PEARL HARBOR ATTACK              493

THE MINORITY PEARL HARBOR REPORT
We, the undersigned, find it impossible to concur with the findings and conclusions of the Committee's report because they are illogical, and unsupported by the preponderance of the evidence before the Committee. The conclusions of the diplomatic aspects are based upon incomplete evidence. We, therefore, find it necessary to file a report setting forth the conclusions which we believe are properly sustained by evidence before the committee. HOMER FERGUSON OWEN BREWSTER 494 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK CONTENTS OF THE MINORITY PEARL HARBOR REPORT Page Duty of the committee ............................................. 495 Fundamental questions before the joint committee .................. 496 Difficulties facing the joint committee and incompleteness of the record .......................................................... 497 Form of this report ............................................... 502 Conclusions of fact and responsibility ............................ 503 Conclusions restated with supporting evidence [1] ................. 506 No. 1-(Growing tension with Japan) .............................. 506 No. 2-(Washington's tactics pending Japanese attack) ............ 510 No. 3-(Likelihood of attack by December 1, 1941) ................ 511 No. 4-(Washington's tactics of waiting for the firing of "the first shot" by the Japanese) .............................. 512 No. 5-(Failure to employ Washington organization and facilities to warn Hawaiian commanders) ................................. 513 No. 6-(Intercepted information respecting Japanese war plans) ... 514 No. 7-(Distribution of intercepted information to high authorities in Washington) ............................................ 520 No. 8-(Expectation of a surprise attack by the Japanese on the United States) ........................................... 521 No. 9-(Probability of an attack on Hawaii) ...................... 521 No. 10-(Obligation of Washington authorities to alert outpost commanders for war) ...................................... 524 No. 11-(Responsibility of Washington authorities in view of the decision to await Japanese attack) ....................... 530 No. 12-(Obligation of Washington to send clear instructions to the Hawaiian commanders .................................. 530 No. 13-(Conflicting messages to Hawaiian commanders) ............ 532 No. 14-(Failure of Washington authorities to emphasize probability, of a Pearl Harbor attack) ................... 537 No. 15-(Delays, confusion, and ,negligence of officers in Washington) .............................................. 538 No. 16-(President Roosevelt's failure to enforce cooperation between high military authorities in Washington) ......... 540 No. 17-(Failure of Washington to allocate adequate material to the Hawaiian commanders) ................................. 543 No. 18-(Washington's responsibility for the competence of subordinate officers) .................................... 553 No. 19-(Interdependent responsibilities of Washington and Hawaii) 553 No. 20-(Failure of the President to take instant Executive action on December 6 and 7) .............................. 565 No. 21-(American people not to blame for Pearl Harbor) .......... 570 Conclusion ...................................................... 572 Summary of responsibilities ....................................... 572 [1] Substance of conclusions, paraphrased. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 495 INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK THE DUTY OF THE COMMITTEE The duty of this Committee is fixed by the terms of the joint resolution under which it was created, as expounded by Senator Barkley, author of the resolution, in his address to the Senate on September 6, 1945, explaining the purpose of the resolution. Section 2 of the joint resolution reads: "The Committee shall make a full and complete investigation of the facts relating to the events and circumstances leading up to or following the attack made by Japanese armed forces upon Pearl Harbor in the Territory of Hawaii n December 7, 1941, and shall report to the Senate and the House of Representatives not later than January 3, 1946 (later extended to July 16, 1946), the results of its investigation, together with such recommendations as it may seem advisable." In his address to the Senate on September 6, 1945, Senator Barkley pointed out the need for this investigation by declaring that the reports on Pearl Harbor by the President's Pearl Harbor Commission, the Roberts Commission, the Army Pearl Harbor Board, the Navy Court of Inquiry, and other authorities "are confusing and conflicting, when compared to one another, and to some extent contain contradictions and inconsistencies within themselves." In this connection he referred to the "widespread confusion and suspicion" that prevailed "among the American people and among the Members of Congress." In all these reports, which had resulted in contradictions, confusion, and inconsistencies, the central issue had been the fixing of responsibility for the catastrophe that befell the American forces at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. This fact Senator Barkley fully recognized in his statement that the first purpose of the investigation is that of "fixing responsibility" for the Pearl Harbor disaster "upon an individual, or a group of individuals, or upon a system under which they operated or cooperated or failed to do either." In fulfillment of this obligation, Senator Barkley said, the investigation- "should be conducted without partisanship or favoritism toward any responsible official, military, naval, or civilian, high or low, living or dead. * * * Congress itself should make its *own thorough, impartial*, and fearless inquiry into the facts and circumstances and conditions prevailing *prior* to and *at the time of the Pearl Harbor attack*, no matter how far back it may be necessary to go in order to appraise the situation which existed prior to and at the time of the attack (Congressional Record, p. 8480, September 6, 1945)." The Joint Committee, therefore, is charged with the duty of investigating the entire subject de novo. It is and should be free from the findings and conclusions of all previous investigations and in 496 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK quiries except such material as members of this committee in their discretion may see fit to cite or incorporate in their report. The second purpose of the investigation, Senator Barkley explained, is that of ascertaining whether in view of what happened at Pearl Harbor the findings might be useful to Congress in legislating with regard to military and naval forces and the executive departments having control of them, or which are supposed to work with them. These views of the obligation of the committee were supported wholeheartedly on the floor of the Senate by Senator Brewster and Senator Ferguson and thereafter the Senate unanimously passed the resolution as so interpreted. Of necessity, as used in relation to the obligation of this committee, responsibility means responsibility for failure on the part of individual officers or groups of officers or civilian officials to do their full official duty in preparing for and meeting effectively the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941; and the term "duty" means duty according to the Constitution, laws, and established administrative practices under which all such individuals and groups of individuals were bound to operate prior to and on the day of that catastrophe. FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS BEFORE THE JOINT COMMITTEE Inasmuch as all decisions and activities connected with this occurrence at Pearl Harbor were decisions and activities of executive authorities of the Government of the United States, the issue of responsibility for the degree of success attained by the Japanese attack involves at least one general question and four subsidiary and specific questions: The general question is: Did all the civil, military, and naval authorities of the United States charged with responsibility for the conduct of diplomatic negotiations with the Japanese Government and for preparedness and defense at Pearl Harbor competently, efficiently, and with proper regard for the trust imposed in them fulfill the duties of their respective offices under the Constitution and laws of the United States? The subsidiary and specific questions are: 1. Did the high civil, military, and naval authorities in Washington secure in advance of 10 o'clock a. m. (E. S. T.) December 7, 1941, information respecting Japanese designs and intentions sufficient to convince them beyond all reasonable doubt that war with Japan was immediately imminent? 2. If so, did they give to General Walter C. Short and Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, the commanders at Pearl Harbor, clear and definite orders, immediately prior to the Japanese attack, instructing them to be fully alert for defense against such an attack? 3. Was Hawaii adequately equipped for its defense against a Japanese attack in accordance with the known circumstances? 4. Did the commanders at Pearl Harbor take the appropriate measures required by the orders issued to them from Washington, by the duties of their respective offices, and by the information in their possession and the resources at their disposal, to maintain the security of the possessions of the United States as far as that responsibility was invested in them? PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 497 The question of the wisdom of the foreign policy pursued by the Government of the United States is excluded by the terms of the committee's instructions. In any case, to go into this issue would involve thcommittee in the complexities of history extending back more than 50 years and in matters of opinion which cannot be settled by reference to anything as positive and definite as the Constitution, laws, and established administrative practices of the United States Government. To understand the questions involved, however, an examination of our relations in the Far East, and of the diplomatic negotiations leading up to December 7, 1941, are part and parcel of the explanation of the responsibilities involved in this inquiry. DIFFICULTIES FACING THE JOINT COMMITTEE AND INCOMPLETENESS OF THE RECORD When all the testimony, papers, documents, exhibits, and other evidence duly laid before the Committee are reviewed, it becomes apparent that the record is far from complete. The Committee did not have an opportunity to cross-examine any of the high civil executive principals in the Pearl Harbor affair. President Roosevelt and Secretary Knox had died before the Committee was created. Harry Hopkins, who was intimately and officially associated with President Roosevelt, died shortly after the Committee began its work. The health of Secretary of War Stimson and Secretary of State Hull prevented the Committee from getting the full benefit of their knowledge, except for the information they voluntarily furnished. It is extremely unfortunate that the Roberts Commission Report was so hasty, inconclusive, and incomplete. Some witnesses were examined under oath; others were not. Much testimony was not even recorded. The Commission knew that Japanese messages had been intercepted and were available, prior to the attack, to the high command in Washington. The Commission did not inquire about what information these intercepts contained, who received them, or what was done about them, although the failure of Washington to inform the commanders in Hawaii of this vital intelligence bears directly on the question of whether those commanders performed their full duties. Mr. Justice Roberts testified before this Committee: "I would not have bothered to read it (the intercepted Japanese traffic) if it had been shown to us (Tr., Vol. 47, p. 8836):" If it were necessary to do so, detailed examples of the many shortcomings of the Roberts Commission could be set forth. The duty of our Committee to examine the entire subject afresh does not require an extended criticism of the Roberts Report. It should be noted, however, that Justice Roberts had sufficient legal experience to know the proper method of collecting and preserving evidence which in this case involved the highest interests of the Nation. The facts were then fresh in the minds of key witnesses in Washington. They could not then have been ignorant of their whereabouts at important times or have forgotten the details of events and operations. No files would have been "lost" and no information would have been distorted by the passage of time. The failure to observe these obvious necessities is almost as tragic to the cause of truth as the attack on Pearl Harbor itself was a tragedy for the Nation. 498 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK These difficulties were supplemented by even greater ones stemming from Presidential restraints on the Committee and from the partisan character of the Committee itself. Even before the Committee commenced its work, it was confronted with an order issued on August 28, 1945, and signed by President Truman, which severely limited the power of the Committee to gain access to the full facts. The order is as follows (Tr., Vol. 1, p. 26): "AUGUST 28, 1945. "Memorandum for-The Secretary of State. The Secretary of War. The Secretary of the Navy. The Attorney General. The Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Director of the Budget. The Director of the Office of War Information. "Appropriate departments of the Government and the Joint Chiefs of Staff are hereby directed to take such steps as are necessary to prevent release to the public, except with the specific approval of the President in each case, of- "Information regarding the past or present status, technique or procedures, degree of success attained, or any specific results of any cryptanalytic unit acting under the authority of the United States Government or any Department thereof. "HARRY S. TRUMAN. "Restricted." It was not until October 23, 1945, that President Truman made the order less stringent by a new order. The modification left much to be desired. The application of the new order was limited to the State, War, and Navy Departments. It relaxed the secrecy of records only so far as "the Joint Committee" was concerned, while it continued to prevent "individual" members of the Committee from searching records as responsible Members of Congress either alone, in groups, or even when accompanied by Committee counsel. By one way or another, control over papers, records, and other information remained in the hands of the majority party members. The President's October order also contained the unfortunate phrase "any information in their possession *material to the investigation*," which provided a cloak for those reluctant to yield information requested by members of the Committee. It was always possible to confront individual members with the view that the papers, data, and information desired was not "material to the investigation." Decisions were made by the majority ruling out evidence as "not material to the investigation" without members of the Committee ever seeing the material about which the decision was made. No subsequent modifying orders wholly removed these restrictions. In an order of November 7, 1945, President Truman relaxed restraints on executives of the Government in order that they may speak freely to *individual members* of the Committee, but the order closed with the direction: "This does not include any files or written material" In this fashion every facility and concession afforded to members of the Joint Committee was hedged about with troublesome qualifications and restraints. The relaxation