[This file contains only Col. Clausen's report to the Secretary of War
and Tab's A and B. See TOC. LWJ]
Page i
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
PURSUANT TO
S. Con. Res. 27
A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN
INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL
HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND
EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
RELATING THERETO
PART 35
CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION
Printed for the use of the
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack
UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1946
Page ii
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
ALBEN W. BARKLEY, Senator from Kentucky, Chairman
JERE COOPER, Representative from Tennessee, Vice Chairman
WALTER F. GEORGE, Senator from Georgia JOHN W. MURPHY, Representative
SCOTT W. LUCAS, Senator from Illinois from Pennsylvania
OWEN BREWSTER, Senator from Maine BERTRAND W. GEARHART, Representa-
HOMER FERGUSON, Senator from Michi- tive from California
gan FRANK B. KEEFE, Representative
J. BAYARD CLARK, Representative from from Wisconsin
North Carolina
COUNSEL
(Through January 14, 1946)
WILLIAM D. MITCHELL, General Counsel
GERHARD A. GESELL, chief Assistant Counsel
JULE M. HANNAFORD, Assistant Counsel
JOHN E. MASTEN, Assistant Counsel
(After January 14, 1946)
SETH W. RICHARDSON, General Counsel
SAMUEL H. KAUFMAN, Associate General Counsel
JOHN E. MASTEN, Assistant Counsel
EDWARD P. MORGAN, Assistant Counsel
LOGAN J. LANE, Assistant Counsel
Page iii
HEARINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
Part Pages Transcript Hearings
No. pages
1 1- 399 1- 1058 Nov. 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, and 21, 1945.
2 401- 982 1059- 2586 Nov. 23, 24, 26 to 30, Dec. 3 and 4, 1945.
3 983-1583 2587- 4194 Dec. 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, and 13, 1945.
4 1585-2063 4195- 5460 Dec. 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, and 21, 1945.
5 2065-2492 5461- 6646 Dec. 31, 1945, and Jan. 2, 3, 4, and 5, 1946.
6 2493-2920 6647- 7888 Jan. 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 21, 1946.
7 2921-3378 7889- 9107 Jan. 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28, and 29, 1946.
8 3379-3927 9108-10517 Jan. 30, 31, Feb. 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6, 1946.
9 3929-4599 10518-12277 Feb. 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, and 14, 1946.
10 4601-5151 12278-13708 Feb. 15, 16, 18, 19, and 20, 1946.
11 5153-5560 13709-14765 Apr. 9 and 11, and May 23 and 31, 1946.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
Part Exhibits Nos.
12 1 through 6.
13 7 and 8.
14 9 through 43.
15 44 through 87.
16 88 through 110.
17 111 through 128.
18 129 through 156.
19 157 through 172.
20 173 through 179.
21 180 through 183, and Exhibits-Illustrations.
22 through 25 Roberts Commission Proceedings.
26 Hart Inquiry Proceedings.
27 through 31 Army Pearl Harbor Board Proceedings.
32 through 33 Navy Court of Inquiry Proceedings.
34 Clarke Investigation Proceedings
35 Clausen Investigation Proceedings.
36 through 38 Hewitt Inquiry Proceedings.
39 Reports of Roberts Commission, Army Pearl Harbor Board.
Navy Court of Inquiry and Hewitt Inquiry, with endorse-
ments.
[Pages iv-xvi are lists of witnesses, which will be made available
separately. A link to this spot will be made at that time.]
Page 1
JOINT COMMITTEE EXHIBIT NO. 148
[1] [TOP SECRET]
REPORT OF INVESTIGATION BY LT. COLONEL, HENRY C. CLAUSEN, JAGD, FOR THE
SECRETARY OF WAR, SUPPLEMENTARY TO PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARMY PEARL HARBOR
BOARD
CONTENTS
Page [1]
Report to Secretary of War by Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen,
JAGD, of investigation supplementary to Army Pearl Harbor Board .... 2
Tab "A"-Copies of statements of Secretary of War dated
1 December 1944 and 29 August 1945, of Colonel Clausen's orders
and of related documents ........................................... 4
Tab "B"-Copies of affidavits and statements obtained in Colonel
Clausen's investigation ........................................... 38
[See this section for testimonies. LWJ]
Tab "C"-List of additional documentary evidence comprising
Exhibits "1" through 8" obtained in Colonel Clausen's
investigation .................................................... 233
Tab "D"-Written periodic reports by Colonel Clausen .............. 246
Tab "E"-Memorandum of The Judge Advocate General giving his
comments upon Top Secret Report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board
in light of Colonel Clausen's investigation ...................... 279
Tab "F"-Memorandum of The Judge Advocate General supplementing and
commenting upon certain aspects of his previous memorandum to the
Secretary of War, dated 25 November 1944, in light of Colonel
Clausen's investigation .......................................... 296
Tab "G"-Memorandum of The Judge Advocate General to the Secretary
of War dated 25 November 1944 .................................... 313
TOP SECRET
[2] WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington, 14 September 1945.
Memorandum for the Secretary of War;
Subject: Report of investigation by Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD,
for the Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings of the
Army Pearl Harbor Board.
Pursuant to orders of the Secretary of War, I have conducted the
investigation supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor
Board, mentioned in he public statements of the Secretary of War on 1
December 1944 and 29 August 1945. Copies of these statements and of my
orders and some related documents are attached as Exhibit "A". In the
course of this investigation, I traveled over 55,000 miles by air and
interviewed 92 Army, Navy, and civilian personnel at the following
places:
Berlin, Germany London, England
Blenchley Park, England Luzon, P. I.
Boston, Massachusetts Manila, P. I.
Cannes, France Neuenahr, Germany
Casserta, Italy New York, New York
Frankfurt on Main, Germany Paris, France
Guam Potsdam, Germany
Honolulu, T. H. Saipan
Langley Field, Virginia Versaille, France
Leyte, P I. Washington, D. C.
Some of these persons were interviewed where they were engaged in combat
in active theaters of operation, as the Secretary of War stated in his
public statement of 1 December 1944 would be necessary.
[1] Pages referred to are indicated by italic figures enclosed by
brackets and represent pages of original exhibit.
Page 2
Of those interviewed, the following persons testified before me. I
recorded their testimony in the form of affidavits, copies of which are
attached as Exhibit "B".
General George C. Marshall Lt. General Leonard T. Gerow
General Douglas MacArthur Lt. General Walter B. Smith
[3]
Lt General Richard K. Suther- Colonel Otis K. Sadtler
land Colonel Rex W. Minkler
Major General John R. Deane Colonel Harold Doud
Major General Charles D. Herron Captain Joseph J. Rochefort, USN
Major General Sherman Miles Captain Edwin T. Layton, USN
Major General C. A. Willoughby Captain Wilfred J. Holmes, USN
Major General Ralph C. Smith Captain Thomas A. Huckins, USN
Brig. General Thomas J. Betts Lt. Colonel Frank B. Rowlett
Brig. General Kendall J. Fielder Major Edward B. Anderson
Brig. General Morrill W. Marston Captain Howard W. Martin
Brig. General Robert H. Dunlop Chief Warrant Officer L. R. Lane
Brig. General Charles K. Gailey Chief Ships Clerk Theodore Emanuel,
Colonel Rufus S. Bratton USN
Colonel Robert E. Schukraft Miss Mary J. Danning
Colonel George W. Bicknell Miss Margaret McKenney
Colonel Clarence G. Jensen Miss Louise Prather
Colonel Carlisle Clyde Dusenbury Miss Mary L. Ross
Colonel Moses W. Pettigrew Mr. George W. Renchard
Colonel Joseph K. Evans Mr. Robert L. Shivers
Colonel Edward F. French Mr. John F. Stone
Colonel Edward W. Raley
The following persons gave me signed statements which, with some records
of my interviews, are also included in Exhibit "B":
Brigadier General C. A. Powell Lt. Donald Woodrum, Jr., USN
Colonel 0. H. Thompson Mr. Harry L. Dawson
Lt Colonel Byron M. Muerlott Mr. John E. Russell
Commander J. S. Holtwick, Jr., USN
I also obtained a great deal of additional documentary evidence. A list
of this is attached as Exhibit "C" and the documents are presented
herewith.
Periodic oral and written reports were heretofore made. The written
reports are attached as Exhibit "D".
There are attached as Exhibits "E" and "F" memoranda of The Judge
Advocate General giving his comments upon the Top Secret Report of the
Army Pearl Harbor Board, and supplementing and commenting upon certain
aspects of his previous memorandum to the Secretary of War dated 25
November 1944, in the light of my investigation.
6 Incls Henry C. Clausen,
1. Ex. "A" HENRY C. CLAUSEN
2. Ex. "B" Lt. Colonel, JAGD.
3. Ex. "C"
4. Ex. "D"
5. Ex. "E"
6. Ex. "F"
Page 3
[4] EXHIBIT A
INVESTIGATION BY LT. COLONEL, HENRY C. CLAUSEN, JAGD, FOR THE SECRETARY
OF WAR; SUPPLEMENTARY TO PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
1. Joint Resolution of the Congress, 13 June 1944, directing the
Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, severally, to
conduct investigations of Pearl Harbor.
2. Public report of Secretary of War regarding Pearl Harbor disaster,
1 December 1944.
3. Order of Secretary of War, 23 November 1944, directing Major Henry
C. Clausen, JAGD, to conduct supplementary investigation.
4. Memorandum of The Judge Advocate General, 5 December 1944,
concerning unexplored leads in Pearl Harbor investigation.
5. Memorandum of the Secretary of War, 6 February 1945, to all Army
personnel concerned relative to investigation to be made by Major
Henry C. Clausen.
6. Letter to Secretary of the Navy from the Secretary of War, 6
February 1945, concerning investigation to be made by Major Henry C.
Clausen.
7. Letter to Secretary of War from the Secretary of the Navy, 10
February 1945, in reply to letter 6 February 1945.
8. Memorandum of the Secretary of War for The Adjutant General, 3 March
1945, requesting travel orders for Major Henry C. Clausen.
9. Movement orders for Major Henry C. Clausen, 14 March 1945.
10. Memorandum of the Secretary of War to the Commanding General,
Pacific Ocean Areas, 24 March 1945, relative to investigation being
made by Major Henry C. Clausen.
11. Memorandum of the Secretary of War to the Commanding General,
Southwest Pacific Theater, 24 March 1945, relative to investigation
being made by Major Henry C. Clausen.
12. Memorandum to Major Duckett, ASF, P&O, 24 March 1945, requesting
change in movement orders.
13. Wire from The Adjutant General, 27 March 1945, to Commanding
Officer, 1504 AAFBU, Fairfield, California, advising of change in
movement orders of Major Henry C. Clausen.
[5]
14. Memorandum of Secretary of War for The Adjutant General, 24 May
1945, requesting travel orders for Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen.
15. Movement orders for Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, 25 May 1945.
16. Letter of the Secretary of War to the Secretary of the Navy, 28 May
1945, concerning investigation.
17. Memorandum of the Secretary of War for The Adjutant General, 7
August 1945, requesting change in movement orders of Lt. Colonel
Henry C. Clausen.
18. Amendment of movement orders of Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, 11
August 1945.
19. Public report of Secretary of War regarding the Pearl Harbor
disaster, 29 August 1945.
[6] [PUBLIC LAW 339-78TH CONGRESS]
[CHAPTER 247-2D SESSION]
[S. J. Res. 133]
JOINT RESOLUTION
To extend the statute of limitation in certain cases.
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States
of America in Congress assembled, That effective as of December 7, 1943,
all statutes, resolutions, laws, articles, and regulations, affecting
the possible prosecution of any person or persons, military or civil,
connected with the Pearl Harbor
Page 4
catastrophe of December 7, 1941, or involved in any other possible or
apparent dereliction of duty, or crime or offense against the United
States, that operate to prevent the court martial, prosecution, trial or
punishment of any person or persons in military or civil capacity,
involved in any matter in connection with the Pearl Harbor catastrophe
of December 7, 1941, or involved in any other possible or apparent
dereliction of duty, or crime or offense against the United States, are
hereby extended for a further period of six months, in addition to the
extension provided for in Public Law 208, Seventy-eighth Congress.
Sec. 2. The Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy are severally
directed to proceed forthwith with an investigation into the facts
surrounding the catastrophe described in section 1 above, and to
commence such proceedings against such persons as the facts may justify.
Approved June 13, 1944.
[7]
WAR DEPARTMENT
BUREAU OF PUBLIC RELATIONS
PRESS BRANCH
Tel.-RE 6700, Brs. 3425 and 4860
Immediate Release DECEMBER 1, 1944
STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF WAR
The following is the text of a statement by the Honorable Henry L.
Stimson, Secretary of War:
By Joint Resolution of the Congress, approved June 13, 1944, the
Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy were severally directed
to proceed with an investigation into the facts surrounding the Pearl
Harbor catastrophe of December 7, 1941, and to commence such proceedings
against such persons as the facts might justify. In order to meet the
wishes of Congress as expressed in this resolution, I have conducted
such an investigation. In order to assist me to this end, there was
appointed by order dated July 8, 1944, a Board of three general officers
which was directed "to ascertain and report the facts relating to the
attack made by Japanese armed forces upon the Territory of Hawaii on 7
December 1941 and to make such recommendations as it might deem proper."
This Army Pearl Harbor Board has conducted an extensive and painstaking
investigation. It has held hearings in Hawaii, San Francisco, and
Washington. It has examined a total of 151 witnesses and received many
exhibits. I have read its report and reviewed the recorded evidence. The
Judge Advocate General of the Army, at my direction, has also examined
the report and the record and has given me fully the benefit of his
views.
I recognize the importance to any individual concerned of having a
decision taken as to what, if any, action is to be instituted against
him and, after weighing all the considerations, I am clear that the
public interest as well as justice and fairness will best be served by a
statement of my present conclusions. So far as they now may be made
public, consonant with the public interest, my conclusions are as
follows:
The Army Pearl Harbor Board, although it recommended no disciplinary or
other action, concluded that there were several officers in the field
and in the War Department who did not perform their duties with the
necessary skill or exercise the judgment which was required under the
circumstances On the recorded evidence, I agree with some but not all of
the Board's conclusions.
So far as the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department is
concerned, I am of the opinion that his errors of judgment were of such
a nature as to demand his relief from a Command status. This was done on
January 11, 1942, and in itself is a serious result for any officer with
a long record of excellent service, and conscientious as I believe
General Short to be. In my judgment, on the evidence now recorded, it is
sufficient action.
Furthermore, I am satisfied that proper steps were taken to correct such
inadequacies of either personnel or organization as were shown to exist
either in the War Department or in the field at the time of the Pearl
Harbor disaster. My conclusion is that under all the circumstances the
evidence now recorded does not warrant the institution of any further
proceedings against any officer in the Army.
Page 5
In accordance with the opinion of the Judge Advocate General, I have
decided that my own investigation should be further continued until all
the facts are made as clear as possible and until the testimony of every
witness in possession of material facts can be obtained, and I have
given the necessary
[8]
directions to accomplish this result. Some of the testimony may be much
delayed where witnesses are engaged in combat in active Theaters of
Operation. My present decision will be reviewed when the investigation
has been finally completed.
Finally, I am absolutely clear that it would be highly prejudicial to
the successful prosecution of the war and the safety of American lives
to make public during the war the report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board
or the record on which it is based.
STATEMENT AS TO COLONEL THEODORE WYMAN, JR., AND CERTAIN OTHERS
I have today made a separate statement of my conclusion on the basis of
the evidence now recorded not to institute further proceedings against
any officer of the Army in respect to the Pearl Harbor disaster.
The Military Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives, by a
report of June 14, 1944, called attention to certain relationships of
Hans Wilhelm Rohl to military construction in Hawaii under the direction
of Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr., District Engineer, and indicated that
this may have contributed to the Pearl Harbor catastrophe. Accordingly,
the phases of the Committee report bearing thereon were referred to the
Army Pearl Harbor Board for further investigation.
I have reviewed the results of this investigation. I do not find from
this review that the Pearl Harbor disaster was in any way contributed to
or caused by any alleged misconduct, neglect or disloyalty on the part
of Rohl, the Hawaiian Constructors, the organization with which he was
connected, Colonel Wyman, or others directing construction activities in
Hawaii, and I do not find that there is any evidence that Rohl or anyone
else directing such construction gave any information to the enemy.
As to certain other alleged misconduct and neglect of Colonel Wyman and
others in construction matters, I have referred the question of the
commencing of any proceedings to the Under Secretary of War and the
Judge Advocate General.
Distribution: Aa, Af, B, Da, Dd, Dm, N.
5:00 P.M.
SECRET
[9] NAVY DEPARTMENT
Washington, 23 November 1944.
Memorandum for the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.
Subject: Pearl Harbor Investigation.
In connection with the recent report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, a
number of unexplored leads have suggested themselves which require
investigation. I have directed that this investigation be undertaken by
Major Henry G. Clausen, JAGD.
You are directed to give Major Clausen access to all records, documents,
and information to your Division whether of secret or top secret nature
and to advise all officers of your Division to afford Major Clausen the
fullest possible cooperation. Inquiries made by Major Clausen should be
answered fully and the persons interrogated should volunteer any
information of which they may have knowledge concerning the subject of
Major Clausen's inquiries.
In addition, copies of any papers required by Major Clausen, whether
secret or top secret should be furnished him, any present directives to
the contrary not withstanding.
HENRY L. STIMSON
Secretary of War.
A true copy.
HENRY A. CLAUSEN
Lt. Colonel, JAGD.
Page 6
TOP SECRET
[10]
HEADQUARTERS SERVICE FORCES
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL
Washington 25, D. C.
Memorandum for Major Henry C. Clausen, JAGD.
Subject: Unexplored Leads in Pearl Harbor Investigation.
1. In order to assist you in the investigation you are now making, I am
suggesting herewith certain unexplored leads which, in my opinion, might
advantageously be followed up in order to complete the general picture
in this matter. The present memorandum merely contains suggestions and
will not be construed as a directive or as in any way fixing the scope
of your investigation.
2. In the War and Navy Departments in Washington, the following matters
can be investigated
a. Whether Kimmel notified the Navy Department and the Navy Department
notified the War Department of the order to sink Jap subs, of the
reasons for the order.
b. What was the naval condition of readiness at Pearl Harbor.
c. Whether Short or Kimmel sent any reconnaissance reports to
Washington.
d. Whether Kimmel had any orders from Washington requiring a large part
of the fleet to remain in harbor.
e. Whether Kimmel understood the term "defensive deployments" or wired
back for its meaning.
f. Whether Kimmel replied to the 24 November, 27 November, and other
Navy Department messages and if so, was the War Department furnished
copies thereof.
g. Whether the June 1940 alert message to Herron was specific and
indicative of an established War Department policy of being specific
when war alerts were believed required by the situation.
h. Whether War Department manuals and war plans, current in 1941,
authorized a Commanding General of an overseas Department to revise the
estimate of the situation, without consulting with or reporting to the
War Department.
i. Whether Short answered the Secretary of War's letter of 7 February
1941.
[11]
j. The number of troops in Hawaii in late 1941, the state of their
training and the possibility of continuing training under Alert 2 or 3.
k. The terms and origin of the Joint Action Agreement, if any, with
Britain and the Netherlands and whether Japan was officially advised of
this agreement or discovered its existence.
l. Whether Short was sent official notice of the Joint Action Agreement
or of the Roosevelt-Churchill July 1941 compact for a joint warning to
Japan (Rep. 41).
3. Concerning the "magic" intercepts we should ascertain:
a. The exact date and time of first translation.
b. The reason for the apparent delay in translating or deciphering of
some of the most vital messages.
c. Who got each message, when and in what form.
d. The evaluation made of them at the time and the degree of reliance
placed thereon by the General Staff and by the Navy.
e. The origin of the "Budapest" intercept.
4. Significant details regarding the "Winds" intercept might be
explored:
a. The original of the Navy Department message and translation, now
probably part of the original Roberts Report records, or at least,
questioning of Mr. Justice Roberts would possibly disclose how that
Commission disposed of it.
b. The Navy's alleged delivery of two copies of the translation to the
Army (Tr., Safford a. 133-135), as to just what procedure there was for
delivery, as to who was responsible therefor, and who had a duty to
check up on whether the transmission was received.
[12]
c. Whether General Miles, Admiral Noyes, Colonel Bratton, or Captain
Safford knew about the Anglo-Dutch-U. S. Joint Action Agreement, in
which case they would have known that a "War with Britain" message would
necessarily have involved the United States in war.
d. Whether the partial implementation "War with Britain" was brought to
Admiral Stark's or General Marshall's attention, it being clear that the
Page 7
of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff did know of the Joint Action
Policy.
e. Did the Navy in any way notify Admiral Kimmel or Commander Rochefort
of the implementation intercept?
f. Did the Honolulu intercept stations independently receive the
activating Winds" message?
g. What was the significance of the other Japanese intercepts which the
Board failed to examine?
h. Whether General (then Colonel) Fielder actually received the message
directing him to contact Commander Rochefort, whether he did so, and
whether here is substance to the hypothesis that he and Short were
relying upon the warning they would expect to receive when the second or
implementing "Winds" message would be intercepted, thus giving advance
notice of hostilities.
Myron C. Cramer
MYRON C. CRAMER,
Major General, USA,
The Judge Advocate General
SECRET
[13]
WAR DEPARTMENT
Washington, 6 February 1945.
Memorandum for Army Personnel Concerned:
Pursuant to my directions and in accordance with my public statement of
1 December 1944, Major Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, is conducting for me the
investigation supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor
Board.
You are directed to give Major Clausen access to all records, documents
and information in your possession or under your control, and to afford
him the fullest possible cooperation and assistance. Inquiries made by
Major Clausen should be answered fully and freely and the persons
interrogated should volunteer any pertinent information of which they
may have knowledge. Copies of any papers required by Major Clausen
should be furnished him.
HENRY L. STIMSON,
Secretary of War.
SECRET
[14]
6 FEBRUARY 1945.
DEAR MR. SECRETARY:
Pursuant to my directions and in accordance with my public statement of
1 December 1944 Major Henry G. Clausen, JAGD, is conducting for me the
investigation supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor
Board.
Some of the additional information which seems to be material is
believed to be available only through Navy personnel or Navy records. I
have instructed Major Clausen to limit his inquiry strictly to matters
which have a bearing on the part hat Army personnel, organization, or
action may have had in the disaster.
I will appreciate it if you will arrange to give Major Clausen access to
all pertinent Navy records and information and afford him the
opportunity of interviewing such Navy personnel as may be necessary, it
being understood that he will comply strictly with the instructions I
have stated above. Sincerely yours,
HENRY L. STIMSON,
Secretary of War.
Above handed to Major Clausen 2/7/45 for delivery to Sec. Navy.
MO'B.
Hon. JAMES V. FORRESTAL,
Secretary of the Navy,
Washington, D. C.
hhb/mob
A True Copy.
HENRY C. CLAUSEN,
Major, JAGD.
Page 8
SECRET
[15]
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
Washington, 10 Feb. 1945
DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I have your letter of 6 February 1945 advising that
Major Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, is conducting for you the investigation
supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and
requesting that he be given access to all pertinent Navy records and
information and be afforded the opportunity of interviewing such Navy
personnel as necessary, it being understood that you have instructed him
to limit his inquiry strictly to matters which have a bearing on that
part that Army personnel, organization, or action may have had in the
disaster
I share your view that Public Law 339 of the 78th Congress, which
directed that we "severally" investigate the facts surrounding the Pearl
Harbor catastrophe authorize us to make available to each other
information in our respective Departments relevant to our separate
investigations. Accordingly, I am happy to comply with your request, and
suggest that Major Clausen communicate with Lt. Commander John F.
Sonnett, of my office, so that arrangements may be made to furnish the
specific information which Major Clausen desires to obtain from the Navy
Department. Sincerely yours,
JAMES FORRESTAL.
Hon. HENRY L. STIMSON
Secretary of War
Washington, D. C.
[16]
SECRET
Memorandum for The Adjutant General.
Subject: Request for Orders.
1. Reference is made to a Secret memorandum from the Secretary of War
dated 6 February 1945, copy of which is attached, concerning the
investigation by Major H. C. Clausen for the Secretary of War,
supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board.
2. In connection with said mission and in pursuance of orders of
Secretary of War, request is made for Orders directing Major Clausen to
proceed on or about 12 March 1945: (a) to Langley Field, Virginia, (b)
then to Honolulu, T. H., and (e) then return to Washington, D. C., and
(d) authority to make such successive trips from Washington, D. C., and
to travel to such other place or places, and to make such changes in
said itinerary as may be necessary to accomplish said mission.
3. It is further requested that travel by military, naval or commercial
aircraft, Army or Naval Transport, belligerent vessel or aircraft,
commercial steamship, rail or any other means of transportation be
authorized as necessary for the accomplishment of an emergency war
mission, and that a baggage allowance of 75 pounds be authorized for
travel by aircraft.
4. It is further requested that in lieu of subsistence flat per diem of
$7.00 be authorized while traveling and on duty for the period while
away from Washington, D. C. required to complete this mission. Reference
is made to the determination of the Secretary of War, dated 22 August
1944, that the thirty day limitation prescribed in War Department
Circular 260, 1944, is not applicable in connection with temporary duty
enjoined upon members of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and Officers on
duty therewith.
/S/ H. C. Clausen,
H. C. CLAUSEN,
Major, JAGD.
Approved:
/s/ Harvey H. Bundy,
HARVEY H. BUNDY, for the Secretary of War.
/S/ Myron C. Cramer,
MYRON C. CRAMER.
The Judge Advocate General.
A true copy.
HENRY C. CLAUSEN
Major, JAGD.
Page 9
[17]
RESTRICTED
AGPO-A 201 Clausen, Henry C. EAD/bls/2231 Mu
(12 Mar 45) Br. 76520
WAR DEPARTMENT,
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
Washington 25, D. C., 14 March 1945.
Subject: Movement Orders.
TO: Major Henry C. Clausen, 0907613, JAGD
4731 Munitions Building
Washington, D. C.
1. Major Henry C. Clausen, 0907613, JAGD, will proceed on or about 20
March 1945 from Washington, D. C., to San Francisco, California, on
temporary duty of approximately three (3) days, thence to Fairfield-
Suisun Army Air Field, Fairfield, California, reporting not later than
28 March 1945, to the Commanding Officer 1504th AAF Base Unit for air
transportation to Fort Shafter, T. H. Upon arrival at destination he
will report to the Commanding General, U. S. Army Forces, Pacific Ocean
Areas, for temporary duty of approximately two (2) months for the
purpose of conducting investigation supplementary to the proceedings of
the Army Pearl Harbor Board. Upon the completion of this temporary duty
he will return to his proper station, Washington, D. C.
2. Travel directed is necessary in the military service. 501-3 P 432-02,
03, 212/50425. Travel by air is directed (Par 3b (2) AR 55-120, Changes
no. 9), and is necessary for the accomplishment of an emergency war
mission, APR-2-331156-ASF. A baggage allowance of sixty-five (65)
pounds, to include all personal effects, and an excess baggage allowance
of ten (10) pounds, (official documents), is authorized while traveling
by aircraft. Within continental United States the provisions of War
Department Circular 260, 1944 apply; outside continental United States
the provisions of War Department Circular 356, 1944, apply.
3. He is authorized to proceed to such additional places within the
theater as may be necessary for the performance of this mission.
4. He will be equipped in accordance with Column M, WD Pamphlet No. 396,
"Itemized Baggage List", as desired. Small arms will be issued at the
port of aerial embarkation in accordance with current instructions.
5. Special instructions: Temporary APO 4236, c/o Postmaster, San
Francisco, California. Will comply with the provisions of Section 10,
POR, pertaining to Medical Requirements. Typhus, cholera and bubonic
plague inoculations will be administered to officer immediately upon
receipt of orders. Designated as special official courier.
BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR:
E. A. DAVIS, Adjutant General.
[18]
3 Incls.
AG Ltr 4 July 1944
AG Form 43
Travel Book
Distribution:
Officer (10)
Officers' Br. Rec. Sec. AGO
Judge Advocate General, 2734 Mu.
Lt. Stump, 1C-931, The Pentagon.
APS, 4A-514, The Pentagon (2)
Port Postal Officer, SFPE, Fort Mason, Calif.
Assistant Ch/Staff, OPD, WDGS, 3B-354, The Pentagon
Mobilization Div. ASF, Foreign Travel Section, 4E-747, The
Pentagon
P & T Officer, Hq. ATC, Rm. 1916 Gravelly Point, Va.
CG, USAFPOA, APO 958, c/o PM, San Francisco, California
Postal Officer, APO 958, c/o PM, San Francisco, Calif.
CO, 1504th AAF Base Unit, Fairfield-Suisun Army Air Field,
Calif. (3)
Page 10
SECRET
[19] 24 MARCH 1945
Memorandum for the Commanding General, Pacific Ocean Areas.
Subject: Investigation Supplementary to Army Pearl Harbor Board.
Pursuant to my directions and in accordance with my public statement of
1 December 1944, Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, is conducting for
me the investigation supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl
Harbor Board.
In connection therewith Colonel Clausen is scheduled to arrive in your
Command within the next thirty days.
It is desired that the fullest possible cooperation and assistance be
given him, and that the senior G-2 General Officer of your Command be
detailed to assist in the investigation, as Colonel Clausen may request,
for the purpose of obtaining statements from Navy personnel and access
to Navy records and information in accordance with arrangements which
have been made between the Secretary of War and the Secretary of Navy.
HENRY L. STIMSON,
Secretary of War.
hcc/es
A true copy.
HENRY C. CLAUSEN
Lt. Colonel, JAGD.
SECRET
[20] 24 MARCH 1945.
Memorandum for the Commanding General, Southwest Pacific Theater.
Subject: Investigation Supplementary to Army Pearl Harbor Board.
Pursuant to my directions and in accordance with my public statement of
1 December 1944, Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, is conducting for
me the investigation supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl
Harbor Board.
In connection therewith Colonel Clausen is scheduled to arrive in your
Command within the next thirty days.
It is desired that the fullest possible cooperation and assistance be
given him, and that the senior G-2 General Officer of your Command be
detailed to assist in the investigation, as Colonel Clausen may request,
for the purpose of obtaining statements from Navy personnel and access
to Navy records and information in accordance with arrangements which
have been made between the Secretary of War and the Secretary of Navy.
HENRY L. STIMSON,
Secretary of War.
hcc/es
A true copy.
HENRY C. CLAUSEN,
Lt. Colonel, JAGD.
[21]
WAR DEPARTMENT
ARMY SERVICE FORCES
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL
24 MARCH 1945.
Memorandum: ASF P&O (Maj. Duckett)
1. Request that so much of par. 1, Movement Orders 14 Mar. 45, (copy
attached) as directs me to proceed from Washington, D. C. on or about 20
Mar. 45, and to report to Fairfield-Suisun Army Air Field not later than
28 Mar. 45, be amended to extend said dates respectively to leave
Washington, D. C. on or about 26 Mar. 45, and to report to Fairfield-
Suisun Army Air Field not later than 4 April 45. Also, if advisable,
amend said orders to designate my correct rank.
2. Necessity for the foregoing extensions is additional time required to
await certain developments in compliance with orders of the S/W.
Henry C. Clausen,
HENRY C. CLAUSEN,
Lieutenant Colonel, Jagd.
Rm. 4741 Munitions
Ex. 78922
Page 11
[22] EAD/ED/ ed/2331 Mu
27 MARCH 1945.
AGPO-A 201-Clausen, Henry C 77723
(27 Mar 46)
AGO Personnel Officers Assignment SPXPO-A
Room 2323 Munitions
CO
1504 AAFBU PP
FAIRFIELD-SUISUN AAF
FAIRFIELD, CALIFORNIA
Orders dated 14 March 1945 pertaining to Major Henry C. Clausen 0907613
JAGD by order SW are amended to direct him proceed on or about 26 March
46 from Washington, DC, and report to CO 1504 AAFBU FAIRFIELD-SUISUN
AAF, Fairfield, Calif., not later than 4 April 45 end SPXPO-A ULIO TAG.
Official:
____________, Adjutant General.
SECRET
[23]
Memorandum for The Adjutant General. 24 MAY 1945
Subject: Movement Orders to Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen. JAGD
1. Reference is made to movement Orders, dated 14 March 1946, to Lt.
Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, and request therefor dated 3 March 1945.
2. Request is made for additional movement Orders to Colonel Clausen
directing him to proceed on or about 30 May 1946 to Headquarters, SHAEF,
and to such other points in the theater, and such other places and
theaters, in such order and frequency as may be necessary for the
purpose of conducting investigation in accordance with Secret
instructions of the Secretary of War.
3. It is requested that the provisions of said prior request for Orders,
dated 3 March 1946, be considered applicable hereto and that a one
priority be assigned for air travel.
HARVEY H. BUNDY
For the Secretary of War.
A true copy.
HENRY C. CLAUSEN
Lt. Colonel, JAGD.
RESTRICTED
EAD/laf/fcs/2323 Mun
Br. 76520
WAR DEPARTMENT,
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE,
Washington 25, D. C., 25 May 1945
[24]
AGPO-A 201 Clausen, Henry C
(24 May 45)
Subject: Movement Orders
To: # Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Clausen, 0907613, JAGD
1. Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Clausen, 0907613, JAGD, will proceed on
or about 30 May 1945 from Washington, D. c. to Headquarters, SHAEF,
European Theater of Operations, Versailes, France, and to such other
points in the theater, and such other places and theaters, in such order
and frequency as may be necessary on temporary duty of approximately two
(2) months for the purposes of conducting an investigation in accordance
with instructions of the Secretary of War. He will report to the
Commanding Officer, 503d Army Air Forces Base Unit, Air Annex: #1, Room
1746, Gravelly Point, Washington, D. C. for processing and air
transportation, upon completion of which, he will proceed from
Washington, D. C. to Versailles, France, reporting upon arrival to the
Commanding General, European Theater of Operations, for duty. Upon
completion of this temporary duty, he will return to his proper station,
Washington, D. C.
2. Travel directed is necessary in the military service. 501-1 P 432-02,
03 212/50425 Travel by air (APR-1-354533-WDP-MAY) is directed (Par. 3b
(2) AR 55-120, Changes No. 9), and is necessary for the accomplishment
of an emerg-
Page 12
ency war mission. A baggage allowance of sixty-five (66) pounds, to
include all personal effects, and an excess baggage allowance of ten
(10) pounds, is authorized while traveling by aircraft. Within the
continental limits of the United States, provisions of Par. 25, AR 35-
4820, 19 April 1945 apply: outside the continental limits of the United
States, provisions of Par. 26, AR 354820, 19 April 1945, apply.
3. Authority is granted to make such changes in the above itinerary and
to proceed to such additional places as may be necessary for the
accomplishment of this mission.
4. Personnel will be equipped as desired in accordance with Column P, WD
Pamphlet No. 38-6, "Itemized Baggage List." One (1) Pistol, caliber .45
will be issued at the aerial port of embarkation.
5. SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS: Temporary APO 4295, c/o Postmaster, New York,
New York. Will comply with provisions of Section 10, POR, pertaining to
Medical Requirement. Typhus inoculations will be administered
immediately upon receipt of orders. Designated special official courier.
BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR:
CAPT. E. A. DAVIS AGO,
Adjutant General.
Officers Br Overseas Assignment Sec
[25]
3 Incls:
AG Ltr 4 Jul 44
AG Form #43
Travel Book
Distribution:
Officer (10)
Offs' Br., Rec Sec, AGO, 1628 Mun
APS, 4A-514, Pentagon
OIC, Emb APO, 464 Lexington Ave., NY, NY (2)
Lt. Stump, 1C-931, Pentagon
CO, 503d AAFBU, WPAE, 1746, Air Annex #1, Gravelly Pt, DC (3)
Judge Advocate General, 2734 Mun
Destination Commander:
SECRET
[26]
DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Referring to your letter dated 10 February 1945, I
wish to thank you for the arrangements made whereby Lt. Colonel Henry C.
Clausen, JAGD, has had access to certain pertinent Navy records and
interviewed certain Navy personnel.
I have also been happy to comply with your request that appropriate Navy
representatives similarly be given Army information which is relevant to
your investigation, it being understood, of course, that the Navy
inquiry will be limited to matters which have a bearing on the part that
Navy personnel, organization or action may have had in the disaster.
Sincerely yours,
______________ Secretary of War.
Honorable JAMES FORRESTAL,
Secretary of the Navy, Washington, D. C.
A true copy
HENRY C. CLAUSEN,
Lt. Colonel, JAGD.
hhb/mob
[27] 7 AUGUST 1945.
Memorandum for the Adjutant General:
Reference is made to Movement Orders to Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen,
JAGD dated 25 May 1945.
It is requested that so much of paragraph one thereof as sets forth
period of temporary duty as approximately two months be amended to read
"four months."
HARVEY H. BUNDY,
Special Assistant to the Secretary of War.
A true copy.
HENRY C. CLAUSEN
Lt. Colonel, JAGD.
Page 13
RESTRICTED
[28] RHO/laf/mm/2323 Mun
Br. 76520
WAR DEPARTMENT
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
Washington, D. C., 11 August 1945.
AGPO-A 201-Clausen, Henry C.
(7 Aug. 45.)
Subject: Amendment of Movement Orders,
To: Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Clausen, O-907613, JAGD.
So much of Classified Letter Orders AGPO-A 201 Clausen, Henry C. (24 May
45. Subject: Movement Orders 25 May 1945 pertaining to Lieutenant
Colonel Henry C. Clausen, O-907613, JAGD as reads: "Temporary Duty of
approximately two (2) months" be amended to read: "Temporary Duty of
approximately four (4) months".
BY ORDERS OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR:
E. A. DAVIS, Adjutant General.
Distribution:
Officer (10)
Offs' Br., Rec Sec, AGO, 1528 Mun
APS, 4A-514, Pentagon
OIC, Emb APO, 464 Lexington Ave., NY, NY (2)
Lt. Stump, 1C-931, Pentagon
CO, 503d AAFBU, WPAE, 1746, Air Annex #1, Gravelly Pt, DC (3)
Judge Advocate General, 2734 Mun
Destination Commander:
[29]
OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR REGARDING THE PEARL HARBOR
DISASTER
By Joint Resolution of the Congress, approved June 13, 1944, the
Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy were severally directed
to proceed with an investigation into the facts surrounding the Pearl
Harbor catastrophe of December 7, 1941, and to commence such proceedings
against such persons as the facts might justify. In order to meet the
wishes of Congress as expressed in this resolution, I have conducted
such an investigation. In order to assist me to this end, there was
appointed by order dated July 8, 1944, a Board of three general officers
which was directed "to ascertain and report the facts relating to the
attack made by Japanese armed forces upon the Territory of Hawaii on 7
December 1941, and to make such recommendations as it might deem
proper."
On December 1,1944, I made a public statement of my decision in this
matter as follows:
"This Army Pearl Harbor Board has conducted an extensive and painstaking
investigation. It has held hearings in Hawaii, San Francisco, and
Washington. It has examined a total of 151 witnesses and received many
exhibits. I have read its report and reviewed the recorded evidence. The
Judge Advocate General of the Army, at my direction, has also examined
the report and the record and has given me fully the benefit of his
views.
"I recognize the importance to any individual concerned of having a
decision taken as to what, if any, action is to be instituted against
him and after weighing all the considerations, I am clear that the
public interest as well as justice and fairness will best be served by a
statement of my present conclusions. So far as they now may be made
public, consonant with the public interest, my conclusions were as
follows:
"The Army Pearl Harbor Board, although it recommended no disciplinary or
other action, concluded that there were several officers in the field
and in he War Department who did not perform their duties with the
necessary skill or exercise the judgment which was required under the
circumstances. On the recorded evidence, I agree with some but not all
of the Board's conclusions.
"So far as the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department is
concerned, I am of the opinion that his errors of judgment were of such
a nature as to demand his relief from a Command status. This was done on
January 11, 1942, and in itself is a serious result for any officer with
a long record of excellent service, and conscientious as I believe
General Short to be. In my judgment, or the evidence now recorded, it is
sufficient action.
Page 14
"Furthermore, I am satisfied that proper steps were taken to correct
such inadequacies of either personnel or organization as were shown to
exist either in the War Department or in the field at the time of the
Pearl Harbor disaster. My conclusion is that under all the circumstances
the evidence now recorded does not warrant the institution of any
further proceedings against any officer in the Army.
"In accordance with the opinion of The Judge Advocate General, I have
decided that my own investigation should be further continued until all
the facts are made as clear as possible and until the testimony of [30]
every witness in possession of material facts can be obtained, and I
have given the necessary directions to accomplish this result. Some of
the testimony may be much delayed where witnesses are engaged in combat
in active theaters of operation. My present decision will be reviewed
when the investigation has been finally completed.
"Finally, I am absolutely clear that it would be highly prejudicial to
the successful prosecution of the war and the safety of American lives
to make public during the war the report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board
or the record on which it is based."
Since December 1, I have continued my own investigation. At my
direction, Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Clausen of the Office of the
Judge Advocate General has made an extensive further examination of
witnesses. Colonel Clausen was Assistant Recorder of the Army Pearl
Harbor Board and as such had an intimate knowledge of the facts. I have
reviewed the additional evidence available and I have reviewed my
earlier decision. I am satisfied that this decision as to the action to
be taken was correct
Until the end of the hostilities with Japan extreme care was necessary
not to disclose information which was in the hands of the War Department
and especially the sources of our information, of which there were many,
including the Intelligence Divisions of the Army and Navy, the F. B. I.,
and others. From these same sources there came to the Government
additional information which resulted in saving of thousands of American
lives during the war with Japan.
The end of hostilities now makes it possible for me to make public much
more fully my conclusions and the reasons for my conclusions without
such serious danger to the public security as to outweigh the
desirability of such publication. It is still not in the public interest
to disclose sources of information. I have directed that all of the
Report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board be made public except that part
which would reveal sources of secret information. The conclusions of the
Board are fully set forth in the part which is now made public. The War
Department will make available to appropriate Committees of Congress the
full reports and the record of the testimony.
My conclusions are as follows:
I
The primary and immediate responsibility for the protection of the
Island of Oahu and Pearl Harbor insofar as the Army was concerned rested
upon the Commanding Officer of the Hawaiian Department Lieutenant
General Walter C. Short. It has been and still is the prevailing policy
and practice of the General Staff of the United States Army to choose
with care as commanding officers of the various theaters men whose
record and experience indicate their capabilities for the command and to
place upon them the responsibility for the performance of their mission
with as little interference from the central Army authorities in
Washington as possible. This policy of decentralized responsibility in
our Army has been found to produce the best results, has been followed
successfully throughout the war, and it is still being followed in all
the various theaters of operation. Thus each theater commander is
charged with the preparation of his own local defense plan, including
the working out of any defense operations with the local Naval
authorities. Such plans are submitted to the appropriate division of the
General Staff in Washington and are subject to any changes or
modifications that might emanate from that source. The primary
responsibility for such plans and their execution, however, rests on the
commanding officer familiar with the local [31] situation and
conditions. Before December 7, 1941, detailed plans for the defense of
the Hawaiian Department had been devised and worked out by General Short
as well as a Joint Agreement with the local Naval authorities for joint
action in the event of an emergency, and he and the Navy commanding
officer had the primary responsibility of putting into effect these
plans or such portions thereof as the occasion
Page 15
demanded. This last, however, had not been done at the time of the
Japanese attack.
I feel that during the year 1941, and particularly during October and
until he latter part of November, General Short was repeatedly advised
of the critical events which were developing. I find that he was clearly
warned on November 27 by the appropriate authorities in Washington that
a break in diplomatic relations between the United States and Japan
might occur at any time, that an attack by Japan on the United States
might occur, and that hostilities were possible at any moment. I find
that he was informed that the defense of his command was to be regarded
as paramount to all other considerations and that le was specifically
directed to take such measures of reconnaissance as he deemed necessary.
In addition to the information received directly from Washington through
both Army and Navy sources, General Short received continuous reports
from his own Intelligence Section, which clearly revealed the
seriousness of the situation. General Short himself knew that it was
traditionally the policy for a responsible commanding officer to
anticipate and to be prepared or the worst form of possible attack, and
he had received and approved military estimates from his own staff as
well as from the Chief of Staff to the effect that a surprise raid by
air and submarine constituted the principal perils to Hawaii.
I do not find that there was any information in the possession of the
War Department and which was not made available to General Short which
would lave modified the essence of the above information which was sent
to him or which would have affected or increased the duties of vigilance
and alertness thus already imposed upon him. The available information
might have given him a clearer picture of the increasing tenseness of
the situation and as later pointed out I believe that the War Department
would have carried out its duties more adequately if General Short had
been given more complete information, but I find that he was amply
warned for the performance of his paramount duty of being alert against
a surprise air attack by Japan.
I find that he failed in the light of the information which he had
received adequately to alert his command to the degree of preparedness
which the situation demanded; and that this failure contributed
measurably to the extent of the disaster, although much damage probably
would have resulted from the attack in any event. I find that he failed
to use fully the means at hand for reconnaissance, especially the radar
air warning service, which was of prime necessity; that he failed to
ascertain from the Navy the extent of its reconnaissance or to
collaborate with it to the end that more adequate reconnaissance should
be secured. I find that he failed to have his antiaircraft defenses
sufficiently manned or supplied with ready ammunition as the situation
demanded.
