Page i

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

HEARINGS BEFORE THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION PURSUANT TO S. Con. Res. 27 A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES RELATING THERETO PART 39 REPORTS, FINDINGS, AND CONCLUSIONS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION, ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD, NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY, AND HEWITT INQUIRY, WITH ENDORSEMENTS Printed for the use of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON : 1946
Page ii JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK ALBEN W. BARKLEY, Senator from Kentucky, Chairman JERE COOPER, Representative from Tennessee, Vice Chairman WALTER F. GEORGE, Senator from Georgia JOHN W. MURPHY, Representative SCOTT W. LUCAS, Senator from Illinois from Pennsylvania OWEN BREWSTER, Senator from Maine BERTRAND W. GEARHART, Representa- HOMER FERGUSON, Senator from Michi- tive from California gan FRANK B. KEEFE, Representative J. BAYARD CLARK, Representative from from Wisconsin North Carolina COUNSEL (Through January 14, 1946) WILLIAM D. MITCHELL, General Counsel GERHARD A. GESELL, chief Assistant Counsel JULE M. HANNAFORD, Assistant Counsel JOHN E. MASTEN, Assistant Counsel (After January 14, 1946) SETH W. RICHARDSON, General Counsel SAMUEL H. KAUFMAN, Associate General Counsel JOHN E. MASTEN, Assistant Counsel EDWARD P. MORGAN, Assistant Counsel LOGAN J. LANE, Assistant Counsel Page iii HEARINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE Part Pages Transcript Hearings No. pages 1 1- 399 1- 1058 Nov. 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, and 21, 1945. 2 401- 982 1059- 2586 Nov. 23, 24, 26 to 30, Dec. 3 and 4, 1945. 3 983-1583 2587- 4194 Dec. 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, and 13, 1945. 4 1585-2063 4195- 5460 Dec. 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, and 21, 1945. 5 2065-2492 5461- 6646 Dec. 31, 1945, and Jan. 2, 3, 4, and 5, 1946. 6 2493-2920 6647- 7888 Jan. 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 21, 1946. 7 2921-3378 7889- 9107 Jan. 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28, and 29, 1946. 8 3379-3927 9108-10517 Jan. 30, 31, Feb. 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6, 1946. 9 3929-4599 10518-12277 Feb. 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, and 14, 1946. 10 4601-5151 12278-13708 Feb. 15, 16, 18, 19, and 20, 1946. 11 5153-5560 13709-14765 Apr. 9 and 11, and May 23 and 31, 1946. EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE Part Exhibits Nos. 12 1 through 6. 13 7 and 8. 14 9 through 43. 15 44 through 87. 16 88 through 110. 17 111 through 128. 18 129 through 156. 19 157 through 172. 20 173 through 179. 21 180 through 183, and Exhibits-Illustrations. 22 through 25 Roberts Commission Proceedings. 26 Hart Inquiry Proceedings. 27 through 31 Army Pearl Harbor Board Proceedings. 32 through 33 Navy Court of Inquiry Proceedings. 34 Clarke Investigation Proceedings 35 Clausen Investigation Proceedings. 36 through 38 Hewitt Inquiry Proceedings. 39 Reports of Roberts Commission, Army Pearl Harbor Board. Navy Court of Inquiry and Hewitt Inquiry, with endorse- ments. Page iv JOINT COMMITTEE EXHIBIT NO. 157 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page 1. Report of Roberts Commission, dated January 23, 1942 ............ 1 2. Report of Army Pearl Harbor Board dated October 20, 1944 ........ 23 3. Appendix No. 1: Supplemental Report of Army Pearl Harbor Board on phases mentioned in House Military Affairs report which relate to the Pearl Harbor disaster ....................................... 179 4. Exhibits A and B to appendix No. 1 (above) ...................... 219 5. Top Secret Report, Army Pearl Harbor Board ...................... 220 6. November 25, 1944, memorandum, from Judge Advocate General for Secretary of War, re APHB report ................................ 231 7. September 14, 1945, memorandum, from Judge Advocate General for Secretary of War, re Lt. Col. Henry C. Clausen's Investigation .. 270 8. September 14, 1945, memorandum from Judge Advocate General for Secretary of War, re APHB Top Secret Report reviewed in connec- tion with Clausen Investigation ................................. 283 9. Report of Naval Court of Inquiry, dated October 19, 1944 ........ 297 10. Addendum to Navy Court of Inquiry findings of fact ............. 323 11. First endorsement to Navy Court of Inquiry report, by Navy Judge Advocate General for Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, and Chief of Naval Operations, dated November 2, 1944 .......... 330 12. November 3, 1944, memorandum from CincUS and CNO to Secretary of Navy, listing parts of Navy Court of Inquiry record that contain information of super secret nature ............................. 332 13. Second endorsement to Navy Court of Inquiry report by CincUS and CNO to Secretary of Navy, dated November 6, 1944 (not made public) ........................................................ 335 14. Paraphrase of second endorsement (item 13) which was made public ......................................................... 345 15. Third endorsement to Navy Court of Inquiry report, by Secretary of Navy, dated December 1, 1944 ................................ 354 16. Fourth endorsement (undated) to Navy Court of Inquiry report, and fourth endorsement to report of Hewitt Inquiry, by Secretary of Navy (not made public) ...................................... 355 17. Paraphrase of fourth endorsement (item 16), dated August 1945, made public August 29, 1945 .................................... 371 18. December 3, 1944, memorandum, from CincUS and CNO to Secretary of Navy, commenting on report of Army Pearl Harbor Board ....... 383 19. Third endorsement to report of Hewitt Inquiry, by CincUS and CNO to Secretary of Navy, dated August 13, 1945 .................... 387 20. Second endorsement to report of Hewitt Inquiry, by Navy Judge Advocate General for CincUS and CNO. Dated August 10, 1945 ..... 388 21. First endorsement to report of Hewitt Inquiry, by Secretary of Navy, dated July 25, 1945 ...................................... 389 22. Report of Admiral H. Kent Hewitt to Secretary of Navy, dated July 12, 1945 .................................................. 390 Page 220 [a] ARMY PEARL HARBOR INVESTIGATION TOP SECRET REPORT AND TOP SECRET MEMORANDA 1. Top Secret Report of Army Pearl Harbor Board, discussing certain evidence and documents. 2. Top Secret Memorandum of Judge Advocate General, dated 25 November 1944, reviewing Secret and Top Secret Reports of Army Pearl Harbor Board, and recommending further investigation. 3. Top Secret Memorandum of Judge Advocate General, dated 14 September 1945, reviewing Secret and Top Secret Reports of Army Pearl Harbor Board on the basis of additional evidence. 4. Top Secret Memorandum of Judge Advocate General, dated 14 September 1945, reviewing in greater detail certain aspects of the Top Secret Report of Army Pearl Harbor Board in the light of additional evidence and modifications of previous testimony. Page 221 [b] TOP SECRET REPORT OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD [c] Memo: To The Secretary of War: The following is a brief discussion of the evidence and documents in the possession of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, which for reasons of security should not be incorporated in the General Report. The Secretary of War is entirely familiar with this type of evidence and the Board is sure concurs in its decision to treat it separately and as Top Secret. [1] 1. General. Information from informers and other means as to the activities of our potential enemy and their intentions in the negotiations between the United States and Japan was in possession of the State, War and Navy Departments in November and December of 1941. Such agencies had a reasonably complete disclosure of the Japanese plans and intentions, and were in a position to know what were the Japanese potential moves that were scheduled by them against the United States. Therefore, Washington was in possession of essential facts as to the enemy's intentions. This information showed clearly that war was inevitable and late in November absolutely imminent. It clearly demonstrated the necessity for resorting to every trading act possible to defer the ultimate day of breach of relations to give the Army and Navy time to prepare for the eventualities of war. The messages actually sent to Hawaii by either the Army or Navy gave only a small fraction on this information. No direction was given the Hawaiian Department based upon this information except the "Do-Don't" message of November 27, 1941. It would have been possible to have sent safely information, ample for the purpose of orienting the commanders in Hawaii, or positive directives could have been formulated to put the Department on Alert Number 3. This was not done. Under the circumstances, where information has a vital bearing upon actions to be taken by field commanders and this information cannot be disclosed by the War Department to its field commanders, it is incumbent upon the War Department the [2] to assume the responsibility for specific directions to the theater commanders. This is an exception to the admirable policy of the War Department of decentralized and complete responsibility upon the competent field commanders. Short got neither form of assistance from the War Department. The disaster of Pearl Harbor would have been eliminated to the extent that its defenses were available on December 7 if alerted in time. The difference between alerting those defenses in time by a directive from the War Department based upon this information and the failure to alert them is a difference for which the War Department is responsible, wholly aside from Short's responsibility in not himself having selected the right alert. Page 222 The War Department had the information. All they had to do was either to give it to Short or give him directions based upon it. The details of this information follow: 2. Story of the Information as to the Japanese Actions and Intentions from September to December 1941. The record shows almost daily information as to the Japanese plans and intentions during this period. 1. For instance, on November 24, it was learned that November 29 had been fixed (Tokyo time) as the government date for Japanese offensive military operations. (R. 86) 2. On November 26 there was received specific evidence of the Japanese' intentions to wage offensive war against Great Britain and the United States. (R. 87) War Department G-2 advised the Chief of Staff on November 26 that the Office of Naval Intelligence reported the [3] concentration of units of the Japanese fleet at an unknown port ready for offensive action. 3. On December 1 definite information came from three independent sources that Japan was going to attack Great Britain and the United States, but would maintain peace with Russia. (R. 87) As Colonel Bratton summed it up: "The picture that lay before all of our policy making and planning officials, from the Secretary of State the Secretary of War down to the Chief of the War Plans Division, they all had the same picture; and it was a picture that was being painted over a period of weeks if not months. (R. 243-244)" The culmination of this complete revelation of the Japanese intentions as to war and the attack came on December 3 with information that Japanese were destroying their codes and code machines. This was construed by G-2 as meaning immediate war. (R. 280) All the information that the War Department G-2 had was presented in one form or another to the policy making and planning agencies of the government. These officials included Secretary of State, Secretary of War, Chief of Staff, and Chief of the War Plans Division. In most instances, copies of our intelligence, in whatever form it was presented, were sent to the Office of Naval Intelligence, to keep them abreast of our trend of thought. (R. 297) Colonel Bratton on occasions had gone to the Chief of the War Plans Division and to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, and stood by while they read the contents of these folders, in case they wished to question him about any of it. Colonel Bratton testifies: "I had an arrangement with Colonel Smith, Secretary to the General Staff, how he could get me on the telephone at any time in case the Chief [4] of Staff wished to be briefed on any of them. (R. 299)" 4. When the information on December 3 came as to the Japanese destroying their codes and code machines, which was construed as certain war, Colonel Bratton took the information to General Miles and General Gerow and talked at length with both of them. General Gerow opposed sending out any further warning to the overseas command. General Miles felt he could not go over General Gerow's decision. (R. 283) Colonel Bratton then went to see Commander McCullom of the Navy, Head of the Far Eastern Section in ONI, and be concurred in Bratton's judgment that further warning should be sent out because this action of the Japanese meant war almost immediately. Colonel Bratton then returned after making arrangements Page 223 with McCullom and persuaded General Miles to send a message to G-2, Hawaiian Department, instructing him to go to Commander Rochefort, Office of Naval Intelligence, with the Fleet to have him secure from Rochefort the same information which General Gerow would not permit to be sent directly in a war warning message. (R. 283-284) All of this important information which was supplied to higher authority in the War Department, Navy Department, and State Department did not go out to the field, with the possible exception of the general statements in occasional messages which are shown in the Board's report. Only the higher-ups in Washington secured this information. (R. 302) G-2 was prevented as a matter of policy from giving out intelligence information of this sort to G-2 in overseas departments. The Navy also objected to any of this type of intelligence being sent by the Army without its authority. [5] The War Plans Division refused to act upon the recommendations of G- 2. Intelligence Bulletins were distributed giving this information. When G-2 recommended, for instance, the occupation of the outer Aleutians ahead of the Japanese, the War Plans Division took no action upon the estimate and recommendation, with the result that we later had to fight two costly campaigns to regain Attu and Kiska. (R. 301-302) Captain Safford of the Communications Security Division in Naval Operations, testified as to the type of information that was coming into the Navy during November and December. Tokyo informed Nomura on the 22nd of November that the 25th was the last date they could permit him negotiations. (R. 121) On November 26th specific information received from the Navy indicated that Japan intended to wage of offensive war against the United States. (R. 123- 124) Nomura on the 26th said he thought he had failed the Emperor and that his humiliation was complete, evidently referring to the ultimatum delivered to him by the Secretary of State. Colonel Sadtler testified as to the information that was coming in as to Japanese intentions in the fall of 1941, saying: "The information began to assume rather serious proportions regarding the tense and strained relations between the two countries and the number of messages about warnings of conditions that obtain in case of hostilities really reached a climax around the middle of November to such an extent that we were of then opinion that there might be a declaration of war between Japan and the United States on Sunday November so. This as you all know proved to be a "dud," and on Monday, December 1, if I recall the date correctly, messages