Page 77

PART II

PEARL HARBOR INVESTIGATION

(On the oral directive of the Chief of Staff, Brig. Gen. Carter W. Clarke is 
now re-opening the investigation concerning Pearl Harbor)

13 JULY 1945

FINDINGS

TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM F. FRIEDMAN

[1] Place: Room 2E780,
The Pentagon.
Date: 13 July 1945, 1:00 p. m. 
Present: Brig. Gen. Carter W. Clarke.
         Colonel E. W. Gibson.
         Mr. William F. Friedman. 

Gen. CLARKE. I have been directed by Gen. Marshall to reopen this 
investigation on the basis of the old order that we had here last September 9 
when we started this investigation. I would like to remind you that you are 
still under oath with reference to that and I would like to re-swear you in, 
in connection with this new investigation. Do you solemnly swear to tell the 
truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God? 

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I do. 

Gen. CLARKE State your name, rank, position and organization. 

Mr. FRIEDMAN. William F. Friedman, Director of Communications Research, Signal 
Security Agency, War Department. 

Gen CLARKE. I would like you to refresh your memory on this matter by looking 
that letter and statement over before we ask you some questions about it. It 
is a statement sent by the Navy bearing date of 5 July 1945 enclosing your 
testimony before Adm. Hewitt, together with letter from Hewitt to Marshall. 

Gen CLARKE. Will you state, to the best of your knowledge and belief and 
recollection, just what conversations you have had with Capt. Safford on this 
whole subject of the Winds message from the very beginning. 

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Well that would go back to a period of about 18 months ago when 
Capt. Safford apparently began to collect material, either on his own behalf 
or at the direction of some higher authorities, having a bearing upon the 
Pearl Harbor attack. In the course of his studies he prepared a list of the 
pertinent message or messages which he thought pertinent that came out of the 
Navy cryptanalytic bureau. Of course at that time we were working very closely 
with the Navy on the diplomatic side and we exchanged fully translations and 
technical data. There were some cases in which he wanted to piece out some 
things which might have been missing from his list of messages. He asked the 
Signal Security Agency_well he asked me first_to



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supply [2] certain of this material, which was supplied only after approval 
had been obtained to supply whatever was necessary. In the course of getting 
together these materials we compared notes of our recollections and of the 
dates because at that time he was head of the Navy cryptanalytic unit and I 
was principal cryptanalyst in the Signal Intelligence Service, and naturally I 
had a deep interest in the whole affair. At about the same time as Capt. 
Safford began his studies, I thought it would be interesting to collect 
material of that nature too. And I had a good deal of such material collected 
in the form of messages and in the form of reports, for example, the Roberts 
published report, periodical literature that was pertinent, and of course the 
technical files at the Agency were available for gathering together such 
material as I was directed to gather together upon three or four instances_I 
don't remember now just how many times. Well Capt. Safford came over to see me 
at my office.

Col. GIBSON. When, about?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I wish I had brought my notes. I can't place the date accurately 
enough for this purpose, I am afraid. 

Col. GIBSON. Do you have notes that could place it? 

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I have some notes of dates of conversations, etc. I could place 
it fairly accurately that way. It is 18 months ago anyhow and possibly more. 

Gen. CLARKE. Suppose you refresh your memory on that from your notes and_ 

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I will do that. Then I was a member of a special committee in 
connection with cryptographic security, and ad hoc committee, and we had 
occasion to go over to the building where Capt. Safford had his office from 
time to time, and every time I passed by he would ask me in or I would stop in 
to exchange a pleasant word or two with him, because he is a long-standing 
friend of mine. We had not only official relations of a cordial nature but 
also in a personal way we were fairly well acquainted. It was in that sort of 
way that we exchanged ideas about Pearl Harbor, and it was from him that I 
first learned of the Winds execute message. I had a very good recollection of 
the Winds code setup-well I had a knowledge of the Winds code setup from the 
old days of pre-Pearl Harbor, but I hadn't had any recollection whatsoever, if 
I even had knowledge at the time, of the existence of a so-called [3] Winds 
execute message. It was in these conversations that Capt. Safford stated on 
several occasions that there had been such a Winds execute message, that he 
believed that a copy of it was still in somebody's safe in the Navy 
Department, but that all of his attempts to local a copy of the Winds execute 
message in the official files of OP-20-G had been fruitless. And he naturally 
wanted to know if we had anything of that nature, and I told him I didn't know 
and I didn't look for anything like that. But some time thereafter_months 
thereafter_an official request came through from somebody higher up in the War 
Department_I think it might have been Gen. Bissell_who directed that a search 
be made through our files at Signal Security Agency to see if we could locate 
such a Winds execute message, and that was fruitless. 

Capt. Safford was very firm in his conviction that there had been  a Winds 
execute message and moreover that he himself had had it in his hands and that 
there was no question in his mind of the actual transmission of the Winds 
execute message, of its actual interception, 



Page 79

of its translation in accordance with the terms of the Winds code setup, of 
its having been handed over in the proper translated form to the Navy people 
in Naval Intelligence who had jurisdiction of dissemination- Also, he was 
apparently quite convinced that dissemination had been made to the Army, if 
not to the Signal Intelligence Service then to somebody in G-2. And he felt 
that there was some very excellent reason why no copies of this message could 
be found, and of course it left a number of questions and inferences in his 
mind which he naturally transferred to my mind. Well he also had apparently 
definite knowledge that certain testimony before one of the several Boards 
investigating Pearl Harbor showed clearly that there had been a Winds execute 
transmission and he believed that the Roberts Board had some definite 
knowledge about its having been transmitted, etc. 

Well this mysterious disappearance, according to him, of all copies of the 
Winds execute message naturally was of extreme interest to me, and some time 
after my first, or possibly second, conversation with Capt. Safford, I learned 
of the return to Washington for duty of Colonel Sadtler. We were old friends. 
I have known him for certainly 20 years. And when he came to Washington_I 
don't know whether he called me or I called him_I can't recall that_but being 
old friends, naturally we wanted to get together. Shortly after he came back 
he came over to my office one day_and I don't know whether he had specifically 
in mind to talk about Pearl Harbor [4] he may have, but at any rate in the 
course of our reminiscences about those days, he told me some very startling 
things. I might say he was quite positive about what he said and left me more 
or less breathless at one part of his news. I don't know whether I should call 
it information or what, but at any rate, when I asked him about the Winds 
execute message his recollection was apparently extremely clear, and he 
certainly was positive about his recollection of the fact that such a Winds 
execute message had been intercepted by a Navy source, because he told me that 
he was called over to either Gen. Miles' office or Col. Bratton's office_I 
don't recall which one_but at any rate he was called over to_well we may have 
to go back_I recall now that he said that Adm. Noyes called him one morning 
and my recollection is that it was on December 4_might have been the 5th_1941, 
saying_and this stands very bright in my memory_he actually quoted what Adm. 
Noyes said to him on the telephone: "It's in," meaning that the Winds execute 
message had been transmitted and had been intercepted and that it meant a 
break in relations between Japan, and he said, if I recall correctly, a break 
in relations between Japan and England, and that he had then gone over to 
either Gen. Miles' office or to Col. Bratton's office_or Adm. Noyes had 
telephoned the same message or the purport of the Winds execute message to 
Gen. Miles or to Col. Bratton. At any rate, Col. Sadtler was either summoned 
or presented himself to G-2 and said that the Winds execute message had come 
in and that something should be done right away. Well Col. Bratton, who was 
the Japanese language expert, wanted Col. Sadtler to tell him what the 
Japanese word was that had been included in the Winds execute message. I don't 
think it is necessary for me to indicate the nature of the Winds code setup, 
but at any rate, Col. Bratton wanted to know what the Japanese word was. Well 
Sadtler said 




Page 80

that he himself had not seen the message, he had gotten the information from 
the Navy source by telephone and that he therefore couldn't give the Japanese 
word. He was directed to go get the Japanese word. And here my recollection 
isn't very clear as to whether he actually went over personally to Adm. Noyes' 
office or whether he tried it on the telephone, but he apparently wasn't able 
to get the Japanese word, whatever it was. He want back to Col. Bratton or Gen 
Miles when he was unsuccessful in getting the Japanese word, or perhaps even a 
copy of the message_which is something I don't understand-that any rate when 
he was unable to produce the message or the Japanese word they said there was 
nothing they could do, that perhaps there was disbelief on their part in the 
allegation that [5] the message had been transmitted and intercepted. That of 
course was very interesting to me. And then I asked him whether he had a copy 
of the Winds execute message, and I am pretty sure in my recollection that he 
said that he never had had one and of course didn't have any now. He did have 
certain things put away in a safe deposit box, and I don't know what sort of 
documents he might have put away. But he did mention one document which was of 
very great interest to me. I have naturally not seen it_I didn't ask him to 
show me a copy of it, but this, to the best of my recollection is what he told 
me about that. He said that on Friday, possibly earlier than Friday, December 
5th, he, being deeply concerned about the threat of negotiations with the 
Japanese Government and noting the tenor of the messages that we were turning 
out in translation, became extremely apprehensive that war might break out at 
almost any hour without any declaration on the part of the Japanese. And he 
felt that somebody high up in the War Department ought to send a message out 
to Gen. Short warning him that_well I remember the words in general of what he 
said was the type of message that he actually prepared in his own hand: "Break 
in relations between Japan and United States may be expected within the next 
24 or 48 hours. Take all necessary steps to insure that there will be no 
repetition of Port Arthur." Now by that of course he meant that in the Russo-
Japanese war the Japanese attacked at Port Arthur without warning, and the 
implication was quite clear what he had in his own mind. Well he tried to 
interest some of the people in the higher echelons in sending such a message, 
and I don't recall the various steps he took. He tried somebody in G-2; he 
tried somebody in Operations Division; the Secretary of the General Staff_I 
can't enumerate them all now_but at any rate he said that he got turned down 
all the way and nobody would pay any attention to him. He claims to have a 
copy of such a proposed message, or rather a draft of a message, still in his 
possession. 

Well, in the course of this conversation I asked him, "What do you suppose 
happened to the Winds execute message which we believe so firmly was 
intercepted" Well he said he was told that they were ordered destroyed. And 
that sort of took me aback, and I said, "By whom?" And he said, "By Gen. 
Marshall." It was something that I just couldn't believe, swallow, or give 
credence to, and I expressed my disbelief, but he was pretty firm in his 
statement and there was no checking him in that. Now where he got it from I 
don't remember. I do know that on a subsequent occasion or two_because we met 
each other once or twice thereafter_my disbelief of the story was discredited 
by [6] him apparently, because he still remained



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very firm in his belief that all copies of the Winds execute message, both in 
the Army and in the Navy, had been destroyed and ordered to be destroyed.

Col. GIBSON. Did he say who told him this story that these messages had been 
burned_at Gen. Marshall's order? 

Mr. FRIEDMAN. He did. 

Col. GIBSON. Who did he say told him that story? 

Mr. FRIEDMAN. The name is Ike Spalding, but I don't recall his grade or rank. 
It is possibly Col. Spalding_I don't recall whether or not he told me of the 
official position which Spalding occupied. Now, while I am at it, I recall 
that Col. Sadtler stated that there were two messages ordered destroyed. 

Col. GIBSON. Did he say that as of his own knowledge or that somebody had told 
him there were two? 

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I am quite sure that it was not of his own knowledge. He was 
passing on second-hand information. Now what credence he gave to the story 
that was told to him I don't know_I don't recall_but the other message which 
was allegedly also one that was destroyed was a message which was supposed to 
have_well as I recall it_a message was sent by the War Department a day or two 
after Pearl Harbor, maybe Monday, to the Signal Officer, Col. Powell, asking 
him whether the radar installation in the islands was in operative order at 
the time of the attack. And the answer came back in the affirmative. Now 
whether the question and answer were destroyed, or rather alleged to have been 
destroyed, or just the answer, I don't recall, but at least there were two 
different things involved. 

Glen. CLARKE. In order words, they were on two different subjects? 

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes. 

Col. GIBSON. This talk took place in your office? 

Mr. FRIEDMAN. In my office. 

Col. GIBSON. You don't know the exact day? 

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I could place that because I made very, very rough notes of the 
substance of the conversation after-

[7] Col. GIBSON. Will you supply us the approximate date? Was anybody else in 
your office when that took place? 

Mr. FRIEDMAN. No. There were just the two of us. 

Col. GIBSON. Was that the first talk you had with Col. Sadtler after he came 
back in the War Department? 

Mr. FRIEDMAN. The very first. 

Col. GIBSON. And after that you had two or three other talks with him? 

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes. 

Col. GIBSON. Those took place where? 

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I think there was one more occasion when he came over to the 
office and the other time or two was when we were socially having dinner 
together or something like that. At my home I know here was one evening that 
we talked about it privately, just the two of us, in my own study. 

Col. GIBSON. He never claimed to you to have seen the Winds execute message 
himself? 

Mr. FRIEDMAN. He never did. 

Col. GIBSON. What did he say he had in his safe deposit box other than a copy 
of the draft of the message he tried to get sent out? 



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Mr. FRIEDMAN. I don't recall that he said anything. I may have asked him, 
"What else do you have there," and he either passed it off with a remark, 
"Well never mind, I am not telling anybody-" But I rather got the impression 
that he felt that as head of the Army communications at the time and the 
superior of the officer in charge of the Signal Intelligence Service, he might 
be called upon some day in connection with an investigation and that he had 
put certain things away. I might say that, to the best of my knowledge and 
recollection, Col. Sadtler didn't impose any secrecy upon what he was telling 
me. Oh naturally he trusted to my discretion, but I don't know whether he had 
in mind that I might or might not communicate the information to others 
entitled to know about such things or not. I certainly wouldn't have said 
anything to Capt. Safford about it if he had imposed some sort of secrecy upon 
what he was telling me, and of course you understand that, not giving any 
credence to it myself, I didn't feel that Safford would believe any of it. But 
to my astonishment [8] Safford seemed to think there might be something to it, 
at least he thought there was a Winds execute message and now it can't be 
found.

Col. GIBSON. Did Safford come to your office for some of these conferences?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes, he was over to my office two or three times in an official 
way_I mean getting together the data that he wanted. He supplied us with 
digests of his series of messages and I think he turned over a copy of 
everything he gave me to Gen. -----. I do have rough notes made of some of 
these conversations. If they are necessary I will put them at your disposal.

Gen. CLARKE. I think that would be highly advisable, because I hope this is 
the last round-up and I think that you ought to come back in the morning_ 

Mr. FRIEDMAN. General, I am going to take for the air tomorrow. I had better 
do it this afternoon. 

Col. GIBSON. At the time of Pearl Harbor and before or somewhat prior, you 
were not working with Jap cryptography, were you?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. No, I was not directly engaged in it because, as you know, I had 
been ill, had had a nervous breakdown. 

Col. GIBSON. You were putting in part time at that time? 

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes, when I came back to duty after I was discharged from Walter 
Reed, Gen. Mauborgne and Col. Minckler told me I was to take it easy and come 
and go as I pleased. I used to come in about a half hour or an hour late in 
the morning and leave a half hour before the end of the day so as to avoid 
heavy traffic. I was not in direct touch with the cryptanalytic work, although 
I did see, whenever I wanted to, the messages that came out. 

Gen. CLARKE. Who was in direct charge of the Japanese at that time, while you 
were ill?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Well of course at the time of Pearl Harbor it was Col. Minckler, 
who was in charge of Signal Intelligence Service, and then I think he was 
ranked as Captain_Capt. Doud, Capt. Svensson and then Rowlett was in technical 
charge of the Jap diplomatic operation. 

Gen. CLARKE. Do you know whether or not Col. Sadtler saw the output of the 
institution?



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[9] Mr. FRIEDMAN. I am certain that he saw the very important messages but I 
don't know that he saw everything that came out.

Gen. CLARKE. Did Gen. Mauborgne? 

Mr. FRIEDMAN. The same situation. He saw the important messages.

Gen. CLARKE. Of course Olmstead was in there_not Mauborgne.

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Well Gen. Olmstead didn't take as much interest in that sort of 
thing as Gen. Mauborgne did. He may have seen occasional messages. As a matter 
of fact, I recall Sadtler said that four or five days before Pearl Harbor, 
Gen. Olmstead was planning on going to Panama on an inspection tour and that 
Col. Sadtler tried to dissuade Gen. Olmstead from taking this trip, saying 
that "conditions are extremely critical and I believe war is going to break 
out within the next 72 hours; maybe you had better stay around." Well Gen. 
Olmstead didn't agree with him and decided to go ahead with the trip, and he 
did. I think he came back within a day or two after Pearl Harbor.

Col. GIBSON. How many were engaged in the cryptanalytic work on his Japanese 
traffic at the time of Pearl Harbor by the Signal Intelligence Service?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. You mean right in the Munitions Building_exclusively the 
intercept personnel? 

Col. GIBSON. Yes. 

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I prefer to wait until I get my notes to answer. 

Col. GIBSON. Was our section as big as the Navy section?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. They were comparable in size. I think there were just as many on 
the diplomatic side as on our side.

Col. GIBSON. Did the Army process its material as speedily after receiving it 
as the Navy did? 

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Oh yes. I believe that there is little to be said about 
comparative speeds. We were both most anxious to get these things out as 
expeditiously as possible, in fact there was a good deal of competition in 
getting out the translations and if, of course on isolated occasions, we found 
that they were a bit slow or we were a bit slow, we would inquire to see what 
had happened. Well it might have been a key had to be reconstructed or_I 
couldn't [10] say that we processed a certain message faster than they because 
there was no way of telling. 

Col. GIBSON. Who set the priorities as to which code should be read first? 

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Those were set by the Chief Signal Officer and the Director of 
Naval Communications in conference with the technical people, etc. As a 
general rule we processed the messages in the Purple system under a first 
priority because our experience had been that that was the system that carried 
the most important traffic. What came after that I don't recall exactly. It 
might have been the combined PA-K2, as I remember one designation. That was an 
enciphered code system. Then there was a J-19, also an enciphered code system, 
and the least of the codes in priority was what we called LA, and of course 
below that would come plain language. 

Col. GIBSON. The Army and Navy agreed on this priority?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Oh yes, the priorities were set by mutual agreement. 



Page 84

Gen. CLARKE. That was done in conference from the Director of Naval 
Communications and the Chief Signal Officer. Do you mean by that those two 
individuals or their representatives? 

Mr. FRIEDMAN. At that time, Gen. Mauborgne, who was in office as Chief Signal 
Officer when the odd and even date was set up as the basis for operation, took 
a great interest in this work, much more so than the Chief Signal Officer. I 
can't say absolutely at the moment that he himself sat down with his opposite 
number_at that time Adm. Noyes_and decided the priority scale, but I thing 
those two officers would certainly approve a schedule recommended by the 
technical people. Naturally the technical people would have to have a hand in 
determining those priorities because of technical considerations. The 
difficulty of each system, etc. I should have said also that the A. C. of S., 
G-2 would have a very vital word to say in the processing of priorities. 

Gen. CLARKE. You never got any guidance from the Chief Signal Officer or the 
A. C. of S., G-2 in your case, or the Office of Naval Intelligence in the 
Navy, on interception or anything of that kind? As you got this stuff you 
worked on it according to the classification of the code and its degree of 
security? Is that what I understand?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I don't understand your question. Are you asking did the 
technical people process these messages in accordance with their own ideas? 

[11] Gen. CLARKE. Their own ideas, or did they get guidance from on high? 

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Guidance from on high. The decision to process Purple messages, 
for example, would be one for the people of a higher echelon to say, "Yes, 
process those first." In fact, even in connection with the intercept operation 
and the forwarding operation, those things were all set up by priorities. The 
material that came from Honolulu, for example, had to be sent according to 
some priority system. 

Gen. CLARKE. Is it correct in your opinion_something that I have heard_that 
the most important traffic came in a lower grade system and not in the high 
grade Purple?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. No, I wouldn't subscribe to that. We occasionally did encounter 
a case in which a message of considerable importance would be in a low or 
medium grade code, but largely because it came from a place which didn't have 
the higher level material, or there have been cases in which some sort of a 
condition of a breakdown of a machine at a station which was provided with a 
machine would cause a message to go in a code of a lower category. 

Gen. CLARKE. In our discussions here we have referred a number of times, and 
so have you, to the so-called Japanese Purple system. Will you state 
approximately when that was solved and by whom it was solved?

Mr. FRIEDMAN. To the best of my recollection, the first complete translation 
was handed in some time in August, it might have been the early of August or 
the middle part of August. We had been working on the Japanese Purple system. 
This system had superseded a system known as the Red, which was also a machine 
cipher. But when the Purple system was first introduced it presented an 
extremely difficult problem on which the Chief Signal Officer asked us to 
direct our best efforts. After work by my associates when we



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were making very slow progress, the Chief Signal Officer asked me personally 
to take hand. I had been engaged largely in administrative duties up to that 
time, so at his request I dropped everything else that I could and began to 
work with the group. Naturally this was a collaborative, cooperative effort on 
the part of all the people concerned. No one person is responsible for the 
solution, nor is there any single person to whom the major share of credit 
should go. As I saw, it was a team, and it was only by very closely 
coordinated teamwork that we were able to solve it, which we did. It 
represents [12] an achievement of the Army cryptanalytic bureau that, so far 
as I know, has not been duplicated elsewhere, because we definitely know that 
the British cryptanalytic service and the German cryptanalytic service was 
baffled in its attempts and they never did solve it. After we solved the 
Purple system, the technical data necessary to operate the system and a 
machine constructed by ourselves were turned over to the British so that they 
were in position to process Purple messages also. We did the same so far as 
concerns the Navy. We provided them with a Purple machine or two. 

Gen. CLARKE. On approximately what date did we give the Purple machine to the 
British? 

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I recall that very clearly. A joint U. S. Navy-U. S. Army 
cryptanalytic mission consisting of four officers, two from each service, went 
to London for the purpose of establishing technical cooperation with the 
British cryptanalytic service. It was at that time the Army furnished a Purple 
machine and the technical data to the British. 

Gen. CLARKE. To the best of your knowledge and belief then, was all of the 
traffic which has since become known as the Pearl Harbor traffic in these 
Pearl Harbor investigations available to the British at the same time as it 
was available to the American Army and Navy? 

Mr. FRIEDMAN. I believe that to be a correct statement. The only thing that 
they might lack would be certain intercepts which they were not in a position 
to_ 

Gen. CLARKE. You mean by that individual messages? 

Mr. FRIEDMAN. Yes. 

Gen. CLARKE. Did you ever discuss or hear them discuss the Pearl Harbor 
traffic? 

Mr. FRIEDMAN. No. 

Gen. CLARKE. Or any of the traffic leading up to Pearl Harbor? 

Mr. FRIEDMAN. No. The only thing that I do know is that there exists in the 
files one or two messages which came from British sources out in the Far East. 
If you remember, the British had some relations with the Dutch in the East 
Indies. 

TESTIMONY 0F COL. OTIS K. SADTLER

[1] Place: Room 2E780,
The Pentagon
Date: 14 July 1945. 
Time: 10:00 a. m. 
Present: Brig. Gen. Carter W. Clarke.
         Colonel E. W. Gibson.
         Colonel Otis E. Sadtler. 



Page 86

Col. GIBSON. Col. Sadtler, you realize that you are under oath and you are 
fully aware of what your rights are? 

Col. SADTLER. Yes. 

Col. GIBSON. I want to ask you first if you ever saw a so-called Winds execute 
message? 

Col. SADTLER. I did not. 

Col. GIBSON. To your knowledge, was such a message ever in the War Department? 

Col. SADTLER. It was not. 

Col. GIBSON. And all that you know about that message and all contact that you 
had with it is in your former testimony? 

Col. SADTLER. That is right. I might further add that the information came 
from Adm. Noyes.

Col. GIBSON. Mr. William F. Friedman has testified before Adm. Hewitt of the 
Department of the Navy recently as follows: "Then if I remember correctly, I 
asked Col. Sadtler whether he had a copy, had ever gotten or seen a copy of 
this message, and his answer was, if I remember correctly, that he hadn't 
himself seen a copy but that he had been told by somebody that the copies had 
been ordered or directed to be destroyed by Gen. Marshall." Did you tell Mr. 
Friedman that you had been told by somebody that the copies of the Winds 
execute message had been ordered or directed to be destroyed by Gen. Marshall? 

Col. SADTLER. I will make an absolute flat denial of that statement made by 
Mr. Friedman because, as far as I know, that message was never in the War 
Department and I never made any statement that Gen. Marshall ordered it 
destroyed or that anyone told me that Gen. Marshall ordered it destroyed. 

[2] Col. GIBSON. When did you return to duty in Washington this last time? 

Col. SADTLER. About March 28, 1944. 

Col. GIBSON. After your return during the following summer and fall on 
occasion did you visit with Mr. Friedman? 

Col. SADTLER. Yes. 

Col. GIBSON. And did you visit about Pearl Harbor, amongst other things? 

Col. SADTLER. Yes. We had discussed what had happened at that time. 

Col. GIBSON. Did some of those discussions take place in Mr. Friedman's 
office? 

Col. SADTLER. Well I assume they did because I have been in his office several 
times. I had talked to him on occasions about what had happened, not only in 
his office but at his house. 

Col. GIBSON. At some time did somebody tell you that messages pertaining to 
the Pearl Harbor affair were being destroyed? 

Col. SADTLER. Yes. Some time during 1943 Gen. Isaac Spalding at Ft. Bragg, 
North Carolina, told me something to the effect that J. T. B. Bissell had told 
him that everything pertaining to Pearl Harbor was being destroyed or had been 
destroyed. 

Col- GIBSON. Is it possible that you told that to Mr. Friedman in one of your 
conversations? 

Col. SADTLER. It is possible. 

Col. GIBSON. You have been an old friend of Mr. Friedman for many years?



Page 87

Col. SADTLER. I have known him for over 25 years. 

Col. GIBSON. This Colonel, now Brigadier General J. T. B. Bissell, that you 
speak of, do you know him personally? 

Col. SADTLER. I do not. 

Col. GIBSON. To your knowledge have you ever met him?

Col. SADTLER. Yes, I have met him casually but I doubt if I would recognize 
him today if I saw him.

[3] Col. GIBSON. During the period immediately prior to Pearl Harbor did you 
have any official business of any nature with the then Col. Bissell? 

Col. SADTLER. No. 

Col. GIBSON. And your only business of an official nature that you did with G-
2 at that particular time was done with Col. Rufus Bratton and Gen. Miles? 

Col. SADTLER. Yes, and Hayes Kroner. Mostly with Bratton and Miles. They were 
my normal contacts. 

Col. GIBSON. Col. Sadtler, Mr. Friedman also has testified that on or about 
the time Adm. Noyes advised you that the Winds execute message was in that you 
prepared a draft of a message that you wanted to suggest be sent to the 
Commanding Generals of the Philippines, Hawaii and Panama. Is that so?

Col. SADTLER. That is correct.

Col. GIBSON. Will you relate now what happened about that? 

Col. SADTLER. In substance the message was about as follows: "Reliable 
information indicates war with Japan in the very near future. Take every 
precaution to prevent a repetition of Port Arthur. Notify the Navy. Signed 
Marshall."

Col. GIBSON. Did you type that message out yourself or who did the typing?

Col. SADTLER. I am positive that I did it because Miss Robinson says she never 
saw it.

Col. GIBSON. Did you have that message with you when you went to discuss Adm. 
Noyes' message to you that the "Winds Execute" messages was in, with Col. 
Bratton and Gen. Miles?

Col. SADTLER. I did not. After leaving Gen. Miles' office where Gen. Miles and 
Col. Bratton more or less casually threw off this information about the 
execute of the Winds message, I went back to my office and thought that 
something ought to be done. That message was typed up and I went to see Gen. 
Gerow and talked this over for a few moments with him and suggested that he 
notify them. Gerow's reply to the effect was that they had been adequately 
notified, as I recall it. I then went to see Secretary of General Staff, Col. 
Bedel [sic] Smith, and told him what had been done and [4] suggested he send a 
message. His reply was to the effect that he refused to discuss it further.

Col. GIBSON. Did Gen. Gailey or Gen. Gerow see the message you had prepared_or 
Gen. Bedel Smith?

Col. SADTLER. No, I don't think so.

Col. GIBSON. Col. Sadtler, I also want to ask you if it is true that early in 
December you tried to dissuade Gen. Olmstead from making a trip to Panama 
because you felt sure that war was going to break out.

Col. SADTLER. That is correct_on December 1. 

Col. GIBSON. Tell us about that. 



Page 88

Col. SADTLER. On December 1, when Gen. Olmstead was making preparations to go 
to Panama, I attempted to dissuade him from his trip because I felt positive 
that war would be declared before he returned and I thought that it was his 
duty to be in Washington. 

Col. GIBSON. What did he say? 

Col. SADTLER. He said, "I am going anyhow and that's all there is to it." 

Col. GIBSON. When did Olmstead return, do you know? 

Col. SADTLER. About the 20th of December.

Col. GIBSON. Did he have any conversation with Marshall when he got back, do 
you know? 

Col. SADTLER. He said that he had gone to Gen. Marshall or had visited Gen. 
Marshall and Gen. Marshall had told him that his men that he had left in 
charge while he was gone had not performed 100 percent, or words to that 
effect. Olmstead said, "Why didn't you act on the information you already 
had?" 

Col. GIBSON. Col. Sadtler, have you ever talked anything pertaining to Pearl 
Harbor over with Capt. Safford of the Navy? 

Col. SADTLER. No. 

Col. GIBSON. Have you discussed it with any naval officer who had any direct 
contact with naval communications at the time of Pearl Harbor? 

[5] Col. SADTLER. Only with Adm. Noyes. 

Continued_17 July 1945, 9:30 a. m. 
Place: Room 2E780, The Pentagon. 
Present: Brig. Gen. Carter W. Clarke. 
         Col. E. W. Gibson
         Col. O. K. Sadtler

Col. GIBSON. Col. Sadtler, Mr. Friedman has also testified that you told him 
that you had heard that in addition to the Winds execute message being ordered 
destroyed by Gen. Marshall, there was a second message that was ordered 
destroyed by Gen. Marshall. This second message was a message which was the 
result of a message sent by the War Department a day or two after Pearl Harbor 
to the Signal Officer, Col. Powell, asking him whether the radar installation 
in the Islands was in operative order at the time of the attack, and the 
answer came back in the affirmative. Did you tell Mr. Friedman that you had 
heard that the message of inquiry relative to the working of the radar 
installation in the Islands or the answer thereto had been destroyed? 

Col. SADTLER. I did not. The circumstances attending that message are about as 
follows: I sent the inquiry, with the approval of the General Staff, inquiring 
as to the operation of radar on December 7. Upon receipt of that message Col. 
Colton, Acting Chief Signal Officer, personally took a copy of it into Gen. 
Marshall's office. I gave a copy to Geo. Gerow. Col. Colton, upon his return 
from Gen. Marshall's office, said that he wanted all copies of that message 
collected and held intact as, inasmuch as radar and the damage done at Pearl 
Harbor secret at that time, the information was not to be disclosed. Gen Gerow 
kept his message and I think that Col. Handy had it and he held it.

Col. GIBSON. To your knowledge, did Gen. Marshall ever order this radar 
message, either the original inquiry or the answer thereto, destroyed?



Page 89

Col. SADTLER. No. To my knowledge, he did not. 

Col. GIBSON. Did you ever hear from any source that he had ordered either of 
those destroyed? 

Col. SADTLER. No. 

TESTIMONY OF BRIG. GEN. ISAAC SPALDING

[1] Place: Room 2E780, 
The Pentagon Building, Washington, D. C
Date: 17 July 1945. 
Time: 9:30 a. m. 
Present: Brig. Gen. Carter W. Clarke. 
         Brig. Gen. Isaac Spalding
         Col. E. W. Gibson.
         Col. O. K. Sadtler. 

Gen. CLARKE. Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you give in this case 
will be the truth, so help you God? 

Gen. SPALDING. I do. 

Gen. CLARKE. Will you state your name, rank, organization and present station? 

Gen. SPALDING. Isaac Spalding, serial number O3383. Brigadier General, USA, 
Station Ft. McPherson, Georgia. 

Gen. CLARKE. What were your station and duties in the three months preceding 
Pearl Harbor? 

Gen. SPALDING. I was on duty as Chief of the Officers Branch of the office of 
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, War Department up to the night of December 3, 
1941, and on the morning of December 4, 1941 I became Chief of the Army 
Exchange Service, which lasted for some time after the Pearl Harbor incident.

Gen. CLARKE. Had you previously been on duty in the old War Plans Division? 

Gen. SPALDING. I had. I was on duty in the War Plans Division from the summer 
of 1932 to the summer of 1936.

Gen. CLARKE. But you were not in the War Plans Division on your return from 
that tour of duty you were then on just preceding Pearl Harbor? 

Gen. SPALDING. No. I was placed on duty in G-1, War Department, on January 11, 
1941 on my return from overseas service in Hawaii 

Gen. CLARKE. Were you on occasion called into conference by the War Plans 
Division with reference to Hawaiian war plans? 

Gen. Spalding. During my four year tour you mean? 

[2] Gen. CLARKE. While you were with G-1. 

Gen. SPALDING. I don't remember ever talking with anyone in WPD bout any war 
plans. I had many friends there and would occasionally go over and see them on 
matters connected with personnel. I remember someone in the summer of '41_I 
think it was Gen. Gerow_stating that a message had been sent to the 
Philippines making Gen. MacArthur the head of all our Army forces over there, 
but I think that is the nearest that I ever came to anything connected with 
the war plans in any way. I don't remember talking about Hawaii with anyone in 
'41, nor do I remember who was in charge of the Hawaiian Defense Project. 




Page 90

Gen. CLARKE. Did you have knowledge of the intercepted traffic which was being 
produced by the Signal Corps at that time? 

Gen. SPALDING. No. My friend Spencer Akin was in charge of some kind of a 
secret room which was right over G-1 in the same wing of the Munitions 
Building, and I had planned to go up and visit Akin and see what was going on 
but I never did go and Akin was transferred away. I knew they had some kind of 
a secret room up there and I thought it was something with breaking down code 
but I don't know what they did.

Col. GIBSON. General, Mr. William F. Friedman, who is at present Director of 
Communications Research of Signal Security Agency of the War Department, has 
testified that sometime in 1944, in a conversation with Col. O. K. Sadtler, 
that Col. Sadtler told him that he had been told that a certain message 
pertaining to a warning on the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, which we 
called the Winds execute message, had been ordered destroyed by Gen. Marshall 
and that another message dealing with the question of whether or not the radar 
installation on the Hawaiian Islands was in operation on the date of Pearl 
Harbor, and the answer thereto, had been destroyed by Gen. Marshall's order. 
Mr. Friedman further testified that Col. Sadtler told him that he had been 
told this story by you. Thereafter Col. Sadtler testified that he had never 
told Mr. Friedman that he had heard that Gen. Marshall had ordered this so-
called Winds execute message destroyed or the radar message destroyed, but 
that he had been told by you at Ft. Bragg sometime in 1943 that the then Col. 
J. T. B. Bissell, now Brigadier General Bissell, had been ordered to destroy 
all matters pertaining to Pearl Harbor, or that in substance. I want to ask 
you, having given you this background, first, did you tell Col. Sadtler that 
in substance? 

[3] Gen. SPALDING. I did not tell him that in substance, answering 
specifically your question, but I did tell him certain things. But at no time 
was the name of Gen. Marshall ever brought into the conversation or 
discussion.

Col. GIBSON. What was it you did tell Col. Sadtler? 

Gen. SPALDING. I would like to make a rather full statement. By so doing maybe 
I can answer questions which you might specifically ask me later. I wish it to 
appear in my testimony that it is my full belief that the Secretary of War, 
Mr. Stimson, and the Chief of Staff, Gen. Marshall, are not involved in any 
way whatsoever with the testimonies which I am about to give, and it is my 
belief that neither one knew anything of it. 

I was around in the War Department for a year preceding Pearl Harbor and for 
six months thereafter, and of course there were various conversations about 
Pearl Harbor after that "blitz." It was all very vague to me as to why the A. 
C. of S., G-2, Gen. Sherman Miles, had not diagnosed this coming war, and it 
was rather queer to me that soon after the blitz he was transferred to other 
duty and Gen. Raymond Lee was brought back from England to be the War 
Department G-2. This transfer aroused my curiosity but I never did know why it 
was done. 

In the summer of 1943 I was stationed at Ft. Bragg, and certain troops at Ft. 
Jackson, South Carolina, came under my command. It was my custom to visit the 
troops at Ft. Jackson about once a week for from one to three or four days at 
a time. In July of 1943 I moved



Page 91

whole headquarters and headquarters battery from Ft. Bragg down on to the 
reservation at Ft. Jackson for two weeks field training. Previous to that time 
and during July and for several weeks after, Col. John T. Bissell, Field 
Artillery, commanded one of my artillery groups at Ft. Jackson, and so I 
requested him to make the necessary reservations for camping space and 
maneuver ground on the Ft. Jackson Reservation. Upon my arrival at this camp 
site I found that Col. Bissell and his staff had made arrangements preliminary 
to our entering the camp and Col. Bissell himself had established his command 
post under canvas within a few hundred yards of my camp site. We were thus 
camped close together for several days and during that time we often sat under 
the trees and talked in the late afternoons and early evenings. Bissell had 
been on duty in the War Department and I believe part of his [4] duties were 
connected with secret service operators. Naturally we talked about matters 
which were of interest to each other and I had some curiosity on our secret 
service but I learned nothing from him except such generalities as that we had 
considerable such effort now that the war was under way. I remember telling 
him that G-2 denied during peacetimes that they ever had any operators, but I 
didn't believe those statements. He made no remark as to whether they did or 
didn't. I remember telling him that I had always wanted to be a sleuth or a 
detective of some kind but I didn't think I would be a success at it. But I 
was always curious concerning detective stories, etc. It is my opinion and 
recollection that Bissell in no way whatsoever revealed any secrets connected 
with his duties concerning our secret operators. I remember that I would have 
liked to have him talk more but he didn't. 

We talked about the Pearl Harbor incident. I remember expressing to him my 
failure to understand how Sherman Miles and the Navy could fail to discover 
that those Japanese vessels had left home ports. I was under the impression 
from my experience in both the Army and Navy War Colleges and in the War 
Department General Staff and in my dealings with the Navy while on duty in the 
General Staff, from all these experiences I had thought or believed that our 
Navy kept track of every vessel carrying the Japanese flag, both commercial 
and war vessels, and I didn't see how those vessels in peacetime could get 
away from Japan and come down near Hawaii without our Navy knowing it. I was 
astounded at their ignorance or inability to detect that! I remember shooting 
off my mouth about Sherman Miles, for whom I didn't have a very high regard 
professionally, and I think I remember telling him what I told Walter Krueger 
when he asked me what I thought about Sherman Miles, I told him that I thought 
Miles was a "stuffed shirt," and Krueger was astonished that I should talk 
that about him. And so by our talking we got into the subject of Pearl Harbor 
and the information which we must have had and which the Navy must have had 
and our failure to give some kind of a better warning to Gen. Short. I 
remember expressing my disgust at those airplanes up at Wheeler Field all 
lined up for Saturday morning inspection and were still there on Sunday 
morning, and I told him of my disgust that those radars weren't working, that 
I knew when I left Hawaii in 1940 they were being installed. And Bissell said 
that certain messages had been received and were in the files of G-2 and he 
deemed it most necessary [5] to destroy them. I got the impression that these 
messages were derogatory to 



Page 92

the War Department and that he (Bissell) on his own responsibility destroyed 
them. I had the impression that they were secret information which it was most 
desirable that the President, Congress, the public, Mr. Stimson and Gen. 
Marshall not know about. I had the feeling that Bissell destroyed them without 
even Gen. Raymond Lee, the G-2 at that time, knowing they were in existence.

Now the question may come up as to sobriety on this occasion. We were out 
there under the trees and upon my arrival a bottle of Scotch and two or three 
bottles of soda water had been presented to me and when I broke camp 14 days 
later I returned the unopened bottle of Scotch and possibly the soda water to 
the officer who had given them to me upon my arrival at Ft. Jackson. I may 
have had some liquor of my own with me and Bissell and I may have had a drink 
or two of Bourbon which I provided_I don't remember_but it is customary for me 
to drink one or two highballs after the day's work is over. Sometimes the 
day's work is not over until late at night, midnight or later, and then of 
course I don't drink, but I am sure I was sober all the time I was down there 
in camp with my headquarters battery and headquarters staff. 

Gen. CLARKE. Was Bissell sober? 

Gen. SPALDING. Yes. Bissell and I, in the course of three or four months that 
he was in my command, we would have a bottle of beer together or over at his 
quarters before supper have a bottle of beer or a highball. I loafed with him 
considerable, was with him a lot during duty hours, and never knew him to take 
a drink during duty and after retreat we would have a drink or two, but I 
never remember taking more than two. Bissell carries liquor very well and did 
not drink to excess. 

Now about this occasion of my talking to Sadtler. It is natural that we talk 
about those things which worry us a little and Sadtler dropped into my house 
one evening at Ft. Bragg about August of 1943 and we talked for an hour or two 
there in my home. Col. Sadtler does not drink alcoholics, to my knowledge, and 
didn't there at my house. I knew that he was interested in Pearl Harbor and I 
told him of this incident of my talking with Bissell out there under the trees 
and [6] Bissell having told me that he had destroyed what I would call vital 
records which, if known, would be very unpleasant for the War Department. I 
don't remember that Bissell used those expressions but that is the impression 
which I got. 

Gen. CLARKE. I got the impression from your statement that these messages were 
from secret operatives. Was that your impression? 

Gen. SPALDING. No, they might have been either, but they were so hot that if 
Gen. Marshall had known about them it would have been very disagreeable for 
Gen. Marshall, but what the source of them was I don't remember that Bissell 
indicated it in any way whatever. 

Col. GIBSON. You definitely understood, then, from him that this destruction 
was done on his own initiative and not at the suggestion of anyone else? 

Gen. SPALDING. That is absolutely the impression I have. 

Col. GIBSON. Have you ever heard from any other source of any of these Pearl 
Harbor records, the claim that they were destroyed? 

Gen. SPALDING. No. Bissell was the only man who ever told me anything, that I 
remember. I hope it is clear in here that I wouldn't want anything I say to 
transgress the integrity of Mr. Stimson or



Page 93

George Marshall. They are two of the finest men in the world and they would 
hew to the line I know.

TESTIMONY OF MAJ. GEN. RALPH C. SMITH

[1] Place: Room 2E780,
The Pentagon.
Date: 18 July 1945.
Time: 10:05 a. m.
Present: Maj. Gen. Ralph C. Smith.
         Brig. Gen. Carter W. Clarke.
         Col. E. W. Gibson. 

Gen. CLARKE. Do you solemnly swear that the statements you make this case will 
be the truth, so help you God?

Gen. SMITH. I do.

Gen. CLARKE. Are you familiar with your rights as a witness, self-
incrimination?

Gen. SMITH. I am.

Gen. CLARKE. Will you state your name, rank, organization and station. 

Gen. SMITH. Major General Ralph C. Smith. Presently Military Attache, Paris, 
France. 

Gen. CLARKE. What were your duties in the three months preceding and 
approximately 3 months following the so-called Pearl Harbor incident? 

Gen. SMITH. During the period specified and for something more than a year 
previous, I was Executive Officer of the Military Intelligence Division. 

Gen. CLARKE. Under General Miles?

Gen. SMITH. Under General Sherman Miles, until his relief in December 1941. 
Thereafter I occupied the same position with respect to Brig. Gen. Raymond 
Lee.

Gen. CLARKE. You never were Executive Office under Gen. Strong?

Gen. SMITH. My recollection is that Gen. Strong was actually designated as G-2 
after I left the G-2 Division. He was acting as G-2 for a week or so prior to 
my departure.

Gen. CLARKE. Will you state in a general way what your duties as Executive 
Officer were?

Gen. SMITH. As Executive Officer of the Military Intelligence Division I was 
charged primarily with responsibility for all administrative functions of the 
Division. As Executive Officer I was also head of the Administrative Branch. I 
conceived my mission to be to relieve the [21] G-2 from as much concern about 
the routine operation of his Division as possible. The Administrative Branch 
included matters such as finance, personnel, both military and civilian, 
allotment of office space (Which I may say parenthetically was a terrible 
headache at that time because we were being moved from one part of the 
Munitions Building to another). I also had charge of the filing system, the 
records room and the general procedure of handling records. The Translation 
Section was also included. Being charged primarily with administrative 
responsibilities, I did not have any direct responsibility in the intelligence 
chain. Because of our close relationship with the G-2, I was aware of a great 
deal that was going on in the intelligence and counter intelligence part of 
the



Page 94

Division's work. But I did not have any direct responsibility for operating 
that. The chain of responsibility passed directly from G-2 to the heads of the 
Intelligence Branch, Counter Intelligence Branch and Plans and Training 
Branch. 

Col. GIBSON. Were you aware of the existence at that time in 1941 of the so-
called Magic material? 

Gen. SMITH. I was. Of course, as you know, every effort was made to limit to 
the very minimum, persons who had contact with or even knowledge of the 
existence of Magic material. However, because of my position, I knew of 
course. Of our work in the Signal Intelligence Service of intercept and I was 
aware of our success in breaking the Japanese codes. I knew that this material 
was being handled in the raw in the Far Eastern Section by Japanese experts 
and that the product of the code-breaking work was being distributed in locked 
leather pouches to the Chief of Staff, the Secretary of War, G-2 and later to 
the State Department and the White House. 

Col. GIBSON. Will you state your recollection as to how this Magic material 
was handled between the period of 1 July 1941 and Pearl Harbor? 

Gen. SMITH. The head of the Far Eastern Section, Col. Bratton, and his 
principal assistant, Col. Pettigrew, were the principal ones involved in 
handling this material. I knew that they had a great deal of contact with Gen. 
Miles, the head of G-2, on this material and I was generally cognizant of its 
nature and sometimes of its context, but I made no effort to pry into the 
exact nature of it because it did not concern my direct functions.

[3] Col. GIBSON. At some time did you read this material? 

Gen. SMITH. Along in the late summer, as I recall it, Gen. Miles gave me a key 
to the Magic pouches. If I remember correctly, it was when he was absent on 
leave for a few days. For a period of several weeks or a month, approximately, 
I saw the pouches and read the contents of most of them. Later in the fall, it 
was about September, Gen. Miles told me that the Chief of Staff had expressed 
the desire to restrict to the absolute minimum persons having access to and 
knowledge of the Magic material. Therefore I returned to Gen. Miles the key to 
the pouches that I had and after that date I did not see any of the material, 
so far as I remember. 

Col. GIBSON. Who delivered those pouches to Gen. Miles? 

Gen. SMITH. As a matter of routine, Col. Bratton. Sometimes Col. Pettigrew. I 
do not recall their being handled by any other person. 

Col. GIBSON. Was that delivery made daily? 

Gen. SMITH. Yes. 

Col. GIBSON. On occasions did you see Col. Bratton with several pouches in his 
possession? 

Gen. SMITH. Yes. Col. Bratton would have several pouches because similar ones 
were being given to the Chief of Staff, to the best of my recollection. I 
believe that the same copy went from the Secretary of War's office to the 
Chief of Staff, and I know that there was a separate copy for G-2. Whether 
there was a third copy I am not certain. 

Col. GIBSON. Is it your recollection that WPD had a pouch? 

Gen. SMITH. Yes. I am certain that Gen. Gerow had access to the material 
because I remember some incidents through the fall when I made contact with 
Gen. Gerow and arranged a meeting with him for Gen. Miles and vice versa. I 
also know that the Navy was handling



Page 95

the material because I remember there were conferences of Adm. Wilkinson with 
Gen. Miles and Gen. Gerow in the G-2 office. 

Col. GIBSON. Is it your recollection that the State Department received a 
pouch? 

[4] Gen. SMITH. Yes. A pouch went to the State Department, delivered there in 
person I believe by Col. Betts, who was the liaison officer with the State 
Department at that time. That I am a little hazy on,  whether it was Col. 
Betts or Col. Bratton that took it over. And I know a pouch was taken to the 
White House on many days. 

Col. GIBSON. Will you describe how the contents of the pouch looked when you 
saw them and about how many sheets might be in the pouch? 

Gen. SMITH. The Magic pouches were leather brief cases, I believe, with a 
zipper opening and susceptible of being locked with a padlock. On removing the 
padlock and opening the zipper the material inside was contained in a loose-
leaf red board cover. In the ones that I recollect seeing there were always 
from three to a dozen or 15 pages. They were always carbon copies of other 
messages. 

Col. GIBSON. Did Gen. Miles destroy the contents or what happened to them?

Gen. SMITH. Gen. Miles would read the material, place it in the locked pouch 
and leave it on his desk and I would return it to Col. Bratton or Col. 
Pettigrew the next time they came up. 

Col. GIBSON. Did you ever hear of a so-called Winds code message prior to 
Pearl Harbor?

Gen. SMITH. Not that I can recall. 

Col. GIBSON. Were you in any conferences of G-2 immediately prior to Pearl 
Harbor or the month prior to Pearl Harbor where the question of Japan and its 
capabilities and intentions were discussed? 

Gen. SMITH. I did not attend such conferences. I think I recall a meeting in 
Gen. Miles' office attended by Col. Kroner, Col. Bratton, Col. Pettigrew, Col. 
Betts and some of the other members of the Intelligence brain-trust. I did not 
participate in the conference but I knew it was being held. 

Col. GIBSON. These estimates of the situation that were being prepared by the 
various intelligence branches during that period of time. Did they come 
through your office? 

Gen. SMITH They came through my desk. The volume of business in my office was 
increasing in geometric proportions at [5] about that time. I tried to read 
those estimates insofar as I could because I wished to keep abreast of the 
general situation. However, many of them I was unable to touch; they would go 
over my desk to G-2 and out again. 

Col. GIBSON. The Military Attache reports and observer reports that came in 
from the field did not cross your desk?

Gen. SMITH. They did not. They went directly from the mail room where they had 
a processing system that would get them with the minimum delay to the 
interested section in the Intelligence Branch. About the only thing that came 
to the front office would be the evaluations and estimates based on the 
Military Attaches' raw material. Sometimes I know, when a report would be of 
particular interest, it would be brought up and shown to Gen. Miles. I 
remember some particularly good reports by Gen. Lee's office in London and 
from the office in Germany.



Page 96

Col. GIBSON. Were you informed prior to Pearl Harbor of the contents of the 
message that our Government had sent to the Imperial Government of Japan along 
in the latter part of November 1941? 

Gen. SMITH. I recall vaguely that such a message was in existence but I do not 
remember that I saw it in the course of my official duties.

Col. GIBSON. In early December 1941 were you preparing to leave the War 
Department?

Gen. SMITH. A list of senior colonels had been prepared by the G-1 Division 
with an indication of possible dates when they might be called for active 
combat duty with the new divisions that were being contemplated. I remember 
that my name was on that list, as well as the names of Col. Bratton, Col. 
Compton, Col. Pettigrew and several other officers. From other divisions of 
the General Staff I knew Col. Huebner, Col. Ridgeway and others were likewise 
on this list. The Chief of Infantry had arranged a special two-weeks' 
refresher course at Ft. Benning for the benefit of colonels who might be 
relieved from staff duty and assigned to active command in the next few 
months. My name and that of Col. Bratton were submitted for this course. 
Bratton's name was later removed because of conversations going on at the 
White House with the Japanese special envoy and the general tense nature of 
the Japanese situation. The course was actually planned to begin on the 8th of 
December. I remember distinctly that I left Washington on the train from the 
Union [6] Station for Atlanta about 6:00 p. m. December 6th. Ralph Huebner, 
Mat Ridgeway and several others were on the same train with me. I remember 
distinctly that we reached Ft. Benning soon after noon of December 7th. We 
were at the Officers' Club having luncheon when the announcement by radio of 
the attack on Pearl Harbor was received. A few hours after this, perhaps about 
5:00 p. m., I received a telephone message from Gen. Omar Bradley, Commandant 
of the school, that Gen. Miles had called by phone and asked to have me return 
to Washington by the quickest available means. Gen. Bradley loaned me a car to 
drive to Atlanta, where I got a plan and reached Washington Monday morning. I 
must admit that because of this course and my preparations to leave, that 
happenings in the office on the morning of December 6 are quite hazy in my 
mind. My place during my absence was taken by the late Col. Roderick, my 
Assistant Executive Officer. 

Col. GIBSON. In the immediate few days prior to Pearl Harbor, any messages 
that were sent out from G-2 to the Commanding Generals of the Philippines, 
Hawaii or Panama, would clear through your office? 

Gen. SMITH. They would clear through my office. The volume of messages had 
reached a formidable proportion at this time and in order to clear them out in 
the evening, I had had an autograph rubber stamp prepared that was kept locked 
in my deck or in the desk of one of my assistants. Whenever a message came up 
properly authenticated with the initials of one of the Chiefs of Branches or 
Sections, this message would be cleared by one of my assistants without ever 
coming to my attention 

Col. GIBSON. As a matter of routine then, any message that came to your office 
at that time to be cabled to the field or sent to the field would be stamped 
by someone in your office and sent forward for dispatch provided that the 
Chief of a Branch had initiated the same?



Page 97

Gen. SMITH. That is right. The functions of my office were to verify that the 
message had been properly coordinated within the G-2 Division prior to being 
sent. I assumed no responsibility for the actual context [sic] of the message 
except that it made sense. I had instructed my assistants to read through and 
see that the message was understandable to them and there were no obvious 
errors.

[7] Col. GIBSON. The wisdom or the propriety of sending such message was not a 
duty of yours?

Gen. SMITH. No. I had no function on that score. I accepted any message that 
had the approval, as indicated by initials, of any Branch or Section Chief, 
and I had delegated that responsibility for approval my assistants. 

Col. GIBSON. In fact in your administrative duties, you were kept busy that 
you didn't know enough of the intelligence situation to really pass sound 
judgment on these messages. Is that correct?

Gen. SMITH. I am sorry to say that that is an understatement, if anything. The 
office was a beehive of activity about this time. 

Col. GIBSON. Were you aware of certain warning messages that were being sent 
out by G-2 to the field during the first week in December?

Gen. SMITH. As I have reflected on the events of that week in retrospection, I 
have a vague awareness that such messages were going out and there was a tense 
atmosphere in the office. I of course knew about the presence of the Japanese 
Ambassador and knew that the conferences were not going satisfactorily, but 
that is about the limit of my detailed knowledge.

Col. GIBSON. Any answers to these messages that were sent out in either the 
latter part of November or the first week of December, the answers being from 
Department Commanders, did you see?

Gen. SMITH. Not that I recollect. Our system of office procedure was such that 
the handling of such messages would be expedited to get them to the interested 
agency as quickly as possible. Outgoing messages did pass through my office. 
Incoming messages were handled directly from the Record Section to the 
interested agency.

Col. GIBSON. Do you ever recall seeing or knowing about a message from Gen. 
Short, the Commanding General in Hawaii, to G-2 in answer to a warning message 
that G-2 had sent out either the latter part of November or the first week of 
December?

