Part I. Diplomatic background of the Pearl Harbor attack ..........    1 
  Japanese record of deceit and aggression ........................    1 
  Fundamental differences between American and Japanese policies ..    4 
  Steps taken by the United States to meet the threat of Axis  
    aggression......................................................  10 
  Initial United States-Japanese negotiations: 1941 ................  13 
  Japanese proposal of May 12 ......................................  14 
  Japanese reaction to German invasion of Russia ...................  15 
  Temporary cessation of negotiations ..............................  16 
  Freezing of assets ...............................................  18 
  Resumption of negotiations and proposed meeting of President 
    Roosevelt and Premier Konoye ...................................  19 
  Japanese proposals of September 6 and 27 .........................  26 
  Advent of the Tojo Cabinet .......................................  28 
  Arrival of Saburo Kurusu .........................................  30 
  Negotiations versus deadlines ....................................  32 
  Japanese ultimatum of November 20 and the modus vivendi ..........  32 
  United States memorandum of November 26 ..........................  38 
  Fraudulent nature of Japanese diplomacy-November 28 to 
    December 7 .....................................................  42 
  Diplomatic and military liaison in Washington ....................  43 
  Conclusions ......................................................  47 

PART I 
 

DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 1 JAPANESE RECORD OF DECEIT AND AGGRESSION For several months prior to December 7, 1941, the Governments of the United States and Japan had been engaged in conversations with a view to settlement of fundamental differences existing in the Far East. To appreciate the realistic basis upon which the Government of the United States participated in the negotiations it is necessary to consider briefly the course of modern Japanese history in order to gauge her diplomatic and military purposes. These purposes become apparent through an outline review of Japanese aggression: [1] Upon the conclusion of a successful war against China in 1895 Japan annexed Formosa and indicated her purpose, not then realized, of establishing herself in China. Following the Russo-Japanese War, Japan in 1905 effected a foothold in Manchuria through acquisition of a lease of the Kwantung territory and ownership of the South Manchuria Railway, at the same time acquiring southern Sakhalin. In 1910, after many years of encroachment, Japan annexed Korea. (In 1904 she had guaranteed Korea's independence and territorial integrity.) In the midst of the First World War Japan in 1915 took advantage of the situation to present to China her notorious Twenty-one Demands. In 1918 Japan entered into an inter-Allied plan whereby not exceeding some 7,000 troops of any one power were to be sent to Siberia to guard military stores which might subsequently be needed by Russian forces, to assist in organizing Russian self-defense, and to aid in evacuating Czechoslovakian forces in Siberia. Seizing upon this opportunity the Japanese conceived the idea of annexing eastern Siberia, in which she was unsuccessful, and sent more than 70,000 troops. Japan participated in the Washington Conference of 1921-22 and became a party to the agreements concluded. One of these agreements was the Nine Power Treaty which was designed to provide for China full opportunity to develop and maintain a stable government. Japan pledged herself to the principles and policies of self-restraint toward China which was the cornerstone of the Nine Power Treaty. Japan agreed to respect the sovereignty, independence, and territorial and administrative integrity of China, and agreed to use her influence to establish the principle of equal opportunity in that country. Following the advent of the Cabinet of General Tanaka in 1927 Japan adopted a positive policy toward China and manifested an increasing disposition to interfere in Chinese internal affairs. In 1931 Japan invaded Manchuria, subsequently establishing the puppet regime of Manchukuo. (This action was a flagrant violation of her agreements SEE APPENDIX D FOR A DETAILED REVIEW OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN FROM THE ATLANTIC CONFERENCE THROUGH DECEMBER 8,1941 [1] See committee record, pp. 1076-1085. Committee record references throughout this report are to page numbers of the official transcript of testimony, which are represented in the printed Hearings of the Committee by italic numerals enclosed in brackets. 2 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK at the Washington Conference and was in complete disregard of her obligations under the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 for the renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy.) [2] The Japanese delegate to the League of Nations had stated on November 91, 1931: " We want no more territory." The end of 1932 saw Japanese occupying the whole of Manchuria. Later they moved southward and westward occupying vast areas of China. When the League of Nations adopted the report of the Lytton Commission appointed by the League to investigate the Manchurian situation, Japan walked out of the Assembly on February 24, 1933. On March 27 of the same year Japan gave notice of her intention to withdraw from the League. [3] On February 21,1934 the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs dispatched a note to the American Secretary of State expressing the conviction that no question existed between the United States and Japan "that is fundamentally incapable of amicable solution". [4] Yet on April 17, 1934 a spokesman of the Japanese Foreign Office issued the "hands off China" statement making clear a purpose to compel China to follow the dictates of Japan and to permit only such relations with China by other countries as the Japanese Government saw fit. In a formal declaration Japan on December 29,1934 announced her purpose to withdraw at the end of 1936 from the Naval Limitation Treaty signed at Washington on February 6, 1922. [5] Thereafter she prepared her armaments with a view to launching the invasion of China. Conversations between Japan and Nazi Germany culminated in the Anti- Comintern Pact of November 25, 1936, to which Italy adhered in 1937. The pact marked the genesis of the "Axis." Thus the parallel courses of aggression being followed by these countries blended in an expression of their common designs in foreign policy. [6] Seizing upon the negligible Marco Polo Bridge incident between Japanese and Chinese forces near Peiping, Japan in July of 1937 began wholesale invasion of China. The lawless acts of the Japanese military in carrying forward the invasion was a disgusting and degrading episode of rape, theft, and murder. In the outrages attending the occupation of Nanking on December 13, 1937, the Japanese military wrote a particularly ignoble pages in history. Yet on July 27, 1937, the Japanese Premier, Prince Konoye, stated, "In sending troops to North China, of course, the Government has no other purpose, as was explained in its recent statement, than to preserve the peace of East Asia." Again on October 28, 1937, the Japanese Foreign Office said: "Japan never looks upon the Chinese people as an enemy." As observed by Secretary Hull: "Japan showed its friendly feeling for China by bombing Chinese civilian populations, by burning Chinese cities, by making millions of Chinese homeless and destitute, by mistreating and killing civilians, and by acts of horror and cruelty." [2] Peace and War, United States Foreign Policy. 1931-41 (State Department publication), p. 4. committee exhibit No. 28. [3] Id., at p. 7. [4] Id., at p. 18. [5] Id., at p. 12. [6] Id., at p. 41. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 3 On December 12, 1937, Japanese aircraft bombed and sank the U. S. S. Panay in the Yangtze River. [7] (A proposal made by the Japanese Prime Minister, Baron Hiranuma, on May 18, 1939 to the Secretary of State, contained the thesis that world peace could only be obtained through assuring to nations their "proper places in the world". It was suggested subsequently that Hiranuma was prepared to sound out Germany and Italy with regard to the holding of a conference if the President were prepared at the same time to sound out Great Britain and France on the settling of European problems. [7a] The proposal was received by the American Government with interest. The suggestion was made that Japan could assist in attaining the objective of world peace by settling the "armed conflict and consequent political disturbances in the Far East today." This suggestion reminded the Japanese Government of "the methods of Japan in relations with China", which perturbed American opinion. In consequence, the proposal of Hiranuma withered with the Japanese refusal to settle her "incident" with China, and to indicate her good faith in proposing a search for world peace.) On April 15, 1940, the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs stated that the "Japanese Government cannot but be deeply concerned over any development * * * that may affect the status quo of the Netherlands East Indies." But following the occupation of the Netherlands by Germany, Japan sent a commercial commission to the Indies asking far-reaching concessions, the effect of which, if acceded to, would have made the Indies a virtual Japanese colony. In August and September of 1940 with German assistance Japan extorted from Vichy France an agreement whereby Japanese forces moved into northern Indochina. On September 27, 1940, Japan entered into the Tripartite Pact along with Germany and Italy-an alliance pointed directly at the United States. [8] As stated by Secretary Hull: "It was designed to discourage the United States from taking adequate measures of self-defense until both Japan and Germany had completed their program of conquest in Asia and Europe, when they could turn on the United States then standing alone." Commenting on the Tripartite Pact, Premier Konoye was quoted in the press of October 1940, as having said: "If the United States refuses to understand the real intentions of Japan, Germany, and Italy and continues persistently its challenging attitude and acts * * * those powers will be forced to go to war. Japan is now endeavoring to adjust Russo-Japanese political and economic relations and will make every effort to reduce friction between Japan and Russia. Japan is now engaged in diplomatic maneuvers to induce Russia, Britain, and the United States to suspend their operations in assisting the Chiang regime." On July 30, 1941 Japanese aircraft bombed the U. S. S. Tutuila at Chungking and struck within 400 yards of the American Embassy at that place. On the following day Japan assured the Government of the United States that her military would discontinue bombing the city area of Chungking. Yet only 11 days later on August 11 the American Embassy reported that during [7] Id., at pp. 52 53. [7a] Committee exhibit No. 177. [8] The pact provided that Germany Italy and Japan would assist one another with all political, economic, and military means when one of the powers was attacked *by a power not then involved in the European war or in the Chinese-Japanese conflict*. Peace and War p. 84. [NOTE: Italics in the original text have been marked with asterisks in the plain text version. LWJ] 4 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK the preceding 4 days Chungking had been delivered unusually heavy and prolonged Japanese air raids. Repeatedly Japan gave assurances that American lives and property in China would be respected. Despite her pledges ever increasing numbers of cases were reported of bombing of American property with consequent loss or endangering of American lives. Secretary Hull summarized the picture in the following words: "Time and again the Japanese gave assurances that American treaty rights in China would be respected. Unnumbered measures infringing those rights were put into effect in Japanese occupied areas. Trade monopolies were set up, discriminatory taxes were imposed, American properties were occupied, and so on. In addition, American nationals were assaulted, arbitrarily detained, and subjected to indignities." FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN AMERICAN AND JAPANESE POLICIES The bold aggression launched by Japan in 1931 in complete violation and disregard of treaty obligations stands in irreconcilable conflict with the policy [9] voiced by the President-elect, Mr. Roosevelt, on January 17, 1933: "I am * * * wholly willing to make it clear that American foreign policies must uphold the sanctity of international treaties. That is the cornerstone on which all relations between nations must rest." In his inaugural address on March 4, 1933, President Roosevelt dedicated the Nation to the policy of the good neighbor: "* * * the neighbor who resolutely respects himself and, because he does so, respects the rights of others-the neighbors who respects his obligations and respects the sanctity of his agreements in and with a world of neighbors." From that time forward, despite repeated efforts and discussions on the part of the Government of the United States to incline the Government of Japan to a peaceful policy in the Orient, she proceeded in July of 1937 to invade China. In consequence of this policy of aggression by the Empire of Japan, the Secretary of State made public a statement of fundamental principles of international policy with a view to rallying all countries to the support of peaceful processes. The Secretary said on July 16, 1937: [10] "I have been receiving from many sources inquiries and suggestions arising out of disturbed situations in various parts of the world. "Unquestionably there are in a number of regions tensions and strains which on their face involve only countries that are near neighbors but which in ultimate analysis are of inevitable concern to the whole world. Any situation in which armed hostilities are in progress or are threatened is a situation wherein rights and interests of all nations either are or may be seriously affected. There can be no serious hostilities anywhere in the world which will not one way or another affect interests or rights or obligations of this country. I therefore feel warranted in making-in fact, I feel it a duty to make-a statement of this Government's position in regard to international problems and situations with respect to which this country feels deep concern. "This country constantly and consistently advocates maintenance of peace. We advocate national and international self-restraint. We advocate abstinence by all nations from use of force in pursuit of policy and from interference in the internal affairs of other nations. We advocate adjustment of problems in international relations by processes of peaceful negotiation and agreement. We advo- [9] Committee record, pp. 1084-1094. [10] Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan: 1931-41. (State Department publication), vol. 1, pp. 325-326. Committee exhibit No. 29. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 5 cate faithful observance of international agreements. Upholding the principle of the sanctity of treaties, we believe in modification of provisions of treaties, when need therefor arises, by orderly processes carried out in a spirit of mutual helpfulness and accommodation. We believe in respect by all nations for the rights of others and performance by all nations of established obligations. We stand for revitalizing and strengthening of international law. We advocate steps toward promotion of economic security and stability the world over. We advocate lowering or removing of excessive barriers in international trade. We seek effective equality of commercial opportunity and we urge upon all nations application of the principle of equality of treatment. We believe in limitation and reduction of armament. Realizing the necessity for maintaining armed forces adequate for national security, we are prepared to reduce or to increase our own armed forces in proportion to reductions or increases made by other countries. We avoid entering into alliances or entangling commitments but we believe in cooperative effort by peaceful and practicable means in support of the principles hereinbefore stated." The principles announced in the statement of July 16, 1937, were given express application to the Chinese situation in a statement of the Secretary of State on August 23, 1937: [11] "The situation in Shanghai is in many ways unique. Shanghai is a great cosmopolitan center, with a population of over three million, a port which has been developed by the nationals of many countries, at which there have prevailed mutually advantageous contacts of all types and varieties between and among the Chinese and people of almost all other countries of the world. At Shanghai there exists a multiplicity of rights and interests which are of inevitable concern to many countries, including the United States. "In the present situation, the American Government is engaged in facilitating in every way possible an orderly and safe removal of American citizens from areas where there is special danger. Further, it is the policy of the American Government to afford its nationals appropriate protection primarily against mobs or other uncontrolled elements. For that purpose it has for many years maintained small detachments of armed forces in China, and for that purpose it is sending the present small reinforcement. These armed forces there have no mission of aggression. It is their function to be of assistance toward maintenance of order and security. It has been the desire and the intention of the American Government to remove these forces when performance of their function of protection is no longer called for, and such remains its desire and expectation. "The issues and problems which are of concern to this Government in the present situation in the Pacific area go far beyond merely the immediate question of protection of the nationals and interests of the United States. The conditions which prevail in that area are intimately connected with and have a direct and fundamental relationship to the general principles of policy to which attention was called in the statement of July 16, which statement has evoked expressions of approval from more than 50 governments. This Government is firmly of the opinion that the principles summarized in that statement should effectively govern international relationships. "When there unfortunately arises in any part of the world the threat or the existence of serious hostilities, the matter is of concern to all nations. Without attempting to pass judgment regarding the merits of the controversy, we appeal to the parties to refrain from resort to war. We urge that they settle their differences in accordance with principles which, in the opinion not alone of our people but of most of the world, should govern in international relationships. We consider applicable throughout the world, in the Pacific area as elsewhere, the principles set forth in the statement of July 16. That statement of principles is comprehensive and basic. It embraces the principles embodied in many treaties; including the Washington Conference treaties and the Kellogg- Briand Pact of Paris. "From the beginning of the present controversy in the Far East we have been urging upon both the Chinese and the Japanese Governments the important of refraining from hostilities and of maintaining peace. We have been participating constantly in consultation with interested governments directed toward peaceful adjustment. The Government does not believe in political alliances or entanglements, nor does it believe in extreme isolation. It does believe in international cooperation for the purpose of seeking through pacific methods the achievement of those objectives set forth in the statement of July 16. In the light of our well- [11] Id., at pp. 355-356. 6 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK defined attitude and policies, and within the range thereof, this Government is giving most solicitous attention to every phase of the Far Eastern situation, toward safeguarding the lives and welfare of our people and making effective the policies-especially the policy of peace- in which this country believes and to which it is committed." On October 6, 1937, a release by the Department of State stated among other things: [12] "The Department of State has been informed by the American Minister to Switzerland of the text of the report adopted by the Advisory Committee of the League of Nations setting forth the Advisory Committee's examination of the facts of the present situation in China and the treaty obligations of Japan. The Minister has further informed the Department that this report was adopted and approved by the Assembly of the League of Nations today, October 6. "Since the beginning of the present controversy in the Far Fast the Government of the United States has urged upon both the Chinese and the Japanese Governments that they refrain from hostilities and has offered to be of assistance in an effort to find some means, acceptable to both parties to the conflict, of composing by pacific methods the situation in the Far Fast. "The Secretary of State, in statements made public on July 16 and August 23 made clear the position of the Government of the United States in regard to international problems and international relationships throughout the world and as applied specifically to the hostilities which are at present unfortunately going on between China and Japan. Among the principles which in the opinion of the Government of the United States should govern international relationships, if peace is to be maintained, are abstinence by all nations from the use of force in the pursuit of policy and from interference in the internal affairs of other nations; adjustment of problems in international relations by process of peaceful negotiation and agreement; respect by all nations for the rights of others and observance by all nations of established obligations; and the upholding of the principle of the sanctity of treaties. "On October 6 at Chicago the President elaborated these principles, emphasizing their importance, and in a discussion of the world situation pointed out that there can be no stability or peace either within nations or between nations except under laws and moral standards adhered to by all, that international anarchy destroys every foundation for peace; that it jeopardizes either the immediate or the future security of every nation, large or small; and that it is therefore of vital interest and concern to the people of the United States that respect for treaties and international morality be restored. "In the light of the unfolding developments in the Far East, the Government of the United States has been forced to the conclusion that the action of Japan in China is inconsistent with the principles which should govern the relationships between nations and is contrary to the provisions of the Nine Power Treaty of February 6, 1922, regarding principles and policies to be followed in matters concerning China, and to those of the Kellogg-Briand Pact of August 27, 1928. Thus the conclusions of this Government with respect to the foregoing are in general accord with those of the Assembly of the League of Nations." Pursuant to the provisions of the Nine Power Treaty of 1922, the United States in November of 1937 with 18 other nations participated in a conference convened at Brussels with a view to "study peaceable means of hastening the end of the regrettable conflict which prevails" in the Far East. The Government of Japan refused repeatedly to participate in the conference which prevented bringing the conflict in China to an end and resulted in the conference suspending its work on November 24. [13] The President late in 1937, exercising the discretion provided by law, refrained from applying the provisions of the Neutrality Act to the conflict between China and Japan. This position was assumed in recognition of the fact that the arms-embargo provisions of the act worked to the detriment of China and to the benefit of Japan. [14] [12] Id., at pp. 396-397. [13] See statement of Secretary Hull, committee record, pp. 1087, 1088; also Peace, and War, pp. 51, 52. [14] See statement of Secretary Hull, committee record, p. 1088. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 7 On July 26, 1939, the following notification was given the Japanese Ambassador by the Secretary of State: [15] "EXCELLENCY: During recent years the Government of the United States has been examining the treaties of commerce and navigation in force between the United States and foreign countries with a view to determining what changes may need to be made toward better serving the purpose for which such treaties are concluded. In the course of this survey, the Government of the United States has come to the conclusion that the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between the United States and Japan which was signed at Washington on February 21, 1911, contains provisions which need new consideration. Toward preparing the way for such consideration and with a view to better safeguarding and promoting American interests as new developments may require, the Government of the United States, acting in accordance with the procedure prescribed in Article XVII of the treaty under reference, gives notice hereby of its desire that this treaty be terminated, and, having thus given notice, will expect the treaty, together with its accompanying protocol, to expire six months from this date." In explaining the foregoing action Secretary Hull testified [16] that the Treaty of commerce and Navigation was not affording adequate protection to American commerce either in Japan or in Japanese-occupied portions of China, while at the same time the operation of the most- favored-nation clause of the treaty was a bar to the adoption of retaliatory measures against Japanese commerce. With the termination of the treaty on January 26, 1940, the legal impediment to placing restrictions upon trade with Japan was removed. In the face of widespread bombings of Chinese civilians by the Japanese, the Government of the United States placed into effect "moral embargoes," adopted on the basis of humanitarian considerations. [17] On July 1, 1938, the Department of State notified aircraft manufacturers and exporters that the United States Government was strongly opposed to the sale of airplanes and aeronautical equipment to countries whose armed forces were using airplanes for attack on civilian populations. In 1939 the "moral embargo" was extended to materials essential to airplane manufacture and to facilities for production of high-quality gasoline. [18] Following passage of the act of July 2, 1941, restrictions were imposed in the interests of national defense on an ever-increasing number of exports of strategic materials. These measures had the additional purpose of deterring and expressing the opposition of the United States to Japanese aggression. [19] On April 15, 1940, when questioned by newspapermen concerning Japan's position with regard to possible involvement of the Netherlands in the European war and its repercussion in the Netherlands East Indies, the Japanese Foreign Minister replied: 20 "With the South Seas regions, especially the Netherlands East Indies, Japan is economically bound by an intimate relationship of mutuality in ministering to one another's needs. Similarly, other countries of East Asia maintain close economic relations with these regions. That is to say, Japan, these countries and these regions together are contributing to the prosperity of East Asia through mutual aid and interdependence. "Should hostilities in Europe be extended to the Netherlands and produce repercussions, as you say, in the Netherlands East Indies, it would not only interfere with the maintenance and furtherance of the above- mentioned relations of economic interdependence and of coexistence and co-prosperity, but would also give rise to an undesirable situation from the standpoint of the peace and stability of East Asia. In view of these considerations, the Japanese Government cannot [15] Foreign Relations. Vol. II, p. 189; also committee record. p. 1088. [16] Committee record, p. 1088. [17] Id. [18] Peace and War, p. 89 [19] See statement of Secretary Hull, Committee Record, pp. 1088,1089. [20] Foreign Relations, vol. II, p. 281. 8 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK but be deeply concerned over any development accompanying an aggravation of the war in Europe that may affect the status quo of the Netherlands East Indies." Referring to the foregoing statement the Secretary of State made the following comments on April 17, 1940: 21 "I have noted with interest the statement by the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs expressing concern on the part of the Japanese Government for the maintenance of the status quo of the Netherlands Indies. "Any change in the status of the Netherlands Indies would directly affect the interests of many countries. "The Netherlands Indies are very important in the international relationships of the whole Pacific Ocean. The islands themselves extend for a distance of approximately 3,200 miles east and west astride of the Equator, from the Indian Ocean on the west far into the Pacific Ocean on the east. They are also an important factor in the commerce of the whole world They produce considerable portions of the word's supplies of important essential commodities such as rubber, tin, quinine, copra, et cetera. Many countries, including the United States, depend substantially upon them for some of these commodities. "Intervention in the domestic affairs of the Netherlands Indies or any alteration of their status quo by other than peaceful processes would be prejudicial to the cause of stability, peace, and security not only in the region of the Netherlands Indies but in the entire Pacific area. "This conclusion, based on a doctrine which has universal application and for which the United States unequivocally stands, is embodied in notes exchanged on November 30, 1908, between the United States and Japan in which each of the two Governments stated that its policy was directed to the maintenance of the existing status quo in the region of the Pacific Ocean. It is reaffirmed in the notes which the United States, the British Empire, France and Japan-as parties to the treaty signed at Washington on December 13, 1921, relating to their insular possessions and their insular dominions in the region of the Pacific Ocean-sent to the Netherlands Government on February 4, 1922, in which each of those Governments declared that "it is firmly resolved to respect the rights of the Netherlands in relation to their insular possessions in the region of the Pacific Ocean." "All peaceful nations have during recent years been earnestly urging that policies of force be abandoned and that peace be maintained on the basis of fundamental principles, among which are respect by every nation for the rights of other nations and nonintervention in their domestic affairs, the according of equality of fair and just treatment, and the faithful observance of treaty pledges, with modification thereof, when needful, by orderly processes. "It is the constant hope of the Government of the United States-as it is no doubt that of all peacefully inclined governments-that the attitudes and policies of all governments will be based upon these principles and that these principles will be applied not only in every part of the Pacific area, but also in every part of the world." The situation existing during 1940 was summarized by Secretary Hull in his testimony before the committee: [22] "Throughout this period the united States increasingly followed a policy of extending all feasible assistance and encouragement to China. This took several different forms, including diplomatic actions in protest of Japan's aggression against China and of Japan's violation of American rights. Loans and credits aggregating some $200,000,000 were extended in order to bolster China's economic structure and to facilitate the acquisition by China of supplies. And later lend-lease and other military supplies were sent to be used in China's resistance against Japan. "During the winter of 1940 and the spring of 1941 I had clearly in mind, and I was explaining to Members of Congress and other Americans with whom I came in contact, that it was apparent that the Japanese military leaders were starting on a mission of conquest of the entire Pacific area west of a few hundred miles of Hawaii and extending to the South Seas and to India. The Japanese were out with force in collaboration with Hitler to establish a new world order, and they thought they had the power to compel all peaceful nations to come in under that new order in the half of the world they had arrogated to themselves. [21] Id., at p. 282. [22] Committee Record, pp. 1089-92. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 9 "I was saying to those Americans that beginning in 1933 I had commenced a systematic and consistently earnest effort to work out our relations with Japan. I had been trying to see whether it was humanly possible to find any new way to approach the Japanese and prevail on them to abandon this movement of conquest. We had been urging the Japanese to consider their own future from the standpoint of political, economic, and social aspects. The people of China were living on a very low standard. Japan, if it should conquer China, would keep China bled white and would not have the capital to aid in restoring purchasing power and social welfare. It meant everything for the development of that half of the world's population to use the capital of all nations, such as the United States and other countries, in helping China, for example, to develop internal improvements and increase its purchasing power. We had reminded the Japanese of our traditional friendship and our mutually profitable relations. "During these years we had kept before the Japanese all these doctrines and principles in the most tactful and earnest manner possible, and at all times we had been careful not to make threats. I said that I had always felt that if a government makes a threat it ought to be ready to back it up. We had been forthright but we had been as tactful as possible. "I was pointing out in these conversations that if we had not, by previously modifying our neutrality Act, been in a position to send military aid to Great Britain in the early summer of 1940 there might well have been a different story. Our aid assisted Britain to hold back the invaders for 7 months, while we had that 7 months in which to arm, and everybody knew that no country ever needed time in which to arm more than we did in the face of the world situation." In his address to Congress on January 6, 1941, President Roosevelt declared [23] that "at no previous time has American security been as seriously threatened from without as it is today." He observed that the pattern of democratic life had been blotted out in an appalling number of independent nations with the aggressors still on the march threatening other nations, great and small. The national policy of the Government of the United States was outlined by the President as committed to an all-inclusive national defense, to full support of resolute peoples everywhere who were resisting aggression and thereby were keeping war away from our hemisphere, and to the proposition that principles of morality and considerations for our own security would "never permit us to acquiesce in a peace dictated by aggressors. " In a statement on January 15, 1941, in support of the Lend-Lease Act before the Committee on Foreign Affairs in the House of Representatives, Secretary Hull said: [24] "It has been clear throughout that Japan has been actuated from the start by broad and ambitious plans for establishing herself in a dominant position in the entire region of the Eastern Pacific. Her leaders have openly declared their determination to achieve and maintain that position by force of arms and thus to make themselves master of an area containing almost one-half of the entire population of the world. As a consequence, they would have arbitrary control of the sea and trade routes in that region." As Secretary Hull testified [25]- "I pointed out that mankind was face to face with an organized, ruthless, and implacable movement of steadily expanding conquests and that control of the high seas by law-abiding nations "is the key to the security of the Western Hemisphere." " The hope of the United States, therefore, for mediation and conciliation based on peaceful processes was overshadowed by an uncompromising and relentless aggressor who had cast her lot with the Axis in the Tripartite Pact of September 1940 and voiced her slogan of domination by force in the "Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere." [23] See Committee record pp. 1092, 1093. [24] Committee record, p, 1093. [25] Id. 10 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK The backdrop of activity by Japan's partners left little doubt as to the program and methods of the Axis: [26] On October 14,1933, Germany withdrew from the Disarmament Conference coincidentally giving notice of withdrawal from the League of Nations. On October 3,1935, Italian armed forces invaded Ethiopia. In violation of the Locarno Pact Hitler proceeded in March of 1936 to occupy and fortify the demilitarized Rhineland. On March 11, 1938, German forces entered Austria and 2 days later proclaimed the union of Germany and Austria. At Munich on September 29, 1938, Hitler and Mussolini extorted a settlement by which Germany acquired the Sudetenland. In violation of pledges given at Munich, Germany invaded Czechoslovakia on March 14,1939. With further German aggression, war broke out in Europe on September 1, 1939, which as Secretary Hull stated "weakened the position of all countries. Including the United States, opposed to Japanese banditry in the Pacific." He presented the picture in the following terms: "In the early summer of 1940 France's effective resistance collapsed. Britain was virtually under siege. Germany's vast and powerful military machine remained intact. "Nazi submarines and long-range bombers were taking a heavy toll of ships and materials in the North Atlantic. Shipping was inadequate. The countries resisting aggression desperately needed supplies to increase their defenses. "It was clear that any aggravation of the situation in the Far East would have a serious effect on the already dangerous situation in Europe, while conversely, an easement of the Far Eastern tension would aid enormously the struggle against the Nazis in Europe." STEPS TAKEN BY THE UNITED STATES TO MEET THE THREAT OF AXIS AGGRESSION With each threatened "annexation" or "occupation" of countries bordering on Germany up to the invasion of Poland, President Roosevelt had made an appeal for the settlement of differences without recourse to force or the threat of force; but the United States in line with its traditional aloofness in European affairs had adopted no positive measures to deter Hitler's course of aggression. In the face of the inexorable trend of Axis militarism, however, progressive steps were taken by the Government of the United States to build our defenses and throw our weight on the side of France and Great Britain. For purposes of convenient reference it would be well to review briefly these steps. Addressing the Congress in extraordinary session on September 21, 1939, the President recommended that the arms embargo be repealed and that our citizens and our ships be restricted from dangerous areas in order to prevent controversies that might involve the United States in war. On November 4 the arms embargo was repealed, thereby permitting large shipments of aircraft and other implements of war, much of which had been ordered by Great Britain and France before the outbreak of war, to be shipped across the Atlantic for use in combating Nazi aggression. [27] [26] See committee record, pp. 1093-1095. [27] Peace and War, pp. 69, 70. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 11 In an address on June 10, 1940, at Charlottesville, Va., the President announced the policy of extending the material resources of the United States to the opponents of force. He said: "We will extend to the opponents of force the material resources of this Nation and, at the same time, we will harness and speed up the use of those resources in order that we ourselves in the Americas may have equipment and training equal to the task of any emergency and every defense. [28]" With a view to strengthening the defenses of the Eastern Hemisphere an agreement was made on September 2, 1940, between the United States and Great Britain whereby the latter received 50 over-aged destroyers and the United States acquired the right to lease naval and air bases in Newfoundland, in British Guiana, and in the islands of Bermuda, the Bahamas, Jamaica, St. Lucia, Trinidad, and Antigua. Referring to this agreement, the President stated that the value to the Western Hemisphere "of these outposts of security is beyond calculation." He considered them essential to the protection of the Panama Canal, Central America, the northern portion of South America, the Antilles, Canada, Mexico, and our eastern and Gulf seaboards. [29] On September 16, 1940, the Selective Training and Service Act was enacted, marking another important step for national defense. The act included a provision that persons inducted into the land forces should not be employed beyond the Western Hemisphere except in United States Territories and possessions. It marked, for the first time in the history of the United States, the adoption of compulsory military training of manpower when the Nation was not at war. [30] President Roosevelt, in an address of December 29, 1940, observed that the Nazi masters of Germany had made it clear they intended not only to dominate all life and thought in their own country but also to enslave the whole of Europe and to use the resources of Europe to dominate the rest of the world. He pointed out that although some of our people liked to believe that wars in Europe and Asia were of no concern to us, it was a matter of most vital concern that European and Asiatic war makers should not gain control of the oceans which led to the Western Hemisphere. He pointed out that if Great Britain went down the Axis Powers would control the continents of Europe, Asia, Africa, and the high seas, and would then be in a position to bring enormous military and naval resources against this hemisphere. Warning of the danger ahead, the President stated the Government was planning our defense with the utmost urgency and in it we must "integrate the war needs of Britain and the other free nations resisting aggression." Referring to the need for increased production, the President said we must have more ships, more guns, more planes; we must be the great "arsenal of democracy." [31] With the signature of the President on March 11, 1941, the lend-lease bill became law. This bill provided the machinery enabling the United States to make the most effective use of our resources for our own needs and for those whom, in our own self-defense, we were determined to aid. Secretary Hull expressed the belief that this act would make it possible for us to allocate our resources in ways best [28} Id., at p. 76. [29] Id., at p. 83. [30] Id., at p. 84. [31] Id., at pp. 86, 87. 12 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK calculated to provide for the security of the United States and of this continent. [32] On April 10, 1941, the Department of State announced an agreement regarding Greenland, recognizing that as a result of a European war there was danger that Greenland might be converted into a point of aggression against nations of the American Continent. This agreement accepted the responsibility on behalf of the United States of assisting Greenland in the maintenance of its existing status, and granted to the United States the right to locate and construct airplane landing fields and facilities for the defense of Greenland and this continent. [33] In an address on May 27, 1941, the President declared an "unlimited national emergency," stating that our whole program of aid for the democracies had been "based on a hard-headed concern for our own security and for the kind of safe and civilized world in which we wished to live." He stated that every dollar of material that we sent helped to keep the dictators away from our own hemisphere and every day they were held off gave us time in which to build more guns and tanks and planes and ships. [34] On July 7, 1941, the President announced that in accordance with an understanding reached with the Prime Minister of Iceland, forces had arrived in Iceland in order to supplement and eventually to replace the British forces which had been stationed there to insure the adequate defense of that country. The President pointed out that the United States could not permit the occupation by Germany of a strategic outpost in the Atlantic to be used as air or naval bases for eventual attack against the Western Hemisphere. [35] Subsequently there was instituted an escort to Iceland of United States and Iceland shipping. [36] In a joint declaration by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, the principles of the Atlantic Charter were enunciated on August 14, 1941. [37] In a message of August 15, 1941, in which he was joined by Prime Minister Churchill, the President advised Premier Stalin that the United States and Great Britain had consulted together as to how best they could help the Soviet Union; that they were cooperating to provide the Soviet Union with the very maximum of supplies most urgently needed and that many shiploads had already left for the Soviet Union and more would leave in the immediate future. [38] On September 11, 1941, as a result of several incidents fully demonstrating a grave menace to the vital interests of the United States, the President warned that from that time forward, if German or Italian vessels of war entered the waters the protection of which was necessary for American defense, they would do so "at their own peril." [39] Despite the announcement of the "shooting orders", ships of the United States and other American Republics continued to be sunk in the Atlantic Ocean by Nazi submarines. In view of this situation and in view of the fact that the Neutrality Act of 1939 prohibited the arm- [32] Id., at p. 100. [33] Id., at pp. 103, 104. [34] Id., at p. 111. [35] Id., at p. 111. [36] See committee record, p. 6111. [37] "Peace and War," p. 111. [38] Id., at p. 113. [39] Id., at pp. 113-115. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 13 ing of United States merchant ships engaged in foreign commerce and prevented United States merchant ships from carrying cargoes to belligerent ports, it became increasingly difficult to obtain shipping for the cartage of lend-lease supplies to Great Britain and other nations whose defense was considered vital to the defense of the United States. Accordingly, on October 9, 1941, the President asked Congress to modify the Neutrality Act. On November 17, 1941, in a joint resolution of the Congress, sections of the act were repealed permitting United States vessels to be armed and to carry cargoes to belligerent ports anywhere. [40] In contrast with our historic aloofness in European affairs, it was the traditional policy of the United States, based upon territorial, commercial, and humanitarian interests, to maintain a concern in the Pacific. This policy had its inception in the enunciation of the Hay open-door policy toward China in 1899 which formed the cornerstone of the Nine-Power Treaty, adopted concurrently with the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922. [41] To implement this policy Japan's course of aggression was countered by a series of deterrent measures in addition to those relating generally to the Axis or applying more specifically to the European situation. These measures included material aid to China, curtailment of trade with Japan, and basing of the Pacific Fleet at Hawaii. INITIAL UNITED STATE-JAPANESE NEGOTIATIONS, 1941 Admiral Nomura, the new Japanese Ambassador, was received by the President on February 14, 1941, at which time reference was made to the progressive deterioration of relations between Japan and the United States. President Roosevelt suggested that Ambassador Nomura might desire to reexamine and frankly discuss with the American Secretary of State important phases of American-Japanese relations. Secretary Hull made the following observations concerning the initial conversations with the Japanese Ambassador: [42] "On March 8 (1941) in my first extended conversation with the Japanese Ambassador I emphasized that the American people had become fully aroused over the German and Japanese movements to take charge of the seas and of the other continents for their own arbitrary control and to profit at the expense of the welfare of all of the victims. "On March 14 the Japanese Ambassador saw the President and me. The President agreed with an intimation by the Ambassador that matters between our two countries could be worked out without a military clash and emphasized that the first step would be removal of suspicion regarding Japan's intentions. With the Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka on his way to Berlin, talking loudly, and Japanese naval and air forces moving gradually toward Thailand, there was naturally serious concern and suspicion. "On April 16, I had a further conversation with the Japanese Ambassador. I pointed out that the one paramount preliminary question about which our Government was concerned was a definite assurance in advance that the Japanese Government had the willingness and power to abandon its present doctrine of conquest by force and to adopt four principles which our Government regarded as the foundation upon which relations between nations should rest, as follows: "(1) Respect for the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of each and all nations; "(2) Support of the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of other countries; [40] Id., at pp. 115-117. [41] Id., at p. 168. [42] Committee record, pp. 1103, 1104. 