of restraints was often publicized while the continuing qualifications were but little discussed. The effect was to restrict individual members of the Committee in practice while the appearance of their freedom of operations was PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 499 held out to the public. In justice to Committee counsel and to individual majority members of the Committee, efforts made by them to overcome these restrictions should be recognized. It is a great tribute to their fairness that the Committee did not break up over this issue but continued to work despite the handicaps which were never wholly removed. The plain fact that an investigation could not be an investigation of committee members remained mere spectators, persuaded some members that restraints on their freedom were not justified. The flimsiness of the argument for restrictions became even more evident when permission to search files and other records was denied by majority vote to individual members *even when accompanied by Committee counsel*. Rightly or wrongly it was inferred from this that there was a deliberate design to block the search for the truth. Such a view was supported by the knowledge that restrictions on individual members of congressional investigatory bodies were contrary to the best practices in other investigations. Some celebrated instances were recalled. Speaking in the Senate on November 9, 1945, during one of the discussions on Committee powers, the Senator from Montana (Mr. Burton K. Wheeler) observed: "I concur in what the Senator from Illinois has said with reference to the authorizing of a single member of the committee to hold hearings. I have served on a good many investigations since I have been a Member of the Senate, and some very important ones. I assisted to quite an extent in the Teapot Dome investigation carried on by my colleague, Senator Walsh, of Montana, and likewise I carried on the investigation of the Department of Justice. I was a minority member of the committee. "In all my experience with any investigating committee, I have never known of any one member of a committee not being permitted to go and look over the files in any department of the Government of the United States. This is the first time I have every known anything of that kind being questioned * * *. "* * * I call attention to the fact that in the Daugherty investigation I sent for files myself, I asked for files from the Attorney General of the United States, Mr. Daugherty. He refused to give them to me. I have forgotten the ground he stated, but at any rate he refused to give them to me. When he did so, the President of the United States, Mr. Coolidge, called him in and asked for his resignation, and Mr. Daugherty was eliminated from the office of Attorney General. After that time, when the new Attorney General was appointed, every single file I ever asked for, as a minority member of the committee, was furnished to me. "* * * As I have stated, my colleague, Senator Walsh, of Montana, was a minority member of the committee investigating the Teapot Dome situation. I know of my own personal knowledge that he got from the Department, and from officials in the Department, information which he afterward used, and if he had not been permitted to do that, and if I had not been permitted to do it, I am sure there would have been a complete failure of the investigation of the Department of Justice. (Congressional Record, vol. 91, No. 198, November 9, 1945, p. 10755.)" Another instance is the more recent one in which President Truman himself is well versed. As Senator, Mr. Truman headed a distinguished committee bearing the popular designation "The Truman Committee" (now the Mead Committee). The cardinal principle of the Truman Committee in the 4 years during which it won the respect and confidence of the American people, rested on the proposition that every individual member of the committee was wholly free to search for any information deemed by him to be relevant wherever and whenever he thought it could be found. Never once did the chairman or the majority of the committee refuse to recognize that right and that responsibility of each individual member. 500 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Untrammeled freedom of individual committee members in these instances did not produce chaos or disorder as was argued would be the case in the Pearl Harbor inquiry. On the contrary, the procedure and results in each case did honor to the committees concerned and proved salutary for the Nation. Complete concurrence with the most admirable outline of the purposes and scope of the investigation of the events leading up to Pearl Harbor and our entry into the World War as presented to the Senate by the author of the resolution at the time of its introduction and hearty approval of much that has been done by the Committee must not blind us to the extent to which the investigation lived up to its advance billing by its distinguished sponsor. At the very inception the tested practices in investigations of this character that had demonstrated such extraordinary success in the entire history of the Truman Committee were very definitely rejected and neither of the two members of the Committee who had received rather extended training under the then Senator Truman were allowed to follow the course in the investigation of Pearl Harbor that had repeatedly produced most gratifying results in their earlier experience. This firm refusal by the Committee majority, consisting of six Democrats as against four Republicans, at the very outset to allow the scope to individual members even with every safeguard proposed against the alleged danger of abuse was both unfortunate and disquieting. Everything that has since developed must be viewed in the light of this iron curtain that was thus imposed. Permission was asked to conduct exploration for certain missing records. Vigorous and public denial was made-presumably on Executive authority- that any records were missing. Subsequently it developed that several records were missing and most inadequate explanations were supplied. How any public interest could possibly have been prejudiced by affording any opportunity to examine the manner of keeping records of this character has never been satisfactorily explained. These incidents revealed a disquieting determination to keep entire control of the investigation in the hands of the Committee majority who were thus put in the unusual position of arrogating to themselves the capacity to conduct an impartial and adequate investigation of their own administration. The history of human conduct furnishes few precedents to justify such confidence. Some of the effects of majority decision as well as gaps in the data and testimony due to other causes illustrate the great difficulty surrounding the work of the Committee. Secretary Stimson declined to appear on the ground that his health did not permit him to undergo the strain. Access to his diary was denied by majority vote. To accommodate Secretary Stimson because of his illness, Senator Ferguson on March 6, 1946, submitted 176 questions as part of the official record for Secretary Stimson to answer as if propounded in open hearing of the Committee (Tr., Vol. 70, p. 14437 ff.). Secretary Stimson did not answer any of these questions, and the Committee made no effort to insist upon his answering these questions, which were highly pertinent to the inquiry. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 501 Later, Senator Ferguson submitted a supplementary list of 61 questions to be answered in the same manner (Tr., Vol. 70, p. 14476). Secretary Stimson answered these questions in writing, and his answers are part of the record. These answers did not, however, make up for the deficiencies in the failure to answer the earlier list of 176 questions. Secretary Hull made three appearances, in the course of which he gave his official version of the matters before the Committee and was briefly examined by the counsel, but minority members of the Committee were not permitted to cross-examine him. When his answers to written interrogatories from Committee members proved unresponsive, there was no way to secure further information from him. The diary of former Ambassador Joseph C. Grew was likewise denied to the Committee. The assertion of its confidential character was somewhat belied by its submission for examination to certain individuals with a view to its commercial publication. The denial to the Committee of the Stimson and Grew diaries was particularly obstructive because these principles placed excerpts of the diaries in the record and withheld the rest. This was contrary to the prime rule in American law that if part of a document is put into the record by a witness in his own behalf, the court is entitled to demand the whole of the document. Concerning each of these diaries the Committee, by majority vote, refused to issue subpoenas for their production. Many messages, probably several hundreds, between Winston Churchill and President Franklin D. Roosevelt received prior to December 7, 1941, were not available to the Committee, although there is good reason to believe that they bore on the gathering crisis. Other messages between Mr. Churchill and the British Embassy and American authorities were made available to the Committee, but our Government replies or action taken were not so available. The former Prime Minister of Great Britain was in this country not on official business while hearings of this Committee were going on. His intimate knowledge of affairs leading up to Pearl Harbor would have cleared up many gaps in the evidence. By majority vote, a request for the appearance of Mr. Churchill was refused. President Roosevelt's secretary, Miss Grace Tully, was permitted to determine for herself and the Committee and the country what portions of the official correspondence of the late President had any relevancy to Pearl Harbor. This could hardly be a satisfactory substitute for the responsibility placed upon this Committee. One of the very important questions concerning the defense of Hawaii dealt with the delays in building airfields and the failure to install radar and other warning devices. Members of the Committee sought to inquire into the performance of one Col. Theodore Wyman, Jr., in this connection, but the Committee decided against it. The whole question of whether or not it would have been possible to avoid war by proper diplomatic action and thus avert the Pearl Harbor tragedy was left largely unexplored. We are permitted only occasional glimpses into this realm but these are fascinating. A modus vivendi was under discussion with Japan in November 1941 to run for 3 months. This had been strongly urged by the War and Navy authorities in order to supply absolutely essential time for 502 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK preparation. Secretary Stimson and Knox went over the terms of this document and advised Secretary Hull that it adequately protected our interest. Suddenly the modus vivendi was dropped from the agenda and there was substituted the Hull message which was followed shortly after by the attack on Pearl Harbor. Early on the morning after the delivery of the Hull message Lord Halifax arrived at the State Department. He found Mr. Welles in charge and asked him what has become of the modus vivendi. Mr. Welles replied that it was dropped because of Chinese lack of interest. Lord Halifax intimated a continuing British interest and Mr. Welles significantly replied: "That is not the way London sounded yesterday." The message from Churchill of the preceding day certainly bears out the Welles' observation. The Committee was told by the State Department that there is no record of any telephone conversations between Mr. Churchill and President Roosevelt. This certainly invites inquiry. The Halifax early morning visit in apparent ignorance of the Churchill message of the day before and of the decision to drop the modus vivendi is not in tune with usual British diplomatic procedure. Whether or not the Japanese would have accepted the modus vivendi must remain a matter of opinion. Whether or not it should have been submitted is a matter on which light might well be shed. Particularly is this the case when we have the testimony of Gen. George C. Marshall that a delay by the Japanese from December 1941 into January 1942 might have resulted in a change of Japanese opinion as to the wisdom of the attack because of the collapse of the German front before Moscow in December 1941. Whether or not such a development would have been one to be desired must remain for future investigation when more of the diplomatic history of the closing months of 1941 can be more thoroughly explored. In short the Committee labored under great difficulties and was not in possession of the full historical record pertinent to the ease before it. Nevertheless an investigation was made and an amazing amount of material was developed in the limited time allowed to cover such a vast field. It is the duty of the Committee to render a report, regardless of the inadequacies of evidence, if sufficient facts are at hand to pass on the issues of responsibility for the catastrophe at Pearl Harbor. A careful review of the evidence is convincing enough that these issues can be decided now. FORM OF THIS REPORT Accepting the primary obligations of the Committee thus defined and regarding the questions presented above as directly relevant to this inquiry, we have reviewed the testimony, documents, and other materials before the Committee, and we have drawn the following conclusions in respect of responsibility for the catastrophe, which we submit, are fully warranted by the evidence before the Committee. For convenience, we present the conclusions seriatim and then re- PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 503 produce each conclusion separately with comment and citations Of evidence in support of it whenever it is not a mere statement taken from the evidence before the Committee. These citations, of course, do not exhaust all the evidence which would be adduced to support the respective conclusions. To make them so comprehensive would require the reproduction of hundreds, if not thousands, of pages of testimony and documents. The conclusions stated below resolve all the evidence developed by the Committee. The citations are in each case merely representative and authoritative-by way of explanation and clarification of what is confirmed by numerous witnesses and exhibits and stated by men who were in a position to know what was known and done by officials of he United States, civil and military, in relation to Pearl Harbor. In other words, citations of hearsay, controverted evidence, and gossip have been avoided in an effort to keep the conclusions within the bounds of unmistakable fact. Another point with regard to the conclusions listed should be emphasized: *Collectively, they constitute one statement* in answer to the general question and the four specific questions presented above as necessarily raised by the primary duty of this Committee; and many items of evidence cited in support of one or more conclusions also help sustain other conclusions. Hence in testing the validity of any one among the conclusions, attention must be given to the cross references to other items of evidence which are made in various parts of the text. This unfortunately makes for some unavoidable duplication has been held to a minimum. CONCLUSIONS OF FACT AND RESPONSIBILITY 1. The course of diplomatic negotiations with Japan during the months preceding December 7, 1941, indicated a growing tension with Japan and after November 26 the immediate imminence of war. 2. By November 7, 1941, President Roosevelt and his Cabinet had reached the unanimous conclusion that war tension had reached such point as to convince them that "the people would back us up in case we struck at Japan down there (in the Far East)." They then took under consideration "what the tactics would be" (Tr., Vol. 70, p. 14415). Unless Japan yielded to diplomatic representations on the part of the United States, there were three choices on tactics before the President and the Cabinet; they could wait until Japan attacked; they could strike without a declaration of war by Congress; or the President could lay the issue of peace or war before Congress (Tr., Vol. 70, p. 14415 ff.). 