Part II. The Japanese attack and its aftermath ..................... 53
Formulation of the plan and date for execution ................... 53
Nature of the plan ............................................... 54
Departure for the attack ......................................... 56
Execution of the attack .......................................... 57
Air phase ..................................................... 57
Submarine phase ............................................... 62
Withdrawal of the striking force ................................. 63
Damage to United States naval forces and installations as a result
of the attack .................................................. 64
Damage to United States Army forces and installations as a result
of the attack .................................................. 65
Japanese losses .................................................. 65
Summary comparison of losses ..................................... 65
State of readiness to meet the attack ............................ 66
Attack a surprise .............................................. 66
Personnel ...................................................... 66
Antiaircraft ................................................... 67
Aircraft ....................................................... 68
Action taken following the attack ................................ 68
Defensive forces and facilities of the Navy at Hawaii ............ 69
Defensive forces and facilities of the Army at Hawaii ............ 70
Comparison of strength and losses: Japanese attacking force and
Hawaiian defensive forces ...................................... 70
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 51
THE JAPANESE ATTACK AND ITS AFTERMATH
52 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 53
PART II. THE JAPANESE ATTACK AND ITS AFTERMATH
FORMULATION OF THE PLAN AND DATE FOR EXECUTION 
The evidence tends to indicate that a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor
was originally conceived and proposed early in January of 1941 by
Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, commander in chief of the combined Japanese
fleet, who at that time ordered Admiral Onishi, chief of staff of the
Eleventh Air Fleet, to study the operation. Admiral Yamamoto is reported
to have told Onishi about February 1,  "If we have war with the
United States we will have no hope of winning unless the United States
Fleet in Hawaiian waters can be destroyed."  During the latter part
of August 1941, all feet commanders and other key staff members were
ordered to Tokyo by Yamamoto for war games preliminary to formulation of
final operation plans for a Pacific campaign which included a surprise
attack on Pearl Harbor. A war plans conference was held continuously at
the Naval War College, Tokyo, from September 2 to 13, and on September
13 an outline incorporating the essential points of a basic operation
order, which was later to be issued as *Combined Fleet Top Secret
Operation Order No. 1*, was completed. On November 5, 1941, this
operation order, which included detailed plans for the surprise attack
on Pearl Harbor, was promulgated to all fleet and task force commanders.
The date, November 5, is in consequence properly to be regarded as the
date on which the plan for the attack on Pearl Harbor was completed.
Under the heading "Preparations for the outbreak of war," operation
order No. 1 provided that " when the decision is made to complete over-
all preparations for operations, orders will be issued establishing the
*approximate* date (Y-day) for commencement of operations and announcing
'first preparations for war.' " The order further provided that "the
time for the outbreak of war (X-day) will be given in an Imperial
general headquarters order." The details of the plan with respect to the
Pearl Harbor attack were worked out by members of the naval general
staff operations section, combined fleet operations staff, and first air
fleet operations staff.
Admiral Yamamoto on November 7 issued combined fleet top secret
operation order No. 2 relating: "First preparations for war. Y-day will
be December 8." Consistent with the definition of Y-day as given in
operation order No. 1, December 8 (December 7, Honolulu time) was thus
established only as the approximate date for commencement of operations.
The imperial general headquarters,
 The chief sources of information concerning the attack are
translations of captured Japanese documents, interrogations of prisoners
of war, and reports submitted by general headquarters, supreme commander
for the Allied Powers, comprising questionnaires filled out since VJ-day
by former members of the Japanese naval high command. See committee
exhibits Nos. 8, 8A, 8B, 8O, and 8D.
For purposes of convenience, the term Hawaii is used throughout this
report as synonymous with the Territory of Hawaii.
 Unless otherwise stated the time indicated is Tokyo time. To obtain
the corresponding time in Washington and Honolulu, 14 hours and 19 1/2
hours, respectively, should be subtracted from Tokyo time. See committee
exhibit No. 6, item 4.
 See committee exhibit No. 8D.
54 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
however, issued an order on December 2 stating, "The hostile actions
against the United States of America shall be commenced on December 8,"
thereby announcing X-day as defined in operation order No. 1. The
tentative approximate date for the attack selected on November 7 and
defined as Y-day in consequence became the final precise date, X-day.
The Japanese imperial headquarters navy section, in discussions prior to
November 7, generally recognized December 8 as a propitious date from an
operational viewpoint and decided upon this date in conjunction with the
leaders of the combined fleet. It was noted that from the standpoint of
a dawn attack in the Hawaiian area December 10 would have been suitable
in view of the dark of the moon. But it was expected the United States
Pacific Fleet, in accordance with its custom during maneuvers, would
enter Pearl Harbor on Friday and leave on Monday. Sunday, December 8,
was therefore decided upon with the understanding that, to assure the
success of the attack and still avoid a night attack, the take-off time
of the attacking planes was to be set as near to dawn as possible; that
is, approximately 1 hour before sunrise. An imperial naval order issued
on December 1 stated: "*Japan * * * has reached a decision to declare
war ors the Untied States of America, British Empire, and the
NATURE OF THE PLAN
Three possible avenues in approaching Hawaii for the attack presented
themselves: The northern course, which was used; a central course which
headed east following the Hawaiian Islands; and a southern route passing
through the Marshall Islands and approaching from the south. Because of
the absolute requirement that the element of surprise be a factor in the
attack, the northern course was selected since it was far from the
United States patrol screen of land-based aircraft, and there was little
chance of meeting commercial vessels.
Screening destroyers were to be sent ahead of the Japanese Fleet and in
the event any vessels were encountered the main body of the force was to
make a severe change in course and endeavor to avoid detection. If the
striking force was detected prior to the day before the attack, it was
planned to have the force return to Japanese waters without executing
the attack. On the other hand, should the force be detected on the day
before the attack, the question of whether to carry home the attack or
to return was to be resolved in accordance with local conditions.  If
the attack should fail, the main force of the Japanese Navy, located in
the Inland Sea, was to be brought out to the Pacific in order to return
the striking force to home waters.
According to Japanese sources interviewed since the defeat of Japan, the
sources of information employed in planning the attack included public
broadcasts from Hawaii; reports from naval attaches in the Japanese
Embassy, Washington; public newspapers in the United States;
reconnaissance submarines in Hawaiian waters prior to the attack; and
information obtained from crews and passengers
 See committee exhibit No. 8D.
 Had the American Fleet left port it is reported that the Japanese
force would have scouted an area of about 300 miles around Oahu and was
prepared to attack. If the American Fleet could not be located the
striking force was to withdraw. See committee exhibit No. 8.
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 55
of ships which had called at Honolulu in mid-November.  It also
appears that Japan was receiving the same type of espionage information
from its Honolulu consul as from other Japanese diplomatic
The Japanese plan of operation was predicated on certain assumptions
with respect to the United States Pacific Fleet: (1) That the main body
of the fleet would be at anchor within Pearl Harbor on Sunday, December
7, Hawaii time; (2) that a carrier could be moved from Japanese home
waters across the Pacific to within striking distance of the main
islands of the Hawaiian group without undue risk of detection by
American defensive reconnaissance; (3) that should the two foregoing
assumptions be in error, a reserve group of heavy naval units could
sortie from the Inland Sea to give support to the carrier striking force
in a decisive engagement with the American Fleet (4) that a powerful
carrier air strike against the American forces based in Hawaii could, if
tactical surprise were effective, achieve the strategic result of
crippling the American Fleet, and (5) that such a strike could achieve
also the destruction of American land-based air power and thus permit
the Japanese striking force to withdraw without damage.
Incident to preparations and discussions on September 6 and 7 relating
to operation order No. 1, it was decided that no landing on the island
of Oahu should be attempted since (1) it would have been impossible to
make preparations for such a landing within less than a month after the
opening of hostilities; (2) it was recognized that the problems of speed
and supply for an accompanying convoy would have rendered it unlikely
that the initial attack could be accomplished without detection; and (3)
insuperable logistic problems rendered landings on Oahu impractical. In
formulating the final plans it was determined that a torpedo attack
against ships anchored in Pearl Harbor was the most effective method of
putting the United States Pacific Fleet in the Hawaiian area out of
action for a long period of time. Two obstacles to a torpedo attack were
considered: The fact that Pearl Harbor is narrow and shallow; and the
fact that it was probably equipped with torpedo nets. In order to
overcome the first difficulty it was decided to attach stabilizers to
the torpedoes and launch them from extremely low altitude. Since the
success of an aerial torpedo attack could not be assured because of the
likelihood of torpedo nets a bombing attack was also to be employed.
