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JOINT COMMITTEE EXHIBIT NO. 147

PART I OF PEARL HARBOR INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED BY COLONEL CARTER W. CLARKE, 
PURSUANT TO ORAL INSTRUCTIONS OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF, U. S. ARMY

TESTIMONY AND FINDINGS CONCERNING HANDLING OF CERTAIN TOP SECRET DOCUMENTS

Top Secret

MIS/DC/CWC/EWG/dc 74195

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff

20 SEPTEMBER 1944

Subject: Investigation regarding the manner in which certain Top Secret 
communications were handled. 

The report of the investigation regarding the manner in which certain Top 
Secret communications were handled is attached hereto as Tab. A. Briefly 
summarized, the findings disclose the following: 

a. That between 1 October 1941 and the attack on Pearl Harbor the Secretary of 
State, Chief of Staff, the Secretary of War, the Chief of War Plans Division 
and the A. C. of S., G-2 each received identical copies of the daily Magic 
material that had been screened out by Col. Bratton, and each received a copy 
of all of the Top Secret documents that are exhibits in this investigation. 

b. During the same period the Navy Department was furnishing similar material 
to the President through the President's naval aide. 

c. On 28 November 1941 the so-called "Winds Code" was decoded. This code 
provided for the warning of Japanese embassies and consulates throughout the 
world in a voice broadcast that relations between Japan and the United States, 
Japan and Russia or Japan and Great Britain, as the case might be, were to be 
severed and that when this word was received all code papers were to be 
destroyed. Arrangements were immediately made both by the Army Signal Corps 
and, through the Army Signal Corps, with Federal Communications Commission for 
listening for a message that would implement this code. However, prior to 
Pearl Harbor neither the F. C. C. nor the Army Signal Corps intercepted an 
implementing message. 

d. Thirteen of the fourteen parts of Tokyo's reply to the American counter 
proposals were received by the War Department in the evening of 6 December and 
were delivered to the Department of State late that evening. The fourteenth 
section, which was the concluding section of the Japanese reply, and a message 
from Tokyo to the Japanese 



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ambassadors in Washington instructing that this reply be presented to the 
Secretary of State at one p. m., Washington time, were received in the War 
Department before 0900 E. S. T., 7 December 1941. As soon as possible 
thereafter Gen. Marshall, Gen. Gerow, Gen. Miles, Col. Bratton and Col. Bundy 
met in Gen. Marshall's office at the War Department and at that time Gen. 
Marshall decided to send a further warning message to the commanders in the 
Pacific area. This information was conveyed by Gen. Marshall to Adm. Stark, 
who concurred therein and asked that the Navy commanders be informed of the 
Army message. This message was filed in the War Department Message Center at 
1200 noon E. S. T., received R. C. A. Honolulu 33 minutes later but not 
delivered to the Hawaiian Department until 7 hours and 25 minutes after its 
receipt by R. C. A. Honolulu. 

Clayton Bissell,
Major General,
A. C. of S., G-2

Enclosures: 

Tab. A. 

MIS/DC/EWG/dc 74195
20 September 1944

Memorandum for the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2: 

Subject: Investigation regarding the manner in which certain Top Secret 
communications were handled.

1. The undersigned was appointed by the A. C. of S., G-2 to conduct an 
investigation regarding the manner in which certain Top Secret communications 
were handled. Under authority of a letter of 9 September 1944 (AGPO-M-B 333.5 
(7 Sep 44)) from The Adjutant General, which read as follows: 

"It is desired that you designate officers of your Division to conduct an 
investigation and interrogations, in accordance with the oral instructions 
issued to you by the Chief of Staff regarding the manner in which certain Top 
Secret communications were handled. 

"The officers designated to conduct this investigation will be authorized to 
administer oaths for this purpose."

The investigation was conducted on 14, 15 and 16 September, in Room 2C637 of 
the Pentagon Building. Testimony under oath was taken of Major General Sherman 
Miles, Acting A. C. of S., G-2 during the year 1941; Brigadier General Hayes 
A. Kroner, Chief of the Intelligence Branch of the Military Intelligence 
Division during the last half of 1941; Colonel Rufus Bratton, Chief of the Far 
Eastern Section of the Military Intelligence Division during the latter half 
of 1941; Colonel John T. Bissell, head of the Counter Intelligence Branch of 
the Military Intelligence Division during the latter part of 1941; Colonel O. 
K Sadtler, Chief of the Army Communications Service during the latter part of 
1941; and Mr. William F. Friedman, principal cryptanalyst of the Signal 
Intelligence Service during the latter part of 1941. Documentary evidence in 
the nature of copies of 38 Top Secret decoded Japanese messages passing 
between the Tokyo Government and various Japanese embassies in many parts of 
the world in October, November and early December, 1941 were also introduced 
into evidence. 



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[8] 2. There were also introduced into evidence memoranda for the Chief of 
Staff in the nature of Estimates of the Situation which were made by the then 
Acting A. C. of S., G-2 the latter part 0f November and early December, 1941, 
all of them immediately prior to Pearl Harbor day; the findings of fact of the 
Roberts Report of January 1942; a telegram to the G-2, Hawaiian Department of 
5 December 1941, signed Miles; a telegram signed Brink received in the War 
Department 6 December 1941 at 1629 E. S. T.; a memorandum of 6 December 1941 
signed Perry regarding Jap Washington Embassy burning code books the night of 
5 December; telegram from Melbourne, Australia from Merlesmith received in the 
War Department 7 December at 1950 E. S. T.; M, I. D. form containing 
information received from the Orient dated 3 November 1941 containing 
information purporting to have come from a Mr. Hirota; report of Headquarters, 
Third Corps Area, dated 18 December 1941 entitled "Report of Rumors Concerning 
Japanese Attack on Hawaii"; secret radiogram dated 7 July 1941 to the 
Commanding Generals, the Caribbean Defense Command, Philippine Department, 
Hawaiian Department and Fourth Army; radio message dated 27 October 1941 from 
Manila, signed Brink; radiogram dated 29 October 1941 from Manila signed 
Evans; copies of 5 radiograms sent from Tokyo to MILID between 12 July and 27 
July 1941; and the following messages flowing between Commanding General, 
Hawaii and the War Department: 27 November 1941 Chief of Staff to Commanding 
General, Hawaii; 27 November 1941 G-2 War Department to G-2 Hawaii; 27 
November 1941 Commanding General, Hawaii to Chief of Staff; 28 November 1941 
The Adjutant General to Commanding General, Hawaii; 29 November 1941 
Commanding General, Hawaii to The Adjutant General; 7 December, Chief of Staff 
to Commanding General, Hawaii et al. 

3. All the testimony taken was stenographically reported and transcribed. 

4. All the testimony and evidence received have been considered and as a 
result of this consideration I find the following facts: 

a. That between 1 October and the afternoon of 7 December 1941 there were at 
least 37 coded massages that were flowing between the Tokyo Government and 
their embassies in various parts of the world which were intercepted by the 
Signal Intelligence Service and were decoded. In addition there was at least 
one copy of a telephone conversation between the Tokyo Government and the 
Japanese Embassy in Washington. These intercepted and decoded messages were 
Top Secret material that was designated as "Magic" in the latter part of 1941. 
(Ex. #1, Bratton, p. 10. Sadtler, p. 1.) 

b. At all times between 1 October 1941 and the time of the attack on Pearl 
Harbor on 7 December 1941, the Top Secret material that is involved in this 
investigation was handled as follows (Bratton p. 24; Miles p._): 

It was delivered daily by the Signal Intelligence Service by hand of an 
officer to the office of Colonel Rufus Bratton who was then Chief of the Far 
Eastern Section of the Intelligence Branch of M. I. D. Col. Bratton then read 
all of the material, screening out that which had intelligence value. The 
other material he then burned. The screened material was then arranged by Col. 
Bratton in separate piles, one for 



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the Chief of Staff, one for the Secretary of War, one for the A. C. of 
S., G-2, one for the Chief, War Plans Division and one for the Secretary of 
State. Col. Bratton then bound each pile in a cardboard folder, inserted the 
folder in the proper leather dispatch case, locked each dispatch case and 
delivered it to the proper office, collecting at that 
time the bags containing the previous day's output. These bags were brought by 
Col. Bratton back to his office, opened and the material therein checked prior 
to destruction by burning.

c. Between 1 October 1941 and the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor the 
Secretary of State, the Chief of Staff, the Secretary of War, the Chief of War 
Plans Division and the A. C. of S., G-2 each received identical copies of the 
daily Magic material that had been screened out by Col. Bratton, and each 
received a copy of each of the 38 Top Secret documents that are exhibits in 
this investigation. In addition, for a short time immediately prior to Pearl 
Harbor and for a short time thereafter, Gen. McNair, Commanding General of the 
Army Ground Forces, also received daily copies of this Top Secret material. 
(Bratton p. 7, 24, 25; Miles p._)

d. During this identical period the Navy Department was furnishing similar 
material to various officers in the Navy Department and to the President 
through the President's naval aide. (Bratton, p. 4- Miles p._)

e. From time to time during this period the Chief of Staff questioned Col. 
Bratton as to his evaluation of certain of the Top Secret reports that are 
exhibits in this investigation. (Bratton p. 5 and 12)

f. That on 28 November 1941 Top Secret Army message No. 25432 was decoded. The 
decoding of this message read as follows (Ex. #2)

"From Tokyo
"To Washington.
"19 November 1941

"Regarding the broadcast of a special message in an emergency.

"In case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations) and the 
cutting off of international communications, the following warning will be 
added in the middle of the daily Japanese language short wave news broadcast:

"(1) In case of a Japan-U. S. relations in danger:
     HIGASHI NO KAZEAME (EAST WIND RAIN)
 (2) Japan-U. S. S. R. relations:
     KITANOKAZE KUMORI (NORTH WIND CLOUDY)
 (3) Japan-British relations:
     NISHI NO KAZE HARE (WEST WIND CLEAR)

"This signal will be given in the middle and at the end as a weather forecast 
and each sentence will be repeated twice. When this is heard, please destroy 
all code papers, etc. This is as yet to be a completely Secret arrangement.

"Forward as urgent intelligence."

On 28 November 1941 Col. Bratton made arrangements for listening for Japanese 
broadcasts that might include this code. These arrangements were made through 
Col. Sadtler, then in the office of the Chief Signal Officer, who put Col. 
Bratton in touch with a Mr. G. E. Sterling, then Chief of the National Defense 
Operations Section of the Federal Communications Commission. The F. C. C. did 
thereafter monitor Japanese broadcasts for the purpose of determining a if



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the Japanese sent a message using the "Winds" code. I am unable to find that a 
Japanese message using the "Winds" code was intercepted by the F. C. C. or the 
Army Signal Corps until after Pearl Harbor. (Bratton p. 10, 11; Miles p. _; 
Sadtler, p. 2; Friedman, p. 7; Ex. #3) 

I find that on 5 December 1941, Col. Sadtler was informed by Adm. Noyes, Naval 
Communications Officer, that a Japanese message using the "Winds" code had 
been intercepted the previous night, and that the message, decoded, meant that 
Japanese-Great Britain relations were to be broken; that on 5 December 1941 
Col. Sadtler so informed Gen Miles, Col. Bratton, Gen. Gerow, Col. Gaily and 
Gen. Bedell Smith, then Secretary of the General Staff, but that Gen. Miles or 
Col. Bratton never informed Gen. Marshall personally of the Sadtler 
information. I do find, however, that Col. Bratton prior to this time had been 
informed by the Navy that Commander Rochefort of the 14th Naval [5] District 
knew all that our own Navy Department knew about the "Winds Code" message and 
that on 5 December he caused the following message to be sent the Commanding 
General, Hawaiian Department (Sadtler p. 2, 3,; Bratton p. 17, 18; Miles p._: 
Ex. #4): 

"CONTACT COMMANDER ROCHEFORT IMMEDIATELY THRU COMMANDANT FOURTEEN NAVAL 
DISTRICT REGARDING BROADCASTS FROM TOKIO [sic] REFERENCE WEATHER."

I further find that Gen. Miles and Col. Bratton were on 5 December 1941 and 
had been for some time prior thereto, expecting a break in Jap-Great Britain 
relations. I further find that no officer of the Navy ever advised Gen. Miles 
or Col. Bratton that any message implementing the Winds Code had been received 
by the Navy. I und that if in fact such a message was intercepted, it was not 
intercepted by the Army Signal Corps or F. C. C. (Bratton p. 11, 12,13, 
Roundtable; Miles p._). 

g. I find that 13 of the 14 sections of the Japanese reply, Top Secret Army 
No. 25843 were received by the evening of 6 December and one copy of that part 
of the Japanese reply was delivered by Col. Bratton to the watch officer on 
duty at the Department of State late in the evening of 6 December, with 
instructions to see that the document was delivered to the Secretary of State 
immediately. (Bratton p. 17; Miles p._, Ex. #5) 

h. I find that between 0830 and 0900 E. S. T. 7 December 1941 Col. Bratton was 
at his office in the War Department and at that time received copies of 
section 14 of the Japanese reply, Top Secret Army No. 25843, and also received 
copies of Tokyo's instructions to deliver the reply at 1:00 p. m. 7 December 
1941. Top Secret Army No. 25850; that Col. Bratton then immediately attempted 
to contact the Chief of Staff and the Chief, War Plans Division at their 
offices in the War Department but these officers were not in their offices at 
that time; that Col. Bratton then telephoned Gen. Marshall's quarters and was 
informed that Gen. Marshall had gone horseback riding; that Col. Bratton 
requested Gen. Marshall's orderly to go out and find him at once and to ask 
Gen. Marshall to call Col. Bratton on the telephone as soon as practicable as 
Col. Bratton had an important message to



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deliver to him; that Col. Bratton then called Gen. Miles, reporting what steps 
he, Col. Bratton, had taken and recommending that Gen. Miles come to the 
office at once; that either Gen. Miles or Col. Bratton thereafter called Gen. 
Gerow, then Chief of War Plans Division; that sometime between 1000 and 1100 
E. S. T. Col. Bratton received a telephone call from Gen. Marshall and then 
informed Gen. Marshall that [6] he, Col. Bratton, had a message of extreme 
importance which Gen. Marshall should see at once and advised Gen. Marshall 
that Col. Bratton would bring the message to Gen. Marshall's quarters if Gen. 
Marshall so desired; that Gen. Marshall instructed Col. Bratton to report to 
Gen. Marshall in Gen. Marshall's office in the War Department as the General 
was on his way there; that Col. Bratton reported to Gen. Marshall in Gen. 
Marshall's office in the War Department at about 1125 E. S. T., which was 
shortly after Gen. Marshall's arrival; that shortly thereafter Gen. Miles 
arrived; that the message, Top Secret Army No. 25850, instructing the Japanese 
ambassadors to present Japanese reply, Top Secret Army No. 25843, to the 
Department of State at 1300 E. S. T. that afternoon was laid before Gen. 
Marshall and discussed; that the Chief of Staff then had on his desk the 
lengthy Japanese reply, Top Secret Army No. 25843, which he read aloud to 
those officers present; that the Chief of Staff asked all officers present for 
an expression of opinion as to the meaning or significance of the message, Top 
Secret Army No. 25850; that Gen. Miles and Col. Bratton both stated that they 
believed there was important significance in the time of the delivery of the 
reply, namely 1:00 p. m., that this was an indication that some military 
action would be undertaken by the Japanese at that time, that they thought it 
probable that the Japanese line of action would be into Thailand but that it 
might be into any one or more of a number of other areas; that Gen. Miles 
urged that the Philippines, Hawaii, Panama and the West Coast be informed 
immediately that the Japanese reply would be delivered at one o'clock that 
afternoon, Washington time, and that the commanders in the areas, indicated 
should be on the alert; that Gen. Marshall then called Adm. Stark on the 
telephone and told Adm. Stark over the telephone that he thought the Army 
should send out a warning substantially as Gen. Miles urged; that after Adm. 
Stark replied Gen. Marshall put down the telephone and stated that Adm. Stark 
did not think any further warning necessary since all the forces had been 
several times alerted; that Gen. Miles and Col. Bratton nevertheless continued 
to urge Gen. Marshall to send the warning; that Gen. Marshall then wrote out 
in pencil the warning message and there was some discussion at this particular 
time as to whether or not the Philippines should be included; that Gen. 
Marshall again got Adm. Stark on the telephone and read to Adm. Stark the 
message he, Gen. Marshall, had just written; that Adm. Stark apparently 
concurred and asked that the naval forces be also informed and Gen. Marshall 
added a request to that effect at the bottom of his penciled [7] warning that 
about this time Gen. Gerow and Col. Bundy arrived and Gen. Marshall again 
asked each officer present, in succession beginning with Gen Miles, their 
opinion as to the significance of the Japanese message, Army Top Secret No. 
25850; that Gen. Miles said he thought it probably meant an attack on Thailand 
but that the timing had some significance and that warning messages to our 
people should be sent; that 



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Gen. Gerow, Col. Bundy and Col. Bratton concurred; that Gen. Marshall then 
gave Col. Bratton the message in Gen. Marshall's handwriting and instructed 
Col. Bratton to take it immediately to the Message Center for transmittal; 
that as Col. Bratton was about to leave there was some discussion as to 
whether the penciled message should go to Gen. Gerow's office for typing first 
but it was decided that as time was an important factor Col. Bratton should 
take it in its draft form to the Message Center; that as Col. Bratton left the 
room Gen. Gerow made a statement to the effect that if there was any question 
of priority involved to give first priority to the Philippines; that Col. 
Bratton took the message to Col. French, a Signal Corps officer then in charge 
of the Message Center, explained to Col. French that it was Gen. Marshall's 
desire that the message be transmitted to the addressees by the fastest 
possible safe means, giving the Philippines first priority; that Col. French 
then said he would give it his personal attention and that processing of the 
message would commence immediately; that Col. Bratton then returned to the 
office of the Chief of Staff and Gen. Marshall then directed Col. Bratton to 
find out how long it would take for the delivery of the message to the 
addressees; that Col. Bratton returned to the Message Center, talked the 
matter over with Col. French, who informed Col. Bratton that the message would 
be encoded in about three minutes, on the air in about eight minutes, and in 
the hands of the addressees in about thirty minutes; that it was then 1150 E. 
S. T.; that Col. Bratton returned to the Chief of Staff's office and so 
reported to him. (Bratton p. 14, 15, 16, 17 and 23; Miles p._, Ex. #6, Ex. #7)

i. I find that the log of the warning message sent by the Chief of Staff to 
the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, is as follows (Ex. #8):

                                                E. S. T.   Honolulu time
Filed War Department Message Center ........... 12:00 noon  6:30 AM
Sent Western Union ............................ 12:17 PM    6:47 AM
Received RCA Honolulu .........................  ----       7:33 AM
Delivered to Signal Officer, Honolulu .........  ----      11:45 AM
Delivered to AGO, Hawaiian Department .........  ----       2:58 PM

CARTER W. CLARKE,
Colonel, General Staff Corps,
Deputy Chief, Military Intelligence Service. 

TESTIMONY OF COLONEL JOHN T. BISSELL

[1] Place: Room 2C637 Pentagon Building, Washington, D. C.

Date: 14 September 1944.
Time: 1310-1330. 
Present: Colonel Carter W. Clarke. 
         Colonel John T. Bissell. 
         Lt. Col. E. W. Gibson. 

Colonel John T. Bissell, having been sworn and warned of his rights by Colonel 
Carter W. Clarke, gave the following testimony: 

Col. CLARKE. State your name, rank, organization and station please. 



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Col. BISSELL. John T. Bissell, Colonel, Field Artillery, Headquarters 89th 
Division Artillery, Camp Butner, North Carolina. 

Col. CLARKE. On what date did you become a member of G-2 Division, War 
Department General Staff?

Col. BISSELL. I believe it was on the 25th day of May 1940.

Col. CLARKE. What were your duties at that time? 

Col. BISSELL. I was assigned to the Counter Intelligence Group of the Military 
Intelligence Division.

Col. CLARKE. In what position? 

Col. BISSELL. I was Executive Officer of that Group. 

Col. CLARKE. How long did you remain on those duties? 

Col. BISSELL. I remained as Executive Officer until, I think July 1, 1941, 
when I became the senior member of that Group. 

Col. CLARKE. As Chief of the Counter Intelligence Group of M. I. D., what were 
your principal duties?

Col. BISSELL. The principal duties that I had were the collection, evaluation 
and dissemination of counter intelligence information. 

Col. CLARKE. Would it be correct to state that your principal duties then 
dealt with what we might call domestic intelligence rather than any foreign 
intelligence?

Col. BISSELL. That is correct

[2] Col. CLARKE. Did you focus your attention on any particular enemy or 
potential enemy? 

Col. BISSELL. Yes, on the Germans and Japanese. 

Col. CLARKE. By that I mean their agents in this country. 

Col. BISSELL. Yes, and in our possessions.

Col. CLARKE. Were Honolulu and the Philippines included?

Col. BISSELL. They were. 

Col. CLARKE. What was your chief source of information with regard to the 
Japanese prior to Pearl Harbor? 

Col. BISSELL. At that time it was from reports we got from the Philippines and 
the F. B. I., principally.

Col. CLARKE. Did you have any knowledge of or access to any material which was 
known as Magic or Ultra during that period prior Pearl Harbor? 

Col. BISSELL. Prior to Pearl Harbor I did not. 

Col. CLARKE. Did you know of its existence?

Col. BISSELL. I did. 

Col. CLARKE. But you had no knowledge of the contents of any the material 
produced?

Col. BISSELL. I never read any of it in the raw. I did receive summaries 
pertaining to Japanese agents in this country. 

Col. CLARKE. Did you ever discuss the contents of it with either A. C. of S., 
G-2 or the Chief of the Intelligence Group?

Col. BISSELL. I don't recall that I ever did.

Col. CLARKE. Did you ever discuss the Japanese situation with the Chief of the 
Far Eastern Branch of the Intelligence Group? 

Col. BISSELL. Only on one or two occasions prior to Pearl Harbor. 

[3] Col. CLARKE. Did you receive any information from F. B. I. at any time 
which would indicate that they had knowledge of any of this material or access 
to it?

Col. BISSELL. No. Of course I did receive reports on the activities of 
Japanese agents and attaches in the United States, but that was 



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obtained by following those individuals, not from any translated codes. 

Col. CLARKE. Did any of this information come from wire tapping sources, to 
your knowledge?

Col. BISSELL. I don't believe so.

Col. CLARKE. In what form did you make available to the A. C. of S., G-2 and 
to the Chief of Staff such information that you did receive?

Col. BISSELL. As I recall it, we prepared in the Group daily a short 
memorandum if there was anything of any value.

Col. CLARKE. Was that sent to the Chief of Staff or just to the A. C. of S., 
G-2?

Col. BISSELL. It went to G-2. I am not absolutely certain in my own mind at 
that time whether I had that system in operation or not, but when I left here 
I had it going.

Col. CLARKE. Then you had no channels of contact with either the Chief of 
Staff or the Chief of the War Plans Division except through the person of the 
A. C. of S., G-2? 

Col. BISSELL. That is correct.

Col. CLARKE. Did you ever receive from F. B. I. any information which would 
lead you to believe that there was a possibility of any attack by the Japanese 
on the U. S. or any of its possessions prior to Pearl Harbor?

Col. BISSELL. No.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did it ever come to your knowledge that certain Japanese 
consulates were destroying codes and burning secret documents early in 
December 1941?

Col. BISSELL. Yes I knew that.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did you know it at the time?

[4] Col. BISSELL. Yes I knew it at the time.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. That was before Pearl Harbor?

Col. BISSELL. It was, I believe, the day of Pearl Harbor that the codes were 
destroyed. They were burned in the Japanese Embassy here in Washington. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did you know of any other places they were burning codes?

Col. BISSELL. No

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did you ever hear or know, prior to Pearl Harbor, that the 
Navy Department sent a message to the Commander-Chief of the Pacific Fleet on 
December 3, 1941 stating that it was believed certain Japanese consulates were 
destroying their codes and burning secret documents? 

Col. BISSELL. I did not know that.

Col. CLARKE. Did you ever initiate any warning message to the corps areas or 
department commanders with respect to sabotage prior Pearl Harbor?

Col. BISSELL. Yes I did.

Col. CLARKE. What did you base that on?

Col. BISSELL. I based that upon a directive that I got from the A. C. of S., 
G-2. 

Col. CLARKE. In other words, you wrote the message at his direction. 

Col. BISSELL I did, and took it to him for correction and editing.

Col. CLARKE Then you did not initiate it? 



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Col. BISSELL. I executed it and carried it out. It was initiated b the A. C. 
of S., G-2. 