Gen. SMITH. I have seen references to the message which I know you mean since, 
but I am certain that I had no knowledge of it prior to December 7.

[8] Col. GIBSON. After you returned from Ft. Benning on the morning of 8 
December, then what were your duties?

Gen. SMITH. My duties continued unchanged as Executive Officer of the Division 
until approximately the end of March.

Col. GIBSON. Then from the 8th of December until the end of March you were in 
charge of the records of G-2?

Gen. SMITH. In a broad supervisory sense, yes. 

Col. GIBSON. If any records were to be copied or destroyed or transferred to 
any other source, would you in the ordinary course of your duties have had to 
pass on it?

Gen. SMITH. I am certain that my subordinates would not have accepted any 
orders to tamper with the records, either in changing



Page 98

them, removing them or destroying them without having reported the fact to me. 

Col. GIBSON. At any time during your service in the War Department in 1941 and 
until you left in March 1942, to your knowledge were any of the records of G-2 
destroyed? 

Gen. SMITH. Categorically, no. The only recollection of any destruction of 
records that I have occurring during my administration was in the early part 
of my function as Executive Officer in 1941 when we were making an effort to 
collect out of the files and eliminate a lot of obsolete material dating back 
to World War I in order to conserve filing space. A considerable cleaning up 
of the Record Section was done in 1940 and 1941, as I recall it, in order to 
place with the National Archives material that should be kept of permanent 
record, and material of no permanent value was destroyed. 

Col. GIBSON. After that time to your knowledge was any material of any type 
destroyed? 

Gen. SMITH. I am very certain that no permanent records after January 1941, 
perhaps, were removed or destroyed. 

Col. GIBSON. At any time did you ever receive any order from anyone after 
Pearl Harbor while you were in the War Department to destroy or have any 
records destroyed?

Gen. SMITH. I did not. 

[9] Col. GIBSON. Or held?

Gen. SMITH. I did not. 

Col. GIBSON. Or tampered with?

Gen. SMITH. I did not. 

Col. GIBSON. Or touched in any way, shape or manner?

Gen. SMITH. I did not. 

Col. GIBSON. As far as you know, are the records of G-2 that pertain to Pearl 
Harbor for 1941 and up until March 1942 complete?

Gen. SMITH. To the best of my knowledge they are. 

Col. GIBSON. Until you arrived at the War Department yesterday, did you ever 
hear of any story to the effect that some of the Pearl Harbor records or 
reports bearing on Pearl Harbor had been destroyed? 

Gen. SMITH. I did not.

Col. GIBSON. Prior to yesterday had you ever heard any comment made that if 
certain records in G-2 became known or were made public that it would be very 
damning to the Secretary of War or the Chief of Staff? 

Gen. SMITH. No I had never heard any such comment.

Col. GIBSON. Did you know Col. J. T. B. Bissell?

Gen. SMITH. I did. 

Col. GIBSON. And was he on duty in the War Department in G-2 at the same time 
you were?

Gen. SMITH. Col. Bissell was, first, assistant to Col. Lester and later became 
Chief of Counter Intelligence Branch. He occupied that position, as I recall 
it, in December 1941. 

Col. GIBSON. Now let me ask you this question. Did Col. Bissell, to your 
knowledge, ever destroy any records in G-2 in the War Department?

Gen. SMITH He did not during my tenure of office; and I believe that if he had 
I would have known about it from my subordinates.



Page 99

[10] Col. GIBSON. Let me ask you this. Did Col. Bissell ever tell you that he 
had destroyed some records dealing with Pear Harbor?

Gen. SMITH. He did not. 

Col. GIBSON. Had you ever heard, until yesterday, any story alleging that Col. 
Bissell had said he did destroy certain records? 

Gen. SMITH. I had not. 

Gen. CLARKE. Did you ever discuss any of the incidents leading up to Pearl 
Harbor with Col. Bissell? 

Gen. SMITH. I have no recollection. It is true that we were both members of 
the G-2 Division for the 3 months following Pearl Harbor. It is possible that 
we may have discussed it in general term but I have no specific recollection. 

Gen. CLARKE. I would like to ask one question here. Do you know whether or not 
the Chief of the Counter Intelligence Group, Col. Bissell, had at his disposal 
all of the information and intelligence which was available to the 
Intelligence Group? 

Gen. SMITH. I have a vague recollection that some point was brought up either 
shortly before Pearl Harbor or possibly afterward that some sources of Counter 
Intelligence data were in existence but not being exploited to the maximum; I 
think I can state as a certainty that the Counter Intelligence Branch did not 
receive the pouch containing the full Magic material. I do, however, have 
vague recollection that the Far Eastern Branch had some contact with the 
Counter Intelligence Branch on activities of Japanese agents in this country. 

Gen. CLARKE. What about Japanese agents in Hawaii? 

Gen. SMITH. I have no recollection on that specific score. 

TESTIMONY 0F BRIG. GEN. JOHN T. BISSELL

[1] Place: Room 2E780,
The Pentagon. 
Date: 4 August 1945, 3:10 p. m. 
Present: Brig. Gen. John T. Bissell.
         Col. E. W. Gibson. 

Col. GIBSON. Gen. Bissell, Gen. Clarke has been directed by Gen Marshall to 
reopen this Pearl Harbor investigation on the basis of the old order that he 
had here last September 9 when this investigation was commenced. I would like 
to remind you that you are still under oath. With reference to that I would 
like to reswear you in, in connection with this new investigation. Do you 
solemnly swear to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth so 
help you God?

Gen. RUSSELL. I do.

Col. GIBSON. You of course are aware of your rights? 

Gen. RUSSELL. I am. 

Col. GIBSON Will you please state your name, rank, position and organization. 

Gen. BISSELL. John T. B. Bissell, Brigadier General, O8624. Headquarters 89th 
Division, Artillery, APO 89, c/o Postmaster, New York. 

Col. GIBSON You are here as a result of receiving cable orders to return here 
for purposes of this interrogation? 

Gen. BISSELL. I am. 

Col. GIBSON. Since your arrival here have you read the sworn testimony of Mr. 
Wm. F. Friedman of 13 July 45 before General Clarke 




Page 100

and myself, of Col. Otis K. Sadtler of 14 July 1945, and of Brig. Gen. S Isaac 
Spaulding of 17 July 1945 pertaining to this Pearl Harbor matter? 

Gen. BISSELL. I have. 

Col. GIBSON. Did you also read a copy of the letter that Adm. Hewitt sent to 
Gen. Marshall calling Gen. Marshall's attention to certain testimony of this 
Mr. Wm. F. Friedman before Adm. Hewitt's board? 

Gen. BISSELL. I did 

[2] Col. GIBSON. Gen. Bissell, you testified previously on this matter in 
September 1944? 

Gen. BISSELL. That is correct. 

Col. GIBSON. And you have refreshed your memory by reading over that 
testimony? 

Gen. BISSELL. I have. 

Col. GIBSON. Do you know Brig. Gen. Isaac Spalding? 

Gen. BISSELL. I do. 

Col. GIBSON How long have you known him? 

Gen. BISSELL. I reported to him in June of 1943 at Ft. Bragg, N. C. while he 
was in command of the 13th Field Artillery Brigade. I had just been ordered to 
take command of the 112th Field Artillery Group which was part of that 
Brigade. 

Col. GIBSON. Had you known him before that? 

Gen. BISSELL. I had not. 

Col. GIBSON. How long did you serve under Gen. Spalding at Ft. Bragg? 

Gen. BISSELL. From about the 12th of June until some time in October. I was 
stationed with my Group at Camp Jackson, S. C. 

Col. GIBSON. During this period of time did you have many occasions to 
converse with Gen. Spalding? 

Gen. BISSELL. I conversed with him frequently as he came down from Ft. Bragg 
about once a week. 

Col. GIBSON. How far is Jackson from Ft. Bragg? 

Gen. BISSELL. Roughly, 70 miles. 

Col. GIBSON So that he was stationed at Bragg and you were at Jackson all of 
this time? 

Gen. BISSELL. Yes. 

Col. GIBSON. There did come a time when his Headquarters Battery did come down 
to Jackson for some training? 

Gen. BISSELL That is correct. It was in the latter part of July as I remember. 

[3] Col. GIBSON. At some time in your acquaintance with Gen. Spalding during 
those months in 1943 did he ask you about what G-2 knew about the Pearl Harbor 
attack? 

Gen. BISSELL. Yes, he asked me several questions about it. 

Col. GIBSON. Did he ask you that on more than one occasion? 

Gen. BISSELL. I don't recall. I think he may have. 

Col. GIBSON. Is there any particular occasion that you have in mind when he 
did talk with you at some length about it? 

Gen. BISSELL. Yes, I recall his saying that he could not understand why the 
airplanes at Pearl Harbor had been lined up on the fields when conditions were 
as strained as they were.

Col. GIBSON. Where was that? 

Gen. BISSELL. I think that was at Camp Jackson. It might possibly have been at 
Bragg, as I was up there several times.



Page 101

Col. GIBSON. Do you remember conversing with him about Pearl Harbor when you 
were sitting together under some trees on the training grounds at Jackson? 

Gen. BISSELL. I don't remember the incident. It may well have occurred there 
or somewhere else. I don't remember the details. 

Col. GIBSON. Gen. Spalding has testified that, among other things, you told 
him that certain messages had been received, these messages pertaining to 
Pearl Harbor and were in the files of G-2 and that you deemed it most 
necessary to destroy them. Did you ever make such a statement?

Gen. BISSELL. No, I did not.

Col. GIBSON. I show you Gen. Spalding's testimony, pages 3, 4 and of his 
testimony of last July, and ask if you will give your recollection of the talk 
you had with Gen. Spalding. 

Gen. BISSELL. AS I recall it, Gen. Spalding asked me a great many questions 
with reference to the Counter Intelligence operated by the Military 
Intelligence Service of which I had been the Chief. He was particularly 
interested in knowing about how we had placed agents, etc. I tried to avoid 
the issue as much as possible and give [4] no information that I thought 
should not be revealed. Following at he discussed at some length the Pearl 
Harbor disaster and stated that he could not understand why G-2 had not been 
more alert and why the planes on the fields at Pearl Harbor had been assembled 
together. He asked me what I know about the matter and I told him that G-2 had 
been afraid of sabotage and that a message had been sent out to the Hawaiian 
Department alerting them to be their guard against possible sabotage. He 
endeavored to draw me out and as it was a matter that was more or less closed, 
he asked at I had personally done in the matter. I stated that I had been 
directed by the A. C. of S., G-2 to draft a message to the G-2, Hawaiian 
Department, and I believe possibly to some of the other Defense Commands and 
Panama to be prepared for possible sabotage on account of the very strained 
relations with which everyone in G-2 was familiar. He asked me further details 
of the matter and I stated, as I recall it, that I had stayed in the office 
one evening until about eight o'clock, at the direction of Gen. Miles, who was 
then the A. C. of S., G-2, and had prepared a message alerting the Hawaiian 
Department for possible sabotage and stressing the strained relations between 
the U. S. and Japan. I took the message in to Gen. Miles personally. He read 
the message and change [sic] it materially, stressing the sabotage angle more 
than I had. That message, as far I know, was sent. The draft which I drew Gen. 
Miles destroyed. It was marked Secret. 

Col. GIBSON. I show you a message, a Memorandum for the Adjutant General, 
dated 28 November 1941, subject: Warning to Corps Area and Overseas 
Commanders, signed Sherman Miles, and ask if that is a copy of the message 
that you refer to just now in your testimony as being the message which Gen. 
Miles drew and substituted for the message that you had prepared. 

Gen. BISSELL. That is the message Gen. Miles drew in substitution for the one 
which I drafted. 

Col. GIBSON. Is it your recollection that Gen. Spalding expressed to you his 
failure to understand why Sherman Miles and the Navy 



Page 102

had failed to discover that these Japanese vessels participating in the Pearl 
Harbor attack had left their home ports? 

Gen. BISSELL. I don't recall that. He may have discussed it but I don't recall 
it. 

[5] Col. GIBSON. Do you recollect Gen. Spaulding telling you that he believed 
that Miles was a stuffed shirt? 

Gen. BISSELL. I think in the course of conversation he did state that he 
believed that Miles was a stuffed shirt? 

Col. GIBSON. Did he tell you of his disgust that the radars on Hawaii weren't 
working because he knew when he left Hawaii in 1940 that they were being 
installed? 

Gen. BISSELL. As far as I remember he never made any mention of radar. 

Col. GIBSON. To your knowledge, while you were connected with G-2 were ever 
any records pertaining to Pearl Harbor or anything else destroyed? 

Gen. BISSELL. Not as far as I know. 

Col. GIBSON. And once a message was okayed and sent it was kept?

Gen. BISSELL. It went to the file immediately. 

Col. GIBSON. And no files were ever destroyed?

Gen. BISSELL. Not as far as I know. 

Col. GIBSON. Did you ever hear of any being destroyed? 

Gen. BISSELL. No, except in 1940 when we cleaned out the World War I excess 
material that had no value. 

Col. GIBSON. Again to clarify the record, your job in G-2 in 1941 and 1942 was 
always connected with the Counter Intelligence work of G-2? 

Gen. BISSELL. That is correct. 

Col. GIBSON. You had nothing whatsoever to do with the signal intelligence? 

Gen. BISSELL. I didn't until after Pearl Harbor. 

Col. GIBSON. Prior to Pearl Harbor did you receive summaries of what you later 
found to be information based on signal intelligence? 

Gen. BISSELL. Yes I did. I knew that the summaries which I got emanated from 
signal intelligence. They pertained principally to [6] suspected Japanese 
again in this country, in Panama, in Hawaii, and in Alaska. 

Col. GIBSON. Shortly after Pearl Harbor you began to see such material in the 
raw pertaining to the matters you have just outlined? 

Gen. BISSELL. A few days after Pearl Harbor I saw materially more of the 
signal intelligence material. 

Col. GIBSON. Did you tell Gen. Spaulding at any time, in substance, that you 
had destroyed what you would call vital records, records which if known to 
exist would be very unpleasant to the War Department? 

Gen. BISSELL. I did not. 

Col. GIBSON. Did YOU ever tell him anything from which he might infer such?

Gen. BISSELL. No.




Page 100

and myself, of Col. Otis K. Sadtler of 14 July 1945, and of Brig. Gen. S Isaac 
Spaulding of 17 July 1945 pertaining to this Pearl Harbor matter? 

Gen. BISSELL. I have. 

Col. GIBSON. Did you also read a copy of the letter that Adm. Hewitt sent to 
Gen. Marshall calling Gen. Marshall's attention to certain testimony of this 
Mr. Wm. F. Friedman before Adm. Hewitt's board? 

Gen. BISSELL. I did 

[2] Col. GIBSON. Gen. Bissell, you testified previously on this matter in 
September 1944? 

Gen. BISSELL. That is correct. 

Col. GIBSON. And you have refreshed your memory by reading over that 
testimony? 

Gen. BISSELL. I have. 

Col. GIBSON. Do you know Brig. Gen. Isaac Spalding? 

Gen. BISSELL. I do. 

Col. GIBSON How long have you known him? 

Gen. BISSELL. I reported to him in June of 1943 at Ft. Bragg, N. C. while he 
was in command of the 13th Field Artillery Brigade. I had just been ordered to 
take command of the 112th Field Artillery Group which was part of that 
Brigade. 

Col. GIBSON. Had you known him before that? 

Gen. BISSELL. I had not. 

Col. GIBSON. How long did you serve under Gen. Spalding at Ft. Bragg? 

Gen. BISSELL. From about the 12th of June until some time in October. I was 
stationed with my Group at Camp Jackson, S. C. 

Col. GIBSON. During this period of time did you have many occasions to 
converse with Gen. Spalding? 

Gen. BISSELL. I conversed with him frequently as he came down from Ft. Bragg 
about once a week. 

Col. GIBSON. How far is Jackson from Ft. Bragg? 

Gen. BISSELL. Roughly, 70 miles. 

Col. GIBSON So that he was stationed at Bragg and you were at Jackson all of 
this time? 

Gen. BISSELL. Yes. 

Col. GIBSON. There did come a time when his Headquarters Battery did come down 
to Jackson for some training? 

Gen. BISSELL That is correct. It was in the latter part of July as I remember. 

[3] Col. GIBSON. At some time in your acquaintance with Gen. Spalding during 
those months in 1943 did he ask you about what G-2 knew about the Pearl Harbor 
attack? 

Gen. BISSELL. Yes, he asked me several questions about it. 

Col. GIBSON. Did he ask you that on more than one occasion? 

Gen. BISSELL. I don't recall. I think he may have. 

Col. GIBSON. Is there any particular occasion that you have in mind when he 
did talk with you at some length about it? 

Gen. BISSELL. Yes, I recall his saying that he could not understand why the 
airplanes at Pearl Harbor had been lined up on the fields when conditions were 
as strained as they were.

Col. GIBSON. Where was that? 

Gen. BISSELL. I think that was at Camp Jackson. It might possibly have been at 
Bragg, as I was up there several times.



Page 101

Col. GIBSON. Do you remember conversing with him about Pearl Harbor when you 
were sitting together under some trees on the training grounds at Jackson? 

Gen. BISSELL. I don't remember the incident. It may well have occurred there 
or somewhere else. I don't remember the details. 

Col. GIBSON. Gen. Spalding has testified that, among other things, you told 
him that certain messages had been received, these messages pertaining to 
Pearl Harbor and were in the files of G-2 and that you deemed it most 
necessary to destroy them. Did you ever make such a statement?

Gen. BISSELL. No, I did not.

Col. GIBSON. I show you Gen. Spalding's testimony, pages 3, 4 and of his 
testimony of last July, and ask if you will give your recollection of the talk 
you had with Gen. Spalding. 

Gen. BISSELL. AS I recall it, Gen. Spalding asked me a great many questions 
with reference to the Counter Intelligence operated by the Military 
Intelligence Service of which I had been the Chief. He was particularly 
interested in knowing about how we had placed agents, etc. I tried to avoid 
the issue as much as possible and give [4] no information that I thought 
should not be revealed. Following at he discussed at some length the Pearl 
Harbor disaster and stated that he could not understand why G-2 had not been 
more alert and why the planes on the fields at Pearl Harbor had been assembled 
together. He asked me what I know about the matter and I told him that G-2 had 
been afraid of sabotage and that a message had been sent out to the Hawaiian 
Department alerting them to be their guard against possible sabotage. He 
endeavored to draw me out and as it was a matter that was more or less closed, 
he asked at I had personally done in the matter. I stated that I had been 
directed by the A. C. of S., G-2 to draft a message to the G-2, Hawaiian 
Department, and I believe possibly to some of the other Defense Commands and 
Panama to be prepared for possible sabotage on account of the very strained 
relations with which everyone in G-2 was familiar. He asked me further details 
of the matter and I stated, as I recall it, that I had stayed in the office 
one evening until about eight o'clock, at the direction of Gen. Miles, who was 
then the A. C. of S., G-2, and had prepared a message alerting the Hawaiian 
Department for possible sabotage and stressing the strained relations between 
the U. S. and Japan. I took the message in to Gen. Miles personally. He read 
the message and change [sic] it materially, stressing the sabotage angle more 
than I had. That message, as far I know, was sent. The draft which I drew Gen. 
Miles destroyed. It was marked Secret. 

Col. GIBSON. I show you a message, a Memorandum for the Adjutant General, 
dated 28 November 1941, subject: Warning to Corps Area and Overseas 
Commanders, signed Sherman Miles, and ask if that is a copy of the message 
that you refer to just now in your testimony as being the message which Gen. 
Miles drew and substituted for the message that you had prepared. 

Gen. BISSELL. That is the message Gen. Miles drew in substitution for the one 
which I drafted. 

Col. GIBSON. Is it your recollection that Gen. Spalding expressed to you his 
failure to understand why Sherman Miles and the Navy 



Page 102

had failed to discover that these Japanese vessels participating in the Pearl 
Harbor attack had left their home ports? 

Gen. BISSELL. I don't recall that. He may have discussed it but I don't recall 
it. 

[5] Col. GIBSON. Do you recollect Gen. Spaulding telling you that he believed 
that Miles was a stuffed shirt? 

Gen. BISSELL. I think in the course of conversation he did state that he 
believed that Miles was a stuffed shirt? 

Col. GIBSON. Did he tell you of his disgust that the radars on Hawaii weren't 
working because he knew when he left Hawaii in 1940 that they were being 
installed? 

Gen. BISSELL. As far as I remember he never made any mention of radar. 

Col. GIBSON. To your knowledge, while you were connected with G-2 were ever 
any records pertaining to Pearl Harbor or anything else destroyed? 

Gen. BISSELL. Not as far as I know. 

Col. GIBSON. And once a message was okayed and sent it was kept?

Gen. BISSELL. It went to the file immediately. 

Col. GIBSON. And no files were ever destroyed?

Gen. BISSELL. Not as far as I know. 

Col. GIBSON. Did you ever hear of any being destroyed? 

Gen. BISSELL. No, except in 1940 when we cleaned out the World War I excess 
material that had no value. 

Col. GIBSON. Again to clarify the record, your job in G-2 in 1941 and 1942 was 
always connected with the Counter Intelligence work of G-2? 

Gen. BISSELL. That is correct. 

Col. GIBSON. You had nothing whatsoever to do with the signal intelligence? 

Gen. BISSELL. I didn't until after Pearl Harbor. 

Col. GIBSON. Prior to Pearl Harbor did you receive summaries of what you later 
found to be information based on signal intelligence? 

Gen. BISSELL. Yes I did. I knew that the summaries which I got emanated from 
signal intelligence. They pertained principally to [6] suspected Japanese 
again in this country, in Panama, in Hawaii, and in Alaska. 

Col. GIBSON. Shortly after Pearl Harbor you began to see such material in the 
raw pertaining to the matters you have just outlined? 

Gen. BISSELL. A few days after Pearl Harbor I saw materially more of the 
signal intelligence material. 

Col. GIBSON. Did you tell Gen. Spaulding at any time, in substance, that you 
had destroyed what you would call vital records, records which if known to 
exist would be very unpleasant to the War Department? 

Gen. BISSELL. I did not. 

Col. GIBSON. Did YOU ever tell him anything from which he might infer such?

Gen. BISSELL. No.


Page 103

EXHIBITS OF THE CLARKE INVESTIGATION

EXHIBITS 1 TO 8

HANDLING OF CERTAIN TOP SECRET DOCUMENTS

CLARKE EXHIBIT NO. 1

TOP SECRET

From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
October 14, 1941
Purple
#943 (Part 1 of 2) [a] (To be handled in Government Code)

I had an interview with Rear Admiral TURNER. If I sum up what he told me, it 
is this:

"What the United States wants is not just a pretense but a definite promise. 
Should a conference of the leaders of the two governments be held without a 
definite preliminary agreement, and should, in the meantime, an advance be 
made into Siberia, the President would be placed in a terrible predicament. 
Japan speaks of peace in the Pacific and talks as if she can decide matters 
independently, and so it would seem to me that Japan could set aside most of 
her obligations toward the Three-Power Alliance. As to the question of 
withdrawing or stationing troops, since it is impossible to withdraw troops 
all at once, it would seem that a detailed agreement could be arranged between 
Japan and China for a gradual withdrawal."

He speculated on the various difficulties which Japan had to face internally. 
It seems that this opinion of his has also been given to the Secretary of 
State.

ARMY 5854 23570 SECRET Trans. 10/16/41 (2)

TOP SECRET

From: Tokyo (Toyoda)
To: Washington
October 16, 1941
Purple (CA)
#671

Although I have been requested by both the German and Italian Ambassadors in 
Tokyo to give them confidential information on the Japanese-American 
negotiations, I have, in consideration of the nature of the negotiations, been 
declining to do so. However, early this month, following the German attacks on 
American merchant ships and the  consequent (revival?) of the movement for the 
revision of the Neutrality Act, the German authorities demanded that the 
Japanese Government submit to the American Government a message to the effect 
that the Japanese Government observes that if the ROOSEVELT Administration 
continues to attack the Axis Powers increasingly, a belligerent situation 
would inevitably arise between Germany and Italy on the one hand and the 
United States on the other, and this would provide the reasons for the 
convocation of the duties envisioned in the Three Power agreement and might 
lead Japan to join immediately the war in opposition to the United States. We 
have not, as yet, submitted this message because, in view of the Japanese-
American negotiations, we found it necessary to consider carefully the proper 
timing as well as wording of the message. The German authorities have been 
repeatedly making the same request and there are reasons which do not permit 
this matter to be postponed any longer. While Japan on the one hand finds it 
necessary to do something in the way of carrying out the duties placed upon 
her by the Three Power Alliance she had 

[a] For part 2 gee S. I. S. #23516



Page 104

concluded with Germany, on the other hand, she is desirous of making a success 
of the Japanese-American negotiations. Under the circumstances, we can do no 
other than to warn the United States at an appropriate moment in such words as 
are given in my separate wire and as would not affect the Japanese-American 
negotiations in one way or another. This message is a secret between me and 
you.

(Separate wire)

The Imperial Japanese Government has repeatedly affirmed to the American 
Government that the aim of the Tripartite Pact is to contribute toward the 
prevention of a further extension of the European war. Should,  however, the 
recent tension in the German-American relations suffer aggravation, there 
would arise a distinct danger of a war between the two powers, a state of 
affairs over which Japan, as a signatory to the Tripartite Pace [sic], 
naturally cannot help entertain a deep concern. Accordingly, in its sincere 
desire that not only the German-American relations will cease further 
deterioration but the prevailing tension will also be alleviated as quickly as 
possible, the Japanese Government is now requesting the earnest consideration 
of the American Government.

ARMY 5901 23631 SECRET

From, Berlin.
To: Tokyo.
1 October 1941
(Purple)
#1198

On this the occasion of the first anniversary of the Tripartite Pact, Foreign 
Minister Ribbentrop has come to Berlin from the Imperial Headquarters 
especially and I have had several visits with him. Using  this opportunity I, 
and the other members of the staff, have mingled with people from all classes 
of society and visited with them. I am endeavoring to sum up all these 
experiences and analyze the present state of feeling toward Japan held by 
Germany in this report to you.

1. Ribbentrop said that he had absolute proof that, while reports of the 
content of the Japanese-American negotiations were withheld from Ambassador 
Ott, America was in secret communication with England in regard to the 
Japanese-American negotiations. Even Ribbentrop who is supposed to understand 
Japan's position, expressed great dissatisfaction regarding Japan's attitude.

2. That the Foreign Office staff from Weizsacker down and also everyone in 
general were thoroughly disgusted with Japan was very apparent from their 
attitude toward myself and other members of the staff. Everyone who feels 
kindly disposed toward Japan is deeply concerned over this state of affairs. 
Even those who do not come to the same conclusion that Ambassador Ott did in 
his telegram are outspoken in their dissatisfaction and expression of 
pessimistic views. I am trying to take the position in interviews with 
newspaper correspondents and others concerned with the outside that Germany is 
cognizant of the Japanese-American negotiations and that they are no 
indication of an alienation between Japan and Germany.

3. Foreign diplomats and newspaper correspondents of third countries show 
great interest in the Japanese attitude and seem to consider it in a certain 
sense as a barometer by which the course of the European war can be judged. 
However we receive the impression that the greater number feel that Japan is 
avoiding war because of the impoverishment resulting from the China incident 
and is taking a pessimistic attitude toward the course of the European war.

4. Even though it might be said that Germany is prepared for these 
machinations of estrangement by third countries and that she is keeping up the 
pretense that there is no change in her feelings toward Japan, the fact that 
the feeling of German leaders and the people in general toward Japan is 
getting bad is one that cannot be covered. Please bear this fact in mind. If 
Japan takes a wishy-washy attitude and goes ahead with her negotiations 
without consulting Germany there is no telling what steps Germany may take 
without consulting Japan.

Please convey this to the army and navy.
Relayed to Rome.

23673 JD-1: (H) Navy Trans. 10-18-41 (4)



Page 105

From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
October 22, 1941.
Purple. (CA)

I have already wired you something about my present psychology. I am sure that 
I, too, should go out with the former cabinet. I know that for some time the 
Secretary of State has known how sincere your humble servant is, yet how 
little influence I have in Japan. I am ashamed to say that it has come to my 
ears that this is the case. There are some Americans who trust this poor 
novice and who say that things will get better for me, but, alas, their 
encouragement is not enough. Among my confreres here in the United States 
there are also some who feel the same way, but, alas, they are all poor 
deluded souls. As for Your Excellency's instructions, WAKASUGI can carry them 
out fully. Nor do I imagine that you all have any objection. I don't want to 
be the bones of a dead horse. I don't want to continue this hypocritical 
existence, deceiving other people. No, don't think I am trying to flee from 
the field of battle but as a man of honor this is the only way that is open 
for me to tread. Please send me your permission to return to Japan. Most 
humbly do I beseech your forgiveness if I have injured your dignity and I 
prostrate myself before you in the depth of my rudeness.

ARMY 6017 23859 SECRET Trans. 10-23-41 (7)

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
5 November 1941
(Purple-CA)
#736

(Of utmost secrecy)

Because of various circumstances, it is absolutely necessary that all 
arrangements for the signing of this agreement be completed by the 25th of 
this month. I realize that this is a difficult order, but under the 
circumstances it is an unavoidable one. Please understand this thoroughly and 
tackle the problem of saving the Japanese-U. S. relations from falling into a 
chaotic condition. Do so with great determination and with unstinted effort, I 
beg of you.

This information is to be kept strictly to yourself only.

JD-1:6254 SECRET (D) Navy Trans. 11-5-41 (S-TT)

From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo

1. I sent MOORE [a] to contact Senator THOMAS of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee and HULL. His report reads as follows:

"The United States is not bluffing. If Japan invades again, the United States 
will fight with Japan. Psychologically the American people are ready. The Navy 
is prepared and ready for action."

2. Yesterday evening, Sunday, a certain Cabinet member, discarding all 
quibbling, began by saying to me:

"You are indeed a dear friend of mine and I tell this to you alone." Then he 
continued: "The American Government is receiving a number of reliable reports 
that Japan will be on the move soon. The American Government does not believe 
that your visit on Monday to the President or the coming of Mr. KURUSU will 
have any effect on the general situation."

I took pains to explain in detail how impatient the Japanese have grown since 
the freezing; how they are eager for a quick understanding; how both the 
Government and the people do not desire a Japanese-American war, and how we 
will hope or peace until the end.

[2] He replied, however:
"Well our boss, the President, believes those reports and so does the 
Secretary of State."

24655 ARMY Trans. 11/12/41 (2)

[a] Frederick Moore_Legal Adviser to the Japanese Embassy in Washington.



Page 106

(Part 2 of 2)

In the newspapers and magazines, with the exception of the Daily News and the 
Hearst Papers, it is reported that the Americans are much more eager for a war 
with Japan than they are for one with Germany. It is said that some of the 
British are using this inclination for their own advantage and that already 
parleys have been started for joint Anglo-American action. Suggestions have 
already been made to the effect that it is necessary for some of the British 
fleet to be located in the Pacific. Now even if the President and other 
statesmen do not follow this trend, who can say how it will be? The friend I 
just spoke of told me that the United States cannot stop now because if Japan 
moves something will have to be done since it is a question of the United 
States saving its face.

3. Well, in any case, I am going to see the President today and talk with him 
on the bases of your instructions. You may be sure that I will do my very 
best.

24656 ARMY Trans. 11/12/41 (2)

From: Tokyo
To:  Washington
November 16, 1941
Purple (Ca) (Urgent)

For your Honor's own information.

1. I have read your #1090, [a] and you may be sure that you have all my 
gratitude for the efforts you have put forth, but the fate of our Empire  
hangs by the slender thread of a few days, so please fight harder than you 
ever did before.

2. What you say in the last paragraph of your message is, of course, so and I 
have given it already the fullest consideration, but I have only to refer you 
to the fundamental policy, laid down in my #725. [b] Will you please try to 
realize what that means. In your opinion we ought to wait and see what turn 
the war takes and remain patient. However, I am awfully sorry to say that the 
situation renders this out of the question. I set the deadline for the 
solution of these negotiations in my #736, [c] and there will be no change. 
Please try to understand that. You see how short the time is, therefore, do 
not allow the United States to sidetrack us and delay the negotiations any 
further. Press them for a solution on the basis of our proposals, and do your 
best to bring about an immediate solution.

ARMY 24,878 JD-1:6638 SECRET Trans. 11/17/41  (S)

From: Tokyo
To:  Washington
November 22, 1941
Purple CA (Urgent)

#812

To both you Ambassadors.

It is awfully hard for us to consider changing the date we set in my #736. [a] 
You should know this, however, I know you are working hard. Stick to our fixed 
policy and do your very best. Spare no efforts and  try to bring about the 
solution we desire. There are reasons beyond your ability to guess why we 
wanted to settle Japanese-American relations by the 25th, but if within the 
next three or

[a] See JD-: 6553 in which NOMURA gives his views on the general situation. 
Part 3 not available.

[b] S. I. S. #24330 in which TOGO says that conditions both within and without 
the Japanese Empire will not permit any further delay in reaching a settlement 
with the United States.

[c] S. I. S. #24373 in which TOGO says that it is absolutely necessary that 
all arrangements for the signing of this agreement be completed by the 25th of 
this month.

[a] See J. D. #6254. Tokyo wires Washington that because of the various 
circumstances it is absolutely necessary that arrangements for the signing of 
the agreement be completed by the 25th of this month.



Page 107

four days you can finish your conversations with the Americans; if the signing 
can be completed by the 29th, (let me write it out for you_twenty ninth); if 
the pertinent notes can be exchanged; if we can get an understanding with 
Great Britain and the Netherlands; and in short if everything can be finished, 
we have decided to wait until that date. This time we mean it, that the 
deadline absolutely cannot be changed. After that things are automatically 
going to happen. Please take this into your careful consideration and work 
harder than you ever have before. This, for the present, is for the 
information of you two  Ambassadors alone.

ARMY 6710 25138 SECRET Trans. 11/22/41 (S)

[1]  From: Tokyo
To: Washington
November 26, 1941
Purple

#836. To be handled in Government Code.

The situation is momentarily becoming more tense and telegrams take too long. 
Therefore, will you cut down the substance of your reports of negotiations to 
the minimum and, on occasion, call up Chief YAMAMOTO of the American Bureau on 
the telephone and make your report to him. At that time we will se the 
following code:

Japanese                                     English
Sangoku Joyaku Mondai                        Nyuu Yooku
(Three-Power Treaty question)                (New York)
Musabetsu Taiguu Mondai                      Shikago
(The question of nondiscriminatory           (Chicago)
treatment)
Shina Mondai                                 Sanfuranshisuko
(The China question)                         (San Francisco)
Soori                                        Itoo Kun
(Premier)                                    (Mr. Itoo)  
Gaimudaijin                                  Date Kun
(Foreign Minister)                           (Mr. Date)
Rikugun                                      Tokugawa Kun
(The Army)                                   (Mr. Tokugawa
Kaigun                                       Maeda Kun
(The Navy)                                   (Mr. Maeda)
Nichi-bei kooshoo                            Endan
(Japan-American negotiations)                (Marriage proposal)
Daitooryoo                                   Kimiko San
(President)                                  (Miss Kimiko)
Haru                                         Fumeko San
(Hull)                                       (Miss Fumeko)

[2]  Japanese                                English
Kokuaijoosei                                 Shoobai
(Internal situation)                         (Trade)
Joohu Suru                                   Yama Wo Uru
(To yield)                                   (To sell the mountain)
Jooho Sezu                                   Yama Wo Urenu
(Not to yield)                               (Not to sell the mountain)
Keisei Kyuuten Suru                          Kodomo Gaumareru
(Situation taking critical turn)             (The child is born)

For your information, telephone addresses other than our Home Office are
as follows:
Bureau Chief YAMAMOTO: Setagaya 4617
Section chief KASE: Yotsuya 4793
The Minister's residence Ginza 3614
The Vice-Ministers residence Ginza 1022

ARMY 6841 25344 SECRET Trans. 11-26-41 (S)



Page 108

To: Nanking.
15 November 1941
From: Tokyo
(Purple)
#499

Re your #818*

To Naval authorities:

We are now in the midst of very serious negotiations and have not reached an 
agreement as yet. As the time limit is near please have them (defer?) for a 
while.

25390 JD-1: 6848 (F) Navy Trans. 11-27-41  (6-AR)

*Not available.

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
19 November 1941
(J19)
Circular #2354

When diplomatic relations are becoming dangerous we will add the following at 
the beginning and end of our general intelligence broadcasts:

(1) If it is Japan U. S. Relations
    "HIGASHI"
(2) Japan Russian relations
    "KITA"
(3) Japan British relations; (including Thai, Malaya, and NEI)
    "NISHI"

The above will be repeated five times and repeated five times at the beginning 
and end.

Relay to Rio de Janeiro, B. A., Mexico City, and San Francisco.

SIS-25392 JD-1: 6850 SECRET Navy Trans. 11-26-41

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
19 November 1941
(J19)
Circular #2353

Regarding the broadcast of a special message in an emergency.

In case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations) and the 
cutting off of international communications, the following warning will be 
added in the middle of the daily Japanese language short wave news broadcast:

(1) In case of a Japan-U. S. relations in danger: HIGASHI NO KAZEAME (EAST 
WIND RAIN)

(2) Japan-U. S. S. R. relations: KITANOKAZE KUMORI (NORTH WIND CLOUDY)

(3) Japan-British relations: NISHI NO KAZE HARE (WEST WIND CLEAR)

This signal will be given in the middle and at the end as a weather forecast 
and each sentence will be repeated twice. When this is heard, please destroy 
all code papers, etc. This is as yet to be a completely secret arrangement. 

Forward as urgent intelligence.

See Supplementary Information File.

(Voice broadcasts)

SIS-25432 JD-1: 6875 SECRET Navy Trans. 11-28-41



Page 109

From: Washington
To: Tokyo
November 26, 1941
Purple. (Extremely urgent)

#1180. (Part 1 of 2)

From Nomura and Kurusu.

As we have wired you several times, there is hardly any possibility of having 
them consider our "B" proposal in toto. On the other hand, if we let the 
situation remain tense as it is now, sorry as we are to say so, the 
negotiations will inevitably be ruptured, if indeed they may not already be 
called so. Our failure and humiliation are complete. We might suggest one 
thing for saving the situation. Although we have grave misgivings, we might 
propose, first, that President ROOSEVELT wire you that for the sake of 
posterity he hopes that Japan and the United States will cooperate for the 
maintenance of peace in the Pacific (just as soon-as you wire us what you 
think of this, we will negotiate for this sort of an arrangement with all we 
have in us), and that you in return reply with a cordial message thereby not 
only clearing the atmosphere, but also gaining a little time. Considering the 
possibility that England and the United States are scheming to bring the 
Netherlands Indies under their protection through military occupation, in 
order to forestall this, I think we should propose the establishment of 
neutral nations, including French Indo-China, Netherlands India and Thai. (As 
you know, last September President ROOSEVELT proposed the neutrality of French 
Indo-China and Thai.)

(Part 2 of 2)

We suppose that the rupture of the present negotiations does not necessarily 
mean war between Japan and the United States, but after we break off, as we 
said, the military occupation of Netherlands India is to be expected of 
England and the United States. Then we would attack them and a clash with them 
would be inevitable. Now, the question is whether or not Germany would feel 
duty bound by the third article of the treaty to help us. We doubt if she 
would. Again, you must remember that the Sino-Japanese incident would have to 
wait until the end of this  world war before it could possibly be settled.

In this telegram we are expressing the last personal opinions we will  have to 
express, so will Your Excellency please be good enough at least to show it to 
the Minister of the Navy, if only to him; then we hope that you will wire us 
back instantly.

ARMY 25436 SECRET Trans. 11-28-41 (1)

[1] From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
November 26, 1941
Purple. (Extremely urgent)

#1189. (Part 1 of 2)

At 4:45 on the afternoon of the 26th I and Ambassador KURUSU met with
Secretary Hull and we talked for about two hours.

HULL said, "For the last several days the American Government has been getting 
the ideas of various quarters, as well as conferring carefully with the 
nations concerned, on the provisional treaty proposal presented by Japan on 
the 20th of this month, and I am sorry to tell you that we cannot agree to it. 
At length, however, we feel compelled to propose a plan, tentative and without 
commitment, reconciling the points of difference between our proposal of June 
21st and yours of September 25th." So saying, he presented us with the 
following two proposals:

A. One which seeks our recognition of his so-called "four principles."

B. (1) The conclusion of a mutual non-aggression treaty between Tokyo
Washington, Moscow, the Netherlands, Chungking and Bangkok.

(2) Agreement between Japan, the United States, England, the Netherlands, 
China and Thai on the inviolability of French Indo-China and equality of 
economic treatment in French Indo-China.




Page 110

(3) The complete evacuation of Japanese forces from China and all French
Indo-China.

[2] (4) Japan and the United States both definitely promise to support no 
regime in China but that of CHIANG KAI SHEK.

(5) The abolition of extra-territoriality and concessions in China.

25441 ARMY Trans. 11-28-41 (1)

[1] (Part 2 of 2)

(6) The conclusion of a reciprocal trade treaty between Japan and the United 
States on the basis of most favored nation treatment.

(7) The mutual rescinding of the Japanese and American freezing orders.

(8) Stabilization of yen-dollar exchange.

(9) No matter what sort of treaties either Japan or the United States has 
contracted with third countries, they both definitely promise that these 
treaties will not be interpreted as hostile to the objective of this treaty or 
to the maintenance of peace in the Pacific. (This is, of course, supposed to 
emasculate the Three-Power Pact.)

In view of our negotiations all along, we were both dumb-founded and said we 
could not even cooperate to the extent of reporting this to Tokyo. We argued 
back furiously, but HULL remained solid as a rock. Why did the United States 
have to propose such hard terms as these? Well, England, the Netherlands and 
China doubtless put her up to it. Then, too, we have been urging them to quit 
helping CHIANG, and lately a number of important Japanese in speeches have 
been urging that we strike at England and the United States. Moreover, there 
have been rumors that we are demanding of Thai that she give us complete [2] 
control over her national defense. All that is reflected in these two hard 
proposals, or we think so.

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
November 28, 1941
Purple. (CA)
#844.

Re your #1189 [a].

Well, you two Ambassadors have exerted superhuman efforts but, in spite of 
this, the United States has gone ahead and presented this humiliating 
proposal. This was quite unexpected and extremely regrettable. The Imperial 
Government can by no means use it as a basis for negotiations. Therefore, with 
a report of the views of the Imperial Government on this American proposal 
which I will send you in two or three days, the negotiations will be de facto 
ruptured. This is inevitable. However, I do not wish you to give the 
impression that the negotiations are broken off. Merely say to them that you 
are awaiting instructions and that, although the opinions of your Government 
are not yet clear to you, to your own way of thinking the Imperial Government 
has always made just claims and has borne great sacrifices for the sake of 
peace in the Pacific. Say that we have always demonstrated a long-suffering 
and conciliatory attitude, but that, on the other hand, the United States has 
been unbending, making it impossible for Japan to establish  negotiations. 
Since things have come to this pass, I contacted the man you told me to in 
your #1180 [b] and he said that under the present circumstances what you 
suggest is entirely unsuitable. From now on do the best you can.

ARMY 6898 25445 SECRET Trans. 11-28 41 (S)

[a] S. I. S. #25441, #25422.
[b] S. I. S. #25435, #25436. The man is the Navy Minister.



Page 111

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
27 November 1941
(Purple)
#843

Broadcast schedule as follows:

    6 p. m. To Pacific Coast              JVJ     12275
 6:30 p. m. To Western Hemisphere         JUO      9430 and
                                          JVJ     12275

 7:00 p. m. To the Coast                  JVJ     12275
 8:00 p. m. To the Coast                  JHL      5160
 9:00 p. m. To the Coast                  JHL      5160
10:00 p. m. To the Coast                  JHL      5160
10:30 p. m. To Europe                     JHP     11980

(Note: All times Tokyo time)

SIS 25446 JD-1: 6899 SECRET (H) Navy Trans. 11-2841 (S-TT)

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
29 November 1941
(Purple-CA)
#857

Re my #844*

We wish you would make one more attempt verbally along the following lines:

The United States government has (always ?) taken a fair and judicial position 
and has formulated its policies after full consideration of the claims of both 
sides.

However, the Imperial Government is at a loss to understand why it has now 
taken the attitude that the new proposals we have made cannot be made the 
basis of discussion, but instead has made new proposals which ignore actual 
conditions in East Asia and would greatly injure the prestige of the Imperial 
Government.

With such a change of front in their attitude toward the China problem, what 
has become of the basic objectives that the U. S. Government has made the 
basis of our negotiations during these seven months? On these points we would 
request careful self-reflection on the part of the United States government.

(In carrying out this instruction, please be careful that this does not lead 
to anything like a breaking off of negotiations.)

SIS 25496 JD-1: 6921 SECRET (F) Navy trans. 30 Nov. 1941 (S-TT)

*JD-1: 6898 (SIS 25445) dated 28 Nov., in which Tokyo's first reaction to the 
new U. S. proposals castigates them as humiliating. When Japan sends a reply 
in 2 or 3 days giving its views on them the negotiations will be "de factor" 
ruptured. However, do not give the impression that negotiations are broken 
off.

From: Washington
To: Tokyo
30 November 1941 (2230 to 2238 EST)
Telephone Code

TransPacific
Radio Telephone

(NOTE: Following is a preliminary, condensed version of conversation between 
Ambassador Kurusu and the Japanese Foreign Office American Division Chief 
Yamamoto on Sunday night)

Kurusu: "It is all arranged for us to meet Hull tomorrow. We received a short 
one from you, didn't we? Well, we will meet him in regard to that. There



Page 112

is a longer one coming isn't there? In any case we are going to see him about 
the short one." (i. e. Telegram. The longer one is probably Tokyo's reply to 
Mr. Hull's proposals.)

Yamamoto: "Yes. I see."

Kurusu: "The President is returning tomorrow. He is hurrying home."

Y: "Is there any special significance to this?"

K: "The newspapers have made much of the Premier's speech, and it is having 
strong repercussions here."

Y: "Is that so."

K: "Yes. It was a drastic statement he made. The newspapers carried large 
headlines over it; and the President seems to be returning because of it. 
There no doubt are other reasons, but this is the reason the newspapers are 
giving."
(Pause)
"Unless greater caution is exercised in speeches by the Premier and others, it 
puts us in a very difficult position. All of you over there must watch out 
about these ill-advised statements. Please tell Mr. Tani."

Y: "We *are* being careful."

K: "We here are doing our best, but these reports are seized upon by the 
correspondents and the worst features enlarged upon. Please caution the 
Premier, the Foreign Minister, and others. Tell the Foreign Minister that we 
had expected to hear something different, some good word, but instead we get 
this." (i. e. Premier's speech)
(After a pause, Kurusu continues, using voice code)
K: "What about the internal situation?" (In Japan)

Y: "No particular_(one or two words faded out)_."

K: "Are the Japanese-American negotiations to continue?"

Y: "Yes."

K: "You were very urgent about them before, weren't you; but now you want them 
to stretch out. We will need your help. Both the Premier and the Foreign 
Minister will need to change the tone of their speeches ! ! ! ! Do you 
understand? Please, all use more discretion."

Y: "When will you see them. The 2nd?"

K: "Let's see . . . this is Sunday midnight here. - Tomorrow morning at ten. 
That will be Monday morning here."
(Pause)
"Actually the real problem we are up against is the effects of happenings in 
the South. You understand don't you?"

Y: "Yes. Yes. How long will it be before the President gets back?"

K: "I don't know exactly. According to news reports he started at 4:00 this 
afternoon. He should be here tomorrow morning sometime."

Y: "Well then_Goodbye."

JD-1: 6922 (M) Navy trans. 30 Nov. 1941 (R-5) 25497

From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
November 28, 1941.
Purple.
#1214. To be handled in Government Code.

Re my # 1190 [a].

So far silence has been maintained here concerning our talks with the United 
States; however, now the results of our conference of the 26th are out and 
headlines like this are appearing in the papers "Hull Hands Peace Plan to 
Japanese," and "America Scorns a Second Munich." The papers say that is up to 
Japan either to accept the American proposal with its four principles, or face 
war, in which latter case the responsibility would be upon Japan.

This we must carefully note.

ARMY 25548 Trans. 12-1-41 (2)

[a] S. I. S. #25444 and #25480 in which NOMURA expresses the danger of the 
responsibility for the rupture of negotiations being cast upon Japan should 
Japan enter into her scheduled operations during the course of the 
negotiations. He suggests that the negotiations be irrevocably concluded 
either through an announcement to the American Embassy in Tokyo or by a 
declaration for internal and external consumption.



Page 113

[1] From: Tokyo
November 30, 1941
To: Berlin
Purple

#986 (Strictly Secret) (To be handled in Government Code) (Part 1 of 2) 
(Secret outside the Department)

1. Japan-American negotiations were commenced the middle of April of this 
year. Over a period of half a year they have been continued. Within that 
period the Imperial Government adamantly stuck to the Tri-Partite Alliance as 
the cornerstone of its national policy regardless of the vicissitudes of the 
international situation. In the adjustment of diplomatic relations between 
Japan and the United States, she has based her hopes for a solution definitely 
within the scope of that alliance. With the intent of restraining the United 
States from participating in the war, she boldly assumed the attitude of 
carrying through these negotiations.

2. Therefore, the present cabinet, in line with your message, with the view of 
defending the Empire's existence and integrity on a just and equitable basis, 
has continued the negotiations carried on in the past. However, their views 
and ours on the question of the evacuation of troops upon which the 
negotiations rested (they demanded the evacuation of Imperial troops from 
China and French Indo-China), were completely in opposition to each other.

Judging from the course of the negotiations that have been going on, we first 
came to loggerheads when the United States, in keeping with its traditional 
ideological tendency of managing international relations, re-emphasized her 
fundamental reliance upon this traditional policy in the conversations carried 
on between the United States and England in the Atlantic Ocean. The motive of 
the United States in all this was brought out by her desire to prevent the 
establishment of a new order by Japan, Germany, and Italy in Europe and in the 
Far East, that is to say, the aims of the Tri-Partite Alliance. As long as the 
Empire of Japan was in alliance with Germany and Italy, there could be no 
maintenance of friendly relations between Japan and the United States was the 
stand they took. From this point of view, they began to demonstrate a tendency 
to demand the divorce of the Imperial Government from the Tri-Partite 
Alliance. This was brought out at the last meeting. That is to say that it has 
only been in the negotiations of the last few days that it has become 
gradually more and more clear that the Imperial Government could no longer 
continue negotiations with the United States. It became clear, too, that a 
continuation of negotiations would inevitably be detrimental to our cause.

[2] (Part 2 of 2)

3. The proposal presented by the United States on the 26th made this attitude 
of theirs clearer than ever. In it there is one insulting clause which says 
that no matter what treaty either party enters into with a third power it will 
not be interpreted as having any bearing upon the basic object of this treaty, 
namely the maintenance of peace in the Pacific. This means specifically the 
Three-Power Pact. It means that in case the United States enters the European 
war at any time the Japanese Empire will not be allowed to give assistance to 
Germany and Italy. It is clearly a trick. This clause alone, let alone others, 
makes it impossible to find any basis in the American proposal for 
negotiations. What is more, before the United States brought forth this plan, 
they conferred with England, Australia, the Netherlands, and China_they do so 
repeatedly. Therefore, it is clear that the United States is now in collusion 
with those nations and has decided to regard Japan, along with Germany and 
Italy, as an enemy.

ARMY 6944 25555 SECRET Trans. 12-1-41  (NR)



Page 114

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
1 December 1941
(Purple-CA)
#865

Re my #857.*

1. The date set in my message #812** has come and gone, and the situation 
continues to be increasingly critical. However, to prevent the United States 
from becoming unduly suspicious we have been advising the press and others 
that though there are some wide differences between Japan and the United 
States, the negotiations are continuing. (The above is for only your 
information)

2. We have decided to withhold submitting the note to the U. S. Ambassador to 
Tokyo as suggested by you at the end of your message #1124***. Please make the 
necessary representations at your end only.

3. There are reports here that the President's sudden return to the capital is 
an effect of Premier Tojo's statement. We have an idea that the President did 
so because of his concern over the critical Far Eastern situation. Please make 
investigations into this matter.

SIS-25605 JD-1: 6983 SECRET (D) Navy Trans. 12-1-41  (S-TT)

*JD-1:6921.
**JD-1:6710.
*** Not available.

From: Tokyo (Togo)
To: Honolulu (Riyoji)
15 November 1941
(J-19)
#111

As relations between Japan and the United States are most critical, make your 
"ships in harbor report" irregular, but at a rate of twice a week. Although 
you already are not doubt aware, please take extra care to maintain secrecy.

SIS-25644 JD-1: 6991  SECRET (Y) Navy Trans. 12-3-41 (S)

From: Washington
To: Tokyo
December 2, 1941
Purple
#1232

[Completed Translation]

(Part 1 of 2)

Re my #1231.

Today, the 2nd Ambassador KURUSU and I had an interview with Under-Secretary 
of State WELLES. At that time, prefacing his statement by saying that it was 
at the direct instruction of the President of the United States, he turned 
over to us the substance of my separate wire #1233. [a] Thereupon we said: 
"Since we haven't been informed even to the slightest degree concerning the 
troops in French Indo-China, we will transmit the gist of your representations 
directly to our Home Government. In all probability they never considered that 
such a thing as this could possibly be an upshot of their proposals of 
November 20th." The Under-Secretary then said: "I want you to know that the 
stand the United States takes is that she opposes aggression in any and all 
parts of the world." Thereupon we replied "The United States and other 
countries have pyramided economic pressure upon economic pressure upon us 
Japanese. (I made that statement that economic warfare was even worse than 
forceful aggression.) We haven't the time to argue the pros and cons of this 
question or the rights and wrongs. The people of Japan are faced with economic 
pressure, and I want you to know that we have but the choice between 

* Not available.



Page 115

submission to this pressure or breaking the chains that it invokes. *We want 
you to realize this as well as the situation in which all Japanese find 
themselves as the result of the four-year incident in China; the President 
recently expressed cognizance of the latter situation.

25659-B Trans. 12/3/41

*Original translation incomplete from this point on.

(Part 2 of 2)

[1] Furthermore, I would have you know that in replying to the recent American 
proposals the Imperial Government is giving the most profound consideration to 
this important question which has to do with our national destiny." Under-
Secretary of State WELLES said: "I am well aware of that." I continued: "We 
cannot overemphasize the fact that, insofar as Japan is concerned, it is 
virtually impossible for her to accept the new American proposals as they now 
stand. Our proposals proffered on the 21st of June and the proposals of 
September 25th, representing our greatest conciliations based on the previous 
proposal, still stand. In spite of the fact that the agreement of both sides 
was in the offing, it has come to naught. At this late juncture to give 
thoughtful consideration to the new proposals certainly will not make for a 
smooth and speedy settlement of the negotiations. Recently, we promised to 
evacuate our troops from French Indo-China in the event of a settlement of the 
Sino-Japanese incident and the establishment of a just peace in the Far East. 
In anticipating the settlement of fundamental questions the question of the 
representations of this date would naturally dissolve." The Under-Secretary 
assiduously heard us out and then said: "The American proposals of the 26th 
were brought about by the necessity to clarify the position of the United 
States because of the internal situation here."

