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B. EVENTS FROM JANUARY THROUGH SEPTEMBER 1941
1. SELECTION OF GENERAL SHORT: General Short was selected for his high
post of command by General Marshall. Upon being notified of this
selection, he was called to Washington to confer with General Marshall,
to receive special written instructions from him and to confer with the
sections of the General Staff and particularly the War Plans Division.
The purpose of this visit and these conferences was to equip him with
the latest and most up-to-date information and instructions as to the
responsibilities of his new command.
Thereafter, General Short proceeded to Hawaii, arriving there on
the fifth day of February, 1941. He assumed command on February 7,
1941. Both Short and Herron concur that the latter fully advised Short
of the problems and conditions with which he was confronted.
At the time of General Short taking over command, there existed
certain basic documents constituting fundamental instructions for his
guidance in the conduct of the command, such as the Joint Army and Navy
Plan of 1935. This was modified by the subsequent agreements between
Short and Kimmel, Bloch and Short, and Bellinger and Martin.
Coincident with the assumption of command by General Short on
February 7, 1941, a letter was written on that date by General Marshall
to General Short comprising a full presentation of the problems
confronting General Short in his new command. The letter was based upon
a conversation with Admiral Stark, then Chief of Naval Operations, and
said in part:
"Admiral Stark said that Kimmel had written him at
length about the deficiencies of Army materiel for the
protection of Pearl Harbor. He referred specifically to
planes and to antiaircraft guns...
"What Kimmel does not realize is that we are
tragically lacking in this materiel throughout the Army and
that Hawaii is on a far better basis than any other command
in the Army. The fullest protection for the fleet is the
rather and a major consideration for us, there can be little
question about that; but the Navy itself makes demands on us
for commands other than Hawaii, which make it difficult for
us to meet the requirements of Hawaii. ...
"You should make clear to Admiral Kimmel that we are
doing everything that is humanly possible to build up the
Army's defenses of the naval overseas installations, but we
cannot perform a miracle. ...
"... However, as I have already said, we are keeping
clearly in mind that our first concern is to protect the
Fleet.
"My impression of the Hawaiian problem has been that
if no serious harm is done us during the first six hours of
known hostilities, thereafter the existing defenses will
discourage an enemy against the hazard of an attack. The
risk of sabotage and the risk involved in a surprise raid by
air and by submarine, constitute the real perils of the
situation. Frankly, I do not see any landing threat in the
Hawaiian Islands so long as we have air superiority.
"Please keep clearly in mind in all of your
negotiations that our mission is to protect the base and the
naval concentration and that purpose should be made clearly
apparent to Admiral Kimmel. I accentuate this because I
found yesterday, for example, in a matter of tremendous
importance that old Army and Navy feuds, engendered from
fights over appropriations, with the usual fallacious
arguments on both sides, still persist in confusing issues
of National defense. We must be completely impersonal in
these matters, at least so far as our own nerves and
irritations are concerned. ..." (R. 14-17)
Thus General Short was provided by his chief with both sound
advice and an admirable set of clear-cut signposts to guide him. Such
being the measure of his instructions, it is interesting to observe in
what particulars he complied with
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them or varied from them and the reasons for his actions. In conformity
with the instructions as to the Navy, General Short proceeded to
establish cordial and cooperative relationships, the exact nature of
which is discussed elsewhere. By the 19th of February he "had made a
pretty thorough inspection or survey" (R. 321), and on that date wrote a
letter to the Chief of Staff as to things that required immediate
attention, which were:
"As a result of my short study of conditions here I
believe that the following are of great importance and I am
taking steps to carry out the necessary changes:
(1) Cooperation with the Navy.
(2) Dispersion and protection of aircraft and of the
repair, maintenance and servicing of aircraft.
(3) Improvement of the Antiaircraft defense.
(4) Improvement of the Harbor Defense Artillery.
(5) Improvement of the situation with reference to
searchlights.
(6) Provision for more rapid movement of supplies and
reserves by improvement in roads and trails.
(7) Bombproofing of vital installations such as
Command Posts and communication centers.
(8) Increase in the number of Engineer troops."
The interim from February 19 to December 7 is replete with the
efforts of Short to secure approvals and money for improving the
defenses of Hawaii. It is also replete with various instances of his
being turned down by the War Department, particularly because of lack of
money in connection with permanent installations.
Undue weight should not be given, however, to the aspects of the
equipment, as General Marshall said in his letter of February 7th,
"Hawaii is on a far better basis than any other command in the Army",
and the fundamental question to be considered is: What did Short do with
what he had to meet the attack?
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As elsewhere stated, he was granted his request for the
construction of many types of installation, including the important
aircraft warning system. (See the discussion of supply of equipment and
construction, and also the delays in construction.) (p. 256)
Again on March 5, 1941, the Chief of Staff wrote General Short as
to the air situation in clear, unmistakable language:
"I would appreciate your early review of the situation
in the Hawaiian Department with regard to defense from air
attack. The establishment of a satisfactory system of
coordinating all means available to this end is a matter of
first priority." (R. 19)
On March 6, General Short wrote General Marshall, with particular
reference to Aircraft Warning System and the delays in its construction,
and delays in sites due to the Department of Interior delays:
"One of the first projects which I investigated in
this department was the Aircraft Warning Service which I
believe is vital to the defense of these islands. At the
present time the maximum distance an approaching airplane
can be detected is about five miles. The radio detector
equipment of the Aircraft Warning Service increases this
distance to one hundred and twenty miles, and in these
islands, the use of this equipment is the only way by which
the detection distance can be increased. With the present
international situation it seems to me that if this
equipment is to be used at all the need for it is now here.
"The Navy is vitally interested in this project. At
present with the fleet in Hawaiian waters, there is no
adequate warning service. ... I believe that this matter is
sufficiently important to be brought to the attention of the
Secretary of War to see if permission can not be obtained
from the Secretary of the Interior to construct the
Haleakala installation without the necessity of submitting
detailed plans for consideration by the National Park
Service.
"Defense of these islands and adequate warning for the
United States Fleet is so dependent upon the
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early completion of this Aircraft Warning Service that I
believe all quibbling over details should be stopped at
once. This project was very thoroughly studied by a board
of officers in this department who made several personal
investigations of each one of the sites. Now that basic
decisions as to locations, types of stations, and general
plans have been approved by the War Department, I strongly
recommend that this project be decentralized and that I be
authorized to give final approval to designs, layouts and
other details to expedite its completion."
On March 13, General Marshall wrote General Short:
"The progress that you are making in reaching close
coordination with local naval authorities, and so insuring a
maximum degree of readiness in your Department, is most
gratifying. ...
"The several letters which you have submitted to The
Adjutant General requesting personnel, materiel and funds
are being processed. To avoid delay in initiating projects
that may be approved, I am tentatively including $3,000,000
in the estimates now being prepared."