Col. CLARKE. Did you know of any message which was initiated by the Chief of 
the Army Air Forces to the same effect? 

Col. BISSELL. No I did not. 

Col. CLARKE. Will you state briefly what your actions and activities were on 
December 7. 

Col. BISSELL. On that particular date I was at my house in Washington [5] and 
happened to be listening to the radio in the afternoon. I heard the 
commentator discuss the attack on Pearl Harbor. I went to the office 
immediately and was there until some time that evening. 

Col. CLARKE. Did you have any knowledge of any warning message which was sent 
to the commanders on the morning of December 7? 

Col. BISSELL. At that time, no. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Were you ever alerted to be watching for a Jap message in 
code that might be given during a news broadcast? 

Col. BISSELL. No. I knew about it after December 7th but not a the time. 

TESTIMONY 0F RUFUS S. BRATTON

PART I

[1] Place: Room 2C637 Pentagon Building, Washington, D. C 
Date: 14 September 1944. 
Time: 1045-1200. 

Present: Colonel Rufus S. Bratton.
         Colonel Carter W. Clarke.
         Lt. Col. E. W. Gibson. 

Colonel Rufus S. Bratton, having been sworn and warned of his rights by 
Colonel Carter W. Clarke, gave the following sworn testimony: 

Col. CLARKE. Will you state your name, rank, organization and station please. 

Col. BRATTON. Rufus S. Bratton, O-3726. Headquarters, Commandant, Headquarters 
3rd U. S. Army ETO. 

Col. CLARKE. When were you first assigned to duty in the G_2 section of the 
War Department General Staff? 

Col. BRATTON. In the fall of 1936. 

Col. CLARKE. And you continued in that duty until when? 

Col. BRATTON. I continued on duty in one capacity or another in G-2 until the 
fall of 1943.

Col. CLARKE. From the time you arrived here until Pearl Harbor on December 7, 
1941 what were your duties? 

Col. BRATTON. I was at first assistant to the Chief of the Far Eastern Section 
of the Intelligence Branch and later succeeded him to that office. 

Col. CLARKE. Who was that? Mason? 

Col. BRATTON. Col. Homer Slaughter. I later succeeded him to that office as 
Chief of the Far Eastern Section. At that time my immediate superior was Col. 
Faye Brabson. He was later succeeded by Col. Charles Mason; he in turn by Col. 
Hayes Kroner. Upon



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the latter's designation as Chief of M. I. S. I became Chief of the 
Intelligence Branch. I think that is accurate. 

Col. CLARKE. Was one of your duties both as the Assistant and as Chief of the 
Far Eastern Section, the handling of this so-called Magic or Ultra material? 

[2] Col. BRATTON. That is correct. When I first arrived in G-2 a copy of the 
day's output was placed on my desk for such information and action as was 
necessary or advisable. At that time the production of Magic was on a very 
limited scale and it was a combined product of naval communications, I 
believe, and the Army SIS. As we progressed in solving various codes and 
ciphers the quantity and quality of this material naturally improved and it 
became quite voluminous, and its study and evaluation occupied a large part of 
my time as Chief of the Far Eastern Section. 

Col. CLARKE. Will you state how this material was handled from the time it was 
received from the Signal Corps, who saw it besides yourself, and what 
selections were made to go to your immediate chief, also to the A. C. of S., 
G-2 and to the Chief of Staff. 

Col. BRATTON. Initially this material reached me through the Chief of the 
Operations & Training Branch of G-2. Later on this office was eliminated as a 
transmitter of this material and I dealt directly with the SIS and their 
counterpart in Navy communications. The material in later years was broken 
down as to source or type of code by the Army and Navy so that the Army worked 
on one type and the Navy on another. Normally the material was collected and 
coordinated by the Army SIS before it was presented to me. Occasionally, in 
matters of great interest or importance, an officer of the Navy could bring me 
a message direct, to save time.

Col. CLARKE. How many copies of this did you receive of each message? 

Col. BRATTON. Initially I received no copy of any message. I simply received a 
statement showing that a message had been sent from one diplomatic post to 
another diplomatic post on such and such a date, followed by a brief summary 
of its contents. Later on, to further develop this very valuable source of 
intelligence, arrangements were made whereby I received exact copies of the 
decoded or deciphered message. 

Col. CLARKE. Do you remember about what date that was, sir? 

Col. BRATTON. We started this latter practice, to the best of my knowledge and 
belief, early in 1941 or late in 1940. It then became my duty to see that the 
proper officials of the War Department had access to the intelligence 
contained in these decoded and deciphered messages. This entailed so much 
traveling around on my part from one office to another that it was a waste of 
time. So at the direction of the Chief [3] of Staff, transmitted to me through 
the A. C. of S., G-2. I started the system of having copies made_my office 
having a very limited number of officers_and instituted a check stem whereby 
all copies were returned to me for destruction. This subsequently proved 
impracticable because of lack of clerical help and other assistance in the Far 
Eastern Section, and arrangements were made with the SIS and their counterpart 
in naval communications to have some six copies of each decoded or deciphered 
message delivered to me daily for study and evaluation. By this time the 
volume of 





Page 12

this work had increased tremendously. Many of the messages were purely 
administrative in character and were of no interest from a intelligence point 
of view. They were all gone over carefully, however, to make sure that I 
missed no item which would be of intelligence value. Those that had no 
intelligence value I destroyed by burning. The others were variously 
processed. 

Col. CLARKE. Were you assigned the duty of selecting the material that went to 
the A. C. of S., G-2 and to the Chief of Staff and Secretary of War?

Col. BRATTON. I was.

Col. CLARKE. By whom?

Col. BRATTON. By the A. C. of S., G_2. 

Col. CLARKE. Then you personally made the selection of what part of this 
material he saw and the Chief of Staff saw?

Col. BRATTON. Yes, they both saw the same material. 

Col. CLARKE. In other words, if you decided that a message was of sufficient 
importance to be seen by the A. C. of S., G-2, it was also of sufficient 
importance to be seen by the Chief of Staff and Secretary of War. Is that 
correct? 

Col. BRATTON. Not always, but the reverse was always true. If the message was 
important enough to be seen by the Chief of Staff and Secretary of War, I of 
course saw to it that the A. C. of S., G-2 saw the same message so that he 
could talk to the Chief of Staff intelligently about it.

Col. CLARKE. Did anyone else in G-2 see this material besides you and the A. 
C. of S., G-2? 

[4] Col. BRATTON. Initially no, but as the volume increased it became 
necessary for me to have assistance in handling it, and with the knowledge and 
consent of the A. C. of S., G-2, certain trusted clerical help and certain of 
my officer assistants helped me in handling it. 

Col. CLARKE. Who made the selection of the material that went to the State 
Department? 

Col. BRATTON. Initially there was no agreement on this. Frequently the Navy 
Department would take the same message to the State Department that we thought 
would be of value to them. As it was a duplication of effort we finally came 
to an agreement that the Army would furnish the Secretary of State with 
material thought to be of interest to the State Department and that the Navy 
would serve the President likewise. 

Col. CLARKE. Do you recall about what date that arrangement became effective? 

Col. BRATTON. Not exactly, but it was sometime early in 1941 when a written 
agreement was drawn up between the A. C. of S., G-2 and the Chief of Naval 
Intelligence, a copy of which was placed in the G-2 files. 

[5] Col. CLARKE. Initially you made a selection of what was to go to the State 
Department or the President and the Navy made a similar selection. Is that 
correct?

Col. BRATTON. That is correct. 

Col. CLARKE. When did you start giving all the material produced to the State 
Department and to the President? 

Col. BRATTON. I am quite positive that at no time was all of the material 
given to the President for the simple reason that the bulk



Page 13

of it would have been of no interest or value to him. To the best of my 
knowledge and belief, the State Department was never given all of the material 
when I was responsible for its transmission. In other words, I made the 
selection of what was to go to the Secretary of State and it was left to my 
discretion to determine the material that would be of interest to him. 

Col. CLARKE. In the period from July 1, 1941 up to and including Pearl Harbor, 
did you ever discuss any individual message or group of messages with either 
the A. C. of S., G-2 or the Chief of Staff? 

Col. BRATTON. Oh yes, on innumerable occasions, with both. 

Col. CLARKE. Was the Chief of Staff inclined to take your evaluation on this 
material or did he want to act on it and place his own interpretation on it?

Col. BRATTON. He almost invariably asked me for my interpretation and 
evaluation.

Col. CLARKE. What were your relationships with what was then known as War 
Plans Division? Did you ever discuss this material with the Chief of that 
Division? 

Col. BRATTON. Yes, by direction of the Chief of Staff. They had access in the 
latter stages of this production and dissemination to exactly the same 
material that went to the A. C. of S.. G-2, to the Chief of Staff and to the 
Secretary of War. 

Col. CLARKE. Who in that Division had that besides the Chief, do you recall? 

Col. BRATTON. Initially, at the direction of the Chief of Staff, I took the 
message that I wanted the Chief of the War Plans Division to read, directly to 
him, and when he had read it and after discussing it with him_if there was any 
discussion_removed the message from his desk, took it back to my office and 
destroyed it. Later on the Chief of the War Plans Division insisted that 
certain of his section chiefs should have access to the material also. This 
was approved by the Chief of Staff, and I then made it a practice to deliver 
this material in a padlocked leather case to the Executive officer of WPD, 
obtaining a receipt from him for certain numbered messages. After they had 
been read by the proper officers in WPD they were returned to me either the 
same day, in the locked bag, or on the following day when I delivered that 
day's messages. 

Col. CLARKE. Was there ever prepared in the Far Eastern Section of G-2 any 
summary or evaluation which was based exclusively on the contents of this 
material? 

Col. BRATTON. Yes. 

Col. CLARKE. Do you recall any particular one? 

Col. BRATTON. I don't recall any particular one but in the early stages of 
this work I very frequently submitted to the Chief of Staff, through the A. C. 
of S., G-2, a staff memorandum [6] based upon one or more messages that I had 
received, concealing the source by some agreed upon code word, so that the 
reader would know where I had secured the information which I was evaluating. 
Later on, as this material became of increasing value, the recipients, that is 
the Secretary of War, the Chief of Staff, the A. C. of S., G-2 and the Chief 
of the War Plans Division, deemed it advisable to have access to the raw 
material themselves so that they could arrive at their own independent 
conclusions as to its meaning. This was how the practice developed of 
delivering the raw material to certain officers desig-



Page 14

nated by the Chief of Staff. Frequently, even after this practice was 
instituted, I submitted memoranda to various officers in connection with such 
and such a message, calling their attention to certain implications or trends 
indicated therein. 

Col. CLARKE. From the period November 1,1941, when the tension increased 
between the United States and Japan, was there any special handling of this 
material? 

Col. BRATTON. As the tension between Japan and the United States grew we all 
took much greater precautions in processing and in otherwise handling the 
material. 

Col. CLARKE. Did you have conferences with your opposite numbers in the Navy 
and in the War Plans Division regarding the interpretation and evaluation of 
this material? 

Col. BRATTON. Yes. I had almost daily conferences with my opposite number in 
ONI and with the Chief of the War Plans Division as to the true significance 
of the material under study. I may say at this point that there was complete 
cooperation and collaboration between my opposite number in ONI, Commander 
McCullem [sic], and myself. 

Col. CLARKE. Did you agree on the interpretation of this material? In other 
words, was your evaluation agreed upon? 

Col. BRATTON. We were for the most part in complete agreement in our 
evaluations of the material. Where there were differences of opinion we always 
consulted and came to an understanding as to how we would present these 
opinions to our respective chiefs. In the event of any major difference of 
opinion as to interpretation I always gave the A. C. of S., G-2 a summary of 
the Navy's viewpoint along with my own, and I believe that my opposite number 
in ONI did likewise. 

Col. CLARKE. In the handling of this material, both in evaluation and [7] 
safeguarding and what not, did you deal directly with the A. C. of S., G-2 or 
did you go through the Chief of the Intelligence Group?

Col. BRATTON. Initially I went through the Chief of the Intelligence Group, 
but as tension grew and time became the important factor, a his direction I 
went straight to the A. C. of S., G-2 first and informed the Chief of 
Intelligence Branch afterward of my action and the nature of the information 
that I had transmitted.

Col. CLARKE. To the best of your knowledge and belief, the Chief of Staff was 
kept completely informed of all information and intelligence which was 
available to G-2 from this source. Is that correct?

Col. BRATTON. Completely. 

Col. CLARKE. I wish also to clear this one point up. I understood you to say 
that it was at the direction of the Chief of Staff that this raw material we 
served to him and to the Chief of the War Plans Division. 

Col. BRATTON. That is correct. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Colonel, you used the term "early stages" of this thing_I 
wish we could put an approximate date to "early stages" as you referred to 
early stages. 

Col. BRATTON. Well, by early stages I mean during the years 1936 and 1937 
before the quantity and quality of the material materially increased. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. May I interrupt? Wouldn't you say that your early stages was 
from the time you came in, in 1936, up to the bombing of the Panay?



Page 15

Col. BRATTON. Well I wouldn't extend the early stages to as late a date as the 
bombing of the Panay_earlier than that. 

Col. CLARKE. In other words, you would say from the summer of 1936 to the 
summer of 1937 would be the early stages? 

Col. BRATTON. Let me put it this way. By early stages I mean the period before 
our relations with Japan became strained. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Approximately when was it that the War Plans Division started 
getting this Top Secret material? 

Col. BRATTON. You mean copies of the raw material? 

[8] Lt. Col. GIBSON. Yes. 

Col. BRATTON. I am sorry, sir, I can't answer that definitely. My memory won't 
permit a definite answer. I would say not earlier than the summer of 1941. I 
would like to amplify that, however, with the statement that prior to the 
summer of 1941 various memoranda, written by me or by the A. C. of S., G-2, 
based upon this material were submitted to WPD. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. When these copies went to the State Department or War Plans 
they were not allowed to keep them on file? You went around and got them? 

Col. BRATTON. They were returned to me as soon as the proper officials of the 
State Department and WPD had seen and initialed them. They did not remain in 
the files of either office. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Were they allowed to make copies of this? 

Col. BRATTON. Not by me or any other officer of the War Department that I know 
of. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. You as Chief of the Intelligence Branch or your Chief of the 
Far Eastern Unit knew generally, did you not, that the United States policy in 
the Pacific in 1941 was in conflict with policies of the Japanese Government? 

Col. BRATTON. Of course. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did you ever have any knowledge of a letter from the 
Secretary of the Navy addressed to the Secretary of War on or about 24 January 
1941 wherein the Secretary of War was warned that hostilities might be 
initiated at any time by the Japanese by an attack on Pearl Harbor, or that in 
substance? Did you ever hear of any such letter at that time? 

Col. BRATTON. To the best of my knowledge and belief I have never seen or 
heard of any such letter. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. The Chief of Staff never advised you of the existence of any 
such letter? 

Col. BRATTON. I have no recollection of any such advice. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did you ever attend any of the what were then termed War 
Council meetings? 

Col. BRATTON. No, I did not. 

[9] Lt. Col. GIBSON. In any of your conversations with the Chief of staff did 
he ever discuss anything that went on at any conferences he had with his 
counterpart of the Navy or regarding the Japanese situation? 

Col. BRATTON. Not that I recall. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Were you ever told, or did you know, in the latter art of 
November, of a message sent by the Chief of Naval Operations to Admiral 
Kimmel, which was concurred in by General Marshall, to the effect that we 
might anticipate a surprise and an aggressive Japa-



Page 16

nese attack, or to be prepared for such a thing, or anything of that 
substance? 

Col. BRATTON. Yes, I saw such a message. It was dispatched, to the best of my 
recollection, on or about the 24th of November. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. From the Chief of Naval Operations to Admiral Kimmel? 

Col. BRATTON. That is right. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Was that message brought to the attention of General Miles at 
that time or General Kroner? 

Col. BRATTON. I think so. I have no way of_ 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Do you recall how you acquired your knowledge of the 
existence of such a message? 

Col. BRATTON. I believe that I first learned of the message through my 
opposite number in ONI, the Chief of the Far Eastern Division. I later saw and 
read a copy of the message. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did you know of General Marshall's message of the 27th of 
November to General Short and other commanders in that general area? A warning 
message so-called? 

Col. BRATTON. Yes. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did you receive at any time during the first week of December 
1941 any information either from the Navy or from our own military attaches to 
the effect that Jap consulates were burning documents and codes on or about 
the third of December? 

Col. BRATTON. I can't recall receiving this information from any local source. 
I do remember, however, that in various Japanese messages detailed 
instructions were issued from Tokyo to their consulate and diplomatic 
officials as to the methods to be used by the latter in destroying their [10] 
codes and ciphers when directed to do so. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. The Roberts report states that on December 3 1941 the Navy 
Department sent a message to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet that 
it was believed certain Japanese consulates were destroying their codes and 
burning secret documents. Did you at that time ever know of such a message 
being sent by the Navy? 

Col. BRATTON. No, to the best of my knowledge and belief this is the first 
time I have heard of it. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Were you aware of the bulletin of December 1, 1941 dealing 
with the Japanese naval situation, issued by the Director of Naval 
Intelligence? 

Col. BRATTON. Yes, this looks very familiar. I believe that I had access to 
this or a similar document and used it as the basis of a memorandum for the 
Chief of Staff, the A. C. of S., G-2 and the Chief of WPD to keep them 
informed as to where the Navy thought the bulk of the Japanese naval forces 
were located. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Colonel, I have here a whole series of these Top Secret 
messages, or copies of them rather, and I just want to get in the record 
whether you knew of these at the time. They are Army Nos. 23570, 23631, 23673, 
23859, 24373, 24655, 24656, 24878, 25138, 25344, 25390, 25392, 25432, 25435, 
25441, 25445, 25446, 25496, 25497, 25548, 25554, 25605, 25644, 25659, 25715, 
25725, 25727, 25730, 25731, 25762, 25773, 25783, 25785, 25807, 25817, 25823, 
25843, 25850. Have you seen these communications? 

Col. BRATTON. Yes I have seen all of these communications before. 



Page 17

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Calling your attention to this No. 25432, after you received 
that did you make some arrangements for listening for broadcasts? 

Col. BRATTON. Yes. I did, through Col. Sadtler, then in the office of the 
Chief Signal officer, who put me in touch with an official of the FCC, a Mr. 
Sterling, I believe. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did you ever receive, prior to Pearl Harbor, word from the 
FCC that such a code message had been put out by the Japanese? 

Col. BRATTON. I did not, though I was in daily telephone communication with 
Mr. Sterling or his assistant in connection with this matter. Their 
understanding was that immediately upon [11] receipt of any such message I was 
to be informed by telephone, day or night. They had my office phone number and 
my house phone number. I did get from them on one or two occasions messages 
resembling the Wind Code, but which upon examination proved to be not in that 
code. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did the Navy ever give you any information of any such code 
message being put out? 

Col. BRATTON. No, although I did discuss with them certain code messages that 
had been received which resembled the expected Wind Code messages. 

Col. CLARKE. Did Col. Sadtler ever tell you that it was in? 

Col. BRATTON. I cannot remember that he did. I have a vague recollection of a 
conversation with him about a code message indicating a break in relations 
between Japan and Great Britain. This, however, was beside the point. Such a 
break had been expected by all of us for some time. The code message we were 
waiting for was one indicating a break between Japan and the U. S. It never 
came through that I know of. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did you know of any message being sent by G-2 to the 14th 
Naval District to check up on some such alleged message prior to Pearl Harbor? 

Col. BRATTON. No, I do know, however, that Gen. Miles sent a message to Gen. 
Short, or to Gen. Short's G-2 directing him to get in touch with Commander 
Rochefort of the Navy with respect to this type of message as the Navy was 
completely aware of all the facts in the case. 

Col. CLARKE. Well that message actually went to G-2 in Hawaii. 

Lt. COL. GIBSON. I show you No. 25138 and ask what your evaluation of that 
message was, if you remember. 

Col. BRATTON. My evaluation of this message at the time I read it was that 
Japan intended taking military and/or naval action in the Pacific on or after 
the dates indicated. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. And was that evaluation given by you to Gen. Miles?

Col. BRATTON. I believe so. I remember that during this period Gen. Miles and 
I discussed at some length the meaning or implication of each and all of these 
messages. 

[12] Lt. Col. GIBSON. Was that true also of you and the Chief of Staff?

Col. BRATTON. Not in every case. 



Page 18

Lt Col. GIBSON. Do you recollect whether it was true or not in this particular 
case, referring to No. 25138? 

Col. BRATTON. I don't remember definitely. I am under the impression that I 
discussed this particular message both with Gen. Miles and Gen. Marshall, and 
Gen. Gerow. 

It. Col. GIBSON. Would you say the same is true of message No. 25644? 

Col. BRATTON. No, but I can state that all three of the officers just 
mentioned were given copies of this in the present form. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Also on No. 25390. What interpretation or evaluation did you 
place on that particular message? 

Col. BRATTON. I at this time do not recall the evaluation I gave that message. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. I call your attention also to No. 25554 and 25555. What was 
your interpretation of this message? Particularly I call your attention to the 
last sentence thereof. 

Col. BRATTON. This message, as is indicated in the text thereof, is an effort 
on the part of the Japanese Government to inform their diplomatic 
representative in Germany as to Japanese inability to successfully negotiate a 
pact with the United States and is an expression of the opinion of the 
Japanese Government that the United States was and would be allied with 
England, Australia, the Netherlands an China against Japan. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did you at this time, Colonel, consider it a capability of 
the Japanese to attack Pearl Harbor? 

Col. BRATTON. Yes. Many of us considered and discussed the feasibility of such 
an attack_an attack on our West Coast, an attack on Alaska, an attack on the 
Canal Zone, an attack on Hawaii and other Pacific installations of ours, the 
Dutch or the British governments. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. From a reading of these messages at that time did you come to 
the conclusion that the Japs were about to undertake a attack on some of the 
United States installations?

Col. BRATTON. It was apparent that there was strong likelihood of some such 
attack. It was also apparent that the Japanese immediate major objective would 
be the British and Dutch [13] possessions in the west Pacific. I believed at 
that time that any attack on any American installation would be in the nature 
of a diversion or have for its purpose the prevention of our going to the 
assistance of the Dutch or British. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Had you talked that thought over with Gen. Miles?

Col. BRATTON. I did. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. General Kroner? 

Col. BRATTON. As to Gen. Kroner, my memory is faulty, but I discussed this 
feature on many occasions with Gen. Miles, with Gen. Gerow and with the Chief 
of Staff when asked my opinion in the matter. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did you inform the Chief of Staff that it was a capability of 
the Japs to attack Pearl Harbor?

Col. BRATTON. In various G-2 estimates submitted to the Chief of Staff over a 
period of many months an attack on Hawaii had always been listed as one of the 
Japanese capabilities against us.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. I notice in the estimate dated 29 November 194 that the 
capability of the attack on Pearl Harbor wasn't included. I wonder how that 
happened, if you have any recollection of it?



Page 19

Col. BRATTON. In reply to that I can only say that those of us in the Army who 
were studying this situation always listed, mentally at least, an attack on 
Hawaii as a capability, but in our discussions of the situation with our 
counterparts in the Navy it was always emphasized by the latter that their 
forces in the Pacific were alert and so stationed as to make such a Japanese 
attack impracticable or suicidal, and we therefore relegated such an attack to 
the realm of remote possibility. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. At that time did you feel that there was a fairly reasonable 
probability that Japan was going to attack the United States in the reasonably 
near future, I mean at the last of November or the first of December 1941?

Col. BRATTON. Yes, and I had felt for some time_that is over a period of 
several years_that war between Japan and the United States was inevitable. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Had you so informed Gen. Miles and the Chief of staff [14] 
that you, in the last of November or first of December 1941, felt it was 
probable that the Japs were going to attack the United States in the near 
future? 

Col. BRATTON. Not in that form, but I repeatedly expressed the opinion to my 
superiors that Japan intended to take some form of aggressive action which 
would involve her in a war with us. 

Col. CLARKE. I would like to ask one question here before we get these people 
back. On the morning of December 7 when you got the famous message that they 
were going to deliver their note at one clock, will you recount briefly the 
actions which you took with reference to that message and also the actions of 
Gen. Miles and Gen. Marshall? 

Col. BRATTON. Will you permit me to refer to a memorandum which I made at the 
time for the record?

Col. CLARKE. Sure.