This failure resulted not from indolence or indifference or willful
disobedience of orders but from a vital error of judgment, viz.: the
failure to comprehend the necessities of the situation in the light of
the warnings and information which he had received. He states that to
put into effect a different degree of alertness than he actually did
would have interfered with the training program which he was carrying
out in various activities, and would have involved the danger of
alarming the population, against which he had been cautioned. In
weighing such considerations he entirely lost sight of the fact that the
defense of his command and station against Japan was his paramount duty.
[32] The underlying cause of this error of Judgment was General Short's
confidence that Japan would not then attack Pearl Harbor. In fairness to
him must be borne in mind that this belief was shared in by almost
everyone concerned including his superior officers in the War Department
in Washington. He was undoubtedly influenced in such a belief by the
then prevailing psychology which completely underestimated the Japanese
military capabilities and particularly the advance which they had made
in the use of aircraft. General Short also knew that the Naval command
at Hawaii, which he regarded as being better informed than he because of
their facilities and the widespread nature of their operations, was
confident that an air attack on Pearl Harbor was most unlikely. The
information which was being received of Japanese naval activity pointed
to operations in southeastern Asia, the Netherlands East Indies, or the
Philippines.
Furthermore, in Hawaii the danger of sabotage was stressed because of
the large Japanese population, and General Short was expressly warned by
the War Department against this danger. But the warning was coupled with
a warning also against the danger of hostile action in general. General
Short relies upon the fact that the War Department took no exception to
his report of November 27, 1941, to the effect that he was "alerted
against sabotage." He urges that this
Page 16
should be regarded as a tacit approval of his failure to alert against
other dangers. I think it is probably true that the emphasis on sabotage
in several War Department warnings and the Department's caution against
alarming the civilian population, coupled with this failure to comment
on Short's report of November 27, confirmed him in his conviction that
he had chosen the correct form of alert and might disregard all others.
But these matters, although they may make his action more
understandable, do not serve to exonerate him for his failure to be
fully alert and prepared against an air attack. He well knew that an air
attack on Pearl Harbor, even if improbable, was possible. Yet he ordered
an alert which he himself had prepared for use only in case of "no
threat from without." Protection against the possibility of such an
attack was his own definite responsibility.
To sum up the situation tersely, General Short was warned by Washington
that there was immediate danger both of an attack from without by Japan
and of an attack from within by sabotage. This warning required him to
be alert against both forms of danger. He chose to concentrate himself
so entirely upon a defense against sabotage as to leave himself more
completely exposed to an attack from without than if there had been no
alert at all. He so concentrated his planes as not only to make them an
easy target for an attack from without but to require several hours to
get any substantial number of them into the air for defense.
To such an error of judgment it is no excuse that he relied upon
assurances from another service, even though he thought that that
service was better informed than he was as to the disposition of the
Japanese fleet. He was the responsible defender of the outpost of
Hawaii. He had no right entirely to subordinate his duty to be prepared
against what he knew to be the most dangerous form of attack on that
outpost to the opinion of another service.
Nor had he any right, after the clear and explicit warning of the War
Department of a possible attack from without, to assume from mere
inference that such a warning had been entirely withdrawn and that he
was thereby relieved from his independent responsibility as a theater
commander.
I have reviewed the conclusions reached with regard to General Short in
my statement of December 1, 1944 and in my judgment the additional
investigation does not warrant any change in the conclusions drawn
therein, nor call for any action beyond that which has already been
taken.
II
[33] Such duties as the War Department in Washington had in the
supervision of the defense of Hawaii devolved primarily upon what was
then known as the War Plans Division of the General Staff. This was the
division of the General Staff specifically charged with the war plans
and operations, and messages to or from the theater commanders were
regularly handled or approved by it. The War Plans Division was in
charge of an Assistant Chief of Staff and under him various officers had
specially assigned duties.
The Intelligence Section of the General Staff (G-2) also had duties of
collecting and analyzing information and transmitting information to
other sections of the War Department and to the theater commanders.
I find as heretofore stated that the messages sent to General Short gave
him adequate information as to the state of the negotiations with the
Japanese and the development of the situation, that he was warned that
Japanese future action was unpredictable; that hostile action was
possible at any moment; and that no consideration was to be permitted to
jeopardize his defense. He was also expressly directed to take
reconnaissance measures-the all-important measure to be taken at the
time. Furthermore, as heretofore stated. I do not think that any special
and detailed warnings against sabotage should have been considered by
General Short as justifying his decision that an alert against any
possible enemy action was not also his duty.
There was certain information in the War Department which was not sent
to General Short and which if forwarded might have sharpened General
Short's attention or emphasized further the imminence of war. Some part
of this information was sent to Admiral Kimmel by the Navy. It was the
rule that all such information should be exchanged between the Army and
Navy at Pearl Harbor, and the War Department had a right to believe that
this information communicated to Admiral Kimmel was also available to
General Short. While Admiral Kimmel and General Short were on very
friendly terms and in frequent communication, the exchange of
information as well as consultation in other respects at Hawaii between
the Army and Navy was inadequate
Page 17
The information available to the War Department on or before December 7
1941, which was not passed on to General Short included the following:
information available November 17 and 22 to the effect that the Japanese
Government insisted that the negotiations for a peaceful settlement be
terminated by November 25, 1941, later extended to November 29, 1941;
information available December 6 and 7 to the effect that Nomura and
Kurusu were to reply to the United States that Japan would yield no
further, and information available the morning of December 7 which did
not reach General Short until after the disaster that the reply was to
be delivered to the representatives of the United States at 1:00 P. M.,
December 7, 1941, and that the remaining cipher and code machines in the
Japanese Embassy at Washington were to be destroyed.
The Army Pearl Harbor Board concluded that the War Department had
earlier in its possession other evidence which indicated that war with
Japan was imminent at a definite time and that this information was not
available to General Short. The principal basis for this conclusion by
the Board, however was that the War Department had information through
secret sources of information that the Japanese diplomatic
representatives in London, Washington and elsewhere had been ordered to
destroy their codes and papers. The additional investigation shows that
officers on General Short's staff also had this information and had
given it to him prior to December 7, 1941. It should be borne in mind
also that General Short had been [34] fully advised by the War
Department that war with Japan was imminent and might commence at any
time.
The War and Navy Departments also had certain information which was not
forwarded to General Short to the effect that the Japanese Consulate at
Honolulu was reporting to Tokyo ship movements and dispositions in Pearl
Harbor. Other somewhat similar information was being given to Tokyo by
Japanese Consulates in other ports. This was apparently considered by
officers in the War Department as merely a part of the enemy's general
plan to keep track of all ships of the American Navy as far as possible.
Information was received by the War Department on December 6, 1941, as
to what the Japanese reply to the settlement overtures of the United
States would be and that this reply indicated an immediate severance of
diplomatic relations. There is no dispute, however, that General
Marshall did not get this information until the morning of December 7.
An officer, then connected with G-2, War Department, testified before
the Army Pearl Harbor Board that on December 6 he personally delivered
this message to the Secretary of the General Staff for the Chief of
Staff, also to the Executive Officer for the Chief of the War Plans
Division, and to the Executive Officer for the Assistant Chief of Staff,
G-2. In the additional investigation conducted by Colonel Clausen
subsequent to the findings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, the witness
corrected his testimony and testified that the only message he delivered
on the night of December 6 was to the duty officer for the Secretary of
State. Other evidence from the additional investigation showed that the
subordinate officer in G-2 who received the message on December 6 did
not deliver it to the Army persons mentioned until after 9:00 A. M. on
the morning of December 7.
When the Chief of Staff received the above mentioned information on the
morning of December 7, together with information which had since arrived
to the effect that the Japanese envoys were to deliver the reply to the
American Government at 1:00 P. M. And the Japanese Embassy was to
destroy its remaining cipher and code machines and secret papers, he
sent to the overseas commanders a message giving these latest
developments. General Marshall gave directions that this message be
immediately dispatched to the theater commanders. This was the message,
which in the ease of General Short, did not arrive until after the
attack.
Another item of information in the possession of the War Department
which General Short denies receiving was that the Japanese had
circulated from Tokyo about November 30, 1941, to their representatives
abroad, a plan to the effect that in case of severance of diplomatic
relations or war with the United States, Great Britain or Russia a
certain signal in the form of a false weather report would be broadcast
in a news message and that all code papers were then to be destroyed. I
find that this information was available to General Short or his command
prior to December 7, 1941. The evidence as to whether the agreed signal
indicating severance of relations or war with the United States was
subsequently given and made known to the War Department is confusing and
contradictory. No written evidence of such a signal has been found. But
in any event, information was available to General Short of the orders
to destroy codes as above discussed.
Page 18
With regard to the information available in the War Department, I
believe the War Plans Division made a mistake in not transmitting to
General Short more information than it did. A keener and more
imaginative appreciation on the part of some of the officers in the War
and Navy Departments of the significance of some of the information
might have led to a suspicion of an attack specifically on Pearl Harbor.
I do not think that certain officers in the War Department [35]
functioned in these respects with sufficient skill. At all times it must
be borne in mind, however, that it is easy to criticize individuals in
the light of hind-sight, and very difficult to recreate fairly the
entire situation and information with which the officers were required
to deal at the time of the event.
Again, as I have pointed out, General Short in response to a message
which had been sent out containing a warning of possible hostilities and
a request for a report of action taken, had sent a message to the War
Department which was susceptible of the interpretation that he was on
the alert against sabotage only and not on the alert against an air raid
or other hostile action. While this interpretation was not necessarily
to be had from the wording of his message, nevertheless a keener sense
of analysis and a more incisive comparison of the messages exchanged
would have invited further inquiry by the War Plans Division of General
Short, and his failure to go on the necessary alert might well have been
discovered. The Chief of this division and certain of his subordinates
knew that a report of the measures taken by General Short had been asked
for. General Short's reply was brought to the attention of the Chief of
the division. A clear and satisfactory reply should have been required.
This was not done and a more efficient functioning of the division would
have demanded that a careful inquiry as to the meaning of General
Short's message be made and no room for ambiguity permitted.
It must clearly be borne in mind that in November and December 1941, the
responsibilities of the War Plans Division covered many fields and many
theaters. Their preoccupation with the theaters most likely to be
threatened, such as the Philippines toward which the Japanese activities
then appeared to be pointed, may be subject to criticism in the light of
the subsequent disaster, but it is understandable. All signs pointed to
an attack in that direction and they were exercising particular care
with respect to that theater. Their conduct must be viewed in an
entirely different light from that of the theater commander, such as
General Short, who was like a sentinel on post and whose attention and
vigilance must be entirely concentrated on the single position which he
has been chosen to defend and whose alertness must not he allowed to be
distracted by consideration of other contingencies in respect to which
he is not responsible. Under all circumstances, I find nothing in the
evidence as now recorded which warrants the institution of any further
proceedings against any officer in the War Plans Division
Since Pearl Harbor, the War Plans Division has been completely
reorganized and the officers involved in the matters in question have
either died or received other assignments where they have already
distinguished themselves in the performance of important duties in the
field. I am satisfied that proper steps were taken to correct such
inadequacies of either personnel or organization as were shown to exist
either in the War Department or in the field at the time of the Pearl
Harbor disaster.
III
The War Plans Division like the other divisions and activities of the
General Staff in Washington was under the general direction and
supervision of the Chief of Staff, General Marshall. Evidently for this
reason the Army Pearl Harbor Board has been led to criticize the Chief
of Staff as being responsible for some of the shortcomings of the
officers of the General Staff which I have just enumerated. In my
opinion, this criticism is entirely unjustified. It arises from a
fundamental misconception of the duties of the Chief of Staff and of his
relations with the divisions and activities of the General Staff. It is
not the function of the Chief of Staff specifically to direct and
personally supervise the execution in detail of the duties of the
various sections of the General Staff. His paramount duty is to advise
the President and the Secretary of War, and to make plans for [36] and
supervise the organization. Equipment, and training of a great army for
a global war; to advise on, and himself to make, decisions regarding
basic problems of military strategy in the many possible theaters in
which the war might develop and in other fundamental and broad military
problems which confront the United States. It would hope-
Page 19
lessly cripple the performance of these great and paramount duties
should a Chief of Staff allow himself to become immersed in
administrative details by which the plans for defense are carried out in
our many outposts.
It is true that the failure of any part of the General Staff to perform
its duties efficiently may be of such a kind or reach such an extent as
to become the responsibility of the Chief of Staff for not having
established a more effective organization. But I do not find any such
situation in this ease. The scattered and individual errors which I have
criticized in respect to the Pearl Harbor disaster were not of a kind or
extent to imply any general inefficiency in a Staff which was performing
the heaviest duties with great ability and with subsequent results which
have produced some of the finest pages of the history of the war. The
shortcomings I have pointed out thus cannot in any fairness be
attributed to he Chief of Staff. On the contrary, throughout this matter
I believe that he acted with his usual great skill, energy, and
efficiency.
IV
The conclusions which I have stated herein as to the responsibilities
and errors of General Short are in general accord with the conclusions
of both the Roberts Commission in their report of January 23, 1942* and
the Army Pearl Harbor Board. My conclusions as to the responsibilities
and errors of the War Plans Division are to a substantial extent, but
not entirely, in accord with the conclusions of the Army Pearl Harbor
Board. The Roberts Commission did not go into details in respect to
these responsibilities. My conclusion as to the responsibility of the
Chief of Staff is, as I have heretofore stated, at variance with the
conclusion of the Army Pearl Harbor Board but it is in entire agreement
with he conclusions of the Roberts Commission. Of the correctness of my
conclusion in this last respect, I have not the slightest doubt.
V
In the conclusions of the Board there were no other individuals charged
with responsibilities who were criticized except for a suggestion which
might be construed as a criticism of Secretary Hull. It is suggested
that in his conduct of he negotiations with the Japanese envoys a
different procedure might have prolonged the negotiations until such
time as the Army and Navy were better prepared for hostile action. Not
only do I strongly disagree with what amounts at best only to a
conjecture, but I feel that the Board's comment in this respect was
uncalled for and not within the scope of their proper inquiry.
VI
There has been omitted from the press release of the text of the Army
Pearl Harbor Board report that portion which dealt solelv with the
related investigation of Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr. My findings as to
Colonel Wyman, as expressed on December 1, 1944,were as follows:
[37]
"I have reviewed the results of this investigation. I do not find from
his review that the Pearl Harbor disaster was in any way contributed to
or caused by any alleged misconduct, neglect or disloyalty on the part
of Rohl, the Hawaiian Constructors, the organization with which he was
connected, Colonel Wyman, or others directing construction activities in
Hawaii, and I do not find hat there is any evidence that Rohl or anyone
else directing such construction gave any information to the enemy."
The additional investigation conducted by Colonel Clausen has disclosed
no further evidence which would in any way modify my decision.
I also stated on December 1, 1944, that "as to other alleged misconduct
and, neglect of Colonel Wyman and others in construction matters, I have
referred he question of the commencing of any proceedings to the Under
Secretary of War and The Judge Advocate General." Until those officials
are ready to report I deem it inappropriate to make public the portions
of the Army Pearl Harbor Board report insofar as it relates to Colonel
Wyman.
*This Commission consisted of Mr. Justice Roberts, Admiral W. H.
Stanley, Retired; Admiral J. M. Reeves, Retired; Major General Frank R.
McCoy, Reitired; and Major General Joseph T. McNarney.
Page 20
[38]
EXHIBIT B
INVESTIGATION BY LT. COLONEL HENRY C. CLAUSEN, JAGD, FOR THE SECRETARY
OF WAR
SUPPLEMENTARY TO PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD.
1. Statement of interview of Brig. General Kendall J. Fielder, 24
January 1945, at Washington D. C.
2. Proposed affidavit of Captain Joseph J. Rochefort, USN, February
1945, at Washington, D. C.
3. Affidavit of Colonel Moses W. Pettigrew, MIS, 13 February 1945, at
Washington, D. C.
4. Affidavit of Colonel Carlisle Clyde Dusenbury, GSC, 13 February
1945, at Washington, D. C.
5. Affidavit of Captain Joseph J. Rochefort, USN, 20 February 1945, at
Washington, D. C.
6. Affidavit of Colonel Clarence G. Jensen, AC, 22 February 1945, at
Washington, D. C.
7. Affidavit of Margaret McKenney, GSC, G-2, 22 February 1945, at
Washington, D. C.
8. Affidavit of Colonel George W. Bicknell, MI, 25 February 1945, at
Washington, D.C.
9. Amendment to affidavit of Colonel George W. Bicknell, MI, 14 August
1945, at Washington, D. C.
10. Affidavit of Major Edward B. Anderson, TC, 27 February 1945, at
Washington, D. C.
11. Affidavit of Brig. General Robert H. Dunlop, AGO, 28 February 1945,
at Washington, D C.
12. Affidavit of Lt. Colonel Frank B. Rowlett, SC, 28 February 1945, at
Washington, D. C.
13. Affidavit of Major General Ralph C. Smith, GSC, G-2, 28 February
1945, at Washington, D. C.
14. Affidavit of Mary L. Ross, GSC, G-2, 1 March 1945, at Washington, D.
C.
15. Affidavit of Colonel Edward W. Raley, AC, 11 March 1945, at Langley
Field, Virginia.
16. Affidavit of General Charles R. Gailey, OPD, GSC, 21 March 1945, at
Washington, D. C.
17. Affidavit of Colonel Edward F. French, 8C, 22 March 1945, at
Washington, D.C.
[39]
18. Affidavit of Colonel Joseph K. Evans, GSC, 22 March 1945, at
Washington, D. C.
19. Statement of Mr. John E. Russell, President, Theo. H. Davies & Co.,
Ltd., Honolulu, T. H., 10 April 1945, at Honolulu, T. H., also
statement of Harry L. Dawson, 16 April 1945, at Honolulu, T. H.
20. Affidavit of Robert L. Shivers, 10 April 1945, at Honolulu, T. H.
21. Statement of Lt. Colonel Byron M. Meurlott, MI, 16 April 1945, at
Honolulu, T. H.
22. Statement of Colonel O. N. Thompson, AGO, 17 April 194a, at
Honolulu, T. H.
23. Affidavits of Captain Thomas A. Huckins, USN, and Captain Wilfred J.
Holmes, USN, 18 April 1945, at Honolulu, T. H.
24. Affidavit of Brig. General Morrill W. Marston, GSC, 21 April 1945,
at Honolulu, T. H.
25. Affidavit of Chief Warrant Officer Louis R. Lane, USN 21 April 1945,
at Honolulu, T. H.
26. Statement of Lieutenant Donald Woodrum, Jr. USN, 22 April 1945, at
Honolulu, T. H.
27. Affidavit of Captain Edwin T. Layton, USN, 26 April 1945, at Guam.
28. Statement of Brig. General C. A. Powell, SC, 27 April 1945, at
Honolulu, T. H.
29. Statement of Commander J. S. Holtwick, Jr., USN, 27 April 1945, at
Honolulu, T. H.
Page 21
30. Affidavit of Chief Ships Clerk Theodore Emanual, USN, 27 April 1945,
at Honolulu, T H.
31. Affidavit of Lt. General Richard K. Sutherland, C/S, GHQ, SW Pacific
Areas 6 May 1945, at Manila, P. I.
32. Affidavit of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, 7 May 1945, at
Manila, P. I.
33. Affidavit of Major General C. A. Willoughby, ACS, GHQ, SW Pacific
Areas 8 May 1945, at Manila, P. I.
34. Affidavit of Brig General Kendall J. Fielder, GSC, 11 May 1945, at
Honolulu, T. H.
35. Affidavit of Brig. General Thomas J. Betts, ACS, GSC, 13 June 1945,
at Frankfurt on Main, Germany.
36. Affidavit of Lt. General Walter B. Smith, C/S, SHAEF, 16 June 1945,
at Frankfurt on Main, Germany.
[40]
37. Affidavit of Lt. General Leonard T. Gerow, CG, 16th Army, 20 June
1945, at Cannes, France.
38. Affidavit of Colonel Robert E. Schukraft, SC, 2 June 1945, at
Casserta, Italy.
39. Affidavit of George W. Renchard, 7 July 1945, at London, England.
40. Affidavit of John F. Stone, 7 July 1945, at London, England.
41. Affidavit of Major General John R. Deane, USA, 24 July 1945, at
Potsdam, Germany.
42. Affidavit of Colonel Rufus S. Bratton, GSC, 27 July 1945, at Paris,
France.
43. Affidavit of Colonel Otis K. Sadtler, SC, 13 August 1945, at
Washington, D.C.
44. Affidavit of Major General Charles D. Herron, GSC, 13 August 1945,
at Washington, D. C.
45. Affidavit of Major General Sherman Miles, USA, 16 August 1945, at
Boston, Massachusetts.
46. Affidavit of Colonel Rex W. Minckler, SC, 21 August 1945, at
Washington, D. C.
47. Affidavit of General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, 28 August
1945, at Washington, D. C.
48. Affidavit of Colonel Harold Doud, SC, 10 September 1945, at
Washington, D. C.
49. Affidavit of Lt. Colonel Frank B. Rowlett, SC, 12 September 1945, at
Washington, D. C.
50. Affidavit of Captain Howard W. Martin, SC, 12 September 1945, at
Washington, D. C.
51. Affidavit of Miss Mary J. Dunning, SC, 12 September 1945, at
Washington, D. C.
52. Affidavit of Miss Louise Prather, SC, 12 September 1945, at
Washington, D. C.
[41]
HEADQUARTERS, ARMY SERVICE FORCES
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL.
Washington 25, D. C., 24 January 1945.
Memorandum for the files.
Subject: Interview of General Fielder.
Pursuant to a telephone call by me to General Fielder through General
Bissell on 8 January 1946, I interviewed General Fielder at Room 4D852,
Pentagon, on 9 January 1945. I explained to General Fielder my mission
and the clearances with General Bissell which permitted General Fielder
to answer all my questions fully and freely. I reminded him that he was
already sworn as a witness for the Army Pearl Harbor Board and the
necessity for secrecy with respect to my examination. To many of my
questions he answered that it would be necessary for me to review the
records at Hawaii and that this would entail considerable research. He
gave the following information or answers to the specific points
indicated.
1. Concerning his message to G-2 not to furnish intelligence from
Washington since it was a duplication (Bratton D. 292-293), he stated
that he referred solely to counterintelligence matters and that had
"nothing to do with combat."
2. He stated he was not very well aquainted with Commander Joseph J.
Rochefort and that he had maintained no liaison with him. He said he did
not know of any liaison arrangements between Commander Rochefort and
Colonel Edward Railey. [Written:] Said he had no knowledge of "U"
(called R1."
3. Upon having his attention invited to his G-2 estimate of 17 and 25
October 1941, he stated it was his understanding that these were
circulated to the Chief of Staff and General Short.
Page 22
4. He said he thought he had talked with General Short concerning the
Washington G-2, 27 November 1941, warning.
5. He claimed that he did not see the Navy Intelligence Bulletin of 1
December 1941.
6. He recalled the Black Dragon Society, Washington G-2 information
(Bratton D. 289-291) and-that it was "circulated" as something he "used
to get."
7. He claimed he did not see the Melbourne, Australia, Military Attache
message of 5-6 December 1941.
[42]
8. He stated that General Short assumed that the Navy was conducting
long distance reconnaissance.
9. Concerning the 5 December 1941, Washington G-2 message to the
Hawaiian Department G-2 to contact Commander Rochefort regarding the
Winds Message he said he "didn't remember" the message but that it
"might have come in a routine."
10. With respect to the subject matter of the message and whether he
knew that the Navy was intercepting such information he stated at first
that he knew of this work but that it was talked about in whispers and
that on this basis he knew the Navy had broken Japanese codes.
Additional questions concerning other subjects relating to the inquiry
were asked.
General Fielder stated that accurate information could not be given
without recourse to the records in Hawaii. A similar qualification
already referred to obtains in part concerning the foregoing answers and
information.
HENRY C. CLAUSEN
H. C. C.,
Major, JAGD,
Assistant Recorder, APHB.
TOP SECRET
[43] AFFIDAVIT OF CAPTAIN JOSEPH J. ROCHEFORT, UNITED STATES NAVY
Captain Joseph J. Rochefort, United States Navy, on duty at Office of
Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department, Washington, D. C., being
first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Major Henry C.
Clausen, JAGD for the Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings of
the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and the authority of the Secretary of the
Navy with respect to Navy personnel and records, does depose and state:
During the period from the fall of 1941 to December 1941 I was the
Combat Intelligence Officer in charge of the Combat Intelligence Unit at
Pearl Harbor. Which was a field unit to the home office at Washington. I
was attached to the Commandant of the 14th Naval District. My duties
involved primarily radio intelligence under assignments from the head
office in Washington. At Pearl Harbor there was also a Fleet
Intelligence Officer and a District Intelligence Officer. My unit
consisted of an intercept station, a radio direction finder station, and
crypto-analytical units in Pearl Harbor.
My opposite number in the Army at Pearl Harbor was Colonel Kendall J.
Fielder, G-2. Hawaiian Department. In the fall of 1941 arrangements were
made between Colonel Fielder and myself for liaison and exchange of
intelligence information pertaining to our functions on matters of
mutual concern to the Army and Navy in the Hawaiian Islands. For this
purpose I had discussions with him and his staff at his headquarters,
and with him and Edwin T. Layton, Fleet Intelligence Officer, at my
headquarters. Thereafter, including the period to 7 December 1941, we
maintained most cordial and close relations, meeting informally and
frequently, and carried out these arrangements.
My normal duties during the period from the fall of 1941 to 7 December
1941 did not include the gathering of information or intelligence from
Japanese political or diplomatic sources. I knew, however, that this was
then being done mainly by joint efforts of the Army and other units of
the Navy. On occasions I would receive special assignments relating to
this type of material. I have had the various documents shown me by
Major Clausen, marked Top Secret Exhibit "B". I did not know the
substance of any of these before 7 December 1941 except those numbered
SIS 25392, SIS 25432, SIS 25545, SIS 25640, and SIS 25787, on the
reverse side of which I have written my initials and today's date. In my
talks with Colonel Fielder I gave him such information as I received
concerning the substance of these documents and similar matters. It
Page 23
was my practice to give Colonel Fielder all the information of
importance in which the Army and Navy were jointly interested and [44]
and which came to my knowledge in the course of my duties. This was done
so that Colonel Fielder and I would keep abreast of intelligence
developments in our common interests.
[Written:] NOTE.-This proposed affidavit was prepared by me in
accordance with statements to me and Comdr. Sonnett by Capt. Rochefort.
Following are examples of such intelligence. My recollection in this
regard distinct because I had been given special assignments concerning
these items intelligence. My assignment with respect to those numbered
SIS 25392 and SIS 25432, after being informed of the substance thereof,
was to monitor for an implementing message and, I in turn so informed
Colonel Fielder during the latter part of November 1941. I did not
receive in Hawaii any implementing message of the kind for which I had
been instructed to monitor. Concerning those numbered SIS 25545, SIS
25640, and SIS 25787, I was informed of the substance thereof and gave
this information to Colonel Fielder and Robert Shivers, FBI Agent in
Charge, Honolulu, about the 4th or 5th of December, 1941. This was done
during the course of conversations relating to the destruction of secret
papers by the Japanese Consul in Honolulu, which information I gave to
my head office in Washington.
JOSEPH J. ROCHEFORT
Captain, USN.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this ___ day of February 1945.
HENRY C. CLAUSEN
Major, JAGD
TOP SECRET
[45]
WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON
AFFIDAVIT OF COLONEL MOSES W. PETTIGREW, MIS
Colonel Moses W. Pettigrew, MIS, being first duly sworn, and informed of
the nature and scope of the investigation by Major Henry C. Clausen, for
the Secretary of War supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl
Harbor Board, and reminded of his rights to remain silent, and warned
that top secrecy was required, deposes and says:
From August to 7 December 1941 he was executive officer of the
Intelligence Branch, G-2, War Department, Washington; that from November
1939 to August 11 he was assistant to Colonel Rufus W. Bratton in the
Far Eastern Unit, G-2, War Department;
That while performing said duties in G-2, he read various intercepts of
diplomatic radio messages from Japan to consulates and embassies; that
these intercepts were variously classified as Purple, High Level
Diplomatic, and J19;
That he recalls reading, on or about 26 November 1941 and 28 November
1941, while in the performance of his said duties, two intercepts, SIS
No. 25392 and SIS No. 25432, copies of which shown him this date by
Major Clausen have been identified by affiant with his initials and
date, and which are now commonly referred to as the "Winds Code"
That someone whom affiant does not now recall, showed affiant on or
about 5 December 1941, an implementation intercept which had been
received from the Navy and which indicated that Japanese-U. S. Relations
were in danger; that view of the prior intercepts which had been read by
affiant he took the implementation message to mean that anything could
happen and, consequently, he had prepared for dispatch to the Assistant
Chief of Staff, Headquarters G-2, Hawaiian Department, Honolulu, at the
request of someone whom he does not now call, a secret cablegram, a copy
of which is attached.
That affiant was of the belief then that the Hawaiian Department was in
possession of the same information he had received in Washington; that
he reached this conclusion by statements therefore of Naval personnel,
whom he does not now recall, to the effect that Hawaii had everything in
the way of information at Washington had; and, that the Navy had a
crypto-analytic unit in Hawaii under Commander Rochefort which was
monitoring and receiving these intercepts and breaking and translating
the codes, as well as Washington, in the
Page 24
interest of saving time, utilizing personnel there available, and a
subsequent exchange of intercept translations as a check one against the
another.
[46] That on 5 December 1941 affiant believed that the Army in Hawaii
would receive this information from the Navy there but he sent the
secret telegram of 5 December 1941 as a precautionary measure since he
felt it might have been possible that the Army in Hawaii did not get the
same information; that affiant has looked at the file copy of the 5
December 1941 secret cablegram he prepared and has affixed his initials
and date on the reverse side thereof; that the initials "RSB" written
thereon in the upper right-hand corner, indicating Colonel Rufus S.
Bratton, were written thereon by affiant on 5 December 1941 and affiant
also wrote his own initials in the upper right-hand corner; that affiant
believes he took the message when it had been prepared to the office of
Colonel Ralph C. Smith, Executive Office, G-2, had the message initialed
by Lt. Colonel C. H. Edmonston, and then took it to the G-2 Cable Room
for dispatch;
That the number 519 on said message indicates to affiant that the
message was dispatched on 5 December 1941 because such was an outgoing
message number which was given only in the ordinary course of procedure
when a message was dispatched;
Affiant does not know what if anything happened after the dispatch of
said message with reference to action thereon by the Hawaiian
Department;
That prior to affiant's aforesaid duties in G-2, War Department, he was
from May 1939 to October 1939, G-2 of the Hawaiian Department; that
while in the performance of said duties of G-2, Hawaiian Department, he
had been informed that the Navy there had a crypto-analytic unit to that
time; that the Army had a certain amount of liaison with the Navy in
that regard for obtaining intercepts of the character indicated,
although the Navy was far ahead of the Army in the development of this
phase of intelligence; that it was possible on occasions to obtain
certain information from a commercial cable company; that Colonel
Morrill W. Marston succeeded affiant as G-2, Hawaiian Department, and in
turn was succeeded by Colonel Fielder;
Affiant recommends as leads to be pursued by Major Clausen, an interview
with Miss Margaret McKenney, Room 2D841, Pentagon, Extension 5851,
questioning of personnel in the War Department Message Center, and
interviews and checking records at Hawaii in possession of the Signal
Corps there, especially Colonel Powell. Also interviews with Colonel C.
C. Dusenbury, MID, former assistant to Colonel Bratton and with General
Marston.
Moses W. Pettigrew
MOSES W. PETTIGREW
Colonel, MIS.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 12th day of February 1945 at
Washington, D. C.
Henry C. Clausen,
HENRY C. CLAUSEN,
Major, JAGD.
SECRET
[47] Standard Form No. 14A
Approved by the President
March 10, 1926
TELEGRAM
OFFICIAL BUSINESS-GOVERNMENT RATES
Sent No. 519, 12/5
DECEMBER 5, 1941.
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF HEADQUARTERS,
G-2, Hawaiian Department
Honolulu, Territory Hawaii:
Contact Commander Rochefort immediately thru Commandant Fourteen Naval
District regarding broadcasts from Tokyo reference weather.
MILES.
I certify that this message is on official business and necessary for
the public service.
RALPH C. SMITH,
Colonel, G. S. C.,
Executive Officer, G-2.
Secret Cablegram
las
Page 25
TOP SECRET
[49] WAR DEPARTMENT
Washington.
AFFIDAVIT OF COLONEL CARLISE CLYDE DUSENBURY, GSC
Colonel Carlise Clyde Dusenbury, GSC, Assistant Director of Intelligence
Southeast Asia Command, Kandy, Ceylon, on temporary duty in Washington
being first duly sworn, and informed of the nature and scope of the
investigation by Major Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War,
supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and
reminded of his right remain silent, and warned that top secrecy was
required, deposes and says;
To the best of my recollection I prepared the initial draft of the 5
December 1941 secret cablegram reading:
"Sent No. 519, 12/5
DECEMBER 5, 1941.
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF HEADQUARTERS,
G2 Hawaiian Department,
Honolulu, Territory Hawaii:
Contact Commander Rochefort immediately thru Commandant Fourteen
Naval District regarding broadcasts from Tokyo reference weather.
MILES."
I have identified a copy of this cablegram by my initials and date on
the reverse side thereof. This was prepared either of my volition or
following consultation with Colonel Rufus S. Bratton, G-2, Chief, Far
Eastern Branch, MIS. For several months prior to and following 7
December 1941 Colonel Pettigrew was duty as Executive Officer,
Intelligence Group, MID, and was not an active member of the Far Eastern
Section when the message of 5 December originated. His duties were
administrative and consisted in part of redrafting and approving
outgoing messages. The reason which I recollect for sending the secret
cablegram was that the trend of translated intercepts which had been
received by G-2, especially the "Winds Code", indicated danger to the
United States and also, because there was believed to be lack of
confidence by Edwin T. Layton, Navy intelligence Officer as to Kendall
J. Fielder, G-2, Hawaiian Department.
It was believed by me that Commander Rochefort had these intercepts,
including the "Winds Code" and similar information, available at Hawaii,
which had been received either at Hawaii or from the Navy Department in
Washington. I understood the Navy had about four or five hundred Naval
personnel in Hawaii doing monitoring, breaking, and translating of the
Japanese diplomatic codes.
[50] During the time in question I was assistant to Colonel Bratton,
having reported to him in August 1940, and continued as his assistant
until and after 7 December 1941. For the four or five months immediately
following August 1940 Colonel Bratton received from the Signal Corps the
translated intercepts of Japanese diplomatic messages and delivered
certain of these to Colonel Harrison, Aide the Secretary of War; John
Stone, secretary to Secretary of State Hull; Colonel Ralph C. Smith,
Executive Officer of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, and Colonel
Bedell Smith and Colonel Thomas T. Handy or Colonel Bundy in OPD. The
procedure followed by Colonel Bratton and myself as his assistant was to
destroy all copies of the translated intercepts received except such as
were thus distributed, and those distributed were inserted in binders
and delivered to the recipients who receipted for them. These receipts
and the intercepts which were covered thereby were then later returned
to Colonel Bratton or myself as the case might be and the receipts and
the intercepts were then destroyed, except one copy of the intercepts
which was retained by G-2. At the expiration of the four or five months
period referred to following August 1940, Colonel Bratton and I
alternated in assembling and delivering these intercepts and continued
this practice until about December 1941, although towards the end of
this period I handled the sorting and delivering almost exclusively. No
record is now available in G-2 to my knowledge of the messages which
were thus sorted and delivered, and none was kept because of the top
secrecy requirements. While I cannot recollect specifically; the message
which I delivered I believe that this information can be obtained
elsewhere than in the War Department. For example, the State Department
may have briefed and recorded the intercepts. Normally, we would receive
daily about fifty to seventy-five of these intercepts which would be
sorted to about twenty-five for distribution.
Page 26
I recall the intercept, Tokyo to Washington, consisting of fourteen
parts, SIS No. 25843, which started coming in the night of 6 December
1941 when I was on duty. Colonel Bratton was also on duty then and saw
the message coming in and he remained until about half of it had been
received. Thereupon he left and went home at about 9 p. m. I stayed so
he could go home and sleep. I waited for the remainder. The fourteenth
part, being the final part of the message, was received about 12 that
night. Thereupon I left and went home. I returned the next morning to
begin the distribution of this intercept consisting of the fourteen
parts and I began the distribution of the fourteen parts comprising this
intercept about 9 a. m. on 7 December 1941 and finished with the
delivery to the State Department as Kurusu and Nomura were meeting with
the Secretary of State, When I delivered the copy for OPD that morning I
handed it to then Colonel Thomas T. Handy who, upon reading it, said to
me "This means war," or words to that effect. None of these parts
comprising this intercept was delivered before the morning of 7 December
1941 because the first half had been received while Colonel Bratton was
on duty and he had seen this and had not had it delivered that night;
furthermore it being late at night when the final part was received, I
did not wish to disturb the usual recipients who were probably at home
asleep, as I did not see the implications of immediate hostilities.
It is to be noted that the intercept translation SIS 25843 was received
by the Army from the Navy and which indicates that the contents thereof
were known to the Navy prior to receipt by the Army.
[51] I recollect that the intercept, Tokyo to Washington, SIS No. 25850,
being the instruction to the ambassadors to deliver the reply to the
United States at 1 p. m. on 7 December 1941, was received by G-2 the
morning of 7 December 1941. It is my impression that it was received by
Colonel Bratton after he arrived that morning, between 9 and 10 a. m.
Carlisle Clyde Dusenbury,
CARLISE CLYDE DUSENBURY,
Colonel, G. S. C.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 13th day of February 1945 at
Washington, D. C.
Henry C. Clausen,
HENRY C. CLAUSEN,
Major, JAGD.
TOP SECRET
[52] AFFIDAVIT OF CAPTAIN JOSEPH J. ROCHEFORT, UNITED STATES NAVY
Captain Joseph J. Rochefort, United States Navy, on duty at Office of
Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department, Washington, D. G., being
first duly sworn, and informed of the investigation by Major Henry C.
Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings of
the Army Pearl Harbor Board and the authority of the Secretary of the
Navy with respect to Navy personnel and records, does depose and state:
During the period from the fall of 1941 to 7 December 1941 I was the
Combat Intelligence Officer in charge of the Combat Intelligence Unit at
Pearl Harbor, which was a field unit to the home office at Washington. I
was attached to the Headquarters of the Commandant of the 14th Naval
District. My duties involved primarily the acquisition of intelligence
as directed by the head office in Washington. At Pearl Harbor there was
also a Fleet Intelligence Officer and a District Intelligence Officer.
My opposite number in the Army in the Pearl Harbor area, was, prior to
December 1941, Colonel Kendall J. Fielder, G-2, Hawaiian Department.
Prior to and during December 1941, we had established and maintained
liaison for the purpose of exchanging information pertaining to our
functions on matters of mutual concern to the Army and Navy in the
Hawaiian area. For this purpose I had discussions with him and his staff
at his headquarters and in Pearl Harbor. During the fall and including
the period up to 7 December 1941, we maintained more cordial and close
relations, meeting informally.
My normal duties during the period from the fall of 1941 to 7 December
1941 did not include the gathering of information or intelligence from
Japanese political or diplomatic sources. On occasions, however, I would
receive special assignments relating to this type of material. I have
read the various documents shown me by Major Clausen, marked Top Secret
Exhibit "B". I did not know the substance of any of these before 7
December 1941 except those numbered SIS 25392, SIS 25432, SIS 25545, SIS
25640, and SIS 25787, on the reverse side of which I have
Page 27
written my initials and today's date. In my talks with Colonel Fielder I
gave him such information as I received concerning the substance of
these documents and similar matters. It was my practice to give Colonel
Fielder all the information of importance in which the Army and Navy
were jointly interested and which came to my knowledge in the course of
my duties. This was done so that Colonel Fielder and I would keep
abreast of intelligence developments in our common interests.
[53] Following are examples of such intelligence. My assignment with
respect to those numbered SIS 25392 and SIS 25432, after being informed
of the substance thereof, was to monitor for an implementing message and
I in turn so informed Colonel Fielder, to the best of my knowledge and
recollection, during the latter part of November 1941. I did not receive
in Hawaii any implementing message of the kind for which I had been
instructed to monitor. Concerning hose numbered SIS 25545, SIS 25640,
and SIS 25787, I was informed of the substance thereof and gave this
information to Colonel Fielder and Robert L. Shiver, FBI Agent in
Charge, Honolulu, about the 4th or 5th of December, 1941. This was done
during the course of conversations relating to the destruction of secret
papers by the Japanese Consul in Honolulu, which information I gave to
my head office in Washington.
Joseph J. Rochefort,
JOSEPH J. ROCHEFORT,
Captain, U. S. Navy.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 20th day of February 1945.
Henry C. Clausen,
HENRY C. CLAUSEN,
Major, JAGD.
at Washington, D. C.
[54] AFFIDAVIT OF CLARENCE G. JENSEN, COLONEL, AIR CORPS, AUS
Clarence G. Jensen, Colonel, Air Corps (0475864), presently assigned to
the office of the Assistant Chief of Air Staff, M. & S., Headquarters
Army Air Forces, Washington, D. C., being first duly sworn, and informed
of the investigation by Major Henry C. Clausen, J. A. G. D., for the
Secretary of War supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor
Board, and that top secrecy is required, deposes and says:
That during the period from 14 August to 1 October, 1944, pursuant to
instructions, I made diligent search of all War Department pertinent
files, and especially hose in the possession of Operational Plans
Division, War Department General Staff, and its predecessor, War Plans
Division, War Department General Staff covering the period 1 July, 1941,
to 7 December, 1941 to ascertain whether a Standing Operating Procedure,
dated 5 November 1941, of Lieutenant General Walter C. Short, Commanding
General, Hawaiian Department, had been received n the War Department
before 7 December, 1941; that among other things I personally searched
or supervised a search of the files of The Adjutant General, the War
Plans Division and the Army Air Forces, and inquired of those likely to
have direct or indirect knowledge of the said Standing Operating
Procedure including Major General L. S. Kuter, Air Corps, Brigadier
General Robert H. Dunlop, Office of The Adjutant General, and Miss Alice
Miller, civilian in charge of the Registered Document Section of
Operational Plans Division, WDGS, that his search indicated that no such
Standing Operating Procedure was received by the War Department at
Washington, D. C., until March of 1942; that I questioned General Dunlop
as to whether he remembered having sent in the Standing operating
Procedure from Hawaii, he having been Adjutant General of the Hawaiian
Department for some months immediately prior to 7 December 1941 and he
stated that he had no recollection on the subject; that I also
questioned General Kuter, who, by reason of his assignment and duties in
Washington with respect to the Air Corps and the War Plans Division,
WDGS, during the months immediately preceding 7 December, 1941, would
have been likely to remember, whether he had any recollection and he
stated he did not; that the net result of my search, therefore,
indicated that a copy of the said Standing Operating Procedure was first
received at Washington, D. C., in March, 1942, at the time it was
receipted for in accordance with the attached photostatic copy-of
receipt; that he reference in said receipt to OHD-41 is to a bound
volume, Register No. 45, Operations Orders Hawaiian Department, 1941,
which contains Standing Operat-
Page 28
ing Procedure Hawaiian Department, dated 5 November, 1941, and
identifies said Standing Operating Procedure as superseding Tentative
Standing Operating Procedure, Hawaiian Department, dated 14 July, 1941;
that a letter dated 5 November 1941, attached to said Standing Operating
Procedure of 5 November, 1941, directs the collection and destruction of
all copies of the said Tentative Standing Operating Procedure; that said
Standing Operating Procedure of 5 November, 1941, provides, among other
things, in paragraphs 13, 14, 15 and 16 of Section II, as follows:
[55] "13. All defense measures are classified under one of the three (3)
Alerts as indicated below. Operations under any Alert will be initiated
by a Department order, except in case of a surprise hostile attack. See
paragraph 15 f (8) below.
"14. ALERT NO. 1.-a. This alert is a defense against acts of sabotage
and uprising within the islands, with no threat from without.
"15. ALERT NO. 2.-a. This alert is applicable to a condition more
serious than Alert No. 1. Security against attacks from hostile sub-
surface, surface, and aircraft, in addition to defense against acts of
sabotage and uprisings, is provided.
16. ALERT NO. 3.-a. This alert requires the occupation of all field
positions by all units, prepared for maximum defense of OAHU and the
Army installations on outlying islands.
* * * * * * *"
Signed: CLARENCE G. JENSEN
Subscribed and sworn to before me, this 22nd day of February 1945.
Henry C. Clausen
HENRY C. CLAUSEN
Major, JAGD.
SECRET
[56] HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER
Fort Shafter, T. H., 29 January 1942.
In reply refer to: WPD-381-Haw Dept (1-29 42)
AG 311.5-OHD-41. Auth: CG, Haw Dept
Initials OMM A. G.
Date: 29 Jan 1942
Subject: Operation Orders Hawaiian Department 1941.
To: War Plans Division, War Department General Staff, Washington, D. C.
Herewith Register Nos. 45 of Operations Orders Hawaiian Department,
1941. Request acknowledgment of receipt by signature below.
By command of Lieutenant General EMMONS:
O. M. McDole
O. M. MCDOLE,
Major, A. G. .D.,
Assistant Adjutant General.
Incls: Received Registers Nos. 45 of OHD-41.