that morning began coming in from Tokyo telling the Consuls to destroy their codes and to reply to Tokyo with one code word when they had so complied with their directive." [6] The Japanese Embassy in Washington was advised to destroy their codes on December 3. (R. 249-250) 3. The "Winds" Message. Colonel Sadtler said that about November 20, a message was intercepted by the Federal Communications Commission, to the effect that the Japanese were notifying nationals of possible war with the United States. The "winds" message was indicated in these instructions, which would indicate whether the war would be with the United States, Russia, or Great Britain, or any combination of them. The Federal Communications Commission was asked to listen for such information. Page 224 On the morning of December 5, 1941, Admiral Noyes, Chief of Naval Communications, called Colonel Sadtler at 9:30 saying, "Sadtler, the message is in!" He did not know whether the particular message was the one that meant war with the United States, but it meant war with either the United States, Russia, or Great Britain. He immediately advised General Miles and Colonel Bratton. Sadtler was instructed to go back to Admiral Noyes to get the precise wording used, but Admiral Noyes said that he was too busy with a conference and he would have to attend to it later. Colonel Sadtler protested that that would be too late. (R. 251-252) He reported back to General Miles. He then went to see General Gerow, Head of the War Plans Division, and suggested a message be sent to Hawaii. General Gerow said, "No, that they had plenty of information in Hawaii." He then went to the Secretary of the General Staff, Colonel Smith, and made the same suggestion. When Smith learned that G-2 and the War Plans Division had been talked to, he declined to discuss it further. [7] It was about the 5th or 6th of December that Tokyo notified the Japanese Embassy at Washington to destroy their remaining codes. It was on December 5 that Sadtler discussed this matter with General Gerow and Colonel Smith, because as Sadtler said, "I was sure war was coming, and coming very quickly." (R. 254) Colonel Bratton arranged on behalf of G-2 for monitoring of Japanese weather broadcasts with the Federal Communications Commission. These arrangements were made through Colonel Sadtler. (R. 57, 103) Colonel Bratton testified that no information reached him as to the break in relations shown by the "winds" message prior to the Pearl Harbor disaster, December 7, 1941, and he does not believe anybody else in G-2 received any such information. (R. 58-59) He conferred with Kramer and McCullom of the Navy. The message sent to him by the Federal Communications Commission was not the message he was looking for. (R. 60) Later he learned from the Navy about their monitoring efforts in Hawaii and the Far East, and the fact that they would probably secure the "winds" message sooner than he would in Washington. That is the reason why he sent the message of December 5, to Fielder, G-2, in Hawaii, to make contact with Commander Rochefort to secure orally information of this sort. (R. 62-63) A copy of this message has been produced in the record showing that it was sent. Colonel Bratton and Colonel Sadtler testified to the fact that their records showed that it was sent. (R. 69, 70, 71) But Colonel Fielder said he got no such message. (R. 68) The Navy now admits having received this "winds" activating message about December 6, but the War Department files show no copy of such message. (R. 89, 281) [8] From the naval point of view Captain Safford recites the story of the "winds" message saying that Japan announced about the 26th of November 1941 that she would state her intentions in regard to war with Russia, England, the Dutch, and the United States, by the "winds" message. On November 28, 1941, the "winds" code was given. On December 3, 1941 the Naval Attache at Batavia gave another version of the "winds" code. All three of these messages indicated the probability of the breaking off of relations and offensive warfare by Japan against the United States or the other nations mentioned. Page 225 On December 4, 1941, information was received through the Navy Department which was sent to Captain Safford which contained the Japanese "winds" message, "War with England, War with America, Peace with Russia." (R. 132) [1] This original message has now disappeared from the Navy files and cannot be found. It was in existence just after Pearl Harbor and was collected with other messages for submission to the Roberts Commission. Copies were in existence in various places but they have all disappeared. (R. 133-135) [9] Captain Safford testified: "General RUSSELL. Have you helped or been active at all in this search which has been made in the Naval Department to discover this original message? "Captain SAFFORD. I have. As a last resort I requested copies of the message repeatedly from 20G, and on the last occasion I asked the officer in charge, who was Captain Stone, to stir his people up a little harder and see if they couldn't make one more search and discover it. And when Captain Stone discovered it couldn't be found, he called for- required written statements for anybody who might have any notice of that; and though the written statements disclosed a of destruction of other messages and things not messages, but the intercepts; not the translations nothing ever came to light on that message, either the carbon copy of the original incoming message, which should have been filed with the work sheet, or of the translation. And one copy of the translation should have been filed under the JD number, which I think is 7001, because that number is missing and unaccounted for, and that falls very close to the proper date. It actually comes in with the 3rd, but things sometimes got a little bit out as far as putting those numbers on was concerned. And the other should be filed under the date and with the translation. We had a double file. "The last time I saw that message after the attack on Pearl Harbor about the 15th of December, Admiral Noyes called for the assembling of all important messages into one file, to show as evidence to the Roberts Commission; and Kramer assembled them, and I checked them over for completeness and to see that we strained out the unimportant ones, and that "Winds" translation, the "Winds execute," was included in those. I do not recall whether that ever came back or not. So far as I know, it may even be with the original papers of the Roberts Commission. It never came back that I know of, and we have never seen it since, and that is the last I have seen of it. "We also asked the people in the Army on several occasions if they could run it down and give us a copy. We were trying to find out the exact date of it and the exact wording of the message, to run this thing down and not make the thing a question depending upon my memory or the memory of Kramer or the memory of Murray, who do districtly [sic] recall it. * * * * * * "General RUSSELL. Well, now, let us talk cases. "Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir. "[10] General RUSSELL. I want to know if over there in 20G you had a place where you had 20G files of messages, and then over here some other place you had a JD file which was separate and distinct from the one I have just discussed. "Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir. "General RUSSELL. But you had messages over there in the JD file? "Captain SAFFORD. We had. Yes, sir; that is correct. "General RUSSELL. And they were the same as the ones in the 20G file? "Captain SAFFORD. Yes, sir, but they were in a different order. "General RUSSELL. All right. Now, this message of December 4th, when it went to the JD file, was given the number, according to your testimony, of 700l? [1] Captain Safford testified that the Japanese were no longer using the code employed to transmit the wind messages; that there was no reason now why they should not be discussed openly. Colonel Rufus Bratton, on the contrary, testified that it would be dangerous to acquaint the Japanese with the fact that we intercepted the winds message, as this might result in further code changes by the Japanese. The Board, as a matter of course, decided to follow the safe plan and treat these messages as Top Secret. Page 226 "Captain SAFFORD. It probably was. "General RUSSELL. You don't know that? "Captain SAFFORD. Not to know; only circumstantial evidence. "General RUSSELL. Well, is JD 7000 in that file now? "Captain SAFFORD. JD 7000 is there, and 7002. "General RUSSELL. But 7001 just isn't there? "Captain SAFFORD. The whole file for the month of December 1941 is present or accounted for except 7001. "General RUSSELL. Now let us talk about 20G, which is some other place in this office. Is this December 4th message the only one that is out of those files? "Captain SAFFORD. That is the only one that we looked for that we couldn't find. It is possible that there will be others missing which we haven't looked for, but we couldn't find that serial number. We looked all through the month to make certain. That is the only one that is missing or unaccounted for. [11] The radio station logs, showing the reception of the message have been destroyed, within the last year. Captain Safford testified that this message, and everything else they got from November 12 on, was sent to the White House by the Navy. It was a circulated copy that circulated to the White House and to the Admirals of the Navy. It is this message which the Army witnesses testified was never received by the Army. It was a clear indication to the United States as early as December 4. The vital nature of this message can be realized. 4. Account of the Delivery of the Long 14 Part Message; the Short Implementing Message. The first 13 parts of the long reply of the Japanese finally terminating the relationships with the United States began to come in in translated form from the Navy on the afternoon of December 6, and the 13 parts were completed between 7:00 and 9:00 the evening of December 6. Colonel Bratton, Chief of the Far Eastern Section of the Intelligence Branch of War Department G-2, was the designated representative for receiving and distributing to the Army and to the Secretary of State copies of messages of this character received from the Navy. The Navy undertook to deliver to the President and to its own organization copies of similar messages. Colonel Bratton delivered a copy of the first 13 parts between 9:00 and 10:30 p. m., December 6, as follows: To Colonel Smith (now Lt. Gen. Smith) Secretary of the General Staff in a locked bag to which General Marshall had the key. (R. 238) He told General Smith that the bag so delivered to him contained very important papers and General Marshall should be told at once so that he could unlock the [12] bag and see the contents. (R 307) To General Miles by handing the message to him (R. 238), by discussing the message with General Miles in his office and reading it in his presence. (R. 239-241) He stated that General Miles did nothing about it as far as he knows. (R. 241) This record shows no action by General Miles. Thereafter he delivered a copy to Colonel Gailey, General Gerow's executive in the War Plans Division. (R. 238) He then took a copy and delivered it to the watch officer of the State Department for the Secretary of State and did so between 10:00 and 10:30 p. M. (R. 234, 239) Therefore, Colonel Bratton had completed his distribution by 10:30, had urged Colonel Smith, Secretary to General Staff, to communicate with General Marshall at once, and had discussed the matter with Page 227 General Miles after reading the message. This record shows no action on the part of General Smith and none by General Miles. Apparently the Chief of Staff was not advised of the situation until the following morning. In the meantime, as the testimony of Captain Safford shows, the following action was taken with the distribution of the same 13 parts of the message by the Navy which clearly indicates its importance. Captain Safford testifies that the first 13 parts came in on the afternoon of December 6 and were translated to English and delivered to the Army to Major Doud by 9 o'clock Saturday night, December 6. This portion of the message was distributed as follows: Commander Kramer consulted with the Director of Naval Intelligence, Admiral Wilkinson, and was directed to go to the White House to deliver a copy. He then delivered a [13] copy to Admiral Wilkinson at his house. As the President was engaged, Kramer gave a copy to the White House Aide, Admiral Beardall. When Kramer reached Admiral Wilkinson's house he also gave a copy to Admiral Turner, Director of War Plans. He delivered the final copy by midnight to Admiral Ingersoll, who read it and initialed it. Admiral Wilkinson phoned Admiral Stark, as did also Admiral Turner. Admiral Stark ordered Kramer to be at his office at 9:00 Sunday morning. Kramer came back to the Navy Department about 1 a. m. to see if part 14 had come in, but it had not. When part 14 did come in it was ready for delivery to the Army in English by 7:15 a. m., December 7. (R. 158, 160, 164, 166) The net result was that no one took any action based upon the first 13 parts until the 14th part came in and the Army took no action on that until between 11:30 and 12:00 on the morning of December 7, or about 13 hours after the first 13 parts came in which clearly indicated the rupture of relations with the Japanese. Nothing more was done with this clear warning in the first 13 parts of the long message until the following events occurred. Colonel Bratton received from a naval officer courier between 8:30 and 9:00 a. m. on the Sunday morning of December 7, the English translation of the 14th part of the long message and the short message of the Japanese direction the Ambassador to deliver the long message at 1 p. m. on December 7 and to destroy their codes. Colonel Bratton immediately called General Marshall's quarters at 9:00 a. m. (R. 85) [14] General Marshall was out horseback riding and he asked that he be sent for. General Marshall called him back between 10:00 and 11:00 a. m. General Marshall came into his office at 11:25 a. m., of which there is a contemporaneous written record maintained by Colonel Bratton. In the meantime, Colonel Bratton called his Chief, General Miles, and reported what he had done. (R. 77) Neither General Miles nor General Gerow were in their office on Sunday morning. General Miles arrived at the same time as General Marshall at 11:25 a. m. The Chief of Staff prepared a message to General Short and called Admiral Stark, who said he was not sending any further warning but asked General Marshall to inform the Navy in Hawaii through Short. The answer to the following question on the record has not been supplied this Board: "Why were not the first 13 parts, which were considered important enough by the Navy to be delivered to the President and everyone of the important Admirals Page 228 of the Navy, delivered by the War Department officers to the Chief of Staff, and his attention called to it so that he could have taken some sort of action upon it? (R )" [reference blank, LWJ] The only possible answer lies in the testimony that Colonel Smith, Secretary to the General Staff was told about 9 p. m. December 6 that there was an important document and that General Marshall should see it right away. (R. 242) There is no proof that Colonel Smith did so act except that from General Marshall, which shows that he was not advised of this situation until the following morning when he received a message from Colonel Bratton between 10:00 and 11:00 a. m., December 7. The record shows that subordinate officers who were [15] entrusted with this information were so impressed with