 It is reported that Japanese agents in Hawaii played no part in the
attack. See committee exhibit No. 8.
The location of the anchorages shown on the maps recovered from the
attacking force was determined on the basis of the indicated sources
beginning in the early part of 1941.
It has been reported that the intelligence section of the Japanese naval
general staff was having a most difficult time judging the habits,
strength, and security situations of the American Fleet in the Hawaiian
ea. Because of this, the intelligence section had been for years
compiling material by carefully collecting, making into statistics, and
analyzing bits of information obtained from naval officers at
Washington, newspapers and magazines published in America, American
radio broadcasts signal intelligence, passengers and crews of ships
stopping over at Honolulu, other foreign diplomatic establishments,
commercial firms, and similar sources. According to the signals of the
American ships, the number of ships and small craft of the Pacific Fleet
anchored in Pearl Harbor or out on training was deduced. By combining
the flying time (judged according to signal situations) of airplanes
shuttling between bases and aircraft carriers out on training missions,
and the location of United States Fleet units as seen by passengers and
crews of ships stopping over at Honolulu, the training areas of the
fleet were determined. The zone, time, etc., of airplanes at Hawaii were
deduced in the same way. From newspapers and magazines published in the
United States, material was obtained for deduction of America's war
preparation, progress and expansion of military installations, location
and capabilities of warships and airplanes, Army strength at Hawaii,
Panama, the Philippines, and other places.
It is reported from Japanese sources that the reports from foreign
diplomatic establishments and commercial firms in foreign countries were
regarded as not important enough from the standpoint of intelligence to
have a "special write-up, and were considered on their own merits." See
committee exhibit No. 8C.
 See committee exhibit No. 2.
56 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
The complete plan of the attack was known in advance to members of the
Navy general staff, the commander in chief and chiefs of staff, and
staff members of the combined fleet headquarters and first air fleet
headquarters. Portions of the plan were known to the Navy Minister, the
Navy Vice Minister, and other ranking naval officers. It has been
reported that the Japanese Emperor knew in advance only the general
outline of the plan and that none of the Japanese officials in the
United States, including Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu, knew anything
concerning the plan prior to the attack.
The aims of the entire Japanese campaign, including the attack on Pearl
Harbor, were based on the desire for military conquest, security, and
enhancement of the Empire by occupation of areas rich in natural
resources. With respect to the Pearl Harbor attack, operation Order No.
1 stated: "In the east the American Fleet will be destroyed and American
lines of operation, and supply lines to the Orient, will be cut. Enemy
forces will be intercepted and annihilated. Victories will be exploited
to break the enemy's will to fight." 
DEPARTURE FOR THE ATTACK
On or about November 14  units of the Pearl Harbor attacking force
were ordered to assemble in Hitokappu Bay, located in the Kurile
Islands,  this operation being completed by November 22. On November
25 the commander in chief of the combined Japanese Fleet issued the
following order: 
(a) The task force, keeping its movements strictly secret and
maintaining close guard against submarines and aircraft, shall advance
into Hawaiian waters and upon the very opening of hostilities, shall
attack the main force of the United States Fleet in Hawaii and deal it a
mortal blow. The first air raid is planned for dawn of X-day (exact date
to be given by later order).
Upon completion of the air raid the task force, keeping close
coordination and guarding against enemy counterattack, shall speedily
leave the enemy waters and then return to Japan.
(b) Should it appear certain that Japanese-American negotiations will
reach an amicable settlement prior to the commencement of hostile
action, all the forces of the combined fleet are to be ordered to
reassemble and return to their bases.
(c) The task force shall leave Hitokappu Bay on the morning of November
26 and advance to 42 N. And 170 E. (standing-by position) on the
afternoon of December 4, Japan time, and speedily complete refueling.
(The actual time of departure was 9 a. M. November 26, Japan time-1:30
p. m., November 25, Hawaii time.)
Since the American Fleet and air power based in the Hawaiian area were
the only obstacles of consequence, a major task force built around a
carrier striking group was considered essential to conducting a
successful surprise attack. Accordingly, the striking force consisted of
6 aircraft carriers, including the Akagi, the flagship of Admiral
Nagumo; 2 battleships, 2 heavy cruisers, 9 destroyers, 3 submarines, 8
train vessels, and approximately 360 planes, which
 Other factors included (1) rendering impotent the United States
Pacific Fleet in order to gain time and maintain freedom of action in
the South Seas operation, including the Philippine Islands, and (2) the
defense of Japan's mandated islands. See committee exhibit No. 8.
 Other information obtained indicates that the commander in chief of
the combined fleet issued the following order on November 7 ("The task
force, keeping its movements strictly secret will assemble in Hitokappu
Bay by November 22 for refueling." Committee exhibit No. 8.
 Also referred to as Tankan Bay (Etorfu Islands, Kuriles), and
 See committee exhibit No. 8.
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 57
participated in the attack. Other submarines had proceeded from the
Inland Sea independent of the striking force. 
At 9 a. m., November 26,  the Japanese Fleet departed under complete
radio silence from Hitokappu Bay for its destination 200 miles north of
Oahu. Held down by the low speed of the train vessels and the need for
fuel economy, the force cruised eastward at 13 knots. Lookouts were
posted, but no searches or combat air patrols were flown.  The
anticipated difficulty in refueling at sea because of weather conditions
did not materialize, since the weather proved uniformly calm. On or
about December 2 all ships were darkened, and on December 4 the
rendezvous point (42 north; 170 east) was reached and the combat ships
fueled to capacity from the tankers. The cruise had been entirely
uneventful, no planes or ships having been sighted. 
The green light to execute the attack had been sent by Admiral Yamamoto
from his flagship, the Yamato, on December 2. The message was "Niita
Kayama Nobore," translated "Climb Mount Niitaka," which was the code
phrase meaning "proceed with attack." 
EXECUTION OF THE ATTACK 
On the night of December 6-7 (Hawaii time) the "run-in" to a point 200
miles north of Oahu was made at top speed, 26 knots. Beginning at 6 a.
m. and ending at 7:15 a. M., December 7, a total of ;60 planes were
launched in three waves. The planes rendezvoused to the south and then
flew in for coordinated attacks. In addition to the attack planes, it is
reported that two type Zero reconnaissance
 The following allocation of forces for the attack was made (see
committee exhibit No. 6, item 17):
Commanding Officer: CinC 1st Air Fleet, Vice Admiral Chuichi NAGUMO
BatDiv 3 (1st Section) (HIEI, KIRISHIMA), 2 BB
CarDiv 1 (KAGA, AKAGI)
CarDiv 2 (HIRYU, SORYU)
CarDiv 5 (SHOKAKU, ZUIKAKU) 6 CV
CruDiv 8 (TONE, CHIKUMA), 2 CA
DesRon 1 (ABUKUMA, 4 DesDivs), 1 CL, 16 DD.
8 Train Vessels.
ADVANCE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
Commanding Officer: CinC 6th Fleet, Vice Admiral Mitsumi SHIMIZU.
ISUZU, YURA, 2 CL.
KATORI, 1 CL-T
I-class submarines (including SubRons 1, 2, 3) (I-1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7,
16, 17, 18, 20, 22-24, 68, 69, 74), 20 SS.
Midget submarines, 5 M-SS.
6 Train Vessels.
 The corresponding time in Washington would be 7 p m. November 25.
 A very close watch was kept on Hawaiian broadcasts by Commander
Ono, staff communication officer of the striking force. Admiral Nagumo
and his staff believed that they could sense from these broadcasts
whether or not the forces on Oahu had an inkling of the impending
attack. They felt they could judge the tenseness of the situation by
these broadcasts. Since stations KGU and KGMB were going along in their
normal manner, Admiral Nagumo felt that American forces were still
oblivious of developments. For several days prior to the attack the Jap
force had been intercepting messages from our patrol planes. They
not broken the code, but they had been able to plot in their positions
with radio bearings and knew the number of our patrol planes in the air
at all times and that they were patrolling entirely in the southwestern
sector from Oahu. Committee exhibit No. 8D.