3. So imminent was war on November 25, that the President in a conference with Secretary Hull, Secretary Knox, Secretary Stimson, General Marshall, and Admiral Stark, "brought up the event that we were likely to be attacked perhaps (as soon as) next Monday" (December 1); and the members of the conference discussed the question "How we should maneuver them (the Japanese) into the position firing the first shot without allowing too much danger to ourselves" (Tr., Vol. 70, p. 14418). 4. Having considered without agreeing upon the proposition that message on the war situation should be sent to Congress, the President and the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, and the Secre- 504 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK tary of the Navy, pursued from November 25 to December 7 the tactics of waiting for the firing of "the first shot" by the Japanese. 5. The appropriate high authorities in Washington had the organization for working in such close cooperation during the days immediately prior to the Japanese attack on December 7 that they had every opportunity to make sure that identical and precise instructions warranted by the imminence of war went to the Hawaiian commanders. 6. Through the Army and Navy Intelligence Services extensive information was secured respecting Japanese war plans and designs by intercepted and decoded Japanese secret messages, which indicated the growing danger of war and increasingly after November 26 the imminence of a Japanese attack. 7. Army and Navy information which indicated growing imminence of war was delivered to the highest authorities in charge of national preparedness for meeting an attack, among others, the President, the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, and the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations. 8. Judging by the military and naval history of Japan, high authorities in Washington and the Commanders in Hawaii had good grounds for expecting that in starting war the Japanese Government would make Lt surprise attack on the United States. 9. Neither the diplomatic negotiations nor the intercepts and other information respecting Japanese designs and operations in the hands of the United States authorities warranted those authorities in excluding from defense measures or from orders to the Hawaiian commanders the probability of an attack on Hawaii. On the contrary, there is evidence to the effect that such an attack was, in terms of strategy, necessary from the Japanese point of view and in fact highly probable and that President Roosevelt was taking the probability into account-before December 7. 10. The knowledge of Japanese designs and intentions in the hands of the President and the Secretary of State led them to the conclusion at least 10 days before December 7 that an attack by Japan within a few days was so highly probable as to constitute a certainty and, having reached this conclusion, the President, as Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, was under obligation to instruct the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy to make sure that the outpost commanders put their armed forces on an all-out alert for war. 11. The decision of the President, in view of the Constitution, to await the Japanese attack rather than ask for a declaration of war by Congress increased the responsibility of high authorities in Washington to use the utmost care in putting the commanders at Pearl Harbor on a full alert for defensive actions before the Japanese attack on December 7, 1941. 12. Inasmuch as the knowledge respecting Japanese designs and operations which was in the possession of high authorities in Washington differed in nature and volume from that in the possession of the Pearl Harbor commanders it was especially incumbent upon the former to formulate instructions to the latter in language not open to misinterpretation as to the obligations imposed on the commanders by the instructions. 13. The messages sent to General Short and Admiral Kimmel by high authorities in Washington during November were couched in such conflicting and imprecise language that they failed to convey to PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 505 the commanders definite information on the state of diplomatic relations with Japan and on Japanese war designs and positive orders respecting the particular actions to be taken-orders that were beyond all reasonable doubts as to the need for an all-out alert. In this regard the said high authorities failed to discharge their full duty. 14. High authorities in Washington failed in giving proper weight to the evidence before them respecting Japanese designs and operations which indicated that an attack on Pearl Harbor was highly probable and they failed also to emphasize this probability in messages to the Hawaiian commanders. 15. The failure of Washington authorities to act promptly and consistently in translating intercepts, evaluating information, and sending appropriate instructions to the Hawaiian commanders was in considerable measure due to delays, mismanagement, non-cooperation, unpreparedness, confusion, and negligence on the part of officers in Washington. 16. The President of the United States was responsible for the failure to enforce continuous, efficient, and appropriate cooperation among the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Staff, and the Chief of Naval Operations, in evaluating information and dispatching clear and positive orders to the Hawaiian commanders as events indicated the growing imminence of war; for the Constitution and laws of the United States vested in the President full power, as Chief Executive and Commander in Chief, to compel such cooperation and vested this power in him alone with a view to establishing his responsibility to the people of the United States. 17. High authorities in Washington failed to allocate to the Hawaiian commanders the material which the latter often declared to be necessary to defense and often requested, and no requirements of defense or war in the Atlantic did or could excuse these authorities for their failures in this respect. 18. Whatever errors of judgment the commanders at Hawaii committed and whatever mismanagement they displayed in preparing for Japanese attack, attention to chain of responsibility in the civil and military administration requires taking note of the fact that they were designated for their posts by high authorities in Washington-all of whom were under obligation to have a care for competence in the selection of subordinates for particular positions of responsibility in the armed forces of the United States. 19. The defense of Hawaii rested upon two sets of interdependent responsibilities: (1) The responsibility in Washington in respect of its ultimate knowledge of diplomatic negotiations, widespread intelligence information, direction of affairs and constitutional duty to plan e defense of the United States; (2) the responsibility cast upon the commanders in the field in charge of a major naval base and the fleet essential to the defense of the territory of the United States to do those things appropriate to the defense of the fleet and outpost. Washington authorities failed in (1); and the commanding officers at Hawaii failed in (2). 20. In the final instance of crucial significance for alerting American outpost commanders, on Saturday night, December 6, and Sunday morning, December 7, the President of the United States failed to take that quick and instant executive action which was required by the occasion and by the responsibility for watchfulness and guardianship 506 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK rightly associated in law and practice with his high office from the establishment of the Republic to our own times. 21. The contention coming from so high an authority as President Truman on August 3, 1945, that the "country is as much to blame as any individual in this final situation that developed in Pearl Harbor," cannot be sustained because the American people had no intimation whatever of the policies and operations that were being undertaken. CONCLUSIONS RESTATED WITH SUPPORTING EVIDENCE 1. *The course of diplomatic negotiations with Japan during the months preceding December 7,1941, indicated a growing tension with Japan and after November 26 the immediate imminence of war*. The duty of conducting negotiations with foreign governments from March 4, 1933, to December 7, 1941, was vested in President Franklin D. Roosevelt, under the Constitution, laws, and established practice of the United States, and he could delegate to the Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, such correspondence and communications relating thereto as he deemed fitting and proper. In respect of matters assigned to him it was the duty of Secretary Hull to keep the President informed of all transactions that were critical in nature and especially those involving the possible use of the armed forces of the United States. At least as early as October 8, 1940, President Roosevelt believed that affairs had reached such a state that the United States would become involved in a war with Japan. On that day Admiral Richardson asked the President "if we were going to enter the war." According to the admiral's account the President replied- "that if the Japanese attacked Thailand, or the Kra Peninsula, or the Dutch East Indies we would not enter the war, that if they even attacked the Philippines he doubted whether we would enter the war, but that they (the Japanese) could not always avoid making mistakes and that as the war continued and the area of operations expanded sooner or later they would make a mistake and have would enter the war (Tr., Vol. 4, pp. 683- 4). In a letter dated January 21, 1941, President Roosevelt informed Ambassador Grew that "our interests are menaced both in Europe and in the Far East. * * * Our strategy of self-defense must be a global strategy * * *" and that "our strategy" must envisage "helping to prevent a closing of channels of communication" between Great Britain and various parts of the world (Grew. Ten Years in Japan, pp. 361-363). Grew's letter dated December 14, 1940, to the President contained this sentence, "* * * the principal point at issue, as I see it, is not whether we call a halt to the Japanese program. But when." (Grew, Ibid., p. 360.) The President replied in a letter: "I find myself in decided agreement with your conclusions." There is additional evidence for the conclusion that in January 1941 President Roosevelt then became convinced that the war was a global war and that his decisions as Chief Executive and Commander in Chief must thenceforward be made with reference to that conviction. This evidence is as follows: Beginning in January 1941 representatives of the American armed forces and representatives of British and Dutch armed forces on the suggestion of the United States started a series of conversations in respect of cooperation against Japan in the Far East. Out of these and subsequent conversations were developed PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 507 American-British-Dutch war plans for combined operations against Japan if Japanese armed forces started hostile actions against British, Dutch, *or* American possessions in the Far East. President Roosevelt approved these plans, "except officially," as Admiral Stark testified The President's commitment to Great Britain was foreshadowed by understandings previously reached between American, British, and Dutch military authorities. In a memorandum to the President dated November 27, 1941 (exhibit 17), General Marshall and Admiral Stark stated: "After consultation with each other United States, British, and Dutch military authorities in the Far East agreed that joint military counteraction against Japan should be undertaken only in case Japan attacks or directly threatens the territory or mandated territory of the United states the British Commonwealth, or the Netherlands East Indies or should the Japanese move forces into Thailand west of 100 East or South of the 10 North, Portuguese Timor, New Caledonia or the Loyalty Islands." The agreement referred to by Admiral Stark and General Marshall was reached at conferences in Singapore in April 1941 between United States, British, and Dutch military authorities in the Far East. It provided that they would advise their respective Governments to authorize military operations against Japan in the event of any of the following Japanese movements (exhibit 50, par. 26): "(a) A direct act of war by Japanese armed forces against the territory or mandated Territory of any of the Associated Powers. It is not possible to define accurately what would constitute "a direct act of war." It is possible for a minor incident to occur which although technically an act of war could be resolved by diplomatic action. It is recognized the decision as to whether such an incident is an act of war must lie with the government concerned. "(b) The movement of the Japanese forces into any part of Thailand to the West of 100 East or to the South or 10 North. "(c) The movement or a large number of Japanese warships or of a convoy of merchant ships escorted by Japanese warships which from its position and course as clearly directed upon the Philippine Islands. The East coast of the Isthmus of Kra of the East coast of Malaya or had crossed the parallel of 6 North between Malaya and the Philippines, a line from the Gulf of Davao to Waigeo Island or the Equator East of Waigeo. "(d) The movement of Japanese forces into Portuguese Timor. "(e) The movement of Japanese forces into New Caledonia or the Loyalty Islands." The report of the Singapore conversations and the memoranda to the President by Admiral Stark and General Marshall on November 5 and 27, 1941, set forth definite geographic lines, over which a Japanese advance was considered to require armed resistance from the United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands. One line ran north and south through Thailand. It was parallel to longitude 100 east. A Japanese movement west of it was prohibited. This line protected Burma and the Indian Ocean. Another line ran east and west across the Isthmus of Kra and was parallel with latitude 10 north. A Japanese movement over this line was forbidden. This line in effect protected the Malay Peninsula and Singapore. The Singapore report sets out certain additional lines. One such line was parallel of latitude 6 north and extended between Malaya and the Philippines. This line protected the Dutch East Indies. They were also protected from Japanese attack, particularly one originating in the 508 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Palau Islands, by another line extending from the Gulf of Davao in the Philippines to Waigeo Island in the Dutch East Indies. On December 4, 1941, Admiral Stark, Chief of Naval Operations, sent to the British and Dutch Admiralties his recommendation- "that if the Dutch authorities considered a warning should be given Japan it should take the form of a declaration to Japan that in view of the current situation Japanese naval vessels or expeditionary forces crossing the Davao-Waigeo line would be considered hostile and would be attacked (exhibit 79 p. 12)." While the President did not approve written agreements