March 10, 1942.
J. L. McKee,
J. L. MCKEE,
Col., G. S. C.
TOP SECRET
[57] AFFIDAVIT OF MARGARET MCKENNEY
Margaret McKenney, civilian clerk in charge, Cable Section, Office of
the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department, Washington, D. C.,
being first duly sworn, and informed of the investigation by Major Henry
C. Clausen, J. A. G. D., for the Secretary of War supplementary to
proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and that top secrecy is
required, deposes and says:
That during the month of December, 1941, and thereafter I was a civilian
clerk in charge of the Cable Section, Office of the Assistant Chief of
Staff,
Page 29
G-2, War Department, Washington, D. A., which section collects and
delivers incoming and outgoing cables pertaining to the office; that I
have read the affidavit of Mary L. Ross and the facts therein set forth
appear to my best information and belief to be accurate; that from my
experience and knowledge of the customary practice during December,
1941, I believe the 6 December 1941 secret cablegram from General Miles
to the Assistant Chief of Staff. Headquarters, G-2, Hawaiian Department,
was sent because (1) the yellow copy of the cablegram, a photostatic
copy of which is attached to the affidavit of Mary L. Ross was returned
in the condition as shown on said copy only if the message was sent, (2)
the notations of the number 519 thereon indicates that the message was
assigned a number by the Signal Corps code room when it was received
from G-2; that the message was then incoded and sent and that then the
notation "SENT NO. 519, 12/5" was placed thereon, (3) that the stamp on
the reverse side of copy of said yellow copy attached to the affidavit
of Colonel Moses W. Pettigrew indicates that it was received in the code
room of the Signal Corps at 11:47 a. m. on 5 December 1941, (4) that the
numeral "4" in the lower left-hand corner of said cablegram indicates
that it is the fourth message that went from G-2 that day and as typed
into the outgoing cables receipt book, the page of which is attached to
the affidavit of Mary L. Ross, (5) that the said G-2 receipt book, 5
December 1941, shows the outgoing cable messages for that day and that
with respect to the cable in question the customary procedure was
followed; that in accordance with this procedure the daily serial number
4 of the message was typewritten on said page with the designation,
classification, time received in the Cable Section, number 32 being Mary
L. Ross as the clerk sending it out, the initials of the originating
officer and the paraphrase of the subject matter of the message; the
page from the receipt book shows that the message was receipted for in
the Signal Corps code room by a clerk using the initials "DG", and that
written on the page of the receipt book is the number 519, being the
number assigned the message by the Signal Corps under a system to
indicate that the message was sent and received by the addressee; (6)
that the system indicated by the number 519 tied in with a system of the
Signal Corps so that the Hawaiian Department in receiving messages must
account for the sequence by numbers and if a number were missing would
check back with Washington to locate the missing message; that since no
check backs were received with respect to number 519, the system shows
that the message was received by the addressee in Hawaii, and (7) that I
have also seen the buck-slip, a photostatic copy [58] of which is
attached to the affidavit of Mary L. Ross, and on which at the bottom is
the handwriting of Colonel Moses W. Pettigrew; that I assisted in the
collection of the pertinent documents bearing on the foregoing facts
prior to Pearl Harbor and at subsequent intervals and for that reason my
memory is clear on the points in which I herein state I have knowledge.
Signed: MARGARET MCKENNEY.
Subscribed and sworn to before me, this 22nd day of February 1945.
Henry C. Clausen
HENRY C. CLAUSEN.
Major, J.A.G.D.
at Washington, D. C.
TOP SECRET
[59] WAR DEPARTMENT
Washington, 25 February 1945.
AFFIDAVIT OF COLONEL GEORGE W. BICKNELL, M. I.
Colonel George W. Bicknell, M. I., presently assigned to G-2, MIS,
Washington, D. C., having been duly sworn and informed of the
investigation of Major Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War,
supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and
informed that top secrecy is required, deposes and says:
I was Assistant G-2 of the Hawaiian Department in charge of
counterintelligence from October 1940 until April 1943. My immediate
chief was Colonel Kendall J. Fielder. Prior to this service I had
training in G-2 work, and in this connection had served under General
Nolan.
Page 30
Before 7 December 1941 and in connection with my duties, I developed
sources of information which included very close liaison with the FBI in
Honolulu whose offices adjoined mine in the Dillingham Building; then
Commander Joseph J. Rochefort, USN, Combat Intelligence Officer in
charge of the Combat Intelligence Unit, Pearl Harbor; the District
Intelligence Officer, Captain Mayfield of the 14th Naval District the
Fleet Intelligence Officer, Commander Layton of the Pacific Fleet, the
British Secret Intelligence Service, and the various units of the Army.
Each Monday I held meetings with Captain Mayfield and Mr. Shivers of the
FBI. I knew at the time of 7 December 1941, and for months preceding
this date that Commander Rochefort was in charge of the unit which
consisted of an intercept radio station, a radio direction finder
station, and crypto-analytical units in Pearl Harbor. I caused other
sources of information to be available to me such as the FCC intercept
radio station, interviews with visitors to Hawaii, the public press, and
certain residents of the Hawaiian Islands.
Before 7 December 1941, and during the latter part of November 1941, I
learned that the Navy had intercepted and decoded Japanese diplomatic
messages from Tokyo to Japanese diplomatic representatives to the effect
that when a false weather report was broadcast by Tokyo it would be a
signal to know that war or breach of diplomatic relations had occurred
between Japan and the United States, Russia, or Britain, or one or more
of these three, and to destroy their secret codes and papers. The
intercepts contained in Top Secret Exhibit "B" shown me by Major
Clausen, numbered SIS 25392 and SIS 25432 which I have initialed,
contained the substance of the information given me in the latter part
of November, 1941. I took immediate action to have the local FCC
intercept radio station monitor for the execution message. The FCC later
furnished me certain intercepts in pursuance of this request, but which
were not the ones for which I was looking.
[60] Later, my attention was again called to this "Winds" code
information when, before 7 December 1941 and to the best of my
recollection on 5 December 1941, I saw on Colonel Fielder's desk a
message from the War Department, Washington, D. C., in substance as
follows:
"DECEMBER 5, 1941.
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF HEADQUARTERS,
G2, Hawaiian Department,
Honolulu, Territory Hawaii.
Contact Commander Rochefort immediately thru commandant Fourteen Naval
District regarding broadcasts from Tokyo reference weather.
MILES."
On the day I saw this message I communicated with Commander Rochefort to
ascertain the pertinent information, and I was advised that he also was
monitoring for the execution message of the "Winds" code. This
information was also given me by Mr. Robert L. Shivers then FBI Agent In
Charge, Honolulu. The information they had as to the "Winds" code was
the same as that which had been given me.
Before 7 December 1941 and about 3 December 1941, I learned from Navy
sources of the destruction of codes and papers by Japanese diplomatic
representatives in Washington, London, Hong Kong, Singapore, Manila, and
elsewhere. I was shown a wire from the Navy Department, Washington, D.
C., in effect as set forth on Page 183, Top Secret Volume "C", testimony
of Captain L. F. Safford, USN. At about this same time this information
was discussed with Commander Rochefort and Mr. Shivers, when Mr. Shivers
told me that the FBI had intercepted a telephone message from the
Japanese Consulate Honolulu, which disclosed that the Japanese Consul
General was burning and destroying all his important papers. In the
morning of 6 December 1941, at the usual staff conference conducted by
the Chief of Staff for General Short I told those assembled, which
included the Chief of Staff, what I had learned concerning the
destruction of their important papers by Japanese Consuls, and stated
that because of this and concurrent information which I had from proved
reliable sources that the destruction of such papers had a very serious
intent and that something warlike by Japan was about to happen
somewhere. I had previously prepared and signed weekly estimates which
were mimeographed and distributed to the Chief of Staff; G 2, Hawaiian
Department; G-2, Hawaiian Air Force; G-2, Schofield Barracks; G 3,
Hawaiian Department; FBI, Honolulu; and ONI, Honolulu, copies of two of
which are set forth
Page 31
between pages 3684 and 3695, Secret Transcript, Volume 30. These weekly
estimates reflected the information that I had received from the sources
I have previously indicated and were in part the means I adopted of
conveying he pertinent information to interested parties.
In the late afternoon of 6 December 1941, Mr. Shivers told me that the
FBI had intercepted a telephone message between Dr. Mori, a Japanese
agent then living in Honolulu, and an individual in Tokyo who ostensibly
was connected with [61] some newspaper in Tokyo, and that the
conversation had been recorded and translated, a copy of which was given
me. Mr. Shivers was alarmed at what he considered the military
implications in this message concerning Pearl Harbor. I concurred in his
views and considered the conversation as very irregular and highly
suspicious. I recall that the subjects of discussion between the
Japanese which caused me alarm were inquiries by the party in Tokyo as
to the fleet, sailors, searchlights, aircraft, weather conditions and
references to "hibiscus" and "poinsettias." My G-2 sense told me that
there was something very significant about the message. I know the
intricacy and subtlety of the Japanese espionage system, that spies
sometimes adopt very innocuous means of transmitting military
information, and I had in mind he other items of intelligence I had
received, including my prior estimates. I reasoned, also, at the time
that while the message from Dr. Mori in Honolulu was ostensibly going by
radio telephone to Tokyo still it could be intercepted elsewhere. I also
considered the Dr. Mori message in the light of the information I had
received concerning the destruction by Japanese Consuls of their codes
and papers. This was the action which the Japanese Consuls were to take
in execution of the "Winds" code.
I therefore telephoned Colonel Fielder, it being about 5:15 p. m., 6
December 1941, and told him that it was very necessary for me to come
and see him and General Short immediately, that I had something that I
considered to be of utmost importance. Colonel Fielder said that he and
General Short were going to dinner at Schofield Barracks and since they
were all ready to go the matter had better wait until tomorrow. I stated
that I though it was too important to wait and that I had to see them
right away. I was then told that if I could get out there in ten minutes
they would wait for me. I did rush out and make it in ten minutes and
handed the intercepted message to General Short who read it with Colonel
Fielder. Both Colonel Fielder and General Short indicated hat I was
perhaps too "intelligence conscious" and that to them this message
seemed to be quite in order, and that it was nothing to be excited
about. My conference with General Short and Colonel Fielder was
comparatively brief and seemed to last only for about five minutes.
Following 7 December 1941, I met General Short while waiting to testify
before the Roberts Commission. We were alone and at that time he stated
to me words to the effect, "Well, Bicknell, I want you to know that
whatever happens you were right and I was wrong."
On 7 December 1941, immediately upon commencement of hostilities I
caused all action to be taken looking toward the apprehension of
Japanese agents for which I had theretofore taken preparatory steps. I
caused, also, a search to be made of the Japanese Consulate, his papers
seized, some of which he did not have time to destroy, and I had these
turned over to Commander Rochefort for our joint investigatory action.
As leads I suggest that the files which were kept under my supervision
and custody in the Dillingham Building be thoroughly reviewed, that Mr.
Jack Russell of the Theodore Davies Company, Honolulu, be questioned
concerning the warning [62] to Short supposed to have been sent on 6
December 1941 by the British SIS, Manila; and that in this connection
then Lt. Colonel Gerald Wilkinson and then Colonel Field, both of
British SIS, be questioned.
George W. Bicknell,
GEORGE W. BICKNELL,
Colonel, M. I.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 25th day of February 1945.
Henry C. Clausen,
HENRY C. CLAUSEN,
Major, JAGD.
At Washington, D. C.
Page 32
[63] AMENDMENT TO AFFIDAVIT OF COLONEL GEORGE W. BICKNELL
Colonel George W. Bicknell, heretofore examined by Lieut. Colonel Henry
C. Clausen, JAGD, makes the following amendment to his affidavit of 25
February 1945, concerning the Pearl Harbor investigation:
I wish to state further that prior to 7 December 1941, namely about
October 1941, I made and practiced, in collaboration with Mr. Shivers of
the FBI, elaborate plans for rounding up dangerous aliens, especially
Japanese, in the event of war with Japan. These plans were divided into
three categories, called "A", "B" and "C". They are specifically set
forth in memoranda I prepared which should be in the G-2 and FBI files.
Plan "C" was put into execution immediately on the proclamation of
martial law.
In connection with such plans I wish also to refer to my written
estimates given to General Short and his Staff, including those dated 17
and 25 October 1941. In view of the impending events, I also, on about
the middle of October 1941, recommended to the Hawaiian Department G-2
and Signal Officer that a teletype system be installed which would link
all the intelligence agencies in the Hawaiian Islands with the
Headquarters, Hawaiian Department.
Colonel Clausen has shown me a file containing many of the reports which
Gerald Wilkinson of the British Secret Intelligence Service sent to Mr.
Harry Dawson in Honolulu. Those in this file which are marked for me,
were received by me on or about the dates set forth in the documents.
Included in this group are the two documents, dated as having been
received at Honolulu 27 November and 3 December, 1941, and in turn
delivered to the FBI at Honolulu on 29 November and 4 December, 1941,
respectively, and which documents were received by me on the dates they
were delivered to the FBI. I have identified a copy of each document by
putting my initials and today's date on the reverse sides.
The information which was thus received from Gerald Wilkinson, including
that set forth on the two documents stated of 27 November and 3
December, 1941 as well as any pertinent information I received in
connection with my G-2 activities, I gave to General Short, promptly, in
one form or another Reference is made in this regard to the files of
written memoranda which should be available in the G-2 offices at
Honolulu and Washington, to my testimony heretofore on the subject, and
to my personal conference with General Short on 6 December 1941.
GEORGE W. BICKNELL.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 14th day of August, 1945.
Henry C. Clausen,
HENRY C. CLAUSEN,
Lieut. Colonel, JAGD.
At Washington, D. C.
[64]
WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON
AFFIDAVIT OF MAJOR EDWARD B. ANDERSON, T. C.
Major Edward B. Anderson, T. C., presently on duty with the Office of
the Transportation Corps, Washington, D. C., being duly sworn and
informed of the investigation by Major Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the
Secretary of War, supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl
Harbor Board, and that top secrecy is required, deposes and says:
My attention has been called to a photostatic copy of a secret telegram
dated 5 December 1941 attached to the affidavit of Colonel Moses W.
Pettigrew. On the date of this message I was assigned to the Office of
The Adjutant General Hawaiian Department. My immediate superior was the
then Major McDole. The customary and usual practice with respect to such
messages was for them to be sent from the Signal Officer, Hawaiian
Department, to the office in which I was assigned, Office of The
Adjutant General, Hawaiian Department and by our office to the
addressee. Normally the Signal Officer sent two copies to our office.
One of these was sent by our office to the action addressee, and if it
was returned it was filed in a subject file. The other copy was retained
in our office and used for the purpose of checking against the sequence
of numbers which was a system in use at the time for assuring that we
received all
Page 33
messages. If a number was missing we would check back with the Signal
Office and ascertain the reason why. I cannot recall specifically having
seen the message in question dated 5 December 1941, but I do not recall
either having occasion at the time to have indications of a missing
number.
As additional leads I suggest questioning of Colonel McDole, Chief
Warrant Officer Lane, Warrant Officer Knapp, and personnel of the Signal
Office, Hawaiian Department. The records of The Adjutant General and the
Signal Office Hawaiian Department, should indicate whether the message
was received.
Edward B. Anderson,
EDWARD B. ANDERSON
Major, T. C.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 27th day of February 1945.
Henry C. Clausen,
HENRY C. CLAUSEN,
Major, JAGD.
At Washington, D. C.
[65] WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON
AFFIDAVIT OF BRIGADIER GENERAL ROBERT H. DUNLOP
Brigadier General Robert H. Dunlop, presently assigned to the Office of
The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C., being duly sworn and informed
of the investigation by Major Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary
of War, supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board,
and that top secrecy is required, deposes and says:
I was Adjutant General of the Hawaiian Department from June 1941 to and
including December 1941 and thereafter.
I recall the all-out alert which was ordered by General Herron in 1940.
So far as I observed, this alert and the action of the Army in pursuance
thereof did not materially alarm the civilian population.
My attention has been invited to the Standing Operating Procedure of the
Hawaiian Department dated 5 November 1941, a copy of which Major Clausen
was shown me, contained in a bound volume, register No. 45, Operations
Orders Hawaiian Department, 1941, which also contains a copy of a letter
dated 6 November 1941, over my signature. I have no recollection of
sending any copy of the Standing Operating Procedure, Hawaiian
Department, dated 6 November 941, or the Operations Orders, Hawaiian
Department, 1941, to Washington D. C., or having these sent to
Washington, D. C., before 7 December 1941.
On 27 November 1941, I was in the office of Lt. General Short Commanding
General of the Hawaiian Department, when Colonel Phillips, Chief of
Staff of the Hawaiian Department, at about 2:30 p. m. entered the room,
excused himself for the interruption, and said that he had come in to
show the Commanding General a very important message from General
Marshall, Chief of Staff of the Army, Washington, D. C., which he had
just received. General Short read this message and said in effect that
it certainly was a very important message, and it is my impression that,
directing himself to Colonel Phillips told him to put into operation
Alert No. 1 of the Standing Operating Procedure dated 5 November 1941.
At that time the Standing Operating Procedure dated 5 November 1941 was
in effect for the Hawaiian Department. I ascertained then or later that
the message from Washington read in general as follows:
"Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical
purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government
might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action
unpredictable, but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities
cannot, repeat cannot, be avoided, the United States desires that Japan
commit the first overt act. This policy should not, repeat not, be
constructed as restricting you to a course of action that might
jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action you are
directed to undertake such reconnaissance and [66] other measures as you
deem necessary, but these measures should be carried out so as not,
repeat not, to alarm civil population or disclose intent. Report
measures taken. Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks
assigned in Rainbow Five so far as they pertain to Japan. Limit
dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential
officers."
Page 34
At 4 p. m. the afternoon of 27 November 1941 I was present at the staff
meeting to which I had been called. The message was read to us and
Colonel Phillips stated that the Commanding General had ordered into
operation Alert No. 1 of the Standing Operating Procedure. He asked for
questions and as I recollect there was only one question put. It
concerned the message from General Marshall but the details of which I
cannot now recall. There was no further discussion. There was no mention
then or thereafter, to my knowledge up to 7 December 1941, as to what
had been the effect upon the civilian population of the alert ordered by
General Herron the preceding year to which I have referred. The staff
meeting did not last longer than about fifteen minutes.
I have no recollection of having seen the message dated 5 December 1941,
the one showed me by Major Clausen, a photostatic copy of which is
attached to the affidavit of Colonel Moses W. Pettigrew, but I suggest
that a search of the records of The Adjutant General and the Signal
Officer, Hawaiian Department, be made since the receipt or non-receipt
should have been recorded and the record thereof preserved.
Robert H. Dunlop,
ROBERT H. DUNLOP
Brigadier General.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 28th day of February 1945.
Henry C. Clausen,
HENRY C. CLAUSEN,
Major, JAGD.
At Washington, D. C.
[67]
WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington, 28 February 1945.
AFFIDAVIT OF LT. COLONEL FRANK B. ROWLETT, S. C.
Lt. Colonel Frank B. Rowlett, Signal Corps, presently Branch Chief,
Signal Security Agency, OCSigO, Washington, D. C., being duly sworn and
informed of the investigation by Major Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the
Secretary of War supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl
Harbor Board, and that top secrecy is required, deposes and says:
On 7 December 1941 and during the immediately preceding month, I was a
civilian technical assistant to the officer in charge of the Crypto-
Analytical Unit Signal Intelligence Service, OCSigO, War Department,
Washington, D. A. My immediate superior was Major Harold S. Doud who was
assistant to Colonel Rex W. Minckler, Chief of the Signal Intelligence
Service, who in turn was under Colonel Otis K. Sadtler, Chief of the
Army Communications Service, and whose superior was the Chief Signal
Officer. Colonel Eric Svensson was in charge of the Japanese Diplomatic
Solution Activities.
I recall in general the tenor of the various Japanese diplomatic
intercepts which had been Deciphered and translated, contained in Top
Secret Exhibit "B" shown me by Major Clausen. Pursuant to the request of
Major Clausen I have attempted to compile from original records
presently in the possession of the Signal Corps information concerning
the intercepts in said Exhibit "B" as to (1) sources of interception;
(2) dates of the messages; (3) dates of interception; (4) dates of
translations; (5) whether Honolulu had copies; (6) whether the
activating message in pursuance of the "Winds" code message is available
in places to which I now have access. Attached hereto is a summary I
prepared which refers to various of the intercepts by the Signal
Intelligence Service number and gives some of the requested information
which I have been able to obtain. My search has not disclosed any
"Winds" code activating message, although at the time it was supposed to
have been intercepted shortly before 7 December 1941. I recall comments
to the effect that it had been intercepted.
As additional leads I suggest questioning of Colonel Doud, Colonel
Minckler, Colonel Sadtler, Colonel Svensson, Miss Prather, and Mr.
Friedman, among others.
Frank B. Rowlett,
FRANK B. ROWLETT,
Lt. Col., S. C.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 28th day of February 1945.
Henry C. Clausen,
HENRY C. CLAUSEN,
Major, JAGD.
At Washington, D. C.
Page 35
[68]
SIS No. Sources* Date Msg Date Int Date translated Honolulu
23260 S 24 Sept 24 Sept 9 Oct No
23570 7 14 Oct 15 Oct 16 Oct No
23516 2, S, 7, M, 3 14 Oct 14 Oct 15 Oct No
23631 1 16 Oct 16 Oct 17 Oct No
23859 2, 7, 1 22 Oct 22/23 Oct 23 Oct No
24373 S (teletype) 5 Nov 5 Nov 5 Nov No
25322 Navy Radio 14 Nov ? 26 Nov No
25644 S 15 Nov ? 3 Dec No
24878 S 16 Nov 17 Nov 17 Nov No
25773 S 18 Nov 18 Nov 5 Dec No
25817 1, 2 18 Nov 18/19 Nov 6 Dec No
25392 S 19 Nov ? 26 Nov No
25823 S, 2 29 Nov ? 5 Dec No
25040 S (teletype) 19 Nov ? 20 Nov No
25432 S (teletype) 19 Nov ? 28 Nov No
25138 S 22 Nov 22 Nov 22 Nov No
25435 1, 6 26 Nov 26 Nov 28 Nov No
25344 S 26 Nov 26 Nov 26 Nov No
25349 ? 26 Nov 26 Nov 26 Nov No
25444 1, 2 26 Nov 27 Nov 28 Nov No
25480 1, 2 26 Nov 26/27 Nov 29 Nov No
25436 1 26 Nov 26 Nov 28 Nov No
25445 S, 6 28 Nov 28 Nov 28 Nov No
25496 S (teletype) 29 Nov 29 Nov 30 Nov No
25554 Navy Radio 30 Nov 30 Nov 1 Dec No
25553 J, Navy Rad 30 Nov 1 Dec 1 Dec No
25552 J, Navy Rad 30 Nov 1 Dec 1 Dec No
25497 ? 30 Nov 30 Nov 30 Nov No
25555 Navy Radio 30 Nov 30 Nov 1 Dec No
25787 British 1 Dec ? 5 Dec No
25605 S (teletype) 1 Dec 1 Dec 1 Dec No
25545 S (teletype) 1 Dec 1 Dec 1 Dec No
25727 S, 1 1 Dec ? 4 Dec No
25783 S, Navy Radio 1 Dec ? 4 Dec No
25659-B 1, 2, 7 2 Dec 2 Dec 3 Dec No
25660 7 2 Dec 2 Dec 3 Dec No
25640 X, 2 2 Dec 2 Dec 3 Dec No
25785 7 3 Dec ? 5 Dec No
25807 W 4 Dec 5 Dec 6 Dec No
27065 S, 5 2 Dec 2 Dec 30 Dec Yes
25843 S (teletype) 4 Dec ? 7 Dec No
25836 S (teletype) 5 Dec ? 6 Dec No
25838 S 6 Dec 6 Dec 6 Dec No
24843 S 6 Dec 6 Dec 6 Dec No
26158 1, 5 6 Dec ? 12 Dec Yes
25846 2 (teletype) 6 Dec 6 Dec 7 Dec No
25854 S 7 Dec 7 Dec 7 Dec No
25850 S 7 Dec 7 Dec 7 Dec No
25856 S (teletype) 7 Dec 7 Dec 7 Dec No
25866 2, Navy Rad 7 Dec 7 Dec 7 Dec No
*Navy: J=Jupiter, Fla. S=Bainbridge Island, Wash. W=Winter Harbor, Me.
Navy Radio-Navy Overseas Intercept or British, X-photographs of original
messages
Army: 1=Ft. Hancock, 2-San Francisco, 3=San Antonio, 4=Panama,
5=Honolulu, 6=Manila, 7= Fort Hunt, Va.
[69] WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON
AFFIDAVIT OF MAJOR GENERAL RALPH C. SMITH
Major General Ralph C. Smith, presently on duty in the Office of the
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department, Washington, D. A., being
first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Major Henry C.
Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to the
proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board and that top secrecy is
required, deposes and says:
During the months of November and December 1941, and theretofore, I was
Executive Officer in the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2,
Washington, D. C. Several months immediately before 7 December 1941,
Colonel Carlise Clyde Dusenbury was assistant to Colonel Rufus S.
Bratton, Chief of the Far Eastern Branch, G-2. Up to a few weeks before
7 December 1941, it was customary for either Colonel Bratton or Colonel
Dusenbury to bring to me, for the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2,
Japanese diplomatic messages which had been intercepted, deciphered, and
translated, in a locked pouch to which I had a key. During this time I
would open the pouch, glance over the intercepts and then give them to
the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2. A few weeks before 7 December 1941,
pursuant to instructions I relinquished my key to the pouch, gave it to
the Assistant Chief
Page 36
of Staff, G-2, General Miles. Thereafter, Colonel Bratton or Colonel
Dusenbury would bring me the locked pouches but I then did not read the
intercepts and gave the locked pouches directly to General Miles. During
the period when I was reading the intercepts, or handed the locked pouch
to General Miles, as stated the pouches containing the intercepts were
almost always delivered to me by Colonel Bratton or Colonel Dusenbury.
While I cannot recollect specifically whether Colonel Bratton and
Colonel Dusenbury alternated in bringing me the pouches, I do recall
clearly that as a customary practice it was either one, or the other.
I did not receive any such intercepts or pouches after about noon on 6
December 1941. This is clearly fixed in my mind because I entrained at
about 6 p. m. for Fort Benning preparatory to a refresher course at the
Infantry School which I then commenced. I recall as being on the train
with me en route to Fort Benning, the evening of 6 December 1941,
Colonel C. R. Huebner. I did not, therefore, following the time stated,
namely about noon on 6 December 1941, receive any pouch containing
intercepts or any intercepts for the Assistant Chief of Staff G-2, or
any other person.
Ralph C. Smith.
RALPH C. SMITH,
Major General.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 28th day of February 1945.
Henry C. Clausen,
HENRY C. CLAUSEN,
Major, JAGD.
At Washington, D. C.
[70] AFFIDAVIT OF MARY L. Ross
Mary L. Ross, presently assigned to the Office of the Assistant Chief of
Staff. G-2, War Department, Washington, D. C., being first duly sworn,
and informed of the investigation by Major Henry C. Clausen, J.A.G.D.,
for the Secretary of War supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl
Harbor Board, and that top secrecy is required, deposes and says:
That during the month of December, 1941, and thereafter I was a clerk in
the Cable Branch in the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G 2, War
Department Washington; that in said month of December, 1941, in
connection with my duties I was assigned the number "32" and said number
was used in said office to designate me.
That my attention has been called to a secret cablegram dated 5 December
1941 from the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, to the Assistant Chief of
Staff, Head quarters, G-2, Hawaiian Department, a photostatic copy of
which is hereto annexed; that I recall the circumstances and my actions
with respect to said cablegram; that the yellow copy of said cablegram,
of which the attached exhibit is a photostatic copy, was brought to me
with a "buck-slip", a photostatic copy of which is attached, and on
which at the bottom is written a message in the hand writing of Colonel
Moses W. Pettigrew; that I recall that the person who brought me the
cablegram also orally informed me that the message was important and its
immediate dispatch was urgent; that on receiving the yellow copy and
said buck-slip I made the customary entry in the office outgoing cables
receipt book a photostatic copy of the pertinent page of which is also
attached hereto, that the entry shown therein as Ser. No. 4 was typed
therein by myself as indicated by my number 32 in the column for the
clerk; that I put a red priority tag on the copy of the cablegram and
took it to the Signal Corps code room, handed it to the clerk who
receipted for it by the initials "DG" written on the page of said
receipt book as is indicated by the attached photostatic copy; that
there after, probably the next day, the yellow copy was returned with
the notation thereon "#519" and "SENT NO. 519, 12/5"; that the said
number 519 was assigned the message by the Signal Corps and was then
written on a page of our receipt book as is indicated on the attached
photostatic copy; that the procedure in the Signal Corps code room was
to assign a number and then after the message was sent to write on the
yellow copy that it was sent as was done on the yellow copy of the
message in question as heretofore indicated.
That also attached hereto is a photostatic copy of the paraphrase kept
in the G-2 office and which has thereon "MAILED G/2 W.D.G.S. DEC 5 1941
32"; that this latter notation on said photostatic copy was placed
thereon by me to
Page 37
indicate that it had been transmitted by the Signal Corps; that the
initials in the lower right hand corner thereof, "RSB WP" are in the
handwriting of Colonel Pettigrew; that my memory with respect to the
foregoing is clear because soon [71] after Pearl Harbor and at intervals
thereafter I was questioned concerning the foregoing and the Office of
G-2 assembled pertinent papers among which were the documents,
photostatic copies of which there are attached; that I assisted the
assembly of these papers.
Signed: MARY L. Ross.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 1st day of March 1945.
Henry C. Clausen,
HENRY C. CLAUSEN,
Major, JAGD.
At Washington, D. C.
[72]
Standard Form No. 14A
Approved by the President
March 10, 1926
SECRET
TELEGRAM
OFFICIAL BUSINESS-GOVERNMENT RATES
Sent No. 519, 12/5 DECEMBER 5, 1941.
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF
Headquarters G2 Hawaiian Department,
Honolulu, Territory Hawaii
Contact Commander Rochefort immediately thru Commandant Fourteen Naval
District regarding broadcasts from Tokyo reference weather
MILES
I certify that this message is on official business and necessary for
the public service.
RALPH C. SMITH,
Colonel, G. S. C.
Executive Officer, G-2.
Secret Cablegram
[73] INTELLIGENCE BRANCH-MISV-WDGS
FROM: TO:
The A. C. of S., G-2
Executive Officer, G-2
Chief, Intelligence Branch
Executive, Intelligence Branch
Administrative
Field Personnel
Drafting and Reproduction
Stenographic Pool
Asst. Chief, Intelligence Branch
Situation
Contact
Dissemination
Air Section
British Empire Section
Central European Section
Eastern European Section
Southern European Section
Western European Section
Far Eastern Section
Latin American Section
Page 38
ADMINISTRATIVE BRANCH
Military Attache Section
Foreign Liaison Section
Coordinating Section
Finance Section
Personnel Section
Record Section
Translation Section
Mimeograph Room
Chief Clerk
COUNTER INTELLIGENCE BRANCH
SPECIAL STUDY GROUP
PLANS AND TRAINING BRANCH
INFORMATION CONTROL BRANCH
W. D. MAP COLLECTION
FOR Necessary Action
Preparation of reply
Recommendation or remark
Information and guidance
Note and return
Number and return
[Written:] Important-Please put priority tag on Re Service Japanese WD
(The page from the receipt book relating to outgoing cables mentioned in
the affidavit of Mary L. Ross, supra, will be found reproduced as Item
No. 1, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Clausen Investigation. These
illustrations will be found bound together following the printed
exhibits of the Clausen investigation.)
SECRET
[75] Paraphrase of an outgoing. Drafting Section: Far Eastern G2/I.
Secret XX Drafting Officer: RSB.
Cablegram XX No. 519 Sent out Dec. 5, 1941
DECEMBER 5, 1941.
To: Assistant Chief of Staff Headquarters, G-2 Hawaiian Department,
Honolulu, Territory of Hawaii.
Commander Rochefort who can be located thru the 14th Naval District has
some information on Japanese broadcasts in which weather reports are
mentioned that you must obtain. Contact him at once.
MILES.
[76] Colonel Edward W. Raley, AC, presently CO, Langley Field, Va.,
being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Major Henry
C. Clausen, JAGD, for the SW, supplementary to proceedings of the Army
Pearl Harbor Board, deposes and says:
On 7 Dec 1941 and for about one year preceding I was G2, Hawaiian Air
Force. Shortly after assuming these duties, I established, for purposes
of the Hawaiian Air Force some form of contact with the Navy, through
then Comdr. Layton, USN. I told Comdr. Layton that my contact was for
the Hawaiian Air Force. During this period of about one year I had not
more than six conversations with Comdr. Layton concerning the subject of
my contact. These conversations were spread out during this period. As
nearly as I can recall the last conversation I had with Comdr. Layton
before 7 Dec 1941 was about October 1941.
The information given me by Comdr. Layton was my only Navy source. He
stated that if there was any Navy movement by Japan, coming to his
knowledge and which might imperil the Hawaiian Islands, he would inform
me. The only specific information he gave me in this regard were studies
he made of a possible Japanese Malay hostility and of Japanese fleet
installations in the Mandates. I believe this was at least two months
before 7 Dec. 1941.
Page 39
[77] Any information I received from Comdr. Layton, I promptly gave to
my Commanding General, General Martin.
On 1 Oct 1941 I conferred with Comdr. Layton and Colonel Bicknell who
was then Asst. G2, Hawaiian Dept. concerning a conclusion I had reached
that hostilities with Japan was possible within a short time or any
moment. They apparently shared my view. I reported this to Gen. Martin.
Attached are portions of a letter written by me to my daughter on 2 Oct
1941, concerning this conference.
I recall the Gen. Herron alert of 1940, which I believe was known to the
civilian population, but to my recollection there was no alarm of the
civilian population.
EDWARD W. RALEY Col. AC.
Subscribed and sworn to before me 11 March 1945 at Langley Field, Va.
HENRY C. CLAUSEN
Major, JAGD.
[78]
THURSDAY AFTERNOON, 2 OCTOBER, 1941.
Last night mother and I had a few people for dinner at the club. We had
Commander Layton, who is Fleet intelligence officer; Col. Bicknell, who
is on intelligence duty down town; and Major Meehan from the post-and
their wives, of course. Wednesday evening is a supper dance evening at
the club. We assembled at the house, and the drinking members lifted a
few and then we adjourned to the club where we had dinner and danced a
bit. We thought a good time was had by all and in your immortal phrase,
it "was a good party."
The reason I was anxious to have these people together was that I was
anxious to get Bicknell's and Layton's opinion regarding the Far Eastern
situation. You night gather from the public prints that United States-
Japanese relations had been improving of late, but somehow, I didn't
think so. It seems to me that Japanese-U. S. relations never were in a
more critical state than they are at this moment. I don't say [79] there
necessarily will be a war between the two countries right now, but I do
say that never in the past has there been a time when it would be easier
to have one.
I thought I'd better speak to the boss about the matter, so I did, and
he made me feel extremely foolish. He agreed with the general conclusion
and then, in he fewest number of words possible, he summed up the
situation in a fashion that was just about perfect. I would have been
very proud of myself if I had had the situation as well ordered in my
mind and was capable of expressing it as well as he did. I've never
heard anything so concisely and comprehensively expressed.
DADDY.
[Hand written:] Letter returned by Joyce Nov. 3, 1942.
EWR.
[80] WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON, D. C.
AFFIDAVIT OF GENERAL CHARLES K. GAILEY
General Charles K. Gailey, presently on duty in the Office of the
Operations Divisions Assistant Chief of Staff, War Department,
Washington, D. C., being duly sworn and informed of the investigation by
Major Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to
the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and that top secrecy is
required, deposes and says:
During the months of November and December 1941 and theretofore, I was
Executive Officer in the Office of the War Plans Division, Assistant
Chief of Staff, G-3, Washington, D. C. With respect to intercepts of
Japanese diplomatic messages which had been deciphered and translated it
was the customary practice for either Colonel Bratton or Colonel
Dusenbury, G-2, to bring these to me for the Assistant Chief of Staff,
G-3, General Gerow. They would be given me and I would get them to
General Gerow as soon as practicable. I recall that these intercepts
were brought to me by either Colonel Bratton or Colonel Dusenbury. While
I cannot recall whether they alternated in bringing them I do remember
that it was either one or the other as a customary practice.
Page 40
Specifically, with respect to the evening of 6 December 1941, I do not
recall having received any pouch or intercepts from Colonel Bratton or
Colonel Dusenbury or from any other source. In the event General Gerow
did not receive any particular intercepts the evening of 6 December
1941, I am certain that they were not delivered to me as, if they had
been, I would have given them to him.
Chas. K. Gailey,
CHARLES K. GAILEY,
Brigadier General.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 21st day of March 1946.
Henry C. Clausen,
HENRY C. CLAUSEN,
Major, JAGD.
at Washington, D. C.
[81]
WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON
AFFIDAVIT OF COLONEL EDWARD F. FRENCH:
Colonel Edward F. French, presently on duty with the Office of the Chief
Signal Officer, Washington, D. C., being duly sworn and informed of the
investigation by Major Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War,
supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and
that top secrecy is required, deposes and says:
During the months of November and December 1941 and theretofore, I was
Officer in Charge of the Traffic Division and Signal Center, Washington,
D. C.
I have been shown the photostatic copy of the secret cablegram dated 5
December 1941, a copy of which is attached to the affidavit of Colonel
Moses W. Pettigrew. Based on customary practice and procedure, it is my
opinion that the message was sent to the addressee for the following
reasons: The notations thereon "#519" and "SENT NO. 519, 12/5" indicate
that the message was brought to the Signal Corps code room and was
assigned the "#519" and that the message was then encoded with the code
room sequence number as the first word in the text of message. The coded
text message, original and carbon copy, was then sent to the message
center. The carbon copy bearing the time stamp of the message center
acknowledging receipt was then returned to the code room and checked
with the original clear text message. The Signal Center time stamp date
was then placed on the original clear text message which was returned
the following morning to the office of origin.
In the Signal Center the original coded text, on receipt after time
stamped, was given a Signal Center sequence number (black number) and
then the message was word counted and placed at the operating position,
where it received a channel sequence number at the time of transmission
which was checked off the operators number sheet. After transmission of
the message the operator put his initials and time of transmission on
the face of the message, which was later collected by a clerk who
verified the "black number" by a check off sheet before sending the
message to file. This was a further guard to assure the transmission of
the message. At midnight these sequence channel numbers were and still
are verified with the distant end of the circuit to assure that all
messages as transmitted were received. This sequence check was and is
known as a "good night service."
Further, had this message been not received, a check would also have
been made by the code room of the addressee, as there would be a break
in the sequence numbers of the code message numbers. This system of
checking sequence numbers of messages was a long time practice to assure
and guard against lost messages.
[82] The loss of a coded message is possible but highly improbable. In
fact, on recent questioning of personnel in the code room and Signal
Center, and from my own experience prior to 7 December 1941, the loss of
a coded message could not be recalled.
I have seen the yellow copy of the message "519" in question, now in
possession of G-2, and it is the yellow copy of which a photostatic copy
is attached to the affidavit of Colonel Pettigrew.
Page 41
I have also seen the photostatic copy of the G-2 Office outgoing cable
receipts book page for 5 December 1941 attached to the affidavit of Mary
L. Ross. The entry shown thereon bearing serial No. 4 indicates that the
clerk in the Signal Corps code room receipted for the message by the
initials "DG", which I recognize as the handwriting of Dorothy Glaves
who was employed as a clerk in the Signal Corps code room on 5 December
1941, and whose duties included receipting for such messages.
Edward F. French,
EDWARD F. FRENCH,
Colonel, S. C.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 22d day of March 1945.
Henry C. Clausen,
HENRY C. CLAUSEN,
Major, JAGD.
At Washington, D. C.
[83] WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON
AFFIDAVIT OF COLONEL JOSEPH K. EVANS
Colonel Joseph K. Evans, presently on duty in G-2, War Department, as
the Pacific Ocean Area Japanese Specialist, being duly sworn and
informed of the investigation by Major Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the
Secretary of War, supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl
Harbor Board, and that top secrecy is required, deposes and says:
For about two months immediately prior to 27 November 1941 I was G-2,
Philippine Department, and for two years prior to said two months period
I was Assistant G-2, Philippine Department.
There was very close liaison and exchange of intelligence information
between the Army and the Navy at Manila. The Army and the Navy each had
facilities for intercepting, decrypting and translating Japanese radio
messages. Each service had a machine for the decryption of Japanese
messages which were encoded in the classification known as Purple. The
types of messages decrypted Manila correspond generally to those shown
me by Major Clausen and designated Top Secret, Exhibit "B". The
customary practice of the Army or Navy at Manila was to inform the Army
or Navy at Hawaii of intelligence on Japanese information thus obtained.
More precise information in this regard as to particular messages was
probably known to my Assistant for Signal Intelligence, Major Sherr, now
deceased, and may be known to Commander "Rosie" Mason, USN. There was
also close liaison with the British S. I. S. at Manila. For example, see
Lt. Colonel Gerald H. Wilkinson, International Building, Room 3501, 630
Fifth Avenue, Rockefeller Center.
I left the Philippine Islands on 27 November 1941 enroute to the United
States Army Transport "H. L. Scott". About two days before I left I
received information, which to the best of my recollection came from the
British Secret intelligence Service at Singapore, to the effect that
hostilities between the United States and Japan were imminent and that
large Japanese Naval forces were concentrating in the vicinity of the
Marshall Islands. For these reasons, the convoy of which the "H. L.
Scott" was a part did not proceed in the usual direct route from Manila
to Pearl Harbor, but went by a circuitous route south through Torres
Strait which separates Australia and New Guinea. On my arrival in Pearl
Harbor on or about 15 December 1941, I for several hours discussed G-2
matters with Colonel Bicknell, Assistant G-2, Hawaiian Department, and
Mr. Shivers, F. B. I. Agent in charge. During the course of these
discussions I told Colonel Bicknell and Mr. Shivers of the information
[84] I had received and was in turn told by Colonel Bicknell that he
also had received this information and at the same time.
Joseph K. Evans
JOSEPH K. EVANS
Colonel, GSC.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 22d day of March 1945.
Henry C. Clausen
HENRY C. CLAUSEN,
Major, JAGD.
At Washington, D. C.
Page 42
[85]
Memorandum to: Lieut. Col. Henry Christian Clausen.
From: Mr. John E. Russell, President Theo. H. Davies & Co., Ltd.,
Honolulu, T. H.
You asked me to recall the circumstances surrounding my receipt of
confidential information before December 7, 1941, which was so
indicative of coming trouble in the Philippine area that I had acted
immediately to cancel orders for shipment to that Territory.
My records indicate that on December 4th I telephoned to Mr. C. V.
Bennett, Manager of our San Francisco office, and asked him to take
steps to cancel all outstanding orders for shipment to the Philippine
Islands and to endeavor to stop shipments that were en route there.
I personally received no message on this subject from the Philippines,
but I saw a copy of a message dispatched by Col. G. H. Wilkinson (then
working secretly for the British Government) addressed to his agent in
Honolulu, and he had requested the agent to show me the message. Mr.
Harry L. Dawson, the agent in question, is sitting beside me while I
dictate this memorandum, and states that after showing this message to
me a copy of it was left with Col. Bicknell, Capt. Mayfield and Mr.
Robert Shivers, then with the FBI. Mr. Dawson finds that all his records
of this incident were destroyed immediately after December 7, 1941.
On December 15th I wrote to Mr. Bennett as follows:
"Thank you for your letter of December 5th about Philippine indent
orders It is certainly interesting to say the least that we should have
taken steps on December 4th to stop this type of business. I took some
similar precautions here at the same time, but cannot give any logical
explanation as to why I had taken such steps. It just looks like one of
those lucky hunches that one gets at times."
I do not recall, exactly, what was in the message that was shown to me,
but believe it indicated some Japanese troop dispositions which were
very illuminating in the light of diplomatic exchanges than taking
place. I do not believe that the message said that trouble would begin
on December 7th; but as I told you today the general tone of the message
was sufficiently alarming to cause a reaction in the mind of a
businessman, strong enough to warrant the cancellation of a considerable
volume of orders for delivery in the Philippines.
I am sorry that I have no other data that might throw [86] light on this
subject; and in the light of what I have said above in connection with
Mr. Dawson's files, he is not submitting a memorandum on this subject;
but I can say that his recollection of the incident is substantially in
agreement with what I have given you herein.
jer-m.
John E. RUSSELL,
President, Theo. H. Davies d Co., Ltd.
April 10, 1945.
At Honolulu.
CONFIDENTIAL
[87A] URGENT CABLE RECEIVED FROM MANILA NIGHT OF DEC. 3, 194l
We have received considerable intelligence confirming following
developments in Indo-China:
A. 1. Accelerated Japanese preparation of air fields and railways.
2. Arrival since Nov. 10 of additional 100,000 repeat 100,000
troops and considerable quantities fighters, medium bombers,
tanks and guns (75 mm).
B. Estimates of specific quantities have already been telegraphed
Washington Nov. 21 by American Military Intelligence here.
C. Our considered opinion concludes that Japan invisages early
hostilities with Britain and U. S. Japan does not repeat not
intend to attack Russia at present but will act in South.
