PEARL HARBOR ATTACK          467

APPENDIX E

THE "WINDS CODE"

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK          468

APPENDIX E

THE "WINDS CODE"

                                                                   Page
Establishment and nature of the "Winds code" ...................... 469
Efforts to monitor ................................................ 471
Considerations bearing on the possibility of a message in 
   execution of the "Winds code" having been received prior to 
   December 7, 1941 ............................................... 471
Considerations militating against likelihood of "Winds code" 
   execute message having been received prior to December 7, 1941 . 475

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK          469

APPENDIX E

THE "WINDS CODE"
ESTABLISHMENT AND NATURE OF "WINDS CODE" The "Winds code" was established and confirmed by five communications, two of which were processed by the Navy; i. e., Circulars 2353 and 2354, as follows: [1] "From: Tokyo "To: Washington "19 November 1941 "Circular #2353 "Regarding the broadcast of a special message in an emergency. "In case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations), and the cutting off of international communications, the following warnings will be added in the middle of the daily Japanese-language short-wave news broadcast. "(1) In case of a Japan-U. S. relations in danger: HIGASHI NO KAZEAME.* "(2) Japan-U. S. S. R. relations: KITANOKAZE KUMORI.** "(3) Japan-British relations: NISHI NO KAZE HARE.*** "This signal will be given in the middle and at the end as a weather forecast and each sentence will be repeated twice. When this is heard please destroy all code papers, etc. This is as yet to be a completely secret arrangement. "Forward as urgent intelligence. "25432 "JD-1: 6875 (Y) Navy Trans. 11-28-41 (S-TT)" *East wind, rain **North wind, cloudy ***West wind, clear "From: Tokyo "To: Washington "19 November 1941 "Circular #2354 "When our diplomatic relations are becoming dangerous, we will add the following at the beginning and end of our general intelligence broadcasts: "(1) If it is Japan-U. S. Relations, "HIGASHI". "(2) Japan-Russia relations, "KITA". "(3) Japan-British relations (including Thai, Malaya, and N. E. I.); "NISHI". "The above will be repeated five times and included at beginning and end. "Relay to Rio de Janeiro, Buenos Aires, Mexico City, San Francisco. "25392 "JD-1: 6850 (Y) Navy Trans. 11-2641 (S)" By way of confirming the winds code and reflecting its nature the following dispatch, No. 281430, was received from the Commander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet: [2] [1] Committee exhibit No. 1, pp. 154, 155. [2] Id., No. 142 470 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK TOP SECRET 28 NOVEMBER 1941 FROM: CINCAF [3] ACTION: OPNAV 4 INFO: COMSIXTEEN CINCPAC COMFOURTEEN [5] 281430 FOLLOWING TOKYO TO NET INTERCEPT TRANSLATION RECEIVED FROM SINGAPORE X IF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS ARE ON VERGE OF BEING SEVERED FOLLOWING WORDS REPEATED FIVE TIMES AT BEGINNING AND END OF ORDINARY TOKYO NEWS BROADCASTS WILL HAVE SIGNIFICANCE AS FOLLOWS X HIGASHI HIGASHI JAPANESE AMERICAN X KITA KITA RUSSIA X NISHA NISHI ENGLAND INCLUDING OCCUPATION OF THAI OR INVASION OF MALAYA AND NEI XX ON JAPANESE LANGUAGE FOREIGN NEWS BROADCASTS THE FOLLOWING SENTENCES REPEATED TWICE IN THE MIDDLE AND TWICE AT THE END OF BROADCASTS WILL BE USED XX AMERICA HIGASHI NO KAZE KUMORI [6] XX ENGLAND X NISHI NO KAZE HARE X UNQUOTE X BRITISH AND COMSIXTEEN MONITORING ABOVE BROADCASTS Two further dispatches relate significantly to the winds code, the first from Consul General Foote, our senior diplomatic representative in the Netherlands East Indies, the second from Colonel Thorpe, our senior Army intelligence officer in Java. [7] "TELEGRAM RECEIVED "BF "This telegram must be Batavia "closely paraphrased be- Dated December 4, 1941 "fore being communicated FROM Rec'd. 9:19 a. M. "to anyone. (SC) "Secretary of State, " Washington. " 220, December 4, 10 a. m. "War Department at Bandoeng claims intercepted and decoded following "from Ministry Foreign Affairs Tokyo: " "When crisis leading to worst arises following will be broadcast at end weather reports; one east wind rain war with United States, two north wind cloudy war with Russia, three west wind clear war with Britain including attack on Thailand or Malaya and Dutch Indies. If spoken twice burn codes and secret papers." "Same re following Japanese Ambassador Bangkok to Consul General Batavia: " "When threat of crises exists following will be used five times in texts of general reports and radio broadcasts: one Higashi east America, two Kita north Russia, three Nishi west Britain with advance into Thailand and attack on Malaya and Dutch Indies." "Thorpe and Slawson cabled the above to War Department. I attach little or no importance to it and view it with some suspicion. Such have been common since 1936. "HSM FOOTE" [3] Commander in chief. Asiatic Fleet. [4] Office of Naval Operations. [5] Commandant Sixteenth Naval District; commander in chief, Pacific Fleet; commandant, Fourteenth Naval District. [6] It is to be noted that, apparently through inadvertence in transmitting the message, the code phrase referring to Russian has been improperly commingled with that referring to the United States. [7] See committee exhibit No. 142. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 471 FROM ALUSNA BATAVIA OPNAV RRRRR DATE 5 DEC 1941 [8] DECODED BY KALAIDJIAN PARAPHRASED BY PURDY 031030 CR0222 FROM THORPE FOR MILES WAR DEPT. CODE INTERCEPT: JAPAN WILL NOTIFY HER CONSULS OF WAR DECISION IN HER FOREIGN BROADCASTS AS WEATHER REPORT AT END. EAST WIND RAIN XXXXXX UNITED STATES: NORTH WIND CLOUDY RUSSIA: WEST WIND CLEAR ENGLAND WITH ATTACK ON THAILAND MALAY AND DUTCH EAST INDIES. WILL BE REPEATED TWICE OR MAY USE COMPASS DIRECTIONS ONLY. IN THIS CASE WORDS WILL BE INTRODUCED FIVE TIMES IN GENERAL TEXT. (Signature illegible) DISTRIBUTION: WAR DEPT. ACTION FILES: CNO 20OP 20A RECORD COPY: 20C X SHOW OPDO TOP SECRET SECRET EFFORTS TO MONITOR The evidence is undisputed that both services extended themselves in an effort to intercept a message, in execution of the winds code, not only through their own monitoring stations but through facilities of the Federal Communications Commission as well. While only fragmentary evidence of a documentary nature is available to indicate the nature of instructions to monitor for an implementing or execute message, the Federal Communications Commission file is complete and, as indicated, there is no contention that every effort was not made to intercept an execute message. [9] CONSIDERATIONS BEARING ON THE POSSIBILITY OF A MESSAGE IN EXECUTION OF THE "WINDS CODE" HAVING BEEN RECEIVED PRIOR TO DECEMBER 7, 1941 1. Capt. L. F. Safford in a prepared statement (read before the joint committee) [10] has set forth a positive assertion that a winds execute message was received in the Navy Department *on the morning of December 4, 1941,* and has elaborated on the circumstances which serve, in his opinion, to indicate that a winds execute was dispatched and why such a message would have been dispatched from Tokyo. Safford asserted that when he first saw the message it had already been translated by Kramer; that Kramer had underscored all three "code phrases" on the original incoming teletype sheet; and that he had written in pencil or colored crayon the free translation: "War with England (including NEI, [11] etc.); war with the U. S.; peace with Russia." Safford has persistently testified that an authentic implementing message was received. [8] It is to be noted that this message bears the date December 5, 1941, whereas the "number group" is 031030, indicating December 3, 1941. From evidence available (see discussion, infra) it appears this message was dispatched from Batavia on December 3, 1941, but was not processed in the Navy Department until December 5, 1941, Inasmuch as the message was sent "deferred." [9] See committee record, pp. 9809, 9810. [10] Id., at pp. 9622-9654. [11] Netherlands East Indies. 