[This file contains only Col. Clausen's report to the Secretary of War
and Tab's A and B. See TOC. LWJ]

Page i

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

HEARINGS BEFORE THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION PURSUANT TO S. Con. Res. 27 A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES RELATING THERETO PART 35 CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION Printed for the use of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON : 1946
Page ii JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK ALBEN W. BARKLEY, Senator from Kentucky, Chairman JERE COOPER, Representative from Tennessee, Vice Chairman WALTER F. GEORGE, Senator from Georgia JOHN W. MURPHY, Representative SCOTT W. LUCAS, Senator from Illinois from Pennsylvania OWEN BREWSTER, Senator from Maine BERTRAND W. GEARHART, Representa- HOMER FERGUSON, Senator from Michi- tive from California gan FRANK B. KEEFE, Representative J. BAYARD CLARK, Representative from from Wisconsin North Carolina COUNSEL (Through January 14, 1946) WILLIAM D. MITCHELL, General Counsel GERHARD A. GESELL, chief Assistant Counsel JULE M. HANNAFORD, Assistant Counsel JOHN E. MASTEN, Assistant Counsel (After January 14, 1946) SETH W. RICHARDSON, General Counsel SAMUEL H. KAUFMAN, Associate General Counsel JOHN E. MASTEN, Assistant Counsel EDWARD P. MORGAN, Assistant Counsel LOGAN J. LANE, Assistant Counsel Page iii HEARINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE Part Pages Transcript Hearings No. pages 1 1- 399 1- 1058 Nov. 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, and 21, 1945. 2 401- 982 1059- 2586 Nov. 23, 24, 26 to 30, Dec. 3 and 4, 1945. 3 983-1583 2587- 4194 Dec. 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, and 13, 1945. 4 1585-2063 4195- 5460 Dec. 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, and 21, 1945. 5 2065-2492 5461- 6646 Dec. 31, 1945, and Jan. 2, 3, 4, and 5, 1946. 6 2493-2920 6647- 7888 Jan. 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 21, 1946. 7 2921-3378 7889- 9107 Jan. 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28, and 29, 1946. 8 3379-3927 9108-10517 Jan. 30, 31, Feb. 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6, 1946. 9 3929-4599 10518-12277 Feb. 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, and 14, 1946. 10 4601-5151 12278-13708 Feb. 15, 16, 18, 19, and 20, 1946. 11 5153-5560 13709-14765 Apr. 9 and 11, and May 23 and 31, 1946. EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE Part Exhibits Nos. 12 1 through 6. 13 7 and 8. 14 9 through 43. 15 44 through 87. 16 88 through 110. 17 111 through 128. 18 129 through 156. 19 157 through 172. 20 173 through 179. 21 180 through 183, and Exhibits-Illustrations. 22 through 25 Roberts Commission Proceedings. 26 Hart Inquiry Proceedings. 27 through 31 Army Pearl Harbor Board Proceedings. 32 through 33 Navy Court of Inquiry Proceedings. 34 Clarke Investigation Proceedings 35 Clausen Investigation Proceedings. 36 through 38 Hewitt Inquiry Proceedings. 39 Reports of Roberts Commission, Army Pearl Harbor Board. Navy Court of Inquiry and Hewitt Inquiry, with endorse- ments. [Pages iv-xvi are lists of witnesses, which will be made available separately. A link to this spot will be made at that time.] Page 1 JOINT COMMITTEE EXHIBIT NO. 148 [1] [TOP SECRET] REPORT OF INVESTIGATION BY LT. COLONEL, HENRY C. CLAUSEN, JAGD, FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR, SUPPLEMENTARY TO PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD CONTENTS Page [1] Report to Secretary of War by Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, of investigation supplementary to Army Pearl Harbor Board .... 2 Tab "A"-Copies of statements of Secretary of War dated 1 December 1944 and 29 August 1945, of Colonel Clausen's orders and of related documents ........................................... 4 Tab "B"-Copies of affidavits and statements obtained in Colonel Clausen's investigation ........................................... 38 [See this section for testimonies. LWJ] Tab "C"-List of additional documentary evidence comprising Exhibits "1" through 8" obtained in Colonel Clausen's investigation .................................................... 233 Tab "D"-Written periodic reports by Colonel Clausen .............. 246 Tab "E"-Memorandum of The Judge Advocate General giving his comments upon Top Secret Report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board in light of Colonel Clausen's investigation ...................... 279 Tab "F"-Memorandum of The Judge Advocate General supplementing and commenting upon certain aspects of his previous memorandum to the Secretary of War, dated 25 November 1944, in light of Colonel Clausen's investigation .......................................... 296 Tab "G"-Memorandum of The Judge Advocate General to the Secretary of War dated 25 November 1944 .................................... 313 TOP SECRET [2] WAR DEPARTMENT, Washington, 14 September 1945. Memorandum for the Secretary of War; Subject: Report of investigation by Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board. Pursuant to orders of the Secretary of War, I have conducted the investigation supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, mentioned in he public statements of the Secretary of War on 1 December 1944 and 29 August 1945. Copies of these statements and of my orders and some related documents are attached as Exhibit "A". In the course of this investigation, I traveled over 55,000 miles by air and interviewed 92 Army, Navy, and civilian personnel at the following places: Berlin, Germany London, England Blenchley Park, England Luzon, P. I. Boston, Massachusetts Manila, P. I. Cannes, France Neuenahr, Germany Casserta, Italy New York, New York Frankfurt on Main, Germany Paris, France Guam Potsdam, Germany Honolulu, T. H. Saipan Langley Field, Virginia Versaille, France Leyte, P I. Washington, D. C. Some of these persons were interviewed where they were engaged in combat in active theaters of operation, as the Secretary of War stated in his public statement of 1 December 1944 would be necessary. [1] Pages referred to are indicated by italic figures enclosed by brackets and represent pages of original exhibit. Page 2 Of those interviewed, the following persons testified before me. I recorded their testimony in the form of affidavits, copies of which are attached as Exhibit "B". General George C. Marshall Lt. General Leonard T. Gerow General Douglas MacArthur Lt. General Walter B. Smith [3] Lt General Richard K. Suther- Colonel Otis K. Sadtler land Colonel Rex W. Minkler Major General John R. Deane Colonel Harold Doud Major General Charles D. Herron Captain Joseph J. Rochefort, USN Major General Sherman Miles Captain Edwin T. Layton, USN Major General C. A. Willoughby Captain Wilfred J. Holmes, USN Major General Ralph C. Smith Captain Thomas A. Huckins, USN Brig. General Thomas J. Betts Lt. Colonel Frank B. Rowlett Brig. General Kendall J. Fielder Major Edward B. Anderson Brig. General Morrill W. Marston Captain Howard W. Martin Brig. General Robert H. Dunlop Chief Warrant Officer L. R. Lane Brig. General Charles K. Gailey Chief Ships Clerk Theodore Emanuel, Colonel Rufus S. Bratton USN Colonel Robert E. Schukraft Miss Mary J. Danning Colonel George W. Bicknell Miss Margaret McKenney Colonel Clarence G. Jensen Miss Louise Prather Colonel Carlisle Clyde Dusenbury Miss Mary L. Ross Colonel Moses W. Pettigrew Mr. George W. Renchard Colonel Joseph K. Evans Mr. Robert L. Shivers Colonel Edward F. French Mr. John F. Stone Colonel Edward W. Raley The following persons gave me signed statements which, with some records of my interviews, are also included in Exhibit "B": Brigadier General C. A. Powell Lt. Donald Woodrum, Jr., USN Colonel 0. H. Thompson Mr. Harry L. Dawson Lt Colonel Byron M. Muerlott Mr. John E. Russell Commander J. S. Holtwick, Jr., USN I also obtained a great deal of additional documentary evidence. A list of this is attached as Exhibit "C" and the documents are presented herewith. Periodic oral and written reports were heretofore made. The written reports are attached as Exhibit "D". There are attached as Exhibits "E" and "F" memoranda of The Judge Advocate General giving his comments upon the Top Secret Report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and supplementing and commenting upon certain aspects of his previous memorandum to the Secretary of War dated 25 November 1944, in the light of my investigation. 6 Incls Henry C. Clausen, 1. Ex. "A" HENRY C. CLAUSEN 2. Ex. "B" Lt. Colonel, JAGD. 3. Ex. "C" 4. Ex. "D" 5. Ex. "E" 6. Ex. "F" Page 3 [4] EXHIBIT A INVESTIGATION BY LT. COLONEL, HENRY C. CLAUSEN, JAGD, FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR; SUPPLEMENTARY TO PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1. Joint Resolution of the Congress, 13 June 1944, directing the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, severally, to conduct investigations of Pearl Harbor. 2. Public report of Secretary of War regarding Pearl Harbor disaster, 1 December 1944. 3. Order of Secretary of War, 23 November 1944, directing Major Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, to conduct supplementary investigation. 4. Memorandum of The Judge Advocate General, 5 December 1944, concerning unexplored leads in Pearl Harbor investigation. 5. Memorandum of the Secretary of War, 6 February 1945, to all Army personnel concerned relative to investigation to be made by Major Henry C. Clausen. 6. Letter to Secretary of the Navy from the Secretary of War, 6 February 1945, concerning investigation to be made by Major Henry C. Clausen. 7. Letter to Secretary of War from the Secretary of the Navy, 10 February 1945, in reply to letter 6 February 1945. 8. Memorandum of the Secretary of War for The Adjutant General, 3 March 1945, requesting travel orders for Major Henry C. Clausen. 9. Movement orders for Major Henry C. Clausen, 14 March 1945. 10. Memorandum of the Secretary of War to the Commanding General, Pacific Ocean Areas, 24 March 1945, relative to investigation being made by Major Henry C. Clausen. 11. Memorandum of the Secretary of War to the Commanding General, Southwest Pacific Theater, 24 March 1945, relative to investigation being made by Major Henry C. Clausen. 12. Memorandum to Major Duckett, ASF, P&O, 24 March 1945, requesting change in movement orders. 13. Wire from The Adjutant General, 27 March 1945, to Commanding Officer, 1504 AAFBU, Fairfield, California, advising of change in movement orders of Major Henry C. Clausen. [5] 14. Memorandum of Secretary of War for The Adjutant General, 24 May 1945, requesting travel orders for Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen. 15. Movement orders for Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, 25 May 1945. 16. Letter of the Secretary of War to the Secretary of the Navy, 28 May 1945, concerning investigation. 17. Memorandum of the Secretary of War for The Adjutant General, 7 August 1945, requesting change in movement orders of Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen. 18. Amendment of movement orders of Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, 11 August 1945. 19. Public report of Secretary of War regarding the Pearl Harbor disaster, 29 August 1945. [6] [PUBLIC LAW 339-78TH CONGRESS] [CHAPTER 247-2D SESSION] [S. J. Res. 133] JOINT RESOLUTION To extend the statute of limitation in certain cases. Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That effective as of December 7, 1943, all statutes, resolutions, laws, articles, and regulations, affecting the possible prosecution of any person or persons, military or civil, connected with the Pearl Harbor Page 4 catastrophe of December 7, 1941, or involved in any other possible or apparent dereliction of duty, or crime or offense against the United States, that operate to prevent the court martial, prosecution, trial or punishment of any person or persons in military or civil capacity, involved in any matter in connection with the Pearl Harbor catastrophe of December 7, 1941, or involved in any other possible or apparent dereliction of duty, or crime or offense against the United States, are hereby extended for a further period of six months, in addition to the extension provided for in Public Law 208, Seventy-eighth Congress. Sec. 2. The Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy are severally directed to proceed forthwith with an investigation into the facts surrounding the catastrophe described in section 1 above, and to commence such proceedings against such persons as the facts may justify. Approved June 13, 1944. [7] WAR DEPARTMENT BUREAU OF PUBLIC RELATIONS PRESS BRANCH Tel.-RE 6700, Brs. 3425 and 4860 Immediate Release DECEMBER 1, 1944 STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF WAR The following is the text of a statement by the Honorable Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War: By Joint Resolution of the Congress, approved June 13, 1944, the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy were severally directed to proceed with an investigation into the facts surrounding the Pearl Harbor catastrophe of December 7, 1941, and to commence such proceedings against such persons as the facts might justify. In order to meet the wishes of Congress as expressed in this resolution, I have conducted such an investigation. In order to assist me to this end, there was appointed by order dated July 8, 1944, a Board of three general officers which was directed "to ascertain and report the facts relating to the attack made by Japanese armed forces upon the Territory of Hawaii on 7 December 1941 and to make such recommendations as it might deem proper." This Army Pearl Harbor Board has conducted an extensive and painstaking investigation. It has held hearings in Hawaii, San Francisco, and Washington. It has examined a total of 151 witnesses and received many exhibits. I have read its report and reviewed the recorded evidence. The Judge Advocate General of the Army, at my direction, has also examined the report and the record and has given me fully the benefit of his views. I recognize the importance to any individual concerned of having a decision taken as to what, if any, action is to be instituted against him and, after weighing all the considerations, I am clear that the public interest as well as justice and fairness will best be served by a statement of my present conclusions. So far as they now may be made public, consonant with the public interest, my conclusions are as follows: The Army Pearl Harbor Board, although it recommended no disciplinary or other action, concluded that there were several officers in the field and in the War Department who did not perform their duties with the necessary skill or exercise the judgment which was required under the circumstances On the recorded evidence, I agree with some but not all of the Board's conclusions. So far as the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department is concerned, I am of the opinion that his errors of judgment were of such a nature as to demand his relief from a Command status. This was done on January 11, 1942, and in itself is a serious result for any officer with a long record of excellent service, and conscientious as I believe General Short to be. In my judgment, on the evidence now recorded, it is sufficient action. Furthermore, I am satisfied that proper steps were taken to correct such inadequacies of either personnel or organization as were shown to exist either in the War Department or in the field at the time of the Pearl Harbor disaster. My conclusion is that under all the circumstances the evidence now recorded does not warrant the institution of any further proceedings against any officer in the Army. Page 5 In accordance with the opinion of the Judge Advocate General, I have decided that my own investigation should be further continued until all the facts are made as clear as possible and until the testimony of every witness in possession of material facts can be obtained, and I have given the necessary [8] directions to accomplish this result. Some of the testimony may be much delayed where witnesses are engaged in combat in active Theaters of Operation. My present decision will be reviewed when the investigation has been finally completed. Finally, I am absolutely clear that it would be highly prejudicial to the successful prosecution of the war and the safety of American lives to make public during the war the report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board or the record on which it is based. STATEMENT AS TO COLONEL THEODORE WYMAN, JR., AND CERTAIN OTHERS I have today made a separate statement of my conclusion on the basis of the evidence now recorded not to institute further proceedings against any officer of the Army in respect to the Pearl Harbor disaster. The Military Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives, by a report of June 14, 1944, called attention to certain relationships of Hans Wilhelm Rohl to military construction in Hawaii under the direction of Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr., District Engineer, and indicated that this may have contributed to the Pearl Harbor catastrophe. Accordingly, the phases of the Committee report bearing thereon were referred to the Army Pearl Harbor Board for further investigation. I have reviewed the results of this investigation. I do not find from this review that the Pearl Harbor disaster was in any way contributed to or caused by any alleged misconduct, neglect or disloyalty on the part of Rohl, the Hawaiian Constructors, the organization with which he was connected, Colonel Wyman, or others directing construction activities in Hawaii, and I do not find that there is any evidence that Rohl or anyone else directing such construction gave any information to the enemy. As to certain other alleged misconduct and neglect of Colonel Wyman and others in construction matters, I have referred the question of the commencing of any proceedings to the Under Secretary of War and the Judge Advocate General. Distribution: Aa, Af, B, Da, Dd, Dm, N. 5:00 P.M. SECRET [9] NAVY DEPARTMENT Washington, 23 November 1944. Memorandum for the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2. Subject: Pearl Harbor Investigation. In connection with the recent report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, a number of unexplored leads have suggested themselves which require investigation. I have directed that this investigation be undertaken by Major Henry G. Clausen, JAGD. You are directed to give Major Clausen access to all records, documents, and information to your Division whether of secret or top secret nature and to advise all officers of your Division to afford Major Clausen the fullest possible cooperation. Inquiries made by Major Clausen should be answered fully and the persons interrogated should volunteer any information of which they may have knowledge concerning the subject of Major Clausen's inquiries. In addition, copies of any papers required by Major Clausen, whether secret or top secret should be furnished him, any present directives to the contrary not withstanding. HENRY L. STIMSON Secretary of War. A true copy. HENRY A. CLAUSEN Lt. Colonel, JAGD. Page 6 TOP SECRET [10] HEADQUARTERS SERVICE FORCES OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL Washington 25, D. C. Memorandum for Major Henry C. Clausen, JAGD. Subject: Unexplored Leads in Pearl Harbor Investigation. 1. In order to assist you in the investigation you are now making, I am suggesting herewith certain unexplored leads which, in my opinion, might advantageously be followed up in order to complete the general picture in this matter. The present memorandum merely contains suggestions and will not be construed as a directive or as in any way fixing the scope of your investigation. 2. In the War and Navy Departments in Washington, the following matters can be investigated a. Whether Kimmel notified the Navy Department and the Navy Department notified the War Department of the order to sink Jap subs, of the reasons for the order. b. What was the naval condition of readiness at Pearl Harbor. c. Whether Short or Kimmel sent any reconnaissance reports to Washington. d. Whether Kimmel had any orders from Washington requiring a large part of the fleet to remain in harbor. e. Whether Kimmel understood the term "defensive deployments" or wired back for its meaning. f. Whether Kimmel replied to the 24 November, 27 November, and other Navy Department messages and if so, was the War Department furnished copies thereof. g. Whether the June 1940 alert message to Herron was specific and indicative of an established War Department policy of being specific when war alerts were believed required by the situation. h. Whether War Department manuals and war plans, current in 1941, authorized a Commanding General of an overseas Department to revise the estimate of the situation, without consulting with or reporting to the War Department. i. Whether Short answered the Secretary of War's letter of 7 February 1941. [11] j. The number of troops in Hawaii in late 1941, the state of their training and the possibility of continuing training under Alert 2 or 3. k. The terms and origin of the Joint Action Agreement, if any, with Britain and the Netherlands and whether Japan was officially advised of this agreement or discovered its existence. l. Whether Short was sent official notice of the Joint Action Agreement or of the Roosevelt-Churchill July 1941 compact for a joint warning to Japan (Rep. 41). 3. Concerning the "magic" intercepts we should ascertain: a. The exact date and time of first translation. b. The reason for the apparent delay in translating or deciphering of some of the most vital messages. c. Who got each message, when and in what form. d. The evaluation made of them at the time and the degree of reliance placed thereon by the General Staff and by the Navy. e. The origin of the "Budapest" intercept. 4. Significant details regarding the "Winds" intercept might be explored: a. The original of the Navy Department message and translation, now probably part of the original Roberts Report records, or at least, questioning of Mr. Justice Roberts would possibly disclose how that Commission disposed of it. b. The Navy's alleged delivery of two copies of the translation to the Army (Tr., Safford a. 133-135), as to just what procedure there was for delivery, as to who was responsible therefor, and who had a duty to check up on whether the transmission was received. [12] c. Whether General Miles, Admiral Noyes, Colonel Bratton, or Captain Safford knew about the Anglo-Dutch-U. S. Joint Action Agreement, in which case they would have known that a "War with Britain" message would necessarily have involved the United States in war. d. Whether the partial implementation "War with Britain" was brought to Admiral Stark's or General Marshall's attention, it being clear that the Page 7 of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff did know of the Joint Action Policy. e. Did the Navy in any way notify Admiral Kimmel or Commander Rochefort of the implementation intercept? f. Did the Honolulu intercept stations independently receive the activating Winds" message? g. What was the significance of the other Japanese intercepts which the Board failed to examine? h. Whether General (then Colonel) Fielder actually received the message directing him to contact Commander Rochefort, whether he did so, and whether here is substance to the hypothesis that he and Short were relying upon the warning they would expect to receive when the second or implementing "Winds" message would be intercepted, thus giving advance notice of hostilities. Myron C. Cramer MYRON C. CRAMER, Major General, USA, The Judge Advocate General SECRET [13] WAR DEPARTMENT Washington, 6 February 1945. Memorandum for Army Personnel Concerned: Pursuant to my directions and in accordance with my public statement of 1 December 1944, Major Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, is conducting for me the investigation supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board. You are directed to give Major Clausen access to all records, documents and information in your possession or under your control, and to afford him the fullest possible cooperation and assistance. Inquiries made by Major Clausen should be answered fully and freely and the persons interrogated should volunteer any pertinent information of which they may have knowledge. Copies of any papers required by Major Clausen should be furnished him. HENRY L. STIMSON, Secretary of War. SECRET [14] 6 FEBRUARY 1945. DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Pursuant to my directions and in accordance with my public statement of 1 December 1944 Major Henry G. Clausen, JAGD, is conducting for me the investigation supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board. Some of the additional information which seems to be material is believed to be available only through Navy personnel or Navy records. I have instructed Major Clausen to limit his inquiry strictly to matters which have a bearing on the part hat Army personnel, organization, or action may have had in the disaster. I will appreciate it if you will arrange to give Major Clausen access to all pertinent Navy records and information and afford him the opportunity of interviewing such Navy personnel as may be necessary, it being understood that he will comply strictly with the instructions I have stated above. Sincerely yours, HENRY L. STIMSON, Secretary of War. Above handed to Major Clausen 2/7/45 for delivery to Sec. Navy. MO'B. Hon. JAMES V. FORRESTAL, Secretary of the Navy, Washington, D. C. hhb/mob A True Copy. HENRY C. CLAUSEN, Major, JAGD. Page 8 SECRET [15] THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY Washington, 10 Feb. 1945 DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I have your letter of 6 February 1945 advising that Major Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, is conducting for you the investigation supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and requesting that he be given access to all pertinent Navy records and information and be afforded the opportunity of interviewing such Navy personnel as necessary, it being understood that you have instructed him to limit his inquiry strictly to matters which have a bearing on that part that Army personnel, organization, or action may have had in the disaster I share your view that Public Law 339 of the 78th Congress, which directed that we "severally" investigate the facts surrounding the Pearl Harbor catastrophe authorize us to make available to each other information in our respective Departments relevant to our separate investigations. Accordingly, I am happy to comply with your request, and suggest that Major Clausen communicate with Lt. Commander John F. Sonnett, of my office, so that arrangements may be made to furnish the specific information which Major Clausen desires to obtain from the Navy Department. Sincerely yours, JAMES FORRESTAL. Hon. HENRY L. STIMSON Secretary of War Washington, D. C. [16] SECRET Memorandum for The Adjutant General. Subject: Request for Orders. 1. Reference is made to a Secret memorandum from the Secretary of War dated 6 February 1945, copy of which is attached, concerning the investigation by Major H. C. Clausen for the Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board. 2. In connection with said mission and in pursuance of orders of Secretary of War, request is made for Orders directing Major Clausen to proceed on or about 12 March 1945: (a) to Langley Field, Virginia, (b) then to Honolulu, T. H., and (e) then return to Washington, D. C., and (d) authority to make such successive trips from Washington, D. C., and to travel to such other place or places, and to make such changes in said itinerary as may be necessary to accomplish said mission. 3. It is further requested that travel by military, naval or commercial aircraft, Army or Naval Transport, belligerent vessel or aircraft, commercial steamship, rail or any other means of transportation be authorized as necessary for the accomplishment of an emergency war mission, and that a baggage allowance of 75 pounds be authorized for travel by aircraft. 4. It is further requested that in lieu of subsistence flat per diem of $7.00 be authorized while traveling and on duty for the period while away from Washington, D. C. required to complete this mission. Reference is made to the determination of the Secretary of War, dated 22 August 1944, that the thirty day limitation prescribed in War Department Circular 260, 1944, is not applicable in connection with temporary duty enjoined upon members of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and Officers on duty therewith. /S/ H. C. Clausen, H. C. CLAUSEN, Major, JAGD. Approved: /s/ Harvey H. Bundy, HARVEY H. BUNDY, for the Secretary of War. /S/ Myron C. Cramer, MYRON C. CRAMER. The Judge Advocate General. A true copy. HENRY C. CLAUSEN Major, JAGD. Page 9 [17] RESTRICTED AGPO-A 201 Clausen, Henry C. EAD/bls/2231 Mu (12 Mar 45) Br. 76520 WAR DEPARTMENT, THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE Washington 25, D. C., 14 March 1945. Subject: Movement Orders. TO: Major Henry C. Clausen, 0907613, JAGD 4731 Munitions Building Washington, D. C. 1. Major Henry C. Clausen, 0907613, JAGD, will proceed on or about 20 March 1945 from Washington, D. C., to San Francisco, California, on temporary duty of approximately three (3) days, thence to Fairfield- Suisun Army Air Field, Fairfield, California, reporting not later than 28 March 1945, to the Commanding Officer 1504th AAF Base Unit for air transportation to Fort Shafter, T. H. Upon arrival at destination he will report to the Commanding General, U. S. Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas, for temporary duty of approximately two (2) months for the purpose of conducting investigation supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board. Upon the completion of this temporary duty he will return to his proper station, Washington, D. C. 2. Travel directed is necessary in the military service. 501-3 P 432-02, 03, 212/50425. Travel by air is directed (Par 3b (2) AR 55-120, Changes no. 9), and is necessary for the accomplishment of an emergency war mission, APR-2-331156-ASF. A baggage allowance of sixty-five (65) pounds, to include all personal effects, and an excess baggage allowance of ten (10) pounds, (official documents), is authorized while traveling by aircraft. Within continental United States the provisions of War Department Circular 260, 1944 apply; outside continental United States the provisions of War Department Circular 356, 1944, apply. 3. He is authorized to proceed to such additional places within the theater as may be necessary for the performance of this mission. 4. He will be equipped in accordance with Column M, WD Pamphlet No. 396, "Itemized Baggage List", as desired. Small arms will be issued at the port of aerial embarkation in accordance with current instructions. 5. Special instructions: Temporary APO 4236, c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, California. Will comply with the provisions of Section 10, POR, pertaining to Medical Requirements. Typhus, cholera and bubonic plague inoculations will be administered to officer immediately upon receipt of orders. Designated as special official courier. BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR: E. A. DAVIS, Adjutant General. [18] 3 Incls. AG Ltr 4 July 1944 AG Form 43 Travel Book Distribution: Officer (10) Officers' Br. Rec. Sec. AGO Judge Advocate General, 2734 Mu. Lt. Stump, 1C-931, The Pentagon. APS, 4A-514, The Pentagon (2) Port Postal Officer, SFPE, Fort Mason, Calif. Assistant Ch/Staff, OPD, WDGS, 3B-354, The Pentagon Mobilization Div. ASF, Foreign Travel Section, 4E-747, The Pentagon P & T Officer, Hq. ATC, Rm. 1916 Gravelly Point, Va. CG, USAFPOA, APO 958, c/o PM, San Francisco, California Postal Officer, APO 958, c/o PM, San Francisco, Calif. CO, 1504th AAF Base Unit, Fairfield-Suisun Army Air Field, Calif. (3) Page 10 SECRET [19] 24 MARCH 1945 Memorandum for the Commanding General, Pacific Ocean Areas. Subject: Investigation Supplementary to Army Pearl Harbor Board. Pursuant to my directions and in accordance with my public statement of 1 December 1944, Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, is conducting for me the investigation supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board. In connection therewith Colonel Clausen is scheduled to arrive in your Command within the next thirty days. It is desired that the fullest possible cooperation and assistance be given him, and that the senior G-2 General Officer of your Command be detailed to assist in the investigation, as Colonel Clausen may request, for the purpose of obtaining statements from Navy personnel and access to Navy records and information in accordance with arrangements which have been made between the Secretary of War and the Secretary of Navy. HENRY L. STIMSON, Secretary of War. hcc/es A true copy. HENRY C. CLAUSEN Lt. Colonel, JAGD. SECRET [20] 24 MARCH 1945. Memorandum for the Commanding General, Southwest Pacific Theater. Subject: Investigation Supplementary to Army Pearl Harbor Board. Pursuant to my directions and in accordance with my public statement of 1 December 1944, Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, is conducting for me the investigation supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board. In connection therewith Colonel Clausen is scheduled to arrive in your Command within the next thirty days. It is desired that the fullest possible cooperation and assistance be given him, and that the senior G-2 General Officer of your Command be detailed to assist in the investigation, as Colonel Clausen may request, for the purpose of obtaining statements from Navy personnel and access to Navy records and information in accordance with arrangements which have been made between the Secretary of War and the Secretary of Navy. HENRY L. STIMSON, Secretary of War. hcc/es A true copy. HENRY C. CLAUSEN, Lt. Colonel, JAGD. [21] WAR DEPARTMENT ARMY SERVICE FORCES OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL 24 MARCH 1945. Memorandum: ASF P&O (Maj. Duckett) 1. Request that so much of par. 1, Movement Orders 14 Mar. 45, (copy attached) as directs me to proceed from Washington, D. C. on or about 20 Mar. 45, and to report to Fairfield-Suisun Army Air Field not later than 28 Mar. 45, be amended to extend said dates respectively to leave Washington, D. C. on or about 26 Mar. 45, and to report to Fairfield- Suisun Army Air Field not later than 4 April 45. Also, if advisable, amend said orders to designate my correct rank. 2. Necessity for the foregoing extensions is additional time required to await certain developments in compliance with orders of the S/W. Henry C. Clausen, HENRY C. CLAUSEN, Lieutenant Colonel, Jagd. Rm. 4741 Munitions Ex. 78922 Page 11 [22] EAD/ED/ ed/2331 Mu 27 MARCH 1945. AGPO-A 201-Clausen, Henry C 77723 (27 Mar 46) AGO Personnel Officers Assignment SPXPO-A Room 2323 Munitions CO 1504 AAFBU PP FAIRFIELD-SUISUN AAF FAIRFIELD, CALIFORNIA Orders dated 14 March 1945 pertaining to Major Henry C. Clausen 0907613 JAGD by order SW are amended to direct him proceed on or about 26 March 46 from Washington, DC, and report to CO 1504 AAFBU FAIRFIELD-SUISUN AAF, Fairfield, Calif., not later than 4 April 45 end SPXPO-A ULIO TAG. Official: ____________, Adjutant General. SECRET [23] Memorandum for The Adjutant General. 24 MAY 1945 Subject: Movement Orders to Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen. JAGD 1. Reference is made to movement Orders, dated 14 March 1946, to Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, and request therefor dated 3 March 1945. 2. Request is made for additional movement Orders to Colonel Clausen directing him to proceed on or about 30 May 1946 to Headquarters, SHAEF, and to such other points in the theater, and such other places and theaters, in such order and frequency as may be necessary for the purpose of conducting investigation in accordance with Secret instructions of the Secretary of War. 3. It is requested that the provisions of said prior request for Orders, dated 3 March 1946, be considered applicable hereto and that a one priority be assigned for air travel. HARVEY H. BUNDY For the Secretary of War. A true copy. HENRY C. CLAUSEN Lt. Colonel, JAGD. RESTRICTED EAD/laf/fcs/2323 Mun Br. 76520 WAR DEPARTMENT, THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, Washington 25, D. C., 25 May 1945 [24] AGPO-A 201 Clausen, Henry C (24 May 45) Subject: Movement Orders To: # Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Clausen, 0907613, JAGD 1. Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Clausen, 0907613, JAGD, will proceed on or about 30 May 1945 from Washington, D. c. to Headquarters, SHAEF, European Theater of Operations, Versailes, France, and to such other points in the theater, and such other places and theaters, in such order and frequency as may be necessary on temporary duty of approximately two (2) months for the purposes of conducting an investigation in accordance with instructions of the Secretary of War. He will report to the Commanding Officer, 503d Army Air Forces Base Unit, Air Annex: #1, Room 1746, Gravelly Point, Washington, D. C. for processing and air transportation, upon completion of which, he will proceed from Washington, D. C. to Versailles, France, reporting upon arrival to the Commanding General, European Theater of Operations, for duty. Upon completion of this temporary duty, he will return to his proper station, Washington, D. C. 2. Travel directed is necessary in the military service. 501-1 P 432-02, 03 212/50425 Travel by air (APR-1-354533-WDP-MAY) is directed (Par. 3b (2) AR 55-120, Changes No. 9), and is necessary for the accomplishment of an emerg- Page 12 ency war mission. A baggage allowance of sixty-five (66) pounds, to include all personal effects, and an excess baggage allowance of ten (10) pounds, is authorized while traveling by aircraft. Within the continental limits of the United States, provisions of Par. 25, AR 35- 4820, 19 April 1945 apply: outside the continental limits of the United States, provisions of Par. 26, AR 354820, 19 April 1945, apply. 3. Authority is granted to make such changes in the above itinerary and to proceed to such additional places as may be necessary for the accomplishment of this mission. 4. Personnel will be equipped as desired in accordance with Column P, WD Pamphlet No. 38-6, "Itemized Baggage List." One (1) Pistol, caliber .45 will be issued at the aerial port of embarkation. 5. SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS: Temporary APO 4295, c/o Postmaster, New York, New York. Will comply with provisions of Section 10, POR, pertaining to Medical Requirement. Typhus inoculations will be administered immediately upon receipt of orders. Designated special official courier. BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR: CAPT. E. A. DAVIS AGO, Adjutant General. Officers Br Overseas Assignment Sec [25] 3 Incls: AG Ltr 4 Jul 44 AG Form #43 Travel Book Distribution: Officer (10) Offs' Br., Rec Sec, AGO, 1628 Mun APS, 4A-514, Pentagon OIC, Emb APO, 464 Lexington Ave., NY, NY (2) Lt. Stump, 1C-931, Pentagon CO, 503d AAFBU, WPAE, 1746, Air Annex #1, Gravelly Pt, DC (3) Judge Advocate General, 2734 Mun Destination Commander: SECRET [26] DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Referring to your letter dated 10 February 1945, I wish to thank you for the arrangements made whereby Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, has had access to certain pertinent Navy records and interviewed certain Navy personnel. I have also been happy to comply with your request that appropriate Navy representatives similarly be given Army information which is relevant to your investigation, it being understood, of course, that the Navy inquiry will be limited to matters which have a bearing on the part that Navy personnel, organization or action may have had in the disaster. Sincerely yours, ______________ Secretary of War. Honorable JAMES FORRESTAL, Secretary of the Navy, Washington, D. C. A true copy HENRY C. CLAUSEN, Lt. Colonel, JAGD. hhb/mob [27] 7 AUGUST 1945. Memorandum for the Adjutant General: Reference is made to Movement Orders to Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD dated 25 May 1945. It is requested that so much of paragraph one thereof as sets forth period of temporary duty as approximately two months be amended to read "four months." HARVEY H. BUNDY, Special Assistant to the Secretary of War. A true copy. HENRY C. CLAUSEN Lt. Colonel, JAGD. Page 13 RESTRICTED [28] RHO/laf/mm/2323 Mun Br. 76520 WAR DEPARTMENT THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE Washington, D. C., 11 August 1945. AGPO-A 201-Clausen, Henry C. (7 Aug. 45.) Subject: Amendment of Movement Orders, To: Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Clausen, O-907613, JAGD. So much of Classified Letter Orders AGPO-A 201 Clausen, Henry C. (24 May 45. Subject: Movement Orders 25 May 1945 pertaining to Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Clausen, O-907613, JAGD as reads: "Temporary Duty of approximately two (2) months" be amended to read: "Temporary Duty of approximately four (4) months". BY ORDERS OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR: E. A. DAVIS, Adjutant General. Distribution: Officer (10) Offs' Br., Rec Sec, AGO, 1528 Mun APS, 4A-514, Pentagon OIC, Emb APO, 464 Lexington Ave., NY, NY (2) Lt. Stump, 1C-931, Pentagon CO, 503d AAFBU, WPAE, 1746, Air Annex #1, Gravelly Pt, DC (3) Judge Advocate General, 2734 Mun Destination Commander: [29] OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR REGARDING THE PEARL HARBOR DISASTER By Joint Resolution of the Congress, approved June 13, 1944, the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy were severally directed to proceed with an investigation into the facts surrounding the Pearl Harbor catastrophe of December 7, 1941, and to commence such proceedings against such persons as the facts might justify. In order to meet the wishes of Congress as expressed in this resolution, I have conducted such an investigation. In order to assist me to this end, there was appointed by order dated July 8, 1944, a Board of three general officers which was directed "to ascertain and report the facts relating to the attack made by Japanese armed forces upon the Territory of Hawaii on 7 December 1941, and to make such recommendations as it might deem proper." On December 1,1944, I made a public statement of my decision in this matter as follows: "This Army Pearl Harbor Board has conducted an extensive and painstaking investigation. It has held hearings in Hawaii, San Francisco, and Washington. It has examined a total of 151 witnesses and received many exhibits. I have read its report and reviewed the recorded evidence. The Judge Advocate General of the Army, at my direction, has also examined the report and the record and has given me fully the benefit of his views. "I recognize the importance to any individual concerned of having a decision taken as to what, if any, action is to be instituted against him and after weighing all the considerations, I am clear that the public interest as well as justice and fairness will best be served by a statement of my present conclusions. So far as they now may be made public, consonant with the public interest, my conclusions were as follows: "The Army Pearl Harbor Board, although it recommended no disciplinary or other action, concluded that there were several officers in the field and in he War Department who did not perform their duties with the necessary skill or exercise the judgment which was required under the circumstances. On the recorded evidence, I agree with some but not all of the Board's conclusions. "So far as the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department is concerned, I am of the opinion that his errors of judgment were of such a nature as to demand his relief from a Command status. This was done on January 11, 1942, and in itself is a serious result for any officer with a long record of excellent service, and conscientious as I believe General Short to be. In my judgment, or the evidence now recorded, it is sufficient action. Page 14 "Furthermore, I am satisfied that proper steps were taken to correct such inadequacies of either personnel or organization as were shown to exist either in the War Department or in the field at the time of the Pearl Harbor disaster. My conclusion is that under all the circumstances the evidence now recorded does not warrant the institution of any further proceedings against any officer in the Army. "In accordance with the opinion of The Judge Advocate General, I have decided that my own investigation should be further continued until all the facts are made as clear as possible and until the testimony of [30] every witness in possession of material facts can be obtained, and I have given the necessary directions to accomplish this result. Some of the testimony may be much delayed where witnesses are engaged in combat in active theaters of operation. My present decision will be reviewed when the investigation has been finally completed. "Finally, I am absolutely clear that it would be highly prejudicial to the successful prosecution of the war and the safety of American lives to make public during the war the report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board or the record on which it is based." Since December 1, I have continued my own investigation. At my direction, Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Clausen of the Office of the Judge Advocate General has made an extensive further examination of witnesses. Colonel Clausen was Assistant Recorder of the Army Pearl Harbor Board and as such had an intimate knowledge of the facts. I have reviewed the additional evidence available and I have reviewed my earlier decision. I am satisfied that this decision as to the action to be taken was correct Until the end of the hostilities with Japan extreme care was necessary not to disclose information which was in the hands of the War Department and especially the sources of our information, of which there were many, including the Intelligence Divisions of the Army and Navy, the F. B. I., and others. From these same sources there came to the Government additional information which resulted in saving of thousands of American lives during the war with Japan. The end of hostilities now makes it possible for me to make public much more fully my conclusions and the reasons for my conclusions without such serious danger to the public security as to outweigh the desirability of such publication. It is still not in the public interest to disclose sources of information. I have directed that all of the Report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board be made public except that part which would reveal sources of secret information. The conclusions of the Board are fully set forth in the part which is now made public. The War Department will make available to appropriate Committees of Congress the full reports and the record of the testimony. My conclusions are as follows: I The primary and immediate responsibility for the protection of the Island of Oahu and Pearl Harbor insofar as the Army was concerned rested upon the Commanding Officer of the Hawaiian Department Lieutenant General Walter C. Short. It has been and still is the prevailing policy and practice of the General Staff of the United States Army to choose with care as commanding officers of the various theaters men whose record and experience indicate their capabilities for the command and to place upon them the responsibility for the performance of their mission with as little interference from the central Army authorities in Washington as possible. This policy of decentralized responsibility in our Army has been found to produce the best results, has been followed successfully throughout the war, and it is still being followed in all the various theaters of operation. Thus each theater commander is charged with the preparation of his own local defense plan, including the working out of any defense operations with the local Naval authorities. Such plans are submitted to the appropriate division of the General Staff in Washington and are subject to any changes or modifications that might emanate from that source. The primary responsibility for such plans and their execution, however, rests on the commanding officer familiar with the local [31] situation and conditions. Before December 7, 1941, detailed plans for the defense of the Hawaiian Department had been devised and worked out by General Short as well as a Joint Agreement with the local Naval authorities for joint action in the event of an emergency, and he and the Navy commanding officer had the primary responsibility of putting into effect these plans or such portions thereof as the occasion Page 15 demanded. This last, however, had not been done at the time of the Japanese attack. I feel that during the year 1941, and particularly during October and until he latter part of November, General Short was repeatedly advised of the critical events which were developing. I find that he was clearly warned on November 27 by the appropriate authorities in Washington that a break in diplomatic relations between the United States and Japan might occur at any time, that an attack by Japan on the United States might occur, and that hostilities were possible at any moment. I find that he was informed that the defense of his command was to be regarded as paramount to all other considerations and that le was specifically directed to take such measures of reconnaissance as he deemed necessary. In addition to the information received directly from Washington through both Army and Navy sources, General Short received continuous reports from his own Intelligence Section, which clearly revealed the seriousness of the situation. General Short himself knew that it was traditionally the policy for a responsible commanding officer to anticipate and to be prepared or the worst form of possible attack, and he had received and approved military estimates from his own staff as well as from the Chief of Staff to the effect that a surprise raid by air and submarine constituted the principal perils to Hawaii. I do not find that there was any information in the possession of the War Department and which was not made available to General Short which would lave modified the essence of the above information which was sent to him or which would have affected or increased the duties of vigilance and alertness thus already imposed upon him. The available information might have given him a clearer picture of the increasing tenseness of the situation and as later pointed out I believe that the War Department would have carried