struggling
to bring order out of chaos, rather as individuals or as small groups,
attempting simultaneously both to establish policies and to accomplish
practical things. As a result a few men, without organization in the
true sense, were attempting to conduct large enterprises, take multiple
actions, and give directions that should have been
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the result of carefully directed commands, instead of action taken by
conference. We were preparing for a war by the conference method. We
were directing such preparations by the conference methods; we were even
writing vital messages by the conference method, and arriving at their
contents by compromise instead of by command; that was the product of
the time and conditions due to the transition from peace to war in a
democracy.
Such was the confusion of men and events, largely unorganized for
appropriate action and helpless before a strong course of events, that
ran away with the situation and prematurely plunged us into war.
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2. Public Opinion. The disaster of Pearl Harbor and the
responsibilities and courses of action taken by those connected
therewith can better be understood when the background of public opinion
and the state of the public mind are likewise understood. Psychological
conditions has a material effect upon the events that took place. A
brief review of the then state of mind of officials and the public; and
the facts known to the public and to the government; and our national
policy are all necessary in order to view the picture in its proper
perspective.
Our Army, like other armies of democracies, in its policies and its
actions to a degree was dependent upon and was influenced by public
opinion and the state of the public mind. Successful war is waged
through a state of mind and a state of public readiness for war. A
recognition of this fact is necessary to the understanding of the
background of public opinion and the state of our desire to make war,
which undoubtedly had its influence on the War Department and the
responsible commanders in Hawaii. A brief resume of that situation will
lead to an understanding of what influenced the taking of certain
actions, or the failures to take action, on the part of the Washington
departments concerned and the higher commanders in the field.
For a long period of time prior to the war the public was reluctant even
to consider a war. [1] There was a distinct
Footnote:
[1] The close vote of Congress on recalling the National Guard from
active service and on a proposal to abandon Lend-Lease clearly reflect
public opinion of that day and time in 1941.
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lack of a war mind in the United States. Isolationist organizations and
propaganda groups against war were powerful and vital factors affecting
any war action capable of being taken by our responsible leadership. So
influential were these campaigns that they raised grave doubts in minds
of such leadership as to whether they would be supported by the people
in the necessary actions for our defense by requisite moves against
Japan. Public opinion in the early stages had to be allowed to develop;
in the later stages it ran ahead of preparation for war. There was
little war spirit either amongst the general public or in the armed
forces, due to this conflicting public opinion having its influence. [1]
The events hereinafter recited must be measured against this important
psychological factor.
At the same time, Japan was pursuing an opposite policy of preparation.
It had been at war for several years in China; both its people and
government were psychologically and physically geared to war and were
implemented with a polished plan of action and equipment to do the job.
It was animated by cunning, hatred and patriotism in a land where life
is cheap; and nurtured in an atmosphere of insane nationalism
Footnotes:
[1] Rear Admiral McMorris testified as to the weak status of our fleet
with respect to the strong Japanese task force that attacked Pearl
Harbor, and what would have happened if our fleet had gone out into deep
blue water to fight: "a fight would have occurred in which our losses
might have been even greater than actually occurred, *** our own losses
would have been extremely heavy and might well have included the loss of
both our carriers." (R. 2878)
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and oriental intrigue. Japan was a nation united for the single purpose
of world conquest based on more than a thousand years of conflict.
As Ambassador Grew testified, from the time of his arrival in Japan in
1932, he constantly developed the theme of the grave necessity for
adequate preparation militantly to implement our diplomatic policy,
because of Japan's readiness for war. As he said to Mr. Stimson, then
Secretary of State, in the latter part of 1932:
"The Japanese Army has been built for war, it feels prepared for war,
and it wants war."
And he continued:
"At that time I said it would be criminally 'short-sighted', I think not
to recognize this fact and be prepared for anything that might develop
in the Far East. Those warnings were, as I say, continued in my
telegrams and dispatches throughout the ten years of my service there,
right up to the end." (R. 4201)
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3. U.S. Policy, (1922-1939). The events leading up to the Pearl Harbor
disaster can only be understood when we examine our national policy as
administered by the State Department. That policy must be examined back
a number of years to see the long-term treatment of Japan which had its
bearing on the Pearl Harbor disaster.
An early step in a direction considered adverse to the interests of the
United States was our failure to have a showdown with Japan on its
fortifications of the mandated islands.
The Mandate for the German possessions in the Pacific Ocean lying north
of the Equator under date of December 17, 1902, the Convention for the
Control of Trade and Arms and Ammunition between the Allied Powers under
date of September 10, 1919, and the Mandates between the United States
and Japan regarding the former German Islands in the Pacific Ocean north
of the Equator and particularly the island of Yap under date of February
11, 1922, have the following in common:
a. "Full power of administration and legislation over the Mandated
territory, including control of public works and services, the
importation of arms, etc. In short it was 'government in trust'."
b. "No military or naval bases shall be established or fortifications
erected in the territory."
c. "The Mandatory...allow all missionaries, nationals of any state
member of the League of Nations, to enter into, travel and reside in the
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territory for the purpose of prosecuting their calling."
d. "Any dispute between Japan and the other nations signing the
Mandates, whether it be the first two Mandates mentioned, or the one
direct with the United States, are to be settled by a negotiation of
'The Permanent Court of International Justice'."
e. "Vested property rights in the Mandated Islands shall be respected
and in no way impaired."
f. "The existing treaties between the United States and Japan shall be
applicable to the Mandated Islands."
g. "The United States and its nationals shall have free access to the
island of Yap on a footing of entire equality with Japan or any other
nations and their respective nationals and all that relates to the
landing and operation of the existing Yap-Guam cable, or over any cable
which may be hereafter laid or operated by the United States or its
nationals connecting with the island of Yap."
h. There are many other provisions of the same effect of entire freedom
of action with respect
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to Yap. [1]
Had the United States successfully insisted upon Japan living up to
those treaty stipulations, the entire naval and military structure in
the key Pacific Islands erected by the Japanese might have been
impossible. Japan, without authority of international law and in
violation of the treaties and mandates above referred to, for nearly
twenty years successfully and completely excluded other nationals from
the mandated territories, and during this time built up army, navy and
air installations of tremendous strategical value.
Footnotes:
[1] The Secretary of State, Mr. Hull, advised this Board: "Japan was
given under a League of Nations mandate full power to administer the
Mandated Islands as an integral part of Japan and to apply Japanese laws
in the islands. The United States had expressly agreed in a treaty with
Japan of February 11, 1922, to administration by Japan of the islands
pursuant to the League mandate. Among the Japanese laws the operation
of which was extended to include the Mandated Islands was that which
stipulated that all ports and harbors shall be closed to foreign vessels
except those that were specifically open to foreign trade. The opened
ports in the Mandated Islands were Saipan, Palau, Angaur, Truk, Ponape,
and Jaluit.
"Article II (3) of the Treaty with Japan of February 11, 1922, regarding
the Mandated Islands provided that: 'Existing treaties between the
United States and Japan shall be applicable to the mandated islands.'