14 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK "(3) Support of the principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity; "(4) Nondisturbance of the status quo in the Pacific except as the status quo may be altered by peaceful means. "I told the Japanese Ambassador that our Government was willing to consider any proposal which the Japanese Government might offer such as would be consistent with those principles." JAPANESE PROPOSAL OF MAY 12 The Japanese Ambassador on May 12 presented a proposal for a general settlement the essence of which was (1) that the United States should request Chiang Kai-shek to negotiate peace with Japan and, if the Generalissimo should not accept the advice of the United States, that the United States should discontinue its assistance to the Chinese Government; (2) that normal trade relations between Japan and the United States should be resumed, and (3) that the United States should help Japan acquire access to facilities for the exploitation of natural resources (including oil, rubber, tin, and nickel) in the Southwest Pacific area. [43] This proposal contained an affirmation of Japan's adherence to the Tripartite Pact with specific reference to Japan's obligations thereunder to come to the aid of any of the parties thereto *if attacked by a power not at that time in the European war or in the Sino-Japanese conflict, other than the Soviet Union which was expressly excepted*. In referring to the proposal Secretary Hull said: [44] "The peace conditions which Japan proposed to offer China were not defined in clear-cut terms. Patient exploring, however, disclosed that they included stipulations disguised in innocuous-sounding formulas whereby Japan would retain control of various strategic resources, facilities, and enterprises in China and would acquire the right to station large bodies of Japanese troops, professedly for "joint defense against communism," for an indefinite period in extensive key areas of China proper and inner Mongolia. "Notwithstanding the narrow and one-sided character of the Japanese proposals, we took them as a starting point to explore the possibility of working out a broad-gage settlement, covering the entire Pacific area, along lines consistent with the principles for which this country stood." The Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs advised Ambassador Grew on May 14, 1941, that he and Prince Konoye were determined that Japan's southward advance should be carried out only by peaceful means "*unless circumstances render this impossible.*" Replying to the inquiry as to what circumstances he had in mind the Foreign Minister referred to the concentration of British troops in Malaya and other British measures. When it was pointed out by Ambassador Grew that such measures were defensive in character, the Japanese Minister observed that the measures in question were regarded as provocative by the Japanese public which might bring pressure on the Government to act. [45] President Roosevelt on May 27, 1941, as has been indicated, proclaimed the existence of an "unlimited national emergency" and declared in a radio address on the same day that our whole program of aid for the democracies had been based on concern for our own security. [46] [43] There were also other provisions, which Japan eventually dropped. calling for joint guaranty of Philippine independence, for the consideration of Japanese immigration to the United States on a nondiscriminatory basis, and for a joint effort by the United States and Japan to prevent the further extension of the European war and for the speedy restoration of peace in Europe. [44] Committee record, pp. 1104-1106. [45] See committee record, pp. 1106, 1107. [46] Id., at p. 1107. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 15 Secretary Hull commented as follows with respect to preliminary conversations with Ambassador Nomura: [47] "During the next few weeks there were a number of conversations for the purpose of clarifying various points and narrowing areas of difference. We repeatedly set forth our attitude on these points-the necessity of Japan's making clear its relation to the Axis in case the United States should be involved in self-defense in the war in Europe; application of the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of another country and withdrawal of Japanese troops from Chinese territory; application of the principle of nondiscrimination in commercial relations in China and other areas of the Pacific; and assurance of Japan's peaceful intent in the Pacific. I emphasized that what we were seeking was a comprehensive agreement which would speak for itself as an instrument of peace. "The Japanese pressed for a complete reply to their proposals of May 12. Accordingly, on June 21, the Ambassador was given our views in the form of a tentative redraft of their proposals. In that redraft there was suggested a formula which would make clear that Japan was not committed to take action against the United States should the latter be drawn by self-defense into the European war. It was proposed that a further effort be made to work out a satisfactory solution of the question of the stationing of Japanese troops in China and of the question of economic cooperation between China and Japan. There also was eliminated any suggestion that the United States would discontinue aid to the Chinese Government. Various other suggested changes were proposed in the interest of clarification or for the purpose of harmonizing the proposed settlement with our stated principles." JAPANESE REACTION TO GERMAN INVASION OF RUSSIA In violation of the August 23, 1939, nonaggression pact, Germany attacked the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941. The invasion of Russia removed the restraining influence on the western flank of Japan and the life-and-death struggle of the Soviet Union for existence was seized upon by the Government of Japan to realize its dreams of empire in the Far East. In an intercepted message of July 31, 1941, from Tokyo to its Washington Embassy the reaction of Japan to the war between Germany and Russia was unequivocally expressed: [48] "Needless to say, the Russo-German war has given us an excellent opportunity to settle the northern question, and it is a fact that we are proceeding with our preparations to take advantage of this occasion. The opportunist disposition of Japan was cogently expressed much earlier in a dispatch of September 12, 1940, from Ambassador Grew to the State Department: [49] "Whatever may be the intentions of the present Japanese Government, there can be no doubt that *the army and other elements in the country see in the present world situation a golden opportunity to carry into effect their dreams of expansion*; the German victories have gone to their heads like strong wine; until recently they have believed implicitly in the defeat of Great Britain; they have argued that the war will probably (*) in a quick German victory and that it is well to consolidate Japan's position in greater East Asia while Germany is still acquiescent and before the eventual hypothetical strengthening of German naval power might rob Japan of far-flung control in the Far East; they have discounted effective opposition on the part of the United States although carefully watching our attitude. *The ability of the saner heads in and out of the Government to control these elements has been and is doubtful*. * * * "Diplomacy may occasionally retard but cannot effectively stem the tide. Force or the display of force can alone prevent these powers from attaining their objectives. Japan today is one of the predatory powers; *she has submerged all moral and ethical sense and has become frankly and unashamedly opportunist, seeking at every turn to profit by the weakness of others*. Her policy of southward expansion [47] Id., at pp. 1108,1109. [48] Committee exhibit No. 1, p. 9. [49] Committee exhibit No. 26. 16 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK is a definite threat to American interests in the Pacific. And is a thrust at the British Empire in the east. Following an Imperial Conference at Tokyo on July 2 at which "the fundamental national policy to be taken toward the present situation was decided" Japan proceeded with military preparations on a vast scale. From one to two million reservists and conscripts were called to the colors. Japanese merchant vessels operating in the Atlantic Ocean were suddenly recalled; restrictions were imposed upon travel in Japan; strict censorship of mails and communications was effected; and conditions were generally imposed throughout the Empire presaging a major military effort. The Japanese press dwelt constantly on the theme that Japan was being faced with pressure directed against it never before approached in its history. The United States was charged with using the Philippine Islands as a "pistol aimed at Japan's heart." The Japanese press warned that if the United States took further action in the direction of encircling Japan, Japanese-American relations would face a final crisis. [50] This false propaganda was clearly designed to condition the Japanese public for further military aggression. In an intercepted dispatch of July 2, 1941, from Tokyo to Berlin for the confidential information of the Japanese Ambassador and staff, the policy of Japan was expressed in the following terms: [51] "1. Imperial Japan shall adhere to the policy of contributing to world peace by establishing the Great East Asia Sphere of Co-prosperity, regardless of how the world situation may change. "2. The Imperial Government shall continue its endeavor to dispose of the China Incident, and shall take measures with a view to advancing southward in order to establish firmly a basis for her self-existence and self-protection." In a second part of the same message Japan outlined the "principal points" upon which she proposed to proceed: "For the purpose of bringing the Chiang Regime to submission, increasing pressure shall be added from various points in the south, and by means of both propaganda and fighting plans for the taking over of concessions shall be carried out. Diplomatic negotiations shall be continued, and various other plans shall be speeded with regard to the vital points in the south. *Concomitantly, preparations for southward advance shall be reinforced and the policy already decided upon with reference to French Indo-China and Thailand shall be executed*. As regards the Russo-German war, although the spirit of the Three-Power Axis shall be maintained, every preparation shall be made at the present and the situation shall be dealt with in our own way. In the meantime, diplomatic negotiations shall be carried on with extreme care. Although every means available shall be resorted to in order to prevent the United States from joining the war, if need be, *Japan shall act in accordance with the Three-Power Pact and shall decide when and how force will be employed*." TEMPORARY CESSATION OF NEGOTIATIONS During July of 1941 reports were received that a Japanese military movement into southern Indochina was imminent. The Government of the United States called to the attention of Japan the incompatibility of such reports with the conversations then under way looking to an agreement for peace in the Pacific. Asked concerning the facts of the situation, the Japanese Ambassador on July 23 explained the Japanese movement into southern as well as northern Indochina by observing that Japan feared, first, that vital supplies including rice, foodstuffs, and raw materials from Indochina might be cut off by [50] Foreign Relations, vol. II, pp. 339, 340. [51] Committee exhibit No. 1, pp. 1, 2. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 17 de Gaullist French agents and Chinese agitators in southern Indochina and, second, that Japan believed certain foreign powers were determined to encircle Japan militarily and for that reason occupation of southern Indochina was undertaken purely as a precautionary measure. [52] The explanation of Ambassador Nomura is in interesting contrast with an intercepted dispatch of July 14, 1941, from Canton to Tokyo: [53] "Subsequent information from the military officials to the Attaches is as follows: "1. The recent general mobilization order expressed the irrevocable resolution of Japan to put an end to Anglo-American assistance in thwarting her natural expansion and her indomitable intention to carry this out, if possible, with the backing of the Axis but, if necessary, alone. Formalities, such as dining the expeditionary forces and saying farewell to them, have been dispensed with. That is because we did not wish to arouse greatly the feelings of the Japanese populace and because we wished to face this new war with a calm and cool attitude. "2. The immediate object of our occupation of French Indo-China will be to achieve our purposes there. Secondly, its purpose is, when the international situation is suitable, to launch therefrom a rapid attack. This venture we will carry out in spite of any difficulties which may arise. We will endeavor to the last to occupy French Indo-China peacefully but, if resistance is offered, we will crush it by force, occupy the country and set up martial law. After the occupation of French Indo-China, next on our schedule is the sending of an ultimatum to the Netherlands Indies. In the seizing of Singapore the Navy will play the principal part. As for the Army, in seizing Singapore it will need only one division and in seizing the Netherlands Indies, only two * * *." In commenting on the observations made by Ambassador Nomura, Acting Secretary of State Sumner Wells on July 23, 1941, pointed out that any agreement which might have been concluded between the French Government at Vichy and Japan could only have resulted from pressure exerted on Vichy by Germany; and in that consequence this agreement could only be looked upon as offering assistance to Germany's policy of world domination and conquest. He further observed that conclusion of the agreement under discussion by the Secretary of State and Ambassador Nomura would bring about a far greater measure of economic security to Japan than she could secure through occupation of Indochina; that the policy of the United States was the opposite of an encirclement policy or of any policy which would be a threat to Japan; that Japan was not menaced by the policy of Great Britain and if an agreement had been concluded, Great Britain, the British Dominions, China, and the Netherlands would have joined the United States and Japan in support of the underlying principles stood for by the United States. He pointed out that the United States could only regard the action of Japan as constituting notice that the Japanese Government intended to pursue a policy of force and conquest, and, since there was no apparent basis calling for filling Indochina with Japanese military and other forces as a measure for defending Japan, the United States must assume that Japan was taking the last step before proceeding on a policy of expansion and conquest in the region of the South Seas. Finally, the Acting Secretary said that in these circumstances the Secretary of State-with whom he had talked a few minutes before-could not see any basis for pursuing further the conversations in which the Secretary and the Ambassador had been engaged. [54] On July 24 Mr. Welles made a statement to the press in which he characterized the Japanese action in Indochina in substantially the [52] Foreign Relations, vol. II, p. 340. [53] Committee exhibit No. 1, p. 2. [54] See Foreign Relations, vol., II, p. 341. 18 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK same terms as in his statement of the previous day to the Japanese Ambassador. He further pointed out that the actions of Japan endangered the use of the Pacific by peaceful nations; that these actions tended to jeopardize the procurement by the United States of essential materials such as tin and rubber, which were necessary in our defense program; and that the steps being taken by Japan endangered the safety of other areas of the Pacific, including the Philippine Islands. [66] Also, on July 24, 1941, in the face of a progressive movement by Japan into southern Indochina, the President proposed to the Japanese Government that French Indochina be regarded as a "neutralized" country. This proposal contemplated that Japan would be given the fullest and freest opportunity of assuring for itself a source of food supplies and other raw materials which on the basis of Japan's own representations she was seeking to obtain. The Japanese Government did not accept the President's proposal. The answer of Japan was characteristically pragmatic and well described in the following language: [56] "Large Japanese forces, however, soon were moved into southern Indochina. Japan's constant expansion of her military position in the southwest Pacific had already substantially imperiled the security of the United States along with that of other powers. By this further expansion in southern Indochina, Japan virtually completed the encirclement of the Philippine Islands and placed its armed forces within striking distance of vital trade routes. *This constituted an overt act directly menacing the security of the United States and other powers that were at peace with Japan*. It created a situation in which the risk of war became so great that the United States and other countries concerned were confronted no longer with the question of avoiding such risk but from then on with the problem of preventing a complete undermining of their security. No sooner were Japanese military forces moved into southern Indochina than there began to appear evidence that there was in progress a vigorous under-cover movement of Japanese infiltration into Thailand. With Japan's armed forces poised for further attacks the possibility of averting armed conflict lay only in the bare chance that there might be reached some agreement which would cause Japan to abandon her policy and procedure of aggression. Under those circumstances and in the light of those considerations, the Government of the United States decided at that point, as did certain other governments especially concerned, that discontinuance of trade with Japan had become an appropriate, warranted and necessary step-as an open warning to Japan and as a measure of self-defense." With the unsuccessful attempt to bring to a halt Japanese aggression in Indochina no further conversations were held on the subject of an agreement until August of 1941. FREEZING OF ASSETS It was clear that positive action must be taken under the circumstances for reasons well expressed by Secretary Hull in his testimony: [57] "The hostilities between Japan and China had been in progress for four years. During those years the United States had continued to follow in its relations with Japan a policy of restraint and patience. It had done this notwithstanding constant violation by Japanese authorities or agents of American rights and legitimate interests in China, in neighboring areas, and even in Japan, and notwithstanding acts and statements by Japanese officials indicating a policy of widespread conquest by force and even threatening the United States. The American Government had sought, while protesting against Japanese acts and while wielding no rights, to make clear a willingness to work out with Japan by peaceful processes a basis for continuance of amiable relations with Japan. It had desired to give the Japanese every opportunity to turn of their own accord from their program of conquest toward peaceful policies. [55] Id. [56] Id., at p. 342. [57] Committee record, pp. 1111-1113. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 19 "The President and I, in our effort to bring about the conclusion of an agreement, had endeavored to present to the Japanese Government a feasible alternative to Japan's indicated program of conquest. We had made abundantly clear our willingness to cooperate with Japan in a program based upon peaceful principles. We had repeatedly indicated that if such a program were adopted for the Pacific, and if thereafter any countries or areas within the Pacific were menaced, our Government would expect to cooperate with other governments in extending assistance to the region threatened. "While these discussions were going on in Washington, many responsible Japanese officials were affirming in Tokyo and elsewhere Japan's determination to pursue a policy of cooperation with her Axis allies. Both Mr. Matsuoka and his successor as Minister for Foreign Affairs had declared that the Three Power Pact stood and that Japanese policy was based upon that pact. Large-scale preparation by Japan for extension of her military activities was in progress, especially since early July. Notwithstanding our efforts expressly to impress upon the Japanese Government our Government's concern and our objection to movement by Japan with use or threat of force into Indochina, the Japanese Government had again obtained by duress from the Vichy Government an authorization and Japanese armed forces had moved into southern Indochina occupied bases there, and were consolidating themselves there for further southward movements." Confronted with the implacable attitude of Japan, President Roosevelt issued an Executive Order on July 26, 1941, freezing Japanese assets in the United States. This order brought under control of the Government all financial and import and export trade transactions in which Japanese interests were involved. The effect of the order was to bring to virtual cessation trade between the United States and Japan. [58] It should be noted that shortly before large Japanese forces went into French Indochina, late in July, a change was effected in the Japanese Cabinet whereby Admiral Toyoda took over the portfolio of Foreign Affairs from Mr. Matsuoka. Thereafter the Japanese Prime Minister, the new Japanese Foreign Minister and Ambassador Nomura made emphatic and repeated protestations of Japan's desire for peace and an equitable settlement of Pacific problems. Despite these representations of peaceful intentions, the Japanese Government continued with mobilization in Japan, and dispatched increasing numbers of armed forces to Manchuria, Indochina, and south China. Bombing of American property in China continued, including bursts which damaged the American Embassy and the U. S. S. Tutuila at Chungking. [59] An intercepted message of July 19, 1941, from Tokyo to Berlin presented a candid estimate of the change in the Japanese Cabinet: [60] "The Cabinet shake-up was necessary to expedite matters in connection with National Affairs and has no further significance. Japan's foreign policy will not be changed and she will remain faithful to the principles of the Tripartite Pact" RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS AND PROPOSED MEETING OF PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT AND PREMIER KONOYE The Japanese Government did not reply to the President's proposal of July 24, but on August 6 the Japanese Ambassador presented a proposal which, so he stated, purported to be responsive to that of the President. This proposal provided among other things: (1) For removal of restrictions which the United States had imposed upon trade with Japan; [58] Foreign Relations, vol. II, p. 343. [59] Id., at p. 343 [60] Committee exhibit No. 1, p. 3. 