You may inform Chiefs of American Military and Naval Intelligence
Honolulu.
cc. Col. Bicknell
Mr. Shivers
Capt. Mayfield
[87B]
On the reverse side of this document is a copy of the message referred
to in memorandum to Lieut. Col. Henry C. Clausen dated April 10, 1945.
which was received by the undersigned and copies distributed to the
persons indicated in said memorandum, on December 4, 1941.
Honolulu T. H. HARRY L. DAWSON.
April 16, 1945. JOHN E. RUSSELL.
Page 43
[88]
AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT L. SHIVERS
Robert L. Shivers, presently Collector of Customs, Hawaiian Islands,
being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Lt. Colonel
Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to the
proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, deposes and says:
On 7 Dec. 1941 and since August 1939, I was FBI Agent in Charge at
Honolulu, T. H.
During the year 1940 I developed close liaison with then Lt. Comdr.
Joseph J. Rochefort, Res., USN, Intelligence Officer Hawaiian
Detachment, U. S. Fleet. Commencing in the first part of 1941 I
developed close liaison with then Capt. Irving H. Mayfield, USN,
District Intelligence Officer, 14th Naval District. Since August 1939 I
had close liaison with then Lt. Colonel George W. Bicknell, MID, Army
Reserve. About July 1941 I developed close liaison with then Lt. Colonel
Kendall J. Fielder, G-2, Hawaiian Dept. This liaison with the fore-going
persons continued down to 7 Dec. 1941 and after. I held weekly meetings
with Colonel Bicknell and Capt. Mayfield. Colonel Fielder would
sometimes be present.
I knew on 7 Dec. 1941 and for months preceding that date that Comdr.
Rochefort was in charge of the Navy unit which consisted [89] of an
intercept radio station, a radio direction finder station, and crypto-
analytical units in Pearl Harbor. Comdr. Rochefort did not discuss with
me his operations, nor did he disclose to me any information as a result
of his operations, until after 7 Dec. 1941.
Before 7 Dec. 1941, about 1 Dec. 1941, Capt. Mayfield told me he was
aware of the code the Japanese would use and announce by radio its war
movements and break in diplomatic relations; and said to me if I
suddenly call you and say I am moving to the East side of the Island
(Oahu) or north, south, or west sides, it will mean that Japan is moving
against the countries which lie in those directions from Japan. I passed
that information on to Colonel Bicknell m that date. At no time did
Capt. Mayfield give me the code indicating such movement.
On 3 Dec. 1941 Capt. Mayfield called me, asking if I could verify his
information that the Japanese Consul [90] General at Honolulu was
burning his codes and papers. At that time I thought his surveillance of
the Consulate had disclosed this fact, but after 7 Dec 1941 I learned he
was referring to information intercepted by the Navy that such was being
done in Singapore, Malaya and London. This latter information was given
me by Comdr. Rochefort after 7 Dec. 1941. About 2 hours after my
conversation with Capt. Mayfield on 3 Dec 1941, the FBI intercepted a
telephone message between the cook at the Japanese consulate & a
Japanese person in Honolulu, during which the cook told this person the
Consul General was burning and destroying all his important papers. This
was about noon on 3 Dec 1941 & I immediately gave this information to
Capt. Mayfield and Colonel Bicknell. I was never informed by Capt.
Mayfield what use he made of it. Col. Bicknell informed me that he
personally gave this information to Gen. Short's Staff at the Staff
meeting on 6 Dec. 1941.
On or about 28 Nov. 1941 I received I received a radio from J. Edgar
Hoover, Director, FBI, to the effect that peace negotiations between the
US & Japan were breaking down & to be on the alert at all [9l] times as
anything could happen. On the same day I gave this information to Capt.
Mayfield & Col. Bicknell, each of whom said they had already received
similar information from their respective headquarters in Washington, D.
C.
About the period 8 Dec to 12 Dec 1941, Col. Bicknell showed me a
paraphrase copy of a radio intercept by the Army at Honolulu on 3 Dec
1941, of a radiogram sent by the Japanese Consul General at Honolulu to
the Japanese Foreign Office at Tokyo, outlining a system of signals
devised by Otto Kuhn, for the Consul General, through which the movement
of the US Fleet at Pearl Harbor could be made known to Japanese
submarines off the Islands of Oahu & Maui.
ROBERT L. SHIVERS.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 10th day of April 1945.
HENRY C. CLAUSEN
Lt. Colonel, JAGD.
At Honolulu
Page 44
[92] AMENDMENT TO AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT L. SHIVERS
Concerning the paraphrase dispatch to C. G. Haw. Dept., signed Marshall,
dated 12 Dec. 1941, relating to signals suggested by Kuhn, it is my
understanding that the basis for this dispatch was an Army radio
intercept I received this information from Col. Bicknell. When this
dispatch was received by the Army in Hawaii, we had already received a
translation of a full text of the message to which it relates. Comdr.
Rochefort furnished this translation, after I had given him a copy of
the message, which copy was found at the Japanese Consulate on 7 Dec.
1941, and a copy of the Japanese code found at the said Consulate also
on 7 Dec. 1941. After getting the copy from the Japanese Consulate of
the message, we got the original from the Mackay Radio Co.
Concerning the Gen. Herron alert [93] of 1940, the civilian population
of Oahu considered it routine Army maneuvers and was not alarmed in any
way because of the manner in which the alert was handled. It was
designed to give the impression it created.
Concerning the Affidavit of Colonel Joseph R. Evans, dated 22 Mar. 1945,
I talked with Col. Evans, in company of Col. Bicknell, when Col. Evans
arrived in Honolulu from Manila in December, 1941. I do not recall the
details of our conversation. I am, however, positive that he did not
discuss in my presence the information set forth in paragraph 3, of his
affidavit.
ROBERT L. SHIVERS.
Subscribed and sworn to before me, this 16th day of March, 1945.
HENRY C. CLAUSEN,
Lt. Colonel, JAGD.
[94] AMENDMENT TO AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT L. SHIVERS, WHO STATES FURTHER:
Gerald Wilkinson, then manager for the Theo. H. Davies Co., Manila, P.
I., called on me about July 1941 and stated he was the representative in
the Pacific area for the Special Intelligence Service of the British
government, reporting direct to the British Foreign Office at London;
that he had established Mr. Harry Dawson, an English citizen and British
Vice Consul for the Hawaiian Islands, as the operative representative of
the said SIS in the Hawaiian Islands; that Mr. Dawson would be concerned
with no internal matters of the Hawaiian Islands but would be concerned
with developing foreign intelligence information pertaining to Japanese,
which information Dawson would get from persons returning to Hawaii from
Japan, that Wilkinson proposed to furnish the FBI, ONI and G-2 at
Honolulu, information, thru Dawson, of information received from other
SIS operatives in the Pacific area, concerning conditions and
intelligence affecting Japan; that pursuant to consent of higher
authority, arrangements were made for the receipt of such information
[95] by the FBI, ONI and G-2 at Honolulu, and such information was
furnished as proposed during the period from July to and including
December, 1941, that the files of the information so furnished include
copies of cables dated 27 November and 3 December, 1941, upon which
appear my initial;
Concerning telephone intercepts at the Japanese Consulate, Honolulu, I
ascertained during the latter part of November, 1941, that the ONI,
which for several years had covered what were supposed to be all
telephone lines at the Consulate did not in fact cover one line to the
cook's quarters; I therefore covered this line which resulted in
information as to the destruction by the Consul of all his important
papers on 3 December 1941, about which I have already testified that I
assumed the ONI had all other lines covered up to and including 7
December 194l, and did not receive any information to the contrary until
today, when it was stated that the coverage by ONI ceased on 2 December,
1941, at the order of the District [96] Intelligence Officer; that had I
known such ONI coverage had ceased, I would have caused FBI coverage in
replacement.
Robert L. Shivers.
ROBERT L. SHIVERS.
Subscribed and sworn to before me, 20 April 1945.
HENRY C. CLAUSEN,
Lt. Colonel, JAGD.
Page 45
[97]
Telegram
Gov Jus
Hoover
FBI Justice
Washington, D. C.
RLS : PB
HONOLULU, T. H., December 5, 1945,
Japanese Activities Honolulu T. H. Espionage confile J. Japanese consul
General Honolulu is burning and destroying all important papers.
SHIVERS.
Official Business.
[98]
HEADQUARTERS CENTRAL PACIFIC BASE COMMAND
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR MIILITARY INTELLICENCE
COUNTER INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
Box 3, APO 456
In reply refer to:
16 APRIL 1945.
Memorandum for Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD.
Subject: Action taken on W. D. information concerning possible
hostilities with Japan.
1. By direction, the undersigned, accompanied by Major (then 1st Lt.) C.
W. Stevenson, met in conference with Lt. Col. E. W. Raley, G-2, Hawaiian
Air Force, and the various Air Force Intelligence officers in the
Hawaiian area, on 29 November 1941. The purpose of the conference was to
acquaint these officers with information contained in a Secret Radio
received by G-2, Hawaiian Department from the War Department, dated 27
November 1941, which advised that negotiations with Japan had reached a
stalemate, that hostilities might ensue, and that subversive activities
might be expected.
2. The conference was held in the office of Lt. Col. Raley at Hickam
Field at 1430, 9 November 1941. The assembled officers were advised by
the undersigned of the context of the above-referred to radio message,
and it was suggested to them that all practicable precautionary measures
be taken to guard against possible sabotage of Air Force installations
and equipment.
Byron M. Meurlott,
BYRON M. MEURLOTT,
Lt. Colonel, M. I.
Assist. A. C. of S., G-2 (CID).
At Honolulu
[99]
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC AREAS
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL
APO 958
In reply refer to: 17 APRIL 1945.
Memorandum:
Subject: Search for WD Radiogram No. 519. 5 Dec 1941.
On April 10, 1945, Lt. Col. Clausen of The Judge Advocate General's
Office requested the assistance of this office in locating a copy, or
record of receipt of secret War Department radio No. 519, dated 5
December 1941. The under-signed instructed Capt. Bosworth, officer in
charge of the AG Classified Records Division to make the search and
assist Col. Clausen in every manner possible.
The following is a brief account of the search made:
a. Master files of incoming radio traffic were inspected and it was
determined that no master files of radios were kept by the AG until on
or about 25 January 1942. This was corroborated by C. W. O. Knapp who
was on duty in the division at that time.
b. A search was made of the AG Decimal files and no record was found of
the subject radio.
Page 46
c. A check was made with Capt. Stockberger, officer in charge of the
Signal Cryptographic Section, to determine whether any permanent record
was kept of incoming radio traffic. No such record was kept.
d. As the radio in question originated in G-2, War Department, it was
assumed that distribution in this headquarters would be made to G-2.
Capt. Bosworth, accompanied by Col. Clausen, went to G-2 and contacted
Major Maresh of that section. A thorough search was made of the G-2
Files by Major Maresh, in the presence of Capt. Bosworth, and no record
was found of the radio.
e. Col. Clausen was given the telephone numbers of three men who were on
duty in the AG CRD at the time.
As a matter of information, it is believed that a thorough search of
this headquarters was made for this radio at the time of the Pearl
Harbor Investigation Board's visit and no record was found at that time.
O. N. Thompson
O. N. THOMPSON
Colonel, AGD
Adjutant General.
at Honolulu.
[100]
AFFIDAVITS OF CAPTAIN THOMAS A. HUCKINS, USN, AND CAPTAIN WILFRED J.
HOLMES, USN.
Captain Thomas A. HUCKINS, USN, presently on duty with FRUPAC, Pearl
Harbor, and Captain Wilfred J. HOLMES, USN, (ret.) presently on duty
with JICPOA, Pearl Harbor, each being first duly sworn and informed of
the investigation by Lt. Col. Henry C. CLAUSEN, J/A/G/D, for the
Secretary of War, supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl
Harbor Board, and the authority of the Secretary of the Navy with
respect to Naval personnel and records, and that top secrecy is
required, do depose as follows:
Captain Thomas A. HUCKINS states that on 7 December 1941 and for several
months immediately prior thereto he was on duty at Combat Intelligence
Unit, Pearl Harbor, under Captain Joseph J. ROCHEFORT, and was in charge
of the radio traffic analysis under Captain ROCHEFORT,; that his duties
included the daily preparation of radio intelligence summaries for
distribution by Captain ROCHEFORT; that copies of the said radio traffic
analysis summaries covering the period 1 November 1941 to and including
6 December 1941, taken from the file of FRUPAC entitled "Communication
Intelligence Daily Summary", are attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and made
a part hereof; that he did not maintain or conduct any liaison with any
Army officer, or exchange any information pertaining to his functions or
duties, prior to 7 December 1941, and, that in this regard, he did not
maintain or conduct any liaison, or exchange any information with
Kendell J. FIELDER, G 2, Hawaiian Department.
Captain Wilfred J. HOLMES states that on 7 December 1941, and for
several weeks immediately prior thereto, he was on duty at Combat
Intelligence Unit, Pearl Harbor, under Captain Joseph J. ROCHEFORT; that
the scope and extent of his duties during said period included only the
preparation of plots of positions of U. S. combat and merchant vessels,
flights of U. S. trans-Pacific planes and positions of Japanese ships
based on call analysis; that these plots were disseminated only to
CinCPac. Commander Jack S. HOLTWICK, Jr., USN, on 7 December 1941, and
several months immediately prior thereto, was assigned to the Combat
Intelligence Unit, Pearl Harbor, and has today stated to Captain HOLMES
and Lt. Col. CLAUSEN as follows:
That he, Commander HOLTWICK, on 7 December 1941, and for several months
immediately prior thereto, was in charge of the I. B. M. machine room,
was assistant to the principle cryptanalyst, and was the administrative
assistant to Captain Joseph J. ROCHEFORT; that the records now available
at Pearl Harbor concerning the intercepts Nos. SIS 25392 and SIS 25432,
referred to in the affidavit of Captain Joseph J. ROCHEFORT given Lt.
Col. Henry C. CLAUSEN and dated 20 February 1945, consists of a dispatch
dated 28 November 1941 from CinCAF to CinCPac concerning monitoring by
British and ComSixteen for a certain Japanese broadcast and, dispatch 29
November 1941 from OpNav [101] to CinCPac concerning Japanese broadcast
schedules and, dispatch 1 December 1941 from ComSIXTEEN to CinCPAC
concerning certain important Japanese news broadcasts which dispatches
have been microfilmed and are contained in In-coming Code Book No. 1;
that the records now available at Pearl Harbor concerning the intercepts
SIS 25545, SIS 25640 and SIS 25787, mentioned in said affidavit
Page 47
of Captain ROCHEFORT, consist of dispatch 4 December 1941 from OpNav to
CinCPAC concerning report of Japanese circular ordering destruction by
Washington of purple machine and papers excepting one copy of certain
system, and by London, Hong Kong, Singapore and Manila of purple
machines, which dispatch has been microfilmed and is contained in
Incoming Code Book No. 1; that the pertinent outgoing messages now
available at Pearl Harbor are contained in outgoing Code Book No. 1 and
consist of dispatch 26 November 1941 from ComFOURTEEN to OpNav of
communication intelligence analysis, dispatch 28 November 1941; from
ComFOURTEEN to OpNav of British consul information that Japanese will
attack Krakaw Isthmus on 1 December 1941 and, dispatch 6 December 1941
from ComFOURTEEN to OpNav of opinion that Japanese consulate at Honolulu
destroyed all codes except one system; that the Communication
Intelligence Daily Summaries covering the period 1 November 1941 to and
including 6 December 1941 are included in Exhibit "A" herewith attached
and made a part hereof, and consist of a resume or evaluation showing
the results traffic analysis based upon intercepts of Japanese naval
radio communications only, and were prepared for Captain ROCHEFORT with
copies thereof disseminated on the dates of preparation, as indicated on
the copies in Exhibit "A", only to Captain Edwin T. LAYTON, USN, Fleet
Intelligence Officer; that on 7 December 1941, and for several months
prior thereto, the said Unit supervised by Captain ROCHEFORT did not
have any facilities for decrypting the Japanese diplomatic radio
messages which required the use of a machine and the USN decrypting
facilities at Pearl Harbor did not include a purple machine and the only
machine available was one designed by Commander HOLTWICK and covered a
Japanese code which was abandoned in 1938 and not used since that time.
Thomas A. Huckins,
THOMAS A. HUCKINS
Captain, USN.
Wilfred J. Holmes,
WILFRED J. HOLMES,
Captain, USN.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 18th day of April 1945.
Henry C. Clausen
HENRY C. CLAUSEN,
Lt. Col., J/A/G/D.
at Honolulu, T. H.
Read and approved.
J. S. Holtwick
J. S. HOLTWICK,
Cdr. U. S. N.
[102]
Morrill W. Marston, 07626, Brig. Gen., presently G-4, POA, being
first duly sworn, and informed of the investigation by Lt. Col. Henry C.
Clausen for the SW, supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl
Harbor Board, and that top secrecy is required, reposes and says:
My attention has been called to the affidavit of Col. Moses W.
Pettigrew, dated 19 Feb. 45; and, during the period about September 1939
to July 1941 I was G-2, Hawaiian Department; and had information, that
the Navy had a cryptoanalytic unit; during the time I was G-2 the Army
maintained a certain amount of liaison with the Navy in that regard for
obtaining information derived from intercepts the character indicated,
although the Navy was far ahead of the Army in the local (MWM)
development of this phase of intelligence; it was possible on occasions
to obtain information as to commercial cables sent and received (MWM) by
e Japanese Consul at Honolulu, it being my recollection that this was
given to the Army by the Navy at liaison meetings
Concerning the 1940 alert (all-out) ordered by Gen. Herron, from my
observations there was no alarm of the civilian population.
Morrill W. MARSTON
Brig. Gen. U. S. A.
Subscribed and sworn to before me 21 April 1945
HENRY C. CLAUSEN
Lt. Col. JAGD.
at Honolulu.
Page 48
[103]
Louis R. Lane, Chief Warrant Officer, presently stationed South
Pacific Base Command, A. G. Office, being first duly sworn and informed
of the investigation by Lt. Col. Henry C. Clausen, JAGD for the SW, and
that top secrecy is required, deposes and says:
Concerning secret message 519, 5 December 1941, I searched for a record
of this message by looking carefully through the classified files and
journals of incoming messages covering said date; said files and
journals being available this date at Hq., POA, Ft. Shafter and
consisting, among others, of the following:
Classified, A. G. Binder 1; 370.2 Battles & Reports of;
Classified, A. G. Binder 1; 091 Japan;
Classified, A. G. Binder 1; 283.4 Espionage;
Classified, A. G. Binder 2; 350.05 Military Information;
Classified, A. G. Journals (microfilmed) (2) 297 and 298;
no record of the receipt by the Hawaiian Department of this message
could be found, although it was the practice to [104] set forth in said
journals the War Department numbers of the messages. Such pertinent
number in this case 519, could not be found as having been entered, but
the preceding numbers 517 and 518 were found, and the succeeding numbers
520 and 521, pertaining to messages dated during the time in question.
I suggest that inquiry be made of RCA, since I believe from reading the
file copy shown me by Colonel Clausen that it came commercial.
Louis R. LANE,
CWO USA.
Subscribed and sworn to before me 21 April 1945.
HENRY C. CLAUSEN,
Lt. Colonel, JAGD.
at Honolulu.
[105]
FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT
DISTRICT INTELLIGENCE OFFICE
SIXTH FLOOR, YOUNG HOTEL,
Honolulu, Hawaii, 22 April, 1945.
Secret
STATEMENT FOR PROCEEDINGS SUPPLEMENTARY TO THE U. S. ARMY PEARL HARBOR
BOARD
This statement has been prepared at the request of Lt. Colonel Henry C.
Clausen, JAGD, for the U. S. Army Pearl Harbor Board. The statement is
based on a personal recollection of events which occurred over three
years ago, and on my personal understanding of what occurred at that
time. To my knowledge, there is no documentary evidence available to
support this statement.
The telephone surveillance of local espionage suspects at, or centering
around, the Japanese Consulate, Honolulu, was maintained by the District
Intelligence Office. The Federal Bureau of Investigation, cognizant of
this activity, received almost daily transcripts and translations of
conversations monitored.
About 1 November 1941 the FBI, with the cognizance of the DIO, began a
telephone surveillance of a suspect in its own office building. To the
knowledge of the writer, this was the first such surveillance conducted
by the FBI itself in Honolulu. This one surveillance was accidentally
discovered by some employees of the telephone company making routine
installations. They reported their discovery to their superior, and
subsequently this information was casually passed on to a member of the
DIO by the DIO contact at the telephone company. In a spirit of
cooperation, the information that their surveillance had been exposed
was in turn passed on by the DIO man to an FBI agent. On receipt of the
information, the FBI agent in charge apparently went directly to the
telephone company and made accusations there that an FBI confidence had
been breached by the DIO's having been given information concerning an
FBI tap.
When Captain Mayfield, then District Intelligence Officer, learned of
the FBI protest at the telephone company, he was not only incensed at
their failure to consult with him before taking such action, but he
considered that action to be a serious breach of security. Cognizant of
his instructions from the Chief of Naval Operations to avoid any
possibility of international compilations, and thoroughly aware of the
explosive potentialities of the surveillances being con-
Page 49
ucted, Captain Mayfield ordered the immediate discontinuance of all
telephone surveillances. This was on 2 December 1941. Surveillances were
not resumed until the [106] morning of 7 December 1941, following the
Japanese attack.
It should be added that very few of the personnel attached to the
District Intelligence Office were in any way aware that such
surveillances were being conducted, and considerable pains were taken to
prevent that knowledge from gaining any currency in the organization.
Donald Woodrum, Jr.,
DONALD WOODRUM, Jr.
Lieutenant, USNR.
[107]
AFFIDAVIT OF CAPTAIN EDWIN T. LAYTON, USN
25 APRIL 1945.
[108] Captain Edwin T. Layton, USN being first duly sworn and informed
of the investigation being conducted by Lieutenant Colonel Henry C.
Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War supplementary to the proceedings
of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and that top secrecy is required,
deposes and says:
On 7 December 1941 and for one year prior thereto I was Fleet
Intelligence Officer, U. S. Pacific Fleet. My duties consisted of the
following: To receive, correlate and evaluate, and to distribute various
intelligence matters to designated members of the Staff, and to Units of
the Pacific Fleet; to provide Plans and Operations Sections with
essential enemy intelligence for preparation of current estimates; to
supervise counter-intelligence and counter-espionage within the U. S.
Pacific Fleet; to maintain strategic and other plots of potential enemy
Naval forces and to keep apprised of the general distribution or
disposition of fleets of potential Allies; to supervise projects
concerning aerial photographic reconnaissance.
Liaison with other Government Agencies, including the Army, would
normally be effected through established channels, i. e., the Naval
shore liaison or representative in the area in which the Fleet was to
move or to be based. To clarify the interlocking yet independent status
of Fleet Intelligence Officer (myself), the Combat Intelligence Officer
Fourteenth Naval District (then Commander Rochefort), and the District
Intelligence Officer, Fourteenth Naval District (then Captain Mayfield);
Captain Mayfield was the District Intelligence Officer and responsible
to the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, and to the Director of
Naval Intelligence for all intelligence matters, including counter-
espionage and counter-sabotage ashore in the Fourteenth Naval District,
and was my direct liaison on Naval matters with other Government
Agencies in the Fourteenth Naval District. Commander Rochefort was the
Head of the Combat Intelligence unit, Fourteenth Naval District, working
under direct orders of the Chief of Naval Operations, but under the
administrative jurisdiction of the Commandant Fourteenth Naval District,
and was my direct liaison in matters of Communications Intelligence. My
intelligence field was limited to the vessels and forces of the U. S.
Pacific Fleet and I was under the direct command of the Commander in
Chief of that Fleet. Were the Fleet to proceed to San Francisco, for
example, I would then contact the District Intelligence Officer, Twelfth
Naval District, there and conduct any business with the Army or other
Government Agencies through that officer.
About 3 months prior to 7 December 1941, the Assistant Chief of Staff
for Intelligence, Hawaiian Air Force, then Lieutenant Colonel Edwin
Raley, called at my office and informed me that he had been directed to
establish with me an Army liaison and requested all information we
possessed on airfields in Australia, Netherlands Fast Indies, Australian
Mandated Territories, and any other Pacific Ocean airports and airways
information. I furnished him with [109] all the information was
possessed, confidential and secret, including Dutch "Airways Guide" and
Australian Air Force "Airports Directory." Thereafter he, or his
assistant Lieutenant Brown, would request various items of intelligence
material and as mid-November approached, the meetings between those
officers and myself and my assistant, Commander Hudson, USN, increased
in frequency. By mid-November 1941 a series of intelligence reports from
various sources, including Dutch, British, Chinese, and American,
collectively indicated that Japan was on the move in a southerly
direction. These consisted of Consular Reports, Attache and Agent
Reports, Ship Master's Reports, and reports from other Intelligence
Agencies that there was a greatly increased movement of
Page 50
Japanese Army transports, Naval auxiliaries, and Naval vessels southward
along the China Coast, with concentrations being seen in French Indo-
China and South China. The general tenor of these reports was imparted
to Colonel Raley and we informally discussed and exchanged opinions on
the general significance thereof. In a period for about 2 to 3 weeks
prior to 7 December 1941, as my recollection serves me, I talked with
Colonel Raley on a general average every other day.
During the period of about ten days to two weeks prior to 7 December
194l, without authorization from higher authority and on my own
initiative, I imparted to Colonel Raley certain "Top Secret"
intelligence from sources that had previously been found to be
completely reliable and from other sources previously determined to be
generally fairly reliable. I did not inform him of the true source and
concealed its true origin, in keeping with the Top Secret Oath by which
I was bound. I explained to Colonel Raley that I was not authorized to
give him this information but would do so if he would promise that he
would make no copy or written memorandum of it and would impart it only
to his Commanding General Major General Fred Martin, Commanding General
Hawaiian Air Force, to which Colonel Raley agreed. In pursuance of this
agreement, I imparted certain "Top Secret" intelligence to Colonel Raley
in person as follows: One item had to do with an intrigue in Thailand,
in which the pro-Japanese Thailand leaders were, by circulating a false
report of a Japanese landing on the East Coast at Singora, to get the
pro-British faction of that Government to request immediate assistance
from British Forces in North Mayana, so that as soon as the British
Forces crossed the border into Thailand, the pro-Japanese element would
declare Great Britain an invader and call upon Japan for assistance,
thereby facilitating Japanese entry into Thailand and an invasion of
Malaya.
To my best knowledge and recollection, I told him as "Top Secret"
information that we were listening for certain cryptic weather messages
to be included in the Japanese broadcasts which were to signal the
breach of diplomatic relations or opening of hostilities between Japan
and certain powers, namely America or Britain or Russia. (No such
message was ever intercepted or received at Pearl Harbor.) I do not
recall positively, whether or not I told him of the message we had
received stating that certain Japanese Diplomatic Officials were
destroying their Purple Machines.
[110] In connection with the reports of movements of Japanese amphibious
equipment, transports, troops, and Naval vessels to the South, in
addition to informing Colonel Raley of these reports I informed him we
had other reliable information which seemed to substantiate a general
movement to the South of a considerable portion of Japanese Naval
Forces, including probably some battleships and carriers as well as
cruisers, destroyers, and submarines. I distinctly recall that I
informed Colonel Raley of the special searches being conducted in late
November or early December of Camranh Bay and the French Indo-China
coast by Naval seaplanes based in the Manila area, and that these planes
had sighted Japanese submarines, cruisers, transports, and destroyers in
Camranh Bay and along the French Indo-China coast. This search, in
itself, was a very strict secret.
Prior to 7 December 1941, I received no information from dispatches sent
by the Japanese Consul General at Honolulu by Commercial Cable or
otherwise.
I was not apprised of the so-called "Mori" telephone message. I received
a telephone call from Captain Mayfield on Saturday evening, 6 December.
He said he wanted to see me the next morning at my convenience. I asked
if I should come down immediately as I was free, and he replied: "We
cannot do anything about it now, as I do not have the material and will
not have it until tomorrow morning."
In connection with the Japanese activity in the Japanese Mandated
Islands: Commencing in late December 1940 and until December 1941, and
subsequently, I made it one of my principal tasks to follow the
increasing Japanese activity in the Marshalls, Carolines, and the
Marianas, including Marcus. That the Japanese were rapidly building air
bases, garrisoning key islands, was very apparent. As Fleet Intelligence
Officer, I wrote and disseminated several bulletins concerning this
activity and also the organization of the Japanese Naval Surface and Air
Forces stationed in the Mandates, for distribution to Fleet High
Commands and the Chief of Naval Operations.
When the U. S. Army proposed to make photographic reconnaissance of
certain of the Japanese Mandates in late November 1941, I held a series
of conferences with Colonel Raley and furnished him with the latest
Intelligence Bulletin
Page 51
(#45-41) concerning these installations and developments, with the
proviso that the publication be not reproduced nor circulated except to
the pilots of the reconnaissance planes and commanders of the Army
Squadrons to be stationed on Wake and Midway, with the further
stipulation that the document be not carried in aircraft. Colonel Raley
also requested, and I acquiesced to sit in on all conferences after the
arrival of the photo planes, and that I brief the pilots on all matters
relating to the Mandates prior to their take-off. This reconnaissance
did not materialize due to delays in arrival of the planes. Attached
hereto as Exhibit "A" is my memorandum to Admiral Kimmel, apprising him
of these conferences concerning the projected reconnaissance flights
over the Mandated Islands. Exhibit "B" is one copy of Pacific Fleet
Intelligence Bulletin #45-41.
[111] I do not specifically recall the term "A, B, C Block" or
discussions with Colonel Raley concerning it. I believe there may have
been conversations concerning a geographical limit beyond which Britain
and the Netherlands could not permit Jap penetration.
My only relationships with Colonel Bicknell was having met him at
Colonel Raley's quarters at Hickam Field in mid- or late November, where
the three of us discussed, in general terms, the world situation and the
situation in the Far East, in particular. Normally, I would have no
occasion to undertake direct liaison with Colonel Bicknell, as that was
carried out by the authorities of the Fourteenth Naval District through
whom the Fleet dealt on all matters pertaining to shore-side business.
From time to time prior to 7 December 1941 when Task Force Commanders
turned to Pearl from sea, I was called into the Commander-in-Chief's
office to give a brief summary of the general intelligence picture at
the time in question. I cannot state positively that General Short was
present at these times, but I believe he may have been. At other times
when General Short was in conference with Admiral Kimmel, I was called
to present the intelligence picture to them. During these intelligence
briefings, I discussed the general disposition, location and activity of
the Japanese Fleet and Major Japanese Naval Air Units as was own or
inferred from all available intelligence, including Top Secret. I also
discussed in considerable detail the Japanese militarization of the
Mandated lands, their building of Air Bases, Naval Bases, and facilities
there, with particular emphasis on the Marshalls.
I had no official liaison with Colonel Fielder, as I had presumed from
Colonel Raley's remarks when he first came to me and suggested setting
up the liaison at he was then representing the Army, as the Hawaiian Air
Force was a subordinate Command of the Commanding General, Hawaiian
Department. His statement at that time was, in effect, that as the Navy
and the heavy bombers the Hawaiian Air Force were the offensive weapons
for carrying out the War Plans, he was directed to establish this
liaison as it was felt that the Hawaiian Department was a defensive
garrison. I gathered from his remarks that other liaison had been
established with the Fourteenth Naval District in accordance with the
existing directives for the defense of the Hawaiian Islands. I knew
there was a specially designated Naval Liaison Officer Lt. Burr USN from
Headquarters, Fourteenth Naval District, permanently attached to the
Headquarters, Commanding General, Hawaiian Department. Inasmuch as I had
no direct liaison with Colonel Fielder, I did not impart to him any of
the information that gave to Colonel Raley. Colonel Fielder did not
contact me nor request any intelligence from me prior to 7 December
1941.
I desire to state that being without my files and notes, which I had
access to all previous hearings concerning Pearl Harbor (the Roberts
Commission in December 1941, the Army and Navy Pearl Harbor Boards in
1944), I am unable make as clear or concise statements from memory as
might be possible with the assistance of my files, notes, and memoranda.
[112] I have read the various documents shown me by Colonel Clausen.
marked TOP SECRET, exhibit B. I did not know of the substance of any of
these prior to 7 December 1941 except those marked SIS 25432 and SIS
25787 which I have written my initials and today's date.
E. T. Layton,
E. T. LAYTON , Captain, USN
Combat Intelligence Officer,
Staff, Commander U. S. Pacific Fleet.
Subscribed and sworn before me on this 26th day of April 1945.
Henry C. Clausen
Colonel HENRY C. CLAUSEN J/A/G/D
At Guam.
Page 52
[113] UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET,
Secret U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship,
Pearl Harbor, T. H., November 28, 1941.
Memorandum for: Admiral.
Subject: Projected Reconnaissance Flight over Mandates Islands.
1. The subject was discussed with the Intelligence Section, Hawaiian Air
Force, on 27 and 28 November, 1941, and will be further discussed this
afternoon at 1430.
2. I have furnished the Intelligence Officer, Hawaiian Air Force, with
Fleet Intelligence Bulletin No. 45-41, giving the general summary of the
installations and developments in the Mandates. The Chief of G-2, H. A.
F., has promised me that this publication will not be reproduced by them
nor given any circulation except to the pilots of the reconnaissance
planes and to the commanders of the Army squadrons to be stationed on
Wake and Midway. This document will not be carried in any aircraft.
3. The urgent need for as wide a reconnaissance of the MARSHALLS, TRUK
and PONAPE was stressed with particular reference to JALUIT, ENIWETOK
KWAJELIEN, RONGELAP, WOTJE and MALOELAP.
4. The Fleet Aerological Officer was present at this morning's
conference and is working up meteorological data in conjunction with the
proposed reconnaissance. From a point of view of photographic
interpretation the hours of medium shadow 9-11 a. m. and 2-4 p. m. are
considered most advantageous and fog conditions are expected to be best
at around 10 a. m. Consequently, that hour has been tentatively agreed
upon for arrival at first objective.
5. The Army plans to fly two (2) B-24 planes fully manned with defensive
armament and photographic equipment from WAKE on the selected day,
departures to be staggered so that arrivals over assigned initial points
would be practically simultaneous. Lacking definite information as to
Radar installations in the MANDATES it is proposed (tentatively) to make
the first objective of the planes JALUIT and TRUK respectively. The
JALUIT plane returning via MALOELAP, WOTJE, KWAJELIEN, RONGELAP and
POKAAKKU. The TRUK plane returning via UJELANG and ENIWETOK. These
return objectives being dependent upon discovery or detection at or
after first objective, and existing conditions at the time.
6. The second reconnaissance is to be conducted over PONAPE enroute to
Port Moresby was assigned UJELANG, PONAPE and KAPINGAMARANGI (Greenwich
Island).
7. The Hawaiian Air Force has requested that I sit in on all conferences
after the arrival here of the photographic planes and that I brief the
pilots on all matters relating to the MANDATES prior to their takeoff
/s/ E. T. LAYTON.
Exhibit "A"
[114] UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship
Cincpac File No. HRK
AA/FF1/(25)
Serial 01954
PEARL HARBOR,
November 27, 1941.
Confidential
From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.
To: PACIFIC FLEET.
Subject: Pacific Fleet Intelligence Bulletin No. 45-41.
Enclosure: (A) Subject Bulletin.
1. Enclosure (A) is forwarded herewith for information.
2. BECAUSE OF THE CONFIDENTIAL NATURE OF BOTH THE SOURCE AND INFORMATION
CONTAINED HEREIN, IT IS OF THE HIGHEST IMPORTANCE THAT THE CONFIDENTIAL
CHARACTER OF THIS BE CAREFULLY PRESERVED.
Page 53
3. This information obtained from Naval Intelligence sources has been
reproduced by the Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet. Any
request for additional copies of this document will be made to the
Commander-in-Chief and not to the Division of Naval Intelligence
4. Additional copies shall not be made. This bulletin should be retained
for study and reference (plus subsequent additions or corrections)
during the present National Emergency.
P. C. Crosley
P. C. CROSLEY,
By direction.
DISTRIBUTION: (7CM41)
List I, Case 3; P., X.
Atlantic Fleet A1;
Asiatic Fleet A1;
One copy each to:
FATU, NTS, NC4, ND11-ND14
NB49, Rdo. & Snd. Lab.
Exhibit "B"
[115] TOP SECRET
Confidential
INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN NO. 45-41
CONTENTS
(A) ORGANIZATION OF THE JAPANESE FLEETS ....... Pages 1 to 12 inclusive.
Major Fleet Commands ............................. Page 1.
Combined Fleet and First Fleet ................... " 2.
Combined Fleet and Second Fleet .................. " 3.
Third Fleet ...................................... " 4.
Fourth Fleet ..................................... " 5 and 6.
Fifth Fleet ...................................... " 7.
Sixth Fleet-(Submarine Fleet)..................... " 7.
Carrier Fleet .................................... " 8.
Combined Air Force ............................... " 9.
Train for Combined Fleet ......................... " 10.
Japanese Naval Forces in China ................... " 11 and 12.
(B) JAPANESE FORCES AND INSTALLATIONS IN THE MANDATED ISLANDS, Pages
13 and 14.
General Situation.
Air Distribution.
Table "A" showing distribution of material and personnel forces
in Mandates
(2 pages to be pasted together)
Sketch of PALAO (PELEW).
Sketch of MALAKAL Harbor, etc.
Sketch of JALUIT Harbor, etc.
[116] TOP SECRET
(A) ORGANIZATION OF THE JAPANESE FLEETS. October 30, 1941.
(10574)
The following revision of Op-16-F-2, O.N.I. Serial #27-41 supersedes and
replaces the former report on this subject.
The principal change consists of a further increase in the number of
fleet commands. This has arisen from the regrouping of aircraft carriers
and seaplane tenders into separate forces, and from the creation of
special task forces in connection with the southward advance into Indo-
China. The regrouping has resulted in a notable specialization within
the various commands, as shown below.
Page 54
MAJOR FLEET COMMANDS
I. Combined Fleet
1 First Fleet (Battle Force) 3 Batdivs, 1 Crudiv,
2 Desrons
2 Second Fleet (Scouting Force) 4 Crudivs, 2 desrons,
etc.
3 Third Fleet (Blockade & Transport Small craft.
Force)
4. Fourth Fleet (Mandate Defense Force) 1 Desron, 1 Subron and
many small units
5. Fifth Fleet ? ?
6. Sixth Fleet (Submarine Fleet) 6 Subrons
7. Carrier Fleet (Aircraft Carriers) 5 Cardivs
8. Combined Air (Seaplane tenders, etc.) 4 Airrons, & shore based
Force planes
II. Japanese Naval Forces (Staff Headquarters) 1 PG and 3 DD s
in China.
1. First China Exped. (Central China) Gunboats
Fleet.
2. Second China (South China) 1 CA, 1 CL and small
Exped. Fleet. craft.
3. Third China (North China) Torpedo Boats, etc.
Exped. Fleet.
4. Southern Exped. (Saigon) 1 CL, transports and
Fleet. mine craft.
[117] The Japanese Navy now includes more vessels in active service
than ever before. More merchant ships have been taken over by the Navy,
and the line between merchant ship and naval auxiliary grows fainter all
the time. The base forces and guard divisions in the Mandated Islands
have also greatly increased the strength of the Navy, which is on full-
war-time footing.
COMBINED FLEET AND FIRST FLEET
YAMAMOTO Isoroku, CinC (Admiral)
NAGATO, Flagship
FIRST FLEET
Batdiv One Desron One (Cont'd)
NAGATO (F) Desdiv 27
MUTSU SHIRATSUYU (F)
YAMASHIRO ARIAKE
Batdiv Two YUGURE
FUSO (F) SHIGURE
ISE Desron Three
HYUGA SENDAI (F)
Batdiv Three Desdiv 11
HIYEI (F) FUBUKI (F)
KONGO SHIRAYUKI
KIRISHIMA HATSUYUKI
*HARUNA Desdiv 12
Crudiv Six SHIRAKUMO (F)
KAKO (F) SHINONOME
FURUTAKA USUGOMO
AOBA MURAKUMO
KINUGASA Desdiv 19
Desron One ISONAMI (F)
ABUKUMA (F) SHIKINAMI
Desdiv 6 AYANAMI
IKAZUCHI (F) URANAMI
INAZUMA Desdiv 20
SAZANAMI AMAGIRI (F)
HIBIKI ASAGIRI
Desdiv 21 YUGIRI
NENOHI (F) ASAGIRI
HATSUHARU Total: 10 BB, 4 CA, 2 CL, 27 DD.
HATSUSHIMO
WAKABA
*Note: The HARUNA has been inactive during 1941, and is probably
undergoing major repairs.
Page 55
[118] COMBINED FLEET
SECOND FLEET
TAKAO, Flagship
Crudiv Four Desron Two (Cont'd)
TAKAO (F) Desdiv 16
ATAGO HATSUKAZE
CHOKAI YUKIKAZE
MAYA AMATSUKAZE
Crudiv Five* TOKITSUKAZE:
MYOKO (F) Desdiv 18
NACHI KASUMI
HAGURO ARARE
Crudiv Seven KAGERO
KUMANO (F) SHIRANUHI
MOGAMI Desron Four
MIKUMA NAKA (F)
SUZUYA Desdiv 2
Crudiv Eight YUDACHI (F)
TONE (F) MURASAME
CHIKUMA HARUSAME
Desron Two SAMIDARE
JINTSU (F) Desdiv 9
Desdiv 8 ASAGUMO
ASASHIO (F) YAMAGUMO
ARASHIO MINEGUMO
OSHIO NATSUGUMO
MICHISHIO Desdiv 24
Desdiv 15 KAWAKAZE (F)
KUROSHIO YAMAKAZE
OYASHIO SUZUKAZE
NATSUSHIO UMIKAZE
HAYASHIO Total: 13 CA, 2 CL, 28 DD.
*Note: There is a possibility that a new cruiser has been added to
Crudiv 6.
[119] THIRD FLEET
TAKAHASHI Ibo-Vice Admiral
NAGARA, Flagship
NORTHERN BLOCKADE FORCE 2nd BLOCKADE FORCE-Con.
CHOGEI (F) Desron Five
Subdiv ........ Desdiv 34
........ HAKAZE
........ AKIKAZE
........ YUKAZE
Subdiv ........ TACHIKAZE
........ 1st BASE FORCE
........ ........ Maru (F)
........ Minelayer Division
2nd BLOCKADE FORCE ITSUKUSHIMA
Desron Five AOTAKA
NATORI (F) HATSUTAKA
Desdiv 5 Mine Sweeper Division 1 and 21
ASAKAZE AM-1 AM-7
HARUKAZE AM-2 AM-8
MATSUKAZE AM-3 AM-9
HATAKAZE AM-4 AM-10
Desdiv 12 AM-5 AM-11
SATSUKI AM-6 AM-12
FUMITSUKI Gunboat Division 1
MINATSUKI 6 Gunboats (Converted Fishing
NAGATSUKI Vessels)
Page 56
THIRD FLEET-continued
2nd BLOCKADE FORCE-Con. 2nd BASE FORCE
SUBCHASER SQUADRON ......... Maru, (F)
.......... (F) Minelayer Division 17
Subchaser Division 1 and 11 SHIRTAKA
PC-1 PC-7 YAEYAMA
PC-2 PC-8 KUNAJIRI
PC-3 PC-9 At least 5 other men of war, and 17
Subchaser Division 21 and 31 merchant ships.
PC-4 PC-10 Total: 1 CL, 12 DD, 1 AS, 6 SS, 6 CM,
PC-5 PC-11 12 AM, 6 XPG 12 PC, 46, AP.
PC-6 PC-12
27 AP-Names Unknown
[120] FOURTH FLEET
Hirata-Vice Admiral
KASHIMA, Flagship
Crudiv Eighteen FOURTH DEFENSE FORCE (HQ-
TENRYU (F) TRUK
TATSUTA Miscellaneous Forces Ashore, in-
KASHIMA cluding Air Group #17 and
Desron Six Ponape Detachment of 4th Def.
YUBARI (F) Force, Kusaie Detachment of 4th
Desdiv 29 Def. Force, Olol Detachment of
OITE 4th Def. Force, Greenwich De-
HAYATE tachment 4th Def. Force, Mort-
ASANAGI lock Detachment 4th Def. Force,
YUNAGI Pingelap Detachment 4th Def.
Desdiv 36 Force, Puluwat Detachment 4th
MUTSUKI (F) Def. Force, Lamortek Detach-
KISARAGI ment ...... (Hall ?) of 4th Def.
YAYOI force.
MOCHITSUKI 5th BASE FORCE
Subron Seven Saipan, Headquarters
JINGEI SHOEI MARU (F)
Subdiv 26 Guard Division 5
RO-60 Composition unknown
RO-61 Minelayer Division 19
RO-62 OKINOSHIMA (F)
Subdiv 27 TOKIWA
RO-65 Subchaser Division 56
RO-66 KASHI (F)
RO-67 XPG 561 (?)
Subdiv 33 XPG 562 (?)
RO-63 XPG 563 (?)