Article IV of the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation concluded between
the United States and Japan on February 21, 1991, contained the
following provisions: 'The citizens or subjects of each of the
Contracting Parties, equally with the citizens or subjects of the most
favored nation, shall have liberty freely to come with their ships and
cargoes to all places, ports and rivers in the territories of the other
which are or may be opened to foreign commerce, subject always to the
laws of the country to which they thus come.'
"By an exchange of notes which took place concurrently with the signing
of the treaty with Japan of February 11, 1922, regarding the Mandated
Islands, Japan assured the United States that 'the usual comity will be
extended to nationals and vessels of the United States in visiting the
harbors and waters of those islands'. The term 'usual comity' in its
application to visits by the nationals and vessels of other countries
means the courtesy which is normally accorded by a country to the
nationals and vessels of other countries."
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As a consequence of the foregoing, Japan gained the enormous advantage
of a string of naval and air and army bases across our lifeline to the
Philippines and rendered futile and impotent any fortification of our
own islands, such as Guam, Midway, Christmas, Palmyra, etc. It also
placed the dagger's point at the heart of the Hawaiian Islands because
such a base as Jaluit in the mandated islands was a thousand miles
closer to Hawaii than to the homeland of Japan.
Our policy through the successive years appears to have been based upon
a combination of fear of the Japanese and of an obsession not to give
offense to the Japanese; a policy which because of their temperamental
characteristics, proved to be one of weakness rather than of strength;
it was also a policy of endeavoring to treat the Japanese on the basis
that they were civilized and that their word could be trusted and at the
same time one which treated them as if they were uncivilized and could
not be trusted, and consequently we excluded them from the United
States.
We entered the year of 1941 with two purposes in mind: first, to avoid
war and settle our troubles by negotiation, treaties, and contracts;
and, while negotiating, we applied exactly the opposite remedy of
economic sanctions.
Efforts to visit the Mandate Islands, presumably to glean information,
were said to have been made and were unsuccessful. (R. Miles, 101-107;
Pye 1064-1065; Bloch, 1503, 1527-1529; DeLaney 1702-1703; Kimmel, 1807-
1808; Layton, 3054-3055). The State Department explanation concerning
these efforts is set forth below. The net result was, however, that we
did not get into these Islands; the Japanese fortified the Islands and
in
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consequence the United States suffered. The Secretary of State, Mr.
Hull, presented his Department's views as fellows:
"The matter of visits to the Mandated Islands by American nationals or
private American vessels, just as visits in general by American
nationals and American private vessels to ports and places elsewhere in
the world, did not call for a procedure involving requests through
diplomatic channels by this Government to the Japanese Government and
would not therefore have come within the cognizance of the Department of
State, except in cases where, because of a refusal of the Japanese
Government to permit such visits, this Government had taken diplomatic
action at the instance of the American parties at interest. No record
has been found in the Department's files of any application having been
made by the Department to the Japanese Government for permission for
American nationals or American private vessels to visit the Mandated
Islands during the year 1940-1941, the year concerning which you made
inquiry. According to the information made available to the Department
in 1940, an officer attached to the office of the Naval Attache in Tokyo
inquired in August 1939 at the ticket office of the Nippon Yusen Kaisha
Steamship company with regard to possibilities of making reservations
for passages were filled for a period of three months. His subsequent
efforts to obtain passage were frustrated by dilatory tactics on the
part of the Japanese. No request for diplomatic assistance was made in
that instance.
***
"The procedure followed by this Government in asking permission from the
Japanese Government for visits by public vessels to Japanese ports or
ports in Japanese mandated areas was in accord with the procedure
followed by this Government in requesting permission for visits by its
public vessels to the port of other countries.
"No record has been found of any requests in 1904 and 1941 by the War or
Navy Department to this Department that there be taken up with the
Japanese Government proposals for visits to the Mandated Islands or of
this Government's having approached the Japanese Government during those
years in regard to visits to the Mandated Islands. In previous years
the Navy Department at various times asked this Department to obtain
permission for certain United States naval vessels to visit certain
specified opened and unopened ports in the Mandated Islands. The
Department of State promptly made representations to the Japanese
Government requesting the necessary permission. With regard to
applications made prior to 1936 the Japanese Government indicated its
readiness
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to permit American public vessels to visit the opened ports but not the
unopened ports named in the lists submitted by the Navy Department. The
Navy Department, however, canceled the proposed visits to the opened
ports for which permission to visit had been granted. In the approaches
made by this Government in 1936 and 1937, the Japanese Government, on
grounds of inconvenience, withheld its permission for United States
public vessels to visit the opened ports as well as the unopened ports
of the Mandated Islands.
"In view of the fact that the Japanese Government in 1936 refused in
actual practice to permit visits to the opened ports as well as to the
unopened ports in the Mandated Islands and in view also of the fact that
with the termination in 1936 of the Treaty Limiting Naval Armament,
signed in Washington in 1922, this Government became free to fortify the
Aleutian Islands, this Government decided to adopt a more restrictive
policy with regard to the admission of Japanese war or other public
vessels to the Aleutians and to Alaska. After 1936 visits by Japanese
public vessels were permitted only to Dutch Harbor, also known as
Unalaska, and, on two occasions, to the Pribiloff Islands which the
Japanese were permitted to visit because of special circumstances
arising out of the Convention of 1911 for the Preservation and
Protection of Fur Seals. Subsequent to 1936 permission was withheld for
all visits by Japanese public vessels to the territorial waters of the
western Aleutian Islands."
The Japanese consulate and its consular agents in Hawaii enjoyed
diplomatic immunity. This gave them a free rein in their spying
activities and unrestricted communication by radio and cable with the
mainland of Japan in reporting upon the movement of our fleet and the
status of our armed defenses in Hawaii. [1] Neither the Army, the Navy,
nor the F.B.I. had
Footnotes:
[1] Admiral McMorris, head of the War Plans Division of Staff of
Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet, 1941, said: "I never entertained any
doubt, any time during 1941, that the Japanese were fully informed of
all military activities in this area." (R. 2882)
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authority to tap these lines and find out what was going on because of
our own legal restriction, the Communication Act of 1934. [1]
No better example of the failure to control consular agents and the
results thereof can be found than the case of the consul general in
Honolulu. This man had about 200 consular agents in the Islands. He
used the telephone and telegraph for reporting on our defenses and fleet
movements with impunity. When he was arrested with his agents on
December 7th, a large number of his messages were found in the
wastepaper basket, torn up and partially burned. As a result of eight
months' work in piecing a portion of these together, Colonel Fielder, G-
2 under General Short and since that time G-2 in Hawaii, produced a
number of these reconstructed messages which clearly revealed that
military information was being gathered and transmitted to Japan. The
day before this event took place a radiophone message, that was
monitored, between a Japanese doctor's house
Footnotes:
[1] Memorandum of September 29, 1944, from James Lawrence Fly, Chairman,
Federal Communications Commission: "The United States was at peace with
Japan prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, and the
Communications Act of 1934, under which the Federal Communications
Commission was organized and from which it derives its powers,
prohibited the tapping of wires or other interception of messages
transmitted between points in the United States, including its
territories, and a foreign country (Section 605). Since that
prohibition upon the Commission had not been in any way superseded, the
Commission did not intercept any messages over the radio-telegraph,
cable telegraph or radiotelephone circuits between the United States
(including Hawaii) and Japan prior to December 7, 1941."