472 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 2. Capt. A. D. Kramer testified before the committee that *on the morning of December 5* the GY Watch Officer, thought by him possibly to be Lieutenant Murray, came to the door of his office and showed him a message which he, Kramer, regarded as an implementation of the winds code; that he saw this message only briefly, relying on the evaluation of the GY watch officer as to the authenticity of the message; that he had no recollection of writing on the message but that had he written anything he positively would not have used the word "war"; that he proceeded to Captain Safford's office with the GY watch officer when the message was delivered to Safford; that he never saw the message again. [12] It should be noted that Kramer testified the message he saw was on a piece of teletype paper torn off from the machine and was not more than a line or two, possibly three lines; that in no case did the message contain some 200 words as alleged by Captain Safford in his statement. [13] Further, that the message he saw referred to only one country, which to the best of his belief was England. [14] This testimony must, of course, be considered along with Kramer's testimony before the Navy Court of Inquiry. When asked what Japanese language words were used in the execute message he saw, he replied: [15] "*Higashi No Kazeame*, I am quite certain. The literal meaning of *Higashi No Kazeame* is East Wind, Rain. That is plain Japanese language. The sense of that, however, meant strained relations or a break in relations, possibly even implying war with a nation to the eastward, the United States." 3. Admiral R. E. Ingersoll testified that during December of 1941 he was Assistant Chief of Naval Operations; that he saw "messages" which were supposed to implement the winds code, they being brought to his office; that he did not recall definitely whether he saw them prior to December 7 or thereafter; that an implementation of the code received prior to December 7, if genuine, would simply have confirmed what had already been dispatched to the Fleet regarding destruction of codes by the Japanese and would have required no action; that he thought the message he saw referred to all three countries; i. e. England, United States, and Russia. [16]" 4. Col. Otis K. Sadtler, in charge of the military branch of the Army Signal Corps in December of 1941, testified that about 9 a. m. or shortly thereafter on Friday, December 5, Admiral Noyes telephoned him to the effect that the "message was in" (referring to an implementing winds message); that Noyes told him "it was the word that implied a break in relations between Japan and Great Britain"; that he went to General Miles' office, informing Miles that the "word was in"; that Miles sent for Colonel Bratton and when Bratton came in, he, Sadtler, told Bratton word had been received from Admiral Noyes to the effect that diplomatic relations between Japan and Great Britain were in danger; that Bratton asked him to verify receipt of the message; that he called Admiral Noyes again, asking him to verify the "Japanese word" and Noyes replied that he did not know any Japanese but it was the one that "meant Japan and Great Britain"; that upon reporting this information to General Miles' [12] Committee record, pp. 10481 et seq. [13] Id., at p. 10491. [14] Id., at p. 10501. [15] Navy court of inquiry (top secret) record, p. 957. [16] Committee record, pp. 11278 et seq. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 473 office he did not thereafter get in touch with Admiral Noyes concerning the message; that he never saw the message Noyes reported to him; and that insofar as he could ascertain it did "not come over", i. e. to his office or the Army. [17] 5. Col. Rufus S. Bratton, Chief of the Far Eastern Section of the Intelligence Branch of the Military Intelligence Division in December of 1941, testified that sometime around 9 or 10 a. m. on the morning of December 5 he was called to General Miles' office where Sadtler stated Noyes had just called to say "it is in" (the winds execute message); that Miles, at his suggestion, requested Sadtler to get from Noyes a copy either of the Japanese text or of the English translation so a determination could be made as to whether the message was a genuine execute or another false alarm; that he did not again see Sadtler concerning the matter; that he, Bratton, called up the Navy, talking to either Captain McCollum or Kramer to inquire if they had received a winds execute message and was advised that no such message had been received; that he contacted Army SIS [18] and was likewise advised that no execute had been received; that the Army continued to monitor for an implementing message up to and after the December 7 attack. [19] 6. Admiral Richmond K. Turner, Chief of War Plans in December of 1941, testified before the committee as follows: "On Friday afternoon, I think it was, of December 5, Admiral Noyes called on the telephone or the interphone, I do not know which, and said "The weather message", or words to this effect, "the first weather message has come in" and I said, "What did it say?" And he said, "North wind clear." And I said, "Well, there is something wrong about that," and he said, "I think so, too", and he hung up "I never saw a draft of that, I do not know from my own knowledge where he got it from. I assumed until recently that it it was an authentic message. From what I can determine since coming back here it was something entirely different, but it was never told to me. If it had come in and had been authentic I am certain that I would have received a copy of it." Turner testified that he did not see an implementation of the winds code applying to the United States. [20] 7. To complete the picture it would seem apropos to set forth the testimony of Rear Adm. Leigh Noyes at this point. Noyes, in December of 1941, Director of Naval Communications, testified before the committee that prior to December 7, 1941, no genuine winds execute message was brought to him of to his attention by anyone in the Navy Department; that prior to the Pearl Harbor attack there were several instances when messages were brought to him which were first thought to be winds execute messages but were determined not to be genuine; that the message described by Captain Safford in his statement, if received, would not have been regarded as an authentic execute message since (1) it is alleged to have been in Morse code and not by voice (2) no provision was made for a negative expression in the winds code (3) an execute would not have been [17] Id., at pp. 12357-12363. [18] Signal Intelligence Service. [19] Committee record. Pp. 12068-12077: Colonel Bratton testified: "I can state most positively that no execute of the winds codes was ever received by me prior to the attack on Pearl E[arbor. I find it hard to believe that any such execute message could get into the War Department without passing over my desk. "It is inconceivable to me. I might have missed it but I had some assistants who were on the watch for it, and there were some people in the Army SIS who were also on the watch for it. They couldn't all have missed it. It is simply inconceivable to me that such a message could have been in the War Department without some one of us knowing about it or seeing it." Committee record, p. 12089. [20] Committee record, p. 5214. 