out its duties more adequately if General Short had been given more complete information, but I find that he was amply warned for the performance of his paramount duty of being alert against a surprise air attack by Japan. I find that he failed in the light of the information which he had received adequately to alert his command to the degree of preparedness which the situation demanded; and that this failure contributed measurably to the extent of the disaster, although much damage probably would have resulted from the attack in any event. I find that he failed to use fully the means at hand for reconnaissance, especially the radar air warning service, which was of prime necessity; that he failed to ascertain from the Navy the extent of its reconnaissance or to collaborate with it to the end that more adequate reconnaissance should be secured. I find that he failed to have his antiaircraft defenses sufficiently manned or supplied with ready ammunition as the situation demanded. This failure resulted not from indolence or indifference or willful disobedience of orders but from a vital error of judgment, viz.: the failure to comprehend the necessities of the situation in the light of the warnings and information which he had received. He states that to put into effect a different degree of alertness than he actually did would have interfered with the training program which he was carrying out in various activities, and would have involved the danger of alarming the population, against which he had been cautioned. In weighing such considerations he entirely lost sight of the fact that the defense of his command and station against Japan was his paramount duty. [32] The underlying cause of this error of Judgment was General Short's confidence that Japan would not then attack Pearl Harbor. In fairness to him must be borne in mind that this belief was shared in by almost everyone concerned including his superior officers in the War Department in Washington. He was undoubtedly influenced in such a belief by the then prevailing psychology which completely underestimated the Japanese military capabilities and particularly the advance which they had made in the use of aircraft. General Short also knew that the Naval command at Hawaii, which he regarded as being better informed than he because of their facilities and the widespread nature of their operations, was confident that an air attack on Pearl Harbor was most unlikely. The information which was being received of Japanese naval activity pointed to operations in southeastern Asia, the Netherlands East Indies, or the Philippines. Furthermore, in Hawaii the danger of sabotage was stressed because of the large Japanese population, and General Short was expressly warned by the War Department against this danger. But the warning was coupled with a warning also against the danger of hostile action in general. General Short relies upon the fact that the War Department took no exception to his report of November 27, 1941, to the effect that he was "alerted against sabotage." He urges that this Page 16 should be regarded as a tacit approval of his failure to alert against other dangers. I think it is probably true that the emphasis on sabotage in several War Department warnings and the Department's caution against alarming the civilian population, coupled with this failure to comment on Short's report of November 27, confirmed him in his conviction that he had chosen the correct form of alert and might disregard all others. But these matters, although they may make his action more understandable, do not serve to exonerate him for his failure to be fully alert and prepared against an air attack. He well knew that an air attack on Pearl Harbor, even if improbable, was possible. Yet he ordered an alert which he himself had prepared for use only in case of "no threat from without." Protection against the possibility of such an attack was his own definite responsibility. To sum up the situation tersely, General Short was warned by Washington that there was immediate danger both of an attack from without by Japan and of an attack from within by sabotage. This warning required him to be alert against both forms of danger. He chose to concentrate himself so entirely upon a defense against sabotage as to leave himself more completely exposed to an attack from without than if there had been no alert at all. He so concentrated his planes as not only to make them an easy target for an attack from without but to require several hours to get any substantial number of them into the air for defense. To such an error of judgment it is no excuse that he relied upon assurances from another service, even though he thought that that service was better informed than he was as to the disposition of the Japanese fleet. He was the responsible defender of the outpost of Hawaii. He had no right entirely to subordinate his duty to be prepared against what he knew to be the most dangerous form of attack on that outpost to the opinion of another service. Nor had he any right, after the clear and explicit warning of the War Department of a possible attack from without, to assume from mere inference that such a warning had been entirely withdrawn and that he was thereby relieved from his independent responsibility as a theater commander. I have reviewed the conclusions reached with regard to General Short in my statement of December 1, 1944 and in my judgment the additional investigation does not warrant any change in the conclusions drawn therein, nor call for any action beyond that which has already been taken. II [33] Such duties as the War Department in Washington had in the supervision of the defense of Hawaii devolved primarily upon what was then known as the War Plans Division of the General Staff. This was the division of the General Staff specifically charged with the war plans and operations, and messages to or from the theater commanders were regularly handled or approved by it. The War Plans Division was in charge of an Assistant Chief of Staff and under him various officers had specially assigned duties. The Intelligence Section of the General Staff (G-2) also had duties of collecting and analyzing information and transmitting information to other sections of the War Department and to the theater commanders. I find as heretofore stated that the messages sent to General Short gave him adequate information as to the state of the negotiations with the Japanese and the development of the situation, that he was warned that Japanese future action was unpredictable; that hostile action was possible at any moment; and that no consideration was to be permitted to jeopardize his defense. He was also expressly directed to take reconnaissance measures-the all-important measure to be taken at the time. Furthermore, as heretofore stated. I do not think that any special and detailed warnings against sabotage should have been considered by General Short as justifying his decision that an alert against any possible enemy action was not also his duty. There was certain information in the War Department which was not sent to General Short and which if forwarded might have sharpened General Short's attention or emphasized further the imminence of war. Some part of this information was sent to Admiral Kimmel by the Navy. It was the rule that all such information should be exchanged between the Army and Navy at Pearl Harbor, and the War Department had a right to believe that this information communicated to Admiral Kimmel was also available to General Short. While Admiral Kimmel and General Short were on very friendly terms and in frequent communication, the exchange of information as well as consultation in other respects at Hawaii between the Army and Navy was inadequate Page 17 The information available to the War Department on or before December 7 1941, which was not passed on to General Short included the following: information available November 17 and 22 to the effect that the Japanese Government insisted that the negotiations for a peaceful settlement be terminated by November 25, 1941, later extended to November 29, 1941; information available December 6 and 7 to the effect that Nomura and Kurusu were to reply to the United States that Japan would yield no further, and information available the morning of December 7 which did not reach General Short until after the disaster that the reply was to be delivered to the representatives of the United States at 1:00 P. M., December 7, 1941, and that the remaining cipher and code machines in the Japanese Embassy at Washington were to be destroyed. The Army Pearl Harbor Board concluded that the War Department had earlier in its possession other evidence which indicated that war with Japan was imminent at a definite time and that this information was not available to General Short. The principal basis for this conclusion by the Board, however was that the War Department had information through secret sources of information that the Japanese diplomatic representatives in London, Washington and elsewhere had been ordered to destroy their codes and papers. The additional investigation shows that officers on General Short's staff also had this information and had given it to him prior to December 7, 1941. It should be borne in mind also that General Short had been [34] fully advised by the War Department that war with Japan was imminent and might commence at any time. The War and Navy Departments also had certain information which was not forwarded to General Short to the effect that the Japanese Consulate at Honolulu was reporting to Tokyo ship movements and dispositions in Pearl Harbor. Other somewhat similar information was being given to Tokyo by Japanese Consulates in other ports. This was apparently considered by officers in the War Department as merely a part of the enemy's general plan to keep track of all ships of the American Navy as far as possible. Information was received by the War Department on December 6, 1941, as to what the Japanese reply to the settlement overtures of the United States would be and that this reply indicated an immediate severance of diplomatic relations. There is no dispute, however, that General Marshall did not get this information until the morning of December 7. An officer, then connected with G-2, War Department, testified before the Army Pearl Harbor Board that on December 6 he personally delivered this message to the Secretary of the General Staff for the Chief of Staff, also to the Executive Officer for the Chief of the War Plans Division, and to the Executive Officer for the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2. In the additional investigation conducted by Colonel Clausen subsequent to the findings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, the witness corrected his testimony and testified that the only message he delivered on the night of December 6 was to the duty officer for the Secretary of State. Other evidence from the additional investigation showed that the subordinate officer in G-2 who received the message on December 6 did not deliver it to the Army persons mentioned until after 9:00 A. M. on the morning of December 7. When the Chief of Staff received the above mentioned information on the morning of December 7, together with information which had since arrived to the effect that the Japanese envoys were to deliver the reply to the American Government at 1:00 P. M. And the Japanese Embassy was to destroy its remaining cipher and code machines and secret papers, he sent to the overseas commanders a message giving these latest developments. General Marshall gave directions that this message be immediately dispatched to the theater commanders. This was the message, which in the ease of General Short, did not arrive until after the attack. Another item of information in the possession of the War Department which General Short denies receiving was that the Japanese had circulated from Tokyo about November 30, 1941, to their representatives abroad, a plan to the effect that in case of severance of diplomatic relations or war with the United States, Great Britain or Russia a certain signal in the form of a false weather report would be broadcast in a news message and that all code papers were then to be destroyed. I find that this information was available to General Short or his command prior to December 7, 1941. The evidence as to whether the agreed signal indicating severance of relations or war with the United States was subsequently given and made known to the War Department is confusing and contradictory. No written evidence of such a signal has been found. But in any event, information was available to General Short of the orders to destroy codes as above discussed. Page 18 With regard to the information available in the War Department, I believe the War Plans Division made a mistake in not transmitting to General Short more information than it did. A keener and more imaginative appreciation on the part of some of the officers in the War and Navy Departments of the significance of some of the information might have led to a suspicion of an attack specifically on Pearl Harbor. I do not think that certain officers in the War Department [35] functioned in these respects with sufficient skill. At all times it must be borne in mind, however, that it is easy to criticize individuals in the light of hind-sight, and very difficult to recreate fairly the entire situation and information with which the officers were required to deal at the time of the event. Again, as I have pointed out, General Short in response to a message which had been sent out containing a warning of possible hostilities and a request for a report of action taken, had sent a message to the War Department which was susceptible of the interpretation that he was on the alert against sabotage only and not on the alert against an air raid or other hostile action. While this interpretation was not necessarily to be had from the wording of his message, nevertheless a keener sense of analysis and a more incisive comparison of the messages exchanged would have invited further inquiry by the War Plans Division of General Short, and his failure to go on the necessary alert might well have been discovered. The Chief of this division and certain of his subordinates knew that a report of the measures taken by General Short had been asked for. General Short's reply was brought to the attention of the Chief of the division. A clear and satisfactory reply should have been required. This was not done and a more efficient functioning of the division would have demanded that a careful inquiry as to the meaning of General Short's message be made and no room for ambiguity permitted. It must clearly be borne in mind that in November and December 1941, the responsibilities of the War Plans Division covered many fields and many theaters. Their preoccupation with the theaters most likely to be threatened, such as the Philippines toward which the Japanese activities then appeared to be pointed, may be subject to criticism in the light of the subsequent disaster, but it is understandable. All signs pointed to an attack in that direction and they were exercising particular care with respect to that theater. Their conduct must be viewed in an entirely different light from that of the theater commander, such as General Short, who was like a sentinel on post and whose attention and vigilance must be entirely concentrated on the single position which he has been chosen to defend and whose alertness must not he allowed to be distracted by consideration of other contingencies in respect to which he is not responsible. Under all circumstances, I find nothing in the evidence as now recorded which warrants the institution of any further proceedings against any officer in the War Plans Division Since Pearl Harbor, the War Plans Division has been completely reorganized and the officers involved in the matters in question have either died or received other assignments where they have already distinguished themselves in the performance of important duties in the field. I am satisfied that proper steps were taken to correct such inadequacies of either personnel or organization as were shown to exist either in the War Department or in the field at the time of the Pearl Harbor disaster. III The War Plans Division like the other divisions and activities of the General Staff in Washington was under the general direction and supervision of the Chief of Staff, General Marshall. Evidently for this reason the Army Pearl Harbor Board has been led to criticize the Chief of Staff as being responsible for some of the shortcomings of the officers of the General Staff which I have just enumerated. In my opinion, this criticism is entirely unjustified. It arises from a fundamental misconception of the duties of the Chief of Staff and of his relations with the divisions and activities of the General Staff. It is not the function of the Chief of Staff specifically to direct and personally supervise the execution in detail of the duties of the various sections of the General Staff. His paramount duty is to advise the President and the Secretary of War, and to make plans for [36] and supervise the organization. Equipment, and training of a great army for a global war; to advise on, and himself to make, decisions regarding basic problems of military strategy in the many possible theaters in which the war might develop and in other fundamental and broad military problems which confront the United States. It would hope- Page 19 lessly cripple the performance of these great and paramount duties should a Chief of Staff allow himself to become immersed in administrative details by which the plans for defense are carried out in our many outposts. It is true that the failure of any part of the General Staff to perform its duties efficiently may be of such a kind or reach such an extent as to become the responsibility of the Chief of Staff for not having established a more effective organization. But I do not find any such situation in this ease. The scattered and individual errors which I have criticized in respect to the Pearl Harbor disaster were not of a kind or extent to imply any general inefficiency in a Staff which was performing the heaviest duties with great ability and with subsequent results which have produced some of the finest pages of the history of the war. The shortcomings I have pointed out thus cannot in any fairness be attributed to he Chief of Staff. On the contrary, throughout this matter I believe that he acted with his usual great skill, energy, and efficiency. IV The conclusions which I have stated herein as to the responsibilities and errors of General Short are in general accord with the conclusions of both the Roberts Commission in their report of January 23, 1942* and the Army Pearl Harbor Board. My conclusions as to the responsibilities and errors of the War Plans Division are to a substantial extent, but not entirely, in accord with the conclusions of the Army Pearl Harbor Board. The Roberts Commission did not go into details in respect to these responsibilities. My conclusion as to the responsibility of the Chief of Staff is, as I have heretofore stated, at variance with the conclusion of the Army Pearl Harbor Board but it is in entire agreement with he conclusions of the Roberts Commission. Of the correctness of my conclusion in this last respect, I have not the slightest doubt. V In the conclusions of the Board there were no other individuals charged with responsibilities who were criticized except for a suggestion which might be construed as a criticism of Secretary Hull. It is suggested that in his conduct of he negotiations with the Japanese envoys a different procedure might have prolonged the negotiations until such time as the Army and Navy were better prepared for hostile action. Not only do I strongly disagree with what amounts at best only to a conjecture, but I feel that the Board's comment in this respect was uncalled for and not within the scope of their proper inquiry. VI There has been omitted from the press release of the text of the Army Pearl Harbor Board report that portion which dealt solelv with the related investigation of Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr. My findings as to Colonel Wyman, as expressed on December 1, 1944,were as follows: [37] "I have reviewed the results of this investigation. I do not find from his review that the Pearl Harbor disaster was in any way contributed to or caused by any alleged misconduct, neglect or disloyalty on the part of Rohl, the Hawaiian Constructors, the organization with which he was connected, Colonel Wyman, or others directing construction activities in Hawaii, and I do not find hat there is any evidence that Rohl or anyone else directing such construction gave any information to the enemy." The additional investigation conducted by Colonel Clausen has disclosed no further evidence which would in any way modify my decision. I also stated on December 1, 1944, that "as to other alleged misconduct and, neglect of Colonel Wyman and others in construction matters, I have referred he question of the commencing of any proceedings to the Under Secretary of War and The Judge Advocate General." Until those officials are ready to report I deem it inappropriate to make public the portions of the Army Pearl Harbor Board report insofar as it relates to Colonel Wyman. *This Commission consisted of Mr. Justice Roberts, Admiral W. H. Stanley, Retired; Admiral J. M. Reeves, Retired; Major General Frank R. McCoy, Reitired; and Major General Joseph T. McNarney. Page 20 [38] EXHIBIT B INVESTIGATION BY LT. COLONEL HENRY C. CLAUSEN, JAGD, FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR SUPPLEMENTARY TO PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD. 1. Statement of interview of Brig. General Kendall J. Fielder, 24 January 1945, at Washington D. C. 2. Proposed affidavit of Captain Joseph J. Rochefort, USN, February 1945, at Washington, D. C. 3. Affidavit of Colonel Moses W. Pettigrew, MIS, 13 February 1945, at Washington, D. C. 4. Affidavit of Colonel Carlisle Clyde Dusenbury, GSC, 13 February 1945, at Washington, D. C. 5. Affidavit of Captain Joseph J. Rochefort, USN, 20 February 1945, at Washington, D. C. 6. Affidavit of Colonel Clarence G. Jensen, AC, 22 February 1945, at Washington, D. C. 7. Affidavit of Margaret McKenney, GSC, G-2, 22 February 1945, at Washington, D. C. 8. Affidavit of Colonel George W. Bicknell, MI, 25 February 1945, at Washington, D.C. 9. Amendment to affidavit of Colonel George W. Bicknell, MI, 14 August 1945, at Washington, D. C. 10. Affidavit of Major Edward B. Anderson, TC, 27 February 1945, at Washington, D. C. 11. Affidavit of Brig. General Robert H. Dunlop, AGO, 28 February 1945, at Washington, D C. 12. Affidavit of Lt. Colonel Frank B. Rowlett, SC, 28 February 1945, at Washington, D. C. 13. Affidavit of Major General Ralph C. Smith, GSC, G-2, 28 February 1945, at Washington, D. C. 14. Affidavit of Mary L. Ross, GSC, G-2, 1 March 1945, at Washington, D. C. 15. Affidavit of Colonel Edward W. Raley, AC, 11 March 1945, at Langley Field, Virginia. 16. Affidavit of General Charles R. Gailey, OPD, GSC, 21 March 1945, at Washington, D. C. 17. Affidavit of Colonel Edward F. French, 8C, 22 March 1945, at Washington, D.C. [39] 18. Affidavit of Colonel Joseph K. Evans, GSC, 22 March 1945, at Washington, D. C. 19. Statement of Mr. John E. Russell, President, Theo. H. Davies & Co., Ltd., Honolulu, T. H., 10 April 1945, at Honolulu, T. H., also statement of Harry L. Dawson, 16 April 1945, at Honolulu, T. H. 20. Affidavit of Robert L. Shivers, 10 April 1945, at Honolulu, T. H. 21. Statement of Lt. Colonel Byron M. Meurlott, MI, 16 April 1945, at Honolulu, T. H. 22. Statement of Colonel O. N. Thompson, AGO, 17 April 194a, at Honolulu, T. H. 23. Affidavits of Captain Thomas A. Huckins, USN, and Captain Wilfred J. Holmes, USN, 18 April 1945, at Honolulu, T. H. 24. Affidavit of Brig. General Morrill W. Marston, GSC, 21 April 1945, at Honolulu, T. H. 25. Affidavit of Chief Warrant Officer Louis R. Lane, USN 21 April 1945, at Honolulu, T. H. 26. Statement of Lieutenant Donald Woodrum, Jr. USN, 22 April 1945, at Honolulu, T. H. 27. Affidavit of Captain Edwin T. Layton, USN, 26 April 1945, at Guam. 28. Statement of Brig. General C. A. Powell, SC, 27 April 1945, at Honolulu, T. H. 29. Statement of Commander J. S. Holtwick, Jr., USN, 27 April 1945, at Honolulu, T. H. Page 21 30. Affidavit of Chief Ships Clerk Theodore Emanual, USN, 27 April 1945, at Honolulu, T H. 31. Affidavit of Lt. General Richard K. Sutherland, C/S, GHQ, SW Pacific Areas 6 May 1945, at Manila, P. I. 32. Affidavit of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, 7 May 1945, at Manila, P. I. 33. Affidavit of Major General C. A. Willoughby, ACS, GHQ, SW Pacific Areas 8 May 1945, at Manila, P. I. 34. Affidavit of Brig General Kendall J. Fielder, GSC, 11 May 1945, at Honolulu, T. H. 35. Affidavit of Brig. General Thomas J. Betts, ACS, GSC, 13 June 1945, at Frankfurt on Main, Germany. 36. Affidavit of Lt. General Walter B. Smith, C/S, SHAEF, 16 June 1945, at Frankfurt on Main, Germany. [40] 37. Affidavit of Lt. General Leonard T. Gerow, CG, 16th Army, 20 June 1945, at Cannes, France. 38. Affidavit of Colonel Robert E. Schukraft, SC, 2 June 1945, at Casserta, Italy. 39. Affidavit of George W. Renchard, 7 July 1945, at London, England. 40. Affidavit of John F. Stone, 7 July 1945, at London, England. 41. Affidavit of Major General John R. Deane, USA, 24 July 1945, at Potsdam, Germany. 42. Affidavit of Colonel Rufus S. Bratton, GSC, 27 July 1945, at Paris, France. 43. Affidavit of Colonel Otis K. Sadtler, SC, 13 August 1945, at Washington, D.C. 44. Affidavit of Major General Charles D. Herron, GSC, 13 August 1945, at Washington, D. C. 45. Affidavit of Major General Sherman Miles, USA, 16 August 1945, at Boston, Massachusetts. 46. Affidavit of Colonel Rex W. Minckler, SC, 21 August 1945, at Washington, D. C. 47. Affidavit of General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, 28 August 1945, at Washington, D. C. 48. Affidavit of Colonel Harold Doud, SC, 10 September 1945, at Washington, D. C. 49. Affidavit of Lt. Colonel Frank B. Rowlett, SC, 12 September 1945, at Washington, D. C. 50. Affidavit of Captain Howard W. Martin, SC, 12 September 1945, at Washington, D. C. 51. Affidavit of Miss Mary J. Dunning, SC, 12 September 1945, at Washington, D. C. 52. Affidavit of Miss Louise Prather, SC, 12 September 1945, at Washington, D. C. [41] HEADQUARTERS, ARMY SERVICE FORCES OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL. Washington 25, D. C., 24 January 1945. Memorandum for the files. Subject: Interview of General Fielder. Pursuant to a telephone call by me to General Fielder through General Bissell on 8 January 1946, I interviewed General Fielder at Room 4D852, Pentagon, on 9 January 1945. I explained to General Fielder my mission and the clearances with General Bissell which permitted General Fielder to answer all my questions fully and freely. I reminded him that he was already sworn as a witness for the Army Pearl Harbor Board and the necessity for secrecy with respect to my examination. To many of my questions he answered that it would be necessary for me to review the records at Hawaii and that this would entail considerable research. He gave the following information or answers to the specific points indicated. 1. Concerning his message to G-2 not to furnish intelligence from Washington since it was a duplication (Bratton D. 292-293), he stated that he referred solely to counterintelligence matters and that had "nothing to do with combat." 2. He stated he was not very well aquainted with Commander Joseph J. Rochefort and that he had maintained no liaison with him. He said he did not know of any liaison arrangements between Commander Rochefort and Colonel Edward Railey. [Written:] Said he had no knowledge of "U" (called R1." 3. Upon having his attention invited to his G-2 estimate of 17 and 25 October 1941, he stated it was his understanding that these were circulated to the Chief of Staff and General Short. Page 22 4. He said he thought he had talked with General Short concerning the Washington G-2, 27 November 1941, warning. 5. He claimed that he did not see the Navy Intelligence Bulletin of 1 December 1941. 6. He recalled the Black Dragon Society, Washington G-2 information (Bratton D. 289-291) and-that it was "circulated" as something he "used to get." 7. He claimed he did not see the Melbourne, Australia, Military Attache message of 5-6 December 1941. [42] 8. He stated that General Short assumed that the Navy was conducting long distance reconnaissance. 9. Concerning the 5 December 1941, Washington G-2 message to the Hawaiian Department G-2 to contact Commander Rochefort regarding the Winds Message he said he "didn't remember" the message but that it "might have come in a routine." 10. With respect to the subject matter of the message and whether he knew that the Navy was intercepting such information he stated at first that he knew of this work but that it was talked about in whispers and that on this basis he knew the Navy had broken Japanese codes. Additional questions concerning other subjects relating to the inquiry were asked. General Fielder stated that accurate information could not be given without recourse to the records in Hawaii. A similar qualification already referred to obtains in part concerning the foregoing answers and information. HENRY C. CLAUSEN H. C. C., Major, JAGD, Assistant Recorder, APHB. TOP SECRET [43] AFFIDAVIT OF CAPTAIN JOSEPH J. ROCHEFORT, UNITED STATES NAVY Captain Joseph J. Rochefort, United States Navy, on duty at Office of Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department, Washington, D. C., being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Major Henry C. Clausen, JAGD for the Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and the authority of the Secretary of the Navy with respect to Navy personnel and records, does depose and state: During the period from the fall of 1941 to December 1941 I was the Combat Intelligence Officer in charge of the Combat Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harbor. Which was a field unit to the home office at Washington. I was attached to the Commandant of the 14th Naval District. My duties involved primarily radio intelligence under assignments from the head office in Washington. At Pearl Harbor there was also a Fleet Intelligence Officer and a District Intelligence Officer. My unit consisted of an intercept station, a radio direction finder station, and crypto-analytical units in Pearl Harbor. My opposite number in the Army at Pearl Harbor was Colonel Kendall J. Fielder, G-2. Hawaiian Department. In the fall of 1941 arrangements were made between Colonel Fielder and myself for liaison and exchange of intelligence information pertaining to our functions on matters of mutual concern to the Army and Navy in the Hawaiian Islands. For this purpose I had discussions with him and his staff at his headquarters, and with him and Edwin T. Layton, Fleet Intelligence Officer, at my headquarters. Thereafter, including the period to 7 December 1941, we maintained most cordial and close relations, meeting informally and frequently, and carried out these arrangements. My normal duties during the period from the fall of 1941 to 7 December 1941 did not include the gathering of information or intelligence from Japanese political or diplomatic sources. I knew, however, that this was then being done mainly by joint efforts of the Army and other units of the Navy. On occasions I would receive special assignments relating to this type of material. I have had the various documents shown me by Major Clausen, marked Top Secret Exhibit "B". I did not know the substance of any of these before 7 December 1941 except those numbered SIS 25392, SIS 25432, SIS 25545, SIS 25640, and SIS 25787, on the reverse side of which I have written my initials and today's date. In my talks with Colonel Fielder I gave him such information as I received concerning the substance of these documents and similar matters. It Page 23 was my practice to give Colonel Fielder all the information of importance in which the Army and Navy were jointly interested and [44] and which came to my knowledge in the course of my duties. This was done so that Colonel Fielder and I would keep abreast of intelligence developments in our common interests. [Written:] NOTE.-This proposed affidavit was prepared by me in accordance with statements to me and Comdr. Sonnett by Capt. Rochefort. Following are examples of such intelligence. My recollection in this regard distinct because I had been given special assignments concerning these items intelligence. My assignment with respect to those numbered SIS 25392 and SIS 25432, after being informed of the substance thereof, was to monitor for an implementing message and, I in turn so informed Colonel Fielder during the latter part of November 1941. I did not receive in Hawaii any implementing message of the kind for which I had been instructed to monitor. Concerning those numbered SIS 25545, SIS 25640, and SIS 25787, I was informed of the substance thereof and gave this information to Colonel Fielder and Robert Shivers, FBI Agent in Charge, Honolulu, about the 4th or 5th of December, 1941. This was done during the course of conversations relating to the destruction of secret papers by the Japanese Consul in Honolulu, which information I gave to my head office in Washington. JOSEPH J. ROCHEFORT Captain, USN. Subscribed and sworn to before me this ___ day of February 1945. HENRY C. CLAUSEN Major, JAGD TOP SECRET [45] WAR DEPARTMENT WASHINGTON AFFIDAVIT OF COLONEL MOSES W. PETTIGREW, MIS Colonel Moses W. Pettigrew, MIS, being first duly sworn, and informed of the nature and scope of the investigation by Major Henry C. Clausen, for the Secretary of War supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and reminded of his rights to remain silent, and warned that top secrecy was required, deposes and says: From August to 7 December 1941 he was executive officer of the Intelligence Branch, G-2, War Department, Washington; that from November 1939 to August 11 he was assistant to Colonel Rufus W. Bratton in the Far Eastern Unit, G-2, War Department; That while performing said duties in G-2, he read various intercepts of diplomatic radio messages from Japan to consulates and embassies; that these intercepts were variously classified as Purple, High Level Diplomatic, and J19; That he recalls reading, on or about 26 November 1941 and 28 November 1941, while in the performance of his said duties, two intercepts, SIS No. 25392 and SIS No. 25432, copies of which shown him this date by Major Clausen have been identified by affiant with his initials and date, and which are now commonly referred to as the "Winds Code" That someone whom affiant does not now recall, showed affiant on or about 5 December 1941, an implementation intercept which had been received from the Navy and which indicated that Japanese-U. S. Relations were in danger; that view of the prior intercepts which had been read by affiant he took the implementation message to mean that anything could happen and, consequently, he had prepared for dispatch to the Assistant Chief of Staff, Headquarters G-2, Hawaiian Department, Honolulu, at the request of someone whom he does not now call, a secret cablegram, a copy of which is attached. That affiant was of the belief then that the Hawaiian Department was in possession of the same information he had received in Washington; that he reached this conclusion by statements therefore of Naval personnel, whom he does not now recall, to the effect that Hawaii had everything in the way of information at Washington had; and, that the Navy had a crypto-analytic unit in Hawaii under Commander Rochefort which was monitoring and receiving these intercepts and breaking and translating the codes, as well as Washington, in the Page 24 interest of saving time, utilizing personnel there available, and a subsequent exchange of intercept translations as a check one against the another. [46] That on 5 December 1941 affiant believed that the Army in Hawaii would receive this information from the Navy there but he sent the secret telegram of 5 December 1941 as a precautionary measure since he felt it might have been possible that the Army in Hawaii did not get the same information; that affiant has looked at the file copy of the 5 December 1941 secret cablegram he prepared and has affixed his initials and date on the reverse side thereof; that the initials "RSB" written thereon in the upper right-hand corner, indicating Colonel Rufus S. Bratton, were written thereon by affiant on 5 December 1941 and affiant also wrote his own initials in the upper right-hand corner; that affiant believes he took the message when it had been prepared to the office of Colonel Ralph C. Smith, Executive Office, G-2, had the message initialed by Lt. Colonel C. H. Edmonston, and then took it to the G-2 Cable Room for dispatch; That the number 519 on said message indicates to affiant that the message was dispatched on 5 December 1941 because such was an outgoing message number which was given only in the ordinary course of procedure when a message was dispatched; Affiant does not know what if anything happened after the dispatch of said message with reference to action thereon by the Hawaiian Department; That prior to affiant's aforesaid duties in G-2, War Department, he was from May 1939 to October 1939, G-2 of the Hawaiian Department; that while in the performance of said duties of G-2, Hawaiian Department, he had been informed that the Navy there had a crypto-analytic unit to that time; that the Army had a certain amount of liaison with the Navy in that regard for obtaining intercepts of the character indicated, although the Navy was far ahead of the Army in the development of this phase of intelligence; that it was possible on occasions to obtain certain information from a commercial cable company; that Colonel Morrill W. Marston succeeded affiant as G-2, Hawaiian Department, and in turn was succeeded by Colonel Fielder; Affiant recommends as leads to be pursued by Major Clausen, an interview with Miss Margaret McKenney, Room 2D841, Pentagon, Extension 5851, questioning of personnel in the War Department Message Center, and interviews and checking records at Hawaii in possession of the Signal Corps there, especially Colonel Powell. Also interviews with Colonel C. C. Dusenbury, MID, former assistant to Colonel Bratton and with General Marston. Moses W. Pettigrew MOSES W. PETTIGREW Colonel, MIS. Subscribed and sworn to before me this 12th day of February 1945 at Washington, D. C. Henry C. Clausen, HENRY C. CLAUSEN, Major, JAGD. SECRET [47] Standard Form No. 14A Approved by the President March 10, 1926 TELEGRAM OFFICIAL BUSINESS-GOVERNMENT RATES Sent No. 519, 12/5 DECEMBER 5, 1941. ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF HEADQUARTERS, G-2, Hawaiian Department Honolulu, Territory Hawaii: Contact Commander Rochefort immediately thru Commandant Fourteen Naval District regarding broadcasts from Tokyo reference weather. MILES. I certify that this message is on official business and necessary for the public service. RALPH C. SMITH, Colonel, G. S. C., Executive Officer, G-2. Secret Cablegram las Page 25 TOP SECRET [49] WAR DEPARTMENT Washington. AFFIDAVIT OF COLONEL CARLISE CLYDE DUSENBURY, GSC Colonel Carlise Clyde Dusenbury, GSC, Assistant Director of Intelligence Southeast Asia Command, Kandy, Ceylon, on temporary duty in Washington being first duly sworn, and informed of the nature and scope of the investigation by Major Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and reminded of his right remain silent, and warned that top secrecy was required, deposes and says; To the best of my recollection I prepared the initial draft of the 5 December 1941 secret cablegram reading: "Sent No. 519, 12/5 DECEMBER 5, 1941. ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF HEADQUARTERS, G2 Hawaiian Department, Honolulu, Territory Hawaii: Contact Commander Rochefort immediately thru Commandant Fourteen Naval District regarding broadcasts from Tokyo reference weather. MILES." I have identified a copy of this cablegram by my initials and date on the reverse side thereof. This was prepared either of my volition or following consultation with Colonel Rufus S. Bratton, G-2, Chief, Far Eastern Branch, MIS. For several months prior to and following 7 December 1941 Colonel Pettigrew was duty as Executive Officer, Intelligence Group, MID, and was not an active member of the Far Eastern Section when the message of 5 December originated. His duties were administrative and consisted in part of redrafting and approving outgoing messages. The reason which I recollect for sending the secret cablegram was that the trend of translated intercepts which had been received by G-2, especially the "Winds Code", indicated danger to the United States and also, because there was believed to be lack of confidence by Edwin T. Layton, Navy intelligence Officer as to Kendall J. Fielder, G-2, Hawaiian Department. It was believed by me that Commander Rochefort had these intercepts, including the "Winds Code" and similar information, available at Hawaii, which had been received either at Hawaii or from the Navy Department in Washington. I understood the Navy had about four or five hundred Naval personnel in Hawaii doing monitoring, breaking, and translating of the Japanese diplomatic codes. [50] During the time in question I was assistant to Colonel Bratton, having reported to him in August 1940, and continued as his assistant until and after 7 December 1941. For the four or five months immediately following August 1940 Colonel Bratton received from the Signal Corps the translated intercepts of Japanese diplomatic messages and delivered certain of these to Colonel Harrison, Aide the Secretary of War; John Stone, secretary to Secretary of State Hull; Colonel Ralph C. Smith, Executive Officer of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, and Colonel Bedell Smith and Colonel Thomas T. Handy or Colonel Bundy in OPD. The procedure followed by Colonel Bratton and myself as his assistant was to destroy all copies of the translated intercepts received except such as were thus distributed, and those distributed were inserted in binders and delivered to the recipients who receipted for them. These receipts and the intercepts which were covered thereby were then later returned to Colonel Bratton or myself as the case might be and the receipts and the intercepts were then destroyed, except one copy of the intercepts which was retained by G-2. At the expiration of the four or five months period referred to following August 1940, Colonel Bratton and I alternated in assembling and delivering these intercepts and continued this practice until about December 1941, although towards the end of this period I handled the sorting and delivering almost exclusively. No record is now available in G-2 to my knowledge of the messages which were thus sorted and delivered, and none was kept because of the top secrecy requirements. While I cannot recollect specifically; the message which I delivered I believe that this information can be obtained elsewhere than in the War Department. For example, the State Department may have briefed and recorded the intercepts. Normally, we would receive daily about fifty to seventy-five of these intercepts which would be sorted to about twenty-five for distribution. Page 26 I recall the intercept, Tokyo to Washington, consisting of fourteen parts, SIS No. 25843, which started coming in the night of 6 December 1941 when I was on duty. Colonel Bratton was also on duty then and saw the message coming in and he remained until about half of it had been received. Thereupon he left and went home at about 9 p. m. I stayed so he could go home and sleep. I waited for the remainder. The fourteenth part, being the final part of the message, was received about 12 that night. Thereupon I left and went home. I returned the next morning to begin the distribution of this intercept consisting of the fourteen parts and I began the distribution of the fourteen parts comprising this intercept about 9 a. m. on 7 December 1941 and finished with the delivery to the State Department as Kurusu and Nomura were meeting with the Secretary of State, When I delivered the copy for OPD that morning I handed it to then Colonel Thomas T. Handy who, upon reading it, said to me "This means war," or words to that effect. None of these parts comprising this intercept was delivered before the morning of 7 December 1941 because the first half had been received while Colonel Bratton was on duty and he had seen this and had not had it delivered that night; furthermore it being late at night when the final part was received, I did not wish to disturb the usual recipients who were probably at home asleep, as I did not see the implications of immediate hostilities. It is to be noted that the intercept translation SIS 25843 was received by the Army from the Navy and which indicates that the contents thereof were known to the Navy prior to receipt by the Army. [51] I recollect that the intercept, Tokyo to Washington, SIS No. 25850, being the instruction to the ambassadors to deliver the reply to the United States at 1 p. m. on 7 December 1941, was received by G-2 the morning of 7 December 1941. It is my impression that it was received by Colonel Bratton after he arrived that morning, between 9 and 10 a. m. Carlisle Clyde Dusenbury, CARLISE CLYDE DUSENBURY, Colonel, G. S. C. Subscribed and sworn to before me this 13th day of February 1945 at Washington, D. C. Henry C. Clausen, HENRY C. CLAUSEN, Major, JAGD. TOP SECRET [52] AFFIDAVIT OF CAPTAIN JOSEPH J. ROCHEFORT, UNITED STATES NAVY Captain Joseph J. Rochefort, United States Navy, on duty at Office of Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department, Washington, D. G., being first duly sworn, and informed of the investigation by Major Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board and the authority of the Secretary of the Navy with respect to Navy personnel and records, does depose and state: During the period from the fall of 1941 to 7 December 1941 I was the Combat Intelligence Officer in charge of the Combat Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harbor, which was a field unit to the home office at Washington. I was attached to the Headquarters of the Commandant of the 14th Naval District. My duties involved primarily the acquisition of intelligence as directed by the head office in Washington. At Pearl Harbor there was also a Fleet Intelligence Officer and a District Intelligence Officer. My opposite number in the Army in the Pearl Harbor area, was, prior to December 1941, Colonel Kendall J. Fielder, G-2, Hawaiian Department. Prior to and during December 1941, we had established and maintained liaison for the purpose of exchanging information pertaining to our functions on matters of mutual concern to the Army and Navy in the Hawaiian area. For this purpose I had discussions with him and his staff at his headquarters and in Pearl Harbor. During the fall and including the period up to 7 December 1941, we maintained more cordial and close relations, meeting informally. My normal duties during the period from the fall of 1941 to 7 December 1941 did not include the gathering of information or intelligence from Japanese political or diplomatic sources. On occasions, however, I would receive special assignments relating to this type of material. I have read the various documents shown me by Major Clausen, marked Top Secret Exhibit "B". I did not know the substance of any of these before 7 December 1941 except those numbered SIS 25392, SIS 25432, SIS 25545, SIS 25640, and SIS 25787, on the reverse side of which I have Page 27 written my initials and today's date. In my talks with Colonel Fielder I gave him such information as I received concerning the substance of these documents and similar matters. It was my practice to give Colonel Fielder all the information of importance in which the Army and Navy were jointly interested and which came to my knowledge in the course of my duties. This was done so that Colonel Fielder and I would keep abreast of intelligence developments in our common interests. [53] Following are examples of such intelligence. My assignment with respect to those numbered SIS 25392 and SIS 25432, after being informed of the substance thereof, was to monitor for an implementing message and I in turn so informed Colonel Fielder, to the best of my knowledge and recollection, during the latter part of November 1941. I did not receive in Hawaii any implementing message of the kind for which I had been instructed to monitor. Concerning hose numbered SIS 25545, SIS 25640, and SIS 25787, I was informed of the substance thereof and gave this information to Colonel Fielder and Robert L. Shiver, FBI Agent in Charge, Honolulu, about the 4th or 5th of December, 1941. This was done during the course of conversations relating to the destruction of secret papers by the Japanese Consul in Honolulu, which information I gave to my head office in Washington. Joseph J. Rochefort, JOSEPH J. ROCHEFORT, Captain, U. S. Navy. Subscribed and sworn to before me this 20th day of February 1945. Henry C. Clausen, HENRY C. CLAUSEN, Major, JAGD. at Washington, D. C. [54] AFFIDAVIT OF CLARENCE G. JENSEN, COLONEL, AIR CORPS, AUS Clarence G. Jensen, Colonel, Air Corps (0475864), presently assigned to the office of the Assistant Chief of Air Staff, M. & S., Headquarters Army Air Forces, Washington, D. C., being first duly sworn, and informed of the investigation by Major Henry C. Clausen, J. A. G. D., for the Secretary of War supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and that top secrecy is required, deposes and says: That during the period from 14 August to 1 October, 1944, pursuant to instructions, I made diligent search of all War Department pertinent files, and especially hose in the possession of Operational Plans Division, War Department General Staff, and its predecessor, War Plans Division, War Department General Staff covering the period 1 July, 1941, to 7 December, 1941 to ascertain whether a Standing Operating Procedure, dated 5 November 1941, of Lieutenant General Walter C. Short, Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, had been received n the War Department before 7 December, 1941; that among other things I personally searched or supervised a search of the files of The Adjutant General, the War Plans Division and the Army Air Forces, and inquired of those likely to have direct or indirect knowledge of the said Standing Operating Procedure including Major General L. S. Kuter, Air Corps, Brigadier General Robert H. Dunlop, Office of The Adjutant General, and Miss Alice Miller, civilian in charge of the Registered Document Section of Operational Plans Division, WDGS, that his search indicated that no such Standing Operating Procedure was received by the War Department at Washington, D. C., until March of 1942; that I questioned General Dunlop as to whether he remembered having sent in the Standing operating Procedure from Hawaii, he having been Adjutant General of the Hawaiian Department for some months immediately prior to 7 December 1941 and he stated that he had no recollection on the subject; that I also questioned General Kuter, who, by reason of his assignment and duties in Washington with respect to the Air Corps and the War Plans Division, WDGS, during the months immediately preceding 7 December, 1941, would have been likely to remember, whether he had any recollection and he stated he did not; that the net result of my search, therefore, indicated that a copy of the said Standing Operating Procedure was first received at Washington, D. C., in March, 1942, at the time it was receipted for in accordance with the attached photostatic copy-of receipt; that he reference in said receipt to OHD-41 is to a bound volume, Register No. 45, Operations Orders Hawaiian Department, 1941, which contains Standing Operat- Page 28 ing Procedure Hawaiian Department, dated 5 November, 1941, and identifies said Standing Operating Procedure as superseding Tentative Standing Operating Procedure, Hawaiian Department, dated 14 July, 1941; that a letter dated 5 November 1941, attached to said Standing Operating Procedure of 5 November, 1941, directs the collection and destruction of all copies of the said Tentative Standing Operating Procedure; that said Standing Operating Procedure of 5 November, 1941, provides, among other things, in paragraphs 13, 14, 15 and 16 of Section II, as follows: [55] "13. All defense measures are classified under one of the three (3) Alerts as indicated below. Operations under any Alert will be initiated by a Department order, except in case of a surprise hostile attack. See paragraph 15 f (8) below. "14. ALERT NO. 1.