Col. BRATTON. The message in question, that is the deciphered message in 
question, was delivered to me from the Navy sometime between 0830 and 9000 
that morning. It was immediately apparent that it was of such importance that 
it had to be communicated to the Chief of staff, the A. C. of S., G-2 and the 
Chief, WPD with the least practicable delay. Neither of these officers were in 
their offices at that time. I called Gen. Marshall's quarters by telephone and 
was informed that he had gone horseback riding. I requested his orderly to go 
out and find him at once and ask him to call me on the telephone as soon as 
practicable as I had an important message to deliver to him. I then called 
Gen. Miles and reported the step that I had taken to him and recommended that 
he come down to the office at once. I do not remember whether I called Gen. 
Gerow or whether Gen. Miles called him, but we had some discussion as to which 
one of us would do it and I don't remember now which of us did, but in any 
event Gen. Gerow was summoned to the office. I waited for the telephone call 
from Gen. Marshall, which I received some time between ten and eleven. I 
informed him that I had a message of extreme importance which he should see at 
once and told him that I would bring it to his quarters if he so desired. He 
said to report to him in his office as he was on his way there. I reported to 
him in his office at about 1125 immediately upon his rival. Shortly thereafter 
Gen. Miles arrived. The message was laid before Gen. Marshall and discussed. 
We were all asked by the 



Page 20

Chief of Staff for an expression of opinion as to the meaning or significance 
of the message, in connection with [15] the length Japanese ultimatum which 
the Chief of Staff had on his desk and read aloud to us at this time. Gen. 
Miles and I stated that we believed there was important significance in the 
time of the delivery of the reply, one p. m., an indication that some military 
action would undertaken by the Japanese at that time. We thought it probable 
that the Japanese line of action would be into Thailand but that might be into 
any one or more of a number of other areas. Gen. Mil urged that the 
Philippines, Hawaii, Panama and the West Coast informed immediately that the 
Japanese reply would be delivered at one o'clock that afternoon, Washington 
time, and that they, the commanders in the areas indicated, should be on the 
alert. 

PART II

Place: Room 2C637
Pentagon Building, Washington, D. C. 
Date: 15 September 1944. 
Time: 1130-1200 and 1340-1453.
Present: Colonel Rufus S. Bratton. 
         Colonel Carter W. Clarke.
         Lt. Col. E. W. Gibson.

[16] Col. BRATTON. General Marshall then called Adm. Stark on the telephone 
and told him over the phone that he thought we should send out a warning as 
indicated above. After Adm. Stark replied, Gen. Marshall put down the 
telephone and stated that the Admiral did not think any further warning 
necessary since all the forces had already been several times alerted. Gen. 
Miles and I nevertheless urged Gen. Marshall to send the warnings. Gen. 
Marshall then wrote out in pencil the warning message. There was some 
discussion at this time, I believe, as to whether or not the Philippines 
should be included. Gen. Marshall again got Adm. Stark on the telephone and 
read to him the message he had just written out. Adm. Stark apparently 
concurred and asked that the naval forces be also informed. Gen. Mar shall 
added a request to that effect at the bottom of his penciled warning. At about 
this time Gen. Gerow and Col. Bundy arrived. Gen Marshall again asked us, in 
succession beginning with Gen. Miles, our opinion as to the significance of 
the Japanese message. Gen. Miles said he thought it probably meant an attack 
on Thailand but that the timing had some significance and that warning 
messages to our people should be sent. Gen. Gerow, Col. Bundy and I concurred. 
Gen Marshall then gave me the message in his handwriting and instruct me to 
take it immediately to the Message Center for transmittal. As I was about to 
go out of the door there was some discussion as to whether it should go to 
Gen. Gerow's office for typing first, but it was decided that as time was an 
important factor, I was to take it in its draft form to the Message Center. As 
I left the room Gen. Gerow made a statement to the effect that if there was 
any question of priority involved, to give first priority to the Philippines. 
I took the message to Col. French, the Signal Corps officer in charge of the 
Message Center, explained to him that it was Gen. Marshall's desire that the 
message be transmitted to the addressees by the fastest possible safe means, 
giving the Philippines first priority. Col. French said that



Page 21

he would give it his personal attention and processing of the message would 
commence immediately. I then returned to the office of the Chief of Staff. The 
latter directed me to find out how long it would he for the delivery of the 
[17] message to the addressees. I returned to the Message Center and talked 
the matter over with Col. French who informed me that the messages would be 
encoded in about tree minutes, on the air in about eight minutes, and in the 
hands of the addressees in about 30 minutes. I looked at my watch at this time 
and saw that it was 1150 a. m. I returned to the Chief of Staff's office and 
reported to him the information as to speed of delivery that had been given me 
by Col. French. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did this reply from Japan (No. 25843) start coming in on the 
6th of December, do you have any recollection as to that?

Col. BRATTON. I believe that the message started coming in to the Navy on the 
6th. My recollection is that I transmitted a copy to the Secretary of State 
that night. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Had you conferred with Gen. Miles or the Chief of Staff 
previously as to when the Japanese reply might be expected? 

Col. BRATTON. We knew that some such message was coming. We course had no way 
of telling when it would be forthcoming; it might have been a question of 
hours, it might be a question of days. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Calling your attention to message No. 25445, which apparently 
was received by you the 28th or 29th of November, you then had some knowledge 
that a reply might be expected within two or three days from that time. Is 
that correct?

Col. BRATTON. That is correct.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Anyway, the first thing you did when you got the message on 
December 7 was to phone Gen. Marshall?

Col. BRATTON. Yes, I called Gen. Marshall at his quarters.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. I call your attention to the message sent to the G-2 Hawaiian 
Department on 5 December, signed Miles, requesting that Commander Rochefort, 
14th Naval District, be contacted regarding broadcasts from Tokyo reference 
weather. How was it that this telegram happened to be sent?

Col. BRATTON. When we received the Japanese message concerning the code to be 
used in weather broadcasts, I discussed the matter with my opposite number in 
the Navy, Commander McCullom, and his assistant, Lt. Kramer. They informed me 
that Commander Rochefort was their man in Hawaii, that he had [18] all the 
information at that we had and the same intercepts. They stated that he could 
explain in detail to the commanding general or his G-2 the significance of the 
code and suggested that I have our G-2 in Hawaii get in touch with Commander 
Rochefort immediately as a means of saving time. In other words, we could get 
the desired information to the commanding General in Hawaii or his G-2 much 
faster and in much greater detail and with far greater security than by means 
of a long and involved explanatory message which we would have been forced to 
send through the Army communication system. 

Lt Col. GIBSON. I want to refer to this so-called Winds message. Did Col. Otis 
K. Sadtler of the Signal Corps ever, prior to Pearl Harbor, notify you that 
the Japanese had implemented the Wind Code by broadcasting a message in 
accordance with that code?



Page 22

Col. BRATTON. As I have stated before, I cannot remember that he did, although 
I believe he did speak about one indicating a break between Japan and Great 
Britain. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did you know a naval officer by the name of Kramer who at the 
time of early December 1941 was an assistant to Commander McCullom of ONI 
particularly being interested in communications work? 

Col. BRATTON. Yes, I knew him well and was in constant communication with him 
at this time both orally, in person and by telephone. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did Lt. Kramer at this time ever notify you that the Navy had 
been advised by the FCC that a so-called Winds message had been intercepted by 
the FCC monitoring station? 

Col. BRATTON. No. We discussed on one or two occasions messages resembling 
those in the Wind Code but as far as I know no actual Wind Code message ever 
came through prior to Pearl Harbor. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. I show you a copy of a cable sent 27 November to Commanding 
General, Hawaiian Dept., containing instructions of how to act in case 
hostilities between Japan and the United States occur and notifying him that 
negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated. Did you know of such a cable 
being sent?

Col. BRATTON. Not prior to the outbreak of hostilities. However, I have seen a 
copy of the message since that date. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. I show you now paraphrase of a cable dated November 27, [19] 
1941 sent to the G-2's of corps areas, Caribbean Defense Command, Hawaiian 
Department, signed Miles. Did you know of that being sent? 

Col. BRATTON. Yes, I did know of this message and was shown a copy of it on or 
about the date of dispatch. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Prior to Pearl Harbor did you ever see any reply from Gen. 
Short to that message? 

Col. BRATTON. No, prior to Pearl Harbor I have never seen any reply from Gen. 
Short to any of these messages. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did you know of the sending of this message to the Adjutant 
General of November 28 warning your corps area and overseas department 
commanders? 

Col. BRATTON. Yes I knew of this message. I am under the impression that I was 
shown a copy of it on or about the date of its dispatch. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. You had nothing to do with the sending of either that message 
or the other message G-2 sent out of November 27? 

Col. BRATTON. I did not. My recollection is that they were both drafted in the 
office of the A. C. of S., G-2 or that of his executive. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. I now show you a copy of a telegram from Melbourne, Australia 
via Honolulu to the War Department and Commanding General, Hawaiian 
Department, date of sending of the message the 6th, date received December 7, 
7:50 p.m. Do you recall seeing such a message? 

Col. BRATTON. I can make no positive statement in reply to that question. the 
message, however, looks vaguely familiar. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did you have any of the information contained this particular 
message prior to one o'clock the afternoon of 7 December 1941? 

Col. BRATTON. No. 



Page 23

Lt. Col. GIBSON. I show you an MID form, subject: Information received from 
the Orient, dated 3 November 1941, which is information purporting to come 
from a Mr. Hirota, a presiding officer at a directors meeting of the Black 
Dragon Society. I ask if you remember receiving this information approximately 
at that time or shortly before. 

[CO] Col. BRATTON. I do not recall ever having seen this document, nor can I 
recall being advised as to its subject matter. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Information such as that, in the ordinary course of routine 
back in the summer and fall of 1941, would be routed through you as an 
ordinary matter, would it Col. Bratton? 

Col. BRATTON. Yes, if this is a report from the Counter Intelligence Branch, 
which I believe it to be, I received information of this nature from the Chief 
of that Branch as a matter of routine. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. I call your attention to a report of the headquarters, Third 
Corps Area, dated 18 December 1941, subject: Report of Rumors Concerning 
Japanese Attack on Hawaii. This report is signed by Philip L. Thurber, 
Colonel, GSC. First I ask if you have any recollection of this particular 
report. 

Col. BRATTON. I have never seen this document before. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. The document last referred to of Headquarters, Third Corps 
Area, of December 18, 1941, on Rumors Concerning Japanese Attack on Hawaii, 
states in substance that Senator Gillette at Washington warned officials what 
was going to happen, stating to officials that Japan would declare war on the 
United States December l9 and would attack Hawaii. This information was 
alleged to have been conveyed about 3 weeks prior to December 18. Did you ever 
receive such information from Senator Gillette or from any other source? 

Col. BRATTON. I did not. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. I show you copy of a secret radiogram dated 7 July 1941 sent 
to Commanding Generals of the Caribbean Defense Command, Philippine 
Department, Hawaiian Department, Fourth Army, which in substance was an 
estimate of the Jap probable course in the near future, and ask if you are 
familiar with that radiogram. 

Col. BRATTON. I do not recall having seen this message prior to or on the date 
of its dispatch. However from its context I assume that it was based upon an 
estimate prepared either in my office or at my direction by one of my 
assistants as it expresses the views we entertained at that time. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. I show you a copy of a radio message dated Oct. 27, 1941 from 
Manila, P. I. to MILID, signed Brink, relative to movement of Japanese 
shipping in Western Pacific and ask if you saw that message at or about that 
time. 

Col. BRATTON. I can make no positive statement in reply to that question, [21] 
but the message looks familiar to me. I have seen this or one like it 
containing similar information. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. I show you a copy of a radiogram dated October 29, 1941 from 
Manila to MILID, signed Evans, relative to the movement of Jap aircraft 
carriers and other seacraft. I ask if you had knowledge of that message at or 
about that time. 

Col. BRATTON. This message also looks familiar. I would like to say at this 
time that during this period messages of this type came over my desk in 
considerable volume as all of our military attaches, ob-



Page 24

servers and agents were under instructions to assist us in following the 
movements of Japanese naval craft and land forces. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. I show you a copy of a paraphrase of secret message dated 
November 29, 1941, No. 986, from Ft. Shafter to TAG, signed Short, which 
answers secret radiogram No. 4820 of November 28, 1941, and gives other data 
relative to the sabotage situation in Hawaii. I ask if you had ever seen that 
message prior to December 7, 1941. 

Col. BRATTON. No. I have not seen this message before. As the subject matter 
deals largely with counter espionage and counter sabotage measures the message 
would not, in the ordinary course of events have come over my desk but rather 
over the desk of the Chief of the Counter Intelligence Branch. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. I show you now copies of 5 radiograms sent from Tokyo to 
MILID, those of July 12, July 14, July 23, 11:32 p. m. and July 27 being 
signed Creswell, and the one of July 23, 3:21 p. m. being signed Orear. I ask 
if you have recollection of seeing those cablegrams at about that time.

Col. BRATTON. Yes, all of these messages passed over my desk on or about the 
date of their arrival in MID. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Earlier I asked you about a brief periodic estimate of the 
situation December 1, 1941 to March 31, 1942, dated 29 November 1941, for the 
Chief of Staff. I now call your attention to a memorandum for the Chief of 
Staff entitled: Supplementary Brief Period Estimate of the Situation December 
1, 1941-March 31, 1942, dated December 5, 1941. What occasioned issuing a 
supplementary report as soon after the November 29th report, if you recall. 

Col. BRATTON. I do not recall what the occasion was which demanded [22] the 
issuance of this supplementary estimate, but I believe that, as is stated in 
paragraph 1, the supplemental estimate is arranged in a form more suitable for 
the Operations Division for use in planning. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did this supplemental report of December 5 correctly 
represent your evaluation of the Japanese situation at that time? 

Col. BRATTON. It did.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. I show you now copies of memorandums for the Chief of Staff 
of November 25, 26 and 27 dealing with the Far Eastern situation, Japanese 
Naval Task Force and Recent Developments in the Far East, respectively. Those 
reports correctly represent your evaluation of the various situations as 
outlined therein, did they?

Col. BRATTON. They did. I wrote them. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. I also call your attention to an undated memorandum of 
November 1941 for the Assistant Chief of staff, WPD, on the subject of G-2 
Estimate of the Far Eastern Situation (for situation and communication maps) 
with tabs b, c, and d. Did this at that time correctly represent your 
evaluation of the facts? 

Col. BRATTON. It did. I wrote it. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did you actually have any knowledge yourself as of early 
December 1941 of exactly what of our naval forces were Pearl Harbor?

Col. BRATTON. Only in a general way. 



Page 25

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did you know at that time that the Navy, or a substantial 
part of it was tying up for weekends at Pearl Harbor? 

Col. BRATTON. I did not and had I been in possession of that knowledge I would 
have urged, through the A. C. of S., G-2, that immediate action be taken to 
prevent such an assemblage in the Harbor. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. At about this time, the first week of December 1941, had you 
heard from any source that the Fleet was ordered to stay in Pearl Harbor? 

Col. BRATTON No. I was under the impression, gained from conversations [23] 
with my opposite number in ONI that the fleet in Hawaiian waters had been 
alerted and all components were their battle stations. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. I wish to say in asking this question that I don't have any 
knowledge that it had been ordered to stay in harbor; I had heard rumors of 
that, and that is the reason I asked the question.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. At that time, the first week of December 1941, were you under 
the impression that extensive air reconnaissance was being maintained from 
Hawaii?

Col. BRATTON. I was under that impression.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. These estimates of the situation or summaries of the 
situation that I have referred to, do you know what their actual dissemination 
was? 

Col. BRATTON. I believe that in each case you will find at the bottom lower 
left hand corner of the last page a distribution list which indicates to whom 
the carbon copies were routed. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Do you have any recollection on the morning of December 7 at 
what time it was that you received the intercept message which in effect 
instructed the Japanese Ambassador to deliver Tokyo's reply to the Secretary 
of State if possible at one o'clock the afternoon? 

Col. BRATTON. I received a copy of this intercept from the Navy about 9 a. m. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Could you say you received it at about the same time as you 
received the reply itself? 

Col. BRATTON. No. The reply itself was received the day before. It was a very 
long one and took considerable time to decipher and typewrite. It came to me 
as fast as the various sections could be typed. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Col. Bratton, if on or about December 5, or at any time prior 
to an attack on Pearl Harbor you had been informed that the Japanese had 
broadcast a code message which implemented message No. 25432, which was the 
Winds Code message, and had been advised that such message, decoded, in 
substance meant U. S.-Japanese relations are in danger of being ruptured and 
their consulates were to burn their codes, what would have been your 
evaluation and action? 

[24] Col. BRATTON. My evaluation would have been that Japan would immediately 
sever diplomatic relations with the United States and that hostilities against 
our country would ensue forthwith. Had I received such a report I would have 
taken immediate and vigorous action, through the A. C. of S., G-2, to see that 
the proper officials were alerted and warned to be on guard against any and 
all eventualities.



Page 26

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Will you once more describe in detail how this Top Secret 
material was handled between 1 October 1941 and the time of the attack on 
Pearl Harbor. 

Col. BRATTON. It was delivered daily by the Signal Intelligence Service by 
hand of an officer to my office. I read all of the material, screening out 
that which had intelligence value. The other material I then burned. Indeed 
much that was daily brought in to me did not have intelligence value but was 
merely routine and administrative in nature. The screened material was then 
arranged by me in separate piles, one for the Chief of Staff, one for the 
Secretary of War, on for the A. C. of S., G-2, one for the Secretary of State, 
and one for the Chief of War Plans Division. I then bound each pile in a 
cardboard folder, inserted the folder in the proper leather dispatch case, 
locked each dispatch case and delivered it to the proper office, collecting at 
that time the bags containing the previous day's output. These bags were 
brought back by me to my office, opened and the material therein checked prior 
to destruction by burning. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. It is also your recollection that it was shortly before Pearl 
Harbor that copies of this Top Secret material were to go also to Gen. McNair, 
Commanding General of the Army Ground Forces, and it was so delivered to him 
by officer messenger daily for a short time prior to Pearl Harbor and a short 
time after Pearl Harbor. 

Col. BRATTON. That is correct. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. I show you a memorandum dated 6 December signed by James F. 
Perry and ask if you ever had that called to your attention at that time. 

Col. BRATTON. No I have never seen this paper before. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Was any of the information contained in that paper ever 
relayed to you as you recollect at that time? 

[25] COL. BRATTON. Not that I recall. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Were you ever notified by anybody from the Navy that the Navy 
had intercepted a message which was an implementation of the Winds Code prior 
to Pearl Harbor?

Col. BRATTON. No, and by Winds Code I mean that phrase which would indicate a 
rupture of diplomatic relations between Japan and the United States. My 
recollection is that Lt. Kramer and Commander McCullom had received what 
appeared to be garbles of variations of this Winds Codes message on one or two 
occasions, but to the best of my knowledge and belief no clear cut Winds Code 
message was received prior to Pearl Harbor indicating that relations between 
Japan and the United States or Japan and Great Britain or Japan and Russia had 
been or were about to be severed. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did Commander McCullom ever tell you of drafting a warning 
message of several hundred words long warning the commanders in the Pacific 
area that war was imminent and that such message was not sent out because his 
superiors deemed it unnecessary?

Col. BRATTON. No, this is the first I have heard of this matter. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Colonel, to make sure to tie in all loose ends, let me ask 
you this. All of the Top Secret material that you have here identified the 
carrying dates of translation between October 1 and instant of Pearl Harbor 
and which are in this case Exhibit 1, were delivered by you or an officer 
working for you to the Chief of staff, Secretary of War, Chief of War Plans 
Division, A. C. of S., G-2 and 



Page 27

the Department of State, were they not? And delivered at times relatively 
close to the date of the translation thereof as shown on the bottom of each 
Top Secret document? 

Col. BRATTON. That is correct. 

[26] PART III

Place: Room 2C637
Pentagon Building, Washington, D. C. 
Date: 20 September 1944 
Time: 1500-1600 
Present: Colonel Rufus S. Bratton
         Colonel Carter W. Clarke
         Lt. Col. E. W. Gibson 

Col. BRATTON. I have a statement to make and I request that it be made a part 
of the record of this investigation. The allegation has been made, in the 
press and elsewhere in connection with the disaster at Pearl Harbor, that if 
G-2 had been "on the job" we would not have been caught so unprepared for our 
war with Japan. In point of fact, G-2 in general and the Far Eastern Section 
in particular were very much "on the job," as evidenced by the written record 
of Estimates, Staff Studies, Memoranda, etc., with which G-2 served the Chief 
of Staff, the A. C. of S., G-2, WPD, ONI, the State Department and other 
interested planning and policy making agencies of the Government, to warn them 
of the increasing menace of Japanese war potential and intentions. G-2 can 
stand on this record and needs no defense from me. I feel, however, that a 
part of this record, as presented in the documents I now lay before you, 
should be taken cognizance of by this investigating committee and made a part 
of its proceedings if for no other reason than that the documents include some 
Top Secret papers heretofore known as Magic and many references to others. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Do I understand, Col. Bratton, that many of the documents 
contained in the summaries now being introduced into this investigation, most 
of which were in the nature of Estimates of the Situation, contain conclusions 
based upon your knowledge of the material contained in the so-called Magic 
material? 

Col. BRATTON. That is correct. The principal document I show you I secured 
from the G-2 files. It is labeled, "Summary of Far Eastern Documents." It came 
into being as a result of a letter from the President to the Chief of Staff, 
dated July 14, 1943, in which the former requested copies of the dispatches of 
our military attaches which estimate or express any opinion regarding the 
probability or improbability of an outbreak of war, or which refer in any way 
to the estimates of potential military strength of any of the countries 
involved. The countries which [27] concerned the President were Germany, 
Japan, Italy, Bulgaria, Austria, Occupied France, Belgium, England and Russia. 
He indicated his interest in dispatches from January 1, 1937 until such time 
as our military attaches left the first seven named countries; his interest in 
similar dispatches from England dated from January 1, 1937 to the outbreak of 
the war in September 1939; and his interest in dispatches bearing on this 
subject from Russia from January 1, 1937 until the present time (that is, the 
time of his letter of July 4. 1943). This letter of the President was 
transmitted to me by the 



Page 28

then A. C. of S., G-2, General Strong, who instructed me to start work on a 
compilation of the desired documents. I was at that time the Chief of the 
Intelligence Branch, MIS, G-2. I detailed Col. Maguire to exercise general 
supervision over the assembly of European documents and Col. Pettigrew over 
the Far Eastern documents. As stated in the explanatory note which you will 
find on page 1 of the Summary of Far Eastern Documents, the yearly summaries 
which follow on successive pages are based on information contained in 
intelligence documents consisting of reports, memoranda, estimates, etc. The 
summary itself was written in a chronologically arranged narrative form 
supported by photostats of the original documents in the files of G-2. It was 
arranged in this way to facilitate the use of the document by historical 
researchers. The European summaries were similarly compiled and supported by 
photostats of the original documents. All summaries were transmitted to the 
Chief of Staff by a covering memorandum signed by the A. C. of S., G-2, 
General Strong, 20 August 1943. With the covering memorandum was transmitted a 
memorandum for the President, subject: Axis War Potential, for the Signature 
of the Chief of Staff, which read as follows: 

"There are forwarded herewith, in accordance with the request of the President 
dated July 14,1943, copies of numerous Military Attach‚ dispatches, memoranda, 
estimates and handbooks dealing with the preparations for war by German Italy 
and Japan, and their aggressive intentions on the continents of Europe and 
Asia from January 1, 1937. Similar documents bearing on Bulgaria, Austria, 
Occupied France, Belgium, England, and Russia are also included. 

"These photostatic, carbon, or "true" copies [28] of G-2 dispatches, 
memoranda, etc., have been arranged in chronological order for each of the 
above named countries. To assist the White House Secretariat in studying this 
material, a brief summary of the contents of each file has been prepared by G-
2 and these summaries have also been arranged in chronological order in two 
volumes, Far Eastern and European, enclosed herewith as Tabs A and B 
respectively. 

"It has not been thought advisable to submit all documents on the subject of 
Axis war preparations to the White House. There are thousands of miscellaneous 
dispatches and other documents which touch incidentally on German, Italian and 
Japanese war preparations, but which are only slightly germane to a historical 
analysis of the information possessed by G-2 on Axis preparations and 
aggressive intentions. 

"Furthermore, as the President is aware, during the summer and fall of 1941, 
G-2 secured from highly secret sources considerable information indicating 
Japan's determination to resort to armed force in the event that the 
negotiation between Secretary Hull and Ambassador Nomura, then being 
conducted, did not result in an agreement satisfactory to Japan. It is 
presumed that the President does not desire to have documents from this source 
included in this compilation because of the danger to security involved. 