RO-64 Gunboat Division 8
RO-68 Composition unknown
Subdiv----- 9 AP or AK
......... FIFTH DEFENSE FORCE (HQ-SAI-
......... PAN)
......... Miscellaneous Forces Ashore, in-
8 XPG cluding Air Group #18.
[121]
4th BASE FORCE Tenian Detachment, 5th Defense
Truk, Headquarters Force
........ Maru (F) PAGAN Detachment, 5th Defense
Guard Division 4 Force
........ Maru (F) Survey and Patrol Division
........ KOSHU
........ KATSURIKI (CM)
4 AP or AK KOMABASHI (AS)
Page 57
FOURTH FLEET-Continued
FIFTH DEFENSE FORCE Con. 6th BASE FORCE-Continued
Repair and Salvage Division Minesweeper Division 16
MATSUEI MARU NAGATA MARU (F)
NAGAURA (MARU) CHOKAI MARU
3rd BASE FORCE DAIDO MARU
Palao, Headquarters IKUTA MARU
.......... Maru (F) ?
Guard Division 3 |- (This may
.......... Maru ....... | be the
.......... ....... Maru | SALVAGE
.......... ....... Maru | Unit known
.......... ....... Maru | to be in
.......... | 6th Base
Subdiv 6 |- Force)
RO-56 Subchaser Division 5
RO-57 PC-51
RO-58 PC-52
RO-59 PC-53
Subchaser Division 55 SIXTH DEFENSE FORCE (HQ-
.......... Maru (F) JALUIT)
XPG 551 (?) KAIKEI Maru
XPG 552 (?) #5 FUKU Maru
XPG 553 (?) ....... Maru
XPG 554 (?) Miscellaneous Forces ashore in-
THIRD DEFENSE FORCE (HQ cluding AIR GROUP #19 at
PALOA) IMIEJI, Jaluit Atoll and prob-
Miscellaneous Forces Ashore, in- able Air Groups at WOTJE and
cluding Air Group #16 and TOBI KWAJALEIN and RUOTTO Is.
detachment of 4th Defense Force (Kwajalein Atoll) Detach-
..... Detach. 4th Def. Force ment 6th Defense Force KWA-
...... " " " " JALEIN Is. (Kwajalein Atoll),
...... " " " " TAROA Is. (Maloelap Atoll ),
...... " " " " ENIWETOK Is. (Eniwetok
...... " " " " Atoll), UJELANG Atoll, ENY-
Estimate these unknown loca- BOR Is. (Jaluit Atoll), IMIEJI
tions to be SOROI, HELEN Is. (Jaluit Atoll), WOTJE
REEF, ULITHI, YAP and AN- Atoll-Detach. of 6th Def. Force,
GUAR). UTIRIK Atoll-Detach. of 6th
6th BASE FORCE Def. Force.
Jaluit, Headquarters Total: 4 CL, 9 DD, 2 AS, 16 SS 1 Sur-
TAKUHAN MARU (F) vey Ship, 3 CM, 15 XPG, 3 PC, 4 XAM
41 AP or AK.
[122] FIFTH FLEET
CL...........(F)
The composition of a new Fifth Fleet is still unknown.
The Flagship has been reported at Maizuru.
SIXTH FLEET
(Submarine Fleet)
KATORI, Flagship
Subron One Subron Two
TAIGEI (F) KITAGANI (F)
Subdiv I Subdiv 7
I-9 I-1
I-15 I-2
I-16 I-3
I-17 I-7
Subdiv 2 Subdiv 8
I-18 I-4
I-19 I-5
I-20 I-6
Page 58
FIFTH FLEET-Continued
Subron Three Subron Six
NAGOYA MARU (F) KINU (F)
Subdiv 1 Subdiv 9
I-74 I-123
I-75 I-124
Subdiv 12 Subdiv 13
I-8 I-121
I-63 I-122
I-69 Subron Ten
I-70 KARASAKI (F)*
Subdiv 20 Subdiv 18
I-71 I-53
I-72 I-54
I-73 I-55
Subron Five Subdiv 19
YURA (F) I-56
Subdiv 28 I-57
I-59 I-58
I-60 Subdiv 21
Subdiv 29 RO-33
I-61 (Sank 10-2-41) RO-34
I-62 Total: 3 CL, 2 AS, 1 AP, 42 SS.
I-64
Subdiv 30
I-65
I-66
*Note: The old sub-tender KARASAKI appears to have been recommissioned.
[123] CARRIER FLEET (Cardivs)
CV KAGA Flagship
Cardiv 1 Cardiv 4
AKAGI ZUIKAKU
KAGA (F) SHOKANU
Desdiv 7 Desdiv 3
OBORO (F) HOKAZE
USHIO SHIOKAZE
AKEBONO NAMIKAZE
AKATSURI NUMAKAZE
Cardiv 2 Cardiv ......
SORYU (F) CV KORYU
HIRYU CV KASUGA (MARU)
Desdiv 23 Total: 10 CV, 16 DD.
UZUKI
KIKUTSUKI
MIKATSUKI
YUZUKI
Cardiv -
RYUJO (F)
HOSHO
Desdiv 17
ISOKAZE
URAKAZE
HAMAKAZE
[124] COMBINED AIR FORCE
Kanoya Naval Air Station, Hdqtrs.
Shore-based land planes and seaplanes. The organization provides for
great mobility. Air units are ordered to work with other forces, and
return to the Combined Air Force pool when their mission is fulfilled.
The named Air Groups (e. g. the Takao Air Group) are not tied down to
their stations, but are sent freely wherever they are needed.
Furthermore, the various air squadrons and air groups frequently split
into smaller units, and are scattered over wide areas.
Page 59
Because of this extreme mobility, the picture is constantly changing.
Accordingly, the following list makes no attempt to indicate all the
temporary groupings into which the various units may be combined.
SHIP-BASED SQUADRONS SHORE-BASED AIR GROUPS
Air Ron 6 8th Air Group
KAMIKAWA MARU (F) 10th Air Group
FUJIKAWA MARU 11th Air Group
KENJO MARU 12th Air Group
(Has been working with the 3rd 14th Air Group
Fleet) 16th Air Group
Air Ron 7 17th Air Group
CHITOSE (F) 18th Air Group
CHIYODA 19th Air Group
MIZUHO 23rd Air Group
(Has been working with the. 1st Chichijima
Fleet) Chinkai
Air Ron 24 Genzan
KAMOI (F) Hyakurihara (or Moribara)
1 XAV Iwakuni
Yokohama Air Group Kanoya (Hdqtrs.)
Chitose Air Group Kashima
(Has been working with the 4th Kasumigaura Sasebo
Fleet) Kisarazu Suzuka
Patrol Squadron 2 Kure Takao
NOTORO Maizuru Tateyama
(Formerly with Air Ron 6) Oita Tsukuba
Ominato Usa
Omura Yatabe
Saeki Yokosuka
TOTAL: 5 AV, 3 XAV, 35 Air Groups.
[125] TRAIN FOR COMBINED FLEET
SHIRETOKO ONDO AKASHI
SATA HAYATOMO MUROTO
TSURUMI NARUTO OTOMARU
SHIRTYA MAMIYA SETTSU
IRO ASAHI
Total: 8 AC, 1 AF, 2 AR, 1 AC, 1 Ice Breaker, 1 Target Ship.
[126] JAPANESE NAVAL FORCES IN CHINA
KOGA, Mineichi-Vice Admiral
IZUMO, Flagship
SHANGHAI BASE FORCE Patrol Division 11-Continued
ASUGA KURI HIRA
TSUGA HASU TOBA
Shanghai Harbor Affairs Section ATAMI
Special Naval Landing Force, Shanghai FUTAMI
Nanking Base Force FUSHIMI
Special Naval Landing Force, Nanking SUMIDA
HASHIDATE
CENTRAL CHINA FLEET, OR FIRST Air Group 10
EXPEDITIONARY FLEET Hankow Base Force
Kiukiang Base Force
KOMATSU, Teruhisa-Vice Admiral Gunboat Division ? ?
UJI, Flagship SHINFUKU MARU (F)
Patrol Division 11 HITONOSE
ATAKA CHIKUBU
SETA Total: 4 PG, 10 PR, 1 AP.
KATADA
Page 60
JAPANESE NAVAL FORCES IN CHINA-Continued
SOUTH CHINA FLEET, OR SECOND [127] NORTH CHINA FLEET, or
EXPEDITIONARY FLEET THIRD EXPEDITIONARY FLEET
SUGIYAWA, Rokozo, Vice Admiral
NIIMI, Wasaichi, Vice Admiral IWATE, Flagship
ISUZU, Flagship Patrol Division 12
Crudiv 15 IWATE (F)
ISUZU (F) MANRI MARU
ASHIGARA Torpedo Boat Division 11
Patrol Division 14 HATO
SAGA SAGI
AM-l7 KARI
AM-18 KIJI
Torpedo Boat Division 1 Torpedo Boat Division 21
OTORI CHIDORI
HAYASUSA MANAZURI
HIYOBORI TOMOZURU
KASASAGI HATSUKARI
Guard Division 15 KARUKAYA
Guard Division 16 Gunboat Division 1
Canton Base Force Gunboat Division 2
Amoy Base Force Gunboat Division 13
Hainan Is. Base Force Gunboat Division 14
13 Special Service Ships Tsingtao Base Force
Total: 1 CA, 1 CL, 4 TB, 1 PG, 2 AM, SOUTHERN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
13 Misc. KASHII (F) (CL)
SHIMBUSHU (CM)
AP
Total: 1 OCA, 1 DD, 8 TB, 1 AP.
[128] (B) JAPANESE FORCES AND INSTALLATIONS IN THE MANDATED ISLANDS
1. FOURTH FLEET, which may be termed the MANDATE FLEET, apparently
administers, the Naval activities, afloat and ashore and also the Army
Garrisons units in the Mandated Islands. While the forces afloat
exercise administrative jurisdiction over the Mandate area, the Yokosuka
Naval District is directly responsible for the supply of stores,
material and provisions. Truk is the headquarters for supply and
munitions and has been principle Fourth Fleet operating base.
2. Up to the present the entire Mandated Islands have been lightly
garrisoned, the majority of the garrison units being Naval Defense
Forces ("special Landing Forces" corresponding to our Marine Corps) but
some Army troops are believed to be on SAIPAN, PALAO, PONAPE, TRUK and
JALUIT. The total garrison force has been estimated at fifteen thousand.
In addition, there are Civil Engineering Units engaged in development
work on various islands. Working in conjunction with these are naval
engineering units, naval ordnance specialists, navy yard units with
civilian navy yard workers and technicians. The network of naval radio
stations has been greatly expanded, meteorological stations and high
frequency direction finders installed at strategic locations, aviation
facilities increased both in scope and number, and shore-batteries
emplaced on strategic islands of key Atolls.
3. It is apparent that a decision to expedite the fortification,
expansion of facilities and militarization of the Mandated Islands, was
made late in 1940, probably concurrently with the signing of the
Tripartite Pact. The movement of naval auxiliaries, small and medium
cargo, freight-passenger vessels (ex-merchant marine) to the Mandates
began in December, 1940, and has increased in scope and number until
some seventy odd vessels are engaged in this traffic, the average number
present in the Mandate area at any one time being some forty odd
vessels.
4. The function of supply of munitions, supplies, material and
provisions to the Mandates is under the YOKOSUKA Naval District with a
Headquarters for Civil Engineering, Munitions, Military Stores and
Supplies for the Mandates centered at Truk, although this function is
normally under the jurisdiction of Yokosuka as the Mandates are in the
First (HQ-YOKOSUKA) Naval District.
5. The Commanders of the 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 6th Base Forces are
subordinate commanders under Commander-in-Chief, 4th Fleet; they have a
designated Flag-
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ship and a Headquarters or Administrative Section, the latter remaining
ashore at the home base regardless of the movements of the command or
the Flagship. Each Base Force contains a DEFENSE FORCE, detachments of
which are stationed on outlying islands of that general area. Four Ro
Class submarines have been reported to be attached to the PALAO BASE
FORCE.
[129]
6. Considerable air activity has been in evidence in the SAIPAN PALAO-
PELELIU, TRUK, PONAPE and JALUIT-KWAJALEIN areas. Close cooperation has
been noted between the Defense Forces and the Aircraft activities at
their home bases. Foreign steamers nearing the SAIPAN area have been
subject to aircraft observation and close scrutiny by Patrol planes,
Bombers and fighters. Heavy land plane bombers and Patrol planes,
undoubtedly ORANGE, have made reconnaissance flights over the Gilbert
Islands (TARAWA; BUTARI-TARI, and BERU).
7. The distribution of material, personnel, and installations in the
Mandated Islands is indicated in table "A". While this is admittedly
incomplete and may be subject to inaccuracies, it represents the latest
and best intelligence on this subject. In addition to those listed in
Table A, there are a number of potential bases, principally in the
lagoons of the naturally protected atolls, which may be used as
emergency bases or may be earmarked for "priority two" development.
8. The latest information (up to 25 November 1941) indicates that the
present distribution of the Air forces (believed to be a temporary
strategical disposition other than a permanent assignment) in the
Mandates is:
Identification Location Includes
Airron 24 Marshall Area (AV) KAMOI
(AV) ...... Maru
ex-CHITOSE Air Group
ex-YOKOHAMA Air Group
11th Air Group PALAO Area
16th Air Group PALAO Area
17th Air Group TRUK
18th Air Group SAIPAN
19th Air Group IMIEJI Is. (Jaluit
Atoll)
Air Station (and Air Group?) WOTJE
Air Station (and Air Group?) KWAJALEIN
? AIR GROUP TRUK
The exact composition of these Air Groups is unknown and the estimates
of total plane strength in the Mandates vary widely: 62-268 planes.
Last Page of Intelligence Bulletin No. 45-41.
(Pages 130, 131 132, and 133 of Exhibit B consist of Table A showing the
distribution of Japanese material and personnel forces in the Mandates,
a sketch of Palao, and a sketch of Malakal Harbor. These pages will be
found reproduced as Items Nos. 2, 3, 4, and 5) EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS,
Clausen Investigation. These illustrations will be found bound together
following the printed exhibits of the Clausen investigation.)
[134] NOTES TO ACCOMPANY SKETCH OF JALUIT
1. Aviation facilities.-Two landing fields, each with a hangar capable
of using twenty medium sized planes. Engineering Shop (camouflaged)
situated between the two fields. Adjacent storehouses (galv. iron)
camouflaged. Diesel fuel and gasoline storage in camouflaged, above-
ground tanks adjacent to air fields. Diesel power plant (June 1940).
Eighty planes reported based here (November, 1940).
On beach opposite southern air field is Naval Air Station having small
ramp and one hangar for seaplanes (June 1940). This may be an auxiliary
as present indications point to naval air Base on IMIEJI (EMIDJ) Is.
2. Headquarters-Two story concrete building. Large building to SE of
headquarters is Post Office and Telephone central. Flagstaff adjacent to
Post Office is also used as signal tower. In town are many one story
concrete stores. Good bituman and powdered coral roads.
Page 62
3. Radio towers.-Two steel combination radio and lookout towers 400 feet
high. Diesel engine power plant near southern tower (1940).
4. Shore Batteries-Bases and trunnions along the three quarter mile
water-front street called the Marine Parade (1940) (guns not mounted in
June, 1940 but are now). Also three 6" guns and a battery of four 4.7"
field pieces. Barracks for regular garrison of 500 soldiers (1940)
(probably enlarged now).
Mobile Batteries-Machine guns and AA guns mounted on Diesel-tractor
towed trailers. 10 searchlights on pneumatic tired truck assemblies
(1940).
5. Government Pier-600 feet long, 75 feet wide (18'-25' alongside)
equipped with two railroad tracks and three 10 ton mobile cranes.
Storehouse on end of pier (1940).
6. Mole-150' concrete mole constructed parallel to shore line along NW.
corner of JABOR (1933).
7. Conspicuous red building (may be red-roofed building) (1936).
8. South Seas Trading Co. PIER (N. B. R. or "NAMBO") also called "SYDNEY
Pier". Two water tanks and warehouses. Coal and briquette storage
(1938).
9. Two buildings (resembling hangars) with tracks leading down to water
from one of them (beaching gear?-small marine railway?). A gasoline
storage located near the two buildings. (1936.)
(Page 135 of Exhibit B is a sketch of Jaluit Harbor which will be found
reproduced as Item No. 6, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Clausen Investigation.
These illustrations will be found bound together following the printed
exhibits of the Clausen investigation.)
[136] Exhibit "A"
U. S. PACIFIC FLEET RADIO UNIT
Box 103-Navy Yard, Navy Number 128 One Two Eight, c/o Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, Calif.
18 APRIL 1945.
Received from Officer-in-Charge U. S. Pacific Fleet Radio Unit 42 pages
covering daily communication intelligence summaries for the period 1
November 1941 through 6 December 1941.
[137] Communication intelligence summary, 1 November 1941
General.-Traffic volume a little less than normal, receiving conditions
fair but a traffic rather slow. The first day's yield of new calls not
very great. Fleet calls only changed, shore station calls and shore
addresses not changed. It is believed that tactical calls also remain
unchanged but not enough intercepted traffic to so state definitely. The
same garble table for calls is employed so the change amounts to a
reassignment of calls previously used. New calls have appeared but it is
thought that they were formerly assigned to obscure units or were in
reserve. All of the major Fleet calls are identified and a small amount
of individual calls were recovered today. Because the new calls are not
yet lined up save for the major Fleet Commanders and all time today was
spent in call recovery, this summary will deal only with general
impressions.
Combined Fleet.-The FIRST FLEET was not very active today in radio
traffic. The CINC SECOND FLEET appears to have originated quite a bit of
traffic to addresses placed in submarine and carrier category. No
indications of movement of any of these units. COMBINED FLEET tactical
circuits were heard but little tactical traffic copied due to
interference by NPM.
Carriers-The COMMANDER CARDIVS was mentioned in dispatches from Tokyo
and he took a fair amount of traffic on the Fleet Broadcast.
Submarines.-Nothing to report. Calls of the Submarine Fleet not well
lined up yet.
Third Fleet.-This Fleet very active as before. The SECOND and FIRST BASE
FORCEs are still marshaling their MARUs and the CINC is very busy with
Tokyo.
China.-The activity of HAINAN BASE continues. The KASHII sent several
messages from Saigon.
Page 63
[138] Communication intelligence summary, 2 November, 1941
General.-Traffic volume normal for Sunday. Receiving conditions were
fair but bulk of traffic derived from the major shore circuits. Solution
of new call system progressing satisfactorily but volume of accumulated
traffic in new system not yet large enough to permit more than casual
identification of individual calls. The number of alternate calls for
major commands is increased over last system. So far there are seven
alternate calls for the Combined Fleet.
Third Fleet traffic is still on a very high level. The combined air
Force traffic is also very high with the Commander of the Combined Air
Force originating many dispatches. It appears that he is now in Taiwan.
Traffic to SAMA and BAKO is on a very high level. Tokyo and The China
Fleet Intelligence bureaus are originating periodic dispatches, these
from Tokyo being prefixed WIWI. There were several high precedence
dispatches from Tokyo with the major fleet commanders as addressees.
[139] Communication Intelligence Summary, 3 November 1941
General.-Traffic volume slightly under normal although fair for Monday.
Receiving conditions good but all circuits slow. General messages
continue to emanate from TOKYO communications. Such an amount is
unprecedented and the import is not understood. A mere call change does
not account for activities of this nature. The impression is strong that
these messages are periodic reports to the Major Commander of a certain
nature. Dummy traffic is again being sent in the TOKYO broadcasts. Naval
Intelligence TOKYO addressed two WIWI messages to Chief of Staff
Combined Fleet and to KUMI 8 (unidentified).
Combined Fleet.-Commander in Chief Combined Fleet sent an urgent message
to BUMIL information all Major Commanders, Combined Fleet, Naval
Intelligence Tokyo, the Chief of Naval General Staff, and Bureau of
Personnel. Commander in Chief, Combined Fleet also was associated in
traffic with offices in the mandates. principally RNO PALAO. The
Commander in Chief, Combined continues to be associated with the
Carriers and Submarines.
Third Fleet.-Third Fleet traffic continues at a high level. A movement
report by RATI 66 (unidentified) was addressed to Commander in Chief
Third fleet for information.
Air.-A WE address today broke down as "ITIKOUKUU KANTAI". The literal
reading of this as "1st Air Fleet" is correct it indicates an entirely
new organization of the Naval Air Forces. There are other points which
indicate that this may be the case. An old call (YOME7) while never
identified seemed to be in a high position with respect to the Carriers
and the Air Corps. Upon movement of air units to TAIWAN the association
of CarDiv 4 and CarDiv 3 with units of the Combined Air Force was
apparent. Their association in a command sense between shore based air
and fleet air had never occurred before but under the concept of an AIR
FLEET can easily be accepted. Traffic in the Air Force continues at a
high level.
[140] Communication Intelligence Summary, 4 November 1941
General.-Traffic volume normal with all circuits easily readable. More
tactical traffic copied than for past few days. Combined Fleet and
Carriers heard on tactical circuits. TOKYO Naval Intelligence sent four
messages to Major Commanders. One of these was for information Chief of
Staff China Fleet and one other for information of Chief of Staff Second
Fleet.
Air-High traffic level of air activities continues. Most significant of
the air dispatches were some in which various air corps were addressed
and BAKO included for information. One from Yokosuka Air was addressed
to SANCHOW Island radio for information TAKAO Air Corps. BAKO was also
noted as an addressee in several messages from SASEBO and originated two
messages to SASEBO and TOKYO. Commander Carriers also addressed a
message to two unidentified calls for information of Commander Combined
Air Force, Commander in Chief, Combined Fleet, CarDiv Collective, BAKO
and others. The Commander Combined Air Force addressed a messaged to
Commander in Chief Third Fleet.
Mandates.-The RNO PALAO was active today, being addressed by Commander
in Chief, Fourth Fleet and sent several messages to TOKYO and YOKOSUKA.
The PALOA weather station sent a long code message addressed to nearly
all the islands of the Mandates. MARCUS island appears as an originator.
No change in the location of Fourth Fleet units noted.
Submarines.-No activity noted.
Page 64
[141] Communication Intelligence Summary, 5 November 1941
General.-Traffic volume above normal. All circuits heard and receiving
conditions were fair to good. TOKYO very active as an originator,
sending out many messages of general address. Two WIWI messages in Kana
Code sent by NGS to Chief of Staff CarDivs and TIYA 44 (unidentified)
respectively. The Intelligence Offices of China Fleet and TOKYO continue
active with many dispatches passing between the two.
Third Fleet.-Two units of the Third Fleet appear today in TAKAO area.
Since these calls are as yet unidentified (RISI4 and YOA2) it is not
known how much of this fleet they represent. It is fairly certain that
the Commander in Chief, Third Fleet has not yet left the Sasebo area
although it is expected that he will before long. One message which may
be a movement report from him was received late on the 5th. The present
state of call recovery on the Third Fleet does not permit of an estimate
of the movement involved.
A unit of the First Fleet, identified today as CARDIV 4 appeared today
at BAKO. This Carrier Division was addressed as "less FUTA SHOTAI" (2nd
Section?) Whether or not these are other units at BAKO is not known. The
Commander CARDIVS has been associated with SAMA and BAKO in several
dispatches today. The following were also associated, SANCHOW ISLAND,
TAKAO AIRCORPS, CANTON (China) and YOKOHAMA Air. The RNO TAIHOKU
originated many dispatches to TOKYO and the French Indo China Forces. A
TAIWAN originator sent one to Lieut. Comdr. SHIBA at the Embassy
THAILAND for information to HANOI and the Commander French Indo China
Forces.
BAKO originated numerous dispatches to the Empire and to the Major Fleet
Commanders.
The South China Fleet was also the recipient of many dispatches from
TOKYO.
Despite the uncertainty due to the Change of Calls it is believed that
there is now being effected a concentration of naval forces in the BAKO
area which will comprise the Third Fleet as organized in SASEBO for the
past month and will be augmented by heavy air forces and Combined Fleet
units to an unknown extent.
[142] Communication Intelligence Summary, 6 November, 1941
General.-Traffic volume slightly above normal. Receiving conditions were
fair, regular strong but heavy static on night watches interfered
somewhat. Today the specific call-up on the Tokyo broadcast was
eliminated. Formerly Tokyo radio called the unit concerned when the
dispatch was addressed to a member of that unit. Beginning yesterday
afternoon all broadcast messages are addressed to a single call without
regard to the addressee of the message. The recovery of the radio
organization will be hampered by this new advance in Communication
Security. Moreover there were nine messages today on this broadcast from
which the address and originator were missing. This may be the start of
complete elimination of headings on broadcast circuits. Tokyo addressed
a WIWI message to the Chiefs of Staff of the Combined Fleet and
Submarine Force.
Takao-Bako Area.-It is now certain that there is a very heavy air
concentration on Taiwan. This comprises practically the entire Combined
Air Force including the Commander and his staff plus at least one
carrier division and an unknown amount of the fleet air arm. No
additional units of the Third Fleet were located there today but it is
believed that CinC Third Fleet is now en route BAKO from SASEBO. From
traffic association it is believed that some Second Fleet units are in
Takao area but this has not yet been proven. The South China Fleet
Command has been active in dispatches to Taiwan addresses.
Combined Fleet.-A large amount of Combined Fleet traffic is now
appearing with secret (tactical) calls in use.
Mandates.-The Mandates traffic has dropped off somewhat. The Sixth
Defense Force at Truk and the RNO PALOA continue to be the most active
units.
[143] Communication Intelligence Summary, 7 November, 1941
General.-Volume of intercepted traffic larger than usual. Due to the use
of the general call "All Major Force Flags" on the UTU for delivery to
all Combined Fleet units, affiliation of unidentified calls with forces
to which at-
Page 65
tached is very difficult. Use of large number of alternate calls for
major fleet forces, many of which have not yet been definitely
identified or associated with known calls, renders the picture more
confusing. Appearance of the prefix "JITSU" (authenticator for bona fide
traffic) in several messages indicates that a communication drill is
being held but without indication as to what units are participating and
therefore much of the traffic is suspected of being "drill." Jaluit
Radio is handling traffic direct with Yokosuka Radio probably due to
congestion of Mandate circuits from the Marshalls caused by heavy
concentrations in that area.
Air.-Continued high traffic level for all classes of air activities,
mainly centered in the Taiwan area, but also with all air activities in
the Mandates included in headings of messages. Dispatches originated by
Fourth Fleet Command included Air Forces, Base Forces, Air Stations, and
all types of Mandate activities in long headings.
Fleet.-Fourth Fleet Command remains in Truk area. There are indications
that portions of the First Fleet may be moving to the Takao area but
identifications are not sufficiently certain to confirm this.
Greatest effort is being made to increase the number of identified calls
to facilitate analysis of the traffic but Orange changes in methods of
handling fleet traffic renders this more difficult than had been hoped.
[144] Communication Intelligence Summary, 8 November 1941
General.-Normal volume of intercepted traffic with no "dummies"
appearing on the UTU. All UTU traffic was broadcast to the general call
only. The Staff Communication Officer of the French Indo-China Force
(So. Exp. For.) sent a dispatch *action* to S. C. O. Combined INFO. S.
C. O. Second Fleet, Combined Air Force, unidentified fleet unit, Radio
stations at Tokyo, Palao and Takao. This may indicate a contemplated
coordination of communications between the Indo-China-South China areas
and the Palao Island-Taiwan area. Secret calls were used very little as
compared to the past few days and only three circuits were heard using
them, including the Combined Fleet Commanders circuit and Air Station
Net. North Japan-Ominato circuits were quiet. All mandate circuits were
active, with heavy interchange of traffic involving all classes of
Mandate addressees in all areas, but with continued emphasis on the
Palao area at one end d the Jaluit-Marshall area on the other.
Chichijima Air Station was included much of the traffic between Empire
Offices and Saipan Air with Jaluit Base Force included for information.
Inclusion of Chichijima usually presages an air movement between
Mandates and Empire but the Units involved are unidentified. Commander
of unidentified shore activity (NEO 66) previously associated with the
Fifth Fleet, was addressed at Chichijima Air which tentatively
identifies him an air activity. Previous association of the Fifth Fleet
traffic with Fourth Fleet and Yokosuka tends to confirm the belief that
Fifth Fleet operations are, or will be, in the area adjacent to
Chichijima-Marcus, supplementing the Fourth Fleet in the lower island
areas.
Fleet.-Chief of staff First Fleet originated a dispatch through Kure
Radio. Batdiv Three of the First Fleet appears to be operating
separately from the main force, possibly in connection with Cardivs
Three and Four in the Taiwan-Naha ea. An apparent movement report from
Cardiv Four was addressed to CinC Combined Fleet, First Fleet, CarDiv
Commander, Combined Air Force Commander d to movement offices at Tokyo,
Yokosuka, Kure, Maizuru, and Sasebo. Traffic from the Commander Indo-
China Force is handled from the Japanese radio station Saigon rather
than from the KASHII, indicating that the staff is based ashore present.
No identifiable submarine activity was noted.
Air.-Takao and Mandates continue to be the center of air activities. The
area between Chichijima, Naha, Takao, Palao and Jaluit appears to-be
particularly concerned with movement of air forces and auxiliaries,
while the formation of force under Combined Air Commander in the Takao-
Bako area appears to be nearly completed as indicated by reports
addressed to CinC. Combined, Naval Minister, Commanders of CarDivs,
Combined Air Force, First [145] Fleet and shore addresses generally
associated with movements or organization changes. This force is
believed to include CarDiv Four, and possibly CarDiv Three, with a
number of auxiliaries and units of the Combined Air Force, also possibly
some its from the First Fleet. Lack of identification renders
composition of the force highly speculative and area of operations
obscure. Prior to change of calls, much traffic was exchanged between
China, South China and Indo-China while at present most traffic includes
Palao.
Page 66
[146] Communication Intelligence Summary, 9 November, 1941
General. Traffic volume heavy for Sunday. Receiving conditions fair but
heavy static caused numerous garbles and fragmentary messages. Navy
Minister sent several messages of general address including one to all
First and Second Class Naval Stations. Practically all of the general
messages carried SAMA as an information address. Carrier Division Three
arrived at Takao and there are indications that Carrier Division Four
will return to Sasebo from Takao. The Flagship of Carrier Divisions is
AKAGI and is in Sasebo area. Some tactical traffic today shows units of
Combined Fleet still operating. The associations of Batdiv Three and
Mandate addresses, especially Saipan may indicate operations of that
unit in the Mariannas. The JINGEI was communicating with SAMA, HAINAN
today. The Chief of Staff of the French-Indo China Force is in Tokyo.
One message today addressed to CinC. Combined Fleet was routed to
MAIZURU for delivery but this is believed a communication error. The
Third Fleet appears to be still in Sasebo area but it was noted that
considerable traffic passed between Hainan, Taiwan addresses and the
Third Fleet. The Fifth Fleet is still being organized with no
indications yet that it has assembled. The Eighteenth Air Corps at
Saipan originated much traffic to Yokosuka Air Corps.
[147] Communication Intelligence Summary, 10 November, 1941
General.-Traffic volume normal, receiving conditions good. There were
fewer general messages sent today than for the past few weeks. Tokyo
Intelligence still active and addressing dispatches to all Major
Commanders. The Mandates construction traffic has decreased
considerably. Call recovery is progressing but has been slowed down by
the general call-up used on Fleet broadcast.
Combined Fleet.-Believed to be mostly in Kure area. A staff officer of
Batdiv Three was addressed there today and it is likely that this whole
division is there also. The CinC. Second Fleet was located at Kure today
as well as two cruiser divisions.
Third Fleet.-The greater portions of this fleet still in Sasebo area.
Several movement reports have been noted by units of this fleet but none
have been noted other than individual ships. At least two units of this
fleet still at Takao. CinC Three originated one movement report for
information of CinC Fourth Fleet.
Fourth Fleet.-Little activity. CinC. Fourth remains in vicinity of Truk
with major portion of his command. The Staff Communication Officer of
Submarine force sent a message to the CinC Fourth for information of
Jaluit.
Fifth Fleet.-One unit of this fleet located at Chichijima.
Air.-The Combined Air Force Command is still talking to Sama and the
South China Fleet. From one address it appears that the Commander of
Carrier Division Three is with the Combined Fleet. Several units of the
Carrier Divisions are in port at Kure and Sasebo. CinC Combined Air
Force is still in Takao.
[148] Communication Intelligence Summary, 12 November 1941
General.-Traffic volume normal for past two days with receiving
condition about average. The general character of the traffic has been
administrative With most of it being between shore logistic and
technical activities. The D. F. net was active today with very little
activity shown yesterday. Intercept operators have commented adversely
on the major shore network which comprises all of the major naval
activities in the EMPIRE. Traffic has been moving slowly over this
circuit. The reason is the non-cooperation of the operators and the
definite lack of control exercised by TOKYO radio stations. TOKYO
Intelligence is still sending messages to the major commands but the
remainder of TOKYO traffic has been mostly from the technical bureaus.
Combined Fleet.-The Fleets remain relatively inactive in the KURE area
The association of BATDIV 3 with the Fourth Fleet and several Mandates
stations is born out by a D. F. position on the flagship of BATDIV 3
which places him about halfway between CHICHIJIMA and MARCUS Island.
Their position was obtained on the 4th when this unit was not yet
identified. No subsequent bearings have been obtained. Also associated
with this BATDIV are a Submarine Squadron and possibly CARDIV 4 although
the association of this CARDIV (Lately returned from TAKAO) is not
positive. The Third Fleet remains at SASEBO with the only activity
exhibited in the Base Forces.
Page 67
Air.-CARDIV 3 returned to KURE from TAKAO as reported by CAVITE. Most of
air activity confined to dispatches between carrier and shore
establishments.
Fifth Fleet.-Nothing to report.
Fourth Fleet.-The Defense Forces of the Mandates fairly active. The
volume of construction traffic has definitely fallen off. The Commander
Submarine Force is still adding JALUIT and today COMSUBRON 2 addressed a
message there. AIRRON 24 sent a movement report but no indication of the
direction. Communication exercises were held by JALUIT and several
stations in that area. YOKOHAMA Air Corps was addressed at RUOTTO.
China.-The previous activity of SAMA and the French Indo China Forces
and bases continues.
[149] Communication Intelligence Summary, 13 November 1941.
General.-Traffic volume normal with receiving conditions good. Several
messages of high precedence intercepted, some of them are:
1. UNIWIWI dispatch in five numeral from TOKYO Intelligence to Chief
of Staff Combined-Air Force, INFO RNO TAIHOKU, BAKO Naval Station.
2. WIWI from N. G. S. to MAIZURU INFO Chief of Staff Fourth Fleet.
3. NIKAWIWI from N. G. S. to Commander in Chief Combined Fleet INFO
Commander in Chief South China Fleet, Commander Third Fleet and
SAMA, HAINAN.
4. UNIWIWI from N. G. S. to Secretary First Fleet.
5. (2 messages) WIWI to same address as 3 above.
6. A 3 part NIKAWIWI from N. G. S. to Commander in Chief Combined
Fleet, INFO Commander in Chief French Indo China Fleet.
7. One UNI message from Commander in Chief China Fleet to SAMA, INFO
Commander in Chief Third Fleet and Commander in Chief Combined
Fleet.
This is the only occurrence in some time of anyone save the TOKYO
intelligence activity using the WIWI prefix. Both TOKYO and the China
Fleet Intelligence Bureau were active all day with dispatches to the
Major Commanders.
The direction finder net was again active all day with CHINKAI, ORU 7
(near CHINKAI), JALUIT, SAIPAN, and TAIWAN sending in bearing reports.
Combined Fleet.-The activity of BATDIV 3 is not clear. The flagship is
operating and was located by D. F. as reported yesterday. The Commander
of BATDIV 3 is located in YOKOSUKA. The Division Communication Officer
is communicating with TRUK, SAIPAN and PALAO. The other ships in this
division remain unlocated but it is assumed, lacking evidence to the
contrary, that they are with the flagship. Other units of First Fleet
seem inactive. One Cruiser Division of Second Fleet is associated in
traffic with PALAO and may be in that area.
Third Fleet.-Still located in SASEBO, the Commander in Chief has been
active in the traffic, being addressed by both TOKYO and Commander in
Chief Combined Fleet. The First BASE FORCE Commander originated several
messages but no indication of change of location.
Fourth Fleet.-The Commander in Chief Fourth Fleet is in communication
with he Sixth BASEFORCE JALUIT. Several message were exchanged. He
appears o be preparing for a move from TRUK but no movement has yet
occurred. SUBRON 2 is again in communication with JALUIT and today
originated a movement report, but no indication of direction.
[156] Air.-Carriers remain relatively inactive. The SETTSU is still
with them and a few may be engaged in target practice near KURE. The
Combined AIRFORCE is still mostly located in TAIWAN and the usual high
traffic level between its component Air Corps still exists.
China.-The Commander in Chief China Fleet was addressed in one of the
RNO TAIHOKU. His Chief of Staff is still in SHANGHAI.
[151] Communication Intelligence Summary, 14 November 1941
General.-Traffic volume a little under normal due to poor to fair
receiving conditions throughout the day. The Naval Ministry originated
several AlNav dispatches. There were three WIWI messages originated
today.
1. UNIWIWI from N. G. S. and BUMIL to Chief of Staff Fourth Fleet
information Chief of Staff Combined Fleet and YOKOSUKA.
Page 68
2. WIWI from N. G. S. and BUMIL to Chief of Staff Combined Fleet,
Chief of Staff Third Fleet, YOKOSUKA and SASEBO.
3. UNIWIWI from N. G. S. to ANI758 (Chief of Staff of an unidentified
unit), Information Chief of Staff Combined Fleet and Chief of
Staff Combined Air Force.
Direction Finder Net active with SASEBO station sending in bearings in
addition to the others. Tactical circuits heard during day with a fair
amount of activity.
Combined Fleet.-Little activity noted. The flagship of BatDiv Three is
still operating but no further information on this division. Two
Combined Fleet units appear active in the traffic. They are DesRon Three
(normally in First Fleet but has been operating with Second Fleet) and
CruDiv Seven of Second Fleet. Both of these units have been associated
in traffic with the South China Fleet and the French Indo China Force.
They may proceed to the South China area in near future.
Third Fleet.-Still in Sasebo area. The CinC. has been addressed by Tokyo
to a great extent and is still associated with South China activities in
traffic. It has been noted that the association between the Third Fleet
and units of the Combined Air Force is growing. Especially the Second
Base Force has been talking with several Air Corps among whom is the
Kure Air Corps. Will air units be embarked in ships of the Base Force?
Fourth Fleet.-No movement yet from the TRUK area. It appears that the
Fourth Fleet Staff is fairly well split up. Various officers of the
staff were addressed at Tokyo and at unidentified locations.
Submarines.-No particular activity. One unit evidently enroute PALAO and
Submarine Squadron Two (now in Kure area) still being addressed by Tokyo
and Yokosuka originators.
Air.-One Air Squadron of the Combined Air Force is at HOIHOW, HAINAN.
The Commander of the Air Force is still at TAKAO with a good
representation of his command. The Carriers remain in home waters with
most of them in port.
[152] Communication Intelligence Summary, 15 November 1941
General.-Traffic volume normal, with a number of general address
messages originated by Communication Division, Tokyo, to Radio Officers,
Ominato, U. E. 9 (D. F. Station in Marshalls), Jaluit, Palao, Truk,
Saipan, Takao and Sama Radios, Staff Communication Officers All Major
Flagships, Staff Communication Officer South Expeditionary Force and two
apparent collective shore addresses. Traffic from all stations mentioned
except Sama and Ominato to D. F. Control and Plotting Room Tokyo
information to Staff Communication Officer Combined Fleet was exchanged.
No messages of the D. F. type were detected so it is presumed that the
interchange had to do with arrangements for drill or organization of the
net. The Minister of the Navy originated one Alnav and one to all Major
Commands and collective shore. Tokyo Personnel and Tokyo Communication
Division originated several to collective fleet and shore. Significance
is not determined though it is believed possible that a further partial
change of shore and air calls may be in prospect. The Empire air station
net was normally active using tactical calls. Secretary First Fleet I
originated one Urgent Code to unidentified (MINI 55), Staff
Communication Officer Carrier Division Four (at Sasebo) and Commanding
Officer of Batdiv Three flagship.
Combined Fleet.-Same as yesterday, same units (Batdiv Three, Desrons One
and Three) associated through traffic with South Expeditionary Force.
CinC Second Fleet was the most active originator and appeared to be
arranging operations of units involving First, Second, Carrier and Air
Units.
Third Fleet.-Inactive.
Fourth Fleet.-Apparent movement of Fourth Fleet units in prospect or
underway with continued emphasis on the Marshalls Area. CinC. Fourth
traffic still being handled from the Truk area, with Airron Twenty-four
(Kamoi) and associated Yokohama and Chitose air units involved in some
movement direction undetermined. All Marshall Island activities,
including unidentified Army Forces, exchanging traffic freely.
Submarine Force.-Little activity detected. It is believed that some
submarine activity is operating or preparing to operate in the Marshall
area, from communication arrangements underway between Staff
Communication Officer
Page 69
Submarine Force and same Fourth Fleet, information to Jaluit. Jaluit has
been heard working on various frequencies, using tactical calls and
procedure associated with submarine operations, but no identifications
of calls used have been made.
[153] Communication Intelligence Summary, 15 November 1941
Air.-Continued air traffic to and from Takao area, with unidentified
Airron formerly YOME 7) including South Expeditionary Force and Sama
addressees n traffic. Composition of this force and purpose still
speculative but believed o be preparing to move southward to work with
the South Expeditionary Force.
The large number of alternate calls used by major forces renders
analysis of traffic headings very slow and difficult, but
identifications and recoveries of alternates are improving as a greater
volume of November traffic becomes available for research.
[154] Communication Intelligence Summary, 16 November 1941
GENERAL.-Traffic volume approximately normal for week-end period. A new
form of dispatch heading appeared in a series of dispatches broadcasted
on the regular UTSU series. Only the originator or the address of the
dispatch appeared; it is assumed that the other pertinent call or
address may be buried n the text. These dispatches were with one
exception (in 5 numeral text) all a the nine-Kana period separator
system and the single call in the heading fitted in each case Line seven
of the call garble table.
A dispatch was originated by the Navy Minister addressed to all Major
Fleets and general addresses to this effect:
"Today the House of Peers and House of Representatives by means of a
decision adopted the following resolution transmitted as follows:
1. Resolution of House of Peers-(Expressed deepest thanks and emotion
to Army and Navy for their glorious service over a long period to the
Empire and expressed condolences, etc., for those fallen in battle.
2. Resolution of House of Representatives-Expressed thanks, etc., to
all officers and men of Army, Navy and Air Force for their 4 1/2
years service (in China affair) and for their contribution to the
establishment of a permanent world peace. Gave prayers for well being
of all hands, etc. ."
First and Second Fleets.-Majority of First and Second Fleet Units remain
in the general Kure area. The units of these two fleets that have been
most active from dispatch heading viewpoint in the last ten days appear
to be:
Airon Seven (3 Chitose class)
Carrier Division Four
Destroyer Squadron Seven
Destroyer Squadron Three
Battleship Division Three
Cruiser Division Seven.
It is rather singular that the CinC. Second Fleet has assumed an
important role in addressing for action several first fleet and other
fleet units recently. In some of these dispatches the call identified as
Southern Expeditionary Force (Indochina Force) appears. Associations of
addresses in several dispatches have shown the Second and Third Fleets
with the Combined Air Force and in other dispatches, there appears to be
an association between First Fleet, Carrier Divisions and the Mandates.
[155] It is apparent that Destroyer Squadron One has been or is
operating with the Carrier Divisions and Battleship Division Three while
Cruiser Division Seven and Destroyer Squadron Three have been operating
together. Iwakuin [sic] Air sent short priority dispatch to the ATAGO,
Second Fleet cruiser and submarine units indicating some joint minor
exercises in that area.
Third Fleet.-Believed inactive in Sasebo-Kure area.
Fourth Fleet.-FUATU, a Tokyo address originated one UNI dispatch to an
unidentified fleet unit (MEN 33), information to CinC. Combined Fleet,
Communication Officer, Fourth Fleet, Saipan Base Force, Kure Movement
Officer, CinC. Fifth Fleet, Tokyo Intelligence, and NEO 66, believed to
be a shore based air activity in Chichijima-Marcus area.
Fifth Fleet.-Prior to the change of calls on 1 November, the composition
of the Fifth Fleet was very indefinite but appeared to contain several
naval auxiliary type vessels. Since 1 November, little has been
recovered of the com-
Page 70
position of this mythical fleet but it is definite that some units are
operating in the general Yokosuka Chichijima-Marcus.
Submarines.-Little activity. Communication Officer, Submarine Force
originated one priority dispatch to unidentified address, information to
Combined Fleet Communication Officer. Association of Submarine Force and
Fourth Fleet Commands continues.
[156] Communications Intelligence Summary, 17 November, 1941
General.-Traffic volume normal with receiving conditions good. More
traffic with single call heading appeared on the broadcast circuit.
These dispatches numbered serially and each call different but all
fitting the same line in the call garble table. Since these messages are
transmitted each hour on the hour and are of approximately the same
length it appears that they are drill messages. It is feared that they
constitute a test of straight broadcasting without a heading. Since none
of this traffic has been found going in to Tokyo it is probably
originated in the Navy Ministry. Very few messages of general address
were noted. Tactical circuits in the Mandates were heard during the day
with radio Saipan controlling.