20 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK (2) For "suspension of its (the United States') military measures in the southwest Pacific area"; (3) For the exercise of good offices by the United States for the initiation of direct negotiations between Japan and China; (4) For withdrawal of Japanese troops from Indochina after a settlement between Japan and China; (5) For recognition by the United States of Japan's special position in Indochina even after the withdrawal of Japanese troops. Throughout the negotiations it had been specified or implied that Japan would expect the United States, in the proposed exercise of its good offices between China and Japan, to discontinue aid to China. The Japanese proposal of August 6 completely ignored the proposal of the President to which it was allegedly responsive. It asked either expressly or by implication that the United States remove the restrictions it had imposed upon trade with Japan; suspend its defensive preparations in the Philippines; discontinue furnishing military equipment to Great Britain and the Netherlands for the arming of their far eastern possessions; discontinue aid to the Chinese Government; and acquiesce in Japan's assertion and exercise of a special military position and a permanent preferential political and economic status in Indochina, involving, as this would, assent to procedures and disposals which menaced the security of the United States and which were contrary to the principles to which this Government was committed. The Japanese Government in return offered not to station Japanese troops in regions of the southwestern Pacific other than Indochina. It proposed to retain its military establishment in Indochina for an indeterminate period. There thus would still have remained the menace to the security of the United States, already mentioned, as well as the menace to the security of British and Dutch territories in the southwestern Pacific area. On August 8 Secretary Hull informed Japan's Ambassador that the Japanese proposal was not responsive to the President's proposal of July 24. Ambassador Nomura thereupon inquired whether it might be possible for President Roosevelt and Premier Konoye to meet with a view to discussing means for reaching an adjustment of views between the two Governments. [61] This suggestion was made pursuant to a dispatch from Tokyo to Ambassador Nomura which related in pertinent part: [62] "We are firm in our conviction that the only means by which the situation can be relieved is to have responsible persons representing each country gather together and hold direct conferences. They shall lay their cards on the table, express their true feelings, and attempt to determine a way out of the present situation. "In the first proposal made by the United States mention was made of just such a step. If, therefore, the United States is still agreeable to this plan, Prime Minister Konoye himself will be willing to meet and converse in a friendly manner with President Roosevelt. "Will you please make clear to them that we propose this step because we sincerely desire maintaining peace on the Pacific." The sincerity of Japan's desire for peace and the appraisal of any hopes for a satisfactory settlement from such n meeting necessarily had to be viewed in the light of a statement only 7 days earlier in an intercepted dispatch from Tokyo to Ambassador Nomura: [63] [61] Foreign Relations, vol. II, p, 344. [62] Committee exhibit No. 1, p. 12 [63] Id., at p. 10. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 21 "Thus, *all measures which our Empire shall take will be based upon a determination to bring about the success of the objectives of the Tripartite Pact*. That this is a fact is proven by the promulgation of an Imperial rescript. We are ever working toward the realization of those objectives, and now during this dire emergency is certainly no time to engage in any light unpremeditated or over-speedy action." On August 18, the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs orally observed to Ambassador Grew that the only way to prevent the strained relations between the United States and Japan from further deterioration would be through a meeting of President Roosevelt and the Japanese Prime Minister. Strict secrecy concerning the proposal was urged upon our Ambassador for the reason that premature announcement of the meeting would result in the project being "torpedoed" by certain elements in Japan. The Japanese Government's concern for preserving the secrecy of the proposed meeting between the President and Premier Konoye is fully evinced in an intercepted dispatch from Tokyo to Washington on September 3, 1941: [64] "Since the existence of the Premier's message was inadvertently made known to the public, *that gang that has been suspecting that unofficial talks were taking place, has really begun to yell and wave the Tripartite Pact banner*. "In the midst of this confusion at home Fleisher's story in the Herald- Tribune relating the rumor of a proposed conference between the Premier and the President broke, which was unfortunate, to say the least, as you can well imagine. "The government is not afraid of the above-mentioned confusion; nor does it feel that that condition will destroy the fruits of the said conference. It is only that the government wished to keep the matter a secret until the arrangements had been completed. I am sure that you are aware that such a policy is not limited to just this ease. "Because of the circumstances being what they are we would like to make all arrangements for the meeting around the middle of September, with all possible speed, and issue a very simple statement to that effect as soon as possible. (If the middle of September is not convenient, any early date would meet with our approval.) "Will you please convey this wish of the government to Hull and wire us the results. If an immediate reply is not forthcoming, we plan to issue a public statement describing our position in this matter. We feel that this should be done from the viewpoint of our domestic situation. Please advise the United States of this plan." The fact that the Konoye Cabinet desired the suggested meeting between the President and the Japanese Premier to be strictly secret for the reason that premature disclosure would result in frustration of the move by hostile elements in Japan would indicate beyond doubt that there existed in Japan a formidable opposition to efforts designed to achieve an improvement in relations with the United States. [65] Further, secrecy with respect to such a meeting would accomplish the additional purpose from the Japanese viewpoint of disguising from her Axis partners, Germany and Italy, the fact that steps might be undertaken which would in any way compromise Japan's commitments under the Tripartite Pact. [*There will be found in Appendix D a detailed and comprehensive review of the diplomatic conversations between the United States and Japan, and related matters, during the critical period from the Atlantic Conference through December 8, 1941, in the light of the facts made public by this committee, to which reference is hereby made.*] In connection with the proposed meeting it should be noted that President Roosevelt returned to Washington on August 17 from the [64] Id., at p. 25. [65] See Memoirs of Prince Fumimaro Konoye, committee exhibit No. 173. 22 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Atlantic Conference at which the far eastern situation had been discussed with Mr. Churchill. It had been agreed by both the President and Prime Minister Churchill that more time was needed by both the United States and Britain to prepare their defenses against Japanese attack in the Far East. It was further agreed that steps should be taken to warn Japan against new moves of aggression. The President and Mr. Churchill were in agreement that this Government should be prepared to continue its conversations with the Government of Japan and thereby leave open to her a reasonable and just alternative to the aggressive course which she had mapped out for herself. Upon his return to Washington from the Atlantic Conference, the President on August 17 handed the Japanese Ambassador two documents, one pointing out that the principles and policies under discussion in conversations between the two Governments precluded expansion by force or threat of force and that if the Japanese Government took any further steps in pursuance of a program of domination by force or threat of force of neighboring countries, the Government of the United States would be compelled to take any and all steps necessary toward insuring the security of the United States. [66] In the second document reference was made to the desire expressed earlier in August by the Japanese Government to resume conversations and to the Ambassador's suggestion of August 8 that President Roosevelt and the Japanese Minister meet with a view to discussing means for adjustment of relations between the United States and Japan. Reaffirmation was made of this Government's intention not to consider any proposals affecting the rights of either country except as such proposals might be in conformity with the basic principles to which the United States had long been committed and of its intention to continue to follow its policy of aiding nations resisting aggression. It was pointed out that informal conversations with the Japanese Government relative to a peaceful settlement would naturally envisage the working out of a progressive program involving the application to the entire Pacific area of the principle of equality of commercial opportunity and treatment, thus making possible access by all countries to raw materials and other essential commodities; and that such a program would contemplate cooperation by all nations of the Pacific toward utilizing all available resources of capital, technical skill and economic leadership toward building up the economies of each country and toward increasing the purchasing power and raising the standards of living of the nations and peoples concerned. The opinion was expressed that if Japan was seeking what it affirmed to be its objectives the program outlined was one that could be counted upon to assure Japan satisfaction of its economic needs and legitimate aspirations with a far greater measure of certainty than could any other program. The statement was made that, in case Japan desired and was in a position to suspend its expansionist activities, to readjust its position, and to embark upon a peaceful program for the Pacific along the lines of the program and principles to which the United States was committed, the Government of the United States was prepared to consider resumption of the informal exploratory discussions which had been interrupted in July and would be glad to endeavor to arrange a suitable time and place to [66] Foreign Relations, vol. II, p. 656. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 23 exchange news. It was also stated that, before renewal of the conversations or proceeding with plans for a meeting of the heads of the two Governments, it would be helpful if the Japanese Government would furnish a clearer statement than had as yet been given of its present attitude and plans. If the Japanese Government continued its movement of force and conquest, "we could not," the President said to the Ambassador, "think of reopening the conversations." On August 28 the Japanese Ambassador handed the President a message from Premier Konoye urging a meeting between the heads of the Governments of the United States and Japan to discuss all important problems in the Pacific. This message was accompanied by a statement of the Japanese Government in which assurances were given, with several qualifications, of Japan's peaceful intentions and her desire to seek a program for the Pacific area consistent with the principles to which the United States had long been committed. The qualifications were voiced in the following terms: the Japanese Government was prepared to withdraw its troops from Indochina "as soon as the China incident is settled or a just peace is established in east Asia"; Japan would take no military action against the Soviet Union as long as the Soviet Union remained faithful to the Soviet Japanese neutrality treaty and did "not menace Japan or Manchukuo or undertake any action contrary to the spirit of said treaty"; the Japanese Government had no intention of using "without provocation" military force against any neighboring nation. [67] On September 3 the President handed the Japanese Ambassador the following "oral statement." [68] "Reference is made to the proposal of the Japanese Government communicated on August 28, 1941, by the Japanese Ambassador to the President of the United States that there be held as soon as possible a meeting between the responsible heads of the Government of Japan and of the Government of the United States to discuss important problems between Japan and the United States covering the entire Pacific area in an endeavor to save the situation and to the reply of the President of the United States, in which the President assured the Prime Minister of the readiness of the Government of the United States to move as rapidly as possible toward the consummation of arrangements for such a meeting and suggested that there be held preliminary discussion of important questions that would come up for consideration in the meeting. In further explanation of the views of the Government of the United States in regard to the suggestion under reference observations are offered, as follows: "On April 16, at the outset of the informal and exploratory conversations which were entered into by the Secretary of State with the Japanese Ambassador, the Secretary of State referred to four fundamental principles which this Government regards as the foundation upon which all relations between nations should properly rest. These four fundamental principles are as follows: "1. Respect for the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of each and all nations. "2. Support of the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of other countries. "3. Support of the principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity. "4. Nondisturbance of the status quo in the Pacific except as the status quo may be altered by peaceful means. "In the subsequent conversations the Secretary of State endeavored to make it clear that in the opinion of the Government of the United States Japan stood to gain more from adherence to courses in harmony with these principles than from any other course, as Japan would thus best be assured access to the raw materials and markets which Japan needs and ways would be opened for mutually beneficial cooperation with the United States and other countries, and that only upon [67] Id., at pp. 346, 347. [68] Id., at pp. 589-59l. 24 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK the basis of these principles could an agreement be reached which would be effective in establishing stability and peace in the Pacific area. "The Government of the United States notes with satisfaction that in the statement marked "Strictly Confidential" which was communicated by the Japanese Ambassador to the President of the United States on August 28 there were given specific assurances of Japan's peaceful intentions and assurances that Japan desires and seeks a program for the Pacific area consistent with the principles to which the Government of the United States has long been committed and which were set forth in detail in the informal conversations already referred to. The Government of the United States understands that the assurances which the Japanese Government has given in that statement exclude any policy which would seek political expansion or the acquisition of economic rights, advantages, or preferences by force. "The Government of the United States is very desirous of collaborating in efforts to make effective in practice the principles to which the Japanese Government has made reference. The Government of the United States believes that it is all-important that preliminary precautions be taken to insure the success of any efforts which the Governments of Japan and of the United States might mate to collaborate toward a peaceful settlement. It will be recalled that in the course of the conversations to which reference has already been made, the Secretary of State on June 21, 1941, handed the Japanese Ambassador a document marked "Oral, Unofficial, and Without Commitment" which contained a redraft of the Japanese Government's proposal of May 12, 1941. It will be recalled further that in oral discussion of this draft it was found that there were certain fundamental questions with respect to which there were divergences of view between the two Governments, and which remained unreconciled at the time the conversations were interrupted in July. The Government of the United States desires to facilitate progress toward a conclusive discussion, but believes that a community of view and a clear agreement upon the points above-mentioned are essential to any satisfactory settlement of Pacific questions. It therefore seeks an indication of the present attitude of the Japanese Government with regard to the fundamental questions under reference. "It goes without saying that each Government in reaching decisions on policy must take into account the internal situation in its own country and the attitude of public opinion therein. The Government of Japan will surely recognize that the Government of the United States could not enter into any agreement which would not be in harmony with the principles in which the American people-in fact all nations that prefer peaceful methods to methods of force-believe. "The Government of the United States would be glad to have the reply of the Japanese Government on the matters above set forth." The formal reply of the President to the Japanese Prime Minister was handed Ambassador Nomura on September 3, and follows: [69] "I have read with appreciation Your Excellency's message of August 27, which was delivered to me by Admiral Nomura. "I have noted with satisfaction the sentiments expressed by you in regard to the solicitude of Japan for the maintenance of the peace of the Pacific and Japan's desire to improve Japanese-American relations. "I fully share the desire expressed by you in these regards, and I wish to assure you that the Government of the United States, recognizing the swiftly moving character of world events, is prepared to proceed as rapidly as possible toward the consummation of arrangements for a meeting at which you and I can exchange views and endeavor to bring about an adjustment in the relations between our two countries. "In the statement which accompanied your letter to me reference was made to the principles to which the Government of the United States has long been committed, and it was declared that the Japanese Government "considers these principles and the practical application thereof, in the friendliest manner possible, are the prime requisites of a true peace and should be applied not only in the Pacific area but throughout the entire world" and that "such a program has long been desired and sought by Japan itself." "I am very desirous of collaborating with you in efforts to make these principles effective in practice. Because of my deep interest in this matter I find it necessary that I constantly observe and take account of developments both in my own country and in Japan which have a bearing upon problems of relations between our two countries. At this particular moment I cannot avoid taking cognizance of indications of the existence in some quarters in Japan of concepts which, if [69] Id., at pp. 591, 592. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 25 widely entertained, would seem capable of raising obstacles to successful collaboration between you and me along the line which I am sure we both earnestly desire to follow. Under these circumstances, I feel constrained to suggest, in the belief that you will share my view, that it would seem highly desirable that *we take precaution, toward ensuring that our proposed meeting shall prove a success, by endeavoring to enter immediately upon preliminary discussion of the fundamental and essential questions on which we seek agreement*. The questions which I have in mind for such preliminary discussions involve practical application of the principles fundamental to achievement and maintenance of peace which are mentioned with more specification in the statement accompanying your letter. I hope that you will look favorably upon this suggestion." The decision to defer any meeting between the President and the Japanese Prime Minister pending preliminary discussions of fundamental and essential questions was deliberate and well considered. Secretary Hull testified fully concerning the considerations attending the decision: [70] "A meeting between the President and Prince Konoe [70a] would have been a significant step. Decision whether it should be undertaken by our Government involved several important considerations. "We knew that *Japanese leaders were unreliable and treacherous*. We asked ourselves whether the military element in Japan would permit the civilian element, even if so disposed, to stop Japan's course of expansion by force and to revert to peaceful courses. Time and again the civilian leaders gave assurances; time and again the military took aggressive action in direct violation of those assurances. Japan's past and contemporary record was replete with instances of military aggression and expansion by force. *Since 1931 and especially since 1937 the military in Japan exercised a controlling voice in Japan's national policy*. "Japan's formal partnership with Nazi Germany in the Tripartite Alliance was a hard and inescapable fact. The Japanese had been consistently unwilling in the conversations to pledge their Government to renounce Japan's commitments in the alliance. They would not state that Japan would refrain from attacking this country if it became involved through self-defense in the European war. *They held on to the threat against the United States implicit in the alliance*. "Our Government could not ignore the fact that throughout the conversations the Japanese spokesmen had made a *practice of offering general formulas* and, when pressed for explanation of the meaning, had consistently narrowed and made more rigid their application. This suggested that when military leaders became aware of the generalized formulas they insisted upon introducing conditions which watered down the general assurances. "A meeting between the President and the Japanese Prime Minister would have had important psychological results. "It would have had a *critically discouraging effect upon the Chinese*. "If the proposed meeting should merely endorse general principles, the Japanese in the light of their past practice could have been expected to utilize such general principles in support of any interpretation which Japan might choose to place upon them. "*If the proposed meeting did not produce an agreement, the Japanese military leaders would then have been in a position to declare that the United States was responsible for the failure of the meeting.* "The Japanese had already refused to agree to any preliminary steps toward reversion to peaceful courses, as, for example, adopting the President's proposal of July 24 regarding the neutralization of Indochina. Instead they steadily moved on with their program of establishing themselves more firmly in Indochina. "It was clear to us that *unless the meeting produced concrete and clear-cut commitments toward peace, the Japanese would have distorted the significance of the meeting in such a way as to weaken greatly this country's moral position and to facilitate their aggressive course.* "The acts of Japan under Konoe's Prime Ministership could not be overlooked. "He had headed the Japanese Government in 1937 when Japan attacked China and when huge Japanese armies poured into that country and occupied its principal cities and industrial regions. "He was Prime Minister when Japanese armed forces attacked the U. S. S. Panay on the Yangtze River on December 12, 1937. [70] Committee record, pp. 1120-1124. For a thoroughgoing discussion of events and circumstances attending the proposed meeting between President Roosevelt and Prince Konoye, see Appendix D. [70a] It is to be noted that except in those instances where the name appears in direct quotations, the Japanese Prime Minister's name is spelled Konoye, rather than Konoe. 