Appendix D. Review of the diplomatic conversations between the  
  United States and Japan, and related matters, from the Atlantic 
  Conference in August 1941 through December 8, 1941 .............. 291 
    Introductory statement ........................................ 291 
    Brief resume of the Japanese-American conversations prior to  
      the Atlantic Conference ..................................... 293 
    The Atlantic Conference (August 10-14, 1941) .................. 300 
    President Roosevelt warns Japan against further aggression and  
      at the same time offers to resume the Japanese-American  
      conversations (August 17, 1941) ............................. 302 
    Japan protests United States shipments of oil to Russia  
      (August 27, 1941) ........................................... 305 
  Premier Konoye sends a personal message to President Roosevelt 
    urging the proposed "Leaders Conference" (August 28, 1941) .... 306 
IX                          C O N T E N T S 
Appendix D-Continued                                               Page 
  Germany suspects treachery (August 29-30, 1941) ................. 307 
  President Roosevelt replies to Premier Konoye's message  
    (September 3, 1941) ........................................... 310 
  Japan presents new proposals in a new form (September 6, 1941) .. 311 
  Ambassador Grew supports the proposed "Leaders Conference" 
   (August-September, 1941) ....................................... 314 
  Japan determines its minimum demands and its maximum concessions 
    in the negotiations with the United States  
    (September 6, 1941) ........................................... 316 
  The United States asks Japan to clarify its new proposals  
    (October 2, 1941) ............................................. 319 
  Germany demands that Japan warn the United States that war  
    between Germany and Italy and the United States would lead to  
    war between Japan and the United States pursuant to the  
    Tripartite Pact (October 1941) ................................ 325 
  The Konoye Cabinet falls, and Ambassador Nomura asks permission 
    to return to Japan (October 16, 1941; October 18-November 5, 
    1941) ......................................................... 326 
  The Tojo Cabinet formulates its "Absolutely final proposal"  
    (November 5, 1941) ............................................ 331 
  Ambassador Grew warns that war with Japan may come with  
    "Dramatic and dangerous suddenness" (November 3, 1941) ........ 335 
  Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek appeals to Great Britain and the 
    United States for aid (October 28-November 4, 1941) ........... 337 
  Japan delivers its next-to-last proposal to the United States  
    (November 10, 1941) ........................................... 344 
  The Tojo Cabinet refuses to consider any suggestion less  
    favorable to Japan than its" Absolutely final proposal"  
    (November 18-19, 1941) ........................................ 355 
  Japan delivers its "Absolutely final proposal" to the United  
    States and demands an agreement on that basis  
    (November 20, 1941) ........................................... 360 
  The United States replies (November 26, 1941) ................... 363 
  The Tojo Cabinet makes a pretense of continuing the Japanese- 
    American conversations and at the same time moves additional 
    Japanese troops into southern Indochina  
    (November 27-December 7, 1941) ................................ 387 
  The invasion of Thailand by Japanese forces from French Indochina 
    appears imminent (December 1-7, 1941) ......................... 405 
  Germany tells Japan the time is ripe to strike at the United  
    States, and promises to join with Japan in war against the  
    United States (November 29, 1941) ............................. 409 
  President Roosevelt returns to Washington as the far eastern  
    situation moves rapidly toward a climax (December 1, 1941) .... 411 
  President Roosevelt asks the Japanese Government to explain its 
    purpose in moving additional troops into southern Indochina 
   (December 2, 1941) ............................................. 415 
  The Japanese Government claims its troop movements in French 
    Indochina are for the purpose of defense against an attack by  
    the Chinese (December 5, 1941) ................................ 421 
  The last hours (December 6-8, 1941) ............................. 424 

Page 291

Appendix D
REVIEW OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN, AND RELATED MATTERS, FROM THE ATLANTIC CONFERENCE IN AUGUST, 1941 THROUGH DECEMBER 8,1941
INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT This appendix reviews, upon the basis of the record before the Committee and in greater detail than in Part I of the report to which it is annexed, the diplomatic conversations between the United States and Japan, and related matters, from the Atlantic Conference in August 1941 through December 8, 1941. While it is not to be regarded as including all of the material contained in the record before the Committee that touches upon those conversations during that period, it does attempt to set forth the material facts in connection therewith. Prior to the Committee's investigation, nearly all of the information concerning the diplomatic conversations during 1941 between the United States and Japan that had been made public was contained in the official State Department publications, "Peace and War" (ex. 28) [1] and "Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan, 1931-1941" (ex. 29), together with former Ambassador Joseph C. Grew's book, "Ten Years in Japan" (ex. 30), which were published during the war and were subject to wartime restrictions. To the basic material contained in those publications, the Committee has added hundreds of documents, personal as well as official, from the files of the State Department and of the late President Franklin D. Roosevelt. In addition, the Committee has received in evidence hundreds of messages between the Japanese Foreign Office in Tokyo and the Japanese Ambassadors in Washington as intercepted, translated, and available at the time to high official; in the United States Government in Washington, including President Roosevelt and Secretary of State Cordell Hull. There 1S also before the Committee testimony of former Secretary of State Hull and of former United States Ambassador in Japan Joseph. C. Grew, a prepared statement and answers to interrogatories submitted by former Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, and collateral (regarding diplomatic matters) testimony of Gen. George C. Marshall, Admiral Harold R. Stark, and other high-ranking officers of the Army and Navy. The record before the Committee also contains hundreds of captured Japanese documents, as well as reports of interrogations conducted in Japan for the supreme allied commander, Gen. Douglas MacArthur, at the request of the Committee, many of which are directly concerned with the diplomatic events immediately preceding Pearl Harbor, including an authoritative translation of the memoirs of Prince Fumimaro Konoye, Premier of Japan until October [1] All references in this appendix indicated in this manner are to exhibits introduced at the hearings before the Committee. Page 292 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 16, 1941. This mass of testimony and documentary evidence, from so many different and independent sources, and including official documents of the Japanese and other governments, as well as of the United States Government, affords countless opportunities for verification by cross- checking By interweaving the diplomatic material contained in the documentary evidence and testimony before the Committee, this appendix attempts to reconstruct chronologically the significant events in the diplomatic conversations between the United States and Japan during the 4 months that immediately preceded the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Only thus, for example, can the intercepted Japanese diplomatic messages between Tokyo and Washington be examined in the surrounding circumstances in which they were first seen by high officials in the United States Government, for those messages were the day-to-day instructions sent by the Japanese Foreign Office in Tokyo to the Japanese Ambassadors in Washington for the purpose of guiding them in their conversations with Secretary Hull and President Roosevelt, and the Ambassadors' reports and comments to the Japanese Foreign Office concerning those conversations. While in American hands the diplomatic messages between Tokyo and Washington not only provided Secretary Hull and President Roosevelt with advance knowledge of the Japanese plans for the conduct of the conversations but also were one of the most important and significant types of intelligence information available to the Army and Navy in Washington, they did not contain any information pointing toward Pearl Harbor as a possible target of Japanese attack. Since the report to which this appendix is annexed discusses in detail the military aspects and implications of the diplomatic conversations between the United States and Japan and of the intercepted Japanese diplomatic messages between Tokyo and Washington, no attempt is made here to tie in the events on the "diplomatic front" with the various warning messages sent by the Army and Navy from Washington to the commanders in the Pacific, although the latter messages were to a considerable extent based upon the state of Japanese-American diplomatic relations at the time they were dispatched. Neither does this appendix attempt to describe the process of building up American military strength in the Pacific area which was underway during the period in question, although by taking up the Marshall-Stark joint memoranda of November 5 and November 27 in connection with the events that gave rise to each, it does indicate in general terms the over-all military and naval considerations that affected American policies in the Pacific during the latter part of 1941. Parenthetically, it may be noted here that the inherent relationship between diplomatic policies and military and naval power was succinctly stated by Secretary Hull when he testified before the Committee that soon after he came to the State Department he learned that the representatives of the aggressor nations with whom he talked "were looking over my shoulder at our Navy and our Army," and that the diplomatic strength of the United States went up or down with their estimate of what the United States Army and Navy "amounted to." The record before the Committee shows that the United States Government participated in the conversations with Japan in an effort to dissuade the Japanese Government from its course of military aggression and its Axis ties with Germany and Italy. The fact that PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Page 293 the United States was engaging in such conversations with Japan was believed to strengthen the position of the elements in that country who disapproved of the policies of those who dominated the Japanese Government; success in negotiations with Japan on the basis of the principles to which the United States Government adhered would have had many material and other advantages for both the United States and Japan. American participation in the conversations had the further purpose of giving the United States Army and Navy more time to prepare their defense of areas in the Pacific regarded as vital to the safety and security of the United States. Recognition of this dual purpose is the key to an understanding of the day-to-day course of the conversations. Every action taken, every move made, on the American side must be considered in the light of those objectives. BRIEF RESUME OF THE JAPANESE-AMERICAN CONVERSATIONS PRIOR TO THE ATLANTIC CONFERENCE This narrative begins in August, 1941 with the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Great Britain, in conference on a warship off the coast of Newfoundland, discussing how to prevent the outbreak of war with Japan. It ends on December 7-8, 1941 with Japanese bombs falling on ships of the United States Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbor, with Japanese troops invading Thailand and British Malaya, and with other Japanese attacks on Singapore, Hong Kong, the Philippine Islands, Guam, Wake, and Midway. Into the intervening 4 months were crowded events the causes of which lay deeper and were more fundamental than the Japanese occupation of southern French Indochina in July or the breaking off of the Japanese- American conversations and the freezing of Japanese assets in the United States which had immediately followed that Japanese move. By August 1941, there was but a slim chance that the Japanese Government would "reverse the engine," as Ambassador Grew expressed it, and abandon the course of aggression through force of arms to which it had been committed. Although it was true that the informal conversations in Washington between the new Japanese Ambassador, Admiral Kichisaburo Nomura, had revealed an apparent willingness on the part of the Japanese Government to go along with certain of the peaceful principles to which the United States was committed, *provided those principles were stated in sufficiently general terms to make their application in specific situations wholly unpredictable*, those conversations had disclosed three crucial points of difference between the two Governments: the question of nondiscrimination in international trade, the question of the withdrawal of Japanese troops from China, and the question of Japan's obligations under the Tripartite Pact. During the latter part of January 1941, through private Japanese and American citizens, the suggestion had reached President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull that the Japanese Government would welcome an opportunity to alter its political alignments and modify its attitude toward the "China Incident" (ex. 29, vol. II, PP. 328-329; ex. 179). The initial reaction of the United States Government had been one of caution (ex. 29, vol. II, P. 330). Secretary Hull testified that - "In the light of Japan's past and current record and in view of the wide divergences between the policies which the United States and Japan had been pursuing [Pairs of asterisks have been used to replace italics in the original text. LWJ] Page 294 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK in the Far East, I estimated from the outset that there was not 1 chance in 20 or 1 in 50 or even 1 in 100 of reaching a peaceful settlement. Existing treaties relating to the Far East were adequate, provided the signatory governments lived up to them. We were, therefore, not calling for new agreements. But if there was a chance that new agreements would contribute to peace in the Pacific, the President and I believed that we should not neglect that possibility, slim as it was. "We had in mind doing everything we could to bring about a peaceful, fair and stabilizing settlement of the situation throughout the Pacific area. Such a course was in accordance with the traditional attitudes and beliefs of the American people. Moreover, the President and I constantly had very much in mind the advice of our highest military authorities who kept emphasizing to us the imperative need of having time to build up preparations for defense vital not only to the United States but to many other countries resisting aggression. Our decision to enter into the conversations with the Japanese was, therefore, in line with our need to rearm for self-defense. "The President and I fully realized that the Japanese government could not, even if it wished, bring about an abrupt transformation in Japan's course of aggression. We realized that so much was involved in a reconstruction of Japan's position that implementation to any substantial extent by Japan of promises to adopt peaceful courses would require a long time. We were, therefore, prepared to be patient in an endeavor to persuade Japan to turn from her course of aggression. We carried no chip on our shoulder, but we were determined to stand by a basic position, built on fundamental principles which we applied not only to Japan but to all countries (tr. 1101-11025)." [1] In his early conversations with Ambassador Nomura, who reached Washington in February 1941, Secretary Hull had expressed the hope that the Japanese Government might have something definite in mind that would offer a practical approach to a general settlement of the problems in the Pacific, and had indicated the willingness of the United States Government to consider any proposal which the Japanese Government might offer that was consistent with the principles to which, the Secretary had made it clear, the United States was committed (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 331-332). Secretary Hull testified as follows regarding his meeting on April 16, 1941, with Ambassador Nomura: "On April 16, I had a further conversation with the Japanese Ambassador. I pointed out that *the one paramount preliminary question about which our Government was concerned was a definite assurance in advance that the Japanese Government had the willingness and power to abandon its present doctrine of conquest by force and to adopt four principles which our Government regarded as the foundation upon which relations between nations should rest*, as follows: (1) Respect for the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of each and all nations; (2) Support of the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of other countries; (3) Support of the principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity; (4) Nondisturbance of the status quo in the Pacific except as the status quo may be altered by peaceful means. "I told the Japanese Ambassador that our Government was willing to consider any proposal which the Japanese Government might offer such as could be consistent with those principles (tr. 11041104)." As the result of these early conversations, on May 12 (Washington time), the Japanese Ambassador had presented to Secretary Hull, upon instructions from his Government, a document (Annex A attached hereto) containing a proposal for a general settlement between the United States and Japan (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 418-425). This document had revealed authoritatively for the first time what the Japanese Government had in mind as the basis for an agreement [1] All references in this appendix indicated in this manner are to pages of the transcript of the hearings before the Committee. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Page 295 between the United States and Japan (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 332). Between May 12 and June 21, there had taken place a number of conferences between Secretary Hull and the Japanese Ambassador at which the Japanese proposal and related matters were discussed. In the meantime a counterproposal by the United States had been prepared, and on June 21 (Washington time) this counterproposal (Annex B attached hereto) had been handed to the Japanese Ambassador (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 483-492). On June 22, 1941, Germany had invaded Russia. The German attack upon Russia had precipitated a series of events in Japan which were to have far-reaching effects upon Japanese-American relations. It had quickened the appetites of those in the Japanese Government who believed that then, or never, Japan's destiny was in her own hands. Intensive consideration had immediately been given in Tokyo to the question whether Japan should not attack Russia at once (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, p. 16). Foreign Minister Matsuoka in particular had urged this course. According to the memoirs of Prince Fumimaro Konoye, the Japanese Premier at the time, the attention of the Government became so centered upon this question that the American counterproposal of June 21, which by that time had been received in Tokyo from the Japanese Ambassador in Washington, became completely side-tracked until after an Imperial Conference with Emperor Hirohito on July 2 (Japan time) (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, pp. 16, 18). At that conference the question of war with Russia had been temporarily shelved in favor of "an advance into the southern regions," and it had been decided that, first of all, the plans "which have been laid with reference to French Indo-China and Thai will be prosecuted, with a view to consolidating our position in the southern territories" (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, p. 70; cf. Ex. 1, pp. 1-2.) It is now known that at the Imperial Conference on July 2 (Japan time) it was also decided that, in case the diplomatic negotiations with the United States should break down, "preparations for a war with England and America will also be carried forward"; that all plans, including the plan to use Japan's military strength to settle the Soviet question if the German-Russian war should develop to Japan's advantage, were to be carried out- "in such a way as to place no serious obstacles in the path of our basic military preparations for a war with England and America;" and that- "In case all diplomatic means fail to prevent the entrance of America into the European War, we will proceed in harmony with our obligations under the Tri-Partite Pact. However, with reference to the time and method of employing our armed forces we will take independent action (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, P. 71)." The following report of the Imperial Conference on July 2 (Japan time) had been cabled by the Japanese Foreign Minister to the Japanese Ambassadors in the United States, Germany, Italy, and Russia, the same day: "(National Secret) "At the conference held in the presence of the Emperor on July 2nd 'The Principal Points in the Imperial Policy for Coping with the Changing Situation' were decided. This Policy consists of the following two parts. The first part 'The Policy' and the second part 'The Principal Points.' (I am wiring merely the gist of the matter.) Inasmuch as this has to do with national defense secrets, keep Page 296 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK the information only to yourself. Please also transmit the content to both the Naval and Military Attaches, together with this precaution. The Policy. 1. Imperial Japan shall adhere to the policy of contributing to world peace by establishing the Great East Asia Sphere of Co-prosperity, regardless of how the world situation may change. 2. The Imperial Government shall continue its endeavor to dispose of the China incident, *and shall take measures with a view to advancing southward* in order to establish firmly a basis for her self-existence and self-protection. The Principal Points. For the purpose of bringing the CHIANG Regime to submission, *increasing pressure shall be added from various points in the south*, and by means of both propaganda and fighting plans for the taking over of concessions shall be carried out. Diplomatic negotiations shall be continued, and various other plans shall be speeded with regard to the vital points in the south. *Concomitantly, preparations for southward advance shall be reinforced and the policy already decided upon with reference to French Indo-China and Thailand shall be executed*. As regards the Russo-German war, although the spirit of the Three-Power Axis shall be maintained, every preparation shall be made at the present and the situation shall be dealt with in our own way. In the meantime, diplomatic negotiations shall be carried on with extreme care. Although every means available shall be resorted to in order to prevent the United States from joining the war, if need be, *Japan shall act in accordance with the Three-Power Pact and shall decide when and how force will be employed* (ex. 1, pp. 1-2)." [1] It is worthy of note that this intercepted Japanese message, which was translated and available in Washington [2] on July 8 (Washington time), did not mention the decisions at the Imperial Conference respecting the United States. Commencing immediately after the Imperial Conference, Japan had proceeded with military preparations on a vast scale, calling up from 1 to 2 million reservists and conscripts, recalling Japanese merchant vessels operating in the Atlantic Ocean, imposing restrictions upon travel in Japan, and carrying out strict censorship of mail and communications. The Japanese press had dwelt constantly on the theme that Japan was being faced with pressure directed against it never equaled in all Japanese history. The United States had been charged with using the Philippine Islands as a "pistol aimed at Japan's heart." The Japanese press had warned that if the United States took further action in the direction of encircling Japan, Japanese-American relations would face a final crisis (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 339-340). Largely as a result of disagreements within the Japanese Government regarding the reply to be made to the American proposals of June 21, Premier Konoye and his entire Cabinet had resigned *en bloc* on July 16 (Japan time) (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, pp. 20-24). Prince Konoye had then been ordered by Emperor Hirohito to organize the new Cabinet, which he had done, the only important change being the appointment of Admiral Toyoda as Foreign Minister, in place of Yosuke Matsuoka (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, p. 25). The views of the latter had been one of the principal causes of the disagreements within the Government regarding its reply to the [1] Unless otherwise noted, all italics in this appendix have been supplied. [2] The expression "translated and available in Washington," as used in this appendix, means that English translations of the particular intercepted Japanese diplomatic messages were available at the time stated to those officials of the United States Government in Washington to whom the Army and Navy were distributing "Magic" at the time. It should be borne in mind that all such messages to which reference is made in this appendix were so available: specific reference has been made to the date when a message became available only in those instances where knowledge of the exact date is important. While the information contained in the intercepted Japanese diplomatic messages was available at the time, the information contained herein which is derived solely from captured Japanese documents (exhibits 8 and 132) and from the memoirs of Prince Konoye (exhibit 173) was not, of course, available at the time. American proposals of June 21. Following this Cabinet change while Premier Konoye and the new Foreign Minister in Tokyo and Ambassador Nomura in Washington had made emphatic and repeated protestations of Japan's desire for peace and an equitable settlement of Pacific problems, the messages from Tokyo to Washington had contained such statements as "there is more reason than ever before to arm ourselves to the teeth for all-out war" (ex. 1, p. 8). The bombing of American property in China had continued, including bursts which damaged the American Embassy and the U. S. S. TUTUILA at Chungking (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 343). An intercepted message of July 19 (Japan time) from Tokyo to Berlin had contained the following estimate of the change in the Japanese Cabinet: "The Cabinet shake-up was necessary to expedite matters in connection with National Affairs and has no further significance. Japan's foreign policy will not be changed and she will remain faithful to the principles of the Tripartite Pact (ex. 1, p. 3)." In the meantime, the movement of Japanese troops and ships in accordance with the Japanese plans for the "southward advance" had begun in earnest, (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 340; ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, p. 26). Those military and naval movements, plus the failure as yet of the Japanese Government to make any reply to the American proposals of June 21, had led Under Secretary Welles, upon instructions from the Secretary of State, to inform Ambassador Nomura on July 23 (Washington time) that Secretary Hull "could not see that there was any basis now offered for the pursuit of the conversations in which he and the Ambassador had been engaged" (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 525). About this time, Colonel Hideo Iwakuro and Mr. Tadao Wikawa, who had been advising Ambassador Nomura in the conversations, left Washington and returned to Japan. On July 24 (Washington time), in a conference with the Japanese Ambassador attended by Under Secretary Welles and Admiral Harold R. Stark, Chief of Naval Operations, President Roosevelt had proposed that, if the Japanese Government would withdraw its forces from French Indochina, he would endeavor to obtain from the British, the Chinese, and the Netherlands Governments, and the United States Government itself would give, a solemn and binding declaration to regard French Indochina as a neutralized country, provided the Japanese Government would give a similar commitment (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 527-530). Nevertheless, the Japanese troop movements into French Indochina had continued, and on July 26 (Washington time) President Roosevelt had issued an Executive order freezing all Japanese assets in the United States (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 267). The effect of this order had been to bring about very soon the virtual cessation of trade between the United States and Japan (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 343). In a message dated July 31 (Japan time), which was translated and available in Washington on August 4 (Washington time), the new Foreign Minister had advised Ambassador Nomura that since the Imperial Conference on July 2 (Japan time) the Japanese Government had been devoting every effort to bring about the materialization of the policies there decided upon. He told the Ambassador: "Commercial and economic relations between Japan and third countries, led by England and the United States, are gradually becoming so horribly strained that we cannot endure it much longer. Consequently, our Empire, to save its very life, must take measures to secure the raw materials of the South Seas. Our Empire Page 298 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK must immediately take steps to break asunder this ever-strengthening chain of encirclement which is being woven under the guidance and with the participation of England and the United States, acting like a cunning dragon seemingly asleep. That is why we decided to obtain military bases in French Indo-China and to have our troops occupy that territory. "That step in itself, I dare say, gave England and the United States, not to mention Russia quite a set-back in the Pacific that ought to help Germany, and now Japanese-American relations are more rapidly than ever treading the evil road. This shows what a blow it has been to the United States. [Discontinuous text] "We are expending our best efforts to cooperate with Germany. She knows it and ought to understand our actions. "6. Well, the formula for cooperation between Tokyo and Berlin, in order to realize the fundamental spirit of the Tripartite Pact, should be for each country to have a certain flexibility in its conduct. What I mean to say is that each should understand that real cooperation does not necessarily mean complete symmetry of action. In other words, we should trust each other and while striving toward one general objective, each use our own discretion within the bounds of good judgment. "Thus, all measures which our Empire shall take will be based upon a determination to bring about the success of the objectives of the Tripartite Pact. That this is a fact is proven by the promulgation of an Imperial rescript. We are ever working toward the realization of those objectives, and now during this dire emergency is certainly no time to engage in any light unpremeditated or over-speedy action. (Ex. 1, pp. 9- 10.)" In the meantime, a reply to the American proposals of June 21 had been transmitted on July 25 (Japan time) to Ambassador Nomura in Washington (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, p. 26). He had not presented it to Secretary Hull, however, because