Combined Fleet.-No movement from the Kure area of any major portion of
the First or Second Fleets. The CinC. Second Fleet very active as an
originator today. He continues to address units which are most normally
under his command. He also addressed the CinC. Third Fleet, Paloa
Forces, and the Chief of Staff Fourth Fleet.
Third Fleet.-Inactive at Sasebo. The Staff Communication Officer of
Third Fleet was addressed by the R. N. O. Paloa.
Fourth Fleet.-The greater part of the activity in the Mandate area
centered about the Third Base Force at Palao and the Sixth Base Force at
Jaluit. Both these activities originated traffic.
Air.-The Commander of the Combined Air Force remains in Takao and was
addressed frequently by SAMA, HAINAN and was in two instances addressed
by the Fourth Fleet. The carriers are mostly in the Kure-Sasebo area
with the exception of a few which are operating in the Kyushu area.
China.-Sama was again active today with dispatches to the Combined Fleet
Staff, Combined Air Force, Third Fleet and Bako. The R. N. O. Taimoku
addressed a dispatch to CinC. China, Sanchow Island Sama, Bako, CinC.
South China, and Chief of Staff Combined Air Force.
[157] Communications Intelligence Summary, 18 November 1941
General.-Traffic volume a little under normal with receiving conditions
fair to poor. Tokyo originators active with several messages of general
address emanating from the Communication Section. The double originator
BUMIL, and N. G. S. sent one NIKAWIWI to the Chief of Staff Combined
Fleet for information to all First Class Naval Stations. BUMIL also
addressed all urgent dispatch to SAMA, information to R. N. O. TONIC,
Chief of Staff South China Fleet and Chief of Staff Combined Fleet.
Another Tokyo originator, believed to be N. G. S., sent an urgent
message to Chief of Staff Combined Fleet, Chief of Staff French Indo
China Force and Chief of Staff Second Fleet. MAIZURU Naval Station also
sent an urgent message to Chief of Staff Combined Fleet, Second Fleet,
Combined Air Force, French Indo China Force and for information to N. G.
S. The Tokyo Direction Finder plotting section sent three long
dispatches to the entire Direction Finder Net which was very active
today with many bearings reported. The Vice Chief Naval General Staff
sent one to Chief of Staff Carrier Divisions and Chief of Staff French
Indo China Force.
Combined Fleet.-CinC. Combined Fleet very prominent as both an
originator and addressee. Since this officer is always included in the
address of every important message, he will no longer be mentioned as an
addressee unless he is the only addressee. The association between the
CinC Second Fleet and the French Indo China Forces and Combined Air
Force is very plain. He was addressed by CinC. French Indo China Force
today in an urgent NIKA dispatch. Several units of the Combined Air
Force also addressed several dispatches to him. Battleship Division
Three the Carrier Divisions and two destroyer squadrons have been
associated in traffic. Several dispatches occurred today, being
addressed by N. G. S. and the Commander Carrier Divisions in several
instances. The CinC. Third Fleet also addressed several dispatches
Page 71
to him. These form the indication that CinC. Second Fleet will be in
command of a large Task Force comprising the Third Fleet, Combined Air
Force, some carrier divisions, and Battleship Division Three. No
movement from home waters has been noted.
Third Fleet.-The Commander Second Base Force originated what appears to
be a movement report. He also sent one to R. N. O. TAIHOKU, information
to CinC. Third Fleet. There were other units tentatively placed in Third
Fleet who sent dispatches in which the Tokyo movement report office was
an addressee. It is expected that the Third Fleet will move from the
Sasebo area in the near future. This Second Base Force was having quite
a bit of traffic with several Air Corps a while ago and may be
transporting air units or equipment.
Fourth Fleet.-Not much activity in this fleet. The amount of traffic
between this fleet and Palao is noticeable with the submarines still
interested in Jaluit.
[158] Communication Intelligence Summary, 19 November 1941
General.-Traffic volume normal. Traffic from Fourth Fleet and Mandates
was noticeably less than usual. Traffic on the northern circuits also
very light. Some tactical traffic received from Combined Fleet units.
There was been a noticeable increase in the afloat traffic over the
normal amount usually seen. Fleet units seem to have a great deal of
business with other Fleet units both within and outside of their own
organization. Staff Officers are frequently addressed at other than
their normal locations. The activity at Tokyo has subsided somewhat in
that there were fewer general messages than for the past few days. Tokyo
Intelligence sent out several messages addressed to Second Fleet,
Submarine Force and Carrier Divisions. One was sent to SAMA for
information to French Indo China Forces and South China Fleet. The Navy
Minister sent out two AlNavs. The Direction Finder net is still active
with all stations sending in reports and Tokyo plotting station making
reports to major commanders.
Combined Fleet.-The flagship of Battleship Division Three appears today
at Sasebo, its southern jaunt apparently having been completed.
Destroyer Squadron Four and Two appear associated with the Third Fleet.
CinC Second Fleet continues his activity, being still associated with
Combined Air Force, French Indo China Force, Third Fleet, and today with
Carrier Division Three. Carrier Division Three was in Takao and returned
to the Empire a week ago and has been associated with Third Fleet since.
A Bako activity addressed the Chief of Staff Second Fleet, Third Fleet
and Combined Air Force. The Chief of Staff Second Fleet addressed an
urgent dispatch to CinC. French Indo China Fleet information to Third
Fleet and Commander Cruiser Division Five.
Third Fleet.-Active as noted above. Several more units of this fleet and
of the Base Forces originated movement reports but no indication of
direction. CinC. Third Fleet is still in Sasebo.
Fourth Fleet.-Activity in Mandates still centers about the Third Base
Defense Force at Palao. Traffic between this force, Tokyo and the Second
Fleet was considerable. One call (SITI 4) appeals at Jaluit today. This
call has been identified as Carrier Division Four and if the one message
is correct it appears that this Carrier Division (ZUIKAKU) is in the
Jaluit area. This is *not* confirmed as no other indications have been
found and its presence at Jaluit is doubted, attributing the message to
be a communication error.
Fifth Fleet.-Flagship located at Yokosuka. The CinC. Fifth Fleet
appeared in a few dispatches from Tokyo but no other activity seen.
[159] Communication Intelligence Summary. 20-21 November 1941
General.-Traffic volume for past two days has been higher than normal.
Tokyo originators active with messages addressed to all major
commanders. N. G. S. sent a UNI WIWI to Commandant BAKO for information
to Chief of Staff South China Fleet and Canton. The Personnel Bureau at
Tokyo become very active on the 21st sending out a series of long
personnel messages. The activity at Tokyo identified as R. D. F.
plotting stations increased his recent high volume of messages with a
long four part message addressed to all major commanders. He also
addressed several dispatches to the Direction Finder net, indicating the
employment and results being obtained by this activity. The traffic load
on the Tokyo-Takao circuit was very heavy on the 21st, so heavy that be
circuit was in duplex operation most of the mid-watch.
Page 72
Combined Fleet.-Flags of both First and Second Fleets are in Kure area
and most of both fleets remain in Kure-Sasebo area. Battleship Division
Three still in Yokosuka area. Traffic to and from the CinC. Second Fleet
continues abnormally high. A list of units addressed by him or who sent
traffic to him and CinC. Third Fleet over the past two days follows:
MIRA 9 (Carrier Division Three) ENO 7 (Unidentified)
TAE 1 (Airron 7) AKU 8 (Air Unit)
KAME 5 (Airron 6) KUSU 7 (Unidentified)
YAWI (Crudiv 5) SATU 88 (Unidentified)
KENU 3 (Crudiv 7) KUNI 88 (Unidentified)
RESE 4 (Desron 3) OYU 9 (Unidentified)
AKI 0 (Desron 4) KONA 0 (Unidentified)
TIYA 7 (Comdr. 1st Base For) NOTU 6 (Unidentified)
SASE 3 (Comdr. 2nd Base For) NETE 5 (Unidentified)
YOMO 9 (Desron 5) NSI 3 (Unidentified)
REA 2 (Shiogama Air Corps) SUTE 1 (Unidentified)
KUNO 9 (Erimo) YAYU 1 (Unidentified)
MIMO 3 (Air Unit ?) MARE 5 (Unidentified)
TUE 7 (Unidentified) Plus 11 Marus.
This list is not the complete estimate of forces being assembled by him
but only the ones occurring in the past two days. Each one appeared not
only with the CinC. Second Fleet but with the Third Fleet and with one
of the units now in South China or Taiwan-South China Address. A
complete list is being made up but was not finished at this writing.
Assuming that the entire Second Fleet will be included in this
organization and that each unit addressed will either participate or
contribute somewhat to the Task Force it appears that it will comprise a
good portion of the navy. One item stands out-so far there has been
practically no submarine units mentioned by the Second or Third Fleets
in connection with South China activities. Commander Submarine Force has
not been included in traffic. He does appear in Tokyo Fourth Fleet and
Mandates traffic.
[160] Communication Intelligence Summary, 20-21 November 1941
Mandates and Fourth Fleet.-The R. N. O. Palao and Palao radio stations
have remained active with the Fourth Fleet and 5 Yokosuka for days. This
is taken to indicate a coming concentration of forces in Palao which
would include the Fourth Fleet and some of the Second Fleet who has also
been active with the R. N. O. Since the activity of the Second Fleet
Commander has been so great it may be that he will assign some non-
Second Fleet units to that area but just which ones is not yet known.
From information from radio sources there is no indication of any
concentration now at Palao beyond the Third Base Force which is based
there. There has been no traffic for other fleet units routed there and
the Maru traffic to Palao is far less than the normal flow to that area.
With the arrival of Siti 4 (yesterday reported as either a carrier unit
or submarine unit and now identified as a submarine squadron of the
Submarine Fleet) the concentration of naval forces in the Marshalls is
far greater than that existing at Palao.
[161] Communication Intelligence Summary, 22 November, 1941
General.-Traffic volume somewhat greater than normal. Only one tactical
circuit heard today, indicating that Combined Fleet tactical exercises
are now completed. The Navy Minister originated several AlNavs and sent
two other messages, one to CinC, Fourth Fleet and one to Yokosuka and
Commander Submarine Squadron Five. Tokyo Intelligence sent out the usual
long messages to CinC Combined Fleet, CinC Second Fleet and CinC Third
Fleet. BuMil addressed Fourth Fleet, Truk, Pagan Civil Engineering
Section At Peleliu and Yokosuka Another unidentified Tokyo originator
sent a priority message to all major flags and China Fleet, information
to ANOS at Taihoku and Palao. Sasebo addressed one to Chief of Staff
French Indo China Force, information Chief of Staff Second Fleet, Bako,
Sama, Chief of Staff South China, Chief of Staff Third Fleet, commander
Cruiser Division Seven and Commander Destroyer Squadron Three Cruiser
Division Seven and Destroyer Squadron Three to South China Area soon
While the Direction Finder Net is still active, the station at Palao
sent in more bearings than usual for that station.
Page 73
Combined Fleet.-CinC. Combined originated only one dispatch to two
unidentified calls, one a Maru, for information to CinC. Third Fleet.
CinC Second Fleet was again prolific with many messages addressed to
Third Fleet and Combined Air Force. The amount of traffic interchanged
between these three commanders was very great. One message addressed
many units as follows:
CinC. Second Fleet. To: NETE 5 (Crudiv?), KOO 2 (Subrons 5) TIYU 66
(CinC. Third Fleet), SUYO 44 (CinC. Comb. Air Force), MIRA 9 (Cardiv
3) RESE 4 (Desron 3), KORE 4 (Second Fleet) (Collective), less
Crudiv 8 and unidentified 2nd Fleet unit), SUTI 2 (BatDiv 3) (at
Kure and Sasebo), Airron 7 (at Kure), SUTI 1 (?) (at Kure), SATU 8
(?) (at Kure), META 0 (AKASHI) (at KURE) META 2 (ASAHI MARU), TUFU 2
(?), NARI 33 CinC. China Fleet), KAKE 66 (CinC. South China Fleet),
MISI 66 (CinC. Comb. Fleet).
Third Fleet.-CinC. Third Fleet received a dispatch from "RIKUGUN
SANBOUTEU MAEDATI SEUZEU (at Tainoku). This is translated as "Army Chief
of Staff General MAEDATI and indicates the linking of the Taiwan Army
Forces with Third Fleet. The CinC. Third Fleet continues his association
with Combined Air Forces.
Fourth Fleet.-CinC Fourth Fleet was mostly occupied with the Sixth Base
Force at Jaluit and AirRon 24 now in Jaluit area. The Third Base Force
at Palao and the RNO Palao are still addressing the CinC Fourth and
Yokosuka. He also received one from Commander Submarine Force.
China.-The Commander French Indo China Force sent one message to CinC.
Combined Fleet for information to CinC. Second Fleet. Bako sent one to
Secretary Fourth Fleet and Secretary Submarine Fleet, Secretary Carrier
Divisions, Secretary Fifth Fleet, Sama and French Indo China Fleet.
[162] Communication Intelligence Summary, 23 November 1941
General.-Traffic volume normal. High precedence traffic has increased.
Some of the high precedence dispatch headings are listed:
1. MAYURU (Tokyo address) to HORONO MUSEKU (Collective Shore Information
Chiefs of Staff Combined, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th,
5th, and Southern Expeditionary Force.
Precedence
NIKA-WIWI
2. Third Fleet Chief of Staff to Second Fleet Chief of Staff Information
Combined and Southern Expeditionary Force
Chief of Staff.
NIKA
3. KESANA EONO (Tokyo) to Chiefs of Staff Third Fleet and Southern
Expeditionary Force. Information "SANKUYUTI"
at Sama Hainan.
WIWI
4. SUIFITE 1 (Unidentified Fleet unit) to Radio Takao, Hainan, Flagship
NWA 2, Information Tadio Tokyo and Second
Fleet flagship.
NIKA
5. Imakuni [sic] Air to Iwakuni Air Detachment at NAHA Information Kure,
Bako, and MINO 3 in Takao.
KIU
Personnel Tokyo also originated several priority dispatches to First
Fleet Third Fleet, and others. The following WE address was followed by
Sasebo Radio in the delivery of a personnel Bureau dispatch
"SAHOTI.RENGO.RI.SI." An unidentified fleet unit (SUTE 1) listed
recently in Kure appeared on radio circuit with Takao Radio. Also on
this circuit were the following:
KENU 3-CruDiv 7 Flagship?
HOWI 2-Fleet unit associated with Second Fleet.
EKE 8-Fleet unit associated with Second Fleet.
MUSE 5-Naval Auxiliary associated with Second Fleet.
The above units received delivery of the long NIKA dispatch originated
by CinC Second Fleet on the 21st of November and which appeared to
outline the forces expected to operate in the Indo-China general area.
Combined Fleet.-CinC Combined was included, as always, in all exchange
of fleet commander traffic, but no important messages originated by him
were inter-
Page 74
cepted. First Fleet was very quiet. Second Fleet messages mentioned in
summaries of 22nd were still being circulated but Third Fleet appeared
as the most active unit in today's traffic. Indications are that Third
Fleet units are underway [163] in a movement coordinated with the
Second Fleet, Combined Air Force and French Indo China Force. Commander
French Indo China Force (So. Exp. For.) was included in all important
traffic from Second, Third and Combined Air Commanders, Hainan
addressees were included in nearly all high precedence messages
concerning these forces and may indicate a rendezvous of forces in that
area. Palao appeared as an information addressee on a portion of the
traffic. Fourth Fleet activity involved Palao area on one end and
Marshalls on the other. With no means of substantiating the impression,
it is believed that more submarines are operating in, or from, the
Marshalls than it has been possible to definitely place from radio
interceptions. It is recalled that there was an exchange between Staff
Communication Officers of the Submarine Force and Fourth Fleet with
Jaluit included as either action or information around November 1st and
that Jaluit opened a direct circuit to Yokosuka early this month,
apparently to relieve traffic congestion from that area. Jaluit Radio
has been heard on various frequencies using and working with units using
tactical or secret type calls, while the main submarine frequency of
6385/12770 has been relatively inactive.
Air.-Combined Air Traffic remains associated with Taiwan area, while the
Mandate Air units continue high level of activity, covering the whole
Mandate area. Carrier Divisions were relatively quiet, but with Carrier
Division Three definitely associated with Second Fleet operations.
China-CinC. China and South China not included with the Second, Third
Air Force and Southern Expeditionary Force traffic and were quiet.
Bearings from Cavite and Guam place CinC. South China east of Taiwan,
but this is believed questionable.
Nothing was seen to contradict impressions gathered during the past few
days and summarized previously, that movement of forces is either
imminent or actually underway, at least in part, to the southward, with
covering forces operating from the Mandates, and possibility of a
striking force assembled or gathering in the Palao area.
[164] Communication Intelligence Summary, 24 November, 1941
General.-Traffic volume normal. High precedence traffic above normal.
Traffic analysis impresses are unchanged from yesterday's report. The
difficulties of identifications have prevented more definite information
of vessels (and fleets to which attached) that appear to be moving south
from Kure-Sasebo area. If the poor reception prevailing here the last
two days can be disregarded and the assumption made that Radio Heeia
intercepted their "share" of the total traffic, the following
impressions are worth something:
(a) The falling off of traffic to China addresses.
(b) The increased activity among third fleet addresses with a high
percentage of what appeals to be movement reports.
(c) The above normal activity in the Mandates both ashore and afloat
addresses.
The association of Second Fleet, Third Fleet and Southern Expeditionary
Force continues as usual. Palao and Jaluit appear prominently in
dispatch traffic, the Second Fleet Commander with the former, and the
Submarine Force Commander with the latter.
First and Second Fleets.-Very little activity in First Fleet. The radio
call believed to represent the flagship of Cruiser Division Seven
originated a dispatch to Commander Cruiser Division Seven, CinC. Second
Fleet, Commander Southern Expeditionary Force, and Radio Sama, Takao,
Sasebo, and Tokyo. The CinC. Second Fleet continues to appear as the
Task Force Commander of a large number of units from First and Second
Fleet plus Carrier Division Three and Combined Air Force units.
Third Fleet.-Large number of dispatches involving Third Fleet units,
some of which appear to be movement reports. The fact that CinC Third
Fleet appears as information addressee on many dispatches to and from
Second Fleet units indicates that these two fleets will be closely
associated in any future operations. Yesterday, a large number of
dispatches associating Carrier Division Three with Cinc. Third Fleet.
Fourth Fleet and Mandates.-Fourth Fleet appears to be concentrated in
Truk area since all of the recent definite reports from Fourth Fleet
vessels have come from Truk. Air Squadron Twenty-four and perhaps a
large number of submarines from the Submarine Force are in the Marshall
Area.
Page 75
Submarines.-Comparatively little activity.
China.-Comparatively quiet.
Carriers.-No definite indications of location.
Combined Air Force.-Commander Kanoya Air appears in the Takao area.
Otherwise no change.
[165] Communication Intelligence Summary, 25 November, 1941
General.-Traffic volume normal. Receiving conditions much improved over
last two days. Tokyo personnel bureau active with messages to various
units. Tokyo originated one UNI WIWI to CinC. Combined Fleet, CinC.
Second Fleet CinC. Third Fleet, CinC. Fourth Fleet and CinC. French,
Indo China Force plus Yokosuka, Kure and Maizuru. The Navy Minister
originated several AlNavs. A Direction Finder Net, controlled by Tokyo
radio was active with secret calls being sent by the five stations. The
entire fleet traffic level is still high which leads to the conclusion
that organizational arrangements or other preparations are not yet
complete.
Combined Fleet.-Little activity by CinC. First Fleet. CinC. Second Fleet
remains highly active as an originator, addressing Third Fleet, Air
Forces and South China units. A Second Fleet unit and a submarine
division or squadron arrived in Takao communication zone today.
Crudivision Seven which previously arrived there has been associated
with Destroyer Squadron Three which indicates the presence of that unit
in Takao vicinity. Palao and Second Fleet still exchanging messages. Two
new units to be associated with CinC Second Fleet and the Task Force now
forming are the North China Fleet and Defense Division One.
Air.-Through the identification of a call made today Genzan Air Corps
has been in Saigon since the eighteenth. We believe that other units of
the Combined Air Force have moved from Taiwan to the French Indo China
Area although this is not yet verified. One or more of the Carrier
Divisions are present in the Mandates.
Fourth Fleet.-CinC. Fourth Fleet is still holding extensive
communications with the Commander Submarine Fleet, the forces at Jaluit
and Commander Carriers. His other communications are with the Third,
Fourth and Fifth Base Forces.
[166] Communications Intelligence Summary, 26 November 1941
General.-Traffic volume normal. All circuits heard well except for
Tokyo-Takao circuit which faded early. Traffic picture about the same as
for the past week. Intra-fleet traffic still very heavy and Tokyo
Bureaus still dispatching AlNavs. The Tokyo Intelligence and Direction
Finder plotting units addressed a succession of urgent dispatches to the
major commands and to the CinC. Second and Third Fleets in particular.
The only MAM schedule was NR15 which was first broadcast on the twenty-
fifth. Takao and Bako originated more traffic today than usual, it was
addressed to Third Fleet mostly but the CinC. Second Fleet and the China
Fleets came in for their share. Tokyo radio is working the ISIZU
(flagship South China) SAMA and CAMRANH Bay radio stations directly
Takao is also working ITSUBA (Spratleys).
Combined Fleet.-Cruiser Division Seven today began receiving traffic via
SAMA, indicating the arrival of that unit in HAINAN waters. While no
indications were seen that Destroyer Squadron Three also arrived it is
probable that this unit is still in company with Cruiser Division Seven
and is also present at Hainan. The Takao, former flagship of the Second
Fleet became active in the traffic today being associated with the
Second and Third Fleets. The tanker HAYATOMO appeared in several of
CinC. Second Fleet's dispatches today as well as the SOYO MARU. No
movement is evident yet of any of the flags of the newly formed force.
The traffic between Second, Third, Fourth Fleets and the Combined Air
Force still continues at its high level.
Fourth Fleet.-No change in Truk location. CinC. held extensive
communication with Saipan forces as well as Palao forces. The KATORI and
CinC. Submarine Fleet appear to be at or near Chichijima.
Fifth Fleet.-The CinC. Fifth Fleet was included in some of the
dispatches of the Second Fleet and is associated with the new Task
Force.
Submarines.-As noted above Commander Submarine Force is in Chichijima
area. The Submarine Squadron NETE5's location is somewhat uncertain
today due to one dispatch being routed to MAIZURU. The routing of this
dispatch is doubted because of the indication of her arrival at Takao
yesterday and her previous association with Cruiser Division Seven.
Page 76
China.-Two Marus of the Third Fleet left Bako for Sama today.
Third Fleet.-Active as above but no indication of large scale movement
from the Sasebo area.
[167] Communication Intelligence Summary, 27 November 1941
General.-Traffic volume a little below normal due to poor signals on the
frequencies above 7000 kcs. Tokyo-Takao circuit unreadable on mid-watch.
Some tactical traffic intercepted from carriers. Bako, Sama, and Saigon
active as originators, addressing traffic to each other and to the
Chiefs of Staff of Second, Third Fleets and Combined Air Force. Bako
addressed the Chief of Staff Third Fleet information Destroyer Squadrons
Four and Five and Chief of Staff Second Fleet. The main Tokyo originator
today was the Intelligence activity who sent five dispatches to the
major commanders. The Direction Finder activity was very high with all
stations sending in bearings including the Marshall Islands Stations
which has been silent for the past four days.
COMBINED FLEET.-No further information as to whether or not Destroyer
Squadron Three is in Hainan area but is believed to be still with
Cruiser Division Seven in that area. There is still no evidence of any
further movement from the Kure-Sasebo area. The Chief of Staff Combined
Fleet originated several messages of general address. He has been fairly
inactive as an originator lately. CinC. Second Fleet originated many
messages to Third Fleet, Combined Air Force and Bako.
THIRD FLEET.-Still holding extensive communication with Baka, Sama South
China Fleet and French Indo China Force. The use of WE addresses is
increasing, those occurring today were:
"DAIHATIFUTABUTAISANBOTEU" (in Taihoku)
"KOROKUKITISIKI"
"KIZUKEYAMASITABUTAI" (in care of RYUJO)
"HEIZEUKAIGUNDAIGONREUSEU"
There is nothing to indicate any movement of the Third Fleet as yet.
FOURTH FLEET.-CinC. Fourth Fleet frequently addressed dispatches to the
defense forces in the Mandates. Jaluit addressed messages to the
Commander Submarine Force and several submarine units. The Saipan Air
Corps held communication with Jaluit and CinC. Fourth Fleet. The Civil
Engineering Units at IMIEJI and ENIWETOK were heard from after being
silent for weeks. Chitose Air Corps is in Saipan and Air Squadron
Twenty-four is still operating in the Marshalls. No further information
on the presence of Carrier Division Five in the Mandates.
AIR.-An air unit in the Takao area addressed a dispatch to the KORYU and
SHOKAKU. Carriers are still located in home waters. No information of
further movement of any Combined Air Force units to Hainan.
SUBMARINES.-Commander Submarine Force still in Chichijima Area.
[168] Communication Intelligence Summary, November 28, 1941
General.-Traffic volume normal. Communications to and from South China
and between Mandates and Empire very heavy. No tactical traffic seen. As
has been previous]y reported the suspected Radio Intelligence net is
very active and is becoming more so. The TOKYO plotting activity
addressed more messages to the Radio net than previously and most of
these sent for information to the Major Commanders. Much traffic also
was directed to NRE0 (the TOKYO D. F. Command) from all eight stations
in the Mandates and OMINATO. This Command also originated messages of
high precedence to the Major Fleet Commanders. This activity is
interpreted to indicate that the R. I. net is operating at full strength
upon U. S. Naval Communications and IS GETTING RESULTS. TOKYO
originators were active with messages of high precedence to the
Commander in Chiefs of the Second and Third Fleets and Combined Air
Force. The Navy Minister sent to Alnavs. The Chief of the Naval General
Staff sent one to the Chief of Staffs of Combined Air Force, Combined
Fleet, Fourth Fleet, Third Fleet, French Indo-China Force, Second Fleet
and RNO PALAO. The BUAERO sent one to Chief of Staff Fourth Fleet info
IMIESI and 11th Air Corps at SAIPAN.
Combined Fleet.-No indication of movement of any Combined Fleet units.
Commander in Chief Second Fleet originated his usual number of
dispatches to Third Fleet and Combined Air Force. The units paid
particular attention to by the Commander in Chief Second Fleet were
CARDIVS Five and Seven and
Page 77
DESRONS Two and Four and SUBRON Five. No traffic today from the TAKAO
(CA).
Third Fleet.-Little activity from Third Fleet units save for the
Commander in Chief. The impression is growing that the First Base Force
is not present with the bulk of the Third Fleet in SASEBO but it is not
yet located elsewhere. The Army Commander in TAIHOKU is still holding
communications with the commander in Chief Third Fleet. Two Third Fleet
units arrived at BAKO and are apparently returning to KURE from BAKO.
Fourth Fleet.-Bulk of Fourth Fleet still at TRUK. The Commander in Chief
Fourth addressed message to the Sixth Base Force at JALUIT and the
Fourth Base Force at TRUK. Yokohama Air Corps is at RUOTTO and WOTJE and
held communications with AIRRON Twenty-Four and KAMOI.
Sixth China.-SAMA sent several messages to shore addresses in the
Empire. SAMA also addressed the OMURA AIR CORPS in several messages
which went for information to SAIGON and TOKYO. TAKAO radio station
addressed the Chiefs of Staff Combined Fleet, Second Fleet, the French
Indo China Force and Combined Air Force. TAKAO Air Corps addressed
SUKUGAWA Air Corps and YOKOSUKA Air Corps. A representative of a HAINAN
office now at SAIGON originated several messages to the Naval Bases at
SASEBO and KURE. The Commander in Chief China Fleet originated more
traffic than usual and addressed his fleet collectively for information
to the Commander in Chief Second and Commander in Chief Third Fleets.
Submarines.-Except for the mention of SUBRONS Five and Six in two
dispatches there was no submarine activity today.
[169] Communication Intelligence Summary, 29 November 1941
General.-Traffic volume above normal, The traffic to South China still
very high. Automatic transmissions was attempted on the Tokyo-Takao
circuit but was a failure and traffic sent by hand. A good share of
today's traffic is made up of messages of an intelligence nature. Tokyo
Intelligence sent eleven messages during the day to Major Commanders
both ashore and afloat, while the radio intelligence activity at Tokyo
sent four long messages to the Major Commanders. In addition to the
stations normally reporting to Tokyo, radio Yokosuka sent in reports.
This station had not previously been seen to submit reports. The
Direction Finder Net controlled directly by Tokyo was up during the
night with much activity. One message for Jaluit Radio Direction Finder
Station included Commander Submarines for information. The Navy Minister
originated his usual two AlNavs and the Naval General Staff addressed
Commanders Second Fleet Third Fleet, Combined Ail Force and the South
China Units. The unit which has been addressed as the "103rd Air Group"
originated one dispatch today whose address was composed entirely of
enciphered calls. It is apparent that he has no Navy call list. One
address was "JUITIKOUKUUKANTAI" "11th AIR *FLEET*". Since this has
appeared before it is evident that the use of KANTAI is intentional
making the existence of an air fleet positive. Its composition is
unknown.
Combined Fleet:-The arrival of Air Squadron Seven in Takao area is
confirmed. The presence of Cruiser Division Four in that area is not
confirmed nor denied. The dispatches today indicate that the following
units are under the immediate command of CinC. Second Fleet:
CARDIV THREE DESRON TWO
SUBRON FIVE DESRON FOUR
SUBRON SIX THIRD FLEET
CRUDIV FIVE FRENCH INDO CHINA FORCE
CRUDIV SEVEN
Associated with Third Fleet are two Battleships but their assignment is
not yet definite. Aside from messages which were addressed to Third
Fleet, China and South China Fleets, Combined Air Force and the Naval
General Staff, Commander in Chief Second Fleet was mainly occupied with
the units listed above. Only one message from Commander in Chief
Combined Fleet was seen. This was addressed to YOKOSUKA, Combined Air
Force, CRUDIV Four and BUMILAFF. The HIYEI sent one message to Chief of
Staff Third Fleet.
Third Fleet.-Commander in Chief Third Fleet sent one message to
Comdesron Five, Number Two Base Force, Number One Base Force, Defense
Division One and Comdesron Two and Four. He held extensive
communications with the Commander in Chief Second Fleet and BAKO. Two
more units of Third Fleet made movement reports.
Page 78
Fourth Fleet.--Relatively inactive today. Sent one message to Commander
in Chief Second Fleet, Commander in Chief Third Fleet and Combined Air
Force. He is still in TRUK area.
[170]
Submarines.-Traffic for Commander Submarine Force was routed through
SAIPAN today. He was at CHICHIJIMA yesterday.
South China.-CRUDIV Seven now in SAMA made a movement report but
direction was not indicated. The French Indo China Force Commander
addressed several messages to Second and Third Fleets as well as TOKYO.
The Commander in Chief China Fleet was active in addressing the South
China Naval Bases and the South China Fleets, all for information to
Commander in Chief Second Fleet.
[171] Communication Intelligence Summary, November 30, 1941
General.-Traffic volume less than for past few days. Today's traffic
consisted largely of dispatches bearing old dates, some as far back as
26 November. No reason can be given for the retransmission of these
messages unless the high volume of traffic for past few days has
prevented the repetition of dispatches. The number of dispatches
originated on the 30th is very small. The only tactical circuit heard
today was one with AKAGI and several MARUs. The TOKYO Intelligence
activity originated two WIWI dispatches to Major Fleet Commanders. One
urgent dispatch was sent by NGS to Chiefs of Staff Combined, Second,
Third, Fourth, and Fifth Fleets, Combined Air Force; Submarine Force and
China Fleets.
Combined Fleet.-The Chiefs of Staff of the Combined Fleet and First
Fleet are in KURE. In the same message the Chief of Staff Second Fleet
was nor at any location. Other traffic indications are that he is at
sea. Commander in Chief Second Fleet sent one to his usual addressees of
the Third Fleet and Combined Air Force but also included KONGO and
HIYEI, which places them as members of his Task Force. The Commander in
Chief Second Fleet is no longer adding PALAO activities and has not for
past two days. The RNO PALAO today addressed two messages to TAIWAN
GUNSIREIBU (TAIWAN Army Headquarters).
Third Fleet.-Commander in Chief Third Fleet addressed two messages to
COMDESRON Two, Four and Five; COMCRUDIV Five; First and Second Base
Forces and Defense Division One for information to Commander in Chief
Second Fleet. No information obtained as to the location of the
Commander in Chief Third Fleet, which gives the strong impression that
he is underway.
Fourth Fleet.-Believed to be still in TRUK area. D. F. activity in
Marshalls a little greater today than normal. JALUIT addressed Commander
Submarine Force and AIRRON 24 in one dispatch. The continued association
of JALUIT and Commander Submarine Force plus his known progress from the
Empire to CHICHIJIMA to SAIPAN makes his destination obviously the
Marshalls. Since one of his large units (SITI4) arrived in the Marshalls
some time ago this unit cannot agree with Com 16 that there is not a
submarine concentration in that area. Every evidence points to a
concentration of not only the small Fourth Fleet submarines there but
also a good portion of the Fleet submarines of the Submarine Force.
AIRRON 24 plus YOKOHAMA AIR CORPS presence in that area points to
intended air-submarine operations from the Marshalls. Also the presence
of a unit of plane guard destroyers indicates the presence of at least
one carrier in the Mandates although this has not been confirmed.
South China.-BAKO active with dispatches to Second and Third Fleets.
Combined Air Force and SAMA. Commander in Chief China Fleet becoming
more and more active as an originator with dispatches to the Task Force.
He made a movement report with the South China Fleet as an information
addressee. The Staff Communication Officer of the South China Fleet was
addressed at Shanghai today.
[172] Communication Intelligence Summary, 1 December 1941
General.-All service radio calls of forces afloat changed promptly at
0000, 1 December. Previously, service calls changed after a period of
six months or more. Calls were last changed on 1 November, 1941. The
fact that service calls lasted only one month indicate an additional
progressive step in preparing for active operations on a large scale.
For a period of two to three days prior to the change of calls, the bulk
of the radio traffic consisted of dispatches from one to four or five
days old. It appears that the Japanese Navy is adopting more and more
security provisions. A study of traffic prior to 0000, 1 December
indicates that an effort was made to deliver all dispatches using old
calls so that promptly with the change of calls, there would be a
minimum of undelivered dispatches and consequent confusion and
compromises. Either that or the large number of old messages may have
been used to pad the total volume and make it appear as if nothing
unusual was pending.
First Fleet.-Nothing to indicate that this fleet as a fleet is operating
outside of Empire waters. It is believed that such a large percentage of
the First Fleet is operating with the Second Fleet Task Force that this
fleet has ceased to operate in a prominent role.
Second Fleet.-This fleet is believed proceeding from the Kure-Sasebo
area in the direction of South China and Indo-China. Takao does not
appear to play an important role in today's traffic; consequently, the
assumption is made that his fleet is passing up Takao. Certain units of
the Second Fleet Task Force are definitely in the Indo-China area
(Cruiser Division Seven and Destroyer Squadron Three most prominent).
Third Fleet.-Nothing to report except that the same association of
Second, Third Fleets, and Combined Air Force with South China and Indo-
China Forces continues.
Fourth Fleet.-No change in the Fourth Fleet or Mandates area.
Fifth Fleet.-Nothing to report.
Submarines.-Large number of the Submarine Force believed to be in the
area to the eastward of Yokosuka-Chichijima and Saipan Flagship
somewhere in this general area.
Carriers.-No change.
Combined Air Force.-No change.
[173] Communication Intelligence Summary, 2 December 1941
General.-The most prominent factor in today's traffic is the apparent
confusion in the routing of traffic for certain major parts of the
Japanese Fleet. There were instances where the same dispatch was
repeated several times after it appeared on the Tokyo broadcast and also
where Takao Radio received the same dispatch that it had previously
sent. ComSixteen reported Second and Third Fleets in Takao area and that
Takao Radio was broadcasting traffic to these fleets. This broadcast was
not uncovered here and contrary to location reports, there was one
indication that these two fleets were not close to Takao. In several
instances Takao Radio forwarded traffic to Tokyo for these fleets.
Summing up all reports and indications, it is believed that the large
fleet made up of Second, Third and First Fleet units has left Empire
waters but is either not close enough to Takao for good communication or
is proceeding on a course not close to Takao. The change of calls on
December first has prevented this office from making definite statements
at this date of the units now in the Southern area. To further
complicate the situation, Shanghai Radio handled a considerable mount of
traffic which obviously was originated by and destined for units in the
Takao area. The Chief of Staff, South China area continues to appear in
Shanghai ComSixteen reported nine submarines proceeding south by Camranh
Bay. This group is believed to comprise both Submarine Squadrons five
and six, which units normally operate with the First Fleet but have been
included repeatedly in the Second Fleet Task Force for Southern
operations.
There was a very high percentage of high precedence traffic originated
both by major forces afloat and Tokyo. Hainan continues as a prominent
address. Palao and Third Base Force is holding the same relative
importance.
First Fleet.-Despite the lack of positive identification, the First
Fleet appears relatively quiet. From inconclusive evidence, it appears
as if there may have been a split in the original or normal Combined
Fleet Staff and that these may be two supreme commanders with staffs. As
an example, traffic routing indicates one Combined Fleet call associated
with the Second and Third Fleets and apparently in company while another
Combined Fleet call appears not associated with the Second and Third
Fleets.
Second Fleet.-No units have stood out prominently the last two or three
days. This is partly due to lack of new identifications but contributes
somewhat to the belief that a large part of the Second Fleet is underway
in company. Cruiser Division Seven and Destroyer Squadron Three are
unlocated and unobserved since change of calls.
Page 80
[174] Third Fleet.-Nothing to report. Shanghai appeared in an indirect
way in some of the Third Fleet traffic.
Mandates.-Association of Submarine Force and Fourth Fleet continues.
Some traffic for Fourth Fleet units still going through Truk.
Carriers.-Almost a complete blank of information on the Carriers today
Lack of identifications has somewhat promoted this lack of information-
however, since over two hundred service calls have been partially
identified since the change on the first of December and not one carrier
call has been recovered, it is evident that carrier traffic is at a low
ebb.
Combined Air Force.-This force continues to be associated closely with
Second, Third and Indo-China Fleets. Some units of the Combined Air
Force have undoubtedly left the Takao area.
[175] Communication Intelligence Summary, 4 December 1941
General.-Traffic volume normal with receiving conditions good. Present
state of call recovery does not permit much detailed information to be
obtained. The extensive use of alternate calls by the major commands
slows up identification of even these Units. Very few units have been
positively identified so far. The Chief of the Naval General Staff
originated three long dispatches to the CINC COMBINED, SECOND and THIRD
FLEETS. The Tokyo Intelligence originated nine dispatches to the same
addresses.
The presence of the CINC SECOND FLEET in Taiwan waters is not revealed
by radio traffic. In some traffic from Takao the CINC SECOND FLEET is
indicated as having previously received the messages while in others to
Tokyo he is indicated for delivery by that station. It is the impression
that both SECOND and THIRD FLEETS are underway but are not verified by
Radio Intelligence means.
There are some FOURTH FLEET Units in the Marshall Islands area including
some of the FOURTH FLEET Staff. The identity of these units is not
known. The SIXTH BASE FORCE at Jaluit addressed several messages to CINC
FOURTH.
Some Swatow Units were addressed at Saigon today indicating a movement
of some South China Units to Saigon. Bako originated many dispatches to
the RNO Taihoku and the Task Force Commander.
No information on submarines or Carriers.
[176] Communication Intelligence Summary, 4 December 1941
General.-Traffic volume normal with fair receiving conditions. Takao
Radio today instituted a fleet broadcast system using the prefix UTU in
heading so that there are now two fleet broadcasts in operation. So far
only a few messages have been placed on the Takao broadcast. There were
a large number of urgent messages, today, most of these from Tokyo to
the major commanders. Among others Tokyo Intelligence originated a seven
part message to Chiefs of Staff China Fleet, Combined Fleet, Third
Fleet, South China Fleet, French Indo-China Force and Sama. In all, this
activity sent twelve messages to the major commanders.
Combined Fleet.-The outstanding item of today's traffic is the lack of
messages from the CinC. Second Fleet and CinC. Third Fleet. These
previously very talkative commanders are now very quiet. While the Fleet
calls are not yet well identified, the lack of traffic from these
commands cannot be ascribed to that. These two commands are still
prominent as addressees. It is now believed that the CinC. Second Fleet
is in the vicinity of Takao and that the apparently conflicting evidence
is due to traffic destined for the Tokyo UTU broadcast which CinC.
Second Fleet is still copying. The CinC. Combined Fleet sent one message
to an unidentified unit for information to Third Base Force Palao, CinC.
Second Fleet and CinC. Third Fleet.
Fourth Fleet.-The CinC. Fourth Fleet sent a message to Chief of Staff
Combined Air Force, information to Eleventh Air Corps, Chitose Air, Air
Squadron Twenty-four, Third Base Force at Palao and Fourth Base Force at
Truk. No further check could be made today on the presence of Fourth
Fleet units in the Marshalls. Jaluit appeared many times in today's
traffic being associated with Commander Submarine Force, Tokyo Radio and
MUSI 88 (which is believed to be an oil tanker).
South China.-Bako continues as an active originator addressing many
messages to Sama and Saigon. Except for traffic between South China
Commanders, all units in that area quiet.
Page 81
[177] Communication Intelligence Summary, December 5, 1941
General.-Traffic volume heavy. All circuits overloaded with Tokyo
broadcast going over full 24 hours. Tokyo-Mandates circuit in duplex
operation. There were several new intercept schedules heard. OMINATO
radio working SAMA and BAKO sending fleet traffic. The Takao broadcast
handling traffic Second and Third Fleet while the Tokyo broadcast is
still handling traffic for these units also. It is noted that some
traffic being broadcast is several days old which indicates the
uncertainty of delivery existing in the radio organization.
There were many messages of high precedence which appears to be caused
by the jammed condition of all circuits.
A plain language message was sent by the Captain, OKAWA from Tokyo to
Takao probably for further relay addressed to FUJIHARA, Chief of the
Political Affairs Bureau saying that "in reference to the Far Eastern
Crisis, what you said is considered important at this end but proceed
with what you are doing, specific orders will be issued soon."
Combined Fleet.-Neither the Second or Third Fleet Commanders have
originated any traffic today. They are still frequently addressed but
are receiving their traffic over broadcast. They are undoubtedly in
Takao area or farther south since the Takao broadcast handles nearly all
their traffic. No traffic from the Commander Carriers or Submarine Force
has been seen either.
Third Fleet.-In one WE address a "Chief of Staff" sent a message to
"Commander Fourteenth Army abroad RYUJOMARU in Third Fleet.
HITOYO.GUN.SATI (IRO 1 REUZEU MARU). A number of MARUS have been
addressing the CINC. Third Fleet.
Fourth Fleet.-The Secretary, Fourth Fleet and Staff Communication
Officer the Fourth Fleet were addressed at Jaluit today strengthening
the impression at the CinC. Fourth Fleet is in the Marshalls. The
Commander of the South China Fleet has been addressing Palao radio and
the RNO TAIHOKU and the Commander Second Fleet.
South China.-SAMA addressed much traffic to CinC. Second Fleet. BAKO
continues as an active originator with many dispatches to Second and
Third Fleet. The Commander Combined Air Force appears to be busy with
the movement of Air Corps. SHIOGAMA Air and at least two unidentified
corps are moving, probably to Indo-China.
[178] Communication Intelligence Summary, December 6, 1941
General.-Traffic volume very heavy with a great deal of old traffic
being transmitted. Messages as far back as 1 December were seen in the
traffic. This not believed an attempt to maintain a high traffic level
but is the result of confusion in traffic routing with uncertainty of
delivery. The stations now holding broadcasts are TOKYO (with 3 distinct
and separate broadcasts), SAIPAN, OMINATO and TAKAO.
Yesterday's high level of traffic from TOKYO originators was maintained
with the Intelligence activity still sending periodic messages.
Practically all of TOKYO's messages carry prefixes of high priority.
Combined Fleet.-Still no traffic from the Second and Third Fleet
Commanders. These units are sending their traffic via the TAKAO and
TOKYO broadcasts. The Commander in Chief Combined Fleet originated
several messages to the Carriers, Fourth Fleet and the Major Commanders.
Fourth Fleet.-The Commander in Chief Fourth Fleet is again in the TRUK
area. It is doubtful that he ever went to JALUIT although it is certain
that some members of his staff were there over the past few days. There
is a definite close association between the Third Base Force at PALAO
and the forces in South China. This unit is constantly sending messages
to the Chief of Staff the Second Fleet, Third Fleet, Indo-China Forces
and BAKO. It is being almost entirely neglected by Commander in Chief
Fourth Fleet under whose command it normally operates. RONGELAB radio
addressed the PALAO weather observer.
Fifth Fleet.-This fleet appears dispersed about the JAPAN Sea with
OMINATO broadcasting traffic for this unit.
Submarines.-The Commander Submarine Force originated two messages to his
command. These are the first two originated since 1 December. He is
definitely in the MARSHALLS.
South China.-Nothing new to report. BAKO, SAMA and TAKAO still sending
many messages to the Task Force.
Page 82
[179] TOP SECRET
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES
PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS
APO 958
In reply to:
POSIG 483 27 APRIL 1945
Memorandum: To Lt. Col. Henry C. Clausen, JAGD.