it that they strongly recommended that definite action be taken. When subordinate officers were prevented from sending this information to the Hawaiian Department, by arrangement with their opposite numbers in the Office of Naval Intelligence, upon learning that the Navy had this information in Hawaii, an apparently innocuous telegram was dispatched by G-2 to Colonel Fielder, G-2 in Hawaii, telling him to see his opposite number in the Office of Naval Intelligence, Commander Rochefort, to secure information from him of importance. The story of the message of November 27 takes on a whole new aspect when the facts are really known as to the background of knowledge in the War Department of Japanese intentions. At the time the Chief of Staff drafted the message of the 27th on the 26th, he knew everything that the Japanese had been proposing between themselves for a long period of time prior to that day, and knew their intentions with respect to the prospects of war. The message of the 27th which he drafted in rough and which was apparently submitted to the Joint Board of the Army and Navy, therefore could have been cast in the clearest sort of language and direction to the Hawaiian Department. It was no surprise that the Japanese would reject the Ten points on November 26; that course of events had been well pictured by complete information of the conversations between the Japanese Government and its representatives available to the Government of the United States. [16] 5. Summary. Now let us turn to the fateful period between November 27 and December 6, 1941. In this period numerous pieces of information came to our State, War and Navy Departments in all of their top ranks indicating precisely the intentions of the Japanese including the probable exact hour and date of the attack. To clinch this extraordinary situation we but have to look at the record to see that the contents of the 13 parts of the Japanese final reply were completely known in detail to the War Department, completely translated and available in plain English, by not later than between 7 and 9 o'clock on the evening of December 6 or approximately Honolulu time. This information was taken by the Officer in Charge of the Far Eastern Section of G-2 of the War Department personally in a locked bag to Colonel Bedell Smith, now Lt. Gen Smith and Chief of staff to General Eisenhower, who was then Secretary the General Staff, and he was told that the message was of the most Page 229 vital importance to General Marshall. It was delivered also to G-2 General Miles, with whom it was discussed and to the Executive Colonel Gailey, of the War Plans Division, each of whom was advised of the vital importance of this information that showed that the hour had struck, and that war was at hand. Before 10:30 o'clock that night, this same officer personally delivered the same information to the Secretary of State's duty officer. General Marshall was in Washington on December 6. This information, as vital and important as it was, was not communicated to him on that date by either Smith or Gerow, so far as this record shows when the final part 14 came in [17] on the morning of December 7 and with it the short message directing the long message be delivered to the Secretary of State at 1 p. m., December 7, 1941. It was then that this same officer, Colonel Bratton of G-2, took the initiative and went direct to General Marshall, calling him at his quarters at Fort Myer and sending an orderly to find him, where he was out horseback riding. When he finally did reach him on the phone, General Marshall said he was coming to the War Department. He met him at about 11:25 a .m., after which time the message of December 7 was formulated by General Marshall in his own handwriting. It failed to reach its destination due to sending it by commercial Western Union RCA. It arrived several hours after the attack. This brings us to the "winds" message. The "winds" message was one that was to be inserted in the Japanese news and weather broadcasts and repeated with a definite pattern of words, so as to indicate that war would take place either with Great Britain, Russia, or the United States, or all three. The Federal Communications Commission was asked to be on the outlook for these key words through their monitoring stations. Such information was picked up by a monitoring station. This information was received and translated on December 3, 1941, and the contents distributed to the same high authority. The Navy received during the evening of December 3, 1941, this message, which when translated said, "War with the United States, War with Britain, including the NEI, except peace with Russia." Captain Safford said he first saw the "winds" message himself about 8 a. m., on Thursday, December 4, 1941. It had been received the previous evening, [18] according to handwriting on it by Commander Kramer, who had been notified by the duty officer, Lt. (jg) Brotherhood, USNR, who was the watch officer on the receipt of this message. It was based upon the receipt of the message that Captain Safford prepared five messages between 1200 and 1600 December 4, ordering the destruction of cryptographic systems and secret and confidential papers on the Asiatic stations. Captain McCullom of the Navy drafted a long message to be sent to all outlying fleet and naval stations. This was disapproved by higher naval authority. This message was confirmation to Naval Intelligence and Navy Department Communications Intelligence Units that war was definitely set. This "winds execute" message has now disappeared from the Navy files and cannot be found despite the extensive search for it. It was last seen by Commander Safford about December 14, 1941, when he collected the papers together with Commander Kramer and turned Page 230 them over to the Director of Naval Communications for use as evidence before the Roberts Commission. There, therefore, can be no question that between the dates of December 4 and December 6, the imminence of war on the following Saturday and Sunday, December 6 and 7, was clear-cut and definite. Up the morning of December 7, 1941, everything that the Japanese were planning to do was known to the United States except the final message instructing the Japanese Embassy to present the 14th part together with the preceding 13 parts of the long message at one o'clock on December 7, or the very hour and minute when bombs were falling on Pearl Harbor. Page 231 [a] Memorandum for The Secretary of War Subject: Army Pearl Harbor Board Report, 25 November 1944 [1] 25 Nov 1944. MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR Subject: Army Pearl Harbor Board Report. You have referred to me for opinion the Report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board dated 20 October 1944 together with the testimony and exhibits. I have examined this Report with great care and submit herewith my views. The present memorandum does not cover so much of the investigation as pertains to the conduct of Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr. and related matters referred to in the Report of the House Military Affairs Committee dated 14 June 1944. Technical Legality of Board's Proceedings: No question of the technical legality of the Board's proceedings is presented. As shown in the Report (Rep. 1) the Board was appointed by the Secretary of War by Letter Order AGO, 8 July 1944, (AGPO-A-A 210.311 (24 Jun 44)), as amended and supplemented, in order meet the wishes of Congress as expressed in Public Law 339, 78th Congress, approved 13 June 1944. The Board followed judicial forms, affording full opportunity to witnesses to produce any data in their possession. Interested parties such as General Short and others were likewise offered the fullest possible opportunity to appear before the Board and submit information. Board's Conclusions in General: The Board concludes broadly that the attack on Pearl Harbor was surprise to all concerned: the nation, the War Department, and the Hawaiian Department, which caught the defending forces practically unprepared to meet it and to minimize its destructiveness (Rep. 297). The extent of the disaster was due, the Board states, (a) to the failure General Short adequately to alert his command for war; (b) to the failure of the War Department, with knowledge of the type of alert taken by Short, to direct him to take an adequate alert; and (c) the failure to keep him adequately informed of the status of the United States-Japanese negotiations, which might have caused him to change from the inadequate alert to an adequate one (Rep. 297). The Board follows these general conclusions by criticizing the conduct of the Secretary of State, the Chief of Staff, the then Chief of War Plans Division, and General Short (Rep. 297-300). The Board makes no recommendations. It is believed that the most feasible method of examining the Report to take up first the Report's conclusions as to General Short and the other conclusions later. Page 232 [2] Board's Conclusion As to General Short: Taking them up in their order the Board concludes that General Short failed in his duties in the following particulars: "(a) To place his command in a state of readiness for war in the face of a war warning by adopting an alert against sabotage only. The information which he had was incomplete and confusing but it was sufficient to warn him of the tense relations between our government and the Japanese Empire and that hostilities might be momentarily expected. This required that he guard against surprise to the extent possible and make ready his command so that it might be employed to the maximum and in time against the worst form of attack that the enemy might launch. "(b) To reach or attempt to reach an agreement with the Admiral commanding the Pacific Fleet and the Admiral commanding the 14th Naval District for implementing the joint Army and Navy plans and agreements then in existence which provided for joint action by the two services. One of the methods by which they might have become operative was through the joint agreement of the responsible commanders. "(c) To inform himself of the effectiveness of the long-distance reconnaissance being conducted by the Navy. "(d) To replace inefficient staff officers. (Rep. 300.)" Short's Defenses: General Short, as the commander of a citadel taken by surprise, is in the position of the captain of a ship which has been wrecked: it is a question of the validity of his defenses. Within a half hour after receiving the 27 November warning radio signed "Marshall," (see p. 8, present memorandum) Short ordered Alert No. 1, which his SOP described as a defense against sabotage "with no threat from without." (Tr., Short 283, 395, Ex. 1, p. 2, p. 5, par. 14.) He did this without consulting his staff, other than his Chief of Staff, and without consulting the Navy. (Tr., Short 282, 395.) He also ordered into operation the radar air raid warning system, but only from 4 to 7 a. m., and primarily on a training basis. (Tr., Short 297, 4442.) [3] The action of Short, which was taken in pursuance of the 27 November wire signed "Marshall," did not contemplate any outside threat. (Tr. Short 283, Ex. 1, p. 2, p. 5, par. 14.) His failure to provide for an outside threat was a serious mistake and resulted in overwhelming tactical advantages to the attackers, his being taken by surprise, the destruction of his aircraft on the ground, the severity of the damage done to the warships in Pearl Harbor and military installations. Short testified that when he ordered Alert No. 1 he did not consider there was any probability of an air attack and that in this regard "I was wrong." (Tr. Short 4440.) Numerous witnesses confirm that the failure of Short to provide against an outside threat constituted a grave error of judgment. (Tr., Allen 3113; Burgin 2618, 2655; Farthing 838-839; Gerow 4274; Hayes 268; Herron 238: King 2700; Murray 3096-3097; Phillips 1127-1128, 1151-1152; Powell 3911-3912; Throckmorton 1395-1396; Wells 2731; Wilson 1380-1381.) Short sought to excuse his error by claiming: (1) that he had assumed the Navy knew the whereabouts of the Japanese fleet and would warn him in ample time in the event of an impending attack (Short, Ex. 1, p. 55; Tr., 299 300, 451, 452; cf. Kimmel 1769); (2) that in response to the radio signed "Marshall" of 27 November he informed the War Department of the alert against sabotage and page 233 the War Department had acquiesced therein and did not give him additional warnings after 27 November (Short, Ex. 1, p. 54; Tr., 286, 287, 308); (3) that measures to provide for threats from without would have interfered with training (Ex. 1, p. 16), and would have disclosed his intent and alarmed the civilian population (Ex. 12 p. 16-17) contrary to War Department instructions, and that the prime danger was sabotage. (Tr., Short 285, 286, 289, 428, 522; Ex. 1, p. 13-18, 54-57.) These excuses are untenable. Short's belief that the Navy knew the whereabouts of the Japanese fleet and would warn him in time cannot excuse him for his failure to take precautions against an outside threat. In the same way he cannot be heard to justify his failure to adopt the necessary alert against an air attack because of fear of sabotage or disclosure of possible intent, or possibility of alarming the civilian population, or interference with his training program. These latter must clearly be subordinated to the overshadowing danger of a possible air attack. Short's testimony indicates that he felt he was not given sufficient information as to the true Japanese situation by Washington and that what information he got was at least in part misleading. (Short, Ex. 1, p. 54-56; Tr., 278-281, 291, 4427.) The Board in its conclusion stated: "The information which he had was incomplete and confusing but it was sufficient to warn him of the tense relations between our government and the Japanese Empire and that hostilities might be momentarily expected. (Rep. 300.)" [4] General Short took command 7 February 1941. That very day the Secretary of War transmitted to him a copy of a letter from the Secretary of the Navy dated 24 January 1941 which stated: "If war eventuates with Japan, it is believed easily possible that hostilities would be initiated by a *surprise attack* upon the fleet or the naval base at Pearl Harbor, (Roberts Report, p. 5) (Italics supplied.)" Secretary Knox further stated that "inherent possibilities of a major disaster" warranted speedy action to "increase the joint readiness of the Army and Navy to withstand a raid of the character mentioned * * *." The letter proceeded: "The dangers envisaged in their order of importance and probability are considered to be: (1) Air bombing attack, (2) air torpedo plane attack, (3) sabotage, (4) submarine attack, (5) mining, (6) bombardment by gunfire. (Roberts Report, p. 5.)" The letter stated that the defenses against all but the first two were satisfactory, described the nature of the probable air attack and urged that the Army consider methods to repel it. It recommended revision of joint Army and Navy defense plans and special training for the forces to meet such raids. (Roberts Report, p. 5.) Short admitted he received Secretary Stimson's letter inclosing [sic] Secretary Knox's letter, both of which he recalled very well. (Tr., Short 368-369.) On the same date, 7 February 1941, General Marshall wrote Short a letter containing the following statement: "My impression of the Hawaiian problem has been that if no serious harm is done us *during the first six hours of known hostilities*, thereafter the existing defenses would discourage an enemy against the hazard of an attack. The risk of sabotage and the risk involved in a *surprise raid by Air* and by submarine, constitute the real perils of the situation. Frankly, I do not see