 To disguise the move against Pearl Harbor the main Japanese force
in the Inland Sea area and the land based air units in the Kyushu area
carried on deceptive communications, and deceptive measures were taken
to indicate that the task force was still in training in the Kyushu
area. See committee exhibit No, 8.
 Committee exhibit No. 8d.
 The time hereafter indicated is Hawaiian time unless otherwise
58 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
seaplanes were launched at approximately 5 a. m., December 7, to execute
reconnaissance of Pearl Harbor and Lahaina Anchorage just before the
attack, reaching their destination about 1 hour before arrival of the
attack planes. 
The Japanese aircraft participating in the operation included 81
fighters, 135 dive bombers, 104 horizontal bombers, and 40 torpedo
bombers. Five distinct phases were noted in the execution of the attack,
as recounted from the Navy point of view: 
Phase I: Combined torpedo plane and dive bomber attacks lasting from
7:55 a. m. to 8:25 a. m.
Phase II: Lull in attacks lasting from 8:25 a. m. to 8:40 a. m.
Phase III: Horizontal bomber attacks extending from 8:40 a. m. to 9:15
Phase IV: Dive bomber attacks between 9:15 a. m. and 9:45 a. m.
Phase V. Warning of attacks and completion of raid after 9:45 a. m.
The primary objectives of the Japanese during the raid were the heavy
combatant ships and aircraft. Damage to the light forces and the
industrial plant was incidental to the destruction or disablement of the
heavy ships and aircraft based ashore. In the statement submitted for
the consideration of the committee and in his testimony, Rear Adm. R. B.
Inglis set forth a review of the various phases of the attack: 
"Phase I: 7:55-8:25 a. m.-Combined Torpedo Plane and Dive Bomber Attacks
"The beginning of the attack coincided with the hoisting of the
preparatory signal for 8 o'clock colors. At this time (namely, 7:55 a.
m.) Japanese dive bombers appeared over Ford Island, and within the next
few seconds enemy torpedo planes and dive bombers swung in from various
sectors to concentrate their attack on the heavy ships moored in Pearl
Harbor. It is estimated that nine planes engaged in the attack on the
naval air station on Ford Island and concentrated on the planes parked
in the vicinity of hangar No. 6.
"At the time of the attack Navy planes (patrol flying boats, float
planes, and scout bombers, carrier type) were lined up on the field.
These planes caught fire and exploded. Machine-gun emplacements were set
up hastily and manned, although the return fire from shore on Ford
Island was pitifully weak. Then, as suddenly as they had appeared, the
Japanese planes vanished. No further attack on this air station was made
during the day. Except for a direct hit on hangar No. 6 resulting from a
bomb which was apparently aimed at the battleship California and which
fell short, the damage to the station itself was comparatively slight.
However, 33 of the Navy's best planes out of a total of 70 planes of all
types were destroyed or damaged.
"As soon as the attack began, the commander of patrol wing 2 broadcasted
from 1. Ford Island the warning: "Air raid, Pearl Harbor. This is *not*
drill." This warning was followed a few minutes later by a similar
message from the commander in chief, United States Fleet.
"At approximately the same time that the Japanese dive bombers appeared
over Ford Island, other low-flying planes struck at the Kaneohe Naval
Air Station on the other side of the island. The attack was well
executed, with the planes coming down in shallow dives and inflicting
severe casualties on the seaplanes moored in the water. Machine guns and
rifles were brought out, and men dispersed to fire at will at the low-
flying planes. After a period of 10 to 15 minutes, the attacking planes
drew off to the north at a low altitude and disappeared from sight.
Several other contingents of bombers passed over, but none dropped bombs
on Kaneohe Bay.
"About 25 minutes after the first attack, another squadron of planes,
similar to one of the Navy's light bomber types, appeared over Kaneohe
and commenced bombing and strafing. No. 3 hanger received a direct hit
during this attack, and
 See committee exhibit No. 155
 For a description of the attack as obtained from Japanese sources
since VJ-day, see committee exhibits Nos. 8 and 8B, p. 10.
 Committee record, pp. 85-103.
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 59
our planes in the hangar were destroyed. The majority of the casualties
suffered at Kaneohe resulted from this attack. Most of the injured
personnel were in the squadrons attempting either to launch their planes
or to save those planes not as yet damaged. When the enemy withdrew,
some 10 to 15 minutes later, salvage operations were commenced, but it
was too late to save No. 1 hangar, which burned until only its steel
structural work was left. Only 9 out of the 36 planes at Kaneohe escaped
destruction in this attack; 6 of these were damaged, and 3 were in the
air on patrol south of Oahu.
"Meanwhile, the Marine air base at Ewa was undergoing similar attack.
Apparently the attack on Ewa preceded that at Pearl Harbor by about 2
minutes. It was delivered by 2 squadrons of 18 to 24 single-seater
fighter planes using machinegun strafing tactics, which came in from the
northwest at an altitude of approximately 1,000 feet. These enemy planes
would descend to within 20 to 25 feet of the ground, attacking single
planes with short bursts of gunfire. Then they would pull over the
treetops, reverse their course and attack from the opposite direction.
Within less than 15 minutes, all the Marine tactical aircraft had been
shot up or set on fire. Then the guns of the enemy fighters were turned
upon Navy utility aircraft, upon planes that had been disassembled for
repair, and upon the marines themselves.
"Effective defense measures were impossible until after the first raid
had subsided. Pilots aching to strike at the enemy in the air viewed the
wreckage which until a few minutes before had been a strong air group of
Marine fighters and bombers. Altogether 33 out of the 49 planes at Ewa
had gone up in smoke. Some marines, unable to find anything more
effective, had tried to oppose fighter lanes with pistols, since the
remaining 16 planes were too badly damaged to fly.
"Although in phase I of the attack on the ships at Pearl Harbor Japanese
dive bombers were effective, *the torpedo planes did the most damage*.
They adhered strictly to a carefully laid plan and directed their
attacks from those sectors which afforded the best avenues of approach
for torpedo attack against selected heavy hip objectives. Thus they
indicated accurate knowledge of harbor and channel depths and the berths
ordinarily occupied by the major combatant units of the fleet. At least
in the great majority of eases, the depth of water in Pearl Harbor did
not prevent the successful execution of this form of attack. Shallow
dives of the torpedoes upon launching were assured by the use of
specially constructed wooden fins, remnants of which were discovered on
enemy torpedoes salvaged after the attack.
"Four separate torpedo plane attacks were made during phase I. The major
attack was made by 12 planes, which swung in generally from the
southeast over the tank farm and the vicinity of Merry Point. After
splitting, they launched their torpedoes at very low altitudes (within
50 to 100 feet of the water), and from very short distances, aiming for
the battleships berthed on the southeast side of Ford Island. All the
outboard battleships (namely, the Nevada, Arizona, West Virginia,
Oklahoma, and California) were effectively hit by one or more torpedoes.
Strafing was simultaneously conducted from the rear cockpits. A
recovered unexploded torpedo carried an explosive charge of 1,000
"During the second of these attacks, the Oklahoma was struck by three
torpedoes on the port side and heeled rapidly to port, impeding the
efforts of her defenders to beat off the attackers.
"The third attack was made by one torpedo plane which appeared from the
west and was directed against the light cruiser Helena and the minelayer
Oglala both of which were temporarily occupying the berth previously
assigned to the battleship Pennsylvania, flagship of the Pacific Fleet.
One torpedo passed under the Oglala and exploded against the side of the
Helena. The blast stove in the side plates of the Oglala. Submersible
pumps for the Oglala were obtained from he Helena but could not be used
since no power was available because of damage to the ship's engineering
"The fourth wave of five planes came in from the northwest and attacked
the seaplane tender Tangier, the target ship Utah, and the light
cruisers Raleigh and Detroit The Raleigh was struck by one torpedo, and
the Utah received two hits in succession, capsizing at 8:13 a. m. At
first it was feared that the Raleigh would capsize. Orders were
thereupon given for all men not at the guns to jettison all topside
weights and put both airplanes in the water. Extra manila and wire lines
were also run to the quays to help keep the ship from capsizing.
"The Utah, an old battleship converted into a target ship, had recently
returned from serving as a target for practice aerial bombardment. As
soon as she received her torpedo hits, she began listing rapidly to
port. After she had listed to about 40 degrees, the order was given to
abandon ship This order was
60 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
"executed with some difficulty, as the attacking planes strafed the crew
as they went over the side. Remnants of the crew had reached Ford Island
safely Later knocking was heard within the hull of the Utah. With
cutting tools obtained from the Raleigh a volunteer crew succeeded in
cutting through the hull and rescuing a fireman, second class, who had
been entrapped in the void space underneath the dynamo room.