On March 15, General Marshall again wrote General Short as to the
Aircraft Warning Service, showing the delays due to the necessity of
getting approvals from the Department of Interior regarding matters
pertaining to its National Park Service:
"The War Department appreciates fully the necessity
for the early establishment of the aircraft warning service
stations I the Hawaiian Department. However, it will be
necessary to comply with certain fixed regulations in those
cases where facilities are to be established on lands
pertaining to the Department of the Interior. The National
Park Service officials are willing to give us temporary use
of their lands when other lands are not suitable for the
purpose, but they will not waive the requirements as to the
submission of preliminary building plans showing the
architecture and general appearance. They are also very
definitely opposed to permitting structures of any type to
be erected at such places as will be open to view and
materially alter the natural appearance of the reservation.
"I have given these matters my personal attention and
have conferred with officials of the National Park Service.
War Department radiogram of March 12, 1941, outlines what
appears to be the most practical solution at this time.
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On March 15 General Short wrote General Marshall a letter showing
full appreciation of the necessity for the dispersion and the protection
of aircraft. Among other things he said:
"On all fields the planes have been kept lined up on
the field where they would suffer terrific loss. As I wrote
you in my letter of February 19th some work has been done
towards the preparation of emergency fields on outlying
islands, but in no case have arrangements been complete for
the dispersion of the planes in the vicinity of the field or
the preparation of bunkers to protect them. I asked for
money and Engineer troops to do this work. The pursuit
planes must necessarily be protected on the Island of Oahu
on account of their limited cruising radius." (R. 21-22)
In this letter he also discussed at length the question of anti-
aircraft defense.
On March 28, 1941, General Marshall replied to this letter as
follows:
"Your proposal for relieving congestion by the
construction of one additional field and by the dispersion
of grounded aircraft in protected bunkers at existing
airfields is undoubtedly sound. As soon as you have
submitted sufficient details to support the defense of the
anticipated expenditures, funds for those purposes will be
included in estimates."
On April 14, General Short again wrote General Marshall and
amongst other things reported progress, as follows:
"Knowing that you are very much interested in the
progress that we are making in cooperating with the Navy, I
am enclosing the following agreements made with them:
"1. Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan Hawaiian
Department and Fourteenth Naval District. Annex No. VII,
Section VI, Joint Security Measure.
"2. Agreement signed by the Commander of the Hawaiian
Air Force and Commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force to
implement the above agreement.
"3. Field Orders No. 1 NS (Naval Security) putting
into effect for the Army the provisions of the joint
agreement.
"I have found both Admiral Kimmel and Admiral
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Bloch very cooperative and we all feel steps have been taken
which make it possible for the Army and Navy Air Forces to
act together and with unity of command as the situation
requires.
"We still have some detail work to do with reference
to coordinating the air force and the antiaircraft defense.
I hope we shall arrive at something on that in the near
future. The more I go into the details the more I am
becoming convinced that it will be necessary for us to set
up an air defense command." (R. 26-27)
On May 2, 1941, Short wired General Marshall as to the sums of
money needed for the construction of airports and other defense projects
totaling over $27,000,000. General Short followed this up with a letter
on May 2 to General Marshall in further explanation of his radiogram
forwarding supporting data.
On May 5, 1941, General Marshall wrote General Short acknowledging
the receipt of these estimates and supporting data, saying:
"The matter of locating strongpoints at various points
throughout the Island looks sound to me, and authority to go
ahead on the leasing of land parcels was radioed on April
22nd. War Plans and the Air Corps are still looking into
the matter of the additional airdrome on Oahu, and I expect
to have an answer for you in a short time.
...
"It is most gratifying to have you say that everything
is going along extremely well and do not hesitate to write
at any time." (R. 28)
On May 29, 1941, General Short furnished General Marshall a
complete report on current maneuvers, the plans for the organization of
the ground and the construction of field fortification, and the plans
for repelling a serious attack, and reporting his theory of the defense
of Hawaii, saying:
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"My theory of the defense of Hawaii is based upon the
following:
"1. Complete organization of the ground at all important
points.
"2. Holding of the most important field fortifications
lightly.
"3. Holding of large mobile reserves centrally located with
sufficient motor transportation to move all reserves at
once if necessary.
"4. Detailed plans for the employment of reserve with
complete reconnaissance and reserves actually rehearsed
in carrying out of the plans.
"5. All troops to be highly trained in delaying action and
counter-attack."
On July The Adjutant General sent General Short the following
wire:
"For your information stop Deduction from information
from numerous sources is that the Japanese government has
determined upon its future policy which is supported by all
principal Japanese political and military groups stop This
policy is present one of watchful waiting involving probably
aggressive action against the maritime provinces of Russia
if and when the Siberian garrison has been materially reduce
in strength and it becomes evident that Germany will win a
decisive victory in European Russia stop Opinion is that Jap
Activity in the south will be for the present confined to
seizure and development of naval comma army and air bases in
Indo China although an advance against the British and Dutch
cannot be entirely ruled out stop The Neutrality pact with
Russia may be abrogated stop They have ordered all Jap
vessels in US Atlantic ports to be west of Panama Canal by
first of August stop Movement of Jap shipping from Japan has
been suspended and additional merchant vessels are being
requisitioned end."
This wire contained notation by the Chief of Staff of July 7,
1941.
On July 11, 1941, General Short asked the location of a new
airfield on the Island of Oahu.
On July 25, 1941, General Short reported to General
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Marshall the Joint Air Arrangements of the Army, Navy, and
exchange of facilities such as airfields. On July 25, 1941, a very
significant message was sent by the Chief of Staff and the Chief of
Naval Operations as a joint dispatch to General Short warning him of the
application of economic sanctions against Japan on July 26, particularly
saying:
"Chief of Naval Operations and the Army Chief of Staff
do not anticipate immediate hostile reaction by Japanese
through the use of military means, but you are furnished
this information in order that you may take appropriate
precautionary measure against any possible eventualities."
On August 19, 1941, General Marshall wrote General Short as to the
establishment of an airfield base for the 15th Pursuit Group and his
reasons for so doing. This brings to conclusion the communications
between the Chief of Staff and General Short to October 1, 1941.
2. SHORT'S STAFF: Short brought one, Colonel Phillips to Hawaii with
the view to making him his Chief of Staff, and to train him for that
assignment he placed him successively in various sections of his General
Staff. On November 1 Colonel Phillips was made Chief of Staff.
Evidence indicates that Phillips failed to measure up to that most
responsible and important assignment -- the "alter ego" of the
Commanding General; that he was but a weak echo of his Commander and
failed to furnish him, as his principal adviser, with vigorous and
candid advice of high professional character and with a competent vision
and knowledge of what was taking place or might take place.
His administration of the staff, as we view it, was weak
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and reflected itself in the work of the several General Staff sections
and in the output thereof as a whole. While the various Assistant
Chiefs of Staff testified that harmony existed, the results are more
important in their conclusive effect that there was a lack of requisite
harmony and teamwork and it was quite evident to the Board that their
testimony was colored by their very evident loyalty to General Short.
Phillips was recognized by the staff as without force and far too
weak for a position of such importance. [1] Short's selection of
Phillips appears to have been a mistake. An examination of Phillips'
testimony as to his conception of his duty and what he did and failed to
do in aiding Short to competent decisions in critical situations, is
sufficient evidence of the matter. (R. 1134-1144) In justice to
Phillips it should be pointed out that while he was Chief of Staff he
never was present at important Navy conferences, (R. 393-394, 534), and
that information of important and vital events came to him second-
handed.