1. With reference to the message sent #519 December 5, 1941, which you
handed me, I certify to the best of my knowledge and belief there are no
copies of clear or coded traffic of this particular message on file in
the Signal Center, Fort Shafter. In fact there are no copies of clear or
coded traffic in the Signal Center prior to 1 July 1944. All coded
traffic prior to 1 July 1944 and all clear traffic dated prior to 1
March 1945 have been destroyed by burning. There are no records,
including the logs, in the Signal Center which would give us any
information as to whether or not this message was received at Fort
Shafter. Search and inquiries have been made within the Signal Center as
to whether this message had been received and they have been negative.
2. You have asked me to recall the circumstances concerning intercept
numbered Army 8007 and dated 2 December 1941. The procedure with respect
to said intercept at the time stated was as follows:
Search has been made as to whether such intercepts were intercepted by
the Army SIS at Honolulu and transmitted to Washington. As to whether
they were intercepted, I have this to report:
There are at this time, no records in the Hawaiian Department to show
whether or not these intercepts were made by MS-5. The fact that
Washington gives an intercept date-time group tends to show that the
intercept was made by MS-5, but the lack of a receiving operator's
personal sign is an indication to the contrary.
As to how they were transmitted to Washington, I have this to report:
Intercepts of this type which were to be forwarded to Washington via
air-mail were handled as follows; On the day following the date of
intercept each message was given a logsheet number and entered on an
index sheet. This entire lot of air-mail traffic for that particular
date was then fastened together to await the next scheduled departure
of the Clipper. Upon notification of the impending departure of the
Clipper all accumulated air-mail traffic together with a letter of
transmittal and a classified document receipt was taken to the
classified files section of the Department Signal Office for
packaging and was then forwarded to the classified files section of
the Department AGO.
[180] The AGO forwarded this traffic via officer courier to the
outgoing Clipper. The Clipper departed for the mainland approximately
once each week, but this schedule was frequently interrupted because
of weather conditions. It is known that this traffic was at times
forwarded by ship because of the long delayed departure of a Clipper.
The only messages transmitted to Washington by radio were those
specially selected in accordance with instructions from the Chief
Signal Officer. The message in question was not within the first
priority mission and therefore is not believed to have been included
in the special instructions.
My search in this regard included:
A search of all Signal Intelligence files including Communication
Service, Central Pacific Base Command and Monitor Station #5. Such
records as have been found pertaining to the assigned mission of
Monitor Station #5 at the time in question show that this station was
intercepting traffic between Japan, Asia and Europe.
In this connection I inquired of Washington on 14 April 1945 concerning
the originals of intercepts, which I understood are or should be on file
in Washington, and received this information.
"Mailing date of traffic was 11 December. Receiving operator's sign
does not appear on the intercept. Log sheet number 014037 appears on
traffic and listed on log forwarded under signature of C. A. Powell.
Intercept time shows 0707 on December 2, 1941".
A copy of the forwarding letter cannot be located and no receipts for
traffic forwarded are available previous to 1943.
3. Concerning your inquiry as to the testimony I previously made
relating to the commercial scrambled phone between Honolulu and the
mainland, we did
Page 83
monitor the commercial radiotelephone. Previous to December 1937
inverters were used on the Trans-Pacific radiophones circuit between
Honolulu and the mainland. The same type inverters were used on the
radiophone circuit between Tokyo and San Francisco. Because these
inverters were of the same type and design Tokyo could monitor the
Honolulu-San Francisco circuit. In December 1937 a new San Francisco-
Honolulu radiophone circuit was commissioned using a new type of privacy
which was called the A-3 privacy. At the time of this installation there
were only two such A-3 privacy built; one for the Honolulu terminal and
one for the San Francisco terminal. This type of privacy is much more
complicated and furnished much more secrecy than the previous old
inverters. The old inverters were still used on the Tokyo-Honolulu
circuit as the A-3 privacy was for use only on the Honolulu-San
Francisco circuit.
Shortly after the installation of this new Honolulu-San Francisco
circuit the Tokyo technical operator asked the Honolulu technical
operator what kind of a new inverter was in use on the Honolulu-San
Francisco circuit as he was not able to understand the conversation.
[181] Tokyo technical operator was advised that the equipment had just
been installed and the only person who knew how this privacy worked was
the Bell Laboratory engineer who had just made the installation. This
was proof that Tokyo had in the past been monitoring the Honolulu-San
Francisco radiophone circuit.
C. A. Powell,
C. A. POWELL
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Signal Officer
At Honolulu
TOP SECRET
[182] UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
RADIO UNIT
COMMANDANT, NAVY 128
c/o Fleet Post Office, San Francisco, Calif.
JSH/rec
EF37/A6(1)
Serial Z-4225
Top Secret 27 APRIL 1945.
Memorandum to Lieut. Colonel H. C. CLAUSEN.
Subject: Information.
1. I regret that results of search for amplifying information on the
subject we discussed immediately prior to your departure has been quite
disappointing.
2. The officers concerned with the monitoring watch were (present ranks
given) Comdr. F. R. Biard, USN, Comdr. J. R. Bromley, USN, Comdr. A.
Cole, USN, and Comdr. G. M. Slonim, USN. In charge of the radio station
at the time was Lieutenant Lankford.
3. Comdr. Cole is the only officer currently present and available for
questioning. He states that, as nearly as he can remember, a program
issued by the Japan Broadcasting Company was obtained from the District
Intelligence Office and used as a basic list. A few other frequencies
were found by searching, but in practically all cases, they were merely
duplicate transmissions of the listed broadcasts. Generally speaking,
there were seldom more than three or more programs of the character
being monitored on the air at the same time. In those cases split-phone
watches were used.
4. All broadcasts that were regularly monitored were the Japanese
Government Japanese language voice news broadcasts, with particular
attention devoted to those scheduled on the hour and half hour, which
usually contained weather information.
5. No positive results whatsoever were obtained from this monitoring at
any time during the period under consideration. The monitoring watch was
naturally secured immediately after it became obviously redundant.
J. S. Holtwick, Jr.,
J. S. HOLTWICK, JR.,
Commander, U. S. Navy
By Direction
At Honolulu
Page 84
[183] AFFIDAVIT OF THEODORE EMANUEL, USN
Theodore Emanuel, USN, presently under orders to CNO, Washington, D. C.
being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Lt. Col.
Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the SW, deposes and says:
Prior to 7 Dec. 1941, and for over 4 years, I was assigned to the
District Intelligence Office, 14th Naval District. About the year 1938 I
became acquainted with Col. George W. Bicknell. When Col. Bicknell was
called to active duty, about 1940 or 1941 (TE), I discussed with him and
Lt. Col. Muerlott (TE) matters of mutual concern relating to the Army
and Navy intelligence activities. It is my understanding that [184]
Col. Bicknell was cognizant of my functions and activities. These
included the obtaining of the telephone conversations originating in and
going to (TE) the Japanese Consulate and persons therein (TE) at
Honolulu. Such conversations were obtained by me during the period from
January 1941 to and including 7 December 1941 by means of covering some
5 or 6 lines. My procedure was to have these conversations recorded,
translated and reported to the District Intelligence Officer. These
reports were written. This traffic would average about 50 to 60 in and
out telephone calls a day. The translator was Comdr. (TE) Denzel Carr,
USNR.
THEODORE EMANUEL.
Chief Ships Clerk, U. S. N.
Subscribed & sworn to before me, 17 April 1946.
Henry C. Clausen,
Lt. Colonel, JAGD.
TOP SECRET
[185] AFFIDAVIT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL RICHARD K. SUTHERLAND
Lieutenant General Richard K. Sutherland, presently Chief of Staff, GHQ
Southwest Pacific Areas, being first duly sworn and informed of the
investigation by Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the
Secretary of War, supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl
Harbor, and that top secrecy is required, deposes and says:
Immediately before 7 December 1941, I was Chief of Staff, USAFFE.
I have been shown what Colonel Clausen has designated Top Secret Exhibit
"B", consisting of a file of intercepts of Japanese diplomatic messages.
To the best of my recollection, I did not see any of these, nor was I
informed of the substance thereof, before 7 December 1941, except
possibly some of those relating to the negotiations at Washington, D.
C., of Kurusu. I did not see the messages described as the "Winds Code",
nor any activating or implementing message. I saw every ultra message
that was delivered to the headquarters.
I have not previously seen the British SIS messages, dated 27 November
1941 and 3 December 1941. I do not know the basis or source of this
intelligence, other than it appears to have been disseminated by a Major
Gerald Wilkinson, British Army, who had liaison status with the
headquarters and as such, had contact with Major General (then Colonel)
Willoughby, ACofS, G-2.
The Signal Intelligence Service, United States Army, operated an
intercept station at Fort McKinley, immediately before 7 December 1941.
Diplomatic messages in purple code which were intercepted by the Signal
Intelligence Service were delivered to the Navy at Corregidor where they
were decrypted and translated. Some or all of these messages, decrypted
and translated, were delivered to the Signal Intelligence Service
officer who delivered them to the Hq. USAFFE.
Among the messages picked up by the Signal Intelligence Service were
reports by the Japanese Consul at Manila requesting the arrivals and
departures of ships in Manila Harbor.
Hq. USAFFE did not disseminate any ultra information. All dissemination
was effected through Signal Intelligence Service channels.
R. K. SUTHERLAND.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 6th day of May 1945.
Henry C. Clausen,
HENRY C. CLAUSEN,
Lieutenant Colonel, JAGD
at Manila, P. I.
Page 85
TOP SECRET
[186] AFFIDAVIT OF GENERAL OF THE ARMY DOUGLAS MACARTHUR
General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, presently Supreme Commander
Southwest Pacific Area, being first duly sworn and informed of the
investigation by Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the
Secretary of War, supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl
Harbor Board, and that top Secrecy is required, deposes and says:
Immediately before 7 December 1941, I was Commanding General, USAFFE.
I have been shown what Colonel Clausen has designated as Top Secret
Exhibit "B", consisting of a file of intercepts of Japanese diplomatic
messages. I have no recollection of having seen any of these before. I
did not see the messages described as the "Winds Code", nor any
activating or implementing message. I believe I saw every ultra message
that was delivered to the Hq. USAFFE.
I have not previously seen the British SIS messages, dated 27 November
1941 and 3 December 1941. I have no knowledge as to the basis or source
of this intelligence, and I did not know that these or similar messages
were being transmitted to persons at Honolulu, T. H.
The Signal Intelligence Service, United States Army, operated an
intercept station at Fort McKinley, immediately before 7 December 1941.
Diplomatic messages in purple code, intercepted by this SIS were
delivered to the Navy at Corregidor where they were decrypted and
translated. Some or all of these messages, decrypted and translated were
delivered to the SIS officer who delivered them to the Hq. USAFFE. The
decrypting and translating of these messages was a function of the Navy.
The Army SIS monitored some circuits and turned the material over to the
Navy for decryption and translation. The Navy had facilities and
personnel, not possessed by the Army, for such processing of this
intelligence. Whether all messages were transmitted by the Navy to the
Army I do not know. All transmission of this subject material was
entirely in the hands of the Navy.
Dispatches from the War Department gave me ample and complete
information and advice for the purpose of alerting the Army Command in
the Philippines on a war basis, which was done prior to 7 December 1941.
DOUGLAS MACARTHUR.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 7th day of May, 1945.
Henry C. Clausen,
HENRY C. CLAUSEN
Lieutenant Colonel, JAGD.
at Manila, P I.
[187] AFFIDAVIT OF MAJOR GENERAL C. A. WILLOUGHBY
Major General C. A. Willoughby, presently Assistant Chief of Staff, GHQ
Southwest Pacific Area, being first duly sworn and informed of the
investigation by Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the
Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor
Board, and that top Secrecy is required, deposes and says:
Immediately before 7 December 1941, I was ACofS, G-2, USAFFE.
I have been shown what Colonel Clausen has designed as Top Secret
Exhibit "B", consisting of a file of intercepts of Japanese diplomatic
messages. I did not see any of these, nor was I informed of the
substance thereof before. except isolated fragments of the Kurusu
diplomat message series. Concerning those which are known as the "Winds
Code" messages, neither I, nor anyone else in the USAFFE to my
knowledge, received any information as to any activating or implementing
message, nor any notice that such a message had been transmitted or
received.
Concerning the British SIS messages dated 27 November 1941 and 3
December 1941, these were not seen by me before 7 December 1941. I do
not know the basis or source of this intelligence, other than that it
appears to have been disseminated by Mr. Gerald Wilkinson, subsequently
appointed Major, British Army. who had some liaison status with the
Philippine Department, later, Hq. USAFFE, and as such had contact with
me and my predecessors in 1941. (See Appendix A).
Page 86
Various intercepts of Japanese diplomatic messages were received by the
Army in the Philippines (Hq. USAFFE) before 7 December 1941. The
decrypting, translating and processing of these messages were functions
of the Navy. The Army monitored some circuits and turned the material
over to the Navy for decrypting and translating. Under this system the
intercepted Japanese code messages were given to the Navy at Corregidor
where the Navy had a "purple" machine and other crypto-analytic
facilities and personnel, not possessed by the Army, for decrypting and
translating these messages. It was customary for the Navy, after these
messages were decrypted and translated, to give the Army (Hq. USAFFE)
such portion of the sum total of this intelligence, and the details and
source thereof, as the Navy considered necessary to the functions of the
Army. (See Appendix B)., Those which were shown me. before 7 December
194l were handed to me by Colonel Shearer, S. C., now deceased, who was
the Army liaison with the Navy for that purpose. Certain of these
messages concerned inquiries from Tokyo and replies by the Japanese
Consul at Manila as to United States military and commercial ships in
Manila Harbor. No record was made by the Army of the dissemination or
substance of this intelligence, and the papers on which the intelligence
was recorded have been destroyed.
To the best of my knowledge and belief, the Army did not transmit any of
this intelligence to the Hawaiian Department, since the dissemination
thereof was exclusively a Navy function.
C. A. Willoughby.
Subscribed and Sworn to before me this 8th day of May 1945.
Henry C. Clausen,
HENRY C. CLAUSEN,
Lieut. Colonel, J. A. G. D.
at Manila, P. I.
2 Encls:
Appendix "A"-Re Col. G. Wilkinson.
Appendix "B"-Re Navy Crypto-analysis Service.
[188]
TOP SECRET
APPENDIX "A"
AFFIDAVIT
8 MAY 1945
The British SIA messages, their purport and evolution and the curious
role played by Mr. Gerald Wilkinson, in Manila and Hawaii are an
integral part of this investigation, in my opinion.
The whole story is one of duplicity, evasion, bargaining, horse-trading
of information and a sort of E. Phillipps Oppenheim international
intrigue.
Wilkinson married into the Davies family and represented his father-in-
law, in Manila, as a sugar broker, for many years; hence, the casual
reference to a "Colonel Wilkinson", that appears in the affidavits of
Mr. Russell and Dawson, suggesting a perfect stranger are obviously
intended to be misleading. Wilkinson combined the convenient status of a
respected local business man, with that of a Secret agent, reporting to
the British Ministry of Information; contrary to U. S. Law, he never
registered as a foreign agent. He apparently came out of hiding, in
Manila, and contacted or obtained tolerance by the then G-2's Philippine
Department, Colonels O'Rear, retired, and J. K. Evans, MID. When I took
over, he approached me, quoting Evans, etc. I was not impressed; the
intelligence material he desired to file with me; they contained mimeo
reprints of old Jap military data and some sprinkling of China-based
reports. It became apparent to me, though, that Wilkinson had dealings
with Hawaii and the local Navy, that he possessed his own cryptographic
systems and decoding clerks, etc. I became convinced that his main
purpose was to ingratiate himself into some official Army-Navy
recognition, that he was willing to trade information for that
recognition but that he was and still is an agent of British
authorities, reporting thereto and executing orders therefrom. This net
of potential spies is world wide, it is still in operation. I employ
both SIA and SOE, British, and find them loyal to no one but themselves
and the Empire.
My intelligence evaluation of his messages to Hawaii is not high-a
horsetrading proposition, pure and simple; I am connived that this
bundle represents not all of the messages sent; the commercial
deductions are obvious: Davies canceled sugar shipments in the nick of
time.
Page 87
Wilkinson is a completely untrained civilian. His Government gave him a
military status to protect him, in case of capture. He attached himself
to us at the outbreak of the War, leaving his wife and children to fend
for themselves, in the Japanese-occupied city; they were promptly
interned, in Sto Tomas, for the duration.
We made use of him and his cypher system, to send an occasional message
to Wavell and Singapore, he continued to report "home" though his stuff
was severely edited by me; the General finally sent him to Wavell's
Headquarters as a sort of liaison, utilizing his cypher system; he then
made his way deviously to Washington and London, where he capitalized
heavily on his "status" with GHQ, USAFFE; he was "promoted" to Colonel
and attempted to return to our Headquarters, as a "liaison"; he even had
the support of the Prime Minister; with a complete lack of military
knowledge, such a position had its ludicrous side except for local
espionage, and we declined to have him. He was promptly demoted and
attached to duty with the British Office of Information at Washington-
New York.
C. A. Willoughby
C. A. WILLOUGHBY
Major General, G. S. C.,
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-2
General Headquarters, SWPA.
TOP SECRET
AFFIDAVIT
[189] Appendix "B"
8 MAY 1945.
In 1941, the Navy obtained and maintained a highly efficient cryto-
analytical service, specializing in Japanese material; though the Army
had notably participated in the development of this subject, the Navy
appears to have obtained a lead; consequently, it can be said that the
Navy enjoyed an almost monopolistic privilege. In an otherwise
meritorious desire for security (though every modern nation knows that
crypto-analysis is going on) the Navy has shrouded the whole enterprise
in mystery, excluding other services, and rigidly centralizing the whole
enterprise. At this date, for example, this same system is still in
vogue: as far as SWPA is concerned, the crypto-analysis is made in
Melbourne, forwarded via 7th Fleet D. N. I.; the Melbourne station is
under direct orders of Washington, is not bound by any local
responsibilities, forwards what they select and when it suits them. The
possibility of erroneous or incomplete selection is as evident now as it
was in 1941. The only excuse the Navy has is that its field is primarily
naval intercepts, but there is a lot of Army traffic or other incidental
traffic. This collateral traffic is not always understood or correctly
interpreted by the Navy, in my opinion.
The solution to this vexing and dangerous problem is a completely joint
interlocking intercept and crypto-analytical service, on the highest
level, with the freest interchange of messages and interpretation.
The sequence of messages referred to, had they been known to a competent
intelligence officer, with Battle Order and tactical background,
beginning with November 14th, would have led instantly to the
inescapable conclusion that Pearl Harbor naval installations were a
target for attack, with November 25th or November 29th as the deadlines,
suggesting irresistibly that elapsed time was involved, for some sort of
naval seaborne sortie.
C. A. Willoughby,
C. A. WILLOUGHBY,
Major General, G. S. C.,
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-2,
General Headquarters, SWPA.
[190] STATEMENT
Kendall J. Fielder, Brigadier General, U. S. Army, being first duly
sworn and informed of the investigation by Lieutenant Colonel Henry C.
Clausen,
Page 88
Judge Advocate General Department, for the Secretary of War,
supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and
that top Secrecy is required, deposes and says:
1. I took charge of the G-2 Section, Hawaiian Department, about four
months prior to December 7, 194l, and had had no prior G-2 experience.
The organization of the Section just prior to and on December 7, 1941,
was as follows: a small administrative section of one officer, two
clerks; a public relations section of two officers and three clerks; a
combat intelligence section of two officers and several clerks organized
to expand rapidly in an emergency; a counter-intelligence section of
approximately twelve officers and thirty agents, known at that time as
the "Contact Office", in charge of Lt. Col. George Bicknell and located
in the City of Honolulu. Other than the "Contact Office", the G-2
Section was at Fort Shafter, and most of the personnel had dual
responsibility since the section was small and the duties varied.
2. The G-2 section depended generally for information on Japan and the
rest of the world on the War Department, on the local Navy Command, and
on interrogation of travelers. I know now that some was also received
from British SIS. No intercept facilities or other agencies were
available to study Japanese communications.
3. While the principle mission of the G-2 Section was to safeguard
against internal disorders and sabotage, the Contact Office did prepare
for publication certain estimates based on information obtained from all
sources. It was customary for all military personnel to channel
information to the Contact Office where summaries and estimates were
prepared. Prior to December 7, 1941, the G-2 Section of the Hawaiian
Department vas mostly concerned with subversive matters since there were
160,000 persons of Japanese ancestry in the Territory of Hawaii of whom
40,000 were aliens. The warnings that came to me were to take every
precaution against possible sabotage and that nothing should be done
which might precipitate an international incident, and that the public
must not be unduly alarmed. I spent a great deal of time the last week
of November and first week in December of 1941 inspecting the various
military establishments to check on sabotage preparations. Likewise this
was done by other Department Staff officers. I also devoted considerable
time in the fall of 1941 speaking before various racial groups in an
effort to avoid complications should war descend on the United States.
Particularly were we worried about friction between local Filipinos and
Japanese.
[191] 4. The Contact Office was directly under G-2 but it also
functioned somewhat as a special staff section: the Contact Officer, Lt.
Col. Bicknell, had direct access to the Commanding General and Chief of
Staff. Actually, this subsection of G-2 performed Combat Intelligence
duties although another group was known as the "Combat Intelligence Sub
Section". I refer to attempting to obtain and disseminate information of
the potential enemy. In reality from the Army viewpoint, there is no
combat intelligence unless there is combat.
5. It was customary prior to December 7, 1941, to hold weekly staff
meetings, usually on Saturday morning: at that time the Contact Officer
presented a brief summary of the international situation while the
undersigned usually presented the European War situation. The Contact
Officer often reported items of information to me or to the Chief of
Staff, or the Commanding General, prior to 7 December 1941. I informed
both the CG and C/S of everything that came to my attention regardless
of its source. The three of us were in adjoining rooms at headquarters
and were in contact many times each day.
6. My relations with the Navy were in general cordial, but none of their
combat intelligence was passed on to me. The conferences and the passage
of information between the Intelligence Agencies of the Navy and myself
had to do primarily with counter-subversive measures. No information was
given to me by anyone in the Navy, which indicated in any way that
aggression by the Japanese against Hawaii was imminent or contemplated.
It was well known that relations with Japan were severely strained and
that war seemed imminent but all my information seemed to predict
sabotage and internal troubles for Hawaii.
7. I have been shown a copy of a message dated 5 December 1941, sent by
G-2 in Washington to G-2, Hawaiian Department, which directed that
Commander Rochefort be contacted for information concerning a Japanese
weather broadcast. This broadcast is commonly referred to as, "The
Winds" message. I have no recollection of having received the War
Department radio, but had it come to me, I would in all probability have
turned it over to Lt. Col. Bicknell for action since he knew Commander
Rochefort and had very close liaison with
Page 89
Captain Mayfield, the 14th Naval District Intelligence Officer;
particularly since the way the radio was worded it would not have seemed
urgent or particularly important. The contents and details of "The
Winds" message were never made known to me. It is possible that Colonel
Bicknell may have conferred with Commander Rochefort or others about
this but I did not and Colonel Bicknell did not tell me if he did.
8. No direct liaison was maintained by me with Navy Intelligence
Agencies except those concerned with local or Territorial problems. I
believed the Pacific Fleet Intelligence Section to have excellent
information of the Japanese Fleet and assumed that if any information
which [192] I needed to know was possessed by Navy agencies, it would be
disseminated to me. I know now that had I asked for information obtained
by the Navy from intercept sources it would not have been given me. For
example Captain Layton stated that if he had turned any over to me he
would not have divulged the source, but in fact, would have given some
different derivation and that this he did do with Lt. Col. Bicknell. The
Hawaiian Department was primarily a defensive command justified
principally to defend the Pearl Harbor Naval Base with fixed seacoast
batteries, antiaircraft batteries, mobile ground troops and the 7th Air
Force as the weapons. The latter being the only one capable of long
range offensive action along with the Navy constituting the first line
of defense for Hawaii. I have been told that prior to December 7, 1941,
the Intelligence Officer of 7th AF, Lt. Col. Raley, was in liaison with
and received some information from Commander Layton, Pacific Fleet
Combat Intelligence, but was honor bound to divulge it only to his
Commanding General. It did not come to me and I didn't know of the
liaison until after the war started.
9. I have been shown by Lt. Col. Clausen a file containing information
received Lt. Col. Bicknell from British SIS and some few items struck a
responsive chord my memory but I cannot remember which if any were
brought to my attention prior to 7 December 1941. The source of the
information was not brought to my attention.
10. I have read the affidavit by Commander Rochefort, Combat
Intelligence Officer, 14th Naval District in which he states that
certain intelligence was given me. I feel sure Commander Rochefort is
thinking of Lt. Col. Bicknell, who according to his own statement did
receive information from Rochefort. If any it came to me indirectly, it
was in vague form and not recognizable as coming from reliable sources.
I certainly had no idea that Lt. Col. Bicknell was getting the contents
of intercepted Japanese diplomatic messages. In any event Rochefort did
not give it to me direct.
11. Col. Clausen has shown me a file of messages marked Top Secret,
Exhibit "B" which are intercepted Japanese dispatches. I had never seen
any of them before nor was the substance of any of them brought to my
attention prior to December 7, 1941, except the destruction by Jap
Consul at Honolulu of codes and papers which was related by Col.
Bicknell at the staff conference on December 6, 1941. I gave this latter
information to General Short the same day. With respect to Top Secret
Exhibit "B", had I been given this series of messages prior December 7,
1941, I believe I would have recommended to General Short that he place
in effect Alert No. 2 instead of No. 1. It is my opinion that if General
Short had seen these messages prior to December 7, 1941, he would have
ordered Alert No. 2 without my recommendation. It is my recollection
that the Commanding General Ordered Alert No. 1 and then announced it to
the Staff.
KENDALL J. FIELDER.
[193] Subscribed and sworn to before me this 11th day of May, 1945.
Henry C. Clausen,
HENRY C. CLAUSEN,
Lieutenant Colonel, JAGD.
At Honolulu, T. H.
[194] TOP SECRET
AFFIDAVIT OF BRIGADIER GENERAL THOMAS J. BETTS
Brigadier General Thomas J. Betts, presently Deputy Assistant Chief of
Staff, G-2, Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force, being first
duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Lt. Colonel Henry C.
Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War supplementary to the proceedings
of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and that top Secrecy is required,
deposes and says:
Page 90
During the months of November and December 1941 I was the Executive
Assistant of the Chief of the then Intelligence Branch, Military
Intelligence Division, War Department General Staff, Washington, D. C.
In that capacity I was required to have a general knowledge of the major
intelligence problems confronting the Military Intelligence Division and
with a reference to the Japanese situation I generally obtained this
knowledge from Colonel Rufus S. Bratton, GSC, who was in charge of the
Far Eastern Section of the Intelligence Branch and to whom was
decentralized the handling of all Ultra messages concerning Japan which
came to the War Department. Colonel Bratton was assisted by Major
Dusenbury, GSC. I know that Major Dusenbury, as Colonel Bratton's
representative, received certain Ultra messages concerning Japan both
from Army and Navy sources. I think that on occasion Colonel Bratton
employed Major Dusenbury to transmit messages so received to authorized
persons in the War Department.
In consequence I have no first hand knowledge of the handling of these
messages, from whom they were received or to whom they were shown. To
the best of my knowledge and belief I received no Ultra messages either
in written form or by oral transmission on behalf of the Military
Intelligence Division during the period in question. I believe, however,
that during the period in question Colonel Bratton either showed me or
informed me of the gist of most of the Ultra messages which he handled.
I am certain that Colonel Bratton informed me of the message which
established the so-called Japanese "Winds Code". I further recall
inquiring of him on several occasions whether any message implementing
the message on the "Winds Code" had been received. I do not recall that
he informed me at any time of such a message being received and I
further believe that if he had received such a message he would have
told me and I would have remember it. To the best of my knowledge and
belief no other person informed me prior to 7 December 1941 that an
implementing message had been received.
THOMAS J. BETTS.
Subscribed and Sworn Before Me This 13th Day of June 1945.
Henry C. Clausen,
HENRY C. CLAUSEN,
Lt. Colonel, JAGD.
Frankfort on Main, Germany.
[195] SUPREME HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
15 JUNE 1945
AFFIDAVIT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL WALTER B. SMITH
Lieutenant General Walter B. Smith, presently Chief of Staff, SHAEF,
being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Lieutenant
Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary
to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and that Top Secrecy is
required, deposes and says:
During the months of November and December 1941, I was stationed at
Washington, D. C. as Secretary of the War Department General Staff. In
that capacity and during the period mentioned, I received from
representatives of G-2, for delivery to the Chief of Staff, containers
carrying especially secret information which I later learned included
various intercepts of Japanese radio diplomatic messages which had been
decrypted and translated, and were then called "Magic". These were also
delivered on occasions for the same purposes to whichever Assistant
Secretary General Staff was on duty in the Office of the Chief of Staff.
I did not personally see these intercepts. I did not know what messages
were delivered to the various distributees, nor the method of
distribution or screening, nor to whom or when they were delivered. They
were always given to me in a locked pouch, the key to which was not
available to me. I would always give the locked pouch to the Chief of
Staff as promptly as possible. If received in the Chief of Staff's
absence, these pouches were given him as soon as he returned to the
office. I recall several occasions when the pouch was delivered to him
at his home when the A. C. of S., G-2, considered the contents urgent.
The Chief of Staff would occasionally mention to me matters connected
with these intercepts, but I do not recall ever having seen a complete
one, nor do I recall specific details.
Page 91
Colonel Clausen has asked me to comment on what is stated to have been
the testimony before the Army Pearl Harbor Board to the general effect:
1. On 5 Dec., 1941, Colonel Otis K. Sadtler, SC, after receiving
information from Admiral Noyes, then Chief of Navy Communications, that
the Japanese "Winds Code" had been implemented to signal rupture of
diplomatic [196] relations or war between Japan and Great Britain, and
after talking this over with General Sherman Miles and Colonel Rufus S.
Bratton of G-2, gave the information to General Leonard T. Gerow of WPD,
and asked him to give the Hawaiian Department more warning. General
Gerow stated, "I think they have had plenty of notification." Colonel
Sadtler then gave the information to me, and made the same request of
me. I replied that since the War Plans Division had acted I did not want
to discuss the matter further.
2. Colonel Bratton delivered the pouches containing the radio intercepts
always in person to the officers concerned; and, when the Chief of Staff
was not there, he delivered the pouches to me for delivery to the Chief
of Staff;
3. During November and December 1941, Colonel Bratton reminded me that
the intercepts were of such value and importance that they should be
shown the Chief of Staff without delay.
4. On Dec. 6, 1941, before Midnight, Colonel Bratton delivered to me for
the Chief of Staff 13 parts of a 14 part intercepted radio message from
the Japanese Government which in terms terminated peace negotiations
with the United States. (I understand this testimony may possibly be
qualified by other testimony to the effect that instead of giving these
to me it "may have been one of others.")
My recollection of the facts concerning these subjects is as follows:
1. I do not recall Colonel Sadtler's coming to me as he has stated.
However, since the matter in question was obviously a difference of
opinion between the A. C. of S., G-2 and the A. C. of S., War Plans
Division, both of whom had direct access to the Chief of Staff, it was
not one in which I had any responsibility or authority, and I cannot
imagine why Colonel Sadtler would have asked me to intervene in a
question of this kind, particularly since I was not at that time an
"Ultra" officer, and it would have been impossible for him to give me
any information to support his contention that I should step out of
[197] my rather minor province.
2. Not only Colonel Bratton, but at least one other officer of G-2
delivered the pouches referred to. These were delivered not only to me,
but to whichever Assistant Secretary General Staff happened to be on
duty at my desk in my absence. When delivered to myself or to one of my
assistants, our standard procedure was to place it immediately on the
desk of the Chief of Staff if he were in his office, or, in his absence,
to lock it in the safe until his return unless instructed that the
contents should reach him at once. There were several occasions when we
were so informed. On these occasions the Duty Officer of the General
Staff Secretariat would take the pouches to General Marshall at his
quarters or wherever he happened to be. On at least several occasions I
recall definitely that I personally sent the G-2 officer to deliver the
pouch to General Marshall at his quarters in the absence of a Duty
Officer.
3. Both I myself and the Assistant Secretaries understood that these
pouches contained information of such value and importance that they
should be shown to the Chief of Staff without delay, and the officers of
the Intelligence Division who handed them to us were aware of the
procedure followed in the Chief of Staff's office as indicated above.
4. To the best of my recollection, I left the office at the usual time
on the evening of 6 Dec. 41, that is about 7 PM, turning over to the
Night Duty Officer. I am quite certain that I was not at the office
after 10 PM. If the intercepted radio message referred to by Colonel
Bratton was delivered either to me or to the Night Duty Officer, it
would have been delivered in the locked envelope which have previously
described, and unless the officer who received it were so informed by
Colonel Bratton, he would have had no definite knowledge of its contents
as neither I nor any other officer of the Secretariat was classified as
"Ultra". If he had been informed of the contents or of their urgent
nature, it would have been delivered to the Chief of Staff in accordance
with our usual procedure, either by the officer on duty or by Colonel
Bratton himself.
W. B. Smith,
W. B. SMITH
Lieutenant General, U. S. A.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 15th day of June 1945.
Henry C. Clausen,
HENRY C. CLAUSEN,
Lt. Col., JAGD.
at Frankfort on Main, Germany.
Page 92
[198] AFFIDAVIT OF LIEUT. GENERAL LEONARD T. GEROW
Lieut. General Leonard T. Gerow, presently Commanding General, 15th
Army, being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Lieut.
Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary
to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and that top secrecy is
required, deposes and says:
During the months of November and December 1941, and theretofore, as
Chief, War Plans Division, War Department, I received and reviewed at
Washington, D. C., some of the highly secret intercepts of Japanese
diplomatic messages which had been decrypted and translated, then known
as "Magic." These were delivered in the "raw" (unevaluated form) to me
or to my Executive Officer by representatives of G-2, War Department.
Copies were not retained by me. Those which I received were returned the
same day to representatives of G-2. No receipts were given by or
requested of me. When these messages were handed me, no evaluations were
made of them by G-2, other than occasional comments by Colonel Rufus S.
Bratton. I placed the highest degree of reliance on this form of
intelligence.
Colonel Clausen has shown me the file of some intercepts of this type,
designated Top Secret Exhibit "B". I recall the general substance of
some of these messages and presume that they were all presented to me on
the approximate dates of the translations. I specifically recall the two
numbered 23570 and 23859. I knew that the intercepts in the exhibit
mentioned, which pertain to reports to Tokio on ship movements in Pearl
Harbor, were going also to and coming from the Navy Department. Since
these related especially to the Navy, I assumed that the Navy was fully
cognizant, and would interpret this information in connection with Navy
studies and estimates, and in coordination with other information
available to the Navy and not given to me. My recollection is that there
were reports similar in nature which had also been intercepted and
disseminated, which showed that Japanese consuls at ports such as Manila
and Seattle were giving Tokio information as to ship movements at these
places.
Colonel Clausen has asked me to comment on what is stated to have been
testimony before the Army Pearl Harbor Board to the following general
effect:
1) On 4 December 1911, Colonel Bratton of G-2 called General Gerow's
attention to an intercept indicating action by Japanese consuls to
destroy their codes and papers in accordance with instructions from
Tokio, and then asked General Gerow to send more warnings to the
overseas commanders. General Gerow replied that sufficient had been
sent. Following this, Colonel Bratton conferred with Navy personnel,
at whose suggestion he sent on 5 December 1941 a message to G-2,
Hawaiian Department, to confer with Commander Rochefort, USN,
concerning the Japanese "Winds Code."
2) On 5 December 1941, Colonel Otis R. Sadtler, SC., informed General
Gerow that the Japanese "Winds Code" had been implemented to signal
breach of diplomatic relations or war with Great Britain, and asked
that the Commanding General Hawaiian Department, be notified. General
Gerow replied that he thought plenty of notification had been sent.
3) On the night of 6 December 1941, Colonel Bratton or another
delivered to General Gerow 13 parts of the 14 part Japanese intercept
number 25843.
[199] My recollection concerning the facts of these subjects is as
follows:
1) I do not recall the incident. In this connection I wish to state
that if a representative of G-2 thought my action inadequate he could
quite properly report the facts to his superior, General Sherman
Miles Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, who had direct access to me and
to the Chief of Staff in a matter of such importance. The proper and
usual manner was to confer and if the matter still remained
unsettled, to present the problem to the Chief of Staff. I believe
the Chief of Staff was then available for that purpose.
2) I have no such recollection and I believe that Colonel Sadtler is
mistaken. It was my understanding at the time that he was purely a
Signal Corps officer and that he was not concerned with the
dissemination or interpretation of "Magic." I would naturally expect
that enemy information of such grave moment would be brought to my
attention and to the attention of the Chief of Staff by the Assistant
Chief of Staff, G-2, and not by a Signal Corps officer. To the best
of my recollection, I did not receive,
Page 93
prior to 7 December 1941, notification from any sources of an
implementing message to the Japanese "Winds Code." If I had received
such a message or notice thereof, I believe I would now recall the
fact, in view of its importance. It is possible that Colonel Sadtler
told me of an unverified report, or that he had received some
tentative information which was subject to confirmation. In any
event, there should be written evidence available in either the War
or Navy Departments as to the fact, which evidence would be more
reliable than any person's memory at this time, especially since so
many major events have intervened.
3) I did not receive or see any parts of the message mentioned until
the morning of 7 December 1941, when a conference was held with the
Chief of Staff. If I had received parts of the message on the night
of 6 December 1941, I would have immediately warned the overseas
commanders and informed the Chief of Staff. Access to the Chief of
Staff for such purposes was always open to me.
In the months immediately before 7 December 1941, I did not receive any
written or oral estimates from G-2, properly vouched for, which pointed
to Pearl Harbor specifically as the attack target at the opening of
hostilities with Japan or the other axis powers. During this period,
however, I did on several occasions receive estimates from G-2, some of
which were not borne out by subsequent events, and which were to the
effect that hostilities with one or more of the Axis powers would open
with attacks on almost any of many strategic points of United States or
British territory in the Pacific areas. Myself and the members of my
staff were constantly concerned with global problems and considerations,
involving possibilities of hostile land, sea and air action against the
United States by the Axis powers.
I wish to state that in my opinion the War Department had sent ample
warnings to the overseas commanders, including General Short, to alert
their respective commands for war. General Short did not send at any
time any notice to the War Department which would indicate that he was
not fully prepared or an attack of the kind which occurred, with the
means available to him. The War Department had given him estimates and
basic war plans which in effect warned him to expect air and submarine
attacks as primary threats in the event of war with Japan. These pre-
battle and battle plans and estimates [200] with which I was very much
concerned, were prepared, reduced to writing and given to General Short
and other officers involved after a great deal of mature consideration
by the best military brains available to us for that purpose. They
represented the consensus of the belief and expert military opinions of
the War and Navy Departments and the Hawaiian Department. Since I was
aware of this and knew that General Short similarly was fully cognizant
thereof, I assumed that these fundamental concepts of primary threats
from a surprise attack by Japan would govern General Short in his
thinking and preparations in light of the warnings of imminent war. No
notice ever reached me that he would disregard these estimates, or that
he would omit preparations against an outside threat. General Short at
no time informed the War Department that he was not in full agreement
with War Department estimates and plans for the defense of Oahu. If he
was not in accord with these estimates and plans, then it would have
been quite reasonable to assume that he would have informed the War
Department, in accordance with established military practice. I assumed
also that General Short's liaison with the Navy was such that he
received all information of use to him and available to the Navy at
Pearl Harbor. It was inadvisable for the War and Navy Departments to
send identical or nearly identical messages to the respective commanders
at Hawaii, for fear of compromising our codes. Hence, it was understood
that information sent by either Department which would be of use to the
other service would be exchanged between the two commanders at Hawaii.
So far as General Short is concerned, the message to him on 27 November
1941, signed "Marshall", should be considered in the light of all the
Army and Navy messages which were sent to Hawaii before and after that
date, as well as with whatever other information was available to him.
It was my understanding that G-2, War Department, in carrying out his
normal responsibilities, was transmitting periodically to the overseas
commanders, information, reports and estimates bearing on the current
situation. For this purpose, G-2 had available all the intercepts
mentioned, as well as many others which are not included in Top Secret
Exhibit "B."
Concerning the "Magic" messages, it was necessary to guard most
carefully against compromising the source of this extremely valuable
intelligence. Only
Page 94
a very few persons knew the details. For example, I did not know fully
how it was obtained. Under this necessity, therefore, it was not the
policy of the War Department to send these messages to overseas
commanders. The wisdom of this policy has been proved by our recent
victories. If more detailed information, or if the actual intercepts,
had been sent to Hawaii, then the same procedure would have been
followed with respect to the other overseas commanders, some of whom
were at places of greater vulnerability than Hawaii. This would have led
to great danger of compromise. The spreading of this highly secret
information at that time into so many hands might have lost us for the
present war the source of this form of the best evidence of the enemy's
intentions. This loss would have been a great disaster, resulting in
prolongation of the war, increased bloodshed, uncertainty and expense,
and Possible defeats.
L. T. GEROW,
Lieut. Gen. U. S. Army.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 20th day of June, 1945.
Henry C. Clausen,
HENRY C. CLAUSEN,
Lieut. Colonel, JAGD.
at Cannes, France.
TOP SECRET
[201] AFFIDAVIT OF COLONEL ROBERT E. SCHUKRAFT, SC
Colonel Robert E. Schukraft, SC, presently Officer in Charge, Signal
Intelligence Service, Signal Section, MTOUSA, AFHQ, Caserta, Italy,
being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Lieut.
Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary
to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and that top secrecy is
required, deposes and says:
On 7 December 1941, and for some time prior thereto, I was stationed at
Washington, D. C., in charge of radio intercepts for the Signal
Intelligence Service, War Department. As such, my duties included the
direct supervision of radio intercept stations operated by the Chief
Signal Officer. In the course of these duties I saw at various times
some of the intercepts which had been decrypted and decoded and
translated.
Regarding the so-called Japanese "Winds Code", I recall seeing, at about
the time of their translation, the intercept in Top Secret Exhibit "B",
numbered 25432. When I saw this message I directed the San Francisco
intercept station to intercept all plain text Japanese messages and to
pick up the news reports from Tokyo. The station did this and sent the
messages and reports in to me. To the best of my knowledge none of these
containing the code words were ever picked up. I did, however, see an
intercept of a telephone conversation between Kurusu and a person in
Tokyo, who I believe was Yamamoto, similar in form to the intercepts in
Top Secret Exhibit "B" numbered 25349 and 25497, but in which the person
at the Tokyo end gave to Kurusu the "Winds Code" signal indicating
breach of diplomatic relations between Japan and the United States.
Kurusu in reply said something to the effect that he was sorry to hear
this. The message to which I refer came to the Signal Intelligence
Service from the Navy, as a Navy intercept or translation, during the
period about 28 November 1941 to 6 December 1941. I think this message
also contained some code words translated as "It is a boy." I did not
know the meaning of this latter code. When the message mentioned was
received from the Navy the Signal Intelligence Service sent it
immediately to G-2.
As additional leads in connection with the foregoing, I suggest
interrogation of my former superior Colonel Minckler; also especially
Lieut. Colonel Rowlett and Miss Prather. Additional information may
possibly be obtained from Colonel Doud, Miss Ray Cave (wife of Sgt.
Liparini), and Mrs. Hazel Adams.
ROBERT E. SCHUKRAFT.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 26th day of June, 1945, at
Caserta, Italy.
Henry C. Clausen,
HENRY C. CLAUSEN,
Lieut. Colonel, JAGD.
Page 95
[202] George W. Reuchard, presently on duty at the American Embassy to
the Netherlands Government, London, England, being duly sworn and
informed of the investigation by Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Clausen,
JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings of the Army
Pearl Harbor Board, convened pursuant to Joint Resolution of the
Congress, approved July 13, 1944, and that top secrecy is required,
deposes and says:
I have read the attached sworn statement of Mr. John F. Stone dated July
7, 1945 given to Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, and
incorporate herein the allegations thereof as my statement in response
to similar questioning.
GEORGD W. REUCHARD.
Subscribed and sworn to before me at London, 7 July 1946.
HENRY C. CLAUSEN,
Lt. Colonel, JAGD.
[203] John F. Stone, presently on duty at the American Embassy, London,
England, being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by
Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War,
supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board convened
pursuant to Joint Resolution of the Congress, approved June 13, 194i,
and that Top Secrecy is required, DEPOSES AND SAYS:
During the months of November and December, 1941, and for some time
theretofore, I was a Foreign Service Officer and a personal assistant to
the Secretary of State at Washington, D. C. As such, I received during
this period from two United States Army officers named Bratton and
Dusenbury, who were then I believe Majors or Lieutenant Colonels,
allegedly representing the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War
Department, Washington, D. C., various intercepts of official Japanese
messages which had been decrypted and translated, and which were landed
to me for submission to the Secretary of State. These messages were also
handed occasionally for the same purpose to Mr. C. W. Gray and Mr.