"An interesting sidelight on Japanese intentions and advance knowledge
is suggested by the fact that berths F-10 and F-11 in which the Utah and
Raleigh were placed, were designated carrier berths and that a carrier
was frequently moored in nearby F-9.
"The Detroit and Tangier escaped torpedo damage, one torpedo passing
just astern of the Detroit and burying itself in the mud. Another
torpedo passed between the Tangier and the Utah.
"It is estimated that the total number of torpedo planes engaged in
these 4 attacks was 21.
"In the eight dive-bomber attacks occurring during phase I, three types
of bombs were employed-light, medium, and incendiary.
"During the second of these attacks, a bomb hit exploded the forward 14-
inch powder magazine on the battleship Arizona and caused a ravaging oil
fire, which sent up a great cloud of smoke, thereby interfering with
antiaircraft fire. The battleship Tennessee in the adjacent berth was
endangered seriously by the oil fire.
"The West Virginia was hit during the third of these attacks by two
heavy bombs as well as by torpedoes. Like the California, she had to be
abandoned after a large fire broke out amidships. Her executive officer,
the senior survivor, dove overboard and swam to the Tennessee, where he
organized a party of West Virginia survivors to help extinguish the fire
in the rubbish, trash, and oil which covered the water between the
Tennessee and Ford Island.
"The total number of dive bombers engaged in this phase is estimated at
30. While a few fighters were reported among the attackers in the
various phases, they were no doubt confused with light bombers and
accordingly are not treated as a distinct type.
"Although the major attack by high-altitude horizontal bombers did not
occur until phase III, 15 planes of this type operating in 4 groups were
active during phase I.
"Most of the torpedo damage to the fleet had occurred by 8:25 a. m. All
outboard battleships had been hit by one or more torpedoes; all the
battleships had been hit by one or more bombs with the exception of the
Oklahoma, which took four torpedoes before it capsized, and the
Pennsylvania, which received a bomb hit later. By the end of the first
phase, the West Virginia was in a sinking condition; the California was
down by the stern; the Arizona was a flaming ruin; the other battleships
were all damaged to a greater or lesser degree.
"Although the initial attack of the Japanese came as a surprise,
defensive action on the part of the feet was prompt. All ships
immediately went to general quarters. Battleship ready machine guns
likewise opened fire at once, and within an estimated average time of
less than 5 minutes, practically all battleship and antiaircraft
batteries were firing. The cruisers were firing all antiaircraft
batteries within an average time of about 4 minutes. The destroyers,
although opening up with machine guns almost immediately, averaged 7
minutes in bringing all antiaircraft guns into action.
"During this phase of the battle there was no movement of ships within
the harbor proper. The destroyer Helm, which had gotten under way just
prior to the attack, was just outside the harbor entrance when, at 8:17
a. m., a submarine conning tower was sighted to the right of the
entrance channel and northward of buoy No. 1. The submarine immediately
submerged. The Helm opened fire at 8:19 a. m., when the submarine again
surfaced temporarily. No hits were observed.
"Phase II: 8:25-8:40 a. m.-Lull in Attacks
"This phase is described as a lull only by way of comparison. Air
activity continued, although somewhat abated, with sporadic attacks by
dive and horizontal bombers. During this phase an estimated total of 15
dive bombers participated in 5 attacks upon the ships in the navy yard,
the battleships Maryland, Oklahoma, Nevada, and Pennsylvania, and
various light cruisers and destroyers.
"Although three attacks by horizontal bombers occurred during the lull,
these appear to have overlapped into phase III and are considered under
"At 8:32 a. m. the battleship Oklahoma took a heavy list to starboard
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 61
"During phase II there was still relatively little ship movement within
the harbor. The ready-duty destroyer Monaghan had received orders at
7:51 a. m. (Pearl Harbor time) to "proceed immediately and contact the
Ward in defensive in sea area." At about 8:37, observing an enemy
submarine just west of Ford Island under fire from both the Curtiss and
Tangier, the Monaghan proceeded a high speed and at about 8:43 rammed
the submarine. As the enemy vessel had submerged, the shock was slight.
The Monaghan thereupon reversed engines and dropped two depth charges.
"The Curtiss had previously scored two direct hits on the conning tower.
This submarine was later salvaged for inspection and disposal. The
Monaghan then proceeded down the channel and continued her sortie. At
the same time that the Monaghan got under way, the destroyer Henley
slipped her chain from buoy X-11 and sortied, following the Monaghan
down the channel.
"Phase III: 8:40-9:15 a m.-Horizontal Bomber Attacks
"The so-called "lull" in the air raid was terminated by the appearance
over the fleet of eight groups of high-altitude horizontal bombers which
crossed and recrossed their targets from various directions, inflicting
serious damage. Some of the bombs dropped were converted 15- or 16-inch
shells of somewhat less explosive quality, marked by very little flame.
According to some observers, many bombs dropped by high-altitude
horizontal bombers either failed to explode or landed outside the harbor
"During the second attack (at 9:06 a. m.) the Pennsylvania was hit by a
heavy bomb which passed through the main deck amidships and detonated,
causing a ire, which was extinguished with some difficulty.
"The third group of planes followed very closely the line of battleship
moorings. It was probably one of these planes that hit the California
with what is believed to have been a 15-inch projectile equipped with
tail vanes which penetrated to the second deck and exploded. As a result
of the explosion, the armored hatch to the machine shop was badly sprung
and could not be closed, resulting in the spreading of a serious fire.
"Altogether, 30 horizontal bombers, including 9 planes which had
participated n earlier attacks, are estimated to have engaged in phase
III. Once more it was the heavy combatant ships, the battleships and
cruisers, which bore the brunt of these attacks.
"Although phase III was largely devoted to horizontal bombing,
approximately 8 dive bombers organized in 5 groups also participated.
"It was probably the second of these groups which did considerable
damage to the Nevada, then proceeding down the South Channel, and also
to the Shaw, Cassin, and Downes, all three of which were set afire.
"During the fifth attack, a Japanese dive bomber succeeded in dropping 1
bomb on the seaplane tender Curtiss which detonated on the main deck
level, killing 20 men, wounding 58, and leaving 1 other unaccounted for.
"During this same phase, the Curtiss took under fire one of these
bombers, which was pulling out of a dive over the naval air station. Hit
squarely by the Curtiss' gunfire, the plane crashed on the ship,
spattering burning gasoline and starting fires so menacing that one of
the guns had to be temporarily abandoned.
"Considerable ship movement took place during phase III. At 8:40 a. m.
The Nevada cleared berth F-8 without assistance and proceeded down the
South channel. As soon as the Japanese became aware that a battleship
was trying to each open water they sent dive bomber after dive bomber
down after her and registered several hits. In spite of the damage she
had sustained in the vicinity of floating dry-dock No. 2, and although
her bridge and forestructure were ablaze, the ship continued to fight
effectively. At 9:10, however, while she was attempting to, make a turn
in the channel, the Nevada ran aground in the vicinity of buoy No. 19.
"Meanwhile the repair ship Vestal, also without assistance, had gotten
under way at about 8:40, had cleared the burning Arizona, and at about
9:40 anchored well clear northeast of Ford Island.
"Soon after the Nevada and Vestal had cleared their berths, tugs began
to move the Oglala to a position astern of the Helena at 10-10 dock. The
Oglala was finally secured in her berth at about 9, but shortly
thereafter she capsized.
"At 8:42, the oiler Neosho cleared berth F-4 unaided and stood toward
Merry Point in order to reduce fire hazard to her cargo and to clear the
way for a possible sortie by the battleship Maryland.
62 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
"Phase IV: 9:15-9:45-Dive Bomber Attacks
"During phase IV an estimated 27 dive bombers conducted 9 strafing
attacks directed against ships throughout the entire harbor area. In all
probability the planes were the same ones that had conducted previous
attacks. These attacks overlapped by about 10 minutes the horizontal
bomber attacks described in phase III.