"Great care has been taken by G-2 to include in this compilation copies of 
mis-estimates by Military Attaches or other persons as regards strength and 
intentions. A few such mis-estimates actually occurred, but on the whole, 
false conclusions were rare and pertained not so much to the strength and 
ultimate aggressive intentions of the Axis as they did to the timing of the 
aggression. 

"In the case of the document collection pertaining to Germany, a few very 
important dispatches have been included dealing with the period 1935-1936, in 
as much as these were the years of the largest and most rapid military 
expansion.

"It is thought probable that, after the White House Secretariat commences to 
study these documents, it will feel the need for examining still further [29] 
dispatches on matters correlated to the Axis rearmament program. They can be 
promptly furnished by G-2 in case they are desired."

COL. BRATTON. On August 26, 1943, the A. C. of S., G-2 received memorandum 
from the Secretary, General Staff, which read as follows:

"The attached tab does not comply with the directive in that it contains much 
material other than MA reports. The Chief of Staff desires that it be revised 
to contain *only* MA reports."



Page 29

This memorandum and Tab A, the Summary of Far Eastern Documents, were given to 
me by Gen. Strong at approximately 2:00 p. m. August 1943, with instructions 
to revise Tab A as directed. Tab B, the Summary of European Documents, 
although prepared in the same manner as Tab A, that is, containing estimates 
by G-2, Staff Studies, memoranda and other entries of evaluated intelligence, 
was not returned to Gen. Strong. I inferred that it would be forwarded to the 
President as compiled and that Tab A was to contain only raw, unevaluated 
military attache reports. I instructed the Chief, Far Eastern Unit, to revise 
Tab A as quickly as possible as directed in Col. Sexton's memorandum. At about 
2:45 p. m. 26 August 1943, Gen. Strong directed me to include military 
observer reports with military attache reports in Tab A. The revised Tab A, 
revised as directed in memorandum from the Secretary, General Staff, dated 26 
August 1943, was forwarded to the Chief of staff on 1 September 1943. The 
Summary as then written and its supporting file of 15 volumes were based only 
upon reports received from military attaches and military observers. The 
Summary of Far Eastern Documents which went forward to the resident did not 
contain any references to Magic or any summaries, estimates or staff Studies 
based thereon wholly or in part. It is to the first edition or unrevised 
Summary of Far Eastern Documents at I wish to call the attention of this 
committee. 

It will be noted that many of the documents have a "distribution list" written 
or printed on the document itself indicating the offices or officers to whom 
copies were given. Where no "distribution list" appears it may be assumed that 
the War Plans Division was given a copy, as was the Office of Naval 
Intelligence, as that was our standard operating procedure. The State 
Department was given copies when the subject matter would be of interest to 
that department. Occasionally, when considered of sufficient importance, 
copies went to the President. 

[30] TOP SECRET

PART IV

Place: Room 2C637 
Pentagon Building, Washington, D. C. 
Date: 23 September 1944. 
Time: 0950-1005.
Present: Colonel Rufus S. Bratton.
         Colonel Carter W. Clarke.
         Lt. Col. E. W. Gibson. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Colonel, while you were testifying about this meeting in the 
office of General Marshall on Sunday morning, 7 December 141, you were using a 
memorandum to refresh your recollection. When was that memorandum prepared and 
by whom? 

Col. BRATTON. On or about the 8th of December 1941, by General Miles with my 
help. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Is the above paper a true copy of that memorandum?

Col. BRATTON. Yes.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. I want to get a few more details about this Sunday morning 
meeting. After your telephone conversation with General 



Page 30

Marshall in which he told you to meet him at his (General Marshall's) office 
and that he was on his way there, what did you do? 

Col. BRATTON. I called General Miles on the telephone and reported to him the 
gist of my conversation with General Marshall and recommended to General Miles 
that he come to the office too as General Marshall would no doubt want to see 
him also. Either General Miles or I, I have forgotten which, then called 
General Gerow and asked him to come to the office also as we felt General 
Marshall would wish to see him also. I then proceeded to General Marshall's 
office and waited for him either in the anteroom, that is, the office of the 
Secretary of the General Staff, or in the hallway where I could see the Chief 
of Staff immediately upon his arrival on that floor. My recollection is that 
General Marshall and General Miles arrived at about the same time and that I 
followed the two of them into the latter's office, carrying a copy of the 
message I wished him to see. 

[31] Lt. Col. GIBSON. Was that message the message of instructions to the 
Japanese Ambassadors to deliver the Japanese reply to the Department of State 
at one p. m. Washington time? 

Col. BRATTON. Yes. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. I want to ask another question to clear up another point. 
When, to the best of your recollection, was the Japanese reply, Top. Secret 
Army No. 25843, delivered to General Marshall's office? 

Col. BRATTON. Either on the night of 6 December or early in the morning of the 
7th, prior to his arrival at his office. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. When you walked into General Marshall's office, following 
General Marshall and General Miles, on the morning of 7 December, what did you 
do? 

Col. BRATTON. I handed him the message referring to the time delivery to the 
Secretary of State of the Japanese long reply. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did he read it that time or did he read the long Japanese 
reply first, as far as you recollect? 

Col. BRATTON. As far as I recollect, he read the message that handed to him 
first, then read the long reply. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Colonel, is it possible that the second telephone 
conversation on that Sunday morning between General Marshall and Admiral Stark 
was as a result of Admiral Stark's calling General Marshall, rather than 
General Marshall calling Admiral Stark? 

Col. Bratton. Yes, it is quite possible. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did you make two or three trips to the message center with 
the message penciled by General Marshall on that forenoon of 7 December? 

Col. BRATTON. I made only two trips to the message center, carrying General 
Marshall's penciled memorandum with me for delivery to the officer in charge 
of the message center on the first trip. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did Colonel Bundy go with you on either trip to the message 
center on that Sunday morning? 

Col. BRATTON. He did not. 

[32] Lt. Col. GIBSON. This 11:25 a. m. when you first saw General Marshall on 
that Sunday morning, that time is the time as you an General Miles recalled it 
when you drew up this Memorandum for the Record, is it not? 

Col. BRATTON. Yes.



Page 31

TESTIMONY OF COL. EDWARD F. FRENCH

[1] Place: Room 2C637
Pentagon Building, Washington, D. C.
Date: 28 September 1944 
Time: 1015-1045. 
Present: Colonel Carter W. Clarke.
         Colonel Edward F. French.
         Lt. Col. E. W. Gibson. 

Colonel Edward F. French, having been sworn and warned of his rights by 
Colonel Carter W. Clarke, gave the following sworn testimony: 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Will you state your name, rank and serial number and present 
position, please. 

Col. FRENCH. Colonel Edward F. French, O8935, officer in charge of Traffic 
Operation Branch, Army Communications Service, Office Chief Signal Officer, 
Washington, D. C. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Were you on duty in the War Department in Washington in that 
position the first week of December 1941? 

Col. FRENCH. I was. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. As such, did you have immediate supervision over the War 
Department message center? 

Col. FRENCH. I did. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. I show you now telegram dated 5 December 1941 signed Miles, 
addressed to Assistant Chief of Staff, Headquarters G-2, Hawaiian Department, 
Honolulu, Territory of Hawaii, and ask if this telegram passed through your 
message center for delivery to the addressee on that particular day. 

Col. FRENCH. This message was received in the code section of the War 
Department message center at 11:47 a. m. on the 5th of December 1941, as 
indicated by the stamp on the reverse side. This message was given a code 
serial number of 519 and its transmission evidenced by the "Sent No. 519 12-
5," as typed on the face of the message. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Was that typed by the message center, that particular typing? 

[2] Col. FRENCH. No. This clear text message never left the code room but that 
number and date was typed on there after the return of the coded copy of the 
coded text itself from the Signal center. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Who actually did the typing of the words "Sent No. 519 12-5"?

Col. FRENCH. That was typed on there by a clerk in the code room after the 
return of the message from the Signal Center. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. After the message had actually been sent? 

Col. FRENCH. After the message had actually been received by the signal Center 
for transmission. Then this copy, as provided for under the routine, was 
returned to G-2. We do not keep any copies of the original texts in our 
office; they were returned to the writer within 24 hours. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Will you explain the routine that then existed between Hawaii 
and the War Department which was set up to insure that all messages sent were 
received? 



Page 32

Col. FRENCH. To assure that all messages were received, we had separate set of 
serial numbers that was utilized to identify the classified message. These 
numbers were assigned in sequence and were frequently checked to assure that 
the message assigned that number reached its destination. In some instances 
messages have been delayed in transmission or in office routine so that a 
message would be received in a code room out of sequence. In such instances a 
service message would be instituted to check for the message not in sequence 
that was evidently delayed or possibly lost. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. In-other words, Colonel, if message No. 519, being the 
telegram in question in this investigation, had not been received by Hawaii, 
what would have happened? 

0 Col. FRENCH. In checking their numbers off in Hawaii, when Hawaii would 
receive No. 520 and No. 419 [sic] did not appear in a reasonable time, they 
would query the War Department message center relative to No. 519, and the War 
Department message center would check the files, verify its transmission and 
repeat the message.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Do you believe this message No. 519 on 5 December 1941 went 
by cable or by radio? 

[3] Col. FRENCH I believe that that message went via radio as it was a 
"routine" message and our normal transmitting would be via radio. In the event 
that our radio was out of service, due to atmospheric conditions, the message 
would have been transmitted via cable. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Your records of messages sent in December 1941 were kept for 
how long? 

Col. FRENCH. AS I recall it, at the time it was 6 months. However the 
regulations have since been changed and the messages are now retained for a 
period of 3 months. The War Department code room is not an office of records, 
under the provisions of Army regulations. All records pertaining to classified 
messages rest with the office of origin. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Then as far as you know the Signal Corps have no existing 
records in Washington that would show any more about the fate of message No. 
519 of 5 December 1941? 

Col. FRENCH. The only actual record of this message is as indicated on the 
message itself. The files of the coded text have all been destroyed by 
burning, as provided for in Army regulations. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. I want to go to the morning of 7 December 1941. Were you on 
duty in the message center on that morning? 

Col. FRENCH. I placed myself on duty on Sunday morning, 7 December. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Were you there when Colonel Rufus Bratton brought a penciled 
message to the message center? 

Col. FRENCH. I was in my office across the hall from the code room when 
Colonel Bratton came to the code room with a message. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Will you tell us now what took place at that time 

Col. FRENCH. I heard some commotion over in the code room and I immediately 
left my desk and on arrival there I found Col. Bratton with a message that he 
was anxious to have processed for immediate transmission. I asked Colonel 
Bratton if I could be of any assistance to him and he said he was anxious to 
get this message processed [4] immediately. The message, as I recall, was 
written in pencil on a slip of paper. It was rather difficult to read so I 
told Colonel 



Page 33

Bratton it would be necessary to type the message and have him verify. The 
message was typed and Colonel Bratton verified and then authenticated the 
message. We immediately processed this message into a code system and after 
the work was under way I went into the Signal Center to cheek and determine 
the method of transmission. I found that our channel at Honolulu was out, due 
to atmospheric conditions, from about 10:30 that morning. I had the operator 
check the channel to Honolulu and at that time Honolulu could not be heard. It 
was determined that Honolulu was working San Francisco but the atmospheric 
condition was so bad that to transmit the message to San Francisco in a relay 
to Honolulu would mean that it would have to be sent at slow speed and then 
copied and retransmitted at San Francisco to Honolulu. I made up my mind that 
the quickest method of dispatch would be via commercial service and avoid the 
risk of any garbling or error in relaying the message via Army facilities 
through San Francisco. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. What did you know about the means of communication between 
RCA and Honolulu and Ft. Shafter? 

Col. FRENCH. Our normal method of transmitting a message, when atmospheric 
conditions prevent handling via radio, is to utilize commercial facilities 
that are available in the Signal Center. As this message could be handled 
directly to San Francisco via the Western Union and on a tube relay of this 
message to the RCA office in San Francisco, with that excellent dispatch, this 
method had been chosen. I had learned on Saturday, the day previous, that the 
RCA was installing a teletype circuit to the Department headquarters at Ft. 
Shafter, so I assumed that this would be the most expeditious means of getting 
that message with the least practicable delay to the Department headquarters. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. You have no personal knowledge, I assume, of actually what 
happened to the message when it got to Hawaii?

Col. FRENCH. No.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did Colonel Bratton return to the message center a second 
time after he had been there the first time as you have described? 

[5] Col. FRENCH. Yes, I believe Colonel Bratton was in my office several times 
during that Sunday morning. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Was he there a second time with reference to is particular 
message? 

Col. FRENCH. As I recall, on my return to the code room from the Signal 
Center, I met Colonel Bratton at the code room door and he asked me how long 
it would take to get that message transmitted Hawaii. I informed him that I 
thought it would be there within half hour to 45 minutes. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did Colonel Bundy ever at any time come that morning to your 
office with Colonel Bratton? 

Col. FRENCH. I don't recall that Colonel Bundy came to my office with Colonel 
Bratton but I very definitely recall Colonel Bundy coming to my office that 
morning and spending some time with me there.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Was that before or after this episode?

Col. FRENCH. After this episode. In fact, Colonel Bundy and I reviewed the 
action taken on certain messages. 



Page 34

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Which messages were they that you reviewed the action taken 
on?

Col. FRENCH. Whatever messages were at that time being transmitted through the 
office. 

TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM F. FRIEDMAN

[1] PART I

Place: Room 20637 [sic] 
Pentagon Building, Washington, D. C. 
Date: 16 September 1944. 
Time: 1045-1115.
Present: Colonel Carter W. Clarke.
         Lt. Col. E. W. Gibson.
         Mr. William F. Friedman.

Mr. William F. Friedman, having been sworn and warned of his rights by Colonel 
Carter W. Clarke, gave the following sworn testimony: 

Col. CLARKE. Will you state your name and official position in the U. S. 
Government. 

Mr. FRIEDMAN. William F. Friedman, Director of Communications Research, Signal 
Security Agency, Office Chief Signal Officer. 

Col. CLARKE. What were your duties in this position during the six months 
period immediately prior to Pearl Harbor? 

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I was principal cryptanalyst in the Signal Intelligence Service. 
I had just been retired from active duty as lieutenant colonel, Signal 
Reserve, in about April, I think it was the early part of April 1941, and was 
given an honorable discharge for permanent disability. I had been in Walter 
Reed hospital for some three or four months and was recovering from a nervous 
breakdown.

Col. CLARKE. In your position you were familiar with and had access to and had 
read all of the production of the Signal Intelligence Service?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I had access to it. I didn't read it all because at than time, 
in my condition I was not able to carry on a full day's duty an had been 
assigned to other work by Col. Minkler who was then the Chief of SIS. 

Col. CLARKE. Were you familiar with a message which was received on or about 
November 28 which later became known as the Winds message?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes. 

Col. CLARKE. I gave you this document and ask you to identify it. 

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I believe that I was familiar with it at the time. 

[2] Col. CLARKE. Will you state what, to the best of your recollection, is the 
history of this message, with any implementing message which may have been 
received in connection with it. 

Mr. FRIEDMAN. My recollection is so hazy at the moment and I really was not in 
on the details of cryptanalytic operations at the time, so I would hesitate to 
make any statement about that. 

COL. CLARKE. Could you refresh your memory by getting a log of SIS?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I think that would be possible. 

Col. CLARKE. Do you know whether any implementing message on that was ever 
received?



Page 35

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Not to my direct knowledge at the time. I only learned of it 
comparatively recently in talking with Col. Sadtler and Capt. Safford of the 
Navy. If I did know it at the time I have forgotten it. 

Col. CLARKE. Would you care to make any statement with reference to the 
arrangement which was then in existence where the Navy processed messages one 
day and the Army the next. Would that have contributed to the disaster where 
you had no continuity of study? 

Air. FRIEDMAN. I don't believe that arrangement had any particular affect on 
the situation. It was an arrangement that was worked out between Adm. Noyes 
and Gen. Mauborgne, to have as fair a distribution of work and credit in the 
results achieved as possible. 

Col. CLARKE. The point I am making there though is, would the translators who 
worked on the same thing day in and out not have had this continuity of 
thought in mind if the same people had been working on it? 

Mr. Friedman. Of course the translators in both the Army and the Navy 
cryptanalytic sections were constantly engaged on the same sort of material. 
There was a full exchange of material and results. A message might be done one 
day by the Navy people and another message the next day by the Army people, so 
that they kept their hands in it together and they were keeping abreast of 
each other in the work. That of course was one of the aims of that 
arrangement. I, as a technician, think that it was a poor arrangement from a 
cryptanolytic standpoint but from a practical standpoint, in trying to share 
the work on all equal basis and share credit perhaps, that is as good an 
arrangement as could be worked out, with two separate but cooperating 
organizations. 

Ll. Col. GIBSON. Just one question. You received from the FCC a document with 
three attachments, a letter dated August 18, 1944 having to do with the so-
called Winds Message and possible implementation thereof. Is that correct? I 
show you this telegram. 

Mr. FRIEDMAN. The documents were not received directly by me from he FCC. I 
was given a copy by Capt. Safford of the Navy. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. And this is the document that I now have in my possession? 

Mr. FRIEDMAN. That is right. 

PART II

Place: Room 2C637
Pentagon Building, Washington, D. C.
Date: 19 September 1944.
Time: 1030-1200.
Present: Colonel Carter W. Clarke.
         Lt. Col. E. W. Gibson.
         Mr. William F. Friedman

[4] Lt. Col. GIBSON. Do you now have access to the Signal Intelligence Service 
records of the United States Army for the dates October through Pearl Harbor 
1941?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I do.

Lt Col. GIBSON. And have you searched those records to see what, if anything, 
was done about having Army signal stations monitor for the Japanese Winds Code 
message? 



Page 36

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I have examined the files which are extant and find that certain 
messages were sent and I can present copies of those which were found.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did the Army ask its stations to monitor for implementations 
of the so-called Winds messages? 

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Not specific Winds messages so far as I know, but a general 
directive was sent to all its monitoring stations on December 2 directing that 
monitoring stations were to copy all Japanese plain text in addition to code 
text and that traffic be forwarded with the regular traffic. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Was any other message sent in this regard after that? 

Mr. FRIEDMAN. On December 7 a message was sent to Signal office at Manila, Ft. 
Shafter and Presidio of San Francisco directing that they were to send to the 
War Department by priority enciphered radio Japanese clear language messages 
all ending with the English word "stop," copied since November 27 and 
thereafter. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Is there any record showing that the Army Signal Service 
received prior to Pearl Harbor any message that implement either of these 
Winds Codes? 

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Not that I have been able to find so far. 

[5] Lt. Col. GIBSON. Have you made a diligent search from all possible sources 
available to you to see if the Army Signal Service through its monitoring 
stations, ever received any executing message to these Winds messages? 

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I have made a diligent search but I will not say that it is a 
completely exhaustive search because of the lack of time. Thus far I have not 
found a single bit of evidence to indicate that an Army station actually 
intercepted a Winds execute message.

TESTIMONY OF MAJ. GEN. L. T. GEROW

[1] Place: Room 3E794 
Pentagon Building, Washington, D. C 
Date: 25 September 1944. 
Time: 1425-1530. 
Present: Major General L. T. Gerow.
         Colonel Carter W. Clarke.
         Lt. Col. E. W. Gibson. 

Major General L. T. Gerow, having been sworn and warned of his rights by 
Colonel Carter W. Clarke, gave the following sworn testimony: 

Col. CLARKE. Will you state your name, rank, organization an station please. 

Gen. GEROW. L. T. Gerow, Major General, U. S. Army, Commanding V Corps, 
Luxembourg.                      . 

Col. CLARKE. What were your duties, sir, from the period October 1, 1941 
through December 7? 

Gen. GEROW. Assistant Chief of Staff, War Plans Division. 

Col. CLARKE. In this position, will you state whether or not you received from 
G-2 any material which was then known to you as Magic.

Gen. GEROW. I did. 

Col. CLARKE. Are you familiar with that material? Do you identify any of it as 
material which you have previously seen?



Page 37

Gen. GEROW. I saw material of a similar nature three years ago. I cannot 
definitely state at this time whether or not I saw these particular documents. 
I imagine I did. 

Col. CLARKE. Do you recall having discussed with Colonel Bratton or General 
Miles a message which later became known as the "Winds" message? In that 
message there was a statement that if certain words occurred in the weather 
broadcast that would indicate the severance of diplomatic relations between 
the United States and Japan or Great Britain and Japan or Russia and Japan. 
The message is Top Secret Army No. 29432. 

Gen. GEROW. I believe I saw the message and discussed it with [2] Colonel 
Bratton. I cannot be sure, at this late date. 

Col. CLARKE. Do you recall whether on the morning of approximately December 5 
or at any other time that you discussed with General Miles or Colonel Bratton 
any message which implemented that which would indicate the severance of 
relations between the United States and Japan? 

Gen. GEROW. I do not remember any such message. 

Col. CLARKE. Do you recall, as Chief of War Plans Division, any warning 
message being sent out on or about November 27, 28 or 29 to the overseas 
commanders? 

Gen. GEROW. Yes, I remember the message sent out on 27 November. 

Col. CLARKE Do you have any recollection of any of this stuff that Sadtler 
says here in his testimony? 

Gen. GEROW. I have recollection of talking to Sadtler only once. I don't 
recall ever being informed by Colonel Sadtler of the fact that Japan had 
decided to declare war on Great Britain. 

Col. CLARKE. Were you ever informed by Colonel Bratton or General Miles of 
that? 

Gen. GEROW. Not to the best of my recollection. 

Col. CLARKE. When Colonel Bratton would bring this material to you, would you 
just read it or did you discuss it with him? 

Gen. GEROW. Ordinarily he would leave it for me to read. On some occasions he 
would remark that he had something very hot or refer to a particular paragraph 
which we would discuss. 

Col. CLARKE. Do you recall ever discussing the contents of any of this, prior 
to Pearl Harbor, with General Marshall? 

Gen. GEROW. Yes, I do recall discussing Magic information with General 
Marshall on numerous occasions. 

Col. CLARKE. Do you remember whether or not any of the warning messages which 
you sent out, as Chief of War Plans Division, were based on this material? 

[3] Gen. Gerow. The warning messages were based on the general situation as we 
knew it and a part of that information came from these messages. 

Col. CLARKE. Do you recall ever having gotten a warning from the Secretary of 
State to the effect that negotiations would very likely break down and that 
war would ensue?

Gen. GEROW. Of course I didn't get any information as a rule direct from the 
Secretary of State. On one occasion I recall there was a general discussion in 
the Secretary of War's office relative to the phrasing of a warning message to 
go to the overseas commanders. Prior to sending this message out the Secretary 
of War conferred over the 



Page 38

telephone with the Secretary of State. The result was that a message, dated 
November 27th, was sent out containing such a statement.

Col. CLARKE. General, will you state what you recollect about the instance of 
the morning of December 7, with particular reference any message which may 
have been brought to your attention by Colonel Bratton or General Miles.

Gen. GEROW. I have here a memorandum for record on that subject which I 
prepared on December 15, 1941. I would like to insert that memorandum in the 
record as my answer to your question. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. I show you Top Secret Army No. 25850. Is this the message you 
refer to? 

Gen. Gerow. I cannot definitely identify this message, but I think it is the 
same one that was under discussion. 

Lt. Gen. GIBSON. Do you recall who, if anyone, there wrote a message to be 
sent to Honolulu? 

Gen. GEROW. General Marshall personally wrote the message. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Referring to your memorandum dated 15 December 1941, do you 
remember whether General Marshall sent Colonel Bratton back to the message 
center a second time to check? 

Gen. GEROW. I don't recall. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Do you recall whether there was any discussion or debate 
regarding the interpretation on either of [4] these messages in General 
Marshall's office prior to the writing of this message? Was it discussed 
freely? 

Gen. GEROW. The message was discussed freely. The main point involved was the 
significance of the time_1:00 p. m. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. And who was there exactly besides you, Bratton and General 
Marshall? 

Gen. GEROW. General Miles and Colonel Bundy. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. The discussion, as you remember it, was about this one 
o'clock proposition?

Gen. GEROW. That is right. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Do you remember whether or not General Marshall asked your 
opinion, what it meant, or anything of this nature? 

Gen. GEROW. He asked all of us for an opinion as to the meaning of the 
message. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. This Magic, was that delivered in a dispatch case at that 
time to your office everyday_a locked dispatch case? 

Gen GEROW. As I recall, Bratton used to bring it down himself personally in a 
locked dispatch case. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. During the day you would go over it and the next day he would 
come and get that and leave you some more? 

Gen. GEROW. I don't think we kept it. I think I went over it as soon as I 
could and occasionally I would call Bundy, my war planning man, in and let him 
see parts of it, and then it would be return immediately to Bratton. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Were you pretty close to G-2 at the time; did they give you 
estimates of the situation occasionally? 