of the change in Japanese Cabinets, because he thought it would not be acceptable to the United States Government, and because he had received no instructions from the new Cabinet as to how to proceed under the circumstances (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, p. 26). Still another proposal had then been drawn up in Tokyo and this new proposal had been presented to Secretary Hull on August 6 by Ambassador Nomura with the statement that it was intended to be responsive to President Roosevelt's suggestion for the neutralization of French Indochina (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 546-550). The new Japanese proposal had asked, either expressly or by implication, that the United States- "(1) remove the restrictions it had imposed upon trade with Japan; (2) suspend its defensive preparations in the Philippines; (3) discontinue furnishing military equipment to Great Britain and the Netherlands for the arming of their Far Eastern possessions; (4) discontinue aid to the Chinese Government; and (5) assent to Japan's assertion and exercise of a special military position and a permanent preferential political and economic status in Indochina, involving, as this would, assent to procedures and disposals which menaced the security of the United States and which were contrary to the principles to which this Government was committed. In return the Japanese Government offered not to station Japanese troops in regions of the southwestern Pacific other than Indochina. It proposed to retain its military establishment in Indochina for an indeterminate period. There thus would still have remained the menace to the security of the United States, already mentioned, as well as the menace to the security of British and Dutch territories in the southwestern Pacific area (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 344)." About this time, in Tokyo, Premier Konoye had determined to propose a personal meeting between himself and President Roosevelt (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, p. 29). It is now known that he had presented this idea to the Ministers of War and Navy on August 4 (Japan time). Before that day ended, the Navy Minister had expressed complete accord and had even anticipated the success of the proposed conference (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, p. 30). The Minister of War, General Tojo, however, had replied in writing as follows: PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Page 299 "If the Prime Minister were to personally meet with the President of the United States, the existing diplomatic relations of the Empire, which are based on the Tripartite Pact, would unavoidably be weakened. At the same time, a considerable domestic stir would undoubtedly be created. For these reasons, the meeting is not considered a suitable move. The attempt to surmount the present critical situation by the Prime Minister's offering his personal services, is viewed with sincere respect and admiration. If, therefore, it is the Prime Minister's intention to attend such a meeting *with determination to firmly support the basic principles embodied in the Empire's Revised Plan to the "N" Plan and to carry out a war against America if the President of the United States still fails to comprehend the true intentions of the Empire even after this final effort is made*, the Army is not necessarily in disagreement. "However, (1) it is not in favor of the meeting if after making preliminary investigations it is learned that the meeting will be with someone other than the President, such as Secretary Hull or one in a lesser capacity. (2) *You shall not resign your post as a result of the meeting on the grounds that it was a failure; rather, you shall be prepared to assume leadership in the war against America* (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, pp. 30-31)." On August 7 (Japan time) Premier Konoye had been instructed by Emperor Hirohito to proceed immediately with arrangements for the meeting (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, p. 31). That day the Premier had sent a telegram to Ambassador Nomura, which was translated and available in Washington on August 8 (Washington time), directing him to propose such a meeting (ex. 1, pp. 12-13). Ambassador Nomura and Secretary Hull had met on August 8 (Washington time), and at that meeting the Ambassador had presented the proposal for a meeting between President Roosevelt and Premier Konoye. Secretary Hull had informed the Ambassador that the new Japanese proposal of August 6 was not responsive to President Roosevelt's suggestion of July 24 (Washington time) mentioned above, and, regarding the proposal for a meeting between the President and Premier Konoye, had said that it remained for the Japanese Government to decide whether it could find means of shaping its policies along lines that would make possible an adjustment of views between the two Governments (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 550-551). The next day, August 9 (Washington time), Secretary Hull had conferred with Lord Halifax, the British Ambassador, who had inquired about the amount of aid the United States Government would be able to give in case the Japanese should attack Singapore or the Dutch East Indies. Secretary Hull recorded: "I replied that I myself have visualized the problem and issue in a broader way and that issue is presented by the plan of the Japanese to invade by force the whole of the Indian Ocean and the islands and continents adjacent thereto, isolating China, sailing across probably to the mouth of the Suez Canal, to the Persian Gulf oil area, to the Cape of Good Hope area, thereby blocking by a military despotism the trade routes and the supply sources to the British. I added that this broad military occupation would perhaps be more damaging to British defense in Europe than any other step short of the German crossing of the Channel. I said that this Government visualizes these broad conditions and the problem of resistance which they present; that the activities of this Government in the way of discouraging this Japanese movement and of resistance will be more or less affected by the British defensive situation in Europe and hence by the question of the number of American naval vessels and other American aid that may be needed by Great Britain at the same time. I said that in the event of further Japanese movements south this Government and the British Government should naturally have a conference at once and this Government would then be able to determine more definitely and in detail its situation pertaining to resistance, in the light of the statement I had just made (ex. 28, pp. 710-711). Page 300 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Except that President Roosevelt had left Washington for the Atlantic Conference meeting with Prime Minister Churchill before either of the two last-mentioned conferences, [1] the foregoing summarizes briefly the immediate background for that Conference so far as relations between the United States and Japan were concerned. The Japanese move into southern French Indochina while at the same time in Washington Ambassador Nomura was engaging in conversations with Secretary Hull looking toward a peaceful settlement of problems in the Pacific, and the consequent breaking off of those conversations, together with the freezing of Japanese assets in the United States, had brought relations between the two countries to a critical stage. Moreover, French Indochina, where the Japanese forces were establishing themselves, was an area of great strategic importance. From it, those forces could strike in many directions, toward major objectives. To the east, across the South China Sea lay the Philippines. To the west and northwest, across Thailand and the Chinese province of Yunnan, lay Rangoon, Kunming, and the Burma Road, over which American supplies for China were moving. To the south, at the tip of the Malay Peninsula, lay the British naval base at Singapore. Beyond Singapore and the Philippines lay the Netherlands East Indies, with rubber, oil, and other materials needed by Japan for the purposes to which the Japanese Government was committed. When Under Secretary Welles informed Ambassador Nomura on July 23 (Washington time) that the conversations were at an end, he said that the United States could only assume, first- "that the occupation of Indochina by Japan constituted notice to the United States that the Japanese Government intended to pursue a policy of force and of conquest, and, second, that in the light of these acts on the part of Japan, the United States, with regard to its own safety in the light of its own preparations for self-defense, must assume *that the Japanese Government was taking the last step before proceeding upon a policy of totalitarian expansion in the South Seas and of conquest in the South Seas through the seizure of additional territories in that region* (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 525). THE ATLANTIC CONFERENCE (August 9-14, 1941) The meeting between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, each accompanied by high officials of their respective Governments, took place at sea near Argentia, Newfoundland, during the second week in August 1941. At it the President and the Prime Minister agreed upon the joint declaration of principles which has since become known as the Atlantic Charter (tr. 1359-1364). Their conversations also dealt with steps which Great Britain and the United States were taking for their safety in the face of the policies of aggression of the German Government and other governments associated with the German Government. They discussed such matters as the proposed occupation of the Canary Islands by the British Government to guard the southern Atlantic convoy route into the [1] Former Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles testified, however, that he believed he (Welles) left Washington for the Atlantic Conference the evening of August 8 (Washington time) (tr. 1254). PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Page 301 British Isles, a proposal that the Portuguese Government request the Government of the United States for assistance in the defense of the Azores as a means of assurance that those islands would not be occupied by Germany, and the protection of the Cape Verde Islands against Axis aggressors (ex. 22-C). The President and the Prime Minister also discussed the situation in the Far East. During those discussions Mr. Churchill submitted a proposal for parallel declarations by the United States, British, and Dutch Governments warning Japan against new moves of military aggression. [1] This proposal also contemplated that the Russian Government would be kept fully informed of such steps (ex. 22). The final discussion of Mr. Churchill's proposal occurred on August 11 (ex. 22-C). According to Under Secretary Welles' record of that discussion- "The President gave Mr. Churchill to read copies of the two statements handed to Secretary Hull by the Japanese Ambassador on August 6. "The Prime Minister read them carefully and then remarked that the implication was that Japan, having already occupied Indochina, said that she would move no further provided the United States would abandon their economic and financial sanctions and take no further military or naval defensive measures and further agree to concessions to Japan, including the opportunity for Japan to strangle the Chinese Government, all of which were particularly unacceptable (ex. 22-C)." The President replied that that was about the picture as he saw it, and after expressing his strong feeling that "every effort should be made to prevent the outbreak of war with Japan," he stated the procedure with respect to Japan that he intended to follow upon his return to Washington. He told the Prime Minister that he would inform Ambassador Nomura that if the Japanese Government would give satisfactory assurances that it would not further station its troops in the Southwestern Pacific areas, except French Indochina, and that the Japanese troops now stationed in French Indochina would be withdrawn, the United States Government-would-resume the informal conversations with the Japanese Government. He said that he would further state that if Japan should refuse to consider this procedure and should undertake further steps in the nature of military expansions, in his belief various steps would have to be taken by the United States notwithstanding his realization that the taking of such measures might result in war between the United States and Japan (ex 22-C). Mr. Churchill immediately concurred in this procedure (ex 22-C). There was then discussed- "the desirability of informing Russia of the steps which would be taken as above set forth and of possibly including in the warning to Japan a statement which would cover any aggressive steps by Japan against the Soviet Union (ex. 22-C)." Under Secretary Welles expressed the view that the real issue involved was whether or not Japan would continue its policy of conquest by force in the entire Pacific and suggested that the statement which the President intended to make- "might more advantageously be based on the question of broad policy rather than be premised solely upon Japanese moves in the southwestern Pacific area (ex. 22-C). [1] The record before the Committee also shows that in February 1941, just before the Lend-Lease Act-described by Prime Minister Churchill as "the Bill on which our hopes depend"-was enacted by Congress, the Prime Minister and Lord Halifax, the British Ambassador, had urged upon President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull their desire for some action by the United States "to deter the Japanese" (ex. 158). Page 302 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK The President and Mr. Churchill both agreed to this, and "*it was decided that the step to be taken by the President* [1] would be taken in that sense" (ex. 22-C). Consideration was then given the question whether or not President Roosevelt should include in his statement to Ambassador Nomura a statement with respect to British policy concerning French Indochina and Thailand (ex. 22-C). However, since the statement ultimately made by the President to Ambassador Nomura did not mention British policy concerning those countries this latter proposal appears to have been dropped (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 554-559). Under Secretary Welles returned to Washington from Argentia several days before President Roosevelt, at the latter's request. Upon his arrival, he advised Secretary Hull of what had transpired there, and, at the President's further request, he prepared the initial draft (ex. 22) of the proposed warning to Japan from notes he had made of his final conversation with the President before leaving Argentia (tr. 1259). A revised draft was given to Secretary Hull by Mr. Welles on August 16, 1941 (ex. 22-A), and was further revised by the Secretary and his advisors on Far Eastern affairs before being communicated to Ambassador Nomura by the President (tr. 1272). PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT WARNS JAPAN AGAINST FURTHER AGGRESSION AND AT THE SAME TIME OFFERS TO RESUME THE JAPANESE-AMERICAN CONVERSATIONS (August 17, 1941) President Roosevelt returned to Washington Sunday morning, August 17 (Washington time) . Late that afternoon, Ambassador Nomura met with the President and Secretary Hull at the White House, at the President's request (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 554 et seq.; ex. 124). [2] Mr. Roosevelt read and then handed to Admiral Nomura the document [1] The evidence before the Committee is conflicting as to whether or not Prime Minister Churchill promised President Roosevelt that the British Government would take action parallel to that to be taken by the United States Government. The only contemporaneous records of the Atlantic Conference before the Committee are three memoranda prepared by Under Secretary Welles (ex. 22-B, 22-C, 22-D). Those memoranda show that the procedure outlined by President Roosevelt differed substantially from that envisaged in Prime Minister Churchill's proposal. As there described by Mr. Welles, the