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PART II
PEARL HARBOR INVESTIGATION
(On the oral directive of the Chief of Staff, Brig. Gen. Carter W. Clarke is
now re-opening the investigation concerning Pearl Harbor)
13 JULY 1945
FINDINGS
TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM F. FRIEDMAN
[1] Place: Room 2E780,
The Pentagon.
Date: 13 July 1945, 1:00 p. m.
Present: Brig. Gen. Carter W. Clarke.
Colonel E. W. Gibson.
Mr. William F. Friedman.
Gen. CLARKE. I have been directed by Gen. Marshall to reopen this
investigation on the basis of the old order that we had here last September 9
when we started this investigation. I would like to remind you that you are
still under oath with reference to that and I would like to re-swear you in,
in connection with this new investigation. Do you solemnly swear to tell the
truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?
Mr. FRIEDMAN. I do.
Gen. CLARKE State your name, rank, position and organization.
Mr. FRIEDMAN. William F. Friedman, Director of Communications Research, Signal
Security Agency, War Department.
Gen CLARKE. I would like you to refresh your memory on this matter by looking
that letter and statement over before we ask you some questions about it. It
is a statement sent by the Navy bearing date of 5 July 1945 enclosing your
testimony before Adm. Hewitt, together with letter from Hewitt to Marshall.
Gen CLARKE. Will you state, to the best of your knowledge and belief and
recollection, just what conversations you have had with Capt. Safford on this
whole subject of the Winds message from the very beginning.
Mr. FRIEDMAN. Well that would go back to a period of about 18 months ago when
Capt. Safford apparently began to collect material, either on his own behalf
or at the direction of some higher authorities, having a bearing upon the
Pearl Harbor attack. In the course of his studies he prepared a list of the
pertinent message or messages which he thought pertinent that came out of the
Navy cryptanalytic bureau. Of course at that time we were working very closely
with the Navy on the diplomatic side and we exchanged fully translations and
technical data. There were some cases in which he wanted to piece out some
things which might have been missing from his list of messages. He asked the
Signal Security Agency_well he asked me first_to
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supply [2] certain of this material, which was supplied only after approval
had been obtained to supply whatever was necessary. In the course of getting
together these materials we compared notes of our recollections and of the
dates because at that time he was head of the Navy cryptanalytic unit and I
was principal cryptanalyst in the Signal Intelligence Service, and naturally I
had a deep interest in the whole affair. At about the same time as Capt.
Safford began his studies, I thought it would be interesting to collect
material of that nature too. And I had a good deal of such material collected
in the form of messages and in the form of reports, for example, the Roberts
published report, periodical literature that was pertinent, and of course the
technical files at the Agency were available for gathering together such
material as I was directed to gather together upon three or four instances_I
don't remember now just how many times. Well Capt. Safford came over to see me
at my office.
Col. GIBSON. When, about?
Mr. FRIEDMAN. I wish I had brought my notes. I can't place the date accurately
enough for this purpose, I am afraid.
Col. GIBSON. Do you have notes that could place it?
Mr. FRIEDMAN. I have some notes of dates of conversations, etc. I could place
it fairly accurately that way. It is 18 months ago anyhow and possibly more.
Gen. CLARKE. Suppose you refresh your memory on that from your notes and_
Mr. FRIEDMAN. I will do that. Then I was a member of a special committee in
connection with cryptographic security, and ad hoc committee, and we had
occasion to go over to the building where Capt. Safford had his office from
time to time, and every time I passed by he would ask me in or I would stop in
to exchange a pleasant word or two with him, because he is a long-standing
friend of mine. We had not only official relations of a cordial nature but
also in a personal way we were fairly well acquainted. It was in that sort of
way that we exchanged ideas about Pearl Harbor, and it was from him that I
first learned of the Winds execute message. I had a very good recollection of
the Winds code setup-well I had a knowledge of the Winds code setup from the
old days of pre-Pearl Harbor, but I hadn't had any recollection whatsoever, if
I even had knowledge at the time, of the existence of a so-called [3] Winds
execute message. It was in these conversations that Capt. Safford stated on
several occasions that there had been such a Winds execute message, that he
believed that a copy of it was still in somebody's safe in the Navy
Department, but that all of his attempts to local a copy of the Winds execute
message in the official files of OP-20-G had been fruitless. And he naturally
wanted to know if we had anything of that nature, and I told him I didn't know
and I didn't look for anything like that. But some time thereafter_months
thereafter_an official request came through from somebody higher up in the War
Department_I think it might have been Gen. Bissell_who directed that a search
be made through our files at Signal Security Agency to see if we could locate
such a Winds execute message, and that was fruitless.
Capt. Safford was very firm in his conviction that there had been a Winds
execute message and moreover that he himself had had it in his hands and that
there was no question in his mind of the actual transmission of the Winds
execute message, of its actual interception,
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of its translation in accordance with the terms of the Winds code setup, of
its having been handed over in the proper translated form to the Navy people
in Naval Intelligence who had jurisdiction of dissemination- Also, he was
apparently quite convinced that dissemination had been made to the Army, if
not to the Signal Intelligence Service then to somebody in G-2. And he felt
that there was some very excellent reason why no copies of this message could
be found, and of course it left a number of questions and inferences in his
mind which he naturally transferred to my mind. Well he also had apparently
definite knowledge that certain testimony before one of the several Boards
investigating Pearl Harbor showed clearly that there had been a Winds execute
transmission and he believed that the Roberts Board had some definite
knowledge about its having been transmitted, etc.
Well this mysterious disappearance, according to him, of all copies of the
Winds execute message naturally was of extreme interest to me, and some time
after my first, or possibly second, conversation with Capt. Safford, I learned
of the return to Washington for duty of Colonel Sadtler. We were old friends.
I have known him for certainly 20 years. And when he came to Washington_I
don't know whether he called me or I called him_I can't recall that_but being
old friends, naturally we wanted to get together. Shortly after he came back
he came over to my office one day_and I don't know whether he had specifically
in mind to talk about Pearl Harbor [4] he may have, but at any rate in the
course of our reminiscences about those days, he told me some very startling
things. I might say he was quite positive about what he said and left me more
or less breathless at one part of his news. I don't know whether I should call
it information or what, but at any rate, when I asked him about the Winds
execute message his recollection was apparently extremely clear, and he
certainly was positive about his recollection of the fact that such a Winds
execute message had been intercepted by a Navy source, because he told me that
he was called over to either Gen. Miles' office or Col. Bratton's office_I
don't recall which one_but at any rate he was called over to_well we may have
to go back_I recall now that he said that Adm. Noyes called him one morning
and my recollection is that it was on December 4_might have been the 5th_1941,
saying_and this stands very bright in my memory_he actually quoted what Adm.
Noyes said to him on the telephone: "It's in," meaning that the Winds execute
message had been transmitted and had been intercepted and that it meant a
break in relations between Japan, and he said, if I recall correctly, a break
in relations between Japan and England, and that he had then gone over to
either Gen. Miles' office or to Col. Bratton's office_or Adm. Noyes had
telephoned the same message or the purport of the Winds execute message to
Gen. Miles or to Col. Bratton. At any rate, Col. Sadtler was either summoned
or presented himself to G-2 and said that the Winds execute message had come
in and that something should be done right away. Well Col. Bratton, who was
the Japanese language expert, wanted Col. Sadtler to tell him what the
Japanese word was that had been included in the Winds execute message. I don't
think it is necessary for me to indicate the nature of the Winds code setup,
but at any rate, Col. Bratton wanted to know what the Japanese word was. Well
Sadtler said
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that he himself had not seen the message, he had gotten the information from
the Navy source by telephone and that he therefore couldn't give the Japanese
word. He was directed to go get the Japanese word. And here my recollection
isn't very clear as to whether he actually went over personally to Adm. Noyes'
office or whether he tried it on the telephone, but he apparently wasn't able
to get the Japanese word, whatever it was. He want back to Col. Bratton or Gen
Miles when he was unsuccessful in getting the Japanese word, or perhaps even a
copy of the message_which is something I don't understand-that any rate when
he was unable to produce the message or the Japanese word they said there was
nothing they could do, that perhaps there was disbelief on their part in the
allegation that [5] the message had been transmitted and intercepted. That of
course was very interesting to me. And then I asked him whether he had a copy
of the Winds execute message, and I am pretty sure in my recollection that he
said that he never had had one and of course didn't have any now. He did have
certain things put away in a safe deposit box, and I don't know what sort of
documents he might have put away. But he did mention one document which was of
very great interest to me. I have naturally not seen it_I didn't ask him to
show me a copy of it, but this, to the best of my recollection is what he told
me about that. He said that on Friday, possibly earlier than Friday, December
5th, he, being deeply concerned about the threat of negotiations with the
Japanese Government and noting the tenor of the messages that we were turning
out in translation, became extremely apprehensive that war might break out at
almost any hour without any declaration on the part of the Japanese. And he
felt that somebody high up in the War Department ought to send a message out
to Gen. Short warning him that_well I remember the words in general of what he
said was the type of message that he actually prepared in his own hand: "Break
in relations between Japan and United States may be expected within the next
24 or 48 hours. Take all necessary steps to insure that there will be no
repetition of Port Arthur." Now by that of course he meant that in the Russo-
Japanese war the Japanese attacked at Port Arthur without warning, and the
implication was quite clear what he had in his own mind. Well he tried to
interest some of the people in the higher echelons in sending such a message,
and I don't recall the various steps he took. He tried somebody in G-2; he
tried somebody in Operations Division; the Secretary of the General Staff_I
can't enumerate them all now_but at any rate he said that he got turned down
all the way and nobody would pay any attention to him. He claims to have a
copy of such a proposed message, or rather a draft of a message, still in his
possession.
Well, in the course of this conversation I asked him, "What do you suppose
happened to the Winds execute message which we believe so firmly was
intercepted" Well he said he was told that they were ordered destroyed. And
that sort of took me aback, and I said, "By whom?" And he said, "By Gen.
Marshall." It was something that I just couldn't believe, swallow, or give
credence to, and I expressed my disbelief, but he was pretty firm in his
statement and there was no checking him in that. Now where he got it from I
don't remember. I do know that on a subsequent occasion or two_because we met
each other once or twice thereafter_my disbelief of the story was discredited
by [6] him apparently, because he still remained
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very firm in his belief that all copies of the Winds execute message, both in
the Army and in the Navy, had been destroyed and ordered to be destroyed.
Col. GIBSON. Did he say who told him this story that these messages had been
burned_at Gen. Marshall's order?
Mr. FRIEDMAN. He did.
Col. GIBSON. Who did he say told him that story?
Mr. FRIEDMAN. The name is Ike Spalding, but I don't recall his grade or rank.
It is possibly Col. Spalding_I don't recall whether or not he told me of the
official position which Spalding occupied. Now, while I am at it, I recall
that Col. Sadtler stated that there were two messages ordered destroyed.
Col. GIBSON. Did he say that as of his own knowledge or that somebody had told
him there were two?
Mr. FRIEDMAN. I am quite sure that it was not of his own knowledge. He was
passing on second-hand information. Now what credence he gave to the story
that was told to him I don't know_I don't recall_but the other message which
was allegedly also one that was destroyed was a message which was supposed to
have_well as I recall it_a message was sent by the War Department a day or two
after Pearl Harbor, maybe Monday, to the Signal Officer, Col. Powell, asking
him whether the radar installation in the islands was in operative order at
the time of the attack. And the answer came back in the affirmative. Now
whether the question and answer were destroyed, or rather alleged to have been
destroyed, or just the answer, I don't recall, but at least there were two
different things involved.
Glen. CLARKE. In order words, they were on two different subjects?
Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes.
Col. GIBSON. This talk took place in your office?
Mr. FRIEDMAN. In my office.
Col. GIBSON. You don't know the exact day?
Mr. FRIEDMAN. I could place that because I made very, very rough notes of the
substance of the conversation after-
[7] Col. GIBSON. Will you supply us the approximate date? Was anybody else in
your office when that took place?
Mr. FRIEDMAN. No. There were just the two of us.
Col. GIBSON. Was that the first talk you had with Col. Sadtler after he came
back in the War Department?
Mr. FRIEDMAN. The very first.
Col. GIBSON. And after that you had two or three other talks with him?
Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes.
Col. GIBSON. Those took place where?
Mr. FRIEDMAN. I think there was one more occasion when he came over to the
office and the other time or two was when we were socially having dinner
together or something like that. At my home I know here was one evening that
we talked about it privately, just the two of us, in my own study.
Col. GIBSON. He never claimed to you to have seen the Winds execute message
himself?
Mr. FRIEDMAN. He never did.
Col. GIBSON. What did he say he had in his safe deposit box other than a copy
of the draft of the message he tried to get sent out?
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Mr. FRIEDMAN. I don't recall that he said anything. I may have asked him,
"What else do you have there," and he either passed it off with a remark,
"Well never mind, I am not telling anybody-" But I rather got the impression
that he felt that as head of the Army communications at the time and the
superior of the officer in charge of the Signal Intelligence Service, he might
be called upon some day in connection with an investigation and that he had
put certain things away. I might say that, to the best of my knowledge and
recollection, Col. Sadtler didn't impose any secrecy upon what he was telling
me. Oh naturally he trusted to my discretion, but I don't know whether he had
in mind that I might or might not communicate the information to others
entitled to know about such things or not. I certainly wouldn't have said
anything to Capt. Safford about it if he had imposed some sort of secrecy upon
what he was telling me, and of course you understand that, not giving any
credence to it myself, I didn't feel that Safford would believe any of it. But
to my astonishment [8] Safford seemed to think there might be something to it,
at least he thought there was a Winds execute message and now it can't be
found.
Col. GIBSON. Did Safford come to your office for some of these conferences?
Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes, he was over to my office two or three times in an official
way_I mean getting together the data that he wanted. He supplied us with
digests of his series of messages and I think he turned over a copy of
everything he gave me to Gen. -----. I do have rough notes made of some of
these conversations. If they are necessary I will put them at your disposal.
Gen. CLARKE. I think that would be highly advisable, because I hope this is
the last round-up and I think that you ought to come back in the morning_
Mr. FRIEDMAN. General, I am going to take for the air tomorrow. I had better
do it this afternoon.
Col. GIBSON. At the time of Pearl Harbor and before or somewhat prior, you
were not working with Jap cryptography, were you?
Mr. FRIEDMAN. No, I was not directly engaged in it because, as you know, I had
been ill, had had a nervous breakdown.
Col. GIBSON. You were putting in part time at that time?
Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes, when I came back to duty after I was discharged from Walter
Reed, Gen. Mauborgne and Col. Minckler told me I was to take it easy and come
and go as I pleased. I used to come in about a half hour or an hour late in
the morning and leave a half hour before the end of the day so as to avoid
heavy traffic. I was not in direct touch with the cryptanalytic work, although
I did see, whenever I wanted to, the messages that came out.
Gen. CLARKE. Who was in direct charge of the Japanese at that time, while you
were ill?
Mr. FRIEDMAN. Well of course at the time of Pearl Harbor it was Col. Minckler,
who was in charge of Signal Intelligence Service, and then I think he was
ranked as Captain_Capt. Doud, Capt. Svensson and then Rowlett was in technical
charge of the Jap diplomatic operation.
Gen. CLARKE. Do you know whether or not Col. Sadtler saw the output of the
institution?
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[9] Mr. FRIEDMAN. I am certain that he saw the very important messages but I
don't know that he saw everything that came out.
Gen. CLARKE. Did Gen. Mauborgne?
Mr. FRIEDMAN. The same situation. He saw the important messages.
Gen. CLARKE. Of course Olmstead was in there_not Mauborgne.
Mr. FRIEDMAN. Well Gen. Olmstead didn't take as much interest in that sort of
thing as Gen. Mauborgne did. He may have seen occasional messages. As a matter
of fact, I recall Sadtler said that four or five days before Pearl Harbor,
Gen. Olmstead was planning on going to Panama on an inspection tour and that
Col. Sadtler tried to dissuade Gen. Olmstead from taking this trip, saying
that "conditions are extremely critical and I believe war is going to break
out within the next 72 hours; maybe you had better stay around." Well Gen.
Olmstead didn't agree with him and decided to go ahead with the trip, and he
did. I think he came back within a day or two after Pearl Harbor.
Col. GIBSON. How many were engaged in the cryptanalytic work on his Japanese
traffic at the time of Pearl Harbor by the Signal Intelligence Service?
Mr. FRIEDMAN. You mean right in the Munitions Building_exclusively the
intercept personnel?
Col. GIBSON. Yes.
Mr. FRIEDMAN. I prefer to wait until I get my notes to answer.
Col. GIBSON. Was our section as big as the Navy section?
Mr. FRIEDMAN. They were comparable in size. I think there were just as many on
the diplomatic side as on our side.
Col. GIBSON. Did the Army process its material as speedily after receiving it
as the Navy did?
Mr. FRIEDMAN. Oh yes. I believe that there is little to be said about
comparative speeds. We were both most anxious to get these things out as
expeditiously as possible, in fact there was a good deal of competition in
getting out the translations and if, of course on isolated occasions, we found
that they were a bit slow or we were a bit slow, we would inquire to see what
had happened. Well it might have been a key had to be reconstructed or_I
couldn't [10] say that we processed a certain message faster than they because
there was no way of telling.
Col. GIBSON. Who set the priorities as to which code should be read first?
Mr. FRIEDMAN. Those were set by the Chief Signal Officer and the Director of
Naval Communications in conference with the technical people, etc. As a
general rule we processed the messages in the Purple system under a first
priority because our experience had been that that was the system that carried
the most important traffic. What came after that I don't recall exactly. It
might have been the combined PA-K2, as I remember one designation. That was an
enciphered code system. Then there was a J-19, also an enciphered code system,
and the least of the codes in priority was what we called LA, and of course
below that would come plain language.
Col. GIBSON. The Army and Navy agreed on this priority?
Mr. FRIEDMAN. Oh yes, the priorities were set by mutual agreement.
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Gen. CLARKE. That was done in conference from the Director of Naval
Communications and the Chief Signal Officer. Do you mean by that those two
individuals or their representatives?
Mr. FRIEDMAN. At that time, Gen. Mauborgne, who was in office as Chief Signal
Officer when the odd and even date was set up as the basis for operation, took
a great interest in this work, much more so than the Chief Signal Officer. I
can't say absolutely at the moment that he himself sat down with his opposite
number_at that time Adm. Noyes_and decided the priority scale, but I thing
those two officers would certainly approve a schedule recommended by the
technical people. Naturally the technical people would have to have a hand in
determining those priorities because of technical considerations. The
difficulty of each system, etc. I should have said also that the A. C. of S.,
G-2 would have a very vital word to say in the processing of priorities.
Gen. CLARKE. You never got any guidance from the Chief Signal Officer or the
A. C. of S., G-2 in your case, or the Office of Naval Intelligence in the
Navy, on interception or anything of that kind? As you got this stuff you
worked on it according to the classification of the code and its degree of
security? Is that what I understand?
Mr. FRIEDMAN. I don't understand your question. Are you asking did the
technical people process these messages in accordance with their own ideas?
[11] Gen. CLARKE. Their own ideas, or did they get guidance from on high?
Mr. FRIEDMAN. Guidance from on high. The decision to process Purple messages,
for example, would be one for the people of a higher echelon to say, "Yes,
process those first." In fact, even in connection with the intercept operation
and the forwarding operation, those things were all set up by priorities. The
material that came from Honolulu, for example, had to be sent according to
some priority system.
Gen. CLARKE. Is it correct in your opinion_something that I have heard_that
the most important traffic came in a lower grade system and not in the high
grade Purple?
Mr. FRIEDMAN. No, I wouldn't subscribe to that. We occasionally did encounter
a case in which a message of considerable importance would be in a low or
medium grade code, but largely because it came from a place which didn't have
the higher level material, or there have been cases in which some sort of a
condition of a breakdown of a machine at a station which was provided with a
machine would cause a message to go in a code of a lower category.
Gen. CLARKE. In our discussions here we have referred a number of times, and
so have you, to the so-called Japanese Purple system. Will you state
approximately when that was solved and by whom it was solved?
Mr. FRIEDMAN. To the best of my recollection, the first complete translation
was handed in some time in August, it might have been the early of August or
the middle part of August. We had been working on the Japanese Purple system.
This system had superseded a system known as the Red, which was also a machine
cipher. But when the Purple system was first introduced it presented an
extremely difficult problem on which the Chief Signal Officer asked us to
direct our best efforts. After work by my associates when we
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were making very slow progress, the Chief Signal Officer asked me personally
to take hand. I had been engaged largely in administrative duties up to that
time, so at his request I dropped everything else that I could and began to
work with the group. Naturally this was a collaborative, cooperative effort on
the part of all the people concerned. No one person is responsible for the
solution, nor is there any single person to whom the major share of credit
should go. As I saw, it was a team, and it was only by very closely
coordinated teamwork that we were able to solve it, which we did. It
represents [12] an achievement of the Army cryptanalytic bureau that, so far
as I know, has not been duplicated elsewhere, because we definitely know that
the British cryptanalytic service and the German cryptanalytic service was
baffled in its attempts and they never did solve it. After we solved the
Purple system, the technical data necessary to operate the system and a
machine constructed by ourselves were turned over to the British so that they
were in position to process Purple messages also. We did the same so far as
concerns the Navy. We provided them with a Purple machine or two.
Gen. CLARKE. On approximately what date did we give the Purple machine to the
British?
Mr. FRIEDMAN. I recall that very clearly. A joint U. S. Navy-U. S. Army
cryptanalytic mission consisting of four officers, two from each service, went
to London for the purpose of establishing technical cooperation with the
British cryptanalytic service. It was at that time the Army furnished a Purple
machine and the technical data to the British.
Gen. CLARKE. To the best of your knowledge and belief then, was all of the
traffic which has since become known as the Pearl Harbor traffic in these
Pearl Harbor investigations available to the British at the same time as it
was available to the American Army and Navy?
Mr. FRIEDMAN. I believe that to be a correct statement. The only thing that
they might lack would be certain intercepts which they were not in a position
to_
Gen. CLARKE. You mean by that individual messages?
Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes.
Gen. CLARKE. Did you ever discuss or hear them discuss the Pearl Harbor
traffic?
Mr. FRIEDMAN. No.
Gen. CLARKE. Or any of the traffic leading up to Pearl Harbor?
Mr. FRIEDMAN. No. The only thing that I do know is that there exists in the
files one or two messages which came from British sources out in the Far East.
If you remember, the British had some relations with the Dutch in the East
Indies.
TESTIMONY 0F COL. OTIS K. SADTLER
[1] Place: Room 2E780,
The Pentagon
Date: 14 July 1945.
Time: 10:00 a. m.
Present: Brig. Gen. Carter W. Clarke.
Colonel E. W. Gibson.
Colonel Otis E. Sadtler.
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Col. GIBSON. Col. Sadtler, you realize that you are under oath and you are
fully aware of what your rights are?
Col. SADTLER. Yes.
Col. GIBSON. I want to ask you first if you ever saw a so-called Winds execute
message?
Col. SADTLER. I did not.
Col. GIBSON. To your knowledge, was such a message ever in the War Department?
Col. SADTLER. It was not.
Col. GIBSON. And all that you know about that message and all contact that you
had with it is in your former testimony?
Col. SADTLER. That is right. I might further add that the information came
from Adm. Noyes.
Col. GIBSON. Mr. William F. Friedman has testified before Adm. Hewitt of the
Department of the Navy recently as follows: "Then if I remember correctly, I
asked Col. Sadtler whether he had a copy, had ever gotten or seen a copy of
this message, and his answer was, if I remember correctly, that he hadn't
himself seen a copy but that he had been told by somebody that the copies had
been ordered or directed to be destroyed by Gen. Marshall." Did you tell Mr.
Friedman that you had been told by somebody that the copies of the Winds
execute message had been ordered or directed to be destroyed by Gen. Marshall?
Col. SADTLER. I will make an absolute flat denial of that statement made by
Mr. Friedman because, as far as I know, that message was never in the War
Department and I never made any statement that Gen. Marshall ordered it
destroyed or that anyone told me that Gen. Marshall ordered it destroyed.
[2] Col. GIBSON. When did you return to duty in Washington this last time?
Col. SADTLER. About March 28, 1944.
Col. GIBSON. After your return during the following summer and fall on
occasion did you visit with Mr. Friedman?
Col. SADTLER. Yes.
Col. GIBSON. And did you visit about Pearl Harbor, amongst other things?
Col. SADTLER. Yes. We had discussed what had happened at that time.
Col. GIBSON. Did some of those discussions take place in Mr. Friedman's
office?
Col. SADTLER. Well I assume they did because I have been in his office several
times. I had talked to him on occasions about what had happened, not only in
his office but at his house.
Col. GIBSON. At some time did somebody tell you that messages pertaining to
the Pearl Harbor affair were being destroyed?
Col. SADTLER. Yes. Some time during 1943 Gen. Isaac Spalding at Ft. Bragg,
North Carolina, told me something to the effect that J. T. B. Bissell had told
him that everything pertaining to Pearl Harbor was being destroyed or had been
destroyed.
Col- GIBSON. Is it possible that you told that to Mr. Friedman in one of your
conversations?
Col. SADTLER. It is possible.
Col. GIBSON. You have been an old friend of Mr. Friedman for many years?
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Col. SADTLER. I have known him for over 25 years.
Col. GIBSON. This Colonel, now Brigadier General J. T. B. Bissell, that you
speak of, do you know him personally?
Col. SADTLER. I do not.
Col. GIBSON. To your knowledge have you ever met him?
Col. SADTLER. Yes, I have met him casually but I doubt if I would recognize
him today if I saw him.
[3] Col. GIBSON. During the period immediately prior to Pearl Harbor did you
have any official business of any nature with the then Col. Bissell?
Col. SADTLER. No.
Col. GIBSON. And your only business of an official nature that you did with G-
2 at that particular time was done with Col. Rufus Bratton and Gen. Miles?
Col. SADTLER. Yes, and Hayes Kroner. Mostly with Bratton and Miles. They were
my normal contacts.
Col. GIBSON. Col. Sadtler, Mr. Friedman also has testified that on or about
the time Adm. Noyes advised you that the Winds execute message was in that you
prepared a draft of a message that you wanted to suggest be sent to the
Commanding Generals of the Philippines, Hawaii and Panama. Is that so?
Col. SADTLER. That is correct.
Col. GIBSON. Will you relate now what happened about that?
Col. SADTLER. In substance the message was about as follows: "Reliable
information indicates war with Japan in the very near future. Take every
precaution to prevent a repetition of Port Arthur. Notify the Navy. Signed
Marshall."
Col. GIBSON. Did you type that message out yourself or who did the typing?
Col. SADTLER. I am positive that I did it because Miss Robinson says she never
saw it.
Col. GIBSON. Did you have that message with you when you went to discuss Adm.
Noyes' message to you that the "Winds Execute" messages was in, with Col.
Bratton and Gen. Miles?
Col. SADTLER. I did not. After leaving Gen. Miles' office where Gen. Miles and
Col. Bratton more or less casually threw off this information about the
execute of the Winds message, I went back to my office and thought that
something ought to be done. That message was typed up and I went to see Gen.
Gerow and talked this over for a few moments with him and suggested that he
notify them. Gerow's reply to the effect was that they had been adequately
notified, as I recall it. I then went to see Secretary of General Staff, Col.
Bedel [sic] Smith, and told him what had been done and [4] suggested he send a
message. His reply was to the effect that he refused to discuss it further.
Col. GIBSON. Did Gen. Gailey or Gen. Gerow see the message you had prepared_or
Gen. Bedel Smith?
Col. SADTLER. No, I don't think so.
Col. GIBSON. Col. Sadtler, I also want to ask you if it is true that early in
December you tried to dissuade Gen. Olmstead from making a trip to Panama
because you felt sure that war was going to break out.
Col. SADTLER. That is correct_on December 1.
Col. GIBSON. Tell us about that.
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Col. SADTLER. On December 1, when Gen. Olmstead was making preparations to go
to Panama, I attempted to dissuade him from his trip because I felt positive
that war would be declared before he returned and I thought that it was his
duty to be in Washington.
Col. GIBSON. What did he say?
Col. SADTLER. He said, "I am going anyhow and that's all there is to it."
Col. GIBSON. When did Olmstead return, do you know?
Col. SADTLER. About the 20th of December.
Col. GIBSON. Did he have any conversation with Marshall when he got back, do
you know?
Col. SADTLER. He said that he had gone to Gen. Marshall or had visited Gen.
Marshall and Gen. Marshall had told him that his men that he had left in
charge while he was gone had not performed 100 percent, or words to that
effect. Olmstead said, "Why didn't you act on the information you already
had?"
Col. GIBSON. Col. Sadtler, have you ever talked anything pertaining to Pearl
Harbor over with Capt. Safford of the Navy?
Col. SADTLER. No.
Col. GIBSON. Have you discussed it with any naval officer who had any direct
contact with naval communications at the time of Pearl Harbor?
[5] Col. SADTLER. Only with Adm. Noyes.
Continued_17 July 1945, 9:30 a. m.
Place: Room 2E780, The Pentagon.
Present: Brig. Gen. Carter W. Clarke.
Col. E. W. Gibson
Col. O. K. Sadtler
Col. GIBSON. Col. Sadtler, Mr. Friedman has also testified that you told him
that you had heard that in addition to the Winds execute message being ordered
destroyed by Gen. Marshall, there was a second message that was ordered
destroyed by Gen. Marshall. This second message was a message which was the
result of a message sent by the War Department a day or two after Pearl Harbor
to the Signal Officer, Col. Powell, asking him whether the radar installation
in the Islands was in operative order at the time of the attack, and the
answer came back in the affirmative. Did you tell Mr. Friedman that you had
heard that the message of inquiry relative to the working of the radar
installation in the Islands or the answer thereto had been destroyed?
Col. SADTLER. I did not. The circumstances attending that message are about as
follows: I sent the inquiry, with the approval of the General Staff, inquiring
as to the operation of radar on December 7. Upon receipt of that message Col.
Colton, Acting Chief Signal Officer, personally took a copy of it into Gen.
Marshall's office. I gave a copy to Geo. Gerow. Col. Colton, upon his return
from Gen. Marshall's office, said that he wanted all copies of that message
collected and held intact as, inasmuch as radar and the damage done at Pearl
Harbor secret at that time, the information was not to be disclosed. Gen Gerow
kept his message and I think that Col. Handy had it and he held it.
Col. GIBSON. To your knowledge, did Gen. Marshall ever order this radar
message, either the original inquiry or the answer thereto, destroyed?
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Col. SADTLER. No. To my knowledge, he did not.
Col. GIBSON. Did you ever hear from any source that he had ordered either of
those destroyed?
Col. SADTLER. No.
TESTIMONY OF BRIG. GEN. ISAAC SPALDING
[1] Place: Room 2E780,
The Pentagon Building, Washington, D. C
Date: 17 July 1945.
Time: 9:30 a. m.
Present: Brig. Gen. Carter W. Clarke.
Brig. Gen. Isaac Spalding
Col. E. W. Gibson.
Col. O. K. Sadtler.
Gen. CLARKE. Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you give in this case
will be the truth, so help you God?
Gen. SPALDING. I do.
Gen. CLARKE. Will you state your name, rank, organization and present station?
Gen. SPALDING. Isaac Spalding, serial number O3383. Brigadier General, USA,
Station Ft. McPherson, Georgia.
Gen. CLARKE. What were your station and duties in the three months preceding
Pearl Harbor?
Gen. SPALDING. I was on duty as Chief of the Officers Branch of the office of
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, War Department up to the night of December 3,
1941, and on the morning of December 4, 1941 I became Chief of the Army
Exchange Service, which lasted for some time after the Pearl Harbor incident.
Gen. CLARKE. Had you previously been on duty in the old War Plans Division?
Gen. SPALDING. I had. I was on duty in the War Plans Division from the summer
of 1932 to the summer of 1936.
Gen. CLARKE. But you were not in the War Plans Division on your return from
that tour of duty you were then on just preceding Pearl Harbor?
Gen. SPALDING. No. I was placed on duty in G-1, War Department, on January 11,
1941 on my return from overseas service in Hawaii
Gen. CLARKE. Were you on occasion called into conference by the War Plans
Division with reference to Hawaiian war plans?
Gen. Spalding. During my four year tour you mean?
[2] Gen. CLARKE. While you were with G-1.
Gen. SPALDING. I don't remember ever talking with anyone in WPD bout any war
plans. I had many friends there and would occasionally go over and see them on
matters connected with personnel. I remember someone in the summer of '41_I
think it was Gen. Gerow_stating that a message had been sent to the
Philippines making Gen. MacArthur the head of all our Army forces over there,
but I think that is the nearest that I ever came to anything connected with
the war plans in any way. I don't remember talking about Hawaii with anyone in
'41, nor do I remember who was in charge of the Hawaiian Defense Project.
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Gen. CLARKE. Did you have knowledge of the intercepted traffic which was being
produced by the Signal Corps at that time?
Gen. SPALDING. No. My friend Spencer Akin was in charge of some kind of a
secret room which was right over G-1 in the same wing of the Munitions
Building, and I had planned to go up and visit Akin and see what was going on
but I never did go and Akin was transferred away. I knew they had some kind of
a secret room up there and I thought it was something with breaking down code
but I don't know what they did.
Col. GIBSON. General, Mr. William F. Friedman, who is at present Director of
Communications Research of Signal Security Agency of the War Department, has
testified that sometime in 1944, in a conversation with Col. O. K. Sadtler,
that Col. Sadtler told him that he had been told that a certain message
pertaining to a warning on the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, which we
called the Winds execute message, had been ordered destroyed by Gen. Marshall
and that another message dealing with the question of whether or not the radar
installation on the Hawaiian Islands was in operation on the date of Pearl
Harbor, and the answer thereto, had been destroyed by Gen. Marshall's order.
Mr. Friedman further testified that Col. Sadtler told him that he had been
told this story by you. Thereafter Col. Sadtler testified that he had never
told Mr. Friedman that he had heard that Gen. Marshall had ordered this so-
called Winds execute message destroyed or the radar message destroyed, but
that he had been told by you at Ft. Bragg sometime in 1943 that the then Col.
J. T. B. Bissell, now Brigadier General Bissell, had been ordered to destroy
all matters pertaining to Pearl Harbor, or that in substance. I want to ask
you, having given you this background, first, did you tell Col. Sadtler that
in substance?
[3] Gen. SPALDING. I did not tell him that in substance, answering
specifically your question, but I did tell him certain things. But at no time
was the name of Gen. Marshall ever brought into the conversation or
discussion.
Col. GIBSON. What was it you did tell Col. Sadtler?
Gen. SPALDING. I would like to make a rather full statement. By so doing maybe
I can answer questions which you might specifically ask me later. I wish it to
appear in my testimony that it is my full belief that the Secretary of War,
Mr. Stimson, and the Chief of Staff, Gen. Marshall, are not involved in any
way whatsoever with the testimonies which I am about to give, and it is my
belief that neither one knew anything of it.
I was around in the War Department for a year preceding Pearl Harbor and for
six months thereafter, and of course there were various conversations about
Pearl Harbor after that "blitz." It was all very vague to me as to why the A.
C. of S., G-2, Gen. Sherman Miles, had not diagnosed this coming war, and it
was rather queer to me that soon after the blitz he was transferred to other
duty and Gen. Raymond Lee was brought back from England to be the War
Department G-2. This transfer aroused my curiosity but I never did know why it
was done.
In the summer of 1943 I was stationed at Ft. Bragg, and certain troops at Ft.
Jackson, South Carolina, came under my command. It was my custom to visit the
troops at Ft. Jackson about once a week for from one to three or four days at
a time. In July of 1943 I moved
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whole headquarters and headquarters battery from Ft. Bragg down on to the
reservation at Ft. Jackson for two weeks field training. Previous to that time
and during July and for several weeks after, Col. John T. Bissell, Field
Artillery, commanded one of my artillery groups at Ft. Jackson, and so I
requested him to make the necessary reservations for camping space and
maneuver ground on the Ft. Jackson Reservation. Upon my arrival at this camp
site I found that Col. Bissell and his staff had made arrangements preliminary
to our entering the camp and Col. Bissell himself had established his command
post under canvas within a few hundred yards of my camp site. We were thus
camped close together for several days and during that time we often sat under
the trees and talked in the late afternoons and early evenings. Bissell had
been on duty in the War Department and I believe part of his [4] duties were
connected with secret service operators. Naturally we talked about matters
which were of interest to each other and I had some curiosity on our secret
service but I learned nothing from him except such generalities as that we had
considerable such effort now that the war was under way. I remember telling
him that G-2 denied during peacetimes that they ever had any operators, but I
didn't believe those statements. He made no remark as to whether they did or
didn't. I remember telling him that I had always wanted to be a sleuth or a
detective of some kind but I didn't think I would be a success at it. But I
was always curious concerning detective stories, etc. It is my opinion and
recollection that Bissell in no way whatsoever revealed any secrets connected
with his duties concerning our secret operators. I remember that I would have
liked to have him talk more but he didn't.
We talked about the Pearl Harbor incident. I remember expressing to him my
failure to understand how Sherman Miles and the Navy could fail to discover
that those Japanese vessels had left home ports. I was under the impression
from my experience in both the Army and Navy War Colleges and in the War
Department General Staff and in my dealings with the Navy while on duty in the
General Staff, from all these experiences I had thought or believed that our
Navy kept track of every vessel carrying the Japanese flag, both commercial
and war vessels, and I didn't see how those vessels in peacetime could get
away from Japan and come down near Hawaii without our Navy knowing it. I was
astounded at their ignorance or inability to detect that! I remember shooting
off my mouth about Sherman Miles, for whom I didn't have a very high regard
professionally, and I think I remember telling him what I told Walter Krueger
when he asked me what I thought about Sherman Miles, I told him that I thought
Miles was a "stuffed shirt," and Krueger was astonished that I should talk
that about him. And so by our talking we got into the subject of Pearl Harbor
and the information which we must have had and which the Navy must have had
and our failure to give some kind of a better warning to Gen. Short. I
remember expressing my disgust at those airplanes up at Wheeler Field all
lined up for Saturday morning inspection and were still there on Sunday
morning, and I told him of my disgust that those radars weren't working, that
I knew when I left Hawaii in 1940 they were being installed. And Bissell said
that certain messages had been received and were in the files of G-2 and he
deemed it most necessary [5] to destroy them. I got the impression that these
messages were derogatory to
Page 92
the War Department and that he (Bissell) on his own responsibility destroyed
them. I had the impression that they were secret information which it was most
desirable that the President, Congress, the public, Mr. Stimson and Gen.
Marshall not know about. I had the feeling that Bissell destroyed them without
even Gen. Raymond Lee, the G-2 at that time, knowing they were in existence.
Now the question may come up as to sobriety on this occasion. We were out
there under the trees and upon my arrival a bottle of Scotch and two or three
bottles of soda water had been presented to me and when I broke camp 14 days
later I returned the unopened bottle of Scotch and possibly the soda water to
the officer who had given them to me upon my arrival at Ft. Jackson. I may
have had some liquor of my own with me and Bissell and I may have had a drink
or two of Bourbon which I provided_I don't remember_but it is customary for me
to drink one or two highballs after the day's work is over. Sometimes the
day's work is not over until late at night, midnight or later, and then of
course I don't drink, but I am sure I was sober all the time I was down there
in camp with my headquarters battery and headquarters staff.
Gen. CLARKE. Was Bissell sober?
Gen. SPALDING. Yes. Bissell and I, in the course of three or four months that
he was in my command, we would have a bottle of beer together or over at his
quarters before supper have a bottle of beer or a highball. I loafed with him
considerable, was with him a lot during duty hours, and never knew him to take
a drink during duty and after retreat we would have a drink or two, but I
never remember taking more than two. Bissell carries liquor very well and did
not drink to excess.
Now about this occasion of my talking to Sadtler. It is natural that we talk
about those things which worry us a little and Sadtler dropped into my house
one evening at Ft. Bragg about August of 1943 and we talked for an hour or two
there in my home. Col. Sadtler does not drink alcoholics, to my knowledge, and
didn't there at my house. I knew that he was interested in Pearl Harbor and I
told him of this incident of my talking with Bissell out there under the trees
and [6] Bissell having told me that he had destroyed what I would call vital
records which, if known, would be very unpleasant for the War Department. I
don't remember that Bissell used those expressions but that is the impression
which I got.
Gen. CLARKE. I got the impression from your statement that these messages were
from secret operatives. Was that your impression?
Gen. SPALDING. No, they might have been either, but they were so hot that if
Gen. Marshall had known about them it would have been very disagreeable for
Gen. Marshall, but what the source of them was I don't remember that Bissell
indicated it in any way whatever.
Col. GIBSON. You definitely understood, then, from him that this destruction
was done on his own initiative and not at the suggestion of anyone else?
Gen. SPALDING. That is absolutely the impression I have.
Col. GIBSON. Have you ever heard from any other source of any of these Pearl
Harbor records, the claim that they were destroyed?
Gen. SPALDING. No. Bissell was the only man who ever told me anything, that I
remember. I hope it is clear in here that I wouldn't want anything I say to
transgress the integrity of Mr. Stimson or
Page 93
George Marshall. They are two of the finest men in the world and they would
hew to the line I know.
TESTIMONY OF MAJ. GEN. RALPH C. SMITH
[1] Place: Room 2E780,
The Pentagon.
Date: 18 July 1945.
Time: 10:05 a. m.
Present: Maj. Gen. Ralph C. Smith.
Brig. Gen. Carter W. Clarke.
Col. E. W. Gibson.
Gen. CLARKE. Do you solemnly swear that the statements you make this case will
be the truth, so help you God?
Gen. SMITH. I do.
Gen. CLARKE. Are you familiar with your rights as a witness, self-
incrimination?
Gen. SMITH. I am.
Gen. CLARKE. Will you state your name, rank, organization and station.
Gen. SMITH. Major General Ralph C. Smith. Presently Military Attache, Paris,
France.
Gen. CLARKE. What were your duties in the three months preceding and
approximately 3 months following the so-called Pearl Harbor incident?
Gen. SMITH. During the period specified and for something more than a year
previous, I was Executive Officer of the Military Intelligence Division.
Gen. CLARKE. Under General Miles?
Gen. SMITH. Under General Sherman Miles, until his relief in December 1941.
Thereafter I occupied the same position with respect to Brig. Gen. Raymond
Lee.
Gen. CLARKE. You never were Executive Office under Gen. Strong?
Gen. SMITH. My recollection is that Gen. Strong was actually designated as G-2
after I left the G-2 Division. He was acting as G-2 for a week or so prior to
my departure.
Gen. CLARKE. Will you state in a general way what your duties as Executive
Officer were?
Gen. SMITH. As Executive Officer of the Military Intelligence Division I was
charged primarily with responsibility for all administrative functions of the
Division. As Executive Officer I was also head of the Administrative Branch. I
conceived my mission to be to relieve the [21] G-2 from as much concern about
the routine operation of his Division as possible. The Administrative Branch
included matters such as finance, personnel, both military and civilian,
allotment of office space (Which I may say parenthetically was a terrible
headache at that time because we were being moved from one part of the
Munitions Building to another). I also had charge of the filing system, the
records room and the general procedure of handling records. The Translation
Section was also included. Being charged primarily with administrative
responsibilities, I did not have any direct responsibility in the intelligence
chain. Because of our close relationship with the G-2, I was aware of a great
deal that was going on in the intelligence and counter intelligence part of
the
Page 94
Division's work. But I did not have any direct responsibility for operating
that. The chain of responsibility passed directly from G-2 to the heads of the
Intelligence Branch, Counter Intelligence Branch and Plans and Training
Branch.
Col. GIBSON. Were you aware of the existence at that time in 1941 of the so-
called Magic material?
Gen. SMITH. I was. Of course, as you know, every effort was made to limit to
the very minimum, persons who had contact with or even knowledge of the
existence of Magic material. However, because of my position, I knew of
course. Of our work in the Signal Intelligence Service of intercept and I was
aware of our success in breaking the Japanese codes. I knew that this material
was being handled in the raw in the Far Eastern Section by Japanese experts
and that the product of the code-breaking work was being distributed in locked
leather pouches to the Chief of Staff, the Secretary of War, G-2 and later to
the State Department and the White House.
Col. GIBSON. Will you state your recollection as to how this Magic material
was handled between the period of 1 July 1941 and Pearl Harbor?
Gen. SMITH. The head of the Far Eastern Section, Col. Bratton, and his
principal assistant, Col. Pettigrew, were the principal ones involved in
handling this material. I knew that they had a great deal of contact with Gen.
Miles, the head of G-2, on this material and I was generally cognizant of its
nature and sometimes of its context, but I made no effort to pry into the
exact nature of it because it did not concern my direct functions.
[3] Col. GIBSON. At some time did you read this material?
Gen. SMITH. Along in the late summer, as I recall it, Gen. Miles gave me a key
to the Magic pouches. If I remember correctly, it was when he was absent on
leave for a few days. For a period of several weeks or a month, approximately,
I saw the pouches and read the contents of most of them. Later in the fall, it
was about September, Gen. Miles told me that the Chief of Staff had expressed
the desire to restrict to the absolute minimum persons having access to and
knowledge of the Magic material. Therefore I returned to Gen. Miles the key to
the pouches that I had and after that date I did not see any of the material,
so far as I remember.
Col. GIBSON. Who delivered those pouches to Gen. Miles?
Gen. SMITH. As a matter of routine, Col. Bratton. Sometimes Col. Pettigrew. I
do not recall their being handled by any other person.
Col. GIBSON. Was that delivery made daily?
Gen. SMITH. Yes.
Col. GIBSON. On occasions did you see Col. Bratton with several pouches in his
possession?
Gen. SMITH. Yes. Col. Bratton would have several pouches because similar ones
were being given to the Chief of Staff, to the best of my recollection. I
believe that the same copy went from the Secretary of War's office to the
Chief of Staff, and I know that there was a separate copy for G-2. Whether
there was a third copy I am not certain.
Col. GIBSON. Is it your recollection that WPD had a pouch?
Gen. SMITH. Yes. I am certain that Gen. Gerow had access to the material
because I remember some incidents through the fall when I made contact with
Gen. Gerow and arranged a meeting with him for Gen. Miles and vice versa. I
also know that the Navy was handling
Page 95
the material because I remember there were conferences of Adm. Wilkinson with
Gen. Miles and Gen. Gerow in the G-2 office.
Col. GIBSON. Is it your recollection that the State Department received a
pouch?
[4] Gen. SMITH. Yes. A pouch went to the State Department, delivered there in
person I believe by Col. Betts, who was the liaison officer with the State
Department at that time. That I am a little hazy on, whether it was Col.
Betts or Col. Bratton that took it over. And I know a pouch was taken to the
White House on many days.
Col. GIBSON. Will you describe how the contents of the pouch looked when you
saw them and about how many sheets might be in the pouch?
Gen. SMITH. The Magic pouches were leather brief cases, I believe, with a
zipper opening and susceptible of being locked with a padlock. On removing the
padlock and opening the zipper the material inside was contained in a loose-
leaf red board cover. In the ones that I recollect seeing there were always
from three to a dozen or 15 pages. They were always carbon copies of other
messages.
Col. GIBSON. Did Gen. Miles destroy the contents or what happened to them?
Gen. SMITH. Gen. Miles would read the material, place it in the locked pouch
and leave it on his desk and I would return it to Col. Bratton or Col.
Pettigrew the next time they came up.
Col. GIBSON. Did you ever hear of a so-called Winds code message prior to
Pearl Harbor?
Gen. SMITH. Not that I can recall.
Col. GIBSON. Were you in any conferences of G-2 immediately prior to Pearl
Harbor or the month prior to Pearl Harbor where the question of Japan and its
capabilities and intentions were discussed?
Gen. SMITH. I did not attend such conferences. I think I recall a meeting in
Gen. Miles' office attended by Col. Kroner, Col. Bratton, Col. Pettigrew, Col.
Betts and some of the other members of the Intelligence brain-trust. I did not
participate in the conference but I knew it was being held.
Col. GIBSON. These estimates of the situation that were being prepared by the
various intelligence branches during that period of time. Did they come
through your office?
Gen. SMITH They came through my desk. The volume of business in my office was
increasing in geometric proportions at [5] about that time. I tried to read
those estimates insofar as I could because I wished to keep abreast of the
general situation. However, many of them I was unable to touch; they would go
over my desk to G-2 and out again.
Col. GIBSON. The Military Attache reports and observer reports that came in
from the field did not cross your desk?
Gen. SMITH. They did not. They went directly from the mail room where they had
a processing system that would get them with the minimum delay to the
interested section in the Intelligence Branch. About the only thing that came
to the front office would be the evaluations and estimates based on the
Military Attaches' raw material. Sometimes I know, when a report would be of
particular interest, it would be brought up and shown to Gen. Miles. I
remember some particularly good reports by Gen. Lee's office in London and
from the office in Germany.
Page 96
Col. GIBSON. Were you informed prior to Pearl Harbor of the contents of the
message that our Government had sent to the Imperial Government of Japan along
in the latter part of November 1941?
Gen. SMITH. I recall vaguely that such a message was in existence but I do not
remember that I saw it in the course of my official duties.
Col. GIBSON. In early December 1941 were you preparing to leave the War
Department?
Gen. SMITH. A list of senior colonels had been prepared by the G-1 Division
with an indication of possible dates when they might be called for active
combat duty with the new divisions that were being contemplated. I remember
that my name was on that list, as well as the names of Col. Bratton, Col.
Compton, Col. Pettigrew and several other officers. From other divisions of
the General Staff I knew Col. Huebner, Col. Ridgeway and others were likewise
on this list. The Chief of Infantry had arranged a special two-weeks'
refresher course at Ft. Benning for the benefit of colonels who might be
relieved from staff duty and assigned to active command in the next few
months. My name and that of Col. Bratton were submitted for this course.
Bratton's name was later removed because of conversations going on at the
White House with the Japanese special envoy and the general tense nature of
the Japanese situation. The course was actually planned to begin on the 8th of
December. I remember distinctly that I left Washington on the train from the
Union [6] Station for Atlanta about 6:00 p. m. December 6th. Ralph Huebner,
Mat Ridgeway and several others were on the same train with me. I remember
distinctly that we reached Ft. Benning soon after noon of December 7th. We
were at the Officers' Club having luncheon when the announcement by radio of
the attack on Pearl Harbor was received. A few hours after this, perhaps about
5:00 p. m., I received a telephone message from Gen. Omar Bradley, Commandant
of the school, that Gen. Miles had called by phone and asked to have me return
to Washington by the quickest available means. Gen. Bradley loaned me a car to
drive to Atlanta, where I got a plan and reached Washington Monday morning. I
must admit that because of this course and my preparations to leave, that
happenings in the office on the morning of December 6 are quite hazy in my
mind. My place during my absence was taken by the late Col. Roderick, my
Assistant Executive Officer.
Col. GIBSON. In the immediate few days prior to Pearl Harbor, any messages
that were sent out from G-2 to the Commanding Generals of the Philippines,
Hawaii or Panama, would clear through your office?
Gen. SMITH. They would clear through my office. The volume of messages had
reached a formidable proportion at this time and in order to clear them out in
the evening, I had had an autograph rubber stamp prepared that was kept locked
in my deck or in the desk of one of my assistants. Whenever a message came up
properly authenticated with the initials of one of the Chiefs of Branches or
Sections, this message would be cleared by one of my assistants without ever
coming to my attention
Col. GIBSON. As a matter of routine then, any message that came to your office
at that time to be cabled to the field or sent to the field would be stamped
by someone in your office and sent forward for dispatch provided that the
Chief of a Branch had initiated the same?
Page 97
Gen. SMITH. That is right. The functions of my office were to verify that the
message had been properly coordinated within the G-2 Division prior to being
sent. I assumed no responsibility for the actual context [sic] of the message
except that it made sense. I had instructed my assistants to read through and
see that the message was understandable to them and there were no obvious
errors.