26660 ARMY

[2] Then he continued: "In regard to the opinions that you have expressed, I 
will make it a point immediately to confer with the Secretary."

I got the impression from the manner in which he spoke that he hoped Japan in 
her reply to the American proposals of the 26th would leave this much room.

Judging by my interview with Secretary of State HULL on the 1st and my 
conversations of today, it is clear that the United States, too, is anxious to 
peacefully conclude the current difficult situation. I am convinced that they 
would like to bring about a speedy settlement. Therefore, please bear well in 
mind this fact in your considerations of our reply to the new American 
proposals and to my separate wire #1233. [a]

ARMY 25660 Trans. 12-3_41 (7)

[a] Not available.

From: Washington.
To: Tokyo.
1 December 1941
(Purple)

#1225 (Part 2 of 3) (Parts 1 and 3 not available).

(Message having the indicator 20803* is part one of three.)

For this reason CHA has been the target of considerable attack and 
dissatisfaction. It was admitted that he was in a very tight spot. As the 
President recently said, it is clearly understood that the people of Japan, 
after over four years of the Japanese-Chinese incident, are very tense.

Japan, too, is highly desirous of having peace on the Pacific assured by 
successfully concluding these negotiations. It is our hope that he would give 
his support and encouragement to the efforts that Hull and we are making in 
this direction.

With regard to the matters pertaining to French Indo-China ______ the 
government of the United States, too, cannot help but feel concern since it 
has been receiving report after report during the past few days, from U. S. 
officials stationed in that area, of unusual movements of the Japanese army 
and navy; the landing

* Not available, probably is Part 1 of this message.



Page 116

of various types of arms; and the movements of transport vessels. Concern is 
felt as to the goal of all these activities (the implication was they they 
[sic] feared that they were going to be used not only against Thailand but in 
the southwestern Pacific area).

As to what plans the responsible persons in the Japanese army and navy are 
planning are not difficult to guess if one goes on the assumption that the 
Japanese army and navy joins forces with the Germans; even if, in actuality, 
that is not what is taking place, preparations must be made for this possible 
eventuality, and all nations concerned must concentrate their fighting forces 
in that area.

25715 JD-1: 7042 (D) Navy Trans. 12-4-41 (T)

From: Tokyo.
To: Washington
3 December 1941
(Purple)
#875

Chief of Office routing
Re your #1232*

Please explain the matter to the United States along the following lines:

There seems to be rumors to the effect that our military garrisons in French 
Indo-China are being strengthened. The fact is that recently there has been an 
unusual amount of activity by the Chinese forces in the vicinity of the Sino-
French Indo-China border. In view of this, we hare increased our forces in 
parts of northern French Indo-China. There would naturally be some movement of 
troops in the southern part as a result of this. We presume that the source of 
the rumors is in the exaggerated reports of these movements. In doing so, we 
have in no way violated the limitations contained in the Japanese-French joint 
defense agreement.

25725 JD-1: 7057 (D) Navy Trans. 12-4-41 (S-TT)

*JD-1: 7 021. (SIS #25659_60)

From: Washington.
To: Tokyo.
1 December 1941
(Purple)

#1227

Indications are that the United States desires to continue the negotiations 
even if it is necessary to go beyond their stands on the so-called basic 
principles. However, if we keep quibbling on the critical points, and continue 
to get stuck in the middle as we have been in the past, it is impossible to 
expect any further developments. If it is impossible from the broad political 
viewpoint, to conduct a leaders' meeting at this time, would it not be 
possible to arrange a conference between persons in whom the leaders have 
complete confidence, (for example, Vice President Wallace or Hopkins from the 
United States and the former Premier Konoye, who is on friendly terms with the 
President, or Adviser to the Imperial Privy Council Ishii). The meeting could 
be arranged for some midway point, such as Honolulu. High army and navy 
officers should accompany these representatives. Have them make one final 
effort to reach some agreement, using as the basis of their discussions the 
latest proposals submitted by each.

We feel that this last effort may facilitate the final decision as to war or 
peace.

We realize of course that an attempt to have President Roosevelt and former 
Premier Konoye meet, failed. Bearing in mind the reaction to that in our 
nation, it may be to our interest to first ascertain the U.S. attitude on this 
possibility. Moreover, since we have no guarantee either of success or failure 
of the objectives even if the meeting is held, careful consideration should 
first be given this matter.

We feel, however, that to surmount the crisis with which we are face to face, 
it is not wasting our efforts to pursue every path open to us. It is our 
opinion that it would be most effective to feel out and ascertain the U.S. 
attitude regarding this matter, in the name of the Japanese Government. 
However, if this procedure



Page 117

does not seem practical to you in view of some internal condition, then how 
would it be if I were to bring up the subject as purely of my own origin and 
in that manner feel out their attitude. Then, if they seem receptive to it the 
government could make the official proposal.

Please advise me of your opinions on this matter.

25727 JD-1: 7055 SECRET (D) Navy Trans. 12-4-41 (1) Copy

From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
December 2, 1941.
Purple. (Urgent)
#1234.

Strictly Secret.
Re your #862. [a]

I knew that to leave that error in the publication of this speech as it now 
stands would have a bad effect on negotiations, so on the morning of the 2nd 
prior to my interview with WELLES I sent TERAZAKI to visit BALLANTINE at the 
State Department to explain the substance of your #862. BALLANTINE said, "At 
this tense psychological moment in Japanese-American negotiations, the fact 
that such a strong statement as this has been circulated has given a severe 
shock to the American Government and people and it is very unfortunate and 
dangerous." TERAZAKI replied, "Well, as it was the American newspapers that 
made such a clamor about it, I did not come to vindicate ourselves or make any 
explanation. I merely wished to state the facts." He added, "At present the 
newspaper of both countries ought both to be cool and calm, so will you please 
advise them hereafter concerning this point."

25730 JD-7059 Trans 12-4-41 (2)

ARMY

[a] Not available.

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
December 4, 1941.
Purple (Urgent)
#891.

To be handled in Government Code
Re your #1256. [a]

What you say in your telegram is, of course, true, but at present it would be 
a very delicate matter to give any more explanations than set forth in my 
#875. [b] I would advise against it because unfortunate results might follow, 
so please reply in accordance with my aforementioned message.

25731 JD-7105 Trans. 12-4-41 (S)

ARMY

[a] Not available.
[b] S. I. S. #25725-

From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
November 30, 1941
Purple
#1224

Re your #857. [a]

I at once requested HULL for an interview, however, I failed to be notified of 
the exact time for it for the reason, among others, of the President's ex-

[a] See S. I. S. #25496. Tokyo instructs Washington to make one more attempt 
verbally to the effect that the Imperial Government is at a loss to understand 
why the United States, in view of the fair position it has always taken, 
should have changed in their front with regard to the China problem.



Page 118

pected arrival tomorrow morning. I am afraid I shall miss a good opportunity 
and so will you transmit your message at once to Ambassador GREW? (7:30 p. m.)

25762

ARMY JD 7089 Trans. 12/5/41 (2)

From: Tokyo (Togo)
To: Honolulu
November 18, 1941
J-19
#113

Please report on the following areas as to vessels anchored therein: Area "N", 
Pearl Harbor, Manila Bay, [a] and the areas adjacent thereto. (Make your 
investigation with great secrecy.)

ARMY 25773 7063 SECRET Trans. 12/5/41  (S)

[a] Probably means Mamala Bay.

From: Tokyo
To: Hsinking
1 December 1941
(Purple)
#893

* * * In the event that Manchuria participates in the war * * * in
view of various circumstances it is our policy to cause Manchuria to 
participate in the war in which event Manchuria will take the same steps 
toward England and America that this country will take in case war breaks out.

A summary follows:

1. American and British consular officials and offices will not be recognized 
as having special rights. Their business will be stopped (the sending of code 
telegrams and the use of short wave radio will be forbidden). However it is 
desired that the treatment accorded them after the suspension of business be 
comparable to that which Japan accords to consular officials of enemy 
countries resident to Japan

2. The treatment accorded to British and American public property, private 
property, and to the citizens themselves shall be comparable to that accorded 
by Japan.

3. British and American requests to third powers to look after their consular 
offices and interests will not be recognized.

However the legal administrative steps taken by Manchoukuo shall be equitable 
and shall correspond to the measures taken by Japan.

4. The treatment accorded Russians resident in Manchoukuo shall conform to the 
provisions of the Japanese-Soviet neutrality pact. Great care shall be 
exercised not to antagonize Russia.

[Handwritten:] Codes Manchukuo, etc.

JD-1: 7092 SECRET (H) Navy Trans. 12-4-41 (5-AR) SIS 25783



Page 119

From: Washington.
To: Tokyo.
December 1941
(Purple)
#1223

Judging from all indications, we feel that some joint military action between 
Great Britain and the United States, with or without a declaration of war, is 
a definite certainty in the event of an occupation of Thailand.

25785

JD-1: 7098 (D) Navy Trans. 12-5-41 (7)

From: Berlin
To: Tokyo
December 4, 1941.
Purple. (CA)
#1410

In case of evacuation by the members of our Embassy in London, I would like to 
arrange to have Secretary MATSUI of that office and three others (URABE and 
KOJIMA and one other) from among the higher officials and two other officials 
(UEHARA and YUWASAKI) stay here. Please do your best to this end.

ARMY 25807 JD-7134 Trans. 12-5-41 (W)

From: Honolulu (Kita)
To: Tokyo
November 18, 1941
J-19
#222

1. The warships at anchor in the Harbor on the 15th were as I told you in my 
#219 [a] on that day.

Area A [b] -A battleship of the Oklahoma class entered and one tanker left 
port.
Area C [c] -3 warships of the heavy cruiser class were at anchor.

2. On the 17th the Saratoga was not in the harbor. The carrier, Enterprise, or 
some other vessel was in Area C. Two heavy cruisers of the Chicago class, one 
of the Pensacola class were tied up at docks "KS". 4 merchant vessels were at 
anchor in Area D. [d]

3. At 10:00 a. m. On the morning of the 17th, 8 destroyers were observed 
entering the Harbor. Their course was as follows: In a single file at a 
distance of 1,000 meters apart at a speed of 3 knots per hour, they moved into 
Pearl Harbor. From the entrance of the Harbor through Area B to the buoys in 
Area C, to which they were moored, they changed course 5 times each time 
roughly 30 degrees. The elapsed time was one hour, however, one of these 
destroyers entered Area A after passing the water reservoir on the Eastern 
side.

Relayed to -----

ARMY 25817 7111 SECRET Trans. 12/6/41 (2)

[a] Available in ME code dated November 14. Code under study.
[b] Waters between Ford Island and the Arsenal.
[c] East Loch.
[d] Middle Loch.




Page 120

From: Tokyo
To: Honolulu
29 November 1941
(J19)
#199

We have been receiving reports from you on ship movements, but in future 
will you also report even when there are no movements.

SIS 25823

JD-1: 7086 SECRET (Y) Navy Trans. 12-5-41 (2)

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
December 6, 1941
Purple
#902 (Part 1 of 14)

Separate telegram
Memorandum

1. The Government of Japan, prompted by a genuine desire to come to an 
amicable understanding with the Government of the United States in order that 
the two countries by their joint efforts may secure the peace of the Pacific 
area and thereby contribute toward the realization of world peace, has 
continued negotiations with the utmost sincerity since April last with the 
Government of the United States regarding the adjustment and advancement of 
Japanese-American relations and the stabilization of the Pacific area.

The Japanese Government has the honor to state frankly its views concerning 
the claims the American Government has persistently maintained as well as the 
measures the United States and Great Britain have taken toward Japan during 
these eight months.

2. It is the immutable policy of the Japanese Government to insure the 
stability of East Asia and to promote world peace, and thereby to enable all 
nations to find each BOAMPYQBR place in the world.

Ever since the China Affair broke out owing to the failure on the part of 
China to comprehend Japan's true intentions, the Japanese Government has 
striven for the restoration of peace and it has consistently exerted its best 
effort to prevent the extension of war-like disturbances. It was also to that 
end that in September last year Japan concluded the Tri Partite Pact with 
Germany and Italy.

(Part 2 of 14)

However, both the United States and Great Britain have resorted to every 
possible measure to assist the Chungking regime so as to obstruct the 
establishment of a general peace between Japan and China, interfering with 
Japan's constructive endeavours toward the stabilization of East Asia, 
exerting pressure on The Netherlands East Indies, or menacing French Indo-
China, they have attempted to frustrate Japan's aspiration to realize the 
ideal of common prosperity in cooperation with these regions. Furthermore, 
when Japan in accordance with its protocol with France took measures of joint 
defense of French Indo-China, both American and British governments, willfully 
misinterpreted it as a threat to their own possession and inducing the 
Netherlands government to follow suit, they enforced the assets freezing 
order, thus severing economic relations with Japan. While manifesting thus an 
obviously hostile attitude, these countries have strengthened their military 
preparations perfecting an encirclement of Japan, and have brought about a 
situation which endangers the very existence of the empire.

(Part 3 of 14)

Nevertheless, facilitate a speedy settlement, the Premier of Japan proposed, 
in August last, to meet the President of the United States for a discussion of 
important problems between the two countries covering the entire Pacific area. 
However, while accepting in principle the Japanese proposal, insisted that the 
meeting should take place after an agreement of View had been reached on



Page 121

fundamental_(75 letters garbled)_The Japanese government submitted a proposal 
based on the formula proposed by the American government, taking fully into 
consideration past American claims and also incorporating Japanese views. 
Repeated discussions proved of no avail in producing readily an agreement of 
view. The present cabinet, therefore, submitted a revised proposal, moderating 
still further the Japanese claims regarding the principal points of difficulty 
in the negotiation and endeavoured strenuously to reach a settlement. But the 
American government, adhering steadfastly to its original proposal, failed to 
misplay in the slightest degree a spirit of conciliation. The negotiation made 
no progress.

(Part 4 of 14)

Thereupon, the Japanese Government, with a view to doing its utmost for 
averting a crisis in Japanese-American relations, submitted on November 20th 
still another proposal in order to arrive .It an equitable solution of the 
more essential and urgent questions which, simplifying its previous proposal, 
stipulated the following points:

(1) The Governments of Japan and the United States undertake not to dispatch 
armed forces into any of the regions, excepting French Indo-China, in the 
Southeastern Asia and the Southern Pacific area.

(2) Both Governments shall cooperate with a view to securing the acquisition 
in the Netherlands East Indies of those goods and commodities of which the two 
countries are in need.

(3) Both Governments mutually undertake to restore commercial relations to 
those prevailing prior to the freezing of assets.

The Government of the United States shall supply Japan the required quantity 
of oil.

(4) The Government of the United States undertakes not to resort to measures 
and actions prejudicial to the endeavours for the restoration of general peace 
between Japan and China.

(5) The Japanese Government undertakes to withdraw troops now stationed in 
French Indo-China upon either the restoration of peace between Japan and China 
or the establishment of an equitable peace in the Pacific area; and it is 
prepared to remove the Japanese troops in the southern part of French Indo-
China to the northern part upon the conclusion of the present agreement.

(Part 5 of 14)

As regards China. The Japanese Government, while expressing its readiness to 
accept the offer of the President of the United States to act as "Introducer" 
of peace between Japan and China as was previously suggested, asked for an 
undertaking on the part of the United States to do nothing prejudicial to the 
restoration of Sino-Japanese peace when the two parties have commenced direct 
negotiations.

The American government not only rejected the above-mentioned new proposal, 
but made known its intention to continue its aid to Chiang Kai-Shek; and in 
spite of its suggestion mentioned above, withdrew the offer of the President 
to act as the so-called "Introducer" of peace between Japan and China, 
pleading that time was not yet ripe for it. Finally, on November 26th, in an 
attitude to impose upon the Japanese government those principles it has 
persistently maintained, the American government made a proposal totally 
ignoring Japanese claims, which is a source of profound regret to the Japanese 
Government.

(Part 6 of 14)

4. From the beginning of the present negotiation the Japanese Government as 
always maintained an attitude of fairness and moderation, and did its best to 
reach a settlement, for which it made all possible concessions often in spite 
of great difficulties.

As for the China question which constituted an important subject of the 
agitation, the Japanese Government showed a most conciliatory attitude. 

As for the principle of Non-Discrimination in International Commerce, 
advocated by the American Government, the Japanese Government expressed its 
desire to see the said principle applied throughout the world, and declared 
that along with the actual practice of this principle in the world, the 
Japanese Government would endeavour to apply the same in the Pacific area, 
including China, and made it clear that Japan had no intention of excluding 
from China economic activities of third powers pursued on an equitable basis.



Page 122

Furthermore, as regards the question of withdrawing troops from French Indo-
China, the Japanese government even volunteered, as mentioned above, to carry 
out an immediate evacuation of troops from Southern French Indo-china as a 
measure of easing the situation.

(Part 7 of 14)

It is presumed that the spirit of conciliation exhibited to the utmost degree 
by the Japanese Government in all these matters is fully appreciated by the 
American government.

On the other hand, the American government, always holding fast to theories in 
disregard of realities, and refusing to yield an inch on its impractical 
principles caused undue delays in the negotiation. It is difficult to 
understand this attitude of the American government and the Japanese 
government desires to call the attention of the American government especially 
to the following points:

1. The American government advocates in the name of world peace those 
principles favorable to it and urges upon the Japanese government the 
acceptance thereof. The peace of the world may be brought about only by 
discovering a mutually acceptable formula through recognition of the reality 
of the situation and mutual appreciation of one another's position. An 
attitude such as ignores realities and imposes one's selfish views upon others 
will scarcely serve the purpose of facilitating the consummation of 
negotiations.

(Part 8 of 14)

Of the various principles put forward by the American government as a basis of 
the Japanese American agreement, there are some which the Japanese government 
is ready to accept in principle, but in view of the world's actual conditions 
it seems only a Utopian ideal, on the part of the American government, to 
attempt to force their immediate adoption.

Again, the proposal to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact between 
Japan, the United States, Great Britain, China, the Soviet Union, The 
Netherlands, and Thailand, which is patterned after the old concept of 
collective security, is far removed from the realities of East Asia.

(2) The American proposal contains a stipulation which states: "Both 
governments will agree that no agreement, which either has concluded with any 
third powers, shall be interpreted by it in such a way as to conflict with the 
fundamental purpose of this agreement, the establishment and preservation of 
peace throughout the Pacific area." It is presumed that the above provision 
has been proposed with a view to restrain Japan from fulfilling its 
obligations under the Tripartite Pact when the United States participates in 
the war in Europe, and, as such, it cannot be accepted by the Japanese 
Government.

(Part 9 of 14)

The American Government, obsessed with its own views and opinions, may be said 
to be scheming for the extension of the war. While it seeks, on the one hand, 
to secure its rear by stabilizing the Pacific area, it is engaged, on the 
other hand, in aiding Great Britain and preparing to attack, in the name of 
self-defense, Germany and Italy two powers that are striving to establish a 
new order in Europe. Such a policy is totally at variance with the many 
principles upon which the American Government proposes to found the stability 
of the Pacific area through peaceful means.

3. Where as the American Government, under the principles it rigidly upholds, 
objects to settling international issues through military pressure, it is 
exercising in conjunction with Great Britain and other nations pressure by 
economic power. Recourse to such pressure as a means of dealing with 
international relations should be condemned as it is at times more inhuman 
than military pressure.

(Part 10 of 14)

4. It is impossible not to reach the conclusion that the American Government 
desires to maintain and strengthen. In collusion with Great Britain and other 
powers, its dominant position it has hitherto occupied not only in China but 
in other areas of East Asia. It is a fact of history that one countr---- (45 
letters garbled or missing)-been compelled to observe the status quo under the 
Anglo-American policy of imperialistic exploitation and to sacrifice the ----
es to the prosperity of the two nations. The Japanese Government cannot 
tolerate



Page 123

the perpetuation of such a situation since it directly runs counter to Japan's 
fundamental policy to enable all nations to enjoy each its proper place in the 
world.

(Part 11 of 14)

The stipulation proposed by the American Government relative to French Indo-
China is a good exemplification of the above-mentioned American policy. That 
the six: countries,_Japan, the United States, Great Britain, The Netherlands, 
China and Thailand,_excepting France, should undertake among themselves to 
respect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of French Indo-China and 
equality of treatment in trade and commerce would be tantamount to placing 
that territory under the joint guarantee of the governments of those six 
countries. Apart from the fact that such a proposal totally ignores the 
position of France, it is unacceptable to the Japanese government in that such 
an arrangement cannot but be considered as an extension to French Indo-China 
of a system similar to the n_(50 letters missed)_sible for the present 
predicament of East Asia.

(Part 12 of 14)

5. All the items demanded of Japan by the American government regarding China 
such as wholesale evacuation of troops or unconditional application of the 
principle of Non-Discrimination in International Commerce ignore the actual 
conditions of China, and are calculated to destroy Japan's position as the 
stabilizing factor of East Asia. The attitude of the American government in 
demanding Japan not to support militarily, politically or economically any 
regime other than the regime at Chungking, disregarding thereby the existence 
of the Nanking government, shatters the very basis of the present negotiation. 
This demand of the American government falling, as it does, in line with its 
above-mentioned refusal to cease from aiding the Chungking regime, 
demonstrates clearly the intention of the American government to obstruct the 
restoration of normal relations between Japan and China and the return of 
peace to East Asia

(Part 13 of 14)

5. In brief, the American proposal contains certain acceptable items such as 
those concerning commerce, including the conclusion of a trade agreement, 
mutual removal of the freezing restrictions, and stabilization of the Yen and 
Dollar exchange, or the abolition of extra-territorial rights in China. On the 
other hand, however, the proposal in question ignores Japan's sacrifices in 
the four years of the China Affair, menaces the empire's existence itself and 
disparages its honour and prestige. Therefore, viewed in its entirety, the 
Japanese government regrets that it cannot accept the proposal as a basis of 
negotiation.

6. The Japanese government, in its desire for an early conclusion of the 
negotiation, proposed that simultaneously with the conclusion of the Japanese-
American negotiation, agreements be signed with Great Britain and other 
interested countries. The proposal was accepted by the American government. 
However, since the American government has made the proposal of November 26th 
as a result of frequent consultations with Great Britain, Australia, The 
Netherlands and Chungking, ANDND* presumably by catering to the wishes of the 
Chungking regime on the questions of CHTUAL YLOKMMTT** be concluded that all 
these countries are at one with the United States in ignoring Japan's 
position.

(Part 14 of 14)

(Note: in the forwarding instructions to the radio station handling this part, 
appeared the plain English phrase "VERY IMPORTANT").

7. Obviously it is the intention of the American Government to conspire with 
Great Britain and other countries to obstruct Japan's efforts toward the 
establishment of peace through the creation of a New Order in East Asia, and 
especially to preserve Anglo-American rights and interests by keeping Japan 
and China at war. This intention has been revealed clearly during the course 
of the present negotiations. Thus, the earnest hope of the Japanese Government 
to adjust Japanese-American relations and to preserve and promote the peace of 
the Pacific through cooperation with the American Government has finally been 
lost.

* Probably "and as"
** Probably "China, can but"



Page 124

The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify hereby the American 
Government that in view of the attitude of the American Government it cannot 
but consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through further 
negotiations.

JD 1:7143 SECRET,(M) Navy trans. 7 Dec. 1941. (S-TT)

25843

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
December 7, 1941
Purple (Urgent_Very Important)
#907. To be handled in government code.

Re my #902. [a]

Will the Ambassador please submit to the United States Government (if possible 
to the Secretary of State) our reply to the United States at 1:00 p. m. on the 
7th, your time.

ARMY 7145 25850 SECRET Trans. 12/7/41 (S)

[a] JD: 7143_text of Japanese reply.

CLARKE EXHIBIT NO. 2

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
19 November 1941
(J19)
Circular #2353

Regarding the broadcast of a special message in an emergency.

In case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations) and the 
cutting off of international communications, the following warning will be 
added in the middle of the daily Japanese language short wave news broadcast:

(1) In case of a Japan-U. S. relations in danger:
    HIGASHI NO KAZEAME (EAST WIND RAIN)

(2) Japan-U. S. S. R. relations:
    KITANOKAZE KUMORI (NORTH WIND CLOUDY)

(3) Japan-British relations:
    NISHI NO KAZE HARE (WEST WIND CLEAR)

This signal will be given in the middle and at the end as a weather forecast 
and each sentence will be repeated twice. When this is heard, please destroy 
all code papers, etc. This is as yet to be a completely secret arrangement.

Forward as urgent intelligence.

(Voice broadcasts)

S/S 25432

JD-1: 6875 SECRET Navy Trans. 11-28-41

CLARKE EXHIBIT NO. 3

SECRET

                   UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
             FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION,
             Washington, D. C.. August 18,1944.

I hereby certify that the attached are true copies of documents described as 
follows:

Document No. 1 is a true copy of the weather message which Major Wesley T. 
Guest (now Colonel), U. S. Army Signal Corps, requested the Commission's 
monitors to be on the lookout for in Tokyo broadcasts and to advise Colonel 
Bratton, Army Military Intelligence, if any such messages was intercepted. 
This request was made on November 28, 1941 at approximately 2140 GMT.



Page 125

Document No. 2 is a true copy of a weather message from Tokyo station JVW3, 
intercepted by Commission monitors at approximately 2200 GMT, December 4, 
1g41, which at 9:05 p. m. EST, December 4, 1941, having been unable to contact 
Colonel Bratton's office, was telephoned to Lieutenant Brotherhood, 20-G, 
Watch Officer, Navy Department, who stated that he was authorized to accept 
messages of interest to Colonel Bratton's office.

Document No. 3 is a true copy of a weather message from Tokyo station JVW3, 
intercepted by Commission monitors at 2130 GMT, December 5, 1941, which was 
telephoned to Colonel Bratton at his residence at 7:50 p.m. EST, December 5, 
1941.

Document No. 4 is a true copy of two weather messages intercepted by 
Commission monitors from Tokyo stations JLG 4 and JZJ between 0002 and 0035 
GMT, December 8, 1941, and telephoned to Lt. Colonel C. A Dusenbury, U. S. 
Army Service Corps, at the request of Colonel Bratton's office at 
approximately 8 p. m. EST, December 7, 1941. Document No. 4 also contains the 
Romaji version of these messages.

on file in this Commission, and that I am the proper custodian of the same.

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand, and caused the seal of the 
Federal Communications Commission to be affixed, this twenty-first day of 
August, 1944.

/S/ T. J. Slowie
    T. J. SLOWIE
Secretary

(SEAL of the F. C. C.)

CLARKE EXHIBIT NO. 4

SECRET

DOCUMENT No. 1

Group One is EAST WIND RAIN
Group Two is NORTH WIND CLOUDY AND
Group Three is WEST WIND CLEAR STOP
Groups repeated twice in middle and at end of broadcast

The above are the weather messages Major Wesley T. Guest requested the 
Commission to monitor on November 28, 1941.

DOCUMENT No. 2

Tokyo today north wind slightly stronger may become cloudy tonight tomorrow 
slightly cloudy and fine weather.

Kanagawa prefecture today north wind cloudy from afternoon more clouds.

China prefecture today north wind clear may become slightly cloudy ocean 
surface calm.

Weather message from Tokyo Station JVW3 transmitted at approximately 2200 GMT, 
December 4, 1941.

DOCUMENT No. 3

Today north wind morning cloudy afternoon clear begin cloudy evening. Tomorrow 
north wind and later from south (repeated 3 times).

Weather message from Tokyo Station JVW3 transmitted at approximately 2130 gmt 
December 6, 1941.



Page 126

DOCUMENT No. 4

English                            Romaji

This is in the middle of the news  Nyusu no tochu de gozaimasu ga hon-
but today, specially at this point jitsu wa toku ni koko de tenki yoho
I will give the weather forecast:  wo moshiage masu
  WEST WIND CLEAR                    NISHI NO KAZE HARE
  WEST WIND CLEAR                    NISHI NO KAZE HARE
This is in the middle of the news  Nyuso no tochu de gozaimasu ga kyo
but today, at this point special-  wa koko de toku ni tenki yollo wo
ly I will give the weather         moshiage masu
forecast:
  WEST WIND, CLEAR                   NISHI NO KAZE HARE
  WEST WIND, CLEAR                   NISHI NO KAZE HARE

Above are the two weather messages from Tokyo stations JLG4 and JZJ 
transmitted by them between 0002 and 0035 GMT December 8, 1941.

Sent No. 519, 12/5

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF HEADQUARTERS
G2 Hawaiian Department, Honolulu, Territory Hawaii.

Contact Commander Rochefort immediately thru Commandment Fourteen Naval 
District regarding broadcasts from Tokyo reference weather

MILES.

I certify that this message is on official business and necessary for the 
public service.

/S/ RALPH C, SMITH,
    Colonel, G. S. C.,
    Executive Officer, G-2.

Secret Cablegram
las

CLARKE EXHIBIT No. 5

TOP SECRET

From Tokyo
To  Washington
December 6, 1941
Purple
#902

(Part 1 of 14)

Separate telegram

MEMORANDUM

1. The Government of Japan, prompted by a genuine desire to come to an 
amicable understanding with the Government of the United States in order that 
the two countries by their joint efforts may secure the peace of the Pacific 
area and thereby contribute toward the realization of world peace, has 
continued negotiations with the utmost sincerity since April last with the 
Government of the United States regarding the adjustment and advancement of 
Japanese-American relations and the stabilization of the Pacific area.

The Japanese Government has the honor to state frankly its views concerning 
the claims the American Government has persistently maintained as well as the 
measures the United States and Great Britain have taken toward Japan during 
these eight months.

2 It is the immutable policy of the Japanese Government to insure the 
stability of East Asia and to promote world peace. And thereby to enable all 
nations to find each BOAMPYQBR place in the world.

Ever since the China Affair broke out owing to the failure on the part of 
China to comprehend Japan's true intentions, the Japanese Government has 
striven for the restoration of peace and it has consistently exerted its best 
efforts to prevent the extension of war-like disturbances. It was also to that 
end that in September last year Japan concluded the Tri Partite Pact with 
Germany and Italy.



Page 127

TOP SECRET

From: Tokyo
To:  Washington
December 6, 1941
Purple
#902

(Part 2 of 14)

However, both the United States and Great Britain have resorted to every 
possible measure to assist the Chungking regime so as to obstruct the 
establishment of a general peace between Japan and China, interfering with 
Japan's constructive endeavours toward the stabilization of East Asia, 
exerting pressure on The Netherlands East Indies, or menacing French Indo-
China, they have attempted to frustrate Japan's aspiration to realize the 
ideal of common prosperity in cooperation with these regions. Furthermore, 
when Japan in accordance with its protocol with France took measures of Joint 
defense of French Indo-China, both American and British governments, willfully 
misinterpreted it as a threat to their own possession and inducing the 
Netherlands government to follow suit, they enforced the assets freezing 
order, thus severing economic relations with Japan. While manifesting thus an 
obviously hostile attitude, these countries have strengthened their military 
preparations perfecting an encirclement of Japan, and have brought about a 
situation which endangers the very existence of the empire.

TOP SECRET

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
December 6, 1941
Purple
#902

(Part 3 of 14)

Nevertheless, facilitate a speedy settlement, the Premier of Japan proposed, 
in August last, to meet the President of the United States for a discussion of 
important problems between the two countries covering the entire Pacific area. 
However, while accepting in principle the Japanese proposal, insisted that the 
meeting should take place after an agreement of view had been reached on 
fundamental_(75 letters garbled)_ The Japanese government submitted a proposal 
based on the formula proposed by the American government, taking fully into 
consideration past American claims and also incorporating Japanese views. 
Repeated discussions proved of no avail in producing readily an agreement of 
view. The present cabinet, therefore, submitted a revised proposal, moderating 
still further the Japanese claims regarding the principal points of difficulty 
in the negotiation and endeavoured strenuously to reach a settlement. But the 
American government, adhering steadfastly to its original proposal, failed to 
display in the slightest degree a spirit of conciliation. The negotiation made 
no progress.

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
December 6, 1941
Purple

#902

(Part 4 of 14)

Thereupon, the Japanese Government, with a view to doing its utmost for 
averting a crisis in Japanese-American relations submitted on November 20th 
still another proposal in order to arrive at an equitable solution of the more 
essential and urgent questions which, simplifying its previous proposal, 
stipulated the following points:

(1) The Governments of Japan and the United States undertake not to dispatch 
armed forces into any of the regions, excepting French Indo-China, in the 
Southeastern Asia and the Southern Pacific area.

(2) Both Governments shall cooperate with a view to securing the acquisition 
in the Netherlands East Indies of those goods and commodities of which the two 
countries are in need.

(3) Both Governments mutually undertake to restore commercial relations to 
those previously prior to the freezing of assets.



Page 128

The Government of the United States shall supply Japan the required quantity 
of oil.

(4) The Government of the United States undertakes not to resort to measures 
and actions prejudicial to the endeavours for the restoration of general peace 
between Japan and China 

(5) The Japanese Government undertakes to withdraw troops now stationed in 
French Indo-China upon either the restoration of peace between Japan and China 
or the establishment of an equitable peace in the Pacific arena and it is 
prepared to remove the Japanese troops in the southern part of French Indo-
China to the northern part upon the conclusion of the present agreement.

JD-1: 1743 Secret Navy Trans 12-1/6-41 (3)

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
December 6, 1941
Purple

#902

(Part 5 of 14)

As regards China, the Japanese Government, while expressing its readiness to 
accept the offer of the President of the United States to act as "Introducer" 
of peace between Japan and China as was previously suggested, asked for an 
undertaking on the part of the United States to do nothing prejudicial to the 
restoration of Sino-Japanese peace when the two parties have commenced direct 
negotiations.

The American government not only rejected the above-mentioned new proposal, 
but made known its intention to continue its aid to Chiang Kai-Shek; and in 
spite of its suggestion mentioned above, withdrew the offer of the President 
to act as the so-called "Introducer" of peace between Japan and China, 
pleading that time was not yet ripe for it. Finally, on November 26th, in an 
attitude to impose upon the Japanese government those principles it has 
persistently maintained, the American government made a proposal totally 
ignoring Japanese claims, which is a source of profound regret to the Japanese 
Government.

JD-1: 1743 Secret Navy Trans 12-1/6-41 (3)

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
December 6, 1941
Purple

#902

(Part 6 of 14)

4. From the beginning of the present negotiation the Japanese Government has 
always maintained an attitude of fairness and moderation, and did its best to 
reach a settlement, for which it made all possible concessions often in spite 
of great difficulties.

As for the China question which constituted an important subject of the 
negotiation, the Japanese Government showed a most conciliatory attitude.

As for the principle of Non-Discrimination in International Commerce, 
advocated by the American Government, the Japanese Government expressed its 
desire to see the said principal applied throughout the world, and declared 
that along with the actual practice of this principle in the world, the 
Japanese Government would endeavour to apply the same in the Pacific area, 
including China, and made it clear that Japan had no intention of excluding 
from China economic activities of third powers pursued on an equitable basis.

Furthermore, as regards the question of withdrawing troops from French Indo-
China, the Japanese government even volunteered, as mentioned above, to carry 
out an immediate evacuation of troops from Southern French Indo-China as a 
measure of easing the situation.

JD-1: 1743  Secret Navy Trans 12-1/6-41 (3)



Page 129

From: Tokyo
To:  Washington
December 4, 1941
#902

(Part 7 of 14)

It is presumed that the spirit of conciliation exhibited to the utmost degree 
by the Japanese Government in all these matters is fully appreciated by the 
American government.

On the other hand, the American government always holding fast to theories in 
disregard of realities, and refusing to yield an inch on its impractical 
principles, caused undue delays in the negotiation. It is difficult to 
understand this attitude of the American government and the Japanese 
government desires to call the attention of the American government especially 
to the following points:

1. The American government advocates in the name of world peace those 
principles favorable to it and urges upon the Japanese government the 
acceptance thereof. The peace of the world may be brought about only by 
discovering a mutually acceptable formula through recognition of the reality 
of the situation and mutual appreciation of one another's position. An 
attitude such as ignores realities and imposes one's selfish views upon others 
will scarcely serve the purpose of facilitating the consummation of 
negotiations.

JD:17143
25843

From: Tokyo
To:  Washington
December 6, 1941
Purple
#902

(Part 8 of 14)

Of the various principles put forward by the American government as a basis of 
the Japanese-American agreement, there are some which the Japanese government 
is ready to accept in principle, but in view of the world's actual conditions, 
it seems only a Utopian ideal, on the part of the American government, to 
attempt to force their immediate adoption.

Again, the proposal to conclude a multilateral non-aggression past between 
Japan, the United States, Great Britain, China the Soviet Union, The 
Netherlands and Thailand, which is patterned after the old concept of 
collective security, is far removed from the realities of East Asia.

(2) The American proposal contains a stipulation which states: "Both 
governments will agree that no agreement, which either has concluded with any 
third powers, shall be interpreted by it in such a way as to conflict with the 
fundamental purpose of this agreement, the establishment and preservation of 
peace throughout the Pacific area." It is presumed that the above provision 
has been proposed with view to restrain Japan from fulfilling its obligations 
under the Tripartite Pact when the United States participates in the war in 
Europe, and, as such, it cannot accepted by the Japanese Government.

JD:1
25843 Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)

From: Tokyo
To:  Washington
December 6, 1941
Purple
#902

(Part 9 of 14)

The American Government, obsessed with its own views and opinions, may be said 
to be scheming for the extension of the war. While it seeks, on the one hand, 
to secure its rear by stabilizing the Pacific area, it is engaged, on the 
other hand, in aiding Great Britain and preparing to attack, in the name of 
self-defense, Germany and Italy two powers that are striving to establish a 
new order in Europe. Such a policy is totally at variance with the many 
principles upon which the American Government proposes to found the stability 
of the Pacific area through peaceful means.




Page 130

3. Where as the American Government, under the principles it rigidly upholds, 
objects to settling international issues through military pressure, it is 
exercising in conjunction with Great Britain and other nations pressure by 
economic power. Recourse to such pressure as a means of dealing with 
international relations should be condemned as it is at times more inhuman 
than military pressure.

JD-1: 7143 Navy Trans 12-6-41 (8)
25843

From: Tokyo
To:  Washington
December 6, 1941
Purple

#902 (Part 10 of 14)

4. It is impossible not to reach the conclusion that the American Government 
desires to maintain and strengthen, in collusion with Great Britain and other 
powers, its dominant position it has hitherto occupied not only in China but 
in other areas of East Asia. It is a fact of history that one countr_ (45 
letters garbled or missing) been compelled to observe the status quo under the 
Anglo-American policy of imperialistic exploitation and to sacrifice the_es to 
the prosperity of the two nations. The Japanese Government cannot tolerate the 
perpetuation of such a situation since it directly runs counter to Japan's 
fundamental policy to enable all nations to enjoy each its proper place in the 
world.

JD-1: 7143 Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (8)
25843

From: Tokyo
To:  Washington
December 6, 1941
Purple

# 902 (Part 11 of 14)

The stipulation proposed by the American Government relative to French Indo-
China is a good exemplification of the above mentioned American policy. That 
the six countries,_Japan, the United States, Great Britain, The Netherlands, 
China and Thailand,_excepting France, should undertake among themselves to 
respect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of French Indo-China and 
equality of treatment in trade and commerce would be tantamount to placing 
that territory under the joint guarantee of the governments of those six 
countries. Apart from the fact that such a proposal totally ignores the 
position of France, it is unacceptable to the Japanese government in that such 
an arrangement cannot but be considered as an extension to French Indo-China 
of a system similar to the n_(50 letters missed)_sible for the present 
predicament of East Asia.

JD-1: 7143 SECRET  Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)
25843

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
December 6, 1941
Purple

#902 (Part 12 of 14)

5. All-the items demanded of Japan by the American government regarding China 
such as wholesale evacuation of troops or unconditional application of the 
principle of Non-Discrimination in International Commerce ignore the actual 
conditions of China, and are calculated to destroy Japan's position as the 
stabilizing factor of East Asia. The attitude of the American government in 
demanding Japan not to support militarily, politically or economically any 
regime other than the regime at Chungking, disregarding thereby the existence 
of the Nanking government, shatters the very basis of the present negotiation. 
This demand of



Page 131

the American government falling, as it does, in line with its above-mentioned 
refusal to cease from aiding the Chungking regime, demonstrates clearly the 
intention of the American government to obstruct the restoration of normal 
relations between Japan and China and the return of peace to East Asia.

JD: 1 7143 SECRET  Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)
25843

TOP SECRET

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
December 6, 1941
Purple

#902 (Part 13 of 14)

5. In brief, the American proposal contains certain acceptable items such as 
lose concerning commerce, including the conclusion of a trade agreement, 
mutual removal of the freezing restrictions, and stabilization of the Yen and 
Dollar exchange, or the abolition of extra-territorial rights in China. On the 
other hand, however, the proposal in question ignores Japan's sacrifices in 
the four years of the China Affair, menaces the empire's existence itself and 
disparages its honour and prestige. Therefore, viewed in all its entirety, the 
Japanese Government regrets that it cannot accept the proposal as a basis of 
negotiation.

6. The Japanese government, in its desire for an early conclusion of the 
negotiation, proposed that simultaneously with the conclusion of the Japanese-
American negotiations, agreements be signed with Great Britain and other 
interested countries. The proposal was accepted by the American government. 
However, since the American government has made the proposal of November 26th 
as a result of frequent consultations with Great Britain, Australia, The 
Netherlands and Chungking. ANDND* presumably by catering to the wishes of the 
Chungking regime on the questions of CHTUAL YLOKMMTT** be concluded that all 
these countries are at one with the United States in ignoring Japan's 
position.

JD: 1 7143 SECRET Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S)
25843

* Probably "and as"

** Probably "China, can but"

From: Tokyo
To:  Washington
December 1941
(Purple_Eng)

#902 (Part 14  of 14)

(Note: In the forwarding instructions to the radio station handling this 
report appeared the plain English phrase "VERY IMPORTANT")

7. Obviously it is the intention of the American Government to conspire with 
Great Britain and other countries to obstruct Japan's efforts toward the 
establishment of peace through the creation of a New Order in East Asia, and 
especially to preserve Anglo-American rights and interests by keeping Japan 
and China at war. This intention has been revealed clearly during the course 
of the present negotiations. Thus, the earnest hope of the Japanese Government 
to adjust Japanese-American relations and to preserve and promote the peace of 
the Pacific through cooperation with the American Government has finally been 
lost.

The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify hereby the American 
Government that in view of the attitude of the American Government it cannot 
but consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through further 
negotiations.

JD: 1 7143 SECRET (M) Navy trans. 7 Dec. 1941 (S-TT)
25843



Page 132

CLARKE EXHIBIT NO. 6

TOP SECRET

From: Tokyo
To:  Washington
December 7, 1941
Purple (Urgent_Very Important)

#907. To be handled in government code.

Re my #902 [a].

Will the Ambassador please submit to the United States Government ( if 
possible to the Secretary of State) our reply to the United States at 1:00 p. 
m. on the 7th, your time.

ARMY 7145 25850 SECRET Trans. 12/7/41 (S)

[a] JD-1:7143_text of Japanese reply.

CLARKE EXHIBIT NO. 7

SECRET

WPD 4544-30                                                          WPD
                                                                     CKG

December 7, 1941

Memorandum for the Adjutant General (Through Secretary, General Staff)

Subject: Far East Situation.

The Secretary of War directs that the following first priority secret 
radiogram be sent to the Commanding General, U. S. Army Forces in the Far 
East; Commanding General, Caribbean Defense Command; Commanding General, 
Hawaiian Department; Commanding General, Fourth Army:

Japanese are presenting at one p. m. Eastern Standard time today what amounts 
to an ultimatum also they are under orders to destroy their Code machine 
immediately stop Just what significance the hour set may have we do not know 
but be on alert accordingly stop Inform naval authorities of this 
communication

MARSHALL
L. T. GEROW
Brigadier General,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff

OCSigO 311.23 (Gen)  1st Memo Ind.                                O Br.
(12-8-41)
War Department, OCSigO, Washington, December 10, 1941. To: A. C. of S. G-2.

1 Following is the log of the message requested in basic memorandum:

                                         Honolulu Time    E. S. T.

Filed War Department Message Center      12:00 noon        6:30 AM
Sent Western Union                       12:17 PM          6:47 AM
Received RCA Honolulu                                      7:33 AM
Delivered to Signal Officer, Honolulu                     11:45 AM
Delivered to AGO, Hawaiian Department                      2:58 PM

2. Attached hereto is paraphrase copy of secret message received from 
Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.
For the Acting Chief Signal Officer:

O. K. SADTLER,
Colonel, Signal Corps.

1 Incl_Paraphrase of radiogram



Page 133

CLARKE EXHIBIT NO. 8

SECRET

Paraphrase
1087 DECEMBER NINTH

Re your five four nine radio five two nine RCA received this message at their 
Honolulu station at seven thirty three morning December seventh and this 
message was delivered Fort Shafter eleven forty five morning seventh the 
Adjutant General received the deciphered copy at two fifty eight pm

SHORT

Incl #1 DECEMBER 8, 1941

Memorandum for: The Chief Signal Officer.
Subject: Warning order to Overseas Departments

1. At about 11: 30 a. m. Sunday, December 7, a secret radiogram, written by 
the Chief of Staff, was handed in to the Message Center by Colonel Bratton of 
this division. Colonel Bratton reported verbally to the Chief of Staff that 
the message would be in the air in about eight minutes as he was assured by 
the Message Center. This radio was a highly important warning to all overseas 
departments including Hawaii regarding the timing of the Japanese ultimatum on 
that afternoon.

2. It is recommended that steps be taken to determine the exact time of 
arrival of this message at Honolulu, the time when the deciphered message was 
transmitted by the Signal Corps to the Staff, and by what office it was 
received in the Staff. Prompt action on this message might have averted 
disaster.

SHERMAN MILES,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

G2/WAH
MID 336. (11-3-41) Haw. Dept.

CONFIDENTIAL

WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, G_2
WASHINGTON, D. C., November 4, 1941.

Subject: Letter of transmittal.
To: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
Headquarters, Hawaiian Department

The attached communications are forwarded for your information and such action 
as you consider advisable.

Sherman Miles
SHERMAN MILES,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

1 Enclosures
336. (1103 41)_MID Sum. of Info. re Information received from the Orient; dtd. 
FMH
Mailed G/2 ---------- Nov 5, 1941 Reg. #910405.

MID 336.  11-3-41

G2/C1
FMH
WAR DEPARTMENT
M. I. D.
November 3, 1941.
(Date)

Subject: Information Received from the Orient.
Summary of Information:
The following information received from the Orient, dated August 26, 1941, is 
considered reliable:

1. Mr. HIROTA, a presiding officer at directors' meeting of the Black Dragon 
Society, told of an order issued by War Minister TOJO (now Premier) "to 
complete full preparation to meet any emergency with United States in the 
Pacific.



Page 134

All guns to be mounted in the islands of the Pacific under Japanese mandate. 
The full preparation to be completed in November."

2. HIROTA and others are said to have stated: "War with United States would 
best begin in December or in February."

3. "Very soon," they say, "the Cabinet will be changed. The new Cabinet would 
likely start war within sixty days."

G2 Note: Full name of individual mentioned above is KOKI HIROTA, who is 
reported to be a member of the House of Peers, former Premier of Japan and 
Director of the Bureau of Intelligence, U. S. Section.

Distribution:                            Evaluation
All Corps Areas              of source                  of information
All Departments              _____X_____   Reliable     ______________
Alaska                       ___________   Credible     ______X_______
FBI                          ___________   Questionable ______________
ONI                          ___________   Undetermined ______________
STATE                        ___________   ___________________________
File
J. B Cognizant

Source: Dr. Cho. Date of original paper 10/28/41 p. m.

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF FOR MILITARY INTELLIGENCE
Fort Shafter, T. H.

6 September 1941.

In reply refer to:
350.05 (G-2)
Subject: Summaries of Information.
To: War Department General Staff
    Military Intelligence Division G-2,
    Washington, D. C.

REC'D-B-2 SEP 17, 1941

1. It has been noted that many Of the Summaries of Information received from 
your office originate with Office Naval Intelligence, 14th Naval District and 
have already been furnished this office by the Navy.

2. The cooperation and contact between Office Naval Intelligence, Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, and the Military Intelligence Division, in this 
Department, is most complete and all such data is received simultaneous with 
the dispatch of information to the respective Washington offices.

3. Inasmuch as such advices are received in duplicate and unless there are 
other reasons to the contrary it is recommended that such notices from your 
office be discontinued in order to avoid the duplication of effort.

Kendall J. Fielder
KENDALL J. FIELDER
Lieut. Colonel, Inf.
Acting A. C. of S., G-2.

FAR EASTERN
G2/1
RSB

No. 519 sent out December 5, 1941
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF HEADQUARTERS
G-2 Hawaiian Department
Honolulu, Territory Hawaii

Commander Rochefort who can be located thru the 14th Naval District has some 
information on Japanese broadcasts in which weather reports are mentioned that 
you must obtain. Contact him at once.

MILES



Page 135

Handwritten: From Boogey Woogie.

Date dispatched
SIS no
Date translated  From.     To          Extract
11/19/41         Tokyo     Washington  "_please present our B proposal
25040                                  of the Imperial Government, and 
11/20/41                               no further concessions can be 
                                       made. If the U.S. consent to this 
                                       cannot be secured the negotia-
                                       tions will have to be broken 
                                       off."
11/22/41         Tokyo     Washington  There are reasons beyond your 
25138                                  ability to guess why we want to 
                                       settle the Japanese-American 
                                       relations by the 25th but if 
                                       within the next three or four 
                                       days you can finish your 
                                       conversations with the Americans, 
                                       if the signing can be completed 
                                       by the 29th . . . we have decided 
                                       to wait until that date. This 
                                       time we mean it, that the dead-
                                       line absolutely cannot be 
                                       changed. After that things are 
                                       automatically going to happen."
Warning Mess. No. 1. OPNAV. 24 Nov.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
"These are very doubtful chances_"

11/14/41         Tokyo     Hongkong    "Should the negotiations collapse
25322                                  . . . we will completely destroy 
11/27/41                               British and American power in
                                       China.
11/26/41         Tokyo     Washington  The situation is momentarily 
25344                                  becoming more tense and telegrams 
11/26/41                               take too long. Therefore will you 
                                       cut down the substance of your 
                                       reports of negotiations to the 
                                       minimum and, on occasion, call up 
                                       Chief Yamamoto of the American 
                                       Bureau on the telephone and make 
                                       your report to him. At that time 
                                       we will use the following code 
                                       . . . "
11/19/41         Tokyo     Washington  "In case of an emergency (danger 
25432                                  of cutting off our diplomatic 
11/26/41                               relations) and the cutting off of
                                       international communications, the
                                       following warning will be added 
                                       in the middle of the [2] daily 
                                       Japanese language short wave news 
                                       broadcast.
                                      (1) In case Japan-U. S. relations 
                                       in danger: Higashi no Kazeame 
                                       (east wind rain). This signal 
                                       will be given in the middle and
                                       at the end as a weather forecast 
                                       and each sentence will be 
                                       repeated twice. When this is 
                                       heard please destroy all code 
                                       papers etc."
11/19/41         Tokyo     Washington  "When our diplomatic relations 
25392                                  are becoming dangerous, we will 
11/26/41                               add the following at the 
                                       beginning and end of our general 
                                       intelligence broadcasts:
                                      (1) If it is Japan-U. S, relations 
                                       "Higashi". . . . The above will 
                                       be repeated five times and 
                                       included at beginning and end."
11/26/41       Washington  Tokyo       Kurusu to Yamamoto: "I have made 
25349                                  all efforts but they will not 
11/26/41                               yield."
Trans Pacific tele-
phone conversa-
tion.

Warning Messages Nos. 2 & 3
------------------------------------------------------------------------

OPD "Negotiations with Japan appear G-2." Advise only the Commanding Officer. 
27 Nov.

11/28/41         Tokyo     Washington  "Therefore with a report of the 
25445                                  Imperial Government on this
11/28/41                               American proposal, which I will 
                                       send you in two or three days, 
                                       the negotiations will be de facto
                                       ruptured... However, I do not 
                                       wish you to give the impression 
                                       that the negotiations are broken 
                                       off, merely say to them that you 
                                       are awaiting instructions."

Warning Message No. 4 28 Nov.
------------------------------------------------------------------------



Page 136

Date dispatched
SIS no
Date translated  From.     To          Extract
11/26/41       Washington  Tokyo       "Should we, during the course of 
25460                                  these conversations, deliberately 
11/29/41                               enter into our scheduled opera-
                                       tions, there is great danger that 
                                       the responsibility for the 
                                       rupture of negotiations will be 
                                       cast upon us."
11/29/41         Tokyo     Washington  "We wish you would make one more
25496                                  attempt verbally along the 
11/20/41                               following lines: . . . 
                                       [3] (in carrying out this 
                                       instruction please be careful 
                                       that this does not lead to any-
                                       thing like a breaking off of 
                                       negotiations).
11/30/41         Tokyo     Washington  Kurusu: "Are the Japanese-
25497                                  American negotiations to 
11/30/41                               continue?"
Telephone                              Yamamoto: "Yes."
conversation
12/1/41          Tokyo     Washington  "When you are faced with the 
25545                                  necessity of destroying codes, 12/1/41                                
get in touch with the Naval
                                       Attache's office there and make 
                                       use of chemicals they have on 
                                       hand for this purpose."
11/30/41         Tokyo     Berlin      "The conversations . . . between 
25552                                  Tokyo and Washington . . . now 
12/1/41                                stand ruptured, broken, have 
                                       taken a provocative attitude ... 
                                       They are planning to move mili-
                                       tary forces into various places  
                                       in East Asia . . . we will have 
                                       to counter by also moving troops 
                                       ... war may suddenly break out 
                                       between the Anglo-Saxon nations 
                                       and Japan."
11/30/41         Tokyo     Berlin      "Say that we have already clari-
25553                                  fied our attitude toward the Rus-
12/1/41                                sians. Say that by our present 
                                       moves southward we do not mean
                                       to relax our pressure against the 
                                       Soviet ... however, right now it 
                                       is to our advantage to stress the 
                                       south and for the time being we
                                       would prefer to refrain from any 
                                       direct moves in the north."
12/2/41          Tokyo     Washington  "Among the telegraphic codes with 
25640                                  which your office is equipped, 
12/3/41                                burn those now being used in 
                                       connection with the machine.
                                       Burn every "O" code ... stop at 
                                       once using the machine and 
                                       destroy it completely ... Burn 
                                       all the codes Kosaka brought 
                                       you."