"Phase V: 9:45-Waning of Attacks and Completion of Raid
"By 9:45 all enemy planes had retired. Evading Navy aerial searches,
both shore-based and from carriers at sea, the Japanese striking force
retired to its home waters without being contacted by any American
An outline review of the Japanese attack on Army planes and
installations is as follows: 
"(Army planes at the time of the attack were lined up on the warming-up
aprons three or four abreast with approximately 10 feet between wing
tips, and approximately 135 feet from the tail of one plane to the nose
"First attack (lasting about 10 minutes): At about 7:55 a. m. nine dive
bombers attacked the Hawaiian Air Depot buildings and three additional
planes attacked the same objectives from the northwest. Several minutes
later nine additional bombers bombed Hickam Field hangar line from the
southeast. Immediately thereafter, seven more dive bombers attacked the
hangar line from the east.
"Second attack (lasting between 10 and 15 minutes): At about 8:25 a. m.
between six and nine planes attacked the No. 1 Aqua System, [21a] the
technical buildings, and the consolidated barracks. During and
immediately after this bombing attack, Army planes on the parking apron
were attacked with gunfire. About 8:26 a. m. a formation of five or six
planes bombed the baseball diamond from a high altitude, possibly
believing the gasoline storage system to be in that area.
"Third attack (lasting about 8 minutes): At 9 a. m. from six to nine
planes attacked with machine gun fire the technical buildings behind the
hangar lines and certain planes which by then were dispersed. At about
the same time from seven to nine planes bombed the consolidated
barracks, the parade ground and the post exchange.
"(Army planes were parked in the space between the aprons in front of
the hangars, generally in a series of parallel lines approximately wing
tip to wing tip, the lines varying from 15 to 20 feet apart.)
"First attack (lasting approximately 15 minutes): At 8:02 a. m. 25
planes dive-bombed the hangar lines, machine-gun fire was also employed
during the attack.
"Second attack (lasting less than 5 minutes): At 9 a. m. seven planes
machine-gunned Army planes being taxied to the airdrome.
"(The P-40's were parked in line at 10 to 15 feet intervals; the
reconnaissance planes were also parked in a line at slightly greater
"First attack: At 8:30 a single Japanese fighter machine-gunned the tent
"Second attack (lasting about 15 minutes): At about 9 a. m. nine
fighters machine-gunned the Army planes."
Haleiwa Field was not attacked and after 9:45 a. m. there were no
further attacks on Army installations. The evidence indicates that a
maximum of 105 planes participated in the attacks on the airfields, it
being noted that some of the planes included in this number may have
taken part in more than one attack.
Prior to completion of the surprise attack the advance Japanese
expeditionary force of submarines was under the command of the striking
force commander, Admiral Nagumo. The precise move-
 See testimony of Col. Bernard Thielen, Committee Record, pages 104-
 A hydrostatic pass for the fuel-pumping system. See committee
record, p. 105.
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 63
ments of the participating submarines are not known, but it is believed
that most of these units departed from Japanese home waters in late
November and proceeded to the Hawaiian area by way of Kwajalein. A few
of the submarines, delayed in leaving Japan, proceeded directly to
Hawaii. The functions assigned to the submarines in operations order No.
1 were: 
(a) Until X-day minus 3 some of the submarines were to reconnoiter
important points in the Aleutians, Fiji, and Samoa, and were to observe
and report on any strong American forces discovered.
(b) One element was assigned to patrol the route of the striking force
in advance of the movement of that force to insure an undetected
(c) Until X-day minus 5, the remaining submarines were to surround
Hawaii at extreme range while one element approached and reconnoitered
without being observed.
(d) On X-day the submarines in the area were to "observe and attack the
American Fleet in the Hawaii area; make a surprise attack on the channel
leading into Pearl Harbor and attempt to close it; if the enemy moves
out to fight, he will be pursued and attacked."
With orders not to attack until the task force strike was verified, the
force of I-class submarines took up scouting positions on the evening of
December 6 in allotted patrol sectors covering the waters in the
vicinity of Pearl Harbor. Between 50 and 100 miles off Pearl Harbor,
five midget submarines were launched from specially fitted fleet
submarines as a special attacking force to conduct an offensive against
American ships within the harbor and to prevent the escape of the
Pacific Fleet through the harbor entrance during the scheduled air raid.
Available data indicates that only one of the five midget submarines
penetrated into the harbor, discharging its torpedoes harmlessly. None
of the five midget submarines rejoined the Japanese force. 
The I-class submarines maintained their patrols in the Hawaiian area
after the attack and at least one of the group (the I-7) launched its
aircraft to conduct a reconnaissance of Pearl Harbor to ascertain he
status of the American Fleet and installations. In the event of virtual
destruction of the American Fleet at Pearl Harbor, the operation plan
provided that one submarine division or less would be placed between
Hawaii and North America to destroy sea traffic. At least one submarine
(the I-7) was dispatched to the Oregon coast on or bout December 13.
WITHDRAWAL OF THE STRIKING FORCE
Upon completion of the launchings of aircraft at 7:15 a. m., December 7,
the fleet units of the Japanese striking force withdrew at high speed to
the northwest. Plane recovery was effected between 10:30 a. m. And 1:30
p.m., whereupon the force proceeded by a circuitous route to Kure,
arriving on December 23. En route two carriers, two cruisers, and two
destroyers were detached on December 5 to serve as reinforcements for
the Wake Island operation. The
 See committee exhibit No. 8.
 All midget submarine personnel were prepared for death and none
expected to return alive. Committee exhibit No. 8.
64 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
original plans called for the retiring force to strike at Midway if
possible but this strike was not made, probably because of the
presence of a United States task force south of Midway. 
DAMAGE TO UNITED STATES NAVAL FORCES AND INSTALLATIONS AS A RESULT OF
Of the vessels at Pearl Harbor on the morning of December 7, 
the following were either sunk or damaged: 
Type Name Extent of damage
Battleships Arizona Sunk.
West Virginia Do.
Nevada Heavily damaged.
Light Cruisers Helena Heavily damaged.
Raleigh Heavily damaged.
Destroyers Shaw Do.
Cassin Heavily damaged (burned).
Repair Ship Vestal Badly damaged.
Minelayer Oglala Sunk.
Seaplane Tender Curtiss Damaged.
Auxiliaries Utah Capsized.
The Navy and Marine Corps suffered a total of 2,835 casualties, of
which 2,086 officers and men were killed or fatally wounded. Seven
hundred and forty-nine wounded survived. None were missing. [26a]
A total of 92 naval planes (including 5 scout planes from the carrier
Enterprise) were lost and an additional 31 planes damaged.  At the
Ford Island Naval Air Station one hangar was badly damaged by fire and
another suffered minor damage. A complete hangar, in which planes were
stored, was destroyed at Kaneohe Naval Air Station along with the planes
therein and the seaplane parking area was damaged. At the marine base at
Ewa a considerable amount of damage was suffered by material
installations, machinery tentage, and buildings. Damage at the base to
aircraft was extremely heavy inasmuch as the primary objective was
aircraft on the ground, the attacks being made on individual aircraft by
enemy planes using explosive and incendiary bullets from extremely low
 The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor cannot be separated from the
wide-scale operations of which it was a part. On the evening of December
7, Japanese forces struck Hong Kong, Guam, the Philippine Islands, Wake
and, on the morning of December 8, Midway.
 The vessels in Pearl Harbor included 8 battleships: 2 heavy
cruisers; 6 light cruisers; 29 destroyers; 5 submarines; 1 gunboat; 8
destroyer minelayers; 1 minelayer; 4 destroyer minesweepers; 6
minesweepers, and 24 auxiliaries. Committee exhibit No. 6.
 Units of the Pacific Fleet not in Pearl Harbor at the time of the
attack included: (1) Task Force 8 under Admiral Halsey, consisting of
one aircraft carrier, the Enterprise, three heavy cruisers, and nine
destroyers, was about 200 miles west of Oahu en route to Pearl Harbor
after having ferried Marine Corps fighter planes to Wake Island. (2)
Task Force 12 under Admiral Newton, consisting of one aircraft carrier,
the Lexington, three heavy cruisers, and five destroyers, was about 460
miles southeast of Midway en route to Midway from Pearl Harbor with a
squadron of Marine Corps scout bombers. (3) Task Force 3 under Admiral
Wilson Brown, consisting of one heavy cruiser and five destroyer
minesweepers, had just arrived off Johnston Island to conduct tests of a
new type landing craft. (4) Other units of the fleet were on isolated
missions of one type or another. See testimony of Admiral Inglis,
committee record, pp. 52-55.