26 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK "He was Prime Minister when Japanese armed forces committed notorious outrages in Nanking in 1937. "He as Prime Minister had proclaimed in 1938 the basic principles upon which the Japanese Government, even throughout the 1941 conversations, stated that it would insist in any peace agreement with China. Those principles in application included stationing large bodies of Japanese troops in North China. They would have enabled Japan to retain a permanent stranglehold on China. "He had been Prime Minister when the Japanese Government concluded in 1940 with the Chinese Quisling regime at Nanking a "treaty" embodying the stranglehold principles mentioned in the preceding paragraph. "Prince Konoe had been Japanese Prime Minster when Japan signed the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy in 1940. "As a result of our close-up conversations with the Japanese over a period of months, in which they showed no disposition to abandon their course of conquest, *we were thoroughly satisfied that a meeting with Konoe could only result either in another Munich or in nothing at all, unless Japan was ready to give some clear evidence of a purpose to move in a peaceful direction*. I was opposed to the first Munich and still more opposed to a second Munich. "Our Government ardently desired peace. It could not brush away the realities in the situation. "Although the President would, as he said, "have been happy to travel thousands of miles to meet the Premier of Japan," it was felt that in view of the factors mentioned the President could go to such a meeting only if there were first obtained tentative commitments offering some assurance that the meeting could accomplish good. Neither Prince Konoe nor any of Japan's spokesmen provided anything tangible. [71]" JAPANESE PROPOSALS OF SEPTEMBER 6 AND 27 On September 6 Ambassador Nomura handed Secretary Hull the following proposal: {72] "The Government of Japan undertakes: "(a) that Japan is ready to express its concurrence in those matters which were already tentatively agreed upon between Japan and the United States in the course of their preliminary informal conversations; "(b) that Japan will not make any military advancement from French Indochina against any of its adjoining areas, and likewise will not, without any justifiable reason, resort to military action against any regions lying south of Japan; "(c) that the attitudes of Japan and the United States towards the European War will be decided by the concepts of protection and self- defense, and, in ease the United States should participate in the European War, the interpretation and execution of the Tripartite Pact by Japan shall be independently decided; "(d) that Japan will endeavour to bring about the rehabilitation of general and normal relationship between Japan and China, upon the realization of which Japan is ready to withdraw its armed forces from China as soon as possible in accordance with the agreements between Japan and China; "(e) that the economic activities of the United States in China will not be restricted so long as pursued on an equitable basis; [71] The Konoye Memoirs reflect that the Japanese Navy approved the idea of a meeting between the President and the Japanese Prime Minister whereas the Army viewed such a meeting as of questioned desirability. After outlining his ideas with respect to such a meeting Prince Konoye observed: "Both the War and Navy Ministers listened to me intently. Neither could give me an immediate reply but before the day (August 4, 1941) was over, the Navy expressed complete accord and, moreover, anticipated the success of the conference. The War Minister's reply came in writing, as follows: " 'If the Prime Minister were to personally meet with the President of the United States, the existing diplomatic relations of the Empire, which are based on the Tripartite Pact, would unavoidably be weakened. At the same time, a considerable domestic stir would undoubtedly be created. For these reasons the meeting is not considered a suitable move. The attempt to surmount the present artificial situation by the Prime Minister's offering his personal services is viewed with sincere respect and admiration. *If, therefore it is the Prime Minister's intention to attend such a meeting with determination to firmly support the basic principles embodied in the Empire's revised plan to the N plan and to carry out a war against America if the President of the United States still fails to comprehend the true intentions of the Empire even after this final effort is made the army is not necessarily in disagreement.* " 'However (1) it is not in favor of the meeting if, after making preliminary investigations it is learned that the meeting will be with someone other than the President such as Secretary Hull or one in a lesser capacity; (2) *you shall not resign your post as a result of the meeting on the grounds that it was a failure; rather, you shall be prepared to assume leadership in the war againat America.'* "The War Minister was of the opinion that 'failure of this meeting is the greater likelihood.' " See committee exhibit No. 173, pp. 30, 31. [72] Foreign Relations, vol. II, pp. 608, 609. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 27 "(f) that Japan's activities in the Southwestern Pacific Area will be carried on by peaceful means and in accordance with the principle of nondiscrimination in international commerce, and that Japan will cooperate in the production and procurement by the United States of natural resources in the said area which it needs; "(g) that Japan will take measures necessary for the resumption of normal trade relations between Japan and the United States, and in connection with the above mentioned, Japan is ready to discontinue immediately the application of the foreigners' transactions control regulations with regard to the United States on the basis of reciprocity. "The Government of the United States undertakes: " "(a) that, in response to the Japanese Government's commitment expressed in point (d) referred to above, the United States will abstain from any measures and actions which will be prejudicial to the endeavour by Japan concerning the settlement of the China Affair; " "(b) that the United States will reciprocate Japan's commitment expressed in point (f) referred to above; " "(e) that the United States will suspend any military measures in the Far East and in the Southwestern Pacific Area; " "(d) that the United States will immediately [upon settlement] reciprocate Japan's commitment expressed in point (g) referred to above by discontinuing the application of the so-called freezing act with regard to Japan and further by removing the prohibition against the passage of Japanese vessels through the Panama Canal." " Secretary Hull made the following comments with respect to the foregoing Japanese proposal: [73] "On September 6 the Japanese Ambassador presented a new draft of proposals. These proposals were much narrower than the assurances given in the statement communicated to the President on August 28. In the September 6 Japanese draft the Japanese gave only an evasive formula with regard to their obligations under the Tripartite Pact. There was a qualified undertaking that Japan would not "without any justifiable reason" resort to military action against any region south of Japan. No commitment was offered in regard to the nature of the terms which Japan would offer to China; nor any assurance of an intention by Japan to respect China's territorial integrity and sovereignty, to refrain from interference in China's internal affairs, not to station Japanese troops indefinitely in wide areas of China, and to conform to the principle of nondiscrimination in international commercial relations. The formula contained in the draft that "the economic activities of the United States in China will not be restricted *so long as pursued* on an equitable basis" [italics added] clearly implied a concept that the conditions under which American trade and commerce in China were henceforth to be conducted were to be a matter for decision by Japan. [74]" From time to time during September of 1941 discussions were held between Secretary Hull and the Japanese Ambassador. On September 27, Ambassador Nomura presented a complete redraft of the Japanese proposals of September 6, following the form of the American proposals of June 21. On October 2, Secretary Hull replied to the proposals made by the Japanese Ambassador during September, handing the Ambassador an "oral statement" reviewing significant developments in the conversations and explaining our Government's attitude toward various points in the Japanese proposals which our Government did not consider consistent with the principles to which this country was committed. He said: [75] "Disappointment was expressed over the narrow character of the outstanding Japanese proposals, and questions were raised in regard to Japan's intentions regarding the indefinite stationing of Japanese troops in wide areas of China and regarding Japan's relationship to the Axis Powers. While welcoming the Japanese suggestion of a meeting between the President and the Japanese Prime [73] Committee record, pp. 1118,1119. [74] The Konoye Memoirs reveal that on September 6 an imperial conference was held at which were determined the basic principles of the Japanese Empire's national policy. Among these principles was the understanding that in case there was no way found for attainment of Japanese demands by early in October of 1941 the Empire should at once determine to make up its mind to get ready for war against the United States Great Britain and the Netherlands. Committee exhibit No. 173. [75] Committee record, pp. 1124-1126. 28 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK Minister, we proposed, in order to lay a firm foundation for such a meeting, that renewed consideration be given to fundamental principles so as to reach a meeting of minds on essential questions. It was stated in conclusion that the subject of the meeting proposed by the Prime Minister and the objectives sought had engaged the close and active interest of the President and that it was the President's earnest hope that discussion of the fundamental questions might be so developed that such a meeting could be held. "During this period there was a further advance of Japanese armed forces in Indochina, Japanese military preparations at home were increased and speeded up, and there continued Japanese bombing of Chinese civilian populations, constant agitation in the Japanese press in support of extremist policies, and the unconciliatory and bellicose utterances of Japanese leaders. For example, Captain Hideo Hiraide, director of the naval intelligence section of Imperial Headquarters, was quoted on October 16 as having declared in a public speech: " "America, feeling her insecurity * * * , is carrying out naval expansion on a large scale. But at present America is unable to carry out naval operations in both the Atlantic and Pacific simultaneously. " "*The imperial navy is prepared for the worst and has completed all necessary preparations. In fact, the imperial navy is itching for action, when needed.* " "In spite of strenuous efforts by the government, the situation is now approaching a final parting of the ways. The fate of our empire depends upon how we act at this moment. It is certain that at such a moment our Navy should set about on its primary mission." " It is of interest to note the Japanese estimate of Secretary Hull's position in the negotiations, reflected in an intercepted message of September 15 from Nomura to Tokyo: [76] "Whatever we tell to Secretary Hull you should understand will surely be passed on to the President if he is in Washington. It seems that the matter of preliminary conversations has been entrusted by the President to Secretary Hull, in fact he told me that if a matter could not be settled by me and Secretary Hull it would not be settled whoever conducted the conversations. Hull himself told me that during the past eight years he and the President had not differed on foreign policies once, and that they are as "two in one." " ADVENT OF THE TOJO CABINET The Konoye Cabinet fell on October 16, 1941, and was replaced on the following day by a new cabinet headed by General Hideki Tojo. On October 17 a dispatch from Tokyo to Washington was intercepted manifesting a disposition by the Tojo Cabinet to continue the negotiations: [77] "The Cabinet has reached a decision to resign as a body. At this time I wish to thank Your Excellency and your entire staff for all the efforts you have made. "The resignation was brought about by a split within the Cabinet. It is true that one of the main items on which opinion differed was on the matter of stationing troops or evacuating them from China. However, regardless of the make-up of the new Cabinet, negotiations with the United States shall be continued along the lines already formulated. There shall be no changes in this respect. "Please, therefore, will you and your staff work in unison and a single purpose, with even more effort, if possible, than before.' The situation existing from the advent of the Tojo Cabinet to the arrival of Saburo Kurusu in Washington on November 15 to assist Ambassador Nomura in the conversations was depicted by Secretary Hull as follows. [78] "On October 17 the American press carried the following statement by Maj. Gen. Kiyofuku Okamoto: " "Despite the different views advanced on the Japanese-American question, our national policy for solution of the China affair and establishment of a common coprosperity sphere in East Asia remains unaltered. [76] Committee exhibit No. 1, p. 27. [76a] For a complete discussion of the fall of the Konoye Cabinet, see Appendix D. [77] Id., at p. 76. [78] Committee record, pp. 1127-34. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 29 " "For fulfillment of this national policy, this country has sought to reach an agreement of views with the U. S. by means of diplomatic means. There is, however, a limit to our concessions, and the negotiations may end in a break with the worst possible situation following. The people must therefore be resolved to cope with such a situation." "Clearly the Japanese war lords expected to clinch their policy of aggrandizement and have the United States make all the concessions. "On October 30, the Japanese Foreign Minister told the American Ambassador that the Japanese Government desired that the conversations be concluded successfully without delay and he said that "in order to make progress, the United States should face certain realities and facts," and here thereupon cited the stationing in China of Japanese armed forces. "The general world situation continued to be very critical, rendering it desirable that every reasonable effort be made to avoid or at least to defer as long as possible any rupture in the conversations. From here on for some weeks especially intensive study was given in the Department of State to the possibility of reaching some stopgap arrangement with the Japanese so as to tide over the immediate critical situation and thus to prevent a break-down in the conversations, and even perhaps to pave the way for a subsequent general agreement. The presentation to the Japanese of a proposal which would serve to keep alive the conversations would also give our Army and Navy time to prepare and to expose Japan's bad faith if it did not accept. We considered every kind of suggestion we could find which might help or keep alive the conversations and at the same time be consistent with the integrity of American principles. "In the last part of October and early November messages came to this Government from United States Army and Navy officers in China and from Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek stating that he believed that a Japanese attack on Kunming was imminent. The Generalissimo requested that the United States send air units to China to defeat this threat. He made a similar request of the British Government. He also asked that the United States issue a warning to Japan. "At this time the Chinese had been resisting the Japanese invaders for 4 years. China sorely needed equipment. Its economic and financial situations were very bad. Morale was naturally low. In view of this, even though a Chinese request might contain points with which we could not comply, we dealt with any such request in a spirit of utmost consideration befitting the gravity of the situation confronting our hard-pressed Chinese friends. "I suggested that the War and Navy Departments study this Chinese appeal. In response, the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations sent a memorandum of November 5 to the President giving an estimate concerning the Far Eastern situation. At the conclusion of this estimate the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations recommended: " "That the dispatch of United States armed forces for intervention against Japan in China be disapproved. " "That material aid to China be accelerated constant with the needs of Russia, Great Britain, and our own forces. " "That aid to the American Volunteer Group be continued and accelerated to the maximum practicable extent. " "That no ultimatum be delivered to Japan." "I was in thorough accord with the views of the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations that United States armed forces should not be sent to China for use against Japan. I also believed so far as American foreign policy considerations were involved that material aid to China should be accelerated as much as feasible, and that aid to the American Volunteer Group should be accelerated. Finally, I concurred completely in the view that no ultimatum should be delivered to Japan. I had been striving for months to avoid a show-down with Japan, and to explore every possible avenue for averting or delaying war between the United States and Japan. That was the cornerstone of the effort which the President and I were putting forth with our utmost patience. "On November 14 the President replied to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, in line with the estimate and recommendations contained in the memorandum of November 5 of the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations. The Generalissimo was told that from our information it did not appear that a Japanese land campaign against Kunming was immediately imminent. It was indicated that American air units could not be sent and that the United States would not issue a warning but there were outlined ways, mentioned in the memorandum of the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations, in which the United States would continue to assist China. 30 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK "On November 7, I attended the regular Cabinet meeting. It was the President's custom either to start off the discussion himself or to ask some member of the Cabinet a question. At this meeting he turned to me and asked whether I had anything in mind. I thereupon pointed out for about 15 minutes the dangers in the international situation. I went over fully developments in the conversations with Japan and emphasized that in my opinion relations were extremely critical and that we should be on the lookout for a military attack anywhere by Japan at any time. When I finished, the President went around the Cabinet. All concurred in my estimate of the dangers. It became the consensus of the Cabinet that the critical situation might well be emphasized in speeches in order that the country would, if possible, be better prepared for such a development. "Accordingly, Secretary of the Navy Knox delivered an address on November 11, 1941, in which he stated that we were not only confronted with the necessity of extreme measures of self-defense in the Atlantic, but we were "likewise faced with grim possibilities on the other side of the world-on the far side of the Pacific"; that the Pacific no less than the Atlantic called for instant readiness for defense "On the same day Under Secretary of State Welles in an address stated that beyond the Atlantic a sinister and pitiless conqueror had reduced more than half of Europe to abject serfdom and that in the Far East the same forces of conquest were menacing the safety of all nations bordering on the Pacific. The waves of world conquest were "breaking high both in the East and in the West" he said and were threatening, more and more with each passing day, "to engulf our own shores." He warned that the United States was in far greater peril than in 1917; that "at any moment war may be forced upon us." "Early in November the Japanese Government decided to send Mr. Saburo Kurusu to Washington to assist the Japanese Ambassador in the conversations. "On November 7, the Japanese Ambassador handed me a document containing draft provisions relating to Japanese forces in China, Japanese forces in Indochina, and the principle of nondiscrimination. That proposal contained nothing fundamentally new or offering any real recessions from the position consistently maintained by the Japanese Government "In telegrams of November 3 and November 17 the American Ambassador in Japan cabled warnings of the possibility of sudden Japanese attacks which might make inevitable war with the United States "In the first half of November there were several indeterminate conversations with the Japanese designed to clarify specific points. On November 15 I gave the Japanese Ambassador an outline for a possible joint declaration by the United States and Japan on economic policy. I pointed out that this represented but one part of the general settlement we had in mind. This draft declaration of economic policy envisaged that Japan could join with the United States in leading the way toward a general application of economic practices which would give Japan much of what her leaders professed to desire. "On November 12 the Japanese Foreign Office, both through Ambassador Grew and through their Ambassador here, urged that the conversations be brought to a settlement at the earliest possible time. In view of the pressing insistence of the Japanese for a definitive reply to their outstanding proposals, I was impelled to comment to the Japanese Ambassador on November 15 that the American Government did not feel that it should be receiving such representations, suggestive of ultimatums. "On November 15 Mr. Kurusu reached Washington. On November 17 he and the Japanese Ambassador called on me and later on the same day on the President." ARRIVAL OF SABURO KURUSU Mr. Kurusu in his initial conversation with President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull indicated that Prime Minister Tojo desired a peaceful adjustment of differences. At the same time it was clear that Kurusu had nothing new to suggest concerning Japan's participation in the Tripartite Pact or the presence of her troops in China. The President reiterated the desire of the United States to avoid war between the two countries and to effect a peaceful settlement of divergent positions in the Pacific. The Secretary of State, setting forth his comments at the conference, stated: [79] [79] Foreign Relations, vol. II, pp. 740, 741. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 31 "Ambassador Kurusu made some specious attempt to explain away the Tripartite Pact. I replied in language similar to that which I used in discussing this matter with Ambassador Nomura on November fifteenth, which need not be repeated here. I made it clear that any kind of a peaceful settlement for the Pacific area, with Japan still clinging to her Tripartite Pact with Germany, would cause the President and myself to be denounced in immeasurable terms and the peace arrangement would not for a moment be taken seriously while all of the countries interested in the Pacific would redouble their efforts to arm against Japanese aggression. I emphasized the point about the Tripartite Pact and self-defense by saying that when Hitler starts on a march of invasion across the earth with ten million soldiers and thirty thousand airplanes with an official announcement that he is out for unlimited invasion objectives, this country from that time was in danger and that danger has grown each week until this minute. The result was that this country with no other motive except self-defense has recognized that danger, and has proceeded thus far to defend itself before it is too late; and that the Government of Japan says that it does not know whether this country is thus acting in self-defense or not. This country feels so profoundly the danger that it has committed itself to ten, twenty-five, or fifty billions of dollars in self-defense; but when Japan is asked about whether this is self-defense, she indicates that she has no opinion on the subject-I said that I cannot get this view over to the American people; that they believe Japan must know that we are acting in self-defense and, therefore, they do not understand her present attitude. I said that he was speaking of their political difficulties and that I was thus illustrating some of our difficulties in connection with this country's relations with Japan." In a further conversation with Ambassador Nomura and Mr. Kurusu on November 18, Secretary Hull's observations were related in the following terms: [80] "The Secretary of State conferred again with the Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu on November 18. The Secretary expressed great doubt whether any agreement into which we entered with Japan while Japan had an alliance with Hitler would carry the confidence of our people. He said that a difficult situation was created when, for example, telegrams of congratulation were sent to Hitler by Japanese leaders when he commits some atrocity, and he emphasized that we would have to have a clear-cut agreement making clear our peaceful purpose, for otherwise there would be a redoubled effort by all nations to strengthen their armaments. He pointed out that we were trying to make a contribution to the establishment of a peaceful world, based on law and order. He said that this is what we want to work out with Japan; that we had nothing to offer in the way of bargaining except our friendship. He said that frankly he did not know whether anything could be done in the matter of reaching a satisfactory agreement with Japan; that we can go so far but rather than go beyond a certain point it would be better for us to stand and take the consequences." During the discussion Ambassador Nomura and Mr. Kurusu suggested the possibility of a modus vivendi or a temporary arrangement to tide over the abnormal situation. [81] They offered as a possibility return to the status prevailing prior to July 26, 1941, when Japanese assets in the United States were frozen following Japan's entry into southern French Indochina. To this suggestion, Secretary Hull replied: [82] "I said that if we should make some modifications in our embargo on the strength of such a step by Japan as the Ambassador had mentioned, we would not know whether the troops to be withdrawn from French Indochina would be diverted to some equally objectionable movement elsewhere. I said that it would be difficult for our Government to go a long way in removing the embargo unless we believed that Japan was definitely started on a peaceful course and had renounced purposes of conquest. I said that I would consult with the representatives of other countries on this suggestion. On the same day I informed the British Minister of my talk with the Japanese about the suggestion of a temporary limited arrangement." [80] Id., at p. 363. [81] See committee record, p. 1135. [82] Id. 32 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK NEGOTIATIONS VERSUS DEADLINES In a conversation with the Secretary of State on November 19, the Japanese emissaries made it clear that Japan could not abrogate the Tripartite Alliance and regarded herself as bound to carry out its obligations. Through all of the discussions it was evident that Japan was pressing for an early decision. In a series of "deadlines" (now known to have been keyed to the contemplated departure of the task force that struck Pearl Harbor) contained in intercepted messages from Tokyo to Washington the urgency of the negotiations was explained: November 5, 1941, circular No. 736. [83] "Because of various circumstances, *it is absolutely necessary that all arrangements for the signing of this agreement be completed by the 25th of this month*. I realize that this is a difficult order, but under the circumstances it is an unavoidable one. Please understand this thoroughly and tackle the problem of saving the Japanese-U. S. Relations from falling into chaotic condition. Do so with great determination and with unstinted effort, I beg of you. "This information is to be kept strictly to yourself only." November 11, 1941, circular No. 762. [84] "Judging from the progress of the conversations, there seem to be indications that the United States is still not fully aware of the exceedingly criticalness of the situation here. *The fact remains that the date set forth in my message #736 is absolutely immovable under present conditions. It is a definite dead-line and therefore it is essential that a settlement be reached by about that time*. The session of Parliament opens on the 15th (work will start on [the following day?]) according to the schedule. The government must have a clear picture of things to come, in presenting its case at the session. You can see, therefore, that the situation is nearing a climax, and that time is indeed becoming short. I appreciate the fact that you are making strenuous efforts, but in view "of the above mentioned situation, will you redouble them. When talking to the Secretary of State and others, drive the points home to them. Do everything in your power to get a clear picture of the U. S. Attitude in the minimum amount of time. *At the same time do everything in your power to have them give their speedy approval to our final proposal.* "We would appreciate being advised of your opinions on whether or not they will accept our final proposal A." November 22, 1941, circular NO. 812. [85] "To both you Ambassadors. "It is awfully hard for us to consider changing the date we set in my No. 736. You should know this, however, I know you are working hard. Stick to our fixed policy and do your very best. Spare no efforts and try to bring about the solution we desire. There are reasons beyond your ability to guess why we wanted to settle Japanese-American relations by the 25th, but if within the next three or four days you can finish your conversations with the Americans, *if the signing can be completed by the 29th* (let me write it out for you-twenty-ninth); if the pertinent notes can be exchanged; if we can get an understanding with Great Britain and the Netherlands; and in short if everything can be finished, we have decided to wait until that date. This time we mean it, that the dead line absolutely cannot be changed. *After that things are automatically going to happen*. Please take this into your careful consideration and work harder than you ever have before. This, for the present, is for the information of you two Ambassadors alone." JAPANESE ULTIMATUM OF NOVEMBER 20 AND THE MODUS VIVENDI During a conversation with Secretary Hull on November 20 the Japanese Ambassador presented a proposal which was in fact an ultimatum, reading as follows: [86] [83] Committee exhibit No. 1, p. 100. [84] Id., at p. 116. [85] Id., at p. 165. [86] Foreign Relations. Vol. II, pp. 366, 367. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 33 "1. Both the Governments of Japan and the United States undertake not to make any armed advancement into any of the regions in the Southeastern Asia and the Southern Pacific area excepting the part of French Indo- China where the Japanese troops are stationed at present. "2. The Japanese Government undertakes to withdraw its troops now stationed in French Indo-China upon either the restoration of peace between Japan and China or the establishment of an equitable peace in the Pacific area. "In the meantime the Government of Japan declares that it is prepared to remove its troops now stationed in the southern part of French Indo- China to the northern part of the said territory upon the conclusion of the present arrangement which shall later be embodied in the final agreement. "3. The Government of Japan and the United States shall cooperate with a view to securing the acquisition of those goods and commodities which the two countries need in Netherlands East Indies. "4. The Governments of Japan and the United States mutually undertake to restore their commercial relations to those prevailing prior to the freezing of the assets. "The Government of the United States shall supply Japan a required quantity of oil. "5. The Government of the United States undertakes to refrain from such measures and actions as will be prejudicial to the endeavors for the restoration of general peace between Japan and China." In his testimony Secretary Hull observed with respect to the foregoing proposal: [87] "On November 20 the Japanese Ambassador and Mr. Kurusu presented to me a proposal which on its face was extreme. I knew, as did other high officers of the Government, from intercepted Japanese messages supplied to me by the War and Navy Departments, that this proposal was the final Japanese proposition-*an ultimatum*. "The plan thus offered called for the supplying by the United States to Japan of as much oil as Japan might require, for suspension of freezing measures, for discontinuance by the United States of aid to China, and for withdrawal of moral and material support from the recognized Chinese Government. It contained a provision that Japan would shift her armed forces from southern Indochina to northern Indochina, but placed no limit on the number of armed forces which Japan might send to Indochina and made no provision for withdrawal of those forces until after either the restoration of peace between Japan and China or the establishment of an "equitable" peace in the Pacific area. While there were stipulations against further extension of Japan's armed force into southeastern Asia and the southern Pacific (except Indochina), there were no provisions which would have prevented continued or fresh Japanese aggressive activities in any of the regions of Asia lying to the north of Indochina-for example, China and the Soviet Union. The proposal contained no provision pledging Japan to abandon aggression and to revert to peaceful courses." There can now be no question that Japan intended her proposal of November 20 as an ultimatum. It was their final proposal [88] and a deadline of November 25, subsequently changed to November 29, had been set for its acceptance. It was a proposal which the Government of Japan knew we could not accept. It was the final gesture of the Tojo Cabinet before launching the vast campaign of aggression which the military overlords of Japan had long before decided upon. The critical situation culminating in consideration of a modus vivendi was revealed by Secretary Hull: [89] "On November 21 we received word from the Dutch that they had information that a Japanese force had arrived near Palao, the nearest point in the Japanese Mandated Islands to the heart of the Netherlands Indies. Our Consuls at Hanoi and Saigon had been reporting extensive new landings of Japanese troops and equipment in Indochina. We had information through intercepted Japanese messages that the Japanese Government had decided that the negotiations must [87] Committee record pp. 1136-1138. [88] In an intercepted dispatch from Tokyo to Washington on November 19 the Japanese Government stated in referring to the ultimatum presented to the United States on the following day: "If the United States consent to this cannot be secured the negotiations will have to he broken off; therefore, with the above well in mind put forth your very best efforts." Committee exhibit No. 1 p. 155. [89] Committee record pp. 1138-1141. 34 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK be terminated by November 25, later extended to November 29. We knew from other intercepted Japanese messages that the Japanese did not intend to make any concessions, and from this fact taken together with Kurusu's statement to me of November 21 making clear that his Government had nothing further to offer, it was plain, as I have mentioned, that the Japanese proposal of November 20 was in fact their "absolutely final proposal." "*The whole issue presented was whether Japan would yield in her avowed movement of conquest or whether we would yield the fundamental principles for which we stood in the Pacific and all over the world*. By midsummer of 1941 we were pretty well satisfied that the Japanese were determined to continue with their course of expansion by force. We had made it clear to them that we were standing fast by our principles. It was evident, however, that they were playing for the chance that we might be overawed into yielding by their threats of force. They were armed to the teeth and we knew they would attack whenever and wherever they pleased. If by chance we should have yielded our fundamental principles, Japan would probably not have attacked for the time being-at least not until she had consolidated the gains she would have made without fighting. "*There was never any question of this country forcing Japan to fight. The question was whether this country was ready to sacrifice its principles.* "To have accepted the Japanese proposal of November 20 was clearly unthinkable. It would have made the United States an ally of Japan in Japan's program of conquest and aggression and of collaboration with Hitler. It would have meant yielding to the Japanese demand that the United States abandon its principles and policies. It would have meant abject surrender of our position under intimidation. "*The situation was critical and virtually hopeless. On the one hand our Government desired to exhaust all possibilities of finding a means to a peaceful solution and to avert or delay an armed clash, especially as the heads of this country's armed forces continued to emphasize the need of time to prepare for resistance. On the other hand, Japan was calling for a showdown*. "There the situation stood-the Japanese unyielding and intimidating in their demands and we standing firmly for our principles. "The chances of meeting the crisis by diplomacy had practically vanished. We had reached the point of clutching at straws. "Three possible choices presented themselves. "Our Government might have made no reply. The Japanese war lords could then have told their people that the American Government not only would make no reply but would also not offer any alternative. "Our Government might have rejected flatly the Japanese proposal. In that event the Japanese war lords would be afforded a pretext, although wholly false, for military attack. "Our Government might endeavor to present a reasonable counter-proposal. "The last course was the one chosen." Full consideration was given by officials of our Government to a counterproposal to the Japanese note of November 20, including the thought of a possible modus vivendi. It was recognized that such an arrangement would demonstrate the desire of the United States for peace and at the same time afford a possible opportunity for the Army and Navy to continue its preparations. From November 22 to 26 the President, State Department, and the highest military authorities discussed a modus vivendi, a first draft being completed on November 22. Revised drafts were prepared on November 24 and 25. The final draft of November 25, which is being set forth in its entirety in view of the testimony that has been adduced concerning it, was as follows: [90] "The representatives of the Government of the United States and of the Government of Japan have been carrying on during the past several months informal and exploratory conversations for the purpose of arriving at a settlement if possible of questions relating to the entire Pacific area based upon the principles of peace, law and order, and fair dealing among nations. These principles include the principle of inviolability of territorial integrity and sovereignty of each and all nations; the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries; the principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity and [90] See Committee Exhibit No. 18. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 35 treatment; and the principle of reliance upon international cooperation and conciliation for the prevention and pacific settlement of controversies and for improvement of international conditions by peaceful methods and processes. "It is believed that in our discussions some progress has been made in reference to the general principles which constitute the basis of a peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific area. Recently, the Japanese Ambassador has stated that the Japanese Government is desirous of continuing the conversations directed toward a comprehensive and peaceful settlement in the Pacific area; that it would be helpful toward creating an atmosphere favorable to the successful outcome of the conversations if a temporary modus vivendi could be agreed upon to be in effect while the conversations looking to a peaceful settlement in the Pacific were continuing; and that it would be desirable that such modus vivendi include as one of its provisions some initial and temporary steps of a reciprocal character in the resumption of trade and normal intercourse between Japan and the United States. "On November 20, the Japanese Ambassador communicated to the Secretary of State proposals in regard to temporary measures to be taken respectively by the Government of Japan and by the Government of the United States, which measures are understood to have been designed to accomplish the purposes above indicated. These proposals contain features which, in the opinion of this Government, conflict with the fundamental principles which form a part of the general settlement under consideration and to which each Government has declared that it is committed. "The Government of the United States is earnestly desirous to contribute to the promotion and maintenance of peace in the Pacific area and to afford every opportunity for the continuance of discussions with the Japanese Government directed toward working out a broad-gauge program of peace throughout the Pacific area. With these ends in view, the Government of the United States offers for the consideration of the Japanese Government an alternative suggestion for a temporary modus vivendi, as follows: "MODUS VIVENDI "1. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan, both being solicitous for the peace of the Pacific, affirm that their national policies are directed toward lasting and extensive peace throughout the Pacific area and that they have no territorial designs therein. "2. They undertake reciprocally not to make from regions in which they have military establishments any advance by force or threat of force into any areas in Southeastern or Northeastern Asia or in the southern or the northern Pacific area. "3. The Japanese Government undertakes forthwith to withdraw its forces now stationed in southern French Indochina and not to replace those forces; to reduce the total of its force in French Indochina to the number there on July 26, 1941; and not to send additional naval, land, or air forces to Indochina for replacements or otherwise. "The provisions of the foregoing paragraph are without prejudice to the position of the Government of the United States with regard to the presence of foreign troops in that area. "4. The Government of the United States undertakes forthwith to modify the application of its existing freezing and export restrictions to the extent necessary to permit the following resumption of trade between the United States and Japan in articles for the use and needs of their peoples: "(a) Imports from Japan to be freely permitted and the proceeds of the sale thereof to be paid into a clearing account to be used for the purchase of the exports from the United States listed below, and at Japan's option for the payment of interest and principal of Japanese obligations within the United States, provided that at least two-thirds in value of such imports per month consist of raw silk. It is understood that all American-owned goods now in Japan, the movement of which in transit to the United States has been interrupted following the adoption of freezing measures shall be forwarded forthwith to the United States. "(b) Exports from the United States to Japan to be permitted as follows: "(i) Bunkers and supplies for vessels engaged in the trade here provided for and for such other vessels engaged in other trades as the two Governments may agree. "(ii) Food and food products from the United States subject to such limitations as the appropriate authorities may prescribe in respect of commodities in short supply in the United States. "(iii) Raw cotton from the United States to the extent of $600,000 in value per month. 36 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK "(iv) Medical and pharmaceutical supplies subject to such limitations the appropriate authorities may prescribe in respect of commodities in short supply in the United States. "(v) Petroleum. The United States will permit the export to Japan of petroleum, within the categories permitted general export, upon a monthly basis for civilian needs. The proportionate amount of petroleum to be exported from the United States for such needs will be determined after consultation with the British and the Dutch Governments. It is understood that by civilian needs in Japan is meant such purposes as the operation of the fishing industry, the transport system, lighting, heating, industrial and agricultural uses, and other civilian uses. "(vi) The above-stated amounts of exports may be increased and additional commodities added by agreement between the two Governments as it may appear to them that the operation of this agreement is furthering the peaceful and equitable solution of outstanding problems in the Pacific area. "The Government of Japan undertakes forthwith to modify the application of its existing freezing and export restrictions to the extent necessary to permit the resumption of trade between Japan and the United States as provided for in paragraph 4 above. "6. The Government of the United States undertakes forthwith to approach the Australian, British, and Dutch Governments with a view to those Governments taking measures similar to those provided for in paragraph 4 above. "7. With reference to the current hostilities between Japan and China, the fundamental interest of the Government of the United States in reference to any discussions which may be entered into between the Japanese and the Chinese Governments is simply that these discussions and any settlement reached as a result thereof be based upon and exemplify the fundamental principles of peace law, order, and justice, which constitute the central spirit of the current conversations between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States and which are applicable uniformly throughout the Pacific area. "8. This modus vivendi shall remain in force for a period of 3 months with the understanding that the two parties shall confer at the instance of either to ascertain whether the prospects of reaching a peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific area justify an extension of the modus vivendi for a further period." The tentative modus vivendi was submitted for consideration to the Governments of Great Britain, Australia, the Netherlands, and China. The ultimate decision to abandon it was made for reasons best set forth in Secretary Hull's testimony: [91] "On the evening of November 25 and on November 26 I went over again the considerations relating to our proposed plan, especially the modus vivendi aspect. "As I have indicated, all the successive drafts, of November 22, of November 24 and of November 25, contained two things: (1) The possible modus vivendi; and (2) a statement of principles, with a suggested example of how those principles could be applied-that which has since been commonly described as the 10-point proposal. "I and other high officers of our Government knew that the Japanese military were poised for attack. We knew that the Japanese were demanding-and had set a time limit, first of November 25 and extended later to November 29, for acceptance by our Government of their extreme, last-word proposal of November 20. "It was therefore my judgment, as it was that of the President and other high officers, that the chance of the Japanese accepting our proposal was remote. "So far as the modus vivendi aspect would have appeared to the Japanese, it contained only a little chicken feed in the shape of some cotton, oil, and a few other commodities in very limited quantities as compared with the unlimited quantities the Japanese were demanding. "It was manifest that there would be widespread opposition from American opinion to the modus vivendi aspect of the proposal especially to the supplying to Japan of even limited quantities of oil. The Chinese Government violently opposed the idea. The other interested governments were sympathetic to the Chinese view and fundamentally were unfavorable or lukewarm. Their cooperation was a part of the plan. It developed that the conclusion with Japan of such an arrangement would have been a major blow to Chinese morale. In view of these considerations it became clear that the slight prospects of Japan's agreeing to the modus vivendi did not warrant assuming the risks involved in proceeding with it, especially the serious [91] Committee Record, pp. 1146-1147. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 37 risk of collapse of Chinese morale and resistance, and even of disintegration of China. It therefore became perfectly evident that the modus vivendi aspect would not be feasible. "The Japanese were spreading propaganda to the effect that they were being encircled. On the one hand we were faced by this charge and on the other by one that we were preparing to pursue a policy of appeasing Japan. In view of the resulting confusion, it seemed important to restate the fundamentals. We could offer Japan once more what we offered all countries, a suggested program of collaboration along peaceful and mutually beneficial and progressive lines. It had always been open to Japan to accept that kind of a program and to move in that direction. It still was possible for Japan to do so. That was a matter for Japan's decision. Our hope that Japan would so decide had been virtually extinguished. Yet it was felt desirable to put forth this further basic effort, in the form of one sample of a broad but simple settlement to be worked out in our future conversations, on the principle that no effort should be spared to test and exhaust every method of peaceful settlement. "In the light of the foregoing considerations, on November 26 I recommended to the President-and he approved-my calling in the Japanese representatives and handing them the broad basic proposals while withholding the modus vivendi plan. This was done in the late afternoon of that day." The very serious reaction of the Chinese to the suggested modus vivendi is clearly set forth in a dispatch dated November 25, 1941, from an American adviser to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek in Chungking: [92] "After discussion with the Generalissimo the Chinese Ambassador's conference with the Secretary of State, I feel you should urgently advise the President of the Generalissimo's very strong reaction. I have never seen him really agitated before. Loosening of economic pressure or unfreezing would dangerously increase Japan's military advantage in China. A relaxation of American pressure while Japan has its forces in China would dismay the Chinese. Any "modus vivendi" now arrived at with Japan would be disastrous to Chinese belief in America and analogous to the closing of the Burma Road, which permanently destroyed British prestige. Japan and Chinese defeatists would instantly exploit the resulting disillusionment and urge oriental solidarity against occidental treachery. It is doubtful whether either past assistance or increasing aid could compensate for the feeling of being deserted at this hour. The Generalissimo has deep confidence in the President's fidelity to his consistent policy but I must warn you that even the Generalissimo questions his ability to hold the situation together if the Chinese national trust in America is undermined by reports of Japan's escaping military defeat by diplomatic victory." There is no possibility whatever that the modus vivendi would have been accepted by the Japanese. In an intercepted dispatch of November 19 [93] the Japanese Ambassadors suggested to Tokyo that there were three courses open to the Empire: (1) maintain the status quo, (2) break the "present deadlock" by an advance under force of arms, or (3) devise some means for bringing about a mutual nonaggression arrangement. In favoring the third alternative it was stated: "* * * as I view it, the present, after exhausting our strength by 4 years of the China incident following right upon the Manchuria incident, is hardly an opportune time for venturing upon another long-drawn-out warfare on a large scale. I think that it would be better to fix up a temporary "truce" now in the spirit of "give and take" and make this the prelude to greater achievement to come later * * *." Replying to the foregoing suggestion, Tokyo advised on November 20 [94] that "under the circumstances here, we regret that *the plan suggested by you, as we have stated in our message would not suffice for [92] Communication from Owen Lattimore in Chungking to Lauchlin Currie, Presidential Assistant handling Chinese matters, in Washington. See Committee exhibit No. 18. [93] Committee exhibit No. 1, p. 158. [94] Id., at p. 160. 38 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK saving the present situation. We see no prospects for breaking the deadlock except for you to push negotiations immediately along the lines of the latter part of our No. 798. [95] Please understand this. The Premier also is absolutely in accord with this opinion." It is significant to note that when Mr. Kurusu suggested the possibility of a modus vivendi to Secretary Hull on November 18, the Japanese ambassadors very obviously had not consulted their Tokyo superiors. When they did on November 19, Tokyo replied the following day rejecting the idea completely, as indicated above. Writing in his diary for November 25, 1941, Secretary Stimson, in referring to the tentative draft of a modus vivendi, clearly indicated an appreciation of the fact that it would not be acceptable to the Japanese: [96] "At 9:30 Knox and I met in Hull's office for our meeting of three. Hull showed us the proposal for a 3 months' truce, which he was going to lay before the Japanese today or tomorrow. It adequately safeguarded all our interests, I thought as I read it, but l don't think there is any chance of the Japanese accepting it, because it was so drastic. In return for the propositions which they were to do, namely, to at once evacuate and at once to stop all preparations or threats of action, and to take no aggressive action against any of her neighbors, etc., we were to give them open trade in sufficient quantities only for their civilian population. This restriction was particularly applicable to oil." Had our Government submitted the tentative modus vivendi, it is clear that Japan would have rejected it, and Chinese morale and resistance would very probably have been seriously impaired if not destroyed. UNITED STATES MEMORANDUM OF NOVEMBER 26 The modus vivendi was designed to accompany a statement of principles with a suggested example of how the principles could be applied. With the decision not to propose a modus vivendi, the Secretary of State on November 26 presented to the Japanese Ambassador its accompanying material which was as follows: [97] "The representatives of the Government of the United States and of the Government of Japan have been carrying on during the past several months informal and exploratory conversations for the purpose of arriving at a settlement if possible of questions relating to the entire Pacific area based upon the principles of peace, law and order and fair dealing among nations. These principles include the principle of inviolability of territorial integrity and sovereignty of each and all nations; the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of other countries; the principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity and treatment; and the principle of reliance upon international cooperation and conciliation for the prevention and pacific settlement of controversies and for improvement of international conditions by peaceful methods and processes. "It is believed that in our discussions some progress has been made in reference to the general principles which constitute the basis of a peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific area. Recently the Japanese Ambassador has stated that the Japanese Government is desirous of continuing the conversations directed toward a comprehensive and peaceful settlement in the Pacific area; that it would be helpful toward creating an atmosphere favorable to the successful outcome of the conversations if a temporary modus vivendi could be agreed upon to be in effect while the conversations looking to a peaceful settlement in the Pacific were continuing. On November 20 the Japanese Ambassador communicated to the Secretary of State proposals in regard to temporary measures to be taken respec- [95] See committee exhibit No. 1, p. 155. [96] See committee record, pp. 14417, 14418. [97] Foreign Relations, vol. II, pp. 766-770. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 39 tively by the Government of Japan and by the Government of the United States, which measures are understood to have been designed to accomplish the purposes above indicated. "The Government of the United States most earnestly desires to contribute to the promotion and maintenance of peace and stability in the Pacific area, and to afford every opportunity for the continuance of discussions with the Japanese Government directed toward working out a broad-gauge program of peace throughout the Pacific area. The proposals which were presented by the Japanese Ambassador on November 20 contain some features which, in the opinion of this Government conflict with the fundamental principles which form a part of the general settlement under consideration and to which each Government has declared that it is committed. The Government of the United States believes that the adoption of such proposals would not be likely to contribute to the ultimate objectives of ensuring peace under law, order and justice in the Pacific area, and it suggests that further effort be made to resolve our divergences of views in regard to the practical application of the fundamental principles already mentioned. "With this object in view the Government of the United States offers for the consideration of the Japanese Government a plan of a broad but simple settlement covering the entire Pacific area as one practical exemplification of *a program which this Government envisages as something to be worked out during our further conversations.* "The plan therein suggested represents an effort to bridge the gap between our draft of June 21, 1941, and the Japanese draft of September 25 by making a new approach to the essential problems underlying a comprehensive Pacific settlement. This plan contains provisions dealing with the practical application of the fundamental principles which we have agreed in our conversations constitute the only sound basis for worthwhile international relations. We hope that in this way progress toward reaching a meeting of minds between our two Governments may be expedited. "OUTLINE OF PROPOSED BASIS FOR AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN "SECTION I-DRAFT MUTUAL DECLARATION OF POLICY "The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan both being solicitous for the peace of the Pacific affirm that their national policies are directed toward lasting and extensive peace throughout the Pacific area, that they have no territorial designs in that area, that they have no intention of threatening other countries or of using military force aggressively against any neighboring nation, and that, accordingly, in their national policies they will actively support and give practical application to the following fundamental principles upon which their relations with each other and with all other governments are based: " "(1) The principle of inviolability of territorial integrity and sovereignty of each and all nations. " "(2) The principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries. " "(3) The principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity and treatment. " "(4) The principle of reliance upon international cooperation and conciliation for the prevention and pacific settlement of controversies and for improvement of international conditions by peaceful methods and processes." "The Government of Japan and the Government of the United States have agreed that toward eliminating chronic political instability, preventing recurrent economic collapse, and providing a basis for peace, they will actively support and practically apply the following principles in their economic relations with each other and with other nations and peoples: " "(1) The principle of nondiscrimination in international commercial relations. " " (2) The principle of international economic cooperation and abolition of extreme nationalism as expressed in excessive trade restrictions. " "(3) The principle of nondiscriminatory access by all nations to raw- material supplies " "(4) The principle of full protection of the interests of consuming countries and populations as regards the operation of international commodity agreements. " "(5) The principle of establishment of such institutions and arrangements of international finance as may lend aid to the essential enterprises and the continuous development of all countries and may permit payments through processes of trade consonant with the welfare of all countries." 40 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK "SECTION II-STEPS TO BE TAKEN BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND BY THE GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN "The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan propose to take steps as follows: "1. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will endeavor to conclude a multilateral nonaggression pact among the British Empire, China, Japan, the Netherlands, the Soviet Union, Thailand, and the United States. "2. Both Governments will endeavor to conclude among the American, British, Chinese, Japanese, the Netherlands, and Thai Governments an agreement whereunder each of the Governments would pledge itself to respect the territorial integrity of French Indochina and, in the event that there should develop a threat to the territorial integrity of Indochina, to enter into immediate consultation with a view to taking such measures as may be deemed necessary and advisable to meet the threat in question. Such agreement would provide also that each of the Governments party to the agreement would not seek or accept preferential treatment in its trade or economic relations with Indochina and would use its influence to obtain for each of the signatories equality of treatment in trade and commerce with French Indochina. "3. The Government of Japan will withdraw all military, naval, air, and police forces from China and from Indochina. "4. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will not support-militarily, politically, economically-any government or regime in China other than the National Government of the Republic of China with capital temporarily at Chungking. "5. Both Governments will give up all extraterritorial rights in China, including rights and interests in and with regard to international settlements and concessions, and rights under the Boxer Protocol of 1901. "Both Governments will endeavor to obtain the agreement of the British and other governments to give up extraterritorial rights in China, including rights in international settlements and in concessions and under the Boxer Protocol of 1901. "6. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will enter into negotiations for the conclusion between the United States and Japan of a trade agreement, based upon reciprocal most-favored-nation treatment and reduction of trade barriers by both countries, including an undertaking by the United States to bind raw silk on the free list. "7. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will respectively, remove the freezing restrictions on Japanese funds in the unite States and on American funds in Japan. "8. Both Governments will agree upon a plan for the stabilization of the dollar-yen rate, with the allocation of funds adequate for this purpose, half to be supplied by Japan and half by the United States. "9. Both Governments will agree that no agreement which either has concluded with any third power or powers shall he interpreted by it in such a way as to conflict with the fundamental purpose of this agreement, the establishment and preservation of peace throughout the Pacific area. "10. Both Governments will use their influence to cause other governments to adhere to and to give practical application to the basic political and economic principles set forth in this agreement." The foregoing reply was clearly not an ultimatum from the standpoint of the Government of the United States. On the contrary it was an admirable statement of every honorable principle for which the United States has stood for many years in the Orient. Ambassador Grew characterized the November 26 note of Secretary Hull as follows: [98] "NOVEMBER 29, 1941. "Our Government has handed to the Japanese a 10-point draft proposal for adjusting the whole situation in the Far East. It is a broad-gauge objective, and statesmanlike document, offering to Japan practically everything that she has ostensibly been fighting for if she will simply stop her aggressive policy. By adopting such a program she would be offered free access to needed raw materials, free trade and commerce, financial cooperation and support, withdrawal of the freezing orders, and an opportunity to negotiate a new treaty of commerce with us. If she wants a political and economic stranglehold on the countries of East Asia (euphemistically called the New Order in East Asia and the East Asia [98] Grew, Ten Years in Japan (1944), pp. 482, 483. Committee exhibit No. 30. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 41 Co-Prosperity Sphere)-which most of her extremists do want-and if she pursues her southward advance by force, she will soon be at war with all of the A B C D powers and will unquestionably be defeated and reduced to the status of a third-rate power. But if she plays her cards wisely, she can obtain without further fighting all of the desiderata for which she allegedly started fighting-strategic, economic, financial, and social security." Referring to the November 26 note Secretary Stimson said: [99] "I personally was relieved that we had not backed down on any of the fundamental principles on which we had stood for so long and which *I felt we could not give up without the sacrifice of our national honor and prestige in the world*. I submit, however, that no impartial reading of this document can characterize it as being couched in the terms of an ultimatum, although the Japanese were of course only too quick to seize upon it and give that designation for their own purposes." As suggested by Mr. Stimson, Japan did choose to regard it as an ultimatum consistent with her purposes. Her note of November 20, it is apparent, was the final diplomatic move and failing to secure the concessions demanded the November 26 reply of the United States was seized upon by the war lords of Japan in subsequent propaganda as their excuse for the attack on Pearl Harbor which they had planned for many weeks. It is to be noted in this connection that the Japanese task force was enroute for its attack on Pearl Harbor before the American note of November 26 was delivered to the Government of Japan. At the time of receiving the note from Secretary Hull, Kurusu stated the Japanese Government would be likely "to throw up its hands" when it received the proposal; that he felt the response which had thus been given to the Japanese proposal of November 20 could be interpreted as tantamount to meaning the end of the conversations. [100] A dispatch from Ambassador Grew to the State Department on December 5 reflected the strong reaction in Japan. [101] Secretary Hull said: 102 "It is not surprising that Japanese propaganda, especially after Japan had begun to suffer serious defeats, has tried to distort and give false meaning to our memorandum of November 26 by referring to it as an "ultimatum." This was in line with a well-known Japanese characteristic of utilizing completely false and flimsy pretexts to delude their people and gain their support for militaristic depredations and aggrandizement." In press conferences on November 26 and 27, Secretary Hull outlined the status of American-Japanese relations. [103] The decision to stand by basic American principles was the only honorable position under the circumstances. [104] To have acceded to the Japanese ultimatum of November 20 would have been indefensible. Firmness was the only language Japan understood. As Ambassador Grew had stated in his celebrated "green light" dispatch of September 12, 1940, to the State Department: [105] "Force or the display of force can alone prevent these powers (including Japan) from attaining their objectives * * *. "If then we can by firmness preserve the status quo in the Pacific until and if Britain emerges successfully from the European struggle, Japan will be faced with a situation which will make it impossible for the present opportunist philosophy to maintain the upper hand * * *. "In the present situation and outlook I believe that the time has come when continued patience and restraint on the part of the United States may and probably will lead to developments which will render Japanese- American relations progressively precarious." [99] See committee reeord, p. 14393 [100] Foreign Relations, vol. II, p. 375. [101] Committee Record, p. 1821-24. [102] Committee Record, p, 1153. [103] See statement of Secretary Hull, Committee Record, pp. 1153 et seq. [104] Id., p. 1155. [105] Committee exhibit No. 26. 42 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK That firmness, the only language the Japanese understood, failed to dissuade them cannot redound to our regret but only to the ignominy of the Empire of Japan. FRAUDULENT NATURE OF JAPANESE DIPLOMACY-NOVEMBER 28 TO DECEMBER 7 An intercepted dispatch NO. 844 from Tokyo to its Washington Embassy on November 28 left little doubt of the fraudulent character of the negotiations thereafter and is a classic example of Japanese deceit and duplicity: [106] "Well, you two Ambassadors have exerted superhuman efforts but, in spite of this, the United States has gone ahead and presented this humiliating proposal. This was quite unexpected and extremely regrettable. The Imperial Government can by no means use it as a basis for negotiations. Therefore, with a report of the views of the Imperial Government on this American proposal which I will send you in two or three days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured. This is inevitable. However, I do not wish you to give the impression that the negotiations are broken off. Merely say to them that you are awaiting instructions and that, although the opinions of your Government are not yet clear to you, to your own way of thinking the Imperial Government has always made just claims and has borne great sacrifices for the sake of peace in the Pacific. Say that we have always demonstrated a long-suffering and conciliatory attitude, but that, on the other hand, the United States has been unbending, making it impossible for Japan to establish negotiations. Since things have come to this pass, I contacted the man you told me to in your #1180 [107] and he said that under the present circumstances what you suggest is entirely unsuitable. From now on do the best you can." The following dispatch, while the attack force was en route to Pearl Harbor, was sent from Tokyo to Washington on December 1: [108] "The date (November 29) set in my message #812 [109] has come and gone, and the situation continues to be increasingly critical. However, to prevent the United States from becoming unduly suspicious we have been advising the press and others that though there are some wide differences between Japan and the United States, the negotiations are continuing. (The above is for only your information) * * *" After November 26 Ambassador Nomura and Mr. Kurusu conferred with the President and Secretary Hull on several occasions but with nothing new being developed looking to a peaceful settlement. On the morning of December 6 a dispatch from Tokyo to Washington was intercepted advising that the Japanese reply to the American note of November 26 was being transmitted: "I will send it in fourteen parts and I imagine you will receive it tomorrow. However, I am not sure. The situation is extremely delicate, and when you receive it I want you to please keep it secret for the time being." This dispatch indicated that subsequent instructions would be forthcoming concerning the time for presenting the reply to the Government of the United States. By approximately 7 p. m. on the evening of December 6 the first 13 parts of the 14-part Japanese memorandum had been intercepted, decoded, and made ready for distribution to authorized recipients by our military. These 13 parts were a long recapitulation of the negotiations with the purposes of Japan colored with pious hue and those of the United States perverted into a base and ulterior scheme "for the extension of the war." The thirteenth part concluded on the note that- "therefore, viewed in its entirety, the Japanese Government regrets that it cannot accept the proposal (American proposal of November 26) as a basis of negotiations." [106] Committee exhibit No. 1, p. 195. [107] See committee exhibit No. 1, p. 181. [108] Committee exhibit No. 1, p. 208. [109] See committee exhibit No. 1, p. 165, setting the date November 29 as the deadline for effecting an understanding. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 43 The fourteenth part was intercepted early on the morning of December 7 and was available for distribution at approximately 8 a. m. It stated that- [110] "obviously it is the intention of the American Government to conspire with Great Britain and other countries to obstruct Japan's efforts toward the establishment of peace through the creation of a New Order in East Asia, and especially to preserve Anglo-American rights and interests by keeping Japan and China at war." With the observation that this intention had been revealed during the course of the negotiations and the "earnest hope of the Japanese Government * * * to preserve and promote the peace of the Pacific through cooperation with the American Government has finally been lost", the Japanese memorandum closed with the statement: "The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify hereby the American Government that in view of the attitude of the American Government it cannot but consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiations." Nowhere in the memorandum was there any indication or intimation of an intention to attack the United States nor, indeed, that formal diplomatic relations were to be broken-merely that it was impossible to reach an agreement through the then current negotiations. Coincident with the receipt of the full reply, instructions were issued to Japan's representatives for its delivery to the American Government at an hour keyed to the time set for the assault on Pearl Harbor. On the previous evening, President Roosevelt had dispatched an earnest appeal to the Emperor of Japan for the preservation of peace in the Pacific. [111] The infamous character of the Japanese reply was voiced by Secretary Hull to the Japanese ambassadors who were making delivery 1 hour after [112] the first bombs had fallen on Pearl Harbor: [113] "I must say that in all my conversations with you (the Japanese ambassador) during the last nine months I have never uttered one word of untruth. This is borne out absolutely by the record. In all my fifty years of public service I have never seen a document that was more crowded with infamous falsehoods and distortions-infamous falsehoods and distortions on a scale so huge that I never imagined until today that any Government on this planet was capable of uttering them." DIPLOMATIC AND MILITARY LIAISON IN WASHINGTON With a view to effecting the fullest liaison between the diplomatic and military arms of the Government, there was created in the light of the approaching emergency a body familiarly referred to as the War Council. This Council consisted of the President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, the Secretary of Navy, the Army Chief of Staff, the Chief of Naval Operations, and, on occasion, the Chief of the Army Air Forces. [114] It met at the call of the President, and during the fall of 1941 it was in frequent session. Secretary Hull said: [110] See committee exhibit No. 1, pp. 239-245. [111] See Foreign Relations, vol. II, pp. 784-786. Several hours after the Pearl Harbor attack had begun Ambassador Grew was informed by the Japanese Foreign Minister that the Japanese 14-part memorandum replying to the American note of November 26 was to be regarded as the Emperor's reply to the President's appeal. See Peace and War, p. 148. [112] The Japanese Ambassadors were instructed to deliver the Japanese note to the American Secretary of State at 1 p. m. on Sunday December 7. They made the appointment pursuant to the instruction; however, they later postponed for 1 hour their previous appointment, stating the delay was due to the need of more time to decode the message they were to deliver. [113] Foreign Relations, vol. II, p. 787. [114] For a rather full discussion of liaison between the various departments, see testimony of Secretary Stimson, Army Pearl Harbor Board Record, p. 4041 et seq. 44 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK "The War Council, which consisted of the President, the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, the Chief of Staff, and the Chief of Naval Operations, was a sort of clearing house for all the information and views which we were currently discussing with our respective contacts and in our respective circles. The high lights in the developments at a particular juncture were invariably reviewed at those meetings." [116] In addition to the War Council, another liaison body, consisting of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, and the Secretary of Navy, was created during 1940, with a view to holding weekly meetings, which were scheduled for 9:30 each Tuesday morning. Secretary Stimson said: [116] "They were perfectly informal and unofficial meetings, but they were very regular, and we met once a week regularly; and * * * just before Pearl Harbor, we had extra meetings. In fact, we were in such a meeting on the Sunday morning that the Japanese attacked. The meetings took place in the State Department, Mr. Hull's office, and during that time the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Navy, and myself were in constant contact." And again: [117] "During this entire period I kept in constant and close touch with Mr. Hull and Mr. Knox, as well as having frequent meetings with the President." During 1941 Rear Adm. R. E. Schuirmann was the Director of the Central Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, and had as one of his duties liaison with the State Department. He made the following observations concerning State Department liaison: [118] "A "Liaison Committee" consisting of the Chief of Naval Operations, the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, and the Under Secretary of State was set up while Admiral Leahy was Chief of Naval Operations. This Committee was mainly occupied with questions other than the Far East, but occasionally questions relating to the Far East were discussed. About the middle of May 1941, the practice of having a stenographer present to record the discussion was commenced; prior to that time I would take notes of the meetings in order to be able to follow up such matters as required action, and I believe one of Mr. Welles' assistants made a precis of the meetings. At times there were "off the record" discussions at these liaison committee meetings. I made notes of some of these "off the record" discussions. Aside from the meetings of the Liaison Committee, Secretary Hull held meetings with various officials of the Navy Department, and I maintained liaison with Dr. Hornbeck and Mr. Hamilton of the Far Eastern Division of the State Department by visit and by telephone. I know of no official record of these meetings and discussions. Fragmentary notes of some are in the files of the Central Division as are such records of the Liaison Committee as are in the possession of the Navy Department. It is possible that the State Department representatives may have made notes of some of these meetings and discussions with Secretary Hull and other State Department officials." Admiral R. W. Turner, Director of War Plans Division in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, summarized the liaison with the State- Department as follows: [119] "The Chief of Naval Operations had a close personal association with the Secretary of State and Under Secretary of State. *He consulted them frequently and they consulted him, I might say invariably, before making any particular diplomatic move*. In the Office of Naval Operations, the Chief of the Central Division was appointed as liaison officer with the State Department. He visited the State Department and discussed problems with them practically every day. There was a weekly meeting in the State Department conducted by the Under Secretary of State, Mr. Welles, usually attended by the Chief of Naval Operations, the Chief of Staff of the Army, Chief of the War Plans of the Army, Chief of War [115] Committee record, p. 1144. [116] Roberts record, pp. 4051-4053, 4078-4079. [117] Committee record, p. 14386. [118] Hart record. p. 405. [119] Id., at p. 257. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 45 Plans of the Navy, the Chief of the Central Division of the Office of Naval Operations, an officer of the General Staff not in the War Plans Division, and two or three representatives of the State Department. The matters discussed at these meetings usually related to events in Western Hemisphere countries. The Army was building a lot of air fields in the Caribbean and South America. The Navy and the Army, both, had sent missions to those countries and at the meetings with the Under Secretary it was chiefly American affairs that were discussed. Occasionally, possibly once a month, the Secretary of State would hold a conference with representatives of the War and Navy Departments, and at these meetings events outside of the Americas were discussed. From time to time the Secretary of State would call individuals from the War and Wavy Departments to discuss particular aspects of world events. There were other unscheduled conferences between the State and War and Navy Departments. I participated in a great many such conferences. From time to time, informal memoranda were exchanged between individuals of the State and Navy Departments or exchanged between the Secretary of State and the Chief of Naval Operations. *I would say that relations between the State and War and State and Navy Departments were very close and were characterized by good feeling.*" At a regular Cabinet meeting on November 7 the President inquired of Secretary Hull as to whether he had anything in mind. In replying Secretary Hull testified: [120] "I thereupon pointed out for about 15 minutes the dangers in the international situation. I went over fully developments in the conversations with Japan and emphasized that in my opinion relations were extremely critical and that we should be on the lookout for a military attack anywhere by Japan at any time. When I finished the President went around the Cabinet. All concurred in my estimate of the dangers. It became the consensus of the Cabinet that the critical situation might well be emphasized in speeches in order that the country would, if possible, be better prepared for such a development. [121]" Secretary Stimson stated: [122] "On Friday, November 7, we had the usual weekly Cabinet meeting. The Far Eastern situation was uppermost in many of our minds. Mr. Hull informed as that relations had become extremely critical and that we should be on the outlook for an attack by Japan at any time. [123]" At a meeting of the war council on November 25 Secretary Hull pointed out that the leaders of Japan were determined and desperate, and, in his opinion, the Japanese military was already poised for attack; that they might attack at ally time and at any place. He emphasized the probable element of surprise in Japanese plans, that "virtually the last stage had been reached and that the safeguarding of our national security was in the hands of the Army and Navy." [124] At the same meeting of the council the President warned that we here likely to be attacked, perhaps as soon as the following Monday, or "the Japanese are notorious for making an attack without warning." [125] On the morning of November 26, Secretary Hull advised Secretary Stimson that he had about decided not to make the proposition of the 3-month truce, the modus vivendi, that he had discussed with Secretaries Knox and Stimson on November 25-"the Chinese, for [120] Committee record, p. 1131. [121] In an address delivered on November 11, 1941, Secretary Knox warned that the Nation was confronted not only by the necessity for extreme measures or self-defense in the Atlantic but was "likewise faced with grim possibilities on the other side of the world-on the far side of the Pacific." See committee record at pp. 1131, 1132. [122] Committee record, pp. 14387, 14388. [123] In an address on November 11, Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles stated that beyond the Atlantic a sinister and pitiless conqueror had reduced more than half of Europe to abject serfdom and that in the Far East the same forces of conquest were menacing the safety of all nations bordering on the Pacific. He said at the waves of world conquest were "breaking high both in the East and in the West" and were threatening "to engulf our own shores"; that the United States was in far greater peril than in 1317 and at any "at any moment war may be forced upon us." See committee record, p. 1132. [124] Id., at p. 1144 See also statement of Mr. Stimson, committee record, p. 14390. [125] See statement of Mr. Stimson, committee record, p. 14390. 46 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK one thing, had pointed out strong objections to the proposal, particularly the effect on the morale of their own people." [126] Secretary Stimson said: [127] "Early that morning (November 27) I had called up Mr. Hull to find out what is final word had been with the Japanese-whether he had handed them the proposal for three months' truce, or whether he had told them he had no other proposition to make. He told me that he had broken the whole matter off. His words were: "*I have washed my hands of it, and it is now in the hands of you and Knox-the Army and the Navy.*" I then called up the President, who gave me a little different view. He said that it was true that the talks had been called off, but that they had ended up with a magnificent statement prepared by Hull. I found out afterwards that this was the fact and that the statement contained a reaffirmation of our constant and regular position without the suggestion of a threat of any kind." With reference to his remarks before the War Council on November 28, Secretary Hull stated: [128] " * * * I reviewed the November 26 proposal which we had made to the Japanese, and pointed out that there was practically no possibility of an agreement being achieved with Japan. *I emphasized that in my opinion the Japanese were likely to break out at any time with new acts of conquest and that the matter of safeguarding our national security was in the hands of the Army and the Navy*. With due deference I expressed my judgment that any plans for our military defense should include an assumption that the Japanese might make *the element of surprise a central point in their strategy* and also might attack at various points simultaneously with a view to demoralizing efforts of defense and of coordination." Addressing a public rally in Japan on November 30, Premier Tojo stated: [129] "The fact that Chiang-Kai-shek is dancing to the tune of Britain, America, and communism at the expense of able-bodied and promising young men in his futile resistance against Japan is only due to the desire of Britain and the United States to fish in the troubled waters of East Asia by putting [pitting?] the East Asiatic peoples against each other and to grasp the hegemony of East Asia. This is a stock in trade of Britain and the United States. "For the honor and pride of mankind we must purge this sort of practice from East Asia with a vengeance." Following a conference with military leaders concerning the Japanese Premier's address, Secretary Hull called the President at Warm Springs, Ga., urging him to advance the date set for his return to Washington. The President accordingly returned to Washington on December 1. [130] In testifying before the Navy inquiry conducted by Admiral Hart, Admiral Schuirmann stated in reply to a query as to whether the State Department's estimate of the situation vis-a-vis Japan as conveyed to the Navy Department was in accord with the statements contained "on page 138 of the book *Peace and War*": [131] "I was not present at any meeting that I recall where the Secretary expressed the element of surprise so strongly or if at all, or the probability of attack at various points. However, the particular meetings which he mentioned, I do not know if I was present. I cannot make any positive statement that he did not make such a statement. However, on Wednesday or Thursday before Pearl Harbor Secretary Hull phoned me saying in effect, "*I know you Navy fellows are always ahead of me but I want you to know that I don't seem to be able to do anything more with these Japanese and they are liable to run loose like a mad dog and bite anyone.*" I assured him that a war warning had been sent out. I reported the conversation to Admiral Stark." [126] Committee record, pp. 14391,14392. [127] Id., at pp. 14392, 14393. [128] Committee record, pp. 1160, 1161. [129] See committee record, p. 1162 [130] Id., at p. 1163. [131] Hart record, p. 412, PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 47 Referring to a meeting at the State Department on the morning of December 7, Mr. Stimson said: [132] "On December 7, 1941, Knox and I arranged a conference with Hull at ten- thirty and we talked the whole matter over. *Hull is very certain that the Japs are planning some deviltry, and we are all wondering where the blow will strike*. We three stayed together in conference until lunchtime, going over the plans for what should be said and done." Considering all of the observations made by Secretary Hull to Army and Navy Officials in the days before December 7, 1941, it is difficult to imagine how he could have more clearly and forcefully depicted the manner in which relations between the United States and Japan had passed beyond the realm of diplomacy and become a matter of cold military reality. [133] This thought was expressed by General Marshall when he testified to a distinct recollection of Mr. Hull's saying: "*These fellows mean to fight; you will have to be prepared.*" [133a] That there was the fullest exchange of information between the diplomatic and military arms of the Government is further indicated by the manner in which intercepted and decoded Japanese diplomatic messages were distributed. These messages, familiarly referred to as "Magic" and discussed in detail elsewhere in this report, contained detailed instructions and proposals from Tokyo to its Washington Embassy and the comments concerning and contents of American proposals as forwarded to Tokyo by its ambassadors. This materials not only indicated what Japan and her ambassadors were saying but literally what they were *thinking*. This material was available to the Secretaries of War and Navy, the Chief of Staff, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Directors of War Plans in both the Army and Navy, and the heads of the intelligence branches of both the services, among others. CONCLUSIONS Beginning in 1931 Japan embarked on a career of conquest no less ambitious nor avowed than that of the Nazis. Despite American protests she overran and subjugated Manchuria. In 1937, bulwarked b her Anti- Comintern Pact with Germany of the preceding year, she invaded China. In 1940 she seized upon the struggle for survival of the western powers against Hitler's war machine to conclude an ironclad alliance with Germany and Italy aimed directly at the United States. Thereupon she set about to drive the "barbarians" from the Orient and to engulf the Far East in her Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere which was to be her bastion for world conquest. As early as January of 1941 the dominating military clique prepared for war on the United States and conceived the attack on Pearl Harbor. Hailing the German invasion of Russia on June 22, 1941, as a divine wind" securing her northern flank, Japan within a period of 2O days adopted a crucial policy followed by an all-out mobilization for war Almost immediately thereafter she invaded Southern French Indochina for the purpose "when the international situation is suitable, to launch therefrom a rapid attack." She boldly declared in an intercepted dispatch of July 14, 1941: [132] Army Pearl Harbor Board record, p. 4081. See also committee record, p, 14428. [133] For a record of Mr. Hull's conferences, consultations, and telephone conversations (as entered in engagement books) with representatives of the War and Navy Departments, November 20 to December 7, 1941, and arrangements for contacts between the Departments of State, War, and navy in 1940 and 1941, see committee record, pp. 1166-1176. See also committee record, p. 1180. [132a] Committee record, p. 3079. 48 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK "After the occupation of French Indochina, next on our schedule is the sending of an ultimatum to the Netherlands Indies. In the seizing of Singapore the Navy will play the principal part." The invasion of southern Indochina resulted in the freezing of asset and virtual cessation of trade between the United States and Japan. On November 20, 1941, the Empire of Japan delivered all ultimatum to the Government of the United States. It required that the United States supply Japan as much oil as she might require; that we discontinue aid to China, withdrawing moral and material support from the recognized Chinese Government. It contained no provision pledging Japan to abandon aggression and to resort to peaceful methods. The ultimatum contained no tenable basis for an agreement, a fact well known to and contemplated by the Tojo Cabinet. During all of the negotiations, Japan qualified and restricted every intimation of her peaceful purposes. With each succeeding proposal it became abundantly apparent that she did not intend to compromise in any measure the bellicose utterances and plans of conquest of her military masters. She uniformly declared her purpose to fulfill her obligations under the Tripartite Pact-aimed directly at the United States. She refused to relinquish the preferential commercial position in the Orient which she had arrogated to herself. She demanded a victor's peace in China and would give no effective recognition to the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of other countries. Her clear purpose was to maintain a military and economic overlordship of China. The story of our negotiations with the Empire of Japan during the year 1941 epitomizes the traditional purpose of the United States to seek peace where compatible with national honor. Conversations were carried forward with the representatives of that nation in the hope of bringing to an end the frightful aggression that had brought sorrow, death, and degradation to the Orient for almost a decade. At the same time it was realistically recognized that the negotiations afforded precious time to improve our own capacity for self-defense, the appalling need for which was becoming daily more apparent as the Axis dreams of world conquest pushed relentlessly toward realization. That there were elements in Japan who desired peace is unquestioned. But for many years the Government of that nation had be divided into two schools of thought, the one conceivably disposed to think in terms of international good will with the other dominated by the militarism of the war lords who had always ultimately resolved Japanese policy. [134] It was this monstrous condition which, from the time of Japan's emergence as a power in world affairs, resulted in her military acts invariably belying her diplomatic promises. The United States therefore in looking to any final settlement had properly before it the substantial question of whether those in Japan who might wish peace possessed the capacity and power to enter a binding and effective agreement reasonably designed to stabilize conditions in the Far East. It was for this reason that our Government insisted Japan offer some tangible proof of her honest purpose to abandon a policy of aggression. No such proof or disposition to provide it was at any time forthcoming. [134] See testimony of Mr. Hull, committee record, p, 1120. PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 49 In considering the negotiations in their entirety the conclusion is inescapable that Japan had no concessions to make and that her program of aggression was immutable. When the Konoye Cabinet could not secure an agreement giving Japan an unrestrained hand in he Orient it was replaced by a Cabinet headed by General Tojo. Tojo made one gesture in the form of an ultimatum to realize Japan's ambitions without fighting for them. When he realized such a price or peace was too high even for the United States, his Government launched the infamous attack on Pearl Harbor while instructing her ambassadors in characteristic duplicity to maintain the pretense of continuing negotiations. [135] It is concluded that the diplomatic actions of the United States provided no provocation whatever for the attack by Japan on Pearl Harbor. It is further concluded that the Secretary of State fully informed both the War and Navy Departments of diplomatic developments and that he in a timely and forceful manner clearly pointed out to these Departments that relations between the United States and Japan had passed beyond the stage of diplomacy and were the hands of the military. [135] The Japanese force to strike Pearl Harbor actually left Hitokappu Bay for the attack at 7 p.m., November 25, Washington time, before the United states note in reply to the Japanese ultimatum of November 20 was delivered to Japan's ambassadors on November 26. 50 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK [Blank]

Page maintained by Larry W. Jewell, lwjewell@omni.cc.purdue.edu. Created: 12/5/96 Updated: 12/8/96