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in Honolulu and a newspaper in Japan was heard and reported, late on
December 6, and was given extensive consideration by General Short and
Colonel Fielder, G-2; but its exact meaning could not be made out. This
message is referred to as the Mori message. (R. 2961) The next morning
the Japanese struck. The evident trend of this message was to report
upon the state of the naval defenses and the presence of the fleet as
well as the Army defenses.
This Board believes that Japan's spying activities could have been
determined, the intentions of the Japanese revealed and much important
information gathered, which would probably have prevented in large
measure the Pearl Harbor disaster, had the Army and Navy been permitted,
with the F.B.I., to tap these lines and find out what was going on. If
the consular agents were conducting commercial business no harm would
have been done; if they were not limiting their activities to consular
business, we than had a right to know it and to take action accordingly,
either by an open breach or by preparing ourselves to meet what they
were doing.
Ambassador Grew has well stated that there are three lines of defense
for a nation such as ours: the diplomatic line of defense, the Navy, and
the Army. However, the diplomatic line -- held by the State Department
-- ofttimes handicaps and influences the preparation for the Army and
Navy defense lines. As an illustration, the policy of compromise
between economic
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sanctions and negotiations [1] in turn influenced War Department action,
in that Short was told by the War Department, which in turn reflected
the State Department's warnings, to take defensive measures but in doing
so he was told not to alarm the population nor to disclose intent. [2]
There appears to be no evidence of a strong policy of standing up for
American rights and boldly stepping out and making the Japanese behave
themselves; and this in the face of the fact that it was well known that
people of the character of the Japanese and their national attitude of
mind respect only force and strength and do not respect a policy of good
intentions nor demands of conduct without means to enforce same.
The Board is impressed with the necessity for a closer, more aggressive
relationship between the Department of State, the Department of Justice,
and the War and Navy Departments, in using all of their facilities as a
coordinated team for the defense of the United States. [3]
Footnotes:
[1] The Secretary of State, Mr. Hull, said: "With regard to the lines
along which this Government's foreign policy with respect to Japan was
directed in 1941, a detailed record is given in Chapter XIV of *Peace
and War* (a publication issued by the Department in 1943), and on pages
325-386 of Volume II of *Foreign Relations of the United States-Japan*,
1931-1941."
[2] The Secretary of State, Mr. Hull, said: "With regard to your request
for an expression of the Department's views touching upon the influence
of foreign policy upon military directives, it was not the policy of
this Government to take provocative action against any country or to
cause Japan to commit an act of war against the United States."
[3] The State Department counter proposals of the 26th of November,
which Japan considered as an ultimatum, the day before the Army and
Navy, Marshall-Stark memorandum could be delivered asking no ultimatum,
is a case in point. Mr. Hull said after delivering his ultimatum that
he washed his hands of the matter and left it to the Army and Navy. (R.
Stimson, 4051-4053, 4078-4079).
Page 26
The Japanese policy was typical of the oriental mind, which is
predominantly a bargaining mind, asking twice as much as they expect to
get and then settling on a compromise. Any show of weakness merely
strengthens the hand of the bargainer, and any crack in the bargainer's
front causes him to lose face and bargaining power. Therefore the
action of the United States in demilitarizing Guam by removing its guns
and other equipment and thus attempting to show Japan the peaceful
intentions of the United States, was undoubtedly considered by Oriental
Japan as an evidence of weakness and merely served to put our interests
backward instead of forward. (R. 3062)
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4. U.S. Policy (1939-1941). We had been following the policy
immediately before the war which broke out between Germany, England, and
France, of veering away from anything that would precipitate a conflict
with the Japanese. In view of the tense international situation,
particularly after the outbreak of the European War in August 1939, it
became apparent that it would be necessary for us to redouble our
efforts to avoid any open friction with the Japanese, both because we
wished to devote what resources were available to the assistance of
England and France, with whom we were in deep sympathy; and also, for
the further purpose, that we were inadequately prepared to meet any
attack from Japan in the Pacific. [1]
Footnotes:
[1] Captain Layton, Fleet Intelligence Officer, gave this very
significant testimony, when asked if the American Navy, with two of its
carriers, had discovered the task force that attacked Hawaii and had
attacked this force at sea, what would have been the outcome:
" Captain Layton: I think the American forces here would have taken the
licking of their life, first, because the American people were not
psychologically prepared for war.
"General Russell: How would the psychology of the American people
influence a naval engagement off of Oahu?
"Captain Layton: I am referring to the American Navy as a part of the
American people, and I use this example: During the Japanese attack on
Pearl Harbor a portion of a squadron of American carrier planes were
than flying in from a carrier to Ford Island. They were attacked by
Japanese fighters, and it is to be observed that these planes were armed
with machine gun ammunition and machine guns ready to fire, and I can
find no record of any of these carrier planes firing one single shot at
any Japanese plane." (R. 3047)
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As events became more critical in 1940 and 1941, the necessity of
following a policy for delay and apparent appeasement of Japan increased
to one of great national urgency. We were faced with a dual load of
unpreparedness for any war and the necessity of sending England and
France what equipment and supplies that were available.
It was, therefore, natural with this factual situation to bow to the
necessity of avoiding war by trying to appease Japan. We found it
expedient to lean over backwards to avoid an appearance in Hawaii of a
war-like or belligerent attitude, particularly, in view of and towards
the large Japanese population of the islands. [1]
Our general national policy and, particularly the War Department policy,
very naturally conveyed itself to the commanders in residence in Hawaii.
Their acts were colored and their dispositions tempered by the repeated
cautions in this direction as we sought for time to prevent an untoward
incident from precipitating war with Japan before we were ready to meet
it. The fact that they were not more fully advised of the progress
towards a critical international situation in the Pacific must be taken
into account.
This policy of avoiding any act to offend the Japanese was offset to
some degree by one at right angles to it, of the application of
commercial restrictions which tended to strangle her economic life and
her preparation for war. For instance, the refusal to sell scrap to
Japan, the abrogation
Footnotes:
[1] 160,000 Japanese were in the Islands, composing about one-third of
the population. (R. 2947)
Page 29
of Japanese commercial rights under treaty and the failure to renew that
treaty with Japan, the oil embargo and similar incidents were at
variance with this general policy.
The net result was a national policy towards which reflected itself I
the "Do-Don't" type of instructions that characterized the message from
the War Department to Hawaiian Commanders up until December 7, 1941.
The policy of our government as practiced by our public officials in
their attitude toward Japan was not one of appeasement openly, but it
was that in effect. Every effort was being exerted to prevent a rupture
of relations with Japan, while presenting a show of face by economic
sanctions to restrain Japanese aggression. Every effort was made to
maintain the *status quo* until we were ready. Time was our most
precious commodity in 1941.