Gen. GEROW. Yes. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. And you conferred with them about the enemy situation 
generally? 

Gen. GEROW. That is correct. 

[5] Lt. Col. GIBSON. It was your duty, as head of the War Plans Division, to 
direct the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Depart- 



Page 39

ment as to dispositions, what state of alert to take, or anything of that 
nature? 

Gen. GEROW. Not necessarily that way. If something important could come up it 
would be discussed with the Chief of Staff and might be discussed by the Joint 
Board. Messages would result from those discussions. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Generally such instructions sent out would be sent through 
your office?

Gen. GEROW. Yes, on matters involving WPD responsibilities. If it were purely 
a G-2 matter, the instructions would go out through the G-2 office. War Plans 
Division occupied a little different status at that time from what it occupies 
now.

Lt. Col. GEROW. Did the Navy ever inform you exactly of what their naval 
schedule was, that is, when their ships would be in harbor and when they would 
he out to sea, or anything of this nature, particularly referring to the 
Hawaiian Islands? 

Gen. GEROW. No. I don't believe they did specifically inform me. I could have 
gotten that information, however, from the Navy had I asked for it. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Were you aware that the Navy were coming in and tying up on 
definite weekends in Hawaii? 

Gen. GEROW. No. I was not. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. I show you a message dated 27 November 1941 and ask if that 
is the message that you have referred to in your testimony where the telephone 
conversation was had with the Secretary of State prior to the sending of that 
particular message? 

Gen. GEROW. Yes, this is the message I referred to. I presume that it is a 
true copy of the original message.

Col. CLARKE. Yes it is. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. I also show you a copy of a secret radiogram dated July 7, 
1941 which is in the nature of a warning to the Hawaiian commander and others 
and ask if you recollect that.

[6] Gen. GEROW. Yes. It carries my signature. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. I just wondered if you had any recollection of it now. 

Gen. GEROW. Yes. I remember such a message.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. In other words, even on July 7, 1941, you were giving some 
sort of warning to these various commanders? 

Gen. GEROW. That is right. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. When you sent this warning of November 27, did you consider 
that as a definite war warning, General? 

Gen. GEROW. I considered it very definitely a message to put our forces on the 
alert in these various overseas garrisons against a possible attack by Japan. 

I was called to the Deputy Chief of Staff's office (General Bryden) and there 
General Miles, Colonel Bundy, General Bryden and I discussed the advisability 
of including in this message any reference to sabotage or subversive 
activities. I objected to the inclusion of any reference to sabotage in this 
message that was being prepared by War Plans Division. As I recall, the 
decision was finally made by General Bryden that G-2 would sent a message to 
the G-2 of the Hawaiian Department telling them to be on the alert against 
sabotage. The original copy of the message that we had at that meeting shows 
that the 



Page 40

reference to subversive activities and sabotage was stricken out and initialed 
by me, with the approval of General Bryden. 

Col. CLARKE. In view, sir, of what you have just stated, in your opinion this 
message of November 27 constituted a definite war warning to the overseas 
commanders and you did not want to confuse sabotage or subversion with an 
alert?

Gen. GEROW. Yes, I did conceive it to be that, very definitely. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON: General, this message of November 27, 1941 to the Commanding 
General, Hawaiian Department and Commanding General, Caribbean Defense 
Command, was considered by you to be a definite warning to be on the alert 
against a possible enemy offensive against those garrisons. 

[7] Gen. GEROW. That is correct. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. I show you now, General, a paraphrase of a radiogram from 
General Short received in the War Department 29 November 1941 and ask if you 
recollect that message. 

Gen. GEROW. I don't recall having seen that message. If I did see it my 
initials probably appear on it in the permanent records. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Do you have any recollection of having an answer from General 
Short to your warning radiogram of 27 November 19412 

Gen. GEROW. The War Department records show that such a message was received 
in the War Department.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. You mean an answer from General Short?

Gen. GEROW. Correct.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Do you recollect what his answer was? 

Gen. GEROW. I have refreshed my memory from War Department records. There was 
a reply received from General Short which in substance stated that he had 
taken all the necessary precautions against sabotage and that he had liaison 
with the Navy. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did you know of the message of November 24, 1941 sent by the 
Chief of Naval Operations to Admiral Kimmel, which message stated that in the 
opinion of the Navy Department a surprise aggressive movement in any direction 
by the Japanese including an attack on the Philippines or Guam, was a 
possibility; that the doubt as to favorable outcome of pending negotiations, 
the statements of the Japanese government, and the movements of its army and 
naval forces, supported this opinion, and that the message stated that the 
Chief of Staff of the Army requested the local senior Army officers be advised 
that he concurred in the dispatch? Did you know of the sending of that 
dispatch on or about 24 November 1941? 

Gen. GEROW. I knew that the Navy sent such a message and believe that I read 
it. As to the exact date and wording, I cannot recall at the moment. 

[8] Lt. Col. GIBSON. But it was at about that time? 

Gen. GEROW. Yes. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did you also know that on the 27th of November, the date on 
which this warning message was sent through your office to the Commanding 
General of Hawaii, that the Chief of Naval Operations was sending a message to 
the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific fleet which stated in substance that the 
dispatch was to be considered a war warning; that the negotiations with Japan 
in an effort to stabilize conditions in the Pacific had ended; that Japan was 
expected to make an aggressive move within the next few days; that an 
amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai, or Kra Pen-



Page 41

insula, or possibly Borneo, was indicated by the number and equipment of 
Japanese troops and the organization of their naval task forces. The message 
further stated that Guam, Samoa and Continental Districts had been directed to 
take appropriate measures against sabotage, that a similar warning was being 
sent by the War Department. At about that time did you know such a message w 
as being sent by the Navy Department? 

Gen. GEROW. To the best of my recollection, at that meeting in the Secretary's 
office on the morning of November 27, it was agreed at that time that the Navy 
would send a similar warning message to the one that the War Department was 
sending out. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did you know at the time that on December 3, 1941 the Navy 
Department sent a message to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific fleet 
stating it was believed certain Japanese consulates were destroying their 
codes and burning secret documents; and that on December 4 and again on 
December 6 they sent instructions to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific 
fleet with regard to destroying certain confidential documents and means of 
confidential communication under conditions of emergency. Did you know of such 
messages being sent? 

Gen. GEROW. I have no recollection of having seen such a message although I 
may have seen it before dispatch. The War Plans Divisions of both the Army and 
Navy were in constant contact and kept each other advised of action taken. 

[9] Lt. Col. GIBSON. At that time, was it your opinion that the commanding 
General of the Hawaiian Department and the other commanding Generals of the 
Departments in the Pacific or of the Caribbean had had sufficient warning 
against any aggressive action by the enemy, particularly the Japanese? 

Gen. GEROW. I felt that they had been sufficiently warned as to the 
possibility of aggressive action on the part of Japan. 

                                                       DECEMBER 15, 1941

On Sunday, December 7, 1941, about 11:30 A. M., E. S. T., General Marshall 
called me to his office. General Miles and Colonel Bratton were present. 
General Marshall referred to the fact that the Japanese Ambassador had been 
directed to deliver a note to the State Department at 1 P. M., December 7, 
1941. He felt that the Japanese Government instructions to deliver the note at 
an exact hour and time might have great significance. The pencilled draft of 
an alert message to be sent at once to CG, U. S. Army Forces in Far East; CG 
Caribbean Defense Command; CG Hawaiian Department; and CG Fourth Army were 
read aloud by General Marshall and concurred in by all present. Colonel 
Bratton was directed to take the pencilled draft of the message to the Message 
Center and have it sent immediately by the most expeditious means. Colonel 
Bratton returned in a few minutes and informed General Marshall that the 
message had been turned over to the Message Center and would reach 
destinations in about thirty minutes. The pencilled draft was typed later 
during the day and formally made of record. 

/S/ L. T. Gerow
L. T. GEROW
Brigadier General,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff.



Page 42

TESTIMONY OF BRIG. GEN. HAYES A. KRONER

[1] Place: Room 2C637 
Pentagon Building, Washington, D. C.
Date: 13 September 1944. 
Time: 1430-1510. 
Present: Brigadier General Hayes A. Kroner.
         Colonel Carter W. Clarke.
         Lt. Col. E. W. Gibson. 

Brigadier General Hayes A. Kroner, having been sworn and warned of his rights 
by Colonel Carter W. Clarke, gave the following sworn testimony: 

COL. CLARKE. Will you state your name, rank and station. 

Gen. KRONER. Hayes A. Kroner, Brigadier General. Station: Rio de Janeiro, 
Military Attache. 

COL. CLARKE. When did you first come on duty in G-2, War Department General 
Staff?

Gen. KRONER. About the first of March 1941. 

Col. CLARKE. What were your duties at that time? 

Gen. KRONER. I was assigned to the British Empire Section of the Intelligence 
Branch, G-2 but before taking up those duties I was sent to England for a 
period of observation of the war. I returned from England early in June, about 
the middle of July 1941, and took up my duties of Chief of the British Empire 
Section, G-2 at that time.

Col. CLARKE. How long did you continue on that duty?

Gen. KRONER. Approximately one month. 

COL. CLARKE. And then what did you do? 

Gen. KRONER. About the middle of July I was informed by the retiring Chief of 
the Intelligence Branch, Col. C. H. Mason, that he was leaving G-2 and that he 
had been instructed to turn the Branch over to me as the next senior officer. 
I immediately took over charge of the Branch and for the next several months 
was acting in charge and later on I was appointed Chief of the Branch. To the 
best of my memory it was about September 17 that an order was issued by the 
Executive Officer, G-2 appointing me as the Chief of the Intelligence Branch, 
which position I [2] held until sometime in the month of December, when 
General Lee became Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 and I was then 
verbally relieved from Chief of Intelligence Branch and made Deputy to General 
Lee. 

Col. CLARKE. What did the Intelligence Branch consist of principally?

Gen. KRONER. I found the Intelligence Branch, in July '41, to consist of a 
very small Administrative Section and of several geographic sections and an 
Air Section. The Administrative Section was in process of transition. Because 
of the impact of the war and more information coming into G-2, there was a 
greater need for proper handling and dissemination of that information. The 
only geographic section of G-2 which appeared to be expanding at that time was 
the Latin American Section. By the 10th of October_referring here to the 
official chart on record_the Intelligence Branch consisted of a headquarters 
or the Administrative Section, Contact Section, Situation Section, 
Dissemination Section, and the Air and geographic sections composed of the 
following: Air Section, British Empire Section, Western European Section, 
Central European Section, Eastern European Section, South-



Page 43

ern European Section, Far East Section, and the Latin American Section. The 
several European sections had been set up to deal with the increased 
information coming in from the European war and, together with the British 
Empire Section, it was considered adequate to handle the war in Europe. The 
Latin American Section was expanding for obvious reasons of hemisphere 
defense. The Far Eastern Section at this time had not undergone any material 
change, so far as I remember, for several months. This organization, with a 
few changes, continued during my tenure of office as Chief of the Branch. The 
second exhibit of the organization chart of December 5, 1941 indicates that.

Col. CLARKE. I understand you to say then that you were Chief of the 
Intelligence Group from about July through Pearl Harbor, December 7?

Gen. KRONER. Yes.

Col. CLARKE. During that time was there any recommendation made_first let me 
ask you this_who was the Chief of the Far Eastern Section?

Gen. KRONER. Col. R. S. Bratton.

Col. CLARKE. During that time was there any recommendation made to you as 
Chief of the Group for any increase in personnel [3] or expansion of its 
intelligence gathering activities?

Gen. KRONER. Not any to give me any trouble_there was some minor decrease of a 
clerk or two and perhaps one officer, I don't remember, but nothing in the 
line of expansion as I have referred to in the European Section. I would say 
this further, that one of their Far East experts, Col. Pettigrew, was taken 
from the Far Eastern Section at that time to assist in the reorganization of 
the Headquarters dissemination, so that I had very close to me at that time an 
experienced Far East officer on my staff.

Col. CLARKE. Who was that?

Gen. KRONER. Pettigrew. It was, I think, worthy of note just here that Col. 
Betts, who was the Chief of the Situation subsection, whom I called my G-2-G-3 
officer on my own staff, Col. Pettigrew being so-called G-1-G-4 officer, 
together with my own experience in the Far East, that with Col. Bratton it was 
a fairly good team of Far East trained officers at the head of the 
Intelligence Group.

Col. CLARKE. Was there any action taken by the Chief of the Far Eastern Group 
that would lead you to think that any difficulties or hostilities were 
expected in the Orient that would affect the United States?

Gen. KRONER. None specifically as to direct threat in regard to time or date 
or place. Japanese possible lines of action were often discussed, as you might 
expect among officers as closely allied as the ones I mentioned above with Far 
East training and influence. I left the evaluation of information pertaining 
to the Far East and its interpretation initially to Col. Bratton, and in that 
over-all sense to Col. Betts.

Col. CLARKE. What was your chief source of information with regard to the Far 
East?

Gen. KRONER. Military Attache reports and translations of books and journals 
which were received from various sources, so far as I was aware.

Col. CLARKE. You had no secret intelligence service?

Gen. KRONER. NO.



Page 44

Col. CLARKE. Was any attempt made to create any during the time that you were 
in charge?

[4] Gen. KRONER. Yes. I remember the time_I don't remember exactly_but I 
remember an instance which was partially fulfilled, I believe, that a former 
Far East trained officer, who I think was retired and living in California, 
Captain or Major W. C. Clear, was brought into G-2 and given secret briefing 
by Gen. Miles, to the best of my knowledge, and sent out to the Far East, I 
think to Singapore, in order to initiate some secret intelligence, of which I 
have no detailed knowledge. 

Col. CLARKE. Did we have any liaison with the Chinese secret intelligence? 

Gen. KRONER. Not that I know of. The Military Attache in China may have had 
such but it did not come to my attention. 

Col. CLARKE. Did you have direct communication and contact or a direct 
reporting system with the G-2 of the Philippine Department? 

Gen. KRONER. Yes, we exchanged reports and some telegrams. That I left largely 
in the hands of Col. Bratton who, as Chief of the Far Eastern Section, 
encompassed Japan, China and the Philippines and in general the whole Pacific 
area. In the Intelligence Section, as far as I know, prior to Pearl Harbor the 
exchange of information was routine; it was automatic. I recall toward the end 
of the summer of '41 that Col. Bratton got somewhat disturbed because our 
Military Attache in Tokyo was getting practically no information. The Japanese 
had practically closed up on him, and we took that as an indication of their 
general hardening of their relationship towards us. 

Col. CLARKE. Did you receive any reports from the State Department agencies 
such as the Commercial Attache or the consular service? 

Gen. KRONER. Yes, all sections in the Intelligence Branch had at that time 
direct liaison with their appropriate opposite number in the State Department. 
This was an established standard procedure, and only when something out of the 
ordinary came to the front was the State Department paper given any special 
attention. In addition to that I, Chief of the Branch, and Col. Betts talked 
and discussed things concerning the Far East with various officers in the 
State Department and also in the Navy Department. 

Col. CLARKE. I was going to ask, did you have the same relation with the Navy? 

[5] Gen. KRONER. And the same relation with the Navy. 

Col. CLARKE. Did that give you, so far as you know, full and complete exchange 
of information and intelligence? 

Gen. KRONER. So far as I know 

Col. CLARKE. What were your relations with the F. B. I.? Did you have any 
contact with them? 

Gen. KRONER. I had none whatever. I got no information_ 

Col. CLARKE. Did you from any other federal government agency? 

Gen. KRONER. The Commerce Department is the only one at that time, I remember.

Col. CLARKE. Did you have access to a source of information which we know as 
Top Secret or the British known as Most Secret? 

Gen. KRONER. Meaning communications information? 

Col. CLARKE. Signal intelligence 

Gen. KRONER. No, none whatever. 



Page 45

Col. CLARKE. YOU mean you didn't get it or your Branch didn't get it? 

Gen. KRONER. I personally as Chief of the Branch did not get it. I was aware 
that something, which later I found out to be of this nature, existed, but I 
was given to understand, particularly by Col. Bratton and Col. Pettigrew, who 
sometimes handled the matter for Col. Bratton, that he received information 
from Col. Minkler, whom I knew to be in the Signal Corps, which perhaps had to 
do with Japanese troop movements, which he by long custom and by General Miles 
special desire, was to handle himself directly with Gen. Miles. 

Col. CLARKE. Then you don't know what Col. Bratton did with this stuff other 
than to give it to Gen. Miles? 

Gen. KRONER. No official information. I frequently remember seeing him leave 
his office with several parcels under his arm and be gone for some hours, but 
I felt it was my duty to follow the established procedure which was apparently 
pleasing to my own chief, and I didn't question the procedure. 

[6] Col. CLARKE. During the time that you were Chief of the Intelligence Group 
you never had access or never saw any of this material yourself? When did you 
first see it?

Gen. KRONER. I only saw the material, which later I learned was called 
material [sic], when I used to receive it from Minkler's hands when Bratton 
was absent, and lock it up in my safe and give it to Bratton without sorting 
it out. In other words, I understood, without any specific orders from Gen. 
Miles, *that he wished it handled that way and therefore I did not violate 
that procedure*. 

Col. CLARKE. Do you know if any estimates were written in the Far Eastern 
Section based on this material or any prognostications, forecasts, or 
predictions? 

Gen. KRONER. I do not. 

Col. CLARKE. If any had been made you would have seen them, wouldn't you, as 
the Chief?

Gen. KRONER. I think so because estimates were accustomed to being made, not 
only at regular intervals, but also special estimates from time to time would 
be made, the Far Eastern part of which was always prepared initially in the 
Far East, held by Col. Bratton or under his direction brought in to Col. 
Betts, who revised it and fitted it in with information from other geographic 
sections. I assumed that the Chief of the Far Eastern Section used all the 
information at his disposal to make a complete estimate and as accurate an 
estimate as possible. 

Col. CLARKE. Did there exist anything like a central evaluating section where 
all information came in and was there melted into one estimate or report or 
summary? 

Gen. KRONER. No. There was a trend toward that at the end of the year but we 
didn't get anywhere with it. It was just in the planning stage. 

Col. CLARKE. Well then you have no personal or official knowledge of who other 
than Col. Bratton and Gen. Miles saw this Top Secret material? 

Gen. KRONER. That is correct. I have not. 

Col. CLARKE. Are you familiar with any warning messages that nay have been 
sent to the Hawaiian or other departments?



Page 46

[7] Gen. KRONER. Only now_not at the time of the sending.

Col. CLARKE. At the time they were prepared and sent you had no knowledge?

Gen. KRONER. No, none whatever.

Colonel CLARKE. When did you first become aware of the existence of these 
warning messages which were sent out of the War Department?

Gen. KRONER. I remember a few days after Pearl Harbor, when there was 
naturally a certain amount of excitement in the War Department, hearing it 
said by someone_I don't remember_either in Col. Ralph Smith or Gen. Miles' 
office, words to the effect, "I wonder if that message got through in time," 
and it was several days later that I learned that an official message from the 
War Department had gone out to the Commanding General at Honolulu either the 
night before or the day after Pearl Harbor, I am not certain. 

Col. CLARKE. Did you know anything about any warning messages that were sent 
out late in November? 

Gen. KRONER. No. 

Col. CLARKE. Or early in December before the morning of December 7? 

Gen. KRONER. I never heard about those until today. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. I would like to ask, General, if you ever asked Gen. Miles 
yourself whether or not you were to see this Top Secret information or whether 
it was his desire that you not see it. 

Gen. KRONER. No, I am very certain I did not ask him and I have a very good 
reason and that is because Col. Bratton impressed me so much with the secrecy 
and the importance of his relation with Gen. Miles, that it was Gen. Miles' 
wish. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. In other words, you received the information from Col. 
Bratton that that was Gen. Miles' wish. 

Gen. KRONER. Not so much the specific information as it was that I received 
the impression from Col. Bratton that Gen. Miles wished Bratton to handle this 
information with him. 

[8] Lt. Col. GIBSON. I want to go back to the State Department liaison. Were 
you, as head of the Intelligence Division, kept informed of the conversations 
between the Secretary of State and Admiral Nomura and Kurusu prior to Pearl 
Harbor? 

Gen. KRONER. No, except that Gen. Miles once in a while would make some remark 
on the subject. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. You personally never went over to the State Department or 
talked with anyone there about the situation? 

Gen. KRONER. In regard to communications? 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. You never received any warning of any kind from anybody in 
the State Department? 

Gen. KRONER. No. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did your Intelligence Section, in receiving reports from the 
Navy receive any submarine reconnaissance reports or reports of that nature 
from the Navy? 

Gen. KRONER. Not to the best of my knowledge. I don't remember any submarine 
reconnaissance reports until 1942. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did you maintain any gathering of information, any contacts 
with religious societies or anything to gather information about the Far East 
from missionaries or anything of that nature?



Page 47

Gen. KRONER. Yes. There were some missionaries who, by habit and custom, 
maintained certain contact direct with the Far Eastern Section. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. I see. How about these big private corporations, banks and 
companies that deal with local ones throughout the Far East_were they 
contacted by your intelligence? 

Gen. KRONER. I think they were rather few and far between. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Was there any contact with the British Secret Service at that 
time? 

Gen. KRONER. Not to my knowledge. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Were inquiries made of the Maritime Commission on whether or 
not shipping was being obstructed out in that area? 

Gen. KRONER. There may have been, but I don't remember that. We [9] were 
building up, you will notice from the chart, the Contact Section and they were 
beginning to explore the field you were referring to. How far they got I don't 
remember. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did you maintain close liaison with the War Plans Division_I 
believe that is what it was called at that time? 

Gen. KRONER. Yes. Every section in G-2 knew personally and talked to the 
Section in War Plans Division. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did you personally, for instance, know of what the Fleet 
consisted of out in Pearl Harbor prior to Pearl Harbor? 

Gen. KRONER. Yes, in a general way. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did you know the extent of our own anti-aircraft defenses and 
of our radar installations? 

Gen. KRONER. A very incomplete idea of that. 

Col. CLARKE. I would like to ask one more question. In any estimate from the 
time you took over the Intelligence Group up to and including Pearl Harbor, 
was there ever any prediction or forecast made of a possible attack on Pearl 
Harbor? 

Gen. KRONER. None to my knowledge. I have in mind the last estimate that was 
made before Pearl Harbor, which was an estimate covering a future period from 
December 1 to sometime in 1942. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did you consider it a capability of the Japanese to 
successfully attack Pearl Harbor with bombers? 

Gen. KRONER. No. The matter was discussed 

Col. CLARKE. Did you identify this document? 

Gen. KRONER. Yes. I identified it_this is the document to which I referred_IB 
159, November 29, 1941. This particular estimate was considered by the whole 
division, not only the Intelligence Group but by General Miles himself, as 
perhaps the most important we had ever gotten out. That importance lay not in 
so much the danger that we saw from Japan, although danger in that field was 
pretty thoroughly discussed, but primarily because Gen. Miles wished to focus 
War Department though [sic] on the defeat that could be administered to the 
Nazi powers. In the [10] preparation of the estimate each geographic section 
in the Intelligence Branch prepared its part. Colonel-now Brigadier General_
Thomas J. Betts put the several estimates together and did what we called 
"polish them up." He and I discussed the lines of action and capabilities of 
all the warring powers and especially of each potential enemy to the U. S. A., 
and I took them to Gen. Miles where they were finally altered to suit him or 
approved. 



Page 48

This particular estimate does not include in the lines of action open to 
Japan, an attack on Pearl Harbor, and I remember that so distinctly because 
when the word came through the radio on that fateful Sunday, December 7, that 
Japan had attacked Pearl Harbors I was sitting in my office in the Munitions 
Building reading from this paper the Japanese capabilities. Therefore from my 
point of view, I feel that Japan's potential capability against Pearl Harbor 
was left from this estimate because neither Col. Betts nor I had any 
information which would lead us to believe that they were capable of or 
planned to do so. 

Col. CLARKE. I would like to ask one final question again just to reiterate 
the fact that you personally had no knowledge of what Col. Bratton did with 
this most secret material or to whom he showed it. 

Gen. KRONER. That is correct, except to Gen. Miles. 

Col. CLARKE. And you don't know what Miles did with it. 

TESTIMONY OF MAJ. GEN. SHERMAN MILES

[1] Place: Room 2C637
Pentagon Building, Washington, D. C. 
Date: 14 September 1944. 
Time: 0930-1030. 
Present: Major General Sherman Miles.
         Colonel Carter W. Clarke.
         Lieutenant Colonel E. W. Gibson. 