 See committee exhibit No. 6.
[26a] See testimony of Admiral Inglis, committee record, p. 131.
 See testimony of Admiral Inglis, committee record, pp. 128, 135,
 See committee exhibit No. 6.
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 65
DAMAGE TO UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES AND INSTALLATIONS AS A RESULT OF THE
The Army suffered a total of 600 casualties, including 194 killed in
action and 360 wounded. 
A total of 96 Army planes were lost as a result of enemy action this
figure including aircraft destroyed in depots and those damaged planes
which were subsequently stripped for parts. 
In addition, extensive damage was inflicted on Army installations as
reflected by photographic evidence submitted to the committee. 
It has been estimated by our own sources, that the Japanese lost a total
of 28 planes, most of them being dive-bombers and torpedo planes, as a
result of Navy action. Three Japanese submarines of 45 tons each,
carrying two torpedoes, were accounted for; two were destroyed by Navy
action and one was grounded off Bellows Field and recovered. From
reports available it is estimated that the Japanese lost, due solely to
Navy action, a minimum of 68 killed. One officer, an ensign, was taken
prisoner when he abandoned the submarine which grounded off Bellows
General Short reported that 11 enemy aircraft were shot down by Army
pursuit planes and antiaircraft fire. 
Information developed through Japanese sources indicates, however that a
total of only 29 aircraft were lost and all of the 5 midget submarines.
SUMMARY COMPARISON OF LOSSES
As a result of the December 7 attack on Hawaii, military and naval
forces of the United States suffered 3,435 casualties; Japan, less than
100. We lost outright 188 planes; Japan, 29. We suffered severe damage
to or loss of 8 battleships, 3 light cruisers, 3 destroyers, and 4
miscellaneous vessels; Japan lost 5 midget submarines. The astoundingly
disproportionate extent of losses marks the greatest military and naval
disaster in our Nation's history.  The only compensating feature was
the many acts of personal valor during the attack.
 In addition 22 were missing in action, 2 died (nonbattle), 1 was
declared dead (Public Law 490), and 21 died of wounds. Committee exhibit
 See testimony of Colonel Thielen, committee record, p. 130. In a
statement by General Short concerning events and conditions leading up
to the Japanese attack, a total of 128 Army planes are indicated as
having been damaged in the raid. See Roberts (Army) exhibit No. 7.
 See committee record, p. 130; exhibits Nos. 5 and 6.
 See testimony of Admiral Inglis, committee record, p. 128.
 See testimony of Colonel Thielen, committee record, p. 139
 Committee exhibit No. 8B.
 The Japanese estimate of losses inflicted was: 4 battleships, 1
cruiser, and 2 tankers sunk, 4 battleships heavily damaged; 1 battleship
lightly damaged; and 260 planes destroyed. Committee exhibit No. 8.
 In the accounts of some 90 ships under attack, commanding officers
have recorded hundreds of acts of heroism in keeping with the highest
traditions of the naval service. No instance is recorded in which the
behavior of crews or individuals left anything to be desired. References
to individual valor are replete with such acts as:
(1) Medical officers and hospital corpsmen rendering aid and treatment
while they themselves needed help.
(2) Officers and men recovering dead and wounded through flame and from
(3) Fighting fires while in actual physical contact with the flames.
(4) Handling and passing ammunition under heavy fire and strafing.
(5) Repairing ordnance and other equipment under fire.
(6) Remaining at guns and battle stations though wounded or while ships
(7) Reporting for further duty to other ships after being blown off
their own sinking vessels.
For deeds of extreme heroism on December 7, 15 Medals of Honor have been
awarded and 60 Navy Crosses. (Testimony of Admiral Inglis, committee
record, pp. 131, 132.)
On the Army side, too, acts of heroism were numerous. Five Distinguished
Service Crosses and 66 Silver Stars were awarded to Army personnel for
heroism displayed during the December 7 attack. ( Testimony of Colonel
Thielen, committee record. p. 133.)
66 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
STATE OF READINESS TO MEET THE ATTACK
ATTACK A SURPRISE
The Japanese attack came as an utter surprise to the Army and Navy
commanders in Hawaii. The Army was on an alert against sabotage only
with the planes, which were on 4 hours' notice, lined up side by side as
perfect targets for an attack. The state of readiness aboard naval
vessels was the usual state of readiness for vessels in port. Fifty
percent of the Navy planes were on 4 hours' notice. Although the
Hawaiian forces were completely surprised, two significant events
occurred on the morning of December 7 which indicated a possible attack.
The first indication came at 3:50 a. m. when the United States coastal
minesweeper Condor reported sighting the periscope of a submerged
submarine while approximately 1 3/4 miles southwest of the Pearl Harbor
entrance buoys, an area in which American submarines were prohibited
from operating submerged.  The Navy destroyer Ward was informed and,
after instituting a search, sighted the periscope of an unidentified
submarine apparently trailing a target repair ship en route to Honolulu
harbor. This submarine was sunk shortly after 6:45 a. m. No action was
taken apart from dispatching the ready-duty destroyer U. S. S Monaghan
to proceed to sea, to close the net gate to Pearl Harbor, and to attempt
to verify the submarine contact report. The presence of the submarine
was not interpreted as indicating the possibility of an attack on Pearl
The second indication of an attack came at approximately 7:02 a. m.,
December 7, when an Army mobile radar unit detected a large number of
planes approaching Oahu at a distance of 132 miles from 3 east of
north.  These planes were the Japanese attacking force. The aircraft
warning information center, which closed down at 7 a. m. on the morning
of December 7, was advised of the approaching planes at 7:20 a. m. An
Army lieutenant, whose tour of duty at the information center was for
training and observation and continued until 8 a. m., took the call and
instructed the radar operators in effect to "forget it." His estimate of
the situation appears to have been occasioned by reason of a feeling
that the detected flight was either a naval patrol, a flight of Hickam
Field bombers, or possibly some B-17's from the mainland that were
scheduled to arrive at Hawaii on December 7.
A summarized statement of Navy personnel actually on board ship at the
beginning of the attack is as follows: 
Commanding officers of battleships .................. 5 out of 8.
Commanding officers of cruisers ..................... 6 out of 7.
Commanding officers of destroyers ................... 63 percent.
Damage control officers of battleships .............. 6 out of 8.
 See committee exhibit No. 112 p. 96.
 See discussion, infra, of the submarine contact on the morning of
 See committee exhibit No. 155.
 See testimony of Admiral Inglis, committee record, p. 103.
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 67
Average percentage of officers:
Battleships (approximate) .......................... 60 to 70 percent.
Cruisers, battle force (approximate) ............... 65 percent.
Destroyers, battle force (approximate) ............. 50 percent.
Average percentage of men:
Battleships ........................................ 95 percent.
Cruisers, battle force ............................. 98 percent.
Destroyers, battle force ........................... 85 percent.
There were ample personnel present and ready to man all naval shore
In the case of the Army, a summary report compiled by the Adjutant
General of the Hawaiian Department indicates that at least 85 percent of
the officers and men were present with their units at 8 a. m., December
All naval antiaircraft batteries, consisting of 780 guns, were ship-
based; that is, located on the ships in Pearl Harbor. At the time of the
attack, roughly one-fourth of all antiaircraft guns were manned, and
within 7 to 10 minutes, all antiaircraft batteries were manned and
firing. It appears that all naval batteries were in operating condition;
the number of temporary gun stoppages during action was so low as to be
negligible. All ships had the full service allowance of ammunition on
board, except in a few instances where removal was necessary because of
repairs in progress, and ammunition was ready at the guns in accordance
with existing directives. Ready antiaircraft machine guns opened fire
immediately and within an average estimated time of under 5 minutes
practically all battleship antiaircraft batteries were firing; cruisers
were firing all antiaircraft batteries within an average time of 4
minutes; and destroyers, though opening up with machine guns almost
immediately, averaged 7 minutes in bringing all antiaircraft guns into
action. Minor combatant types had all joined in the fire within 10
minutes after the beginning of the attack. 
In the case of the Army, the following table reflects the places and
times at which antiaircraft units were in position: 
In position and ready
Regiment Battery to fire
Sixty-fourth A (searchlight) at Honolulu 10:00 a.m.
(alerted at 8:15 a.m.) B (3-inch) at Aiea 10:00 a.m.
C (3-inch) at Aliamanu 10:30 a.m.