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5. Moral Embargoes Versus Japanese Expansion. No competent
understanding can be gained of the relationship with Japan unless we
break down the problem into its essential aspects. Japanese industry
had received a succession of serious blows by reason of our successive
steps of not renewing the commercial treaty with Japan, the cutting off
of scrap to Japan, the cessation of our trade in silk with Japan, the
oil embargo, the freezing of credits and assets, and numerous other
incidents. On the diplomatic front, strong efforts were being made to
maintain the *status quo* leading up to the final visit of Japanese
special Ambassadors to the United States terminating with Pearl Harbor.
This situation generally trended, however, towards placating and
appeasing Japan with such firmness as was necessary to keep the
negotiations going.
During all of this period the government was not supported by a public
that was war-minded; just the contrary. Public irritation was
increasing, but it was still hoping to avoid war. On the contrary,
Japan's attitude toward the United States was one of increasing
hostility. Its policy was to conduct its aggressions starting in 1935
against China, as rapidly and as effectively as its resources would
permit, while maintaining a diplomatic screen and pretense of
considering the views of the United States. Being unable to agree with
them, it had no intention of doing so whatever.
During this period Japan made no concessions. It was quite apparent
that she would continue her course until the patience of the United
States was exhausted; and the United States was forced into a position
of an open breach -- the time of that breach was stipulated clearly to
the President
Page 31
November 27 by General Marshall and Admiral Stark. The delivery of the
counter proposals to Japan on November 26 anticipated that time -- war
came before we were fully prepared.
It was well known that Japan's entry into all wars of the past had been
characterized by the first overt act of war coming simultaneously with
the declaration. The services, both Army and Navy, were well aware of
this Japanese characteristic. It was, therefore, to be expected that an
unexpected attack would be made by Japan as the first indication of a
breach of relations. This is well expressed by the Secretary of War,
Mr. Stimson, who testified:
"General Russell: Then you were not surprised at the air attack on the
7th of December:
"Mr. Stimson: Well, I was not surprised, in one sense, in any attack
that would be made; but I was watching, with considerably more care,
because I knew more about it, the attack that was framing up in the
southwestern Pacific. And I knew also that there was a concentration in
the mandated islands -- I know now, because I was shown by General
Arnold the letter about the telegram, and an order; so that that was an
additional threat, and that might fall on either Hawaii or Panama." (R.
4072)
Indeed, Ambassador Grew on January 27, 1941, sent the State Department
the following message:
Tokyo, January 27, 1941 -- 6 p.m.
(Received January 27 -- 6:38 a.m.)
"A member of the Embassy was told by my...colleague that from many
quarters, including a Japanese one, he had heard that a surprise mass on
Pearl Harbor was planned by the Japanese Military forces, in case of
'trouble' between Japan and the United States; that the attack would
involve the use of *all* the Japanese military facilities. My colleague
said that he was prompted to pass this on because it had come to him
from many sources, although the plan seemed fantastic."
Grew
Page 32
Japan, well knowing the policy of the United States had been to avoid
war to the limit of its endurance, took advantage of our situation. It
was, therefore, obvious that the United States would have to avoid
friction with Japanese nationals as that would be a ready excuse for
Japan to precipitate the issue prematurely. On the other hand, sabotage
was to be expected from these Japanese nationals. A large body of them,
as in Hawaii, was a potential source of great danger, not only as to
what they might do, but as the basis of precipitation of an
international incident with Japan.
The public generally did not understand the importance of Hawaii. It
had no appreciation of the danger except as the press became
increasingly insistent in pointing out the progress of the advance
towards war and the likelihood that this outpost would be involved in
the conflict as one of the first line elements of our western defense.
[1]
The War Department was urging officially and privately that every effort
be made to delay the declaration of war by Japan because of our serious
state of unpreparedness and because much of our available military
resources were being utilized to assist the United Nations. The battle
of the Atlantic was the predominant factor in the public mind and
dominated the policy of the War Department, as evidenced by the transfer
of a considerable part of the Pacific Fleet to the Atlantic. Therefore,
the entire consciousness of the War
Footnotes:
[1] *Fortune* magazine polled the public in late 1939 and made a report
in January which showed that 55% of those questioned were in favor of
defending Hawaii; 25%, not defend, and the balance did not know what
they wanted.
Page 33
Department was directed towards avoiding any incident that might
precipitate war with Japan while, at the same time, exerting its efforts
to prepare for such a war. The War Department was confronted with a
grave lack of planes, anti-aircraft guns, and other implements of war
with which to equip Hawaii with an adequate defense mechanism. The
previous delay in implementing our defense had left us, two year after
war had started in Europe, gravely lacking in our preparations. The
strong anti-war group in the Unites States made it unwise for the United
States to take a stronger action against Japan.
These general policies apparently were the subject of discussion of the
War Council. [1] Its policies were reflected
Footnotes:
[1] There is some apparent confusion of that testimony in the use of
this term, and the two bodies to which it refers. The situation was
clarified by the testimony of Mr. Stimson, who said:
"The first subject that was listed here is that of the 'War Council'.
By the 'War Councils' we meant the meetings that were held by the
Secretary of State, possibly the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the
Navy, the Chief of Staff, and the Chief of Naval Operations, from time
to time, to discuss the relations between the Japanese Empire and the
American Government.
***
"The name 'War Council' is the name of a statutory body which was
created in, I think, the National Defense Law of about 1920; but it was
purely a War Department board. It did not have any members from the
Navy or from any other department in it.
***
"The War Council was in effect and used to meet, usually on Wednesdays,
in the times that we are taking over, but it consisted solely of myself,
my assistants, civil assistants, and the Chief of Staff and such other
officers as I invited in; and it had nothing to do with the Navy or
matters outside of this Department. But we did have two sets of
meetings -- they can hardly be dignified by the 'organization' -- but
early, very soon after Mr. Knox and I came into the Government in 1940,
we decided that we ought to meet regularly, and we ought to meet with
the Secretary of State; we were approaching important matters; and so we
went to the Secretary of State and asked him if he had any objection to
meeting with us once a week. He agreed cordially, and accordingly we
began meeting on Tuesday mornings at 9:30 every week, whenever we were
present in Washington, or able to come, and those series of
Page 34
Footnote [1] - Continued from preceding page.
meetings went on until Mr. Know died; they lasted right through.
"They were perfectly informal and unofficial meetings, but they were
very regular, and we met once a week regularly; and during the time at
which you are about to inquire, just before Pearl Harbor, we had extra
meetings. In fact, we were in such a meeting on the Sunday morning that
the Japanese attacked. The meetings took place in the State Department,
Mr. Hull's office, and during that time the Secretary of State, the
Secretary of the Navy, and myself were in constant contact.