-a. This alert is a defense against acts of sabotage and uprising within the islands, with no threat from without. "15. ALERT NO. 2.-a. This alert is applicable to a condition more serious than Alert No. 1. Security against attacks from hostile sub- surface, surface, and aircraft, in addition to defense against acts of sabotage and uprisings, is provided. 16. ALERT NO. 3.-a. This alert requires the occupation of all field positions by all units, prepared for maximum defense of OAHU and the Army installations on outlying islands. * * * * * * *" Signed: CLARENCE G. JENSEN Subscribed and sworn to before me, this 22nd day of February 1945. Henry C. Clausen HENRY C. CLAUSEN Major, JAGD. SECRET [56] HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT, OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER Fort Shafter, T. H., 29 January 1942. In reply refer to: WPD-381-Haw Dept (1-29 42) AG 311.5-OHD-41. Auth: CG, Haw Dept Initials OMM A. G. Date: 29 Jan 1942 Subject: Operation Orders Hawaiian Department 1941. To: War Plans Division, War Department General Staff, Washington, D. C. Herewith Register Nos. 45 of Operations Orders Hawaiian Department, 1941. Request acknowledgment of receipt by signature below. By command of Lieutenant General EMMONS: O. M. McDole O. M. MCDOLE, Major, A. G. .D., Assistant Adjutant General. Incls: Received Registers Nos. 45 of OHD-41. March 10, 1942. J. L. McKee, J. L. MCKEE, Col., G. S. C. TOP SECRET [57] AFFIDAVIT OF MARGARET MCKENNEY Margaret McKenney, civilian clerk in charge, Cable Section, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department, Washington, D. C., being first duly sworn, and informed of the investigation by Major Henry C. Clausen, J. A. G. D., for the Secretary of War supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and that top secrecy is required, deposes and says: That during the month of December, 1941, and thereafter I was a civilian clerk in charge of the Cable Section, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Page 29 G-2, War Department, Washington, D. A., which section collects and delivers incoming and outgoing cables pertaining to the office; that I have read the affidavit of Mary L. Ross and the facts therein set forth appear to my best information and belief to be accurate; that from my experience and knowledge of the customary practice during December, 1941, I believe the 6 December 1941 secret cablegram from General Miles to the Assistant Chief of Staff. Headquarters, G-2, Hawaiian Department, was sent because (1) the yellow copy of the cablegram, a photostatic copy of which is attached to the affidavit of Mary L. Ross was returned in the condition as shown on said copy only if the message was sent, (2) the notations of the number 519 thereon indicates that the message was assigned a number by the Signal Corps code room when it was received from G-2; that the message was then incoded and sent and that then the notation "SENT NO. 519, 12/5" was placed thereon, (3) that the stamp on the reverse side of copy of said yellow copy attached to the affidavit of Colonel Moses W. Pettigrew indicates that it was received in the code room of the Signal Corps at 11:47 a. m. on 5 December 1941, (4) that the numeral "4" in the lower left-hand corner of said cablegram indicates that it is the fourth message that went from G-2 that day and as typed into the outgoing cables receipt book, the page of which is attached to the affidavit of Mary L. Ross, (5) that the said G-2 receipt book, 5 December 1941, shows the outgoing cable messages for that day and that with respect to the cable in question the customary procedure was followed; that in accordance with this procedure the daily serial number 4 of the message was typewritten on said page with the designation, classification, time received in the Cable Section, number 32 being Mary L. Ross as the clerk sending it out, the initials of the originating officer and the paraphrase of the subject matter of the message; the page from the receipt book shows that the message was receipted for in the Signal Corps code room by a clerk using the initials "DG", and that written on the page of the receipt book is the number 519, being the number assigned the message by the Signal Corps under a system to indicate that the message was sent and received by the addressee; (6) that the system indicated by the number 519 tied in with a system of the Signal Corps so that the Hawaiian Department in receiving messages must account for the sequence by numbers and if a number were missing would check back with Washington to locate the missing message; that since no check backs were received with respect to number 519, the system shows that the message was received by the addressee in Hawaii, and (7) that I have also seen the buck-slip, a photostatic copy [58] of which is attached to the affidavit of Mary L. Ross, and on which at the bottom is the handwriting of Colonel Moses W. Pettigrew; that I assisted in the collection of the pertinent documents bearing on the foregoing facts prior to Pearl Harbor and at subsequent intervals and for that reason my memory is clear on the points in which I herein state I have knowledge. Signed: MARGARET MCKENNEY. Subscribed and sworn to before me, this 22nd day of February 1945. Henry C. Clausen HENRY C. CLAUSEN. Major, J.A.G.D. at Washington, D. C. TOP SECRET [59] WAR DEPARTMENT Washington, 25 February 1945. AFFIDAVIT OF COLONEL GEORGE W. BICKNELL, M. I. Colonel George W. Bicknell, M. I., presently assigned to G-2, MIS, Washington, D. C., having been duly sworn and informed of the investigation of Major Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and informed that top secrecy is required, deposes and says: I was Assistant G-2 of the Hawaiian Department in charge of counterintelligence from October 1940 until April 1943. My immediate chief was Colonel Kendall J. Fielder. Prior to this service I had training in G-2 work, and in this connection had served under General Nolan. Page 30 Before 7 December 1941 and in connection with my duties, I developed sources of information which included very close liaison with the FBI in Honolulu whose offices adjoined mine in the Dillingham Building; then Commander Joseph J. Rochefort, USN, Combat Intelligence Officer in charge of the Combat Intelligence Unit, Pearl Harbor; the District Intelligence Officer, Captain Mayfield of the 14th Naval District the Fleet Intelligence Officer, Commander Layton of the Pacific Fleet, the British Secret Intelligence Service, and the various units of the Army. Each Monday I held meetings with Captain Mayfield and Mr. Shivers of the FBI. I knew at the time of 7 December 1941, and for months preceding this date that Commander Rochefort was in charge of the unit which consisted of an intercept radio station, a radio direction finder station, and crypto-analytical units in Pearl Harbor. I caused other sources of information to be available to me such as the FCC intercept radio station, interviews with visitors to Hawaii, the public press, and certain residents of the Hawaiian Islands. Before 7 December 1941, and during the latter part of November 1941, I learned that the Navy had intercepted and decoded Japanese diplomatic messages from Tokyo to Japanese diplomatic representatives to the effect that when a false weather report was broadcast by Tokyo it would be a signal to know that war or breach of diplomatic relations had occurred between Japan and the United States, Russia, or Britain, or one or more of these three, and to destroy their secret codes and papers. The intercepts contained in Top Secret Exhibit "B" shown me by Major Clausen, numbered SIS 25392 and SIS 25432 which I have initialed, contained the substance of the information given me in the latter part of November, 1941. I took immediate action to have the local FCC intercept radio station monitor for the execution message. The FCC later furnished me certain intercepts in pursuance of this request, but which were not the ones for which I was looking. [60] Later, my attention was again called to this "Winds" code information when, before 7 December 1941 and to the best of my recollection on 5 December 1941, I saw on Colonel Fielder's desk a message from the War Department, Washington, D. C., in substance as follows: "DECEMBER 5, 1941. ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF HEADQUARTERS, G2, Hawaiian Department, Honolulu, Territory Hawaii. Contact Commander Rochefort immediately thru commandant Fourteen Naval District regarding broadcasts from Tokyo reference weather. MILES." On the day I saw this message I communicated with Commander Rochefort to ascertain the pertinent information, and I was advised that he also was monitoring for the execution message of the "Winds" code. This information was also given me by Mr. Robert L. Shivers then FBI Agent In Charge, Honolulu. The information they had as to the "Winds" code was the same as that which had been given me. Before 7 December 1941 and about 3 December 1941, I learned from Navy sources of the destruction of codes and papers by Japanese diplomatic representatives in Washington, London, Hong Kong, Singapore, Manila, and elsewhere. I was shown a wire from the Navy Department, Washington, D. C., in effect as set forth on Page 183, Top Secret Volume "C", testimony of Captain L. F. Safford, USN. At about this same time this information was discussed with Commander Rochefort and Mr. Shivers, when Mr. Shivers told me that the FBI had intercepted a telephone message from the Japanese Consulate Honolulu, which disclosed that the Japanese Consul General was burning and destroying all his important papers. In the morning of 6 December 1941, at the usual staff conference conducted by the Chief of Staff for General Short I told those assembled, which included the Chief of Staff, what I had learned concerning the destruction of their important papers by Japanese Consuls, and stated that because of this and concurrent information which I had from proved reliable sources that the destruction of such papers had a very serious intent and that something warlike by Japan was about to happen somewhere. I had previously prepared and signed weekly estimates which were mimeographed and distributed to the Chief of Staff; G 2, Hawaiian Department; G-2, Hawaiian Air Force; G-2, Schofield Barracks; G 3, Hawaiian Department; FBI, Honolulu; and ONI, Honolulu, copies of two of which are set forth Page 31 between pages 3684 and 3695, Secret Transcript, Volume 30. These weekly estimates reflected the information that I had received from the sources I have previously indicated and were in part the means I adopted of conveying he pertinent information to interested parties. In the late afternoon of 6 December 1941, Mr. Shivers told me that the FBI had intercepted a telephone message between Dr. Mori, a Japanese agent then living in Honolulu, and an individual in Tokyo who ostensibly was connected with [61] some newspaper in Tokyo, and that the conversation had been recorded and translated, a copy of which was given me. Mr. Shivers was alarmed at what he considered the military implications in this message concerning Pearl Harbor. I concurred in his views and considered the conversation as very irregular and highly suspicious. I recall that the subjects of discussion between the Japanese which caused me alarm were inquiries by the party in Tokyo as to the fleet, sailors, searchlights, aircraft, weather conditions and references to "hibiscus" and "poinsettias." My G-2 sense told me that there was something very significant about the message. I know the intricacy and subtlety of the Japanese espionage system, that spies sometimes adopt very innocuous means of transmitting military information, and I had in mind he other items of intelligence I had received, including my prior estimates. I reasoned, also, at the time that while the message from Dr. Mori in Honolulu was ostensibly going by radio telephone to Tokyo still it could be intercepted elsewhere. I also considered the Dr. Mori message in the light of the information I had received concerning the destruction by Japanese Consuls of their codes and papers. This was the action which the Japanese Consuls were to take in execution of the "Winds" code. I therefore telephoned Colonel Fielder, it being about 5:15 p. m., 6 December 1941, and told him that it was very necessary for me to come and see him and General Short immediately, that I had something that I considered to be of utmost importance. Colonel Fielder said that he and General Short were going to dinner at Schofield Barracks and since they were all ready to go the matter had better wait until tomorrow. I stated that I though it was too important to wait and that I had to see them right away. I was then told that if I could get out there in ten minutes they would wait for me. I did rush out and make it in ten minutes and handed the intercepted message to General Short who read it with Colonel Fielder. Both Colonel Fielder and General Short indicated hat I was perhaps too "intelligence conscious" and that to them this message seemed to be quite in order, and that it was nothing to be excited about. My conference with General Short and Colonel Fielder was comparatively brief and seemed to last only for about five minutes. Following 7 December 1941, I met General Short while waiting to testify before the Roberts Commission. We were alone and at that time he stated to me words to the effect, "Well, Bicknell, I want you to know that whatever happens you were right and I was wrong." On 7 December 1941, immediately upon commencement of hostilities I caused all action to be taken looking toward the apprehension of Japanese agents for which I had theretofore taken preparatory steps. I caused, also, a search to be made of the Japanese Consulate, his papers seized, some of which he did not have time to destroy, and I had these turned over to Commander Rochefort for our joint investigatory action. As leads I suggest that the files which were kept under my supervision and custody in the Dillingham Building be thoroughly reviewed, that Mr. Jack Russell of the Theodore Davies Company, Honolulu, be questioned concerning the warning [62] to Short supposed to have been sent on 6 December 1941 by the British SIS, Manila; and that in this connection then Lt. Colonel Gerald Wilkinson and then Colonel Field, both of British SIS, be questioned. George W. Bicknell, GEORGE W. BICKNELL, Colonel, M. I. Subscribed and sworn to before me this 25th day of February 1945. Henry C. Clausen, HENRY C. CLAUSEN, Major, JAGD. At Washington, D. C. Page 32 [63] AMENDMENT TO AFFIDAVIT OF COLONEL GEORGE W. BICKNELL Colonel George W. Bicknell, heretofore examined by Lieut. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, makes the following amendment to his affidavit of 25 February 1945, concerning the Pearl Harbor investigation: I wish to state further that prior to 7 December 1941, namely about October 1941, I made and practiced, in collaboration with Mr. Shivers of the FBI, elaborate plans for rounding up dangerous aliens, especially Japanese, in the event of war with Japan. These plans were divided into three categories, called "A", "B" and "C". They are specifically set forth in memoranda I prepared which should be in the G-2 and FBI files. Plan "C" was put into execution immediately on the proclamation of martial law. In connection with such plans I wish also to refer to my written estimates given to General Short and his Staff, including those dated 17 and 25 October 1941. In view of the impending events, I also, on about the middle of October 1941, recommended to the Hawaiian Department G-2 and Signal Officer that a teletype system be installed which would link all the intelligence agencies in the Hawaiian Islands with the Headquarters, Hawaiian Department. Colonel Clausen has shown me a file containing many of the reports which Gerald Wilkinson of the British Secret Intelligence Service sent to Mr. Harry Dawson in Honolulu. Those in this file which are marked for me, were received by me on or about the dates set forth in the documents. Included in this group are the two documents, dated as having been received at Honolulu 27 November and 3 December, 1941, and in turn delivered to the FBI at Honolulu on 29 November and 4 December, 1941, respectively, and which documents were received by me on the dates they were delivered to the FBI. I have identified a copy of each document by putting my initials and today's date on the reverse sides. The information which was thus received from Gerald Wilkinson, including that set forth on the two documents stated of 27 November and 3 December, 1941 as well as any pertinent information I received in connection with my G-2 activities, I gave to General Short, promptly, in one form or another Reference is made in this regard to the files of written memoranda which should be available in the G-2 offices at Honolulu and Washington, to my testimony heretofore on the subject, and to my personal conference with General Short on 6 December 1941. GEORGE W. BICKNELL. Subscribed and sworn to before me this 14th day of August, 1945. Henry C. Clausen, HENRY C. CLAUSEN, Lieut. Colonel, JAGD. At Washington, D. C. [64] WAR DEPARTMENT WASHINGTON AFFIDAVIT OF MAJOR EDWARD B. ANDERSON, T. C. Major Edward B. Anderson, T. C., presently on duty with the Office of the Transportation Corps, Washington, D. C., being duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Major Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and that top secrecy is required, deposes and says: My attention has been called to a photostatic copy of a secret telegram dated 5 December 1941 attached to the affidavit of Colonel Moses W. Pettigrew. On the date of this message I was assigned to the Office of The Adjutant General Hawaiian Department. My immediate superior was the then Major McDole. The customary and usual practice with respect to such messages was for them to be sent from the Signal Officer, Hawaiian Department, to the office in which I was assigned, Office of The Adjutant General, Hawaiian Department and by our office to the addressee. Normally the Signal Officer sent two copies to our office. One of these was sent by our office to the action addressee, and if it was returned it was filed in a subject file. The other copy was retained in our office and used for the purpose of checking against the sequence of numbers which was a system in use at the time for assuring that we received all Page 33 messages. If a number was missing we would check back with the Signal Office and ascertain the reason why. I cannot recall specifically having seen the message in question dated 5 December 1941, but I do not recall either having occasion at the time to have indications of a missing number. As additional leads I suggest questioning of Colonel McDole, Chief Warrant Officer Lane, Warrant Officer Knapp, and personnel of the Signal Office, Hawaiian Department. The records of The Adjutant General and the Signal Office Hawaiian Department, should indicate whether the message was received. Edward B. Anderson, EDWARD B. ANDERSON Major, T. C. Subscribed and sworn to before me this 27th day of February 1945. Henry C. Clausen, HENRY C. CLAUSEN, Major, JAGD. At Washington, D. C. [65] WAR DEPARTMENT WASHINGTON AFFIDAVIT OF BRIGADIER GENERAL ROBERT H. DUNLOP Brigadier General Robert H. Dunlop, presently assigned to the Office of The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C., being duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Major Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and that top secrecy is required, deposes and says: I was Adjutant General of the Hawaiian Department from June 1941 to and including December 1941 and thereafter. I recall the all-out alert which was ordered by General Herron in 1940. So far as I observed, this alert and the action of the Army in pursuance thereof did not materially alarm the civilian population. My attention has been invited to the Standing Operating Procedure of the Hawaiian Department dated 5 November 1941, a copy of which Major Clausen was shown me, contained in a bound volume, register No. 45, Operations Orders Hawaiian Department, 1941, which also contains a copy of a letter dated 6 November 1941, over my signature. I have no recollection of sending any copy of the Standing Operating Procedure, Hawaiian Department, dated 6 November 941, or the Operations Orders, Hawaiian Department, 1941, to Washington D. C., or having these sent to Washington, D. C., before 7 December 1941. On 27 November 1941, I was in the office of Lt. General Short Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, when Colonel Phillips, Chief of Staff of the Hawaiian Department, at about 2:30 p. m. entered the room, excused himself for the interruption, and said that he had come in to show the Commanding General a very important message from General Marshall, Chief of Staff of the Army, Washington, D. C., which he had just received. General Short read this message and said in effect that it certainly was a very important message, and it is my impression that, directing himself to Colonel Phillips told him to put into operation Alert No. 1 of the Standing Operating Procedure dated 5 November 1941. At that time the Standing Operating Procedure dated 5 November 1941 was in effect for the Hawaiian Department. I ascertained then or later that the message from Washington read in general as follows: "Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable, but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot, be avoided, the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not, repeat not, be constructed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and [66] other measures as you deem necessary, but these measures should be carried out so as not, repeat not, to alarm civil population or disclose intent. Report measures taken. Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow Five so far as they pertain to Japan. Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers." Page 34 At 4 p. m. the afternoon of 27 November 1941 I was present at the staff meeting to which I had been called. The message was read to us and Colonel Phillips stated that the Commanding General had ordered into operation Alert No. 1 of the Standing Operating Procedure. He asked for questions and as I recollect there was only one question put. It concerned the message from General Marshall but the details of which I cannot now recall. There was no further discussion. There was no mention then or thereafter, to my knowledge up to 7 December 1941, as to what had been the effect upon the civilian population of the alert ordered by General Herron the preceding year to which I have referred. The staff meeting did not last longer than about fifteen minutes. I have no recollection of having seen the message dated 5 December 1941, the one showed me by Major Clausen, a photostatic copy of which is attached to the affidavit of Colonel Moses W. Pettigrew, but I suggest that a search of the records of The Adjutant General and the Signal Officer, Hawaiian Department, be made since the receipt or non-receipt should have been recorded and the record thereof preserved. Robert H. Dunlop, ROBERT H. DUNLOP Brigadier General. Subscribed and sworn to before me this 28th day of February 1945. Henry C. Clausen, HENRY C. CLAUSEN, Major, JAGD. At Washington, D. C. [67] WAR DEPARTMENT, Washington, 28 February 1945. AFFIDAVIT OF LT. COLONEL FRANK B. ROWLETT, S. C. Lt. Colonel Frank B. Rowlett, Signal Corps, presently Branch Chief, Signal Security Agency, OCSigO, Washington, D. C., being duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Major Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and that top secrecy is required, deposes and says: On 7 December 1941 and during the immediately preceding month, I was a civilian technical assistant to the officer in charge of the Crypto- Analytical Unit Signal Intelligence Service, OCSigO, War Department, Washington, D. A. My immediate superior was Major Harold S. Doud who was assistant to Colonel Rex W. Minckler, Chief of the Signal Intelligence Service, who in turn was under Colonel Otis K. Sadtler, Chief of the Army Communications Service, and whose superior was the Chief Signal Officer. Colonel Eric Svensson was in charge of the Japanese Diplomatic Solution Activities. I recall in general the tenor of the various Japanese diplomatic intercepts which had been Deciphered and translated, contained in Top Secret Exhibit "B" shown me by Major Clausen. Pursuant to the request of Major Clausen I have attempted to compile from original records presently in the possession of the Signal Corps information concerning the intercepts in said Exhibit "B" as to (1) sources of interception; (2) dates of the messages; (3) dates of interception; (4) dates of translations; (5) whether Honolulu had copies; (6) whether the activating message in pursuance of the "Winds" code message is available in places to which I now have access. Attached hereto is a summary I prepared which refers to various of the intercepts by the Signal Intelligence Service number and gives some of the requested information which I have been able to obtain. My search has not disclosed any "Winds" code activating message, although at the time it was supposed to have been intercepted shortly before 7 December 1941. I recall comments to the effect that it had been intercepted. As additional leads I suggest questioning of Colonel Doud, Colonel Minckler, Colonel Sadtler, Colonel Svensson, Miss Prather, and Mr. Friedman, among others. Frank B. Rowlett, FRANK B. ROWLETT, Lt. Col., S. C. Subscribed and sworn to before me this 28th day of February 1945. Henry C. Clausen, HENRY C. CLAUSEN, Major, JAGD. At Washington, D. C. Page 35 [68] SIS No. Sources* Date Msg Date Int Date translated Honolulu 23260 S 24 Sept 24 Sept 9 Oct No 23570 7 14 Oct 15 Oct 16 Oct No 23516 2, S, 7, M, 3 14 Oct 14 Oct 15 Oct No 23631 1 16 Oct 16 Oct 17 Oct No 23859 2, 7, 1 22 Oct 22/23 Oct 23 Oct No 24373 S (teletype) 5 Nov 5 Nov 5 Nov No 25322 Navy Radio 14 Nov ? 26 Nov No 25644 S 15 Nov ? 3 Dec No 24878 S 16 Nov 17 Nov 17 Nov No 25773 S 18 Nov 18 Nov 5 Dec No 25817 1, 2 18 Nov 18/19 Nov 6 Dec No 25392 S 19 Nov ? 26 Nov No 25823 S, 2 29 Nov ? 5 Dec No 25040 S (teletype) 19 Nov ? 20 Nov No 25432 S (teletype) 19 Nov ? 28 Nov No 25138 S 22 Nov 22 Nov 22 Nov No 25435 1, 6 26 Nov 26 Nov 28 Nov No 25344 S 26 Nov 26 Nov 26 Nov No 25349 ? 26 Nov 26 Nov 26 Nov No 25444 1, 2 26 Nov 27 Nov 28 Nov No 25480 1, 2 26 Nov 26/27 Nov 29 Nov No 25436 1 26 Nov 26 Nov 28 Nov No 25445 S, 6 28 Nov 28 Nov 28 Nov No 25496 S (teletype) 29 Nov 29 Nov 30 Nov No 25554 Navy Radio 30 Nov 30 Nov 1 Dec No 25553 J, Navy Rad 30 Nov 1 Dec 1 Dec No 25552 J, Navy Rad 30 Nov 1 Dec 1 Dec No 25497 ? 30 Nov 30 Nov 30 Nov No 25555 Navy Radio 30 Nov 30 Nov 1 Dec No 25787 British 1 Dec ? 5 Dec No 25605 S (teletype) 1 Dec 1 Dec 1 Dec No 25545 S (teletype) 1 Dec 1 Dec 1 Dec No 25727 S, 1 1 Dec ? 4 Dec No 25783 S, Navy Radio 1 Dec ? 4 Dec No 25659-B 1, 2, 7 2 Dec 2 Dec 3 Dec No 25660 7 2 Dec 2 Dec 3 Dec No 25640 X, 2 2 Dec 2 Dec 3 Dec No 25785 7 3 Dec ? 5 Dec No 25807 W 4 Dec 5 Dec 6 Dec No 27065 S, 5 2 Dec 2 Dec 30 Dec Yes 25843 S (teletype) 4 Dec ? 7 Dec No 25836 S (teletype) 5 Dec ? 6 Dec No 25838 S 6 Dec 6 Dec 6 Dec No 24843 S 6 Dec 6 Dec 6 Dec No 26158 1, 5 6 Dec ? 12 Dec Yes 25846 2 (teletype) 6 Dec 6 Dec 7 Dec No 25854 S 7 Dec 7 Dec 7 Dec No 25850 S 7 Dec 7 Dec 7 Dec No 25856 S (teletype) 7 Dec 7 Dec 7 Dec No 25866 2, Navy Rad 7 Dec 7 Dec 7 Dec No *Navy: J=Jupiter, Fla. S=Bainbridge Island, Wash. W=Winter Harbor, Me. Navy Radio-Navy Overseas Intercept or British, X-photographs of original messages Army: 1=Ft. Hancock, 2-San Francisco, 3=San Antonio, 4=Panama, 5=Honolulu, 6=Manila, 7= Fort Hunt, Va. [69] WAR DEPARTMENT WASHINGTON AFFIDAVIT OF MAJOR GENERAL RALPH C. SMITH Major General Ralph C. Smith, presently on duty in the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department, Washington, D. A., being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Major Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board and that top secrecy is required, deposes and says: During the months of November and December 1941, and theretofore, I was Executive Officer in the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Washington, D. C. Several months immediately before 7 December 1941, Colonel Carlise Clyde Dusenbury was assistant to Colonel Rufus S. Bratton, Chief of the Far Eastern Branch, G-2. Up to a few weeks before 7 December 1941, it was customary for either Colonel Bratton or Colonel Dusenbury to bring to me, for the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Japanese diplomatic messages which had been intercepted, deciphered, and translated, in a locked pouch to which I had a key. During this time I would open the pouch, glance over the intercepts and then give them to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2. A few weeks before 7 December 1941, pursuant to instructions I relinquished my key to the pouch, gave it to the Assistant Chief Page 36 of Staff, G-2, General Miles. Thereafter, Colonel Bratton or Colonel Dusenbury would bring me the locked pouches but I then did not read the intercepts and gave the locked pouches directly to General Miles. During the period when I was reading the intercepts, or handed the locked pouch to General Miles, as stated the pouches containing the intercepts were almost always delivered to me by Colonel Bratton or Colonel Dusenbury. While I cannot recollect specifically whether Colonel Bratton and Colonel Dusenbury alternated in bringing me the pouches, I do recall clearly that as a customary practice it was either one, or the other. I did not receive any such intercepts or pouches after about noon on 6 December 1941. This is clearly fixed in my mind because I entrained at about 6 p. m. for Fort Benning preparatory to a refresher course at the Infantry School which I then commenced. I recall as being on the train with me en route to Fort Benning, the evening of 6 December 1941, Colonel C. R. Huebner. I did not, therefore, following the time stated, namely about noon on 6 December 1941, receive any pouch containing intercepts or any intercepts for the Assistant Chief of Staff G-2, or any other person. Ralph C. Smith. RALPH C. SMITH, Major General. Subscribed and sworn to before me this 28th day of February 1945. Henry C. Clausen, HENRY C. CLAUSEN, Major, JAGD. At Washington, D. C. [70] AFFIDAVIT OF MARY L. Ross Mary L. Ross, presently assigned to the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff. G-2, War Department, Washington, D. C., being first duly sworn, and informed of the investigation by Major Henry C. Clausen, J.A.G.D., for the Secretary of War supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and that top secrecy is required, deposes and says: That during the month of December, 1941, and thereafter I was a clerk in the Cable Branch in the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G 2, War Department Washington; that in said month of December, 1941, in connection with my duties I was assigned the number "32" and said number was used in said office to designate me. That my attention has been called to a secret cablegram dated 5 December 1941 from the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, to the Assistant Chief of Staff, Head quarters, G-2, Hawaiian Department, a photostatic copy of which is hereto annexed; that I recall the circumstances and my actions with respect to said cablegram; that the yellow copy of said cablegram, of which the attached exhibit is a photostatic copy, was brought to me with a "buck-slip", a photostatic copy of which is attached, and on which at the bottom is written a message in the hand writing of Colonel Moses W. Pettigrew; that I recall that the person who brought me the cablegram also orally informed me that the message was important and its immediate dispatch was urgent; that on receiving the yellow copy and said buck-slip I made the customary entry in the office outgoing cables receipt book a photostatic copy of the pertinent page of which is also attached hereto, that the entry shown therein as Ser. No. 4 was typed therein by myself as indicated by my number 32 in the column for the clerk; that I put a red priority tag on the copy of the cablegram and took it to the Signal Corps code room, handed it to the clerk who receipted for it by the initials "DG" written on the page of said receipt book as is indicated by the attached photostatic copy; that there after, probably the next day, the yellow copy was returned with the notation thereon "#519" and "SENT NO. 519, 12/5"; that the said number 519 was assigned the message by the Signal Corps and was then written on a page of our receipt book as is indicated on the attached photostatic copy; that the procedure in the Signal Corps code room was to assign a number and then after the message was sent to write on the yellow copy that it was sent as was done on the yellow copy of the message in question as heretofore indicated. That also attached hereto is a photostatic copy of the paraphrase kept in the G-2 office and which has thereon "MAILED G/2 W.D.G.S. DEC 5 1941 32"; that this latter notation on said photostatic copy was placed thereon by me to Page 37 indicate that it had been transmitted by the Signal Corps; that the initials in the lower right hand corner thereof, "RSB WP" are in the handwriting of Colonel Pettigrew; that my memory with respect to the foregoing is clear because soon [71] after Pearl Harbor and at intervals thereafter I was questioned concerning the foregoing and the Office of G-2 assembled pertinent papers among which were the documents, photostatic copies of which there are attached; that I assisted the assembly of these papers. Signed: MARY L. Ross. Subscribed and sworn to before me this 1st day of March 1945. Henry C. Clausen, HENRY C. CLAUSEN, Major, JAGD. At Washington, D. C. [72] Standard Form No. 14A Approved by the President March 10, 1926 SECRET TELEGRAM OFFICIAL BUSINESS-GOVERNMENT RATES Sent No. 519, 12/5 DECEMBER 5, 1941. ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF Headquarters G2 Hawaiian Department, Honolulu, Territory Hawaii Contact Commander Rochefort immediately thru Commandant Fourteen Naval District regarding broadcasts from Tokyo reference weather MILES I certify that this message is on official business and necessary for the public service. RALPH C. SMITH, Colonel, G. S. C. Executive Officer, G-2. Secret Cablegram [73] INTELLIGENCE BRANCH-MISV-WDGS FROM: TO: The A. C. of S., G-2 Executive Officer, G-2 Chief, Intelligence Branch Executive, Intelligence Branch Administrative Field Personnel Drafting and Reproduction Stenographic Pool Asst. Chief, Intelligence Branch Situation Contact Dissemination Air Section British Empire Section Central European Section Eastern European Section Southern European Section Western European Section Far Eastern Section Latin American Section Page 38 ADMINISTRATIVE BRANCH Military Attache Section Foreign Liaison Section Coordinating Section Finance Section Personnel Section Record Section Translation Section Mimeograph Room Chief Clerk COUNTER INTELLIGENCE BRANCH SPECIAL STUDY GROUP PLANS AND TRAINING BRANCH INFORMATION CONTROL BRANCH W. D. MAP COLLECTION FOR Necessary Action Preparation of reply Recommendation or remark Information and guidance Note and return Number and return [Written:] Important-Please put priority tag on Re Service Japanese WD (The page from the receipt book relating to outgoing cables mentioned in the affidavit of Mary L. Ross, supra, will be found reproduced as Item No. 1, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Clausen Investigation. These illustrations will be found bound together following the printed exhibits of the Clausen investigation.) SECRET [75] Paraphrase of an outgoing. Drafting Section: Far Eastern G2/I. Secret XX Drafting Officer: RSB. Cablegram XX No. 519 Sent out Dec. 5, 1941 DECEMBER 5, 1941. To: Assistant Chief of Staff Headquarters, G-2 Hawaiian Department, Honolulu, Territory of Hawaii. Commander Rochefort who can be located thru the 14th Naval District has some information on Japanese broadcasts in which weather reports are mentioned that you must obtain. Contact him at once. MILES. [76] Colonel Edward W. Raley, AC, presently CO, Langley Field, Va., being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Major Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the SW, supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, deposes and says: On 7 Dec 1941 and for about one year preceding I was G2, Hawaiian Air Force. Shortly after assuming these duties, I established, for purposes of the Hawaiian Air Force some form of contact with the Navy, through then Comdr. Layton, USN. I told Comdr. Layton that my contact was for the Hawaiian Air Force. During this period of about one year I had not more than six conversations with Comdr. Layton concerning the subject of my contact. These conversations were spread out during this period. As nearly as I can recall the last conversation I had with Comdr. Layton before 7 Dec 1941 was about October 1941. The information given me by Comdr. Layton was my only Navy source. He stated that if there was any Navy movement by Japan, coming to his knowledge and which might imperil the Hawaiian Islands, he would inform me. The only specific information he gave me in this regard were studies he made of a possible Japanese Malay hostility and of Japanese fleet installations in the Mandates. I believe this was at least two months before 7 Dec. 1941. Page 39 [77] Any information I received from Comdr. Layton, I promptly gave to my Commanding General, General Martin. On 1 Oct 1941 I conferred with Comdr. Layton and Colonel Bicknell who was then Asst. G2, Hawaiian Dept. concerning a conclusion I had reached that hostilities with Japan was possible within a short time or any moment. They apparently shared my view. I reported this to Gen. Martin. Attached are portions of a letter written by me to my daughter on 2 Oct 1941, concerning this conference. I recall the Gen. Herron alert of 1940, which I believe was known to the civilian population, but to my recollection there was no alarm of the civilian population. EDWARD W. RALEY Col. AC. Subscribed and sworn to before me 11 March 1945 at Langley Field, Va. HENRY C. CLAUSEN Major, JAGD. [78] THURSDAY AFTERNOON, 2 OCTOBER, 1941. Last night mother and I had a few people for dinner at the club. We had Commander Layton, who is Fleet intelligence officer; Col. Bicknell, who is on intelligence duty down town; and Major Meehan from the post-and their wives, of course. Wednesday evening is a supper dance evening at the club. We assembled at the house, and the drinking members lifted a few and then we adjourned to the club where we had dinner and danced a bit. We thought a good time was had by all and in your immortal phrase, it "was a good party." The reason I was anxious to have these people together was that I was anxious to get Bicknell's and Layton's opinion regarding the Far Eastern situation. You night gather from the public prints that United States- Japanese relations had been improving of late, but somehow, I didn't think so. It seems to me that Japanese-U. S. relations never were in a more critical state than they are at this moment. I don't say [79] there necessarily will be a war between the two countries right now, but I do say that never in the past has there been a time when it would be easier to have one. I thought I'd better speak to the boss about the matter, so I did, and he made me feel extremely foolish. He agreed with the general conclusion and then, in he fewest number of words possible, he summed up the situation in a fashion that was just about perfect. I would have been very proud of myself if I had had the situation as well ordered in my mind and was capable of expressing it as well as he did. I've never heard anything so concisely and comprehensively expressed. DADDY. [Hand written:] Letter returned by Joyce Nov. 3, 1942. EWR. [80] WAR DEPARTMENT WASHINGTON, D. C. AFFIDAVIT OF GENERAL CHARLES K. GAILEY General Charles K. Gailey, presently on duty in the Office of the Operations Divisions Assistant Chief of Staff, War Department, Washington, D. C., being duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Major Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and that top secrecy is required, deposes and says: During the months of November and December 1941 and theretofore, I was Executive Officer in the Office of the War Plans Division, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, Washington, D. C. With respect to intercepts of Japanese diplomatic messages which had been deciphered and translated it was the customary practice for either Colonel Bratton or Colonel Dusenbury, G-2, to bring these to me for the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, General Gerow. They would be given me and I would get them to General Gerow as soon as practicable. I recall that these intercepts were brought to me by either Colonel Bratton or Colonel Dusenbury. While I cannot recall whether they alternated in bringing them I do remember that it was either one or the other as a customary practice. Page 40 Specifically, with respect to the evening of 6 December 1941, I do not recall having received any pouch or intercepts from Colonel Bratton or Colonel Dusenbury or from any other source. In the event General Gerow did not receive any particular intercepts the evening of 6 December 1941, I am certain that they were not delivered to me as, if they had been, I would have given them to him. Chas. K. Gailey, CHARLES K. GAILEY, Brigadier General. Subscribed and sworn to before me this 21st day of March 1946. Henry C. Clausen, HENRY C. CLAUSEN, Major, JAGD. at Washington, D. C. [81] WAR DEPARTMENT WASHINGTON AFFIDAVIT OF COLONEL EDWARD F. FRENCH: Colonel Edward F. French, presently on duty with the Office of the Chief Signal Officer, Washington, D. C., being duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Major Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and that top secrecy is required, deposes and says: During the months of November and December 1941 and theretofore, I was Officer in Charge of the Traffic Division and Signal Center, Washington, D. C. I have been shown the photostatic copy of the secret cablegram dated 5 December 1941, a copy of which is attached to the affidavit of Colonel Moses W. Pettigrew. Based on customary practice and procedure, it is my opinion that the message was sent to the addressee for the following reasons: The notations thereon "#519" and "SENT NO. 519, 12/5" indicate that the message was brought to the Signal Corps code room and was assigned the "#519" and that the message was then encoded with the code room sequence number as the first word in the text of message. The coded text message, original and carbon copy, was then sent to the message center. The carbon copy bearing the time stamp of the message center acknowledging receipt was then returned to the code room and checked with the original clear text message. The Signal Center time stamp date was then placed on the original clear text message which was returned the following morning to the office of origin. In the Signal Center the original coded text, on receipt after time stamped, was given a Signal Center sequence number (black number) and then the message was word counted and placed at the operating position, where it received a channel sequence number at the time of transmission which was checked off the operators number sheet. After transmission of the message the operator put his initials and time of transmission on the face of the message, which was later collected by a clerk who verified the "black number" by a check off sheet before sending the message to file. This was a further guard to assure the transmission of the message. At midnight these sequence channel numbers were and still are verified with the distant end of the circuit to assure that all messages as transmitted were received. This sequence check was and is known as a "good night service." Further, had this message been not received, a check would also have been made by the code room of the addressee, as there would be a break in the sequence numbers of the code message numbers. This system of checking sequence numbers of messages was a long time practice to assure and guard against lost messages. [82] The loss of a coded message is possible but highly improbable. In fact, on recent questioning of personnel in the code room and Signal Center, and from my own experience prior to 7 December 1941, the loss of a coded message could not be recalled. I have seen the yellow copy of the message "519" in question, now in possession of G-2, and it is the yellow copy of which a photostatic copy is attached to the affidavit of Colonel Pettigrew. Page 41 I have also seen the photostatic copy of the G-2 Office outgoing cable receipts book page for 5 December 1941 attached to the affidavit of Mary L. Ross. The entry shown thereon bearing serial No. 4 indicates that the clerk in the Signal Corps code room receipted for the message by the initials "DG", which I recognize as the handwriting of Dorothy Glaves who was employed as a clerk in the Signal Corps code room on 5 December 1941, and whose duties included receipting for such messages. Edward F. French, EDWARD F. FRENCH, Colonel, S. C. Subscribed and sworn to before me this 22d day of March 1945. Henry C. Clausen, HENRY C. CLAUSEN, Major, JAGD. At Washington, D. C. [83] WAR DEPARTMENT WASHINGTON AFFIDAVIT OF COLONEL JOSEPH K. EVANS Colonel Joseph K. Evans, presently on duty in G-2, War Department, as the Pacific Ocean Area Japanese Specialist, being duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Major Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and that top secrecy is required, deposes and says: For about two months immediately prior to 27 November 1941 I was G-2, Philippine Department, and for two years prior to said two months period I was Assistant G-2, Philippine Department. There was very close liaison and exchange of intelligence information between the Army and the Navy at Manila. The Army and the Navy each had facilities for intercepting, decrypting and translating Japanese radio messages. Each service had a machine for the decryption of Japanese messages which were encoded in the classification known as Purple. The types of messages decrypted Manila correspond generally to those shown me by Major Clausen and designated Top Secret, Exhibit "B". The customary practice of the Army or Navy at Manila was to inform the Army or Navy at Hawaii of intelligence on Japanese information thus obtained. More precise information in this regard as to particular messages was probably known to my Assistant for Signal Intelligence, Major Sherr, now deceased, and may be known to Commander "Rosie" Mason, USN. There was also close liaison with the British S. I. S. at Manila. For example, see Lt. Colonel Gerald H. Wilkinson, International Building, Room 3501, 630 Fifth Avenue, Rockefeller Center. I left the Philippine Islands on 27 November 1941 enroute to the United States Army Transport "H. L. Scott". About two days before I left I received information, which to the best of my recollection came from the British Secret intelligence Service at Singapore, to the effect that hostilities between the United States and Japan were imminent and that large Japanese Naval forces were concentrating in the vicinity of the Marshall Islands. For these reasons, the convoy of which the "H. L. Scott" was a part did not proceed in the usual direct route from Manila to Pearl Harbor, but went by a circuitous route south through Torres Strait which separates Australia and New Guinea. On my arrival in Pearl Harbor on or about 15 December 1941, I for several hours discussed G-2 matters with Colonel Bicknell, Assistant G-2, Hawaiian Department, and Mr. Shivers, F. B. I. Agent in charge. During the course of these discussions I told Colonel Bicknell and Mr. Shivers of the information [84] I had received and was in turn told by Colonel Bicknell that he also had received this information and at the same time. Joseph K. Evans JOSEPH K. EVANS Colonel, GSC. Subscribed and sworn to before me this 22d day of March 1945. Henry C. Clausen HENRY C. CLAUSEN, Major, JAGD. At Washington, D. C. Page 42 [85] Memorandum to: Lieut. Col. Henry Christian Clausen. From: Mr. John E. Russell, President Theo. H. Davies & Co., Ltd., Honolulu, T. H. You asked me to recall the circumstances surrounding my receipt of confidential information before December 7, 1941, which was so indicative of coming trouble in the Philippine area that I had acted immediately to cancel orders for shipment to that Territory. My records indicate that on December 4th I telephoned to Mr. C. V. Bennett, Manager of our San Francisco office, and asked him to take steps to cancel all outstanding orders for shipment to the Philippine Islands and to endeavor to stop shipments that were en route there. I personally received no message on this subject from the Philippines, but I saw a copy of a message dispatched by Col. G. H. Wilkinson (then working secretly for the British Government) addressed to his agent in Honolulu, and he had requested the agent to show me the message. Mr. Harry L. Dawson, the agent in question, is sitting beside me while I dictate this memorandum, and states that after showing this message to me a copy of it was left with Col. Bicknell, Capt. Mayfield and Mr. Robert Shivers, then with the FBI. Mr. Dawson finds that all his records of this incident were destroyed immediately after December 7, 1941. On December 15th I wrote to Mr. Bennett as follows: "Thank you for your letter of December 5th about Philippine indent orders It is certainly interesting to say the least that we should have taken steps on December 4th to stop this type of business. I took some similar precautions here at the same time, but cannot give any logical explanation as to why I had taken such steps. It just looks like one of those lucky hunches that one gets at times." I do not recall, exactly, what was in the message that was shown to me, but believe it indicated some Japanese troop dispositions which were very illuminating in the light of diplomatic exchanges than taking place. I do not believe that the message said that trouble would begin on December 7th; but as I told you today the general tone of the message was sufficiently alarming to cause a reaction in the mind of a businessman, strong enough to warrant the cancellation of a considerable volume of orders for delivery in the Philippines. I am sorry that I have no other data that might throw [86] light on this subject; and in the light of what I have said above in connection with Mr. Dawson's files, he is not submitting a memorandum on this subject; but I can say that his recollection of the incident is substantially in agreement with what I have given you herein. jer-m. John E. RUSSELL, President, Theo. H. Davies d Co., Ltd. April 10, 1945. At Honolulu. CONFIDENTIAL [87A] URGENT CABLE RECEIVED FROM MANILA NIGHT OF DEC. 3, 194l We have received considerable intelligence confirming following developments in Indo-China: A. 1. Accelerated Japanese preparation of air fields and railways. 