Warning message No. 5 Dec.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

[4]  G-2 "Contact Commander Rochefort

12/1/41          Tokyo     London      "Please discontinue the use of 
25878                                  your code machine and dispose of 
12/5/41                                it immediately."
12/5/41        Washington  Tokyo       We have completed destruction of 
25836                                  codes but since the U. S.-Japan-
12/6/41                                ese negotiations are still con-
                                       tinuing I request your approval
                                       of our desire to delay for a 
                                       while yet the destruction of the 
                                       one code machine."
12/6/41          Tokyo     Washington  "The Government has deliberated 
25838                                  deeply on the American proposal 
                                       of the 26th of November and as a 
                                       result we have drawn up a memo-
                                       randum for the United States ...
                                       when you receive it I want you to 
                                       keep it secret for the time 
                                       being. Concerning the time of 
                                       presenting this memorandum to the 
                                       United States I will wire you in 
                                       a separate message."
12/6/41          Tokyo     Washington  The memorandum referred to in 
25843                                  25838 above. A 14 part telegram 
12/6/41                                in reply to the American proposal 
                                       and concluding with the sentence-
                                       "The Japanese Government regrets 
                                       to have to notify hereby the 
                                       American government that in view 
                                       of the attitude of the American
                                       Government it cannot but consider 
                                       that it is impossible to reach an 
                                       agreement through further 
                                       negotiations.



Page 137

Date dispatched
SIS no
Date translated  From.     To          Extract
12/7/41          Tokyo     Washington  Re my #902 (see 25843 above) will
25850                                  the Ambassador please submit to 
                                       the United States Government, if 
                                       possible to the Secretary of 
                                       State, our reply to the United
                                       States at 1:00 p. m. on the 7th, 
                                       your time.

Final message 7 Dec.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

"Japanese are presenting at one p. m."

FAR EASTERN
G2/1
RSB

No 519 sent out December 5, 1941

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF HEADQUARTERS
G-2 Hawaiian Department,
Honolulu, Territory Hawaii.

Commander Rochefort who can be located thru the 14th Naval District has some 
information on Japanese broadcasts in which weather reports are mentioned that 
you must obtain. Contact him at once.

MILES



Page 138

Organization Chart

Page 139

INCIDENTAL EXHIBITS
RE
PEARL HARBOR INVESTIGATION

INDEX

1. Organization chart, General Staff, G-2. Dec. 5, 1941.

2. Organization chart, General Staff, G-2. Oct. 10, 1941.

3. Newspaper article re Pearl Harbor.

4. Two letters re testimony of Gen. Miles and testimony of Gen. Miles before 
Grunert Board.

5. Copies of Messages.

6. Letter to A. C. of S., G-2 from Lt. Col. Fielder, Hawaii, 31 Dec. 1941.

7. Message from Manila, P. I. to The Adjutant General, Dec. 28, 1940.

8. Letter to A. C. of S., G-2 from Col. Thurber, Dec. 18, 1941 re Report of 
Rumors Concerning Japanese Attack on Hawaii.

9. Message, to Hawaii.

10. Message, from Melbourne, Australia to War Dept. & CG Hawaii.

11. Memo for Col. Holbrook from Lt. Perry, Evaluation Section, Dec. 6, 1941, 
re Japanese Embassy burning code book.

12. Messages re weather broadcast.

13. Estimate of the Situation Dec. 1, 1941_March 31, 1942.

14. Message from Short, Ft. Shafter, Nov. 29, 1941.

15. Memo for Adjutant General from Gen. Gerow, Nov. 27, 1941, sending messages 
to CG Hawaii and CG, Caribbean Defense Command, re negotiations terminated 
with Japan.

16. Cable to all Corps Areas, Caribbean Defense Command and Hawaii, by Miles, 
Nov. 27, 1941.

17. Paraphrase of cable to all Corps Areas (same as No. 16).

18. Message from Manila, P. I. to The Adjutant General re Jap troops 
evacuating.

19. Message to G-2, Hawaii from Miles, Nov. 12,1941, re custodial detention 
list.

20. Message from Manila, P. I. Oct. 28 re Jap aircraft.

21. Information received from the Orient, Oct. 28, 1941.

22. Copies of Messages.

23. Index of Translations and Memoranda re Pearl Harbor.

24. Summary of Far Eastern Documents Relating to Japan's War Potential and 
Intentions.

EXHIBIT No 1

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2: Brigadier General Sherman Miles (Acting)
Executive Officer:
   Lt. Col. R. C. Smith
   Lt. Col. T. E. Roderick
Administrative Branch: Lt. Col. R. C. Smith
Intelligence Branch: Col. G. H. Mason
   Balkans and Near East Section: Lt. Col. W. W. Cox
   British Empire Section: Lt. Col. Homer Case
   Central European Section: Lt. Col. H. E. Maguire
   Eastern European Section: Lt. Col. G. B. Guenther
   Far Eastern Section Lt. Col. R S. Bratton
   Latin American Section: Lt. Col. R. T. Heard
   Western European Section: Lt. Col. H. F. Cunningham
   Aviation Section
   Editorial Section
   Collection Section




Page 140

Liaison Branch: Lt. Col. A. R. Harris
Counterintelligence Branch: Lt. Col. J. A. Lester
   Safeguarding Military Information: Maj. W. P. Corderman
   Domestic Intelligence: Maj. W. A. Holbrook
   Plant and Utilities Section: Maj. W. E. Crist
   General
Plans and Training Branch: Lt. Col. V. W. Cooper
   Plans and Training: Maj. H. V. Canan
   Geographic: Lt. Col. C. Y. Banfill
Approved March 10, 1941.

EXHIBIT No. 2_See facing folder

[This is a copy of the organization chart reproduced on page 138. LWJ]

EXHIBIT No. 3

[From the Times-Herald, Washington, D. C., Thursday, September 28, 1944]

THE TRUTH OF PEARL HARBOR

(EDITORIAL)

By Basil Brewer, Publisher, The New Bedford (Mass.) Standard-Times

Pearl Harbor is the saddest chapter in the history of America.

Here, in one hour, was destroyed the Pacific battle fleet, chief weapon to 
restrain Japan from war_chief weapon with which to win, if war came.

Here were wiped out 4,000 officers and men of the American Army and Navy.

Innocent of responsibility, they died in a classic funeral pyre, built for 
them by the criminal negligence of others.

Pearl Harbor, which, as the Japanese planned, made impossible relief of the 
Philippines, may have been responsible for that other great tragedy_Bataan and 
Corregidor.

Pearl Harbor marked the beginning of war with Japan.

It may well have finished any hope of an early successful ending of the 
Japanese war.

Certainly the victims there, those who paid the "last full measure of 
devotion," were not to blame for the disaster.

*Who were to blame for Pearl Harbor*?

Surely here, if ever, there was guilt and there were guilty.

Who were the guilty and why have they not been apprehended, tried, convicted 
and punished?

WHY?

The President had said Jan. 7, 1941, 11 months before Pearl Harbor:

"When the dictators are ready to make war upon us, they will not wait for an 
act of war on our part. *They, not we*, will choose the *time*, the *method* 
and the *place* of their attack."

Why, then, were we "surprised" at Pearl Harbor?

Why was the battle fleet there, each in its place, names and exact locations 
map-marked by the Japanese flyers to receive the torpedoes, made especially 
for this attack?

Why was the air arm of the Army there, herded together, unarmed, for the kill?

Should the Pacific battle fleet have been at Pearl Harbor on Dec. 7?

And, if it should not, why was it there, and by whose orders?

INVESTIGATIONS

Four different "investigations" of Pearl Harbor have been conducted_all 
secret.

Only one "report" has been made, the report of the Roberts Commission, 
released a few weeks after Pearl Harbor.

Of the 127 witnesses who testified in the Roberts investigation, the testimony 
of none has been made public.

Of the hundreds of documents studied and put in the record in the Roberts 
Investigation, none has been made public.



Page 141

Why have not these documents been made public?

The Roberts report blamed General Short, commanding general of the Army, 
and Admiral Kimmel, commander-in-chief of the fleet at Pearl Harbor, for the 
disaster.

As a result of the findings of the Roberts Commission, both have been ordered 
tried by court-martial

Kimmel and Short, members of Congress and many others repeatedly have demanded 
the trials be held.

Today, more than 2 1/2 years after the report of the Roberts Commission, 
neither Short nor Kimmel has been brought to trial.

It was urged, shortly after Pearl Harbor, that trials would interfere with the 
war.

Certainly now, almost three years after the disaster, no such claim validly 
can be made.

More than a year ago the late Secretary of the Navy Knox wrote a letter saying 
public trials of Kimmel and Short could not affect the progress of the war.

Very recently a sub-committee of the House Military Affairs Committee stated 
public trials would not interfere with the war.

Why, in justice, have not these trials been publicly held, that those charged 
may be punished, if guilty, and, if innocent, freed?

Why have not the American people been told the truth about Pearl Harbor?

Truth, which they need in order properly to appraise their military and 
political leaders_and their policies.

Truth, which they need to appraise their own share, if any, in the guilt.

Truth, which they need to better guide themselves, as citizens_in the interest 
of the country in war.

The American people grew old overnight at Pearl Harbor.

Why are they being treated as children, who must not be told?

Pearl Harbor was the Gethsemane of the American people, as well as of the 
soldier dead.

Why not the truth, no matter how hard to take to cleanse the soul_perhaps to 
bring temporal, as well as spiritual, salvation?

* * *

Not even the truth, as to the Pearl Harbor dead, was known, until long 
afterwards.

The facts as to the destruction of the battle fleet were withheld for a year_
and then released with news of successful salvage operations.

WAR

For a year or more prior to Pearl Harbor, it had been clear to official 
Washington only a miracle or American surrender could keep the United States 
out of the European war and war with Japan

Japan had signed the Tripartite pact with Hitler, binding her to war with the 
U. S., if war with Hitler came.

Japan had notified Ambassador Grew, in the Spring of 1941, the pact meant what 
it said.

Grew had advised Washington.

Concurrently, Japan's course of conquest clearly pointed to the Dutch East 
Indies, Singapore, Burma, possibly India, if not the Philippines.

That Britain could successfully meet this attack, without help, was dubious 
indeed.

Lend-lease, convoyed supplies, loaned destroyers, etc., would not suffice if 
Japan attacked Britain.

Therefore, the President faced, early in '41, the two horns of dilemma.

He must decide whether to join Britain in stopping Japan_which meant war.

Or he must take the chance, which seemed a certainty, that without the U. S 
actively fighting, the Tripartite powers would defeat Britain, force Russia to 
peace_and attack the U. S

That the President had determined on war seems indisputable.

On Jan. 21, 1941, he wrote Ambassador Grew in Tokyo that the maintenance of 
British supply lines from the Far East was vital.

On Feb. 14, 1941, Dooman, Counsel of the American Embassy in Tokyo, told the 
Japanese Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs Okashi that, if the Japanese 
attacked Singapore, "the logic of the situation would inevitably raise the 
question" that this would mean war also with the U. S.



Page 142

On Feb. 26, 1941, Ambassador Grew reported Dooman's conference to Washington, 
saying:

"I propose to say to Mr. Matsuoka (Japanese foreign minister), with whom I 
have an appointment this morning that the statements made by Mr. Dooman to Mr. 
Okashi were made with my prior knowledge and have my full approval."

Washington did not disapprove nor disavow Dooman's and Grew's statements.

In April 1941, Naval authorities in Washington had written the commanders of 
the Asiatic and Pacific fleets that the question of U. S. entry into the war 
seemed a matter of_"not whether_but when."

By the time of the Atlantic Charter meeting between Churchill and Roosevelt 
early in August '41, events in Asia were moving with tremendous and ominous 
speed.

Churchill, the Australians and the Dutch urged an immediate ultimatum_war-if 
Japan pursued her expected course.

Responding to the argument for an immediate ultimatum, the President only 
asked if "we would not be better off in three months?"

And then said, "Leave it to me. I think I can baby them (the Japs) along *for 
three months*."

There was no disagreement between the President and Churchill as to Japanese 
plans_nor that Japan must be stopped.

Probably there was no disagreement that an ultimatum meant war.

It now is clear the President only was playing for time_time to be better 
prepared_

And_time for the American people to "catch up," mentally and morally, with 
commitments, made and to be made.

The Atlantic Conference between Churchill and Roosevelt settled the policy of 
a united front between the U. S. And England toward Japan.

That this was true seems implied in the following from Churchill's address to 
Parliament on Jan. 28, 1942, about seven weeks after Pearl Harbor:

"It has been the policy of the Cabinet at almost all costs to avoid 
embroilment with Japan until we were sure that the United States would also be 
engaged. * * *

"On the other hand, the probability since the Atlantic Conference, at which I 
discussed these matters with President Roosevelt, that the United States, even 
if not herself attacked, would come into the war in the Far East and thus make 
the final victory assured, seemed to allay some of these anxieties, and that 
expectation has not been falsified by the events."

July 24, the United States had "frozen" Japanese funds.

Immediately after the Atlantic Conference, commercial embargoes, against oil, 
steel and gasoline were ordered which only could result in war.

This writer believes the President, in all these matters, made the correct 
decision_in the country's interests_that history shall so record.

With equal impartiality, history shall record that the President, out of his 
political genius, made one, perhaps two fatal errors, which may have brought 
on the Pearl Harbor disaster.

Certainly these contributed greatly to the disastrous success of the attack.

POLITICS

The working agreement with Churchill being what it was, the danger to the 
country being apprehended_the President failed to take the people into 
confidence.

This was the President's political bent.

A statesman long ago would have told the people the facts_and risen or fallen 
with the consequences.

Democracy rises or falls, lives or dies, based on how well this thesis is 
understood and followed

But the President was not of that talent nor taste.

Far more than he trusted the people, he trusted his own facility of 
expression, his ability, not necessarily by the use of facts, to get the 
people to think as he wanted them to think

Concurrently, this formula had seemed to the President not to have worked 
badly in eight years of the Presidency and three elections for President.

It was true, also, this was the only method the President knew.

Secretary Hull had said, when questioned about apparent inaction in 
Washington, "governments which get too far ahead of the people are apt to 
fall."



Page 143

The President, in the grave war situation in the Fall of '41, had gotten far 
ahead of the people_far too far for the people ever to catch up by anything 
which he, by that time, could say.

Fortunately we can now depend on two of the President's friends and 
biographers for the facts at this stage of the crisis.

Forrest Davis and Ernest K. Lindley, friends of the President, had access, 
through the President, to confidential information, from which they produced 
early in 1942, "How War Came."

This is from page 305 under the title, "The Sands Run Out_Pearl Harbor":

"Few, if any, high officials believed, however, that the United States would, 
or could, stand aside for long if the Japanese struck at the East Indies or 
Malaya, or even thrust into Siam. For at stake were not only immediate 
interests vital to us, but resources and strategical positions affecting our 
long-term security as a nation.

"*The question perplexing many high officials was how, in the absence of a 
direct Japanese attack on the American flag, to summon the nation, divided as 
it then was on questions of foreign policy, to the strong action which they 
believed essential*.

"*There had been considerable discussion of possible methods* . . . It was 
commonly supposed that the Japanese were too smart to solve this problem for 
the President by a direct assault on the American flag_especially at Hawaii, 
which even the extreme isolationists recognize as a bastion of our security."

Surely this is plain enough.

"As the Sands Ran Out at Pearl Harbor," the Japanese "solved the problem 
for the President by a direct assault on the American flag."

The President, in the last weeks before Pearl Harbor, required an  "incident" 
that would enable the people to catch up with him.

Pearl Harbor gave the President far more of an incident than he needed,
expected_or wanted.

Born optimist, the incident the President expected was to be a glancing blow_
but the blow came full and head-on at the whole body of the country.

Moreover, it was not the kind of an incident he had in mind, as shall be
disclosed.

THE FLEET

Naval strategy opposed having the Pacific Fleet based at Pearl Harbor.

Three or more high admirals had opposed it, including Kimmel.

Admiral Richardson, immediate predecessor of Kimmel, was removed from
command by the President because, among other things, he opposed basing the 
fleet at Pearl Harbor.

The fleet was at Pearl Harbor by orders of the President, though of course he 
ordered no such concentration as existed there on Dec. 7.

Reasons of diplomacy, and war strategy, as judged by the President, required a 
powerful fleet based at Hawaii, a threat and a warning to Japan, the only kind 
the Japanese could understand.

In no other way, the President judged, could the U. S. hope to keep open the 
British, and our own, supply lines from the Far East.

These supply lines, the President had told Grew, were vital.

These were the supply lines the President and Churchill had agreed to defend 
together at the Atlantis Conference.

The admirals were opposed to basing the main fleet at Hawaii, because they 
believed the fleet there was too confined, too exposed to possible attack.

Knowing the power of the Japanese fleet, high officers of the Navy had for 
years questioned its ability to meet the Japanese successfully in Far Eastern 
waters.

Defending the Philippines always had been considered difficult.

Certainly this thesis had not been changed by large increases in the Japanese 
Navy and by the fact the U. S Fleet in '41 was divided between the Pacific and 
the Atlantic.

Additionally, the admirals opposed using the fleet at Hawaii as a threat to 
Japan.

Such an approach, they considered, was apt to result in "backing into the 
war," instead of the more forthright and direct method, which they favored.

What the admirals didn't know was, we were, to all practical purposes, already 
in the war.



Page 144

We were watchfully waiting for the "incident" which would make the war,
already a foregone conclusion, "politically possible."

A plan of co-operation with the British Far Eastern fleet had been arranged 
which required the U S. fleet to be as near as practical to the Philippines.

The Japanese knew the full meaning of the U. S. fleet at Pearl Harbor.

Every war plan of the Japanese, including the latest by Kinoaki Matsuo, "The 
Three Power Alliance," published in 1940, plainly stated in war with U. S. 
Japan would be defeated_if the U. S. Pacific fleet were permitted to get to 
the Philippines.

We were, at the time of Pearl Harbor, waiting for an "incident" which would 
start war.

The Japanese, having in mind basic Japanese strategy, that the battle fleet of 
the U. S. must not get to Manila_for a long time had been *preparing the 
"incident*."

SABOTAGE

Having overruled his admirals in basing the Pacific fleet at Pearl Harbor, it 
would be expected that the President, of all persons, would make most certain 
no disaster came from the fleet's being there.

Doubtless the President thought he had so arranged.

It is a fact, however, the President, by his own acts, unwittingly of course, 
contrived to bring about the success of the Japanese attack.

This was not in the manner that he has been commonly accused, running all the 
way from plotting the attack, to ordering the fleet unprotected to appease the 
Japanese all of which are false.

The President's responsibility is nevertheless direct and definite.

Early in January, Secretary of Navy Knox had sent a warning to both Army
and Navy chiefs at Pearl Harbor suggesting the danger of a surprise bombing 
attack by air against the fleet at Pearl Harbor.

It had been a foregone conclusion, if war with Japan came, it would begin by 
surprise attack, the Japanese way, as the President himself had said Jan. 6, 
1941.

But, as the months went by between the first of the year and Dec. 7,  1941, as 
the plans of the Japanese to attack became matured, for some strange reason 
there was less and less emphasis on surprise attack on the fleet at Pearl 
Harbor by air, more and more on sabotage.

Of seven warning messages from Washington to Short and Kimmel, recorded in the 
Roberts report, in addition to the one in January from Secretary Knox, four 
referred to sabotage

None, after the Knox warning, referred to the possibility of surprise attack 
by air on the fleet.

Twice, in acknowledging warnings and instructions from Washington, General 
Short reported to Washington he had taken all precautions against sabotage.

On Nov. 27, 10 days before Pearl Harbor, General Short advised Washington he 
had ordered Hawaii "alert No. 1" against sabotage, and gave details of what 
measures he had taken.

Washington knew of and did not disapprove these "defense steps," solely 
against sabotage.

Sabotage, third in the list of attacks most expected by Knox in January, had 
become No. 1 of those expected in Washington and Pearl Harbor as Dec. 7 
approached.

It is not sabotage which competent military leaders, in Washington or Pearl 
Harbor, would normally most fear, as war with Japan approached.

As Dec. 7 approached, the "incident," which would bring war with Japan, was 
daily, almost hourly, expected in Washington.

Historically, the sinking of the battleship Maine in Havana harbor on Feb. 15, 
1898-an act of sabotage, had brought war with Spain.

By some strange twist, the President, and to some extent the military leaders 
in Washington, were in a "Battleship Maine" state of mind, when the attack 
occurred, or at least were up to the last hours before the attack

This explains why the battle fleet was docked, each ship at its station, 
awnings up-why the planes were grounded wing to wing, unarmed, ammunition for 
guns and planes locked in magazines, when Japan struck Dec. 7.

The Army at Pearl Harbor on Dec. 7, interpreting its instructions from 
Washington. Was "alerted" for sabotage only.

Had Hawaii "alert No. 3" been ordered, by General Short, the Japs might never 
have struck, certainly the damage would have been far less.



Page 145

In far-away Aleutian Islands, at Dutch Harbor where military orders only had 
to be followed, U. S. bombers were cruising with live bombs in racks, U. S. 
Fighters with live ammunition in guns, when the attack came to Pearl Harbor 
Dec. 7.

DISASTER

But it is not alone the "sabotage psychology" at Pearl Harbor for which the 
president must accept his share of responsibility.

There were blunders there, both of omission and commission, which he must 
shoulder.

The Commanders at Pearl Harbor had warnings of danger.

But with every warning, save one, came a "precaution," which tied their hands 
psychologically, if not actually

As the danger became greater and Pearl Harbor closer, the "precautions" became 
more definite, more insistent, more urgent.

These precautions came direct from the White House.

The only warning message that Kimmel and Short received, which did not
contain definite precautionary orders, was the one from Secretary of the Navy 
Knox in January '41.

This was 11 months before Pearl Harbor and long before the expected 
"incident," which would kick off hostilities, was expected.

Here are the precautions, which accompanied each "warning," as told in the 
Roberts report.

Oct. 16, as Kimmel and Short were warned of danger by Washington, they were 
ordered to do nothing which would "*constitute provocation as against Japan*."

Nov. 24 ,13 days before Pearl Harbor, Kimmel was enjoined to strictest secrecy 
in any defense moves he made "*to prevent complication of tense existing 
situation*."

Nov. 27, came the most serious warning yet, from the Chief of Staff to Short, 
but with it an order that under no circumstances was he to take any steps or 
make any moves *that would make it appear* the U. S. had committed "*the first 
overt act*."

In the same message "reconnaissance" was ordered but only "*in such a way as 
not to alarm the civil population or disclose intent*."

Here a military authority must have thought of the possibility such an order 
might tie the hands of the commander, for there was inserted:

"He (General Short) was not to be restricted to any course, which would
jeopardize his defense."

Nov. 28, nine days before Pearl Harbor, Short was cautioned again that any 
protective measures he took, "*must be confined to those essential to 
security*" and *he must avoid "unnecessary publicity and alarm*."

It was the next day, Nov. 29, Secretary Hull stated, "The diplomatic part of 
our relations with Japan is virtually over and the matter will now go to the 
officials of the Army and Navy."

Nov. 29, eight days before Pearl Harbor, Kimmel was ordered to "*take no
offensive action until Japan had committed the first overt act*."

Nov. 30, seven days before Pearl Harbor, Kimmel received the last warning 
message to reach Pearl Harbor before the attack.

It was a copy of a dispatch sent to Admiral Hart at Manila, ordering certain 
scouting, but again with the admonition, to "*avoid the appearance of 
attacking*."

None of these precautionary orders came from military authorities in 
Washington, though all came though military channels.

None of these precautionary orders at Pearl Harbor ever was withdrawn.

One of the last warning messages sent to Pearl Harbor was changed by the
President, personally, to insert the usual precaution.

The official explanation, of course, is that, if war came, the President 
wanted the record to show he had done all he could to prevent it.

But on Nov. 29, eight days before Pearl Harbor, as stated, the Secretary of 
State had said "the matter will now go to the officials of the Army and Navy."

The Roberts report, in No. 15 of its conclusions, quotes one of the many 
precautionary orders from Washington as a cause of the success of the Pearl 
Harbor attack though the report does not fix the responsibility.

The last full fatal week before Dec. 7, 1941, the Roberts report does not show 
a single message from Washington to Kimmel and Short at Pearl Harbor.

It is known Washington had, during this week, information of greatest
importance which Short and Kimmel didn't receive until after the attack.

This is the real story of Pearl Harbor, seven warnings of danger to the 
commanders there, *six confusing and contradictory* "precautions," which tied 
their hands.



Page 146

Word available the last fatal week_word most needed at Pearl Harbor-
never was sent.

Obviously the President "as the sands ran out" at Pearl Harbor, was definitely 
expecting a Japanese attack.

But the nearer it was expected the more careful he became that when the
attack should come, it should be such as the isolationists could not tie onto 
himself.

The attack, which came at Pearl Harbor Dec. 7, was one which the 
"isolationists" could not tie onto the President.

But the success of the attack can in part, in all fairness, and in such 
measure as each citizen shall judge, be placed at the door of the Commander-
in-Chief as commander and personally.

The President, and others, in Washington, first had lulled the commanders at 
Pearl Harbor into expecting only_sabotage.

The President then had given them such restraining precautions and orders they 
did not know what they could or dare do_in measures of protection and defense.

The Japanese, as Davis and Lindley had said, solved the problem of how to 
summon the nation against isolationism for the President at Pearl Harbor.

But in trying to keep "the record clear," the President unknowingly and
unintentionally had contributed to the destruction of the Pacific battle 
fleet, had helped to bring about Bataan and Corregidor, had lengthened 
immeasurably the Japanese war.

WHY?

This of course explains many things.

It explains the long delay of the court-martial of General Short and Admiral 
Kimmel.

It explains why the President through members of Senate and House, stopped 
Congress from passing resolutions calling for trials.

It explains why the President still prevents the records of the Roberts 
Commission and the testimony of its 127 witnesses being made public.

It explains the Presidential order which forbade Admiral Hooper a year
ago to testify about Pearl Harbor to a committee of Congress.

It explains why no information has been given out as to the  investigation by 
Admiral Hart, at the suggestion of Secretary Knox.

It explains investigation number 4, now being held behind closed doors.

White House pressure succeeded in substituting secret hearing number 4, for a 
proposed resolution of Congress calling for immediate court-martial.

[EDITOR'S NOTE: *This editorial is republished and paid for by The New 
Bedford, Mass, Standard-Times, as a patriotic public service. No outside 
parties have contributed in any way toward the cost of publication. 
Republication permitted*.]

EXHIBIT NO. 4

10 August 1944.

Confidential

Colonel CHARLES W. WEST, JAGD
Recorder, Army Pearl Harbor Board,
Room 4741, Munitions Building,
Washington 25, D. C.

DEAR COLONEL General Miles has asked me to write to you requesting a copy of 
the transcript of his evidence before the Board. The General desires this copy 
of the transcript because he is concerned with the possibility of his evidence 
showing an inaccurate statement of fact.

General Miles would have written to you personally on this matter but he is 
now on an inspection trip and by long distance telephone he  communicated with 
me today, asking me to make this request of you. The General will be at this 
headquarters on Tuesday, 15 August 1944, and I can assure you that he will 
examine and return the same immediately.

I trust everything is going well with you and that you are enjoying your
assignment.

Sincerely,
DANIEL L. O'DONNELL,
Lt. Colonel, J. A. G. D.,
Service Command Judge Advocate.



Page 147

WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON
HEADQUARTERS ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD,
Munitions Building, 12 August 1944.

Lt Col. DANIEL L. O'DONNELL, J. A G. D.
Hqs. First Service Command,
Boston 15, Massachusetts.

DEAR COLONEL O'DONNELL: Pursuant to your request of 10 August 1944, I am
enclosing herewith a copy of the transcript of General Miles' testimony. 
Certain minor inaccuracies such as typographical errors, may appear therein 
which we haven't yet had an opportunity to correct but will do so at the 
earliest opportunity. May I suggest that the matter of any possibly 
"inaccurate statement of fact" be made the subject of a letter to General 
Grunert.

Please return the transcript when it has served its purpose. With kindest 
regards, I am.

Sincerely yours,
Charles W. West,
CHARLES W. WEST
Colonel, J. A. A. D.,
Recorder.

1 Incl: Transcript.

[91] TESTIMONY OF MAJ. GEN. SHERMAN MLLES, COMMANDING 1ST SERVICE
COMMAND, BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article 
of War 24. )

Colonel WEST. General, will you state to the Board your name, rank, 
organization and station?

General MILES. Sherman Miles, Major General, Commanding 1st service Command, 
Boston, Massachusetts.

General GRUNERT. General Miles, the Board, in an attempt to get at the facts, 
is looking into the War Department background and viewpoint prior to and 
leading up to the Pearl Harbor attack. It is hoped that, because of your 
assignment as A. C. of S. G-2, at that time, you can throw some light on the 
subject. In order to cover so large a field in the limited time available, 
individual Board members have been assigned objectives or phases for special 
investigation, although the entire Board will pass upon the objectives and 
phases. General Russell has this particular phase. So he will lead in 
propounding the questions and the other members will assist in developing 
them. So I will turn you over to the mercies of General Russell.

General RUSSELL. What was your assignment in the year 1941?

General MILES. I was Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department.

General RUSSELL. Can you remember approximately the date on which you
entered upon that assignment?

General MILES. May 1, 1940.

General RUSSELL. When were you relieved or transferred from that assignment?

[92] General MILES. The end of January 1942.

General RUSSELL. During that period of time you were actually the head of that 
we know as G-2 which embraced the Military Intelligence Division. Was that the 
name of it?

General MILES. That was the official name_Military Intelligence Division, War 
Department General Staff.

General RUSSELL. Briefly stated, General Miles, what were the functions of the 
G-2 section, including this Military Intelligence Division?

General MILES. The Military Intelligence Division, General, was all-inclusive. 
It was the whole thing, not as it is now, broken and divided between G-2 and 
Military Intelligence Service. It was all one division, just as the Operations 
and Training Division, or the Personnel Division War Plans Division, and so 
forth. I was head of the entire division, which, in turn, was divided into 
counter-intelligence, positive intelligence, and in turn that was divided 
geographically to cover the world, or as much as we could cover.



Page 148

General RUSSELL. Definitely, General Miles, as to the operations of your 
department related to the Japanese Government during your period of service 
there what were you attempting to learn about the Japanese Government?

General MILES. We were attempting to learn everything we could about the
Japanese Government, and had been doing so, in fact, a great many years. It 
was only one of the nations which we were attempting to cover, to gather all 
possible information about. Our system was a running digest.

General GRUNERT. May I interrupt there? If anything which [93] you
put into the record is of such a nature as might be of value to other nations 
now, I wish you would consider that and, if so, give us that information in 
closed session, so that it will not be disclosed to anybody who may be able to 
see this record. Do you see what I am getting at?

General MILES. Yes, sir, I understand.

This summary digest was maintained on the principal countries of the world. 
Such a system is no secret. It has been maintained by practically every 
government. It was a running digest covering the military side, the political 
side, the economic side, and the psychological side. All the information that 
ever came in from any country to G-2 was collated and put into this digest and 
sent out to the various military attaches and G-2s, all the corps areas and 
overseas departments who were interested in a particular country, in the form 
of corrected loose-leaf, so that you had a running build-up constantly. This 
had been going on, to my knowledge, for twenty years. In addition to that, of 
course, we sent out bi-weekly, as I remember, military intelligence summaries,
which were short documents of facts that we had gotten in in the last two or 
three days from all sorts of agencies that we had. I say all sorts, because we 
kept in very close touch with the State Department, the Department of 
Commerce, the Rockefeller people in South America, and, of course, our own 
military attaches and observers that we had throughout the world.

That, in general, was our system of getting information and disseminating it

General RUSSELL. Did the G-2 section, as such, have [94] personnel
available for investigations in foreign fields in the year 1941?

General MILES. A limited personnel, General. We were building up. When
I took over Military Intelligence in May of 1940 I remember there were 36 
officers in the entire division. We built up rapidly to something over 400, 
with an equal proportion of clerical personnel. We built up very rapidly, as 
the war came nearer and nearer, our agencies in the field, field observers, 
military attaches. Our personnel was always limited. We did not have unlimited 
money or unlimited selection, particularly of officers. That was a time when 
the Army was building very rapidly. The natural inclination of a soldier is to 
go with troops and remain with troops. The general officers, in the field of 
course wanted the best men, naturally, and should have had them. We did not 
have a free field for the selection of personnel, and quite rightly. We did 
the best we could with the personnel and the funds we had available.

General RUSSELL. About when did this personnel reach its maximum development 
of 400?

General MILES. Well, it was increasing all the time I was there. I do not 
know. I imagine it continued to increase after I left. I am pretty sure it 
did, I cannot place any date on any maximum reached.

General RUSSELL. Can you approximate the number of people who were available 
to you for service in Washington and throughout the country and in foreign 
fields, in October and November of 1941?

[95] General MILES. General, I would not try to answer that question from my 
memory. The records are certainly available to you. I could not do it.

General RUSSELL. General a moment ago you referred to monthly or bi-monthly 
documents of some kind that were sent to the corps commanders and to the 
overseas departments. Did your office maintain copies of those reports?

General MILES. Oh, yes.

General RUSSELL. Are they in the files now?

General MILES. I imagine they are, sir. They are permanent records of the 
Military Intelligence Division.

General RUSSELL. There would be no reason to destroy them at all?

General MILES. Not that I know of.

General RUSSELL I want at this point to say that I have asked for a search of 
the records over there and have looked at the records, but did not discover 
copies of such reports, although specifically I have asked for such reports. I 
am giving you that, because it may be necessary for us to conduct a further 
search to locate, if possible, these documents.



Page 149

Now, to discuss for a moment the sources of information which you have
divulged already and to limit it to Japanese information, what sources of 
information were there in Japan in the fall of 1941 on which you as G-2 could 
rely as to activities of the Japanese at home and in home waters?

GENERAL MILES. Within the United States?

General RUSSELL. No. I am now addressing myself to the situation in Japan and 
have asked what agencies or what sources existed in Japan upon which you could 
rely for information [96] about Japanese activities at home and in Hawaii.

General MILES. I would say that by far the most important source was our
Embassy in Tokyo. We had a very excellent Ambassador who had been there
a number of years with a staff that had been there a good deal longer than 
that. We had, of course, used the military attache and his assistants. The 
information which we could get on the military side from our military attache 
and his assistants was of course very limited; the Japanese being extremely 
close-mouthed. But the Embassy itself was constantly sending in dispatches to 
the State Department_Mr. Grew, particularly_on the state of mind of the 
Japanese people and the probability of what they were going to do next, and so 
forth. We
also, of course, had direct access, through our very close connection with the 
State Department, to what was transpiring in the negotiations in the fall of 
1941 here in Washington. Aside from that, I do not think there were any 
important sources of information in Japan. We were getting a good deal of 
information from what might be called the borders; in other words, China, and 
even the part of the Continent occupied by the Japanese. The Koreans would get 
out once in a while and we would get some information in that way. We 
exchanged information very freely with the British and, to a certain extent, 
with the Dutch.

They were a little afraid to give us information, as I remember, but we were 
getting some.

General RUSSELL. Did the British have any organization within the homeland of 
Japan which was watching the movement of their Army and Navy in the fall of 
1941?

General MILES. I believe that they had about the same as [97] we
had. As to actually watching the movements of ships and troops, it was
necessarily a system that worked sometimes and did not work at other times. 
You might see the ships move or the troops move, or you might not.

General RUSSELL. General Miles, is it true or not that from the State 
Department or from our Ambassador to Japan the information which we obtained 
related almost exclusively to the state of mind of the Japanese people toward 
the war and their enmity toward the United States?

General MILES. Are you putting that in the form of a question, sir?

General RUSSELL. Yes. Is it true or not that that was the case?

General MILES. That was the Ambassador's principal concern, naturally. I
could not say, from my memory of the information that we got from our Embassy, 
that that by any means covered the field.

General RUSSELL. Do you remember a message from our Ambassador along
in the fall of 1941, in which he summed up the situation and told the State 
Department to what extent they could rely upon him for information of troop 
movements, movements of the Navy, and so forth?

General MILES. I do not recall that particular message, General.

General RUSSELL. Maybe I can refresh your memory. May I ask you this
as a preliminary? Did you attend the conferences that were held by the
Secretary of State, which he refers to as the War Councils, where he had
ordinarily the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, and some of
our high-ranking military [98] and naval people in to discuss the
Japanese situation?

General MLLES. No, sir. I think only the Chief of Staff attended them.

General RUSSELL. I refer particularly to this message which is contained in 
the State Department's book that they call the White Paper, which is a report 
from our Ambassador to Japan on the 17th day of November, I believe, 1941 
(handing a book to the witness).

General MILES. What is the question, now, sir?

General RUSSELL. When did you first know about that message?

General MILES. I don't remember, General, I can't answer that question.

General FRANK. Did you know about it at all?

General MILES. I am not sure that I did. I think I did, because we had
very close liaison with the State Department. I feel sure that I did but
frankly, it is so obvious a message that the impression it gives me today is




Page 150

probably the same impression it gave me then: "Yes, of course I know we can't 
count on the Embassy. How can we be sure that any group can tell us the 
movement of the Japanese fleet or army?" We knew we could not. 

General RUSSELL. In other words, the information which you have testified that 
you had from Japan about what was going on over there was rather general and 
indefinite in its nature?

General GRUNERT. Unless we know about that message the record will not be 
intelligible. Is it going to be copied into the record?

General RUSSELL. Yes.

Your information about the activities in Japan in the fall [99] of 1941 was 
very indefinite and general?

General MILES. Necessarily so.

General RUSSELL. The message from Ambassador Grew in Japan to the Secretary of 
State for purposes of the record will be identified as a paraphrase of a 
telegram dated November 17, 1941, and it may be copied from page 788 of this 
White Paper entitled "Peace and War, United States Foreign Policy, 1931-1941."

(Telegram from Ambassador Grew to Secretary of State, dated November 17, 1941, 
is as follows:) 

"The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State
"(Telegram: Paraphrase)

"Tokyo, November 17, 1941_1 p. m. 

"Received November 17_2:09 p. m.) 

"1814. Referring to Embassy's previous telegram No. 1736 of November 3, 3 p. 
m., final sentence, and emphasizing the need to guard against sudden Japanese 
naval or military actions in such areas as are not now involved in the Chinese 
theater of operations. I take into account the probability of the Japanese 
exploiting every possible tactical advantage, such as surprise and initiative. 
Accordingly you are advised of not placing the major responsibility in giving 
prior warning upon the Embassy staff, the naval and military attaches included 
since in Japan there is extremely effective control over both primary and 
secondary military information. We would not expect to obtain any information 
in advance either from personal Japanese contacts or through the press the 
observation of [100] military movements is not possible by the few Americans 
remaining in the country, concentrated mostly in three cities (Tokyo, 
Yokohama, Kobe); and with American and other foreign shipping absent from 
adjacent waters the Japanese are assured of the ability to send without 
foreign observation their troop transports in various directions. Japanese 
troop concentrations were reported recently by American consuls in Manchuria 
and Formosa, while troop dispositions since last July's general mobilization 
have, according to all other indications available, been made with a view to 
enabling the carrying out of new operations on the shortest possible notice 
either in the Pacific southwest or in Siberia or in both. 

"We are fully aware that our present most important duty perhaps is to detect 
any premonitory signs of naval or military operations likely in areas 
mentioned above and every precaution is being taken to guard against surprise. 
The Embassy's field of naval or military observation is restricted almost 
literally to what could be seen with the naked eye, and this is negligible. 
Therefore, you are advised, from an abundance of caution, to discount as much 
as possible the likelihood of our ability to give substantial warning.

"GREW"

General RUSSELL. General Miles, referring to the statement which is contained 
in Ambassador Grew's message "and with American and other foreign shipping 
absent from adjacent waters the Japanese are assured of the [101] ability to 
send without foreign observation their troop transports in various 
directions." 

As a matter of information, do you know why at that particular time there was 
an absence of American and foreign shipping in Japanese waters? 

General MILES. NO, sir. I do not remember knowing of any particular absence of 
American shipping from Japanese waters at that time. Of course we had had 
information for a great many years which had been considered in all of our war 
plans in Hawaii that there was a certain part of the Pacific Ocean that we 
called the "Vacant Sea" in which there are practically no ships and in which 
large movement of ships could occur without anybody seeing them. It was that 
part of the ocean between the great southern routes that go from Hawaii to the 
coast of Japan and China, and the northern great circle routes that go near 
the Aleutians. 

General RUSSELL. The term which you used intrigues me. What was it you called 
it?



Page 151

General MILES. I used to call it the "Vacant Sea." 

General RUSSELL. As applied to that part of the Pacific adjacent to the 
mandated islands, would you say that they were in the area of the "Vacant Sea" 
or not? 

General MILES No, sir. The southern trade routes, as I remember, from Hawaii 
to Yokohama, we will say, pass considerably north of most of the mandated 
islands, such as the Marianas. All the seas surrounding the mandated islands 
were, as you know, extremely difficult for us to penetrate and get any 
information on for other reasons. 

General RUSSELL. Why? 

[102] General MILES. Because the Japanese would not allow us in there. You 
might sail through, but you would not see very much. That had existed for many 
years. 

General RUSSELL. Was there any restriction on Americans landing on those 
islands that were mandated to the Japanese? 

General MILES. Absolutely, sir. 

General RUSSELL: Were Americans prohibited from landing in the mandated 
islands? 

General MILES. Well, they did not say "Americans are prohibited," but 
Americans did not land. That was well known for years. No American warship 
went in there. 

General FRANK. Do you know of any American port or any point over which the 
United States had jurisdiction that excluded Jap vessels or Japanese 
nationals? 

General MILES. No, sir. 

General RUSSELL. Do you know where there is any documentary evidence of the 
exclusion of Americans from the Japanese mandated islands? 

General MILES. General, I would not know exactly where to put my hand on 
documentary evidence. It was one of the things perfectly well known to all of 
us in the Intelligence. I should think probably the Navy Department could aid 
you in that respect. I am pretty sure that the Navy Department several times 
tried to get ships in there. 

General GRUNERT. As far as the so-called mandated islands are concerned, they 
were sort of a blind spot for our Military Intelligence, were they? 

General MILES. Yes, sir. 

[103] General RUSSELL. That is exactly what I was trying to find out. 

How far are the Marshall Islands from Honolulu? 

General MILES. My recollection is, about 1,600 miles. I would not swear to it. 

General RUSSELL. General, were you acquainted with the plans for the defense 
of Pearl Harbor and the estimates in connection with the Japanese situation as 
to the probabilities of attack? Were all those things known to you at G-2? 

General MILES. Rather intimately. I was G-3, of the Hawaiian Department from 
1929 to 1931. I rewrote the war plan. I wrote the general staff study and 
estimate of the situation, which was the "bible" at that time and for some 
years. Then from 1934 to 1938 I was here in War Plans Division and was 
particularly charged with the three overseas departments, their projects and 
their plans. So up to 1938, at least, and between 1929 and 1938, I was 
intimately acquainted with it.

General RUSSELL. In our brief study of the plan generally and the evidence 
just given by you, there was considerable emphasis placed on a probability of 
an attack on Pearl Harbor by carrier-borne aircraft. During the year 1941 you 
were, of course, familiar with the estimate and the probabilities? 

General MILES. Yes, sir. 

General RUSSELL. Did it occur to you as G-2 from what port or ports these 
carriers might depart on a mission of that sort? 

General MILES. They might have departed on a mission from a great many ports. 
We did not know really what bases they had in the mandated islands and 
obviously they could have departed [104] from almost any port in Japan, such 
as Kobe or Yokohama. 

General RUSSELL. You stated that you did not know what bases they had in the 
mandated islands? 

General MILES. Very little information on bases in the mandated islands. 

General RUSSELL. As I recall, they acquired jurisdiction, such as they had 
over the mandated islands, as a result of the settlement at the end of the 
other war in 1918? 

General MILES. That is correct. 

General RUSSELL. And in 1941 they had had approximately twenty years to 
develop their bases in the mandated islands, their ports and so forth. Was 



Page 152

there any information in G-2 in preparing ports and bases in any of the  
mandated islands? 

General MILES Very little, and very general information. We knew that they 
were developing certain places, such as Palau and Truk particularly, and we 
suspected Saipan. We relied very largely on information from Naval 
Intelligence. Taken together it could not have been called any detailed or 
complete information of possible bases in the mandated islands. 

General FRANK. Did you have anything on the Island of Jaluit? 

General MILES. I do not remember what we had on Jaluit, but it was one of the 
islands that we used to discuss and suspect that they were developing. 

General RUSSELL. General Miles, in the fall of 1941 did you in G-2 have 
sufficient data on Japanese developments in the mandated islands to predicate 
an intelligent opinion as to the [105] possibilities of launching convoys from 
there which might have included aircraft carriers? 

General MILES. I would say that positively we knew enough to form an estimate 
that such a thing was a strong possibility not a probability; that they had 
the means. That they would do it is another matter. They had the means to do 
it. I would say that our estimate at the time was that it was very possible, 
if not probable, that they did have those means. 

General RUSSELL. Do you know whether or not the data on these developments on 
the mandated islands is a matter of record any place in the G-2 files? 

General MILES. Oh, yes; we had files on them. We had maps and whatever we 
could get. The Office of Naval Intelligence had even more. 

General RUSSELL. Did those maps show the developments, or just show where the 
islands were? 

General MILES. So far as possible we made charts of the islands from one 
source or another and plotted on those charts, both Naval Intelligence and 
ours, where we thought they were developing, from what information we could 
get from traveling natives or missionaries or what have you. 

General RUSSELL. I was asking you some questions a moment ago about the 
inhibition as to our going on those mandated islands. Were the inhibitions 
against going into the mandated islands only those of force or semi-force by 
the Japanese people who were there? 

General MILES. That is what kept us away, General. 

General RUSSELL. They just would not let you go in? 

[106] General MILES. They just would not let us go in. They had one excuse or 
another. I don't remember just exactly what they were; but the net result was 
that mighty few people got into the mandated islands. 

General RUSSELL. Did you attempt to send people from G-2 into the mandated 
islands in 1941? 

General MILES. No, sir. I do not think any attempt had been made by G-2 for 
ten years. We knew we could not do it and get them out. 

General RUSSELL. Were there any restrictions imposed on G-2 from higher 
authority about attempting to get in there and develop that situation in the 
mandated islands? 

General MILES. Not specifically the mandated islands; no, sir. 

General RUSSELL. But you did regard the geographic location of these mandated 
islands with respect to our naval base at Pearl Harbor as being rather 
material?

General MILES. Yes, I did, General; but, on the other hand, we knew perfectly 
well that Japan could attack the Hawaiian Islands without the use of the 
mandates. I remember very well writing one plan in which we developed the 
other side, based on a surprise attack launched from the mainland of Japan, 
with fast cruisers and carriers, carrying troops on their most rapid liners. 
We worked it up, just how they would take those liners off their routes for 
one reason or another_this one to be repaired, and so forth_and suddenly 
launch an attack from the "Vacant Sea," suddenly arrive in Honolulu. So the 
mandates were always a black shadow, but they were not [107] the only means of 
attacking Hawaii, and we it as far back as the early 1930's. 

General RUSSELL.  In those studies which were made by you, and others with 
which you may be familiar, did you ever consider steps which might be taken to 
discover in advance the mission and dispatch of these convoys to carry out 
that type of attack? 

General MILES. We considered it, General, but, as Ambassador Grew says in that 
dispatch, "Don't rely on us from that point of view." We attacked the problem 
from the other side. 

General FRANK. What do you mean by that?



Page 153

General MILES. I mean, from the Hawaiian side, particularly air reconnaissance 
and submarine reconnaissance [handwritten: by our own people in Hawaii] to 
detect any force coming in before it could actually attack. I recall 
particularly during all of General Drum's command out there in the middle 
1930's that he was very much interested in it. He was constantly sending in 
papers to War Plans, and they were coming to my desk, involving the 
possibility of a screen of large bombers which would cover the entire enormous 
perimeter containing the five big Hawaiian islands That was a current matter 
almost. Then, of course, the submarine screen was another matter that was 
constantly discussed. We had about twenty submarines out there in the middle 
1930's. 

But, to answer your question more succinctly, I do not think any Intelligence 
officer ever thought that he could be sure of picking up a convoy or attack 
force or task force in Japan before it sailed and know where it was going. 
That was beyond our dreams of efficiency. 

[108] General RUSSELL. Or even the mandated islands? 

General MILES. Rather less in the mandated islands. 

General RUSSELL. You had less chance there? 

General MILES. Yes. 

General GRUNERT. Would such a force moving from one of the mandated islands 
indicate where it was going? Would there be a clear indication that it was 
bound for Hawaii or elsewhere? 

General MILES. It would be no indication at all where it was going, General. 

(There was informal discussion off the record.) 

General RUSSELL. The G-2 people in their studies had to all intents and 
purposes eliminated investigations in Japan proper and other Japanese 
territory to determine probable action on the part of the Japanese Army and 
Navy? 

General MILES. Oh, no, sir. We had not eliminated it. As Mr. Grew says, it was 
the principal task of the Embassy, particularly of the military and naval part 
of the Embassy! What I say is just what Mr. Grew says, that we never dreamed 
that we could rely on getting that information. It would have been almost a 
military intelligence miracle had we been able to spot a task force in forming 
and have known before it sailed where it was going. 

General RUSSELL. Now, general, if that be true, then the conclusion has been 
reached, so far as discovering task forces of any sort moving to the Hawaiian 
Islands, that the chief if not the sole reliance would have to be placed on 
reconnaissance agencies based on the islands or on United States possessions 
contiguous thereto? 

[109] General MILES. Yes, and at sea. I mean, by submarine and air power. 

General RUSSELL. Do you recall when the last estimate of the situation was 
sent out to the Hawaiian Department from G-2? 

General FRANK. Prior to December 7? 

General RUSSELL. Yes; prior to December 7,1941. 

General MILES. General, I do not know that any estimate of the situation, if 
you are using that term strictly, was sent. What we sent were those corrected 
sheets of the digest on Japan from time to time, whenever we got the 
information, and copies of the bi-weekly summary. The estimate of the 
situation is or the information of the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of 
War. G-2 is the G-2 of the General Staff. I am bringing up that point because 
I had to be very careful, and I think all G-2s of the General Staff have to be 
very careful. The information you give your Chief is something which he must 
pass on from the command point of view. If that information is habitually sent 
out to the various overseas departments particularly, you run into the serious 
danger of telling the Lieutenant General commanding the Hawaiian Department, 
we will say something that G-2 thinks which the Chief of Staff does not concur 
in and forcing his hand or inducing him to take some action in which the Chief 
of Staff does not concur. In other words, you must be careful to keep out of 
the command channel. So you give your information, your summary, your estimate 
of the situation, to your Chief, and action must flow from the Chief through 
the command channels; and G-2 is not in the command channels. 

[110] General GRUNERT. Insofar as action is concerned on the information hat 
is passed to the subordinate command, is that action then passed back through 
G-2, or does G-2 prepare it for the Chief of Staff insofar as it pertains to 
information? 

General MILES. I do not know that I have your question clearly.



Page 154

General GRUNERT. You have gotten information from various sources which 
influenced you to make an estimate of the situation, which you passed to the 
Chief of Staff. Now, there are parts of that information, if true, that 
certain command channels in the Philippines or Hawaii should get. Who insures 
that they get that information? 

General MILES. As a routine matter, G-2 insures it. In other words, all 
information that pertained directly to the Hawaiian Department or to the 
Philippine Department that G-2 received, it insured that G-2 in that 
Department got it. That is exclusive, however, of any deductions in a very 
broad sense that G-2 of the War Department might draw which would induce 
action. The latter, in other words, is a command proposition. 

General GRUNERT. In other words, you give them the information, but you do not 
analyze it; or do you? 

General MILES. Ordinarily you do not analyze it for them. 

General FRANK. You gave information and interpretation only through command 
channels? 

General MILES. Interpretation would certainly go only through command 
channels.

General GRUNERT. Any warning, then, should come from command channels; rather 
than from G-2? 

[111] General MILES. If it is warning that probably would result in action, 
yes, most definitely. 

General RUSSELL. Your G-2 sent a message on November 27 out to G-2 of the 
Hawaiian Department? 

General MILES. Yes; to all departments, as I remember. 

General RUSSELL. Now, a few specific questions, General Miles, and I will be 
through: 

On October 27, 1941, Brink reported to your office that there were two 
aircraft carriers that had been operating among the mandated islands, of which 
Kaga was one. Was Brink one of your operators? 

General MILES. How is the name spelled? 

General RUSSELL. B-r-i-n-k. 

General GRUNERT. Was there not a Colonel Brink for a time in Singapore, and 
then he went to the Philippines? 

General MILES Yes; that was the man, I think. 

General RUSSELL. This was sent from the Philippines? 

General MILES. Yes. 

General GRUNERT. He was one of the staff in the office of the A. C. of S., G 
2, Philippine Department, and on my recommendation he was sent to Singapore to 
be directly under the War Department there. That is why I recall a man named 
Brink. 

General RUSSELL. Do you have any recollection about that type of Japanese 
aircraft carrier being in the mandated islands? Do you have any independent 
recollection on that subject? 

General MILES. I remember that the Japanese carriers were reported in the 
mandated islands, but I would not be able to [112] pin it down to any 
particular source. 

General RUSSELL. Would it be about that time? 

General MILES. It was about that time.

General RUSSELL. In the records some place we have discovered evidence of a 
photographic mission by aircraft down into the mandated islands in late 
November or early December of 1941. Do you have any independent recollection 
of that activity on our part?

General MILES. No, sir; I did not know we sent one. 

General RUSSELL. You were in touch in a general way with the Navy at that time 
in obtaining information from them? 

General MILES. I was intimately in touch with the Office of Naval 
Intelligence. 

General RUSSELL. What did you know from the Navy about the location and 
disposition of the Japanese fleet in late November and early December? Do you 
remember? 

General MILES. My recollection is that the Navy had information of carriers in 
the mandates, and definitely of a movement of naval vessels and transports, 
they thought, south through the China Sea in the direction of Indo China and 
Thailand.

General RUSSELL. What was your impression as to the knowledge which the Navy 
had generally during the last six months before the attack on Pearl 



Page 155

Harbor of the location of the Jap Navy and various types of craft that were in 
their Navy? 

General MILES. Their information was very general and incomplete. 

General RUSSELL. General, when in your opinion did it [113] become apparent 
that war with Japan was inevitable? 

General MILES. On the 27th of November, when we learned that we had 
practically given what might be considered or probably would be considered by 
them an ultimatum from then on I considered war as very probable if not 
ultimately inevitable. 

General RUSSELL. That was based almost exclusively on the negotiations between 
the Japanese who were in Washington negotiating with our State Department?

General MILES. Primarily on that. It was a build-up.

General RUSSELL. In the message of November 27, which I will not discuss with 
you in any great detail, there was a statement that negotiations had 
practically ended. I am not quoting, but it said substantially that_although 
there was a bare possibility that the Japanese might come back for further 
negotiations. Do you remember that? 

General MILES. That was in General Marshall's dispatch? 

General RUSSELL. Yes. 

General MILES. I do not remember that; no. 

General RUSSELL. Let us assume that they did come back after November 27 and 
continued negotiations: Would that have affected your conclusions about the 
inevitability of war? 

General MILES. Oh, yes. 

General RUSSELL. As a matter of fact, they were back on the 1st, 2nd, and 5th 
f December, were they not? 

