[This file contains only Col. Clausen's report to the Secretary of War and Tab's A and B. See TOC. LWJ] Page iPEARL HARBOR ATTACK
HEARINGS BEFORE THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION PURSUANT TO S. Con. Res. 27 A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES RELATING THERETO PART 35 CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION Printed for the use of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON : 1946 Page ii JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK ALBEN W. BARKLEY, Senator from Kentucky, Chairman JERE COOPER, Representative from Tennessee, Vice Chairman WALTER F. GEORGE, Senator from Georgia JOHN W. MURPHY, Representative SCOTT W. LUCAS, Senator from Illinois from Pennsylvania OWEN BREWSTER, Senator from Maine BERTRAND W. GEARHART, Representa- HOMER FERGUSON, Senator from Michi- tive from California gan FRANK B. KEEFE, Representative J. BAYARD CLARK, Representative from from Wisconsin North Carolina COUNSEL (Through January 14, 1946) WILLIAM D. MITCHELL, General Counsel GERHARD A. GESELL, chief Assistant Counsel JULE M. HANNAFORD, Assistant Counsel JOHN E. MASTEN, Assistant Counsel (After January 14, 1946) SETH W. RICHARDSON, General Counsel SAMUEL H. KAUFMAN, Associate General Counsel JOHN E. MASTEN, Assistant Counsel EDWARD P. MORGAN, Assistant Counsel LOGAN J. LANE, Assistant Counsel Page iii HEARINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE Part Pages Transcript Hearings No. pages 1 1- 399 1- 1058 Nov. 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, and 21, 1945. 2 401- 982 1059- 2586 Nov. 23, 24, 26 to 30, Dec. 3 and 4, 1945. 3 983-1583 2587- 4194 Dec. 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, and 13, 1945. 4 1585-2063 4195- 5460 Dec. 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, and 21, 1945. 5 2065-2492 5461- 6646 Dec. 31, 1945, and Jan. 2, 3, 4, and 5, 1946. 6 2493-2920 6647- 7888 Jan. 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 21, 1946. 7 2921-3378 7889- 9107 Jan. 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28, and 29, 1946. 8 3379-3927 9108-10517 Jan. 30, 31, Feb. 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6, 1946. 9 3929-4599 10518-12277 Feb. 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, and 14, 1946. 10 4601-5151 12278-13708 Feb. 15, 16, 18, 19, and 20, 1946. 11 5153-5560 13709-14765 Apr. 9 and 11, and May 23 and 31, 1946. EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE Part Exhibits Nos. 12 1 through 6. 13 7 and 8. 14 9 through 43. 15 44 through 87. 16 88 through 110. 17 111 through 128. 18 129 through 156. 19 157 through 172. 20 173 through 179. 21 180 through 183, and Exhibits-Illustrations. 22 through 25 Roberts Commission Proceedings. 26 Hart Inquiry Proceedings. 27 through 31 Army Pearl Harbor Board Proceedings. 32 through 33 Navy Court of Inquiry Proceedings. 34 Clarke Investigation Proceedings 35 Clausen Investigation Proceedings. 36 through 38 Hewitt Inquiry Proceedings. 39 Reports of Roberts Commission, Army Pearl Harbor Board. Navy Court of Inquiry and Hewitt Inquiry, with endorse- ments. [Pages iv-xvi are lists of witnesses, which will be made available separately. A link to this spot will be made at that time.] Page 1 JOINT COMMITTEE EXHIBIT NO. 148 [1] [TOP SECRET] REPORT OF INVESTIGATION BY LT. COLONEL, HENRY C. CLAUSEN, JAGD, FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR, SUPPLEMENTARY TO PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD CONTENTS Page [1] Report to Secretary of War by Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, of investigation supplementary to Army Pearl Harbor Board .... 2 Tab "A"-Copies of statements of Secretary of War dated 1 December 1944 and 29 August 1945, of Colonel Clausen's orders and of related documents ........................................... 4 Tab "B"-Copies of affidavits and statements obtained in Colonel Clausen's investigation ........................................... 38 [See this section for testimonies. LWJ] Tab "C"-List of additional documentary evidence comprising Exhibits "1" through 8" obtained in Colonel Clausen's investigation .................................................... 233 Tab "D"-Written periodic reports by Colonel Clausen .............. 246 Tab "E"-Memorandum of The Judge Advocate General giving his comments upon Top Secret Report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board in light of Colonel Clausen's investigation ...................... 279 Tab "F"-Memorandum of The Judge Advocate General supplementing and commenting upon certain aspects of his previous memorandum to the Secretary of War, dated 25 November 1944, in light of Colonel Clausen's investigation .......................................... 296 Tab "G"-Memorandum of The Judge Advocate General to the Secretary of War dated 25 November 1944 .................................... 313 TOP SECRET [2] WAR DEPARTMENT, Washington, 14 September 1945. Memorandum for the Secretary of War; Subject: Report of investigation by Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board. Pursuant to orders of the Secretary of War, I have conducted the investigation supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, mentioned in he public statements of the Secretary of War on 1 December 1944 and 29 August 1945. Copies of these statements and of my orders and some related documents are attached as Exhibit "A". In the course of this investigation, I traveled over 55,000 miles by air and interviewed 92 Army, Navy, and civilian personnel at the following places: Berlin, Germany London, England Blenchley Park, England Luzon, P. I. Boston, Massachusetts Manila, P. I. Cannes, France Neuenahr, Germany Casserta, Italy New York, New York Frankfurt on Main, Germany Paris, France Guam Potsdam, Germany Honolulu, T. H. Saipan Langley Field, Virginia Versaille, France Leyte, P I. Washington, D. C. Some of these persons were interviewed where they were engaged in combat in active theaters of operation, as the Secretary of War stated in his public statement of 1 December 1944 would be necessary. [1] Pages referred to are indicated by italic figures enclosed by brackets and represent pages of original exhibit. Page 2 Of those interviewed, the following persons testified before me. I recorded their testimony in the form of affidavits, copies of which are attached as Exhibit "B". General George C. Marshall Lt. General Leonard T. Gerow General Douglas MacArthur Lt. General Walter B. Smith [3] Lt General Richard K. Suther- Colonel Otis K. Sadtler land Colonel Rex W. Minkler Major General John R. Deane Colonel Harold Doud Major General Charles D. Herron Captain Joseph J. Rochefort, USN Major General Sherman Miles Captain Edwin T. Layton, USN Major General C. A. Willoughby Captain Wilfred J. Holmes, USN Major General Ralph C. Smith Captain Thomas A. Huckins, USN Brig. General Thomas J. Betts Lt. Colonel Frank B. Rowlett Brig. General Kendall J. Fielder Major Edward B. Anderson Brig. General Morrill W. Marston Captain Howard W. Martin Brig. General Robert H. Dunlop Chief Warrant Officer L. R. Lane Brig. General Charles K. Gailey Chief Ships Clerk Theodore Emanuel, Colonel Rufus S. Bratton USN Colonel Robert E. Schukraft Miss Mary J. Danning Colonel George W. Bicknell Miss Margaret McKenney Colonel Clarence G. Jensen Miss Louise Prather Colonel Carlisle Clyde Dusenbury Miss Mary L. Ross Colonel Moses W. Pettigrew Mr. George W. Renchard Colonel Joseph K. Evans Mr. Robert L. Shivers Colonel Edward F. French Mr. John F. Stone Colonel Edward W. Raley The following persons gave me signed statements which, with some records of my interviews, are also included in Exhibit "B": Brigadier General C. A. Powell Lt. Donald Woodrum, Jr., USN Colonel 0. H. Thompson Mr. Harry L. Dawson Lt Colonel Byron M. Muerlott Mr. John E. Russell Commander J. S. Holtwick, Jr., USN I also obtained a great deal of additional documentary evidence. A list of this is attached as Exhibit "C" and the documents are presented herewith. Periodic oral and written reports were heretofore made. The written reports are attached as Exhibit "D". There are attached as Exhibits "E" and "F" memoranda of The Judge Advocate General giving his comments upon the Top Secret Report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and supplementing and commenting upon certain aspects of his previous memorandum to the Secretary of War dated 25 November 1944, in the light of my investigation. 6 Incls Henry C. Clausen, 1. Ex. "A" HENRY C. CLAUSEN 2. Ex. "B" Lt. Colonel, JAGD. 3. Ex. "C" 4. Ex. "D" 5. Ex. "E" 6. Ex. "F" Page 3 [4] EXHIBIT A INVESTIGATION BY LT. COLONEL, HENRY C. CLAUSEN, JAGD, FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR; SUPPLEMENTARY TO PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD 1. Joint Resolution of the Congress, 13 June 1944, directing the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, severally, to conduct investigations of Pearl Harbor. 2. Public report of Secretary of War regarding Pearl Harbor disaster, 1 December 1944. 3. Order of Secretary of War, 23 November 1944, directing Major Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, to conduct supplementary investigation. 4. Memorandum of The Judge Advocate General, 5 December 1944, concerning unexplored leads in Pearl Harbor investigation. 5. Memorandum of the Secretary of War, 6 February 1945, to all Army personnel concerned relative to investigation to be made by Major Henry C. Clausen. 6. Letter to Secretary of the Navy from the Secretary of War, 6 February 1945, concerning investigation to be made by Major Henry C. Clausen. 7. Letter to Secretary of War from the Secretary of the Navy, 10 February 1945, in reply to letter 6 February 1945. 8. Memorandum of the Secretary of War for The Adjutant General, 3 March 1945, requesting travel orders for Major Henry C. Clausen. 9. Movement orders for Major Henry C. Clausen, 14 March 1945. 10. Memorandum of the Secretary of War to the Commanding General, Pacific Ocean Areas, 24 March 1945, relative to investigation being made by Major Henry C. Clausen. 11. Memorandum of the Secretary of War to the Commanding General, Southwest Pacific Theater, 24 March 1945, relative to investigation being made by Major Henry C. Clausen. 12. Memorandum to Major Duckett, ASF, P&O, 24 March 1945, requesting change in movement orders. 13. Wire from The Adjutant General, 27 March 1945, to Commanding Officer, 1504 AAFBU, Fairfield, California, advising of change in movement orders of Major Henry C. Clausen. [5] 14. Memorandum of Secretary of War for The Adjutant General, 24 May 1945, requesting travel orders for Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen. 15. Movement orders for Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, 25 May 1945. 16. Letter of the Secretary of War to the Secretary of the Navy, 28 May 1945, concerning investigation. 17. Memorandum of the Secretary of War for The Adjutant General, 7 August 1945, requesting change in movement orders of Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen. 18. Amendment of movement orders of Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, 11 August 1945. 19. Public report of Secretary of War regarding the Pearl Harbor disaster, 29 August 1945. [6] [PUBLIC LAW 339-78TH CONGRESS] [CHAPTER 247-2D SESSION] [S. J. Res. 133] JOINT RESOLUTION To extend the statute of limitation in certain cases. Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That effective as of December 7, 1943, all statutes, resolutions, laws, articles, and regulations, affecting the possible prosecution of any person or persons, military or civil, connected with the Pearl Harbor Page 4 catastrophe of December 7, 1941, or involved in any other possible or apparent dereliction of duty, or crime or offense against the United States, that operate to prevent the court martial, prosecution, trial or punishment of any person or persons in military or civil capacity, involved in any matter in connection with the Pearl Harbor catastrophe of December 7, 1941, or involved in any other possible or apparent dereliction of duty, or crime or offense against the United States, are hereby extended for a further period of six months, in addition to the extension provided for in Public Law 208, Seventy-eighth Congress. Sec. 2. The Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy are severally directed to proceed forthwith with an investigation into the facts surrounding the catastrophe described in section 1 above, and to commence such proceedings against such persons as the facts may justify. Approved June 13, 1944. [7] WAR DEPARTMENT BUREAU OF PUBLIC RELATIONS PRESS BRANCH Tel.