2. Arrival since Nov. 10 of additional 100,000 repeat 100,000 troops and considerable quantities fighters, medium bombers, tanks and guns (75 mm). B. Estimates of specific quantities have already been telegraphed Washington Nov. 21 by American Military Intelligence here. C. Our considered opinion concludes that Japan invisages early hostilities with Britain and U. S. Japan does not repeat not intend to attack Russia at present but will act in South. You may inform Chiefs of American Military and Naval Intelligence Honolulu. cc. Col. Bicknell Mr. Shivers Capt. Mayfield [87B] On the reverse side of this document is a copy of the message referred to in memorandum to Lieut. Col. Henry C. Clausen dated April 10, 1945. which was received by the undersigned and copies distributed to the persons indicated in said memorandum, on December 4, 1941. Honolulu T. H. HARRY L. DAWSON. April 16, 1945. JOHN E. RUSSELL. Page 43 [88] AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT L. SHIVERS Robert L. Shivers, presently Collector of Customs, Hawaiian Islands, being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, deposes and says: On 7 Dec. 1941 and since August 1939, I was FBI Agent in Charge at Honolulu, T. H. During the year 1940 I developed close liaison with then Lt. Comdr. Joseph J. Rochefort, Res., USN, Intelligence Officer Hawaiian Detachment, U. S. Fleet. Commencing in the first part of 1941 I developed close liaison with then Capt. Irving H. Mayfield, USN, District Intelligence Officer, 14th Naval District. Since August 1939 I had close liaison with then Lt. Colonel George W. Bicknell, MID, Army Reserve. About July 1941 I developed close liaison with then Lt. Colonel Kendall J. Fielder, G-2, Hawaiian Dept. This liaison with the fore-going persons continued down to 7 Dec. 1941 and after. I held weekly meetings with Colonel Bicknell and Capt. Mayfield. Colonel Fielder would sometimes be present. I knew on 7 Dec. 1941 and for months preceding that date that Comdr. Rochefort was in charge of the Navy unit which consisted [89] of an intercept radio station, a radio direction finder station, and crypto- analytical units in Pearl Harbor. Comdr. Rochefort did not discuss with me his operations, nor did he disclose to me any information as a result of his operations, until after 7 Dec. 1941. Before 7 Dec. 1941, about 1 Dec. 1941, Capt. Mayfield told me he was aware of the code the Japanese would use and announce by radio its war movements and break in diplomatic relations; and said to me if I suddenly call you and say I am moving to the East side of the Island (Oahu) or north, south, or west sides, it will mean that Japan is moving against the countries which lie in those directions from Japan. I passed that information on to Colonel Bicknell m that date. At no time did Capt. Mayfield give me the code indicating such movement. On 3 Dec. 1941 Capt. Mayfield called me, asking if I could verify his information that the Japanese Consul [90] General at Honolulu was burning his codes and papers. At that time I thought his surveillance of the Consulate had disclosed this fact, but after 7 Dec 1941 I learned he was referring to information intercepted by the Navy that such was being done in Singapore, Malaya and London. This latter information was given me by Comdr. Rochefort after 7 Dec. 1941. About 2 hours after my conversation with Capt. Mayfield on 3 Dec 1941, the FBI intercepted a telephone message between the cook at the Japanese consulate & a Japanese person in Honolulu, during which the cook told this person the Consul General was burning and destroying all his important papers. This was about noon on 3 Dec 1941 & I immediately gave this information to Capt. Mayfield and Colonel Bicknell. I was never informed by Capt. Mayfield what use he made of it. Col. Bicknell informed me that he personally gave this information to Gen. Short's Staff at the Staff meeting on 6 Dec. 1941. On or about 28 Nov. 1941 I received I received a radio from J. Edgar Hoover, Director, FBI, to the effect that peace negotiations between the US & Japan were breaking down & to be on the alert at all [9l] times as anything could happen. On the same day I gave this information to Capt. Mayfield & Col. Bicknell, each of whom said they had already received similar information from their respective headquarters in Washington, D. C. About the period 8 Dec to 12 Dec 1941, Col. Bicknell showed me a paraphrase copy of a radio intercept by the Army at Honolulu on 3 Dec 1941, of a radiogram sent by the Japanese Consul General at Honolulu to the Japanese Foreign Office at Tokyo, outlining a system of signals devised by Otto Kuhn, for the Consul General, through which the movement of the US Fleet at Pearl Harbor could be made known to Japanese submarines off the Islands of Oahu & Maui. ROBERT L. SHIVERS. Subscribed and sworn to before me this 10th day of April 1945. HENRY C. CLAUSEN Lt. Colonel, JAGD. At Honolulu Page 44 [92] AMENDMENT TO AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT L. SHIVERS Concerning the paraphrase dispatch to C. G. Haw. Dept., signed Marshall, dated 12 Dec. 1941, relating to signals suggested by Kuhn, it is my understanding that the basis for this dispatch was an Army radio intercept I received this information from Col. Bicknell. When this dispatch was received by the Army in Hawaii, we had already received a translation of a full text of the message to which it relates. Comdr. Rochefort furnished this translation, after I had given him a copy of the message, which copy was found at the Japanese Consulate on 7 Dec. 1941, and a copy of the Japanese code found at the said Consulate also on 7 Dec. 1941. After getting the copy from the Japanese Consulate of the message, we got the original from the Mackay Radio Co. Concerning the Gen. Herron alert [93] of 1940, the civilian population of Oahu considered it routine Army maneuvers and was not alarmed in any way because of the manner in which the alert was handled. It was designed to give the impression it created. Concerning the Affidavit of Colonel Joseph R. Evans, dated 22 Mar. 1945, I talked with Col. Evans, in company of Col. Bicknell, when Col. Evans arrived in Honolulu from Manila in December, 1941. I do not recall the details of our conversation. I am, however, positive that he did not discuss in my presence the information set forth in paragraph 3, of his affidavit. ROBERT L. SHIVERS. Subscribed and sworn to before me, this 16th day of March, 1945. HENRY C. CLAUSEN, Lt. Colonel, JAGD. [94] AMENDMENT TO AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT L. SHIVERS, WHO STATES FURTHER: Gerald Wilkinson, then manager for the Theo. H. Davies Co., Manila, P. I., called on me about July 1941 and stated he was the representative in the Pacific area for the Special Intelligence Service of the British government, reporting direct to the British Foreign Office at London; that he had established Mr. Harry Dawson, an English citizen and British Vice Consul for the Hawaiian Islands, as the operative representative of the said SIS in the Hawaiian Islands; that Mr. Dawson would be concerned with no internal matters of the Hawaiian Islands but would be concerned with developing foreign intelligence information pertaining to Japanese, which information Dawson would get from persons returning to Hawaii from Japan, that Wilkinson proposed to furnish the FBI, ONI and G-2 at Honolulu, information, thru Dawson, of information received from other SIS operatives in the Pacific area, concerning conditions and intelligence affecting Japan; that pursuant to consent of higher authority, arrangements were made for the receipt of such information [95] by the FBI, ONI and G-2 at Honolulu, and such information was furnished as proposed during the period from July to and including December, 1941, that the files of the information so furnished include copies of cables dated 27 November and 3 December, 1941, upon which appear my initial; Concerning telephone intercepts at the Japanese Consulate, Honolulu, I ascertained during the latter part of November, 1941, that the ONI, which for several years had covered what were supposed to be all telephone lines at the Consulate did not in fact cover one line to the cook's quarters; I therefore covered this line which resulted in information as to the destruction by the Consul of all his important papers on 3 December 1941, about which I have already testified that I assumed the ONI had all other lines covered up to and including 7 December 194l, and did not receive any information to the contrary until today, when it was stated that the coverage by ONI ceased on 2 December, 1941, at the order of the District [96] Intelligence Officer; that had I known such ONI coverage had ceased, I would have caused FBI coverage in replacement. Robert L. Shivers. ROBERT L. SHIVERS. Subscribed and sworn to before me, 20 April 1945. HENRY C. CLAUSEN, Lt. Colonel, JAGD. Page 45 [97] Telegram Gov Jus Hoover FBI Justice Washington, D. C. RLS : PB HONOLULU, T. H., December 5, 1945, Japanese Activities Honolulu T. H. Espionage confile J. Japanese consul General Honolulu is burning and destroying all important papers. SHIVERS. Official Business. [98] HEADQUARTERS CENTRAL PACIFIC BASE COMMAND OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR MIILITARY INTELLICENCE COUNTER INTELLIGENCE DIVISION Box 3, APO 456 In reply refer to: 16 APRIL 1945. Memorandum for Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD. Subject: Action taken on W. D. information concerning possible hostilities with Japan. 1. By direction, the undersigned, accompanied by Major (then 1st Lt.) C. W. Stevenson, met in conference with Lt. Col. E. W. Raley, G-2, Hawaiian Air Force, and the various Air Force Intelligence officers in the Hawaiian area, on 29 November 1941. The purpose of the conference was to acquaint these officers with information contained in a Secret Radio received by G-2, Hawaiian Department from the War Department, dated 27 November 1941, which advised that negotiations with Japan had reached a stalemate, that hostilities might ensue, and that subversive activities might be expected. 2. The conference was held in the office of Lt. Col. Raley at Hickam Field at 1430, 9 November 1941. The assembled officers were advised by the undersigned of the context of the above-referred to radio message, and it was suggested to them that all practicable precautionary measures be taken to guard against possible sabotage of Air Force installations and equipment. Byron M. Meurlott, BYRON M. MEURLOTT, Lt. Colonel, M. I. Assist. A. C. of S., G-2 (CID). At Honolulu [99] HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC AREAS OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL APO 958 In reply refer to: 17 APRIL 1945. Memorandum: Subject: Search for WD Radiogram No. 519. 5 Dec 1941. On April 10, 1945, Lt. Col. Clausen of The Judge Advocate General's Office requested the assistance of this office in locating a copy, or record of receipt of secret War Department radio No. 519, dated 5 December 1941. The under-signed instructed Capt. Bosworth, officer in charge of the AG Classified Records Division to make the search and assist Col. Clausen in every manner possible. The following is a brief account of the search made: a. Master files of incoming radio traffic were inspected and it was determined that no master files of radios were kept by the AG until on or about 25 January 1942. This was corroborated by C. W. O. Knapp who was on duty in the division at that time. b. A search was made of the AG Decimal files and no record was found of the subject radio. Page 46 c. A check was made with Capt. Stockberger, officer in charge of the Signal Cryptographic Section, to determine whether any permanent record was kept of incoming radio traffic. No such record was kept. d. As the radio in question originated in G-2, War Department, it was assumed that distribution in this headquarters would be made to G-2. Capt. Bosworth, accompanied by Col. Clausen, went to G-2 and contacted Major Maresh of that section. A thorough search was made of the G-2 Files by Major Maresh, in the presence of Capt. Bosworth, and no record was found of the radio. e. Col. Clausen was given the telephone numbers of three men who were on duty in the AG CRD at the time. As a matter of information, it is believed that a thorough search of this headquarters was made for this radio at the time of the Pearl Harbor Investigation Board's visit and no record was found at that time. O. N. Thompson O. N. THOMPSON Colonel, AGD Adjutant General. at Honolulu. [100] AFFIDAVITS OF CAPTAIN THOMAS A. HUCKINS, USN, AND CAPTAIN WILFRED J. HOLMES, USN. Captain Thomas A. HUCKINS, USN, presently on duty with FRUPAC, Pearl Harbor, and Captain Wilfred J. HOLMES, USN, (ret.) presently on duty with JICPOA, Pearl Harbor, each being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Lt. Col. Henry C. CLAUSEN, J/A/G/D, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and the authority of the Secretary of the Navy with respect to Naval personnel and records, and that top secrecy is required, do depose as follows: Captain Thomas A. HUCKINS states that on 7 December 1941 and for several months immediately prior thereto he was on duty at Combat Intelligence Unit, Pearl Harbor, under Captain Joseph J. ROCHEFORT, and was in charge of the radio traffic analysis under Captain ROCHEFORT,; that his duties included the daily preparation of radio intelligence summaries for distribution by Captain ROCHEFORT; that copies of the said radio traffic analysis summaries covering the period 1 November 1941 to and including 6 December 1941, taken from the file of FRUPAC entitled "Communication Intelligence Daily Summary", are attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and made a part hereof; that he did not maintain or conduct any liaison with any Army officer, or exchange any information pertaining to his functions or duties, prior to 7 December 1941, and, that in this regard, he did not maintain or conduct any liaison, or exchange any information with Kendell J. FIELDER, G 2, Hawaiian Department. Captain Wilfred J. HOLMES states that on 7 December 1941, and for several weeks immediately prior thereto, he was on duty at Combat Intelligence Unit, Pearl Harbor, under Captain Joseph J. ROCHEFORT; that the scope and extent of his duties during said period included only the preparation of plots of positions of U. S. combat and merchant vessels, flights of U. S. trans-Pacific planes and positions of Japanese ships based on call analysis; that these plots were disseminated only to CinCPac. Commander Jack S. HOLTWICK, Jr., USN, on 7 December 1941, and several months immediately prior thereto, was assigned to the Combat Intelligence Unit, Pearl Harbor, and has today stated to Captain HOLMES and Lt. Col. CLAUSEN as follows: That he, Commander HOLTWICK, on 7 December 1941, and for several months immediately prior thereto, was in charge of the I. B. M. machine room, was assistant to the principle cryptanalyst, and was the administrative assistant to Captain Joseph J. ROCHEFORT; that the records now available at Pearl Harbor concerning the intercepts Nos. SIS 25392 and SIS 25432, referred to in the affidavit of Captain Joseph J. ROCHEFORT given Lt. Col. Henry C. CLAUSEN and dated 20 February 1945, consists of a dispatch dated 28 November 1941 from CinCAF to CinCPac concerning monitoring by British and ComSixteen for a certain Japanese broadcast and, dispatch 29 November 1941 from OpNav [101] to CinCPac concerning Japanese broadcast schedules and, dispatch 1 December 1941 from ComSIXTEEN to CinCPAC concerning certain important Japanese news broadcasts which dispatches have been microfilmed and are contained in In-coming Code Book No. 1; that the records now available at Pearl Harbor concerning the intercepts SIS 25545, SIS 25640 and SIS 25787, mentioned in said affidavit Page 47 of Captain ROCHEFORT, consist of dispatch 4 December 1941 from OpNav to CinCPAC concerning report of Japanese circular ordering destruction by Washington of purple machine and papers excepting one copy of certain system, and by London, Hong Kong, Singapore and Manila of purple machines, which dispatch has been microfilmed and is contained in Incoming Code Book No. 1; that the pertinent outgoing messages now available at Pearl Harbor are contained in outgoing Code Book No. 1 and consist of dispatch 26 November 1941 from ComFOURTEEN to OpNav of communication intelligence analysis, dispatch 28 November 1941; from ComFOURTEEN to OpNav of British consul information that Japanese will attack Krakaw Isthmus on 1 December 1941 and, dispatch 6 December 1941 from ComFOURTEEN to OpNav of opinion that Japanese consulate at Honolulu destroyed all codes except one system; that the Communication Intelligence Daily Summaries covering the period 1 November 1941 to and including 6 December 1941 are included in Exhibit "A" herewith attached and made a part hereof, and consist of a resume or evaluation showing the results traffic analysis based upon intercepts of Japanese naval radio communications only, and were prepared for Captain ROCHEFORT with copies thereof disseminated on the dates of preparation, as indicated on the copies in Exhibit "A", only to Captain Edwin T. LAYTON, USN, Fleet Intelligence Officer; that on 7 December 1941, and for several months prior thereto, the said Unit supervised by Captain ROCHEFORT did not have any facilities for decrypting the Japanese diplomatic radio messages which required the use of a machine and the USN decrypting facilities at Pearl Harbor did not include a purple machine and the only machine available was one designed by Commander HOLTWICK and covered a Japanese code which was abandoned in 1938 and not used since that time. Thomas A. Huckins, THOMAS A. HUCKINS Captain, USN. Wilfred J. Holmes, WILFRED J. HOLMES, Captain, USN. Subscribed and sworn to before me this 18th day of April 1945. Henry C. Clausen HENRY C. CLAUSEN, Lt. Col., J/A/G/D. at Honolulu, T. H. Read and approved. J. S. Holtwick J. S. HOLTWICK, Cdr. U. S. N. [102] Morrill W. Marston, 07626, Brig. Gen., presently G-4, POA, being first duly sworn, and informed of the investigation by Lt. Col. Henry C. Clausen for the SW, supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and that top secrecy is required, reposes and says: My attention has been called to the affidavit of Col. Moses W. Pettigrew, dated 19 Feb. 45; and, during the period about September 1939 to July 1941 I was G-2, Hawaiian Department; and had information, that the Navy had a cryptoanalytic unit; during the time I was G-2 the Army maintained a certain amount of liaison with the Navy in that regard for obtaining information derived from intercepts the character indicated, although the Navy was far ahead of the Army in the local (MWM) development of this phase of intelligence; it was possible on occasions to obtain information as to commercial cables sent and received (MWM) by e Japanese Consul at Honolulu, it being my recollection that this was given to the Army by the Navy at liaison meetings Concerning the 1940 alert (all-out) ordered by Gen. Herron, from my observations there was no alarm of the civilian population. Morrill W. MARSTON Brig. Gen. U. S. A. Subscribed and sworn to before me 21 April 1945 HENRY C. CLAUSEN Lt. Col. JAGD. at Honolulu. Page 48 [103] Louis R. Lane, Chief Warrant Officer, presently stationed South Pacific Base Command, A. G. Office, being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Lt. Col. Henry C. Clausen, JAGD for the SW, and that top secrecy is required, deposes and says: Concerning secret message 519, 5 December 1941, I searched for a record of this message by looking carefully through the classified files and journals of incoming messages covering said date; said files and journals being available this date at Hq., POA, Ft. Shafter and consisting, among others, of the following: Classified, A. G. Binder 1; 370.2 Battles & Reports of; Classified, A. G. Binder 1; 091 Japan; Classified, A. G. Binder 1; 283.4 Espionage; Classified, A. G. Binder 2; 350.05 Military Information; Classified, A. G. Journals (microfilmed) (2) 297 and 298; no record of the receipt by the Hawaiian Department of this message could be found, although it was the practice to [104] set forth in said journals the War Department numbers of the messages. Such pertinent number in this case 519, could not be found as having been entered, but the preceding numbers 517 and 518 were found, and the succeeding numbers 520 and 521, pertaining to messages dated during the time in question. I suggest that inquiry be made of RCA, since I believe from reading the file copy shown me by Colonel Clausen that it came commercial. Louis R. LANE, CWO USA. Subscribed and sworn to before me 21 April 1945. HENRY C. CLAUSEN, Lt. Colonel, JAGD. at Honolulu. [105] FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT DISTRICT INTELLIGENCE OFFICE SIXTH FLOOR, YOUNG HOTEL, Honolulu, Hawaii, 22 April, 1945. Secret STATEMENT FOR PROCEEDINGS SUPPLEMENTARY TO THE U. S. ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD This statement has been prepared at the request of Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the U. S. Army Pearl Harbor Board. The statement is based on a personal recollection of events which occurred over three years ago, and on my personal understanding of what occurred at that time. To my knowledge, there is no documentary evidence available to support this statement. The telephone surveillance of local espionage suspects at, or centering around, the Japanese Consulate, Honolulu, was maintained by the District Intelligence Office. The Federal Bureau of Investigation, cognizant of this activity, received almost daily transcripts and translations of conversations monitored. About 1 November 1941 the FBI, with the cognizance of the DIO, began a telephone surveillance of a suspect in its own office building. To the knowledge of the writer, this was the first such surveillance conducted by the FBI itself in Honolulu. This one surveillance was accidentally discovered by some employees of the telephone company making routine installations. They reported their discovery to their superior, and subsequently this information was casually passed on to a member of the DIO by the DIO contact at the telephone company. In a spirit of cooperation, the information that their surveillance had been exposed was in turn passed on by the DIO man to an FBI agent. On receipt of the information, the FBI agent in charge apparently went directly to the telephone company and made accusations there that an FBI confidence had been breached by the DIO's having been given information concerning an FBI tap. When Captain Mayfield, then District Intelligence Officer, learned of the FBI protest at the telephone company, he was not only incensed at their failure to consult with him before taking such action, but he considered that action to be a serious breach of security. Cognizant of his instructions from the Chief of Naval Operations to avoid any possibility of international compilations, and thoroughly aware of the explosive potentialities of the surveillances being con- Page 49 ucted, Captain Mayfield ordered the immediate discontinuance of all telephone surveillances. This was on 2 December 1941. Surveillances were not resumed until the [106] morning of 7 December 1941, following the Japanese attack. It should be added that very few of the personnel attached to the District Intelligence Office were in any way aware that such surveillances were being conducted, and considerable pains were taken to prevent that knowledge from gaining any currency in the organization. Donald Woodrum, Jr., DONALD WOODRUM, Jr. Lieutenant, USNR. [107] AFFIDAVIT OF CAPTAIN EDWIN T. LAYTON, USN 25 APRIL 1945. [108] Captain Edwin T. Layton, USN being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation being conducted by Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and that top secrecy is required, deposes and says: On 7 December 1941 and for one year prior thereto I was Fleet Intelligence Officer, U. S. Pacific Fleet. My duties consisted of the following: To receive, correlate and evaluate, and to distribute various intelligence matters to designated members of the Staff, and to Units of the Pacific Fleet; to provide Plans and Operations Sections with essential enemy intelligence for preparation of current estimates; to supervise counter-intelligence and counter-espionage within the U. S. Pacific Fleet; to maintain strategic and other plots of potential enemy Naval forces and to keep apprised of the general distribution or disposition of fleets of potential Allies; to supervise projects concerning aerial photographic reconnaissance. Liaison with other Government Agencies, including the Army, would normally be effected through established channels, i. e., the Naval shore liaison or representative in the area in which the Fleet was to move or to be based. To clarify the interlocking yet independent status of Fleet Intelligence Officer (myself), the Combat Intelligence Officer Fourteenth Naval District (then Commander Rochefort), and the District Intelligence Officer, Fourteenth Naval District (then Captain Mayfield); Captain Mayfield was the District Intelligence Officer and responsible to the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, and to the Director of Naval Intelligence for all intelligence matters, including counter- espionage and counter-sabotage ashore in the Fourteenth Naval District, and was my direct liaison on Naval matters with other Government Agencies in the Fourteenth Naval District. Commander Rochefort was the Head of the Combat Intelligence unit, Fourteenth Naval District, working under direct orders of the Chief of Naval Operations, but under the administrative jurisdiction of the Commandant Fourteenth Naval District, and was my direct liaison in matters of Communications Intelligence. My intelligence field was limited to the vessels and forces of the U. S. Pacific Fleet and I was under the direct command of the Commander in Chief of that Fleet. Were the Fleet to proceed to San Francisco, for example, I would then contact the District Intelligence Officer, Twelfth Naval District, there and conduct any business with the Army or other Government Agencies through that officer. About 3 months prior to 7 December 1941, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Hawaiian Air Force, then Lieutenant Colonel Edwin Raley, called at my office and informed me that he had been directed to establish with me an Army liaison and requested all information we possessed on airfields in Australia, Netherlands Fast Indies, Australian Mandated Territories, and any other Pacific Ocean airports and airways information. I furnished him with [109] all the information was possessed, confidential and secret, including Dutch "Airways Guide" and Australian Air Force "Airports Directory." Thereafter he, or his assistant Lieutenant Brown, would request various items of intelligence material and as mid-November approached, the meetings between those officers and myself and my assistant, Commander Hudson, USN, increased in frequency. By mid-November 1941 a series of intelligence reports from various sources, including Dutch, British, Chinese, and American, collectively indicated that Japan was on the move in a southerly direction. These consisted of Consular Reports, Attache and Agent Reports, Ship Master's Reports, and reports from other Intelligence Agencies that there was a greatly increased movement of Page 50 Japanese Army transports, Naval auxiliaries, and Naval vessels southward along the China Coast, with concentrations being seen in French Indo- China and South China. The general tenor of these reports was imparted to Colonel Raley and we informally discussed and exchanged opinions on the general significance thereof. In a period for about 2 to 3 weeks prior to 7 December 1941, as my recollection serves me, I talked with Colonel Raley on a general average every other day. During the period of about ten days to two weeks prior to 7 December 194l, without authorization from higher authority and on my own initiative, I imparted to Colonel Raley certain "Top Secret" intelligence from sources that had previously been found to be completely reliable and from other sources previously determined to be generally fairly reliable. I did not inform him of the true source and concealed its true origin, in keeping with the Top Secret Oath by which I was bound. I explained to Colonel Raley that I was not authorized to give him this information but would do so if he would promise that he would make no copy or written memorandum of it and would impart it only to his Commanding General Major General Fred Martin, Commanding General Hawaiian Air Force, to which Colonel Raley agreed. In pursuance of this agreement, I imparted certain "Top Secret" intelligence to Colonel Raley in person as follows: One item had to do with an intrigue in Thailand, in which the pro-Japanese Thailand leaders were, by circulating a false report of a Japanese landing on the East Coast at Singora, to get the pro-British faction of that Government to request immediate assistance from British Forces in North Mayana, so that as soon as the British Forces crossed the border into Thailand, the pro-Japanese element would declare Great Britain an invader and call upon Japan for assistance, thereby facilitating Japanese entry into Thailand and an invasion of Malaya. To my best knowledge and recollection, I told him as "Top Secret" information that we were listening for certain cryptic weather messages to be included in the Japanese broadcasts which were to signal the breach of diplomatic relations or opening of hostilities between Japan and certain powers, namely America or Britain or Russia. (No such message was ever intercepted or received at Pearl Harbor.) I do not recall positively, whether or not I told him of the message we had received stating that certain Japanese Diplomatic Officials were destroying their Purple Machines. [110] In connection with the reports of movements of Japanese amphibious equipment, transports, troops, and Naval vessels to the South, in addition to informing Colonel Raley of these reports I informed him we had other reliable information which seemed to substantiate a general movement to the South of a considerable portion of Japanese Naval Forces, including probably some battleships and carriers as well as cruisers, destroyers, and submarines. I distinctly recall that I informed Colonel Raley of the special searches being conducted in late November or early December of Camranh Bay and the French Indo-China coast by Naval seaplanes based in the Manila area, and that these planes had sighted Japanese submarines, cruisers, transports, and destroyers in Camranh Bay and along the French Indo-China coast. This search, in itself, was a very strict secret. Prior to 7 December 1941, I received no information from dispatches sent by the Japanese Consul General at Honolulu by Commercial Cable or otherwise. I was not apprised of the so-called "Mori" telephone message. I received a telephone call from Captain Mayfield on Saturday evening, 6 December. He said he wanted to see me the next morning at my convenience. I asked if I should come down immediately as I was free, and he replied: "We cannot do anything about it now, as I do not have the material and will not have it until tomorrow morning." In connection with the Japanese activity in the Japanese Mandated Islands: Commencing in late December 1940 and until December 1941, and subsequently, I made it one of my principal tasks to follow the increasing Japanese activity in the Marshalls, Carolines, and the Marianas, including Marcus. That the Japanese were rapidly building air bases, garrisoning key islands, was very apparent. As Fleet Intelligence Officer, I wrote and disseminated several bulletins concerning this activity and also the organization of the Japanese Naval Surface and Air Forces stationed in the Mandates, for distribution to Fleet High Commands and the Chief of Naval Operations. When the U. S. Army proposed to make photographic reconnaissance of certain of the Japanese Mandates in late November 1941, I held a series of conferences with Colonel Raley and furnished him with the latest Intelligence Bulletin Page 51 (#45-41) concerning these installations and developments, with the proviso that the publication be not reproduced nor circulated except to the pilots of the reconnaissance planes and commanders of the Army Squadrons to be stationed on Wake and Midway, with the further stipulation that the document be not carried in aircraft. Colonel Raley also requested, and I acquiesced to sit in on all conferences after the arrival of the photo planes, and that I brief the pilots on all matters relating to the Mandates prior to their take-off. This reconnaissance did not materialize due to delays in arrival of the planes. Attached hereto as Exhibit "A" is my memorandum to Admiral Kimmel, apprising him of these conferences concerning the projected reconnaissance flights over the Mandated Islands. Exhibit "B" is one copy of Pacific Fleet Intelligence Bulletin #45-41. [111] I do not specifically recall the term "A, B, C Block" or discussions with Colonel Raley concerning it. I believe there may have been conversations concerning a geographical limit beyond which Britain and the Netherlands could not permit Jap penetration. My only relationships with Colonel Bicknell was having met him at Colonel Raley's quarters at Hickam Field in mid- or late November, where the three of us discussed, in general terms, the world situation and the situation in the Far East, in particular. Normally, I would have no occasion to undertake direct liaison with Colonel Bicknell, as that was carried out by the authorities of the Fourteenth Naval District through whom the Fleet dealt on all matters pertaining to shore-side business. From time to time prior to 7 December 1941 when Task Force Commanders turned to Pearl from sea, I was called into the Commander-in-Chief's office to give a brief summary of the general intelligence picture at the time in question. I cannot state positively that General Short was present at these times, but I believe he may have been. At other times when General Short was in conference with Admiral Kimmel, I was called to present the intelligence picture to them. During these intelligence briefings, I discussed the general disposition, location and activity of the Japanese Fleet and Major Japanese Naval Air Units as was own or inferred from all available intelligence, including Top Secret. I also discussed in considerable detail the Japanese militarization of the Mandated lands, their building of Air Bases, Naval Bases, and facilities there, with particular emphasis on the Marshalls. I had no official liaison with Colonel Fielder, as I had presumed from Colonel Raley's remarks when he first came to me and suggested setting up the liaison at he was then representing the Army, as the Hawaiian Air Force was a subordinate Command of the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department. His statement at that time was, in effect, that as the Navy and the heavy bombers the Hawaiian Air Force were the offensive weapons for carrying out the War Plans, he was directed to establish this liaison as it was felt that the Hawaiian Department was a defensive garrison. I gathered from his remarks that other liaison had been established with the Fourteenth Naval District in accordance with the existing directives for the defense of the Hawaiian Islands. I knew there was a specially designated Naval Liaison Officer Lt. Burr USN from Headquarters, Fourteenth Naval District, permanently attached to the Headquarters, Commanding General, Hawaiian Department. Inasmuch as I had no direct liaison with Colonel Fielder, I did not impart to him any of the information that gave to Colonel Raley. Colonel Fielder did not contact me nor request any intelligence from me prior to 7 December 1941. I desire to state that being without my files and notes, which I had access to all previous hearings concerning Pearl Harbor (the Roberts Commission in December 1941, the Army and Navy Pearl Harbor Boards in 1944), I am unable make as clear or concise statements from memory as might be possible with the assistance of my files, notes, and memoranda. [112] I have read the various documents shown me by Colonel Clausen. marked TOP SECRET, exhibit B. I did not know of the substance of any of these prior to 7 December 1941 except those marked SIS 25432 and SIS 25787 which I have written my initials and today's date. E. T. Layton, E. T. LAYTON , Captain, USN Combat Intelligence Officer, Staff, Commander U. S. Pacific Fleet. Subscribed and sworn before me on this 26th day of April 1945. Henry C. Clausen Colonel HENRY C. CLAUSEN J/A/G/D At Guam. Page 52 [113] UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET, Secret U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship, Pearl Harbor, T. H., November 28, 1941. Memorandum for: Admiral. Subject: Projected Reconnaissance Flight over Mandates Islands. 1. The subject was discussed with the Intelligence Section, Hawaiian Air Force, on 27 and 28 November, 1941, and will be further discussed this afternoon at 1430. 2. I have furnished the Intelligence Officer, Hawaiian Air Force, with Fleet Intelligence Bulletin No. 45-41, giving the general summary of the installations and developments in the Mandates. The Chief of G-2, H. A. F., has promised me that this publication will not be reproduced by them nor given any circulation except to the pilots of the reconnaissance planes and to the commanders of the Army squadrons to be stationed on Wake and Midway. This document will not be carried in any aircraft. 3. The urgent need for as wide a reconnaissance of the MARSHALLS, TRUK and PONAPE was stressed with particular reference to JALUIT, ENIWETOK KWAJELIEN, RONGELAP, WOTJE and MALOELAP. 4. The Fleet Aerological Officer was present at this morning's conference and is working up meteorological data in conjunction with the proposed reconnaissance. From a point of view of photographic interpretation the hours of medium shadow 9-11 a. m. and 2-4 p. m. are considered most advantageous and fog conditions are expected to be best at around 10 a. m. Consequently, that hour has been tentatively agreed upon for arrival at first objective. 5. The Army plans to fly two (2) B-24 planes fully manned with defensive armament and photographic equipment from WAKE on the selected day, departures to be staggered so that arrivals over assigned initial points would be practically simultaneous. Lacking definite information as to Radar installations in the MANDATES it is proposed (tentatively) to make the first objective of the planes JALUIT and TRUK respectively. The JALUIT plane returning via MALOELAP, WOTJE, KWAJELIEN, RONGELAP and POKAAKKU. The TRUK plane returning via UJELANG and ENIWETOK. These return objectives being dependent upon discovery or detection at or after first objective, and existing conditions at the time. 6. The second reconnaissance is to be conducted over PONAPE enroute to Port Moresby was assigned UJELANG, PONAPE and KAPINGAMARANGI (Greenwich Island). 7. The Hawaiian Air Force has requested that I sit in on all conferences after the arrival here of the photographic planes and that I brief the pilots on all matters relating to the MANDATES prior to their takeoff /s/ E. T. LAYTON. Exhibit "A" [114] UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship Cincpac File No. HRK AA/FF1/(25) Serial 01954 PEARL HARBOR, November 27, 1941. Confidential From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet. To: PACIFIC FLEET. Subject: Pacific Fleet Intelligence Bulletin No. 45-41. Enclosure: (A) Subject Bulletin. 1. Enclosure (A) is forwarded herewith for information. 2. BECAUSE OF THE CONFIDENTIAL NATURE OF BOTH THE SOURCE AND INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN, IT IS OF THE HIGHEST IMPORTANCE THAT THE CONFIDENTIAL CHARACTER OF THIS BE CAREFULLY PRESERVED. Page 53 3. This information obtained from Naval Intelligence sources has been reproduced by the Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet. Any request for additional copies of this document will be made to the Commander-in-Chief and not to the Division of Naval Intelligence 4. Additional copies shall not be made. This bulletin should be retained for study and reference (plus subsequent additions or corrections) during the present National Emergency. P. C. Crosley P. C. CROSLEY, By direction. DISTRIBUTION: (7CM41) List I, Case 3; P., X. Atlantic Fleet A1; Asiatic Fleet A1; One copy each to: FATU, NTS, NC4, ND11-ND14 NB49, Rdo. & Snd. Lab. Exhibit "B" [115] TOP SECRET Confidential INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN NO. 45-41 CONTENTS (A) ORGANIZATION OF THE JAPANESE FLEETS ....... Pages 1 to 12 inclusive. Major Fleet Commands ............................. Page 1. Combined Fleet and First Fleet ................... " 2. Combined Fleet and Second Fleet .................. " 3. Third Fleet ...................................... " 4. Fourth Fleet ..................................... " 5 and 6. Fifth Fleet ...................................... " 7. Sixth Fleet-(Submarine Fleet)..................... " 7. Carrier Fleet .................................... " 8. Combined Air Force ............................... " 9. Train for Combined Fleet ......................... " 10. Japanese Naval Forces in China ................... " 11 and 12. (B) JAPANESE FORCES AND INSTALLATIONS IN THE MANDATED ISLANDS, Pages 13 and 14. General Situation. Air Distribution. Table "A" showing distribution of material and personnel forces in Mandates (2 pages to be pasted together) Sketch of PALAO (PELEW). Sketch of MALAKAL Harbor, etc. Sketch of JALUIT Harbor, etc. [116] TOP SECRET (A) ORGANIZATION OF THE JAPANESE FLEETS. October 30, 1941. (10574) The following revision of Op-16-F-2, O.N.I. Serial #27-41 supersedes and replaces the former report on this subject. The principal change consists of a further increase in the number of fleet commands. This has arisen from the regrouping of aircraft carriers and seaplane tenders into separate forces, and from the creation of special task forces in connection with the southward advance into Indo- China. The regrouping has resulted in a notable specialization within the various commands, as shown below. Page 54 MAJOR FLEET COMMANDS I. Combined Fleet 1 First Fleet (Battle Force) 3 Batdivs, 1 Crudiv, 2 Desrons 2 Second Fleet (Scouting Force) 4 Crudivs, 2 desrons, etc. 3 Third Fleet (Blockade & Transport Small craft. Force) 4. Fourth Fleet (Mandate Defense Force) 1 Desron, 1 Subron and many small units 5. Fifth Fleet ? ? 6. Sixth Fleet (Submarine Fleet) 6 Subrons 7. Carrier Fleet (Aircraft Carriers) 5 Cardivs 8. Combined Air (Seaplane tenders, etc.) 4 Airrons, & shore based Force planes II. Japanese Naval Forces (Staff Headquarters) 1 PG and 3 DD s in China. 1. First China Exped. (Central China) Gunboats Fleet. 2. Second China (South China) 1 CA, 1 CL and small Exped. Fleet. craft. 3. Third China (North China) Torpedo Boats, etc. Exped. Fleet. 4. Southern Exped. (Saigon) 1 CL, transports and Fleet. mine craft. [117] The Japanese Navy now includes more vessels in active service than ever before. More merchant ships have been taken over by the Navy, and the line between merchant ship and naval auxiliary grows fainter all the time. The base forces and guard divisions in the Mandated Islands have also greatly increased the strength of the Navy, which is on full- war-time footing. COMBINED FLEET AND FIRST FLEET YAMAMOTO Isoroku, CinC (Admiral) NAGATO, Flagship FIRST FLEET Batdiv One Desron One (Cont'd) NAGATO (F) Desdiv 27 MUTSU SHIRATSUYU (F) YAMASHIRO ARIAKE Batdiv Two YUGURE FUSO (F) SHIGURE ISE Desron Three HYUGA SENDAI (F) Batdiv Three Desdiv 11 HIYEI (F) FUBUKI (F) KONGO SHIRAYUKI KIRISHIMA HATSUYUKI *HARUNA Desdiv 12 Crudiv Six SHIRAKUMO (F) KAKO (F) SHINONOME FURUTAKA USUGOMO AOBA MURAKUMO KINUGASA Desdiv 19 Desron One ISONAMI (F) ABUKUMA (F) SHIKINAMI Desdiv 6 AYANAMI IKAZUCHI (F) URANAMI INAZUMA Desdiv 20 SAZANAMI AMAGIRI (F) HIBIKI ASAGIRI Desdiv 21 YUGIRI NENOHI (F) ASAGIRI HATSUHARU Total: 10 BB, 4 CA, 2 CL, 27 DD. HATSUSHIMO WAKABA *Note: The HARUNA has been inactive during 1941, and is probably undergoing major repairs. Page 55 [118] COMBINED FLEET SECOND FLEET TAKAO, Flagship Crudiv Four Desron Two (Cont'd) TAKAO (F) Desdiv 16 ATAGO HATSUKAZE CHOKAI YUKIKAZE MAYA AMATSUKAZE Crudiv Five* TOKITSUKAZE: MYOKO (F) Desdiv 18 NACHI KASUMI HAGURO ARARE Crudiv Seven KAGERO KUMANO (F) SHIRANUHI MOGAMI Desron Four MIKUMA NAKA (F) SUZUYA Desdiv 2 Crudiv Eight YUDACHI (F) TONE (F) MURASAME CHIKUMA HARUSAME Desron Two SAMIDARE JINTSU (F) Desdiv 9 Desdiv 8 ASAGUMO ASASHIO (F) YAMAGUMO ARASHIO MINEGUMO OSHIO NATSUGUMO MICHISHIO Desdiv 24 Desdiv 15 KAWAKAZE (F) KUROSHIO YAMAKAZE OYASHIO SUZUKAZE NATSUSHIO UMIKAZE HAYASHIO Total: 13 CA, 2 CL, 28 DD. *Note: There is a possibility that a new cruiser has been added to Crudiv 6. [119] THIRD FLEET TAKAHASHI Ibo-Vice Admiral NAGARA, Flagship NORTHERN BLOCKADE FORCE 2nd BLOCKADE FORCE-Con. CHOGEI (F) Desron Five Subdiv ........ Desdiv 34 ........ HAKAZE ........ AKIKAZE ........ YUKAZE Subdiv ........ TACHIKAZE ........ 1st BASE FORCE ........ ........ Maru (F) ........ Minelayer Division 2nd BLOCKADE FORCE ITSUKUSHIMA Desron Five AOTAKA NATORI (F) HATSUTAKA Desdiv 5 Mine Sweeper Division 1 and 21 ASAKAZE AM-1 AM-7 HARUKAZE AM-2 AM-8 MATSUKAZE AM-3 AM-9 HATAKAZE AM-4 AM-10 Desdiv 12 AM-5 AM-11 SATSUKI AM-6 AM-12 FUMITSUKI Gunboat Division 1 MINATSUKI 6 Gunboats (Converted Fishing NAGATSUKI Vessels) Page 56 THIRD FLEET-continued 2nd BLOCKADE FORCE-Con. 2nd BASE FORCE SUBCHASER SQUADRON ......... Maru, (F) .......... (F) Minelayer Division 17 Subchaser Division 1 and 11 SHIRTAKA PC-1 PC-7 YAEYAMA PC-2 PC-8 KUNAJIRI PC-3 PC-9 At least 5 other men of war, and 17 Subchaser Division 21 and 31 merchant ships. PC-4 PC-10 Total: 1 CL, 12 DD, 1 AS, 6 SS, 6 CM, PC-5 PC-11 12 AM, 6 XPG 12 PC, 46, AP. PC-6 PC-12 27 AP-Names Unknown [120] FOURTH FLEET Hirata-Vice Admiral KASHIMA, Flagship Crudiv Eighteen FOURTH DEFENSE FORCE (HQ- TENRYU (F) TRUK TATSUTA Miscellaneous Forces Ashore, in- KASHIMA cluding Air Group #17 and Desron Six Ponape Detachment of 4th Def. YUBARI (F) Force, Kusaie Detachment of 4th Desdiv 29 Def. Force, Olol Detachment of OITE 4th Def. Force, Greenwich De- HAYATE tachment 4th Def. Force, Mort- ASANAGI lock Detachment 4th Def. Force, YUNAGI Pingelap Detachment 4th Def. Desdiv 36 Force, Puluwat Detachment 4th MUTSUKI (F) Def. Force, Lamortek Detach- KISARAGI ment ...... (Hall ?) of 4th Def. YAYOI force. MOCHITSUKI 5th BASE FORCE Subron Seven Saipan, Headquarters JINGEI SHOEI MARU (F) Subdiv 26 Guard Division 5 RO-60 Composition unknown RO-61 Minelayer Division 19 RO-62 OKINOSHIMA (F) Subdiv 27 TOKIWA RO-65 Subchaser Division 56 RO-66 KASHI (F) RO-67 XPG 561 (?) Subdiv 33 XPG 562 (?) RO-63 XPG 563 (?) RO-64 Gunboat Division 8 RO-68 Composition unknown Subdiv----- 9 AP or AK ......... FIFTH DEFENSE FORCE (HQ-SAI- ......... PAN) ......... Miscellaneous Forces Ashore, in- 8 XPG cluding Air Group #18. [121] 4th BASE FORCE Tenian Detachment, 5th Defense Truk, Headquarters Force ........ Maru (F) PAGAN Detachment, 5th Defense Guard Division 4 Force ........ Maru (F) Survey and Patrol Division ........ KOSHU ........ KATSURIKI (CM) 4 AP or AK KOMABASHI (AS) Page 57 FOURTH FLEET-Continued FIFTH DEFENSE FORCE Con. 6th BASE FORCE-Continued Repair and Salvage Division Minesweeper Division 16 MATSUEI MARU NAGATA MARU (F) NAGAURA (MARU) CHOKAI MARU 3rd BASE FORCE DAIDO MARU Palao, Headquarters IKUTA MARU .......... Maru (F) ? Guard Division 3 |- (This may .......... Maru ....... | be the .......... ....... Maru | SALVAGE .......... ....... Maru | Unit known .......... ....... Maru | to be in .......... | 6th Base Subdiv 6 |- Force) RO-56 Subchaser Division 5 RO-57 PC-51 RO-58 PC-52 RO-59 PC-53 Subchaser Division 55 SIXTH DEFENSE FORCE (HQ- .......... Maru (F) JALUIT) XPG 551 (?) KAIKEI Maru XPG 552 (?) #5 FUKU Maru XPG 553 (?) ....... Maru XPG 554 (?) Miscellaneous Forces ashore in- THIRD DEFENSE FORCE (HQ cluding AIR GROUP #19 at PALOA) IMIEJI, Jaluit Atoll and prob- Miscellaneous Forces Ashore, in- able Air Groups at WOTJE and cluding Air Group #16 and TOBI KWAJALEIN and RUOTTO Is. detachment of 4th Defense Force (Kwajalein Atoll) Detach- ..... Detach. 