D (3-inch) south of Aliamanu 11:00 a.m.
E (searchlight) at Ewa- (Time not
Pearl Harbor known)
F (3-inch) at Pearl City 11:05 a.m.
G (3-inch) at Ahua Point 10:30 a.m.
H (3-inch) at Fort Weaver 10:00 a.m.
I (37-mm) at Aliamanu (Known only
K (37-mm) at Hickam Field that batteries
L (37-mm) at Hickam Field were in posi-
M (37-mm) at Wheeler Field 11:55 a.m.
Ninety-seventh A (searchlight) at Fort
Kamehameha 8:34 a.m.
(alerted between 7:55 F (3-inch) at Fort Kamehameha 8:55 a.m.
and 8:10 a.m.). G (3-inch) at Fort Weaver 8:30 a.m.
H (3-inch) at Fort Barrett 10:20 a.m.
Ninety-eighth. A (searchlight) at Schofield (Time not
B (3-inch) at Schofield Barracks 9:55 a.m.
C (3-inch) at Schofield Barracks 10:30 a.m.
D (3-inch) at Puuloa Dump,
south of Ewa 11:45 a.m.
F (3-inch) at Kaneohe Naval Air
Station 1:15 p.m.
G (3-inch) at Kaneohe Naval Air
Station 1:15 p.m.
H (3-inch) at Waipahu High
School 1:30 p.m.
 See testimony of Colonel Thielen, committee record, p. 114.
 See testimony of Admiral Inglis, committee record, pp. 123, 124.
 See committee exhibit No. 5.
68 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
In position and ready
Regiment Battery to fire
Two Hundred and A (searchlight) at Ewa (Time not
B (3-inch) at West Loch 11:45 a.m.
C (3-inch) at Ewa Beach 11:45 a.m.
D (3-inch) at South of Ewa 11:45 a.m.
E (50-caliber) at Navy Yard
Pearl Harbor 12:41 p.m.
F (37-mm) at Navy Recreation
area 12:30 p.m.
G (37-mm) at tank farm,
Schofield Barracks 11:00 a.m.
H (37-mm) at Navy Yard 12:05 p.m.
One antiaircraft detachment was located at Sand Island when the attack
started and engaged the enemy with 3-inch guns at 8:15 a. m., shooting
down two enemy planes at that time.
The foregoing table reflects that of 31 army antiaircraft batteries,
27 were not in position and ready to fire until after the attack and in
several instances not for a considerable period of time after the
The extraordinary lack of readiness of Army antiaircraft units appears
to have been occasioned largely by the time required for moving into
position and the fact that ammunition was not readily accessible to the
mobile batteries. 
Seven Navy patrol flying boats were in the air at the time of the
attack. Three of these planes were engaged in a routine search of the
fleet operating area approximately 120 miles south of Oahu and the
remaining four were engaged in inter-type tactical exercises with United
States submarines near Lahaina Roads. Eight Scout bombers that had been
launched from the carrier Enterprise, which was 200 miles west of Pearl
Harbor at the time of the attack, for the purpose of searching ahead of
the ship and then landing at Ewa, arrived during the attack and engaged
Japanese aircraft. Three of these planes landed after the attack while
the remaining five were lost.  The majority of the Navy planes were
on 4 hours' notice. 
In the case of the Army, planes were generally on 4 hours' notice.
Between 25 and 35 planes, these being fighters, took off after the
attack began and before it was concluded. 
ACTION TAKEN FOLLOWING THE ATTACK
An effort was made in the course of and after the attack, through
planes already in the air and those that could get into the air during
 Colonel Thielen stated "* * * only a limited amount of ammunition
was in the hands of troops of the Hawaiian Department. The Coast
Artillery Command had previously been authorized to draw, and had drawn,
ammunition for its fixed positions only, including antiaircraft.
However, at these installations, the shells were kept in boxes in order
to keep the ammunition from damage and deterioration. The ammunition for
the mobile guns and batteries was in storage chiefly at Aliamanu Crater
and Schofield Barracks. The Infantry and Artillery units of the Twenty-
fourth and Twenty-fifth Divisions had only a small amount of machine gun
and rifle ammunition. All divisional artillery ammunition, grenades, and
mortar shells were in the ordnance storage depots principally at
Schofield Barracks." Committee record, pp. 119, 120.
The situation with respect to artillery ammunition was testified to by
General Burgin as follows: "They were all ready to go into action
immediately, with the exception that the mobile batteries did not have
the ammunition. The fixed batteries along the seacoast, those batteries
bolted down to concrete, had the ammunition nearby. I had insisted on
that with General Short in person and had gotten his permission to take
this antiaircraft ammunition, move it into the seacoast gun battery
positions, and have it nearby the antiaircraft guns. It was, however,
boxed up in wooden boxes and had to be taken out. The ammunition for the
mobile guns and batteries was in Aliamanu Crater, which, you may know or
may not, is about a mile from Fort Shafter, up in the old volcano. The
mobile batteries had to send there to get ammunition. In addition to
that, the mobile batteries had to move out from the various posts to
their field position. They were not in field positions." Roberts
Commission Record, pp. 2604-2605.
 See committee record, pp. 71, 72.
 Admiral Bellinger stated that of 69 patrol planes at Oahu, 2 were
on 15-minute notice, 8 on 30 minute notice, 9 were undergoing repairs,
and 42 were on 4 hours' notice. Committee record, p. 9303.
 See committee exhibit No. 5.
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 69
and following the attack, to locate the Japanese carrier force but to no
avail. The attacking planes withdrew and were recovered by the fleet
units without the latter being detected.
While it appears some planes under Navy direction were assigned to
search the sector to the north of Oahu, generally regarded as the
dangerous sector from the standpoint of an air attack, they were
diverted to the southwest by reason of a false report that the Japanese
carriers were in that direction. 
The deplorable feature of the action following the attack was the
failure of the Navy and Army to coordinate their efforts through
intelligence at hand. The same Army radar unit that had tracked the
Japanese force in, plotted it back out to the north.  Yet this vital
information, which would have made possible an effective search, was
employed by neither service. 
DEFENSIVE FORCES AND FACILITIES OF THE NAVY AT HAWAII
The principal vessels in Pearl Harbor at the time of the attack were 8
battleships, 8 cruisers, and 29 destroyers. Inasmuch as there were no
naval antiaircraft shore batteries in or around Pearl Harbor at the time
of the Japanese attack, these warships provided the chief antiaircraft
defense. The ship-based antiaircraft batteries totaled 780 guns, 427 of
which had an effective range of from 500 to 2,500 yards and the
remainder from 5,000 to 12,000 yards. 
The Navy is indicated to have had a total of 169 planes at Hawaii prior
to the attack, 71 of which were patrol bombers and 15 fighter planes.
 It is to be noted, however, that Admiral Bellinger in a report to
Admiral Kimmel on December 19, 1941, concerning the viability and
disposition of patrol planes on the morning of December 7 indicated 69
patrol planes as being at Hawaii. His tabulation was as follows: 
In commis- Top available Under repair Ready at In air
sion for flight base
At Kaneohe 36 33 3 30 3
At Pearl 33 28 5 24 4
At Midway 12 11 1 4 7
-- -- -- -- --
Total 81 72 9 58 14
It thus appears that a total of 61 patrol planes were available for
flight as of December 7. Fifty-four of the patrol planes were new PBY-
5's that had been recently ferried to Hawaii between October 28 and
November 23, 1941. Admiral Bellinger indicated that the new
 Admiral Smith, Chief of Staff to Admiral Kimmel, said he did not
get the information as to the probable location from which the Japanese
carriers launched the attack for some 2 days. There was a great deal of
confusion including false civilian reports of troop parachute landings
and a false report from one of own planes concerning an enemy carrier to
the south. A chart showing the position of the Japanese carriers was
taken from a Japanese plane by the Army on December 7 but was not shown
the Navy until the afternoon. See Navy Court of Inquiry record, p. 564.
With further respect to the confusion that prevailed, Captain Rochefort
stated that when the attack began his communications unit at Pearl
Harbor lost all contact with the "direction finder" stations, located at
Lualualei and Aiea, and that in consequence no bearings on the attacking
Japanese force were received by his unit. He commented that the failure
of communications was the result of an accident, caused by Army
personnel setting up new circuits. See Hewitt inquiry record, pp. 63,
 See committee exhibit No. 155 for original radar plot of Opana
station, December 7, 1941.