474 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK interpreted to mean war, and (4) Circular 2353 made no provision for N. E. I. as stated by Safford. With respect to Colonel Sadtler's testimony that Noyes called him saying "The message is in," or words to that effect, Noyes stated he had no present recollection of having made such a statement although he would not say it did not occur inasmuch as he talked with the chief signal officer a number of times each day. [21] Further, Noyes testified that he was directed to prepare a folder for the Roberts Commission but that it did not include a winds execute message and the folder in fact was supposed to contain no magic nor any reference to it; that the McCollum message, [22] to his knowledge, contained no reference to a winds execute message. [23] 8. The "Rochefort Message." On December 5, 1941, a dispatch signed "Miles" was sent by the War Department to the assistant chief of staff headquarters G-2, Hawaiian Department, as follows: [24] "Contact Commander Rochefort immediately thru Commandant Fourteen Naval District regarding broadcasts from Tokyo reference weather." At first blush, the foregoing dispatch would suggest, inferentially at least, the possibility of an execute message having been received. Colonel Bratton, upon whose recommendation the dispatch was sent, testified, however: [26] "I had a discussion with Commander McCollum, now Captain McCollum, as to the amount of knowledge that the Navy had in Hawaii. He assured me his man Rochefort there at that time knew practically everything that there was to be known about the U. S.-Japanese relations through one means or another. I knew that suitable warning messages had been sent out to Hawaii and elsewhere. I had not read the messages and did not know their exact contents. I wanted to make sure that our G-2 in Hawaii got in touch with the ONI man in Hawaii, to get from him all the intelligence that he had in his possession, and I knew that if they got together on the subject of this winds message-I did not know, but I felt that they were going from there, and that there would be a complete exchange of intelligence and that the Army G-2 would then be in possession of just as much intelligence as Rochefort, the ONI man, had." Colonel Bratton's testimony is to the effect that the dispatch of the message to G-2 to contact Rochefort had nothing whatever to do with receipt of a message in execution of the winds code. In this regard Captain McCollum stated: [26] "I understood that G-2 was very anxious for their G-2 in Hawaii to have direct access with Commander Rochefort, who had the only agency capable of intercepting the winds message in Hawaii, sir. The Army, as I understand it, had no parallel set-up in Hawaii at that time." [21] In a statement submitted to the committee under date of February 25 1946, in amplification of his testimony Admiral Noyes said: "In reading over my testimony I noted that I failed to bring out the following point, which, however, is supported by my previous testimony and by documentary evidence. "In connection with the alleged telephone conversation with me on 5 December to which Colonel Sadtler testified and which I did not recall in that form: "On 5 December there was received from Colonel Thorpe in Batavia addressed to General Miles in the War Department. This message was transmitted by the Naval Attache to Nary Department for delivery to General Miles. As I have already testified the subject matter was under discussion between me and the War Department during that day. It is very probable that I would have called Colonel Sadtler and notified him of the fact that this message had been received and was being delivered to the War Department for General Miles on account of its importance. Since discussion took place between me and the War Department during that day on the subject matter of this message and the War Department recommended that we should make no change in our original translation of the set-up of the Winds Code (see previous testimony), it would appear that any possible authentic or false execute of the winds message would have also been discussed and settled during that day." Committee record pp. 14101, 14102. [22] See discussion, infra [23] Committee record, pp. 12605-12620. [24] Committee exhibit No. 32 p 20. [25] Committee record p. 12120, 12121. [26] Id., at pp. 9271, 9272. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 475 CONSIDERATIONS MILITATING AGAINST LIKELIHOOD OF "WINDS CODE" EXECUTE MESSAGE HAVING BEEN RECEIVED PRIOR TO DECEMBER 7, 1941 1. Examination of Circular 2353 (to which Captain Safford admits the alleged winds execute was responsive) reflects that an execute warning would be added in the middle and at the end of the daily Japanese language short wave news broadcast "in case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations), and *the cutting off of international communications.*" When the execute was heard "all code papers, etc." Were to be destroyed. A reasonable construction of this circular would indicate that the winds code was an emergency arrangement designed to be employed in the event ordinary commercial means of international communications were no longer available to the Japanese Government. Contemplating that such commercial means conceivably might not be available to her, it would appear natural that Japan should devise a means such as the winds code to direct her diplomatic establishments to destroy their codes and secret papers. Manifestly and quite naturally the winds code should provide for destruction of all code papers inasmuch as the necessity for having any codes whatever of the type outstanding would be precluded by the cutting-off of international communications. Ordinary commercial means of communications were available to Japan up to the December 7 attack on Pearl Harbor and in fact committee exhibit 1 is replete with instructions to Japanese diplomatic establishments with respect to destruction of codes. [27] Accordingly, it can fairly be concluded that recourse to the emergency system provided by the winds code was not necessitated and in consequence was not resorted to prior to December 7 inasmuch as the contingency contemplating its use (cutting off of international communications) did not materialize prior to the Pearl Harbor attack. 