4th Def. Force ment 6th Defense Force KWA- ...... " " " " JALEIN Is. (Kwajalein Atoll), ...... " " " " TAROA Is. (Maloelap Atoll ), ...... " " " " ENIWETOK Is. (Eniwetok ...... " " " " Atoll), UJELANG Atoll, ENY- Estimate these unknown loca- BOR Is. (Jaluit Atoll), IMIEJI tions to be SOROI, HELEN Is. (Jaluit Atoll), WOTJE REEF, ULITHI, YAP and AN- Atoll-Detach. of 6th Def. Force, GUAR). UTIRIK Atoll-Detach. of 6th 6th BASE FORCE Def. Force. Jaluit, Headquarters Total: 4 CL, 9 DD, 2 AS, 16 SS 1 Sur- TAKUHAN MARU (F) vey Ship, 3 CM, 15 XPG, 3 PC, 4 XAM 41 AP or AK. [122] FIFTH FLEET CL...........(F) The composition of a new Fifth Fleet is still unknown. The Flagship has been reported at Maizuru. SIXTH FLEET (Submarine Fleet) KATORI, Flagship Subron One Subron Two TAIGEI (F) KITAGANI (F) Subdiv I Subdiv 7 I-9 I-1 I-15 I-2 I-16 I-3 I-17 I-7 Subdiv 2 Subdiv 8 I-18 I-4 I-19 I-5 I-20 I-6 Page 58 FIFTH FLEET-Continued Subron Three Subron Six NAGOYA MARU (F) KINU (F) Subdiv 1 Subdiv 9 I-74 I-123 I-75 I-124 Subdiv 12 Subdiv 13 I-8 I-121 I-63 I-122 I-69 Subron Ten I-70 KARASAKI (F)* Subdiv 20 Subdiv 18 I-71 I-53 I-72 I-54 I-73 I-55 Subron Five Subdiv 19 YURA (F) I-56 Subdiv 28 I-57 I-59 I-58 I-60 Subdiv 21 Subdiv 29 RO-33 I-61 (Sank 10-2-41) RO-34 I-62 Total: 3 CL, 2 AS, 1 AP, 42 SS. I-64 Subdiv 30 I-65 I-66 *Note: The old sub-tender KARASAKI appears to have been recommissioned. [123] CARRIER FLEET (Cardivs) CV KAGA Flagship Cardiv 1 Cardiv 4 AKAGI ZUIKAKU KAGA (F) SHOKANU Desdiv 7 Desdiv 3 OBORO (F) HOKAZE USHIO SHIOKAZE AKEBONO NAMIKAZE AKATSURI NUMAKAZE Cardiv 2 Cardiv ...... SORYU (F) CV KORYU HIRYU CV KASUGA (MARU) Desdiv 23 Total: 10 CV, 16 DD. UZUKI KIKUTSUKI MIKATSUKI YUZUKI Cardiv - RYUJO (F) HOSHO Desdiv 17 ISOKAZE URAKAZE HAMAKAZE [124] COMBINED AIR FORCE Kanoya Naval Air Station, Hdqtrs. Shore-based land planes and seaplanes. The organization provides for great mobility. Air units are ordered to work with other forces, and return to the Combined Air Force pool when their mission is fulfilled. The named Air Groups (e. g. the Takao Air Group) are not tied down to their stations, but are sent freely wherever they are needed. Furthermore, the various air squadrons and air groups frequently split into smaller units, and are scattered over wide areas. Page 59 Because of this extreme mobility, the picture is constantly changing. Accordingly, the following list makes no attempt to indicate all the temporary groupings into which the various units may be combined. SHIP-BASED SQUADRONS SHORE-BASED AIR GROUPS Air Ron 6 8th Air Group KAMIKAWA MARU (F) 10th Air Group FUJIKAWA MARU 11th Air Group KENJO MARU 12th Air Group (Has been working with the 3rd 14th Air Group Fleet) 16th Air Group Air Ron 7 17th Air Group CHITOSE (F) 18th Air Group CHIYODA 19th Air Group MIZUHO 23rd Air Group (Has been working with the. 1st Chichijima Fleet) Chinkai Air Ron 24 Genzan KAMOI (F) Hyakurihara (or Moribara) 1 XAV Iwakuni Yokohama Air Group Kanoya (Hdqtrs.) Chitose Air Group Kashima (Has been working with the 4th Kasumigaura Sasebo Fleet) Kisarazu Suzuka Patrol Squadron 2 Kure Takao NOTORO Maizuru Tateyama (Formerly with Air Ron 6) Oita Tsukuba Ominato Usa Omura Yatabe Saeki Yokosuka TOTAL: 5 AV, 3 XAV, 35 Air Groups. [125] TRAIN FOR COMBINED FLEET SHIRETOKO ONDO AKASHI SATA HAYATOMO MUROTO TSURUMI NARUTO OTOMARU SHIRTYA MAMIYA SETTSU IRO ASAHI Total: 8 AC, 1 AF, 2 AR, 1 AC, 1 Ice Breaker, 1 Target Ship. [126] JAPANESE NAVAL FORCES IN CHINA KOGA, Mineichi-Vice Admiral IZUMO, Flagship SHANGHAI BASE FORCE Patrol Division 11-Continued ASUGA KURI HIRA TSUGA HASU TOBA Shanghai Harbor Affairs Section ATAMI Special Naval Landing Force, Shanghai FUTAMI Nanking Base Force FUSHIMI Special Naval Landing Force, Nanking SUMIDA HASHIDATE CENTRAL CHINA FLEET, OR FIRST Air Group 10 EXPEDITIONARY FLEET Hankow Base Force Kiukiang Base Force KOMATSU, Teruhisa-Vice Admiral Gunboat Division ? ? UJI, Flagship SHINFUKU MARU (F) Patrol Division 11 HITONOSE ATAKA CHIKUBU SETA Total: 4 PG, 10 PR, 1 AP. KATADA Page 60 JAPANESE NAVAL FORCES IN CHINA-Continued SOUTH CHINA FLEET, OR SECOND [127] NORTH CHINA FLEET, or EXPEDITIONARY FLEET THIRD EXPEDITIONARY FLEET SUGIYAWA, Rokozo, Vice Admiral NIIMI, Wasaichi, Vice Admiral IWATE, Flagship ISUZU, Flagship Patrol Division 12 Crudiv 15 IWATE (F) ISUZU (F) MANRI MARU ASHIGARA Torpedo Boat Division 11 Patrol Division 14 HATO SAGA SAGI AM-l7 KARI AM-18 KIJI Torpedo Boat Division 1 Torpedo Boat Division 21 OTORI CHIDORI HAYASUSA MANAZURI HIYOBORI TOMOZURU KASASAGI HATSUKARI Guard Division 15 KARUKAYA Guard Division 16 Gunboat Division 1 Canton Base Force Gunboat Division 2 Amoy Base Force Gunboat Division 13 Hainan Is. Base Force Gunboat Division 14 13 Special Service Ships Tsingtao Base Force Total: 1 CA, 1 CL, 4 TB, 1 PG, 2 AM, SOUTHERN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE 13 Misc. KASHII (F) (CL) SHIMBUSHU (CM) AP Total: 1 OCA, 1 DD, 8 TB, 1 AP. [128] (B) JAPANESE FORCES AND INSTALLATIONS IN THE MANDATED ISLANDS 1. FOURTH FLEET, which may be termed the MANDATE FLEET, apparently administers, the Naval activities, afloat and ashore and also the Army Garrisons units in the Mandated Islands. While the forces afloat exercise administrative jurisdiction over the Mandate area, the Yokosuka Naval District is directly responsible for the supply of stores, material and provisions. Truk is the headquarters for supply and munitions and has been principle Fourth Fleet operating base. 2. Up to the present the entire Mandated Islands have been lightly garrisoned, the majority of the garrison units being Naval Defense Forces ("special Landing Forces" corresponding to our Marine Corps) but some Army troops are believed to be on SAIPAN, PALAO, PONAPE, TRUK and JALUIT. The total garrison force has been estimated at fifteen thousand. In addition, there are Civil Engineering Units engaged in development work on various islands. Working in conjunction with these are naval engineering units, naval ordnance specialists, navy yard units with civilian navy yard workers and technicians. The network of naval radio stations has been greatly expanded, meteorological stations and high frequency direction finders installed at strategic locations, aviation facilities increased both in scope and number, and shore-batteries emplaced on strategic islands of key Atolls. 3. It is apparent that a decision to expedite the fortification, expansion of facilities and militarization of the Mandated Islands, was made late in 1940, probably concurrently with the signing of the Tripartite Pact. The movement of naval auxiliaries, small and medium cargo, freight-passenger vessels (ex-merchant marine) to the Mandates began in December, 1940, and has increased in scope and number until some seventy odd vessels are engaged in this traffic, the average number present in the Mandate area at any one time being some forty odd vessels. 4. The function of supply of munitions, supplies, material and provisions to the Mandates is under the YOKOSUKA Naval District with a Headquarters for Civil Engineering, Munitions, Military Stores and Supplies for the Mandates centered at Truk, although this function is normally under the jurisdiction of Yokosuka as the Mandates are in the First (HQ-YOKOSUKA) Naval District. 5. The Commanders of the 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 6th Base Forces are subordinate commanders under Commander-in-Chief, 4th Fleet; they have a designated Flag- Page 61 ship and a Headquarters or Administrative Section, the latter remaining ashore at the home base regardless of the movements of the command or the Flagship. Each Base Force contains a DEFENSE FORCE, detachments of which are stationed on outlying islands of that general area. Four Ro Class submarines have been reported to be attached to the PALAO BASE FORCE. [129] 6. Considerable air activity has been in evidence in the SAIPAN PALAO- PELELIU, TRUK, PONAPE and JALUIT-KWAJALEIN areas. Close cooperation has been noted between the Defense Forces and the Aircraft activities at their home bases. Foreign steamers nearing the SAIPAN area have been subject to aircraft observation and close scrutiny by Patrol planes, Bombers and fighters. Heavy land plane bombers and Patrol planes, undoubtedly ORANGE, have made reconnaissance flights over the Gilbert Islands (TARAWA; BUTARI-TARI, and BERU). 7. The distribution of material, personnel, and installations in the Mandated Islands is indicated in table "A". While this is admittedly incomplete and may be subject to inaccuracies, it represents the latest and best intelligence on this subject. In addition to those listed in Table A, there are a number of potential bases, principally in the lagoons of the naturally protected atolls, which may be used as emergency bases or may be earmarked for "priority two" development. 8. The latest information (up to 25 November 1941) indicates that the present distribution of the Air forces (believed to be a temporary strategical disposition other than a permanent assignment) in the Mandates is: Identification Location Includes Airron 24 Marshall Area (AV) KAMOI (AV) ...... Maru ex-CHITOSE Air Group ex-YOKOHAMA Air Group 11th Air Group PALAO Area 16th Air Group PALAO Area 17th Air Group TRUK 18th Air Group SAIPAN 19th Air Group IMIEJI Is. (Jaluit Atoll) Air Station (and Air Group?) WOTJE Air Station (and Air Group?) KWAJALEIN ? AIR GROUP TRUK The exact composition of these Air Groups is unknown and the estimates of total plane strength in the Mandates vary widely: 62-268 planes. Last Page of Intelligence Bulletin No. 45-41. (Pages 130, 131 132, and 133 of Exhibit B consist of Table A showing the distribution of Japanese material and personnel forces in the Mandates, a sketch of Palao, and a sketch of Malakal Harbor. These pages will be found reproduced as Items Nos. 2, 3, 4, and 5) EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Clausen Investigation. These illustrations will be found bound together following the printed exhibits of the Clausen investigation.) [134] NOTES TO ACCOMPANY SKETCH OF JALUIT 1. Aviation facilities.-Two landing fields, each with a hangar capable of using twenty medium sized planes. Engineering Shop (camouflaged) situated between the two fields. Adjacent storehouses (galv. iron) camouflaged. Diesel fuel and gasoline storage in camouflaged, above- ground tanks adjacent to air fields. Diesel power plant (June 1940). Eighty planes reported based here (November, 1940). On beach opposite southern air field is Naval Air Station having small ramp and one hangar for seaplanes (June 1940). This may be an auxiliary as present indications point to naval air Base on IMIEJI (EMIDJ) Is. 2. Headquarters-Two story concrete building. Large building to SE of headquarters is Post Office and Telephone central. Flagstaff adjacent to Post Office is also used as signal tower. In town are many one story concrete stores. Good bituman and powdered coral roads. Page 62 3. Radio towers.-Two steel combination radio and lookout towers 400 feet high. Diesel engine power plant near southern tower (1940). 4. Shore Batteries-Bases and trunnions along the three quarter mile water-front street called the Marine Parade (1940) (guns not mounted in June, 1940 but are now). Also three 6" guns and a battery of four 4.7" field pieces. Barracks for regular garrison of 500 soldiers (1940) (probably enlarged now). Mobile Batteries-Machine guns and AA guns mounted on Diesel-tractor towed trailers. 10 searchlights on pneumatic tired truck assemblies (1940). 5. Government Pier-600 feet long, 75 feet wide (18'-25' alongside) equipped with two railroad tracks and three 10 ton mobile cranes. Storehouse on end of pier (1940). 6. Mole-150' concrete mole constructed parallel to shore line along NW. corner of JABOR (1933). 7. Conspicuous red building (may be red-roofed building) (1936). 8. South Seas Trading Co. PIER (N. B. R. or "NAMBO") also called "SYDNEY Pier". Two water tanks and warehouses. Coal and briquette storage (1938). 9. Two buildings (resembling hangars) with tracks leading down to water from one of them (beaching gear?-small marine railway?). A gasoline storage located near the two buildings. (1936.) (Page 135 of Exhibit B is a sketch of Jaluit Harbor which will be found reproduced as Item No. 6, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Clausen Investigation. These illustrations will be found bound together following the printed exhibits of the Clausen investigation.) [136] Exhibit "A" U. S. PACIFIC FLEET RADIO UNIT Box 103-Navy Yard, Navy Number 128 One Two Eight, c/o Fleet Post Office, San Francisco, Calif. 18 APRIL 1945. Received from Officer-in-Charge U. S. Pacific Fleet Radio Unit 42 pages covering daily communication intelligence summaries for the period 1 November 1941 through 6 December 1941. [137] Communication intelligence summary, 1 November 1941 General.-Traffic volume a little less than normal, receiving conditions fair but a traffic rather slow. The first day's yield of new calls not very great. Fleet calls only changed, shore station calls and shore addresses not changed. It is believed that tactical calls also remain unchanged but not enough intercepted traffic to so state definitely. The same garble table for calls is employed so the change amounts to a reassignment of calls previously used. New calls have appeared but it is thought that they were formerly assigned to obscure units or were in reserve. All of the major Fleet calls are identified and a small amount of individual calls were recovered today. Because the new calls are not yet lined up save for the major Fleet Commanders and all time today was spent in call recovery, this summary will deal only with general impressions. Combined Fleet.-The FIRST FLEET was not very active today in radio traffic. The CINC SECOND FLEET appears to have originated quite a bit of traffic to addresses placed in submarine and carrier category. No indications of movement of any of these units. COMBINED FLEET tactical circuits were heard but little tactical traffic copied due to interference by NPM. Carriers-The COMMANDER CARDIVS was mentioned in dispatches from Tokyo and he took a fair amount of traffic on the Fleet Broadcast. Submarines.-Nothing to report. Calls of the Submarine Fleet not well lined up yet. Third Fleet.-This Fleet very active as before. The SECOND and FIRST BASE FORCEs are still marshaling their MARUs and the CINC is very busy with Tokyo. China.-The activity of HAINAN BASE continues. The KASHII sent several messages from Saigon. Page 63 [138] Communication intelligence summary, 2 November, 1941 General.-Traffic volume normal for Sunday. Receiving conditions were fair but bulk of traffic derived from the major shore circuits. Solution of new call system progressing satisfactorily but volume of accumulated traffic in new system not yet large enough to permit more than casual identification of individual calls. The number of alternate calls for major commands is increased over last system. So far there are seven alternate calls for the Combined Fleet. Third Fleet traffic is still on a very high level. The combined air Force traffic is also very high with the Commander of the Combined Air Force originating many dispatches. It appears that he is now in Taiwan. Traffic to SAMA and BAKO is on a very high level. Tokyo and The China Fleet Intelligence bureaus are originating periodic dispatches, these from Tokyo being prefixed WIWI. There were several high precedence dispatches from Tokyo with the major fleet commanders as addressees. [139] Communication Intelligence Summary, 3 November 1941 General.-Traffic volume slightly under normal although fair for Monday. Receiving conditions good but all circuits slow. General messages continue to emanate from TOKYO communications. Such an amount is unprecedented and the import is not understood. A mere call change does not account for activities of this nature. The impression is strong that these messages are periodic reports to the Major Commander of a certain nature. Dummy traffic is again being sent in the TOKYO broadcasts. Naval Intelligence TOKYO addressed two WIWI messages to Chief of Staff Combined Fleet and to KUMI 8 (unidentified). Combined Fleet.-Commander in Chief Combined Fleet sent an urgent message to BUMIL information all Major Commanders, Combined Fleet, Naval Intelligence Tokyo, the Chief of Naval General Staff, and Bureau of Personnel. Commander in Chief, Combined Fleet also was associated in traffic with offices in the mandates. principally RNO PALAO. The Commander in Chief, Combined continues to be associated with the Carriers and Submarines. Third Fleet.-Third Fleet traffic continues at a high level. A movement report by RATI 66 (unidentified) was addressed to Commander in Chief Third fleet for information. Air.-A WE address today broke down as "ITIKOUKUU KANTAI". The literal reading of this as "1st Air Fleet" is correct it indicates an entirely new organization of the Naval Air Forces. There are other points which indicate that this may be the case. An old call (YOME7) while never identified seemed to be in a high position with respect to the Carriers and the Air Corps. Upon movement of air units to TAIWAN the association of CarDiv 4 and CarDiv 3 with units of the Combined Air Force was apparent. Their association in a command sense between shore based air and fleet air had never occurred before but under the concept of an AIR FLEET can easily be accepted. Traffic in the Air Force continues at a high level. [140] Communication Intelligence Summary, 4 November 1941 General.-Traffic volume normal with all circuits easily readable. More tactical traffic copied than for past few days. Combined Fleet and Carriers heard on tactical circuits. TOKYO Naval Intelligence sent four messages to Major Commanders. One of these was for information Chief of Staff China Fleet and one other for information of Chief of Staff Second Fleet. Air-High traffic level of air activities continues. Most significant of the air dispatches were some in which various air corps were addressed and BAKO included for information. One from Yokosuka Air was addressed to SANCHOW Island radio for information TAKAO Air Corps. BAKO was also noted as an addressee in several messages from SASEBO and originated two messages to SASEBO and TOKYO. Commander Carriers also addressed a message to two unidentified calls for information of Commander Combined Air Force, Commander in Chief, Combined Fleet, CarDiv Collective, BAKO and others. The Commander Combined Air Force addressed a messaged to Commander in Chief Third Fleet. Mandates.-The RNO PALAO was active today, being addressed by Commander in Chief, Fourth Fleet and sent several messages to TOKYO and YOKOSUKA. The PALOA weather station sent a long code message addressed to nearly all the islands of the Mandates. MARCUS island appears as an originator. No change in the location of Fourth Fleet units noted. Submarines.-No activity noted. Page 64 [141] Communication Intelligence Summary, 5 November 1941 General.-Traffic volume above normal. All circuits heard and receiving conditions were fair to good. TOKYO very active as an originator, sending out many messages of general address. Two WIWI messages in Kana Code sent by NGS to Chief of Staff CarDivs and TIYA 44 (unidentified) respectively. The Intelligence Offices of China Fleet and TOKYO continue active with many dispatches passing between the two. Third Fleet.-Two units of the Third Fleet appear today in TAKAO area. Since these calls are as yet unidentified (RISI4 and YOA2) it is not known how much of this fleet they represent. It is fairly certain that the Commander in Chief, Third Fleet has not yet left the Sasebo area although it is expected that he will before long. One message which may be a movement report from him was received late on the 5th. The present state of call recovery on the Third Fleet does not permit of an estimate of the movement involved. A unit of the First Fleet, identified today as CARDIV 4 appeared today at BAKO. This Carrier Division was addressed as "less FUTA SHOTAI" (2nd Section?) Whether or not these are other units at BAKO is not known. The Commander CARDIVS has been associated with SAMA and BAKO in several dispatches today. The following were also associated, SANCHOW ISLAND, TAKAO AIRCORPS, CANTON (China) and YOKOHAMA Air. The RNO TAIHOKU originated many dispatches to TOKYO and the French Indo China Forces. A TAIWAN originator sent one to Lieut. Comdr. SHIBA at the Embassy THAILAND for information to HANOI and the Commander French Indo China Forces. BAKO originated numerous dispatches to the Empire and to the Major Fleet Commanders. The South China Fleet was also the recipient of many dispatches from TOKYO. Despite the uncertainty due to the Change of Calls it is believed that there is now being effected a concentration of naval forces in the BAKO area which will comprise the Third Fleet as organized in SASEBO for the past month and will be augmented by heavy air forces and Combined Fleet units to an unknown extent. [142] Communication Intelligence Summary, 6 November, 1941 General.-Traffic volume slightly above normal. Receiving conditions were fair, regular strong but heavy static on night watches interfered somewhat. Today the specific call-up on the Tokyo broadcast was eliminated. Formerly Tokyo radio called the unit concerned when the dispatch was addressed to a member of that unit. Beginning yesterday afternoon all broadcast messages are addressed to a single call without regard to the addressee of the message. The recovery of the radio organization will be hampered by this new advance in Communication Security. Moreover there were nine messages today on this broadcast from which the address and originator were missing. This may be the start of complete elimination of headings on broadcast circuits. Tokyo addressed a WIWI message to the Chiefs of Staff of the Combined Fleet and Submarine Force. Takao-Bako Area.-It is now certain that there is a very heavy air concentration on Taiwan. This comprises practically the entire Combined Air Force including the Commander and his staff plus at least one carrier division and an unknown amount of the fleet air arm. No additional units of the Third Fleet were located there today but it is believed that CinC Third Fleet is now en route BAKO from SASEBO. From traffic association it is believed that some Second Fleet units are in Takao area but this has not yet been proven. The South China Fleet Command has been active in dispatches to Taiwan addresses. Combined Fleet.-A large amount of Combined Fleet traffic is now appearing with secret (tactical) calls in use. Mandates.-The Mandates traffic has dropped off somewhat. The Sixth Defense Force at Truk and the RNO PALOA continue to be the most active units. [143] Communication Intelligence Summary, 7 November, 1941 General.-Volume of intercepted traffic larger than usual. Due to the use of the general call "All Major Force Flags" on the UTU for delivery to all Combined Fleet units, affiliation of unidentified calls with forces to which at- Page 65 tached is very difficult. Use of large number of alternate calls for major fleet forces, many of which have not yet been definitely identified or associated with known calls, renders the picture more confusing. Appearance of the prefix "JITSU" (authenticator for bona fide traffic) in several messages indicates that a communication drill is being held but without indication as to what units are participating and therefore much of the traffic is suspected of being "drill." Jaluit Radio is handling traffic direct with Yokosuka Radio probably due to congestion of Mandate circuits from the Marshalls caused by heavy concentrations in that area. Air.-Continued high traffic level for all classes of air activities, mainly centered in the Taiwan area, but also with all air activities in the Mandates included in headings of messages. Dispatches originated by Fourth Fleet Command included Air Forces, Base Forces, Air Stations, and all types of Mandate activities in long headings. Fleet.-Fourth Fleet Command remains in Truk area. There are indications that portions of the First Fleet may be moving to the Takao area but identifications are not sufficiently certain to confirm this. Greatest effort is being made to increase the number of identified calls to facilitate analysis of the traffic but Orange changes in methods of handling fleet traffic renders this more difficult than had been hoped. [144] Communication Intelligence Summary, 8 November 1941 General.-Normal volume of intercepted traffic with no "dummies" appearing on the UTU. All UTU traffic was broadcast to the general call only. The Staff Communication Officer of the French Indo-China Force (So. Exp. For.) sent a dispatch *action* to S. C. O. Combined INFO. S. C. O. Second Fleet, Combined Air Force, unidentified fleet unit, Radio stations at Tokyo, Palao and Takao. This may indicate a contemplated coordination of communications between the Indo-China-South China areas and the Palao Island-Taiwan area. Secret calls were used very little as compared to the past few days and only three circuits were heard using them, including the Combined Fleet Commanders circuit and Air Station Net. North Japan-Ominato circuits were quiet. All mandate circuits were active, with heavy interchange of traffic involving all classes of Mandate addressees in all areas, but with continued emphasis on the Palao area at one end d the Jaluit-Marshall area on the other. Chichijima Air Station was included much of the traffic between Empire Offices and Saipan Air with Jaluit Base Force included for information. Inclusion of Chichijima usually presages an air movement between Mandates and Empire but the Units involved are unidentified. Commander of unidentified shore activity (NEO 66) previously associated with the Fifth Fleet, was addressed at Chichijima Air which tentatively identifies him an air activity. Previous association of the Fifth Fleet traffic with Fourth Fleet and Yokosuka tends to confirm the belief that Fifth Fleet operations are, or will be, in the area adjacent to Chichijima-Marcus, supplementing the Fourth Fleet in the lower island areas. Fleet.-Chief of staff First Fleet originated a dispatch through Kure Radio. Batdiv Three of the First Fleet appears to be operating separately from the main force, possibly in connection with Cardivs Three and Four in the Taiwan-Naha ea. An apparent movement report from Cardiv Four was addressed to CinC Combined Fleet, First Fleet, CarDiv Commander, Combined Air Force Commander d to movement offices at Tokyo, Yokosuka, Kure, Maizuru, and Sasebo. Traffic from the Commander Indo- China Force is handled from the Japanese radio station Saigon rather than from the KASHII, indicating that the staff is based ashore present. No identifiable submarine activity was noted. Air.-Takao and Mandates continue to be the center of air activities. The area between Chichijima, Naha, Takao, Palao and Jaluit appears to-be particularly concerned with movement of air forces and auxiliaries, while the formation of force under Combined Air Commander in the Takao- Bako area appears to be nearly completed as indicated by reports addressed to CinC. Combined, Naval Minister, Commanders of CarDivs, Combined Air Force, First [145] Fleet and shore addresses generally associated with movements or organization changes. This force is believed to include CarDiv Four, and possibly CarDiv Three, with a number of auxiliaries and units of the Combined Air Force, also possibly some its from the First Fleet. Lack of identification renders composition of the force highly speculative and area of operations obscure. Prior to change of calls, much traffic was exchanged between China, South China and Indo-China while at present most traffic includes Palao. Page 66 [146] Communication Intelligence Summary, 9 November, 1941 General. Traffic volume heavy for Sunday. Receiving conditions fair but heavy static caused numerous garbles and fragmentary messages. Navy Minister sent several messages of general address including one to all First and Second Class Naval Stations. Practically all of the general messages carried SAMA as an information address. Carrier Division Three arrived at Takao and there are indications that Carrier Division Four will return to Sasebo from Takao. The Flagship of Carrier Divisions is AKAGI and is in Sasebo area. Some tactical traffic today shows units of Combined Fleet still operating. The associations of Batdiv Three and Mandate addresses, especially Saipan may indicate operations of that unit in the Mariannas. The JINGEI was communicating with SAMA, HAINAN today. The Chief of Staff of the French-Indo China Force is in Tokyo. One message today addressed to CinC. Combined Fleet was routed to MAIZURU for delivery but this is believed a communication error. The Third Fleet appears to be still in Sasebo area but it was noted that considerable traffic passed between Hainan, Taiwan addresses and the Third Fleet. The Fifth Fleet is still being organized with no indications yet that it has assembled. The Eighteenth Air Corps at Saipan originated much traffic to Yokosuka Air Corps. [147] Communication Intelligence Summary, 10 November, 1941 General.-Traffic volume normal, receiving conditions good. There were fewer general messages sent today than for the past few weeks. Tokyo Intelligence still active and addressing dispatches to all Major Commanders. The Mandates construction traffic has decreased considerably. Call recovery is progressing but has been slowed down by the general call-up used on Fleet broadcast. Combined Fleet.-Believed to be mostly in Kure area. A staff officer of Batdiv Three was addressed there today and it is likely that this whole division is there also. The CinC. Second Fleet was located at Kure today as well as two cruiser divisions. Third Fleet.-The greater portions of this fleet still in Sasebo area. Several movement reports have been noted by units of this fleet but none have been noted other than individual ships. At least two units of this fleet still at Takao. CinC Three originated one movement report for information of CinC Fourth Fleet. Fourth Fleet.-Little activity. CinC. Fourth remains in vicinity of Truk with major portion of his command. The Staff Communication Officer of Submarine force sent a message to the CinC Fourth for information of Jaluit. Fifth Fleet.-One unit of this fleet located at Chichijima. Air.-The Combined Air Force Command is still talking to Sama and the South China Fleet. From one address it appears that the Commander of Carrier Division Three is with the Combined Fleet. Several units of the Carrier Divisions are in port at Kure and Sasebo. CinC Combined Air Force is still in Takao. [148] Communication Intelligence Summary, 12 November 1941 General.-Traffic volume normal for past two days with receiving condition about average. The general character of the traffic has been administrative With most of it being between shore logistic and technical activities. The D. F. net was active today with very little activity shown yesterday. Intercept operators have commented adversely on the major shore network which comprises all of the major naval activities in the EMPIRE. Traffic has been moving slowly over this circuit. The reason is the non-cooperation of the operators and the definite lack of control exercised by TOKYO radio stations. TOKYO Intelligence is still sending messages to the major commands but the remainder of TOKYO traffic has been mostly from the technical bureaus. Combined Fleet.-The Fleets remain relatively inactive in the KURE area The association of BATDIV 3 with the Fourth Fleet and several Mandates stations is born out by a D. F. position on the flagship of BATDIV 3 which places him about halfway between CHICHIJIMA and MARCUS Island. Their position was obtained on the 4th when this unit was not yet identified. No subsequent bearings have been obtained. Also associated with this BATDIV are a Submarine Squadron and possibly CARDIV 4 although the association of this CARDIV (Lately returned from TAKAO) is not positive. The Third Fleet remains at SASEBO with the only activity exhibited in the Base Forces. Page 67 Air.-CARDIV 3 returned to KURE from TAKAO as reported by CAVITE. Most of air activity confined to dispatches between carrier and shore establishments. Fifth Fleet.-Nothing to report. Fourth Fleet.-The Defense Forces of the Mandates fairly active. The volume of construction traffic has definitely fallen off. The Commander Submarine Force is still adding JALUIT and today COMSUBRON 2 addressed a message there. AIRRON 24 sent a movement report but no indication of the direction. Communication exercises were held by JALUIT and several stations in that area. YOKOHAMA Air Corps was addressed at RUOTTO. China.-The previous activity of SAMA and the French Indo China Forces and bases continues. [149] Communication Intelligence Summary, 13 November 1941. General.-Traffic volume normal with receiving conditions good. Several messages of high precedence intercepted, some of them are: 1. UNIWIWI dispatch in five numeral from TOKYO Intelligence to Chief of Staff Combined-Air Force, INFO RNO TAIHOKU, BAKO Naval Station. 2. WIWI from N. G. S. to MAIZURU INFO Chief of Staff Fourth Fleet. 3. NIKAWIWI from N. G. S. to Commander in Chief Combined Fleet INFO Commander in Chief South China Fleet, Commander Third Fleet and SAMA, HAINAN. 4. UNIWIWI from N. G. S. to Secretary First Fleet. 5. (2 messages) WIWI to same address as 3 above. 6. A 3 part NIKAWIWI from N. G. S. to Commander in Chief Combined Fleet, INFO Commander in Chief French Indo China Fleet. 7. One UNI message from Commander in Chief China Fleet to SAMA, INFO Commander in Chief Third Fleet and Commander in Chief Combined Fleet. This is the only occurrence in some time of anyone save the TOKYO intelligence activity using the WIWI prefix. Both TOKYO and the China Fleet Intelligence Bureau were active all day with dispatches to the Major Commanders. The direction finder net was again active all day with CHINKAI, ORU 7 (near CHINKAI), JALUIT, SAIPAN, and TAIWAN sending in bearing reports. Combined Fleet.-The activity of BATDIV 3 is not clear. The flagship is operating and was located by D. F. as reported yesterday. The Commander of BATDIV 3 is located in YOKOSUKA. The Division Communication Officer is communicating with TRUK, SAIPAN and PALAO. The other ships in this division remain unlocated but it is assumed, lacking evidence to the contrary, that they are with the flagship. Other units of First Fleet seem inactive. One Cruiser Division of Second Fleet is associated in traffic with PALAO and may be in that area. Third Fleet.-Still located in SASEBO, the Commander in Chief has been active in the traffic, being addressed by both TOKYO and Commander in Chief Combined Fleet. The First BASE FORCE Commander originated several messages but no indication of change of location. Fourth Fleet.-The Commander in Chief Fourth Fleet is in communication with he Sixth BASEFORCE JALUIT. Several message were exchanged. He appears o be preparing for a move from TRUK but no movement has yet occurred. SUBRON 2 is again in communication with JALUIT and today originated a movement report, but no indication of direction. [156] Air.-Carriers remain relatively inactive. The SETTSU is still with them and a few may be engaged in target practice near KURE. The Combined AIRFORCE is still mostly located in TAIWAN and the usual high traffic level between its component Air Corps still exists. China.-The Commander in Chief China Fleet was addressed in one of the RNO TAIHOKU. His Chief of Staff is still in SHANGHAI. [151] Communication Intelligence Summary, 14 November 1941 General.-Traffic volume a little under normal due to poor to fair receiving conditions throughout the day. The Naval Ministry originated several AlNav dispatches. There were three WIWI messages originated today. 1. UNIWIWI from N. G. S. and BUMIL to Chief of Staff Fourth Fleet information Chief of Staff Combined Fleet and YOKOSUKA. Page 68 2. WIWI from N. G. S. and BUMIL to Chief of Staff Combined Fleet, Chief of Staff Third Fleet, YOKOSUKA and SASEBO. 3. UNIWIWI from N. G. S. to ANI758 (Chief of Staff of an unidentified unit), Information Chief of Staff Combined Fleet and Chief of Staff Combined Air Force. Direction Finder Net active with SASEBO station sending in bearings in addition to the others. Tactical circuits heard during day with a fair amount of activity. Combined Fleet.-Little activity noted. The flagship of BatDiv Three is still operating but no further information on this division. Two Combined Fleet units appear active in the traffic. They are DesRon Three (normally in First Fleet but has been operating with Second Fleet) and CruDiv Seven of Second Fleet. Both of these units have been associated in traffic with the South China Fleet and the French Indo China Force. They may proceed to the South China area in near future. Third Fleet.-Still in Sasebo area. The CinC. has been addressed by Tokyo to a great extent and is still associated with South China activities in traffic. It has been noted that the association between the Third Fleet and units of the Combined Air Force is growing. Especially the Second Base Force has been talking with several Air Corps among whom is the Kure Air Corps. Will air units be embarked in ships of the Base Force? Fourth Fleet.-No movement yet from the TRUK area. It appears that the Fourth Fleet Staff is fairly well split up. Various officers of the staff were addressed at Tokyo and at unidentified locations. Submarines.-No particular activity. One unit evidently enroute PALAO and Submarine Squadron Two (now in Kure area) still being addressed by Tokyo and Yokosuka originators. Air.-One Air Squadron of the Combined Air Force is at HOIHOW, HAINAN. The Commander of the Air Force is still at TAKAO with a good representation of his command. The Carriers remain in home waters with most of them in port. [152] Communication Intelligence Summary, 15 November 1941 General.-Traffic volume normal, with a number of general address messages originated by Communication Division, Tokyo, to Radio Officers, Ominato, U. E. 9 (D. F. Station in Marshalls), Jaluit, Palao, Truk, Saipan, Takao and Sama Radios, Staff Communication Officers All Major Flagships, Staff Communication Officer South Expeditionary Force and two apparent collective shore addresses. Traffic from all stations mentioned except Sama and Ominato to D. F. Control and Plotting Room Tokyo information to Staff Communication Officer Combined Fleet was exchanged. No messages of the D. F. type were detected so it is presumed that the interchange had to do with arrangements for drill or organization of the net. The Minister of the Navy originated one Alnav and one to all Major Commands and collective shore. Tokyo Personnel and Tokyo Communication Division originated several to collective fleet and shore. Significance is not determined though it is believed possible that a further partial change of shore and air calls may be in prospect. The Empire air station net was normally active using tactical calls. Secretary First Fleet I originated one Urgent Code to unidentified (MINI 55), Staff Communication Officer Carrier Division Four (at Sasebo) and Commanding Officer of Batdiv Three flagship. Combined Fleet.-Same as yesterday, same units (Batdiv Three, Desrons One and Three) associated through traffic with South Expeditionary Force. CinC Second Fleet was the most active originator and appeared to be arranging operations of units involving First, Second, Carrier and Air Units. Third Fleet.-Inactive. Fourth Fleet.-Apparent movement of Fourth Fleet units in prospect or underway with continued emphasis on the Marshalls Area. CinC. Fourth traffic still being handled from the Truk area, with Airron Twenty-four (Kamoi) and associated Yokohama and Chitose air units involved in some movement direction undetermined. All Marshall Island activities, including unidentified Army Forces, exchanging traffic freely. Submarine Force.-Little activity detected. It is believed that some submarine activity is operating or preparing to operate in the Marshall area, from communication arrangements underway between Staff Communication Officer Page 69 Submarine Force and same Fourth Fleet, information to Jaluit. Jaluit has been heard working on various frequencies, using tactical calls and procedure associated with submarine operations, but no identifications of calls used have been made. [153] Communication Intelligence Summary, 15 November 1941 Air.-Continued air traffic to and from Takao area, with unidentified Airron formerly YOME 7) including South Expeditionary Force and Sama addressees n traffic. Composition of this force and purpose still speculative but believed o be preparing to move southward to work with the South Expeditionary Force. The large number of alternate calls used by major forces renders analysis of traffic headings very slow and difficult, but identifications and recoveries of alternates are improving as a greater volume of November traffic becomes available for research. [154] Communication Intelligence Summary, 16 November 1941 GENERAL.-Traffic volume approximately normal for week-end period. A new form of dispatch heading appeared in a series of dispatches broadcasted on the regular UTSU series. Only the originator or the address of the dispatch appeared; it is assumed that the other pertinent call or address may be buried n the text. These dispatches were with one exception (in 5 numeral text) all a the nine-Kana period separator system and the single call in the heading fitted in each case Line seven of the call garble table. A dispatch was originated by the Navy Minister addressed to all Major Fleets and general addresses to this effect: "Today the House of Peers and House of Representatives by means of a decision adopted the following resolution transmitted as follows: 1. Resolution of House of Peers-(Expressed deepest thanks and emotion to Army and Navy for their glorious service over a long period to the Empire and expressed condolences, etc., for those fallen in battle. 2. Resolution of House of Representatives-Expressed thanks, etc., to all officers and men of Army, Navy and Air Force for their 4 1/2 years service (in China affair) and for their contribution to the establishment of a permanent world peace. Gave prayers for well being of all hands, etc. ." First and Second Fleets.-Majority of First and Second Fleet Units remain in the general Kure area. The units of these two fleets that have been most active from dispatch heading viewpoint in the last ten days appear to be: Airon Seven (3 Chitose class) Carrier Division Four Destroyer Squadron Seven Destroyer Squadron Three Battleship Division Three Cruiser Division Seven. It is rather singular that the CinC. Second Fleet has assumed an important role in addressing for action several first fleet and other fleet units recently. In some of these dispatches the call identified as Southern Expeditionary Force (Indochina Force) appears. Associations of addresses in several dispatches have shown the Second and Third Fleets with the Combined Air Force and in other dispatches, there appears to be an association between First Fleet, Carrier Divisions and the Mandates. [155] It is apparent that Destroyer Squadron One has been or is operating with the Carrier Divisions and Battleship Division Three while Cruiser Division Seven and Destroyer Squadron Three have been operating together. Iwakuin [sic] Air sent short priority dispatch to the ATAGO, Second Fleet cruiser and submarine units indicating some joint minor exercises in that area. Third Fleet.-Believed inactive in Sasebo-Kure area. Fourth Fleet.-FUATU, a Tokyo address originated one UNI dispatch to an unidentified fleet unit (MEN 33), information to CinC. Combined Fleet, Communication Officer, Fourth Fleet, Saipan Base Force, Kure Movement Officer, CinC. Fifth Fleet, Tokyo Intelligence, and NEO 66, believed to be a shore based air activity in Chichijima-Marcus area. Fifth Fleet.-Prior to the change of calls on 1 November, the composition of the Fifth Fleet was very indefinite but appeared to contain several naval auxiliary type vessels. Since 1 November, little has been recovered of the com- Page 70 position of this mythical fleet but it is definite that some units are operating in the general Yokosuka Chichijima-Marcus. Submarines.-Little activity. Communication Officer, Submarine Force originated one priority dispatch to unidentified address, information to Combined Fleet Communication Officer. Association of Submarine Force and Fourth Fleet Commands continues. [156] Communications Intelligence Summary, 17 November, 1941 General.-Traffic volume normal with receiving conditions good. More traffic with single call heading appeared on the broadcast circuit. These dispatches numbered serially and each call different but all fitting the same line in the call garble table. Since these messages are transmitted each hour on the hour and are of approximately the same length it appears that they are drill messages. It is feared that they constitute a test of straight broadcasting without a heading. Since none of this traffic has been found going in to Tokyo it is probably originated in the Navy Ministry. Very few messages of general address were noted. Tactical circuits in the Mandates were heard during the day with radio Saipan controlling. Combined Fleet.-No movement from the Kure area of any major portion of the First or Second Fleets. The CinC. Second Fleet very active as an originator today. He continues to address units which are most normally under his command. He also addressed the CinC. Third Fleet, Paloa Forces, and the Chief of Staff Fourth Fleet. Third Fleet.-Inactive at Sasebo. The Staff Communication Officer of Third Fleet was addressed by the R. N. O. Paloa. Fourth Fleet.-The greater part of the activity in the Mandate area centered about the Third Base Force at Palao and the Sixth Base Force at Jaluit. Both these activities originated traffic. Air.-The Commander of the Combined Air Force remains in Takao and was addressed frequently by SAMA, HAINAN and was in two instances addressed by the Fourth Fleet. The carriers are mostly in the Kure-Sasebo area with the exception of a few which are operating in the Kyushu area. China.-Sama was again active today with dispatches to the Combined Fleet Staff, Combined Air Force, Third Fleet and Bako. The R. N. O. Taimoku addressed a dispatch to CinC. China, Sanchow Island Sama, Bako, CinC. South China, and Chief of Staff Combined Air Force. [157] Communications Intelligence Summary, 18 November 1941 General.-Traffic volume a little under normal with receiving conditions fair to poor. Tokyo originators active with several messages of general address emanating from the Communication Section. The double originator BUMIL, and N. G. S. sent one NIKAWIWI to the Chief of Staff Combined Fleet for information to all First Class Naval Stations. BUMIL also addressed all urgent dispatch to SAMA, information to R. N. O. TONIC, Chief of Staff South China Fleet and Chief of Staff Combined Fleet. Another Tokyo originator, believed to be N. G. S., sent an urgent message to Chief of Staff Combined Fleet, Chief of Staff French Indo China Force and Chief of Staff Second Fleet. MAIZURU Naval Station also sent an urgent message to Chief of Staff Combined Fleet, Second Fleet, Combined Air Force, French Indo China Force and for information to N. G. S. The Tokyo Direction Finder plotting section sent three long dispatches to the entire Direction Finder Net which was very active today with many bearings reported. The Vice Chief Naval General Staff sent one to Chief of Staff Carrier Divisions and Chief of Staff French Indo China Force. Combined Fleet.-CinC. Combined Fleet very prominent as both an originator and addressee. Since this officer is always included in the address of every important message, he will no longer be mentioned as an addressee unless he is the only addressee. The association between the CinC Second Fleet and the French Indo China Forces and Combined Air Force is very plain. He was addressed by CinC. French Indo China Force today in an urgent NIKA dispatch. Several units of the Combined Air Force also addressed several dispatches to him. Battleship Division Three the Carrier Divisions and two destroyer squadrons have been associated in traffic. Several dispatches occurred today, being addressed by N. G. S. and the Commander Carrier Divisions in several instances. The CinC. Third Fleet also addressed several dispatches Page 71 to him. These form the indication that CinC. Second Fleet will be in command of a large Task Force comprising the Third Fleet, Combined Air Force, some carrier divisions, and Battleship Division Three. No movement from home waters has been noted. Third Fleet.-The Commander Second Base Force originated what appears to be a movement report. He also sent one to R. N. O. TAIHOKU, information to CinC. Third Fleet. There were other units tentatively placed in Third Fleet who sent dispatches in which the Tokyo movement report office was an addressee. It is expected that the Third Fleet will move from the Sasebo area in the near future. This Second Base Force was having quite a bit of traffic with several Air Corps a while ago and may be transporting air units or equipment. Fourth Fleet.-Not much activity in this fleet. The amount of traffic between this fleet and Palao is noticeable with the submarines still interested in Jaluit. [158] Communication Intelligence Summary, 19 November 1941 General.-Traffic volume normal. Traffic from Fourth Fleet and Mandates was noticeably less than usual. Traffic on the northern circuits also very light. Some tactical traffic received from Combined Fleet units. There was been a noticeable increase in the afloat traffic over the normal amount usually seen. Fleet units seem to have a great deal of business with other Fleet units both within and outside of their own organization. Staff Officers are frequently addressed at other than their normal locations. The activity at Tokyo has subsided somewhat in that there were fewer general messages than for the past few days. Tokyo Intelligence sent out several messages addressed to Second Fleet, Submarine Force and Carrier Divisions. One was sent to SAMA for information to French Indo China Forces and South China Fleet. The Navy Minister sent out two AlNavs. The Direction Finder net is still active with all stations sending in reports and Tokyo plotting station making reports to major commanders. Combined Fleet.-The flagship of Battleship Division Three appears today at Sasebo, its southern jaunt apparently having been completed. Destroyer Squadron Four and Two appear associated with the Third Fleet. CinC Second Fleet continues his activity, being still associated with Combined Air Force, French Indo China Force, Third Fleet, and today with Carrier Division Three. Carrier Division Three was in Takao and returned to the Empire a week ago and has been associated with Third Fleet since. A Bako activity addressed the Chief of Staff Second Fleet, Third Fleet and Combined Air Force. The Chief of Staff Second Fleet addressed an urgent dispatch to CinC. French Indo China Fleet information to Third Fleet and Commander Cruiser Division Five. Third Fleet.