-RE 6700, Brs. 3425 and 4860 Immediate Release DECEMBER 1, 1944 STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF WAR The following is the text of a statement by the Honorable Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War: By Joint Resolution of the Congress, approved June 13, 1944, the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy were severally directed to proceed with an investigation into the facts surrounding the Pearl Harbor catastrophe of December 7, 1941, and to commence such proceedings against such persons as the facts might justify. In order to meet the wishes of Congress as expressed in this resolution, I have conducted such an investigation. In order to assist me to this end, there was appointed by order dated July 8, 1944, a Board of three general officers which was directed "to ascertain and report the facts relating to the attack made by Japanese armed forces upon the Territory of Hawaii on 7 December 1941 and to make such recommendations as it might deem proper." This Army Pearl Harbor Board has conducted an extensive and painstaking investigation. It has held hearings in Hawaii, San Francisco, and Washington. It has examined a total of 151 witnesses and received many exhibits. I have read its report and reviewed the recorded evidence. The Judge Advocate General of the Army, at my direction, has also examined the report and the record and has given me fully the benefit of his views. I recognize the importance to any individual concerned of having a decision taken as to what, if any, action is to be instituted against him and, after weighing all the considerations, I am clear that the public interest as well as justice and fairness will best be served by a statement of my present conclusions. So far as they now may be made public, consonant with the public interest, my conclusions are as follows: The Army Pearl Harbor Board, although it recommended no disciplinary or other action, concluded that there were several officers in the field and in the War Department who did not perform their duties with the necessary skill or exercise the judgment which was required under the circumstances On the recorded evidence, I agree with some but not all of the Board's conclusions. So far as the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department is concerned, I am of the opinion that his errors of judgment were of such a nature as to demand his relief from a Command status. This was done on January 11, 1942, and in itself is a serious result for any officer with a long record of excellent service, and conscientious as I believe General Short to be. In my judgment, on the evidence now recorded, it is sufficient action. Furthermore, I am satisfied that proper steps were taken to correct such inadequacies of either personnel or organization as were shown to exist either in the War Department or in the field at the time of the Pearl Harbor disaster. My conclusion is that under all the circumstances the evidence now recorded does not warrant the institution of any further proceedings against any officer in the Army. Page 5 In accordance with the opinion of the Judge Advocate General, I have decided that my own investigation should be further continued until all the facts are made as clear as possible and until the testimony of every witness in possession of material facts can be obtained, and I have given the necessary [8] directions to accomplish this result. Some of the testimony may be much delayed where witnesses are engaged in combat in active Theaters of Operation. My present decision will be reviewed when the investigation has been finally completed. Finally, I am absolutely clear that it would be highly prejudicial to the successful prosecution of the war and the safety of American lives to make public during the war the report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board or the record on which it is based. STATEMENT AS TO COLONEL THEODORE WYMAN, JR., AND CERTAIN OTHERS I have today made a separate statement of my conclusion on the basis of the evidence now recorded not to institute further proceedings against any officer of the Army in respect to the Pearl Harbor disaster. The Military Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives, by a report of June 14, 1944, called attention to certain relationships of Hans Wilhelm Rohl to military construction in Hawaii under the direction of Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr., District Engineer, and indicated that this may have contributed to the Pearl Harbor catastrophe. Accordingly, the phases of the Committee report bearing thereon were referred to the Army Pearl Harbor Board for further investigation. I have reviewed the results of this investigation. I do not find from this review that the Pearl Harbor disaster was in any way contributed to or caused by any alleged misconduct, neglect or disloyalty on the part of Rohl, the Hawaiian Constructors, the organization with which he was connected, Colonel Wyman, or others directing construction activities in Hawaii, and I do not find that there is any evidence that Rohl or anyone else directing such construction gave any information to the enemy. As to certain other alleged misconduct and neglect of Colonel Wyman and others in construction matters, I have referred the question of the commencing of any proceedings to the Under Secretary of War and the Judge Advocate General. Distribution: Aa, Af, B, Da, Dd, Dm, N. 5:00 P.M. SECRET [9] NAVY DEPARTMENT Washington, 23 November 1944. Memorandum for the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2. Subject: Pearl Harbor Investigation. In connection with the recent report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, a number of unexplored leads have suggested themselves which require investigation. I have directed that this investigation be undertaken by Major Henry G. Clausen, JAGD. You are directed to give Major Clausen access to all records, documents, and information to your Division whether of secret or top secret nature and to advise all officers of your Division to afford Major Clausen the fullest possible cooperation. Inquiries made by Major Clausen should be answered fully and the persons interrogated should volunteer any information of which they may have knowledge concerning the subject of Major Clausen's inquiries. In addition, copies of any papers required by Major Clausen, whether secret or top secret should be furnished him, any present directives to the contrary not withstanding. HENRY L. STIMSON Secretary of War. A true copy. HENRY A. CLAUSEN Lt. Colonel, JAGD. Page 6 TOP SECRET [10] HEADQUARTERS SERVICE FORCES OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL Washington 25, D. C. Memorandum for Major Henry C. Clausen, JAGD. Subject: Unexplored Leads in Pearl Harbor Investigation. 1. In order to assist you in the investigation you are now making, I am suggesting herewith certain unexplored leads which, in my opinion, might advantageously be followed up in order to complete the general picture in this matter. The present memorandum merely contains suggestions and will not be construed as a directive or as in any way fixing the scope of your investigation. 2. In the War and Navy Departments in Washington, the following matters can be investigated a. Whether Kimmel notified the Navy Department and the Navy Department notified the War Department of the order to sink Jap subs, of the reasons for the order. b. What was the naval condition of readiness at Pearl Harbor. c. Whether Short or Kimmel sent any reconnaissance reports to Washington. d. Whether Kimmel had any orders from Washington requiring a large part of the fleet to remain in harbor. e. Whether Kimmel understood the term "defensive deployments" or wired back for its meaning. f. Whether Kimmel replied to the 24 November, 27 November, and other Navy Department messages and if so, was the War Department furnished copies thereof. g. Whether the June 1940 alert message to Herron was specific and indicative of an established War Department policy of being specific when war alerts were believed required by the situation. h. Whether War Department manuals and war plans, current in 1941, authorized a Commanding General of an overseas Department to revise the estimate of the situation, without consulting with or reporting to the War Department. i. Whether Short answered the Secretary of War's letter of 7 February 1941. [11] j. The number of troops in Hawaii in late 1941, the state of their training and the possibility of continuing training under Alert 2 or 3. k. The terms and origin of the Joint Action Agreement, if any, with Britain and the Netherlands and whether Japan was officially advised of this agreement or discovered its existence. l. Whether Short was sent official notice of the Joint Action Agreement or of the Roosevelt-Churchill July 1941 compact for a joint warning to Japan (Rep. 41). 3. Concerning the "magic" intercepts we should ascertain: a. The exact date and time of first translation. b. The reason for the apparent delay in translating or deciphering of some of the most vital messages. c. Who got each message, when and in what form. d. The evaluation made of them at the time and the degree of reliance placed thereon by the General Staff and by the Navy. e. The origin of the "Budapest" intercept. 4. Significant details regarding the "Winds" intercept might be explored: a. The original of the Navy Department message and translation, now probably part of the original Roberts Report records, or at least, questioning of Mr. Justice Roberts would possibly disclose how that Commission disposed of it. b. The Navy's alleged delivery of two copies of the translation to the Army (Tr., Safford a. 133-135), as to just what procedure there was for delivery, as to who was responsible therefor, and who had a duty to check up on whether the transmission was received. [12] c. Whether General Miles, Admiral Noyes, Colonel Bratton, or Captain Safford knew about the Anglo-Dutch-U. S. Joint Action Agreement, in which case they would have known that a "War with Britain" message would necessarily have involved the United States in war. d. Whether the partial implementation "War with Britain" was brought to Admiral Stark's or General Marshall's attention, it being clear that the Page 7 of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff did know of the Joint Action Policy. e. Did the Navy in any way notify Admiral Kimmel or Commander Rochefort of the implementation intercept? f. Did the Honolulu intercept stations independently receive the activating Winds" message? g. What was the significance of the other Japanese intercepts which the Board failed to examine? h. Whether General (then Colonel) Fielder actually received the message directing him to contact Commander Rochefort, whether he did so, and whether here is substance to the hypothesis that he and Short were relying upon the warning they would expect to receive when the second or implementing "Winds" message would be intercepted, thus giving advance notice of hostilities. Myron C. Cramer MYRON C. CRAMER, Major General, USA, The Judge Advocate General SECRET [13] WAR DEPARTMENT Washington, 6 February 1945. Memorandum for Army Personnel Concerned: Pursuant to my directions and in accordance with my public statement of 1 December 1944, Major Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, is conducting for me the investigation supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board. You are directed to give Major Clausen access to all records, documents and information in your possession or under your control, and to afford him the fullest possible cooperation and assistance. Inquiries made by Major Clausen should be answered fully and freely and the persons interrogated should volunteer any pertinent information of which they may have knowledge. Copies of any papers required by Major Clausen should be furnished him. HENRY L. STIMSON, Secretary of War. SECRET [14] 6 FEBRUARY 1945. DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Pursuant to my directions and in accordance with my public statement of 1 December 1944 Major Henry G. Clausen, JAGD, is conducting for me the investigation supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board. Some of the additional information which seems to be material is believed to be available only through Navy personnel or Navy records. I have instructed Major Clausen to limit his inquiry strictly to matters which have a bearing on the part hat Army personnel, organization, or action may have had in the disaster. I will appreciate it if you will arrange to give Major Clausen access to all pertinent Navy records and information and afford him the opportunity of interviewing such Navy personnel as may be necessary, it being understood that he will comply strictly with the instructions I have stated above. Sincerely yours, HENRY L. STIMSON, Secretary of War. Above handed to Major Clausen 2/7/45 for delivery to Sec. Navy. MO'B. Hon. JAMES V. FORRESTAL, Secretary of the Navy, Washington, D. C. hhb/mob A True Copy. HENRY C. CLAUSEN, Major, JAGD. Page 8 SECRET [15] THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY Washington, 10 Feb. 1945 DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I have your letter of 6 February 1945 advising that Major Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, is conducting for you the investigation supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and requesting that he be given access to all pertinent Navy records and information and be afforded the opportunity of interviewing such Navy personnel as necessary, it being understood that you have instructed him to limit his inquiry strictly to matters which have a bearing on that part that Army personnel, organization, or action may have had in the disaster I share your view that Public Law 339 of the 78th Congress, which directed that we "severally" investigate the facts surrounding the Pearl Harbor catastrophe authorize us to make available to each other information in our respective Departments relevant to our separate investigations. Accordingly, I am happy to comply with your request, and suggest that Major Clausen communicate with Lt. Commander John F. Sonnett, of my office, so that arrangements may be made to furnish the specific information which Major Clausen desires to obtain from the Navy Department. Sincerely yours, JAMES FORRESTAL. Hon. HENRY L. STIMSON Secretary of War Washington, D. C. [16] SECRET Memorandum for The Adjutant General. Subject: Request for Orders. 1. Reference is made to a Secret memorandum from the Secretary of War dated 6 February 1945, copy of which is attached, concerning the investigation by Major H. C. Clausen for the Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board. 2. In connection with said mission and in pursuance of orders of Secretary of War, request is made for Orders directing Major Clausen to proceed on or about 12 March 1945: (a) to Langley Field, Virginia, (b) then to Honolulu, T. H., and (e) then return to Washington, D. C., and (d) authority to make such successive trips from Washington, D. C., and to travel to such other place or places, and to make such changes in said itinerary as may be necessary to accomplish said mission. 3. It is further requested that travel by military, naval or commercial aircraft, Army or Naval Transport, belligerent vessel or aircraft, commercial steamship, rail or any other means of transportation be authorized as necessary for the accomplishment of an emergency war mission, and that a baggage allowance of 75 pounds be authorized for travel by aircraft. 4. It is further requested that in lieu of subsistence flat per diem of $7.00 be authorized while traveling and on duty for the period while away from Washington, D. C. required to complete this mission. Reference is made to the determination of the Secretary of War, dated 22 August 1944, that the thirty day limitation prescribed in War Department Circular 260, 1944, is not applicable in connection with temporary duty enjoined upon members of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and Officers on duty therewith. /S/ H. C. Clausen, H. C. CLAUSEN, Major, JAGD. Approved: /s/ Harvey H. Bundy, HARVEY H. BUNDY, for the Secretary of War. /S/ Myron C. Cramer, MYRON C. CRAMER. The Judge Advocate General. A true copy. HENRY C. CLAUSEN Major, JAGD. Page 9 [17] RESTRICTED AGPO-A 201 Clausen, Henry C. EAD/bls/2231 Mu (12 Mar 45) Br. 76520 WAR DEPARTMENT, THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE Washington 25, D. C., 14 March 1945. Subject: Movement Orders. TO: Major Henry C. Clausen, 0907613, JAGD 4731 Munitions Building Washington, D. C. 1. Major Henry C. Clausen, 0907613, JAGD, will proceed on or about 20 March 1945 from Washington, D. C., to San Francisco, California, on temporary duty of approximately three (3) days, thence to Fairfield- Suisun Army Air Field, Fairfield, California, reporting not later than 28 March 1945, to the Commanding Officer 1504th AAF Base Unit for air transportation to Fort Shafter, T. H. Upon arrival at destination he will report to the Commanding General, U. S. Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas, for temporary duty of approximately two (2) months for the purpose of conducting investigation supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board. Upon the completion of this temporary duty he will return to his proper station, Washington, D. C. 2. Travel directed is necessary in the military service. 501-3 P 432-02, 03, 212/50425. Travel by air is directed (Par 3b (2) AR 55-120, Changes no. 9), and is necessary for the accomplishment of an emergency war mission, APR-2-331156-ASF. A baggage allowance of sixty-five (65) pounds, to include all personal effects, and an excess baggage allowance of ten (10) pounds, (official documents), is authorized while traveling by aircraft. Within continental United States the provisions of War Department Circular 260, 1944 apply; outside continental United States the provisions of War Department Circular 356, 1944, apply. 3. He is authorized to proceed to such additional places within the theater as may be necessary for the performance of this mission. 4. He will be equipped in accordance with Column M, WD Pamphlet No. 396, "Itemized Baggage List", as desired. Small arms will be issued at the port of aerial embarkation in accordance with current instructions. 5. Special instructions: Temporary APO 4236, c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, California. Will comply with the provisions of Section 10, POR, pertaining to Medical Requirements. Typhus, cholera and bubonic plague inoculations will be administered to officer immediately upon receipt of orders. Designated as special official courier. BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR: E. A. DAVIS, Adjutant General. [18] 3 Incls. AG Ltr 4 July 1944 AG Form 43 Travel Book Distribution: Officer (10) Officers' Br. Rec. Sec. AGO Judge Advocate General, 2734 Mu. Lt. Stump, 1C-931, The Pentagon. APS, 4A-514, The Pentagon (2) Port Postal Officer, SFPE, Fort Mason, Calif. Assistant Ch/Staff, OPD, WDGS, 3B-354, The Pentagon Mobilization Div. ASF, Foreign Travel Section, 4E-747, The Pentagon P & T Officer, Hq. ATC, Rm. 1916 Gravelly Point, Va. CG, USAFPOA, APO 958, c/o PM, San Francisco, California Postal Officer, APO 958, c/o PM, San Francisco, Calif. CO, 1504th AAF Base Unit, Fairfield-Suisun Army Air Field, Calif. (3) Page 10 SECRET [19] 24 MARCH 1945 Memorandum for the Commanding General, Pacific Ocean Areas. Subject: Investigation Supplementary to Army Pearl Harbor Board. Pursuant to my directions and in accordance with my public statement of 1 December 1944, Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, is conducting for me the investigation supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board. In connection therewith Colonel Clausen is scheduled to arrive in your Command within the next thirty days. It is desired that the fullest possible cooperation and assistance be given him, and that the senior G-2 General Officer of your Command be detailed to assist in the investigation, as Colonel Clausen may request, for the purpose of obtaining statements from Navy personnel and access to Navy records and information in accordance with arrangements which have been made between the Secretary of War and the Secretary of Navy. HENRY L. STIMSON, Secretary of War. hcc/es A true copy. HENRY C. CLAUSEN Lt. Colonel, JAGD. SECRET [20] 24 MARCH 1945. Memorandum for the Commanding General, Southwest Pacific Theater. Subject: Investigation Supplementary to Army Pearl Harbor Board. Pursuant to my directions and in accordance with my public statement of 1 December 1944, Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, is conducting for me the investigation supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board. In connection therewith Colonel Clausen is scheduled to arrive in your Command within the next thirty days. It is desired that the fullest possible cooperation and assistance be given him, and that the senior G-2 General Officer of your Command be detailed to assist in the investigation, as Colonel Clausen may request, for the purpose of obtaining statements from Navy personnel and access to Navy records and information in accordance with arrangements which have been made between the Secretary of War and the Secretary of Navy. HENRY L. STIMSON, Secretary of War. hcc/es A true copy. HENRY C. CLAUSEN, Lt. Colonel, JAGD. [21] WAR DEPARTMENT ARMY SERVICE FORCES OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL 24 MARCH 1945. Memorandum: ASF P&O (Maj. Duckett) 1. Request that so much of par. 1, Movement Orders 14 Mar. 45, (copy attached) as directs me to proceed from Washington, D. C. on or about 20 Mar. 45, and to report to Fairfield-Suisun Army Air Field not later than 28 Mar. 45, be amended to extend said dates respectively to leave Washington, D. C. on or about 26 Mar. 45, and to report to Fairfield- Suisun Army Air Field not later than 4 April 45. Also, if advisable, amend said orders to designate my correct rank. 2. Necessity for the foregoing extensions is additional time required to await certain developments in compliance with orders of the S/W. Henry C. Clausen, HENRY C. CLAUSEN, Lieutenant Colonel, Jagd. Rm. 4741 Munitions Ex. 78922 Page 11 [22] EAD/ED/ ed/2331 Mu 27 MARCH 1945. AGPO-A 201-Clausen, Henry C 77723 (27 Mar 46) AGO Personnel Officers Assignment SPXPO-A Room 2323 Munitions CO 1504 AAFBU PP FAIRFIELD-SUISUN AAF FAIRFIELD, CALIFORNIA Orders dated 14 March 1945 pertaining to Major Henry C. Clausen 0907613 JAGD by order SW are amended to direct him proceed on or about 26 March 46 from Washington, DC, and report to CO 1504 AAFBU FAIRFIELD-SUISUN AAF, Fairfield, Calif., not later than 4 April 45 end SPXPO-A ULIO TAG. Official: ____________, Adjutant General. SECRET [23] Memorandum for The Adjutant General. 24 MAY 1945 Subject: Movement Orders to Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen. JAGD 1. Reference is made to movement Orders, dated 14 March 1946, to Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, and request therefor dated 3 March 1945. 2. Request is made for additional movement Orders to Colonel Clausen directing him to proceed on or about 30 May 1946 to Headquarters, SHAEF, and to such other points in the theater, and such other places and theaters, in such order and frequency as may be necessary for the purpose of conducting investigation in accordance with Secret instructions of the Secretary of War. 3. It is requested that the provisions of said prior request for Orders, dated 3 March 1946, be considered applicable hereto and that a one priority be assigned for air travel. HARVEY H. BUNDY For the Secretary of War. A true copy. HENRY C. CLAUSEN Lt. Colonel, JAGD. RESTRICTED EAD/laf/fcs/2323 Mun Br. 76520 WAR DEPARTMENT, THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, Washington 25, D. C., 25 May 1945 [24] AGPO-A 201 Clausen, Henry C (24 May 45) Subject: Movement Orders To: # Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Clausen, 0907613, JAGD 1. Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Clausen, 0907613, JAGD, will proceed on or about 30 May 1945 from Washington, D. c. to Headquarters, SHAEF, European Theater of Operations, Versailes, France, and to such other points in the theater, and such other places and theaters, in such order and frequency as may be necessary on temporary duty of approximately two (2) months for the purposes of conducting an investigation in accordance with instructions of the Secretary of War. He will report to the Commanding Officer, 503d Army Air Forces Base Unit, Air Annex: #1, Room 1746, Gravelly Point, Washington, D. C. for processing and air transportation, upon completion of which, he will proceed from Washington, D. C. to Versailles, France, reporting upon arrival to the Commanding General, European Theater of Operations, for duty. Upon completion of this temporary duty, he will return to his proper station, Washington, D. C. 2. Travel directed is necessary in the military service. 501-1 P 432-02, 03 212/50425 Travel by air (APR-1-354533-WDP-MAY) is directed (Par. 3b (2) AR 55-120, Changes No. 9), and is necessary for the accomplishment of an emerg- Page 12 ency war mission. A baggage allowance of sixty-five (66) pounds, to include all personal effects, and an excess baggage allowance of ten (10) pounds, is authorized while traveling by aircraft. Within the continental limits of the United States, provisions of Par. 25, AR 35- 4820, 19 April 1945 apply: outside the continental limits of the United States, provisions of Par. 26, AR 354820, 19 April 1945, apply. 3. Authority is granted to make such changes in the above itinerary and to proceed to such additional places as may be necessary for the accomplishment of this mission. 4. Personnel will be equipped as desired in accordance with Column P, WD Pamphlet No. 38-6, "Itemized Baggage List." One (1) Pistol, caliber .45 will be issued at the aerial port of embarkation. 5. SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS: Temporary APO 4295, c/o Postmaster, New York, New York. Will comply with provisions of Section 10, POR, pertaining to Medical Requirement. Typhus inoculations will be administered immediately upon receipt of orders. Designated special official courier. BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR: CAPT. E. A. DAVIS AGO, Adjutant General. Officers Br Overseas Assignment Sec [25] 3 Incls: AG Ltr 4 Jul 44 AG Form #43 Travel Book Distribution: Officer (10) Offs' Br., Rec Sec, AGO, 1628 Mun APS, 4A-514, Pentagon OIC, Emb APO, 464 Lexington Ave., NY, NY (2) Lt. Stump, 1C-931, Pentagon CO, 503d AAFBU, WPAE, 1746, Air Annex #1, Gravelly Pt, DC (3) Judge Advocate General, 2734 Mun Destination Commander: SECRET [26] DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Referring to your letter dated 10 February 1945, I wish to thank you for the arrangements made whereby Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, has had access to certain pertinent Navy records and interviewed certain Navy personnel. I have also been happy to comply with your request that appropriate Navy representatives similarly be given Army information which is relevant to your investigation, it being understood, of course, that the Navy inquiry will be limited to matters which have a bearing on the part that Navy personnel, organization or action may have had in the disaster. Sincerely yours, ______________ Secretary of War. Honorable JAMES FORRESTAL, Secretary of the Navy, Washington, D. C. A true copy HENRY C. CLAUSEN, Lt. Colonel, JAGD. hhb/mob [27] 7 AUGUST 1945. Memorandum for the Adjutant General: Reference is made to Movement Orders to Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD dated 25 May 1945. It is requested that so much of paragraph one thereof as sets forth period of temporary duty as approximately two months be amended to read "four months." HARVEY H. BUNDY, Special Assistant to the Secretary of War. A true copy. HENRY C. CLAUSEN Lt. Colonel, JAGD. Page 13 RESTRICTED [28] RHO/laf/mm/2323 Mun Br. 76520 WAR DEPARTMENT THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE Washington, D. C., 11 August 1945. AGPO-A 201-Clausen, Henry C. (7 Aug. 45.) Subject: Amendment of Movement Orders, To: Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Clausen, O-907613, JAGD. So much of Classified Letter Orders AGPO-A 201 Clausen, Henry C. (24 May 45. Subject: Movement Orders 25 May 1945 pertaining to Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Clausen, O-907613, JAGD as reads: "Temporary Duty of approximately two (2) months" be amended to read: "Temporary Duty of approximately four (4) months". BY ORDERS OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR: E. A. DAVIS, Adjutant General. Distribution: Officer (10) Offs' Br., Rec Sec, AGO, 1528 Mun APS, 4A-514, Pentagon OIC, Emb APO, 464 Lexington Ave., NY, NY (2) Lt. Stump, 1C-931, Pentagon CO, 503d AAFBU, WPAE, 1746, Air Annex #1, Gravelly Pt, DC (3) Judge Advocate General, 2734 Mun Destination Commander: [29] OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR REGARDING THE PEARL HARBOR DISASTER By Joint Resolution of the Congress, approved June 13, 1944, the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy were severally directed to proceed with an investigation into the facts surrounding the Pearl Harbor catastrophe of December 7, 1941, and to commence such proceedings against such persons as the facts might justify. In order to meet the wishes of Congress as expressed in this resolution, I have conducted such an investigation. In order to assist me to this end, there was appointed by order dated July 8, 1944, a Board of three general officers which was directed "to ascertain and report the facts relating to the attack made by Japanese armed forces upon the Territory of Hawaii on 7 December 1941, and to make such recommendations as it might deem proper." On December 1,1944, I made a public statement of my decision in this matter as follows: "This Army Pearl Harbor Board has conducted an extensive and painstaking investigation. It has held hearings in Hawaii, San Francisco, and Washington. It has examined a total of 151 witnesses and received many exhibits. I have read its report and reviewed the recorded evidence. The Judge Advocate General of the Army, at my direction, has also examined the report and the record and has given me fully the benefit of his views. "I recognize the importance to any individual concerned of having a decision taken as to what, if any, action is to be instituted against him and after weighing all the considerations, I am clear that the public interest as well as justice and fairness will best be served by a statement of my present conclusions. So far as they now may be made public, consonant with the public interest, my conclusions were as follows: "The Army Pearl Harbor Board, although it recommended no disciplinary or other action, concluded that there were several officers in the field and in he War Department who did not perform their duties with the necessary skill or exercise the judgment which was required under the circumstances. On the recorded evidence, I agree with some but not all of the Board's conclusions. "So far as the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department is concerned, I am of the opinion that his errors of judgment were of such a nature as to demand his relief from a Command status. This was done on January 11, 1942, and in itself is a serious result for any officer with a long record of excellent service, and conscientious as I believe General Short to be. In my judgment, or the evidence now recorded, it is sufficient action. Page 14 "Furthermore, I am