General MILES. The Japanese reply was not back, sir. 

General RUSSELL. I mean, the Japs came back and negotiated. 

[114] General MILES. Oh, they continued to stay here and talk, but that it all 
hinged, to my mind, on the reply or the position taken by the Japanese 
Government as a result of the U. S. paper on the 26th of November, I think it 
was, which was considered practically an ultimatum. 

General RUSSELL. I think that is all. 

General GRUNERT. I have a few questions. 

General MILES. I should like, if I may, to add a little bit. I am not quite 
sure of my answer regarding inevitable war. I do not want to give the 
impression that I thought on November 27th that war was immediately 
inevitable. I thought that, very definitely, some action by Japan, a pretty 
radical action, would be taken almost at once; but that need not necessarily 
be an overt and open attack on the United States. I didn't feel at all sure 
that war with Japan was immediately inevitable any time. There were a good 
many things Japan could have done, if she broke her negotiations in Washington 
short of open war with the United States and we were considering all of those 
possibilities.

General RUSSELL. That suggests one other question: Did you know that there had 
been established by reference to the degrees of latitude and longitude lines 
beyond which, if Japan went with armed force out in the Pacific, the British, 
Dutch, and Americans would regard that as an act of war? 

General MILES. Yes. 

General RUSSELL. Then you knew as G-2 that if certain things occurred, we, in 
association with those powers, might attack?

General MILES. Yes; certainly.

[115] General FRANK . You said you were not prevented specifically by higher 
authority from attempting to get information regarding the Japanese mandated 
islands. Was there any general prohibition in this regard? Was there general 
attitude of "hands off"? 

General MILES. Not specifically affecting the mandated islands. It was simply 
question of whether you wanted to send a man to his almost certain death or 
not, and whether the information you expected to get out of it would be worth 
at risk. But there was no general or specific prohibition against my sending 
man into the mandated islands if I could get him there. But I did not think I 
could get him in there and get him back alive, or get information from him 
while there. 



Page 156

General GRUNERT. Was there or was there not a fear on the part of all 
concerned that doing so and being picked up after having done so would offend 
the Japanese? 

General MILES. Oh, it most certainly would. We would have had to disavow it 
and swear that we never sent him, and so forth. That is an old part of the 
game. 

General FRANK. On November 27 there went out a message from G-2 of the War 
Department, which was your organization, saying: 

"Advise only Commanding General and Chief of Staff that it appears that 
conference with the Japanese has ended in an apparent deadlock. Acts of 
sabotage and espionage probable. Also possible that hostilities may begin." 

Do you remember that message? 

General MILES. Very well. 

[116] General FRANK. You are familiar with the war plan as it applied to 
Honolulu, the Standing Operating Procedure? 

General MILES. Yes; in a general way. 

General FRANK. Did not the provisions of that war plan and the Standing 
Operating Procedure provide for this defense against sabotage? 

General MILES. Yes; it provided against all forms of attack, including 
sabotage. 

General FRANK. Why, then, was sabotage especially emphasized in that message? 

General MILES. I will be very glad to answer that question, General, but my 
answer must be somewhat long. 

In the summer of 1939 the President issued a directive to all bureaus and 
offices of the Government to keep out of anti-sabotage and anti-espionage 
work, except three that were to do it all, F. B. I., O. N. I. and M. I. D. 
After I took M. I. D. in May of 1940, I began to build up the counter-
intelligence part of it. I drafted a written agreement with F. B. I. and O. N. 
I. delimiting our responsibilities under the President's directive. It was 
then countersigned by the three Cabinet Ministers concerned. Then I drew up a 
counter-subversive system for the Army, and later a counter-fifth-column plan, 
the first one we ever had. I met certain opposition among my colleagues, the 
other Assistant Chiefs of Staff and I am relating this only to point out that 
by the summer of 1941 I had gotten myself in a position where it was 
definitely established that counter-subversive activity of all kinds was G-2's 
responsibility and solely G-2's responsibility. I shared the [117] 
responsibility for measures against an overt to attack by a possible enemy 
with Operations and with War Plans, because I was supposed to give the 
information on which their orders were based. But I shared with nobody the 
responsibility for counter-subversive measures, and therefore, when I found on 
the 27th of November that nothing was 
specifically said about sabotage in General Marshall's dispatch of that date, 
the war warning order, I felt it necessary to warn the G-2's, not only of the 
overseas departments  but particularly those in this country. It was sent it 
to all of the corps area G-2s, because we knew the build-up in this country 
very well. The F. B. I., the O. N. I., and my people were very worried about 
what could be done in this country, particularly to the Air Force. General 
Arnold was very much worried. He broke loose the next day and occasioned the 
further dispatch of November 28. 

So that was the reason for the emphasis. The policy had already been laid down 
by General Marshall's telegram of the 27th. So I was simply backing up the 
policy of the Chief of Staff and emphasizing the form of attack for which I 
was most directly responsible as G 2, [handwritten:] and reiterating the 
possibility of open hostilities.

GENERAL FRANK. In the beginning of General Russell's questions you gave an 
answer to the effect that as a result of your background and experience you 
had felt a strong probability of an air raid or air attack on Honolulu. Is 
that correct?

General MILES That was one of the methods of attack to which we were most 
vulnerable.

General FRANK. At this time, we will say, December 1, 1941, what was your 
attitude as to the probability of such an [118] air attack? 

General MILES. If the Japs attack openly at all, and if their attack was made 
on Hawaii, I think I would have said on December 1, 1941, that an air attack 
on the Pearl Harbor installations and the fleet (although I did not actually 
know the ships were there in Pearl Harbor) was one of the most probable 
movements that the Japs would take. 



Page 157

General FRANK. Since you went out of your way to caution them about sabotage, 
why did you not likewise go out of your way to caution them about the 
probability of an air attack? 

General MILES. Because, General, all that had been covered in General 
Marshall's dispatch in which he specifically ordered such necessary 
reconnaissances_I remember the use of that word_to protect the Hawaiian 
Department against attack. And that was the only way_that, and of course 
radar_that such an attack could have been countered. My message also warned of 
possible hostilities. 

General FRANK. You knew that the following day General Arnold sent a message 
with respect to sabotage? 

General MILES. Yes, indeed. 

General FRANK. Did the logic ever occur to you that as a result of emphasizing 
sabotage in a series of messages it might have the result of de-emphasizing 
something else? 

General MILES. That had occurred to me. I very strongly objected to General 
Marshall's message on the basis, among other things, that I did not want to 
overemphasize sabotage and that I had already sent the day before a sufficient 
message to cover the question of sabotage. 

General FRANK. As hindsight, of course, and considering [119] the fact that 
provisions for all of these defenses were covered in the war plans and other 
documents, would not the following message have-sufficed; 

"War imminent. Act accordingly."? 

General MILES. For me to send? 

General FRANK. No; for the War Department to have sent. That would not have 
emphasized nor de-emphasized anything, would it? 

General MILES. I would prefer not to pass upon the Chief of Staff's wording in 
his message of November 27. 

General FRANK. There were six messages sent between November 16th and 28th. 
Four of them cautioned against provoking the Japs; three of them emphasized 
sabotage. Now, with respect to caution against provoking the Japs: while we 
were leaning over backward as a result of these cautions, what was the 
attitude of the Japanese, relatively speaking? 

General MILES. Their attitude where, General? Here in Washington, in the 
negotiations? 

General FRANK. All over the world. Were they as particular about preventing 
any suspicion on our part as we were particular about trying to prevent any 
provocation on their part? 

General MILES. Oh, no. They had been provocative for a great many years, 
particularly since they began their attack on China. 

General FRANK. Will you develop that in just a few words? 

General MILES. I should say that the Japanese attack in Manchuria and later in 
China, which, after all, was the basis [120] of our diplomatic negotiations 
here in Washington in 1941 the basic cause of it, was the beginning of a very 
provocative attitude on the part of the Japanese. 

General FRANK. What I am after is this: There was little or no attempt on the 
Japanese side to keep from provoking us, where as there was every effort on 
the part of the Americans to keep from provoking the Japanese; is that 
correct? 

General MILES. I should say as a general statement that that is very accurate, 
sir.

General FRANK. I asked that of you because you should have information on that 
as the War Department G-2 at that time. 

General MILES. Yes, sir; but I think it was very general information that at 
Shanghai and all through the Peiping episode, they had been very provocative, 
as we all knew; and it was the policy of our Government not to provoke war; to 
take a firm stand in a certain way, as you know, but not to provoke war with 
Japan. At least, so we read it. 

General FRANK. Do you think that we were leaning over backwards in that 
attitude? 

General MILES. That is a very difficult question to answer, General. I simply 
say that our policy was to avoid any unnecessary provocative action.

[121] General FRANK. You said you objected to General Arnold's message. To 
whom? 

General MILES. To General Arnold, in the first place, and later, to General 
Scanlon. It was quite a long discussion, as I remember it. 



Page 158

General FRANK. What were the circumstances under which your objection was 
finally overcome and the message sent? 

General MILES. It had to go to the Deputy Chief of Staff, General Bryden 
General Marshall was away. General Bryden did not want to decide it, either, 
very much. I objected strongly and was backed up by General Gerow. Our 
objections were on this line: (1) an anti-sabotage message had gone out; (2) a 
the proposed message should not go to the air forces alone, but if sent at 
all, should go to the Commanding Generals for their air forces and for 
everybody else; and (3) the message as originally drawn was very drastic. As 
you know very well, at that time, the Air Force had a lot of young men in 
command of fields and so forth, and a very drastic order, from General Arnold 
particularly, to protect planes and so forth, might very well have resulted in 
somebody's being shot. 

I would also like to say, here, that General Arnold's message was primarily 
addressed to the continental United States; he was thinking about that. What 
started him was the fact about seven planes arrived at one of your western 
fields_I think at Salt Lake_all with the same trouble, and from different 
depots, and he thought there was some real sabotage going on in this country. 
But, to go on with the story, we finally had to take it to the Deputy Chief of 
Staff, late that afternoon of the 28th. I don't think it was decided until 
[122] about six o'clock. General Scanlon was present, presenting the Air side, 
and I think, General Gerow and General Gullion, Provost Marshal General and 
General Bryden finally decided that it would be sent in modified form; that 
is, not directing such drastic action be against anybody who might climb over 
a fence; and that it would be sent to the Commanding Generals, and that the 
Air Corps might also, if they desired, send it direct under General Arnold's 
name to the Air Force, to the Air Commanders concerned:  that was the final 
decision. 

General FRANK. NOW, another question that I am asking because G-2 might have 
drawn a conclusion on it: What was the attitude of the public toward the 
possibility of war at that time? Can you answer that? 

General MILES. I can only give you my impression, that they were not nearly as 
much worried about it as they should have been. After all, it was only a few 
months past since we had saved the Army by one vote in the House of 
Representatives. You remember, I think it was in October 1941 that that vote 
was taken, and we just barely saved the Army at that time. 

General FRANK. What do you mean, "saved the Army"? 

General MILES. Well, you remember there was a bill, sir, to send back all the 
men that had been drafted, put them back on the reserve, or something like 
that.

General RUSSELL. A bill to demobilize the National Guard. 

General MILES. To demobilize the National Guard and send the draftees back. 
The War Department was extremely worried about it. 

General FRANK. Aside from the people "top side" in the Army, can you give me 
an expression of what the attitude in the [123] Army was with respect to the 
possibility of war? 

General MILES. Not accurately. I attended the North Carolina maneuvers, early 
preceding November, and I don't remember to have heard the matter discussed. 
The Army in those days, as you well remember, we all remember, was intensely 
busy in building itself and training and maneuvering and so forth. I would not 
say the Army as a whole were much concerned as to where war was going to break 
if they could get their troops ready before the break.

General FRANK. Do you think they felt that war was on the horizon? 

General MILES. The Army?

General FRANK. Yes. 

General MILES. Yes, sir. 

General FRANK. All right. 

General MILES. Not necessarily with Japan, but war was on the horizon. 

General FRANK. Did you know that there was a Japanese striking force 
consisting of several carriers and a couple of battleships and a submarine 
force in the Marshall Islands, in the vicinity of Jaluit, about the 1st of 
December? 

General MILES. I knew that such a force had been reported about there, and 
about that time. 

General FRANK. Was that information given to the Commanding General of the 
Hawaiian Department? 

General MILES. I don't know, sir. I do not remember.



Page 159

General FRANK. Have you any way of determining that? 

General MILES. The records of the Military Intelligence Department undoubtedly 
will disclose it.

[124] General FRANK. If it were given? 

General MILES. Yes, if it were given. I feel very sure that in one form or 
another he was informed of that report. I say "in one form or another" because 
one form might very well have been through Navy and Fleet. 

General FRANK. Information on the situation surrounding the Hawaiian Islands, 
you stated some time back, information as to the presence of hostile activity 
in the waters, would mainly be obtained through submarine reconnaissance and 
air reconnaissance? 

General MILES. That is correct_and radar. 

General FRANK. And radar? Since the Navy is the only Department that has 
submarines, and since also in the plan for air reconnaissance at Honolulu they 
were responsible for distant reconnaissance, it would appear then that it was 
the responsibility of the Navy to keep both the Army and the Navy in Honolulu 
advised and to provide protection against any kind of attack so far as 
reconnaissance could provide that, is that correct? 

General MILES. So far as distance reconnaissance is concerned, they alone had 
the means of carrying it out. 

General FRANK. That is all I have. 

General GRUNERT. I want you to explain once more so I can get it clear in mind 
about the dissemination of information gathered by G-2, of the War Department, 
so I will put it in various questions. You get information from the State 
Department, ONI, your own sources, and whatever other sources might become 
available to you. Now, when you get this information, who judges whether or 
not particular parts of that information [125] are of value and should be 
transmitted, for instance, to the Commanding General of Hawaii? 

General MILES. The first people who pass on it are the members of the section, 
the Geographical Section, which includes the country about which we have that 
information_the Japanese, we will say. Information would pass first through 
the Far Eastern Section, I think it was called at that time, under Colonel 
Bratton, of the Intelligence Subdivision of the Military Intelligence. It 
would then go to the Intelligence Division, itself, which collated all 
positive intelligence, dealt with all positive intelligence as distinguished 
from counter-intelligence, the negative side, and would then be sent out. 

If it was simply routine, the Chief in the Military Intelligence Division, G-
2, would simply see it passing over his desk. If there were any question about 
it, it would be brought up-through normal channels; to the executive officer, 
who if he did not feel competent to decide it, would take it up with G-2 
himself. That was the method. 

General GRUNERT. If you were disseminating it, then, to the various commands, 
or any particular command, would it then pass directly from G-2 to such 
Commander, and in what form? 

General MILES. The normal form would be these semiweekly summaries. That would 
be the routine. Any particular information of particular importance would be 
telegraphed out to those agencies concerned with that particular bit of 
information, in the case of Japan, to (certainly) the Philippines, to Hawaii, 
to Panama, to the West Coast, possibly and so forth right to our military 
attache in China and to the G-2 of the corps areas. 

[126] General GRUNERT. But when you make an estimate of the situation that 
then goes to be processed through War Plans Division, to the Chief of Staff? 

General MILES. Yes. 

General GRUNERT. Now, if there is any information to be passed out on that 
estimate, it then must be authorized for you to pass it out, or for them to 
pass it out directly to those concerned, is that right? 

General MILES. Yes. It becomes more than information, then; it becomes an 
opinion of the War Department, a communication of the Chief of Staff. 

General GRUNERT. All right. Now, the next question I have is one on which we 
will have to go back to the sabotage message. Was that sabotage message of 
November 27 O. K.'d by WPD, or the Chief of Staff, or whom? Or was it 
necessary to have that O. K.'d? Did you send it out directly to the G-2? 

General MILES. It was not necessary for the Chief of Staff or his office to 
pass an it, since it simply carried out a policy already established by the 
previous 




Page 160

messages of the same date from General Marshall. I do remember, however, 
consulting, as I almost always did, War Plans, as they consulted me on 
messages and I think it was General Gerow who suggested that I add to the 
message that the G-2s were to inform their Commanding Generals and the Chiefs 
of Staff only.

General GRUNERT. Did G-2 do its utmost to inform, by contact with the various 
agencies made available; so as to best advise the Chief of Staff and keep 
subordinate commands informed, and so that they could carry out their mission? 

General MILES. I did not hear the first of your question, [127] relative to 
the G-2. 

General GRUNERT. Did G-2 do its utmost, so far as you could judge, to carry 
out its mission, in informing the Chief of Staff of everything they had got, 
making estimates, and passing down information they thought was pertinent? 

General MILES. The answer to that is Yes. 

General GRUNERT. Naturally. I wanted to put it in the record. 

General MILES. I might add, if I may, that we wrote so much that we got 
certain complaints_complaints that nobody could read all the stuff we turned 
out. We certainly tried to do whatever we could. 

General GRUNERT. Did so many things go out at one time that the "low side" 
might have considered themselves as being informed to such a point of 
saturation that they did not pay much attention to the information they were 
getting? In other words, "crying wolf! wolf!" so that they became confused, or 
"fed up"? 

General MLLES. That could have been, sir.

General GRUNERT. Do you think that the G-2 message_we call it "the G-2 
message," of November 27_and the sabotage message we call that the "Arnold 
message," of the 28th, which was sent out under the Adjutant General's 
signature did you consider whether or not they might be taken by the Command 
"down below" as modifying or changing the Chief of Staff's instructions of 
November 27?

General MILES. No, sir; I did not. The Chief of Staff's message of November 27 
was a war-warning message, in my mind, all inclusive so far as different forms 
of attack or dangers [128] might be considered, and my message of the same 
date in regard to sabotage was simply inviting the attention of the G-2, who 
was particularly charged with that, in each corps area and overseas 
department, to that particular form of danger.

General GRUNERT. There was no report from the recipients required?

General MILES. There were no report required.

General GRUNERT. That is, to your message.

General MILES. No answer to my message, of the 27th.

General GRUNERT. No answer? But there was a report required by the Chief of 
Staff's message of November 27?

General MILES. That is true, sir.

General GRUNERT. The Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department made his 
report to the Chief of Staff, presumably on the Chief of Staff's message of 
November 27. Therein, he reported just the measures taken as to sabotage. Did 
you see that report?

General MILES. I did not see that message_that answer_until after Pearl 
Harbor. 

General GRUNERT. I do not think of anything else. Does anybody else think of 
anything else?

General FRANK. When General Grunert just asked you about the possibility of 
confusing those messages on sabotage, you replied from the point of view of 
the man at this end. Now, consider yourself for a moment as the man at the 
receiving end of those messages, not knowing who prepared them, nor anything 
about their source, but from the point of view of their coming from the War 
Department, and considering that as a single source: under those conditions, 
might it or might it not have been a [129] little confusing?

General MILES. It might have been, but I think the first message was signed 
"Marshall."

General FRANK. That is right.

General MILES. That would be my answer.

General FRANK. Now, the next question is: I asked you, in my questions a few 
minutes ago, as to whether or not you had sent any message to the Commanding 
General of the Hawaiian Department with respect to the presence in the 
Marshall Islands of this Japanese force. We have, we think, all the 
communications that went from the War Department to the Hawaiian Department,



Page 161

from the 16th of November until December 7. This Japanese force was not in the 
vicinity of Jaluit until about the 25th. In view of the critical stage of the 
situation, it would seem that that information was rather vital, as there is 
no record of its having been communicated. Is there any explanation of that?

General MILES. I wouldn't know what the explanation was, if it wasn't 
communicated. If we had known at the time, as we probably did, that that 
information, coming from Navy, was being transmitted to the Fleet in Hawaii, 
to all of their naval vessels, it might very well have been that we considered 
that as sufficient, knowing that the two Intelligence branches, Army and Navy 
were working in very close cooperation we thought, everywhere_in Hawaii and 
the West Coast and in the Philippines, and so forth. 

I am a little worried about that message, because I was told, this morning, by 
Military Intelligence, that there are numbered gaps in their files today, and 
they do not know where [130] those messages are. We hope you have them, but 
they do not know. 

General RUSSELL. We didn't get them from G-2. 

General MILES. How? 

General RUSSELL. We haven't gotten anything from G-2. 

General FRANK. In the Roberts Commission interrogation of Colonel Fielder, who 
was G-2 in the Hawaiian Department-

General MILES. Yes, G-2. 

General FRANK. He discloses that he was not, prior to December 7, getting this 
information from the Navy, in Honolulu. He was not getting it.

General MILES. He should have, of course. 

General FRANK. That is all. 

General GRUNERT. One final question. In your experience as Staff Officer and 
as a Commander in the field, outside the War Department, would a message 
signed by Marshall carry more weight with you than one signed by the Adjutant 
General, or one signed by a Staff Officer? 

General MILES. Very much more weight, General, particularly when it begins 
with some such phrase as "This is a war-warning message." 

General GRUNERT. Are there any other questions? 

General RUSSELL. What message did he ever send, beginning that way, General 
Miles? 

General MILES. My impressions of the message of November 27, but I haven't it 
before me. 

General GRUNERT. There was one starting out that way, but it happened to be 
Navy message. This particular message from the Chief of Staff did not start 
out that way, [131] according to the record. 

General RUSSELL. Who was Creswell? 

General MILES. Creswell? He was Military Attache in Japan. 

General RUSSELL. I want to go back to my Mandated Islands for a minute 
General, because you have excited me a little bit. I want to get some 
description of those islands. Referring to the Marshall Islands, where these 
carriers are supposed to have assembled, that attacked, is there anybody on 
those islands except Japanese? 

General MILES. Some natives there, I believe a few, there. 

General RUSSELL. Are there towns and roads and those sorts of things there? 

General MILES. The only so-called "civilized people" are the Japanese, there, 
and the others are natives of the Islands. They don't live in towns, very 
much, I imagine. My information about the Mandated Islands is very slim, now, 
particularly now-

General RUSSELL. There is no secret at all about the questions that I am 
asking, and what I am attempting to develop for my own satisfaction, in 
arriving at what happened at Pearl Harbor. They had everything on us, yet they 
sailed up and attacked us, and apparently today G-2 doesn't know where they 
came from, or how many there were, or where they went to. We have not been 
able so far to get any very intelligent information on what these convoys were 
like, if there were more than one. Do you have any ideas about that, the size 
of the attacking forces? 

General MILES. Prior to the attack? 

General RUSSELL. No, since the attack. Have you gotten [132] information that 
led you to know how strong these convoys were that came in there, launching 
this attack? 



Page 162

General MILES. We have only general information, largely from Naval 
Intelligence. The ships supposed to be the KAGA and AKAGI, those two very 
large carriers of theirs, supported by probably some of their older 
battleships of the KONGO class_their four old battle cruisers; but I have no 
definite information.

General RUSSELL. I think that is all.

General GRUNERT. Thank you, very much.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

(Whereupon, at 12:46 p. m., the Board recessed until 2 p. m.) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
EXHIBIT No. 5

                            CONFIDENTIAL

                [Exact Copy Action Copy Radiogram]

                                                            EHB/bjs-1712
                                                     SEPTEMBER 29, 1941. 

AG 383.4 (9-29-41) MC
From: Ft. Shafter, T. H.
To: The Adjutant General. 

No. 420. September 29th. 

For G-2. Reurad 114 tenth September Nineteen Forty One Re Natzi [sic] agents 
aboard army transports. Investigation revealed that subject Wilhelm Brandeis 
was not a member of the crew of USAT President Coolidge nor was Joseph Ryan 
aboard USAT President Cleveland. 

                                                                  SH0RT. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                               [Radiogram]

                                                         SEPT. 23, 1941. 
                                                               704 a. m. 

105 WTJ
DJ
FLD 1205P 22nd
From: Ft. Shafter T. H.
To: G Two

No. 379 September 22nd. 

Request authority to reproduce and distribute to certain G two and S two 
officers in this department confidential document subject protection electric 
utility property issued by the Federal Power Commission Washington January 
twentieth nineteen forty one received as enclosure to your letter G two dash 
ten three thirteen dash one six three March twentieth. Fielder 

                                                                   Short
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                   CI/G2
                                                                     CWC
MID 350.05 Safeguarding
                                                      SEPTEMBER 23, 1941

                    MEMORANDUM FOR THE ADJUTANT GENERAL

Subject: Security of information pertaining to movements of ships and 
aircraft.

The Secretary of War Directs: 

1. That a Confidential radiogram substantially as follows be sent to the 
Commanding Generals of all Departments and Defense Commands: 

Effective immediately all radio or cable traffic pertaining to movement of 
vessels and aircraft to or from the overseas bases comma department or defense 
commands will be classified as confidential. 

2. That notification to this effect, for information and compliance, be given 
general distribution, including General Headquarters, the Chief of the Army 
Air Force, and the commanding officers of outlying bases. 

                                                          SHERMAN MILES.

Memorandum for record: Certain overseas bases have made inquiries by radio of 
cable messages sent in the clear about personnel, material and docking time of 
transports, and the Navy has protested this.



Page 163

                                     Drafting Section: C. I. P.
                                     Drafting Officer: Hugh D. Wise, Jr.
                                     G-2 File Number: 

                        Paraphrase of an outgoing
                                X Radiogram
                                 Cablegram

  Secret
X Confidential
  Restricted

                                                 No. 128 Sent 9-13-41 LW
                                               Date: September 13, 1941. 

To: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Headquarters, Hawaiian Department, Fort 
Shafter, T. H

Present strength of Corps of Intelligence Police in your department is 
requested by radio. 

Mailed G/2 W. D. G. S. Sep. 13,1941. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
             MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION (G-2) GENERAL STAFF

From:       To:
   The A. C. of S., G-2
   Executive Officer, G-2
   ADMINISTRATIVE BRANCH
      Finance Section
      Personnel Section
      Chief Clerk
      Record Section
      Translation Section
   INTELLIGENCE BRANCH
LIAISON BRANCH
   COUNTERINTELLIGENCE BRANCH
      C. I. P.
   PLANS AND TRAINING BRANCH
   SECRETARY, GENERAL STAFF
   EXECUTIVE OFFICER, G-1
   EXECUTIVE OFFICER, G-3
   EXECUTIVE OFFICER, G-4
   EXECUTIVE OFFICER, WPD
   ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
   PUBLIC RELATIONS BRANCH, DCofS
   BUDGET & LEGISLATIVE BRANCH
   WAR DEPARTMENT MESSAGE CENTER
   W. D. MAP COLLECTION

For:
   Necessary action
   Preparation of reply
   Recommendation or remark
   As a matter of primary interest
   Previous correspondence
   Note and return
   Information
   Mail
   File
   Noted
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                   G2/CI
                                                                     WAT

Sent #114, 9/10/41
The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Hawaiian Department.
   Honolulu Territory of Hawaii. 

Following men reported to be crew members of Army transports and Nazi agents 
Joseph Ryan present Cleveland due Honolulu September twenty first and Wilhelm 
Brandeis President Coolidge due Honolulu September thirteenth.

                                                                  MILES. 



Page 164

                                        Drafting Section: Administrative
                                                                    G2/I
                                        Drafting Officer:           MWP
                                                                    MWP
                                        G-2 File number:

                       Paraphrase of an outgoing
Secret xx
              Radiogram xx
Confidential
              Cablegram
Restricted

                                                  No. 75-Sent Aug. 29-41
                                                  Date: August 29, 1941.

To: G-2 Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, Territory Hawaii. 

Colonel Field of the British Army will pass through Honolulu aboard the Klip 
Fontein about September fifth. Desire you meet him personally and hold full 
and free discussion on all intelligence matters. 

Record Section copy 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                        AUGUST 18, 1941.
Memorandum for The Adjutant General:
Subject: Radiogram

The Secretary of War directs that a radiogram, substantially as follows, be 
sent to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department:

Reurad fifteenth requesting War Department Maps Eastern Europe comma these 
maps not produced and are sending you mail necessary sheets International Map 
of World together with other miscellaneous map coverage period

                                                           SHERMAN MILES 
                                          Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
                                   Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2. 

Received Aug. 19, 1941. Miscl. Div. A. G. O. 
Action taken Radio to CG Haw Dept. 8-19-41. GHB 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                   [exact copy_action copy_radiogram]
AG 336.3 Japan (7-9 41) MC Received at the War Department
74 WTJ AE 124P
July 10, 1941 7:34 A. M.
From: Manila 
To: TAG 

No. 1337, July 9th. 

Further remarks for G-2 reference our radio one three zero one are that Mexico 
Maru small Philippine-Japan run freighter due Manila July 25th has been 
canceled and commandeered. Kokkai Maru ten thousand ton on New York-Philippine 
run due Manila about August first has also been canceled and commandeered. 
Ganges Maru now enroute to Manila not yet affected. Signed O'Rear 

                                                                GRUNERT. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                            [Paraphrase] 
AG 600.12 (7-1-41) MC-D                                      EHB/sm_1712
To: CG, Hawaiian Dept.
From: TAG
July 9, 1941

Consideration being given projects for Wheeler Field, Hickam Field, and
Hawaiian Air Depot from FY 1942 funds by Chief of Air Corps. The Quartermaster 
General has been directed to expend $104,202 from available funds for anti-
sabotage protection. Correspondence now en route advising you of action. Above 
Reurad thirty one seventy three.
Copy For: Chief of the Air Corps
          The Quartermaster General
          A. C. of S., G-2
          Chief of Engineers
------------------------------------------------------------------------



Page 165

                               [Radiogram]

                                                           JULY 30, 1941
                                                                 3:44 AM
From: Hawaii
To: War Department
No. 3419, July 29th. 

For A C of S G-2 reliable information concerning Japanese forces in Manchuria 
as follows. Ten divisions of a total strength of two hundred forty two 
thousand men. These are the eight divisions which-are given in latest British 
military intelligence order of battle; with the twelfth and twenty fifth 
repeat twelfth and twenty fifth in addition. Eight Frontier Garrison units of 
a total strength about twenty two thousand six hundred. Six independent 
garrisons units of total strength about thirty eight thousand. Total strength 
approximately three hundred thousand repeat three hundred thousand. The weapon 
equipment of Four Regiment Divisions is given as seven thousand six hundred 
eighty six rifles, five hundred seventy six trench mortars and infantry 
support guns. Three hundred ninety six heavy and light machine guns. Ninety 
two field guns and howitzers. Same source reports that German accounts in 
South America steadily being transferred to Japanese custody. It is freely 
predicted Germany will ask Japan to blockade Vladivostok to prevent essential 
supplies reaching Russia. 

                                                                  SHORT.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                               [Cablegram]
LAS
WUWA 3
                                                          July 29, 1941.
                                                                 8:33 AM
From: Tokyo
To: MILID
No. 508, July 29th. 

After period during which no reservations from Japan in any direction 
procurable NYK today confirmed reservation Nitta sailing August 7th arriving 
Honolulu about August 15th. Since restriction travel south and west may be 
unduly prolonged strongly recommend Pape avail himself this opportunity and 
that clipper reservation Honolulu Singapore be arranged. Request prompt reply 
as reservations in great demand. 

                                                               CRESWELL.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                  [Exact copy_action copy_radiogram]

AG 380.3 (6-26-41) MC
159 WTJ
AE
616P 

Received at the War Department June 28, 1941, 2:00 PM.
From: Manila.
To: TAG.
No. 1236, June 26th. 

Twenty five thousand Japanese Troops received parachute training in China and 
Japan of this number fifteen hundred in Canton Army according to British 
report evaluation questionable. Three Japanese convoys last reported headed 
south believed to have gone to Pescazores and Formosa. Typhoon reported east 
Manila lends credibility to above. For G-2 Signed OREAR. 

                                                               GRUNERT.
------------------------------------------------------------------------



Page 166

                  [Exact copy_action copy_radiogram]

AG 380.3  (6-25-41) MC
21 WTJ
AE
620P

Received at the War Department, June 26 1941 8:00 AM.
From: Manila
To: TAG
No. 1225, June 25th.

Following is paraphrase of cable from Brink. For G-2. On 19th and 20th of June 
British Commander in Chief Far East and the Director of Operations of Chinese 
Air Force (General Mow) discussed plans for cooperation in the event of 
Japanese operations against the British. British plan to use following Chinese 
airfields as bases from which to attack Japanese sea communications land 
troops and Japanese bases on Hainan Island and in French Indo China in the 
event of Japanese attack against Malaya or Hongkong: Nanning 23 degrees zero 
minutes north 108 degrees 30 minutes east: Liuchow 24 degrees 20 minutes north 
109 degrees 20 minutes east: Kweilin 25 degrees 20 minutes north 110 degrees 
10 minutes east: Chihkiang 27 degrees 30 minutes north 109 degrees 40 minutes 
east: Hemagyang 27 degrees zero minutes north 112 degrees 30 minutes east. 
Chinese agree to stock these airfields now with gasoline and bombs. Chinese 
suggest that the British use airfields in the following area from which to 
make direct raids on Formosa and the Japanese mainland: Wenchow-Chuchowfu-
Kienowhs.

British intend to encourage Guerrilla warfare against the Japanese in the 
following general areas: Ichang-Kingchow-Hanhu; Siagtanhs-Changsha-Yowchow; 
Nanchang-Haohcow-Kiukiang; Soochow-Changshow-Taiping; Canton-Kongmoon-China 
Sea-Shamchung. Agreements for mutual cooperation will be arranged the 1st week 
in July at a meeting between British and Chinese staffs in Burma. Signed 
Orear.

                                                                GRUNERT.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                             [Radiogram]

2WVY
519P
BVC

                                                           JUNE 6, 1941.
                                                                   1030Z
                                                            From: Tokyo.
                                               To: The Adjutant General.
                                                   No. 482, June 6, 1941

Investigations among Japanese Russian and others nationals fails to reveal any 
information either positive or negative regarding your number 492. Efforts 
will be continued.

                                                                CRESWELL
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                              [Radiogram]

(JTP)
152WTJ
                                                             MAY 3 1941. 
                                                                 9:22 AM
From: Tokyo. 
To: Assistant Chief of Staff G-2.
Tokyo No. 467, May 2, 1941. 

under the provisions of Article 20 Tripartite pact military missions known to 
have left Japan for Germany and Italy though no first hand information this 
office relative arrival Japan similar missions from those countries. At 
present no move discernible which might be considered preparatory to military 
action as provided by Article three although frequent rumors refer Japanese 
strength Formosa Hainan Indo-China greater than normal under China war 
conditions and held in readiness move against Dutch East Indies Singapore. 
Increase of Japanese Naval and Air force Saigon likewise rumored. This office 
not in position to confirm or refute such reports. No unusual mission 
movements observed 



Page 167

Japan distinguishable from normal movements connected operations China 
although such moves would be carefully hidden and difficult to follow after 
leaving Japan. Attention is invited to recent State Department dispatch 
concerning transit

(Sheet Two Tokyo, No. 467, May 2, 1941)

of German aircraft, artillery and other military supplies via Trans-Siberian 
railway to Japan. 

Instead of daily report required by your No. 505 suggest immediate report any 
information obtained since without change present international political and 
military situation many such reports will be negative. 

                                                               CRESWELL. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                             [Radiogram]

L4 WTJ ae
                                                            MAY 3, 1941.
                                                                 9:22 AM

From: Manila
To: Asst. Chief of Staff.
No. 915, May 3, 1941. 

Telegraphic summary of report of Singapore conference sent by radio to British 
Ambassador Washington by conference chairman. If urgent suggest you consult 
that summary. Copy of report with my comments going forward by clipper naval 
courier to Washington scheduled to leave May eighth. 

                                                                GRUNERT.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                               [Radiogram]

LW                                                     April 26th, 1941.
104 WTJ                                                          7:11 AM
From: Manila.
To: The Adjutant General.
Manila No. 881.  April 26th.

Reliably informed German Ambassador to Japan has requested that Japanese 
shipping lines facilitate the evacuation of German Nationals from Philippines. 
For G-2. And that Kokusai Kisen Kaisha office in Manila has been so advised. 
Signed O'Rear. 

                                                                GRUNERT. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                               [Radiogram]

(RRR)                                                    MARCH 21, 1941. 
53-WVY                                                          6:06 PM
From: Manila, P. I.
To: The Adjutant General.
No. 662 March 21st.
For G-2

Exaggerated account of visit of Japanese fishing boat to Itbayat Island on 
March 12 apparently has been given press distribution. Actually fishing boat 
Dichi Maru anchored at Mauyen Itbayat Island took on supplies of cocoanuts and 
fruit and some stores and departed. Carried Japanese flag engraved on both 
sides and was equipped with radio apparatus, fishing nets, and one life boat. 
This incident is normal and is without importance. Signed O'Rear. 

                                                                GRUNERT. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                               [Radiogram]

BFS                                                      MARCH 13, 1941.
22 WVY                                                           3:42 PM
From: Tokyo via Manila
To: MILID
Number 469.
March 13th. 

Japanese in position to know definitely states parachute training of infantry 
and engineers taking place for the past year. No information as to number and 
location. 

                                                               CRESWELL. 




Page 168

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                               [Radiogram]

(MWW)                                                     MARCH 8, 1941.
63-WTJ                                                          10:07 PM
From: Tokyo, Japan
To: MILID, Washington, D. C.
Number 457, March 7th. Files 425 PM. 

Colonel Takeo Iwakuro who sailed on S. S. Tatsuta Maru for the United States 
March 6th is adviser to Admiral Nomura and liaison between Admiral Nomura and 
Army. As such will occupy important position Japanese Embassy. Suggest Martin 
meet him San Francisco. See Embassy Number 330 February 27. 

                                                               CRESWELL. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                               [Radiogram]

BFS                                                   FEBRUARY 24, 1941.
3WVY                                                             9:59 AM
From: Tokyo
To: MILID
Number 453, February 25th. 

Reference your 496 the three Japanese translators and one Formosan messenger 
employed by this office are doing translation that can not be done adequately 
by American personnel. Although we known they report to police when *hostile* 
affairs of office so organized that they can report nothing of any 
consequence. Miss Ishigami an American citizen handles routine reports and 
correspondence only with Miss McMahon writing all confidential matters. 

Recommend that present setup remain unchanged.

                                                               CRESWELL.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                               [Radiogram]

WE                                                    FEBRUARY 14, 1941.
72 WTJ                                                           6:04 AM
338
From: Manila.
To: G-2.
Number 512, February 13th.

Netherlands Consul reports concerning two vessels Java China Japan line as 
follows: For G dash two signed Orear. The Tjitjalenka sailed from Manila zero 
seven zero zero February thirteen but was ordered to return to Manila shortly 
thereafter; the Tjibesar now enroute from Japan has been ordered to put into 
Manila for further instructions. No explanation available as yet. 

                                                                GRUNERT. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                               [Radiogram]
WE
89 WTJ
213 PH
                                                       FEBRUARY 5, 1941.
                                                                 7:04 AM

From Manila
To: MILID
Number 41, February 5th. 

British consular source reports Governor East Java intercepted telephone 
conversation between two important Japanese at Sourabaya and Lawang discussing 
news that Japanese attack is scheduled for February, tenth repeat I tenth. 
Both Japanese arrested and both denied conversation. This message for G dash 
two signed Orear. Governor comments very few Japanese believed to be armed and 
no difficulty is anticipated in taking all Japanese into custody when desired. 
Evaluation of data low.

                                                                GRUNERT.



Page 169

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                               [Radiogram]
(MWW)
44-WTJ 
                                                        JANUARY 5, 1941.
                                                                 8:05 PM

From: Fort Shafter, T. H.
To: The Adjutant General.
Number 2041, January 4th. Filed 2:47 PM. 

ATTENTION G-2. Following information was given out by official British sources 
and was obtained from Captain Thomas V. Hill, Master ARMS AORANGI. Description 
of three raiders operating in Pacific is as follows: 

TOKYO MARU EX KULMERLAND, Japanese markings, 7300 tons, 20 passenger, one 
straight funnel amidships, two masts, three single Samson posts one between 
bridge and foremast one directly abaft passenger accommodation one abaft the 
mainmast, crows next [sic] extreme head foremast, slightly raked stem, cruiser 
stern, one seaplane carried. 

MANYO MARU, Japanese marking, 5000 tons, 20 passenger, one straight funnel 
amidships very close to bridge, two masts with foremast abaft well deck with 
seaplane derrick one set of Samson posts immediately before bridge, Maier form 
bow, cruiser stern, one seaplane. 

Probably MARVIK, Norwegian MARKINGS, 6000 tons, one large funnel amidships 
close to bridge, narrow bridge to heavy mast, foremast well aft and single 
Samson post forward of foremast, one Samson post abaft mainmast, black hull, 

(Sheet 2, No. 2041 from Ft. Shafter, T. H.) 

white band, straight stem, counter stern, raised forecastle, high after deck 
house, one seaplane. 

In almost every attack of U boats on shipping a [sic] night it has 
subsequently transpired that light were being shown, it is believed darkening 
of merchant ships is improving but it is reported that light torches are 
sometimes used on upper decks.

                                                                  HERRON
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                               [Radiogram]

(RRR)
31-WTJ
                                                       JANUARY 4th 1941. 
                                                                  354 AM

From: Ft. Shafter, T. H.
To: G-2.
No. 2339, Jany 3rd.

Reurad 584 second January. Sagami Maru arrived Honolulu 21st December departed 
for Hilo 23rd December enroute to Lima Peru. 490 cases small arms ammunition, 
one pounder ammunition and fuses all destined for Peru. Now shown on manifest 
and discovered by U. S. Customs. Next boat Nita Maru due fourth January. This 
steamer and future ships will be watched report being made any further 
shipments this nature. Signed Marston.

                                                                 HERRON.




Page 170

                               EXHIBIT No. 6

                                CONFIDENTIAL

[1] Rec'd_G-2 Jan 29, 1942

                    HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR MILITARY INTELLIGENCE
                                      Fort Shafter, T. H., 31 Dec. 1941.

In reply refer to: 350.05 (G-2) 

Subject: Report on Internal Subversive Activities for the Month of 
         December 1941 

To:   Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department General Staff, War 
      Department, Washington, D. C. 

1. Reference paragraph 6a, CONFIDENTIAL letter, AG 350.05 (8-5-40) M-B-M, 
dated 17 August 1940, the following items are submitted: 

    HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT, INCLUDING ALL POSTS, FIELDS, AND DISTRICTS
               Period: 15 November 1941 to 15 December 1941

                      Individual and special cases

The abnormal conditions which have prevailed in this Department since 7 
December 1941 have made inadvisable, for the time being, continuing 
investigation of minor routine cases, other more pressing matters having been 
given priority. Only cases of more active character, such as have been listed 
in previous reports with an asterisk to denote their importance continue under 
active investigation at present. It is anticipated, however, that the summary 
for next month, January 1942, will be in its usual complete form. 

                           Situation summary

PROPAGANDA: Japanese radio broadcasts, presumably originating in Japan, give 
highly exaggerated accounts of Japanese success, together with violent anti-
American propaganda. No local stations are permitted to broadcast in Japanese 
(or in any other foreign language). Except for these broadcasts there has been 
no attempt at enemy propaganda. Gossip and loose talk among local residents of 
all nationalities, both service personnel and civilian, were common 
immediately after the raid of 7 December, but have subsided to a reasonable 
volume and are decreasing. No instance has been verified of deliberate 
spreading of rumors as enemy propaganda. 

SUSPICIOUS CASES almost without number have been reported and investigated, 
with results largely negative. Among service personnel, the unanimous report 
of all S-2's has been that even those individuals in the past most suspected 
of subversive tendencies have proved intensely loyal when put to the test of 
actual war conditions.

                     Estimate of the situation

[2] No attempt can be made in this summary to cover other than the internal 
situation, as only preliminary investigations have been made of most of the 
aliens in detention, and the labor of checking reports of alleged subversive 
actions continues, with little positive result, on a 24 hour daily basis. In 
general it may be said, however, that the morale of the civilian populace is 
very high, and that labor disputes and other disturbing factors have 
disappeared in the general effort to effect a united front. 

Within the various Army establishments morale is at the highest level. 
However, in anticipation of the probable "let-down" incident to the lessening 
of the initial excitement, the C. S. System is being completely reorganized 
and enlarged so as to cover effectively all of the newly arriving units as 
well as those already established in the Department.

                                             Kendall J. Fielder
                                             KENDALL J. FIELDER
                                                Lt. Colonel, G. S. C.
                                                   A. C. of S., G-2



Page 171

                              EXHIBIT NO. 7
                              CONFIDENTIAL
                               EXACT COPY
                               ACTION COPY

AG 380.3 (12-28-40) M 
From: Grunert, Manila, P. I.                          DECEMBER 28, 1940.
To:   TAG
*Prority* For G-2

Netherlands Consul sources: Japan attacks January 15 against Netherlands 
Indies with light Naval force and transports against New Guinea simultaneously 
with Naval force and transports against Java. Evaluation of plan high. 
Evaluation of date doubtful. 

United Press sources: Two German vessels have been outfitted Shanghai with 
Japan guns as raiders, three German vessels being outfitted at Tsingtao and 
two at Canton. All German vessels in Japan controlled ports are to be 
outfitted as raiders before January 16. Signed, O'Rear. 

                              EXHIBIT NO. 8
[1]                                                              RSU/tes
                     HEADQUARTERS THIRD CORPS AREA
                            UNITED STATES ARMY
                OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF G_2
         MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, PUBLIC RELATIONS, CIVIL DEFENSE
                                  SEVENTH FLOOR, STANDARD OIL BUILDING
                                  Baltimore, Maryland, December 18, 1941

In reply refer to File: III-7764

                                   SECRET

Subject: Reports of Rumors Concerning Japanese Attack on Hawaii.
        [Stamped:] Secret. Date 12/18/41. HQ. 3RD C. A.  Initial, PLT.
To:     Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
          War Department
          Washington, D. C.
Attention Lt. Col. W. A. Holbrook, Jr. 

1. This office is in receipt of a report, information of undetermined 
reliability, source usually reliable, which is quoted as follows: 

"Three weeks ago SENATOR GILLETT at Washington warned officials what was going 
to happen. Stated that Japan would declare war on United States Dec. 19. Also 
told of an attack on Hawaii. No attention paid to assertions and Dec. 9 held 
conference with some of the leading officials of New York City, State of New 
Jersey, Jersey City and two congressmen from Washington who flew back for this 
conference. Conference was for purpose of possibly setting up an individual 
Intelligence Unit because they are disgusted with the actions of G-2 in some 
cases and as far as O. N. I. is concerned they are so disgusted against this 
group that they do not know what to do about it. At Washington Dec. 9, one of 
the highest officials of the British Government got in communication with the 
same country's officials at New York and in substance here is the story_ the 
Japanese Business Group at Honolulu had invited practically all the officers 
at Pearl Harbor to a big celebration and dinner on Saturday evening. A vast 
number of the Naval officers were reported to have been so drunk that they had 
to be taken to their quarters. He also stated that the damages suffered by the 
United States Government at Honolulu and on the sea were far greater than the 
total damages that England suffered the first year of the war on the sea. Am 
positive that SENATOR GILLETT has received a lot of his information from WYTHE 
WILLIAMS, who has retired from the air and is now preparing several books. 
Remember that WILLIAMS is a pal and confident of ATTORNEY GENERAL BIDDLE and 
still the F. B. I. is reported to be afraid of WILLIAMS and the material that 
he sends out. WILLIAMS is smart. He has a staff here in New York that



Page 172

includes the ex-Chief of Police of Berlin (Note, G-2 III C. A.: Believed to be 
one GRZYSINSKI, who has lectured against Nazism in New York) and other good 
men." Destroyed by 84 Dec. 29, 1941. 

2. However much or little truth there may be in this report, the possibility 
is not overlooked by this office that there may be an attempt to make 
political capital at the expense of military and naval morale. 

3. No other distribution of this report whatsoever has been or will be made 
from this office. No action is contemplated except at the request of the War 
Department. 

4. The original report, quoted above, was dated December 10th. The 
capitalization of names of persons was done by this office. The source was a 
Pittsburgh source which has been discussed with General Miles. 

                                                Philip L. Thurber,
                                                PHILIP L. THURBER,
                                                   Colonel G. S. C. 
                                                      A. C. of S., G-2.

                              EXHIBIT No. 9
                                 SECRET

This message was addressed to CG., Hawaii, and relayed to War Dept. by signals 
Hawaii with request for decipherment and repeat to them. This message also 
contained a request that Honolulu repeat it to War Dept. CS WDMC Will 
paraphrase and repeat back to Honolulu 

                                                       /S/ B. F. SMITH
                                                       Code Section WDMC
12-8-41

                             EXHIBIT No. 10
                                SECRET

                                                                   0-4-C

Exact copy of radiogram received at the War Department Message Center, Room 
3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C. 

                                                       DECEMBER 7, L84L.
                                                              7:58 P. M.

P 23 WT J
From: Melbourne, Australia, via Honolulu,
To: War Department & C. G. Hawaiian Department

Number 24. DECEMBER 6th. 

Based on Dutch intelligence report unconfirmed here of Naval movements from 
Pelau objective Manado and or Ambon, Dutch ordered execution plan A-2 and 
suggested RAAF reciprocal movement be directed Laha Ambon and Keopang. So 
ordered pm yesterday including flight Catalina to Rabaul task reconnaissance 
Buka and northwest passage Australian army reinforcements Ambon Beopang 
subject to request Dutch East Indies. This message held 17 hours by .... 
government eight am Dutch reported advancing planes to be on Keopang not now 
considered necessary. Eleven am chief of air corps desired proceed with all 
aircraft forward movements Manila informed. 

                                                             MERLESMITH.



Page 173

                              EXHIBIT No. 11
                              CONFIDENTIAL

                                            WAR DEPARTMENT
                                      WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
                                      MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION G-2

                                           Washington, December 6, 1941.
                                                                  G-2/CI
                                                                  JFP

Memorandum for Colonel Holbrook: 

Word has just been received from O. N. I. by telephone to the effect that the 
Japanese Embassy, in Washington, D. C., was reliably reported to have burned 
its Code Book and Ciphers last night.
                              
                                                         James F. Perry,
                                                         JAMES F. PERRY,
                                         1st Lt., Military Intelligence,
                                                  Evaluation Subsection. 

                          ENGINEERING DEPARTMENT
                              FIELD DIVISION
                 National Defense Operations Section

To: G. E. Sterling, Chief.                                 Date: 12/4

[Hand written:] Major Guest foned [sic] 12/4 that Msg from Carter should go to 
Lt. Col. C. C. Dusenbury, Phone War Dept. 2054.  Home Tel. Glebe 1129.
D. C. & Laurel advised.

Route in Order Indicated:

  Chief Engineer  _____                    Mr. Webster    _____
  Mr. Terrell     _____                    Mr. Cruse      _____
  Secretary       _____                    Mr. Turner     _____
  Mr. Reynolds    _____                    Mr. Mason      _____
  Mr. Cureton     _____                    Mr. Loucks     _____
  Mr. Ring        _____                    Miss Wiltshire _____

Remarks:
[Hand written:] Until Saturday night. 

Group one is east wind rain group two is north wind "X" cloudy and group three 
is west wind. Clear stop groups repeated twice in middle and at end of 
broadcast. 

                             EXHIBIT No. 12
                                                           Dec. 4, 1941.

Mr. STERLING: Received following from Carter at 8.12 p. m.: 
Remarks: First type of program received since Nov. 28th, 4-5 hours spent 
monitoring. Sounds like regular weather reports. 

About 2200 GMT 12/4/41 JVW3: 

Tokyo today north wind slightly stronger may become cloudy tonight tomorrow 
slightly cloudy and fine weather.

Kanagawa prefecture today north wind cloudy from afternoon more clouds. 

Chiba prefecture today north wind clear may become slightly cloudy ocean 
surface calm. 

(End of program followed by music)
                                                                      DE



Page 174

                                                           Dec. 5, 1941. 

Mr. STERLING: At 7.45 p. m. Mr. Carter called in from Portland with the 
following information:

JVW3 2130G

Today north wind morning cloudy afternoon clear begin cloudy evening. Tomorrow 
north wind and later from south.

(The above was repeated three times)

JWV3 sent a time signal at 2200G and then; 

I will now give you the weather report (nothing further, carrier on but no 
modulation_evidently cutoff in Tokyo)

Remarks by Carter:

They are getting a more compete picture of the operations now and it is 
evident that at 2130G the Tokyo weather is transmitted and at 2200G the Tokyo 
weather and weather for other prefectures. Reception is getting better and 
estimate efficiency on this assignment has increased approximately twenty-five 
percent.

                                FINI

Foned [sic] Col. Bratton and gave him the message at 7.50 p. m. 

Remarks by Col. Bratton: 

Results still negative but am pleased to receive the negative results as it 
means that we have that much more time. The information desired will occur in 
the middle of a program and possibly will be repeated at frequent intervals. 
(Asked Col Bratton if I should communicate the information to Portland_
concerning the fact that the desired data will be in the middle of a program.) 
No. I will have a conference with Lt. Col. Dusenburg [sic] in the morning and 
will contact Mr. Sterling in that regard. 

                                FINI
                                                                     DE

                [Exact copy-action copy_radiogram]

AG 580.81 (12-1-41) MC                                       EHB/sm_1712

15 WTJ                                                             0-4-C
1/1130P

Received at the War Department Message Center, Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., 
Washington, D. C., December 4, 1941, 411 p. M. 

From: Manila, P. I. 
To: Adjutant General

No. 1046 First

Replying your radio of November twenty eight and your radio six four seven on 
same subject all practical steps within the limits of the facilities of this 
command are being taken to protect all air and ground installations.
                                                               MACARTHUR

[Copy]

                                                  Batavia
                                                  Dated December 4, 1941
                                                  Rec'd 9:19 a. m. 

Secretary of State, Washington. 

220, December 4, 10 a. m. 

War Department at Bandoeng claims intercepted and decoded following from 
Ministry Foreign Affairs Tokyo: 

"When crisis leading to worst arises following will be broadcast at end 
weather reports: one east wind rain war with United States, two north wind 
cloudy war with Russia, three west wind clear war with Britain including 
attack on Thailand or Malaya and Dutch Indies. If spoken twice burn codes and 
secret papers." 

Same re following from Japanese Ambassador Bangkok to Consul General Batavia:



Page 175

"When threat of crisis exists following will be used five times in texts of 
general reports and radio broadcasts: one Higashi east America, two Kita North 
Russia, three Nichi west Britain with advance into Thailand and attack on 
Malaya and Dutch Indies." 

Thorpe and Slawson cabled the above to War Department. I attach little or no 
importance to it and view it with some suspicion. Such have been common since 
1936. 

FOOTE. 

Groups one is east rain group two is north wind wind cloudy and group x three 
is west wind clear stop groups repeated twice in middle and at and of 
broadcast. 

                          ENGINEERING DEPARTMENT
                              FIELD DIVISION
                 National Defense Operations Section

To: G. E. Sterling, Chief.                                 Date: 12/4

[Hand written:] Major Guest foned [sic] 12/4 that Msg from Carter should go to 
Lt. Col. C. C. Dusenbury, Phone War Dept. 2054.  Home Tel. Glebe 1129.
D. C. & Laurel advised.