on these understandings he and the high authorities in Washington acted with the British and Dutch just as if a binding pact had been made. Likewise the Japanese acted upon the same belief that the United States, Britain, and Netherlands East Indies were working together. There is ample evidence in the record to this effect. (Ex. 1, p. 205- Tokyo to Berlin dispatch: Id. P. 227, Washington to Tokyo dispatch.) Subsequent American diplomatic negotiations with Japan were based upon the principle of cooperation with Great Britain, the Dutch Netherlands, China, and Australia. No separate over-all plan for the simple defense of American possessions against Japan was developed by the armed forces of the United States between January 1941 and December 7, 1941, with a view to safeguarding American interests separately. After the Japanese attack on December 7, American, British, Dutch, and Australian operations in the Pacific theater were conducted on the cooperative principle which had governed the military and naval conversations and planning between January and December 1941. The danger of war with Japan formed a principal theme of discussion between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill at the Atlantic Conference in August 1941, and agreements or understandings reached by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill at that Conference were based on a common program for dealing with Japan and close cooperation between the United States and Great Britain in diplomatic, military, and naval affairs in respect of the Far East as well as the Atlantic. Their chief understandings as thus far disclosed by official records were three in number: (1) Common diplomatic actions warning Japan against taking any further steps in dominating neighboring countries by force or threat of force. (2) Occupation of the Azores by the armed forces of the United States with protective assistance by British armed forces in guarding against a possible Nazi thrust from the mainland. (3) Cooperation between the United States and Great Britain in "the policing of the world" during a transition period following the close of the war. Admiral Stark and General Marshall did not approve these Singapore agreements because they were of a "political nature," beyond their authority to sanction. They recommended, however, that these be taken up by the political departments of the governments involved. Further, under other provisions of the Singapore agreements, Britain entrusted the naval defense of her vital interests in the so-called Malay barrier exclusively to the United States and the Dutch. Only three British vessels were allocated to the defense of this area, and PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 509 these only for escort and patrol. This arrangement was not approved by Stark and Marshall (exhibit 65). After an understanding was reached at the Atlantic Conference on common diplomatic action against Japan- "the President expressed the belief that by adopting this course any further move of aggression on the part of Japan which might result in war *could be held off for at least thirty days*." [*Italics supplied*.] The Prime Minister thought that there was a reasonable chance of averting a war in the Pacific (Sumner Welles, Memorandum of Conversation, August 11, 1941; Ex. 22-C, p. 9). It is scarcely thinkable that in his discussions with Prime Minister Churchill at the Atlantic Conference in August 1941, President Roosevelt would have assumed that the United States was to cooperate with Great Britain in "the policing of the world" for a transition period after the war unless he was then certain that at some stage in the development of the war the United States would become involved in it. In his statement to the Japanese Ambassador on Sunday, August 17, 1941, immediately following his return from the Atlantic Conference, President Roosevelt warned Japan against further attempts to dominate "neighboring countries," not merely the possessions of the United States, and used diplomatic language which, according to long-established usages, had only one meaning, namely, that such further attempts would result in a conflict with the United States. His statement read: "* * * this Government (of the United States) now finds it necessary to say the Government of Japan that if the Japanese Government takes *any further steps* in pursuance of a policy or program of military domination by force or threat of force of neighboring countries, the Government of the United States *will be compelled to take immediately any and all steps* which it may deem necessary toward safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests of the United States and American nationals and toward insuring the safety and security of the United States. [Italics supplied; Foreign Relations of the United States: Japan, vol. II, p. 556-557.]" In urging upon the State Department, in September 1941, an acceptance of the Japanese proposal for a conference between President Roosevelt and Premier Konoye, the American Ambassador in Tokyo Joseph Grew, declared that, in his opinion, unless a certain amount of confidence be placed by the United States in the professed sincerity of the Premier Konoye and his supporters in making arrangements for he proposed conference: "the ambassador does not believe that a new orientation can be successfully created in Japan to lead to a general improving of Japanese-American relations and to the hope that ultimate war may be avoided in the Pacific (Grew, Ten Years in Japan, pp. 436-442)." Accordingly, in rejecting the Japanese proposal for this conferences President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull whatever their reasons and however justifiable these reasons may have been, had before them the deliberate judgment of the American Ambassador in Tokyo that such action would reduce the chances of peace and increase the probability of war. The Konoye Cabinet fell on October 16, 1941, after all Japanese efforts to bring about the conference between President Roosevelt and Premier Konoye had failed. On November 26, 1941, Secretary Hull, with the approval of President Roosevelt, rejected the Japanese proposal of November 20 for a 510 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK temporary agreement, sometimes called a modus vivendi (below conclusion 19) and presented to Japan his memorandum of that date, the Secretary recognized, and said, that there was then "practically no possibility of an agreement being achieved with Japan." Having reached this conclusion, the Secretary, according to his account of what happened, declared on November 25 and on November 28, at meetings of high officials of this Government, "that the matter of safeguarding our national security was in the hands of the Army and Navy." (Peace and War, 1943, p. 144.) This was presumptively a warning to the War Department and the Navy Department to make ready for war. Accepting it as such the two Departments sent to General Short and Admiral Kimmel messages which, the Departments claimed, ordered the commanders to put into effect a due alert for war-a possible Japanese attack (but see conclusion 13). The President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, and the Secretary of the Navy were, therefore, certainly bound by the duties of their respective offices to be on the alert day and night after November 26, 1941, for the receipt of any word or message from Japan and for the receipt of any intercepts or other information respecting Japanese designs and intentions that were indicative of a breach of relations and war. They were also bound by their duties to alert and to keep on the alert for sudden attack their immediate subordinates and the outpost commanders having duties in connection with war operations. 2. *By November 7, 1941, President Roosevelt and his Cabinet had reached the unanimous conclusion that war tension had reached such a point as to convince them that "the people would back us up in case we struck at Japan down there (in the Far East)." They then took under consideration "what the tactics would be." (Tr., Vol. 70, p. 14415.) Unless Japan yielded to diplomatic representations on the part of the United States, there were three choices on tactics before the President and the Cabinet: They could wait until Japan attacked; they could strike without a declaration of war by Congress; or the President could lay the issue of peace or war before Congress. (Tr., Vol. 70, p. 14415 ff.*) The proposal of an appeal to Congress was not new. So high was the war tension in August 1941, that Prime Minister Churchill, recognizing the constitutional inability of President Roosevelt to declare war, proposed that the President seek authority from Congress to act on certain conditions. The Prime Minister's proposal contained in his draft of parallel communications to Japan read: "If any third power becomes the object of aggression by Japan in consequence of such counter measures or in their support of them the President would have the intention to seek authority from Congress to give aid to such power. (Welles, memorandum of conversation, August 10, 1941.)" The proposal to incorporate in the American communication to the Japanese Government an announcement of this intention to appeal to Congress was not accepted by President Roosevelt. Sometime after November 7, 1941, when the President and his Cabinet unanimously agreed that "the country" would back them up in case they struck at Japan in the Far East, high administration authorities discussed the tactics of an appeal by President Roosevelt to Congress in a special message laying before it the serious danger that was PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 511 threatening the United States and its interests in the Far East. The officers of the State Department, the Secretary of War, and the Secretary of the Navy took part in drafting the proposed message for the resident and their draft when completed was accompanied by a Memorandum for the President," dated November 29, 1941, initialed by Secretary Hull (Ex. 19; 161). In a note sending this draft message to the President, Mr. Hull wrote: "I think we agree that you will not send message to Congress *until the last stage of our relations, relating to actual hostilities*. [Ex. 19, italics supplied.]" The decision against laying the issue before Congress left to the administration authorities only the tactics of renewing negotiations with Japan (which as to substantive issues had come to an end on November 26) or the tactics of waiting on Japanese decisions and actions. Mr. Roosevelt chose to wait until December 7, 1941, rather than place this grave issue before Congress. This seems clear from the testimony as late as the night before the attack as follows: Commander Schulz said that when he delivered the 13-part message to the President on the night of December 6: "Mr. Hopkins then expressed a view that since war was undoubtedly going to come at the convenience of the Japanese it was too bad that we could not strike the first blow and prevent any sort of surprise. The President nodded and then said, in effect, "No, we can't do that. We are a democracy and a peaceful people." Then he raised his voice, and this much I remember definitely. He said, "But we have a good record." "The impression that I got was that we would have to stand on that record, we could not make the first overt move. We would have to wait until it came (Tr., Vol. 63, p. 12442-3)." 3. *So imminent was war on November 25 that the President, in a conference with Secretary Hull, Secretary Know, Secretary Stimson, General Marshall, and Admiral Stark, "brought up the event that we were likely to be attacked perhaps (as soon as) next Monday" (December 1); and the members of the conference discussed the question "How we should maneuver them (the Japanese) into the position of firing the first shot without allowing too much danger to ourselves" (Tr., Vol. 70, p. 14418). In the diplomatic documents, exhibits, and testimony before the Committee there is a wealth of evidence which underwrites the statement that the tactics of maneuvering the Japanese into "the position of firing the first shot" were followed by high authorities in Washington after November 2S, 1941. Examples of such tactics are afforded by- (a) Secretary Hull's decision, with the approval of President Roosevelt, to discard the proposal for a temporary agreement with Japan without notifying the Secretary of War or the British and Australian representatives in Washington who had collaborated in working out a draft of a memorandum with a view to reaching such an agreement if possible (conclusion 19). (b) The substitution for the proposed modus vivendi of the note of November 26 to Japan, which, as Secretary Hull knew and said at the moment, practically put an end to negotiations with Japan and passed over to the Army and Navy the burden of safeguarding the security of the United States. 512 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Secretary Stimson quoted his diary for November 26 as follows: "* * * Hull told me over the telephone this morning that he had about made up his mind not to give (make) the proposition that Knox and I passed on the other day to the Japanese but to kick the whole thing over-to tell them that he has no other proposition at all. * * * I called Hull up this morning to tell him [of Chiang Kai-shek's objections to the modus vivendi as set forth in a letter to T. V. Soong and shown by him to Mr. Stimson] and ask him what he wanted me to do about it. * * * He replied as I have said above-that he had made up his mind to give up the whole thing in respect to a truce and to simply tell the Japanese that he had no further action to propose. * * * (Tr. Vol. 70 p. 14420.)" (c) The rejection of appeals made to President Roosevelt by General Marshall and Admiral Stark on November 5 and also later on November 97, 1911, for a delay in bringing about a breach with Japan-appeals based on their belief that the Army and Navy were not then ready for a war with Japan. (d) The orders of the Secretary of War to the effect that General Marshall and Admiral Stark should not put into their memorandum appealing for delay, signed November 27, anything that could be "construed as a recommendation to the President that he request Japan to reopen the conversations" (Tr. Vol. 20, p. 3325, and below, especially conclusion 19). According to Secretary Hull, the tactics of waiting for the Japanese to fire the first shot was, in a measure, forced upon the Administration by the attachment of a large part of the American people to neutrality as expressed in the neutrality legislation of Congress and by their opposition to involvement in war in the Far East as well as elsewhere. This view Secretary Hull expressed in his statement to the Committee (Tr., Vol. 7, pp. 1096 ff.) and it is set forth more fully by other documents before the Committee, particularly the State Department's publication: *Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy 1931-41*, especially chapter 1. In this chapter the State Department explains that the President and Secretary Hull were hampered in the pursuit of the foreign policy they had "clearly" decided upon-at a date not fixed by the Secretary-on account of the opposition by "much of public opinion" in the United States. In this chapter the State Department also explains that- "Our foreign policy during the decade under consideration (1931-41) necessarily had to move within the framework of a gradual evolution of public opinion in the United States away from the idea of isolation expressed in "neutrality" legislation. * * * The pages (in the volume) which follow show the slow march of the United States from an attitude of illusory aloofness toward world-wide forces endangering America to a position in the forefront of the United Nations that are now (l943) making common cause against an attempt at world conquest unparalleled alike in boldness of conception and in brutality of operation." It is a serious question whether the President and his advisers were justified in making the conclusions that the country would support them for war; and whether actions taken by them upon their own opinion without placing the matter before Congress was in violation of their responsibilities under the Constitution and laws of the land. (See Conclusion 2.) 