 Admiral Kitts said that on December 8 while in conference with
General Davidson he was shown a plot showing planes coming in to Oahu
and going out again. This plot was not reported to the Navy until Kitts
saw it on December 8. See Hewitt inquiry record, p. 520.
 See testimony of Admiral Inglis, committee record, p. 122.
 See committee exhibit No. 6.
 See committee exhibit No. 120
70 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
PBY-5's were experiencing the usual shake-down difficulties and were
hampered in maintenance by an absence of spare parts. He pointed out
that 12 of the patrol planes indicated as available for fight had
returned from Midway on December 5 after an arduous tour of duty at
Midway and Wake since October 17, and were in relatively poor material
condition because of the extended operations. 
While radar equipment was available on three of the battleships and on
one seaplane tender, it was not being manned inasmuch as the height of
the land surrounding Pearl Harbor rendered ships' radar ineffective.
DEFENSIVE FORCES AND FACILITIES OF THE ARMY IN HAWAII
As of December 6, 1941, General Short had a total of 42,959 officers and
men under his command. The principal elements of the Hawaiian Department
were 2 infantry divisions and supporting ground troops composing the
beach and land defense forces; the Coast Artillery Command, consisting
of the seacoast and antiaircraft defense forces; and the Hawaiian Air
The Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command had a total of 213 antiaircraft
guns.  Eighty-six were 3-inch antiaircraft guns (70 percent mobile);
20, 37-millimeter; and 107 caliber .50.
The Army on December 7, prior to the attack, had a total of 227 planes
 located principally at Hickam, Wheeler, and Bellows Fields. They
consisted of 12 heavy bombers; 36 medium bombers (obsolescent); 14 light
bombers (2 obsolescent); 152 pursuit planes (53 obsolescent); and 13
observation planes.  Eighty-seven of these planes for one reason or
another were not available for flight, including 6 of the heavy bombers
and 58 of the pursuit planes. Ninety-four pursuit planes (including 30
of the obsolescent craft) were available for flight.
In addition, the Army had six mobile radar units which were available
and in operating condition. 
COMPARISON OF STRENGTH AND LOSSES: JAPANESE ATTACKING FORCE AND HAWAIIAN
The Japanese attacking force brought to bear 360 planes incident to the
attack; whereas the Army and Navy together had a total of 402 planes of
all types, not taking into account those not available of flight on the
morning of December 7. The operating strength of the opposing forces by
 The only ships in Pearl Harbor equipped with ship search radar on
December 7 were the battleships Pennsylvania, California, and West
Virginia and the seaplane tender Curtiss. The radar equipment these
ships was not manned since the height of the land around Pearl Harbor
would have made it ineffective. The equipment of the Curtiss was put
into operation at the beginning of the first attack and that on the
Pennsylvania began to operate 15 minutes later, both with negative
results. There were no naval radar stations on shore in Hawaii. See
testimony of Admiral Inglis, committee record, p. 82.
 See testimony of Colonel Thielen, committee record, p. 64; also
committee exhibit No. 5.
 The principal weapons of the Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command
included: 4 16-inch guns, 2 14-in guns (obsolescent), 4 12-inch guns (2
obsolescent), 4 3-inch seacoast guns, 36 155-millimeter guns, 86 3-inch
antiaircraft guns (70 percent mobile), 20 37-millimeter antiaircraft
guns, and 107 caliber .50 antiaircraft guns. Committee exhibit No. 5.
 The statement of General Short of events and conditions leading up
to the Japanese attack, Roberts (Army) exhibit No. 7, reflected the
status of planes as follows: Pursuit planes in commission, 80; pursuit
planes out of commission, 69; reconnaissance planes in commission, 6;
reconnaissance planes out of commission, 7; bombers in commission, 39;
bombers out of commission, 33.
 See committee exhibit No. 5.
 Three additional radar units calling for permanent installation
were not as yet in operating condition.
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 71
Japanese attacking force
Fighters ................................................... 81 
Dive bombers ............................................... 135
Horizontal bombers ......................................... 104
Torpedo planes ............................................. 40
Available for Not available
flight for flight
Fighters .......................... (30 obsolescent) 108 59
Army bombers ...................... (21 obsolescent) 35 27
Navy patrol bombers ................................ 61 8
Navy scout bombers ................................. 36 1
Army observation planes ............................ 11 2
Miscellaneous Navy planes .......................... 45 1
(Planes from carrier Enterprise which
joined the defense) 8
Army-Navy antiaircraft ............................. 993 guns
A comparison of losses or severe damage in summary form is as follows:
Japanese attacking force Defending force 
Personnel (less than) ............... 100 ............... 3,435
Planes ............................. 29 ............... 188
Ships ............................... 0 ............... 18*
Submarines (midget) ................. 5 ............... 0
Facilities. (Extensive damage to Army and Navy installations on Oahu.)
*8 battleships, 3 light cruisers, 3 destroyers, and 4 miscellaneous
The extreme disproportion of Army and Navy losses to equipment and
facilities at hand is traceable to the complete surprise of the
commanders in Hawaii when the Japanese struck on the morning of December
7. The Japanese employed, it is true, a powerful attacking force, much
more powerful than they had been thought capable of utilizing in a
single tactical venture. They executed the attack with a skill, daring,
and military know-how of which we thought them incapable. However, as
reflected by the comparison of relative strength, the Hawaiian
commanders had formidable defensive forces which, if properly
coordinated and brought into play should have been capable of inflicting
severe damage on the Japanese raiders and repelling the attack to a
degree. How great the losses that might have been inflicted on the
attacking force and the extent to which the attack might have been
repulsed will forever remain a matter of conjecture. The real power of
the defenses of Hawaii was not brought into the fight. [62a]
There can be no question that some damage would have been inflicted
irrespective of the state of alertness that might have prevailed; for as
a military proposition it is agreed that some attacking planes will
invariably get through the screen of defense and carry home the attack.
This is largely true no matter how fully equipped and how alert a
garrison may be.  But this fact does not draw forth the con-
 It is reported that of the Japanese fighter planes, 39 were kept
around the carriers as interceptors in case the American planes get in
the air and made an attack. Committee Exhibit No. 8D. (Enclosure 1, p.
 It is interesting to note that Admiral Bloch testified that had the
Japanese attacked the oil supply at Oahu, the dry-docks, repair shops,
barracks and other facilities instead of the airfields and ships of the
fleet, the United States would have been hurt more so far as the
prosecution of the war was concerned even though we did have a terrific
loss of life. He pointed out that *the oil storage was in tanks above
the ground or visible from the air*. See Hart Inquiry Record, p. 94.
[62a] It is interesting to note that the Japanese had estimated the air
strength in Hawaii at roughly twice the actual strength and had expected
to lose one-third of the striking force, including two of the aircraft
carriers. See discussion "The Role of Espionage in the Attack", Part
 It appears agreed as a military proposition that carrier-borne
planes must be caught before they are launched in order to repel
successfully a carrier attack. See, for example, testimony of Admiral
Bellinger, Navy Court of Inquiry Record, p. 686; also Admiral Stark,
Id., pp. 1023, 1024.
As stated by the Navy Court of Inquiry: "An attack by carrier aircraft
can be prevented only by intercepting and destroying the carrier prior
to the launching of planes. Once launched, attacking planes can be
prevented from inflicting damage only by other planes or antiaircraft
gunfire or both. Even when a determined air attack is intercepted,
engaged by aircraft, and opposed by gunfire some of the attacking planes
rarely fail to get through and inflict damage." See Navy Court of
Inquiry Report, committee exhibits Nos. 157 and 181.
72 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
clusion that the attacker cannot and must not be made to pay and pay
The disaster of Pearl Harbor lies in the failure of the Army and Navy to
make their fight with the equipment at hand-it was not that they had no
equipment, for they did, but that they did not utilize what they had.
This failure is attributable to the complete surprise with which the
attack came. It is proper, therefore, to inquire at this point to
determine whether the Hawaiian commanders should thus have been
surprised and, more particularly, whether they were justified in
employing their defensive facilities in a manner least calculated to
meet the Japanese on the morning of December 7.
(The responsibilities relating to the disaster affecting both Hawaii and
Washington will be found treated in Parts III and IV, respectively,
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 73
RESPONSIBILITIES IN HAWAII
74 PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
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