[7] Col. GIBSON. The wisdom or the propriety of sending such message was not a
duty of yours?
Gen. SMITH. No. I had no function on that score. I accepted any message that
had the approval, as indicated by initials, of any Branch or Section Chief,
and I had delegated that responsibility for approval my assistants.
Col. GIBSON. In fact in your administrative duties, you were kept busy that
you didn't know enough of the intelligence situation to really pass sound
judgment on these messages. Is that correct?
Gen. SMITH. I am sorry to say that that is an understatement, if anything. The
office was a beehive of activity about this time.
Col. GIBSON. Were you aware of certain warning messages that were being sent
out by G-2 to the field during the first week in December?
Gen. SMITH. As I have reflected on the events of that week in retrospection, I
have a vague awareness that such messages were going out and there was a tense
atmosphere in the office. I of course knew about the presence of the Japanese
Ambassador and knew that the conferences were not going satisfactorily, but
that is about the limit of my detailed knowledge.
Col. GIBSON. Any answers to these messages that were sent out in either the
latter part of November or the first week of December, the answers being from
Department Commanders, did you see?
Gen. SMITH. Not that I recollect. Our system of office procedure was such that
the handling of such messages would be expedited to get them to the interested
agency as quickly as possible. Outgoing messages did pass through my office.
Incoming messages were handled directly from the Record Section to the
interested agency.
Col. GIBSON. Do you ever recall seeing or knowing about a message from Gen.
Short, the Commanding General in Hawaii, to G-2 in answer to a warning message
that G-2 had sent out either the latter part of November or the first week of
December?
Gen. SMITH. I have seen references to the message which I know you mean since,
but I am certain that I had no knowledge of it prior to December 7.
[8] Col. GIBSON. After you returned from Ft. Benning on the morning of 8
December, then what were your duties?
Gen. SMITH. My duties continued unchanged as Executive Officer of the Division
until approximately the end of March.
Col. GIBSON. Then from the 8th of December until the end of March you were in
charge of the records of G-2?
Gen. SMITH. In a broad supervisory sense, yes.
Col. GIBSON. If any records were to be copied or destroyed or transferred to
any other source, would you in the ordinary course of your duties have had to
pass on it?
Gen. SMITH. I am certain that my subordinates would not have accepted any
orders to tamper with the records, either in changing
Page 98
them, removing them or destroying them without having reported the fact to me.
Col. GIBSON. At any time during your service in the War Department in 1941 and
until you left in March 1942, to your knowledge were any of the records of G-2
destroyed?
Gen. SMITH. Categorically, no. The only recollection of any destruction of
records that I have occurring during my administration was in the early part
of my function as Executive Officer in 1941 when we were making an effort to
collect out of the files and eliminate a lot of obsolete material dating back
to World War I in order to conserve filing space. A considerable cleaning up
of the Record Section was done in 1940 and 1941, as I recall it, in order to
place with the National Archives material that should be kept of permanent
record, and material of no permanent value was destroyed.
Col. GIBSON. After that time to your knowledge was any material of any type
destroyed?
Gen. SMITH. I am very certain that no permanent records after January 1941,
perhaps, were removed or destroyed.
Col. GIBSON. At any time did you ever receive any order from anyone after
Pearl Harbor while you were in the War Department to destroy or have any
records destroyed?
Gen. SMITH. I did not.
[9] Col. GIBSON. Or held?
Gen. SMITH. I did not.
Col. GIBSON. Or tampered with?
Gen. SMITH. I did not.
Col. GIBSON. Or touched in any way, shape or manner?
Gen. SMITH. I did not.
Col. GIBSON. As far as you know, are the records of G-2 that pertain to Pearl
Harbor for 1941 and up until March 1942 complete?
Gen. SMITH. To the best of my knowledge they are.
Col. GIBSON. Until you arrived at the War Department yesterday, did you ever
hear of any story to the effect that some of the Pearl Harbor records or
reports bearing on Pearl Harbor had been destroyed?
Gen. SMITH. I did not.
Col. GIBSON. Prior to yesterday had you ever heard any comment made that if
certain records in G-2 became known or were made public that it would be very
damning to the Secretary of War or the Chief of Staff?
Gen. SMITH. No I had never heard any such comment.
Col. GIBSON. Did you know Col. J. T. B. Bissell?
Gen. SMITH. I did.
Col. GIBSON. And was he on duty in the War Department in G-2 at the same time
you were?
Gen. SMITH. Col. Bissell was, first, assistant to Col. Lester and later became
Chief of Counter Intelligence Branch. He occupied that position, as I recall
it, in December 1941.
Col. GIBSON. Now let me ask you this question. Did Col. Bissell, to your
knowledge, ever destroy any records in G-2 in the War Department?
Gen. SMITH He did not during my tenure of office; and I believe that if he had
I would have known about it from my subordinates.
Page 99
[10] Col. GIBSON. Let me ask you this. Did Col. Bissell ever tell you that he
had destroyed some records dealing with Pear Harbor?
Gen. SMITH. He did not.
Col. GIBSON. Had you ever heard, until yesterday, any story alleging that Col.
Bissell had said he did destroy certain records?
Gen. SMITH. I had not.
Gen. CLARKE. Did you ever discuss any of the incidents leading up to Pearl
Harbor with Col. Bissell?
Gen. SMITH. I have no recollection. It is true that we were both members of
the G-2 Division for the 3 months following Pearl Harbor. It is possible that
we may have discussed it in general term but I have no specific recollection.
Gen. CLARKE. I would like to ask one question here. Do you know whether or not
the Chief of the Counter Intelligence Group, Col. Bissell, had at his disposal
all of the information and intelligence which was available to the
Intelligence Group?
Gen. SMITH. I have a vague recollection that some point was brought up either
shortly before Pearl Harbor or possibly afterward that some sources of Counter
Intelligence data were in existence but not being exploited to the maximum; I
think I can state as a certainty that the Counter Intelligence Branch did not
receive the pouch containing the full Magic material. I do, however, have
vague recollection that the Far Eastern Branch had some contact with the
Counter Intelligence Branch on activities of Japanese agents in this country.
Gen. CLARKE. What about Japanese agents in Hawaii?
Gen. SMITH. I have no recollection on that specific score.
TESTIMONY 0F BRIG. GEN. JOHN T. BISSELL
[1] Place: Room 2E780,
The Pentagon.
Date: 4 August 1945, 3:10 p. m.
Present: Brig. Gen. John T. Bissell.
Col. E. W. Gibson.
Col. GIBSON. Gen. Bissell, Gen. Clarke has been directed by Gen Marshall to
reopen this Pearl Harbor investigation on the basis of the old order that he
had here last September 9 when this investigation was commenced. I would like
to remind you that you are still under oath. With reference to that I would
like to reswear you in, in connection with this new investigation. Do you
solemnly swear to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth so
help you God?
Gen. RUSSELL. I do.
Col. GIBSON. You of course are aware of your rights?
Gen. RUSSELL. I am.
Col. GIBSON Will you please state your name, rank, position and organization.
Gen. BISSELL. John T. B. Bissell, Brigadier General, O8624. Headquarters 89th
Division, Artillery, APO 89, c/o Postmaster, New York.
Col. GIBSON You are here as a result of receiving cable orders to return here
for purposes of this interrogation?
Gen. BISSELL. I am.
Col. GIBSON. Since your arrival here have you read the sworn testimony of Mr.
Wm. F. Friedman of 13 July 45 before General Clarke
Page 100
and myself, of Col. Otis K. Sadtler of 14 July 1945, and of Brig. Gen. S Isaac
Spaulding of 17 July 1945 pertaining to this Pearl Harbor matter?
Gen. BISSELL. I have.
Col. GIBSON. Did you also read a copy of the letter that Adm. Hewitt sent to
Gen. Marshall calling Gen. Marshall's attention to certain testimony of this
Mr. Wm. F. Friedman before Adm. Hewitt's board?
Gen. BISSELL. I did
[2] Col. GIBSON. Gen. Bissell, you testified previously on this matter in
September 1944?
Gen. BISSELL. That is correct.
Col. GIBSON. And you have refreshed your memory by reading over that
testimony?
Gen. BISSELL. I have.
Col. GIBSON. Do you know Brig. Gen. Isaac Spalding?
Gen. BISSELL. I do.
Col. GIBSON How long have you known him?
Gen. BISSELL. I reported to him in June of 1943 at Ft. Bragg, N. C. while he
was in command of the 13th Field Artillery Brigade. I had just been ordered to
take command of the 112th Field Artillery Group which was part of that
Brigade.
Col. GIBSON. Had you known him before that?
Gen. BISSELL. I had not.
Col. GIBSON. How long did you serve under Gen. Spalding at Ft. Bragg?
Gen. BISSELL. From about the 12th of June until some time in October. I was
stationed with my Group at Camp Jackson, S. C.
Col. GIBSON. During this period of time did you have many occasions to
converse with Gen. Spalding?
Gen. BISSELL. I conversed with him frequently as he came down from Ft. Bragg
about once a week.
Col. GIBSON. How far is Jackson from Ft. Bragg?
Gen. BISSELL. Roughly, 70 miles.
Col. GIBSON So that he was stationed at Bragg and you were at Jackson all of
this time?
Gen. BISSELL. Yes.
Col. GIBSON. There did come a time when his Headquarters Battery did come down
to Jackson for some training?
Gen. BISSELL That is correct. It was in the latter part of July as I remember.
[3] Col. GIBSON. At some time in your acquaintance with Gen. Spalding during
those months in 1943 did he ask you about what G-2 knew about the Pearl Harbor
attack?
Gen. BISSELL. Yes, he asked me several questions about it.
Col. GIBSON. Did he ask you that on more than one occasion?
Gen. BISSELL. I don't recall. I think he may have.
Col. GIBSON. Is there any particular occasion that you have in mind when he
did talk with you at some length about it?
Gen. BISSELL. Yes, I recall his saying that he could not understand why the
airplanes at Pearl Harbor had been lined up on the fields when conditions were
as strained as they were.
Col. GIBSON. Where was that?
Gen. BISSELL. I think that was at Camp Jackson. It might possibly have been at
Bragg, as I was up there several times.
Page 101
Col. GIBSON. Do you remember conversing with him about Pearl Harbor when you
were sitting together under some trees on the training grounds at Jackson?
Gen. BISSELL. I don't remember the incident. It may well have occurred there
or somewhere else. I don't remember the details.
Col. GIBSON. Gen. Spalding has testified that, among other things, you told
him that certain messages had been received, these messages pertaining to
Pearl Harbor and were in the files of G-2 and that you deemed it most
necessary to destroy them. Did you ever make such a statement?
Gen. BISSELL. No, I did not.
Col. GIBSON. I show you Gen. Spalding's testimony, pages 3, 4 and of his
testimony of last July, and ask if you will give your recollection of the talk
you had with Gen. Spalding.
Gen. BISSELL. AS I recall it, Gen. Spalding asked me a great many questions
with reference to the Counter Intelligence operated by the Military
Intelligence Service of which I had been the Chief. He was particularly
interested in knowing about how we had placed agents, etc. I tried to avoid
the issue as much as possible and give [4] no information that I thought
should not be revealed. Following at he discussed at some length the Pearl
Harbor disaster and stated that he could not understand why G-2 had not been
more alert and why the planes on the fields at Pearl Harbor had been assembled
together. He asked me what I know about the matter and I told him that G-2 had
been afraid of sabotage and that a message had been sent out to the Hawaiian
Department alerting them to be their guard against possible sabotage. He
endeavored to draw me out and as it was a matter that was more or less closed,
he asked at I had personally done in the matter. I stated that I had been
directed by the A. C. of S., G-2 to draft a message to the G-2, Hawaiian
Department, and I believe possibly to some of the other Defense Commands and
Panama to be prepared for possible sabotage on account of the very strained
relations with which everyone in G-2 was familiar. He asked me further details
of the matter and I stated, as I recall it, that I had stayed in the office
one evening until about eight o'clock, at the direction of Gen. Miles, who was
then the A. C. of S., G-2, and had prepared a message alerting the Hawaiian
Department for possible sabotage and stressing the strained relations between
the U. S. and Japan. I took the message in to Gen. Miles personally. He read
the message and change [sic] it materially, stressing the sabotage angle more
than I had. That message, as far I know, was sent. The draft which I drew Gen.
Miles destroyed. It was marked Secret.
Col. GIBSON. I show you a message, a Memorandum for the Adjutant General,
dated 28 November 1941, subject: Warning to Corps Area and Overseas
Commanders, signed Sherman Miles, and ask if that is a copy of the message
that you refer to just now in your testimony as being the message which Gen.
Miles drew and substituted for the message that you had prepared.
Gen. BISSELL. That is the message Gen. Miles drew in substitution for the one
which I drafted.
Col. GIBSON. Is it your recollection that Gen. Spalding expressed to you his
failure to understand why Sherman Miles and the Navy
Page 102
had failed to discover that these Japanese vessels participating in the Pearl
Harbor attack had left their home ports?
Gen. BISSELL. I don't recall that. He may have discussed it but I don't recall
it.
[5] Col. GIBSON. Do you recollect Gen. Spaulding telling you that he believed
that Miles was a stuffed shirt?
Gen. BISSELL. I think in the course of conversation he did state that he
believed that Miles was a stuffed shirt?
Col. GIBSON. Did he tell you of his disgust that the radars on Hawaii weren't
working because he knew when he left Hawaii in 1940 that they were being
installed?
Gen. BISSELL. As far as I remember he never made any mention of radar.
Col. GIBSON. To your knowledge, while you were connected with G-2 were ever
any records pertaining to Pearl Harbor or anything else destroyed?
Gen. BISSELL. Not as far as I know.
Col. GIBSON. And once a message was okayed and sent it was kept?
Gen. BISSELL. It went to the file immediately.
Col. GIBSON. And no files were ever destroyed?
Gen. BISSELL. Not as far as I know.
Col. GIBSON. Did you ever hear of any being destroyed?
Gen. BISSELL. No, except in 1940 when we cleaned out the World War I excess
material that had no value.
Col. GIBSON. Again to clarify the record, your job in G-2 in 1941 and 1942 was
always connected with the Counter Intelligence work of G-2?
Gen. BISSELL. That is correct.
Col. GIBSON. You had nothing whatsoever to do with the signal intelligence?
Gen. BISSELL. I didn't until after Pearl Harbor.
Col. GIBSON. Prior to Pearl Harbor did you receive summaries of what you later
found to be information based on signal intelligence?
Gen. BISSELL. Yes I did. I knew that the summaries which I got emanated from
signal intelligence. They pertained principally to [6] suspected Japanese
again in this country, in Panama, in Hawaii, and in Alaska.
Col. GIBSON. Shortly after Pearl Harbor you began to see such material in the
raw pertaining to the matters you have just outlined?
Gen. BISSELL. A few days after Pearl Harbor I saw materially more of the
signal intelligence material.
Col. GIBSON. Did you tell Gen. Spaulding at any time, in substance, that you
had destroyed what you would call vital records, records which if known to
exist would be very unpleasant to the War Department?
Gen. BISSELL. I did not.
Col. GIBSON. Did YOU ever tell him anything from which he might infer such?
Gen. BISSELL. No.
Page 100
and myself, of Col. Otis K. Sadtler of 14 July 1945, and of Brig. Gen. S Isaac
Spaulding of 17 July 1945 pertaining to this Pearl Harbor matter?
Gen. BISSELL. I have.
Col. GIBSON. Did you also read a copy of the letter that Adm. Hewitt sent to
Gen. Marshall calling Gen. Marshall's attention to certain testimony of this
Mr. Wm. F. Friedman before Adm. Hewitt's board?
Gen. BISSELL. I did
[2] Col. GIBSON. Gen. Bissell, you testified previously on this matter in
September 1944?
Gen. BISSELL. That is correct.
Col. GIBSON. And you have refreshed your memory by reading over that
testimony?
Gen. BISSELL. I have.
Col. GIBSON. Do you know Brig. Gen. Isaac Spalding?
Gen. BISSELL. I do.
Col. GIBSON How long have you known him?
Gen. BISSELL. I reported to him in June of 1943 at Ft. Bragg, N. C. while he
was in command of the 13th Field Artillery Brigade. I had just been ordered to
take command of the 112th Field Artillery Group which was part of that
Brigade.
Col. GIBSON. Had you known him before that?
Gen. BISSELL. I had not.
Col. GIBSON. How long did you serve under Gen. Spalding at Ft. Bragg?
Gen. BISSELL. From about the 12th of June until some time in October. I was
stationed with my Group at Camp Jackson, S. C.
Col. GIBSON. During this period of time did you have many occasions to
converse with Gen. Spalding?
Gen. BISSELL. I conversed with him frequently as he came down from Ft. Bragg
about once a week.
Col. GIBSON. How far is Jackson from Ft. Bragg?
Gen. BISSELL. Roughly, 70 miles.
Col. GIBSON So that he was stationed at Bragg and you were at Jackson all of
this time?
Gen. BISSELL. Yes.
Col. GIBSON. There did come a time when his Headquarters Battery did come down
to Jackson for some training?
Gen. BISSELL That is correct. It was in the latter part of July as I remember.
[3] Col. GIBSON. At some time in your acquaintance with Gen. Spalding during
those months in 1943 did he ask you about what G-2 knew about the Pearl Harbor
attack?
Gen. BISSELL. Yes, he asked me several questions about it.
Col. GIBSON. Did he ask you that on more than one occasion?
Gen. BISSELL. I don't recall. I think he may have.
Col. GIBSON. Is there any particular occasion that you have in mind when he
did talk with you at some length about it?
Gen. BISSELL. Yes, I recall his saying that he could not understand why the
airplanes at Pearl Harbor had been lined up on the fields when conditions were
as strained as they were.
Col. GIBSON. Where was that?
Gen. BISSELL. I think that was at Camp Jackson. It might possibly have been at
Bragg, as I was up there several times.
Page 101
Col. GIBSON. Do you remember conversing with him about Pearl Harbor when you
were sitting together under some trees on the training grounds at Jackson?
Gen. BISSELL. I don't remember the incident. It may well have occurred there
or somewhere else. I don't remember the details.
Col. GIBSON. Gen. Spalding has testified that, among other things, you told
him that certain messages had been received, these messages pertaining to
Pearl Harbor and were in the files of G-2 and that you deemed it most
necessary to destroy them. Did you ever make such a statement?
Gen. BISSELL. No, I did not.
Col. GIBSON. I show you Gen. Spalding's testimony, pages 3, 4 and of his
testimony of last July, and ask if you will give your recollection of the talk
you had with Gen. Spalding.
Gen. BISSELL. AS I recall it, Gen. Spalding asked me a great many questions
with reference to the Counter Intelligence operated by the Military
Intelligence Service of which I had been the Chief. He was particularly
interested in knowing about how we had placed agents, etc. I tried to avoid
the issue as much as possible and give [4] no information that I thought
should not be revealed. Following at he discussed at some length the Pearl
Harbor disaster and stated that he could not understand why G-2 had not been
more alert and why the planes on the fields at Pearl Harbor had been assembled
together. He asked me what I know about the matter and I told him that G-2 had
been afraid of sabotage and that a message had been sent out to the Hawaiian
Department alerting them to be their guard against possible sabotage. He
endeavored to draw me out and as it was a matter that was more or less closed,
he asked at I had personally done in the matter. I stated that I had been
directed by the A. C. of S., G-2 to draft a message to the G-2, Hawaiian
Department, and I believe possibly to some of the other Defense Commands and
Panama to be prepared for possible sabotage on account of the very strained
relations with which everyone in G-2 was familiar. He asked me further details
of the matter and I stated, as I recall it, that I had stayed in the office
one evening until about eight o'clock, at the direction of Gen. Miles, who was
then the A. C. of S., G-2, and had prepared a message alerting the Hawaiian
Department for possible sabotage and stressing the strained relations between
the U. S. and Japan. I took the message in to Gen. Miles personally. He read
the message and change [sic] it materially, stressing the sabotage angle more
than I had. That message, as far I know, was sent. The draft which I drew Gen.
Miles destroyed. It was marked Secret.
Col. GIBSON. I show you a message, a Memorandum for the Adjutant General,
dated 28 November 1941, subject: Warning to Corps Area and Overseas
Commanders, signed Sherman Miles, and ask if that is a copy of the message
that you refer to just now in your testimony as being the message which Gen.
Miles drew and substituted for the message that you had prepared.
Gen. BISSELL. That is the message Gen. Miles drew in substitution for the one
which I drafted.
Col. GIBSON. Is it your recollection that Gen. Spalding expressed to you his
failure to understand why Sherman Miles and the Navy
Page 102
had failed to discover that these Japanese vessels participating in the Pearl
Harbor attack had left their home ports?
Gen. BISSELL. I don't recall that. He may have discussed it but I don't recall
it.
[5] Col. GIBSON. Do you recollect Gen. Spaulding telling you that he believed
that Miles was a stuffed shirt?
Gen. BISSELL. I think in the course of conversation he did state that he
believed that Miles was a stuffed shirt?
Col. GIBSON. Did he tell you of his disgust that the radars on Hawaii weren't
working because he knew when he left Hawaii in 1940 that they were being
installed?
Gen. BISSELL. As far as I remember he never made any mention of radar.
Col. GIBSON. To your knowledge, while you were connected with G-2 were ever
any records pertaining to Pearl Harbor or anything else destroyed?
Gen. BISSELL. Not as far as I know.
Col. GIBSON. And once a message was okayed and sent it was kept?
Gen. BISSELL. It went to the file immediately.
Col. GIBSON. And no files were ever destroyed?
Gen. BISSELL. Not as far as I know.
Col. GIBSON. Did you ever hear of any being destroyed?
Gen. BISSELL. No, except in 1940 when we cleaned out the World War I excess
material that had no value.
Col. GIBSON. Again to clarify the record, your job in G-2 in 1941 and 1942 was
always connected with the Counter Intelligence work of G-2?
Gen. BISSELL. That is correct.
Col. GIBSON. You had nothing whatsoever to do with the signal intelligence?
Gen. BISSELL. I didn't until after Pearl Harbor.
Col. GIBSON. Prior to Pearl Harbor did you receive summaries of what you later
found to be information based on signal intelligence?
Gen. BISSELL. Yes I did. I knew that the summaries which I got emanated from
signal intelligence. They pertained principally to [6] suspected Japanese
again in this country, in Panama, in Hawaii, and in Alaska.
Col. GIBSON. Shortly after Pearl Harbor you began to see such material in the
raw pertaining to the matters you have just outlined?
Gen. BISSELL. A few days after Pearl Harbor I saw materially more of the
signal intelligence material.
Col. GIBSON. Did you tell Gen. Spaulding at any time, in substance, that you
had destroyed what you would call vital records, records which if known to
exist would be very unpleasant to the War Department?
Gen. BISSELL. I did not.
Col. GIBSON. Did YOU ever tell him anything from which he might infer such?
Gen. BISSELL. No.
Page 103
EXHIBITS OF THE CLARKE INVESTIGATION
EXHIBITS 1 TO 8
HANDLING OF CERTAIN TOP SECRET DOCUMENTS
CLARKE EXHIBIT NO. 1
TOP SECRET
From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
October 14, 1941
Purple
#943 (Part 1 of 2) [a] (To be handled in Government Code)
I had an interview with Rear Admiral TURNER. If I sum up what he told me, it
is this:
"What the United States wants is not just a pretense but a definite promise.
Should a conference of the leaders of the two governments be held without a
definite preliminary agreement, and should, in the meantime, an advance be
made into Siberia, the President would be placed in a terrible predicament.
Japan speaks of peace in the Pacific and talks as if she can decide matters
independently, and so it would seem to me that Japan could set aside most of
her obligations toward the Three-Power Alliance. As to the question of
withdrawing or stationing troops, since it is impossible to withdraw troops
all at once, it would seem that a detailed agreement could be arranged between
Japan and China for a gradual withdrawal."
He speculated on the various difficulties which Japan had to face internally.
It seems that this opinion of his has also been given to the Secretary of
State.
ARMY 5854 23570 SECRET Trans. 10/16/41 (2)
TOP SECRET
From: Tokyo (Toyoda)
To: Washington
October 16, 1941
Purple (CA)
#671
Although I have been requested by both the German and Italian Ambassadors in
Tokyo to give them confidential information on the Japanese-American
negotiations, I have, in consideration of the nature of the negotiations, been
declining to do so. However, early this month, following the German attacks on
American merchant ships and the consequent (revival?) of the movement for the
revision of the Neutrality Act, the German authorities demanded that the
Japanese Government submit to the American Government a message to the effect
that the Japanese Government observes that if the ROOSEVELT Administration
continues to attack the Axis Powers increasingly, a belligerent situation
would inevitably arise between Germany and Italy on the one hand and the
United States on the other, and this would provide the reasons for the
convocation of the duties envisioned in the Three Power agreement and might
lead Japan to join immediately the war in opposition to the United States. We
have not, as yet, submitted this message because, in view of the Japanese-
American negotiations, we found it necessary to consider carefully the proper
timing as well as wording of the message. The German authorities have been
repeatedly making the same request and there are reasons which do not permit
this matter to be postponed any longer. While Japan on the one hand finds it
necessary to do something in the way of carrying out the duties placed upon
her by the Three Power Alliance she had
[a] For part 2 gee S. I. S. #23516
Page 104
concluded with Germany, on the other hand, she is desirous of making a success
of the Japanese-American negotiations. Under the circumstances, we can do no
other than to warn the United States at an appropriate moment in such words as
are given in my separate wire and as would not affect the Japanese-American
negotiations in one way or another. This message is a secret between me and
you.
(Separate wire)
The Imperial Japanese Government has repeatedly affirmed to the American
Government that the aim of the Tripartite Pact is to contribute toward the
prevention of a further extension of the European war. Should, however, the
recent tension in the German-American relations suffer aggravation, there
would arise a distinct danger of a war between the two powers, a state of
affairs over which Japan, as a signatory to the Tripartite Pace [sic],
naturally cannot help entertain a deep concern. Accordingly, in its sincere
desire that not only the German-American relations will cease further
deterioration but the prevailing tension will also be alleviated as quickly as
possible, the Japanese Government is now requesting the earnest consideration
of the American Government.
ARMY 5901 23631 SECRET
From, Berlin.
To: Tokyo.
1 October 1941
(Purple)
#1198
On this the occasion of the first anniversary of the Tripartite Pact, Foreign
Minister Ribbentrop has come to Berlin from the Imperial Headquarters
especially and I have had several visits with him. Using this opportunity I,
and the other members of the staff, have mingled with people from all classes
of society and visited with them. I am endeavoring to sum up all these
experiences and analyze the present state of feeling toward Japan held by
Germany in this report to you.
1. Ribbentrop said that he had absolute proof that, while reports of the
content of the Japanese-American negotiations were withheld from Ambassador
Ott, America was in secret communication with England in regard to the
Japanese-American negotiations. Even Ribbentrop who is supposed to understand
Japan's position, expressed great dissatisfaction regarding Japan's attitude.
2. That the Foreign Office staff from Weizsacker down and also everyone in
general were thoroughly disgusted with Japan was very apparent from their
attitude toward myself and other members of the staff. Everyone who feels
kindly disposed toward Japan is deeply concerned over this state of affairs.
Even those who do not come to the same conclusion that Ambassador Ott did in
his telegram are outspoken in their dissatisfaction and expression of
pessimistic views. I am trying to take the position in interviews with
newspaper correspondents and others concerned with the outside that Germany is
cognizant of the Japanese-American negotiations and that they are no
indication of an alienation between Japan and Germany.
3. Foreign diplomats and newspaper correspondents of third countries show
great interest in the Japanese attitude and seem to consider it in a certain
sense as a barometer by which the course of the European war can be judged.
However we receive the impression that the greater number feel that Japan is
avoiding war because of the impoverishment resulting from the China incident
and is taking a pessimistic attitude toward the course of the European war.
4. Even though it might be said that Germany is prepared for these
machinations of estrangement by third countries and that she is keeping up the
pretense that there is no change in her feelings toward Japan, the fact that
the feeling of German leaders and the people in general toward Japan is
getting bad is one that cannot be covered. Please bear this fact in mind. If
Japan takes a wishy-washy attitude and goes ahead with her negotiations
without consulting Germany there is no telling what steps Germany may take
without consulting Japan.
Please convey this to the army and navy.
Relayed to Rome.
23673 JD-1: (H) Navy Trans. 10-18-41 (4)
Page 105
From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
October 22, 1941.
Purple. (CA)
I have already wired you something about my present psychology. I am sure that
I, too, should go out with the former cabinet. I know that for some time the
Secretary of State has known how sincere your humble servant is, yet how
little influence I have in Japan. I am ashamed to say that it has come to my
ears that this is the case. There are some Americans who trust this poor
novice and who say that things will get better for me, but, alas, their
encouragement is not enough. Among my confreres here in the United States
there are also some who feel the same way, but, alas, they are all poor
deluded souls. As for Your Excellency's instructions, WAKASUGI can carry them
out fully. Nor do I imagine that you all have any objection. I don't want to
be the bones of a dead horse. I don't want to continue this hypocritical
existence, deceiving other people. No, don't think I am trying to flee from
the field of battle but as a man of honor this is the only way that is open
for me to tread. Please send me your permission to return to Japan. Most
humbly do I beseech your forgiveness if I have injured your dignity and I
prostrate myself before you in the depth of my rudeness.
ARMY 6017 23859 SECRET Trans. 10-23-41 (7)
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
5 November 1941
(Purple-CA)
#736
(Of utmost secrecy)
Because of various circumstances, it is absolutely necessary that all
arrangements for the signing of this agreement be completed by the 25th of
this month. I realize that this is a difficult order, but under the
circumstances it is an unavoidable one. Please understand this thoroughly and
tackle the problem of saving the Japanese-U. S. relations from falling into a
chaotic condition. Do so with great determination and with unstinted effort, I
beg of you.
This information is to be kept strictly to yourself only.
JD-1:6254 SECRET (D) Navy Trans. 11-5-41 (S-TT)
From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
1. I sent MOORE [a] to contact Senator THOMAS of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee and HULL. His report reads as follows:
"The United States is not bluffing. If Japan invades again, the United States
will fight with Japan. Psychologically the American people are ready. The Navy
is prepared and ready for action."
2. Yesterday evening, Sunday, a certain Cabinet member, discarding all
quibbling, began by saying to me:
"You are indeed a dear friend of mine and I tell this to you alone." Then he
continued: "The American Government is receiving a number of reliable reports
that Japan will be on the move soon. The American Government does not believe
that your visit on Monday to the President or the coming of Mr. KURUSU will
have any effect on the general situation."
I took pains to explain in detail how impatient the Japanese have grown since
the freezing; how they are eager for a quick understanding; how both the
Government and the people do not desire a Japanese-American war, and how we
will hope or peace until the end.
[2] He replied, however:
"Well our boss, the President, believes those reports and so does the
Secretary of State."
24655 ARMY Trans. 11/12/41 (2)
[a] Frederick Moore_Legal Adviser to the Japanese Embassy in Washington.
Page 106
(Part 2 of 2)
In the newspapers and magazines, with the exception of the Daily News and the
Hearst Papers, it is reported that the Americans are much more eager for a war
with Japan than they are for one with Germany. It is said that some of the
British are using this inclination for their own advantage and that already
parleys have been started for joint Anglo-American action. Suggestions have
already been made to the effect that it is necessary for some of the British
fleet to be located in the Pacific. Now even if the President and other
statesmen do not follow this trend, who can say how it will be? The friend I
just spoke of told me that the United States cannot stop now because if Japan
moves something will have to be done since it is a question of the United
States saving its face.
3. Well, in any case, I am going to see the President today and talk with him
on the bases of your instructions. You may be sure that I will do my very
best.
24656 ARMY Trans. 11/12/41 (2)
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
November 16, 1941
Purple (Ca) (Urgent)
For your Honor's own information.
1. I have read your #1090, [a] and you may be sure that you have all my
gratitude for the efforts you have put forth, but the fate of our Empire
hangs by the slender thread of a few days, so please fight harder than you
ever did before.
2. What you say in the last paragraph of your message is, of course, so and I
have given it already the fullest consideration, but I have only to refer you
to the fundamental policy, laid down in my #725. [b] Will you please try to
realize what that means. In your opinion we ought to wait and see what turn
the war takes and remain patient. However, I am awfully sorry to say that the
situation renders this out of the question. I set the deadline for the
solution of these negotiations in my #736, [c] and there will be no change.
Please try to understand that. You see how short the time is, therefore, do
not allow the United States to sidetrack us and delay the negotiations any
further. Press them for a solution on the basis of our proposals, and do your
best to bring about an immediate solution.
ARMY 24,878 JD-1:6638 SECRET Trans. 11/17/41 (S)
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
November 22, 1941
Purple CA (Urgent)
#812
To both you Ambassadors.
It is awfully hard for us to consider changing the date we set in my #736. [a]
You should know this, however, I know you are working hard. Stick to our fixed
policy and do your very best. Spare no efforts and try to bring about the
solution we desire. There are reasons beyond your ability to guess why we
wanted to settle Japanese-American relations by the 25th, but if within the
next three or
[a] See JD-: 6553 in which NOMURA gives his views on the general situation.
Part 3 not available.
[b] S. I. S. #24330 in which TOGO says that conditions both within and without
the Japanese Empire will not permit any further delay in reaching a settlement
with the United States.
[c] S. I. S. #24373 in which TOGO says that it is absolutely necessary that
all arrangements for the signing of this agreement be completed by the 25th of
this month.
[a] See J. D. #6254. Tokyo wires Washington that because of the various
circumstances it is absolutely necessary that arrangements for the signing of
the agreement be completed by the 25th of this month.
Page 107
four days you can finish your conversations with the Americans; if the signing
can be completed by the 29th, (let me write it out for you_twenty ninth); if
the pertinent notes can be exchanged; if we can get an understanding with
Great Britain and the Netherlands; and in short if everything can be finished,
we have decided to wait until that date. This time we mean it, that the
deadline absolutely cannot be changed. After that things are automatically
going to happen. Please take this into your careful consideration and work
harder than you ever have before. This, for the present, is for the
information of you two Ambassadors alone.
ARMY 6710 25138 SECRET Trans. 11/22/41 (S)
[1] From: Tokyo
To: Washington
November 26, 1941
Purple
#836. To be handled in Government Code.
The situation is momentarily becoming more tense and telegrams take too long.
Therefore, will you cut down the substance of your reports of negotiations to
the minimum and, on occasion, call up Chief YAMAMOTO of the American Bureau on
the telephone and make your report to him. At that time we will se the
following code:
Japanese English
Sangoku Joyaku Mondai Nyuu Yooku
(Three-Power Treaty question) (New York)
Musabetsu Taiguu Mondai Shikago
(The question of nondiscriminatory (Chicago)
treatment)
Shina Mondai Sanfuranshisuko
(The China question) (San Francisco)
Soori Itoo Kun
(Premier) (Mr. Itoo)
Gaimudaijin Date Kun
(Foreign Minister) (Mr. Date)
Rikugun Tokugawa Kun
(The Army) (Mr. Tokugawa
Kaigun Maeda Kun
(The Navy) (Mr. Maeda)
Nichi-bei kooshoo Endan
(Japan-American negotiations) (Marriage proposal)
Daitooryoo Kimiko San
(President) (Miss Kimiko)
Haru Fumeko San
(Hull) (Miss Fumeko)
[2] Japanese English
Kokuaijoosei Shoobai
(Internal situation) (Trade)
Joohu Suru Yama Wo Uru
(To yield) (To sell the mountain)
Jooho Sezu Yama Wo Urenu
(Not to yield) (Not to sell the mountain)
Keisei Kyuuten Suru Kodomo Gaumareru
(Situation taking critical turn) (The child is born)
For your information, telephone addresses other than our Home Office are
as follows:
Bureau Chief YAMAMOTO: Setagaya 4617
Section chief KASE: Yotsuya 4793
The Minister's residence Ginza 3614
The Vice-Ministers residence Ginza 1022
ARMY 6841 25344 SECRET Trans. 11-26-41 (S)
Page 108
To: Nanking.
15 November 1941
From: Tokyo
(Purple)
#499
Re your #818*
To Naval authorities:
We are now in the midst of very serious negotiations and have not reached an
agreement as yet. As the time limit is near please have them (defer?) for a
while.
25390 JD-1: 6848 (F) Navy Trans. 11-27-41 (6-AR)
*Not available.
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
19 November 1941
(J19)
Circular #2354
When diplomatic relations are becoming dangerous we will add the following at
the beginning and end of our general intelligence broadcasts:
(1) If it is Japan U. S. Relations
"HIGASHI"
(2) Japan Russian relations
"KITA"
(3) Japan British relations; (including Thai, Malaya, and NEI)
"NISHI"
The above will be repeated five times and repeated five times at the beginning
and end.
Relay to Rio de Janeiro, B. A., Mexico City, and San Francisco.
SIS-25392 JD-1: 6850 SECRET Navy Trans. 11-26-41
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
19 November 1941
(J19)
Circular #2353
Regarding the broadcast of a special message in an emergency.
In case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations) and the
cutting off of international communications, the following warning will be
added in the middle of the daily Japanese language short wave news broadcast:
(1) In case of a Japan-U. S. relations in danger: HIGASHI NO KAZEAME (EAST
WIND RAIN)
(2) Japan-U. S. S. R. relations: KITANOKAZE KUMORI (NORTH WIND CLOUDY)
(3) Japan-British relations: NISHI NO KAZE HARE (WEST WIND CLEAR)
This signal will be given in the middle and at the end as a weather forecast
and each sentence will be repeated twice. When this is heard, please destroy
all code papers, etc. This is as yet to be a completely secret arrangement.
Forward as urgent intelligence.
See Supplementary Information File.
(Voice broadcasts)
SIS-25432 JD-1: 6875 SECRET Navy Trans. 11-28-41
Page 109
From: Washington
To: Tokyo
November 26, 1941
Purple. (Extremely urgent)
#1180. (Part 1 of 2)
From Nomura and Kurusu.
As we have wired you several times, there is hardly any possibility of having
them consider our "B" proposal in toto. On the other hand, if we let the
situation remain tense as it is now, sorry as we are to say so, the
negotiations will inevitably be ruptured, if indeed they may not already be
called so. Our failure and humiliation are complete. We might suggest one
thing for saving the situation. Although we have grave misgivings, we might
propose, first, that President ROOSEVELT wire you that for the sake of
posterity he hopes that Japan and the United States will cooperate for the
maintenance of peace in the Pacific (just as soon-as you wire us what you
think of this, we will negotiate for this sort of an arrangement with all we
have in us), and that you in return reply with a cordial message thereby not
only clearing the atmosphere, but also gaining a little time. Considering the
possibility that England and the United States are scheming to bring the
Netherlands Indies under their protection through military occupation, in
order to forestall this, I think we should propose the establishment of
neutral nations, including French Indo-China, Netherlands India and Thai. (As
you know, last September President ROOSEVELT proposed the neutrality of French
Indo-China and Thai.)
(Part 2 of 2)
We suppose that the rupture of the present negotiations does not necessarily
mean war between Japan and the United States, but after we break off, as we
said, the military occupation of Netherlands India is to be expected of
England and the United States. Then we would attack them and a clash with them
would be inevitable. Now, the question is whether or not Germany would feel
duty bound by the third article of the treaty to help us. We doubt if she
would. Again, you must remember that the Sino-Japanese incident would have to
wait until the end of this world war before it could possibly be settled.
In this telegram we are expressing the last personal opinions we will have to
express, so will Your Excellency please be good enough at least to show it to
the Minister of the Navy, if only to him; then we hope that you will wire us
back instantly.
ARMY 25436 SECRET Trans. 11-28-41 (1)
[1] From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
November 26, 1941
Purple. (Extremely urgent)
#1189. (Part 1 of 2)
At 4:45 on the afternoon of the 26th I and Ambassador KURUSU met with
Secretary Hull and we talked for about two hours.
HULL said, "For the last several days the American Government has been getting
the ideas of various quarters, as well as conferring carefully with the
nations concerned, on the provisional treaty proposal presented by Japan on
the 20th of this month, and I am sorry to tell you that we cannot agree to it.
At length, however, we feel compelled to propose a plan, tentative and without
commitment, reconciling the points of difference between our proposal of June
21st and yours of September 25th." So saying, he presented us with the
following two proposals:
A. One which seeks our recognition of his so-called "four principles."
B. (1) The conclusion of a mutual non-aggression treaty between Tokyo
Washington, Moscow, the Netherlands, Chungking and Bangkok.
(2) Agreement between Japan, the United States, England, the Netherlands,
China and Thai on the inviolability of French Indo-China and equality of
economic treatment in French Indo-China.
Page 110
(3) The complete evacuation of Japanese forces from China and all French
Indo-China.
[2] (4) Japan and the United States both definitely promise to support no
regime in China but that of CHIANG KAI SHEK.
(5) The abolition of extra-territoriality and concessions in China.
25441 ARMY Trans. 11-28-41 (1)
[1] (Part 2 of 2)
(6) The conclusion of a reciprocal trade treaty between Japan and the United
States on the basis of most favored nation treatment.
(7) The mutual rescinding of the Japanese and American freezing orders.
(8) Stabilization of yen-dollar exchange.
(9) No matter what sort of treaties either Japan or the United States has
contracted with third countries, they both definitely promise that these
treaties will not be interpreted as hostile to the objective of this treaty or
to the maintenance of peace in the Pacific. (This is, of course, supposed to
emasculate the Three-Power Pact.)
In view of our negotiations all along, we were both dumb-founded and said we
could not even cooperate to the extent of reporting this to Tokyo. We argued
back furiously, but HULL remained solid as a rock. Why did the United States
have to propose such hard terms as these? Well, England, the Netherlands and
China doubtless put her up to it. Then, too, we have been urging them to quit
helping CHIANG, and lately a number of important Japanese in speeches have
been urging that we strike at England and the United States. Moreover, there
have been rumors that we are demanding of Thai that she give us complete [2]
control over her national defense. All that is reflected in these two hard
proposals, or we think so.
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
November 28, 1941
Purple. (CA)
#844.
Re your #1189 [a].
Well, you two Ambassadors have exerted superhuman efforts but, in spite of
this, the United States has gone ahead and presented this humiliating
proposal. This was quite unexpected and extremely regrettable. The Imperial
Government can by no means use it as a basis for negotiations. Therefore, with
a report of the views of the Imperial Government on this American proposal
which I will send you in two or three days, the negotiations will be de facto
ruptured. This is inevitable. However, I do not wish you to give the
impression that the negotiations are broken off. Merely say to them that you
are awaiting instructions and that, although the opinions of your Government
are not yet clear to you, to your own way of thinking the Imperial Government
has always made just claims and has borne great sacrifices for the sake of
peace in the Pacific. Say that we have always demonstrated a long-suffering
and conciliatory attitude, but that, on the other hand, the United States has
been unbending, making it impossible for Japan to establish negotiations.
Since things have come to this pass, I contacted the man you told me to in
your #1180 [b] and he said that under the present circumstances what you
suggest is entirely unsuitable. From now on do the best you can.
ARMY 6898 25445 SECRET Trans. 11-28 41 (S)
[a] S. I. S. #25441, #25422.
[b] S. I. S. #25435, #25436. The man is the Navy Minister.
Page 111
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
27 November 1941
(Purple)
#843
Broadcast schedule as follows:
6 p. m. To Pacific Coast JVJ 12275
6:30 p. m. To Western Hemisphere JUO 9430 and
JVJ 12275
7:00 p. m. To the Coast JVJ 12275
8:00 p. m. To the Coast JHL 5160
9:00 p. m. To the Coast JHL 5160
10:00 p. m. To the Coast JHL 5160
10:30 p. m. To Europe JHP 11980
(Note: All times Tokyo time)
SIS 25446 JD-1: 6899 SECRET (H) Navy Trans. 11-2841 (S-TT)
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
29 November 1941
(Purple-CA)
#857
Re my #844*
We wish you would make one more attempt verbally along the following lines:
The United States government has (always ?) taken a fair and judicial position
and has formulated its policies after full consideration of the claims of both
sides.
However, the Imperial Government is at a loss to understand why it has now
taken the attitude that the new proposals we have made cannot be made the
basis of discussion, but instead has made new proposals which ignore actual
conditions in East Asia and would greatly injure the prestige of the Imperial
Government.
With such a change of front in their attitude toward the China problem, what
has become of the basic objectives that the U. S. Government has made the
basis of our negotiations during these seven months? On these points we would
request careful self-reflection on the part of the United States government.
(In carrying out this instruction, please be careful that this does not lead
to anything like a breaking off of negotiations.)
SIS 25496 JD-1: 6921 SECRET (F) Navy trans. 30 Nov. 1941 (S-TT)
*JD-1: 6898 (SIS 25445) dated 28 Nov., in which Tokyo's first reaction to the
new U. S. proposals castigates them as humiliating. When Japan sends a reply
in 2 or 3 days giving its views on them the negotiations will be "de factor"
ruptured. However, do not give the impression that negotiations are broken
off.
From: Washington
To: Tokyo
30 November 1941 (2230 to 2238 EST)
Telephone Code
TransPacific
Radio Telephone
(NOTE: Following is a preliminary, condensed version of conversation between
Ambassador Kurusu and the Japanese Foreign Office American Division Chief
Yamamoto on Sunday night)
Kurusu: "It is all arranged for us to meet Hull tomorrow. We received a short
one from you, didn't we? Well, we will meet him in regard to that. There
Page 112
is a longer one coming isn't there? In any case we are going to see him about
the short one." (i. e. Telegram. The longer one is probably Tokyo's reply to
Mr. Hull's proposals.)
Yamamoto: "Yes. I see."
Kurusu: "The President is returning tomorrow. He is hurrying home."
Y: "Is there any special significance to this?"
K: "The newspapers have made much of the Premier's speech, and it is having
strong repercussions here."
Y: "Is that so."
K: "Yes. It was a drastic statement he made. The newspapers carried large
headlines over it; and the President seems to be returning because of it.
There no doubt are other reasons, but this is the reason the newspapers are
giving."
(Pause)
"Unless greater caution is exercised in speeches by the Premier and others, it
puts us in a very difficult position. All of you over there must watch out
about these ill-advised statements. Please tell Mr. Tani."
Y: "We *are* being careful."
K: "We here are doing our best, but these reports are seized upon by the
correspondents and the worst features enlarged upon. Please caution the
Premier, the Foreign Minister, and others. Tell the Foreign Minister that we
had expected to hear something different, some good word, but instead we get
this." (i. e. Premier's speech)
(After a pause, Kurusu continues, using voice code)
K: "What about the internal situation?" (In Japan)
Y: "No particular_(one or two words faded out)_."
K: "Are the Japanese-American negotiations to continue?"
Y: "Yes."
K: "You were very urgent about them before, weren't you; but now you want them
to stretch out. We will need your help. Both the Premier and the Foreign
Minister will need to change the tone of their speeches ! ! ! ! Do you
understand? Please, all use more discretion."
Y: "When will you see them. The 2nd?"
K: "Let's see . . . this is Sunday midnight here. - Tomorrow morning at ten.
That will be Monday morning here."
(Pause)
"Actually the real problem we are up against is the effects of happenings in
the South. You understand don't you?"
Y: "Yes. Yes. How long will it be before the President gets back?"
K: "I don't know exactly. According to news reports he started at 4:00 this
afternoon. He should be here tomorrow morning sometime."
Y: "Well then_Goodbye."
JD-1: 6922 (M) Navy trans. 30 Nov. 1941 (R-5) 25497
From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
November 28, 1941.
Purple.
#1214. To be handled in Government Code.
Re my # 1190 [a].
So far silence has been maintained here concerning our talks with the United
States; however, now the results of our conference of the 26th are out and
headlines like this are appearing in the papers "Hull Hands Peace Plan to
Japanese," and "America Scorns a Second Munich." The papers say that is up to
Japan either to accept the American proposal with its four principles, or face
war, in which latter case the responsibility would be upon Japan.
This we must carefully note.
ARMY 25548 Trans. 12-1-41 (2)
[a] S. I. S. #25444 and #25480 in which NOMURA expresses the danger of the
responsibility for the rupture of negotiations being cast upon Japan should
Japan enter into her scheduled operations during the course of the
negotiations. He suggests that the negotiations be irrevocably concluded
either through an announcement to the American Embassy in Tokyo or by a
declaration for internal and external consumption.
Page 113
[1] From: Tokyo
November 30, 1941
To: Berlin
Purple
#986 (Strictly Secret) (To be handled in Government Code) (Part 1 of 2)
(Secret outside the Department)
1. Japan-American negotiations were commenced the middle of April of this
year. Over a period of half a year they have been continued. Within that
period the Imperial Government adamantly stuck to the Tri-Partite Alliance as
the cornerstone of its national policy regardless of the vicissitudes of the
international situation. In the adjustment of diplomatic relations between
Japan and the United States, she has based her hopes for a solution definitely
within the scope of that alliance. With the intent of restraining the United
States from participating in the war, she boldly assumed the attitude of
carrying through these negotiations.
2. Therefore, the present cabinet, in line with your message, with the view of
defending the Empire's existence and integrity on a just and equitable basis,
has continued the negotiations carried on in the past. However, their views
and ours on the question of the evacuation of troops upon which the
negotiations rested (they demanded the evacuation of Imperial troops from
China and French Indo-China), were completely in opposition to each other.
Judging from the course of the negotiations that have been going on, we first
came to loggerheads when the United States, in keeping with its traditional
ideological tendency of managing international relations, re-emphasized her
fundamental reliance upon this traditional policy in the conversations carried
on between the United States and England in the Atlantic Ocean. The motive of
the United States in all this was brought out by her desire to prevent the
establishment of a new order by Japan, Germany, and Italy in Europe and in the
Far East, that is to say, the aims of the Tri-Partite Alliance. As long as the
Empire of Japan was in alliance with Germany and Italy, there could be no
maintenance of friendly relations between Japan and the United States was the
stand they took. From this point of view, they began to demonstrate a tendency
to demand the divorce of the Imperial Government from the Tri-Partite
Alliance. This was brought out at the last meeting. That is to say that it has
only been in the negotiations of the last few days that it has become
gradually more and more clear that the Imperial Government could no longer
continue negotiations with the United States. It became clear, too, that a
continuation of negotiations would inevitably be detrimental to our cause.
[2] (Part 2 of 2)
3. The proposal presented by the United States on the 26th made this attitude
of theirs clearer than ever. In it there is one insulting clause which says
that no matter what treaty either party enters into with a third power it will
not be interpreted as having any bearing upon the basic object of this treaty,
namely the maintenance of peace in the Pacific. This means specifically the
Three-Power Pact. It means that in case the United States enters the European
war at any time the Japanese Empire will not be allowed to give assistance to
Germany and Italy. It is clearly a trick. This clause alone, let alone others,
makes it impossible to find any basis in the American proposal for
negotiations. What is more, before the United States brought forth this plan,
they conferred with England, Australia, the Netherlands, and China_they do so
repeatedly. Therefore, it is clear that the United States is now in collusion
with those nations and has decided to regard Japan, along with Germany and
Italy, as an enemy.
ARMY 6944 25555 SECRET Trans. 12-1-41 (NR)
Page 114
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
1 December 1941
(Purple-CA)
#865
Re my #857.*
1. The date set in my message #812** has come and gone, and the situation
continues to be increasingly critical. However, to prevent the United States
from becoming unduly suspicious we have been advising the press and others
that though there are some wide differences between Japan and the United
States, the negotiations are continuing. (The above is for only your
information)
2. We have decided to withhold submitting the note to the U. S. Ambassador to
Tokyo as suggested by you at the end of your message #1124***. Please make the
necessary representations at your end only.