Although Short did not insulate himself from his staff, he had
Phillips conduct most of the staff conferences and apparently rarely
dealt with his principal staff officers. He delegated to his staff
little more than mere routine duties. His direct relationship with his
G-2 seemed particularly inadequate in view of the then existing tense
situation. (R. 393, 519, 520, 521) Although he frequently visited and
consulted with his principal subordinate commanders he held no periodic
conferences, and his second
Footnotes:
[1] R. 265, 1408-1409, 1946, 1977-1978, 2625-2626.
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in command, General Burgin, was not taken into his confidence as to
existing conditions nor was his advise sought. (R. 2625)
3. SHORT'S ACTIONS IN BUILDING DEFENSE INSTALLATIONS AND ADDING
EQUIPMENT:
There is no question that Short made many demands for equipment,
defense construction, and personnel. He was active and diligent in this
matter. Except as to aircraft and anti-aircraft, his command appears to
have been well supplied. In many instances, long delays were incurred
in the approval of defense construction and making funds available
therefor and some of the recommended defense construction was
disapproved by the War Department.
4. SHORT'S REORGANIZATION OF DIVISIONS: Short converted the square
division, known as the Hawaiian Division, into two triangular divisions
and equipped them with unusually heavy fire power in both artillery and
machine guns as a basis for future expansion in time of war.
General Maxwell Murray, commanding the 25th Division, testified:
"General Grunert: And in your division you had what
artillery?
"General Murray: I had the Eighth, Eleventh, and
Thirteenth Field Artillery, but it is not generally known
that we had practically doubled the gun strength of the
brigade before the 75-mm. gun batteries; the Eighth and the
Thirteenth were 75-mm. gun regiments, and each of those
batteries had eight guns to the battery instead of four.
The Eleventh was the 155-howitzer regiment, but they were in
addition manning two batteries of 155 guns, and some 240-mm.
howitzers. The 75 regiments both had 240-mm. howitzers
assigned to them, too." (R. 3076-77)
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5. SHORT'S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE NAVY: Turning from Short's efforts to
build up the physical installations and equipment of Hawaii and his
staff, and the successful conversion of his single square division into
two triangular division on which his staff seemed primarily engaged, we
come to his actions with the Navy. Acting upon General Marshall's
instructions and admonitions of February 7, 1941, which seemed to
greatly impress him, Short succeeded in establishing an amiable
relationship with Admiral Kimmel, Admiral Bloch and Admiral Bellinger.
As stated hereinafter, he entered into a series of agreements with
the Navy. Suffice it to say that these agreements, while admirable in
concept and in many particulars equally admirable in the proposed plan
of administration, under the handicap of joint action by cooperation
instead of unity of command, were of quite limited effectiveness because
neither the Army nor the Navy had sufficient means to properly implement
them.
The agreements were difficult of execution. To make them
effective would have taken skilled professional officers of both
services, guided by a well organized composite staff, and practiced in
operational tests.
The agreements themselves were not to go into effect until either
a period of strained relations occurred, or M-Day was declared, or in
the actual event of war. Neither the Army nor Navy seemed to appreciate
this defect.
Short apparently mistook the conduct of "war by contrast" for a
conduct of "war by command".
Even without the full means of putting these agreements physically
into effect, had the equipment and material available been utilized, had
there been in existence a
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detailed plan of operation of the staff and lower echelons, and had
sound judgment been exercised in the selection of the alert, the
disaster of Pearl Harbor undoubtedly would have been materially
mitigated, if not wholly avoided.
(For a full discussion of the agreements see p. 88 to p. 97.)
6. ABANDONMENT OF HERRON'S FIELD ORDER #1: ADOPTION OF TRIPLE-ALERT
SYSTEM: SABOTAGE ISSUE:
A further step, and one of great import, taken by Short was the
study that he initiated through his staff with a view to abandoning the
Field Order No. 1, in vogue under the regime of General Herron, and
substituting his temporary Standard Operating Procedure, which was
published tentatively on July 14, 1941. The final draft of this vital
document came out on November 5, 1941 (R. 283), and provided for three
types of alerts, which are defined by Short as follows:
"Our Alert No. 1 was a defense against sabotage,
espionage, and subversive activities without any threats
from the outside.
"Alert No. 2 included all these sabotage measure in
No. 1, and, in addition, defense against air attacks and
surface and submarine attacks.
"Alert No. 3 was a defense against an all-out attack
where everybody moved to their battle stations and carried
out their duties as if there was a possible attempt at
landing in sight." (R. 283)
Short says that he sent ten copies to the Navy. (R. 395, 400) He
says he sent a copy to Washington. (R. 431) Alert No. 1 was purely
antisabotage. Its effect when executed was to concentrate the planes in
groups, wing-tip to wing-tip, where they were vulnerable from the air
but less vulnerable from sabotage on the ground. He said he did this
because of
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his deficiency of personnel in protecting his planes against sabotage.
If they had been put in dispersed position about the fields within
bunkers, they would have been less vulnerable to wholesale destruction
from the air. This alert concentrated equipment and personnel and in
effect set up almost perfect conditions for a successful enemy air
attack.
Alerts Number 2 and Number 3, on the contrary, constituted wide
dispersion of men and equipment in battle positions, with ammunition at
the guns and troops and planes in positions of readiness for action and
maximum protection. Under Alert Number 1, the earliest time in which
planes were planned to get off the ground was four hours, while under
Alerts Number 2 and Number 3 available aircraft is ready and can take to
the air in from seven to eight minutes. Likewise, in connection with
putting into action the antiaircraft guns and other similar
establishments, the contrast between Alert Number 1 and Alert Numbers 2
and 3 was the difference between minutes and hours.
As the entire attack upon Pearl Harbor did not extend beyond
approximately three hours, it is obvious that the selection of the
correct alert was vital. Historically, and by way of precedent, Short
had before him the action of General Herron in the preceding year of an
all-out alert under Field Order No. 1 of Herron by which complete
dispersal of planes and troops and guns was effected, with ammunition at
the guns. The record shows (Colonel Capron and other witnesses - r.
1398, 2025, 2720, 2728, 2772-2773, 3096-3097) that there was no
disturbance of the civilian population as a result of the action by
Herron. This is significant, in view
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of the fact, as will later appear, that General Short gives that
explanation as one of his primary reasons for the selection of Alert
Number 1, because he might alarm the population. (R. 427-428, 532-533)
It should be kept in mind that the civilian population was
accustomed to the continued movements of the Army and Navy in their
frequent maneuvers and practice operations. Much of the civilian
population in this instance was living practically in the midst of one
of the greatest military and naval installations anywhere, so that their
state of mind would be far different from that of people on the mainland
unaccustomed to such sights. Then, too, the newspapers ofttimes
contained much more exciting news, threats and disturbing events, than
anything that an alert could stir up, either by the Army or Navy or
both. The explanations therefore lacks both substance and credibility.