4. *Having considered, without agreeing upon the proposition,, that a message on the war situation should be sent to Congress, the President PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 513 and the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, and the Secretary of the Navy pursued, from November 25 to December 7, the tactics of waiting for the firing of "the first shot" by the Japanese.* Nothing that indicates any easing of the tension between the United States and Japan appears in the records of the exchanges with the Japanese representatives in Washington between November 27 and December 6, inclusive. On the contrary, relations were rapidly deteriorating (Foreign Relations: 11, pp. 772-784). It was the general opinion among Washington authorities that the question was no longer "would Japan attack," but "when and where." On November 28, President Roosevelt said to Secretary Stimson that he could see only three alternatives before him in the situation: "first, to do nothing; second, to make something in the nature of an ultimatum again, stating a point beyond which we would fight; third, to fight at once" (Tr., Vol. 70, p. 14423) As late as December 2, President Roosevelt seemed to be still considering the subject of a message to Congress. Secretary Stimson recorded on that day: The President "is quite settled, I think, that he will make a message to the Congress and will, perhaps, back that up with a speech to the country" (ibid., p. 14427). On December 2, he was also considering the possibility of a message to the Japanese Emperor (ibid., p. 14427). With these possibilities of tactics before him, the President fully abandoned the three projects: another ultimatum, fighting at once, sending a message to Congress. He only turned to the fourth possibility- sending an appeal to the Japanese Emperor-after it was too late; that is, after 9 p. m. on the night of December 6, when the White House had been alerted that the Japanese answer to our note of November 26 was coming in and being decoded and his naval aide was on special duty to receive and deliver it to him. Hence, in such respects, he adhered to his first alternative, that of waiting for Japanese action. 5. *The appropriate high authorities in Washington had the organization for working in such close cooperation during the days immediately prior to the Japanese attack on December 7 that they had every opportunity to make sure that identical and precise instructions warranted by the imminence of war went to the Hawaiian Commanders.* For the purpose of taking concerted actions in fulfillment of the duties imposed upon them, authorities in Washington formed two groups or organizations with a view to coordinating the operations of the civil and military branches of the executive department. If these groups were so loosely constituted as not to deserve the name of organizations, this was due to a failure on the part of the members to make them effective bodies for the discharge of their coordinating responsibilities. The first of these two groups consisted of the Secretary of State, Secretary of War, Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Staff, and the Chief of Naval Operations. Sometimes it was called colloquially the "War Council." The second group included the President, Secretary of State, Secretary of War, Secretary of Navy, usually the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations, and occasionally commanding general of Air Force, General Arnold. This group was sometimes colloquially called the "War Cabinet." 514 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK The use of these terms-"War Council" and "War Cabinet"-while the country was still at peace seems to indicate that high civil and military authorities in Washington were thinking in terms of war and should have been more alert to the probable events of war such as an attack upon our most important outpost and fleet in the Pacific. Each of these groups or organizations- "was a sort of clearinghouse for information, a gathering place for discussion of policies, so that each of the independent actors in the scene *would know what was going on and would have information to guide him in making his own decisions* that were more or less independent, but at the same time somewhat dependent on the action of other members of the group. (Italics supplied.) (Army Pearl Harbor Board Report, p. 219.)" If it be argued that these groups were loosely constituted and met irregularly and informally and hence were not organizations in the strict sense of the term [they met once a week at least and had other irregular and additional meetings], it remains a fact that they existed for the purposes described. Furthermore, if, owing to their loose constitution, they did not discharge their duties efficiently, it also remains a fact that the President had the power, and the corresponding duty, to transform either or both of these groups into positive organizations with positive obligations in respect of exchanging information, making decisions, coordinating the civil and military branches of the executive department, and framing orders to outpost commanders. (See Conclusion No. 16.) At all events, these groups had every opportunity to make sure that identical and precise instructions warranted by the imminence of war went out to the Hawaiian commanders and the President had the power and duty to see that this was done directly or through the agency of these groups, especially the second-the "War Cabinet." 6. *Through the Army and Navy intelligence services extensive information was secured respecting Japanese war plans and designs, by intercepted and decoded Japanese secret messages, which indicated the growing danger of war and increasingly after November 26 the imminence of a Japanese attack.* With extraordinary skill, zeal, and watchfulness the intelligence services of the Army Signal Corps and Navy Office of Naval Communications broke Japanese codes and intercepted messages between the Japanese Government and its spies and agents and ambassadors in all parts of the world and supplied the high authorities in Washington reliable secret information respecting Japanese designs, decisions, and operations at home, in the United States, and in other countries. Although there were delays in the translations of many intercepts, the intelligence services had furnished to those high authorities a large number of Japanese messages which clearly indicated the growing resolve of the Japanese Government on war before December 7, 1941. Incidentally, it was a matter of great imprudence for the State and War Department to permit so large a number (200) of Japanese consular representatives at so important a naval base as Hawaii. Much of the espionage involved in the intercepts emanated from this consular group m Hawaii. Four volumes laid before the Committee contain hundreds of these messages-including in some cases comment and interpretations: PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 515 (l) *Pearl Harbor: Intercepted Diplomatic messages*. Ex. 1 (253 pp.); (2) *Japanese Messages Concerning Military Installations, Ship Movements*, etc. (of the United States) (mimeograph, Ex. 2); and (3) *Army Pearl Harbor Board: Top Secret Testimony, Report, and Official Memoranda* (mimeograph). (4) *The Navy Court of Inquiry Top Secret Testimony and Report*. No person has any intellectual or moral right to pass judgment on the question of responsibility for Pearl Harbor who has not read, compared, studied, and interpreted all of these documents. With regard to the volume, nature, and details of the information respecting Japanese designs and operations supplied by the Army and Navy intelligence services to high authorities in Washington, see below. (Conclusion 20.) The President and the other officials receiving the intercepted messages in Washington prior to December 7, 1941, considered it likely hat Japan would attack the United States. At a meeting of the President and his so-called War Council on November 25, 1941, according to Mr. Stimson's notes, the President stated: "That we were likely to be attacked perhaps (as soon as) next Monday" (Tr., Vol. 70, p. 14418)." There was abundant evidence in the intercepted messages that Japan intended to attack the United States. Japan had fixed a dead-line date of November 25 [ex. I, p. 100], extended to November 29 [ex. I, p. 165] for reaching diplomatic agreement with the United States. There were at least six Japanese messages emphasizing this dead line. If the dead-line date passed without agreement, the Japanese Government advised her Ambassadors in Washington: "Things are automatically going to happen." The necessity for agreement by the dead-line date was stressed by Japan in these terms: "The fate of our Empire hangs by the slender thread of a few days"; "We gambled the fate of our land on the throw of this die" (exhibit 1, p. 137, 93). On November 26, 1941, prior to the advanced "dead-line" date, the United States Government delivered to Japan a diplomatic note, which the intercepted messages revealed Japan considered to be a "humiliating proposal," impossible of acceptance (exhibit 1, p. 195). The intercepted diplomatic messages further revealed that Japan expected to "rupture" negotiations with the United States when she replied to the American note of November 26 (exhibit 1, p. 204). To prevent the United States from becoming unduly suspicious, Japan instructed her envoys in Washington to keep up a pretext of continuing negotiations until this Japanese reply was ready for delivery (exhibit 1, p. 208). A message from the Japanese Government to its Ambassador in Berlin, sent on November 30, was intercepted and translated by the Navy in Washington on December 1 (exhibit 1, p. 204). In this message the Japanese Ambassador was instructed to- "immediately interview Chancellor Hitler and Foreign Minister Ribbentrop and confidentially communicate to them a summary of developments * * *. *Say very secretly to them that there is extreme danger that war may suddenly break out between the Anglo-Saxon nations and Japan through some clash of arms and add the time of the breaking out of this war may come quicker than anyone dreams*. (Italic supplied.) The President regarded this message as of such interest that he retained a copy of it, contrary to the usual practice in handling the 516 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK intercepted messages (Tr., Vol. 57, p. 10887). On December 2, 1941, elaborate instructions from Japan were intercepted dealing in precise detail with the method of internment of American and British nationals in Asia "on the outbreak of war with England and the United States" (exhibit 1, p. 198). The probability that the Pacific Fleet would be attacked at Pearl Harbor was clear from the "bomb plot" available in Washington as early as October 9, 1941, and related Japanese messages. It will aid in obtaining a clear understanding of these important messages if the principal intercepted communications are set forth in full. They are: From: Tokyo (Toyoda) To: Honolulu September 24, 1941 #83 Strictly secret. Henceforth, we would like to have you make reports concerning vessels along the following lines insofar as possible: 1. The waters (of Pearl Harbor) are to be divided roughly into five sub- areas. (We have no objections to your abbreviating as much as you like.) Area A. Waters between Ford Island and the Arsenal. Area B. Waters adjacent to the Island south and west of Ford Island. (This area is on the opposite side of the Island from Area A.) Area C. East Loch. Area D. Middle Loch. Area E. West Loch. And the communicating water routes. 2. With regard to warships and aircraft carriers, we would like to have you report on those at anchor, (these are not so important) tied up at wharves, buoys and in the docks. (Designate types and classes briefly. If possible we would like to have you make mention of the fact when there are two or more vessels along side the same wharf.) ARMY 23260 Trans. 10/9/41 (S) From: Honolulu (Kita) To: Washington September 29, 1941. Circular #041 Honolulu to Tokyo #178 Re your #083* (Strictly secret) The following codes will be used hereafter to designate the location vessels: 1. Repair dock in Navy Yard (The repair basin referred to in my message Washington #48**): KS. 2. Navy Dock in the Navy Yard (The Ten Ten Pier): KT. 3. Moorings in the vicinity of Ford Island: FV. 4. Alongside in Ford Island: FG. (East and west sides will be differentiated by A and B respectively.) Relayed to Washington, San Francisco. * Not available ** Available dated 21 August JD-1 5730 23312 (D) Navy Trans. 10-10-41 (X) From: Tokyo (Togo) To: Honolulu (Riyoji) November 15, 1941. #111 As relations between Japan and the United States are most critical, make your ships in harbor report irregular, but at a rate of twice a week. Although you already are no doubt aware, please take extra care to maintain secrecy. JD 1: 6991 25644 (Y) Navy Trans. 12-3-41 (S) PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 517 From: Tokyo (Togo) To: Honolulu November 18, 1941 #113 Please report on the following areas as to vessels anchored therein: Area "N", Pearl Harbor, Manila Bay,[a] and the Areas Adjacent thereto. (Make your investigation with great secrecy.) ARMY 25773 Trans 12.5.41 (S) [a] Probably means Mamala May. From: Tokyo (Togo) To: Honolulu November 20, 1941 #111 Strictly secret Please investigate comprehensively the fleet-bases in the neighborhood of the Hawaiian military reservation. ARMY 25694 JD 7029 Trans. 12-4-41 (S) From: Tokyo To: Honolulu November 29, 1941 #122 We have been receiving reports from you on ship movements, but in future will you also report even where there are no movements. JD-1: 7086 25823 (Y) Navy Trans. 12-5-41 (2) From: Honolulu (Kita). To: Tokyo. November 18, 1941. #222. 1. The warship at anchor in the harbor on the 15th were as I told you in my #219 [a] on that day. Area A [b]-A battleship of the Oklahoma class entered and one tanker left port. Area C [c]-Three warships of the heavy cruiser class were at anchor. 2. On the 17th the Saratoga was not in the harbor. The carrier Enterprise, or some other vessel, was in area C. Two heavy cruisers of the Chicago class, one of the Pensacola class were tied up at docks KS. Four merchant vessels were at anchor in Area D [d]. 