3. There are reports here that the President's sudden return to the capital is
an effect of Premier Tojo's statement. We have an idea that the President did
so because of his concern over the critical Far Eastern situation. Please make
investigations into this matter.
SIS-25605 JD-1: 6983 SECRET (D) Navy Trans. 12-1-41 (S-TT)
*JD-1:6921.
**JD-1:6710.
*** Not available.
From: Tokyo (Togo)
To: Honolulu (Riyoji)
15 November 1941
(J-19)
#111
As relations between Japan and the United States are most critical, make your
"ships in harbor report" irregular, but at a rate of twice a week. Although
you already are not doubt aware, please take extra care to maintain secrecy.
SIS-25644 JD-1: 6991 SECRET (Y) Navy Trans. 12-3-41 (S)
From: Washington
To: Tokyo
December 2, 1941
Purple
#1232
[Completed Translation]
(Part 1 of 2)
Re my #1231.
Today, the 2nd Ambassador KURUSU and I had an interview with Under-Secretary
of State WELLES. At that time, prefacing his statement by saying that it was
at the direct instruction of the President of the United States, he turned
over to us the substance of my separate wire #1233. [a] Thereupon we said:
"Since we haven't been informed even to the slightest degree concerning the
troops in French Indo-China, we will transmit the gist of your representations
directly to our Home Government. In all probability they never considered that
such a thing as this could possibly be an upshot of their proposals of
November 20th." The Under-Secretary then said: "I want you to know that the
stand the United States takes is that she opposes aggression in any and all
parts of the world." Thereupon we replied "The United States and other
countries have pyramided economic pressure upon economic pressure upon us
Japanese. (I made that statement that economic warfare was even worse than
forceful aggression.) We haven't the time to argue the pros and cons of this
question or the rights and wrongs. The people of Japan are faced with economic
pressure, and I want you to know that we have but the choice between
* Not available.
Page 115
submission to this pressure or breaking the chains that it invokes. *We want
you to realize this as well as the situation in which all Japanese find
themselves as the result of the four-year incident in China; the President
recently expressed cognizance of the latter situation.
25659-B Trans. 12/3/41
*Original translation incomplete from this point on.
(Part 2 of 2)
[1] Furthermore, I would have you know that in replying to the recent American
proposals the Imperial Government is giving the most profound consideration to
this important question which has to do with our national destiny." Under-
Secretary of State WELLES said: "I am well aware of that." I continued: "We
cannot overemphasize the fact that, insofar as Japan is concerned, it is
virtually impossible for her to accept the new American proposals as they now
stand. Our proposals proffered on the 21st of June and the proposals of
September 25th, representing our greatest conciliations based on the previous
proposal, still stand. In spite of the fact that the agreement of both sides
was in the offing, it has come to naught. At this late juncture to give
thoughtful consideration to the new proposals certainly will not make for a
smooth and speedy settlement of the negotiations. Recently, we promised to
evacuate our troops from French Indo-China in the event of a settlement of the
Sino-Japanese incident and the establishment of a just peace in the Far East.
In anticipating the settlement of fundamental questions the question of the
representations of this date would naturally dissolve." The Under-Secretary
assiduously heard us out and then said: "The American proposals of the 26th
were brought about by the necessity to clarify the position of the United
States because of the internal situation here."
26660 ARMY
[2] Then he continued: "In regard to the opinions that you have expressed, I
will make it a point immediately to confer with the Secretary."
I got the impression from the manner in which he spoke that he hoped Japan in
her reply to the American proposals of the 26th would leave this much room.
Judging by my interview with Secretary of State HULL on the 1st and my
conversations of today, it is clear that the United States, too, is anxious to
peacefully conclude the current difficult situation. I am convinced that they
would like to bring about a speedy settlement. Therefore, please bear well in
mind this fact in your considerations of our reply to the new American
proposals and to my separate wire #1233. [a]
ARMY 25660 Trans. 12-3_41 (7)
[a] Not available.
From: Washington.
To: Tokyo.
1 December 1941
(Purple)
#1225 (Part 2 of 3) (Parts 1 and 3 not available).
(Message having the indicator 20803* is part one of three.)
For this reason CHA has been the target of considerable attack and
dissatisfaction. It was admitted that he was in a very tight spot. As the
President recently said, it is clearly understood that the people of Japan,
after over four years of the Japanese-Chinese incident, are very tense.
Japan, too, is highly desirous of having peace on the Pacific assured by
successfully concluding these negotiations. It is our hope that he would give
his support and encouragement to the efforts that Hull and we are making in
this direction.
With regard to the matters pertaining to French Indo-China ______ the
government of the United States, too, cannot help but feel concern since it
has been receiving report after report during the past few days, from U. S.
officials stationed in that area, of unusual movements of the Japanese army
and navy; the landing
* Not available, probably is Part 1 of this message.
Page 116
of various types of arms; and the movements of transport vessels. Concern is
felt as to the goal of all these activities (the implication was they they
[sic] feared that they were going to be used not only against Thailand but in
the southwestern Pacific area).
As to what plans the responsible persons in the Japanese army and navy are
planning are not difficult to guess if one goes on the assumption that the
Japanese army and navy joins forces with the Germans; even if, in actuality,
that is not what is taking place, preparations must be made for this possible
eventuality, and all nations concerned must concentrate their fighting forces
in that area.
25715 JD-1: 7042 (D) Navy Trans. 12-4-41 (T)
From: Tokyo.
To: Washington
3 December 1941
(Purple)
#875
Chief of Office routing
Re your #1232*
Please explain the matter to the United States along the following lines:
There seems to be rumors to the effect that our military garrisons in French
Indo-China are being strengthened. The fact is that recently there has been an
unusual amount of activity by the Chinese forces in the vicinity of the Sino-
French Indo-China border. In view of this, we hare increased our forces in
parts of northern French Indo-China. There would naturally be some movement of
troops in the southern part as a result of this. We presume that the source of
the rumors is in the exaggerated reports of these movements. In doing so, we
have in no way violated the limitations contained in the Japanese-French joint
defense agreement.
25725 JD-1: 7057 (D) Navy Trans. 12-4-41 (S-TT)
*JD-1: 7 021. (SIS #25659_60)
From: Washington.
To: Tokyo.
1 December 1941
(Purple)
#1227
Indications are that the United States desires to continue the negotiations
even if it is necessary to go beyond their stands on the so-called basic
principles. However, if we keep quibbling on the critical points, and continue
to get stuck in the middle as we have been in the past, it is impossible to
expect any further developments. If it is impossible from the broad political
viewpoint, to conduct a leaders' meeting at this time, would it not be
possible to arrange a conference between persons in whom the leaders have
complete confidence, (for example, Vice President Wallace or Hopkins from the
United States and the former Premier Konoye, who is on friendly terms with the
President, or Adviser to the Imperial Privy Council Ishii). The meeting could
be arranged for some midway point, such as Honolulu. High army and navy
officers should accompany these representatives. Have them make one final
effort to reach some agreement, using as the basis of their discussions the
latest proposals submitted by each.
We feel that this last effort may facilitate the final decision as to war or
peace.
We realize of course that an attempt to have President Roosevelt and former
Premier Konoye meet, failed. Bearing in mind the reaction to that in our
nation, it may be to our interest to first ascertain the U.S. attitude on this
possibility. Moreover, since we have no guarantee either of success or failure
of the objectives even if the meeting is held, careful consideration should
first be given this matter.
We feel, however, that to surmount the crisis with which we are face to face,
it is not wasting our efforts to pursue every path open to us. It is our
opinion that it would be most effective to feel out and ascertain the U.S.
attitude regarding this matter, in the name of the Japanese Government.
However, if this procedure
Page 117
does not seem practical to you in view of some internal condition, then how
would it be if I were to bring up the subject as purely of my own origin and
in that manner feel out their attitude. Then, if they seem receptive to it the
government could make the official proposal.
Please advise me of your opinions on this matter.
25727 JD-1: 7055 SECRET (D) Navy Trans. 12-4-41 (1) Copy
From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
December 2, 1941.
Purple. (Urgent)
#1234.
Strictly Secret.
Re your #862. [a]
I knew that to leave that error in the publication of this speech as it now
stands would have a bad effect on negotiations, so on the morning of the 2nd
prior to my interview with WELLES I sent TERAZAKI to visit BALLANTINE at the
State Department to explain the substance of your #862. BALLANTINE said, "At
this tense psychological moment in Japanese-American negotiations, the fact
that such a strong statement as this has been circulated has given a severe
shock to the American Government and people and it is very unfortunate and
dangerous." TERAZAKI replied, "Well, as it was the American newspapers that
made such a clamor about it, I did not come to vindicate ourselves or make any
explanation. I merely wished to state the facts." He added, "At present the
newspaper of both countries ought both to be cool and calm, so will you please
advise them hereafter concerning this point."
25730 JD-7059 Trans 12-4-41 (2)
ARMY
[a] Not available.
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
December 4, 1941.
Purple (Urgent)
#891.
To be handled in Government Code
Re your #1256. [a]
What you say in your telegram is, of course, true, but at present it would be
a very delicate matter to give any more explanations than set forth in my
#875. [b] I would advise against it because unfortunate results might follow,
so please reply in accordance with my aforementioned message.
25731 JD-7105 Trans. 12-4-41 (S)
ARMY
[a] Not available.
[b] S. I. S. #25725-
From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
November 30, 1941
Purple
#1224
Re your #857. [a]
I at once requested HULL for an interview, however, I failed to be notified of
the exact time for it for the reason, among others, of the President's ex-
[a] See S. I. S. #25496. Tokyo instructs Washington to make one more attempt
verbally to the effect that the Imperial Government is at a loss to understand
why the United States, in view of the fair position it has always taken,
should have changed in their front with regard to the China problem.
Page 118
pected arrival tomorrow morning. I am afraid I shall miss a good opportunity
and so will you transmit your message at once to Ambassador GREW? (7:30 p. m.)
25762
ARMY JD 7089 Trans. 12/5/41 (2)
From: Tokyo (Togo)
To: Honolulu
November 18, 1941
J-19
#113
Please report on the following areas as to vessels anchored therein: Area "N",
Pearl Harbor, Manila Bay, [a] and the areas adjacent thereto. (Make your
investigation with great secrecy.)
ARMY 25773 7063 SECRET Trans. 12/5/41 (S)
[a] Probably means Mamala Bay.
From: Tokyo
To: Hsinking
1 December 1941
(Purple)
#893
* * * In the event that Manchuria participates in the war * * * in
view of various circumstances it is our policy to cause Manchuria to
participate in the war in which event Manchuria will take the same steps
toward England and America that this country will take in case war breaks out.
A summary follows:
1. American and British consular officials and offices will not be recognized
as having special rights. Their business will be stopped (the sending of code
telegrams and the use of short wave radio will be forbidden). However it is
desired that the treatment accorded them after the suspension of business be
comparable to that which Japan accords to consular officials of enemy
countries resident to Japan
2. The treatment accorded to British and American public property, private
property, and to the citizens themselves shall be comparable to that accorded
by Japan.
3. British and American requests to third powers to look after their consular
offices and interests will not be recognized.
However the legal administrative steps taken by Manchoukuo shall be equitable
and shall correspond to the measures taken by Japan.
4. The treatment accorded Russians resident in Manchoukuo shall conform to the
provisions of the Japanese-Soviet neutrality pact. Great care shall be
exercised not to antagonize Russia.
[Handwritten:] Codes Manchukuo, etc.
JD-1: 7092 SECRET (H) Navy Trans. 12-4-41 (5-AR) SIS 25783
Page 119
From: Washington.
To: Tokyo.
December 1941
(Purple)
#1223
Judging from all indications, we feel that some joint military action between
Great Britain and the United States, with or without a declaration of war, is
a definite certainty in the event of an occupation of Thailand.
25785
JD-1: 7098 (D) Navy Trans. 12-5-41 (7)
From: Berlin
To: Tokyo
December 4, 1941.
Purple. (CA)
#1410
In case of evacuation by the members of our Embassy in London, I would like to
arrange to have Secretary MATSUI of that office and three others (URABE and
KOJIMA and one other) from among the higher officials and two other officials
(UEHARA and YUWASAKI) stay here. Please do your best to this end.
ARMY 25807 JD-7134 Trans. 12-5-41 (W)
From: Honolulu (Kita)
To: Tokyo
November 18, 1941
J-19
#222
1. The warships at anchor in the Harbor on the 15th were as I told you in my
#219 [a] on that day.
Area A [b] -A battleship of the Oklahoma class entered and one tanker left
port.
Area C [c] -3 warships of the heavy cruiser class were at anchor.
2. On the 17th the Saratoga was not in the harbor. The carrier, Enterprise, or
some other vessel was in Area C. Two heavy cruisers of the Chicago class, one
of the Pensacola class were tied up at docks "KS". 4 merchant vessels were at
anchor in Area D. [d]
3. At 10:00 a. m. On the morning of the 17th, 8 destroyers were observed
entering the Harbor. Their course was as follows: In a single file at a
distance of 1,000 meters apart at a speed of 3 knots per hour, they moved into
Pearl Harbor. From the entrance of the Harbor through Area B to the buoys in
Area C, to which they were moored, they changed course 5 times each time
roughly 30 degrees. The elapsed time was one hour, however, one of these
destroyers entered Area A after passing the water reservoir on the Eastern
side.
Relayed to -----
ARMY 25817 7111 SECRET Trans. 12/6/41 (2)
[a] Available in ME code dated November 14. Code under study.
[b] Waters between Ford Island and the Arsenal.
[c] East Loch.
[d] Middle Loch.
Page 120
From: Tokyo
To: Honolulu
29 November 1941
(J19)
#199
We have been receiving reports from you on ship movements, but in future
will you also report even when there are no movements.
SIS 25823
JD-1: 7086 SECRET (Y) Navy Trans. 12-5-41 (2)
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
December 6, 1941
Purple
#902 (Part 1 of 14)
Separate telegram
Memorandum
1. The Government of Japan, prompted by a genuine desire to come to an
amicable understanding with the Government of the United States in order that
the two countries by their joint efforts may secure the peace of the Pacific
area and thereby contribute toward the realization of world peace, has
continued negotiations with the utmost sincerity since April last with the
Government of the United States regarding the adjustment and advancement of
Japanese-American relations and the stabilization of the Pacific area.
The Japanese Government has the honor to state frankly its views concerning
the claims the American Government has persistently maintained as well as the
measures the United States and Great Britain have taken toward Japan during
these eight months.
2. It is the immutable policy of the Japanese Government to insure the
stability of East Asia and to promote world peace, and thereby to enable all
nations to find each BOAMPYQBR place in the world.
Ever since the China Affair broke out owing to the failure on the part of
China to comprehend Japan's true intentions, the Japanese Government has
striven for the restoration of peace and it has consistently exerted its best
effort to prevent the extension of war-like disturbances. It was also to that
end that in September last year Japan concluded the Tri Partite Pact with
Germany and Italy.
(Part 2 of 14)
However, both the United States and Great Britain have resorted to every
possible measure to assist the Chungking regime so as to obstruct the
establishment of a general peace between Japan and China, interfering with
Japan's constructive endeavours toward the stabilization of East Asia,
exerting pressure on The Netherlands East Indies, or menacing French Indo-
China, they have attempted to frustrate Japan's aspiration to realize the
ideal of common prosperity in cooperation with these regions. Furthermore,
when Japan in accordance with its protocol with France took measures of joint
defense of French Indo-China, both American and British governments, willfully
misinterpreted it as a threat to their own possession and inducing the
Netherlands government to follow suit, they enforced the assets freezing
order, thus severing economic relations with Japan. While manifesting thus an
obviously hostile attitude, these countries have strengthened their military
preparations perfecting an encirclement of Japan, and have brought about a
situation which endangers the very existence of the empire.
(Part 3 of 14)
Nevertheless, facilitate a speedy settlement, the Premier of Japan proposed,
in August last, to meet the President of the United States for a discussion of
important problems between the two countries covering the entire Pacific area.
However, while accepting in principle the Japanese proposal, insisted that the
meeting should take place after an agreement of View had been reached on
Page 121
fundamental_(75 letters garbled)_The Japanese government submitted a proposal
based on the formula proposed by the American government, taking fully into
consideration past American claims and also incorporating Japanese views.
Repeated discussions proved of no avail in producing readily an agreement of
view. The present cabinet, therefore, submitted a revised proposal, moderating
still further the Japanese claims regarding the principal points of difficulty
in the negotiation and endeavoured strenuously to reach a settlement. But the
American government, adhering steadfastly to its original proposal, failed to
misplay in the slightest degree a spirit of conciliation. The negotiation made
no progress.
(Part 4 of 14)
Thereupon, the Japanese Government, with a view to doing its utmost for
averting a crisis in Japanese-American relations, submitted on November 20th
still another proposal in order to arrive .It an equitable solution of the
more essential and urgent questions which, simplifying its previous proposal,
stipulated the following points:
(1) The Governments of Japan and the United States undertake not to dispatch
armed forces into any of the regions, excepting French Indo-China, in the
Southeastern Asia and the Southern Pacific area.
(2) Both Governments shall cooperate with a view to securing the acquisition
in the Netherlands East Indies of those goods and commodities of which the two
countries are in need.
(3) Both Governments mutually undertake to restore commercial relations to
those prevailing prior to the freezing of assets.
The Government of the United States shall supply Japan the required quantity
of oil.
(4) The Government of the United States undertakes not to resort to measures
and actions prejudicial to the endeavours for the restoration of general peace
between Japan and China.
(5) The Japanese Government undertakes to withdraw troops now stationed in
French Indo-China upon either the restoration of peace between Japan and China
or the establishment of an equitable peace in the Pacific area; and it is
prepared to remove the Japanese troops in the southern part of French Indo-
China to the northern part upon the conclusion of the present agreement.
(Part 5 of 14)
As regards China. The Japanese Government, while expressing its readiness to
accept the offer of the President of the United States to act as "Introducer"
of peace between Japan and China as was previously suggested, asked for an
undertaking on the part of the United States to do nothing prejudicial to the
restoration of Sino-Japanese peace when the two parties have commenced direct
negotiations.
The American government not only rejected the above-mentioned new proposal,
but made known its intention to continue its aid to Chiang Kai-Shek; and in
spite of its suggestion mentioned above, withdrew the offer of the President
to act as the so-called "Introducer" of peace between Japan and China,
pleading that time was not yet ripe for it. Finally, on November 26th, in an
attitude to impose upon the Japanese government those principles it has
persistently maintained, the American government made a proposal totally
ignoring Japanese claims, which is a source of profound regret to the Japanese
Government.
(Part 6 of 14)
4. From the beginning of the present negotiation the Japanese Government as
always maintained an attitude of fairness and moderation, and did its best to
reach a settlement, for which it made all possible concessions often in spite
of great difficulties.
As for the China question which constituted an important subject of the
agitation, the Japanese Government showed a most conciliatory attitude.
As for the principle of Non-Discrimination in International Commerce,
advocated by the American Government, the Japanese Government expressed its
desire to see the said principle applied throughout the world, and declared
that along with the actual practice of this principle in the world, the
Japanese Government would endeavour to apply the same in the Pacific area,
including China, and made it clear that Japan had no intention of excluding
from China economic activities of third powers pursued on an equitable basis.
Page 122
Furthermore, as regards the question of withdrawing troops from French Indo-
China, the Japanese government even volunteered, as mentioned above, to carry
out an immediate evacuation of troops from Southern French Indo-china as a
measure of easing the situation.
(Part 7 of 14)
It is presumed that the spirit of conciliation exhibited to the utmost degree
by the Japanese Government in all these matters is fully appreciated by the
American government.
On the other hand, the American government, always holding fast to theories in
disregard of realities, and refusing to yield an inch on its impractical
principles caused undue delays in the negotiation. It is difficult to
understand this attitude of the American government and the Japanese
government desires to call the attention of the American government especially
to the following points:
1. The American government advocates in the name of world peace those
principles favorable to it and urges upon the Japanese government the
acceptance thereof. The peace of the world may be brought about only by
discovering a mutually acceptable formula through recognition of the reality
of the situation and mutual appreciation of one another's position. An
attitude such as ignores realities and imposes one's selfish views upon others
will scarcely serve the purpose of facilitating the consummation of
negotiations.
(Part 8 of 14)
Of the various principles put forward by the American government as a basis of
the Japanese American agreement, there are some which the Japanese government
is ready to accept in principle, but in view of the world's actual conditions
it seems only a Utopian ideal, on the part of the American government, to
attempt to force their immediate adoption.
Again, the proposal to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact between
Japan, the United States, Great Britain, China, the Soviet Union, The
Netherlands, and Thailand, which is patterned after the old concept of
collective security, is far removed from the realities of East Asia.
(2) The American proposal contains a stipulation which states: "Both
governments will agree that no agreement, which either has concluded with any
third powers, shall be interpreted by it in such a way as to conflict with the
fundamental purpose of this agreement, the establishment and preservation of
peace throughout the Pacific area." It is presumed that the above provision
has been proposed with a view to restrain Japan from fulfilling its
obligations under the Tripartite Pact when the United States participates in
the war in Europe, and, as such, it cannot be accepted by the Japanese
Government.
(Part 9 of 14)
The American Government, obsessed with its own views and opinions, may be said
to be scheming for the extension of the war. While it seeks, on the one hand,
to secure its rear by stabilizing the Pacific area, it is engaged, on the
other hand, in aiding Great Britain and preparing to attack, in the name of
self-defense, Germany and Italy two powers that are striving to establish a
new order in Europe. Such a policy is totally at variance with the many
principles upon which the American Government proposes to found the stability
of the Pacific area through peaceful means.
3. Where as the American Government, under the principles it rigidly upholds,
objects to settling international issues through military pressure, it is
exercising in conjunction with Great Britain and other nations pressure by
economic power. Recourse to such pressure as a means of dealing with
international relations should be condemned as it is at times more inhuman
than military pressure.
(Part 10 of 14)
4. It is impossible not to reach the conclusion that the American Government
desires to maintain and strengthen. In collusion with Great Britain and other
powers, its dominant position it has hitherto occupied not only in China but
in other areas of East Asia. It is a fact of history that one countr---- (45
letters garbled or missing)-been compelled to observe the status quo under the
Anglo-American policy of imperialistic exploitation and to sacrifice the ----
es to the prosperity of the two nations. The Japanese Government cannot
tolerate
Page 123
the perpetuation of such a situation since it directly runs counter to Japan's
fundamental policy to enable all nations to enjoy each its proper place in the
world.
(Part 11 of 14)
The stipulation proposed by the American Government relative to French Indo-
China is a good exemplification of the above-mentioned American policy. That
the six: countries,_Japan, the United States, Great Britain, The Netherlands,
China and Thailand,_excepting France, should undertake among themselves to
respect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of French Indo-China and
equality of treatment in trade and commerce would be tantamount to placing
that territory under the joint guarantee of the governments of those six
countries. Apart from the fact that such a proposal totally ignores the
position of France, it is unacceptable to the Japanese government in that such
an arrangement cannot but be considered as an extension to French Indo-China
of a system similar to the n_(50 letters missed)_sible for the present
predicament of East Asia.
(Part 12 of 14)
5. All the items demanded of Japan by the American government regarding China
such as wholesale evacuation of troops or unconditional application of the
principle of Non-Discrimination in International Commerce ignore the actual
conditions of China, and are calculated to destroy Japan's position as the
stabilizing factor of East Asia. The attitude of the American government in
demanding Japan not to support militarily, politically or economically any
regime other than the regime at Chungking, disregarding thereby the existence
of the Nanking government, shatters the very basis of the present negotiation.
This demand of the American government falling, as it does, in line with its
above-mentioned refusal to cease from aiding the Chungking regime,
demonstrates clearly the intention of the American government to obstruct the
restoration of normal relations between Japan and China and the return of
peace to East Asia
(Part 13 of 14)
5. In brief, the American proposal contains certain acceptable items such as
those concerning commerce, including the conclusion of a trade agreement,
mutual removal of the freezing restrictions, and stabilization of the Yen and
Dollar exchange, or the abolition of extra-territorial rights in China. On the
other hand, however, the proposal in question ignores Japan's sacrifices in
the four years of the China Affair, menaces the empire's existence itself and
disparages its honour and prestige. Therefore, viewed in its entirety, the
Japanese government regrets that it cannot accept the proposal as a basis of
negotiation.
6. The Japanese government, in its desire for an early conclusion of the
negotiation, proposed that simultaneously with the conclusion of the Japanese-
American negotiation, agreements be signed with Great Britain and other
interested countries. The proposal was accepted by the American government.
However, since the American government has made the proposal of November 26th
as a result of frequent consultations with Great Britain, Australia, The
Netherlands and Chungking, ANDND* presumably by catering to the wishes of the
Chungking regime on the questions of CHTUAL YLOKMMTT** be concluded that all
these countries are at one with the United States in ignoring Japan's
position.
(Part 14 of 14)
(Note: in the forwarding instructions to the radio station handling this part,
appeared the plain English phrase "VERY IMPORTANT").
7. Obviously it is the intention of the American Government to conspire with
Great Britain and other countries to obstruct Japan's efforts toward the
establishment of peace through the creation of a New Order in East Asia, and
especially to preserve Anglo-American rights and interests by keeping Japan
and China at war. This intention has been revealed clearly during the course
of the present negotiations. Thus, the earnest hope of the Japanese Government
to adjust Japanese-American relations and to preserve and promote the peace of
the Pacific through cooperation with the American Government has finally been
lost.
* Probably "and as"
** Probably "China, can but"
Page 124
The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify hereby the American
Government that in view of the attitude of the American Government it cannot
but consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through further
negotiations.
JD 1:7143 SECRET,(M) Navy trans. 7 Dec. 1941. (S-TT)
25843
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
December 7, 1941
Purple (Urgent_Very Important)
#907. To be handled in government code.
Re my #902. [a]
Will the Ambassador please submit to the United States Government (if possible
to the Secretary of State) our reply to the United States at 1:00 p. m. on the
7th, your time.
ARMY 7145 25850 SECRET Trans. 12/7/41 (S)
[a] JD: 7143_text of Japanese reply.
CLARKE EXHIBIT NO. 2
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
19 November 1941
(J19)
Circular #2353
Regarding the broadcast of a special message in an emergency.
In case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations) and the
cutting off of international communications, the following warning will be
added in the middle of the daily Japanese language short wave news broadcast:
(1) In case of a Japan-U. S. relations in danger:
HIGASHI NO KAZEAME (EAST WIND RAIN)
(2) Japan-U. S. S. R. relations:
KITANOKAZE KUMORI (NORTH WIND CLOUDY)
(3) Japan-British relations:
NISHI NO KAZE HARE (WEST WIND CLEAR)
This signal will be given in the middle and at the end as a weather forecast
and each sentence will be repeated twice. When this is heard, please destroy
all code papers, etc. This is as yet to be a completely secret arrangement.
Forward as urgent intelligence.
(Voice broadcasts)
S/S 25432
JD-1: 6875 SECRET Navy Trans. 11-28-41
CLARKE EXHIBIT NO. 3
SECRET
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION,
Washington, D. C.. August 18,1944.
I hereby certify that the attached are true copies of documents described as
follows:
Document No. 1 is a true copy of the weather message which Major Wesley T.
Guest (now Colonel), U. S. Army Signal Corps, requested the Commission's
monitors to be on the lookout for in Tokyo broadcasts and to advise Colonel
Bratton, Army Military Intelligence, if any such messages was intercepted.
This request was made on November 28, 1941 at approximately 2140 GMT.
Page 125
Document No. 2 is a true copy of a weather message from Tokyo station JVW3,
intercepted by Commission monitors at approximately 2200 GMT, December 4,
1g41, which at 9:05 p. m. EST, December 4, 1941, having been unable to contact
Colonel Bratton's office, was telephoned to Lieutenant Brotherhood, 20-G,
Watch Officer, Navy Department, who stated that he was authorized to accept
messages of interest to Colonel Bratton's office.
Document No. 3 is a true copy of a weather message from Tokyo station JVW3,
intercepted by Commission monitors at 2130 GMT, December 5, 1941, which was
telephoned to Colonel Bratton at his residence at 7:50 p.m. EST, December 5,
1941.
Document No. 4 is a true copy of two weather messages intercepted by
Commission monitors from Tokyo stations JLG 4 and JZJ between 0002 and 0035
GMT, December 8, 1941, and telephoned to Lt. Colonel C. A Dusenbury, U. S.
Army Service Corps, at the request of Colonel Bratton's office at
approximately 8 p. m. EST, December 7, 1941. Document No. 4 also contains the
Romaji version of these messages.
on file in this Commission, and that I am the proper custodian of the same.
In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand, and caused the seal of the
Federal Communications Commission to be affixed, this twenty-first day of
August, 1944.
/S/ T. J. Slowie
T. J. SLOWIE
Secretary
(SEAL of the F. C. C.)
CLARKE EXHIBIT NO. 4
SECRET
DOCUMENT No. 1
Group One is EAST WIND RAIN
Group Two is NORTH WIND CLOUDY AND
Group Three is WEST WIND CLEAR STOP
Groups repeated twice in middle and at end of broadcast
The above are the weather messages Major Wesley T. Guest requested the
Commission to monitor on November 28, 1941.
DOCUMENT No. 2
Tokyo today north wind slightly stronger may become cloudy tonight tomorrow
slightly cloudy and fine weather.
Kanagawa prefecture today north wind cloudy from afternoon more clouds.
China prefecture today north wind clear may become slightly cloudy ocean
surface calm.
Weather message from Tokyo Station JVW3 transmitted at approximately 2200 GMT,
December 4, 1941.
DOCUMENT No. 3
Today north wind morning cloudy afternoon clear begin cloudy evening. Tomorrow
north wind and later from south (repeated 3 times).
Weather message from Tokyo Station JVW3 transmitted at approximately 2130 gmt
December 6, 1941.
Page 126
DOCUMENT No. 4
English Romaji
This is in the middle of the news Nyusu no tochu de gozaimasu ga hon-
but today, specially at this point jitsu wa toku ni koko de tenki yoho
I will give the weather forecast: wo moshiage masu
WEST WIND CLEAR NISHI NO KAZE HARE
WEST WIND CLEAR NISHI NO KAZE HARE
This is in the middle of the news Nyuso no tochu de gozaimasu ga kyo
but today, at this point special- wa koko de toku ni tenki yollo wo
ly I will give the weather moshiage masu
forecast:
WEST WIND, CLEAR NISHI NO KAZE HARE
WEST WIND, CLEAR NISHI NO KAZE HARE
Above are the two weather messages from Tokyo stations JLG4 and JZJ
transmitted by them between 0002 and 0035 GMT December 8, 1941.
Sent No. 519, 12/5
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF HEADQUARTERS
G2 Hawaiian Department, Honolulu, Territory Hawaii.
Contact Commander Rochefort immediately thru Commandment Fourteen Naval
District regarding broadcasts from Tokyo reference weather
MILES.
I certify that this message is on official business and necessary for the
public service.
/S/ RALPH C, SMITH,
Colonel, G. S. C.,
Executive Officer, G-2.
Secret Cablegram
las
CLARKE EXHIBIT No. 5
TOP SECRET
From Tokyo
To Washington
December 6, 1941
Purple
#902
(Part 1 of 14)
Separate telegram
MEMORANDUM
1. The Government of Japan, prompted by a genuine desire to come to an
amicable understanding with the Government of the United States in order that
the two countries by their joint efforts may secure the peace of the Pacific
area and thereby contribute toward the realization of world peace, has
continued negotiations with the utmost sincerity since April last with the
Government of the United States regarding the adjustment and advancement of
Japanese-American relations and the stabilization of the Pacific area.
The Japanese Government has the honor to state frankly its views concerning
the claims the American Government has persistently maintained as well as the
measures the United States and Great Britain have taken toward Japan during
these eight months.
2 It is the immutable policy of the Japanese Government to insure the
stability of East Asia and to promote world peace. And thereby to enable all
nations to find each BOAMPYQBR place in the world.
Ever since the China Affair broke out owing to the failure on the part of
China to comprehend Japan's true intentions, the Japanese Government has
striven for the restoration of peace and it has consistently exerted its best
efforts to prevent the extension of war-like disturbances. It was also to that
end that in September last year Japan concluded the Tri Partite Pact with
Germany and Italy.
Page 127
TOP SECRET
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
December 6, 1941
Purple
#902
(Part 2 of 14)
However, both the United States and Great Britain have resorted to every
possible measure to assist the Chungking regime so as to obstruct the
establishment of a general peace between Japan and China, interfering with
Japan's constructive endeavours toward the stabilization of East Asia,
exerting pressure on The Netherlands East Indies, or menacing French Indo-
China, they have attempted to frustrate Japan's aspiration to realize the
ideal of common prosperity in cooperation with these regions. Furthermore,
when Japan in accordance with its protocol with France took measures of Joint
defense of French Indo-China, both American and British governments, willfully
misinterpreted it as a threat to their own possession and inducing the
Netherlands government to follow suit, they enforced the assets freezing
order, thus severing economic relations with Japan. While manifesting thus an
obviously hostile attitude, these countries have strengthened their military
preparations perfecting an encirclement of Japan, and have brought about a
situation which endangers the very existence of the empire.
TOP SECRET
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
December 6, 1941
Purple
#902
(Part 3 of 14)
Nevertheless, facilitate a speedy settlement, the Premier of Japan proposed,
in August last, to meet the President of the United States for a discussion of
important problems between the two countries covering the entire Pacific area.
However, while accepting in principle the Japanese proposal, insisted that the
meeting should take place after an agreement of view had been reached on
fundamental_(75 letters garbled)_ The Japanese government submitted a proposal
based on the formula proposed by the American government, taking fully into
consideration past American claims and also incorporating Japanese views.
Repeated discussions proved of no avail in producing readily an agreement of
view. The present cabinet, therefore, submitted a revised proposal, moderating
still further the Japanese claims regarding the principal points of difficulty
in the negotiation and endeavoured strenuously to reach a settlement. But the
American government, adhering steadfastly to its original proposal, failed to
display in the slightest degree a spirit of conciliation. The negotiation made
no progress.
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
December 6, 1941
Purple
#902
(Part 4 of 14)
Thereupon, the Japanese Government, with a view to doing its utmost for
averting a crisis in Japanese-American relations submitted on November 20th
still another proposal in order to arrive at an equitable solution of the more
essential and urgent questions which, simplifying its previous proposal,
stipulated the following points:
(1) The Governments of Japan and the United States undertake not to dispatch
armed forces into any of the regions, excepting French Indo-China, in the
Southeastern Asia and the Southern Pacific area.
(2) Both Governments shall cooperate with a view to securing the acquisition
in the Netherlands East Indies of those goods and commodities of which the two
countries are in need.
(3) Both Governments mutually undertake to restore commercial relations to
those previously prior to the freezing of assets.
Page 128
The Government of the United States shall supply Japan the required quantity
of oil.
(4) The Government of the United States undertakes not to resort to measures
and actions prejudicial to the endeavours for the restoration of general peace
between Japan and China
(5) The Japanese Government undertakes to withdraw troops now stationed in
French Indo-China upon either the restoration of peace between Japan and China
or the establishment of an equitable peace in the Pacific arena and it is
prepared to remove the Japanese troops in the southern part of French Indo-
China to the northern part upon the conclusion of the present agreement.
JD-1: 1743 Secret Navy Trans 12-1/6-41 (3)
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
December 6, 1941
Purple
#902
(Part 5 of 14)
As regards China, the Japanese Government, while expressing its readiness to
accept the offer of the President of the United States to act as "Introducer"
of peace between Japan and China as was previously suggested, asked for an
undertaking on the part of the United States to do nothing prejudicial to the
restoration of Sino-Japanese peace when the two parties have commenced direct
negotiations.
The American government not only rejected the above-mentioned new proposal,
but made known its intention to continue its aid to Chiang Kai-Shek; and in
spite of its suggestion mentioned above, withdrew the offer of the President
to act as the so-called "Introducer" of peace between Japan and China,
pleading that time was not yet ripe for it. Finally, on November 26th, in an
attitude to impose upon the Japanese government those principles it has
persistently maintained, the American government made a proposal totally
ignoring Japanese claims, which is a source of profound regret to the Japanese
Government.
JD-1: 1743 Secret Navy Trans 12-1/6-41 (3)
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
December 6, 1941
Purple
#902
(Part 6 of 14)
4. From the beginning of the present negotiation the Japanese Government has
always maintained an attitude of fairness and moderation, and did its best to
reach a settlement, for which it made all possible concessions often in spite
of great difficulties.
As for the China question which constituted an important subject of the
negotiation, the Japanese Government showed a most conciliatory attitude.
As for the principle of Non-Discrimination in International Commerce,
advocated by the American Government, the Japanese Government expressed its
desire to see the said principal applied throughout the world, and declared
that along with the actual practice of this principle in the world, the
Japanese Government would endeavour to apply the same in the Pacific area,
including China, and made it clear that Japan had no intention of excluding
from China economic activities of third powers pursued on an equitable basis.
Furthermore, as regards the question of withdrawing troops from French Indo-
China, the Japanese government even volunteered, as mentioned above, to carry
out an immediate evacuation of troops from Southern French Indo-China as a
measure of easing the situation.
JD-1: 1743 Secret Navy Trans 12-1/6-41 (3)
Page 129
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
December 4, 1941
#902
(Part 7 of 14)
It is presumed that the spirit of conciliation exhibited to the utmost degree
by the Japanese Government in all these matters is fully appreciated by the
American government.
On the other hand, the American government always holding fast to theories in
disregard of realities, and refusing to yield an inch on its impractical
principles, caused undue delays in the negotiation. It is difficult to
understand this attitude of the American government and the Japanese
government desires to call the attention of the American government especially
to the following points:
1. The American government advocates in the name of world peace those
principles favorable to it and urges upon the Japanese government the
acceptance thereof. The peace of the world may be brought about only by
discovering a mutually acceptable formula through recognition of the reality
of the situation and mutual appreciation of one another's position. An
attitude such as ignores realities and imposes one's selfish views upon others
will scarcely serve the purpose of facilitating the consummation of
negotiations.
JD:17143
25843
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
December 6, 1941
Purple
#902
(Part 8 of 14)
Of the various principles put forward by the American government as a basis of
the Japanese-American agreement, there are some which the Japanese government
is ready to accept in principle, but in view of the world's actual conditions,
it seems only a Utopian ideal, on the part of the American government, to
attempt to force their immediate adoption.
Again, the proposal to conclude a multilateral non-aggression past between
Japan, the United States, Great Britain, China the Soviet Union, The
Netherlands and Thailand, which is patterned after the old concept of
collective security, is far removed from the realities of East Asia.
(2) The American proposal contains a stipulation which states: "Both
governments will agree that no agreement, which either has concluded with any
third powers, shall be interpreted by it in such a way as to conflict with the
fundamental purpose of this agreement, the establishment and preservation of
peace throughout the Pacific area." It is presumed that the above provision
has been proposed with view to restrain Japan from fulfilling its obligations
under the Tripartite Pact when the United States participates in the war in
Europe, and, as such, it cannot accepted by the Japanese Government.
JD:1
25843 Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
December 6, 1941
Purple
#902
(Part 9 of 14)
The American Government, obsessed with its own views and opinions, may be said
to be scheming for the extension of the war. While it seeks, on the one hand,
to secure its rear by stabilizing the Pacific area, it is engaged, on the
other hand, in aiding Great Britain and preparing to attack, in the name of
self-defense, Germany and Italy two powers that are striving to establish a
new order in Europe. Such a policy is totally at variance with the many
principles upon which the American Government proposes to found the stability
of the Pacific area through peaceful means.
Page 130
3. Where as the American Government, under the principles it rigidly upholds,
objects to settling international issues through military pressure, it is
exercising in conjunction with Great Britain and other nations pressure by
economic power. Recourse to such pressure as a means of dealing with
international relations should be condemned as it is at times more inhuman
than military pressure.
JD-1: 7143 Navy Trans 12-6-41 (8)
25843
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
December 6, 1941
Purple
#902 (Part 10 of 14)
4. It is impossible not to reach the conclusion that the American Government
desires to maintain and strengthen, in collusion with Great Britain and other
powers, its dominant position it has hitherto occupied not only in China but
in other areas of East Asia. It is a fact of history that one countr_ (45
letters garbled or missing) been compelled to observe the status quo under the
Anglo-American policy of imperialistic exploitation and to sacrifice the_es to
the prosperity of the two nations. The Japanese Government cannot tolerate the
perpetuation of such a situation since it directly runs counter to Japan's
fundamental policy to enable all nations to enjoy each its proper place in the
world.
JD-1: 7143 Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (8)
25843
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
December 6, 1941
Purple
# 902 (Part 11 of 14)
The stipulation proposed by the American Government relative to French Indo-
China is a good exemplification of the above mentioned American policy. That
the six countries,_Japan, the United States, Great Britain, The Netherlands,
China and Thailand,_excepting France, should undertake among themselves to
respect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of French Indo-China and
equality of treatment in trade and commerce would be tantamount to placing
that territory under the joint guarantee of the governments of those six
countries. Apart from the fact that such a proposal totally ignores the
position of France, it is unacceptable to the Japanese government in that such
an arrangement cannot but be considered as an extension to French Indo-China
of a system similar to the n_(50 letters missed)_sible for the present
predicament of East Asia.
JD-1: 7143 SECRET Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)
25843
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
December 6, 1941
Purple
#902 (Part 12 of 14)
5. All-the items demanded of Japan by the American government regarding China
such as wholesale evacuation of troops or unconditional application of the
principle of Non-Discrimination in International Commerce ignore the actual
conditions of China, and are calculated to destroy Japan's position as the
stabilizing factor of East Asia. The attitude of the American government in
demanding Japan not to support militarily, politically or economically any
regime other than the regime at Chungking, disregarding thereby the existence
of the Nanking government, shatters the very basis of the present negotiation.
This demand of
Page 131
the American government falling, as it does, in line with its above-mentioned
refusal to cease from aiding the Chungking regime, demonstrates clearly the
intention of the American government to obstruct the restoration of normal
relations between Japan and China and the return of peace to East Asia.
JD: 1 7143 SECRET Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)
25843
TOP SECRET
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
December 6, 1941
Purple
#902 (Part 13 of 14)
5. In brief, the American proposal contains certain acceptable items such as
lose concerning commerce, including the conclusion of a trade agreement,
mutual removal of the freezing restrictions, and stabilization of the Yen and
Dollar exchange, or the abolition of extra-territorial rights in China. On the
other hand, however, the proposal in question ignores Japan's sacrifices in
the four years of the China Affair, menaces the empire's existence itself and
disparages its honour and prestige. Therefore, viewed in all its entirety, the
Japanese Government regrets that it cannot accept the proposal as a basis of
negotiation.
6. The Japanese government, in its desire for an early conclusion of the
negotiation, proposed that simultaneously with the conclusion of the Japanese-
American negotiations, agreements be signed with Great Britain and other
interested countries. The proposal was accepted by the American government.
However, since the American government has made the proposal of November 26th
as a result of frequent consultations with Great Britain, Australia, The
Netherlands and Chungking. ANDND* presumably by catering to the wishes of the
Chungking regime on the questions of CHTUAL YLOKMMTT** be concluded that all
these countries are at one with the United States in ignoring Japan's
position.
JD: 1 7143 SECRET Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)
25843
* Probably "and as"
** Probably "China, can but"
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
December 1941
(Purple_Eng)
#902 (Part 14 of 14)
(Note: In the forwarding instructions to the radio station handling this
report appeared the plain English phrase "VERY IMPORTANT")
7. Obviously it is the intention of the American Government to conspire with
Great Britain and other countries to obstruct Japan's efforts toward the
establishment of peace through the creation of a New Order in East Asia, and
especially to preserve Anglo-American rights and interests by keeping Japan
and China at war. This intention has been revealed clearly during the course
of the present negotiations. Thus, the earnest hope of the Japanese Government
to adjust Japanese-American relations and to preserve and promote the peace of
the Pacific through cooperation with the American Government has finally been
lost.
The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify hereby the American
Government that in view of the attitude of the American Government it cannot
but consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through further
negotiations.
JD: 1 7143 SECRET (M) Navy trans. 7 Dec. 1941 (S-TT)
25843
Page 132
CLARKE EXHIBIT NO. 6
TOP SECRET
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
December 7, 1941
Purple (Urgent_Very Important)
#907. To be handled in government code.
Re my #902 [a].
Will the Ambassador please submit to the United States Government ( if
possible to the Secretary of State) our reply to the United States at 1:00 p.
m. on the 7th, your time.
ARMY 7145 25850 SECRET Trans. 12/7/41 (S)
[a] JD-1:7143_text of Japanese reply.
CLARKE EXHIBIT NO. 7
SECRET
WPD 4544-30 WPD
CKG
December 7, 1941
Memorandum for the Adjutant General (Through Secretary, General Staff)
Subject: Far East Situation.
The Secretary of War directs that the following first priority secret
radiogram be sent to the Commanding General, U. S. Army Forces in the Far
East; Commanding General, Caribbean Defense Command; Commanding General,
Hawaiian Department; Commanding General, Fourth Army:
Japanese are presenting at one p. m. Eastern Standard time today what amounts
to an ultimatum also they are under orders to destroy their Code machine
immediately stop Just what significance the hour set may have we do not know
but be on alert accordingly stop Inform naval authorities of this
communication
MARSHALL
L. T. GEROW
Brigadier General,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff
OCSigO 311.23 (Gen) 1st Memo Ind. O Br.
(12-8-41)
War Department, OCSigO, Washington, December 10, 1941. To: A. C. of S. G-2.
1 Following is the log of the message requested in basic memorandum:
Honolulu Time E. S. T.
Filed War Department Message Center 12:00 noon 6:30 AM
Sent Western Union 12:17 PM 6:47 AM
Received RCA Honolulu 7:33 AM
Delivered to Signal Officer, Honolulu 11:45 AM
Delivered to AGO, Hawaiian Department 2:58 PM
2. Attached hereto is paraphrase copy of secret message received from
Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.
For the Acting Chief Signal Officer:
O. K. SADTLER,
Colonel, Signal Corps.
1 Incl_Paraphrase of radiogram
Page 133
CLARKE EXHIBIT NO. 8
SECRET
Paraphrase
1087 DECEMBER NINTH
Re your five four nine radio five two nine RCA received this message at their
Honolulu station at seven thirty three morning December seventh and this
message was delivered Fort Shafter eleven forty five morning seventh the
Adjutant General received the deciphered copy at two fifty eight pm
SHORT
Incl #1 DECEMBER 8, 1941
Memorandum for: The Chief Signal Officer.
Subject: Warning order to Overseas Departments
1. At about 11: 30 a. m. Sunday, December 7, a secret radiogram, written by
the Chief of Staff, was handed in to the Message Center by Colonel Bratton of
this division. Colonel Bratton reported verbally to the Chief of Staff that
the message would be in the air in about eight minutes as he was assured by
the Message Center. This radio was a highly important warning to all overseas
departments including Hawaii regarding the timing of the Japanese ultimatum on
that afternoon.
2. It is recommended that steps be taken to determine the exact time of
arrival of this message at Honolulu, the time when the deciphered message was
transmitted by the Signal Corps to the Staff, and by what office it was
received in the Staff. Prompt action on this message might have averted
disaster.
SHERMAN MILES,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.
G2/WAH
MID 336. (11-3-41) Haw. Dept.
CONFIDENTIAL
WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, G_2
WASHINGTON, D. C., November 4, 1941.
Subject: Letter of transmittal.
To: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
Headquarters, Hawaiian Department
The attached communications are forwarded for your information and such action
as you consider advisable.
Sherman Miles
SHERMAN MILES,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
1 Enclosures
336. (1103 41)_MID Sum. of Info. re Information received from the Orient; dtd.
FMH
Mailed G/2 ---------- Nov 5, 1941 Reg. #910405.
MID 336. 11-3-41
G2/C1
FMH
WAR DEPARTMENT
M. I. D.
November 3, 1941.
(Date)
Subject: Information Received from the Orient.
Summary of Information:
The following information received from the Orient, dated August 26, 1941, is
considered reliable:
1. Mr. HIROTA, a presiding officer at directors' meeting of the Black Dragon
Society, told of an order issued by War Minister TOJO (now Premier) "to
complete full preparation to meet any emergency with United States in the
Pacific.
Page 134
All guns to be mounted in the islands of the Pacific under Japanese mandate.
The full preparation to be completed in November."
2. HIROTA and others are said to have stated: "War with United States would
best begin in December or in February."
3. "Very soon," they say, "the Cabinet will be changed. The new Cabinet would
likely start war within sixty days."
G2 Note: Full name of individual mentioned above is KOKI HIROTA, who is
reported to be a member of the House of Peers, former Premier of Japan and
Director of the Bureau of Intelligence, U. S. Section.
Distribution: Evaluation
All Corps Areas of source of information
All Departments _____X_____ Reliable ______________
Alaska ___________ Credible ______X_______
FBI ___________ Questionable ______________
ONI ___________ Undetermined ______________
STATE ___________ ___________________________
File
J. B Cognizant
Source: Dr. Cho. Date of original paper 10/28/41 p. m.
HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF FOR MILITARY INTELLIGENCE
Fort Shafter, T. H.
6 September 1941.
In reply refer to:
350.05 (G-2)
Subject: Summaries of Information.
To: War Department General Staff
Military Intelligence Division G-2,
Washington, D. C.
REC'D-B-2 SEP 17, 1941
1. It has been noted that many Of the Summaries of Information received from
your office originate with Office Naval Intelligence, 14th Naval District and
have already been furnished this office by the Navy.
2. The cooperation and contact between Office Naval Intelligence, Federal
Bureau of Investigation, and the Military Intelligence Division, in this
Department, is most complete and all such data is received simultaneous with
the dispatch of information to the respective Washington offices.
3. Inasmuch as such advices are received in duplicate and unless there are
other reasons to the contrary it is recommended that such notices from your
office be discontinued in order to avoid the duplication of effort.
Kendall J. Fielder
KENDALL J. FIELDER
Lieut. Colonel, Inf.
Acting A. C. of S., G-2.
FAR EASTERN
G2/1
RSB
No. 519 sent out December 5, 1941
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF HEADQUARTERS
G-2 Hawaiian Department
Honolulu, Territory Hawaii
Commander Rochefort who can be located thru the 14th Naval District has some
information on Japanese broadcasts in which weather reports are mentioned that
you must obtain. Contact him at once.
MILES
Page 135
Handwritten: From Boogey Woogie.
Date dispatched
SIS no
Date translated From. To Extract
11/19/41 Tokyo Washington "_please present our B proposal
25040 of the Imperial Government, and
11/20/41 no further concessions can be
made. If the U.S. consent to this
cannot be secured the negotia-
tions will have to be broken
off."
11/22/41 Tokyo Washington There are reasons beyond your
25138 ability to guess why we want to
settle the Japanese-American
relations by the 25th but if
within the next three or four
days you can finish your
conversations with the Americans,
if the signing can be completed
by the 29th . . . we have decided
to wait until that date. This
time we mean it, that the dead-
line absolutely cannot be
changed. After that things are
automatically going to happen."
Warning Mess. No. 1. OPNAV. 24 Nov.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
"These are very doubtful chances_"
11/14/41 Tokyo Hongkong "Should the negotiations collapse
25322 . . . we will completely destroy
11/27/41 British and American power in
China.
11/26/41 Tokyo Washington The situation is momentarily
25344 becoming more tense and telegrams
11/26/41 take too long. Therefore will you
cut down the substance of your
reports of negotiations to the
minimum and, on occasion, call up
Chief Yamamoto of the American
Bureau on the telephone and make
your report to him. At that time
we will use the following code
. . . "
11/19/41 Tokyo Washington "In case of an emergency (danger
25432 of cutting off our diplomatic
11/26/41 relations) and the cutting off of
international communications, the
following warning will be added
in the middle of the [2] daily
Japanese language short wave news
broadcast.