"The other set of meetings were meetings called by the President, which
he usually called with great regularity -- the Secretary of State, the
Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Staff -- that
was, of course, General Marshall -- the Chief of Naval Operations, who
was at that time Admiral Stark; and sometimes, General Arnold. Well,
that was also improvised, so to speak; it had no custom before it. It
was created in the light of the approaching emergency, and among
ourselves, as a nickname we called it the 'War Cabinet,' or the 'War
Council,' or something like that; and evidently Mr. Hull, from what you
say, used that expression in his White Paper.
"There was no regular day set for the meetings of that body. They met
on the call of the President, at his office; and during this time about
which you particularly ask, the autumn of 1941, they were meeting very
frequently, also; and, fortunately, I have records. I have kept records
during the time that I am here, in which I have set down very briefly,
and without much reference to good English sometimes, what was taking
place, including everything that was important, that I deemed to be
important; in regard to the crisis that was coming along; and including
these meetings; so that I am in a position where I can give you dates of
these meetings pretty fully." (R. 4041-4043) (General Marshall, R. 5-6)
Page 35
in actions of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, as to measures taken for
defense in the Pacific. It is necessary to keep these factors in mind
in reading the messages from the War Department to the Commanding
General of the Hawaiian Department. The handling of Japan had been a
mixture of diverse policies; and this reflected itself in War Department
messages to Hawaii, which both told Short to prepare for defense and at
the same time to do nothing in preparing it that might precipitate
trouble with the local Japanese population or excite the local public.
As evidence of this was the fact that Short responded to the situation
by selecting an anti-sabotage alert and the War Department took no
exception to it. These two conflicting courses of action were reflected
in the messages and in the policies of the War Department; they account
in part for the attitude of mind in Short and others in the Hawaiian
Department. Whether justified or not, we consider later.
Then, too, official War Department thought on the subject of Pacific
defense was almost wholly concentrated as to what might happen to the
Philippines, the intermediate islands, and Panama. It was there that
the main attack, in the first phase, was expected from Japan. No early
attack was expected on Hawaii. As the Chief of Staff testified, it was
a surprise to him. (R. 9)
All efforts were being made towards strengthening these outposts. Such
modern bombing aircraft as could be made available was being flown to
the Philippine theater. Likewise, efforts were being made to strengthen
the defenses of Midway, Guam, Wake, and other localities judged to
become the first
Page 36
involved. The Hawaiian defense was clearly secondary at that time,
although prior thereto it was considered as our strongest outpost, and
had first priority on equipment and maintenance. (R. 14,184)
Planes flown from the mainland as late as December 7, 1941, to Hawaii en
route to the Philippines were not supplied with ammunition until they
were ready to depart from Hawaii. General Arnold explains this was
because of the necessity of carrying sufficient gas to insure a safe
arrival. (R. 168) This too led to a state of mind, both officially and
personally, in the responsible officers of the Hawaiian Department,
that, even if war with Japan was about to start, Japan would not
initially attack Hawaii. It was felt that Hawaii was quite well down on
the list of objectives of Japan, as those parts of American territory
closer to Japan would be the first to feel the blow and that the
implementing of other defenses must give way in priority to those though
to become the first involved. (R. 2872)
Japan shrewdly calculate and estimated correctly this state of mind. It
arrived at this conclusion and acted accordingly, temporarily by-passing
the Philippines and the intermediate American islands, for a direct
attack on Hawaii December 7, 1941, just as Ambassador Grew had clearly
warned in his message of January 27, 1941. So clearly did Japan
understand our national psychology that it selected Sunday morning,
early, as the time for attack, well knowing this to be the best time to
achieve surprise. Japan took, as the Chief of Staff of the Hawaiian Air
Force estimated, a 50 to 1 shot. Later, it will appear how well that
venture was
Page 37
prepared and executed, and how well timed as an answer to our counter
proposals of November 26, which the Japanese considered an ultimatum;
because it was on and after the delivery of that document against which
General Marshall and Admiral Stark warned too late, that the task force
of Japan that attacked Hawaii moved out of its rendezvous at Tankan Bay
o the 27th or 28th of November to launch the attack against Pearl Harbor
on December 7, 1941. [1]
Footnotes:
[1] The best attainable evidence supports this statement. (R. 3033)
Page 38
6. Public Demands Action Against Japanese. Our national policy has been
to avoid war. The difficulty with our policy appears to have been its
conflicting nature, in that in the case of Japan we desired to avoid
war, to continue in business with Japan, and at the same time to prevent
Japanese aggression by both negotiation and simultaneously to apply
economic sanctions against Japan. As our nation was not prepared for
war, it left the administration, particularly the State Department,
without the full support of the public so it could proceed with a firm
policy toward Japan; and it left the War and Navy Departments without
sufficient means to implement a more aggressive policy towards Japan.
The result of this conflicting situation made it extremely difficult for
the State Department to handle negotiations with japan, which well know
our national policy. It was difficult both to negotiate for a peaceful
solution of differences with a nation such as Japan, and at the same
time impede negotiations by applying economic sanctions such as the
freezing of assets and credits, the cutting off of the supply of oil and
scrap, and the termination of a commercial treaty with Japan.
This conflicting element of policy reflected itself in the actions
directed by the War Department to its field commanders, who were
required to both take all the necessary precautions to meet war and at
the same time to take no steps either to excite the civil population or
to precipitate war by overt acts. Such a policy was particularly
difficult to carry out in Hawaii, where there was a very large
proportion, some thirty percent, of the population of the nationality or
Page 39
Japan. The danger, therefore, was great in carrying out the War
Department policy, that in our preparations for war we would precipitate
an issue with Japanese nationals in the Hawaiian Islands which would be
an excuse by Japan to open hostilities.
This state of public minds was further inflamed to demand action by the
Government against Japan, because of the latter's open aggressions in
1941; but effective action was impossible of fulfillment because of the
long public policy of only maintaining a very modest army and navy.
Public opinion can change far faster than a nation can make ready for
war. The time element of making preparations for war is so long that it
always lags behind a sudden change of public views, as in our case with
Japan. Our public opinion had changed against Japan faster than
preparations for war could be made.
This left the Department of State with the most difficult task of
negotiation without means of enforcing its views by force of arms. It
likewise left the War and Navy Departments unable to fully support the
State Department in its negotiations. This led to a compromise
solution, due to this public opinion as expressed by the press, in the
form of a resort to economic sanctions.
But the difficulty with economic sanctions was that, while it indicated
a firm policy on the part of the United States, it also so aggravated
the situation in that it made negotiation difficult of either progress
or consummation. At most, our national policy was one of defensive
character while waiting for the preparations for war to catch up with
the new state of the public mind that Japan should be made to
Page 40
behave herself and that our government should do something about it.
7. Economic Sanctions Against Japan. In 1938 and 1939 a series of
"moral embargoes" or commercial sanctions were applied to Japan by the
United States. During those two years there had been brought about a
cessation of the United States' export to Japan of airplanes,
aeronautical equipment, and certain other materials. There also
resulted a state of decline of export to Japan of strategic materials,
and as of July 1904, under the Export Control Act, the President had
curtailed or prohibited the export of basic war materials.. Licenses
were refused for the export of Japan of aviation gasoline and most types
of machine tools as of September 1940.