President's procedure did not call for parallel action by either the British or Dutch Governments, or for keeping Russia informed, as Mr. Churchill had proposed. Nor, as is the case of Mr. Churchill's proposal, was the precise phraseology of the warning to Japan prescribed, it being left entirely up to the President. Mr. Welles testified that the promise given by the President to Mr. Churchill "was limited to the fact that a warning would be given" (tr. 1422) and that the only agreement reached between the President and the Prime Minister was "that the President made the promise to Mr. Churchill that the Government of the United States, in its own words and in its own way, would issue a warning to the Japanese Government of the character which actually was made by the President on August 17" (tr. 1428). While it is true that Mr. Welles testified that the promise made by President Roosevelt was to "take parallel action with the British Government in warning the Japanese Government" (tr. 12354) and that he "took it for granted Mr. Churchill must have made that statement" (i. e. promised to make a parallel warning) to the President (tr. 1446), it is also true that when asked directly whether the President had told him that Mr. Churchill had promised to make a parallel warning, Mr. Welles said, "the President in his conversation with me, so far as I remember, did not make that specific statement" (tr. 1446). Moreover, as previously noted, the Welles' memoranda neither state nor indicate that any such promise was made by Mr. Churchill (ex. 22-B, 22-C, 22-D), and there is no evidence before the Committee showing that action parallel to the President's warning to Japan was ever taken by the British Government. On the other hand both "Peace and War" {ex. 28, p. 129) and "Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan 1931-1941" (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 345) refer to an "agreement" to take parallel action made by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, though, of course, neither of these purports to be a contemporaneous account of the Atlantic Conference. Likewise, in his testimony before the Committee, Secretary Hull referred to such an "agreement." Though again Secretary Hull did not attend the Atlantic Conference (tr. 1116). [2] This discussion of the meeting referred to in the text, and the discussions in this appendix of other meetings in Washington or Tokyo between representatives of the United States Government and the Japanese Government, are based primarily upon the official State Department records of such meetings appearing in Volumes I and II of " Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan, 1931-1941" (ex. 29) and upon intercepted Japanese messages between Washington and Tokyo reporting such meetings, the Committee exhibits in which such messages appear being indicated-in all cases. Reference is made to such records and reports, only the material portions of which have been quoted or summarized here. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Page 303 drafted by Mr. Welles and the Secretary. It noted that notwithstanding the protracted conversations engaged in by the United States and Japanese Governments looking toward a peaceful settlement in the Pacific and the President's suggestion on July 24, 1941, for the "neutralization" of French Indochina, the Japanese Government had continued to dispose its armed forces at various points in the Far East and had occupied French Indochina. Reading from the document, President Roosevelt said that the United States Government felt that at the present stage "nothing short of the most complete candor on its part in the light of the evidence and indications" in its possession would tend to further the objectives sought. He then warned Japan against further aggression, saying: "Such being the case, this Government now finds it necessary to say to the Government of Japan that if the Japanese Government takes any further steps in pursuance of a policy or program of military domination by force or threat of force of neighboring countries, the Government of the United States will be compelled to take immediately any and all steps which it may deem necessary toward safe-guarding the legitimate rights and interests of the United States and American nationals and toward insuring the safety and security of the United States (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 556-557)." On behalf of his Government, Ambassador Nomura reasserted the sincerity of its desire to bring about an adjustment of Japanese-American diplomatic relations. He expressed his Government's desire to be advised as to the possibility of arranging a meeting between President Roosevelt and Premier Konoye and of resuming the informal conversations which had been terminated by the United States in July because of the Japanese occupation of southern French Indochina. He stated, however, that he felt no further explanations regarding his Government's actions in French Indochina, in addition to the views already expressed to Secretary Hull, were necessary. The President then read and handed to Ambassador Nomura a second document. It opened with a reference to the Japanese proposal of August 8 (Washington time) for a meeting between himself and Premier Konoye and to the Japanese desire for resumption of the informal conversations. The President said that the United States Government would be prepared to resume the conversations provided the Japanese Government felt that Japan desired and was in a position to suspend its expansionist activities, and to embark upon a peaceful program for the Pacific along the lines of the program to which the United States was committed. His statement concluded: "the Government of the United States, however, feels that, in view of the circumstances attending the interruption of the informal conversations between the two Governments, it would be helpful to both Governments, before undertaking a resumption of such conversations or proceeding with plans for a meeting, if the Japanese Government would be so good as to furnish a clearer statement than has yet been furnished as to its present attitude and plans, just as this Government has repeatedly outlined to the Japanese Government its attitude and plans (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 559)." In Ambassador Nomura's report to Tokyo on this meeting, he emphasized the "graveness with which he (President Roosevelt) views Japanese-U. S. relations." The Ambassador expressed the view that the Japanese proposal for a "leaders' conference" between President Roosevelt and Premier Konoye had "considerably eased" the attitude of the United States Government and that there was no room for doubt "that the President hopes that matters will take a turn for the better" (ex 124). Page 304 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK The next day, August 18 (Washington time), President Roosevelt sent a message to Prime Minister Churchill describing his meeting with Ambassador Nomura. This message indicates that the President did not learn until after his return to Washington of the Ambassador's request on August 16 (Washington time) for a resumption of the informal conversations. In his message, the President told Mr. Churchill that- "I made to him (Admiral Nomura) a statement covering the position of this Government with respect to the taking by Japan of further steps in the direction of military domination by force along the lines of the proposed statement such as you and I had discussed. The statement I made to him was no less vigorous than and was substantially similar to the statement we had discussed (ex. 70)." The evidence before the Committee does not show whether or not the British Government took "parallel action" to the warning given Japan by President Roosevelt. Under Secretary Welles testified before the Committee that he took it for granted that the British Government took such parallel action and that the records of the State Department would probably show that (tr. 1279), but Secretary Hull testified, and the State Department has advised the Committee, that its files contain no record of any such action (tr. 14, 306; 4480). Furthermore, as late as November 30 (Washington time), Prime Minister Churchill sent a message to the President saying that "one important method remains unused in averting war between Japan and our two countries, namely a plain declaration, secret or public as may be thought best, that any further act of aggression by Japan will lead immediately to the gravest consequences. * * * We would, of course, make a similar declaration or share in a joint declaration" (ex. 24); and the evidence further shows that on December 7 the Prime Minister submitted to President Roosevelt a draft of a proposed warning to Japan (tr. 13738-13740). On the other hand, on August 25, 1941, in an address reporting to Parliament on the Atlantic Conference, the Prime Minister said: "But Europe is not the only continent to be tormented and devastated by aggression. For five long years the Japanese military factions, seeking to emulate the style of Hitler and Mussolini, taking all their posturing as if it were a new European revelation, have been invading and harrying the 500,000,000 inhabitants of China. Japanese armies have been wandering about that vast land in futile excursions, carrying with them carnage, ruin and corruption, and calling it "the Chinese incident." Now they stretch a grasping hand into the southern seas of China. They snatch Indo-China from the wretched Vichy French. They menace by their movements Siam, menace Singapore, the British link with Australasia, and menace the Philippine islands under the protection of the United States. "It is certain that this has got to stop. Every effort will be made to secure a peaceful settlement. The United States are laboring with infinite patience to arrive at a fair and amicable settlement which will give Japan the utmost reassurance for her legitimate interests. We earnestly hope these negotiations will succeed. But this I must say: That if these hopes should fail we shall, of course, range ourselves unhesitatingly at the side of the United States (tr. 1355-1356; 4480- 4481)." While Secretary Hull testified that he knew of no parallel action taken by the British other than this address (tr. 14306), which was broadcast by radio, Under Secretary Welles testified that in his opinion this address did not constitute "parallel action" of the kind proposed by Mr. Churchill to the President, and that in Mr. Welles' PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Page 305 judgment such action would necessarily have had to have been in the form of an exchange of diplomatic notes (tr. 1356). [1] On August 21 (Washington time) President Roosevelt sent a message to Congress describing the meeting at Argentia (tr. 1359-1364). This message embodied the text of the "Atlantic Charter" and referred in general terms to other matters discussed at the meeting, but made no specific mention of the proposal to issue a warning to Japan. Under Secretary Welles testified that publication of the proposal to issue a warning to Japan or of the President's warning, itself, would not have been conducive to a successful result in attempting to find a peaceful solution, as it would have inflamed public opinion in Japan (tr. 1277). JAPAN PROTESTS UNITED STATES SHIPMENTS OF OIL TO RUSSIA (August 27, 1941) The Japanese reply to President Roosevelt's request on August 17 (Washington time) for a " clearer statement than has yet been furnished as to its present attitude and plans" was not received until August 28 (Washington time). During the interval between those dates, Ambassador Nomura reported to the Japanese Foreign Office an increasing interest on the part of President Roosevelt in participating in the resumption of the Japanese-American negotiations and stated that, in his opinion, "the President is the one who shows the most interest in the 'leaders conference' " (ex. 124). About the same time the Ambassador received a report from Tokyo concerning the Foreign Minister's talk with Ambassador Grew on August 18 (Japan time) at which Ambassador Grew indicated that he would give the proposed meeting his personal support (ex. 124). On August 23 (Japan time) the Foreign Minister cabled Ambassador Nomura that "everything in our power" was being done " to rush our reply to the United States and at the same time to bring about the 'leaders conference' at an earlier date" (ex. 124). The next day Ambassador Nomura called of Secretary Hull and reported that his Government wanted the "leaders conference" to take place before October 15. The reason he gave for this was the fear in Tokyo that the impression would be created that Japan " had given in in the face of the threat of 'encirclement' " if the proposed Roosevelt-Konoye meeting should follow a reported British-U. S.-Soviet conference to be held at an earlier date (ex. 124; ex. 29, vol. II, p. 568). At about this time the German Ambassador in Japan, General Ott, received intelligence reports that the United States was preparing to ship oil to Russia via Vladivostok, that the first of the transporting vessels had already sailed, that they would soon sail in rapid succession, and that the oil would undoubtedly be used by Russia for an attack upon Japan. General Ott repeated this information to the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs during an interview on August 19 (Japan time), and in reply the Vice Minister said that the problem of American oil was receiving very careful attention (ex. 132-A, item C). The nest day, and again on August 22 (Japan time), the Foreign [1] There is also before the Committee a memorandum of Dr. Stanley K. Hornbeck, Political Advisor to Secretary Hull, dated, however, February 28, 1944, in which it is stated that toward the end of August 1941, the British and American Governments "served on Japan a strong warning" against further extending her courses of aggression (ex. 108). Page 306 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Minister cabled Ambassador Nomura requesting him to call the attention of the United States authorities to the fact that if it should become known in Japan that the United States was shipping iron, airplanes, and other materials to Russia by way of Japanese coastal waters, this might have an adverse effect upon Japanese-American relations (ex. 1, p. 19; ex. 124). Ambassador Nomura told Secretary Hull during their conversation on August 23 (Washington time) that the shipment of oil by the United States to Russia through Japanese waters "would naturally give the Japanese real concern at an early date" (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 566). A more urgent message concerning this matter was sent from Tokyo to Ambassador Nomura on August 26 (Japan time) requesting him to "make representations again to the Secretary of State in order that he may reconsider an immediate cessation of these measures from the general viewpoint of the current Japan-American diplomatic relations" (ex. 1, p. 21 ) . Representations of this nature were made to Ambassador Grew in Tokyo the next day (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 569), and on August 27 (Washington time) Ambassador Nomura orally protested to Secretary Hull against American shipments of oil to Russia through Japanese waters. Secretary Hull stated that only two tankers were involved and that the shipments were entirely valid under all the laws of commerce (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 570). PREMIER KONOYE SENDS A PERSONAL MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT URGING THE PROPOSED "LEADERS CONFERENCE" (August 28, 1941) Premier Konoye replied to President Roosevelt's statement of August 17 (Washington time) in a personal message which Ambassador Nomura handed to the President at a conference at the White House on the morning of August 28 (Washington time). The Premier's message was accompanied by a statement which the Japanese Government intended to be responsive to the President's suggestion that it would be helpful if that Government would furnish a clearer statement of its present attitude and plans than had as yet been given (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 