(1) In case Japan-U. S. relations
in danger: Higashi no Kazeame
(east wind rain). This signal
will be given in the middle and
at the end as a weather forecast
and each sentence will be
repeated twice. When this is
heard please destroy all code
papers etc."
11/19/41 Tokyo Washington "When our diplomatic relations
25392 are becoming dangerous, we will
11/26/41 add the following at the
beginning and end of our general
intelligence broadcasts:
(1) If it is Japan-U. S, relations
"Higashi". . . . The above will
be repeated five times and
included at beginning and end."
11/26/41 Washington Tokyo Kurusu to Yamamoto: "I have made
25349 all efforts but they will not
11/26/41 yield."
Trans Pacific tele-
phone conversa-
tion.
Warning Messages Nos. 2 & 3
------------------------------------------------------------------------
OPD "Negotiations with Japan appear G-2." Advise only the Commanding Officer.
27 Nov.
11/28/41 Tokyo Washington "Therefore with a report of the
25445 Imperial Government on this
11/28/41 American proposal, which I will
send you in two or three days,
the negotiations will be de facto
ruptured... However, I do not
wish you to give the impression
that the negotiations are broken
off, merely say to them that you
are awaiting instructions."
Warning Message No. 4 28 Nov.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Page 136
Date dispatched
SIS no
Date translated From. To Extract
11/26/41 Washington Tokyo "Should we, during the course of
25460 these conversations, deliberately
11/29/41 enter into our scheduled opera-
tions, there is great danger that
the responsibility for the
rupture of negotiations will be
cast upon us."
11/29/41 Tokyo Washington "We wish you would make one more
25496 attempt verbally along the
11/20/41 following lines: . . .
[3] (in carrying out this
instruction please be careful
that this does not lead to any-
thing like a breaking off of
negotiations).
11/30/41 Tokyo Washington Kurusu: "Are the Japanese-
25497 American negotiations to
11/30/41 continue?"
Telephone Yamamoto: "Yes."
conversation
12/1/41 Tokyo Washington "When you are faced with the
25545 necessity of destroying codes, 12/1/41
get in touch with the Naval
Attache's office there and make
use of chemicals they have on
hand for this purpose."
11/30/41 Tokyo Berlin "The conversations . . . between
25552 Tokyo and Washington . . . now
12/1/41 stand ruptured, broken, have
taken a provocative attitude ...
They are planning to move mili-
tary forces into various places
in East Asia . . . we will have
to counter by also moving troops
... war may suddenly break out
between the Anglo-Saxon nations
and Japan."
11/30/41 Tokyo Berlin "Say that we have already clari-
25553 fied our attitude toward the Rus-
12/1/41 sians. Say that by our present
moves southward we do not mean
to relax our pressure against the
Soviet ... however, right now it
is to our advantage to stress the
south and for the time being we
would prefer to refrain from any
direct moves in the north."
12/2/41 Tokyo Washington "Among the telegraphic codes with
25640 which your office is equipped,
12/3/41 burn those now being used in
connection with the machine.
Burn every "O" code ... stop at
once using the machine and
destroy it completely ... Burn
all the codes Kosaka brought
you."
Warning message No. 5 Dec.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
[4] G-2 "Contact Commander Rochefort
12/1/41 Tokyo London "Please discontinue the use of
25878 your code machine and dispose of
12/5/41 it immediately."
12/5/41 Washington Tokyo We have completed destruction of
25836 codes but since the U. S.-Japan-
12/6/41 ese negotiations are still con-
tinuing I request your approval
of our desire to delay for a
while yet the destruction of the
one code machine."
12/6/41 Tokyo Washington "The Government has deliberated
25838 deeply on the American proposal
of the 26th of November and as a
result we have drawn up a memo-
randum for the United States ...
when you receive it I want you to
keep it secret for the time
being. Concerning the time of
presenting this memorandum to the
United States I will wire you in
a separate message."
12/6/41 Tokyo Washington The memorandum referred to in
25843 25838 above. A 14 part telegram
12/6/41 in reply to the American proposal
and concluding with the sentence-
"The Japanese Government regrets
to have to notify hereby the
American government that in view
of the attitude of the American
Government it cannot but consider
that it is impossible to reach an
agreement through further
negotiations.
Page 137
Date dispatched
SIS no
Date translated From. To Extract
12/7/41 Tokyo Washington Re my #902 (see 25843 above) will
25850 the Ambassador please submit to
the United States Government, if
possible to the Secretary of
State, our reply to the United
States at 1:00 p. m. on the 7th,
your time.
Final message 7 Dec.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
"Japanese are presenting at one p. m."
FAR EASTERN
G2/1
RSB
No 519 sent out December 5, 1941
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF HEADQUARTERS
G-2 Hawaiian Department,
Honolulu, Territory Hawaii.
Commander Rochefort who can be located thru the 14th Naval District has some
information on Japanese broadcasts in which weather reports are mentioned that
you must obtain. Contact him at once.
MILES
Page 138
Organization Chart
Page 139
INCIDENTAL EXHIBITS
RE
PEARL HARBOR INVESTIGATION
INDEX
1. Organization chart, General Staff, G-2. Dec. 5, 1941.
2. Organization chart, General Staff, G-2. Oct. 10, 1941.
3. Newspaper article re Pearl Harbor.
4. Two letters re testimony of Gen. Miles and testimony of Gen. Miles before
Grunert Board.
5. Copies of Messages.
6. Letter to A. C. of S., G-2 from Lt. Col. Fielder, Hawaii, 31 Dec. 1941.
7. Message from Manila, P. I. to The Adjutant General, Dec. 28, 1940.
8. Letter to A. C. of S., G-2 from Col. Thurber, Dec. 18, 1941 re Report of
Rumors Concerning Japanese Attack on Hawaii.
9. Message, to Hawaii.
10. Message, from Melbourne, Australia to War Dept. & CG Hawaii.
11. Memo for Col. Holbrook from Lt. Perry, Evaluation Section, Dec. 6, 1941,
re Japanese Embassy burning code book.
12. Messages re weather broadcast.
13. Estimate of the Situation Dec. 1, 1941_March 31, 1942.
14. Message from Short, Ft. Shafter, Nov. 29, 1941.
15. Memo for Adjutant General from Gen. Gerow, Nov. 27, 1941, sending messages
to CG Hawaii and CG, Caribbean Defense Command, re negotiations terminated
with Japan.
16. Cable to all Corps Areas, Caribbean Defense Command and Hawaii, by Miles,
Nov. 27, 1941.
17. Paraphrase of cable to all Corps Areas (same as No. 16).
18. Message from Manila, P. I. to The Adjutant General re Jap troops
evacuating.
19. Message to G-2, Hawaii from Miles, Nov. 12,1941, re custodial detention
list.
20. Message from Manila, P. I. Oct. 28 re Jap aircraft.
21. Information received from the Orient, Oct. 28, 1941.
22. Copies of Messages.
23. Index of Translations and Memoranda re Pearl Harbor.
24. Summary of Far Eastern Documents Relating to Japan's War Potential and
Intentions.
EXHIBIT No 1
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2: Brigadier General Sherman Miles (Acting)
Executive Officer:
Lt. Col. R. C. Smith
Lt. Col. T. E. Roderick
Administrative Branch: Lt. Col. R. C. Smith
Intelligence Branch: Col. G. H. Mason
Balkans and Near East Section: Lt. Col. W. W. Cox
British Empire Section: Lt. Col. Homer Case
Central European Section: Lt. Col. H. E. Maguire
Eastern European Section: Lt. Col. G. B. Guenther
Far Eastern Section Lt. Col. R S. Bratton
Latin American Section: Lt. Col. R. T. Heard
Western European Section: Lt. Col. H. F. Cunningham
Aviation Section
Editorial Section
Collection Section
Page 140
Liaison Branch: Lt. Col. A. R. Harris
Counterintelligence Branch: Lt. Col. J. A. Lester
Safeguarding Military Information: Maj. W. P. Corderman
Domestic Intelligence: Maj. W. A. Holbrook
Plant and Utilities Section: Maj. W. E. Crist
General
Plans and Training Branch: Lt. Col. V. W. Cooper
Plans and Training: Maj. H. V. Canan
Geographic: Lt. Col. C. Y. Banfill
Approved March 10, 1941.
EXHIBIT No. 2_See facing folder
[This is a copy of the organization chart reproduced on page 138. LWJ]
EXHIBIT No. 3
[From the Times-Herald, Washington, D. C., Thursday, September 28, 1944]
THE TRUTH OF PEARL HARBOR
(EDITORIAL)
By Basil Brewer, Publisher, The New Bedford (Mass.) Standard-Times
Pearl Harbor is the saddest chapter in the history of America.
Here, in one hour, was destroyed the Pacific battle fleet, chief weapon to
restrain Japan from war_chief weapon with which to win, if war came.
Here were wiped out 4,000 officers and men of the American Army and Navy.
Innocent of responsibility, they died in a classic funeral pyre, built for
them by the criminal negligence of others.
Pearl Harbor, which, as the Japanese planned, made impossible relief of the
Philippines, may have been responsible for that other great tragedy_Bataan and
Corregidor.
Pearl Harbor marked the beginning of war with Japan.
It may well have finished any hope of an early successful ending of the
Japanese war.
Certainly the victims there, those who paid the "last full measure of
devotion," were not to blame for the disaster.
*Who were to blame for Pearl Harbor*?
Surely here, if ever, there was guilt and there were guilty.
Who were the guilty and why have they not been apprehended, tried, convicted
and punished?
WHY?
The President had said Jan. 7, 1941, 11 months before Pearl Harbor:
"When the dictators are ready to make war upon us, they will not wait for an
act of war on our part. *They, not we*, will choose the *time*, the *method*
and the *place* of their attack."
Why, then, were we "surprised" at Pearl Harbor?
Why was the battle fleet there, each in its place, names and exact locations
map-marked by the Japanese flyers to receive the torpedoes, made especially
for this attack?
Why was the air arm of the Army there, herded together, unarmed, for the kill?
Should the Pacific battle fleet have been at Pearl Harbor on Dec. 7?
And, if it should not, why was it there, and by whose orders?
INVESTIGATIONS
Four different "investigations" of Pearl Harbor have been conducted_all
secret.
Only one "report" has been made, the report of the Roberts Commission,
released a few weeks after Pearl Harbor.
Of the 127 witnesses who testified in the Roberts investigation, the testimony
of none has been made public.
Of the hundreds of documents studied and put in the record in the Roberts
Investigation, none has been made public.
Page 141
Why have not these documents been made public?
The Roberts report blamed General Short, commanding general of the Army,
and Admiral Kimmel, commander-in-chief of the fleet at Pearl Harbor, for the
disaster.
As a result of the findings of the Roberts Commission, both have been ordered
tried by court-martial
Kimmel and Short, members of Congress and many others repeatedly have demanded
the trials be held.
Today, more than 2 1/2 years after the report of the Roberts Commission,
neither Short nor Kimmel has been brought to trial.
It was urged, shortly after Pearl Harbor, that trials would interfere with the
war.
Certainly now, almost three years after the disaster, no such claim validly
can be made.
More than a year ago the late Secretary of the Navy Knox wrote a letter saying
public trials of Kimmel and Short could not affect the progress of the war.
Very recently a sub-committee of the House Military Affairs Committee stated
public trials would not interfere with the war.
Why, in justice, have not these trials been publicly held, that those charged
may be punished, if guilty, and, if innocent, freed?
Why have not the American people been told the truth about Pearl Harbor?
Truth, which they need in order properly to appraise their military and
political leaders_and their policies.
Truth, which they need to appraise their own share, if any, in the guilt.
Truth, which they need to better guide themselves, as citizens_in the interest
of the country in war.
The American people grew old overnight at Pearl Harbor.
Why are they being treated as children, who must not be told?
Pearl Harbor was the Gethsemane of the American people, as well as of the
soldier dead.
Why not the truth, no matter how hard to take to cleanse the soul_perhaps to
bring temporal, as well as spiritual, salvation?
* * *
Not even the truth, as to the Pearl Harbor dead, was known, until long
afterwards.
The facts as to the destruction of the battle fleet were withheld for a year_
and then released with news of successful salvage operations.
WAR
For a year or more prior to Pearl Harbor, it had been clear to official
Washington only a miracle or American surrender could keep the United States
out of the European war and war with Japan
Japan had signed the Tripartite pact with Hitler, binding her to war with the
U. S., if war with Hitler came.
Japan had notified Ambassador Grew, in the Spring of 1941, the pact meant what
it said.
Grew had advised Washington.
Concurrently, Japan's course of conquest clearly pointed to the Dutch East
Indies, Singapore, Burma, possibly India, if not the Philippines.
That Britain could successfully meet this attack, without help, was dubious
indeed.
Lend-lease, convoyed supplies, loaned destroyers, etc., would not suffice if
Japan attacked Britain.
Therefore, the President faced, early in '41, the two horns of dilemma.
He must decide whether to join Britain in stopping Japan_which meant war.
Or he must take the chance, which seemed a certainty, that without the U. S
actively fighting, the Tripartite powers would defeat Britain, force Russia to
peace_and attack the U. S
That the President had determined on war seems indisputable.
On Jan. 21, 1941, he wrote Ambassador Grew in Tokyo that the maintenance of
British supply lines from the Far East was vital.
On Feb. 14, 1941, Dooman, Counsel of the American Embassy in Tokyo, told the
Japanese Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs Okashi that, if the Japanese
attacked Singapore, "the logic of the situation would inevitably raise the
question" that this would mean war also with the U. S.
Page 142
On Feb. 26, 1941, Ambassador Grew reported Dooman's conference to Washington,
saying:
"I propose to say to Mr. Matsuoka (Japanese foreign minister), with whom I
have an appointment this morning that the statements made by Mr. Dooman to Mr.
Okashi were made with my prior knowledge and have my full approval."
Washington did not disapprove nor disavow Dooman's and Grew's statements.
In April 1941, Naval authorities in Washington had written the commanders of
the Asiatic and Pacific fleets that the question of U. S. entry into the war
seemed a matter of_"not whether_but when."
By the time of the Atlantic Charter meeting between Churchill and Roosevelt
early in August '41, events in Asia were moving with tremendous and ominous
speed.
Churchill, the Australians and the Dutch urged an immediate ultimatum_war-if
Japan pursued her expected course.
Responding to the argument for an immediate ultimatum, the President only
asked if "we would not be better off in three months?"
And then said, "Leave it to me. I think I can baby them (the Japs) along *for
three months*."
There was no disagreement between the President and Churchill as to Japanese
plans_nor that Japan must be stopped.
Probably there was no disagreement that an ultimatum meant war.
It now is clear the President only was playing for time_time to be better
prepared_
And_time for the American people to "catch up," mentally and morally, with
commitments, made and to be made.
The Atlantic Conference between Churchill and Roosevelt settled the policy of
a united front between the U. S. And England toward Japan.
That this was true seems implied in the following from Churchill's address to
Parliament on Jan. 28, 1942, about seven weeks after Pearl Harbor:
"It has been the policy of the Cabinet at almost all costs to avoid
embroilment with Japan until we were sure that the United States would also be
engaged. * * *
"On the other hand, the probability since the Atlantic Conference, at which I
discussed these matters with President Roosevelt, that the United States, even
if not herself attacked, would come into the war in the Far East and thus make
the final victory assured, seemed to allay some of these anxieties, and that
expectation has not been falsified by the events."
July 24, the United States had "frozen" Japanese funds.
Immediately after the Atlantic Conference, commercial embargoes, against oil,
steel and gasoline were ordered which only could result in war.
This writer believes the President, in all these matters, made the correct
decision_in the country's interests_that history shall so record.
With equal impartiality, history shall record that the President, out of his
political genius, made one, perhaps two fatal errors, which may have brought
on the Pearl Harbor disaster.
Certainly these contributed greatly to the disastrous success of the attack.
POLITICS
The working agreement with Churchill being what it was, the danger to the
country being apprehended_the President failed to take the people into
confidence.
This was the President's political bent.
A statesman long ago would have told the people the facts_and risen or fallen
with the consequences.
Democracy rises or falls, lives or dies, based on how well this thesis is
understood and followed
But the President was not of that talent nor taste.
Far more than he trusted the people, he trusted his own facility of
expression, his ability, not necessarily by the use of facts, to get the
people to think as he wanted them to think
Concurrently, this formula had seemed to the President not to have worked
badly in eight years of the Presidency and three elections for President.
It was true, also, this was the only method the President knew.
Secretary Hull had said, when questioned about apparent inaction in
Washington, "governments which get too far ahead of the people are apt to
fall."
Page 143
The President, in the grave war situation in the Fall of '41, had gotten far
ahead of the people_far too far for the people ever to catch up by anything
which he, by that time, could say.
Fortunately we can now depend on two of the President's friends and
biographers for the facts at this stage of the crisis.
Forrest Davis and Ernest K. Lindley, friends of the President, had access,
through the President, to confidential information, from which they produced
early in 1942, "How War Came."
This is from page 305 under the title, "The Sands Run Out_Pearl Harbor":
"Few, if any, high officials believed, however, that the United States would,
or could, stand aside for long if the Japanese struck at the East Indies or
Malaya, or even thrust into Siam. For at stake were not only immediate
interests vital to us, but resources and strategical positions affecting our
long-term security as a nation.
"*The question perplexing many high officials was how, in the absence of a
direct Japanese attack on the American flag, to summon the nation, divided as
it then was on questions of foreign policy, to the strong action which they
believed essential*.
"*There had been considerable discussion of possible methods* . . . It was
commonly supposed that the Japanese were too smart to solve this problem for
the President by a direct assault on the American flag_especially at Hawaii,
which even the extreme isolationists recognize as a bastion of our security."
Surely this is plain enough.
"As the Sands Ran Out at Pearl Harbor," the Japanese "solved the problem
for the President by a direct assault on the American flag."
The President, in the last weeks before Pearl Harbor, required an "incident"
that would enable the people to catch up with him.
Pearl Harbor gave the President far more of an incident than he needed,
expected_or wanted.
Born optimist, the incident the President expected was to be a glancing blow_
but the blow came full and head-on at the whole body of the country.
Moreover, it was not the kind of an incident he had in mind, as shall be
disclosed.
THE FLEET
Naval strategy opposed having the Pacific Fleet based at Pearl Harbor.
Three or more high admirals had opposed it, including Kimmel.
Admiral Richardson, immediate predecessor of Kimmel, was removed from
command by the President because, among other things, he opposed basing the
fleet at Pearl Harbor.
The fleet was at Pearl Harbor by orders of the President, though of course he
ordered no such concentration as existed there on Dec. 7.
Reasons of diplomacy, and war strategy, as judged by the President, required a
powerful fleet based at Hawaii, a threat and a warning to Japan, the only kind
the Japanese could understand.
In no other way, the President judged, could the U. S. hope to keep open the
British, and our own, supply lines from the Far East.
These supply lines, the President had told Grew, were vital.
These were the supply lines the President and Churchill had agreed to defend
together at the Atlantis Conference.
The admirals were opposed to basing the main fleet at Hawaii, because they
believed the fleet there was too confined, too exposed to possible attack.
Knowing the power of the Japanese fleet, high officers of the Navy had for
years questioned its ability to meet the Japanese successfully in Far Eastern
waters.
Defending the Philippines always had been considered difficult.
Certainly this thesis had not been changed by large increases in the Japanese
Navy and by the fact the U. S Fleet in '41 was divided between the Pacific and
the Atlantic.
Additionally, the admirals opposed using the fleet at Hawaii as a threat to
Japan.
Such an approach, they considered, was apt to result in "backing into the
war," instead of the more forthright and direct method, which they favored.
What the admirals didn't know was, we were, to all practical purposes, already
in the war.
Page 144
We were watchfully waiting for the "incident" which would make the war,
already a foregone conclusion, "politically possible."
A plan of co-operation with the British Far Eastern fleet had been arranged
which required the U S. fleet to be as near as practical to the Philippines.
The Japanese knew the full meaning of the U. S. fleet at Pearl Harbor.
Every war plan of the Japanese, including the latest by Kinoaki Matsuo, "The
Three Power Alliance," published in 1940, plainly stated in war with U. S.
Japan would be defeated_if the U. S. Pacific fleet were permitted to get to
the Philippines.
We were, at the time of Pearl Harbor, waiting for an "incident" which would
start war.
The Japanese, having in mind basic Japanese strategy, that the battle fleet of
the U. S. must not get to Manila_for a long time had been *preparing the
"incident*."
SABOTAGE
Having overruled his admirals in basing the Pacific fleet at Pearl Harbor, it
would be expected that the President, of all persons, would make most certain
no disaster came from the fleet's being there.
Doubtless the President thought he had so arranged.
It is a fact, however, the President, by his own acts, unwittingly of course,
contrived to bring about the success of the Japanese attack.
This was not in the manner that he has been commonly accused, running all the
way from plotting the attack, to ordering the fleet unprotected to appease the
Japanese all of which are false.
The President's responsibility is nevertheless direct and definite.
Early in January, Secretary of Navy Knox had sent a warning to both Army
and Navy chiefs at Pearl Harbor suggesting the danger of a surprise bombing
attack by air against the fleet at Pearl Harbor.
It had been a foregone conclusion, if war with Japan came, it would begin by
surprise attack, the Japanese way, as the President himself had said Jan. 6,
1941.
But, as the months went by between the first of the year and Dec. 7, 1941, as
the plans of the Japanese to attack became matured, for some strange reason
there was less and less emphasis on surprise attack on the fleet at Pearl
Harbor by air, more and more on sabotage.
Of seven warning messages from Washington to Short and Kimmel, recorded in the
Roberts report, in addition to the one in January from Secretary Knox, four
referred to sabotage
None, after the Knox warning, referred to the possibility of surprise attack
by air on the fleet.
Twice, in acknowledging warnings and instructions from Washington, General
Short reported to Washington he had taken all precautions against sabotage.
On Nov. 27, 10 days before Pearl Harbor, General Short advised Washington he
had ordered Hawaii "alert No. 1" against sabotage, and gave details of what
measures he had taken.
Washington knew of and did not disapprove these "defense steps," solely
against sabotage.
Sabotage, third in the list of attacks most expected by Knox in January, had
become No. 1 of those expected in Washington and Pearl Harbor as Dec. 7
approached.
It is not sabotage which competent military leaders, in Washington or Pearl
Harbor, would normally most fear, as war with Japan approached.
As Dec. 7 approached, the "incident," which would bring war with Japan, was
daily, almost hourly, expected in Washington.
Historically, the sinking of the battleship Maine in Havana harbor on Feb. 15,
1898-an act of sabotage, had brought war with Spain.
By some strange twist, the President, and to some extent the military leaders
in Washington, were in a "Battleship Maine" state of mind, when the attack
occurred, or at least were up to the last hours before the attack
This explains why the battle fleet was docked, each ship at its station,
awnings up-why the planes were grounded wing to wing, unarmed, ammunition for
guns and planes locked in magazines, when Japan struck Dec. 7.
The Army at Pearl Harbor on Dec. 7, interpreting its instructions from
Washington. Was "alerted" for sabotage only.
Had Hawaii "alert No. 3" been ordered, by General Short, the Japs might never
have struck, certainly the damage would have been far less.
Page 145
In far-away Aleutian Islands, at Dutch Harbor where military orders only had
to be followed, U. S. bombers were cruising with live bombs in racks, U. S.
Fighters with live ammunition in guns, when the attack came to Pearl Harbor
Dec. 7.
DISASTER
But it is not alone the "sabotage psychology" at Pearl Harbor for which the
president must accept his share of responsibility.
There were blunders there, both of omission and commission, which he must
shoulder.
The Commanders at Pearl Harbor had warnings of danger.
But with every warning, save one, came a "precaution," which tied their hands
psychologically, if not actually
As the danger became greater and Pearl Harbor closer, the "precautions" became
more definite, more insistent, more urgent.
These precautions came direct from the White House.
The only warning message that Kimmel and Short received, which did not
contain definite precautionary orders, was the one from Secretary of the Navy
Knox in January '41.
This was 11 months before Pearl Harbor and long before the expected
"incident," which would kick off hostilities, was expected.
Here are the precautions, which accompanied each "warning," as told in the
Roberts report.
Oct. 16, as Kimmel and Short were warned of danger by Washington, they were
ordered to do nothing which would "*constitute provocation as against Japan*."
Nov. 24 ,13 days before Pearl Harbor, Kimmel was enjoined to strictest secrecy
in any defense moves he made "*to prevent complication of tense existing
situation*."
Nov. 27, came the most serious warning yet, from the Chief of Staff to Short,
but with it an order that under no circumstances was he to take any steps or
make any moves *that would make it appear* the U. S. had committed "*the first
overt act*."
In the same message "reconnaissance" was ordered but only "*in such a way as
not to alarm the civil population or disclose intent*."
Here a military authority must have thought of the possibility such an order
might tie the hands of the commander, for there was inserted:
"He (General Short) was not to be restricted to any course, which would
jeopardize his defense."
Nov. 28, nine days before Pearl Harbor, Short was cautioned again that any
protective measures he took, "*must be confined to those essential to
security*" and *he must avoid "unnecessary publicity and alarm*."
It was the next day, Nov. 29, Secretary Hull stated, "The diplomatic part of
our relations with Japan is virtually over and the matter will now go to the
officials of the Army and Navy."
Nov. 29, eight days before Pearl Harbor, Kimmel was ordered to "*take no
offensive action until Japan had committed the first overt act*."
Nov. 30, seven days before Pearl Harbor, Kimmel received the last warning
message to reach Pearl Harbor before the attack.
It was a copy of a dispatch sent to Admiral Hart at Manila, ordering certain
scouting, but again with the admonition, to "*avoid the appearance of
attacking*."
None of these precautionary orders came from military authorities in
Washington, though all came though military channels.
None of these precautionary orders at Pearl Harbor ever was withdrawn.
One of the last warning messages sent to Pearl Harbor was changed by the
President, personally, to insert the usual precaution.
The official explanation, of course, is that, if war came, the President
wanted the record to show he had done all he could to prevent it.
But on Nov. 29, eight days before Pearl Harbor, as stated, the Secretary of
State had said "the matter will now go to the officials of the Army and Navy."
The Roberts report, in No. 15 of its conclusions, quotes one of the many
precautionary orders from Washington as a cause of the success of the Pearl
Harbor attack though the report does not fix the responsibility.
The last full fatal week before Dec. 7, 1941, the Roberts report does not show
a single message from Washington to Kimmel and Short at Pearl Harbor.
It is known Washington had, during this week, information of greatest
importance which Short and Kimmel didn't receive until after the attack.
This is the real story of Pearl Harbor, seven warnings of danger to the
commanders there, *six confusing and contradictory* "precautions," which tied
their hands.
Page 146
Word available the last fatal week_word most needed at Pearl Harbor-
never was sent.
Obviously the President "as the sands ran out" at Pearl Harbor, was definitely
expecting a Japanese attack.
But the nearer it was expected the more careful he became that when the
attack should come, it should be such as the isolationists could not tie onto
himself.
The attack, which came at Pearl Harbor Dec. 7, was one which the
"isolationists" could not tie onto the President.
But the success of the attack can in part, in all fairness, and in such
measure as each citizen shall judge, be placed at the door of the Commander-
in-Chief as commander and personally.
The President, and others, in Washington, first had lulled the commanders at
Pearl Harbor into expecting only_sabotage.
The President then had given them such restraining precautions and orders they
did not know what they could or dare do_in measures of protection and defense.
The Japanese, as Davis and Lindley had said, solved the problem of how to
summon the nation against isolationism for the President at Pearl Harbor.
But in trying to keep "the record clear," the President unknowingly and
unintentionally had contributed to the destruction of the Pacific battle
fleet, had helped to bring about Bataan and Corregidor, had lengthened
immeasurably the Japanese war.
WHY?
This of course explains many things.
It explains the long delay of the court-martial of General Short and Admiral
Kimmel.
It explains why the President through members of Senate and House, stopped
Congress from passing resolutions calling for trials.
It explains why the President still prevents the records of the Roberts
Commission and the testimony of its 127 witnesses being made public.
It explains the Presidential order which forbade Admiral Hooper a year
ago to testify about Pearl Harbor to a committee of Congress.
It explains why no information has been given out as to the investigation by
Admiral Hart, at the suggestion of Secretary Knox.
It explains investigation number 4, now being held behind closed doors.
White House pressure succeeded in substituting secret hearing number 4, for a
proposed resolution of Congress calling for immediate court-martial.
[EDITOR'S NOTE: *This editorial is republished and paid for by The New
Bedford, Mass, Standard-Times, as a patriotic public service. No outside
parties have contributed in any way toward the cost of publication.
Republication permitted*.]
EXHIBIT NO. 4
10 August 1944.
Confidential
Colonel CHARLES W. WEST, JAGD
Recorder, Army Pearl Harbor Board,
Room 4741, Munitions Building,
Washington 25, D. C.
DEAR COLONEL General Miles has asked me to write to you requesting a copy of
the transcript of his evidence before the Board. The General desires this copy
of the transcript because he is concerned with the possibility of his evidence
showing an inaccurate statement of fact.
General Miles would have written to you personally on this matter but he is
now on an inspection trip and by long distance telephone he communicated with
me today, asking me to make this request of you. The General will be at this
headquarters on Tuesday, 15 August 1944, and I can assure you that he will
examine and return the same immediately.
I trust everything is going well with you and that you are enjoying your
assignment.
Sincerely,
DANIEL L. O'DONNELL,
Lt. Colonel, J. A. G. D.,
Service Command Judge Advocate.
Page 147
WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON
HEADQUARTERS ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD,
Munitions Building, 12 August 1944.
Lt Col. DANIEL L. O'DONNELL, J. A G. D.
Hqs. First Service Command,
Boston 15, Massachusetts.
DEAR COLONEL O'DONNELL: Pursuant to your request of 10 August 1944, I am
enclosing herewith a copy of the transcript of General Miles' testimony.
Certain minor inaccuracies such as typographical errors, may appear therein
which we haven't yet had an opportunity to correct but will do so at the
earliest opportunity. May I suggest that the matter of any possibly
"inaccurate statement of fact" be made the subject of a letter to General
Grunert.
Please return the transcript when it has served its purpose. With kindest
regards, I am.
Sincerely yours,
Charles W. West,
CHARLES W. WEST
Colonel, J. A. A. D.,
Recorder.
1 Incl: Transcript.
[91] TESTIMONY OF MAJ. GEN. SHERMAN MLLES, COMMANDING 1ST SERVICE
COMMAND, BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS
(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article
of War 24. )
Colonel WEST. General, will you state to the Board your name, rank,
organization and station?
General MILES. Sherman Miles, Major General, Commanding 1st service Command,
Boston, Massachusetts.
General GRUNERT. General Miles, the Board, in an attempt to get at the facts,
is looking into the War Department background and viewpoint prior to and
leading up to the Pearl Harbor attack. It is hoped that, because of your
assignment as A. C. of S. G-2, at that time, you can throw some light on the
subject. In order to cover so large a field in the limited time available,
individual Board members have been assigned objectives or phases for special
investigation, although the entire Board will pass upon the objectives and
phases. General Russell has this particular phase. So he will lead in
propounding the questions and the other members will assist in developing
them. So I will turn you over to the mercies of General Russell.
General RUSSELL. What was your assignment in the year 1941?
General MILES. I was Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department.
General RUSSELL. Can you remember approximately the date on which you
entered upon that assignment?
General MILES. May 1, 1940.
General RUSSELL. When were you relieved or transferred from that assignment?
[92] General MILES. The end of January 1942.
General RUSSELL. During that period of time you were actually the head of that
we know as G-2 which embraced the Military Intelligence Division. Was that the
name of it?
General MILES. That was the official name_Military Intelligence Division, War
Department General Staff.
General RUSSELL. Briefly stated, General Miles, what were the functions of the
G-2 section, including this Military Intelligence Division?
General MILES. The Military Intelligence Division, General, was all-inclusive.
It was the whole thing, not as it is now, broken and divided between G-2 and
Military Intelligence Service. It was all one division, just as the Operations
and Training Division, or the Personnel Division War Plans Division, and so
forth. I was head of the entire division, which, in turn, was divided into
counter-intelligence, positive intelligence, and in turn that was divided
geographically to cover the world, or as much as we could cover.
Page 148
General RUSSELL. Definitely, General Miles, as to the operations of your
department related to the Japanese Government during your period of service
there what were you attempting to learn about the Japanese Government?
General MILES. We were attempting to learn everything we could about the
Japanese Government, and had been doing so, in fact, a great many years. It
was only one of the nations which we were attempting to cover, to gather all
possible information about. Our system was a running digest.
General GRUNERT. May I interrupt there? If anything which [93] you
put into the record is of such a nature as might be of value to other nations
now, I wish you would consider that and, if so, give us that information in
closed session, so that it will not be disclosed to anybody who may be able to
see this record. Do you see what I am getting at?
General MILES. Yes, sir, I understand.
This summary digest was maintained on the principal countries of the world.
Such a system is no secret. It has been maintained by practically every
government. It was a running digest covering the military side, the political
side, the economic side, and the psychological side. All the information that
ever came in from any country to G-2 was collated and put into this digest and
sent out to the various military attaches and G-2s, all the corps areas and
overseas departments who were interested in a particular country, in the form
of corrected loose-leaf, so that you had a running build-up constantly. This
had been going on, to my knowledge, for twenty years. In addition to that, of
course, we sent out bi-weekly, as I remember, military intelligence summaries,
which were short documents of facts that we had gotten in in the last two or
three days from all sorts of agencies that we had. I say all sorts, because we
kept in very close touch with the State Department, the Department of
Commerce, the Rockefeller people in South America, and, of course, our own
military attaches and observers that we had throughout the world.
That, in general, was our system of getting information and disseminating it
General RUSSELL. Did the G-2 section, as such, have [94] personnel
available for investigations in foreign fields in the year 1941?
General MILES. A limited personnel, General. We were building up. When
I took over Military Intelligence in May of 1940 I remember there were 36
officers in the entire division. We built up rapidly to something over 400,
with an equal proportion of clerical personnel. We built up very rapidly, as
the war came nearer and nearer, our agencies in the field, field observers,
military attaches. Our personnel was always limited. We did not have unlimited
money or unlimited selection, particularly of officers. That was a time when
the Army was building very rapidly. The natural inclination of a soldier is to
go with troops and remain with troops. The general officers, in the field of
course wanted the best men, naturally, and should have had them. We did not
have a free field for the selection of personnel, and quite rightly. We did
the best we could with the personnel and the funds we had available.
General RUSSELL. About when did this personnel reach its maximum development
of 400?
General MILES. Well, it was increasing all the time I was there. I do not
know. I imagine it continued to increase after I left. I am pretty sure it
did, I cannot place any date on any maximum reached.
General RUSSELL. Can you approximate the number of people who were available
to you for service in Washington and throughout the country and in foreign
fields, in October and November of 1941?
[95] General MILES. General, I would not try to answer that question from my
memory. The records are certainly available to you. I could not do it.
General RUSSELL. General a moment ago you referred to monthly or bi-monthly
documents of some kind that were sent to the corps commanders and to the
overseas departments. Did your office maintain copies of those reports?
General MILES. Oh, yes.
General RUSSELL. Are they in the files now?
General MILES. I imagine they are, sir. They are permanent records of the
Military Intelligence Division.
General RUSSELL. There would be no reason to destroy them at all?
General MILES. Not that I know of.
General RUSSELL I want at this point to say that I have asked for a search of
the records over there and have looked at the records, but did not discover
copies of such reports, although specifically I have asked for such reports. I
am giving you that, because it may be necessary for us to conduct a further
search to locate, if possible, these documents.
Page 149
Now, to discuss for a moment the sources of information which you have
divulged already and to limit it to Japanese information, what sources of
information were there in Japan in the fall of 1941 on which you as G-2 could
rely as to activities of the Japanese at home and in home waters?
GENERAL MILES. Within the United States?
General RUSSELL. No. I am now addressing myself to the situation in Japan and
have asked what agencies or what sources existed in Japan upon which you could
rely for information [96] about Japanese activities at home and in Hawaii.
General MILES. I would say that by far the most important source was our
Embassy in Tokyo. We had a very excellent Ambassador who had been there
a number of years with a staff that had been there a good deal longer than
that. We had, of course, used the military attache and his assistants. The
information which we could get on the military side from our military attache
and his assistants was of course very limited; the Japanese being extremely
close-mouthed. But the Embassy itself was constantly sending in dispatches to
the State Department_Mr. Grew, particularly_on the state of mind of the
Japanese people and the probability of what they were going to do next, and so
forth. We
also, of course, had direct access, through our very close connection with the
State Department, to what was transpiring in the negotiations in the fall of
1941 here in Washington. Aside from that, I do not think there were any
important sources of information in Japan. We were getting a good deal of
information from what might be called the borders; in other words, China, and
even the part of the Continent occupied by the Japanese. The Koreans would get
out once in a while and we would get some information in that way. We
exchanged information very freely with the British and, to a certain extent,
with the Dutch.
They were a little afraid to give us information, as I remember, but we were
getting some.
General RUSSELL. Did the British have any organization within the homeland of
Japan which was watching the movement of their Army and Navy in the fall of
1941?
General MILES. I believe that they had about the same as [97] we
had. As to actually watching the movements of ships and troops, it was
necessarily a system that worked sometimes and did not work at other times.
You might see the ships move or the troops move, or you might not.
General RUSSELL. General Miles, is it true or not that from the State
Department or from our Ambassador to Japan the information which we obtained
related almost exclusively to the state of mind of the Japanese people toward
the war and their enmity toward the United States?
General MILES. Are you putting that in the form of a question, sir?
General RUSSELL. Yes. Is it true or not that that was the case?
General MILES. That was the Ambassador's principal concern, naturally. I
could not say, from my memory of the information that we got from our Embassy,
that that by any means covered the field.
General RUSSELL. Do you remember a message from our Ambassador along
in the fall of 1941, in which he summed up the situation and told the State
Department to what extent they could rely upon him for information of troop
movements, movements of the Navy, and so forth?
General MILES. I do not recall that particular message, General.
General RUSSELL. Maybe I can refresh your memory. May I ask you this
as a preliminary? Did you attend the conferences that were held by the
Secretary of State, which he refers to as the War Councils, where he had
ordinarily the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, and some of
our high-ranking military [98] and naval people in to discuss the
Japanese situation?
General MLLES. No, sir. I think only the Chief of Staff attended them.
General RUSSELL. I refer particularly to this message which is contained in
the State Department's book that they call the White Paper, which is a report
from our Ambassador to Japan on the 17th day of November, I believe, 1941
(handing a book to the witness).
General MILES. What is the question, now, sir?
General RUSSELL. When did you first know about that message?
General MILES. I don't remember, General, I can't answer that question.
General FRANK. Did you know about it at all?
General MILES. I am not sure that I did. I think I did, because we had
very close liaison with the State Department. I feel sure that I did but
frankly, it is so obvious a message that the impression it gives me today is
Page 150
probably the same impression it gave me then: "Yes, of course I know we can't
count on the Embassy. How can we be sure that any group can tell us the
movement of the Japanese fleet or army?" We knew we could not.
General RUSSELL. In other words, the information which you have testified that
you had from Japan about what was going on over there was rather general and
indefinite in its nature?
General GRUNERT. Unless we know about that message the record will not be
intelligible. Is it going to be copied into the record?
General RUSSELL. Yes.
Your information about the activities in Japan in the fall [99] of 1941 was
very indefinite and general?
General MILES. Necessarily so.
General RUSSELL. The message from Ambassador Grew in Japan to the Secretary of
State for purposes of the record will be identified as a paraphrase of a
telegram dated November 17, 1941, and it may be copied from page 788 of this
White Paper entitled "Peace and War, United States Foreign Policy, 1931-1941."
(Telegram from Ambassador Grew to Secretary of State, dated November 17, 1941,
is as follows:)
"The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State
"(Telegram: Paraphrase)
"Tokyo, November 17, 1941_1 p. m.
"Received November 17_2:09 p. m.)
"1814. Referring to Embassy's previous telegram No. 1736 of November 3, 3 p.
m., final sentence, and emphasizing the need to guard against sudden Japanese
naval or military actions in such areas as are not now involved in the Chinese
theater of operations. I take into account the probability of the Japanese
exploiting every possible tactical advantage, such as surprise and initiative.
Accordingly you are advised of not placing the major responsibility in giving
prior warning upon the Embassy staff, the naval and military attaches included
since in Japan there is extremely effective control over both primary and
secondary military information. We would not expect to obtain any information
in advance either from personal Japanese contacts or through the press the
observation of [100] military movements is not possible by the few Americans
remaining in the country, concentrated mostly in three cities (Tokyo,
Yokohama, Kobe); and with American and other foreign shipping absent from
adjacent waters the Japanese are assured of the ability to send without
foreign observation their troop transports in various directions. Japanese
troop concentrations were reported recently by American consuls in Manchuria
and Formosa, while troop dispositions since last July's general mobilization
have, according to all other indications available, been made with a view to
enabling the carrying out of new operations on the shortest possible notice
either in the Pacific southwest or in Siberia or in both.
"We are fully aware that our present most important duty perhaps is to detect
any premonitory signs of naval or military operations likely in areas
mentioned above and every precaution is being taken to guard against surprise.
The Embassy's field of naval or military observation is restricted almost
literally to what could be seen with the naked eye, and this is negligible.
Therefore, you are advised, from an abundance of caution, to discount as much
as possible the likelihood of our ability to give substantial warning.
"GREW"
General RUSSELL. General Miles, referring to the statement which is contained
in Ambassador Grew's message "and with American and other foreign shipping
absent from adjacent waters the Japanese are assured of the [101] ability to
send without foreign observation their troop transports in various
directions."
As a matter of information, do you know why at that particular time there was
an absence of American and foreign shipping in Japanese waters?
General MILES. NO, sir. I do not remember knowing of any particular absence of
American shipping from Japanese waters at that time. Of course we had had
information for a great many years which had been considered in all of our war
plans in Hawaii that there was a certain part of the Pacific Ocean that we
called the "Vacant Sea" in which there are practically no ships and in which
large movement of ships could occur without anybody seeing them. It was that
part of the ocean between the great southern routes that go from Hawaii to the
coast of Japan and China, and the northern great circle routes that go near
the Aleutians.
General RUSSELL. The term which you used intrigues me. What was it you called
it?
Page 151
General MILES. I used to call it the "Vacant Sea."
General RUSSELL. As applied to that part of the Pacific adjacent to the
mandated islands, would you say that they were in the area of the "Vacant Sea"
or not?
General MILES No, sir. The southern trade routes, as I remember, from Hawaii
to Yokohama, we will say, pass considerably north of most of the mandated
islands, such as the Marianas. All the seas surrounding the mandated islands
were, as you know, extremely difficult for us to penetrate and get any
information on for other reasons.
General RUSSELL. Why?
[102] General MILES. Because the Japanese would not allow us in there. You
might sail through, but you would not see very much. That had existed for many
years.
General RUSSELL. Was there any restriction on Americans landing on those
islands that were mandated to the Japanese?
General MILES. Absolutely, sir.
General RUSSELL: Were Americans prohibited from landing in the mandated
islands?
General MILES. Well, they did not say "Americans are prohibited," but
Americans did not land. That was well known for years. No American warship
went in there.
General FRANK. Do you know of any American port or any point over which the
United States had jurisdiction that excluded Jap vessels or Japanese
nationals?
General MILES. No, sir.
General RUSSELL. Do you know where there is any documentary evidence of the
exclusion of Americans from the Japanese mandated islands?
General MILES. General, I would not know exactly where to put my hand on
documentary evidence. It was one of the things perfectly well known to all of
us in the Intelligence. I should think probably the Navy Department could aid
you in that respect. I am pretty sure that the Navy Department several times
tried to get ships in there.
General GRUNERT. As far as the so-called mandated islands are concerned, they
were sort of a blind spot for our Military Intelligence, were they?
General MILES. Yes, sir.
[103] General RUSSELL. That is exactly what I was trying to find out.
How far are the Marshall Islands from Honolulu?
General MILES. My recollection is, about 1,600 miles. I would not swear to it.
General RUSSELL. General, were you acquainted with the plans for the defense
of Pearl Harbor and the estimates in connection with the Japanese situation as
to the probabilities of attack? Were all those things known to you at G-2?
General MILES. Rather intimately. I was G-3, of the Hawaiian Department from
1929 to 1931. I rewrote the war plan. I wrote the general staff study and
estimate of the situation, which was the "bible" at that time and for some
years. Then from 1934 to 1938 I was here in War Plans Division and was
particularly charged with the three overseas departments, their projects and
their plans. So up to 1938, at least, and between 1929 and 1938, I was
intimately acquainted with it.
General RUSSELL. In our brief study of the plan generally and the evidence
just given by you, there was considerable emphasis placed on a probability of
an attack on Pearl Harbor by carrier-borne aircraft. During the year 1941 you
were, of course, familiar with the estimate and the probabilities?
General MILES. Yes, sir.
General RUSSELL. Did it occur to you as G-2 from what port or ports these
carriers might depart on a mission of that sort?
General MILES. They might have departed on a mission from a great many ports.
We did not know really what bases they had in the mandated islands and
obviously they could have departed [104] from almost any port in Japan, such
as Kobe or Yokohama.
General RUSSELL. You stated that you did not know what bases they had in the
mandated islands?
General MILES. Very little information on bases in the mandated islands.
General RUSSELL. As I recall, they acquired jurisdiction, such as they had
over the mandated islands, as a result of the settlement at the end of the
other war in 1918?
General MILES. That is correct.
General RUSSELL. And in 1941 they had had approximately twenty years to
develop their bases in the mandated islands, their ports and so forth. Was
Page 152
there any information in G-2 in preparing ports and bases in any of the
mandated islands?
General MILES Very little, and very general information. We knew that they
were developing certain places, such as Palau and Truk particularly, and we
suspected Saipan. We relied very largely on information from Naval
Intelligence. Taken together it could not have been called any detailed or
complete information of possible bases in the mandated islands.
General FRANK. Did you have anything on the Island of Jaluit?
General MILES. I do not remember what we had on Jaluit, but it was one of the
islands that we used to discuss and suspect that they were developing.
General RUSSELL. General Miles, in the fall of 1941 did you in G-2 have
sufficient data on Japanese developments in the mandated islands to predicate
an intelligent opinion as to the [105] possibilities of launching convoys from
there which might have included aircraft carriers?
General MILES. I would say that positively we knew enough to form an estimate
that such a thing was a strong possibility not a probability; that they had
the means. That they would do it is another matter. They had the means to do
it. I would say that our estimate at the time was that it was very possible,
if not probable, that they did have those means.
General RUSSELL. Do you know whether or not the data on these developments on
the mandated islands is a matter of record any place in the G-2 files?
General MILES. Oh, yes; we had files on them. We had maps and whatever we
could get. The Office of Naval Intelligence had even more.
General RUSSELL. Did those maps show the developments, or just show where the
islands were?
General MILES. So far as possible we made charts of the islands from one
source or another and plotted on those charts, both Naval Intelligence and
ours, where we thought they were developing, from what information we could
get from traveling natives or missionaries or what have you.
General RUSSELL. I was asking you some questions a moment ago about the
inhibition as to our going on those mandated islands. Were the inhibitions
against going into the mandated islands only those of force or semi-force by
the Japanese people who were there?
General MILES. That is what kept us away, General.
General RUSSELL. They just would not let you go in?
[106] General MILES. They just would not let us go in. They had one excuse or
another. I don't remember just exactly what they were; but the net result was
that mighty few people got into the mandated islands.
General RUSSELL. Did you attempt to send people from G-2 into the mandated
islands in 1941?
General MILES. No, sir. I do not think any attempt had been made by G-2 for
ten years. We knew we could not do it and get them out.
General RUSSELL. Were there any restrictions imposed on G-2 from higher
authority about attempting to get in there and develop that situation in the
mandated islands?
General MILES. Not specifically the mandated islands; no, sir.
General RUSSELL. But you did regard the geographic location of these mandated
islands with respect to our naval base at Pearl Harbor as being rather
material?
General MILES. Yes, I did, General; but, on the other hand, we knew perfectly
well that Japan could attack the Hawaiian Islands without the use of the
mandates. I remember very well writing one plan in which we developed the
other side, based on a surprise attack launched from the mainland of Japan,
with fast cruisers and carriers, carrying troops on their most rapid liners.
We worked it up, just how they would take those liners off their routes for
one reason or another_this one to be repaired, and so forth_and suddenly
launch an attack from the "Vacant Sea," suddenly arrive in Honolulu. So the
mandates were always a black shadow, but they were not [107] the only means of
attacking Hawaii, and we it as far back as the early 1930's.
General RUSSELL. In those studies which were made by you, and others with
which you may be familiar, did you ever consider steps which might be taken to
discover in advance the mission and dispatch of these convoys to carry out
that type of attack?
General MILES. We considered it, General, but, as Ambassador Grew says in that
dispatch, "Don't rely on us from that point of view." We attacked the problem
from the other side.
General FRANK. What do you mean by that?
Page 153
General MILES. I mean, from the Hawaiian side, particularly air reconnaissance
and submarine reconnaissance [handwritten: by our own people in Hawaii] to
detect any force coming in before it could actually attack. I recall
particularly during all of General Drum's command out there in the middle
1930's that he was very much interested in it. He was constantly sending in
papers to War Plans, and they were coming to my desk, involving the
possibility of a screen of large bombers which would cover the entire enormous
perimeter containing the five big Hawaiian islands That was a current matter
almost. Then, of course, the submarine screen was another matter that was
constantly discussed. We had about twenty submarines out there in the middle
1930's.
But, to answer your question more succinctly, I do not think any Intelligence
officer ever thought that he could be sure of picking up a convoy or attack
force or task force in Japan before it sailed and know where it was going.
That was beyond our dreams of efficiency.
[108] General RUSSELL. Or even the mandated islands?
General MILES. Rather less in the mandated islands.
General RUSSELL. You had less chance there?
General MILES. Yes.
General GRUNERT. Would such a force moving from one of the mandated islands
indicate where it was going? Would there be a clear indication that it was
bound for Hawaii or elsewhere?
General MILES. It would be no indication at all where it was going, General.
(There was informal discussion off the record.)
General RUSSELL. The G-2 people in their studies had to all intents and
purposes eliminated investigations in Japan proper and other Japanese
territory to determine probable action on the part of the Japanese Army and
Navy?
General MILES. Oh, no, sir. We had not eliminated it. As Mr. Grew says, it was
the principal task of the Embassy, particularly of the military and naval part
of the Embassy! What I say is just what Mr. Grew says, that we never dreamed
that we could rely on getting that information. It would have been almost a
military intelligence miracle had we been able to spot a task force in forming
and have known before it sailed where it was going.
General RUSSELL. Now, general, if that be true, then the conclusion has been
reached, so far as discovering task forces of any sort moving to the Hawaiian
Islands, that the chief if not the sole reliance would have to be placed on
reconnaissance agencies based on the islands or on United States possessions
contiguous thereto?
[109] General MILES. Yes, and at sea. I mean, by submarine and air power.
General RUSSELL. Do you recall when the last estimate of the situation was
sent out to the Hawaiian Department from G-2?
General FRANK. Prior to December 7?
General RUSSELL. Yes; prior to December 7,1941.
General MILES. General, I do not know that any estimate of the situation, if
you are using that term strictly, was sent. What we sent were those corrected
sheets of the digest on Japan from time to time, whenever we got the
information, and copies of the bi-weekly summary. The estimate of the
situation is or the information of the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of
War. G-2 is the G-2 of the General Staff. I am bringing up that point because
I had to be very careful, and I think all G-2s of the General Staff have to be
very careful. The information you give your Chief is something which he must
pass on from the command point of view. If that information is habitually sent
out to the various overseas departments particularly, you run into the serious
danger of telling the Lieutenant General commanding the Hawaiian Department,
we will say something that G-2 thinks which the Chief of Staff does not concur
in and forcing his hand or inducing him to take some action in which the Chief
of Staff does not concur. In other words, you must be careful to keep out of
the command channel. So you give your information, your summary, your estimate
of the situation, to your Chief, and action must flow from the Chief through
the command channels; and G-2 is not in the command channels.