2. It is admitted and of course definitely known that a winds execute message (*Nishi No Kaze Hare*-west wind, clear) applying to England was transmitted from Tokyo stations JLG4 and JZJ between 0002 and 0035 GMT, December 8, 1941. [28] Such a message was of course reasonable inasmuch as Japan could very well contemplate that ordinary commercial means of communications would no longer be available after the Pearl Harbor attack. Inasmuch as a genuine winds execute message applying to England was transmitted after the Pearl Harbor attack, it would appear anomalous that such a message should also have been sent prior to December 7. [29] 3. The investigation conducted in Japan by headquarters of the supreme allied commander reflected that a signal implementing Circulars 2353 and 2354 was probably not transmitted prior to December 8, Tokyo time but was transmitted by radio voice broadcast at some hour after 0230, December 8, Tokyo time. [30] No evidence could be obtained that an implementing signal was transmitted by radio telegraph. Significantly, those who conducted the interrogation [27] See sections relating to destruction of codes pt. III and IV this report. [28] See committee exhibit No. 142. [29] Admiral Noyes suggested that Japan s sending an execute on December 7 was probably occasioned by reason of the fact that some Japanese diplomatic establishment had failed to respond to instructions to destroy their codes which had been dispatched through ordinary channels of communication. [30] December 7, Washington time. 476 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK in Japan had no knowledge prior to the interrogation that the United States had information that the winds code was used on December 8, Tokyo time. [31] Mr. Shinroku Tanomogi was head of the overseas department of the Japan Radio Broadcasting Corporation in December 1941, and as such was in charge of programs, including news programs, beamed to foreign countries. Upon interview he stated he had no recollection at all of any "east wind rain" report or any similar phrase being broadcast. Prior to December 8. [32] 4. Inquiry made through the State Department reflects that no winds execute message was intercepted prior to the Pearl Harbor attack by the British, Dutch, or Australians. [33] 5. In his statement submitted for the committee's consideration, Captain Safford definitely states that the alleged implementing winds message was part of a Japanese overseas "news" broadcast from station JAP (Tokyo) on 11980 kilcoycles beginning at 1330 Greenwich civil time on Thursday, December 4, 1941, this time corresponding to 10:30 p. m., Tokyo time, and 8:30 a. m., Washington time, December 4, 1941; that the winds message broadcast was forwarded by teletype from Cheltenham to the Navy Department shortly before 9 a. m. On December 4, 1941. Further, that when he first saw the message it had already been translated by Kramer; that Kramer had underscored all three "code phrases" on the original incoming teletype sheet; and that he had written in pencil or colored crayon the following free translations: "War with England (including NEI, etc.) "War with the U. S. "Peace with Russia." Kramer has testified that had he seen such a message, as alleged by Safford, he would in no case have interpreted a winds execute to mean war. [34] In this regard, the Thorpe and Foote messages, which interpreted the winds code as meaning war, were not available to the Navy Department until after the time Safford alleges the winds execute came in and was interpreted by Kramer to mean war. The Thorpe dispatch, while intended for General Miles of the War Department, was sent by Naval Communications and was received at the Navy Department at 1:21 a. m., December 4, l941. [35] It was not decoded until 1:45 a. m., December 5, 1941, the delay being occasioned by the fact that the dispatch was sent "deferred," the lowest priority in handling. [36] The Foote dispatch, it is to be noted, was not received in the State Department until 9:19 a. m., December 4. Consequently, as indicated, no information was available in the Navy Department on the morning of December 4 as alleged by Safford serving as basis for interpreting a winds execute message to mean war. Even conceding the availability of the Thorpe and Foote dispatches, it would scarcely appear likely that the Navy Department would disregard its own translation of the winds code and be guided solely by the dispatches from outside sources. [31] See committee exhibit No. 142 [32] Id., sec 4B. [33] Committee exhibit No. 142, secs. 4c, 4d, 4e. See also committee record, p. 11564. [34] See Navy Court of Inquiry (top secret) record, pp. 968, 969, 975, 987; committee record, 10492. [35] Committee record, p. 10135. [36] Id., at pp. 11255,11256. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 477 6. The winds execute message Safford alleges he saw on the morning of December 4, bore the "negative form for war with Russia" and mixed up the plain language broadcast with the Morse broadcast. [37] It is thus clear that the alleged winds execute of December 4 was not responsive to the establishing winds code. Captain Kramer, it should be noted, testified before the joint committee that had the "negative form" been employed with respect to Russia, he would have regarded such fact as nullifying any credence to be placed in a broadcast purporting to be a winds execute message. It would appear agreed that the implementation of an establishing code must conform in meticulous detail to the code as originally established. 7. Referring to Captain Safford's statement, the following matters appear to be subject to serious question: A. Safford relies on Cincaf 281430 [38] as basis for evaluation of a winds execute message to mean war, pointing out that this dispatch contained the statement "Nishi nishi England *including occupation of Thai or Invasion of Malay and N. E. I.*" It should be noted, however, that Cincaf 281430 indicates the winds code would be employed "if diplomatic relations are on verge of being severed." In any event the interpretation of Cincaf 281430 as relied upon by Safford while possibly indicating war with England does not by any reasonable construction indicate war with the United States. [38a] B. Safford's reliance in his statement on Cincaf 281430 as providing basis for evaluating a winds execute as meaning war is in contradiction of his testimony before the Navy Court of Inquiry where reliance was placed on the Thorpe and Foote dispatches. [39] While denied by Safford, the suggestion was made by counsel before the committee that Safford may have shifted reliance on the Thorpe and Foote dispatches to Cincaf 281430 by reason of the fact that he had learned that both the Thorpe and Foote dispatches were not available to the Navy Department until after the morning of December 4. [40] C. Safford seeks to bring out that the alleged winds execute was intended for the Japanese London Embassy inasmuch as the latter had destroyed its codes 3 days previously and a winds message was the only way that Tokyo could get news to its London Ambassador secretly. [41] This statement is not true insofar as it implies that no other means of communication between Tokyo and London was available. By Circular 2409 of November 27, 1941, [42] the Japanese established the "hidden word" code and by Circular 2461 [43] instructed that this code be kept [37] That is, Circular 2363 with Circular 2354. [38] Set forth, supra. [38a] See committee record, p. 9670. [39] Navy Court of Inquiry (top secret) record, p. 748, see also committee record, p. 9667 [40] Committee record, pp. 9667, 9668. [41] Id., at p. 9639. [42] Committee exhibit No. 1, p. 186. [43] Id., at p. 226. 