571-572). In his message to President Roosevelt, Premier Konoye urged that the meeting between himself and the President be arranged "as soon as possible." He said that while the preliminary informal negotiations that were terminated in July had been "quite appropriate both in spirit and content," nevertheless- "the idea of continuing those conversations and to have their conclusion confirmed by the responsible heads of the two Governments does not meet the need of the present situation which is developing swiftly and may produce unforeseen contingencies "I consider it, therefore, of urgent necessity that the two heads of the Governments should meet first to discuss from a broad standpoint all important problems between Japan and America covering the entire Pacific area, and to explore the possibility of saving the situation. Adjustment of minor items may, if necessary be left to negotiations between competent officials of the two countries, following the meeting (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 573)." The statement which accompanied Premier Konoye's message referred, among other things, to the- "principles and directives set forth in detail by the United States Government and envisaged in the informal conversations as constituting a program for the Pacific area- PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Page 307 and continued- "The Japanese Government wishes to state that it considers these principles and the practical application thereof, in the friendliest manner possible, are the prime requisites of a true peace and should be applied not only in the Pacific area but throughout the entire world. Such a program has long been desired and sought by Japan itself (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 575)." However, while the statement contained many assurances regarding Japan's peaceful intentions, the more important assurances were qualified or conditional. Thus, the Japanese Government was prepared to withdraw its troops from Indochina, but only "as soon as the China incident is settled or a just peace is established in East Asia"; concerning Soviet- Japanese relations it was said that Japan would take no military action "as long as the Soviet Union remains faithful to the Soviet-Japanese neutrality treaty and does not menace Japanese Manchukuo or take any action contrary to the spirit of the said treaty"; the Japanese Government had no intention, it was said, of using, "without provocation" military force against any neighboring nation (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 573-576). Ambassador Nomura reported to his Government that President Roosevelt " vas well pleased" with the Premier's message (ex. 124). The President had said, he cabled, "I am looking forward to having approximately three days talk with Prince Konoye", but that Hawaii was out of the question as a meeting place and that he would prefer Juneau, Alaska. The Ambassador quoted the President as having "smilingly and cynically" said during his reading of the message: "Though I am looking forward to conversations with Prince Konoye, I wonder whether invasion of Thailand can be expected during those conversations just as an invasion of French Indo-China occurred during Secretary Hull's conversations with your Excellency (ex. 124)." The evening of the same day, August 28 (Washington time), Ambassador Nomura called on Secretary Hull and outlined to the Secretary his ideas concerning the arrangements for the proposed Roosevelt-Konoye meeting. During this conversation, the Secretary pointed out to Ambassador Nomura the desirability of there being reached in advance of the proposed meeting "an agreement in principle on the principal questions which were involved in a settlement of Pacific questions between the two nations." The Secretary said that if the proposed meeting should fail to result in an agreement, serious consequences from the point of view of both Governments would ensue. He expressed the view that therefore the purpose of the proposed meeting should be "the ratification of essential points agreed upon in principle" (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 576-577). Ambassador Nomura concluded his report of this meeting to Tokyo with the comment: "In general, it may be said that the Secretary of State is an exceedingly cautious person. There are indications that he is considering this matter from many angles. I feel that unless we are in fairly close agreement the "leaders conference" will not materialize (ex. 124)." GERMANY SUSPECTS TREACHERY (August 29-30, 1941) It became known to the American press, soon after Ambassador Nomura left the White House following his conference with President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull on August 28 (Washington time), that Page 308 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK the Ambassador had delivered a personal message to the President from Premier Konoye. Whether this information was given out by Secretary Hull or by Ambassador Nomura is not clear from the record before the Committee (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 582-583; ex. 124); however, as a result of the disclosure, Foreign Minister Toyoda became greatly concerned that the proposed "leaders conference" should be kept absolutely secret, fearing the project would fail if news of it should leak out before a settlement was reached. The Foreign Minister cabled Ambassador Nomura twice on August 29 (Japan time) urging him "to take every precaution" to guard against leaks (ex. 124). This concern in Tokyo over the effect of publicity on the conversations and the proposed "leaders conference" was a major reason for calls by the Director of the American Bureau of the Japanese Foreign Office on Ambassador Grew on August 29 and September 3 (Japan time) and for a call by Ambassador Nomura on Secretary Hull on September 1 (Washington time) (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 579-582, 586-587, 583-585). During his first conversation with Ambassador Grew, the Director, Mr. Terasaki, dwelt at some length on the unfortunate effects of the publicity in Washington about Premier Konoye's message to President Roosevelt, and then communicated to the Ambassador an appeal from Foreign Minister Toyoda that (1) the proposed Roosevelt-Konoye meeting be arranged without delay and (2) pending the outcome of the proposed meeting, the United States postpone the sending oil tankers to the Soviet Union and suspend the order freezing Japanese assets in the United States. Ambassador Grew's memorandum of this meeting noted that he left Mr. Terasaki "under no illusion" that the United States Government would find it possible to agree to either of the "preposterous requests" contained in (2) above (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 582). Ambassador Nomura's conference with Secretary Hull on September 1 (Washington time) was concerned largely with discussion of the effect upon the conversations of the positions taken by the press in Japan and the United States. The Secretary took advantage of the occasion to ask the Ambassador what would happen if an agreement should not be reached at the proposed "leaders conference," and to repeat his suggestion that an effort be made to reach an agreement in principle on fundamental questions before the meeting (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 583-585). As a result of the fear in Tokyo of publicity, Ambassador Nomura wrote a brief note to Secretary Hull on August 29 (Washington time) requesting his cooperation in keeping the conversations secret. The Secretary replied on September 2 (Washington time) saying that he would "be glad to conform to the desires of yourself and your Government in the foregoing respect, to every extent practical" (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 579, 586). However, apparently believing that some official comment was needed in view of the rumors and speculation in Tokyo about Ambassador Nomura's meeting with President Roosevelt, at 2:30 p. M. On August 29 (Japan time). The Japanese Foreign Office released an official statement that Ambassador Nomura had called on President Roosevelt on August 28 and had delivered to the President a message from Premier Konoye stating "Japan's view regarding Pacific problems which are pending between Japan and the United States" (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 579). Ambassador Grew advised Secretary Hull of this announcement later the same afternoon (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 579). PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Page 309 Foreign Minister Toyoda feared publicity because of "the exceedingly complex domestic situation" and the consideration which had to be given to "our relations with Germany and Italy" (ex. 124). What the Foreign Minister had in mind in the first connection is indicated by his cable to Ambassador Nomura on September 3 (Japan time), in which he said: "Since the existence of the Premier's message was inadvertently made known to the public, that gang that has been suspecting that unofficial talks were taking place, has really begun to yell and wave the Tripartite Pact banner (ex. 1, p. 25)." In the second connection, it is now known from captured Japanese documents that less than 4 hours after the Tokyo announcement of Premier Konoye's message to President Roosevelt, General Ott, the German Ambassador, called on the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Amau, and demanded to know whether the Premier's message departed from the policy determined at the Imperial Conference on July 2, which had been secretly communicated to the German Government, and whether the Cabinet was contemplating any change in that regard (ex. 132-A, item C). The Vice Minister replied that the message did not mean that there had been "a change in Japan's policy, nor that we are contemplating any change in our relations with the Axis." The reason for sending the message, he told the Ambassador, "was to clarify the atmosphere in the Pacific" and to attempt "to start conversations between the two parties." Ambassador Ott suggested that "precautions must be taken against America's scheme to prolong these negotiations, so that this might work to her advantage," to which the Vice Minister replied that "we have given the matter careful thought so that the carrying on of negotiations by Japan with America might not have any disadvantageous consequences upon Germany and Italy." "Our aim," he said, "is to keep her (America) from joining in the war." The German Ambassador then requested an interview with Foreign Minister Toyoda, which took place on the afternoon of August 30 (Japan time). At that interview General Ott again demanded to know whether the intentions of Japan were still as secretly communicated to Germany on July 2. The Foreign Minister denied that there had been any change in Japan's intentions, and stated that Japan's preparations to avail herself of any new developments "are now making headway." The German Ambassador said: "In Foreign Minister Matsuoka's time the Japanese government authorities thought that what America was planning to do was to get Japan to take an attitude in conflict with the Tripartite Pact, that is, to give up taking any positive action in the Pacific area no matter what occasion might arise, and Germany is very grateful that at the time the Japanese government resolutely resisted these American designs, and we hope that it will continue to take that "line." I would like to ask what Your Excellency's views are concerning this point (ex. 132-A, item C)." Admiral Toyoda replied: "In a word I may say that the purpose of the Tripartite Pact is to prevent American participation in the war, and that this view is the same as in the past; nor will it change in the future (ex. 132-A, item C)." The Japanese Ambassador in Berlin reported to Tokyo on October 1, 1941, that because of the Japanese-American negotiations everyone in the German Foreign Office was "thoroughly disgusted with Japan." He said that the fact that the feeling of German leaders and people in Page 310 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK general toward Japan was getting bad could not be covered up, and that if Japan were to go ahead with the negotiations without consulting Germany, "there is no telling what steps Germany may take without consulting Japan" (ex. 1, pp. 4849). In Italy, the impression created by the Japanese-American talks was not enthusiastic, as the Japanese Ambassador in Rome reported to the Foreign Office on September 30: "Our recent negotiations with the United States have put a bad taste in the mouths of the people of this country. Our attitude toward the Tripartite Alliance appears to them to be faithless. Recently the newspapers have been growing more critical in tone where we Japanese are concerned. Official comment, too, has been none too complimentary. As for Italy's attitude toward the recent celebration of the first anniversary of the conclusion of the Japanese-German-Italian Tripartite Alliance, its coolness reflects the attitude of the whole Italian people (ex. 1, p. 44)." PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT REPLIES TO PREMIER KONOYE'S MESSAGE (September 5, 1941) President Roosevelt handed to Ambassador Nomura his reply to Premier Konoye at a conference at the White House on the afternoon of September 3 (Washington time) (Ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 588-592). The President's reply mentioned the reference in the statement which had accompanied the Premier's message to the basic principles to which the United States Government had long been committed and the President's desire to collaborate in making these principles effective in practice. The President stated that his deep interest in this matter made it necessary for him to observe and take account of developments both in the United States and Japan which had a bearing on Japanese-American relations, and that he could not avoid taking cognizance of indications- "of the existence in some quarters in Japan of concepts which, if widely entertained, would seem capable of raising obstacles to successful collaboration between you and me along the line which I am sure both of us earnestly desire to follow (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 592)." The President then suggested: "that it would seem highly desirable that we take precaution, toward ensuring that our proposed meeting shall prove a success, by endeavoring to enter immediately upon preliminary discussion of the fundamental and essential questions on which we seek agreement. The questions which I have in mind for such preliminary discussions involve practical application of the principles fundamental to achievement and maintenance of peace which are mentioned with more specification in the statement accompanying your letter. I hope that you will look favorably upon this suggestion (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 592)." The President also read and handed to Ambassador Nomura a statement which referred to the American proposals of June 21 (Washington time) and to the fact that subsequent conversations bad disclosed that there were divergences of view between the two Governments with respect to certain fundamental questions dealt with in those proposals. Reading from the statement, the President expressed the desire of the United States Government "to facilitate progress toward a conclusive discussion" and its belief- "that a community of view and a clear agreement upon the points above mentioned are essential to any satisfactory settlement of Pacific questions. It therefore seeks an indication of the present attitude of the Japanese Government with regard to the fundamental questions under reference (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 591)." PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Page 311 In connection with this statement, it will be remembered that the second Konoye Cabinet had resigned on July 16 (Japan time) and had been replaced by the third Konoye Cabinet the next day (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, p. 24). In his memorandum of the conversation with Ambassador Nomura, Secretary Hull wrote: "Both the President