[110] General GRUNERT. Insofar as action is concerned on the information hat
is passed to the subordinate command, is that action then passed back through
G-2, or does G-2 prepare it for the Chief of Staff insofar as it pertains to
information?
General MILES. I do not know that I have your question clearly.
Page 154
General GRUNERT. You have gotten information from various sources which
influenced you to make an estimate of the situation, which you passed to the
Chief of Staff. Now, there are parts of that information, if true, that
certain command channels in the Philippines or Hawaii should get. Who insures
that they get that information?
General MILES. As a routine matter, G-2 insures it. In other words, all
information that pertained directly to the Hawaiian Department or to the
Philippine Department that G-2 received, it insured that G-2 in that
Department got it. That is exclusive, however, of any deductions in a very
broad sense that G-2 of the War Department might draw which would induce
action. The latter, in other words, is a command proposition.
General GRUNERT. In other words, you give them the information, but you do not
analyze it; or do you?
General MILES. Ordinarily you do not analyze it for them.
General FRANK. You gave information and interpretation only through command
channels?
General MILES. Interpretation would certainly go only through command
channels.
General GRUNERT. Any warning, then, should come from command channels; rather
than from G-2?
[111] General MILES. If it is warning that probably would result in action,
yes, most definitely.
General RUSSELL. Your G-2 sent a message on November 27 out to G-2 of the
Hawaiian Department?
General MILES. Yes; to all departments, as I remember.
General RUSSELL. Now, a few specific questions, General Miles, and I will be
through:
On October 27, 1941, Brink reported to your office that there were two
aircraft carriers that had been operating among the mandated islands, of which
Kaga was one. Was Brink one of your operators?
General MILES. How is the name spelled?
General RUSSELL. B-r-i-n-k.
General GRUNERT. Was there not a Colonel Brink for a time in Singapore, and
then he went to the Philippines?
General MILES Yes; that was the man, I think.
General RUSSELL. This was sent from the Philippines?
General MILES. Yes.
General GRUNERT. He was one of the staff in the office of the A. C. of S., G
2, Philippine Department, and on my recommendation he was sent to Singapore to
be directly under the War Department there. That is why I recall a man named
Brink.
General RUSSELL. Do you have any recollection about that type of Japanese
aircraft carrier being in the mandated islands? Do you have any independent
recollection on that subject?
General MILES. I remember that the Japanese carriers were reported in the
mandated islands, but I would not be able to [112] pin it down to any
particular source.
General RUSSELL. Would it be about that time?
General MILES. It was about that time.
General RUSSELL. In the records some place we have discovered evidence of a
photographic mission by aircraft down into the mandated islands in late
November or early December of 1941. Do you have any independent recollection
of that activity on our part?
General MILES. No, sir; I did not know we sent one.
General RUSSELL. You were in touch in a general way with the Navy at that time
in obtaining information from them?
General MILES. I was intimately in touch with the Office of Naval
Intelligence.
General RUSSELL. What did you know from the Navy about the location and
disposition of the Japanese fleet in late November and early December? Do you
remember?
General MILES. My recollection is that the Navy had information of carriers in
the mandates, and definitely of a movement of naval vessels and transports,
they thought, south through the China Sea in the direction of Indo China and
Thailand.
General RUSSELL. What was your impression as to the knowledge which the Navy
had generally during the last six months before the attack on Pearl
Page 155
Harbor of the location of the Jap Navy and various types of craft that were in
their Navy?
General MILES. Their information was very general and incomplete.
General RUSSELL. General, when in your opinion did it [113] become apparent
that war with Japan was inevitable?
General MILES. On the 27th of November, when we learned that we had
practically given what might be considered or probably would be considered by
them an ultimatum from then on I considered war as very probable if not
ultimately inevitable.
General RUSSELL. That was based almost exclusively on the negotiations between
the Japanese who were in Washington negotiating with our State Department?
General MILES. Primarily on that. It was a build-up.
General RUSSELL. In the message of November 27, which I will not discuss with
you in any great detail, there was a statement that negotiations had
practically ended. I am not quoting, but it said substantially that_although
there was a bare possibility that the Japanese might come back for further
negotiations. Do you remember that?
General MILES. That was in General Marshall's dispatch?
General RUSSELL. Yes.
General MILES. I do not remember that; no.
General RUSSELL. Let us assume that they did come back after November 27 and
continued negotiations: Would that have affected your conclusions about the
inevitability of war?
General MILES. Oh, yes.
General RUSSELL. As a matter of fact, they were back on the 1st, 2nd, and 5th
f December, were they not?
General MILES. The Japanese reply was not back, sir.
General RUSSELL. I mean, the Japs came back and negotiated.
[114] General MILES. Oh, they continued to stay here and talk, but that it all
hinged, to my mind, on the reply or the position taken by the Japanese
Government as a result of the U. S. paper on the 26th of November, I think it
was, which was considered practically an ultimatum.
General RUSSELL. I think that is all.
General GRUNERT. I have a few questions.
General MILES. I should like, if I may, to add a little bit. I am not quite
sure of my answer regarding inevitable war. I do not want to give the
impression that I thought on November 27th that war was immediately
inevitable. I thought that, very definitely, some action by Japan, a pretty
radical action, would be taken almost at once; but that need not necessarily
be an overt and open attack on the United States. I didn't feel at all sure
that war with Japan was immediately inevitable any time. There were a good
many things Japan could have done, if she broke her negotiations in Washington
short of open war with the United States and we were considering all of those
possibilities.
General RUSSELL. That suggests one other question: Did you know that there had
been established by reference to the degrees of latitude and longitude lines
beyond which, if Japan went with armed force out in the Pacific, the British,
Dutch, and Americans would regard that as an act of war?
General MILES. Yes.
General RUSSELL. Then you knew as G-2 that if certain things occurred, we, in
association with those powers, might attack?
General MILES. Yes; certainly.
[115] General FRANK . You said you were not prevented specifically by higher
authority from attempting to get information regarding the Japanese mandated
islands. Was there any general prohibition in this regard? Was there general
attitude of "hands off"?
General MILES. Not specifically affecting the mandated islands. It was simply
question of whether you wanted to send a man to his almost certain death or
not, and whether the information you expected to get out of it would be worth
at risk. But there was no general or specific prohibition against my sending
man into the mandated islands if I could get him there. But I did not think I
could get him in there and get him back alive, or get information from him
while there.
Page 156
General GRUNERT. Was there or was there not a fear on the part of all
concerned that doing so and being picked up after having done so would offend
the Japanese?
General MILES. Oh, it most certainly would. We would have had to disavow it
and swear that we never sent him, and so forth. That is an old part of the
game.
General FRANK. On November 27 there went out a message from G-2 of the War
Department, which was your organization, saying:
"Advise only Commanding General and Chief of Staff that it appears that
conference with the Japanese has ended in an apparent deadlock. Acts of
sabotage and espionage probable. Also possible that hostilities may begin."
Do you remember that message?
General MILES. Very well.
[116] General FRANK. You are familiar with the war plan as it applied to
Honolulu, the Standing Operating Procedure?
General MILES. Yes; in a general way.
General FRANK. Did not the provisions of that war plan and the Standing
Operating Procedure provide for this defense against sabotage?
General MILES. Yes; it provided against all forms of attack, including
sabotage.
General FRANK. Why, then, was sabotage especially emphasized in that message?
General MILES. I will be very glad to answer that question, General, but my
answer must be somewhat long.
In the summer of 1939 the President issued a directive to all bureaus and
offices of the Government to keep out of anti-sabotage and anti-espionage
work, except three that were to do it all, F. B. I., O. N. I. and M. I. D.
After I took M. I. D. in May of 1940, I began to build up the counter-
intelligence part of it. I drafted a written agreement with F. B. I. and O. N.
I. delimiting our responsibilities under the President's directive. It was
then countersigned by the three Cabinet Ministers concerned. Then I drew up a
counter-subversive system for the Army, and later a counter-fifth-column plan,
the first one we ever had. I met certain opposition among my colleagues, the
other Assistant Chiefs of Staff and I am relating this only to point out that
by the summer of 1941 I had gotten myself in a position where it was
definitely established that counter-subversive activity of all kinds was G-2's
responsibility and solely G-2's responsibility. I shared the [117]
responsibility for measures against an overt to attack by a possible enemy
with Operations and with War Plans, because I was supposed to give the
information on which their orders were based. But I shared with nobody the
responsibility for counter-subversive measures, and therefore, when I found on
the 27th of November that nothing was
specifically said about sabotage in General Marshall's dispatch of that date,
the war warning order, I felt it necessary to warn the G-2's, not only of the
overseas departments but particularly those in this country. It was sent it
to all of the corps area G-2s, because we knew the build-up in this country
very well. The F. B. I., the O. N. I., and my people were very worried about
what could be done in this country, particularly to the Air Force. General
Arnold was very much worried. He broke loose the next day and occasioned the
further dispatch of November 28.
So that was the reason for the emphasis. The policy had already been laid down
by General Marshall's telegram of the 27th. So I was simply backing up the
policy of the Chief of Staff and emphasizing the form of attack for which I
was most directly responsible as G 2, [handwritten:] and reiterating the
possibility of open hostilities.
GENERAL FRANK. In the beginning of General Russell's questions you gave an
answer to the effect that as a result of your background and experience you
had felt a strong probability of an air raid or air attack on Honolulu. Is
that correct?
General MILES That was one of the methods of attack to which we were most
vulnerable.
General FRANK. At this time, we will say, December 1, 1941, what was your
attitude as to the probability of such an [118] air attack?
General MILES. If the Japs attack openly at all, and if their attack was made
on Hawaii, I think I would have said on December 1, 1941, that an air attack
on the Pearl Harbor installations and the fleet (although I did not actually
know the ships were there in Pearl Harbor) was one of the most probable
movements that the Japs would take.
Page 157
General FRANK. Since you went out of your way to caution them about sabotage,
why did you not likewise go out of your way to caution them about the
probability of an air attack?
General MILES. Because, General, all that had been covered in General
Marshall's dispatch in which he specifically ordered such necessary
reconnaissances_I remember the use of that word_to protect the Hawaiian
Department against attack. And that was the only way_that, and of course
radar_that such an attack could have been countered. My message also warned of
possible hostilities.
General FRANK. You knew that the following day General Arnold sent a message
with respect to sabotage?
General MILES. Yes, indeed.
General FRANK. Did the logic ever occur to you that as a result of emphasizing
sabotage in a series of messages it might have the result of de-emphasizing
something else?
General MILES. That had occurred to me. I very strongly objected to General
Marshall's message on the basis, among other things, that I did not want to
overemphasize sabotage and that I had already sent the day before a sufficient
message to cover the question of sabotage.
General FRANK. As hindsight, of course, and considering [119] the fact that
provisions for all of these defenses were covered in the war plans and other
documents, would not the following message have-sufficed;
"War imminent. Act accordingly."?
General MILES. For me to send?
General FRANK. No; for the War Department to have sent. That would not have
emphasized nor de-emphasized anything, would it?
General MILES. I would prefer not to pass upon the Chief of Staff's wording in
his message of November 27.
General FRANK. There were six messages sent between November 16th and 28th.
Four of them cautioned against provoking the Japs; three of them emphasized
sabotage. Now, with respect to caution against provoking the Japs: while we
were leaning over backward as a result of these cautions, what was the
attitude of the Japanese, relatively speaking?
General MILES. Their attitude where, General? Here in Washington, in the
negotiations?
General FRANK. All over the world. Were they as particular about preventing
any suspicion on our part as we were particular about trying to prevent any
provocation on their part?
General MILES. Oh, no. They had been provocative for a great many years,
particularly since they began their attack on China.
General FRANK. Will you develop that in just a few words?
General MILES. I should say that the Japanese attack in Manchuria and later in
China, which, after all, was the basis [120] of our diplomatic negotiations
here in Washington in 1941 the basic cause of it, was the beginning of a very
provocative attitude on the part of the Japanese.
General FRANK. What I am after is this: There was little or no attempt on the
Japanese side to keep from provoking us, where as there was every effort on
the part of the Americans to keep from provoking the Japanese; is that
correct?
General MILES. I should say as a general statement that that is very accurate,
sir.
General FRANK. I asked that of you because you should have information on that
as the War Department G-2 at that time.
General MILES. Yes, sir; but I think it was very general information that at
Shanghai and all through the Peiping episode, they had been very provocative,
as we all knew; and it was the policy of our Government not to provoke war; to
take a firm stand in a certain way, as you know, but not to provoke war with
Japan. At least, so we read it.
General FRANK. Do you think that we were leaning over backwards in that
attitude?
General MILES. That is a very difficult question to answer, General. I simply
say that our policy was to avoid any unnecessary provocative action.
[121] General FRANK. You said you objected to General Arnold's message. To
whom?
General MILES. To General Arnold, in the first place, and later, to General
Scanlon. It was quite a long discussion, as I remember it.
Page 158
General FRANK. What were the circumstances under which your objection was
finally overcome and the message sent?
General MILES. It had to go to the Deputy Chief of Staff, General Bryden
General Marshall was away. General Bryden did not want to decide it, either,
very much. I objected strongly and was backed up by General Gerow. Our
objections were on this line: (1) an anti-sabotage message had gone out; (2) a
the proposed message should not go to the air forces alone, but if sent at
all, should go to the Commanding Generals for their air forces and for
everybody else; and (3) the message as originally drawn was very drastic. As
you know very well, at that time, the Air Force had a lot of young men in
command of fields and so forth, and a very drastic order, from General Arnold
particularly, to protect planes and so forth, might very well have resulted in
somebody's being shot.
I would also like to say, here, that General Arnold's message was primarily
addressed to the continental United States; he was thinking about that. What
started him was the fact about seven planes arrived at one of your western
fields_I think at Salt Lake_all with the same trouble, and from different
depots, and he thought there was some real sabotage going on in this country.
But, to go on with the story, we finally had to take it to the Deputy Chief of
Staff, late that afternoon of the 28th. I don't think it was decided until
[122] about six o'clock. General Scanlon was present, presenting the Air side,
and I think, General Gerow and General Gullion, Provost Marshal General and
General Bryden finally decided that it would be sent in modified form; that
is, not directing such drastic action be against anybody who might climb over
a fence; and that it would be sent to the Commanding Generals, and that the
Air Corps might also, if they desired, send it direct under General Arnold's
name to the Air Force, to the Air Commanders concerned: that was the final
decision.
General FRANK. NOW, another question that I am asking because G-2 might have
drawn a conclusion on it: What was the attitude of the public toward the
possibility of war at that time? Can you answer that?
General MILES. I can only give you my impression, that they were not nearly as
much worried about it as they should have been. After all, it was only a few
months past since we had saved the Army by one vote in the House of
Representatives. You remember, I think it was in October 1941 that that vote
was taken, and we just barely saved the Army at that time.
General FRANK. What do you mean, "saved the Army"?
General MILES. Well, you remember there was a bill, sir, to send back all the
men that had been drafted, put them back on the reserve, or something like
that.
General RUSSELL. A bill to demobilize the National Guard.
General MILES. To demobilize the National Guard and send the draftees back.
The War Department was extremely worried about it.
General FRANK. Aside from the people "top side" in the Army, can you give me
an expression of what the attitude in the [123] Army was with respect to the
possibility of war?
General MILES. Not accurately. I attended the North Carolina maneuvers, early
preceding November, and I don't remember to have heard the matter discussed.
The Army in those days, as you well remember, we all remember, was intensely
busy in building itself and training and maneuvering and so forth. I would not
say the Army as a whole were much concerned as to where war was going to break
if they could get their troops ready before the break.
General FRANK. Do you think they felt that war was on the horizon?
General MILES. The Army?
General FRANK. Yes.
General MILES. Yes, sir.
General FRANK. All right.
General MILES. Not necessarily with Japan, but war was on the horizon.
General FRANK. Did you know that there was a Japanese striking force
consisting of several carriers and a couple of battleships and a submarine
force in the Marshall Islands, in the vicinity of Jaluit, about the 1st of
December?
General MILES. I knew that such a force had been reported about there, and
about that time.
General FRANK. Was that information given to the Commanding General of the
Hawaiian Department?
General MILES. I don't know, sir. I do not remember.
Page 159
General FRANK. Have you any way of determining that?
General MILES. The records of the Military Intelligence Department undoubtedly
will disclose it.
[124] General FRANK. If it were given?
General MILES. Yes, if it were given. I feel very sure that in one form or
another he was informed of that report. I say "in one form or another" because
one form might very well have been through Navy and Fleet.
General FRANK. Information on the situation surrounding the Hawaiian Islands,
you stated some time back, information as to the presence of hostile activity
in the waters, would mainly be obtained through submarine reconnaissance and
air reconnaissance?
General MILES. That is correct_and radar.
General FRANK. And radar? Since the Navy is the only Department that has
submarines, and since also in the plan for air reconnaissance at Honolulu they
were responsible for distant reconnaissance, it would appear then that it was
the responsibility of the Navy to keep both the Army and the Navy in Honolulu
advised and to provide protection against any kind of attack so far as
reconnaissance could provide that, is that correct?
General MILES. So far as distance reconnaissance is concerned, they alone had
the means of carrying it out.
General FRANK. That is all I have.
General GRUNERT. I want you to explain once more so I can get it clear in mind
about the dissemination of information gathered by G-2, of the War Department,
so I will put it in various questions. You get information from the State
Department, ONI, your own sources, and whatever other sources might become
available to you. Now, when you get this information, who judges whether or
not particular parts of that information [125] are of value and should be
transmitted, for instance, to the Commanding General of Hawaii?
General MILES. The first people who pass on it are the members of the section,
the Geographical Section, which includes the country about which we have that
information_the Japanese, we will say. Information would pass first through
the Far Eastern Section, I think it was called at that time, under Colonel
Bratton, of the Intelligence Subdivision of the Military Intelligence. It
would then go to the Intelligence Division, itself, which collated all
positive intelligence, dealt with all positive intelligence as distinguished
from counter-intelligence, the negative side, and would then be sent out.
If it was simply routine, the Chief in the Military Intelligence Division, G-
2, would simply see it passing over his desk. If there were any question about
it, it would be brought up-through normal channels; to the executive officer,
who if he did not feel competent to decide it, would take it up with G-2
himself. That was the method.
General GRUNERT. If you were disseminating it, then, to the various commands,
or any particular command, would it then pass directly from G-2 to such
Commander, and in what form?
General MILES. The normal form would be these semiweekly summaries. That would
be the routine. Any particular information of particular importance would be
telegraphed out to those agencies concerned with that particular bit of
information, in the case of Japan, to (certainly) the Philippines, to Hawaii,
to Panama, to the West Coast, possibly and so forth right to our military
attache in China and to the G-2 of the corps areas.
[126] General GRUNERT. But when you make an estimate of the situation that
then goes to be processed through War Plans Division, to the Chief of Staff?
General MILES. Yes.
General GRUNERT. Now, if there is any information to be passed out on that
estimate, it then must be authorized for you to pass it out, or for them to
pass it out directly to those concerned, is that right?
General MILES. Yes. It becomes more than information, then; it becomes an
opinion of the War Department, a communication of the Chief of Staff.
General GRUNERT. All right. Now, the next question I have is one on which we
will have to go back to the sabotage message. Was that sabotage message of
November 27 O. K.'d by WPD, or the Chief of Staff, or whom? Or was it
necessary to have that O. K.'d? Did you send it out directly to the G-2?
General MILES. It was not necessary for the Chief of Staff or his office to
pass an it, since it simply carried out a policy already established by the
previous
Page 160
messages of the same date from General Marshall. I do remember, however,
consulting, as I almost always did, War Plans, as they consulted me on
messages and I think it was General Gerow who suggested that I add to the
message that the G-2s were to inform their Commanding Generals and the Chiefs
of Staff only.
General GRUNERT. Did G-2 do its utmost to inform, by contact with the various
agencies made available; so as to best advise the Chief of Staff and keep
subordinate commands informed, and so that they could carry out their mission?
General MILES. I did not hear the first of your question, [127] relative to
the G-2.
General GRUNERT. Did G-2 do its utmost, so far as you could judge, to carry
out its mission, in informing the Chief of Staff of everything they had got,
making estimates, and passing down information they thought was pertinent?
General MILES. The answer to that is Yes.
General GRUNERT. Naturally. I wanted to put it in the record.
General MILES. I might add, if I may, that we wrote so much that we got
certain complaints_complaints that nobody could read all the stuff we turned
out. We certainly tried to do whatever we could.
General GRUNERT. Did so many things go out at one time that the "low side"
might have considered themselves as being informed to such a point of
saturation that they did not pay much attention to the information they were
getting? In other words, "crying wolf! wolf!" so that they became confused, or
"fed up"?
General MLLES. That could have been, sir.
General GRUNERT. Do you think that the G-2 message_we call it "the G-2
message," of November 27_and the sabotage message we call that the "Arnold
message," of the 28th, which was sent out under the Adjutant General's
signature did you consider whether or not they might be taken by the Command
"down below" as modifying or changing the Chief of Staff's instructions of
November 27?
General MILES. No, sir; I did not. The Chief of Staff's message of November 27
was a war-warning message, in my mind, all inclusive so far as different forms
of attack or dangers [128] might be considered, and my message of the same
date in regard to sabotage was simply inviting the attention of the G-2, who
was particularly charged with that, in each corps area and overseas
department, to that particular form of danger.
General GRUNERT. There was no report from the recipients required?
General MILES. There were no report required.
General GRUNERT. That is, to your message.
General MILES. No answer to my message, of the 27th.
General GRUNERT. No answer? But there was a report required by the Chief of
Staff's message of November 27?
General MILES. That is true, sir.
General GRUNERT. The Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department made his
report to the Chief of Staff, presumably on the Chief of Staff's message of
November 27. Therein, he reported just the measures taken as to sabotage. Did
you see that report?
General MILES. I did not see that message_that answer_until after Pearl
Harbor.
General GRUNERT. I do not think of anything else. Does anybody else think of
anything else?
General FRANK. When General Grunert just asked you about the possibility of
confusing those messages on sabotage, you replied from the point of view of
the man at this end. Now, consider yourself for a moment as the man at the
receiving end of those messages, not knowing who prepared them, nor anything
about their source, but from the point of view of their coming from the War
Department, and considering that as a single source: under those conditions,
might it or might it not have been a [129] little confusing?
General MILES. It might have been, but I think the first message was signed
"Marshall."
General FRANK. That is right.
General MILES. That would be my answer.
General FRANK. Now, the next question is: I asked you, in my questions a few
minutes ago, as to whether or not you had sent any message to the Commanding
General of the Hawaiian Department with respect to the presence in the
Marshall Islands of this Japanese force. We have, we think, all the
communications that went from the War Department to the Hawaiian Department,
Page 161
from the 16th of November until December 7. This Japanese force was not in the
vicinity of Jaluit until about the 25th. In view of the critical stage of the
situation, it would seem that that information was rather vital, as there is
no record of its having been communicated. Is there any explanation of that?
General MILES. I wouldn't know what the explanation was, if it wasn't
communicated. If we had known at the time, as we probably did, that that
information, coming from Navy, was being transmitted to the Fleet in Hawaii,
to all of their naval vessels, it might very well have been that we considered
that as sufficient, knowing that the two Intelligence branches, Army and Navy
were working in very close cooperation we thought, everywhere_in Hawaii and
the West Coast and in the Philippines, and so forth.
I am a little worried about that message, because I was told, this morning, by
Military Intelligence, that there are numbered gaps in their files today, and
they do not know where [130] those messages are. We hope you have them, but
they do not know.
General RUSSELL. We didn't get them from G-2.
General MILES. How?
General RUSSELL. We haven't gotten anything from G-2.
General FRANK. In the Roberts Commission interrogation of Colonel Fielder, who
was G-2 in the Hawaiian Department-
General MILES. Yes, G-2.
General FRANK. He discloses that he was not, prior to December 7, getting this
information from the Navy, in Honolulu. He was not getting it.
General MILES. He should have, of course.
General FRANK. That is all.
General GRUNERT. One final question. In your experience as Staff Officer and
as a Commander in the field, outside the War Department, would a message
signed by Marshall carry more weight with you than one signed by the Adjutant
General, or one signed by a Staff Officer?
General MILES. Very much more weight, General, particularly when it begins
with some such phrase as "This is a war-warning message."
General GRUNERT. Are there any other questions?
General RUSSELL. What message did he ever send, beginning that way, General
Miles?
General MILES. My impressions of the message of November 27, but I haven't it
before me.
General GRUNERT. There was one starting out that way, but it happened to be
Navy message. This particular message from the Chief of Staff did not start
out that way, [131] according to the record.
General RUSSELL. Who was Creswell?
General MILES. Creswell? He was Military Attache in Japan.
General RUSSELL. I want to go back to my Mandated Islands for a minute
General, because you have excited me a little bit. I want to get some
description of those islands. Referring to the Marshall Islands, where these
carriers are supposed to have assembled, that attacked, is there anybody on
those islands except Japanese?
General MILES. Some natives there, I believe a few, there.
General RUSSELL. Are there towns and roads and those sorts of things there?
General MILES. The only so-called "civilized people" are the Japanese, there,
and the others are natives of the Islands. They don't live in towns, very
much, I imagine. My information about the Mandated Islands is very slim, now,
particularly now-
General RUSSELL. There is no secret at all about the questions that I am
asking, and what I am attempting to develop for my own satisfaction, in
arriving at what happened at Pearl Harbor. They had everything on us, yet they
sailed up and attacked us, and apparently today G-2 doesn't know where they
came from, or how many there were, or where they went to. We have not been
able so far to get any very intelligent information on what these convoys were
like, if there were more than one. Do you have any ideas about that, the size
of the attacking forces?
General MILES. Prior to the attack?
General RUSSELL. No, since the attack. Have you gotten [132] information that
led you to know how strong these convoys were that came in there, launching
this attack?
Page 162
General MILES. We have only general information, largely from Naval
Intelligence. The ships supposed to be the KAGA and AKAGI, those two very
large carriers of theirs, supported by probably some of their older
battleships of the KONGO class_their four old battle cruisers; but I have no
definite information.
General RUSSELL. I think that is all.
General GRUNERT. Thank you, very much.
(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)
(Whereupon, at 12:46 p. m., the Board recessed until 2 p. m.)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
EXHIBIT No. 5
CONFIDENTIAL
[Exact Copy Action Copy Radiogram]
EHB/bjs-1712
SEPTEMBER 29, 1941.
AG 383.4 (9-29-41) MC
From: Ft. Shafter, T. H.
To: The Adjutant General.
No. 420. September 29th.
For G-2. Reurad 114 tenth September Nineteen Forty One Re Natzi [sic] agents
aboard army transports. Investigation revealed that subject Wilhelm Brandeis
was not a member of the crew of USAT President Coolidge nor was Joseph Ryan
aboard USAT President Cleveland.
SH0RT.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
[Radiogram]
SEPT. 23, 1941.
704 a. m.
105 WTJ
DJ
FLD 1205P 22nd
From: Ft. Shafter T. H.
To: G Two
No. 379 September 22nd.
Request authority to reproduce and distribute to certain G two and S two
officers in this department confidential document subject protection electric
utility property issued by the Federal Power Commission Washington January
twentieth nineteen forty one received as enclosure to your letter G two dash
ten three thirteen dash one six three March twentieth. Fielder
Short
------------------------------------------------------------------------
CI/G2
CWC
MID 350.05 Safeguarding
SEPTEMBER 23, 1941
MEMORANDUM FOR THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
Subject: Security of information pertaining to movements of ships and
aircraft.
The Secretary of War Directs:
1. That a Confidential radiogram substantially as follows be sent to the
Commanding Generals of all Departments and Defense Commands:
Effective immediately all radio or cable traffic pertaining to movement of
vessels and aircraft to or from the overseas bases comma department or defense
commands will be classified as confidential.
2. That notification to this effect, for information and compliance, be given
general distribution, including General Headquarters, the Chief of the Army
Air Force, and the commanding officers of outlying bases.
SHERMAN MILES.
Memorandum for record: Certain overseas bases have made inquiries by radio of
cable messages sent in the clear about personnel, material and docking time of
transports, and the Navy has protested this.
Page 163
Drafting Section: C. I. P.
Drafting Officer: Hugh D. Wise, Jr.
G-2 File Number:
Paraphrase of an outgoing
X Radiogram
Cablegram
Secret
X Confidential
Restricted
No. 128 Sent 9-13-41 LW
Date: September 13, 1941.
To: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Headquarters, Hawaiian Department, Fort
Shafter, T. H
Present strength of Corps of Intelligence Police in your department is
requested by radio.
Mailed G/2 W. D. G. S. Sep. 13,1941.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION (G-2) GENERAL STAFF
From: To:
The A. C. of S., G-2
Executive Officer, G-2
ADMINISTRATIVE BRANCH
Finance Section
Personnel Section
Chief Clerk
Record Section
Translation Section
INTELLIGENCE BRANCH
LIAISON BRANCH
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE BRANCH
C. I. P.
PLANS AND TRAINING BRANCH
SECRETARY, GENERAL STAFF
EXECUTIVE OFFICER, G-1
EXECUTIVE OFFICER, G-3
EXECUTIVE OFFICER, G-4
EXECUTIVE OFFICER, WPD
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
PUBLIC RELATIONS BRANCH, DCofS
BUDGET & LEGISLATIVE BRANCH
WAR DEPARTMENT MESSAGE CENTER
W. D. MAP COLLECTION
For:
Necessary action
Preparation of reply
Recommendation or remark
As a matter of primary interest
Previous correspondence
Note and return
Information
Mail
File
Noted
------------------------------------------------------------------------
G2/CI
WAT
Sent #114, 9/10/41
The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Hawaiian Department.
Honolulu Territory of Hawaii.
Following men reported to be crew members of Army transports and Nazi agents
Joseph Ryan present Cleveland due Honolulu September twenty first and Wilhelm
Brandeis President Coolidge due Honolulu September thirteenth.
MILES.
Page 164
Drafting Section: Administrative
G2/I
Drafting Officer: MWP
MWP
G-2 File number:
Paraphrase of an outgoing
Secret xx
Radiogram xx
Confidential
Cablegram
Restricted
No. 75-Sent Aug. 29-41
Date: August 29, 1941.
To: G-2 Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, Territory Hawaii.
Colonel Field of the British Army will pass through Honolulu aboard the Klip
Fontein about September fifth. Desire you meet him personally and hold full
and free discussion on all intelligence matters.
Record Section copy
------------------------------------------------------------------------
AUGUST 18, 1941.
Memorandum for The Adjutant General:
Subject: Radiogram
The Secretary of War directs that a radiogram, substantially as follows, be
sent to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department:
Reurad fifteenth requesting War Department Maps Eastern Europe comma these
maps not produced and are sending you mail necessary sheets International Map
of World together with other miscellaneous map coverage period
SHERMAN MILES
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.
Received Aug. 19, 1941. Miscl. Div. A. G. O.
Action taken Radio to CG Haw Dept. 8-19-41. GHB
------------------------------------------------------------------------
[exact copy_action copy_radiogram]
AG 336.3 Japan (7-9 41) MC Received at the War Department
74 WTJ AE 124P
July 10, 1941 7:34 A. M.
From: Manila
To: TAG
No. 1337, July 9th.
Further remarks for G-2 reference our radio one three zero one are that Mexico
Maru small Philippine-Japan run freighter due Manila July 25th has been
canceled and commandeered. Kokkai Maru ten thousand ton on New York-Philippine
run due Manila about August first has also been canceled and commandeered.
Ganges Maru now enroute to Manila not yet affected. Signed O'Rear
GRUNERT.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
[Paraphrase]
AG 600.12 (7-1-41) MC-D EHB/sm_1712
To: CG, Hawaiian Dept.
From: TAG
July 9, 1941
Consideration being given projects for Wheeler Field, Hickam Field, and
Hawaiian Air Depot from FY 1942 funds by Chief of Air Corps. The Quartermaster
General has been directed to expend $104,202 from available funds for anti-
sabotage protection. Correspondence now en route advising you of action. Above
Reurad thirty one seventy three.
Copy For: Chief of the Air Corps
The Quartermaster General
A. C. of S., G-2
Chief of Engineers
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Page 165
[Radiogram]
JULY 30, 1941
3:44 AM
From: Hawaii
To: War Department
No. 3419, July 29th.
For A C of S G-2 reliable information concerning Japanese forces in Manchuria
as follows. Ten divisions of a total strength of two hundred forty two
thousand men. These are the eight divisions which-are given in latest British
military intelligence order of battle; with the twelfth and twenty fifth
repeat twelfth and twenty fifth in addition. Eight Frontier Garrison units of
a total strength about twenty two thousand six hundred. Six independent
garrisons units of total strength about thirty eight thousand. Total strength
approximately three hundred thousand repeat three hundred thousand. The weapon
equipment of Four Regiment Divisions is given as seven thousand six hundred
eighty six rifles, five hundred seventy six trench mortars and infantry
support guns. Three hundred ninety six heavy and light machine guns. Ninety
two field guns and howitzers. Same source reports that German accounts in
South America steadily being transferred to Japanese custody. It is freely
predicted Germany will ask Japan to blockade Vladivostok to prevent essential
supplies reaching Russia.
SHORT.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
[Cablegram]
LAS
WUWA 3
July 29, 1941.
8:33 AM
From: Tokyo
To: MILID
No. 508, July 29th.
After period during which no reservations from Japan in any direction
procurable NYK today confirmed reservation Nitta sailing August 7th arriving
Honolulu about August 15th. Since restriction travel south and west may be
unduly prolonged strongly recommend Pape avail himself this opportunity and
that clipper reservation Honolulu Singapore be arranged. Request prompt reply
as reservations in great demand.
CRESWELL.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
[Exact copy_action copy_radiogram]
AG 380.3 (6-26-41) MC
159 WTJ
AE
616P
Received at the War Department June 28, 1941, 2:00 PM.
From: Manila.
To: TAG.
No. 1236, June 26th.
Twenty five thousand Japanese Troops received parachute training in China and
Japan of this number fifteen hundred in Canton Army according to British
report evaluation questionable. Three Japanese convoys last reported headed
south believed to have gone to Pescazores and Formosa. Typhoon reported east
Manila lends credibility to above. For G-2 Signed OREAR.
GRUNERT.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Page 166
[Exact copy_action copy_radiogram]
AG 380.3 (6-25-41) MC
21 WTJ
AE
620P
Received at the War Department, June 26 1941 8:00 AM.
From: Manila
To: TAG
No. 1225, June 25th.
Following is paraphrase of cable from Brink. For G-2. On 19th and 20th of June
British Commander in Chief Far East and the Director of Operations of Chinese
Air Force (General Mow) discussed plans for cooperation in the event of
Japanese operations against the British. British plan to use following Chinese
airfields as bases from which to attack Japanese sea communications land
troops and Japanese bases on Hainan Island and in French Indo China in the
event of Japanese attack against Malaya or Hongkong: Nanning 23 degrees zero
minutes north 108 degrees 30 minutes east: Liuchow 24 degrees 20 minutes north
109 degrees 20 minutes east: Kweilin 25 degrees 20 minutes north 110 degrees
10 minutes east: Chihkiang 27 degrees 30 minutes north 109 degrees 40 minutes
east: Hemagyang 27 degrees zero minutes north 112 degrees 30 minutes east.
Chinese agree to stock these airfields now with gasoline and bombs. Chinese
suggest that the British use airfields in the following area from which to
make direct raids on Formosa and the Japanese mainland: Wenchow-Chuchowfu-
Kienowhs.
British intend to encourage Guerrilla warfare against the Japanese in the
following general areas: Ichang-Kingchow-Hanhu; Siagtanhs-Changsha-Yowchow;
Nanchang-Haohcow-Kiukiang; Soochow-Changshow-Taiping; Canton-Kongmoon-China
Sea-Shamchung. Agreements for mutual cooperation will be arranged the 1st week
in July at a meeting between British and Chinese staffs in Burma. Signed
Orear.
GRUNERT.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
[Radiogram]
2WVY
519P
BVC
JUNE 6, 1941.
1030Z
From: Tokyo.
To: The Adjutant General.
No. 482, June 6, 1941
Investigations among Japanese Russian and others nationals fails to reveal any
information either positive or negative regarding your number 492. Efforts
will be continued.
CRESWELL
------------------------------------------------------------------------
[Radiogram]
(JTP)
152WTJ
MAY 3 1941.
9:22 AM
From: Tokyo.
To: Assistant Chief of Staff G-2.
Tokyo No. 467, May 2, 1941.
under the provisions of Article 20 Tripartite pact military missions known to
have left Japan for Germany and Italy though no first hand information this
office relative arrival Japan similar missions from those countries. At
present no move discernible which might be considered preparatory to military
action as provided by Article three although frequent rumors refer Japanese
strength Formosa Hainan Indo-China greater than normal under China war
conditions and held in readiness move against Dutch East Indies Singapore.
Increase of Japanese Naval and Air force Saigon likewise rumored. This office
not in position to confirm or refute such reports. No unusual mission
movements observed
Page 167
Japan distinguishable from normal movements connected operations China
although such moves would be carefully hidden and difficult to follow after
leaving Japan. Attention is invited to recent State Department dispatch
concerning transit
(Sheet Two Tokyo, No. 467, May 2, 1941)
of German aircraft, artillery and other military supplies via Trans-Siberian
railway to Japan.
Instead of daily report required by your No. 505 suggest immediate report any
information obtained since without change present international political and
military situation many such reports will be negative.
CRESWELL.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
[Radiogram]
L4 WTJ ae
MAY 3, 1941.
9:22 AM
From: Manila
To: Asst. Chief of Staff.
No. 915, May 3, 1941.
Telegraphic summary of report of Singapore conference sent by radio to British
Ambassador Washington by conference chairman. If urgent suggest you consult
that summary. Copy of report with my comments going forward by clipper naval
courier to Washington scheduled to leave May eighth.
GRUNERT.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
[Radiogram]
LW April 26th, 1941.
104 WTJ 7:11 AM
From: Manila.
To: The Adjutant General.
Manila No. 881. April 26th.
Reliably informed German Ambassador to Japan has requested that Japanese
shipping lines facilitate the evacuation of German Nationals from Philippines.
For G-2. And that Kokusai Kisen Kaisha office in Manila has been so advised.
Signed O'Rear.
GRUNERT.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
[Radiogram]
(RRR) MARCH 21, 1941.
53-WVY 6:06 PM
From: Manila, P. I.
To: The Adjutant General.
No. 662 March 21st.
For G-2
Exaggerated account of visit of Japanese fishing boat to Itbayat Island on
March 12 apparently has been given press distribution. Actually fishing boat
Dichi Maru anchored at Mauyen Itbayat Island took on supplies of cocoanuts and
fruit and some stores and departed. Carried Japanese flag engraved on both
sides and was equipped with radio apparatus, fishing nets, and one life boat.
This incident is normal and is without importance. Signed O'Rear.
GRUNERT.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
[Radiogram]
BFS MARCH 13, 1941.
22 WVY 3:42 PM
From: Tokyo via Manila
To: MILID
Number 469.
March 13th.
Japanese in position to know definitely states parachute training of infantry
and engineers taking place for the past year. No information as to number and
location.
CRESWELL.
Page 168
------------------------------------------------------------------------
[Radiogram]
(MWW) MARCH 8, 1941.
63-WTJ 10:07 PM
From: Tokyo, Japan
To: MILID, Washington, D. C.
Number 457, March 7th. Files 425 PM.
Colonel Takeo Iwakuro who sailed on S. S. Tatsuta Maru for the United States
March 6th is adviser to Admiral Nomura and liaison between Admiral Nomura and
Army. As such will occupy important position Japanese Embassy. Suggest Martin
meet him San Francisco. See Embassy Number 330 February 27.
CRESWELL.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
[Radiogram]
BFS FEBRUARY 24, 1941.
3WVY 9:59 AM
From: Tokyo
To: MILID
Number 453, February 25th.
Reference your 496 the three Japanese translators and one Formosan messenger
employed by this office are doing translation that can not be done adequately
by American personnel. Although we known they report to police when *hostile*
affairs of office so organized that they can report nothing of any
consequence. Miss Ishigami an American citizen handles routine reports and
correspondence only with Miss McMahon writing all confidential matters.
Recommend that present setup remain unchanged.
CRESWELL.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
[Radiogram]
WE FEBRUARY 14, 1941.
72 WTJ 6:04 AM
338
From: Manila.
To: G-2.
Number 512, February 13th.
Netherlands Consul reports concerning two vessels Java China Japan line as
follows: For G dash two signed Orear. The Tjitjalenka sailed from Manila zero
seven zero zero February thirteen but was ordered to return to Manila shortly
thereafter; the Tjibesar now enroute from Japan has been ordered to put into
Manila for further instructions. No explanation available as yet.
GRUNERT.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
[Radiogram]
WE
89 WTJ
213 PH
FEBRUARY 5, 1941.
7:04 AM
From Manila
To: MILID
Number 41, February 5th.
British consular source reports Governor East Java intercepted telephone
conversation between two important Japanese at Sourabaya and Lawang discussing
news that Japanese attack is scheduled for February, tenth repeat I tenth.
Both Japanese arrested and both denied conversation. This message for G dash
two signed Orear. Governor comments very few Japanese believed to be armed and
no difficulty is anticipated in taking all Japanese into custody when desired.
Evaluation of data low.
GRUNERT.
Page 169
------------------------------------------------------------------------
[Radiogram]
(MWW)
44-WTJ
JANUARY 5, 1941.
8:05 PM
From: Fort Shafter, T. H.
To: The Adjutant General.
Number 2041, January 4th. Filed 2:47 PM.
ATTENTION G-2. Following information was given out by official British sources
and was obtained from Captain Thomas V. Hill, Master ARMS AORANGI. Description
of three raiders operating in Pacific is as follows:
TOKYO MARU EX KULMERLAND, Japanese markings, 7300 tons, 20 passenger, one
straight funnel amidships, two masts, three single Samson posts one between
bridge and foremast one directly abaft passenger accommodation one abaft the
mainmast, crows next [sic] extreme head foremast, slightly raked stem, cruiser
stern, one seaplane carried.
MANYO MARU, Japanese marking, 5000 tons, 20 passenger, one straight funnel
amidships very close to bridge, two masts with foremast abaft well deck with
seaplane derrick one set of Samson posts immediately before bridge, Maier form
bow, cruiser stern, one seaplane.
Probably MARVIK, Norwegian MARKINGS, 6000 tons, one large funnel amidships
close to bridge, narrow bridge to heavy mast, foremast well aft and single
Samson post forward of foremast, one Samson post abaft mainmast, black hull,
(Sheet 2, No. 2041 from Ft. Shafter, T. H.)
white band, straight stem, counter stern, raised forecastle, high after deck
house, one seaplane.
In almost every attack of U boats on shipping a [sic] night it has
subsequently transpired that light were being shown, it is believed darkening
of merchant ships is improving but it is reported that light torches are
sometimes used on upper decks.
HERRON
------------------------------------------------------------------------
[Radiogram]
(RRR)
31-WTJ
JANUARY 4th 1941.
354 AM
From: Ft. Shafter, T. H.
To: G-2.
No. 2339, Jany 3rd.
Reurad 584 second January. Sagami Maru arrived Honolulu 21st December departed
for Hilo 23rd December enroute to Lima Peru. 490 cases small arms ammunition,
one pounder ammunition and fuses all destined for Peru. Now shown on manifest
and discovered by U. S. Customs. Next boat Nita Maru due fourth January. This
steamer and future ships will be watched report being made any further
shipments this nature. Signed Marston.
HERRON.
Page 170
EXHIBIT No. 6
CONFIDENTIAL
[1] Rec'd_G-2 Jan 29, 1942
HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR MILITARY INTELLIGENCE
Fort Shafter, T. H., 31 Dec. 1941.
In reply refer to: 350.05 (G-2)
Subject: Report on Internal Subversive Activities for the Month of
December 1941
To: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department General Staff, War
Department, Washington, D. C.
1. Reference paragraph 6a, CONFIDENTIAL letter, AG 350.05 (8-5-40) M-B-M,
dated 17 August 1940, the following items are submitted:
HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT, INCLUDING ALL POSTS, FIELDS, AND DISTRICTS
Period: 15 November 1941 to 15 December 1941
Individual and special cases
The abnormal conditions which have prevailed in this Department since 7
December 1941 have made inadvisable, for the time being, continuing
investigation of minor routine cases, other more pressing matters having been
given priority. Only cases of more active character, such as have been listed
in previous reports with an asterisk to denote their importance continue under
active investigation at present. It is anticipated, however, that the summary
for next month, January 1942, will be in its usual complete form.
Situation summary
PROPAGANDA: Japanese radio broadcasts, presumably originating in Japan, give
highly exaggerated accounts of Japanese success, together with violent anti-
American propaganda. No local stations are permitted to broadcast in Japanese
(or in any other foreign language). Except for these broadcasts there has been
no attempt at enemy propaganda. Gossip and loose talk among local residents of
all nationalities, both service personnel and civilian, were common
immediately after the raid of 7 December, but have subsided to a reasonable
volume and are decreasing. No instance has been verified of deliberate
spreading of rumors as enemy propaganda.
SUSPICIOUS CASES almost without number have been reported and investigated,
with results largely negative. Among service personnel, the unanimous report
of all S-2's has been that even those individuals in the past most suspected
of subversive tendencies have proved intensely loyal when put to the test of
actual war conditions.
Estimate of the situation
[2] No attempt can be made in this summary to cover other than the internal
situation, as only preliminary investigations have been made of most of the
aliens in detention, and the labor of checking reports of alleged subversive
actions continues, with little positive result, on a 24 hour daily basis. In
general it may be said, however, that the morale of the civilian populace is
very high, and that labor disputes and other disturbing factors have
disappeared in the general effort to effect a united front.
Within the various Army establishments morale is at the highest level.
However, in anticipation of the probable "let-down" incident to the lessening
of the initial excitement, the C. S. System is being completely reorganized
and enlarged so as to cover effectively all of the newly arriving units as
well as those already established in the Department.
Kendall J. Fielder
KENDALL J. FIELDER
Lt. Colonel, G. S. C.
A. C. of S., G-2
Page 171
EXHIBIT NO. 7
CONFIDENTIAL
EXACT COPY
ACTION COPY
AG 380.3 (12-28-40) M
From: Grunert, Manila, P. I. DECEMBER 28, 1940.
To: TAG
*Prority* For G-2
Netherlands Consul sources: Japan attacks January 15 against Netherlands
Indies with light Naval force and transports against New Guinea simultaneously
with Naval force and transports against Java. Evaluation of plan high.
Evaluation of date doubtful.
United Press sources: Two German vessels have been outfitted Shanghai with
Japan guns as raiders, three German vessels being outfitted at Tsingtao and
two at Canton. All German vessels in Japan controlled ports are to be
outfitted as raiders before January 16. Signed, O'Rear.
EXHIBIT NO. 8
[1] RSU/tes
HEADQUARTERS THIRD CORPS AREA
UNITED STATES ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF G_2
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, PUBLIC RELATIONS, CIVIL DEFENSE
SEVENTH FLOOR, STANDARD OIL BUILDING
Baltimore, Maryland, December 18, 1941
In reply refer to File: III-7764
SECRET
Subject: Reports of Rumors Concerning Japanese Attack on Hawaii.
[Stamped:] Secret. Date 12/18/41. HQ. 3RD C. A. Initial, PLT.
To: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
War Department
Washington, D. C.
Attention Lt. Col. W. A. Holbrook, Jr.
1. This office is in receipt of a report, information of undetermined
reliability, source usually reliable, which is quoted as follows:
"Three weeks ago SENATOR GILLETT at Washington warned officials what was going
to happen. Stated that Japan would declare war on United States Dec. 19. Also
told of an attack on Hawaii. No attention paid to assertions and Dec. 9 held
conference with some of the leading officials of New York City, State of New
Jersey, Jersey City and two congressmen from Washington who flew back for this
conference. Conference was for purpose of possibly setting up an individual
Intelligence Unit because they are disgusted with the actions of G-2 in some
cases and as far as O. N. I. is concerned they are so disgusted against this
group that they do not know what to do about it. At Washington Dec. 9, one of
the highest officials of the British Government got in communication with the
same country's officials at New York and in substance here is the story_ the
Japanese Business Group at Honolulu had invited practically all the officers
at Pearl Harbor to a big celebration and dinner on Saturday evening. A vast
number of the Naval officers were reported to have been so drunk that they had
to be taken to their quarters. He also stated that the damages suffered by the
United States Government at Honolulu and on the sea were far greater than the
total damages that England suffered the first year of the war on the sea. Am
positive that SENATOR GILLETT has received a lot of his information from WYTHE
WILLIAMS, who has retired from the air and is now preparing several books.
Remember that WILLIAMS is a pal and confident of ATTORNEY GENERAL BIDDLE and
still the F. B. I. is reported to be afraid of WILLIAMS and the material that
he sends out. WILLIAMS is smart. He has a staff here in New York that
Page 172
includes the ex-Chief of Police of Berlin (Note, G-2 III C. A.: Believed to be
one GRZYSINSKI, who has lectured against Nazism in New York) and other good
men." Destroyed by 84 Dec. 29, 1941.
2. However much or little truth there may be in this report, the possibility
is not overlooked by this office that there may be an attempt to make
political capital at the expense of military and naval morale.
3. No other distribution of this report whatsoever has been or will be made
from this office. No action is contemplated except at the request of the War
Department.
4. The original report, quoted above, was dated December 10th. The
capitalization of names of persons was done by this office. The source was a
Pittsburgh source which has been discussed with General Miles.
Philip L. Thurber,
PHILIP L. THURBER,
Colonel G. S. C.
A. C. of S., G-2.
EXHIBIT No. 9
SECRET
This message was addressed to CG., Hawaii, and relayed to War Dept. by signals
Hawaii with request for decipherment and repeat to them. This message also
contained a request that Honolulu repeat it to War Dept. CS WDMC Will
paraphrase and repeat back to Honolulu
/S/ B. F. SMITH
Code Section WDMC
12-8-41
EXHIBIT No. 10
SECRET
0-4-C
Exact copy of radiogram received at the War Department Message Center, Room
3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.
DECEMBER 7, L84L.
7:58 P. M.
P 23 WT J
From: Melbourne, Australia, via Honolulu,
To: War Department & C. G. Hawaiian Department
Number 24. DECEMBER 6th.
Based on Dutch intelligence report unconfirmed here of Naval movements from
Pelau objective Manado and or Ambon, Dutch ordered execution plan A-2 and
suggested RAAF reciprocal movement be directed Laha Ambon and Keopang. So
ordered pm yesterday including flight Catalina to Rabaul task reconnaissance
Buka and northwest passage Australian army reinforcements Ambon Beopang
subject to request Dutch East Indies. This message held 17 hours by ....
government eight am Dutch reported advancing planes to be on Keopang not now
considered necessary. Eleven am chief of air corps desired proceed with all
aircraft forward movements Manila informed.
MERLESMITH.
Page 173
EXHIBIT No. 11
CONFIDENTIAL
WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION G-2
Washington, December 6, 1941.
G-2/CI
JFP
Memorandum for Colonel Holbrook:
Word has just been received from O. N. I. by telephone to the effect that the
Japanese Embassy, in Washington, D. C., was reliably reported to have burned
its Code Book and Ciphers last night.
James F. Perry,
JAMES F. PERRY,
1st Lt., Military Intelligence,
Evaluation Subsection.