478 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK until the last moment. This code system of communication was clearly available to the Japanese in communicating with their London Ambassador and was in fact employed on December 7 in Circular 2494. [44] Safford admitted in his testimony before the joint committee the availability in the London Embassy of the hidden word code. Furthermore, in Circular 2443, dated December 1, [45] to London instructions were issued to discontinue use of the code machine and to dispose of it immediately. Ostensibly other code systems were still available after destruction of the code machine and it is known that coded traffic in the system referred to as PA-K2 passed from the Japanese London Embassy to Tokyo December 6, 1941. [46] D. By way of lending credence to his assertion that a winds execute was received, Safford has testified that McCollum's dispatch of December 4 (not sent) was predicated on such a winds execute and mentioned the execute in the last portion. [47] McCollum definitely contradicted this in testifying before the committee, asserting that his dispatch was based on a memorandum he, McCollum, had prepared under, date of December 1 [48] and bore no relationship to a winds execute message; that he neither saw nor received knowledge of a true winds execute prior to December 7. [49] E. In further substantiation of his allegation that a winds execute was received on the morning of December 4, Safford has referred to the fact that the dispatches from OpNav to our own establishments to destroy their codes was based on a winds execute. This assertion is diametrically contrary to testimony of Noyes [50] and Kramer [51] who declared that OpNav instructions to our establishments to destroy their codes was based on instructions sent out by the Japanese [52] to their diplomatic establishments to destroy codes, and bore no relationship to a winds execute. The testimony of McCollum and Ingersoll tends to confirm the foregoing. F. Safford points out that the individual smooth translations of the alleged winds execute for authorized Navy Department officials and the White House were distributed at noon on December 4, 1941, in accordance with standard operating procedure. [53] Kramer, in testifying before the joint committee, categorically denied that any copies of a winds execute message were prepared for distribution by his section, it [44] Id., at p. 251 [45] Id., at p. 209. [46] Committee record, p. 9740. [47] See pt. IV, this report, for discussion of so-called McCollum dispatch. [48] Committee exhibit No. 81. [49] Committee record pp. 9124-9134. [50] Id., at p. 12623. [51] Id., at p. 10504. [52] Committee exhibit No. 1. [53] Committee record, pp. 9763 et seq. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 479 being noted that it was the responsibility of Kramer to prepare and distribute the smooth translations. [54] G. Captain Safford has pointed out that a winds-execute was dispatched in Morse code. Captain Rochefort, who was in charge of the Communications Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harbor in December of l941, testified that all of the broadcast schedules giving the various frequencies furnished by Washington were all voice frequencies; that to him the very setting up of the winds code implied "voice"; that if an execute message were sent in Morse code it would have meant that every Japanese Embassy (and consulate) in every Japanese location throughout the world for whom the message was intended by the Japanese Government would "have had to maintain Morse code operators, people capable of receiving Morse code. I do not think so." [55] Rochefort further testified that they were monitoring for a winds execute message at Honolulu and continued to do so until after the attack; that four of his best language officers were on a 24-hour watch for an execute; that no winds implementing message was intercepted. [56] H. Admiral Noyes testified that he would not have regarded the message which Safford alleges was received as an authentic execute message inasmuch as (1) Morse code was allegedly used and in consequence not responsive to Circular 2353; (2) no provision was made in the winds code for a "negative form" with respect to Russia; (3) an execute message would not have been interpreted to mean war; and (4) no reference is made in Circular 2353 to N. E. I., although the alleged execute was responsive to Circular 2353 and Safford indicates reference was made to. N. E. I. [57] 8. Safford, in testifying before the joint committee, placed emphasis on the fact that the winds code provided for destruction of all codes (Circular 2353) and by reason thereof a winds execute message would have more significance than the intercepts contained in committee exhibit 1 which gave instructions with respect to destruction of particular codes. [58] If a winds execute message was dispatched for the Japanese London Embassy on December 4, as alleged by Safford, it would necessarily [54] Committee record, p. 10496. [55] Id., at p. 12548. [56] Id., at pp. 12532-12534. [57] Id., at pp. 12614, 126l5. [58] When asked what there was in the winds execute message alleged by him to have been received which indicated *war*, Captain Safford testified: "For one thing there is instruction to destroy all code papers. If that is regarded as synonymous with the outbreak of war, as I have heard testified in this room, that by itself means something more than the wording of these three paragraphs above * * *. Tokyo had sent out instructions to various people telling them to burn their most important codes but to leave two codes open. One was the so-called PA-K2 code and the other was the LA code. Now, with those two exceptions all codes had been burnt, but this said, '*Please destroy all code papers*,' and so forth. In other words, there was no exceptions in this one." Committee record, p. 9778. In marked contradiction of the foregoing testimony is the explanation of Captain Safford as to the reason for Japan's London Embassy having the PA-K2 code system after the alleged winds execute message was received. He stated: "There were two systems that were exempt from destruction. One was PA-K2, and the other was LA, neither of which were considered by ourselves as secret, and we presumed the Japanese did not consider them secret." Committee record, p. 9741. It is to be noted, however, that the Honolulu consulate, as well as Tokyo, used the PA-K2 system for some of the most vital messages shortly before December 7 (see committee exhibit No. 2). While this was virtually the only system left after the messages ordering the destruction of various codes, the PA-K2 system was employed for the sending of messages which would probably have tipped off the attack on Pearl Harbor, had it not been for the fact they were not translated until after the attack. 