3. At 10 a. m. on the morning of the 17th, eight destroyers were observed entering the harbor. Their course was as follows: In a single file at a distance of 1,000 meters apart at a speed of 3 knots per hour, they moved into Pearl Harbor. From the entrance of the harbor through area B to the buoys in area C, to which they were moored, they changed course five times, each time roughly 30 degrees. The elapsed time was 1 hour; however; one of these destroyers entered area A after passing the water reservoir on the eastern side. Relayed to-. ARMY 25817 Trans 12-6-41. In the "bomb plot" message of September 24, 1941, the Japanese Government gave detailed instructions to its consul general in Hawaii as to the character of report it required concerning vessels in Pearl Harbor. Pearl Harbor was to be divided into five subareas. An alphabetical symbol was given each area. The Japanese Government instructed the consul: "With regard to warships and aircraft carriers, we would like to have you report on those at anchor (these are not so important) tied up at wharves, buoys, and in docks. (Designate type and classes briefly. If possible we would like to have you make mention of the fact when there are two or more vessels alongside the same wharf.) [a] Available, dated November 14. Code under study. [b] Waters between Ford Island and the Arsenal. [c] East Loch. [d] Middle Loch. 518 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK This dispatch was decoded and translated in Washington on October 9,1941 (exhibit 2, p. 12) On September 29, 1941, the Japanese consul in Hawaii replied to his government. He established a system of symbols to be used in designating the location of vessels at key points in Pearl Harbor. This dispatch was decoded and translated in Washington on October L0, 1941. On November 15,18,20, and 29 the Japanese Government urgently called for information about the location of ships in Pearl Harbor (exhibit 2, p. 13-15). On November 15 the Japanese consul in Honolulu was directed to make his "ships in harbor report" irregular but at the rate of twice a week (exhibit 2, p. 13). The reports were to give vessel locations in specific areas of the harbor, using the symbols established in September (exhibit 2, p. 15). The greatest secrecy was enjoined because relations between Japan and the United States were described as "most critical." On November 18 the Japanese consul general reported to Tokyo the locations of the ships in the various subareas of Pearl Harbor, giving minute descriptions of the courses, speed, and distances apart of destroyers entering the harbor (exhibit 2, p. 14). On November 29 reports were requested even though there were no movements of ships. These despatches were intercepted, decoded, and translated in Washington on December 3, 4, 5, and 6, 1941. The "bomb plot" message, and those messages relating to Pearl Harbor which followed it, meant that the ships of the Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbor were marked for a Japanese attack. No other American harbor was divided into subareas by Japan. And no other American harbor had such a large share of the fleet to protect. In no other area did Japan seek information as to whether two or more vessels were alongside the same wharf. Prior to the "bomb plot" message Japanese espionage in Hawaii was directed to ascertain the general whereabouts of the American Fleet, whether at sea or in port. With the "bomb plot" message Japan inaugurated a new policy directed to Pearl Harbor and to no other place, in which information was no longer sought merely as to the general whereabouts of the fleet. But as to the presence of particular ships in particular areas of the harbor. In the period immediately preceding the attack Japan required such reports even when there was no movement of ships in and out of Pearl Harbor. The reports which Japan thus sought and received had a useful purpose only in planning and executing an attack upon the ships in port. These reports were not just the work of enthusiastic local spies gathering meticulous details in an excess of zeal. They were the product of instructions emanating from the Government of Japan in Tokyo. Officers of the high command in Washington have admitted before us that the "bomb plot" message, if correctly evaluated, meant an attack on ships of the Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbor (Tr., Vol. 18, p. 3026; Vol. 23, p. 4014; Vol. 27, p. 4874; Vol. 12, p. 2100-2102; Vol. 59, p. 11313-11314; Vol. 35, p. 6390, 6394; Vol. 30, p. 5378). On October 9th, 1941 (ex. 2, p. 12), Lieutenant Commander Kramer of Naval Intelligence in Washington promptly distributed the Pearl Harbor "bomb plot" message to the President, the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Stark, the Director of Naval Communications, the Director of War Plans, and the PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 519 Director of Naval Intelligence (Tr., Vol. 59 p. 11209). It bore the location "interesting message" on a gist or flag (Tr., Vol. 59, p. 11207). It was accompanied by a summary of its contents as follows: "Tokyo directs special reports on ships in Pearl Harbor which is divided into five areas for the purpose of showing exact locations (Tr., Vol. 69, p. 11207)." Military Intelligence through Colonel Bratton delivered the "bomb plot" message to the Secretary of War, the Chief of Staff, and the chief of the War Plans Division (Tr., Vol. 62, p. 12083). The message was discussed several times by Colonel Bratton, Chief of the Far Eastern Section, Military Intelligence Division, War Department General Staff, with his opposite numbers in the Navy Department (Tr., Vol. 62, p. 12105). They discussed possible significance of the message, as implicating a plan for an air attack on ships in Pearl Harbor (Tr., Vol. 62, p. 12105). In the course of these discussions officers in Naval Intelligence stated that the Japanese were wasting their time in getting such meticulous detail about the location of ship in Pearl Harbor because the fleet would not be in Pearl Harbor when the emergency arose. Simple reason in evaluating these bomb plot messages should have discovered their significance. 1. Such meticulous detail was not needed to enable Japan to keep track of the American fleet for general purposes. 2. The messages were sent to *Tokyo* obviously for use originating from there-air or sea attack. 3. The messages couldn't be for sabotage. Sabotage is an on-the-spot affair. Saboteurs have to be in Hawaii. They get their information direct by local observation. Therefore, they needed no bomb plot. 4. The only purpose could be for air attack, submarine attack, direct invasion-all external operations. 5. Had Washington so evaluated this bomb plot, it could have seen this significance and warned the commanders at Hawaii. Washington authorities failed to do so or if they did in fact evaluate it, they failed to pass the information on to the Hawaiian commanders. The commander of a fleet (in this case Admiral Kimmel) has custody of the fleet; he is at all times materially interested in its safety. The commander of a naval base (in this case General Short) has the duty of protecting the fleet when it is at his base. Any information showing specific hostile interest in that fleet or in the harbor where the fleet is anchored is basic information for the commander of the fleet and the commander of the naval base. In Washington, long prior to December 7, 1941, Army and Navy Intelligence officers, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Army Chief of Staff, and other high authorities gained vital information (the bomb- plot messages) from intercepted Japanese communications affecting the fleet and the defense of the naval base at Hawaii. They gained it from sources of information not available to Admiral Kimmel and General Short. In these circumstances, it was the express duty of the Washington authorities to pass this information in its original form on to Admiral Kimmel and General Short. The information was of such a specific character and so directly related to the fleet and naval 520 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK base that Washington authorities were not justified in keeping to themselves or in evaluating it in any manner which would dilute or generalize the significance of the messages in their original form. Washington authorities failed in this, a prime responsibility in their relations with the outpost commanders. In the days immediately preceding Pearl Harbor, Japan made no effort to conceal the movements or presence of her naval forces in South East Asia (Tr., Vol. 3, p. 453). The movements of her troops in Indo-China at that time were the subject of diplomatic exchanges between the United States and Japan (Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan, 1931-41, vol. II, p. 779). Yet the intercepts showed that some Japanese plan went into effect automatically on November 29, from which Japan hoped to divert American suspicion by a pretext of continued negotiations. The Pearl Harbor "bomb plot" messages gave some hint of what might follow "automatically." Only the President and his top advisers in Washington had this information. Other messages intercepted later were even more revealing. These were the intercepted Japanese messages distributed in Washington on Saturday afternoon and evening, December 6, and several hours before the blow fell on Sunday morning, December 7. These were: 1. The "Pilot message." This was a message from Japan to her Ambassadors in Washington advising them that the Japanese reply to the American note of November 26 was ready and being sent to them in 14 parts; that it was to be treated with great secrecy pending instructions as to the time of its delivery; and that the time for its delivery was to be fixed in a separate message (Exhibit 1, p. 238). 2. The first 13 parts of the Japanese reply. This included all but the last paragraph of the Japanese note handed to the Secretary of State on December 7 (Exhibit 1, pp. 239-244). 3. The fourteenth and last paragraph of the Japanese reply, and the message to the Japanese Ambassadors which fixed the time for delivery of the Japanese note as 1 p. m Washington time, December 7 (Exhibit 1, p. 248). Full details of the timing and significance of these messages, how they were handled, and what was done about them is discussed in conclusion 20. It is sufficient to say here that prior to December 7, 1941, a great volume of secret information obtained by American and other intelligence services from intercepted Japanese messages was available in Washington with which to gage the designs, intentions, and operations of Japan relative to the United States. This information was distributed to high authorities in Washington and practically none of it was passed on to the commanders in Hawaii although it bore directly on their responsibilities in the defense of their outpost. 7. *Army and Navy information which indicated growing imminence of war was delivered to the highest authorities in charge of national preparedness for meeting an attack, among others, the President, the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, and the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations*. The "magic" intelligence was regarded as preeminently confidential and the policy with respect to its restricted distribution was dictated by a desire to safeguard the secret that the Japanese diplomatic codes PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 521 were being broken. Delivery of the English texts of the intercepted messages was limited, within the War Department, to the Secretary of War, the Chief of Staff, the Chief of the War Plans Division, and the Chief of the Military Intelligence Division; within the Navy, to the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Chief of the War Plans Division, and the Director of Naval Intelligence; to the State Department; and to the President's naval aide for transmittal to the President. By agreement between the Army and Navy in Washington, the Army was responsible for distribution of magic within the War Department and to the State Department; the Navy for distribution within the Navy Department and to the White House. The President requested the original raw messages in English examining them personally and on December 6 had his naval aide on special night duty to receive and deliver them to him. The dissemination of magic materials did not include the commanders at Hawaii, but on a few occasions material derived therefrom was dispatched by the Navy Department to Admiral Kimmel. The War Department did not send the magic to the field. A large amount of other intelligence obtained from various sources within and without the country was not sent to either of the commanders in Hawaii. 8. *Judging by the military and naval history of Japan, high authorities in Washington and the commanders in Hawaii had good grounds for expecting that in starting war the Japanese Government would make a surprise attack on the United States*. There is no evidence in the record before the Committee that President Roosevelt, Secretary Hull, Secretary Stimson, and/or Secretary Knox expected at any time prior to December 7 a formal declaration of war on the United States by Japan in case the diplomatic negotiations came to a break. Indeed, all the evidence bearing on expectations in Washington as to Japan's probable methods of making war point to the belief of the Administration that Japan would begin with a surprise attack. For example, Secretary Hull on November 25 and November 28 at a meeting of "high officials," when he stated that the matter of safeguarding our national security was in the hands of the Army and Navy, "expressed his judgment that any plans for our military defense would include the assumption that the Japanese might make the element of surprise a central point in their strategy, and also might attack at various points simultaneously with a view to demoralizing efforts of defense and of coordination for purposes thereof" (Peace and War, 1943, p. 144). Speaking to Ambassador Halifax on November 29, Secretary Hull said that it would be a- "serious mistake * * * to make plans of resistance without including the possibility that Japan may move suddenly and with every possible element of surprise * * * that the Japanese recognize that their course of unlimited conquest * * * is a desperate gamble and requires the utmost boldness and risk. (Peace and War, 1943, pp. 144-145)." Ambassador Grew reported to Hull on November 3- "Japan may resort with dangerous and dramatic suddenness to measures which night make inevitable war with the United States. (Peace and War, p. 775.)" 