At this point the question of sabotage which led to the selection
and implementation of Alert No. 1 should be examined. No single instance
of sabotage occurred while Short was in command up to December 7. It
was true that there were 35,000 aliens of Japanese origin and there was
a total of 160,000 or about 37% of the population of Japanese origin
affiliations (R. 289), but in no case was there any instance of
misbehavior, despite a very exhaustive investigation being made
constantly by the F.B.I. and by G-2, as well as by Naval Intelligence.
We have investigated the state of mind and the information as to
the actions of the Japanese population in an endeavor to understand why
it was that General Short adopted his antisabotage alert on November 27
in the face of the
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increasing international tension, and of his own estimate and that of
the Navy that an air attack was the most dangerous for of attack likely
to be encountered. We therefore resorted to the testimony of a great
variety of witnesses in all walks of life in Honolulu, resident there
during 1941, and inquired of their feelings and views and the whole
situation as to the Japanese population.
We could find no substantial evidence of any fear by these
witnesses, including some of the best-informed leaders in the civil life
of the Islands, that the Japanese would commit acts of sabotage. Their
knowledge was based upon long residence in the Islands and experience
with the Japanese. Governor Poindexter, newspaper editors like Raymond
S. Coll, of the Honolulu Advertiser, United States District Attorney
Angus Taylor, Shiver, head of the F.B.I., General Wells, executive vice-
president of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters Association, and Walter Francis
Dillingham, president of the Oahu Railway and Land Company and owner or
director of many other enterprises in the Islands, concurred with many
other witnesses such as ranch owners, government officials, leaders in
business, that the risk of sabotage, so long as the Army and Navy were
in a predominant position, before an actual landing and show of success
by the Japanese, was a relatively minor matter. However, the Army was
sabotage-minded. There appeared to be no substantial basis for this
fear other than speculation as to what a large body of citizens and
aliens of Japanese ancestry might do in case of stress.
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7. NAVY LONG-DISTANCE RECONNAISSANCE: He assumed that the Navy was
conducting long-distance reconnaissance, and in this he was joined by a
large group of ranking subordinates, but an inquiry by him, if it had
been made, would have soon revealed the fact that his assumption that
the task forces went out for conducting reconnaissance at long distance
was not true. Such reconnaissance as they were conducting was only
incident to the maneuvers of the task forces of the fleet, who were
operating for training purposes and were looking for Japanese submarines
so as not to interfere with their training operations. The Navy was
submarine- and training-minded. (R. 1527, 1600, 1725, 1773, 1802)
It should have been apparent upon examination of the facts by him
that any such operations of the task forces were not only intermittent
and limited in scope but they could not possibly cover the entire 360
degrees around the Island. A further understanding by him of the actual
facts would have disclosed very promptly, as it did to his air force
subordinates, that the Navy did not have any means for such long-
distance reconnaissance, even though under the agreements the Army on
call was to supply a substantial portion of the long-range aircraft for
this purpose. In fact, the Army had at the time of Pearl Harbor
available for this purpose only six planes capable of this work.
The Navy acceptance of responsibility for long-distance
reconnaissance is set forth in paragraph 18(I) of the Joint Coastal
Frontier Defense Plan, which provides:
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"18. NAVY. The Commandant, FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT, shall
provide for:
...
"i. Distant reconnaissance." (R. 1745)
The purpose of long-distance reconnaissance, which the Navy
assumed in its agreements with the Army, was to discover hostile naval
forces and particularly carriers before they could launch an attack.
The area of search extended two to six hundred miles from the shore. It
was assumed by Short that the presence of task forces of the Navy at sea
insured such reconnaissance being conducted. Long-distance
reconnaissance was obviously the very heart of the defense of Oahu
because upon its results would depend not only the opportunity to
destroy the carriers and carrier-borne planes of the Japanese but also
put the forces on Oahu on the alert for an effective reception of the
attack if it got through. But, as elsewhere stated, this long-distance
reconnaissance was not being conducted by the Navy and such air
reconnaissance as was being conducted was for the purpose of clearing
the area of submarines where the fleet was in training. The inshore
reconnaissance by the Army, up to twenty miles from shore, was
substantially for the same purpose.
The record showed it was the well-considered estimate of the Army
and Navy commanders and their staffs that carriers and their supporting
craft would attempt to approach Pearl Harbor, arriving in position at
dark preceding the dawn of the day on which the attack was to be made.
(R. 106) Under the protection of darkness 300 additional miles could be
covered so that at dawn the attack could be launched within
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approximately 300 miles from shore. This is apparently substantially
what actually did happen. (Roberts Record 556-F)
The conception and estimate of the situation was correct; steps
taken to meet it were either absent completely or so defective as to
amount to little. The Navy had available for long-distance
reconnaissance, from November 27 to December 7, 1941, 50 PBY's and the
Army had six heavy bombers while at least 270 planes would have been
required as a minimum for conducting such a reconnaissance if a 360-
degree area around Oahu was to be covered. (R. 1762, 1766) It is
significant that in the joint Army-Navy plan of 1935 distant
reconnaissance was made a mission of the Army but Short and Bloch agreed
early in 1941, in the joint plan for the defense of the Hawaiian
frontier and for the employment of the Army-navy Air Forces, to place
the responsibility for distant reconnaissance on the Navy, leaving to
the Army reconnaissance only about 20 miles from shore. This is due to
the fact that almost all of the planes suitable for distant
reconnaissance were naval. This Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan was
O.K.'d by Kimmel and approved by the War Department.
The result was that the critical band of sea around Hawaii (the
600- to 900-mile area) was not patrolled. Observations therein was
infrequent and incidental. Admiral Kimmel reached a decision that the
few planes available would be wholly ineffective for this purpose and
employed them otherwise. (R. 1763)
Both Admiral Kimmel and General Short were conversant with these
conditions. (R. 375, 1763, 4438-4439) It was obvious,
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therefore, that a Japanese task force with carriers could launch an
attack upon Oahu with a reasonable certainty of success since its
discovery prior to such launching would have been purely accidental and
its chances of discovery remote.
An early alert by the Navy to the Army would have permitted of a
dispersion of its planes with the result that they could have been
aloft, ready to intercept the attack, and the damage done would have
been greatly lessened.
The remaining factor for reconnaissance and detection was in the
Aircraft Warning System, which was a responsibility of the Army. [1] The
Army had put into operation in the fall of 1941, on a training basis,
which was operating for all practical purposes, a number of mobile radar
sets and an aircraft information center. That it was in operating
condition, even with the state of training of the personnel that then
existed in late November and early December 1941 was amply proven by the
successful operation of the system during previous tests and exercises
and of the station that discovered the attacking Japanese force 132
miles from the Island and the correct interpretation by the two enlisted
men operating the station, who duly reported the presence of a strange
force but were told by an inexperienced and only partially trained Air
Force lieutenant to "forget it". This was at 0702 on December 7, 1941.
If this information had been transmitted to the Air Force and to
the Navy the latter would have had the anti-aircraft weapons on its
ships in action, since only three to five minutes were required for that
purpose, the Army anti-aircraft
Footnote:
[1] See p. 147 for complete study of construction difficulties of
an aircraft warning system, signal difficulties, and how the enemy fleet
was discovered.