480 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK mean that *all* codes were to be destroyed by Japan's London Ambassador. It is definitely known, as earlier indicated, that London sent a dispatch to Tokyo in the system known as PA-K2 on December 6, 1941. Such fact would indicate strongly that no winds execute was dispatched on December 4 with consequent destruction of all codes. [59] 9. It appears clear that both the Navy and Army were still looking for a winds execute message after the morning of December 4, based on records of the Federal Communications Commission. [60] In this connection at 7:50 p. m. on December 5, 1941, the watch officer of FCC phoned Colonel Bratton of the Army with respect to a false winds message received from the FCC Portland monitoring station. The FCC watch officer submitted the following memorandum for his superior with respect to Bratton's remarks: "Remarks by Col. Bratton: "Results still negative but am pleased to receive the negative results as it means we have that much more time. The information desired will occur in the middle of a program and possibly will be repeated at frequent intervals. (Asked Col. Bratton if I should communicate the information to Portland-concerning the fact that the desired data will be in the middle of a program.) No, I will have a conference with Lt. Col. Dusenberg in the morning and will contact Mr. Sterling in that regard." The foregoing would indicate that the Army had received no genuine winds execute message by 7:50 p. m., December 5. The FCC night watch log for December 4, 1941, [61] contains the notation that at 9:32 p. m. "Lt. Brotherhood called to inquire if any other reference to weather was made previously in program intercepted by Portland. Informed him that no other reference was made." There is manifested here an interest by the Navy in the nature of a winds message on the evening of December 4 which is hardly likely if a true execute was received on the morning of December 4. Further, it would appear logical that had a true winds execute been received on the morning of December 4 the FCC would have been requested to discontinue its monitoring activities. This, however, was not done and the FCC was still monitoring for a winds execute and actually intercepted such an execute (with respect to England) after the Pearl Harbor attack. [62] 10. Collateral considerations tending to minimize likelihood that implementing winds message was dispatched from Tokyo. A. Referring to the message telephoned by the FCC to Brotherhood at 9:05 p. m. on December 4,63 Safford testified before Admiral Hewitt [64] that this was the "false" message which appeared on this surface to use the "winds" code relating to Russia but which was a genuine weather broadcast. This message, Safford said, Brotherhood telephoned to Admiral Noyes and later *Kramer took one look at it and said it was not what was wanted and threw it into the waste basket*. He testified that this message was received * * * 12 hours or more after what he referred to as the "true winds message." [59] Committee record, p. 9740. [60] Committee exhibit No. 142-A. [61] Id. [62] See also testimony of Colonel Bratton, committee record, p. 12074. [63] Committee exhibit No. 142, see. 3. [64] Hewitt inquiry record, p. 113. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 481 Query: Why would Kramer be "wanting" a winds execute message 12 hours after Safford alleges Kramer had an execute message and had noted thereon "War with England, War with U. S., peace with Russia"? B. In testifying before the committee, Justice Roberts stated he had no knowledge of the winds matter and no access to Magic. This would appear to be partially at least in contradiction of Safford's testimony that he last saw the winds execute among material assembled for the Roberts Commission. Further, Admiral Noyes testified that he was directed to prepare a folder for the Roberts Commission, but it did not include a winds execute message and the folder was in fact supposed to contain no magic nor any reference to it. [65] C. Safford's detailed recollection of the winds matter, as set forth in his statement, is in sharp conflict with his indefinite and somewhat nebulous memory as reflected by his testimony and the letters directed to Kramer during December 1943, and January 1944. It should be noted in this connection that Safford testified before Admiral Hart [66] that the winds implementing message came in on the evening of December 3 and Kramer went down to get it. From all of the testimony it appears that Safford's position before the committee was assumed after a process of elimination of possibilities and reconstruction of a situation concerning which he had only a partially independent recollection. D. Considering the tight reign maintained by the military in Japan and particularly the desire to clothe the movement against Pearl Harbor with utmost secrecy, it would seem highly improbable that the Japanese would tip off her war decision in a news broadcast by advising her London Ambassador of such decision 3 days before Pearl Harbor. E. If a true winds execute was received and distributed on December 4 it would appear reasonable to assume that some record of the message could be found in the War or Navy Departments. Yet despite repeated searches there is no record whatever in either department of such a message. In this connection Safford has suggested that intercept No. JD-7001, marked "canceled" in the Navy file of intercepts, may have been the missing winds execute. Such a premise, of course, presupposes a deliberate abstraction by someone of an official record from the Navy Department. In evaluation of Safford's suggestion with respect to No. JD-7001, it should be noted that the file of JD intercepts was maintained by Kramer who has emphatically testified that no winds execute came into his section or was distributed by him. Further, Kramer has pointed out that there are several examples of canceled JD numbers in the file [67] and presented several reasons in testi- [65] Committee record. P. 12620. [66] Hart inquiry record, p. 361. [67] This appears to be borne out by the record. See committee exhibit No. 142, sec. 6. 482 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK fying before the committee why a JD number might be canceled. Significantly, a check of the Army file of intercepts for the period December 3-5, 1941, reflected that the Navy file contains all intercepts that are in the Army file. [68] Conceding for purposes of discussion that a winds execute message was received in the form alleged by Safford, it will be noted that such message would not indicate where or when Japan would strike but merely her possible purpose to go to war. Bearing in mind the rather frank admission by Army and Navy officials that they knew war was imminent in the days before December 7, credence could scarcely be placed in the theory that the message was deliberately destroyed when it contained no information that was not admittedly already possessed. Admiral Ingersoll, for example, testified before the committee that had a true winds execute message been received it would have been regarded as merely confirmatory of the implications contained in Japanese instructions to destroy codes contained in committee exhibit 1, inasmuch as instructions to destroy codes, particularly in the consulates, meant war. The testimony of several other witnesses, including Admiral Noyes and Colonel Bratton, is to the same effect. 