and I repeatedly emphasized the necessity for his (i. e. Ambassador Nomura's) Government to clarify its position on the question of abandoning a policy of force and conquest and on three fundamental questions concerning which difficulties had been encountered in our discussion of the Japanese proposal of May twelfth and the discussion of which we had not pursued after the Japanese went into Indochina (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 588)." JAPAN PRESENTS NEW PROPOSALS IN A NEW FORM (September 6, 1941) It is now known that about the time President Roosevelt was meeting with Ambassador Nomura, new Japanese proposals were being discussed at a Joint Conference of Japanese Foreign Office and War and Navy officials in Tokyo. According to Premier Konoye, these new proposals were intended by the Foreign Office to bring up only "immediate and concrete problems" and to focus the proposed meeting between President Roosevelt and the Premier on those problems. The Foreign Office took the position that it was difficult to predict how long it would take to consider all of the important fundamental principles dealt with in the proposals which had been under consideration by the two Governments before the freezing orders, and that consequently "the present crisis might not be averted" if it should be necessary to consider all of those principles (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, p. 37). The new proposals were approved at the Joint Conference mentioned above and were given to Ambassador Grew by Foreign Minister Toyoda the next day, September 4 (Japan time), with the request that they be transmitted to Secretary Hull by the Ambassador to overcome any possibility of inaccuracy in handling by Ambassador Nomura (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 593). Ambassador Nomura presented the new proposals to Secretary Hull at a meeting on September 6 (Washington time). He explained that although the new proposals had been prepared by the Japanese Government before it received President Roosevelt's reply of September 3 (Washington time), nevertheless his Government believed that the contents of the new proposals constituted a reply to the President. He said that the proposals were also in response to the view expressed by Secretary Hull at the conference with him on the evening of August 28, namely, that it would be desirable for the two Governments to reach an agreement in principle on the fundamental questions involved before making arrangements for the proposed Roosevelt-Konoye meeting (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 606-607). As presented to Secretary Hull the new Japanese proposals were as follows: DRAFT PROPOSAL HANDED BY THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR (NOMURA) TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE ON SEPTEMBER 6, 1941 The Government of Japan undertakes: (a) that Japan is ready to express its concurrence in those matters which were already tentatively agreed upon between Japan and the United States in the course of their preliminary informal conversations; 312 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK (b) that Japan will not make any military advancement from French Indo-China against any of its adjoining areas, and likewise will not, without any justifiable reason, resort to military action against any regions lying south of Japan; (c) that the attitudes of Japan and the United States towards the European War will be decided by the concepts of protection and self- defense, and, in case the United States should participate in the European War, the interpretation and execution of the Tripartite Pact by Japan shall be independently decided; (d) that Japan will endeavor to bring about the rehabilitation of general and normal relationship between Japan and China, upon the realization of which Japan is ready to withdraw its armed forces from China as soon as possible in accordance with the agreements between Japan and China; (e) that the economic activities of the United States in China will not be restricted so long as pursued on an equitable basis; (f) that Japan's activities in the Southwestern Pacific Area will be carried on by peaceful means and in accordance with the principle of nondiscrimination in international commerce, and that Japan will cooperate in the production and procurement by the United States of natural resources in the said area which it needs; (g) that Japan will take measures necessary for the resumption of normal trade relations between Japan and the United States, and in connection with the above-mentioned, Japan is ready to discontinue immediately the application of the foreigners' transactions control regulations with regard to the United States on the basis of reciprocity. "The Government of the United States undertakes: (a) that, in response to the Japanese Government's commitment expressed in point (d) referred to above, the United States will abstain from any measures and actions which will be prejudicial to the endeavor by Japan concerning the settlement of the China Affair; (b) that the United States will reciprocate Japan's commitment expressed in point (f) referred to above; (c) that the United States will suspend any military measures in the Far East and in the Southwestern Pacific Area; (d) that the United States will immediately (upon settlement) reciprocate Japan's commitment expressed in point (g) referred to above by discontinuing the application of the so-called freezing act with regard to Japan and further by removing the prohibition against the passage of Japanese vessels through the Panama Canal (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 608-609)." Secretary Hull testified that these new Japanese proposals- "were much narrower than the assurances given in the statement communicated to the President on August 28. In the September 6 Japanese draft the Japanese gave only an evasive formula with regard to their obligations under the Tripartite Pact. There was a qualified undertaking that Japan would not "without any justifiable reason" resort to military action against any region south of Japan. No commitment was offered in regard to the nature of the terms which Japan would offer to China; nor any assurance of an intention by Japan to respect China's territorial integrity and sovereignty, to refrain from interference in China's internal affairs, not to station Japanese troops indefinitely in wide areas of China, and to conform to the principle of nondiscrimination in international commercial relations. The formula contained in that draft that "the economic activities of the United States in China will not be restricted so long as pursued on an equitable basis" clearly implied a concept that the conditions under which American trade and commerce in China were henceforth to be conducted were to be a matter for decision by Japan (tr. 1118-1119)." On September 9 (Washington time) Secretary Hull cabled to Ambassador Grew a series of questions to be submitted to Foreign Minister Toyoda regarding the intentions of the Japanese Government in offering certain of the new proposals, especially those relating to China (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 610-613). The Foreign Minister's replies to these questions were received by Ambassador Grew on September 13 (Japan time) and promptly cabled to Washington (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 620-624). PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Page 313 On September 15 (Washington time) Ambassador Nomura cabled Foreign Minister Toyoda that it seemed that the matter of the preliminary conversations had been entrusted to Secretary Hull. He said that in such conversations the United States would want to be advised of the peace terms Japan would propose between Japan and China and would refuse to act as intermediary unless the terms were fair and just; therefore, he said, it would be necessary to outline the terms in advance of the proposed "leaders conference." He also reported that the United States wanted to arrange matters with Britain, China, and the Netherlands in advance of the proposed conference, so that those countries would not get the impression the United States was trading them off (ex. 1, p. 27). Two days later, Ambassador Nomura cabled that there were "considerable signs of anticipation of a Japanese-U. S. Conference" at a recent United States Cabinet meeting and that "there is no mistaking the fact that the President is prepared to attend the meeting if the preliminary arrangements can be made" (ex. 1, p. 28). On September 22 (Washington time), he cabled a long report to the Foreign Minister concerning conditions and attitudes in the United States generally. His report concluded with the following estimate: "Finally, though the United States Government does not wish to compromise with Japan at the expense of China, should Japan give up forceful aggressions, Japanese-American trade relations could be restored, and the United States would even go so far as to render economic assistance to Japan (ex. 1, p. 31)." In the meantime, in Tokyo at Joint Conferences on September 6 and 13 (Japan time), the Japanese Government had determined the basic peace terms which it was prepared to offer to China (ex. 132-A, item D). A document containing those terms (Annex C attached hereto) was handed to Secretary Hull by Ambassador Nomura on September 23 (Washington time), having been communicated by the Foreign Minister to Ambassador Grew in Tokyo on September 22 (Japan time) (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 631-633). During this conference with Secretary Hull, Ambassador Nomura reiterated the desire of his Government to have the Roosevelt-Konoye meeting take place at the earliest possible opportunity. He told the Secretary that the several documents which he had now presented were a full expression of everything the Japanese Government desired to say, and that anything further pertaining to the Tripartite Pact might best be left to the proposed meeting of the heads of the two Governments (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 634-635). However, on September 27 (Washington time), he delivered to Secretary Hull a further document (Annex D attached hereto), which had been prepared in the form, and along the lines, of the American proposals of June 21 (Washington time) and had been approved at a Joint Conference on September 20 (Japan time). The new document, it was said, incorporated all that the Japanese Government had communicated to the American Government since June 21. A similar document had been delivered to Ambassador Grew on September 25, 1941 (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 636-641). On September 27 (Japan time) ceremonies were held in Tokyo celebrating the first anniversary of the Tripartite Pact. That day Foreign Minister Toyoda requested Ambassador Grew to call on him, and asked the Ambassador to convey to President Roosevelt, through Secretary Hull, the anxiety of Premier Konoye and the entire Cabinet Page 314 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK lest the proposed Roosevelt-Konoye meeting might be indefinitely delayed, stating that all preparations had been made by the Japanese Government. During this conference he described to Ambassador Grew in considerable detail his Government's position regarding the conversations (ex. 29, vol. I1, pp. 641-645). The Foreign Minister cabled his remarks to Ambassador Nomura, saying that "in view of internal and external circumstances in our country, we cannot keep postponing matters forever" (ex. 1, p. 33). Ambassador Nomura communicated the gist of the Foreign Minister's remarks to Secretary Hull on September 29 (Washington time). He said that while he was well aware of the United States Government's position and had communicated it to Tokyo, nevertheless, his Government had instructed him to press for an answer to the Japanese proposal. AS his personal opinion, he judged that if nothing came of the proposal for a meeting between the heads of the two Governments, it might be difficult for Premier Konoye to retain his position and that he then would be likely to be succeeded by a less moderate leader (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 652). AMBASSADOR GREW SUPPORTS THE PROPOSED "LEADERS CONFERENCE" (August-September 1941) In Tokyo Ambassador Grew had reached the conclusion that if the Roosevelt-Konoye meeting should not be held, or if it should be long delayed, the Konoye Cabinet might fall. He had first learned of the proposed "leaders conference" at a meeting with Foreign Minister Toyoda on August 18 (Japan time.) During the Foreign Minister's lengthy remarks concerning the proposed meeting, Ambassador Grew had commented on Japan's progressive southward advance and the fact that, in spite of all peaceful assurances, the United States Government in the light of the steps Japan had taken "could only be guided by facts and actions and not words." Notwithstanding the doubts reflected in these statements, at the conclusion of the Foreign Minister's remarks Ambassador Grew had said "that in the interests of peace, (he) would give the proposal (for a meeting) his own. Personal support" (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 559-564). Ambassador Grew reported the Foreign Minister's remarks to Secretary Hull the following day in a message which included the following, as paraphrased in the State Department: "that naturally he is not aware of the reaction President Roosevelt will have to the proposal made today orally by the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs. The Ambassador urges, however, with all the force at his command, for the sake of avoiding the obviously growing possibility of an utterly futile war between Japan and the United States, that this Japanese proposal not be turned aside without very prayerful consideration. Not only is the proposal unprecedented in Japanese history, but it is an indication that Japanese intransigence is not crystallized completely owing to the fact that the proposal has the approval of the Emperor and the highest authorities in the land. The good which may flow from a meeting between Prince Konoye and President Roosevelt is incalculable. The opportunity is here presented, the Ambassador ventures to believe, for an act of the highest statesmanship, such as the recent meeting of President Roosevelt with Prime Minister Churchill at sea, with the possible overcoming thereby of apparently insurmountable obstacles to peace hereafter in the Pacific (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 565)." A month later, in a personal letter dated September 22 (Japan time) to President Roosevelt, which apparently did not, however, reach PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Page 315 Washington until after the fall of the Konoye Cabinet, he referred to his conversations with Premier Konoye "who," he said- "in the face of bitter antagonism from extremist and pro-Axis elements in the country is courageously working for an improvement in Japan's relations with the United States. He bears the heavy responsibility for having allowed our relations to come to such a pass and he no doubt now sees the handwriting on the wall and realizes that Japan has nothing to hope for from the Tripartite Pact and must shift her orientation of policy if she is to avoid disaster; but whatever the incentive that has led to his present efforts, I am convinced that he now means business and will go as far as is possible, without incurring open rebellion in Japan, to reach a reasonable understanding with us. In spite of all the evidence of Japan's bad faith in times past in failing to live up to her commitments, I believe that there is a better chance of the present Government implementing whatever commitments it may now undertake than has been the case in recent years. It seems to me highly unlikely that this chance will come again or that any Japanese statesman other than Prince Konoye could succeed in controlling the military extremists in carrying through a policy which they, in their ignorance of international affairs and economic laws, resent and oppose. The alternative to reaching a settlement now would be the greatly increased probability of war * * *. I therefore most earnestly hope that we can come to terms, even if we must take on trust, at least to some degree, the continued good faith and ability of the present Government fully to implement those terms." (Ex. 178.)" A week later, on September 29 (Japan time), following his meeting with Foreign Minister Toyoda on September 27 referred to above, Ambassador Grew cabled a long report to Secretary Hull, in which "in all deference to the much broader field of view of President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull and in full awareness that the Ambassador's approach to the matter is limited to the viewpoint of the American Embassy in Japan," he stated at length his appraisal of the existing situation (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 645-650). The most significant part of this report was the following, as paraphrased in the State Department: "8. Should the United States expect or await agreement by the Japanese Government, in the present preliminary conversations, to clear-cut commitments which will satisfy the United States Government both as to principle and as to concrete detail, almost certainly the conversations will drag along indefinitely and unproductively until the Konoye Cabinet and its supporting elements desiring *rapprochement* with the United States will come to the conclusion that the outlook for an agreement is hopeless and that the United States Government is only playing for time. If the abnormal sensitiveness of Japan and the abnormal effects of loss of face are considered, in such a situation Japanese reaction may and probably will be serious. This will result in the Konoye Government's being discredited and in a revulsion of anti-American feeling, and this may and probably will lead to unbridled acts. The eventual cost of these will not be reckoned, and their nature is likely to inflame Americans, while reprisal and counter-reprisal measures will bring about a situation in which it will be difficult to avoid war. *The logical outcome of this will be the downfall of the Konoye Cabinet and the formation of a military dictatorship which will lack either the disposition or the temperament to avoid colliding head-on with the United States.