Page 85
system could have been alerted and many of the Army planes dispersed and
some could have gotten off the ground.
The only other reconnaissance instrumentality available was that
being operated by the Navy.
It was functioning officially in the latter part of 1941 and was
constantly supplying information of the greatest value to important
naval commanders, a part of which information was communicated to
General Short by Admiral Kimmel. (R. 1771-1772)
The one notable and tragic exception was the failure to advise
General Short that on or about November 25 a Japanese task force was
discovered in the Marshall Islands, in which force there were reported
as present two or three carriers, 15 to 20 submarines, and possibly
other vessels. (R. 361) About the first of December radio contact was
lost with this force as it apparently went into radio silence, which was
known to be by the Navy the third and last and most dangerous phase of
the movement of the enemy fleet. (R. 1654-1655, 1662) The loss of such
contact of a threatening fleet in the year preceding was the occasion
for a directive from Washington for an all-out alert by which all troops
went into the field with live ammunition and remained there for six
weeks.
So here again, as in the case of the Army radar system, there was
a failure of transmission of the information by the Navy to the Army as
the Army had failed to transmit its radar information on the morning of
December 7th to the Navy. Such a Japanese task force in the Marshall
Islands was 72 hours away from Pearl Harbor and nearly a thousand miles
closer to Pearl Harbor than the Japanese fleet resident in Japan, from
whence
Page 86
the main attack was expected if it ever did arrive. (R. 106-107)
After extensive testimony had been given before this Board on the
Jaluit task force and the fact that there was long belief that it was
from Jaluit that the attacking force had moved against Pearl Harbor,
there was produced in Hawaii the more certain proof that this force had
assembled at Tankan Bay in northern Japan and had moved from that point
eastward and then southward for the attack, leaving Tankan Bay on the
27th-28th of November 1941. If this proof be accepted of the later
naval witnesses as against the testimony of the earlier naval witnesses,
who seemed equally well informed, it does not change the situation. The
Navy failed to give the Army a very vital and important piece of
information.
In conclusion, the last elements in the tragic situation was the
failure of the subordinate officers of the Navy to report to the Army
the presence in the outer harbor, on the early morning of December 7, at
about 0630, of a Japanese submarine which was sunk by naval action (the
destroyer "U.S.S. Ward" and a naval patrol plane) about 0633 to 0645
hours, which would have indicated that something was on the move and the
whole naval and military establishment should have been correspondingly
alerted. The "Ward" reported this action to the Naval Chief of Staff.
The Army was not notified. (R. 536-537; Roberts Record 1725)
The situation as to this reconnaissance is best set forth in
excerpts in testimony from senior commanders. The
Page 87
long-distance patrol of the Navy consisted of only two or three PBY's
and it was "nothing to amount to much." (R. 1820) General Martin said:
"I complained to Admiral Bellinger about the lack of patrolling that was
being done. 'Well', he said, 'this is all that I have. This is all I
can put up'." (R. 1822)
"General Frank: But so far as there having been a
reconnaissance for the actual protection of Oahu, such
continuous reconnaissance had not been done?"
"Admiral Bloch: That is correct; and that was a matter
subject to the orders of the Commander-in-Chief. I think
that might as well be cleared. He would be the man to order
that, in my opinion." (R. 1527)
As to Army reconnaissance, General Mollison testified that such
reconnaissance as was being conducted from Bellows Field did not operate
on Sundays, saying, "I'm sure it did not. It may have on this Sunday,
but I doubt very much if it did." (R. 812) So far as inshore patrol is
concerned, he said that the Army Air Forces did so little that it would
amount to "a token payment only". (R. 824)
"General Rudolph: On that particular Sunday morning I
understood they didn't have a boat out -- an airplane,
seaplane." (R. 1232)
"General Frank: But you understand that they were not
out on that morning?"
"General Rudolph: So I was informed." (R. 1233)
"General Grunert: Then, according to the instructions
under which you were functioning you had no responsibility
for distant air reconnaissance?
"Admiral Bloch: There was no distant air
reconnaissance ordered in that order. That is the only
order that I know which was operative.
Page 88
"General Grunert: But actually was there some distant
air reconnaissance being made from time to time or
continuously?
"Admiral Bloch: I do not know. I do not know whether
there was or not. That would not be under me." (R. 1484)
With reference to distant reconnaissance, means of performing it
under the joint air agreement, Admiral Bloch testified:
"So I had no implements to perform distant
reconnaissance in the 14th Naval District force." (R. 1484)
"General Grunert: Do you know on the morning of the
7th of December whether any such planes were in the air on
any reconnaissance mission?
"Admiral Bloch: I hear planes taking off. I do not
know exactly what missions they were on, but there were
planes in the air." (R. 1494)
So now let us turn to the agreements upon which Short placed such
reliance for protection by Naval long-distant reconnaissance and joint
air action with the Navy.
8. AGREEMENTS BETWEEN ARMY AND NAVY: The basic document governing the
relationship of the Army and Navy in the formulation of defense plans
for the Hawaiian Islands is contained in the document entitled "War
Plans, Joint Action of the Army and Navy, 1935". This was prepared in
pursuance of the directive of the Rainbow War Plan. It covers the over-
all policies of the functions and agreements between the Army and Navy
as to their relative responsibilities in the Joint Coastal Frontier
Defense Plan, Hawaiian Coastal Frontier.
The category of defense in this document which applied to Hawaii
was Category D. This category was defined as "Coastal Frontiers That
May Be Subject to Major Attack." Under this
Page 89
category the coastal defense areas should, in general, be provided with
means of defense, both Army and Navy, required to meet enemy naval
operations preliminary to joint operations. All available means of
defense will generally find application. ... In addition, antiaircraft
defense of important area outside of harbor defenses should be
organized; ... Long-range air reconnaissance will be provided. ... (Page
39)
And the purpose of coastal frontier defense was stated to be
"Protecting our Military and Civil Installations and Facilities; ...
Insuring the security of those portions of our coastal frontiers which
are vital to military, industrial and commercial operations."
It was also provided that there be furnished "a communication and
intelligence system to include an aircraft warning service among the
elements of the land defense with provision for the prompt exchange of
information or instructions with the Navy." This was a responsibility
of the Army.
Pursuant to the foregoing plan, an agreement was entered into
entitled "Joint Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Defense Plan." (Prepared by
the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and the Commandant, 14th
Naval District.) This agreement was signed by Admiral Bloch and General
Short and provided the fundamental plan for the defense of Hawaii.
The third agreement was that entitled "Joint Air Agreement",
signed March 28, 1941. This document was prepared by Major General
Martin, U.S. Army Air Force, and Admiral Bellinger, as Base Defense Air
Force Commander, and signed by Admiral Bloch and General Short. It
provided for the combined air action as follows:
Page 90
"Joint air attacks upon hostile surface vessels will
be executed under the tactical command of the Navy. The
Department Commander will determine the Army Bombardment
strength to participate in each mission, etc."
"Defensive air operation over and in the immediate
vicinity of Oahu will be executed under the tactical command
of the Army. The Naval Base Defense Officer will determine
the Navy fighter strength to participate in these missions.