-Active as noted above. Several more units of this fleet and of the Base Forces originated movement reports but no indication of direction. CinC. Third Fleet is still in Sasebo. Fourth Fleet.-Activity in Mandates still centers about the Third Base Defense Force at Palao. Traffic between this force, Tokyo and the Second Fleet was considerable. One call (SITI 4) appeals at Jaluit today. This call has been identified as Carrier Division Four and if the one message is correct it appears that this Carrier Division (ZUIKAKU) is in the Jaluit area. This is *not* confirmed as no other indications have been found and its presence at Jaluit is doubted, attributing the message to be a communication error. Fifth Fleet.-Flagship located at Yokosuka. The CinC. Fifth Fleet appeared in a few dispatches from Tokyo but no other activity seen. [159] Communication Intelligence Summary. 20-21 November 1941 General.-Traffic volume for past two days has been higher than normal. Tokyo originators active with messages addressed to all major commanders. N. G. S. sent a UNI WIWI to Commandant BAKO for information to Chief of Staff South China Fleet and Canton. The Personnel Bureau at Tokyo become very active on the 21st sending out a series of long personnel messages. The activity at Tokyo identified as R. D. F. plotting stations increased his recent high volume of messages with a long four part message addressed to all major commanders. He also addressed several dispatches to the Direction Finder net, indicating the employment and results being obtained by this activity. The traffic load on the Tokyo-Takao circuit was very heavy on the 21st, so heavy that be circuit was in duplex operation most of the mid-watch. Page 72 Combined Fleet.-Flags of both First and Second Fleets are in Kure area and most of both fleets remain in Kure-Sasebo area. Battleship Division Three still in Yokosuka area. Traffic to and from the CinC. Second Fleet continues abnormally high. A list of units addressed by him or who sent traffic to him and CinC. Third Fleet over the past two days follows: MIRA 9 (Carrier Division Three) ENO 7 (Unidentified) TAE 1 (Airron 7) AKU 8 (Air Unit) KAME 5 (Airron 6) KUSU 7 (Unidentified) YAWI (Crudiv 5) SATU 88 (Unidentified) KENU 3 (Crudiv 7) KUNI 88 (Unidentified) RESE 4 (Desron 3) OYU 9 (Unidentified) AKI 0 (Desron 4) KONA 0 (Unidentified) TIYA 7 (Comdr. 1st Base For) NOTU 6 (Unidentified) SASE 3 (Comdr. 2nd Base For) NETE 5 (Unidentified) YOMO 9 (Desron 5) NSI 3 (Unidentified) REA 2 (Shiogama Air Corps) SUTE 1 (Unidentified) KUNO 9 (Erimo) YAYU 1 (Unidentified) MIMO 3 (Air Unit ?) MARE 5 (Unidentified) TUE 7 (Unidentified) Plus 11 Marus. This list is not the complete estimate of forces being assembled by him but only the ones occurring in the past two days. Each one appeared not only with the CinC. Second Fleet but with the Third Fleet and with one of the units now in South China or Taiwan-South China Address. A complete list is being made up but was not finished at this writing. Assuming that the entire Second Fleet will be included in this organization and that each unit addressed will either participate or contribute somewhat to the Task Force it appears that it will comprise a good portion of the navy. One item stands out-so far there has been practically no submarine units mentioned by the Second or Third Fleets in connection with South China activities. Commander Submarine Force has not been included in traffic. He does appear in Tokyo Fourth Fleet and Mandates traffic. [160] Communication Intelligence Summary, 20-21 November 1941 Mandates and Fourth Fleet.-The R. N. O. Palao and Palao radio stations have remained active with the Fourth Fleet and 5 Yokosuka for days. This is taken to indicate a coming concentration of forces in Palao which would include the Fourth Fleet and some of the Second Fleet who has also been active with the R. N. O. Since the activity of the Second Fleet Commander has been so great it may be that he will assign some non- Second Fleet units to that area but just which ones is not yet known. From information from radio sources there is no indication of any concentration now at Palao beyond the Third Base Force which is based there. There has been no traffic for other fleet units routed there and the Maru traffic to Palao is far less than the normal flow to that area. With the arrival of Siti 4 (yesterday reported as either a carrier unit or submarine unit and now identified as a submarine squadron of the Submarine Fleet) the concentration of naval forces in the Marshalls is far greater than that existing at Palao. [161] Communication Intelligence Summary, 22 November, 1941 General.-Traffic volume somewhat greater than normal. Only one tactical circuit heard today, indicating that Combined Fleet tactical exercises are now completed. The Navy Minister originated several AlNavs and sent two other messages, one to CinC, Fourth Fleet and one to Yokosuka and Commander Submarine Squadron Five. Tokyo Intelligence sent out the usual long messages to CinC Combined Fleet, CinC Second Fleet and CinC Third Fleet. BuMil addressed Fourth Fleet, Truk, Pagan Civil Engineering Section At Peleliu and Yokosuka Another unidentified Tokyo originator sent a priority message to all major flags and China Fleet, information to ANOS at Taihoku and Palao. Sasebo addressed one to Chief of Staff French Indo China Force, information Chief of Staff Second Fleet, Bako, Sama, Chief of Staff South China, Chief of Staff Third Fleet, commander Cruiser Division Seven and Commander Destroyer Squadron Three Cruiser Division Seven and Destroyer Squadron Three to South China Area soon While the Direction Finder Net is still active, the station at Palao sent in more bearings than usual for that station. Page 73 Combined Fleet.-CinC. Combined originated only one dispatch to two unidentified calls, one a Maru, for information to CinC. Third Fleet. CinC Second Fleet was again prolific with many messages addressed to Third Fleet and Combined Air Force. The amount of traffic interchanged between these three commanders was very great. One message addressed many units as follows: CinC. Second Fleet. To: NETE 5 (Crudiv?), KOO 2 (Subrons 5) TIYU 66 (CinC. Third Fleet), SUYO 44 (CinC. Comb. Air Force), MIRA 9 (Cardiv 3) RESE 4 (Desron 3), KORE 4 (Second Fleet) (Collective), less Crudiv 8 and unidentified 2nd Fleet unit), SUTI 2 (BatDiv 3) (at Kure and Sasebo), Airron 7 (at Kure), SUTI 1 (?) (at Kure), SATU 8 (?) (at Kure), META 0 (AKASHI) (at KURE) META 2 (ASAHI MARU), TUFU 2 (?), NARI 33 CinC. China Fleet), KAKE 66 (CinC. South China Fleet), MISI 66 (CinC. Comb. Fleet). Third Fleet.-CinC. Third Fleet received a dispatch from "RIKUGUN SANBOUTEU MAEDATI SEUZEU (at Tainoku). This is translated as "Army Chief of Staff General MAEDATI and indicates the linking of the Taiwan Army Forces with Third Fleet. The CinC. Third Fleet continues his association with Combined Air Forces. Fourth Fleet.-CinC Fourth Fleet was mostly occupied with the Sixth Base Force at Jaluit and AirRon 24 now in Jaluit area. The Third Base Force at Palao and the RNO Palao are still addressing the CinC Fourth and Yokosuka. He also received one from Commander Submarine Force. China.-The Commander French Indo China Force sent one message to CinC. Combined Fleet for information to CinC. Second Fleet. Bako sent one to Secretary Fourth Fleet and Secretary Submarine Fleet, Secretary Carrier Divisions, Secretary Fifth Fleet, Sama and French Indo China Fleet. [162] Communication Intelligence Summary, 23 November 1941 General.-Traffic volume normal. High precedence traffic has increased. Some of the high precedence dispatch headings are listed: 1. MAYURU (Tokyo address) to HORONO MUSEKU (Collective Shore Information Chiefs of Staff Combined, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, and Southern Expeditionary Force. Precedence NIKA-WIWI 2. Third Fleet Chief of Staff to Second Fleet Chief of Staff Information Combined and Southern Expeditionary Force Chief of Staff. NIKA 3. KESANA EONO (Tokyo) to Chiefs of Staff Third Fleet and Southern Expeditionary Force. Information "SANKUYUTI" at Sama Hainan. WIWI 4. SUIFITE 1 (Unidentified Fleet unit) to Radio Takao, Hainan, Flagship NWA 2, Information Tadio Tokyo and Second Fleet flagship. NIKA 5. Imakuni [sic] Air to Iwakuni Air Detachment at NAHA Information Kure, Bako, and MINO 3 in Takao. KIU Personnel Tokyo also originated several priority dispatches to First Fleet Third Fleet, and others. The following WE address was followed by Sasebo Radio in the delivery of a personnel Bureau dispatch "SAHOTI.RENGO.RI.SI." An unidentified fleet unit (SUTE 1) listed recently in Kure appeared on radio circuit with Takao Radio. Also on this circuit were the following: KENU 3-CruDiv 7 Flagship? HOWI 2-Fleet unit associated with Second Fleet. EKE 8-Fleet unit associated with Second Fleet. MUSE 5-Naval Auxiliary associated with Second Fleet. The above units received delivery of the long NIKA dispatch originated by CinC Second Fleet on the 21st of November and which appeared to outline the forces expected to operate in the Indo-China general area. Combined Fleet.-CinC Combined was included, as always, in all exchange of fleet commander traffic, but no important messages originated by him were inter- Page 74 cepted. First Fleet was very quiet. Second Fleet messages mentioned in summaries of 22nd were still being circulated but Third Fleet appeared as the most active unit in today's traffic. Indications are that Third Fleet units are underway [163] in a movement coordinated with the Second Fleet, Combined Air Force and French Indo China Force. Commander French Indo China Force (So. Exp. For.) was included in all important traffic from Second, Third and Combined Air Commanders, Hainan addressees were included in nearly all high precedence messages concerning these forces and may indicate a rendezvous of forces in that area. Palao appeared as an information addressee on a portion of the traffic. Fourth Fleet activity involved Palao area on one end and Marshalls on the other. With no means of substantiating the impression, it is believed that more submarines are operating in, or from, the Marshalls than it has been possible to definitely place from radio interceptions. It is recalled that there was an exchange between Staff Communication Officers of the Submarine Force and Fourth Fleet with Jaluit included as either action or information around November 1st and that Jaluit opened a direct circuit to Yokosuka early this month, apparently to relieve traffic congestion from that area. Jaluit Radio has been heard on various frequencies using and working with units using tactical or secret type calls, while the main submarine frequency of 6385/12770 has been relatively inactive. Air.-Combined Air Traffic remains associated with Taiwan area, while the Mandate Air units continue high level of activity, covering the whole Mandate area. Carrier Divisions were relatively quiet, but with Carrier Division Three definitely associated with Second Fleet operations. China-CinC. China and South China not included with the Second, Third Air Force and Southern Expeditionary Force traffic and were quiet. Bearings from Cavite and Guam place CinC. South China east of Taiwan, but this is believed questionable. Nothing was seen to contradict impressions gathered during the past few days and summarized previously, that movement of forces is either imminent or actually underway, at least in part, to the southward, with covering forces operating from the Mandates, and possibility of a striking force assembled or gathering in the Palao area. [164] Communication Intelligence Summary, 24 November, 1941 General.-Traffic volume normal. High precedence traffic above normal. Traffic analysis impresses are unchanged from yesterday's report. The difficulties of identifications have prevented more definite information of vessels (and fleets to which attached) that appear to be moving south from Kure-Sasebo area. If the poor reception prevailing here the last two days can be disregarded and the assumption made that Radio Heeia intercepted their "share" of the total traffic, the following impressions are worth something: (a) The falling off of traffic to China addresses. (b) The increased activity among third fleet addresses with a high percentage of what appeals to be movement reports. (c) The above normal activity in the Mandates both ashore and afloat addresses. The association of Second Fleet, Third Fleet and Southern Expeditionary Force continues as usual. Palao and Jaluit appear prominently in dispatch traffic, the Second Fleet Commander with the former, and the Submarine Force Commander with the latter. First and Second Fleets.-Very little activity in First Fleet. The radio call believed to represent the flagship of Cruiser Division Seven originated a dispatch to Commander Cruiser Division Seven, CinC. Second Fleet, Commander Southern Expeditionary Force, and Radio Sama, Takao, Sasebo, and Tokyo. The CinC. Second Fleet continues to appear as the Task Force Commander of a large number of units from First and Second Fleet plus Carrier Division Three and Combined Air Force units. Third Fleet.-Large number of dispatches involving Third Fleet units, some of which appear to be movement reports. The fact that CinC Third Fleet appears as information addressee on many dispatches to and from Second Fleet units indicates that these two fleets will be closely associated in any future operations. Yesterday, a large number of dispatches associating Carrier Division Three with Cinc. Third Fleet. Fourth Fleet and Mandates.-Fourth Fleet appears to be concentrated in Truk area since all of the recent definite reports from Fourth Fleet vessels have come from Truk. Air Squadron Twenty-four and perhaps a large number of submarines from the Submarine Force are in the Marshall Area. Page 75 Submarines.-Comparatively little activity. China.-Comparatively quiet. Carriers.-No definite indications of location. Combined Air Force.-Commander Kanoya Air appears in the Takao area. Otherwise no change. [165] Communication Intelligence Summary, 25 November, 1941 General.-Traffic volume normal. Receiving conditions much improved over last two days. Tokyo personnel bureau active with messages to various units. Tokyo originated one UNI WIWI to CinC. Combined Fleet, CinC. Second Fleet CinC. Third Fleet, CinC. Fourth Fleet and CinC. French, Indo China Force plus Yokosuka, Kure and Maizuru. The Navy Minister originated several AlNavs. A Direction Finder Net, controlled by Tokyo radio was active with secret calls being sent by the five stations. The entire fleet traffic level is still high which leads to the conclusion that organizational arrangements or other preparations are not yet complete. Combined Fleet.-Little activity by CinC. First Fleet. CinC. Second Fleet remains highly active as an originator, addressing Third Fleet, Air Forces and South China units. A Second Fleet unit and a submarine division or squadron arrived in Takao communication zone today. Crudivision Seven which previously arrived there has been associated with Destroyer Squadron Three which indicates the presence of that unit in Takao vicinity. Palao and Second Fleet still exchanging messages. Two new units to be associated with CinC Second Fleet and the Task Force now forming are the North China Fleet and Defense Division One. Air.-Through the identification of a call made today Genzan Air Corps has been in Saigon since the eighteenth. We believe that other units of the Combined Air Force have moved from Taiwan to the French Indo China Area although this is not yet verified. One or more of the Carrier Divisions are present in the Mandates. Fourth Fleet.-CinC. Fourth Fleet is still holding extensive communications with the Commander Submarine Fleet, the forces at Jaluit and Commander Carriers. His other communications are with the Third, Fourth and Fifth Base Forces. [166] Communications Intelligence Summary, 26 November 1941 General.-Traffic volume normal. All circuits heard well except for Tokyo-Takao circuit which faded early. Traffic picture about the same as for the past week. Intra-fleet traffic still very heavy and Tokyo Bureaus still dispatching AlNavs. The Tokyo Intelligence and Direction Finder plotting units addressed a succession of urgent dispatches to the major commands and to the CinC. Second and Third Fleets in particular. The only MAM schedule was NR15 which was first broadcast on the twenty- fifth. Takao and Bako originated more traffic today than usual, it was addressed to Third Fleet mostly but the CinC. Second Fleet and the China Fleets came in for their share. Tokyo radio is working the ISIZU (flagship South China) SAMA and CAMRANH Bay radio stations directly Takao is also working ITSUBA (Spratleys). Combined Fleet.-Cruiser Division Seven today began receiving traffic via SAMA, indicating the arrival of that unit in HAINAN waters. While no indications were seen that Destroyer Squadron Three also arrived it is probable that this unit is still in company with Cruiser Division Seven and is also present at Hainan. The Takao, former flagship of the Second Fleet became active in the traffic today being associated with the Second and Third Fleets. The tanker HAYATOMO appeared in several of CinC. Second Fleet's dispatches today as well as the SOYO MARU. No movement is evident yet of any of the flags of the newly formed force. The traffic between Second, Third, Fourth Fleets and the Combined Air Force still continues at its high level. Fourth Fleet.-No change in Truk location. CinC. held extensive communication with Saipan forces as well as Palao forces. The KATORI and CinC. Submarine Fleet appear to be at or near Chichijima. Fifth Fleet.-The CinC. Fifth Fleet was included in some of the dispatches of the Second Fleet and is associated with the new Task Force. Submarines.-As noted above Commander Submarine Force is in Chichijima area. The Submarine Squadron NETE5's location is somewhat uncertain today due to one dispatch being routed to MAIZURU. The routing of this dispatch is doubted because of the indication of her arrival at Takao yesterday and her previous association with Cruiser Division Seven. Page 76 China.-Two Marus of the Third Fleet left Bako for Sama today. Third Fleet.-Active as above but no indication of large scale movement from the Sasebo area. [167] Communication Intelligence Summary, 27 November 1941 General.-Traffic volume a little below normal due to poor signals on the frequencies above 7000 kcs. Tokyo-Takao circuit unreadable on mid-watch. Some tactical traffic intercepted from carriers. Bako, Sama, and Saigon active as originators, addressing traffic to each other and to the Chiefs of Staff of Second, Third Fleets and Combined Air Force. Bako addressed the Chief of Staff Third Fleet information Destroyer Squadrons Four and Five and Chief of Staff Second Fleet. The main Tokyo originator today was the Intelligence activity who sent five dispatches to the major commanders. The Direction Finder activity was very high with all stations sending in bearings including the Marshall Islands Stations which has been silent for the past four days. COMBINED FLEET.-No further information as to whether or not Destroyer Squadron Three is in Hainan area but is believed to be still with Cruiser Division Seven in that area. There is still no evidence of any further movement from the Kure-Sasebo area. The Chief of Staff Combined Fleet originated several messages of general address. He has been fairly inactive as an originator lately. CinC. Second Fleet originated many messages to Third Fleet, Combined Air Force and Bako. THIRD FLEET.-Still holding extensive communication with Baka, Sama South China Fleet and French Indo China Force. The use of WE addresses is increasing, those occurring today were: "DAIHATIFUTABUTAISANBOTEU" (in Taihoku) "KOROKUKITISIKI" "KIZUKEYAMASITABUTAI" (in care of RYUJO) "HEIZEUKAIGUNDAIGONREUSEU" There is nothing to indicate any movement of the Third Fleet as yet. FOURTH FLEET.-CinC. Fourth Fleet frequently addressed dispatches to the defense forces in the Mandates. Jaluit addressed messages to the Commander Submarine Force and several submarine units. The Saipan Air Corps held communication with Jaluit and CinC. Fourth Fleet. The Civil Engineering Units at IMIEJI and ENIWETOK were heard from after being silent for weeks. Chitose Air Corps is in Saipan and Air Squadron Twenty-four is still operating in the Marshalls. No further information on the presence of Carrier Division Five in the Mandates. AIR.-An air unit in the Takao area addressed a dispatch to the KORYU and SHOKAKU. Carriers are still located in home waters. No information of further movement of any Combined Air Force units to Hainan. SUBMARINES.-Commander Submarine Force still in Chichijima Area. [168] Communication Intelligence Summary, November 28, 1941 General.-Traffic volume normal. Communications to and from South China and between Mandates and Empire very heavy. No tactical traffic seen. As has been previous]y reported the suspected Radio Intelligence net is very active and is becoming more so. The TOKYO plotting activity addressed more messages to the Radio net than previously and most of these sent for information to the Major Commanders. Much traffic also was directed to NRE0 (the TOKYO D. F. Command) from all eight stations in the Mandates and OMINATO. This Command also originated messages of high precedence to the Major Fleet Commanders. This activity is interpreted to indicate that the R. I. net is operating at full strength upon U. S. Naval Communications and IS GETTING RESULTS. TOKYO originators were active with messages of high precedence to the Commander in Chiefs of the Second and Third Fleets and Combined Air Force. The Navy Minister sent to Alnavs. The Chief of the Naval General Staff sent one to the Chief of Staffs of Combined Air Force, Combined Fleet, Fourth Fleet, Third Fleet, French Indo-China Force, Second Fleet and RNO PALAO. The BUAERO sent one to Chief of Staff Fourth Fleet info IMIESI and 11th Air Corps at SAIPAN. Combined Fleet.-No indication of movement of any Combined Fleet units. Commander in Chief Second Fleet originated his usual number of dispatches to Third Fleet and Combined Air Force. The units paid particular attention to by the Commander in Chief Second Fleet were CARDIVS Five and Seven and Page 77 DESRONS Two and Four and SUBRON Five. No traffic today from the TAKAO (CA). Third Fleet.-Little activity from Third Fleet units save for the Commander in Chief. The impression is growing that the First Base Force is not present with the bulk of the Third Fleet in SASEBO but it is not yet located elsewhere. The Army Commander in TAIHOKU is still holding communications with the commander in Chief Third Fleet. Two Third Fleet units arrived at BAKO and are apparently returning to KURE from BAKO. Fourth Fleet.-Bulk of Fourth Fleet still at TRUK. The Commander in Chief Fourth addressed message to the Sixth Base Force at JALUIT and the Fourth Base Force at TRUK. Yokohama Air Corps is at RUOTTO and WOTJE and held communications with AIRRON Twenty-Four and KAMOI. Sixth China.-SAMA sent several messages to shore addresses in the Empire. SAMA also addressed the OMURA AIR CORPS in several messages which went for information to SAIGON and TOKYO. TAKAO radio station addressed the Chiefs of Staff Combined Fleet, Second Fleet, the French Indo China Force and Combined Air Force. TAKAO Air Corps addressed SUKUGAWA Air Corps and YOKOSUKA Air Corps. A representative of a HAINAN office now at SAIGON originated several messages to the Naval Bases at SASEBO and KURE. The Commander in Chief China Fleet originated more traffic than usual and addressed his fleet collectively for information to the Commander in Chief Second and Commander in Chief Third Fleets. Submarines.-Except for the mention of SUBRONS Five and Six in two dispatches there was no submarine activity today. [169] Communication Intelligence Summary, 29 November 1941 General.-Traffic volume above normal, The traffic to South China still very high. Automatic transmissions was attempted on the Tokyo-Takao circuit but was a failure and traffic sent by hand. A good share of today's traffic is made up of messages of an intelligence nature. Tokyo Intelligence sent eleven messages during the day to Major Commanders both ashore and afloat, while the radio intelligence activity at Tokyo sent four long messages to the Major Commanders. In addition to the stations normally reporting to Tokyo, radio Yokosuka sent in reports. This station had not previously been seen to submit reports. The Direction Finder Net controlled directly by Tokyo was up during the night with much activity. One message for Jaluit Radio Direction Finder Station included Commander Submarines for information. The Navy Minister originated his usual two AlNavs and the Naval General Staff addressed Commanders Second Fleet Third Fleet, Combined Ail Force and the South China Units. The unit which has been addressed as the "103rd Air Group" originated one dispatch today whose address was composed entirely of enciphered calls. It is apparent that he has no Navy call list. One address was "JUITIKOUKUUKANTAI" "11th AIR *FLEET*". Since this has appeared before it is evident that the use of KANTAI is intentional making the existence of an air fleet positive. Its composition is unknown. Combined Fleet:-The arrival of Air Squadron Seven in Takao area is confirmed. The presence of Cruiser Division Four in that area is not confirmed nor denied. The dispatches today indicate that the following units are under the immediate command of CinC. Second Fleet: CARDIV THREE DESRON TWO SUBRON FIVE DESRON FOUR SUBRON SIX THIRD FLEET CRUDIV FIVE FRENCH INDO CHINA FORCE CRUDIV SEVEN Associated with Third Fleet are two Battleships but their assignment is not yet definite. Aside from messages which were addressed to Third Fleet, China and South China Fleets, Combined Air Force and the Naval General Staff, Commander in Chief Second Fleet was mainly occupied with the units listed above. Only one message from Commander in Chief Combined Fleet was seen. This was addressed to YOKOSUKA, Combined Air Force, CRUDIV Four and BUMILAFF. The HIYEI sent one message to Chief of Staff Third Fleet. Third Fleet.-Commander in Chief Third Fleet sent one message to Comdesron Five, Number Two Base Force, Number One Base Force, Defense Division One and Comdesron Two and Four. He held extensive communications with the Commander in Chief Second Fleet and BAKO. Two more units of Third Fleet made movement reports. Page 78 Fourth Fleet.--Relatively inactive today. Sent one message to Commander in Chief Second Fleet, Commander in Chief Third Fleet and Combined Air Force. He is still in TRUK area. [170] Submarines.-Traffic for Commander Submarine Force was routed through SAIPAN today. He was at CHICHIJIMA yesterday. South China.-CRUDIV Seven now in SAMA made a movement report but direction was not indicated. The French Indo China Force Commander addressed several messages to Second and Third Fleets as well as TOKYO. The Commander in Chief China Fleet was active in addressing the South China Naval Bases and the South China Fleets, all for information to Commander in Chief Second Fleet. [171] Communication Intelligence Summary, November 30, 1941 General.-Traffic volume less than for past few days. Today's traffic consisted largely of dispatches bearing old dates, some as far back as 26 November. No reason can be given for the retransmission of these messages unless the high volume of traffic for past few days has prevented the repetition of dispatches. The number of dispatches originated on the 30th is very small. The only tactical circuit heard today was one with AKAGI and several MARUs. The TOKYO Intelligence activity originated two WIWI dispatches to Major Fleet Commanders. One urgent dispatch was sent by NGS to Chiefs of Staff Combined, Second, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Fleets, Combined Air Force; Submarine Force and China Fleets. Combined Fleet.-The Chiefs of Staff of the Combined Fleet and First Fleet are in KURE. In the same message the Chief of Staff Second Fleet was nor at any location. Other traffic indications are that he is at sea. Commander in Chief Second Fleet sent one to his usual addressees of the Third Fleet and Combined Air Force but also included KONGO and HIYEI, which places them as members of his Task Force. The Commander in Chief Second Fleet is no longer adding PALAO activities and has not for past two days. The RNO PALAO today addressed two messages to TAIWAN GUNSIREIBU (TAIWAN Army Headquarters). Third Fleet.-Commander in Chief Third Fleet addressed two messages to COMDESRON Two, Four and Five; COMCRUDIV Five; First and Second Base Forces and Defense Division One for information to Commander in Chief Second Fleet. No information obtained as to the location of the Commander in Chief Third Fleet, which gives the strong impression that he is underway. Fourth Fleet.-Believed to be still in TRUK area. D. F. activity in Marshalls a little greater today than normal. JALUIT addressed Commander Submarine Force and AIRRON 24 in one dispatch. The continued association of JALUIT and Commander Submarine Force plus his known progress from the Empire to CHICHIJIMA to SAIPAN makes his destination obviously the Marshalls. Since one of his large units (SITI4) arrived in the Marshalls some time ago this unit cannot agree with Com 16 that there is not a submarine concentration in that area. Every evidence points to a concentration of not only the small Fourth Fleet submarines there but also a good portion of the Fleet submarines of the Submarine Force. AIRRON 24 plus YOKOHAMA AIR CORPS presence in that area points to intended air-submarine operations from the Marshalls. Also the presence of a unit of plane guard destroyers indicates the presence of at least one carrier in the Mandates although this has not been confirmed. South China.-BAKO active with dispatches to Second and Third Fleets. Combined Air Force and SAMA. Commander in Chief China Fleet becoming more and more active as an originator with dispatches to the Task Force. He made a movement report with the South China Fleet as an information addressee. The Staff Communication Officer of the South China Fleet was addressed at Shanghai today. [172] Communication Intelligence Summary, 1 December 1941 General.-All service radio calls of forces afloat changed promptly at 0000, 1 December. Previously, service calls changed after a period of six months or more. Calls were last changed on 1 November, 1941. The fact that service calls lasted only one month indicate an additional progressive step in preparing for active operations on a large scale. For a period of two to three days prior to the change of calls, the bulk of the radio traffic consisted of dispatches from one to four or five days old. It appears that the Japanese Navy is adopting more and more security provisions. A study of traffic prior to 0000, 1 December indicates that an effort was made to deliver all dispatches using old calls so that promptly with the change of calls, there would be a minimum of undelivered dispatches and consequent confusion and compromises. Either that or the large number of old messages may have been used to pad the total volume and make it appear as if nothing unusual was pending. First Fleet.-Nothing to indicate that this fleet as a fleet is operating outside of Empire waters. It is believed that such a large percentage of the First Fleet is operating with the Second Fleet Task Force that this fleet has ceased to operate in a prominent role. Second Fleet.-This fleet is believed proceeding from the Kure-Sasebo area in the direction of South China and Indo-China. Takao does not appear to play an important role in today's traffic; consequently, the assumption is made that his fleet is passing up Takao. Certain units of the Second Fleet Task Force are definitely in the Indo-China area (Cruiser Division Seven and Destroyer Squadron Three most prominent). Third Fleet.-Nothing to report except that the same association of Second, Third Fleets, and Combined Air Force with South China and Indo- China Forces continues. Fourth Fleet.-No change in the Fourth Fleet or Mandates area. Fifth Fleet.-Nothing to report. Submarines.-Large number of the Submarine Force believed to be in the area to the eastward of Yokosuka-Chichijima and Saipan Flagship somewhere in this general area. Carriers.-No change. Combined Air Force.-No change. [173] Communication Intelligence Summary, 2 December 1941 General.-The most prominent factor in today's traffic is the apparent confusion in the routing of traffic for certain major parts of the Japanese Fleet. There were instances where the same dispatch was repeated several times after it appeared on the Tokyo broadcast and also where Takao Radio received the same dispatch that it had previously sent. ComSixteen reported Second and Third Fleets in Takao area and that Takao Radio was broadcasting traffic to these fleets. This broadcast was not uncovered here and contrary to location reports, there was one indication that these two fleets were not close to Takao. In several instances Takao Radio forwarded traffic to Tokyo for these fleets. Summing up all reports and indications, it is believed that the large fleet made up of Second, Third and First Fleet units has left Empire waters but is either not close enough to Takao for good communication or is proceeding on a course not close to Takao. The change of calls on December first has prevented this office from making definite statements at this date of the units now in the Southern area. To further complicate the situation, Shanghai Radio handled a considerable mount of traffic which obviously was originated by and destined for units in the Takao area. The Chief of Staff, South China area continues to appear in Shanghai ComSixteen reported nine submarines proceeding south by Camranh Bay. This group is believed to comprise both Submarine Squadrons five and six, which units normally operate with the First Fleet but have been included repeatedly in the Second Fleet Task Force for Southern operations. There was a very high percentage of high precedence traffic originated both by major forces afloat and Tokyo. Hainan continues as a prominent address. Palao and Third Base Force is holding the same relative importance. First Fleet.-Despite the lack of positive identification, the First Fleet appears relatively quiet. From inconclusive evidence, it appears as if there may have been a split in the original or normal Combined Fleet Staff and that these may be two supreme commanders with staffs. As an example, traffic routing indicates one Combined Fleet call associated with the Second and Third Fleets and apparently in company while another Combined Fleet call appears not associated with the Second and Third Fleets. Second Fleet.-No units have stood out prominently the last two or three days. This is partly due to lack of new identifications but contributes somewhat to the belief that a large part of the Second Fleet is underway in company. Cruiser Division Seven and Destroyer Squadron Three are unlocated and unobserved since change of calls. Page 80 [174] Third Fleet.-Nothing to report. Shanghai appeared in an indirect way in some of the Third Fleet traffic. Mandates.-Association of Submarine Force and Fourth Fleet continues. Some traffic for Fourth Fleet units still going through Truk. Carriers.-Almost a complete blank of information on the Carriers today Lack of identifications has somewhat promoted this lack of information- however, since over two hundred service calls have been partially identified since the change on the first of December and not one carrier call has been recovered, it is evident that carrier traffic is at a low ebb. Combined Air Force.-This force continues to be associated closely with Second, Third and Indo-China Fleets. Some units of the Combined Air Force have undoubtedly left the Takao area. [175] Communication Intelligence Summary, 4 December 1941 General.-Traffic volume normal with receiving conditions good. Present state of call recovery does not permit much detailed information to be obtained. The extensive use of alternate calls by the major commands slows up identification of even these Units. Very few units have been positively identified so far. The Chief of the Naval General Staff originated three long dispatches to the CINC COMBINED, SECOND and THIRD FLEETS. The Tokyo Intelligence originated nine dispatches to the same addresses. The presence of the CINC SECOND FLEET in Taiwan waters is not revealed by radio traffic. In some traffic from Takao the CINC SECOND FLEET is indicated as having previously received the messages while in others to Tokyo he is indicated for delivery by that station. It is the impression that both SECOND and THIRD FLEETS are underway but are not verified by Radio Intelligence means. There are some FOURTH FLEET Units in the Marshall Islands area including some of the FOURTH FLEET Staff. The identity of these units is not known. The SIXTH BASE FORCE at Jaluit addressed several messages to CINC FOURTH. Some Swatow Units were addressed at Saigon today indicating a movement of some South China Units to Saigon. Bako originated many dispatches to the RNO Taihoku and the Task Force Commander. No information on submarines or Carriers. [176] Communication Intelligence Summary, 4 December 1941 General.-Traffic volume normal with fair receiving conditions. Takao Radio today instituted a fleet broadcast system using the prefix UTU in heading so that there are now two fleet broadcasts in operation. So far only a few messages have been placed on the Takao broadcast. There were a large number of urgent messages, today, most of these from Tokyo to the major commanders. Among others Tokyo Intelligence originated a seven part message to Chiefs of Staff China Fleet, Combined Fleet, Third Fleet, South China Fleet, French Indo-China Force and Sama. In all, this activity sent twelve messages to the major commanders. Combined Fleet.-The outstanding item of today's traffic is the lack of messages from the CinC. Second Fleet and CinC. Third Fleet. These previously very talkative commanders are now very quiet. While the Fleet calls are not yet well identified, the lack of traffic from these commands cannot be ascribed to that. These two commands are still prominent as addressees. It is now believed that the CinC. Second Fleet is in the vicinity of Takao and that the apparently conflicting evidence is due to traffic destined for the Tokyo UTU broadcast which CinC. Second Fleet is still copying. The CinC. Combined Fleet sent one message to an unidentified unit for information to Third Base Force Palao, CinC. Second Fleet and CinC. Third Fleet. Fourth Fleet.-The CinC. Fourth Fleet sent a message to Chief of Staff Combined Air Force, information to Eleventh Air Corps, Chitose Air, Air Squadron Twenty-four, Third Base Force at Palao and Fourth Base Force at Truk. No further check could be made today on the presence of Fourth Fleet units in the Marshalls. Jaluit appeared many times in today's traffic being associated with Commander Submarine Force, Tokyo Radio and MUSI 88 (which is believed to be an oil tanker). South China.-Bako continues as an active originator addressing many messages to Sama and Saigon. Except for traffic between South China Commanders, all units in that area quiet. Page 81 [177] Communication Intelligence Summary, December 5, 1941 General.-Traffic volume heavy. All circuits overloaded with Tokyo broadcast going over full 24 hours. Tokyo-Mandates circuit in duplex operation. There were several new intercept schedules heard. OMINATO radio working SAMA and BAKO sending fleet traffic. The Takao broadcast handling traffic Second and Third Fleet while the Tokyo broadcast is still handling traffic for these units also. It is noted that some traffic being broadcast is several days old which indicates the uncertainty of delivery existing in the radio organization. There were many messages of high precedence which appears to be caused by the jammed condition of all circuits. A plain language message was sent by the Captain, OKAWA from Tokyo to Takao probably for further relay addressed to FUJIHARA, Chief of the Political Affairs Bureau saying that "in reference to the Far Eastern Crisis, what you said is considered important at this end but proceed with what you are doing, specific orders will be issued soon." Combined Fleet.-Neither the Second or Third Fleet Commanders have originated any traffic today. They are still frequently addressed but are receiving their traffic over broadcast. They are undoubtedly in Takao area or farther south since the Takao broadcast handles nearly all their traffic. No traffic from the Commander Carriers or Submarine Force has been seen either. Third Fleet.-In one WE address a "Chief of Staff" sent a message to "Commander Fourteenth Army abroad RYUJOMARU in Third Fleet. HITOYO.GUN.SATI (IRO 1 REUZEU MARU). A number of MARUS have been addressing the CINC. Third Fleet. Fourth Fleet.-The Secretary, Fourth Fleet and Staff Communication Officer the Fourth Fleet were addressed at Jaluit today strengthening the impression at the CinC. Fourth Fleet is in the Marshalls. The Commander of the South China Fleet has been addressing Palao radio and the RNO TAIHOKU and the Commander Second Fleet. South China.-SAMA addressed much traffic to CinC. Second Fleet. BAKO continues as an active originator with many dispatches to Second and Third Fleet. The Commander Combined Air Force appears to be busy with the movement of Air Corps. SHIOGAMA Air and at least two unidentified corps are moving, probably to Indo-China. [178] Communication Intelligence Summary, December 6, 1941 General.-Traffic volume very heavy with a great deal of old traffic being transmitted. Messages as far back as 1 December were seen in the traffic. This not believed an attempt to maintain a high traffic level but is the result of confusion in traffic routing with uncertainty of delivery. The stations now holding broadcasts are TOKYO (with 3 distinct and separate broadcasts), SAIPAN, OMINATO and TAKAO. Yesterday's high level of traffic from TOKYO originators was maintained with the Intelligence activity still sending periodic messages. Practically all of TOKYO's messages carry prefixes of high priority. Combined Fleet.-Still no traffic from the Second and Third Fleet Commanders. These units are sending their traffic via the TAKAO and TOKYO broadcasts. The Commander in Chief Combined Fleet originated several messages to the Carriers, Fourth Fleet and the Major Commanders. Fourth Fleet.-The Commander in Chief Fourth Fleet is again in the TRUK area. It is doubtful that he ever went to JALUIT although it is certain that some members of his staff were there over the past few days. There is a definite close association between the Third Base Force at PALAO and the forces in South China. This unit is constantly sending messages to the Chief of Staff the Second Fleet, Third Fleet, Indo-China Forces and BAKO. It is being almost entirely neglected by Commander in Chief Fourth Fleet under whose command it normally operates. RONGELAB radio addressed the PALAO weather observer. Fifth Fleet.-This fleet appears dispersed about the JAPAN Sea with OMINATO broadcasting traffic for this unit. Submarines.-The Commander Submarine Force originated two messages to his command. These are the first two originated since 1 December. He is definitely in the MARSHALLS. South China.-Nothing new to report. BAKO, SAMA and TAKAO still sending many messages to the Task Force. Page 82 [179] TOP SECRET HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS APO 958 In reply to: POSIG 483 27 APRIL 1945 Memorandum: To Lt. Col. Henry C. Clausen, JAGD. 1. With reference to the message sent #519 December 5, 1941, which you handed me, I certify to the best of my knowledge and belief there are no copies of clear or coded traffic of this particular message on file in the Signal Center, Fort Shafter. In fact there are no copies of clear or coded traffic in the Signal Center prior to 1 July 1944. All coded traffic prior to 1 July 1944 and all clear traffic dated prior to 1 March 1945 have been destroyed by burning. There are no records, including the logs, in the Signal Center which would give us any information as to whether or not this message was received at Fort Shafter. Search and inquiries have been made within the Signal Center as to whether this message had been received and they have been negative. 2. You have asked me to recall the circumstances concerning intercept numbered Army 8007 and dated 2 December 1941. The procedure with respect to said intercept at the time stated was as follows: Search has been made as to whether such intercepts were intercepted by the Army SIS at Honolulu and transmitted to Washington. As to whether they were intercepted, I have this to report: There are at this time, no records in the Hawaiian Department to show whether or not these intercepts were made by MS-5. The fact that Washington gives an intercept date-time group tends to show that the intercept was made by MS-5, but the lack of a receiving operator's personal sign is an indication to the contrary. As to how they were transmitted to Washington, I have this to report: Intercepts of this type which were to be forwarded to Washington via air-mail were handled as follows; On the day following the date of intercept each message was given a logsheet number and entered on an index sheet. This entire lot of air-mail traffic for that particular date was then fastened together to await the next scheduled departure of the Clipper. Upon notification of the impending departure of the Clipper all accumulated air-mail traffic together with a letter of transmittal and a classified document receipt was taken to the classified files section of the Department Signal Office for packaging and was then forwarded to the classified files section of the Department AGO. [180] The AGO forwarded this traffic via officer courier to the outgoing Clipper. The Clipper departed for the mainland approximately once each week, but this schedule was frequently interrupted because of weather conditions. It is known that this traffic was at times forwarded by ship because of the long delayed departure of a Clipper. The only messages transmitted to Washington by radio were those specially selected in accordance with instructions from the Chief Signal Officer. The message in question was not within the first priority mission and therefore is not believed to have been included in the special instructions. My search in this regard included: A search of all Signal Intelligence files including Communication Service, Central Pacific Base Command and Monitor Station #5. Such records as have been found pertaining to the assigned mission of Monitor Station #5 at the time in question show that this station was intercepting traffic between Japan, Asia and Europe. In this connection I inquired of Washington on 14 April 1945 concerning the originals of intercepts, which I understood are or should be on file in Washington, and received this information. "Mailing date of traffic was 11 December. Receiving operator's sign does not appear on the intercept. Log sheet number 014037 appears on traffic and listed on log forwarded under signature of C. A. Powell. Intercept time shows 0707 on December 2, 1941". A copy of the forwarding letter cannot be located and no receipts for traffic forwarded are available previous to 1943. 3. Concerning your inquiry as to the testimony I previously made relating to the commercial scrambled phone between Honolulu and the mainland, we did Page 83 monitor the commercial radiotelephone. Previous to December 1937 inverters were used on the Trans-Pacific radiophones circuit between Honolulu and the mainland. The same type inverters were used on the radiophone circuit between Tokyo and San Francisco. Because these inverters were of the same type and design Tokyo could monitor the Honolulu-San Francisco circuit. In December 1937 a new San Francisco- Honolulu radiophone circuit was commissioned using a new type of privacy which was called the A-3 privacy. At the time of this installation there were only two such A-3 privacy built; one for the Honolulu terminal and one for the San Francisco terminal. This type of privacy is much more complicated and furnished much more secrecy than the previous old inverters. The old inverters were still used on the Tokyo-Honolulu circuit as the A-3 privacy was for use only on the Honolulu-San Francisco circuit. Shortly after the installation of this new Honolulu-San Francisco circuit the Tokyo technical operator asked the Honolulu technical operator what kind of a new inverter was in use on the Honolulu-San Francisco circuit as he was not able to understand the conversation. [181] Tokyo technical operator was advised that the equipment had just been installed and the only person who knew how this privacy worked was the Bell Laboratory engineer who had just made the installation. This was proof that Tokyo had in the past been monitoring the Honolulu-San Francisco radiophone circuit. C. A. Powell, C. A. POWELL Brigadier General, U. S. Army, Signal Officer At Honolulu TOP SECRET [182] UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET RADIO UNIT COMMANDANT, NAVY 128 c/o Fleet Post Office, San Francisco, Calif. JSH/rec EF37/A6(1) Serial Z-4225 Top Secret 27 APRIL 1945. Memorandum to Lieut. Colonel H. C. CLAUSEN. Subject: Information. 1. I regret that results of search for amplifying information on the subject we discussed immediately prior to your departure has been quite disappointing. 2. The officers concerned with the monitoring watch were (present ranks given) Comdr. F. R. Biard, USN, Comdr. J. R. Bromley, USN, Comdr. A. Cole, USN, and Comdr. G. M. Slonim, USN. In charge of the radio station at the time was Lieutenant Lankford. 3. Comdr. Cole is the only officer currently present and available for questioning. He states that, as nearly as he can remember, a program issued by the Japan Broadcasting Company was obtained from the District Intelligence Office and used as a basic list. A few other frequencies were found by searching, but in practically all cases, they were merely duplicate transmissions of the listed broadcasts. Generally speaking, there were seldom more than three or more programs of the character being monitored on the air at the same time. In those cases split-phone watches were used. 4. All broadcasts that were regularly monitored were the Japanese Government Japanese language voice news broadcasts, with particular attention devoted to those scheduled on the hour and half hour, which usually contained weather information. 