11. The testimony of Col. Robert E. Schukraft, assigned to the office of the chief signal officer at the time of the Pearl Harbor attack, before the committee on February 19, 1946, is of particular pertinence to the testimony of Captain Kramer, set forth under section 3, supra. Schukraft testified that 2 or 3 days prior to Pearl Harbor Col. Rex Minckler brought to Schukraft's office a piece of yellow teletype paper (the carbon copy) which contained what appeared to be a winds execute message but that the message upon examination was obviously not a true winds execute. Further, Schukraft testified Colonel Minckler had indicated that the Navy had thought the message a true winds execute, Captain Kramer having seen the message and so thinking. He stated that he concluded very positively that the message was not a true execute of the Winds Code. [69] 12. The following officers have stated they have no knowledge of a message in execution of the Winds code prior to December 7, 1941: Navy Admiral Harold R. Stark, Chief of Naval Operations. [70] Admiral Leigh Noyes, Director of Naval Communications. [71] Admiral T. S. Wilkinson, Director of Naval Intelligence. [72] Capt. Arthur N. McCollum, in charge, Far Eastern Section of Naval Intelligence. [73] Admiral Joseph R. Redman, Assistant Director of Naval Communications. [74] [68] See Army liaison memorandum dated January 26, 1946. Committee record, pp. 8965, 8966. [69] Committee record pp. 13093-13096. [70] See Navy Court of Inquiry record, pp. 783 872. Confirmed in testimony before the committee. [71] Committee record, pp. 12605-12620. [72] Hewitt inquiry record, pp. 398-401. [73] Committee record, pp. 9124-9134. [74] Navy Court of Inquiry record, p. 1103. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 483 Lt. Comdr. George W. Linn, GY watch officer. [75] Lt. Comdr. Alfred V. Pering, GY watch officer. [76] Lt. Comdr. Allan A. Murray, GY watch officer. [77] Lt. Frederick L. Freeman, assigned to section disseminating to ONI intelligence received from radio intelligence units. [78] Capt. Redfield Mason, fleet intelligence officer, Asiatic Fleet. [79] Commander Rudolph J. Fabian, Radio Intelligence Unit at Corregidor. [80] Capt. Edwin T. Layton, Pacific Fleet intelligence officer. [81] Capt. Joseph John Rochefort, in charge, Communications Intelligence Unit, Pearl Harbor. [82] Army Gen. George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff. [83] Maj. Gen. Leonard T. Gerow, Chief of War Plans. [84] Maj. Gen. Sherman Miles, Chief of G-2. [85] Col. Rufus W. Bratton, Chief, Far Eastern Section of G-2. [86] Col. Robert E. Schukraft, Chief, Radio Interception for SIS. [87] Col. Rex W. Minckler, Chief, SIS. [88] Brig. Gen. Thomas J; Betts, executive assistant to the Chief of Intelligence Branch MID. [89] Lt. Col. Frank B. Rowlett, prior to Pearl Harbor attack a civilian technical assistant to the officer of the Cryptoanalytic unit, SIS. [90] William F. Friedman, a cryptanalyst of War Department. [91] Over-all observations with respect to Captain Safford's testimony: 13. As previously indicated Captain Safford has rather consistently testified that a true winds execute message was received prior to December 7. However, there are certain discrepancies in his testimony tending to show particularly that his recollection of the incident attending receipt of such an execute has not been definite and has been developed through a process of elimination. A. The following testimony, in relation to a winds execute, of Captain Safford before Admiral Hewitt reflects rather clearly his indefinite recollection of the winds matter and his efforts to reconstruct a "vague memory": [92] "Captain SAFFORD. In the fall of l943 it appeared that there was going to be a trial or court martial of Admiral Kimmel. It was hinted in the newspapers and various people in the Navy Department were getting testimony ready for it. I realized I would be one of the important witnesses that, my memory was very vague, and I began looking around to get everything that I could to prepare a written statement which I could follow as testimony. That was the time when I studied the Robert's Report carefully for the first [75] Hewitt Inquiry record pp. 140-142. [76] Id., at p. 148. [77] Id., at pp. 433-441. [78] Id., at pp. 149, 150. [79] Id., at pp. 73, 78. [80] Id., at pp. 73, 78. [81] Id., at pp. 269-271. [82] Id., at pp. 46, 48. [83] See Army Pearl Harbor Board (Top secret) record pp. 35-39. Confirmed in testimony before the committee. [84] Committee record. p. 4302. [85] See Clausen investigation record pp. 214, 215. Confirmed In testimony before the committee. [86] Committee record pp. 12068-12077. [87] Id., at pp. 13093-13096. [88] Clausen Investigation record p. 217. [89] Id., at p. 194. [90] Id., at pp. 225, 226. [91] Hewitt Inquiry record pp. 515-520. [92] Id., at pp. 112, 113. 484 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK time and noted no reference to the winds message or to the message which McCollum had written and which I had seen and I thought had been sent. And then I began talking to everybody who had been around at the time and who I knew had been mixed up in it to see what they could remember to straighten me out on the thing and give me leads to follow down to where I could put my hands on official messages and things so that it would be a matter of fact and not a matter of memory. I also talked the thing over with whatever Army people were still around at the time and had anything in this thing, and bit by bit these facts appeared to come together. The investigation was conducted, if you call it that, for the purpose of preparing myself to take the stand as a witness in a prospective court martial of Admiral Kimmel." E. The letters directed to Captain Kramer by Safford and incorporated in the committee transcript also indicate an indefinite recollection of events prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor. [93] C. In testifying before Admiral Hart, Safford stated: [94] "The "Winds Message" was actually broadcast during the evening of December 3, 1941 (Washington time), which was December 4 by Greenwich time and Tokyo time. The combination of frequency, time of day, and radio propagation was such that the "Winds Message" was heard only on the East Coast of the United States, and even then by only one or two of the Navy stations that were listening for it. The other nations and other Navy C. I. Units, not hearing the "Winds Message" themselves and not receiving any word from the Navy Department, naturally presumed that the "Winds Message" had not yet been sent, and that the Japanese Government was still deferring the initiation of hostilities. When the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, the British at Singapore, the Dutch at Java and the Americans at Manila were just as surprised and astonished as the Pacific Fleet and Army posts in Hawaii. It is apparent that the War Department, like the Navy Department failed to send out information that the "Winds Message" had been sent by Tokyo. The "Winds Message" was received in the Navy Department during the evening of December 