satisfied that proper steps were taken to correct such inadequacies of either personnel or organization as were shown to exist either in the War Department or in the field at the time of the Pearl Harbor disaster. My conclusion is that under all the circumstances the evidence now recorded does not warrant the institution of any further proceedings against any officer in the Army. "In accordance with the opinion of The Judge Advocate General, I have decided that my own investigation should be further continued until all the facts are made as clear as possible and until the testimony of [30] every witness in possession of material facts can be obtained, and I have given the necessary directions to accomplish this result. Some of the testimony may be much delayed where witnesses are engaged in combat in active theaters of operation. My present decision will be reviewed when the investigation has been finally completed. "Finally, I am absolutely clear that it would be highly prejudicial to the successful prosecution of the war and the safety of American lives to make public during the war the report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board or the record on which it is based." Since December 1, I have continued my own investigation. At my direction, Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Clausen of the Office of the Judge Advocate General has made an extensive further examination of witnesses. Colonel Clausen was Assistant Recorder of the Army Pearl Harbor Board and as such had an intimate knowledge of the facts. I have reviewed the additional evidence available and I have reviewed my earlier decision. I am satisfied that this decision as to the action to be taken was correct Until the end of the hostilities with Japan extreme care was necessary not to disclose information which was in the hands of the War Department and especially the sources of our information, of which there were many, including the Intelligence Divisions of the Army and Navy, the F. B. I., and others. From these same sources there came to the Government additional information which resulted in saving of thousands of American lives during the war with Japan. The end of hostilities now makes it possible for me to make public much more fully my conclusions and the reasons for my conclusions without such serious danger to the public security as to outweigh the desirability of such publication. It is still not in the public interest to disclose sources of information. I have directed that all of the Report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board be made public except that part which would reveal sources of secret information. The conclusions of the Board are fully set forth in the part which is now made public. The War Department will make available to appropriate Committees of Congress the full reports and the record of the testimony. My conclusions are as follows: I The primary and immediate responsibility for the protection of the Island of Oahu and Pearl Harbor insofar as the Army was concerned rested upon the Commanding Officer of the Hawaiian Department Lieutenant General Walter C. Short. It has been and still is the prevailing policy and practice of the General Staff of the United States Army to choose with care as commanding officers of the various theaters men whose record and experience indicate their capabilities for the command and to place upon them the responsibility for the performance of their mission with as little interference from the central Army authorities in Washington as possible. This policy of decentralized responsibility in our Army has been found to produce the best results, has been followed successfully throughout the war, and it is still being followed in all the various theaters of operation. Thus each theater commander is charged with the preparation of his own local defense plan, including the working out of any defense operations with the local Naval authorities. Such plans are submitted to the appropriate division of the General Staff in Washington and are subject to any changes or modifications that might emanate from that source. The primary responsibility for such plans and their execution, however, rests on the commanding officer familiar with the local [31] situation and conditions. Before December 7, 1941, detailed plans for the defense of the Hawaiian Department had been devised and worked out by General Short as well as a Joint Agreement with the local Naval authorities for joint action in the event of an emergency, and he and the Navy commanding officer had the primary responsibility of putting into effect these plans or such portions thereof as the occasion Page 15 demanded. This last, however, had not been done at the time of the Japanese attack. I feel that during the year 1941, and particularly during October and until he latter part of November, General Short was repeatedly advised of the critical events which were developing. I find that he was clearly warned on November 27 by the appropriate authorities in Washington that a break in diplomatic relations between the United States and Japan might occur at any time, that an attack by Japan on the United States might occur, and that hostilities were possible at any moment. I find that he was informed that the defense of his command was to be regarded as paramount to all other considerations and that le was specifically directed to take such measures of reconnaissance as he deemed necessary. In addition to the information received directly from Washington through both Army and Navy sources, General Short received continuous reports from his own Intelligence Section, which clearly revealed the seriousness of the situation. General Short himself knew that it was traditionally the policy for a responsible commanding officer to anticipate and to be prepared or the worst form of possible attack, and he had received and approved military estimates from his own staff as well as from the Chief of Staff to the effect that a surprise raid by air and submarine constituted the principal perils to Hawaii. I do not find that there was any information in the possession of the War Department and which was not made available to General Short which would lave modified the essence of the above information which was sent to him or which would have affected or increased the duties of vigilance and alertness thus already imposed upon him. The available information might have given him a clearer picture of the increasing tenseness of the situation and as later pointed out I believe that the War Department would have carried out its duties more adequately if General Short had been given more complete information, but I find that he was amply warned for the performance of his paramount duty of being alert against a surprise air attack by Japan. I find that he failed in the light of the information which he had received adequately to alert his command to the degree of preparedness which the situation demanded; and that this failure contributed measurably to the extent of the disaster, although much damage probably would have resulted from the attack in any event. I find that he failed to use fully the means at hand for reconnaissance, especially the radar air warning service, which was of prime necessity; that he failed to ascertain from the Navy the extent of its reconnaissance or to collaborate with it to the end that more adequate reconnaissance should be secured. I find that he failed to have his antiaircraft defenses sufficiently manned or supplied with ready ammunition as the situation demanded. This failure resulted not from indolence or indifference or willful disobedience of orders but from a vital error of judgment, viz.: the failure to comprehend the necessities of the situation in the light of the warnings and information which he had received. He states that to put into effect a different degree of alertness than he actually did would have interfered with the training program which he was carrying out in various activities, and would have involved the danger of alarming the population, against which he had been cautioned. In weighing such considerations he entirely lost sight of the fact that the defense of his command and station against Japan was his paramount duty. [32] The underlying cause of this error of Judgment was General Short's confidence that Japan would not then attack Pearl Harbor. In fairness to him must be borne in mind that this belief was shared in by almost everyone concerned including his superior officers in the War Department in Washington. He was undoubtedly influenced in such a belief by the then prevailing psychology which completely underestimated the Japanese military capabilities and particularly the advance which they had made in the use of aircraft. General Short also knew that the Naval command at Hawaii, which he regarded as being better informed than he because of their facilities and the widespread nature of their operations, was confident that an air attack on Pearl Harbor was most unlikely. The information which was being received of Japanese naval activity pointed to operations in southeastern Asia, the Netherlands East Indies, or the Philippines. Furthermore, in Hawaii the danger of sabotage was stressed because of the large Japanese population, and General Short was expressly warned by the War Department against this danger. But the warning was coupled with a warning also against the danger of hostile action in general. General Short relies upon the fact that the War Department took no exception to his report of November 27, 1941, to the effect that he was "alerted against sabotage." He urges that this Page 16 should be regarded as a tacit approval of his failure to alert against other dangers. I think it is probably true that the emphasis on sabotage in several War Department warnings and the Department's caution against alarming the civilian population, coupled with this failure to comment on Short's report of November 27, confirmed him in his conviction that he had chosen the correct form of alert and might disregard all others. But these matters, although they may make his action more understandable, do not serve to exonerate him for his failure to be fully alert and prepared against an air attack. He well knew that an air attack on Pearl Harbor, even if improbable, was possible. Yet he ordered an alert which he himself had prepared for use only in case of "no threat from without." Protection against the possibility of such an attack was his own definite responsibility. To sum up the situation tersely, General Short was warned by Washington that there was immediate danger both of an attack from without by Japan and of an attack from within by sabotage. This warning required him to be alert against both forms of danger. He chose to concentrate himself so entirely upon a defense against sabotage as to leave himself more completely exposed to an attack from without than if there had been no alert at all. He so concentrated his planes as not only to make them an easy target for an attack from without but to require several hours to get any substantial number of them into the air for defense. To such an error of judgment it is no excuse that he relied upon assurances from another service, even though he thought that that service was better informed than he was as to the disposition of the Japanese fleet. He was the responsible defender of the outpost of Hawaii. He had no right entirely to subordinate his duty to be prepared against what he knew to be the most dangerous form of attack on that outpost to the opinion of another service. Nor had he any right, after the clear and explicit warning of the War Department of a possible attack from without, to assume from mere inference that such a warning had been entirely withdrawn and that he was thereby relieved from his independent responsibility as a theater commander. I have reviewed the conclusions reached with regard to General Short in my statement of December 1, 1944 and in my judgment the additional investigation does not warrant any change in the conclusions drawn therein, nor call for any action beyond that which has already been taken. II [33] Such duties as the War Department in Washington had in the supervision of the defense of Hawaii devolved primarily upon what was then known as the War Plans Division of the General Staff. This was the division of the General Staff specifically charged with the war plans and operations, and messages to or from the theater commanders were regularly handled or approved by it. The War Plans Division was in charge of an Assistant Chief of Staff and under him various officers had specially assigned duties. The Intelligence Section of the General Staff (G-2) also had duties of collecting and analyzing information and transmitting information to other sections of the War Department and to the theater commanders. I find as heretofore stated that the messages sent to General Short gave him adequate information as to the state of the negotiations with the Japanese and the development of the situation, that he was warned that Japanese future action was unpredictable; that hostile action was possible at any moment; and that no consideration was to be permitted to jeopardize his defense. He was also expressly directed to take reconnaissance measures-the all-important measure to be taken at the time. Furthermore, as heretofore stated. I do not think that any special and detailed warnings against sabotage should have been considered by General Short as justifying his decision that an alert against any possible enemy action was not also his duty. There was certain information in the War Department which was not sent to General Short and which if forwarded might have sharpened General Short's attention or emphasized further the imminence of war. Some part of this information was sent to Admiral Kimmel by the Navy. It was the rule that all such information should be exchanged between the Army and Navy at Pearl Harbor, and the War Department had a right to believe that this information communicated to Admiral Kimmel was also available to General Short. While Admiral Kimmel and General Short were on very friendly terms and in frequent communication, the exchange of information as well as consultation in other respects at Hawaii between the Army and Navy was inadequate Page 17 The information available to the War Department on or before December 7 1941, which was not passed on to General Short included the following: information available November 17 and 22 to the effect that the Japanese Government insisted that the negotiations for a peaceful settlement be terminated by November 25, 1941, later extended to November 29, 1941; information available December 6 and 7 to the effect that Nomura and Kurusu were to reply to the United States