any landing threat Page 234 in the Hawaiian Islands so long as we have air superiority. (Tr., Marshall 17) (Italics supplied.)" On 5 March 1941 General Marshall wrote Short a follow-up letter saying: "I would appreciate your early review of the situation in the Hawaiian Department with regard to defense from *air attack*. The establishment of a satisfactory system of coordinating all means available to this end is a matter of *first priority*. (Tr., Marshall 19) (Italics supplied.)" [5] Short replied by a letter, dated 15 March 1941, outlining the situation at length and stating: "The most serious situation with reference to an *air attack* is the vulnerability of both the Army and Navy airfields to the attack. (Tr., Marshall 21.) (Italics supplied.)" Short further stated: "The Island is so small that there would not be the same degree of warning that would exist on the mainland. (Tr. Marshall 24.)" On 14 April 1941 Short, reporting progress in cooperating with the Navy, sent General Marshall three agreements made with the Navy to implement the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan and concluding with the remark: "We still have some detail work to do with reference to coordinating the air force and the *anti-aircraft* defense. (Tr., Marshall 27.) (Italics supplied.)" General Marshall on 5 May 1941 complimented him for "being on the job. (Tr., Marshall 27.) On 7 July 1941, The Adjutant General sent Short a radio fully advising him of the Japanese situation. It told him that the Japanese Government had determined upon its future policy which might involve aggressive action against Russia and that an advance against the British and Dutch could not be entirely ruled out. It further advised him that all Jap vessels had been warned by Japan to be west of the Panama Canal by 1 August, that the movement of Japanese shipping from Japan had been suspended, and that merchant vessels were being requisitioned. (Tr., Marshall 33, Fielder 2974, Stimson 4055.) Indicating his awareness of the threat of an air attack, Short sent General Marshall a tentative SOP, dated 14 July 1941, containing three alerts, Alert No. 1 being the all-out alert requiring occupation of field positions; Alert No. 2 being applicable to a condition not sufficiently serious to require occupation of field positions as in Alert No. 1; and Alert No. 3 being a defense against sabotage and uprisings within the Islands "with no particular threat from without." It will be noted that these alerts are in inverse order to the actual alerts of the final plan of 5 November 1941. It will be noted further that in paragraph 13 of the SOP, HD, 5 November 1941, as well as in the earlier tentative draft of the SOP, sent to Washington, Short expressly recognized the necessity for preparation for "*a surprise hostile attack*." (Short, Ex. 1, pp. 5. 64.) (Italics supplied.) [6] On 6 September, Colonel Fielder, Short's G-2, advised the War Department that many of the Summaries of Information received from the War Department originated with the Office of Naval Intelligence, 14th Naval District, and that he had already received them. He stated that as the cooperation between his office, the Office of Naval Intelligence, and the FBI was most complete, that all such Page 235 data was given him simultaneously with its dispatch to Washington and recommended that such notices from Washington to him be discontinued to avoid duplication of effort. (Tr., Bratton D. 292-293.) On 16 October, the Chief of Naval Operations advised Kimmel that the Japanese Cabinet resignation created a grace [sic] situation, that the new cabinet would probably be anti-American, that hostilities between Japan and Russia were strongly possible, and that since Japan held Britain and the United States responsible for the present situation there was also a possibility that Japan might attack these two powers. The radio concluded: "In view of these possibilities you will take due precautions, including such preparatory deployments as will not disclose strategic intention or constitute provocative action against Japan. (Tr. Short 279.)" Short admits receiving this message. (Tr., Short 278.) Secretary Stimson testified the War Department had this warning sent to Short. (Tr., Stimson 4055.) On 17 October, Short's G-2 furnished Short's staff with a full estimate of the Japanese situation which stated the situation was extremely critical, that Japan would shortly announce her decision to challenge militarily any nation which might oppose her policy, and that the major successes of the Axis afforded an unparalleled opportunity for expansion with chances of minimum resistance, that probable moves included an attack upon Russia, upon British possessions in the Far East, a defense against American attack in support of the British, and a simultaneous attack upon the ABCD bloc "at whatever points might promise her greatest tactical, strategic, and economical advantages." The report stated that a simultaneous attack on the ABCD powers "* * * cannot be ruled out as a possibility for the reason that if Japan considers war with the United States to be inevitable as a result of her actions against Russia, it is reasonable to believe that she may decide to strike before our naval program is completed. (Tr. 3688.)" [7] On 18 or 20 October the War Department advised Short: "The following War Department estimate of the Japanese situation for your information. Tension between the United States and Japan remains strained but no, repeat no, abrupt change in Japanese foreign policy seems imminent. (Tr., Short 412-413, Hain 3307, Gerow 4258, 4264.)" Short's G-2 gave him a further estimate of the Japanese situation on 25 October 1941 stating that there had been no fundamental change in the situation since his warning advice of 17 October above referred to. It stated that a crisis of the first magnitude was created in the Pacific by the fall of the Japanese Cabinet, that actions of the new cabinet "definitely places Japan in a camp hostile to the United States" and "forces America into a state of constant vigilance." It predicted Jap use of peace negotiations "as a means to delude and disarm her potential enemies." It predicted a major move would be made before the latter part of November "with a chance that the great break, if it comes, will not occur before spring." (Tr., 3689-3694.) On 5 November, the War Department G-2 wrote Short's G-2 that Hirota, head of the Black Dragon Society, had stated that "* * * War with the United States would best begin in December or in February. * * * The new cabinet would likely start war within sixty days. [Tr., Bratton D. 289-291.)" Page 236 Colonel Bicknell, Short's Asst. G-2, testified that early in November in his Weekly Intelligence Summary the statement was made that " * * * From all information which had been gathered in our office in Hawaii it looked as though hostilities could be expected either by the end of November or, if not, then not until spring. (Tr., Bicknell 1439- 1440.)" Captain Edwin T. Layton, Intelligence Officer Of the Pacific Fleet, testified he believed he had informed Colonel Edwin Raley, G-2 Of the Hawaiian Air Force and who had been assigned as liaison with the Navy, that Japanese troops, vessels, naval vessels, and transports were moving south. This information came from Naval observers in China, the naval attache in Tokyo, the naval attache in Chungking, British and other sources. This intelligence indicated that the Japanese would invade the Kra Isthmus. Jap submarines about this time had been contacted in the vicinity Of Oahu. (Tr., Layton 3030, 3031, 3040-3041.) [8] On 24 November 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations radioed the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, that "There are very doubtful chances of a favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan. This situation coupled with statements of Nippon Government and movements of their naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction including an attack on the Philippines or Guam is a possibility. The Chief of Staff has seen this dispatch and concurs and requests action addresses (CINCAF, CINCAP, COMS 11, 12, 13, 14) inform senior army officers their respective areas. Utmost secrecy is necessary in order not to complicate an already tense situation or precipitate Jap action. Guam will be informed in a separate dispatch. (Tr., Gerow 4258; cf. Bloch 1503-C.)" This message was presented to General Short by Captain Layton with his estimate. Not only did he deliver the message but he discussed it fully with Short. (Tr., Layton 3058-3059.) Short said, "I do not think I ever got that message. * * * I might have I seen it, * * * and I might have forgotten about it." (Tr., Short 414.) On 26 November 1941, the War Department radioed Short: "It is desired following instructions be given pilots of two B-24's on special photo mission. Photograph Jaluit Island in the Carolina group while simultaneously making visual reconnaissance. Information is desired as to location and number of guns, aircraft, airfields, barracks, camps and naval vessels including submarines * * * before they depart Honolulu insure that both B-24's are fully supplied with ammunition for guns. (Tr., Gerow 4259.)" The War Department sent Short three messages on 27 November, all of which arrived. The one signed "Marshall" read as follows: "Negotiations with Japanese appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot, be avoided, United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile [9] Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not, repeat not, to alarm the civil population or disclose intent. Report measures taken. Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow 5 as far as they pertain to Japan. Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers. (Tr., Gerow 4259-4260, Short 280-281)" Page 237 This same day, 27 November, G-2 of the War Department radioed Short's G- 2 as follows: "Advise only the Commanding Officer and the Chief of Staff that it appears at the conference with the Japanese has ended in an apparent deadlock. Acts of sabotage and espionage probable. *Also possible that hostilities may begin*. (Tr., Gerow 4260.) (Italics supplied.)" The third message sent Short on 27 November 1941 was through the Navy Department, reading as follows: "This dispatch is to be considered a war warning. Negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased and an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days. The number and equipment of Jap troops and the organization of naval task forces indicates an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines or the Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo. Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the task assigned in WPL 46X. Inform District and Army authorities. A similar warning is being sent by the War Department. Spenavo informed British. Continental district Guam Samoa directed to take appropriate measures against sabotage. (Tr., Gerow 4262.)" Short admits he got this message. (Tr., Short 415, 416, 469.) "The following day, 28 November, The Adjutant General sent Short a long radio stating that the critical situation demanded that all precautions be taken immediately against subversive activities and sabotage. (Tr., Arnold 170, Short 293, Scanlon 4176. ) Short stated he took this as tacit consent to his alert against sabotage only (Short, Ex. 1, p. 54) and as a reply to his radio report of 27 November. (Tr., Short 422.) Short sent a long reply to this message giving the various precautions taken by him against subversive activities and sabotage. (Tr., Short 294-296.)" [10] There was a further message from the Chief of Naval Operations, dated 30 November, stating that Japan was about to launch an attack on the Kra Isthmus. (Roberts Report, p. 8.) Short also received Admiral Kimmel's Fortnightly Summary of Current International Situations, dated December 1, 1941, which stated that deployment of Jap naval ships southward indicated clearly that extensive preparations were under way for hostilities and referred to naval and air activity in the Mandates. (Tr., Kimmel 1769-1770.) An FBI or War Department report that the Jap Consuls in Honolulu were burning their codes and secret papers was given to Short's G-2 on 5 or 6 December 1941. (Tr., Fielder 2986, Bicknell 1413-1414.) The Navy advised Kimmel on 3 December that Jap Consulates in Washington and London were destroying codes and burning secret documents. (Tr., Bloch 1512-1513.) There were two Navy messages on December 1941, the first on information copy to Kimmel of advice to certain naval commanders to destroy confidential documents (Tr., Bloch 1514), the second a similar radiogram advising "be prepared to destroy instantly in event of emergency all classified matter you retain." (Tr., Bloch 1514, Safford C. 187.) Another Navy message of 6 December "directed that in view of the tense situation naval commanders in Western Pacific areas should be authorized to destroy confidential papers." (Tr., Safford C. 189, Bloch 1514.) In addition to all the above, G-2 of the War Department radioed Short's G-2 on 5 December 1941 to contact Commander Rochefort, in charge of naval cryptographic work in Pearl Harbor, relative to Jap weather broadcasts from Tokyo "that you must obtain" and stating categorically "contact him at once." This had reference to the important "Winds" intercept, to be discussed more fully later. (Tr., Bratton Page 238 B. 62, D. 283.) Also, Colonel Bicknell of Short's G-2 staff advised Short's entire staff on 5 December that the Jap Consulate was burning papers and that to him this meant war was imminent. (Tr., Bicknell 1413.) Colonel Fielder, Short's G-2, confirmed the fact that Colonel Bicknell so reported. (Tr., Fielder 2986.) On 5 December 1941, Hawaii time, Colonel Van S. Merle-Smith, U. S. Military Attache in Melbourne, Australia, sent a cable to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, stating that the Netherlands Far Eastern Command had ordered the execution of Plan A-2 based on their intelligence report of Japanese naval movements in the vicinity of Palau. (Tr., O'Dell 4506-4507.) Lieutenant Robert H. O'Dell who was then Assistant Military Attache in the American Legation, Melbourne, Australia, testified that Plan A-2 was integrated into the Rainbow Plan. (Tr., O'Dell 4511-4512.) The message in question was supposed to be relayed to the War Department by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, for deciphering and repeat. (Tr., O'Dell 4509.) The record does not show whether Short ever received this message. Other messages in the same code had been transmitted between the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and the American Legation in Australia. (Tr., O'Dell 4510.) Colonel Merle-Smith had not sent the cable in question to Washington in the first instance in order that there should be no delay. [11] Lastly, on 6 December 1941, Short's Assistant G-2, Colonel Bicknell, informed him that the FBI at Honolulu had intercepted a telephone conversation between one Dr. Mori, a Japanese agent in Honolulu, and a person in Tokyo who inquired as to the fleet, sailors, searchlights, aircraft, and "Hibiscus" and "poinsettias," (probably code words). This message evidently had "military significance" as a Mr. Shivers, the FBI Agent in charge, and Colonel Bicknell testified. (Tr., Shivers 3205, Bicknell 1415-1416.) Short knew that the most dangerous form of attack on Pearl Harbor would be a surprise air attack at dawn. He had participated in plans and exercises against such a possibility. The fact is that on 31 March 1941 he signed the Martin-Bellinger Air Operations Agreement with the Navy, paragraph IV of which provided that daily patrols should be instituted to reduce