Route in Order Indicated:

  Chief Engineer  _____                    Mr. Webster    _____
  Mr. Terrell     _____                    Mr. Cruse      _____
  Secretary       _____                    Mr. Turner     _____
  Mr. Reynolds    _____                    Mr. Mason      _____
  Mr. Cureton     _____                    Mr. Loucks     _____
  Mr. Ring        _____                    Miss Wiltshire _____

Remarks:
[Hand written:] Until Saturday night. 

                                                           Dec. 4, 1941. 

Mr. STERLING: Received following from Carter at 8.12 p. m.:

Remarks: First type of program received since Nov. 28th, 4-5 hours spent 
monitoring. Sounds like regular weather reports. 

About 2200 GMT 12/4/41 JVW3: 

Tokyo today north wind slightly stronger may become cloudy tonight tomorrow 
slightly cloudy and fine weather. 

Kanagawa prefecture today north wind cloudy from afternoon more clouds. 

Chiba prefecture today north wind clear may become slightly cloudy ocean 
surface calm. 

(End of program followed by music.) 
                                                                      DE

                                                           DEC. 5. 1941.
Mr. STERLING: 

At 7.45 p. m. Mr. Carter called in from Portland with the following 
information: 

JVW3 2130G

Today north wind morning cloudy afternoon clear begin cloudy evening. Tomorrow 
north wind and later from south.

(The above was repeated three times.) 

JVW3 sent a time signal at 2200 G and then: 

I will now give you the weather report (nothing further, carrier on but no 
modulation_evidently cutoff in Tokyo) 



Page 176

Remarks by Carter: 

They are getting a more complete picture of the operations now and it is 
evident that at 2130G the Tokyo weather is transmitted and at 2200G the Tokyo 
weather and weather for other prefectures. Reception is getting better and 
estimate efficiency on this assignment has increased approximately twenty-five 
percent.

                                 FINI

Foned [sic] Col. Bratton and gave him the message at 7.50 p. m.
Remarks by Col. Bratton: 

Results still negative but am pleased to receive the negative results as it 
means that we have that much more time. The information desired will occur in 
the middle of a program and possibly will be repeated at frequent intervals. 
(Asked Col. Bratton if I should communicate the information to Portland_
concerning the fact that the desired data will be in the middle of a program.) 
No. I will have a conference with Lt. Col. Dusenburg [sic] in the morning and 
will contact Mr. Sterling in that regard.

                                 FINI
                                                                      DE

                                                  For action OPNAV RRRRR
From ALUSNA Batavia
Date: 5 DEC 1941
Decoded by Kalaidjian
Paraphrased by Purdy

                            031030  CR0222

From Thorpe for Miles War Dept. Code intercept: Japan will notify her consuls 
of war decision in her foreign broadcasts as weather report at end. East wind 
rain United States; north wind cloudy Russia; west wind clear England with 
attack on Thailand Malay and Dutch East Indies. Will be repeated twice or may 
use compass directions only. In this case words will be introduced five times 
in general text.

Distribution:

War Dept. _________ ACTION. FILES: CNO _____ 20OP _______ 20A ________
Record Copy: ________ 20G _____X Show OPDO ______ 

                             EXHIBIT No. 13

                              CONFIDENTIAL
                         MILITARY INTELLIGENCE
                               I. B. 159

BRIEF PERIODIC ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION, DECEMBER 1, 1941_MARCH 31, 1942

Record Section

                                                                    G2/1
                                                                     TJB

[1] I. B. 159 NOVEMBER 29, 1941.
Memorandum for the Chief of Staff: 
Subject: Brief Periodic Estimate of the Situation, December 1, 1941-
         March 31, 1942. 

I. General. 

1. This estimate is addressed to the objective of Nazi defeat. Its purpose is 
to examine the factors of strength and weakness and of strategic positions of 
the Nazis and of their opponents, in order to present the military 
possibilities and probabilities during the period December 1, 1941 to March 
31, 1942. 

2. a. During that period Germany, though weakened by her losses in Russia, 
will remain the only power capable of launching large scale strategic 
offensives. Her success in Russia and the advent of winter make disposable a 
larger portion of German land and air power than at any time since the 
beginning of the Russo-German war. On the other hand, the price she has had to 
pay for her Russian success and the width of the wasted zone behind her 
Eastern Front indicate that



Page 177

considerable period of time would be required for the reorganization and 
disposition of her major forces. The German conduct of war, so far, has been 
characterized by a thoroughness and deliberation in this regard. Between the 
end of one campaign and the launching of the next there have been considerable 
periods of time. In the present case if Germany should decide to shift the 
theater of war, all indications point to an even greater necessity for a 
considerable time lag than has so far existed between her successive 
campaigns. Large scale German strategic offensives are therefore not to be 
expected outside of the Russian theater within the period under consideration. 
It is much more probable that Germany will continue her attack on Russia, 
particularly in the Ukraine and the North Caucasus plain between the Azov and 
Caspian Seas during the winter and early spring. 

[2] b. Japan also has the strategic initiative, but to a much more limited 
degree than is the case with Germany. Japan, already extended militarily, has 
a multiplicity of strategic objectives; but for a variety of reasons, she 
cannot concentrate the required forces to attack any of them on a large scale 
and with assurance of success. A possible exception to the latter statement 
lies in the contingency of a serious depletion of Russian forces in eastern 
Siberia. But even in this case, a large scale Japanese strategic offensive 
against Siberia during the period in question is somewhat doubtful in the 
light of present politico-military situation and of the rigorous winter 
climate in that region. 

c. Great Britain is pressing a limited strategic offensive in Libya and has 
taken the aerial offensive over Western Europe. She, too, is extended 
militarily and more extensive ground and aerial action is beyond her means. 

d. All other belligerent or potentially belligerent powers must be considered 
incapable of large scale strategic offensives during the period in question. 
The United States, committed to the defeat of Nazi Germany, is an increasingly 
important element in the situation. Our influence is exerted in naval and 
aerial participation in the Battle of the Atlantic, in the supply of material 
and technical assistance to the four land theaters and in psychological, 
economic and political action against the Axis throughout the world. But all 
this does not sum up to a large scale strategical offensive. We have only a 
means of strategical maneuver our ability to make available more or less 
material and technical facilities and in their allocation to those theaters 
where they will be most advantageously employed. 

e. Neither the economic nor the psychologic [sic] situation in Germany 
indicates any possibility of weakening the Nazi power to a critical extent 
during the period in question. 

f. From the above it must be concluded that, during the period in question: 

(1) Neither the anti-Axis nor the Axis powers can force a decision. 

(2) The anti-Axis powers will have a period of at least four months in which 
they may strengthen their position in one or more of the four important 
theaters of war, and in which they may decide upon a regrouping of forces, 
subject to certain physical limitations, consonant with their chosen long 
range strategy for the defeat of the Nazis. 

[3] II. Brief Estimate on the Theaters of War. 

1. The British Isles. This theater is the citadel of the Anti-Axis Powers. Its 
security is, therefore, so essential to Nazi defeat that it must be held. The 
ground, sea and aerial defenses of the islands have been and are being 
materially strengthened. 

For reasons given previously, it is not believed that Germany will be in a 
position to attempt an invasion of the islands during the period in question. 
It is probable that an invasion, if attempted, will be delayed until mid-
summer of 1942. An attempt made at that time will probably be unsuccessful. As 
for the present, after a short delay of reorganization and transfer, Germany 
can launch large-scale air attacks on the United Kingdom at any time that she 
is willing to move the necessary forces from the Russian front. In view of 
improved British defenses and of the weakening of the German Air Force, 
however, it is estimated that in the period in question such attacks cannot 
reach the intensities of those of the winter of 1940-41. 

From this theater the only British offensive capability lies in the air. It is 
to be expected that strategic bombing of Germany and the occupied territories 
will continue; but that this action will be indecisive. 

Material aid from the United States has been an essential element in the 
resistance and survival of the British Isles. Continuance of this aid is still 
essential. It is, fortunately, the easiest of all the land theaters for us to 
aid. 




Page 178

2. The Atlantic. The Battle of the Atlantic is essentially a struggle for the 
sealanes radiating from the United Kingdom, this conflict is now trending 
against Germany. Sinkings by the Axis are decreasing and ship construction in 
Britain and the United States is increasing. It is now probable that 
replacements have overtaken losses. Figures on ship and tonnage losses during 
1941 are as follows: 

                                   Losses (British, Allied, and Neutral)
                                         Total        Monthly Average
                                   Ships    Tonnage    Ships   Tonnage
January 1 to June 30 (6 months)      628   2,755,242     105   459,207
June 30 to Nov. 15 (4 1/2 months)    284   1,000,900      63   222,442

[4] During October over 4,200,000 tons of goods were imported into the United 
Kingdom, as compared with a monthly average for the year of approximately 
2,500,000. The October imports were received after the United States Navy 
began convoy duty in the Atlantic. As the weight of the United States Navy 
continues to increase, success in the Battle of the Atlantic should be 
assured. 

Since Germany's means of attack (surface raiders, long-range planes and 
submarines) are of limited use in other theaters, it is to be expected that 
she will continue the offensive in this theater, regardless of results or of 
operations elsewhere. 

The United States is contributing powerfully to the decision in the Battle of 
the Atlantic by direct naval action and by the building of cargo vessels. 
Continuance of this action is essential to the defeat of Germany. 

3. Eastern Theater. By a series of relentless offensives Germany has occupied 
vast stretches of terrain, including many of Russia's industrial regions and 
has inflicted grave casualties on the Red Army. But Germany has suffered great 
losses in men and material, and has not yet attained her basic objectives of 
destroying the Russian armies and the Stalin regime. While Germany could 
transfer her principal military effort to other theaters this winter, it is 
estimated that she will continue to concentrate on the attack on Russia. 
Specifically she will:

Seek to destroy the mass of the Russian armies. 
Continue the siege of Leningrad. 
Attempt to cut the Russian supply lines to Archangel and Murmansk.
Seek to seize the general line of the Volga. 
Attempt to overrun the Caucasus, thus obtaining oil and securing a 
  jump-off position for an eventual advance into the Middle East. 

The most serious German threat is southeastwards to the Caucasus, and her goal 
is oil. Axis forces are extending eastward north of Rostov toward the Don. 
They may capture Stalingrad and gain control of the Volga south to its mouth 
at Astrakhan. Russian defense of the North Caucasus will probably eventually 
fail, after substantially delaying the Axis advance. With sufficiently 
determined and prompt allied aid, the Germans may be kept from occupation of 
the Trans-Caucasus and control of the Baku oil fields. 

[5] The U. S. S. R. is weaker, relative to Germany, than at the outset of 
hostilities. Her political structure has remained stable and her armies, while 
depleted, have not been irreparably defeated. Russia is favored by the 
following: The extreme cold of winter is a deterrent to operations, and 
Russian training and technique in severe winter weather is considered better 
than that of the invaders. While the Soviet situation is critical, ready 
availability of manpower resources is in Russian favor. Defense industry is in 
operation at approximately 60% of pre-war volume. British and American 
material assistance is being received; increased and continuing allied 
assistance is urgently required. 

The following considerations are unfavorable to the U. S. S. R.: The 
uncertainty of the Far Eastern situation causes concentration of efficient 
Soviet troops along the Manchukuo frontier, not available for use in the 
western theater. The Soviet Army has shortages in tanks, all weapons, probably 
in all ammunition. The shortage in tanks is especially serious; that in small 
arms and small arms ammunition is less marked than in other weapons. The means 
of supply from the outside world are difficult and precarious. To date no 
British operation elsewhere


Page 179

has been sufficiently strong to cause any withdrawal of German troops from 
Russia. 

Aside from surrender, which seems unlikely, Russia's only feasible line of 
action is to resist stubbornly in the hope that attrition, climate and 
lengthened communications will eventually bring her assailants to a 
standstill. By the spring of 1942 it is estimated that organized but depleted 
Russian armies will stand behind the Volga and perhaps even as far west as 
Moscow. It is also probable that Russian forces will hold the Caucasus 
mountains and Trans-Caucasia. 

With her industry dislocated, Russia is in extreme need of material assistance 
from abroad. She requires raw materials, machine tools and munitions. 
Unfortunately, the avenues of entry are vulnerable, limited in capacity and 
very awkwardly located. Aid to Russia has been planned on the basis of a total 
import capacity of 500,000 tons per month. It is by no means certain that this 
figure will be reached. Russian requirements can only be met by the United 
States and Great Britain. This relatively small contribution at the crisis of 
the Russo-German war appears to be the total material means available to the 
Democracies to influence the struggle within this theater. 

4. Middle Eastern Theater. In this theater, extending from Libya to the 
Caspian, only the western segment is active. In Libya the British are engaged 
in an offensive the issue of which is still in doubt Farther to the east, 
Syria Iraq and Iran are shielded from the war for the time being by neutral 
Turkey and by the Russian forces in the Caucasus. 

[6] Because of the Russian campaign and certain great logistic difficulties, 
there is practically no danger of an Axis major offensive in this theater, 
from the north, before the spring of 1942. Even a British defeat in their 
current Libyan operations would so exhaust the Axis forces in North Africa as 
to free Alexandria and Suez from the threat of a thrust from the west. A 
British victory in Libya would probably force German entry into Tunisia and 
their occupation of Algiers and Morocco. But such an eventuality would be more 
apt to delay than to hasten an all-out German offensive, from the west and the 
north, against the Middle East Theater. 

Even if successful in their current Libyan offensive, it is not believed that 
the British will be able to advance through Tripolitania without a 
considerable delay for reorganization. It is therefore probable that from the 
British point of view this theater will shortly become a defensive one, with a 
minimum of several months available for the completion of its organization. 

In the eastern sector of this theater (the Levant, Iraq and Iran), the British 
are gradually building a substantial force to meet any Axis threat to the area 
through Turkey or the Caucasus Mountains. In the Levant, there are three 
Australian divisions with other troops, and General Wavell told our Military 
Observer in Iran that he expected to have at least ten divisions in Northern 
Iraq by March of 1942. 

The United States is committed to providing great masses of material to the 
Middle East, and is undertaking vast construction projects to facilitate 
supply. Except the British Isles, the Middle East is the most accessible of 
the important active theaters to us, and our lines of supply to it, though 
long, are the least vulnerable. We are building up an influence on British 
military policy in the Middle East. Further American commitments, including 
probably the eventual employment of our armed forces, will be necessary in 
this region. 

5. The Far Eastern Theater. Here the initiative rests with Japan in spite of 
her military over-extension. She has the following lines of action open to 
her: 

a. Attack Siberia. 

b. Attack Yunnan Province to cut the Burma Road with a view to an early end to 
the war with China. 

[7] c. occupy Thailand. 

d. Through Thailand, attack (1) Burma and the Burma Road (2) Malaya. 

e. Attack the Philippines and Hong Kong, preparatory to a movement on 
Singapore or the Netherlands East Indies. 

f. Contain or isolate the Philippines and Hong Kong and
  (1) Attack Singapore
     (a) directly, by sea;
     (b) by sea in conjunction with a land attack through Thailand
         and Malaya.
  (2) Attack the Netherlands East Indies




Page 180

g. Bide her time wait for a better opportunity to pursue any of the above 
lines of action, hoping that the course of events will turn in her favor. 

h. Seek a general settlement through American mediation, including an 
understanding with the United States and Great Britain as to political and 
economic penetration of southeast Asia and the southwestern Pacific. 

i. Reorient her whole foreign policy by withdrawing from the Axis. 

(h) and (i) are impossible, short of a complete overthrow of her governing 
forces. 

The most probable line of action for Japan is the occupation of Thailand. 

The forces of all other countries in the Far East are on the defensive before 
Japan. The British Commonwealth, the Netherlands East Indies and the United 
States are in consultative association for the defense of Malaysia. To date 
this association has been effective in slowing down the Japanese penetration 
to the southwest. China is containing the equivalent of 30 Japanese divisions. 
The U. S. S. R., hard pressed for troops in European Russia, has reduced her 
Siberian garrisons to what she estimates to be the minimum necessary to deter 
Japan from attacking to the north. So far she has been successful in this 
effort.

China, aided and encouraged by America, will remain in the war against Japan 
and will continue to contain important [8] Japanese forces. The effective use 
of China's unlimited manpower, as an anti-Axis potential, depends entirely on 
the extent to which she is able to equip it, particularly in artillery and 
aviation. For this, she is entirely dependent upon the United States. The 
stronger the Chinese become, the more Japanese troops will be pinned down in 
China, thereby releasing further Russian strength for use against Hitler. 

Although China is receiving an increasing amount of equipment from this 
country, a major offensive by the Chinese cannot be expected during the period 
ending March 31, 1942. 

The British Imperial forces in Malaysia and at Hong Kong occupy a purely 
defensive role. The forces in Malaya have recently been re-enforced by 
additional troops from Australia, New Zealand (air), and India, while those in 
Hong Kong have been augmented by the arrival of Canadian levies. Both of these 
localities present a very strong defense against any possible Japanese attack. 

The people and government of the Netherlands East Indies have continued, 
affirmatively and constructively, to function practically as a sovereign 
state, loyal to the mother country. As evidence of Dutch spirit, they (a) have 
reorganized their army, (b) are actively at work manufacturing needed army 
equipment, (c) are actively training reserves, (d) have expanded their system 
of air fields throughout the islands, (e) have cooperated with the British and 
United States governments in preparation of extensive plans for defense, (f) 
have refused to renew their commercial treaty with Japan, (g) have delivered 
to Japan only 10,000 tons of oil since January 1, 1941_said delivery having 
been on an old contract still in force. 

In the Far East the United States is concerned as a possible belligerent and 
also as a prime source of war materials for China, the British Commonwealth 
and for the Netherlands East Indies. We are in process of sending a few 
military airplanes to Thailand. But this theater will be a secondary one from 
the point of view of supply. Under all circumstances we will continue to be 
able to supply Australasia, the Dutch East Indies, and probably also China, 
though somewhat precariously, through the Burma Road. Siberia will become 
completely cut off if Japan attacks Russia. 

Our influence in the Fast Eastern Theater lies in the threat of our naval 
power and the effort of our economic blockade. Both are primary deterrents 
against Japanese all-out entry in the war as an Axis partner. If we become 
involved in war with Japan we could launch a serious offensive against her by 
Naval and Air forces. But such an attack would fall short of a major strategic 
offensive because it could not be decisive within [9] a reasonable time and 
still more, because it would be a diversion of forces away from rather than 
toward our objective, the defeat of the Nazis.

[10] III. Morale.

The outstanding feature of the war in 1941 has been the rise in anti-Axis and 
the decline in Axis morale. 

The anti-Axis powers have been heartened by the Failure of the German air 
attack on Britain, the decreased German success in the Atlantic, the continued 
resistance in the Middle and Far Eastern theaters, the drain on Germany of the 
Russian Campaign and of her conquered territories, and probably most of all, 



Page 181

by the continued progress of America from neutrality towards participation in 
the war.

Even more notable has been the decline in Axis morale. In Italy and Japan the 
reasons are obvious. Both are weary of unsuccessful war and economically 
distressed. But Germany presents a true paradox. Here is a warrior nation 
which has made colossal sacrifices to build war power and has had 
unprecedented success in war_and yet is wholly apathetic. No enthusiasm 
prevails, only the desire to see it all end. 

In any given period, a nation at war generally finds itself in one of three 
military situations. To each of these situations there should be a 
corresponding moral reaction. These situations and reactions are: 

Military Situation                      Moral Reaction

1. Superiority of strength.          1. The elan of victory_fighting
Possession of initiative.            with confidence of success. 
Unbroken success.

2. Approximate equality in strength. 2. The grim struggle_fighting to
Initiative doubtful.                 gain success.
Ultimate success still in balance.

3. Inferiority in strength.          3. Their "back to the wall"_
Strategic initiative lost.           fighting prevent defeat. 
Ultimate success doubtful. 

Perhaps the most fundamental fact in the war situation today is that Germany 
is, and has continuously been in military situation Number 1, while the moral 
reaction of her people is, and has been for some time rather lower that number 
2. 

The morale factor in the war will be affected by the out [11] come, probably 
within the next month, of the operations in Russia and in Libya, and by 
Japan's decision. But there is no reason to believe that the trend of 1941 in 
German morale will be reversed or even materially reduced in the period under 
discussion.

In this factor lies the germ of Nazi defeat.

                                   SHERMAN MILES,
                                   Brigadier General, U. S. Army, 
                                   Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

Distribution:
   The President
   Secretary of War 
   Secretary of State
   Under Secretary of War
   Assistant Secretary of War
   Assistant Secretary of War for Air
   The Chief of Staff 
   Chief of the Army Air Forces
   Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1
   Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3
   Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4
   Assistant Chief of Staff, W. P. D.
   G. H. Q.
   Chief of the Air Corps
   Director of Naval Intelligence
   Coordinator of Information
   General Embick.
   Record Section
   I. B. File
   dya

[Hand written:] Copies checked in red delivered by an officer_other copies 
sent out by Miss Finch & Miss Carrick. 



Page 182

                             EXHIBIT No. 14
                                 Secret
 [Paraphrase of a SECRET RADIOGRAM]
                                                                   G2/CI
                                                                   FMH
Received at the War Department, November 29, 1941.
From: Fort Shafter, November 29, 1941. No. 986.
To: TAG 

With reference to protection of vital installations outside of Military 
reservations such as highway bridges, telephone exchanges, and power plants 
this headquarters by confidential letter of 19 June, 1941 asked the Governor 
of the territory to use the authority given him by the Organic Act Section 67 
which provides that the Governor may call upon the Naval and Military Force 
Commanders of the United States in the Hawaiian Territory to suppress or 
prevent invasion, lawless violence, insurrection, etc. In accordance with the 
above stated Authority on 20 June 1941 the Governor made a confidential formal 
demand in writing on this headquarters to supply and to keep on furnishing 
such suitable protection as may be required in order to prevent sabotage, and 
violence of a lawless nature in connection therewith, being done in the 
territory against vital structures and installations. Suitable military 
protection in accordance with the above request is now being given important 
civilian installations and structures. Upon the suggestion of this 
headquarters, in connection with the above, the county and city of Honolulu 
enacted, an ordnance on 30 June 1941 permitting the Hawaiian Dept. Commanding 
General to restrict the use of and travel upon or to close within the county 
or city of Honolulu any road whenever such action is necessary in the interest 
of National Defense. No exercise of the authority thus given has yet been 
necessary. Cordial relations exist and have been maintained and mutual 
cooperation has been given on all pertinent matters which involve the FBI and 
all other Federal and Territorial Officials. 

In regard to the secret radiogram of your office numbered 482 dated November 
28, 1941, within the scope of investigative responsibility of the War 
Department (Paragraph No. 3 MID SC 30-45) and Military establishments which 
include equipment and personnel, full precautions against activities of a 
subversive nature are being taken. 

                                                                  SHORT. 
                               EXHIBIT No. 15
                                   SECRET
                                   (Copy)
WPD 4544-13                                           NOVEMBER 27, 1941. 

Memorandum for The Adjutant General (through Secretary, General Staff): 
Subject: Far Eastern Situation. 

The Secretary of War directs that the following secret, first priority, 
message be dispatched by cable, radio or telegraph (whichever method is the 
most secure from the viewpoint of secrecy) to each of the following: 

Commanding General, Hawaiian Department
Commanding General, Caribbean Defense Command

Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with 
only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and 
offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action 
possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot, be avoided, the 
United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy 
should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action 
that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action you are 
directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem 
necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not, repeat not to 
alarm civil population or disclose intent. Report measures taken. Should 
hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow Five so far 
as they pertain



Page 183

to Japan. Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum 
essential officers.

                                                 L. T. Gerow,
                                               Brigadier General
                                        Acting Assistant Chief of Staff. 

                             EXHIBIT No. 16
PRIORITY_
From: War Department,
Bureau: G-2  sm/mis

                                            T. E. Roderick
                                            T. E. RODERICK
                                            Lt. Colonel, G. S. C.
                                            Asst. Executive Officer, G-2

                                TELEGRAM
                   OFFICIAL BUSINESS_GOVERNMENT RATES

                                                      NOVEMBER 27, 1941.
All Corps Areas
Caribbean Defense
Command Hawaiian Department

Japanese negotiations have come to practical stalemate stop Hostilities may 
ensue stop Subversive activities may be expected stop Inform commanding 
general and chief of staff only end

                                                                  MILES.
Sent no. 473 to Hawaii, 11/27
Sent no. 562 to Panama, 11/27
Sent no. 66 to 1st. CA, 11/27
I certify that this message is on official business and necessary for the 
public service.

                                            T. E. Roderick
                                            T. E. RODERICK
                                            Lt. Colonel, G. S. C.
                                            Asst. Executive Officer, G-2

Sent no. 191 to 2nd CA, 11/27
Sent no.  48 to 3rd CA, 11/27
Sent no.  72 to 4th CA, 11/27
Sent no.  49 to 5th CA, 11/27
Sent no.  54 to 6th CA, 11/27
Sent no.  45 to 7th CA, 11/27
Sent no.  75 to 8th CA, 11/27
Sent no. 367 to 9th CA, 11/27

                                                 RALPH C. SMITH
                                                 Colonel, General Staff,
                                                 Executive Officer, G-2.

Cable recorded in M. L. D.
Exact Copy made for Gen. Miles 1-28-42.  380.

                               EXHIBIT No. 17
                                [Paraphrase]
                                                                     G-2
                                                                   SM/td
                                                      NOVEMBER 27, 1941. 
G-2's All Corps Areas
      Caribbean Defense Command
      Hawaiian Department.

Advise only the commanding officer and the chief of staff that it appears that 
the conference with the Japanese has ended in an apparent deadlock stop Acts 
of sabotage and espionage probable stop Also possible that hostilities may 
begin stop

                                                                   MILES



Page 184
                            [PRIORITY_SECRET]
                                                   Drafting Section: G-2
                                                   Drafting Officer: SM 
                                                   G-2 File Number: 

               [Paraphrase of an outgoing Secret Cablegram]

                                             #66 Sent out Nov. 27, 1941.
                                                Date: November 27, 1941.

To: All Corps Areas, Caribbean Defense Command, and Hawaiian Department, First 
Corps Area 

Advise only the commanding officer and the chief of staff that it appears that 
the conference with the Japanese has ended in an apparent deadlock stop Acts 
of sabotage and espionage probable stop Also possible that hostilities may 
begin stop 

                                                                  MILES. 

 #66 to 1st CA
 191 to 2nd CA
  48 to 3rd CA
  72 to 4th CA
  49 to 5th CA
  54 to 6th CA
  45 to 7th CA
  75 to 8th CA
 367 to 9th CA
#473 to Hawaii
 562 to Panama 

                             EXHIBIT No. 18
                                 SECRET
                              [Radiogram]
(RRR)
56-WTJ
                                                      November 14, 1940.
                                                                  312 AM
From: Manila, P. I.
To: The Adjustment [sic] General.
November 14th,
For G-2

Following received reliable sources "Reliably reported Japanese evacuating 
troops and air forces middle Yantze [sic] including Hangkow. Washington report 
states concentration transports Haiphong Taipong and Formosa." Taiping 
referred to probably on Pearl River. Informant believes this presages 
initiation new plans and not result Chinese pressure. Signed O'Rear. 

                                                                GRUNERT. 

                              EXHIBIT No. 19
                               CONFIDENTIAL
                                                                     CIB
                                                    Maj. David G. Erskin

No. 381 sent Nov. 12, 1941.
To: G-2, Hawaiian Department. 

Requests you be prepared to check with FBI and render them every assistance 
FBI field office Honolulu is being advised to check with MID and ONI 
concerning custodial detention list in order to ascertain that all points are 
covered. 

                                                                  MILES. 



Page 185

                             EXHIBIT NO. 20
                                 SECRET
83 WTJ                                                             O-4-C 
616-P
                               [RADIOGRAM]
                                                       OCTOBER 29, 1941.
                                                                  731 AM
From: Manila, P. I.
To: MILID
No. 700, October 28th. 

Three Japanese aircraft carriers including one latest type comma two armed 
merchant vessels of unknown size suitable for transports and one aircraft 
tender are now at Takao Formosa. Commander in chief combined naval and air 
forces has been ordered to Takao G-2. Comment report concerning commander in 
chief may signify beginning of assembling of an expeditionary force. 

                              EXHIBIT NO. 21
                               CONFIDENTIAL

                                     WAR DEPARTMENT,
                                     WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF,
                                     MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION G_2,
                                     Washington, October 28, 1941. 

                 INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM THE ORIENT

                                                  Dated August 26, 1941.

1. "Mr. HIROTA, a presiding officer at directors' meeting of the Black Dragon 
Society, told of an order issued by War Minister TOJO (now premier) "to 
complete full preparation to meet any emergency with United States in the 
Pacific. All guns to be mounted in the islands of the Pacific under Japanese 
mandate. The full preparation to be completed in November." 

2. HIROTA and others are said to have stated: "War with United States would 
best begin in December or in February." 

3. "Very soon," they say, "the Cabinet will be changed. The new Cabinet would 
likely start war within sixty days." 
                                                                   S. C.
[Handwritten:] 
Summary of Inf. 11/3/41 
Distribution: 
   All C. A.'s F. B. I.
   All Dept.'s O. N. I.
   Alaska State
   File
   P.M. S. 

                            EXHIBIT NO. 22
                                SECRET
                                [Radio]

R. A. Oct. 27, 1941
4 WTJ 
4 WTJ 
                                                          Oct. 27, 1941.
                                                                 1055 PM

From: Manila, Philippine Islands.
To: Milid, Washington.
54 Twenty Seventh. 

General southward movement of Japanese shipping in western Pacific is reported 
by British sources two aircraft carriers have been operating among 



Page 186

mandated islands, of which Kaga repeat Kaga still present following planes 
reported based there: Palau repeat Palau, eight flying boats, Saipan repeat 
Saipan eight fighters, six heavy bombers; Truk repeat Truk, six fighters, six 
heavy bombers: Jalu repeat Jalu, eight flying boats, twelve flight planes; 
Wotje repeat Wotje, eight flying boats. 

                                                                  BRINK. 

                             CONFIDENTIAL
                             [Radiogram]
LAS
3 WTJ
518P
                                                          JULY 28, 1941.
                                                                10:36 PM
From: Manila
To: Milid
No. 1485, July 26th. 

British intelligence Singapore reports existence in Middle East of enemy 
connected organization there for supply of semiannual passports to so called 
refugees paren potential fifth columnists paren enroute from Middle East to 
South American stop One identified member of this organization Schwarzstein 
reported now enroute Far East stop Information suggests all passports for 
South and Central American countries issued nationals of occupied territories 
be regarded with suspicion stop Uncertain extent South and Central American 
governments may be involved. 

                                                                 O'REAR. 
                             CONFIDENTIAL
                             [Radiogram]
LAS
30 WTJ
715P
                                                          JULY 27, 1941.
                                                                 6:20 AM
From: Tokyo
To: Milid
No. 505, July 26th. 

Mobilization mentioned in my radio 498 and 500 still going on under conditions 
extreme secrecy involving restrictions all kinds on movements additional 
foreigners to the Continent also foreigners restricted as far south as Formosa 
and as far north as Korea and Manchukuo. Size of mobilization cannot be 
estimated but it is one of the largest single drafts since initial 
mobilization for China war. Some reports of troop movements away from Japan 
but nothing available to number preponderance moving in any single direction.

                                                                CRESWELL
                                SECRET
                              [Radiogram]
LAS
29 WTJ
8P
                                                          JULY 27, 1941.
                                                                 6:20 AM
From: Tokyo
To: Milid
No. 507, July 26th. 

On basis of statements made by heretofore reliable contact, it is thought 
likely, should Japanese occupation French Indo China be extended, occupying 
forces will include one specially selected pursuit wing of approximately 80 to 
90 planes now being organized Formosa. 

                                                               CRESWELL.



Page 187
                              [Radiogram]
LAS
82 WTJ
248P
                                                          JULY 23, 1941.
                                                                 3:21 PM
From: Manila.
To: Milid.
No. 1456 July 22nd. 

United Press states Lomei news Tokyo claims following from reliable French 
source quote as result of secret agreement between British, Chinese and De 
Gualliets [sic] the Chingking forces are massing for attack on northern Indo 
China stop Simultaneously the British will attack south Indo China using 
natives stop Whether Indo China govt will participate is not known unquote 
stop This office estimates above as build up for Japanese movement into Indo 
China stop We are of opinion that new Japanese cabinet is war minded and 
capable of action. 

                                                                 O'REAR. 
                              [Radiogram]
LAS
150 WTJ
1210P 
                                                          JULY 23, 1941. 
                                                                11:32 PM
From: Tokyo
To: Milid
No. 504, July 21st. 

Recently imposed restrictions of indefinite duration on land, water, and air 
travel in Japan reduces available services southward to NYK Transpacific liner 
Application has been made for reservations through to Manila on first 
possibility namely Yawata sailing Yokohama August 14th Shanghai August 19 
arriving Manila August 21 without touching Hongkong. Company states that 
reservations cannot be confirmed for several days. If it is desired that Pape 
carry digest on Japanese vessel he requests specific authority therefor. It 
not, suggest that assistant naval attache in Shanghai be requested to forward 
digest to Manila by first available safe hand and if it does not arrive before 
Pape leaves he be authorized to pick up Manila copy of digest. Only other 
alternative is for Pape to go to Shanghai first available transportation and 
to proceed thence by whatever combination of clippers and non Japanese 
shipping will put him soonest in Singapore. Schedule of British and Dutch 
lines are not available to their agents in Japan. Assist naval attache in 
Shanghai has been requested to secure and forward pertinent information if 
possible. No detailed schedule can be reported until transportation to 
Shanghai is secured and possibly until after arrival there. 

                                                               CRESWELL. 

                               [Radiogram]
AEL
8 WVY
743P
                                                          JULY 14, 1941.
                                                                 1:36 PM
From: Tokyo
To: Assis Chief of Staff G-2
No 500, July 14. 

Now evident that mobilization mentioned our number 498 taking place on 
considerable scale and under unusual conditions as to secrecy. It has been 
determined that some of the newly mobilized men are being sent to Manchuria, 
but as yet unable to determine how many or whether any are being sent southern 
destination. Although Tokyo is alive with rumors as to purpose this 
mobilization there is no conclusive indication so far available. 

                                                               CRESWELL. 



Page 188

                              [Radiogram]
67-WTJ
                                                          July 12, 1941.
                                                                 1032 AM
From: Tokyo.
To: MILID.
No. 498 July 12th. 

Considerable talk and some evidence of unusual recruiting extent and purpose 
not clearly determined but thought to be precautionary as for the time being 
governments attitude not considered as one tending towards positive 
commitments.

                                                                CRESWELL
                                                    
WPD 4544                                                    July 7 1941.
Memorandum for the Adjutant General:
Subject: Secret Radiogram

1. The Secretary of War directs that a secret radiogram as follows be sent to 
the: 

Commanding General, Caribbean Defense Command
Commanding General, Philippine Department
Commanding General, Hawaiian Department
Commanding General, Fourth Army 

For your information stop Deduction from information from numerous sources is 
that the Japanese Govt has determined upon its future policy which is 
supported by all principal Japanese political and military groups stop This 
policy is at present one of watchful waiting involving probable aggressive 
action against the maritime provinces of Russia if and when the Siberian 
garrison has been materially reduced in strength and it becomes evident that 
Germany will win a decisive victory in European Russia stop Opinion is that 
Jap activity in the south will be for the present confined to seizure and 
development of naval comma army and air bases in Indo China although an 
advance against the British and Dutch cannot be entirely ruled out stop The 
neutrality pact with Russia may be abrogated stop They have ordered all Jap 
vessels in its Atlantic ports to be west of Panama Canal by first of August 
stop Movement of Jap shipping from Japan has been suspended and additional 
merchant vessels are being requisitioned end 

II. That a copy of the above radiogram be furnished to the Chief of the Army 
Air Force.

                                      L. T. GEROW
                                      Brigadier General,
                                      Acting Assistant (Chief of Staff.)

ks
COPY/ml
(Original paper filed under Panama Command. 

                              [Radiogram]
AEL
85 WTJ
451
                                                          June 29, 1941.
                                                                 7:43 AM
From: Tokyo.
To: The Assis Chief of Staff G-2.
No. 493 June 27

War Office states that cannot grant attachment regiment Japan proper Dickey 
Verback present time but may be able to arrange in future. At same time 
mentioned possibility arrange those officers Korea provided suitable exchange 
in one of our possessions no specific possession requested but Philippines 
mentioned as examples. Request statement policy regarding arrange our 
possessions in general and reciprocity for Korea in particular. In my opinion 
under present conditions Korea is not adequate trade any of our possessions 
and arrange in any other Japanese possessions would be severely circumscribed. 
Suggest I continue efforts obtain arrange Japan proper. See my letter June 9 
to Harris, Chief Liaison Section in June 13 pouch.

                                                                CRESWELL



Page 189

                                                          G-2(WEC)
                                                          Ralph G. Smith
Sent to all listed destination * * * WE
May  29, 1941  *  *  *
                                                          MAY 28, 1941.

Assistant Chiefs of Staff, G-2, First Corps Area, Third Corps area, Fourth 
Corps Area, Fifth Corps area, Sixth Corps area, Seventh Corps Area, Eighth 
Corps area, Ninth Corps Area, Panama Canal Department, Puerto Rican 
Department, Hawaiian Department, Philippine Department and Alaskan Department. 

Communist Party order recently issued directs all Communist Party members of 
National Maritime Union to remain on board ship until further notice period 
Highly reliable British source reports nation-wide sabotage may be expected 
comma especially on Pacific Coast comma over may thirtieth weekend on all 
defense projects including shipping facilities period 

                                                                  MILES. 

                                              ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE,
AG 220.482(4-3-41)E                                       April 3, 1941.

COMMANDING GENERAL
Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, TH. 

Issue orders detailing on temporary duty the necessary number of armed 
noncommissioned officers of the Air Corps but not less than 6 for the purpose 
of providing adequate and continuous guard from Hawaiian Department to 
destination for airplanes and parts being shipped on the Steel Mariner 
scheduled to sail to Philippine Department from Hawaiian Department April 5, 
1941, and directing that upon completion of such duty soldiers return to 
proper stations in Hawaiian Department on first available army transport 
payment of monetary allowances * * * authorized while traveling on SS Steel 
Mariner a chartered vessel * * * 

                                                                  ADAMS.

Copy for A. C. of S., G-2. In connection with your disposition form dated 
April 3, 1941.

                                                AGO 004.5 (5-13-41) MB-G
                                                                 The AGO
                                                                  AGMX-G
                                                                     EAH
                                                           MAY 13, 1941. 
COMMANDING GENERAL,
Schofield Barracks, TH.

In reply city AGMX period. War Department authority granted you to permit 
representative of Pan Pacific Press Association to make photographs of 
unrestricted training activities and general views of post at your station for 
forthcoming articles Colliers Magazine period. All photographs to be made 
under your supervision and to be reviewed by War Department prior to 
publication. 

                                                                  ADAMS. 
Copy for: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 (Major Corderman). 

                                                    G-2
                                                    Lt. Col. R. C. Smith
G-2/272-82
No. 740 Sent April 18,1941

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G_2,
Hawaiian Dept., Fort Shafter, T. H. 

Naval Intelligence on March 21 received from unknown source partially 
illegible copy combat estimate of Fiji Islands dated December 1940 signed by 
Captain John W. Coulter present address University of Hawaii period. 
Investigate authenticity and why G-2 did not receive copy this valuable 
report. 

                                                                  MILES. 




Page 190

                               [Radiogram]
                                                         MARCH 29, 1941.
                                                                 8:32 AM
(JTP)
39WTJ

From: Ft. Shafter.
To: The Adjutant General. 
                                 FORT SHAFTER, No. 2492, March 28, 1941.

For G-2. Colonel Hideo Iwakuru, Ija passed through Honolulu 15th aboard 
Tatsuta Maru enroute Washington, D. C. Nippu Jiji of Honolulu reported, 
"Colonel Iwakuro was formerly head of military affairs section of Military 
Affairs Bureau which is probably the most important office in the army. He is 
so influential that there is no one in army circles who does not know him. We 
do not know what mission this colonel is on but in view of the times the visit 
of so important an army personage is worth our attention." 
                                                                  SHORT. 

                             EXHIBIT NO. 23

[Hand written:] Copy of Capt. Safford's digest, with missing numbers supplied:

1 copy to Safford.
1 copy to Corderman.

[1] Index of translations and memoranda re Pearl Harbor

                           MARCH 1941

DATE       JD#     SIS#    OTHER           BRIEF
                                                                      
 #Mar. 13  A ____  15306   Hsinking #58    Foreign Propaganda 
                                           Conference.
 #Mar. 13  N 1472  15351   Tokyo 216       Japanese-Russian Cooperation.
 #Mar. 13  A 1479  15330   Tokyo 222       Get the Russians to accept
                                           the Ribbentrop proposal.
  Mar. 14  A ____  15341   Hsinking #59    Propaganda towards the South 
                   15342                   Seas.
  Mar. 18  A 1540  15425   Tokyo 126       Put Terazaki in charge of 
                                           information and propaganda.
 #Mar. 18  A ____  15421   Tokyo 276       Southern Advance.
 #Mar. 19  A 1572  15455   Moscow #5       German-Soviet Relations: 
                                           change in.
 *Mar. 21  A ____  15550   Tokyo #40       Trade-agreement between Japan 
                   to 15555                and USSR.
**Mar. 22  A ____  _____   __________      SIS Memorandum predicting 
                                           German attack on Russia.  
                                           (Memo not available.) Given 
                                           to State
 #Mar. 22  A 1654  15621   Tokyo #81       Secure intelligences by
                                           bribe.
 #Mar. 25  N 1662  15656   Tokyo 286       Dinner with Admiral Raeder.
 #Mar. 29  A 1748  15749   Berlin 308      Germany plans to attack 
                                           Russia.  It is necessary for
                                           Japan to attack Singapore.

                           APRIL 1941
 #Apr.  3  A 1806  15900   Berlin #56      German preparations for war
 #Apr.  4  A 1826  15993                   with Russia.
 #Apr.  3  N 1829  15945   Batavia 142     Military campaign in the 
                                           lowlands.
 #Apr.  5  N 1842  15976   Honolulu #43    Typical Honolulu Spy Report.
 #Apr. 18  N 2066  16409   Wash. 230       "As a result of the Japanese-
                                           Soviet Neutrality Pact Japan 
                                           is at last free to use force
                                           in this area (Southwest
                                           Pacific)."
 #Apr. 19  N 2099  16455   Tokyo 171       "Our Southward Move would be 
                                           halted."
 *Apr. 29  A 2251  16741   Wash. 253       "It is truly a marvelous 
                                           thing that our relations with 
                                           Moscow have been adjusted."
 *Apr. 30  N ____  _____   GZ-32           Early intentions of Germany 
                                           to attack Russia.

***Most important. 
**Very important. 
*Important
Unmarked_Normal.
#Supplementary.



Page 191

Index of translations and memoranda re Pearl Harbor_Continued

                                MAY 1941

DATE       JD#     SIS#    OTHER           BRIEF

 #May   9  N 2452  17089   Tokyo 202       "I am most anxious to see the 
                                           United States discontinue its
                                           policy of aiding Chiang Kai-shek
 #May  13  A 2509  17161   Tokyo 396       "Advise the president to counsel 
                                           Chiang Kai-shek to respond to 
                                           Japanese peace overtures."
 #May  13  N 2513  17263   Tokyo 216       Transmit #217 to the Secretary of
                                           State without delay. (Precedent 
                                           for Tokyo #901 & 902, 6 Dec. 
                                           1941.)
 #May  13  NQ2514  17264   Tokyo 217       The U. S. Govt. agree to advise 
                                           Chiang Kai-shek to enter into
                                           direct negotiations with Japan.
 #May  15  N 2549  17272   Wash. 299       Japan has absolutely no aggres-
                                           sive ambitions in the southern 
                                           area. (!)
 #May  16  N 2562  17305   Tokyo 230       Our request that the United 
                                           States stay out of the war.
 #May  21  N 2619  17423   Wash. 320       Japanese southward expansion.
**May  22  N 2643  17473   Berlin 569      "Our dreams of southward 
                                           expansion . . ."
                                           "To further bolster the spirit of
                                           the Tripartite Pact. "
  May  26  A 2675  17636   Tokyo 440       Wire *real* intentions of the 
                                           German Govt.

                           JUNE 1941

 #June  3  A 2791  17741   Rome            The German Govt. has recently 
                                           completed all preparations for 
                                           attacking Soviet Russia.
 #June 14  N ____  _____   GZ-1            German Plans to attack Russia.
 #June 16  N ____  _____   GZ-9            Crisis in German-Soviet 
                                           relations.
 #June 16  N ____  _____   GZ-10           Japanese-United States 
                                           negotiations.
 #June 17  N ____  _____   GZ 15           German-Soviet crisis. Prediction 
                                           of surprise German attack.
 #June 27  N ____  _____   GZ-26           Japanese attitude toward Soviet-
                                           German crisis. "It will be well 
                                           for the Imperial Govt. To assume
                                           a very prudent attitude in
                                           respect to this German-Soviet 
                                           war."
                           JULY 1941

 #July  7  A ____  _____   I. B. 1-155     "The Jap Govt._do not at present 
                                           feel compelled to modify their 
                                           policy towards the USSR." (JD
                                           3461)
 #July  9  A _____ 19126   I. B. 1-157     Plans for utilizing American
                   19127                   Negroes for espionage. (JD 3490)
                   19128
 #July  9  N 3515  19197   Wash. 463       "If we are definitely determined 
                                           to make a military stroke 
                                           southward."
 #July 10  A ____  _____   I. B. 1-158     Comments and paraphrase of JD 
                                           3515. [Note: MID missed the point 
                                           completely.]
 *July 24  N ____  _____   ___________     Memo to Naval Aide to the 
                                           President re withdrawal of Jap 
                                           merchant vessels from the 
                                           Atlantic Ocean.

                           AUGUST 1941

 *Aug.  4  N ____  _____   GZ-1            Jap Decisions at Imperial 
                                           Conference, July 2, 1941_to break 
                                           British-American encirclement and 
                                           arm for all-out war.
 #Aug.  9  N ____  _____   GZ-4            Preparation for the southward 
                                           advance shall be reinforced.
 #Aug. 10  N ____  _____   GZ-5            The belief of Ambassador Oshima
                                           is discounted by
                                           the Tokyo Government belief that 
                                           the war will continue into next 
                                           year, with the Russians holding 
                                           in Siberia.
 #Aug. 16  N ____  _____   GZ-9            Nomura's estimate of U. S. 
                                           Policy. (U. S. is determined to 
                                           take drastic action to counter 
                                           further attempts at Japanese 
                                           expansion.)
 *Aug. 28  N 4814  21575   Berlin 1066     The German-Soviet war as 
                                           described by Marshal Keitel 
                                           (Germany conquering Russia).



Page 192

Index of translations and memoranda re Pearl Harbor_Continued

[4]                      SEPTEMBER 1941

DATE       JD#     SIS#    OTHER           BRIEF

 #Sept.  4 A 4929  21784   Rome 556        Essential to carry out boldly at 
                   21785                   this time our policy
                                           of southward advance.
 #Sept.  4 A 4940  21790   Tokyo 528       U. S.-Japan Negotiations-
                                           See JD; 4941. 
 *Sept.  4 A 4941  21786   Tokyo 529       Japanese Draft Proposal of Sept. 
                   to                      6, 1941. (Japan demands condi-
                   21788                   tions that the U.S. cannot pos-
                                           sibly agree to.)
 #Sept. 19 N 5234  22377   Shanghai 808    "Japan's war preparations 
                                           against the Soviet."
 *Sept. 22 A 5360  22550   Tokyo 590       Basic terms of peace between
                                           Japan and China. (Jap troops in
                                           China & Recognition of 
                                           Manchukuo.)
 #Sept. 23 A 5381  22588   Berlin 1161     I repeatedly requested_our 
                                           Government's real policy.
 *Sept. 26 N 5438  22748   Tokyo 595       Japanese Proposal of Sept. 25, 
                                           1941 (submitted to State Dept. On 
                                           Sept. 27, 1941). (Amplifies Note 
                                           of Sept. 6th (JD 4941) and at-
                                           tempts to force the U.S. to 
                                           relinquish its position.  It is 
                                           apparent that the negotiations 
                                           are getting nowhere and that the 
                                           Japanese believe that the U.S. 
                                           will back down or resort to 
                                           appeasement if they put up a 
                                           determined front.)
 #Sept. 26 A 5441  22753  Tokyo 597        Nomura is bawled-out.
 #Sept. 27 A 5464  22787  Wash. 852        Nomura apologizes.
  Sept. 30 A 5510  22870  Tokyo 614        This whole matter concerns the 
                                           China Incident and the South Seas 
                                           Question.

[5]                       OCTOBER 1941

 *Oct.  2  A 5598  22987  Wash. 881       Interview with Adm. Stark. "The 
                                          Admiral stated that if the United 
                                          States fights a two-ocean war she 
                                          will have to defend herself in the 
                                          Pacific." 
 #Oct.  3  N 5593  23034  Wash. 869       Relations of Terasaki (First 
                                          Sec'y) and Schmitt (spy).
 #Oct.  6  A 5640  23114  Wash. 901       Nomura sounds a warning against 
                                          further aggression.
 #Oct.  7  N 5650  23162  Wash. 880       Nomura advises caution "After 
                                          Japan has had time to evaluate the 
                                          results let her determine her 
                                          course."
 #Oct.  7  N 5661  23166  Wash. 894       Nomura submits his humble opinion:
                                          "The only remaining problem is 
                                          concerning the evacuation of our 
                                          troops (from China)."
 #Oct.  8  A 5693  23220  Tokyo 647       The internal situation here_would 
                                          not permit further delay.
  Oct.  9  A 5696  23260  Tokyo #83       Area designations in Pearl Harbor 
                                          (for spy reports).
  Oct. 10  N 5730  23312  Honolulu #41    Dock & Mooring designations in 
                                          Pearl Harbor (for spy reports).
 #Oct. 10  N 5738  23318  Harbin 129      Promise of American aid 
                                          to Russia.
 #Oct. 13  N 5779  23421  Tokyo 658       "The situation at home is fast
                                          approaching a crisis."
 #Oct. 13  N ____  _____  GZ-9            Crisis in Japan (see JD 5779).
 #Oct. 15  N 5838  23513  Berlin 1237     Ambassador Oshima urges Japan 
                                          attack Russia-"at the time of the 
                                          fall of Moscow"-and adds "It is 
                                          absolutely essential for us to 
                                          make sure of the resources and 
                                          markets of the south."
 *Oct. 16  N ____  _____  GZ-10           Kramer's Memo to CNO with para-
                                          phrase of JD # 5838.
 #Oct. 16  A 5854  23570  Wash. 943       Interview with Adm. Turner (With-
 #Oct. 15  A 5854  23516    "    "        drawal of Jap troops from China.
 #Oct. 16  N 5888  23622  Berlin 1236     Protest on Domei editorial.
  Oct. 17  N 5898  23629  Rome 661        Evacuation of Japanese merchants
                                          from Europe.
 #Oct. 17  A 5901  23631  Tokyo 671       German pressure on Japan.
  Oct. 18  N 5919  23677  Rome 664        "My (Paulucci's) personal opinion 
                                          is that Japan should strike at the 
                                          Soviet Union immediately."
  Oct. 18  N 5923  23677  Tokyo 682       Resignation of Jap cabinet.
  Oct. 20  A 5941  23715  Wash. 959       Conversation between Terazaki and 
                                          Adm. Turner. 
  Oct. 23  A 6017  23859  Wash.           Nomura submits his resignation. "I 
                                          don't want to continue this hypo-
                                          critical existence deceiving
[6]                                       other people . . . As a man of 
                                          honor this is the only way open to 
                                          me." (This is why Kurusu was 
                                          sent.)
  Oct. 27  A 6084  23996  Wash. 989       "The Chief of Staff has sent the 
                                          Military Attache some secret 
                                          advice. Is this the future policy 
                                          of the Government."
  Oct. 28  N 6116  24046  Shanghai 361    "At the time of a Japanese advance 
                                          to the North."
  Oct. 26  N 6118  24070  Mex. City 422   Sec'y Knox's statement that there 
                                          would be imminent action in the 
                                          Far East.
 *Oct. 28  N 6138  24125  Tokyo 674       Japanese nationals evacuating the 
                                          N. E. I. 
  Oct. 30    6175  24192  Wash. 1004      Talk with Adm. Pratt_"Stark 
                                          cannot de said to be a 'strong' 
                                          individual, Admiral Pratt said.



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Index of translations and memoranda re Pearl Harbor_Continued

[4]                      SEPTEMBER 1941

DATE       JD#     SIS#   OTHER           BRIEF

  Nov.  1  N 6204  24249  Hsinking 697    Border clash. "Let the matter be 
                                          forgotten.
  Nov.  4  N 6238  24322  Tokyo 343       Japanese nationals evacuating the
                                          Philippine.
 *Nov.  4  A 6248  24330  Tokyo 725       Counter proposals will be given 
                                          in #726 & 727. Conditions are so 
                                          tense that no longer is procras-
                                          tination possible. This is our 
                                          last effort The success or fail-
                                          ure of the pending discussions  
                                          will have an immense effect on 
                                          the destiny of the Empire of 
                                          Japan.
 *Nov.  4  A 6249  24334  Tokyo 726       Proposal "A" Submitted in Part 
                     to                   State Dept. on Nov. 7, 1941. "How
                   24337                  have we fought in China for four
                                          years. What tremendous sacrifices
                                          have we made. They must know this
                                          ... In any case, our internal 
                                          situation also makes it impos-
                                          sible for us to make any further 
                                          compromise." 
  Nov.  4  A 6250  24338  Tokyo 727       Proposal "B"_Never submitted. "A
                                          last effort to prevent something 
                                          happening."
 #Nov.  4  A 6251  24339  Tokyo 730       "Ambassador Kurusu is leaving by 
                                          clipper on the 7th.  He is car-
                                          rying no additional instruct-
                                          ions."
**Nov.  5  N 6254  24373  Tokyo 736       It is absolutely necessary that 
                                          all arrangements for the signing 
                                          of this agreement be completed by 
                                          the 25th of this month. (Of ut-
                                          most secrecy.)
 #Nov.  5  N 6275  24386  Tokyo 734       Ambassador Kurusu left the 5th 
                                          for (Shanghai(?)).
 #Nov.  6  A 6302  24439  Tokyo 739       We are sending Ambassador Kurusu 
                                          to show our Empire's 
                                          *sincerety...To make it sound 
                                          good* we are telling the 
                                          public... Both the Army and Navy 
                                          are pleased. (Note: See JD 
                                          #6017.)
  Nov.  7  N 6320  24479  Wash. 1040      There is danger that America will 
                                          see through our condition.  If we 
                                          have made up our minds to a final 
                                          course of action it would be the 
                                          part of wisdom to keep still 
                                          about it.
  Nov.  8  N 6335  24533  Manila 722      Spy report on U.S. aircraft in 
                                          the Philippines and analysis. 
                                          (Note This is why we did not 
                                          worry over much about Japanese 
                                          espionage.)
[8]
  Nov. 12  N ____  _____  _____________   "Dissemination to White House." 
                                          (This memorandum in Kramer's 
                                          handwriting records reasons for 
                                          giving original translations to 
                                          Pres. Roosevelt (& Sec'y Hull) 
                                          after Nov. 12, 1941. Prior to 
                                          that time Memoranda forwarding 
                                          Paraphrases of important messages 
                                          had been furnished.)
 *Nov. 12  N 6415  24373  Tokyo 762       The United States is still not 
                                          full aware of the situation here. 
                                          The  date set in message #736 is 
                                          a definite deadline. The situa-
                                          tion is nearing a climax ... time 
                                          is indeed becoming short.
 #Nov. 12  N 6416  24654  Tokyo 763       Germany putting pressure on Japan 
                                          to get tough with the U.S.
  Nov. 17  A 6540  24853  Hsinking #1     Umetsu to Kurusu (Nov. 6, 1941).
 *Nov. 17  A 6541  24854  Hsinking #2     Manchukuo-Soviet Relations. (It
                          (Appended to    would impossible for us to fight
                            #1)           the Soviet Union unless something
                                          unforeseen happens.  The Kwantung
                                          military command is restraining 
                                          the forces there from any rash 
                                          action. The Soviet is also endea-
                                          voring not to antagonize our 
                                          country.
 *Nov. 17  A 6542  24856  Hsinking #3     Estimate of the Russo-German War.
                          (Appended to    (The foundations of the Stalin 
                            #1).          regime are very firmly fixed. The 
                                          outlook for any early close to 
                                          hostilities in Europe is fading.)
**Nov. 17  A 6553  24877  Wash. 1090      Nomura's swan song. (Nov. 14, 
    &  22.         24857                  1941.) (The policy of the Ameri-
                     &                    can Govt. in the Pacific is to 
                   25139                  stop any northward. They are 
                                          contriving by every possible 
                                          means to prepare for actual 
                                          warfare. It is not their inten-
                                          tion to repeat the Munich Con-
                                          ference. The apex of German 
                                          victories has been passed.
                                          The United States would not favor 
                                          us at the sacrifice of China: 
                                          This war will be long, and who-
                                          ever can hold out till the end 
                                          will be the victors. I would like 
                                          to caution patience for one or 
                                          two months to get a clear view of 
                                          the world situation. This would 
                                           be the best plan.
[9]
  Nov. 17  A 6638  24878  Tokyo           Reply to Nomura. (The fate of our
                                          Empire hangs by a slender thread 
                                          of a few days. I set the deadline. 
                                          There will be no change.) 