that Japan would yield no further, and information available the morning of December 7 which did not reach General Short until after the disaster that the reply was to be delivered to the representatives of the United States at 1:00 P. M., December 7, 1941, and that the remaining cipher and code machines in the Japanese Embassy at Washington were to be destroyed. The Army Pearl Harbor Board concluded that the War Department had earlier in its possession other evidence which indicated that war with Japan was imminent at a definite time and that this information was not available to General Short. The principal basis for this conclusion by the Board, however was that the War Department had information through secret sources of information that the Japanese diplomatic representatives in London, Washington and elsewhere had been ordered to destroy their codes and papers. The additional investigation shows that officers on General Short's staff also had this information and had given it to him prior to December 7, 1941. It should be borne in mind also that General Short had been [34] fully advised by the War Department that war with Japan was imminent and might commence at any time. The War and Navy Departments also had certain information which was not forwarded to General Short to the effect that the Japanese Consulate at Honolulu was reporting to Tokyo ship movements and dispositions in Pearl Harbor. Other somewhat similar information was being given to Tokyo by Japanese Consulates in other ports. This was apparently considered by officers in the War Department as merely a part of the enemy's general plan to keep track of all ships of the American Navy as far as possible. Information was received by the War Department on December 6, 1941, as to what the Japanese reply to the settlement overtures of the United States would be and that this reply indicated an immediate severance of diplomatic relations. There is no dispute, however, that General Marshall did not get this information until the morning of December 7. An officer, then connected with G-2, War Department, testified before the Army Pearl Harbor Board that on December 6 he personally delivered this message to the Secretary of the General Staff for the Chief of Staff, also to the Executive Officer for the Chief of the War Plans Division, and to the Executive Officer for the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2. In the additional investigation conducted by Colonel Clausen subsequent to the findings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, the witness corrected his testimony and testified that the only message he delivered on the night of December 6 was to the duty officer for the Secretary of State. Other evidence from the additional investigation showed that the subordinate officer in G-2 who received the message on December 6 did not deliver it to the Army persons mentioned until after 9:00 A. M. on the morning of December 7. When the Chief of Staff received the above mentioned information on the morning of December 7, together with information which had since arrived to the effect that the Japanese envoys were to deliver the reply to the American Government at 1:00 P. M. And the Japanese Embassy was to destroy its remaining cipher and code machines and secret papers, he sent to the overseas commanders a message giving these latest developments. General Marshall gave directions that this message be immediately dispatched to the theater commanders. This was the message, which in the ease of General Short, did not arrive until after the attack. Another item of information in the possession of the War Department which General Short denies receiving was that the Japanese had circulated from Tokyo about November 30, 1941, to their representatives abroad, a plan to the effect that in case of severance of diplomatic relations or war with the United States, Great Britain or Russia a certain signal in the form of a false weather report would be broadcast in a news message and that all code papers were then to be destroyed. I find that this information was available to General Short or his command prior to December 7, 1941. The evidence as to whether the agreed signal indicating severance of relations or war with the United States was subsequently given and made known to the War Department is confusing and contradictory. No written evidence of such a signal has been found. But in any event, information was available to General Short of the orders to destroy codes as above discussed. Page 18 With regard to the information available in the War Department, I believe the War Plans Division made a mistake in not transmitting to General Short more information than it did. A keener and more imaginative appreciation on the part of some of the officers in the War and Navy Departments of the significance of some of the information might have led to a suspicion of an attack specifically on Pearl Harbor. I do not think that certain officers in the War Department [35] functioned in these respects with sufficient skill. At all times it must be borne in mind, however, that it is easy to criticize individuals in the light of hind-sight, and very difficult to recreate fairly the entire situation and information with which the officers were required to deal at the time of the event. Again, as I have pointed out, General Short in response to a message which had been sent out containing a warning of possible hostilities and a request for a report of action taken, had sent a message to the War Department which was susceptible of the interpretation that he was on the alert against sabotage only and not on the alert against an air raid or other hostile action. While this interpretation was not necessarily to be had from the wording of his message, nevertheless a keener sense of analysis and a more incisive comparison of the messages exchanged would have invited further inquiry by the War Plans Division of General Short, and his failure to go on the necessary alert might well have been discovered. The Chief of this division and certain of his subordinates knew that a report of the measures taken by General Short had been asked for. General Short's reply was brought to the attention of the Chief of the division. A clear and satisfactory reply should have been required. This was not done and a more efficient functioning of the division would have demanded that a careful inquiry as to the meaning of General Short's message be made and no room for ambiguity permitted. It must clearly be borne in mind that in November and December 1941, the responsibilities of the War Plans Division covered many fields and many theaters. Their preoccupation with the theaters most likely to be threatened, such as the Philippines toward which the Japanese activities then appeared to be pointed, may be subject to criticism in the light of the subsequent disaster, but it is understandable. All signs pointed to an attack in that direction and they were exercising particular care with respect to that theater. Their conduct must be viewed in an entirely different light from that of the theater commander, such as General Short, who was like a sentinel on post and whose attention and vigilance must be entirely concentrated on the single position which he has been chosen to defend and whose alertness must not he allowed to be distracted by consideration of other contingencies in respect to which he is not responsible. Under all circumstances, I find nothing in the evidence as now recorded which warrants the institution of any further proceedings against any officer in the War Plans Division Since Pearl Harbor, the War Plans Division has been completely reorganized and the officers involved in the matters in question have either died or received other assignments where they have already distinguished themselves in the performance of important duties in the field. I am satisfied that proper steps were taken to correct such inadequacies of either personnel or organization as were shown to exist either in the War Department or in the field at the time of the Pearl Harbor disaster. III The War Plans Division like the other divisions and activities of the General Staff in Washington was under the general direction and supervision of the Chief of Staff, General Marshall. Evidently for this reason the Army Pearl Harbor Board has been led to criticize the Chief of Staff as being responsible for some of the shortcomings of the officers of the General Staff which I have just enumerated. In my opinion, this criticism is entirely unjustified. It arises from a fundamental misconception of the duties of the Chief of Staff and of his relations with the divisions and activities of the General Staff. It is not the function of the Chief of Staff specifically to direct and personally supervise the execution in detail of the duties of the various sections of the General Staff. His paramount duty is to advise the President and the Secretary of War, and to make plans for [36] and supervise the organization. Equipment, and training of a great army for a global war; to advise on, and himself to make, decisions regarding basic problems of military strategy in the many possible theaters in which the war might develop and in other fundamental and broad military problems which confront the United States. It would hope- Page 19 lessly cripple the performance of these great and paramount duties should a Chief of Staff allow himself to become immersed in administrative details by which the plans for defense are carried out in our many outposts. It is true that the failure of any part of the General Staff to perform its duties efficiently may be of such a kind or reach such an extent as to become the responsibility of the Chief of Staff for not having established a more effective organization. But I do not find any such situation in this ease. The scattered and individual errors which I have criticized in respect to the Pearl Harbor disaster were not of a kind or extent to imply any general inefficiency in a Staff which was performing the heaviest duties with great ability and with subsequent results which have produced some of the finest pages of the history of the war. The shortcomings I have pointed out thus cannot in any fairness be attributed to he Chief of Staff. On the contrary, throughout this matter I believe that he acted with his usual great skill, energy, and efficiency. IV The conclusions which I have stated herein as to the responsibilities and errors of General Short are in general accord with the conclusions of both the Roberts Commission in their report of January 23, 1942* and the Army Pearl Harbor Board. My conclusions as to the responsibilities and errors of the War Plans Division are to a substantial extent, but not entirely, in accord with the conclusions of the Army Pearl Harbor Board. The Roberts Commission did not go into details in respect to these responsibilities. My conclusion as to the responsibility of the Chief of Staff is, as I have heretofore stated, at variance with the conclusion of the Army Pearl Harbor Board but it is in entire agreement with he conclusions of the Roberts Commission. Of the correctness of my conclusion in this last respect, I have not the slightest doubt. V In the conclusions of the Board there were no other individuals charged with responsibilities who were criticized except for a suggestion which might be construed as a criticism of Secretary Hull. It is suggested that in his conduct of he negotiations with the Japanese envoys a different procedure might have prolonged the negotiations until such time as the Army and Navy were better prepared for hostile action. Not only do I strongly disagree with what amounts at best only to a conjecture, but I feel that the Board's comment in this respect was uncalled for and not within the scope of their proper inquiry. VI There has been omitted from the press release of the text of the Army Pearl Harbor Board report that portion which dealt solelv with the related investigation of Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr. My findings as to Colonel Wyman, as expressed on December 1, 1944,were as follows: [37] "I have reviewed the results of this investigation. I do not find from his review that the Pearl Harbor disaster was in any way contributed to or caused by any alleged misconduct, neglect or disloyalty on the part of Rohl, the Hawaiian Constructors, the organization with which he was connected, Colonel Wyman, or others directing construction activities in Hawaii, and I do not find hat there is any evidence that Rohl or anyone else directing such construction gave any information to the enemy." The additional investigation conducted by Colonel Clausen has disclosed no further evidence which would in any way modify my decision. I also stated on December 1, 1944, that "as to other alleged misconduct and, neglect of Colonel Wyman and others in construction matters, I have referred he question of the commencing of any proceedings to the Under Secretary of War and The Judge Advocate General." Until those officials are ready to report I deem it inappropriate to make public the portions of the Army Pearl Harbor Board report insofar as it relates to Colonel Wyman. *This Commission consisted of Mr. Justice Roberts, Admiral W. H. Stanley, Retired; Admiral J. M. Reeves, Retired; Major General Frank R. McCoy, Reitired; and Major General Joseph T. McNarney. Page 20 [38] EXHIBIT B INVESTIGATION BY LT. COLONEL HENRY C. CLAUSEN, JAGD, FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR SUPPLEMENTARY TO PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD. 1. Statement of interview of Brig. General Kendall J. Fielder, 24 January 1945, at Washington D. C. 2. Proposed affidavit of Captain Joseph J. Rochefort, USN, February 1945, at Washington, D. C. 3. Affidavit of Colonel Moses W. Pettigrew, MIS, 13 February 1945, at Washington, D. C. 4. Affidavit of Colonel Carlisle Clyde Dusenbury, GSC, 13 February 1945, at Washington, D. C. 5. Affidavit of Captain Joseph J. Rochefort, USN, 20 February 1945, at Washington, D. C. 6. Affidavit of Colonel Clarence G. Jensen, AC, 22 February 1945, at Washington, D. C. 7. Affidavit of Margaret McKenney, GSC, G-2, 22 February 1945, at Washington, D. C. 8. Affidavit of Colonel George W. Bicknell, MI, 25 February 1945, at Washington, D.C. 9. Amendment to affidavit of Colonel George W. Bicknell, MI, 14 August 1945, at Washington, D. C. 10. Affidavit of Major Edward B. Anderson, TC, 27 February 1945, at Washington, D. C. 11. Affidavit of Brig. General Robert H. Dunlop, AGO, 28 February 1945, at Washington, D C. 12. Affidavit of Lt. Colonel Frank B. Rowlett, SC, 28 February 1945, at Washington, D. C. 13. Affidavit of Major General Ralph C. Smith, GSC, G-2, 28 February 1945, at Washington, D. C. 14. Affidavit of Mary L. Ross, GSC, G-2, 1 March 1945, at Washington, D. C. 15. Affidavit of Colonel Edward W. Raley, AC, 11 March 1945, at Langley Field, Virginia. 