the probability of "air surprise."' (Tr., Short 387-388.) Paragraphs (d) and (e) of this Agreement (quoted in Report on page 98; Roberts Record 556-D-F) state: "(d) * * * It appears that the most likely and dangerous form of attack on Oahu would be an air attack. * * * "(e) In a dawn air attack there is a high probability that it would he delivered as a complete surprise in spite of any patrols we might be using and that it might find us in a condition of readiness under which pursuit would be slow to start * * *." General Short himself testified that he was fully aware of a possible surprise air attack. (Tr., Short 388.) General Hayes, Short's Chief of Staff up to the middle of October 1941, (Tr., Hayes 242) testified that he, General Martin, Short's air chief, and Admiral Bellinger, the naval air chief, considered a surprise air raid as the most probable enemy action and that this was the estimate of the Hawaiian Department in Short's time and also in the time of his predecessor General Herron. (Tr., Hayes 267-268.) Colonel Donegan, Short's G-3 at the time of the attack (Tr., Donegan 1929), Page 239 testified that the possibility of a surprise air raid had been discussed "many, many times." (Tr., Donegan 1961-1963.) Short had at least one air defense exercise each week with the Navy from March (Tr., Short 293) and he conducted an air raid drill as late as 29 November 941. (Tr., DeLany 1727.) General Short admitted that while the 27 November message instructed him to undertake reconnaissance, this only indicated to him that "whoever wrote that message was not familiar with the fact that the Navy had assumed the full responsibility for that long-distance reconnaissance * * *." (Tr., Short 4442.) [12] Thus, Short concluded that in drafting the message Washington did not understand the situation but that he, Short, did. It should be borne in mind that Short at no time called on Washington for clarification of any of these messages. Short contended that both the War Department message of 16 October and that of 27 November stressed the necessity of avoiding provocative action against Japan (Short, Ex. 1, p. 14, 54; Tr., 279-281) and that when the 27 November message was sent there was still hope in the minds of the War Department that differences might be avoided. (Tr., Short 281.) He likewise interpreted the 27 November message to mean that he must avoid any action which would alarm the Japanese population, which was confirmed by The Adjutant General's radio to him of 28 November. (Short, Ex. 1, p. 14, 54; Tr., 293-294.) As Short testified: "Everything indicated to me that the War Department did not believe that there was going to be anything more than sabotage * * *. (Tr., Short 437.)" Short testified he was confirmed in this conclusion by the action of the War Department in sending the flight of B-17's to Hawaii without ammunition for defense. The planes arrived in this condition during he attack. (Short, Ex. 1, p. 21, 22, 55; Tr., 307, 471.) Asked about "the possibility of confusion" created by the messages from Washington and whether he did not think the situation demanded vigorous action on his part, Short replied "very definitely not, from the information I had." (Tr., Short 453.) The Board stated in its conclusions that the information furnished General Short was "incomplete and confusing." (Rep. 300.) Notwithstanding any information from Washington which Short regarded as conflicting or qualifying, the responsibility rested upon Short to be prepared for the most dangerous situation with which he could be confronted. This precaution on his part as the Commanding General was mandatory. Short was adequately advised of the imminent rupture in diplomatic relations between the United States and Japan, of the imminence of war, of the probable momentary outbreak of hostilities by Japan against the United States, and of the possibility of sabotage and espionage. The prime and unanswered question was when and where Japan would strike. As to this danger, the limitations and restrictions set forth in the messages were at all times subordinate to the principal instruction, namely that war was imminent and Short should be prepared for it. The instruction to this effect contained in the message of 27 November was as follows: "[13] * * * This policy should not repeat not be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. * * * (Tr., Short 280 281.)" Page 240 Thus, a mere reading of the messages will show that Short should not have been misled as to their essential meaning, namely, that he must be on the alert against threats both from within *and from without*. Short stresses greatly his reply to the 27 November message signed "Marshall." This reads: "Department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with the Navy. (Short Ex. 1, p. 16; Tr. 286.)" As previously pointed out, Short sent this brief reply within thirty minutes after receipt of the 27 November radio from Washington, and without consulting the Navy or the members of his staff. This decision and action by Short occurred before Short's G-2 received the message which the War Department G-2 radioed to Short on 27 November, clearly indicating that both sabotage and hostilities might commence and be concurrent. (Tr., Short 282, 395, 520, Fielder 2962). Short claims his report to Washington, quoted above, was in effect a notice that he had only ordered an alert against sabotage, pursuant to the directive to report contained in the 27 November message signed "Marshall." He testified: "Everything indicated to me that the War Department did not believe there was going to be anything more than sabotage; and, as I have explained, we had a very serious training proposition with the Air corps particularly, that if we went into Alert No. 2 or 3 instead of No. 1 at the time that we couldn't meet the requirements on the Philippine ferrying business. Also the fact that they told me to report the action taken unquestionably had an influence because when I reported action taken and there was no comment that my action was to little or too much I was a hundred percent convinced that they agreed with it. (Tr., Short 437.)" When, however, he was asked what that portion of his reply reading, "liaison with the Navy" meant, he replied: "General Short. To my mind it meant very definitely keeping in touch with the Navy knowing what information they had and what they were doing. "General GRUNERT. Did it indicate in any way that you expected the Navy to carry out its part of that agreement for long-distance reconnaissance? "[14] General SHORT. Yes. Without any question, whether I had sent that or not it would have affected it because they had signed a definite agreement which was approved by the Navy as well as our Chief of Staff. (Tr., Short 380)" Both the Army and Navy messages of 27 November 1941 pictured an emergency and called for action under the War Plan. The Navy message expressly stated: "This dispatch is to be considered a war warning. * * * Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the task assigned in WPL 46X. Inform District and Army authorities. A similar warning is being sent by the war Department. * * * (Tr. Gerow 4262)" The symbols WPL 46X refer to the Rainbow Plan. (Tr., Bloch 1512) On 27 November 1941, the Navy informed the Army authorities of the message. (Tr., Layton 3041, Kimmel 1779) Short admits he received this message. (Tr., Short 416, 469) The corresponding warning sent by the War Department was Radiogram No. 472, 27 November 1941. That message after stating "hostile action possible at any moment" goes on to say that after the outbreak of hostilities the tasks assigned in the Rainbow Plan will be carried out in so far as they pertain to Japan. The implementation of that portion of the Plan by means of reconnaissance refers to paragraph 18 (I) of the Plan which Page 241 provides that the Navy shall undertake the distant reconnaissance. (Tr. Kimmel 1745) Short is in a dilemma in contending that distant reconnaissance was a Navy responsibility, (Short, Ex. 1, p. 14, 15; Tr. 54, 281, 373, 377- 380, 383, 393-394, 4443-4444) because it only became a Navy responsibility if and when the Joint Army and Navy Agreement was put into effect. Yet Short made no effort to put it into effect, even in part. (Tr., Lawton 2675-2676, Short 4437, 4441) General Gerow, Chief of War Plans Division at the time, testified: "* * * A threat of hostile attack was clearly stated in the War Plans message of November 27, and there was no reason for members of the War Plans Division to believe that the CG of the Hawaiian Department did not recognize that threat as imminent, and that he would not take action in accordance with the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan of the Hawaiian Department and the Fourteenth Naval District. (Tr., Gerow 4283-4284)" [15] General Gerow testified further that from Short's reply "liaison with the Navy" it was reasonable for General Gerow to assume further that "General Short was working out reconnaissance and other defensive measures in coordination with the Navy. This would be normal procedure under the basic Plan. * * * (Tr., Gerow 4289)" Thus, in reality, the reply of Short indicated to the War Department not only that he had taken precautions against sabotage but also that defense measures were being taken in accordance with the basic War Plan. There is nothing in the Plan to compel its being put into effect in toto. Paragraph 15 (c), (2) of the Plan provides: "Such parts of this plan as are believed necessary will be put into effect prior to M-Day as ordered by the War and Navy Departments or as mutually agreed upon by local commanders. (Tr., Bellinger 1584)" It is therefore clear that even assuming that the Chief of the War Plans Division should have checked up more thoroughly on the inadequacy of the brief report by Short, nevertheless Short did not inform the War Department that he had merely alerted his command against sabotage. In any event, a military commander with a great responsibility cannot entirely divest himself of that responsibility with respect to 7 December 1941 by giving the War Department on 27 November 1941 the report that he did. Furthermore, during the time which intervened from 27 November to 7 December he received other messages, heretofore quoted, which called for his reexamination of his decision. Reconnaissance: Means Available: Short's reply did not fully or accurately inform the War Department of his action taken. For example on 27 November, after receiving the message in question, he ordered the radar air raid warning service into operation but only from 4 to 7 a. m. (Tr., Short 297, 469-470) and primarily on a training basis. (Tr., Short 516, 4442) No mention of this was made in his reply. One of the most important means of reconnaissance was the radar air raid warning service. The 27 November message signed "Marshall" ordered Short "to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary." An added reason for twenty-four hour operation of the radar is Short's claim that the Hawaiian Department did not have sufficient aircraft Page 242 for 360 degree reconnaissance. It is clear that the radar air raid warning system was capable of twenty-four hour operation since this schedule was maintained immediately following the attack. (Tr., Short 470) [16] Short assumed that the Navy was conducting long-distance reconnaissance by air and water to a measurable extent (Tr., Short 284, 385), but he also realized that such reconnaissance by the Navy was not perfect. (Tr., Short 375, 384) He even failed to ascertain from the Navy, in a business-like way, just what reconnaissance was in fact being conducted. (Cf. Roberts Report, p. 18, 19) The Navy conducted reconnaissance but this was only incidental to the maneuvers of the task forces of the fleet. These maneuvers were for training purposes and also to guard against Japanese submarines. (Tr., Short 359-360, 384; Bloch 157; Bellinger 1600; DeLany 175; Kimmel 1773; 1794-1795; 1802; McMorris 2885; cf. Roberts Report, p. 16) According to Admiral Kimmel, the Navy "had plans for reconnaissance and *could run reconnaissance of a sort*, but in our estimate which had been submitted to Washington, * * * it was clearly stated that we had to know the time of the attack, within rather narrow limits in order to have anything like an effective search, because we could not maintain a search except for a very few days. Then of course we were hoping to get more planes all the time * * *" (Tr., Kimmel 1806) (Italics supplied) Concerning the air force necessary for naval reconnaissance, Admiral Kimmel stated: "* * * I think it is generally accepted that proper reconnaissance against aircraft attack requires that the patrol planes run out to about 800 miles from Oahu. Around a 360 degree arc, if you want a full coverage, *and this will take about 84 planes*, assuming a 15 miles visibility, for one day. * * * (Tr., Kimmel 1763) (Italics supplied)" How many planes were available? From Kimmel's own testimony it appears that the Navy had 81 patrol planes: "* * * it was planned to utilize so many of the patrol planes of the fleet as might be available at any one time augmented by such planes as the Army could supply to do that distant reconnaissance. *The number of patrol planes in the fleet was 81, all told*. Of those approximately between 50 and 60 were in the Island of Oahu and suitable for service on the 7th of December. * * * and they had to cover all the Hawaiian Islands and cover all actions of the Pacific Fleet * * *. (Tr., Kimmel 1739; Tr. Bellinger 1598, 1630) (Italics supplied)" Testifying from hearsay only and not purporting to render an expert opinion, Admiral Bloch stated 170 aircraft and 350 pilots would be needed for such reconnaissance. (Tr., Bloch 1494) According to General Martin, 72 long-range bomber planes were needed for distant reconnaissance, "flying at an interval of five degrees. (Tr., Martin 1872) "An additional 72 ships were required for the next day's reconnaissance mission, with 36 remaining on the ground as the striking force. * * * This brought the total of heavy bombardment to 180. (Tr., Martin 1873)" Short contended that perfect 360 degree reconnaissance would have required 180 B-17 Flying Fortresses. (Tr., Short 324,374) But Short testified that he believed the naval task forces and planes from outlying islands were conducting reconnaissance equivalent to covering a 180 degree arc (Tr., Short 385; cf. Roberts Report, p. 16), and that the task force reconnaissance covered a strip 600 miles wide. (Tr., Short 4438) On Short's assumption only 90 B-17 Flying Fortresses would have been Page 243 needed to cover the remaining 180 degree arc. (Tr., Short 324, 374) According to Kimmel 42 planes could have scouted that arc. (Tr., Kimmel 1763) The Navy had about 58 patrol planes available Oahu (Tr., Bellinger 1598,1630; Kimmel 1739), but how many of these could have been used for reconnaissance is debatable. Some at least were needed to scout ahead of the then operating task forces. The Army had available 6 B-17's, 10 A- 20's, and 54 B-18's. (Tr., Short 281, 314, 479) These B-18's were not the best type of plane, but as General Martin says, "* * * *They could be used for reconnaissance*, but * * * were always recognized as not being a combat ship. (Tr. Martin 1859) (Italics supplied)" General Martin was not asked whether for purposes of distant reconnaissance a B-18 or A-20 plane was substantially the equivalent of a Navy Flying Fortress. Thus, there were 58 naval planes and 70 army planes, or a total of 128 planes in Oahu in late November and early December. How many of these planes were actually available for operations as distinguished from those undergoing repairs, is not clear from the record. It is clear, however, from the above that a substantial