5. No positive results whatsoever were obtained from this monitoring at any time during the period under consideration. The monitoring watch was naturally secured immediately after it became obviously redundant. J. S. Holtwick, Jr., J. S. HOLTWICK, JR., Commander, U. S. Navy By Direction At Honolulu Page 84 [183] AFFIDAVIT OF THEODORE EMANUEL, USN Theodore Emanuel, USN, presently under orders to CNO, Washington, D. C. being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Lt. Col. Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the SW, deposes and says: Prior to 7 Dec. 1941, and for over 4 years, I was assigned to the District Intelligence Office, 14th Naval District. About the year 1938 I became acquainted with Col. George W. Bicknell. When Col. Bicknell was called to active duty, about 1940 or 1941 (TE), I discussed with him and Lt. Col. Muerlott (TE) matters of mutual concern relating to the Army and Navy intelligence activities. It is my understanding that [184] Col. Bicknell was cognizant of my functions and activities. These included the obtaining of the telephone conversations originating in and going to (TE) the Japanese Consulate and persons therein (TE) at Honolulu. Such conversations were obtained by me during the period from January 1941 to and including 7 December 1941 by means of covering some 5 or 6 lines. My procedure was to have these conversations recorded, translated and reported to the District Intelligence Officer. These reports were written. This traffic would average about 50 to 60 in and out telephone calls a day. The translator was Comdr. (TE) Denzel Carr, USNR. THEODORE EMANUEL. Chief Ships Clerk, U. S. N. Subscribed & sworn to before me, 17 April 1946. Henry C. Clausen, Lt. Colonel, JAGD. TOP SECRET [185] AFFIDAVIT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL RICHARD K. SUTHERLAND Lieutenant General Richard K. Sutherland, presently Chief of Staff, GHQ Southwest Pacific Areas, being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor, and that top secrecy is required, deposes and says: Immediately before 7 December 1941, I was Chief of Staff, USAFFE. I have been shown what Colonel Clausen has designated Top Secret Exhibit "B", consisting of a file of intercepts of Japanese diplomatic messages. To the best of my recollection, I did not see any of these, nor was I informed of the substance thereof, before 7 December 1941, except possibly some of those relating to the negotiations at Washington, D. C., of Kurusu. I did not see the messages described as the "Winds Code", nor any activating or implementing message. I saw every ultra message that was delivered to the headquarters. I have not previously seen the British SIS messages, dated 27 November 1941 and 3 December 1941. I do not know the basis or source of this intelligence, other than it appears to have been disseminated by a Major Gerald Wilkinson, British Army, who had liaison status with the headquarters and as such, had contact with Major General (then Colonel) Willoughby, ACofS, G-2. The Signal Intelligence Service, United States Army, operated an intercept station at Fort McKinley, immediately before 7 December 1941. Diplomatic messages in purple code which were intercepted by the Signal Intelligence Service were delivered to the Navy at Corregidor where they were decrypted and translated. Some or all of these messages, decrypted and translated, were delivered to the Signal Intelligence Service officer who delivered them to the Hq. USAFFE. Among the messages picked up by the Signal Intelligence Service were reports by the Japanese Consul at Manila requesting the arrivals and departures of ships in Manila Harbor. Hq. USAFFE did not disseminate any ultra information. All dissemination was effected through Signal Intelligence Service channels. R. K. SUTHERLAND. Subscribed and sworn to before me this 6th day of May 1945. Henry C. Clausen, HENRY C. CLAUSEN, Lieutenant Colonel, JAGD at Manila, P. I. Page 85 TOP SECRET [186] AFFIDAVIT OF GENERAL OF THE ARMY DOUGLAS MACARTHUR General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, presently Supreme Commander Southwest Pacific Area, being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and that top Secrecy is required, deposes and says: Immediately before 7 December 1941, I was Commanding General, USAFFE. I have been shown what Colonel Clausen has designated as Top Secret Exhibit "B", consisting of a file of intercepts of Japanese diplomatic messages. I have no recollection of having seen any of these before. I did not see the messages described as the "Winds Code", nor any activating or implementing message. I believe I saw every ultra message that was delivered to the Hq. USAFFE. I have not previously seen the British SIS messages, dated 27 November 1941 and 3 December 1941. I have no knowledge as to the basis or source of this intelligence, and I did not know that these or similar messages were being transmitted to persons at Honolulu, T. H. The Signal Intelligence Service, United States Army, operated an intercept station at Fort McKinley, immediately before 7 December 1941. Diplomatic messages in purple code, intercepted by this SIS were delivered to the Navy at Corregidor where they were decrypted and translated. Some or all of these messages, decrypted and translated were delivered to the SIS officer who delivered them to the Hq. USAFFE. The decrypting and translating of these messages was a function of the Navy. The Army SIS monitored some circuits and turned the material over to the Navy for decryption and translation. The Navy had facilities and personnel, not possessed by the Army, for such processing of this intelligence. Whether all messages were transmitted by the Navy to the Army I do not know. All transmission of this subject material was entirely in the hands of the Navy. Dispatches from the War Department gave me ample and complete information and advice for the purpose of alerting the Army Command in the Philippines on a war basis, which was done prior to 7 December 1941. DOUGLAS MACARTHUR. Subscribed and sworn to before me this 7th day of May, 1945. Henry C. Clausen, HENRY C. CLAUSEN Lieutenant Colonel, JAGD. at Manila, P I. [187] AFFIDAVIT OF MAJOR GENERAL C. A. WILLOUGHBY Major General C. A. Willoughby, presently Assistant Chief of Staff, GHQ Southwest Pacific Area, being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and that top Secrecy is required, deposes and says: Immediately before 7 December 1941, I was ACofS, G-2, USAFFE. I have been shown what Colonel Clausen has designed as Top Secret Exhibit "B", consisting of a file of intercepts of Japanese diplomatic messages. I did not see any of these, nor was I informed of the substance thereof before. except isolated fragments of the Kurusu diplomat message series. Concerning those which are known as the "Winds Code" messages, neither I, nor anyone else in the USAFFE to my knowledge, received any information as to any activating or implementing message, nor any notice that such a message had been transmitted or received. Concerning the British SIS messages dated 27 November 1941 and 3 December 1941, these were not seen by me before 7 December 1941. I do not know the basis or source of this intelligence, other than that it appears to have been disseminated by Mr. Gerald Wilkinson, subsequently appointed Major, British Army. who had some liaison status with the Philippine Department, later, Hq. USAFFE, and as such had contact with me and my predecessors in 1941. (See Appendix A). Page 86 Various intercepts of Japanese diplomatic messages were received by the Army in the Philippines (Hq. USAFFE) before 7 December 1941. The decrypting, translating and processing of these messages were functions of the Navy. The Army monitored some circuits and turned the material over to the Navy for decrypting and translating. Under this system the intercepted Japanese code messages were given to the Navy at Corregidor where the Navy had a "purple" machine and other crypto-analytic facilities and personnel, not possessed by the Army, for decrypting and translating these messages. It was customary for the Navy, after these messages were decrypted and translated, to give the Army (Hq. USAFFE) such portion of the sum total of this intelligence, and the details and source thereof, as the Navy considered necessary to the functions of the Army. (See Appendix B)., Those which were shown me. before 7 December 194l were handed to me by Colonel Shearer, S. C., now deceased, who was the Army liaison with the Navy for that purpose. Certain of these messages concerned inquiries from Tokyo and replies by the Japanese Consul at Manila as to United States military and commercial ships in Manila Harbor. No record was made by the Army of the dissemination or substance of this intelligence, and the papers on which the intelligence was recorded have been destroyed. To the best of my knowledge and belief, the Army did not transmit any of this intelligence to the Hawaiian Department, since the dissemination thereof was exclusively a Navy function. C. A. Willoughby. Subscribed and Sworn to before me this 8th day of May 1945. Henry C. Clausen, HENRY C. CLAUSEN, Lieut. Colonel, J. A. G. D. at Manila, P. I. 2 Encls: Appendix "A"-Re Col. G. Wilkinson. Appendix "B"-Re Navy Crypto-analysis Service. [188] TOP SECRET APPENDIX "A" AFFIDAVIT 8 MAY 1945 The British SIA messages, their purport and evolution and the curious role played by Mr. Gerald Wilkinson, in Manila and Hawaii are an integral part of this investigation, in my opinion. The whole story is one of duplicity, evasion, bargaining, horse-trading of information and a sort of E. Phillipps Oppenheim international intrigue. Wilkinson married into the Davies family and represented his father-in- law, in Manila, as a sugar broker, for many years; hence, the casual reference to a "Colonel Wilkinson", that appears in the affidavits of Mr. Russell and Dawson, suggesting a perfect stranger are obviously intended to be misleading. Wilkinson combined the convenient status of a respected local business man, with that of a Secret agent, reporting to the British Ministry of Information; contrary to U. S. Law, he never registered as a foreign agent. He apparently came out of hiding, in Manila, and contacted or obtained tolerance by the then G-2's Philippine Department, Colonels O'Rear, retired, and J. K. Evans, MID. When I took over, he approached me, quoting Evans, etc. I was not impressed; the intelligence material he desired to file with me; they contained mimeo reprints of old Jap military data and some sprinkling of China-based reports. It became apparent to me, though, that Wilkinson had dealings with Hawaii and the local Navy, that he possessed his own cryptographic systems and decoding clerks, etc. I became convinced that his main purpose was to ingratiate himself into some official Army-Navy recognition, that he was willing to trade information for that recognition but that he was and still is an agent of British authorities, reporting thereto and executing orders therefrom. This net of potential spies is world wide, it is still in operation. I employ both SIA and SOE, British, and find them loyal to no one but themselves and the Empire. My intelligence evaluation of his messages to Hawaii is not high-a horsetrading proposition, pure and simple; I am connived that this bundle represents not all of the messages sent; the commercial deductions are obvious: Davies canceled sugar shipments in the nick of time. Page 87 Wilkinson is a completely untrained civilian. His Government gave him a military status to protect him, in case of capture. He attached himself to us at the outbreak of the War, leaving his wife and children to fend for themselves, in the Japanese-occupied city; they were promptly interned, in Sto Tomas, for the duration. We made use of him and his cypher system, to send an occasional message to Wavell and Singapore, he continued to report "home" though his stuff was severely edited by me; the General finally sent him to Wavell's Headquarters as a sort of liaison, utilizing his cypher system; he then made his way deviously to Washington and London, where he capitalized heavily on his "status" with GHQ, USAFFE; he was "promoted" to Colonel and attempted to return to our Headquarters, as a "liaison"; he even had the support of the Prime Minister; with a complete lack of military knowledge, such a position had its ludicrous side except for local espionage, and we declined to have him. He was promptly demoted and attached to duty with the British Office of Information at Washington- New York. C. A. Willoughby C. A. WILLOUGHBY Major General, G. S. C., Asst. Chief of Staff, G-2 General Headquarters, SWPA. TOP SECRET AFFIDAVIT [189] Appendix "B" 8 MAY 1945. In 1941, the Navy obtained and maintained a highly efficient cryto- analytical service, specializing in Japanese material; though the Army had notably participated in the development of this subject, the Navy appears to have obtained a lead; consequently, it can be said that the Navy enjoyed an almost monopolistic privilege. In an otherwise meritorious desire for security (though every modern nation knows that crypto-analysis is going on) the Navy has shrouded the whole enterprise in mystery, excluding other services, and rigidly centralizing the whole enterprise. At this date, for example, this same system is still in vogue: as far as SWPA is concerned, the crypto-analysis is made in Melbourne, forwarded via 7th Fleet D. N. I.; the Melbourne station is under direct orders of Washington, is not bound by any local responsibilities, forwards what they select and when it suits them. The possibility of erroneous or incomplete selection is as evident now as it was in 1941. The only excuse the Navy has is that its field is primarily naval intercepts, but there is a lot of Army traffic or other incidental traffic. This collateral traffic is not always understood or correctly interpreted by the Navy, in my opinion. The solution to this vexing and dangerous problem is a completely joint interlocking intercept and crypto-analytical service, on the highest level, with the freest interchange of messages and interpretation. The sequence of messages referred to, had they been known to a competent intelligence officer, with Battle Order and tactical background, beginning with November 14th, would have led instantly to the inescapable conclusion that Pearl Harbor naval installations were a target for attack, with November 25th or November 29th as the deadlines, suggesting irresistibly that elapsed time was involved, for some sort of naval seaborne sortie. C. A. Willoughby, C. A. WILLOUGHBY, Major General, G. S. C., Asst. Chief of Staff, G-2, General Headquarters, SWPA. [190] STATEMENT Kendall J. Fielder, Brigadier General, U. S. Army, being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Clausen, Page 88 Judge Advocate General Department, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and that top Secrecy is required, deposes and says: 1. I took charge of the G-2 Section, Hawaiian Department, about four months prior to December 7, 194l, and had had no prior G-2 experience. The organization of the Section just prior to and on December 7, 1941, was as follows: a small administrative section of one officer, two clerks; a public relations section of two officers and three clerks; a combat intelligence section of two officers and several clerks organized to expand rapidly in an emergency; a counter-intelligence section of approximately twelve officers and thirty agents, known at that time as the "Contact Office", in charge of Lt. Col. George Bicknell and located in the City of Honolulu. Other than the "Contact Office", the G-2 Section was at Fort Shafter, and most of the personnel had dual responsibility since the section was small and the duties varied. 2. The G-2 section depended generally for information on Japan and the rest of the world on the War Department, on the local Navy Command, and on interrogation of travelers. I know now that some was also received from British SIS. No intercept facilities or other agencies were available to study Japanese communications. 3. While the principle mission of the G-2 Section was to safeguard against internal disorders and sabotage, the Contact Office did prepare for publication certain estimates based on information obtained from all sources. It was customary for all military personnel to channel information to the Contact Office where summaries and estimates were prepared. Prior to December 7, 1941, the G-2 Section of the Hawaiian Department vas mostly concerned with subversive matters since there were 160,000 persons of Japanese ancestry in the Territory of Hawaii of whom 40,000 were aliens. The warnings that came to me were to take every precaution against possible sabotage and that nothing should be done which might precipitate an international incident, and that the public must not be unduly alarmed. I spent a great deal of time the last week of November and first week in December of 1941 inspecting the various military establishments to check on sabotage preparations. Likewise this was done by other Department Staff officers. I also devoted considerable time in the fall of 1941 speaking before various racial groups in an effort to avoid complications should war descend on the United States. Particularly were we worried about friction between local Filipinos and Japanese. [191] 4. The Contact Office was directly under G-2 but it also functioned somewhat as a special staff section: the Contact Officer, Lt. Col. Bicknell, had direct access to the Commanding General and Chief of Staff. Actually, this subsection of G-2 performed Combat Intelligence duties although another group was known as the "Combat Intelligence Sub Section". I refer to attempting to obtain and disseminate information of the potential enemy. In reality from the Army viewpoint, there is no combat intelligence unless there is combat. 5. It was customary prior to December 7, 1941, to hold weekly staff meetings, usually on Saturday morning: at that time the Contact Officer presented a brief summary of the international situation while the undersigned usually presented the European War situation. The Contact Officer often reported items of information to me or to the Chief of Staff, or the Commanding General, prior to 7 December 1941. I informed both the CG and C/S of everything that came to my attention regardless of its source. The three of us were in adjoining rooms at headquarters and were in contact many times each day. 6. My relations with the Navy were in general cordial, but none of their combat intelligence was passed on to me. The conferences and the passage of information between the Intelligence Agencies of the Navy and myself had to do primarily with counter-subversive measures. No information was given to me by anyone in the Navy, which indicated in any way that aggression by the Japanese against Hawaii was imminent or contemplated. It was well known that relations with Japan were severely strained and that war seemed imminent but all my information seemed to predict sabotage and internal troubles for Hawaii. 7. I have been shown a copy of a message dated 5 December 1941, sent by G-2 in Washington to G-2, Hawaiian Department, which directed that Commander Rochefort be contacted for information concerning a Japanese weather broadcast. This broadcast is commonly referred to as, "The Winds" message. I have no recollection of having received the War Department radio, but had it come to me, I would in all probability have turned it over to Lt. Col. Bicknell for action since he knew Commander Rochefort and had very close liaison with Page 89 Captain Mayfield, the 14th Naval District Intelligence Officer; particularly since the way the radio was worded it would not have seemed urgent or particularly important. The contents and details of "The Winds" message were never made known to me. It is possible that Colonel Bicknell may have conferred with Commander Rochefort or others about this but I did not and Colonel Bicknell did not tell me if he did. 8. No direct liaison was maintained by me with Navy Intelligence Agencies except those concerned with local or Territorial problems. I believed the Pacific Fleet Intelligence Section to have excellent information of the Japanese Fleet and assumed that if any information which [192] I needed to know was possessed by Navy agencies, it would be disseminated to me. I know now that had I asked for information obtained by the Navy from intercept sources it would not have been given me. For example Captain Layton stated that if he had turned any over to me he would not have divulged the source, but in fact, would have given some different derivation and that this he did do with Lt. Col. Bicknell. The Hawaiian Department was primarily a defensive command justified principally to defend the Pearl Harbor Naval Base with fixed seacoast batteries, antiaircraft batteries, mobile ground troops and the 7th Air Force as the weapons. The latter being the only one capable of long range offensive action along with the Navy constituting the first line of defense for Hawaii. I have been told that prior to December 7, 1941, the Intelligence Officer of 7th AF, Lt. Col. Raley, was in liaison with and received some information from Commander Layton, Pacific Fleet Combat Intelligence, but was honor bound to divulge it only to his Commanding General. It did not come to me and I didn't know of the liaison until after the war started. 9. I have been shown by Lt. Col. Clausen a file containing information received Lt. Col. Bicknell from British SIS and some few items struck a responsive chord my memory but I cannot remember which if any were brought to my attention prior to 7 December 1941. The source of the information was not brought to my attention. 10. I have read the affidavit by Commander Rochefort, Combat Intelligence Officer, 14th Naval District in which he states that certain intelligence was given me. I feel sure Commander Rochefort is thinking of Lt. Col. Bicknell, who according to his own statement did receive information from Rochefort. If any it came to me indirectly, it was in vague form and not recognizable as coming from reliable sources. I certainly had no idea that Lt. Col. Bicknell was getting the contents of intercepted Japanese diplomatic messages. In any event Rochefort did not give it to me direct. 11. Col. Clausen has shown me a file of messages marked Top Secret, Exhibit "B" which are intercepted Japanese dispatches. I had never seen any of them before nor was the substance of any of them brought to my attention prior to December 7, 1941, except the destruction by Jap Consul at Honolulu of codes and papers which was related by Col. Bicknell at the staff conference on December 6, 1941. I gave this latter information to General Short the same day. With respect to Top Secret Exhibit "B", had I been given this series of messages prior December 7, 1941, I believe I would have recommended to General Short that he place in effect Alert No. 2 instead of No. 1. It is my opinion that if General Short had seen these messages prior to December 7, 1941, he would have ordered Alert No. 2 without my recommendation. It is my recollection that the Commanding General Ordered Alert No. 1 and then announced it to the Staff. KENDALL J. FIELDER. [193] Subscribed and sworn to before me this 11th day of May, 1945. Henry C. Clausen, HENRY C. CLAUSEN, Lieutenant Colonel, JAGD. At Honolulu, T. H. [194] TOP SECRET AFFIDAVIT OF BRIGADIER GENERAL THOMAS J. BETTS Brigadier General Thomas J. Betts, presently Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force, being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and that top Secrecy is required, deposes and says: Page 90 During the months of November and December 1941 I was the Executive Assistant of the Chief of the then Intelligence Branch, Military Intelligence Division, War Department General Staff, Washington, D. C. In that capacity I was required to have a general knowledge of the major intelligence problems confronting the Military Intelligence Division and with a reference to the Japanese situation I generally obtained this knowledge from Colonel Rufus S. Bratton, GSC, who was in charge of the Far Eastern Section of the Intelligence Branch and to whom was decentralized the handling of all Ultra messages concerning Japan which came to the War Department. Colonel Bratton was assisted by Major Dusenbury, GSC. I know that Major Dusenbury, as Colonel Bratton's representative, received certain Ultra messages concerning Japan both from Army and Navy sources. I think that on occasion Colonel Bratton employed Major Dusenbury to transmit messages so received to authorized persons in the War Department. In consequence I have no first hand knowledge of the handling of these messages, from whom they were received or to whom they were shown. To the best of my knowledge and belief I received no Ultra messages either in written form or by oral transmission on behalf of the Military Intelligence Division during the period in question. I believe, however, that during the period in question Colonel Bratton either showed me or informed me of the gist of most of the Ultra messages which he handled. I am certain that Colonel Bratton informed me of the message which established the so-called Japanese "Winds Code". I further recall inquiring of him on several occasions whether any message implementing the message on the "Winds Code" had been received. I do not recall that he informed me at any time of such a message being received and I further believe that if he had received such a message he would have told me and I would have remember it. To the best of my knowledge and belief no other person informed me prior to 7 December 1941 that an implementing message had been received. THOMAS J. BETTS. Subscribed and Sworn Before Me This 13th Day of June 1945. Henry C. Clausen, HENRY C. CLAUSEN, Lt. Colonel, JAGD. Frankfort on Main, Germany. [195] SUPREME HEADQUARTERS ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF 15 JUNE 1945 AFFIDAVIT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL WALTER B. SMITH Lieutenant General Walter B. Smith, presently Chief of Staff, SHAEF, being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and that Top Secrecy is required, deposes and says: During the months of November and December 1941, I was stationed at Washington, D. C. as Secretary of the War Department General Staff. In that capacity and during the period mentioned, I received from representatives of G-2, for delivery to the Chief of Staff, containers carrying especially secret information which I later learned included various intercepts of Japanese radio diplomatic messages which had been decrypted and translated, and were then called "Magic". These were also delivered on occasions for the same purposes to whichever Assistant Secretary General Staff was on duty in the Office of the Chief of Staff. I did not personally see these intercepts. I did not know what messages were delivered to the various distributees, nor the method of distribution or screening, nor to whom or when they were delivered. They were always given to me in a locked pouch, the key to which was not available to me. I would always give the locked pouch to the Chief of Staff as promptly as possible. If received in the Chief of Staff's absence, these pouches were given him as soon as he returned to the office. I recall several occasions when the pouch was delivered to him at his home when the A. C. of S., G-2, considered the contents urgent. The Chief of Staff would occasionally mention to me matters connected with these intercepts, but I do not recall ever having seen a complete one, nor do I recall specific details. Page 91 Colonel Clausen has asked me to comment on what is stated to have been the testimony before the Army Pearl Harbor Board to the general effect: 1. On 5 Dec., 1941, Colonel Otis K. Sadtler, SC, after receiving information from Admiral Noyes, then Chief of Navy Communications, that the Japanese "Winds Code" had been implemented to signal rupture of diplomatic [196] relations or war between Japan and Great Britain, and after talking this over with General Sherman Miles and Colonel Rufus S. Bratton of G-2, gave the information to General Leonard T. Gerow of WPD, and asked him to give the Hawaiian Department more warning. General Gerow stated, "I think they have had plenty of notification." Colonel Sadtler then gave the information to me, and made the same request of me. I replied that since the War Plans Division had acted I did not want to discuss the matter further. 2. Colonel Bratton delivered the pouches containing the radio intercepts always in person to the officers concerned; and, when the Chief of Staff was not there, he delivered the pouches to me for delivery to the Chief of Staff; 3. During November and December 1941, Colonel Bratton reminded me that the intercepts were of such value and importance that they should be shown the Chief of Staff without delay. 4. On Dec. 6, 1941, before Midnight, Colonel Bratton delivered to me for the Chief of Staff 13 parts of a 14 part intercepted radio message from the Japanese Government which in terms terminated peace negotiations with the United States. (I understand this testimony may possibly be qualified by other testimony to the effect that instead of giving these to me it "may have been one of others.") My recollection of the facts concerning these subjects is as follows: 1. I do not recall Colonel Sadtler's coming to me as he has stated. However, since the matter in question was obviously a difference of opinion between the A. C. of S., G-2 and the A. C. of S., War Plans Division, both of whom had direct access to the Chief of Staff, it was not one in which I had any responsibility or authority, and I cannot imagine why Colonel Sadtler would have asked me to intervene in a question of this kind, particularly since I was not at that time an "Ultra" officer, and it would have been impossible for him to give me any information to support his contention that I should step out of [197] my rather minor province. 2. Not only Colonel Bratton, but at least one other officer of G-2 delivered the pouches referred to. These were delivered not only to me, but to whichever Assistant Secretary General Staff happened to be on duty at my desk in my absence. When delivered to myself or to one of my assistants, our standard procedure was to place it immediately on the desk of the Chief of Staff if he were in his office, or, in his absence, to lock it in the safe until his return unless instructed that the contents should reach him at once. There were several occasions when we were so informed. On these occasions the Duty Officer of the General Staff Secretariat would take the pouches to General Marshall at his quarters or wherever he happened to be. On at least several occasions I recall definitely that I personally sent the G-2 officer to deliver the pouch to General Marshall at his quarters in the absence of a Duty Officer. 3. Both I myself and the Assistant Secretaries understood that these pouches contained information of such value and importance that they should be shown to the Chief of Staff without delay, and the officers of the Intelligence Division who handed them to us were aware of the procedure followed in the Chief of Staff's office as indicated above. 4. To the best of my recollection, I left the office at the usual time on the evening of 6 Dec. 41, that is about 7 PM, turning over to the Night Duty Officer. I am quite certain that I was not at the office after 10 PM. If the intercepted radio message referred to by Colonel Bratton was delivered either to me or to the Night Duty Officer, it would have been delivered in the locked envelope which have previously described, and unless the officer who received it were so informed by Colonel Bratton, he would have had no definite knowledge of its contents as neither I nor any other officer of the Secretariat was classified as "Ultra". If he had been informed of the contents or of their urgent nature, it would have been delivered to the Chief of Staff in accordance with our usual procedure, either by the officer on duty or by Colonel Bratton himself. W. B. Smith, W. B. SMITH Lieutenant General, U. S. A. Subscribed and sworn to before me this 15th day of June 1945. Henry C. Clausen, HENRY C. CLAUSEN, Lt. Col., JAGD. at Frankfort on Main, Germany. Page 92 [198] AFFIDAVIT OF LIEUT. GENERAL LEONARD T. GEROW Lieut. General Leonard T. Gerow, presently Commanding General, 15th Army, being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Lieut. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and that top secrecy is required, deposes and says: During the months of November and December 1941, and theretofore, as Chief, War Plans Division, War Department, I received and reviewed at Washington, D. C., some of the highly secret intercepts of Japanese diplomatic messages which had been decrypted and translated, then known as "Magic." These were delivered in the "raw" (unevaluated form) to me or to my Executive Officer by representatives of G-2, War Department. Copies were not retained by me. Those which I received were returned the same day to representatives of G-2. No receipts were given by or requested of me. When these messages were handed me, no evaluations were made of them by G-2, other than occasional comments by Colonel Rufus S. Bratton. I placed the highest degree of reliance on this form of intelligence. Colonel Clausen has shown me the file of some intercepts of this type, designated Top Secret Exhibit "B". I recall the general substance of some of these messages and presume that they were all presented to me on the approximate dates of the translations. I specifically recall the two numbered 23570 and 23859. I knew that the intercepts in the exhibit mentioned, which pertain to reports to Tokio on ship movements in Pearl Harbor, were going also to and coming from the Navy Department. Since these related especially to the Navy, I assumed that the Navy was fully cognizant, and would interpret this information in connection with Navy studies and estimates, and in coordination with other information available to the Navy and not given to me. My recollection is that there were reports similar in nature which had also been intercepted and disseminated, which showed that Japanese consuls at ports such as Manila and Seattle were giving Tokio information as to ship movements at these places. Colonel Clausen has asked me to comment on what is stated to have been testimony before the Army Pearl Harbor Board to the following general effect: 1) On 4 December 1911, Colonel Bratton of G-2 called General Gerow's attention to an intercept indicating action by Japanese consuls to destroy their codes and papers in accordance with instructions from Tokio, and then asked General Gerow to send more warnings to the overseas commanders. General Gerow replied that sufficient had been sent. Following this, Colonel Bratton conferred with Navy personnel, at whose suggestion he sent on 5 December 1941 a message to G-2, Hawaiian Department, to confer with Commander Rochefort, USN, concerning the Japanese "Winds Code." 2) On 5 December 1941, Colonel Otis R. Sadtler, SC., informed General Gerow that the Japanese "Winds Code" had been implemented to signal breach of diplomatic relations or war with Great Britain, and asked that the Commanding General Hawaiian Department, be notified. General Gerow replied that he thought plenty of notification had been sent. 3) On the night of 6 December 1941, Colonel Bratton or another delivered to General Gerow 13 parts of the 14 part Japanese intercept number 25843. [199] My recollection concerning the facts of these subjects is as follows: 1) I do not recall the incident. In this connection I wish to state that if a representative of G-2 thought my action inadequate he could quite properly report the facts to his superior, General Sherman Miles Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, who had direct access to me and to the Chief of Staff in a matter of such importance. The proper and usual manner was to confer and if the matter still remained unsettled, to present the problem to the Chief of Staff. I believe the Chief of Staff was then available for that purpose. 2) I have no such recollection and I believe that Colonel Sadtler is mistaken. It was my understanding at the time that he was purely a Signal Corps officer and that he was not concerned with the dissemination or interpretation of "Magic." I would naturally expect that enemy information of such grave moment would be brought to my attention and to the attention of the Chief of Staff by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, and not by a Signal Corps officer. To the best of my recollection, I did not receive, Page 93 prior to 7 December 1941, notification from any sources of an implementing message to the Japanese "Winds Code." If I had received such a message or notice thereof, I believe I would now recall the fact, in view of its importance. It is possible that Colonel Sadtler told me of an unverified report, or that he had received some tentative information which was subject to confirmation. In any event, there should be written evidence available in either the War or Navy Departments as to the fact, which evidence would be more reliable than any person's memory at this time, especially since so many major events have intervened. 3) I did not receive or see any parts of the message mentioned until the morning of 7 December 1941, when a conference was held with the Chief of Staff. If I had received parts of the message on the night of 6 December 1941, I would have immediately warned the overseas commanders and informed the Chief of Staff. Access to the Chief of Staff for such purposes was always open to me. In the months immediately before 7 December 1941, I did not receive any written or oral estimates from G-2, properly vouched for, which pointed to Pearl Harbor specifically as the attack target at the opening of hostilities with Japan or the other axis powers. During this period, however, I did on several occasions receive estimates from G-2, some of which were not borne out by subsequent events, and which were to the effect that hostilities with one or more of the Axis powers would open with attacks on almost any of many strategic points of United States or British territory in the Pacific areas. Myself and the members of my staff were constantly concerned with global problems and considerations, involving possibilities of hostile land, sea and air action against the United States by the Axis powers. I wish to state that in my opinion the War Department had sent ample warnings to the overseas commanders, including General Short, to alert their respective commands for war. General Short did not send at any time any notice to the War Department which would indicate that he was not fully prepared or an attack of the kind which occurred, with the means available to him. The War Department had given him estimates and basic war plans which in effect warned him to expect air and submarine attacks as primary threats in the event of war with Japan. These pre- battle and battle plans and estimates [200] with which I was very much concerned, were prepared, reduced to writing and given to General Short and other officers involved after a great deal of mature consideration by the best military brains available to us for that purpose. They represented the consensus of the belief and expert military opinions of the War and Navy Departments and the Hawaiian Department. Since I was aware of this and knew that General Short similarly was fully cognizant thereof, I assumed that these fundamental concepts of primary threats from a surprise attack by Japan would govern General Short in his thinking and preparations in light of the warnings of imminent war. No notice ever reached me that he would disregard these estimates, or that he would omit preparations against an outside threat. General Short at no time informed the War Department that he was not in full agreement with War Department estimates and plans for the defense of Oahu. If he was not in accord with these estimates and plans, then it would have been quite reasonable to assume that he would have informed the War Department, in accordance with established military practice. I assumed also that General Short's liaison with the Navy was such that he received all information of use to him and available to the Navy at Pearl Harbor. It was inadvisable for the War and Navy Departments to send identical or nearly identical messages to the respective commanders at Hawaii, for fear of compromising our codes. Hence, it was understood that information sent by either Department which would be of use to the other service would be exchanged between the two commanders at Hawaii. So far as General Short is concerned, the message to him on 27 November 1941, signed "Marshall", should be considered in the light of all the Army and Navy messages which were sent to Hawaii before and after that date, as well as with whatever other information was available to him. It was my understanding that G-2, War Department, in carrying out his normal responsibilities, was transmitting periodically to the overseas commanders, information, reports and estimates bearing on the current situation. For this purpose, G-2 had available all the intercepts mentioned, as well as many others which are not included in Top Secret Exhibit "B." Concerning the "Magic" messages, it was necessary to guard most carefully against compromising the source of this extremely valuable intelligence. Only Page 94 a very few persons knew the details. For example, I did not know fully how it was obtained. Under this necessity, therefore, it was not the policy of the War Department to send these messages to overseas commanders. The wisdom of this policy has been proved by our recent victories. If more detailed information, or if the actual intercepts, had been sent to Hawaii, then the same procedure would have been followed with respect to the other overseas commanders, some of whom were at places of greater vulnerability than Hawaii. This would have led to great danger of compromise. The spreading of this highly secret information at that time into so many hands might have lost us for the present war the source of this form of the best evidence of the enemy's intentions. This loss would have been a great disaster, resulting in prolongation of the war, increased bloodshed, uncertainty and expense, and Possible defeats. L. T. GEROW, Lieut. Gen. U. S. Army. Subscribed and sworn to before me this 20th day of June, 1945. Henry C. Clausen, HENRY C. CLAUSEN, Lieut. Colonel, JAGD. at Cannes, France. TOP SECRET [201] AFFIDAVIT OF COLONEL ROBERT E. SCHUKRAFT, SC Colonel Robert E. Schukraft, SC, presently Officer in Charge, Signal Intelligence Service, Signal Section, MTOUSA, AFHQ, Caserta, Italy, being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Lieut. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and that top secrecy is required, deposes and says: On 7 December 1941, and for some time prior thereto, I was stationed at Washington, D. C., in charge of radio intercepts for the Signal Intelligence Service, War Department. As such, my duties included the direct supervision of radio intercept stations operated by the Chief Signal Officer. In the course of these duties I saw at various times some of the intercepts which had been decrypted and decoded and translated. Regarding the so-called Japanese "Winds Code", I recall seeing, at about the time of their translation, the intercept in Top Secret Exhibit "B", numbered 25432. When I saw this message I directed the San Francisco intercept station to intercept all plain text Japanese messages and to pick up the news reports from Tokyo. The station did this and sent the messages and reports in to me. To the best of my knowledge none of these containing the code words were ever picked up. I did, however, see an intercept of a telephone conversation between Kurusu and a person in Tokyo, who I believe was Yamamoto, similar in form to the intercepts in Top Secret Exhibit "B" numbered 25349 and 25497, but in which the person at the Tokyo end gave to Kurusu the "Winds Code" signal indicating breach of diplomatic relations between Japan and the United States. Kurusu in reply said something to the effect that he was sorry to hear this. The message to which I refer came to the Signal Intelligence Service from the Navy, as a Navy intercept or translation, during the period about 28 November 1941 to 6 December 1941. I think this message also contained some code words translated as "It is a boy." I did not know the meaning of this latter code. When the message mentioned was received from the Navy the Signal Intelligence Service sent it immediately to G-2. As additional leads in connection with the foregoing, I suggest interrogation of my former superior Colonel Minckler; also especially Lieut. Colonel Rowlett and Miss Prather. Additional information may possibly be obtained from Colonel Doud, Miss Ray Cave (wife of Sgt. Liparini), and Mrs. Hazel Adams. ROBERT E. SCHUKRAFT. Subscribed and sworn to before me this 26th day of June, 1945, at Caserta, Italy. Henry C. Clausen, HENRY C. CLAUSEN, Lieut. Colonel, JAGD. Page 95 [202] George W. Reuchard, presently on duty at the American Embassy to the Netherlands Government, London, England, being duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, convened pursuant to Joint Resolution of the Congress, approved July 13, 1944, and that top secrecy is required, deposes and says: I have read the attached sworn statement of Mr. John F. Stone dated July 7, 1945 given to Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, and incorporate herein the allegations thereof as my statement in response to similar questioning. GEORGD W. REUCHARD. Subscribed and sworn to before me at London, 7 July 1946. HENRY C. CLAUSEN, Lt. Colonel, JAGD. [203] John F. Stone, presently on duty at the American Embassy, London, England, being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board convened pursuant to Joint Resolution of the Congress, approved June 13, 194i, and that Top Secrecy is required, DEPOSES AND SAYS: During the months of November and December, 1941, and for some time theretofore, I was a Foreign Service Officer and a personal assistant to the Secretary of State at Washington, D. C. As such, I received during this period from two United States Army officers named Bratton and Dusenbury, who were then I believe Majors or Lieutenant Colonels, allegedly representing the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department, Washington, D. C., various intercepts of official Japanese messages which had been decrypted and translated, and which were landed to me for submission to the Secretary of State. These messages were also handed occasionally for the same purpose to Mr. C. W. Gray and Mr. George W. Renchard, who performed similar duties for the Secretary of State, and were at some times handed direct to the Secretary of State by the alleged representative of G-2. The intercepts were, to the best of my recollection, complete translations of the deciphered code texts. I do not recollect that except for possibly a few instances receipts were required when they were of course always given. If, however, delivery was made direct to the Secretary of State by the alleged representative of [204] G-2 written record of the visit to the Secretary of State was normally made in his engagement book. I do not remember that any copies were ever made of the intercepts, which were either read and returned while the alleged representative of G-2 waited or returned to him at the time of a subsequent delivery or call. The irregularity in the delivery of and the volume of the intercepts were such as to prevent my recollection of any specific details regarding any one or several deliveries; I thus cannot state the exact time prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor December 7, 1941, when any intercept indicating the possibility of a breach in diplomatic relations between Japan and the United States or Great Britain might have been received or called to my attention. Prior to the servicing of the Secretary of State with the intercepts in question by the alleged representatives of G-2 as mentioned, the function was performed periodically by officers of the United States Navy, presumably of the Office of Naval Intelligence, and it is my recollection that on one or more occasions information of this type was brought to the Office of the Secretary of State by Naval officer subsequent to the date when as requested United States Army officers undertook the continuous servicing of the Secretary of State. I recollect no statement made to me by any United States Navy Officer prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, which I interpreted as indicating the possibility of said attack. JOHN F. STONE. Sworn and subscribed to before me this 7th day of July 1945. HENRY C. CLAUSEN Lt. Colonel, JAGD. at London, England. Page 96 TOP SECRET [205] AFFIDAVIT OF MAJOR GENERAL JOHN R. DEANE John R. Deane, Major General. USA, being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and that top secrecy is required, deposes and says: During the months of November and December, 1941, I was on duty in the War Department, Washington, D. C., as Assistant Secretary, General Staff; On 6 December 1941, I was not on duty after 5 p. m., and did not receive from Colonel Rufus S. Bratton, nor from Colonel Carlisle Dusenbury, or any other person, any pouch for the Chief of Staff; On 7 December, 1941, I arrived at the Munitions Building for duty at the same time as Colonel Bratton, which to the best of my recollection, was between 9 and 9:30 a.m. JOHN R. DEANE Major General, USA, Commanding General, U. S. Mil Mission with U. S. S. R. Subscribed and sworn to before me this 24th day of July 1945. HENRY C. CLAUSEN, Lt. Colonel, JAGD. at Potsdam, Germany. [206] AFFIDAVIT OF COLONEL. RUFUS S. BRATTON Colonel Rufus S. Bratton, O-3726, GSC, presently A. C. OF S. G-2, U. S. HQ., BERLIN DISTRICT, being first duly sworn, and informed of the investigation by Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, convened pursuant to Joint Resolution of the Congress, approved June 13, 1944, and that Top Secrecy is required, deposes and says: Colonel Clausen has shown me and has asked me to comment on certain testimony adduced before the Army Pearl Harbor Board; and on statements and affidavits of Carlisle Clyde Dusenbury, Colonel, GSC; Moses W. Pettigrew, Colonel; Ralph C. Smith, Major General; Charles K. Gailey, Brig. General; Thomas J. Betts, Brig. General; Walter B. Smith, Lieut. General, Leonard T. Gerow, Lieut. General; Robert E. Schukraft, Colonel; John F. Stone and George W. Renchard, which statements and affidavits were given by the named persons to Colonel Clausen in the course of the investigation mentioned. During the month of December, 1941, and for several years prior thereto, as Chief, Far Eastern