With due consideration to the tactical situation existing,
the number of fighter aircraft released to Army control will
be the maximum practical. This force will remain available
to the Army for repeated patrols or combat or for
maintenance of the required alert status, until, due to a
change in the tactical situation, it is withdrawn by the
Naval Base Defense Officer and reverts to Navy control."
(Roberts Record 555)
This Joint Air Agreement of March 21, 1941, signed by Bloch and
Short, was implemented by certain additional documents signed by
Bellinger and Martin as operating plans. The date of these operating
plans was April 9, 1941. (Roberts Record 556a-0 vol. 5)
Under this agreement Admiral Bloch, not an air officer, was acting
on behalf of the Commander-in-Chief in signing the document, and there
operated under him Admiral Bellinger, who had the command of the planes,
so far as the Navy could implement the Agreement, as Commander of the
Air Base Force. Bellinger, however, was under the command of Admiral
Kimmel, and Bloch, who was charged with the responsibility for the
operation orders and plans of operation for the base defense air force,
had no air force with which to implement the Agreement. Bellinger had
the job to do and such means as existed to do it with was Fleet
aviation. Bloch had supervisory control over Bellinger, but the
Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Kimmel, had to approve the Agreement. (R.
1522)
Page 91
Bloch was called upon to designate the condition of readiness of
the aircraft, but did not have control of the aircraft, the readiness of
which he was to determine. The confusion inherent from the Navy's
organization is best expressed in the following question:
"General Grunert: Who would the Commander-in-Chief of
the Pacific Fleet hold responsible in case something went
wrong? Would he hold you or Bellinger?
"Admiral Bloch: I do not know." (R. 1522)
This agreement was the result of a report of a Joint Army and Navy
board dated October 31, 1941, convened to prepare recommendations
covering the allocation of aircraft operating areas in the Hawaiian
Islands. This report was signed by Major General Martin and Admiral
Bellinger. (R. 1581)
Under such circumstances the Army had a difficult time in
determining under which of the three shells (Kimmel, Bloch, or
Bellinger) rested the pea of performance and responsibility.
Plans which must wait to be put into practice and only become
operative when war strikes under all the unexpected and changing
conditions of an attack inevitably prove unsound in practice. The basic
difficulty of the Short-Bloch-Kimmel agreements was inherent in all such
agreements, as they constituted a vain paper attempt to predict war
procedure without having properly tested out the proposed arrangements
in training and by joint staff action to see if they were practical
measures.
The proof of the soundness of the plans is whether they work, and
the Short-Bloch-Kimmel agreements were never tested out far enough to
find out if their plans were sound in practice. There was inadequate
practice of them to enable
Page 92
the respective organizations to acquire that automatic facility in their
execution so that the plans would be carried out effectively despite all
the stresses, strains and unexpected developments to personnel and
equipment that were incident of a conflict. We desire to emphasize this
synthetic structure of agreements and plans based upon them. The
following analysis of these agreements shows that:
There were two joint agreements. The first was known as the Joint
Coastal Frontier Defense Plan. It was based on the war plan and the
"Joint Action of the Army and Navy" of 1935. The second agreement was
the Joint Air Force Agreement signed by Admiral Bloch and General Short
and based upon it as Appendix #7 was an operating plan worked out by
General Martin and Admiral Bellinger.
As Admiral Bloch said:
"Ordinarily it would no be operative." (R. 1478)
He also testified:
"The plan was never operative as a plan because the
War and Navy Departments never ordered it to become
operative, either in part or in whole. The local commanders
never mutually agreed to have it become operative in part."
(R. 1474)
And again he testified:
"General Russell: So that respecting missions of the
Army and Navy, according to your construction of the
Agreement, reconnaissance missions were not effective until
December 7, 1941?
"Admiral Bloch: Under the circumstances that obtained,
that is the way it happened. I will say that I accepted the
responsibility I that agreement for distant reconnaissance
for the Navy, and I did my utmost to implement my
responsibility by demanding patrol planes for that purpose,
but I never had any; I never had one." (R. 1487)
The agreements entered into between the Navy and the Army
Page 93
had two basic defects. First, they did not become operative until an
emergency arose. The agreements said (paragraph 15(c), 2):
"Such parts of this plan as are believed necessary
will be put into effect prior to M-Day as ordered by the War
and Navy Departments or as mutually agreed upon by local
commanders." (R. 1584)
The local commanders as testified to by Admiral Bellinger were
understood to be General Short and Admiral Bloch. These commanders
apparently took no action to "mutually agree" to implement parts of the
plan and, evidently were going to let the agreements go until an
emergency arose, when they became operative automatically. As Admiral
Bellinger testified:
"That could have been done at anytime by the
commandant of the 14th Naval District, who was Commander,
Naval Base Defense Air Force, if it was approved by and
agreed upon by General Short." (R. 1591)
But it was not done. The selection of M-Day to initiate the
putting of the joint plan and agreements thereunder into effect
according to the terms of the agreement just quoted was a function of
the War and Navy Departments. They took no action to put it into effect
although a copy of this agreement was forwarded to the War Department
and presumably to the Navy Department. (R. 1474)
The consequence was that not until the morning of December 7th did
the agreement become operative, when it was too late to have gotten the
benefit of the cooperative action that it implied, and the training
which would result from this close teamwork by the Army and Navy. As
Admiral Bellinger testified:
"The Commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force, did not
have the authority to place that organization in the
functioning status, except in case of an actual emergency."
(R. 1582)
Page 94
This brings us to the second defect: unit of command. If that had
been put into effect as provided in paragraph 9(b) of the Joint Hawaiian
Coastal Frontier Defense Plan this air agreement would have become
effective by reason of such unity of command. As Admiral Bellinger
against testified:
"I was not satisfied with the setup under the estimate
and directives concerning the Naval Base Defense Air Force.
I thought that it was necessary to have a unity of command
to make such an operation a success.
"General Frank: You mean a unity of command before
something happened?
"Admiral Bellinger: Yes
"General Frank: Rather than when it happened?
"Admiral Bellinger: Yes." (R. 1589)
Under the Joint Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Defense Plan the unity
of command and could be put into effect either by the President of the
United States or by joint agreements of the Secretary of War and the
Secretary of the Navy or when the commanders of the Army and Navy forces
agreed that the situation required unity of command who was to exercise
it. No one of these agencies took steps to effectuate what all of the
witnesses have concurred in stating was the principal cause of
difficulties on December 7, 1941, and the events leading up to and
causing those difficulties, that is, unity of command. (R. 1587-1588)
It is interesting to observe the reason why this air agreement was
not put into effect, in addition to lack of equipment to make it
effective. As Admiral Bellinger testified:
"The placing of the Naval Base Defense Air Force
organization into a functioning status
Page 95
would have necessitated the substantial cessation of
training activities in order to concentrate on defense."
(R. 1582)
Likewise General Short testified:
"General Martin and I talked over the situation and we
felt that we should do nothing that would interfere with the
training or ferrying group. The responsibility was
definitely on the Hawaiian Department. It was up to us to
get the ships there and get them there without loss; and we
could not do it if we started them out with untrained crews.