number of planes were available by which reconnaissance could have been undertaken to some extent. Hence, the testimony of both Kimmel and Short that the umber of planes on hand was entirely insufficient for reconnaissance must be taken with some qualifications. I agree with the following statement in the Roberts Report (paragraph XV, p. 12): "[18] Under the joint coastal frontier defense plan when the plan became effective the Navy was to conduct distinct air reconnaissance radiating from Oahu, to a distance of from 700 to 800 miles. Prior to December 7 1941 no distant reconnaissances were conducted except during drills and maneuvers. The fleet from time to time had task forces operating in various areas off the island of Oahu and in connection with such operations carrier and patrol planes conducted reconnaissances of the operating areas. The sectors searched however constituted but small areas of the total are of 360' and rarely extended to a radius of 700 miles. "Means were available for distant reconnaissance which would have afforded measure of security against a surprise air attack. "General Short assumed that the Navy was conducting distant reconnaissance but after seeing the warning messages of October and November from the War and Navy Departments he made no inquiry with respect to the distant reconnaissance if any, being conducted by the Navy." Information Not Received by Short; In General; Short claimed that the War Department had considerable important information prior to the attack which should have been but was not transmitted to him and the Board so found. (Top Secret Rep., p. 1) The Board held that under these circumstances, where vital information cannot be disclosed by the War Department to its field commanders it is incumbent upon the War Department to assume the responsibility for specific instructions to these commanders. (Top Secret Rep., p. 1) I do not feel that these are proper conclusions in the present case. It should be made clear at the outset that so far as the present record or the Roberts Report shows, the War Department possessed no information definitely pointing to an attack on Pearl Harbor and no advance information as to the date of an attack anywhere. This is contrary to many past and current newspaper stories. Indeed, aside Page 244 from the Top Secret information which will now be considered, the Dutch- British-United States agreement for joint action, which Short said would have made him "more conscious" war was practically unavoidable, (Tr., Short 449-450), and possibly Navy messages not presented to the Board, there was no substantial information in the War Department which was not transmitted to Short. Short, as Commanding General, must be charged with having all the important information sent to his G-2. It is a fact also that Short received important information from his G-2 of which the War Department was not informed. [19] An examination of the Top Secret Report of the Board indicates that it is mainly a collection of conclusions by the Board which cite as a basis references to Top Secret transcripts and exhibits. These references in turn indicate that the testimony given by the witnesses consists largely of their conclusions or evaluations of certain intercepts. The testimony of some of these witnesses is undefined and inconclusive. Moreover, the quantum of the information thus received by the War Department and not sent to Short has been magnified out of all proportions to its reasonable evaluation as each message was received from day to day. This is all the more apparent when fundamental military concepts are borne in mind as to the responsibilities of the commander of the Hawaiian Department. The Board considered that the most damning indictment of the War Department was that it has possession of information which indicated war at a time certain (Top Secret Rep., p. 3) and that this information was exclusively in the possession of the War Department and did not go to Short. (Top Secret Rep., p. 4) The basis for this conclusion by the Board, however, is that the War Department was advised that the Japanese in London, Washington, and elsewhere were burning their consular records, and destroying their codes and confidential papers. (Top Secret Rep., p. 4) But Short's G-2, Colonel Fielder, and his Asst. G-2, Colonel Bicknell, had information before 7 December that the Japanese Consulate in Honolulu was likewise destroying its codes and burning its secret papers, which information in the opinion of Colonel Bicknell meant war. (Tr., Fielder 2985-2986; Bicknell 1413-1417) Furthermore, Colonel Fielder testified that he believed the source of his information was the War Department. (Tr., Fielder 2986) It must be presumed that Short was informed of his own G- 2's information. Colonel Bicknell testified definitely that he told Short's staff he had such information and that to him this meant war. (Tr. Bicknell 1413-1414) Colonel Phillips, Short's Chief of Staff, testified Short was given this information. (Tr., Phillips 1242-1243) Moreover, the Navy at Hawaii had received information of the burning of codes by Japanese Consular agents in London and Washington (Tr., Bloch 1512-1513) which information, according to Short's G-2 would come to him in the natural course. (Top Secret Tr., Bratton D. 292-293) The principal information of the character above described is contained in Top Secret Exhibit "B", a series of forty-seven intercepted radiograms principally between Washington and Tokyo and the so-called "Winds" message. In order to compare the information Washington had and what it sent Short it is necessary briefly to recite the contents of these various messages: Page 245 24 September, translated 9 October. Tokyo to Honolulu. Requesting reports on vessels in Pearl Harbor and dividing Pearl Harbor into various subdivisions for that purpose. 14 October, translated 16 October. Ambassador Nomura, Washington to Tokyo. Giving interview with Rear Admiral Turner; Turner suggesting Japan abandon her obligations under the Three-Power Alliance and gradually withdraw Jap troops from China. [20] 16 October, translated presumably 17 October. Toyoda, Foreign Minister, Tokyo to Washington. Stating war between Germany and U. S. might result in Japan joining, fulfilling its obligations under Three- Power agreement. At the same time, Japan wished to make a success of the Japanese-American negotiations, hence Japan was warning the U. S. of the above. 22 October, translated 23 October. Nomura, Washington to Tokyo. Advises Tokyo of his lack of success in negotiations and asks to be relieved. 5 November, translated 5 November. Tokyo to Washington, of utmost secrecy. Setting 25 November as deadline for signing agreement and urging renewed effort. 14 November, translated 26 November. Tokyo to Hongkong. Stating that should U. S.-Jap negotiations collapse Japan will destroy British and American power in China. 15 November, translated 3 December. Foreign Minister Togo to Honolulu stating: "As relations between Japan and the United States are most critical, make your "ships in harbor report" irregular, but at a rate of twice a week." 16 November, translated 17 November. Tokyo to Washington. Referring to impossibility to change deadline of 25 November and to press negotiations with the U. S. 18 November, translated 6 December. Kita, Honolulu to Tokyo. Bringing Tokyo up to date as to warships in Pearl Harbor and giving course of eight destroyers entering harbor. 19 November, translated 20 November. Tokyo to Washington. Advises to present "the proposal" and that "if the U. S. consent to this cannot be secured, the negotiations will have to be broken off. 19 November, translated 26 November. Tokyo to Washington. Giving three code words to be added at end of Jap intelligence broadcasts if Jap-U. S.-Russian-British relations should become dangerous. 22 November, translated 22 November. Tokyo to Washington. Extends time for signing agreement from 25 November to 29 November. Latter is absolute deadline. "After that things are automatically going to happen." 26 November translated 28 November. Ambassador Nomura and Kurusu to Tokyo. Advising hardly any possibility of U. S. considering the "proposal" in toto, that if situation remains tense as it is negotiations will inevitably be ruptured, if indeed they may not already be called so. "Our failure and humiliation are complete." Suggest that rupture of present negotiations does not necessarily mean war between Japan and U. S. but would be followed by U. S. and English military occupations of Netherlands Indies, which would make war inevitable. 26 November, translated 26 November. Tokyo to Washington. Stating "the situation is momentarily becoming more tense and tele- Page 246 grams take too long." Contains code for future telephone conversations. 26 November, translated 26 November. Conversation between Kurusu and Yamamoto, Kurusu stating U. S. will not yield, that he could make no progress. 26 November, translated 29 November. Nomura to Tokyo. Stating great danger responsibility for rupture of negotiations will be cast upon Japan and suggesting plan to avoid this. 28 November, translated 28 November. Tokyo to Washington. Stating that in spite of Ambassadors super-human efforts, U. S. has "presented a humiliating proposal and Japan cannot use it as basis for negotiations"; therefore answer will be sent Ambassadors in two or three days after which negotiations will be de facto ruptured. Ambassadors are told not to give impression negotiations are broken off. 29 November, translated 5 December. Tokyo to Honolulu. "We have been receiving reports from you on ship movements, but in the future will you also report even when there are no movements." 29 November, translated 30 November. Tokyo to Washington. Instructing Ambassadors to make one more attempt and giving line of approach. 30 November, translated 1 December. Tokyo to Berlin. Advising Japan's adherence to Tri-Partite Alliance and that U. S. on 26th made insulting proposal, in effect demanding Japan not give assistance to Germany and Italy in accordance with alliance. "This clause alone, let alone others, makes it impossible to find any basis in the American proposal for negotiations" and that United States in collusion with the allied nations "has decided to regard Japan, along with Germany and Italy, as an enemy." [22] 30 November, translated 1 December. Tokyo to Berlin. Stating negotiations with Washington "now stand ruptured broken" and to give Hitler and Ribbentrop a summary of the developments; that England and the United States have taken a provocative attitude, were planning to move forces into East Asia which would require counter measures by Japan, that there was extreme danger that war might suddenly break out and that "the time of the breaking out of this war may come quicker than anyone dreams." This message was to be sent to Rome and to be held "in the most absolute secrecy." 30 November, translated 30 November. Telephone conversation between Kurusu, Washington, and Yamamoto. Discussion as to stretching out negotiations and effect of return of President Roosevelt. 1 December, translated 5 December. Tokyo to London. Directing destruction of code machine and to confirm this by cable. 1 December, translated 1 December. Tokyo to Washington. Date set in deadline message has gone by. To prevent U. S. becoming unduly suspicious press has been advised negotiations are continuing. States note will not be presented to U. S. Ambassador in Tokyo as suggested but in Washington only. 1 December, translated 1 December. Tokyo to Washington. Advising when faced with necessity of destroying codes to use chemicals on hand for that purpose. 1 December, translated 4 December. Washington to Tokyo. Advising continuation of negotiations and meeting leaders, if not top leaders those lower down. Page 247 1 December, translated 4 December. Tokyo to Hsinking. Advising that it was Jap policy to have Manchuria participate in war and that British and American Consular rights would not be recognized. 2 December, translated 3 December. Washington to Tokyo. Reciting conversation between Jap Ambassadors and Under Secretary Welles wherein Japs complain against pyramiding U. S. economic pressure upon Japan and expressing doubt as to whether Japan could consider again proposals of 26th. Japan convinced U. S. would like to bring about a speedy settlement which fact Foreign Office should consider in making reply to new American proposals. 2 December, translated 3 December. Tokyo to Washington. (Strictly Secret) Destroy all codes except one, destroy one code machine unit and destroy all secret documents. [23] 3 December, translated 5 December. Washington to Tokyo. Stating that in event of occupation of Thailand joint military action by Great Britain and U. S. with or without declaration of war was a certainty. 4 December, translated 5 December. Berlin to Tokyo asking for certain members of London staff in event Jap Embassy in London was evacuated. 6 December, translated 6 December. Washington to Tokyo. Reports destruction of codes and states that since negotiations are still continuing request delay in destruction of one code machine. 6 December, translated 6 December. Tokyo to Washington. Gives advance notice of memorandum for. U. S. to be sent in fourteen parts and to prepare to present it when directed. 6 December, translated 7 December. Washington to Tokyo, urgent. Stating that in addition to negotiating with Hull Japs had worked with other Cabinet Members some of whom had dined with President and advised against Jap-American war. 7 December, translated 7 December. Tokyo to Washington, extremely urgent. Advising that after deciphering fourteenth part of final memorandum, Japan to U. S., to destroy at once remaining cipher machine and all machine codes, also all secret documents. 