ENGINEERING DEPARTMENT
FIELD DIVISION
National Defense Operations Section
To: G. E. Sterling, Chief. Date: 12/4
[Hand written:] Major Guest foned [sic] 12/4 that Msg from Carter should go to
Lt. Col. C. C. Dusenbury, Phone War Dept. 2054. Home Tel. Glebe 1129.
D. C. & Laurel advised.
Route in Order Indicated:
Chief Engineer _____ Mr. Webster _____
Mr. Terrell _____ Mr. Cruse _____
Secretary _____ Mr. Turner _____
Mr. Reynolds _____ Mr. Mason _____
Mr. Cureton _____ Mr. Loucks _____
Mr. Ring _____ Miss Wiltshire _____
Remarks:
[Hand written:] Until Saturday night.
Group one is east wind rain group two is north wind "X" cloudy and group three
is west wind. Clear stop groups repeated twice in middle and at end of
broadcast.
EXHIBIT No. 12
Dec. 4, 1941.
Mr. STERLING: Received following from Carter at 8.12 p. m.:
Remarks: First type of program received since Nov. 28th, 4-5 hours spent
monitoring. Sounds like regular weather reports.
About 2200 GMT 12/4/41 JVW3:
Tokyo today north wind slightly stronger may become cloudy tonight tomorrow
slightly cloudy and fine weather.
Kanagawa prefecture today north wind cloudy from afternoon more clouds.
Chiba prefecture today north wind clear may become slightly cloudy ocean
surface calm.
(End of program followed by music)
DE
Page 174
Dec. 5, 1941.
Mr. STERLING: At 7.45 p. m. Mr. Carter called in from Portland with the
following information:
JVW3 2130G
Today north wind morning cloudy afternoon clear begin cloudy evening. Tomorrow
north wind and later from south.
(The above was repeated three times)
JWV3 sent a time signal at 2200G and then;
I will now give you the weather report (nothing further, carrier on but no
modulation_evidently cutoff in Tokyo)
Remarks by Carter:
They are getting a more compete picture of the operations now and it is
evident that at 2130G the Tokyo weather is transmitted and at 2200G the Tokyo
weather and weather for other prefectures. Reception is getting better and
estimate efficiency on this assignment has increased approximately twenty-five
percent.
FINI
Foned [sic] Col. Bratton and gave him the message at 7.50 p. m.
Remarks by Col. Bratton:
Results still negative but am pleased to receive the negative results as it
means that we have that much more time. The information desired will occur in
the middle of a program and possibly will be repeated at frequent intervals.
(Asked Col Bratton if I should communicate the information to Portland_
concerning the fact that the desired data will be in the middle of a program.)
No. I will have a conference with Lt. Col. Dusenburg [sic] in the morning and
will contact Mr. Sterling in that regard.
FINI
DE
[Exact copy-action copy_radiogram]
AG 580.81 (12-1-41) MC EHB/sm_1712
15 WTJ 0-4-C
1/1130P
Received at the War Department Message Center, Room 3441 Munitions Bldg.,
Washington, D. C., December 4, 1941, 411 p. M.
From: Manila, P. I.
To: Adjutant General
No. 1046 First
Replying your radio of November twenty eight and your radio six four seven on
same subject all practical steps within the limits of the facilities of this
command are being taken to protect all air and ground installations.
MACARTHUR
[Copy]
Batavia
Dated December 4, 1941
Rec'd 9:19 a. m.
Secretary of State, Washington.
220, December 4, 10 a. m.
War Department at Bandoeng claims intercepted and decoded following from
Ministry Foreign Affairs Tokyo:
"When crisis leading to worst arises following will be broadcast at end
weather reports: one east wind rain war with United States, two north wind
cloudy war with Russia, three west wind clear war with Britain including
attack on Thailand or Malaya and Dutch Indies. If spoken twice burn codes and
secret papers."
Same re following from Japanese Ambassador Bangkok to Consul General Batavia:
Page 175
"When threat of crisis exists following will be used five times in texts of
general reports and radio broadcasts: one Higashi east America, two Kita North
Russia, three Nichi west Britain with advance into Thailand and attack on
Malaya and Dutch Indies."
Thorpe and Slawson cabled the above to War Department. I attach little or no
importance to it and view it with some suspicion. Such have been common since
1936.
FOOTE.
Groups one is east rain group two is north wind wind cloudy and group x three
is west wind clear stop groups repeated twice in middle and at and of
broadcast.
ENGINEERING DEPARTMENT
FIELD DIVISION
National Defense Operations Section
To: G. E. Sterling, Chief. Date: 12/4
[Hand written:] Major Guest foned [sic] 12/4 that Msg from Carter should go to
Lt. Col. C. C. Dusenbury, Phone War Dept. 2054. Home Tel. Glebe 1129.
D. C. & Laurel advised.
Route in Order Indicated:
Chief Engineer _____ Mr. Webster _____
Mr. Terrell _____ Mr. Cruse _____
Secretary _____ Mr. Turner _____
Mr. Reynolds _____ Mr. Mason _____
Mr. Cureton _____ Mr. Loucks _____
Mr. Ring _____ Miss Wiltshire _____
Remarks:
[Hand written:] Until Saturday night.
Dec. 4, 1941.
Mr. STERLING: Received following from Carter at 8.12 p. m.:
Remarks: First type of program received since Nov. 28th, 4-5 hours spent
monitoring. Sounds like regular weather reports.
About 2200 GMT 12/4/41 JVW3:
Tokyo today north wind slightly stronger may become cloudy tonight tomorrow
slightly cloudy and fine weather.
Kanagawa prefecture today north wind cloudy from afternoon more clouds.
Chiba prefecture today north wind clear may become slightly cloudy ocean
surface calm.
(End of program followed by music.)
DE
DEC. 5. 1941.
Mr. STERLING:
At 7.45 p. m. Mr. Carter called in from Portland with the following
information:
JVW3 2130G
Today north wind morning cloudy afternoon clear begin cloudy evening. Tomorrow
north wind and later from south.
(The above was repeated three times.)
JVW3 sent a time signal at 2200 G and then:
I will now give you the weather report (nothing further, carrier on but no
modulation_evidently cutoff in Tokyo)
Page 176
Remarks by Carter:
They are getting a more complete picture of the operations now and it is
evident that at 2130G the Tokyo weather is transmitted and at 2200G the Tokyo
weather and weather for other prefectures. Reception is getting better and
estimate efficiency on this assignment has increased approximately twenty-five
percent.
FINI
Foned [sic] Col. Bratton and gave him the message at 7.50 p. m.
Remarks by Col. Bratton:
Results still negative but am pleased to receive the negative results as it
means that we have that much more time. The information desired will occur in
the middle of a program and possibly will be repeated at frequent intervals.
(Asked Col. Bratton if I should communicate the information to Portland_
concerning the fact that the desired data will be in the middle of a program.)
No. I will have a conference with Lt. Col. Dusenburg [sic] in the morning and
will contact Mr. Sterling in that regard.
FINI
DE
For action OPNAV RRRRR
From ALUSNA Batavia
Date: 5 DEC 1941
Decoded by Kalaidjian
Paraphrased by Purdy
031030 CR0222
From Thorpe for Miles War Dept. Code intercept: Japan will notify her consuls
of war decision in her foreign broadcasts as weather report at end. East wind
rain United States; north wind cloudy Russia; west wind clear England with
attack on Thailand Malay and Dutch East Indies. Will be repeated twice or may
use compass directions only. In this case words will be introduced five times
in general text.
Distribution:
War Dept. _________ ACTION. FILES: CNO _____ 20OP _______ 20A ________
Record Copy: ________ 20G _____X Show OPDO ______
EXHIBIT No. 13
CONFIDENTIAL
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE
I. B. 159
BRIEF PERIODIC ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION, DECEMBER 1, 1941_MARCH 31, 1942
Record Section
G2/1
TJB
[1] I. B. 159 NOVEMBER 29, 1941.
Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:
Subject: Brief Periodic Estimate of the Situation, December 1, 1941-
March 31, 1942.
I. General.
1. This estimate is addressed to the objective of Nazi defeat. Its purpose is
to examine the factors of strength and weakness and of strategic positions of
the Nazis and of their opponents, in order to present the military
possibilities and probabilities during the period December 1, 1941 to March
31, 1942.
2. a. During that period Germany, though weakened by her losses in Russia,
will remain the only power capable of launching large scale strategic
offensives. Her success in Russia and the advent of winter make disposable a
larger portion of German land and air power than at any time since the
beginning of the Russo-German war. On the other hand, the price she has had to
pay for her Russian success and the width of the wasted zone behind her
Eastern Front indicate that
Page 177
considerable period of time would be required for the reorganization and
disposition of her major forces. The German conduct of war, so far, has been
characterized by a thoroughness and deliberation in this regard. Between the
end of one campaign and the launching of the next there have been considerable
periods of time. In the present case if Germany should decide to shift the
theater of war, all indications point to an even greater necessity for a
considerable time lag than has so far existed between her successive
campaigns. Large scale German strategic offensives are therefore not to be
expected outside of the Russian theater within the period under consideration.
It is much more probable that Germany will continue her attack on Russia,
particularly in the Ukraine and the North Caucasus plain between the Azov and
Caspian Seas during the winter and early spring.
[2] b. Japan also has the strategic initiative, but to a much more limited
degree than is the case with Germany. Japan, already extended militarily, has
a multiplicity of strategic objectives; but for a variety of reasons, she
cannot concentrate the required forces to attack any of them on a large scale
and with assurance of success. A possible exception to the latter statement
lies in the contingency of a serious depletion of Russian forces in eastern
Siberia. But even in this case, a large scale Japanese strategic offensive
against Siberia during the period in question is somewhat doubtful in the
light of present politico-military situation and of the rigorous winter
climate in that region.
c. Great Britain is pressing a limited strategic offensive in Libya and has
taken the aerial offensive over Western Europe. She, too, is extended
militarily and more extensive ground and aerial action is beyond her means.
d. All other belligerent or potentially belligerent powers must be considered
incapable of large scale strategic offensives during the period in question.
The United States, committed to the defeat of Nazi Germany, is an increasingly
important element in the situation. Our influence is exerted in naval and
aerial participation in the Battle of the Atlantic, in the supply of material
and technical assistance to the four land theaters and in psychological,
economic and political action against the Axis throughout the world. But all
this does not sum up to a large scale strategical offensive. We have only a
means of strategical maneuver our ability to make available more or less
material and technical facilities and in their allocation to those theaters
where they will be most advantageously employed.
e. Neither the economic nor the psychologic [sic] situation in Germany
indicates any possibility of weakening the Nazi power to a critical extent
during the period in question.
f. From the above it must be concluded that, during the period in question:
(1) Neither the anti-Axis nor the Axis powers can force a decision.
(2) The anti-Axis powers will have a period of at least four months in which
they may strengthen their position in one or more of the four important
theaters of war, and in which they may decide upon a regrouping of forces,
subject to certain physical limitations, consonant with their chosen long
range strategy for the defeat of the Nazis.
[3] II. Brief Estimate on the Theaters of War.
1. The British Isles. This theater is the citadel of the Anti-Axis Powers. Its
security is, therefore, so essential to Nazi defeat that it must be held. The
ground, sea and aerial defenses of the islands have been and are being
materially strengthened.
For reasons given previously, it is not believed that Germany will be in a
position to attempt an invasion of the islands during the period in question.
It is probable that an invasion, if attempted, will be delayed until mid-
summer of 1942. An attempt made at that time will probably be unsuccessful. As
for the present, after a short delay of reorganization and transfer, Germany
can launch large-scale air attacks on the United Kingdom at any time that she
is willing to move the necessary forces from the Russian front. In view of
improved British defenses and of the weakening of the German Air Force,
however, it is estimated that in the period in question such attacks cannot
reach the intensities of those of the winter of 1940-41.
From this theater the only British offensive capability lies in the air. It is
to be expected that strategic bombing of Germany and the occupied territories
will continue; but that this action will be indecisive.
Material aid from the United States has been an essential element in the
resistance and survival of the British Isles. Continuance of this aid is still
essential. It is, fortunately, the easiest of all the land theaters for us to
aid.
Page 178
2. The Atlantic. The Battle of the Atlantic is essentially a struggle for the
sealanes radiating from the United Kingdom, this conflict is now trending
against Germany. Sinkings by the Axis are decreasing and ship construction in
Britain and the United States is increasing. It is now probable that
replacements have overtaken losses. Figures on ship and tonnage losses during
1941 are as follows:
Losses (British, Allied, and Neutral)
Total Monthly Average
Ships Tonnage Ships Tonnage
January 1 to June 30 (6 months) 628 2,755,242 105 459,207
June 30 to Nov. 15 (4 1/2 months) 284 1,000,900 63 222,442
[4] During October over 4,200,000 tons of goods were imported into the United
Kingdom, as compared with a monthly average for the year of approximately
2,500,000. The October imports were received after the United States Navy
began convoy duty in the Atlantic. As the weight of the United States Navy
continues to increase, success in the Battle of the Atlantic should be
assured.
Since Germany's means of attack (surface raiders, long-range planes and
submarines) are of limited use in other theaters, it is to be expected that
she will continue the offensive in this theater, regardless of results or of
operations elsewhere.
The United States is contributing powerfully to the decision in the Battle of
the Atlantic by direct naval action and by the building of cargo vessels.
Continuance of this action is essential to the defeat of Germany.
3. Eastern Theater. By a series of relentless offensives Germany has occupied
vast stretches of terrain, including many of Russia's industrial regions and
has inflicted grave casualties on the Red Army. But Germany has suffered great
losses in men and material, and has not yet attained her basic objectives of
destroying the Russian armies and the Stalin regime. While Germany could
transfer her principal military effort to other theaters this winter, it is
estimated that she will continue to concentrate on the attack on Russia.
Specifically she will:
Seek to destroy the mass of the Russian armies.
Continue the siege of Leningrad.
Attempt to cut the Russian supply lines to Archangel and Murmansk.
Seek to seize the general line of the Volga.
Attempt to overrun the Caucasus, thus obtaining oil and securing a
jump-off position for an eventual advance into the Middle East.
The most serious German threat is southeastwards to the Caucasus, and her goal
is oil. Axis forces are extending eastward north of Rostov toward the Don.
They may capture Stalingrad and gain control of the Volga south to its mouth
at Astrakhan. Russian defense of the North Caucasus will probably eventually
fail, after substantially delaying the Axis advance. With sufficiently
determined and prompt allied aid, the Germans may be kept from occupation of
the Trans-Caucasus and control of the Baku oil fields.
[5] The U. S. S. R. is weaker, relative to Germany, than at the outset of
hostilities. Her political structure has remained stable and her armies, while
depleted, have not been irreparably defeated. Russia is favored by the
following: The extreme cold of winter is a deterrent to operations, and
Russian training and technique in severe winter weather is considered better
than that of the invaders. While the Soviet situation is critical, ready
availability of manpower resources is in Russian favor. Defense industry is in
operation at approximately 60% of pre-war volume. British and American
material assistance is being received; increased and continuing allied
assistance is urgently required.
The following considerations are unfavorable to the U. S. S. R.: The
uncertainty of the Far Eastern situation causes concentration of efficient
Soviet troops along the Manchukuo frontier, not available for use in the
western theater. The Soviet Army has shortages in tanks, all weapons, probably
in all ammunition. The shortage in tanks is especially serious; that in small
arms and small arms ammunition is less marked than in other weapons. The means
of supply from the outside world are difficult and precarious. To date no
British operation elsewhere
Page 179
has been sufficiently strong to cause any withdrawal of German troops from
Russia.
Aside from surrender, which seems unlikely, Russia's only feasible line of
action is to resist stubbornly in the hope that attrition, climate and
lengthened communications will eventually bring her assailants to a
standstill. By the spring of 1942 it is estimated that organized but depleted
Russian armies will stand behind the Volga and perhaps even as far west as
Moscow. It is also probable that Russian forces will hold the Caucasus
mountains and Trans-Caucasia.
With her industry dislocated, Russia is in extreme need of material assistance
from abroad. She requires raw materials, machine tools and munitions.
Unfortunately, the avenues of entry are vulnerable, limited in capacity and
very awkwardly located. Aid to Russia has been planned on the basis of a total
import capacity of 500,000 tons per month. It is by no means certain that this
figure will be reached. Russian requirements can only be met by the United
States and Great Britain. This relatively small contribution at the crisis of
the Russo-German war appears to be the total material means available to the
Democracies to influence the struggle within this theater.
4. Middle Eastern Theater. In this theater, extending from Libya to the
Caspian, only the western segment is active. In Libya the British are engaged
in an offensive the issue of which is still in doubt Farther to the east,
Syria Iraq and Iran are shielded from the war for the time being by neutral
Turkey and by the Russian forces in the Caucasus.
[6] Because of the Russian campaign and certain great logistic difficulties,
there is practically no danger of an Axis major offensive in this theater,
from the north, before the spring of 1942. Even a British defeat in their
current Libyan operations would so exhaust the Axis forces in North Africa as
to free Alexandria and Suez from the threat of a thrust from the west. A
British victory in Libya would probably force German entry into Tunisia and
their occupation of Algiers and Morocco. But such an eventuality would be more
apt to delay than to hasten an all-out German offensive, from the west and the
north, against the Middle East Theater.
Even if successful in their current Libyan offensive, it is not believed that
the British will be able to advance through Tripolitania without a
considerable delay for reorganization. It is therefore probable that from the
British point of view this theater will shortly become a defensive one, with a
minimum of several months available for the completion of its organization.
In the eastern sector of this theater (the Levant, Iraq and Iran), the British
are gradually building a substantial force to meet any Axis threat to the area
through Turkey or the Caucasus Mountains. In the Levant, there are three
Australian divisions with other troops, and General Wavell told our Military
Observer in Iran that he expected to have at least ten divisions in Northern
Iraq by March of 1942.
The United States is committed to providing great masses of material to the
Middle East, and is undertaking vast construction projects to facilitate
supply. Except the British Isles, the Middle East is the most accessible of
the important active theaters to us, and our lines of supply to it, though
long, are the least vulnerable. We are building up an influence on British
military policy in the Middle East. Further American commitments, including
probably the eventual employment of our armed forces, will be necessary in
this region.
5. The Far Eastern Theater. Here the initiative rests with Japan in spite of
her military over-extension. She has the following lines of action open to
her:
a. Attack Siberia.
b. Attack Yunnan Province to cut the Burma Road with a view to an early end to
the war with China.
[7] c. occupy Thailand.
d. Through Thailand, attack (1) Burma and the Burma Road (2) Malaya.
e. Attack the Philippines and Hong Kong, preparatory to a movement on
Singapore or the Netherlands East Indies.
f. Contain or isolate the Philippines and Hong Kong and
(1) Attack Singapore
(a) directly, by sea;
(b) by sea in conjunction with a land attack through Thailand
and Malaya.
(2) Attack the Netherlands East Indies
Page 180
g. Bide her time wait for a better opportunity to pursue any of the above
lines of action, hoping that the course of events will turn in her favor.
h. Seek a general settlement through American mediation, including an
understanding with the United States and Great Britain as to political and
economic penetration of southeast Asia and the southwestern Pacific.
i. Reorient her whole foreign policy by withdrawing from the Axis.
(h) and (i) are impossible, short of a complete overthrow of her governing
forces.
The most probable line of action for Japan is the occupation of Thailand.
The forces of all other countries in the Far East are on the defensive before
Japan. The British Commonwealth, the Netherlands East Indies and the United
States are in consultative association for the defense of Malaysia. To date
this association has been effective in slowing down the Japanese penetration
to the southwest. China is containing the equivalent of 30 Japanese divisions.
The U. S. S. R., hard pressed for troops in European Russia, has reduced her
Siberian garrisons to what she estimates to be the minimum necessary to deter
Japan from attacking to the north. So far she has been successful in this
effort.
China, aided and encouraged by America, will remain in the war against Japan
and will continue to contain important [8] Japanese forces. The effective use
of China's unlimited manpower, as an anti-Axis potential, depends entirely on
the extent to which she is able to equip it, particularly in artillery and
aviation. For this, she is entirely dependent upon the United States. The
stronger the Chinese become, the more Japanese troops will be pinned down in
China, thereby releasing further Russian strength for use against Hitler.
Although China is receiving an increasing amount of equipment from this
country, a major offensive by the Chinese cannot be expected during the period
ending March 31, 1942.
The British Imperial forces in Malaysia and at Hong Kong occupy a purely
defensive role. The forces in Malaya have recently been re-enforced by
additional troops from Australia, New Zealand (air), and India, while those in
Hong Kong have been augmented by the arrival of Canadian levies. Both of these
localities present a very strong defense against any possible Japanese attack.
The people and government of the Netherlands East Indies have continued,
affirmatively and constructively, to function practically as a sovereign
state, loyal to the mother country. As evidence of Dutch spirit, they (a) have
reorganized their army, (b) are actively at work manufacturing needed army
equipment, (c) are actively training reserves, (d) have expanded their system
of air fields throughout the islands, (e) have cooperated with the British and
United States governments in preparation of extensive plans for defense, (f)
have refused to renew their commercial treaty with Japan, (g) have delivered
to Japan only 10,000 tons of oil since January 1, 1941_said delivery having
been on an old contract still in force.
In the Far East the United States is concerned as a possible belligerent and
also as a prime source of war materials for China, the British Commonwealth
and for the Netherlands East Indies. We are in process of sending a few
military airplanes to Thailand. But this theater will be a secondary one from
the point of view of supply. Under all circumstances we will continue to be
able to supply Australasia, the Dutch East Indies, and probably also China,
though somewhat precariously, through the Burma Road. Siberia will become
completely cut off if Japan attacks Russia.
Our influence in the Fast Eastern Theater lies in the threat of our naval
power and the effort of our economic blockade. Both are primary deterrents
against Japanese all-out entry in the war as an Axis partner. If we become
involved in war with Japan we could launch a serious offensive against her by
Naval and Air forces. But such an attack would fall short of a major strategic
offensive because it could not be decisive within [9] a reasonable time and
still more, because it would be a diversion of forces away from rather than
toward our objective, the defeat of the Nazis.
[10] III. Morale.
The outstanding feature of the war in 1941 has been the rise in anti-Axis and
the decline in Axis morale.
The anti-Axis powers have been heartened by the Failure of the German air
attack on Britain, the decreased German success in the Atlantic, the continued
resistance in the Middle and Far Eastern theaters, the drain on Germany of the
Russian Campaign and of her conquered territories, and probably most of all,
Page 181
by the continued progress of America from neutrality towards participation in
the war.
Even more notable has been the decline in Axis morale. In Italy and Japan the
reasons are obvious. Both are weary of unsuccessful war and economically
distressed. But Germany presents a true paradox. Here is a warrior nation
which has made colossal sacrifices to build war power and has had
unprecedented success in war_and yet is wholly apathetic. No enthusiasm
prevails, only the desire to see it all end.
In any given period, a nation at war generally finds itself in one of three
military situations. To each of these situations there should be a
corresponding moral reaction. These situations and reactions are:
Military Situation Moral Reaction
1. Superiority of strength. 1. The elan of victory_fighting
Possession of initiative. with confidence of success.
Unbroken success.
2. Approximate equality in strength. 2. The grim struggle_fighting to
Initiative doubtful. gain success.
Ultimate success still in balance.
3. Inferiority in strength. 3. Their "back to the wall"_
Strategic initiative lost. fighting prevent defeat.
Ultimate success doubtful.
Perhaps the most fundamental fact in the war situation today is that Germany
is, and has continuously been in military situation Number 1, while the moral
reaction of her people is, and has been for some time rather lower that number
2.
The morale factor in the war will be affected by the out [11] come, probably
within the next month, of the operations in Russia and in Libya, and by
Japan's decision. But there is no reason to believe that the trend of 1941 in
German morale will be reversed or even materially reduced in the period under
discussion.
In this factor lies the germ of Nazi defeat.
SHERMAN MILES,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.
Distribution:
The President
Secretary of War
Secretary of State
Under Secretary of War
Assistant Secretary of War
Assistant Secretary of War for Air
The Chief of Staff
Chief of the Army Air Forces
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4
Assistant Chief of Staff, W. P. D.
G. H. Q.
Chief of the Air Corps
Director of Naval Intelligence
Coordinator of Information
General Embick.
Record Section
I. B. File
dya
[Hand written:] Copies checked in red delivered by an officer_other copies
sent out by Miss Finch & Miss Carrick.
Page 182
EXHIBIT No. 14
Secret
[Paraphrase of a SECRET RADIOGRAM]
G2/CI
FMH
Received at the War Department, November 29, 1941.
From: Fort Shafter, November 29, 1941. No. 986.
To: TAG
With reference to protection of vital installations outside of Military
reservations such as highway bridges, telephone exchanges, and power plants
this headquarters by confidential letter of 19 June, 1941 asked the Governor
of the territory to use the authority given him by the Organic Act Section 67
which provides that the Governor may call upon the Naval and Military Force
Commanders of the United States in the Hawaiian Territory to suppress or
prevent invasion, lawless violence, insurrection, etc. In accordance with the
above stated Authority on 20 June 1941 the Governor made a confidential formal
demand in writing on this headquarters to supply and to keep on furnishing
such suitable protection as may be required in order to prevent sabotage, and
violence of a lawless nature in connection therewith, being done in the
territory against vital structures and installations. Suitable military
protection in accordance with the above request is now being given important
civilian installations and structures. Upon the suggestion of this
headquarters, in connection with the above, the county and city of Honolulu
enacted, an ordnance on 30 June 1941 permitting the Hawaiian Dept. Commanding
General to restrict the use of and travel upon or to close within the county
or city of Honolulu any road whenever such action is necessary in the interest
of National Defense. No exercise of the authority thus given has yet been
necessary. Cordial relations exist and have been maintained and mutual
cooperation has been given on all pertinent matters which involve the FBI and
all other Federal and Territorial Officials.
In regard to the secret radiogram of your office numbered 482 dated November
28, 1941, within the scope of investigative responsibility of the War
Department (Paragraph No. 3 MID SC 30-45) and Military establishments which
include equipment and personnel, full precautions against activities of a
subversive nature are being taken.
SHORT.
EXHIBIT No. 15
SECRET
(Copy)
WPD 4544-13 NOVEMBER 27, 1941.
Memorandum for The Adjutant General (through Secretary, General Staff):
Subject: Far Eastern Situation.
The Secretary of War directs that the following secret, first priority,
message be dispatched by cable, radio or telegraph (whichever method is the
most secure from the viewpoint of secrecy) to each of the following:
Commanding General, Hawaiian Department
Commanding General, Caribbean Defense Command
Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with
only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and
offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action
possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot, be avoided, the
United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy
should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action
that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action you are
directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem
necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not, repeat not to
alarm civil population or disclose intent. Report measures taken. Should
hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow Five so far
as they pertain
Page 183
to Japan. Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum
essential officers.
L. T. Gerow,
Brigadier General
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff.
EXHIBIT No. 16
PRIORITY_
From: War Department,
Bureau: G-2 sm/mis
T. E. Roderick
T. E. RODERICK
Lt. Colonel, G. S. C.
Asst. Executive Officer, G-2
TELEGRAM
OFFICIAL BUSINESS_GOVERNMENT RATES
NOVEMBER 27, 1941.
All Corps Areas
Caribbean Defense
Command Hawaiian Department
Japanese negotiations have come to practical stalemate stop Hostilities may
ensue stop Subversive activities may be expected stop Inform commanding
general and chief of staff only end
MILES.
Sent no. 473 to Hawaii, 11/27
Sent no. 562 to Panama, 11/27
Sent no. 66 to 1st. CA, 11/27
I certify that this message is on official business and necessary for the
public service.
T. E. Roderick
T. E. RODERICK
Lt. Colonel, G. S. C.
Asst. Executive Officer, G-2
Sent no. 191 to 2nd CA, 11/27
Sent no. 48 to 3rd CA, 11/27
Sent no. 72 to 4th CA, 11/27
Sent no. 49 to 5th CA, 11/27
Sent no. 54 to 6th CA, 11/27
Sent no. 45 to 7th CA, 11/27
Sent no. 75 to 8th CA, 11/27
Sent no. 367 to 9th CA, 11/27
RALPH C. SMITH
Colonel, General Staff,
Executive Officer, G-2.
Cable recorded in M. L. D.
Exact Copy made for Gen. Miles 1-28-42. 380.
EXHIBIT No. 17
[Paraphrase]
G-2
SM/td
NOVEMBER 27, 1941.
G-2's All Corps Areas
Caribbean Defense Command
Hawaiian Department.
Advise only the commanding officer and the chief of staff that it appears that
the conference with the Japanese has ended in an apparent deadlock stop Acts
of sabotage and espionage probable stop Also possible that hostilities may
begin stop
MILES
Page 184
[PRIORITY_SECRET]
Drafting Section: G-2
Drafting Officer: SM
G-2 File Number:
[Paraphrase of an outgoing Secret Cablegram]
#66 Sent out Nov. 27, 1941.
Date: November 27, 1941.
To: All Corps Areas, Caribbean Defense Command, and Hawaiian Department, First
Corps Area
Advise only the commanding officer and the chief of staff that it appears that
the conference with the Japanese has ended in an apparent deadlock stop Acts
of sabotage and espionage probable stop Also possible that hostilities may
begin stop
MILES.
#66 to 1st CA
191 to 2nd CA
48 to 3rd CA
72 to 4th CA
49 to 5th CA
54 to 6th CA
45 to 7th CA
75 to 8th CA
367 to 9th CA
#473 to Hawaii
562 to Panama
EXHIBIT No. 18
SECRET
[Radiogram]
(RRR)
56-WTJ
November 14, 1940.
312 AM
From: Manila, P. I.
To: The Adjustment [sic] General.
November 14th,
For G-2
Following received reliable sources "Reliably reported Japanese evacuating
troops and air forces middle Yantze [sic] including Hangkow. Washington report
states concentration transports Haiphong Taipong and Formosa." Taiping
referred to probably on Pearl River. Informant believes this presages
initiation new plans and not result Chinese pressure. Signed O'Rear.
GRUNERT.
EXHIBIT No. 19
CONFIDENTIAL
CIB
Maj. David G. Erskin
No. 381 sent Nov. 12, 1941.
To: G-2, Hawaiian Department.
Requests you be prepared to check with FBI and render them every assistance
FBI field office Honolulu is being advised to check with MID and ONI
concerning custodial detention list in order to ascertain that all points are
covered.
MILES.
Page 185
EXHIBIT NO. 20
SECRET
83 WTJ O-4-C
616-P
[RADIOGRAM]
OCTOBER 29, 1941.
731 AM
From: Manila, P. I.
To: MILID
No. 700, October 28th.
Three Japanese aircraft carriers including one latest type comma two armed
merchant vessels of unknown size suitable for transports and one aircraft
tender are now at Takao Formosa. Commander in chief combined naval and air
forces has been ordered to Takao G-2. Comment report concerning commander in
chief may signify beginning of assembling of an expeditionary force.
EXHIBIT NO. 21
CONFIDENTIAL
WAR DEPARTMENT,
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF,
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION G_2,
Washington, October 28, 1941.
INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM THE ORIENT
Dated August 26, 1941.
1. "Mr. HIROTA, a presiding officer at directors' meeting of the Black Dragon
Society, told of an order issued by War Minister TOJO (now premier) "to
complete full preparation to meet any emergency with United States in the
Pacific. All guns to be mounted in the islands of the Pacific under Japanese
mandate. The full preparation to be completed in November."
2. HIROTA and others are said to have stated: "War with United States would
best begin in December or in February."
3. "Very soon," they say, "the Cabinet will be changed. The new Cabinet would
likely start war within sixty days."
S. C.
[Handwritten:]
Summary of Inf. 11/3/41
Distribution:
All C. A.'s F. B. I.
All Dept.'s O. N. I.
Alaska State
File
P.M. S.
EXHIBIT NO. 22
SECRET
[Radio]
R. A. Oct. 27, 1941
4 WTJ
4 WTJ
Oct. 27, 1941.
1055 PM
From: Manila, Philippine Islands.
To: Milid, Washington.
54 Twenty Seventh.
General southward movement of Japanese shipping in western Pacific is reported
by British sources two aircraft carriers have been operating among
Page 186
mandated islands, of which Kaga repeat Kaga still present following planes
reported based there: Palau repeat Palau, eight flying boats, Saipan repeat
Saipan eight fighters, six heavy bombers; Truk repeat Truk, six fighters, six
heavy bombers: Jalu repeat Jalu, eight flying boats, twelve flight planes;
Wotje repeat Wotje, eight flying boats.
BRINK.
CONFIDENTIAL
[Radiogram]
LAS
3 WTJ
518P
JULY 28, 1941.
10:36 PM
From: Manila
To: Milid
No. 1485, July 26th.
British intelligence Singapore reports existence in Middle East of enemy
connected organization there for supply of semiannual passports to so called
refugees paren potential fifth columnists paren enroute from Middle East to
South American stop One identified member of this organization Schwarzstein
reported now enroute Far East stop Information suggests all passports for
South and Central American countries issued nationals of occupied territories
be regarded with suspicion stop Uncertain extent South and Central American
governments may be involved.
O'REAR.
CONFIDENTIAL
[Radiogram]
LAS
30 WTJ
715P
JULY 27, 1941.
6:20 AM
From: Tokyo
To: Milid
No. 505, July 26th.
Mobilization mentioned in my radio 498 and 500 still going on under conditions
extreme secrecy involving restrictions all kinds on movements additional
foreigners to the Continent also foreigners restricted as far south as Formosa
and as far north as Korea and Manchukuo. Size of mobilization cannot be
estimated but it is one of the largest single drafts since initial
mobilization for China war. Some reports of troop movements away from Japan
but nothing available to number preponderance moving in any single direction.
CRESWELL
SECRET
[Radiogram]
LAS
29 WTJ
8P
JULY 27, 1941.
6:20 AM
From: Tokyo
To: Milid
No. 507, July 26th.
On basis of statements made by heretofore reliable contact, it is thought
likely, should Japanese occupation French Indo China be extended, occupying
forces will include one specially selected pursuit wing of approximately 80 to
90 planes now being organized Formosa.
CRESWELL.
Page 187
[Radiogram]
LAS
82 WTJ
248P
JULY 23, 1941.
3:21 PM
From: Manila.
To: Milid.
No. 1456 July 22nd.
United Press states Lomei news Tokyo claims following from reliable French
source quote as result of secret agreement between British, Chinese and De
Gualliets [sic] the Chingking forces are massing for attack on northern Indo
China stop Simultaneously the British will attack south Indo China using
natives stop Whether Indo China govt will participate is not known unquote
stop This office estimates above as build up for Japanese movement into Indo
China stop We are of opinion that new Japanese cabinet is war minded and
capable of action.
O'REAR.
[Radiogram]
LAS
150 WTJ
1210P
JULY 23, 1941.
11:32 PM
From: Tokyo
To: Milid
No. 504, July 21st.
Recently imposed restrictions of indefinite duration on land, water, and air
travel in Japan reduces available services southward to NYK Transpacific liner
Application has been made for reservations through to Manila on first
possibility namely Yawata sailing Yokohama August 14th Shanghai August 19
arriving Manila August 21 without touching Hongkong. Company states that
reservations cannot be confirmed for several days. If it is desired that Pape
carry digest on Japanese vessel he requests specific authority therefor. It
not, suggest that assistant naval attache in Shanghai be requested to forward
digest to Manila by first available safe hand and if it does not arrive before
Pape leaves he be authorized to pick up Manila copy of digest. Only other
alternative is for Pape to go to Shanghai first available transportation and
to proceed thence by whatever combination of clippers and non Japanese
shipping will put him soonest in Singapore. Schedule of British and Dutch
lines are not available to their agents in Japan. Assist naval attache in
Shanghai has been requested to secure and forward pertinent information if
possible. No detailed schedule can be reported until transportation to
Shanghai is secured and possibly until after arrival there.
CRESWELL.
[Radiogram]
AEL
8 WVY
743P
JULY 14, 1941.
1:36 PM
From: Tokyo
To: Assis Chief of Staff G-2
No 500, July 14.
Now evident that mobilization mentioned our number 498 taking place on
considerable scale and under unusual conditions as to secrecy. It has been
determined that some of the newly mobilized men are being sent to Manchuria,
but as yet unable to determine how many or whether any are being sent southern
destination. Although Tokyo is alive with rumors as to purpose this
mobilization there is no conclusive indication so far available.
CRESWELL.
Page 188
[Radiogram]
67-WTJ
July 12, 1941.
1032 AM
From: Tokyo.
To: MILID.
No. 498 July 12th.
Considerable talk and some evidence of unusual recruiting extent and purpose
not clearly determined but thought to be precautionary as for the time being
governments attitude not considered as one tending towards positive
commitments.
CRESWELL
WPD 4544 July 7 1941.
Memorandum for the Adjutant General:
Subject: Secret Radiogram
1. The Secretary of War directs that a secret radiogram as follows be sent to
the:
Commanding General, Caribbean Defense Command
Commanding General, Philippine Department
Commanding General, Hawaiian Department
Commanding General, Fourth Army
For your information stop Deduction from information from numerous sources is
that the Japanese Govt has determined upon its future policy which is
supported by all principal Japanese political and military groups stop This
policy is at present one of watchful waiting involving probable aggressive
action against the maritime provinces of Russia if and when the Siberian
garrison has been materially reduced in strength and it becomes evident that
Germany will win a decisive victory in European Russia stop Opinion is that
Jap activity in the south will be for the present confined to seizure and
development of naval comma army and air bases in Indo China although an
advance against the British and Dutch cannot be entirely ruled out stop The
neutrality pact with Russia may be abrogated stop They have ordered all Jap
vessels in its Atlantic ports to be west of Panama Canal by first of August
stop Movement of Jap shipping from Japan has been suspended and additional
merchant vessels are being requisitioned end
II. That a copy of the above radiogram be furnished to the Chief of the Army
Air Force.
L. T. GEROW
Brigadier General,
Acting Assistant (Chief of Staff.)
ks
COPY/ml
(Original paper filed under Panama Command.
[Radiogram]
AEL
85 WTJ
451
June 29, 1941.
7:43 AM
From: Tokyo.
To: The Assis Chief of Staff G-2.
No. 493 June 27
War Office states that cannot grant attachment regiment Japan proper Dickey
Verback present time but may be able to arrange in future. At same time
mentioned possibility arrange those officers Korea provided suitable exchange
in one of our possessions no specific possession requested but Philippines
mentioned as examples. Request statement policy regarding arrange our
possessions in general and reciprocity for Korea in particular. In my opinion
under present conditions Korea is not adequate trade any of our possessions
and arrange in any other Japanese possessions would be severely circumscribed.
Suggest I continue efforts obtain arrange Japan proper. See my letter June 9
to Harris, Chief Liaison Section in June 13 pouch.
CRESWELL
Page 189
G-2(WEC)
Ralph G. Smith
Sent to all listed destination * * * WE
May 29, 1941 * * *
MAY 28, 1941.
Assistant Chiefs of Staff, G-2, First Corps Area, Third Corps area, Fourth
Corps Area, Fifth Corps area, Sixth Corps area, Seventh Corps Area, Eighth
Corps area, Ninth Corps Area, Panama Canal Department, Puerto Rican
Department, Hawaiian Department, Philippine Department and Alaskan Department.
Communist Party order recently issued directs all Communist Party members of
National Maritime Union to remain on board ship until further notice period
Highly reliable British source reports nation-wide sabotage may be expected
comma especially on Pacific Coast comma over may thirtieth weekend on all
defense projects including shipping facilities period
MILES.
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE,
AG 220.482(4-3-41)E April 3, 1941.
COMMANDING GENERAL
Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, TH.
Issue orders detailing on temporary duty the necessary number of armed
noncommissioned officers of the Air Corps but not less than 6 for the purpose
of providing adequate and continuous guard from Hawaiian Department to
destination for airplanes and parts being shipped on the Steel Mariner
scheduled to sail to Philippine Department from Hawaiian Department April 5,
1941, and directing that upon completion of such duty soldiers return to
proper stations in Hawaiian Department on first available army transport
payment of monetary allowances * * * authorized while traveling on SS Steel
Mariner a chartered vessel * * *
ADAMS.
Copy for A. C. of S., G-2. In connection with your disposition form dated
April 3, 1941.
AGO 004.5 (5-13-41) MB-G
The AGO
AGMX-G
EAH
MAY 13, 1941.
COMMANDING GENERAL,
Schofield Barracks, TH.
In reply city AGMX period. War Department authority granted you to permit
representative of Pan Pacific Press Association to make photographs of
unrestricted training activities and general views of post at your station for
forthcoming articles Colliers Magazine period. All photographs to be made
under your supervision and to be reviewed by War Department prior to
publication.
ADAMS.
Copy for: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 (Major Corderman).
G-2
Lt. Col. R. C. Smith
G-2/272-82
No. 740 Sent April 18,1941
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G_2,
Hawaiian Dept., Fort Shafter, T. H.
Naval Intelligence on March 21 received from unknown source partially
illegible copy combat estimate of Fiji Islands dated December 1940 signed by
Captain John W. Coulter present address University of Hawaii period.
Investigate authenticity and why G-2 did not receive copy this valuable
report.
MILES.
Page 190
[Radiogram]
MARCH 29, 1941.
8:32 AM
(JTP)
39WTJ
From: Ft. Shafter.
To: The Adjutant General.
FORT SHAFTER, No. 2492, March 28, 1941.
For G-2. Colonel Hideo Iwakuru, Ija passed through Honolulu 15th aboard
Tatsuta Maru enroute Washington, D. C. Nippu Jiji of Honolulu reported,
"Colonel Iwakuro was formerly head of military affairs section of Military
Affairs Bureau which is probably the most important office in the army. He is
so influential that there is no one in army circles who does not know him. We
do not know what mission this colonel is on but in view of the times the visit
of so important an army personage is worth our attention."
SHORT.
EXHIBIT NO. 23
[Hand written:] Copy of Capt. Safford's digest, with missing numbers supplied:
1 copy to Safford.
1 copy to Corderman.
[1] Index of translations and memoranda re Pearl Harbor
MARCH 1941
DATE JD# SIS# OTHER BRIEF
#Mar. 13 A ____ 15306 Hsinking #58 Foreign Propaganda
Conference.
#Mar. 13 N 1472 15351 Tokyo 216 Japanese-Russian Cooperation.
#Mar. 13 A 1479 15330 Tokyo 222 Get the Russians to accept
the Ribbentrop proposal.
Mar. 14 A ____ 15341 Hsinking #59 Propaganda towards the South
15342 Seas.
Mar. 18 A 1540 15425 Tokyo 126 Put Terazaki in charge of
information and propaganda.
#Mar. 18 A ____ 15421 Tokyo 276 Southern Advance.
#Mar. 19 A 1572 15455 Moscow #5 German-Soviet Relations:
change in.
*Mar. 21 A ____ 15550 Tokyo #40 Trade-agreement between Japan
to 15555 and USSR.
**Mar. 22 A ____ _____ __________ SIS Memorandum predicting
German attack on Russia.
(Memo not available.) Given
to State
#Mar. 22 A 1654 15621 Tokyo #81 Secure intelligences by
bribe.
#Mar. 25 N 1662 15656 Tokyo 286 Dinner with Admiral Raeder.
#Mar. 29 A 1748 15749 Berlin 308 Germany plans to attack
Russia. It is necessary for
Japan to attack Singapore.
APRIL 1941
#Apr. 3 A 1806 15900 Berlin #56 German preparations for war
#Apr. 4 A 1826 15993 with Russia.
#Apr. 3 N 1829 15945 Batavia 142 Military campaign in the
lowlands.
#Apr. 5 N 1842 15976 Honolulu #43 Typical Honolulu Spy Report.
#Apr. 18 N 2066 16409 Wash. 230 "As a result of the Japanese-
Soviet Neutrality Pact Japan
is at last free to use force
in this area (Southwest
Pacific)."
#Apr. 19 N 2099 16455 Tokyo 171 "Our Southward Move would be
halted."
*Apr. 29 A 2251 16741 Wash. 253 "It is truly a marvelous
thing that our relations with
Moscow have been adjusted."
*Apr. 30 N ____ _____ GZ-32 Early intentions of Germany
to attack Russia.
***Most important.
**Very important.
*Important
Unmarked_Normal.
#Supplementary.
Page 191
Index of translations and memoranda re Pearl Harbor_Continued
MAY 1941
DATE JD# SIS# OTHER BRIEF
#May 9 N 2452 17089 Tokyo 202 "I am most anxious to see the
United States discontinue its
policy of aiding Chiang Kai-shek
#May 13 A 2509 17161 Tokyo 396 "Advise the president to counsel
Chiang Kai-shek to respond to
Japanese peace overtures."
#May 13 N 2513 17263 Tokyo 216 Transmit #217 to the Secretary of
State without delay. (Precedent
for Tokyo #901 & 902, 6 Dec.
1941.)
#May 13 NQ2514 17264 Tokyo 217 The U. S. Govt. agree to advise
Chiang Kai-shek to enter into
direct negotiations with Japan.
#May 15 N 2549 17272 Wash. 299 Japan has absolutely no aggres-
sive ambitions in the southern
area. (!)
#May 16 N 2562 17305 Tokyo 230 Our request that the United
States stay out of the war.
#May 21 N 2619 17423 Wash. 320 Japanese southward expansion.
**May 22 N 2643 17473 Berlin 569 "Our dreams of southward
expansion . . ."
"To further bolster the spirit of
the Tripartite Pact. "
May 26 A 2675 17636 Tokyo 440 Wire *real* intentions of the
German Govt.
JUNE 1941
#June 3 A 2791 17741 Rome The German Govt. has recently
completed all preparations for
attacking Soviet Russia.
#June 14 N ____ _____ GZ-1 German Plans to attack Russia.
#June 16 N ____ _____ GZ-9 Crisis in German-Soviet
relations.
#June 16 N ____ _____ GZ-10 Japanese-United States
negotiations.
#June 17 N ____ _____ GZ 15 German-Soviet crisis. Prediction
of surprise German attack.
#June 27 N ____ _____ GZ-26 Japanese attitude toward Soviet-
German crisis. "It will be well
for the Imperial Govt. To assume
a very prudent attitude in
respect to this German-Soviet
war."
JULY 1941
#July 7 A ____ _____ I. B. 1-155 "The Jap Govt._do not at present
feel compelled to modify their
policy towards the USSR." (JD
3461)
#July 9 A _____ 19126 I. B. 1-157 Plans for utilizing American
19127 Negroes for espionage. (JD 3490)
19128
#July 9 N 3515 19197 Wash. 463 "If we are definitely determined
to make a military stroke
southward."
#July 10 A ____ _____ I. B. 1-158 Comments and paraphrase of JD
3515. [Note: MID missed the point
completely.]
*July 24 N ____ _____ ___________ Memo to Naval Aide to the
President re withdrawal of Jap
merchant vessels from the
Atlantic Ocean.
AUGUST 1941
*Aug. 4 N ____ _____ GZ-1 Jap Decisions at Imperial
Conference, July 2, 1941_to break
British-American encirclement and
arm for all-out war.
#Aug. 9 N ____ _____ GZ-4 Preparation for the southward
advance shall be reinforced.
#Aug. 10 N ____ _____ GZ-5 The belief of Ambassador Oshima
is discounted by
the Tokyo Government belief that
the war will continue into next
year, with the Russians holding
in Siberia.
#Aug. 16 N ____ _____ GZ-9 Nomura's estimate of U. S.
Policy. (U. S. is determined to
take drastic action to counter
further attempts at Japanese
expansion.)
*Aug. 28 N 4814 21575 Berlin 1066 The German-Soviet war as
described by Marshal Keitel
(Germany conquering Russia).
Page 192
Index of translations and memoranda re Pearl Harbor_Continued
[4] SEPTEMBER 1941
DATE JD# SIS# OTHER BRIEF
#Sept. 4 A 4929 21784 Rome 556 Essential to carry out boldly at
21785 this time our policy
of southward advance.
#Sept. 4 A 4940 21790 Tokyo 528 U. S.-Japan Negotiations-
See JD; 4941.
*Sept. 4 A 4941 21786 Tokyo 529 Japanese Draft Proposal of Sept.
to 6, 1941. (Japan demands condi-
21788 tions that the U.S. cannot pos-
sibly agree to.)
#Sept. 19 N 5234 22377 Shanghai 808 "Japan's war preparations
against the Soviet."
*Sept. 22 A 5360 22550 Tokyo 590 Basic terms of peace between
Japan and China. (Jap troops in
China & Recognition of
Manchukuo.)
#Sept. 23 A 5381 22588 Berlin 1161 I repeatedly requested_our
Government's real policy.
*Sept. 26 N 5438 22748 Tokyo 595 Japanese Proposal of Sept. 25,
1941 (submitted to State Dept. On
Sept. 27, 1941). (Amplifies Note
of Sept. 6th (JD 4941) and at-
tempts to force the U.S. to
relinquish its position. It is
apparent that the negotiations
are getting nowhere and that the
Japanese believe that the U.S.
will back down or resort to
appeasement if they put up a
determined front.)
#Sept. 26 A 5441 22753 Tokyo 597 Nomura is bawled-out.
#Sept. 27 A 5464 22787 Wash. 852 Nomura apologizes.
Sept. 30 A 5510 22870 Tokyo 614 This whole matter concerns the
China Incident and the South Seas
Question.
[5] OCTOBER 1941
*Oct. 2 A 5598 22987 Wash. 881 Interview with Adm. Stark. "The
Admiral stated that if the United
States fights a two-ocean war she
will have to defend herself in the
Pacific."
#Oct. 3 N 5593 23034 Wash. 869 Relations of Terasaki (First
Sec'y) and Schmitt (spy).
#Oct. 6 A 5640 23114 Wash. 901 Nomura sounds a warning against
further aggression.
#Oct. 7 N 5650 23162 Wash. 880 Nomura advises caution "After
Japan has had time to evaluate the
results let her determine her
course."
#Oct. 7 N 5661 23166 Wash. 894 Nomura submits his humble opinion:
"The only remaining problem is
concerning the evacuation of our
troops (from China)."
#Oct. 8 A 5693 23220 Tokyo 647 The internal situation here_would
not permit further delay.
Oct. 9 A 5696 23260 Tokyo #83 Area designations in Pearl Harbor
(for spy reports).
Oct. 10 N 5730 23312 Honolulu #41 Dock & Mooring designations in
Pearl Harbor (for spy reports).
#Oct. 10 N 5738 23318 Harbin 129 Promise of American aid
to Russia.
#Oct. 13 N 5779 23421 Tokyo 658 "The situation at home is fast
approaching a crisis."
#Oct. 13 N ____ _____ GZ-9 Crisis in Japan (see JD 5779).
#Oct. 15 N 5838 23513 Berlin 1237 Ambassador Oshima urges Japan
attack Russia-"at the time of the
fall of Moscow"-and adds "It is
absolutely essential for us to
make sure of the resources and
markets of the south."
*Oct. 16 N ____ _____ GZ-10 Kramer's Memo to CNO with para-
phrase of JD # 5838.
#Oct. 16 A 5854 23570 Wash. 943 Interview with Adm. Turner (With-
#Oct. 15 A 5854 23516 " " drawal of Jap troops from China.
#Oct. 16 N 5888 23622 Berlin 1236 Protest on Domei editorial.
Oct. 17 N 5898 23629 Rome 661 Evacuation of Japanese merchants
from Europe.
#Oct. 17 A 5901 23631 Tokyo 671 German pressure on Japan.
Oct. 18 N 5919 23677 Rome 664 "My (Paulucci's) personal opinion
is that Japan should strike at the
Soviet Union immediately."
Oct. 18 N 5923 23677 Tokyo 682 Resignation of Jap cabinet.
Oct. 20 A 5941 23715 Wash. 959 Conversation between Terazaki and
Adm. Turner.