"That had a great deal to do with my decision to go
into Alert No. 1 rather than Alert No. 2 or No. 3." (R. 286)
"As I say, none of these fixed stations was in
operation. We had gotten, along in November, the mobile
stations, and as soon as we got them we started using them
right away; and when this message of the 27th came along, I
prescribed that the Aircraft Warning Service would function
those hours (4:00 to 7:00 A.M.). In addition to that, they
had their normal training. They trained then from 7 to 11,
and they had maintenance work, work of the kind, from 12 to
4." (R. 298)
"By making it 4 hours (time for aircraft to get into
the air) it gave the possibility to the men going ahead with
recreation and athletics without being worried about getting
that alert. They could go right ahead with their normal
functions. They might have been out on a problem where it
would take them an hour to get back in." (R. 460)
"Alert No. 2 would have practically stopped the
training of the Air Corps and the Antiaircraft Corps. It
would not have interfered seriously with the training of the
infantry divisions." (R. 528)
The reason for not so doing is shown in Kimmel's
words:
"We wanted to maintain our training status. Up to the
last minute we had received no orders to mobilize." (R.
1811)
Admiral Kimmel observed that while the responsibility was on the
Commandant, 14th Naval District and himself, on behalf of the Navy, for
putting this plan into effect, yet it would have been necessary to refer
to Washington for a decision. When asked why this would be so, he said:
Page 96
"It would have alarmed the population. It might have
been considered by Japan an overt act. It would have tended
to upset the Japanese-American relations, which we had been
enjoined to maintain in status quo; and it would have
required, so far as the Navy is concerned, certain movements
of the fleet and certain action which should not have been
taken without reference to the Department." (R. 1756)
Therefore it is apparent that the local commanders waited for
Washington and Washington took no action under the Joint Hawaiian
Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, relying upon Hawaii to do so; and that in
turn meant that the Martin-Bellinger Air Plan of Cooperation, which
depended upon the Joint Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, did not
go into operation.
The second reason why the air plan was ineffective was that
Admiral Bloch, Commandant of the 14th Naval District, as testified by
Admiral Kimmel, "had no planes assigned to him at that time." (R.
1751), so that he could do nothing to carry it out. As to the Army,
Admiral Kimmel pointed out:
"There weren't any general headquarters Army aircraft
available in Hawaii, and we knew that there weren't going to
be any." (R. 1753)
When asked why the Navy accepted responsibility for distant
reconnaissance without any effective means of carrying it out, Admiral
Kimmel testified "he accepted responsibility for distant reconnaissance,
because he couldn't do anything else and be sensible." (R. 1753)
Admiral Bellinger confirms Admiral Kimmel's statement of long-
distance reconnaissance means not being available. (R. 1595, 1606)
Therefore, paragraph 18 in the air agreement providing the Navy will
furnish distant reconnaissance was without effect. (R. 1605-1606) Bloch
had no planes and such planes as Bellinger had were under command of
Kimmel and were
Page 97
being used for other purposes in connection with reconnaissance with the
fleet for protecting maneuver areas against submarines.
For the dual reason that the instrumentalities were not available
and to the extent that any planes were available the use of them would
have interfered with training, and for the further reason that the
agreements were not to go into effect until an emergency, the Joint
Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Defense Plan and the Martin-Bellinger Air
Agreement signed by Short and Bloch were ineffectual. The Army and Navy
agreed that when and if the time came that they had to put the plan into
effect, the documents could only show what the working scheme would be.
The inherent weakness in making such plans was the fact of their not
being operative in time to meet the attack. Neither the local
commanders nor Washington took steps to make them operative as they
could have done. (R. 1606-1607, 1609) However, unity of command in
Washington would have been a condition precedent to unity of command in
Hawaii.
9. ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION: The best indication of what the Army and
Navy recognized as the primary danger to the defense of Hawaii is found
in the estimate of the situation in the implementing, operating plans
signed by Bellinger and Martin on April 9, 1941, in execution of the
Joint Air Agreement of March 21, 1941. This estimate was prophetic in
its accuracy and called for vigorous implementation to meet the worst
the enemy could do, as estimated in this document. The document says:
"b. In the past Orange (Japan) has never preceded
hostile action by a declaration of war.
"c. A successful, sudden raid against our
Page 98
ships and naval installations on Oahu might prevent
effective defensive action by our forces in the Western
Pacific for a long period.
"d. It appears possibly that Orange (Japan)
submarines and/or an Orange fast raiding force might arrive
in Hawaiian waters with no prior warning from our
intelligence Service. ... II(s) Orange might send into this
area one or more submarines, and/or one or more fast raiding
forces composed of carriers supported by fast cruisers. ...
III(b) It appears that the most likely and dangerous form of
attack of Oahu would be an air attack. It is believed that
at present such an attack would most likely be launched from
one or more carriers, which would probably approach inside
of 300 miles. ... (o?) In a dawn air attack there is a high
probability that it would be delivered as a complete
surprise in spite of any patrols we might be using and that
it might find us in a condition of readiness under which
pursuit would be slow to start. ..." (Roberts Record 556-D-
F)
It is also significant that in this estimate of the situation it
was stated:
"Any single submarine attack might indicate the
presence of a considerable undiscovered surface force,
probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a carrier."
(Roberts Record 556-F)
It will be recalled that a submarine appeared off the entrance to
Pearl Harbor and was sunk at about 6:45 a.m. on December 7th, but was
not reported by the Navy to the Army. Such a report would have been a
sure warning of an hour before the attack of what was coming as
recognized by paragraph 3(d) of the Estimate of the Situation, forming a
part of the Martin-Bellinger Plan.
In reviewing the situation as Short knew it in order to judge of
the information that he had upon which to premise a successful course of
action, it is necessary both to take into consideration the background
in the first chapter and of the official communications of those
estimates
Page 99
of the situation at the time.
It will be recalled that Ambassador Grew had warned that State
Department on January 27th by wire of the possibility of an air attack
upon Pearl Harbor. This possibility had already been apparently
thoroughly considered by the War and Navy Departments, and it had been
concluded that that was the strongest danger to Hawaii. In early
January, Admiral Richardson, with the concurrence of Admiral Kimmel and
General Herron, had written at length to the Navy Department on this
subject, with particular reference to the weaknesses of the Army
defenses against air attack. This letter and the resulting
correspondence between the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of
War must be read in light of the Joint Army and Navy Defense Plan of
1935, which places upon the Army the following mission:
"b. Army - Hold Oahu against attacks by land, sea and
air forces and against hostile sympathizers."
General Marshall testified, however, as follows:
"We anticipated, beyond a doubt, Japanese movement in
Indo-China and the Gulf of Siam, and against the Malay
Peninsula. We anticipate an attack on Hawaii; the reason
being that we thought, with the addition of more modern
planes, that the defenses there would be sufficient to make
it extremely hazardous for the Japanese to attempt such an
attack." (R. 9)
As a result, Secretary of Navy Knox wrote to Secretary of War
Stimson on January 24, 1941, in part as follows:
"My Dear Mr. Secretary:
"The security of the U.S. Pacific Fleet while in Pearl
Harbor and of the Pearl Harbor Naval Base itself, has been
under renewed study by the Navy Department and forces afloat
for the past several weeks. This reexamination has been, in
part, prompted by the increased gravity of the situation
with respect to Japan, and by reports
Page 100
from abroad of successful bombing and torpedo-plane attacks
on ships while in bases. If war eventuates with Japan, it
is believed easily possible that hostilities would be
initiated by a surprise attack on the fleet or the naval
base at Pearl Harbor.