7 December, translated 7 December. Budapest to Tokyo stating: "On the 6th, the American Minister presented to the Government of this country a British Government communique to the effect that a state of war would break out on the 7th." The final message, outside the "Winds" message which will be noticed in detail later was the diplomatic note of the Japanese Government to the United States Government sent from Tokyo to Washington 6 December 1941 in fourteen parts, thirteen of which arrived and were translated on 6 December and the fourteenth part the morning of 7 December. (Top Secret Ex. "B"; Tr., Safford C. 154) The Japanese note in general is a review of the Japanese-American negotiations and the Japanese position, complaining in effect of an insult and breaking off the negotiations. A radio from Tokyo to Washington 7 December, translated the same day, marked "urgent, very important," instructs the Ambassador to present this note to the United States at 1:00 p. m., 7 December. (Top Secret Ex. "B") [24] The Winds Message: The Federal Communications Commission, around 20 November 1941, intercepted a message from Tokyo to Japanese diplomatic repre- Page 248 sentatives to the effect that "in case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations)" a warning message would be given in the middle and the end of the Japanese daily short-wave news broadcasts as follows: (1) In case of a Japan-U. S. relations in danger: HIGASHI NO KAZEAME (EAST WIND RAIN) (2) Japan-U.S.S.R. relations: KITANOKAZE KUMORI (NORTH WIND CLOUDY) (3) Japan-British relations: NISHINO KAZE HARE (WEST WIND CLEAR) When this signal was heard, all codes and papers were to be destroyed. (Exhibit "B", 19 Nov., S.I.S. 25432; Tr., Marshall A. 35; Sadtler D. 250; Safford C. 125-126) A radio from Tokyo to Washington, dated 19 November and translated 26 November, was to the same effect. (Top Secret Ex. "B", S.I.S. 25432) The Army, Navy, and Federal Communications intercept stations immediately commenced a close watch for the second or implementing "Winds" message. On 5 December, Admiral Noyes, Chief of Navy Communications. Phoned Colonel Sadtler, in charge of Army codes and ciphers, saying, "The message is in." Asked which one it was, Admiral Noyes stated he did not know but believed it meant war between Japan and Great Britain. (Tr., Sadtler D. 251) Sadtler immediately went to General Miles, A. C. of S., G-2, where he was joined by Colonel Bratton of G-2. Discussing Admiral Noyes' uncertainty as to which message it was, General Miles stated: "Do you think you can verify that word? This may be a false alarm." Colonel Bratton telephoned Admiral Noyes, who was on his way to a meeting and had no time to discuss the matter except to say that he could not verify it at that time but would telephone later. Sadtler returned to General Miles, who told him to keep on the lookout. (Tr., Sadtler D. 252-253) Colonel Sadtler then advised General Gerow of the message and suggested that the various overseas stations including Hawaii should be notified. General Gerow replied "I think they have had plenty of notification," and the matter dropped. Sadtler then informed Colonel (now Lieutenant General) Bedell Smith, Secretary of the General Staff, of the message and that he had talked to G-2 and War Plans, and Colonel Smith did not wish to discuss it further. (Tr., Sadtler D. 253-254) It will be noted from the above that the activating or second "Winds" message apparently indicated a breach in diplomatic relations with Great Britain. Colonel Sadtler testified he told General Miles and Colonel Bratton that Admiral Noyes was positive that it did not indicate a breach in Japanese-American relations. (Tr., Sadtler D.252) According to [25] Colonel Bratton no one in G-2 ever received a message of this latter character. (Tr., Bratton B. 59, 66-67; see also Marshall A. 36- 38) The present record fails to show whether Colonel Sadtler or Colonel Bratton ever ascertained the exact meaning of the Navy activating "Winds" message. Colonel Sadtler apparently made no further inquiry of Admiral Noyes nor did the Board examine him further on the subject. On this general subject there is the testimony of General Marshall who stated: "I find that no officer of the Navy advised General Miles or Colonel Bratton that any message implementing the 'Winds' code (indicating with whom relations Page 249 would be ruptured) had been received by the Navy." (Tr., Marshall A. 38- 39) It seems clear that no Japanese message using the "Winds" Code was intercepted by the FCC or by the Army Signal Corps until after Pearl Harbor. (Tr., Marshall A. 37) Colonel Sadtler testified that he discussed with General Miles and Colonel Bratton the Navy activating "Winds" message, indicating to him, war with Great Britain (Tr., Sadtler D. 251-2a2) Apparently, therefore, the source of the activating or second "Winds" message was the Navy. The Navy story as to the "Winds" message is as follows: Captain Safford, head of the Navy Communications Security Division, stated that on 4 December the activating "Winds" message came in and was sent to him in teletype. Lieutenant Commander Kramer, the senior language officer, wrote on the bottom of it, "War with England, War with America, Peace with Russia." The message was different in wording from what had been expected but, according to Captain Safford, its meaning was clear. It was given immediately to Admiral Noyes. (Tr., Safford C. 131-132) According to Captain Safford two copies were sent to the War Department. (Tr., Safford C. 133) Colonel Gibson of War Department G-2 testified that there is no record that G-2 of the War Department or the Army Signal Intelligence ever received any implementing message from the Navy. (Tr. Gibson D. 273) Neither the original nor copies of the message can now be found in the files of either the War or Navy Departments according to Captain Safford. The message was distributed to various high officials of the Navy Department and copies were sent to the State Department and White House. (Tr. Safford C. 133, 136 138, 172) The proof that it got to the White House seems to be that this was routine distribution (Tr., Safford C. 136-138) the same is true as to its getting to the Secretary of State. (Tr., Safford C. 138) Captain Safford also testified that the Navy had roughly around sixty intercepted Japanese messages pertaining to this period which were in the possession of the Navy Court of Inquiry. (Tr. Safford C. 139-140, 152) Whether these include the forty-seven messages submitted in evidence by Colonel Bratton (Top Secret Ex. "B") is not known as they do not appear in the present record. Captain Safford testified that Commander Kramer told him in 1943 that when he submitted S.I.S. 25850, the message to the Jap Ambassadors to present the Japanese reply at 1:00 p. m., to Secretary Knox, he sent a note along with it saying in effect, "This means a sunrise attack on Pearl Harbor today and possibly a midnight attack on Manila." (Tr., Safford C. 167) [28] Captain Safford testified that coupling the "Winds" activating message with the messages instructing destruction of codes and secret papers, he became worried and telephoned Commander McCollum and asked him whether Naval Intelligence was doing anything to get a warning out to the Pacific Fleet. McCollum said they were and as a result McCollum finally succeeded in having sent a message to the Pacific naval commanders, including the Commandant of the 14th Naval District, Honolulu, to the effect that the Japanese had been instructed to destroy their codes. (Tr., Safford C. 182-184) Safford stated he also arranged for four additional messages o be sent out to various naval attaches in the Far East advising destruction of our own secret papers. (Tr., Safford C. 184-185) This message was sent 4 December. A message to the same effect was also Page 250 sent to Guam, (Tr., Safford C. 186-187) with an information copy to the Commandant of the 14th Naval District in Honolulu. (Tr., Safford C. 187) An additional message was sent to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, covering destruction of papers on Wake Island. (Tr., Safford C. 188-190) One of the members of the Board, General Russell, had in his possession a statement, unidentified as to source, but which he says "reached the Naval authorities and which it is alleged was sent over to the War Department." (Tr., Russell A. 30) This statement apparently was the testimony given by Captain Safford which was contained in a volume of the examination of various witnesses conducted by Admiral Thomas C. Hart, during April to June 1944, in accordance with directions of the Secretary of the Navy. (Tr., Safford C. 120, 123, 145, 152, 168) Examining General Marshall from this document, General Russell stated: "This same naval source from which I have been quoting stated that: " "On the 4th of December 1941 Commander McCollum drafted a long warning message to the Commanders-in-Chief of the Asiatic and Pacific Fleets summarizing significant events up to that date quoting the Winds Message and ending with the positive warning that war was imminent." "Now, this is on the 4th day of December: " "Admiral Wilkinson approved this message" "which I shall talk about in a minute more definitely " "and discussed it with Admiral Noyes in my presence. I was given the message to read after Admiral Noyes read it and saw it about three p. m. Washington time on December 4, 1941. Admiral Wilkinson asked, 'What do you thing [sic] of the message?' Admiral Noyes replied 'I think it is an insult to the intelligence of the Commander-in-Chief.' Admiral Wilkinson stated 'I do not agree with you. Admiral Kimmel is a very busy man,' and so forth. (Tr. Russell A. 33-34)" [27] Colonel Gibson referred to the above incident, stating that "Admiral Noyes said they had been alerted enough" and disapproved sending it. (Tr., Gibson D. 276-277) Colonel Bratton testified that on receipt of the 2 December message translated 4 December, from Tokyo to Washington, ordering destruction of codes and code machines, he took a copy of this message to General Miles and General Gerow and discussed it with them at some length. Bratton advocated sending further warnings or alerts to our overseas commanders. General Gerow felt what sufficient warning had already been given. General Miles felt that he could not go over General Gerow's decision. Bratton, however, continued to feel uneasy about the matter and went over to the Navy Department where he had a conference with Commander McCollum who felt as he did that further warnings should be sent out. McCollum stated that Commander Rochefort in Honolulu had gotten the first "Winds" message and was listening for the implementing message. He suggested that as a way out of their difficulty a wire be sent to the Army G-2 in Hawaii to see Rochefort at once. (Tr., Bratton D. 283-284) Bratton stated he managed to get General Miles to OK this message which was sent 5 December to Short's G-2 and read as follows: "Commander Rochefort, who can be located through the 14th Naval District has some information on Japanese broadcasts in which weather reports are mentioned that you must obtain. Contact him at once." (Tr., Bratton D. 283)" Page 251 In addition to the "Winds" message, the sheaf of forty-seven intercepts, Top Secret Exhibit "B", contains a somewhat similar message from Tokyo, dated 19 November 1941, reading as follows: "When diplomatic relations are becoming dangerous we will add the following at the beginning and end of our general intelligence broadcasts: (1) If it is Japan U. S. relations "HIGASHI" (2) Japan Russia relations "KITA" (3) Japan British relations; (including Thai, Malay, and NEI) 'NISHI' (Top Secret Ex. "B", S. I. S. 25392)" There is a conflict as to the meaning of the "Winds" message, namely, as to whether it meant war or only a breach of diplomatic relations. (Tr., [28] Bratton B. 60-71; Safford C. 126-130; Sadtler D. 250; See also Top Secret Ex. "B", S. I. S. 25392 and 25432, both 19 November 1941) This conflict is not significant, however, as it was common knowledge that Japan might begin war prior to terminating diplomatic relations. Even Short realized this. (Tr., Short 456-457; see also Stimson 4051) There is no clear showing in the record as to what higher officers in the War Department got either the original "Winds" message, in whatever version, or the activating message, or got the brief message of 19 November as to the single code word to be inserted in the intelligence broadcasts when diplomatic relations became dangerous. (Top Secret Ex. "B", S. I. S. 25392) Colonel Bratton, apparently testifying from Top Secret Exhibit B", a sheaf of forty-seven messages, stated: "All the information that we had was presented in one form or another to the policy making and planning agencies of the Government. * * * The officials to whom I refer include the President, the Secretary of State the Secretary of War, the Chief of Staff, and the Chief of the War Plans Division (Tr., Bratton D. 297)" Assuming this refers to the 47 intercepts, there is no testimony that any one of these specifically got to the various officials mentioned, or if so, when. Nor, assuming some or all of these intercepts got to these officials, is there any showing of the form in which they received them. Such general testimony as that of Colonel Bratton's, above quoted relying, as it apparently does, entirely on a practice, without specific recollection of specific occasions cannot be regarded is fairly bringing home to any of the individuals concerned knowledge of any specific intercept. This is certainly so where the record contains a specific denial, such as in the case of General Marshall, of any recollection of having seen some of these documents. (Tr., Marshall A 30-31, 33-40, 209- 211) Discussion of Foregoing Information: It is obvious that these Top Secret intercepts show a gradual deterioration in Japanese-American relations and the probability of war. Short, however, was specifically advised of the possibility of the outbreak of hostilities at any time and in this respect these intercepts are merely cumulative. Some of them, however, are very pointed; for example, the radio of 24 September, translated 9 October from Tokyo to Honolulu requesting reports on vessels in Pearl Harbor and dividing Pearl Harbor into subdivisions for that purpose; the radio of 15 November, translated 3 December, from Togo to Honolulu requesting that the "ships in harbor" [29] report be made Page 252 twice a week in view of the critical Jap-U. S. relations; the radio of 18 November, translated 6 December from Honolulu to Tokyo, bringing Tokyo up to date as to war ships in Pearl Harbor and giving the course of eight destroyers entering the harbor; the radio of 24 November, translated 5 December, from Tokyo to Honolulu, asking for a "ships in harbor" report even when there were no movements. The above appear to point to some specific action against Pearl Harbor. However, this inference is in the light of after-events; at that time these radios, to an unimaginative person, were consistent with routine Japanese effort to keep themselves advised as to our naval strength in the Pacific or possible sabotage attacks on ships in Pearl Harbor by native Jap fishing boats. Similarly, the radio of 5 November, translated the same day, from Tokyo to Washington, setting 25 November as the deadline for signing the agreement; the radio of 16 November, translated 17 November, reiterating the impossibility of changing the deadline; the radio of 22 November, translated the same day, extending the deadline from 25 November to 29 November, and stating "after that things are automatically going to happen" indicate in the light of information we now have, but which was not available prior to the attack, that steps were being taken for an early attack. But at that time these dates had no such significance. As General Marshall testified, November 29 came and passed and nothing happened. (Tr., Marshall A. 4-5) As to the "Winds" message, according to War Department witnesses this meant war between Japan and Great Britain, not war with the United States. The most significant messages were the radios of 1 December, translated the same day; 2 December, translated 3 December, 5 December, translated 6 December, directing the destruction of codes, code machines and secret papers. There is also the reference to destroying codes in the "Winds" message. These messages, to Colonel Bratton, meant war. But General Short had already been warned that war was imminent and hostilities might commence at any moment. Whether, had General Short received these messages, he would have altered his view that there was no threat from without is problematical. One message clearly suggested an attack on Pearl Harbor, namely the radio of 2 December from Tokyo to Honolulu, inquiring as to the war ships there, whether there were barrage balloons above Pearl Harbor, and whether the war ships there were provided with antimine nets. But this message was not received until 23 December and not translated until 30 December 1941. (Top Secret Ex. "13", S. I. S. 27065) It is a fair conclusion from the testimony that the Navy interpretation of the "Winds" message was that it meant war with the United States. Also, there is the testimony of Captain Safford that Commander Kramer told him in 1943 that when he handed Secretary Knox S. I. S. 25850 instructing the Jap Ambassadors to present the Japanese reply at 1:00 p. m., he sent along a [30] note stating "This means a sunrise attack on Pearl Harbor today." (Tr., Safford C. 167) Action upon this information if believed credible, was a Navy responsibility. There is no testimony it was communicated to the War Department. The most that can be said relative