9. *Neither the diplomatic negotiations nor the intercepts and other information respecting Japanese designs and operations in the hands of 522 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK the United States authorities warranted those authorities in excluding from defense measures or from orders to the Hawaiian commanders the probability of an attack on Hawaii. On the contrary, there is evidence to the effect that such an attack was, in terms of strategy, necessary from the Japanese point of view and in fact highly probable, and that President Roosevelt was taking the probability into account-before December 7*. The fleet was stationed at Pearl Harbor in a large measure, if not entirely, for the purpose of exercising a deterring effect on the aggressive propensities of the Japanese Government during the diplomatic negotiations and of making the Government more likely to yield to the diplomatic representations of the United States in matters of policy. This was done contrary to the advice of the Commander in Chief of the U. S. Fleet, Admiral Richardson (who was removed because of protest on that issue), and with which Admiral William D. Leahy, former Chief of Naval Operations agreed. (Tr. Vol. 6, p. 916). The fleet could produce this effect only as an instrument of war that constituted a potential threat to the Japanese; that is, a powerful instrument which could be used effectively to strike Japanese armed forces if they moved too far southward in the direction of British, Dutch, and/or American possessions in that region. Having determined to move far southward and having moved far on the way early in December toward that region, the Japanese were warned by every principle of sound naval strategy to destroy, if possible, the American fleet at Hawaii on their left flank. As Prime Minister Churchill said, in an address to the House of Commons on January 27, 1942, with reference to the Atlantic Conference and British strategic decisions as time went on after that Conference: "It must also be remembered that over the whole Pacific scene brooded the great power of the United States Fleet, concentrated at Hawaii. It seemed very unlikely that Japan would attempt the distant invasion of the Malay Peninsula, the assault upon Singapore, and the attack upon the Dutch East Indies, while leaving behind them in their rear this great American Fleet." President Roosevelt recognized this strategic consideration as shown by his message to Chiang Kai-shek as follows: "Meanwhile we are exchanging views with the British Government in regard to the entire situation and the tremendous problems which are presented, with a view to effective coordinating of efforts in the most practicable way possible. * * * "Indirectly influencing that situation: American military and naval defensive forces in the Philippine Islands, which are being steadily increased, and the United States Fleet at Hawaii, lying as they do along the flank of any Japanese military movement into China from Indo-china, are ever present and significant factors in the whole situation, as are the increasing British and Dutch defensive preparations in their territories to the south (Exhibit 16, State Department message, approved by President Roosevelt and transmitted through Ambassador Hu Shih to Chiang Kai-shek)." High authorities in Washington definitely knew from a message received from Ambassador Winant in London at 10:40 a. m. December 6, 1941 (Washington time) that two large Japanese forces had been seen sailing toward the Kra Peninsula and were distant only fourteen hours in time (Ex. 21). Washington authorities should have known, therefore, that this would bring the strategic principle of what to do PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 523 bout Hawaii into immediate military calculations. They took no steps to alert Hawaii. The Japanese were fully aware of this strategic principle in December 1941, as their attack on Pearl Harbor demonstrated. During the weeks preceding December 7, what was the attitude of high authorities in Washington with regard to the probability of Japanese action against Pearl Harbor in accordance with this strategic principle? Some of those high authorities thought that the Japanese would not take the risk of such an attack. Indeed those authorities were seriously lacking in information respecting the progress and state of Japanese military and naval preparedness and equipment, and they were unaware of the degree to which the Japanese were equipped to attack the American fleet and military installations at Pearl Harbor. The State Department seemed to labor under the impression that the United States could defeat Japan in a few weeks. (See also Secretary Knox Annual Navy Report of June 30, 1941, released December 6, 1911.) Judging by the testimony and documents before the Committee, most of the high authorities in Washington, especially after the Atlantic conference in August 1941, so concentrated their attention on American-British-Australian-Dutch plans for combined actions against the Japanese in southeastern Asia that they failed to give sufficient, if any, careful consideration to the strategic principle which enjoined the Japanese to destroy, if they could, the American fleet at Hawaii on their left flank before advancing too deeply into southeastern waters. Nevertheless the possibility, indeed the probability, of a Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor had entered into the calculations of high authorities in Washington and the commanders at Pearl Harbor for years, months, and days before December 7, 1941. The whole raison d' etre of the powerful naval and military installations in Hawaii, as publicly announced, was *defense against a Japanese attack*. (See testimony of Mr. Grew for discussion of this point (Tr. 7 Vol. 9, p. 1586.) Preparations for defense against attack necessarily implied the possibility of an attack. American war plans and maneuvers in the Hawaiian area for years prior to December 7, 1941, took into full account the probability of a Japanese attack by air. (See Martin-Bellinger report, Ex. 44.) None of the Army and Navy witnesses before the committee admitted they had neglected the possibility-or the probability-of a Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor during the period prior to December. On the contrary, they testified that they had consistently reckoned with the possibility, even when they minimized the probability. (Tr., for example, Vol. 12, p. 2111, Vol. 13, pp. 2162, 2167, 2172, 2173, Vol. 14, p. 2341.) Intercepts of Japanese messages made by the Army and Navy intelligence services showed high authorities in Washington that the Japanese Government had ordered its agents in Hawaii to report on American military and naval installations and ship movements in that region. They also required reports on "lack of movements." For example, September 24, 1941, it ordered an agent to subdivide the waters of Pearl Harbor into five subareas, as well as to report on ship movements there. Prior to and after this date Japanese agents were, 524 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK up to the Japanese attack, reporting on ship movements, installations, and other matters of military and naval significance to the Japanese government. (Japanese messages concerning Military installations, Ship movements, etc., pp. 2-29. See conclusion 6.) It is true that owing to neglect or delays in Washington some of these messages were not translated prior to December 7, 1941, but enough messages had been translated to provide copious information to high authorities in Washington. Delays in translations were not due to lack of congressional appropriations (General Marshall, Tr., Vol. 19, p. 3149). Witnesses before the Committee, it may be noted, in extenuation of their lack of emphasis on the probability of an attack on Pearl Harbor, called attention to the fact that Japanese agents were also reporting on the military and naval installations of the United States at Panama, the Philippines, the west coast, and other points. But to men, competent, careful, and watchful, men alert on their all-around and indivisible responsibility, this fact provided no excuse whatever for minimizing the probability of an attack on Pearl Harbor any more than at any other American outpost. Nor does it excuse the failure of Washington authorities to note that far greater detail was being asked for by the Japanese about Hawaii at a time when Japanese movements in the Southeastern Pacific had to contend with the strategic position of Hawaii where the real American striking force, the fleet, rested. A full review of the testimony and documents before the Committee confirms the conclusion reached by the Army Pearl Harbor Board (p. 107); after its survey of relevant facts: "We must therefore conclude that the responsible authorities, the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Staff in Washington, down to the generals and admirals in Hawaii, *all expected an air attack before Pearl Harbor* (that is December 7, 1941)." As a general statement, when testifying *after* the Pearl Harbor attack, they did not expect it. Apparently the only person who was not surprised was the Secretary of War, Mr. Stimson. Who testified: "Well, I was not surprised!" 10. *The knowledge of Japanese designs and intentions in the hands of the President and the Secretary of State led them to the conclusion at least 10 days before December 7 that an attack by Japan within a few days was so highly probable as to constitute a certainty and, having reached this conclusion, the President, as Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, was under obligation to instruct the Secretary of War and Secretary of the Navy to make sure that the outpost commanders put their armed forces on an all-out alert for war*. Besides the knowledge of Japanese designs and operations which the President and the Secretary of State acquired from their diplomatic negotiations with Japan, they also had the knowledge of Japanese designs and operations made available to them by the Army and Navy intelligence services. This additional knowledge could only serve to fortify the conviction already reached as early as November 25, namely, that a Japanese attack was near at hand or to use President Roosevelt's own words, "we were likely to be attacked perhaps as soon as Monday" (December 1). (See above, conclusion 3.) The nature of the additional information placed at the disposal of the President and Secretary of State by the Army and Navy Intelligence Service is indicated by the citations of Army and Navy intercepts of Japanese messages. (See conclusion 20.) PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 525 Through intercept of Japanese messages extending over many months prior to December 7, 1941, translated and laid before high authorities in Washington by the Army and Navy Intelligence Services, these Washington authorities learned that Japanese spies and agents, directed by the Japanese Government, were collecting and transmitting to Tokyo an immense amount of exact and detailed information respecting the military and naval installations and the state of preparedness in the Hawaiian Islands, as well as elsewhere, but more detailed in relation to Hawaii than elsewhere. (See conclusion 6.) As early as September 24, 1941, Washington authorities knew that Japanese agents in Hawaii were instructed to divide the waters of Pearl Harbor into five subareas and later to report to Tokyo regularly on ships in the Harbor, ship movements and also to report even though there were no ship movements. These and other Japanese messages requested information also on military installations, and American preparedness materiel, defensive practices, including air reconnaissance, and other matters of vital importance to Japanese armed forces in case they made an attack on Pearl Harbor. (See conclusion 6.) Owing to inexcusable delays on the part of Army and Navy authorities in Washington in translating the intercepts of Japanese messages, many of the most critical and important messages intercepted on and after November 24, 1941, were unavailable for general distribution among high authorities in Washington before the Japanese blow fell at Pearl Harbor on the morning of December 7. From a message from Tokyo to Washington, dated and translated on November 28, authorities in Washington learned that the Japanese Government regarded the American note of November 26 as "a humiliating proposal," and that "Japan cannot use it as a basis for negotiations." They further learned from this same Tokyo message that the Japanese answer would be sent to the Japanese ambassadors in Washington in two or three days, "*after which negotiations will be de facto ruptured." [Italics supplied.] From a message from Tokyo to Berlin, dated November 30 and translated December 1, high authorities in Washington learned that the American note of November 26 was considered by the Japanese Government as "insulting" and that it was impossible for the Japanese Government to find any basis in the American proposal for negotiations, and that, in the Japanese Government's opinion, the United States regarded Japan, along with Germany and Italy as an enemy. From a message from Tokyo to Berlin, dated November 30 and translated December 1, high authorities in Washington learned that the Japanese Government regarded negotiations with the United States as "ruptured- broken," and that the Japanese Government had stated that "the time of the breaking out of this war may come quicker than anyone dreams." Although the knowledge gained from these and other items of information was sufficient to warn high authorities in Washington that Japan was on the verge of starting hostilities, reference should be made in this connection to the so-called "winds" messages concerning which there had been much dispute and no little mystery. The story, though long, may be abbreviated here. 526 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Colonel Otis Sadtler testified before the Army Pearl Harbor Board that about November 20, 1941, a Japanese message was intercepted notifying nationals that another message was to come indicating whether war, if launched, would be against the United States, Great Britain, or Russia or any combination of them. The first message stated that the second or "activating" message to come would indicate by reference to the directions of the winds and weather the names of the countries against which war would be started. The Army Pearl Harbor Board also had evidence to the effect that the second or "activating" message from Japan had come and that it meant "War with England, War with America, Peace with Russia." According to the Board's report: "This original message has now disappeared from the Navy files and cannot be found. It was in existence just after Pearl Harbor and was collected with other messages for submission to the Roberts commission. Copies were in existence in various places but they have all disappeared (Top secret p. 8)." The evidence before this Committee bearing on the interception of the activating message from Tokyo and on the contention that it indicated hostilities between Japan and the Anglo-American combination covers hundreds of pages. Admittedly the evidence is confusing and conflicting, but after reviewing it; Admiral Royal E. Ingersoll, deputy to Admiral Harold Stark, testified before the Hart Inquiry to questions 68 and 69: "68. Q. During November or December '41 were you cognizant of a special code which the Japanese had arranged under which they were to inform their nationals concerning against what nations they would make aggressive movements by means of a partial weather report? "A. Yes; I do recall such messages. "69. Q. Do you recall having seen on or about 4 December the broadcast directive thus given indicating that the Japanese were about to attack both Britain and the United States? "A. Yes." Admiral Ingersoll, Deputy to Admiral Harold Stark at Washington, and Admiral Turner, Navy operations officer at Washington, both stated they did not know until 1945 about the allegation that there had been no wind execute message. Even if the wind execute message they saw was a false one they believed it true at the time and should have acted accordingly. If, however, the receipt of the activating "winds" message be wholly discounted, such discounting in no way affects the other items of unmistakable evidence which demonstrates that high authorities in Washington had sufficient knowledge of Japanese designs to convince them before the attack that war with Japan was an imminent certainty. From a message from Tokyo to Washington, dated December 2 and translated December 3, high authorities in Washington learned that the Japanese Government had ordered its Washington Embassy to destroy all codes except one and all secret documents. (One code machine was to be kept for use in the final negotiations which ended in the rupture of relations on December 7.) From a message dated December 6 and translated on December 6, sometime in the afternoon, Washington authorities learned that the Japanese Government had notified the Japanese Embassy in Washington that a memorandum for the United States would be sent in 14 parts and to be prepared to present it-the memorandum that would make a rupture in relations with the United States. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 527 Messages serving as guides to procedure in the matter of this 14-part message follow: (Secret) From: Tokyo To: Washington December 7, 1941 (Urgent-Very Important) #907 To be handled in Government Code Re my #902. [a] Will the Ambassador please submit to the United States Government (if possible to the Secretary of State) our reply to the United States at 1:00 p. m., on the 7th, your time. Trans. 12/7/41 (S) Army 25850 [a] S.I.S. #25843-text of Japanese reply. (Secret) From: Tokyo To: Washington December 6, 1941 #904 Re my #902 There is really no need to tell you this, but in the preparation of the aide memoire be absolutely sure not to use a typist or any other person. Be most extremely cautious in preserving secrecy. Trans. 