Major General Sherman Miles, having been sworn and warned of his rights by 
Colonel Carter W. Clarke, gave the following sworn testimony: 

Col. CLARKE. Will you state your name, rank and station please.

Gen. MILES. Sherman Miles, Major General, First Service Command, Boston, 
Massachusetts. 

Col. CLARKE. During what period were you A. C. of S., G-2? 

Gen. MILES. I was Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 from the first of May 
1940 until late in December 1941, when I was made Assistant Chief of Staff_
that was a technicality_and relieved from the duty the end of January 1942. 

Col. CLARKE. In the six months period preceding Pearl Harbor did you have 
presented to you all information and intelligence which was received in the 
War Department General Staff with reference to the war making potentialities 
of Japan? 

Gen. MILES. I can't say that all came to me personally. A synopsis of all came 
to me through my organization. Certain dispatches and reports I never saw in 
toto. They were handled by the particular Section of the Military Intelligence 
Division, which I headed, and came to me in the original form if they were of 
very great importance, but otherwise in the form of summaries, estimates, etc. 

Col. CLARKE. Who was the head of the Intelligence Group during the time that 
you were A. C. of S., G-2? 

Gen. MILES. General John Magruder was the Chief. He was succeeded by Colonel 
Charles Mason, as I remember it, who was relieved in the summer of 1941 and 
succeeded by General Hayes Kroner. 

[2] Col. CLARKE. During this entire period who was your Chief of the Far 
Eastern Section?

Gen. MILES. Colonel Bratton 

Col. CLARKE. The entire period?



Page  49

Gen. MLLES. I think so although I wouldn't be positive. 

Col. CLARKE. I am sure that is correct. 

During this period, information which was received with reference to Japan or 
the Far East, was that presented to you, when it was important, direct by Col. 
Bratton or did you have that transmitted through the Chief of the Intelligence 
Group, Colonel Kroner or Colonel Mason? 

Gen. MILES. Such information as came in Top Secret was habitually handed 
direct by Colonel Bratton to me. This was particularly so in the six months 
preceding Pearl Harbor. We were tightening up on secrecy to a great extent. 
Other information normally came to me through the Chief of the Intelligence 
Branch. 

Col. CLARKE. How was this Ultra information presented to the Chief of Staff? 

Gen. MILES. It was presented in a loose-leaf folder in a locked dispatch case 
for which the Chief of Staff had the key. He took the folder out, read the Top 
Secret dispatches and returned it to its bag. 

Col. CLARKE. Who made the selection of what was presented to the Chief of 
Staff? 

Gen. MILES. The Chief of the Far Eastern Section_Colonel Bratton. 

Col. CLARKE. Did he present all of that or just what he, Colonel Bratton, 
considered were the important items? 

Gen. MILES. Only what were considered the important items. There was, as I 
remember, an immense amount of what we called chitter-chatter which came in 
Top Secret, routine stuff and stuff of no particular significance except to 
the people to whom it was addressed. This was not put in. 

Col. CLARKE. Did Colonel Bratton present this direct to the Chief of Staff or 
did you present it? 

[S] Gen. MILES. It was presented by Colonel Bratton direct to the Chief of 
Staff. We had a regular system by which it was taken around by an officer 
courier. 

Col. CLARKE. Then Bratton himself didn't always take it to the Chief of Staff 
and discuss it with him, to the best of your knowledge? 

Gen. MLLES. No. 

Col. CLARKE. Did the Chief of Staff ever discuss with you or Colonel Bratton 
the contents of any of these messages and their significance? 

Gen. MILES. Oh yes, he discussed it with me several times. 

Col. CLARKE. Do you recall any particular messages of the Top Secret which he 
discussed with you? 

Gen. MILES. No I don't. Strangely, I recall the lack of messages which he 
discussed with me. The one thing we couldn't understand was why they weren't 
talking more about our air reinforcements of the Philippines. I remember he 
discussed that point with me at length although we reached no conclusion. 

Col. CLARKE. Were you familiar with what has later been referred to as the 
"Winds Message" at the time of its receipt? 

Gen. MILES. Yes, I remember the receipt of the "Winds Message." 

Col. CLARKE. Was that discussed with you by the Chief of Staff? 

Gen. MILES. Not that I remember. 

Col. CLARKE. Did you ever receive any information that the Winds Message had 
been implemented? 



Page 50

Gen. MILES. I have been trying to remember and my memory is very hazy about 
it. I do not remember seeing any document on it, any written statement on it. 
I'm sorry but my memory is_ 

Col. CLARKE. Do you recall any oral discussion you may have had with any 
individual with reference to that message, with the implementation of it?

Gen. MILES. No I do not, and yet I do know of course that we sent a dispatch 
to Hawaii early in December, to the G-2 in [4] Hawaii, directing him to 
contact a certain officer about the Winds Message. 

Col. CLARKE. Do you recall what the occasion of the sending of that message 
was? 

Gen. MILES. Sending which message? 

Col. CLARKE. The one to contact the officer in Hawaii who was familiar with 
the "Winds Message." 

Gen. MILES. It must have been information that the naval command had in regard 
to the "Winds Message" but I don't remember the background. 

Col. CLARKE. Were any of the warning messages that were sent from November 25 
through to include Pearl Harbor the result of this most secret source? 

Col. MILES. Oh yes, very definitely. The first warning message, the main 
warning message, written by the War Plans Division, of 27 November was the 
result not only of what we knew about our own note to the Japanese of the 26th 
of November, but of the general build-up of Top Secret information, and that 
also applied to my message to the G-2's of the 27th of November. 

Col. CLARKE. At that time did you have direct contact or authority to 
communicate directly with all of the corps area and department G-2's or did 
your traffic have to go through command channels? 

Gen. MILES. That is somewhat a difficult question to answer because it 
depended on the message. I realized that I should never put myself, the G-2, 
in a position of influencing the commanding generals, particularly of overseas 
departments, on action which had not previously been approved by command 
channels. I kept in very close contact with War Plans Division, General Gerow, 
and I remember particularly in my message to the G-2 of November 27 discussing 
that with Gerow, and I am pretty sure it was his suggestion that I put in the 
sentence to communicate this only to the Commanding General and Chief of 
Staff. The general proposition held that the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 of 
the War Department had authority of communicate freely with his G-2's but 
always under the principal that he did not influence the commanding generals 
in lines of action not previously approved. 

[5] Col. CLARKE. During this period from July 1 through to Pearl Harbor, did 
the officers of G-2 in the various geographic branches have daily contact with 
their opposite numbers in the War Plans Division? 

Gen. MILES. I can't say that they had daily; they had very close contact I 
know but how frequent that contact was I think undoubtedly depended on the 
situation. It might have been two or three times a day in some cases.



Page 51

Col. CLARKE. In your opinion every piece of vital information that was 
available in G-2 was made known to the proper people in War Plans? 

Gen. MILES. That was my policy and Gen. Gerow's policy-what we were trying to 
work to at all times. The same applied to ONI.

Col. CLARKE. Then it was the responsibility of War Plans Division and not of 
yourself to inform these overseas department commanders?

Gen. MILES. To promulgate command decisions, yes.

Col. CLARKE. That is what I am trying to bring out. Do you know whether or not 
there were discussions between the Chief of the War Plans Division and the 
Chief of Staff regarding this Top Secret material that you weren't a party to?

Gen. MILES. I don't know whether there were such conversations or not. 

Col. CLARKE. Did you ever discuss any of this material with the chief of the 
War Plans Division and its significance? 

Gen. MILES. Oh yes, frequently. 

Col. CLARKE. These warning messages that you spoke about, they were sent to 
all overseas departments, Panama, Philippines and Hawaii? 

Gen. MILES. My recollection is that the first one drafted by War Plans was 
sent to all overseas departments. Mine, the one of the 27th to the G-2's, was 
not sent to the Philippines. 

Col. CLARKE. Do you know whether or not messages were received from the 
overseas commanders of the three overseas depart- [6] ments at that time 
indicating that they had been warned and had taken appropriate action? 

Gen. MILES. I did not at that time know because I never saw the answers of the 
overseas departments to the first or War Plans warning of the 27th. I did, 
however, see General Short's reply to a subsequent telegram of November 28 
about sabotage which of course clearly indicated to me at that time that he 
had at least received that warning.

Col. CLARKE. Did you ever have any discussions with the Chief of the ONI with 
reference to the contents of the Top Secret material? 

Gen. MILES. Frequent discussions with him.

Col. CLARKE. Did you and he take parallel action with reference to this 
material?

Gen. MILES. In the sense of informing our Chiefs, yes. I don't remember any 
difference of opinion on this evaluation between Admiral Wilkinson and myself 
or Admiral Kirk and myself on Top Secret.

Col. CLARKE. Did you ever receive any information in G-2 from FBI with 
reference to this material? 

Gen. MILES. Top Secret? 

Col. CLARKE. Yes. 

Gen. MILES. No, not that I remember. 

Col. CLARKE. Can you say whether or not this material or copies of the same 
material that was made available to the Chief of Staff was also made available 
to the President and the Secretary of State? 

Gen. MILES. Yes, definitely.

Col. CLARKE. Would the President and Secretary of State have received any 
material which the Chief of Staff didn't receive? 

Gen. MILES. Of Top Secret? 



Page 52

Col. CLARKE. Yes, sir. 

Gen. MILES. No. 

[7] Col. CLARKE. Can you state definitely that the same material which was 
made available to the Chief of Staff here was made available to the President 
and the Secretary of State? 

Gen. MILES. My recollection is that on Navy day the Navy put these things in 
the file and that the same file copies went to the Chief of Staff of the Army, 
Chief of Naval Operations, the two Secretaries the President and Secretary of 
State. But I see your point_I don't know. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. General, I may ask some rather unintelligent questions 
because I am somewhat foggy about this whole thing. Did you know of the letter 
that the Secretary of the Navy wrote the Secretary of War on or about the 24th 
of January 1941, wherein the Secretary of the Navy warned the Secretary of War 
that hostilities might be initiated any time by an attack on Pearl Harbor, and 
did you have at that time any knowledge of such a letter being written? 

Gen. MILES. I had at that time no knowledge of a letter containing a warning 
of an attack on Pearl Harbor other than this, that I remember in the late 
winter of 1940-41 that the Navy was worried about our anti-aircraft defense 
and air defense of Pearl Harbor. I didn't known that it resulted, although I 
assume it resulted, from some communication from the Navy Department. I never 
saw the letter, to my knowledge. However I remember that it was a matter under 
discussion at about that time. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did the Chief of Staff ever tell you of any such letter being 
received from the Navy? 

Gen. MILES. Not that I remember. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did you ever attend any War Council meetings during that 
period of 1941? 

Gen. MILES. Those were the ones with Secretary Welles, Assistant Secretary of 
State and the Chief of Staff? 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Generally, I believe, provided for a meeting of the 
Secretaries of War, Navy and State. 

Gen. MILES. No I did not attend any of them. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did the Chief of Staff ever talk with you of any matters that 
were discussed as these War Council meetings during the year 1941? 

[8] Gen. MILES. I don't remember. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did you yourself ever have any conferences with the Secretary 
of State or the Assistant Secretary of State or any responsible official in 
the Department of State relative to their interpretation or understanding of 
these so-called Top Secret reports during the year 1941? 

Gen. MILES. No I did not. I remember, however, once_perhaps twice_going to the 
office of the Secretary of State, Secretary Hull, rather formally, together 
with the head of ONI and certain other State Department officials, for a 
general discussion of the military and naval situations throughout the world. 
I don't remember in any of these discussions that Top Secret was mentioned. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Were you ever informed by the Chief of Staff of any warning 
from the State Department that war might be expected any minute because of a 
breakdown of negotiations between the two countries that were then going on in 
November 1941? 



Page 53

Gen. MILES No, I don't remember ever having been told by the Chief of Staff 
that the State Department considered war might result. I did know at the time 
the general trend, and I think very accurately, the actual substance of our 
note of November 26 which gave me certainly the impression that war might 
result. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Was your knowledge of that note obtained from the newspapers 
or from State Department copies of the note? 

Gen. MILES. From our liaison with the State Department. We sent an officer to 
the State Department every day. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Do you recall who the officer was at that time? 

Gen. MILES. Colonel Betts, generally. I don't know whether he actually did it 
that particular day. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Were you ever advised or told by the Chief of Staff of the 
message of 24 November 1941 sent by the Chief of Naval Operations to Admiral 
Kimmel, which message said it was concurred in by Marshall, warning of a 
possible surprise aggressive Japanese attack? 

Gen. MILES. I was never told by the Chief of Staff of any such message. 

[9] Lt. Col. GIBSON. You of course knew from previous history that the Japs 
were apt to make a surprise attack in starting any war? 

Gen. MILES. I knew that they had done that in the Russian war. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did you have any knowledge from our military attaches or any 
other information, possibly from the Navy Department, that certain Japanese 
consulates were burning their documents and codes on or about 3 December 1941?

Gen. MLLES. I have no recollection of any such knowledge as of that date. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did you know of the bulletin issued by the Director of ONI on 
the Japanese situation, on the Japanese naval situation, on December 1 of 
1941? I show you a copy of it. 

Gen. MILES. I undoubtedly saw this document. I certainly remember that ONI and 
the Navy Department were persuaded that there was a considerable movement of 
Japanese naval forces to the south and that there were rumors of forces in the 
mandates, which were, of course, Japanese waters.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Do you remember seeing document 23673, message from Berlin to 
Tokyo? 

Gen. MILES. Yes. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Do you recollect seeing Army 23570? 

Gen. MILES. Yes I do. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. With reference to this 23570, did you ever talk with the ONI 
about this conversation between Admiral Turner and Admiral Nomura? 

Gen. MILES. My recollection is that I did. Admiral Turner was rather a law 
unto himself and my recollection is that I discussed it in a friendly way with 
my colleague. We didn't reach any definite conclusion. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did you ever visit with Admiral Turner about this?

Gen. MILES. No. 



Page 54

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did you ever get any information on how this meeting came 
about?

Gen. MILES. No.

[10] Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did you ever hear from the Navy Department of any other 
meeting between Admiral Turner and Admiral Nomura about one week prior to 
Pearl Harbor as a result of which Admiral Turner called a meeting of high 
naval officials as to what Nomura was alleged to have told Turner at this 
meeting? 

Gen. MILES. No I don't remember having any knowledge of that. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Army No. 23631. Had you seen that? 

Gen. MILES. Yes I remember seeing this one, which was to indicate that Germany 
and Italy might act of themselves against the United States. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. I ask you now if you remember seeing 23859 at that time. 

Gen. MILES. Yes I do. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Would you say that, generally speaking, you saw these shortly 
after the date shown on the bottom, apparently translated 10-23-41? 

Gen. MILES. In all probability the same day.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. That is undoubtedly true of all of these?

Gen. MILES. Yes. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. I show you 23860 and ask if you recollect seeing that. 

Gen. MILES. Yes I saw that. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. I show you 24373 and ask if you saw that. 

Gen. MILES. I am pretty sure that I saw that.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. I show you 24655 and 24656, which go together, and ask if you 
saw those.

Gen. MILES. I saw that. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. I show you No. 25644 and ask if you saw that. 

Gen. MILES. I don't remember seeing that. 

Lt. Gen. GIBSON. No. 25390. Did you see that? 

Gen. MILES. I don't remember. I would like to say here that those I have said 
I have seen recall to my mind in each case [11] certain things that make me 
say I have seen them. I don't recall that or the one preceding it. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. I show you No. 24878. 

Gen. MILES. I recall that. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. No. 25773. 

Gen. MILES. I recall that because it was about Mamala. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. No. 25817. 

Gen. MILES. I don't recall that. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. No. 25432, which is the Winds Code. 

Gen. MILES. I recall that. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. And did you have that in mind when this so-called Winds 
Message was reported to you? 

Gen. MILES. You mean the implementation of that. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Do you recall a message being intercepted on the evening of 
December 3 or 4 which apparently used this code as shown in Army 25432? 

Gen. MILES. Well that question I have already answered. My memory is very hazy 
about it. I don't remember seeing any document on the subject. 



Page 55

Lt. Col. GIBSON. In other words, you yourself never got the intercepted 
message of December 3 or 4?

Gen. MILES. Not that I remember.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. No. 25392.

Gen. MILES. I don't recall this message, which is supplementary to the Winds 
Code.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. No. 25138.

Gen. MILES. No. 25138 I do recall. You want this 25441 to?

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Yes.

Gen. MILES. 25441, yes I do recall that.

[12] Lt. Col. GIBSON. 25435 and 25436.

Gen. MILES. Yes I remember 25435 and 436.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. No. 25442.

Gen. MILES. That is a continuation of the summary of our note of November 26. 
I remember it.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. 25446.

Gen. MILES. I do not recall that message.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. 25548.

Gen. MILES. I do recall that message.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. 25823.

Gen. MILES. I don't recall that message.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. 25496.

Gen. MILES. Yes I recall that.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. 25497.

Gen. MILES. I don't remember seeing that radio telephone message.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. 25554.

Gen. MILES. Yes, I remember that.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. 25344.

Gen. MILES. I don't recall that.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. 25762.

Gen. MILES. I don't recall that.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. 25605.

Gen. MILES. I think I recall that, yes that was when they told us they were 
going to handle the note here, not in Tokyo.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. 25727.

Gen. MILES. Yes, I remember that.

[13] Lt. Col. GIBSON. 25783.

Gen MILES. I don't remember that.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. 25715.

Gen. MILES. Yes, I remember that.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. 25659 and 25660.

Gen. MILES. Yes. This is the interview with Sumner Welles. I remember that.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. 25730.

Gen. MILES. Yes, I remember that.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. 25725, and 25721 goes with it. 

Gen. MILES. Yes, I think I remember both of those. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. 25731. 

Gen. MILES. I don't remember that. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. 25785. 

Gen. MILES. I think I remember that. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. 25807. 

Gen. MILES. I don't remember that.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. 25838 and 25843. 



Page 56

Gen. MILES. 25838, yes. 25843, this is an answer. Yes I certainly remember 
that.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. 25445.

Gen. MILES. Yes, I remember that. Before we go any further think I ought to 
make a statement. You have shown me a series of important dispatches. I 
believe, from my knowledge of the system then in effect, that I saw them all. 
I have identified certain ones as being those that I remembered because as I 
read them I find statements of fact or assumption that ring a bell in my mind. 
Others I have identified as not having seen, so far as I now remember, because 
[14] I find no such statements or assumptions in them that ring a bell in 
mind. I am conscious of my oath and I want to make it plain that my memory, 
after two and a half years, is not of the best and cannot even be sure of 
identifying those messages which I think remember. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. I want to come back for just a moment to that so-called Winds 
Code. I believe you said you did not remember seeing that. 

Gen. MILES. I remember seeing the Winds Code. Then there was another code that 
I don't remember seeing that was in the intelligence summary. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did you make any arrangements with the Army or Federal 
Communications Commission or Navy or any listening agencies to listen_to pick 
up anything that might be broadcast? 

Gen. MILES. We did. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. And what were those arrangements? 

Gen. MILES. These arrangements were that if certain words that we had from the 
Top Secret were intercepted in any of our monitoring stations we were to be 
immediately notified by telephone. As I remember, the telephone number that we 
gave was that of Colonel Bratton_it was to come through that source. We did 
not, of course, tell FCC what the meaning of this intercepted message would 
be. They were simply to notify us if they heard it.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did you have knowledge, General, along about the first of 
December 1941, that there was a Japanese fleet operating in the Marshalls 
area.?

Gen. MILES. I had knowledge that the Navy had received reports that there was 
a Japanese naval force in the mandated islands. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did you know of your own knowledge or did the Navy tell you 
as to our own fleet out there around Pearl Harbor, what we had out there, 
etc.?

Gen. MILES. I knew in general what part of our fleet was in Pearl Harbor. I 
don't remember that I particularly tried to find out exactly what ships were 
there but the [15] greater part of the battle fleet was there, I knew from 
general knowledge. Whether it was in Pearl Harbor or in that area I did not 
know on any particular day.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did you have any general knowledge from anybody on the state 
of our anti-aircraft defenses of Hawaii at this time?

Gen. MILES. Yes, I know from my previous knowledge of the defenses of Hawaii 
pretty generally the number and strength of our anti-aircraft batteries on the 
island. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did you know about the practice of the fleet coming in and 
tying up in the Harbor for the weekends? 

Gen. MLLES. No, I did not know that.



Page 57

Lt. Col. GIBSON. General, you, I believe, got out an estimate of the situation 
generally for the Chief of Staff as of 29 November 1941. I will show you a 
copy for your recollection.

Gen. MILES. I did. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. That did not disclose in it that you considered the Japs had 
a capability of attacking Pearl Harbor by air. I wonder, was that considered 
before you submitted the report, was that capability considered by you?

Gen. MILES. I presume so. Please note that this estimate starts out with this 
sentence: "This estimate is addressed to the objective of Nazi defeat." It was 
deliberately written that way. I was a little tired of certain defeatist 
attitudes among certain of my own people and I wanted to get out an estimate 
of the situation addressed to the objective of the defeat of the Nazis. Now an 
air attack on Pearl Harbor or any other attack on Pearl Harbor had been, I 
knew very well, a source of study for twenty years in Hawaii and in the War 
Department. It is not mentioned in this estimate of the situation presumably 
because it was so obvious. We had spent several hundred million in defense of 
Hawaii, we had our greatest fleet out there. That Hawaii could be attacked if 
Japan went to war was obvious to everyone. I reread that estimate yesterday. I 
regret that in stating the possibilities we stated an attack on the 
Philippines and did not state an attack on Hawaii, Alaska, West Coast, Panama, 
etc. It was an omission, but I think a rather obvious omission. 

[16] Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did you ever talk with the Chief of the War Plans 
Division as to the possibility of a Jap attack on Hawaii?

Gen. MILES. I don't remember specifically talking with him on that subject, 
no. We both were thoroughly familiar with the defense plans and I don't 
remember that the subject came up.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. These reports, these Top Secret reports, when you got them 
did you evaluate them yourself or did you have somebody else give you their 
evaluation of them? 

Gen. MILES. I evaluated them myself in my own mind. Colonel Bratton was 
evaluating them and putting his evaluation into the big estimate. 

Lt Col. GIBSON. The only dissemination that you made of the evaluation of 
these reports would be to Colonel Bratton or WPD or the Chief of Staff? 

Gen. MILES. AS I say, I do not remember that the Chief of Staff ever discussed 
the effect of the Top Secret dispatches except their absence in not talking 
about our reinforcement of the Philippines. I don't remember any particular 
discussion that I had with General Gerow on evaluating them. These were highly 
important dispatches which all three of us saw and after all I assumed that 
the command channels could evaluate about as well as I could, in plain 
English, what the Japanese were saying and thinking. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did you ever take it upon yourself to go up to see the Chief 
of Staff and say you thought a very serious situation was being revealed by 
these things and jog him on it?

Gen. MILES. Not until the morning of December 7th. The seriousness of the 
situation was, obviously, known to him.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. On what occasion on that particular morning did you go up and 
personally see him



Page 58

Gen. MILES. Well, upon the receipt of the long Japanese telegram reply. That I 
notice, is dated December 6. I first knew that it was in that evening and of 
course we were watching for it very eagerly. We knew that that meant some very 
definite decision regarding the conference. It was being translated all night. 
[17] I knew that the first part of it was translated on the evening of the 6th 
but that did not give away the whole business. I went to the office the 
morning of the 7th and got the whole thing, also was informed that it was to 
be delivered that afternoon, and arrangements were made to see Secretary Hull. 
That of course alone was enough to go to the Chief of Staff. 

Col. CLARKE. These messages which you have identified here and which you say 
according to the system you are sure you had seen all of them, you are 
positive these were seen by the Chief of Staff, to the best of your knowledge?

Gen. MILES. They were all seen by the Chief of Staff and all seen by me to the 
best of my knowledge. Certain ones, as I say, ring bell in my mind. I feel 
morally certain that I saw them all and the Chief of Staff saw them all.

Col. CLARKE. Were you ever told by the Assistant Secretary of State or the 
Under Secretary of State in July of 1941 that in their opinion war was 
inevitable and that the War Department should get a Secret intelligence 
service started and get their agents planted around through the world while 
there was yet time? 

Gen. MILES. No, I have no recollection whatever of being told by the Secretary 
of State or Assistant Secretary of State. 

Col. CLARKE. What was the occasion when you started censorship in the War 
Department?