* There is a question that such a situation may prove to be more serious even than the failure to produce a entirely satisfactory agreement through the proposed meeting between President Roosevelt and Prince Konoye, should it take place as planned (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 648-649)." In connection with Ambassador Grew's reference to the "viewpoint of the American Embassy in Japan," in his testimony before the Committee he said: "I may say here that we in our Embassy in Tokyo did not have access to any of the secret documents or intercepted telegrams. We didn't even know that they existed (tr. 1481)." Page 316 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK And again: "I just want to say once more everything I have said today represents the point of view of one spot, our Embassy in Tokyo, and we were deprived of a great deal of the information which was available to the President and Mr. Hull. We had none of the secret intercepts or telegrams, we had none of the documents that have come into the State Department from time to time documents of a secret nature, so of course the President and Mr. Hull saw the picture with a great deal more information than we had available to us (tr. 1903-1904)." JAPAN DETERMINES ITS MINIMUM DEMANDS AND ITS MAXIMUM CONCESSIONS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES (September 6, 1941) It is now known that in the meantime, in Tokyo far-reaching decisions had been made. The "Policy of the Imperial Government" which was decided upon at the Imperial Conference on July 2 (Japan time) had provided that in carrying out a southward advance the Government would not be deterred "by the possibility of being involved in a war with England and America." It had also been decided at that conference that in carrying out Japan's preparations for war with Russia and in the use of Japan's military strength against Russia in case the German-Soviet war "should develop to our advantage," "all plans, especially the use of armed forces, will be carried out in such a way as to place no serious obstacles *in the path of our basic military preparations for a war with England and America* (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, pp. 70-71)." When the Japanese advance into southern French Indochina during the latter part of July had brought about the termination of the conversations between Secretary Hull and Ambassador Nomura and the American freezing order, Premier Konoye had come forward early in August with his proposal for a "leaders conference" between President Roosevelt and himself. While this proposal had received the support of the Japanese Navy, it had been supported by the Japanese Army only provided the Premier intended "*to carry out a war against America if the President of the United States still failed to comprehend the true intentions of the Empire* (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, p. 31). As tension increased in Tokyo, the Japanese Army General Staff began advocating the immediate breaking off of negotiations with the United States and the opening of Japanese-American hostilities, and Premier Konoye discussed this question at innumerable conferences with the Army and Navy Ministers during the latter part of August (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, p. 39-40). It is now known that during those conferences there were developed "Plans for the Prosecution of the Policy of the Imperial Government" which set forth the manner in which the Government would proceed in carrying out the plans "for the southern territories" decided upon at the Imperial Conference on July 2 (Japan time). Premier Konoye submitted these new "Plans" to the Emperor informally on September ,5 (Japan time) in the form of an agenda for an Imperial Conference the next day, as follows: "1. Determined not to be deterred by the possibility of being involved in a war with America (and England and Holland), in order to secure our national existence, *we will proceed with war preparations so that they be completed approximately toward the end of October*." PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Page 317 "2. At the same time, *we will endeavor by every possible diplomatic means to have our demands agreed to by America and England*. Japan's minimum demands in these negotiations with America (and England), together with the Empire's maximum concessions are embodied in the attached document. "3. *If by the early part of October there is no reasonable hope of having our demands agreed to in the diplomatic negotiations mentioned above, we will immediately make up our minds to get ready for war against America (and England and Holland).* "Policies with reference to countries other than those in the southern territories will be carried out in harmony with the plans already laid. Special effort will be made to prevent America and Soviet Russia from forming a united front against Japan (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, p. 77)." According to Premier Konoye, on examining the "Plans", Emperor Hirohito was impressed by the fact that the document seemed "to give precedence to war over diplomatic activities." The Premier explained that the order of business in the agenda did not indicate any differences in degree of importance. The Emperor then summoned the Chiefs of the Army and Navy General Staffs. When they came, he questioned them sharply concerning the probable length of hostilities in the event of a Japanese-American conflict, and then asked whether it was not true that both of them "were for giving precedence to diplomacy." Both answered in the affirmative (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs pp. 40-41) . At the Imperial Conference the next day, September 6 (Japan time) the "Plans" were decided upon and approved (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, p. 40). However, at the Conference first the President of the Privy Council and then Emperor Hirohito asked for a clarification of the views of the Government as to whether the emphasis was not being placed by the Government upon war rather than diplomacy. When none of the Supreme Command replied, and only the Navy Minister representing the Government, the Emperor is reported to have rebuked the Supreme Command by indicating that he was striving for international peace. After this the Chief of the Navy General Staff assured the Emperor that the Chiefs of the Supreme Command were conscious of the importance of diplomacy, and "advocated a resort to armed force only when there seemed no other way out." According to Premier Konoye, the Conference adjourned "in an atmosphere of unprecedented tenseness" (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, p. 41). Japan's "minimum demands" in the negotiations with America and England, as approved at the Imperial Conference on September 6 (Japan time), were as follows, according to Premier Konoye's memoirs: "1. America and England would be required to agree not to intervene in, or obstruct, the settlement by Japan of the "China Incident", to close the Burma Road, and to cease all aid of any kind to China. "2. America and England would be required to agree to take no action in the Far East which offered a threat to the Japanese Empire, and not to establish military bases in Thailand, the Netherlands East Indies, China, or Far Eastern Soviet Russia or increase their existing Far Eastern military forces over their present strength. In this connection Japan would not consider any demands 'for the liquidation of Japan's special relations with French Indo-China'." "3. America and England would be required to agree to cooperate with Japan in her attempt to obtain needed raw materials; to restore trade relations with Japan and "furnish her with the Page 318 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK "raw materials she needs" from British and American territories in the Southwest Pacific; and to assist Japan in establishing close economic relations with Thai and the Netherlands East Indies (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, appendix V, pp. 77-78)." The "maximum concessions" Japan was prepared to make in return for agreement to her "minimum demands" were as follows: "1. Japan would not use French Indochina as a base for operations against any neighboring countries 'with the exception of China'. "2. Japan would be prepared to withdraw her troops from French Indochina 'as soon as a just peace is established in the Far East'." "3. Japan would be prepared to guarantee the neutrality of the Philippine Islands (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, appendix V, p. 78). In other words in an effort to take all possible advantage of the world situation, the Japanese Government (determined at the Imperial Conference on September 6 (Japan time) that the least Japan would accept from America and England in return for the withdrawal of her troops from French Indochina would be the agreement of America and England to cease all aid to China, to accept a military and naval status in the Far East inferior to Japan, and to furnish all possible material aid to Japan. Furthermore, Japan did not intend to perform her part of the "bargain" until after "a just peace" had been established in the Far East. From the Japanese standpoint, this latter qualification meant after the settlement of the "China Incident" by Japan on her own terms. The substance of these "minimum demands" was contained in the ultimatum which the Japanese Government later delivered to the United States on November 20 (Washington time). The evening of the same day, September 6 (Japan time), Premier Konoye, with the knowledge and approval of the Japanese Ministers of War, Navy, and Foreign Affairs met with Ambassador Grew at a private house under conditions of extraordinary secrecy. In his notes of the meeting, Ambassador Grew wrote that the Premier had requested that his statements be transmitted personally to President Roosevelt in the belief that they might amplify and clarify the approach which he had made through Ambassador Nomura. Ambassador Grew noted that the Premier and, consequently, the Government of Japan, conclusively and wholeheartedly agreed with the four principles put forward by Secretary Hull as a basis for the rehabilitation of Japanese-American relations. [1] In his memoirs, however, Prince Konoye stated that when at this meeting Ambassador Grew asked for his views regarding Secretary Hull's four principles he said "that they were splendid as principles but when it came down to actual application a variety of problems arose" and that it was in order to solve those very problems that he deemed it necessary to hold the meeting with President Roosevelt (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, p. 42). Ambassador Grew noted that Premier Konoye had strongly urged that no better opportunity for the improvement of Japanese-American relations would be presented, and that the Premier had [1] In a memorandum dated October 7 (Japan time) recording a conference which he had on that date with the Japanese Foreign Minister, Ambassador Grew noted that the Foreign Minister told him that Ambassador Nomura had been instructed to inform Secretary Hull that the statement in the United States memorandum of October 2 (Washington time) (*see infra*) that Premier Konoye "fully subscribed" to the four principles should be modified to indicate that the Premier subscribed "in principle" (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 664). PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Page 319 said that he had the full support of the responsible chiefs of the Army and Navy, who were already choosing their delegates to the proposed conference. Premier Konoye had said, he noted, that he could control any opposition from within the Government, and that he was determined to spare no effort, despite all elements and factors opposing him to crown his present endeavors with success. The Ambassador wrote that during the conversation he had outlined in general terms- "the bitter lessons of the past to our Government as the result of the failure of the Japanese Government to honor the promises given to me by former Japanese Ministers for Foreign Affairs apparently in all sincerity-" and had stated that, as the result- "the Government of the United States had at long last concluded that it must place its reliance on actions and facts and not on Japanese promises or assurances." He noted that Premier Konoye had expressed the earnest hope that in view of the present internal situation in Japan the projected meeting with the President could be arranged "with the least possible delay" (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 604-606). THE UNITED STATES ASKS JAPAN TO CLARIFY ITS NEW PROPOSALS (October 2, 1941) Thus, as September ended the Japanese Government, on the one hand, was vigorously asserting the urgent and pressing need to go forward with the proposed Roosevelt-Konoye meeting at the earliest possible moment. It is now known that this desire for haste reflected the decision of the Imperial Conference on September 6 (Japan time) that- "*If by the early part of October* there is no reasonable hope of having our demands agreed to in the diplomatic negotiations * * *, we will immediately make up our minds to get ready for war against America (and England and Holland) (ex. 173, Konoye Memoirs, p. 77)." On the other hand, the United States Government, knowing nothing of these plans but nonetheless skeptical of Japan's peaceful intentions, was insisting that before the proposed Roosevelt-Konoye meeting should take place the two Governments should preliminary agree upon the fundamental matters under consideration when the conversations were broken off in July after the Japanese military occupation of southern French Indochina. This latter position had been taken in the reply to Premier Konoye which President Roosevelt handed to Ambassador Nomura on September 3, and had been repeated many times by Secretary Hull in his subsequent conversations with the Ambassador. The Committee has obtained