Section, Intelligence Branch, War Department G-2, I received and reviewed at Washington, D. C. various intercepts of Japanese diplomatic radio messages for the purpose of screening and distributing to authorized officials such of these intercepts as were matters of military intelligence value. In the period of about October to December, 1941, the volume of these intercepts increased to such an extent that with the permission of General Miles, A. C. of S. G-2, I utilized several of my assistants, such as then Major or Lieut. Colonel Dusenbury, then Major Moore, then Lieutenant Schindel, in processing, assembling and distributing this material. These were distributed in the raw, unevaluated form. This arrangement and method of presentation to the Chief of Staff and other authorized recipients had been prescribed by the Chief of Staff. These recipients during October to December, 1941, authorized by the Chief of Staff, were, so far as G-2 distribution was concerned, the Chief of Staff, the Secretary of War, the Secretary of State, the Chief, War Plans Division and Assistant Chief of Staff, G- 2. By agreement between the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, and representatives of the Office of Naval Intelligence, the President was served by representatives of the Navy. The normal procedure was to secure receipts by SIS document numbers from the Aide to the Secretary of War, the confidential secretaries of the Secretary of State, and the Executive Officer of the War Plans Division. The material distributed and thus covered by receipts were usually taken from the recipients by the representatives of G-2 mentioned the following day, and were then burned with the Page 97 corresponding receipts which were given to assure the ultimate destruction the material. During the period October to November, 1941, the G-2 received daily about fifty to seventy five of these intercepts which were sorted to about twenty per cent for distribution, and which twenty per cent represented such the documents as had intelligence value. It was necessary to have help in the distribution of this material so that the various recipients would receive their copies simultaneously. I am unable to call at this time except as may be hereinafter [207] mentioned, and there are no records to show, who delivered what to whom during this period, with any degree of accuracy. Concerning the so-called Japanese "Winds Code", I recall a meeting about 5 December 1941 with General Miles and Colonel Otis R. Sadtler, SC, at which Colonel Sadtler presented information he had received from Admiral Noyes of a possible implementation. There had been several "false alarm" reports to this same effect. In view of an intercept which had already been received and translated, being an order from Tokyo to the embassy of Japan at Washington to destroy their codes, in my opinion an implementation message to the "Winds Code" was superfluous and no longer of importance, since the purpose would be to effect a destruction of the codes. Following receipt of the order mentioned, I verified that the Japanese Embassy at Washington were burning what appeared to important papers. Colonel Sadtler was, however, directed at the meeting mentioned, to get from Admiral Noyes verification of the purported implementation message in the form of a clear text and in the original Japanese. Colonel Sadtler never, to my knowledge, returned to G-2 with this or any additional information the subject. I have no knowledge as to whether Colonel Sadtler, after getting the purported implementation message mentioned, went to Walter B. Smith, then Secretary of the General Staff, or to Leonard T. Gerow, then Chief of the War Plans Division, and in effect asked that the Hawaiian Department be given more warning. I did not mention to the Chief of Staff the subject of Colonel Sadtler's report, nor do I know that any one else in G-2 did. General Miles and I, by reason of our knowledge among other things of the existence of the ABCD Bloc, were aware of the implications which would be inherent in any implementing message to the "Winds Code" indicating Japanese aggression against Great Britain. At no time prior to 7 December 1941, although a thorough alert in this regard was in effect, did I ever see or hear of an authentic message implementing the "Winds Code". In connection with testimony of Captain Safford on this subject the effect that two copies of such a message was sent by the Navy to the Army, it was the customary practice for the Navy when sending the Army material of is character, to send six copies. Prior to 7 December 1941, representatives of the Navy had discussed with me several "false alarms", but no one in the Navy had discussed with me, nor to my knowledge with any one else in G-2, the message supposed to have been received according to the testimony of Captain Safford. The intercept mentioned from Tokyo to the Japanese Embassy at Washington, destroy their codes and ciphers, was processed for distribution to the authorized recipients. The intercept, Tokyo to Washington, consisting of fourteen parts, SIS No. 25843, started coming in from the Navy the evening of 6 December 1941, when was on duty with Colonel Dusenbury in the office. We assembled and studied the thirteen parts, which I believe had come in by ten o'clock p. m. After receipt of the thirteenth part I called the officer on duty at the SIS, who I believe was either Colonel Schukraft or Colonel Doud, and asked if there was any likelihood of the fourteenth part coming in that night. I was told there was not, as there had been a delay in transmission. Colonel Dusenbury and I then assembled the thirteen parts in preparation for delivery to the authorized recipients. [208] I directed Colonel Dusenbury to deliver the set for the Chief of Staff to his home at Fort Meyer that night as Colonel Dusenbury went to his home Arlington. This was about ten o'clock p. m. The sets of these thirteen parts for the ACofS, G-2, the Chief WPD, and the Secretary of War were not delivered the night of 6 December 1941, but were delivered the next morning, 7 December 1941, with the fourteenth part. They were not given to General Walter B. Smith, General Leonard T. Gerow, General Gailey or General Ralph Smith the night of 6 December 1941, nor were they given that night to General Sherman Miles. When I saw the Chief of Staff the morning of 7 December 1941, he then had the fourteen part message, which I had not given him. About o'clock p. m. on 6 December 1941, I took the thirteen parts destined for the Page 98 Secretary of State and between ten and eleven p. m. delivered them to the night duty officer at the State Department. I cannot recall who the night duty officer was. I told this officer that it was of the greatest importance that the papers be placed in the hand of the Secretary of State at once. He assured me that this would be done. This was the only delivery I made that night. I then went home to bed and returned to the office the following morning between 7:30 and 8 a. m. 7 December 1941. The fourteenth part of the message came to my desk about the time I reached my office. It was processed at once and about 8:30 a. m. it was sent to be delivered to the authorized recipients. I did not deliver any material that morning except the intercept, Tokyo to Washington, SIS No. 25850, being the instruction to the ambassadors to deliver at 1 p. m,/1941, Japan's reply to the United States, and which intercept I gave to the Chief of Staff between ten thirty and eleven thirty that morning. The last mentioned message was sent to the Secretary of State for delivery by either Colonel Dusenbury or Lieutenant Schindel. In my opinion the fourteen part message mentioned was relatively unimportant, in view of the other messages which preceded it, especially the one ordering the destruction of the Japanese codes and ciphers and the one ordering the delivery of the fourteen part message at one p. m. 7 December 1941. The fourteen part message was merely the formal announcement couched in diplomatic language of a break which, from the evidence, seemed inevitable. I do not recall having discussed the thirteen parts of the fourteen part message with General Sherman Miles the night of 6 December 1941. In further reference to my seeing the fourteen parts on the desk or in the possession of the Chief of Staff the morning of 7 December 1941, I do not know for certain how they came into his possession. Any prior statements or testimony of mine which may be contrary to any statements here, including among other things as to the processing and delivery of material, and to whom and when, should be modified and considered changed in accordance with my statements herein. This affidavit now represents my best recollection of the matters and events set forth, and a better recollection than when I previously testified before the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and is made after having my memory refreshed in several ways and respects. RUFUS S. BRATTON Col. G. S. C. Subscribed and sworn to before me this 27th day of July, 1945, at Paris, France. Henry C. Clausen, HENRY C. CLAUSEN, Lieut. Colonel, JAGD. [209] AFFIDAVIT OF COLONEL OTIS K. SADTLER Colonel Otis K. Sadtler, SC, assigned to the Army Ground Forces and on duty at Washington, D. C., being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board pursuant to Joint Resolution of Congress. and that top secrecy is required, deposes and says: Referring to my testimony on 6 October 1944 before the Army Pearl Harbor Board as to information of a possible "Winds Code" execute message given me on 5 December 1941 by Admiral Noyes, I wish to add further that following my second telephone conversation with Admiral Noyes on that day, as set forth on page 252, Top Secret Volume D, transcript of proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, I did nothing further to ascertain from Admiral Noyes or any other person the exact wording of the intercept or information which he had conveyed to me, and as far as I know nothing further was done to get further information from Admiral Noyes. I assumed that the basis of the information before Admiral Noyes when he telephoned me was an intercept which would, according to the standard practice, be transmitted without delay to G-2 of the Army. I made the recommendations to General Gerow and General Smith on 5 December 1941, as stated on pages 253 and 254 of the transcript mentioned, without getting additional information from Admiral Noyes, on my own initiative and without informing any representatives of G-2. I was alarmed by the series of Japanese diplomatic and consular intercepts which I had been reading over a considerable period of time, and the mounting tension, and the information which Page 99 Admiral Noyes had just given me. Accordingly, after I had conferred with General Miles and Colonel Bratton, as I have testified before the Army Pearl arbor Board, I went to my office, which was also in the Munitions Buildings and personally typed a proposed warning which I intended to recommend be sent to the overseas commanders, and which warning read substantially as follows and quoted herewith from memory: "C. G.-P. I., Hawaii-Panama. Reliable information indicates war with Japan in the very near future stop take every precaution to prevent a repetition of Port Arthur stop notify the Navy. Marshall." I have since checked with my office staff at the time and they have no recollection of the drafting of this proposed warning message. I did not show it to anyone. I do not know where the message is now and I made no copy at the me. After I had typed this message I conferred with General Gerow and General Smith, as I have testified before the Army Pearl Harbor Board. I did not [210] show them the warning message I had typed. I have read the comments of General Gerow and General Smith in affidavits given Colonel Clausen, dated respectively 20 June 1945 and 15 June 1945, referring to my testimony before the Army Pearl Harbor Board as to my conference with them for the purpose stated on 5 December 1941. I believe that comments by General Gerow and General Smith, contained in the affidavits mentioned, are correct statements of fact, wherein they set forth as follows concerning this subject: General Gerow.-"I have no such recollection and I believe that Colonel Sadtler is mistaken. It was my understanding at the time that he was purely Signal Corps officer and that he was not concerned with the dissemination or interpretation of "Magic." I would naturally expect that enemy information of such grave moment would be brought to my attention and to the attention of the Chief of Staff by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, and not by a Signal Corps Officer. To the best of my recollection, I did not receive, prior to 7 December 1941, notification from any source of an implementing message to the Japanese "Winds Code." If I had received such a message or notice thereof, I believe I would now recall the fact, in view of its importance. It is possible that Colonel Sadtler told me of an unverified report, or that he had received some tentative formation which was subject to confirmation. In any event, there should be written evidence available in either the War or Navy Departments as to the fact, which evidence would be more reliable than any person's memory at this time, especially so since so many major events have intervened." General Smith.-"I do not recall Colonel Sadtler's coming to me as he has stated. However, since the matter in question was obviously a difference of opinion between the A. C. of S., G-2, and the A. C. of S., War Plans Division, both of whom had direct access to the Chief of Staff, it was not one in which I had any responsibility or authority, and I cannot imagine why Colonel Sadtler would have asked me to intervene in a question of this kind, particularly since I was not at that time an "Ultra" officer, and it would have been impossible for me to give me any information to support his contention that I should step out of my rather minor province." I had seen no intercepts and no information came to my attention which pointed to Pearl Harbor as an attack target prior to 7 December 1941. The actual attack on Pearl Harbor was a surprise to me. I thought that the Panama Canal would be the surprise attack target. [Hand written: Other than the persons mentioned, namely Gen. Miles Col. Bratton, Genl. Gerow, Col. Smith, and whomever may have been in Gen. Miles' office the time, to the best of my recollection, prior to Dec. 7, 1941 I did not give any other person the information I received from Admiral Noyes.] [211] I did not see any execute message to the arrangement for sending such a message as contemplated by the so-called Japanese "Winds Code", and far as I know there was no such execute message received in the War Department. I had no time urged General Sherman Miles, G-2, or any other representative G-2, to send any warning message to the overseas commanders, and I deny the testimony in that regard of Mr. Friedman given to General Carter W. Clarke on 13 July 1945. I also deny the testimony of Mr. Friedman given to General Clarke to the effect that I could not get the execute message from Admiral Noyes, and reiterated that other than making the telephone call, as testified before the Army Pearl Harbor Board, I made no further efforts to obtain the execute message mentioned by Admiral Noyes. Page 100 I further deny the testimony of Mr. Friedman given General Clarke to the effect that I had collected and had material in a safe deposit box concerning the Pearl Harbor disaster. I have not collected any such material in a safe-deposit box although I thought I had done so. I do have possession of the testimony given by me before General Carter W. Clarke on two occasions, 16 September 1944 and 14 July 1945, which was given to me by General Clarke, and is now in a private box in my home. Otis K. Sadtler, OTIS K. SADTLER, Colonel, S. C. Subscribed and sworn to before me this 13th day of August 1941. Henry C. Clausen, HENRY C. CLAUSEN. Lt. Colonel, JAGD. At Washington, D. C. [212] AFFIDAVIT OF MAJOR GENERAL CHARLES D. HERRON Major General Charles D. Herron presently assigned to the Office Chief of Staff, War Department, being first duly sworn, and informed of the investigation by Lieut. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, pursuant to Joint Resolution of the Congress. and that Top Secrecy is required, desposes and says: Referring to my testimony given the Army Pearl Harbor Board on 9 August 1944, I wish to state further that when arrangements had been made for General Short to relieve me as Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, which command I had held since October 1937, I desired to acquaint him as fully as I could with my experience and knowledge of affairs pertaining thereto. Since he was to arrive and I was to depart on the same ship, there was only a limited time in which to do this by personal conferences, namely, two and one-half days. Accordingly, in order that he might be prepared for his conferences with me, I sent to San Francisco for delivery to him there certain papers and material relating to the command, for his preliminary review on the ship's journey of five days. These papers and material comprised in effect an agenda and exhibits. Upon my meeting General Short when he arrived at Hawaii, I asked him whether he had received the data at San Francisco and whether he had read the papers and material. He replied that they had been received by him at San Francisco but that he had not given them much time while en route. I did what I could in the limited time of two and one-half days then remaining to brief General Short personally on matters pertaining to the command. This included my giving him my opinions on the officers and men. I told him of my estimate as to the efficiency of the staff officers and, with respect to G-2, that Colonel George W. Bicknell, a Reserve Officer, was an experienced and qualified, efficient man for that position, and that it had been my intention to make him my G-2. I further told him of the G-2 work being done, of the liaison with the Navy, the FBI and related sources of information, of the defense plans, of my experience and measures taken in the all-out alert of 1940 which I had ordered on receipt of a communication from the War Department, dated 17 June 1940, reading as follows: "Immediately alert complete defensive organization to deal with possible trans-Pacific raid, to the greatest extent possible without creating public hysteria or provoking undue curiosity of newspapers or alien agents. Suggest maneuver basis. Maintain alert until further orders. Instructions for secret communication direct with Chief of Staff will be furnish you shortly. Acknowledge." [213] I also told him of the relations and cooperation which bad existed with the Navy, of the civilian population, of the Japanese situation, of the assumption that alien agents conducted espionage for the Japanese Government. I took him around the Island of Oahu, showing him the installations and gave him my ideas of possible attack and defense of that Island. Following my talks with General Short at the time mentioned, in Hawaii, he did not ever ask my opinions or for information or correspond with me on the subject of command and related problems. Concerning your question as to whether correct military practice, current in 1941, permitted a Commanding General of an overseas Department to revise a Page 101 War Department estimate of the situation, without consulting with or reporting to the War Department my answer is that the Commander may and should take whatever action he believes dictated by necessity but must so report to the War Department at the earliest possible moment. Charles D. Herron, CHARLES D. HERRON, Major General, U. S. A. Subscribed and sworn to before me this 13th day of August 1945. Henry C. Clausen, HENRY C. CLAUSEN, Lt. Colonel, JAGD. At Washington, D. C. [214] AFFIDAVIT OF MAJOR GENERAL SHERMAN MILES MAJOR GENERAL SHERMAN MILES, presently Commanding General, First Service Command, being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Lieut. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, pursuant to Joint Resolution of the Congress, and that Top Secrecy is required, deposes and says: Concerning the testimony I gave before the Army Pearl Harbor Board, 8 August 1944, as corrected by my letter, 18 August 1944, I wish to add that I avoided any statement concerning details of information and intelligence which I had derived from Top Secret sources then called "Magic", or any intimation that such sources existed. The reason I so limited my testimony was because prior to my appearance before the Board, Brig. General Russell A. Osmun and then Colonel Carter V. Clarke, of G-2, War Department transmitted to me instructions from the Chief of Staff that I was not to disclose to the Army Pearl Harbor Board any facts concerning the radio intelligence mentioned, or the existence of that form of information or intelligence in the period preceding 7 December 1941. Accordingly, I obeyed that instruction. My testimony mentioned above should be considered in that light, therefore. In the months preceding 7 December 1941, there was available to the War and Navy Departments in Washington, D. C., intercepts of Japanese radio messages to their diplomatic and consular representatives throughout the world. These were intercepted, decrypted, decoded and translated by the two services in Washington D. C., under arrangements for mutual assistance in this regard and for their dissemination. So far as the Army was concerned, Colonel Rufus S. Bratton, who was the head of the Ear Eastern Section of the Intelligence Branch, when I was G-2, War Department, received and reviewed the material received daily from this source. He and his assistants, Colonel Dusenbury, Major Moore and Lieutenant Schindel, screened the material, picking out that which contained information valuable from a military intelligence standpoint. The latter was then distributed by these officers to various officers and persons who had theretofore been summarized to receive them. Those on this authorized list, in the several months immediately preceding 7 December 1941, and to whom deliveries were made by the officers mentioned, included the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, the Chief of Staff, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 and the Assistant Chief of Staff, WPD. The material was delivered in locked brief cases. The brief cases contained receipts for purposes of assuring the ultimate destruction of the material thus delivered. The cases were returned to Colonel Bratton's office when they had been read, the receipts they contained having been initialed by the authorized officers. The material and the receipts were then destroyed by burning. This intelligence was distributed in the raw, unevaluated form. I do not believe there are any records which would show what intercepts were delivered to whom, nor the dates of delivery, so far as any particular intercepts are concerned. I do not think that any such records were made at the time. Colonel Clausen has shown me a file of such intercepts, called Top Secret Exhibit "B" before the Army Pearl Harbor Board. At this late date I am unable to recall having seen, prior to 7 December 1941, any particular messages translated prior to that date, except those bearing Army serial numbers 23570, 23859, 24373 25322, 24878, 25432, 25138, 25435, 25445, 25496, 25552, 25553, 25554, 25555, 25727, 25545, 25640, 25785, 25836 and 25838. In the latter cases, each of the messages contain something that I recall knowing or seeing at the time. The remainder of the series do not. I do not recall the intercepts, Army serial numbers 25874 and 25877, summaries of which were shown me by Colonel Clausen nor do I know how these two happened to be omitted from the Top Secret Exhibit "B", in the Page 102 preparation of which I was not in any way concerned. I must add, however, that I believe I saw, prior to 7 December [215] 1941, all the messages contained in Top Secret Exhibit "B", which were translated prior to that date except number 25843. My belief is based on the fact that they were of such importance that my officers would have assured themselves that I had seen them. Those which I do not recall simply do not register in my mind after nearly four years. Concerning such of the intercepts mentioned as relate to reports by the Japanese consul at Honolulu to Tokyo and inquiries from Tokyo as to ship movements in Pearl Harbor, and the division of Pearl Harbor into districts for such reporting, I would like to point out that such messages were primarily of Naval interest and what might have been expected. Of course the Japanese were following the movements of our major ships, as best they could, as we were doing with regard to their ships. Since I knew that the Navy was getting the messages mentioned also, they did not leave any impression on my mind which has endured four years. Further concerning the intercepts mentioned as contained in Top Secret Exhibit "B", and those which related to joint action by the ABCD Bloc, or members thereof, I knew at the time about the Joint Action Agreement. The general contents of the first thirteen parts of the intercepts in the Top Secret Exhibit "B", number 25843, consisting of fourteen parts, were known to me on the evening of 6 December 1941. This came about because I was dining at the home of my opposite number in the Navy, Admiral Wilkinson, when Admiral Bearsdall the President's Aide, brought the information to Admiral Wilkinson, who transmitted it to me. Concerning the intercepts of the character mentioned, it was my belief in the period preceding 7 December 1941, that the Navy was intercepting, decrypting, decoding and translating this material, consisting of Japanese diplomatic and consular messages, at Hawaii, for use in connection with the fleet. I was given so to understand by Naval sources, but I do not recall who told me. Referring to testimony as to a meeting I am said to have had with Colonel Bratton and Colonel Sadtler, on 5 December 1941, concerning information received by Colonel Sadtler from Admiral Noyes of a possible "Winds Code" execute message, I cannot specifically recall any such meeting, nor having received the information stated. To the best of my knowledge and belief, no authentic execute message was ever received in the War Department before the outbreak of hostilities. In the event of the receipt of such a message, I was prepared to transmit it immediately to the Chief of Staff and to WPD. The Far Eastern Section of G-2 was especially alerted to watch for this message since receiving information of the "Winds Code" set-up. It was considered most important and of vital concern. I have some recollection that there were several messages intercepted which, while thought at first to be the execute message, proved on analysis not to be authentic, or to be too vague for definite acceptance as such. It is my belief that the meeting with Colonel Sadtler on 5 December 1941, if it occurred, concerned such a message. It may have resulted in the message to Hawaii about Commander Rochefort, on that date. As to the meeting the morning, of 7 December 1941, with the Chief of Staff, according to my best recollection, refreshed from notes made shortly thereafter, I conferred with the Chief of Staff in his office at the Munitions Building at about 11 a. m. On the general subject of my being alive to the danger of a possible surprise attack against Pearl Harbor, I would like to refer to my service in the Hawaiian Detachment, during 1929-1932, as Department G-3. It was while so assigned that I [216] prepared and disseminated a General Staff study, afterwards disseminated further by General Wells, on the defense of Oahu. This study emphasized the advantages which an attack on Oahu, particularly by surprise, might give Japan. The usual assumption in war planning during my assignment was that of a surprise attack made with little warning in the nature of strained relations internationally, what was called "out of the blue". I remember one situation we war-gamed, that of an attack "out of the blue" on a Sunday morning. During my service as G-2, War Department, I caused Colonel Warren J. Clear to be sent to the Ear East for undercover work for G-2. He made reports to G-2, War Department, using the name of Knight, through Colonel Brink at Singapore. My attention has been called to the testimony of William F. Friedman, given to Admiral Henry K. Hewitt, as conducting for the Secretary of the Navy the type of investigation being conducted for the Secretary of War by Colonel Clausen. To my knowledge, no records of G-2, War Department, pertinent to Pearl Page 103 Harbor, were ever ordered destroyed by General Marshall, or any other person. Specifically, to my knowledge, General Marshall did not ever order destroyed any copies of a possible "Winds Code" execute message. Nor, to my knowledge, were any records of G-2, pertinent to Pearl Harbor and derogatory to the War Department, destroyed. While serving as G-2, I would have known of any destruction of records ordered by any competent authority. Concerning the question as to whether correct military practice, current in 1941, would have justified a Commanding General of an overseas command, such as the Hawaiian Department, to act contrary to War Department estimates of the situation, such as were contained in War Department messages prior to 7 December 1941, without consulting with or reporting to the War Department, my answer is that the Commanding General was responsible for the successful execution of his mission; he could act contrary to War Department estimates of the situation, but at his own risk; and that custom and doctrine of command would require him to report his action and the reasons therefore promptly to is superiors. In my opinion the messages sent by the War Department to General Short, prior to 7 December 1941, especially the ones dated 27 November 1941, were definitive directives that a war alert was required by the situation, and that there was an immediate threat from without as well as danger from sabotage. SHERMAN MILES. Subscribed and sworn to before me this 16th day of August, 1945, at Boston, Mass. Henry C. Clausen HENRY C. CLAUSEN Lieut. Colonel, JAGD. [217] AFFIDAVIT OF COLONEL REX W. MINCKLER, SC Colonel Rex W. Minckler, SC, presently director of training, Camp Crowder, Mo., being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, pursuant to joint resolution of the Congress, and that TOP SECRECY is required, deposes and says: On 7 December 1941, and for some months prior thereto, I was stationed at Washington, D. C. as Officer in Charge of Signal Intelligence Service. Colonel Robert E. Schukraft and Colonel Harold S. Doud were my subordinates in the Signal Intelligence Service at the time, and Colonel Otis K. Sadtler was my superior. My duties included the direct supervision of the receipt and dissemination of intercepted radio messages. In the course of these duties I saw at various times most of the intercepts of Japanese radio messages which had been decrypted and translated. Regarding the so-called Japanese "Winds Code", I recall having seen, and at about the time of its translation, the intercept numbered 25432 in Top Secret Exhibit "B", before the Army Pearl Harbor Board. I recall the action which was taken under my supervision to monitor for the execute message contemplated by the "Winds Code". I never saw or heard of an authentic execute message of this character either before or since 7 December 1941. It is my belief that no such message was sent. Before 7 December 1941 there were one or two "false alarms", one of which I think discussed with representatives of G-2 and the Navy, and which was to the effect that a possible execute message ad been received indicating a breach of Japanese and British relations. My opposite number in the Navy was Captain L. F. Safford. I was in almost daily contact with Army and Navy representatives who were also on the lookout for such an execute message, and it is my belief that if an authentic execute message ad been received, some of these persons would have discussed it with me. The normal procedure in the reciprocal sending of messages by the Army and Navy, one to the other, was to send six copies. Concerning the two messages shown me by Colonel Clausen, Army Serial numbers 25874 and 25877, which appear to have been intercepted on 6 December 1941 and translated on 8 December 1941, I believe the time indicated for decrypting and translation by the Army was normal and then required for decrypting and decoding Code PA-K2. The Navy time was about four days. The Code indicated was not top priority and involved manual processing. When the intercepts [218] were received by the Signal Intelligence Service they were sorted into categories of priority, and then after being decrypted and Page 104 translated, one copy was retained by the Signal Intelligence Service and additional copies were then sent to G-2 and the Navy ONI for dissemination. Rex W. Minckler, REX W. MINCKLER, Colonel, SC. Subscribed and sworn to before me this 21st day of August 1945. Henry C. Clausen, HENRY C. CLAUSEN. Lt. Colonel, JAGD. At Washington, D. C. [219] AFFIDAVIT OF GENERAL GEORGE C. MARSHALL GENERAL GEORGE C. MARSHALL, presently Chief of Staff, War Department, being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, pursuant to Joint Resolution of the Congress, and that Top Secrecy is required, deposes and says: Concerning testimony I gave the Army Pearl Harbor Board, I wish to add that, as indicated on page 6 of the Secret Transcript of Proceedings before the Army Pearl Harbor Board, the General Officers comprising the voting members of that Board, namely, Lt. General Grunert, Major General Henry D. Russell, and Major General Walter H. Frank, participated in a closed session with me from 11:10 A. M. to 12:07 P. M. on 7 August 1944. As indicated on pages 4 and 6 of the Top Secret Transcript of the Proceedings, during this closed session I informed the General Officers mentioned the character of information which had been derived before 7 December 1941 from Top Secret sources then called "Magic". I told them, among other things that the source of this information included intercepts of Japanese radio diplomatic messages which were decrypted, decoded and translated under the supervision of the Signal Corps and G- 2. I further stated that neither this information nor the source thereof should be made public because it would result in at least temporarily, if not permanently, extinguishing that source. This [220] would have meant that our enemies concerned would certainly have changed their systems of communication and would thus have terminated this most vital source of information which has continued to be available up to the present hour. Many of our military successes and the saving of American lives would have been seriously limited if the source of intelligence mentioned had been so compromised. I did not see General Miles, Colonel Bratton or Colonel Sadtler, officers of G-2 and the Signal Corps, who were some of the officers concerned with "Magic", prior to or after their testimony before the Army Pearl Harbor Board. Though I personally and secretly informed the voting members of the Board of the existence and important part played by "Magic", it was not until it developed that the "Magic" papers were being disclosed before the Navy Court of Inquiry that the Army officers concerned were authorized to go into all the details regarding "Magic" before the Army Pearl Harbor Board. On my second appearance before the Army Pearl Harbor Board, 29 September 1944, I discussed with the Board at length the general problem concerning the method of including "Magic" in the report of the Board and also the availability to the Board of any officers concerned for the purpose of giving testimony on the Top Secret "Magic" phases of the investigation. I informed the Board, for example, as indicated on pages 18 and 37, of the Top Secret Transcript mentioned, that Colonel Bratton was available in Washington for that purpose. [221] Concerning intercepts of the character mentioned, it was my understanding in the period preceding 7 December 1941 that the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department was aware of and was receiving some of this information from facilities available in his command. Concerning information sent to General Short or his command prior to 7 December 1941, I find that Colonel George W. Bicknell, Assistant G-2 at the time for General Short, testified before Colonel Clausen that he was shown, about 3 December 1941, a wire from the Navy Department, Washington, to the Navy at Pearl Harbor, in effect as set forth on page 183, Top Secret Volume "C" Transcript Page 105 of Proceedings before the Army Pearl Harbor Board in the testimony of Captain L. F Safford, USN, which reads as follows: "Highly reliable information has been received that categoric and urgent instructions were sent yesterday to the Japanese diplomatic and consular posts at Hong Kong, Singapore, Batavia, Manila, Washington, and London to destroy most of their codes and ciphers at once and to burn all other important confidential and secret documents." It is customary and expected that information of this character would be exchanged between the respective Services at Hawaii. Concerning correspondence which was exchanged between General Short and myself before 7 December 1941, I gave him my estimates in my letters to him dated 7 February 1941 and 5 March 1941 as follows: [222] "My impression of the Hawaiian problem has been that if no serious harm is done us during the first six hours of known hostilities thereafter the existing defenses would discourage an enemy against the hazard of an attack. The risk of sabotage and the risk involved in a surprise raid by air and by submarine, constitute the real perils of the situation. Frankly, I do not see any landing threat in the Hawaiian Islands so long as we have air superiority." "I would appreciate your early review of the situation in the Hawaiian Department with regard to defense from air attack. The establishment of a satisfactory system of coordinating all means available to this end is a matter of first priority." Estimates to the same general effect were sent to General Short by the War Department. General Short answered these estimates prior to 7 December 1941 with replies and sent communications to the War Department which indicated that he was then alive to the danger of the possible surprise attack by air against Pearl Harbor. He participated in plans and exercises against such a possibility. At no time did General Short inform me or, to my knowledge, anyone else in the War Department that he was not in full agreement with these War Department estimates and plans for the defense of Oahu, which in effect warned him to expect air and submarine attacks as primary threats in the event of war with Japan. The doctrine of military command required that the Commanding General of an overseas command, such as the Hawaiian Department, must not act contrary to War Department estimates of the character mentioned, unless he believed such action to be dictated by necessity and unless he immediately reported and gave full details and reasons to the War Department. George C. Marshall GEORGE C. MARSHALL. Subscribed and sworn to before me this 28th day of August 1945. Henry C. Clausen, HENRY C. CLAUSEN, Lt. Colonel, JAGD. At Washington, D. C. TOP SECRET AFFIDAVIT OF COLONEL HAROLD DOUD COLONEL HAROLD DOUD, presently with the Allied Translator and Intelligence Service, GHQ, AFPAC, being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, pursuant to Joint Resolution of the Congress, and that Top Secrecy is required, deposes and says: On 7 December 1941, and for some time prior thereto, I was stationed at Washington, D. C., in charge of the B Section, Signal Intelligence Service, which was the Code and Cipher Solution Section. My duties included the supervision of the solution of Japanese radio diplomatic and military messages. In the course of these duties my section solved and translated at various times many Japanese messages which had been intercepted. Page 106 Regarding the so-called Japanese "Winds Code" I recall seeing at about the time of its translation the intercept in top secret Exhibit B, No. 25432. I recall that when this intercept was translated arrangements were made to monitor for the execute message contemplated by the "Winds Code". I did not see any execute message as thus contemplated and so far as I know there was no such execute message received in the War Department. My attention has been called to certain testimony of Captain L. F. Stafford, USN, to the effect that I may have some knowledge concerning such an execute message. I do not know the basis for this testimony of Captain Safford as I did not have any information of an execute message. [224] My attention has also been called to the testimony on the subject of 13 parts of a 14-part message, which 13 parts was received the afternoon and evening of 6 December 1941 and is numbered SIS 25843. I recall having seen the message but do not remember the details connected with its receipt and solution. I went on duty on the afternoon of 6 December and came off duty sometime on the 7th of December, the exact times, however, I do not recall. Concerning the time required to solve and disseminate the of the Japanese radio diplomatic messages in Code PA-K2, it is my present belief that the average time required was at least two days. I have been shown top secret Exhibit "B" before the Army Pearl Harbor Board. The translation dates indicated thereon were not always the dates of receipt. Reference to the records of the Signal Intelligence Service should be made to show the time required between the dates of receipt and the actual solutions and disseminations. Prior to 7 December 1941, according to my recollection, we did not solve any current Japanese military codes. Harold Doud, HAROLD DOUD, Colonel. Subscribed and sworn to before me this 10th day of September 1945. Henry C. Clausen, HENRY C. CLAUSEN, Lt. Colonel, JAGD. At Washington, D. C. [225] AFFIDAVIT OF LT. COLONEL FRANK B. ROWLETT LT. COLONEL FRANK B. ROWLETT, presently with the Signal Security Agency, being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, pursuant to Joint Resolution of the Congress, and that Top Secrecy is required, deposes and says: The average length of time required for processing the messages in the Japanese system known by us as PAK-2, calculated on 19 messages for the period of 1 November to 6 December 1941, shows 3.5 days as average. Only messages which were actually published were included in the data on which the average was calculated. No military systems which were in use by the Japanese Army or Military Attaches previous to the date of 6 December 1941 were readable. Some intercepts were available but not in sufficient quantity to permit the solution of any military system. a. No written record has been discovered which would indicate positively the exact hour at which intercept traffic was received by teletype from San Francisco by the Signal Intelligence Service in the Munitions Building. My recollection is that the first call to initiate the use of the circuit with San Francisco was placed sometime after six o'clock in the evening of 6 December 1941. The response from Station 2 at San Francisco indicated that they had already forwarded by air mail the messages intercepted that day and that it would be necessary for them to use the station file copy for preparing the intercepts for transmission by teletype. [226] This preparation required some time because tapes had to be punched for the material to be forwarded. To the best of my recollection it was not until after midnight that actual intercept traffic was received by the Signal Intelligence Service from San Francisco. b. Since this was the first time the Army had used teletype facilities to forward traffic to Signal Intelligence, my recollection is very clear. Also, I actually helped to operate the teletype equipment in the Munitions Building in both the prelimi- Page 107 nary discussions in which traffic was requested and also in receipting for the traffic. Colonel Robert E. Schukraft and Miss Mary Jo Dunning were present and also operated the teletype equipment. The conditions under which we operated were very unusual in that ordinarily we operated only day shifts, and this also tended to impress the matter on my memory. Frank B. Rowlett, FRANK B. ROWLETT, Lt. Colonel, SC. Subscribed and sworn to before me this 12th day of September 1945. Henry C. Clausen, HENRY C. CLAUSEN, Lt. Colonel, JAGD. At Washington, D. C. [227] AFFIDAVIT OF CAPTAIN HOWARD W. MARTIN CAPTAIN HOWARD W. MARTIN, presently with the Signal Security Agency being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, pursuant to Joint Resolution of the Congress, and that Top Secrecy is required, deposes and says: To the best of my knowledge and remembrance the following facts are true: At approximately 8:00 p. m. PST on 6 December 1941 I was in my quarters at Fort Scott, Presidio of San Francisco when the telephone rang and the man on duty at the station (MS #2) said Washington had called us on the teletype machine and had requested we transmit immediately all the day's intercepted traffic. It being Saturday night I had only one man on duty and other personnel could not be reached readily. Therefore I went down to the station immediately and began transmitting all of Saturday's traffic using our retained copy, as the original traffic had been air- mailed to Washington at approximately 1:00 p. m. on the same day. Because the following day the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor I have always associated the two things in my memory, and am certain that the TWX machine was not used for traffic prior to 6 December and the hours as given are approximately correct. [228] I was NCO in charge of MS #2 at that time. Howard W. Martin HOWARD W. MARTIN Captain, SC Subscribed and sworn to before me this 12th day of September 1945. Henry C. Clausen, HENRY C. CLAUSEN Lt. Colonel, JAGD. At Washington. D. C. TOP SECRET [229] AFFIDAVIT OF MARY J. DUNNING MARY J. DUNNING, presently with Signal Security Agency, being first duly worn and informed of the investigation by Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, or the Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, pursuant to Joint Resolution of the Congress, and that Top Secrecy is required, deposes and says: On 6 December 1941, I left the Munitions Building around 1:00 p. m., the regular hour for the close of business on Saturdays. Between 2:15 and 2:45 that afternoon, I received a telephone call from Colonel Minckler's office, requesting me to report for work as soon as possible. I fix the hour by the length of time it takes me to drive from my home to the Munitions Building and by 1:00 p. m. I was in Colonel Minckler's office ready to work. I remember the hour because later in the evening when I was asked to report at the same time on the following day I asked to be allowed to report at 5:00 p. m. instead, since I had made plans to spend the day out of town. Page 108 I can't recall being told why we were called back to work, but the general assumption was that we wanted to process traffic without delay since the Japanese Ambassador was in conference with the President. I was asked to work in the "cage" (a room where machine traffic was processed, so called because of the grille work at its entrance to restrict admittance) where I had not worked for some time. [230] I think that as I entered the room, I was surprised to see a teletype machine. How long it had been installed, I don't know, but I thought it could not have been there more than a few hours, since I often had occasion to go to the door of the cage and it was clearly visible from the door. It must have been roughly around four o'clock that representatives of the teletype company came to instruct us in the operation of the machine. After that we spent some time practicing. It is difficult to fix the time very definitely because time spent in waiting always seems longer than it really is, and we were expecting traffic from San Francisco at any moment. I remember that I was getting hungry but could not leave the room to get supper since we were waiting for S. F. to call. When Colonel Minckler came into the cage, I spoke to him about getting someone to relieve me just long enough for me to buy a sandwich. This conversation I remember because we joked about my teaching *him* to operate the teletype. To the best of my knowledge, we were in communication with our intercept station in S. F. not later than 7:00 p. m., although I cannot say whether or not they actually had any traffic for us at that time. I believe I went home around midnight or 1:00 a. m. and I recall processing some traffic during the course of the evening before I left. I cannot say, however, whether it came to us by teletype, or not, since the Message Center had been asked to deliver [231] traffic to us as soon as it arrived. That was traffic from Honolulu and the Philippines. I did not return to the office until five o'clock on 7 December 1941. Mary J. Dunning MARY J. DUNNING. Subscribed and sworn to before me this 12th day of September 1945. Henry C. Clausen, HENRY C. CLAUSEN Lt. Colonel, JAGD. At Washington, D. C. [232] AFFIDAVIT OF LOUISE PRATHER Louise Prather, presently with the Signal Security Agency, being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, pursuant to Joint Resolution of the Congress, and that Top Secrecy is required, deposes and says: To the best of my knowledge, the teletype machine was used to transmit traffic from San Francisco for the first time during the night of 6 December 1941. This particular point is clear in my memory because of the unusual circumstances. In the evening of 6 December I was called at home and told our unit was being placed on a 24-hour basis immediately and that I should report for work at 7:00 a. m. the following morning, 7 December. When I arrived at the office at this unusual hour I learned that the teletype was being operated and the reason for the urgent call had been to process this, and other, traffic as rapidly as possible. Since for some months, the highest priority had been given Japanese traffic between Washington and Tokyo by our unit, the transmission of such traffic by teletype seemed to me to be a matter of major importance. This further served to impress the event on my memory. Louise Prather. LOUISE PRATHER. Subscribed and sworn to before me this 12th day of September 1945. Henry C. Clausen, HENRY C. CLAUSEN Lt. Colonel, JAGD. At Washington, D. C.

Page maintained by Larry W. Jewell, lwjewell@omni.cc.purdue.edu. Created: 12/13/96 Updated: 12/19/96