Gen. MILES. It is rather a long story. A censorship plan had been drafted in 
the War Department, largely in MID, before I came in May 1940. My recollection 
is that that plan was approved by the Joint Board. It must have been because I 
distinctly remember it went to the President and was disapproved. From then on 
there were many attempts to revise some form of censorship plan. It was 
obviously a war necessity if war did occur between us and the German or 
Japanese or anyone and a necessity which could be filled only by pre-
preparation and training, in other words, you had to train censors. During 
1941 or perhaps as early as late 1940, the Navy, without approval of the 
President, quietly began to train censors and my naval colleague at that time, 
Admiral Anderson, Chief of ONI, use to spur me on_"why don't you do this too?" 
I remember several conversations about that. We were trying, as usual, to play 
the game and do only what was approved, but as the thing warmed up all over 
the world, our lend-lease and other [18] approaches to war, it became obvious 
that the War Department had to do something about it and I started the 
censorship school, as you remember over here in Clarendon. 

Col. CLARKE. That had nothing to do with any of this material, it was the 
general knowledge inherent within you that- 

Gen. MILES. It was just the general trend. We knew we had to prepare for 
censorship immediately. 

Col. CLARKE. You had close contact with ONI but not with the Naval Operations_
is that true, at that time?



Page 59

Gen. MILES. That was very true. Admiral Turner was practically Naval 
Operations through a large part of that time. Neither Gerow or McNarney nor 
McCloy nor myself could get very far with him. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. So the only real liaison you had was with ONI, which really 
had the strategic intelligence data and not the actual up-to-the-minute 
operations of the Navy?

Gen. MILES. Yes. The liaison which I should have maintained with the Navy was 
with ONI. I had nothing officially to do with the Naval Operations. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did ONI ever give you any information of Naval Operations or 
what Naval Operations were doing or what messages they sent to their fleet in 
Hawaii?

Gen. MILES. Yes. I knew, for instance, through ONI of the naval telegram that 
went out paralleling ours of November 27. I am pretty sure that I knew other 
definite moves that were made. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Your liaison was an officer that went from here to the Navy, 
ONI? 

Gen. MILES. Several officers, but more directly my own relationship with 
Admirals Anderson, Kirk and Wilkinson, the latter two of which happened to be 
very old friends of mine. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did your liaison with the State Department merely consist of 
getting cables that were coming in to the State Department? 

Gen. MILES. Yes. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. It didn't consist of contacting the Under Secretaries [19] or 
Secretary of State or the experts on the various country desks to ask for 
their judgment on what was picked up? 

Gen. MILES. In a sense it did. Our liaison officer, particularly Colonel 
Betts, who was extremely successful as a liaison officer, established very 
personal relations in order to carry out his job with various people of the 
State Department, from whom he could get his information, not only the factual 
information but what they thought of it. I had that close relationship also 
with Assistant Secretary Berle. I saw Under Secretary Sumner Welles at times. 
I saw Mr. Hull at least once and perhaps more, I don't remember. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. At this time while these critical negotiations were going on 
in November 1941, did you yourself or Colonel Betts go over particularly to 
ask the State Department what the result of this thing was going to be? 

Gen. MILES. I did not. I don't know if Colonel Betts did or not. 

TESTIMONY OF LIEUTENANT O'DELL

[1] Colonel Carter W. Clarke, Colonel E. W. Gibson, and Lt. O'Dell. 6 October 
1944, 9 A. M. 

CWC: All right, now tell me your story. We got the story that you wrote to 
Kemper and said you knew who did Pearl Harbor, or something to that effect; so 
you can start telling us what you know. 

O'D: Well, sir, here's the part of the information that I thought might not 
have come out through other sources. There was a cable that was sent on the 
fifth of December to the Commanding Generals of the Hawaiian and Philippine 
Departments concerning the movement of a Japanese Task Force in the South 
China Sea. The information had come to the Military Attache through the 
Australian 




Page 60

Government, Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Burnett, who called Colonel Merle 
Smith and myself to his office.

CWC: You were then Merle Smith's assistant?

O'D: That's right. There were the two of us, and he is now dead. That's the 
reason I stuck my nose in this. We were called over on Thursday afternoon 
about 5 o'clock. Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Burnett, myself, and Colonel 
Merle Smith and Commander Saom, who is the Naval Liaison Officer from the 
Dutch East Indies. The information was primarily in regard to the Netherlands, 
to the Indies, and, as I say, principally concerned itself with the movement 
of a Jap Task Force in the South China Sea. However, within an hour after we 
had gotten there some additional information came in, the exact nature of 
which I wasn't told at the time, but when we went out, Colonel Merle Smith had 
me prepare a cable which he revised to send out and the principal part of that 
other than the movement of this convoy was that the Dutch had ordered the 
execution of the Rainbow Plan, A-2. I remember, it's been almost three years 
now, and I can distinctly remember that particular part of the cable where it 
said A-2, repeat A-2, which was a part of the joint Abducan plan only to be 
taken in the event of war. It provided for specific occurrences they would 
counteract by certain other action. In other words, A-1 would have been some 
other direction expected attack, A-2 was from a particular direction, and they 
ordered the execution of this A-2. That was significant because the plan 
called for joint operations for the Australians and the Dutch and to the best 
of my knowledge our Navy if nothing else. That was to go into effect only in 
case of war and here the Dutch had ordered it. That was the definite 
information that it had gone into effect. There was a bit of flurried 
excitement with that, and Sir Charles Burnett asked us not to send that cable 
and Colonel Merle Smith, although impatient to send it, said that he would 
wait twelve hours at Sir Charles Burnett's specific request. In other words, 
they didn't say they wouldn't let that cable go out, but I dare say they 
probably would have stopped it had we tried to launch it. 

[2] CWC: Let me ask you_now that was on December 5? 

O'D: Sir, that was Thursday, the 4th, and we held it. 

CWC: In other words that's the 3rd our time. 

O'D: That's right, sir. 

CWC: And you didn't send it actually until the 5th? 

O'D: Well, the reason for the delay was that there was a War Cabinet Meeting 
at which Sir Charles Burnett was to report this information to the Australian 
War Cabinet which was meeting in Melbourne that evening and he went from his 
office to the War Cabinet meeting. We, on our part, held the cable twelve 
hours, and I coded it and had it ready for dispatch and held on to it. In the 
cable (it was extremely urgent) this convoy, they had it doped out could get 
to somewhere. Either the Philippines or the Indies within, I believe it was, 
60 hours. And that is the way that we had figured it. So we sent the cable one 
copy to General MacArthur in his code that we had then and another copy in a 
different code to Hawaii with a repeat to the Commanding General, Hawaiian 
Department, the request to repeat it to Washington. In other words, we sent 
none direct to MILID as we would have done if time hadn't been such a factor. 
But, we were extremely laborious in writing-



Page 61

CWC: In other words, you fellows instead of having a drop copy for Hawaii, you 
gave it to Hawaii and told them-

O'D: And told them to repeat it here, sir, and then send another copy to the 
Philippines. There was no hint of Pearl Harbor in this whatsoever. It wholly 
concerned itself with the Philippines and the Indies, and it looked like the 
Indies at that precise moment would be the first to get it. Now, we sent that 
cable, that would be the morning of the 5th their time, and I see in the 
papers where Dixon denied that his country had any information of an attack on 
Pearl Harbor, and it was reported to the press in that way, which is so. But 
they did have a warning of action in the Philippines or in the South Pacific 
Area. I would say it is inescapable that they did. I don't know_we never had 
any acknowledgment of the cable from either Hawaii or the Philippines, and we 
never heard anything from MILID to let us know whether or not it had reached 
them. Of course, the subsequent events were such that it might have been 
overlooked. The file copy was destroyed_ah, this looks like it. That's it, 
sir, Netherlands Far East Command on Execution of Plan A-2. Naval moves in 
Mindanao_ (interrupted) 

CWC: General Osmun, this is Lieutenant O'Dell. 

RAO: O'Dell. 

[3] O'D: How do you do, sir. 

RAO: Mighty glad to know you. 

O'D: Pleased to meet you, sir. 

CWC: He's giving us some information here in connection with this Pearl Harbor 
business. 

RAO: I've heard about it. 

CWC: You've heard about Pearl Harbor?

RAO: Ha! Ha! I'll tell you sometime about a year from now at Christmas we'll 
all get together and celebrate that. I'm glad to have met you. 

O'D: Thank you, sir. 

O'D: What made us particularly angry about this was that the next morning the 
newspaper came out in the early edition with a certain part of this 
information about the Indies. And, after we had held the cable up at their 
request, Colonel Merle-Smith naturally raised a great deal of trouble over why 
we had had to hold our cable and the press had gotten an inkling of it; they 
hadn't gotten the works, sir, but they had an inkling. That is the message in 
particular, sir. That is the one.

CWC: Notice the footnote down there. 

O'D: "And relayed to War Department message center" (reading From message). 
(Interrupted by telephone. CWC talked for some time with General Strong)

O'D: We expected action to take place on Sunday our time, and we all went down 
to the office on Sunday and waited with bated breath, and nothing happened 
Sunday. That led us to believe that, well, this was another of those scares. 
As you can probably guess, sir, we had had several previous warnings of 
impending action in time to reflect that in the reports and cables that we had 
sent. One other positive action was that Kopang_two days before this happened_
received fifty (the Japanese Consul received) cases which he wished to have in 
under Diplomatic privilege and it was refused by the Dutch and opened by the 
Dutch before he could get them back on this Japanese ship. 



Page 62

I think that was the trouble, there wasn't a Japanese ship that he could put 
it on. And, when they opened it, they found a complete, well not radar because 
radar wasn't in the state that we now know it but it was a sending and 
receiving radio set, and we had had information about that. Also, [4] of 
course, all the Japanese shipping had been pulled back into Japanese waters 
for at least sixty days before. And, then on the afternoon that this was sent, 
we sent that in the morning, the Japanese consul in Melbourne, who was under 
surveillance, was seen to burn all of his codes in the backyard. Nobody, of 
course, was able to make a move to stop him, but they saw that.

CWC. You're sure this was sent out from Singapore, or where was it sent from? 

O'D. From Melbourne, sir. 

CWC. Melbourne on the fifth. 

O'D. The fifth, in the morning, sir. 

EWG. According to this copy, Colonel, this was received by Signals Hawaii, 
don't know when, but it was relayed to the War Department arriving here at the 
night of Pearl Harbor day, December 7, with a memo on it that this was 
addressed to CG, Hawaii and relayed here with request for decipherment and 
repeat back to them. 

CWC. Well, we got that in there with old man Smith's note. 

EWG. Yes. We have that. The only thing is, it is curious why Signals Hawaii 
held that so long. They couldn't decipher it; maybe they thought they could, I 
don't know. 

O'D. It was sent positively in a code which Hawaii had. 

CWC. What did you use? 

O'D. The information that was on the code and cipher. We used the Secret book 
with the cipher table. 

CWC. Did you use the black book or the red book? Do you remember? 

O'D. If I saw it, of course, I could identify it. As I remember it, it was 
gray. I don't remember. There was a thick confidential and a thin secret and 
then there were the cipher tables that were changed every thirty days, and we 
were very careful to pick one. That's why we had to code it twice, once in a 
code that we knew Hawaii had and once in one the Philippines had because the 
Philippines had different codes entirely from Hawaii, and we had to_well, you 
can imagine. That is a rather laborious job, a message like that. 

CWC. The message we got in said it was held 17 hours. 

O'D. That was 17 hours, sir, from one afternoon until the next morning. I see 
they have a question mark under what government. It was the Australian 
government. We put that in the message. 

[5] EWG. Did you ever in Australia hear of any information indicating that 
there was a task force sailing toward Pearl Harbor? 

O'D. Not toward Pearl Harbor, sir. We never had any information or anything in 
that direction. We knew of a task force in the South China Sea, and whether it 
was headed for the Philippines or whether it was headed for any part of the 
Indies, the reconnaissance information that was available to us did not 
specify. 

CWC. Did you know about the build up of a task force in the Marshalls? 

O'D. Yes, sir. 

CWC. You did know about that.



Page 63

O'D. Yes, sir, through the Australian Government again. Mostly the RAAF. They 
were the ones rather than the Army or the Navy, it was the RAAF that was 
feeding us what information of value- 

CWC. How far in advance of Pearl Harbor did you know that, do you recall? 

O'D. I should say it was in that same week. Probably early in that week. That 
was toward the latter part of the week. I should say in the early part of that 
week, sir. We had been following the Japanese disposition of troops and had 
sent a report, a regular M/A report on the disposition of all Japanese 
divisions about a month before all this came up, which was used merely to 
confirm what other reports were here. It was just how the Australians had the 
disposition of the Japanese Army and which we sent in confirming the other 
information here. Shipping, as I say, we knew that all the Japanese shipping 
had been moved back into its own territorial waters. Most of our information 
led us to the definite and inescapable conclusion that war was going to break 
here, nothing about Pearl Harbor, sir. 

CWC. Well, of course, that is a typical Jap stunt. Now, who is this Sir 
Charles Burnett again? 

O'D. He was Chief of Staff of the RAAF. He has been sent back to England now. 
He is an RAF officer who was on loan, and it was through him and Air Commodore 
Hewett, he was an intelligence officer that we had disposal of whatever 
information they had, and they did, of course, cooperate a great deal with us. 
But the message that you have there, sir, which is the same one exactly as we 
sent it out, and a pretty good decipherment as well, Colonel Merle Smith was 
exceedingly careful, and he was the opposite of an alarmist. He would not put 
anything in a cable that he didn't have absolutely down under his thumb 
perfectly. 

CWC. Yes, I knew Merle Smith. I knew him very well. 

[6] O'D. And you can see from that cable, sir, that he put nothing that would 
tend to alarm that wasn't definite fact that he could attribute to something 
precise. 

EWG. Do you know whether or not Hawaii knew what this plan A-2 was? 

O'D. We believed that they did. That point came up because of the Naval, 
because of Pearl Harbor being the Naval Headquarters and the Plan A-2 being 
for U. S. participation mostly in a naval manner. We certainly assumed that if 
anybody knew A-2, Pearl Harbor did know it. Now, whether the Army would show 
that to the Navy and that sort of thing, we naturally left up to them. But 
this Naval Plan, you see there was a Naval Attache in Melbourne, Captain 
Coursey, and we informed him of that and curiously enough Captain Coursey did 
not send any message like that. I do not believe he did. I'm not qualified to 
say for certain, but he was not in the same state that we were about it. What 
I am trying to say is that what we sent back might not have seemed such a 
positive indication, but that everything where we were definitely led to the 
assumption that war was going to break out. This was about the third or fourth 
time it had happened, but this time it really seemed in a state where in 60 
hours that task force was going to be somewhere and with all this code burn



Page 64

ing and various other indications from all sorts that I knew about and no 
doubt they knew more than I did, it looked like this time it was going to be 
the end, and, as I say, we expected it on our Sunday and that Sunday came and 
went and nothing happened, and we had a let down, and then of course it was 
Monday, our time, that it happened. He put nothing in that cable that wouldn't 
be- 

EWG. Well, this cable says the Netherlands Command at 8 A. M. on 7 December 
reported planes to have reached Kopang. Could you have sent it before?

O'D. That was added, sir, on the morning as was the fact that it was delayed. 
In other words we had to re-write it because the situation was changing 
momentarily.

EWG. Then you don't think that this was-

O'D. No, sir, that went out on Friday. 

EWG. Do you think that might have been a mistake in deciphering?

O'D. Yes, sir. You see the meat of the thing: the suggestion that the RAAF 
likewise take reciprocal action. In other words "we're going to live up to our 
obligation-".

EWG. This date bothered me. That's all. 

O'D. Well, it bothers me a bit, sir. That is the only copy I that know of in 
existence. The file copy was destroyed by the present Military Attache with 
all old papers, about two years ago. 

[7] CWC. Do you think that the Australians notified their people here? Do you 
have any way of knowing that, or any opinion?

O'D. I know that our own Minister was not informed of the situation. You see, 
of course, the capitol, sir, is in Canberra, and we were stationed in 
Melbourne because that was the scene of activity. The War Cabinet met the 
previous night. That's when Sir Charles Burnett had told them this 
information. Whether the War Cabinet, who would be the body then who would 
have instructed them to let Washington know-. Sir Owen Dixon wasn't here then. 
He was a shipping man in Australia, and Mr. Casey was here.

CWC. Casey was the guy that was here then. 

O'D. That's right, sir. Mr. Casey. 

CWC. I know there was a roar about it when they pulled him out of here. 

O'D. Yes, sir, that's right, sir, jealousy I think. Whether or not they sent a 
cable to_I rather doubt that they did, sir, because, as I say, the Australian 
Government wasn't too happy about our sending this out even after the delay. I 
mean they realized that it was inescapable, and we had to keep our government 
informed, but-.

CWC. Well, there is one thing I'd like to get straight in my own mind. Now, 
when Burnett gave Merle Smith this information, he gave it to you with the 
understanding that you not transmit it. 

O'D. No, sir, when he told it to us we were getting ready to send it out. It 
was only after we had the cable_you see, we were there over an hour, over two 
hours, that afternoon, and the information was dribbling in in spurts, and we 
had that and it was only when we were getting ready to go, which was around 
seven o'clock, that the War Cabinet meeting was called. I shouldn't say before 
six thirty, at the time we came out there, it wasn't scheduled. They called 
this emergency meeting and at that time when we had prepared the cable and 
were getting ready to go code it, Sir Charles Burnett requested very 
specifically that it not be sent, that we hold it up until he had 



Page 65

informed the War Cabinet. I rather think that that is why he didn't want the 
information to leave Melbourne. In other words, he hadn't told his own 
government yet.

CWC. In other words he wanted to spring it on his people first. 

O'D. Before there was any chance of our sending anything out, sir. 

CWC. That's logical.

O'D. I might say, sir, that because there were only two of us and because 
everything was happening day and night then, that was one of the last messages 
that we sent out in our own code. From then on we used the Australian cipher 
section back and forth.

[8] CWC: Why?

O'D: Well, sir, we weren't too sure of our codes to the Philippines. We knew 
they had the cipher device, but we weren't sure of the security afforded by 
the cipher device. 

CWC: You mean the cylindrical? 

O'D: That's right. After the outbreak of war, you see, sir. 

CWC: But it was secure before the outbreak of war?

O'D: Once the show broke and we were going back and forth between General 
MacArthur's headquarters and Australia, we were given the use of the 
Australian code and it was mostly of a liaison nature, anyway, as to whether 
General MacArthur could send a plane here on reconnaissance or a plane there 
or what could be expected in one way or another. There were so many messages 
coming and going. General MacArthur would send us messages. Sir Charles 
Burnett would ask us for certain information from the Philippines. You see 
Washington was pretty far removed from us at that time. We didn't know what 
delays would be encountered in the cables going through Hawaii to Washington, 
which was the only means of sending any message here, and there were matters 
which would come up which we would want answered in 5 or 6 hours, which we 
knew we'd never get to Washington and back in that time, and it concerned what 
General MacArthur would be able to tell us and which Washington could only 
have to ask someone else for. So, we had quite a bit of correspondence back 
and forth by cable and wireless from the Philippines to Australia as soon as 
the war broke out. We simply didn't have the means, I mean it would take at 
least three hours to do a job like that message there. By that time the 
information was not even wanted. So, we had this coming and going. We moved 
our office right into the RAAF Headquarters.

CWC: They had the machines then, too, didn't they?

O'D: No, sir, they did not. They had_I can assure you that Colonel Merle Smith 
went into it to the last detail, no violations of any security. 

CWC: Oh, no, I wasn't thinking about that. Mine was just a question of the 
time factor. There is one question I want to ask you. This has nothing to do 
with Pearl Harbor. Were you aware of that convoy which was at sea when Pearl 
Harbor hit? 

O'D: Yes, sir.

CWC: Were you aware of the correspondence when they sent it all over the whole 
damned South Pacific? 

O'D: Then, sir, we started getting messages from General Marshall in a code 
that was, at first one message came and we didn't have the code. They repeated 
the message in a different code, and we had that code, and curiously went 
through that and got that, it was a 



Page 66

[9] double transposition, which, of course, didn't use the book. We got that, 
and, of course, that was a long one there again. We were having our troubles. 
We got that deciphered, and it was from General Marshall, and we called that 
the Pensacola, sir, that was under escort by one cruiser, which was the 
Pensacola. We would do about ten of those in one message, sir. One little 
error in the first and you go back and do the whole thing over again, and you 
can't tell until after you've finished that you've made an error, when you 
start to get your word groups. But we had heard, we got several cables about 
the arrival of the Pensacola convoy, including what was on it. As I remember, 
there were A-24's and P-40's. There were, I think 26 P-40's and 18 A-24's. 
Immediately Sir Charles Burnett want to know what was the A-24. Well, sir, 
frankly the means at o disposal there, the Air Force manuals on what the A-
24's were, didn't get far, and that was a little annoying.

CWC: That was that Mitchell dive bomber?

O'D: That's right, sir, single engine and, of course, the A-20 was a twin 
engine, and the question in Sir Charles Burnett's mind was, is it a single 
engine or is it a twin engine. They wanted those planes and they had to make 
arrangements for staging areas for them and discharge and so forth, and it was 
rather difficult to do without that information. Still, by the time we wired 
to Washington to ask them (we didn't, of course, because, with everything 
happening all over) they were going to land. They were due on the 23rd of 
December, sir. They arrived in Brisbane and we went up to Brisbane to meet the 
convoy. 

CWC: Some of my old gang in the Second Air Force were on that. That 
interceptor outfit that came out with them. 

O'D: Yes, sir, they were destined, of course, for the Philippines and South 
Hawaii. General Brereton had sent a mission down. General MacArthur had sent 
General Brereton with a mission of about eight men, eight officers, from the 
Philippines in the latter part of November, and General Brereton had arrived 
at Darwin and Colonel Merle Smith went up to Darwin and flew over to Rabaul 
with them. And I met them in Brisbane and they went on this mission. They were 
primarily concerned with the fueling facilities for B-17's being flown out 
from Hawaii via Rabaul, Darwin and then up through the Indies to the 
Philippines. They were trying to arrange for petrol from the Shell Oil Company 
and airports, airports principally. That was where we got about a 60 day 
start, not quite that, about a 45 day start on building airports around Darwin 
which were later used when they evacuated the B-17's, these strips through the 
jungle. General Brereton, of course, had come down in plain clothes. He 
wouldn't have been allowed in the country in uniform at that time. He had 
flown down here, and we took them all around looking for airports where we 
could land them. Then, of course, this Pensacola convoy came in. 

CWC: Yes, I remember all those things. Well, I don't think there is anything 
else unless you have something you want to add to what you have said.

O'D: No, sir, I just wanted you to have_ 

CWC. All right. Well, I'm awfully glad you came in, and I appreciate your 
taking the trouble. It's nice to have seen you.

O'D: Thank you very much, sir.



Page 67

TESTIMONY OF COL. OTIS K. SADTLER

[1] Place: Room 2C637
Pentagon Building, Washington. D C.
Date: 16 September 1944. 
Time: 0945-1030, 
Present: Colonel Carter W. Clarke.
         Colonel Otis K. Sadtler.
         Lt. Col. E. W. Gibson. 

Colonel Otis K. Sadtler, having been sworn and warned of his rights by Colonel 
Carter W. Clarke, gave the following sworn testimony: 

Col. CLARKE. Will you state you name, rank, organization and station. 

Col. SADTLER. Otis K. Sadtler, 03577, Headquarters Army Ground Forces, War 
College, Washington, D. C. 

Col. CLARKE. When did you become Chief of Army Communications Service, 
approximately what date? 

Col. SADTLER. About the 7th of August 1941. 

Col. CLARKE. You held that position at the time of Pearl Harbor 

Col. SADTLER. I did. 

Col. CLARKE. As such were you responsible for the production of what is known 
as Magic or Ultra intelligence?

Col. SADTLER. I was. 

Col. CLARKE. Did you have access to this?

Col. SADTLER. I did. 

Col. CLARKE. Did you read the messages before they were sent to G_2? 

Col. SADTLER. In general yes, not always. 

Col. CLARKE. Were you familiar with a message which was received in the SIS on 
or about November 28 which later became known as the Winds message?

Col. SADTLER. I am familiar with that message. 

Col. CLARKE. I hand you that and ask if you can identify it_ #25432. 

Col. SADTLER. That is the message, yes. 

[2] Col. CLARKE. Will you state what, to the best of your knowledge, belief 
and recollection, you know of the history of this message and any implementing 
message which may have been received regarding it? 

Col. SADTLER. It is my recollection that that message was intercepted by the 
Navy and we asked the Federal Communications Commission to monitor all press 
broadcasts from Japan as a result of that message. 

Col. CLARKE. BY "we" you mean Signal Corps?