16. Affidavit of General Charles R. Gailey, OPD, GSC, 21 March 1945, at Washington, D. C. 17. Affidavit of Colonel Edward F. French, 8C, 22 March 1945, at Washington, D.C. [39] 18. Affidavit of Colonel Joseph K. Evans, GSC, 22 March 1945, at Washington, D. C. 19. Statement of Mr. John E. Russell, President, Theo. H. Davies & Co., Ltd., Honolulu, T. H., 10 April 1945, at Honolulu, T. H., also statement of Harry L. Dawson, 16 April 1945, at Honolulu, T. H. 20. Affidavit of Robert L. Shivers, 10 April 1945, at Honolulu, T. H. 21. Statement of Lt. Colonel Byron M. Meurlott, MI, 16 April 1945, at Honolulu, T. H. 22. Statement of Colonel O. N. Thompson, AGO, 17 April 194a, at Honolulu, T. H. 23. Affidavits of Captain Thomas A. Huckins, USN, and Captain Wilfred J. Holmes, USN, 18 April 1945, at Honolulu, T. H. 24. Affidavit of Brig. General Morrill W. Marston, GSC, 21 April 1945, at Honolulu, T. H. 25. Affidavit of Chief Warrant Officer Louis R. Lane, USN 21 April 1945, at Honolulu, T. H. 26. Statement of Lieutenant Donald Woodrum, Jr. USN, 22 April 1945, at Honolulu, T. H. 27. Affidavit of Captain Edwin T. Layton, USN, 26 April 1945, at Guam. 28. Statement of Brig. General C. A. Powell, SC, 27 April 1945, at Honolulu, T. H. 29. Statement of Commander J. S. Holtwick, Jr., USN, 27 April 1945, at Honolulu, T. H. Page 21 30. Affidavit of Chief Ships Clerk Theodore Emanual, USN, 27 April 1945, at Honolulu, T H. 31. Affidavit of Lt. General Richard K. Sutherland, C/S, GHQ, SW Pacific Areas 6 May 1945, at Manila, P. I. 32. Affidavit of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, 7 May 1945, at Manila, P. I. 33. Affidavit of Major General C. A. Willoughby, ACS, GHQ, SW Pacific Areas 8 May 1945, at Manila, P. I. 34. Affidavit of Brig General Kendall J. Fielder, GSC, 11 May 1945, at Honolulu, T. H. 35. Affidavit of Brig. General Thomas J. Betts, ACS, GSC, 13 June 1945, at Frankfurt on Main, Germany. 36. Affidavit of Lt. General Walter B. Smith, C/S, SHAEF, 16 June 1945, at Frankfurt on Main, Germany. [40] 37. Affidavit of Lt. General Leonard T. Gerow, CG, 16th Army, 20 June 1945, at Cannes, France. 38. Affidavit of Colonel Robert E. Schukraft, SC, 2 June 1945, at Casserta, Italy. 39. Affidavit of George W. Renchard, 7 July 1945, at London, England. 40. Affidavit of John F. Stone, 7 July 1945, at London, England. 41. Affidavit of Major General John R. Deane, USA, 24 July 1945, at Potsdam, Germany. 42. Affidavit of Colonel Rufus S. Bratton, GSC, 27 July 1945, at Paris, France. 43. Affidavit of Colonel Otis K. Sadtler, SC, 13 August 1945, at Washington, D.C. 44. Affidavit of Major General Charles D. Herron, GSC, 13 August 1945, at Washington, D. C. 45. Affidavit of Major General Sherman Miles, USA, 16 August 1945, at Boston, Massachusetts. 46. Affidavit of Colonel Rex W. Minckler, SC, 21 August 1945, at Washington, D. C. 47. Affidavit of General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, 28 August 1945, at Washington, D. C. 48. Affidavit of Colonel Harold Doud, SC, 10 September 1945, at Washington, D. C. 49. Affidavit of Lt. Colonel Frank B. Rowlett, SC, 12 September 1945, at Washington, D. C. 50. Affidavit of Captain Howard W. Martin, SC, 12 September 1945, at Washington, D. C. 51. Affidavit of Miss Mary J. Dunning, SC, 12 September 1945, at Washington, D. C. 52. Affidavit of Miss Louise Prather, SC, 12 September 1945, at Washington, D. C. [41] HEADQUARTERS, ARMY SERVICE FORCES OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL. Washington 25, D. C., 24 January 1945. Memorandum for the files. Subject: Interview of General Fielder. Pursuant to a telephone call by me to General Fielder through General Bissell on 8 January 1946, I interviewed General Fielder at Room 4D852, Pentagon, on 9 January 1945. I explained to General Fielder my mission and the clearances with General Bissell which permitted General Fielder to answer all my questions fully and freely. I reminded him that he was already sworn as a witness for the Army Pearl Harbor Board and the necessity for secrecy with respect to my examination. To many of my questions he answered that it would be necessary for me to review the records at Hawaii and that this would entail considerable research. He gave the following information or answers to the specific points indicated. 1. Concerning his message to G-2 not to furnish intelligence from Washington since it was a duplication (Bratton D. 292-293), he stated that he referred solely to counterintelligence matters and that had "nothing to do with combat." 2. He stated he was not very well aquainted with Commander Joseph J. Rochefort and that he had maintained no liaison with him. He said he did not know of any liaison arrangements between Commander Rochefort and Colonel Edward Railey. [Written:] Said he had no knowledge of "U" (called R1." 3. Upon having his attention invited to his G-2 estimate of 17 and 25 October 1941, he stated it was his understanding that these were circulated to the Chief of Staff and General Short. Page 22 4. He said he thought he had talked with General Short concerning the Washington G-2, 27 November 1941, warning. 5. He claimed that he did not see the Navy Intelligence Bulletin of 1 December 1941. 6. He recalled the Black Dragon Society, Washington G-2 information (Bratton D. 289-291) and-that it was "circulated" as something he "used to get." 7. He claimed he did not see the Melbourne, Australia, Military Attache message of 5-6 December 1941. [42] 8. He stated that General Short assumed that the Navy was conducting long distance reconnaissance. 9. Concerning the 5 December 1941, Washington G-2 message to the Hawaiian Department G-2 to contact Commander Rochefort regarding the Winds Message he said he "didn't remember" the message but that it "might have come in a routine." 10. With respect to the subject matter of the message and whether he knew that the Navy was intercepting such information he stated at first that he knew of this work but that it was talked about in whispers and that on this basis he knew the Navy had broken Japanese codes. Additional questions concerning other subjects relating to the inquiry were asked. General Fielder stated that accurate information could not be given without recourse to the records in Hawaii. A similar qualification already referred to obtains in part concerning the foregoing answers and information. HENRY C. CLAUSEN H. C. C., Major, JAGD, Assistant Recorder, APHB. TOP SECRET [43] AFFIDAVIT OF CAPTAIN JOSEPH J. ROCHEFORT, UNITED STATES NAVY Captain Joseph J. Rochefort, United States Navy, on duty at Office of Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department, Washington, D. C., being first duly sworn and informed of the investigation by Major Henry C. Clausen, JAGD for the Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and the authority of the Secretary of the Navy with respect to Navy personnel and records, does depose and state: During the period from the fall of 1941 to December 1941 I was the Combat Intelligence Officer in charge of the Combat Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harbor. Which was a field unit to the home office at Washington. I was attached to the Commandant of the 14th Naval District. My duties involved primarily radio intelligence under assignments from the head office in Washington. At Pearl Harbor there was also a Fleet Intelligence Officer and a District Intelligence Officer. My unit consisted of an intercept station, a radio direction finder station, and crypto-analytical units in Pearl Harbor. My opposite number in the Army at Pearl Harbor was Colonel Kendall J. Fielder, G-2. Hawaiian Department. In the fall of 1941 arrangements were made between Colonel Fielder and myself for liaison and exchange of intelligence information pertaining to our functions on matters of mutual concern to the Army and Navy in the Hawaiian Islands. For this purpose I had discussions with him and his staff at his headquarters, and with him and Edwin T. Layton, Fleet Intelligence Officer, at my headquarters. Thereafter, including the period to 7 December 1941, we maintained most cordial and close relations, meeting informally and frequently, and carried out these arrangements. My normal duties during the period from the fall of 1941 to 7 December 1941 did not include the gathering of information or intelligence from Japanese political or diplomatic sources. I knew, however, that this was then being done mainly by joint efforts of the Army and other units of the Navy. On occasions I would receive special assignments relating to this type of material. I have had the various documents shown me by Major Clausen, marked Top Secret Exhibit "B". I did not know the substance of any of these before 7 December 1941 except those numbered SIS 25392, SIS 25432, SIS 25545, SIS 25640, and SIS 25787, on the reverse side of which I have written my initials and today's date. In my talks with Colonel Fielder I gave him such information as I received concerning the substance of these documents and similar matters. It Page 23 was my practice to give Colonel Fielder all the information of importance in which the Army and Navy were jointly interested and [44] and which came to my knowledge in the course of my duties. This was done so that Colonel Fielder and I would keep abreast of intelligence developments in our common interests. [Written:] NOTE.-This proposed affidavit was prepared by me in accordance with statements to me and Comdr. Sonnett by Capt. Rochefort. Following are examples of such intelligence. My recollection in this regard distinct because I had been given special assignments concerning these items intelligence. My assignment with respect to those numbered SIS 25392 and SIS 25432, after being informed of the substance thereof, was to monitor for an implementing message and, I in turn so informed Colonel Fielder during the latter part of November 1941. I did not receive in Hawaii any implementing message of the kind for which I had been instructed to monitor. Concerning those numbered SIS 25545, SIS 25640, and SIS 25787, I was informed of the substance thereof and gave this information to Colonel Fielder and Robert Shivers, FBI Agent in Charge, Honolulu, about the 4th or 5th of December, 1941. This was done during the course of conversations relating to the destruction of secret papers by the Japanese Consul in Honolulu, which information I gave to my head office in Washington. JOSEPH J. ROCHEFORT Captain, USN. Subscribed and sworn to before me this ___ day of February 1945. HENRY C. CLAUSEN Major, JAGD TOP SECRET [45] WAR DEPARTMENT WASHINGTON AFFIDAVIT OF COLONEL MOSES W. PETTIGREW, MIS Colonel Moses W. Pettigrew, MIS, being first duly sworn, and informed of the nature and scope of the investigation by Major Henry C. Clausen, for the Secretary of War supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and reminded of his rights to remain silent, and warned that top secrecy was required, deposes and says: From August to 7 December 1941 he was executive officer of the Intelligence Branch, G-2, War Department, Washington; that from November 1939 to August 11 he was assistant to Colonel Rufus W. Bratton in the Far Eastern Unit, G-2, War Department; That while performing said duties in G-2, he read various intercepts of diplomatic radio messages from Japan to consulates and embassies; that these intercepts were variously classified as Purple, High Level Diplomatic, and J19; That he recalls reading, on or about 26 November 1941 and 28 November 1941, while in the performance of his said duties, two intercepts, SIS No. 25392 and SIS No. 25432, copies of which shown him this date by Major Clausen have been identified by affiant with his initials and date, and which are now commonly referred to as the "Winds Code" That someone whom affiant does not now recall, showed affiant on or about 5 December 1941, an implementation intercept which had been received from the Navy and which indicated that Japanese-U. S. Relations were in danger; that view of the prior intercepts which had been read by affiant he took the implementation message to mean that anything could happen and, consequently, he had prepared for dispatch to the Assistant Chief of Staff, Headquarters G-2, Hawaiian Department, Honolulu, at the request of someone whom he does not now call, a secret cablegram, a copy of which is attached. That affiant was of the belief then that the Hawaiian Department was in possession of the same information he had received in Washington; that he reached this conclusion by statements therefore of Naval personnel, whom he does not now recall, to the effect that Hawaii had everything in the way of information at Washington had; and, that the Navy had a crypto-analytic unit in Hawaii under Commander Rochefort which was monitoring and receiving these intercepts and breaking and translating the codes, as well as Washington, in the Page 24 interest of saving time, utilizing personnel there available, and a subsequent exchange of intercept translations as a check one against the another. [46] That on 5 December 1941 affiant believed that the Army in Hawaii would receive this information from the Navy there but he sent the secret telegram of 5 December 1941 as a precautionary measure since he felt it might have been possible that the Army in Hawaii did not get the same information; that affiant has looked at the file copy of the 5 December 1941 secret cablegram he prepared and has affixed his initials and date on the reverse side thereof; that the initials "RSB" written thereon in the upper right-hand corner, indicating Colonel Rufus S. Bratton, were written thereon by affiant on 5 December 1941 and affiant also wrote his own initials in the upper right-hand corner; that affiant believes he took the message when it had been prepared to the office of Colonel Ralph C. Smith, Executive Office, G-2, had the message initialed by Lt. Colonel C. H. Edmonston, and then took it to the G-2 Cable Room for dispatch; That the number 519 on said message indicates to affiant that the message was dispatched on 5 December 1941 because such was an outgoing message number which was given only in the ordinary course of procedure when a message was dispatched; Affiant does not know what if anything happened after the dispatch of said message with reference to action thereon by the Hawaiian Department; That prior to affiant's aforesaid duties in G-2, War Department, he was from May 1939 to October 1939, G-2 of the Hawaiian Department; that while in the performance of said duties of G-2, Hawaiian Department, he had been informed that the Navy there had a crypto-analytic unit to that time; that the Army had a certain amount of liaison with the Navy in that regard for obtaining intercepts of the character indicated, although the Navy was far ahead of the Army in the development of this phase of intelligence; that it was possible on occasions to obtain certain information from a commercial cable company; that Colonel Morrill W. Marston succeeded affiant as G-2, Hawaiian Department, and in turn was succeeded by Colonel Fielder; Affiant recommends as leads to be pursued by Major Clausen, an interview with Miss Margaret McKenney, Room 2D841, Pentagon, Extension 5851, questioning of personnel in the War Department Message Center, and interviews and checking records at Hawaii in possession of the Signal Corps there, especially Colonel Powell. Also interviews with Colonel C. C. Dusenbury, MID, former assistant to Colonel Bratton and with General Marston. Moses W. Pettigrew MOSES W. PETTIGREW Colonel, MIS. Subscribed and sworn to before me this 12th day of February 1945 at Washington, D. C. Henry C. Clausen, HENRY C. CLAUSEN, Major, JAGD. SECRET [47] Standard Form No. 14A Approved by the President March 10, 1926 TELEGRAM OFFICIAL BUSINESS-GOVERNMENT RATES Sent No. 519, 12/5 DECEMBER 5, 1941. ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF HEADQUARTERS, G-2, Hawaiian Department Honolulu, Territory Hawaii: Contact Commander Rochefort immediately thru Commandant Fourteen Naval District regarding broadcasts from Tokyo reference weather. MILES. I certify that this message is on official business and necessary for the public service. RALPH C. SMITH, Colonel, G. S. C., Executive Officer, G-2. Secret Cablegram las Page 25 TOP SECRET [49] WAR DEPARTMENT Washington. AFFIDAVIT OF COLONEL CARLISE CLYDE DUSENBURY, GSC Colonel Carlise Clyde Dusenbury, GSC, Assistant Director of Intelligence Southeast Asia Command, Kandy, Ceylon, on temporary duty in Washington being first duly sworn, and informed of the nature and scope of the investigation by Major Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and reminded of his right remain silent, and warned that top secrecy was required, deposes and says; To the best of my recollection I prepared the initial draft of the 5 December 1941 secret cablegram reading: "Sent No. 519, 12/5 DECEMBER 5, 1941. ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF HEADQUARTERS, G2 Hawaiian Department, Honolulu, Territory Hawaii: Contact Commander Rochefort immediately thru Commandant Fourteen Naval District regarding broadcasts from Tokyo reference weather. MILES." I have identified a copy of this cablegram by my initials and date on the reverse side thereof. This was prepared either of my volition or following consultation with Colonel Rufus S. Bratton, G-2, Chief, Far Eastern Branch, MIS. For several months prior to and following 7 December 1941 Colonel Pettigrew was duty as Executive Officer, Intelligence Group, MID, and was not an active member of the Far Eastern Section when the message of 5 December originated. His duties were administrative and consisted in part of redrafting and approving outgoing messages. The reason which I recollect for sending the secret cablegram was that the trend of translated intercepts which had been received by G-2, especially the "Winds Code", indicated danger to the United States and also, because there was believed to be lack of confidence by Edwin T. Layton, Navy intelligence Officer as to Kendall J. Fielder, G-2, Hawaiian Department. It was believed by me that Commander Rochefort had these intercepts, including the "Winds Code" and similar information, available at Hawaii, which had been received either at Hawaii or from the Navy Department in Washington. I understood the Navy had about four or five hundred Naval personnel in Hawaii doing monitoring, breaking, and translating of the Japanese diplomatic codes. [50] During the time in question I was assistant to Colonel Bratton, having reported to him in August 1940, and continued as his assistant until and after 7 December 1941. For the four or five months immediately following August 1940 Colonel Bratton received from the Signal Corps the translated intercepts of Japanese diplomatic messages and delivered certain of these to Colonel Harrison, Aide the Secretary of War; John Stone, secretary to Secretary of State Hull; Colonel Ralph C. Smith, Executive Officer of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, and Colonel Bedell Smith and Colonel Thomas T. Handy or Colonel Bundy in OPD. The procedure followed by Colonel Bratton and myself as his assistant was to destroy all copies of the translated intercepts received except such as were thus distributed, and those distributed were inserted in binders and delivered to the recipients who receipted for them. These receipts and the intercepts which were covered thereby were then later returned to Colonel Bratton or myself as the case might be and the receipts and the intercepts were then destroyed, except one copy of the intercepts which was retained by G-2. At the expiration of the four or five months period referred to following August 1940, Colonel Bratton and I alternated in assembling and delivering these intercepts and continued this practice until about December 1941, although towards the end of this period I handled the sorting and delivering almost exclusively. No record is now available in G-2 to my knowledge of the messages which were thus sorted and delivered, and none was kept because of the top secrecy requirements. While I cannot recollect specifically; the message which I delivered I believe that this information can be obtained elsewhere than in the War Department. For example, the State Department may have briefed and recorded the intercepts. Normally, we would receive daily about fifty to seventy-five of these intercepts which would be sorted to about twenty-five for distribution. Page 26 I recall the intercept, Tokyo to Washington, consisting of fourteen parts, SIS No. 25843, which started coming in the night of 6 December 1941 when I was on duty. Colonel Bratton was also on duty then and saw the message coming in and he remained until about half of it had been received. Thereupon he left and went home at about 9 p. m. I stayed so he could go home and sleep. I waited for the remainder. The fourteenth part, being the final part of the message, was received about 12 that night. Thereupon I left and went home. I returned the next morning to begin the distribution of this intercept consisting of the fourteen parts and I began the distribution of the fourteen parts comprising this intercept about 9 a. m. on 7 December 1941 and finished with the delivery to the State Department as Kurusu and Nomura were meeting with the Secretary of State, When I delivered the copy for OPD that morning I handed it to then Colonel Thomas T. Handy who, upon reading it, said to me "This means war," or words to that effect. None of these parts comprising this intercept was delivered before the morning of 7 December 1941 because the first half had been received while Colonel Bratton was on duty and he had seen this and had not had it delivered that night; furthermore it being late at night when the final part was received, I did not wish to disturb the usual recipients who were probably at home asleep, as I did not see the implications of immediate hostilities. It is to be noted that the intercept translation SIS 25843 was received by the Army from the Navy and which indicates that the contents thereof were known to the Navy prior to receipt by the Army. [51] I recollect that the intercept, Tokyo to Washington, SIS No. 25850, being the instruction to the ambassadors to deliver the reply to the United States at 1 p. m. on 7 December 1941, was received by G-2 the morning of 7 December 1941. It is my impression that it was received by Colonel Bratton after he arrived that morning, between 9 and 10 a. m. Carlisle Clyde Dusenbury, CARLISE CLYDE DUSENBURY, Colonel, G. S. C. Subscribed and sworn to before me this 13th day of February 1945 at Washington, D. C. Henry C. Clausen, HENRY C. CLAUSEN, Major, JAGD. TOP SECRET [52] AFFIDAVIT OF CAPTAIN JOSEPH J. ROCHEFORT, UNITED STATES NAVY Captain Joseph J. Rochefort, United States Navy, on duty at Office of Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department, Washington, D. G., being first duly sworn, and informed of the investigation by Major Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board and the authority of the Secretary of the Navy with respect to Navy personnel and records, does depose and state: During the period from the fall of 1941 to 7 December 1941 I was the Combat Intelligence Officer in charge of the Combat Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harbor, which was a field unit to the home office at Washington. I was attached to the Headquarters of the Commandant of the 14th Naval District. My duties involved primarily the acquisition of intelligence as directed by the head office in Washington. At Pearl Harbor there was also a Fleet Intelligence Officer and a District Intelligence Officer. My opposite number in the Army in the Pearl Harbor area, was, prior to December 1941, Colonel Kendall J. Fielder, G-2, Hawaiian Department. Prior to and during December 1941, we had established and maintained liaison for the purpose of exchanging information pertaining to our functions on matters of mutual concern to the Army and Navy in the Hawaiian area. For this purpose I had discussions with him and his staff at his headquarters and in Pearl Harbor. During the fall and including the period up to 7 December 1941, we maintained more cordial and close relations, meeting informally. My normal duties during the period from the fall of 1941 to 7 December 1941 did not include the gathering of information or intelligence from Japanese political or diplomatic sources. On occasions, however, I would receive special assignments relating to this type of material. I have read the various documents shown me by Major Clausen, marked Top Secret Exhibit "B". I did not know the substance of any of these before 7 December 1941 except those numbered SIS 25392, SIS 25432, SIS 25545, SIS 25640, and SIS 25787, on the reverse side of which I have Page 27 written my initials and today's date. In my talks with Colonel Fielder I gave him such information as I received concerning the substance of these documents and similar matters. It was my practice to give Colonel Fielder all the information of importance in which the Army and Navy were jointly interested and which came to my knowledge in the course of my duties. This was done so that Colonel Fielder and I would keep abreast of intelligence developments in our common interests. [53] Following are examples of such intelligence. My assignment with respect to those numbered SIS 25392 and SIS 25432, after being informed of the substance thereof, was to monitor for an implementing message and I in turn so informed Colonel Fielder, to the best of my knowledge and recollection, during the latter part of November 1941. I did not receive in Hawaii any implementing message of the kind for which I had been instructed to monitor. Concerning hose numbered SIS 25545, SIS 25640, and SIS 25787, I was informed of the substance thereof and gave this information to Colonel Fielder and Robert L. Shiver, FBI Agent in Charge, Honolulu, about the 4th or 5th of December, 1941. This was done during the course of conversations relating to the destruction of secret papers by the Japanese Consul in Honolulu, which information I gave to my head office in Washington. Joseph J. Rochefort, JOSEPH J. ROCHEFORT, Captain, U. S. Navy. Subscribed and sworn to before me this 20th day of February 1945. Henry C. Clausen, HENRY C. CLAUSEN, Major, JAGD. at Washington, D. C. [54] AFFIDAVIT OF CLARENCE G. JENSEN, COLONEL, AIR CORPS, AUS Clarence G. Jensen, Colonel, Air Corps (0475864), presently assigned to the office of the Assistant Chief of Air Staff, M. & S., Headquarters Army Air Forces, Washington, D. C., being first duly sworn, and informed of the investigation by Major Henry C. Clausen, J. A. G. D., for the Secretary of War supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and that top secrecy is required, deposes and says: That during the period from 14 August to 1 October, 1944, pursuant to instructions, I made diligent search of all War Department pertinent files, and especially hose in the possession of Operational Plans Division, War Department General Staff, and its predecessor, War Plans Division, War Department General Staff covering the period 1 July, 1941, to 7 December, 1941 to ascertain whether a Standing Operating Procedure, dated 5 November 1941, of Lieutenant General Walter C. Short, Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, had been received n the War Department before 7 December, 1941; that among other things I personally searched or supervised a search of the files of The Adjutant General, the War Plans Division and the Army Air Forces, and inquired of those likely to have direct or indirect knowledge of the said Standing Operating Procedure including Major General L. S. Kuter, Air Corps, Brigadier General Robert H. Dunlop, Office of The Adjutant General, and Miss Alice Miller, civilian in charge of the Registered Document Section of Operational Plans Division, WDGS, that his search indicated that no such Standing Operating Procedure was received by the War Department at Washington, D. C., until March of 1942; that I questioned General Dunlop as to whether he remembered having sent in the Standing operating Procedure from Hawaii, he having been Adjutant General of the Hawaiian Department for some months immediately prior to 7 December 1941 and he stated that he had no recollection on the subject; that I also questioned General Kuter, who, by reason of his assignment and duties in Washington with respect to the Air Corps and the War Plans Division, WDGS, during the months immediately preceding 7 December, 1941, would have been likely to remember, whether he had any recollection and he stated he did not; that the net result of my search, therefore, indicated that a copy of the said Standing Operating Procedure was first received at Washington, D. C., in March, 1942, at the time it was receipted for in accordance with the attached photostatic copy-of receipt; that he reference in said receipt to OHD-41 is to a bound volume, Register No. 45, Operations Orders Hawaiian Department, 1941, which contains Standing Operat- Page 28 ing Procedure Hawaiian Department, dated 5 November, 1941, and identifies said Standing Operating Procedure as superseding Tentative Standing Operating Procedure, Hawaiian Department, dated 14 July, 1941; that a letter dated 5 November 1941, attached to said Standing Operating Procedure of 5 November, 1941, directs the collection and destruction of all copies of the said Tentative Standing Operating Procedure; that said Standing Operating Procedure of 5 November, 1941, provides, among other things, in paragraphs 13, 14, 15 and 16 of Section II, as follows: [55] "13. All defense measures are classified under one of the three (3) Alerts as indicated below. Operations under any Alert will be initiated by a Department order, except in case of a surprise hostile attack. See paragraph 15 f (8) below. "14. ALERT NO. 1.