The testimony of Ambassador Grew throws light upon the effect and result
of embargoes. He said:
"During the period up to, I think it was, the autumn of 1940, I took the
position that economic embargoes against Japan -- and embargoes are in
the nature of sanctions and therefore are always interpreted as
international insults -- I took the position that we should not put
embargoes on Japan, until we were prepared to go all the way through
with whatever might result from those embargoes. I pointed out that
when we put embargoes against Japan in effect, our relations with that
country were bound to go steadily down-hill and it might, and probably
would, end in war; and that until we were prepared to go to war with
Japan. I felt it would be very short-sighted to get into a situation
where we might be obliged at a later date to withdraw those embargoes.
There is nothing so conducive to a lowering of national prestige,
reputation, and authority as to make threats and then have to recall
those threats or modify those threats. We saw that working out in the
relations between Great Britain and Italy at the time of the Abysinnian
campaign.
Page 41
"But, in the autumn of 1940, I telegraphed the Secretary of State that I
felt that time had then come, since Japan was threatening not only our
national interests, but, I would say, our vital national interests; I
felt that the time had come to consider, not whether we must call a halt
to Japan's expansion, but when. It seemed to me at that time, whether
we were fully prepared for war or not, that we must in our own interests
put those embargoes in effect; and, shortly thereafter, those embargoes
were put into effect.
"Our relations than started directly on a down-hill course, and they
ended in war; but at least we were more prepared for war at that time
than we had been two years earlier."
It was in the fall of 1940 that we cast the die and adopted economic
sanctions. And we find it significant that about June 1940 General
Herron as Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department upon Washington
orders went into an all-out alert into battle positions with live
ammunition for six weeks. (R. 212).
In September the export of iron and steel scrap was prohibited. The
effect of the United States policy was to cut off from Japan by the
winter of 1940-1941 the shipment of many strategic commodities,
including arms, ammunition, and implements of war, aviation gasoline and
many other petroleum products, machine tools, scrap iron, pig iron and
steel manufactures, copper, lead, zinc, aluminum, and a variety of other
commodities important to a war effort.
Further parallel to this course of action by the United States was the
decision in August 1941 between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister
Churchill of Great Britain that the United States and Great Britain
should take parallel action in warning Japan against new moves of
aggression, that the United States could continue its conversation with
the
Page 42
Japanese government and offer her a reasonable and just alternatives to
the course upon which that country was embarked. [1]
As was stated in the White Papers [2] as to economic sanctions, he
(Grew) said that "considering the temper of the people of Japan it was
dangerously uncertain to base United States policy on a view that the
imposition of progressive and rigorous economic measure would probably
avert war; that it was the view of the Embassy that war would not be
averted by such a course. Finally he warned of the possibility of
Japan's adopting measures with dramatic and dangerous suddenness which
might make inevitable a war with the United States."
As Ambassador Grew testified in summary:
"However, I can say, in brief compass, that the trend of our relations
during the period you mention; that is, the year 1940 and 1941; was
almost steadily down-hill; we, of course, in our embassy in Tokyo,
leaving nothing undone to arrest that trend; and I think everything was
done that could possibly have arrested it, in our work in Tokyo. But,
we were up against what I would call a 'tidal wave' of military
extremism in Japan; and I think the results as culminating in Pearl
Harbor proved that fact."
The testimony of Ambassador Grew as to his actions as reflected in the
State Department's White Papers and in extracts from his diary indicates
that he too was acting under what
Footnotes:
[1] "Peace and War, United States Foreign Policy 1931-1941," Department
of State, Washington, p. 129.
[2] "*Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan, 1931-1941* Vol. I
and Vol. II; and *Peace and War, United States Foreign Policy, 1931-
1941*, Department of State, Washington D.C."
Page 43
apparently was a conflicting policy but with a full recognition of the
inevitable date of a final trial of strength with Japan. A review of
Grew's communications to the State Department in the year 1941 is an
excellent perspective of the course of the fatal events that led to
Pearl Harbor.
On January 27, 1941, he communicated by wire with the State Department
indicating that an attack on Pearl Harbor by all means available to the
military and naval forces of Japan was being discussed, and he felt that
it was so serious that it should be reported, even though it was
fantastic to consider it; on February 1 he said the outlook was never
darker for peace; on July 25 the United States froze Japanese assets,
causing bitter Japanese resentment; on August 18 he reported the
Japanese protest on U.S. economic pressure; on August 29 the United
States applied the oil embargo, decided to send oil tankers to Russia
and a military mission to China; on September 6 Grew reported the
statement of the Japanese Premier that if the United States continued
its economic sanctions it would prevent any settlement for six months to
a year after they terminated, and on September 29 Grew sent an important
message to Washington that the Japanese could only be brought to a halt
by a show of force. He pointed out that any agreement would be a mere
breathing spell for Japan, that war was likely in any event, and unless
results were shown in the negotiations, more than had been demonstrated
to date, the Japanese would conclude the United States was only playing
for time and would act accordingly. On September 30 Grew protested at
the secrecy of our conversations with Japan as practiced by the United
States without advising with the public,
Page 44
whereas it was common knowledge in Japan.
On October 9 he significantly reported that the frozen-credit policy of
the United States was driving Japan into national bankruptcy and she
would be forced to act. His prediction was correct, because Tojo, the
only Japanese Premier to stay on the active Army list in that position,
was made Premier on October 16. There was an indication of trouble when
the Premier of Japan was a dominant military figure on the active Army
list, and on October 25 he reported that the Emperor ordered the Privy
Council before him and asked them if they intended war. When they
refused to answer, he instructed them that there should be no war with
the United States. This was the final effort by conservative Japanese
to avoid war. The next step would probably be war itself.
Grew warned on October 30 that the situation was fraught with the
greatest danger. On November 3 he said that war was not only possible
but probable and that Japan was preparing for hostilities "with
dangerous and dramatic suddenness." It was on that date that Kurusu
left for Washington, refusing to take a *later* clipper for "technical
reasons", the significance of which was apparent.
On November 7 Secretary Hull informed the Cabinet "that relations
between Japan and the United States were 'extremely critical' and that
there was 'imminent possibility' that Japan might at any time start a
new military movement of conquest by force." (White Papers, p. 136)
This was followed by warnings of the impending seriousness of the
situation in speeches made by Secretary of the Navy Knox and Under
Secretary of State Welles, November 11, 1941.
Page 45
The White Papers continue:
"On November 17 Ambassador Grew cabled from Tokyo that we could expect a
'sudden Japanese Naval or military attack in regions not then
involved'."
Secretary Hull on November 25 and November 28 at meetings of high
officials of this government.
"stated there was practically no possibility of agreement being achieved
with Japan; that in his opinion the Japanese were likely to break out at
any time with new acts of conquest by force; and that the matter of
safeguarding our national security was in the hands of the Army and
Navy. The Secretary expressed his judgment that any plans for our
military defense should include an assumption that the Japanese might
make the element of surprise a central point in their strategy and also
might attack at various points simultaneously with a view to
demoralizing efforts of defense and of coordination for the purpose
thereof." (White Papers, p. 144)
It does not appear that such a statement was sent by the Army and Navy
to their field forces.