12-6-41 (S) Army 25844 JD: 7144 (Secret) From: Tokyo To: Washington December 7, 1941 (Extremely Urgent) #910 After deciphering part 14 of my #902 a and also #907 b, #908 c and 909 d, please destroy at once the remaining cipher machine and all machine codes. Dispose in like manner also secret documents. Trans. 12/7/41 (S) The "pilot message" was filed in Tokyo at 6:56 *a. m*. Washington time December 6; it was intercepted by the Navy by 7:20 a. m. Washington time December 6, and forwarded to the Navy Department. It was sent by the Navy to the Army for decryption and translation about noon, Washington time, on December 6 (exhibit 41). It was decrypted, translated, and distributed about 3 p. m., Washington time, by the Army, to Mr. Hull, Mr. Stimson, General Marshall, the Chief of the Far Plans Division, General Gerow, and the Chief of Military Intelligence, General Miles (Tr., Vol. 62, p. 12050). In the Navy Department the Director of Naval Intelligence-Admiral Wilkinson-received the so-called "pilot message" prior to 6 p. m., Washington time, on December 6 (Tr., Vol. 26, p. 4658). He had previously told his subordinates to be on the lookout for the Japanese reply and felt sure that he gave instructions that the "pilot message" was to be delivered to Admiral Stark (Tr., Vol. 26, p. 4662). Admiral Turner, Chief of the War Plans Division in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, received the "pilot message" in the evening of December 6 (Tr., Vol. 528 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 30, pp. 5440-5442). Admiral Stark and General Marshall each denies that on December 6 he had knowledge of the "pilot message" (Tr., Vol. 21, p. 3473, and Vol. 32, p. 5813). We find on the testimony of General Miles and Colonel Bratton that the "pilot message" was delivered to General Marshall during the afternoon of December 6, 1941 (Tr., Vol. 21, pp. 3589-3590, and Vol. 62, pp. 12019-12050). In late afternoon or early evening of December 6, American Naval Communications intercepted, decoded, and translated the first 13 parts of this memorandum from the Japanese Government to the State Department- the answer to the United States note to Japan on November 26. The translation of these 13 parts was presented to President Roosevelt between 9 and 10 o'clock that evening. After he had read the 13 parts, the President said in substance, "This means war." The evidence indicated that the first 13 parts were read on the evening of December 6 by, particularly, the President, Mr. Harry Hopkins, Secretary Knox, Admiral Ingersoll, Admiral Turner, Admiral Wilkinson, Admiral Beardall, General Miles, Captain Kramer, and Colonel Bratton. Owing to the practice of making decisions by war cabinets, councils, joint committees, and individuals, official responsibility of each man was so blurred that each man became indifferent to his own individual responsibility. A good example of this is Admiral Turner's assumption that so long as Admiral Wilkinson, Admiral Ingersoll, and Secretary Knox had seen the 13-part message, "I did not believe it was my function to take any action." No one took action that night; all waited for the next day. [1] When Mr. Knox received the message he called Mr. Stimson and Mr. Hull and arranged a conference with them for Sunday morning at 10 a. m. (Tr., Vol. 56, pp. 10675-10681). Mr. Stimson asked the Navy Department on Saturday evening to furnish him by 9 a. m. Sunday morning the following information: "Compilation of men-of-war in Far East: British, American, Japanese, Dutch, Russian; *also compilation of American men-of-war in Pacific Fleet*, with locations, with a *list* of American men-of-war in the Atlantic without locations (Tr., Vol. 69, p. 13,988; italics inserted)." Admirals Stark, Ingersoll, and the Secretary of the Navy were consulted about this request. The Secretary of the Navy directed that [1] On many occasions the obligation of an officer was weakened by intermeddling of superiors. President Roosevelt, himself, often directed detailed operations for which field commanders were responsible. An example of this occurred in connection with an order on December 2, 1941, which the Chief of Naval Operations sent to the Commander in Chief of the Asiatic Fleet, commencing as follows: "President directs that the following be done as soon as possible and within 2 days if possible after receipt this despatch" (exhibit 37, p. 39). The President's directions were that the Commander in Chief of the Asiatic Fleet was to charter three small vessels to form a "defensive information patrol." The minimum requirements to establish these ships as United States men of war would suffice in manning them. These requirements were command by a naval officer and the mounting of a small gun and one machine gun. The employment of Filipino crews with the minimum number naval ratings was authorized. The ships were to observe and report by radio Japanese movements to the West China Sea and Gulf of Siam. The President prescribed the point at which each vessel was to be stationed. One vessel was to be stationed between Hainan and Hue, one between Camranh Bay and Cape St. Jaques, one off Pointe De Camau (exhibit 37, p. 39). All these points were clearly in the path of the Japanese advance down the coast of Indochina, and toward the Gulf of Siam. The Navy Department did not originate this plan (Tr., Vol. 60, p. 11351) The Navy Department would not have directed it to be done unless the President had specifically ordered it (Tr., Vol. 60, p. 11351) Admiral Hart was already conducting reconnaissance off that coast by planes from Manila (Tr., Vol. 60 p. 11350). So far as the Navy Department was concerned, sufficient information was being received from this air reconnaissance (Tr., Vol. 60 p. 11351). Had the Japanese fired upon any one of these three small vessels, it would have constituted an overt act on the part of Japan (Tr., Vol. 60, p. 11352). Interferences such as these by superior officers, however, permitted by the line of authority, breed indifference to responsibility on the part of the officer who is superseded. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 529 the information be compiled and delivered prior to 10 o'clock Sunday, December 7, (Tr., Vol. 69, p. 13989). This was done. The compilation showed that practically all the ships of the Pacific Fleet were in Pearl Harbor (Exhibit 176, p. 2). In the early morning of December 7, 1941, about 5 a. m. Washington time, the message fixing the hour for delivery of the Japanese note as 1 p. m., Washington time, was available in the Navy Department in Washington (Tr., Vol. 56, pp. 10694-10701). This was 8 1/2 hours before the attack on Pearl Harbor. Admiral Stark and his principal subordinates have testified before us that they had knowledge of this message about 10:30 a. m. (Tr., Vol. 26, p. 4675; Vol. 49, pp. 9146-9148; Vol. 55, p. 10469). This was 5 1/2 hours after it had been received in the Navy Department. It was about 3 hours before the attack. The relation of 1 p. m. Washington time to early morning in Hawaii was pointed out to Admiral Stark (Tr., Vol. 49, pp. 9146-9148, 9154-9156, 9236-9254; Vol. 26, pp. 4679, 4685). It meant dawn in Hawaii-the strategic time at which to launch an attack. Admiral Stark was urged by the Director of Naval Intelligence to send a warning to the fleet (Tr., Vol. 26, p. 4673). The chief intelligence officers of the Army had the "1 p. m. message" by 9 a. m. Washington time, immediately appreciated its significance, but did not succeed in bringing to General Marshall's attention until nearly several hours later (Tr., Vol. 62, pp. 12077- 12078, 12079-12081). Marshall was horseback riding in Virginia. No action was taken by the Army until he saw and read the 1 p. m. message and related intercepts, at which time he sent a message to General Short which went over commercial facilities and was received after the Pearl Harbor attack (Tr., Vol. 18, pp. 2935-2939, Vol. 45, p. 8396). Admiral Stark took no action on this information except to agree to the inclusion in the belated Army message of instructions to General Short to advise Admiral Kimmel of its contents (Tr., Vol. 32, pp. 5814-5816). Mr. Hull, Mr. Stimson, and Mr. Knox had the 1 p. m. message at their conference about 10:30 a. M. Washington time, December 7 (Tr., Vol. 55, p. 10473). The relation of Washington time to time in Hawaii and the Philippines was brought to their attention (Tr., Vol. 5, pp. 10473- 10475). Mr. Stimson's notes describing the Sunday morning conference state: "Today is the day that the Japanese are going to bring their answer to Hull and everything in MAGIC indicated they had been keeping the time back until now in order to accomplish something hanging in the air. Knox and I arranged conference with Hull at 10:30 and we talked the whole matter over. Hull very certain that the Japs are planning some deviltry and we are all wondering where the blow will strike (Tr., Vol. 70, p. 14428)." The 1 p. m. message was delivered to the White House about 10:30 m. Sunday, December 7, 1941 (Tr., Vol. 55, p. 10476). On the morning of December 7, before 8 o'clock, Navy Intelligence had ready for high authorities of the United States Government a translation of its intercept of the fourteenth and final part of the Japanese memorandum. The fact that General Marshall decided on the basis of the intercepts of Japanese messages made available on or before 11:25 o'clock on the morning of December 7, to send an urgent war warning to the outpost commanders is itself evidence that, despite previous messages to outpost commanders, Washington authorities recognized that their 530 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK knowledge of these intercepts and their minute direction of affairs placed an obligation on them to convey precise information to outpost commanders and to make sure that they were on an all-out alert for war. Owing to inexcusable delays in Washington this final warning to General Short did not reach him until after the Japanese attack. General Marshall failed to use the scrambler telephone on his desk to call General Short in Hawaii on Sunday morning, December 7, nearly 2 hours before the attack, and give him the same information which he sent in the delayed telegram which reached General Short after the attack. General Marshall testified that among the possible factors which may have influenced him against using the scrambler telephone was the possibility that the Japanese could construe the fact that the Army was alerting its garrisons in Hawaii as a hostile act (Tr., Vol. 20, pp. 3389-3390). "The Japanese would have grasped at most any straw to bring to such portions of our public that doubted our integrity of action that we were committing an act that forced action on their part (Tr., Vol. 19, p. 3193)." This explanation is no excuse for the failure to put the Hawaiian commanders on the full alert for defense. Such an alert could not be considered a hostile or aggressive act on the part of the United States. 11. *The decision of the President, in view of the Constitution, to await the Japanese attack rather than ask for a declaration of war by Congress increased the responsibility of high authorities in Washington to use the utmost care in putting the commanders at Pearl Harbor on a full alert for defensive actions before the Japanese attack on December 7, 1941*. The difficulty of coping effectively with the menace of Japanese hostilities by the method of maneuvering and waiting for an attack or attacks (conclusions 2, 3, and 4) was recognized by the President and his immediate subordinates. They knew that the power to declare war was vested in Congress alone by the Constitution. Prime Minister Churchill, who had referred to this matter at the Atlantic Conference (conclusion 1) again suggested to President Roosevelt, on November 30, 1941, that the President inform the Japanese that further aggression on their part would compel him "to place the gravest issues before Congress" (Tr., Vol. 8, p. 1253). President Roosevelt must have given serious thought to the constitutional difficulty during the several days prior to December 7, while he was considering plans for a special message to Congress (conclusions 3 and 4). After it was decided, therefore, that no message be sent to Congress it then became all the more incumbent upon the President and the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Staff, and the Chief of Naval Operations to make doubly certain that war warning messages to General Short and Admiral Kimmel be so clearly formulated as to mean to them an all-out alert of the forces under their command. 12. *Inasmuch as the knowledge respecting Japanese designs and, operations which was in the possession of high authorities in Washington differed in nature and volume from that in the possession of the Pearl Harbor commanders it was especially incumbent upon the former to formulate instructions to the latter in language not open PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 531 to misinterpretations as to the obligations imposed on the commanders by the instructions*. Since Washington authorities knew that vital information in their possession-diplomatic, military, and naval-was not being sent to General Short and Admiral Kimmel, and that this was because of Washington's own decision, it was obligatory for them to give particular care to the formulation of messages to the commanders which revealed the growing war tension, the menacing imminence of the breach in American-Japanese relations, and the resolve of those high authorities to wait for an attack, while still carrying on maneuvering (conclusions 1-5 and below, conclusion 20). The increasing assumption of the detailed direction of affairs by high authorities in Washington added to the obligation of those high authorities to give precise instructions to the outpost commanders. For information in possession of Washington authorities not sent to General Short and Admiral Kimmel, see Army Pearl Harbor Board and Navy Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry reports, top secret reports, and top secret memoranda. It is true that General Short and Admiral Kimmel had a great deal of information as to Japanese designs and operations which was not in the messages sent to them by the War Department and the Navy Department. It is also true that there were differences of opinion among high authorities in Washington over the nature of the information conveyed by certain intercepts; for example, the so-called "winds message" and the activating "winds message." But it is beyond all question that Washington authorities had a large volume of information, particularly as to vital diplomatic decisions and Japanese intentions which was not transmitted to the Hawaiian commanders. This withholding of information from General Short and Admiral Kimmel was in part due to general policy adopted in Washington. General Sherman Miles, at the hearing of November 30, testified at neither the intercepted messages nor essential information derived from them had been sent to Hawaii, although in exceptional cases the substance of some messages had been transmitted in naval code. The exceptional practice of sending the substance in some messages was stopped in July 1941 and General Miles testified that, so far as he knew, General Short and Admiral Kimmel were not notified of this change- this discontinuance of sending even the substance of some intercepts. (Tr., Vol. 13, pp. 2140-2142.) Admiral Kimmel had requested all information and was assured by Admiral Stark he would get it. A few messages were sent up until December 7, but he had no notice that he was not getting all the information available. From among the numerous items of crucial information in possession of Navy Intelligence an