3, 1941, while Lieutenant (j. g.) Francis M. Brotherhood, U. S. N. R., was on watch. There was some question in Brotherhood's mind as to what this message really meant because it came in a different form from what had been anticipated. Brotherhood called in Lieutenant Commander Kramer who came down that evening and identified that message as the 'Winds Message" we had been looking for." Yet in his statement and in testifying before the committee Safford has the message coming in on the morning of December 4, 1941, it being brought to him by Lt. A. A. Murray. D. In testifying before the Navy Court of Inquiry Safford said: [95] "22. Q. Captain, in a previous answer you stated that the copy of the intercept using the winds code which you saw on the morning of 4 December 1941 indicated a break in diplomatic relations between the United States and Japan and Japan and Great Britain, and war between these nations. Was there anything in the establishment of the code originally which would indicate that a use of that code would indicate war as contrasted with a mere break in diplomatic relations? "A. The Dutch translation said "war." The Japanese language is very vague and you can put a number of constructions or interpretations or translations on the same message. In very important documents it was customary for the Army and Navy to make independent translations and the differences were sometimes surprising; that [93] See testimony of Captains Kramer and Safford before the committee. [94] Hart inquiry record, p. 361. [95] Navy Court of Inquiry record, p. 748. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 485 is, a difference in degree. The general facts would be alike. However, the people in Communication Intelligence and the people in Signal Intelligence Service and the people in the Far Eastern Section of Naval Intelligence, as well as the Director of Naval Intelligence, considered that meant war and it was a signal of execute for the Japanese war plans. "23. Q. Captain, I call your attention again to Document 3 in Exhibit 64 which is an English-language translation of the Dutch intercept. Was this your only source of information that the use of this code would indicate "a war decision" which is the wording used by the attach, in Batavia? "A. Mr. Foote's message to the State Department was even more specific. It said, "When crises leading to worst arises following will be broadcast at end of weather reports. 1. *East wind rain*-war with United States. 2. *North wind cloudy*-war with Russia. 3. *West wind clear*-war with Britain, including an attack on Thailand or Malaya and Dutch East Indies." This was apparently a verbatim quotation from the Dutch translation." Significantly, in testifying before the committee Safford relies on Cincaf 281430 as the dispatch serving as basis for interpreting a winds execute message to mean war. It has now been conclusively shown that neither the Foote nor Thorpe dispatches were available in the Navy Department at the time Safford alleges an execute was received and interpreted to mean war; i. e. The morning of December 4, 1941. [96] E. The testimony of Captain Safford taken in its entirety reflects substantial discrepancies as to where the alleged execute message was received. It was only at the time of submitting his statement to the committee that Safford stated definitely the message came in at the Navy's Cheltenham station. 14. Because of substantial discrepancies in testimony given in prior proceedings with respect to the question of whether a winds execute message was received in the War or Navy Department, the inquiry conducted by Admiral Hewitt went fully into the matter, among others, of determining if such a message was intercepted prior to December 7, 1941. Admiral Hewitt found: [97] "The interception of a "winds" message relating to the United States during the first week of December 1941, would not have conveyed any information of significance which the Chief of Naval Operations and the commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, did not already have. "No message in the "winds" code relating to the United States was received by any of the watch officers in the Navy Department to whom such a message would have come had it been received in the Navy Department. No such message was intercepted by the radio intelligence units at Pearl Harbor or in the Philippines although intensive efforts were made by those organizations to intercept such a message. The evidence indicates further that no such message was intercepted by the British or the Dutch, despite their efforts to intercept such a message. Neither the Fleet Intelligence Officer of the Asiatic Fleet nor the Fleet Intelligence Officer of the Pacific Fleet nor the Intelligence Officer of the Far Eastern Section of the Office of Naval Intelligence, recalled any such message. The Chief of Naval Operations, the Director of Naval Communications, and the Director of Naval Intelligence recalled no such message. Testimony to the effect that a "winds" code message was received prior to the attack was given by Captain Safford, in charge of Op-20-G, a communications security section at the Navy Department, who stated that such a message was received on December 3rd or 4th, that it related to the United States, and that no copy could be found in the Navy or Army files. In his testimony before Admiral Hart, Captain Safford named, in addition [96] See in this connection, committee record, pp. 9667, 9668. [97] For Hewitt Inquiry report, see committee exhibit No. 157. 486 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK to himself, three other officers who, he stated, recalled having seen and read the "winds" message. Each of those officers testified that he had never seen such a message. The only other testimony to the effect that a "winds" message was received was by Captain Kramer, an intelligence officer assigned to Op-2O-G, who said that he recalled that there was a message but that he could not recall whether or not it related to the United States or England or Russia. It may be noted that until he testified in this investigation, Captain Kramer erroneously thought that a "hidden word" message intercepted on the morning of December 7th had been a "winds" message." CONCLUSION: From consideration of all evidence relating to the winds code, it is concluded that no genuine message, in execution of the code and applying to the United States, was received in the War or Navy Department prior to December 7, 1941. It appears, however, that messages were received which were initially thought possibly to be in execution of the code but were determined not to be execute messages. In view of the preponderate weight of evidence to the contrary, it is believed that Captain Safford is honestly mistaken when he insists that an execute message was received prior to December 7, 1941. Considering the period of time that has elapsed, this mistaken impression is understandable. Granting for purposes of discussion that a genuine execute message applying to the winds code was intercepted before December 7, it is concluded that such fact would have added nothing to what was already known concerning the critical character of our relations with the Empire of Japan.

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