to the Top Secret information available in Washington is that a keener and more incisive analysis Page 253 by the intelligence sections of either service of the over-all picture presented by these intercepts, along the line of Commander Kramer's deductions (Tr., Safford C. 167), might have led to an anticipation of the possibility, at least, of an attack on Pearl Harbor at or about the time it actually occurred. The danger in attempting to make such an estimate is, however, the fact that unconsciously we do so in the light of after-occurring events and read into each message a significance which was not obvious at the time of receipt. It must also be borne in mind that substantially all the definite information received is to Jap naval movements pointed to activity in the Philippines or in Southeast Asia. As to whether if Short had gotten the Top Secret information above referred to he would have made a different estimate of the situation and placed in operation a different alert, we are in the realm of conjecture. The fact that Short regarded as unimportant the information he got on 3 December 1941 that the Japanese Consuls in Honolulu were destroying their codes and secret papers (which meant war to Short's Asst. G-2) is very significant in postulating what Short would have done if he had gotten all the information he complains he did not get. As I have previously stated, while there was more information in Washington than Short had, Short had enough information to indicate to any responsible commander that there was an outside threat against which he should make preparations. To the same effect was he testimony of General Marshall (Tr., Marshall A. 14-15), General Gerow (Tr., Gerow 4300, Sadtler D. 253; Bratton D. 283), General Bedell Smith (Tr., Sadtler D. 253), General Miles (Tr., Miles 127-128, 128-129; Sadtler D. 253-254; Bratton D. 283), Admiral Stark (Tr., Marshall A. 7-8, 14; Bratton B. 78), and Admiral Noyes (Tr., Gibson D. 276-277; Russell A. 34). This was the opinion of the Roberts Board. (Roberts Rep., pp. 18- 21) Comments on Short's Defenses: The fundamental fact to bear in mind and from which there can be no escape is that Short was the sole responsible Army commander charged with the mission of defending Pearl Harbor. Knowing as he did that there were threats both from within and from without and that the most dangerous form of attack which he could expect as a surprise air attack, he cannot now [31] be heard to say at he was led into becoming sabotage- minded to the exclusion of all else by War Department messages stressing sabotage. It is obvious at General Marshall's radio of 27 November was not intended to change the official War Department estimate, solidly imbedded in elaborate war plans and stressed continuously from Short's assumption of command 7 February 1941 into the fall of 1941, that a surprise r attack was a primary threat. It is equally obvious that Short's reply to General Marshall's radio of 27 November did not amount to communication by Short to the War Department that he had arrived at a new and entirely different estimate of the situation which included a surprise air attack as a then present basic threat. As to Short's defense that he was not given sufficient information, or, as held by the Board, that the information which he had was "incomplete and confusing" (though the Board held it sufficient), it is clear that the information given Short continually stressed the pos Page 254 sible outbreak of war which necessarily implied a threat from with out. But, as seen, Short's Alert No. 1 expressly excluded the idea of a threat from without. Unless it can be said that Short would have interpreted the Top Secret intercepts as indicating a specific attack on Pearl Harbor, an unreasonable assumption, they merely stress the inevitability of war. But this would not necessarily have led Short to establish Alert No. 3, bearing in mind the Navy view that there was no chance of an air attack on Pearl Harbor and Short's claim that in any event he could rely upon the Navy for warning in ample time of the whereabouts of the Jap fleet. Short's defense that Alert No. 3 would have interfered with training and that Alert No. 3 would have disclosed his intent and alarmed the civilian population, is refuted by the statement in General Marshall's radio to him of 27 November that the policy of avoiding the first overt act should not be construed as restricting him to a course of action that might jeopardize his defense. But they are also answered by the fact that Alert No. 2, at least, would not have disclosed his intent or alarmed the civilian population. It should be borne in mind that Short's problem was two-fold, both to guard against an outside attack and at the same time to do so without alarming the civil population. This should not have been beyond the capabilities of an experienced Commander. I am of the opinion therefore that the Board's conclusion (Rep. 300) that Short failed in his duties (a) to place his command in a state of readiness for war, in the face of a war warning, appears justified except in so far as it holds the information which Short had was incomplete and confusing. I likewise agree that the Board's conclusion (b) that Short failed in his duties in not reaching an agreement with the naval authorities in Hawaii for joint Army and Navy action under the various plans, is supported by the record. I also concur in the opinion of the Board (c) that Short failed in his duties in not informing himself of the effectiveness of the long-distance reconnaissance being conducted by the Navy. [32] The question whether Short's failure in the performance of these various duties constituted a neglect of duty in the sense of an offense under military law, will be discussed later. In my opinion Short's various failures were not so much the result of a neglect of duty as of serious errors of judgment. His first error of judgment was in the erroneous estimate of the situation which he made and which led him to the conclusion that the Japanese would not attack Pearl Harbor from the air. His second error was in failing to realize that it was his duty to be on the alert against even what might appear to him as the highly improbable. I believe, however, that these mistakes were honest ones, not the result of any conscious fault, and, having in mind all the circumstances, do not constitute a criminal neglect of duty. Board's Conclusion (d) as to Short's Failure to Replace Inefficient Staff Officers: The Board found that Short failed in his duty to replace inefficient staff officers. (Rep. 300) This conclusion is related to the statement in the body of the Report that "Phillips was recognized by the staff as without force and far too weak for a position of such importance." (Rep 72) Page 255 A careful reading of the transcript citations upon which the Board relies for its findings as to Colonel Phillips shows that certain witnesses were asked as to their *opinion* of Phillips as Chief of Staff. Their replies varied from complete reluctance to answer (Tr., Donegan 1946) to positive expressions that the Colonel was unqualified. (Tr., Throckmorton 1408-1409) General Burgin considered Phillips "one of General Short's fair-haired boys," high-handed, not prone to confer with subordinates, not "extremely efficient, or otherwise the average, run- of-the-mine." (Tr., Burgin 2625-2626) General Hayes, the preceding Chief of Staff, very mildly stated that Phillips had a G-3 trend, and that he did not "feel that he had worked himself into the position of Chief of Staff by the time of the Pearl Harbor attack." (Tr., Hayes 265) Colonel Pratt merely added that he considered that Hayes had been a stronger Chief of Staff. (Tr., Pratt 1977-1978) These scattered opinions, unsupported by a factual examination of Phillips' training, experience, and activities can hardly be thought to support the blanket conclusion of the Board about Short's staff. The Board adds, however, that Phillips' own testimony "as to his conception of his duty and what he did and failed to do in aiding Short to competent decisions in critical situations, is sufficient evidence of the matter." (Rep. 74) The testimony cited by the Board to support this findings is that Phillips and Short considered the inevitable interference with training which would occur if Alerts 2 or 3 were ordered, that all phases of the situation were discussed, the danger of a Jap landing, of an air attack, [33] what Phillips considered to be his duties as Chief of Staff, how Short ordered Alert No. 1 without a "specific recommendation" from Colonel Phillips, and a general discussion of activities in the Department after 27 November. (Tr., Phillips 1134-1144) It is established, of course, that Phillips was inexperienced as Chief of Staff, as he had not been appointed until 5 November, 1941, (Tr., Phillips 1108) and that Short did not treat Phillips as Chief of Staff, for example, in not having him present at important Navy conferences. (Rep. 74) But there is no substantial evidence that Phillips was inefficient to a degree that would require his removal by Short, or that Short's failure to remove Phillips was in any way proximate or concurrent cause of the Pearl Harbor disaster. The most that can be said is that there were indications that Short selected a man not fully qualified as Chief of Staff. These indications were not fully investigated by the Board, either as to their accuracy or as to their possible contribution to the disaster on 7 December 1941. Aside from the above as to Colonel Phillips, there is no testimony in the record as to the efficiency or inefficiency of Short's G-1, G-3. or G4. Short's G-2, Colonel Fielder, testified at length but there is no substantial testimony either from his own lips or from other witnesses from which the Board could hold Colonel Fielder inefficient. The worst that can be said against Fielder is that he failed to realize the importance of the Dr. Mori message and the fact that Japanese consuls were destroying their codes and burning their papers. However, this viewpoint was shared by Short who was as fully informed as Fielder about these matters. The Board also stated that Page 256 "While the various assistant Chiefs of Staff testified that harmony existed, the results are more important in their conclusive effect that there was a lack requisite harmony and teamwork and it was quite evident to the Board that their testimony was colored by their very evident loyalty to General Short. (Rep. 74)" The only testimony on this score was the testimony of Colonel Throckmorton, Short's G-1 at the time of the attack, who testified there was complete harmony when General Hayes was Chief of Staff and that "such disharmony as existed under Phillips I do not think was of a serious enough nature to have affected what happened on December 7." (Tr., Throckmorton 1409) There is, therefore, no substantial testimony as to any significant disharmony among Short's staff. It follows from the above that the Board's conclusion (Rep. 300) that Short failed in his duty to replace inefficient staff officers is not justified. [34] Board's Conclusions as to General Marshall: The Board concludes that General Marshall failed in his relations with the Hawaiian Department in the following particulars: "(a) To keep the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department fully advised of the growing tenseness of the Japanese situation which indicated an increasing necessity for better preparation for war of which information he ad an abundance and Short had little. "(b) To send additional instructions to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department on November 28 1941 when evidently he failed to realize the import of General Short's reply of November 27th which indicated clearly that General Short had misunderstood and misconstrued the message of November 27 (472) and had not adequately alerted his command for war. "(c) To get to General Short on the evening of December 6th and the early morning of December 7th the critical information indicating an almost immediate break with Japan though there was ample time to have accomplished this. "(d) To investigate and determine the state of readiness of the Hawaiian Command between November 27 and December 7 1941, despite the impending threat of war. (Rep. 298-299)" Adequacy of General Marshall's 27 November Warning Message: The Chief of Staff testified that the message of 27 November signed "Marshall" should be regarded as containing all the information concerning the Japanese and the instructions necessary for General Short to accomplish his mission. (Tr., Marshall A. 14, 15; C. 197) The Board's statement that General Marshall failed "to keep the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department fully advised of the growing tenseness of the Japanese situation" (Rep. 298) over-looks the fact that the 27 November message signed "Marshall" pictured the Japanese-United States situation accurately as it appeared from the information available to the War Department at that time and up until 7 December. The negotiations between the Japanese representatives in the United States and our State Department actually continued up to 7 December, and various intercepts suggest the possibility that they may have been conducted by the envoys in good faith and with evident hope of a peaceful settlement. [35] Thus, on 29 November Tokyo radioed its representative in Washington to make one more attempt at settlement along certain lines and "in carrying out this instruction, please be careful that this does not lead to anything like a breaking off of negotiations." (Top Secret Ex. "B") Page 257 Mr. Kurusu, in talking to Tokyo on 30 November, spoke to Tojo's drastic statement, and urged that unless greater caution was exercised the Japanese negotiators would be in a difficult position. Further, he stated they Were doing their best and that negotiations were to continue. (Top Secret Ex. "B") On 1 December Tokyo radioed its representatives in Washington suggesting a possible approach for making some progress in negotiations. (Top Secret Ex. "B") On 2 December a radio intercept from Washington to Tokyo stated: "Judging from my interview with Secretary of State Hull on the 1st and my considerations of today, it is clear that the United States, too, is anxious to peacefully conclude the current difficult situation. I am convinced that they would like to bring about a speedy settlement. Therefore, please bear well in mind this fact in your considerations of our reply to the new American proposals and to my separate wire #1233. (Top Secret Ex "B")" On 5 December a Japanese radio to Tokyo requested approval to delay destruction of one code machine as Japanese negotiations were still continuing. (Top Secret Ex. "B") Former Ambassador Grew said with regard to the alleged inevitability of war: "* * * If the whole problem had lain with the military authorities, I would have said without question that war was inevitable, but there were times when I believed the Japanese government was doing its best to prevent war for the reason that it realized much better than the military people did what might be the result of war. * * * Now the question at that time was whether they would be successful or not, and, as I say, I was not in a position to answer that question definitely and finally prior to the outbreak of war. (Tr., Grew 4213-4214 )" When asked when it became evident that war with Japan was inevitable, Mr. Grew replied: "[36] I could not put my finger on any particular date, General. My own position, there, was that I was going to fight up to the last possible minute to prevent war; and I did everything in my power to prevent it; and, not being defeatist by nature, I was unwilling to admit that war was inevitable