Page 194

Index of translations and memoranda re Pearl Harbor_Continued

                           NOVEMBER 1941-Continued

DATE       JD#     SIS#    OTHER           BRIEF

 *Nov. 22  A 6710  25138   Tokyo 812       There are reasons beyond your 
                                           ability to guess why we wanted to 
                                           settle Japanese-American 
                                           relations by the 25th, but if the 
                                           signing can be completed by *the 
                                           29th, we have decided to wait 
                                           until that date*. This time we 
                                           mean it that the deadline abso-
                                           lutely cannot be changed. *After 
                                           that things are automatically 
                                           going to happen*.
  Nov. 24  N 6731  25171   Tokyo 969       We would welcome peace between 
                                           Germany and the Soviet Union.
 #Nov. 24  A 6737  25174   Wash. 1148      Continue your efforts in guiding 
                                           newspaper opinion.
 *Nov. 24  A 6744  25178   Tokyo 823       The time limit set in my #812 is 
                                           in Tokyo time. (See JD #6710.)
  Nov. 26  A 6801  25322   Tokyo 2319      Should negotiations collapse...we 
                                           will completely destroy British 
                                           and American power in China. Keep 
                                           absolutely quiet the existence of 
                                           these decisions. (Circular to 
                                           China Net_Nov. 14, 1941.)
 #Nov. 26  A 6841  25344   Tokyo 836       Telephone Code (see JD 6890)
  Nov. 26  N 6850  25392   Tokyo 2354      Winds Code_Morse (Nov. 19, 1941-
                                           J19).
 *Nov. 28  N 6875  25432   Tokyo 2353      Winds Code_Voice (Nov. 19, 1941-
                           Appended to     J19).
                           JD 6875         (Singapore version of the Winds 
                                           Code. (N. E. I. (Thorpe) version 
                                           of the Winds Code. (N. E. I. 
                                          (Foote) version of the Winds Code. 
                                           Japan-U. S.=East Wind Rain. 
                                           Japan-U. S. S. R.=North Wind 
                                                 Cloudy.
                                           Japan-British=West Wind Clear 
                                                (including N. E. I.).
  Nov. 28  N 6890  25443  ______________   Washington-Tokyo Telephone Con-
                                           versation Nov. 27, 1941 (2327-
                                           2334 EST)-The South, southward 
                                           matter. A crisis does appear 
                                           imminent. Regarding negotiations_
                                           do not break them off. We have a 
                                           crisis on hand and the Army is 
                                           champing at the bit [Note: This 
                                           was the only telephone conver-
                                           sation of any importance.] (See
                                           JD 6841.)
 #Nov. 26  A 6891  25435   Wash. 1180      Our failure and humiliation are 
             6869  25436    "     "        complete.
[10]
 #Nov. 28  A 6892  25437   Wash. 1181      It is better to wire urgent news 
                                           than to phone it.
 #Nov. 28  A 6898  25445   Tokyo 844       The United States has gone ahead
                                           and presented this humiliating
                                           proposal (of Nov. 26th). Negoti-
                                           ations will be de facto ruptured. 
                                           Do not give the impression that 
                                           negotiations are broken off.
  Nov. 28  N 6899  25446   Tokyo 843       Tokyo Broadcast Schedule.
 #Nov. 29  N 6908  25476   Wash 1197       Ref. Tokyo 843, recommends change 
                                           in Broadcast Schedule_Nov. 27, 
                                           1941. (See JD 6899.)
  Nov. 30  N 6921  25496   Tokyo 857       Make one more attempt. Please be 
                                           careful that this does not lead 
                                           to anything like a breaking off
                                           of negotiations.

[11]                       DECEMBER 1941

 #Dec.  1  N 6939  25545   Tokyo 2436      Destroying codes with chemicals.
 *Dec.  1  N 6942  25556   Berlin 1393     Ribbentrop said  "It is essential 
                                           that Japan effect the New Order 
                                           in East Asia without losing this 
                                           opportunity." "Should Japan
                                           become engaged in a war against 
                                           the U. S.  Germany, of, course, 
                                           would join the war immediately." 
                                           Foreign Minister Ribbentrop 
                                           requested that the contents of 
                                           our talks be kept a strict 
                                           secret.
**Dec.  1  A 6943  25552   Tokyo 985       The conversation between Tokyo 
                   25553                   and Washington now stand rup-
                                           tured-broken. Say *very secretly* 
                                           to Hitler and Ribbentrop that 
                                           there is extreme danger that war 
                                           may suddenly break out between 
                                           the Anglo-Saxon nations and 
                                           Japan, and this war may come 
                                           quicker than anyone dreams. Will 
                                           not relax our pressure on the 
                                           Soviet, but for the time being we 
                                           would prefer to refrain from any 
                                           direct moves in the north. 
                                           *Impress on the Germans
                                           and Italians how important 
                                           secrecy is*. (Nov. 30, 1941.)]
                                           Note: Coded message forwarded by 
                                           Com 16 as GYROF 010001, 010014, 
                                           or 010027. 
                                           Also forwarded from London as 
                                           Admiralty #104 and #105. Admir-
                                           alty 011530 advised "Tokyo to 
                                           Berlin #985 of immediate interest 
                                           to].



Page 195

Index of translations and memoranda re Pearl Harbor_Continued

                           DECEMBER 1941-Continued

DATE       JD#     SIS#    OTHER           BRIEF

 *Dec.  1  A 6944  25554   Tokyo 986       The Imperial Govt. can no longer 
                   25555    "     "        continue negotiations with the U.
                                           S. The proposal presented by the 
                                           U. S. On the 26th contains one 
                                           insulting clause. It is clearly a 
                                           trick. *The U.S. has decided to 
                                           regard Japan as an enemy*. (Nov. 
                                           30, 1941.) [Forwarded by Com 16 
                                           as CYROF 010001, 010014, or 
                                           010029.]
  Dec.  2  A 6974  25572  Hsinking 781     In the event that war break out 
                                           with England and the U.S. persons 
                                           to be interned: (a) British nat-
                                           ionals, 339; (b) American citi-
                                           zens, 81; (d) Nationals of the 
                                           Soviet observed to be obnoxious 
                                           characters with pro-British and 
                                           American leanings are to be 
                                           suitably taken care of.
 #Dec.  2  N 6981  25604  Rome 768         Japanese language broadcasts to 
                                           Europe. (Nov. 29, 1941.)
 #Dec.  2  A 6982  25571  Rio 482          At present we can hear only the 
                                           6:309 p. m. JVJ transmission to 
                                           the U.S. (Nov. 30, 1941.)
 *Dec.  1  N 6983  25605  Tokyo 865        To prevent the U.S. from becoming
                                           unduly suspicious we have been 
                                           advising the press and others 
                                           that the negotiations are con-
                                           tinuing. The above is for only 
                                           your information. (GY Log #6428.)
**Dec.  1  N 6984  25606  Tokyo 2444       The four offices in London, Hong 
                                           Kong. Singapore, and Manila have 
                                           been instructed to abandon the 
                                           use of the code machines and to 
                                           dispose of them.  The machine in 
                                           Batavia has been returned to  
                                           Japan. (GY Log #6432.)
 *Dec.  2  N 6985  25609  Tokyo 2409       Hidden Word Code (Nov. 27, 1941-
                                           J19). For later additions see:
                                           JD#   SIS#       OTHER#
                                           7122  25830  Tokyo 2432.
                                                        Tokyo 2433.  (?)
                                           7214  25943  Tokyo 2450.
                                           7360         Tokyo 2431.
  Dec.  3  N 6991  25644  Tokyo 111        Make your "ships in harbor" 
                                           report irregular but twice a 
                                           week. (Nov. 15, 1941-J19).
**Dec.  4  N 7001                          JD #7001 or #6975 is believed to 
                                           be the (missing) translation of 
                                           the Winds Message.
 #Dec.  3  N 7012  25656  Berlin 1396      Note from German Ambassador con-
                                           cerning what is to be done in the 
                                           event of an Anglo-Japanese and an 
                                           American-Japanese War. (Dec. 1, 
                                           1941.)
 *Dec.  3  A 7017  25640  Tokyo 867        Washington burn all codes except 
                                           one copy of "Oite" (Pa-K2) and 
                                           "L" (LA). Stop using the code 
                                           machine and destroy it com-
                                           pletely when you have finished 
                                           this, wire back "HARUNA."
                                           Destroy all messages files and 
                                           other secret documents. (Dec. 2, 
                                           1941.)
 #Dec.  4  A 7029  25694  Tokyo 114        Investigate fleet bases in Hawaii 
                             or 111        reservation. (Nov. 20, 1941_J19.)
 #Dec.  5  A 7063  25773  Tokyo 113        Report ships in Pearl Harbor, 
                                           Manila Bay, etc. (Nov. 18, 1941_
                                           J19.)
 #Dec.  5  A 7064  25772  Honolulu 224     Unimportant spy report. (Nov. 18, 
                                           1941_I
[13]

 #Dec.  5  N 7080  25781  Tokyo 842        The United  States might make a 
                                           protective occupation of the East 
                                           Indies. (Nov. 27, 1941).
 *Dec.  5  N 7086  25823  Tokyo 122        In the future report even when 
                                           there are no (ship) movements 
                                           (Nov 29, 1941_J19.)
 #Dec.  5  N 7091  25787  Tokyo 2443       London discontinue use of code 
                                           machine and dispose of it immed-
                                           iately. Wire "SETUJU." (Dec. 1, 
                                           1941.)
**Dec.  4  N 7092  25783  Tokyo 893        Manchuria will take the same 
                                           steps toward England and America 
                                           that this country will take in
                                           case war breaks out. American and 
                                           British consular officials and 
                                           offices will not be recognized as 
                                           having special rights. Great care 
                                           shall be exercised not to antag-
                                           onize Russia. (Dec. 1st.) [Note: 
                                           Intercepted by Army at Fort 
                                           Shafter, T. H. Received by Navy 
                                           in late afternoon of Dec. 3, 
                                           1941, LCT. (GY Log #6498.)]



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Index of translations and memoranda re Pearl Harbor_Continued

                           DECEMBER 1941-Continued

DATE       JD#     SIS#    OTHER           BRIEF

 #Dec.  6  A 7111  25817   Honolulu 222    Spy report on Naval vessels in 
                                           Pearl Harbor. (Nov. 18, 1941-
                                           J19.)
 #Dec.  5  N 7122  25830   Rio 329         Tokyo Circular 2432 Additions to 
                                           Hidden Word.
  Dec.  6  A 7125  25837   Bern            Tokyo Circular #2447. Orders have 
                                           been issued to our diplomatic 
                                           officials in North America and
                                           the South Seas, and to all our 
                                           officials in British and 
                                           Netherlands territory to burn all
                                           telegraphic codes except one copy 
                                           of "Oite" and "L". (Dec. 2_J19.)
  Dec.  6  N 7136  25836  Wash. 1268       We have completed destruction of 
                                           codes but since negotiations are
                                           still continuing I request to
                                           delay the destruction of one code 
                                           machine.
  Dec.  6  A 7142  25835  Tokyo 897        Destroy one "B" code machine and 
                                           use the other for the time being.
                                           [Note: #897 was the first Tokyo
                                           to Washington serial sent on Dec.
                                           6, 1941. We intercepted #897-912 
                                           solid.]
 _______   ______  _____  Tokyo 898        See JD #7199.
 _______   ______  _____  Tokyo 899        See JD #7170.
 #Dec.  6  A ____  _____  Tokyo 900        Doemi praises KATO for good 
                                           reporting.
[14]
**Dec.  6  A ____  _____  Tokyo 901        See JD #7149.
**Dec.  6  N 7143  25843  Tokyo 902        Japanese Declaration of War. 
   (1-13)                                  (Parts 1-13.)  (See GY Log #6619,
                                           6620, etc.)
**Dec.  7  N 7143  25843  Tokyo 902.       Japanese Declaration of War (Part 
   (14)                                    14.) (Very Important.) (See GY 
                                           Log #6649.)
 *Dec.  6  A 7144  25844  Tokyo 904        Re my 902_Be most caution in 
                                           preserving secrecy.  [Note: This 
                                           was received before #902-See GY 
                                           Log #6618.] 
**Dec.  7  A 7145  25850  Tokyo 907        Re My #902_Submit our reply to 
                                           the U. S. Govt. at 1:00 p. m. on 
                                           the 7th your time. (Urgent_Very
                                           important.) (See GY Log #6648.)
 #Dec.  7  A 7146  25853  Tokyo 908        Deepest thanks to both you 
                                           ambassadors. (Urgent.)
 *Dec.  7  A 7147  25854  Tokyo 910        After deciphering Part 14 of my 
                                           902 and also 907, 908, and 909, 
                                           destroy at once the remaining 
                                           cipher machine. (Extremely 
                                           Urgent)
**Dec.  7  N 7148  25856  Tokyo 2494       Relations between Japan and 
                                           England are not in accordance 
                                           with expectations. (In Hidden 
                                           Word Code.) (See JD #6985.)
**Dec.  6  A 7149  25838  Tokyo 901        Re my 844 (JD 6898). The Govt. 
                                           has deliberated on the American 
                                           proposal of the 26th of November
                                           and as a result we have drawn up 
                                           a memorandum for the U. S. 
                                           contained in my separate message
                                           *#902, in English*. This message 
                                           is very long_in 14 parts. Keep it 
                                           secret for the time being. I will
                                           wire you in a separate message 
                                           the time of presenting this memo-
                                           randum to the U. S. Present it to
                                           the Americans just as soon as you 
                                           receive instructions. [Note: #901 
                                           was intercepted before #904 and
                                           #902. See GY Log #6612.]
 #Dec.  7  A 7150  25857  Tokyo 905        According to AP & UP reports the 
                                           President has wire'd a personal n 
                                           message to His Majesty the 
                                           Emperor. Please wire me the 
                                           facts. (Urgent.)
 #Dec.  7  A 7151  25858  Tokyo 909        I heartily thank IGUCHI and YUKI. 
                                           (Urgent.)

[15]

  Dec.  9  A 7214  25943  Tokyo 2450       Supplement to Hidden Word Code 
                                           (Dec. 2-J19). [Note: Com 16's 
                                           051402 advised "Singapore at-
                                           taches *great importence* to 
                                           Tokyo Circulars 2433 and 2450." 
                                           Circular 2450 was requested by 
                                           Op-Nav 061605 and was forwarded 
                                           by Com 16 GY-ROF 070330, 070415, 
                                           & 071257 (?). See GY Log #6665-
                                           6669.]
 #Dec.  8  A 7257  25998  Tokyo/Extra      PAK2 message dated Dec. 6th. Of 
                                           no importance, except to show 
                                           *solid interception* of Tokyo-
                                           Washington messages on Dec. 6 & 
                                           7, 1941.
 #Dec.  9  N ____  _____  Tokyo 912        Same as #911 but in PAK2 (Dec. 
                                           7th) [Note: #912 was the last 
                                           Tokyo-Washington serial sent. Our
                                           file of Tokyo-Washington serials 
                                           sent on Dec. 6 & 7, 1941, is 
                                           *complete*.]
 *Dec. 10  N 7280  26029  Honolulu 252     The following ships were in port 
                                           on the afternoon of the fifth: 8
                                           battleships, 3 light cruisers, 16 
                                           destroyers. Four ships of the 
                                           Honolulu class were in dock. 
                                           (Dec. 5th_PAK2.) [Note: Army 
                                           intercept forwarded (by mail?) 
                                           from San Francisco.]



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Index of translations and memoranda re Pearl Harbor_Continued

                           DECEMBER 1941-Continued

DATE       JD#     SIS#    OTHER          BRIEF

 *Dec. 10  N 7294  26053   Honolulu 241   The usual schedule for departure 
                                          and returns of the battleships is: 
                                          leaving on Tuesday and returning
                                          on Friday and returning on Satur-
                                          day of the following week. (Dec. 
                                          1_J19.) [Note: Army intercept
                                          forwarded (by mail?) from San 
                                          Francisco.]
 #Dec. 11  N 7299  26047   Wash. 1278     Re your #910 we will commence the 
                                          demolition (of the code machine) 
                                          and destruction by fire. [Note:
                                          Last Purple message sent by 
                                          Washington (Dec. 7th).]
 #Dec. 12  A 7330  26103   Cant. 512      The Army has completed all 
                                          preparations to move immediately 
                                          on Thai. (Dec. 2_J19.) [Note:
                                          Place of interception not known.]
  Dec. 11  N 7335  26108   Pek. 625       Coincident with the beginning of 
                                          the war against Britain and 
                                          America (*Dec. 5th*). [NOTE: 
                                          Intercepted at Fort Shafter T. H. 
                                          Received Dec. 10 1941_see GY Log 
                                          #6749.]
[6]                                                        

  _______  ______  _____   903            See entry after JD #7205.
  _______  ______  _____   906            See JD #7183.
  _______  ______  _____   911            See JD #7205.
  _______  ______  _____   912            See Entry after JD #7257.
 #Dec.  7  A 7157  25859   Tokyo 118      Honolulu retain codes so long as 
                                          the local situation permits. (Nov. 
                                          28-J19.)
 #Dec.  8  A 7158  25880   Tokyo 119      Report entrance and departure of 
                                          capital ships. (Nov. 28-J19.)
 #Dec.  8  A 7164  25879   Tokyo 2445     Burn all codes with exception of 
                                          one copy of "Oite" and "L". Wire 
                                          "HARUNA." Burn all secret docu-
                                          ments. Be especially careful not 
                                          to arouse suspicion. (To Habana.) 
                                          (Dec. 2_J19.)
 #Dec.  7  A 7170  25868   Tokyo 899      Anti-U. S. Propaganda.
 #Dec.  7  A 7171  25851   Tokyo/Extra    Correction to #902.
 #Dec.  7  A 7175  25845   Wash/Extra     Requests correction to #902. 
                                          [Note: This is why Nomura was 
                                          late.]
 #Dec.  7  A 7176  25846   Wash. 1272     Japanese attempts to influence the 
                                          American Govt. (Dec. 6th.)
 *Dec.  8  A 7178  25877   Honolulu 253   There is considerable opportunity 
                                          left to take advantage for a 
                                          *surprise* attack against these 
                                          places. (Dec. 6th_PAK2.) Army 
                                          intercept forwarded by teletype 
                                          from San Francisco.]
 *Dec.  8  A 7179  25874   Honolulu 254   It appears that no air recon-
                                          naissanee is being conducted by 
                                          the fleet air arm. (Dec. 6th_
                                          PAK2.) [Army intercept forwarded 
                                          by teletype from San Francisco.]
 #Dec.  7  A 7183  25852   Tokyo 906      Minister SAKAMOTO return to his 
                                          post at once. (*Urgent*.)
**Dec.  7  A 7184  25866   Budapest 104   On the 6th the American Minister 
                                          presented to the Government of 
                                          this country a British Govern-
                                          ment communique to the effect that 
                                          a state of war would break out on 
                                          the 7th. (LA).
 #Dec.  8  A 7199  25896   Tokyo 898      Send Terasaki to his post 
                                          immediately.  (Urgent. (Dec. 6th.)
 #Dec.  8  N 7205  25923   Tokyo 911      Minor correction to #902. (Dec. 
                                          7th.)
 #Dec.  8  A       _____   Tokyo 903      Washington send #1286 to Brazil. 
                                          (LA)
 #Dec.  8  A 7212  25928   Honolulu 238   Honolulu spy report. (Nov. 28_
                                          J19.)

[17]

 #Dec. 11  N 7338  26109   Wash. 1276     Please wire the December operating 
                                          expenses for all offices today. 
                                          (Dec. 7_LA)
 #Dec. 11  N 7360  26144   Rio. 328       Tokyo Circular #2431_Nov 29th. 
                                          Additions to Hidden Word Code. 
                                          (Dec. 2_J19) (See JD #6985) [Note: 
                                          Intercepted at Fort Hunt, Va.]
 #Dec. 12  A 7369  26214   Hsinking       Prospective use of the Kwantung
                   27136                  Army and recommendation against 
                                          attacking Russia. (Dec. 4th)
                                          [Note: Intercepted at Fort Shafter 
                                          T. H.]
 *Dec. 11  N 7370  26145   Hono. 245      Spy method of communication by 
                                          signals; KGMB Want Ads. (Dec. 3_
                                          PAK2). [Note: Intercepted at Fort 
                                          Hunt Va. Translated in the rough 
                                          by Mrs. Edgers 1:00 p. m. on Dec. 
                                          6 1941. Seen by Lt. Cdr. Kramer 
                                          about 3:00 p. m. Typed smooth
                                          and distributed on Dec. 11th.]
 #Dec. 11  A 7377  26142   Tokyo 909      When the Japanese Empire commences 
                                          hostilities Manchukuo will not 
                                          participate. (Dec. 4th) [Note: 
                                          Intercepted at Fort Shafter T. H.]
 *Dec. 12  A 7381  26158   Tokyo 128      Honolulu wire immediately move-
                                          ments of the fleet subsequent to 
                                          the 4th. (Dec. 6_PAK2) [Note:
                                          Intercepted at Fort Shafter T. H.]



Page 198

Index of translations and memoranda re Pearl Harbor_Continued

                           DECEMBER 1941-Continued

DATE       JD#     SIS#    OTHER           BRIEF

**Dec. 15  N 7469  26308   Tokyo 2556      Explanation of circumstances 
                                           attending Nomura's presentation 
                                           of Japanese Declaration of War to
                                           the U. S. Govt: "We really sup-
                                           posed that the negotiations had 
                                           been broken off first, and the
                                           shooting had taken place after 
                                           this. The President's speech was 
                                           trying to hide the fact that the 
                                           United States had been taken by 
                                           surprise and failed in the first 
                                           step." (Dec. 11_J19) [Forwarded 
                                           from Bainbridge Island by tele-
                                           type.]
 #Dec. 14  A 7479  26294   Rio 379         Tokyo Circular #2570:_The 
                                           Imperial Naval Air Force damaged 
                                           three battleships and sank three
                                           in the Battle of Hawaii. Those 
                                           sunk were the Oklahoma, West 
                                           Virginia, and Arizona. (Dec. 14-
                                           Plain Language.)
 #Dec. 16  A 7511  26351   Hono. 234       Spy report on maneuvers of U. S. 
                   26352                   Pacific Fleet. (Nov. 24_J19) 
                                           [Note: Intercepted by Army at
                                           San Francisco.]

[18]

 #Dec. 19  A 7590  26479   Tokyo #4        War News Circular #4. The 
                                           following report based on what 
                                           the attacking forces witnessed
                                           during the battle as well as 
                                           photographic observations after 
                                           the battle, show that we had com-
                                           pletely destroyed the United 
                                           States Pacific Fleet and the 
                                           American Air Forces in the Hawai-
                                           ian region. (Detailed losses 
                                           reported were very accurate.) 
                                           (Dec. 18_Plain Language)
 #Dec. 26  N 7848  26881  Pek. 616         If this war does start, this will 
                                           be a war which will decide the 
                                           rise or fall of the Japanese 
                                           Empire ... It can be imagined 
                                           that the next war is to be a 
                                           longer one than the China 
                                           Incident (Dated Dec. 3 1941.) 
                                           [Note: Intercepted at Corregidor, 
                                           Dec. 7, 1941. Forwarded by Com 16 
                                           GYROF  # -?- and received Dec. 8, 
                                           1941. (GY Log #6707.]
**Dec. 30  A 8007  27065  Tokyo 123        To Honolulu: In view of the 
                                           present situation, *the presence 
                                           in port of warships, airplane 
                                           carriers, and cruisers is of 
                                           utmost importance*. Let me know
                                           day by day. Wire me in each case 
                                           whether or not there are any 
                                           observation balloons above
                                           Pearl Harbor. Also whether or not 
                                           the warships are provided with 
                                           anti-mine nets. (Dec. 2-J19) 
                                           [Note: Intercepted at Fort 
                                           Shafter, T. H. Reason for long 
                                           delay not known, but apparently 
                                           some one fumbled the ball. Note
                                           on translation says: "This mes-
                                           sage was received here Dec. 23."]

14 S5$. 44

                               EXHIBIT No. 24
[1]
                                   SECRET
                SUMMARY OF FAR EASTERN DOCUMENTS RELATING TO
                    JAPAN'S WAR POTENTIAL AND INTENTIONS

Explanatory Notes.

The summaries which follow are based solely on information relating to Japan's 
war potential and intentions included in reports from U. S. Military Attaches 
and Military Observers during the period beginning 1 January 1937 and ending 7 
December 1941. These intelligence documents, a descriptive catalogue of which 
follows the yearly summaries, are reproduced in Far Eastern Documents, Volumes 
I-XV. In most cases marginal lines have been added to the documents to 
indicate sections pertinent to the subject. 
Marginal references in the yearly summaries indicate the documents from which 
the information is extracted. For instance, "FE 1" refers to the first Far 
Eastern document. Where several sources contain essentially the same 
information, they are indicated in the margins but not always referred to



Page 199

specifically in the text of the summaries. When the source of any statement is 
desired, the marginal references should be compared with the annexed table of 
contents of the documentary file. 

The following abbreviations have been used: 

MA Military Attache or Assistant Military Attache
MO Military Observer 

Expressions such as "Tokyo reported" or "Singapore reported" refer to reports 
from War Department intelligence personnel stationed at those places. Reports 
are included from Military Attaches or Assistant Military Attaches on duty at 
embassies or legations in Japan, China, Thailand, Australia, Portugal, Great 
Britain, and Mexico, and from Military Observers in India, Malaya, and 
Netherlands Indies, where no diplomatic representation was maintained. 

[2]           Japan's War Potential and Intentions

1937

FE 1     During the first half of 1937, the military leaders of Japan were
       building up a war psychology. One of the most formidable instru-
FE 3   ments used as an army propaganda agency was the Imperial Reserv-
       sists Association, with a large and well disciplined membership 
       scattered throughout Japan. The Army was engaged in a six-year
FE 4   expansion program providing for (a) increase of the Air Corps and
       antiaircraft defenses; (b) increase of the military force in Man-
       choukuo; (c) improvement of military training facilities; (d) re-
       plenishment of war materials; and (e) organization of industry in
       the interest of national defense.
FE 4     In the budget debate in the Diet during the early months of the
       year, references were made to the so-called "Continental Policy"
       and "Southward Expansion". While most of the pronouncements on
FE 2   expansion came from army leaders, there was indication of concur-
       rence by the Navy when Rear Admiral Sekine, addressing a private
       gathering, said: "Even with no naval treaty, we need not worry. 
       Our duty is clearly to go ahead with our preparations for 
       overseas development."
EE 16    In early July the so-called China Incident began, and what at
FE 18  first appeared to be a local incident in North China developed 
FE 22  into a major conflict engulfing a large portion of the Chinese
       Republic.
FE 24  Following the outbreak of hostilities, Japan began mobilizing the
FE 26  Army, and the movement eventually took on the proportions of a
       general mobilization. Four divisions were added to the active army
FE 29. by reconstituting similar units disbanded in 1925.
NE 31    The Japanese War Office extended the terms of service for members
       of mobilized units and units in China until ordered transferred to
       the reserves, except such privates as might be ordered discharged,
       Special volunteer officers and reservists of all ranks and grades        
       called into active service were to serve until relieved from active 
       service. For members of non-mobilized units at home stations, 
       including conscript reserve privates, where the term would normally 
       expire in 1938, the term was extended to 1939.
FE 30    The Japanese War Office, as of 30 September, estimated that there
       were available 4,750,000 trained and partly trained reservists meet-
       ing physical requirements. The MA in Tokyo estimated Japan had
FE 36  950,000 troops under arms as of 29 October. The Imperial Headquar-
FE 40  ters was established in the Imperial Palace on 20 November. Only on
       two previous occasions had this headquarters been established: in
       1894, just prior to the Sino-Japanese War; and [3] in 1904,
       following the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War.
FE 23    Appropriations for the Army during 1937-38 totaled Yen 2,464,078,-
       117, including supplementary appropriations of Yen 1,422,712,777, or
       45 percent of the expenditures voted for the year, which amounted
       to Yen 5,483,364,279.
FE 20    Few thoroughly modern army airplanes were in use in 1937, but
       prospects of improvement were excellent with an ambitious building
       program for 1937-38.  The new 97 (1937) type planes compared favor-




Page 200

        ably with service models of foreign nations. Contracts were let for
        500 new 97 (1937) type planes for delivery by 1 July 1938. Compared 
        with the previous year, squadron strength increased from 53 to
        59. Trained pilots numbered about 1400, with 288 trained during
        the year. The number of obsolete planes decreased, so that the number
        of available planes on 1 July (1223 of all types) represented an
FE 13   increase of only 34 planes. Several new airplane companies were
        formed, and plans were made for increasing production facilities.
FE 17     Legislation of a wartime character enacted at special sessions of 
        the Diet included the "Military Secrets Protection Law," passed on 7
FE 25   August, and the "Munitions Industry Mobilization Law," passed on
        9 September. The Cabinet planning Board was reorganized to plan
FE 38   for complete control of industry, finance and labor, in accordance 
        with the need of the national defense program.
FE 22     An unfriendly attitude toward foreign powers was manifested on
        several occasions during military operations in China. It was clearly
FE 26   stated on l7 September by the Senior Aide to the Navy Minister that
        peaceful commerce with China would not be interfered with, but if a
        situation like that in Spain should develop, Japan might change her
        policy. Nevertheless, there were several incidents involving British
FE 22   and American nationals. The attitude toward Great Britain was
FE 34   decidedly unfriendly, although Russia was constantly referred to as
        the immediate and potential enemy.
FE 32     The reaction to President Roosevelt's "Quarantine" speech of 5
        October was one of shocked disappointment without any demonstration of 
        enmity. Likewise, the sinking of the American gunboat
FE 41   "Panay" brought an official expression of regret with offer of 
        restitition. The public and the press expressed hope that the United 
        States would be magnanimous in its judgment of the incident.

               JAPAN'S WAR POTENTIAL AND INTENTIONS
[4]
                            1938

FE 42     The MA in Tokyo reported on 6 January that the amicable settlement 
        of the Panay Case should not obscure the fact that nationalistic
        groups in Japan harbor "considerable irritation and ill-feeling"
        toward the United States because of our "interference in the affairs
        of the Far East."
FE 56     The Japanese often reiterated that the United States "does not
FE 57   understand Japan" or "fully recognize the justice of Japan's stand,"
FE 58   and in so doing they made it evident that "understanding Japan"
        really meant giving her a free hand in East Asia.
FE 57     The Japanese Foreign Minister stated in March that "Japan desires
        stabilization in the Far East, with herself as the central figure,"
        and that "there will be no conflict between Japan and the United
        States as long as they understand each other."
FE 58     Tokyo reported on 18 March that the Shiunso Society, a Japanese
        nationalistic group, stated in newspaper advertisements addressed
        to the American people that the way for the United States to get
        "peace in the Orient" was to stop oppressing Japan; "respect the
        position of Japan, the greatest power in the Orient; ... make 
        absolutely no political activity or economic operations having 
        political significance without the understanding of Japan; . . . guide
        other Powers to take the same attitude."
FE 62     The enactment of the General Mobilization Law on 24 March
FE 65   laid the foundation for totalitarian control and for complete war-
FE 66   time mobilization of Japan's economy and manpower. This law,
FE 68   which was originally passed with the specific assurance that it
FE 69   would not be invoked for the "China Incident," virtually suspended
FE 78   the constitution and enabled the Government, through the issuance
FE 87   of Imperial Ordinances, to mobilize and regulate the human and
        material resources of the Empire exclusively for war. The Minister
FE 62   of War told the Japanese Army Division Commanders in April that there
        must be a mobilization of the entire Japanese strength "because the 
        end of the China incident was remote and



Page 201

        the changes in the international situation were difficult to predict."
        Tokyo reported on 12 May that the Japanese War Ministry
FE 66   planned to issue a pamphlet which emphasized that "Japan is facing
        a crisis in which the fortune of the nation is at stake" and that
        "only by strengthening this general mobilization system can the
        ambitions of a third power be restrained." On 15 November the
FE 86   MA in Tokyo outlined the process by which the [5] General
        Mobilization Law was gradually being put into full effect through
        the piecemeal application of the various provisions at times when
        propaganda or military successes made conditions favorable.
FE 59     With the extension of military operations in China during 1938
        the mobilized strength of the Japanese Army steadily increased.
        On 26 March the MA in China reported that a total of 1,200,000
        Japanese troops were under arms. Various measures to strengthen
FE 44   the military conscription system, to increase the efficiency of 
FE 78   military training, and to begin to utilize the manpower of Japan's
FE 60   colonies for military purposes were reported during 1938. The MA
        in Tokyo reported on 18 January that the new law to require two
FE 44   years of military service by all conscripts in the Japanese Infantry,
        regardless of pre-conscription training, was necessary because of the
        need for "further training of soldiers in the varied weapons now in
FE 60   use." An Imperial Ordinance, effective 3 April, provided that all
        Japanese subjects, including Koreans, Formosans, Ainu, and South
        Sea Islanders, above the age of 17, might volunteer for the Army,
        subject to selection and physical examination. Under this new program
        400 Koreans were selected for training in 1938. Under the
FE 45   leadership of General Araki, Minister of Education, the Japanese
FE 78   educational system put increased emphasis on Japanese nationalism
        and military training.
FE 61     In commenting on the continued strengthening of Japanese home
        air defenses, the MA in Tokyo reported on 11 April that the Japanese
        were not greatly worried over the prospects of air raids by Chinese
        but that they were "drawing plans to combat potential danger from
        any source" and were "taking advantage of the present emergency
        to organize and train personnel on a nation-wide basis for coordina-
        tion with military preparations." On 14 May the MA in Tokyo
FE 67   reported Japanese plans for the construction of 28 new airdromes
        near large cities and of double purpose parks-emergency landing
        fields in Japanese villages.
FE 63     Tokyo reported on 19 April that appropriations for the Army
FE 64   during 1938-39 totaled Yen 3,823,594,189 (compared with Yen
FE 23   2,464,078,117 for the fiscal year 1937-38) of which Yen 2,259,000,000
        represented appropriations for the "China Incident" (against sup-
        plemental appropriations of Yen 1,422,712,777 during 1937-38).
FE 67     In the spring of 1938 the Japanese Government launched a vigorous
        "spiritual mobilization" program to secure on the home [6]
        front the fullest possible support of the war in China. The MA in
        Tokyo reported on 14 May: "The response of the people appears to
        be all that could be desired.... With stoic determination the people
FE 75   have set to fight a serious war." Tokyo reported "as significant"
        that General Araki, Minister of Education, stated in a speech on 2
        July that Japan possessed the perfect social system and therefore
        had become the center of the world. General Araki emphasized
        Japan's "mission" to unite the cultures of the Orient and the Occident
        in accordance with the "Imperial Principle."
FE 74     Tokyo reported on 1 July that the Japanese Army Air Corps was
        undergoing a "most widespread modernization program." On 1 July
        the number of Army planes was estimated to be 1,455 with 305 
        additional planes ordered but not delivered. The increase in first-
        line army planes from 782 to 1,093 and the decrease in obsolescent 
        planes from 435 to 359 during the preceding 12 months was "due largely 
        to the tremendous Army production program which commenced during
        the spring of 1937 and continues at present." Japanese aircraft
        production facilities were unable to meet the increased demands of
        the Army and Navy, however, and the Army bought 80 Fiat bombers
        abroad. During the preceding year Japanese army squadron



Page 202

        strength increased from 59 to 80, and on 1 July army pilots 
        numbered 1,600, with 350 trained during the preceding 12 months.
FE 67   Increasing Japanese irritation over the foreign aid rendered the
FE 71   Chinese Government by foreign powers was reflected in numerous
FE 72   reports from the Far East during 1938. France was especially
FE 73   singled out for allowing the use of French Indo-China railways
FE 76   in transporting material to the Chinese and for objecting to Japan's
FE 77   apparent intention of occupying Hainan Island.
FE 84
FE 85     The MA in China on 15 July quoted Prince Konoe as saying that
FE 76   "foreign aid alone is prolonging the life of the Chiang Kai-shek 
         regime and that "Japan would take both economic and diplomatic 
         measures to dissuade the foreign powers from aiding Chiang Kai-shek."
FE 67      While the Japanese were using discriminatory measures and other
FE 71    pressure against French English, and American interests in
FE 84    Japanese-occupied territories in the hope of stopping foreign aid
FE 67    to China, Germany tried to strengthen its ties with Japan by such
         acts as the recognition of Manchoukuo on 12 May, the ban on
FE 71    German exports of arms to China in June, and the withdrawal of
FE 76    German military advisers from China in July.

[7]

FE 72      Russo-Japanese relations remained strained as a result of 
FE 77    continued delay in renewal of the fishing agreement and of recurrent
FE 78    border incidents, especially the fighting at Changkufeng during July
FE 81    and August.
FE 79      During the European crisis over Czechoslovakia in September,
FE 80    the MA in China reported by radio that a Japanese-controlled news-
         paper in Tientsin and a Japanese military spokesman in Shanghai
         indicated that Japan was prepared to support Germany and Italy
         given to the point of war.
FE 84      After the League of Nations authorized the imposition of economic
         sanctions upon Japan, but left it up to the individual nations to
         take action as they saw fit, the MA in China commented on 12
         October that such decisions mean nothing unless strong nations "are
         willing to go to war to back them up." Japan answered this action
FE 85    of the League of Nations by severing all relations with that 
         organization on 2 November, but the Japanese retained their Mandated
         Islands.
FE 86    Tokyo reported that the United States note of 6 October relating to
         the Nine Power Treaty brought Japanese newspaper comments
         probably government-inspired, to the effect that this treaty was
         "out-moded" and could not "be made a cloak for political interference
         with Japan's aims."
FE 59      The Japanese Army continued its advance in China, having
FE 76    overrun over 500,000 square miles of territory in China by the
FE 85    end of 1938. Japan began to consolidate her military and economic
FE 58    gains in North and Central China. In order to strengthen the
FE 71    Japanese military machine, the semi-official North China Develop-
FE 75    ment Company and Central China Development Company placed
FE 72    their main emphasis upon the expansion of communication and
         transportation facilities and the production of iron, steel, coal, 
         and synthetic oil.

[8]                      1939

FE 91      The occupation of Hainan Island early in 1939, Tokyo reported on
         13 February, gave Japan the following advantages: (1) it provided
         an air base close to Burma and French Indo-China; (2) it made 
         possible a naval blockade of South China; (3) it brought French and 
         British holdings in South China under Japanese guns; (4) it threat-
         ened Manila with encirclement; and (5) it added a second "Formosa" to
         Japan's island possessions. On 28 February Tokyo interpreted the
FE 93    significance of recent Japanese pressure upon French Indo-China and
         related to this aggression the strategical implications involved: 
         "The occupation of Hainan is so obvious a form of pressure on the 
         French that it is universally assigned a political motive of 
         retaliation, in spite



Page 203

        of official denials. Occupation of the island not only gives Japan a
        potential naval base right in the front-yard of Indo-China, but it 
        also provides a close-in base for immediate air operations to cut the 
        supply routes leading into China from French territory." Concurrently, 
        the MA evaluated the reaction of the Japanese press to recent 
        manifestations of U. S. Foreign policy": "These developments [I. E., 
        United States sale of war planes to France and proposed fortification 
        of Guam], along with the parallel diplomatic action by the United 
        States, England and France concerning Hainan and previous issues, are
        widely interpreted as indications of abandonment by the U. S. 
        Administration of the isolationist tradition of U. S. foreign policy, 
        and of an alignment of the democratic powers against the authoritarian
        states including Japan." Subsequently, on 7 March, the MA in China
FE 95   reported the Japanese occupation of Hainan as a strategic move 
        directed toward French Indo-China. Hongkong, Singapore, and the
        Philippines rather than a military expedient for current operations in
        China.
FE 96      On 8 March Tokyo forwarded further evidence of Japanese legislative
        measures designed to bring the nation closer to a war footing.
        Of particular significance was the proposal of a new "Law for the
        Protection of Secrets Concerning Military Resources," supplementing 
        the provisions of the Military Secrets Protection Law of October 1937.
FE 99     On 23 March the MA in Tokyo reported that Japan was preparing
        a three-year plan for expansion of production of strategic materials
        and products in Japan, China and Manchoukuo in order to attain self-
        sufficiency. The MA stated that the government intended to spend 13
        billion yen on the project and that in his opinion the degree of 
        dependence on foreign sources in wartime would as a result be 
        considerably reduced.

[9]

FE 102    On 1 April the MA in Tokyo commented on and forwarded to the
        War Department a tactical study made by an Army officer under his
        command. The study reviewed tactical doctrines of the Japanese
        Army, as modified by the new combat regulations of 1939 and by 
        observation of current military operations in China. The report stated
        that the Japanese were making great efforts to modernize the Army,
        were spending large sums on aviation, motorization, and mechanization, 
        and were increasing the strength of the division artillery. They
        were at the same time endeavoring to increase the efficiency of their
        military organization and tactical operation.
          In the light of these improvements, the report concluded:
        "The division which started the China Incident will not be the 
        division of a future war. Increased material means will facilitate the
        task of Japanese tactics. Tactics are without meaning unless studied
        in relation to the human agent who will apply them in battle. This
        study has avoided excursions into the field of Japanese military 
        psychology and national characteristics; however, it should be read 
        with a constant eye to the nature of the Japanese Army for which these
        tactics are designed. It is an army easily misjudged by the foreign
        officer who sees first of all its straggling columns, slovenly dress 
        and unmilitary bearing. Just as there is no glitter to its 
        accoutrements, there is little theoretical excellence to recommend its 
        tactics. But it is an army which excels in durability and performance. 
        In the same way that its infantry "straggles" thirty miles a day and 
        arrives at the destination on time and with surprisingly few 
        casualties, its command and staff can be counted on to evolve plans 
        and orders which, without being brilliant tactical combinations, are 
        practical and workable schemes for getting a maximum performance from 
        the Japanese soldier. Furthermore, the Japanese Army which fought with 
        bows and arrows seventy years ago is thoroughly capable of learning 
        from its mistakes and advancing with the new developments of warfare.
        While its swaggering self-confidence may receive some rude jolts in
        a major war, it is a rugged army fired with a devotion to duty and a
        narrow patriotism which make it a dangerous foe on a field of its
        own choosing."



Page 204

FE 103    The rapid expansion of Japanese armaments was reflected in the
        1939-40 budget passed by the Diet. On l0 April Tokyo reported that
        the sum for defense amounted to Yen 6,432,155,345, which was 68.35
        per cent of the total budget. Both the Army and the Navy were
        being improved and modernized, and large sums were allocated to
        artillery, aviation, motorization, and new ships.
FE l04    Tokyo reported on 12 April further legislation enacted to establish
        the nation upon a more secure war footing. Articles 2 [10] and 6 of
        the National General Mobilization Law were invoked to provide
        (1) governmental limitation of dividends, and (2) governmental
        regulation of a maximum working day of 12 hours and of wages in
        factories employing more than 50 workers.
FE 105    In April, the MA in Japan, reviewing the trend of military 
FE 106  aviation toward expansion stated that since the beginning of the war
        in China, the personnel and aircraft strength of the Army Air Corps
        had increased 60 per cent, production had increased 125 per cent, and
        new construction of plants had enlarged production facilities by 40
        per cent.
FE 110    Tokyo on 7 June reported a revision of the Military Service Law
        which extended the term of service in the Conscript Reserve from 12
        years 4 months to 17 years 4 months and the training period of
        reservists to include the Second Conscript Reserve.
FE 111    On 9 June the MA in Tokyo reported on the series of disputes
        occurring toward the end of May and early in June between the
        Japanese and British Over control of the British and French 
        Concessions at Tientsin and the International Settlement at Shanghai.
        Ill feeling between the Japanese and the British was described as
        acute, particularly in Tientsin.
FE 113    On 1 July, Tokyo reported that the Army Air Corps, during the
FE 74   preceding year, had increased to 106 squadrons from 80; planes to
        1961 from 1093; and pilot strength to 2900 from 1600.
FE 115    The MA in China, reporting on 13 July with reference to the anti-
        British campaign of the Japanese, pointed out that "the Japanese
        credo is to drive out all western influence from China"; that the time
        for an anti-American campaign would come; and that Japanese 
        extremists and conservatives were agreed on the necessity for Japanese
        dominance in Asia.
FE 116    The MA in China; in a report dated 14 July, estimated the strength
        of the Japanese Army in China to be 840,000 men, and 240,000 
        additional men in Manchoukuo.
FE 120    The MA in Tokyo reported on 15 August that as a result of changes
        in conscription regulations, the estimated strength of the standing
        army will be 800,000 men, with an annual enrollment of 400,000 men.
FE 122    Tokyo reported on 12 September that the Japanese were taken
        aback by the announcement on 26 July of the American abrogation
        of the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation. The press claimed that
        the [11] United States Government was abandoning the isolationist 
        tradition of foreign policy and was entering the alignment
        of democratic powers against the authoritarian states, including
        Japan. The government had adopted a "wait-and-see" course, being
        deterred, according to the MA. From exploiting an opportunity to
        push the hard-pressed British only because of apprehension of Russia.
          On the same date the MA in Japan estimated the future course of
        Japanese foreign policy, particularly with reference to the outbreak
        of hostilities in Europe, as follows: "Under present conditions, it
        can safely be said that Japanese foreign policy will be directed 
        toward a settlement of the China incident as rapidly as possible, and 
        an avoidance, if possible, of any entanglements of any sort until a 
        settlement of the China war shall have been realized."
FE 124    Tokyo reported on 20 September that the Japanese government
        was concerned over possible loss of exports as a result of the China
        war and was taking steps toward reducing electric consumption on
        non-essential lines. The MA stated that the power shortage touched
        many points in the national economy and was a vital matter, although
        Japan, in his opinion, could fill the military need of manpower
        through the use of female labor or other devices to maintain electric
        power at a necessary level.



Page 205

FE 129    The MA in Shanghai dispatched on 1 October to the War Department
        a memorandum containing estimates of Japanese imperialistic
        designs in relation to the European war: "In the realm of foreign
        affairs Japan's immediate policy will be directed toward placating
        the United States and toward taking advantage of the present European
        embroglio to secure as many plums as possible.... Japan is
        reported to be watching carefully . . . the Dutch East Indies. It is
        rumored that Japan is waiting for the propitious moment to take
        advantage of British and French preoccupation to make a swoop in
        that direction.... Leap frogging Hongkong, French Indo-China and
        Singapore, the Japanese Navy could bring an irresistible force to
        bear and easily lop off this rich prize."
FE 132    On 1 November the same source defined the probability of an im-
        pending Japanese-American conflict and reported: "[The] Japanese
        realize that the United States is the greatest potential threat to the
        attainment of their 'Manifest Destiny' . . . Regardless of the final
        outcome, we may expect early retaliation for any decisive action we
        may take against Japan."
FE 133    Tokyo reported on 6 November (subsequent to the speech of 
        Ambassador Grew of 19 October expressing unfavorable American
        opinion toward Japanese aspirations and activities in China, that
        [12] attempts on the part of the United States to apply economic
        pressure upon Japan would result in "a refusal to accept such pressure
        supinely and a turning toward such more sympathetic nations as
        may be available." The imminence of Japanese realignment incidental
        to such economic pressure was thus estimated: "Should the European
        struggle develop into a world war through participation by the
        United States, the grouping of Germany, Japan, and possibly Russia
        and Italy is a combination which under some circumstances could
        be very embarrassing to the United States as a belligerent in a world
        war."
FE 134    An impending crisis in Japanese-American relations was reported
        on 20 November by the MA in Japan. Included among citations of
        threatening Japanese policy were the Japanese War Minister's 
        assertions that the Army intended to press the China Incident to a 
        successful conclusion "without over-much regard for public opinion" 
        and that although abrogation of the Japanese-American commercial 
        treaty would undeniably affect Japan's material mobilization plans,
        "this situation can be met and our policy toward the United States 
        should be a strong one "
FE 138    The year closed with the Japanese opening the lower Yangtze
        River. With reference to this move, the MA in Japan, in his report
        of 22 December, estimated that such conciliatory policies might
        temporarily ease relations but had little long-run significance in 
        view of the ambitious continental policy of the Japanese, from which 
        they were "not likely to be diverted except by force of arms or 
        circumstances."

[13]                     1940

FE 140    Reporting on 11 January that the imminent fall of the Abe Cabinet
        was due in part to Japanese concern over the approaching non-treaty
        status with the United States, the MA in China stated that Japanese
        political and military leaders "are anxious to appease us only until
        their 'immutable policy' of a Far Eastern hegemony is well on the
        road to accomplishment. Thereafter they feel they can disregard
        American opinion and pressure with impunity."
FE 141    Following the expiration of the Japanese-American trade treaty
FE 142  on 26 January, the Japanese felt that relations with the United
        States were in a "state of delicate balance." Tokyo reported that
        Japanese abrogation of the trade treaty with the Dutch might be
        the first step toward an eventual attempt at economic domination
        of the Netherlands Indies.
FE 144     The Japanese interpreted the new twenty-million-dollar American
        loan made to the Chinese Government in March as further evidence
        of American determination to try to thwart Japan's China program.
        The Japanese were pushing plans for setting up the Wang Ching-wei
        regime in Occupied China.



Page 206

FE 146    The American non-recognition policy toward the Wang Ching-wei
        regime was interpreted by the Japanese as additional proof of our
        determination to try to check the Japanese in China, but Tokyo
        reported on 10 April that the Japanese were hopeful of making a
        deal with England and France whereby those nations would not
        oppose Japan's China policy in return for assurances of Japan's 
        neutrality in the European war.
FE 147    Tokyo reported on 24 April that rumors of an imminent German
        attack on Holland were current in Japan, and that the Japanese
        demand for the maintenance of the status quo of the Netherlands
        Indies "was so presented as to invite the conclusion that it was
        intended to pave the way for intervention by the Japanese themselves."
FE 149    The increase in the Japanese Army budget for 1940-41 was accounted
        for by plans to reorganize the Army Air Corps and to replenish and
        improve armaments, Tokyo reported on 16 May. A chart of continuing
        expenditures for the years following 1940 indicated efforts to bring
        the equipment of the Japanese Army up-to-date as quickly as possible
        but the decrease in the "China Incident" budget showed that new
        large-scale campaigns were not expected in China.

[14]

FE 148    After the German invasion of Holland, Tokyo reported increasing
        Japanese concern over the status of the Netherlands Indies. Concen-
FE 150  trations of Japanese troops on the islands of Formosa and Hainan
FE 151  were reported on 7 June from Tokyo, while a report dated 10 June
        stated that the impending American embargo on the export of machine
        tools had created "quite a furor" in Japan and that agitation for
        "positive action" against the Netherlands Indies was increasing.
FE 152    The MA in China reported large Japanese military, naval, and air
        force concentrations on Hainan Island. The present goal is apparently
        French Indo-China, this report of 12 June added, but the "ultimate
        objective is of course complete domination of the East Asian 
        seaboard."
FE 153    The MA in Tokyo estimated that Japan had on 1 July a minimum
        of 4040 Army and Navy airplanes of all types, with 1510 additional
        planes contracted for and not delivered; a total of 4565 officers, 
        1350 cadets, and 63,045 enlisted men in the Army Air Corps and Naval 
        Air Service, including 5950 pilots; and a total of 238 air combat 
        squadrons composed of 114 in the Army Air Corps and 124 in the Naval 
FE 156  Air Services. Further improvement in military aviation was expected 
        with the establishment of the Hokota Army Air School for training in 
        light bombing, as this would release the facilities at the Hamamatsu 
        Army Air School for more extensive training in heavy bombardment and
        would be conducive to more efficient training in both light and heavy
        bombardment.
FE 154    On 11 July Tokyo reported that within Japan "the situation is at                
        present sharply drawn between those who favor a closer tie-up with
        Germany and prompt action against Allied possessions in the Far East,
        and those who, distrusting Germany or feeling that immediate action
        is not necessary or desirable, would continue to concentrate on 
        accomplishment of the China venture." Pending a decision, the 
        Japanese Army concentrated troops, ready for action, opposite both 
        Hong Kong and the French Indo-China border.
FE 155    Tokyo reported that Army Districts in Japan were being reorganized,
        effective 1 August, to increase the efficiency of the Japanese Army 
        for national defense, training, and administration.
FE 158    In the opinion of the MA in Tokyo the shakeup in the Japanese
        foreign service probably indicated an effort to remove men who were
        pro-American or pro-Allied. He reported on 4 September that the
        number of Japanese advocating an alignment with the Rome-Berlin
        Axis was increasing and that from a military standpoint the Japanese
        Army would not find it difficult "to take over the northern part of
        Indo-China."