Oct. 23 A 6017 23859 Wash. Nomura submits his resignation. "I
don't want to continue this hypo-
critical existence deceiving
[6] other people . . . As a man of
honor this is the only way open to
me." (This is why Kurusu was
sent.)
Oct. 27 A 6084 23996 Wash. 989 "The Chief of Staff has sent the
Military Attache some secret
advice. Is this the future policy
of the Government."
Oct. 28 N 6116 24046 Shanghai 361 "At the time of a Japanese advance
to the North."
Oct. 26 N 6118 24070 Mex. City 422 Sec'y Knox's statement that there
would be imminent action in the
Far East.
*Oct. 28 N 6138 24125 Tokyo 674 Japanese nationals evacuating the
N. E. I.
Oct. 30 6175 24192 Wash. 1004 Talk with Adm. Pratt_"Stark
cannot de said to be a 'strong'
individual, Admiral Pratt said.
Page 193
Index of translations and memoranda re Pearl Harbor_Continued
[4] SEPTEMBER 1941
DATE JD# SIS# OTHER BRIEF
Nov. 1 N 6204 24249 Hsinking 697 Border clash. "Let the matter be
forgotten.
Nov. 4 N 6238 24322 Tokyo 343 Japanese nationals evacuating the
Philippine.
*Nov. 4 A 6248 24330 Tokyo 725 Counter proposals will be given
in #726 & 727. Conditions are so
tense that no longer is procras-
tination possible. This is our
last effort The success or fail-
ure of the pending discussions
will have an immense effect on
the destiny of the Empire of
Japan.
*Nov. 4 A 6249 24334 Tokyo 726 Proposal "A" Submitted in Part
to State Dept. on Nov. 7, 1941. "How
24337 have we fought in China for four
years. What tremendous sacrifices
have we made. They must know this
... In any case, our internal
situation also makes it impos-
sible for us to make any further
compromise."
Nov. 4 A 6250 24338 Tokyo 727 Proposal "B"_Never submitted. "A
last effort to prevent something
happening."
#Nov. 4 A 6251 24339 Tokyo 730 "Ambassador Kurusu is leaving by
clipper on the 7th. He is car-
rying no additional instruct-
ions."
**Nov. 5 N 6254 24373 Tokyo 736 It is absolutely necessary that
all arrangements for the signing
of this agreement be completed by
the 25th of this month. (Of ut-
most secrecy.)
#Nov. 5 N 6275 24386 Tokyo 734 Ambassador Kurusu left the 5th
for (Shanghai(?)).
#Nov. 6 A 6302 24439 Tokyo 739 We are sending Ambassador Kurusu
to show our Empire's
*sincerety...To make it sound
good* we are telling the
public... Both the Army and Navy
are pleased. (Note: See JD
#6017.)
Nov. 7 N 6320 24479 Wash. 1040 There is danger that America will
see through our condition. If we
have made up our minds to a final
course of action it would be the
part of wisdom to keep still
about it.
Nov. 8 N 6335 24533 Manila 722 Spy report on U.S. aircraft in
the Philippines and analysis.
(Note This is why we did not
worry over much about Japanese
espionage.)
[8]
Nov. 12 N ____ _____ _____________ "Dissemination to White House."
(This memorandum in Kramer's
handwriting records reasons for
giving original translations to
Pres. Roosevelt (& Sec'y Hull)
after Nov. 12, 1941. Prior to
that time Memoranda forwarding
Paraphrases of important messages
had been furnished.)
*Nov. 12 N 6415 24373 Tokyo 762 The United States is still not
full aware of the situation here.
The date set in message #736 is
a definite deadline. The situa-
tion is nearing a climax ... time
is indeed becoming short.
#Nov. 12 N 6416 24654 Tokyo 763 Germany putting pressure on Japan
to get tough with the U.S.
Nov. 17 A 6540 24853 Hsinking #1 Umetsu to Kurusu (Nov. 6, 1941).
*Nov. 17 A 6541 24854 Hsinking #2 Manchukuo-Soviet Relations. (It
(Appended to would impossible for us to fight
#1) the Soviet Union unless something
unforeseen happens. The Kwantung
military command is restraining
the forces there from any rash
action. The Soviet is also endea-
voring not to antagonize our
country.
*Nov. 17 A 6542 24856 Hsinking #3 Estimate of the Russo-German War.
(Appended to (The foundations of the Stalin
#1). regime are very firmly fixed. The
outlook for any early close to
hostilities in Europe is fading.)
**Nov. 17 A 6553 24877 Wash. 1090 Nomura's swan song. (Nov. 14,
& 22. 24857 1941.) (The policy of the Ameri-
& can Govt. in the Pacific is to
25139 stop any northward. They are
contriving by every possible
means to prepare for actual
warfare. It is not their inten-
tion to repeat the Munich Con-
ference. The apex of German
victories has been passed.
The United States would not favor
us at the sacrifice of China:
This war will be long, and who-
ever can hold out till the end
will be the victors. I would like
to caution patience for one or
two months to get a clear view of
the world situation. This would
be the best plan.
[9]
Nov. 17 A 6638 24878 Tokyo Reply to Nomura. (The fate of our
Empire hangs by a slender thread
of a few days. I set the deadline.
There will be no change.)
Page 194
Index of translations and memoranda re Pearl Harbor_Continued
NOVEMBER 1941-Continued
DATE JD# SIS# OTHER BRIEF
*Nov. 22 A 6710 25138 Tokyo 812 There are reasons beyond your
ability to guess why we wanted to
settle Japanese-American
relations by the 25th, but if the
signing can be completed by *the
29th, we have decided to wait
until that date*. This time we
mean it that the deadline abso-
lutely cannot be changed. *After
that things are automatically
going to happen*.
Nov. 24 N 6731 25171 Tokyo 969 We would welcome peace between
Germany and the Soviet Union.
#Nov. 24 A 6737 25174 Wash. 1148 Continue your efforts in guiding
newspaper opinion.
*Nov. 24 A 6744 25178 Tokyo 823 The time limit set in my #812 is
in Tokyo time. (See JD #6710.)
Nov. 26 A 6801 25322 Tokyo 2319 Should negotiations collapse...we
will completely destroy British
and American power in China. Keep
absolutely quiet the existence of
these decisions. (Circular to
China Net_Nov. 14, 1941.)
#Nov. 26 A 6841 25344 Tokyo 836 Telephone Code (see JD 6890)
Nov. 26 N 6850 25392 Tokyo 2354 Winds Code_Morse (Nov. 19, 1941-
J19).
*Nov. 28 N 6875 25432 Tokyo 2353 Winds Code_Voice (Nov. 19, 1941-
Appended to J19).
JD 6875 (Singapore version of the Winds
Code. (N. E. I. (Thorpe) version
of the Winds Code. (N. E. I.
(Foote) version of the Winds Code.
Japan-U. S.=East Wind Rain.
Japan-U. S. S. R.=North Wind
Cloudy.
Japan-British=West Wind Clear
(including N. E. I.).
Nov. 28 N 6890 25443 ______________ Washington-Tokyo Telephone Con-
versation Nov. 27, 1941 (2327-
2334 EST)-The South, southward
matter. A crisis does appear
imminent. Regarding negotiations_
do not break them off. We have a
crisis on hand and the Army is
champing at the bit [Note: This
was the only telephone conver-
sation of any importance.] (See
JD 6841.)
#Nov. 26 A 6891 25435 Wash. 1180 Our failure and humiliation are
6869 25436 " " complete.
[10]
#Nov. 28 A 6892 25437 Wash. 1181 It is better to wire urgent news
than to phone it.
#Nov. 28 A 6898 25445 Tokyo 844 The United States has gone ahead
and presented this humiliating
proposal (of Nov. 26th). Negoti-
ations will be de facto ruptured.
Do not give the impression that
negotiations are broken off.
Nov. 28 N 6899 25446 Tokyo 843 Tokyo Broadcast Schedule.
#Nov. 29 N 6908 25476 Wash 1197 Ref. Tokyo 843, recommends change
in Broadcast Schedule_Nov. 27,
1941. (See JD 6899.)
Nov. 30 N 6921 25496 Tokyo 857 Make one more attempt. Please be
careful that this does not lead
to anything like a breaking off
of negotiations.
[11] DECEMBER 1941
#Dec. 1 N 6939 25545 Tokyo 2436 Destroying codes with chemicals.
*Dec. 1 N 6942 25556 Berlin 1393 Ribbentrop said "It is essential
that Japan effect the New Order
in East Asia without losing this
opportunity." "Should Japan
become engaged in a war against
the U. S. Germany, of, course,
would join the war immediately."
Foreign Minister Ribbentrop
requested that the contents of
our talks be kept a strict
secret.
**Dec. 1 A 6943 25552 Tokyo 985 The conversation between Tokyo
25553 and Washington now stand rup-
tured-broken. Say *very secretly*
to Hitler and Ribbentrop that
there is extreme danger that war
may suddenly break out between
the Anglo-Saxon nations and
Japan, and this war may come
quicker than anyone dreams. Will
not relax our pressure on the
Soviet, but for the time being we
would prefer to refrain from any
direct moves in the north.
*Impress on the Germans
and Italians how important
secrecy is*. (Nov. 30, 1941.)]
Note: Coded message forwarded by
Com 16 as GYROF 010001, 010014,
or 010027.
Also forwarded from London as
Admiralty #104 and #105. Admir-
alty 011530 advised "Tokyo to
Berlin #985 of immediate interest
to].
Page 195
Index of translations and memoranda re Pearl Harbor_Continued
DECEMBER 1941-Continued
DATE JD# SIS# OTHER BRIEF
*Dec. 1 A 6944 25554 Tokyo 986 The Imperial Govt. can no longer
25555 " " continue negotiations with the U.
S. The proposal presented by the
U. S. On the 26th contains one
insulting clause. It is clearly a
trick. *The U.S. has decided to
regard Japan as an enemy*. (Nov.
30, 1941.) [Forwarded by Com 16
as CYROF 010001, 010014, or
010029.]
Dec. 2 A 6974 25572 Hsinking 781 In the event that war break out
with England and the U.S. persons
to be interned: (a) British nat-
ionals, 339; (b) American citi-
zens, 81; (d) Nationals of the
Soviet observed to be obnoxious
characters with pro-British and
American leanings are to be
suitably taken care of.
#Dec. 2 N 6981 25604 Rome 768 Japanese language broadcasts to
Europe. (Nov. 29, 1941.)
#Dec. 2 A 6982 25571 Rio 482 At present we can hear only the
6:309 p. m. JVJ transmission to
the U.S. (Nov. 30, 1941.)
*Dec. 1 N 6983 25605 Tokyo 865 To prevent the U.S. from becoming
unduly suspicious we have been
advising the press and others
that the negotiations are con-
tinuing. The above is for only
your information. (GY Log #6428.)
**Dec. 1 N 6984 25606 Tokyo 2444 The four offices in London, Hong
Kong. Singapore, and Manila have
been instructed to abandon the
use of the code machines and to
dispose of them. The machine in
Batavia has been returned to
Japan. (GY Log #6432.)
*Dec. 2 N 6985 25609 Tokyo 2409 Hidden Word Code (Nov. 27, 1941-
J19). For later additions see:
JD# SIS# OTHER#
7122 25830 Tokyo 2432.
Tokyo 2433. (?)
7214 25943 Tokyo 2450.
7360 Tokyo 2431.
Dec. 3 N 6991 25644 Tokyo 111 Make your "ships in harbor"
report irregular but twice a
week. (Nov. 15, 1941-J19).
**Dec. 4 N 7001 JD #7001 or #6975 is believed to
be the (missing) translation of
the Winds Message.
#Dec. 3 N 7012 25656 Berlin 1396 Note from German Ambassador con-
cerning what is to be done in the
event of an Anglo-Japanese and an
American-Japanese War. (Dec. 1,
1941.)
*Dec. 3 A 7017 25640 Tokyo 867 Washington burn all codes except
one copy of "Oite" (Pa-K2) and
"L" (LA). Stop using the code
machine and destroy it com-
pletely when you have finished
this, wire back "HARUNA."
Destroy all messages files and
other secret documents. (Dec. 2,
1941.)
#Dec. 4 A 7029 25694 Tokyo 114 Investigate fleet bases in Hawaii
or 111 reservation. (Nov. 20, 1941_J19.)
#Dec. 5 A 7063 25773 Tokyo 113 Report ships in Pearl Harbor,
Manila Bay, etc. (Nov. 18, 1941_
J19.)
#Dec. 5 A 7064 25772 Honolulu 224 Unimportant spy report. (Nov. 18,
1941_I
[13]
#Dec. 5 N 7080 25781 Tokyo 842 The United States might make a
protective occupation of the East
Indies. (Nov. 27, 1941).
*Dec. 5 N 7086 25823 Tokyo 122 In the future report even when
there are no (ship) movements
(Nov 29, 1941_J19.)
#Dec. 5 N 7091 25787 Tokyo 2443 London discontinue use of code
machine and dispose of it immed-
iately. Wire "SETUJU." (Dec. 1,
1941.)
**Dec. 4 N 7092 25783 Tokyo 893 Manchuria will take the same
steps toward England and America
that this country will take in
case war breaks out. American and
British consular officials and
offices will not be recognized as
having special rights. Great care
shall be exercised not to antag-
onize Russia. (Dec. 1st.) [Note:
Intercepted by Army at Fort
Shafter, T. H. Received by Navy
in late afternoon of Dec. 3,
1941, LCT. (GY Log #6498.)]
Page 196
Index of translations and memoranda re Pearl Harbor_Continued
DECEMBER 1941-Continued
DATE JD# SIS# OTHER BRIEF
#Dec. 6 A 7111 25817 Honolulu 222 Spy report on Naval vessels in
Pearl Harbor. (Nov. 18, 1941-
J19.)
#Dec. 5 N 7122 25830 Rio 329 Tokyo Circular 2432 Additions to
Hidden Word.
Dec. 6 A 7125 25837 Bern Tokyo Circular #2447. Orders have
been issued to our diplomatic
officials in North America and
the South Seas, and to all our
officials in British and
Netherlands territory to burn all
telegraphic codes except one copy
of "Oite" and "L". (Dec. 2_J19.)
Dec. 6 N 7136 25836 Wash. 1268 We have completed destruction of
codes but since negotiations are
still continuing I request to
delay the destruction of one code
machine.
Dec. 6 A 7142 25835 Tokyo 897 Destroy one "B" code machine and
use the other for the time being.
[Note: #897 was the first Tokyo
to Washington serial sent on Dec.
6, 1941. We intercepted #897-912
solid.]
_______ ______ _____ Tokyo 898 See JD #7199.
_______ ______ _____ Tokyo 899 See JD #7170.
#Dec. 6 A ____ _____ Tokyo 900 Doemi praises KATO for good
reporting.
[14]
**Dec. 6 A ____ _____ Tokyo 901 See JD #7149.
**Dec. 6 N 7143 25843 Tokyo 902 Japanese Declaration of War.
(1-13) (Parts 1-13.) (See GY Log #6619,
6620, etc.)
**Dec. 7 N 7143 25843 Tokyo 902. Japanese Declaration of War (Part
(14) 14.) (Very Important.) (See GY
Log #6649.)
*Dec. 6 A 7144 25844 Tokyo 904 Re my 902_Be most caution in
preserving secrecy. [Note: This
was received before #902-See GY
Log #6618.]
**Dec. 7 A 7145 25850 Tokyo 907 Re My #902_Submit our reply to
the U. S. Govt. at 1:00 p. m. on
the 7th your time. (Urgent_Very
important.) (See GY Log #6648.)
#Dec. 7 A 7146 25853 Tokyo 908 Deepest thanks to both you
ambassadors. (Urgent.)
*Dec. 7 A 7147 25854 Tokyo 910 After deciphering Part 14 of my
902 and also 907, 908, and 909,
destroy at once the remaining
cipher machine. (Extremely
Urgent)
**Dec. 7 N 7148 25856 Tokyo 2494 Relations between Japan and
England are not in accordance
with expectations. (In Hidden
Word Code.) (See JD #6985.)
**Dec. 6 A 7149 25838 Tokyo 901 Re my 844 (JD 6898). The Govt.
has deliberated on the American
proposal of the 26th of November
and as a result we have drawn up
a memorandum for the U. S.
contained in my separate message
*#902, in English*. This message
is very long_in 14 parts. Keep it
secret for the time being. I will
wire you in a separate message
the time of presenting this memo-
randum to the U. S. Present it to
the Americans just as soon as you
receive instructions. [Note: #901
was intercepted before #904 and
#902. See GY Log #6612.]
#Dec. 7 A 7150 25857 Tokyo 905 According to AP & UP reports the
President has wire'd a personal n
message to His Majesty the
Emperor. Please wire me the
facts. (Urgent.)
#Dec. 7 A 7151 25858 Tokyo 909 I heartily thank IGUCHI and YUKI.
(Urgent.)
[15]
Dec. 9 A 7214 25943 Tokyo 2450 Supplement to Hidden Word Code
(Dec. 2-J19). [Note: Com 16's
051402 advised "Singapore at-
taches *great importence* to
Tokyo Circulars 2433 and 2450."
Circular 2450 was requested by
Op-Nav 061605 and was forwarded
by Com 16 GY-ROF 070330, 070415,
& 071257 (?). See GY Log #6665-
6669.]
#Dec. 8 A 7257 25998 Tokyo/Extra PAK2 message dated Dec. 6th. Of
no importance, except to show
*solid interception* of Tokyo-
Washington messages on Dec. 6 &
7, 1941.
#Dec. 9 N ____ _____ Tokyo 912 Same as #911 but in PAK2 (Dec.
7th) [Note: #912 was the last
Tokyo-Washington serial sent. Our
file of Tokyo-Washington serials
sent on Dec. 6 & 7, 1941, is
*complete*.]
*Dec. 10 N 7280 26029 Honolulu 252 The following ships were in port
on the afternoon of the fifth: 8
battleships, 3 light cruisers, 16
destroyers. Four ships of the
Honolulu class were in dock.
(Dec. 5th_PAK2.) [Note: Army
intercept forwarded (by mail?)
from San Francisco.]
Page 197
Index of translations and memoranda re Pearl Harbor_Continued
DECEMBER 1941-Continued
DATE JD# SIS# OTHER BRIEF
*Dec. 10 N 7294 26053 Honolulu 241 The usual schedule for departure
and returns of the battleships is:
leaving on Tuesday and returning
on Friday and returning on Satur-
day of the following week. (Dec.
1_J19.) [Note: Army intercept
forwarded (by mail?) from San
Francisco.]
#Dec. 11 N 7299 26047 Wash. 1278 Re your #910 we will commence the
demolition (of the code machine)
and destruction by fire. [Note:
Last Purple message sent by
Washington (Dec. 7th).]
#Dec. 12 A 7330 26103 Cant. 512 The Army has completed all
preparations to move immediately
on Thai. (Dec. 2_J19.) [Note:
Place of interception not known.]
Dec. 11 N 7335 26108 Pek. 625 Coincident with the beginning of
the war against Britain and
America (*Dec. 5th*). [NOTE:
Intercepted at Fort Shafter T. H.
Received Dec. 10 1941_see GY Log
#6749.]
[6]
_______ ______ _____ 903 See entry after JD #7205.
_______ ______ _____ 906 See JD #7183.
_______ ______ _____ 911 See JD #7205.
_______ ______ _____ 912 See Entry after JD #7257.
#Dec. 7 A 7157 25859 Tokyo 118 Honolulu retain codes so long as
the local situation permits. (Nov.
28-J19.)
#Dec. 8 A 7158 25880 Tokyo 119 Report entrance and departure of
capital ships. (Nov. 28-J19.)
#Dec. 8 A 7164 25879 Tokyo 2445 Burn all codes with exception of
one copy of "Oite" and "L". Wire
"HARUNA." Burn all secret docu-
ments. Be especially careful not
to arouse suspicion. (To Habana.)
(Dec. 2_J19.)
#Dec. 7 A 7170 25868 Tokyo 899 Anti-U. S. Propaganda.
#Dec. 7 A 7171 25851 Tokyo/Extra Correction to #902.
#Dec. 7 A 7175 25845 Wash/Extra Requests correction to #902.
[Note: This is why Nomura was
late.]
#Dec. 7 A 7176 25846 Wash. 1272 Japanese attempts to influence the
American Govt. (Dec. 6th.)
*Dec. 8 A 7178 25877 Honolulu 253 There is considerable opportunity
left to take advantage for a
*surprise* attack against these
places. (Dec. 6th_PAK2.) Army
intercept forwarded by teletype
from San Francisco.]
*Dec. 8 A 7179 25874 Honolulu 254 It appears that no air recon-
naissanee is being conducted by
the fleet air arm. (Dec. 6th_
PAK2.) [Army intercept forwarded
by teletype from San Francisco.]
#Dec. 7 A 7183 25852 Tokyo 906 Minister SAKAMOTO return to his
post at once. (*Urgent*.)
**Dec. 7 A 7184 25866 Budapest 104 On the 6th the American Minister
presented to the Government of
this country a British Govern-
ment communique to the effect that
a state of war would break out on
the 7th. (LA).
#Dec. 8 A 7199 25896 Tokyo 898 Send Terasaki to his post
immediately. (Urgent. (Dec. 6th.)
#Dec. 8 N 7205 25923 Tokyo 911 Minor correction to #902. (Dec.
7th.)
#Dec. 8 A _____ Tokyo 903 Washington send #1286 to Brazil.
(LA)
#Dec. 8 A 7212 25928 Honolulu 238 Honolulu spy report. (Nov. 28_
J19.)
[17]
#Dec. 11 N 7338 26109 Wash. 1276 Please wire the December operating
expenses for all offices today.
(Dec. 7_LA)
#Dec. 11 N 7360 26144 Rio. 328 Tokyo Circular #2431_Nov 29th.
Additions to Hidden Word Code.
(Dec. 2_J19) (See JD #6985) [Note:
Intercepted at Fort Hunt, Va.]
#Dec. 12 A 7369 26214 Hsinking Prospective use of the Kwantung
27136 Army and recommendation against
attacking Russia. (Dec. 4th)
[Note: Intercepted at Fort Shafter
T. H.]
*Dec. 11 N 7370 26145 Hono. 245 Spy method of communication by
signals; KGMB Want Ads. (Dec. 3_
PAK2). [Note: Intercepted at Fort
Hunt Va. Translated in the rough
by Mrs. Edgers 1:00 p. m. on Dec.
6 1941. Seen by Lt. Cdr. Kramer
about 3:00 p. m. Typed smooth
and distributed on Dec. 11th.]
#Dec. 11 A 7377 26142 Tokyo 909 When the Japanese Empire commences
hostilities Manchukuo will not
participate. (Dec. 4th) [Note:
Intercepted at Fort Shafter T. H.]
*Dec. 12 A 7381 26158 Tokyo 128 Honolulu wire immediately move-
ments of the fleet subsequent to
the 4th. (Dec. 6_PAK2) [Note:
Intercepted at Fort Shafter T. H.]
Page 198
Index of translations and memoranda re Pearl Harbor_Continued
DECEMBER 1941-Continued
DATE JD# SIS# OTHER BRIEF
**Dec. 15 N 7469 26308 Tokyo 2556 Explanation of circumstances
attending Nomura's presentation
of Japanese Declaration of War to
the U. S. Govt: "We really sup-
posed that the negotiations had
been broken off first, and the
shooting had taken place after
this. The President's speech was
trying to hide the fact that the
United States had been taken by
surprise and failed in the first
step." (Dec. 11_J19) [Forwarded
from Bainbridge Island by tele-
type.]
#Dec. 14 A 7479 26294 Rio 379 Tokyo Circular #2570:_The
Imperial Naval Air Force damaged
three battleships and sank three
in the Battle of Hawaii. Those
sunk were the Oklahoma, West
Virginia, and Arizona. (Dec. 14-
Plain Language.)
#Dec. 16 A 7511 26351 Hono. 234 Spy report on maneuvers of U. S.
26352 Pacific Fleet. (Nov. 24_J19)
[Note: Intercepted by Army at
San Francisco.]
[18]
#Dec. 19 A 7590 26479 Tokyo #4 War News Circular #4. The
following report based on what
the attacking forces witnessed
during the battle as well as
photographic observations after
the battle, show that we had com-
pletely destroyed the United
States Pacific Fleet and the
American Air Forces in the Hawai-
ian region. (Detailed losses
reported were very accurate.)
(Dec. 18_Plain Language)
#Dec. 26 N 7848 26881 Pek. 616 If this war does start, this will
be a war which will decide the
rise or fall of the Japanese
Empire ... It can be imagined
that the next war is to be a
longer one than the China
Incident (Dated Dec. 3 1941.)
[Note: Intercepted at Corregidor,
Dec. 7, 1941. Forwarded by Com 16
GYROF # -?- and received Dec. 8,
1941. (GY Log #6707.]
**Dec. 30 A 8007 27065 Tokyo 123 To Honolulu: In view of the
present situation, *the presence
in port of warships, airplane
carriers, and cruisers is of
utmost importance*. Let me know
day by day. Wire me in each case
whether or not there are any
observation balloons above
Pearl Harbor. Also whether or not
the warships are provided with
anti-mine nets. (Dec. 2-J19)
[Note: Intercepted at Fort
Shafter, T. H. Reason for long
delay not known, but apparently
some one fumbled the ball. Note
on translation says: "This mes-
sage was received here Dec. 23."]
14 S5$. 44
EXHIBIT No. 24
[1]
SECRET
SUMMARY OF FAR EASTERN DOCUMENTS RELATING TO
JAPAN'S WAR POTENTIAL AND INTENTIONS
Explanatory Notes.
The summaries which follow are based solely on information relating to Japan's
war potential and intentions included in reports from U. S. Military Attaches
and Military Observers during the period beginning 1 January 1937 and ending 7
December 1941. These intelligence documents, a descriptive catalogue of which
follows the yearly summaries, are reproduced in Far Eastern Documents, Volumes
I-XV. In most cases marginal lines have been added to the documents to
indicate sections pertinent to the subject.
Marginal references in the yearly summaries indicate the documents from which
the information is extracted. For instance, "FE 1" refers to the first Far
Eastern document. Where several sources contain essentially the same
information, they are indicated in the margins but not always referred to
Page 199
specifically in the text of the summaries. When the source of any statement is
desired, the marginal references should be compared with the annexed table of
contents of the documentary file.
The following abbreviations have been used:
MA Military Attache or Assistant Military Attache
MO Military Observer
Expressions such as "Tokyo reported" or "Singapore reported" refer to reports
from War Department intelligence personnel stationed at those places. Reports
are included from Military Attaches or Assistant Military Attaches on duty at
embassies or legations in Japan, China, Thailand, Australia, Portugal, Great
Britain, and Mexico, and from Military Observers in India, Malaya, and
Netherlands Indies, where no diplomatic representation was maintained.
[2] Japan's War Potential and Intentions
1937
FE 1 During the first half of 1937, the military leaders of Japan were
building up a war psychology. One of the most formidable instru-
FE 3 ments used as an army propaganda agency was the Imperial Reserv-
sists Association, with a large and well disciplined membership
scattered throughout Japan. The Army was engaged in a six-year
FE 4 expansion program providing for (a) increase of the Air Corps and
antiaircraft defenses; (b) increase of the military force in Man-
choukuo; (c) improvement of military training facilities; (d) re-
plenishment of war materials; and (e) organization of industry in
the interest of national defense.
FE 4 In the budget debate in the Diet during the early months of the
year, references were made to the so-called "Continental Policy"
and "Southward Expansion". While most of the pronouncements on
FE 2 expansion came from army leaders, there was indication of concur-
rence by the Navy when Rear Admiral Sekine, addressing a private
gathering, said: "Even with no naval treaty, we need not worry.
Our duty is clearly to go ahead with our preparations for
overseas development."
EE 16 In early July the so-called China Incident began, and what at
FE 18 first appeared to be a local incident in North China developed
FE 22 into a major conflict engulfing a large portion of the Chinese
Republic.
FE 24 Following the outbreak of hostilities, Japan began mobilizing the
FE 26 Army, and the movement eventually took on the proportions of a
general mobilization. Four divisions were added to the active army
FE 29. by reconstituting similar units disbanded in 1925.
NE 31 The Japanese War Office extended the terms of service for members
of mobilized units and units in China until ordered transferred to
the reserves, except such privates as might be ordered discharged,
Special volunteer officers and reservists of all ranks and grades
called into active service were to serve until relieved from active
service. For members of non-mobilized units at home stations,
including conscript reserve privates, where the term would normally
expire in 1938, the term was extended to 1939.
FE 30 The Japanese War Office, as of 30 September, estimated that there
were available 4,750,000 trained and partly trained reservists meet-
ing physical requirements. The MA in Tokyo estimated Japan had
FE 36 950,000 troops under arms as of 29 October. The Imperial Headquar-
FE 40 ters was established in the Imperial Palace on 20 November. Only on
two previous occasions had this headquarters been established: in
1894, just prior to the Sino-Japanese War; and [3] in 1904,
following the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War.
FE 23 Appropriations for the Army during 1937-38 totaled Yen 2,464,078,-
117, including supplementary appropriations of Yen 1,422,712,777, or
45 percent of the expenditures voted for the year, which amounted
to Yen 5,483,364,279.
FE 20 Few thoroughly modern army airplanes were in use in 1937, but
prospects of improvement were excellent with an ambitious building
program for 1937-38. The new 97 (1937) type planes compared favor-
Page 200
ably with service models of foreign nations. Contracts were let for
500 new 97 (1937) type planes for delivery by 1 July 1938. Compared
with the previous year, squadron strength increased from 53 to
59. Trained pilots numbered about 1400, with 288 trained during
the year. The number of obsolete planes decreased, so that the number
of available planes on 1 July (1223 of all types) represented an
FE 13 increase of only 34 planes. Several new airplane companies were
formed, and plans were made for increasing production facilities.
FE 17 Legislation of a wartime character enacted at special sessions of
the Diet included the "Military Secrets Protection Law," passed on 7
FE 25 August, and the "Munitions Industry Mobilization Law," passed on
9 September. The Cabinet planning Board was reorganized to plan
FE 38 for complete control of industry, finance and labor, in accordance
with the need of the national defense program.
FE 22 An unfriendly attitude toward foreign powers was manifested on
several occasions during military operations in China. It was clearly
FE 26 stated on l7 September by the Senior Aide to the Navy Minister that
peaceful commerce with China would not be interfered with, but if a
situation like that in Spain should develop, Japan might change her
policy. Nevertheless, there were several incidents involving British
FE 22 and American nationals. The attitude toward Great Britain was
FE 34 decidedly unfriendly, although Russia was constantly referred to as
the immediate and potential enemy.
FE 32 The reaction to President Roosevelt's "Quarantine" speech of 5
October was one of shocked disappointment without any demonstration of
enmity. Likewise, the sinking of the American gunboat
FE 41 "Panay" brought an official expression of regret with offer of
restitition. The public and the press expressed hope that the United
States would be magnanimous in its judgment of the incident.
JAPAN'S WAR POTENTIAL AND INTENTIONS
[4]
1938
FE 42 The MA in Tokyo reported on 6 January that the amicable settlement
of the Panay Case should not obscure the fact that nationalistic
groups in Japan harbor "considerable irritation and ill-feeling"
toward the United States because of our "interference in the affairs
of the Far East."
FE 56 The Japanese often reiterated that the United States "does not
FE 57 understand Japan" or "fully recognize the justice of Japan's stand,"
FE 58 and in so doing they made it evident that "understanding Japan"
really meant giving her a free hand in East Asia.
FE 57 The Japanese Foreign Minister stated in March that "Japan desires
stabilization in the Far East, with herself as the central figure,"
and that "there will be no conflict between Japan and the United
States as long as they understand each other."
FE 58 Tokyo reported on 18 March that the Shiunso Society, a Japanese
nationalistic group, stated in newspaper advertisements addressed
to the American people that the way for the United States to get
"peace in the Orient" was to stop oppressing Japan; "respect the
position of Japan, the greatest power in the Orient; ... make
absolutely no political activity or economic operations having
political significance without the understanding of Japan; . . . guide
other Powers to take the same attitude."
FE 62 The enactment of the General Mobilization Law on 24 March
FE 65 laid the foundation for totalitarian control and for complete war-
FE 66 time mobilization of Japan's economy and manpower. This law,
FE 68 which was originally passed with the specific assurance that it
FE 69 would not be invoked for the "China Incident," virtually suspended
FE 78 the constitution and enabled the Government, through the issuance
FE 87 of Imperial Ordinances, to mobilize and regulate the human and
material resources of the Empire exclusively for war. The Minister
FE 62 of War told the Japanese Army Division Commanders in April that there
must be a mobilization of the entire Japanese strength "because the
end of the China incident was remote and
Page 201
the changes in the international situation were difficult to predict."
Tokyo reported on 12 May that the Japanese War Ministry
FE 66 planned to issue a pamphlet which emphasized that "Japan is facing
a crisis in which the fortune of the nation is at stake" and that
"only by strengthening this general mobilization system can the
ambitions of a third power be restrained." On 15 November the
FE 86 MA in Tokyo outlined the process by which the [5] General
Mobilization Law was gradually being put into full effect through
the piecemeal application of the various provisions at times when
propaganda or military successes made conditions favorable.
FE 59 With the extension of military operations in China during 1938
the mobilized strength of the Japanese Army steadily increased.
On 26 March the MA in China reported that a total of 1,200,000
Japanese troops were under arms. Various measures to strengthen
FE 44 the military conscription system, to increase the efficiency of
FE 78 military training, and to begin to utilize the manpower of Japan's
FE 60 colonies for military purposes were reported during 1938. The MA
in Tokyo reported on 18 January that the new law to require two
FE 44 years of military service by all conscripts in the Japanese Infantry,
regardless of pre-conscription training, was necessary because of the
need for "further training of soldiers in the varied weapons now in
FE 60 use." An Imperial Ordinance, effective 3 April, provided that all
Japanese subjects, including Koreans, Formosans, Ainu, and South
Sea Islanders, above the age of 17, might volunteer for the Army,
subject to selection and physical examination. Under this new program
400 Koreans were selected for training in 1938. Under the
FE 45 leadership of General Araki, Minister of Education, the Japanese
FE 78 educational system put increased emphasis on Japanese nationalism
and military training.
FE 61 In commenting on the continued strengthening of Japanese home
air defenses, the MA in Tokyo reported on 11 April that the Japanese
were not greatly worried over the prospects of air raids by Chinese
but that they were "drawing plans to combat potential danger from
any source" and were "taking advantage of the present emergency
to organize and train personnel on a nation-wide basis for coordina-
tion with military preparations." On 14 May the MA in Tokyo
FE 67 reported Japanese plans for the construction of 28 new airdromes
near large cities and of double purpose parks-emergency landing
fields in Japanese villages.
FE 63 Tokyo reported on 19 April that appropriations for the Army
FE 64 during 1938-39 totaled Yen 3,823,594,189 (compared with Yen
FE 23 2,464,078,117 for the fiscal year 1937-38) of which Yen 2,259,000,000
represented appropriations for the "China Incident" (against sup-
plemental appropriations of Yen 1,422,712,777 during 1937-38).
FE 67 In the spring of 1938 the Japanese Government launched a vigorous
"spiritual mobilization" program to secure on the home [6]
front the fullest possible support of the war in China. The MA in
Tokyo reported on 14 May: "The response of the people appears to
be all that could be desired.... With stoic determination the people
FE 75 have set to fight a serious war." Tokyo reported "as significant"
that General Araki, Minister of Education, stated in a speech on 2
July that Japan possessed the perfect social system and therefore
had become the center of the world. General Araki emphasized
Japan's "mission" to unite the cultures of the Orient and the Occident
in accordance with the "Imperial Principle."
FE 74 Tokyo reported on 1 July that the Japanese Army Air Corps was
undergoing a "most widespread modernization program." On 1 July
the number of Army planes was estimated to be 1,455 with 305
additional planes ordered but not delivered. The increase in first-
line army planes from 782 to 1,093 and the decrease in obsolescent
planes from 435 to 359 during the preceding 12 months was "due largely
to the tremendous Army production program which commenced during
the spring of 1937 and continues at present." Japanese aircraft
production facilities were unable to meet the increased demands of
the Army and Navy, however, and the Army bought 80 Fiat bombers
abroad. During the preceding year Japanese army squadron
Page 202
strength increased from 59 to 80, and on 1 July army pilots
numbered 1,600, with 350 trained during the preceding 12 months.
FE 67 Increasing Japanese irritation over the foreign aid rendered the
FE 71 Chinese Government by foreign powers was reflected in numerous
FE 72 reports from the Far East during 1938. France was especially
FE 73 singled out for allowing the use of French Indo-China railways
FE 76 in transporting material to the Chinese and for objecting to Japan's
FE 77 apparent intention of occupying Hainan Island.
FE 84
FE 85 The MA in China on 15 July quoted Prince Konoe as saying that
FE 76 "foreign aid alone is prolonging the life of the Chiang Kai-shek
regime and that "Japan would take both economic and diplomatic
measures to dissuade the foreign powers from aiding Chiang Kai-shek."
FE 67 While the Japanese were using discriminatory measures and other
FE 71 pressure against French English, and American interests in
FE 84 Japanese-occupied territories in the hope of stopping foreign aid
FE 67 to China, Germany tried to strengthen its ties with Japan by such
acts as the recognition of Manchoukuo on 12 May, the ban on
FE 71 German exports of arms to China in June, and the withdrawal of
FE 76 German military advisers from China in July.
[7]
FE 72 Russo-Japanese relations remained strained as a result of
FE 77 continued delay in renewal of the fishing agreement and of recurrent
FE 78 border incidents, especially the fighting at Changkufeng during July
FE 81 and August.
FE 79 During the European crisis over Czechoslovakia in September,
FE 80 the MA in China reported by radio that a Japanese-controlled news-
paper in Tientsin and a Japanese military spokesman in Shanghai
indicated that Japan was prepared to support Germany and Italy
given to the point of war.
FE 84 After the League of Nations authorized the imposition of economic
sanctions upon Japan, but left it up to the individual nations to
take action as they saw fit, the MA in China commented on 12
October that such decisions mean nothing unless strong nations "are
willing to go to war to back them up." Japan answered this action
FE 85 of the League of Nations by severing all relations with that
organization on 2 November, but the Japanese retained their Mandated
Islands.
FE 86 Tokyo reported that the United States note of 6 October relating to
the Nine Power Treaty brought Japanese newspaper comments
probably government-inspired, to the effect that this treaty was
"out-moded" and could not "be made a cloak for political interference
with Japan's aims."
FE 59 The Japanese Army continued its advance in China, having
FE 76 overrun over 500,000 square miles of territory in China by the
FE 85 end of 1938. Japan began to consolidate her military and economic
FE 58 gains in North and Central China. In order to strengthen the
FE 71 Japanese military machine, the semi-official North China Develop-
FE 75 ment Company and Central China Development Company placed
FE 72 their main emphasis upon the expansion of communication and
transportation facilities and the production of iron, steel, coal,
and synthetic oil.
[8] 1939
FE 91 The occupation of Hainan Island early in 1939, Tokyo reported on
13 February, gave Japan the following advantages: (1) it provided
an air base close to Burma and French Indo-China; (2) it made
possible a naval blockade of South China; (3) it brought French and
British holdings in South China under Japanese guns; (4) it threat-
ened Manila with encirclement; and (5) it added a second "Formosa" to
Japan's island possessions. On 28 February Tokyo interpreted the
FE 93 significance of recent Japanese pressure upon French Indo-China and
related to this aggression the strategical implications involved:
"The occupation of Hainan is so obvious a form of pressure on the
French that it is universally assigned a political motive of
retaliation, in spite
Page 203
of official denials. Occupation of the island not only gives Japan a
potential naval base right in the front-yard of Indo-China, but it
also provides a close-in base for immediate air operations to cut the
supply routes leading into China from French territory." Concurrently,
the MA evaluated the reaction of the Japanese press to recent
manifestations of U. S. Foreign policy": "These developments [I. E.,
United States sale of war planes to France and proposed fortification
of Guam], along with the parallel diplomatic action by the United
States, England and France concerning Hainan and previous issues, are
widely interpreted as indications of abandonment by the U. S.
Administration of the isolationist tradition of U. S. foreign policy,
and of an alignment of the democratic powers against the authoritarian
states including Japan." Subsequently, on 7 March, the MA in China
FE 95 reported the Japanese occupation of Hainan as a strategic move
directed toward French Indo-China. Hongkong, Singapore, and the
Philippines rather than a military expedient for current operations in
China.
FE 96 On 8 March Tokyo forwarded further evidence of Japanese legislative
measures designed to bring the nation closer to a war footing.
Of particular significance was the proposal of a new "Law for the
Protection of Secrets Concerning Military Resources," supplementing
the provisions of the Military Secrets Protection Law of October 1937.
FE 99 On 23 March the MA in Tokyo reported that Japan was preparing
a three-year plan for expansion of production of strategic materials
and products in Japan, China and Manchoukuo in order to attain self-
sufficiency. The MA stated that the government intended to spend 13
billion yen on the project and that in his opinion the degree of
dependence on foreign sources in wartime would as a result be
considerably reduced.
[9]
FE 102 On 1 April the MA in Tokyo commented on and forwarded to the
War Department a tactical study made by an Army officer under his
command. The study reviewed tactical doctrines of the Japanese
Army, as modified by the new combat regulations of 1939 and by
observation of current military operations in China. The report stated
that the Japanese were making great efforts to modernize the Army,
were spending large sums on aviation, motorization, and mechanization,
and were increasing the strength of the division artillery. They
were at the same time endeavoring to increase the efficiency of their
military organization and tactical operation.
In the light of these improvements, the report concluded:
"The division which started the China Incident will not be the
division of a future war. Increased material means will facilitate the
task of Japanese tactics. Tactics are without meaning unless studied
in relation to the human agent who will apply them in battle. This
study has avoided excursions into the field of Japanese military
psychology and national characteristics; however, it should be read
with a constant eye to the nature of the Japanese Army for which these
tactics are designed. It is an army easily misjudged by the foreign
officer who sees first of all its straggling columns, slovenly dress
and unmilitary bearing. Just as there is no glitter to its
accoutrements, there is little theoretical excellence to recommend its
tactics. But it is an army which excels in durability and performance.
In the same way that its infantry "straggles" thirty miles a day and
arrives at the destination on time and with surprisingly few
casualties, its command and staff can be counted on to evolve plans
and orders which, without being brilliant tactical combinations, are
practical and workable schemes for getting a maximum performance from
the Japanese soldier. Furthermore, the Japanese Army which fought with
bows and arrows seventy years ago is thoroughly capable of learning
from its mistakes and advancing with the new developments of warfare.
While its swaggering self-confidence may receive some rude jolts in
a major war, it is a rugged army fired with a devotion to duty and a
narrow patriotism which make it a dangerous foe on a field of its
own choosing."
Page 204
FE 103 The rapid expansion of Japanese armaments was reflected in the
1939-40 budget passed by the Diet. On l0 April Tokyo reported that
the sum for defense amounted to Yen 6,432,155,345, which was 68.35
per cent of the total budget. Both the Army and the Navy were
being improved and modernized, and large sums were allocated to
artillery, aviation, motorization, and new ships.
FE l04 Tokyo reported on 12 April further legislation enacted to establish
the nation upon a more secure war footing. Articles 2 [10] and 6 of
the National General Mobilization Law were invoked to provide
(1) governmental limitation of dividends, and (2) governmental
regulation of a maximum working day of 12 hours and of wages in
factories employing more than 50 workers.
FE 105 In April, the MA in Japan, reviewing the trend of military
FE 106 aviation toward expansion stated that since the beginning of the war
in China, the personnel and aircraft strength of the Army Air Corps
had increased 60 per cent, production had increased 125 per cent, and
new construction of plants had enlarged production facilities by 40
per cent.
FE 110 Tokyo on 7 June reported a revision of the Military Service Law
which extended the term of service in the Conscript Reserve from 12
years 4 months to 17 years 4 months and the training period of
reservists to include the Second Conscript Reserve.
FE 111 On 9 June the MA in Tokyo reported on the series of disputes
occurring toward the end of May and early in June between the
Japanese and British Over control of the British and French
Concessions at Tientsin and the International Settlement at Shanghai.
Ill feeling between the Japanese and the British was described as
acute, particularly in Tientsin.
FE 113 On 1 July, Tokyo reported that the Army Air Corps, during the
FE 74 preceding year, had increased to 106 squadrons from 80; planes to
1961 from 1093; and pilot strength to 2900 from 1600.
FE 115 The MA in China, reporting on 13 July with reference to the anti-
British campaign of the Japanese, pointed out that "the Japanese
credo is to drive out all western influence from China"; that the time
for an anti-American campaign would come; and that Japanese
extremists and conservatives were agreed on the necessity for Japanese
dominance in Asia.
FE 116 The MA in China; in a report dated 14 July, estimated the strength
of the Japanese Army in China to be 840,000 men, and 240,000
additional men in Manchoukuo.
FE 120 The MA in Tokyo reported on 15 August that as a result of changes
in conscription regulations, the estimated strength of the standing
army will be 800,000 men, with an annual enrollment of 400,000 men.
FE 122 Tokyo reported on 12 September that the Japanese were taken
aback by the announcement on 26 July of the American abrogation
of the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation. The press claimed that
the [11] United States Government was abandoning the isolationist
tradition of foreign policy and was entering the alignment
of democratic powers against the authoritarian states, including
Japan. The government had adopted a "wait-and-see" course, being
deterred, according to the MA. From exploiting an opportunity to
push the hard-pressed British only because of apprehension of Russia.
On the same date the MA in Japan estimated the future course of
Japanese foreign policy, particularly with reference to the outbreak
of hostilities in Europe, as follows: "Under present conditions, it
can safely be said that Japanese foreign policy will be directed
toward a settlement of the China incident as rapidly as possible, and
an avoidance, if possible, of any entanglements of any sort until a
settlement of the China war shall have been realized."
FE 124 Tokyo reported on 20 September that the Japanese government
was concerned over possible loss of exports as a result of the China
war and was taking steps toward reducing electric consumption on
non-essential lines. The MA stated that the power shortage touched
many points in the national economy and was a vital matter, although
Japan, in his opinion, could fill the military need of manpower
through the use of female labor or other devices to maintain electric
power at a necessary level.
Page 205
FE 129 The MA in Shanghai dispatched on 1 October to the War Department
a memorandum containing estimates of Japanese imperialistic
designs in relation to the European war: "In the realm of foreign
affairs Japan's immediate policy will be directed toward placating
the United States and toward taking advantage of the present European
embroglio to secure as many plums as possible.... Japan is
reported to be watching carefully . . . the Dutch East Indies. It is
rumored that Japan is waiting for the propitious moment to take
advantage of British and French preoccupation to make a swoop in
that direction.... Leap frogging Hongkong, French Indo-China and
Singapore, the Japanese Navy could bring an irresistible force to
bear and easily lop off this rich prize."
FE 132 On 1 November the same source defined the probability of an im-
pending Japanese-American conflict and reported: "[The] Japanese
realize that the United States is the greatest potential threat to the
attainment of their 'Manifest Destiny' . . . Regardless of the final
outcome, we may expect early retaliation for any decisive action we
may take against Japan."
FE 133 Tokyo reported on 6 November (subsequent to the speech of
Ambassador Grew of 19 October expressing unfavorable American
opinion toward Japanese aspirations and activities in China, that
[12] attempts on the part of the United States to apply economic
pressure upon Japan would result in "a refusal to accept such pressure
supinely and a turning toward such more sympathetic nations as
may be available." The imminence of Japanese realignment incidental
to such economic pressure was thus estimated: "Should the European
struggle develop into a world war through participation by the
United States, the grouping of Germany, Japan, and possibly Russia
and Italy is a combination which under some circumstances could
be very embarrassing to the United States as a belligerent in a world
war."
FE 134 An impending crisis in Japanese-American relations was reported
on 20 November by the MA in Japan. Included among citations of
threatening Japanese policy were the Japanese War Minister's
assertions that the Army intended to press the China Incident to a
successful conclusion "without over-much regard for public opinion"
and that although abrogation of the Japanese-American commercial
treaty would undeniably affect Japan's material mobilization plans,
"this situation can be met and our policy toward the United States
should be a strong one "
FE 138 The year closed with the Japanese opening the lower Yangtze
River. With reference to this move, the MA in Japan, in his report
of 22 December, estimated that such conciliatory policies might
temporarily ease relations but had little long-run significance in
view of the ambitious continental policy of the Japanese, from which
they were "not likely to be diverted except by force of arms or
circumstances."
[13] 1940
FE 140 Reporting on 11 January that the imminent fall of the Abe Cabinet
was due in part to Japanese concern over the approaching non-treaty
status with the United States, the MA in China stated that Japanese
political and military leaders "are anxious to appease us only until
their 'immutable policy' of a Far Eastern hegemony is well on the
road to accomplishment. Thereafter they feel they can disregard
American opinion and pressure with impunity."
FE 141 Following the expiration of the Japanese-American trade treaty
FE 142 on 26 January, the Japanese felt that relations with the United
States were in a "state of delicate balance." Tokyo reported that
Japanese abrogation of the trade treaty with the Dutch might be
the first step toward an eventual attempt at economic domination
of the Netherlands Indies.
FE 144 The Japanese interpreted the new twenty-million-dollar American
loan made to the Chinese Government in March as further evidence
of American determination to try to thwart Japan's China program.
The Japanese were pushing plans for setting up the Wang Ching-wei
regime in Occupied China.
Page 206
FE 146 The American non-recognition policy toward the Wang Ching-wei
regime was interpreted by the Japanese as additional proof of our
determination to try to check the Japanese in China, but Tokyo
reported on 10 April that the Japanese were hopeful of making a
deal with England and France whereby those nations would not
oppose Japan's China policy in return for assurances of Japan's
neutrality in the European war.
FE 147 Tokyo reported on 24 April that rumors of an imminent German
attack on Holland were current in Japan, and that the Japanese
demand for the maintenance of the status quo of the Netherlands
Indies "was so presented as to invite the conclusion that it was
intended to pave the way for intervention by the Japanese themselves."
FE 149 The increase in the Japanese Army budget for 1940-41 was accounted
for by plans to reorganize the Army Air Corps and to replenish and
improve armaments, Tokyo reported on 16 May. A chart of continuing
expenditures for the years following 1940 indicated efforts to bring
the equipment of the Japanese Army up-to-date as quickly as possible
but the decrease in the "China Incident" budget showed that new
large-scale campaigns were not expected in China.
[14]
FE 148 After the German invasion of Holland, Tokyo reported increasing
Japanese concern over the status of the Netherlands Indies. Concen-
FE 150 trations of Japanese troops on the islands of Formosa and Hainan
FE 151 were reported on 7 June from Tokyo, while a report dated 10 June
stated that the impending American embargo on the export of machine
tools had created "quite a furor" in Japan and that agitation for
"positive action" against the Netherlands Indies was increasing.
FE 152 The MA in China reported large Japanese military, naval, and air
force concentrations on Hainan Island. The present goal is apparently
French Indo-China, this report of 12 June added, but the "ultimate
objective is of course complete domination of the East Asian
seaboard."
FE 153 The MA in Tokyo estimated that Japan had on 1 July a minimum
of 4040 Army and Navy airplanes of all types, with 1510 additional
planes contracted for and not delivered; a total of 4565 officers,
1350 cadets, and 63,045 enlisted men in the Army Air Corps and Naval
Air Service, including 5950 pilots; and a total of 238 air combat
squadrons composed of 114 in the Army Air Corps and 124 in the Naval
FE 156 Air Services. Further improvement in military aviation was expected
with the establishment of the Hokota Army Air School for training in
light bombing, as this would release the facilities at the Hamamatsu
Army Air School for more extensive training in heavy bombardment and
would be conducive to more efficient training in both light and heavy
bombardment.