On November 26 the Secretary of State handed the President's Ten Points
of Settlement to Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu. These proposals were
verbally rejected by the Japanese Ambassadors at once, but they inquired
as to any other basis of negotiation or a *modus vivendi*. The
following day, at the request of the Japanese Ambassadors, the President
received them and Secretary of State Hull, at which time the President
reaffirmed with finality the "Ten Points" were based. On the same day,
General Marshall and Admiral Stark wrote a memorandum to the President
requesting that no ultimatum be delivered to the Japanese as the Army
and Navy were not ready to precipitate an issue with Japan, and notified
him of the agreement reached with the British and the
Page 46
Dutch for reciprocal action in the case either one of them was attacked.
The proof indicates that the Marshall-Stark memorandum of the 27th to
the President did not reach him until after the meeting with the
Japanese Ambassador on the 27th or possibly on the 28th of November.
Whether or not the Secretary of State, Mr. Hull, now disclaims that this
document of the 26th was an ultimatum, Ambassador Grew testifies that
the Japanese so regarded it. (R. 4208, 4215, 4221, 4222) They so acted
upon it and Mr. Hull likewise so acted because he so informed the
Secretary of War, Mr. Stimson, on the morning of November 27. The
latter testified, based on his diary of contemporaneous events, thus:
"The first thing in the morning I called up Hull to find out what his
final decision had been with the Japanese --- whether he had handed them
the new proposal which we passed on two or three days ago or whether, as
he suggested yesterday, he had broken the whole matter off. He told me
now he had broken the whole matter off. As he put it, 'I have washed my
hands of it, and it is now in the hands of you and Knox, the Army and
Navy.'
"General Russell: Mr. Secretary, I don't like to disturb you, but I have
become a little confused on dates, about this telephone call. Was that
on the 26th of --
"Mr. Stimson: This was the 27th.
"General Russell: 27th.
"Mr. Stimson: The day after the 26th.
"General Russell: Yes, sir.
"Mr. Stimson: The 26th was the day he told me he was in doubt whether
he would go on with it.
"General Russell: Yes.
"Mr. Stimson: Or whether he would break it off; and on the morning of
the 27th, by telephone, he told me that he decided to break it off.
"I then called up the President and talked with him about it." (R.
4052-4053)
On November 29 Secretary Hull said to the British Ambassador, "The
matter will now go to the officials of the
Page 47
Army and Navy." He warned that the Japanese action would probably be "a
desperate gamble and require the utmost boldness and risk." His
predictions were uncanny. (White Papers, pp. 144-145) On November 29,
Ambassador Grew relates that there had just reached Japan news that the
President had made a proposition to settle Japanese grievances by giving
her substantially most of what she wanted, [1] and on December 1 Grew
reported Japan cold to the proposals, a fact Secretary Hull had found on
the 26th when he handed the President's Ten Points to the Ambassador.
On the same day, December 1, his diary shows that he had a conversation
with a Japanese friend apparently high in that government, Grew saying
"everything was over and that I would soon be leaving Japan."
On December 6 an address of Tojo was read for the Diet different from
all others heretofore delivered by him, the tone of which clearly
indicated Japanese intentions. The following day, on Sunday morning,
the Pearl Harbor attack occurred.
Footnotes:
[1] "Ten Years in Japan" by Ambassador Grew.
Page 48
8. The Hawaiian Population Problem: Sabotage Complex. The conditions
in Hawaii and the state of the public mind in Hawaii were considered
apparently by the War Department to be primary factors to be taken into
consideration in the carrying out of the military mission of the defense
of the islands and defense of the fleet. As elsewhere indicated in War
Department communications, this was a fact; and the responsible
commanders in Hawaii in the Army also gave great weight to the state of
the Hawaiian situation on the civil side.
It is significant that it had been the national policy of the United
States to exclude Japanese national from the United States and its
territories, both for self-protection and to protect American labor
against cheap foreign labor of the yellow races. Yet in Hawaii, our
fleet base and one of our most important defense outposts, we permitted
the introduction into the population of the islands of Japanese, to the
extent of 30% of the total population or 160,000. [1]
Footnotes:
[1] There are three classes of Japanese population: (a) old aliens
known as Issei, about 37,500; (b) Hawaiian-born Japanese who are sent
back to the mainland of Japan for education known as Kibei, about 2,599;
and (c) Hawaiian-born Japanese and Hawaiian-educated known as Nisei,
composing the balance of 160,000. 95% of the Japanese children attend
the Japanese language schools. Under Japanese Law no Japanese is
released from Japanese citizenship until he goes through a formal
procedure securing his release from that citizenship. Most Japanese in
the Islands have not secured such a release and they therefore have dual
citizenship in the United States and Japan. Approximately 50,000
Japanese attended the Shinto temples of which there were 55. Around
these temples were centered the teachings of Japanese culture,
patriotism, and family fealty. (R. 3919-3920) See also Chapter I,
"Gentlemen of Japan" by B. S. Haven, Ziff-Davis Publishing Co.; "Feudal
Hawaii; Paradise, Ltd." by Stanley High, *Readers Digest*, June 1943,
pp. 19-23; and "Are the Japs Hopeless?" by George Horne, *Saturday
Evening Post*, September 9, 1944.
Page 49
Many were Japanese of dual citizenship who, although born in the United
States, had not yet taken the steps made available by Japan to become
released from their Japanese citizenship. These Japanese laborers and
artisans were comparatively economical in terms of performance, useful
both in agricultural pursuits and as artisans, were highly prized by the
great commercial interests in sugar cane, pineapples, shipping, and
other interests of the Islands; and it was the urgent desire of these
commercial interests apparently both to enjoy the protection and profit
from the basing of the fleet in Hawaii and also to have no disturbance
of such labor or to be led into any situation that would disturb these
profitable labor relations.
This policy of encouraging the Japanese and permitting them to become
dominant in the affairs of the Islands has even gone so far as to permit
the Japanese to become important political factors with membership in
both the Senate and the House of Hawaii, and to dominate, by way of
majority, the Island governing councils in some of the islands of the
Hawaiian Group. (R. 2941)
Sabotage was a critical consideration by the local Army authorities.
But up to December 7 there had been not a single instance of sabotage.
On December 7 a number of illegal radio stations interfered with the
radio operations of the Army. No other specific instance of sabotage or
alien enemy action had been reported either by the War Department of
Hawaii or by G-2 or the F.B.I. in Hawaii.
Additionally, the placing of the Army upon alert by War Department order
to General Herron, by which his troops moved
Page 50
into the field in battle positions with live ammunition in June 1940,
had no effect upon the civilian population or their anxieties.