-a. This alert is a defense against acts of sabotage and uprising within the islands, with no threat from without. "15. ALERT NO. 2.-a. This alert is applicable to a condition more serious than Alert No. 1. Security against attacks from hostile sub- surface, surface, and aircraft, in addition to defense against acts of sabotage and uprisings, is provided. 16. ALERT NO. 3.-a. This alert requires the occupation of all field positions by all units, prepared for maximum defense of OAHU and the Army installations on outlying islands. * * * * * * *" Signed: CLARENCE G. JENSEN Subscribed and sworn to before me, this 22nd day of February 1945. Henry C. Clausen HENRY C. CLAUSEN Major, JAGD. SECRET [56] HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT, OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER Fort Shafter, T. H., 29 January 1942. In reply refer to: WPD-381-Haw Dept (1-29 42) AG 311.5-OHD-41. Auth: CG, Haw Dept Initials OMM A. G. Date: 29 Jan 1942 Subject: Operation Orders Hawaiian Department 1941. To: War Plans Division, War Department General Staff, Washington, D. C. Herewith Register Nos. 45 of Operations Orders Hawaiian Department, 1941. Request acknowledgment of receipt by signature below. By command of Lieutenant General EMMONS: O. M. McDole O. M. MCDOLE, Major, A. G. .D., Assistant Adjutant General. Incls: Received Registers Nos. 45 of OHD-41. March 10, 1942. J. L. McKee, J. L. MCKEE, Col., G. S. C. TOP SECRET [57] AFFIDAVIT OF MARGARET MCKENNEY Margaret McKenney, civilian clerk in charge, Cable Section, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department, Washington, D. C., being first duly sworn, and informed of the investigation by Major Henry C. Clausen, J. A. G. D., for the Secretary of War supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and that top secrecy is required, deposes and says: That during the month of December, 1941, and thereafter I was a civilian clerk in charge of the Cable Section, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Page 29 G-2, War Department, Washington, D. A., which section collects and delivers incoming and outgoing cables pertaining to the office; that I have read the affidavit of Mary L. Ross and the facts therein set forth appear to my best information and belief to be accurate; that from my experience and knowledge of the customary practice during December, 1941, I believe the 6 December 1941 secret cablegram from General Miles to the Assistant Chief of Staff. Headquarters, G-2, Hawaiian Department, was sent because (1) the yellow copy of the cablegram, a photostatic copy of which is attached to the affidavit of Mary L. Ross was returned in the condition as shown on said copy only if the message was sent, (2) the notations of the number 519 thereon indicates that the message was assigned a number by the Signal Corps code room when it was received from G-2; that the message was then incoded and sent and that then the notation "SENT NO. 519, 12/5" was placed thereon, (3) that the stamp on the reverse side of copy of said yellow copy attached to the affidavit of Colonel Moses W. Pettigrew indicates that it was received in the code room of the Signal Corps at 11:47 a. m. on 5 December 1941, (4) that the numeral "4" in the lower left-hand corner of said cablegram indicates that it is the fourth message that went from G-2 that day and as typed into the outgoing cables receipt book, the page of which is attached to the affidavit of Mary L. Ross, (5) that the said G-2 receipt book, 5 December 1941, shows the outgoing cable messages for that day and that with respect to the cable in question the customary procedure was followed; that in accordance with this procedure the daily serial number 4 of the message was typewritten on said page with the designation, classification, time received in the Cable Section, number 32 being Mary L. Ross as the clerk sending it out, the initials of the originating officer and the paraphrase of the subject matter of the message; the page from the receipt book shows that the message was receipted for in the Signal Corps code room by a clerk using the initials "DG", and that written on the page of the receipt book is the number 519, being the number assigned the message by the Signal Corps under a system to indicate that the message was sent and received by the addressee; (6) that the system indicated by the number 519 tied in with a system of the Signal Corps so that the Hawaiian Department in receiving messages must account for the sequence by numbers and if a number were missing would check back with Washington to locate the missing message; that since no check backs were received with respect to number 519, the system shows that the message was received by the addressee in Hawaii, and (7) that I have also seen the buck-slip, a photostatic copy [58] of which is attached to the affidavit of Mary L. Ross, and on which at the bottom is the handwriting of Colonel Moses W. Pettigrew; that I assisted in the collection of the pertinent documents bearing on the foregoing facts prior to Pearl Harbor and at subsequent intervals and for that reason my memory is clear on the points in which I herein state I have knowledge. Signed: MARGARET MCKENNEY. Subscribed and sworn to before me, this 22nd day of February 1945. Henry C. Clausen HENRY C. CLAUSEN. Major, J.A.G.D. at Washington, D. C. TOP SECRET [59] WAR DEPARTMENT Washington, 25 February 1945. AFFIDAVIT OF COLONEL GEORGE W. BICKNELL, M. I. Colonel George W. Bicknell, M. I., presently assigned to G-2, MIS, Washington, D. C., having been duly sworn and informed of the investigation of Major Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and informed that top secrecy is required, deposes and says: I was Assistant G-2 of the Hawaiian Department in charge of counterintelligence from October 1940 until April 1943. My immediate chief was Colonel Kendall J. Fielder. Prior to this service I had training in G-2 work, and in this connection had served under General Nolan. Page 30 Before 7 December 1941 and in connection with my duties, I developed sources of information which included very close liaison with the FBI in Honolulu whose offices adjoined mine in the Dillingham Building; then Commander Joseph J. Rochefort, USN, Combat Intelligence Officer in charge of the Combat Intelligence Unit, Pearl Harbor; the District Intelligence Officer, Captain Mayfield of the 14th Naval District the Fleet Intelligence Officer, Commander Layton of the Pacific Fleet, the British Secret Intelligence Service, and the various units of the Army. Each Monday I held meetings with Captain Mayfield and Mr. Shivers of the FBI. I knew at the time of 7 December 1941, and for months preceding this date that Commander Rochefort was in charge of the unit which consisted of an intercept radio station, a radio direction finder station, and crypto-analytical units in Pearl Harbor. I caused other sources of information to be available to me such as the FCC intercept radio station, interviews with visitors to Hawaii, the public press, and certain residents of the Hawaiian Islands. Before 7 December 1941, and during the latter part of November 1941, I learned that the Navy had intercepted and decoded Japanese diplomatic messages from Tokyo to Japanese diplomatic representatives to the effect that when a false weather report was broadcast by Tokyo it would be a signal to know that war or breach of diplomatic relations had occurred between Japan and the United States, Russia, or Britain, or one or more of these three, and to destroy their secret codes and papers. The intercepts contained in Top Secret Exhibit "B" shown me by Major Clausen, numbered SIS 25392 and SIS 25432 which I have initialed, contained the substance of the information given me in the latter part of November, 1941. I took immediate action to have the local FCC intercept radio station monitor for the execution message. The FCC later furnished me certain intercepts in pursuance of this request, but which were not the ones for which I was looking. [60] Later, my attention was again called to this "Winds" code information when, before 7 December 1941 and to the best of my recollection on 5 December 1941, I saw on Colonel Fielder's desk a message from the War Department, Washington, D. C., in substance as follows: "DECEMBER 5, 1941. ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF HEADQUARTERS, G2, Hawaiian Department, Honolulu, Territory Hawaii. Contact Commander Rochefort immediately thru commandant Fourteen Naval District regarding broadcasts from Tokyo reference weather. MILES." On the day I saw this message I communicated with Commander Rochefort to ascertain the pertinent information, and I was advised that he also was monitoring for the execution message of the "Winds" code. This information was also given me by Mr. Robert L. Shivers then FBI Agent In Charge, Honolulu. The information they had as to the "Winds" code was the same as that which had been given me. Before 7 December 1941 and about 3 December 1941, I learned from Navy sources of the destruction of codes and papers by Japanese diplomatic representatives in Washington, London, Hong Kong, Singapore, Manila, and elsewhere. I was shown a wire from the Navy Department, Washington, D. C., in effect as set forth on Page 183, Top Secret Volume "C", testimony of Captain L. F. Safford, USN. At about this same time this information was discussed with Commander Rochefort and Mr. Shivers, when Mr. Shivers told me that the FBI had intercepted a telephone message from the Japanese Consulate Honolulu, which disclosed that the Japanese Consul General was burning and destroying all his important papers. In the morning of 6 December 1941, at the usual staff conference conducted by the Chief of Staff for General Short I told those assembled, which included the Chief of Staff, what I had learned concerning the destruction of their important papers by Japanese Consuls, and stated that because of this and concurrent information which I had from proved reliable sources that the destruction of such papers had a very serious intent and that something warlike by Japan was about to happen somewhere. I had previously prepared and signed weekly estimates which were mimeographed and distributed to the Chief of Staff; G 2, Hawaiian Department; G-2, Hawaiian Air Force; G-2, Schofield Barracks; G 3, Hawaiian Department; FBI, Honolulu; and ONI, Honolulu, copies of two of which are set forth Page 31 between pages 3684 and 3695, Secret Transcript, Volume 30. These weekly estimates reflected the information that I had received from the sources I have previously indicated and were in part the means I adopted of conveying he pertinent information to interested parties. In the late afternoon of 6 December 1941, Mr. Shivers told me that the FBI had intercepted a telephone message between Dr. Mori, a Japanese agent then living in Honolulu, and an individual in Tokyo who ostensibly was connected with [61] some newspaper in Tokyo, and that the conversation had been recorded and translated, a copy of which was given me. Mr. Shivers was alarmed at what he considered the military implications in this message concerning Pearl Harbor. I concurred in his views and considered the conversation as very irregular and highly suspicious. I recall that the subjects of discussion between the Japanese which caused me alarm were inquiries by the party in Tokyo as to the fleet, sailors, searchlights, aircraft, weather conditions and references to "hibiscus" and "poinsettias." My G-2 sense told me that there was something very significant about the message. I know the intricacy and subtlety of the Japanese espionage system, that spies sometimes adopt very innocuous means of transmitting military information, and I had in mind he other items of intelligence I had received, including my prior estimates. I reasoned, also, at the time that while the message from Dr. Mori in Honolulu was ostensibly going by radio telephone to Tokyo still it could be intercepted elsewhere. I also considered the Dr. Mori message in the light of the information I had received concerning the destruction by Japanese Consuls of their codes and papers. This was the action which the Japanese Consuls were to take in execution of the "Winds" code. I therefore telephoned Colonel Fielder, it being about 5:15 p. m., 6 December 1941, and told him that it was very necessary for me to come and see him and General Short immediately, that I had something that I considered to be of utmost importance. Colonel Fielder said that he and General Short were going to dinner at Schofield Barracks and since they were all ready to go the matter had better wait until tomorrow. I stated that I though it was too important to wait and that I had to see them right away. I was then told that if I could get out there in ten minutes they would wait for me. I did rush out and make it in ten minutes and handed the intercepted message to General Short who read it with Colonel Fielder. Both Colonel Fielder and General Short indicated hat I was perhaps too "intelligence conscious" and that to them this message seemed to be quite in order, and that it was nothing to be excited about. My conference with General Short and Colonel Fielder was comparatively brief and seemed to last only for about five minutes. Following 7 December 1941, I met General Short while waiting to testify before the Roberts Commission. We were alone and at that time he stated to me words to the effect, "Well, Bicknell, I want you to know that whatever happens you were right and I was wrong." On 7 December 1941, immediately upon commencement of hostilities I caused all action to be taken looking toward the apprehension of Japanese agents for which I had theretofore taken preparatory steps. I caused, also, a search to be made of the Japanese Consulate, his papers seized, some of which he did not have time to destroy, and I had these turned over to Commander Rochefort for our joint investigatory action. As leads I suggest that the files which were kept under my supervision and custody in the Dillingham Building be thoroughly reviewed, that Mr. Jack Russell of the Theodore Davies Company, Honolulu, be questioned concerning the warning [62] to Short supposed to have been sent on 6 December 1941 by the British SIS, Manila; and that in this connection then Lt. Colonel Gerald Wilkinson and then Colonel Field, both of British SIS, be questioned.