FE 154 On 11 July Tokyo reported that within Japan "the situation is at
present sharply drawn between those who favor a closer tie-up with
Germany and prompt action against Allied possessions in the Far East,
and those who, distrusting Germany or feeling that immediate action
is not necessary or desirable, would continue to concentrate on
accomplishment of the China venture." Pending a decision, the
Japanese Army concentrated troops, ready for action, opposite both
Hong Kong and the French Indo-China border.
FE 155 Tokyo reported that Army Districts in Japan were being reorganized,
effective 1 August, to increase the efficiency of the Japanese Army
for national defense, training, and administration.
FE 158 In the opinion of the MA in Tokyo the shakeup in the Japanese
foreign service probably indicated an effort to remove men who were
pro-American or pro-Allied. He reported on 4 September that the
number of Japanese advocating an alignment with the Rome-Berlin
Axis was increasing and that from a military standpoint the Japanese
Army would not find it difficult "to take over the northern part of
Indo-China."
[l5]
FE 159 On 19 September Tokyo reported that the Japanese Army continued
to avoid further commitments in China in order to be ready for action
Page 207
if and when a favorable opportunity presented itself for a new venture
elsewhere. If the European war seemed to point to a long-drawn-out
struggle, the Japanese would eventually decide to seize the desired
territories, counting on having time to organize their conquests for
defense against the final European victor. The Japanese felt that
the United States was certain to object to this expansion, was likely
to retaliate by economic means, and might possibly oppose aggression
with armed force. The Japanese believed that time would be on their
side, however, as they felt it would be years before America's naval
and military strength could be built up sufficiently for major
operations in the Far East as long as the German menace still existed.
The most radical immediate action, however, would probably be a move
across French Indo-China, with or without acquiescence, to hasten the
conclusion of the China War.
FE 160 Tokyo reported on 6 October that the Tripartite Pact had been signed
after Japan realized that the United States was irreconcilably opposed
to Japanese expansion in Asia. Japan had decided to change her tradi-
tional policy of "at least quiet relations" with the United States and
to pursue a course to satisfy her national ambitions. The statement
of Prince Konoe, in which he flatly declared that the question of
peace or war in the Pacific "will be decided by whether Japan and the
United States respect and understand the stand of each other"
expressed the determination of the Japanese not to be dissuaded from
FE 161 their present ambitions by any half-way measures. Other reports from
FE 162 Japan and China during October emphasized the tense state of Japanese-
FE 163 American relations and the probability of continued Japanese aggress-
sion.
FE 164 On 31 October the MA in China reported that if a nonaggression pact
could be signed with Russia, Japan would probably continue her south-
ern expansion regardless of its effect on Japanese-American relations
FE 165 Details of a new "Ten-Year-Plan" to weld Japan, China, and Man-
choukuo into a close-knit economic unit were transmitted by the MA
in Tokyo on 18 November, with comment on the great potential strength
of Japan's economic position if such plans were to succeed.
FE 166 The MA in London forwarded on 20 November a report on the Jap-
anese Army which stated, among other things, that the Japanese were
probably ahead of most Western nations in landing and [16]
combined operations. Special mention was made of the emphasis
which the Japanese put on outflanking and enveloping movements in
attacking and on morale and endurance in training army personnel.
Japan was estimated to have had 1,350,000 men under arms, of whom
1,000,000 had had active service experience, as of December, 1939.
This report concluded that "the Japanese army is a formidable fighting
machine but has not yet reached the standard of efficiency of Western
armies. It is, however, trained for and will probably only required
to fight in Eastern Asia where it will have inherent advantages over
an Opponent,"
FE 167 Reports from both China and Japan discussed the Japanese Army's
FE 168 evacuation of Kwangsi Province in November, and indicated that
Japan's next move might be into southern French Indo-China.
FE 168 The MA in China, in commenting on Japan's plane with regard to
the troops being assembled on the islands of Formosa and Hainan,
observed that "some even presume an attack on the Philippines via
Lingayen Gulf."
FE 169 Tokyo reported on 12 December that Ambassador Nomura's
mission to try to improve Japanese-American relations was
probably "doomed from the start" because the Japanese Government
was "completely in the hands of the more chauvinistic elements"
and was not prepared to make concessions in the Japanese program
for East Asia which would be acceptable to American opinion.
[17] 1941
FE 170 In forwarding the English text of the Japan-Thailand Treaty
of Amity, the Tokyo MA on 11 January called attention to the
progress of Japanese designs on French Indo-China and on bases
for operations against Malaya and Singapore.
Page 208
FE 174 In February Tokyo reported on the extreme character of the
National Defense Security Act and said that its immediate effect
would be closure of many sources of information. The MA in
FE 172 China reported that Japan was promoting border trouble in order to
profit as a mediator "preserving the peace" between Thailand and
French Indo-China. He also commented on Japan's warnings to the
FE 173 United States that she would tolerate no interference in develop-
ing the East Asia economic bloc, on her inclusion of the Netherlands
Indies in this bloc, and on the reports that many Japanese divisions
were being trained on Formosa and Hainan, all of which indicated
plans to move southward. He believed that under certain conditions
Japan would move directly on the Netherlands Indies.
FE 175 On 1 March Chungking reported that foreigners generally believed
Japan's move on Singapore and the Netherlands Indies de-
pended upon the outcome of Germany's offensive against England.
FE 177 The Military Observer at Singapore on 22 March reviewed the
FE 178 disposition of British forces in Malaya with approval, but pre-
dicted difficulties in meeting flank attacks and in maintain-
ing signal communications. He also reported that the Japanese
were reconnoitering the northern border of Malaya.
FE 179 On 18 April Tokyo pointed out that although the newly-concluded
Japanese-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact obviously freed Japan on one
front and enabled her to prepare for issues elsewhere, it removed
none of the basic differences of opinion between the two countries.
FE 180 Tokyo reported the establishment of an Army Mechanization Head-
quarters charged with research into, and supervision of, training in
the use of mechanized equipment.
FE 181 Meanwhile on 2 May Tokyo cabled a warning that the reported
increases of Japanese strength in Formosa, Hainan, and French Indo-
China were greater than normal for the China Incident and that these
forces "may be there in readiness for a move against Singapore or East
Indies." A report on field operations from Tokyo,
FE 184 21 May, warned that the Japanese would probably attempt [18]
an all-out drive to conclude the China Incident in order to have a
free hand for southward expansion if the United States should be-
FE 182 come involved in the war in Europe. In transmitting the Japanese
Army Budget for the fiscal year 1941 42, the Tokyo MA contrasted
it with the budget for the preceding year and pointed out that the
China Incident expenditures alone could not explain its expansion.
FE 185 On 29 May Chunking forwarded Chinese estimates that Japan had
2000 Navy planes and 2500 Army planes.
FE 186 On 3 June Tokyo wrote: "* * * two new Inspectorates have
been established, the Chemical Warfare Inspectorate and the Com-
munications Inspectorate, thus considerably raising these two forms
of military activity above the places which they have heretofore
FE 187 occupied in the Japanese services." Tokyo also reported on the
FE 188 yellow fever inoculations given in May to certain officers attached
to northern units, on the training for transport of troops and sup-
plies by air, and on parachute troop training. The Japanese Gov-
FE 194 ernment at this time was said to be facing great difficulty in pre-
serving restraint vis-a-vis internal public pressure for strong,
direct action toward the Netherlands Indies after the failure of the
trade negotiations at Batavia.
FE 189 The Singapore MO believed that the Japanese would not move
without a 50-50 chance for success. He expressed the opinion on
5 June that the Japanese were forcing economic penetration of
Thailand and Indo-China, to be followed by military occupation
in readiness for any advantage to be had from weakened British
or American positions in that area. "With regards to defense of
Malaya," he continued, "it is believed that the present forces of
approximately 60,000 Army and 5,000 Royal Air Force personnel
can contain for six months or more the force of six divisions and
1,000 planes which it is estimated Japan can now send against them."
FE 190 Hongkong reported that on 14 June 27 Japanese transports con-
voyed by 21 destroyers were off the China coast traveling southward,
FE 192 and were expected to be off Hongkong on 17 June. On 25 June Hong-
Kong further reported that three convoys, totaling about 50 trans-
Page 209
ports, had been seen during the preceding fortnight and were believed
to have gone to the Pescadores or Formosa. The MA in
FE 191 Mexico forwarded a report that the Japanese were constructing special
small submarines for attacking the American fleet in Pearl Harbor, and
that a training program then under way included towing them from Japan
to positions off the Hawaiian Islands, where they practiced surfacing
and submerging.
[19]
FE 193 Chungking believed that the sudden German offensive against Rus-
sia had caused a temporary lull in the threatening attitude toward
FE 195 the United States, and on 27 June cabled the opinion that the
Japanese would be reluctant to make a major move until results
of border incidents revealed the potential strength of the Russians.
FE 197 On 12 July Tokyo cabled: "Considerable scale of mobilization
FE 196 and unusual secrecy attending it now beyond question." Tokyo
believed the Government, however, was still seeking to avoid positive
FE 199 commitments. Two days later Tokyo cabled that it was "now evi-
dent that large scale mobilization under way covered by unusual
secrecy. Some newly mobilized men being sent to Manchoukuo but
unable to determine number or whether any being sent south."
FE 200 Hongkong reported that 19 Japanese transports were moving south-
ward from Formosa on 12 July.
FE 201 Chinese Military Intelligence was reported on 15 July to anticipate
an early invasion of French Indo-China and to believe that areas
newly ceded to Thailand were to be used as air bases.
FE 203 On 21 July Singapore reported that the Japanese had delivered a
virtual ultimatum, with a 20 July deadline, in which they de-
manded the use of naval bases in southern French Indo-China. "If
the French refuse, regardless of British or United States inter-
ference, the bases will be taken forcibly."
FE 204 London on 22 July reported belief that the Japanese had com-
pleted all preparations for taking over French Indo-China bases.
FE 206 On 26 July Tokyo cabled: "Largest single draft since initial mo-
bilization for China War now under way under conditions extreme
secrecy involving restrictions on movements foreigners in all direc-
FE 207 tions." Some Japanese in Tokyo interpreted the 26 July freezing
of Japanese credits by the United States as the first step toward
a final break with America.
FE 208 Singapore on 29 July estimated that Japanese strength in French
Indo-China was approaching 40,000 men and believed there would
be forcible seizure of additional bases.
FE 209 Japan demanded the right to occupy Thai naval and air bases,
and on 31 July Bangkok commented: "An immediate Nipponese
move is anticipated due to Thai indecision."
[20]
FE 211 Estimates were forwarded from London on 3 August that more
FE 220 than 500,000 Japanese were mobilized during June and July, and
further British estimates, forwarded from Chungking, 20 August,
placed Japanese strength at 49 divisions, with 54 available by the
end of August when mobilization would be complete.
FE 212 The MA in Tokyo estimated that Japan had on 1 July 3200 Army
(FE 153)airplanes (1940 estimate was 2010)- a total of 3600 officers, 1600
cadets and 34,800 enlisted men (1940 estimate was 2900 officers, 1350
cadets and 28,700 enlisted men) in the Army Air corps, including 3900
pilots (1940_3100 pilots); and 136 air combat squadrons in the Army
Air Corps (1940_114 combat air squadrons).
FE 213 Tokyo estimated on 5 August that the aircraft industry, working
at maximum wartime capacity, could produce annually the equivalent
of 4,500 two-place, single-engine military airplanes. Actual produc-
tion for the period 1 July 1940 to 30 June 1941 was estimated to be
2,730 combat aircraft. It was concluded that since the end of 1939
the aircraft industry had increased production by about one-half and
of capacity by about two-thirds, while completion of construction then
in
Page 210
sight would give a capacity double that of 1939. The number of em-
ployees engaged in the manufacture of airplanes had increased 55 per
cent, and employees in engine manufacturing plants had increased in
number 57 per cent from 1938-39 to 1940-41.
FE 218 Chungking reported 15 August Japanese plans to take over inter-
national concessions and to capture American marines in Shanghai
by surprise.
FE 219 Chungking on 19 August forwarded British estimates that Japanese
tank strength, exclusive of baby tanks and armored machine gun cars,
was ten regiments, each consisting of 160 tanks, with an equal num-
ber in reserve.
FE 224 In addition the MA at Chungking on 27 August forwarded a Rus-
sian estimate that the actual strength of the Japanese Army was 48
divisions and 20 independent brigades (approximately 58 divisions)
with 300,000 men in training, possibly ready in three months. Un-
called reserves were believed to number 210,000. Eleven divisions
could be organized from reserves already trained and 16 from those
then in training. These figures include corps, army, and service
troops. Artillery was believe to be insufficient. The total potential
strength was estimated by the Russians to be 76 divisions.
[21]
FE 222 On 21 August Tokyo reported that drastic shipping control meas-
FE 223 ures were about to be instituted by the Japanese Cabinet. Tokyo also
reported five main forces, composed of ten armies (54 divisions),
located overseas.
FE 226 On 1 September the Tokyo MA reported on the organization and
high quality of the Japanese military signal communications system
and commented that Japanese radio equipment was "comparable to
our own in every respect."
FE 229 On 11 September Tokyo made a full report on the National mobili-
zation which had begun 3 June. In his opinion "in round numbers
about 700,000 were called up during this mobilization." This number
did not include the home defense "National Army," which was called
up for five days' training. "The number of men mobilized was far
too great for mere replacement purposes in existing divisions now in
Japan or on the Continent . . . While estimates of other foreign ob-
servers place the total number of men mobilized as high as 1,250,000
it is believed that these estimates . . . [are too high]." About 90
per cent of the total of 18,000 horses also mobilized at this time
were known to have gone south rather than direct to Manchoukuo or
Korea.
FE 230 Japan set up a National Defense General Headquarters (reported
by Tokyo on 16 September) in a move to improve arrangements for
the defense of Japan Proper.
FE 231 Invocation of the last drastic measures of the 1938 National Mobil-
ization Law (revised) and a tense political atmosphere indicated
according to Tokyo, that the day for a final decision on "immutable"
policies was drawing near. Internally the nation was mobilizing for
total war.
FE 239 On 14 October Hongkong reported the presence of 22 transports
on the Pearl River.
FE 240 The China MA cabled on 17 October: "Increased Nazi activity in
Japan plus the cabinet crisis and attacks on U. S. by spokesmen and
press considered strong evidence of drastic action in the near
future."
FE 242 Commenting on heavy troop movements into French Indo-China
Tokyo concluded on 20 October: "If the rumored increase goes above
the number originally agreed upon there cannot remain much doubt
as to the intention behind it."
[22]
FE 243 Tokyo reported on 20 October that General Tojo, on becoming
Premier, retained his status as an officer on the active list, an
unusual
Page 211
procedure, and concluded that the third Konoe cabinet fell because
of inability to meet army criticism of its policy toward French Indo-
China, the conversations in Washington, and its policy vis-a-vis a
weakened Russia.
FE 245 London cabled on 21 October: "Japanese troops in Indo-China will
be strengthened as follows: 36,000 there now; an estimated 20,000
enroute, and an additional 20,000 included in Japanese plans." Chung-
FE 246 king on 23 October reported the official French Indo-Chinese view to
be that the Japanese would attack Thailand about 15 November.
FE 247 A general southward movement of Japanese shipping in the Western
Pacific was reported on 27 October from Singapore, together with
intelligence that two aircraft carriers and 80 flying boats, fighters
and bombers were operating in the Mandated Islands.
FE 249 Under pretext of surveying a new commercial air route the Japanese
made a number of flights between Palau (Pelew) and Timor, violating
at the same time certain provisions of the agreement granting them
the privilege of flying over Dutch territory. Unusual passenger lists,
the absence of commercial justification, the type of equipment, and
the movement of guard vessels were reported on by the MO at
Bandoeng on 30 October.
FE 248 On 29 October the MA in Chungking radioed that Japanese strength
in French Indo-China was then 57,000 troops, and that it was steadily
increasing in numbers. He anticipated a possible drive through
FE 250 Yunnan toward the Burma Road. Thailand was reported ready to
capitulate in the hope that the country would be saved from the
ravages of war.
FE 262 The Japanese Consul General at Batavia was reported to have
recommended that on the outbreak of war all Japanese should report
promptly to the Netherlands Indies authorities for internment, thus
FE 253 avoiding violence. The Singapore British, however, were reported
by the MO to believe that no attack could be expected before April
because of the prevailing northeast monsoon over Malaya.
FE 254 The MA in London forwarded on 9 November a British opinion that
Japan no longer felt that it must make every effort to avoid war with
the United States and that Japan would find it too difficult to attack
Malaya or the Burma Road and hence might be expected to attack
Netherlands Indies.
[23]
FE 258 On 18 November Tokyo estimated production of aircraft at 200
planes per month for the Army. All factories in the aircraft industry
had gone on a 3-shift 24-hour day in mid-June. The MA estimated
that the current monthly maximum for production was 420 military
planes, including trainers.
FE 258 The London MA on 21 November cabled a summary of British
Intelligence as of 18 November, in which it was stated that failure
of agreement in the Washington talks would require a major Japanese
decision whether to risk probable war; that Japan would probably not
attack Siberia at that time; that unless agreement was reached in
Washington, the war in China would continue; that Japan probably
did not intend to attack the Burma Road at that time; and that the
occupation of Thailand, the best possibility for the moment, would
pave the way for subsequent attack upon Malaya, yet minimize the
risk of a general war.
FE 264 The Singapore MO advised the War Department on 2 December
that the alert in Malaya had been advanced from the third to the
second degree on the previous day. Japanese reconnaissance activ-
FE 280 ities over Malaya were reported.
FE 288 The MA in Melbourne radioed that on 8 December the Netherlands
Far East Command, upon learning of Japanese naval moves on Menado
and/or Ambon out of Palau, had ordered the execution of Plan A-2.
Page 212
FAR EASTERN DOCUMENTS*
CONTENTS
VOLUME I
FE Docu-
Source, Date Subject ment
Number
Tokyo M/A The Japanese Army during 1936 1
No. 8601
13 Jan 37
Tokyo M/A Comment on Current Events, January 21-30, 1937 2
No. 8631
30 Jan 37
Tokyo M/A [Japanese] Militarized Societies_Imperial 3
No. 8667 Reservists Association.
25 Feb 37
Tokyo M/A Political Issues and Problems: 70th Session of the 4
No. 8670 [Japanese] Diet.
1 Mar 37
Tokyo M/A Aircraft Production (Non-Governmental) [Japan] 5
No. 8681 Aircraft Industrial Activity.
11 Mar 37
Tokyo M/A Air Budgets [Japan]. Appropriations for Civil and 6
No. 8707 Military Aviation.
31 Mar 37
Tokyo M/A General Headquarters Air Force [Japan]. Organization 7
No. 8724 of G H Q Air Force.
9 Apr 37
Tokyo M/A Comment on Current Events, April 1-15, 1937 8
No. 8738
17 Apr 37
China M/A Situation Report, April 10-23, 1937 9
No. 9540
23 Apr 37
Tokyo M/A Distribution of Troops [Japan]. Proposed Air Regiments 10
No. 8744
23 Apr. 37
[ii]
Tokyo M/A Military Aviation [Japan]. 5th Air Regiment 11
No. 8762
5 May 37
Tokyo M/A Military Aviation [Japan]. Tokorozawa Army Air 12
No. 8767 Technical School.
8 May 37
Tokyo M/A Aircraft Production (Non-Governmental) [Japan]. 13
No. 8775 Expansion of Aviation Manufacturing Industry
11 May 37
Tokyo M/A Aircraft Production (Non-Governmental) [Japan]. 14
No. 8794 Nakajima Aircraft Factory (Otamachi, Gumma
25 May 37 prefecture)
Tokyo M/A Organization of the [Japanese] Cabinet Planning Board 15
No. 8795
26 May 37
Tokyo M/A [Japanese] Foreign Relations. North China Incident 16
No. 8893
22 July 37
Tokyo M/A National Defense Laws [Japan]. Military Secrets 17
No. 8930 Protection Law.
10 Aug 37
Tokyo M/A [Japanese] Foreign Relations. North China Incident 18
No. 8941
18 Aug 37
Tokyo M/A Distribution of Troops [Japan]. Number and 19
No. 8945 Classification of Air Units.
25 Aug 37
VOLUME II
Tokyo M/A Annual Aviation Intelligence Report [Japan]. 20
No. 8948 July 1, 1937
26 Aug 37
* Bound in fifteen volumes of Far Eastern Documents File.
Page 213
FAR EASTERN DOCUMENTS*_Continued
VOLUME III
FE Docu-
Source, Date Subject ment
Number
China M/A Situation Report, August 21_September 1, 1937. 21
No. 9588 (Shanghai Area, North China, Order of Battle).
1 Sept. 37
Tokyo M/A Foreign Relations_North China Incident 22
No. 8960
1 Sept 37
Tokyo M/A Government Budget_War Department Budget [Japan] 23
No. 8978 1937-1938.
15 Sept 37
Tokyo M/A General Mobilization [Japan] 24
No 8973
17 Sept 37
Tokyo M/A Mobilization of Industry_Munitions Industry 25
No. 8981 Mobilization Law.
17 Sept 37
Tokyo M/A Foreign Relations [Japan]. North China Incident 26
No. 8980
18 Sept 37
Tokyo M/A Comments on Aviation Personnel [Japan] 27
No. 8989
22 Sept 37
Tokyo M/A Organization and Distribution of Troops [Japan] 28
No. 9004 Movement of Air Units. Expansion Program.
30 Sept 37
Tokyo M/A Increase in Active Army Divisions [Japan] 29
No 9001
30 Sept 37
Tokyo M/A Mobilization of Personnel [Japan]. Available Man Power, 30
No. 9002
30 Sept 37
[iv]
Tokyo M/A Commissioned, Warrant and Enlisted Personnel [Japanese 31
No. 9005 Army]. Terms of Service Extended.
30 Sept 37
Tokyo M/A Foreign Relations [Japan]. The United States. 32
No. 9035
14 Oct 37
China M/O Sino-Japanese Operations 33
(Colonel Ord)
20 Oct 37
Tokyo M/A Foreign Relations [Japan]. U. S. S. R 34
No. 9059
28 Oct 37
Tokyo M/A Foreign Relations [Japan]. Great Britain 35
No. 9060
28 Oct 37
Tokyo M/A Japanese Order of Battle in North China: 36
Radiogram No. 343
29 Oct 37
Tokyo M/A Estimate of Strength of Kwantung Army 37
Radiogram No. 345
l Nov 37
Tokyo M/A Political Issues and Problems [Japan]. Organization 38
No. 9071 of the New Planning Board (Kikaku-in).
4 Nov 37
Tokyo M/A National Defense Policy_General [Japan]. Military 39
No. 9089 Secrets Protection Law Enforcement Regulations.
16 Nov 37
Tokyo M/A [Japanese] Imperial Headquarters (Daihonei) 40
No. 9099
24 Nov 37
Tokyo M/A Foreign Relations [Japan]. The Panay Sinking 41
No. 9150
22 Dec 37
*Bound in fifteen volumes of Far Eastern Documents File.
Page 214
FAR EASTERN DOCUMENTS*_Continued
VOLUME IV
FE Docu-
Source, Date Subject ment
Number
Tokyo M/A Foreign Relations [Japan]. The Panay Sinking 42
No. 9172 (Continued from Report No. 9160,
6 Jan 38 December 22, 1937).
Tokyo M/A Japanese Warehouse and Factory Stocks, War Reserves 43
(via Manila)
Radiogram No. 363
14 Jan 38
Tokyo M/A Recruitment_Enlisted Personnel [Japan]. Enrollments 44
No. 9192 in the Active Army.
18 Jan 38
Tokyo M/A Military Schools and Colleges [Japan]. 45
No. 9193 Preconscriptional Training.
18 Jan 38
Tokyo M/A Comment on Current Events, January 6-19, 1938 46
No. 9198
19 Jan 38
Tokyo M/A Foreign Relations [Japan]. Great Britain 47
No. 9201
19 Jan 38
Tokyo M/A Reactivation of Divisions of Japanese Army 48
Radiogram No. 365
22 Jan 38
Tokyo M/A Armament and Equipment. Organizational, Standard 49
No. 9206 [Japan] New Equipment for the Japanese Army Air Corps.
26 Jan 38
Tokyo M/A Japanese Troop Concentrations in Formosa 50
Radiogram No. 368
31 Jan 38
China M/A Comments on Current Events, January 13-February 1, 1938 51
No. 9633
1 Feb 38
Tokyo M/A Foreign Relations [Japan]. U.S.S.R. 52
No. 9219
2 Feb 38
[vi]
Tokyo M/A Recruitment_Enlisted Personnel [Japan]. Age and 53
No 9232 Physical Standards for Enrollment in the Active Army.
12 Feb 38
Tokyo M/A Comment on Current Events, February 3-16, 1938 54
No. 9239
17 Feb 38
Tokyo M/A Political Issues and Problems [Japan]. 73rd Diet 55
No. 9240 (Continued from Report No. 9221 February 3, 1938).
18 Feb 38
Tokyo M/A Comment on Current Events, February l8-March 2, 1938 56
No. 9256
2 March 38
Tokyo M/A Political Issues and Problems [Japan]. 73rd Diet 57
No. 9286
17 March 38
Tokyo M/A Comment on Current Events, March 3-17, 1938 58
No. 9288
18 March 38
Peiping M/A Strength of Japanese Troops in China 59
Radiogram No. 893
26 March 38
Tokyo M/A Recruitment_Enlisted Personnel [Japan], Volunteer 60
No 9322 Enrollment of Japanese Subjects_Active Army.
5 April 38
Tokyo M/A Air Defense System [Japan]. Strengthening of Japanese 61
No. 9326 Home Air Defense.
11 April 38
Tokyo M/A Comment on Current Events, April 1-13, 1938 62
No. 9332
13 April 38
Tokyo M/A Expenditures for National Defense by Japan 63
Memo to A C. of S., G-2
18 April 38
[vii]
Tokyo M/A War Department Budget [Japan]. 1938-1939 Army Budget 64
No. 9336
19 April 38
*Bound in fifteen volumes of Far Eastern Documents File.
Page 215
FAR EASTERN DOCUMENTS*_Continued
VOLUME IV_Continued
FE Docu-
Source, Date Subject ment
Number
Tokyo M/A Mobilization of Industry [Japan]. General Mobilization 65
No. 9339 Law.
19 April 38
Tokyo M/A Political Issues and Problems [Japan]. The Effect of 66
No 9376 the Protracted China Operations in Japan.
12 May 38
Tokyo M/A Comment on Current Events, April 27-May 13,1938. 67
No 9380
14 May 38
Tokyo M/A Reply to Evaluation of Reports 68
Memo for A. C. of S., G-2
16 May 38
Tokyo M/A Comment on Current Events, May 14-May 26, 1938 --
No 9397
26 May 38
Tokyo M/A Cabinet Changes Relative to China Operations; 70
Radiogram No. 386 Mobilization
26 May 38
VOLUME V
Tokyo M/A Comment on Current Events, May 27-June 9, 1938 71
No. 9422
11 June 38
Tokyo M/A Comment on Current Events, June 10-20 1938 72
No. 9440
22 June 38
China M/A Comments on Current Events, May 22-June 25, 1938 73
No. 9668
26 June 38
Tokyo M/A Annual Aviation Intelligence Report [Japan]. Annual 74
No. 9381 Aviation Intelligence Report as of July 1, 1938.
1 July 38
[viii]
Tokyo M/A Comment on Current Events, June 21-July 7, 1938 75
No. 9462
11 July 38
China M/A Comments on Current Events, June 26-July 16, 1938 76
No. 9676
15 July 38
Tokyo M/A Comment on Current Events, July 8-21,1938 7 [sic]
No. 9486
22 July 38
Tokyo M/A Comments on Current Events, August 10-27, 1938 78
No. 9539
27 Aug 38
Peiping M/A Japanese Military Operations in China 79
Radiogram (via Naval Communication Service)
5 Sept 38
Peiping M/A Japanese Operations and Troop Dispositions in China 80
Radiogram (via Naval Communication Service)
20 Sept 38
Tokyo M/A Comments on Current Events, August 28 September 21, 1938 81
No. 9574
21 Sept 38
Peiping M/A Japanese Policies toward Foreign Powers in China 82
Radiogram (via Naval Communication Service)
30 Sept 38
Tokyo M/A Government Policy Pertaining to Air [Japan]. Aircraft 83
No. 9583 Manufacturing Industry Law.
[ix]
China M/A Comments on Current Events, September 14- 8 [sic]
No. 9687 October 12, 1938
12 Oct 38
*Bound in fifteen volumes of Far Eastern Documents File.
Page 216
FAR EASTERN DOCUMENTS*_Continued
VOLUME V_Continued
FE Docu-
Source, Date Subject ment
Number
Tokyo M/A Comments on Current Political Events; October 19- 85
No. 9607 November 4 1938.
4 Nov 38
Tokyo M/A Comment's on Current Political Events, 86
No. 9619
15 Nov 38
Tokyo M/A Mobilization of Industry [Japan]. Invocation of 87
No. 9623 Article II of National Mobilization Bill.
21 Nov 38
Tokyo M/A Mobilization of Industry [Japan]. Invocations of 88
No 9633 Portions of Mobilization Law.
30 Nov 38
VOLUME VI
Tokyo M/A Distribution of Major Japanese Army Units Overseas 89
No. 9709
6 Feb 39
Tokyo M/A National and (Government Income. Taxation to Meet 90
No. 9711 1939-1940 Budget.
9 Feb. 39
Tokyo M/A Field Operations in China, January 28-February 13, 1939 91
No. 9713
13 Feb 39
Tokyo M/A Estimate of National Wealth [of Japan] 92
No. 9722
27 Feb 39
Tokyo M/A Comments on Current Events, February 28, 1939 (No. 4) 93
No. 9726
28 Feb 39
Tokyo M/A Adherence of Manchoukuo and Hungary to Anti-Comintern 94
No. 9734 Pact.
7 Mar 39
[x]
China M/A Situation Report, February 5th-March 6th, 1939 95
No. 9744
7 Mar 39
Tokyo M/A National Defense Policy_General [Japan]. Military 96
No. 9735 Resource Secrets Protection Law.
8 Mar 39
China M/A Comment on Current Events, February 9-March 9, 1939 97
No. 9745
9 Mar 39
Tokyo M/A Comments on Current Events, March 14, 1939 (No. 5) 98
No. 9739
14 Mar 39
Tokyo M/A Plan for Expansion of Production [Japan] 99
No. 9744
23 Mar 39
Tokyo M/A Appropriation for 1939-1940 Budget [Japan] 100
No. 9748
25 Mar 39
Tokyo M/A Aircraft Production [Japan]. Licensed Aircraft 101
No. 9749 Manufacturers.
27 Mar 39
VOLUME VII
Tokyo M/A Tactical Doctrine of the Japanese Army 102
No. 9755
1 Apr 39
VOLUME VIII
Tokyo M/A Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1939-1940 [Japan] 103
No. 9754
10 Apr 39
*Bound in fifteen volumes of Far Eastern Documents File.
Page 217
FAR EASTERN DOCUMENTS*_Continued
VOLUME III
FE Docu-
Source, Date Subject ment
Number
Tokyo M/A Comments on Current Events April 12, 1939 (No. 7) 104
No. 9764
12 Apr 39
[xi]
Tokyo M/A Aviation School System_General [Japan]. Tokyo Army 105
No. 9766 Air School.
13 Apr 39
Tokyo M/A Annual Aviation Intelligence Report [Japan]. 106
No. 9768 Supplementary Air Force Strength Report as of
24 Apr 39 February 28 1939.
Tokyo M/A Comments on Current Events, April 26,1939 (No. 8) 107
No. 9772
26 Apr 39
Tokyo M/A Expenditures for National Defence by Japan 108
Memo to A. C. of S., G-2
No. 9778
4 May 39
Tokyo M/A Comments on Current Events May 24, 1939 (No. 1O) 109
No. 9796
24 May 39
Tokyo M/A Recruitment_Enlisted Personnel [Japan]. Changes in 110
No. 9803 Conscription Regulations.
7 June 39
Tokyo M/A Comments on Current Events, June ,9 1939 (No. 11) 111
No. 9807
9 June 39
Tokyo M/A Annual Aviation Intelligence Report. Annual Aviation 112
No 9858 Digest. [Japan]
1 July 39
Tokyo M/A Annual Aviation Intelligence Report [Japan]. Aviation 113
No. 9850 Statistics_MID_ONI Joint Forms.
1 July 39
VOLUME IX
Tokyo M/A Comments on Current Events, July 4, l939 (No. 13) 114
No. 9833
4 July 39
China M/A Comments on Current Events, June 16 July 13, 1939 115
No. 9783
13 July 39
[xii]
China M/A Situation Report, June 12-July 11, 1939 116
No. 9784
14 July 39
Tokyo M/A Comments on Current Events July 19, 1939 (No. 14) 117
No. 9845
19 July 39
Tokyo M/A Comments on Current Events August 4, l939 (No. 16) 118
No. 9859
4 Aug 39
Tokyo M/A Minor Military Operations, Outer Mongolian Border 119
No. 9868 Incident
14 Aug 39
Tokyo M/A Reply to Evaluation of Reports 120
No. 9873
15 Aug 39
Tokyo M/A Comments on Current Events, August 25, 1939 (No. 17) 121
No. 9877
25 Aug 39
Tokyo M/A [Japanese] Foreign Relations 122
No 9893
12 Sept 39
Tokyo M/A Minor Military Operations, Outer Mongolian Border 123
No. 9883 Incident, August 13-September 10, 1939.
12 Sept 39
Tokyo M/A Shortage of Electric Power [Japan] 124
No. 9899
20 Sept 39
*Bound in fifteen volumes of Far Eastern Documents File.
Page 218
FAR EASTERN DOCUMENTS*_Continued
VOLUME IX
FE Docu-
Source, Date Subject ment
Number
Tokyo M/A Comments on Current Events September 21, 1939 125
No. 9902 (No. 18)
21 Sept 39
Tokyo M/A Minor Military Operations, Mongolian-Manchoukuo 126
No. 9900 Border Incident.
21 Sept 39
[xiii]
Tokyo M/A Foreign Relation_Press Releases on American Relations 127
No. 9906
22 Sept 39
Tokyo M/A Army Finance_Donations [Japan] 128
No. 9907
22 Sept 39
China M/A Comments from the Field No. 3 129
Memo to A. C. of. S., G-2
1 Oct 39
Tokyo M/A Aviation School System_General [Japan]. Air Cadet System 130
No. 9915
2 Oct 39
Tokyo M/A Aviation School System_[Japan]. Mito Army Flying School 131
No. 9914
5 Oct 39
China M/A Comments on Current Events October November 1, 1939 132
No. 9810
1 Nov 39
Tokyo M/A Comment on Current Events November 6, 1939 (No. 20) 133
No. 9955
6 Nov 39
Tokyo M/A Comments on Current Events November 20, 1939 (No. 21) 134
No. 9964
20 Nov 39
Tokyo M/A Recruitment_Enlisted Personnel [Japan]. Military Service 135
No. 9973 Law.
15 Dec 39
Tokyo M/A Government Budget [Japan]. Appropriations for Fiscal 136
No. 9986 Year 1940-1941
16 Dec 39
Tokyo M/A Major Military Operations Field Operations in China, 137
No. 9995 November 18-December 18, 1939.
21 Dec 39
[xiv]
Tokyo M/A Comments on Current Events, December 21, 1939 (No. 22) 138
No. 9996
22 Dec 39
VOLUME X
Tokyo M/A Major Military Operations Distribution of Major Japanese 139
No. 9998 Army Units Overseas, January 1, 1940.
9 Jan 40
China M/A Comments on Current Events January-11, 1940 (No. 1) 140
No. 9844
11 Jan 40
Tokyo M/A Comments on Current Events, February 16, 1940 (No. 24) 141
No. 10,037
17 Feb 40
Tokyo M/A Comments on Current Events, February 27, 1940 (No. 25) 142
No. 10,045
27 Feb 40
Tokyo M/A Recruitment_Enlisted Personnel [Japan]. Conscription 143
No. 10,053 Statistics
11 March 40
Tokyo M/A Comments on Current Events, March 14, 1940 (No. 26) 144
No. 10,060
14 March 40
VOLUME XI
Tokyo M/A Reciprocity in Inspections of Air Activities 145
No. 10,074
4 April 40
*Bound in fifteen volumes of Far Eastern Documents File.
Page 219
FAR EASTERN DOCUMENTS*_Continued
VOLUME XI_Continued
FE Docu-
Source, Date Subject ment
Number
Tokyo M/A Comments on Current Events, April 9 1940 (No. 27) 146
No. 10,076
10 April 40
Tokyo M/A Comments on Current Events, April 23, 1940 (No. 28) 147
No. 10,091
24 April 40
[xv]
Tokyo M/A Comments on Current Events, May 14, 1940 (No. 29) 148
No. 10,112
14 May 40
Tokyo M/A War Department Budget 1940-1941 Army Budget 149
No. 10,113
16 May 40
Tokyo M/A Major Military Operations Field Operations in China, 150
No. 10,128 May 14-June 6, l940.
7 June 40
Tokyo M/A Comments on Current Events, June 9, 1940 (No. 30) 151
No. 10,129
10 June 40
China M/A Comments on Current Events, June 12, 1940 (No. 6) 152
No. 9903
12 June 40
Tokyo M/A Annual Aviation Intelligence Report [Japan]. 153
No. 10,166 July 1, 1940
1 July 1940
Tokyo M/A Field Operations in China, June 20-July 10, 1940 154
No. 10.146
11 July 40
VOLUME XII
Tokyo M/A Newly Created Army Districts [Japan] 155
No. 10,154
24 July 40
Tokyo M/A Hokota Army Air School 156
No. 10,167
1 Aug 40
Tokyo M/A Comment on Current Events (No. 63) 157
No. 10,169
5 Aug 40
Tokyo M/A Comment on Current Events, September 4, l940 (No. 34) 158
No. 10,190
4 Sept 40
[xvi]
Tokyo M/A Field Operations in China, September 4-18, 1940, 159
No. 10,203
19 Sept 40
Tokyo M/A Alignment with Rome-Berlin Axis 160
No. 10,209
5 Oct 40
Tokyo M/A Field Operations in China, September 19-October 5, 1940 161
No. 10,215
7 0ct 4O
Tokyo M/A Language Officers in Japan 162
Radiogram
20 Oct 40
Tokyo M/A Comments on Current Events (No. 37) 163
No. 10,225
29 Oct 40
China M/A Comments on Current Events 164
No. 9944
31 Oct 40
Tokyo M/A Ten-Year-Plan for Japan, China and Manchoukuo 165
No. 10,234
18 Nov 40
London M/A The Japanese Army, General 166
No. 41,865
20 Nov 40
Tokyo M/A Field Operations in China, November 1-20, 194O 167
No. 10,241
21 Nov 40
*Bound in fifteen volumes of Far Eastern Documents File.
Page 220
FAR EASTERN DOCUMENTS*_Continued
VOLUME XII_Continued
FE Docu-
Source, Date Subject ment
Number
China M/A Situation Report, November l-December 4, 1940 168
No. 9956
5 Dec 40
Tokyo M/A Comment on Current Events 169
No. 10,257
12 Dec 40
VOLUME XIII
[xvii]
Tokyo M/A Japan-Thailand Treaty of Amity 170
No. 10,274
11 Jan 41
Peiping Comments on Current Events (No. 13) 171
Assistant M/A Memo to
A. C. of S., G-2
31 Aug 41
China M/A Situation Report, December 31-February 4, 1941 172
No. 9972
4 Feb 41
China M/A Comments on Current Events No. 13 173
No. 9973
6 Feb 41
Tokyo M/A [Japanese] National Defense Security Act 174
No. 10,317
8 Feb 41
China M/A Comments on Current Events No. 14 175
Dispatch to A. C. of S., G-2
1 March 41
Tokyo M/A Paratroops Training in Japan 176
Radiogram No. 459
13 March 41
Singapore M/O Defenses of Malaya 177
Special Report dated 22
March 41
Singapore M/O Comments, U. S. Military Observer, Singapore 178
Extracts of letter dated 29
March 41
Tokyo M/A Soviet Non-Aggression Pact 179
No. 10,382
18 April 41
[xviii]
Tokyo M/A [Japanese] Army Mechanization Headquarters 180
No. 10,383
19 April 41
Tokyo M/A Japanese Preparations for Military Action Toward l81
Radiogram (Paraphrase) Singapore and East Indies.
No. 467
2 May 41
Tokyo M/A Army Budget for Fiscal Year 1941-1942 182
No. 10,403
5 May 41
Tokyo M/A National Defense Budget 183
No. 10,414
20 May 41
Tokyo M/A Field Operations in China, May 7-21, 1941 184
No. 10,419
21 May 41
Chungking, China M/A Estimate of Japanese Air Strength 185
Radiogram
(No. 83)
29 May 41
Tokyo M/A New Inspectorate for Communications and Chemical 186
No. 10,423 Warfare [Japan].
3 June 41
VOLUME XIV
Tokyo M/A Yellow Fever Inoculations 187
No. 10,434
5 June 41
*Bound in fifteen volumes of Far Eastern Documents File.
Page 221
FAR EASTERN DOCUMENTS*_Continued
VOLUME XIV_Continued
FE Docu-
Source, Date Subject ment
Number
Tokyo M/A Transport of Troops and Supplies by Air-Parachute 188
No. 10,435 Training [Japan].
5 June 41
Singapore M/O Summary of Situation, Malaya 189
Memo for A. C. of S., G-2, HPD
5 June 41
[xix]
Hongkong M/A Japanese Convoy Movements 190
Cablegram
No. 135
16 June 41
Mexico City M/A Activities of Foreigners in Country 191
No. 9899
17 June 41
Hongkong M/A: Japanese Convoy Movements 192
Radiogram No. 145
25 June 41
China M/A Comments on Current Events No. 16 193
No. 10,001
25 June 41
Tokyo M/A Comments on Current Events No. 61 194
No. 10,447
26 June 41
Chungking M/A Russo-Japanese Border Incidents l95
Cablegram (Paraphrase)
27 June 41
Tokyo M/A Japanese Government's Plans 196
Radiogram
No 498
12 July 41
Tokyo M/A Japanese Mobilization 197
Radiogram (Paraphrase)
12 July 41
Tokyo M/A Transport of Troops and Supplies by Air_Parachute 198
No. 10,459 Training
12 July 41
Tokyo M/A Mobilization of Japanese Army 199
Radiogram
No. 500
14 July 41
[xx]
Hongkong M/A Japanese Convoy Movements 200
Radiogram
No. 168
15 July 41
Chungking M/A Probability of Japanese Invasion of Indo-China 201
Cablegram (Paraphrase)
15 July 41
Tokyo M/A Japanese Mobilization 202
Radiogram (Paraphrase)
21 July 41
Singapore M/O Japanese Ultimatum to French Indo-China 203
No. 31
21 July 41
London M/A Japanese Designs on French Indo China 204
Cablegram
22 July 41
Tokyo M/A Third Konoe Cabinet 205
No. 10,472
23 July 41
Tokyo M/A Japanese Troop Movements 206
Radiogram
No. 605
26 July 41
Tokyo M/A Comments on Current Events No. 62 207
No. 10,476
28 July 41
Singapore M/O Japanese Aggression in French Indo-China 208
Radiogram
No. 37
29 July 41
*Bound in fifteen volumes of Far Eastern Documents File.
Page 222
FAR EASTERN DOCUMENTS*_Continued
VOLUME XIV_Continued
FE Docu-
Source, Date Subject ment
Number
Bangkok M/A Japanese Demands on Thailand 2095 [sic]
Cablegram
31 July 41
[xxi]
China M/A Comments on Current Events, Hongkong 210
No. 1
1 Aug 41
London M/A Japanese Mobilization 211
Cablegram
3 Aug 41
Tokyo M/A Annual Aviation Intelligence Report 212
No 10,492
5 Aug 41
Tokyo M/A Estimates of Production [Japan] 213
No. 10,493
5 Aug 41
China M/A Situation Report, June 16-August 6, 1941 214
No. 2
6 Aug 41
Chungking M/A Japanese Troop Movements in Indo-China 215
Cablegram (Paraphrase)
8 Aug 41
London M/A Japanese Military Movements 216
Cablegram
8 Aug 41
Delhi M/O Defenses of Singapore 217
No. 2
11 Aug 41
Chungking M/A Probable Japanese Administration of International 218
Cablegram (Paraphrase) Settlement, Shanghai in Event of War.
15 Aug 41
Chungking M/A Japanese Tank Strength 219
Cablegram (Paraphrase)
19 Aug 41
Chungking M/A Divisional Strength of the Japanese Army 220
Cablegram (Paraphrase)
20 Aug 41
[xxii]
Tokyo M/A Field Operations in China, July 28-August 20, 1941. 221
No. 10,506
20 Aug 41
Tokyo M/A Comments on Current Events No. 53 222
No. 10,505
21 Aug 41
Tokyo M/A Distribution of Major [Japanese] Units Overseas 223
No. 10,511
25 Aug 41
Chungking M/A Divisional Strength of the Japanese Army 224
Cablegram (Paraphrase)
27 Aug 41
Chungking China M/A Distribution of Major Japanese Army Units 225
Radiogram No. 31
27 Aug 41
Tokyo M/A [Japanese] Signal Communication 226
No. 10,515
1 Sept 41
Singapore M/O Training in Defense Against Airborne Troops 227
No. 48
1 Sept 41
Singapore M/O Air Defense in the Far East 228
No. 52
8 Sept 41
Tokyo M/A [Japanese] Mobilization Personnel_Actual 229
No. 10,530
11 Sept 41
Tokyo M/A [Japanese] National Defense General Headquarters 230
No. 10,543
16 Sept 41
*Bound in fifteen volumes of Far Eastern Documents File.
Page 223
FAR EASTERN DOCUMENTS*_Continued
VOLUME XV
FE Docu-
Source, Date Subject ment
Number
Tokyo M/A Comments on Current Events No. 54 231
No. 10,544
18 Sept 41
Singapore M/O Estimates, Plans and Training_British Far East_for 232
No. 60 October, November, December and January.
18 Sept 41
Singapore M/O Japanese Troops in French Indo-China 233
Cablegram
No. 26
23 Sept 41
Singapore M/O Japanese Troop Movements 234
Cablegram
No. 30
25 Sept 41
Tokyo M/A Enlistment of Formosans 235
No. 10,553
26 Sept 41
Lisbon M/A Probability of War Between United States and Japan 236
Cablegram (Paraphrase)
6 Oct 41
Tokyo M/A Army Arsenals and Depots [Japan] 237
No. 10,567
11 Oct 41
Tokyo M/A Increase of Japanese Strength in Indo-China 238
Radiogram (Paraphrase)
13 Oct 41
Chungking M/A Japanese Troop Concentrations, Pearl River 239
Cablegram (Paraphrase)
14 Oct 41
Chungking M/A Japanese Cabinet Crisis and Press Attacks on U. S. 240
Cablegram (Paraphrase)
17 0ct 41
[xxiv]
Singapore M/O Analysis of Japanese Aviation Production 241
No. 87
17 Oct 41
Tokyo M/A Comments on Current Events, October 20, 1941 (No. 55) 242
No. 10,581
20 Oct 41
Tokyo M/A Resignation of Third Konoe Cabinet 243
No. 10,578
20 Oct 41
London M/A Estimate of Japan's Future Moves 244
Radiogram
No. 795
20 Oct 41
London M/A Japanese Military Plans 245
Cablegram
21 Oct 41
Chungking M/A Japanese Plans to Attack Thailand 246
Radiogram
No. 79
23 Oct 41
Singapore M/O Japanese Aircraft Carriers in Mandated Islands 247
Radiogram
No. 54
27 0ct 41
Chungking M/A Japanese Troop Strength in Indo-China 248
Radiogram
(Paraphrase)
(No. C-88)
29 0ct 41
Bandoeng M/O Japanese in Portuguese Timor 249
Report No. 4
30 Oct 41
Bangkok M/A Probable Reaction of Thailand to Japanese Attack 25 [sic]
Radiogram (Paraphrase)
(No. 38)
30 Oct 41
*Bound in fifteen volumes of Far Eastern Documents File.
Page 224
FAR EASTERN DOCUMENTS*_Continued
VOLUME XV_Continued
FE Docu-
Source, Date Subject ment
Number
[xxv]
Singapore M/O Probable Japanese Invasion of Thailand 251
Radiogram (Paraphrase)
(No. 57)
31 Oct 41
Singapore M/O Japanese Air Strength in Indo-China 252
Radiogram
5 Nov 41
Singapore M/O Japanese Troop Concentrations in China and Indo-China 253
Radiogram
7 Nov 41
London M/A Probable Japanese Attack in Netherlands East Indies 254
Radiogram (paraphrase)
9 Nov 41
Peiping M/A Japanese Proposals for Settlement of Far Eastern 255
Radiogram (Paraphrase) Problems via Envoy to Washington.
(No. 9)
11 Nov 41
Tokyo M/A Aircraft Production [Japan] 256
No. 10,593
16 Nov 41
Tokyo M/A Objective Material [Japan] 257
No. 10,608
19 Nov 41
London M/A Probable Japanese Offensive and Possibility of War With 258
Radiogram (Paraphrase) ABD Powers.
21 Nov 41
London M/A Japanese Intentions 259
No. 45481
21 Nov 41
Singapore M/O British Air Activity over China 260
Radiogram
23 Nov 41
Bandoeng M/O Comments 261
No. 8
24 Nov 41
Bandoeng M/O Japanese in the N. E. I. 262
No. 10
27 Nov 41
Chungking M/A Probable Japanese Attack on Thailand 263
Secret Message
No. 104
29 Nov 41
Singapore M/O Alerting of Malayan Command 264
No. 133
2 Dec 41
Singapore M/O Japanese Naval Operations 265
Secret Message
No. 96
6 Dec 41
Singapore M/O British Defense of Singapore 266
Secret Message
No. 97
7 Dec 41
Singapore M/O Japanese Air-Operations and Troop Movements in Malaya 267
Secret Message
No. 103
7 Dec 41
Melbourne M/A Execution of Plans Ordered by Netherlands Far East 268
Secret Message Command
No. 24
7 Dec 41
Singapore M/O Japanese Landings at Patani 269
Secret Message
No. 105
8 Dec 41
*Bound in fifteen volumes of Far Eastern Documents File.
Page 225
MID 336. (11-3-41) Alaska
Confidential
WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF,
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, G_2,
Washington, D. C., November 5, 1941.
Subject: Letter of transmittal
To: Commanding General, Alaska Defense Force.
The attached communications are forwarded for your information and such action
as you consider advisable.
Sherman Miles,
SHERMAN MILES,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.
1. Enclosures: 336. (11-3-41)_MID Summ. of Info. re Information Received via
the Orient: 11/3/41. FMH
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MID 336. (11-3X41) Phil Dept. Dept.
Confidential
WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF,
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, G_2,
Washington, D. C., November 5, 1941.
Subject: Letter of transmittal
To: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Headquarters, Philippine Department.
The attached communications are forwarded for your information and such action
as you consider advisable.
Sherman Miles,
SHERMAN MILES,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.
1. Enclosures: 336. (11-3-41)_MID Summ. of Info. re Information Received from
the orient: dtd. FMH
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MID 336. (11-3-41) PR Dept.
Confidential
WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF,
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, G_2,
Washington, D. C., November 5, 1941.
Subject: Letter of transmittal.
To: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
Headquarters, Puerto Rican Dept.
The attached communications are forwarded for your information and such action
as you consider advisable.
Sherman Miles,
SHERMAN MILES,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.
1. Enclosures: 336. (11-3-41)_MID Summ. of Info. re Information Received from
the Orient: dtd. FMH
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Page maintained by Larry W. Jewell, lwjewell@omni.cc.purdue.edu. Created: 12/12/96 Updated: 12/12/96