Subsequent frequent alerts and maneuvers which were constantly going on,
including Short's Alert Number 1 as to sabotage, had had no effect upon
the civil population. All activities of the Army in disturbing the
local populace paled by comparison with the contents of the local
newspapers and their reports of the war news and the progressively
increasing threats of Japanese action. Indeed, approximately a week
before the attack at Pearl Harbor, a local newspaper in Hawaii carried a
complete prediction of this attack on the following Sunday. (Exhibits
19-19a.)
The foregoing statement of fact as to background should be considered in
connection with the communication of the War Department warnings as to
sabotage, the action of General Short in placing the Department under
the Number 1 Alert against sabotage on November 27, and the claimed
reasons for not taking other defensive measures, because of the
reluctance to disturb both the civilian population and the alien
population of Hawaii.
The effect of such an atmosphere upon the policies and actions of the
responsible commanders and their resulting state of mind is an important
factor for consideration. As part of this state of mind, it was
generally considered that Japan would never dare attack; and certainly,
in the early stages of a war, she would not dare risk the major portion
of her carriers for the launching of such an attack. The probabilities
were strongly against such a bold and possibly suicidal move by Japan.
Page 51
The state of mind engendered by the sabotage issue and the presence of
the large Japanese population built up a sabotage consciousness in the
responsible authorities as a more likely course of Japanese action than
what was regarded as the more remote military operation of a direct air
attack. This background is important to consider in evaluating the
decisions arrived at by the Army commander and the actions taken by his
associates.
The existence of this state of public opinion had its effect upon the
evaluation by the Army of the Japanese capabilities. Likewise, it was
supplemented by the American attitude that Japan would not dare attack
the United States in what was regarded as its home territory in the
Islands, in the presence of the fleet, which was considered an asset and
not, in reality, a liability.
Senator Hill of the Hawaiian Senate testified (R. 2939-2940) as to the
protests of local commercial interests to General Emmons when he
proposed to take action in removing the dangerous Japanese from the
sugar plantations after the Pearl Harbor attack. He said the political
pressure brought to bear by these interests was sufficient to bring
about a cancellation of this effort of General Emmons. It was
significant of the propaganda pressure on the subject of doing nothing
to offend the Japanese in the Islands and to let them alone so they
could work for these Island industries and agriculture, which must have
been imposed heavily on General Short. The constant application of such
pressure for a period of nearly a year upon General Short doubtless had
a material effect upon his mind and upon his anxiety about the Japanese
population,
Page 52
about which he could do nothing. This was particularly reflected in his
refusal to have legal action taken against those who failed to register
as aliens. (R. 3255-3256)
It was well known in Honolulu to both the F.B.I. and G-2 of the Army
that there were certain Japanese activities that were inimical to the
best interests of the United States in the Hawaiian Islands. A Japanese
combines in his Shinto religion, centering about the Shinto temples,
three things: patriotism, religion, and family fealty. Those three
things compose his entire emotional, political, and family life.
The Shinto priests and the large number, 55, of Shinto temples in the
Islands were the focal point of Japanese propaganda, patriotism, and
disloyalty to the United States. This was all well known and could have
been cured promptly by closing the temples and arresting the priests, as
was done after December 7. Then there were the Shinto societies, and
particularly the Black Dragon society. The Japanese are well known as
great organizers and they had countless organizations, many of which
were potential subversive character. The Japanese ran their own
Japanese-language newspapers which promoted the same national spirit.
They had Japanese-language schools in which they taught Japanese
customs, family fealty, religion, and patriotism to Japanese children
one hour each day after their regular education in the American schools.
Here again our national policy, due to freedom of the press and freedom
of religion and of education, permitted these people to jeopardize the
defense of Hawaii. After December 7 the Japanese newspapers were put
under strict control and used by the United States for propaganda
agencies to control the
Page 53
Japanese population, and the Shinto temples were closed.
9. Hawaiian Press. The state of mind and the state of information in
the Hawaiian Islands leading up to Pearl Harbor, and particularly before
it, is not better illustrated than the articles appearing in the
*Honolulu Advertiser* and the *Honolulu Star-Bulletin*. A mere
recitation of these headlines would seem to have been sufficient to have
warned General Short and his subordinate officers of the critical
international situation.
The newspaper headlines in question read as follows: "U.S. Waits Japan
Reply" (29 Nov 41 -- *Honolulu Star-Bulletin*); "Japanese May Strike
Over Weekend"; "Kurusu Bluntly Warned Nation Ready For Battle" (30 Nov
41 -- *Honolulu Advertiser*); "Hull, Kurusu In Crucial Meeting Today" (1
Dec 41 -- *Honolulu Advertiser*); "U.S. Army Alerted in Manila,
Singapore Mobilizing as War Tension Grows"; "Japan Envoys Resume Talks
Amid Tension"; "War Fears Grow in Philippines" (1 Dec 41 -- *Honolulu
Star-Bulletin*); "Japan Called Still Hopeful of Making Peace with U.S.";
"Japan Gives Two Weeks More to Negotiations" (2 Dec 41 -- *Honolulu
Advertiser*); "Huge Pincer Attack on U.S. by Japan, France Predicted" (3
Dec 41 -- *Honolulu Star-Bulletin*); "Japan Spurns U.S. Program" (4 Dec
41 -- *Honolulu Advertiser*); "Pacific Zero Hour Near; Japan Answers
U.S. Today" (4 Dec 41 -- *Honolulu Star-Bulletin*); "Singapore on War
Footing"; "New Peace Effort Urged in Tokyo"; "Civilians Urged to Leave
Manila" (6 Dec 41 -- *Honolulu Star-Bulletin*); "Japanese Navy Moving
South"; "Detailed Plans Completed for M-Day Setup" (6 Dec 41 --
*Honolulu Advertiser*); "F.D.R. Will Send Message
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to Emperor on War Crisis" (7 Dec 41 -- *Honolulu Advertiser*). [1] [2]
10. Summary. We have learned a great deal about psychological warfare
since this nation went to war. Looking backwards, it is possible to se
that the psychological phases of the preparatory period for war leading
up to the conflict with Japan had an immense effect upon the state of
mind of our own public, officials and commanders; and upon what they did
or did not do, prior to December 7. The deception of Japan and its
actions based upon that deception in combination with our own failures
to take precautions against the attack played no small part in the
disaster of December 7th.
Our complacent nation appeared to be sure, in view of its wealth and
industrial strength and its prestige and leadership, that no one would
presume to attack it.
This national pride and vanity and sense of false security, so prevalent
on the mainland, undoubtedly had its influence in Hawaii.
With the foregoing background it is possible to understand more
accurately and judge the following story of Pearl Harbor from early
January 1941 until the attack and shortly thereafter.
Footnotes:
[1] Complete excerpts from the newspapers during this period will be
found in Exhibits 19 and 19a.
[2] The editors of both papers were called and examined as witnesses.
They testified that these headlines resulted from deductions based on
current trends in international relations gleaned from news dispatches.
No other factual data was available to them. (R. 3107-3108, 3169-3170)
Page maintained by Larry W. Jewell, lwjewell@omni.cc.purdue.edu. Created: 12/12/96 Updated: 12/12/96