[l5]

FE 159    On 19 September Tokyo reported that the Japanese Army continued
        to avoid further commitments in China in order to be ready for action



Page 207

        if and when a favorable opportunity presented itself for a new venture
        elsewhere. If the European war seemed to point to a long-drawn-out
        struggle, the Japanese would eventually decide to seize the desired
        territories, counting on having time to organize their conquests for
        defense against the final European victor. The Japanese felt that
        the United States was certain to object to this expansion, was likely
        to retaliate by economic means, and might possibly oppose aggression
        with armed force. The Japanese believed that time would be on their
        side, however, as they felt it would be years before America's naval
        and military strength could be built up sufficiently for major 
        operations in the Far East as long as the German menace still existed. 
        The most radical immediate action, however, would probably be a move
        across French Indo-China, with or without acquiescence, to hasten the
        conclusion of the China War.
FE 160    Tokyo reported on 6 October that the Tripartite Pact had been signed
        after Japan realized that the United States was irreconcilably opposed
        to Japanese expansion in Asia. Japan had decided to change her tradi-
        tional policy of "at least quiet relations" with the United States and
        to pursue a course to satisfy her national ambitions. The statement
        of Prince Konoe, in which he flatly declared that the question of 
        peace or war in the Pacific "will be decided by whether Japan and the 
        United States respect and understand the stand of each other" 
        expressed the determination of the Japanese not to be dissuaded from 
FE 161  their present ambitions by any half-way measures. Other reports from 
FE 162  Japan and China during October emphasized the tense state of Japanese-
FE 163  American relations and the probability of continued Japanese aggress-
        sion.
FE 164    On 31 October the MA in China reported that if a nonaggression pact
        could be signed with Russia, Japan would probably continue her south-
        ern expansion regardless of its effect on Japanese-American relations
FE 165    Details of a new "Ten-Year-Plan" to weld Japan, China, and Man-
        choukuo into a close-knit economic unit were transmitted by the MA
        in Tokyo on 18 November, with comment on the great potential strength
        of Japan's economic position if such plans were to succeed.
FE 166    The MA in London forwarded on 20 November a report on the Jap-
        anese Army which stated, among other things, that the Japanese were
        probably ahead of most Western nations in landing and [16]
        combined operations. Special mention was made of the emphasis
        which the Japanese put on outflanking and enveloping movements in
        attacking and on morale and endurance in training army personnel.
        Japan was estimated to have had 1,350,000 men under arms, of whom
        1,000,000 had had active service experience, as of December, 1939.
        This report concluded that "the Japanese army is a formidable fighting
        machine but has not yet reached the standard of efficiency of Western
        armies. It is, however, trained for and will probably only required
        to fight in Eastern Asia where it will have inherent advantages over 
        an Opponent,"
FE 167    Reports from both China and Japan discussed the Japanese Army's
FE 168  evacuation of Kwangsi Province in November, and indicated that
        Japan's next move might be into southern French Indo-China.
FE 168  The MA in China, in commenting on Japan's plane with regard to
        the troops being assembled on the islands of Formosa and Hainan,
        observed that "some even presume an attack on the Philippines via
        Lingayen Gulf."
FE 169    Tokyo reported on 12 December that Ambassador Nomura's
        mission to try to improve Japanese-American relations was
        probably "doomed from the start" because the Japanese Government
        was "completely in the hands of the more chauvinistic elements"
        and was not prepared to make concessions in the Japanese program
        for East Asia which would be acceptable to American opinion.

[17]                    1941

FE 170    In forwarding the English text of the Japan-Thailand Treaty
        of Amity, the Tokyo MA on 11 January called attention to the
        progress of Japanese designs on French Indo-China and on bases
        for operations against Malaya and Singapore.



Page 208

FE 174    In February Tokyo reported on the extreme character of the
        National Defense Security Act and said that its immediate effect
        would be closure of many sources of information. The MA in
FE 172  China reported that Japan was promoting border trouble in order to
        profit as a mediator "preserving the peace" between Thailand and
        French Indo-China. He also commented on Japan's warnings to the
FE 173  United States that she would tolerate no interference in develop-
        ing the East Asia economic bloc, on her inclusion of the Netherlands
        Indies in this bloc, and on the reports that many Japanese divisions
        were being trained on Formosa and Hainan, all of which indicated
        plans to move southward. He believed that under certain conditions
        Japan would move directly on the Netherlands Indies.
FE 175    On 1 March Chungking reported that foreigners generally believed
        Japan's move on Singapore and the Netherlands Indies de-
        pended upon the outcome of Germany's offensive against England.
FE 177  The Military Observer at Singapore on 22 March reviewed the
FE 178  disposition of British forces in Malaya with approval, but pre-
        dicted difficulties in meeting flank attacks and in maintain-
        ing signal communications. He also reported that the Japanese
        were reconnoitering the northern border of Malaya.
FE 179    On 18 April Tokyo pointed out that although the newly-concluded
        Japanese-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact obviously freed Japan on one
        front and enabled her to prepare for issues elsewhere, it removed
        none of the basic differences of opinion between the two countries.
FE 180    Tokyo reported the establishment of an Army Mechanization Head-
        quarters charged with research into, and supervision of, training in
        the use of mechanized equipment.
FE 181    Meanwhile on 2 May Tokyo cabled a warning that the reported             
        increases of Japanese strength in Formosa, Hainan, and French Indo-
        China were greater than normal for the China Incident and that these 
        forces "may be there in readiness for a move against Singapore or East  
        Indies." A report on field operations from Tokyo,
FE 184  21 May, warned that the Japanese would probably attempt [18]
        an all-out drive to conclude the China Incident in order to have a
        free hand for southward expansion if the United States should be-
FE 182  come involved in the war in Europe. In transmitting the Japanese
        Army Budget for the fiscal year 1941 42, the Tokyo MA contrasted
        it with the budget for the preceding year and pointed out that the
        China Incident expenditures alone could not explain its expansion.
FE 185    On 29 May Chunking forwarded Chinese estimates that Japan had
        2000 Navy planes and 2500 Army planes.
FE 186    On 3 June Tokyo wrote: "* * * two new Inspectorates have
        been established, the Chemical Warfare Inspectorate and the Com-
        munications Inspectorate, thus considerably raising these two forms
        of military activity above the places which they have heretofore
FE 187  occupied in the Japanese services." Tokyo also reported on the
FE 188  yellow fever inoculations given in May to certain officers attached
        to northern units, on the training for transport of troops and sup-
        plies by air, and on parachute troop training. The Japanese Gov-
FE 194  ernment at this time was said to be facing great difficulty in pre-
        serving restraint vis-a-vis internal public pressure for strong, 
        direct action toward the Netherlands Indies after the failure of the 
        trade negotiations at Batavia.
FE 189    The Singapore MO believed that the Japanese would not move
        without a 50-50 chance for success. He expressed the opinion on
        5 June that the Japanese were forcing economic penetration of
        Thailand and Indo-China, to be followed by military occupation
        in readiness for any advantage to be had from weakened British
        or American positions in that area. "With regards to defense of
        Malaya," he continued, "it is believed that the present forces of
        approximately 60,000 Army and 5,000 Royal Air Force personnel
        can contain for six months or more the force of six divisions and
        1,000 planes which it is estimated Japan can now send against them."
FE 190    Hongkong reported that on 14 June 27 Japanese transports con-
        voyed by 21 destroyers were off the China coast traveling southward,
FE 192  and were expected to be off Hongkong on 17 June. On 25 June Hong-
        Kong further reported that three convoys, totaling about 50 trans-



Page 209

        ports, had been seen during the preceding fortnight and were believed
        to have gone to the Pescadores or Formosa. The MA in 
FE 191  Mexico forwarded a report that the Japanese were constructing special  
        small submarines for attacking the American fleet in Pearl Harbor, and 
        that a training program then under way included towing them from Japan 
        to positions off the Hawaiian Islands, where they practiced surfacing 
        and submerging. 

[19]

FE 193    Chungking believed that the sudden German offensive against Rus-
        sia had caused a temporary lull in the threatening attitude toward
FE 195  the United States, and on 27 June cabled the opinion that the
        Japanese would be reluctant to make a major move until results
        of border incidents revealed the potential strength of the Russians.
FE 197    On 12 July Tokyo cabled: "Considerable scale of mobilization
FE 196  and unusual secrecy attending it now beyond question." Tokyo
        believed the Government, however, was still seeking to avoid positive
FE 199  commitments. Two days later Tokyo cabled that it was "now evi-
        dent that large scale mobilization under way covered by unusual
        secrecy. Some newly mobilized men being sent to Manchoukuo but
        unable to determine number or whether any being sent south."
FE 200    Hongkong reported that 19 Japanese transports were moving south-
        ward from Formosa on 12 July.
FE 201    Chinese Military Intelligence was reported on 15 July to anticipate
        an early invasion of French Indo-China and to believe that areas
        newly ceded to Thailand were to be used as air bases.
FE 203    On 21 July Singapore reported that the Japanese had delivered a
        virtual ultimatum, with a 20 July deadline, in which they de-
        manded the use of naval bases in southern French Indo-China. "If
        the French refuse, regardless of British or United States inter-
        ference, the bases will be taken forcibly."
FE 204    London on 22 July reported belief that the Japanese had com-
        pleted all preparations for taking over French Indo-China bases.
FE 206    On 26 July Tokyo cabled: "Largest single draft since initial mo-
        bilization for China War now under way under conditions extreme
        secrecy involving restrictions on movements foreigners in all direc-
FE 207  tions." Some Japanese in Tokyo interpreted the 26 July freezing
        of Japanese credits by the United States as the first step toward
        a final break with America.
FE 208    Singapore on 29 July estimated that Japanese strength in French
        Indo-China was approaching 40,000 men and believed there would
        be forcible seizure of additional bases.
FE 209    Japan demanded the right to occupy Thai naval and air bases,
        and on 31 July Bangkok commented: "An immediate Nipponese
        move is anticipated due to Thai indecision."

[20]

FE 211    Estimates were forwarded from London on 3 August that more
FE 220  than 500,000 Japanese were mobilized during June and July, and
        further British estimates, forwarded from Chungking, 20 August,
        placed Japanese strength at 49 divisions, with 54 available by the
        end of August when mobilization would be complete.
FE 212    The MA in Tokyo estimated that Japan had on 1 July 3200 Army
(FE 153)airplanes (1940 estimate was 2010)- a total of 3600 officers, 1600
        cadets and 34,800 enlisted men (1940 estimate was 2900 officers, 1350
        cadets and 28,700 enlisted men) in the Army Air corps, including 3900
        pilots (1940_3100 pilots); and 136 air combat squadrons in the Army
        Air Corps (1940_114 combat air squadrons).
FE 213    Tokyo estimated on 5 August that the aircraft industry, working
        at maximum wartime capacity, could produce annually the equivalent
        of 4,500 two-place, single-engine military airplanes. Actual produc-
        tion for the period 1 July 1940 to 30 June 1941 was estimated to be
        2,730 combat aircraft. It was concluded that since the end of 1939
        the aircraft industry had increased production by about one-half and
        of capacity by about two-thirds, while completion of construction then 
        in




Page 210

        sight would give a capacity double that of 1939. The number of em-
        ployees engaged in the manufacture of airplanes had increased 55 per
        cent, and employees in engine manufacturing plants had increased in
        number 57 per cent from 1938-39 to 1940-41.
FE 218    Chungking reported 15 August Japanese plans to take over inter-
        national concessions and to capture American marines in Shanghai
        by surprise.
FE 219    Chungking on 19 August forwarded British estimates that Japanese
        tank strength, exclusive of baby tanks and armored machine gun cars,
        was ten regiments, each consisting of 160 tanks, with an equal num-
        ber in reserve.
FE 224    In addition the MA at Chungking on 27 August forwarded a Rus-
        sian estimate that the actual strength of the Japanese Army was 48
        divisions and 20 independent brigades (approximately 58 divisions)
        with 300,000 men in training, possibly ready in three months. Un-
        called reserves were believed to number 210,000. Eleven divisions
        could be organized from reserves already trained and 16 from those
        then in training. These figures include corps, army, and service
        troops. Artillery was believe to be insufficient. The total potential
        strength was estimated by the Russians to be 76 divisions.

[21]

FE 222    On 21 August Tokyo reported that drastic shipping control meas-
FE 223  ures were about to be instituted by the Japanese Cabinet. Tokyo also
        reported five main forces, composed of ten armies (54 divisions),
        located overseas.
FE 226    On 1 September the Tokyo MA reported on the organization and
        high quality of the Japanese military signal communications system
        and commented that Japanese radio equipment was "comparable to
        our own in every respect."
FE 229    On 11 September Tokyo made a full report on the National mobili-
        zation which had begun 3 June. In his opinion "in round numbers
        about 700,000 were called up during this mobilization." This number
        did not include the home defense "National Army," which was called
        up for five days' training. "The number of men mobilized was far
        too great for mere replacement purposes in existing divisions now in
        Japan or on the Continent . . . While estimates of other foreign ob-
        servers place the total number of men mobilized as high as 1,250,000
        it is believed that these estimates . . . [are too high]." About 90
        per cent of the total of 18,000 horses also mobilized at this time 
        were known to have gone south rather than direct to Manchoukuo or 
        Korea.
FE 230    Japan set up a National Defense General Headquarters (reported
        by Tokyo on 16 September) in a move to improve arrangements for
        the defense of Japan Proper.
FE 231    Invocation of the last drastic measures of the 1938 National Mobil-
        ization Law (revised) and a tense political atmosphere indicated
        according to Tokyo, that the day for a final decision on "immutable"
        policies was drawing near. Internally the nation was mobilizing for
        total war.
FE 239    On 14 October Hongkong reported the presence of 22 transports
        on the Pearl River.
FE 240    The China MA cabled on 17 October: "Increased Nazi activity in
        Japan plus the cabinet crisis and attacks on U. S. by spokesmen and
        press considered strong evidence of drastic action in the near 
        future."
FE 242    Commenting on heavy troop movements into French Indo-China
        Tokyo concluded on 20 October: "If the rumored increase goes above
        the number originally agreed upon there cannot remain much doubt
        as to the intention behind it."

[22]

FE 243    Tokyo reported on 20 October that General Tojo, on becoming
        Premier, retained his status as an officer on the active list, an 
        unusual



Page 211

        procedure, and concluded that the third Konoe cabinet fell because
        of inability to meet army criticism of its policy toward French Indo-
        China, the conversations in Washington, and its policy vis-a-vis a
        weakened Russia.
FE 245    London cabled on 21 October: "Japanese troops in Indo-China will
        be strengthened as follows: 36,000 there now; an estimated 20,000
        enroute, and an additional 20,000 included in Japanese plans." Chung-
FE 246  king on 23 October reported the official French Indo-Chinese view to
        be that the Japanese would attack Thailand about 15 November.
FE 247    A general southward movement of Japanese shipping in the Western
        Pacific was reported on 27 October from Singapore, together with
        intelligence that two aircraft carriers and 80 flying boats, fighters 
        and bombers were operating in the Mandated Islands.
FE 249    Under pretext of surveying a new commercial air route the Japanese
        made a number of flights between Palau (Pelew) and Timor, violating
        at the same time certain provisions of the agreement granting them
        the privilege of flying over Dutch territory. Unusual passenger lists,
        the absence of commercial justification, the type of equipment, and
        the movement of guard vessels were reported on by the MO at
        Bandoeng on 30 October.
FE 248    On 29 October the MA in Chungking radioed that Japanese strength
        in French Indo-China was then 57,000 troops, and that it was steadily
        increasing in numbers. He anticipated a possible drive through
FE 250  Yunnan toward the Burma Road. Thailand was reported ready to
        capitulate in the hope that the country would be saved from the
        ravages of war.
FE 262    The Japanese Consul General at Batavia was reported to have
        recommended that on the outbreak of war all Japanese should report
        promptly to the Netherlands Indies authorities for internment, thus
FE 253  avoiding violence. The Singapore British, however, were reported
        by the MO to believe that no attack could be expected before April
        because of the prevailing northeast monsoon over Malaya.
FE 254    The MA in London forwarded on 9 November a British opinion that
        Japan no longer felt that it must make every effort to avoid war with
        the United States and that Japan would find it too difficult to attack
        Malaya or the Burma Road and hence might be expected to attack
        Netherlands Indies.

[23]

FE 258    On 18 November Tokyo estimated production of aircraft at 200
        planes per month for the Army. All factories in the aircraft industry
        had gone on a 3-shift 24-hour day in mid-June. The MA estimated
        that the current monthly maximum for production was 420 military
        planes, including trainers.
FE 258    The London MA on 21 November cabled a summary of British
        Intelligence as of 18 November, in which it was stated that failure
        of agreement in the Washington talks would require a major Japanese
        decision whether to risk probable war; that Japan would probably not
        attack Siberia at that time; that unless agreement was reached in
        Washington, the war in China would continue; that Japan probably
        did not intend to attack the Burma Road at that time; and that the
        occupation of Thailand, the best possibility for the moment, would
        pave the way for subsequent attack upon Malaya, yet minimize the
        risk of a general war.
FE 264    The Singapore MO advised the War Department on 2 December
        that the alert in Malaya had been advanced from the third to the
        second degree on the previous day. Japanese reconnaissance activ-
FE 280  ities over Malaya were reported.
FE 288    The MA in Melbourne radioed that on 8 December the Netherlands
        Far East Command, upon learning of Japanese naval moves on Menado
        and/or Ambon out of Palau, had ordered the execution of Plan A-2.



Page 212

                         FAR EASTERN DOCUMENTS*
                                CONTENTS
                                VOLUME I
                                                                   FE Docu-
Source, Date   Subject                                             ment
                                                                   Number

Tokyo M/A      The Japanese Army during 1936                             1
  No. 8601
  13 Jan 37
Tokyo M/A      Comment on Current Events, January 21-30, 1937            2
  No. 8631
  30 Jan 37
Tokyo M/A      [Japanese] Militarized Societies_Imperial                 3
  No. 8667       Reservists Association.
  25 Feb 37
Tokyo M/A      Political Issues and Problems: 70th Session of the        4
  No. 8670       [Japanese] Diet.
  1 Mar 37
Tokyo M/A      Aircraft Production (Non-Governmental) [Japan]            5
  No. 8681       Aircraft Industrial Activity.
  11 Mar 37
Tokyo M/A      Air Budgets [Japan]. Appropriations for Civil and         6
  No. 8707       Military Aviation.
  31 Mar 37
Tokyo M/A      General Headquarters Air Force [Japan]. Organization      7
  No. 8724       of G H Q Air Force.
  9 Apr 37 
Tokyo M/A      Comment on Current Events, April 1-15, 1937               8
  No. 8738
  17 Apr 37
China M/A      Situation Report, April 10-23, 1937                       9
  No. 9540
  23 Apr 37
Tokyo M/A      Distribution of Troops [Japan]. Proposed Air Regiments   10
  No. 8744
  23 Apr. 37

[ii]

Tokyo M/A      Military Aviation [Japan]. 5th Air Regiment              11
  No. 8762
  5 May 37
Tokyo M/A      Military Aviation [Japan]. Tokorozawa Army Air           12
  No. 8767       Technical School.
  8 May 37
Tokyo M/A      Aircraft Production (Non-Governmental) [Japan].          13
  No. 8775       Expansion of Aviation Manufacturing Industry 
  11 May 37
Tokyo M/A      Aircraft Production (Non-Governmental) [Japan].          14
  No. 8794       Nakajima Aircraft Factory (Otamachi, Gumma 
  25 May 37      prefecture)
Tokyo M/A      Organization of the [Japanese] Cabinet Planning Board    15
  No. 8795
  26 May 37
Tokyo M/A      [Japanese] Foreign Relations. North China Incident       16
  No. 8893
  22 July 37
Tokyo M/A      National Defense Laws [Japan]. Military Secrets          17
  No. 8930       Protection Law.
  10 Aug 37
Tokyo M/A      [Japanese] Foreign Relations. North China Incident       18
  No. 8941
  18 Aug 37
Tokyo M/A      Distribution of Troops [Japan]. Number and               19
  No. 8945        Classification of Air Units.
  25 Aug 37

                        VOLUME II

Tokyo M/A      Annual Aviation Intelligence Report [Japan].             20
  No. 8948     July 1, 1937  
  26 Aug 37

* Bound in fifteen volumes of Far Eastern Documents File. 



Page 213

                         FAR EASTERN DOCUMENTS*_Continued
                                  VOLUME III
 
                                                                   FE Docu-
Source, Date   Subject                                             ment
                                                                   Number

China M/A      Situation Report, August 21_September 1, 1937.           21
  No. 9588       (Shanghai Area, North China, Order of Battle).
  1 Sept. 37
Tokyo M/A      Foreign Relations_North China Incident                   22
  No. 8960
  1 Sept 37
Tokyo M/A      Government Budget_War Department Budget [Japan]          23
  No. 8978       1937-1938.
  15 Sept 37
Tokyo M/A      General Mobilization [Japan]                             24
  No 8973
  17 Sept 37
Tokyo M/A      Mobilization of Industry_Munitions Industry              25
  No. 8981       Mobilization Law.
  17 Sept 37
Tokyo M/A      Foreign Relations [Japan]. North China Incident          26
  No. 8980
  18 Sept 37
Tokyo M/A      Comments on Aviation Personnel [Japan]                   27
  No. 8989
  22 Sept 37
Tokyo M/A      Organization and Distribution of Troops [Japan]          28 
  No. 9004       Movement of Air Units. Expansion Program.
  30 Sept 37
Tokyo M/A      Increase in Active Army Divisions [Japan]                29
  No 9001
  30 Sept 37
Tokyo M/A      Mobilization of Personnel [Japan]. Available Man Power,  30
  No. 9002
  30 Sept 37

[iv]

Tokyo M/A      Commissioned, Warrant and Enlisted Personnel [Japanese   31
  No. 9005       Army]. Terms of Service Extended.
  30 Sept 37
Tokyo M/A      Foreign Relations [Japan]. The United States.            32
  No. 9035
  14 Oct 37
China M/O      Sino-Japanese Operations                                 33
  (Colonel Ord)
  20 Oct 37
Tokyo M/A      Foreign Relations [Japan]. U. S. S. R                    34
  No. 9059
  28 Oct 37
Tokyo M/A      Foreign Relations [Japan]. Great Britain                 35
  No. 9060
  28 Oct 37
Tokyo M/A      Japanese Order of Battle in North China:                 36
  Radiogram No. 343
  29 Oct 37
Tokyo M/A      Estimate of Strength of Kwantung Army                    37
  Radiogram No. 345
  l Nov 37
Tokyo M/A      Political Issues and Problems [Japan]. Organization      38
  No. 9071       of the New Planning Board (Kikaku-in).
  4 Nov 37
Tokyo M/A      National Defense Policy_General [Japan]. Military        39
  No. 9089       Secrets Protection Law Enforcement Regulations.
  16 Nov 37
Tokyo M/A      [Japanese] Imperial Headquarters (Daihonei)              40
  No. 9099
  24 Nov 37
Tokyo M/A      Foreign Relations [Japan]. The Panay Sinking             41
  No. 9150
  22 Dec 37

*Bound in fifteen volumes of Far Eastern Documents File.



Page 214

                         FAR EASTERN DOCUMENTS*_Continued
                                  VOLUME IV
 
                                                                   FE Docu-
Source, Date   Subject                                             ment
                                                                   Number

Tokyo M/A      Foreign Relations [Japan]. The Panay Sinking             42
  No. 9172       (Continued from Report No. 9160, 
  6 Jan 38        December 22, 1937).
Tokyo M/A      Japanese Warehouse and Factory Stocks, War Reserves      43
 (via Manila)
  Radiogram No. 363
  14 Jan 38
Tokyo M/A      Recruitment_Enlisted Personnel [Japan]. Enrollments      44
  No. 9192       in the Active Army.
  18 Jan 38 
Tokyo M/A      Military Schools and Colleges [Japan].                   45
  No. 9193       Preconscriptional Training.
  18 Jan 38
Tokyo M/A      Comment on Current Events, January 6-19, 1938            46
  No. 9198
  19 Jan 38
Tokyo M/A      Foreign Relations [Japan]. Great Britain                 47
  No. 9201
  19 Jan 38
Tokyo M/A      Reactivation of Divisions of Japanese Army               48
Radiogram No. 365
  22 Jan 38
Tokyo M/A      Armament and Equipment. Organizational, Standard         49
  No. 9206       [Japan] New Equipment for the Japanese Army Air Corps.
  26 Jan 38
Tokyo M/A      Japanese Troop Concentrations in Formosa                 50
Radiogram No. 368
  31 Jan 38
China M/A      Comments on Current Events, January 13-February 1, 1938  51
  No. 9633
  1 Feb 38
Tokyo M/A      Foreign Relations [Japan]. U.S.S.R.                      52
  No. 9219
  2 Feb 38

[vi]

Tokyo M/A      Recruitment_Enlisted Personnel [Japan]. Age and          53
  No 9232      Physical Standards for Enrollment in the Active Army.
  12 Feb 38
Tokyo M/A      Comment on Current Events, February 3-16, 1938           54
  No. 9239
  17 Feb 38
Tokyo M/A      Political Issues and Problems [Japan]. 73rd Diet         55
  No. 9240       (Continued from Report No. 9221 February 3, 1938).
  18 Feb 38
Tokyo M/A      Comment on Current Events, February l8-March 2, 1938     56
  No. 9256
  2 March 38
Tokyo M/A      Political Issues and Problems [Japan]. 73rd Diet         57
  No. 9286
  17 March 38
Tokyo M/A      Comment on Current Events, March 3-17, 1938              58
  No. 9288
  18 March 38
Peiping M/A    Strength of Japanese Troops in China                     59
  Radiogram No. 893
  26 March 38
Tokyo M/A      Recruitment_Enlisted Personnel [Japan], Volunteer        60
  No 9322        Enrollment of Japanese Subjects_Active Army.
  5 April 38
Tokyo M/A      Air Defense System [Japan]. Strengthening of Japanese    61
  No. 9326       Home Air Defense.
  11 April 38
Tokyo M/A      Comment on Current Events, April 1-13, 1938              62
  No. 9332
  13 April 38
Tokyo M/A      Expenditures for National Defense by Japan               63
  Memo to A C. of S., G-2
  18 April 38

[vii]

Tokyo M/A      War Department Budget [Japan].  1938-1939 Army Budget    64
  No. 9336
  19 April 38

*Bound in fifteen volumes of Far Eastern Documents File.



Page 215

                         FAR EASTERN DOCUMENTS*_Continued
                                  VOLUME IV_Continued
 
                                                                   FE Docu-
Source, Date   Subject                                             ment
                                                                   Number

Tokyo M/A      Mobilization of Industry [Japan]. General Mobilization   65
  No. 9339       Law.
  19 April 38
Tokyo M/A      Political Issues and Problems [Japan]. The Effect of     66
  No 9376        the Protracted China Operations in Japan.
  12 May 38
Tokyo M/A      Comment on Current Events, April 27-May 13,1938.         67
  No 9380
  14 May 38
Tokyo M/A      Reply to Evaluation of Reports                           68
  Memo for A. C. of S., G-2
  16 May 38
Tokyo M/A      Comment on Current Events, May 14-May 26, 1938           --
  No 9397
  26 May 38
Tokyo M/A      Cabinet Changes Relative to China Operations;            70
  Radiogram No. 386  Mobilization
  26 May 38

                               VOLUME V

Tokyo M/A      Comment on Current Events, May 27-June 9, 1938           71
  No. 9422
  11 June 38
Tokyo M/A      Comment on Current Events, June 10-20 1938               72
  No. 9440
  22 June 38
China M/A      Comments on Current Events, May 22-June 25, 1938         73
  No. 9668
  26 June 38
Tokyo M/A      Annual Aviation Intelligence Report [Japan]. Annual      74
  No. 9381       Aviation Intelligence Report as of July 1, 1938.
  1 July 38

[viii]

Tokyo M/A      Comment on Current Events, June 21-July 7, 1938          75
  No. 9462
  11 July 38
China M/A      Comments on Current Events, June 26-July 16, 1938        76
  No. 9676
  15 July 38
Tokyo M/A      Comment on Current Events, July 8-21,1938               7 [sic]
  No. 9486
  22 July 38
Tokyo M/A      Comments on Current Events, August 10-27, 1938           78
  No. 9539
  27 Aug 38                                                                                          
Peiping M/A    Japanese Military Operations in China                    79
  Radiogram (via Naval Communication Service)
  5 Sept 38
Peiping M/A    Japanese Operations and Troop Dispositions in China      80
  Radiogram (via Naval Communication Service)
  20 Sept 38
Tokyo M/A      Comments on Current Events, August 28 September 21, 1938 81
  No. 9574
  21 Sept 38
Peiping M/A    Japanese Policies toward Foreign Powers in China         82
  Radiogram (via Naval Communication Service)
  30 Sept 38
Tokyo M/A      Government Policy Pertaining to Air [Japan]. Aircraft    83
  No. 9583       Manufacturing Industry Law.

[ix]

China M/A      Comments on Current Events, September 14-               8 [sic]
  No. 9687       October 12, 1938 
  12 Oct 38

*Bound in fifteen volumes of Far Eastern Documents File.



Page 216

                         FAR EASTERN DOCUMENTS*_Continued
                                  VOLUME V_Continued
 
                                                                   FE Docu-
Source, Date   Subject                                             ment
                                                                   Number

Tokyo M/A      Comments on Current Political Events; October 19-         85
  No. 9607       November 4 1938.
  4 Nov 38
Tokyo M/A      Comment's on Current Political Events,                    86
  No. 9619        
  15 Nov 38
Tokyo M/A      Mobilization of Industry [Japan]. Invocation of           87
  No. 9623       Article II of National Mobilization Bill.
  21 Nov 38
Tokyo M/A      Mobilization of Industry [Japan]. Invocations of          88
  No 9633        Portions of Mobilization Law.
  30 Nov 38

                                  VOLUME VI

Tokyo M/A      Distribution of Major Japanese Army Units Overseas        89
  No. 9709
  6 Feb 39
Tokyo M/A      National and (Government Income. Taxation to Meet         90
  No. 9711       1939-1940 Budget.
  9 Feb. 39
Tokyo M/A      Field Operations in China, January 28-February 13, 1939   91
  No. 9713
  13 Feb 39
Tokyo M/A      Estimate of National Wealth [of Japan]                    92
  No. 9722
  27 Feb 39
Tokyo M/A      Comments on Current Events, February 28, 1939 (No. 4)     93
  No. 9726
  28 Feb 39
Tokyo M/A      Adherence of Manchoukuo and Hungary to Anti-Comintern     94
  No. 9734        Pact.
  7 Mar 39

[x]

China M/A      Situation Report, February 5th-March 6th, 1939            95
  No. 9744
  7 Mar 39
Tokyo M/A      National Defense Policy_General [Japan]. Military         96
  No. 9735       Resource Secrets Protection Law.
  8 Mar 39
China M/A      Comment on Current Events, February 9-March 9, 1939       97
  No. 9745
  9 Mar 39
Tokyo M/A      Comments on Current Events, March 14, 1939 (No. 5)        98
  No. 9739 
  14 Mar 39
Tokyo M/A      Plan for Expansion of Production [Japan]                  99
  No. 9744
  23 Mar 39
Tokyo M/A      Appropriation for 1939-1940 Budget [Japan]               100
  No. 9748
  25 Mar 39
Tokyo M/A      Aircraft Production [Japan]. Licensed Aircraft           101 
  No. 9749       Manufacturers.
  27 Mar 39

                              VOLUME VII

Tokyo M/A      Tactical Doctrine of the Japanese Army                   102
  No. 9755
  1 Apr 39

                               VOLUME VIII

Tokyo M/A      Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1939-1940 [Japan]         103
  No. 9754
  10 Apr 39

*Bound in fifteen volumes of Far Eastern Documents File.



Page 217

                         FAR EASTERN DOCUMENTS*_Continued
                                  VOLUME III
 
                                                                   FE Docu-
Source, Date   Subject                                             ment
                                                                   Number

Tokyo M/A      Comments on Current Events April 12, 1939 (No. 7)        104
  No. 9764
  12 Apr 39

[xi]

Tokyo M/A      Aviation School System_General [Japan]. Tokyo Army       105
  No. 9766       Air School.
  13 Apr 39
Tokyo M/A      Annual Aviation Intelligence Report [Japan].             106
  No. 9768       Supplementary Air Force Strength Report as of 
  24 Apr 39      February 28 1939.
Tokyo M/A      Comments on Current Events, April 26,1939 (No. 8)        107
  No. 9772
  26 Apr 39
Tokyo M/A      Expenditures for National Defence by Japan               108
  Memo to A. C. of S., G-2
  No. 9778
  4 May 39
Tokyo M/A      Comments on Current Events May 24, 1939 (No. 1O)         109
  No. 9796
  24 May 39
Tokyo M/A      Recruitment_Enlisted Personnel [Japan]. Changes in       110
  No. 9803       Conscription Regulations.
  7 June 39
Tokyo M/A      Comments on Current Events, June ,9 1939 (No. 11)        111
  No. 9807
  9 June 39
Tokyo M/A      Annual Aviation Intelligence Report. Annual Aviation     112
  No 9858        Digest. [Japan]
  1 July 39
Tokyo M/A      Annual Aviation Intelligence Report [Japan]. Aviation    113
  No. 9850       Statistics_MID_ONI Joint Forms.
  1 July 39

                                VOLUME IX

Tokyo M/A      Comments on Current Events, July 4, l939 (No. 13)        114
  No. 9833
  4 July 39
China M/A      Comments on Current Events, June 16 July 13, 1939        115
  No. 9783
  13 July 39

[xii]

China M/A      Situation Report, June 12-July 11, 1939                  116
  No. 9784
  14 July 39
Tokyo M/A      Comments on Current Events July 19, 1939 (No. 14)        117
  No. 9845
  19 July 39
Tokyo M/A      Comments on Current Events August 4, l939 (No. 16)       118
  No. 9859
  4 Aug 39
Tokyo M/A      Minor Military Operations, Outer Mongolian Border        119
  No. 9868       Incident 
  14 Aug 39
Tokyo M/A      Reply to Evaluation of Reports                           120
  No. 9873
  15 Aug 39
Tokyo M/A      Comments on Current Events, August 25, 1939  (No. 17)    121
  No. 9877
  25 Aug 39
Tokyo M/A      [Japanese] Foreign Relations                             122
  No 9893
  12 Sept 39
Tokyo M/A      Minor Military Operations, Outer Mongolian Border        123
  No. 9883       Incident, August 13-September 10, 1939.
  12 Sept 39
Tokyo M/A      Shortage of Electric Power [Japan]                       124
  No. 9899 
  20 Sept 39

*Bound in fifteen volumes of Far Eastern Documents File.



Page 218

                         FAR EASTERN DOCUMENTS*_Continued
                                  VOLUME IX
 
                                                                   FE Docu-
Source, Date   Subject                                             ment
                                                                   Number

Tokyo M/A      Comments on Current Events September 21, 1939            125
  No. 9902       (No. 18)
  21 Sept 39
Tokyo M/A      Minor Military Operations, Mongolian-Manchoukuo          126
  No. 9900       Border Incident.
  21 Sept 39

[xiii]

Tokyo M/A      Foreign Relation_Press Releases on American Relations    127
  No. 9906
  22 Sept 39
Tokyo M/A      Army Finance_Donations [Japan]                           128
  No. 9907
  22 Sept 39
China M/A      Comments from the Field No. 3                            129
  Memo to A. C. of. S., G-2
  1 Oct 39
Tokyo M/A      Aviation School System_General [Japan]. Air Cadet System 130
  No. 9915
  2 Oct 39
Tokyo M/A      Aviation School System_[Japan]. Mito Army Flying School  131
  No. 9914
  5 Oct 39
China M/A      Comments on Current Events October November 1, 1939      132
  No. 9810
  1 Nov 39
Tokyo M/A      Comment on Current Events November 6, 1939 (No. 20)      133
  No. 9955
  6 Nov 39
Tokyo M/A      Comments on Current Events November 20, 1939 (No. 21)    134
  No. 9964
  20 Nov 39
Tokyo M/A      Recruitment_Enlisted Personnel [Japan]. Military Service 135
  No. 9973       Law.
  15 Dec 39
Tokyo M/A      Government Budget [Japan]. Appropriations for Fiscal     136
  No. 9986       Year 1940-1941
  16 Dec 39
Tokyo M/A      Major Military Operations Field Operations in China,     137
  No. 9995       November 18-December 18, 1939.
  21 Dec 39

[xiv]

Tokyo M/A      Comments on Current Events, December 21, 1939 (No. 22)   138
  No. 9996
  22 Dec 39

                                  VOLUME X

Tokyo M/A      Major Military Operations Distribution of Major Japanese 139
  No. 9998       Army Units Overseas, January 1, 1940.
  9 Jan 40
China M/A      Comments on Current Events January-11, 1940 (No. 1)      140
  No. 9844
  11 Jan 40
Tokyo M/A      Comments on Current Events, February 16, 1940 (No. 24)   141
  No. 10,037
  17 Feb 40
Tokyo M/A      Comments on Current Events, February 27, 1940 (No. 25)   142
  No. 10,045
  27 Feb 40
Tokyo M/A      Recruitment_Enlisted Personnel [Japan]. Conscription     143
  No. 10,053     Statistics
  11 March 40
Tokyo M/A      Comments on Current Events, March 14, 1940 (No. 26)      144
  No. 10,060
  14 March 40

                                VOLUME XI

Tokyo M/A      Reciprocity in Inspections of Air Activities             145
   No. 10,074
   4 April 40

*Bound in fifteen volumes of Far Eastern Documents File.



Page 219

                         FAR EASTERN DOCUMENTS*_Continued
                                  VOLUME XI_Continued
 
                                                                   FE Docu-
Source, Date   Subject                                             ment
                                                                   Number

Tokyo M/A      Comments on Current Events, April 9 1940 (No. 27)        146
  No. 10,076
  10 April 40
Tokyo M/A      Comments on Current Events, April 23, 1940 (No. 28)      147
  No. 10,091
 24 April 40

[xv]

Tokyo M/A      Comments on Current Events, May 14, 1940 (No. 29)        148
  No. 10,112     
  14 May 40
Tokyo M/A      War Department Budget 1940-1941 Army Budget              149
  No. 10,113
  16 May 40
Tokyo M/A      Major Military Operations Field Operations in China,     150
  No. 10,128     May 14-June 6, l940.
  7 June 40
Tokyo M/A      Comments on Current Events, June 9, 1940 (No. 30)        151
  No. 10,129
  10 June 40
China M/A      Comments on Current Events, June 12, 1940 (No. 6)        152
  No. 9903
  12 June 40
Tokyo M/A      Annual Aviation Intelligence Report [Japan].             153
  No. 10,166    July 1, 1940
  1 July 1940
Tokyo M/A      Field Operations in China, June 20-July 10, 1940         154
  No. 10.146
  11 July 40

                             VOLUME XII

Tokyo M/A      Newly Created Army Districts [Japan]                     155
  No. 10,154
  24 July 40
Tokyo M/A      Hokota Army Air School                                   156
  No. 10,167
  1 Aug 40
Tokyo M/A      Comment on Current Events (No. 63)                       157
  No. 10,169
  5 Aug 40
Tokyo M/A      Comment on Current Events, September 4, l940 (No. 34)    158
  No. 10,190
  4 Sept 40

[xvi]

Tokyo M/A      Field Operations in China, September 4-18, 1940,         159
  No. 10,203
  19 Sept 40
Tokyo M/A      Alignment with Rome-Berlin Axis                          160
  No. 10,209
  5 Oct 40
Tokyo M/A      Field Operations in China, September 19-October 5, 1940  161
  No. 10,215
  7 0ct 4O
Tokyo M/A      Language Officers in Japan                               162
  Radiogram 
  20 Oct 40
Tokyo M/A      Comments on Current Events (No. 37)                      163
  No. 10,225
  29 Oct 40
China M/A      Comments on Current Events                               164
  No. 9944
  31 Oct 40
Tokyo M/A      Ten-Year-Plan for Japan, China and Manchoukuo            165
  No. 10,234
  18 Nov 40
London M/A     The Japanese Army, General                               166
  No. 41,865
  20 Nov 40
Tokyo M/A      Field Operations in China, November 1-20, 194O           167
  No. 10,241
  21 Nov 40

*Bound in fifteen volumes of Far Eastern Documents File.




Page 220

                         FAR EASTERN DOCUMENTS*_Continued
                                  VOLUME XII_Continued
 
                                                                   FE Docu-
Source, Date   Subject                                             ment
                                                                   Number

China M/A      Situation Report, November l-December 4, 1940            168
  No. 9956
  5 Dec 40
Tokyo M/A      Comment on Current Events                                169
  No. 10,257
  12 Dec 40

                            VOLUME XIII

[xvii]

Tokyo M/A      Japan-Thailand Treaty of Amity                           170
  No. 10,274
  11 Jan 41
Peiping        Comments on Current Events (No. 13)                      171
  Assistant M/A Memo to
   A. C. of S., G-2
  31 Aug 41
China M/A      Situation Report, December 31-February 4, 1941           172
  No. 9972
  4 Feb 41
China M/A      Comments on Current Events No. 13                        173
  No. 9973
  6 Feb 41
Tokyo M/A      [Japanese] National Defense Security Act                 174
  No. 10,317
  8 Feb 41
China M/A      Comments on Current Events No. 14                        175
  Dispatch to A. C. of S., G-2
  1 March 41
Tokyo M/A      Paratroops Training in Japan                             176
  Radiogram No. 459
  13 March 41
Singapore M/O  Defenses of Malaya                                       177
  Special Report dated 22
  March 41
Singapore M/O  Comments, U. S. Military Observer, Singapore             178
  Extracts of letter dated 29
  March 41
Tokyo M/A      Soviet Non-Aggression Pact                               179
  No. 10,382
  18 April 41

[xviii]

Tokyo M/A      [Japanese] Army Mechanization Headquarters               180
  No. 10,383
  19 April 41
Tokyo M/A      Japanese Preparations for Military Action Toward         l81
  Radiogram (Paraphrase)  Singapore and East Indies.
  No. 467
  2 May 41
Tokyo M/A      Army Budget for Fiscal Year 1941-1942                    182
  No. 10,403
  5 May 41
Tokyo M/A      National Defense Budget                                  183
  No. 10,414
  20 May 41
Tokyo M/A      Field Operations in China, May 7-21, 1941                184
  No. 10,419
  21 May 41
Chungking, China M/A   Estimate of Japanese Air Strength                185
  Radiogram
  (No. 83)
  29 May 41
Tokyo M/A      New Inspectorate for Communications and Chemical         186
  No. 10,423     Warfare [Japan].
  3 June 41

                            VOLUME XIV

Tokyo M/A      Yellow Fever Inoculations                                187
  No. 10,434
  5 June 41

*Bound in fifteen volumes of Far Eastern Documents File.



Page 221

                         FAR EASTERN DOCUMENTS*_Continued
                                  VOLUME XIV_Continued
 
                                                                   FE Docu-
Source, Date   Subject                                             ment
                                                                   Number

Tokyo M/A      Transport of Troops and Supplies by Air-Parachute        188
  No. 10,435     Training [Japan].
  5 June 41
Singapore M/O  Summary of Situation, Malaya                             189
  Memo for A. C. of S., G-2, HPD
  5 June 41

[xix]

Hongkong M/A   Japanese Convoy Movements                                190
  Cablegram
  No. 135
  16 June 41
Mexico City M/A  Activities of Foreigners in Country                    191
  No. 9899
  17 June 41
Hongkong M/A:  Japanese Convoy Movements                                192
  Radiogram No. 145
  25 June 41
China M/A      Comments on Current Events No. 16                        193
  No. 10,001
  25 June 41
Tokyo M/A      Comments on Current Events No. 61                        194
  No. 10,447
  26 June 41
Chungking M/A  Russo-Japanese Border Incidents                          l95
  Cablegram (Paraphrase)
  27 June 41
Tokyo M/A      Japanese Government's Plans                              196
  Radiogram
  No 498
  12 July 41
Tokyo M/A      Japanese Mobilization                                    197
  Radiogram (Paraphrase)
  12 July 41
Tokyo M/A      Transport of Troops and Supplies by Air_Parachute        198
  No. 10,459    Training
  12 July 41
Tokyo M/A      Mobilization of Japanese Army                            199
  Radiogram
  No. 500
  14 July 41

[xx]

Hongkong M/A   Japanese Convoy Movements                                200
  Radiogram
  No. 168
  15 July 41
Chungking M/A  Probability of Japanese Invasion of Indo-China           201
  Cablegram (Paraphrase)
  15 July 41
Tokyo M/A      Japanese Mobilization                                    202
  Radiogram (Paraphrase)
  21 July 41
Singapore M/O  Japanese Ultimatum to French Indo-China                  203
  No. 31
  21 July 41
London M/A     Japanese Designs on French Indo China                    204
  Cablegram
  22 July 41
Tokyo M/A      Third Konoe Cabinet                                      205
  No. 10,472
  23 July 41
Tokyo M/A      Japanese Troop Movements                                 206
  Radiogram
  No. 605
  26 July 41
Tokyo M/A      Comments on Current Events No. 62                        207
  No. 10,476
  28 July 41
Singapore M/O  Japanese Aggression in French Indo-China                 208
  Radiogram
  No. 37 
  29 July 41

*Bound in fifteen volumes of Far Eastern Documents File.



Page 222

                         FAR EASTERN DOCUMENTS*_Continued
                                  VOLUME XIV_Continued
 
                                                                   FE Docu-
Source, Date   Subject                                             ment
                                                                   Number

Bangkok M/A    Japanese Demands on Thailand                      2095 [sic]
  Cablegram
  31 July 41

[xxi]

China M/A      Comments on Current Events, Hongkong                     210
  No. 1
  1 Aug 41
London M/A     Japanese Mobilization                                    211
  Cablegram
  3 Aug 41
Tokyo M/A      Annual Aviation Intelligence Report                      212
  No 10,492
  5 Aug 41
Tokyo M/A      Estimates of Production [Japan]                          213
  No. 10,493
  5 Aug 41
China M/A      Situation Report, June 16-August 6, 1941                 214
  No. 2
  6 Aug 41
Chungking M/A  Japanese Troop Movements in Indo-China                   215
  Cablegram (Paraphrase)
  8 Aug 41 
London M/A     Japanese Military Movements                              216
  Cablegram
  8 Aug 41
Delhi M/O      Defenses of Singapore                                    217
  No. 2
  11 Aug 41
Chungking M/A  Probable Japanese Administration of International        218
  Cablegram (Paraphrase)  Settlement, Shanghai in Event of War.
  15 Aug 41
Chungking M/A  Japanese Tank Strength                                   219
  Cablegram (Paraphrase)
  19 Aug 41
Chungking M/A  Divisional Strength of the Japanese Army                 220
  Cablegram (Paraphrase)
  20 Aug 41

[xxii]

Tokyo M/A      Field Operations in China, July 28-August 20, 1941.      221
  No. 10,506
  20 Aug 41
Tokyo M/A      Comments on Current Events No. 53                        222
  No. 10,505
  21 Aug 41
Tokyo M/A      Distribution of Major [Japanese] Units Overseas          223
  No. 10,511
  25 Aug 41
Chungking M/A  Divisional Strength of the Japanese Army                 224
  Cablegram (Paraphrase)
  27 Aug 41
Chungking China M/A  Distribution of Major Japanese Army Units          225
  Radiogram No. 31
  27 Aug 41
Tokyo M/A      [Japanese] Signal Communication                          226
  No. 10,515
  1 Sept 41
Singapore M/O  Training in Defense Against Airborne Troops              227
  No. 48
  1 Sept 41
Singapore M/O  Air Defense in the Far East                              228
  No. 52
  8 Sept 41
Tokyo M/A      [Japanese] Mobilization Personnel_Actual                 229
  No. 10,530
  11 Sept 41
Tokyo M/A      [Japanese] National Defense General Headquarters         230
  No. 10,543
  16 Sept 41

*Bound in fifteen volumes of Far Eastern Documents File.



Page 223

                         FAR EASTERN DOCUMENTS*_Continued
                                  VOLUME XV
 
                                                                   FE Docu-
Source, Date   Subject                                             ment
                                                                   Number

Tokyo M/A      Comments on Current Events No. 54                        231
  No. 10,544
  18 Sept 41
Singapore M/O  Estimates, Plans and Training_British Far East_for       232
  No. 60         October, November, December and January.
  18 Sept 41
Singapore M/O  Japanese Troops in French Indo-China                     233
  Cablegram
  No. 26
  23 Sept 41
Singapore M/O  Japanese Troop Movements                                 234
  Cablegram
  No. 30
  25 Sept 41
Tokyo M/A      Enlistment of Formosans                                  235
  No. 10,553
  26 Sept 41
Lisbon M/A     Probability of War Between United States and Japan       236
  Cablegram (Paraphrase)
  6 Oct 41
Tokyo M/A      Army Arsenals and Depots [Japan]                         237
  No. 10,567
  11 Oct 41
Tokyo M/A      Increase of Japanese Strength in Indo-China              238
  Radiogram (Paraphrase)
  13 Oct 41
Chungking M/A  Japanese Troop Concentrations, Pearl River               239
  Cablegram (Paraphrase)
  14 Oct 41
Chungking M/A  Japanese Cabinet Crisis and Press Attacks on U. S.       240
  Cablegram (Paraphrase)
  17 0ct 41

[xxiv]

Singapore M/O  Analysis of Japanese Aviation Production                 241
  No. 87
  17 Oct 41
Tokyo M/A      Comments on Current Events, October 20, 1941 (No. 55)    242
  No. 10,581
  20 Oct 41
Tokyo M/A      Resignation of Third Konoe Cabinet                       243
  No. 10,578
  20 Oct 41
London M/A     Estimate of Japan's Future Moves                         244
  Radiogram
  No. 795
  20 Oct 41
London M/A     Japanese Military Plans                                  245
  Cablegram
  21 Oct 41
Chungking M/A  Japanese Plans to Attack Thailand                        246
  Radiogram
  No. 79
  23 Oct 41
Singapore M/O  Japanese Aircraft Carriers in Mandated Islands           247
  Radiogram
  No. 54
  27 0ct 41
Chungking M/A  Japanese Troop Strength in Indo-China                    248
  Radiogram
 (Paraphrase)
 (No. C-88)
 29 0ct 41
Bandoeng M/O   Japanese in Portuguese Timor                             249
 Report No. 4
 30 Oct 41
Bangkok M/A    Probable Reaction of Thailand to Japanese Attack       25 [sic]
  Radiogram (Paraphrase)
  (No. 38)
  30 Oct 41

*Bound in fifteen volumes of Far Eastern Documents File.



Page 224

                         FAR EASTERN DOCUMENTS*_Continued
                                  VOLUME XV_Continued
 
                                                                   FE Docu-
Source, Date   Subject                                             ment
                                                                   Number

[xxv]

Singapore M/O  Probable Japanese Invasion of Thailand                   251
  Radiogram (Paraphrase)
  (No. 57)
  31 Oct 41
Singapore M/O  Japanese Air Strength in Indo-China                      252
  Radiogram
  5 Nov 41
Singapore M/O  Japanese Troop Concentrations in China and Indo-China    253
  Radiogram
  7 Nov 41
London M/A     Probable Japanese Attack in Netherlands East Indies      254
  Radiogram (paraphrase)
  9 Nov 41
Peiping M/A    Japanese Proposals for Settlement of Far Eastern         255
  Radiogram (Paraphrase)  Problems via Envoy to Washington.
  (No. 9)
  11 Nov 41
Tokyo M/A      Aircraft Production [Japan]                              256
  No. 10,593
  16 Nov 41
Tokyo M/A      Objective Material [Japan]                               257
  No. 10,608
  19 Nov 41
London M/A     Probable Japanese Offensive and Possibility of War With  258
  Radiogram (Paraphrase) ABD Powers.
  21 Nov 41
London M/A     Japanese Intentions                                      259
  No. 45481
  21 Nov 41
Singapore M/O  British Air Activity over China                          260
  Radiogram
  23 Nov 41
Bandoeng M/O   Comments                                                 261
  No. 8
  24 Nov 41
Bandoeng M/O   Japanese in the N. E. I.                                 262
  No. 10
  27 Nov 41
Chungking M/A  Probable Japanese Attack on Thailand                     263
  Secret Message
  No. 104
  29 Nov 41
Singapore M/O  Alerting of Malayan Command                              264
  No. 133
  2 Dec 41
Singapore M/O  Japanese Naval Operations                                265
  Secret Message
  No. 96
  6 Dec 41
Singapore M/O  British Defense of Singapore                             266
  Secret Message
  No. 97
  7 Dec 41
Singapore M/O  Japanese Air-Operations and Troop Movements in Malaya    267
  Secret Message
  No. 103
  7 Dec 41
Melbourne M/A  Execution of Plans Ordered by Netherlands Far East       268
  Secret Message Command
  No. 24
  7 Dec 41
Singapore M/O  Japanese Landings at Patani                              269
  Secret Message
  No. 105
  8 Dec 41

*Bound in fifteen volumes of Far Eastern Documents File.



Page 225

MID 336.   (11-3-41) Alaska
                                Confidential

                                         WAR DEPARTMENT
                                         WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF,
                                         MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, G_2,
                                         Washington, D. C., November 5, 1941.

Subject: Letter of transmittal
To:   Commanding General, Alaska Defense Force. 
The attached communications are forwarded for your information and such action 
as you consider advisable.
                                         Sherman Miles,
                                         SHERMAN MILES,
                                         Brigadier General, U. S. Army
                                         Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

1. Enclosures: 336. (11-3-41)_MID Summ. of Info. re Information Received via 
the Orient: 11/3/41. FMH 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MID 336.  (11-3X41) Phil Dept. Dept.

                                Confidential

                                         WAR DEPARTMENT
                                         WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF,
                                         MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, G_2,
                                         Washington, D. C., November 5, 1941.

Subject: Letter of transmittal
To:   Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Headquarters, Philippine Department.

The attached communications are forwarded for your information and such action 
as you consider advisable.
                                         Sherman Miles,
                                         SHERMAN MILES,
                                         Brigadier General, U. S. Army
                                         Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

1. Enclosures: 336. (11-3-41)_MID Summ. of Info. re Information Received from 
the orient: dtd. FMH 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MID 336. (11-3-41)  PR Dept.

                                Confidential

                                         WAR DEPARTMENT
                                         WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF,
                                         MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, G_2,
                                         Washington, D. C., November 5, 1941.

Subject: Letter of transmittal.
To:   Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
      Headquarters, Puerto Rican Dept.

The attached communications are forwarded for your information and such action 
as you consider advisable.
                                         Sherman Miles,
                                         SHERMAN MILES,
                                         Brigadier General, U. S. Army
                                         Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

1. Enclosures: 336.  (11-3-41)_MID Summ. of Info. re Information Received from 
the Orient: dtd. FMH
------------------------------------------------------------------------------



Page maintained by Larry W. Jewell, lwjewell@omni.cc.purdue.edu. Created: 12/12/96 Updated: 12/12/96