George W. Renchard, who performed similar duties for the Secretary of
State, and were at some times handed direct to the Secretary of State by
the alleged representative of G-2. The intercepts were, to the best of
my recollection, complete translations of the deciphered code texts. I
do not recollect that except for possibly a few instances receipts were
required when they were of course always given. If, however, delivery
was made direct to the Secretary of State by the alleged representative
of [204] G-2 written record of the visit to the Secretary of State was
normally made in his engagement book. I do not remember that any copies
were ever made of the intercepts, which were either read and returned
while the alleged representative of G-2 waited or returned to him at the
time of a subsequent delivery or call. The irregularity in the delivery
of and the volume of the intercepts were such as to prevent my
recollection of any specific details regarding any one or several
deliveries; I thus cannot state the exact time prior to the attack on
Pearl Harbor December 7, 1941, when any intercept indicating the
possibility of a breach in diplomatic relations between Japan and the
United States or Great Britain might have been received or called to my
attention.
Prior to the servicing of the Secretary of State with the intercepts in
question by the alleged representatives of G-2 as mentioned, the
function was performed periodically by officers of the United States
Navy, presumably of the Office of Naval Intelligence, and it is my
recollection that on one or more occasions information of this type was
brought to the Office of the Secretary of State by Naval officer
subsequent to the date when as requested United States Army officers
undertook the continuous servicing of the Secretary of State. I
recollect no statement made to me by any United States Navy Officer
prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, which I
interpreted as indicating the possibility of said attack.
JOHN F. STONE.
Sworn and subscribed to before me this 7th day of July 1945.
HENRY C. CLAUSEN
Lt. Colonel, JAGD.
at London, England.
Page 96
TOP SECRET
[205] AFFIDAVIT OF MAJOR GENERAL JOHN R. DEANE
John R. Deane, Major General. USA, being first duly sworn and informed
of the investigation by Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the
Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor
Board, and that top secrecy is required, deposes and says:
During the months of November and December, 1941, I was on duty in the
War Department, Washington, D. C., as Assistant Secretary, General
Staff;
On 6 December 1941, I was not on duty after 5 p. m., and did not receive
from Colonel Rufus S. Bratton, nor from Colonel Carlisle Dusenbury, or
any other person, any pouch for the Chief of Staff;
On 7 December, 1941, I arrived at the Munitions Building for duty at the
same time as Colonel Bratton, which to the best of my recollection, was
between 9 and 9:30 a.m.
JOHN R. DEANE
Major General, USA,
Commanding General, U. S. Mil Mission with U. S. S. R.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 24th day of July 1945.
HENRY C. CLAUSEN,
Lt. Colonel, JAGD.
at Potsdam, Germany.
[206] AFFIDAVIT OF COLONEL. RUFUS S. BRATTON
Colonel Rufus S. Bratton, O-3726, GSC, presently A. C. OF S. G-2, U. S.
HQ., BERLIN DISTRICT, being first duly sworn, and informed of the
investigation by Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary
of War, supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board,
convened pursuant to Joint Resolution of the Congress, approved June 13,
1944, and that Top Secrecy is required, deposes and says:
Colonel Clausen has shown me and has asked me to comment on certain
testimony adduced before the Army Pearl Harbor Board; and on statements
and affidavits of Carlisle Clyde Dusenbury, Colonel, GSC; Moses W.
Pettigrew, Colonel; Ralph C. Smith, Major General; Charles K. Gailey,
Brig. General; Thomas J. Betts, Brig. General; Walter B. Smith, Lieut.
General, Leonard T. Gerow, Lieut. General; Robert E. Schukraft, Colonel;
John F. Stone and George W. Renchard, which statements and affidavits
were given by the named persons to Colonel Clausen in the course of the
investigation mentioned.
During the month of December, 1941, and for several years prior thereto,
as Chief, Far Eastern Section, Intelligence Branch, War Department G-2,
I received and reviewed at Washington, D. C. various intercepts of
Japanese diplomatic radio messages for the purpose of screening and
distributing to authorized officials such of these intercepts as were
matters of military intelligence value. In the period of about October
to December, 1941, the volume of these intercepts increased to such an
extent that with the permission of General Miles, A. C. of S. G-2, I
utilized several of my assistants, such as then Major or Lieut. Colonel
Dusenbury, then Major Moore, then Lieutenant Schindel, in processing,
assembling and distributing this material. These were distributed in the
raw, unevaluated form. This arrangement and method of presentation to
the Chief of Staff and other authorized recipients had been prescribed
by the Chief of Staff. These recipients during October to December,
1941, authorized by the Chief of Staff, were, so far as G-2 distribution
was concerned, the Chief of Staff, the Secretary of War, the Secretary
of State, the Chief, War Plans Division and Assistant Chief of Staff, G-
2. By agreement between the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, and
representatives of the Office of Naval Intelligence, the President was
served by representatives of the Navy. The normal procedure was to
secure receipts by SIS document numbers from the Aide to the Secretary
of War, the confidential secretaries of the Secretary of State, and the
Executive Officer of the War Plans Division. The material distributed
and thus covered by receipts were usually taken from the recipients by
the representatives of G-2 mentioned the following day, and were then
burned with the
Page 97
corresponding receipts which were given to assure the ultimate
destruction the material. During the period October to November, 1941,
the G-2 received daily about fifty to seventy five of these intercepts
which were sorted to about twenty per cent for distribution, and which
twenty per cent represented such the documents as had intelligence
value.
It was necessary to have help in the distribution of this material so
that the various recipients would receive their copies simultaneously. I
am unable to call at this time except as may be hereinafter [207]
mentioned, and there are no records to show, who delivered what to whom
during this period, with any degree of accuracy.
Concerning the so-called Japanese "Winds Code", I recall a meeting about
5 December 1941 with General Miles and Colonel Otis R. Sadtler, SC, at
which Colonel Sadtler presented information he had received from Admiral
Noyes of a possible implementation. There had been several "false alarm"
reports to this same effect. In view of an intercept which had already
been received and translated, being an order from Tokyo to the embassy
of Japan at Washington to destroy their codes, in my opinion an
implementation message to the "Winds Code" was superfluous and no longer
of importance, since the purpose would be to effect a destruction of the
codes. Following receipt of the order mentioned, I verified that the
Japanese Embassy at Washington were burning what appeared to important
papers. Colonel Sadtler was, however, directed at the meeting mentioned,
to get from Admiral Noyes verification of the purported implementation
message in the form of a clear text and in the original Japanese.
Colonel Sadtler never, to my knowledge, returned to G-2 with this or any
additional information the subject. I have no knowledge as to whether
Colonel Sadtler, after getting the purported implementation message
mentioned, went to Walter B. Smith, then Secretary of the General Staff,
or to Leonard T. Gerow, then Chief of the War Plans Division, and in
effect asked that the Hawaiian Department be given more warning. I did
not mention to the Chief of Staff the subject of Colonel Sadtler's
report, nor do I know that any one else in G-2 did. General Miles and I,
by reason of our knowledge among other things of the existence of the
ABCD Bloc, were aware of the implications which would be inherent in any
implementing message to the "Winds Code" indicating Japanese aggression
against Great Britain.
At no time prior to 7 December 1941, although a thorough alert in this
regard was in effect, did I ever see or hear of an authentic message
implementing the "Winds Code". In connection with testimony of Captain
Safford on this subject the effect that two copies of such a message was
sent by the Navy to the Army, it was the customary practice for the Navy
when sending the Army material of is character, to send six copies.
Prior to 7 December 1941, representatives of the Navy had discussed with
me several "false alarms", but no one in the Navy had discussed with me,
nor to my knowledge with any one else in G-2, the message supposed to
have been received according to the testimony of Captain Safford.
The intercept mentioned from Tokyo to the Japanese Embassy at
Washington, destroy their codes and ciphers, was processed for
distribution to the authorized recipients.
The intercept, Tokyo to Washington, consisting of fourteen parts, SIS
No. 25843, started coming in from the Navy the evening of 6 December
1941, when was on duty with Colonel Dusenbury in the office. We
assembled and studied the thirteen parts, which I believe had come in by
ten o'clock p. m. After receipt of the thirteenth part I called the
officer on duty at the SIS, who I believe was either Colonel Schukraft
or Colonel Doud, and asked if there was any likelihood of the fourteenth
part coming in that night. I was told there was not, as there had been a
delay in transmission. Colonel Dusenbury and I then assembled the
thirteen parts in preparation for delivery to the authorized recipients.
[208] I directed Colonel Dusenbury to deliver the set for the Chief of
Staff to his home at Fort Meyer that night as Colonel Dusenbury went to
his home Arlington. This was about ten o'clock p. m. The sets of these
thirteen parts for the ACofS, G-2, the Chief WPD, and the Secretary of
War were not delivered the night of 6 December 1941, but were delivered
the next morning, 7 December 1941, with the fourteenth part. They were
not given to General Walter B. Smith, General Leonard T. Gerow, General
Gailey or General Ralph Smith the night of 6 December 1941, nor were
they given that night to General Sherman Miles. When I saw the Chief of
Staff the morning of 7 December 1941, he then had the fourteen part
message, which I had not given him. About o'clock p. m. on 6 December
1941, I took the thirteen parts destined for the
Page 98
Secretary of State and between ten and eleven p. m. delivered them to
the night duty officer at the State Department. I cannot recall who the
night duty officer was. I told this officer that it was of the greatest
importance that the papers be placed in the hand of the Secretary of
State at once. He assured me that this would be done. This was the only
delivery I made that night. I then went home to bed and returned to the
office the following morning between 7:30 and 8 a. m. 7 December 1941.
The fourteenth part of the message came to my desk about the time I
reached my office. It was processed at once and about 8:30 a. m. it was
sent to be delivered to the authorized recipients. I did not deliver any
material that morning except the intercept, Tokyo to Washington, SIS No.
25850, being the instruction to the ambassadors to deliver at 1 p.
m,/1941, Japan's reply to the United States, and which intercept I gave
to the Chief of Staff between ten thirty and eleven thirty that morning.
The last mentioned message was sent to the Secretary of State for
delivery by either Colonel Dusenbury or Lieutenant Schindel. In my
opinion the fourteen part message mentioned was relatively unimportant,
in view of the other messages which preceded it, especially the one
ordering the destruction of the Japanese codes and ciphers and the one
ordering the delivery of the fourteen part message at one p. m. 7
December 1941. The fourteen part message was merely the formal
announcement couched in diplomatic language of a break which, from the
evidence, seemed inevitable. I do not recall having discussed the
thirteen parts of the fourteen part message with General Sherman Miles
the night of 6 December 1941. In further reference to my seeing the
fourteen parts on the desk or in the possession of the Chief of Staff
the morning of 7 December 1941, I do not know for certain how they came
into his possession.
Any prior statements or testimony of mine which may be contrary to any
statements here, including among other things as to the processing and
delivery of material, and to whom and when, should be modified and
considered changed in accordance with my statements herein. This
affidavit now represents my best recollection of the matters and events
set forth, and a better recollection than when I previously testified
before the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and is made after having my memory
refreshed in several ways and respects.
RUFUS S. BRATTON
Col. G. S. C.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 27th day of July, 1945, at Paris,
France.
Henry C. Clausen,
HENRY C. CLAUSEN,
Lieut. Colonel, JAGD.
[209] AFFIDAVIT OF COLONEL OTIS K. SADTLER
Colonel Otis K. Sadtler, SC, assigned to the Army Ground Forces and on
duty at Washington, D. C., being first duly sworn and informed of the
investigation by Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary
of War supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board
pursuant to Joint Resolution of Congress. and that top secrecy is
required, deposes and says:
Referring to my testimony on 6 October 1944 before the Army Pearl Harbor
Board as to information of a possible "Winds Code" execute message given
me on 5 December 1941 by Admiral Noyes, I wish to add further that
following my second telephone conversation with Admiral Noyes on that
day, as set forth on page 252, Top Secret Volume D, transcript of
proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, I did nothing further to
ascertain from Admiral Noyes or any other person the exact wording of
the intercept or information which he had conveyed to me, and as far as
I know nothing further was done to get further information from Admiral
Noyes. I assumed that the basis of the information before Admiral Noyes
when he telephoned me was an intercept which would, according to the
standard practice, be transmitted without delay to G-2 of the Army.
I made the recommendations to General Gerow and General Smith on 5
December 1941, as stated on pages 253 and 254 of the transcript
mentioned, without getting additional information from Admiral Noyes, on
my own initiative and without informing any representatives of G-2. I
was alarmed by the series of Japanese diplomatic and consular intercepts
which I had been reading over a considerable period of time, and the
mounting tension, and the information which
Page 99
Admiral Noyes had just given me. Accordingly, after I had conferred with
General Miles and Colonel Bratton, as I have testified before the Army
Pearl arbor Board, I went to my office, which was also in the Munitions
Buildings and personally typed a proposed warning which I intended to
recommend be sent to the overseas commanders, and which warning read
substantially as follows and quoted herewith from memory:
"C. G.-P. I., Hawaii-Panama. Reliable information indicates war with
Japan in the very near future stop take every precaution to prevent a
repetition of Port Arthur stop notify the Navy. Marshall."
I have since checked with my office staff at the time and they have no
recollection of the drafting of this proposed warning message. I did not
show it to anyone. I do not know where the message is now and I made no
copy at the me. After I had typed this message I conferred with General
Gerow and General Smith, as I have testified before the Army Pearl
Harbor Board. I did not [210] show them the warning message I had typed.
I have read the comments of General Gerow and General Smith in
affidavits given Colonel Clausen, dated respectively 20 June 1945 and 15
June 1945, referring to my testimony before the Army Pearl Harbor Board
as to my conference with them for the purpose stated on 5 December 1941.
I believe that comments by General Gerow and General Smith, contained in
the affidavits mentioned, are correct statements of fact, wherein they
set forth as follows concerning this subject:
General Gerow.-"I have no such recollection and I believe that Colonel
Sadtler is mistaken. It was my understanding at the time that he was
purely Signal Corps officer and that he was not concerned with the
dissemination or interpretation of "Magic." I would naturally expect
that enemy information of such grave moment would be brought to my
attention and to the attention of the Chief of Staff by the Assistant
Chief of Staff, G-2, and not by a Signal Corps Officer. To the best of
my recollection, I did not receive, prior to 7 December 1941,
notification from any source of an implementing message to the Japanese
"Winds Code." If I had received such a message or notice thereof, I
believe I would now recall the fact, in view of its importance. It is
possible that Colonel Sadtler told me of an unverified report, or that
he had received some tentative formation which was subject to
confirmation. In any event, there should be written evidence available
in either the War or Navy Departments as to the fact, which evidence
would be more reliable than any person's memory at this time, especially
so since so many major events have intervened."
General Smith.-"I do not recall Colonel Sadtler's coming to me as he has
stated. However, since the matter in question was obviously a difference
of opinion between the A. C. of S., G-2, and the A. C. of S., War Plans
Division, both of whom had direct access to the Chief of Staff, it was
not one in which I had any responsibility or authority, and I cannot
imagine why Colonel Sadtler would have asked me to intervene in a
question of this kind, particularly since I was not at that time an
"Ultra" officer, and it would have been impossible for me to give me any
information to support his contention that I should step out of my
rather minor province."
I had seen no intercepts and no information came to my attention which
pointed to Pearl Harbor as an attack target prior to 7 December 1941.
The actual attack on Pearl Harbor was a surprise to me. I thought that
the Panama Canal would be the surprise attack target.
[Hand written: Other than the persons mentioned, namely Gen. Miles Col.
Bratton, Genl. Gerow, Col. Smith, and whomever may have been in Gen.
Miles' office the time, to the best of my recollection, prior to Dec. 7,
1941 I did not give any other person the information I received from
Admiral Noyes.]
[211] I did not see any execute message to the arrangement for sending
such a message as contemplated by the so-called Japanese "Winds Code",
and far as I know there was no such execute message received in the War
Department.
I had no time urged General Sherman Miles, G-2, or any other
representative G-2, to send any warning message to the overseas
commanders, and I deny the testimony in that regard of Mr. Friedman
given to General Carter W. Clarke on 13 July 1945.
I also deny the testimony of Mr. Friedman given to General Clarke to the
effect that I could not get the execute message from Admiral Noyes, and
reiterated that other than making the telephone call, as testified
before the Army Pearl Harbor Board, I made no further efforts to obtain
the execute message mentioned by Admiral Noyes.
Page 100
I further deny the testimony of Mr. Friedman given General Clarke to the
effect that I had collected and had material in a safe deposit box
concerning the Pearl Harbor disaster. I have not collected any such
material in a safe-deposit box although I thought I had done so. I do
have possession of the testimony given by me before General Carter W.
Clarke on two occasions, 16 September 1944 and 14 July 1945, which was
given to me by General Clarke, and is now in a private box in my home.
Otis K. Sadtler,
OTIS K. SADTLER,
Colonel, S. C.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 13th day of August 1941.
Henry C. Clausen,
HENRY C. CLAUSEN.
Lt. Colonel, JAGD.
At Washington, D. C.
[212] AFFIDAVIT OF MAJOR GENERAL CHARLES D. HERRON
Major General Charles D. Herron presently assigned to the Office Chief
of Staff, War Department, being first duly sworn, and informed of the
investigation by Lieut. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the
Secretary of War supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor
Board, pursuant to Joint Resolution of the Congress. and that Top
Secrecy is required, desposes and says:
Referring to my testimony given the Army Pearl Harbor Board on 9 August
1944, I wish to state further that when arrangements had been made for
General Short to relieve me as Commanding General, Hawaiian Department,
which command I had held since October 1937, I desired to acquaint him
as fully as I could with my experience and knowledge of affairs
pertaining thereto. Since he was to arrive and I was to depart on the
same ship, there was only a limited time in which to do this by personal
conferences, namely, two and one-half days. Accordingly, in order that
he might be prepared for his conferences with me, I sent to San
Francisco for delivery to him there certain papers and material relating
to the command, for his preliminary review on the ship's journey of five
days. These papers and material comprised in effect an agenda and
exhibits. Upon my meeting General Short when he arrived at Hawaii, I
asked him whether he had received the data at San Francisco and whether
he had read the papers and material. He replied that they had been
received by him at San Francisco but that he had not given them much
time while en route.
I did what I could in the limited time of two and one-half days then
remaining to brief General Short personally on matters pertaining to the
command. This included my giving him my opinions on the officers and
men. I told him of my estimate as to the efficiency of the staff
officers and, with respect to G-2, that Colonel George W. Bicknell, a
Reserve Officer, was an experienced and qualified, efficient man for
that position, and that it had been my intention to make him my G-2. I
further told him of the G-2 work being done, of the liaison with the
Navy, the FBI and related sources of information, of the defense plans,
of my experience and measures taken in the all-out alert of 1940 which I
had ordered on receipt of a communication from the War Department, dated
17 June 1940, reading as follows:
"Immediately alert complete defensive organization to deal with
possible trans-Pacific raid, to the greatest extent possible without
creating public hysteria or provoking undue curiosity of newspapers
or alien agents. Suggest maneuver basis. Maintain alert until further
orders. Instructions for secret communication direct with Chief of
Staff will be furnish you shortly. Acknowledge."
[213] I also told him of the relations and cooperation which bad existed
with the Navy, of the civilian population, of the Japanese situation, of
the assumption that alien agents conducted espionage for the Japanese
Government. I took him around the Island of Oahu, showing him the
installations and gave him my ideas of possible attack and defense of
that Island.
Following my talks with General Short at the time mentioned, in Hawaii,
he did not ever ask my opinions or for information or correspond with me
on the subject of command and related problems.
Concerning your question as to whether correct military practice,
current in 1941, permitted a Commanding General of an overseas
Department to revise a
Page 101
War Department estimate of the situation, without consulting with or
reporting to the War Department my answer is that the Commander may and
should take whatever action he believes dictated by necessity but must
so report to the War Department at the earliest possible moment.
Charles D. Herron,
CHARLES D. HERRON,
Major General, U. S. A.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 13th day of August 1945.
Henry C. Clausen,
HENRY C. CLAUSEN,
Lt. Colonel, JAGD.
At Washington, D. C.
[214] AFFIDAVIT OF MAJOR GENERAL SHERMAN MILES
MAJOR GENERAL SHERMAN MILES, presently Commanding General, First Service
Command, being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by
Lieut. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War,
supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, pursuant to
Joint Resolution of the Congress, and that Top Secrecy is required,
deposes and says:
Concerning the testimony I gave before the Army Pearl Harbor Board, 8
August 1944, as corrected by my letter, 18 August 1944, I wish to add
that I avoided any statement concerning details of information and
intelligence which I had derived from Top Secret sources then called
"Magic", or any intimation that such sources existed. The reason I so
limited my testimony was because prior to my appearance before the
Board, Brig. General Russell A. Osmun and then Colonel Carter V. Clarke,
of G-2, War Department transmitted to me instructions from the Chief of
Staff that I was not to disclose to the Army Pearl Harbor Board any
facts concerning the radio intelligence mentioned, or the existence of
that form of information or intelligence in the period preceding 7
December 1941. Accordingly, I obeyed that instruction.
My testimony mentioned above should be considered in that light,
therefore. In the months preceding 7 December 1941, there was available
to the War and Navy Departments in Washington, D. C., intercepts of
Japanese radio messages to their diplomatic and consular representatives
throughout the world. These were intercepted, decrypted, decoded and
translated by the two services in Washington D. C., under arrangements
for mutual assistance in this regard and for their dissemination. So far
as the Army was concerned, Colonel Rufus S. Bratton, who was the head of
the Ear Eastern Section of the Intelligence Branch, when I was G-2, War
Department, received and reviewed the material received daily from this
source. He and his assistants, Colonel Dusenbury, Major Moore and
Lieutenant Schindel, screened the material, picking out that which
contained information valuable from a military intelligence standpoint.
The latter was then distributed by these officers to various officers
and persons who had theretofore been summarized to receive them. Those
on this authorized list, in the several months immediately preceding 7
December 1941, and to whom deliveries were made by the officers
mentioned, included the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, the
Chief of Staff, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 and the Assistant
Chief of Staff, WPD. The material was delivered in locked brief cases.
The brief cases contained receipts for purposes of assuring the ultimate
destruction of the material thus delivered. The cases were returned to
Colonel Bratton's office when they had been read, the receipts they
contained having been initialed by the authorized officers. The material
and the receipts were then destroyed by burning. This intelligence was
distributed in the raw, unevaluated form. I do not believe there are any
records which would show what intercepts were delivered to whom, nor the
dates of delivery, so far as any particular intercepts are concerned. I
do not think that any such records were made at the time.
Colonel Clausen has shown me a file of such intercepts, called Top
Secret Exhibit "B" before the Army Pearl Harbor Board. At this late date
I am unable to recall having seen, prior to 7 December 1941, any
particular messages translated prior to that date, except those bearing
Army serial numbers 23570, 23859, 24373 25322, 24878, 25432, 25138,
25435, 25445, 25496, 25552, 25553, 25554, 25555, 25727, 25545, 25640,
25785, 25836 and 25838. In the latter cases, each of the messages
contain something that I recall knowing or seeing at the time. The
remainder of the series do not. I do not recall the intercepts, Army
serial numbers 25874 and 25877, summaries of which were shown me by
Colonel Clausen nor do I know how these two happened to be omitted from
the Top Secret Exhibit "B", in the
Page 102
preparation of which I was not in any way concerned. I must add,
however, that I believe I saw, prior to 7 December [215] 1941, all the
messages contained in Top Secret Exhibit "B", which were translated
prior to that date except number 25843. My belief is based on the fact
that they were of such importance that my officers would have assured
themselves that I had seen them. Those which I do not recall simply do
not register in my mind after nearly four years.
Concerning such of the intercepts mentioned as relate to reports by the
Japanese consul at Honolulu to Tokyo and inquiries from Tokyo as to ship
movements in Pearl Harbor, and the division of Pearl Harbor into
districts for such reporting, I would like to point out that such
messages were primarily of Naval interest and what might have been
expected. Of course the Japanese were following the movements of our
major ships, as best they could, as we were doing with regard to their
ships. Since I knew that the Navy was getting the messages mentioned
also, they did not leave any impression on my mind which has endured
four years.
Further concerning the intercepts mentioned as contained in Top Secret
Exhibit "B", and those which related to joint action by the ABCD Bloc,
or members thereof, I knew at the time about the Joint Action Agreement.
The general contents of the first thirteen parts of the intercepts in
the Top Secret Exhibit "B", number 25843, consisting of fourteen parts,
were known to me on the evening of 6 December 1941. This came about
because I was dining at the home of my opposite number in the Navy,
Admiral Wilkinson, when Admiral Bearsdall the President's Aide, brought
the information to Admiral Wilkinson, who transmitted it to me.
Concerning the intercepts of the character mentioned, it was my belief
in the period preceding 7 December 1941, that the Navy was intercepting,
decrypting, decoding and translating this material, consisting of
Japanese diplomatic and consular messages, at Hawaii, for use in
connection with the fleet. I was given so to understand by Naval
sources, but I do not recall who told me.
Referring to testimony as to a meeting I am said to have had with
Colonel Bratton and Colonel Sadtler, on 5 December 1941, concerning
information received by Colonel Sadtler from Admiral Noyes of a possible
"Winds Code" execute message, I cannot specifically recall any such
meeting, nor having received the information stated. To the best of my
knowledge and belief, no authentic execute message was ever received in
the War Department before the outbreak of hostilities. In the event of
the receipt of such a message, I was prepared to transmit it immediately
to the Chief of Staff and to WPD. The Far Eastern Section of G-2 was
especially alerted to watch for this message since receiving information
of the "Winds Code" set-up. It was considered most important and of
vital concern. I have some recollection that there were several messages
intercepted which, while thought at first to be the execute message,
proved on analysis not to be authentic, or to be too vague for definite
acceptance as such. It is my belief that the meeting with Colonel
Sadtler on 5 December 1941, if it occurred, concerned such a message. It
may have resulted in the message to Hawaii about Commander Rochefort, on
that date.
As to the meeting the morning, of 7 December 1941, with the Chief of
Staff, according to my best recollection, refreshed from notes made
shortly thereafter, I conferred with the Chief of Staff in his office at
the Munitions Building at about 11 a. m.
On the general subject of my being alive to the danger of a possible
surprise attack against Pearl Harbor, I would like to refer to my
service in the Hawaiian Detachment, during 1929-1932, as Department G-3.
It was while so assigned that I [216] prepared and disseminated a
General Staff study, afterwards disseminated further by General Wells,
on the defense of Oahu. This study emphasized the advantages which an
attack on Oahu, particularly by surprise, might give Japan. The usual
assumption in war planning during my assignment was that of a surprise
attack made with little warning in the nature of strained relations
internationally, what was called "out of the blue". I remember one
situation we war-gamed, that of an attack "out of the blue" on a Sunday
morning.
During my service as G-2, War Department, I caused Colonel Warren J.
Clear to be sent to the Ear East for undercover work for G-2. He made
reports to G-2, War Department, using the name of Knight, through
Colonel Brink at Singapore.
My attention has been called to the testimony of William F. Friedman,
given to Admiral Henry K. Hewitt, as conducting for the Secretary of the
Navy the type of investigation being conducted for the Secretary of War
by Colonel Clausen. To my knowledge, no records of G-2, War Department,
pertinent to Pearl
Page 103
Harbor, were ever ordered destroyed by General Marshall, or any other
person. Specifically, to my knowledge, General Marshall did not ever
order destroyed any copies of a possible "Winds Code" execute message.
Nor, to my knowledge, were any records of G-2, pertinent to Pearl Harbor
and derogatory to the War Department, destroyed. While serving as G-2, I
would have known of any destruction of records ordered by any competent
authority.
Concerning the question as to whether correct military practice, current
in 1941, would have justified a Commanding General of an overseas
command, such as the Hawaiian Department, to act contrary to War
Department estimates of the situation, such as were contained in War
Department messages prior to 7 December 1941, without consulting with or
reporting to the War Department, my answer is that the Commanding
General was responsible for the successful execution of his mission; he
could act contrary to War Department estimates of the situation, but at
his own risk; and that custom and doctrine of command would require him
to report his action and the reasons therefore promptly to is superiors.
In my opinion the messages sent by the War Department to General Short,
prior to 7 December 1941, especially the ones dated 27 November 1941,
were definitive directives that a war alert was required by the
situation, and that there was an immediate threat from without as well
as danger from sabotage.
SHERMAN MILES.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 16th day of August, 1945, at
Boston, Mass.
Henry C. Clausen
HENRY C. CLAUSEN
Lieut. Colonel, JAGD.
[217] AFFIDAVIT OF COLONEL REX W. MINCKLER, SC
Colonel Rex W. Minckler, SC, presently director of training, Camp
Crowder, Mo., being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation
by Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War,
supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, pursuant to
joint resolution of the Congress, and that TOP SECRECY is required,
deposes and says:
On 7 December 1941, and for some months prior thereto, I was stationed
at Washington, D. C. as Officer in Charge of Signal Intelligence
Service. Colonel Robert E. Schukraft and Colonel Harold S. Doud were my
subordinates in the Signal Intelligence Service at the time, and Colonel
Otis K. Sadtler was my superior. My duties included the direct
supervision of the receipt and dissemination of intercepted radio
messages. In the course of these duties I saw at various times most of
the intercepts of Japanese radio messages which had been decrypted and
translated.
Regarding the so-called Japanese "Winds Code", I recall having seen, and
at about the time of its translation, the intercept numbered 25432 in
Top Secret Exhibit "B", before the Army Pearl Harbor Board. I recall the
action which was taken under my supervision to monitor for the execute
message contemplated by the "Winds Code". I never saw or heard of an
authentic execute message of this character either before or since 7
December 1941. It is my belief that no such message was sent. Before 7
December 1941 there were one or two "false alarms", one of which I think
discussed with representatives of G-2 and the Navy, and which was to the
effect that a possible execute message ad been received indicating a
breach of Japanese and British relations. My opposite number in the Navy
was Captain L. F. Safford. I was in almost daily contact with Army and
Navy representatives who were also on the lookout for such an execute
message, and it is my belief that if an authentic execute message ad
been received, some of these persons would have discussed it with me.
The normal procedure in the reciprocal sending of messages by the Army
and Navy, one to the other, was to send six copies.
Concerning the two messages shown me by Colonel Clausen, Army Serial
numbers 25874 and 25877, which appear to have been intercepted on 6
December 1941 and translated on 8 December 1941, I believe the time
indicated for decrypting and translation by the Army was normal and then
required for decrypting and decoding Code PA-K2. The Navy time was about
four days. The Code indicated was not top priority and involved manual
processing. When the intercepts [218] were received by the Signal
Intelligence Service they were sorted into categories of priority, and
then after being decrypted and
Page 104
translated, one copy was retained by the Signal Intelligence Service and
additional copies were then sent to G-2 and the Navy ONI for
dissemination.
Rex W. Minckler,
REX W. MINCKLER,
Colonel, SC.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 21st day of August 1945.
Henry C. Clausen,
HENRY C. CLAUSEN.
Lt. Colonel, JAGD.
At Washington, D. C.
[219] AFFIDAVIT OF GENERAL GEORGE C. MARSHALL
GENERAL GEORGE C. MARSHALL, presently Chief of Staff, War Department,
being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Lt. Colonel
Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to
proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, pursuant to Joint Resolution
of the Congress, and that Top Secrecy is required, deposes and says:
Concerning testimony I gave the Army Pearl Harbor Board, I wish to add
that, as indicated on page 6 of the Secret Transcript of Proceedings
before the Army Pearl Harbor Board, the General Officers comprising the
voting members of that Board, namely, Lt. General Grunert, Major General
Henry D. Russell, and Major General Walter H. Frank, participated in a
closed session with me from 11:10 A. M. to 12:07 P. M. on 7 August 1944.
As indicated on pages 4 and 6 of the Top Secret Transcript of the
Proceedings, during this closed session I informed the General Officers
mentioned the character of information which had been derived before 7
December 1941 from Top Secret sources then called "Magic". I told them,
among other things that the source of this information included
intercepts of Japanese radio diplomatic messages which were decrypted,
decoded and translated under the supervision of the Signal Corps and G-
2. I further stated that neither this information nor the source thereof
should be made public because it would result in at least temporarily,
if not permanently, extinguishing that source. This [220] would have
meant that our enemies concerned would certainly have changed their
systems of communication and would thus have terminated this most vital
source of information which has continued to be available up to the
present hour. Many of our military successes and the saving of American
lives would have been seriously limited if the source of intelligence
mentioned had been so compromised.
I did not see General Miles, Colonel Bratton or Colonel Sadtler,
officers of G-2 and the Signal Corps, who were some of the officers
concerned with "Magic", prior to or after their testimony before the
Army Pearl Harbor Board. Though I personally and secretly informed the
voting members of the Board of the existence and important part played
by "Magic", it was not until it developed that the "Magic" papers were
being disclosed before the Navy Court of Inquiry that the Army officers
concerned were authorized to go into all the details regarding "Magic"
before the Army Pearl Harbor Board. On my second appearance before the
Army Pearl Harbor Board, 29 September 1944, I discussed with the Board
at length the general problem concerning the method of including "Magic"
in the report of the Board and also the availability to the Board of any
officers concerned for the purpose of giving testimony on the Top Secret
"Magic" phases of the investigation. I informed the Board, for example,
as indicated on pages 18 and 37, of the Top Secret Transcript mentioned,
that Colonel Bratton was available in Washington for that purpose.
[221] Concerning intercepts of the character mentioned, it was my
understanding in the period preceding 7 December 1941 that the
Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department was aware of and was
receiving some of this information from facilities available in his
command.
Concerning information sent to General Short or his command prior to 7
December 1941, I find that Colonel George W. Bicknell, Assistant G-2 at
the time for General Short, testified before Colonel Clausen that he was
shown, about 3 December 1941, a wire from the Navy Department,
Washington, to the Navy at Pearl Harbor, in effect as set forth on page
183, Top Secret Volume "C" Transcript
Page 105
of Proceedings before the Army Pearl Harbor Board in the testimony of
Captain L. F Safford, USN, which reads as follows:
"Highly reliable information has been received that categoric and
urgent instructions were sent yesterday to the Japanese diplomatic
and consular posts at Hong Kong, Singapore, Batavia, Manila,
Washington, and London to destroy most of their codes and ciphers at
once and to burn all other important confidential and secret
documents."
It is customary and expected that information of this character would be
exchanged between the respective Services at Hawaii.
Concerning correspondence which was exchanged between General Short and
myself before 7 December 1941, I gave him my estimates in my letters to
him dated 7 February 1941 and 5 March 1941 as follows:
[222] "My impression of the Hawaiian problem has been that if no serious
harm is done us during the first six hours of known hostilities
thereafter the existing defenses would discourage an enemy against
the hazard of an attack. The risk of sabotage and the risk involved
in a surprise raid by air and by submarine, constitute the real
perils of the situation. Frankly, I do not see any landing threat in
the Hawaiian Islands so long as we have air superiority."
"I would appreciate your early review of the situation in the
Hawaiian Department with regard to defense from air attack. The
establishment of a satisfactory system of coordinating all means
available to this end is a matter of first priority."
Estimates to the same general effect were sent to General Short by the
War Department. General Short answered these estimates prior to 7
December 1941 with replies and sent communications to the War Department
which indicated that he was then alive to the danger of the possible
surprise attack by air against Pearl Harbor. He participated in plans
and exercises against such a possibility. At no time did General Short
inform me or, to my knowledge, anyone else in the War Department that he
was not in full agreement with these War Department estimates and plans
for the defense of Oahu, which in effect warned him to expect air and
submarine attacks as primary threats in the event of war with Japan.
The doctrine of military command required that the Commanding General of
an overseas command, such as the Hawaiian Department, must not act
contrary to War Department estimates of the character mentioned, unless
he believed such action to be dictated by necessity and unless he
immediately reported and gave full details and reasons to the War
Department.
George C. Marshall
GEORGE C. MARSHALL.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 28th day of August 1945.
Henry C. Clausen,
HENRY C. CLAUSEN,
Lt. Colonel, JAGD.
At Washington, D. C.
TOP SECRET
AFFIDAVIT OF COLONEL HAROLD DOUD
COLONEL HAROLD DOUD, presently with the Allied Translator and
Intelligence Service, GHQ, AFPAC, being first duly sworn and informed of
the investigation by Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the
Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor
Board, pursuant to Joint Resolution of the Congress, and that Top
Secrecy is required, deposes and says:
On 7 December 1941, and for some time prior thereto, I was stationed at
Washington, D. C., in charge of the B Section, Signal Intelligence
Service, which was the Code and Cipher Solution Section. My duties
included the supervision of the solution of Japanese radio diplomatic
and military messages. In the course of these duties my section solved
and translated at various times many Japanese messages which had been
intercepted.
Page 106
Regarding the so-called Japanese "Winds Code" I recall seeing at about
the time of its translation the intercept in top secret Exhibit B, No.
25432. I recall that when this intercept was translated arrangements
were made to monitor for the execute message contemplated by the "Winds
Code". I did not see any execute message as thus contemplated and so far
as I know there was no such execute message received in the War
Department. My attention has been called to certain testimony of Captain
L. F. Stafford, USN, to the effect that I may have some knowledge
concerning such an execute message. I do not know the basis for this
testimony of Captain Safford as I did not have any information of an
execute message.
[224] My attention has also been called to the testimony on the subject
of 13 parts of a 14-part message, which 13 parts was received the
afternoon and evening of 6 December 1941 and is numbered SIS 25843. I
recall having seen the message but do not remember the details connected
with its receipt and solution. I went on duty on the afternoon of 6
December and came off duty sometime on the 7th of December, the exact
times, however, I do not recall.
Concerning the time required to solve and disseminate the of the
Japanese radio diplomatic messages in Code PA-K2, it is my present
belief that the average time required was at least two days.
I have been shown top secret Exhibit "B" before the Army Pearl Harbor
Board. The translation dates indicated thereon were not always the dates
of receipt. Reference to the records of the Signal Intelligence Service
should be made to show the time required between the dates of receipt
and the actual solutions and disseminations.
Prior to 7 December 1941, according to my recollection, we did not solve
any current Japanese military codes.
Harold Doud,
HAROLD DOUD,
Colonel.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 10th day of September 1945.
Henry C. Clausen,
HENRY C. CLAUSEN,
Lt. Colonel, JAGD.
At Washington, D. C.
[225] AFFIDAVIT OF LT. COLONEL FRANK B. ROWLETT
LT. COLONEL FRANK B. ROWLETT, presently with the Signal Security Agency,
being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Lt. Colonel
Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to
proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, pursuant to Joint Resolution
of the Congress, and that Top Secrecy is required, deposes and says:
The average length of time required for processing the messages in the
Japanese system known by us as PAK-2, calculated on 19 messages for the
period of 1 November to 6 December 1941, shows 3.5 days as average. Only
messages which were actually published were included in the data on
which the average was calculated.
No military systems which were in use by the Japanese Army or Military
Attaches previous to the date of 6 December 1941 were readable. Some
intercepts were available but not in sufficient quantity to permit the
solution of any military system.
a. No written record has been discovered which would indicate positively
the exact hour at which intercept traffic was received by teletype from
San Francisco by the Signal Intelligence Service in the Munitions
Building. My recollection is that the first call to initiate the use of
the circuit with San Francisco was placed sometime after six o'clock in
the evening of 6 December 1941. The response from Station 2 at San
Francisco indicated that they had already forwarded by air mail the
messages intercepted that day and that it would be necessary for them to
use the station file copy for preparing the intercepts for transmission
by teletype. [226] This preparation required some time because tapes had
to be punched for the material to be forwarded. To the best of my
recollection it was not until after midnight that actual intercept
traffic was received by the Signal Intelligence Service from San
Francisco.
b. Since this was the first time the Army had used teletype facilities
to forward traffic to Signal Intelligence, my recollection is very
clear. Also, I actually helped to operate the teletype equipment in the
Munitions Building in both the prelimi-
Page 107
nary discussions in which traffic was requested and also in receipting
for the traffic. Colonel Robert E. Schukraft and Miss Mary Jo Dunning
were present and also operated the teletype equipment. The conditions
under which we operated were very unusual in that ordinarily we operated
only day shifts, and this also tended to impress the matter on my
memory.
Frank B. Rowlett,
FRANK B. ROWLETT,
Lt. Colonel, SC.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 12th day of September 1945.
Henry C. Clausen,
HENRY C. CLAUSEN,
Lt. Colonel, JAGD.
At Washington, D. C.
[227] AFFIDAVIT OF CAPTAIN HOWARD W. MARTIN
CAPTAIN HOWARD W. MARTIN, presently with the Signal Security Agency
being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Lt. Colonel
Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to
proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, pursuant to Joint Resolution
of the Congress, and that Top Secrecy is required, deposes and says:
To the best of my knowledge and remembrance the following facts are
true:
At approximately 8:00 p. m. PST on 6 December 1941 I was in my quarters
at Fort Scott, Presidio of San Francisco when the telephone rang and the
man on duty at the station (MS #2) said Washington had called us on the
teletype machine and had requested we transmit immediately all the day's
intercepted traffic. It being Saturday night I had only one man on duty
and other personnel could not be reached readily. Therefore I went down
to the station immediately and began transmitting all of Saturday's
traffic using our retained copy, as the original traffic had been air-
mailed to Washington at approximately 1:00 p. m. on the same day.
Because the following day the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor I have always
associated the two things in my memory, and am certain that the TWX
machine was not used for traffic prior to 6 December and the hours as
given are approximately correct.
[228] I was NCO in charge of MS #2 at that time.
Howard W. Martin
HOWARD W. MARTIN
Captain, SC
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 12th day of September 1945.
Henry C. Clausen,
HENRY C. CLAUSEN
Lt. Colonel, JAGD.
At Washington. D. C.
TOP SECRET
[229] AFFIDAVIT OF MARY J. DUNNING
MARY J. DUNNING, presently with Signal Security Agency, being first duly
worn and informed of the investigation by Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen,
JAGD, or the Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings of the Army
Pearl Harbor Board, pursuant to Joint Resolution of the Congress, and
that Top Secrecy is required, deposes and says:
On 6 December 1941, I left the Munitions Building around 1:00 p. m., the
regular hour for the close of business on Saturdays. Between 2:15 and
2:45 that afternoon, I received a telephone call from Colonel Minckler's
office, requesting me to report for work as soon as possible. I fix the
hour by the length of time it takes me to drive from my home to the
Munitions Building and by 1:00 p. m. I was in Colonel Minckler's office
ready to work. I remember the hour because later in the evening when I
was asked to report at the same time on the following day I asked to be
allowed to report at 5:00 p. m. instead, since I had made plans to spend
the day out of town.
Page 108
I can't recall being told why we were called back to work, but the
general assumption was that we wanted to process traffic without delay
since the Japanese Ambassador was in conference with the President.
I was asked to work in the "cage" (a room where machine traffic was
processed, so called because of the grille work at its entrance to
restrict admittance) where I had not worked for some time. [230] I think
that as I entered the room, I was surprised to see a teletype machine.
How long it had been installed, I don't know, but I thought it could not
have been there more than a few hours, since I often had occasion to go
to the door of the cage and it was clearly visible from the door. It
must have been roughly around four o'clock that representatives of the
teletype company came to instruct us in the operation of the machine.
After that we spent some time practicing.
It is difficult to fix the time very definitely because time spent in
waiting always seems longer than it really is, and we were expecting
traffic from San Francisco at any moment. I remember that I was getting
hungry but could not leave the room to get supper since we were waiting
for S. F. to call. When Colonel Minckler came into the cage, I spoke to
him about getting someone to relieve me just long enough for me to buy a
sandwich. This conversation I remember because we joked about my
teaching *him* to operate the teletype. To the best of my knowledge, we
were in communication with our intercept station in S. F. not later than
7:00 p. m., although I cannot say whether or not they actually had any
traffic for us at that time.
I believe I went home around midnight or 1:00 a. m. and I recall
processing some traffic during the course of the evening before I left.
I cannot say, however, whether it came to us by teletype, or not, since
the Message Center had been asked to deliver [231] traffic to us as soon
as it arrived. That was traffic from Honolulu and the Philippines.
I did not return to the office until five o'clock on 7 December 1941.
Mary J. Dunning
MARY J. DUNNING.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 12th day of September 1945.
Henry C. Clausen,
HENRY C. CLAUSEN
Lt. Colonel, JAGD.
At Washington, D. C.
[232] AFFIDAVIT OF LOUISE PRATHER
Louise Prather, presently with the Signal Security Agency, being first
duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Lt. Colonel Henry C.
Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings of
the Army Pearl Harbor Board, pursuant to Joint Resolution of the
Congress, and that Top Secrecy is required, deposes and says:
To the best of my knowledge, the teletype machine was used to transmit
traffic from San Francisco for the first time during the night of 6
December 1941.
This particular point is clear in my memory because of the unusual
circumstances. In the evening of 6 December I was called at home and
told our unit was being placed on a 24-hour basis immediately and that I
should report for work at 7:00 a. m. the following morning, 7 December.
When I arrived at the office at this unusual hour I learned that the
teletype was being operated and the reason for the urgent call had been
to process this, and other, traffic as rapidly as possible. Since for
some months, the highest priority had been given Japanese traffic
between Washington and Tokyo by our unit, the transmission of such
traffic by teletype seemed to me to be a matter of major importance.
This further served to impress the event on my memory.
Louise Prather.
LOUISE PRATHER.
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 12th day of September 1945.
Henry C. Clausen,
HENRY C. CLAUSEN
Lt. Colonel, JAGD.
At Washington, D. C.
Page maintained by Larry W. Jewell, lwjewell@omni.cc.purdue.edu. Created: 12/13/96 Updated: 12/19/96