from the files of President Roosevelt a memorandum in Secretary Hull's handwriting, on White House stationery, apparently written by the Secretary for the President before the latter left Washington for Hyde Park about September 25 (Washington time) (ex. 179; ex. 1, p. 40). This memorandum summarized Secretary Hull's views at the time: "My suggestion on Jap situation-for you to read later*." "C.H. "When the Jap Prime Minister requested a meeting with you, he indicated a fairly basic program in generalities, but left open such questions as getting troops out of China, Tripartite Pact, nondiscrimination in trade in Pacific." Page 320 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK "We indicated desire for meeting, but suggested first an agreement in principle on the vital questions left open, so as to insure the success of the conference. "Soon thereafter, the Japs narrowed their position on these basic questions, and now continue to urge the meeting at Juneau. "My suggestion is to recite their more liberal attitude when they first sought the meeting with you, with their much narrowed position *now*, and earnestly ask if they cannot go back to their original liberal attitude so we can start discussions again on agreement in principle before the meeting, and reemphasizing your desire for a meeting (ex. 179). [Italics in original.]" President Roosevelt sent his comments to Secretary Hull from Hyde Park in the following memorandum dated September 28 (Washington time): "MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE "I wholly agree with your penciled note-to recite the more liberal original attitude of the Japanese when they first sought the meeting, point out their much narrowed position now, earnestly ask if they cannot go back to their original attitude, start discussions again on agreement in principle, and reemphasize my hope for a meeting. "F. D. R. "(Ex. 179.)" On October 2 (Washington time), Secretary Hull handed to Ambassador Nomura the United States' reply to the Japanese Government's proposals of September 6 and its subsequent statements of September 23 (Annex c) and September 27 (Annex D). This reply briefly reviewed the course of the conversations thus far, pointing out that developments from early August up to September 6 had seemed to justify the United States Government in concluding that the Japanese Government might be expected to adhere to and to give practical application to a broad progressive program covering the entire Pacific area. The reply continued: "It was therefore a source of disappointment to the Government of the United States that the proposals of the Japanese Government presented by the Japanese Ambassador on September 6, 1941, which the Japanese Government apparently intended should constitute a concrete basis for discussions, appeared to disclose divergence in the concepts of the two Governments. That is to say, those proposals and the subsequent explanatory statements made in regard thereto serve, in the opinion of this Government, to narrow and restrict not only the application of the principles upon which our informal conversations already referred to had been based but also the various assurances given by the Japanese Government of its desire to move along with the United States in putting into operation a broad program looking to the establishment and maintenance of peace and stability in the entire Pacific area (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 658-659)." It was then noted that the Japanese assurances of peaceful intent continued to be qualified by phrases the need for which was not readily apparent; that in the economic sphere the new proposals were restricted to the countries of the Southwest Pacific area, rather than the entire Pacific area, as before; and that a clear-cut manifestation of Japan's intention in regard to the withdrawal of Japanese troops from China and French Indochina would be most helpful in making known Japan's peaceful intentions, as would additional clarification of the Japanese Government's position with respect to the European war. The reply continued by stating that from what the Japanese Government had so far indicated in regard to its purposes, the United States Government had derived the impression that Japan had in mind a program by which the liberal and progressive principles adhered to by the United States would be circumscribed in their application by qualifications and exceptions. The Japanese Government was PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Page 321 then asked whether, under such circumstances, it believed the proposed Roosevelt-Konoye meeting would be likely to contribute to the high purposes "which we have mutually had in mind." The reply concluded by stating that it was the belief of the United States Government that renewed consideration of the fundamental principles which it had long advocated would aid in reaching a meeting of minds in regard to the essential questions on which agreement was sought and would thus lay a firm foundation for the proposed meeting, and that it was the President's earnest hope that a discussion of the fundamental questions might be so developed that the meeting could be held (ex. 29, vol. II, pp. 656-661). After reading the reply, Ambassador Nomura commented that he thought his Government would be disappointed because of its very earnest desire to hold the meeting, but that in any case he would transmit it to his Government, which he did the same day (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 655; ex. 1, p. 50). He added that he was convinced that the Japanese Government was entirely sincere in this matter and had no ulterior purpose. He said, however, that in view of the difficulties of the internal situation in Japan, he did not think his Government could go any further at this time (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 655). In a memorandum bearing the same date, October 2 (Washington time), which was distributed to President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull in addition to Secretary Stimson, General Marshall and other high officers in the War Department, Colonel Hayes A. Kronor, Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, reached the following conclusions: "10. This Division is of the opinion that neither a conference of leaders nor economic concessions at this point would be of any material advantage to the United States unless a definite commitment to withdraw from the Axis were obtained prior to the conference. * * * "11. Since it is highly improbable that this condition can be met by the Japanese Government at the present time our course lies straight before us. This Division still believes that forceful diplomacy vis-a-vis Japan, including the application of ever increasing military and economic pressure on our part, offers the best chance of gaining time, the best possibility of preventing the spread of hostilities in the Pacific Area, and the best hope of the eventual disruption of the Tripartite Pact. The exercise of increasingly strong "power diplomacy" by the United States is still clearly indicated (ex. 33)." The following undated note, in Secretary Stimson's handwriting, appears at the end of his copy of the above memorandum: "Quite independently I have reached similar conclusions and hold them strongly. I believe however that during the next three months while we are rearming the Philippines great care must be exercised to avoid an explosion by the Japanese Army. Put concretely this means, that while I approve of stringing out negotiations during that period, they should not be allowed to ripen into a personal conference between the President and P. M. [1] I greatly fear that such a conference if actually held would produce concessions which would be highly dangerous to our vitally important relations with China (ex. 33)." Admiral Stark testified before the Committee that he neither opposed or approved the proposal for a meeting between President Roosevelt and Premier Konoye. He continued: "I do recall when it was discussed my own personal opinion was that the President and Mr. Hull were right in not just going out to discuss something with the Prime Minister without some preliminary agreement regarding the agenda and something which might be accomplished (tr. 6308). [1] Prime Minister Konoye. Page 322 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK In his testimony before the Committee, Secretary Hull set forth at length the considerations which were taken into account in determining the position to be taken by the United States Government regarding the proposed "leaders conference" (tr. 1120-1124). The next day, October 3 (Washington time), after he had forwarded the United States reply to Tokyo, Ambassador Nomura cabled Foreign Minister Toyoda a long report on the situation in the United States as he saw it. His report began by stating- "although there is a feeling that the Japanese-U. S. Talks have finally reached a deadlock, we do not believe that it should be considered as an absolutely hopeless situation. We are of the impression that the United States worded their memorandum in such a way as to permit a ray of hope to penetrate through (ex. 1, p. 51-52)." He expressed the view that an "understanding" between Japan and the United States hinged on one point, the problem of the evacuation of the Japanese troops from China (ex. 1, p. 53). During the next 2 weeks the Japanese Foreign Office made repeated efforts both in Washington and in Tokyo to have the United States Government state what further assurances it desired from the Japanese Government, emphasizing that the position of Premier Konoye was daily growing more difficult. Also during this period, Ambassador Nomura appears to have incurred the displeasure of Foreign Minister Toyoda. In a message to the Foreign Minister on October 8 (Washington time), the Ambassador indicated that he agreed with many of Secretary Hull's criticisms of the Japanese proposals of September 6, which the Foreign Office had prepared. He expressed the opinion that- "In our proposal of the 6th and in the explanation thereof, not only did we limit them and narrow what we had discussed in our informal conversations thus far, but we also curtailed extremely the guarantees we offered concerning the aforementioned principles. We equivocated concerning guarantees that we would not engage in armed aggression. We limited the area to which the principle of nondiscriminatory treatment would apply in the Pacific, and on the excuse that China was geographically near to us, we limited the very principle itself. On the question of stationing and evacuating troops in and from China (including French Indo-China), the Americans are making some demands which we in principle have objections to. Moreover, they figure that they must be much surer of our attitude toward the three-power pact. These points you probably already know (ex. 1, p. 59)." As the result of repeated instructions from the Foreign Minister to obtain from Secretary Hull an expression of his views regarding the three major points of difference between the two Governments, i. e., which had developed in the earlier conversations, namely, (1) the withdrawal of troops from China, (2) Japan's obligations under the Tripartite Pact, and (3) nondiscrimination in international trade, Ambassador Nomura called on Secretary Hull on October 9 (Washington time) (vol. II, pp. 670 672). The Ambassador's report of this meeting (ex. 1, p. 61) was plainly unsatisfactory to Foreign Minister Toyoda, for on October 10 (Japan time) the Foreign Minister cabled Ambassador Nomura that he was well aware of the Ambassador's opinions and that what he wanted was "the opinions of the American officials and none other." Saying that "slowly but surely the question of these negotiations has reached the decisive stage," and that he was doing his utmost "to bring about a decision on them and the situation does not permit of this senseless procrastination," he told Ambassador Nomura: PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Page 323 "You do not tell me whether or not we have a chance to proceed with these parleys. You do not tell me how Hull answers. You do not tell me anything else I need to know for my future consideration. You must wire me in detail and immediately the minutes of these conversations, what they say and the prospect for negotiations. Hereafter, when you interview Hull or the President of the United States, please take Wakasugi or Iguchi with you and please send me without delay the complete minutes of what transpires (ex. 1, p. 63)." On the same afternoon, October 10 (Japan time), Foreign Minister Toyoda requested Ambassador Grew to call on him, and during their conversation told Ambassador Grew that Ambassador Nomura had been "unable to provide the information" he had asked for and that- "a week of very valuable time had been wasted in an endeavor to elicit through the Japanese Ambassador information which, had it been received, would have measurably accelerated the present conversations (ex. 30, p. 454)." The Foreign Minister told Ambassador Grew that in order to prevent further delay he was requesting the Ambassador to ask his Government to reply to the following question: "The Government of Japan has submitted to the Government of the United States with reference to certain questions proposals which are apparently not satisfactory to the Government of the United States. Will the American Government now set forth to the Japanese Government for its consideration the undertakings to be assumed by the Japanese Government which would be satisfactory to the American Government (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 678)?" He continued by saying that since- "he had the impression that the Japanese Ambassador in Washington was apparently very fatigued, serious consideration was being given to the question of sending to Washington a diplomat of wide experience to assist the Ambassador in carrying on the present conversations. Admiral Toyoda said he had in mind a high-ranking diplomatic official with the personal rank of Ambassador, but he had not yet approached the official in question and was therefore uncertain as to whether he would agree to undertake to accept the mission. It would be of great assistance to the Minister to ascertain whether the Government of the United States, in the event that it was decided to send the official in question to Washington, would be prepared to make available a reservation for him on the airplane from Manila to San Francisco. Admiral Toyoda said that the official in question would not be accredited to the Government of the United-States but would be temporarily and unofficially attached to the Japanese Embassy in Washington. I told the Foreign Minister that I would transmit his inquiry to my Government. "In concluding the conversation, the Minister several times stressed to me, in view of the importance of the time factor, the necessity of expediting the progress of the conversations (ex. 29, vol. II, p. 679)." Ambassador Nomura replied to Foreign Minister Toyoda's message of October 10 (Japan time) on the same date (Washington time): "What they want is the maintenance of peace in the Pacific, and they claim that our policy is semipacific and semiaggressive. They say that our proposal of September 6 diverged greatly from preceding statements and that it will be out of the question to agree on any preparatory talks on the basis of such a proposal. In addition to the three matters mentioned in your message, it seems that there are many other objections. I have repeatedly asked them to clarify what I do not understand, but they won't answer. At any rate, however, I feel safe at least in saying that they are demanding that we compromise in accordance with the lines laid down in their memorandum of October 2. *I am sure that there is not the slightest chance on earth of them featuring a conference of leaders so long as we do not make that compromise.* "In other words, they are not budging an inch from the attitude they have always taken; however, they act as if they were ready to consider at any time any plan of ours which would meet the specifications of their answer of the 2nd (ex. I, p. 63). On October 13 (Japan time) Foreign Minister Toyoda c