Col. SADTLER. Yes, and Col. Guest, as I recall, was the man who made the 
arrangements. The FCC put their Wharton station on these broadcasts from Japan 
and made arrangements with the telephone company to contact Col. Bratton, the 
G-2 liaison officer at that time, directly if they heard anything regarding 
the implementing of that message. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Meaning message #25432. 

Col. SADTLER. That Winds message. We contacted the FCC from time to time and 
asked them whether anything had been heard that could give us any clue as to 
when that was going to happen, etc. The 



Page 68

first information that I had regarding any new developments on that message 
was on the morning of December 5, when Adm. Noyes called me and said, "Sadtler 
that message is in," or words to that effect. Adm. Noyes was the head of Navy 
communications service which included this code and cipher work. I went 
immediately to General Sherman Miles' office, who was G-2 of the Army at the 
time, and told him that the message was in and that it was to the effect that 
war would be declared between Japan and Great Britain. He said, "Wait a 
minute, I will get Col. Bratton." Bratton came in almost immediately. I told 
him what Adm. Noyes had told me and he said, "What was the word?" I told him I 
didn't know what the word was. He took out a little slip of paper he had in 
his pocket which had the Japanese words shown in this message and asked me if 
it was one of those I said, "I don't know but it is the one that means war 
with Japan and Great Britain." He said, "Do you think you can verify this?" 
and I said, "I will go back and call Adm. Noyes." The reason I had to go back 
to call Adm. Noyes was that the Secret phone was in my office. I called Adm. 
Noyes and he said something to the effect that, "I don't know any more 
Japanese than you do; it's the one of Japan and Great Britain." I said, "Do 
you think you can verify it?" He said, "I can't do it [3] now because I must 
report to the Chief of Naval Operations but I will do it later." I said it 
would be too late then. 

I then returned to Gen. Miles' office and told him that Adm. Noyes did not 
know the word but that it was the one that war was going to be declared 
between Japan and Great Britain. They said, "Well unless there is something 
definite as to the meaning of this word this may be a false alarm." There was 
some other conversation on the subject, and as I recall I was instructed by 
Gen. Miles to make sure that FCC and other agencies listened on that Japanese 
press broadcast and to let him know of any future developments. I then 
returned to my office. 

Col. CLARKE. Did you ever discuss this with anybody else? Did you make any 
report of this to the Chief Signal Officer, for example, or to the Chief of 
Staff or Secretary of General Staff? 

Col. SADTLER. No, it wasn't told to anyone else in the Signal Corps because 
the Chief Signal Officer was in Panama at the time. That was discussed in War 
Plans Division and it was to some extent discussed with the Secretary of the 
General Staff, Col. Smith. 

Col. CLARKE. Did they evidence any interest in this case? 

Col. SADTLER. Not a great deal. As I remember, Gen. Gerow made a statement 
that they had been adequately warned. 

Col. CLARKE. By they you mean the department commanders? 

Col. SADTLER. Hawaii, Panama and Philippines. Col. Smith decided that nothing 
further should be done because it had been discussed with G-2 and War Plans. 

Col. CLARKE. Will you state what you know about any action that may have been 
taken on the morning of December 7. 

Col. SADTLER. I did not go to the office on the morning of December 7. 
Anything that I can say about December 7 is as a result of going down to the 
office afterwards. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. This Col. Smith is Col. Bedell Smith, now General? 

Col. SADTLER. That's the one. 

[4] Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did you talk to Col. Smith personally about the 5th of 
December? 



Page 69

Col. SADTLER. It was the morning of the 5th, Friday morning, after I talked to 
G-2. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. And he asked you if you had talked with G-2? 

Col. SADTLER. He asked me what I had done as a result of this and I told him I 
had been to G-2 and that I had visited WPD and had seen Col. Gaily and Gen. 
Gerow. Gaily had nothing to say but Gen. Gerow said they had had plenty of 
warning. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Did you ever, prior to Pearl Harbor, tell this to Gen. 
Marshall? 

Col. SADTLER. Personally, no. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Do you know of anybody who did?

Col. SADTLER. I don't know if Gen. Marshall ever knew it. 

ROUND TABLE DISCUSSION

[1]

Place: Room 2C637
Pentagon Building, Washington, D. C. 
Date: 14 September 1944. 
Time: 1330-1430. 

Present: Major General Sherman Miles.
         Brigadier General Hayes A. Kroner.
         Colonel John T. Bissell.
         Colonel Rufus Bratton.
         Colonel Carter W. Clarke.
         Lieutenant Colonel E. W. Gibson. 

Gen. MILES (to Col. BISSELL). Definitely you confirmed yesterday my impression 
that the information we got from F. B. I. through the translations or 
intercepts of their messages at Hawaii was not given to us and was not 
available in fact to F. B. I. until after Pearl Harbor. 

Col. BISSELL. That is correct. 

Gen. MILES. I think you also said that we got nothing from the F. B. I. before 
Pearl Harbor indicating the possibilities of an open break of war with the 
United States.

Col. BISSELL. That is correct, too. 

Col. CLARKE. Where did this message come from here on December 3 that they 
were burning the codes? Where did that information come from_it is in the 
Roberts Report. It apparently was the Navy and it must have had something 
which McCullom didn't make available to you. Bissell says he knew about 
burning the codes on the morning of December 7. That was in the papers of 
course. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Was there much interchange between the F. B. I. and G-2 prior 
to Pearl Harbor? 

Col. BISSELL. Oh yes, there was a great deal but not of this nature. 

Col. CLARKE. It was all on domestic intelligence. 

Gen. MILES. Oh, no, there was a lot on South American stuff and a lot on 
Japanese stuff. I had a personal meeting with Hoover and ONI once a week. 

[2] Lt. Col. GIBSON. Had you ever asked them if they had anything on Hawaii, 
any information of Japanese activities in Hawaii prior to Pearl Harbor? 

Col. BISSELL. Yes, to a great extent. The F. B. I. kept us informed as to the 
locations of these Japanese military attaches and then when they passed into 
Panama I in turn notified the G-2, with Gen. Miles' 




Page 70

consent, where they were going, and they in turn shadowed them in Panama, and 
if they turned up in Hawaii we got information both from the F. B. I. and our 
own people. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Why was it that the F. B. I. suddenly started to turn over to 
you after Pearl Harbor information that might have been helpful before Pearl 
Harbor? 

Col BISSELL. They didn't have it before. 

Gen. MILES. They were held down. 

Col. BRATTON. I would like to clear this up. I understand that you (Col. 
Bissell) and Gen. Kroner have stated that this material (referring to Top 
Secret) was not made available to you prior to Pearl Harbor. I am of the 
distinct impression that, under orders from Gen. Miles, I did make it 
available to you before Pearl Harbor in the form of memorandums that had to do 
with certain subversive activities. I told you sometime before Pearl Harbor 
that I had a source of information which_ 

Col. BISSELL. I don't remember the date. That may have been before Pearl 
Harbor. 

Col. BRATTON. I am of the distinct impression that that was initiated sometime 
before Pearl Harbor, and I am also of the distinct impression that these 
things were made available to you, at Gen. Miles' order, prior to Pearl Harbor 
and that you (Gen. Kroner) and Betts used to read them in the evening in the 
office. 

Gen. KRONER That is not my impression. I am aware of such (Top Secret) 
existing but I remember very clearly_ 

Col. Bratton. Pursuant to instructions to you and an understanding with the 
General here, when anything was hot I used to run to General Miles first and I 
always acquainted you with what I had done afterwards at your convenience. 

[3] Gen. KRONER. I do not remember that procedure with regard to signal 
intelligence or what was known as Magic. I do not remember any specific 
instance. 

Col. BRATTON. I cannot recall any specific instance, but I am under the 
impression you knew what had gone between General Miles and myself. 

Gen. KRONER. Well I have just the opposite impression and that is that it was 
General Miles' wish, not expressed specifically but as I got it in working 
with you and his not talking about it to me specifically, that he wished it to 
continue to be handled between you two and that would form the basis of 
information, with your general information, and you advised me about the 
Philippines or about the Far Eastern situation according to the information 
you had available to you. 

Gen. MILES. Your section, Bratton, was part of Kroner's Branch. Now it is 
true, I remember, that we were always closing in on Magic making it more 
secure all the time_trying to_and that we had several people outside of the 
Munitions Building to serve. It was my definite desire and direction, I think, 
that you would handle the mechanics of Magic direct with me and the Chief of 
Staff, and later WPD, ONI etc., but that you were to inform your Chief of 
anything important and certainly use Magic in your estimate of the Far East 
that you were giving to your Chief, Gen. Kroner. I am pretty sure that was the 
definite arrangement. 

Col. BRATTON. That is my understanding too.



Page 71

Gen KRONER. My only comment on that is that I was never told or ever received 
the impression that you wanted me to be specifically informed, but I assumed 
from our association that you expected Bratton to use the information in an 
all around appreciation of what was available to him when he gave me an 
opinion about the Far East. 

Gen. MILES. I would like to ask Gen. Kroner if you can remember what your 
general impression of the Far Eastern situation was, of the probabilities of 
Japanese action whether against us or foreign powers, late in November or 
early in December. 

Gen. KRONER. That there were a number of lines of action open to Japan, mostly 
connected with the Asiatic Continent, [4] which she would be more likely to 
take in case she decided to go to war against England or America, and that my 
attention was focused, after frequent discussions with Col. Bratton and Col. 
Betts, on the Asiatic continent rather than toward the South Pacific. 

Gen. MILES. Then I would like to ask both of you this. I have just read today 
that excellent summary that you prepared last year on the information received 
in MID. From that I get the very distinct impression, and I can remember this 
was my impression at the time, that the bulk of our information, all of it 
including Magic, indicated the major probability of a Japanese move to the 
south, Indo China, Siam, Thailand, perhaps the Dutch West Indies, perhaps 
Malaya, that our general impression at that time was that that was the most 
probable Japanese move. We did not exclude war with the United States since we 
specifically mentioned the Philippines as being part of the Japanese southern 
push and in a war with the United States of course there was a possibility, 
particularly with the Japanese, that a surprise attack might be made anywhere, 
certainly including Hawaii which had been armed and prepared for such an 
attack for twenty years. 

Col. BRATTON. But that initially, as I have testified this morning, any attack 
against an American installation in the middle or eastern Pacific would be in 
the nature of a diversion and having as its objective the immobilizing of any 
force that we might call in to help the Dutch and British in west and 
southwest Pacific, but as you say their primary initial objective was the 
destruction of Great Britain's power in southeast Asia and the seizure of-

Gen. MILES. We don't very greatly differ there. I don't know that I would have 
said at the time that an attack on Hawaii or the Panama Canal, if made, would 
be a diversion. It would be a pretty serious attack to attain the objective, 
but not likely in view of the mass of information that we had as to the 
southern push. Is that more what you remember, Kroner? 

Gen. KRONER. Yes. 

Col. CLARKE. In view of what you have just stated here with reference to this 
great mass of information, didn't you consider it was equally the 
responsibility of the Chief of the War Plans Division to advise the Chief of 
Staff, as much [5] his responsibility as it was yours with reference to any 
potential attack which we might expect from Japan or any line of action that 
Japan might take? 

Gen. MILES. It was the primary responsibility of Military Intelligence, always 
is and always will be, to advise the Command what the enemy may do and 
possibly do or more probably do. It is certainly the responsibility of 
Operations to advise the Chief of Staff 



Page 72

what we should do as the result of information received in Military 
Intelligence from their sources. I certainly considered it then a part of my 
business to know, in general terms, the disposition of American forces and 
rather specifically our defense plans of vital installations such as the 
Panama Canal, Hawaii, and the Philippines. I certainly knew the location of 
the major parts of the U. S. Fleet. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. In other words, General, once you informed the Chief of Staff 
and the War Plans Division the possibility of an attack it was then up to the 
WPD, through the Chief of Staff, to inform our forces what plan to put into 
effect? 

Gen. MILES Yes, a command responsibility. Now Bratton, in reading your 
testimony, it gave me the impression that the Magic that you selected for the 
Secretary of State might not be and was not in some cases perhaps quite the 
same as that presented to the Chief of Staff and to me. 

Col. BRATTON. No, if you got that impression from anything I said I wish to 
correct it at this time. The Secretary of State never saw document that was 
not presented to you, the Chief of Staff and WPD, as far as I am concerned. 

Gen. MILES. Vice versa, was any document presented to the Chief of Staff that 
was not also presented to the Secretary of State? 

Col. BRATTON. Yes, very often. 

Gen. MILES. Really? 

Col. BRATTON. Initially, but in our final breakdown of the thing it was the 
understanding that Mr. Hull was to see all [6] the communications that you and 
General Marshall saw. 

Gen. MILES. And that had been in effect for sometime previous to Pearl Harbor. 

Col. BRATTON. Yes. When I first started handling this stuff the State 
Department didn't see any of it. It was not until our relations with Japan 
became rather strained that I was instructed to serve it to the State 
Department at all. 

Gen. MILES. I remember that, but for months preceding Pearl Harbor exactly the 
same selections from Magic which you made went to the Secretary of State, the 
Chief of Staff, the A. C. of S., G-2, WPD, and the Secretary of War. 

Col. BRATTON. Identical. 

Col. CLARKE. This meeting is primarily for the purpose of getting the four of 
you together here to iron out any little differences. 

Col. BISSELL. After Bratton talked, I do recall now_I was thinking primarily 
of Japanese information at the time_Bratton did give me in the summer time 
various things which applied to domestic things as Communism and things of 
that nature. It was not primarily Japanese. 

Col. CLARKE. One thing I want to bring out, you did not receive any raw 
material? 

Col. BISSELL. I never got any raw material until after Pearl Harbor.

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Going back to this so-called Winds matter again. Gen. Kroner, 
do you have any recollection of how this telegram was sent to G-2, Hawaii_how 
it happened to be sent on December 5, 1941, asking them to contact Commander 
Rochefort immediately regarding a Tokyo weather reference? 

Gen. KRONER. No, I have no knowledge of it.



Page 73

Col. BRATTON. I wrote that, had General Miles' O.K. and had it dispatched. 

Lt. Col. GIBSON. Who initiated it? 

Col. BRATTON. I did. The basis is in one of those messages there. 

Col. CLARKE. That message is November 19 and this is December 5. 

[7] Col. BRATTON. There were a number of these messages about this boogey-
woogey they were going to send out on weather broadcast. They changed them a 
number of times and finally it became apparent this was what they were going 
to do. 

Col. CLARKE. It has never been clear in my mind what brought this on. Sadtler 
said the message came in on the night of December 4 and on the morning of 
December 5 is when he went to General Miles with reference to this. This 
message is dated December 5. I wondered if by any chance you could recall 
whether or not Gen. Miles talked to you about it and told you to have the 
message sent, or whether McCullom, or maybe Sadtler. 

Col. BRATTON. I had discussed this weather announcement system with Commander 
McCullom of the Navy and was informed by him that the officer in Hawaii who 
had complete knowledge of all of these Magic messages and who could explain 
most readily to the Army officials the significance of the radio broadcast, 
was Commander Rochefort. 

Gen. MILES. So then this was a means of getting the information to Hawaii that 
the Winds message was out. Is that what you mean? 

Col. BRATTON. No, that this would be the most expeditious way of telling our 
people in Hawaii that relations between Japan and one or more countries would 
be broken off. 

Gen. MILES. If a certain message came through? 

Col. BRATTON. They were monitoring them in Hawaii; they got them there before 
we got them. They were listening to the same stuff we were, so my idea here 
was that if our G-2 got in touch with Rochefort, he having already received 
this code by broadcast, could tell our G-2 at once what it meant. It was a 
means of saving time. 

Col. CLARKE. Why did you wait two weeks? You got it on November 19 and told 
Hawaii on December 5. I am not clear on that. Circumstantial evidence points 
to the fact that Sadtler is partly accurate in what he says. 

Gen. MILES. The message of November 19 gave us the word which they would use 
in three cases. Now what Bratton is saying, if I understand correctly, is that 
this message of December 5 was a means of letting our G-2 know thoroughly not 
only that this code had been arranged [8] but the implementing message was in, 
which would account for the date of December 5. My recollection about at is 
very vague. 

Col. BRATTON. This accounts for some of the discrepancy in the timing. It 
wasn't translated until the 28th. 

Gen. MILES. The Winds Code message was not translated until November 28. 

Col. Bratton. And may not have been given to me until the 29th.

Col. CLARKE. What I am trying to prove is, was there any knowledge in G-2 of 
the implementing message?

Gen. MILES. I think that that is the correct explanation but, as I say, on 
that particular thing my memory is hazy, of the implementation of the Winds 
Code. I can conceive, however, of no reason for



Page 74

sending that message about Commander Rochefort except that Rochefort was in 
position not only to know the code but to know the implementation of the code.

Col. BRATTON. There were several nights when I sat up all night waiting for 
this thing to come through.

Gen. MILES. I am not trying to excuse my poor memory, but I can say that 
certainly from the 5th to the 7th of December there was little doubt in my 
mind that war was going to ensue. I wouldn't have said it was inevitable, but 
on the 6th the President appealed direct to the Emperor of Japan and there 
wasn't much doubt in our minds here that we were in a very difficult crisis. 

Lt. Col GIBSON. It seems to me that if you had notice that the Japanese were 
ordered to burn their codes on the 5th of December you wouldn't have forgotten 
that anyway. 

Gen. MILES. This (Winds message) says that these words mean "east wind rain" 
which means, according to this code, that the Japanese-U. S. Relations are in 
danger and also means that these code papers will be burned, but we knew 
damned well that the Japanese-U. S. relations were in danger. I cannot say 
that I did know of the implementing message. I can't explain why I knew and 
why Bratton didn't know if I knew. That is a blank in my memory. 

[9] Col. BRATTON. It isn't conceivable that you would have known of this 
without saying something to me about it because we were both waiting for the 
thing. 

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff

17 AUGUST 1945

Subject: Investigation regarding certain testimony of William F. Friedman, 
Director of Communications Research, Signal Security Agency, War Department, 
regarding alleged destruction of certain War Department records pertaining to 
Pearl Harbor.

1. The report of the investigation regarding statements of fact made by 
William F. Friedman in testimony before Admiral H. K. Hewitt of the U. S. Navy 
sometime prior to 5 July 1945 is attached hereto as TAB A. 

2. In view of the fact that the investigation being conducted by Admiral 
Hewitt is on the same level as that being conducted by Lt. Col. Henry C. 
Clausen, JAGD, it would seem that the release of information to the Navy, as 
requested by Admiral Hewitt in his letter of 5 July 1945, is a matter for 
determination by the Secretary of War. It is recommended, therefore, that the 
request of Admiral Hewitt and the results of this investigation be referred to 
Lt. Col. Clausen for preparation of such portion of the testimony in this case 
as the Secretary's office deems desirable to furnish Admiral Hewitt.

CARTER W. CLARKE
Brigadier General, GSC
Deputy Chief, MIS

1 Include.
  Tab A



Page 75

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff

13 August 1945

Subject: Investigation regarding certain testimony of William F. Friedman 
Director of Communications Research, Signal Security Agency, War Department, 
regarding alleged destruction of certain War Department records pertaining to 
Pearl Harbor.

1. The undersigned was appointed by the A. C. of S., G-2 to conduct an 
investigation regarding the manner in which certain Top Secret communications 
were handled, under authority of a letter of 9 September 1944 which read as 
follows: 

"It is desired that you designate officers of your Division to conduct an 
investigation and interrogations, in accordance with the oral instructions 
issued to you by the Chief of Staff regarding the manner in which certain Top 
Secret communications were handled. 

"The officers designated to conduct this investigation will be authorized to 
administer oaths for this purpose. 

"By order of the Secretary of War:

/s/ J. A. Ulio
    J. A. ULIO
Major General
The Adjutant General"

2. The investigation was completed in September 1944. 

3. On about 8 July 1945, the undersigned was instructed to reopen the 
investigation to investigate certain statements made by William F. Friedman in 
testimony before Admiral H. K. Hewitt of the Department of the Navy earlier in 
July 1945. 

4. The investigation was re-opened on 13 July 1945 in Room 2E780, Pentagon 
Building. Testimony under oath was taken of Mr. William F. Friedman, Director 
of Communications Research, [2] Signal Security Agency, War Department; Col. 
Otis K. Sadtler, Signal Officer of the Army Ground Forces; Brig. Gen. Isaac 
Spalding, presently stationed at Ft. McPherson, Georgia; Maj. Gen. Ralph C. 
Smith, presently Military Attache to France and, during the days of Pearl 
Harbor, Executive Officer of the Military Intelligence Division; and Brig. 
Gen. John T. Bissell, Headquarters 89th Division, Artillery, APO 89, c/o 
Postmaster, New York. At the time of Pearl Harbor, Gen. Bissell was Chief of 
the Counter-intelligence Branch of the Military Intelligence Division. There 
as also introduced into evidence the testimony of Mr. William F. Friedman as 
given before Admiral H. K. Hewitt.

5. All the testimony taken was stenographically reported and transcribed.

6. All the testimony and evidence received have been considered and, as a 
result of this consideration, I find the following facts:

a. That shortly before 5 July 1945, William F. Friedman, Director 
Communications Research, Signal Security Agency, War Department testified 
before Admiral H. K. Hewitt of the Department of Navy in an investigation 
pertaining to the Pearl Harbor disaster. In his testimony Mr. Friedman 
testified, along with other things, as follows: 

"Approximately a year and a half ago I had a conversation with Colonel 
Sadtler, who came to duty in Washington about then, and we talked about



Page 76

Pearl Harbor because of the fact that he had been the head of our 
communications service at the time, and he indicated that he had tried his 
best to urge that some specific warning message be sent out to the Department 
commander. He indicated that the "winds" code execute message had come in on 
the-some time on the 4th or 5th of December. I don't think that he was clear 
himself as to which of those two days it was. If I remember correctly, he was 
either notified himself by somebody in the Navy, possibly Admiral Noyes that 
the message was in_"It's in," as I recall it, was the expression used-or it 
may be that the Navy source called Army G-2 and indicated that they had had 
word that the message was in, and that Colonel Sadtler was then called to G-2 
to corroborate the interception of the message. 

"At any rate, there was a question as to the exact word, the Japanese word, 
that was used and when Colonel Sadtler couldn't indicate the word, because he 
hadn't seen the message himself, I think they tried_I think he said [3] that 
they tried to get a verification from whoever it was_Admiral Noyes_but they 
weren't successful, whereupon the G-2 authorities simply passed the matter 
over. There was apparently nothing to substantiate the existence of the 
message. 

"*Then, if I remember correctly, I asked Colonel Sadtler whether he had a 
copy, had ever gotten or seen a copy of this message, and his answer was, it I 
remember correctly, that he hadn't himself seen a copy, but that he had been 
told by somebody that the copies had been ordered or directed to be destroyed 
by General Marshall. Of course, I regarded this as merely hearsay evidence and 
nothing more than that: highly inconceivable that such a thing would happen. 
And when I talked over the Pearl Harbor story with Captain Safford, I probably 
just passed that out as one of those crazy things that yet started. I 
shouldn't have done it. I certainly had no idea that he would repeat it."

b. I find that Mr. Friedman was not told by Col. Sadtler the facts as outlined 
in the last paragraph of Finding a, but was told by Col. Sadtler at some time 
in 1943 that Brig. Gen. Isaac Spalding had told Col. Sadtler that Brig. Gen. 
J. T. B. Bissell had told Gen Spalding that everything pertaining to Pearl 
Harbor was being destroyed or had been destroyed. 

c. I find that Col. Sadtler was told by Brig. Gen. Isaac Spalding sometime in 
August 1943 that Brig. Gen. J. T. B. Bissell had told Gen. Spalding that 
certain messages, pertaining to Pearl Harbor, had been received and were in 
the files of G-2 on 7 December 1941 and that Bissell had deemed it most 
necessary to destroy them.

d. I find that Brig. Gen. Isaac Spalding was not told by Brig. Gen. J. T. B. 
Bissell that certain messages had been received and were in the files of G-2 
and that he (Bissell) deemed it most necessary to destroy them. 

e. I find that Col. Sadtler did not tell Mr. Friedman that Gen. Spalding had 
told Col. Sadtler that certain messages implementing the Winds Code message 
were destroyed as a result of an order or direction of Gen. Marshall. 

f. I find that no written message implementing the Winds Code message was ever 
received by G-2, and I find that no records pertaining to Pearl Harbor have 
been destroyed by G-2 or by anybody connected with G-2. 

CARTER W. CLARKE,
Brigadier General, GSC
Deputy Chief, MIS

Page maintained by Larry W. Jewell, lwjewell@omni.cc.purdue.edu. Created: 12/12/96 Updated: 12/12/96