"In my opinion, the inherent possibility of a major
disaster to the fleet or naval base warrant taking every
step as rapidly as can be done, that will increase the joint
readiness of the Army and Navy to withstand a raid of the
character mentioned above.
"The dangers envisioned in their order of importance
and probability are considered to be:
(1) Air bombing attack
(2) Air torpedo-plane attack
(3) Sabotage
(4) Submarine attack
(5) Mining
(6) Bombardment by gunfire
"Defense for all but the first two appears to have
been provided for satisfactorily."
It will be noted that an anxiety of Secretary Knox was as to air
attack and that he was satisfied that precautions as to sabotage were
sufficient by the Army. It will be recalled that Admiral Richardson's
letter stimulating this letter of Secretary Knox was based on
Richardson's personal inspection and knowledge of the Army situation.
Secretary Knox concludes his letter with the following
recommendations to the Army:
"Assign the highest priority to the increase of
pursuit aircraft and anti-aircraft artillery, and the
establishment of an air warning net in Hawaii...that the
Army and Navy forces in Oahu agree on appropriate degrees of
joint readiness for immediate action in defense against
surprise aircraft raids against Pearl Harbor."
"(5) That joint exercises, designed to prepare Army
and Navy forces in Oahu for defense against surprise
aircraft raids, be held at least once weekly so long as the
present uncertainty exists."
So this letter clearly outlined the considered judgment
Page 101
then existing that the most serious threat was an air attack and
that all means should be taken to implement against it.
On February 7, 1941, the Secretary of War replied to this letter
of the Secretary of the Navy under the subject "Air Defense of Pearl
Harbor, Hawaii," and said:
"In reply to your letter of January 24, 1941, regarding the
possibility of surprise attacks upon the fleet or naval base at Pearl
Harbor, I wish to express complete concurrence as to the importance of
this matter and of the urgency of our making every possible preparation
to meet such a hostile effort..."
"(6) With respect to your other proposals for joint defense, I am
forwarding a copy of your letter and of this reply to the Commanding
General, Hawaiian Department, and am directing him to cooperate with the
local naval authorities in making those measures effective."
On the same day another communication was addressed to General
Short, and this time by General Marshall:
"Admiral Stark said that Kimmel had written him at length about
the deficiencies of Navy materiel for the protection of Pearl Harbor.
He referred specifically to planes and antiaircraft guns."
"The risk of sabotage and the risk involved in a surprise raid and
by submarine, constitute the real peril of the situation. Frankly, I do
not see any landing threat in the Hawaiian Islands, as long as we have
air superiority."
And not satisfied with this first letter, General Marshall on
March 5, 1941, again addressed General Short, saying:
"I would appreciate your early review of the situation in the
Hawaiian Department with regard to defense from air attack. The
establishment of a satisfactory system of coordinating all means
available to this end is a *matter of first priority*."
And to that General Short replied on March 15, 1941, at length
with reference to the vulnerability of Hawaii to air attack and the
measures being taken to meet this situation.
Page 102
He points out that antisabotage measures and suppression of local
disorders could be handled by battalions of National Guard, which come
from the Islands. The rest of the letter dealt with defenses against
air attacks. His estimate of the situation was:
"The most serious situation with reference to an air attack is the
vulnerability of both the Army and Navy air fields to the attack."
Short realized the necessity for the dispersion of planes, the use
of emergency fields on the outlying islands and the preparation of
bunkers to protect the dispersed planes, as he discusses such a problem
at length and its solution. (R. 21-25)
On April 14, 1941, Short wrote the Chief of Staff sending him the
Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Department and 14th Naval
District, Annex No. VII, Section VI, Joint Security Measures; Agreement
signed by the Commander of the Hawaiian Air Force and Commander, Naval
Base Defense Air Force to implement the above agreement, and Field
Orders No. 1-NS (Naval Security) putting into effect for the Army the
provisions of the Joint Agreement. (R. 26-27)
He also stated that Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch and himself
felt all steps had been taken "which make it possible for the Army and
Navy Air Force to act together with the unity of command as the
situation requires." (R. 27) [1]
This statement was in error at the time it was made, as the
agreements could not be implemented for lack of means to do so in any
material way and there was no unity of command, none
Footnote:
[1] Excerpts from letter dated April 14, 1941 (R. 27)
Page 103
proposed and none was ever put into effect under these agreements.
Open hostilities were necessary to make the agreement operative.
This communication was acknowledged by General Marshall on May
5th.
This brings us to the estimate of the air situation thus
transmitted to the Chief of Staff on April 14th as indicating the best
judgment in estimating the situation by General Martin and Admiral
Bellinger and approved by General Short and Admirals Kimmel and Bloch.
It is a familiar premise of military procedure in estimating a
situation *to select the most dangerous and disastrous type of attack
the enemy may make and devote your primary efforts to meeting this most
serious of the attacks*. (R. 1121, 2662) In the present instance, it
was clearly recognized, not only in the foregoing correspondence, but in
this formal joint estimate by the Army and Navy of the situation, *that
the most serious attack to be met by the Army and Navy was an air attack
by Japan*. Herewith is the following statement from that estimate
signed by the Army and Navy through General Martin and Admiral Bellinger
and approved by Kimmel, Short and Bloch. This estimate is prophetic in
its accuracy and uncanny in its analysis of the enemy's intention.
"2. Assumptions:
...
c. The Hawaiian Air Force is primarily concerned with the
destruction of hostile carriers in this vicinity before they approach
within range of Oahu where they can launch their bombardment aircraft
for a raid or attack on Oahu.
e?. Our most likely enemy, Orange, can probably employ a maximum
of six carriers against Oahu.
...
c. ... The early morning attack is, therefore, the best plan of
action open to the enemy.
"2. a. The most favorable plan of action open to the enemy, and
the *action upon which we should base our plans of operation*, is the
early morning attack in which the enemy must make good the following
time schedule:
(1) Cross circle 881 nautical miles from Oahu at dawn of the day
before attack.
(3) Launch his planes 233 nautical miles from Oahu at dawn the day
of the attack.
...
"4. ... The sole purpose of the existence of the military
establishment on Oahu, ground, and air, is for the defense of Oahu as an
outlying naval base. ..."
"It has been said, and it is a popular belief, that Hawaii is the
strongest outlying naval base in the world and could, therefore,
withstand indefinitely attacks and attempted invasions. Plans based on
such convictions are inherently weak and tend to create a false sense of
security with the consequent unpreparedness for offensive action."
Page maintained by Larry W. Jewell, lwjewell@omni.cc.purdue.edu. Created: 12/12/96 Updated: 12/12/96